In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Richard H. Pildes, one of America’s leading constitutional scholars, warns that democracy’s survival depends not only on equality and participation but also on its capacity to deliver effective governance. “Democracy,” he says, “rests on two simple promises: equal voice and better lives. When governments fail in that second task, it profoundly undermines democracy itself.” Professor Pildes argues that excessive focus on participation, coupled with digital fragmentation and weakened political parties, have eroded governments’ ability to act decisively. The rise of “free-agent politicians,” algorithmic outrage, and social media-driven polarization, he cautions, threaten to make democracy less capable of solving problems. “Effective government,” Professor Pildes insists, “is the forgotten pillar of democracy.”
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Richard H. Pildes, the Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law at New York University School of Law and one of the foremost scholars of constitutional and democratic theory, reflects on one of the most neglected yet urgent dimensions of democratic life: the capacity to govern effectively.
Professor Pildes argues that modern democracies have grown dangerously unbalanced by emphasizing participation and representation—the “inputs” of democracy—while neglecting its “outputs,” namely the ability of governments to deliver results that improve citizens’ lives. As he puts it, “I often think of democracy, and what justifies it, as resting on two simple promises. First, democracy promises to treat citizens as equals—with equal standing, equal voice, and equal moral worth. Second, it promises to make their lives better.” When democratic governments fail at that second task, he warns, “it profoundly undermines the justification and purpose of democracy itself.”
Throughout the interview, Professor Pildes develops this theme of effective government as democracy’s forgotten pillar, linking it to rising polarization, social media dynamics, and the fragmentation of political authority. “Neglecting the value of effective government,” he observes, “is one of the greatest challenges of our time. Perhaps the fundamental challenge for contemporary democracies is to demonstrate that they can once again deliver for their citizens.”
Professor Pildes identifies digital fragmentation as one of the defining forces reshaping democratic governance. The communications revolution, he explains, has made it “incredibly easy to mobilize opposition to whatever government is doing,” eroding the stability of political institutions and making compromise more elusive. Social media and algorithmic amplification have “flattened political authority,” giving rise to spontaneous, leaderless movements but also fueling paralysis in democratic decision-making.
He also traces how the decline of strong political parties has weakened democracy’s capacity to build coalitions and sustain coherent governance. Whereas parties once mediated between citizens and the state, today’s hyper-pluralist media ecosystems and privatized campaign finance systems have encouraged the rise of “free-agent politicians”—performative figures who bypass party structures to cultivate online followings and raise funds directly from polarized small donors.
Looking ahead, Professor Pildes cautions that the structural fragmentation produced by digital media cannot be easily reversed: “The genie is out; you can’t really go back.” Yet, he insists that democracies must learn to manage these forces more effectively if they are to regain public trust and legitimacy. “Democracy,” he concludes, “must prove that it can still deliver—by governing effectively, addressing citizens’ needs, and meeting the great challenges of our time.”
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Richard H. Pildes, revised for clarity and flow.
Democracy Must Deliver
Photo: Iryna Kushnarova.
Professor Richard H. Pildes, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your recent work, you highlight the “neglected value of effective government” as central to democratic stability. How do disinformation and fragmented information ecosystems undermine the capacity of democratic institutions to deliver effective governance, and how should legal theory integrate these challenges?
Professor Richard H. Pildes: First of all, thank you very much for having me. Let me begin with the first part of your question, which concerns my writings on what I call the neglected value of effective government. The challenge many democracies across the West have been facing over the last 10 to 15 years is that a large portion of their citizens have become increasingly dissatisfied with what government is producing—with its ability to deliver on the major economic and cultural issues that people care most about.
When democratic systems fail to deliver over sustained periods of time on the issues their citizens value most, that creates a very dangerous situation. It breeds anger, alienation, frustration, and withdrawal. Worse still, it can lead people to yearn for strongman figures who promise to cut through paralysis and dysfunction and to deliver what democratic institutions appear incapable of achieving.
In my view, much of legal and political theory focuses on issues like political equality, deliberation, or participation, but pays too little attention to the outputs of democracy—to whether democracy is actually delivering for people. Neglecting the value of effective government is, in fact, one of the greatest challenges of our time. Perhaps the fundamental challenge for contemporary democracies is to demonstrate that they can once again deliver for their citizens.
I often think of democracy, and what justifies it, as resting on two simple promises. First, democracy promises to treat citizens as equals—with equal standing, equal voice, and equal moral worth. Second, it promises to make their lives better. When democratic governments are perceived by many of their citizens as failing in that second task, it profoundly undermines the justification and purpose of democracy itself.
That’s why I believe those of us who work on democratic and legal theory must focus more on how governments can become effective again—just as they were for many decades after World War II—at delivering meaningful results on the issues that matter most to their citizens.
Democracy’s Dilemma: Openness vs. Effectiveness
Your scholarship has long examined how democratic values can come into tension—such as openness versus effectiveness. In the digital era, how do these tensions manifest between free expression online and the state’s ability to govern effectively in an environment saturated with disinformation?
Professor Richard H. Pildes: As an initial matter, one of the points I try to make in emphasizing the importance of effective government as a democratic value is that it helps us recognize the trade-offs between various things we want democracy to achieve—between competing democratic values. For example, some of the reforms introduced over the past 20 or 30 years around political accountability or transparency are, of course, important democratic values. So are participation and voice for citizens. All of these are valuable goals.
But if we push too far along those dimensions, we can make it much harder for democratic governments to deliver. To make this concrete, consider the clean energy transition. There are many things governments need to do to enable a shift to cleaner forms of energy production. In the United States, for instance, we must build many more transmission lines to carry electricity from where there’s abundant sun or wind across multiple states. Yet, that’s extremely difficult because so many local communities and local governments have the ability to veto the passage of power lines through their territory.
What I mean to emphasize by highlighting the value of effective government is that democracy inevitably involves trade-offs. Not all democratic values can always be realized simultaneously. Sometimes, we must balance them, and we’ve given too little weight over the last few decades to the importance of effectiveness in government.
Turning to the second part of your question—how social media has made effective governance more difficult—one of the most striking developments of the last 10 or 15 years, particularly visible in Europe, is the increasing fragmentation of political systems. In many European countries, the traditionally dominant center-right and center-left parties have collapsed. They’ve lost voters in dramatic numbers to new parties—especially those of the far right—which have proliferated across the continent.
This reflects public dissatisfaction with democratic governments, a search for alternatives, and a growing willingness to consider more extreme options. But it also makes it much harder for parliamentary systems to deliver on core issues. Take France, for example. France has become almost ungovernable because its political system is so fragmented. With such a wide range of parties and interests represented in the National Assembly, it’s extremely difficult to form stable majorities to act on major issues.
So one of the perverse dynamics democracies face today is that ongoing dissatisfaction leads people to seek new, often more extreme, alternatives. That breaks down major parties and fragments parliaments, which, ironically, makes it even harder for governments to deliver what citizens demand.
Social media amplifies all of this. The communications and technology revolution—apart from issues like disinformation or hate speech—has made it incredibly easy to generate and sustain opposition to whatever the government is doing. Sometimes that opposition is legitimate; sometimes it’s not. But we now live in a world where groups can be mobilized instantly, new parties can be organized rapidly, and even individuals can wield enormous influence.
Some of that is positive—it encourages engagement and participation—but in a political environment where power can be constantly undermined and opposition endlessly mobilized, it becomes increasingly difficult for democratic governments to deliver on the economic and cultural issues people care most about.
Democracy’s Input-Output Imbalance
You have argued that modern democracies often focus excessively on input legitimacy (participation, representation) at the expense of output legitimacy (governing effectively). To what extent has the rise of social media deepened this imbalance by privileging participatory noise over institutional capacity?
Professor Richard H. Pildes: That’s a very good question. This goes back to our earlier discussion about how democratic theory and political theory tend to focus heavily on values associated with the process of democracy—what we might call its inputs—such as political equality, participation, and representation.
What often receives far less attention is whether democratic governments are actually able to deliver on the issues people care most intensely about, or that large segments of society care most deeply about. As I’ve said before, this imbalance poses a real risk for democracies, and we’re experiencing that risk now. When democratic systems are repeatedly perceived by citizens as unable to address the major challenges of the era—whether economic or cultural—that perception corrodes confidence in the system itself.
Social media, in many ways, has intensified this problem. In the United States, for instance, it has enabled what I call the rise of “free-agent politicians.” Lawmakers today can reach a national audience in a way that was unthinkable even a generation ago. Previously, new members of Congress were virtually invisible; they had to build expertise and move up gradually through the political hierarchy. Now, through social media, even first-year members can cultivate a national following almost instantly.
Because of this, and because campaigns in the US are privately financed, these politicians can raise significant sums of money online without relying on their political parties. The result is that many of them have become independent actors—no longer beholden to party discipline or structure. Unless political parties can assemble enough strength in the legislature to move legislation forward, you end up with hundreds of atomized individuals who are difficult to organize and coordinate.
This dynamic contributes to the paralysis and dysfunction we see in many legislatures today. As a result, more power shifts to chief executives—presidents or prime ministers—because the legislative or parliamentary process has become so gridlocked.
This is a major danger we need to confront. It requires serious reflection on how we can structure democratic processes and institutions in ways that make it more likely they can actually deliver the outcomes that large numbers of citizens are demanding.
The Leveling of Political Authority
French President Emmanuel Macron at the Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest, Romania on August 24, 2017. Photo: Carol Robert.
Scholars like Fukuyama argue that digital technologies have fundamentally reshaped political fragmentation across Western democracies. How do you see algorithmic amplification and social media platforms interacting with existing institutional fragmentation to exacerbate polarization and weaken democratic mediation?
Professor Richard H. Pildes: Francis Fukuyama’s point is very nicely captured by a phrase Emmanuel Macron used a while back. Macron, who is more philosophically inclined than most political leaders, said—translated into English—that there has been a “leveling of political authority.” I think that description captures well what the technological revolution and social media have done.
In both good and bad ways, these changes have made it much harder for political authority to be legitimate, to be marshaled, and to be organized in a way that allows for effective governance. As I mentioned earlier, it is now incredibly easy to mobilize opposition to whatever government is doing. The mobilizations that social media enables are often composed of large groups that are not formally organized, and the demonstrations are frequently spontaneous.
If you look at recent examples—the Canadian Truckers Movement opposing COVID policies, the Yellow Vests in France, the Indignados in Spain, or the Occupy movement in the US—these movements have no clear leaders and are not hierarchically structured. This makes it very difficult for governments to know who to negotiate with, who to engage in dialogue with, or even what some of these movements specifically want.
There are both positive and negative aspects to this. On the positive side, more people are able to express themselves and make their voices heard. But the downside, as I’ve been emphasizing, is that it makes it increasingly difficult for governments to function effectively.
We have to pay close attention to this dynamic because when people begin to feel alienated from democracy itself—when they perceive it as failing to deliver for them—that becomes a very risky situation.
Moreover, in this era, we also have, looming in the background, the example of authoritarian China, which many people believe is delivering more—whether they are right or wrong about that. Things can be built faster in China; they have high-speed rail, massive infrastructure growth, and so forth. President Biden has spoken frequently about this, saying that his goal is to demonstrate that democracies can work again in the face of the challenges posed by China’s rise.
That’s why I keep emphasizing the need to focus not just on whether democracies can deliver, but on how we can structure—or, if necessary, restructure—their institutions and processes to make it more likely that democratic governments will actually be able to do so.
The Economics of Outrage
The rise of digital platforms has dramatically expanded the reach and speed of small-donor mobilization, often through emotionally charged and polarizing content. How do you see the interaction between algorithmic amplification and small-donor dynamics shaping candidate incentives, campaign rhetoric, and party polarization in the medium term?
Professor Richard H. Pildes: This is particularly an issue in the United States because we finance our elections through private funding. That means individual donors—or sometimes very large billionaires who now spend vast amounts of money in elections. It can also be small donors, whom the internet now enables campaigns to reach very cheaply, and who can make donations with almost no transaction costs—very easily.
We went through an era in which the internet was celebrated as the democratization of information—a wonderful new age. But we have since come to recognize the darker side of that transformation: social media rewards outrage. The algorithms, as you mentioned, amplify outrage. The content that gets the most attention is often the most extreme. We’ve learned that lesson well.
The same dynamic applies to political fundraising online, especially from small donors. How do you get attention as a politician—again, this is a particularly American problem—in the attention economy we now live in? The more extreme or outrageous you are, the more likely you are to attract attention. In the United States, that attention translates directly into small-donor contributions.
So, the rise of online fundraising mirrors what we’ve come to understand about the internet more generally: it rewards those who take more extreme positions. This dynamic fuels polarization in the United States. Donations flow in response to viral moments on social media—moments that often depend on outrage or confrontation.
One small example illustrates this point. A number of years ago, when President Obama was delivering his State of the Union address to Congress—which is supposed to be a very dignified, if partisan, occasion—a congressman shouted, “You lie!” It was an extraordinary breach of decorum, and he was rightly criticized by major newspapers and commentators. Yet, in the days that followed, he raised a tremendous amount of money from small donors online.
That episode shows how the amplification and cultivation of outrage can turn on the flow of money. The result is that we get politicians who are more performative—more focused on attracting attention than on governing—and who are encouraged by these dynamics to be more extreme. I do think this has significantly contributed to polarization in the United States.
The Collapse of Democratic Mediation: The Disappearance of Gatekeepers
In this photo illustration, a smartphone screen displays an image of US President Donald Trump’s Truth Social app on July 8, 2024, in Washington, D.C., United States. Photo: Charles McClintock Wilson.
In your broader work on political fragmentation and effective governance, you emphasize the importance of institutions that mediate between citizens and the state. To what extent do current campaign-finance reforms and unregulated social media ecosystems undermine these mediating structures, and what kinds of institutional or legal interventions might restore equilibrium without unduly restricting participation or speech?
Professor Richard H. Pildes: That’s a very hard question. I’ll give you an example of probably the most dramatic change we’ve made to the structures of American democracy in the last 50 years—one that most people in the United States have long forgotten.
For 170 years, presidential nominees for the major parties were chosen primarily by elected party figures from across the country during political conventions. In the 1970s, that system was abandoned in favor of the current one, in which voters, through presidential primaries, effectively decide who each party will nominate for the presidency.
So, for 170 years, we had this mediating device—call it the political convention—in which elected party figures from throughout the country would choose the nominee. These were often people with direct experience working with the potential candidates; they knew them much better than those without that experience. They sought to find candidates who would best represent the range of factions and interests within the party.
All of that was eliminated when we shifted to using primary elections to select presidential nominees. That was the removal of a mediating institution—the political convention—and of certain gatekeepers, namely, the elected political figures.
At the time we made this change, some political scientists warned that it would make it easier for demagogic figures—those able to gain popular attention by stirring up hatreds and divisions—to rise to prominence. They cautioned that the new system would reward such candidates. I’ll let people decide for themselves how true that prediction has turned out to be in the United States, but it certainly marked the dismantling of an important mediating structure.
As you know, many democracies in Europe still retain these mediating roles. For example, in the Conservative Party in the UK, members of Parliament first winnow down the possible party leaders to two candidates. Then, it’s those two individuals whom the party’s broader membership votes between to choose the leader. That’s a gatekeeping role—a mediating institution.
We eliminated mechanisms like that, which is why I believe we’ve seen more populist-type figures rise to the presidency in the years since we abandoned the political convention as a meaningful device.
And this is precisely what social media does as well. The main thing social media does is eliminate gatekeepers. It dismantles mediating institutions and bypasses the structures that have long been part of democracy—at least in the US—for more than 200 years. That’s what Macron is referring to when he says the technological revolution is creating a “leveling of authority.” Some of that is good, and some of it is very bad. But that’s the nature of the democracy we are living in today.
When Parties Lose Power, Democracies Lose Direction
In your analysis of political fragmentation, how do decentralized, hyper-pluralist media ecosystems affect coalition-building and compromise, which are traditionally central to democratic governance?
Professor Richard H. Pildes: These are very challenging questions. When you have strong political parties—parties that have real authority in the sense that they can develop policy agendas and communicate those clearly to voters—they can then implement those agendas once in office. If they have a majority, or if they form a governing coalition, they can steer that coalition in a coherent direction. All of that depends on having strong political parties.
A big part of what’s happened across many democracies is that political parties have become much weaker than they used to be. And that’s for a variety of reasons. The parties used to be anchored in institutions—like labor unions on the left or churches on the right—that themselves have lost power over time. As those institutions have weakened, so have the parties.
And although we love to complain about political parties—and we love to hate political parties—strong parties are actually essential to making democracy work effectively. They organize the legislative agenda, craft the messages to voters, structure what people campaign on, and, when they gain political power, they have the cohesion needed to push policies through.
When political parties are weak, it becomes much harder for them to perform all of these functions. That, in turn, makes it harder to build coalitions, harder to sustain compromise, and harder to form stable governing majorities in parliaments. I think this is very much part of the situation we face today.
The Genie Is Out: Social Media and the Future of Democracy
Illustration by Ulker Design.
Given your emphasis on institutional design, do you view the structural fragmentation induced by online media as something that can be mitigated through legal or regulatory reform, or is it now a constitutive feature of contemporary democracies?
Professor Richard H. Pildes: The short answer is that it’s the latter. We’ve had a lot of discussion about social media’s effects on democracy that focus on issues like disinformation or misinformation, as we talked about earlier. But my view is that the challenges social media poses to democracy are much deeper than that.
Even if we could somehow fix those problems—through legal reforms, or if the platforms were to self-regulate—I still don’t think we would have addressed the major ways social media is transforming democracy. The real impact lies in how it contributes to the fragmentation of political power and authority more broadly: the greater ease of creating new political groups and parties, the greater ease of mobilizing opposition to what government is doing, and the greater ease of spreading—not necessarily disinformation—but very different interpretations of what to do with accurate information.
This is constitutive, to use the term you raised, of democracy today. There’s no way to put social media back in the bottle—the genie is out, and we can’t go back. The real question is whether democracies, political parties, and political leaders can learn to manage these forces in a way that still enables government to deliver effectively—so that democracy continues to do what it promises to do: respond to citizens’ needs and address the major challenges they face, as they understand them.
Defending Democracy in the Age of Global Disinformation
And finally, Professor Pildes, given the globalized nature of disinformation operations (e.g., Russia, China, Iran), how do existing US constitutional and regulatory frameworks—designed for domestic actors—struggle to address transnational information threats?
Professor Richard H. Pildes: This is a very big challenge. It’s not, of course, the first era in which foreign actors have tried to influence elections in other countries. The United States did this after World War II when it was trying to prevent countries like Italy or France from electing communist governments.
But in the social media age, all of this can now be done much more cheaply and at a far greater scale. One positive feature in the US is that we have a highly decentralized system for our national elections. That makes it more difficult for a hostile foreign actor to capture control of the election system because it is so dispersed across states and localities.
Still, when it comes to foreign influence and efforts to manipulate public opinion, this is a very difficult challenge. Legally speaking, even with our strong First Amendment, the US government does have significant authority—if Congress chooses to act—to address some of these issues. We already ban foreign contributions in our campaigns because of the fear of foreign influence.
So, I think there is legal authority to do more. The harder question is whether it’s possible, as a practical matter, to implement effective measures in the digital age. That remains a very open question.
In this insightful interview, world-renowned revolution scholar Professor Jack A. Goldstone warns that we are witnessing both “a descent into an authoritarian pattern across much of the world” and “the beginning of a revolutionary movement.” Professor Goldstone argues that today’s global instability—rising inequality, elite overproduction, populist anger, and democratic decay—signals the breakdown of the post–World War II liberal order. “The global and national institutions of the last 50 years,” he notes, “are falling apart.” Yet he remains cautiously hopeful: while “the next ten years will be very difficult,” he foresees that by the late 2030s, a new generation will “demand more accountability, more freedom, and use new technologies to build a better world.”
In a wide-ranging and thought-provoking interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Jack A. Goldstone—one of the world’s foremost scholars of revolutions and social change—offers a sobering yet ultimately hopeful assessment of the current global order. As the Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr. Chair Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, senior fellow at the Mercatus Center, and director of Schar’s Center for the Study of Social Change, Institutions and Policy (SCIP), Professor Goldstone brings decades of comparative historical insight to bear on today’s crises of democracy, capitalism, and governance. His diagnosis is clear and unsettling: “We are in a kind of descent into an authoritarian pattern across much of the world. That’s also the beginning of a revolutionary movement.”
According to Professor Goldstone, the present era is marked by the unraveling of the political and institutional order that defined the last half-century. “The global and national institutions of the last 50 years,” he explains, “are falling apart—they’ve come under strain for decades and are now being picked apart by both elite groups seeking advantage and populations deeply dissatisfied with financial crises, cultural clashes, and stagnant mobility.” This confluence of forces, he argues, signals not simply democratic backsliding but the early stirrings of a new revolutionary epoch.
Professor Goldstone situates these developments within the long cycles of political upheaval he has mapped throughout his career. His structural-demographic theory identifies three recurring stressors that produce revolutionary moments: rising government debt, the overproduction of elites, and mass grievances rooted in inequality and declining opportunity. Today, all three are present—governments are overextended, elites are multiplying faster than elite positions, and younger generations across the world are losing faith in social mobility. As he observes, “Failure of mobility is becoming the expectation… and that has huge effects on people’s optimism for the future and confidence in government. It creates the kind of anger that fuels a revolutionary moment.”
Yet, Professor Goldstone warns, the contemporary landscape also differs profoundly from past revolutionary ages. New technologies—from algorithmic media to artificial intelligence—are reshaping how truth, mobilization, and resistance operate. “The internet,” he notes, “was once seen as a tool of democracy, but governments have learned to weaponize it. They don’t shut down dissent; they drown it in misinformation.” In this digital ecosystem, both democratic discourse and authoritarian control are being transformed, deepening uncertainty about the trajectory of change.
Still, Professor Goldstone’s long-view perspective tempers despair with cautious optimism. While he predicts that “the next ten years will be very difficult,” he insists that revolutionary renewal remains possible: “From the late 2030s onward, we will see the next generation demanding more accountability, more freedom, and using new technologies to build a better world for themselves.” For Professor Goldstone, the world’s descent into authoritarianism may, paradoxically, set the stage for its next great democratic transformation.
Professor Jack A. Goldstone, one of the world’s leading scholars of revolutions and social change, holds the Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr. Chair in Public Policy at George Mason University. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Mercatus Center and Director of the Center for the Study of Social Change, Institutions and Policy (SCIP).
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Jack Goldstone, revised for clarity and flow.
The World Is Entering an Authoritarian Phase—but Also the Dawn of a New Revolution
Professor Jack Goldstone, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Throughout your career, you’ve explored how demographic pressures, elite fragmentation, and structural crises shape political transformation. In today’s world—marked by democratic erosion, rising authoritarianism, populist polarization, and a weakening rules-based order—how would you define this historical moment? Are we in a phase of democratic recalibration, a descent into authoritarian consolidation, or the early stirrings of a new revolutionary epoch? And what do these trajectories mean for the future of human rights, freedom, and global democracy?
Professor Jack Goldstone: Well, as a theme I will come back to during several of your questions, I’d say the answer is both—not either/or. That is, yes, we are in a kind of descent into an authoritarian pattern across much of the world. But that’s also the beginning of a revolutionary movement.
Revolutions are long processes. What we are seeing is a situation in which the global and national political institutions of the last 50 years are falling apart. They’ve come under strain for decades and are now being picked apart by both elite groups seeking advantage and by populations deeply dissatisfied with what has happened in terms of global financial crises, economic growth, social mobility, cultural clashes, and global migration.
All these pressures have overwhelmed both mainstream political parties and even the post–World War II liberal consensus institutions. So, yes, it’s the beginning of a revolutionary movement. It’s taking the form of a rejection of democracies increasingly seen as corrupt, self-serving, and ineffective for ordinary citizens.
Where that ends remains to be seen. Revolutions are long processes. We may go through a decade of authoritarian consolidation, but then that may turn around. In the long term, the world is going to move toward democracy—that’s the outcome consistent with growing education and increasing demands for autonomy.
But before we get there, we may experience a period of authoritarian distress, not unlike the 1930s. I hope we avoid wars on the scale of the 1940s, but we’re already seeing conflicts larger than any since that time. So, I do fear we’re entering a phase of authoritarianism and war. Yet, on the other side of that, there’s a good chance the world will emerge on a new path toward greater democracy and prosperity—much as it did after World War II.
Dictatorships Always Appear Stronger Than They Really Are
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey on August 30, 2014. Photo: Mustafa Kirazlı.
In some of your recent articles, you argue that democratic breakdowns and the re-emergence of dictatorships have reignited revolutionary cycles. How do you interpret this paradox in an era where regimes such as those in Russia, Turkey, and China appear to have mastered new techniques—digital surveillance, managed populism, and algorithmic governance—to pre-empt revolt and consolidate authoritarian rule?
Professor Jack Goldstone: I’d simply say that regimes have always appeared stronger than they really are. Before the Arab Spring, there was a widespread conviction among Middle East specialists that the region’s autocracies were stable, entrenched, and inherently suited to authoritarian rule. People forgot that the Middle East had been convulsed by revolutions in the 1950s and 1960s. But because from the 1980s to the early 2000s there were stable dictatorships that lasted for decades, many observers thought these regimes had found some key to survival. It wasn’t true.
The same was said of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They had crushed multiple uprisings in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia during the 1950s and 1960s. And yet, in the 1970s, when Gorbachev admitted that the Soviet Union was struggling economically—that the consumer sector was terrible, industries were falling behind, and reforms were needed—nobody imagined that would lead to the total collapse of communism within a decade.
Again, many autocratic regimes appear stronger than they are. They may be strong, but they’re also brittle. And that’s because politics, at the end of the day, is driven by one of two emotions: fear or anger. If people are fearful that the government will come after them if they protest, then protest will be suppressed. That’s how authoritarian regimes survive for decades. But if people become sufficiently angry—if they sense that the government is showing signs of weakness and that collective action might succeed—they can be remarkably courageous. The crowds that filled the streets in Moscow and Leipzig had no assurance they wouldn’t face violence, but they sensed widespread discontent and believed that acting together could bring change. The same thing happened in Cairo’s Tahrir Square.
So yes, there is new digital surveillance, and yes, regimes look tough. But if people truly feel compelled to challenge their government, they will. Digital surveillance is only an incremental advantage. Regimes have been targeting, imprisoning, and torturing dissidents for decades. China was just as harsh on opposition leaders after Tiananmen Square as it is today.
So, I don’t think we can say we’ve entered a fundamentally new era that makes dictators far more powerful. They do have new technologies at their disposal, but those don’t change the game entirely. They’re simply the latest tools in the ongoing struggle between governments and the people—a contest that has been unfolding for centuries.
Populism as a Prelude to Revolution?
Building on your structural-demographic theory, could the surge of populist movements across both developing and advanced democracies be viewed as pre-revolutionary signals of systemic stress? How does elite overproduction and the manipulation of anti-elite sentiment by insiders fit within your model of cyclical instability and regime decay?
Professor Jack Goldstone:The structural-demographic theory points to three major weaknesses or vulnerabilities that precipitate a revolutionary situation. One is government debt. That is, when government is unable to raise revenues because of resistance to taxation or economic difficulties, but expenses keep growing. And in the West, the aging of the population and the demand for retirement and healthcare and so on has kept expenses rising as the population’s gotten older. Meanwhile, the population is not growing as fast as it used to. So, the labor force is stagnating, and tax revenues are stagnating. So, we’ve seen Britain, France, Germany, the United States, China—all of these countries are dealing with problems of financing their government and growing government debt. So that’s one major element that no one seems able to escape, because they can’t find the rapid growth that would be necessary to balance the books against the growth in government spending that the populations demand. Plus, the rich are seeking more tax cuts for themselves wherever they can.That’s one element.
Second element, what you mentioned, the overproduction of elites. This is something that’s a little hard to understand, because it’s not just that more people are becoming qualified for elite positions. During times of economic growth and population expansion, that can be a good thing. As long as there’s a growing demand for more doctors, lawyers, accountants, financiers, engineers—after all, China blew its economy up four or five-fold increases—part of that was growing population, growing number of college graduates, growing number of engineers.
Overproduction of elites occurs when you have a growth in the number of people who consider themselves entitled to elite positions, but the number of elite positions that society is providing starts to stagnate or decline. And that leads to kind of a pileup, with more and more people hoping to obtain elite positions and unable to do so. So the visible sign of this is a sharp decline in social mobility—the number of people who are able to move from middle or working or lower class into upper-class positions that declines, because the number of upper-class positions starts to stagnate, and those who are already in those positions try and protect that status for themselves and their families.
For example, universities throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and even the 1970s were engines of social mobility. People went to college, earned degrees, secured white-collar jobs in government, finance, or the private sector, and contributed to sustained economic growth. But from the 1980s and 1990s onward, we began to see wealth becoming more concentrated. The elite universities gradually turned into what I call “the elites’ universities.” It became increasingly difficult for ordinary people to gain admission, as applicants were required to navigate meritocratic hoops that were increasingly dominated by families already entrenched in the upper echelons of the elite.
Declining Mobility, Rising Fury
Many Nepali citizens join Gen Z–led protests in Bhojpur, Nepal on September 9, 2025, showing solidarity with nationwide demonstrations. Photo: Dipesh Rai.
It’s the decline of social mobility that’s really the marker of overproduction of elites. And we see this everywhere. Japan, China—you have the hikikomori in Japan, you have the lie-flat phenomenon in China. In Western Europe and in the United States, you have young people who are increasingly frustrated and angry that they’re not seeing the kind of expected gains in quality of life and lifestyle that their parents enjoyed.
We have data for the United States that shows for cohorts that were born in the 1940s and 50s, their rate of social mobility was almost 85% plus. Whereas for the cohorts that were born in the 1990s, early 2000s, their rate of social mobility—that is, earning a higher income in their 20s than their parents did—has dropped below 50%. Now, failure of mobility is becoming the expectation, and that has huge effects on people’s sense of optimism for the future and confidence in government. It creates the kind of anger that fuels a revolutionary moment. With the government continually burdened by excessive finance, financial debt, there’s not much the government can do to expand employment or provide alternatives. Governments are in debt, elites are getting stacked up, and social mobility is declining.
Then the third element is that the labor force grew with the baby boom. That was amplified by a big surge of immigration in the 1960s and 70s, and then again in the 2000s. The result of all of that is that the wage structure has stratified. That is to say, at the high end, professionals have continued to enjoy rising wages, but for the non-college-educated worker, especially non-college-educated men, real wages have stagnated or even declined over the last 30 years. That creates the sense of popular grievances among a majority of the population that is taking their anger out on those dominant elites who are pulling up the ladder and reducing social mobility.
Structural-demographic theory, in a word: government debt, elite overproduction and excess competition, and popular grievances about declining living standards and loss of opportunity. You put those three together, you have a collapse of faith in the existing government and institutions. That creates a revolutionary situation that can be exploited by leaders who want to lead a group of people who are interested in blowing everything up. People who are angry, frustrated, feel the government is not working in their interests, hasn’t done so for a while, and if they don’t create a dramatic change, they see their situation as only getting worse. That’s a revolutionary moment.
AI, Algorithms, and the Erosion of Reality
3D render of an AI processor chip on a circuit board. Photo: Dreamstime.
You have warned that unregulated social media “floods the zone” with disinformation, eroding democratic consensus. How do emerging technologies—especially artificial intelligence and algorithmic content curation—reshape the conditions for mobilization and revolution? Do these tools empower new forms of collective agency or primarily strengthen authoritarian regimes’ capacity for control and pre-emption?
Professor Jack Goldstone: Any new communications method—whether it was the printing press, radio, television, or now the internet—sets off a struggle between popular groups and governments to see who can control that medium more effectively to create and empower communities. In the beginning, radio and TV were hailed as great opportunities for popular education and strengthening democracy. But of course, whether it was in Germany with radio or in the Soviet Union with television, governments quickly figured out how to use those media and turn them into tools of propaganda. This, of course, happened even earlier with print censorship and government control of public publications. Wherever you see governments controlling media—whether newspapers, radio, or television—it inevitably becomes an outlet for propaganda.
Now, the idea behind the internet was that everyone could publish—that there was no way for the government to take it over. Bill Clinton famously said that if China wanted to run the internet, it would be like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall. The Chinese figured out how to use staples and glue guns. They managed to take control of the internet by creating their own workforce and bots so that if something appears online that Chinese authorities dislike, they don’t try to shut it down—since that would trigger backlash. Instead, they flood social media with contradictory or countering stories. Whatever the original truth or complaint was gets buried under waves of conflicting information, making it nearly impossible for the truth to emerge if there’s no trusted source that people believe.
Instead of having one or two major networks or print publications, we now have thousands. Everyone has their own podcast or internet channel, and people can say whatever they like. It’s completely unregulated. Anyone can lie—and have those lies widely distributed. The President of the United States can spread falsehoods on his own platform, Truth Social—ironically named. It’s reminiscent of how the Soviet Union had Pravda (“Truth”) as its flagship publication, and now the United States has Truth Social as the flagship for whatever stories a president wishes to tell.
The fact that AI can now fabricate visuals and stories at zero marginal cost—and spread them instantly—adds to the problem. But even without AI, the internet itself provides countless channels for misinformation. Originally, people thought the internet would be a great tool for mobilizing citizens against governments, a tool for democracy, because you couldn’t stop people from communicating with each other.
Yet communication for mobilization can also be undermined by a flood of false information. Even if the internet can build communities of resistance, it doesn’t provide the flesh-and-blood courage and solidarity that emerge from physical bonds of community, neighborhood, or religion. If you want to see effective resistance to authoritarian regimes, it still comes from those real-world ties, not just online chat groups.
Where the internet is truly dangerous, in my view, is in its distortion of reality. It makes it difficult for people to be certain of what is true and what is not, which in turn undermines the shared foundation needed to say: This is the truth we must defend. This is the goal we all want to work toward. When that shared reality fractures, complacency, passivity, and anxiety take hold. That’s the greatest danger I see in the social media world.
Still, people will overcome it—just as we’re beginning to rebuild real human bonds in schools, for example, with policies that require students to leave their cell phones in lockers during the school day. For eight hours, they must engage with friends, play real sports, read real books, and talk to one another. That’s a big improvement, and people will increasingly hunger for that kind of genuine connection. But over the last 10 or 15 years, we’ve seen real personal connections, genuine bonds, and confidence in truth significantly eroded by the easy access and superficial engagement fostered by social media. Still, I don’t think that’s permanent.
When Winning Becomes Losing
Protest against Bidzina Ivanishvili on Rustaveli Avenue, Tbilisi, Georgia — November 8, 2020. Demonstrators gather to voice opposition to the ruling party and its leader. Photo: Koba Samurkasov.
In“The Paradox of Victory”(with Bert Useem), you describe how movements that achieve short-term success often fail to institutionalize durable change. Could the Arab Spring, Occupy, and various anti-establishment populist movements exemplify this paradox—where mobilization triumphs are followed by democratic regression or authoritarian backlash? What determines whether such moments yield reform or re-entrenchment?
Professor Jack Goldstone: We’ve seen wild swings back and forth in many policy domains, largely because we’ve become so polarized. And by “we,” I mean the West—the United States, Europe, even Japan. When you look at governments today, instead of opposing parties working to hammer out compromises that could serve as the basis for broad, lasting agreement, you have factions trying to win narrow victories—ramming their views down the throats of the opposition and declaring, “We’re in power now, so we’re going to pass this law or push this policy.” The problem is that as soon as power shifts and the other faction takes control, they respond, “We’re going to repeal everything our opponents did and push our own agenda.” But that doesn’t endure either, because there’s no broad consensus to sustain it.
If we look back at the transformative actions of the 1960s in the United States—building the Great Society, advancing the Civil Rights Movement—leaders then tried to bring on board a broad coalition of different actors. For example, Social Security was not presented as a socialist-style welfare state. In the US, Social Security—pension payments to seniors—was framed as something individuals earned through their contributions.
What other countries saw as a welfare state, American politicians presented as a fair return on an individual’s labor. That framing created broad public consent, so much so that people now consider Social Security payments a basic right of American citizenship. Yet those same people will say, “We reject socialism, but Social Security is something I earned.” It was all in the presentation—a deliberate effort to build compromise and a shared foundation.
If you look at other policies, healthcare—Obamacare, for instance—was a narrow Democratic victory, and Republicans have been trying to dismantle it ever since. Affirmative action once had broader support for a few decades, especially in areas like housing, where people agreed that discrimination was wrong. But school integration—especially when it involved busing students far from home—was never widely accepted. Affirmative action, in general, has always been marginal. America never fully embraced the idea of creating broad-based justice for minorities. It was always piecemeal — “a little bit here for this group, a little bit there for that one.” And now, it has become deeply unpopular, to the point that most affirmative action policies have been or are being rolled back.
This kind of policy instability is damaging. It’s hard for people to plan for the future if policy changes radically every four, six, or eight years. It’s hard for businesses, it’s hard for families, and it erodes public confidence in government when governance itself becomes a football kicked back and forth between two opposing teams. It makes it look like each party is just in it for itself. People start asking, “Who’s looking out for me? Who’s watching out for the ordinary citizen?”
If government doesn’t have a widely accepted set of goals to lift everyone up, then what’s the purpose of it? It just becomes my faction versus your faction. So, when I talk about “the paradox of victory,” what I mean is that you can win something by a narrow margin in the short term—but those narrow, short-term victories often turn into long-term failures for society as a whole. Because without stability, consensus, or shared values, each side’s win just breeds more polarization, more backlash, and more chaos. Each victory overturns what came before, creating insecurity and uncertainty. It might feel good in the moment to say, “We won this year,” but that’s not a victory for society.
Capitalism: From Engine of Progress to Source of Revolt
In “The Handbook of Revolutions in the 21st Century,” you identify global capitalism and corrupt elites as key drivers of revolutionary pressure. How do you interpret the global resurgence of state capitalism—from China’s digital authoritarianism to Western neo-industrialism—as both a mechanism for managing inequality and a source of renewed instability within the international political economy?
Professor Jack Goldstone: In general, I am an enthusiastic supporter of capitalism. By that, I mean there’s no better way than free market competition and the price mechanism for encouraging enterprise and rewarding effort. That is to say, as long as the rules of the game encourage competition, fair dealing, open information, and open opportunity, capitalism can be effective in promoting social mobility, economic growth, higher productivity, and innovation. But, as we all know, capitalism is also prone to control by monopolies and oligopolies.
When oligopolies and monopolies start to dominate, when elites monopolize the key positions in society, you no longer get those benefits for the average person. Instead, you see growing inequality, less social mobility, more difficulties for the average worker, and greater political and economic influence for those who control the largest corporations and main financial institutions. So, while I’m in favor of capitalism, if it becomes too unregulated and allows excessive concentration of wealth and power, it tends to produce revolutionary pressures—fueled by the anger and frustration of those left behind.
During the Cold War, capitalist countries were on the defensive, and capitalist elites tolerated higher taxation on the rich. They accepted stronger unions. All of that was seen as necessary to respond to the challenge of communism, which promised a worker’s paradise and claimed to put workers first. The response to communism since the 19th century has always been to give workers better wages, greater benefits, and more opportunities.
But after the Cold War, when communism seemed defeated and gone, capitalism was unleashed. It was like, “We’ve won this fight—capitalism is clearly the better system—so let it rip.” Globalization accelerated. The market was left to “do its thing.” Profits were good. Greed was good. Unions and regulations were portrayed as obstacles. And what did that bring us? The speculative bubble of the dot-com boom, followed by the unrestrained credit excesses that led to the Great Recession of 2007–2008, which devastated small homeowners.
Those two crises showed that letting capitalism run unchecked leads to instability, wealth concentration, and periodic crises. Look at the United States today: the economy seems to be doing well, but more than half of all private consumption comes from just the top 20% of earners. We’re seeing taller penthouses, bigger yachts, and greater private art collections—but not more investment in public parks, schools, or health systems. Public goods that help ordinary citizens gain security are being weakened, while systems that help the very rich accumulate even more wealth are being strengthened.
At that point, capitalism shifts from being a powerful engine of progress to something that actually undermines the social bonds, confidence, optimism, and shared values that sustain social cohesion and a well-functioning democracy. That’s why I think so many of today’s democracies are in a revolutionary situation that’s opening the way for authoritarian leaders. We’ve allowed capitalism to go too far in the direction of wealth concentration. That’s a normal cycle, but I believe it always has to be regulated to some degree.
From Liberal Order to Ethno-Nationalist Empire
“No Kings” protest against the Trump administration, New York City, USA — June 14, 2025. Demonstrators march down Fifth Avenue as part of the nationwide “No Kings” movement opposing President Donald Trump and his administration. Photo: Dreamstime.
And lastly, Professor Goldstone, your comparative work on historical state crises suggests that revolutionary waves accompany periods of hegemonic decline. Does the erosion of the liberal, rule-based order—through geopolitical fragmentation, trade nationalism, and elite polarization—mark the onset of a new world-systemic revolutionary cycle comparable to those surrounding 1789, 1848, or 1917?
Professor Jack Goldstone: Yes, I think they do. There’s no question that today we are in a worldwide pattern of ethno-nationalist populism. It has already triumphed in Russia and China, where there’s a very strong emphasis on national and ethnic identity as the basis for national cohesion, and that identity is embodied by a strong leader—whether it’s Putin or Xi Jinping. That pattern was once seen as the antithesis of Western democratic values but has actually turned out to be the leading edge of a global ethno-nationalist authoritarian movement.
We see this with the rise of anti-immigration parties. They’ve taken power in Hungary, briefly in Poland, and they’re becoming a larger part of coalitions across European countries. And clearly, in the United States, we now have a government willing to enact authoritarian measures against foreigners—against immigrants if they are suspected of being illegal. We’re bombing fishing boats on the high seas in an act of war to protect our borders from drugs.
The motivating idea now behind the American government is “America First.” “America for Americans”. There’s even a movement to end birthright citizenship and say that you can’t just be born on American territory—you have to be born of American citizens. I don’t know if that will become law or not—it has never been the case—but the fact that we now have a government pursuing that goal, restricting citizenship, becoming more hostile to foreigners, and becoming harshly militarized against suspected illegal immigrants, shows we’re in a worldwide wave of ethno-nationalist populism that has gained power because of the ineffectiveness, turmoil, and collapse of trust in democratic institutions.
Now, you ask, is this like other waves of revolution? Yes—and all waves of revolution are eventually succeeded by a period of consolidation, but then often change. The French Revolution went through phases of republican, authoritarian, and Napoleonic empire—even the restoration of the monarchy. But then, a couple of decades later, there was another revolution to promote constitutional rule. And after several cycles, the French government eventually settled into democracy after 1870.
Across Europe in the 1930s, you had ethno-nationalist authoritarian leaders. This was true of Eastern European states, Germany, of course, and the countries Germany conquered. There were a few exceptions, but for the most part, Europe was given over to dictatorship and ethno-nationalist ideology. After World War II, that reversed.
Hope Beyond the Authoritarian Tide
Now we’re in another wave that reminds me very much of the 1930s—weak democracies accused of being corrupt, elites under attack, and popular strongman authoritarian leaders rising while mainstream parties are cast aside. The mainstream parties have failed in France. Right now, Labour looks very weak in Britain—even after winning a huge majority, they seem ineffective. The ethno-nationalist British Reform Party looks like it’s gaining strength. In France, it looks like the National Rally will be effective.
So, we have a global populist authoritarian movement—and they’re aware of it. These authoritarian leaders meet at The Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), share notes, encourage one another, and actively support each other in their quest to create ethno-nationalist authoritarian states.
I’m worried that the 2020s will look like the 1930s in that regard. And, as I say, there may be wars as a result. I don’t rule out the possibility that America and China may go to war over Taiwan. We already see this endless war in Ukraine. I don’t know where others may break out, but ethno-nationalism tends to breed conflict because, by its nature, it’s exclusionary and often hostile.
So, I expect the next ten years to be very difficult. But I’m hopeful that from the late 2030s onward, we will see the next generation of young people demanding more accountability, more freedom, and wanting to use new technologies to build a better world for themselves. So, I remain optimistic in the long run, even though pessimistic, unfortunately, for the next five to ten years.
In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. Maria Papageorgiou, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at Newcastle University, examines how digital platforms have transformed both domestic politics and international relations. Drawing on her Leverhulme project on Sino–Russian disinformation synergies, she argues that Russia and China have developed a “division of labor” in online influence operations aimed at destabilizing Western democracies. “They have attempted to amplify both sides of political debates through bots and anonymous accounts—using certain elements to appeal to the right wing and others to the left… In short, they play both sides,” she explains. By exploiting emotional content and deepening polarization, these actors are reshaping democratic discourse and testing the limits of resilience in open societies.
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Maria Papageorgiou, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at Newcastle University, discusses the complex relationship between digital technologies, political communication, and the global rise of disinformation. Her current Leverhulme-funded project investigates Sino–Russian disinformation synergies during UK and US elections, shedding light on how coordinated influence operations exploit social divisions and challenge democratic resilience.
According to Dr. Papageorgiou, the structural shift introduced by social media represents “a more profound transformation in communication than previous technological advancements.” Unlike earlier forms of mass media that centralized information flows, today’s digital platforms empower a wide range of actors—ordinary citizens, political elites, and state institutions alike—to produce and disseminate content instantly. “It allows real-time responses, travels almost instantly, and reaches audiences across multiple countries and languages,” she explains. Yet this democratization of communication also carries serious consequences: “Online content often contains false or exaggerated claims, leading to more emotional forms of political expression and, ultimately, to polarization.”
These dynamics are not confined to domestic politics. In the international arena, Dr. Papageorgiou notes that states increasingly use social media to construct and project national identity in real time, especially during crises. She points to cases such as Russia’s and China’s digital diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war, when both countries sought to frame themselves as responsible global powers while amplifying counter-narratives to Western accounts. “Particularly during times of crisis, when information circulates in real time, states amplify their social media presence… to more easily frame and project their national identity,” she observes.
Her research finds that Russia and China have developed a complementary “division of labor” in influence operations, pursuing shared objectives of weakening Western unity and credibility. “They have attempted to amplify both sides of political debates through bots and anonymous accounts—using certain elements to appeal to the right wing and others to the left,” Dr. Papageorgiou explains. “They are particularly focused on exaggerating existing polarization, using these accounts to disseminate emotionally charged content designed to provoke reactions. In short, they play both sides.”
For Dr. Papageorgiou, this pattern highlights a wider transformation in global political communication: the erosion of traditional information hierarchies and the normalization of populist performance in digital spaces. “Digital platforms enable a more populist style of performance, especially when one holds executive authority,” she concludes. “We can now see that it is almost impossible to return to older forms of communication. The public is no longer receptive to them; they have become accustomed to these newer, more direct political practices.”
In a fragmented information landscape, her insights underscore both the promise and the peril of digital politics: greater participation on the one hand, and deeper division on the other.
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Maria Papageorgiou, revised for clarity and flow.
Social Media as a Structural Revolution in Political Communication
Dr. Maria Papageorgiou, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Your work often situates social media within broader transformations of international relations. How would you characterize the structural shift introduced by social media platforms compared to earlier communication technologies (e.g., the printing press, radio), particularly regarding their impact on democratic deliberation?
Dr. Maria Papageorgiou: We need to consider social media as a more profound structural shift in communication than previous technological advancements. It differs in many significant ways. For instance, earlier technologies transformed how information was produced and disseminated, but social media fundamentally altered another key element—who communicates that information. A wide range of actors now participates: traditional media, ordinary citizens, and politicians alike. In this way, social media has transformed who can produce and share information.
Another crucial aspect is the speed at which information circulates. It allows real-time responses, travels almost instantly, and reaches audiences across multiple countries and languages. This has greatly expanded accessibility for the wider population, as the only requirement is an internet-connected mobile phone. In short, social media has drastically transformed the nature of communication.
When it comes to democratic deliberation, social media presents both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, it has broadened participation in public discourse. Ordinary citizens can voice their opinions, share information, and engage directly with political actors. For instance, they can comment, criticize policies or statements, and more easily participate in debates. This has significantly increased and mobilized political participation.
On the other hand, the sheer volume of online information brings negative consequences. Online content often contains false or exaggerated claims, leading to more emotional forms of political expression and, ultimately, to polarization. We now see distinct ideological camps, creating a kind of chasm—or schism—that did not exist before. As a result, deliberation has become fragmented, with opposing audiences and fewer shared spaces for dialogue.
Although social media has increased political participation—especially among younger generations—the quality of debate has been distorted by the overwhelming amount of information available. Disinformation, often framed to support particular narratives, has encouraged a binary view of politics, where people feel compelled to choose one side over another. Consequently, individuals rarely critique ideas on their merits or acknowledge successful initiatives by opponents. Instead, they remain confined within their ideological camps, reinforcing their group’s narrative. This is a significant drawback for democratic deliberation.
However, we should not focus solely on democracies when evaluating the impact of social media. In more authoritarian states, social media initially created new spaces for civic engagement, mobilization, and even dissent against government policies. It enabled citizens to coordinate collective actions and organize movements. We saw the impact of this, for instance, during the Arab Spring and the protests in Iran. Thus, social media has had a profound influence not only in democratic societies but also in more tightly controlled authoritarian regimes.
How States Perform Power and Identity Online
Illustration: Shutterstock.
Drawing on role theory and your Twitter-based analyses, how do digital platforms reshape state identity and foreign policy roles in real time, especially during crises like COVID-19 or the Ukraine war?
Dr. Maria Papageorgiou: One of the greatest advantages of social media is that they allow policies to be presented in real time. You can offer shorter responses without the need for lengthy diplomatic language. Simple words and concise messages—within 800 characters—make information easily accessible. It becomes much easier to share updates and provide guidance. This was particularly useful in times of crisis; however, it also created several challenges, which I will now unpack.
If we look specifically at role theory, it focuses on how states present themselves to others, and this is very important because we can see how many states actively engage in digital diplomacy. They have established multiple official Twitter (X) accounts, remain highly active, and post continuously—either through ambassadors or ministries of foreign affairs. There is a clear and sustained online presence.
Through their messaging and phrasing, these actors position themselves and seek to construct a particular role for their country, especially during crises. For instance, during COVID-19, many states tried to present themselves as responsible global powers or humanitarians—sharing data, sending messages of solidarity, delivering equipment, and distributing vaccines. They deliberately framed themselves as responsible actors. We saw this particularly with China, Russia, and several other countries adopting this communicative strategy.
They used various communicative acts: videos of airplanes transporting aid and medical supplies, and hashtags such as #RussiaHelps that went viral, increasing engagement, retweets, and likes. These activities helped them project a specific image to the international community.
During the Ukraine war, Ukraine effectively leveraged the advantages of social media to present itself as a country defending its democracy. It sought to engage global citizens, rally support for the Ukrainian cause, and showcase the injustices occurring on the ground. On the other hand, Russia used social media to justify its actions, employing historical narratives about territorial claims—arguing that these areas were part of the Russian Empire or that Crimea had been given to Ukraine during the Soviet period—and portraying itself as acting defensively in response to NATO expansion and grievances in Donbas.
We can see that, particularly during crises when information circulates in real time, states amplify their social media presence. These moments allow them to more easily frame and project their national identity. This is especially significant because countries like Russia and China use platforms that are not widely accessible domestically. For example, Twitter is banned in China and less used in Russia compared to Telegram. This indicates that their communication is primarily aimed at international audiences. From a role theory perspective, this demonstrates how states project themselves and their identities to others—seeking to be perceived in a specific way.
How Social Media Rewired American Campaigns
To what extent were the 2016, 2020, and 2024 US elections shaped by the strategic use of social media by political actors versus structural platform dynamics (e.g., algorithms, network effects)?
Dr. Maria Papageorgiou: The impact of social media on political campaigning, communication, and public engagement actually began earlier. It started with the Obama campaign in 2008, when he utilized Facebook to attract younger volunteers and later to target voters. So, it began then—but 2016 marks a crucial turning point due to Donald Trump’s entry into politics.
Even before officially becoming the Republican nominee, we could see that he fundamentally altered how social media was used for political purposes and how political communication was designed. Particularly during the 2016 election, he relied almost exclusively on Twitter. He posted short, direct messages and frequently retweeted his followers. Many times, he responded to them directly, which was received very positively by the public. Even neutral observers found this approach remarkably new and engaging.
This was also evident in the number of followers he amassed. Compared to Hillary Clinton during the same period, Trump had a double-digit advantage in follower count. He used this informal, personal tone extensively—directly addressing his audience, his voters, and his base. He avoided traditional media channels and the rigid format of reading formal statements.
If we compare the styles of the two campaigns during that period, we can see a clear contrast. Although the Clinton campaign tried to adapt once they recognized the impact of Trump’s strategy in gaining followers and retweets, Trump’s communication style proved far more influential. He used more casual and sarcastic language, as well as humor, which inspired memes, parodies, and skits—helping his campaign content go viral. For example, certain Trump tweets were retweeted up to 6,000 times, compared to Clinton’s average of around 1,000–1,500, showing a significant difference in engagement.
By 2020, social media campaigns had become far more professionalized. They incorporated advanced digital operations, analytics, influencer partnerships, and systematic messaging strategies with targeted content and increased use of video. Campaign communication was far more organized and data-driven.
In 2024, we saw even further advancements. Both candidates used social media systematically—not only to communicate with voters but also to conduct exclusive interviews, raise campaign funds, and coordinate volunteer activities. Social media became a comprehensive campaign infrastructure, not just a communication tool.
While Twitter had been the dominant platform in 2016 and 2020, the 2024 election saw the widespread use of TikTok alongside Twitter, as well as podcasts and YouTube channels. Both major candidates gave interviews to influencers, invited them to record campaign events, and included them in press and official settings.
This evolution has transformed how campaigns—especially in the United States, but also globally—are designed to communicate with the public. Social media have allowed campaigns to adopt more cost-effective strategies, reaching vast audiences without the financial constraints of traditional advertising. This approach has been quite successful for both parties.
A new tool introduced during the 2024 campaigns, used by both candidates, was generative AI. Trump posted memes and cartoons of Kamala Harris, while the Harris campaign reportedly used AI to fill in crowds in certain photos—demonstrating how both sides took advantage of the technology in different ways. This marked a new element integrated into the election process.
Overall, since 2008, we can observe a steady increase in the role of social media in political communication, culminating in 2024, when social media campaigns and communications clearly took precedence over traditional media.
Populism Goes Viral: Trump’s Legacy in Digital Political Culture
In this photo illustration, a smartphone screen displays an image of U.S. President Donald Trump’s Truth Social app on July 8, 2024, in Washington, D.C., United States. Photo: Charles McClintock Wilson.
Do you view Trump’s digital communication strategies as a case of personalized populist leadership leveraging structural media affordances, or as indicative of broader transformations in US political communication?
Dr. Maria Papageorgiou: Trump’s style, we can say, completely changed communication in social media and digital diplomacy. We can see that he managed to bypass traditional media and speak directly to his supporters. He used a particular language and tone that conveyed an urgent sense of crisis or confrontation with his opponents. It became very distinctive. Even after becoming president, the way he addressed both his opponents and allies created an entirely new phenomenon. Other countries even tried to adopt similar forms of what we might call “Twitter diplomacy.”
He truly transformed the way diplomatic communication operated, replacing many previous norms. What he did was important because he bridged domestic issues with international signaling. His messages were performative and highly personalized, centered around himself and his actions.
He also had a particular digital posture toward his critics and opponents. There are, for example, many well-known tweets about the North Korean leader and other political figures whom he directly threatened or criticized. So, we can say that Trump’s presence fundamentally changed communication practices—it was a turning point.
I think this demonstrates how digital platforms enable a more populist style of performance, especially when one holds executive authority, and how they can reshape established norms of political and diplomatic interaction. We can now see that it is almost impossible to return to older forms of communication. The public is no longer receptive to them; they have become accustomed to these newer, more direct political practices.
I’m afraid this trend will continue in the future. Trump truly transformed communication. We cannot say he was merely a populist leader or actor; rather, his approach to social media had a significant impact, particularly in decreasing public trust in traditional media. His repeated criticism of mainstream outlets allowed people to feel they could access information directly—information they might previously have been denied or filtered through traditional media promoting a single narrative or party line.
Even diplomacy and the conduct of international relations and foreign policy have changed. Directly mentioning or addressing specific leaders, making public statements about policies, and using social media to communicate national positions—all of this has profoundly altered the norms of political and diplomatic interaction.
Social Media, Polarization, and Lost Consensus
How has the fragmentation of the US information ecosystem affected democratic resilience, especially when different partisan groups operate with divergent factual baselines?
Dr. Maria Papageorgiou: This is a very important issue, and I believe social media have not only exemplified but also created these highly polarized groups, where both sides operate with very divergent factual baselines. For example, we have long known that certain media—particularly in the US, but also in other countries—lean toward particular political parties and seek to reinforce specific policies. But now, with social media, we see extreme polarization when it comes to supporting one political party or leader over another.
This situation creates many difficulties when we try to have constructive democratic deliberation or solve collective problems. Social media have amplified these divisions by using emotionally charged content. We have seen many people posting videos to express strong views and emotions. This polarization now affects families and friendships; it has expanded far beyond political affiliation and become deeply partisan.
It has also enabled the rapid spread of misinformation because of this emotional tendency. People often do not verify the accuracy of information, even when they suspect something is incorrect. As a result, the repetition of misleading content has created echo chambers where narrow perspectives dominate, further fueling polarization.
It has also deepened distrust in traditional media because, for instance, on social media, people can present an actual event and then compare it with how a particular news channel reported it. At this point, traditional media can no longer bridge this gap.
To address this polarization—which sometimes tends toward extremes—there needs to be broader consensus among political parties and candidates about the appropriate limits of criticism and how opponents should be addressed, focusing, for example, on policy disagreements rather than personal attacks. Unfortunately, I don’t see this kind of consensus emerging. As parties become more ideologically divided, they tend to focus on energizing their bases and emphasizing their differences.
Sadly, the idea of common ground, critical thinking, and collective engagement seems increasingly distant—at least for now.
Sino–Russian Coordination in the Digital Information War
A smartphone displaying the TikTok logo is seen in front of the flag of China. US President Donald Trump banned Chinese apps citing national security concerns. Photo: Dreamstime.
Your Leverhulme project examines Sino–Russian disinformation synergies during UK and US elections. How would you characterize the evolving strategic division of labor between Moscow and Beijing in influence operations? Do you see evidence of complementary tactics, coordinated narratives, or merely parallel but independent efforts—and how might this coordination shape democratic resilience in upcoming electoral cycles?
Dr. Maria Papageorgiou: Both states have heavily invested in information operations. They have even embedded this element in their national security strategy documents and established specific units dedicated to it. Russia, in particular, recognized very early—starting from 2009—the importance of social media and how it would transform political communication. When they began creating official Twitter accounts in 2011, they quickly saw the importance of directly targeting the population, providing them with specific information, and communicating Russian officials’ views without a third party—without, as they put it, allowing other countries to frame Russia’s policies or define what Russia represents.
They have invested extensively in their official presence on social media but also in creating troll farms, as we say. We know about the Russia Internet Research Agency, which controls thousands of social media accounts and creates bots used extensively to promote disinformation and conduct hacking or cyberattacks. So, they have invested significantly in both the technical and diplomatic components of these operations. Moreover, these practices—especially the technical aspects—have been shared with China.
China has also developed its own mechanisms. For example, the PLA Strategic Support Force was established in 2015, two or three years after Russia’s equivalent, showing that they exchanged knowledge and strategies. Later, in 2024, China created the Information Support Force, which places strong emphasis on information-related capabilities. We can see that both countries have committed significant resources to these types of operations.
They share common objectives in what they seek to achieve: creating disunity and social disruption in the West while presenting themselves in a more positive light. Russia wants to avoid appearing isolated, while China seeks to project itself as a great power—even a superpower.
As I mentioned, they have invested not only in technical aspects—how to use bots or conduct cyberattacks—but also in refining how they present and phrase information on social media. For instance, both often emphasize that they were not colonial or imperial powers and promote the idea of a multipolar world where many countries can have equal roles in the international system. They claim to support multilateral cooperation and criticize what they describe as exclusive Western groups such as the G7.
They have thus used converging and coordinated narratives to convey these messages. Regarding elections, they have attempted to amplify both sides of political debates through bots and anonymous accounts—using certain elements to appeal to the right wing and others to the left. They are particularly focused on exaggerating existing polarization, using these accounts to disseminate emotionally charged content designed to provoke reactions. In short, they play both sides.
When it comes to democratic resilience in upcoming electoral cycles, the key challenge lies in public education and better coordination among political campaigns—to help citizens identify official accounts, verify reliable information, and recognize manipulative content. However, it will be very difficult to monitor the influence of these operations because, even if they do not directly change votes or shift support from one candidate to another, they have succeeded—especially since 2020—in deepening polarization.
They tend to emphasize the extremes and keep feeding those divisions through provocative and polarizing operations. This creates disunity within Western societies, generating opposing camps that cannot find common ground. It also fosters doubt about national policies. Many people no longer agree with their country’s foreign or domestic policy and may start to question mainstream narratives—for instance, what China is doing in the South China Sea or whether Russia has valid reasons for the war in Ukraine. This, ultimately, is their goal.
How to Curb Disinformation Without Deepening Distrust
AI, artificial intelligence, and the concept of fake news, misinformation, and disinformation: A man uses his smartphone displaying the red text “Fake News,” surrounded by related keywords. Photo: Dreamstime.
Scholars like Fukuyama and Pildes argue that new technologies have made governance harder by enabling constant mobilization and fragmentation. What regulatory or governance mechanisms do you see as viable for democracies to minimize harm without undermining free speech?
Dr. Maria Papageorgiou: This is a deeply double-edged issue because, on the one hand, we want to limit harmful content or, for example, disinformation and fake news. However, if governments adopt aggressive or poorly designed interventions, these can have the opposite effect. They tend to reinforce public distrust in democratic institutions and mainstream media, and people often claim that such measures are attempts to censor them. We can see examples of this in many countries. For instance, here in the UK, there is a very popular response on social media about the so-called “two-tier justice system,” which has gone viral and become deeply embedded in public discourse.
So, I think that to create viable governance mechanisms, we need to prioritize transparency and ensure accountability that follows from it. Importantly, the process must be bottom-up rather than top-down, involving different levels of governance and public input. When governments impose measures without listening to alternative perspectives or the views of citizens, these actions are perceived very negatively.
The idea of community notes introduced by social media platforms has been quite positive in this regard. Even though they are sometimes added too late—after misinformation has already spread—they still help provide correct information, relevant links, or clarification on how certain content has been distorted. This has been received more positively because it came from public engagement and the platforms themselves, rather than as a direct ban imposed by government authorities.
Another very important element is media literacy and public education. Instead of resorting to censorship, we should emphasize teaching people—whether in schools or universities—how to understand and critically assess information. This kind of literacy helps build societal resilience and critical awareness.
In addition, there should be more direct, coordinated networks that can identify bots and other malicious actors. Governments and social media companies need to collaborate openly and transparently to detect and minimize such activities—but not in a way that silences political opponents.
That is why regulations should avoid appearing partisan or overreaching, especially when they come from the ruling party or government. Often, when governments are struggling in the polls and dislike certain narratives, their interventions risk being perceived as politically motivated. Any regulation must therefore be deliberated collectively—by multiple political parties, organizations, and the social media companies themselves—to create frameworks that do not backfire or further erode public trust in democratic institutions.
How AI Is Rewriting the Playbook of Disinformation
Looking ahead, how do you anticipate AI-generated disinformation—particularly deepfakes and synthetic text—will transform foreign influence operations by Russia, China, and other major or mid-sized actors such as Iran, Turkey, and Israel in upcoming electoral cycles?
Dr. Maria Papageorgiou: I think it will have a significant impact, and we will start seeing this from now on. As I’ve mentioned, in 2024 we already saw AI being used in particular ways by political campaigns—whether to mock opponents or to present one political candidate in a specific light. But as AI technology continues to advance, the implications will become much greater. Until now, many of the images used were clearly identifiable as AI-generated, but as the technology produces increasingly realistic images, videos, and even voices that can mimic public figures or fabricate entire events, new challenges will emerge. It will become much harder to verify authenticity, and this could easily lead to unrest.
For example, people could be drawn into a protest based on fabricated content, only to be confronted by another group—without anyone being able to quickly verify the information. Such content can spread rapidly, while verification often comes later, which can create serious problems.
Other countries—particularly Iran, Turkey, North Korea, and Israel—have also used AI tools to run operations targeting both domestic and international audiences. They have sought to generate more sympathetic views of their governments or movements, presenting themselves in a particular way. They have also tried to discredit opponents or to take tragic events and spin them into specific narratives.
AI allows for highly personalized messaging, tailored to specific demographic audiences, whether one group or another. Fact-checking, however, will become increasingly costly and challenging for social media platforms, as AI-generated content spreads faster and becomes more sophisticated. This raises questions about the willingness of these companies to invest the necessary resources and to engage in responsible practices.
Beyond social media, the more important impact will be on traditional communication channels. For example, during the 2024 campaigns, AI was used in telephone calls to voters to promote certain content or to discredit candidates for the Senate or Congress. Deepfake images and videos of particular leaders addressing the public were also circulated. This shows how widespread and multifaceted the use of AI-generated disinformation can become.
We really need to start thinking proactively about this, because governments, unfortunately, tend to react too late to technological developments. It is crucial that they begin engaging more closely with social media companies to identify the emerging challenges and find the best ways to address these issues.
This commentary examines the tension between authoritarian populism and innovation-driven growth, drawing on the insights of Nobel laureates Joel Mokyr, Philippe Aghion, and Peter Howitt. Their research highlights that sustainable prosperity relies on creative destruction, institutional openness, and freedom of inquiry. In contrast, authoritarian populism undermines these conditions by eroding pluralism, legal stability, and academic autonomy. Using comparative cases such as China, Turkey, Hungary, and Poland, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk shows how populist regimes politicize innovation systems, stifling long-term productivity. The essay concludes that innovation is not merely economic—it is institutional, cultural, and democratic. Without inclusive institutions and free knowledge systems, technological progress becomes extractive rather than transformative.
This commentary explores the fundamental tension between authoritarian populism and innovation-driven economic growth, drawing on the work of Nobel laureates Joel Mokyr, Philippe Aghion, and Peter Howitt. These scholars emphasize the critical role of knowledge, institutions, and creative destruction in fostering sustainable growth. In contrast, authoritarian populism undermines these pillars by eroding institutional openness, pluralism, and policy stability. Combining their contributions with insights from economists like Acemoglu and North, this commentary underlines that technological progress without institutional freedom becomes extractive rather than transformative. Innovation, therefore, is not solely an economic process—it is profoundly institutional, cultural, and democratic.
Innovation Ecosystems and the Foundations of Long-Term Growth
The awarding of the 2025 Nobel Prize in Economics to Mokyr, Aghion, and Howitt comes at a pivotal moment, as authoritarian populism gains ground globally, including in liberal democracies like the United States and across Europe. This recognition is more than an academic endorsement; it serves as a warning against the populist trajectory—and as a call to reaffirm the institutional foundations necessary for long-term, inclusive prosperity. Together, these laureates have transformed our understanding of how innovation drives growth and why it depends critically on inclusive, resilient institutions.
Joel Mokyr provides a historical and cultural framework, arguing that technological advancement arises not simply from material conditions, but from epistemic institutions—universities, protections for dissent, and a culture of inquiry that supports the creation and diffusion of knowledge. Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, meanwhile, formalized the process of innovation-led growth through their endogenous growth model, rooted in creative destruction. Their work illustrates how growth is generated when new technologies and firms continuously disrupt the old, enabled by competition, R&D investment, and enabling public policy. Their combined message is clear: Sustainable innovation cannot thrive without freedom of inquiry, legal stability, institutional independence, and competitive markets. When these are eroded, growth not only slows—it may become directionally regressive, channeling resources toward control rather than creativity.
Authoritarian Populism and the Threat to Innovation Institutions
While the Nobel laureates underscore the importance of institutional infrastructure for innovation, the global rise of authoritarian populism presents a sharp countercurrent. Populism’s consolidation of executive power, erosion of checks and balances, and hostility toward expertise and dissent undermine the very systems that make innovation possible. This raises two fundamental questions: i) What can we learn from the intellectual legacy behind the 2025 Nobel Prize in an era of resurgent populism? ii) If our primary concern is sustainable and inclusive economic prosperity, what paths do the populist versus institutionalist frameworks each offer?
The answers lie in the institutional costs of populism. Populist regimes, as Rodrik (2019) explains, often emerge from economic discontent and cultural anxiety—but they typically respond by concentrating authority and limiting contestation. This instinct directly conflicts with the unpredictability and disruption inherent in innovation.
How Populism Damages the Mechanisms of Creative Destruction
Creative destruction, the engine of Aghion and Howitt’s growth model, is inherently destabilizing. It disrupts incumbents, transforms labor markets, and threatens established power structures—dynamics that populist regimes seek to resist. Though some argue that authoritarian populists could theoretically design innovation-friendly policies, empirical reality suggests otherwise. Populist leaders prioritize short-term visibility and control over long-term, uncertain processes like R&D. Consequently, megaprojects and state-industrial policies replace long-term innovation strategies. As Portuese (2021) notes, populists may even weaponize antitrust policy, using it to punish disloyal firms and protect politically connected monopolies—thereby cultivating a climate of fear and rent-seeking, not innovation. The erosion of judicial independence, university autonomy, and press freedom disables the feedback mechanisms essential for adaptive learning. As institutions hollow out, clientelist redistribution replaces competitive funding. Brezis and Young (2023) demonstrate how innovation systems under populist rule become politicized and inefficient, redirecting resources away from discovery and toward loyalty.
Empirical Evidence: Populism’s Innovation Deficit
Numerous case studies support this idea: China, despite its strong state capacity, faces innovation stagnation at the frontier due to censorship, limited peer review, and politically driven science (To, 2022). While China has made significant advances in frontier technologies—ranging from electric vehicles and green energy to artificial intelligence and quantum computing—this progress exists alongside growing structural barriers. Recent reports by the Financial Times (2024) and the World Bank (2023) highlight a widening gap between technological investment and productivity results, indicating that innovation has become increasingly state-led but not more efficient.
The politicization of science limited academic independence, and the expanding influence of party committees within universities and tech companies has hindered the creativity and openness necessary for frontier innovation. Although China has surpassed the United States and the EU in patent volume and some industrial technologies, its overall total factor productivity growth has slowed sharply since the late 2010s, meaning that technological accumulation is not leading to widespread productivity gains. As Foreign Policy (2025) analysis points out, China’s innovation model now risks “technological involution,” where large R&D spending only reproduces existing ideas rather than creating breakthroughs; in short, centralized control can mobilize resources on a large scale but also limits the institutional diversity and critical inquiry that are essential for true creative disruption.
The situation in Turkey, Poland, and Hungary, which exhibits highly strong populist authoritarian hybrid governance mechanisms, shows a similar trend. Turkey’s shift toward authoritarianism after 2011 reversed earlier gains in R&D and scientific output as scientific governance became politicized (Apaydin, 2025). In Hungary and Poland, Ágh (2019) finds that populist leaders systematically undermined institutional independence, leading to stagnation in innovation indices despite EU integration.
While Turkey’s R&D investment and publication output grew rapidly during the 2000s, the post-2011 erosion of academic autonomy—and particularly the post-2016 state-of-emergency decrees—triggered a systemic collapse in institutional freedom and international collaboration. Studies by the Freedom House (2023) and V-Dem Institute (2024) show Turkey’s academic freedom score falling to the bottom decile globally, coinciding with an 18–25% drop in publication activity and widespread self-censorship across universities. The World Bank (2023) further notes that this institutional degradation has curtailed the country’s innovation potential, as politicization redirected R&D spending from independent inquiry toward regime-aligned projects.
In Hungary, the Orbán government’s transformation of public universities into quasi-private “foundations” after 2020—where board members are appointed by the ruling Fidesz party—has drawn strong criticism from the European Commission (2022) and led to suspension of EU research funds under the Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe programs. According to the European Innovation Scoreboard (2024), Hungary remains a “Moderate Innovator,” showing stagnation or decline in scientific co-publications and R&D intensity.
Poland exhibits a similar trajectory: rule-of-law backsliding and politicization of the judiciary under the Law and Justice (PiS) government have weakened legal predictability and university independence. The Freedom House (2023) report documents a marked decline in judicial independence and civil liberties, while the European Innovation Scoreboard categorizes Poland as an “Emerging Innovator,” lagging behind EU averages in R&D expenditure and innovation outputs.
Collectively, these cases demonstrate that while state-led development under populist or illiberal regimes may yield short-term industrial gains, it ultimately erodes the very institutional foundations—autonomy, rule of law, and international openness—upon which decentralized, pluralistic, and experimental innovation systems depend.
Institutional Resilience and the Direction of Innovation
As Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) argue, innovation is not inherently progressive or welfare-enhancing. Its social impact depends on who funds it, controls it, and decides where it is applied. Under authoritarian populism, technological advancement often serves repression—surveillance, military tools, propaganda—rather than social welfare. By contrast, democratic and pluralistic systems encourage innovation aligned with public interest. Independent media, civil society, and open debate create a feedback-rich environment that improves allocative efficiency and mitigates risks.
Importantly, innovation ecosystems are not simply clusters of firms and labs—they are institutional configurations that support curiosity, tolerate failure, and reward experimentation. Where expression is free, laws are predictable, and academia is autonomous, breakthrough innovation thrives. Conversely, populist regimes undermine all three. Furthermore, their nationalist isolationism curtails international collaboration, peer review, and talent mobility—all of which are essential for frontier innovation, especially in an era of global challenges like climate change and pandemics.
Conclusion: Innovation Requires Democracy, Market, and Competition
The message from the 2025 Nobel Prize is unambiguous: Innovation is not merely an economic outcome—it is a political and institutional achievement. Prosperity does not arise from investment alone, but from the freedom to thought, challenge, and experiment. Where institutions collapse, innovation recedes. Where pluralism flourishes, discovery thrives.
Authoritarian populism, by closing civic space and concentrating power, not only compromises democratic legitimacy—it dismantles the very foundations of long-term economic growth. As Acemoglu and Johnson warn, without inclusive institutions, innovation becomes a tool of control—not of emancipation. Thus, the future of progress lies not only in laboratories or startups, but also in constitutions, courts, and universities. Any society that seeks prosperity through innovation must first protect these spaces.
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Populist actors often present themselves as defenders of “the people” while strategically boosting state capacity for select groups and undermining it overall, argues Edward L. Knudsen, a doctoral researcher at the University of Oxford and Affiliate Policy Fellow at the Jacques Delors Centre. In an interview with ECPS, Knudsen explains how modern populists “selectively increase governance measures for specific populations while often undermining them in the aggregate,” creating new forms of exclusion and weakening accountability. He highlights fiscal control as the central battleground for populist movements and warns that if democratic actors fail to adapt to the rise of state capitalism, authoritarian forces may fill the void with illiberal governance models.
In recent years, the resurgence of populist and authoritarian politics has profoundly reshaped the relationship between state capacity, democratic accountability, and public goods provision. To unpack these dynamics, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Edward Lawrence Knudsen, a doctoral researcher in international relations at the University of Oxford and an Affiliate Policy Fellow in European political economy at the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin. Knudsen’s research, particularly through his work on the Berggruen Governance Index (BGI), offers a nuanced framework for understanding how governance quality interacts with populist and illiberal strategies in both established and emerging democracies.
Knudsen argues that modern populist and authoritarian actors are not merely dismantling governance structures but “selectively increase governance measures for specific populations while often undermining them in the aggregate.”Rather than speaking for the entire nation, these actors redefine “the people” as a narrower in-group, targeting state capacity and democratic accountability to benefit this constituency. “They argue that democratic accountability should serve this group, that state capacity should be strengthened in certain areas, and that public goods provision should focus on those regions or communities,” Knudsen explains. This selective strategy challenges national-level governance indices and highlights the need for more disaggregated analytical tools.
Drawing on his article “A Falling Star,” Knudsen underscores the mutually reinforcing decline of state capacity and democratic accountability in advanced democracies, particularly the United States. He identifies a “downward spiral” in which decades of underinvestment erode state capacity, fueling dissatisfaction and boosting the appeal of populist leaders. These leaders “capitalize on pre-existing governance weaknesses by offering simple answers,” but once in power, they “rarely improve state capacity and often end up pillaging or plundering the state, further weakening it and deepening the negative spiral.”
A central thread in the interview is Knudsen’s emphasis on the fiscal dimension as the primary target of populist capture. “There’s a reason that in every democratic revolution in history, going back to the French Revolution, the first thing you try to do is seize the treasury from the monarch,” he notes. Fiscal control—both taxation and expenditure—remains the core battleground for insurgent populist movements seeking to consolidate power.
Looking ahead, Knudsen identifies the rise of state capitalism as the defining political-economic trend of the coming decade. He warns that if democratic actors cling to outdated ideas of non-intervention, they risk leaving the field open to authoritarian forces willing to use state power for illiberal ends. “If the center is not willing to counter that with a form of democratic state capitalism, then that’s the real risk for the future in terms of a rising tide of authoritarianism globally.”
This wide-ranging conversation traces how governance weaknesses enable populist exploitation, how technocratic language can mask illiberal intentions, and how democracies might strategically adapt to an era of intensified state intervention.
Edward Lawrence Knudsen is a doctoral researcher in international relations at the University of Oxford and an Affiliate Policy Fellow in European political economy at the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin.
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Edward Lawrence Knudsen, revised for clarity and flow.
Populism Feeds on Governance Decay
Edward Knudsen, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your article “A Falling Star,” you trace the origins of declining state capacity and democratic accountability. How do you conceptualize the causal interplay between these two dimensions, particularly in contexts where populist leaders actively erode horizontal accountability mechanisms while claiming to strengthen state capacity?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: What’s important to note is that, as we conceptualize governance through what we call the governance triangle, all the different elements are deeply interlinked, and there isn’t a clear causal relationship where one always causes the other, or vice versa. In the article “Falling Star,” about the US, we observed that both state capacity and democratic accountability have declined substantially across different political administrations. This article was published before Trump’s re-election, so this isn’t a post-2020 development; rather, both dimensions have been deteriorating for years.
This connects to populism in an interesting way because we can see a kind of downward spiral. Much of this stems from a lack of investment going back decades, which erodes state capacity. That, in turn, fuels disaffection, dissatisfaction, and frustration, increasing the political appeal of populist leaders. They capitalize on pre-existing governance weaknesses by offering simple answers, as is typical of populist rhetoric. However, once in power, they rarely improve state capacity and often end up pillaging or plundering the state, further weakening it and deepening the negative spiral.
In short, some degree of prior erosion opens the door to populist—especially right-wing populist—governments that claim they will fix state capacity but don’t, while often being more willing to erode democratic accountability even further.
Selective Strengthening, Aggregate Erosion
The Berggruen Governance Index (BGI) emphasizes the triangular relationship between public goods provision, democratic accountability, and state capacity. How does this framework help us understand the governance strategies of contemporary populist or authoritarian actors, who often deliver selective public goods while undermining accountability?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: What’s important to mention when we talk about modern populist styles of government and political appeal in relation to our quantitative index of governance indicators is that we designed this system to cover almost the entire world and across different time periods. The measures we use are geared toward capturing as wide a range of political and regime types as possible.
There’s a way in which a particular type of political appeal that emerges in one part of the world or another over specific periods of time doesn’t necessarily challenge quantitative indices outright, but it does make us look at them differently. By that, I mean that these indicators measure governance at the aggregate national level.
What’s so interesting about populism—particularly the more clientelist, right-wing populism surging globally today—is that it explicitly doesn’t try to speak for the entire country. This is where we need to disaggregate from national-level frameworks. Instead of treating “the people” as the whole electorate and assessing democratic accountability and public goods provision for the entire population, these actors explicitly claim, “These are the true people.”
They argue that democratic accountability should serve this group, that state capacity should be strengthened in certain areas, and that public goods provision should focus on those regions or communities. In this sense, populist or authoritarian strategies selectively increase governance measures for specific populations while often undermining them in the aggregate.
Eroded State Capacity Fuels Populist Appeal
Your work identifies long-term stagnation in core state capacities in several advanced democracies. To what extent do such governance weaknesses create structural openings for populist or authoritarian movements, and are there historical cases where strong state capacity has insulated democracies against such pressures?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: This ties back to my first point about the US case, but you also see it across the world, where there’s widespread dissatisfaction with the existing order, leading people to complain about the state of things and become more open to populist appeals. You see this both anecdotally and in a lot of polling, where voters for right-wing, populist, and authoritarian parties often have complaints that dovetail quite closely with a more left critique. They say things like, “The public services are all eroded, there’s not enough opportunity, my kids can’t afford a house.” Those kinds of statements—thinking of the UK context, for example, where people interviewed recently who support the UK Reform Party—sound almost like a Corbynite, left-populist argument. But instead, they’re drawn to the right.
People’s dissatisfaction with elements of state capacity, infrastructure, or the ability of the state to deliver both public goods and services increases the potential appeal of populism. And it’s very difficult to combat these sorts of populist and authoritarian political movements in the short term because, as we know, it takes a long time to build up these capacities. By the time you notice that your eroded state capacity is allowing an opening for a populist or authoritarian party to move in, it’s not necessarily too late, but there’s a lot of ground to cover.
We saw this in the US again, where many in the Biden administration shared the diagnosis of Trump’s appeal in his first term. They scrambled to implement big infrastructure projects—both increasing public goods like infrastructure investment and strengthening state capacity by trying to improve the US bureaucracy and deliver more effectively for people. But it’s very hard to get any of that off the ground in time for the next election, and that can contribute to more dissatisfaction. People say, “There’s all this rhetoric about rebuilding America, build back better, this and that, but I’m not seeing it. Okay, let’s go for the more radical, tear-it-all-down, simple solutions.”
In the short run, it’s hard to think of examples where there’s suddenly a big push into new state capacity that keeps populists away. But as we find in countries with stronger state capacities, there tends to be less appeal. Populist governments have still emerged across even very wealthy, developed countries. That said, the countries—especially in Europe—where the populist right has perhaps peaked or is advancing more slowly are those with more substantial state capacity that haven’t fully embraced the neoliberal reforms of the past several decades and haven’t eroded their state to the same extent as others.
Authoritarian Capture Begins with the Treasury
Photo: Dreamstime.
You emphasize fiscal, coordination, and delivery capacity as key subdimensions of state capacity. Which of these dimensions do populist governments tend to exploit most effectively to consolidate power, and which dimensions are most vulnerable to authoritarian capture?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: The main target of any insurgent power seeking to take control is, of course, the fiscal apparatus. We see this notably and dramatically in the US case, both in terms of taking in state revenues and giving out expenditures. The Trump administration really tried to instrumentalize both sides of that—whether by going after political opponents for alleged tax noncompliance or by trying to keep money from going out the door to perceived political opponents, using that as a kind of threat. There’s a reason that in every democratic revolution in history, going back to the French Revolution, the first thing you try to do is seize the treasury from the monarch. That’s a key measure of democracy: does the parliament have control over the purse strings of the country? If you really boil it down, in many ways that is the core of democracy—who has sovereignty over spending and taxation. This is probably the central element of contestation for many populist and authoritarian governments.
When it comes to delivery capacity, this ties into the idea of favored groups, political allies, and opponents—you want to deliver for one group or another. The story there is somewhat similar to fiscal capacity, but it’s a little more complex to instrumentalize directly. Often, insurgent parties lack the bureaucratic expertise to seize those control levers effectively. This is what’s different with the second Trump administration—it learned on the job and was able to come in more effectively this time around.
However, the ability to coordinate across different agencies and levels of government is often the Achilles’ heel of many populist governments, because they lack experience working within bureaucratic systems. In many cases, from a democratic perspective, this is quite alarming: governments come into power but aren’t able to fully consolidate their rule because of difficulties in seizing coordination capacity. So, fiscal capacity is the main target and one of the most obvious areas they can use to seize power, but this can be undermined by their failure to fully grasp the complexity of coordination capacity in a modern governance context.
Global North Nostalgia vs. Global South Frustration
In your comparative work on Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, you describe how governance challenges can lead to “lost decades.” To what extent can the populist-authoritarian trajectories of leaders such as Bolsonaro or Kirchnerism be read through the lens of state capacity decay, and are similar dynamics visible in parts of Europe and North America?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: It’s always important to distinguish right from left populism. The Argentinian case is quite complex with Peronism and then Kirchnerism, but there are elements of left-wing politics there that have, over the decades, tried to build up the Argentinian state. By contrast, the more right-populist Bolsonaro side of things has much stronger sympathies with libertarianism and is, in that way, more aligned with a Milei-type figure in Argentina. Of course, Milei may share some authoritarian commonalities with Kirchnerism, but they are major political rivals and have emerged from very different political trajectories.
It is therefore always important—especially for an institute that studies populism more broadly—to separate left and right populism. While there are some commonalities, there are also clear differences in their goals and approaches. As you say, the lens of state capacity decay is crucial here. Bolsonaro falls more in line with the Trump approach of seizing on dissatisfaction without necessarily offering meaningful ways to improve it.
His political base also differs significantly from those in many European and North American contexts. Although figures like Trump and Bolsonaro are often compared in a global context, their political bases are actually very different. In Latin America, right-wing populists tend to draw on a more traditional right-wing social base—upper and middle classes—while the working class still largely votes for the left. This pattern is almost inverted in much of Europe and especially North America, where the so-called “Brahmin left” votes for the Democratic Party and much of the working class supports Trump.
So, while there are similarities in their governance approaches, their political bases differ markedly. This reflects different types of dissatisfaction. In the Global North, it’s often a feeling of lost promise—that strong state capacity once existed but has since eroded. In much of the Global South and middle-income countries, it’s more anger that the state has never been effectively built; it’s a desire to accelerate state-building, not nostalgia for a lost golden age. So, while there are parallels, all related to state capacity, the class bases of their support and their historical expectations differ significantly.
Technocratic Inertia and Populist Frustration
In “Stable or Stagnant,” you examine the political economy of governance in the UK, France, and Italy. How has the interaction between technocratic inertia and populist mobilization shaped governance outcomes in these countries, and do they offer lessons for newer democracies confronting similar tensions?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: The word you used there—inertia—is very important. It keeps coming back to an answer I’ve given a few times already, and that’s frustration. In the European context, these appeals have even more power because there’s this perception of Brussels as a kind of bureaucratic monster, which, of course, is not really true. There aren’t that many people who actually work for the European Commission. But there’s this idea of a supranational political body that is stagnating innovation and growth.
That perception contributes to frustration, which relates closely to populist appeals—the notion that there’s something simple and easy to do, the Trump’s “only I can fix it” logic, or “just leave the European Union and everything will get better.” As we’re finding out, these issues are far more complex than that. The mere perception of bureaucratic inertia can be enough—or at least a significant driving force—in the success of populist appeals.
That said, perception alone wouldn’t be enough if people’s lives were genuinely improving. In Europe especially, while the political appeal might focus on the idea of an overweening state, much of the dissatisfaction people feel in their daily lives actually stems from state cutbacks and a lack of investment. We saw this particularly after the 2008 crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crises, when severe austerity was imposed across Europe. That’s when state capacity began to decline significantly, and the rise of many populist parties followed.
These parties often say things like “Brussels is controlling us” or refer to the “EUSSR”—the kinds of simplistic slogans that circulate—but in reality, much of the dissatisfaction politicians harness comes from the state not being active enough.
Endogenous Weaknesses, Exogenous Shocks
How do you interpret the recent surge of sovereigntist populism and illiberalism in Central and Eastern Europe through the lens of the BGI framework? Do these developments reflect endogenous weaknesses in state capacity that populist leaders exploit, or are they primarily authoritarian reactions to exogenous shocks such as migration, EU conditionality, war?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: There are some previous endogenous weaknesses in these cases, such as weaker traditions of an independent judiciary and less entrenched media pluralism. In a way, we could say these are not as consolidated democracies. There is also a kind of civilizational legacy at play, visible in competing understandings of the idea of Europe. Towards the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, you see this rhetoric in much of Eastern Europe with the impending fall of the communist system—this idea of a “return to Europe” and a civilizational understanding of Europe. In Western Europe, especially among people on the left, there was a sense of transcending these older views of civilization and nationalism, whereas in Eastern Europe, they felt like they never quite got to enjoy that.
It’s hard to capture this in terms of governance, but there are competing understandings of what it means to be a modern European state and how much ethnic homogeneity that implies, which triggers very different reactions to migration. This is something you have to be honest about when doing quantitative indicator work—there are historical factors you’re simply not going to capture, which is why we write reports with more qualitative background as well.
That being said, there are many things we do capture in our work. Even something as simple as GDP per capita shows a lot of catch-up growth in Central and Eastern Europe—Poland being one of the best examples. From a Western perspective, it’s easy to say, “Here’s our GDP line, and here’s the Polish one catching up.” It looks striking visually on a graph. But people there ask, “Why aren’t we richer than Germany? When are we going to get there?” Structurally, the way things are set up in the European Union—in terms of supply chains and where value is really added—makes it difficult for them to fully overtake Germany.
This contributes to some of the dissatisfaction. Along with lower GDP per capita, there are lower levels of public goods provision. So, the story is not so much one of decline as of insufficient growth. Combined with less entrenched democratic norms, this allows populist forces to exploit both frustration with the lack of catch-up speed and incomplete democratic consolidation. These two factors together can create a potent and toxic mix.
The Politics of Misplaced Trust
Protests against the government’s economic policy in Syntagma Square, Athens, Greece on October 20, 2011. Photo: Dreamstime.
In “The 21st Century Trust and Leadership Problem,” you argue that declining institutional trust undermines governance. How do populist actors strategically exploit trust deficits to delegitimize institutions, and what tools can democratic leaders use to rebuild trust in polarized societies?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: In politics, trust is a somewhat fuzzy concept. This comes from an article that’s not part of the Berggruen Governance Index, which I co-authored with Professor Helmut K. Anheier, who also leads the INDEX project. Trust is something we’re actually thinking about incorporating into the index more directly because it’s so important. What’s vital to understand is that politics requires some degree of trust—people want to place their trust in something. So, when institutional trust erodes, which is what we’re seeing, this is essentially another way of talking about the decline in state capacity. People see that the state isn’t delivering, and they end up trusting it less.
But their instinct and desire to trust don’t disappear; they get redirected. Often, in the context of populism and authoritarianism, that trust, rather than being placed in institutions that are no longer deemed trustworthy, is transferred to a singular person or party. This is where the “trust me, only I can fix it” narrative or promises of “simple solutions” come in. In many ways, populist appeals can be seen as a form of misplaced or transferred trust that has moved away from more appropriate targets—like independent media or local government services. People want to be able to rely on institutions at different levels. When they no longer can—when they think, “They’re never going to pick up the trash,” or “The media’s always lying to me”—those instincts are redirected toward a more demagogic figure who promises, “I’ll fix everything, and I’m the only one telling you the truth.”
Yes, populists exploit trust deficits, but they also capture people’s desire to trust something. And in many cases, they ultimately betray that trust and fail to deliver, which deepens the problem. They also encourage people to distrust other institutions, even those that are still functioning at a high level—such as research universities. While there may be issues within these institutions, the claim that they’re systematically producing fake science, for example, shows how justified distrust in some areas can be transferred to others where it’s not justified, ultimately undermining the entire system.
Leadership in Times of Governance Crisis
You highlight leadership as a critical factor in reversing governance crises. What institutional safeguards or leadership selection mechanisms might help prevent the rise of authoritarian-populist figures who exploit weak accountability structures for personalist rule?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: The issue of leadership here is really difficult because it’s one of those things that, if you prefer a more structural or material account of the world, feels somewhat unsatisfying and fuzzy to talk about—the importance of leadership. How do you select for that? How do you account for one individual having integrity? It feels very risky from a democratic perspective to say, “We’re going to stake our future on just hoping we get a good guy or a good woman in power.”
That being said, there are important factors to consider. There are actual institutional selection mechanisms, such as greater meritocratic promotion in bureaucracies. That’s an element of state capacity that we capture, and it’s the kind of building block of a modern state that you would, of course, want to have.
On the fuzzier side, there are issues of norms—saying, for example, “No, we’re not going to tolerate more demagogical or corrupt figures.” This ties back to feelings of dissatisfaction, where those norms can break down if people feel they no longer deliver the goods, or if they’re being told to live by a set of norms that elites themselves do not follow. When you see a decline in opportunity, state capacity, and public goods provision, people feel like these rules and norms aren’t delivering anymore. Then they’re more open to a type of appeal that says, “Yeah, it’s all a scam, and I’m a scammer too, but I’ll scam on your behalf.”
So, you can’t necessarily draw a one-to-one connection between a specific level of state capacity decline and the selection of a particular type of leader. However, there are clear patterns where a broader lack of integrity and fairness in society makes the appeal of someone who openly flouts ideas of fairness more likely.
Strong Managers or Strategic Demagogues?
Many populist leaders claim to be “strong managers” while simultaneously undermining institutions—blending technocratic rhetoric with authoritarian tendencies. How can we analytically distinguish between genuine technocratic competence and populist instrumentalization of technocratic language to justify illiberal measures?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: There’s this book that came out a few years ago, which maybe you’re alluding to, Techno-Populism by Carlo Invernizzi Accetti and Christopher J. Bickerton. They speak to this idea of two concepts that seem like they’re at odds with each other. Populism is a sort of mass of people resisting the technocrats, and technocracy is this sort of cloistered room of Davos elites tweaking the economy—those are the stereotypes. But what they point out is that there’s actually a way in which the two can go together, that’s not always obvious, and that’s the populist appeal to technocratic instincts: “We’re just going to get the best and the smartest people in there, and they’ll fix all of this.”
Understanding that there are linkages between those two is very important. There is a tension, though, often in the notion of “strong managers.” The phrasing itself almost seems contradictory because you think of strong leaders and then you think of competent managers, and so “strong managers” has a kind of built-in tension as a phrase and as a concept. The two are often at odds. There are ways in which you might need to rouse a population for a great struggle, but the day-to-day business of government is a lot more bland than that. You don’t need a Winston Churchill “we will fight them on the beaches” kind of speech to figure out how to successfully devolve council taxes to local governments in Britain, for example. They’re very different things, and oftentimes the two don’t really go together.
The struggle for populists is actually creating that linkage between a more nationalist appeal, which can generate large-scale political mobilization, and then implementing that on the ground. Again, to stay with the UK example, there was a Financial Times article recently about UK Reform’s struggles in local councils. They have all this lofty nationalist rhetoric, but when it actually comes to the things people care about, it’s very hard to deliver. For people who are more democratically inclined, that is in some ways a blessing—there’s an opening to discredit some of these more nationalist and populist movements.
Things will become a lot more dangerous if there’s a form of populist authoritarian governance that figures out how to move beyond just the technocratic language you described to actual technocratic competence. That’s when you’ll see a more enduring political form. As it stands now, if people see it’s not working, they’ll throw them out again after a few years. The more politically successful forms of authoritarianism actually are technocratically competent, or at least strive to be for their preferred groups.
Governing in the Age of State Capitalism
Shanghai Aerial View. Photo: Sean Pavone.
And finally, situating your work within the broader global context, how do you see the interplay between governance quality, populism, and authoritarianism evolving over the next decade? Do you anticipate cyclical populist waves, or a more entrenched structural realignment toward illiberal governance models in both established and emerging democracies?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: It’s hard to say at the global level whether we’ll see a clear wave or not because there are so many local specifics. What we can say on a larger level is that we’re witnessing the rise of state capitalism as a form of political economy. There is a lot more direct intervention of the state in the economy—not in a socialist or communist way, but rather using it for desired political ends in domestic politics, international politics, geopolitics, and geoeconomics, as it’s increasingly called. That’s the main trend.
Of course, populism will come in different forms. It’s a contested term. But I would say that the overall rising tide of liberal democracy is no longer moving in that direction. I wouldn’t say it’s definitely shifting toward complete authoritarianism, either. The challenge will be that, given the likely irresistible rise of state intervention in the economy for the foreseeable future, it will be incumbent on democratic forces to wield that intervention in a way that delivers for people and neutralizes some of the appeals of more authoritarian parties.
One of the main risks would be if more established democratic parties cling to ideas of non-intervention in the economy, rather than recognizing this as the new reality and using it to deliver for people and promote greater equality. If they keep their heads in the sand and cling to these 1980s or 1990s norms of relative non-intervention, it opens the door for more simplistic approaches. You see that in the US case, where many market-liberal types say, “We’re not going to nationalize US Steel,” or “We’re not going to ban AI truck drivers,” while more populist-inclined actors—who often have no real democratic commitments—say, “Of course we’ll do that. Of course we’ll protect the truck drivers. Of course we’ll protect the steel workers.”
When there are changing economic times and increasing uncertainty, people will naturally gravitate toward those kinds of simple appeals. If the center is not willing to counter that with a form of democratic state capitalism, then that’s the real risk for the future in terms of a rising tide of authoritarianism globally.
Professor Vlastimil Havlík warns that the incoming Babiš government “is not good news for the quality of Czech democracy.” Although constitutional majorities are “very unlikely,” he predicts “a slower, incremental decrease in the quality of democracy” through politicization of public service media, weakening of liberal civil society, and the conflation of private business and state power. He describes ANO’s victory as “a consolidation of the illiberal space” and emphasizes that probable coalition partners like the Motorists and SPD share “hostile rhetoric toward NGOs” and key democratic institutions. Strategically, ANO now pursues “a soft version of Euroscepticism,” aligning with median voter preferences while maintaining a pragmatic, catch-all profile.
On October 4, 2025, billionaire populist Andrej Babiš’s ANO party won the Czech parliamentary elections with just under 35% of the vote, securing 80 of 200 seats—an increase from the previous election. Although short of a majority, Babiš is expected to lead coalition talks. His most likely allies are two small right-wing, Eurosceptic parties: the anti-Green Deal Motorists for Themselves and Tomio Okamura’s anti-immigrant Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). While ANO shares the Motorists’ opposition to EU emissions targets, relations with the SPD may prove more complicated due to internal divisions and radical demands. A new Babiš government would likely shift Czech foreign policy, notably by scrapping the Czech ammunition initiative supporting Ukraine.
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Vlastimil Havlík, a leading expert on Czech party politics and populism at Masaryk University and the SYRI National Institute, analyses the electoral outcome and its implications for Czech democracy. He argues that ANO’s 2025 victory represents “a consolidation of the illiberal space,”with the party securing record electoral support and aligning with far-right forces, but without the constitutional majorities that enabled Hungary’s Fidesz to overhaul the political system. Despite this, Professor Havlík warns that the incoming government “is not good news for the quality of Czech democracy.”
According to Professor Havlík, Babiš’s coalition arithmetic now depends on “Eurosceptic and far-right actors such as the Motorists and SPD,” making stable governance uncertain but also potentially dangerous. He cautions that their shared hostility toward public service media and liberal civil society could translate into concrete measures to weaken democratic institutions: “We may see attempts to limit the role and funding of public service media, or even to take it over,” he says. “There has also been very hostile rhetoric from the three parties toward NGOs… essentially liberal, left-leaning civil society organizations.”
Professor Havlík also highlights structural constraints that differentiate the Czech case from Hungary and Poland. A majoritarian Senate system and the presidency of Petr Pavel make constitutional majorities for populists “very unlikely.” Yet he foresees a “slower, incremental decrease in the quality of democracy” through piecemeal institutional changes, politicization of media oversight, and the blurring of boundaries between Babiš’s private business empire and the state.
Economically, Professor Havlík emphasizes continuity. ANO’s electoral base resembles that of the former Social Democrats, with strong support in peripheral regions suffering from economic stagnation. Strategically, the party has embraced “a soft version of Euroscepticism” and aligned itself with the “Patriots for Europe” group, adapting its discourse to a skeptical public while avoiding the radical Czexit positions of SPD.
In sum, Professor Havlík sees both continuity and transformation: ANO has evolved from centrist populism into a dominant illiberal force, constrained by institutions but poised to erode liberal democratic checks incrementally.
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Vlastimil Havlík, revised for clarity and flow.
ANO’s Victory Reflects Continuity Within a Changing Political Context
Andrej Babiš, leader of the ANO party and one of the richest businessmen in the Czech Republic, during a press conference in Prague on March 2, 2013. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Vlastimil Havlík, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Andrej Babiš’s ANO achieved a clear parliamentary plurality in recent parliamentary elections, consolidating its role as the hegemon of the illiberal camp. How do you interpret this outcome in light of your work on the rise of centrist populism and the persistence of cleavage structures in Czech politics? Does this election signify continuity or a critical juncture in party competition?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: Thank you very much for this excellent question. What is clear is that ANO decisively won the election, as you mentioned. It was a kind of landslide victory, with more than 30% of the votes. In fact, in terms of the number of votes, it was the best result in the history of Czech electoral politics.
You asked me to interpret this outcome in the context of centrist populism. I would say I’m not entirely sure whether the party is still centrist populist in the way it was when it was established 12 or 13 years ago. At that time, the party relied on populism, anti-corruption narratives, and anti-establishment arguments, while simultaneously promoting technocracy and its competence to run the state as the solution, deliberately avoiding clear ideological stances. It declared, “We are not on the left, we are not on the right. That is not important anymore. What is important is to get rid of the current politicians.”
Over time, as a consequence of the party’s participation in government and the immigration crises, ANO had to take positions on many political issues. Today, it still employs populism and technocratic narratives. Babiš remains the central figure, continuing to present himself as a skillful manager capable of running the state effectively. The party, however, is highly pragmatic. It follows public opinion and has adopted relatively clear stances on several issues, combining left-leaning positions—such as targeted social policies for pensioners and protectionist measures—with a culturally conservative, even radical-right orientation.
So, when I return to your question about the persistence of cleavage structures, I would say both yes and no. The shift in the party’s ideology and political discourse reminds me of what we saw in the Social Democratic Party 10 or 15 years ago, when it was a major political force. Electorally, ANO’s base is quite similar to that of past social democratic voters. However, the environment is different now, with the rising salience of cultural issues. So, while it is not really a social democratic party, ANO has adopted a position very similar to what the Social Democratic Party once held. It has also placed a strong emphasis on economic issues, which is another sign of continuity. I don’t view this election as a major rupture; rather, I see clear signs of continuity, albeit within a changing political context.
Czech Party Politics Has Become Two-Dimensional: Culture Now Rivals the Economy
The 2025 elections revealed ANO’s shift toward left-leaning conservatism, especially on socio-economic and cultural issues. How significant is this realignment for reshaping the Czech political space, and how does it affect the interaction between populist actors and traditional party families?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: Actually, I can follow what I said a couple of seconds ago. What we have seen in the party landscape of the party system over the last decade is a major increase in the salience of cultural and post-materialist issues, such as immigration, as a clear result of the so-called immigration crisis. There is also much more discussion about minority rights, such as the position of LGBTQ+ groups, the position of women, and environmental protection vis-à-vis global warming.
In general, the party system in the Czech Republic is no longer unidimensional as it used to be, when Czech party politics was defined for at least two decades by conflicts over economic issues, redistribution, taxes, and social policies. Now, clearly, it has become two-dimensional. The economic dimension is still there, but the cultural dimension has become similarly important.
When it comes to ANO and its position toward traditional party families, this is to some extent determined by the party’s populist profile. It is highly polarizing and somewhat hostile toward mainstream political parties. So, in addition to the two dimensions I mentioned, I would add a kind of populist sentiment—perhaps not an entirely independent dimension, but a significant factor nonetheless. There is quite a high level of polarization between ANO and other populist political parties on the one hand and the rest of the party space on the other. As a result, there are not many positive interactions between populist actors and traditional party families, which are often depicted by populist sectors as the “enemy of the people.”
Babiš’s Coalition with Far-Right Parties Poses Risks to Czech Democracy
The Statue of Justice by Marius Kotrba, a modern sculpture located at the Supreme Court building in Brno, Czech Republic, on March 10, 2022. Photo: Evgeniy Fesenko.
Babiš’s coalition arithmetic now depends on Euroskeptic and far-right actors such as the Motorists and SPD. Drawing on your research on populism–anti-populism divides, how feasible is stable governance under such a constellation, and what risks might this pose for the quality of Czech democracy?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: It’s a really good question. I will start with the effects of populist or anti-populist divides. What I meant by that when we wrote about it, it was before the 2021 election, two major electoral coalitions were formed with the aim of defeating ANO, Babiš’s party. They changed their communication strategy and based it on anti-populist arguments. They depicted populism and Babiš, as well as other populist parties and the communists, as a major threat to Czech democracy and as a force that would take the Czech Republic back to the East in foreign policy. This was highly polarizing rhetoric. On the other hand, we saw similarly polarizing rhetoric on the side of populist actors.
Why do I mention that? It seems that there are not many options to form a government after the election as a result of this polarization. So now it really seems that there will be some sort of government collaboration between ANO and Motorists, a far-right or radical-right populist political party.
As for its stability, it’s difficult to predict. There are some shared policy attitudes between ANO and the other parties, but there are also differences, for example, in their attitudes toward the EU and NATO. Economic policies differ as well, and this may be one of the main sources of conflict after the coalition is formed because, on one hand, you have ANO, which is quite good at spending, and on the other, Motorists, who want conservative fiscal policies.
Another issue concerns SPD, which actually involves four political parties, as members of four parties were elected on the SPD list. This creates more space for tensions. Moreover, both SPD and Motorists lack experience in government participation and high politics. They have been in opposition, and Motorists are a new party. So, it’s difficult to say, but there are not many other options, which may push the parties to maintain the coalition and overcome possible conflicts and disagreements.
When it comes to risks for democracy, I can see several. These stem from similar stances of these parties on, for example, public service media. We may see attempts to limit the role and funding of public service media, or even to take it over. There has also been very hostile rhetoric from the three parties toward NGOs, which they call “political NGOs.” This essentially refers to liberal, left-leaning civil society organizations, so we can expect cuts to state funding for them.
Finally, there is Babiš himself. As the owner of large businesses, his main motivation for entering politics is to profit from the state through subsidies. This creates a major threat to democracy: the blurring of lines between Babiš’s private business and the state. Such a conflation of big private business and the state represents a serious risk to the quality of Czech democracy. Therefore, this government is not good news for the quality of Czech democracy.
Illiberal Consolidation Is Clear, But Institutional Limits Remain
The collapse of traditional left-wing parties and SPD’s decline suggest consolidation of the illiberal space rather than its expansion. Do you see this as a Pyrrhic victory—given the fragility of potential coalitions—or as the institutionalisation of ANO’s dominance akin to Hungary’s Fidesz?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: I would call it more of a consolidation of the illiberal space, although it depends. In a way, the electoral support for illiberal or populist forces remained more or less the same compared to the last election. But there is one difference. In the 2021 election, some illiberal forces did not cross the electoral threshold. Now, Motorists were able to cross it, so we have almost 50% of votes translated into parliamentary seats for illiberal parties. In this sense, we can see an expansion of the illiberal space.
At the same time, some SPD voters shifted, so we may say that more voters opted for a slightly more moderate version of illiberalism. If you compare ANO and SPD, ANO is more moderate.
You asked about a comparison between Fidesz and ANO. One difference is that ANO does not hold a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, so its position is weaker compared to Fidesz. On the other hand, its electoral support is higher—indeed, a record level for ANO. Another difference lies in the institutional structure of the Czech political system. There is also an upper chamber of parliament, where ANO is far weaker, partly because of the electoral system, and it is very far from a majority of populist parties in that chamber. So, the position of illiberal forces is weaker compared to Hungary and Fidesz.
Economic Cleavages Remain Central Despite Populist Surge
A demonstration against the Czech government, high energy prices, the Green Deal, and the EU took place in Prague on September 3, 2022. Protesters demanded a change of government amidst the crises. Photo: Helena Zezulkova.
Your recent co-authored work on “Revolution or Evolution” shows remarkable persistence of socio-economic and cultural cleavages despite electoral volatility. How do the 2025 results reflect the resilience or reconfiguration of these cleavages, and what new issue dimensions (e.g. climate policy, migration) are becoming decisive for party competition?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: Thank you very much for mentioning the article we wrote with Lubomír Kopeček and Martin Vérteši for Prominence of Post-Communism. We looked at party manifestos and found that the economy still plays a significant role in party competition, at least in party manifestos, even after the rise of populist political parties. This remains true, but I would also add that the economy may now be framed differently. The rise of populism does not mean it is framed in exactly the same way as before; it has been presented more in a populist and less in an establishment-oriented way since Babiš’s party entered the system.
Regarding the 2025 elections, I would highlight two points. First, cultural or post-materialist issues became more important in campaigning and in debates between party leaders. Second, and more importantly in my view, the economy remains the key explanatory factor—particularly economic difficulties in peripheral areas. One of the most important aspects of the recent election was the notably high turnout, driven by increased mobilization in economically disadvantaged peripheral regions that voted mostly for Babiš’s party. So, the economy continues to be a major issue, and I wouldn’t say there has been a reconfiguration of the cleavages.
Populism vs. Anti-Populism Becomes Key Communication Axis
In your studies of the 2021 election, you identified a populism vs. anti-populism cleavage that temporarily overshadowed left–right competition. To what extent has this divide become entrenched as the primary axis of contestation, and how does this shape the prospects for liberal democratic parties?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: I would be a little bit careful to call the populism–anti-populism divide a cleavage in the sense that it is well structured in society. I would describe it more as a political divide or perhaps a communication strategy. On one hand, you have populist communication or populist actors, and on the other hand, the communication of democratic or pro-liberal democratic parties, which used anti-populist arguments. As I mentioned, they depicted ANO, SPD, and, at that time, in the 2021 election, the communists as a major threat to democracy. They essentially copy-pasted this strategy in the last election, perhaps stressing more the claim that the populist parties in the Czech Republic are clearly pro-Russian forces, turning Czechia back to the East.
You asked whether this was the primary axis of contestation. I would say it was a very important part of the communication of these democratic or pro-liberal democratic parties. On the other hand, ANO’s communication was clearly focused on the economy. They blamed the government for poor economic performance because, if you look at some indicators, the Czech Republic was not doing particularly well during the last four years.
As for the prospects for liberal democratic parties, I see two important points. This anti-populist communication was a highly polarizing strategy, using emotional arguments and depicting populist parties as a real enemy—not just a rival—and a threat to democracy. This limits the space for possible government collaboration across this divide. Not that ANO and Babiš are interested in such cooperation, but the possibilities are limited also because of this type of communication.
As for the future of this divide or communication, it’s not very clear. After the election, there was much discussion about whether the electoral coalitions—I mentioned the coalitions of the pro-democratic camp, in this case, right-wing political parties—would continue, and now it seems that will not be the case. So, we may again see the three parties that formed the coalition together, “Spolu” in Czech, running in the election independently. But this is still uncertain. There will be party congresses and possibly new leadership of the parties, and they will evaluate this strategy.
Babiš’s Model Is Shifting Closer to Radical Right Discourses
In your 2019 article, you argue that ANO’s technocratic populism constitutes a regime alternative by rejecting pluralism and constitutionalism. How do you foresee this model evolving under Babiš’s renewed electoral dominance—toward a more overt illiberalism or continued reliance on managerial, depoliticised discourse?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: That’s a really good question. I think it’s not very clear. To some extent, it’s difficult to say because the party has changed a bit in its communication. It is now closer to radical right discourses, but what has not changed is Babiš’s view of liberal democracy, checks and balances, separation of powers, public service media, and NGOs. He doesn’t care much about these. He actually sees them as annoying, unnecessary obstacles that limit the ability to govern effectively and slow down the process of government.
If a coalition with other populist or radicalized parties is formed, there will be even more radical elements. What we can expect is a number of attacks on liberal democratic institutions, or institutions that guarantee the liberal part of democracy, such as public service media and some NGOs. We may also see attempts to change parliamentary procedures, although this would be difficult.
You mentioned Fidesz and Hungary several times. I think there is a difference because the government will not have enough votes to change the constitution or the majority needed to change electoral laws, since that requires a majority in both parliamentary chambers. So, I don’t expect major structural changes to the political system, but what we can see is liberal democracy being cut into small pieces. Not because there is a complex plan to do this, but because none of the possibly future government parties cares much about liberal democracy, and the rhetoric we have heard from them, including ANO, is close to Fidesz.
Incremental Democratic Backsliding Likely in Czechia
Unlike Orbán’s Fidesz, ANO operates within a fragmented party system checked by the Senate and President Pavel. Based on your research on illiberal tendencies in Central Europe, what forms of democratic backsliding might occur in a Czech context where constitutional majorities are unlikely?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: You’re absolutely right. A constitutional majority for populist parties is not very likely in the Czech context. The reason lies in how the Senate, the upper chamber, is elected. It’s based on a majoritarian, two-round electoral system, and only one-third of senators is elected every two years. So it’s not very likely—actually very unlikely—that there will be a constitutional majority for populist parties. This means no major changes when it comes to altering the constitution or electoral laws, as I mentioned.
However, there will be many opportunities for the future government coalition to limit Czech liberal democracy. For example, regarding public service media, they can change the leadership or the board—the council of Czech TV or Czech Radio—to increase control. There’s also significant discussion about the funding of public service media. Currently, it’s funded by everyone paying a small monthly fee, which is the main source of funding. They want to abolish this or replace it with state funding, which would again increase government control.
A similar logic applies to civil society organizations. There will be several elections of different state institutions and their leadership, which the government can influence. And, of course, there is the conflict of interest between Babiš’s economic interests and the state. So, we will not see revolutionary changes but rather a slower, incremental decrease in the quality of democracy.
Populist Elite Cues Could Undermine Trust in Democratic Institutions
Chamber of Deputies of Parliament of Czech Republic during constituent meeting in Prague on November 25, 2013. Photo: Dreamstime.
Your work highlights the role of anti-establishment attitudes, political distrust, and low efficacy in fueling populist support. How might these underlying attitudes evolve under another Babiš government, and what implications does this have for the long-term resilience of liberal democratic institutions?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: A really good question. It’s a very complex one. There are many sources of public trust in different institutions. I would choose two points to discuss.
The first is the role of the economy. It’s not directly related to the nature of Babiš’s party, or SPD, or Motorists, but what we have seen in the Czech Republic is that when the economy is doing well—and especially when people feel that they are doing better economically—their satisfaction with politics and trust in political institutions is higher. We saw that even during the first Babiš government between 2017 and 2021: satisfaction with politics went up because macroeconomic conditions were much better, inflation was low, unemployment was quite low, and average salaries rose. Dissatisfaction with politics and institutions increased during the COVID crisis, when trust declined because the government mismanaged the situation and insecurity grew.
So, it will first depend on economic performance, which is partly linked to government policies. As I said, Babiš’s victory was fueled by increased turnout in peripheral regions, where people suffered from worsening economic conditions. If I were in Babiš’s place, I would invest in these regions. This would, of course, increase personal support, but it would also, as a side effect, boost satisfaction with politics and political institutions.
The second point is that, as political science and political sociology research shows, elite cues actually work. Over the next few years, we will hear attacks on liberal democracy, checks and balances, and the separation of powers. This can feed people, especially voters of populist parties, with cues that, despite possibly increased satisfaction with politics, can go hand in hand with lower trust in liberal democratic institutions. These are the two points that seem to me important when it comes to Babiš’s government and satisfaction with institutions.
ANO’s Euroscepticism Is Pragmatic, Not Ideological
ANO’s leadership of the “Patriots for Europe” group and its stance on EU climate policy reflect a new Eurosceptic axis. In light of your research on populism and Europeanisation, how should we understand this development? Is ANO’s Euroscepticism primarily strategic—targeting specific policies—or part of a deeper ideological realignment, particularly compared to SPD’s Czexit discourse?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: It’s definitely strategy. It’s very pragmatic—a calculated approach. ANO has tried to catch as many voters as possible. They use the notion of a catch-all party in a somewhat distorted way, but they actively employ it. They want to be a catch-all party to increase their electoral support. When you look at EU-related public opinion in the Czech Republic, you see quite a lot of skepticism. Many people are not very satisfied with EU membership, and general trust in the EU is not very high. There are also clear indications of skepticism toward joining the Eurozone.
So, ANO has adapted its discourse to align closely with the views of the majority of the population. This is interesting because, when the party was established, it was pro-European and quite positive about the Euro and the Eurozone. Now it represents a soft version of Euroscepticism, using populist anti-elite discourse—for example, criticizing “Brussels elites” and specific EU policies such as migration. Migration has become a salient issue, and most of the population holds negative attitudes toward immigration, so ANO has adopted anti-immigration positions as well. The same can be said about the Green Deal. Essentially, the party tries to position itself close to the median voter on these issues. It’s a very pragmatic strategy.
Czech Populism Shares Traits with Hungary and Poland but Remains Distinct
Lastly, Professor Havlík, when viewed comparatively, how does the Czech populist trajectory under Babiš resemble or diverge from developments in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia? Are we witnessing a distinct “Czech model” of illiberal populism?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: Czech model of populism — I don’t know in what sense. I would say that compared to Fidesz, Law and Justice (PiS), and SMER, we can see some discursive differences. In a way, ANO is more moderate and not as clearly pro-Russian compared to Robert Fico. The discourse of Fico, for example, or Orbán is very different from Babiš. He’s quite careful when it comes to commenting on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
As I mentioned, ANO does not have a constitutional majority, which is different from Hungary. It also differs in the nature of the threats to liberal democracy, which stem largely from Babiš’s private business interests. In this sense, it is similar to Fidesz but in a slightly different way: there’s a much more direct conflation of economic interests and the state, whereas in the case of Fidesz it’s a bit more indirect.
As for similarities, the populist discourses—anti-elitism, moralizing narratives, and anti-liberal rhetoric—are similar. All of the populist parties and discourses strongly resist checks and balances and the separation of powers—those elements that limit their power. So, I don’t know if we can really speak of a distinct “Czech model.” I don’t like to generalize from a single case. But there are both similarities and some differences.
Please cite as: ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 4: Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 16, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00116
On October 16, 2025, the ECPS held the fourth session of its Virtual Workshop Series “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches.” The session examined how political actors construct and mobilize “the people” to legitimize both inclusive and exclusionary political projects. Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni, the session featured presentations by Samuel Ngozi Agu, Shiveshwar Kundu, and Mouli Bentman & Michael Dahan, each exploring different regional and theoretical perspectives. Abdelaaziz El Bakkali and Azize Sargın provided incisive discussant feedback, followed by a lively Q&A. Concluding reflections by Prof. Mazzoleni emphasized populism’s dual nature as both a political strategy and a symptom of structural democratic crises, setting the stage for future interdisciplinary debate.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On October 16, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the fourth session of its ongoing Virtual Workshop Series, titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This series (September 2025 – April 2026) provides a structured forum for interdisciplinary dialogue on the contemporary challenges of democratic backsliding, populism, and the future of liberal democracy across different regions.
The fourth session, titled “Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging,” focused on how political actors construct and mobilize the idea of “the people” to reshape democratic imaginaries, often in ways that blur the line between inclusion and exclusion. Against a backdrop in which one-fifth of the world’s democracies disappeared between 2012 and 2024, the session explored the dual role of “the people” as both a democratic resource and a political instrument used to legitimize exclusionary, often authoritarian projects. The event brought together a diverse group of scholars and practitioners from India, Nigeria, Israel, Morocco, Switzerland, and beyond, reflecting the comparative and interdisciplinary scope of the series.
The session was chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni (University of Lausanne). Following a welcome by Reka Koletzer on behalf of ECPS, Prof. Mazzoleni opened with a conceptual framing that situated the panel within broader debates on populism and democratic legitimacy. He emphasized that there is “no populism without the people,” tracing the notion’s roots to ancient Greece and its evolution as a key source of political legitimation.
Historically, he noted, when “the people” were not central, politics drew on divine authority. Today, however, democratic politics is increasingly intertwined with religion and sacralized notions of a homogeneous people—developments that pose serious challenges to the rule of law and democratic sustainability. Prof. Mazzoleni highlighted how populist leaders exploit these dynamics to consolidate power and reshape belonging, stressing the importance of contextual, cross-regional reflection—linking contributions from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to global debates.
Three scholarly presentations followed, each addressing the theme from a distinct geographical and theoretical perspective: Dr. Samuel Ngozi Agu (Abia State University, Nigeria) presented “We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches,” arguing for decentralization and participatory governance as democratic correctives to elite-dominated political systems. Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu (Jangipur College, University of Kalyani, India) delivered “The Idea of ‘People’ Within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” offering a psychoanalytic and structuralist interpretation of the rise of Hindu nationalist populism. Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr.Mike Dahan (Sapir College, Israel) presented “We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal,” examining how populist movements appropriate the universalist language of liberal democracy to undermine its institutions from within.
The presentations were followed by discussant feedback from Associate Professor Abdelaaziz Elbakkali (SMBA University, Morocco; Fulbright Postdoctoral Scholar, Arizona State University) and Dr. Azize Sargın (Director for External Affairs, ECPS). Their interventions offered comparative perspectives, theoretical reflections, and methodological suggestions, deepening the debate and encouraging the presenters to refine their arguments. A Q&A session allowed for interactive exchanges between the speakers and participants, further probing the conceptual, empirical, and normative implications of the presentations. Finally, Prof. Mazzoleni provided a general assessment, synthesizing the key insights of the session.
This report documents the presentations, discussants’ feedback, Q&A exchanges, and concluding reflections, offering a comprehensive overview of a rich and interdisciplinary scholarly discussion on how “the people” is performed, politicized, and contested in contemporary democratic politics.
Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu: The Idea of ‘People’ within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India
A man chanting songs with a dummy cow in the background during the Golden Jubilee celebration of VHP – a Hindu nationalist organization on December 20, 2014 in Kolkata, India. Photo: Arindam Banerjee.
In his presentation titled “The Idea of ‘People’ within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu explored the philosophical and structural underpinnings of contemporary populism, focusing particularly on the Indian case. His talk was anchored around two central questions: (1) how to understand the rise of populism in India and its philosophical justification, and (2) what kind of alternative conception of “the people” can offer a revolutionary counterpoint to right-wing populism. Through this dual lens, Dr. Kundu aimed to bridge political theory—especially psychoanalytic and structuralist perspectives—with empirical developments in Indian democratic politics.
Dr. Kundu began by noting that, historically, critiques of democracy tended to originate from outside liberal democratic systems—for example, from traditional societies or cultural contexts resistant to liberal political models. However, the current wave of populism represents a distinctive internal critique of liberal democracy, emerging from within its own institutional and ideological frameworks. This shift marks populism as a transformative force, challenging not external impositions but the internal logic and practices of liberal democratic governance.
Focusing on India, Dr. Kundu traced the philosophical roots of populism’s rise to its opposition to Enlightenment-derived ideas of consciousness, rationality, and elite liberal politics. Liberalism and Marxism, he argued, have historically relied on “conscious” language and scientific outlooks to address complex social problems. In the Indian context, this was vividly visible in the 1970s and 1980s when many liberal elites—especially from prestigious institutions such as Jawaharlal Nehru University, St. Stephen’s College, Jadavpur University, and Presidency College—engaged in social outreach projects in rural areas. Their efforts, however, often failed because they approached communities with pre-formulated “scientific” solutions rather than through genuine dialogue. This failure, according to Dr. Kundu, reflected a broader disconnect between liberal political discourse and the emotional, affective, and unconscious dimensions of popular life.
Similarly, in the period leading up to 2014, the language and policies of India’s dominant liberal-progressive forces, notably the Congress Party, were insufficient to prevent the rise of right-wing populism. Dr. Kundu emphasized that Hindu nationalist forces were able to mobilize repressed emotional energies linked to long-standing issues such as the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, the abrogation of Article 370 concerning Kashmir, and debates over the Uniform Civil Code. These issues, though latent in the public consciousness, had been inadequately addressed by previous governments. Right-wing populists successfully activated these emotional reservoirs, enabling their rapid rise to power in 2014.
To make sense of this phenomenon, Dr. Kundu proposed a theoretical hypothesis grounded in Althusserian psychoanalysis. Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, particularly the concepts of the unconscious elaborated by Freud (id, ego, and superego), he argued that populist leaders can be understood as symptomatic expressions of the id—the primal, instinctual component of the human psyche. Liberal and Marxist political traditions have largely ignored or repressed the role of unconscious elements such as desire, fantasy, sexuality, and instinct in the public domain. Populism, by contrast, taps into these unconscious forces, channeling them into political mobilization.
For Dr. Kundu, this psychoanalytic perspective allows for a more structural understanding of emotion in politics. Rather than treating emotions as irrational residues to be overcome through reason, he urged scholars to analyze how unconscious drives are structured and mobilized within political contexts. Authoritarian populism, in this view, thrives where liberalism fails to address or incorporate these unconscious dimensions into its political discourse.
Dr. Kundu also linked the rise of populism to structural inequalities in both economic and political domains. Liberalism’s inability to offer credible redistributive solutions has created fertile ground for right-wing mobilizations. He noted that discussions of redistribution in contemporary democracies have become narrowly focused on land reform, neglecting broader possibilities for income and resource redistribution suited to modern contexts. A renewed focus on redistribution, he suggested, is essential to constructing a progressive alternative to populism.
The second major component of Dr. Kundu’s presentation addressed the question of alternatives: what kind of “people” could function as a revolutionary subject capable of countering right-wing populism? Here he engaged with debates among left theorists such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who emphasized the political construction of “the people” as a central task of progressive politics. Dr. Kundu argued that in India—and indeed in many democracies—progressive forces have struggled to construct such a people. Their presence is often vibrant in student politics, gender activism, and issue-based mobilizations, but they have been unable to translate these energies into sustained electoral strength.
Dr. Kundu illustrated this point by referencing the case of Bernie Sanders in the United States. Sanders’ radical redistributive platform failed to secure the Democratic Party nomination twice, revealing a structural incompatibility between progressive redistribution and prevailing democratic politics. A similar gap exists in India, where progressive movements have not succeeded in transforming localized activism into a broad-based political subject capable of challenging Hindu nationalist hegemony.
Despite these challenges, Dr. Kundu identified signs of potential realignment in the 2024 Indian general election. He presented data from the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) showing that the Congress Party increased its share of Dalit and Adivasi votes in 2024, reversing some of the gains made by the BJP in 2014 and 2019. Specifically, the BJP won 29 Scheduled Caste-reserved seats in 2024, down from 46 in 2019, while the Congress rose from 6 to 20 seats in the same category. The Congress also increased its national vote share from 16.7% in 2019 to 20.8% in 2024. Dr. Kundu interpreted these shifts as evidence that appeals to redistribution and social justice can resonate with marginalized groups, forming the basis for a counter-populist political alliance.
In his concluding reflections, Dr. Kundu reiterated that challenging authoritarian populism requires constructing alliances among marginalized and dispossessed groups—economically, culturally, and politically. The brief resurgence of center-left discourse in 2024 offers some grounds for cautious optimism. However, he emphasized that a durable alternative must address both structural inequalities and the unconscious dimensions of political subjectivity. Authoritarian populism has reshaped the notion of the political subject beyond universal, rationalist language; understanding and engaging with unconscious drives may be essential to forging new forms of democratic politics.
Overall, Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s presentation offered a theoretically rich and contextually grounded analysis of populism’s rise in India. By integrating psychoanalytic theory, structural political economy, and empirical electoral data, he illuminated both the sources of right-wing populism’s appeal and the formidable challenges facing progressive alternatives.
Dr. Samuel Ngozi Agu: ‘We, the People’: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches
Street life and transportation in bustling, tropical Lagos, Nigeria. Photo: Dreamstime.
Due to unforeseen internet connectivity problems during the virtual panel, Dr. Samuel Ngozi Agu’s presentation could not be delivered live. Instead, this report provides a structured summary of his draft article titled “We, the People: Rethinking Governance through Bottom-Up Approaches,” capturing its key arguments, theoretical foundations, and policy recommendations.
The Crisis of Centralized Governance
Dr. Agu begins by interrogating the disjuncture between the ideals and practice of democracy. While democracy is often celebrated as governance “of the people, by the people, and for the people,” in practice, many democratic systems concentrate power at the center. This over-centralization alienates citizens from meaningful decision-making, erodes trust in institutions, and fuels social unrest.
Nigeria, his primary case study, exemplifies this paradox. After more than two decades of democratic rule, the country continues to struggle with corruption, inequality, and exclusionary governance structures. Mass movements such as #EndSARS, #OccupyNigeria, and #EndHardship reflect widespread frustration with a political system that privileges elite interests while sidelining the grassroots. These protests, Dr. Agu argues, are not isolated events but symptoms of a deeper crisis of representation.
To address this gap between citizens and the state, Dr. Agu proposes a shift toward bottom-up governance—an approach that places citizens and communities at the center of governance processes. By devolving decision-making authority, enhancing civic education, promoting community-based development, embracing digital democracy, and enacting inclusive legislative reforms, bottom-up governance can strengthen accountability, improve development outcomes, and restore democratic legitimacy.
Dr. Agu anchors his analysis in a combination of Participatory Governance Theory and Sustainable Development Theory, integrating insights from deliberative democracy and Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach. i) Participatory Governance Theory emphasizes that democracy requires more than periodic elections. Active citizen engagement in decision-making enhances legitimacy, trust, and policy effectiveness. Participation is not merely instrumental; it is constitutive of democracy itself, transforming citizens from passive recipients into co-producers of governance. ii) Sustainable Development Theory stresses that development is most durable when it is inclusive and participatory. Decisions that emerge from the grassroots better reflect local needs and ensure long-term stewardship of resources.
From this synthesis, Dr. Agu develops the Participation–Accountability–Development (PAD) Nexus, which posits that: Decentralization + Civic Engagement → Increased Participation → Strengthened Accountability → Improved Governance Outcomes → Sustainable Development.
This model links governance reforms directly to human flourishing, suggesting that bottom-up governance expands people’s capabilities to lead lives they value.
Bottom-Up Governance: Concept and Rationale
Dr. Agu defines bottom-up governance as a participatory system of administration in which power and authority originate from the grassroots rather than being imposed from above. In this model, citizens directly influence policy formation, implementation, and evaluation. Unlike the top-down model, which treats citizens as passive recipients of elite decisions, bottom-up governance positions them as active co-creators of development outcomes.
This approach reclaims the moral foundation of democracy by restoring to citizens both agency and authorship. It turns governance from “government for the people” into “government with the people,” fostering trust, curbing corruption, and ensuring that policies reflect real needs.
In the Nigerian context, persistent problems such as declining voter turnout, the rise of separatist agitations (e.g., IPOB, Niger Delta movements), and youth-led mobilizations highlight the urgent need for participatory governance rooted in local realities.
Linking Participatory Governance to Sustainable Development
Empirical evidence, Dr. Agu notes, shows a direct relationship between grassroots participation and improved governance outcomes. Nigeria’s Community Social Development Project (CSDP) provides a compelling example. Under this initiative, communities identify their priorities, plan projects, and oversee their implementation. The result has been more inclusive, transparent, and effective local development.
Globally, similar successes abound:
Brazil’s participatory budgeting has improved resource allocation and citizen trust.
Rwanda’s Vision 2020 leveraged community participation (via Umuganda and Imihigo) to drive development.
Uganda’s Local Government Act (1997) empowered rural councils to deliver essential services more efficiently.
These cases demonstrate that bottom-up governance enhances transparency, curbs corruption, and produces more sustainable development outcomes than centralized models.
Nigeria’s Governance Challenges and Social Movements
Dr. Agu situates Nigeria’s governance crisis within this framework. Despite democratic institutions, the country has failed to translate formal democracy into inclusive development. Voter turnout has plummeted from over 69% in 2003 to just 26.7% in 2023, reflecting widespread disillusionment with political elites.
Social movements have increasingly filled this participatory vacuum. #OccupyNigeria (2012) emerged in response to fuel subsidy removal; #EndSARS (2020) evolved from police brutality protests to broader demands for accountability; more recent protests highlight worsening economic hardship. Alongside these movements, separatist agitations and insurgencies reflect deep grievances over political exclusion and resource distribution.
For Dr. Agu, these developments underscore a structural failure of top-down governance. Without meaningful channels for citizen engagement, protests and unrest become the primary means of political expression.
Strategies for Implementing Bottom-Up Governance
Dr. Agu identifies five interlinked strategies to institutionalize participatory governance in Nigeria:
Decentralization: Strengthen local governance through constitutional reforms that devolve fiscal, administrative, and political powers to local authorities. Empower local governments with independent revenue sources and decision-making authority.
Civic Education: Integrate civic learning into educational curricula to cultivate active citizenship. Promote civil society–led public debates, town halls, and participatory forums to bridge citizen–state gaps.
Community-Based Development (CBD): Institutionalize CDD frameworks that prioritize local ownership, inclusivity, and accountability. Target marginalized groups (youth, women, people with disabilities) to ensure equitable participation.
Digital Democracy: Leverage technology for transparency and citizen engagement through participatory budgeting platforms, budget tracking tools, and open data initiatives. Invest in digital inclusion to ensure rural populations are not excluded.
Legislative Reforms: Enact laws mandating community representation in decision-making bodies. Strengthen anti-corruption frameworks and consider electoral reforms (e.g., proportional representation) to enhance inclusivity.
Reclaiming Democracy from Below
Dr. Agu concludes that achieving inclusive democracy and sustainable development in Nigeria requires a fundamental shift from elite-centered, top-down governance toward citizen-centered, bottom-up approaches.
Grassroots participation, underpinned by decentralization, civic education, community engagement, and digital innovation, can bridge the widening gap between state and society. This shift is not merely a policy alternative but a democratic imperative. By empowering citizens as co-authors of governance, Nigeria can foster political stability, social cohesion, and sustainable growth. Ultimately, as Dr. Agu emphasizes, the future of democracy depends on restoring the agency of “We, the People” and making governance a shared enterprise.
Dr. Mouli Bentman & Dr. Michael Dahan: ‘We, the People’: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal
Israelis protest in Tel Aviv, Israel on July 18, 2023, against Netanyahu’s anti-democratic coup as a bill to erase judicial ‘reasonableness clause’ is expected to pass despite 27,676 reservations. Photo: Avivi Aharon.
Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan delivered a jointly structured and intellectually rich presentation that explored how populist movements have appropriated the core language of democracy—particularly the notion of “the people”—to undermine liberal democratic institutions from within. Their central claim was both clear and unsettling: the rise of right-wing populism is not simply a matter of rhetorical manipulation but stems from deep-seated contradictions within liberal democracy itself. By tracing the intellectual genealogy of concepts like legitimacy and universality, and examining contemporary political developments in Israel, the speakers demonstrated how populists have weaponized democratic language to hollow out liberal democracy.
Dr. Bentman opened the presentation by focusing on the paradox at the heart of modern democracy. The phrase “We the People,” once celebrated as the most universal and inclusive expression of collective self-rule, has been turned upside down by populists. Rather than binding citizens across differences, it is now mobilized to divide society between an “authentic” people and its perceived enemies: corrupt elites, minorities, ideological adversaries, and liberal institutions. This shift, he argued, is not merely tactical—it reflects unresolved tensions within the liberal democratic project itself, particularly around questions of legitimacy, universality, and belonging.
To illustrate these tensions, Dr. Bentman offered a concise intellectual history. In the 17th and 18th centuries, debates over political legitimacy revolved around the source of authority. Conservatives grounded legitimacy in divine will, tradition, and natural hierarchy. Liberals, by contrast, rooted legitimacy in the individual—his rights, autonomy, and consent. Thinkers like John Locke argued that governments exist to protect natural rights—life, liberty, and property—while Jean-Jacques Rousseau located legitimacy in la volonté générale, the collective self-rule of the people. Out of this intellectual revolution emerged the liberal democratic order, promising universal rights and collective self-government.
Yet, as Dr. Bentman reminded the audience, critical thinkers from Karl Marx to Simone de Beauvoir exposed the limits of this liberal promise. Marx demonstrated how formal liberty meant little for the working class within a society structured by property and capital. Critical theorists such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno highlighted the dominance of instrumental reason. Postcolonial and feminist thinkers like Frantz Fanon and Beauvoir revealed how liberalism often coexisted with colonialism, patriarchy, and structural violence. By the mid-20th century, figures like Michel Foucault, Edward Said, and Judith Butler deepened the critique, showing how power was embedded not only in the state or capital but in knowledge systems, discourses, and identities themselves.
According to Dr. Bentman, these critiques were not intended to destroy liberal democracy but to deepen it—to expose hidden exclusions and move toward a more just and pluralistic order. However, they inadvertently opened a new political space. If universality had always been partial and exclusionary, could it ever truly include everyone? This unresolved question created an opening for the populist right. Traditionally defenders of hierarchy, the populist right seized upon liberalism’s self-critique, not to expand democracy but to hollow it out. By appropriating the language of postcolonialism, identity politics, and suspicion of elites, they reframed democratic institutions as tools of domination and presented themselves as the authentic voice of “the people.”
Dr. Bentman gave the example of American right-wing activist Charlie Kirk, who appropriated the language of decolonization to depict Christian Americans as the “colonized,” oppressed by secular liberal elites. Similarly, concepts like diversity are inverted to portray universities as discriminatory against conservatives, and the white middle class is recast as a marginalized group. This rhetorical reversal is emblematic of a broader global trend in which the tools of democratic critique are redeployed to legitimize exclusionary majoritarianism.
Dr. Michael Dahan then shifted the focus to Israel as a case study illustrating these dynamics with striking clarity. Ten years ago, Dr. Dahan noted, Israeli politics lacked clear populist parties. This has changed dramatically, particularly over the past two years. Today, two parties embody populist politics: Likud, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Strength) Party, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir, which espouses Jewish supremacism. Over two decades, the Israeli right has reframed liberal universalism as a mask for elite domination, elevating instead a narrow ethno-national identity of “the Jewish people” as the sole legitimate sovereign. Palestinians, Arab citizens, left-wing Israelis, and anyone not fully aligned with this project are cast outside the political community.
The events of October 7, 2023—when the state catastrophically failed to protect its citizens—might have been expected to trigger a profound legitimacy crisis. State security apparatuses, emergency services, and welfare systems all collapsed. Civil society—volunteers, NGOs, local authorities—filled the void, rescuing survivors and supporting displaced communities. Rather than acknowledging this, the government turned against these actors, accusing them of betrayal or complicity. Dr. Dahan interpreted this as a deliberate strategy: by delegitimizing alternative sources of solidarity, the state seeks to monopolize the definition of “the people.” This strategy demonstrates how populism not only survives institutional failure but actively feeds on it, having already replaced a universal civic “we” with an exclusionary ethno-national fiction.
Dr. Dahan then tied these developments to broader theoretical trends. Liberalism’s hold on universality has weakened. Critical theories that once sought to liberate have been hijacked. Foucault’s critique of power is misused to undermine expertise; Butler’s performativity is invoked to question democratic norms; postcolonial critiques justify nationalist withdrawal. Pluralism devolves into fragmentation, and fragmentation is weaponized to justify majoritarianism. Democracy is redefined not as a system of rights, deliberation, and checks, but as the unchecked rule of a self-defined majority.
In concluding, Dr. Bentman and Dr. Dahan argued that reclaiming universality is essential to countering these trends. Drawing on thinkers like John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Hannah Arendt, they underscored that universality is not sameness, but the institutionalization of diversity under shared rules of fairness. “We the people” must mean all of us—not because we are identical, but because we commit to living together under a shared civic framework. Achieving this requires three strategies: (1) building deliberative infrastructures—citizen assemblies and participatory forums—to integrate diverse voices; (2) protecting civil society organizations from delegitimization; and (3) reinforcing constitutional and judicial safeguards to prevent majoritarian overreach.
Their presentation offered a powerful synthesis of political theory and contemporary politics, revealing how liberal democracy’s own internal critiques have become tools for its destabilization—and suggesting pathways to reclaim democratic universality in an era of resurgent populism.
Discussant’s Feedback:Associate Professor Abdelaaziz El Bakkali
Volunteers of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) on Vijyadashmi festival, a large gathering or annual meeting during Ramanavami a Hindu festival in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh on October 19, 2018. Photo: Pradeep Gaurs.
In his role as discussant, Associate Professor Abdelaaziz El Bakkali offered an incisive and comprehensive reflection on the three presentations delivered during the panel. His intervention combined an overall thematic synthesis with targeted commentary on each presentation, situating the papers within broader scholarly debates on populism, democracy, and political participation.
Dr. El Bakkali highlighted that, taken together, the papers moved beyond superficial analyses of populist rhetoric to probe the philosophical, institutional, and psychological foundations that make the performance of “the people” both possible and potent. He noted a common thread: the mobilization of “the people” not as a pre-given democratic sovereign, but as a politically constructed entity, often instrumentalized by leaders who claim to act in the name of democracy while redefining its substance.
Turning to individual presentations, Dr. El Bakkali commended Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s examination of Hindu nationalism as a form of authoritarian populism in India. He observed that Dr. Kundu’s analysis effectively linked the rise of Hindutva populism to disillusionment with liberal democratic institutions, emphasizing the role of emotions and psychological factors in shaping populist subjectivities. Dr. Kundu’s argument that Hindutva is rooted less in formal political strategy than in emotional mobilization and cultural identity was, in Dr. El Bakkali’s view, compelling. However, he suggested several ways to sharpen the analysis:
First, the paper could focus more explicitly on emotion as a political technology—examining how populist leaders strategically use fear, pride, and resentment to define belonging and mobilize support. Second, incorporating empirical data, such as social media discourse or electoral mobilization, would ground the theoretical reflections more robustly. Third, linking the Indian case to global debates on post-truth politics and the psychology of populism could situate it within broader comparative frameworks, rather than treating it as a unique exception.
Despite these suggestions, Dr. El Bakkali described the presentation as “very interesting and rich,” highlighting its contribution to understanding the emotional and psychological underpinnings of contemporary populism.
Dr. El Bakkali then turned to Dr. Samuel Agu’s presentation, which he found both timely and significant, especially for the Global South. Dr. Agu’s argument centered on how top-down governance in Nigeria has produced alienation, corruption, and inequality, and how decentralization, civic education, community-based development, and digital democracy can offer participatory alternatives. While praising the clarity and relevance of the paper, Dr. El Bakkali cautioned against romanticizing grassroots governance as a moral corrective to elite domination. He noted that local participation can itself be entangled with control and clientelism, as local elites may capture power, reproduce inequalities, or create new patronage networks. He suggested that the paper address the risks of elite capture and local clientelism, drawing on evidence from Nigerian municipal politics to strengthen its critique.
He also posed two substantive questions: How can one distinguish between participatory democracy and populist mobilization, given that both claim to speak for “the people”? Why were Brazil and Uganda chosen as comparative cases, and how do their experiences differ from those of other Global South contexts?
Finally, Dr. El Bakkali discussed the paper by Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan, which he found theoretically rich and thought-provoking. He agreed with their argument that populism’s redefinition of “We the People” reflects a deep crisis within liberal democracy, where inclusive universalist ideals have been weaponized to draw exclusionary boundaries between “true” citizens and outsiders. He noted that their paper reveals how populist discourse cannibalizes the Enlightenment’s universalist vocabulary, converting inclusion into exclusion through subtle linguistic strategies. He suggested that this point could be elaborated further. Additionally, he encouraged the authors to integrate non-Western perspectives to avoid reproducing Eurocentric narratives and to expand their discussion on the role of civic education and institutions in reconstructing inclusive forms of belonging beyond ideological polarization.
He concluded with two broad, thought-provoking questions: How can we reclaim the notion of “the people” without reproducing the exclusionary binaries on which populism thrives? Has the concept of “the people” outlived its democratic usefulness?
In conclusion, Dr. El Bakkali praised all three presenters for their illuminating and multifaceted contributions, noting that their work enriched the scholarly conversation on populism, belonging, and democratic governance. His feedback was both analytical and constructive, offering theoretical reflections, methodological suggestions, and comparative perspectives to deepen and sharpen each paper’s contribution.
Discussant’s Feedback: Dr. Azize Sargın
Discussant Dr. Azize Sargın delivered thoughtful and analytically sharp feedback on the three presentations, combining conceptual engagement with practical questions that encouraged further development of each paper. She began by expressing her gratitude to the panel organizers and commended all presenters, highlighting in particular the efforts of the African presenter for ensuring that his research was represented despite technical difficulties. She emphasized that all scholars should have equal opportunities to present their work, framing this as a broader academic responsibility to support inclusive scholarly participation.
Dr. Sargın first turned to Dr. Samuel Agu’s paper, acknowledging that although the presentation itself could not be delivered due to technical issues, the abstract offered a compelling entry point for discussion. She found the argument for bottom-up governance—emphasizing decentralization, civic education, and digital democracy—particularly persuasive.
However, she raised several important conceptual and practical questions for the author to consider in further developing the paper. First, she asked for a clearer definition of “bottom-up governance”: whether it refers primarily to institutional decentralization, or whether it encompasses a broader social process of civic empowerment. This conceptual clarification, she argued, is crucial for understanding how such governance might function in practice.
Second, she commended Agu’s linkage between participatory governance and sustainable development, calling it a “powerful claim” that bottom-up governance can foster inclusivity, stability, and growth. However, she encouraged the author to demonstrate more concretely how these dynamics would work in practice, ideally through specific mechanisms, policy examples, or empirical evidence drawn from Nigeria or other comparative cases.
Third, she suggested that the author consider the challenges to implementing bottom-up governance in Nigeria, asking whether these are primarily political, structural, or related to civic capacity. By addressing these challenges, the paper could offer a more nuanced and grounded account of how bottom-up approaches might be operationalized in real-world governance systems.
Turning to Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s presentation, Dr. Sargın praised the paper for its ambition and depth, especially in examining the conceptual and emotional dimensions of authoritarian populism within India’s contemporary political landscape. She highlighted the paper’s strength in linking the rise of Hindu nationalism to both the failures of liberal democratic institutions and the psychological and emotional undercurrents of Indian society, situating the discussion within the broader global crisis of liberal democracy.
She then offered several constructive reflections. First, she encouraged the author to clarify how these complex theoretical ideas would be operationalized—both methodologically and empirically. She suggested that clearly articulating how the politics of emotion is examined in the Indian context would strengthen the analytical coherence of the paper. Second, she raised an important comparative question: whether Hindu nationalist populism should be understood as a variant of global populism or as a distinct phenomenon rooted in India’s post-colonial and religious context. Finally, she expressed curiosity about the alternatives to populism that the paper hinted at. She asked whether these alternatives in the Indian context might involve a revival of liberal institutions, a grassroots democratic project, or a more radical reimagining of politics. These questions, she noted, could deepen the paper’s contribution to debates on authoritarian populism and democratic renewal.
Dr. Sargın concluded with reflections on Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan’s paper, which she described as “very engaging and conceptually rich.” She highlighted the central argument that populism’s redefinition of “We the People” reflects not mere rhetorical manipulation but a deeper crisis within liberal democracy itself. This framing, she argued, is significant because it positions populism as a symptom rather than a distortion, prompting critical reflection on liberalism’s internal tensions.
She raised two key questions for the authors. First, does the crisis lie within liberalism’s theory of inclusion itself, or in how that theory has been institutionalized and practiced? Second, she asked whether their analysis is grounded in specific empirical contexts—such as particular populist movements in Western democracies—or whether it is meant as a globally applicable conceptual reflection. These questions, she suggested, could help clarify the scope and applicability of their arguments.
Dr. Sargın concluded by thanking all presenters for their contributions, noting that each paper tackled different dimensions of the panel’s central theme with intellectual rigor and originality. Her feedback was structured, probing, and constructive, encouraging the presenters to strengthen conceptual clarity, operationalize their claims empirically, and engage with broader theoretical debates.
Presenter’s Response: Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu
Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu delivered a thoughtful and philosophically grounded response to the comments and suggestions raised by the discussants. His reply offered both clarifications on theoretical positioning and elaborations on how his analysis engages with the emotional and structural dimensions of authoritarian populism in India, as well as reflections on alternative democratic imaginaries.
Dr. Kundu began by thanking Dr. El Bakkali for his constructive suggestions, emphasizing that they aligned closely with aspects he had already sought to highlight in his presentation. In particular, he welcomed the suggestion to further develop the analysis of emotion as a political technology—that is, the ways in which political leaders deploy pride, belonging, and resentment to shape collective identities and mobilize political support. This, he noted, was already a central thread of his argument, and he plans to strengthen this dimension further.
He also acknowledged the importance of incorporating empirical data, such as social media discourse and electoral mobilization strategies, to ground the theoretical reflections. In addition, he agreed that linking the Indian case more explicitly to global debates on post-truth politics and the psychology of populism would situate his work within broader comparative discussions, enhancing its analytical reach.
Responding to Dr. Sargın’s question on the operationalization of his theoretical framework, Dr. Kundu provided an extended explanation of how his work positions emotion within political theory. He observed that modern political philosophy has historically privileged reason over emotion, a hierarchy that can be traced back to Enlightenment thought and its liberal humanist legacy. Both liberalism and Marxism, he argued, have been shaped by this rationalist orientation—liberalism through its focus on institutional reason, and Marxism through its claim to be a “scientific” critique of capitalism.
Dr. Kundu explained that his project seeks to theorize emotion not as the opposite of reason but as an integral dimension of political subjectivity and mobilization. Drawing on Althusser’s post-Marxist intervention, he highlighted how Althusser linked ideology to the unconscious, thus opening a conceptual space where desire, fantasy, and affect become central to understanding political dynamics. By situating ideology within the unconscious, Althusser challenges the dominance of rationalist frameworks and reveals how structures of feeling shape political identification.
For Dr. Kundu, this perspective is essential for understanding the rise of Hindutva nationalism in India after 2014. Hindu nationalist movements, he argued, have strategically mobilized affective sentiments tied to religious identity, historical narratives, and collective grievances. Issues such as the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, the Uniform Civil Code, and the abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir tapped into deep-seated emotional reservoirs and historical resentments. Progressive parties, including the Indian National Congress, largely failed to address or mobilize these sentiments substantively, allowing Hindu nationalist forces to harness and redirect these affective energies for electoral gain.
By bringing psychoanalytic and structural perspectives into the analysis, Dr. Kundu aims to provide a richer theoretical account of how populist movements shape political subjectivities and construct “the people” through emotional infrastructures, rather than merely through rational discourse or institutional politics.
Addressing Dr. Sargın’s question regarding alternative democratic imaginaries, Dr. Kundu clarified that his notion of an “alternative people” refers to social groups and communities marginalized by existing structural logics—political, cultural, and social. In the Indian context, this primarily includes lower-caste communities, whose experiences of marginalization parallel those of racial minorities in other societies. He argued that any democratic reimagining must begin with these dispossessed groups, whose historical exclusion provides the basis for a more inclusive conception of “the people.”
Central to this reimagining is the principle of redistribution. Dr. Kundu stressed that redistribution should not be understood narrowly as land reform but as encompassing the redistribution of income, resources, and welfare benefits. He pointed to the 2024 general elections in India, where the Congress Party and opposition forces effectively mobilized redistributive politics to gain support among marginalized communities. He argued that reviving redistribution as a central political principle is essential for countering the affective and cultural narratives mobilized by populist movements, thereby addressing both material inequalities and symbolic exclusions.
Dr. Kundu concluded by reaffirming his commitment to integrating the discussants’ feedback into his ongoing research. He intends to deepen the empirical base, clarify conceptual frameworks, and further elaborate the normative and strategic implications of his work. His response underscored the theoretical ambition of situating emotional dynamics at the center of political analysis, while also engaging with the practical stakes of democratic politics in contemporary India.
Presenters’ Response: Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan
Protests against judicial reform and religious coercion in Israel. Photo: Dreamstime.
Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan offered a thoughtful and layered response to the feedback raised by the discussants on their joint presentation examining the populist subversion of the universalist ideal encapsulated in the phrase “We the People.” Their response addressed theoretical, methodological, and contextual questions, while also extending the discussion to the role of technology and the current crises of liberalism.
Dr. Bentman began by addressing Dr. El Bakkali’s observation that their paper relied primarily on European political theory, without engaging with non-European perspectives. He candidly acknowledged this as both a limitation and an opportunity. He noted that, as a scholar raised in a context that “pretends to be part of Europe while geographically located in Western Asia,” he had not developed expertise in non-European political philosophies. However, he agreed that integrating non-Western intellectual traditions could enrich the analysis, offering alternative conceptual vocabularies and historical experiences that may shed new light on populist transformations. He expressed genuine interest in pursuing this line of inquiry in future research, acknowledging the validity and importance of the comment.
Dr. Bentman then turned to the core theoretical question raised by both Dr. El Bakkali and Dr. Sargın: whether liberalism can be reconstituted to meet contemporary challenges, or whether it is in a terminal phase. Drawing a provocative historical analogy, he compared the current crisis of liberalism to the crisis of monarchy in the 16th and 17th centuries. Just as monarchies lost their legitimacy when they could no longer command the consent of their subjects, Dr. Bentman argued that liberalism today faces a legitimacy deficit. It struggles to convince citizens that its institutions and principles still offer a viable framework for collective life.
From his perspective, populism represents not an endpoint but a transitional phase, a political and ideological interregnum between the decline of liberalism as the hegemonic model and the emergence of whatever may replace it—whether a renewed form of liberalism or new authoritarian formations. He expressed doubts about whether liberalism can fully recover but left open the possibility of a “Liberalism 2.0,” contingent on liberal thought and institutions recognizing their limitations, reopening themselves to pluralism, and reclaiming political strength without ceding ground to populist forces.
Dr. Bentman pointed to contemporary political dynamics in Europe as illustrative. For example, in France, the collapse of centrist parties has led to unstable coalitions between radical right and left forces. Similar patterns, he observed, are visible across Europe, the United States, Israel, and India. These developments signal the erosion of liberalism’s institutional backbone—a challenge that demands both theoretical innovation and political reorganization.
Methodologically, Dr. Bentman emphasized that their project seeks to bridge political theory with empirical analysis, especially data on trust and legitimacy in democratic institutions. This dual approach is designed to ensure that the philosophical arguments remain grounded in political realities.
Dr. Michael Dahan supplemented Dr. Bentman’s remarks by addressing Dr. El Bakkali’s point on technology. Drawing on his background in technology and internet studies, Dr. Dahan clarified that the role of digital media in their analysis is not deterministic but catalytic. He described technology as functioning like a “chemical catalyst” in political processes—amplifying and accelerating underlying social and political dynamics rather than creating them outright.
In particular, new media platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram play a critical role in disseminating populist rhetoric, often more so than visible public platforms like Twitter or Facebook. Their encrypted, closed-network nature makes them harder to monitor and analyze, but their role in embedding populist narratives in everyday communication is substantial. Dr. Dahan underscored that understanding these dynamics is crucial for any analysis of contemporary populist movements.
Dr. Dahan then turned to what he described as the “elephant in the room”: the mobilization of Jewish supremacist rhetoric and historical imaginaries in Israel. He argued that framing the October 7th attacks as a “second Holocaust” played a decisive role in enabling populist rhetoric to feed and justify acts of mass violence, including widespread participation in the war on Gaza. This, he suggested, illustrates how populist discourses can appropriate historical traumas and collective identities to mobilize support for exclusionary and violent political projects.
The presenters’ reply demonstrated an openness to critical feedback and a willingness to expand their analytical framework. They acknowledged gaps (particularly regarding non-European perspectives), clarified their theoretical stance on the crisis of liberalism, and highlighted the catalytic role of technology and identity narratives in contemporary populist politics. Their response situated their work at the intersection of political theory, empirical analysis, and contemporary political developments, reinforcing the paper’s relevance to ongoing debates about populism, democracy, and liberalism’s future.
Q&A Session
The Q&A session opened with a conceptually rich question from Dr. Bülent Keneş, directed to Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan, which probed the historical and normative tension between pluralism, polarization, and national unity. Referring to the presentation’s guiding motto—“People — Once united, now divided”—Dr. Keneş observed that calls for a “united people” often carry nostalgic undertones, yet history reveals that such unity has frequently been mobilized by fascist and authoritarian movements to suppress pluralism in the name of a singular, homogenous “people.” His question centered on three key points: How should we interpret the contemporary tension between pluralism, which sustains democratic contestation, and polarization, which turns difference into entrenched enmity? To what extent does the longing for a “united people” risk reviving homogenizing impulses that undermine liberal democratic pluralism? What might constitute the optimal balance between pluralism, polarization, and unity in a healthy democracy?
Dr. Dahan began by reflecting on the constructed nature of “the people,” drawing on political theory and comparative examples. He emphasized that “the people” is always imagined—whether as an ethno-national entity or as a pluralist civic collective. Nations, from Czechs to Turks to Serbs, are imagined communities, and the content of this imagination determines whether “the people” is inclusive or exclusionary.
If this imagined construct is filled with pluralist values and a multifaceted vision, democratic contestation can thrive without descending into authoritarianism. However, if the construct is defined in ethno-nationalist terms, history shows that societies eventually devolve toward exclusionary or authoritarian structures. This, he cautioned, is a “very dangerous slope” that has been observed across historical and contemporary contexts.
Dr. Dahan illustrated this tension through American historical imaginaries of “We, the People.” While the ideal was articulated as multifaceted and inclusive, its realization has always been contingent on institutional arrangements. He underscored that the key to achieving pluralist unity lies in building and maintaining institutions that can embody this inclusive vision and in ensuring that public trust in these institutions remains strong.
He cited Canada’s constitutional framework as a partial example of this attempt. Through a multicultural constitutional vision, Canada sought to establish an institutional basis for inclusive belonging. While not perfect—racism and nationalist sentiments persist—Canada demonstrates that institutional design matters in mediating between pluralism and unity.
Importantly, Dr. Dahan noted that political culture and historical trajectories shape how these tensions play out. Countries in Eastern Europe, for example, followed different democratic transitions depending on their political histories, demonstrating that no universal template exists. Any attempt to balance pluralism and unity must therefore take local political cultures seriously.
He concluded by invoking his own hybrid identity as a Moroccan Jew with an American accent to illustrate how multifaceted identities complicate ethno-national definitions of “the people” and point toward the need for inclusive imaginaries in diverse societies.
Dr. Bentman expanded on these themes by examining the conceptual duality of “we” in political thought. He argued that both liberalism and fascism mobilize “we,” but in fundamentally different ways. In liberal thought, “we” refers to individuals choosing to live together, either literally or metaphorically, under shared civic rules. In fascist and authoritarian conceptions, “we” refers to an organic national or racial body, something that transcends voluntary association and instead invokes essentialized cultural or racial unity.
Dr. Bentman observed that the founding liberal “we”—as in the American constitutional moment—was itself exclusive, excluding Black people, women, and many minorities. Over time, liberalism expanded the circle of inclusion. However, he argued that inclusion alone proved insufficient. Inviting marginalized groups into a structure designed for a dominant cultural model revealed deeper structural limitations. As societies became more plural, structural and cultural incompatibilities surfaced, contributing to today’s democratic crises.
He noted that contemporary right-wing actors are not necessarily openly fascist, but they appropriate liberal language—individualism, democracy, rights—strategically, blending it with exclusionary identity politics. This hybrid rhetoric allows them to appeal to citizens without explicitly disavowing democratic norms, making their challenge more insidious.
Dr. Bentman drew historical analogies to moments of deep political transformation, such as the 17th-century crisis of monarchy, when political theory (Hobbes, Locke) and institutional innovation (constitutional monarchy) developed in tandem. By contrast, today, he argued, there is a disconnect between political theory and political practice: political scientists and philosophers have not yet articulated a compelling new framework to address the current crisis, while the radical right has developed a coherent and widely disseminated intellectual infrastructure—often outside traditional academia—that is effectively reshaping political imaginaries.
Dr. Bentman concluded by stressing that liberal democracies face a conceptual and political struggle to articulate a renewed vision of pluralist unity. Without such a vision, the political ground may increasingly be ceded to exclusionary movements.
Dr. Azize Sargın raised an incisive theoretical question regarding the concept of the “revolutionary subject” in Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s presentation on authoritarian populism in India. Specifically, she asked whether the meaning and role of the revolutionary subject differ across contexts, such as between India and Western Europe, and how this concept might be contextually adapted in different socio-political settings.
In his response, Dr. Kundu affirmed that the notion of the “revolutionary subject” is deeply contextual and contingent upon local socio-political cultures. Drawing on the Indian case, he argued that the revolutionary subject comprises the dispossessed and marginalized communities—including Dalits, Adivasis, minorities, women, and other groups excluded from the country’s dominant economic and political narratives. These groups, he explained, are structurally positioned outside the logic of capital and have been systematically marginalized from India’s celebrated “growth story.”
Dr. Kundu emphasized that progressive political forces must engage with these groups if they wish to effectively counter the rise of right-wing populism. He argued that while right-wing populist movements possess strong cultural and nationalist narratives, they lack a coherent economic theory. This absence makes them vulnerable when confronted with structural questions of inequality. For Dr. Kundu, “redistribution” represents the key political discourse capable of challenging the entrenched structures—whether they be economic systems, caste hierarchies, patriarchal relations, or racial discrimination—that sustain inequality.
By centering redistribution, progressive movements can articulate a vision of economic and social justice that mobilizes marginalized groups as active political agents. Dr. Kundu concluded by agreeing with Dr. Sargın’s premise: the definition and composition of the revolutionary subject will vary across different contexts—shaped by specific historical, social, and political circumstances in each society.
Concluding Remarks by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni
Professor Oscar Mazzoleni closed the session with a set of thoughtful reflections that synthesized the key themes of the day’s discussion. He identified two central issues that framed the debate: 1) The hijacking of “the people” by populist movements, particularly those on the right and of an authoritarian character, which often deploy a top-down vision to construct an exclusionary notion of belonging. 2) The democratic responses from below, emphasizing bottom-up strategies, the role of civil society, the defense of pluralism and individual rights, and the promotion of an inclusionary political vision.
Prof. Mazzoleni highlighted the dual nature of populism as both a strategic political project—seeking to mobilize identity and belonging—and a symptom of deeper structural crises within liberal democracies. To understand the global success of populist movements, he argued, it is crucial to analyze three interrelated dimensions:
Rule of Law: Populist movements exploit weaknesses and contradictions within democratic legal systems. While the rule of law embodies universal principles such as pluralism and respect for others, its local variations and inconsistent application create vulnerabilities that populists capitalize on.
Territory and Borders: Questions of belonging are inseparable from territorial and border politics. Defining “who belongs” involves not only political conflict but also emotional dynamics and, in some contexts, war. Borders shape identities and collective imaginaries, becoming a key arena for populist mobilization.
Globalization and Neoliberalism: The neoliberal transformation has not merely reduced the role of the state but has reshaped cultural attitudes, placing competition—both between individuals and between nations—at the core of social relations. This has produced new uncertainties and a heightened desire for belonging, which right-wing populists have adeptly exploited.
According to Prof. Mazzoleni, populist movements thrive by tapping into these tensions, positioning “the people” against democracy, the rule of law, and pluralistic communities. Polarization and hate have emerged as dominant political emotions, deepening democratic fractures. While acknowledging the gravity of these challenges, Prof. Mazzoleni concluded with a measured pessimism: understanding these dynamics clearly is a necessary starting point for rebuilding hope and formulating effective democratic responses in the future.
Overall Conclusion
The fourth session of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a rich and multi-layered examination of how “the people” is constructed, mobilized, and contested across diverse political contexts. Bringing together perspectives from Nigeria, India and Israel, the session illuminated the dual role of “the people” as both a democratic resource and a political instrument leveraged to legitimize exclusionary projects. Throughout the discussions, three interrelated themes emerged.
First, the conceptual construction of “the people” remains central to both democratic renewal and authoritarian subversion. As shown in the presentations, populist actors strategically deploy affective, cultural, and institutional mechanisms to redefine “the people” in exclusionary ways, often by appropriating liberal democratic language itself.
Second, structural dynamics—legal, territorial, and economic—shape the political uses of “the people.” Populist movements thrive where the rule of law is inconsistently applied, where borders and belonging are contested, and where neoliberal globalization has generated competition, insecurity, and a search for identity. These structural tensions are not peripheral but fundamental to understanding contemporary populism.
Third, the responses to populist constructions of “the people” must engage both top-down and bottom-up dynamics. While populism often advances through centralized, leader-driven narratives, democratic resilience depends on revitalizing participatory governance, reinforcing pluralist institutions, and fostering inclusive imaginaries that bridge rather than deepen divisions.
The interplay of theoretical reflections, empirical insights, and comparative perspectives generated a vibrant interdisciplinary dialogue. Presenters offered innovative analyses of participatory governance, psychoanalytic approaches to populism, and the subversion of universalist ideals. Discussants sharpened these contributions through methodological and conceptual critiques, while the Q&A underscored the urgency of rethinking pluralism, polarization, and unity in fractured democracies.
As Professor Oscar Mazzoleni emphasized in his concluding remarks, understanding populism as both a strategic project and a symptom of structural crises is essential for formulating effective democratic responses. This session thus laid a strong foundation for continued interdisciplinary engagement on how “the people” is performed and politicized in the 21st century.
In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Bruce E. Cain—Professor of Political Science at Stanford University—analyzes how Donald Trump has reshaped the Republican Party and advanced classical authoritarian strategies. “There’s no question that, whether by instinct or by deliberate strategy, Trump is playing the classical authoritarian game,” Professor Cain asserts. He situates Trumpism within long-term demographic, institutional, and ideological shifts while underscoring Trump’s unique use of crisis narratives, bullying tactics, and federal coercion. Professor Cain also warns that Trumpism has exploited structural weaknesses in party regulation, executive power, and campaign finance, stressing the urgency of reinforcing democratic guardrails to prevent lasting authoritarian consolidation.
In a wide-ranging and incisive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Bruce E. Cain—Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Director of the Bill Lane Center for the American West—offers a penetrating analysis of how Donald Trump’s leadership has reshaped the Republican Party and pushed American politics toward classical authoritarian strategies. “There’s no question that, whether by instinct or by deliberate strategy, Trump is playing the classical authoritarian game,” Professor Cain observes. “There’s no doubt that’s what he’s trying to do. It suits the way he has run his companies, and it suits the kinds of leaders he admires in other countries. He’s essentially following in their footsteps.”
Professor Cain situates Trumpism within broader structural transformations of American politics, emphasizing long-term demographic, geographic, and institutional shifts that made Trump’s rise possible. He points to “social sorting” and “party sorting” since the 1960s, along with growing racial diversity and economic inequality, as crucial background conditions. These shifts, he argues, preceded Trump and “made his rise possible,” even as his “adroit use of social media” and personal brand amplified their impact.
Central to Professor Cain’s analysis is Trump’s deliberate exploitation of crisis narratives and authoritarian tactics. Reflecting on Trump’s response to crises such as the Charlie Kirk assassination, Professor Cain notes that “Trump is playing the classical authoritarian game” and has escalated his reliance on bullying tactics compared to his first term. He highlights Trump’s willingness to deploy federal forces in Democratic-run cities, calling it “very disturbing and very unusual,” and likens it to the EU sending troops into member states to enforce policy—an action that violates deeply held American principles of state sovereignty.
Professor Cain also examines the evolving coalition underpinning the contemporary Republican Party. He underscores the critical role of the MAGA base, describing it as “maybe, at best, 40%, but more likely 30% of the Republican Party’s support,” driven in part by cultural grievance politics and white nationalist narratives. Yet, he stresses the uneasy alliance between this base and more traditional Republicans, warning of internal tensions that could shape future elections.
Institutionally, Professor Cain warns that Trumpism has both exploited and accelerated structural weaknesses in the American political system—from the weakening of party authority and campaign finance regulation to the expansion of executive power. He cautions that if the Supreme Court legitimizes Trump’s expansive claims of emergency powers and unilateral action, “it’ll be monkey see, monkey do,” with Democrats following suit—leading to instability and democratic erosion.
Professor Cain concludes by emphasizing the urgency of shoring up democratic guardrails, particularly regarding executive power, emergency provisions, and the role of the courts. His analysis offers a sobering reminder that while Trump may be unique, the authoritarian strategies he has deployed are embedded within deeper institutional vulnerabilities that will persist beyond his presidency.
Bruce E. Cain is a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Director of the Bill Lane Center for the American West.
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Bruce Cain, revised for clarity and flow.
How Demography and Party Sorting Paved the Way for Trump
Professor Cain, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Many scholars locate the transformation of the American Right within long-term structural changes dating back to the 1970s—such as realignments in race, region, and party organization—while others highlight the Trump and MAGA era as a moment of acute disruption. How do you conceptually distinguish between these deeper ideological and institutional evolutions and the more contingent, charismatic, and stylistic ruptures introduced by Trump?
Professor Bruce Cain: This is a really important point that you’re making. Because Trump sucks all the oxygen out of the conversation, people tend to think that everything has to do with Trump himself—his personality and his adroit use of social media. But it’s crucial to emphasize that there were larger demographic and political trends behind Trumpism.
Because the list is very long, I’ll focus on a couple that are particularly important. One is what we call social sorting. America is a very mobile society, and because of this mobility, many states—as well as rural and urban areas—have come to reflect the partisan makeup of different parties. We now have heavily Democratic urban areas and heavily Republican rural areas. This is partly enabled by the fact that people tend to move into neighborhoods with others who are like themselves. As a result, you get social sorting that reinforces what happens online, where people similarly find their way into virtual communities that mirror their own demographics.
The second is party sorting, as we describe it in political science. Party coalitions underwent a sorting process beginning in the 1960s and 1970s with the signing of civil rights legislation. From that period forward, the Democratic Party—which had been a coalition of liberal elites in blue areas and, if you like, very conservative, racially conservative Southern Democrats—broke apart. Essentially, the social conservatives, and racial conservatives in particular, moved to the Republican Party, while liberal Republicans shifted to the Democratic Party.
As a result, the parties—rather than remaining more heterogeneous and containing internal breaks within their coalitional structures—became more ideologically consistent along lines of social and political liberalism versus conservatism.
Then there are factors outside the political process per se, though they are partly the result of policies we passed. One is the incredible rise in inequality, largely based on education, as the American economy became increasingly service-oriented and high-tech. Another is the change in immigration policies during the Civil Rights era, which opened the country to groups from all over the world and increased the racial diversity of the United States. That trend continues, partly because once immigrant groups arrive, they tend to have higher birth rates; even if immigration were to be curtailed, diversity would still grow.
Finally, there are the residual racial tensions from the earlier period, particularly around African Americans and, to some extent, Latinos. So yes, Trump made things worse—but crucially, there were demographic and political trends that preceded him and made his rise possible.
Grievance Politics and the New Republican Base
The contemporary Republican coalition increasingly rests on rural, white, non-college-educated constituencies mobilized through identity-based appeals rather than policy commitments. How has this demographic and geographic consolidation reshaped the movement’s ideological core, and to what extent has the strategic shift toward cultural grievance politics weakened traditional party mediation and fostered extra-institutional ecosystems like the alt-right and online mobilization networks?
Professor Bruce Cain: Yes, and again, this is another one of these underlying trends that really is so critical. I’m an old man, and when I was growing up, there was more of a working-class versus non-working-class managerial divide in American politics. Today, it’s much more college-educated versus not college-educated. The problem for the Democratic Party is that, while there are a large number of college-educated people in the United States, the percent of people who’ve graduated from college is about 37%, and those who do not have a college education make up about 60%.
What that means is that, as we moved away from manufacturing, particularly in the middle of the country, we were taking a whole bunch of jobs—union jobs and well-paying non-white-collar jobs—and giving them over to other countries. Our free trade policies were undermining not only the economic basis of the middle of the country but also that of blue-collar workers throughout the United States.
I believe one element of this is just the anger about downward social mobility on the part of people who do not have a university education. But you also mentioned, and I think it’s right to say, that there’s been a shift in terms of cultural grievance. Part of it is that, along with the economic downward mobility, comes social and political loss of power and loss of status, and that certainly contributes to the grievance that you’re talking about.
But there was also the fact that the court got way out ahead on abortion policy and took it away from the states, nationalizing a policy I tend to agree with, but nonetheless, many Catholics and many fundamentalist Protestant groups don’t agree with, which is the right to abortion. Abortion really played a major role, on top of the racial divisions, in creating a divide between the Democratic and Republican Party.
So, yes, absolutely, I think grievance politics is now a very important part of what we’re talking about here.
Typical cold winter scene in the Rust Belt city of Cleveland, Ohio, with a steel mill in the background. Photo: Dreamstime.
Harnessing Crises for Authoritarian Ends
Trump’s response to events such as the Charlie Kirk assassination reveals how crises can be harnessed to justify extraordinary measures. How would you situate Trump’s use of crisis narratives within classical authoritarian playbooks—such as “Reichstag fire” strategies—and do you see this as a deliberate authoritarian project or an improvisational charismatic populism that nonetheless has authoritarian consequences?
Professor Bruce Cain: That involves psychoanalyzing Mr. Trump, which unfortunately I can’t do. I think some of it is absolutely a deliberate strategy, but some of it is simply that this is not a man who controls his emotions very well. And perhaps, if he follows the path of his father into dementia, we may see more of this kind of emotional rollercoaster, because that’s one of the features of dementia. So, believe me, we’re worried about that in the United States.
There’s no question that, whether by instinct or by deliberate strategy, Trump is playing the classical authoritarian game. There’s no doubt that’s what he’s trying to do. It suits the way he has run his companies, and it suits the kinds of leaders he admires in other countries. He’s essentially following in their footsteps.
But I will say this: so far, he is tracking other presidents—the three presidential administrations, including Trump One—in terms of his popularity with the public. His numbers have been dropping; he’s now at about 41% favorability, which is where he was during Trump One, when he suffered a major setback in the by-election that followed his 2016 victory.
There are also many more courts now, particularly below the Supreme Court level, that are blocking his attempts to implement authoritarian measures, whether involving the use of troops or emergency clauses. Admittedly, we still have to wait for the Supreme Court to weigh in on these matters, but it seems the Court is waiting to hear from many of the district and appellate courts. If I were the Trump administration, I would suspect he’s going to lose a fair number of these cases.
Then, of course, the press corps are increasingly angry with him. Most recently, when the Defense Department tried to get journalists to sign pledges not to use leaked information, virtually the entire press—including the right-wing press—rejected the move.
So, yes, there’s no question that he wants to play the authoritarian playbook. The question is whether that’s actually possible in the United States, even in these very divided times.
Trump’s Legacy and the Institutionalization of MAGA
Do you view the MAGA movement as populism evolving toward a stable authoritarian formation, potentially institutionalized through mechanisms like Project 2025, or as a personalist phenomenon tied to Trump’s leadership that may dissipate with his exit? What institutional or cultural legacies do you expect to persist beyond his tenure?
Professor Bruce Cain: Again, it’s a mix. You can’t take Trump out of the equation. His ability to use social media, the fact that he is a self-financed candidate who was able to launch his campaign with his own money, and his status as a TV star on a show that portrayed him as a strong business leader—even if we think that image was fake—all of these factors mattered. It’s not clear that anyone else could have brought all those elements together, so there is a unique dimension to Trump in that regard.
But the reality is that there was a base composed of people who were unhappy about many of the social issues we’ve been discussing and people who were experiencing downward mobility. There was always the potential to mobilize this base, which we now call the Make America Great Again base, or MAGA base. That base is a critical part of the equation, and it likely won’t disappear, even if Trump decides not to contest the next presidential election because he believes he can run a third time. The Constitution says no. But the MAGA base will remain, no matter what happens to Trump.
Another issue we face is the extremely close contestation between the two parties. Many of our most stable periods have occurred when one party held clear dominance. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was the Democratic Party; during the Reagan years, it was the Republican Party. Today, neither party has a firm grip, which means we’re likely to see a lot of back-and-forth, closely contested elections. This dynamic creates opportunities for mischief, as both sides try to extract tactical and strategic advantages from the system.
So yes, much of this will endure even after Trump moves on. But Trump brings a unique element to the equation—one that I don’t see anyone else in the Republican Party being able to duplicate.
Militarizing Politics: A Break with American Norms
46th US Presidential Inauguration in Washington, D.C. — Held on January 20, 2021, under heightened security following the January 6 insurrection. Public access was restricted, and 25,000 National Guard troops were deployed around the US Capitol. Photo: Dreamstime.
Trump’s willingness to deploy more National Guard in major Democratic-run cities raises questions about federal coercion, politicization of armed forces, and the subversion of local democratic autonomy. How might such measures operate within an authoritarian power-consolidation strategy, particularly in delegitimizing urban, racially diverse political centers framed as “internal enemies”?
Professor Bruce Cain: We’re worried about that. There’s no question that what’s different about Trump is his attempt to incite division rather than suppress or mediate it, along with his use of extra-controversial methods—going around the rules in dubious ways—and waiting for the courts to slap his hand. The courts, of course, are very deliberate; they will examine these matters carefully before making decisions that will shape the future.
This is what’s troubling. Compared to Trump One, there is much more bullying. There was always a bullying element in Trump One, but he has really taken that a step further. He’s now extending it into the states, which is a major violation of American political norms. It would be the equivalent of the EU entering Spain, France, and other European countries and deploying military forces to enforce EU policies.
In the United States, we believe that states have sovereign powers over areas such as education, policing, fire services, and other local affairs. For Trump to coerce at that level is both disturbing and highly unusual. I believe it will ultimately be struck down by the courts, but it will take time before these issues are fully litigated.
DEI Backlash and the Toleration of Extremism
“White replacement” and “white genocide” conspiracies have become central to far-right mobilization. How integral are these narratives to sustaining the contemporary Republican coalition, and how do they interact with institutional party strategies versus grassroots extremist currents?
Professor Bruce Cain: For the MAGA base, these narratives are absolutely essential. The MAGA base constitutes, at best, around 40%, but more likely closer to 30% of the Republican Party’s support. I don’t believe that the white replacement and white genocide conspiracies are significantly influencing traditional Republicans. What may resonate with them, however, is concern over what they perceive as overly zealous efforts to implement Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives. But that doesn’t mean they’ve embraced white nationalism.
The Republican Party should be seen as a coalition between those who believe in the white nationalist agenda that Trump is promoting and traditional Republicans who supported him for tax cuts and regulatory relief. Many in the latter group were willing to tolerate the former, using perceived DEI overreach as a justification for accommodating the white nationalist wing of the party.
As a result, these groups exist in an uneasy coalition within the Republican Party. However, I don’t believe the party as a whole is fully aligned with the MAGA agenda on this issue.
The Secular Strongman of a Sacred Cause
A Trump flag waves at a pier on Coden Beach in Coden, Alabama, on June 9, 2024. The flag bears the slogan, “Jesus is my Savior. Trump is my President.” Photo: Carmen K. Sisson.
The intensified fusion of evangelical Christianity and Republican politics under Trump has transformed the political theology of the Right. How has this religious alignment shaped authoritarian tendencies, policy radicalization, and the sacralization of political conflict?
Professor Bruce Cain: The secular–religious divide in America has deepened over the lifetime of many of us. Those of us who were boomers and grew up in the 1960s and 1970s remember a time when the Democratic Party, under Carter, for example, had an evangelical wing. The abortion issue and subsequent legal decisions created a separation, and George Bush Jr. then brought more evangelicals over to the Republican side.
Trump is not a religious man. He pretends to be, but I don’t think anyone seriously believes he is a pious human being. It is striking that perhaps one of the most secular and morally compromised figures imaginable has become the leader of the religious right. But they view him much like someone views their divorce lawyer: they don’t care about the lawyer’s personal morality as long as they get the divorce.
Trump functions in the same way. They know he’s not a decent person, but they appreciate that he stands up for them, and they overlook the fact that he is anything but a religious man himself.
Strategic Ambiguity on White Nationalism
Republican elites have alternated between embracing and distancing themselves from alt-right and white supremacist movements. How should we interpret this oscillation—tactical ambiguity, strategic co-optation, or deeper ideological convergence?
Professor Bruce Cain: I don’t think it’s completely resolved how far they’re willing to go with this sort of white nationalism. I know too many educated Republicans who don’t share that perspective. For example, at Stanford, one of the most powerful people on campus is the head of the Hoover Institute, Condoleezza “Condi” Rice, an African-American woman who is widely respected. She certainly doesn’t tolerate white supremacist beliefs.
So, it’s an uneasy alliance, and as I mentioned before, it’s justified for the time being because there’s a belief that Democrats went a little too far in promoting diversity, equity, and inclusion measures, and that affirmative action went too far as well—leading some to feel that fairness has been denied in the present to redress past injustices.
There’s a clear distinction between Republican skepticism about DEI and outright supremacist thinking. It’s really a small part of the base that genuinely holds those extremist views. This makes for an uneasy coalition, which could become problematic at some point in the future—perhaps as soon as the next presidential election.
The Activist–Billionaire Nexus in GOP Politics
nti-Trump protest during the Labor Day Parade in New York City on September 6, 2025. Demonstrators gathered on Fifth Avenue across from Trump Tower during the annual parade in Midtown Manhattan. Photo: Dreamstime.
Drawing on your work on party autonomy, how has Trumpism altered the internal structure and strategic independence of the Republican Party? Has it hollowed out institutional authority or merely displaced it toward charismatic leadership and movement actors, especially within a nomination system that was reformed to democratize candidate selection but arguably enabled populist capture?
Professor Bruce Cain: There’s definitely, again, an element that is peculiar to Trump and his very strong bullying methods. That’s enabled him to capture the party. But if we step back, we see that there are longer-term trends that made it possible for him to do this. Right at the top of the list is social media. Social media, as we’ve seen, has become a powerful tool for bullying—everything from doxing to the ability to publicly shame people to mobilizing crowds instantaneously. All of these dynamics have made bullying and intimidation much stronger, not only in politics but also in the lives of our children and in our communities. Trump was definitely a beneficiary of that.
But there were also things we did through political reform that weakened parts of the party. In America, we think of the party as having three components: the party in office, namely the partisanship of the officeholders; the party in the bureaucracy, which consists of the people in the Republican National Committee (RNC), the Democratic National Committee (DNC), and the 50 state parties—those who run the machinery of the party; and finally, the activists.
To make a long, complicated story short, political reforms have strengthened the activists, who are by far the most ideological component of the electorate, while weakening the power of officeholders. Congress is now so afraid of party primaries because primaries do not attract all voters; they attract only the most partisan, activist ones. As a result, the control activists have over the primaries skews both parties to either the left or the right.
Another key factor is that the Supreme Court has allowed wealthy individuals to spend as much money as they want, creating almost limitless self-financing. This helped Trump significantly, as he was able to use his own money to catapult himself into the primaries. There is now far more independent spending, which essentially dwarfs the money given directly to candidates. We are awash in ideological and interest group money, and our inability to control campaign finance has unquestionably helped Trump and made the situation much worse.
Emergency Powers and Democratic Stability
The rise of executive-centered partisanship has weakened Congress and elevated the presidency as the primary partisan engine. Do you see this imbalance as reversible through institutional reform, or has it become structurally entrenched within the constitutional order?
Professor Bruce Cain: We’ll know a lot more about the answer to this question over the next year, as the Supreme Court will have to decide how far emergency powers can be used—the use of emergency powers to suspend normal processes, the use of impoundment activities (i.e., deciding upon entering office not to spend the money allocated by the previous Congress), and how much authority the president has to remove people in the bureaucracy who are nonpartisan rather than political appointees. In other words, how much of the Progressive Era reforms designed to create a nonpartisan bureaucracy can be undone.
If the Court condones these actions, it will be a case of monkey see, monkey do, because the Democrats will take whatever powers are given to the president to politicize everything, use emergency powers, and undo everything that Trump is doing. The Democrats will do the same thing, which means there will be far more instability in American positions vis-à-vis Europe, trade, and climate change. Essentially, the system will become much more schizophrenic and variable, and I believe this will ultimately undermine capitalism, investment, and infrastructure. Whether we are headed in that direction—and whether it becomes permanent—will be decided by the Supreme Court over the next year or two.
Money as Speech—and as a Tool of Power
Image of a pile of dollars currency and text of Trump Effect, symbolizing Trump Effect in American economy. Photo: Paulus Rusyanto.
In your work on “dependence corruption,” you highlighted how financial flows shape representation. How do emerging funding ecosystems—around MAGA media, Christian nationalist donors, tech billionaires, and PACs—challenge existing regulatory frameworks and deepen authoritarian tendencies within the movement?
Professor Bruce Cain: I do believe that America, because it has a very liberal interpretation of the First Amendment—i.e., because we believe that money is speech and that we can only restrict it under the narrowest purposes, namely to prevent quid pro quo corruption, meaning money that’s given directly to a candidate—has opened up the floodgates to a lot of money. That can still work if the money is balanced on both sides, and on many issues, that’s true. But what we’re seeing, for example, with digital currencies is that Trump has brought in lots of billionaires—tech billionaires—who want to create meme coins and invest in large server farms to generate value for digital currency.
All of these developments are tied not only to corruption stemming from campaign contributions but also to Trump himself cutting deals, investing in currency, and then making policy that favors those investments. We’re seeing in America now a level of corruption that we didn’t think was possible after the reforms of the 1970s. It’s approaching the levels of the 19th century, with people getting into office or power and then using it to make themselves richer. This is a major concern, and many of us in the legal and political science communities will be thinking seriously about how to strengthen the system against it.
Reinforcing Democratic Guardrails
Lastly, given these structural, ideological, and institutional transformations, what democratic guardrails or institutional reforms do you view as most urgent to counteract potential authoritarian consolidation on the American Right? Are there specific vulnerabilities—such as in party regulation, executive power, or information ecosystems—that should be prioritized?
Professor Bruce Cain: I would say that many people in my world of political reform are going to try to restore some of the institutions we once had, like the filibuster—i.e., supermajority votes that aim to create bipartisanship. They’re going to try to bring that back, but I think this runs up against the underlying political culture in America right now. Where the Court really needs to draw the line to save American democracy is on executive actions—specifically, the degree to which the President can act unilaterally by imaginatively reinterpreting existing legislation and issuing executive actions.
Secondly, emergency provisions. If everything is an emergency, then nothing is a democracy. That’s essentially where we’re headed if we’re not careful, because political parties can pretty much declare anything an emergency—whether it’s somebody being attacked in a city, an immigration issue, or economic downturns. If everything qualifies as an emergency, democratic norms erode. That is a major vulnerability that needs to be addressed.
Lastly, for both the United States and within the EU, there must be a clear understanding that states’ rights—the ability of states to check the federal government, to serve as laboratories of innovation, and to act differently from the federal government—are critically important. It’s essential that the Court continues to recognize the importance of state sovereignty as granted under the Constitution.
These are the most important steps to take right now, and Trump has made it very clear that we need to shore up both judicial interpretations and, potentially, some of the statutory and constitutional language associated with these issues.
Please cite as: Shukri, Syaza & Hassan, Isyraf. (2025). “Anwar Ibrahim’s Civilisational Populism: The Gaza War and Malaysia.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). October 9, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000119
Abstract
This paper examines how Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia’s tenth prime minister, employs civilisational populism in shaping his foreign policy rhetoric, particularly during the Gaza War that started in 2023. Through the lens of civilisational populism defined by Yilmaz and Morieson as a political strategy that constructs “the people” as defenders of a superior but threatened civilisation, the paper argues that Anwar leverages the Gaza/Palestinian cause to project Islamic solidarity and deflect domestic criticisms of liberalism. In doing so, he seeks to consolidate support against the conservative Islamist opposition, PAS, while maintaining international legitimacy. Drawing on the framework of Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM), the study emphasizes the role of individual agency, cognitive calculations, and domestic political pressures in guiding Malaysia’s external stance. Anwar’s rhetorical and symbolic actions such as mass rallies, public condemnations of Israel, and economic restrictions on Israeli-linked entities are analysed not simply as moral positioning but as calculated decisions aimed at managing political survival within a fragmented coalition. The paper highlights contradictions in this approach, such as the BlackRock controversy and local backlash over prioritizing Palestinian aid over domestic needs, revealing the tension between foreign policy idealism and domestic political pragmatism. By integrating FPDM with civilisational populism, the paper provides an understanding of how Malaysia’s foreign policy is not purely reactive or interest-based but shaped by identity politics, leadership perception, and populist imperatives.
The pendulum of civilisationism has swung. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, humanity entered an era of globalisation where connectivity prevailed. However, it did not last, and now that we are in the third decade of the 21st century, we are referring back to Samuel Huntington’s most well-known work, which states that civilisation will be the basis for clashes. In the 1990s, the Washington Consensus fostered a wave of neoliberal globalization, making civilisational divisions seem unlikely. However, following the devastating events of 2001, these divisions have become more apparent, especially against Islamic civilisation. Instead of all-out war, the divisions we are seeing occurs within the framework of national elections. Politicians today are increasingly using civilisationism as part of their populist strategies to win votes.
According to Yilmaz and Morieson, civilisational populism is a political ideology that combines elements of populism with a civilisational framework. It involves a discourse that portrays a particular civilisation—often religious or cultural—as superior and under threat from outsiders or other civilisations. They argued, “populist uses of civilisational discourses differ from non-populist discourses insofar as they use civilisationism to construct internal divisions between an ingroup who they claim belong to ‘our’ civilisation (‘the people’), and outgroups (‘elites,’ ‘others’) who they claim have either betrayed the civilisation of the people or belong to a threatening foreign civilisation,” (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022: 8).
This form of populism appeals to sentiments of cultural heritage, identity, and belonging by positioning “the people” as defenders of their civilisation against perceived existential threats.
For this paper, we are looking at civilisational populism and its impact beyond the nation-state. We argue that Anwar Ibrahim, the tenth prime minister of Malaysia, has been involved with civilisational rhetoric for the purpose of gaining support. Domestically, Anwar’s main political rival is the Islamist Malaysian Pan-Islamic Party (PAS). Shukri (2023) argued that PAS definitely participated in the civilisational narrative of Islam against non-Muslims, specifically non-Muslim Chinese of Malaysia. On the other hand, Anwar, as argued by Shukri (2024), is more of an inclusivist populist. There is heightened political tension in Malaysia between the Islamists that get support from the majority Malay population and Anwar’s own coalition that is usually labelled derogatorily as “liberal” and finds support among non-Muslims and urban Malays. Due to this pressure, Anwar needs to portray himself as a “defender” of Malays and Muslims but in a civilisational way beyond Muslims in Malaysia in order to maintain his inclusivist reputation. Specifically, this paper will look at Anwar’s rhetoric on the Israel-Gaza War that erupted in October 2023.
Anwar has established himself as an Islamist since his days as a youth leader, and he later transitioned to become a Muslim democrat (Malik & Shukri, 2018). However, we observe that his more assertive rhetoric since becoming prime minister is slightly different from his days as the deputy prime minister under Mahathir Mohamad’s first administration. As a result, it may have led to intra-civilisational discord with other Muslim countries, such as with Saudi Arabia, albeit before the start of the ongoing war, when he was unable to meet either the king or the crown prince during his first visit as prime minister.
The next section will look at Malaysian politics and Anwar Ibrahim’s background. Next, we will look at the literature on civilisational populism and foreign policy decision making in order to provide a framework to guide our understanding of Anwar’s rhetoric about Palestine, Gaza, and the Muslim world. Following that, we will delve deeper into Anwar’s civilisational populism and his relationship with other Muslim leaders. The penultimate section will discuss the impact of Anwar’s civilisational rhetoric in the broader Muslim world context.
On October 4, 2025, billionaire populist Andrej Babiš’s ANO party won the Czech parliamentary elections with just under 35% of the vote, setting the stage for coalition talks with two small right-wing, Eurosceptic parties. In this in-depth interview with ECPS, Professor Lenka Bustikova analyzes the implications of this outcome for Czech democracy and the broader Central European political landscape. Warning that “Babiš’s victory is a big win for illiberalism in Europe,” she explains how this election represents both a consolidation of illiberal forces and a strategic shift in Babiš’s populism—from managerialism to paternalism—raising concerns about democratic backsliding and Czechia’s future orientation within the EU.
On October 4, 2025, billionaire populist Andrej Babiš’s ANO party won the Czech parliamentary elections with just under 35% of the vote, securing 80 of 200 seats—an increase from the previous election. Although short of a majority, Babiš is expected to lead coalition talks. His most likely allies are two small right-wing, Eurosceptic parties: the anti-Green Deal Motorists for Themselves and Tomio Okamura’s anti-immigrant Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). While ANO shares the Motorists’ opposition to EU emissions targets, relations with the SPD may prove more complicated due to internal divisions and radical demands. A new Babiš government would likely shift Czech foreign policy, notably by scrapping the Czech ammunition initiative supporting Ukraine.
Against this backdrop, Professor Lenka Bustikova, Director of the Center for European Studies and Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, provides a detailed analysis of the political transformations currently unfolding in Czechia. In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), she warns: “I’m very concerned. Despite the relatively moderate appeal, I do think that Babiš’s victory is a significant win for illiberals in the region. I do not think this will be a bloodbath for Czech democracy, but I do think there’s going to be a lot of bleeding. The patient will survive, but there will be a strong shift.”
Professor Bustikova situates the election within a broader pattern of democratic contestation in Central Europe, describing it as both a consolidation of the illiberal camp and a reconsolidation of the liberal camp. Drawing on her scholarship on technocratic populism, she explains how Babiš has evolved from presenting himself as a competent manager to positioning himself as a paternal figure promising redistribution and state-led solutions to economic grievances. His emphasis on managerial competence now interacts with sovereigntist and anti-Green Deal rhetoric, reflecting a hybrid populist strategy.
Crucially, Professor Bustikova underlines the significance of the far right’s role in the coalition-building process. “If this coalition emerges, it will be the first time in Czech history that the far right is either in coalition or silently supporting the government. That’s a huge breakthrough, and it’s very concerning,” she notes. This development, she argues, marks a major illiberal breakthrough, with potential implications for Czechia’s position in the EU.
Although Czechia retains strong institutional guardrails—including the presidency, the Senate, the Constitutional Court, and a pluralistic media environment—Professor Bustikova expects democratic quality to decline during Babiš’s tenure. Situating these developments in a regional perspective, she warns that the illiberal camp is “numerically much stronger,” making future liberal victories increasingly difficult.
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Lenka Bustikova, revised for clarity and flow.
Professor Lenka Bustikova is the Director of the Center for European Studies and Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida.
Czech Elections Mark a Strategic Shift Toward Illiberalism
Professor Lenka Bustikova, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In light of Andrej Babiš’s decisive electoral victory, how would you interpret the current realignment of Czech party politics? Does this signify a deeper structural shift toward sovereigntist populism, or is it a contingent backlash against liberal governance?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: Thank you for this wonderful and difficult question. I would say that I am not alarmed by the outcome of the Czech elections, but I’m certainly concerned. What happened in this election—and many others have commented on it as well—is the consolidation of two camps. I would call them liberal and illiberal, because what the previous or outgoing government offered was not a particularly liberal government.
In this election, Andrej Babiš and his party, ANO, very successfully and skillfully consolidated voters who are unhappy, struggling, insecure, and also revengeful—and he did so effectively. The encouraging news about the Czech elections is that, in the previous election, about one million votes were wasted on smaller anti-system parties. This time, it was only 400,000. Babiš managed to unite this “coalition of the unhappy” and those seeking change, and he did it well. That camp has now consolidated, will have a voice, and will act as an accountability mechanism.
The liberal camp actually did quite well; the electoral math just didn’t work in their favor as it did four years ago. They were punished for not delivering on certain issues. They could have implemented progressive policies that wouldn’t have cost them much, but they didn’t—partly due to tensions within the coalition. They could have been more proactive on LGBTQ rights, registered partnerships, and perhaps on women’s rights.
More importantly, voters were facing a country with high inflation and high debt. The government did all it could, but it wasn’t enough. While the macroeconomic statistics in the Czech Republic are quite favorable, the government failed to communicate this effectively and neglected key economic issues, such as the housing crisis, that required greater attention. The outgoing coalition also continued to embody a kind of 1990s economic approach—loyal to an era that many voters now question and want to move beyond.
Overall, this election represents both a consolidation of the illiberal camp and a reconsolidation of the liberal camp. What we are seeing—in the Czech Republic and elsewhere—is that the illiberal camp is much stronger. If these patterns of consolidation continue, it will become increasingly difficult for the liberal camp to win elections. This is a major challenge in many countries today.
From Technocrat to ‘Big Daddy’ Populist
Drawing on your concept of technocratic populism, how does Babiš’s blend of managerialism and anti-elite rhetoric differ from classical populist radical right movements in Central Europe? Has this hybrid model evolved since his first premiership (2017–2021)?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: When we wrote the article with Professor Petra Guasti on technocratic populism, we conceived of it as an ideal type—and, of course, every ideal type, when faced with reality, becomes a bit murky and messy. In the original classification, technocratic populism in its pure form did not involve culture wars, nativism, or sovereigntism. It was about the populist utilization of expertise to win elections.
Babiš, who is a very flexible and savvy politician, has certainly evolved. Especially during the 2023 presidential elections, we saw him significantly amplify his nativist appeal—it was quite remarkable. But then he softened his rhetoric again. In the current election, he and his party, ANO, have toned it down.
We also see a shift away from the original technocratic populist model and its managerial appeal. When he first ran, he presented himself as a competent manager. Now, he positions himself more as a “big daddy” figure who will take care of things and spend generously on his constituents. The party he originally founded was fiscally conservative, advocating for running the state efficiently like a firm. That is no longer the platform. The current platform focuses on redistribution and targeted spending toward core constituencies.
This has little to do with efficiency, even though one of his electoral appeals is that the previous coalition was ineffective at managing economic problems—and there is certainly some truth to that. In many ways, this election has centered on pocketbook concerns, poverty, and voters in economically disadvantaged regions. Babiš and ANO have managed to mobilize these voters very successfully and effectively.
Sovereigntist Rhetoric, Pragmatic Strategy
Given Babiš’s membership in the Patriots for Europe and his critiques of the Green Deal, how do you assess the interplay between sovereigntist populism in Czechia and EU-level constraints? Are we witnessing a gradual erosion of the EU’s leverage over domestic political agendas?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: We certainly see that the European Union either lacks the instruments or is unwilling to use the instruments at hand to deal with autocratic or illiberal leaders, unfortunately. Babiš is a very pragmatic politician. He will criticize the Green Deal, but if, for instance, his agro-federate firm can benefit from it, I’m sure he would be open to discussions. One important aspect of the Green Deal debate is the likely involvement of the Motorists party, which is expected to be part of the future coalition and absolutely opposes the Green Deal. There is even a possibility that this party will get the environment portfolio, which would certainly lead to a strong pushback against the Green Deal from the incoming coalition.
The coalition negotiations have just started and will take some time, but resistance is almost certain. However, Babiš, being highly pragmatic, will likely oppose the Green Deal selectively, in ways that suit his political agenda, while also accommodating his coalition partners. I’m sure he will navigate this very skillfully, as part of the Green Deal is rhetorical, but there are also technical aspects that will not be easy to roll back.
A Volatile Marriage of Convenience
If Babiš succeeds in forming a minority government backed by SPD and Motorists, how might this affect the strategic behavior of far-right actors? Does your research on illiberal alliances suggest a stable coalition or a volatile marriage of convenience?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: The negotiations have just started, and one possibility is a coalition of ANO, led by Andrej Babiš, and Motorists. It’s not clear whether the far-right party—Tomio Okamura’s party—or its 10 plus 5 MPs will be part of the government or whether they will silently support the coalition from parliament. It’s possible that, for the far right, Babiš will ask them to nominate experts.
This is likely to be a volatile coalition, but Babiš has shown in the past that he can handle coalitions very well. In fact, anyone considering entering a coalition with Andrej Babiš should be very cautious. Babiš was once in a coalition with the Social Democrats, and he completely destroyed them, siphoning off all their voters. They are basically gone, especially after this election—a dead party for which Babiš can take much of the credit.
The SPD should really think twice about how to approach this future coalition relationship because the election results have shown that Babiš can very skillfully siphon off far-right voters as well. He is a highly strategic politician who has effectively cannibalized his coalition partners in the past.
With Motorists, there are likely to be some tensions. It’s not a stable party; it’s built around a few personalities. The biggest source of tension in the coalition will probably concern budget balance. The party of Motorists is, in a way, the intellectual child of former President Václav Klaus. They want to keep balanced budgets—an idea that has already been signaled as completely unrealistic. There may be some initial friction, but it’s likely they will get over it quickly.
Babiš is one of the most talented politicians in the Czech Republic today, and I expect he will handle this situation quite effectively, using a combination of arm-twisting and incentives. I suspect he will be very successful.
Okamura Overshoots, Babiš Benefits
Czech businessman and SPD leader Tomio Okamura in Prague on May 5, 2010. Photo: Dreamstime.
The SPD underperformed compared to expectations. How do you explain the resilience of Babiš’s populist appeal despite the presence of established far-right actors? Does this reflect a mainstreaming of radical right discourse in Czech politics?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: Okamura underperformed—his party underperformed. Moreover, he has a group of very undisciplined MPs because, in fact, he had three other parties in the coalition, so he has five MPs who are more like coalition MPs than SPD members. He is no longer an authentic politician. Many far-right voters, including those from other parties, no longer see him as a credible nativist fighter—that’s one aspect. But also, he is too extreme for the Czech context. He ran a very vitriolic, pro-Russian campaign and openly declared that he would like the Czech Republic to leave NATO and the European Union. Czech voters absolutely do not have the stomach for that, so he overshot. This is simply too extreme.
As Aleš Michal, one Czech political scientist, insightfully observed, the mobilization against the far right led by the pro-democratic parties and the coalition Together—when they warned Czech voters against parties that would steer the country towards Russia—actually worked. Anti-system and far-right or far-left voters moved under the umbrella of ANO. So, in a way, the strategy worked, but it did not help the coalition Together—it helped Babiš.
Another important aspect is that during the presidential elections, which Babiš lost but which were highly polarized, he managed to attract a significant number of far-right voters. In 2023, these voters grew accustomed to the idea of voting for him. So, although he lost the presidential election, it helped him enormously in this election, as he became an acceptable alternative for the far right.
Cultural Issues Trigger Policy Backlash
In your work on the “Revenge of the Radical Right,” you emphasize how minority accommodation can trigger backlash. To what extent are current Czech political dynamics shaped by cultural issues (e.g., LGBTQ+ rights, immigration, Ukrainian refugees) rather than economic grievances?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: I’ve thought about these issues quite a bit because I do think that with a lot of foreign mobilization today, the appeal of ethnic issues is somewhat subdued. I also have one or two articles with Professor Petra Guasti where we speculate about this. The logic of the book is that backlash ensues after the accommodation of minorities—it’s a backlash against elevating groups and putting forward policies that help them. In that sense, the logic of backlash applies here as well. In the Czech Republic, when you consider the status quo and the pursuit of policies that were genuinely beneficial to Ukrainian refugees, you can anticipate an ensuing backlash. Ukrainian refugees are no longer as warmly welcomed as they once were. There have also been many attempts to advance more robust legislation to protect women against rape and sexual assault, as well as attempts to codify the Istanbul Convention. These are all policies that, in a way, shift the balance of power or policy direction, and we have seen backlash as a result. Similarly, the LGBTQ community is hoping to increase their rights. Much of the public is quite open to this possibility, but the process of getting there involves shifting the balance and policies. Once that happens, advocates on the opposing side are naturally activated. So, I do think the policy backlash logic applies here as well.
Recent scholarship highlights the rise of confessional illiberalism across Central Europe. Do you see religiously inflected sovereigntism gaining ground in Czechia, or does the country’s secular legacy limit this trajectory compared to Hungary and Poland?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: This is an excellent question. It refers to a recent article that I’ve written with Lottam Halevi, who is now at the University of Constance. One important thing to keep in mind is that much of the mobilization around religious issues is actually a mobilization of political identity. It is not necessarily the case that more religiously infused countries will experience a higher mobilization of religious identity or religious activity as political identity. Czechia is a very secular country. However, we do see issues around transgender rights or some LGBTQ questions being framed in ways that are very similar to Hungary and Poland. The culture wars are nowhere near as fierce as in neighboring countries, but the country could potentially develop its own mini culture wars.
Another important point is that in the Czech Republic, the Christian Democratic Party is firmly in a coalition and belongs to the liberal or pro-democratic camp. As long as they remain on the side of parties that respect the rule of law, this creates a kind of firewall against the politicization of some of these issues. Nevertheless, we have seen signs of this dynamic even in a country as secular as the Czech Republic.
Culture Wars Remain Underutilized in Czech Politics
Ukrainian activists protest against the Russian invasion of Ukraine during a peaceful demonstration with flags in support of Ukraine in Prague, Czechia on February 24, 2023. Photo: Dreamstime.
Your article “In Europe’s Closet” discusses how minority rights can catalyze illiberal backlash. Are Czech populist and far-right actors increasingly weaponizing LGBTQ+ issues as part of their sovereigntist narratives? How does this compare to developments in Slovakia or Poland?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: Suddenly, these issues are high on the agenda in Slovakia and Poland, even though in Poland some LGBTQ issues are not as salient as they were a few years ago. However, we do see narratives about protecting children against transgenderism emerging. This rhetoric often appears as part of anti-EU, Euroskeptic discourse—telling people what to do, how to raise their children, promoting a progressive agenda around women, or framing gender rights as a threat to traditional families. The offshoots of these narratives are present, though they are not a particularly dominant strain. Pocketbook issues largely dominated this election. So, the potential is there, but it remains underutilized. Moreover, the Catholic Church in the Czech Republic is quite restrained and does not enter into these debates in the way it does in Slovakia or Poland.
In your co-authored work on “Patronage, Trust, and State Capacity,” you argue that low bureaucratic trust fosters clientelism. How does this dynamic manifest in Babiš’s political strategy, especially considering his corporate background and patronage networks?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: Andrej Babiš cares about one thing only, and that’s his firm, Agrofert, and his political party is his firm. The party is not a regular party; it is a business project and a business offshoot. He has a huge conflict of interest, which nobody knows how he’s going to solve if he’s nominated as prime minister, because the Czech Republic doesn’t have an institute of blind trust. The conflict of interest will always be there because his firm, Agrofert, is a large recipient of state subsidies. That’s not necessarily patronage networks; it’s, in a way, making sure that the state is in a fantastic synergistic position with his firm. That is a particularity of his business background and the setup of the party. It is a vehicle for him to keep political power and be able to use state and EU subsidies, and the conflict of interest is just written all over him.
In terms of ANO as a party strategy, I would not necessarily define it as clientelism. What we saw when Babiš was in power, I would call targeted distribution—targeting pockets of voters, many of whom actually do need this targeting, and it is very beneficial to them. It involves picking out or dissecting groups that will be selected for state help, and again, the budget deficit is going to balloon. I don’t think that’s necessarily patronage, but it’s a targeted exchange that a lot of parties engage in, and it’s bread-and-butter politics. Having said that, aside from the targeted distribution, Babiš will make sure that his agglomerate benefits from him being prime minister again, which is a very likely scenario, as it seems now.
From Fiscal Conservatism to Programmatic Populism
Do you think Babiš’s economic promises—higher pensions, lower taxes, welfare expansion—should be understood as clientelistic appeals rooted in weak state capacity, or as programmatic populism aimed at reshaping public expectations?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: If I were to choose, I would really use more of a frame of programmatic populism or targeted distribution. We saw this between 2017–2021. What’s happening in the region now is that voter expectations have changed—and this applies to Poland and Slovakia as well—so that populist voters now expect redistribution and higher spending. If Babiš stays in power for four years, these expectations will become absolutely entrenched. There is a recent book on Poland by Ben Stanley that talks about this lock-in: basically, the transformation of the Polish party system in such a way that all voters now expect the next party in power to spend, no matter who that might be. If the current governing coalition ever comes back, they will have to do the same thing. They will not be able to promise balanced budgets. If they want to defeat Babiš four years from now, they will also have to promise spending. Good luck with the budgets, but there is a general entrenchment of voters expecting that the state needs to really open up the valves. It will probably have pretty bad long-term consequences, but nobody’s thinking long-term these days.
Given Babiš’s emphasis on managerial competence, how does technocratic rhetoric interact with populist radical right sovereigntist claims in his current coalition-building efforts?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: It’s going to be a big spending spree, and the Motorists will have to hold their noses. The far right really doesn’t care—actually, it supports spending as long as it’s spending on Czechs, or native spending, and not on Ukrainians or migrants. This is going to be a move from manager to, in a way, a paternal figure who is going to take care of everybody, including making appointments for colonoscopy. Part of the big appeal of Babiš was the emphasis on improving the healthcare system.
Having been quite critical about ANO, I do have to emphasize that it’s quite possible that some of the portfolios the coalition will control can be given to very competent people. In the previous government, ANO had some ministers or portfolios that were run quite well. For example, the Ministry of Education underwent some really good changes. It’s also possible that some of the infrastructure projects that started and need to be completed, or the huge shortage of housing stock—if Babiš can really deliver on these issues, that’s going to be very successful, rewarded, and it would benefit the country quite a bit. If he throws in managerial competence and delivers, that would be fantastic, and it’s possible that there might be some policy changes that can be done well and have long-term benefits. But I suspect a big spending spree and a very short-term horizon, given Babiš’s age. We’ll see.
A Historic Breakthrough for the Far Right
Analysts have warned that Babiš could align Czechia with Hungary and Slovakia, forming a sovereigntist bloc inside the EU. Do you view this as a tactical positioning or a substantive ideological shift toward illiberal governance?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: I’m very concerned. Despite the relatively moderate appeal, I do think that Babiš’s victory is a significant win for illiberals in the region. I do not think this will be a bloodbath for Czech democracy, but I do think there’s going to be a lot of bleeding. The patient will survive, but there will be a strong shift. Babiš is also very strategic. If he and his coalition partners drag him to some extreme positions, the Czech public may become accustomed to that. If this coalition emerges, it will be the first time in Czech history that the far right is either in coalition or silently supporting the government. That’s a huge breakthrough, and it’s very concerning. The Motorists are not an extreme party, but they are certainly not rooting for the European rule of law and liberal democratic values. This is very troubling, and it’s a big win for illiberalism in Europe. Babiš’s victory is undoubtedly a big win for illiberalism.
Guardrails Exist, But Democratic Quality May Decline
The Statue of Justice by Marius Kotrba, a modern sculpture located at the Supreme Court building in Brno, Czech Republic, on March 10, 2022. Photo: Evgeniy Fesenko.
What are the potential institutional guardrails against democratic backsliding in Czechia, and how do they compare to Hungary and Slovakia during their own illiberal turns?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: There are a lot of guardrails. The most important actor is the current president, Petr Pavel. He can veto, he can play a huge informal role, and he will have to think very carefully about whether the future prime minister is going to violate the law by being in a position of conflict of interest. This is going to be a hard puzzle to solve. The Czech president is a pro-democratic, centrist figure with good temperament and very high levels of popularity.
The second guardrail is the second chamber, which Slovakia does not have. The Czech Senate is still dominated by so-called liberal or pro-democratic parties. There are a lot of roadblocks. Another institution that’s quite important is the Constitutional Court, which has saved Czech democracy many times. That’s also significant.
The media in the Czech Republic have been independent. Babiš is going to go after Czech Television and Czech Radio, but the country has a robust, pluralistic media scene. It might change, but that’s an important characteristic.
Czech civil society is quite active, although one has to be very careful about what mobilization means. For example, work by Petra Guasti and Aleš Michal showed that populists are sometimes much better at mobilizing. This election has shown that people can be mobilized for and against democracy, or for liberal or illiberal causes. This time, the election mobilized the illiberals more, but there were other elections in the past when the pro-democratic camp was mobilized quite well. Civil society is active. It pays attention.
So, there is hope, but I do expect that the quality of Czech democracy will decline during this period because of disrespect for the rule of law. Babiš does not like the rule of law, and his coalition partners are either extremists or at the fringe of the mainstream. Another thing I would like to mention is that one of the leaders of the Motorist Party has accusations of domestic abuse filed against him. In terms of signaling the moral integrity of political leaders, this also doesn’t bode well for appointing people with questionable moral standing to very high positions of power.
Swerve for Now, But the Future Looks Troubling
Finally, situating Czechia within the broader Central European context, do you see the current developments as part of a cyclical populist wave or a deeper structural illiberal swerve, as discussed in “The Illiberal Turn or Swerve in Central Europe?”
Professor Lenka Bustikova: At this moment, I expect that this is going to be four years’ worth, but I don’t know what’s going to happen at the end of these four years, because what we see in other countries is that when the 2.0 comes back—when populists return to power—they are much more effective. They know what to do, they have their playbooks ready, they have done this before, they are much more revengeful, aggressive, and they know how to get things done. So I expect that Babiš will weaken the rule of law and definitely try to weaken some of the guardrails. I do think that the coalition partners will certainly drag the country more towards the East than towards the West. The real question is going to be: after four years, is there anyone who will be able to beat them? It’s going to be very difficult because this consolidation of camps shows that the illiberal camp is simply numerically much stronger. Either they’ll have to make some terrible mistakes—which they will—and the voters may forgive them or may not, or the liberal camp will have to grow, and we see in other countries that it is a very steep hill to climb. So, swerve for now, but I am very concerned about the future.
