Professor Dominika Kasprowicz, a leading scholar of political communication at the Faculty of Management and Social Communication, Jagiellonian University.

Professor Kasprowicz: Despite Polarization and Populist Gains, Poland’s Democratic Potential Remains Intact

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In an in-depth interview with ECPS, Professor Dominika Kasprowicz of Jagiellonian University offers a measured assessment of Poland’s political trajectory following Karol Nawrocki’s narrow presidential victory. While acknowledging the rise of populism and deepening polarization, she maintains that “there is still substantial democratic potential within the system and society.” Professor Kasprowicz highlights the role of affective campaigning, the normalization of populist narratives, and the growing impact of disinformation as structural challenges to liberal democracy. Yet, she points to the resilience of civil society—especially youth and feminist movements—as a critical bulwark against authoritarian drift. “Civic involvement is one of the most important factors behind societal resilience,” she argues, emphasizing the importance of renewed mobilization in the face of rising illiberalism.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging and analytically rich conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Dominika Kasprowicz—a leading scholar of political communication at the Faculty of Management and Social Communication, Jagiellonian University—offers a nuanced assessment of Poland’s evolving political terrain in the aftermath of Karol Nawrocki’s narrow presidential victory. While acknowledging the rise of populist narratives and affective polarization, she resists the notion that Poland has definitively succumbed to democratic backsliding. “In spite of the many political turbulences along the way,” she states, “I’m convinced there is still substantial democratic potential within the system and society.”

Professor Kasprowicz contends that although Nawrocki’s victory signals a “U-turn” from recent liberal governance, it must be viewed within a broader cycle of disillusionment with the ruling coalition and not solely as an affirmation of authoritarian consolidation. Rather than reading the outcome as a clear-cut shift toward autocracy, she underscores the resilience of democratic institutions and civil society, pointing to the alternation of power as a key indicator: “We saw it happen after the 2023 parliamentary elections, and the recent presidential election also demonstrated this.”

The interview also engages with the civilizational framing and symbolic politics that increasingly shape Polish electoral behavior. Professor Kasprowicz highlights how Nawrocki’s campaign “aligned—both in tone and policy—with figures like Donald Trump and, at times, Viktor Orbán,” tapping into deep-seated cultural cleavages and reframing electoral appeals through affective channels rather than technocratic reasoning. Against this backdrop, she observes that emotions have overtaken policy in shaping political allegiance: “Mr. Nawrocki’s emotionally driven strategy proved more effective… even moderate voters seemed to seek a more assertive, emotionally resonant message.”

Still, Professor Kasprowicz cautions against overlooking structural forces, particularly foreign information manipulation (FIMI), which she describes as “a third actor” in recent Polish elections. Poland, she argues, has become a “testing ground” for new forms of disinformation that remain understudied and underacknowledged politically.

Yet amid the challenges, Professor Kasprowicz finds hope in civil society—particularly youth movements, feminist organizations, and rights-based NGOs. Despite prior government hostility, she emphasizes their enduring relevance: “Engaged, well-trained, highly capable, and deeply connected to European and global networks,” these actors form the backbone of what she terms Poland’s social resilience. Whether this will suffice to resist authoritarian normalization remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: the democratic story in Poland is far from over.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Dominika Kasprowicz, edited lightly for readability.

This Is Not the End of Polish Democracy

President-elect Karol Nawrocki campaigning ahead of Poland’s 2025 presidential election in Łódź, Poland, on April 27, 2024. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you interpret Karol Nawrocki’s narrow presidential victory within the broader trajectory of democratic backsliding in Poland? Does it reflect a recalibration of populist dominance despite the 2023 parliamentary setback for PiS, or does it suggest the consolidation of a hybrid regime model that blends electoral competitiveness with authoritarian resilience?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: That’s a very interesting and complex question that has several underpinnings. To answer it, we should start from the very beginning.

As of mid-2025, Poland as a country—and Poles as a society—are in an unprecedented situation and facing unprecedented global circumstances. I believe that the overarching evaluation of both the society and the political system proves that it’s not as bad as is occasionally suggested in the media, particularly across electronic and online outlets.

Let me begin with a brief reminder that for years, especially in terms of economic growth and political developments, Poland has been seen as a frontrunner among the then-new EU Member States. In spite of the many political turbulences along the way, I’m convinced there is still substantial democratic potential within the system and society.

To support this, I would point out that despite the growing cleavage and deepening political polarization, we still observe alternation of power. We saw it happen after the 2023 parliamentary elections, and the recent presidential election also demonstrated this. The course of events suggests that, while the notion of democratic backsliding is certainly a valid concern, at this moment I would not find enough persuasive arguments to fully agree with that interpretation.

Nevertheless, the result of the presidential election—and the victory of Mr. Karol Nawrocki—is clearly a U-turn, following just a few years of a pro-European, more liberal government in power. It was a narrow but decisive win for opposing narratives.

What we often emphasize when commenting on presidential elections in Poland is that, while it’s certainly about the politicians and candidates, it is mostly about the government in power at that time. What I mean is that, to better understand the wider context of this victory—or the lack of victory—it’s crucial to consider the performance or underperformance of the current government.

This growing sense of disillusionment and the slow but steady loss of public support for the coalition government were clearly reflected in the presidential election. Of course, that’s not the only reason for the 2025 electoral outcome, but without including that variable in the analysis, it’s very difficult to fully understand what actually happened.

Civilizational Realignment and Shifting Cleavages Are Redefining Polish Politics

To what extent did Nawrocki’s ideologically coherent messaging and symbolic alignment with figures such as Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán transcend conventional party cleavages and reconfigure voter alignments along deeper cultural or civilizational lines?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: It’s an interesting question, because since the early 2000s, what we see in Poland is shifting cleavages and changing trajectories. Until then, it was quite obvious—there was a post-communist versus pro-European sentiment among the electorate. Since the early 2000s, when the formerly aligned center and right-leaning parties became the two main opponents, these cleavages have been changing. This shift is actually happening, and the direction and dynamic are quite interesting.

Over the past 25 years, we’ve seen quite a lot of empirically driven studies and commentary pointing to changing moods and trends within the Polish electorate. Nevertheless, the cleavage I believe is now most salient is the one between traditional and liberal lifestyles, and between more socially oriented or liberal economic worldviews.

What is somewhat surprising—or at least unexpected—is the combination of pro-social yet traditional lifestyle attitudes found on the right or among the populist radical right. In contrast, what is more centrist and liberal in terms of economic views—and pro-European, pro-progressive—belongs to the parties currently governing, including centrist and what remains of the left in Poland.

You asked about civilizational realignment. During the electoral campaign, these were indeed prominent reference points, particularly emphasized by Mr. Nawrocki, who frequently aligned—both in tone and policy—with figures like Donald Trump and, at times, Viktor Orbán. It’s important, however, to analyze these two associations separately. Regarding the US and Donald Trump: beyond personal sympathies, Mr. Nawrocki was, in fact, the only candidate in the campaign to be received—albeit briefly—at the White House. Nevertheless, the meeting did take place.

We must keep in mind Poland’s geopolitical situation—as a country on the so-called eastern flank of the EU and NATO. Despite recent political turbulence in the US, Poland has very limited room for maneuver when it comes to security policy. Poland has long been a close ally of the US. Our NATO membership and the US military presence in this part of Europe have been critically important. I believe both candidates—whether openly or subtly—aligned themselves with the American ally. So, I don’t think anyone here was particularly surprised by Mr. Nawrocki’s open and positive stance toward the US and its president. This broader global security context played a significant role.

When it comes to the Hungarian case and Viktor Orbán, it’s no secret that the former government—as well as the outgoing President Mr. Duda and the Law and Justice Party—maintained friendly relations with Orbán and his party. However, if you look at the actions taken in the European Parliament or the European Commission, the relationship was not always as smooth or friendly as campaign rhetoric might suggest.

Still, the model of strong, charismatic populist leadership remains a point of reference for Mr. Nawrocki—and likely will continue to be. But again, we should take a step back and view the situation from a distance.

Just to remind you: Prime Minister Donald Tusk, later this year, visited Serbia and was actively involved in shaping the priorities of the Polish EU Presidency—including efforts to sustain momentum in the EU enlargement process.

The complex nature of the region, and the growing threat from the East—particularly from Russia—add many shades of grey to the performance of all political leaders, not just the presidential candidates during the June 2025 Polish election.

Donald Tusk speaks at an election rally after a televised debate on government television at the end of the campaign in Warsaw, Poland on October 9, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

Emotional Politics Has Overtaken Technocratic Appeals

What structural and discursive limitations inhibited the effectiveness of the liberal-centrist coalition in this electoral cycle? In particular, how might Trzaskowski’s electoral underperformance reflect a broader crisis of technocratic centrism and the limits of rationalist appeals in an emotionally polarized political landscape?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: Of course, emotions play a role. This is not only the case in Poland—I believe we are living in an era of emotional politics.

There is a growing body of academic research showing the short- and long-term impact of political messaging, both offline and online, on social attitudes. An interesting aspect of this phenomenon is that a significant part of this process—the persuasive effects on individual and group behavior—often occurs beneath the surface. It is not necessarily a conscious experience for those receiving the message.

We can say that the recent presidential campaign in Poland clearly tapped into pre-existing emotional undercurrents among the electorate. If you examine the main themes of past electoral campaigns in Poland, you’ll notice that none lacked an emotional appeal—often built on imagined threats, mythical enemies, or existing, highly salient cleavages between centrist-liberal voters and those aligned with the traditionalist/populist/radical right.

There is already a strong emotional charge embedded in the political landscape, and Mr. Nawrocki was definitively more effective at triggering those emotions throughout the campaign. By contrast, Mr. Trzaskowski focused on reconciliation. He promised to be a president for all Poles—a unifying figure capable of bridging the deep divisions shaping contemporary Polish society.

So, if you ask whether emotions played a role in the campaign, the answer is unequivocally yes. Mr. Nawrocki’s emotionally driven strategy proved more effective. In times of crisis, war, and growing polarization, even moderate voters seemed to seek a more assertive, emotionally resonant message—which Mr. Trzaskowski’s campaign failed to deliver.

I would also add that there was a significant imbalance between the two candidates in terms of their online presence and social media strategy. Although both were active on popular platforms, it is clear that Mr. Trzaskowski’s team did not prioritize his social media visibility. As we know, social platforms are not only crucial for reaching younger voters but also for shaping narratives, including the spread of false information, disinformation, or misinformation. I believe this was one of the key strategic missteps in Mr. Rafał Trzaskowski’s campaign.

Systemic Constraints Undermine Technocratic Governance

From a political communication perspective, did the 2025 presidential campaign mark a paradigmatic shift from policy-based deliberation to symbolic and affective personalization? If so, how might this transformation affect democratic accountability and voter agency?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: Poland is a parliamentary system, which means that while the recent presidential elections—held under a majoritarian formula—are important for several reasons, I would not consider them the most crucial factor in the processes you are asking about.

Nevertheless, considering the prerogatives of the President of the Republic, and the ongoing situation of cohabitation between two opposing sides, this will not contribute to the stabilization of the Polish political system, which has already undergone significant destabilization over the past eight years. By this, I mean the changes that have occurred within the judiciary and media systems, as well as in less visible yet important areas of social and political life, such as education and culture.

If you were to ask what supports or undermines a technocratic model of policymaking, I would point to the systemic obstacles that have been left behind—constraints embedded within the system itself—which continue to prevent its stabilization. By stabilization, I also refer to the difficulty of reversing some of the reforms introduced by the Law and Justice Party during their two terms in power.

Nawrocki’s Campaign Mobilized Memory, Fear, and Identity to Activate a Populist Base

Pro-Ukrainian demonstrators protest against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policies during a rally titled “Stop Putin” in Warsaw, Poland on July 27, 2014. Photo: Tomasz Bidermann.

Your work has emphasized the affective potency of populist grievance narratives. How did Nawrocki’s campaign instrumentalize national identity and mnemonic politics to mobilize affective loyalty and consolidate a post-ideological populist base?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: Oh, it’s a very interesting question. When you look at the numbers, Poland to this day remains an example of unprecedented success—whether in terms of GDP per capita, quality of life, or the growing quality of infrastructure. Of course, this is a large country with a sizable population, and that doesn’t mean everything is perfect or without problems. Nevertheless, when you consider and compare the situation of the average Polish citizen over the past 20 years—across almost all demographic groups, whether by age, location, or education level—you can observe enormous progress.

Of course, the war in Ukraine, the Russian invasion, and the escalation of conflict have added an additional layer of anxiety, which now influences political attitudes and behaviors. But when you think about the typical populist message and the typical populist voter in Poland today, the external enemy—Russia—is no longer a dividing line. It’s a point of consensus across the political spectrum. Both Nawrocki and Trzaskowski, both Law and Justice and Civic Platform and their coalition partners, agree that Russia poses the greatest threat to Poland. This was also an important element in Nawrocki’s campaign.

Mr. Nawrocki, formerly Director of the Institute of National Remembrance—a public institution responsible for historical archival research and the promotion of Poland’s national narrative—integrated historical memory into his messaging. He strategically appealed to specific resentments and grievances, which, while not shared by the majority of society, still provided fuel for his campaign, depending on the region in which he was speaking. One example is the historical grievance between Poland and Ukraine over the Volhynia massacres during the final years of World War II—mass killings of Polish citizens that remain a sensitive and painful issue. This theme was used to tap into regional resentment. The second element involved anxiety and fear around refugees and illegal migrants—an ongoing and unresolved issue at the Polish-Belarusian border.

As for other grievances, while they may lack strong empirical grounding, they tap into an anti-EU rhetoric aligned with the idea that Poland should maintain as much independence as possible within the EU—prioritizing national interests and resisting pressure, especially from the European Commission.

None of these three elements—historical resentment (e.g., Polish-Ukrainian relations), fear of migrants or refugees, and anti-EU sentiment—are new in Polish politics. They have been present, more or less visibly, for the past 25 years. But they proved effective again, especially when directed at specific segments of Nawrocki’s electorate. I would not say these are overarching or widely shared attitudes across Polish society—on the contrary. Yet they worked for this specific purpose in this specific context.

Disinformation Is Among the Main Actors Shaping Poland’s Political Landscape

Would you argue that the nationalist-populist rhetoric encapsulated in slogans like “Poland First” has become hegemonically embedded in the Polish political imaginary? If so, what counter-hegemonic discursive strategies remain available to liberal-democratic actors?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: As I said before, these themes and motifs can be seen as recurring ones. I wouldn’t say that they are of growing importance. What is of growing importance is the changing political environment. And this is an unprecedentedly new framework that we should take into consideration when interpreting the course of political action in Poland.

We haven’t yet touched on a topic that is something of an elephant in the room—disinformation and FIMI (foreign information manipulations), the foreign interference that is present not only in Poland. Nevertheless, Poland should be considered a testing ground for many new strategies of that kind. While we are mostly discussing recent electoral outcomes and the two political figures—Mr. Trzaskowski and Mr. Nawrocki—what is overshadowing not only the Polish elections is, let’s say, a third actor or third agent. And I don’t mean only one country, but rather an important and salient factor behind past and current political developments.

And despite the fact that the long-lasting and very effective impact of disinformation during electoral campaigns has been acknowledged—we have examples and plenty of data coming from Ukraine, but also from other countries such as Georgia, Romania, the Balkan countries, and Slovakia—there is still very little research, and far too little political acknowledgment of the importance of this element.

Civil Society Remains the Backbone of Poland’s Democratic Resilience

March of a Million Hearts. Hundreds of thousands march in anti-government protest to show support for democracy in Warsaw, Poland on October 1, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

And lastly, Professor Kasprowicz, in light of the apparent demobilization among progressive constituencies, what role can civil society—particularly youth movements, feminist groups, and rights-based NGOs—play in resisting authoritarian normalization and restoring democratic engagement?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: Let me start with a quick reminder that the parliamentary elections which brought pro-European, more liberal political parties back to power were—putting it simply—won by the youngest voters and by women. This happened with important support from social movements and the NGO sector, which in Poland is large, fairly well institutionalized, and has managed to remain operational despite the previous government’s unfavorable attitude.

It’s not that all NGOs were opposed to the government. Of course, we witnessed the mushrooming of NGOs and mirroring institutions—similar to what we saw earlier in Hungary. But in fact, despite two terms in power, the populist radical right government did not succeed in dismantling the pro-European, liberal-oriented NGO sector, which played a significant role. At the moment, the presence of this segment of society—engaged, well-trained, highly capable, and deeply connected to European and global networks—is of great importance.

On the other hand, when thinking about Polish civil society and the largest NGOs on the ground, they are generally not political. Poles involved in the NGO sector, according to available data, tend to engage more in other forms of activism.

Still, whether political or not, civil involvement—or civic engagement—is one of the most important factors behind societal resilience. And I refer to resilience not only in terms of the political struggle between Law and Justice and the Civic Coalition, but more broadly, as the capacity of society to face global challenges—not just the war in Ukraine and the growing threat from the eastern flank, but also the climate crisis, migration, and other challenges faced by societies worldwide. So, this foundation and interconnectivity of citizens—whether engaged in political or non-political NGOs—is crucial, and it remains intact.

If you ask me whether, in mid-2025, this could serve as a kind of remedy against the rise of populist radical right parties—well, it’s hard to say. As you noted, we are witnessing disillusionment with current policies and growing impatience regarding reforms that were promised but have yet to be delivered. So, it may come down to renewed mobilization—or the search for a political alternative.

Professor Arend Lijphart, one of the most influential political scientists of the past and present century and Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.

Professor Arend Lijphart: Presidentialism Creates a Greater Risk of Democratic Collapse

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In a wide-ranging interview with ECPS, renowned political scientist Professor Arend Lijphart warns that the design of democratic institutions plays a decisive role in democratic resilience or erosion. Drawing from over 50 years of comparative research, Professor Lijphart argues that presidential and majoritarian systems—as seen in the US, India, and the UK—enable dangerous concentrations of power. “Some electoral systems make the concentration of power much more likely,” he states. In contrast, parliamentary systems with proportional representation foster inclusion, accountability, and stability. His core message is urgent: consensus democracy is not just more effective—it’s essential in resisting authoritarian backsliding. “Strong governments may decide faster,” he notes, “but they often decide wrongly.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving a wide-ranging interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Arend Lijphart, one of the most influential political scientists of the past and present century and Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, offers a sobering diagnosis of the institutional roots of intensifying democratic backsliding. Drawing on over five decades of comparative research, Professor Lijphart—one of the signatories of the “International Declaration Against Fascism,” published on June 13, 2025, alongside Nobel laureates, public intellectuals, and leading scholars of democracy and authoritarianism—revisits his foundational distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies to illuminate why authoritarian populism so often flourishes in systems that concentrate political power. At the heart of his critique lies a stark warning: “Presidentialism creates a greater risk of democratic collapse.”

Throughout the interview, Professor Lijphart argues that the structural design of presidential and winner-takes-all electoral systems—such as those in the United States, India, and the United Kingdom—facilitates the erosion of liberal democratic norms. “Some electoral systems make the concentration of power much more likely,” he warns. “In presidential systems—such as the United States—we currently see a significant concentration of executive power.” Even parliamentary democracies are not immune, especially when paired with majoritarian electoral rules like first-past-the-post. These systems, he explains, enable governments to take power without majority support and to gradually expand their authority unchecked.

Professor Lijphart draws a direct connection between these institutional flaws and the rise of what he calls “strongman rule”—a hallmark of modern authoritarianism. “It is about trying to organize the entire society in such a way that civil society is weakened—anything that can challenge the authority of the single-person ruler or a single-party ruler.” From Trump’s attacks on journalists and universities to Modi’s and Erdoğan’s efforts to centralize power, Professor Lijphart sees a global pattern enabled by institutional design.

But he also offers a proven alternative: consensus democracy. Based on parliamentary systems and proportional representation (PR), these arrangements, he argues, are “much, much better” not only at ensuring inclusive governance but at resisting authoritarian encroachment. “Consensus systems do just as well—or even a little bit better” than majoritarian ones in terms of performance, he says, while also producing lower levels of terrorism, greater satisfaction with government, and stronger representation for women and minorities.

While Lijphart acknowledges that no democratic system offers perfect safeguards, his message is clear: “Strong governments may make decisions more easily than coalition or power-sharing governments—but those decisions are often the wrong ones.” His long-standing mantra—parliamentary government and proportional representation—emerges not simply as a technical preference, but as a democratic imperative in an age of global authoritarian drift.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Arend Lijphart, edited lightly for readability.

Majoritarian Systems Invite Authoritarian Drift

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Arend Lijphart, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your typology of democratic systems (1968), you contrast majoritarian and consensus models. To what extent do majoritarian systems—especially those lacking robust institutional checks, as seen in Hungary and India—enable the concentration of power that facilitates the rise of authoritarian or fascistic regimes?

Professor Arend Lijphart: I think this seems to be happening in many places—not everywhere, but in lots of places—that a government comes into power and then gradually expands its power step by step.

You’re specifically talking about the judicial system. It’s important that the system is strong, but in democratic systems, that depends very much on other factors. I think more important—and I guess that’s the main message of my book Patterns of Democracy—is that there should be more sharing of power, so that we do not get a concentration of power.

Some electoral systems make the concentration of power much more likely. For example, in presidential systems—such as the United States—we currently see a significant concentration of executive power. The same can occur in parliamentary systems, as in the United Kingdom. This typically happens when the electoral system is what the British call “first past the post,” or what is known in the US as the plurality system. That system creates a concentration of power.

In Britain, for instance, power can end up in the hands of a party that did not win a majority of the vote. The same happened in the 2016 US presidential election, where Donald Trump was elected despite receiving significantly fewer votes than Hillary Clinton. This, in my view, highlights a key weakness of both presidential systems and parliamentary systems that employ majoritarian electoral rules. But perhaps I’m circling around your question rather than addressing it directly.

Fascism Weakens Civil Society to Centralize Power

My second question is: The recent declaration you signed warns of a global authoritarian drift. How do you view the contribution of majoritarian democratic structures—particularly those favoring winner-takes-all outcomes, such as in the United Kingdom or the United States—to this resurgence of fascistic traits in contemporary politics?

Professor Arend Lijphart: I consider fascism to involve, among other things, strongman rule. It is about trying to organize the entire society in such a way that civil society is weakened—anything that can challenge the authority of the single-person ruler or a single-party ruler. Weakening civil society means targeting independent institutions and external sources of power.

In the United States, for instance, the federal system—because of its decentralization—provides some protection against the concentration of power. That’s one safeguard. The judicial system and the rest of civil society are also crucial. Yet we are currently seeing efforts to undermine these very institutions. Under President Trump, we’ve seen attempts to weaken universities, to attack journalists, and to discredit lawyers who may oppose the government. This all contributes to a dangerous concentration of power.

And what can we do about it? I signed that declaration to call attention to the danger. The declaration itself may not have any immediate or specific effect, but it is important that people become more aware of the threats we are facing in democratic systems today.

Consensus Democracies Are More Resilient

In your co-authored article with Matt Qvortrup (2013), you demonstrate that majoritarian democracies are significantly more prone to fatal domestic terrorism. Do similar institutional vulnerabilities—like those evident in the United States post-January 6 or in Brazil under Bolsonaro—help explain the susceptibility of these systems to authoritarian populist mobilization today?

Professor Arend Lijphart: Actually, my entire work—specifically Patterns of Democracy—shows that consensus democracies work better than majoritarian democracies. The old wisdom in political science was that you need majoritarian democracy in order to have a strong enough government to run things effectively. But what I found in a comparative study of 36 countries is that the idea of a strong and effective government is not the province only of majoritarian systems. Consensus systems do just as well—or even a little bit better.

Moreover, consensus systems are much, much better at doing other things. For example, when there is consensus in government, there’s likely to be less danger of terrorism. And there are many other advantages—better representation of women, better representation of minorities, greater public satisfaction with government, and so on. So it really all kind of boils down to that.

And then the question is—and perhaps I’m making this answer too long—is how do you create a consensus system? I think there are two mechanisms that are especially important: parliamentary government rather than presidential government, and proportional representation rather than majoritarian elections. Now, those two things are not, if installed, a guarantee of success. It’s not a sufficient condition for success—but I would say it’s a necessary one. It doesn’t guarantee that it will work, but it is more likely to work than the alternative.

No System Offers Absolute Guarantees

In “Democracy in the 21st Century,” you argue that democracies that ignore the institutional superiority of parliamentary government and proportional representation risk degradation. In the light of backsliding cases like Tunisia, Turkey, and Israel, what constitutional reforms would be most effective in preventing the kind of democratic erosion outlined in the declaration?

Professor Arend Lijphart: I suppose there’s really no guarantee—take Israel, for example. It essentially has a parliamentary government. Turkey, on the other hand, began with a parliamentary system but later shifted to presidentialism. Still, I’m not entirely sure. There’s simply no assurance that any given system will succeed. That said, I recall listening to a lecture by one of the authors of the important book How Democracies Die, and their central argument, as I understand it, is that democracies often collapse gradually.

That can happen in both systems. In a presidential government, it could be the president that decides, with the aid of the armed forces, to take over power—or the armed forces simply take over power. And I asked the author, does it make a difference whether you have a presidential or parliamentary government? And he said, “Oh, I see there is a political scientist in the audience”—that was me—but he said, yes, in presidential government you have a greater chance that this will happen than in parliamentary government. But there’s obviously just no guarantee whatsoever to ward off this danger.

Proportional Representation Could Have Prevented the Rise of the BJP

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is showing victory sign with both hand to supporters at Bharatiya Janata Party office amid the results of the Indian General Elections 2024 in New Delhi, India on June 4 2024. Photo: PradeepGaurs.

Your 1985 work on electoral rules illustrates the democratic benefits of proportional representation (PR). Given the rise of exclusionary populism in countries with first-past-the-post systems—such as the UK, the US, and India—how might PR systems act as a structural safeguard against democratic backsliding?

Professor Arend Lijphart: Well, I think in the case of the US, it would help to have proportional representation. Right now, even though it’s a presidential system, the president effectively controls the legislature. If you had proportional representation, there would likely be a multiparty system, and there would be much less chance that the president could control the legislature to the extent we see now in the United States. 

In fact, this past week you could see a similar dynamic in India. I wrote about India and the possible dangers for Indian democracy in the 1990s, and I said the danger is that an authoritarian party—namely, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—could come to power. How can you prevent that? The BJP does not have a popular majority. What the Congress Party should have done when they were in power was introduce proportional representation. I think that would have—again, there’s no guarantee— made it less likely for the BJP to emerge as the strongest party in India. The BJP has been engaged in democratic backsliding. Minorities have not been adequately protected, and so on. We know what is going on, and India has shifted from a liberal democracy to what is now an illiberal democracy. It’s no longer the kind of shining example of a big country in Asia that manages to be a stable democracy.

When Power Is Shared, Democracy Stands Stronger

Given your long-standing critique of power concentration in majoritarian systems, how can electoral reform—particularly the adoption of PR or mixed-member systems, as seen in Germany or New Zealand—disincentivize authoritarian tendencies and promote institutional pluralism in increasingly polarized democracies?

Professor Arend Lijphart: Well, again, you mentioned Germany and New Zealand—they basically have mixed-member systems that are fundamentally proportional. It’s just less likely that an extreme party will come to power. I mean, it’s kind of amazing to think about Germany in the early 1930s. How did Hitler come to power? Hitler never won an election. He was defeated in the presidential election by Hindenburg, and in the last free parliamentary election, the Nazi Party won more than 40% of the vote. But there were other conservative parties. The president then appointed Hitler to be chancellor, and that, of course, was the beginning of the complete end of democracy in Germany. But the important thing to remember is that—even in a time of severe crisis in Germany—and with the Nazi Party claiming they would solve everything, they still did not win a majority. And obviously, under proportional representation, parties can still win a majority, but it’s just less likely that it will happen.

Your 2010 research on democratic quality highlights the representational benefits of consensus systems for women and minority groups. In the light of resurgent anti-gender and exclusionary rhetoric in countries like Poland, Italy, Turkey and the US, how crucial is electoral system design in sustaining democratic inclusiveness and resilience?

Professor Arend Lijphart: Yes, indeed what proportional representation does is make it more likely that women and members of minority groups get representation—and if they get representation, they gain a political voice and some political power. I remember being in New Zealand and listening to an interview with the woman Prime Minister. This was after the change to proportional representation, and there was a proposal by her party to introduce some limits on proportional representation. She was asked, “Do you favor that?” And she said, “Well, just wait a minute. Proportional representation has made it easier for women to get representation,” and she pointed to the larger number of women in her own party. So, she said, “Well, let’s just wait a bit with limiting proportional representation,” because she was then thinking of protecting the women members of her own party. So, when women and minority group members gain representation, it is more likely to lead to policies and outcomes that advance the interests of women and minorities.

Social Media Amplifies Extremes—Just Like Primary Elections

Social Media

In an era marked by digital disinformation and epistemic fragmentation—phenomena actively weaponized in democratic erosion cases like India, Brazil, and Hungary—how must electoral and media institutions evolve to uphold the rational, inclusive discourse central to your model of consensus democracy?

Professor Arend Lijphart: I guess I don’t have a good answer to that. What do you do about social media, when so many voices—especially extreme ones—dominate the space? It reminds me of what has happened with primary elections in the United States. The idea was to give more influence to voters. But in practice, turnout tends to be very low, and those who do vote are often the most passionate and extreme. So instead of improving representation, the primary system has become a vehicle for amplifying more radical views. 

I think something similar is happening with social media: extreme voices gain disproportionate attention. And honestly, I don’t know what to do about that. Shutting down social media isn’t an option—people wouldn’t accept it. But the potential, and I think real, danger of extremism spreading through these platforms remains a serious concern.

Proportional Representation and Federalism Help Diffuse Power

The declaration, you signed, warns that fascism historically erodes the separation of powers. How can the institutional diffusion of authority in consensus democracies serve as a bulwark against executive aggrandizement, especially in light of how Erdoğan in Turkey and Modi in India have centralized power?

Professor Arend Lijphart: If you have—and again, I always come back to the same answer—a parliamentary government and proportional representation, you’re more likely to have a diffusion of power. But of course, in India they do not have proportional representation, which they really should have.

Now, you’re talking about an institutional diffusion of authority. For instance, a presidential system with separation of powers and a federal system with considerable decentralization. I think a federal system with a high degree of decentralization is one way of decreasing the danger of fascism and the concentration of power.

The problem with federalism, for instance in the United States—but also in countries like Brazil and Argentina—is that it means giving special representation to the states. In the case of the United States, it’s equal representation of the states of the federation, and this results in huge inequality of population. So you have a problem that is not a necessary element of federalism, but it often goes together with it.

In the case of Germany, also, Germany is a federal system, and I think that is helpful for its democracy. There is some inequality there too, but not as extreme as in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina.

Inclusion Weakens Extremists by Exposing Their Incompetence

Geert Wilders (PVV) during an interview at the Plenary Debate in the Tweede Kamer on June 4, 2024, in The Hague, Netherlands. Photo: Orange Pictures.

In systems where populist leaders have weakened judicial independence and neutralized parliamentary oversight—as seen in Israel’s controversial judicial overhaul and Hungary’s court packing—how might consociational design principles be leveraged to insulate democratic institutions from authoritarian encroachment?

Professor Arend Lijphart: I could come back to saying there are just no absolute instruments that will do—it is just less likely when you have a good proportional representation system and a parliamentary government. But, as you see in the case of Israel, they have a parliamentary government, and they do have proportional representation. Yet there is one party and its allies that has power, and it’s using it to slowly erode this.

That’s the idea in the book How Democracies Die—if you have a group, a party, or a president that has this power and aims to undermine the system, aims to concentrate power in one party’s or one person’s hands, then it’s not a guarantee that democracy will be preserved. But again, I think it’s all just less likely in parliamentary systems with proportional representation.

Your functionalist rationale for consensus democracy emphasizes broad-based inclusion. How can inclusive, multiparty coalitions help depolarize political discourse and counteract the “us-versus-them” narratives instrumentalized by authoritarian populists in cases like Venezuela or El Salvador?

Professor Arend Lijphart: If you have a highly divided and potentially polarized society, it’s important to include a broad range of parties and to foster compromise, even with those holding very different points of view. I often think it is better, when extreme parties are present—as in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands—to try to include them in government rather than to enforce what is known in Belgium as the cordon sanitaire, which excludes such parties.

In the Netherlands, for example, the tendency has been to include these parties, and doing so has often revealed that they are not particularly effective in governance—they lack qualified people to serve in government roles. In that sense, inclusion can become a way of letting them destroy themselves. Most recently, the Dutch cabinet collapsed after Wilders’s party—arguably the main extreme party—was part of the government but has since withdrawn. According to current opinion polls, they are now likely to lose votes. By being included and then shown to be ineffective, these parties have weakened themselves.

We Need a Broader Cultural Shift Toward Consensus and Inclusion

And lastly, Professor Lijphart, the anti-fascist declaration urges stronger international institutions. How might the core principles of consensus democracy—such as proportionality, minority protection, and power-sharing—inform the reform of multilateral bodies like the UN, EU, or African Union to more effectively resist authoritarian influence and erosion of global democratic norms?

Professor Arend Lijphart: I wish I knew. One thing I can say is that international organizations like the United Nations have increasingly shifted toward a preference for proportional representation—particularly to enhance minority representation. That was the case in Iraq, and I think it marks a significant change in the general attitude toward government and electoral reform.

Historically, the individuals who had influence in politics and governance tended to admire the British system. But in the case of the United Nations, for example, they advocated for proportional representation in Iraq. While Iraq is clearly not a well-functioning democracy, this still reflects a broader institutional endorsement of such reforms.

Of course, I would argue that these organizations should listen to experts who understand the specific context of each country and can guide them away from the assumption that strong governments are synonymous with good governance. Strong governments may make decisions more easily than coalition or power-sharing governments—but those decisions are often the wrong ones.

What we need, clearly, is a broader cultural shift. There’s an important relationship between culture and structure: if a society has a more consensual culture, it is more likely to develop consensual institutional structures. Conversely, introducing consensual structures—again, I always return to my mantra of parliamentary government and proportional representation—makes it more likely that consensus-oriented norms will take root.

Professor Baskın Oran, a veteran and venerated Turkish political scientist.

Professor Oran on Turkey’s Erdogan Regime: “Let’s Just Call It a ‘Democratic Administration’—So That No Harm Comes to Anyone”

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In an era when even naming an oppressive regime can invite peril, Professor Baskın Oran offers a cuttingly ironic response to a straightforward question: How should we define Turkey’s current political system? His reply—”Let’s just say a ‘democratic administration,’ so that no harm comes to anyone”—encapsulates the climate of fear and repression under Erdogan’s rule. In this wide-ranging interview, the veteran scholar and dissident traces historical fascism’s return through economic crisis, digital dependency, centralism, and xenophobia. With clarity and conviction, Professor Oran explores how Turkey’s authoritarian populism mirrors global patterns while revealing homegrown roots—and why excessive control may ultimately become the regime’s undoing.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Baskın Oran, a veteran and venerated political scientist, offered reflections that resonate deeply with the political climate in Turkey today. In times when truth is often criminalized and words carry the weight of consequences, the choice to speak cautiously is, in itself, a powerful political act. When asked to define the nature of Turkey’s current regime—whether it aligns more with fascism, authoritarian populism, competitive authoritarianism, or autocracy—Professor Oran answered with quiet precision: “Let’s just say ‘a democratic administration,’ so that no harm comes to anyone—shall we?” That one sentence, both ironic and revealing, captures the essence of the repression gripping contemporary Turkey. It also offers a striking entry point into the mind of one of Turkey’s most principled and enduring intellectuals.

As one of the signatories of the “International Declaration Against Fascism,” published on June 13, 2025, alongside Nobel laureates, public intellectuals, and leading scholars of democracy and authoritarianism, Professor Baskın Oran stands out as a figure whose life and career have been deeply shaped by Turkey’s political upheavals. Born in İzmir in 1945, Oran was convicted in 1971 while still a student at Ankara University’s Faculty of Political Science (Mülkiye) for participating in a protest march, resulting in his dismissal from his post as a research assistant. After a successful legal battle, he was reinstated by administrative court order. He later earned a PhD in international relations and completed postdoctoral research in Geneva on international minority rights.

Oran’s struggles did not end with student activism. Following the 1980 military coup, he was once again purged from his university post—only to be reinstated and removed again under martial law provisions. For eight years, he survived by working various jobs, including editing for AnaBritannica. In 1990, he was finally reinstated for good and rose to become a full professor by 1997. In 2004, his authorship of the “Minority Rights and Cultural Rights Report” for the Human Rights Advisory Board led to criminal charges under infamous articles 216 and 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. Though ultimately not convicted, the ordeal reinforced Oran’s image as a courageous dissenter within the Turkish academy.

That lifelong defiance permeates this interview with the ECPS, though it is now tempered with the strategic irony born of experience. In this wide-ranging conversation, Professor Oran explores the structural logic of fascism—“the most extreme and harmful form of capitalism,” as he puts it—and traces its return through today’s economic and geopolitical crises. Comparing the present moment to the capitalist collapse of 1929, he warns: “Back then, everyone tried to protect their own economy by closing to imports—and international trade collapsed. We’re witnessing a very similar process today.”

For Professor Oran, the rise of anti-immigration sentiment in the West and the shift from targeting “internal enemies” to “external threats” signals a reconfiguration, not a disappearance, of fascist logics. In Turkey, he argues, this reconfiguration is expressed through intense centralization, erosion of local governance, and state suppression of Kurdish identity and representation. “Fascism is centralism taken to its extreme,” he observes, linking today’s appointment of state trustees (kayyım) to a long tradition of top-down governance.

Yet even as he traces the parallels between historical fascism and present-day authoritarianism, Professor Oran remains grounded in a nuanced reading of political causality. He credits the excesses of past Kemalist policies—including headscarf bans and cultural repression—as having laid the groundwork for the current regime: “Those oppressive measures prepared the conditions for today’s authoritarianism.”

Despite this sobering diagnosis, Professor Oran ends with a dialectical warning rather than despair: “Excessive centralism and intervention in democratic will—dialectically speaking—mark the first step toward a regime’s self-destruction.”

In a political environment where naming power risks invoking its wrath, Professor Oran’s careful yet cutting answer—“a ‘democratic administration,’ so that no harm comes to anyone”—becomes more than evasion. This subtle yet telling response speaks volumes about the repressive nature of the current regime in Turkey. Coming from a scholar whose life has been marked by principled resistance and personal cost, Professor Oran’s cautious phrasing is itself a reflection of the political climate—one in which even naming the regime carries risk.

What follows is the full transcript of our interview with Professor Baskın Oran, originally conducted in Turkish and lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Fascism Is the Most Extreme and Harmful Form of Capitalism

Photo of a woman protester holding an anti-fascism sign during the Women’s March on January 21, 2017, in Washington, D.C. Photo: Richard Gunion.

Professor Oran, thank you very much for participating in our interview. How do you evaluate the historical continuity emphasized in the anti-rising fascism declaration—which you signed—through the statement, “fascism never disappeared; it merely remained on the sidelines for a while”? In your view, in what ways does today’s fascism differ from the classical fascisms of the 20th century, and what structural similarities does it maintain?

Prof. Dr. Baskın Oran: First of all, I would like to point out that while speaking on this subject, I do not wish to appear overly Marxist, but fascism—which is the most extreme and harmful form of capitalism—is a tool that the capitalist system resorts to when it feels threatened. We have witnessed this in the past as well.

The declaration from Italy, which I gladly signed, reminded us that the fascism of the Mussolini era is now resurfacing. This is a very accurate observation. In fact, it is possible to go even further back to the historical crises of capitalism. Today, we are experiencing a digital revolution. Artificial intelligence is also a significant part of this transformation—just like the Industrial Revolution that began in the late 18th century. That era brought major opportunities, but the working class was severely oppressed.

Today, too, many professions are disappearing due to digitalization. For example, I previously had one of my books translated by an American for publication in the US. Now, there’s no need for that—translation programs can complete it within a few days. These developments can be used for good or bad—technology itself is neutral.

We discussed the emergence of capitalism in the late 18th century and drew parallels with the present day, right? Then, about a hundred years later, in the late 19th century, the imperialist extension of capitalism emerged. They seized regions—especially in Africa and Asia—through every means possible, including military occupation.

We know that the crises of capitalism are inherent in its nature—they arise periodically from within the system itself. For instance, the Great Depression of 1929 was the result of such an internal contradiction. Just like today, all states at that time tried to cope by shutting down imports. What does that mean? It means blocking other countries’ exports, which in turn paralyzes international trade. But countries had no choice due to the crisis they were in. The 1929 crisis began with a stock market collapse in New York and soon spread worldwide. In the end, every country tried to protect its own economy, and the global economy essentially collapsed. We are witnessing a very similar process today.

However, this time there is a crucial distinction: today’s developments stem not only from capitalism’s internal contradictions but also from external pressures. A key example is China, which, despite maintaining Communist Party rule, has largely embraced a capitalist economic model. This shift has deeply unsettled Western powers—particularly during Donald Trump’s presidency. In response, economic protectionist measures were introduced, including attempts to impose significant tariffs on Chinese goods, which in turn posed risks to the European economy as well.

The dynamics we are witnessing today echo those of earlier historical moments—namely, the crises at the end of the 18th and 19th centuries, and the Great Depression of 1929. These parallels make the declaration I signed not merely a warning about present dangers, but a timely reminder that the past continues to shape our political and economic future.

The Real Fear Lies with the Regime Itself

Despite living under the Erdoğan regime, you have once again demonstrated an example of intellectual courage by being among the signatories of the declaration. In your view, how should the responsibility of intellectuals against fascism be defined under today’s conditions? How can the calls in the declaration—such as boycott, strike, and collective action—be concretized for academic and cultural circles?

Professor Baskın Oran: Frankly, I don’t think I’ve shown any major intellectual reaction in this matter. I mean, being afraid of something this small is out of the question. After all, as you know, there’s Article 299 of the Turkish Penal Code—insulting the president. But in this case, such a situation does not exist. No matter how much they try to stretch it, they cannot justify or substantiate such a claim. Therefore, it would not be right to see this as a small act of heroism.

As for the second part of your question: To be honest, I don’t always trust the (Turkish main opposition Republican People Party) CHP. However, the current trajectory of the CHP under the leadership of Özgür Özel is quite positive. This should be acknowledged, and he should be congratulated accordingly. Because he is truly expanding the societal movement to broader masses and succeeding in integrating with the people. He’s going beyond mere declarations and embracing a political approach that translates into action.

And precisely because of this, arrest warrants are being issued for those around him, and attempts are being made to ban political opponents—especially Ekrem İmamoğlu—from participating in elections. The system is clearly afraid of this new, young, and rightly governed CHP. That’s why I believe this process should be supported. 

Yes, if one day the CHP reverts to its old ways, then we will resume our criticisms. But for now, I support the CHP under Özgür Özel’s leadership.

A Turkish man in Hyde Park, London, shows support for protesters in Istanbul following the eruption of nationwide demonstrations—Turkey’s largest anti-government unrest —challenging then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authority in June 2013.
Photo credit: Ufuk Uyanik.

Authoritarianism in the West Is Rooted in a Deep Fear of the Consequences of Its Own Imperial Past

What role have the structural ruptures caused by imperialist expansion—gaining momentum in the late 19th century—in underdeveloped countries, and the waves of migration originating from these regions, played in the rise of fascist and authoritarian tendencies currently observed in the West? In this process, how has the concept of “development” undergone an inversion or distortion?

Professor Baskın Oran: Now, what you are actually asking me—albeit implicitly—is the following: In some developed countries, we are witnessing the hardening and spread of authoritarian regimes; however, at the same time, you are reminding us that similar authoritarian tendencies are also emerging in less developed countries. For example, within the European Union, we observe this trend especially in Poland and Hungary. On the other hand, you are also pointing out the grave actions committed by Israel in Gaza and how they are not being sufficiently condemned by the Western world—particularly by the European Union. You are essentially asking, “Why is this happening?” If I’m understanding your question correctly, I’ll respond right away.

This authoritarian turn and drift away from democracy in developed countries actually stems from a deep fear. And the root of that fear lies in the following reality: The desperate people living in countries oppressed by imperialist forces since the late 19th century no longer know what to do. With hope, they head toward more developed countries, seeking asylum.

Considering that the populations of these developed countries are already limited, that their social security systems are strong, and that these systems are also targeted for use by migrants, a major sense of fear has emerged in these societies. This fear has led to the rise of right-wing politics. Especially through the discourse of anti-immigration and anti-asylum seekers, this fear has provided fertile ground for legitimizing authoritarianism. That’s the heart of the matter.

Trump Globalized the Monroe Doctrine

How do you evaluate the United States’ position—particularly in the Middle East—its Israel-backed aggressive stance, and its anti-Iran strategy in the context of a contemporary reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine? What kind of groundwork has the unipolar order that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union laid for this process?

Prof. Dr. Baskın Oran: You brought up a very important point by mentioning Trump. Trump is, in fact, a typical contemporary representative of the Monroe Doctrine. People generally understand this doctrine as follows — this is also how it’s taught in schools: “America should not interfere in European affairs.” Because Europe’s affairs are complicated, and since America was newly founded at the time, getting involved could harm it. That is the first proposition of the doctrine. However, the real significance of the Monroe Doctrine lies in its second proposition: Europe, too, shall not interfere in the developments on the American continent. In other words, there is a principle of mutual non-intervention.

Trump, however, has taken this second proposition and interpreted it in an entirely different way. The issue is no longer confined to the American continent; Trump has extended this principle globally and is essentially saying: “I will intervene anywhere in the world, but no one may interfere with me.” With this mindset, he is trying to exert pressure everywhere — from Canada to Denmark, from China to Iran. One of the tools he uses for this pressure is Israel. By supporting Israel’s authoritarian and fascist policies, he is in fact pursuing his own global strategy. Looking at the current situation, we see that Trump has become an extremely radicalized representative of the second and most important proposition of the Monroe Doctrine: “I will interfere with everyone, but no one may interfere with me.”

Civilizations That Merely Consume Technology Do Not Survive

To what extent has the difference between producing and merely consuming technology throughout history determined whether civilizations survived or not? For instance, what kinds of historical parallels can be drawn between the impact of the Industrial Revolution on underdeveloped societies and the impact of today’s digital revolution on those same societies? Does the asymmetry between producers and consumers of digital technology constitute a new regime of dependency?

Professor Baskın Oran: Of course, it creates dependency—because there is a world of difference between producing technology and merely consuming it. In fact, just recently, in 2024, Çağatay Anadolu wrote a very interesting article. In that piece, he went quite far back in history and offered an eye-opening analysis.

He said something along these lines: As you know, we descend from Homo sapiens. But before Homo sapiens, there were Neanderthals. The Neanderthals were not as skilled as the sapiens in things like tool-making or abstract thinking. And while we cannot be sure whether the Neanderthals were wiped out by the Homo sapiens, he argued that it is entirely logical for the Neanderthals—who ended up in the position of technology consumers in contrast to the technology-producing sapiens—to have vanished over time. I found this interpretation quite enlightening.

We’re talking about the Stone Age—actually not even about humans, but about human-like species, hominids. Even back then, the difference between producing and consuming technology determined the fate of entire species. Today, we are facing a similar situation: In the digital age, the disparity between societies that produce technology and those that only consume it creates a new regime of dependency.

Crushed Societies Give Rise to Authoritarianism and War

Mass protests in Russia demanded the release of Alexei Navalny. Police detained protesters in Moscow, Russia, on January 31, 2021. A girl holds a sign saying “Freedom for Putin from office!” Photo: Elena Rostunova.

How do you interpret the structural and political similarities between the rise of economic protectionism, authoritarian regimes, and the atmosphere of pre-world war following the 1929 Depression, and today’s neoliberal crisis moment? Are figures like Trump, Putin, Erdoğan, etc., representative of an updated form of fascism in this process?

Professor Baskın Oran: There is a very serious similarity here. The process that began with the 1929 crash of the New York Stock Exchange needs to be carefully examined. Why did it collapse? Because the market had suddenly and excessively risen. Such sharp increases followed by steep declines can devastate stock exchanges. In that situation, people panicked, withdrew, and the market collapsed.

As we just discussed, this collapse triggered the 1929 Depression. Following that, all countries tried to overcome the crisis by restricting imports and increasing exports. But that wasn’t possible—because everyone was trying to do the same thing simultaneously. In an instant, international trade collapsed. And this, ultimately, led to the Second World War.

The Treaty of Versailles, which followed the First World War (1914–1918), imposed such severe conditions on Germany that the people could barely breathe. German women were forced to sell their jewelry. Hitler took advantage of this immense pressure and came to power through a democratic election in 1933. 

Around the same time, we see a parallel in Turkey: Mustafa Kemal launched the War of Independence in 1919 in response to the unbearable terms imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres on the Ottoman Empire. Just as Versailles had done to Germany, Sèvres imposed unacceptable obligations on the Ottomans.

There is an important lesson here: international treaties cannot be based on crushing one side; if they are, they lead to new crises and wars. Treaties must be mutually acceptable. Lausanne is an example of this. It remains the only World War I peace treaty still in force because it was balanced.

Turning Fear into Power: Populists Redefine the ‘Other’ to Justify Authoritarianism

In your view, does the shift from the rhetoric targeting the ‘internal enemy’ in classical fascism to the perception of an ‘external threat’ through rising anti-immigrant sentiment in developed countries today indicate a transformation in the structural codes of fascism? In this context, what kind of political significance does the redefinition of the ‘other’ carry?

Professor Baskın Oran: Actually, we just talked about this. The main reason why governments in developed countries that push the limits of democracy or verge on fascism come to power through elections is the fear generated by immigrants. The sudden influx of asylum seekers creates a significant perception of threat in these countries. However, the root of this fear is a direct consequence of the imperialist policies initiated in the 19th century.

Populism frequently derives its legitimacy from an artificial conflict constructed between “the people” and “the elite.” How has this form of conflict laid the groundwork for a model of authoritarianism in Turkey? How would you analyze the relationship between the populist rhetoric of the administration under Erdoğan’s leadership and its actual authoritarian practices?

Professor Baskın Oran: Let me begin by saying this: The main factor that brought the Erdoğan regime to power and strengthened it was the excesses of past Kemalist practices. Especially during the military coup periods, the oppressive and denigrating measures laid the groundwork for this process.

One of the most striking examples is the rector and vice-rector of Istanbul University of the time preventing veiled female students from entering the university. Can such a thing be acceptable? A university is a place where a thousand voices echo, a space for thought and freedom of expression. A veiled student should be able to enter the university; both veiled and unveiled should benefit equally from this environment.

So what happens if a veiled student is not admitted? She stays at home, waits to get married, and raises daughters who are veiled just like herself. But if she does enter university, she will take courses like my “Nationalism and Minorities” class and be exposed to new ideas. This is precisely the point: the oppressive excesses of Kemalist policies are what initiated the process that laid the foundations of today’s authoritarian regime in Turkey.

Therefore, we must analyze the emergence of Turkey’s authoritarian regime not solely through the lens of populism, but also within this historical context. Moreover, the Erdoğan regime’s increasingly repressive policies in recent years are actually fueling a process that may bring about its own downfall. Let’s not forget: the logic of dialectics applies to everyone.

Excessive Centralism Marks the First Step Toward a Regime’s Self-Destruction

Do the trustee policy targeting municipalities governed by the DEM Party and the CHP in Turkey, as well as the legislative attempts to transfer municipal powers to provincial governors, align with the classical centralist reflexes of fascism? Could you evaluate these developments in comparison with historical experiences of fascism?

Professor Baskın Oran: Fascism, by definition, is centralism taken to its extreme; in fact, fascism is the most radical form of centralization. After the War of Independence, the implementation of centralist policies in Turkey—specifically Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s, later Atatürk’s, rise to power as a single-man ruler and continuation of that rule—can be understood to a certain extent. Of course, by “understood,” I don’t mean “justified” or “approved.” One of the clearest examples of this excessive centralism was how it was applied to the Kurds. This is a broad topic, but just to give an example: from the Eastern Reform Plan (Şark Islahat Planı) to today, we are talking about a centralism where even speaking Kurdish can still be penalized, albeit indirectly.

As you just mentioned, removing mayors elected by popular vote and replacing them with centrally appointed trustees—either governors or district governors—is a clearly fascist practice. Such actions make the Kurdish issue increasingly intractable and end up strengthening parties like the DEM Party, which advocate against this oppression. Even the CHP, which has long maintained a distant stance on these matters, begins to feel its influence.

In this sense, excessive centralism and intervention in the democratic will—dialectically speaking—mark the first step toward a regime’s self-destruction.

‘Native and National Judiciary’ Is Just a Euphemism for Authoritarian Retreat from Universal Law

Does the frequent emphasis in recent years on a ‘national and native judiciary’ represent a departure from universal legal principles and the instrumentalization of the judiciary? What is the function of such rhetoric in the construction of ideological hegemony by populist-authoritarian regimes?

Professor Baskın Oran: There was a time when there was no ideological framework whatsoever to support people who were under extreme oppression. It was only after World War I that the concept of “minority rights” emerged. In fact, Articles 37 to 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne are titled “Protection of Minorities.” This was the first time such a protection mechanism entered the agenda of international law.

Following the Second World War, this concept evolved further with the emergence of the notion of “human rights.” Especially after the 1950s, efforts to institutionalize human rights gained momentum, leading to the establishment of the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights. Turkey also recognized the jurisdiction of this Court and pledged to comply with its rulings. However, unfortunately, despite this commitment, Turkey largely fails to implement these decisions.

For instance, in cases like those of Selahattin Demirtaş and Osman Kavala, the clear and binding rulings of the European Court of Human Rights are being ignored. The core reason for this is that such decisions are perceived as a threat by the centralized and repressive ideological structure in Turkey. This amounts to an attempt to avoid implementing human rights. But such a stance is not sustainable in the long run.

The frequent emphasis on a so-called “native and national judiciary” must also be understood in this context. This slogan signals a break from universal legal principles and the instrumentalization of the judiciary for political ends. Populist-authoritarian regimes deliberately employ such rhetoric to construct ideological hegemony. In reality, the phrase “native and national” is a euphemism for a regressive, inward-looking, and authoritarian vision that seeks to legitimize distancing from universal values.

Assimilation Backfires Once Identity Forms

Kurdish protesters gather in Taksim Square, Istanbul, on April 13, 2010, following the assault on Kurdish politician Ahmet Türk, who suffered a broken nose. Photo: Sadık Güleç.

Do the pressures on Kurdish citizens in the areas of language, culture, and representation—alongside the appointment of state trustees (kayyım) to municipalities—indicate that Turkey is moving away from a democratic resolution to the Kurdish issue? How do you foresee this approach impacting both national unity and democratization in the long term?

Professor Baskın Oran: Nazism has now reached such a point in the global and Turkish context that I believe Turkey is approaching the end of its centralized structure and its negative effects on Kurdish citizens.

Let me put it this way: you can attempt to assimilate a minority—a group treated as second-class citizens. This is a common historical occurrence. But assimilation has its limits: up until the point when a collective identity emerges within that group. Once that awareness forms, all further efforts at assimilation backfire and only serve to strengthen that group identity.

Turkey reached this point in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but failed to recognize it. Today, with the influence of external dynamics, this collective awareness has become even more visible. In this context, the autonomous Kurdish administration in northeastern Syria must be emphasized. This structure is supported by the most powerful country in the world—the United States—and is also recognized by the Syrian regime.

The current regime in Turkey, out of concern over this development, has initiated a second attempt at reform. The first attempt began in 1993, when Öcalan declared a ceasefire. Now, on July 17, 2025, it is planned that 30-40 PKK members will symbolically lay down their arms in a formal ceremony. This points to a very significant and positive development for Turkey.

“Let’s Just Call It a ‘Democratic Administration’—So That No Harm Comes to Anyone”

The foreign policy of the Erdoğan administration is frequently used as a tool for generating domestic political legitimacy. Does Turkey’s gradual shift away from Western values toward a “Russia-like” model resemble the foreign policy reflexes of fascism?

Professor Baskın Oran: Now, if you pay attention, there are two leaders with whom Erdoğan has very good relations: Trump and Putin. One is the head of the United States, the other of Russia. Although these two countries are fierce rivals and constantly at odds with one another, Erdoğan has managed to establish close ties with both. So, what is the common feature of these two leaders? Both are figures who have established—or are attempting to establish—autocratic regimes. That’s all I have to say.

Lastly, considering current developments, how would you conceptually define the regime in Turkey? Among terms such as fascism, authoritarian populism, competitive authoritarianism, and autocracy, which one do you think best fits today’s Turkey? Why?

Professor Baskın Oran: We’ve actually discussed this before. Let’s just say “a democratic administration,” so that no harm comes to anyone—shall we?

Dr. Richard Falk, Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University, and former UN Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights.

Professor Richard Falk: The US Is Experiencing a ‘Weimar Moment’

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviewsMONITOR

In this urgent ECPS interview, Professor Richard Falk warns that the US is facing a “Weimar moment”—a fragile liberal democracy under siege by a resurgent ultra-right. A signatory of the International Declaration Against Fascism, Professor Falk links today’s “techno-fascist enthusiasts” to a global authoritarian drift. He critiques surveillance capitalism, weaponized nationalism, and soft authoritarianism, highlighting leaders like Trump, Modi, Erdoğan, and Netanyahu as drivers of this ideological mutation. Despite this grim trajectory, Professor Falk calls for renewed “normative resistance”—a defiant civic ethics rooted in critical thinking, international law, and solidarity. This interview is a vital reflection on the future of democracy, authoritarianism, and global justice.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a political climate increasingly marked by creeping authoritarianism, disinformation, and democratic fragility, Dr. Richard Falk, Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University, and former UN Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights, offers a powerful and sobering warning: the United States, he says, is currently undergoing a “Weimar moment.” This, he explains, refers to “a democratic superstructure and a liberal opposition, but one that is weak and unable to really mount effective resistance to a rising, ultra-right political formation.” Drawing on history and contemporary global trends, Professor Falk suggests we are witnessing not merely a democratic crisis, but the possible prelude to a systemic authoritarian transformation.

This interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) comes in the wake of the “International Declaration Against Fascism,” published on June 13, 2025. Professor Falk was one of the signatories, alongside Nobel laureates, public intellectuals, and leading scholars of democracy and authoritarianism. Echoing the spirit of the 1925 Anti-Fascist Intellectuals’ Manifesto, the declaration warns that “the threat of fascism is back—and so we must summon that courage and defy it again.” It urges citizens worldwide to resist not only overt autocracy, but also the instrumentalization of law, culture, media, and technology in the service of “techno-fascist enthusiasts.”

In our interview, Professor Falk elaborates on how the architecture of 21st-century power—surveillance capitalism, digital disinformation, populist polarization—is reshaping classical authoritarian strategies. While differing in structure and aesthetic from 20th-century fascism, he argues today’s movements share its core ambitions: the monopolization of political space, the stigmatization of dissent, and the erosion of checks and balances under charismatic strongmen. He points to figures like Trump, Modi, Erdoğan, and Netanyahu as examples of a new ideological formation—what he elsewhere calls a “mutation of soft authoritarianism” that weaponizes nationalism, racialized resentment, and neoliberal precarity.

Yet Professor Falk is not entirely pessimistic. He highlights the enduring relevance of “normative resistance”—a civic and intellectual defiance rooted in critical inquiry, public ethics, and transnational solidarity. In an age of disinformation and partisan moralism, he calls for a recommitment to truth, international law, and the unfinished democratic project, warning that the erosion of global governance and international legal norms risks a regression “to an era of colonialism, suffering, and destruction.”

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Richard Falk, edited lightly for readability.

The Threat of Fascism Is Real, but the Form Has Mutated

Professor Richard Falk, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: You were among the signatories of the recent declaration warning of the return of fascism. In your view, how does the current resurgence of authoritarian-nationalist politics differ in structure, aesthetic, and operational logic from the classical 20th-century fascism? Can we still meaningfully use the term “fascism” across such divergent historical contexts without diminishing its analytical precision?

Professor Richard Falk: That’s a very tough starting question and requires a good deal of reflection and nuance to do justice to it. It’s important—of course, a crucial question.

One of the striking differences is that the resurgence of especially autocratic tendencies in the West is less focused on internal class relations than on the threats of migration and immigration, and the outsider rather than the enemy inside, which was a feature particularly of the Nazi version of fascism. But generally, the struggles in Italy and Spain that resulted in fascist emergence as dominant forces were essentially internal in their vital strategy.

Furthermore, there was a different technological environment in the early decades of the 20th century than what exists currently. The forms of control and resistance are really radically different. In the present world situation, due to the innovative technology that we group under the phrase “digital age.”

But the core features of militarism and a single charismatic leader that exert control over the political space and do not respect divergent views—I think that feature is present. Also, the resistance of the state to dissent and protest is characteristic of this new wave of far-right politics.

Whether it’s useful to connect this current wave with the problems that underlay World War II is something that needs exploration and debate. I’ve sometimes referred to the situation in my country, the US, as experiencing what I call a “Weimar moment.” That is, where you have a democratic superstructure and a liberal opposition, but it’s weak and unable to really mount effective resistance to a rising, ultra-right political formation. It takes advantage of crises in the domestic economy and in the success or failure of state undertakings. But it’s essentially concerned with a monopolizing of political power and economic influence and control. And in that sense, there is a continuity. The German and Spanish versions of fascism particularly stress this alliance between the state and the military. In the Spanish case, you had the Catholic Church. There was a kind of anti-communist element in the struggle.

I don’t know as much about the Italian political atmosphere accompanying the rise of Mussolini, but I think there was also a right-left division in the country—a polarization. So each of these fascist narratives of the past has its own originality and characteristics, and in one sense even grouping them together may be questionable because it overlooks those differences.

So, on balance, it is useful to warn of the emergence of a new phase in the encounter between liberal democracies and fascist movements. However, it can be misleading to treat this phenomenon as uniform, given its inherently heterogeneous nature. The situation in the United States, for example, differs markedly from that in major European countries—and even more so from key Global South contexts such as India, or, in a different way, China and Russia. While these cases may fall outside the conventional scope of what is typically labeled “fascism,” they share certain characteristics: a concentration of power in the hands of a single leader, systematic surveillance, the stigmatization of dissent, and a concerted effort to monopolize the political sphere through an alliance between economic elites and political leaders.

Techno-Authoritarianism Has Already Arrived in Some States

Photo: Shutterstock

The declaration warns of “techno-fascist enthusiasts.” How do you interpret the convergence of surveillance capitalism, algorithmic governance, and digital disinformation ecosystems with authoritarian statecraft? Are we witnessing the emergence of a new modality of domination—a digital totalitarianism—beyond Orwellian metaphors?

Professor Richard Falk: I think that is a threat; whether it will materialize in that kind of absolutist form is not yet clear or certain. We are at a period, I believe, of transition in which resistance—and even a reversal of these tendencies—remains a possibility. In other words, I don’t think we’re predetermined at this stage to have that future, though there are alarming signs that this is where the major liberal democracies are headed.

Some of the more organized autocratic societies have already more or less arrived at those points. I would mention India, China, and Russia as being very well organized to manage a kind of techno-authoritarianism that, in the Chinese case, produces some pretty impressive results for its population. It is not war-prone in the way that fascism is usually portrayed. So, again, it may be misleading to group autocratic tendencies in various states into one category, because the originality of the Chinese path is quite notable and seems to have some advantages compared to the liberal democratic path.

Today’s Fascistic Movement Has a Blueprint, Opposition Does Not

A century after the Manifesto of the Anti-Fascist Intellectuals in 1925, what enduring ethical and strategic lessons can today’s democratic societies extract from those who risked everything to confront fascism at its inception? Are there analogues today to the cultural complicity and intellectual appeasement that enabled fascist ascendancy then?

Professor Richard Falk: I think again, speaking first about the United States, which I know best, there’s definitely that similarity of a weak liberal opposition and a very impassioned autocratic, fascistic movement that has very dedicated conceptions of what it wants to achieve. Trump came to his second presidential term with a very worked-out plan or blueprint of how to govern in the light of the acceptance of this autocratic, authoritarian, anti-democratic set of aspirations, and he seems to have at least temporarily neutralized the economic oligarchs by having them—for opportunistic reasons—join with his MAGA movement. And that does suggest a drift toward this kind of consolidated authoritarian governance structure.

There are some glimmers of light that suggest it may not be so simplistic to fulfill these autocratic ambitions. One of the glimmers of light was the outcome in New York City of the race to become mayor, which surprised most Americans—and even most New Yorkers—by selecting, by an impressive margin, the Muslim son of a mixed parental background, a self-proclaimed Democratic Socialist, who seemed to defy all the traditional biases associated with the drift to the ultra-right. And it’s at least being welcomed in the US as a warning to the Democratic establishment that they better get their oppositional act together or they’ll be bypassed by this more progressive alternative politics. I happen to know the parents of Zohran Mamdani quite well, and it’s very thrilling for people who had these progressive hopes.

Normative Resistance Persists in a Structurally Degraded Public Sphere

In a political landscape defined by polarization, truth decay, and performative resistance, what forms of civic defiance remain normatively defensible and strategically viable? Is there still space for what you have elsewhere called ‘normative resistance’ within a structurally degraded public sphere?

Professor Richard Falk: It’s a very interesting question, marked by contradictory tendencies. There is a clear effort to shrink the space for critical discourse, alongside a growing recognition that the ultra-right project is largely incompatible with knowledge-based politics. One of its defining features—and here we see continuity with earlier fascist movements—is a preference for mobilizing people through emotional and belief-based appeals, with little regard for empirical truth. It is therefore unsurprising that leading universities in the United States have become primary targets of this ultra-right agenda.

Equally unsurprising is the simultaneous embrace of an aggressive nationalism and a retreat from internationalism—whether in the form of the UN or collaborative responses to global challenges like climate change. These forces coexist in a contradictory political landscape where tensions are mounting but remain unresolved.

The harsh treatment of undocumented immigrants—who are nonetheless vital to key sectors of the economy—reveals some of these contradictions. Even Trump has had to walk back elements of his anti-immigration stance when it came to essential labor in agriculture, restaurants, and other industries where undocumented workers are difficult to replace.

Predatory Capitalism Fuels Authoritarian Resentment

A protester holds a banner demanding economic justice. Photo: Shutterstock.

You have long emphasized the dangers of ‘soft authoritarianism’ embedded within liberal orders. From Modi to Erdoğan, from Netanyahu to Trump, do you regard contemporary populist authoritarianism as a transitional phase toward a more explicit fascist ethos—or does it represent a distinct ideological mutation altogether?

Professor Richard Falk: Well again, that’s a very hard question which requires a clearer crystal ball than one in my possession. In other words, it can go either way—or both ways—and differently in different places. I think one of the interesting recent developments is the normalization of the language of genocide as applied to Israel’s violence in Gaza. That was—and still is—a prohibited terminology on the part of the governments supporting Israel, and it’s used selectively as a way of punishing protesters. But still, within societies at large, that terminology—the naming of the violence—is no longer abnormal or extreme: to refer to it as genocide, or to refer to the pre-October 7th situation as apartheid.

And that represents a victory of sorts for those who want a truth-based mode of governance, which is associated with liberalism, the tradition of the Enlightenment, and the whole role of science. So you have this peculiar attitude of the ultra-right, which on one side uses instrumentally the politics of surveillance—a kind of fascist variant of a surveillance state—and on the other side is very unsupportive of scientific research, technological innovation, and really of knowledge acquisition within leading centers of learning. And the hostility, for instance, to foreign students that is taking hold here—which was one of the tendencies of the Trump presidency—is emblematic of this tendency.

Your scholarship on global capitalism critiques the deep structural inequalities produced by neoliberal orthodoxy. How do you see these economic dislocations—especially the evisceration of public goods, precaritization of labor, and austerity—as constituting fertile ground for authoritarian-populist narratives and politics of resentment?

Professor Richard Falk: It has created those fertile grounds, and Trump and others around the world have known how to take advantage of them to win support from those elements of society that are most victimized by what I call ‘predatory capitalism’. This model is highly exploitative toward vulnerable sectors of society and facilitates growing inequalities between a tiny number of successful entrepreneurial individuals and the broader population. At the same time, it is fiscally stingy toward those at the bottom of the economic scale. This dynamic exacerbates class-based polarization and generates widespread alienation and resentment—sentiments that are effectively mobilized by belief-driven, strong leaders like Trump, Modi, or Erdoğan, as you mentioned.

Resistance Depends on Forces Outside the Bipartisan Order

Can the anti-fascist imperative itself become captive to ideological co-optation or instrumentalization? How can progressive actors preserve the ethical clarity of anti-fascist struggle without succumbing to partisan reductionism or performative moralism?

Professor Richard Falk: Of course, that remains to be seen—how strong they are. I don’t have much confidence in the liberal wing of the political spectrum, represented here by the Democratic Party and elsewhere, for instance, in the UK by the Labour Party. Those who accept the structure of capitalism and nationalism tend not to have the political will to maintain resistance in the face of strong repressive policies. That creates my fear that these autocratic, fascistic movements will test the resilience of the political system, and that resistance will depend on a surge of affiliation and commitment to what I call the progressive portions of society—those outside the framework of the bipartisan political structures that dominate most sovereign states.

In the light of Israel’s recent military operations in Gaza and the structural conditions of Palestinian dispossession, how would you assess the extent to which settler-colonial regimes today deploy fascistic methods under the rubric of democratic self-defense or counterterrorism?

Professor Richard Falk: That really depends on whether you consider Israel an anomaly or something more menacing globally as part of this regressive trend. I tend to view it as an anomaly because of the additional influence of Zionist ideology added onto the settler-colonial project, and that gives it a dehumanizing focus on dominating the other in the name of racial supremacy. And that’s why a Zionist state like Israel turns into an apartheid regime, treating the resident population as a persecuted presence in their own homeland.

It’s really a repetition of the story of settler colonialism in the white breakaway British colonies of North America, Australia, and New Zealand, where apartheid practices gave way to the embrace of a genocidal strategy in order to achieve the ends of a purified ethnic hierarchy that completely marginalizes the native population.

But I don’t see that happening beyond Israel—certainly not in as crude a form. You have some of it in India, with the treatment of Muslims by the Hindu nationalist orientation of the Modi government, especially in Kashmir, where many of these same tendencies are evident. But I don’t find it a general characteristic.

International Law as Sword for Enemies, Shield for Friends

And lastly, Professor Falk, you have consistently critiqued the asymmetries of global governance. Does the international community’s paralysis in the face of enduring Palestinian suffering reflect not only political hypocrisy but a deeper erosion of the normative foundations of international law itself?

Professor Richard Falk: Yes, I’m guilty of all those things. And I think the comparison between the Western reaction to the Russian attack on Ukraine and its reaction to Israel’s behavior in Gaza and the West Bank is illustrative of using international law and the UN as a sword against enemies while using international law and the UN as a shield protecting friends.

So you have complete double standards between how law is working when you’re dealing with an adversary, and how law works when you’re dealing with your own behavior or that of your close allies. You have that dualism in the reaction—on the one side, to Ukraine, where there are impassioned appeals to the UN and to the International Criminal Court; and with Israel, where the UN is denounced and the International Criminal Court is repudiated when it issues arrest warrants.

So it undermines law as a regulative framework that governs behavior and turns it into a policy instrument with inconsistent use for friends and enemies.

Professor Larry Diamond, a renowned expert on democratic development and Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Professor Diamond: Fascism Isn’t Back—But Its Features Are

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In this timely and wide-ranging interview, Stanford University’s Professor Larry Diamond explores the resurgence of authoritarianism and the global diffusion of fascistic features. “We don’t have the fully formed, classic version of fascism today,” he explains, “but there is a lot of fascistic behavior, organization, and intent spreading worldwide.” Drawing on his democratic theory expertise and recent support for an international declaration warning that “the threat of fascism is back,” Professor Diamond dissects how elected strongmen exploit polarization, subvert institutions, and erode epistemic authority. From Erdoğan to Orbán to Trump, he examines the authoritarian playbook and offers paths forward—through institutional reform, global alliances, and deliberative democracy—to defend liberal norms before they are incrementally strangled into irrelevance.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an age of democratic erosion and the rise of authoritarian populism across continents, Professor Larry Diamond, one of the world’s foremost scholars on democracy, joins the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) to assess the contemporary mutations of fascism. As a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Professor Diamond brings a deeply informed and historically grounded perspective to the question that frames this conversation: Are we witnessing a return of fascism—or something disturbingly adjacent?

Reflecting on the recent international declaration signed by Nobel laureates and leading intellectuals warning that “the threat of fascism is back,” Professor Diamond strikes a careful but urgent tone. “I think it’s better to talk about fascistic properties or features rather than fascism per se,” he explains, “because I don’t think we have the fully formed, classic version of it in many places today. But there is a lot of fascistic behavior, organization, and intent that’s spreading around the world today.”

Throughout the interview, Professor Diamond underscores the ways in which elected strongmen—from Narendra Modi in India to Viktor Orbán in Hungary, from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey to Donald Trump in the United States—gradually dismantle liberal-democratic norms. This process, which he calls the “incremental strangulation” of democratic institutions, shares strategic continuities with the fascist playbook of the 20th century, even if it is less overtly violent in form.

The interview also addresses the weaponization of cultural and religious norms, the co-optation of far-right discourse by centrist parties, and the epistemic breakdown that enables authoritarian actors to dominate public narratives. Professor Diamond warns of “a mode of thinking and reasoning that puts blind faith in a single leader and party,” a dynamic echoed in the declaration’s call to “uphold facts and evidence” in the face of disinformation.

The Declaration Against the Return of Fascism, published on the centenary of the original 1925 anti-fascist manifesto, serves as a timely and powerful backdrop to this conversation. Signed by a wide array of Nobel laureates, leading scholars, and cultural figures, the declaration urges renewed commitment to democratic values, multilateralism, and human rights. It warns of a “renewed wave of far-right movements” that threaten to erode hard-won liberties under the guise of nationalism and moral purity.

As Professor Diamond makes clear, the danger we face today is not merely political—it is civilizational. And while the forms may differ from the 1930s, the stakes are every bit as high.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Larry Diamond.

We’re Not Seeing Classic Fascism

Hitler and Mussolini in Munich, Germany, June 18, 1940. Photo: Everett Collection.

Professor Larry Diamond, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: As a signatory of the recent international declaration warning that “the threat of fascism is back,” how would you characterize the most empirically robust indicators of this re-emergence? To what extent do contemporary manifestations differ from classical fascism in terms of institutional form and sociopolitical function?

Professor Larry Diamond: I thought it was a very good statement. I had reservations about it because I think the term fascism is used too casually. It’s a very specific historical phenomenon that involves elements of extreme authoritarianism, deprivation of civil liberties, contradiction of the rule of law, individual rights, and the very principle of individuality.

There are certainly a number of regimes around the world that manifest those characteristics or have been moving in that direction. But fascism is also ultra-nationalistic and typically quite aggressive and expansionist. It celebrates violence as a means of acquiring and maintaining rule and political domination, including the violence of extreme shock troops or irregular forces that do the bidding—celebrating and elevating the leader while intimidating anyone who would challenge them. Fascist regimes freely use violence or the threat of violence to suppress and silence the opposition and to threaten their neighbors as well.

So, I think there is no pure form of fascism in the world today that is entirely similar to what we saw in Germany or Italy in the 1930s. But there are a number of regimes that have fascistic elements or properties—certainly Vladimir Putin’s in Russia, and there are others, in Turkey and India. And now certain features of what Donald Trump has been trying to construct in the United States—in terms of the intimidation of opposition, threats to opposition, the invitation to violence, and the celebration of violence by his followers—have fascistic properties.

I think it’s better to talk about fascistic properties or features rather than fascism per se, because I don’t think we have the fully formed, classic version of it in many places today. But there is a lot of fascistic behavior, organization, and intent that’s spreading around the world today.

Authoritarian Regimes Are Repackaging Masculinity, Identity, and Power to Redraw Citizenship

The declaration identifies a resurgence of “manufactured traditional authority,” rooted in religious, gender, and national identity constructs. How do you see these cultural logics being instrumentalized within modern illiberal or authoritarian-populist regimes to reshape the boundaries of political legitimacy and citizenship?

Professor Larry Diamond: Well, you certainly see a kind of resurrection and celebration of extreme masculinity, and of very traditional—even martial or militaristic—notions of what constitutes male identity and the male role, and the effort to subjugate women, and to draw artificially rigid boundaries around sexual identity and sexual behavior, and just put people into rigid, state-sponsored, movement-sponsored boxes.

These are also elements of an extreme authoritarian or, in some ways, fascistic mentality. You see this in China too—although it’s kind of odd to call a Communist regime fascistic—but they share certain properties in terms of hierarchy, domination, chauvinism, militarism, and aggressive threats to their neighbors.

So I find it more useful personally—and I think we’re drifting in that direction in the world, and the phenomenon, with its many component parts, seems to be more relevant these days—but I find it more useful to break it apart into its pieces and analyze where these pieces are emerging or gaining momentum, and what it means for the character and dynamics—internally and internationally—of authoritarian behavior.

Autocrats Strangle Democracy in Stages

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

In your analysis of democratic regression, you emphasize the process of “incremental strangulation” of liberal institutions by elected executives. How does this slow erosion align with the historical trajectory of fascism, and would you consider today’s authoritarianism to be a technocratic mutation of the fascist archetype—less overtly violent, but no less repressive?

Professor Larry Diamond: It certainly is in most places less repressive than the classic instances of fascism, particularly in Nazi Germany. But some of them have been creeping in that direction. It didn’t take long between the time that Hitler entered power in early 1933 to the time, really just months later, that he had eliminated opposition and begun to throw his opponents in jail—and before too much longer, the emergence of concentration camps. I would not describe the collapse of the liberal and constitutional state in Germany after Hitler’s rise to the Chancellorship as an incremental process. It happened in stages, but they came very rapidly and very brutally.

Italy was a little bit more incremental, but not in the same way as we’ve seen under Orbán in Hungary, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, under Narendra Modi in India—which remains sufficiently incremental so that people still debate whether we can call India an electoral democracy. I tend to think it’s crossed the line into authoritarianism.

It took a while in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. It didn’t take very long this most recent time in power for Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. It happened pretty quickly under Bukele in El Salvador.

So it varies. But in the classic instance of a country that has been a democracy for some time—whether a liberal democracy or not—it usually is an incremental process that may move step by step over a period of years: to demonize the opposition, undermine the independence of the legislature, and certainly the judiciary, which must be quashed if authoritarian regimes are to have kind of free rein to emerge. And the ultimate elimination of all independent sources of power—regulatory institutions in the executive branch, civil society, the professional civil service, the business community, the mass media, and so on. Usually, it takes a few years, and sometimes a number of years, for an emerging autocrat to sufficiently conquer and crush these independent institutions in government and civil society so that they can have unchecked power.

Moreover, even when they’ve crossed the line into authoritarianism—which I think Erdoğan did within some number of years after taking power around 2003, more than two or three perhaps, but considerably less than ten—even after the line had been crossed from electoral democracy into electoral or competitive authoritarianism, the incremental descent can proceed. And the regime can become more authoritarian, more abusive, more terroristic, more domineering, more hegemonic—and, to use a word that is increasingly in vogue—with more and more frequent manifestations of fascism.

Authoritarianism Thrives Where Truth Dies

The declaration posits a growing epistemic crisis—an erosion of truth, science, and critical inquiry. Are we witnessing a systemic undermining of epistemic authority as a strategy of soft authoritarianism, and how does this epistemic degradation relate to the collapse of public trust and the spread of disinformation?

Professor Larry Diamond: I think the causation moves in both directions. It’s a collapse of trust in all kinds of institutions and sources of information that helps pave the way for authoritarian populism to come into power and elevate a leader—a “great leader”—as the source of all wisdom and authority, to try and rescue the country from various forms of treason, greed, sabotage, corruption, however they depict the ruling elite, the ruling establishment.

Then, of course, once in power, these kinds of leaders and parties further accentuate public distrust in science, in objective sources of knowledge, in alternative sources of information—in anything we know to be true, independent of what the dear leader and the ruling party say is true.

So, I think what you describe as an epistemic crisis typically precedes, to some degree, the coming to power of an authoritarian, hegemonic, extremely illiberal populist political party, with deeply authoritarian, if not fascistic, intentions and ambitions. And then they drive it—they drive the people—further into distrust and cynicism, and into a mode of thinking and reasoning that puts blind faith in a single leader and party.

Why Democracy Must Lead the Fight Against Authoritarian Drift

The declaration calls for renewed multilateralism grounded in human rights and the rule of law. With international institutions facing legitimacy crises, what new or reformed global mechanisms might be necessary to counteract the diffusion of authoritarian norms and “sharp power” influence?

Professor Larry Diamond: There are many dimensions to the crisis we’re facing globally regarding the rule of law and the liberal international order. And obviously, these have worsened with the multiple conflicts in the Middle East over the last two and a half years, if not more.

I worry deeply about the damage that’s been done to the United Nations and the overall erosion of liberal international institutions, which are being undermined from all directions—by Russia and China, by Iran, and by Donald Trump in the United States, with his contempt for multilateral institutions and for the liberal international order itself. After all, that order has helped keep peace in Europe for 80 years—until Vladimir Putin shattered it. I believe it still remains our best hope for international peace, security, and individual freedom.

At present, international multilateral institutions are in serious distress. The United Nations has appeared quite feeble in response to the recent Middle East crisis. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization are all under significant strain. The entire nuclear nonproliferation regime—which, in my view, did a relatively poor job of restraining Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons—has also faltered.

To my mind, we need to begin with the democracies of the world and try to build outward from there, reaffirming commitments to the rule of law, international order, and collective security. That must include a reassertion of peace and security mechanisms in the Middle East, as well as a clear and unified message to the People’s Republic of China that the international community opposes any use of force to resolve the Taiwan conflict or differing interpretations of sovereignty across the strait. Certainly, it also means that Vladimir Putin cannot be allowed to forcibly dissolve Ukraine into a greater imperial Russia.

We need a stronger NATO, a reinforced alliance of liberal democracies, a renewed commitment to the integrity of borders, and shared principles of collective defense. These are the building blocks for reconstituting global order. But we cannot begin rebuilding while the United States is in retreat from that very order.

In my view, we must not only deepen cooperation with our NATO and EU allies—as well as partners like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and, where feasible, India—but also revitalize and relaunch the United States’ instruments of international engagement. This includes agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Voice of America, and other channels of diplomacy, assistance, and cultural exchange. We should be offering scholarships, promoting global educational exchange, and ensuring that our scientific, technological, and medical innovations are shared worldwide.

They Need to Polarize Politics to Seize Power

In “The Electoral Reform Imperative,” you diagnose affective polarization as a destabilizing force for democratic governance. How do populist actors exploit this emotional antagonism to reframe pluralism as moral corruption and consolidate plebiscitary rule under the guise of majoritarianism?

Professor Larry Diamond: They do it pretty much as your question describes. It’s very important to understand that people who want to crush democracy—and who seek to do so through politics, by winning power via competitive elections—need to create an atmosphere of fear and desperation. In other words, they need to polarize politics in order to seize power.

All of the agents of illiberal or authoritarian populism—Orban, Erdoğan, Robert Fico in Slovakia, certainly Modi in India, Andrés Manuel López Obrador during his six-year presidency in Mexico, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, and now his successor, Nicolás Maduro—they all polarize politics. They must generate fear and hatred for the other side, because rational politics—deliberation, compromise, reason—(these) are the enemies of their project to conquer and entrench total power.

So they manufacture fear, animosity, and hatred. They deploy memes and narratives that divide people on an emotional level and manipulate symbols of fear, violence, militarism, and extreme ambition to pit citizens against one another. They typically identify a dangerous “other” within the country. Often it’s a minority group or outsider—it could be immigrants, a marginalized group like the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, or a religious minority of some kind. But they always need someone to scapegoat, someone to vilify and rally people to fear.

Deliberation Works—If You Create the Right Setting

Your collaborative work on “America in One Room” suggests that structured deliberation can depolarize attitudes and restore democratic norms. How scalable are these models of deliberative democracy in politically fragile or culturally heterogeneous societies—especially where civic trust is already eroded?

Professor Larry Diamond: We think the methods are scalable. The problem with scalability is not that you can’t bring people with very different political orientations or racial and religious backgrounds into one room. When you step outside the white-hot glare of politics and mass media polarization and simply invite people to deliberate, to share their views and listen to others, it often works. You don’t need to persuade people—it’s the setting that matters.

The real challenge is that in-person deliberation is very expensive. You have to fly people to a location, manage the logistics of in-person gatherings, and hire moderators to facilitate small-group sessions.

Now, at our Deliberative Democracy Lab at Stanford University, we have an online platform—very similar to the one we’re using now—that can accommodate 10, 15, or even 20 participants. If it can handle 12, that’s already enough. This platform uses a simple form of artificial intelligence to manage the discussion: it poses questions, ensures everyone has a chance to speak, maintains respectful dialogue, and balances participation.

It’s a flexible, intuitive, and fair tool that has opened up dramatic new possibilities for scaling deliberation—provided the questions and the framework for engagement are well-designed.

Electoral Systems Must Temper, Not Amplify, Polarization

Illustration by Lightspring.

Given the weaponization of electoral legitimacy by populist incumbents to hollow out liberal checks and balances, do you view institutional reforms such as proportional representation or open primaries as viable defenses against democratic backsliding—or might they risk unintended consequences?

Professor Larry Diamond: It’s a good question. When you start tinkering with institutions—certainly including electoral systems—you do risk unintended consequences. I think this should counsel some degree of humility on the part of institutional reformers.

In countries like India, the US, and the United Kingdom—where simple majoritarian, first-past-the-post systems prevail—allowing a candidate to win with just 35 or 38 percent of the vote, as has occurred in Britain with the Labour Party, is not particularly democratic. In an era of deep political polarization, requiring voters to choose only one candidate often results in leaders who command the support of just a third of the electorate. This outcome fuels political cynicism by granting disproportionate power to figures lacking broad public backing. And keep in mind what can happen: maybe in one election a moderate Labour Prime Minister comes to power, but four or five years later a more extreme party might win an absolute majority of seats due to the bonus effect inherent in first-past-the-post system.

In a social and psychological context of polarization—driven by rising economic inequality and social media—you don’t want an electoral system that exacerbates polarization further. So, I favor at a minimum moving to the Australian system of preferential voting, or what we call ranked-choice voting in the US. Another option is proportional representation. Although moving to proportional representation would be very hard for the US, if a country adopts it, I think a moderate version is preferable—one that avoids excessive party fragmentation and promotes open-list voting, so parties aren’t entirely in control of who within the party gets elected. For countries struggling with polarization, the Irish system of the single transferable vote is a good model to consider.

Co-Opting Without Capitulating

And lastly, Professor Diamond, to what extent does the co-optation of far-right discourse by centrist parties accelerate the normalization of authoritarian populism? Is this a short-term electoral tactic or a structural accommodation with long-term implications for the ideological boundaries of democratic politics?

Professor Larry Diamond: It’s another good question. And since these projects have really been gaining momentum over the last 15 years or so, it’s still too soon to answer definitively. It’s even more recent in terms of right-of-center parties trying to co-opt some of the voters and agenda of the extreme right.

I will say this: on the one hand, right-of-center parties—and even progressive ones—are beginning to respond. A recent and insightful commentary by a progressive British analyst in The New York Times argued that progressive parties would be well-advised to take immigration management more seriously. His central point was that a cohesive sense of national identity is often necessary to foster the social solidarity required to support the disadvantaged—the poor, the marginalized, and others in need. That solidarity, however, becomes more difficult to sustain when segments of the population perceive that social benefits are increasingly directed toward newcomers who have not yet become part of the national fabric.

I think Europe, the United States, and other advanced industrial democracies need humane and generous immigration policies. For one thing, they need the labor. With declining populations or slowing growth rates, they will face labor shortages of various kinds. But they also need to be serious about preserving the integrity of borders. If you don’t have borders, you don’t really have a country.

So, on the one hand, it is right and proper for political parties—not only of the right but also of the center-left—to recognize the frustrations surrounding unchecked immigration that the far right, often tinged with fascistic overtones, has been fanning. These concerns should be acknowledged and addressed. But that does not mean adopting the racism, hatred, or xenophobia of the far right.

Being humane, decent, respectful, and committed to the dignity of all people, regardless of origin, is essential. But that doesn’t necessarily mean—and I don’t think it is sustainable for liberal democracies to assume it should mean—purely open borders. That’s just one example where mainstream or progressive parties can respond to some of the legitimate issues the far right has exploited.

The far right is also raising concerns about economic inequality and injustice—issues that are central to progressive platforms. So, I think this has to be approached on an issue-by-issue basis.

Professor Rafal Soborski, who teaches International Politics at Richmond American University and serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University.

Prof. Soborski: The Recent Polish Election Shows That Shifting Right Doesn’t Win Over the Right

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In this compelling interview, Professor Rafal Soborski critiques Poland’s liberal democratic actors for mimicking right-wing rhetoric in a failed attempt to broaden appeal. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he warns, urging pro-democratic forces to adopt bold, progressive agendas rooted in class justice and social solidarity. Drawing comparisons to political centrists across Europe, Soborski emphasizes that ideological clarity—not cautious managerialism—is key to countering the far right’s emotional narratives and mobilizing mythologies. His insights offer a timely call for a renewed progressive vision amid the turbulent political landscape in Poland and beyond.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Rafal Soborski offers a trenchant critique of the Polish liberal democratic actors’ strategic missteps in the recent presidential election, arguing that centrist attempts to mimic the right not only fail to capture conservative voters but also alienate the progressive base. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he asserts, summarizing what he sees as a recurring failure of liberal parties not only in Poland but across much of Europe.

Professor Soborski, who teaches International Politics at Richmond American University and serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University, situates this analysis within a broader critique of what he calls “managerial centrism.” For him, this style of governance—technocratic, uninspiring, and devoid of ideological ambition—has become a default mode for centrist parties. “Even when the center wins elections, it then limits itself in office to this very managerialism… without a compelling vision of its own,” he explains.

This was evident in the performance of Civic Platform’s candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski, who lost narrowly to the nationalist Karol Nawrocki in a deeply polarized race in Poland. Rather than galvanizing progressive voters with bold policies, Trzaskowski, Professor Soborski suggests, hedged his ideological bets and made symbolic missteps that demoralized key constituencies. “I don’t think he convinced anyone by hiding the rainbow flag handed to him by Nawrocki during one of the debates,” Professor Soborski notes. “This alienated many people on the left… while not convincing anyone on the right.”

In his view, such political positioning reflects a deeper failure to recognize the need for ideological clarity and courage. Drawing comparisons to Germany’s Olaf Scholz and Britain’s Keir Starmer, Professor Soborski warns that when liberal parties attempt to neutralize far-right narratives by parroting them, they lose both authenticity and voter trust. “It tends to mimic instead the narratives of the right,” he laments.

For Professor Soborski, the path forward lies not in cautious centrism but in a reinvigoration of progressive values—rooted in social justice, pro-Europeanism, and recognition of class dynamics. “I would like to see pro-democratic forces in Poland challenging the right,” he concludes, “rather than hoping in vain that they can occupy some of the right’s discursive territory.”

This interview reveals not only the ideological contours of Poland’s political battleground but also the urgent need for liberal democratic actors to rethink their strategy before the far right consolidates its recent gains.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Rafal Soborski.

Populism Is a Style, Not an Ideology

Posters of 2025 Polish presidential candidates Rafał Trzaskowski (KO) and Karol Nawrocki (PiS) in Kuślin, Poland, on April 6, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Rafal Soborski, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. You’ve argued that populism lacks ideological coherence. How would you categorize Karol Nawrocki’s brand of politics—Trumpian, nationalist, anti-liberal—within your broader critique of the term ‘populism’?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I don’t think mine is a critique of the term populism as such.
But instead, what I would argue—and I am, of course, far from being original here—is that approaching populism as an ideology, even a thin one, is misguided. Incidentally, the author to whom we owe the concept of thin-centered ideology, Michael Freeden, does not think populism qualifies as one, so it doesn’t qualify as a worldview. According to Freeden, thin-centered ideologies have a restricted conceptual core, a restricted range of concepts, and hence need broader, more mature ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism, to serve as their hosts. But the thin-centered ideologies are still more complex than populism. So think of nationalism, feminism, perhaps ecology.

On the other hand, populism revolves merely around the opposition between the decent people and the corrupted elite, and this is not enough to construct a worldview that any ideology is expected to offer. Of course, you can further distinguish between right-wing populism, left-wing populism, and so on. But such distinctions often reveal that populism does not really make much sense as an ideological category. So both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders have been described as populists, but their views are dramatically different.

During the pandemic, I analyzed approaches to COVID-19 that others had categorized as populist, and I showed that there was no consistent pattern or any general similarities in terms of the track record—in terms of the success or otherwise—of so-called populist policies, and that, in fact, the major factor was the degree of neoliberalization. So, I think it is better to keep populism as a description of the type of political communication—the style of political communication—and perhaps also the convention-breaking behavior of some politicians, including dressing down, swearing, smoking—in the case of Nawrocki, sniffing snus during TV debates with Trzaskowski.

But the populist manner may carry very different ideological and political messages, and in that sense it may be better to speak of populist nationalism or populist socialism rather than vice versa—rather than socialist populism. Populism then becomes just a description of the style in which a given ideology is conveyed.

As for Nawrocki, I think all of the adjectives that you have mentioned—Trumpian, nationalist, anti-liberal—could potentially apply, for of course they are different categories.
Trumpism seems to have an obvious meaning. It’s a blend of hostile grievances against all kinds of minorities and some pernicious establishment—which is, of course, ironic, considering Trump’s own status—and Trumpism is expressed more as ephemeral sound bites than coherent ideas. We’ve become used to that with Donald Trump. Trump is also associated with political transactionism, bringing his personal monetary interest quite unashamedly into politics, which also affects what he says and how he says it. So it remains to be seen if Nawrocki tries to emulate this.

Is Nawrocki a nationalist? Certainly. And it is a nationalism that thrives on and stirs up collective fears and collective resentment in a volatile world whose complexities this kind of nationalism oversimplifies.

Anti-liberal? Well, absolutely. However, I think we need to be fair and wait and see who Nawrocki turns out to be ideologically when in office.

We need to remember that until he was selected by Jarosław Kaczyński as an ostensibly nonpartisan candidate—but really the candidate of Law and Justice (PiS)—he had been almost a complete unknown to the wider public. So I think we need to wait and see what happens.

Ideological Balkanization and the Far Right’s Mythmaking Machine

You’ve called for taking ideology seriously in times of crisis. What ideological threads—beyond vague populism—do you see underpinning Nawrocki’s support base and discourse?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Thank you for this question. Yes, I think political ideology should be taken seriously, and I discussed this in my work. For years, however, ideology has undergone a radical transformation, becoming increasingly fragmented, fluid, ephemeral,
reacting haphazardly to rapid social and political changes. So, traditional left-right distinctions have blurred. They have given way to hybrid belief systems and situational politics, featuring often contradictory positions depending on the issue at hand, emerging at any moment. Of course, social media have accelerated this shift as well, favoring meme-driven and personality-centered politics over more durable, collectively held ideological commitments. And, comprehensive worldviews are losing ground to issue-based activism, identity politics, and also algorithmically reinforced echo chambers. So, ideology has changed, and far-right politics provides a particularly revealing lens through which to analyze ongoing ideological transformations. 

The far right today combines elements of nationalism, traditionalism, libertarianism, conspiracism, accelerationism—you name it—into an unstable and contradictory but potent political force. The far right also engages in constructing and mobilizing its followers around myths—political myths of civilizational decline, national betrayal, or demographic apocalypse. It offers emotionally charged narratives of victimization and redemption. So, for example, “the Great Replacement” myth frames migration as an existential threat to the West; “the Deep State” conspiracy envisions elites orchestrating some global control or takeover. The far right relies on such narratives, positing a moralized struggle between the people and their perceived enemies, and seems to be capitalizing on the fears that these cause.

Overall, I think what we witness is ideological Balkanization—adherence to tribalism over universalism, feeling over reasoning—and it’s going in that direction. But this does not mean that we should be paying less attention to these fragmented new forms of ideology. Ideology scholars should really be exploring ideology in its different expressions, whether they are sophisticated and structured, or crass and fleeting. For better or worse, this is how we tend to think politically today, and we should be studying this.

However, coming back to Nawrocki, I think it is likely that he will be blending different ideological themes, and it seems certain to me that it will be a narrative mobilizing collective exclusionary emotions over reasoning. But still, as I said earlier, I think we need to wait and see. His political communication thus far has been subject to the pressures of electoral competition much more than it will be when he’s in office, with at least five years of presidency ahead of him. Perhaps he will continue this kind of discourse, or perhaps he will change. We’ll see.

The Far Right Has a Base and a Superstructure—But No Real International

President-elect Karol Nawrocki campaigning ahead of Poland’s 2025 presidential election in Łódź, Poland, on April 27, 2024. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

How does Nawrocki’s alignment with Trumpism reflect broader transnational ideological flows between far-right actors across the Atlantic? Are we seeing a global ideological bloc emerging?

Professor Rafal Soborski: That’s a great question. Far-right ideologies take increasingly transnational forms. This includes the emergence of different forms of civilizationism, variously aligning with or transcending nationalism or racism. So, with my colleagues at London Metropolitan University, Professor Michał Garapich and Dr. Anna Jochymek, we’ve been working on a project funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council, studying the emerging transnational Polish-British far right. And we see a significant number of Polish migrants in Britain recruited by British far-right organizations. We also see British far-right leaders and activists visiting Poland, for example, to take part in the Polish Independence March on 11/11, which is probably the world’s largest transnational far-right hub, as well as a symbolic space for the reproduction of political myths.

Far-right cooperation is fast becoming both a matter of ideological synergy and financial benefit. Far-right influencers play an increasingly important role, and there is money around them. So, for example, one Polish-British far-right PR expert has been behind the rightward shift of Elon Musk, and both have promoted the staunchly pro-Israeli, Islamophobic far-right influencer Tommy Robinson.

So, in that sense, I think an ideological bloc has already emerged, and this far right of today does have both its base and its superstructure, using Marxian terminology. But having said all that, far-right nationalism’s logic is not really given to cooperation—to put this mildly—and as we know from history. So, I anticipate all kinds of tensions, potentially conflicts emerging, and I don’t think that a robust, coherent far-right international is likely in that sense.

Populist Nationalism Thrives on Imagined Enemies And PiS Knows This Well

With Nawrocki now positioned to veto progressive reforms by Tusk’s government, are we witnessing a new phase of institutional gridlock engineered by ideological confrontation between liberalism and authoritarian conservatism?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think this is highly likely. But I don’t think, to be honest, that Tusk’s government would have done much, even with a president from its own side. The coalition is too divided on social issues and has been, I have to say this with regret, highly ineffective. And Tusk’s party itself is really right-wing—I mean, by Western standards. This is a neoliberal/neoconservative party. It resembles the Tories under Cameron before their shift in a far-right direction. So, yes, but I don’t think that it would be a very dramatic change in relation to what we have.

Do you foresee PiS leveraging the presidency to engineer a strategic comeback in 2027, thereby locking in illiberal reforms? If so, how might ideology serve as the vehicle of this restoration?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think the broad ideological outlook of Law and Justice (PiS) will remain as it is—traditional, conservative on social issues, and protectionist—some would say drifting towards the left—on economic issues. At the same time, the populist nationalism that PiS represents, as I said earlier, thrives on imagining enemies and hostile forces.
So, at one point it was the LGBT community that PiS stigmatized, with some regions and locations under the control of the party declaring themselves to be LGBT-free zones. At other points, it was refugees from the Middle East, whom Kaczyński presented in a language resembling Nazi rhetoric, really—namely, as carriers of dangerous diseases. So, with the rapid growth of the Ukrainian population in Poland following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, PiS will be keen to capitalize on any emerging fears and tensions between the Polish population and the Ukrainian minority in Poland, and that this will be used to engineer this strategic comeback in 2027.

PiS Is Illiberal—But Let’s Not Mistake It for Neoliberal

Chairperson of Law and Justice, Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Photo: Tomasz Kudala.

In your analysis, how does neoliberalism continue to structure Polish politics even amidst this nationalist, anti-liberal wave? Can we speak of an ‘illiberal neoliberalism’ in the Polish context?

Professor Rafal Soborski: This is an interesting question—questions like this color the debate on whether we still live in a neoliberal era. Trump’s tariffs, Brexit, etc., seem to perhaps contradict this. Neoliberalism—and by this I mean a crass version of 19th-century economic liberalism, not the paradigm in the studies of international relations also known as neoliberalism—has been the hegemonic ideology for so long that, even if we are to assume its terminal decline in the near future, it will continue resonating for some time. By the way, the end of neoliberalism was pronounced a few times before, especially during the 2008 economic crisis—the gravest one since 1929—which revealed the serious flaws of neoliberalism, and then during the pandemic, when suddenly the state, which neoliberals tend to blame for all problems, proved indispensable, and neoliberal regimes coped with the pandemic far worse, far less effectively than the more social-democratic, statist ones.

Now, neoliberalism is compatible with authoritarianism—think of Chile under Pinochet’s rule, for instance—but as far as PiS is concerned, I am not sure if the party represents illiberal neoliberalism. Neoliberals preach that markets are always right, they don’t find inequality to be a problem, they promote austerity and the rolling back of the welfare state. And PiS, on the other hand, is actually quite statist in approach, supportive of the welfare state—for whichever reasons, usually just electoral reasons, but still—and big projects like, for instance, the central airport in Poland, which is now in a bit of a limbo. Economic inequalities—we have to keep this in mind—under the PiS government declined in Poland. The Gini coefficient, which measures inequality, fluctuated during PiS years but was never higher than in 2015 and is now significantly below average. So, I wouldn’t describe them as illiberal neoliberals. They are certainly illiberal, but probably not neoliberal.

Is Poland a Nationalist Haven?

Your recent co-authored work shows how Polish migrants in the UK are co-opted into transnational far-right movements. How might Nawrocki’s presidency reinforce or reshape diasporic nationalism and transnational far-right solidarities?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Thank you very much for this question. This is the topic that I’m working on with Professor Garapich and Dr. Jochymek at LMU. 

Poland is often seen by the global far right as a nationalist haven that remains relatively homogeneous ethnically, that remains traditional, conservative, and has also been very economically successful in recent decades, while maintaining a strong identity. And this kind of perception has been articulated and reinforced by all kinds of far-right influencers, but also by Donald Trump. When he visited Warsaw during his first presidency, he chose Warsaw as the location for his main European speech—often described by scholars as the major narrative of Western civilizational populism.

I think this perception of Poland—has been undermined by the 2023 elections and the premiership of the globalist Donald Tusk, as he’s seen by the far right. But if PiS regains power in 2027, then the far-right narrative about Poland as a model country is likely to make a comeback. 

I already mentioned our work on Polish migrants in Britain, one of the largest minorities in the country. At this point, approximately 700,000 Poles live in Britain, and their voting patterns are interesting. They are different from how Poles living in, for example, the United States or Canada vote. So in the first round of the presidential elections, almost 36% of those who voted voted for Trzaskowski. But then he was followed by two far-right candidates—Sławomir Mentzen, over 18%, and Grzegorz Braun, who got over 14%—and Nawrocki was only fourth, with just 13%. So it seems that Polish right-wing migrants in Britain prefer either the more extreme narrative coming from Braun, which is messianic, antisemitic, extremely homophobic, or the more economically libertarian far-right views of Mentzen. And the popularity of the latter may be explicable by the fact that many Poles living in Britain are self-employed and hence averse to big state and high taxation. But in the second round, Trzaskowski got almost 61%. So we should keep in mind that the majority of Poles in Britain are not interested in politics and do not vote. Those who vote ultimately voted for the centrist candidate.

Now, coming back to Nawrocki: only time will tell what his win means for transnational far-right solidarities. What we know is that the PiS government until 2023—so for eight years—supported symbolically and financially various initiatives of the Polish diaspora in Britain that were of a far-right nature, and the British press did register this. More broadly, taking a more global perspective, as the far right assumes an increasingly civilizationist posture, transnational far-right ideologies, activism, and symbolism will become more important, I’m sure—reinforcing these solidarities that you’ve asked about. However, as I already said, we should not forget the lesson from history: that collision courses are inherent in nationalism, and such friendships are likely to be subordinated and perhaps ultimately trumped by jingoistic passions.

Shifting Right Won’t Win the Right

What are the ideological weaknesses of the liberal opposition in Poland, particularly in light of Trzaskowski’s narrow loss? Is managerial centrism enough to challenge the far right’s mobilizing narratives?

Professor Rafal Soborski: It certainly is not enough, and this can be seen not just in Poland, but also in other places, including Germany or Britain, where—even when the center wins elections—it then limits itself in office to this very managerialism you mentioned, without a compelling vision of its own. It tends to mimic instead the narratives of the right. Think of Keir Starmer’s shift to the right in recent months, or Scholz when he was Germany’s Chancellor. There are many other examples. And I think this was also a mistake of the coalition government in Poland—the rightward shift in the rhetoric around migration, for example, and no progress whatsoever on the promises made to the LGBT community. And of course, this was caused by the coalition being divided on the question. But why would voters take into consideration the inner workings of the governing coalition? They generally expect results. 

Many leftists did vote for Trzaskowski, perhaps with a heavy conscience. I would have liked many more of them to vote for him, just to avoid having a nationalist with a shady past as president of the country. But Trzaskowski himself should have shifted in a more progressive direction. For example, I don’t think he convinced anyone by hiding the rainbow flag that was handed to him by Nawrocki during one of the debates, and then it was quickly taken over from Trzaskowski by a left-wing candidate. This alienated many people on the left—members of the LGBT community, I presume, as well—while not convincing anyone on the right, who had seen Trzaskowski before participating in Pride marches in Warsaw. So, this was inconsistent, and shifting to the right will not work.

Don’t Chase the Right—Reclaim Class Politics and Solidarity

A fatigued factory worker.
A fatigued factory worker experiencing exhaustion, weakness, hopelessness, and burnout. Photo: Shutterstock.

How should pro-democratic forces in Poland reframe their political project to contest both the nationalist cultural agenda and the underlying neoliberal consensus you critique?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think it is evident from what I have said so far that my political views are leftist and progressive. I would like to see pro-democratic forces in Poland challenging the right rather than hoping in vain that they can occupy some of the right’s discursive territory. I would like to see an open, pro-European Poland respecting minorities and celebrating diversity. 

But I would also like to see the importance of social class really appreciated by Polish progressive politicians.The liberal center, and even the liberal left, sometimes appear to believe that class is no longer a significant dimension of identity or social stratification. They see class as a concept that was relevant in the industrial era—in the 19th century, early 20th century—but not in an information- and service-based society of today. But the concept of class describes an economic relationship, and anyone working for wages, not living off rent or interest, belongs to the working class. So to appeal to this huge group, pro-democratic forces should start talking about the four-day working week, more loudly about universal income, universal benefits—especially in the context of AI, which will likely eliminate a wide range of professions, a wide range of jobs, or rather, it will replace humans in those jobs. 

The Razem (Together) party in Poland has started this conversation, and I think this is the way to go, rather than caring mainly for the interests of a small number of wealthy individuals or entrepreneurs, however important they may be for the economy. We should also remember on this point that some of the people who voted for Law and Justice—I suspect a significant share of the party’s electorate—chose it because of the range of social benefits, welfare benefits that the party has introduced or expanded, hence, as I mentioned, reducing inequalities while at the same time sustaining economic growth. So, I think a social democratic, solidary response—protecting the poor while shifting more of the financial burden towards the privileged few—is what I would recommend, and I would recommend this both in principle and also strategically, as a way to weaken, to defeat PiS.

And finally, Professor Soborski, given the gender and education-based electoral cleavages evident in the runoff, how might intersectional ideological analysis help explain—and perhaps overcome—these divisions?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Most of the cleavages were not that surprising—big cities for Trzaskowski, provincial Poland for Nawrocki, Western Poland for Trzaskowski, Eastern Poland for Nawrocki. Education was, of course, a big factor as well. But what I would like to highlight—what came unexpectedly—was the support far-right candidates Mentzen and Braun received from young people, who then, in the second round, voted primarily for Nawrocki. So clearly, this is a group for whom Civic Platform—the coalition government—does not seem to have a convincing offer, and I already explained what I see as the right response.

A distressed Black woman professional faces gender discrimination and workplace bullying, as male colleagues point fingers and place blame. The image highlights the emotional toll of inequality and harassment in professional environments. Photo: Dreamstime.

“No One Can Make You Feel Inferior Without Your Consent”: Is Eleanor Roosevelt Right?

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceGenderHomeLeadership & Persona

Can we truly choose not to feel inferior? In this thought-provoking commentary, Syed Yousha Haider critically examines Eleanor Roosevelt’s famous quote, “No one can make you feel inferior without your consent.” Blending insights from psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and social theory, Haider explores the limits of agency in the face of trauma, social conditioning, and structural inequality. While celebrating resilience and self-determination, he also challenges oversimplified notions of empowerment. This essay invites readers to reflect on the complex dynamics of self-worth, consent, and resistance in a world where internal struggles are often shaped by forces far beyond the individual.

By Syed Yousha Haider*

Eleanor Roosevelt’s much-quoted maxim—”No one can make you feel inferior without your consent”—has traveled a long way from its origins as a personal empowerment mantra. The quote says that individual choice is more important than what other people think, based on ideas about agency, dignity, and self-concept. But beneath its catchy simplicity lies a philosophical paradox: is it ever in our choice to refuse consent to feelings of inferiority? Are these kinds of feelings, at least in part, caused by social, psychological, and even neurobiological processes that we can’t control? This essay argues that Roosevelt’s maxim, as inspiring as it is, is only partially true. Individual agency is essential to self-perception, but the action of structural forces, psychological conditioning, and automatic cognitive processes complicate the idea that one can simply choose not to feel inferior.

The Appeal of Personal Agency

People still use Roosevelt’s quote because it fits with the liberal humanist idea of the self-governing person. For example, Stoic philosophy heard Epictetus say, “It’s not what happens to you, but how you react to it that matters.” It seems like there is strength inside despite what is going on outside. Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) is probably the most scientifically-based type of psychotherapy. It also believes that how we feel is based on how we think about things, not the events themselves. This view says that changing the way you talk to yourself can help you get over feelings of inferiority and move on.

Also, there are literally countless examples from history of people who have overcome feelings of inferiority even though the system tried to make them feel less important. Viktor E. Frankl, a survivor of the Holocaust, famously said in his book Man’s Search for Meaning that the last of the human freedoms is “to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances.” Many people point to Frankl’s ability to survive extreme dehumanization as proof that accepting one’s inferiority is a choice..

After serving 27 years in prison for refusing to change his beliefs to suit apartheid’s demands, Nelson Mandela came out of prison with his dignity unharmed and guided South Africa through a peaceful transition. The strength of agency against humiliation is demonstrated by the fact that he was able to maintain his dignity despite institutional racism. After surviving a Taliban assassination attempt, Malala Yousafzai transformed personal hardship into a global movement for girls’ education. Her refusal to submit in the face of patriarchal violence is a brilliant illustration of how victims can become empowered..

The idea that people are powerless in the face of hardship is refuted by the resilience philosophy. The study of learned optimism by Dr. Martin Seligman emphasizes how our mental habits can influence how we react to criticism and failure. People can develop what Seligman refers to as “psychological immunity”—a defense against internalized inferiority—by confronting negative internal monologues and redefining failures as temporary and external. Roosevelt’s ideal can then be seen as psychologically realized through the development of optimism and internal locus of control.

Limits of Consent: Neuropsychological Constraints

However, this utopian vision is obscured by current psychological and neuroscientific research. Cognitive processes related to self-worth are not always under conscious control. The Default Mode Network (DMN) is primarily outside of conscious awareness and is active during self-referential cognition and daydreaming. In order to construct a cohesive sense of self, it is known to combine memories, emotions, and imagined situations, maintaining negative self-beliefs without conscious consent.

Furthermore, unconscious bias affects how we view ourselves from an early age. Implicit Association Tests demonstrate how years of exposure to social stereotypes can cause people to internalize group stereotype attitudes toward members of their own group, such as women being biased against women in positions of power. These are kept in the brain areas responsible for moral and emotional judgments, the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala, demonstrating the neurobiological basis of negative self-perceptions.

Though unconscious, the trauma survivors feel ashamed and inferior. It has been observed that distorted self-perceptions, such as guilt and worthlessness, are more potent than logical thought in people with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). These are neurophysiologic reactions rather than choices, and correcting them usually requires a lengthy therapeutic intervention. In these situations, inferiority is more neurologically motivated than widely accepted.

Additionally, early attachment orientations are crucial in determining self-esteem and vulnerability to feelings of inadequacy, according to affective neuroscience research. A child who experiences emotional abuse or neglect may grow up with a persistent internal schema of worthlessness. The internalized, which was solidified during brain-sensitive developmental stages, restricts the person’s capacity to “withdraw consent” from inferiority complexes as an adult.

Second, feelings of inferiority might have adaptive roots, according to evolutionary psychology. Humans were made to live in small communities where access to resources and partners depended heavily on status and belonging. One adaptation that might have developed in order to survive is hypersensitivity to social rejection. However, this evolutionary baggage now shows up as irrational and habitual feelings of inferiority, especially in hierarchical environments like online forums, workplaces, and schools.

Social and Structural Determinants of Inferiority

In addition to the psychology of the individual, social structures also produce and enforce inferiority. Language, the media, and institutions are all infused with heteronormativity, which tends to dictate who is capable, desirable, or deserving. Symbolic violence, as defined by Pierre Bourdieu, describes how dominant social groups impose meanings that are internalized as acceptable. For example, colonial education systems used to portray colonized people as intellectually inferior; this claim is still present in the disparities in academic accreditation around the world.

Erving Goffman studied how stigma, or the discrediting of people for supposedly deviating from the norm, contributes to feelings of shame and undesirableness. According to his theory, the stigmatized individual absorbs society’s scrutiny and agrees to being inferior out of social pressure rather than choice. This consent is not voluntary; it is coerced.

According to the “stereotype threat,” as defined by social psychologist Claude Steele, people perform less well when they are concerned about reinforcing unfavorable stereotypes about their identity category. For instance, when race is emphasized on tests, African American students do worse—not because they think they are less capable, but rather because the cultural script instills fear, which impairs performance. Such scripts can effectively short-circuit the will by altering behavior and thought.

Another sociocultural phenomenon is groupthink. People will repress contradictory self-concepts in order to preserve group harmony, embracing the flawed consensus. Conventional instances, like discouraging women’s aspirations for education or politics, demonstrate how social norms can force internalization of inferiority.

Furthermore, social media has given rise to new channels for the propagation of inferiority. Social media platforms like Instagram and TikTok propagate idealized beauty standards and manufactured lives, creating a culture of comparison that undermines self-worth. Younger generations, particularly teenage girls, are disproportionately targeted by algorithmic promotion of idealized imagery, which contributes to the rise in anxiety and depression. Here, inferiority is fostered by repeated exposure to distorted norms rather than being elected outright.

Such effects are amplified by intersectionality. The accumulation of marginalization experiences is demonstrated by Kimberlé Crenshaw’s intersectional matrix of oppressive systems, which includes racism, sexism, and classism. Black women who are economically marginalized may encounter overlapping social messages that portray them as inferior in multiple ways. These messages, which are delivered through cultural imagery and institutional norms, carry a cumulative psychological burden that is difficult to deny.

Resisting Inferiority: Possibility and Limits

Resistance is evident in opposition to these limits. The recovery of the imposed identity of inferiority has already been demanded by feminist and postcolonial theorists. “Caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation,” as Audre Lorde insists, is a rejection of internalizing the condemnation of the world. Black Pride and LGBTQ+ affirmations are just two examples of grassroots movements that have successfully challenged hegemonic discourses and empowered people to reject internalized oppression.

The solution to this difficulty lies in education. According to Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, the oppressed must be able to recognize internalized inferiority brought on by systemic injustice and recover their dignity via critical thinking, or conscientization. Only with time, resources, and support groups—things that not everyone has access to—can it be accomplished.

The ability to challenge hegemonic narratives and reinterpret value on their own terms has been made possible by cyberspace. Default inferiority narratives are countered by discourses like #BlackGirlMagic and #DisabledAndProud. In addition to being empowering in and of themselves, these claims also have a cumulative effect by changing the broader cultural environment.

However, not all attempts at resistance are successful. The enduring resilience of systemic powers is demonstrated by the continued existence of racial profiling, wage inequality, and underrepresentation in leadership positions. One’s identity is typically determined by societal approval, even if you fight valiantly against subordinating ideologies. The internal conflict gets harder to sustain when one lacks acceptance and a sense of belonging.

However, resilience-building programs enable psychological resistance. Education and mental health programs that promote self-advocacy, growth mindsets, and trauma-informed care are essential. Instead of opposing systemic forces, these empower individuals to challenge internalized narratives. Roosevelt’s assertion is interpreted by adults as an invitation to build internal strength in tandem with structural change, rather than as a rejection of putting up with oppression.

The Philosophical Implications of Consent

Roosevelt only used the word “consent” to refer to a deliberate action. However, in ethics and the law, consent must be given voluntarily and free from coercion. Consent to be in a subordinate position cannot be based on psychological conditioning, neurobiology, or societal power dynamics that reduce one’s agency and awareness.

Here, it’s important to distinguish between “responsibility” and “causality.” One can be held accountable for facing their own shortcomings over time, even if they were never the direct cause of them. This nuanced stance maintains the moral requirement of agency while rejecting the all-powerful forces that exist within our inner selves.

The “dialogical self” theory of philosopher Charles Taylor makes consent more difficult to understand. According to Taylor, identity is socially constructed through interactions with other people rather than something that is determined for oneself. Feelings of inferiority could be exogenously programmed rather than endogenously generated if selfhood is relational. Roosevelt’s statement may therefore be exaggerated in light of the extent to which an individual can create their own sense of self-worth.

Jean-Paul Sartre and other existentialist philosophers support radical freedom and self-creation. His theory that “existence precedes essence” holds that people must create their identities consciously since they are not born with predetermined natures. According to this viewpoint, willpower alone is sufficient to overcome inferiority complexes. But Sartre also introduced the idea of “bad faith,” which acknowledges the limitations of volition and refers to people lying to themselves in order to escape the responsibility that comes with freedom. In The Ethics of Belief, philosopher William Clifford makes the case that it is immoral to hold beliefs in the absence of adequate evidence. When used in this context, inferiority complexes that are based on erroneous social or psychological assumptions are illogical and ought to be disregarded. However, Thomas Nagel argues that human subjectivity cannot be avoided; irrational feelings, such as inferiority, are.

Conclusion

A powerful affirmation of human dignity and inner strength is the Eleanor Roosevelt maxim. However, it would be oversimplifying the combined influence of psychological, biological, and social factors on self-perception to claim that no one can ever make us feel inferior if we do not consent. Although agency still functions, it must be understood in the context of limitations. Since Roosevelt’s assertion that reassertion of value is as much a matter of will as it is of struggle against forces of inheritance, the reality is not so much a question of its complete cancellation or confirmation. Therefore, empowerment is more about knowing on what terms to give consent than it is about refusing it.

 

(*) Syed Yousha Haider is a student with a growing interest in understanding the human mind and behavior. In his own words, he has always been curious about what drives people to think, feel, and act the way they do. This curiosity, combined with his desire to understand himself and others better, naturally led him to explore the field of psychology. While he is still learning, he finds joy in asking questions, noticing patterns in emotions, and reflecting on the deeper reasons behind everyday choices. For him, psychology is more than a subject—it is a way to connect with people, understand their stories, and perhaps even help make sense of his own.

Billboard reading “The Looting Government,” part of a protest campaign against the conservative coalition's policies in Ra'anana, Israel, May 2023. Photo: Rene Van Den Berg

Professor Ben-Porat: Israel’s Rightward Shift Is More Than Political Strategy

by Editor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

In a candid and comprehensive interview with ECPS, Professor Guy Ben-Porat warns that Israel’s political rightward shift is not simply a strategic maneuver, but the product of deeper ideological currents. Describing the current coalition as “a unification of several forces,” Professor Ben-Porat highlights its populist hostility toward liberal institutions, minorities, and judicial independence. He draws direct parallels to Hungary and Poland, identifying a shared authoritarian trajectory. Professor Ben-Porat also reflects on how the October 7 attacks have further racialized political discourse, with Arab-Palestinian citizens facing intensified securitization. Yet, he sees hope in mass democratic mobilization: “Thousands of people have taken to the streets every week… the fact that many Israelis are still fighting for democracy means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a period marked by growing polarization, religious populism, and democratic backsliding, Israel’s political landscape has undergone a profound transformation. In a wide-ranging and timely interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Guy Ben-Porat—an expert in comparative politics and political sociology at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev—offers a critical diagnosis of Israel’s sharp rightward turn. “It’s more than strategy,” Professor Ben-Porat asserts, describing the current government as “a unification of several forces that make a very strong right-wing government,” rooted in anti-liberalism, exclusionary nationalism, and religious traditionalism.

At the center of this transformation is a coalition led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, flanked by ultra-Orthodox parties and far-right figures such as Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. Their political agenda, Professor Ben-Porat explains, has taken aim at core liberal-democratic institutions. “From the get-go, this government was determined to undermine the power of the Supreme Court… What they’re proposing is a majoritarian government that will stamp upon the rights of minorities.”

This encroachment on judicial independence is not merely an Israeli phenomenon. Professor Ben-Porat highlights the striking parallels with populist regimes in Hungary and Poland, noting that “Orbán and what happened in Poland before the last elections were good examples for Israel… this was a copycat.” The broader objective is to reconfigure Israeli democracy into a more ethnocratic and majoritarian model—where Jewish identity increasingly overrides civic inclusion and pluralism.

In a particularly sobering observation, Professor Ben-Porat warns that the October 7 Hamas attacks have only deepened the state’s securitized and racialized posture toward its Arab-Palestinian citizens. “There’s much more securitization of political statements and actions of Arab citizens,” he notes. And yet, despite populist figures like Ben Gvir hoping to use the crisis as justification for repression, Israel’s Arab citizens “did not play the game as expected”—remaining distant from Hamas and at times even risking their lives to protect Jewish compatriots.

Still, Professor Ben-Porat cautions that democratic decline is not inevitable. “Thousands of people have taken to the streets every week. That should not be discounted.” Though the protest movement remains largely focused on “Jewish democracy,” he sees the potential for it to evolve, to challenge systemic inequalities and the ongoing occupation. “It’s hard to be hopeful now,” he concludes, “but the fact that many Israelis are still on the streets, still fighting for democracy, means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.”

Professor Guy Ben-Porat—an expert in comparative politics and political sociology at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Guy Ben-Porat.

It’s More Than Strategy: A Unified Assault on Liberal Democracy

Professor Guy Ben-Porat, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you understand the convergence of neo-Zionist ideology and populist rhetoric in the post-2022 electoral landscape, particularly under the Ben Gvir–Smotrich axis within Netanyahu’s coalition?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s a big question, with many terms—neo, Zionist, etc.—which I’m not sure I understand or use all of them. It’s a right-wing government that has several elements within it. Likud, Netanyahu’s party, is a populist party which has become an exclusionary populist party in recent years, centered on anti-Arab, anti-immigrant, and anti-liberal sentiments.

Alongside it are the ultra-Orthodox parties, which have a very special perspective on Israel’s future and on church–state relations. You mentioned Ben Gvir and Smotrich. This is a united party combining into an extreme right-wing party—maybe akin to some things you see among the extreme right in Europe. So, major populism is the main theme here. I think it’s a right-wing, religious government with populist elements within it.

To what extent can the recent rightward shift in Israeli politics be interpreted as a populist response to long-standing ethnic and religious cleavages rather than a mere electoral strategy?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think it’s more than strategy. I think the government has a common interest in undermining some of the established democratic features of Israel—namely, the Supreme Court in particular. And if you look at the internal scene, or the internal politics, from the get-go, this government was determined to undermine the power of the Supreme Court and what we call the checks and balances. Now each part of the government has a different take on the Supreme Court. 

For the ultra-Orthodox, the Supreme Court is perceived as liberal and as undermining their coalitional achievements, which they gain—particular gains for their own good—whether it is exemption from military service, whether it’s budgets for religious institutions, etc.

For the extreme right, the Supreme Court is perceived as slowing down the annexation of the West Bank and the territories. The Supreme Court is perceived as putting some blocks on the military and on the settlement movement—which, one could argue, it does not—but that’s the way they perceive it.

And for Netanyahu, being involved in a series of trials, the Supreme Court is perceived—or is depicted—as an attempt to remove an elected leader by the elites.

So each part of this government has its own take on democracy, kind of combining together into this coalition.

Now, what unites them is, first, a very right-wing perspective in terms of Palestinians and Arab citizens; a more religious attitude or more traditional attitude towards religion; and a strong dislike of what they describe as elites and liberal democracy. So all this together makes it more than a fluke, more than a conjecture. It’s a unification of several forces that make a very strong right-wing government.

Religion Is Used to Draw Boundaries—Not Just to Guide Lives

Does the growing prominence of religious populism in Israel suggest a broader transformation in the political culture, where the ethno-religious identity of “the people” overrides civic and pluralistic conceptions of citizenship?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think here it’s a bit more complex, and that’s what we do—Dani Filc and I—in our work. For some of the religious right, religion is about demarcating boundaries. Religion is used as a way to define the Jewish state, to defend Jewish privileges, and to exclude those who are not Jewish. But if you look at their perception of religion as a way of life—as an ethical way of living—then some of them are not religious, or not religious in the way that orthodoxy perceives religion. To make this a bit more clear: if you look at issues like LGBTQ rights or issues about women’s rights within the Jewish camp, they can be somewhat liberal.

So, in this government, there is a clear divide between those for whom religion is a genuine way of life—shaping their daily practices, beliefs, and ethical system—and those who use religion primarily to draw boundaries and assert identity. Take, for example, the policy issue of exempting yeshiva students from military service: for the ultra-Orthodox, this is entirely natural and self-evident. For Likud members, however, it is far less obvious. That’s where you see differences between what religion is for these people.

Ehud Olmert, former Israeli Prime Minister, in his article published in Haaretz/The Guardian recently, warns of Israel’s potential international isolation and prosecution over war crimes, describing a state policy of starvation and indiscriminate violence. How does the normalization of such extreme policies reflect the convergence of populist ethno-nationalism with authoritarian state practices and what are the long-term implications for democratic institutions and minority rights in Israel?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think we need to make a little separation of things. First, Olmert’s warning is true and real. Israel’s actions in Gaza are dangerous. Many civilian lives are lost, and one could say—in very careful terms—without good reason. Not that there’s ever a good reason, but this war has definitely gone to extremes.

Now, why is this war continuing? Well, I think there are some reasons. One: it’s the government’s policy. And for Netanyahu, as long as the war goes on, the government stays intact. It keeps the government together. If the war ends, then some of the more extreme elements of the government might pull it apart, which means that Netanyahu would have to stand trial without the protection of being Prime Minister. It means there’ll be new elections. It means that Jews will begin debating what happened on October 7th—who’s responsible for this debacle. So for the government, the continuation of the war serves several purposes.

For some, the war should be continued because “we should not stop before the final victory,” which I’m not sure what it means—but for them, it’s the annihilation of Hamas. And I’m not sure that’s even possible. For others, maybe we should end the war on better terms for Israel. Again, I have no idea what that means.

But you could say there’s a mixture of ideology—of extreme right-wing ideology—of political interests, and mainly the fact that the government, for reasons that relate to what I said before, has never really introduced a strategy for how to end this war. If you ask Netanyahu: when does this war end? What will be in Gaza? Who will rule Gaza? Where will Israel be? What’s the role of the Palestinian Authority? What’s the role of other countries? What’s going to happen in Gaza once this war ends? What are the goals of this war? What is the strategy? We don’t know.

A Coherent Network of Right-Wing Advocacy Is Shaping Israel’s Future

Protests against judicial reform and religious coercion in Israel. Photo: Dreamstime.

How has the increasing influence of religiously conservative diaspora-funded NGOs and settler movements shaped the neo-Zionist agenda, particularly under populist governance?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Within Israel, money from abroad is not a new thing. NGOs—from both the left and the right—are supported from abroad. That’s not a new phenomenon. The same goes for the government. The Jewish diaspora has always maintained strong ties with Israel and influenced Israeli politics.

You can see NGOs on the so-called left and on the right receiving funding from abroad. Now, from the right-wing perspective, it’s the money from abroad that’s financing the left. So if you look at the populist kind of discourse, it’s about international elites supporting leftist, anti-Zionist forces who are opposing the government. It depends on which side is telling the story.

But to be more precise, I think what we’re seeing today is a very strong connection between the Israeli right and the Trump administration, as well as right-wing organizations in Europe. That’s where you see, perhaps, a new development: a more coherent network of right-wing advocacy that also has influence on Israel.

In your analysis of ‘good citizenship’ among new religious movements, how do such actors reframe legitimacy within a populist framework that delegitimizes secular or liberal opponents?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: There are several ways this is conducted. Begin with “good citizenship” in Israel—the republican equation, as we call it—has often been about military service. Many on the right pride themselves on being the foot soldiers: “We are carrying out the mission of defending Israel. We are paying the price in blood,” whether it’s through settlement in the West Bank or military service. Hence, we are the good citizens.

They blame the other side for not doing as much. By the way, statistics don’t necessarily support that, but that’s the claim. So being a good citizen is framed around military service and combat. That’s how they define good citizenship.

Now, this of course has implications for issues of gender and ethnicity—namely, for non-Jewish citizens. This whole concept of good citizenship is used by populists to describe themselves as the good, contributing, fighting citizens, in contrast to the “detached elites”—those who are global, more fluid, who can use their money to escape responsibility.

Now, this is a myth—a fable. The Israeli center-left has been fighting on the streets for democracy for two years now. So the whole notion of detached elites is complete baloney. But it makes for a compelling narrative on the right: We are the good citizens. We are the ones who sacrifice. We are truly committed to the country, while you—the elites—are global cosmopolitans. This, by the way, echoes classic anti-Semitic tropes once used in Europe against Jews. Put that aside—but the story they tell is that we are the good people, and they are the detached elites with less commitment to the country’s welfare.

A Different Government Might Have Chosen Strategy Over Messianic Dreams

Had a centrist or center-left coalition prevailed in the 2022 elections, how might the Israeli state have handled the aftermath of the October 7 attacks differently—in terms of military response, international diplomacy, and internal discourse?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s hard to talk about things that didn’t happen. The “what if” is always very difficult. I can say one thing: if the October 7th debacle had happened under a center-left government, the right would have used all its power to force that government out, to place the blame squarely on them, and to sell the narrative that this is what happens when you have a left-leaning government—one that is weak and unequipped to fight. A left-wing government would have been discredited to the bones.

That hasn’t happened with the right. Netanyahu’s government has been fighting for almost two years now to shed responsibility. “It’s not us, it’s the military, it’s the intelligence.” They’ve been working very hard since October 7th—October 8th even—to deflect responsibility.

Now, what would a different government do? Hard to say. But what a sensible one would do is, at some stage early in the war, begin to form a strategy. On October 8th, right after October 7th, we had very strong international support. We could have fought Hamas, brought an alternative government to Gaza, brought back the hostages, and started thinking of a new future for the Middle East. We could have pursued Middle East alliances—with the Saudis, with the Gulf countries. There were opportunities on the table. This government, because of its right-wing, messianic, and ultra-nationalist agenda, simply threw that out the window. What we would have had instead is maybe a strategy—not messianic dreams. A strategy.

Would an alternative government have challenged the securitization logic that you argue has long shaped Israeli-Arab relations, or merely adopted a more technocratic or liberal gloss?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Again, hard to tell. I would take anything that improves the current situation. Gloss might become, at some point, substance. But I think the previous government—at least on one issue that I’m researching, internal security—had a different approach.

We have an ongoing crisis within Arab neighborhoods in Israel. Arab citizens make up about 20% of the country’s population, and they account for more than 50% of the murders in this country. The numbers are skyrocketing.

The previous government, through an attempt to create a strategy, was able for the first time to slightly reduce the number of people murdered among Arab citizens. In this government, the police are in the hands of Itamar Ben-Gvir, an extreme right-wing nationalist and, if I may say, a convicted criminal. Under his office, the numbers have doubled since the last government. So yes, a different government could have made a difference.

Copying Orbán: Undermining Democracy in the Name of Sovereignty

To what extent is the judicial overhaul effort by the Netanyahu-led coalition part of a broader pattern of populist institutional capture akin to what we have seen in Hungary or Poland?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s been mentioned many times, and the comparison has been made by many people. The connection between Orbán and Netanyahu is well known. Netanyahu’s son has been advocating and has become something of a poster child for some of these movements. So there’s a strong relationship between the Israeli right and the right in Europe and the US.

To a large extent, this was the playbook of the right: undermine liberal democratic institutions and give more power to the government. Orbán—and what happened in Poland before the last elections—were good examples for Israel. And I think, to some extent, this was a copycat. Yes, we saw this in Europe; we can do the same things here. It’s a kind of logic that follows its own lead—it doesn’t really need the examples from abroad. Still, I think the fact that this is happening on a global scale has some meaning.

Do you view the weakening of judicial independence in Israel as a calculated step toward majoritarian rule under the guise of popular sovereignty? How does this resonate with your broader work on state-minority relations?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: They’ve said it explicitly—so it’s not a mystery. Their position is clear: they want to transfer power from the judiciary to the government. That’s not a secret—it’s the stated policy of this government. The Supreme Court may have its faults, and liberal democracy can certainly be debated. But what they’re proposing is a majoritarian government that tramples the rights of minorities. Again, this isn’t hidden. Some members of the government openly declare that Israel is a Jewish state in which Jewish citizens should enjoy privileges over non-Jews.

Israel has long debated how to reconcile being both a Jewish state and a democracy. It’s an ongoing tension—these principles often clash. Liberal Israelis—and one can debate whether they were right or wrong—have tried to argue that the two can be balanced. A Jewish state, they’ve said, can still be fair toward its Arab citizens. It may not be perfect, it may have flaws, but the contradictions can be managed, even if not fully resolved.

Under the current government, however, there is a clear and explicit shift toward prioritizing the Jewish character of the state. If being both Jewish and democratic comes into conflict, their answer is unequivocal: it is a Jewish state, and democracy comes second. For some in this government, that’s not incidental—it’s ideological. That’s what they believe.

Annexation of Gaza Is No Longer a Whisper—It’s a Declared Agenda

Do you see a fundamental shift in the far right’s approach to governing Palestinians under occupation—moving from ‘managing’ the conflict to accelerating irreversible annexation?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Absolutely. And again, these are things that are being said explicitly. You don’t really have to search—it’s not hypothetical. These are statements made by Smotrich, Ben Gvir, and others: that it’s time to annex the West Bank. So, it’s almost obvious. The only thing that has prevented it so far is international pressure. But under Trump, they believed the time had come—an opportunity to do what they always wanted: annex the West Bank. They’ve announced plans to build more settlements, to use more force against Palestinians, to expel so-called top terrorists—which can mean many things. So while these ideas are not yet fully implemented as policy, they are being openly discussed.

Thousands march in Jerusalem against judicial overhaul, March 2025. A broad protest fills the streets at night, with demonstrators calling to save Israeli democracy. Photo: Dreamstime.

Given the current political trajectory, do you believe Israel’s liberal democratic elements are in structural decline, or are there still viable pathways for democratic resilience—perhaps through civil society, judicial pushback, or international pressure?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think the jury is still out on this question. For many years, we’ve been lamenting the death of the left-liberal spectrum in Israel. The prevailing notion was that these people were tired—they were busy with themselves, individualistic, global, cosmopolitan. While the right appeared united and committed, the liberal left seemed aloof and less engaged.

However, over the past two years, we’ve witnessed something remarkable: thousands of people have taken to the streets every week. I think that should not be discounted. I’m not sure who will win, but two or three years ago, if you had told Israelis there would be large weekly rallies in defense of democracy, most would have dismissed it as impossible. Yet, when Israelis perceived that democracy was in danger, they rose up.

There is still a question about how far and how open this movement is. For the moment, it is focused on Jewish democracy. It does not yet address the occupation or fully include the rights of Palestinian citizens—that remains on the margins of the demonstrators’ consensus. The movement is centered on defending Israel’s democracy, and to maintain broad support, it has set aside, at least for now, the occupation and non-Jewish rights.

However, once a movement like this begins to grow and starts to confront the deeper implications of occupation and inequality, then maybe there is room for optimism. It’s hard to be hopeful right now—given the war and two years of ongoing struggle—but the fact that many Israelis are still on the streets, still fighting for democracy, means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.

Fear Is Driving Policy—But That’s Exactly What Ben Gvir Wants

To what extent does the current populist ascendancy reflect a systemic recoding of Israel’s founding ethno-religious cleavages into a majoritarian regime logic, rather than a contingent electoral maneuver?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think it’s more contingent. We’ve had many years of cleavages and schisms that have come to the fore with the last elections, and we are seeing a very strong cleavage between center-left and right. But within those camps, there are divisions. People on both the right and the left can change their opinions.

Especially in the last 18 months—after October 7th—there has also been the fear factor. People are acting out of fear. Let’s look at the Palestinians, or Arab citizens, or the world. There is still a memory of October 7th. This trauma still lingers.

So, I think what needs to happen now is the restoration of hope and the development of a strategy—reaching out to people on the other side of the spectrum and trying to convince them that there is another option. Maybe then there’s room for change.

To answer your question: no, it’s not merely a contingency. It is the result of many years of struggles and cleavages. Netanyahu was able to position himself as a defender of “the true people” in a very populist sense. But the war has also somewhat shattered that image—being Mr. Security and managing the economy. So, while these shifts are, at the moment, tragic, they may in the future provide some room for change.

In the light of your work on the ‘shrinking of citizenship,’ how has the October 7 Hamas attack provided a discursive and policy framework for intensifying the racialized securitization of Arab-Palestinian citizens under the guise of national unity and collective trauma?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s a good question. And again, it has several layers that we need to look at. To begin with—yes, Israel became more securitized. People are more afraid, which, of course, also shapes opinions and perceptions. When you’re afraid, it’s very hard to think things through and look at the long term. In that sense, it’s become more securitized. For example, political dissent is much less tolerated. There’s much more securitization of political statements and actions of Arab citizens.

At the same time, Ben Gvir was expecting Arab citizens to join in the October 7th events. That would have given him the reason to use more force against them. So, from Ben Gvir’s perspective or hopes, October 7th provided an opportunity to crack down on Israeli Arab citizens. This has not happened. Arab citizens did not play the game as expected. They remained very detached from Hamas. On October 7th, they were saying, “That is not us. We don’t condone these things.” More than that—among the hostages were Arab citizens, Bedouins from the Negev, who were taken by Hamas to Gaza, and some were killed by Hamas. Arab citizens on October 7th, in some cases, saved Jewish citizens.

The whole story became more complex. But now Gaza makes it more difficult—because those citizens are saying, “Those people in Gaza are our brothers.” When people are dying in Gaza in scores, “We can’t stand aside. People are starving in Gaza. We have to speak our mind. We have to protest.” And that’s the test for Israel. Can Jewish citizens be tolerant toward that? Or do their fears make them see those protests as pro-Hamas—which they are not? 

Now we’re in a very difficult situation where Arab citizens who are protesting against the war in Gaza feel themselves threatened by the government. It has not exploded yet. But that’s exactly what Ben Gvir wants. For him, that would be a good day—one in which he can make the connection: Arab citizens, Palestinians, Hamas—they’re all the same, and they’re all here to destroy us. “Now we have legitimacy to use all means.” That’s the scare right now.

Evangelical Backing Fuels Israel’s Right-Wing Populism

Election billboard showing Netanyahu shaking hands with Trump, with the slogan “Netanyahu. Another League,” in Jerusalem on September 16, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.

And lastly, Professor Ben-Porat, what role have transnational, religiously conservative, and diaspora-funded networks played in amplifying the settler-theocratic undercurrents of neo-Zionist populism, particularly in relation to territorial maximalism and cultural hegemony?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: For many years there were relations between settlers and right-wing movements in Israel and similar or supportive movements abroad. As I said before, that is not unique in Israel. All movements—left, right, and center—have often found alliances abroad, whether among Jewish diasporas or liberals in America. So in that sense, what the right wing is doing is not unique.

This transnationality, to be fair, is something used by many groups in Israel for different purposes and reasons. You can say whether it’s good or bad, but the use itself is not unique. Where it is unique is in the US. If you look at Trump supporters in the US, the Evangelicals were a very strong element in his campaign. They provide very strong support for Israel, the right wing, and the settlers. That’s where the connection is important.

It’s more dramatic than it seems—because for many years, Israel was very careful to maintain a bipartisan approach in the US, having support from both Democrats and Republicans. Also remember, the Jewish community in the US is mostly pro-Democratic. So Israel traditionally refrained from taking sides in American politics. Israel was above the Republican–Democratic divide and maintained a relationship with the Jewish diaspora in the US, who are mostly pro-Democrats.

In the last decade or so, things have begun to change. Netanyahu has put his weight on the Republican camp—anti-Obama, anti-Biden, and pro-Trump in the US. His support came in many cases from either right-wing Jews, religious Jews, or right-wing Christians. So, the whole dynamic changes here. Before, it was bipartisan with strong support from the Jewish community. Now, it’s Republican—with support from right-wing Christians and Jews—and an alienation of a large part of the liberal Jewish community.

That’s a strange turn of events. But I think the important religious factor here is the right-wing religious Christians in the US. That’s probably the most important development in Israel’s foreign relations.

Dr. Radoslaw Markowski is Professor of Political Science, Center for the Study of Democracy, Director, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw & Polish Academy of Sciences and Polish National Election Study, Principal Investigator.

Professor Markowski on Poland’s President-Elect Karol Nawrocki: Future Statesman or Mere Footnote?

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In this compelling post-election interview, Professor Radosław Markowski offers a candid, expert analysis of Poland’s newly elected president, Karol Nawrocki. Backed by PiS and inspired by Trump-style politics, Nawrocki’s narrow win poses serious challenges to Prime Minister Tusk’s pro-European government. Professor Markowski dissects the roots of this upset—calling it the result of a “fantastically prepared campaign”—and warns of potential institutional gridlock and democratic backsliding. While describing Nawrocki as “inexperienced” and lacking policy depth, Professor Markowski holds out a sliver of hope that he may rise above partisan loyalties. With sharp insights into Polish society, EU disillusionment, and the dangers of populist overreach, this interview is essential reading on Poland’s increasingly polarized and uncertain political trajectory.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In the aftermath of Poland’s 2025 presidential election, the political landscape remains fraught with uncertainty, ideological tension, and institutional fragility. Karol Nawrocki, a nationalist conservative backed by PiS and inspired by Trump-style politics, narrowly secured victory with 50.89% of the vote, defeating centrist candidate Rafal Trzaskowski. His win delivers a major setback to Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s pro-European government, which has been striving to reverse judicial reforms enacted under the previous PiS administration. With presidential veto power at his disposal, Nawrocki is expected to obstruct key liberal policies, deepening political gridlock and intensifying concerns about democratic backsliding.

In this timely and probing interview, renowned political scientist Professor Radosław Markowski offers a sharp analysis of Nawrocki’s narrow win, calling it the product of a “fantastically prepared campaign” rather than a sign of a lasting ideological shift. Professor Markowski emphasizes that Nawrocki is “definitely inexperienced,” lacking basic knowledge of international relations and economics. Yet despite these limitations, he entertains a faint hope—perhaps naively—that Nawrocki might rise above his campaign alliances and “act reasonably and become a good politician serving the country and society he represents.”

This cautious optimism is tempered by structural concerns about Poland’s democratic integrity. Professor Markowski draws a direct line between the present moment and the legacy of what he has termed “free but unfair” elections. Referencing his article in West European Politics, he highlights the disproportionality of PiS’s 2015 win—where only 18.8% of eligible voters delivered a 51% parliamentary majority—and the subsequent “eight years of structural lawlessness.” Nawrocki’s victory, Professor Markowski argues, does not signal a visionary mandate, but reflects the effective demobilization of liberal voters and the disciplined overperformance of a conservative-nationalist base.

With his strong nationalist rhetoric and pledges to limit EU influence while promoting Polish sovereignty, Nawrocki’s rise has been cheered by Eurosceptic leaders across Central Europe, including Viktor Orbán and Marine Le Pen. Yet his alignment with this populist-right alliance only heightens fears of further democratic erosion in a country once considered a model of post-communist European integration.

Whether Nawrocki becomes a transformative statesman or a forgettable footnote in Polish political history remains an open question. As Professor Markowski underscores, the new president now faces a choice: to entrench polarization and gridlock, or to rise above partisan constraints and define his legacy in the eyes of future generations.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Radosław Markowski.

Democracy at a Tipping Point

Posters of 2025 Polish presidential candidates Rafał Trzaskowski (KO) and Karol Nawrocki (PiS) in Kuślin, Poland, on April 6, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Radosław Markowski, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In the light of Karol Nawrocki’s narrow victory, how do you interpret this outcome within your framework of “plurality support for democratic decay”? Does this mark a deepening of democratic vulnerability in Poland, despite Law and Justice party’s (PiS) 2023 parliamentary loss?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let’s first try to recall the facts. In 2023, PiS won the elections against Platforma Obywatelska by nearly 4 percentage points—an equivalent of several hundred thousand votes—but it was unable to govern due to its lack of coalition-building capacity. Today in 2025, they won by a significantly smaller margin—just 1.5% effectively. It is a sort of a tie with a slight edge toward one of the candidates. However, the narrative remains consistent.

Polish society—and this is the focus of my ongoing research, soon to be published—is fundamentally liberal, progressive, and cosmopolitan. This stands in stark contrast to the narratives promoted by pundits and public intellectuals who advocate for a nationalist, conservative, and ultra-religious vision of Poland. The proportion of those who support liberal and progressive values over traditional and nationalistic ones is typically three to one, two to one, or at worst, three to two. Across more than 20 dimensions of this cultural divide, I see no evidence of conservative-nationalist dominance.

The problem lies in the fact that these conservative forces, supported by the Polish Catholic Church and representative of a departing world order, have successfully achieved nearly full mobilization in the last decade or decade and a half. Ninety to ninety-nine percent of all available nationalist-conservative voters turn out for elections.

On the other hand, the liberal-progressive side struggles, occasionally succeeding—as in 2023. Compounding this issue is the fact that PiS supporters are notably older, less educated, primarily from rural areas or outside the labor market by choice or by circumstance and are ill-equipped for success in a meritocratic modern world. They are part of society, of course—this is a description, not a judgment. Their mobilization is straightforward, relying on black-and-white imagery, simplifications, and the narrative of stark Manichean good versus evil.

In contrast, the liberal-progressive side comprises highly educated voters—predominantly individuals with high socioeconomic status, capable people who run their own businesses, academics, entrepreneurs, and the middle class. This is a challenging electorate. They are critical readers who verify information coming from politicians and reject simplistic depictions of the world. They ask not only about the goals but also about the means of achieving those goals. They question; they ask about possible side effects. They ask about alternative policies. They are concerned about trade-offs.

More so, they are very capricious in a way and dissatisfied with trivial answers to complicated matters. And this is precisely why it is so tough to attract these liberal, cosmopolitan, progressive voters. They are knowledgeable people who do not buy simplistic propaganda or demagoguery from politicians.

Eight Years of Structural Lawlessness in Poland

Logo and sign of the PiS (Law and Justice / Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) party in Pruszcz Gdański, Poland, on April 11, 2021. Photo: Dreamstime.

You’ve previously described Polish elections as “free but unfair.” Do the 2025 presidential results reflect a continuity of institutional imbalance, particularly with regard to partisan control over historical institutions like the Institute of National Remembrance?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let me say—this is a subtitle of one of my articles in West European Politics—that the elections were “free but unfair,” with unfair results. What I meant then is that in the 2015 elections, in which PiS won in a free and fair contest, they received 5.7 million votes out of nearly 31 million eligible voters—meaning that only 18.8% of eligible voters supported PiS, yet they gained a 51% parliamentary majority. You know, this kind of miracle almost never happens under proportional representation. But due to 17% of wasted votes and the D’Hondt formula—which eliminated a significant portion of minor votes—it was possible.

There would have been no problem with this kind of translation from 18.8% to 51% parliamentary majority if they had merely run the country in the sense of administrating government affairs. But unfortunately, they behaved after that election as if they had received a qualified majority, and they started changing the constitutional rules of the game.

I like Adam Przeworski’s definition of democracy, which says: democracy is institutionalized uncertainty. There should be frozen, strict, and obeyed rules of the game that never change during the process of electing politicians—but the outcomes of these rules are unknown, and that’s the beauty of democracy.

So, what PiS did illegally since 2015—because they thought this kind of miracle would never happen again—was to bash the Constitutional Tribunal, interfere with the Supreme Court by inventing a new chamber, the “Extraordinary Chamber of Something.” It is “extraordinary” in the sense that nobody in Europe or worldwide recognizes it. We experienced a period of eight years of structural lawlessness in Poland, which excluded us from the community of civilized democracies in the European Union.

We used to enjoy relatively high prestige with people like Jerzy Buzek, former President of the European Parliament, and Donald Tusk, who was President of the European Council. These roles may have even overstated Poland’s influence, but they indicated that Poland was politically important in the EU. That prestige vanished immediately after PiS came to power and began misbehaving in terms of the rule of law and democratic procedures.

Nawrocki’s Win: A Campaign Masterpiece or a Populist Rebrand?

Given Nawrocki’s political inexperience but ideological clarity, how do you interpret his victory as a possible recalibration of Poland’s populist-authoritarian project? Is this a new chapter or simply a rebranding of the PiS legacy?

Professor Radosław Markowski: It’s very hard to say who he is. He’s definitely inexperienced. He lacks basic knowledge about international relations, about economic issues, and so forth. Again, let me reiterate: Poland is a parliamentary democracy in which the executive power lies with the Prime Minister and his government. The president is mainly symbolic in terms of positive policies. He can propose something, but it is up to the parliamentary majority to pay attention to his activities. He, however, has negative powers. He can veto, and this is unfortunately what we expect from him. We’ll talk about that maybe later on.

But back to the campaign, I would say—well, in a way, it is quite interesting, and we’ll probably be teaching students about it in the future. It was a campaign masterpiece by Nawrocki’s electoral team—by the people who managed to craft a serious presidential contender out of almost nothing. Their most notable success was in discouraging turnout for Trzaskowski in the second round. Typically, second-round presidential contests hinge more on demobilizing the opponent’s base than on attracting new voters. In short, this was not a substantial victory in terms of broad public endorsement. Rather, it clearly illustrates how easily a poorly informed segment of the electorate can be—well, if you prefer, persuaded. If you prefer the term manipulated, that works too. Meanwhile, on Trzaskowski’s side, there was a clear failure of his electoral staff.

What does this outcome suggest about the limits of liberal coalition-building in Poland? Could Trzaskowski’s failure be linked to coalition fatigue, perceived elitism, or a lack of emotional mobilization compared to the nationalist right?

Professor Radosław Markowski: I already spoke about mobilization before, so I won’t repeat that here. But yes, the conservative nationalist camp is—quite frankly—astronomically over-mobilized. Virtually everyone in that camp turns out to vote. Unfortunately, the liberal democratic camp is less mobilized, and there are many reasons for that. One contributing factor is the one and a half years of the new government and its difficulties in implementing certain policies. However, it’s important to note that these delays—particularly on issues that matter deeply to many, such as abortion rights and women’s issues—were largely due to the fact that the current president, Andrzej Duda, had already made it clear he would veto such legislation.

So, the government was, de facto, waiting for a new opening—once the president is from their camp, or at least a person who is neutral and capable of reading what are the prerogatives of the president enshrined in the Polish constitution.

So, we have to wait and see. I don’t think I would interpret this win of Nawrocki as anything more than an incident and a fantastically prepared campaign by his staff, rather than something more deeply rooted. But one should also recognize that such victories—unexpected victories of unknown persons—sometimes redefine the political landscape and the political developments, and this should also be taken seriously into account.

Why Trzaskowski’s Campaign Missed the Mark

Rafał Trzaskowski, Mayor of Warsaw and presidential candidate, campaigning in Łódź, Poland, on June 3, 2020. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

To what extent did the personalization of the campaign around symbolic figures (Trzaskowski as elite technocrat vs. Nawrocki as populist traditionalist) reinforce identity cleavages over policy-based electoral competition?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let me reiterate a point about Trzaskowski’s campaign that I mentioned earlier. His team made a fundamental mistake—one I publicly flagged six months ago: they attempted to court the right-wing electorate. This group is a clear minority in Poland and already firmly aligned and mobilized by parties like PiS and Confederacja. The likelihood of swaying voters from that camp was virtually nonexistent.

This approach came at the expense of engaging the left-liberal electorate with progressive, liberal ideas. Trzaskowski is not an ultra-progressive or ultra-liberal, but he is certainly a meritocratic, cosmopolitan liberal—someone who speaks several languages fluently, who comes from an elite Warsaw family. Yet, he and his campaign team decided to pretend he was “one of us”—an average guy. One of the campaign’s obsessions was to ensure that no one mentioned his multilingualism.

This is a typical populist miscalculation—thinking you win elections by downplaying meritocracy. Unfortunately, it backfired. We estimate that around 1.5 million people who voted for the current ruling coalition in 2023 became disillusioned with Trzaskowski due to these mixed signals and overt appeals to the right-wing electorate. It was a real disappointment for them.

In the light of your concept of “Eurodisappointment,” to what extent does Trzaskowski’s loss suggest growing frustration even among pro-European voters with the EU’s perceived ineffectiveness in addressing democratic backsliding?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Together with my co-author, we pointed out in an article in European Union Politics that we began observing, around 2021–2022, a new phenomenon we called “new Euroscepticism” or “Eurodisappointment” among Poles. This isn’t the typical Euroscepticism rooted in xenophobic or nationalist attitudes. Rather, it’s a disappointment driven by frustration with the European Union’s inability to push back against leaders like Orbán and Kaczyński.

That old saying— “Brussels barks but doesn’t bite”— began to resonate, especially among a segment of the Polish population that had long been very enthusiastic about the EU. It fostered a growing suspicion that the EU might not be genuinely committed to upholding its core axiological pillars—democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental values.

Poland’s Populist Path and the Limits of EU Leverage

Has the European Union’s cautious and often delayed response to autocratizing member states like Hungary and Poland amplified the populist portrayal of Brussels as politically impotent? Could Nawrocki’s presidency signal a shift toward a more defiant, nationalist approach to EU engagement—echoing Orbán’s model of selective integration without formal rupture?

Professor Radosław Markowski: It might not be exactly what Orbán has invented, because in Poland—unlike in Hungary—there isn’t a deep-rooted historical sentiment akin to Hungarians’ longing for “Greater Hungary” or resentment over the Treaty of Trianon. In Hungary today, you can walk into nearly any hotel or public space and see maps depicting a pre-Trianon Hungary—three times its current size.

Poland also had its imperial moments in the past, being much larger in both territory and population. But even among nationalists, that imperial history doesn’t serve as a powerful reference point in contemporary politics. So, emulating Orbán isn’t straightforward.

Also, Orbán won a constitutional majority in Hungary’s first free and fair 2010 election. He could legitimately claim the mandate to rewrite the rules—which he did. It’s another matter how he later amended the constitution. But that legitimacy gave him more latitude than PiS or Nawrocki have in Poland.

Back to Polish politics: Nawrocki’s attitude toward the EU is definitely critical. But unfortunately, this is paired with a kind of infantile pro-Americanism—specifically, pro-Trumpism. You hear ideas like Poland leading the Trimarium Pact (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Georgia, North Macedonia, etc.). While maintaining good relations with these countries is important—especially those aspiring to EU membership—this can’t replace engagement with core EU mechanisms.

We should be at the heart of EU decision-making. Poland was recently re-invited by figures like Friedrich Merz and Emmanuel Macron to take a central role in European affairs—particularly because of our prescient warnings about Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine. As early as 2005, 2010, and 2014, we sounded alarms about Putin’s ambitions—warnings largely ignored by Angela Merkel and others in Western Europe. Now, Poland is being taken more seriously, and we should seize that moment.

Let me emphasize once again: Poland is a parliamentary democracy. Executive power lies with the Prime Minister and the government. Foreign policy is handled by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The President can influence foreign affairs symbolically or by refusing to appoint certain ambassadors, which creates problems for individuals and embassies. But in the grand scheme, it’s not a major institutional hurdle.

Nawrocki’s Risky Global Alliances

President-elect Karol Nawrocki campaigning ahead of Poland’s 2025 presidential election in Łódź, Poland, on April 27, 2024. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

Nawrocki’s campaign drew symbolic and rhetorical support from leaders like Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán. How do you see Poland’s evolving position in the broader network of global populist-right alliances?

Professor Radosław Markowski: For Poland, this dynamic doesn’t resonate with the PiS electorate—the party’s core support remains around 6 to 6.5 million voters, not the full 10 million who voted for Nawrocki in the second round. While he ultimately secured over 10 million votes, PiS’s true, consistent base is closer to the 29% he garnered in the first round.

Unlike Hungary, Poland—due to its historical experience—cannot accept pro-Russian sentiment. That simply doesn’t resonate here. As PiS and Nawrocki continue aligning with figures like Orbán, Marine Le Pen, Salvini, and even the prime minister of Slovakia, it will become increasingly difficult to justify such alliances to the Polish public. Even on the political right, there is discomfort with someone like Donald Trump, who appears either overly sympathetic to or dangerously naive about Russia.

But again, Polish foreign policy is in the hands of one of Europe’s most talented politicians: Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. So, I see no immediate cause for concern. External affairs will be shaped by the government and Sikorski, not the president.

Let me also point out something almost comical. Just a week ago, on May 25th, Donald Trump finally declared publicly that “Vladimir Putin is insane.” For Poles, this is hardly news. The average high school student here has known that for the last 15 to 20 years. It’s astonishing that it took so long for the most powerful man in the world—surrounded by the CIA and an array of intelligence agencies—to come to that conclusion.

So, in the long run, I believe Nawrocki will lose credibility and support if he aligns too closely with what I would call Kremlin muppets like Orbán, or with those financially entangled with Russia, like Salvini. It’s a very difficult political position in today’s Poland to be seen as a friend of Vladimir Putin.

Nawrocki’s Test: Rise Above Politics or Deepen the Deadlock?

Considering the veto powers of the presidency, how do you expect the new phase of institutional deadlock to evolve under Nawrocki, and what risks does it pose to executive-legislative accountability in Poland?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let’s give Nawrocki a chance. He is not strictly a PiS politician. He has made certain agreements and signed deals with Confederacja and others, and he will formally become Poland’s president in early August this year.

Every person—no matter their troubled CV or ethically questionable behavior in the past—who becomes president of a mid-sized country at the heart of Europe has the opportunity to reflect on how they want to be remembered. Will he be just a short footnote—an irrelevant president who did nothing for Poland—or will he attempt to act reasonably and become a good politician serving the country and society he represents?

Let’s give him that chance. Perhaps he will become less dependent on the political actors who backed him during the campaign. It’s a naïve expectation, I know—but there’s still a bit of the child in me. Sometimes, I deliberately want to be naïve to leave room for optimism. I’ve seen people radically change their political biographies before.

But if not—if he ends up blindly vetoing everything based on ideological conviction—then we’re back to what we’ve had for the last two years: a tense standoff between a combative president and a determined prime minister. That’s not good for Poland. Still, it’s the reality we may face. And if that happens, Nawrocki and his camp will ultimately lose, because it will become clear that they are obstructing the work of the government. It will be easy to demonstrate that things are not getting done in this country because of the president’s stubbornness.

Colorful election posters featuring presidential candidate Leni Robredo during the Philippine General Elections 2022, seen in Manila on April 16, 2022. Photo: Jim Kayalar.

The ‘Pink Movement,’ Youth Vote, and the Future of Philippine Politics

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHome

The surprising midterm victories of Benigno Aquino IV and Kiko Pangilinan—both underdog candidates backed by the progressive Pink Movement—signal a potential turning point in Philippine politics. Despite polling poorly before the vote, both secured top spots in the Senate race, fueled largely by a mobilized youth electorate and disillusionment with traditional power blocs. The resurgence of the Pink Movement, rooted in civic resistance during the Duterte era, now finds new momentum amid internal fractures in the Marcos-Duterte alliance. While questions remain about the opposition’s long-term cohesion and whether these gains reflect lasting ideological shifts, the current momentum and demographic advantage suggest the Pink Movement—and the youth—could play a decisive role in shaping the 2028 national elections.

By Bernard Allan V. Garcia*

The most recent midterm elections in the Philippines came as a surprise to many. Benigno Aquino IV and Kiko Pangilinan—both seasoned politicians yet widely considered underdogs—secured spots in the Magic 12. Weeks and months before the elections, major polling firms in the Philippines had not projected them to make the cut. Pulse Asia’s final pre-election survey placed Aquino in the 11th–18th range and Pangilinan slightly behind in the 13th–20th range, both outside the winning circle (Pulse Asia Research, 2025). Similarly, the SWS Survey predicted that neither would secure a seat (Cupin, 2025). However, unofficial results revealed a dramatic shift: Aquino placed second and Pangilinan fifth. This unexpected outcome has since sparked widespread discussion on what led to such a turn of events.

The Pink Movement

The ‘Pink Movement’ is not an overnight project established by the opposition; it is a product of years of suppression and human rights abuse. To understand the movement, one must walk down memory lane and go back to 2016 when Rodrigo Roa Duterte was elected to power. Many controversial policies were made, including the infamous Oplan: Tokhang, a systematic government crackdown on illegal drugs that resulted in numerous extrajudicial killings. Most of the victims of this government policy are from the vulnerable sectors of the population, including low to lower-middle-income communities. The administration also made multiple attempts to silence media companies, activists, and educational institutions, while introducing a new systemic plague in the form of propaganda groups that distort truth and facts. In one notable instance, the government targeted activist organizations, and the practice of red-tagging has become a recurring theme in Philippine politics, radio broadcasts, and late-night press conferences.

The Duterte administration also saw a highly controversial shift in foreign policy—from a traditionally American-leaning stance to a China-oriented approach, all under the banner of an “independent foreign policy.” During this uneasy transition, the Philippines found itself in a precarious position: efforts to assert its claims in the West Philippine Sea were frequently met with Chinese aggression, yet the government consistently downplayed the tensions, portraying the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a good friend of the Philippines.

However, the worst is yet to come, as the Philippines suffered great losses during the COVID-19 pandemic. At some points during the pandemic and global shutdown, the Philippines had multiple surges of new cases. The evident lack of preparations manifested in sub-standard medical facilities, a lack of manpower, insufficient medical responses, and episodes of late-night press conferences. On top of all these difficulties, the Duterte-backed Congress also revoked the franchise of the local media giant, ABS-CBN Corporation, further dismantling information dissemination in the country. Needless to say, Filipinos had a rough six-year journey, and the power struggles of the vulnerable population were pretty evident. Along the lines of problems and incompetence, the Philippines had a glimpse of a silver lining. 

In 2022, the Pink Movement took fruition, from small numbers of young volunteers to having sectoral branches in almost every local government unit, the movement became a force. Leni Robredo, the then-incumbent vice president, became the face of the Pink Movement. Her presidential candidacy was backed by the youth, advocacy groups, multiple political parties, independents, and many academic institutions. Political rallies related to her campaign were attended by millions of people from different sectoral communities of the Philippines. Celebrities and public figures also shared their support for her candidacy. Despite having the elections during the pandemic, people showed up in support of good governance and to put an end to the return of the Marcoses to power.

Despite gallant efforts, the Pink Movement did not succeed. Robredo lost the presidential seat against Marcos, and Sara Duterte won the vice presidency against Kiko Pangilinan. However, the 2022 loss of the Pink Movement not only planted seeds for the next election but also established a huge demographic advantage – the youth vote. 

Youth Vote and Demographic Advantage

The foundation of Robredo’s 2022 Pink Movement is young. Most of the members of this movement are students, young entrepreneurs, and youth activists. Given that the demographic is young and the most recent 2025 midterm elections were just three years apart from the 2022 national elections, the solid foundation remained strong. Young individuals who were not able to vote in 2022 are now more than eligible to vote. The bulk of the Pink Movement’s foundation was carried over to the next election.

It is also interesting that the Pink Movement, with its hope for a more inclusive society, is backed by academics and student organizations. In several polling surveys conducted in universities, candidates affiliated with the Pink Movement top the surveys. Other left-leaning candidates, who are not necessarily affiliated with the Pink Movement, also top the surveys.

Political Climate and Political Ambivalence

The Pink Movement also benefited from the current political climate of the Philippines. The once uniteam partnership of President Marcos and Vice President Duterte dwindled, and the feud became pretty evident, resulting in a divide in the Congress and Senate. The two camps also introduced their senatorial lineups, both having an incomplete lineup of 12 candidates. It left an open opportunity for Filipinos to choose a better-suited candidate to complete the Magic 12.

It is also important to note that Aquino, in his interviews before the elections, took an ambivalent position on many social issues concerning the political climate of the country. In one instance, when asked regarding his position on Vice President Sara Duterte’s impeachment, he clarified that Filipinos are more interested in more important discussions, such as food, education, and basic services, than the political feud between the two political families (News5Everywhere, 2025). This ambivalent position, which is clearly the opposite of his character from the 2022 elections, is a personal choice. The recognition of the window of opportunity demands a safe and secure way to the goal of getting elected. 

The Challenge of Sustaining the Momentum

Aquino and Pangilinan’s entry in the Magic 12 of the 20th Congress is a celebratory milestone for Filipino voters, more so for the left-leaning political parties in the Philippines. Other than Aquino and Pangilinan, the left also won other seats, including three seats for the Akbayan Party (social democratic party) and one seat for the Mamamayang Liberal (liberal). Despite this win and a demographic dividend on their side, it is still a question whether the left has enough gas to turn the tide in the next national elections set to happen in 2028. It remains a challenge to unite a fragmented opposition, each with a distinct left ideology. A prime example of this is the never-ending debate between the national democratic organisations and the social democratic organisations. 

It is also difficult to say that the opposition has enough gas to succeed in the 2028 national elections because it could be that the win this year is due to the window of opportunity posed by the current political climate and not entirely due to a change in political ideals for many Filipinos. Also, there is not enough evidence on how many of the youth voted for the Pink Movement. Nevertheless, the win today is a statement that the left is gaining momentum, just not clear if it would be enough to push boundaries in 2028.

(*) Bernard Allan V. Garcia has a Master degree in Population Studies at University of the Philippines, Diliman and Early Career Researcher at Scalabrini Migration Center. Email: bvgarcia2@up.edu.ph


References

Cupin, B. (2025, May 8). “May 2025 SWS poll shows tight race for ‘Magic 12’.”  https://www.rappler.com/philippines/elections/senate-race-survey-results-sws-may-2025/

News5Everywhere (Director). (2025, February 11). “Bam Aquino sa VP Sara Duterte impeachment: Hindi siya isyu nung mga kababayan natin.” [Video recording]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZRuFIP5pG4

Pulse Asia Research. (2025). “April 2025 Nationwide Survey on the May 2025 Elections.”

Pulse Asia Research Inc. https://pulseasia.ph/updates/april-2025-nationwide-survey-on-the-may-2025-elections/