In a powerful interview with ECPS, genocide scholar Omer Bartov argues that Israel’s military campaign in Gaza amounts to a “deliberate strategy of slow-moving genocide.” Drawing on the legal framework of the UN Genocide Convention and field reports from Israeli human rights groups, Professor Bartov contends that the Israeli government is intentionally making Gaza uninhabitable through starvation, displacement, and destruction of civilian infrastructure. He warns of a broader system of international complicity—what he calls a “diplomatic Iron Dome”—shielding Israel from accountability. As he dissects settler-colonial logic, media self-censorship, and the erasure of Palestinian voices, Professor Bartov issues a clear call: it is time for the world to confront both the scale of the violence and its own enabling silence.
In a searing and uncompromising interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Omer Bartov—Dean’s Professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Brown University—offers a stark diagnosis of the ongoing war in Gaza: a deliberate strategy of “slow-moving genocide.” Drawing on decades of scholarship on genocide, historical memory, and the politics of violence, Professor Bartov asserts that Israel’s military campaign is not merely excessive or misguided but rather exhibits clear patterns of intent to destroy Palestinian society in Gaza through starvation, forced displacement, and the systematic destruction of essential infrastructure. “Making life impossible,” he warns, “has become a central strategy—not an accidental consequence—of Israeli policy.”
Professor Bartov’s assessment, rooted in both empirical observation and the legal definitions enshrined in the UN Genocide Convention, challenges conventional narratives that frame the Gaza campaign solely as a response to Hamas’s October 7 attacks. While condemning massacre as a war crime and crime against humanity, Professor Bartov insists that it must be placed within a broader context of occupation, siege, and settler-colonial ideology that predates the current conflict. By May 2024, he argues, the Israeli Defense Forces had clearly shifted from their stated war aims to a policy of intentional devastation aimed at rendering Gaza uninhabitable.
What makes this analysis all the more urgent, Professor Bartov notes, is not only the scale of the destruction, but the active complicity of powerful international actors. He draws particular attention to what he calls the “diplomatic Iron Dome”—a term he uses to describe the protective shield provided by the United States and its European allies, who have continued to supply arms and political cover to Israel despite growing evidence of atrocity crimes. “This is extraordinary,” he says, “because the very countries that present themselves as guardians of international law are those facilitating what may well amount to genocide.”
Professor Bartov does not exempt the Israeli media from this dynamic of obfuscation. He highlights the role of pervasive self-censorship in shaping Israeli public opinion, describing a near-total internalization of the government’s narrative that casts all Gazans as complicit in terrorism. And yet, he also sees hope in first-person Palestinian accounts—testimonies that survive, sometimes only fleetingly, before their authors are killed. These narratives, he suggests, may ultimately reshape our collective understanding of the Gaza war and expose the moral cost of international silence.
In this wide-ranging interview, Professor Bartov unflinchingly dissects the ideological, political, and historical forces behind Israel’s war in Gaza—and calls on the world to reckon with its own responsibility.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Omer Bartov, edited lightly for readability.
The Intent to Destroy Gaza Is No Longer Hidden—It’s Being Systematically Implemented
Destruction in Shejayia, Gaza City, Gaza Strip. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Omar Bartov, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Given your extensive work on the complexities of defining genocide and the centrality of intent, how should we evaluate the Israeli military campaign and mass killings in Gaza through the lens of genocide studies—particularly when patterns of indiscriminate force, dehumanizing rhetoric, and systematic targeting of civilians are framed by the Netanyahu government as necessary and legitimate acts of self-defense?
Professor Omer Bartov: Thank you for that question. First of all, the most important thing to understand when you try to determine whether genocide is happening is that you need to show that there’s an intent—an intent to destroy a particular group, in whole or in part, as such—and that that intent is being implemented.
Now, all regimes or organizations that commit genocide typically employ alternative rhetoric. They claim it is a matter of security, that they have no other choice, that war is inherently brutal, and that terrible actions are sometimes necessary in such contexts. Therefore, it is essential to cut through this rhetoric to determine whether there is a demonstrable intent to destroy a group, and whether that intent is being actively implemented on the ground.
I concluded that that intent was both expressed and then implemented in May of 2024. The reason was that already in October, immediately after the Hamas attack of October 7th, statements were made by Israeli politicians and generals that appeared to have genocidal content—statements that spoke about flattening Gaza, cutting off water, food, and energy; that nobody was uninvolved; and describing people there as human animals. But the government also then declared that its war goals were to destroy Hamas and to release the hostages, and that seemed to be a more limited kind of objective.
By May, it became evident to me that the IDF was no longer pursuing its stated war goals, but rather carrying out precisely what had been declared in the immediate aftermath of October 7th—namely, a systematic and deliberate destruction of Gaza, aimed at rendering it uninhabitable for its population. This became particularly clear when the IDF moved into Rafah, ordering the evacuation of a million people—most of whom had already been displaced at least once or multiple times—and relocated them to the Mawasi area along the coast, which lacked any form of humanitarian infrastructure. Following this forced displacement, the IDF proceeded to destroy Rafah.
That seemed to indicate that the pattern of operations—which is one way to assess whether genocide is occurring—was aimed not only at making Gaza uninhabitable through its physical destruction, but also at systematically eliminating all essential infrastructure. As we now know from a recent report by Physicians for Human Rights in Israel, this included the deliberate destruction of health services, universities, schools, and mosques—effectively targeting everything necessary for a population to care for its health, receive an education, and ultimately reconstitute itself as a community, once the violence ends—if it ever does.
That’s a conclusion I reached as early as May 2024. I wrote about it that August, but since then, of course, we’ve seen much more evidence supporting it, along with numerous additional expressions of intent to carry out ethnic cleansing in Gaza. This is a form of ethnic cleansing that, notably, cannot be fully accomplished—because there is no place for the population to flee. Consequently, we are increasingly witnessing not only the killing of large numbers of people and the creation of conditions that make life unsustainable, but also—as outlined in one of the subsections of the Genocide Convention—the severe diminishment of the ability to give birth or deliver healthy children. This is due, among other factors, to starvation, food shortages, and the collapse of medical services. One striking figure: there has been a 300% increase in miscarriages among women in Gaza since October 7th.
Israel’s Most Far-Right Government Is Mainstreaming Extremism
Billboard reading “The Looting Government,” part of a protest campaign against the conservative coalition’s policies in Ra’anana, Israel, May 2023. Photo: Rene Van Den Berg
In your 2023Guardianop-ed, you describe the Israeli far right as increasingly theocratic and exclusionary. How does this ideological shift, when coupled with populist rhetoric, justify or normalize indiscriminate violence?
Professor Omer Bartov: I would say that the current Israeli government is the most far-right government the country has ever had. It includes not only Netanyahu—who himself has become much more extreme, while remaining a savvy and cynical politician—but also members of parties that, until the coalition was formed in late 2022, had been anathema to Israeli politics and considered marginal. This includes the party led by Bezalel Smotrich, a settler who promotes an ideology rooted in Jewish supremacy, and Itamar Ben-Gvir, who represents another strain ideologically connected to Rabbi Meir Kahane—a figure often described as a Jewish Nazi. Kahane was banned from running for the Knesset by the Supreme Court, and Ben-Gvir is widely regarded as his ideological descendant.
These two people are now the most powerful ministers in Netanyahu’s government. However, I would add that alongside these figures—who are religious fanatics, anti-democratic, and openly racist—there are also other members of the government who are secular. While they do not belong to the religious camp, they are nonetheless extremely radical in their views. The current Minister of Defense, Israel Katz, for instance, has openly proposed the creation of what he calls a “humanitarian city” over the ruins of Rafah—which, in fact, would function as a vast concentration camp. Into this space, approximately 600,000 Palestinians—those who were displaced last year and sent to the Mawasi area—would be crammed, and they would only be allowed to leave if they exited the Gaza Strip altogether. Figures like Katz, and Levin, the current Minister of Justice, are extremely radical both in terms of their ambitions to transform Israel’s political system and in their approach to the treatment of Palestinians. Yet, they are not part of the religious-messianic faction.
Genocide Is Framed as Justified Retaliation in Israeli Public Discourse
In your article “Israel’s War in Gaza and the Question of Genocide” (2025), you argue that Israeli policies in Gaza are shaped by settler-colonial logic and a dehumanizing view of Palestinians, often perceived by many Israelis as a collective threat. In the light of Hamas’s October 7 massacre, how should we interpret the moral and legal boundaries of state response—especially when that attack is used to legitimize large-scale military campaigns that may constitute genocide?
Professor Omer Bartov: There are two levels here that you need to think about. One is what most people who are trying to defend Israel would like to forget—that the Hamas attack of October 7th, however heinous it was—and to my mind, it was a massacre, a war crime, and a crime against humanity—came within a broader context, which we should not ignore. That context includes, first of all, the siege of Gaza, which has gone on for 16 years by Israel since Hamas took over, and more generally, the occupation of Palestinians since 1967. So, for most of the existence of the State of Israel— I was 12 when Israel won the 1967 War and began the occupation. That’s the occupation.
By the way, most of the Palestinians who were living then in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were people or descendants of people who had been expelled from Israel in 1948. So, they had already become refugees. Now I’m 71. It’s most of my lifetime that Israel has occupied those people. When you occupy large numbers of people—and there are equal numbers of Jews and Palestinians between the river and the sea—this has a dehumanizing effect on both sides. Obviously, the occupier dehumanizes those they occupy, because that’s the only way they can justify it to themselves. And they, too, are dehumanized by that process. So that’s the broader context that helps explain, in part, why the Israeli public is so indifferent to what is happening in Gaza.
But the second, of course, is the attack itself. The Hamas attack created a sense of trauma, confusion, and insecurity within the Israeli public that seemed to justify any kind of response to such an extent. Now there is more discussion of that—both around the world and even in parts of Israel—to the extent that people were willing to entertain the idea of genocide in response to a massacre—which, of course, is not only illegal under international law but is plainly unethical. So, the situation we find ourselves in now is that, for large parts of the Israeli public over all those months, it appeared that, because of the attack of October 7th, the only guilty party in starving the population, destroying Gaza altogether, and killing large numbers of people was Hamas. And that’s a typical dynamic in these kinds of situations. Usually, organizations carrying out genocide—and the public that supports them—see their victims as the main perpetrators. That’s a very common aspect of genocide. And that is what we’re seeing now in Israel.
A Deliberate Strategy to Render Gaza Uninhabitable Is Unfolding Before Our Eyes
Ramallah, Palestine, surrounded by the controversial Israeli wall that separates the State of Israel from West Bank. Photo: Giovanni De Caro.
Two prominent Israeli human rights organizations, B’Tselem and Physicians for Human Rights, recently reported that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza by targeting civilians based solely on their Palestinian identity—causing severe, and in some cases irreparable, harm to Gazan society. As a genocide scholar, could you evaluate how such assessments reinforce or complicate international legal debates surrounding intent, proportionality, and the criteria for defining state violence as genocide?
Professor Omer Bartov: First of all, what is important to point out is that both the report—which I was reading drafts of over the last few weeks—and Physicians for Human Rights in Israel, these are Israeli NGOs. And it’s the first time that Israeli NGOs, made up of Israeli physicians, scholars, legal scholars, have said openly, with a huge amount of evidence, that what they’re seeing is genocide. They make slightly different arguments, but it comes down to the same thing. That as such is very important, because this is coming from within Israeli society itself.
The debate over whether this constitutes genocide has gone on for a long time. As I wrote in The New York Times, I believe there is a growing consensus among both genocide scholars and legal experts that this is, in fact, genocide. It’s true that genocide can be difficult to identify, and it’s also true that if the debate focuses solely on whether this is genocide, there is a risk of overlooking the fact that—even if the classification remains uncertain—clear war crimes and crimes against humanity are being committed on a daily basis. Thus, the ongoing debate may actually divert attention from the criminality of the war itself, as we remain preoccupied with the question: “Is it genocide or not?”
But by now, I think intentionality is clearly there. In fact, one curious aspect of this event is that intentions were declared very early on, and that’s not always the case. The question was whether these declared intentions were being implemented. And as I said, that to me became clear well over a year ago, right in May last year.
And by now, I think it’s clear that what the IDF tried to do between October and January was to ethnically cleanse Northern Gaza and the area north of the Netzarim Corridor. Since breaking the ceasefire in March, its focus has shifted to starving the population—not merely as an unintended consequence, but as a deliberate tactic to force people to move south. That was the objective: first, to withhold food from the North so that people would leave; and second, once distribution points were finally established—four in total—three were located in the South, clearly intended to draw people there and concentrate them in preparation for the next phase, which would be to push them out altogether.
So, I think these reports contribute significantly to the discussion. I would say that the report by Physicians for Human Rights is especially valuable, in addition to the other report, because it clearly demonstrates—for the first time—that there was a deliberate destruction of the entire healthcare system in Gaza. This, even more than the ongoing famine, will have long-term repercussions. It’ll be very hard to rebuild it, if ever, and the consequences for the life and health of the population will be very long term.
And so, it speaks about a sort of slow-moving genocide, among other things, explaining why, as they understand it, the Israeli government refrained from killing larger numbers of people that might have brought more public attention and international pressure on Israel, but rather doing it in a slower version that is more difficult to prove, at least while it is happening. So, you can see a tactic here—and a deliberate one—to make life impossible in Gaza for its Palestinian population.
Israel Is Operating Under a Diplomatic Iron Dome While Advancing Ethnic Cleansing
Election billboard showing Netanyahu shaking hands with Trump, with the slogan “Netanyahu. Another League,” in Jerusalem on September 16, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.
In your 2021 article“Blind Spots of Genocide,”you critique the Western-centric orientation of genocide studies and call for the inclusion of settler-colonial violence and victim perspectives. How should these frameworks be revised to more accurately reflect the dynamics of Israeli state violence in Gaza? Moreover, how does the international community’s muted response to this violence- especially in contrast to its swift condemnation of Hamas’s October 7 massacre- highlight enduring asymmetries in how global discourse defines and recognizes victimhood and perpetration?
Professor Omer Bartov: There’s a lot in your question, so I’ll focus on at least part of it—perhaps the most crucial part right now, or maybe two aspects. The first is that it is absolutely extraordinary that, since October 7th, Israel has operated with complete impunity in its actions in Gaza—and, of course, also in the West Bank, which we can discuss in a moment. This is not merely impunity in the sense that no one intervenes to stop it, but active facilitation through massive military assistance. The Israeli IDF could not have carried out its operations without a constant supply of arms and munitions from the United States, as well as from European allies—most notably Germany, which is the second-largest supplier of arms to Israel—and substantial diplomatic cover.
You know that Israel is living under a diplomatic Iron Dome—protected by the United States, which, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, vetoes any attempt to sanction Israel for its actions. This is extraordinary, because the countries facilitating Israel’s actions in Gaza are the very ones most strongly identified as defenders of international law and human rights—that is how they describe themselves. And Israel is not Syria, Russia, China, or Somalia; it is a country described by itself and its allies as the only democracy in the Middle East, as a protector of human rights. It is, therefore, an exceptional case that receives exceptional support from the very actors who champion the rules and norms of the international legal order—rules that Israel is now in severe breach of. That’s an extraordinary situation. There are reasons for this, and they are somewhat complex, but that is the reality.
The second issue, of course, is: why is Israel doing what it is doing? Israel is doing this because, I would say, until October 7th, Netanyahu had managed to persuade most of the Israeli public—and, in fact, much of the international community—that Israel could, so to speak, manage the occupation. That there was no need for any territorial compromise or further negotiations, because the occupation was containable. One way he did this was by supporting Hamas. We tend to forget that Hamas was seen by the Israeli right—by figures like Smotrich, and very much by Netanyahu himself—as an asset. Israel persuaded Qatar to provide millions of dollars to Hamas, which were literally handed over in large cash bags by Israelis to Hamas. A fair amount of that money, in fact, was used to build Hamas’s tunnel infrastructure.
The rationale was: it’s advantageous to have Hamas, because Hamas is widely viewed as a terrorist and fundamentalist organization, one that seeks to replace Israel with an Islamic state. Therefore, it is not considered a viable partner for negotiations. In contrast, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is recognized internationally—which is not favorable for Israel—but it is also perceived as weak and corrupt, and thus not a significant threat. Moreover, the PA collaborates with Israel in the West Bank, which further diminishes any urgency for diplomatic engagement from Israel’s perspective.
That all blew up on October 7th, when Hamas launched its attack. Initially, the Israeli government and military were quite shocked by the events, and it took them a few days to recover. Then, figures like Netanyahu, Smotrich, and Ben-Gvir suddenly realized—at least in their minds—that this was an opportunity rather than merely a fiasco. They saw it as a chance to resolve the issue by other means. If the occupation could no longer be effectively managed, then the alternative, in their view, was to ethnically cleanse the population—using the global consensus that Israel had been attacked and that hundreds of Israeli civilians had been massacred as a justification to now “solve” the problem.
But for Netanyahu, of course, there is a dilemma. And the dilemma is this: if, as he claims, he needs absolute victory—total victory—what does that actually mean? If Hamas is eliminated from Gaza, who takes over Gaza? Who would govern it? The IDF does not want to assume that role—for good reason. It would be too costly, both in lives and in resources; it would be unsustainable. So, who would govern? The natural choice would be the Palestinian Authority—perhaps a reconfigured version of it—but ultimately, it would need to be ruled by Palestinians. And that would defeat the entire purpose of this government, which is to maintain the separation between Gaza and the West Bank, complete the operation in Gaza, and then accelerate the creeping ethnic cleansing of the West Bank. This is the situation we find ourselves in now. The dynamic this government is pursuing is the completion of ethnic cleansing and, to the extent possible, the annexation of territories in both Gaza and the West Bank.
Holocaust Memory Has Been Turned Into a License for Extreme Violence
In your New York Times and Guardian commentaries, you warn against the instrumentalization of Holocaust memory as a means of shielding the Netanyahu regime from accountability. How has the Israeli far right- particularly figures like Netanyahu and Ben-Gvir- invoked Holocaust analogies to deflect allegations of war crimes and genocide in Gaza?
Professor Omer Bartov: I want to point out that it’s not only the far right in Israel that uses these analogies. The phenomenon is much broader. In fact, there is almost a consensus in Israeli society—ranging from the left to the far right. This has been a long process. I would argue that the use of the Holocaust as both a unifying memory for Israeli society and a license to exercise extreme violence against anyone perceived to be resisting Israeli rule and occupation, accelerated particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. You may recall that Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin—the first right-wing prime minister of Israel and a disciple of Ze’ev Jabotinsky—remarked in 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, that Arafat, who was then in Beirut, was hunkering down in his bunker like Hitler in Berlin during World War II. These kinds of associations between Palestinians, the PLO, Hamas—and Nazis—have become embedded in the fabric of Israeli politics.
If you listen to mainstream Israeli media—which never shows images of the horrors in Gaza—they consistently refer to Hamas as Nazis. This triggers, within the Israeli public, a perception that the threat is existential, that Auschwitz is just around the corner. And if Auschwitz is around the corner, then Israel must do everything it can to prevent it and to destroy its enemies entirely. To hell with what the international community says, to hell with international law—we are fighting for our very existence. That’s the kind of rhetorical mechanism that has been perfected.
To this, Netanyahu has added a crucial element: the weaponization of anti-Semitism. Any protest against Israel—regardless of whether it comes from Jewish students on American campuses demonstrating against the atrocities in Gaza—is immediately labeled as anti-Semitism. He has succeeded in doing this to such an extent that, both in Europe—particularly in Germany—and in the United States, there has been a clampdown on these protests in the name of combating anti-Semitism.
This Isn’t Censorship—It’s Self-Mobilization
Israeli newspapers and magazines on display in the streets of Tel Aviv, December 12, 2018. Photo: Jose Hernandez.
In“Blind Spots of Genocide”(2021), you stress the need to center victims’ perspectives. In Gaza, how do Israeli media censorship and the framing of all Gazans as “Hamas” obscure or erase civilian experiences?
Professor Omer Bartov: It does, of course. But again, I want to say—when you say censorship, you’re being kind. Because on mainstream outlets, such as the public TV channel Kan 11, there is no formal censorship. There is military censorship—they can’t reveal certain information—but they have every right to report on what’s happening to Palestinians in Gaza. They choose not to, out of self-censorship. And self-censorship is a much more effective mechanism, one that has existed in the Israeli media for a long time.
My father was a journalist, and I remember that kind of self-censorship since I was a child under the Labor governments. This was not invented today. But now, at this point, it’s extraordinary—the extent of both self-censorship and the mobilization of the entire spectrum of the Israeli media—with two very small but important exceptions: Haaretz newspaper, which is reporting very bravely (in fact, some of the best reporting on the war in Gaza is coming from Haaretz itself), and Local Call or +972, which is an even smaller group of intrepid reporters.
But by and large, this is not censorship; this is self-censorship and self-mobilization. And that’s something much more difficult to fight against. In part, it has to do—as so much does in the world today—with ratings. They don’t want to alienate their own viewers by saying things the audience doesn’t want to hear. But in part, it’s that they themselves have internalized the narrative. And while they may not be particularly supportive of Netanyahu, and certainly not of the far-right elements in his government, they generally view this as a just war, and they tend to regard the killing in Gaza as, at best, lamentable collateral damage. And that’s a far worse situation than the kind of censorship that could be removed simply by changing the government.
First-Person Testimonies Will Redefine How the World Remembers Gaza
And lastly Professor Bartov, in“Between Integrated and First-Person History”(2021), you advocate for incorporating personal narratives. How might first-person Palestinian accounts reshape dominant narratives about the Gaza war and its moral consequences?
Professor Omer Bartov: So, about the Gaza war itself—I think, look, it’s deeply tragic, because so many of the reports that have come out of Gaza are not only heartbreaking; often, they are accounts by people who were themselves killed shortly afterward. But I do think these reports are increasingly having an effect around the world. Clearly, there has been a widespread failure—perhaps not an intentional one, but nonetheless real—on the part of the international media, which, being denied access to Gaza, has largely accepted this absence of reporting. It has not pressed hard enough to provide objective coverage of events inside Gaza and has, in general, paid insufficient attention to what is happening.
This has changed somewhat now because of the widespread starvation. And, as has happened in many past genocides and other forms of war crimes, there often comes a moment when certain images begin to shift public perception and draw global attention. This occurred during the war in the former Yugoslavia, for example, with the photographs of Bosniaks behind barbed wire. It also happened during the Vietnam War with the iconic image of the girl burned by napalm. Similarly, the recent images of starving children have had a profound effect—a different kind of narrative, in a way. At the very least, you see the people themselves. You see what is happening to obviously innocent children. You simply can’t present that as anything other than what it is.
I think in the future—I’ve read several such texts by people who were there and who, fortunately, managed to get out and write accounts. As a strong believer in first-person narratives—which convey what you will never hear or understand if you rely solely on top-down documentation—I believe there will be more of these stories. And I think that, eventually, our understanding of what is going on—and, once it’s over, what had gone on—will deepen significantly, and the horror will be revealed to have been even greater than we could have imagined.
Please cite as: Varriale, Amedeo. (2025). “Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (FdI): Conservative, Populist, or Extreme Right?” ECPS Party Profiles. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 27, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/op0011
This study demonstrates that Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) is best characterized as a conservative party with a strong ideological foundation in cultural and socio-economic conservatism. While the party occasionally uses populist rhetoric—particularly anti-elitist and people-centric language—populism plays only a secondary role. The party’s programs from 2018 and 2022 emphasize traditional values, national identity, and limited but socially conscious state intervention, aligning it more with liberal conservatism than with radical right populism. FdI’s relatively moderate stances on civil rights and its pro-European, Atlanticist foreign policy further distance it from the extreme right. Thus, FdI is most accurately described as a populist-Conservative party, where conservatism is dominant and populism serves more as a rhetorical strategy than a core ideology.
By Amedeo Varriale*
Introduction
This contribution focuses on categorizing the political party Brothers of Italy (FdI) from an entirely ideological standpoint. In essence, the aim of this work is to address the question of whether Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s FdI should ultimately be classified as a conservative, populist, or far-right party. To achieve this aim, a theoretical framework based on an ideological approach – where each ideology is considered to be firmly grounded in a core set of values – will be combined with a qualitative methodology comprising discourse and manifesto analysis. This approach will be utilized to empirically determine which of the three ideologies (conservatism, populism, right-wing extremism) is most closely aligned with FdI’s general positions.
Through both forms of analysis, domestic and foreign policy are considered in determining what party family FdI currently belongs to. Hopefully, the approach adopted in this investigation – both flexible and reliable – will shed light on this crucial European political actor and, in time, also inspire future scholars to use a similar framework to evaluate other[1] ideologically ambiguous cases. For instance, other right-wing parties in Europe may reflect modern liberal conservatism or represent something entirely distinct, more radical, or even extreme.
The reason for selecting FdI as a case study lies not only in its brisk rise in political influence both domestically and internationally – due to the popularity of its leader among voters and her pragmatic relationship with key players (e.g. Donald J. Trump, Ursula von der Leyen, Elon Musk) – but also in its complex ideological roots, including its supposedly“post-fascist” legacy and its recent foreign policy realignment. Both aspects provide a unique case for analyzing the boundaries among conservatism, populism, and extreme right ideology in 21st century Europe.
The FdI Case: Background, Literature, and Method
Party Background
Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia – FdI) is a political party that emerged from a split in Silvio Berlusconi’s “big-tent” People of Freedom (Popolo delle Libertà – PDL) party on December 28, 2012 (Palladino, 2023). The split occurred in response to Berlusconi’s decision not to hold primary elections for the PDL’s leadership before the 2013 general election, as well as his continued endorsement of the technocratic government led by the Europhile economist Mario Monti (Tarchi, 2024: 22-23). Essentially, the goal of FdI’s three principal founders—Guido Crosetto, Ignazio La Russa, and Giorgia Meloni—was to create a new center-right to right-wing political entity with a distinctly nationalist (and thus Euroskeptic) and conservative agenda, in contrast to Berlusconi’s centrist and classical liberal party (Tarchi, 2024: 23–24).
However, for much of its existence, FdI struggled to make a significant impact on the Italian political landscape. In fact, between 2013 and 2022, it seemed that Meloni and her close associates were content with having a limited influence on the national agenda, operating mainly from the sidelines of Parliament. During this period, FdI accepted the role of junior partner in the center-right coalition, securing a modest 1.95% in the 2013 general election and a slightly better 4.3% in 2018 (see Il Sole 24 Ore, 2015; 2018). As a minor player, it frequently aligned with Forward Italy! (FI!) and the League (Lega) on critical matters such as immigration, security, taxation, and the broader economy.
Literature Review
Taking this into account, the situation for FdI is now drastically different. The party decisively won the Italian general election in September 2022, securing 26% of the national vote (see Ansa.it, September 26, 2022). Indeed, not only has the prominent news outlet Politico described Meloni—Prime Minister since October 2022—as “the most powerful person in Europe” in its “Class of 2025” ranking, but her party also remains electorally stable, consistently leading national polls (see www.politico.eu). More crucially, analysts consistently acknowledge that there has been an ideological shift undergone by Meloni – as FdI repositioned itself in the international arena, becoming more moderate, Atlanticist, and “pro-European” on foreign policy – and that she will continue to be a high-profile figure in the near future (Cerasa, 2024; The Economist, January 24, 2024).
Notwithstanding, numerous political commentators, particularly within the media, still draw attention to the darker past of Meloni’s party, stressing her party’s neofascist origins (see Neil, 2024; Riva and Bagnoli, 2024; Rizzitelli, 2024; Saviano, 2022; Stille, 2024). After all, FdI is a direct successor to the post-fascist National Alliance (AN) and an indirect heir to the neofascist Italian Social Movement (MSI). It is for this reason that most of its classe dirigente (“ruling class”) derives from the traditional extreme right and – as some suggest – that the logo of the party still reflects the old MSI’s tricolor burning flame (Tarchi, 2024: 23). This is a symbol that represents the fascist idea of palingenesis, which in the Italian case is meant to pay tribute to the rise of a new political force from Benito Mussolini’s ashes (for a more detailed account, see Jones, 2022).
Considering this, surprisingly, unlike in media circles, “FdI until recently attracted little academic attention” (Bressanelli & de Candia, 2023: 1). Nevertheless, in the rare instances where FdI has received scholarly focus, scholars disagree on the core ideology that shapes the essence of the party’s political discourse and policy decisions. On one hand, there are scholars that insist – notwithstanding its commitment to democracy as well as its pro-USA, pro-Israel, and pro-Ukraine stances – FdI can still be categorized as “far right” or “radical right” (see Broder, 2002; Donà, 2022; Indelicato and Lopes, 2024; Tortola and Griffini, 2024). Moreover, although the most severe designation “extreme right” is rarely ever employed in scholarly literature, the terms above have served as quasi-direct alternatives, carrying an either identical or similar negative connotation, and are interchangeably used to emphasize FdI’s extreme positions. On the other hand, other experts are more cautious with their categorizations and refrain from explicitly highlighting the party’s extremist credentials (e.g. Tarchi, 2024). Alternatively, a minority of specialists, such as the Italian academics Salvatore Vassallo and Rinaldo Vignati (2024) or the essayist Bill Emmott (2024) prefer to stress how Meloni’s party is best aligned with the ideology of conservatism. For instance, the former contend that FdI is a new “national conservative” party, rather than a populist or neofascist one, and the latter – although with some reservations – assents that Meloni has governed as a “bog-standard conservative” (Emmott, 2024; Ronaldo and Vignati, 2024).
Although several analysts quickly label FdI as a “radical right” or “(new) populist radical right” party—including Biancalana (2024), Puleo and Piccolino (2022), Rooduijn et al. (2019), and Zulianello (2020)—this classification often leads to an incomplete reading for two reasons. First, FdI’s predecessor National Alliance (AN) was already being classified as a relatively “moderate” national conservative party by scholars in the early 2000s (see Ignazi, 2005; Tarchi, 2003; 2008). Thus, it is difficult to imagine that Meloni’s party today – which directly draws from its previous political legacy – would opt to radicalize itself, especially in a context where, following Berlusconi’s downfall, moderate right voters no longer have a stable political home, and a leadership vacuum exists within the center-right bloc. In fact, two Italian authors – Leonardo Puleo and Gianluca Piccolino (2022) – even outrightly state “FdI’s position in the bi-dimensional political space (GAL/TAN and Economic L-R) of the Italian party system appears quite similar to that of AN” (Puleo and Piccolino, 2022: 368). Unexpectedly, they still conclude that FdI is part of the populist radical right (PRR) family. Second, it appears that current literature, in attempts to categorize FdI, prioritizes issues that unequivocally align with PRR ideology (e.g. anti-elitism/populism, anti-progressivism, authoritarianism, nativism, Euroskepticism) while overlooking those that put the party at odds with this political family, such as its domestic economic policy and its “neo-conservative” and Atlanticist foreign policy.
In summary, the principal debate among scholars revolves around the ideological nature of FdI. This includes discussions on whether it is a party that conveys a conservative message while effectively adhering to democratic laws (both in form and in practice), or whether it remains influenced by its neofascist heritage and is also now capitalizing on the populist wave, challenging core tenets and institutions of liberal democracy – such as the separation of powers, the rule of law, and minority rights – in a way typical of “radical right” parties, as Cas Mudde (2019) maintains. Considering this, this contribution will not directly focus on FdI’s relationship with (liberal) democracy, nor will it compare the party to its predecessor AN to stress its moderately conservative tendencies. Instead, as already mentioned, it will delve into a theoretical and empirical investigation of its worldview from a supply-side, to discover how it relates – discursively and programmatically – to three distinct contemporary ideologies: conservatism, populism, and extreme right.
Theoretical Framework and Methodology
In summary, this contribution adopts a qualitative methodology and undertakes a manifesto analysis of the Brothers of Italy (FdI) party drawing primarily on the 2018 and 2022 general elections programs, supplemented by recent public statements (including interview material) by elected party representatives. That said, given the discourse analysis is more compact and direct than the manifesto analysis, the former precedes the latter in the body of this article. As the literature on party ideology suggests, the qualitative method embraced throughout is driven by an ideological approach (this functions as a theoretical framework) because in this particular case “the substance and prevalence of a party’s ideology are of primary interest to the investigator” (Lawson, 1976: 15). Ideology can be defined as “a body of normative and normative-related ideas about the nature of man and society as well as the organization and purposes of society” (Sainsbury, 1980: 8). Therefore, the main strength of the ideological approach resides in the fact that by observing a party’s ideology scholars can learn how a political organization interprets the world, frames its core values, and positions itself in relation to broader societal conflicts and ethical orientations.
Discourse Analysis (DA) is – in simple terms – “the close study of language and language use as evidence of aspects of society and social life” (Taylor, 2013: 7). It is an appropriate tool to observe the political behavioral patterns reflected by politicians to learn something about their ideology. Instead, manifesto analysis is the perusal of “strategic documents written by politically sophisticated party elites with many different objectives in mind” (Laver & Garry, 2000: 620). Considering the above, a methodological synthesis where the analysis of discourse is presented alongside the analysis of electoral programs provides a unique opportunity to unravel whether the speeches or statements made by Meloni and her parliamentary group correspond or contradict the policies put forward in written form. Manifesto analysis is also particularly useful, because, as the public policy expert Emma Norris (2019) outlines, “Manifestos are a ‘party’s contract with the electorate’ – outlining competing visions and policies that make up their respective programs for government” (Norris, 2019). It follows, then, that party programs and party ideology are inextricably linked.
The reason this study prioritizes Meloni’s statements over those of other FdI politicians is that, in a highly centralized party structure, key decisions are made primarily by the leadership—often by Meloni herself or her close inner circle (see Melito and Zulianello, 2025). Therefore, focusing on her discourse is the most effective way to identify recurring ideological trends within the party. Furthermore, it should be noted that only more recent statements (2018-2024) are considered as a unit of discourse analysis because examining party ideology through discourse cannot extend too far back: since its inception, the party has undergone major ideological shifts. Even Meloni’s most hardline positions – on Euroscepticism, nationalism, authoritarianism, and her originally sympathetic stance towards Vladimir Putin – have been notably moderated or altogether abandoned in recent years, making earlier statements less representative of the party’s current ideological trajectory.
As for manifesto analysis, this study prioritizes the 2018 and 2022 programs given their relevance to national political orientation and ideological policymaking. Especially the 2022 program, which remains contemporaneous in relation to ideological framing, as it reflects the party’s most recent national electoral platform and serves as a blueprint for its current governance agenda. Instead, the inclusion of the 2018 manifesto enables a diachronic perspective, allowing for the detection of ideological continuities and changes over time. Combined with an analysis of current (or recent) discourse, this approach enables a robust comprehension of the party’s evolution of beliefs and present stance.
Conservatism as an Ideology
Photo: Dreamstime.
Which Conservatism?
As the political theorist Edmund Neill (2021) asserts, “…unlike some of the vaguer, more contested concepts in political theory, such as nationalism, populism or fascism, conservatism appears to have a relatively fixed and stable meaning” (Neill, 2021: 1). Considering this, several scholars, including political historians, political scientists, and sociologists, either refuse to attach a permanent set of ideas to conservatism or offer disparate definitions of it, some of which are outdated in the contemporary context. The most cited definitions of modern conservatism are those belonging to theorists such as Peter Dorey (2011), Michael Freeden (1996), Ian Gilmour (1977), Samuel Huntington (1957), Karl Mannheim (1986), Michael Oakeshott (1991).
Conservative ideas are also closely associated with influential post-Enlightenment intellectuals, including Edmund Burke, G.K. Chesterton, Joseph de Maistre, T.S. Eliot, W.H. Mallock and Heinrich von Treitschke (Neill, 2021: 1-3). In the more recent past, conservatism has been tied to the ideas of figures such as Christopher Lasch, Robert Nisbet, Sir Roger Scruton, and Leo Strauss. Perhaps, using a more inclusive parameter, even the controversial French novelist Michel Houellebecq can be added to the list. Instead, the Austrian School economists Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises are excluded, because although they have supported free-market capitalism and shared certain views with modern conservatives, they are ultimately classical liberals (Hayek, 2011; Wire and Deist, 2022).
In order to understand conservatism as an ideology, one must begin with the historical approaches to its study. For instance, Burke, an archetype of this political theory, was according to some the carrier of a rigid definition of conservatism (Bourke, 2018: 459; Huntington, 1956: 456). In essence, he laid the foundation for a conservative philosophy by presenting six definite maxims. First, Burke argued men are inherently religious beings, and religion itself is “the foundation of civil society” (Huntington, 1956: 456). Second, society needs to be understood as the natural and organic product of gradual historical growth (Huntington, 1956: 456). Third, man is primarily an instinctive and emotional creature, and habit trumps reason (Huntington, 1956: 456). Fourth, unlike liberals, Burke strongly believed community is always superior to the individual (Huntington, 1956: 456). It also for this reason that 20th-century conservative thinkers, such as Scruton, have acknowledged the importance of state intervention on private property when the general material welfare of the populace is threatened (Neill, 2021: 3). Fourth, men are naturally and inevitably unequal (Huntington, 1956: 456). Last but not least, he spoke against accelerated change, especially alterations to institutions and radical rethinking of social laws, explaining that “efforts to remedy existing evils usually result in even greater ones” (Huntington, 1956: 456). In simple terms, Burkean conservatism, favored (democratic) reform or “evolution” over violent “revolution” (Bourke, 2018: 459; Neill, 2021: 1).
Notwithstanding, it is important to note that not all political theorists explicitly refer to conservatism as a full-scale ideology or provide a fixed definitional framework with a series of core ideological characteristics. In fact, important thinkers – Russel Kirk (1953) for example – postulate that conservatism involves a rejection of abstract ideologies in favor of a more pragmatic, tradition-based approach to political affairs. After all, it is logical for conservatives to regard ideologies as artificial, radical, and disruptive, insofar as they often fail to respect tradition and tend to be progressive rather than preservationist (see Neill, 2021: 7-8). Similarly, the German-Italian sociologist, Robert Michels (1968) argued that conservatism is not a doctrinal ideology (in the sense of having stable core concepts or abstract values) but rather a “positional ideology” – essentially an attitude – capable of endless modification. Instead, Peter Dorey (2011) prefers to directly ascertain that conservatism is a form of philosophical commitment to inequality, whereas more traditionalistapproaches – adopted by Gilmour (1977) or Oakeshott (1991) – interpret conservatism mainly in relation to its attitude towards societal change, accordingly something that should be managed cautiously.
A more complete definition, where conservatism as an ideology has a relatively stable meaning, derives from the famous political scientist Huntington who suggests it is “that system of ideas employed to justify any established social order, no matter where or when it exists, against any fundamental challenge to its nature or being, no matter from what quarter” (Huntington, 1957: 455). In academia, this is often known as a dispositional approach to examine conservatism, although Huntington himself refers to it as the situational definition (Huntington, 1956: 455-456). Nevertheless, it appears that Huntington’s main objective in presenting this thesis was to support a “new” conservatism in America, one influenced by liberalism, in order to preserve the country’s liberal tradition (Bourke, 2018: 458).
The main issue with traditionalist and dispositional approaches stems from this idea that conservatism is mainly an impulsive reaction to societal change and progress. However, modern history teaches us that not all political movements we usually associate with conservatism are nostalgic, backward-looking, reactionary, or skeptical of change per se. In fact, as Bourke points out, “self-designating conservatives have often been revolutionary in temper” (Bourke, 2018: 453). Specifically, strands of conservatism tied to Anglophile society and traditions, such as the Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan phenomena, have advocated radical systemic change to modernize certain[2] aspects of society (Neill, 2021: 2).
Other very distinct examples of “revolutionary conservatives” include those intellectuals affiliated to the deutsche Bewegung (“German Movement”) who sometimes appear ideologically closer to National Socialism or fascism than conservatism, namely Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt and Oswald Spengler (Bourke, 2018: 454). While this form of conservatism can certainly be linked to a coherent political tradition and traditionalism per se, its most prominent feature was its “revolutionary spirit” (Bourke, 2018: 454). Moreover, there have been authoritarian and totalitarian states pursuing political causes entirely alternative to those of conservatives, the early Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and Albania under Enver Hoxha, that have been extremely resistant towards societal and institutional change. None of these were conservative or “right-wing” ideologically. In other words, conservatism should not be understood as being merely a reactive (or reactionary) political philosophy.
Setting aside traditionalist and dispositional approaches, Karl Mannheim (1986) offers an alternative interpretation of conservative ideology. This sociologist dismisses the idea that conservatism is synonymous with traditionalism, or the mere upholding of the status quo. Instead, adopting a sociological perspective, Mannheim frames conservatism as a primarily (though, in his own words, “peculiarly”) modern phenomenon (Neill, 2021: 9). In essence, Mannheim argues that conservatism – as an explicit ideological stance – before the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution had no reason to exist (Mannheim, 1986 as cited in Neill, 2021: 10). From this perspective, conservatism proposes a thorough replacement to the key principles of liberal Enlightenment thought. In doing so, it champions the concrete over the abstract (Mannheim, 1986 as cited in Neill, 2021: 10). Liberal concepts such as freedom, individual liberty, or progress, lose their meaning unless they are understood as within a specific historical and cultural context, and seen as interdependent with other foundational principles like nation or tradition (Mannheim, 1986 as cited in Neill, 2021: 9-10).
In conservative ideology, the core tenets of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment liberalism are not simply rebuffed as perilous and unnecessary, instead they are reframed in a more concrete manner, one that is “historically specific and only comprehensive within a wider social framework” (Mannheim, 1986 as cited in Neill, 2021: 10). Mannheim’s postulation is both interesting and more encouraging than other definitions for scholars who seek to define conservatism concretely, and more importantly, as an ideology. Nevertheless, in an objective critique of this approach, a political scientist, Michael Freeden (1996) highlights that “although Mannheim’s work is insightful, conservatism should not just be viewed as a peculiarly ‘reactive’ movement but as a full-scale political ideology” (Neill, 2021: 11).
Insights from Freeden
In this work, conservatism is not seen as a basic or generic attitude, nor as merely a commitment to maintaining inequality (e.g. Dorey), a reactive impulse to preserve the statusquo (e.g. Huntington), an effort to control change (e.g. Oakeshott and Gilmour), or a response to sociological shifts in defense of tradition (e.g. Mannheim). Instead, it is viewed as a more intricate and sophisticated philosophical system of beliefs. In other words, conservatism is a “systemization of ideas” or a coherent ideology (Freeden, 1996: 124-127; Neill, 2021: 11). In truth, conservatism is an ideology that possesses a morphological structure of “core concepts” – as the sociologist Michael Freeden (1996) observes. On one hand, core concepts are permanent and fundamental (Freeden, 1996: 77-91), as for example conservatism’s pessimistic idea of human nature, seen as something inherently imperfect and to be wary of. On the other hand, adjacent concepts are supplementary to core concepts and allow them to be refined and placed into a specific context (Freeden, 1996: 77-91). Regarding conservatism, it is their Hobbesian distrust that inspires their preference for limited government – as the academic Noel O’Sullivan (1976) has also argued before. Finally, peripheral concepts offer an ideology like conservatism a degree of versatility to adapt to shifting circumstances, rooted in definite times, places, and contemporary concerns (see Franks et al., 2018). For example, during and soon after the Enlightenment, conservative illiberalism (e.g. Burke was highly critical of the French revolution) was motivated by the fact new liberal ideologies were causing widespread disruption and posing a threat to accepted social norms and traditions.
In any case, Freeden’s most significant contribution to the study of conservatism is providing us (intentionally or unintentionally) with a fixed or permanent definition of this concept, one that can serve as a foundation for assessing individual cases empirically. According to him, conservatism is “a fully-fledged ideology, based around the core concepts of managing change and of an ‘extra-human’ dimension to individual agency” (Neill, 2021: 16). It is apparent that adjacent and peripheral concepts constitute secondary aspects of conservative ideology, and therefore, they will receive limited attention in this study. Given this, Freeden’s clear definition enables an empirical approach to the analysis of FdI as a specific case. Only by borrowing this precise interpretation of conservatism, we can ultimately assess whether it is this ideology that influences FdI in its discourse and political program, rather than other current ideologies, such as the ones mentioned earlier.
Populism as an Ideology
What is Populism?
Over the course of the years, theorists have continuously referred to populism as a “quintessentially contested concept” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: 2-5; Webber, 2023: 849). Indeed, its chameleonic, protean, and polymorphous characteristics, along with its inherent versatility, have made the ongoing debate surrounding the nature of populism a subject of considerable intellectual fascination on multiple fronts. Given this, it is important to emphasize that, at present, the majority scholars – regardless of whether they associate with the ideational, political-strategic, or socio-culturalschools of thought – agree that in order for populism to function there must be a Manichean sentiment that accentuates the societal tension between “common people” and the elites, pitting one group against the other. Hence, there exists a general academic consensus regarding the fundamental nature of populism (Taggart, 2018).
This leads us to the most widely accepted framework for the study of populism: the ideational approach, which is primarily associated with its key advocate, the Dutch scholar Cas Mudde (2017). Mudde defines the concept as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2017: 29). According to this framework, “theoretically, populismdistinguishes the people and the elite on the basis of just one dimension, i.e. morality” (Mudde, 2017: 32). Thus, in the simplistic and Manichean terms that populism abides by anti-elitism is merely the idea that (cultural, economic, political) elites are inherently evil(Mudde, 2017: 32-33). Following this logic, people-centrism is the idea that “the people” (regardless of whether they are defined as a class or nation) are inherently good and pure from an ethical standpoint (Mudde, 2017: 32-33). Similarly, the concept of volonté générale should be understood as “closely linked” to this “homogenous interpretation of the people” (Mudde, 2017: 33). It reflects the “honest and logical priorities of the (common) people” – which only populists can allegedly interpret rightly, as they claim to base their politics on what the people want: common-sense solutions to the everyday problems of common men and women (Mudde, 2017: 33). As Mudde’s is the prevalent definition – or, as Paul Taggart (2018) succinctly puts it, the one that is “winning” – it will serve as the working definition later applied to the empirical investigation regarding FdI’s discourse, manifesto and analysis.
Evaluating Approaches to Populism
The reason why it is better to observe populism through an ideological lens is that the other approaches exhibit more flaws than Mudde’s. For instance, while the outdated economic notions of populism have been refuted over time, even more modern approaches, such as Kurt Weyland’s (2017) political-strategic approach, presents substantial limitations. According to the lead critic of this approach – Daniel Rueda (2021) – considering populism merely as a political strategy utilized by a personalistic leader to maximize electoral profit is debatable for three reasons. Firstly, Weyland’s approach suffers from “selective rationalism,” in that it unreasonably assumes that only populist actors can be pragmatic and behave as self-interested “power-seeking actors” (Rueda, 2021: 169-171). However, in practice, within the political landscape of electoral competition, liberals, conservatives, socialists, and neo-communists, pursue similar strategies (Rueda, 2021: 171).
Secondly, this approach is over-reliant on the idea of “leader-centrism” (Rueda, 2021: 174), when, in fact, not all populist actors are entirely centralized personalist parties that can only survive politically as long as their charismatic chief does. Let alone the fact that there have been several populist movements that are leaderless and characterized by a decentralized/horizontal structure, such as the Girotondi, INDIGNADOS and Occupy Wall Street, successful populist parties ranging from the rightist AfD to the leftist PODEMOS through the centrist Forward Italy![3] have outlived their leaders, continuing to be competitive in the political arena. Also, charisma is not a distinctive feature when it comes to the identity of a populist party, as some of the organizations have not always had charismatic leaders. For instance, none of the last three leaders of the AfD (Alexander Gauland, Frauke Petry, Alice Weidel) have been highly charismatic in the traditional sense, nor has Andrej Babiš from the Czech party ANO, and it is at best debatable whether other widely known figures such as Christopher Blocher, Matteo Salvini, or Geert Wilders are charismatic in the Weberian sense.
Thirdly, the political-strategic theory is contentious because while it insistingly argues that populism is not an ideology, it concomitantly criticizes the left-wing variants of populism present in Latin America (thus recognizing the existence of an ideological element) which accordingly are less moderate and less democratic than their right-wing counterparts (Rueda, 2021: 178-180). Scholars who have picked up on this, such as Rueda, have legitimately made the accusation of “normative bias” (Rueda, 2021: 178). As stressed before in a different context: “…by saying this Weyland makes the opposite mistake that a handful of liberal scholars in Europe make when they paint all right-wing populism under the same brush dismissing all populism as reactionary, xenophobic and exclusivist. It is never a good idea to overlook individual cases that can be entirely different from one another…” (Varriale, 2024: 19).
Similarly, the socio-cultural approach put forward by Pierre Ostiguy (2017) in The Oxford Handbook of Populism has a limitation. Ostiguy frames populism as a performative aspect of politics and argues it can be situated on a high-low axis orthogonal to the right-left dimension of a coordinate grid (Ostiguy, 2017: 77-87). This axis supposedly concerns the interactions between political actors and the population (Ostiguy, 2017: 77). Accordingly, political actors who are notpopulist are located on the high dimension because apart from utilizing institutionally mediated and impersonal authority (e.g. proceduralism or reglamentismo)to lead supporters, they also tend to be “well-behaved,” “stiff,” “polished,” and always educated, formal, and polite in manifesting their cosmopolitanism (Ostiguy, 2017: 79). In contrast, populists are the opposite from both a political-cultural and socio-cultural perspective and are positioned on the “low” pole of politics. Essentially, while being “nativist” and “culturally popular” they are also vulgar and uninhibited in their speech and come across as highly personalist in terms of leadership (Ostiguy, 2017: 79). Hence, populists rely on personal authority and behavioral strength to mobilize supporters (Ostiguy, 2017: 79). However, this theory overly generalizes, as not all populists fit the “low” category in both political-cultural and socio-cultural terms. For instance, few scholars question the populist credentials of the US People’s Party and the Pim Fortuyn List (LPF), yet their political-cultural mannerisms differed substantially from Ostiguy’s description (Mudde, 2017: 41).
Given these circumstances, despite the fact not all scholars agree with Mudde’s assertion that populism is inherently an ideology (e.g. Schroder, 2020), or more specifically a “thin-centered” one that relies on other ideologies to function (see Mudde, 2004), the ideational approach remains the most appropriate framework to study populism. It is undisputable that anti-elitism, alongside people-centrism and the concept of “general will,” are central components of the populist narrative across the political spectrum. In summary, since the majority of scholars directly or indirectly employ ideational approaches (and definitions) to populism (see Abts & Rummens, 2007; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017; Rooduijn, 2013, Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014, Stanley, 2008) this approach will also be assumed in this contribution to determine whether a key Italian political actor can be effectively classified as a populist formation.
Extreme Right as an Ideology
Casa Pound, an Italian neo-fascist extreme right-wing political association, held a manifestation in honor of fallen comrades in Milan on April 29, 2012. Photo: Eugenio Marongiu.
Extreme Right, Radical Right and Other Terms: An Overview
In this contribution, the choice for the term “extreme right” over other academic terminologies is based on the fact that, despite some disagreements (as we shall discuss below), it remains the most widely accepted, even though there is no universally agreed-upon definition (Mudde, 2000: 16). More crucially, it enables a comprehensive description of an ideology that consists of multiple diverse features (Mudde, 2000: 16). However, unlike conservatism and populism, which are today more readily definable ideologies, categorizing the so-called “extreme right” as a singular ideology is a more complex task. As Mudde himself states: “almost every scholar in the field point to the lack of a generally accepted definition” regarding what this term precisely means and which parties belong to its party family (Mudde, 2000: 10).
In essence, there are three cardinal reasons that render the objective usage of this term for political parties and movements relatively complicated. First, “extreme right” is sometimes conflated by scholarship with other terms such as “radical right” (Bell, 2001; Betz, 1994), “new right” (Chryssogelos, 2013), “ultra-right” (Padovani, 2016), or even “populist right” (Gross, 2022). For example, during the mid-to-late 20th century, scholars, particularly from English-speaking countries, frequently used these terms interchangeably to refer to the American nationalist movements located to the right of mainstream conservatism on the political spectrum (Ignazi, 2000: 38-40). Among those, radically conservative phenomena such as the John Birch Society and the McCarthyites, which were certainly vehemently anti-communist and perhaps even anti-pluralist but not necessarily opposed to representative democracy per se (Ignazi, 2000: 40-41).
However, the main issue emerged when this label began incautiously being applied to a heterogeneous array of parties and movements across Europe, which were ideologically disparate (Ignazi, 2000: 42). This practice failed to discern between anti-establishment and anti-systemic actors, reformist and revolutionary movements, as well as democratic and anti-democratic parties. Not to mention, terms like “radical right” – still the most utilized alternative to extreme right in scholarship – were adopted incautiously to include extra-parliamentary terrorist groups that openly engage in illegal activity and aim to overthrow the democratic system entirely (Ignazi, 2000: 42). In essence, such a disjointed assemblage persisted into the late 20th century and erroneously grouped European anti-systemic and anti-democratic parties, typically neofascist groups, alongside American pro-systemic and democratic right-wing movements that had no connection to fascism or neofascism (Ignazi, 2000: 42).
Analogous challenges surface with the designation “new right,” as there is still no scholarly consensus on which parties belong to this political famille spirituelle or on what type of rightist ideology this label should reflect overall. In French and Italian academic circles, the nouvelle droite or nuova destra is used to refer to the anti-capitalist, anti-liberal, and “ethno-pluralist” intellectual movement inspired by the GRECE[4] and in particular by the essayist Alain de Benoist (Ignazi, 2000: 43). In contrast, within the Anglosphere thinkers spoke of the “new right” only when referring to neoliberal and moderate movements focusing on the historical experiences of Thatcherism and Reaganism (Ignazi, 2000: 47). Essentially, this term has been employed to describe fully distinct phenomena with opposing perspectives, especially in the context of the political economy.
It is also for this reason that today scholars who normally advocate for an ideational approach, such as Andrea L.P. Pirro (2021), have supported the use of new “umbrella concepts” – supposedly useful in the American context – such as “far right,” which purposely encompasses both political actors who are illiberal but democratic (e.g. “populist radical right”) and those who are entirely anti-democratic (e.g. “extreme right”) (Pirro, 2021: 3-6). However, this view can be problematic, as there is a fundamental axiological difference between parties that support democracy but are skeptical of certain aspects of liberal-democracy (such as the rule of law and individual/minority rights) and parties that outright reject democracy altogether. The term far right is only useful, if useful at all, when applied to so-called borderline cases (see Tarchi, 2015), namely Alternative for Germany (AfD), the old British National Party (BNP) led by Nick Griffin, and the Hungarian Jobbik. In theory, those parties outwardly endorse democratic representation, but their rhetoric and actions, as well as their links at a local level (at times with the “skinhead” community), suggest otherwise. In practice, they advocate for ultra-authoritarian positions and ultimately oppose democratic principles.
Second, it remains unclear whether the extreme right party family should include actors who, in addition to repudiating democratic and liberal values, also openly embrace the fascist and/or National Socialist ideological tradition(s). One claim that can be made is that in the same way not all radical right parties are necessarily populist (although today most are), not all extreme right parties are neofascist or neo-Nazi. Essentially, this argument posits that an actor can be considered both “extremist” and “right-wing” (thus the label “extreme right”) due to their objection to pluralism (to the extent where political violence is tolerated or promoted) and equality (to the point where racial differences are regarded as natural and positive), without necessarily aligning with what Roger Eatwell (1992) illustrates as “Generic Fascism.”
In defense of this assertion, empirical work by historians such as Robert O. Paxton (2005) reminds us of that corporatist regimes such as the Francoist dictatorship in Spain and the Estado Novo (New State) led by António de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal were ideologically very far to the right, but did not fully align with the characteristics of fascism. Not only did they lack some of fascism’s defining features, such as militaristic mass mobilization and an intense cult of personality, but these deeply conservative and repressive dictatorships chose to ban fascist movements in their countries, namely the Spanish Falange (José Antonio Primo de Rivera) and the Portuguese Legion. Notwithstanding, the vastmajority of contemporary extreme right parties are directlyinfluenced by fascist or National Socialist ideologies, often employing the myths and symbols associated with both for political purposes. Hence, scholars who discriminately use the term “extreme right” to refer to neofascist and neo-Nazi movements today are doing so in bona fides and are, quite justified in their approach.
Third, as Mudde explains, “there is a large number of political parties whose extreme right status is not debated” (Mudde, 2000: 16). However, sometimes it can still be difficult to differentiate between populist radical right parties and extreme right ones, especially when the latter attempt to modernize and “moderate” their positions for strategic rather than ideological purposes. For example, this occurred with the BNP under Griffin’s leadership, as he invited his supporters to abandon the “three Hs” – hard talk, hobbyism, and Hitler (Cobain, 2006; see also Copsey, 2008: 138). Essentially, the idea was to have them stop shaving their heads, dressing in black, wearing big Dr. Martens boots, and expressing sympathy for Nazi actions during World War II. Also, extreme right parties may engage in a “double-speak strategy” which simply imitates the language of liberal democracy without effectively adhering to it (Feldman and Jackson, 2014).
Similarly to FdI, which has been accused of tolerating the antisemitism and fascism of its youth sections in Rome (see Corriere Della Sera, June 14, 2024), organizations like the AfD actively participate in representative democracy yet continue to discretely engage with much more extremist factions at a local extra-parliamentary level (Hülsemann, 2024). In fact, the latter, still has a supposedly neo-Nazi wing called Der Flügel (see Pytlas and Biehler, 2023). On the other hand, it has also occurred historically that liberal-conservative parties have radicalized themselves under a new leadership, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) taken over by the charismatic Jörg Haider in 1986 serves as a textbook example of this phenomenon (see Moreau, 2024). This creates even more confusion when discussing these types of parties.
Defining the “Extreme Right”
Casting aside doubts and disagreements over terminology, defining the extreme right remains an essential academic practice before undertaking an empirical investigation of the phenomenon. In this contribution, the minimal definition employed and tested throughout the qualitative analysis is a recent one introduced by scholar Elisabeth Carter (2018) who asserts this ideology encompasses authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and/or holistic nationalism (Carter, 2018: 174). Firstly, authoritarianism is characterized by “conventionalism,” “submission,” and “aggression.” Thus, a state or a party which ideologically promotes traditional social norms and morality (e.g. anti-abortion, anti-homosexuality, and patriarchal family structure) as well as the duty and compliance of citizens to the government, and punitive legal measures for those individuals who do not comply is an authoritarian entity (Carter, 2018: 169). Secondly, anti-democracy is defined as “any opposition to, or rejection or undermining of, the values of democracy, or of the values and the procedures and institutions of democracy…” (Carter, 2018: 170). Thirdly, nationalism – “in its holistic form” – can be defined as something that “undermines the civil and political liberty of the individual through the requirement of subordination to the collective…when it is exclusionary, not least because it targets minorities who are citizens, it signals a rejection of pluralism, diversity and equality” (Carter, 2018: 172). This builds on Mudde’s characterization of nationalism as “a political doctrine that proclaims congruence of the political unit, the state, and the cultural unit, the nation” (Mudde, 1995: 209).
Accordingly, in this case, if FdI is effectively recognized as an extreme right party, its ideology – from which its policies are derived – and its discourse will have to reflect most, if not all, of these elements. For example, if only two out of the three elements are present it will already be difficult to legitimate FdI as comfortably belonging to the extreme right party family. The main strength of Carter’s definition resides in its clarity and precision, as well as its universality and efficiency for the study of political parties. Fundamentally, this minimal definition is more concise but also more precise than other maximal definitions available. Also, its universality or “travelability” is remarkable, as it is easy to speculate – regardless of the geographic location – that a right-wing extremist party will in one way or the other be authoritarian rather than libertarian, distrust and despise the values and procedures of democracy, and identify with a nation to the point of celebrating both the cultural and ethnic characteristics of its people in a predominantly exclusionary manner. In essence, ethno- nationalism rather than civic nationalism.
Moreover, other popular definitions – Mudde’s (1995) for instance – have been very effective in conveying a general idea of what ideological concepts revolve around extreme right parties (e.g. nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, strong state). However, as this author himself admits, it is difficult to find parties that match these with complete accuracy (Mudde, 2000: 17). In another empirical investigation where Mudde observes the party literature of parties in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, he discovers not all are archetypal extreme right parties, as they are not unquestionably anti-democratic, nor are they always ethno-nationalists (Mudde, 2000: 165-184). Ultimately, it will be Carter’s definition that undergoes scrutiny to yield reliable results and provide further insights into Meloni’s political party.
Anatomy of FdI: A Discourse Analysis
Supporters with Brothers of Italy flags during the electoral tour of the party’s leader Giorgia Meloni in Caserta, Italy on September 18, 2022. Photo: M. Cantile.
Examples of Conservatism in Discourse
Examples of FdI’s conservatism in discourse are evident in several public statements. Firstly, Meloni is known to quote the fathers of conservative thought, Chesterton and Scruton, in her speeches (Starkey, 2022; Laghos, 2022). For instance, she shared the former’s line: “swords will be drawn to prove that leaves are green in the summer” (Laghos, 2022). The original quote by Chesterton was intended as a satirical commentary, essentially a critique of the human propensity to clash with each other over trivialities, especially when ideologies become involved. On one hand, it is logical for Meloni – as a self-proclaimed conservative – to be skeptical of ideologies followed to the letter, particularly those she views as opposing her beliefs, such as socialism and Marxism. On the other hand, putting forward this quote contradicts her party’s broader outlook, which frames the natural (and “inevitable”) struggle against external threats to the nation – namely, the Islamic world, China, Russia, and any political entities promoting progressivism (or “woke ideology”) – all in defense of a Christian “Europe of the people” (Meloni, June 1, 2024). Uncoincidentally, in an article for The European Conservative, the political analyst Mario Laghos (2022) suggests “Meloni isn’t a modernist; she’s a profoundly Christian conservative. Her mission is to defend identity, spirituality, and the family” (Laghos, 2022).
Secondly, a series of declarations originating from Meloni’s speeches at rallies, in press conferences, and interviews[5], are a clear sign of this politician’s philosophical attachment to conservative ideas. The same can be stated about the majority of her party officials and cabinet ministers. In fact, what transpires from the discourse of Meloni and FdI representatives is an inclination to be skeptical of change, and the desire to manage it (particularly regarding abortion, the nuclear family, and LGBTQ+ rights), alongside a conscious acceptance that individual agency is influenced by forces beyond the human domain. In essence, FdI’s weltanschauung frames a narrative of nation, tradition, divine and civilizational order (known as “Civilizationism” in academic terms, see Brubaker, 2017) that demands loyalty and action beyond self-interest.
On one hand, an example of their will to control change comes from a statement published by Meloni herself on social media: “Yes to the nuclear family, no to LGBT lobbies. Yes to sexual identity, no to gender ideology” (Meloni, Instagram, June 15, 2022). This is a purely conservative position rather than a populist one. In fact, “radical left populist” parties (e.g. PODEMOS, Five Star Movement) and (now extinct) more libertarian right-wing populists (e.g. Pim Fortuyn List), tend to adopt a more flexible and inclusive definition of the people, and are generally more lenient toward the LGBTQ+ community. Whereas Meloni has never explicitly spoken against the rights of sexual minorities, her party’s stance to wholeheartedly conserve conformist social norms in a Catholic-majority country inevitably led her to oppose radical changes on these matters. In a similar vein, she has spoken against Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), including gestational surrogacy (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 52-53).
Paradoxically, in some instances Meloni – wittingly or unwittingly – has accepted ideas and conserved policies that are liberal or progressive rather than conservative. For example, when in power FdI avoided scrapping the center-Left’s law on civil unions. Additionally, the FdI-led government retained the Italian legge 194 (“law 194”) which renders abortion legal (even in subjects deemed healthy) within three months of pregnancy – as emphasized by Meloni during the G7summit held in Italy in June 2024 (Il Sole 24 Ore, YouTube, June 15, 2024). In these particular cases, Huntington’s theory of conservatism (discussed earlier) may seem more plausible, as these are classic examples of a common tendency among conservatives to prioritize political stability and the status quo, sometimes even aligning with ideas that may conflict with traditional conservative values. In other circumstances, Meloni attempted to reassure the population that “homophobia, meaning contempt for anyone who has a certain sexual orientation which results in discrimination or even physical violence, is an unacceptable scourge that should be forcefully fought against” (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 54). Hence, on social issues, Meloni is increasingly framing FdI’s positions to align with a more moderate form of conservatism, already prevalent in the European Nordic regions and in the Anglosphere, as she draws inspiration from parties such as the British Tories (Roberts, 2022; Decode39, April 28, 2023).
Indeed, when Meloni calls for a society that champions ““liberty of vote, liberty in business, liberty in expression,” she is speaking the language of liberal conservatism, rather than that of the old Italian destra sociale (“social Right”) associated with the MSI—and only marginally with a more ideologically constrained vision (for a detailed socio-economic account, see Andriola, 2020). That type of socialistic extreme right was still influenced by neofascist anti-capitalism, marked also by strong chauvinistic welfarism, economic interventionism, and ultimately an ultra-authoritarian, statist outlook. A similar strand of this ideology was found in neighboring France during the Vichy-regime era, where Maréchal Petain forcefully emphasized collectivist conservative values such as “Travail, Famille, Patrie” (“Work, Family, Fatherland”) instead of economic and individual freedom.
On the other hand, examples of how Meloni’s rhetoric draws on a moralistic and transcendental narrative are found in a diverse array of her public statements. Examples are drawn from her recurring references to the “sacred borders of the fatherland” or when she states the family, a union between a man and a woman… is the vital cell of society. According to this deeply conservative view, the individual is inescapably dependent on this extra-human dimension of social life and factors beyond human agency – including cultural inheritance and the family as a pre-political institution – play a crucial role in one’s integration into society. As alluded to earlier, this contrasts with progressive-liberal perspectives that instead affirm human agency, rational choice, and opportunities for social engineering or radical reform. In a lengthy interview, Meloni asserts, “What I am is the fruit of what has generated me—of the traditions and culture I have inherited, of the influence of religion in my civilization” (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 38).
It is evident that, under Meloni’s leadership, FdI rejects modern progressive liberalism in favor of a more conservative version of liberalism. In this view, society is not simply a collection of atomized individuals but something more organic; individuals find meaning in life through deeper “extra-human” connections. In this vision, an individual’s everyday experience is shaped by culture, national identity, religion, and even biological sex. In this respect, FdI’s stance reflects a traditionally conservative position—one that is not necessarily illiberal or anti-liberal, but certainly not liberal either. More precisely, it can be described as a form of post-liberalism.[6] However, discussing her party’s view, Meloni insists that “liberal democracy is in our DNA” (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 39).
Turning to another aspect, FdI’s discourse frequently weaves together elements of conservatism and populism. On the rare occasions when populism takes a more prominent role, it typically emerges as a critique of supranational bodies, portrayed as being tainted by progressive or pro-migrant ideologies. Specifically, Meloni accuses the United Nations (UN) of attempting to use the Global Compact to “complete the grand plan of financial speculation, to deprive nations and people of their identity. Because without roots you’re a slave, and when you are a slave, you serve the interests of Soros” (Laghos, 2022). This statement contains a pronounced conspiratorial undertone. As the literature indicates, populists in power—whether ideologically or strategically—often employ conspiracy theories to “demonize and delegitimize” their opponents (Taggart & Pirro, 2022). Similarly to Meloni, FdI’s Antonio Baldelli makes his accusation: “numerous members of the Democratic Party (PD) and the Greens and Left Alliance (AVS) have obtained conspicuous financial support (more than 1,000,000 euros) from associations tied to the financier George Soros” (Il Fatto Quotidiano, YouTube, April 24, 2024).
Therefore, one observable trend in the discourse analysis is the persistent use of antagonistic and inflammatory rhetoric—often marked by paranoid and conspiratorial tropes—towards political opponents, particularly the Democratic Party (PD), the Five Star Movement, and the left more broadly. Even Meloni, who generally serves as the “friendly face” of her party, tends to radicalize some of her otherwise more temperate positions (as we will discuss in subsequent paragraphs) on immigration when criticizing the policies of her leftist rivals. In La Versione di Giorgia(“Giorgia’s Take”), numerous interview passages portray the left-leaning Hungarian philanthropist, banker, and entrepreneur, George Soros in a purely negative light (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 50). In one instance, Meloni declares “I do not believe in puppeteers, however, speaking of Soros, this is a person that has publicly taken responsibility for having speculated against the Italian Lira in 1992 and today, through his galaxy of foundations, pursues a political agenda. This includes lavish foundations to some NGO’s that deal with immigration” (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 50). While—as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) notes—not every actor who promotes Soros-related conspiracy theories is necessarily advancing antisemitism, the narrative becomes clearly antisemitic when his pro-immigration views, background in banking, and legal funding of NGOs are deliberately linked to his Jewish heritage (see ADL.org, October 11, 2018). Given this, there is no substantive evidence of antisemitism in Meloni’s or FdI’s political discourse; their critique of Soros appears rooted primarily in policy disagreements over immigration. However—as we shall explore—while FdI is not strictly a populist party, it clearly employs populist rhetoric in specific contexts.
Examples of Populism in Discourse
Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, speaks at the Atreju convention in Rome, Italy on December 16, 2023. Photo: Alessia Pierdomenico.
Beyond conservatism, the analysis of discourse predominantly associates this party with the populist party family. In fact, if scholars were to observe only the discourse and disregard other elements of analysis, such as policy positions, in order to attribute a precise ideology to FdI, many would likely infer that, due to its occasional inflammatory rhetoric—tainted with a mix of anti-elitism and people-centrism—the party is staunchly populist above all else. In early 2024, it was Meloni herself who stated in a parliamentary address that “nothing comes before the interests of the Italian people”(Meloni, March 21, 2024). This phrase resonates not only with contemporary textbook definitions of populism, such as Mudde’s, but also with older ones, like Edward Shils’ (1996). In fact, according to this leading sociologist, “populism proclaims that the will of the people as such is supreme over every other standard—over the standards of traditional institutions, over the autonomy of institutions, and over the will of other strata. Populism identifies the will of the people with justice and morality” (Shils, 1996).
Moreover, it was also Meloni who in her autobiographical book stressed that she is “proud to come from the people” and that before the 2018 Atreju[7]event appeared in an official party poster with the following slogan encapsulated: “peopleagainst elites, identity against finance, sovereignty against technocracy” (Meloni, September 15, 2018). These are all tropes of ideological populism, as they are basic examples of anti-elitist and people-centric messages. Other than Meloni, many of her elected representatives employ the same rhetorical strategy of opposing various elites in the name of a “pure,” morally virtuous, and—at least from their perspective—homogeneous Italian people. It is this idea of homogeneity that prompts some of FdI’s elected representatives to voice more controversial views—ones that Meloni typically avoids. A clear illustration of the intersection between populist nativism[8]– rooted in the idea of “the pure people” (as defined by Mudde) – and extreme right holistic nationalism, can be found in a speech by FdI’s Minister of Agriculture, Francesco Lollobrigida (also Meloni’s brother-in-law). During a formal event held by a bipartisan and independent organization focused on promoting births, Lollobrigida declared that “an Italian ethnicity exists” and that it should be preserved (see Mastrodonato, 2023). In this case, although FdI (and Meloni in particular) partially defended Lollobrigida’s remarks—arguing that his language could have been more refined and concurrently asserting that there is a difference between the terms “race” and “ethnicity,” and that the party’s role is to preserve Italy’s cultural and linguistic identity rather than the population’s biological characteristics—this can still be understood as nativism. In fact, scholars who have thoroughly investigated both the populist right and the extreme right have pointed to a “new,” softened version of xenophobia that does not involve biological racism but rather cultural nativism (Betz, 2003: 195) or culturism(Schinkel, 2017).
From a socio-political standpoint, cultural nativism refers to the belief in the superiority of certain cultures—understood as “customs” and “ways of life”—relative to others (see Betz, 2003: 195). In any case, certain views regarding an epic struggle to counter immigration, declining birth rates, and liberal or progressive elites, expressed by FdI’s high-ranking politicians (e.g., Lollobrigida), are a cause for concern when they resonate with the Great Replacement Theory formulated by the French intellectual Renaud Camus (2021). This popular conspiracy theory argues that left-leaning corporate and political elites are orchestrating mass immigration and hyper-ethnic change aimed at replacing white majorities in Western countries with non-white people from Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Setting aside its core concepts for a moment, populism also presents itself as an assemblage of distinct secondary (or “adjacent”) features. One of these is the idea that populists—especially those on the Right—seek to present themselves not only as the direct alternative to neoliberal, internationalist, and progressive ideologies but also as post-ideologicalactors altogether. Although populism is deeply ideological, populists are convinced that 18th- and 20th-century ideologies are too outdated and divisive for the monist and monolithic community (also known as the heartland) they idolize (see Taggart, 2000). When one of Meloni’s right-hand men and MEP, Nicola Procaccini, reposts online that the EU “has to focus on the concrete needs of citizens and offer solutions to the real necessities of the people, abandoning the insane ideologies of the past,” the concept of volonté générale subtly comes into play (Procaccini, February 12, 2025). More crucially, this statement shows that new-wave populists aim and claim to be post-ideological, yet it remains unclear whether this is an adjacent concept of populist ideology or simply a political strategy.
Similarly, in her book-length interview, when asked by her interlocutor – a well-known Italian journalist – what kind of political Right her party aspires to represent, Meloni plainly responds: “the camp of realism” in contrast to “the left’s utopian ideals” (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 36). Additionally, discussing the relationship between USA and Italy (after Trump’s tariffs) at a conference, FdI Senator Giovanni Fazzolari, asserts “Italy’s position does not change, because it is not ideological and pursues national interest” (Fazzolari, as cited in Scafi, 2025). These types of statements by FdI politicians further illustrate that Meloni’s party aspires to be a home for mostly moderate voters who may be skeptical of excessive liberalism (as both conservatives and populists are) but also endorse a pragmatic, business-oriented realpolitik rather than an idealistic approach. FdI is an ideological party in that it is driven by a set of core ideas, beliefs, and principles that shape its policies and actions, but it is not idealistic, as it does not pursue lofty, unattainable goals.
Examples of Right-Wing Extremism in Discourse
Examples of extreme right (or neofascist) forms of discourse are either rare or nonexistent in FdI’s repertoire, at least[9]among its parliamentary representatives. However, exceptions or isolated instances can be found in statements made by the President of the Senate of Italy, Ignazio La Russa MP, and Andrea Delmastro Delle Vedove MP, the Undersecretary at the Ministry of Justice. Although La Russa, like his party leader Meloni, has clearly stated that “with neofascists and folklorist nostalgia we have nothing to share” (Linkiesta, October 14, 2021), he also ambiguously told an interviewer in 2022 that “we are all heirs of the Duce” (Mackinson, 2022). Additionally, when former Prime Minister and current Senator Matteo Renzi provocatively called La Russa a camerata (“a fascist comrade”) after being interrupted during a speech in parliament, La Russa—who is known to possess fascist-era memorabilia in his home—did not object, nor did he sue Renzi for defamation (Corriere della Sera, December 24, 2024).
Nevertheless, the most prominent example of extreme right authoritarianism and anti-democratic rhetoric in FdI’s public discourse originates from Delmastro Delle Vedove MP, the Undersecretary at the Ministry of Justice. At an Italian Penitentiary Police meeting, where new state vehicles were being showcased, this MP openly stated: “The idea of seeing this powerful vehicle parade, the idea of letting citizens know who is behind that darkened glass, just as we do not let those behind that darkened glass breathe, is certainly an intimate joy for me” (Renzi, 2025: 112). The use of such language is clearly incompatible with any conception of democracy and its liberal foundations – particularly the rule of law and protection of human rights (Renzi, 2025: 113). Following this politician’s remark, both constitutional scholars and political opponents of FdI have emphasized that, unlike in authoritarian regimes (such as Fascist dictatorships), democratic states do not seek to dehumanize individuals in this manner, irrespective of whether they come from a background of organized crime or political terrorism (Renzi, 2025: 113).
For all that, except for infrequent exceptions, a discourse analysis shows that features of extreme right ideology—such as authoritarianism and anti-democracy—are largely absent from the discourse of Meloni and her MPs. Moreover, even another core feature of right-wing extremism, namely holistic nationalism, is not consistently present in official speeches. As previously noted, holistic nationalism is a form of ethno-nationalism that, unlike civic nationalism, seeks to enforce ethnic, cultural, and spiritual uniformity within the nation-state. Overall, it is inherently exclusive, as it rejects internal diversity in favor of promoting a paternalistic and interventionist state that actively shapes national identity and loyalty. It has already been established that FdI is, above all, Meloni’s party, with her playing the central role in setting its agenda and making key decisions. Even so, Meloni herself cannot be considered an ethno-nationalist; her brand of nationalism is increasingly framed in civic and liberal-democratic terms. For example, in April 2024, during a bilateral meeting in Tunisia, she called for Italy to accept “more legal immigrants” (Fassini, 2024).
To be sure, Meloni’s positions on (or against) illegal immigration are—so far as discourse is concerned—not framed as extreme right positions. Meloni promotes a “sustainable and legal” form of immigration, which she refers to as “compatible immigration,” drawing on an old theory of integration developed by the Catholic-conservative thinker Cardinal Giacomo Biffi (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023). FdI’s leader also reframes Pope Francis’ message (albeit in a more populist and subtly ethno-pluralist fashion) and argues that people who migrate to European countries, especially from the African continent, must also have the financial opportunity and right not to migrate (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 48).
At first glance, this moderation of language does not appear to be a variant of double-speak—a strategy in which extreme right actors mimic the language of liberal democrats. Rather, it seems to reflect a moderation that, despite its (distant) neofascist origins, is now steadily progressing toward liberal conservatism. To provide a comparative example, a party in Europe that has followed a similar trajectory is Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) (see Varriale, 2024). In their respective countries, these parties have—to some degree—become more open to legal immigration and have reconsidered their hardline positions on abortion, gay marriage, and human rights in general.
Anatomy of FdI: A Manifesto Analysis
A poster for the 2024 European elections featuring Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in Rome, Italy on May 4, 2024. Photo: Stefano Chiacchiarini.
As previously discussed, this section analyzes only FdI’s 2018 and 2022 electoral programs, as they are deemed the most relevant for understanding the party’s current ideological stance, rather than reflecting positions from ten or twelve years ago. Moreover, FdI’s programs for EU elections (such as those in 2019 and 2024) are not analyzed, as these are second-order elections compared to domestic ones. As a result, they reveal less about a party’s ideological tendencies and more about how it wishes to be perceived in the European arena, as well as which parties it seeks to align with at the EU Parliament level.
Nevertheless, in-depth analyses of older electoral programs or ideological manifestos (e.g., the 2013 general election program, the 2014 EU election program, and the Tesi di Trieste) are already available in the scholarly literature (e.g., Donà, 2022; Sondel-Cedarmas, 2022; Tarchi, 2024). While the scholar Alessia Donà (2022) postulates that the second party convention, which produced the 2017 Tesi di Trieste, “formalized the radical right shift of FdI,” Tarchi emphasizes that alongside classic PRR positions, “other ideas were rather inspired by a conservative philosophy, destined, over time, to take precedence over the party’s political culture…” (Tarchi, 2024). More specifically, Tarchi points to the party’s criticism of the “cult of progress,” its repudiation of gender theory, its valorization of Italy’s historical heritage (e.g., art, landscape, nature), and its glorification of authority in state and society to suggest that the party is ultimately more conservative than populist (Tarchi, 2024).
Taking this into account, the characterization of FdI as unequivocally part of the PRR warrants both revision and refinement. Examining the party’s more recent programs is likely to produce distinct conclusions regarding its ideological orientation.
FdI’s 2018 Program
In a similar manner to the Tesi di Trieste, conservative and populist positions stand out in the 2018 electoral program titled “A Program for Italy: For Growth, Security, Family and Full Employment.”[10] However, in terms of economic policy, rather than adhering to overt economic nationalism or populism, FdI endorses a substantial degree of neoliberalism. A flat tax—where the tax rate is essentially the same for Italian citizens with higher incomes as for those with lower incomes—is proposed to stimulate the Italian economy (FdI 2018, section 1, point 1).
Although no specific income threshold is provided, and in a bid to appeal to the working class (an example of people-centrism, and thus populism), the document clearly states there should be a no-tax area for the more economically destitute (FdI 2018, section 1, point 1). Additionally, the so-called pace fiscale (“Fiscal Peace”) is promoted to give small and medium businesses (and individual taxpayers) the opportunity to rectify previous irregularities in accordance with the law (FdI 2018, section 1, point 3). FdI also aims to “facilitate access to (state) credit for small and medium businesses” (FdI 2018, section 1, point 9).
From a populist-conservative perspective, local small businesses are seen as an integral part of the organic state—essentially the backbone of the national economy—in contrast to big businesses, such as multinationals and third-sector financial services, which are blamed for offshoring and depriving ordinary Italians of jobs and Italy of its manufacturing base. After all, producerism is a socio-economic dimension of populism (and thus also an “adjacent concept”) that “implies a moral distinction between ‘makers’ and ‘takers,’ which stigmatizes undeserving people and pits those ‘who produce society’s wealth against those who consume it without giving back’” (Ivaldi & Mazzoleni, 2024: 2).
In brief, for parties such as FdI, who often combine conservatism with populism, the craft-oriented local businesses are the virtuous “makers” whereas the multinationals and financial services corporations are the parasitic “takers.” In any case, in public, the pace fiscale is often sold by FdI representatives as a measure by a forgiving paternalist state (led by an anti-elitist and pro-people party) that rewards hardworking citizens with a fiscal amnesty, a correction of past injustices (e.g. over-taxation, excessive bureaucracy) and an instrument to protect the “common people.” Overall, it is a people-centric measure to reconcile the state with its citizens. In simple terms, FdI (similarly to their allies from the League) believes that a smaller, less bureaucratic and less interventionist state allows individuals and businesses to flourish and benefit Italy’s overall growth. This can also be interpreted as a mildly conservative stance, given that—as noted earlier—limited government intervention is a secondary or adjacent concept to the ideological core of conservatism.
In any case, the EU is perceived as a supra-national “nanny-state” bloc that keeps Italy lagging behind. Under the banner “Less constraints from Europe” (FdI 2018, section 3), the program clearly states, “No to excessive regulations that obstruct development” (FdI 2018, section 3, point 2). Scholarly literature remains divided on whether these “new” parties that combine populism with conservatism—often grouped under the umbrella term PRR in Europe—are neoliberal, pro-market forces or anti-laissez-faire statist parties that support protectionism, dirigisme, and a social-market economy (see Carter, 2005; Galli & Bochicchio, 2019; Loch, 2021; Revelli, 2017; Taggart, 1995). In sum, it appears that right-wing populist parties can be both pro- and anti-free market (Brusenbauch Meislova & Chrysoggelos, 2024). However, it is evident that more radical populist parties do not endorse the same free-market (or “globalist capitalist”) outlook supported by parties affiliated with the European People’s Party (EPP). Clearly, the former favor a more authoritarian and statist form of economic nationalism. Nevertheless, unlike other parties in France and Germany, this does not seem to apply to the same extent with FdI.
Moreover, while there is some consensus among Italian intellectuals and pundits that FdI began its political career as a socially conscious, pro-welfare, statist force, it gradually moved in a classically liberal direction in economic matters, promoting deregulation and private enterprise. In fact, a shift in economic policy can already be observed in the 2018 manifesto. However, due to its ideologically populist-conservative Eurosceptic positions—similar to those of the British right—the main culprit in economic affairs is portrayed as the EU (a “protectionist racket,” see Hall, 2019).
According to Section 3 of the program, the EU question can only be addressed by rejecting austerity politics (FdI 2018, section 3, point 1), revising EU treaties (without specifying which ones) (FdI 2018, section 3, point 3), demanding “more politics and less bureaucracy in Europe” (FdI 2018, section 3, point 4), reducing the surplus of annual EU payments (FdI 2018, section 3, point 5), and defending Italian-made products (FdI 2018, section 3, point 7). However, the term “protectionism” is deliberately avoided so as not to appear excessively radical.
Many of these EU-related positions reflect ideological conservatism intertwined with populism, as they are driven by a revanchist nationalism rooted in nostalgia—a desire to return to a romantic and glorious past (pre-Maastricht EU) in which Italy was more economically self-sufficient and political decisions were made solely by sovereign national parliaments. More crucially, FdI’s view is that only then will politics finally reflect the volonté générale of the Italian people, as opposed to that of EU elites.
With regard to foreign policy, the program does not appear to place significant emphasis on this area, presenting FdI as a party that (at least in 2018) was primarily focused on reforming Italian domestic politics. Notably, there are no explicit references to maintaining positive relations with allies such as the USA, France, Germany, or Israel—nor any mentions of major global powers like Russia or China. This suggests that, in 2018, FdI drafted its program with the awareness that it had no realistic chance of winning the election—or even of being a runner-up—and instead pursued a strategy of indirect influence. It put forward catchy and straightforward policy proposals (particularly on immigration) in the hope that larger right-wing parties (e.g., Matteo Salvini’s League) would adopt them during the electoral campaign and implement them once in power.
Notwithstanding, in this program, foreign policy intersects with domestic politics. For instance, “Section 5” policies such as “the war on terror(-ism)” (FdI 2018, Section 5, Point 1) and a proposed Marshall Plan for Africa (possibly referring to foreign aid aimed at preventing illegal immigration) (FdI 2018, Section 5, Point 4) are presented alongside domestic measures, specifically the “repatriation of all illegal immigrants” (FdI 2018, Section 5, Point 5), the “resumption of border control” (FdI 2018, Section 5, Point 2), and the introduction of a new self-defense law (FdI 2018, Section 5, Point 7), apparently modeled after the (conservative/Republican) American version, which grants homeowners more extensive rights to use force against trespassers on private property. These points suggest that FdI’s foreign policy positions—limited as they may be—are used to reinforce its domestic agenda, particularly on immigration and national security.
While state security, including anti-terrorism measures, has historically been a bipartisan issue in Italian politics—especially during the 1970s due to neofascist and neocommunist terror attacks—it was, for a time, even adopted as a valence issue by the Left (see Rampini, 2019). However, after 9/11, the securitization[11] of this topic, reframed as a “war on terror,” became closely associated with neoconservative politics in the West, often pursued to advance anti-Islamist, and at times, overtly anti-Muslim agendas (see Abbas, 2021). However, FdI not only refrains from providing a detailed discussion of the policy but also omits any mention of the specific type of terrorism to be combated—perhaps as a calculated move to be perceived as a more moderate force, one that does not scapegoat broad and diverse religious communities. This approach appears aimed at appealing to a broader centrist electorate, extending beyond hardline conservatives and fascist nostalgics.
Insofar as FdI’s stance on immigration is concerned, it comes as no surprise that a party with authoritarian and deeply nationalist roots seeks to prevent immigration—especially from non-EU nations with distinct cultures, religions, and laws—and supposed future demographic changes (or “hyper-ethnic change,” to use an academic term coined in a 2018 text) in order to supposedly preserve the “spiritual” identity of the patria (the fatherland or “motherland” Meloni often mentions). There are elements of a deep-rooted conservative philosophy here, as not only is there a strong desire to control societal changes (in this case brought about by the integration of immigrants or refugees), but also an inherently pessimistic ideo of human cohabitation.
The latter aspect is typical of the old right but also of the “new right,” as it was the French nouvelle droite that popularized the concept of “ethno-pluralism” (or “ethno-differentialism”)—the idea that mutual respect among nations and peoples can only occur under the condition that different races or ethnicities live separately in their so-called natural homelands.
Furthermore, a conservative ideology or thought process can also be linked to the concept that, according to FdI, “borders are sacred” (as noted previously in the discourse analysis). The territorial space where a population lives is seen as the epicenter of the development of their particularistic collective identity, composed of a common language, traditions, legal and social norms, behavioral patterns, and a shared destiny.[12] Notably, conservatives do not merely defend the idea of border control from a legal standpoint. Similar to their conceptualization of private property—also regarded as inviolable and sacred—borders are considered symbolic anchors of national identity.
Following this logic, the nation is not simply a political entity but is perceived as an (extra-human) transcendent force that forges and sustains the community. For obvious reasons, this conservative nationalism intertwines with populism, as almost any type of immigration is a priori viewed as an external, unnecessary threat to the peace of the heartland—thus, to the moral (rather than specifically biological, as in Nazism) purity of the people, a monolithic community that does not require external input, as this may lead to corruption. For populists, immigration is seen as nearly as great a threat to the harmony of the organic nation as the elites are; indeed, they often believe elites purposely destabilize their countries, and here conspiracies may also come into play. Like other proposals in the program, these policies are merely listed, with no details provided on how to implement them—understandably so, as at the time FdI had no real ambition to govern. In any case, this vague list of policies serves the purpose of presenting FdI to potential voters as a conservative alternative to the more liberal (FI!) and populist (League) forces within the center-right coalition.
Nevertheless, certain aspects of this program exhibit distinctly populist traits, rather than aligning with conventional conservative principles. Examples of populism are clearly present in “Section 9” of the program (titled “More Territorial Autonomy, A Better Central Government”), where FdI advances proposals such as the direct election of the President of the Republic (FdI 2018, Section 9, Point 1), the implementation of an imperative mandate (FdI 2018, Section 9, Point 3), and a reduction in the number of parliamentarians (FdI 2018, Section 9, Point 2). The first policy is unmistakably populist, as it reflects a form of direct democracy[13] in which the people (i.e., eligible voters) directly choose the Head of State through a horizontal decision-making process. Implementing this measure would diminish the decisional authority of career politicians—often portrayed as “power-hungry” and “corrupt”—within the parliamentary system and increase popular influence, thereby supposedly making the presidential selection process more democratic and transparent.
The second policy is also populist because it empowers the people to remove “elite” figures (such as elected officials) from office before the end of their term, thus increasing politicians’ accountability to ordinary citizens and reducing their insulation from public concerns. Similarly, the third policy—the reduction in the number of parliamentarians—emerges from a populist (anti-elitist and people-centric)forma mentis for four reasons. First, it conveys a sense of rejection of the political elite, aiming to make Italian representative parliamentary democracy more efficient and cost-effective by reducing the privileges of the political class—or “caste,” as populists often argue. Second, it promotes the idea that a smaller parliament can make swifter and more people-centered decisions. Third, the reduction is seen as an opportunity to challenge the establishment and signal radical reform. In all three of FdI’s policies, there is a clear commitment to reform from a populist perspective, in which the people—both virtuous and endowed with common sense—are trusted to make important political decisions.
Conversely, “Section 7” of the program is titled “More Support to the Family” and encompasses both traditional conservative and more modern liberal-conservative policies. With regard to the former, FdI suggests that the family is unequivocally the “first and fundamental nucleus of society” (FdI 2018, Section 7, Point 1). Ironically, Margaret Thatcher—considered to reflect a Right that is more liberal than FdI—used to say, “there is no such thing as society, but just individuals and families” (see McLachlan, 2020). In the same section, FdI proposes “an extraordinary plan for births,” accompanied by entirely free nursery school (a policy most conservative and PRR parties agree upon) and state subsidies to families based on the number of children they have (FdI 2018, Section 7, Point 2).
Concerning the latter, FdI’s program suggests “protection of work for young mothers” (FdI 2018, Section 7, Point 4) and the “defense of equal opportunity and protection of women” in the workplace, as well as “pension recognition in favor of mothers” (FdI 2018, Section 7, Point 5). These policies reflect FdI’s more liberal-democratic side. After all, Meloni—who claims to be “proud to be a woman and a mother” (in addition to being a Christian)—often talks about the challenges women face in modern society, especially single women who struggle economically and sometimes find themselves forced to consider abortion or options such as surrogacy. Other modern conservative policies appear in Sections “8” and “10” of the program, where the party suggests the “progressive elimination of precarious employment” (FdI 2018, Section 8, Point 8), the “protection of the environment” (FdI 2018, Section 8, Point 3), and support for renewable energy (FdI 2018, Section 10, Point 11).
The first set of policies is modern because, although they reflect a conservative perspective (FdI acknowledges motherhood as part of a broader social-demographic policy), they are adapted to conform to the values of a contemporary liberal-democratic Western society—a society where women are an active, fundamental, and indispensable part of both the family (as mothers and caretakers) and the workforce. Moreover, FdI appears to have a different view from most PRR and radical conservative parties on this issue, as their plan prioritizes women’s rights in the labour system (e.g., workplace representation, pensions). PRR parties, in particular, are theoretically against any form of affirmative action, as they believe it undermines the principle of meritocracy and increasingly benefits distinct minorities at the expense of majorities.
The second set of policies discussed above also reflects a modern and pragmatic conservatism, as they borrow from the répertoire of more liberal ideology and “provide alternative definitions of such core progressive concepts as ‘liberty,’ ‘progress,’ and ‘equality’” (see Neill, 2021: 14–15). Political parties with a predominantly conservative agenda, yet influenced by populist egalitarian ideals, may incorporate proposals in their programs that are not ordinarily aligned with the preservation of the existing order. Instead, these proposals aim to reduce economic inequalities (e.g., elimination of precarious employment) and subtly endorse certain forms of environmentalism (e.g., renewable energy policy). In this context only, FdI draws upon elements of a traditionally left-wing agenda. However, with respect to environmentalism, a form of environmentalist conservatism (or “green conservatism”) has already been conceptualized by various authors, ranging from Ludwig Klages to Sir Roger Scruton and Wendell Berry. In light of all the evidence, the fact that this final policy is mentioned only in the conclusive section (and final page) of the program suggests that although FdI’s ideological platform includes a responsible environmentalism, it is not one of the party’s main priorities—especially when compared to other issues such as immigration or the reduction of state bureaucracy, regulation, and taxation.
FdI’s 2022 Program
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen meet in Brussels, Belgium on November 03, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.
The 2022 electoral program of FdI (titled “Ready to Lift Up Italy”[14]) is more comprehensive and detailed than its 2018 counterpart. It not only expands with fifteen additional sections but also includes a more extensive focus on foreign policy. Overall, what emerges from this program is the party’s “new” core ideology: a cultural and socio-economic conservatism that is more moderate, liberal, pragmatic, and Europhile (but also Atlanticist[15]), in contrast to the (slightly) Eurosceptic and populist tendencies of previous positions.
Taking this into account, the program begins with a section entirely dedicated to domestic policies aimed at supporting births and the family unit (FdI 2022, section 1). A quotation from former Pope John Paul II (who is appreciated in rightist circles for his anti-Communism) is included, stating that the family is a “foundational element of society” and what renders a nation truly sovereign (FdI 2022, section 1, par. 1). More specifically, FdI suggests progressively introducing the quoziente familiare—essentially a taxation system that primarily considers the number of individuals in the family unit (FdI 2022, section 1, par. 2).
Unlike in the 2018 program, there is no explicit reference to free nursery schools for economically disadvantaged families, although the “German model” of Tagesmutter is suggested as a concrete economic policy to address this matter (FdI 2022, section 1, par. 3). In any case, these are all textbook conservative policies, indirectly tied to the ideological conviction that there are forces beyond human control which exert substantial influence—both positive and negative—on the human condition. Among these forces are not only God, biology, and history, but also the family unit, which in many religious traditions is seen as a divine institution ordained by God and, from a biological standpoint, is an essential reproductive and child-rearing entity.
Sections “2” to “8” focus on a series of domestic economic policies: efficient usage of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), a fairer tax system to defend the purchasing power of Italians, support for the Italian entrepreneurial system, promotion of Made in Italy brands, support for the dignity of work, support for younger generations, and the “revitalization” of schools, universities, and research. All these policy proposals involve a combination of tax reductions (mainly for smaller businesses and large families), streamlining of bureaucracy, and targeted state support (FdI 2022, sections 2–8). In essence, they reflect a “socially conscious” conservative core ideology that blends elements of capitalism and laissez-faire economics with a more social-democratic outlook—one that also aims to moderately regulate competition and maintain a (small) welfare state (e.g., a social market economy).
Specifically, the aspects that stand out—and align with democratic conservatism—include ideas such as “combating tax evasion” (including that of big banks and big business, in a more populist tone), promoting youth employment (through apprenticeships, internships, and reforms to Higher Technical Institutes), deterring delocalization (e.g., offshoring), and strategically using the EU’s NRRP funds to enhance Italy’s competitiveness and administrative efficiency (FdI 2022, sections 3, 7, 4, 2, respectively).
More crucially, the EU project is not particularly questioned or criticized. On the contrary, FdI’s more recent program states that the party aims to accelerate European integration and sees the NRRP as an opportunity to achieve goals such as independence from Russian gas and energy security for Europe. Therefore, unlike most populist radical right parties (or PRRPs), the “new” conservative FdI believes that Italy’s future lies within the EU, rather than outside of it.
Section “9” of the program is pivotal for understanding the underlying ideology that informs FdI’s positions (FdI 2022, section 9). This section is particularly relevant because it highlights the party’s adherence to a (partial) welfare state, where “the state guarantees a web of social protection to sustain people who are fragile and struggle economically” (FdI 2022, section 9, par. 1). FdI also plans to support disadvantaged individuals through collaboration with the so-called third sector[16] and intermediate bodies, as the document states, “it is necessary to rediscover real national solidarity” (FdI 2022, section 9, par. 1). However, there is no specification as to whether FdI’s welfarism is directed at all individuals residing on Italian soil (including legal immigrants) or exclusively at Italian citizens.
In any case, FdI’s plan to abolish the reddito di cittadinanza (Basic Universal Income)—a policy criticized by some experts as an archetypical example of welfare chauvinism—does not appear to be accompanied by a proposal for a more inclusive welfare scheme, as advocated by liberal, progressive, and democratic-socialist parties (FdI 2022, section 9, par. 2). Nevertheless, FdI’s call for “a true social state that does not forget anybody” (FdI 2022, section 9) is informed and partly inspired by the political legacy of its predecessors, AN and MSI—both adherents to the historical destra sociale. The neofascist (yet pro-welfare) MSI was known for its corporatist and socialistic tendencies, although there is reason to believe that FdI does not endorse the same level of welfarism. What is clear, however, is that FdI’s appeal to a working-class, lower-middle-class, and middle-class, socially conservative (and often Catholic) electorate requires demonstrating a degree of sensitivity toward the needs of common people (see Angelucci, CISE, 2022).
Given this, even from an ideological standpoint, it has become evident that—while not strictly influenced by a leftist welfare state ideology—FdI advocates for the moral economics of distributism. This position supports widespread property ownership (similarly to British Thatcherites) and a robust social safety net in which smaller local communities play a major role, and state interventionism is employed to prevent both unfettered globalized capitalism and full-scale socialism. After all, such positions were already conceptualized by past conservative thinkers such as G.K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc.
Insofar as the economy is concerned, a degree of populism is also present in these programmatic directives, as it is evident that the volonté générale of the people can only be safeguarded when a state or government launches public housing plans, allocates funds for infrastructure development through “a system of public-private synergies,” provides incentives for the employment of people with disabilities, increases pensions, and offers other forms of social assistance (FdI 2022, section 9, par. 3). In the concluding paragraph of this section, it is also stated that there are plans to allocate additional public resources to the Italian civil service (FdI 2022, section 9, par. 3). Overall, there is a clear push to improve the living conditions of ordinary men and women. Therefore, there is evidence that FdI is not a fully anti-state conservative party and is not comparable to right-wing libertarian groups such as the UK and US libertarian parties.
The body of this program (sections “11” to “21”) contains a series of detailed policies ranging from healthcare reform and the defence of civil and social rights to the promotion of Italian culture (the new “Italian Renaissance”), tourism, investment, and agriculture—this last element is referred to as “a pillar of our nation” (FdI 2022, sections 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, respectively). While not all these policies are directly relevant to an investigation concerning FdI’s ideological core, it is certain that the party’s positions continue to oscillate between classical liberalism and populistic conservatism in all of these areas.
For example, conservatism—focused on managing the changes to Western civilization brought by high-tech statism—emerges when they oppose the introduction of all instruments related to “mechanisms of mass digital control,” such as the scoring system or the “Social Credit System,” modelled after communist dictatorships like China (FdI 2022, section 12, par. 2). To be sure, right-wing parties across Europe and North America, including both moderate conservatives and PRR parties, voiced their criticism of what they saw as tools of “elite control” during the COVID-19 pandemic. Their objections covered a range of measures, from lockdown restrictions and mobile tracking apps (used to curb the virus’s spread) to compulsory vaccinations (Tasker, 2023; Wondreys & Mudde, 2022: 97).
Additionally, ideologically conservative features of the party—intended to regulate or mitigate societal change while preserving the biological essence of humanity—are evident when Meloni’s party rejects gay adoptions and surrogacy (FdI 2022, section 12, par. 3). However, these positions are tempered by more liberal stances (almost mimicking the language of progressives), such as the “contrasting of any form of discrimination” (with specific references to antisemitism, racism, and radical Islamism in another section) and the “support for paths of emancipation from cultural stereotypes that see women in a position of subalternity” (FdI 2022, section 12, par. 3). In this context, FdI also proposes harsher punishments for forced marriages and female genital mutilation—both practices that are rare but still present in certain cultures (FdI 2022, section 12, par. 3).
Other conservative proposals relate to “the promotion of Italian culture through the enhancement of cultural, artistic, historical, archaeological, ethnological, archival, and bibliographic heritage,” as well as “the valorization of the 2025 Jubilee…and of Christianity,” while also “combatting cancel culture and iconoclasm that threaten the symbols of our identity” (FdI 2022, section 12, pars. 2 and 4). All of the above are inherently conservative positions, as they are clearly influenced by an awareness and respect for the extra-human dimension, as well as classical history and aesthetics. Furthermore, a similar green conservatism present in the 2018 program is showcased in the 2022 edition through state policies designed to prepare Italy to adapt to climate change (which, unlike PRR actors, FdI does not deny), with the addition of an “environment-friendly” quote by traditionalist thinker José Ortega y Gasset (FdI 2022, section 16, par. 1).
Ultimately, in sections “21,” “22,” “24,” and “25,” the reformist vein of conservatism—still tinged with populist “pro-people” aspects—emerges (FdI 2022, sections 21–25). First and foremost, FdI outlines its policies against mass migration, framing them within a classical—and not necessarily authoritarian or anti-democratic—communitarian “law and order” approach. The program states that “security is the core of social coexistence and guarantees development and well-being” (FdI 2022, section 21, par. 1). However, its conflation of forms of “new criminality” with illegal immigration, without any demonstrable evidence, may suggest that—despite its democratic credentials—it engages in a form of “paranoid style” in politics (see Hofstadter, 1965), evoking resentment typical of culturally nativist parties.
To put it succinctly, FdI calls for complete control of Italy’s territorial and maritime borders, including the use of military force to stop boats carrying migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers if necessary (FdI 2022, section 21, par. 4). The party also proposes using hot spots in non-EU countries (e.g., Albania) to process migrants and determine their eligibility to enter Italy (FdI 2022, section 21, par. 4). Importantly, it legitimizes these policies by claiming alignment with the Schengen Agreement and international law, further asserting that the EU has requested such measures to combat mass migration (FdI 2022, section 21, par. 4). This reflects the party’s effort to avoid appearing either Eurosceptic or extremist. FdI also clearly states its support for the “social inclusion of legal immigrants” within the labor system (FdI 2022, section 21, par. 3).
Second, the party advocates for a major constitutional reform: the introduction of Presidenzialismo (FdI 2022, section 24). This Presidential system is proposed to transform Italy into a more people-centric democracy—where majority rule and the “general will of the people” supersede the power of checks and balances and the interests of institutional elites. According to FdI, this reform would enhance the country’s political stability and improve the efficiency of decision-making (FdI 2022, section 24, par. 1). Notably, this has long been a key policy for the party and has appeared in earlier electoral manifestos and programs.
Third, the final section of the program (“25”) outlines FdI’s vision of Italian foreign policy. The party proudly affirms Italy’s identity as the “cradle of Western civilization” and a “founding member of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance” (FdI 2022, section 25, par. 1). Concurrently, FdI urges Italy to “return as a protagonist in Europe, after years of marginalization under left-wing governments” (FdI 2022, section 25, par. 1). These positions—particularly the first—stand in stark contrast to those of typical PRR actors. While FdI emphasizes a foreign policy centered on protecting national interest and defending the homeland, it also reaffirms its “utmost respect for international alliances” and support for NATO’s defense spending commitments (FdI 2022, section 25, par. 2).
Moreover, the document states that, alongside Italy’s international allies, FdI will continue to support Ukraine in the face of the Russian Federation’s invasion (FdI 2022, section 25, par. 2). Thus, unlike other right-wing or PRR parties in Europe (e.g., AfD, ANO, Fidesz, Lega), FdI appears to be fully committed to an Atlanticist (pro-USA, pro-UK) and Europeanist (pro-EU) liberal conservatism in the context of foreign alliances and policy. It is known that, while PRR parties have been apologetic toward Putin’s campaign in Ukraine and other political causes (as he is perceived as a bulwark against “Islamization” and progressive liberalism), center-right conservatives have unequivocally condemned his invasion of another sovereign state. Further evidence of this positioning shift can be observed in a paragraph (in the same foreign policy section) where it is stated that FdI wishes to uphold the classical and Judeo-Christian values of Europe alongside its “fundamental values of liberty, democracy, solidarity, subsidiarity, and justice” (FdI 2022, section 25, par. 3).
Discussion: Categorizing “the Uncategorizable”
Giorgia Meloni, leader of Brothers of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia and Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, attend a center-right coalition rally in Rome, Italy on March 01, 2018. Photo: Alessia Pierdomenico.
Preliminary Analytical Considerations
At this stage, following an in-depth discourse and manifesto analysis, it should be noted that there are five main reasons (although the fourth and fifth are related) that make FdI nearly impossible to categorize as a populist political party. First, as briefly discussed, the party entered the political scene—essentially in 2013—as a moderate and conservative force, one whose logo featured the slogan centrodestra nazionale (“National Centre-Right”). After its second National Congress in December 2017 in Trieste, FdI partially shifted toward a populist radical right (PRR) orientation, only to subsequently return to a less populist and more moderately conservative stance. Essentially, the years between the Tesi di Trieste and the beginning of the electoral campaign preceding the 2022 general election marked FdI’s “populist phase,” where Giorgia Meloni, competing with other more successful right-wing parties such as the Lega (led by the firebrand Matteo Salvini), was forced to radicalize her message to some extent. In hindsight, this choice was influenced by realpolitik rather than ideology, in a time immediately after the refugee crisis and prolonged economic stagnation, when a populist zeitgeist (see Mudde, 2024), accompanied by general fear, angst, and preoccupation (see Wittgenstein, 2001), consolidated itself in Europe as a direct result of EU policies, especially regarding austerity and its evasive responses to unemployment and mass immigration.
Second, remaining on the subject of political shifts, even today its positions are often blurred between three right-leaning ideologies. As the manifesto analysis particularly showed, these are— in order of importance—conservatism, (right-wing) populism, and classical liberalism[17]. However, in the 2022 program, populism plays a truly marginal role compared to the other two ideologies, and liberalism also plays a secondary role compared to traditional conservatism. To put it simply, conservatism is always the primary ingredient in FdI’s political cocktail.
Conservative ideology drives FdI’s stances on the economy, welfare, family life, the immigration-integration debate, law and order, transnational alliances, and the role of the state in general. All factors considered, even if conservatism dominates FdI’s agenda, the fact that socio-economic liberalism and populism are also present and sporadically influence some of the aspects mentioned above still makes it difficult for scholars to draw definitive conclusions about the party’s overall ideology. This also, in part, explains why certain scholars have argued that populism is “…a popular variation of conservative thinking which is situated in a triangle between anarchism, liberalism, and conservatism” (Priester, 2007: 9). Not to mention, the existence of different forms of conservatism, liberalism, and populism adds further complexity to the matter.
Third, one of the party’s important programs—crucial for the diachronic element of this analysis—almost entirely disregards foreign policy, except for vague proposals such as the Marshall Plan for Africa. This is problematic because a party’s or government’s foreign policy is objectively an extension of its domestic political philosophy and priorities, or as former US Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey contended: “foreign policy is really domestic policy with its hat on” (see Foyle, 2017). For obvious reasons, foreign policy positions naturally mirror a political actor’s core ideology. In other words, a political actor’s foreign policy is ultimately an extension of its domestic policy (Eksteen, 2019). PRR parties tend to be isolationist, Eurosceptic (sometimes anti-American, usually anti-NATO), and economically nationalist or protectionist. Furthermore, although not all populists have identical foreign policies (Verbeek & Zaslove, 2017), they are often against humanitarian and military intervention abroad but are open to dialogue and trade with authoritarian regimes (e.g., Russia).
With this in mind, it would have been easier to make the case that FdI was a full-blown PRR party in 2018 if its foreign policy had been explicitly presented in its program. However, even then, FdI’s populist-conservative positions on domestic policy were not sufficiently radical to automatically ascribe the PRR acronym to the party.
Fourth, FdI is essentially a personalist party (Ventura, 2022: 3), but there is reason to believe that Meloni—both as an individual politician and state leader—is ideologically more moderate than her party’s parliamentary “elite,” who mostly originate from the youth wings of the old MSI, are AN veterans, or have militated in other groupuscules of the Italian (especially Roman) extreme right. Specifically, unlike Senator La Russa and a few other MPs, Meloni has condemned Italian Fascism and its infamous laws against Jews and other minorities, explaining that the Italian Right “has consigned fascism to history for decades now” (Meloni as cited in Mattera, 2022). As shown, she has also occasionally spoken favourably of legal immigration and long-standing international alliances, positioning Italy within a liberal-democratic Western and European geopolitical framework.
Fifth, as the discourse analysis demonstrates, the rhetoric utilized by FdI’s representatives (sometimes including Meloni) makes the party appear more radical than it is in terms of policy. To put it succinctly, as the author Erik Jones (2023) has already pointed out, “Meloni’s policy agenda does not seem as frightening as her rhetoric” (Jones, 2023: 21). This is especially evident when the party’s leader addresses controversial issues such as the increase in illegal immigration, its links to NGOs operating in the Mediterranean Sea, and the legal funding from private donors supporting political agendas that conflict with those of the Italian Right. All these factors contribute to significant confusion among scholars attempting to categorize FdI—whether as conservative, populist, or part of the extreme right. In any case, what transpires from both the manifesto and discourse analysis is that conservatism occupies a more prominent position compared to the other two ideologies. The following section of this contribution will provide further clarification on why conservatism is at the heart of FdI’s political ideology.
Discussion
This study employed a methodological synthesis of discourse and manifesto analysis to identify the core ideology underlying FdI’s political agenda. To bridge the two qualitative methods, an ideological approach was applied, in which three distinct political ideologies – conservatism, populism, and right-wing extremism – were examined through the possible manifestation of their core characteristics (as minimally defined in the scholarly literature) within FdI’s public statements and party documents.
In terms of discourse, the data gathered shows that FdI (specifically Meloni, but also Baldelli, Delmastro Delle Vedove, La Russa, Lollobrigida, and Procaccini) uses antagonistic and inflammatory rhetoric. Much of this rhetoric belongs to the ideological repertoire of populism as it is embedded with anti-elitism and people-centrism, as well as an attachment to the vaguer concept of volonté générale/ “general will.” Examples of the former two have transpired when Meloni states that the interests of the people come before anything else and juxtaposes her commitment to popular interest with that of financial and technocratic elites. Examples of the latter have transpired when important FdI MEPs such as Procaccini have (discursively) highlighted the EU’s moral duty to focus on the concrete needs of citizens and leave behind any past ideological affiliation. More indirect examples of populist ideology have been gathered by compiling statements made in parliament by MPs (e.g., Baldelli) and by Meloni in one of her extended interviews, where, in typical populist fashion, they delegitimize and demonize their opponents, particularly those who disagree with them on the immigration question.
However, this populist rhetoric often presents itself alongside other (more or less moderate) conservative statements that emphasize the control of societal change and an awareness of an extra-human (and natural) dimension to individual agency. Examples of FdI’s conservatism in discourse may include Meloni’s quoting of Chesterton and Scruton, her inherently civilizationist statements (in favor of the West and Christianity), her traditionalist pro-family messages, and her commitment to defending the Italian border. The border is considered something sacred within the collective imaginary and certainly beyond the selfish interests of the individual.
With that in mind, a much more populistic (or even “extremist”) form of conservatism, tainted by cultural nativism and holistic nationalism—which most of FdI’s opponents find pathological—has been found in a statement made by Lollobrigida in support of increasing the birthrate among autochthonous Italians. Accordingly, Italians are said to possess particular biological, cultural, and linguistic characteristics. Notwithstanding, the somewhat blurry threshold that exists between right-wing populism and right-wing extremism is only crossed by FdI’s Delmastro Delle Vedove MP, who has discussed punishment for offenders in deeply disturbing authoritarian and anti-democratic terms. However, this example of extreme right ideology in discourse is not sufficient to argue that the party is extremist per se, as these core concepts of right-wing extremism did not replicate in the manifesto analysis. Given that FdI’s public discourse includes not only elements of conservatism and populism—more precisely, a form of populist conservatism—but also, albeit infrequently, traits associated with a more authoritarian and nationalist extreme right, it can be argued that the party adopts a more radical stance in its rhetoric.
Despite all of this, it is the manifesto analysis that makes it clearer what core ideology drives FdI’s politics. By observing the data gathered from the 2018 and 2022 programs, it can be deduced that FdI is, overall, a (right-wing) conservative party, as there are undeniably more core concepts of conservatism than populism throughout. For example, typically conservative (pro-market, small-government) anti-bureaucracy and anti-tax measures (e.g. flat tax, no tax area) were found in both programs. Although FdI’s economic neoliberalism (which is compatible with cultural conservatism) is balanced with a more communitarian and “compassionate” populist conservatism that allows for a “Fiscal Peace” between small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs or families and the Italian state. The message FdI wants to convey is that it envisions a small but efficient state that trusts its people and protects them by adapting to their temporary economic necessities.
Also, in its 2022 program, FdI’s “social Right” and social market economy inclination comes to the fore increasingly compared to the 2018 program, simply because the former is more detailed and exhaustive. Even so, these socially conscious and partially populist and statist measures (e.g. third-sector support, increase of pensions, quoziente familiare, welfare reforms) coexist with more liberal-capitalist and laissez-faire positions on the economy. From a purely economic perspective, there was no real change in FdI’s position between 2018 and 2022. That said, the 2022 manifesto is more liberal (though not fully neoliberal in the financial sense) on social issues and foreign policy—as already stated, the latter is essentially nonexistent in the 2018 program.
Similarly, an “unofficial” defining element of contemporary populism, Euroscepticism, is not consistently present in either of the programs. Perhaps a very soft form of Euroscepticism (sometimes referred to as Euro-criticism) is found in the older program (2018), as the party calls for fewer regulatory/bureaucratic constraints from the EU and for the revision of some of its treaties. However, both elements largely disappear by the time the 2022 program is drafted, and FdI even correlates the new EU funds (NRRP) with an opportunity for growth and a means to distance European economies from Russia’s. Another trait correlated with the PRR, protectionism (see Loch, 2021: 79), is only briefly touched upon in one 2022 program policy, which supports tariffs to prevent the importation of lower-quality products (e.g. Italian Sounding) that do not meet EU health and safety standards. Not to mention, in the more recent document, the party’s idea of sovereignty or sovereignism is so abstract and vague (to the point that FdI argues the family unit fully represents this concept) that it cannot be directly correlated with a populist Euroscepticism.
In both electoral programs, conservative concepts—such as the will to manage or prevent societal alterations and the idea that there is an extra-human dimension to individual agency (as well as forces of nature that define a people)—take precedence over populist anti-elitism and people-centrism. Purely populist positions, inspired by anti-elitism and direct democracy—such as the reduction of MPs (2018 program), the “imperative mandate” (2018 program), and the direct election of the President (2018 and 2022)—do not bear the same weight in FdI’s agenda as the impulse to conserve and uphold tradition. FdI not only believes that a dangerous form of progress will alter the dynamics of traditional society for the worse, through the introduction of supposedly unnatural or artificial practices such as gay marriage, surrogacy, and high-tech (Chinese-modeled) social credit systems, but also that the spiritual and natural identity of the nation is in danger due to mass immigration. Conversely, both in 2018 and in 2022—but especially in the latter—FdI reconciles these traditional conservative stances with more liberal ones, spanning from its support for anti-racism, gender equality, renewable energy, secure (not precarious) employment, civil unions, and social aid for the most disadvantaged people.
Conclusion
Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, reacts during a handover ceremony at Chigi Palace in Rome, Italy on October 23, 2022. Photo: Alessia Pierdomenico.
This study has analyzed FdI’s discourse and policy positions, showing that while the party cannot, under any circumstances, be classified as extreme right—given the absence or inconsistency of core ideological elements—it also cannot be accurately characterized as a full-blown populist party. Whereas FdI clearly exhibits populist discursive traits, the core features of populism (anti-elitism, people-centrism, volonté générale) do not play a leading role in its electoral programs, and it is, at best, debatable whether they do so in its broader discourse. In fact, even when anti-elitism and people-centrism do (sporadically) manifest, they are largely disconnected from a broader populist weltanschauung in which the will of the people is paramount and influences every aspect of policy within an electoral program. By contrast, conservatism—and its key concepts—plays a key role in defining FdI’s agenda between 2018 and 2022. The management of societal change, followed by an awareness of an extra-human dimension to individual agency, lies at the very heart of FdI’s programs, which certainly offer a window into the party’s political ideology.
FdI is a conservative party, with conservatism serving as the primary force behind its policy agenda and likely its discourse as well. However, given that populism still plays a marginal role—particularly in framing the party’s language against elites—it is also accurate to describe FdI as a “populist-Conservative” party, where populism functions as a secondary ideological layer. This is substantially different from labeling FdI as a “conservative-Populist” or “radical-right populist” party, which would imply that conservatism is either peripheral or absent—an interpretation that does not align with the party’s actual positions. Furthermore, FdI’s relatively liberal stances on certain domestic policy issues (such as civil rights concerning women, people from the gay community, and legal immigrants), as well as its Atlanticist and pro-European foreign policy, indicate that while the party remains rooted in traditional conservatism, it is gradually undertaking a trajectory toward liberal conservatism.
Future studies could adopt a more comparative approach, analysing FdI’s stances alongside other groups from its party family, which would mainly be found in the European Conservatives and Reformists Party (ECR) (e.g. Czech Republic’s ODS or Poland’s PiS). Alternatively, comparisons could be drawn with more radical right-wing organizations, such as the Lega or AfD, to see where the commonalities between conservatism and radical-right populism or right-wing extremism reside, if there are any. Naturally, political ideologies can also be studied from a demand-side perspective, and accurate analysis of FdI’s rising electoral base can tell us more about this party’s future trajectory. Current trends suggest a movement toward the political center, rather than a drift toward the extremes.
(*) DR. AMEDEO VARRIALEearned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism. During his academic career, Dr. Varriale contributed as a research assistant to the development of a significant textbook project on the global resurgence of nationalism, titled“The New Nationalism in America and Beyond,” co-authored by Robert Schertzer and Eric Taylor Woods. He has written for ECPS before but has also been published by other academic outlets ranging from the Journal of Dialogue Studies to UEL’s Crossing Conceptual Boundaries. Currently, he is also an “affiliated researcher” for the Centre for the Study of Global Nationalisms (CSGN).
References
Abbas, T. (2021). “Reflection: The ‘War on Terror’, islamophobia and radicalisation twenty years on.” Critical Studies on Terrorism, 14(4), pp. 402–404. doi:10.1080/17539153.2021.1980182
Abts, K. and Rummens S. (2007). “Populism and democracy.” Political Studies, 55(2), pp.405-424.
Albertazzi, D. and McDonnell, D. (2015). Populists in Power. 1st ed. Routledge.
Bell, D. (2001). The Radical Right. 3rd edn. Routledge.
Betz, H.-G. (1994). Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Palgrave Macmillan.
Betz, H.-G. (2003). “Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe”, Socialist Register (Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno-Nationalism). Edited by L. Panitch and C. Leys, pp. 193–210.
Biancalana, Cecilia. (2023). “Italy’s multiple populisms facing the Russo-Ukrainian war.” In: The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-wing Populism in Europe. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 8, 2023. Brussels. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0022
Bourke, R. (2018). “What is Conservatism? History, Ideology and Party.” European Journal of Political Theory, 17(4), pp. 449–475. doi:10.1177/1474885118782384.
Bressanelli, E. and de Candia, M. (2023). “Fratelli d’Italia in the European Parliament: Between radicalism and Conservatism.” Contemporary Italian Politics, 17(1), pp. 61–80. doi:10.1080/23248823.2023.2285545.
Broder, D. (2022). “In Italy’s Deserted Democracy, Far-Right Giorgia Meloni Has Emerged Victorious.” Jacobin,September 26, 2022.
Brubaker, R. (2017). “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European populist moment in Comparative Perspective.” Ethnic and Racial, 40(8), pp. 1191–1226.
Buzan, B. and Waever, O. (2009). “Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: Reconsidering scale in securitisation theory.” Review of International Studies, 35(2), pp. 253–276. doi:10.1017/s0260210509008511.
Camus, R. (2021). Le grand remplacement: Introduction au remplacisme global. La Nouvelle Librairie (éditions).
Carter, E. (2005). The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or failure? Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester University Press.
Carter, E. (2018). “Right-wing extremism/radicalism: Reconstructing the concept.” Journal of Political Ideologies, 23(2), pp. 157–182. doi:10.1080/13569317.2018.1451227.
Cerasa, C. (2024). “Meloni come Le Pen? Con tutto il rispetto, non diciamo vaccate, grazie”, Il Foglio, July 9, 2024. https://www.ilfoglio.it/politica/2024/07/09/news/meloni-come-le-pen-con-tutto-il-rispetto-non-diciamo-vaccate-grazie-6730078/ (accessed on April 17, 2025).
Chryssogelos, A.-S. (2013). “The evolution of the “populist potential” in European politics: From new right radicalism to anti-system populism.” European View, 12(1), pp. 75–83. doi:10.1007/s12290-013-0249-3.
Cobain, I. (2006). “Racism, recruitment and how the BNP believes it is just ‘one crisis away from power’.” The Guardian. December 22, 2006.
Copsey, N. (2008). Contemporary British Fascism: The British National Party and the Quest for Legitimacy. Palgrave Macmillan.
Decode 39. (2023). Speaking Conservative: Meloni looks to the UK to remake the Italian righthttps://decode39.com/6601/conservative-meloni-uk-italy-right/ (accessed on April 19, 2025).
Deist, J. (2022). “Classical Liberalism” Will Never Satisfy the Left, Mises Institute. Available at: https://mises.org/mises-wire/classical-liberalism-will-never-satisfy-left (accessed on April 17, 2025).
Dokos, T. et al. (2013). Eurocriticism: The Eurozone Crisis and Anti-Establishment Groups in Southern Europe. rep. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09728?seq=3 (accessed on July 17, 2025).
Donà, A. (2022). “The rise of the radical right in Italy: The case of fratelli d’italia.” Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 27(5), pp. 775–794. doi:10.1080/1354571x.2022.2113216.
Dorey, P. (2011). British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality. London, England: I.B. Tauris.
Eatwell, R. (1992). “Towards a new model of generic fascism.” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4(2), pp. 161–194. doi:10.1177/0951692892004002003.
Eksteen, R. (2019). “The effect of domestic affairs on foreign policy, with specific reference to current events in the United States of America.” Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe, 59(3), pp. 2224–7912. doi: https://doi.org/10.17159/2224-7912/2019/v59n3a6.
Elezioni 2022, i risultati. Meloni al lavoro sulla squadra di governo. I nodi dei ministeri del Tesoro e dell’Interno (2022) www.ansa.it. Available at: https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2022/09/26/elezioni-2022-i-risultati-in-diretta.-meloni-non-deluderemo-gli-italiani.-fdi-la-costituzione-e-bella-ma-ha-70-anni_31c6a853-8c75-455d-b964-63fee32947a7.html (accessed on April 21, 2025).
Emmott, B. (2024). “Giorgia Meloni: the right side of wrong?” Prospect, June 25, 2024. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/europe/european-union/european-politics/66920/giorgia-meloni-italy-le-pen-right-wing (accessed on May 23, 2025).
Fanpage.it (2024). Insulti antisemiti e razzisti: la seconda puntata dell’inchiesta su Gioventù Nazionale. Fanpage.it (YouTube). June 26, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1X-g7YbJzQ (accessed on May 13, 2025).
Fassini, D. (2024). “Italia-Tunisia. Meloni: «Più migranti regolari». Ma scoppia il caso delle motovedette.” Avvenire, April 17, 2024. https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/italia-tunisia-tre-nuovi-accordi (accessed on April 18, 2025).
FdI. (2018). “Un Programma Per L’Italia: Per la crescita, per la sicurezza, le famiglie e la piena occupazione.” Roma, Italia: Fratelli d’Italia con Giorgia Meloni.
FdI. (2022). “Il Programma Pronti a risollevare L’Italia (Elezioni politiche Settembre 25, 2022)”. Fratelli d’Italia con Giorgia Meloni.
Feldman, M. and Jackson, P. (2014). Doublespeak: The Rhetoric of the Far Right Since 1945 (Explorations of the Far Right, 3) Vol 3. ibidem Press.
Fortuna, G. and Genovese, V. (2025). “L’ultima resistenza dell’atlantismo: il tentativo di Meloni di mantenere uniti Europa e Usa.” Euronews, March 7, 2025. https://it.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/07/lultima-resistenza-dellatlantismo-il-tentativo-di-meloni-di-mantenere-uniti-europa-e-usa (accessed on July 1, 2025).
Foyle, D. (2017). “Public opinion and foreign policy.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics [Preprint]. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.472.
Franks, B., Jun, N. and Williams, L. (2018). Anarchism: A Conceptual Approach. Routledge.
Freeden, M. (1996). Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach. 1st ed. Clarendon Press.
Galli, G. and Bochicchio, F. (2019). Il populismo anticapitalistico. Ruolo storico-politico e suoi limiti. Due voci critiche (diverse) sul rapporto tra populismo e sinistra radicale. Edizioni Punto Rosso.
Gilmour, I. (1977). Inside right: A study of Conservatism. London, England: Hutchinson.
Gross, S.G. (2022). “Understanding Europe’s populist right: The state of the field.” Contemporary European History, 32(3), pp. 489–497. doi:10.1017/s0960777322000261.
Hawkins, K.A. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2018). “Introduction: the ideational approach.” In: The Ideational Approach to Populism Concept, Theory, and Analysis. 1st edn. Routledge.
Hayek, F.A. (2011). The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition (Volume 17) (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek). 1st edn. University of Chicago Press.
Hobsbawm, E.J. (1990). Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (The Wiles Lectures). Cambridge University Press.
Hofstadter, R. (1965). The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays. New York, New York, United States: Alfred A. Knopf.
Hülsemann, L. (2024). “After neo-Nazi meeting, Germany’s far-right AfD bashed by Scholz.” Politico, January 11, 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-chancellor-scholz-bashes-afd-far-right-investigation-assimilation-comments/ (accessed on April 14, 2025).
Huntington, S.P. (1957). Conservatism as an Ideology, 51(2), pp. 454–473. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/1952202.
Ignazi, P. (2005). “Legitimation and evolution on the Italian right wing: Social and ideological repositioning of calleanza nazionale and the lega nord.” South European Society and Politics, 10(2), pp. 333–349. doi:10.1080/13608740500135058.
Il Fatto Quotidiano. (2024). L’attacco di Baldelli (FdI): ‘Pd e Avs finanziati da Soros, è nell’interesse dell’Italia?’ YouTube. April 24, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1QzNEaVdPL8 (accessed on April 17, 2025).
Il Sole 24 Ore. (2024) IT G7, Meloni: ‘Sull’aborto è stata fatta una polemica del tutto artefatta’ YouTube. June 15, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KkXIBThjeuw (accessed on April 17, 2025).
Indelicato, M.E. and Magalhães Lopes, M. (2024) “Understanding populist far-right anti-immigration and anti-gender stances beyond the paradigm of gender as ‘a symbolic glue’: Giorgia Meloni’s modern motherhood, neo-catholicism, and reproductive racism.” European Journal of Women’s Studies, 31(1), pp. 6–20. doi:10.1177/13505068241230819.
Ivaldi, G and Mazzoleni, O. (2024). “Producerist populist attitudes and electoral support for populism in the USA and Western Europe.” Socio-Economic Review, 2024, 10.1093/ser/mwae034. hal-04617683
Jones, E. (2023). “Italy’s Hard Truths.” Journal of Democracy, 34(1), pp. 21–35. Available at: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/italys-hard-truths/ (Accessed: April 2025).
Kirk R. (1953). The Conservative Mind, Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Co.
Laghos, M. (2022). “Giorgia Meloni: “Far-Right” or Just Right?” The European Conservative, July 29, 2022.: https://europeanconservative.com/articles/commentary/giorgia-meloni-far-right-or-just-right/ (accessed on April 27, 2025).
Laver, M. and Garry, J. (2000). “Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts.” American Journal of Political Science, 44(3), pp. 619–634. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2669268.
Lawson, K. (1976). The Comparative Study of Political Parties, New York, St.Martin‘s Press.
Loch, D. (2021). “Populism and the Radical Right.” In: R.C. Heinisch, C. Holtz-Bacha and O. Mazzoleni, 2nded., Political Populism: Handbook of Concepts, Questions and Strategies of Research. Nomos. pp.79-91.
Mammone, A. (2024). “On the historical evolution of the Northern League in Italy.” Segle XX Revista catalana d’història, (16), pp. 228–246. doi:10.1344/seglexx2023.16.11.
Mannheim, K. (1986). Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. D. Kettler, V. Meja and N. Stehr, trans. D. Kettler and V. Meja. London: Routledge.
Meislová, M.B. and Chryssogelos, A. (2024). “The ambiguous impact of populist trade discourses on the International Economic Order.” International Affairs, 100(5), pp. 1941–1957. doi:10.1093/ia/iiad296.
Melito, F. and Zulianello, M. (2024). “The organization of Brothers of Italy: An activist and centralized party led by a ‘mother in the family’.” South European Society and Politics, 29(3), pp. 299–324. doi:10.1080/13608746.2025.2463909.
Meloni, G. (2024). Niente viene prima degli interessi del popolo italiano. Mi batto per questo. GiorgiaMeloniTV (YouTube). March 21, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/shorts/J1ve5EqQA-M (accessed on April 17, 2025).
Michels R. (1968). Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, New York: The Free Press.
Mohrenberg, S.; Huber, R.A. and Freyburg, T. (2021). “Love at first sight? populist attitudes and support for direct democracy.” Party Politics, 27(3).
Mudde, C. (1995). “Right-wing extremism analyzed.” European Journal of Political Research, 27(2), pp. 203–224. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1995.tb00636.x.
Mudde, C. (2000). The Ideology of the Extreme Right. Manchester University Press.
Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press.
Mudde, C. (2017). “Populism: An Ideational Approach.” In: P. Ochoa Espejo, C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart and P. Ostiguy, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press, pp.27-47.
Mudde, C. (2019). The Far Right Today. Cambridge: Polity.
Mudde, C. (2024). “Interview #62 – 20 Years of Populist Zeitgeist with Cas Mudde.” Political Observer on Populism.https://populismobserver.com/2024/04/02/interview-62-20-years-of-populist-zeitgeist-with-cas-mudde/ (accessed on May 31, 2025).
Mudde, C. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. 1st ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
O’Sullivan, N. (1976). Conservatism. London: J.M. Dent.
Oakeshott, M. (1991). Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays. Liberty Fund.
Ostiguy, P. (2017). “Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach.” In: P. Ochoa Espejo, C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart and P. Ostiguy, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press, pp.73-97.
Padovani, C. (2016). “The media of the ultra-right.” Journal of Language and Politics, 15(4), pp. 399–421. doi:10.1075/jlp.15.4.02pad.
Palladino, A. (2023). “La nascita di Fratelli d’Italia.” MicroMega.
Passarelli, G. and Tuorto, D. (2018). La Lega di Salvini. Estrema destra di governo. il Mulino.
Paxton, R. (2005). The Anatomy of Fascism. 2nd ed. London, United Kingdom: Penguin Books.
Pirro, A.L. (2022). “Far right: The significance of an umbrella concept.” Nations and Nationalism, 29(1), pp. 101–112. doi:10.1111/nana.12860.
Pirro, A.L. and Taggart, P. (2022). “Populists in power and conspiracy theories.” Party Politics, 29(3), pp. 413–423. doi:10.1177/13540688221077071.
Puleo, L. and Piccolino, G. (2022). “Back to the post-fascist past or landing in the populist radical right? The Brothers of Italy between continuity and change.” South European Society and Politics, 27(3), pp. 359–383. doi:10.1080/13608746.2022.2126247.
Pytlas, B. and Biehler, J. (2023). “The AFD within the AFD: Radical right intra-party competition and ideational change.” Government and Opposition, 59(2), pp. 322–340. doi:10.1017/gov.2023.13.
Rampini, F. (2019). ‘La sicurezza deve essere un discorso di sinistra!’.
https://www.la7.it/piazzapulita/video/rampini-%E2%80%98la-sicurezza-deve-essere-un-discorso-di-sinistra%E2%80%99-28-03-2019-267333 (accessed on August 24, 2022).
Renzi, M. (2025). L’influencer. Milano, Italia: Piemme.
Rooduijn, M. (2013). A Populist Zeitgeist? The Impact of Populism on Parties, Media and the Public in Western Europe. Unpublished PhD thesis.
Rooduijn, M., S. Van Kessel, C. Froio, A. Pirro, S. De Lange, D. Halikiopoulou, P. Lewis, C. Mudde, and P. Taggart. (2019). “The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe.” www.popu-list.org
Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2014). “The responses of populism to Dahl’s democratic dilemma.” Political Studies, 62(3), pp.470-487.
Rueda, D. (2021). “Is Populism a Political Strategy? A Critique of an Enduring Approach.” Political Studies, 69(2), pp.167-184.
Sainsbury, D. (1980). Swedish Social Democratic Ideology and Electoral Politics 1944-1948: A Study of the Functions of Party Ideology. Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist
Sallusti, A. (2023) La Versione di Giorgia: Allesandro Sallusti intervista Giorgia Meloni. Milano, Italia: Rizzoli.
Saviano, R. (2022) “Giorgia Meloni is a danger to Italy and the rest of Europe”, The Guardian, 24 September. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2022/sep/24/giorgia-meloni-is-a-danger-to-italy-and-the-rest-of-europe-far-right (Accessed: April 2025).
Scafi, M. (2025). “Fazzolari: ‘Giorgia in America tutelerà gli interessi occidentali’.” Il Giornale, 16 April, pp. 5–5.
Schinkel, W. (2017). Imagined Societies A Critique of Immigrant Integration in Western Europe. Cambridge University Press.
Schroeder, R. (2020). “The Dangerous Myth of Populism as a Thin Ideology.” BRILL, 3 (2020) (3), pp.13-28.
Shils, E. (1996). The Torment of Secrecy. 1st ed. Chicago, IL, USA: Elephant Paperback (Ivan R. Dee).
Sondel-Cedarmas, J. (2022). “Giorgia Meloni’s New Europe: Europe of Sovereign Nations in the Brothers of Italy Party Manifestos.” 1st edn. In: J.Sondel-Cedarmas and F.Berti, The Right-Wing Critique of Europe: Nationalist, Sovereignist and Right-Wing Populist Attitudes to the EU. Routledge.
Spektorowski, A. (2003). “The new right: Ethno-regionalism, ethno-pluralism and the emergence of a neo-fascist ‘third way’.” Journal of Political Ideologies, 8(1), pp. 111–130. doi:10.1080/13569310306084.
Stanley, B. (2008). “The thin ideology of populism.” Journal of Political Ideologies, 13(1), pp.95-110.
Taggart, P. (1995). “New populist parties in Western Europe.” West European Politics, 18(1), pp. 34–51. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389508425056.
Taggart, P. (2018). Conférence ‘Populism and Unpolitics’ animée par P. Taggart, Colloque VISAGES DU POPULISME CONTEMPORAIN EN EUROPE ET AUX ÉTATS-UNIS. Populism and Unpolitics: Core Features and Tropes in Contemporary Populism in Europe and the United States, Toulon, France: l’Université de Toulon, 22 June.
Tarchi, M. (2003). “The political culture of the Alleanza Nazionale: An analysis of the party’s programmatic documents (1995-2002).” Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 8(2), pp. 135–181. doi:10.1080/1354571032000078248.
Tarchi, M. (2008) “Recalcitrant allies: The conflicting foreign policy agenda of the Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord.” In: C.S. Liang. Europe for the Europeans. Routledge.
Tarchi, M. (2015). Italia populista: Dal qualunquismo a Beppe Grillo. Bologna, Italia: Il Mulino.
Tarchi, M. (2024). Fratelli d’Italia: Neo-fascist heritage, populism and conservatism, Fratelli d’Italia: neo-fascist heritage, populism and conservatism. fondapol.org. pp.1-72 (in pdf. format).
Taylor, S. (2012). What is Discourse Analysis? (The ‘What is?’ Research Methods Series). Bloomsbury.
The Economist. (January 24, 2024). “Giorgia Meloni’s not-so-scary right-wing government.
Tortola, P.D. and Griffini, M. (2024). “Abuses of the past by the Italian far right: A first assessment of the Meloni Government.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies, pp. 1–14. doi:10.1080/14782804.2024.2390161.
Varriale, A. (2024). The Nature of Italian Populism. PhD thesis.
Varriale, A. (2024). “Populism and the Extreme Right in Comparative Perspective: The French Rassemblement National and the Italian Forza Nuova.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). August 12, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0036
Vassallo, S. and Vignati, R. (2024). Brothers of Italy and the rise of the Italian national conservative right under Giorgia Meloni. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, an imprint of Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
Vista Agenzia Televisiva Nazionale (2024). Meloni premiata all’Atlantic Council – Il discorso INTEGRALE (YouTube). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Mj_geV81X4 (accessed on April 30, 2025).
Webber, J. (2023). “Understanding Populism.” Social & Legal Studies, 32(6), pp. 849–876. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/09646639231156144.
Weyland, K. (2017). “Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach.” In: P. Ochoa Espejo, C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart and P. Ostiguy, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press, pp.48-72.
Wittgenstein, H. (2001). “Angst nel cuore d’Europa (Sussurri e grida a Berlino).” Apulia. Banca Popolare Pugliese.
Zulianello, M. (2019). “Varieties of populist parties and party systems in Europe: From state-of-the-art to the application of a novel classification scheme to 66 parties in 33 countries. Government and Opposition, 55(2), pp. 327–347. doi:10.1017/gov.2019.21.
Footnotes
[1] In addition to the “borderline cases” (mentioned in this work’s section discussing the extreme right), some of the parties belonging to the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group (active in the European Union’s Parliament) may require a more nuanced analysis as they are not easily categorizable.
[2] This reference primarily pertains to the large-scale deregulation and privatization of state-owned industries, as well as the creation of a “new middle class” through an increase in home ownership, that occurred during both tenures.
[3] Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (2015) have included the party founded by the Italian tycoon Berlusconi in their study of “populists in power”, however, they have also hinted that it is reasonable for scholars to classify this is a center-right or classical liberal party, rather than a strictly populist one (see Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015: 17-33). Ultimately, the nature of this party remains matter of ongoing contention.
[4]Groupement de Recherche et d’Études pour la Civilisation Européenne (GRECE)
[5] The only interview used to gather data for analysis is the one published by Rizzoli in book form in 2023, where Giorgia Meloni was interviewed by a famous Italian journalist – Alessandro Sallusti. Many distinct subjects are touched upon during this interview, thus, it is unquestionably the source that allows the most comprehensive understanding of Meloni’s (and FdI’s) political views.
[6] Essentially, this means addressing some of the shortcomings of liberalism and especially economic neoliberalism (e.g. wage inequality, displacement of labor) without questioning or undermining other aspects, such as the rule of law.
[7]Atreju is an annual kermess form of event organized by FdI and its youth wing where political figures who oppose each other’s views are given the opportunity to debate in a cordial, civil and somewhat informal context.
[8] Mudde specifically defines nativism as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde, 2007: 19).
[9] A reportage made public in the summer of 2024 by the Italian news outlet fanpage.it (also specialized investigative journalism undercover) proved there have been neofascist infiltrations among FdI’s youth wing (Gioventù Nazionale) at an internal level (see fanpage.it, YouTube, June 26, 2024).
[10] Original title: Un Programma Per L’Italia: Per La Crescita, La Sicurezza, Le Famiglie e La Piena Occupazione.
[11] For this concept, refer to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2009).
[12] See E.J. Hobsbawm (1990).
[13] For examples of how populism and direct democracy relate to each other, see Mohrenberg et al. (2019).
[14] Original title: (Il programma) Pronti a risollevare l’Italia.
[15] Unsurprisingly, as someone devoted to the preservation and enhancement of Italy’s (and Europe’s) relationship with the USA (both during the Joe Biden and Trump terms) Meloni has been conferred the “Global Citizen Award” by the Atlantic Council in New York City in September 2024 (see Vista AgenziaTelevisiva Nazionale, 2024; see also Fortuna and Genovese, 2025).
[16] In the Italian context this is not finance-banking (like in certain countries of the Anglosphere) but a reference to the voluntary work sector (charities, churches, etc.).
[17] While foreign scholars may struggle to accept Meloni’s new liberal image, some Italian journalists have described her as undergoing a “political metamorphosis” (e.g. Cangini, 2022) or as adopting (a typically radical right) statist stance with allies and a liberal anti-statist one with opponents (e.g. Muratore, 2023).
In this wide-ranging interview with ECPS, Professor Tariq Modood calls for the creation of a “multiculturalist international” to counter the rise of far-right transnational networks and exclusionary nationalisms. Highlighting the dangers posed by xenophobia, Islamophobia, and authoritarian populism across Europe and beyond, Professor Modood argues that multiculturalism is “not simply a reaction to populism… it is a positive vision” that affirms shared citizenship while respecting diversity. He contrasts his model of “moderate secularism” with French laïcité and Hindu nationalist secularism, emphasizing inclusivity and equality. Brexit, he notes, weakened the EU’s capacity for multicultural integration: “We need to create a multiculturalist alliance across countries, in the way that the far right is creating its own transnational network.”
In an era marked by the transnational rise of far-right populism, exclusionary nationalism, and algorithmically amplified xenophobia, Professor Tariq Modood, the founding Director of the Bristol University Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, offers a deeply considered and nuanced account of how multiculturalism can serve as both a critique of and alternative to these reactionary forces. As one of Europe’s leading theorists of multicultural citizenship, Professor Modood’s work insists on reconciling respect for ethno-religious group identities with an inclusive and reconstituted national identity—a project he characterizes as “multicultural nationalism.”
In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Modood, who is also one of the signatories of the “International Declaration Against Fascism,” published on June 13, 2025, alongside Nobel laureates, public intellectuals, and leading scholars of democracy and authoritarianism, explains that his vision of multiculturalism is “not simply a reaction to populism, nor a political strategy against it; it is a positive vision.” For Professor Modood, multiculturalism affirms that “we are not just individuals” but also members of groups whose identities have historically been marginalized or excluded from full membership in national life. Yet this project is integrative, not separatist: “We must not become anti-national. We must oppose the exploitation of national identity to exclude, racialize, or degrade others,” he emphasizes, rejecting both monocultural nationalism and cosmopolitan detachment.
A key element of Professor Modood’s thought is his advocacy for “moderate secularism,” which contrasts sharply with both French laïcité and authoritarian appropriations of secularism in places like India. Unlike the rigid secularism that seeks to privatize or marginalize religion, moderate secularism recognizes the public role of religious identities while embedding them in democratic equality and inclusion: “Moderate secularism can be inclusionary and potentially develop in a multiculturalist direction,” he explains.
In response to the global diffusion of far-right discourse—whether through social media networks or coordinated political strategies—Professor Modood argues for an explicitly internationalist response rooted in multicultural values. “I would like to say that one way of resisting that is trying to create a multiculturalism international—not just a far-right international, but a multiculturalism international,” he asserts. Brexit, in this regard, represented a significant setback: “When we left the European Union, much against my wishes, the European Union became weaker in relation to multiculturalism and anti-racism.”
Throughout this wide-ranging conversation, Professor Modood emphasizes that multicultural nationalism requires a “rethinking of our national identity and national story so that minority identities can become part of the national identity,” offering examples from Britain’s imperial history and inclusive popular culture, such as the 2012 London Olympics. His vision ultimately calls for a democratic, pluralistic, and solidaristic reimagining of national belonging—an urgent project in a time of resurgent authoritarianism.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Tariq Modood, edited lightly for readability.
Religious tolerance-themed graffiti in Bristol, UK. August 31, 2009. Photo: Dreamstime.
Multiculturalism Is a Positive Vision, Not Just a Strategy Against Populism
Professor Tariq Modood, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: As a signatory of the June 13, 2025 anti-fascism declaration, how would you theorize the contemporary far-right populist phenomenon as an incipient form of fascism—particularly in the light of Viktor Orbán’s “illiberal democracy” in Hungary and Donald Trump’s authoritarian revival in the US—and what normative resources does your conception of multicultural nationalism offer for resisting this resurgence while preserving democratic pluralism?
Professor Tariq Modood: Thank you very much for inviting me onto your site. I should explain that while I was a signatory to that letter—which I thought was important and was glad to sign—it is not, as such, an example of my own research or thinking.
You asked how I see multicultural nationalism relating to the fight against fascism and populism. The first thing to say is that I see them as connected, but not directly or immediately; they are connected through several layers of unpacking. For me, multiculturalism—the central theoretical and political idea I work with—is a positive idea and a value in itself. It is not simply a reaction to populism or a political strategy against it; it is a positive vision.
And what is this positive vision? It is the idea that we are not just individuals. We have various group identities that are important to us, and some of these identities have been the basis for exclusion from rights, opportunities, participation, and full membership in citizenship and national identity.
Multiculturalism asserts that if these identities are important and valuable to their bearers, then not only must they not be a basis for exclusion or discrimination, but they should also be valued within our common citizenship. These group memberships and identities are part of who we are—not merely abstract individuals as understood by law.
Another important identity for multiculturalism is national identity. Why? Because multiculturalism, in order to get people to respect group identities, has to work with a strong concept of citizenship. Citizenship requires respect for group identities as a basis of inclusion because citizenship is egalitarian and inclusive. But this is not just liberal citizenship focused on equality before the law and individual rights; rather, it is a stronger concept of citizenship as a collectivity with shared identity and significance for its members. Citizenship and national identity are tied together. When we appeal for multicultural equality, we appeal to citizenship, but we need a strong sense of citizenship—identifying with and insisting on our right to belong to that national identity.
That is why multiculturalism works with two identities: respect for group identities (e.g., British Pakistani, Jewish, Hindu, Black) and respect for national identity, which should bring us all together. Multiculturalism must also resist exclusion when it occurs. Once we understand this, we see that multiculturalism is diametrically opposed to monocultural nationalism, which is exclusionary and creates two tiers of citizenship: “real” nationals and second-class citizens who do not really belong. Multiculturalism is totally against that idea and, therefore, against nationalist populism—but it opposes it because of its own value commitments. It is not simply a political strategy for opposing fascism.
Multiculturalism as an Alternative Nation-Building Project
What do you take to be the normative and institutional obligations of democratic polities in mediating the tension between protecting minorities from processes of “othering” and responding to legitimate concerns of cultural majorities—particularly in contexts where populist narratives exploit these tensions?
Professor Tariq Modood: Some people who are anti-right-wing and anti-populism misunderstand the situation. You referred to those who exploit national identity and tensions within our national community—the key word being exploit. We must not become anti-national; we must oppose the exploitation of national identity to exclude, racialize, or degrade others. The national itself is not the problem. That’s why I say some anti-populists misunderstand this issue: they declare themselves anti-nationalism.
Well, I am certainly not anti-nationalism, because I support multicultural nationalism. I believe in an alternative conception of national belonging and identity that contrasts with populist, divisive, monocultural nationalism. I’m not anti-national or anti-nationalist.
The key is to reclaim the idea of the national. We mustn’t allow right-wing figures like Nigel Farage in Britain, Marine Le Pen in France, and others to define themselves as the “true nationalists” while casting people like me—and perhaps you—as anti-nationalists. No, I want to assert that I am a nationalist too, but with a better understanding of who we are today and who we can become in the future—how we can unite our nation rather than divide it, not to transcend our nation but to transform it.
In this sense, multiculturalism is an alternative nation-building project, and that’s how we counter those who exploit tensions within our national community.
Moderate Secularism as an Inclusive Alternative to Authoritarian Models
Muslims demonstrating against Islamophobia outside the Grande Mosquée de Paris, France. Photo: Tom Craig.
In what ways does your model of “moderate secularism” serve as a corrective to both French laïcité and Hindu nationalist instrumentalizations of secularism in India, and how can it safeguard against appropriation by exclusionary or authoritarian iterations of secularism emerging from the populist right?
Professor Tariq Modood: This is quite a complicated question you’ve asked me because it brings in something new—namely, the idea of moderate secularism. So, I first need to explain that idea before I can answer the rest of the question.A lot of people—liberals and progressives—say that we live in secular societies and therefore shouldn’t have religion in politics or shouldn’t have the state recognizing religious groups, Christians or Muslims or Hindus. But that’s not the reality of the societies we live in.
France is somewhat different, but Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Norway—these are all secular societies. No one can say they’re not secular polities, but they accommodate religion or some religions within the public sphere. They often fund various aspects of organized religious activity, whether it’s education, maintaining cathedrals and church heritage, or expecting religious organizations to provide welfare work. Germany, for instance, has an enormous welfare budget that it hands over to churches as well as collecting taxes to give to the churches.
So, I say we need a concept to describe this relationship. We are clearly secular polities—we are not run by religious organizations. Britain is not governed by the Church of England, and the Church of England is not a powerful institution. So, we are secular countries—but what kind of secularism is this? It’s not like the laïcité of France; it’s not like the secularism of the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China. Those are forms of radical secularism.
By contrast, this is a form of moderate secularism. One of the things moderate secularism can do is serve as a platform for recognizing excluded or newly settled religious minorities, like Muslims, for instance. Therefore, moderate secularism can be inclusionary and potentially develop in a multiculturalist direction, so that it doesn’t have to be exclusionary, as it is in France. Laïcité is hardening—it’s not being moderated; it’s being hardened in order to discipline or exclude Muslims, to confront them in the name of so-called secular values, national culture, or national identity.
We have to oppose those kinds of authoritarian secularisms. Sometimes these secularisms are not quite like France in that they are not anti-religious, but rather in alliance with the majority religion. This fits the example you gave of India, where the majority religion is being reconceptualized as a national ideology: everyone has to belong, in some way or another, to this Hindu nation; otherwise, they’re not a true Indian. So that’s a kind of secularism, because otherwise India has a very pluralistic tradition—a pluralistic secularism—which is now being defeated, pushed aside by the current Modi government; they’ve been doing this for about 15 years.
That’s how moderate secularism can be inclusive—unlike the radical secularism of France or China, and unlike the majoritarian religious nationalism of countries like India or, for that matter, Turkey. Quite a few Sunni Muslim countries also move in that direction. India has taken it even further, but this kind of authoritarian religious majoritarianism is, at present, all too common in Muslim countries around the world.
Rethinking National History as a Shared Story of Inclusion
To what extent does multicultural nationalism necessitate a historiographical reconstitution of national narratives, and how can such reconstructions avoid exacerbating cultural polarization or being dismissed as an elite project of historical revisionism?
Professor Tariq Modood: That’s a good question, and I don’t really have a fully satisfactory answer, because we really do need to rethink our history. Take Britain: British Empire, British glory, conquered the world, and so on. Well, we can’t tell that story in a simplistic way, as if the British were simply on top, a superior race, doing all this to the rest of the world. We need to tell a story that is about domination and conquest, but also about mixing—how India became part of Britain because the British went out there and ruled India but did so by connecting with Indians in various ways. They certainly modified India in major ways, but there was influence coming back as well. Just think about the number of Urdu and Hindi words in the English language—it’s enough to fill a big dictionary, and these dictionaries exist.
In any case, we need to tell that history to explain how we came to be the current population of Great Britain. There’s an old political slogan: “I’m over here because you were over there.” So yes, we need to tell this story of how the British made Indians British, because my story of being a Briton does not begin when I came to Britain as a child; it’s older than that. It belongs to the British making India British—that includes my dad, my grandparents, my ancestors, and so on. I became part of the British story through a historical formation of domination and conquest—but not only so.
In any case, we have to tell that story. I can see there are difficulties in how we tell it because it can be conflictual, and that’s something we want to avoid because multicultural nationalism is about bringing people together, respecting each other, and treating each other as equal members. So, there will be some revision and tension—I don’t think we can avoid it—but we need to try, bite the bullet, and think our way through. But there can be positive presentations; it doesn’t have to be just an elite project.
One of the best examples of a non-elite presentation of this project is the opening ceremony of the London Olympics of 2012. Have you seen it? You really should, and your readers really should. It’s not very long—about 45 minutes or so—and it told, in a dramatic, playful, and friendly way, to British people and the rest of the world, “this is the country we are.” It was a very inclusive Britain, which included people from the West Indies, Africa, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and so on—and the youth culture they have created today. So, I think there are non-elitist ways of telling this story. Probably sport is actually the main vehicle at the moment through which this story is being told—or if it’s not a story, these emotions and sensibilities are being formed. We have lots of Black players in our football teams, followed all over the world, and in our national team as well. We have multi-ethnic cricket teams and other sports. Entertainment is a real melting pot or mixing place for people of different heritages and colors, who then put on an England shirt or a British badge and are cheered and recognized as such by all the fans. So that’s another way of doing it in a non-elitist way.
Respect for Group Identities Must Go Hand in Hand with Shared National Belonging
Women in festive costumes with decorative flowers in their hair dance through the streets during the annual Belfast Mela Carnival Parade, celebrating multiculturalism and diversity in Belfast, UK, on August 17, 2024. Photo: Dreamstime.
How do you address critiques that your emphasis on the public recognition of ethno-religious identities risks entrenching communitarian enclaves, as critics argue may be occurring in parts of Belgium or Germany, potentially impeding the development of integrative civic identities?
Professor Tariq Modood: Yes, I can see that sometimes ethnic community identities, based on flows of migrations over 50 years or so, can sometimes become segregated parts of cities and can be quite inward-looking. There are a number of aspects to this. One is that when people come to a city or country, they obviously need to meet people who speak their language and who can guide them, assist them, advise them about housing, work, schools for their children, where to shop for food they want, and about places of worship—they may want to live near a temple or mosque. So, all these things lead to a certain amount of clustering, and that’s very understandable.
But they may also feel unsafe because they fear racist abuse against themselves, the elderly, or their children. So again, they may huddle together for safety. We also have the phenomenon of white flight: when significant numbers of ethnic minorities move into a neighborhood or street, white residents begin to leave. That, of course, makes it more of a ghetto, more segregated. So, we do have to avoid segregated communities—it is an issue. We have to encourage people to mix more. Certainly, we have to protect them from racist abuse in the street and in workplaces, and from violence against themselves, their property, cultural centers, mosques, and so on. All those things need to be done to enable people to more freely spread out and not be so concentrated together.
Moreover, there are issues to do with identity. Going back to the beginning helps me round this off. I said it is important for multiculturalists to respect group identities that their bearers value, but at the same time, to allow everyone to join in, share in, and take pride in our national identity and citizenship. Similarly, when it comes to what are called divisive identities or communitarianism, we need to encourage these dual identities—they are not just dual, really, they are multiple. But the key point is that we need to encourage identities that matter to individuals as members of a group, while also encouraging identities that matter to them as members of their country.
For multiculturalism in particular, the important thing is that these aren’t just two things we do in parallel, but that we bring them together and do them together. One way of doing this is by rethinking our national identity and national story so that minority identities can become part of the national identity. I gave you examples of how the British coming to India made my ancestors and my family part of Britain—and so we need to recognize that. I also gave you the example of the London Olympic opening ceremony, which celebrated an idea of what it is to be British that was not tied to being white, Christian, or secular. It was tied to other identities important to people as well, not forgetting national identities such as Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish. These are ways we can avoid narrow identities, because we want to respect identities—but within a national framework of equality, inclusion, recognition, and valuing ourselves as members of a national community.
Multiculturalist International vs. Far-Right International
Given the anti-fascist imperative to “defy authoritarianism globally,” how might multicultural frameworks respond to transnational threats such as algorithmic disinformation networks amplifying xenophobia, global Islamophobia intensified by networks stretching from India to Europe, and exclusionary imaginaries promoted by far-right parties like Alternative für Deutschland or Italy’s Fratelli d’Italia?
Professor Tariq Modood: Your question brings together a number of things. Firstly, some fascist and racist messages become transnational. I understand that, of course, because the social media we are using is global and things go viral on it—it’s a real problem. But of course, the opposite—positive messages—can also become global and viral. For example, Black Lives Matter wasn’t simply a local Minnesota thing or even just a US movement; it became very important in Britain, parts of Europe, and other parts of the world. So clearly, social media has both positive and very negative, divisive aspects.
Another part of your question was about the power of certain projections like Alternative für Deutschland, because AfD is really quite a national project—they’re not trying to be transnational—but various kinds of far-right groups are connecting in a transnational way. That is obvious, often led by the American far right or by Hungarian-sponsored conferences and networks because of Orbán. So yes, they want to group together, and it’s quite paradoxical that they do, because they all want to say their country is the most important—make America great again, make Germany great again, leave the EU, make Britain great again, etc.—and yet they see they can best cooperate because they have a similar message in their own countries.
I would like to say that one way of resisting that is trying to create a multiculturalism international—not just a far-right international, but a multiculturalism international. In this regard, Brexit was really very disappointing for people like me, because I think that Britain is the most multiculturalist country in Europe. So, when we left the European Union, much against my wishes and for other reasons as well, the European Union became weaker in relation to multiculturalism and anti-racism. So, I do think we need to create a multiculturalist alliance across countries, in the way that the far right is creating its own kind of exclusionary nationalism within a transnational network.
In a candid and comprehensive interview with ECPS, Professor Guy Ben-Porat warns that Israel’s political rightward shift is not simply a strategic maneuver, but the product of deeper ideological currents. Describing the current coalition as “a unification of several forces,” Professor Ben-Porat highlights its populist hostility toward liberal institutions, minorities, and judicial independence. He draws direct parallels to Hungary and Poland, identifying a shared authoritarian trajectory. Professor Ben-Porat also reflects on how the October 7 attacks have further racialized political discourse, with Arab-Palestinian citizens facing intensified securitization. Yet, he sees hope in mass democratic mobilization: “Thousands of people have taken to the streets every week… the fact that many Israelis are still fighting for democracy means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.”
In a period marked by growing polarization, religious populism, and democratic backsliding, Israel’s political landscape has undergone a profound transformation. In a wide-ranging and timely interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Guy Ben-Porat—an expert in comparative politics and political sociology at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev—offers a critical diagnosis of Israel’s sharp rightward turn. “It’s more than strategy,” Professor Ben-Porat asserts, describing the current government as “a unification of several forces that make a very strong right-wing government,” rooted in anti-liberalism, exclusionary nationalism, and religious traditionalism.
At the center of this transformation is a coalition led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, flanked by ultra-Orthodox parties and far-right figures such as Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. Their political agenda, Professor Ben-Porat explains, has taken aim at core liberal-democratic institutions. “From the get-go, this government was determined to undermine the power of the Supreme Court… What they’re proposing is a majoritarian government that will stamp upon the rights of minorities.”
This encroachment on judicial independence is not merely an Israeli phenomenon. Professor Ben-Porat highlights the striking parallels with populist regimes in Hungary and Poland, noting that “Orbán and what happened in Poland before the last elections were good examples for Israel… this was a copycat.” The broader objective is to reconfigure Israeli democracy into a more ethnocratic and majoritarian model—where Jewish identity increasingly overrides civic inclusion and pluralism.
In a particularly sobering observation, Professor Ben-Porat warns that the October 7 Hamas attacks have only deepened the state’s securitized and racialized posture toward its Arab-Palestinian citizens. “There’s much more securitization of political statements and actions of Arab citizens,” he notes. And yet, despite populist figures like Ben Gvir hoping to use the crisis as justification for repression, Israel’s Arab citizens “did not play the game as expected”—remaining distant from Hamas and at times even risking their lives to protect Jewish compatriots.
Still, Professor Ben-Porat cautions that democratic decline is not inevitable. “Thousands of people have taken to the streets every week. That should not be discounted.” Though the protest movement remains largely focused on “Jewish democracy,” he sees the potential for it to evolve, to challenge systemic inequalities and the ongoing occupation. “It’s hard to be hopeful now,” he concludes, “but the fact that many Israelis are still on the streets, still fighting for democracy, means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.”
Professor Guy Ben-Porat—an expert in comparative politics and political sociology at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.
Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Guy Ben-Porat.
It’s More Than Strategy: A Unified Assault on Liberal Democracy
Professor Guy Ben-Porat, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you understand the convergence of neo-Zionist ideology and populist rhetoric in the post-2022 electoral landscape, particularly under the Ben Gvir–Smotrich axis within Netanyahu’s coalition?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s a big question, with many terms—neo, Zionist, etc.—which I’m not sure I understand or use all of them. It’s a right-wing government that has several elements within it. Likud, Netanyahu’s party, is a populist party which has become an exclusionary populist party in recent years, centered on anti-Arab, anti-immigrant, and anti-liberal sentiments.
Alongside it are the ultra-Orthodox parties, which have a very special perspective on Israel’s future and on church–state relations. You mentioned Ben Gvir and Smotrich. This is a united party combining into an extreme right-wing party—maybe akin to some things you see among the extreme right in Europe. So, major populism is the main theme here. I think it’s a right-wing, religious government with populist elements within it.
To what extent can the recent rightward shift in Israeli politics be interpreted as a populist response to long-standing ethnic and religious cleavages rather than a mere electoral strategy?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think it’s more than strategy. I think the government has a common interest in undermining some of the established democratic features of Israel—namely, the Supreme Court in particular. And if you look at the internal scene, or the internal politics, from the get-go, this government was determined to undermine the power of the Supreme Court and what we call the checks and balances. Now each part of the government has a different take on the Supreme Court.
For the ultra-Orthodox, the Supreme Court is perceived as liberal and as undermining their coalitional achievements, which they gain—particular gains for their own good—whether it is exemption from military service, whether it’s budgets for religious institutions, etc.
For the extreme right, the Supreme Court is perceived as slowing down the annexation of the West Bank and the territories. The Supreme Court is perceived as putting some blocks on the military and on the settlement movement—which, one could argue, it does not—but that’s the way they perceive it.
And for Netanyahu, being involved in a series of trials, the Supreme Court is perceived—or is depicted—as an attempt to remove an elected leader by the elites.
So each part of this government has its own take on democracy, kind of combining together into this coalition.
Now, what unites them is, first, a very right-wing perspective in terms of Palestinians and Arab citizens; a more religious attitude or more traditional attitude towards religion; and a strong dislike of what they describe as elites and liberal democracy. So all this together makes it more than a fluke, more than a conjecture. It’s a unification of several forces that make a very strong right-wing government.
Religion Is Used to Draw Boundaries—Not Just to Guide Lives
Does the growing prominence of religious populism in Israel suggest a broader transformation in the political culture, where the ethno-religious identity of “the people” overrides civic and pluralistic conceptions of citizenship?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think here it’s a bit more complex, and that’s what we do—Dani Filc and I—in our work. For some of the religious right, religion is about demarcating boundaries. Religion is used as a way to define the Jewish state, to defend Jewish privileges, and to exclude those who are not Jewish. But if you look at their perception of religion as a way of life—as an ethical way of living—then some of them are not religious, or not religious in the way that orthodoxy perceives religion. To make this a bit more clear: if you look at issues like LGBTQ rights or issues about women’s rights within the Jewish camp, they can be somewhat liberal.
So, in this government, there is a clear divide between those for whom religion is a genuine way of life—shaping their daily practices, beliefs, and ethical system—and those who use religion primarily to draw boundaries and assert identity. Take, for example, the policy issue of exempting yeshiva students from military service: for the ultra-Orthodox, this is entirely natural and self-evident. For Likud members, however, it is far less obvious. That’s where you see differences between what religion is for these people.
Ehud Olmert, former Israeli Prime Minister, in his article published in Haaretz/The Guardian recently, warns of Israel’s potential international isolation and prosecution over war crimes, describing a state policy of starvation and indiscriminate violence. How does the normalization of such extreme policies reflect the convergence of populist ethno-nationalism with authoritarian state practices and what are the long-term implications for democratic institutions and minority rights in Israel?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think we need to make a little separation of things. First, Olmert’s warning is true and real. Israel’s actions in Gaza are dangerous. Many civilian lives are lost, and one could say—in very careful terms—without good reason. Not that there’s ever a good reason, but this war has definitely gone to extremes.
Now, why is this war continuing? Well, I think there are some reasons. One: it’s the government’s policy. And for Netanyahu, as long as the war goes on, the government stays intact. It keeps the government together. If the war ends, then some of the more extreme elements of the government might pull it apart, which means that Netanyahu would have to stand trial without the protection of being Prime Minister. It means there’ll be new elections. It means that Jews will begin debating what happened on October 7th—who’s responsible for this debacle. So for the government, the continuation of the war serves several purposes.
For some, the war should be continued because “we should not stop before the final victory,” which I’m not sure what it means—but for them, it’s the annihilation of Hamas. And I’m not sure that’s even possible. For others, maybe we should end the war on better terms for Israel. Again, I have no idea what that means.
But you could say there’s a mixture of ideology—of extreme right-wing ideology—of political interests, and mainly the fact that the government, for reasons that relate to what I said before, has never really introduced a strategy for how to end this war. If you ask Netanyahu: when does this war end? What will be in Gaza? Who will rule Gaza? Where will Israel be? What’s the role of the Palestinian Authority? What’s the role of other countries? What’s going to happen in Gaza once this war ends? What are the goals of this war? What is the strategy? We don’t know.
A Coherent Network of Right-Wing Advocacy Is Shaping Israel’s Future
Protests against judicial reform and religious coercion in Israel. Photo: Dreamstime.
How has the increasing influence of religiously conservative diaspora-funded NGOs and settler movements shaped the neo-Zionist agenda, particularly under populist governance?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Within Israel, money from abroad is not a new thing. NGOs—from both the left and the right—are supported from abroad. That’s not a new phenomenon. The same goes for the government. The Jewish diaspora has always maintained strong ties with Israel and influenced Israeli politics.
You can see NGOs on the so-called left and on the right receiving funding from abroad. Now, from the right-wing perspective, it’s the money from abroad that’s financing the left. So if you look at the populist kind of discourse, it’s about international elites supporting leftist, anti-Zionist forces who are opposing the government. It depends on which side is telling the story.
But to be more precise, I think what we’re seeing today is a very strong connection between the Israeli right and the Trump administration, as well as right-wing organizations in Europe. That’s where you see, perhaps, a new development: a more coherent network of right-wing advocacy that also has influence on Israel.
In your analysis of ‘good citizenship’ among new religious movements, how do such actors reframe legitimacy within a populist framework that delegitimizes secular or liberal opponents?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: There are several ways this is conducted. Begin with “good citizenship” in Israel—the republican equation, as we call it—has often been about military service. Many on the right pride themselves on being the foot soldiers: “We are carrying out the mission of defending Israel. We are paying the price in blood,” whether it’s through settlement in the West Bank or military service. Hence, we are the good citizens.
They blame the other side for not doing as much. By the way, statistics don’t necessarily support that, but that’s the claim. So being a good citizen is framed around military service and combat. That’s how they define good citizenship.
Now, this of course has implications for issues of gender and ethnicity—namely, for non-Jewish citizens. This whole concept of good citizenship is used by populists to describe themselves as the good, contributing, fighting citizens, in contrast to the “detached elites”—those who are global, more fluid, who can use their money to escape responsibility.
Now, this is a myth—a fable. The Israeli center-left has been fighting on the streets for democracy for two years now. So the whole notion of detached elites is complete baloney. But it makes for a compelling narrative on the right: We are the good citizens. We are the ones who sacrifice. We are truly committed to the country, while you—the elites—are global cosmopolitans. This, by the way, echoes classic anti-Semitic tropes once used in Europe against Jews. Put that aside—but the story they tell is that we are the good people, and they are the detached elites with less commitment to the country’s welfare.
A Different Government Might Have Chosen Strategy Over Messianic Dreams
Had a centrist or center-left coalition prevailed in the 2022 elections, how might the Israeli state have handled the aftermath of the October 7 attacks differently—in terms of military response, international diplomacy, and internal discourse?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s hard to talk about things that didn’t happen. The “what if” is always very difficult. I can say one thing: if the October 7th debacle had happened under a center-left government, the right would have used all its power to force that government out, to place the blame squarely on them, and to sell the narrative that this is what happens when you have a left-leaning government—one that is weak and unequipped to fight. A left-wing government would have been discredited to the bones.
That hasn’t happened with the right. Netanyahu’s government has been fighting for almost two years now to shed responsibility. “It’s not us, it’s the military, it’s the intelligence.” They’ve been working very hard since October 7th—October 8th even—to deflect responsibility.
Now, what would a different government do? Hard to say. But what a sensible one would do is, at some stage early in the war, begin to form a strategy. On October 8th, right after October 7th, we had very strong international support. We could have fought Hamas, brought an alternative government to Gaza, brought back the hostages, and started thinking of a new future for the Middle East. We could have pursued Middle East alliances—with the Saudis, with the Gulf countries. There were opportunities on the table. This government, because of its right-wing, messianic, and ultra-nationalist agenda, simply threw that out the window. What we would have had instead is maybe a strategy—not messianic dreams. A strategy.
Would an alternative government have challenged the securitization logic that you argue has long shaped Israeli-Arab relations, or merely adopted a more technocratic or liberal gloss?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Again, hard to tell. I would take anything that improves the current situation. Gloss might become, at some point, substance. But I think the previous government—at least on one issue that I’m researching, internal security—had a different approach.
We have an ongoing crisis within Arab neighborhoods in Israel. Arab citizens make up about 20% of the country’s population, and they account for more than 50% of the murders in this country. The numbers are skyrocketing.
The previous government, through an attempt to create a strategy, was able for the first time to slightly reduce the number of people murdered among Arab citizens. In this government, the police are in the hands of Itamar Ben-Gvir, an extreme right-wing nationalist and, if I may say, a convicted criminal. Under his office, the numbers have doubled since the last government. So yes, a different government could have made a difference.
Copying Orbán: Undermining Democracy in the Name of Sovereignty
To what extent is the judicial overhaul effort by the Netanyahu-led coalition part of a broader pattern of populist institutional capture akin to what we have seen in Hungary or Poland?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s been mentioned many times, and the comparison has been made by many people. The connection between Orbán and Netanyahu is well known. Netanyahu’s son has been advocating and has become something of a poster child for some of these movements. So there’s a strong relationship between the Israeli right and the right in Europe and the US.
To a large extent, this was the playbook of the right: undermine liberal democratic institutions and give more power to the government. Orbán—and what happened in Poland before the last elections—were good examples for Israel. And I think, to some extent, this was a copycat. Yes, we saw this in Europe; we can do the same things here. It’s a kind of logic that follows its own lead—it doesn’t really need the examples from abroad. Still, I think the fact that this is happening on a global scale has some meaning.
Do you view the weakening of judicial independence in Israel as a calculated step toward majoritarian rule under the guise of popular sovereignty? How does this resonate with your broader work on state-minority relations?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: They’ve said it explicitly—so it’s not a mystery. Their position is clear: they want to transfer power from the judiciary to the government. That’s not a secret—it’s the stated policy of this government. The Supreme Court may have its faults, and liberal democracy can certainly be debated. But what they’re proposing is a majoritarian government that tramples the rights of minorities. Again, this isn’t hidden. Some members of the government openly declare that Israel is a Jewish state in which Jewish citizens should enjoy privileges over non-Jews.
Israel has long debated how to reconcile being both a Jewish state and a democracy. It’s an ongoing tension—these principles often clash. Liberal Israelis—and one can debate whether they were right or wrong—have tried to argue that the two can be balanced. A Jewish state, they’ve said, can still be fair toward its Arab citizens. It may not be perfect, it may have flaws, but the contradictions can be managed, even if not fully resolved.
Under the current government, however, there is a clear and explicit shift toward prioritizing the Jewish character of the state. If being both Jewish and democratic comes into conflict, their answer is unequivocal: it is a Jewish state, and democracy comes second. For some in this government, that’s not incidental—it’s ideological. That’s what they believe.
Annexation of Gaza Is No Longer a Whisper—It’s a Declared Agenda
Do you see a fundamental shift in the far right’s approach to governing Palestinians under occupation—moving from ‘managing’ the conflict to accelerating irreversible annexation?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Absolutely. And again, these are things that are being said explicitly. You don’t really have to search—it’s not hypothetical. These are statements made by Smotrich, Ben Gvir, and others: that it’s time to annex the West Bank. So, it’s almost obvious. The only thing that has prevented it so far is international pressure. But under Trump, they believed the time had come—an opportunity to do what they always wanted: annex the West Bank. They’ve announced plans to build more settlements, to use more force against Palestinians, to expel so-called top terrorists—which can mean many things. So while these ideas are not yet fully implemented as policy, they are being openly discussed.
Thousands march in Jerusalem against judicial overhaul, March 2025. A broad protest fills the streets at night, with demonstrators calling to save Israeli democracy. Photo: Dreamstime.
Given the current political trajectory, do you believe Israel’s liberal democratic elements are in structural decline, or are there still viable pathways for democratic resilience—perhaps through civil society, judicial pushback, or international pressure?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think the jury is still out on this question. For many years, we’ve been lamenting the death of the left-liberal spectrum in Israel. The prevailing notion was that these people were tired—they were busy with themselves, individualistic, global, cosmopolitan. While the right appeared united and committed, the liberal left seemed aloof and less engaged.
However, over the past two years, we’ve witnessed something remarkable: thousands of people have taken to the streets every week. I think that should not be discounted. I’m not sure who will win, but two or three years ago, if you had told Israelis there would be large weekly rallies in defense of democracy, most would have dismissed it as impossible. Yet, when Israelis perceived that democracy was in danger, they rose up.
There is still a question about how far and how open this movement is. For the moment, it is focused on Jewish democracy. It does not yet address the occupation or fully include the rights of Palestinian citizens—that remains on the margins of the demonstrators’ consensus. The movement is centered on defending Israel’s democracy, and to maintain broad support, it has set aside, at least for now, the occupation and non-Jewish rights.
However, once a movement like this begins to grow and starts to confront the deeper implications of occupation and inequality, then maybe there is room for optimism. It’s hard to be hopeful right now—given the war and two years of ongoing struggle—but the fact that many Israelis are still on the streets, still fighting for democracy, means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.
Fear Is Driving Policy—But That’s Exactly What Ben Gvir Wants
To what extent does the current populist ascendancy reflect a systemic recoding of Israel’s founding ethno-religious cleavages into a majoritarian regime logic, rather than a contingent electoral maneuver?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think it’s more contingent. We’ve had many years of cleavages and schisms that have come to the fore with the last elections, and we are seeing a very strong cleavage between center-left and right. But within those camps, there are divisions. People on both the right and the left can change their opinions.
Especially in the last 18 months—after October 7th—there has also been the fear factor. People are acting out of fear. Let’s look at the Palestinians, or Arab citizens, or the world. There is still a memory of October 7th. This trauma still lingers.
So, I think what needs to happen now is the restoration of hope and the development of a strategy—reaching out to people on the other side of the spectrum and trying to convince them that there is another option. Maybe then there’s room for change.
To answer your question: no, it’s not merely a contingency. It is the result of many years of struggles and cleavages. Netanyahu was able to position himself as a defender of “the true people” in a very populist sense. But the war has also somewhat shattered that image—being Mr. Security and managing the economy. So, while these shifts are, at the moment, tragic, they may in the future provide some room for change.
In the light of your work on the ‘shrinking of citizenship,’ how has the October 7 Hamas attack provided a discursive and policy framework for intensifying the racialized securitization of Arab-Palestinian citizens under the guise of national unity and collective trauma?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s a good question. And again, it has several layers that we need to look at. To begin with—yes, Israel became more securitized. People are more afraid, which, of course, also shapes opinions and perceptions. When you’re afraid, it’s very hard to think things through and look at the long term. In that sense, it’s become more securitized. For example, political dissent is much less tolerated. There’s much more securitization of political statements and actions of Arab citizens.
At the same time, Ben Gvir was expecting Arab citizens to join in the October 7th events. That would have given him the reason to use more force against them. So, from Ben Gvir’s perspective or hopes, October 7th provided an opportunity to crack down on Israeli Arab citizens. This has not happened. Arab citizens did not play the game as expected. They remained very detached from Hamas. On October 7th, they were saying, “That is not us. We don’t condone these things.” More than that—among the hostages were Arab citizens, Bedouins from the Negev, who were taken by Hamas to Gaza, and some were killed by Hamas. Arab citizens on October 7th, in some cases, saved Jewish citizens.
The whole story became more complex. But now Gaza makes it more difficult—because those citizens are saying, “Those people in Gaza are our brothers.” When people are dying in Gaza in scores, “We can’t stand aside. People are starving in Gaza. We have to speak our mind. We have to protest.” And that’s the test for Israel. Can Jewish citizens be tolerant toward that? Or do their fears make them see those protests as pro-Hamas—which they are not?
Now we’re in a very difficult situation where Arab citizens who are protesting against the war in Gaza feel themselves threatened by the government. It has not exploded yet. But that’s exactly what Ben Gvir wants. For him, that would be a good day—one in which he can make the connection: Arab citizens, Palestinians, Hamas—they’re all the same, and they’re all here to destroy us. “Now we have legitimacy to use all means.” That’s the scare right now.
Election billboard showing Netanyahu shaking hands with Trump, with the slogan “Netanyahu. Another League,” in Jerusalem on September 16, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.
And lastly, Professor Ben-Porat, what role have transnational, religiously conservative, and diaspora-funded networks played in amplifying the settler-theocratic undercurrents of neo-Zionist populism, particularly in relation to territorial maximalism and cultural hegemony?
Professor Guy Ben-Porat: For many years there were relations between settlers and right-wing movements in Israel and similar or supportive movements abroad. As I said before, that is not unique in Israel. All movements—left, right, and center—have often found alliances abroad, whether among Jewish diasporas or liberals in America. So in that sense, what the right wing is doing is not unique.
This transnationality, to be fair, is something used by many groups in Israel for different purposes and reasons. You can say whether it’s good or bad, but the use itself is not unique. Where it is unique is in the US. If you look at Trump supporters in the US, the Evangelicals were a very strong element in his campaign. They provide very strong support for Israel, the right wing, and the settlers. That’s where the connection is important.
It’s more dramatic than it seems—because for many years, Israel was very careful to maintain a bipartisan approach in the US, having support from both Democrats and Republicans. Also remember, the Jewish community in the US is mostly pro-Democratic. So Israel traditionally refrained from taking sides in American politics. Israel was above the Republican–Democratic divide and maintained a relationship with the Jewish diaspora in the US, who are mostly pro-Democrats.
In the last decade or so, things have begun to change. Netanyahu has put his weight on the Republican camp—anti-Obama, anti-Biden, and pro-Trump in the US. His support came in many cases from either right-wing Jews, religious Jews, or right-wing Christians. So, the whole dynamic changes here. Before, it was bipartisan with strong support from the Jewish community. Now, it’s Republican—with support from right-wing Christians and Jews—and an alienation of a large part of the liberal Jewish community.
That’s a strange turn of events. But I think the important religious factor here is the right-wing religious Christians in the US. That’s probably the most important development in Israel’s foreign relations.
In the wake of Romania’s high-turnout 2025 presidential election, Dr. Vladimir Bortun offers a powerful analysis of how deep-rooted economic insecurity—fueled by decades of neoliberal reform—has driven support for the far right. Despite a centrist victory, nationalist George Simion’s strong performance underscores a broader post-crisis populist consolidation. In this exclusive ECPS interview, Dr. Bortun explores the AUR’s appeal among the diaspora and rural poor, the ideological vacuum left by the mainstream left, and how Romania exemplifies a wider European shift from democratic to authoritarian neoliberalism. A must-read for anyone interested in the structural dynamics behind Europe’s populist realignment.
Romania’s 2025 presidential election represented a pivotal moment for the country’s democratic trajectory and its place within the broader European political landscape. In a high-stakes runoff, centrist candidate and pro-European reformer Nicușor Dan secured a clear victory over George Simion, the leader of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). With the highest voter turnout in a quarter-century and the specter of a previously annulled election looming large, the vote was widely interpreted as a referendum on Romania’s political future—particularly on the tension between liberal democracy and the rising tide of far-right populism. Despite Simion’s defeat, his strong first-round performance and continued popularity signaled a deeper, more durable undercurrent of reactionary politics in Romania.
Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Dr. Vladimir Bortun, a lecturer at the University of Oxford and an expert on European politics, transnational party networks, and left-populist movements. With unique insight into both the structural drivers and class dynamics underpinning political realignments in Romania and beyond, Dr. Bortun offers a compelling analysis of how economic insecurity—rooted in decades of neoliberal reforms, mass emigration, and systemic inequality—has created fertile ground for the rise of the far right.
In this wide-ranging interview, Dr. Bortun reflects on how the socioeconomic legacies of Romania’s post-1989 transition have failed to deliver on their liberal democratic promises, especially for large swaths of the population living in poverty or working precariously. He argues that this deep economic discontent, compounded by the collapse of credible left-wing alternatives and the ideological convergence of the center-left and center-right, has allowed far-right actors like Simion and AUR to present themselves as anti-establishment voices—even as their own policies serve entrenched economic elites.
Crucially, Dr. Bortun situates Romania within a broader European context, where authoritarian neoliberalism is increasingly replacing the post-Cold War liberal consensus. He draws instructive comparisons with Poland, France, and Southern Europe, exploring how the mainstreaming of far-right rhetoric and policy by centrist parties—particularly around immigration and national sovereignty—has reshaped the ideological field.
By examining the rise of AUR’s support among the Romanian diaspora and among marginalized rural voters, Dr. Bortun challenges simplistic narratives about populism and brings attention to the lived realities of class, exclusion, and political abandonment. As he makes clear, the battle over Romania’s future is not only political or cultural—it is fundamentally about economic power, ownership, and whose voices get to shape the nation’s path forward.
Dr. Vladimir Bortun, a lecturer at the University of Oxford and an expert on European politics, transnational party networks, and left-populist movements.
Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Vladimir Bortun.
Neoliberalism Created the Perfect Storm
Professor Vladimir Bortun, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question:Given Simion’s stronger-than-expected first-round lead and his continued appeal despite being defeated in the runoff, how would you theorize the durability of far-right populism in Romania beyond the electoral cycle? Can this be conceptualized within a broader post-crisis populist consolidation rather than a mere reactionary surge?
Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a very important question. First of all, thank you again for the invitation. I should clarify that I’m not a professor yet—just a lecturer.
To go straight into the topic: recent academic literature has shed significant light on the key drivers behind the rise of the populist far right across borders. While there are, of course, multiple factors at play—and we will explore some of them—the most consistent driver across all contexts is economic insecurity, rooted in decades of neoliberal globalization.
These conditions have only worsened in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 crisis, which—as you mentioned—took a particularly austerity-driven form in Europe, shaped by how both European institutions and national governments responded. Romania was no exception.
To provide some context on the socioeconomic situation in Romania: after 35 years of neoliberal capitalism and roughly 18 years since joining the European Union—which has brought certain benefits but, for many Romanians (including those who have supported the far right), has failed to fulfill its initial promises—we are now facing deeply concerning indicators.
Approximately 45% of the population lives in poverty or on the brink of it—the highest percentage in the European Union, meaning nearly half the population is affected. Romania also ranks first or second in terms of in-work poverty. Moreover, it allocates the lowest—or among the lowest—shares of GDP to healthcare, education, and social protection.
After Ireland, Romania has the lowest tax collection capacity in the European Union. It also maintains some of the lowest tax rates in the EU. There is a 10% flat income tax, which disproportionately affects workers and employees—particularly because, in addition to this tax, they are also responsible for paying social contributions that were previously covered by employers. These include contributions to healthcare and pensions.
Unsurprisingly, this flat tax structure primarily benefits the wealthier segments of society. In addition, Romania has a corporate tax rate of 16%, one of the lowest in the European Union.
These are clearly the right conditions for economic insecurity—fertile ground for the rise of the far right. But it’s not only the poorest in society that we should consider. Economic insecurity affects various social classes and class fractions.
In Romania, it has had a particularly strong impact on the petty bourgeoisie—small and medium-sized entrepreneurs—who have been closing down their businesses at an increasing rate over the past few years, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic. I believe the pandemic represents another critical crisis that must be factored into any explanation of the far right’s rise. These small and medium entrepreneurs, going bankrupt by the thousands, form a core component of the far right’s social base.
Nationalism Meets Neoliberalism in a Peripheral Economy
People in traditional national costume return from Sunday church service in Maramureș, Romania—a region renowned for preserving its cultural heritage. Photo: Theodor Bunica.
How would you situate the AUR’s electoral messaging—particularly its nationalist-economically neoliberal synthesis—within the wider genealogy of post-2008 far-right formations in Europe? Is there a uniquely Romanian hybrid emerging, or does AUR largely mirror external templates?
Dr. Vladimir Bortun:There are certain similarities with the broader profile of the European far right. There is clearly this populist discourse they employ, which is built on the dichotomy between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.”The elite, as in other countries, is portrayed as those who have sold out our country—who don’t represent the interests of our country but rather represent foreign interests, globalist interests. And of course, other undesirable categories in society are targeted as well, such as the LGBTQ community and immigrants from non-European countries, who have started to come to Romania in recent years as cheap labor—these are the usual suspects in far-right rhetoric.
At the same time, there is an element of truth in relation to the domination of foreign interests in Romania. Foreign companies hold a dominant position in key sectors of the economy, such as the energy sector, manufacturing—especially the auto industry—and the banking sector. They make huge profits in Romania, which they then repatriate to their home countries rather than reinvesting, even partially, in the Romanian economy.
Foreign banks, in particular, are guilty of this kind of profit repatriation from Romania, and this has generated a level of dissatisfaction that can also be observed in other countries. For example, in Poland, there is a very interesting study on the role of “comprador bankers” in the rise to power of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), which governed the country for about a decade. These comprador bankers were Polish managers of foreign bank subsidiaries who eventually came to realize that these foreign banks were operating in Poland solely to extract profit—profits that were then repatriated to their home countries, rather than being reinvested in the Polish economy. They did not, for instance, offer affordable or advantageous loans to Polish businesses. In response, some of these managers rebelled against the model and aligned themselves with the national capitalist hegemonic project advanced by PiS.
So, there is an element of what I would call the “comprador professional managerial class” that has served foreign capital in these peripheral Central and Eastern European countries, now fighting back against this foreign capital domination—in coalition with the domestic capitalist class. Particularly, those fractions of the domestic capitalist class that are trying to secure the sectors where they are still dominant—especially in Romania, such as real estate, construction, and hospitality.
The party you mentioned—AUR—led by Simion, who lost the election, is heavily funded by segments of the domestic capitalist class, particularly in the construction, real estate, and hospitality sectors. These actors are seeking to ring-fence and protect their interests from foreign capital, while also attempting to gain state power in order to advance those interests.
This project of the national bourgeoisie reclaiming state power is a common regional feature across Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary, Poland, and now Romania exhibit this pattern. I would even argue that it extends beyond the region—to Turkey, for example. Correct me if I’m wrong, but the Erdogan project seems to share similar characteristics, as far as I understand.
Now, regarding the distinctive features of the Romanian case—since I’ve already outlined some of the common regional characteristics—there are two aspects that stand out about the Romanian far right. I would highlight these two features, and perhaps we’ll focus on one of them in the following questions.
The first is their particular appeal to the diaspora. The diaspora represents a significant portion of their social base, and I’ll elaborate later on why they’ve been so successful in mobilizing this group.
The second distinctive feature is their appeal to farmers. Romania has the highest share of the workforce employed in agriculture in the entire European Union—between 18% and 20% of the total workforce. To give you a sense of how high this is: the second-ranked country in the EU is Poland, with only 10% of its workforce in agriculture. France, despite having a strong agricultural sector, has just 2.4% of its workforce employed in this field.
So, this is a huge sector in Romania, and the vast majority of these people working in agriculture are subsistence farmers. They are small farmers who feel like nobody is looking after their interests. The state is perceived as only overburdening them with regulations and taxation, while favoring the interests of big foreign corporations. And the far right is managing to build inroads into this significant social class in Romania.
A Left in Name, Neoliberal in Practice
Crin Antonescu, the pro-European presidential candidate, speaks during the Social Democratic Party (PSD) Congress in Bucharest, Romania, where he was officially confirmed as the party’s nominee on February 2, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.
How do you interpret the apparent paradox between widespread socioeconomic grievances and the relative electoral failure of redistributive political platforms, particularly in the light of the Social Democratic Party’s strategic vacillation and policy convergence with the right?
Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s the key factor from a subjective perspective. I’ve tried to talk about the objective factors, but in terms of the subjective conditions, clearly the key factor that has facilitated the rise of the far right—not just in Romania, but across the region and beyond—is the lack of a credible left-wing political project.
And the current left party, the center-left party you’ve mentioned—the PSD—is left in name, but not in substance, not in policy. They have actually governed for the majority of these 35 years of neoliberal capitalism—more or less 20 of those 35 years have seen them in government. So, they have implemented some of the very policies I mentioned earlier, which are responsible for the current socioeconomic conditions.
The very minimal social concessions they have made in terms of redistribution while in government have been largely limited to increasing the minimum wage—which is, of course, better than nothing. This partly explains why they remain the most voted-for party in Romania.
However, these measures are far from sufficient. Despite repeated increases over the past six or seven years, the minimum wage remains very low—about 30% below what would be considered a living wage in Romania, that is, the income necessary for a decent standard of living.
Moreover, Romania has the highest share of its workforce earning the minimum wage. Nearly 40% of all workers are on minimum wage—twice the EU average.
So, we are a minimum-wage economy, a low-taxation economy, and a low public spending economy. Romania is pretty much a paradigmatic case of neoliberalism—and the PSD is very much responsible for this. It is arguably the single most responsible political party for this situation.
Proletarians Abroad, Petit Bourgeois at Home
With over 60% of the diaspora backing Simion in the first round, what implications does this have for the dominant narratives that have historically cast diasporic Romanians as liberalizing or pro-European agents?
Dr. Vladimir Bortun:That’s a significant shift indeed! And it started already in 2020, when the party AUR—which, by the way, stands for the Alliance for the Union of Romanians, but the acronym aur also means “gold” in Romanian— from the very beginning targeted its message toward the diaspora. They even called the diaspora “the gold of Romania” that they wanted to bring back to the country.
The party was launched in the diaspora in December 2019, one year before the first elections in which they stood candidates. Their launch meeting took place in the UK, among Romanians living there—not in Romania. So, from the outset, they were oriented toward the diaspora, and they managed to appeal to it in several ways.
On the one hand, this diaspora is not one unified entity; it consists of several diasporas. We’re talking about five million people, which is a quarter of Romania’s total population. They live very different lives in the West of Europe. Some of them live in quite squalid conditions, working very hard jobs for low wages, in poor environments, with little respect and little sense of being treated equally.
There is a widespread feeling among them that Romanians are treated as second-class citizens. Many are temporary or circular migrants—working on a construction site for three or four months, then returning to Romania, or working seasonal jobs picking vegetables on farms in Italy, Spain, the UK, or Germany, and then going back.
They don’t have a favorable context for integration or for deeper socialization in the host countries. But let’s be honest—those host countries themselves have experienced a surge in far-right politics. The far right is now much more mainstream in Western Europe than it was 10 or 20 years ago, when these migrants may have been sending back more liberal kinds of social remittances.
These societies have shifted significantly to the right. Anti-immigration discourse has become more mainstream, normalized, and legitimized—and Romanians living there have internalized some of that discourse.
In my own fieldwork, I often came across people who, despite being migrants themselves and suffering from anti-immigration attitudes and discourse, were nevertheless against other groups of migrants. They distinguished themselves from them—talking about “good migrants” and “bad migrants.” There is a real cognitive dissonance at play here, where migrants adopt anti-migration attitudes and political preferences.
Another aspect is that many feel Romania is a peripheral country that lacks a real voice in the European Union and in the broader global political stage. They perceive Romania as subordinated economically and geopolitically—which is true.
So, when a populist demagogue like Simion comes along and says, “I will make Romania stand tall again in the EU and in the world,” it resonates. It gives them a sense of restored dignity and pride.
Meanwhile, all the other political parties—including the PSD—are utterly uncritical in their allegiance to the EU, NATO, and the West in general. They refuse to acknowledge the real problems Romanians face, both in terms of their living conditions in the diaspora and in terms of Romania’s position within international power structures.
These parties speak only about the benefits and advantages of being part of these institutions, without addressing the contradictions, the challenges, or the structural disadvantages of Romania’s position in the European and international economic and political system. This, of course, creates a window of opportunity for the far right to come in and capitalize on people’s sense of marginalization and humiliation.
One additional point is that many of these migrants, as I mentioned, are circular or temporary migrants. They may be working blue-collar jobs abroad, but they’ve managed to accumulate enough capital to open a small business back home in their town or village of origin. This means they occupy a complex, dual class position: proletarians abroad, petit bourgeois at home. When they return home, after years of hard work abroad to save capital and open a small guesthouse, café, restaurant, or corner shop, they feel the state does nothing for them.
Instead, they feel overburdened by taxation. Increases in the minimum wage are perceived as a burden because they are now small employers who have to pay two, three, or four salaries. They blame the state—but they also blame those below them: people on minimum wage, or on welfare benefits, whom they see as lazy or asking for too much. They see themselves as the real hard-working people who have sacrificed abroad to invest in the Romanian economy—only to be abandoned by the state, which should be protecting their interests.
I think this is very important. I’m not saying it’s unique to Romania, but it is very salient here—and perhaps not as salient a feature in the social base of the far right in other European countries.
A Race to the Bottom Among Migrants
Building on your work on transnational political mobilization, how should we understand the AUR’s success among emigrants in Italy and Spain? Do these cases indicate a diasporic production of illiberal subjectivities shaped by specific host-country political contexts?
Dr. Vladimir Bortun:I think I already touched on this in my previous answer. However, Italy and Spain are particularly illustrative of some of the dynamics I outlined earlier—especially Italy, where the far right has been in power for the past two and a half years.
In that context, migrants often find themselves in a race to the bottom, trying to prove they are more deserving than other migrant groups. I encountered numerous cases of Romanian migrants in Italy—or former migrants who had lived there for many years—expressing very negative attitudes toward Moroccan or Albanian migrants, for example.
Some even told me they had voted for the Northern League, now known as La Lega—Salvini’s party—which was the original far-right populist force before Brothers of Italy surpassed it in popularity. Ironically, this is a party that had made openly anti-Romanian statements in the Italian press. Nevertheless, this became their way of attempting to carve out a place for themselves—by identifying someone “below” them to target as the “bad” migrant.
In Spain, we see a similar surge with the Vox party over the last few years. It is now the third-largest political force in Spain—a country where the far right was outside of Parliament for decades.
Again, we’re talking about a Romanian diaspora that has suffered a lot of discrimination and marginalization. It took a long time for this community to settle. But there is also a split within these diasporas, as I mentioned—between the more settled, integrated diaspora, and the precariously employed, circular, temporary migrants who come and go and who cannot really find a foothold in these countries.
The Center Imitates, but the Far Right Dominates
Comparing Romania’s recent presidential runoff to parallel dynamics in Poland and Portugal, to what extent can we speak of converging or diverging trajectories in the European center-right’s strategy to contain or accommodate far-right surges?
Dr. Vladimir Bortun: I think we see a very strong trend of accommodation of the far right—and not just from the center-right, but also from the center-left. In Denmark, for example—going a bit outside the region—the Social Democratic Party currently in government has adopted one of the harshest anti-immigration policies in Europe. And this trend extends further. Even here in the UK, the Starmer-led Labour Party has adopted many of the talking points not just from the Conservative Party but also from Reform UK. Just the other day, Starmer was speaking about Britain being “a country of strangers,” “an island of strangers” due to mass migration, according to him. Apparently, that makes me a stranger here.
There is a growing body of literature—by scholars like Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter—that refers to this as the mainstreaming of the far right: the normalization of reactionary ideas and policies. And this applies not just to rhetoric, but to actual policymaking, with both center-right and center-left parties adopting positions in an attempt to win back voters lost to the far right.
But as the saying goes, “the original is better than the copy.” People who want to vote for the far right for reactionary reasons—because they oppose immigration, for example—are unlikely to switch to the center-left just because it has adopted similar anti-immigration tropes. They will continue to vote for the far right. And we have seen this across the board.
The one Social Democratic party currently in power in Western Europe—in the EU at least—is in Spain. And they have resisted the temptation to go in this reactionary direction on issues like immigration and other topics dear to the far right. On the contrary, in some ways they have been an example of what a progressive government can and should say on key issues of our time, including the atrocities we are seeing in Gaza. They are, of course, not a perfect government—they have many flaws and shortcomings. But they demonstrate that it is still possible to stay true to Social Democratic values and policies and win elections. And that’s just speaking from a pragmatic point of view.
Corruption Isn’t the Cause—It’s the Symptom of a System
Protesters gather for the 13th consecutive day in front of Victoria Palace, the government headquarters in Bucharest, Romania, on February 12, 2017. Over 50,000 demonstrators rallied against controversial corruption reforms, illuminating the night with their mobile phones and forming the national flag with colored paper and cellophane. Photo: Dreamstime.
What insights might Romania’s 2025 election offer for understanding the evolving relationship between anti-corruption discourse and far-right populism, especially when contrasted with the cases of Poland’s Law and Justice or France’s National Rally?
Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a very interesting question. I think, on the one hand, the far right’s collusion with corrupt and clientelist practices shows that, after all, they are not such a real alternative to the mainstream parties they criticize. They are quite happy to engage in the same kind of bad politics that the mainstream parties are guilty of.
On the other hand, while corruption is indeed a major issue in Romania—as it is in many other countries—it is often framed in a very legalistic or even moralistic way, as if it’s simply a flaw of character or the result of an inefficient state bureaucracy.
In this sense, corruption is frequently instrumentalized ideologically to justify the further shrinking of the state and additional cuts to public spending. For example, it’s often claimed that there’s widespread corruption in the welfare system—even though Romania already allocates the lowest percentage of its GDP to welfare in the entire European Union.
Nevertheless, this anti-corruption mantra remains highly salient in public discourse.
The anti-corruption discourse has thus been used to legitimize harsh austerity and neoliberal measures. At the same time, when actions are taken against corruption—such as jailing corrupt politicians—they often remain at a superficial, legalistic level.
This approach is ineffective against the far right. In the United States, we saw the democratic establishment spend four years trying to go after Trump through legal channels—and yet Trump still won the election. Le Pen has been barred from standing in elections, and her party continues to grow in the polls. It’s certainly not declining.
In Romania, the Constitutional Court canceled the November election and barred the winning candidate, Georgescu. Yet the person who replaced him—Simion—secured double the percentage in the first round. It didn’t work.
I’m not saying such measures shouldn’t be taken—if there is a legal basis for them, then by all means, pursue them. But we need to recognize that this is not a real solution to tackling the far right.
On the subject of corruption, an important point must be made beyond its ideological instrumentalization. Corruption is a real issue that must be addressed, but it is often decontextualized.
Corruption needs to be understood as a key vehicle for the primitive accumulation of capital—something characteristic of any early stage in the development of capitalism, in any country, at any point in history.
Corruption, along with other violent forms of capital accumulation, has always been present—even in so-called advanced, consolidated democracies that have practiced capitalism for a longer time. Corruption played a massive role in the emergence of capitalism and continues to play a central role in capital accumulation today.
After all, the dirty money of drug cartels, criminal syndicates, and authoritarian regimes around the world is largely laundered through the City of London—the very heart of global capital. So, if we truly want to tackle corruption, we need to go to the root of the problem and understand it as part of a broader structural and systemic issue.
From Democratic Neoliberalism to Its Authoritarian Mutation
Lastly, from a historical-comparative perspective, how does the Dan–Simion runoff recalibrate the ideological field established in the 1990s transition era? Are we witnessing a definitive exhaustion of post-1989 liberal centrism or its tactical reanimation?
Dr. Vladimir Bortun: This is a great question. There have been repeated claims about the death of the neoliberal center over the past 15 years—after the financial crisis, for instance. There were suggestions that neoliberalism was coming to an end, and that we would see a return to a more Keynesian type of economic model. That didn’t happen. Instead, we got more neoliberalism—more austerity, more privatizations, more deregulation, more flexibilization of the workforce.
Then, again, after the COVID-19 pandemic, there were claims that this marked the death of neoliberalism, especially given the forceful intervention of the state to keep societies afloat—or more accurately, to keep the accumulation of capital going. But again, that was temporary. Neoliberalism has returned in full force.
Now we are witnessing the militarization of Europe, with promises of spending cuts on the most important public services in society in order to fund military efforts. So, I’m afraid we are not seeing the end of neoliberal centrism, but rather its transformation into something more authoritarian—still neoliberal, but authoritarian. A shift, if you will, from democratic neoliberalism to authoritarian neoliberalism.
This transformation is being endorsed by the political center, which is increasingly adopting authoritarian measures across Europe. Here in the UK, the so-called center-left government has imprisoned individuals not for taking part in a protest, but simply for holding a Zoom meeting to plan one—specifically, a protest against environmental destruction. They were not punished for blocking a motorway, but merely for discussing civil disobedience in response to the climate crisis. This illustrates a clear shift toward authoritarianism. Yet when it comes to economic policy, there is a striking convergence between centrist parties and the far right.
The far right claims to be an alternative to the status quo and capitalizes on the grievances, socioeconomic anxiety, and insecurity of ordinary people. But if we look at their actual policy proposals—or, in places where they are in power, their actual policymaking—it’s more of the same. They might throw a few crumbs to ordinary people, to the popular classes, in order to maintain their support. But the bulk of their economic agenda still serves the business class and the wealthy—just different factions of the business class and wealthy than those typically represented by centrist parties.
Marine Le Pen’s conviction for embezzling EU funds might have marked a legal defeat—but politically, it became a narrative victory. In her commentary, Julie Van Elslander explores how France’s far-right leader transformed her trial into a populist spectacle of persecution, mobilizing public anger and institutional distrust. By reframing judicial accountability as elite conspiracy, Le Pen advanced a post-truth strategy that defied factual condemnation and resonated deeply with disillusioned voters. This timely analysis illuminates the broader phenomenon of populist resilience in the face of scandal, showing how legal consequences can be strategically repurposed as political capital by populist actors within Europe’s increasingly contested democratic landscape.
By Julie Van Elslander*
Introduction
On March 31, 2025, Marine Le Pen, long-time leader of France’s far-right National Rally, was convicted by the criminal court of Paris for the misappropriation of an estimated €4.6 million in European Parliament funds (Ledroit, 2025). Sentenced to a heavy condemnation, Marine Le Pen suffered a significant legal and political blow. Yet, instead of weakening her influence or undermining her party’s credibility, the trial became a platform for Le Pen to reaffirm her political narrative. Despite legal conviction and moral discredit, the National Rally maintained political relevance by reframing the sentence as an element of political persecution – raising a question: How does a legal defeat become a populist narrative victory?
At the core, this narrative dynamic is emblematic of what scholars qualify of post-truth populism: The transformation of political culture by the devaluation of factual correctness over emotional appeal (Conrad & Hálfdanarson, 2023). In a context where public discourse is increasingly shaped by the logic of “alternative facts” – a concept introduced by Trump’s counselor in 2017 (Gajanan, 2017) – Le Pen’s trial is another example of the way post-truth populists challenge liberal democracies.
Rather than interrogating the legal dimensions of guilt or innocence, this analysis focuses on the populist discursive strategies through which Marine Le Pen’s trial was reframed in the public sphere, and how those shaped citizens’ political thinking (Aslanidis, 2016). The trial serves not simply as a juridical event, but also as a communicative site where competing narratives about power, legitimacy and truth are constructed.
The Case of Le Pen’s Trial – Facts and Only Facts
Among twenty-four others, nine ex-MEPs and twelve parliamentary assistants from the National Rally were trialed for “embezzlement of public funds” and “complicity in the embezzlement of public funds” from 2004 to 2016 (Maad, 2025). In this case, the court recognized that the European Parliament’s public funds were misappropriated in order to remunerate employees working for the party management under fictitious contracts, rather than related to the European parliamentary activity – as it is normally required for those collaborators (ibid.).
Marine Le Pen was sentenced to a €100.000 fine, two years under house arrest while wearing an electronic ankle bracelet, additional two-year suspended sentence, and five years’ ineligibility for public office with immediate effect. Le Pen’s heavy condemnation was due to what the court’s president as qualified as her “central role” in this case: “at the heart of this system since 2009, Marine Le Pen has signed up with authority and determination in the operation established by her father, in which was participating since 2004” (Dao, 2025).
Le Pen will appeal the verdict, but she will remain ineligible and could be ruled out of the 2027 presidential elections. She won’t serve the house arrest until every appeal is exhausted but the ban on running for office will be implemented immediately despite her legal challenge.
The irony of the case is striking: Marine Le Pen, who used to call for life ineligibility for elected officials convicted of embezzlement or corruption (Brault, 2025), now contests the legitimacy of her own sentence – but how does such a reversal become not a source of discredit, but a tool for reaffirming political legitimacy?
Not Guilty, Just Targeted? Le Pen’s Populist Response to Conviction
Despite her conviction, Marine Le Pen managed to maintain her political standing by discursively reframing the charges into a populist narrative of persecution and resistance. Ever since the trial’s deliberation, Le Pen has not stopped claiming her innocence, repeatedly insisting the judges were “mistaken” and reducing the issue to a simple “administrative disagreement with the European Parliament” that involved “no personal enrichment” (Marchal, 2025). Yet, the tribunal clearly stated that although the actions did not generate direct personal enrichment, they constituted serious breach of integrity and democratic principles, involving deception of both the European Parliament and voters (Sicard, 2025). By providing financial benefits to the National Rally, the stolen funds allowed it to maintain political influence and electoral advantages for over a decade (ibid.).
The judges justified the use of the ineligibility sentence and its exécution provisoire (which allows the sentence to be enforced even before an appeal), emphasizing that the defendants had expressed no recognition of their violation of the law, and the court had a duty to ensure that “elected officials, like any other subject, do not benefit from a preferential regime incompatible with the trust sought by citizens in political life” (France info, 2025). In 2023 alone, around 16.000 ineligibility sentences were issued in France, 639 of which included the exécution provisoire (France info, 2025a). While such measure is applied selectively – and in about 4% of the cases – it is far from exceptional (ibid.). Indeed, several other high-profile political figures in France, such as Nicolas Sarkozy or François Fillon, have been sentenced to ineligibility in recent years (Louis, 2025).
However, in the populist narrative, these precedents are rarely acknowledged. By using terms such as a “tyranny of the judges” (Cossard, 2025), the National Rally reinforced the idea that Le Pen is being unfairly targeted. The rhetoric implies an extraordinary sanction used to silence political opposition: the trial isn’t presented as a neutral legal process, but as the proof of a biased system – with Le Pen denouncing a “political decision,” a practice “we believed to be reserved for authoritarian regimes” (Vignal, 2025). The judiciary becomes just another part of the “elite” that is supposedly trying to stop her from acceding to the Elysée: “the system has released the nuclear bomb. If it uses such a powerful weapon against us, it is obviously because we are about to win the elections” (A.B., 2025). Here, Le Pen’s reframing does not deny the factual events themselves; rather, she strategically reinterprets them because openly acknowledging illegality could undermine her political legitimacy and moral authority.
This discursive approach fits neatly into what researchers call post-truth populism: The idea isn’t just to reject facts but to question who gets to decide what’s true in the first place(Ylä-Anttila, 2018). Populist leaders like Le Pen challenge the credibility and intentions of traditional fact-producers – such as judges, journalists or experts – to position themselves as more trustworthy (Mahmutović & Lovec, 2024). By stating that their version of facts are biased, corrupt or politically motivated, populist leaders construct alternative narratives, in which facts are selectively reinterpreted in ways that support their political agenda. The aim is not necessarily to prove their narrative is objectively true, but rather to undermine opposing ones as suspicious and irrelevant.
This type of rhetoric fits within a common populist logic, where courts and other oversight bodies are seen as tools of an unaccountable elite trying to undermine the will of the “real people” – a homogeneous group not defined by citizenship, but by symbolic alignment with the populist cause (Arato, 2017). By framing her conviction as political persecution, Le Pen not only shields herself from public blame, but also primes her supporters to view the case as of a “stolen election”.
Why Marine Le Pen Wasn’t ‘Cancelled’: Political Loyalty in a ‘Stolen’ Election
Marine Le Pen may have been convicted in court, but in the arena of public opinion, she proved to be remarkably cancel-proof. This resilience is rooted in the post-truth populist strategy that places narrative above norms, and emotional appeal above factual truth. It particularly stemmed among her supporters, for whom the verdict was seen as a symbol of political persecution, and an attempt to steal the 2027 election – a narrative that quickly found concrete expression in public reactions. On March 31, 2025, a few hours after Le Pen’s conviction, a French national news broadcast captured street interviews where multiple citizens reacted with shock and outrage, describing the verdict as “personal” and a way to “take her out” of the presidential race (TF1info, 2025).
An online petition launched by National Rally, titled “Save democracy, save Marine” (Rassemblement National, 2025) rapidly gathered thousands of signatures and rallied support over social media, but its message was not just about supporting Le Pen – it was about defending her voters’ rights. In an open letter promoting the petition, Jordan Bardella, the young president of the National Rally, described the conviction as an attack against voters: “They are trying to prevent a candidacy supported by millions of French people, which is well ahead in all the polls. They deprive millions of voters of their choice and therefore their freedom” (Krupa, 2025). This sense of disenfranchisement was further amplified at a public rally held a week later, during which Bardella addressed the crowd and further defended Le Pen as a candidate of the people, framing her conviction as an attempt to prevent the National Rally from acceding to power (ibid.). The conviction, as he claimed, was not just about her but about the right of French voters to choose their leader. The rally became a platform where Le Pen was portrayed not only as a victim but as a representative of silenced voters.
This narrative fits the typical populist discourse, which emerges from a perceived failure of representation (Rosanvallon, 2020) and frames political reality as a fundamental conflict between a corrupted elite and the common people, “whose mobilization is presented as the only solution” (Aslanidis, 2016) to regain sovereignty. Here, the mobilization efforts are largely symbolic: Neither a petition nor public rally could change the judicial outcome, as courts are not influenced by popularity. However, their aim is to reinforce the idea that the verdict is unjust, judicial independence compromised and that the electors are the true victims of this case. Those efforts function as political and social tools – not legal ones – allowing Le Pen’s supporters to transform outrage into collective action, and to signal strength and solidarity.
This is a key aspect of post-truth populism: The National Rally’s version of events is framed as more authentic because it taps into a deeper, widespread sense of institutional distrust (Harsin, 2024). When ordinary citizens feel that traditional institutions no longer represent them fairly, populist leaders like Le Pen often claim to embody the will of the people directly, calling for diverse forms of direct democracy (ibid.). Within this logic, portraying Le Pen’s sentence as exceptional and biased doesn’t require evidence – it simply needs to fit the broader story that her supporters believe: That she, like them, is being unfairly treated by a system that no longer serves them.
Yet, while this narrative mobilized Le Pen’s supporters within France, the impact of her conviction also reverberated beyond national borders, sparking polarized reactions at the European level.
A European Issue with Global Repercussions
With the National Rally’s discourse focusing on national stakes, the European legal affair was reframed as a national political issue. That is, in part, due to the nature of the European Union’s legal proceedings. Even though the European Parliament’s public funds are distributed through the institutions, MEPs are elected nationally and therefore reside within national jurisdiction. The investigation was first opened by the OLAF – the European Anti-Fraud Office, an independent entity – in 2014 (Bouquet, 2025), but criminal prosecution and sentencing remained the responsibility of national courts. Although the matter originated at the European level, with the European Parliament lifting Le Pen’s immunity following a referral to French authorities, the fact that the trial was handled nationally contributed to the widespread perception that it was a purely domestic affair. This procedural pathway ultimately placed the case within a broader discursive shift, reframing the trial as a French political controversy – judges, media and legal discourse – all nationally situated.
Moreover, the French discourse largely undermined the collective European harm caused by the embezzlement. While the European Parliament – the civil plaintiff in the case – announced it “took note” of the decision and declined to comment further, Le Pen’s conviction quickly gathered support among fellow populist leaders, particularly from far-right figure such as Viktor Orbán, Matteo Salvini, and Donald Trump. Orbán expressed direct solidarity by stating “Je suis Marine!” – a phrase typically used to express support and mourning for victims – while Salvini denounced the verdict as a “declaration of war by Brussels” (Les Echos, 2025). Trump compared Le Pen’s legal troubles to his own, labeling it a “witch hunt” and accusing European elites of using the judiciary to silence political opposition (Le Monde, 2025).
These international endorsements were not merely supportive gesture; they became central elements of the populist narrative surrounding Le Pen’s case. While the trial was framed in France as a part of a broader struggle between national sovereignty and a hostile elite, this international support further cast her as a symbol of resistance against a corrupt system – reinforcing the idea of a national and European political conspiracy targeting her.
The same divisive framing extended into the European Parliament itself. During the plenary session held shortly after the verdict, several Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the Patriots for Europe group – Le Pen’s European political family – expressed their support for Le Pen, condemning the conviction as undemocratic and broadly questioning the state of the rule of law in Europe. Hungarian MEP András László notably accused the “Brussels elite” of trying to “legally sabotage a far-right politician” because of her patriotism and opposition to a “globalist elite” (European Parliament, 2025) – aligning with the narrative of persecution. In contrast, MEPs from other political groups welcomed the conviction as a critical step in combating corruption within the institution. German MEP Daniel Freund notably qualified the Le Pen’s actions as “the biggest fraud case in the history of the European Parliament” (ibid.).
This polarized reaction within the European Parliament highlighted the trial’s dual nature: Legally, it was a case of embezzlement involving European funds, but politically, it became a battleground over competing narratives. For Le Pen’s allies, it symbolized a struggle against an oppressive European elite; for her critics, it was a long-overdue act of accountability.
Indeed, Le Pen’s case comes within the broader context of corruption scandals that have been shaking the European Parliament itself. The Qatargate scandal in 2022, involving allegations of bribes paid by Qatar to influence European lawmakers, and the Huawei case in 2023, where Chinese lobbying was accused of seeking favorable policies through financial incentives, exposed the vulnerability of European institutions to corruption. These scandals not only undermined the Parliament’s authority as a democratic institution of EU decision-making but also deepened the citizens’ distrust in EU governance – a distrust that populists are quick to weaponize.
Conclusion
The Le Pen case is more than a legal scandal – it is a test of the resilience of European institutions against populist narratives that thrive on distrust. It is not merely about one politician reframing her conviction as persecution; it is a case study in how a legal process can be transformed into a battleground of competing truths. At its core, this case reveals a deeper conflict between factual accountability and symbolic politics.
Ultimately, the stakes go beyond Le Pen herself. The crisis of trust she has exploited is part of a broader European problem. As Qatargate and the Huawei scandal have shown, European institutions are not immune to corruption, and this vulnerability has fueled perceptions of institutional hypocrisy. It is this perceived hypocrisy that populist leaders weaponize, transforming legitimate accountability efforts into narratives of persecution. Ultimately, the Le Pen case is a message of political legitimacy: In an era of post-truth populism, the verdict in court may matter less than the verdict in public opinion.
(*) Julie Van Elslander is a double master’s student in European Governance (Sciences Po Grenoble) and Politics and Public Administration (Universität Konstanz), with a strong interest in how democracies respond to challenges like populism, post-truth politics, and institutional distrust. She has contributed to European-level research projects on political communication, corruption, and democratic accountability, and currently works as a research intern at the Center of International Relations (University of Ljubljana).
Aslanidis, P. (2016). “Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective.” Political Studies, 64(1_suppl), 88–104. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12224
Conrad, M., & Hálfdanarson, G. (2023). “Introduction: Europe in the Age of Post-Truth Politics.” In: M. Conrad, G. Hálfdanarson, A. Michailidou, C. Galpin, & N. Pyrhönen (Eds.), Europe in the Age of Post-Truth Politics (pp. 1–9). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13694-8_1
Harsin, J. (2024). Post-truth Politics and Epistemic Populism: About (Dis-)Trusted Presentation and Communication of Facts, Not False Information. In Newman, S., Conrad, M. (eds) Post-Truth Populism. Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64178-7_2
Mahmutović, M., & Lovec, M. (2024). “‘The First in the Service of Truth’: Construction of Counterknowledge Claims and the Case of Janša’s SDS’ Media Outlets.” In: S. Newman & M. Conrad (Eds.), Post-Truth Populism (pp. 177–216). Springer Nature Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64178-7_7
Ylä-Anttila, T. (2018). Populist knowledge: “Post-truth’ repertoires of contesting epistemic authorities.” European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology, 5(4), 356–388. https://doi.org/10.1080/23254823.2017.1414620
“The more rigid the regime becomes, the more easily it may break,” warns Dr. Spyros Sofos in an illuminating interview with ECPS. Tracing the Erdogan regime’s shift from reformist Islamism to a personalized authoritarianism, Dr. Sofos highlights how the dismantling of institutional checks and grassroots engagement has deepened Turkey’s democratic crisis. He sharply critiques the EU and US for enabling this drift, arguing that their silence—rooted in strategic pragmatism over refugee control and regional stability—amounts to tacit complicity. As Erdogan’s rule grows more centralized and brittle, Dr. Sofos suggests its very inflexibility could be its undoing. Amid repression and international complacency, he insists, spaces for resistance persist—and the next rupture may come from within the regime itself.
In a timely and far-reaching interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Spyros Sofos—Assistant Professor in Global Humanities at Simon Fraser University—offers a deeply informed and critical analysis of the Erdogan regime’s evolution into an increasingly rigid and personalized form of authoritarian populism. “The more rigid the regime becomes,” Dr. Sofos warns, “the more easily it may break.” Far from being a sign of consolidated power, he argues, the regime’s escalation of repression—most recently with the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu—betrays deep insecurity and structural fragility within a system that has steadily dismantled institutional checks and blurred distinctions between state, party, and judiciary.
Dr. Sofos traces how the AKP’s early reformist stance, driven in part by strategic engagement with European institutions, gave way to a calculated centralization of power following institutional resistance from the military and judiciary. He explores the AKP’s ideological recalibration—through religious nationalism, neo-Ottoman nostalgia, and pan-Turkic outreach—as a tactical means to expand and solidify its coalition amid economic turmoil and intra-Islamist fragmentation.
Yet just as trenchant is his critique of the European Union and the broader West, whose response to Turkey’s democratic backsliding has been marked by passivity and strategic self-interest. “Effectively, what the EU and the US have been doing is wanting Turkey to ensure that the masses of displaced people within its territory would not move towards the West,” he states bluntly. In prioritizing border control, security cooperation, and transactional diplomacy over democratic principles, Western powers have turned a blind eye to the regime’s authoritarian escalation—signaling tacit approval through their silence. Dr. Sofos calls out this hypocrisy, echoing Imamoglu’s own condemnation of European leaders for abandoning not just him personally, but the very idea of democracy in Turkey.
He also warns that the West’s failure to push back meaningfully against Erdogan’s authoritarian turn—driven by domestic electoral concerns and geopolitical calculus—risks normalizing the erosion of democracy, both in Turkey and beyond. With comparative insights from Hungary, India, and Israel, Dr. Sofos situates the Turkish case within a wider global trend of populist-authoritarian drift, but insists that this is not a one-way trajectory. The regime’s internal contradictions, coupled with mounting grassroots resistance and international hypocrisy fatigue, may yet create opportunities for democratic renewal.
This interview is not only a sobering account of democratic decline in Turkey, but also a compelling indictment of Western complacency in the face of it.
Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Spyros Sofos.
Ottoman Nostalgia as a Tool of Populist Reinvention
Supporters await the arrival of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at a referendum rally in Istanbul on April 8, 2017. Photo: Thomas Koch.
Professor Sofos, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you interpret the Erdoğan regime’s mobilization of Ottoman nostalgia in both domestic and international contexts as part of a broader populist-authoritarian narrative?
Dr. Spyros Sofos: Thank you for having me. That’s a very interesting question, as there has been considerable discussion about neo-Ottomanism and the broader concept of Ottoman nostalgia. I believe the Erdogan regime needed a narrative that could effectively counter the one developed by the Kemalist regime over the past century. This new narrative serves several purposes.
The first is linked to the regime’s reinterpretation of history—particularly evident in debates around the reconversion of Hagia Sophia and other Christian monuments. Erdogan’s government has framed the Justice and Development Party (AKP) constituency as victims whose sovereignty was denied under the Republic for 100 years. In that context, a return to Ottoman nostalgia becomes a way of reclaiming a past where, ostensibly, there was more sovereignty and the people were heard. This re-imagined past helps construct an alternative vision of popular sovereignty, centered around the AKP’s base—and, I would argue, much of the nationalist constituency as well.
The second reason relates more to the interests the current leadership perceives as central to Turkey’s role both domestically and internationally, as well as to the political elite’s own strategic goals. For example, we see Ottoman nostalgia being used in foreign policy to justify, or at least lend legitimacy to, expanded relationships with countries that Turkey sees as pivotal—not only in its immediate region but also across Africa.
A striking example is Turkey’s presence in the Sahel and West Africa. The invocation of Ottoman-era connections is used to frame Turkey’s involvement in countries like Somalia—not only in humanitarian terms but as part of a broader strategic interest, grounded in a historical narrative of Ottoman reach. This is, of course, a very flexible interpretation of history, but one that the regime has used effectively.
This pattern also applies to Turkey’s outreach in the Balkans—something that began under Turgut Ozal. In countries like Bosnia, North Macedonia, and Albania, there’s a strong emphasis on rekindling historical and cultural kinship, often under the umbrella of shared Ottoman heritage.
Interestingly, the outreach to Central Asia—while unrelated to the Ottoman Empire—is also wrapped into this broader narrative. This connection seems driven either by economic interests or by a pan-Turkic nationalism that predates the AKP. So while neo-Ottomanism features prominently in both domestic and foreign policy, the regime also draws on other strands of historical memory to shape its identity and strategy.
From Reform to Repression: The Strategic Evolution of Political Islam under the AKP
How has political Islamism under the AKP evolved from a reformist or counter-hegemonic force into an ideological tool for authoritarian consolidation and state-led populism?
Dr. Spyros Sofos: I think that’s an important question. Political Islam—broadly speaking—had long been under threat from Turkey’s military, judiciary, and bureaucratic institutions before the AKP’s first electoral victory. In those earlier years, Islamist politicians were cautious in how they criticized the state and its institutions.
In the first five or so years of the AKP government, we saw what some scholars have called a “politics of patience”—a cautious, incremental approach to reform. There were several reasons for this. First, the AKP sought to emphasize its commitment to European institutions and to the broader European integration project. As such, it had to present itself as a genuinely reformist party.
While it may sound a bit cynical to frame it this way, this positioning made it much harder for the military and judiciary to halt the AKP’s political momentum. After all, the AKP was arguably the most pro-European and pro-reform force in Turkish politics at the time. Any attempt to stop it would likely have triggered significant Western backlash, possibly even sanctions. With hindsight, I now see this as a carefully calculated strategy. At the time, I was quite hopeful—thinking that this opening could bridge the divide between the “old regime” and the emerging Islamic-oriented political elite. But in retrospect, it seems it was more about ensuring the survival and viability of Erdogan’s political project.
The so-called “e-coup” during the 2007 presidential election, when Abdullah Gul’s candidacy was being obstructed by military and judicial actors, marked a turning point. This intervention allowed Erdogan and his allies to pivot from their cautious stance to a more confrontational and assertive posture.
So, while the AKP initially positioned itself as reformist out of necessity, the institutional resistance it faced—particularly from the army and judiciary—created an opening for it to strike back sooner than it might have otherwise. And unfortunately, this shift happened at a time when civil society lacked the strength to act as an effective check on power.
Islamist Nationalism Rebranded: Survival Politics in Erdogan’s Turkey
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan watching the August 30 Victory Day Parade in Ankara, Turkey on August 30, 2014. Photo by Mustafa Kirazli.
Do the regime’s increasingly religious-nationalist narratives reflect a deeper radicalization or strategic recalibration—and to what extent do these still resonate with the AKP’s traditional base amid economic hardship and intra-Islamist fragmentation?
Dr. Spyros Sofos: That’s one of the most interesting and challenging questions I’ve had to think about over the past couple of years. I believe we need to complicate the idea of the AKP as simply an “Islamist” party, full stop. It’s something more complex—and its ideology has evolved, largely in response to shifting constituencies that it needs to mobilize for political survival.
Over the years, we’ve seen alliances like the one with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Devlet Bahceli, which introduced a significant nationalist component into the AKP’s political orbit. Most recently, in the 2023 presidential elections, we witnessed a major push to win over nationalist voters. While Islam isn’t necessarily incompatible with nationalist currents in Turkey, this required the AKP to recalibrate its discourse in a way that differed substantially from its earlier messaging.
The party continues to promote a form of nationalism infused with Islamic elements, but it’s no longer offering the same vision as in the early 2000s. It’s certainly not a reincarnation of Alparslan Turkes-style nationalism either—but it has shown a willingness to experiment with different formulations of Turkish nationalism in order to appeal to broader political forces and secure electoral dominance.
This ideological flexibility is significant. Some of the intellectual figures in the AKP’s broader sphere of influence now engage with strands of nationalist thought that were previously absent from Islamist political discourse in Turkey.
At the same time, I don’t believe Islam has been displaced from the core of the AKP’s identity. But it has never been the only element. From the beginning, the party positioned itself as a voice for the downtrodden—regardless of their level of religiosity or piety. It’s always sought to build a broader coalition, and I think that remains true today.
In your work on the Gezi Protests, you emphasized the significance of bottom-up resistance. How do the dynamics of current mass protests compare to the 2013 Gezi movement in terms of ideological coherence, regime response, and potential for catalyzing long-term democratic transformation?
Dr. Spyros Sofos: That’s also the million-dollar question. So let me just try to unpack a few things about Gezi. I think Gezi was unique in the sense that it was not a movement that wanted to change a government. It was not aspiring to play a political role in the way, for example, that political parties would. And I think that was the secret behind its success and its failure at the same time. So it was a movement about bringing some sort of freedom into what Habermas would have called the life-world.
It was a movement that was against the policing of everyday life, people’s bodies, people’s relationship with nature, and so on. And of course, it had a political emphasis, which is the element of continuity. So it was a different movement, but there was also an emphasis on change—not necessarily governmental change—that I can see today in the mobilizations that have been taking place, especially after the arrest of Imamoglu recently.
What has changed, I think, and what is quite interesting to bear in mind, is that the mobilizations of today, at least in my reading, have not been as unplanned as the mobilizations of Gezi. You know, most people—I interviewed people—said, “I went there because I felt something was happening, and I needed to be part of it.” Today, many people may be thinking that something is happening and they need to be part of it—but I think Imamoglu himself, who is a very astute politician, had been preparing for this moment, and therefore he had ensured that there would be some sort of planning for what happens after his arrest or incapacitation.
We see that also in the fact that he’s been able to communicate out of jail fairly easily, that he managed to publish in international media quite articulate articles that could not have been scribbled at the last minute. And also, we have a change within the CHP that has allowed the party to be more able to mobilize people in support of democratic change.
I’m not trying to say that there is something sinister about this. I’m trying to say that there is a spirit of Gezi in the air—I can see that—but there is also more of a relationship between the current mobilizations and the political parties of the opposition that want to see democratic change.
Imamoglu’s Arrest Signals the Cracking Façade of Competitive Authoritarianism
To what extent does the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu mark a definitive rupture in Turkey’s evolution from competitive authoritarianism toward full-fledged autocracy—and does it reflect a broader erosion of political pluralism?
Dr. Spyros Sofos: I was always cautious about Imamoglu, because I really consider him a very astute politician—a politician who is not authoritarian per se, but who has realized that a kind of populism—which I find, I’m always suspicious of populism—was the means of defeating Erdogan. And I was always arguing that Imamoglu may be one of the best hopes of defeating Erdogan, but not populism. But that’s a fine detail we can talk about later.
So, I think that definitely the arrest of Imamoglu, his lawyers, and a lot of his collaborators is an important damage inflicted on the prospects of a more pluralistic political scene in Turkey.
Imamoglu, during his time as Istanbul mayor, has really tried to engage with the grassroots in ways that no other politician has ever done. So I think arresting him is also a kind of condemnation of his political project—of talking with grassroots, of trying to empower and mobilize communities in ways different from the AKP’s.
Therefore, I do believe that it is also an attempt not only at his person, but at the model of politics that could emerge out of a possible victory by Imamoglu. Now we’re seeing a more naked, fully fledged authoritarian move in Turkish politics.
I’ve heard all these discussions about who will succeed Erdogan, and sometimes family appears to be first in these discussions. It indicates that even the fig leaf of competitive authoritarianism is dropping at the moment. But it’s a very fluid situation. The intentions of Erdogan and his advisers may not lead to the results that they want to achieve. I think the regime is the more rigid it is, the more easily it breaks in some ways.
In your view, how has the personalization of power under Erdogan blurred institutional distinctions between the state, the ruling party, and the judiciary? Is the judiciary now operating more as an instrument of regime survival than of rule-of-law governance?
Dr. Spyros Sofos: Let me start from the judiciary, but I will go to the personalization in a minute. We’ve seen that the judiciary was the target of reforms and the target of a lot of meddling. Effectively, what was being planned was to render it less independent. We had all these kinds of promotions of different judges, the retirements of other judges, and so on. There have been pressures from time to time on the judiciary, so definitely the judiciary is no longer a means of checks and balances in the political system.
And this is the problem generally with the hyper-presidential system that Erdogan introduced. In some ways, there is no institution that has the gravitas and authority that the institution of the presidency has. Therefore, it’s not only the judiciary—even the Parliament, in many ways, although there are ways in which it can throw a spanner in the works, as we say—even the Parliament cannot really challenge the presidential dominance in the political system.
Now, if you add the personal charisma and its cultivation by Erdogan, the situation becomes even clearer. It’s not only an institution, but it’s also a president who in the past has spoken out against the courts. When the courts decided against him, he talked about the milletin iradesi—the national will—as superior to the courts’ legal rationale and thinking.
So we can see here that the personalization and the charisma that has been brought into politics is significant, even without the presidential system. But of course, now it is also institutionalized.
A final thought: I had written, when I was writing about Ataturk, that Ataturk had established a two-tier political system, in some ways. I’m simplifying now. One was, of course, the institutions of the Republic—the National Assembly and the party—and then two aborted experiments with the Liberal Party, and so on. And then there was another element—that was his person: the state as a person, and it was the person of Ataturk.
What I meant by this is that whereas the citizen in the villages of the Republic, would be harassed by the jandarma, would be suppressed in a variety of ways, then you would see Ataturk touring the countryside or the cities of the country and being the object or subject of adoration. He would hug kids, and he would talk to people in a charming way. I think Erdogan has done something very similar, and the personalistic element is crucial in that.
So there is a state that is really vicious—it can take passports away, put people into jail—and then you have Erdogan, who cannot do it as well as I think Ataturk did, but on the other hand, he is another facet of the state, unmediated. He talks to people, and he derives authority from this—not from his institutional position only.
Regime Insecurity and Western Complicity Feed Erdogan’s Authoritarian Drift
President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrives at the European Council building in Brussels, Belgium, on May 25, 2017. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.
Would you frame the current authoritarian escalation as a sign of regime insecurity ahead of critical elections, or as part of a calculated strategy to secure post-electoral permanence through managed democracy and repression?
Dr. Spyros Sofos: I would not distinguish these two because they can work together. So what I would say is that we had seen a calculated attempt already in the autumn, when Bahceli talked about PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan visiting the National Assembly, and he said that he treated him as an interlocutor. At the time, I was arguing—and I had written an article that, however, was published very recently—I was trying to say that this was a sign for me that Erdogan and others were feeling insecurity, as they had seen that the Kurdish movement had supported the opposition tacitly in most elections in the past. Therefore, they needed to ensure that this would not continue—that the Kurdish parties, the Kurdish organizations, the PKK would not continue supporting the opposition—and thus they attempted this Kurdish opening, this attempt to bring Kurdish politicians to the table, while keeping Selahattin Demirtas, who would be a charismatic figure that could challenge this possibility, in jail.
So, I think already at the time we could see that regime insecurity was at the center of the thinking of the current political elite. It’s not only Erdogan, it’s all these people who have made fortunes under Erdogan, and they want to maintain impunity and those fortunes. Therefore, they are also insecure, and they have the ear of people close to Erdogan, maybe Erdogan himself. So that’s the first thing.
The second thing is that this also prompts the political leadership at the moment to think that in order to counter this regime insecurity, a system that would limit the possibility of a challenge—political, electoral challenge—to the current incumbents would need to be in place. And therefore we have this leap from regime insecurity to a more authoritarian system that would allow the durability of the current regime in one way or another, and the impunity of those who have managed to benefit from it.
So both.
Do you interpret the EU’s and US’s muted response to Imamoglu’s arrest as tacit legitimation, strategic pragmatism, or democratic fatigue? To what extent does Western inaction enable further authoritarian entrenchment?
Dr. Spyros Sofos: The West, especially the European Union, has a lot to do with the current situation. Already, in the first decade of the century, they were getting cold feet about engaging with Turkey regarding membership or some sort of closer union with the EU. Now, they are much more cynical. They have been treating Turkey—and Turkey has been treating them—in a transactional way.
Effectively, what the EU and the US have been doing is wanting Turkey to ensure that the masses of displaced people within its territory would not move towards the West. In view of the war in Ukraine and the broader threats coming from Russia, they also want Turkey to be a cornerstone of some evolving security policy. I find it difficult to see how this will happen, but that seems to be the logic within Western political circles.
In this sense, now that Turkey has become strategically important for various aspects of Western European security, there seems to be a willingness to turn a blind eye to what is happening domestically in the country. Imamoglu himself said this very clearly, castigating European leaders for doing nothing—not just for failing to support him personally, but for abandoning the broader hope of democracy in Turkey.
I believe there is a general democratic fatigue in the West, especially as many Western governments are dealing with their own populist challenges. In addition, they are wary of creating a rift with Erdogan. There are several reasons for this, including domestic electoral considerations—such as the influence of Turkish communities in countries like Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
Erdogan has also been actively engaging in the Balkans, including meddling in Bosnian affairs. Western leaders want to mute this influence. At the same time, they want Turkey to feel that it can benefit from supporting the security architecture of the EU and NATO, and to distance itself from closer ties with Russia. As a result, they are largely disinterested in democratic resistance inside Turkey.
Erdogan Leverages East-West Tensions to Shield His Regime from Accountability
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made the opening of the Natural Gas Pipeline (Turkstream) in Istanbul, Turkey on November 19, 2018.
How does Erdogan’s external positioning—on migration with the EU, and regional geopolitics vis-à-vis Iran and Russia—insulate the regime from meaningful international pressure despite ongoing democratic erosion?
Dr. Spyros Sofos: Well, it relates to your previous question, but thank you for this, because it allows me to elaborate a bit more. I think that the positioning of Ankara toward Russia, Iran, and even Syria is quite significant, as it clearly reflects a strategy of leveraging different relationships to insulate the regime—from criticism and possibly even from sanctions. I’m not necessarily talking about economic sanctions.
Erdogan—specifically Erdogan, not necessarily Turkey—has been very skillful in cultivating relationships with both the Iranian leadership, including Khamenei and various conservative politicians, and with Putin. He has also played an active role in the Astana process dealing with the future of Syria, in which Iran and Russia have been central players.
So we can observe a two-pronged strategy here. First, Erdogan ensures that every time Turkey feels under pressure from the West, it can leverage one of these alternative relationships. Second, Turkey is simultaneously helping to develop and participate in institutions that undermine Western international influence.
For example, instead of engaging with the Geneva process on Syria, Turkey remains committed to the Astana process—a trilateral format involving three illiberal regimes deciding Syria’s future. More broadly, we now frequently see Turkey participating in efforts to build an alternative international institutional architecture—one that weakens those institutions capable of holding it accountable.
And lastly, Professor Sofos, how does Turkey’s trajectory under Erdogan challenge or confirm existing theoretical models of populist-authoritarian governance? Are we witnessing a uniquely Turkish path or a globally resonant pattern of democratic decay in hybrid regimes?
Dr. Spyros Sofos: Actually, I’m writing a book at the moment on this, and I am trying to argue that we can see similarities in the cases of Modi in India, Orban in Hungary—to some extent, although Hungary is not an emerging power like Turkey—and even in Israel, where very similar developments are taking place. The judicial reform attempt by Netanyahu could have been written by Erdogan, in many ways.
So what I’m trying to say is that, yes, there is definitely a uniquely Turkish way of building populism. I have struggled in the past to find ways in which the Turkish case can be meaningful for understanding populism, particularly authoritarian populism, more broadly. But leaving aside the particularly Turkish elements—like the century-long divide between those who benefited from the Kemalist reforms and those who were left behind—there is a kind of playbook that we can see being repeated or developed simultaneously in other parts of the world.
Turkey is one of the initiators of a number of political developments that are now being copied by other illiberal actors. But I also see a broader attempt to develop scripts of sliding toward illiberalism—what I would describe as an authoritarian version of populism. I should say, I consider populism—regardless of whether it is left or right—authoritarian in character. So I sometimes find it difficult to use the terms authoritarianism and populism together.
But yes, we can see this happening elsewhere, and therefore we are in for a rough ride. It’s not just one individual country that is affected. I think it’s about the way we are now thinking
In this timely and incisive interview, Professor Philippe Marlière (UCL) discusses Marine Le Pen’s conviction, the limits of far-right populism, and the resilience of democratic institutions in France. While Le Pen’s narrative frames her disqualification as a “denial of democracy,” Professor Marlière warns against buying into this rhetoric. “Politicians are not above the law,” he asserts, adding, “The far right has no free pass to establish a dictatorship in France.” A must-read on the legal, political, and symbolic stakes of France’s 2027 presidential race.
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Philippe Marlière of University College London offers a trenchant analysis of Marine Le Pen’s conviction, the broader rise of the far right in France and Europe, and the fragile boundaries between democratic politics and authoritarian temptation. Known for his work on French and European politics, Professor Marlière opens the conversation by sharply distinguishing between fascism and the far-right populism embodied by Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN). “I would describe Marine Le Pen’s National Rally as a far-right party,” he says, stressing that although it is “reactionary” and “nativist,” it is “not fascist” in the classical sense, since it operates within existing democratic institutions.
The interview takes on greater urgency in the wake of Le Pen’s conviction on corruption charges and her disqualification from running in the 2027 presidential election. According to Professor Marlière, the ruling represents a “major blow” not only to Le Pen personally—who was widely seen as a leading contender—but to the party’s claim of moral superiority over the political establishment. “The conviction is so clear-cut,” he notes, “and her defense so weak,” that overturning the verdict on appeal seems unlikely.
At the heart of the conversation is the far right’s delicate balancing act between anti-establishment rhetoric and the imperative to appear legitimate within democratic norms. Marlière cautions that while Le Pen and her allies may frame the ruling as “a denial of democracy,” they have not dared to attack the judiciary wholesale, because “if she does, she risks being seen as undermining French justice and being pushed back to the political fringe.”
This fragility, he argues, reveals the limits of populist authoritarianism in France. “In a democracy, when you are a politician, you must respect the decisions of the judiciary,” he insists, citing Montesquieu’s separation of powers. And that is why, he concludes, “the far right has no free pass to establish a dictatorship in France.” Voters may be willing to punish the mainstream, but they are not prepared to dismantle liberal democratic institutions in the process.
Dr. Philippe Marlière, Professor of French and European Politics at University College London.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Philippe Marlière with some edits.
RN Is Nativist, Reactionary, Far-Right—But Not Fascist
Professor Marliere, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: You’ve distinguished between authoritarianism and fascism in recent analyses. Given Le Pen’s ideological evolution and her party’s increasing parliamentary power, where would you situate her movement today?
Professor Philippe Marlière: Well, I would describe Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) as a far-right party. If you want to place it on the left-right axis, as political scientists typically do, it clearly falls on the far-right. That’s also how many people in France perceive it today. Le Pen herself resists the “far-right” label, as it implies being on the fringe or extreme end of the political spectrum. However, that is how pollsters and the media commonly categorize the party. So yes, it is far-right.
It’s not fascist. I don’t think the National Rally can be described as a fascist party. Fascism is something quite specific. You can find fascism today in some countries and in some parties, but I don’t think the National Rally is fascist. I would call it nativist. The main concern of the National Rally is the support, through policies, of the indigenous population—the French—as they describe it, as opposed to non-French people or migrants. So: nativist.
Probably reactionary. Much of the National Rally’s policy and ideology seems aimed at returning to a past—often an idealized or even mythical version of the past—that France, in reality, never fully experienced. A past, of course, with fewer migrants and fewer foreigners. In that sense, it is reactionary.
The party used to advocate policies that were decidedly illiberal. For a long time, it supported the death penalty, opposed abortion, and stood against LGBTQ rights. It has evolved on these issues, and that’s likely something we’ll discuss further. In sum: reactionary, nativist, far-right—that’s how I would describe it.
Fascism, as I’ve said, is different. It involves the attempt to establish a totalitarian regime. It can promote racial politics and undermine or directly challenge the rule of law. I don’t believe the National Rally is currently inclined to do that—although, of course, once in power, they might attempt to.
That said, within the current political context, the National Rally appears to be a party that, if elected, would operate within the main institutions of France and Europe. It would likely cooperate with European partners within the European Union. For all these reasons, it is a far-right party, but not a fascist one.
A Major Blow to the RN’s Anti-Establishment Credibility
How do you assess the political implications of Marine Le Pen’s conviction and subsequent disqualification from running for office in 2027? Given the National Rally’s efforts to portray itself as a respectable, anti-corruption alternative to the political establishment, to what extent does this judicial outcome represent a decisive rupture in the party’s quest for power—and could it destabilize its electoral momentum ahead of a crucial presidential race?
Professor Philippe Marlière: Le Pen’s conviction—alongside that of up to 20 party members, mostly elected representatives in the European Parliament—is undoubtedly a major blow. It’s especially significant for Le Pen herself. She might not be able to run in 2027. As far as I’m concerned, I don’t think the decision will be overturned on appeal. She likely won’t be a candidate, so someone else will have to step in.
For now, she’s fighting to clear her name, but the conviction is so clear-cut, the corruption charges so substantial, and both her defense and the party’s defense so weak, in my view, that overturning the verdict will be extremely difficult.
This is a serious setback for Le Pen, particularly because she was seen as having a strong chance of winning the 2027 presidential election. It now seems increasingly unlikely that she will be able to run.
But more broadly, it’s also a significant blow for the party. As you mentioned, it has increasingly been seen as a normalized political force—no longer on the extreme fringe, but rather as a party whose ideas, members, and officials have gradually gained a degree of legitimacy. I wouldn’t go so far as to say it fully belongs to the political mainstream—not yet, not entirely—but to some extent, it is certainly no longer the early National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the party that once frightened a large portion of the public.
So it’s a major blow for the party because part of its appeal lay in being increasingly perceived as no longer extreme by a majority of voters—or at least by a solid base of 37 to 40% of the electorate—while simultaneously remaining highly critical of the system; that is, the other mainstream parties, which it portrayed as corrupt and part of a de facto coalition responsible for poor governance in France and for the French people.
So, of course, being convicted and found guilty of corruption is a major blow, especially since much of Le Pen’s rhetoric has focused on attacking other parties—branding them as corrupt, accusing them of collusion, and portraying them as operating within a deeply flawed system. Now, that very charge is being applied to her.
There is evidence, and according to the first opinion polls, many people now view the National Rally as a corrupt party—or at least believe that the initial conviction handed down by the judges last week was justified.
Politicians Are Not Above the Law
Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the end of a polical meeting in Marseille for Rassemblement National party on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.
In a democracy, how should we balance judicial independence with the political fallout when a leading presidential contender like Marine Le Pen is barred from running due to financial crimes? Do you see this ruling as reinforcing or undermining public trust in French institutions? Moreover, is there a risk that—even if legally justified—it will fuel far-right conspiratorial narratives about ‘elites’ silencing dissent? How should mainstream parties navigate this moment without inadvertently legitimizing those populist frames?
Professor Philippe Marlière: As you would expect, Le Pen’s defense—and the party’s defense—was to claim that this is a denial of democracy, that the conviction was politically motivated, that the judges are politicized, and that the goal is to bar her from running because she would likely win. That’s what she said at a large rally last Sunday at Place Vauban in Paris. She made these claims, and throughout the week, Le Pen and her supporters have continued to repeat them. Of course, that is their narrative. But that doesn’t mean the narrative is true. In my view, it should be taken with a large pinch of salt and critically examined.
Let’s start with the heart of the matter. What is that? It’s the conviction of Le Pen and her supporters. She is guilty—guilty of a serious act of corruption. Several million euros of public funds were diverted to fake jobs. So we begin with that fact: she is guilty.
However, I believe that, with the support of some media outlets in France—not all, but some—the discussion has shifted away from Le Pen’s conviction and guilt toward a debate about politicized judges and an alleged denial of democracy. I remain very skeptical, if not outright critical, of Le Pen’s narrative, because it seems to me that the judges simply did their job: they applied the law.
By the way, who passed the law—the one that led to Le Pen’s conviction and its immediate effect? It was the lawmakers themselves. A bill was passed in Parliament in 2016. So it was people like Le Pen who voted for that law. They wanted to be extremely harsh on individuals convicted of acts of corruption.
That’s why I think it would be useful to bring the debate back to the heart of the matter: Le Pen’s conviction. She was found guilty of a serious act of corruption. And secondly, the judges simply did their job. To claim that they politicized the process is incorrect—they applied the law.
This also demonstrates something important: politicians are not above the law. They are treated like ordinary citizens—and rightly so. Why should a politician—even someone intending to run for the presidency, with a real chance of winning—be exempt from the law if condemned by French justice?
That’s the real issue. That’s what we should all be reflecting on, instead of defaulting to claims like “the judges are politicized,” and so on. In my view, that is the real question.
Undermining Justice Would Push Le Pen Back to the Political Fringe
Marine Le Pen has characterized her conviction and political ban as a ‘denial of democracy,’ echoing a broader far-right populist tactic of depicting institutions as tools of political repression. In the light of your critique of ‘political nudges’ like the ‘Islamo-gauchisme’ narrative, do you see a danger that the far right will now instrumentalize this legal verdict to delegitimize the French judiciary and fuel deeper mistrust in liberal democratic institutions?
Professor Philippe Marlière: I think it will be difficult to do that. They have probably already tried—particularly Le Pen. If you heard her speak last Sunday in Paris, when she addressed a rally of supporters, she was, of course, very harsh in her response to the judgment. She said, “Of course I’m innocent, this is a denial of democracy,” and so on. She also claimed that the judges who made the decision were politicized.
But she didn’t, so to speak, issue a broader criticism of the French judiciary. She didn’t say, for example, that the entire justice system is corrupt. She avoided that, because doing so would amount to directly challenging the French judicial system as a whole—and that would be quite serious.
It would indeed be highly problematic for a leading contender for the highest office in French politics to undermine the judiciary through such criticism. In a democracy, when you are a politician, you must respect the decisions of the judiciary. Failing to do so means interfering with justice—and that is a very serious matter.
The French political philosopher Montesquieu, in the 18th century, wrote about the separation of powers—executive, legislative, and judiciary—and he said that no power, executive or legislative, should be in a position to interfere with or encroach upon the power of the judiciary. If you do that, it’s no longer a democracy; it’s a tyranny. So justice must remain independent.
That’s why Le Pen will be very careful before launching a broader attack on the justice system. So far, she hasn’t done that. Some of her supporters have likely been less cautious, but she herself has been careful not to place blame on the judiciary as a whole. Instead, she has focused on specific individuals—the judges who issued the ruling—claiming, for instance, that the presiding judge was a leftist.
But this is a difficult line for Le Pen to walk. She cannot push too far in that direction. If she does, she risks being seen as undermining French justice and, as a consequence, being pushed back to the political fringe. Her opponents will say, “Look, you’re clearly not part of the mainstream. If you were ever elected, you would interfere with the justice system.” And that, of course, would be very serious.
Le Pen Must Defend Herself Without Undermining the Rule of Law
Given your work on the ‘dé–diabolisation’ or “de–demonization” of the Rassemblement National and the normalization of the far right in France, do you think Marine Le Pen’s conviction and political ban will disrupt this process—or could it paradoxically bolster her image as a political martyr and reinforce the RN’s anti-establishment appeal? Does this verdict pose a serious challenge to the RN’s attempt to position itself as a credible party of governance, or might it instead deepen its populist narrative of being targeted by a hostile elite?
Professor Philippe Marlière: Again, this is a difficult situation for Le Pen to handle, because she will, of course, try to defend herself. She has already filed an appeal, and I believe it will proceed very quickly—much faster than it would for ordinary citizens. Normally, an appeal takes two to three years, but in this case, it is scheduled for next year, which is unusually swift.
Why next year? Because it allows time for a decision to be made before the presidential election. This gives Le Pen one last chance to run—if she is cleared on appeal. In that sense, it also serves as further evidence that the judges, or the French justice system more broadly, are not conspiring against her. On the contrary, the legal process is offering her another opportunity to stand as a candidate.
So it’s a very difficult situation, because they have to be extremely moderate in their criticism of the justice system; otherwise, they risk being seen as a party that challenges the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. They simply can’t afford to do that. Someone like Donald Trump may be doing so in the US and getting away with it for now—but in France, where Trump is, by the way, quite unpopular, that approach would not be well received.
So the room for maneuver for Le Pen and her party is quite limited. She can say, “I’m innocent, I’m going to appeal, the judges who made the decision were unfair,” but they cannot go much further than that. They cannot openly criticize the judicial system as a whole.
That’s why I think, in terms of image—since that’s your question—if we look at the initial opinion polls, of course, these will need to be confirmed over time. But according to the polls, people don’t seem to have changed their minds. The party remains quite high in the rankings, and Jordan Bardella appears to have, roughly speaking, the same level of support as Le Pen.
There are two distinct points here. First, it’s clear that the National Rally is currently the leading party in French politics. That was evident in the last two elections—the 2024 European election and the general election—where the party came out ahead of all others.
That’s one thing. The other is the judicial decision. And I think, overall, the opinion polls show that the French public believes the decision was fair. That’s why Le Pen can’t make too much noise about it. It’s seen as a fair judgment. French voters appear to believe that no one should be above the law—including national politicians. If they’ve done something wrong, they should be punished like anyone else would be in similar circumstances.
A Far-Right International Is Emerging—But It Won’t Help Le Pen
In the light of the vocal support Marine Le Pen has received from international right-wing figures like Donald Trump and Elon Musk, to what extent does this signal the emergence of a transnational populist narrative centered on judicial persecution or ‘lawfare’? Are we witnessing a growing global solidarity among populist leaders who frame legal accountability as political victimization by elite institutions and the consolidation of a transnational illiberal alliance?
Professor Philippe Marlière: Well, very likely. The initial signs suggest that there is a kind of de facto reactionary or far-right international that has rallied in support of Le Pen. I think all the major figures—key leaders of that movement in Europe—came out: Orbán in Hungary, Salvini in Italy, Trump, J.D. Vance, Bolsonaro. Many of them made public statements. Even Trump tweeted.
He probably doesn’t know Le Pen very well—perhaps not at all—but someone likely mentioned the case to him, so he tweeted in her support. Of course, he did so because these kinds of far-right leaders seek to undermine the rule of law in liberal democracies. They challenge judicial decisions whenever those decisions go against them, and that’s precisely what Trump has been doing in the US. So, this was more of an opportunity for them to do just that, rather than a genuine expression of support for Le Pen herself.
But yes, there is a de facto far-right international. And every time a decision appears to deprive far-right politicians of power—or simply goes against them—they tend to rally in support of that politician, as they did in this case.
What does that mean, concretely? I think this kind of reaction doesn’t clearly indicate what the future holds, one way or another. It remains very uncertain. When I refer to a far-right international, it shouldn’t be compared to something like the Socialist International, where organized parties met regularly and committed to shared policies. It’s not that structured. It’s more at the level of national leaders or heads of state issuing statements, especially via social media.
So yes, she received that support. But what does it mean for Le Pen in France? I don’t think it means much. As I mentioned, Trump is deeply unpopular in France—on both the left and the right. Almost no one likes him. So I don’t believe receiving support from those far-right figures will benefit Le Pen. I think she has to be very careful. Le Pen wants to be seen as more mainstream, so if she appears to be in cahoots with, or too close to, highly controversial politicians abroad, I don’t think it will help her.
Far Right Is Rising—But Too Divided to Replace Le Pen Easily
Leaflets featuring candidates for the 2024 legislative elections in Versailles, France, on June 28, 2024. Photo: Dreamstime.
From the French perspective, does Le Pen’s downfall create space for a new figure on the European far-right, or is her symbolic centrality too embedded in the populist narrative across Europe to be easily replaced?
Professor Philippe Marlière: This highlights the central challenge facing the far-right in Europe. The far-right has been steadily growing—making electoral gains, winning elections, and even holding power in several countries. To start with Europe: they were in power in Poland; they remain in power in Hungary and Italy—a major EU country—and Le Pen and her party are performing very well in France. The AfD in Germany has also been doing well. So there is a clear, steady rise of the far-right, marked by significant gains in the most recent European elections.
That’s one of the reasons why the far-right is no longer seriously considering leaving the EU if it were to come into power. They’ve realized they can fight from within and attempt to redirect the EU’s political course.
So that’s good news for the far-right. However, does this translate into greater coordination or cohesion among far-right parties and governments in Europe? Not necessarily. For example, there are at least two parliamentary groups in the EU that include far-right parties. They were unable to form a single group, which, of course, weakens their influence because their efforts are divided across multiple blocs.
It’s also well known that far-right leaders do not necessarily get along well; they do not necessarily work together. For instance, Marine Le Pen is close to Salvini and La Lega but doesn’t get along well with the Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni—which is strange, because Giorgia Meloni has a legacy that is more similar to Le Pen’s. They both come from far-right parties initially. Of course, they’ve evolved somewhat and are now a little bit different. But whereas La Lega initially wasn’t a far-right party when it was created in the 1990s, it became a far-right party. So it’s very strange, and I can’t necessarily explain the logic of these de facto alliances between far-right leaders and parties.
I think it often comes down to their positions on policy, but it’s also about whether the leaders get along personally. I believe it’s more the latter. And that, in itself, is telling. Political scientists often say that the left has trouble uniting—and if you look at the French left right now, that’s clearly the case. They can’t come together.
But it seems the far right also struggles to unite, for similar reasons: ideological differences and personal rivalries. So this is where things stand at the moment. The far right has become more successful recently, but it remains divided. It is not a unified movement. Instead, it’s a collection of far-right parties spread across various parliamentary groups in the European Parliament—groups that don’t necessarily cooperate well or work together effectively.
Bardella Isn’t a Le Pen—But He May Be Even More Radical
Jordan Bardella, Le Pen’s protégé, is poised to become her replacement. Based on your analysis of generational shifts within the European far right, do you see Bardella as a mere avatar of Le Penism by remaining dependent on the Le Pen name, or does he represent a potentially more radical or technocratic trajectory?
Professor Philippe Marlière: There are differences between Le Pen and Bardella. First of all, he’s not a Le Pen. If Bardella runs in 2027, it will be the first time since Jean-Marie Le Pen launched the National Front in 1972 that no Le Pen is running for the FN/RN party. That’s the first difference.
There’s also a generational difference. Le Pen is 56, and Bardella’s youth could be appealing—particularly to younger voters—by presenting a new, youthful face of leadership. But of course, there’s a downside: he is politically untested and very inexperienced. He’s not known as a strong debater or a skilled orator. Reaching that level in politics takes time—it requires years of experience. Le Pen has improved over the years, and with Bardella, it would be a very different proposition.
There are also political differences. I think Le Pen has been—and still appears to be—more supportive of the de-demonization strategy. Unlike her father, she hasn’t attempted to shift the party to the center—the National Rally remains firmly on the far right—but she has worked to make some of its flagship policies on immigration, Islam, and the interpretation of French laïcité more acceptable to a broader segment of voters.
To make them more acceptable to other parties as well, because de-demonization works both ways. It involves you, as a far-right party, refraining from using aggressive rhetoric or making racist statements—things that generally do not resonate well with the electorate. But it also involves your opponents shifting to the right and adopting some of your policies, particularly on issues like immigration.
So there are differences, as Bardella appears to be somewhat more radical on those issues. His economic policies also differ; he’s more like Jean-Marie Le Pen of the 1980s and 1990s—more neoliberal, more supportive of laissez-faire economics than Marine Le Pen. So, you might think these are merely cosmetic differences.
And who knows what will happen if we assume that Le Pen won’t run? Bardella seems to be in a good position—he holds a strong position as the party leader. But who knows? Something might change. Other candidates might try to enter the race, and there could even be a primary election within the party.
Think, for instance, of Marion Maréchal, the niece of Marine Le Pen. She left the party a few years ago to join Éric Zemmour, but now she seems to have taken a step back from him as well. She attended the rally on Sunday in Paris in support of Le Pen. Who knows? She’s very popular among party voters. She’s a Le Pen, even though she no longer uses the name—she’s Marion Maréchal-Le Pen—and for that reason, her presence could be significant. She’s also a better orator than Bardella.
So, who knows what might happen? Bardella appears to be the front-runner to replace Le Pen, but we might be in for a surprise.
Portrait of French politician Éric Zemmour with Marion Maréchal (formerly Le Pen), leader of the Reconquête party, seen in Toulon during a protest against the arrival of the migrant rescue ship Ocean Viking. Photo: Laurent Coust.
Le Pen’s Legal Struggles Will Have a Limited Impact on Europe’s Far-Right Strategy
And lastly, Professor Marlière, what ripple effects might Le Pen’s conviction and framing as a martyr have on sister far-right movements in Europe, especially in states like Italy, Hungary, and Germany? Could it embolden them or shift their strategies? Do you think this case and its framing could be used by other European populists to delegitimize legal institutions, especially in countries where the rule of law is already under strain?
Professor Philippe Marlière: I might be a little optimistic on this, but I don’t think it will have a significant impact on the political situations in other countries. Of course, some will use Le Pen’s case to talk about so-called politicized judges, to claim a denial of democracy, to argue that the “true patriots”—as they describe themselves—are being sanctioned by their opponents, that they can’t speak the truth to the people, that they are restricted and constrained. You know, all the usual arguments.
I think they might refer to the Le Pen case in national debates to make those points. But I’m optimistic in the sense that each national context is different. And besides, the pace of politics today is very fast. In a few months, who will still be talking about Le Pen’s conviction?
There will be the appeal, so in a year or so, it may come back onto the agenda. But if the appeal is upheld, I think people will move on—there will be a replacement, another candidate, probably Bardella—and Le Pen will be quickly forgotten.
That’s one thing. The other reason I’m optimistic is that, as I said earlier, Le Pen has to be very careful about criticizing the judges and the justice system—not to be seen as undermining the rule of law—because that would be an extreme move. It would place her in a very radical position, one that most of the electorate, particularly conservative voters who are not far-right, would likely reject.
These are the voters who, in the second round of a presidential election, might be tempted to vote for Le Pen or someone from the National Rally against, for instance, a left-wing candidate—if one were to make it to the runoff. This electorate is conservative, right-wing, but not far-right. The National Rally needs to keep them on board and continue appealing to them. If they can’t—if they lose that electorate—they will never get elected. That’s why they have to be extremely cautious. And I think the situation is the same across most European countries—Italy, probably—with one exception: Hungary.
Hungary has been governed by Orbán for a long time, and many people say that while elections still take place, they are not very fair. It’s a highly authoritarian regime—illiberal. So, probably with the exception of Hungary, where the opposition is now quite weak due to all the laws passed by Orbán’s government, I think in other countries there are still counterpowers—opposition parties, trade unions, the media, and most importantly, the public—the electorate.
It’s not because the electorate is putting the National Rally ahead in France that they want an authoritarian regime. It’s a very complex reality to grasp. I think supporting the far right in France today means, above all, rejecting the other parties—both left and right. People believe those parties were once in power and failed. They tried Macron, and they believe he failed too. So it’s more about the idea: let’s try the only party that has never governed—the National Rally.
But that doesn’t mean voters want an authoritarian regime, or a government that will curb public freedoms or take extreme measures. That’s why Le Pen can’t see herself as the new Trump. I don’t think being a Trump figure would go down well in France. Then again, you might say, in the US, who could have predicted what happened there?
You see, that’s why I’m optimistic. But of course, things can sometimes go wrong very quickly. Still, that’s my view. I think that for Le Pen and the party to be successful and ultimately win an election, they will have to stick to their strategy of de-demonization—which means no longer being seen as an extreme or threatening party—so that enough people will be willing to vote for them.
Of course, they will maintain their policies—against immigration, against Islam, and against a number of other things—but they do so because they believe there is probably a majority of people who could support those positions. Just enough. That’s their strategy. It doesn’t mean they have a free pass to establish a dictatorship in France.
Date/Time: Thursday, March 13, 2025 / 15:00-17:00 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. Cengiz Aktar(Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member).
Speakers
“How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?” by Dr. Eric Langenbacher (Teaching Professor and Director of the Senior Honors Program in the Department of Government, Georgetown University).
“How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?” by Dr. Kai Arzheimer(Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz).
“Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election,” byDr. Hannah M. Alarian (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida).
“The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications,” by Dr. Conrad Ziller (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen).
“Germany’s Far Right: Antifeminism Sells,” by Dr. Sabine Volk (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau).
Dr. Cengiz Aktar(Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member).
Speakers
“How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?” by Dr. Eric Langenbacher (Teaching Professor and Director of the Senior Honors Program in the Department of Government, Georgetown University).
“How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?” by Dr. Kai Arzheimer(Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz).
“Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election,” byDr. Hannah M. Alarian (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida).
“The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications,” by Dr. Conrad Ziller (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen).
“Germany’s Far Right: Antifeminism Sells,” by Dr. Sabine Volk (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau).
Dr. Cengiz Aktar is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens. He is a former director at the United Nations specializing in asylum policies. He is known to be one of the leading advocates of Turkey’s integration into the EU. He was the Chair of European Studies at Bahçeşehir University-Istanbul. In addition to EU integration policies, Dr. Aktar’s research focuses on the politics of memory regarding ethnic and religious minorities, the history of political centralism, and international refugee law.
How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?
Dr. Eric Langenbacher is a Teaching Professor and Director of Honors and Special Programs in the Department of Government, Georgetown University. His research interests center on political culture, collective memory, political institutions, public opinion and German and European politics. His publications include From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Germany at the Twentieth Anniversary of Unification (co-edited with Jeffrey J. Anderson, 2010), Dynamics of Memory and Identity in Contemporary Europe (co-edited with Ruth Wittlinger and Bill Niven, 2013), The German Polity, 10th, and 11th, 12th edition” (2013, 2017, 2021) (co-authored with David Conradt), The Merkel Republic: The 2013 Bundestag Election and its Consequences (2015), and Twilight of the Merkel Era: Power and Politics in Germany after the 2017 Bundestag Election (2019). He is also Managing Editor of German Politics and Society, which is housed in Georgetown’s BMW Center for German and European Studies.
How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?
Dr. Kai Arzheimer is a Professor of German Politics and Political Sociology at the University of Mainz in Germany. He is particularly interested in European far right parties and their voters.
Abstract: Within just three years, Germany’s Far Right “Alternative for Germany” has managed to double the 2021 result, making them the second largest party in the new parliament. During this period, the party has undergone a bewildering transformation that involved (further) radicalization on the one hand and normalization on the other. In my presentation, I trace this process and will also use (very preliminary) survey data to look into the micro-foundations of the AfD’s meteoric rise.
Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election
Dr. Hannah Alarian is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, where she is also a faculty affiliate with the Center for Arts, Migration, and Entrepreneurship and the Center for European Studies. Dr. Alarian’s research examines questions of immigration, citizenship, and far-right politics in Europe and the United States. Her research appears in the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Politics, and Comparative Political Studies, among others.
Abstract:The 2025 German Federal Election marked a seismic political shift. Voter turnout soared to its highest since reunification, the far-right AfD secured 20.8%, becoming the second-largest party in the Bundestag, and the FDP lost all parliamentary representation for only the second time in history. How did Germany reach this moment of far-right ascendence, and what lies ahead? This presentation addresses these pressing questions, examining the democratic challenges posed by AfD. In particular, I examine the expected driver of far-right support (i.e., immigration) and party strategies regarding accommodation or exclusion of the AfD in parliament (i.e., breaching the Brandmauer). I conclude by discussing the democratic challenges facing the next German government and strategies the coalition may employ to stave off further far-right mobilization.
The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications
Dr. Conrad Ziller is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at University of Duisburg-Essen. His research interests focus on the role of immigration in politics and society, the radical right, and policy effects on citizens, amongst others. More information can be found here: https://conradziller.com/
Outlines: In the 2025 German federal election, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) achieved a historic 20.8% of the vote, doubling its previous performance and marking its strongest postwar result. This surge was particularly pronounced in economically disadvantaged regions, especially in the former East Germany, where the AfD secured up to 46% of votes in certain districts. Notably, the party made significant inroads in traditional Social Democratic Party (SPD) strongholds, such as Gelsenkirchen in North Rhine-Westphalia, a constituency long dominated by the SPD. Additionally, the AfD has gained popularity among young men and even attracted votes from immigrant communities, indicating a substantial realignment of voter bases. The implications for German politics over the next four years are profound. With a stronger parliamentary presence, the AfD’s will continue to challenge the traditional party system and influence debates on immigration, economic reform, and Germany’s role in the European Union. While mainstream parties have ruled out coalitions with the AfD, their electoral losses highlight growing societal divisions. Addressing the economic and cultural divisions fueling the AfD’s rise will be crucial for maintaining political stability and democratic cohesion.
Germany’s Far Right: Antifeminism Sells
Dr. Sabine Volk is a postdoctoral researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau. She is affiliated with the Hub on Emotions, Populism and Polarisation, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki. Her research appears in European Societies, European Politics and Society, Frontiers in Political Science, German Politics, Political Research Exchange and Social Movement Studies, as well as in edited volumes. Her research interests include populism and the far right, party politics and social movements in Germany and Europe.
Abstract: The issue of immigration surely dominated the German federal election campaign. Mainstream parties adopted an increasingly harsh anti-immigration discourse under the impression of AfD’s increasing strength in the polls. This presentation shifts our attention to yet another important issue of far-right politics in Germany and beyond: antifeminism or ‘antigenderism’. Addressing the puzzle of AfD’s lesbian leader Alice Weidel, it examines how AfD successfully fashions itself as Germany’s key antifeminist actor. Among other things, it traces AfD’s radicalization in the issue areas of women’s reproductive rights as well as trans and gender diverse minority rights.