Professor Tariq Modood, the founding Director of the Bristol University Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship.

Professor Modood: A ‘Multiculturalist International’ Needed to Counter ‘Far-Right International’

by Editor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviewsMigration

In this wide-ranging interview with ECPS, Professor Tariq Modood calls for the creation of a “multiculturalist international” to counter the rise of far-right transnational networks and exclusionary nationalisms. Highlighting the dangers posed by xenophobia, Islamophobia, and authoritarian populism across Europe and beyond, Professor Modood argues that multiculturalism is “not simply a reaction to populism… it is a positive vision” that affirms shared citizenship while respecting diversity. He contrasts his model of “moderate secularism” with French laïcité and Hindu nationalist secularism, emphasizing inclusivity and equality. Brexit, he notes, weakened the EU’s capacity for multicultural integration: “We need to create a multiculturalist alliance across countries, in the way that the far right is creating its own transnational network.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era marked by the transnational rise of far-right populism, exclusionary nationalism, and algorithmically amplified xenophobia, Professor Tariq Modood, the founding Director of the Bristol University Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, offers a deeply considered and nuanced account of how multiculturalism can serve as both a critique of and alternative to these reactionary forces. As one of Europe’s leading theorists of multicultural citizenship, Professor Modood’s work insists on reconciling respect for ethno-religious group identities with an inclusive and reconstituted national identity—a project he characterizes as “multicultural nationalism.”

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Modood explains that his vision of multiculturalism is “not simply a reaction to populism, nor a political strategy against it; it is a positive vision.” For Professor Modood, multiculturalism affirms that “we are not just individuals” but also members of groups whose identities have historically been marginalized or excluded from full membership in national life. Yet this project is integrative, not separatist: “We must not become anti-national. We must oppose the exploitation of national identity to exclude, racialize, or degrade others,” he emphasizes, rejecting both monocultural nationalism and cosmopolitan detachment.

A key element of Professor Modood’s thought is his advocacy for “moderate secularism,” which contrasts sharply with both French laïcité and authoritarian appropriations of secularism in places like India. Unlike the rigid secularism that seeks to privatize or marginalize religion, moderate secularism recognizes the public role of religious identities while embedding them in democratic equality and inclusion: “Moderate secularism can be inclusionary and potentially develop in a multiculturalist direction,” he explains.

In response to the global diffusion of far-right discourse—whether through social media networks or coordinated political strategies—Professor Modood argues for an explicitly internationalist response rooted in multicultural values. “I would like to say that one way of resisting that is trying to create a multiculturalism international—not just a far-right international, but a multiculturalism international,” he asserts. Brexit, in this regard, represented a significant setback: “When we left the European Union, much against my wishes, the European Union became weaker in relation to multiculturalism and anti-racism.”

Throughout this wide-ranging conversation, Professor Modood emphasizes that multicultural nationalism requires a “rethinking of our national identity and national story so that minority identities can become part of the national identity,” offering examples from Britain’s imperial history and inclusive popular culture, such as the 2012 London Olympics. His vision ultimately calls for a democratic, pluralistic, and solidaristic reimagining of national belonging—an urgent project in a time of resurgent authoritarianism.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Tariq Modood, edited lightly for readability.

Religious tolerance-themed graffiti in Bristol, UK. August 31, 2009. Photo: Dreamstime.

Multiculturalism Is a Positive Vision, Not Just a Strategy Against Populism

Professor Tariq Modood, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: As a signatory of the June 13, 2025 anti-fascism declaration, how would you theorize the contemporary far-right populist phenomenon as an incipient form of fascism—particularly in the light of Viktor Orbán’s “illiberal democracy” in Hungary and Donald Trump’s authoritarian revival in the US—and what normative resources does your conception of multicultural nationalism offer for resisting this resurgence while preserving democratic pluralism?

Professor Tariq Modood: Thank you very much for inviting me onto your site. I should explain that while I was a signatory to that letter—which I thought was important and was glad to sign—it is not, as such, an example of my own research or thinking.

You asked how I see multicultural nationalism relating to the fight against fascism and populism. The first thing to say is that I see them as connected, but not directly or immediately; they are connected through several layers of unpacking. For me, multiculturalism—the central theoretical and political idea I work with—is a positive idea and a value in itself. It is not simply a reaction to populism or a political strategy against it; it is a positive vision.

And what is this positive vision? It is the idea that we are not just individuals. We have various group identities that are important to us, and some of these identities have been the basis for exclusion from rights, opportunities, participation, and full membership in citizenship and national identity.

Multiculturalism asserts that if these identities are important and valuable to their bearers, then not only must they not be a basis for exclusion or discrimination, but they should also be valued within our common citizenship. These group memberships and identities are part of who we are—not merely abstract individuals as understood by law.

Another important identity for multiculturalism is national identity. Why? Because multiculturalism, in order to get people to respect group identities, has to work with a strong concept of citizenship. Citizenship requires respect for group identities as a basis of inclusion because citizenship is egalitarian and inclusive. But this is not just liberal citizenship focused on equality before the law and individual rights; rather, it is a stronger concept of citizenship as a collectivity with shared identity and significance for its members. Citizenship and national identity are tied together. When we appeal for multicultural equality, we appeal to citizenship, but we need a strong sense of citizenship—identifying with and insisting on our right to belong to that national identity.

That is why multiculturalism works with two identities: respect for group identities (e.g., British Pakistani, Jewish, Hindu, Black) and respect for national identity, which should bring us all together. Multiculturalism must also resist exclusion when it occurs. Once we understand this, we see that multiculturalism is diametrically opposed to monocultural nationalism, which is exclusionary and creates two tiers of citizenship: “real” nationals and second-class citizens who do not really belong. Multiculturalism is totally against that idea and, therefore, against nationalist populism—but it opposes it because of its own value commitments. It is not simply a political strategy for opposing fascism.

Multiculturalism as an Alternative Nation-Building Project

What do you take to be the normative and institutional obligations of democratic polities in mediating the tension between protecting minorities from processes of “othering” and responding to legitimate concerns of cultural majorities—particularly in contexts where populist narratives exploit these tensions?

Professor Tariq Modood: Some people who are anti-right-wing and anti-populism misunderstand the situation. You referred to those who exploit national identity and tensions within our national community—the key word being exploit. We must not become anti-national; we must oppose the exploitation of national identity to exclude, racialize, or degrade others. The national itself is not the problem. That’s why I say some anti-populists misunderstand this issue: they declare themselves anti-nationalism.

Well, I am certainly not anti-nationalism, because I support multicultural nationalism. I believe in an alternative conception of national belonging and identity that contrasts with populist, divisive, monocultural nationalism. I’m not anti-national or anti-nationalist.

The key is to reclaim the idea of the national. We mustn’t allow right-wing figures like Nigel Farage in Britain, Marine Le Pen in France, and others to define themselves as the “true nationalists” while casting people like me—and perhaps you—as anti-nationalists. No, I want to assert that I am a nationalist too, but with a better understanding of who we are today and who we can become in the future—how we can unite our nation rather than divide it, not to transcend our nation but to transform it.

In this sense, multiculturalism is an alternative nation-building project, and that’s how we counter those who exploit tensions within our national community.

Moderate Secularism as an Inclusive Alternative to Authoritarian Models

Muslims demonstrating against Islamophobia outside the Grande Mosquée de Paris, France. Photo: Tom Craig.

In what ways does your model of “moderate secularism” serve as a corrective to both French laïcité and Hindu nationalist instrumentalizations of secularism in India, and how can it safeguard against appropriation by exclusionary or authoritarian iterations of secularism emerging from the populist right?

Professor Tariq Modood: This is quite a complicated question you’ve asked me because it brings in something new—namely, the idea of moderate secularism. So, I first need to explain that idea before I can answer the rest of the question.A lot of people—liberals and progressives—say that we live in secular societies and therefore shouldn’t have religion in politics or shouldn’t have the state recognizing religious groups, Christians or Muslims or Hindus. But that’s not the reality of the societies we live in.

France is somewhat different, but Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Norway—these are all secular societies. No one can say they’re not secular polities, but they accommodate religion or some religions within the public sphere. They often fund various aspects of organized religious activity, whether it’s education, maintaining cathedrals and church heritage, or expecting religious organizations to provide welfare work. Germany, for instance, has an enormous welfare budget that it hands over to churches as well as collecting taxes to give to the churches.

So, I say we need a concept to describe this relationship. We are clearly secular polities—we are not run by religious organizations. Britain is not governed by the Church of England, and the Church of England is not a powerful institution. So, we are secular countries—but what kind of secularism is this? It’s not like the laïcité of France; it’s not like the secularism of the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China. Those are forms of radical secularism.

By contrast, this is a form of moderate secularism. One of the things moderate secularism can do is serve as a platform for recognizing excluded or newly settled religious minorities, like Muslims, for instance. Therefore, moderate secularism can be inclusionary and potentially develop in a multiculturalist direction, so that it doesn’t have to be exclusionary, as it is in France. Laïcité is hardening—it’s not being moderated; it’s being hardened in order to discipline or exclude Muslims, to confront them in the name of so-called secular values, national culture, or national identity. 

We have to oppose those kinds of authoritarian secularisms. Sometimes these secularisms are not quite like France in that they are not anti-religious, but rather in alliance with the majority religion. This fits the example you gave of India, where the majority religion is being reconceptualized as a national ideology: everyone has to belong, in some way or another, to this Hindu nation; otherwise, they’re not a true Indian. So that’s a kind of secularism, because otherwise India has a very pluralistic tradition—a pluralistic secularism—which is now being defeated, pushed aside by the current Modi government; they’ve been doing this for about 15 years.

That’s how moderate secularism can be inclusive—unlike the radical secularism of France or China, and unlike the majoritarian religious nationalism of countries like India or, for that matter, Turkey. Quite a few Sunni Muslim countries also move in that direction. India has taken it even further, but this kind of authoritarian religious majoritarianism is, at present, all too common in Muslim countries around the world.

Rethinking National History as a Shared Story of Inclusion

To what extent does multicultural nationalism necessitate a historiographical reconstitution of national narratives, and how can such reconstructions avoid exacerbating cultural polarization or being dismissed as an elite project of historical revisionism?

Professor Tariq Modood: That’s a good question, and I don’t really have a fully satisfactory answer, because we really do need to rethink our history. Take Britain: British Empire, British glory, conquered the world, and so on. Well, we can’t tell that story in a simplistic way, as if the British were simply on top, a superior race, doing all this to the rest of the world. We need to tell a story that is about domination and conquest, but also about mixing—how India became part of Britain because the British went out there and ruled India but did so by connecting with Indians in various ways. They certainly modified India in major ways, but there was influence coming back as well. Just think about the number of Urdu and Hindi words in the English language—it’s enough to fill a big dictionary, and these dictionaries exist.

In any case, we need to tell that history to explain how we came to be the current population of Great Britain. There’s an old political slogan: “I’m over here because you were over there.” So yes, we need to tell this story of how the British made Indians British, because my story of being a Briton does not begin when I came to Britain as a child; it’s older than that. It belongs to the British making India British—that includes my dad, my grandparents, my ancestors, and so on. I became part of the British story through a historical formation of domination and conquest—but not only so. 

In any case, we have to tell that story. I can see there are difficulties in how we tell it because it can be conflictual, and that’s something we want to avoid because multicultural nationalism is about bringing people together, respecting each other, and treating each other as equal members. So, there will be some revision and tension—I don’t think we can avoid it—but we need to try, bite the bullet, and think our way through. But there can be positive presentations; it doesn’t have to be just an elite project.

One of the best examples of a non-elite presentation of this project is the opening ceremony of the London Olympics of 2012. Have you seen it? You really should, and your readers really should. It’s not very long—about 45 minutes or so—and it told, in a dramatic, playful, and friendly way, to British people and the rest of the world, “this is the country we are.” It was a very inclusive Britain, which included people from the West Indies, Africa, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and so on—and the youth culture they have created today. So, I think there are non-elitist ways of telling this story. Probably sport is actually the main vehicle at the moment through which this story is being told—or if it’s not a story, these emotions and sensibilities are being formed. We have lots of Black players in our football teams, followed all over the world, and in our national team as well. We have multi-ethnic cricket teams and other sports. Entertainment is a real melting pot or mixing place for people of different heritages and colors, who then put on an England shirt or a British badge and are cheered and recognized as such by all the fans. So that’s another way of doing it in a non-elitist way.

Respect for Group Identities Must Go Hand in Hand with Shared National Belonging

Women in festive costumes with decorative flowers in their hair dance through the streets during the annual Belfast Mela Carnival Parade, celebrating multiculturalism and diversity in Belfast, UK, on August 17, 2024. Photo: Dreamstime.

How do you address critiques that your emphasis on the public recognition of ethno-religious identities risks entrenching communitarian enclaves, as critics argue may be occurring in parts of Belgium or Germany, potentially impeding the development of integrative civic identities?

Professor Tariq Modood: Yes, I can see that sometimes ethnic community identities, based on flows of migrations over 50 years or so, can sometimes become segregated parts of cities and can be quite inward-looking. There are a number of aspects to this. One is that when people come to a city or country, they obviously need to meet people who speak their language and who can guide them, assist them, advise them about housing, work, schools for their children, where to shop for food they want, and about places of worship—they may want to live near a temple or mosque. So, all these things lead to a certain amount of clustering, and that’s very understandable.

But they may also feel unsafe because they fear racist abuse against themselves, the elderly, or their children. So again, they may huddle together for safety. We also have the phenomenon of white flight: when significant numbers of ethnic minorities move into a neighborhood or street, white residents begin to leave. That, of course, makes it more of a ghetto, more segregated. So, we do have to avoid segregated communities—it is an issue. We have to encourage people to mix more. Certainly, we have to protect them from racist abuse in the street and in workplaces, and from violence against themselves, their property, cultural centers, mosques, and so on. All those things need to be done to enable people to more freely spread out and not be so concentrated together.

Moreover, there are issues to do with identity. Going back to the beginning helps me round this off. I said it is important for multiculturalists to respect group identities that their bearers value, but at the same time, to allow everyone to join in, share in, and take pride in our national identity and citizenship. Similarly, when it comes to what are called divisive identities or communitarianism, we need to encourage these dual identities—they are not just dual, really, they are multiple. But the key point is that we need to encourage identities that matter to individuals as members of a group, while also encouraging identities that matter to them as members of their country.

For multiculturalism in particular, the important thing is that these aren’t just two things we do in parallel, but that we bring them together and do them together. One way of doing this is by rethinking our national identity and national story so that minority identities can become part of the national identity. I gave you examples of how the British coming to India made my ancestors and my family part of Britain—and so we need to recognize that. I also gave you the example of the London Olympic opening ceremony, which celebrated an idea of what it is to be British that was not tied to being white, Christian, or secular. It was tied to other identities important to people as well, not forgetting national identities such as Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish. These are ways we can avoid narrow identities, because we want to respect identities—but within a national framework of equality, inclusion, recognition, and valuing ourselves as members of a national community.

Multiculturalist International vs. Far-Right International

Given the anti-fascist imperative to “defy authoritarianism globally,” how might multicultural frameworks respond to transnational threats such as algorithmic disinformation networks amplifying xenophobia, global Islamophobia intensified by networks stretching from India to Europe, and exclusionary imaginaries promoted by far-right parties like Alternative für Deutschland or Italy’s Fratelli d’Italia?

Professor Tariq Modood: Your question brings together a number of things. Firstly, some fascist and racist messages become transnational. I understand that, of course, because the social media we are using is global and things go viral on it—it’s a real problem. But of course, the opposite—positive messages—can also become global and viral. For example, Black Lives Matter wasn’t simply a local Minnesota thing or even just a US movement; it became very important in Britain, parts of Europe, and other parts of the world. So clearly, social media has both positive and very negative, divisive aspects.

Another part of your question was about the power of certain projections like Alternative für Deutschland, because AfD is really quite a national project—they’re not trying to be transnational—but various kinds of far-right groups are connecting in a transnational way. That is obvious, often led by the American far right or by Hungarian-sponsored conferences and networks because of Orbán. So yes, they want to group together, and it’s quite paradoxical that they do, because they all want to say their country is the most important—make America great again, make Germany great again, leave the EU, make Britain great again, etc.—and yet they see they can best cooperate because they have a similar message in their own countries.

I would like to say that one way of resisting that is trying to create a multiculturalism international—not just a far-right international, but a multiculturalism international. In this regard, Brexit was really very disappointing for people like me, because I think that Britain is the most multiculturalist country in Europe. So, when we left the European Union, much against my wishes and for other reasons as well, the European Union became weaker in relation to multiculturalism and anti-racism. So, I do think we need to create a multiculturalist alliance across countries, in the way that the far right is creating its own kind of exclusionary nationalism within a transnational network.

Billboard reading “The Looting Government,” part of a protest campaign against the conservative coalition's policies in Ra'anana, Israel, May 2023. Photo: Rene Van Den Berg

Professor Ben-Porat: Israel’s Rightward Shift Is More Than Political Strategy

by Editor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

In a candid and comprehensive interview with ECPS, Professor Guy Ben-Porat warns that Israel’s political rightward shift is not simply a strategic maneuver, but the product of deeper ideological currents. Describing the current coalition as “a unification of several forces,” Professor Ben-Porat highlights its populist hostility toward liberal institutions, minorities, and judicial independence. He draws direct parallels to Hungary and Poland, identifying a shared authoritarian trajectory. Professor Ben-Porat also reflects on how the October 7 attacks have further racialized political discourse, with Arab-Palestinian citizens facing intensified securitization. Yet, he sees hope in mass democratic mobilization: “Thousands of people have taken to the streets every week… the fact that many Israelis are still fighting for democracy means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a period marked by growing polarization, religious populism, and democratic backsliding, Israel’s political landscape has undergone a profound transformation. In a wide-ranging and timely interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Guy Ben-Porat—an expert in comparative politics and political sociology at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev—offers a critical diagnosis of Israel’s sharp rightward turn. “It’s more than strategy,” Professor Ben-Porat asserts, describing the current government as “a unification of several forces that make a very strong right-wing government,” rooted in anti-liberalism, exclusionary nationalism, and religious traditionalism.

At the center of this transformation is a coalition led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, flanked by ultra-Orthodox parties and far-right figures such as Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. Their political agenda, Professor Ben-Porat explains, has taken aim at core liberal-democratic institutions. “From the get-go, this government was determined to undermine the power of the Supreme Court… What they’re proposing is a majoritarian government that will stamp upon the rights of minorities.”

This encroachment on judicial independence is not merely an Israeli phenomenon. Professor Ben-Porat highlights the striking parallels with populist regimes in Hungary and Poland, noting that “Orbán and what happened in Poland before the last elections were good examples for Israel… this was a copycat.” The broader objective is to reconfigure Israeli democracy into a more ethnocratic and majoritarian model—where Jewish identity increasingly overrides civic inclusion and pluralism.

In a particularly sobering observation, Professor Ben-Porat warns that the October 7 Hamas attacks have only deepened the state’s securitized and racialized posture toward its Arab-Palestinian citizens. “There’s much more securitization of political statements and actions of Arab citizens,” he notes. And yet, despite populist figures like Ben Gvir hoping to use the crisis as justification for repression, Israel’s Arab citizens “did not play the game as expected”—remaining distant from Hamas and at times even risking their lives to protect Jewish compatriots.

Still, Professor Ben-Porat cautions that democratic decline is not inevitable. “Thousands of people have taken to the streets every week. That should not be discounted.” Though the protest movement remains largely focused on “Jewish democracy,” he sees the potential for it to evolve, to challenge systemic inequalities and the ongoing occupation. “It’s hard to be hopeful now,” he concludes, “but the fact that many Israelis are still on the streets, still fighting for democracy, means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.”

Professor Guy Ben-Porat—an expert in comparative politics and political sociology at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Guy Ben-Porat.

It’s More Than Strategy: A Unified Assault on Liberal Democracy

Professor Guy Ben-Porat, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you understand the convergence of neo-Zionist ideology and populist rhetoric in the post-2022 electoral landscape, particularly under the Ben Gvir–Smotrich axis within Netanyahu’s coalition?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s a big question, with many terms—neo, Zionist, etc.—which I’m not sure I understand or use all of them. It’s a right-wing government that has several elements within it. Likud, Netanyahu’s party, is a populist party which has become an exclusionary populist party in recent years, centered on anti-Arab, anti-immigrant, and anti-liberal sentiments.

Alongside it are the ultra-Orthodox parties, which have a very special perspective on Israel’s future and on church–state relations. You mentioned Ben Gvir and Smotrich. This is a united party combining into an extreme right-wing party—maybe akin to some things you see among the extreme right in Europe. So, major populism is the main theme here. I think it’s a right-wing, religious government with populist elements within it.

To what extent can the recent rightward shift in Israeli politics be interpreted as a populist response to long-standing ethnic and religious cleavages rather than a mere electoral strategy?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think it’s more than strategy. I think the government has a common interest in undermining some of the established democratic features of Israel—namely, the Supreme Court in particular. And if you look at the internal scene, or the internal politics, from the get-go, this government was determined to undermine the power of the Supreme Court and what we call the checks and balances. Now each part of the government has a different take on the Supreme Court. 

For the ultra-Orthodox, the Supreme Court is perceived as liberal and as undermining their coalitional achievements, which they gain—particular gains for their own good—whether it is exemption from military service, whether it’s budgets for religious institutions, etc.

For the extreme right, the Supreme Court is perceived as slowing down the annexation of the West Bank and the territories. The Supreme Court is perceived as putting some blocks on the military and on the settlement movement—which, one could argue, it does not—but that’s the way they perceive it.

And for Netanyahu, being involved in a series of trials, the Supreme Court is perceived—or is depicted—as an attempt to remove an elected leader by the elites.

So each part of this government has its own take on democracy, kind of combining together into this coalition.

Now, what unites them is, first, a very right-wing perspective in terms of Palestinians and Arab citizens; a more religious attitude or more traditional attitude towards religion; and a strong dislike of what they describe as elites and liberal democracy. So all this together makes it more than a fluke, more than a conjecture. It’s a unification of several forces that make a very strong right-wing government.

Religion Is Used to Draw Boundaries—Not Just to Guide Lives

Does the growing prominence of religious populism in Israel suggest a broader transformation in the political culture, where the ethno-religious identity of “the people” overrides civic and pluralistic conceptions of citizenship?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think here it’s a bit more complex, and that’s what we do—Dani Filc and I—in our work. For some of the religious right, religion is about demarcating boundaries. Religion is used as a way to define the Jewish state, to defend Jewish privileges, and to exclude those who are not Jewish. But if you look at their perception of religion as a way of life—as an ethical way of living—then some of them are not religious, or not religious in the way that orthodoxy perceives religion. To make this a bit more clear: if you look at issues like LGBTQ rights or issues about women’s rights within the Jewish camp, they can be somewhat liberal.

So, in this government, there is a clear divide between those for whom religion is a genuine way of life—shaping their daily practices, beliefs, and ethical system—and those who use religion primarily to draw boundaries and assert identity. Take, for example, the policy issue of exempting yeshiva students from military service: for the ultra-Orthodox, this is entirely natural and self-evident. For Likud members, however, it is far less obvious. That’s where you see differences between what religion is for these people.

Ehud Olmert, former Israeli Prime Minister, in his article published in Haaretz/The Guardian recently, warns of Israel’s potential international isolation and prosecution over war crimes, describing a state policy of starvation and indiscriminate violence. How does the normalization of such extreme policies reflect the convergence of populist ethno-nationalism with authoritarian state practices and what are the long-term implications for democratic institutions and minority rights in Israel?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think we need to make a little separation of things. First, Olmert’s warning is true and real. Israel’s actions in Gaza are dangerous. Many civilian lives are lost, and one could say—in very careful terms—without good reason. Not that there’s ever a good reason, but this war has definitely gone to extremes.

Now, why is this war continuing? Well, I think there are some reasons. One: it’s the government’s policy. And for Netanyahu, as long as the war goes on, the government stays intact. It keeps the government together. If the war ends, then some of the more extreme elements of the government might pull it apart, which means that Netanyahu would have to stand trial without the protection of being Prime Minister. It means there’ll be new elections. It means that Jews will begin debating what happened on October 7th—who’s responsible for this debacle. So for the government, the continuation of the war serves several purposes.

For some, the war should be continued because “we should not stop before the final victory,” which I’m not sure what it means—but for them, it’s the annihilation of Hamas. And I’m not sure that’s even possible. For others, maybe we should end the war on better terms for Israel. Again, I have no idea what that means.

But you could say there’s a mixture of ideology—of extreme right-wing ideology—of political interests, and mainly the fact that the government, for reasons that relate to what I said before, has never really introduced a strategy for how to end this war. If you ask Netanyahu: when does this war end? What will be in Gaza? Who will rule Gaza? Where will Israel be? What’s the role of the Palestinian Authority? What’s the role of other countries? What’s going to happen in Gaza once this war ends? What are the goals of this war? What is the strategy? We don’t know.

A Coherent Network of Right-Wing Advocacy Is Shaping Israel’s Future

Protests against judicial reform and religious coercion in Israel. Photo: Dreamstime.

How has the increasing influence of religiously conservative diaspora-funded NGOs and settler movements shaped the neo-Zionist agenda, particularly under populist governance?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Within Israel, money from abroad is not a new thing. NGOs—from both the left and the right—are supported from abroad. That’s not a new phenomenon. The same goes for the government. The Jewish diaspora has always maintained strong ties with Israel and influenced Israeli politics.

You can see NGOs on the so-called left and on the right receiving funding from abroad. Now, from the right-wing perspective, it’s the money from abroad that’s financing the left. So if you look at the populist kind of discourse, it’s about international elites supporting leftist, anti-Zionist forces who are opposing the government. It depends on which side is telling the story.

But to be more precise, I think what we’re seeing today is a very strong connection between the Israeli right and the Trump administration, as well as right-wing organizations in Europe. That’s where you see, perhaps, a new development: a more coherent network of right-wing advocacy that also has influence on Israel.

In your analysis of ‘good citizenship’ among new religious movements, how do such actors reframe legitimacy within a populist framework that delegitimizes secular or liberal opponents?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: There are several ways this is conducted. Begin with “good citizenship” in Israel—the republican equation, as we call it—has often been about military service. Many on the right pride themselves on being the foot soldiers: “We are carrying out the mission of defending Israel. We are paying the price in blood,” whether it’s through settlement in the West Bank or military service. Hence, we are the good citizens.

They blame the other side for not doing as much. By the way, statistics don’t necessarily support that, but that’s the claim. So being a good citizen is framed around military service and combat. That’s how they define good citizenship.

Now, this of course has implications for issues of gender and ethnicity—namely, for non-Jewish citizens. This whole concept of good citizenship is used by populists to describe themselves as the good, contributing, fighting citizens, in contrast to the “detached elites”—those who are global, more fluid, who can use their money to escape responsibility.

Now, this is a myth—a fable. The Israeli center-left has been fighting on the streets for democracy for two years now. So the whole notion of detached elites is complete baloney. But it makes for a compelling narrative on the right: We are the good citizens. We are the ones who sacrifice. We are truly committed to the country, while you—the elites—are global cosmopolitans. This, by the way, echoes classic anti-Semitic tropes once used in Europe against Jews. Put that aside—but the story they tell is that we are the good people, and they are the detached elites with less commitment to the country’s welfare.

A Different Government Might Have Chosen Strategy Over Messianic Dreams

Had a centrist or center-left coalition prevailed in the 2022 elections, how might the Israeli state have handled the aftermath of the October 7 attacks differently—in terms of military response, international diplomacy, and internal discourse?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s hard to talk about things that didn’t happen. The “what if” is always very difficult. I can say one thing: if the October 7th debacle had happened under a center-left government, the right would have used all its power to force that government out, to place the blame squarely on them, and to sell the narrative that this is what happens when you have a left-leaning government—one that is weak and unequipped to fight. A left-wing government would have been discredited to the bones.

That hasn’t happened with the right. Netanyahu’s government has been fighting for almost two years now to shed responsibility. “It’s not us, it’s the military, it’s the intelligence.” They’ve been working very hard since October 7th—October 8th even—to deflect responsibility.

Now, what would a different government do? Hard to say. But what a sensible one would do is, at some stage early in the war, begin to form a strategy. On October 8th, right after October 7th, we had very strong international support. We could have fought Hamas, brought an alternative government to Gaza, brought back the hostages, and started thinking of a new future for the Middle East. We could have pursued Middle East alliances—with the Saudis, with the Gulf countries. There were opportunities on the table. This government, because of its right-wing, messianic, and ultra-nationalist agenda, simply threw that out the window. What we would have had instead is maybe a strategy—not messianic dreams. A strategy.

Would an alternative government have challenged the securitization logic that you argue has long shaped Israeli-Arab relations, or merely adopted a more technocratic or liberal gloss?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Again, hard to tell. I would take anything that improves the current situation. Gloss might become, at some point, substance. But I think the previous government—at least on one issue that I’m researching, internal security—had a different approach.

We have an ongoing crisis within Arab neighborhoods in Israel. Arab citizens make up about 20% of the country’s population, and they account for more than 50% of the murders in this country. The numbers are skyrocketing.

The previous government, through an attempt to create a strategy, was able for the first time to slightly reduce the number of people murdered among Arab citizens. In this government, the police are in the hands of Itamar Ben-Gvir, an extreme right-wing nationalist and, if I may say, a convicted criminal. Under his office, the numbers have doubled since the last government. So yes, a different government could have made a difference.

Copying Orbán: Undermining Democracy in the Name of Sovereignty

To what extent is the judicial overhaul effort by the Netanyahu-led coalition part of a broader pattern of populist institutional capture akin to what we have seen in Hungary or Poland?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s been mentioned many times, and the comparison has been made by many people. The connection between Orbán and Netanyahu is well known. Netanyahu’s son has been advocating and has become something of a poster child for some of these movements. So there’s a strong relationship between the Israeli right and the right in Europe and the US.

To a large extent, this was the playbook of the right: undermine liberal democratic institutions and give more power to the government. Orbán—and what happened in Poland before the last elections—were good examples for Israel. And I think, to some extent, this was a copycat. Yes, we saw this in Europe; we can do the same things here. It’s a kind of logic that follows its own lead—it doesn’t really need the examples from abroad. Still, I think the fact that this is happening on a global scale has some meaning.

Do you view the weakening of judicial independence in Israel as a calculated step toward majoritarian rule under the guise of popular sovereignty? How does this resonate with your broader work on state-minority relations?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: They’ve said it explicitly—so it’s not a mystery. Their position is clear: they want to transfer power from the judiciary to the government. That’s not a secret—it’s the stated policy of this government. The Supreme Court may have its faults, and liberal democracy can certainly be debated. But what they’re proposing is a majoritarian government that tramples the rights of minorities. Again, this isn’t hidden. Some members of the government openly declare that Israel is a Jewish state in which Jewish citizens should enjoy privileges over non-Jews.

Israel has long debated how to reconcile being both a Jewish state and a democracy. It’s an ongoing tension—these principles often clash. Liberal Israelis—and one can debate whether they were right or wrong—have tried to argue that the two can be balanced. A Jewish state, they’ve said, can still be fair toward its Arab citizens. It may not be perfect, it may have flaws, but the contradictions can be managed, even if not fully resolved.

Under the current government, however, there is a clear and explicit shift toward prioritizing the Jewish character of the state. If being both Jewish and democratic comes into conflict, their answer is unequivocal: it is a Jewish state, and democracy comes second. For some in this government, that’s not incidental—it’s ideological. That’s what they believe.

Annexation of Gaza Is No Longer a Whisper—It’s a Declared Agenda

Do you see a fundamental shift in the far right’s approach to governing Palestinians under occupation—moving from ‘managing’ the conflict to accelerating irreversible annexation?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Absolutely. And again, these are things that are being said explicitly. You don’t really have to search—it’s not hypothetical. These are statements made by Smotrich, Ben Gvir, and others: that it’s time to annex the West Bank. So, it’s almost obvious. The only thing that has prevented it so far is international pressure. But under Trump, they believed the time had come—an opportunity to do what they always wanted: annex the West Bank. They’ve announced plans to build more settlements, to use more force against Palestinians, to expel so-called top terrorists—which can mean many things. So while these ideas are not yet fully implemented as policy, they are being openly discussed.

Thousands march in Jerusalem against judicial overhaul, March 2025. A broad protest fills the streets at night, with demonstrators calling to save Israeli democracy. Photo: Dreamstime.

Given the current political trajectory, do you believe Israel’s liberal democratic elements are in structural decline, or are there still viable pathways for democratic resilience—perhaps through civil society, judicial pushback, or international pressure?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think the jury is still out on this question. For many years, we’ve been lamenting the death of the left-liberal spectrum in Israel. The prevailing notion was that these people were tired—they were busy with themselves, individualistic, global, cosmopolitan. While the right appeared united and committed, the liberal left seemed aloof and less engaged.

However, over the past two years, we’ve witnessed something remarkable: thousands of people have taken to the streets every week. I think that should not be discounted. I’m not sure who will win, but two or three years ago, if you had told Israelis there would be large weekly rallies in defense of democracy, most would have dismissed it as impossible. Yet, when Israelis perceived that democracy was in danger, they rose up.

There is still a question about how far and how open this movement is. For the moment, it is focused on Jewish democracy. It does not yet address the occupation or fully include the rights of Palestinian citizens—that remains on the margins of the demonstrators’ consensus. The movement is centered on defending Israel’s democracy, and to maintain broad support, it has set aside, at least for now, the occupation and non-Jewish rights.

However, once a movement like this begins to grow and starts to confront the deeper implications of occupation and inequality, then maybe there is room for optimism. It’s hard to be hopeful right now—given the war and two years of ongoing struggle—but the fact that many Israelis are still on the streets, still fighting for democracy, means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.

Fear Is Driving Policy—But That’s Exactly What Ben Gvir Wants

To what extent does the current populist ascendancy reflect a systemic recoding of Israel’s founding ethno-religious cleavages into a majoritarian regime logic, rather than a contingent electoral maneuver?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think it’s more contingent. We’ve had many years of cleavages and schisms that have come to the fore with the last elections, and we are seeing a very strong cleavage between center-left and right. But within those camps, there are divisions. People on both the right and the left can change their opinions.

Especially in the last 18 months—after October 7th—there has also been the fear factor. People are acting out of fear. Let’s look at the Palestinians, or Arab citizens, or the world. There is still a memory of October 7th. This trauma still lingers.

So, I think what needs to happen now is the restoration of hope and the development of a strategy—reaching out to people on the other side of the spectrum and trying to convince them that there is another option. Maybe then there’s room for change.

To answer your question: no, it’s not merely a contingency. It is the result of many years of struggles and cleavages. Netanyahu was able to position himself as a defender of “the true people” in a very populist sense. But the war has also somewhat shattered that image—being Mr. Security and managing the economy. So, while these shifts are, at the moment, tragic, they may in the future provide some room for change.

In the light of your work on the ‘shrinking of citizenship,’ how has the October 7 Hamas attack provided a discursive and policy framework for intensifying the racialized securitization of Arab-Palestinian citizens under the guise of national unity and collective trauma?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s a good question. And again, it has several layers that we need to look at. To begin with—yes, Israel became more securitized. People are more afraid, which, of course, also shapes opinions and perceptions. When you’re afraid, it’s very hard to think things through and look at the long term. In that sense, it’s become more securitized. For example, political dissent is much less tolerated. There’s much more securitization of political statements and actions of Arab citizens.

At the same time, Ben Gvir was expecting Arab citizens to join in the October 7th events. That would have given him the reason to use more force against them. So, from Ben Gvir’s perspective or hopes, October 7th provided an opportunity to crack down on Israeli Arab citizens. This has not happened. Arab citizens did not play the game as expected. They remained very detached from Hamas. On October 7th, they were saying, “That is not us. We don’t condone these things.” More than that—among the hostages were Arab citizens, Bedouins from the Negev, who were taken by Hamas to Gaza, and some were killed by Hamas. Arab citizens on October 7th, in some cases, saved Jewish citizens.

The whole story became more complex. But now Gaza makes it more difficult—because those citizens are saying, “Those people in Gaza are our brothers.” When people are dying in Gaza in scores, “We can’t stand aside. People are starving in Gaza. We have to speak our mind. We have to protest.” And that’s the test for Israel. Can Jewish citizens be tolerant toward that? Or do their fears make them see those protests as pro-Hamas—which they are not? 

Now we’re in a very difficult situation where Arab citizens who are protesting against the war in Gaza feel themselves threatened by the government. It has not exploded yet. But that’s exactly what Ben Gvir wants. For him, that would be a good day—one in which he can make the connection: Arab citizens, Palestinians, Hamas—they’re all the same, and they’re all here to destroy us. “Now we have legitimacy to use all means.” That’s the scare right now.

Evangelical Backing Fuels Israel’s Right-Wing Populism

Election billboard showing Netanyahu shaking hands with Trump, with the slogan “Netanyahu. Another League,” in Jerusalem on September 16, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.

And lastly, Professor Ben-Porat, what role have transnational, religiously conservative, and diaspora-funded networks played in amplifying the settler-theocratic undercurrents of neo-Zionist populism, particularly in relation to territorial maximalism and cultural hegemony?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: For many years there were relations between settlers and right-wing movements in Israel and similar or supportive movements abroad. As I said before, that is not unique in Israel. All movements—left, right, and center—have often found alliances abroad, whether among Jewish diasporas or liberals in America. So in that sense, what the right wing is doing is not unique.

This transnationality, to be fair, is something used by many groups in Israel for different purposes and reasons. You can say whether it’s good or bad, but the use itself is not unique. Where it is unique is in the US. If you look at Trump supporters in the US, the Evangelicals were a very strong element in his campaign. They provide very strong support for Israel, the right wing, and the settlers. That’s where the connection is important.

It’s more dramatic than it seems—because for many years, Israel was very careful to maintain a bipartisan approach in the US, having support from both Democrats and Republicans. Also remember, the Jewish community in the US is mostly pro-Democratic. So Israel traditionally refrained from taking sides in American politics. Israel was above the Republican–Democratic divide and maintained a relationship with the Jewish diaspora in the US, who are mostly pro-Democrats.

In the last decade or so, things have begun to change. Netanyahu has put his weight on the Republican camp—anti-Obama, anti-Biden, and pro-Trump in the US. His support came in many cases from either right-wing Jews, religious Jews, or right-wing Christians. So, the whole dynamic changes here. Before, it was bipartisan with strong support from the Jewish community. Now, it’s Republican—with support from right-wing Christians and Jews—and an alienation of a large part of the liberal Jewish community.

That’s a strange turn of events. But I think the important religious factor here is the right-wing religious Christians in the US. That’s probably the most important development in Israel’s foreign relations.

George Simion

Dr. Bortun: Economic Insecurity Fuels the Rise of the Far Right in Romania

by Editor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

In the wake of Romania’s high-turnout 2025 presidential election, Dr. Vladimir Bortun offers a powerful analysis of how deep-rooted economic insecurity—fueled by decades of neoliberal reform—has driven support for the far right. Despite a centrist victory, nationalist George Simion’s strong performance underscores a broader post-crisis populist consolidation. In this exclusive ECPS interview, Dr. Bortun explores the AUR’s appeal among the diaspora and rural poor, the ideological vacuum left by the mainstream left, and how Romania exemplifies a wider European shift from democratic to authoritarian neoliberalism. A must-read for anyone interested in the structural dynamics behind Europe’s populist realignment.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Romania’s 2025 presidential election represented a pivotal moment for the country’s democratic trajectory and its place within the broader European political landscape. In a high-stakes runoff, centrist candidate and pro-European reformer Nicușor Dan secured a clear victory over George Simion, the leader of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). With the highest voter turnout in a quarter-century and the specter of a previously annulled election looming large, the vote was widely interpreted as a referendum on Romania’s political future—particularly on the tension between liberal democracy and the rising tide of far-right populism. Despite Simion’s defeat, his strong first-round performance and continued popularity signaled a deeper, more durable undercurrent of reactionary politics in Romania.

Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Dr. Vladimir Bortun, a lecturer at the University of Oxford and an expert on European politics, transnational party networks, and left-populist movements. With unique insight into both the structural drivers and class dynamics underpinning political realignments in Romania and beyond, Dr. Bortun offers a compelling analysis of how economic insecurity—rooted in decades of neoliberal reforms, mass emigration, and systemic inequality—has created fertile ground for the rise of the far right.

In this wide-ranging interview, Dr. Bortun reflects on how the socioeconomic legacies of Romania’s post-1989 transition have failed to deliver on their liberal democratic promises, especially for large swaths of the population living in poverty or working precariously. He argues that this deep economic discontent, compounded by the collapse of credible left-wing alternatives and the ideological convergence of the center-left and center-right, has allowed far-right actors like Simion and AUR to present themselves as anti-establishment voices—even as their own policies serve entrenched economic elites.

Crucially, Dr. Bortun situates Romania within a broader European context, where authoritarian neoliberalism is increasingly replacing the post-Cold War liberal consensus. He draws instructive comparisons with Poland, France, and Southern Europe, exploring how the mainstreaming of far-right rhetoric and policy by centrist parties—particularly around immigration and national sovereignty—has reshaped the ideological field.

By examining the rise of AUR’s support among the Romanian diaspora and among marginalized rural voters, Dr. Bortun challenges simplistic narratives about populism and brings attention to the lived realities of class, exclusion, and political abandonment. As he makes clear, the battle over Romania’s future is not only political or cultural—it is fundamentally about economic power, ownership, and whose voices get to shape the nation’s path forward.

Vladimir Bortun
Dr. Vladimir Bortun, a lecturer at the University of Oxford and an expert on European politics, transnational party networks, and left-populist movements.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Vladimir Bortun.

Neoliberalism Created the Perfect Storm

Professor Vladimir Bortun, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Given Simion’s stronger-than-expected first-round lead and his continued appeal despite being defeated in the runoff, how would you theorize the durability of far-right populism in Romania beyond the electoral cycle? Can this be conceptualized within a broader post-crisis populist consolidation rather than a mere reactionary surge?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a very important question. First of all, thank you again for the invitation. I should clarify that I’m not a professor yet—just a lecturer.

To go straight into the topic: recent academic literature has shed significant light on the key drivers behind the rise of the populist far right across borders. While there are, of course, multiple factors at play—and we will explore some of them—the most consistent driver across all contexts is economic insecurity, rooted in decades of neoliberal globalization.

These conditions have only worsened in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 crisis, which—as you mentioned—took a particularly austerity-driven form in Europe, shaped by how both European institutions and national governments responded. Romania was no exception.

To provide some context on the socioeconomic situation in Romania: after 35 years of neoliberal capitalism and roughly 18 years since joining the European Union—which has brought certain benefits but, for many Romanians (including those who have supported the far right), has failed to fulfill its initial promises—we are now facing deeply concerning indicators.

Approximately 45% of the population lives in poverty or on the brink of it—the highest percentage in the European Union, meaning nearly half the population is affected. Romania also ranks first or second in terms of in-work poverty. Moreover, it allocates the lowest—or among the lowest—shares of GDP to healthcare, education, and social protection.

After Ireland, Romania has the lowest tax collection capacity in the European Union. It also maintains some of the lowest tax rates in the EU. There is a 10% flat income tax, which disproportionately affects workers and employees—particularly because, in addition to this tax, they are also responsible for paying social contributions that were previously covered by employers. These include contributions to healthcare and pensions.

Unsurprisingly, this flat tax structure primarily benefits the wealthier segments of society. In addition, Romania has a corporate tax rate of 16%, one of the lowest in the European Union.

These are clearly the right conditions for economic insecurity—fertile ground for the rise of the far right. But it’s not only the poorest in society that we should consider. Economic insecurity affects various social classes and class fractions.

In Romania, it has had a particularly strong impact on the petty bourgeoisie—small and medium-sized entrepreneurs—who have been closing down their businesses at an increasing rate over the past few years, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic. I believe the pandemic represents another critical crisis that must be factored into any explanation of the far right’s rise. These small and medium entrepreneurs, going bankrupt by the thousands, form a core component of the far right’s social base.

Nationalism Meets Neoliberalism in a Peripheral Economy

People in traditional national costume return from Sunday church service in Maramureș, Romania—a region renowned for preserving its cultural heritage. Photo: Theodor Bunica.

How would you situate the AUR’s electoral messaging—particularly its nationalist-economically neoliberal synthesis—within the wider genealogy of post-2008 far-right formations in Europe? Is there a uniquely Romanian hybrid emerging, or does AUR largely mirror external templates?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: There are certain similarities with the broader profile of the European far right. There is clearly this populist discourse they employ, which is built on the dichotomy between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.”The elite, as in other countries, is portrayed as those who have sold out our country—who don’t represent the interests of our country but rather represent foreign interests, globalist interests. And of course, other undesirable categories in society are targeted as well, such as the LGBTQ community and immigrants from non-European countries, who have started to come to Romania in recent years as cheap labor—these are the usual suspects in far-right rhetoric.

At the same time, there is an element of truth in relation to the domination of foreign interests in Romania. Foreign companies hold a dominant position in key sectors of the economy, such as the energy sector, manufacturing—especially the auto industry—and the banking sector. They make huge profits in Romania, which they then repatriate to their home countries rather than reinvesting, even partially, in the Romanian economy.

Foreign banks, in particular, are guilty of this kind of profit repatriation from Romania, and this has generated a level of dissatisfaction that can also be observed in other countries. For example, in Poland, there is a very interesting study on the role of “comprador bankers” in the rise to power of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), which governed the country for about a decade. These comprador bankers were Polish managers of foreign bank subsidiaries who eventually came to realize that these foreign banks were operating in Poland solely to extract profit—profits that were then repatriated to their home countries, rather than being reinvested in the Polish economy. They did not, for instance, offer affordable or advantageous loans to Polish businesses. In response, some of these managers rebelled against the model and aligned themselves with the national capitalist hegemonic project advanced by PiS.

So, there is an element of what I would call the “comprador professional managerial class” that has served foreign capital in these peripheral Central and Eastern European countries, now fighting back against this foreign capital domination—in coalition with the domestic capitalist class. Particularly, those fractions of the domestic capitalist class that are trying to secure the sectors where they are still dominant—especially in Romania, such as real estate, construction, and hospitality.

The party you mentioned—AUR—led by Simion, who lost the election, is heavily funded by segments of the domestic capitalist class, particularly in the construction, real estate, and hospitality sectors. These actors are seeking to ring-fence and protect their interests from foreign capital, while also attempting to gain state power in order to advance those interests.

This project of the national bourgeoisie reclaiming state power is a common regional feature across Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary, Poland, and now Romania exhibit this pattern. I would even argue that it extends beyond the region—to Turkey, for example. Correct me if I’m wrong, but the Erdogan project seems to share similar characteristics, as far as I understand.

Now, regarding the distinctive features of the Romanian case—since I’ve already outlined some of the common regional characteristics—there are two aspects that stand out about the Romanian far right. I would highlight these two features, and perhaps we’ll focus on one of them in the following questions.

The first is their particular appeal to the diaspora. The diaspora represents a significant portion of their social base, and I’ll elaborate later on why they’ve been so successful in mobilizing this group.

The second distinctive feature is their appeal to farmers. Romania has the highest share of the workforce employed in agriculture in the entire European Union—between 18% and 20% of the total workforce. To give you a sense of how high this is: the second-ranked country in the EU is Poland, with only 10% of its workforce in agriculture. France, despite having a strong agricultural sector, has just 2.4% of its workforce employed in this field.

So, this is a huge sector in Romania, and the vast majority of these people working in agriculture are subsistence farmers. They are small farmers who feel like nobody is looking after their interests. The state is perceived as only overburdening them with regulations and taxation, while favoring the interests of big foreign corporations. And the far right is managing to build inroads into this significant social class in Romania.

A Left in Name, Neoliberal in Practice

Crin Antonescu
Crin Antonescu, the pro-European presidential candidate, speaks during the Social Democratic Party (PSD) Congress in Bucharest, Romania, where he was officially confirmed as the party’s nominee on February 2, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

How do you interpret the apparent paradox between widespread socioeconomic grievances and the relative electoral failure of redistributive political platforms, particularly in the light of the Social Democratic Party’s strategic vacillation and policy convergence with the right?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s the key factor from a subjective perspective. I’ve tried to talk about the objective factors, but in terms of the subjective conditions, clearly the key factor that has facilitated the rise of the far right—not just in Romania, but across the region and beyond—is the lack of a credible left-wing political project.

And the current left party, the center-left party you’ve mentioned—the PSD—is left in name, but not in substance, not in policy. They have actually governed for the majority of these 35 years of neoliberal capitalism—more or less 20 of those 35 years have seen them in government. So, they have implemented some of the very policies I mentioned earlier, which are responsible for the current socioeconomic conditions.

The very minimal social concessions they have made in terms of redistribution while in government have been largely limited to increasing the minimum wage—which is, of course, better than nothing. This partly explains why they remain the most voted-for party in Romania.

However, these measures are far from sufficient. Despite repeated increases over the past six or seven years, the minimum wage remains very low—about 30% below what would be considered a living wage in Romania, that is, the income necessary for a decent standard of living.

Moreover, Romania has the highest share of its workforce earning the minimum wage. Nearly 40% of all workers are on minimum wage—twice the EU average.

So, we are a minimum-wage economy, a low-taxation economy, and a low public spending economy. Romania is pretty much a paradigmatic case of neoliberalism—and the PSD is very much responsible for this. It is arguably the single most responsible political party for this situation.

Proletarians Abroad, Petit Bourgeois at Home

With over 60% of the diaspora backing Simion in the first round, what implications does this have for the dominant narratives that have historically cast diasporic Romanians as liberalizing or pro-European agents?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a significant shift indeed! And it started already in 2020, when the party AUR—which, by the way, stands for the Alliance for the Union of Romanians, but the acronym aur also means “gold” in Romanian— from the very beginning targeted its message toward the diaspora. They even called the diaspora “the gold of Romania” that they wanted to bring back to the country.

The party was launched in the diaspora in December 2019, one year before the first elections in which they stood candidates. Their launch meeting took place in the UK, among Romanians living there—not in Romania. So, from the outset, they were oriented toward the diaspora, and they managed to appeal to it in several ways.

On the one hand, this diaspora is not one unified entity; it consists of several diasporas. We’re talking about five million people, which is a quarter of Romania’s total population. They live very different lives in the West of Europe. Some of them live in quite squalid conditions, working very hard jobs for low wages, in poor environments, with little respect and little sense of being treated equally.

There is a widespread feeling among them that Romanians are treated as second-class citizens. Many are temporary or circular migrants—working on a construction site for three or four months, then returning to Romania, or working seasonal jobs picking vegetables on farms in Italy, Spain, the UK, or Germany, and then going back.

They don’t have a favorable context for integration or for deeper socialization in the host countries. But let’s be honest—those host countries themselves have experienced a surge in far-right politics. The far right is now much more mainstream in Western Europe than it was 10 or 20 years ago, when these migrants may have been sending back more liberal kinds of social remittances.

These societies have shifted significantly to the right. Anti-immigration discourse has become more mainstream, normalized, and legitimized—and Romanians living there have internalized some of that discourse.

In my own fieldwork, I often came across people who, despite being migrants themselves and suffering from anti-immigration attitudes and discourse, were nevertheless against other groups of migrants. They distinguished themselves from them—talking about “good migrants” and “bad migrants.” There is a real cognitive dissonance at play here, where migrants adopt anti-migration attitudes and political preferences.

Another aspect is that many feel Romania is a peripheral country that lacks a real voice in the European Union and in the broader global political stage. They perceive Romania as subordinated economically and geopolitically—which is true.

So, when a populist demagogue like Simion comes along and says, “I will make Romania stand tall again in the EU and in the world,” it resonates. It gives them a sense of restored dignity and pride.

Meanwhile, all the other political parties—including the PSD—are utterly uncritical in their allegiance to the EU, NATO, and the West in general. They refuse to acknowledge the real problems Romanians face, both in terms of their living conditions in the diaspora and in terms of Romania’s position within international power structures.

These parties speak only about the benefits and advantages of being part of these institutions, without addressing the contradictions, the challenges, or the structural disadvantages of Romania’s position in the European and international economic and political system. This, of course, creates a window of opportunity for the far right to come in and capitalize on people’s sense of marginalization and humiliation.

One additional point is that many of these migrants, as I mentioned, are circular or temporary migrants. They may be working blue-collar jobs abroad, but they’ve managed to accumulate enough capital to open a small business back home in their town or village of origin. This means they occupy a complex, dual class position: proletarians abroad, petit bourgeois at home. When they return home, after years of hard work abroad to save capital and open a small guesthouse, café, restaurant, or corner shop, they feel the state does nothing for them.

Instead, they feel overburdened by taxation. Increases in the minimum wage are perceived as a burden because they are now small employers who have to pay two, three, or four salaries. They blame the state—but they also blame those below them: people on minimum wage, or on welfare benefits, whom they see as lazy or asking for too much. They see themselves as the real hard-working people who have sacrificed abroad to invest in the Romanian economy—only to be abandoned by the state, which should be protecting their interests.

I think this is very important. I’m not saying it’s unique to Romania, but it is very salient here—and perhaps not as salient a feature in the social base of the far right in other European countries.

A Race to the Bottom Among Migrants

Building on your work on transnational political mobilization, how should we understand the AUR’s success among emigrants in Italy and Spain? Do these cases indicate a diasporic production of illiberal subjectivities shaped by specific host-country political contexts?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: I think I already touched on this in my previous answer. However, Italy and Spain are particularly illustrative of some of the dynamics I outlined earlier—especially Italy, where the far right has been in power for the past two and a half years.

In that context, migrants often find themselves in a race to the bottom, trying to prove they are more deserving than other migrant groups. I encountered numerous cases of Romanian migrants in Italy—or former migrants who had lived there for many years—expressing very negative attitudes toward Moroccan or Albanian migrants, for example.

Some even told me they had voted for the Northern League, now known as La Lega—Salvini’s party—which was the original far-right populist force before Brothers of Italy surpassed it in popularity. Ironically, this is a party that had made openly anti-Romanian statements in the Italian press. Nevertheless, this became their way of attempting to carve out a place for themselves—by identifying someone “below” them to target as the “bad” migrant.

In Spain, we see a similar surge with the Vox party over the last few years. It is now the third-largest political force in Spain—a country where the far right was outside of Parliament for decades.

Again, we’re talking about a Romanian diaspora that has suffered a lot of discrimination and marginalization. It took a long time for this community to settle. But there is also a split within these diasporas, as I mentioned—between the more settled, integrated diaspora, and the precariously employed, circular, temporary migrants who come and go and who cannot really find a foothold in these countries.

The Center Imitates, but the Far Right Dominates

Comparing Romania’s recent presidential runoff to parallel dynamics in Poland and Portugal, to what extent can we speak of converging or diverging trajectories in the European center-right’s strategy to contain or accommodate far-right surges?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: I think we see a very strong trend of accommodation of the far right—and not just from the center-right, but also from the center-left. In Denmark, for example—going a bit outside the region—the Social Democratic Party currently in government has adopted one of the harshest anti-immigration policies in Europe. And this trend extends further. Even here in the UK, the Starmer-led Labour Party has adopted many of the talking points not just from the Conservative Party but also from Reform UK. Just the other day, Starmer was speaking about Britain being “a country of strangers,” “an island of strangers” due to mass migration, according to him. Apparently, that makes me a stranger here.

There is a growing body of literature—by scholars like Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter—that refers to this as the mainstreaming of the far right: the normalization of reactionary ideas and policies. And this applies not just to rhetoric, but to actual policymaking, with both center-right and center-left parties adopting positions in an attempt to win back voters lost to the far right.

But as the saying goes, “the original is better than the copy.” People who want to vote for the far right for reactionary reasons—because they oppose immigration, for example—are unlikely to switch to the center-left just because it has adopted similar anti-immigration tropes. They will continue to vote for the far right. And we have seen this across the board.

The one Social Democratic party currently in power in Western Europe—in the EU at least—is in Spain. And they have resisted the temptation to go in this reactionary direction on issues like immigration and other topics dear to the far right. On the contrary, in some ways they have been an example of what a progressive government can and should say on key issues of our time, including the atrocities we are seeing in Gaza. They are, of course, not a perfect government—they have many flaws and shortcomings. But they demonstrate that it is still possible to stay true to Social Democratic values and policies and win elections. And that’s just speaking from a pragmatic point of view.

Corruption Isn’t the Cause—It’s the Symptom of a System

Romania protest.
Protesters gather for the 13th consecutive day in front of Victoria Palace, the government headquarters in Bucharest, Romania, on February 12, 2017. Over 50,000 demonstrators rallied against controversial corruption reforms, illuminating the night with their mobile phones and forming the national flag with colored paper and cellophane. Photo: Dreamstime.

What insights might Romania’s 2025 election offer for understanding the evolving relationship between anti-corruption discourse and far-right populism, especially when contrasted with the cases of Poland’s Law and Justice or France’s National Rally?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a very interesting question. I think, on the one hand, the far right’s collusion with corrupt and clientelist practices shows that, after all, they are not such a real alternative to the mainstream parties they criticize. They are quite happy to engage in the same kind of bad politics that the mainstream parties are guilty of. 

On the other hand, while corruption is indeed a major issue in Romania—as it is in many other countries—it is often framed in a very legalistic or even moralistic way, as if it’s simply a flaw of character or the result of an inefficient state bureaucracy.

In this sense, corruption is frequently instrumentalized ideologically to justify the further shrinking of the state and additional cuts to public spending. For example, it’s often claimed that there’s widespread corruption in the welfare system—even though Romania already allocates the lowest percentage of its GDP to welfare in the entire European Union.

Nevertheless, this anti-corruption mantra remains highly salient in public discourse.

The anti-corruption discourse has thus been used to legitimize harsh austerity and neoliberal measures. At the same time, when actions are taken against corruption—such as jailing corrupt politicians—they often remain at a superficial, legalistic level.

This approach is ineffective against the far right. In the United States, we saw the democratic establishment spend four years trying to go after Trump through legal channels—and yet Trump still won the election. Le Pen has been barred from standing in elections, and her party continues to grow in the polls. It’s certainly not declining.

In Romania, the Constitutional Court canceled the November election and barred the winning candidate, Georgescu. Yet the person who replaced him—Simion—secured double the percentage in the first round. It didn’t work.

I’m not saying such measures shouldn’t be taken—if there is a legal basis for them, then by all means, pursue them. But we need to recognize that this is not a real solution to tackling the far right.

On the subject of corruption, an important point must be made beyond its ideological instrumentalization. Corruption is a real issue that must be addressed, but it is often decontextualized.

Corruption needs to be understood as a key vehicle for the primitive accumulation of capital—something characteristic of any early stage in the development of capitalism, in any country, at any point in history.

Corruption, along with other violent forms of capital accumulation, has always been present—even in so-called advanced, consolidated democracies that have practiced capitalism for a longer time. Corruption played a massive role in the emergence of capitalism and continues to play a central role in capital accumulation today.

After all, the dirty money of drug cartels, criminal syndicates, and authoritarian regimes around the world is largely laundered through the City of London—the very heart of global capital. So, if we truly want to tackle corruption, we need to go to the root of the problem and understand it as part of a broader structural and systemic issue.

From Democratic Neoliberalism to Its Authoritarian Mutation

Lastly, from a historical-comparative perspective, how does the Dan–Simion runoff recalibrate the ideological field established in the 1990s transition era? Are we witnessing a definitive exhaustion of post-1989 liberal centrism or its tactical reanimation?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: This is a great question. There have been repeated claims about the death of the neoliberal center over the past 15 years—after the financial crisis, for instance. There were suggestions that neoliberalism was coming to an end, and that we would see a return to a more Keynesian type of economic model. That didn’t happen. Instead, we got more neoliberalism—more austerity, more privatizations, more deregulation, more flexibilization of the workforce.

Then, again, after the COVID-19 pandemic, there were claims that this marked the death of neoliberalism, especially given the forceful intervention of the state to keep societies afloat—or more accurately, to keep the accumulation of capital going. But again, that was temporary. Neoliberalism has returned in full force.

Now we are witnessing the militarization of Europe, with promises of spending cuts on the most important public services in society in order to fund military efforts. So, I’m afraid we are not seeing the end of neoliberal centrism, but rather its transformation into something more authoritarian—still neoliberal, but authoritarian. A shift, if you will, from democratic neoliberalism to authoritarian neoliberalism.

This transformation is being endorsed by the political center, which is increasingly adopting authoritarian measures across Europe. Here in the UK, the so-called center-left government has imprisoned individuals not for taking part in a protest, but simply for holding a Zoom meeting to plan one—specifically, a protest against environmental destruction. They were not punished for blocking a motorway, but merely for discussing civil disobedience in response to the climate crisis. This illustrates a clear shift toward authoritarianism. Yet when it comes to economic policy, there is a striking convergence between centrist parties and the far right.

The far right claims to be an alternative to the status quo and capitalizes on the grievances, socioeconomic anxiety, and insecurity of ordinary people. But if we look at their actual policy proposals—or, in places where they are in power, their actual policymaking—it’s more of the same. They might throw a few crumbs to ordinary people, to the popular classes, in order to maintain their support. But the bulk of their economic agenda still serves the business class and the wealthy—just different factions of the business class and wealthy than those typically represented by centrist parties.

Marine Le Pen

From Fraud to Framing: Marine Le Pen’s Trial and ‘Alternative Truth’

by AuthoritarianismCommentariesEditor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHome

Marine Le Pen’s conviction for embezzling EU funds might have marked a legal defeat—but politically, it became a narrative victory. In her commentary, Julie Van Elslander explores how France’s far-right leader transformed her trial into a populist spectacle of persecution, mobilizing public anger and institutional distrust. By reframing judicial accountability as elite conspiracy, Le Pen advanced a post-truth strategy that defied factual condemnation and resonated deeply with disillusioned voters. This timely analysis illuminates the broader phenomenon of populist resilience in the face of scandal, showing how legal consequences can be strategically repurposed as political capital by populist actors within Europe’s increasingly contested democratic landscape.

By Julie Van Elslander*

Introduction

On March 31, 2025, Marine Le Pen, long-time leader of France’s far-right National Rally, was convicted by the criminal court of Paris for the misappropriation of an estimated €4.6 million in European Parliament funds (Ledroit, 2025). Sentenced to a heavy condemnation, Marine Le Pen suffered a significant legal and political blow. Yet, instead of weakening her influence or undermining her party’s credibility, the trial became a platform for Le Pen to reaffirm her political narrative. Despite legal conviction and moral discredit, the National Rally maintained political relevance by reframing the sentence as an element of political persecution – raising a question: How does a legal defeat become a populist narrative victory?

At the core, this narrative dynamic is emblematic of what scholars qualify of post-truth populism: The transformation of political culture by the devaluation of factual correctness over emotional appeal (Conrad & Hálfdanarson, 2023). In a context where public discourse is increasingly shaped by the logic of “alternative facts” – a concept introduced by Trump’s counselor in 2017 (Gajanan, 2017) – Le Pen’s trial is another example of the way post-truth populists challenge liberal democracies. 

Rather than interrogating the legal dimensions of guilt or innocence, this analysis focuses on the populist discursive strategies through which Marine Le Pen’s trial was reframed in the public sphere, and how those shaped citizens’ political thinking (Aslanidis, 2016). The trial serves not simply as a juridical event, but also as a communicative site where competing narratives about power, legitimacy and truth are constructed. 

The Case of Le Pen’s Trial – Facts and Only Facts

Among twenty-four others, nine ex-MEPs and twelve parliamentary assistants from the National Rally were trialed for “embezzlement of public funds” and “complicity in the embezzlement of public funds” from 2004 to 2016 (Maad, 2025). In this case, the court recognized that the European Parliament’s public funds were misappropriated in order to remunerate employees working for the party management under fictitious contracts, rather than related to the European parliamentary activity – as it is normally required for those collaborators (ibid.). 

Marine Le Pen was sentenced to a €100.000 fine, two years under house arrest while wearing an electronic ankle bracelet, additional two-year suspended sentence, and five years’ ineligibility for public office with immediate effect. Le Pen’s heavy condemnation was due to what the court’s president as qualified as her “central role” in this case: “at the heart of this system since 2009, Marine Le Pen has signed up with authority and determination in the operation established by her father, in which was participating since 2004” (Dao, 2025).

Le Pen will appeal the verdict, but she will remain ineligible and could be ruled out of the 2027 presidential elections. She won’t serve the house arrest until every appeal is exhausted but the ban on running for office will be implemented immediately despite her legal challenge.

The irony of the case is striking: Marine Le Pen, who used to call for life ineligibility for elected officials convicted of embezzlement or corruption (Brault, 2025), now contests the legitimacy of her own sentence – but how does such a reversal become not a source of discredit, but a tool for reaffirming political legitimacy?

Not Guilty, Just Targeted? Le Pen’s Populist Response to Conviction

Despite her conviction, Marine Le Pen managed to maintain her political standing by discursively reframing the charges into a populist narrative of persecution and resistance. Ever since the trial’s deliberation, Le Pen has not stopped claiming her innocence, repeatedly insisting the judges were “mistaken” and reducing the issue to a simple “administrative disagreement with the European Parliament” that involved “no personal enrichment” (Marchal, 2025). Yet, the tribunal clearly stated that although the actions did not generate direct personal enrichment, they constituted serious breach of integrity and democratic principles, involving deception of both the European Parliament and voters (Sicard, 2025). By providing financial benefits to the National Rally, the stolen funds allowed it to maintain political influence and electoral advantages for over a decade (ibid.). 

The judges justified the use of the ineligibility sentence and its exécution provisoire (which allows the sentence to be enforced even before an appeal), emphasizing that the defendants had expressed no recognition of their violation of the law, and the court had a duty to ensure that “elected officials, like any other subject, do not benefit from a preferential regime incompatible with the trust sought by citizens in political life” (France info, 2025). In 2023 alone, around 16.000 ineligibility sentences were issued in France, 639 of which included the exécution provisoire (France info, 2025a). While such measure is applied selectively – and in about 4% of the cases – it is far from exceptional (ibid.). Indeed, several other high-profile political figures in France, such as Nicolas Sarkozy or François Fillon, have been sentenced to ineligibility in recent years (Louis, 2025).

However, in the populist narrative, these precedents are rarely acknowledged. By using terms such as a “tyranny of the judges” (Cossard, 2025), the National Rally reinforced the idea that Le Pen is being unfairly targeted. The rhetoric implies an extraordinary sanction used to silence political opposition:  the trial isn’t presented as a neutral legal process, but as the proof of a biased system – with Le Pen denouncing a “political decision,” a practice “we believed to be reserved for authoritarian regimes” (Vignal, 2025). The judiciary becomes just another part of the “elite” that is supposedly trying to stop her from acceding to the Elysée: “the system has released the nuclear bomb. If it uses such a powerful weapon against us, it is obviously because we are about to win the elections” (A.B., 2025). Here, Le Pen’s reframing does not deny the factual events themselves; rather, she strategically reinterprets them because openly acknowledging illegality could undermine her political legitimacy and moral authority.

This discursive approach fits neatly into what researchers call post-truth populism: The idea isn’t just to reject facts but to question who gets to decide what’s true in the first place (Ylä-Anttila, 2018). Populist leaders like Le Pen challenge the credibility and intentions of traditional fact-producers – such as judges, journalists or experts – to position themselves as more trustworthy (Mahmutović & Lovec, 2024). By stating that their version of facts are biased, corrupt or politically motivated, populist leaders construct alternative narratives, in which facts are selectively reinterpreted in ways that support their political agenda. The aim is not necessarily to prove their narrative is objectively true, but rather to undermine opposing ones as suspicious and irrelevant. 

This type of rhetoric fits within a common populist logic, where courts and other oversight bodies are seen as tools of an unaccountable elite trying to undermine the will of the “real people” – a homogeneous group not defined by citizenship, but by symbolic alignment with the populist cause (Arato, 2017). By framing her conviction as political persecution, Le Pen not only shields herself from public blame, but also primes her supporters to view the case as of a “stolen election”.

Why Marine Le Pen Wasn’t ‘Cancelled’: Political Loyalty in a ‘Stolen’ Election

Marine Le Pen may have been convicted in court, but in the arena of public opinion, she proved to be remarkably cancel-proof. This resilience is rooted in the post-truth populist strategy that places narrative above norms, and emotional appeal above factual truth. It particularly stemmed among her supporters, for whom the verdict was seen as a symbol of political persecution, and an attempt to steal the 2027 election – a narrative that quickly found concrete expression in public reactions. On March 31, 2025, a few hours after Le Pen’s conviction, a French national news broadcast captured street interviews where multiple citizens reacted with shock and outrage, describing the verdict as “personal” and a way to “take her out” of the presidential race (TF1info, 2025). 

An online petition launched by National Rally, titled “Save democracy, save Marine” (Rassemblement National, 2025) rapidly gathered thousands of signatures and rallied support over social media, but its message was not just about supporting Le Pen – it was about defending her voters’ rights. In an open letter promoting the petition, Jordan Bardella, the young president of the National Rally, described the conviction as an attack against voters: “They are trying to prevent a candidacy supported by millions of French people, which is well ahead in all the polls. They deprive millions of voters of their choice and therefore their freedom” (Krupa, 2025). This sense of disenfranchisement was further amplified at a public rally held a week later, during which Bardella addressed the crowd and further defended Le Pen as a candidate of the people, framing her conviction as an attempt to prevent the National Rally from acceding to power (ibid.). The conviction, as he claimed, was not just about her but about the right of French voters to choose their leader. The rally became a platform where Le Pen was portrayed not only as a victim but as a representative of silenced voters.  

This narrative fits the typical populist discourse, which emerges from a perceived failure of representation (Rosanvallon, 2020) and frames political reality as a fundamental conflict between a corrupted elite and the common people, “whose mobilization is presented as the only solution” (Aslanidis, 2016) to regain sovereignty. Here, the mobilization efforts are largely symbolic: Neither a petition nor public rally could change the judicial outcome, as courts are not influenced by popularity. However, their aim is to reinforce the idea that the verdict is unjust, judicial independence compromised and that the electors are the true victims of this case. Those efforts function as political and social tools – not legal ones – allowing Le Pen’s supporters to transform outrage into collective action, and to signal strength and solidarity. 

This is a key aspect of post-truth populism: The National Rally’s version of events is framed as more authentic because it taps into a deeper, widespread sense of institutional distrust (Harsin, 2024). When ordinary citizens feel that traditional institutions no longer represent them fairly, populist leaders like Le Pen often claim to embody the will of the people directly, calling for diverse forms of direct democracy (ibid.). Within this logic, portraying Le Pen’s sentence as exceptional and biased doesn’t require evidence – it simply needs to fit the broader story that her supporters believe: That she, like them, is being unfairly treated by a system that no longer serves them. 

Yet, while this narrative mobilized Le Pen’s supporters within France, the impact of her conviction also reverberated beyond national borders, sparking polarized reactions at the European level.

A European Issue with Global Repercussions

With the National Rally’s discourse focusing on national stakes, the European legal affair was reframed as a national political issue. That is, in part, due to the nature of the European Union’s legal proceedings. Even though the European Parliament’s public funds are distributed through the institutions, MEPs are elected nationally and therefore reside within national jurisdiction. The investigation was first opened by the OLAF – the European Anti-Fraud Office, an independent entity – in 2014 (Bouquet, 2025), but criminal prosecution and sentencing remained the responsibility of national courts. Although the matter originated at the European level, with the European Parliament lifting Le Pen’s immunity following a referral to French authorities, the fact that the trial was handled nationally contributed to the widespread perception that it was a purely domestic affair.  This procedural pathway ultimately placed the case within a broader discursive shift, reframing the trial as a French political controversy – judges, media and legal discourse – all nationally situated. 

Moreover, the French discourse largely undermined the collective European harm caused by the embezzlement. While the European Parliament – the civil plaintiff in the case – announced it “took note” of the decision and declined to comment further, Le Pen’s conviction quickly gathered support among fellow populist leaders, particularly from far-right figure such as Viktor Orbán, Matteo Salvini, and Donald Trump. Orbán expressed direct solidarity by stating “Je suis Marine!” – a phrase typically used to express support and mourning for victims – while Salvini denounced the verdict as a “declaration of war by Brussels” (Les Echos, 2025). Trump compared Le Pen’s legal troubles to his own, labeling it a “witch hunt” and accusing European elites of using the judiciary to silence political opposition (Le Monde, 2025). 

These international endorsements were not merely supportive gesture; they became central elements of the populist narrative surrounding Le Pen’s case. While the trial was framed in France as a part of a broader struggle between national sovereignty and a hostile elite, this international support further cast her as a symbol of resistance against a corrupt system – reinforcing the idea of a national and European political conspiracy targeting her. 

The same divisive framing extended into the European Parliament itself. During the plenary session held shortly after the verdict, several Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the Patriots for Europe group – Le Pen’s European political family – expressed their support for Le Pen, condemning the conviction as undemocratic and broadly questioning the state of the rule of law in Europe. Hungarian MEP András László notably accused the “Brussels elite” of trying to “legally sabotage a far-right politician” because of her patriotism and opposition to a “globalist elite” (European Parliament, 2025) – aligning with the narrative of persecution. In contrast, MEPs from other political groups welcomed the conviction as a critical step in combating corruption within the institution. German MEP Daniel Freund notably qualified the Le Pen’s actions as “the biggest fraud case in the history of the European Parliament” (ibid.).

This polarized reaction within the European Parliament highlighted the trial’s dual nature: Legally, it was a case of embezzlement involving European funds, but politically, it became a battleground over competing narratives. For Le Pen’s allies, it symbolized a struggle against an oppressive European elite; for her critics, it was a long-overdue act of accountability. 

Indeed, Le Pen’s case comes within the broader context of corruption scandals that have been shaking the European Parliament itself. The Qatargate scandal in 2022, involving allegations of bribes paid by Qatar to influence European lawmakers, and the Huawei case in 2023, where Chinese lobbying was accused of seeking favorable policies through financial incentives, exposed the vulnerability of European institutions to corruption. These scandals not only undermined the Parliament’s authority as a democratic institution of EU decision-making but also deepened the citizens’ distrust in EU governance – a distrust that populists are quick to weaponize. 

Conclusion

The Le Pen case is more than a legal scandal – it is a test of the resilience of European institutions against populist narratives that thrive on distrust. It is not merely about one politician reframing her conviction as persecution; it is a case study in how a legal process can be transformed into a battleground of competing truths. At its core, this case reveals a deeper conflict between factual accountability and symbolic politics.

Ultimately, the stakes go beyond Le Pen herself. The crisis of trust she has exploited is part of a broader European problem. As Qatargate and the Huawei scandal have shown, European institutions are not immune to corruption, and this vulnerability has fueled perceptions of institutional hypocrisy. It is this perceived hypocrisy that populist leaders weaponize, transforming legitimate accountability efforts into narratives of persecution. Ultimately, the Le Pen case is a message of political legitimacy: In an era of post-truth populism, the verdict in court may matter less than the verdict in public opinion.

 

(*) Julie Van Elslander is a double master’s student in European Governance (Sciences Po Grenoble) and Politics and Public Administration (Universität Konstanz), with a strong interest in how democracies respond to challenges like populism, post-truth politics, and institutional distrust. She has contributed to European-level research projects on political communication, corruption, and democratic accountability, and currently works as a research intern at the Center of International Relations (University of Ljubljana).

 

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Rosanvallon, P. (2020). Le Siècle du populisme. Histoire, théorie, critique. Média Diffusion.

Sicard, S. (2025, April 7). « Inéligibilité de Marine Le Pen : “Il n’y a pas eu d’enrichissement personnel…” La justice moins catégorique sur l’affirmation répétée par le RN depuis l’annonce du jugement. » lindependant.fr. https://www.lindependant.fr/2025/04/07/ineligibilite-de-marine-le-pen-il-ny-a-pas-eu-denrichissement-personnel-la-justice-moins-categorique-sur-laffirmation-repetee-par-le-rn-depuis-12621458.php

TF1info. (2025, March 31). « Marine Le Pen inéligible : “Démocratie exécutée”, “justiciable comme les autres”. . . les réactions divisées de la classe politique. » TF1 INFO. https://www.tf1info.fr/politique/marine-le-pen-ineligible-democratie-executee-justiciable-comme-les-autres-les-reactions-divisees-de-la-classe-politique-2362454.html

Vignal, F. (2025, March 31). « « Soyons bien clairs, je suis éliminée » : Marine Le Pen dénonce une « décision politique » après sa condamnation. » Public Sénat. https://www.publicsenat.fr/actualites/politique/soyons-bien-clairs-je-suis-eliminee-marine-le-pen-denonce-une-decision-politique-apres-sa-condamnation

Ylä-Anttila, T. (2018). Populist knowledge: “Post-truth’ repertoires of contesting epistemic authorities.” European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology, 5(4), 356–388. https://doi.org/10.1080/23254823.2017.1414620

Dr. Spyros Sofos—Assistant Professor in Global Humanities at Simon Fraser University in Canada.

Dr. Sofos: The More Rigid the Erdogan Regime Becomes, the Easier It May Break

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

“The more rigid the regime becomes, the more easily it may break,” warns Dr. Spyros Sofos in an illuminating interview with ECPS. Tracing the Erdogan regime’s shift from reformist Islamism to a personalized authoritarianism, Dr. Sofos highlights how the dismantling of institutional checks and grassroots engagement has deepened Turkey’s democratic crisis. He sharply critiques the EU and US for enabling this drift, arguing that their silence—rooted in strategic pragmatism over refugee control and regional stability—amounts to tacit complicity. As Erdogan’s rule grows more centralized and brittle, Dr. Sofos suggests its very inflexibility could be its undoing. Amid repression and international complacency, he insists, spaces for resistance persist—and the next rupture may come from within the regime itself.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a timely and far-reaching interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Spyros Sofos—Assistant Professor in Global Humanities at Simon Fraser University—offers a deeply informed and critical analysis of the Erdogan regime’s evolution into an increasingly rigid and personalized form of authoritarian populism. “The more rigid the regime becomes,” Dr. Sofos warns, “the more easily it may break.” Far from being a sign of consolidated power, he argues, the regime’s escalation of repression—most recently with the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu—betrays deep insecurity and structural fragility within a system that has steadily dismantled institutional checks and blurred distinctions between state, party, and judiciary.

Dr. Sofos traces how the AKP’s early reformist stance, driven in part by strategic engagement with European institutions, gave way to a calculated centralization of power following institutional resistance from the military and judiciary. He explores the AKP’s ideological recalibration—through religious nationalism, neo-Ottoman nostalgia, and pan-Turkic outreach—as a tactical means to expand and solidify its coalition amid economic turmoil and intra-Islamist fragmentation.

Yet just as trenchant is his critique of the European Union and the broader West, whose response to Turkey’s democratic backsliding has been marked by passivity and strategic self-interest. “Effectively, what the EU and the US have been doing is wanting Turkey to ensure that the masses of displaced people within its territory would not move towards the West,” he states bluntly. In prioritizing border control, security cooperation, and transactional diplomacy over democratic principles, Western powers have turned a blind eye to the regime’s authoritarian escalation—signaling tacit approval through their silence. Dr. Sofos calls out this hypocrisy, echoing Imamoglu’s own condemnation of European leaders for abandoning not just him personally, but the very idea of democracy in Turkey.

He also warns that the West’s failure to push back meaningfully against Erdogan’s authoritarian turn—driven by domestic electoral concerns and geopolitical calculus—risks normalizing the erosion of democracy, both in Turkey and beyond. With comparative insights from Hungary, India, and Israel, Dr. Sofos situates the Turkish case within a wider global trend of populist-authoritarian drift, but insists that this is not a one-way trajectory. The regime’s internal contradictions, coupled with mounting grassroots resistance and international hypocrisy fatigue, may yet create opportunities for democratic renewal.

This interview is not only a sobering account of democratic decline in Turkey, but also a compelling indictment of Western complacency in the face of it.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Spyros Sofos.

Ottoman Nostalgia as a Tool of Populist Reinvention

Supporters await the arrival of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at a referendum rally in Istanbul on April 8, 2017. Photo: Thomas Koch.

Professor Sofos, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you interpret the Erdoğan regime’s mobilization of Ottoman nostalgia in both domestic and international contexts as part of a broader populist-authoritarian narrative?

Dr. Spyros Sofos: Thank you for having me. That’s a very interesting question, as there has been considerable discussion about neo-Ottomanism and the broader concept of Ottoman nostalgia. I believe the Erdogan regime needed a narrative that could effectively counter the one developed by the Kemalist regime over the past century. This new narrative serves several purposes.

The first is linked to the regime’s reinterpretation of history—particularly evident in debates around the reconversion of Hagia Sophia and other Christian monuments. Erdogan’s government has framed the Justice and Development Party (AKP) constituency as victims whose sovereignty was denied under the Republic for 100 years. In that context, a return to Ottoman nostalgia becomes a way of reclaiming a past where, ostensibly, there was more sovereignty and the people were heard. This re-imagined past helps construct an alternative vision of popular sovereignty, centered around the AKP’s base—and, I would argue, much of the nationalist constituency as well.

The second reason relates more to the interests the current leadership perceives as central to Turkey’s role both domestically and internationally, as well as to the political elite’s own strategic goals. For example, we see Ottoman nostalgia being used in foreign policy to justify, or at least lend legitimacy to, expanded relationships with countries that Turkey sees as pivotal—not only in its immediate region but also across Africa.

A striking example is Turkey’s presence in the Sahel and West Africa. The invocation of Ottoman-era connections is used to frame Turkey’s involvement in countries like Somalia—not only in humanitarian terms but as part of a broader strategic interest, grounded in a historical narrative of Ottoman reach. This is, of course, a very flexible interpretation of history, but one that the regime has used effectively.

This pattern also applies to Turkey’s outreach in the Balkans—something that began under Turgut Ozal. In countries like Bosnia, North Macedonia, and Albania, there’s a strong emphasis on rekindling historical and cultural kinship, often under the umbrella of shared Ottoman heritage.

Interestingly, the outreach to Central Asia—while unrelated to the Ottoman Empire—is also wrapped into this broader narrative. This connection seems driven either by economic interests or by a pan-Turkic nationalism that predates the AKP. So while neo-Ottomanism features prominently in both domestic and foreign policy, the regime also draws on other strands of historical memory to shape its identity and strategy.

From Reform to Repression: The Strategic Evolution of Political Islam under the AKP

How has political Islamism under the AKP evolved from a reformist or counter-hegemonic force into an ideological tool for authoritarian consolidation and state-led populism?

Dr. Spyros Sofos: I think that’s an important question. Political Islam—broadly speaking—had long been under threat from Turkey’s military, judiciary, and bureaucratic institutions before the AKP’s first electoral victory. In those earlier years, Islamist politicians were cautious in how they criticized the state and its institutions.

In the first five or so years of the AKP government, we saw what some scholars have called a “politics of patience”—a cautious, incremental approach to reform. There were several reasons for this. First, the AKP sought to emphasize its commitment to European institutions and to the broader European integration project. As such, it had to present itself as a genuinely reformist party.

While it may sound a bit cynical to frame it this way, this positioning made it much harder for the military and judiciary to halt the AKP’s political momentum. After all, the AKP was arguably the most pro-European and pro-reform force in Turkish politics at the time. Any attempt to stop it would likely have triggered significant Western backlash, possibly even sanctions. With hindsight, I now see this as a carefully calculated strategy. At the time, I was quite hopeful—thinking that this opening could bridge the divide between the “old regime” and the emerging Islamic-oriented political elite. But in retrospect, it seems it was more about ensuring the survival and viability of Erdogan’s political project.

The so-called “e-coup” during the 2007 presidential election, when Abdullah Gul’s candidacy was being obstructed by military and judicial actors, marked a turning point. This intervention allowed Erdogan and his allies to pivot from their cautious stance to a more confrontational and assertive posture.

So, while the AKP initially positioned itself as reformist out of necessity, the institutional resistance it faced—particularly from the army and judiciary—created an opening for it to strike back sooner than it might have otherwise. And unfortunately, this shift happened at a time when civil society lacked the strength to act as an effective check on power.

Islamist Nationalism Rebranded: Survival Politics in Erdogan’s Turkey

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan watching the August 30 Victory Day Parade in Ankara, Turkey on August 30, 2014. Photo by Mustafa Kirazli.

Do the regime’s increasingly religious-nationalist narratives reflect a deeper radicalization or strategic recalibration—and to what extent do these still resonate with the AKP’s traditional base amid economic hardship and intra-Islamist fragmentation?

Dr. Spyros Sofos: That’s one of the most interesting and challenging questions I’ve had to think about over the past couple of years. I believe we need to complicate the idea of the AKP as simply an “Islamist” party, full stop. It’s something more complex—and its ideology has evolved, largely in response to shifting constituencies that it needs to mobilize for political survival.

Over the years, we’ve seen alliances like the one with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Devlet Bahceli, which introduced a significant nationalist component into the AKP’s political orbit. Most recently, in the 2023 presidential elections, we witnessed a major push to win over nationalist voters. While Islam isn’t necessarily incompatible with nationalist currents in Turkey, this required the AKP to recalibrate its discourse in a way that differed substantially from its earlier messaging.

The party continues to promote a form of nationalism infused with Islamic elements, but it’s no longer offering the same vision as in the early 2000s. It’s certainly not a reincarnation of Alparslan Turkes-style nationalism either—but it has shown a willingness to experiment with different formulations of Turkish nationalism in order to appeal to broader political forces and secure electoral dominance.

This ideological flexibility is significant. Some of the intellectual figures in the AKP’s broader sphere of influence now engage with strands of nationalist thought that were previously absent from Islamist political discourse in Turkey.

At the same time, I don’t believe Islam has been displaced from the core of the AKP’s identity. But it has never been the only element. From the beginning, the party positioned itself as a voice for the downtrodden—regardless of their level of religiosity or piety. It’s always sought to build a broader coalition, and I think that remains true today.

In your work on the Gezi Protests, you emphasized the significance of bottom-up resistance. How do the dynamics of current mass protests compare to the 2013 Gezi movement in terms of ideological coherence, regime response, and potential for catalyzing long-term democratic transformation?

Dr. Spyros Sofos: That’s also the million-dollar question. So let me just try to unpack a few things about Gezi. I think Gezi was unique in the sense that it was not a movement that wanted to change a government. It was not aspiring to play a political role in the way, for example, that political parties would. And I think that was the secret behind its success and its failure at the same time. So it was a movement about bringing some sort of freedom into what Habermas would have called the life-world.

It was a movement that was against the policing of everyday life, people’s bodies, people’s relationship with nature, and so on. And of course, it had a political emphasis, which is the element of continuity. So it was a different movement, but there was also an emphasis on change—not necessarily governmental change—that I can see today in the mobilizations that have been taking place, especially after the arrest of Imamoglu recently.

What has changed, I think, and what is quite interesting to bear in mind, is that the mobilizations of today, at least in my reading, have not been as unplanned as the mobilizations of Gezi. You know, most people—I interviewed people—said, “I went there because I felt something was happening, and I needed to be part of it.” Today, many people may be thinking that something is happening and they need to be part of it—but I think Imamoglu himself, who is a very astute politician, had been preparing for this moment, and therefore he had ensured that there would be some sort of planning for what happens after his arrest or incapacitation.

We see that also in the fact that he’s been able to communicate out of jail fairly easily, that he managed to publish in international media quite articulate articles that could not have been scribbled at the last minute. And also, we have a change within the CHP that has allowed the party to be more able to mobilize people in support of democratic change.

I’m not trying to say that there is something sinister about this. I’m trying to say that there is a spirit of Gezi in the air—I can see that—but there is also more of a relationship between the current mobilizations and the political parties of the opposition that want to see democratic change.

Imamoglu’s Arrest Signals the Cracking Façade of Competitive Authoritarianism

To what extent does the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu mark a definitive rupture in Turkey’s evolution from competitive authoritarianism toward full-fledged autocracy—and does it reflect a broader erosion of political pluralism?

Dr. Spyros Sofos: I was always cautious about Imamoglu, because I really consider him a very astute politician—a politician who is not authoritarian per se, but who has realized that a kind of populism—which I find, I’m always suspicious of populism—was the means of defeating Erdogan. And I was always arguing that Imamoglu may be one of the best hopes of defeating Erdogan, but not populism. But that’s a fine detail we can talk about later.

So, I think that definitely the arrest of Imamoglu, his lawyers, and a lot of his collaborators is an important damage inflicted on the prospects of a more pluralistic political scene in Turkey.

Imamoglu, during his time as Istanbul mayor, has really tried to engage with the grassroots in ways that no other politician has ever done. So I think arresting him is also a kind of condemnation of his political project—of talking with grassroots, of trying to empower and mobilize communities in ways different from the AKP’s.

Therefore, I do believe that it is also an attempt not only at his person, but at the model of politics that could emerge out of a possible victory by Imamoglu. Now we’re seeing a more naked, fully fledged authoritarian move in Turkish politics.

I’ve heard all these discussions about who will succeed Erdogan, and sometimes family appears to be first in these discussions. It indicates that even the fig leaf of competitive authoritarianism is dropping at the moment. But it’s a very fluid situation. The intentions of Erdogan and his advisers may not lead to the results that they want to achieve. I think the regime is the more rigid it is, the more easily it breaks in some ways. 

In your view, how has the personalization of power under Erdogan blurred institutional distinctions between the state, the ruling party, and the judiciary? Is the judiciary now operating more as an instrument of regime survival than of rule-of-law governance?

Dr. Spyros Sofos: Let me start from the judiciary, but I will go to the personalization in a minute. We’ve seen that the judiciary was the target of reforms and the target of a lot of meddling. Effectively, what was being planned was to render it less independent. We had all these kinds of promotions of different judges, the retirements of other judges, and so on. There have been pressures from time to time on the judiciary, so definitely the judiciary is no longer a means of checks and balances in the political system.

And this is the problem generally with the hyper-presidential system that Erdogan introduced. In some ways, there is no institution that has the gravitas and authority that the institution of the presidency has. Therefore, it’s not only the judiciary—even the Parliament, in many ways, although there are ways in which it can throw a spanner in the works, as we say—even the Parliament cannot really challenge the presidential dominance in the political system.

Now, if you add the personal charisma and its cultivation by Erdogan, the situation becomes even clearer. It’s not only an institution, but it’s also a president who in the past has spoken out against the courts. When the courts decided against him, he talked about the milletin iradesi—the national will—as superior to the courts’ legal rationale and thinking.

So we can see here that the personalization and the charisma that has been brought into politics is significant, even without the presidential system. But of course, now it is also institutionalized.

A final thought: I had written, when I was writing about Ataturk, that Ataturk had established a two-tier political system, in some ways. I’m simplifying now. One was, of course, the institutions of the Republic—the National Assembly and the party—and then two aborted experiments with the Liberal Party, and so on. And then there was another element—that was his person: the state as a person, and it was the person of Ataturk.

What I meant by this is that whereas the citizen in the villages of the Republic, would be harassed by the jandarma, would be suppressed in a variety of ways, then you would see Ataturk touring the countryside or the cities of the country and being the object or subject of adoration. He would hug kids, and he would talk to people in a charming way. I think Erdogan has done something very similar, and the personalistic element is crucial in that.

So there is a state that is really vicious—it can take passports away, put people into jail—and then you have Erdogan, who cannot do it as well as I think Ataturk did, but on the other hand, he is another facet of the state, unmediated. He talks to people, and he derives authority from this—not from his institutional position only.

Regime Insecurity and Western Complicity Feed Erdogan’s Authoritarian Drift

President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrives at the European Council building in Brussels, Belgium, on May 25, 2017. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Would you frame the current authoritarian escalation as a sign of regime insecurity ahead of critical elections, or as part of a calculated strategy to secure post-electoral permanence through managed democracy and repression?

Dr. Spyros Sofos: I would not distinguish these two because they can work together. So what I would say is that we had seen a calculated attempt already in the autumn,
when Bahceli talked about PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan visiting the National Assembly, and he said that he treated him as an interlocutor. At the time, I was arguing—and I had written an article that, however, was published very recently—I was trying to say that this was a sign for me that Erdogan and others were feeling insecurity, as they had seen that the Kurdish movement had supported the opposition tacitly in most elections in the past. Therefore, they needed to ensure that this would not continue—that the Kurdish parties, the Kurdish organizations, the PKK would not continue supporting the opposition—and thus they attempted this Kurdish opening, this attempt to bring Kurdish politicians to the table, while keeping Selahattin Demirtas, who would be a charismatic figure that could challenge this possibility, in jail.

So, I think already at the time we could see that regime insecurity was at the center of the thinking of the current political elite. It’s not only Erdogan, it’s all these people who have made fortunes under Erdogan, and they want to maintain impunity and those fortunes. Therefore, they are also insecure, and they have the ear of people close to Erdogan, maybe Erdogan himself. So that’s the first thing.

The second thing is that this also prompts the political leadership at the moment to think that in order to counter this regime insecurity, a system that would limit the possibility of a challenge—political, electoral challenge—to the current incumbents would need to be in place. And therefore we have this leap from regime insecurity to a more authoritarian system that would allow the durability of the current regime in one way or another, and the impunity of those who have managed to benefit from it.

So both.

Do you interpret the EU’s and US’s muted response to Imamoglu’s arrest as tacit legitimation, strategic pragmatism, or democratic fatigue? To what extent does Western inaction enable further authoritarian entrenchment?

Dr. Spyros Sofos: The West, especially the European Union, has a lot to do with the current situation. Already, in the first decade of the century, they were getting cold feet about engaging with Turkey regarding membership or some sort of closer union with the EU. Now, they are much more cynical. They have been treating Turkey—and Turkey has been treating them—in a transactional way.

Effectively, what the EU and the US have been doing is wanting Turkey to ensure that the masses of displaced people within its territory would not move towards the West. In view of the war in Ukraine and the broader threats coming from Russia, they also want Turkey to be a cornerstone of some evolving security policy. I find it difficult to see how this will happen, but that seems to be the logic within Western political circles.

In this sense, now that Turkey has become strategically important for various aspects of Western European security, there seems to be a willingness to turn a blind eye to what is happening domestically in the country. Imamoglu himself said this very clearly, castigating European leaders for doing nothing—not just for failing to support him personally, but for abandoning the broader hope of democracy in Turkey.

I believe there is a general democratic fatigue in the West, especially as many Western governments are dealing with their own populist challenges. In addition, they are wary of creating a rift with Erdogan. There are several reasons for this, including domestic electoral considerations—such as the influence of Turkish communities in countries like Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

Erdogan has also been actively engaging in the Balkans, including meddling in Bosnian affairs. Western leaders want to mute this influence. At the same time, they want Turkey to feel that it can benefit from supporting the security architecture of the EU and NATO, and to distance itself from closer ties with Russia. As a result, they are largely disinterested in democratic resistance inside Turkey.

Erdogan Leverages East-West Tensions to Shield His Regime from Accountability

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made the opening of the Natural Gas Pipeline (Turkstream) in Istanbul, Turkey on November 19, 2018.

How does Erdogan’s external positioning—on migration with the EU, and regional geopolitics vis-à-vis Iran and Russia—insulate the regime from meaningful international pressure despite ongoing democratic erosion?

Dr. Spyros Sofos: Well, it relates to your previous question, but thank you for this, because it allows me to elaborate a bit more. I think that the positioning of Ankara toward Russia, Iran, and even Syria is quite significant, as it clearly reflects a strategy of leveraging different relationships to insulate the regime—from criticism and possibly even from sanctions. I’m not necessarily talking about economic sanctions.

Erdogan—specifically Erdogan, not necessarily Turkey—has been very skillful in cultivating relationships with both the Iranian leadership, including Khamenei and various conservative politicians, and with Putin. He has also played an active role in the Astana process dealing with the future of Syria, in which Iran and Russia have been central players.

So we can observe a two-pronged strategy here. First, Erdogan ensures that every time Turkey feels under pressure from the West, it can leverage one of these alternative relationships. Second, Turkey is simultaneously helping to develop and participate in institutions that undermine Western international influence.

For example, instead of engaging with the Geneva process on Syria, Turkey remains committed to the Astana process—a trilateral format involving three illiberal regimes deciding Syria’s future. More broadly, we now frequently see Turkey participating in efforts to build an alternative international institutional architecture—one that weakens those institutions capable of holding it accountable.

And lastly, Professor Sofos, how does Turkey’s trajectory under Erdogan challenge or confirm existing theoretical models of populist-authoritarian governance? Are we witnessing a uniquely Turkish path or a globally resonant pattern of democratic decay in hybrid regimes?

Dr. Spyros Sofos: Actually, I’m writing a book at the moment on this, and I am trying to argue that we can see similarities in the cases of Modi in India, Orban in Hungary—to some extent, although Hungary is not an emerging power like Turkey—and even in Israel, where very similar developments are taking place. The judicial reform attempt by Netanyahu could have been written by Erdogan, in many ways.

So what I’m trying to say is that, yes, there is definitely a uniquely Turkish way of building populism. I have struggled in the past to find ways in which the Turkish case can be meaningful for understanding populism, particularly authoritarian populism, more broadly. But leaving aside the particularly Turkish elements—like the century-long divide between those who benefited from the Kemalist reforms and those who were left behind—there is a kind of playbook that we can see being repeated or developed simultaneously in other parts of the world.

Turkey is one of the initiators of a number of political developments that are now being copied by other illiberal actors. But I also see a broader attempt to develop scripts of sliding toward illiberalism—what I would describe as an authoritarian version of populism. I should say, I consider populism—regardless of whether it is left or right—authoritarian in character. So I sometimes find it difficult to use the terms authoritarianism and populism together.

But yes, we can see this happening elsewhere, and therefore we are in for a rough ride. It’s not just one individual country that is affected. I think it’s about the way we are now thinking 

Le Pen & Bardella

Professor Marlière: The Far Right Has No Free Pass to Establish a Dictatorship in France

by Editor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

In this timely and incisive interview, Professor Philippe Marlière (UCL) discusses Marine Le Pen’s conviction, the limits of far-right populism, and the resilience of democratic institutions in France. While Le Pen’s narrative frames her disqualification as a “denial of democracy,” Professor Marlière warns against buying into this rhetoric. “Politicians are not above the law,” he asserts, adding, “The far right has no free pass to establish a dictatorship in France.” A must-read on the legal, political, and symbolic stakes of France’s 2027 presidential race.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Philippe Marlière of University College London offers a trenchant analysis of Marine Le Pen’s conviction, the broader rise of the far right in France and Europe, and the fragile boundaries between democratic politics and authoritarian temptation. Known for his work on French and European politics, Professor Marlière opens the conversation by sharply distinguishing between fascism and the far-right populism embodied by Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN). “I would describe Marine Le Pen’s National Rally as a far-right party,” he says, stressing that although it is “reactionary” and “nativist,” it is “not fascist” in the classical sense, since it operates within existing democratic institutions.

The interview takes on greater urgency in the wake of Le Pen’s conviction on corruption charges and her disqualification from running in the 2027 presidential election. According to Professor Marlière, the ruling represents a “major blow” not only to Le Pen personally—who was widely seen as a leading contender—but to the party’s claim of moral superiority over the political establishment. “The conviction is so clear-cut,” he notes, “and her defense so weak,” that overturning the verdict on appeal seems unlikely.

At the heart of the conversation is the far right’s delicate balancing act between anti-establishment rhetoric and the imperative to appear legitimate within democratic norms. Marlière cautions that while Le Pen and her allies may frame the ruling as “a denial of democracy,” they have not dared to attack the judiciary wholesale, because “if she does, she risks being seen as undermining French justice and being pushed back to the political fringe.”

This fragility, he argues, reveals the limits of populist authoritarianism in France. “In a democracy, when you are a politician, you must respect the decisions of the judiciary,” he insists, citing Montesquieu’s separation of powers. And that is why, he concludes, “the far right has no free pass to establish a dictatorship in France.” Voters may be willing to punish the mainstream, but they are not prepared to dismantle liberal democratic institutions in the process.

Dr. Philippe Marlière, Professor of French and European Politics at University College London.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Philippe Marlière with some edits.

RN Is Nativist, Reactionary, Far-Right—But Not Fascist

Professor Marliere, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: You’ve distinguished between authoritarianism and fascism in recent analyses. Given Le Pen’s ideological evolution and her party’s increasing parliamentary power, where would you situate her movement today?

Professor Philippe Marlière: Well, I would describe Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) as a far-right party. If you want to place it on the left-right axis, as political scientists typically do, it clearly falls on the far-right. That’s also how many people in France perceive it today. Le Pen herself resists the “far-right” label, as it implies being on the fringe or extreme end of the political spectrum. However, that is how pollsters and the media commonly categorize the party. So yes, it is far-right.

It’s not fascist. I don’t think the National Rally can be described as a fascist party. Fascism is something quite specific. You can find fascism today in some countries and in some parties, but I don’t think the National Rally is fascist. I would call it nativist. The main concern of the National Rally is the support, through policies, of the indigenous population—the French—as they describe it, as opposed to non-French people or migrants. So: nativist.

Probably reactionary. Much of the National Rally’s policy and ideology seems aimed at returning to a past—often an idealized or even mythical version of the past—that France, in reality, never fully experienced. A past, of course, with fewer migrants and fewer foreigners. In that sense, it is reactionary.

The party used to advocate policies that were decidedly illiberal. For a long time, it supported the death penalty, opposed abortion, and stood against LGBTQ rights. It has evolved on these issues, and that’s likely something we’ll discuss further. In sum: reactionary, nativist, far-right—that’s how I would describe it.

Fascism, as I’ve said, is different. It involves the attempt to establish a totalitarian regime. It can promote racial politics and undermine or directly challenge the rule of law. I don’t believe the National Rally is currently inclined to do that—although, of course, once in power, they might attempt to.

That said, within the current political context, the National Rally appears to be a party that, if elected, would operate within the main institutions of France and Europe. It would likely cooperate with European partners within the European Union. For all these reasons, it is a far-right party, but not a fascist one.

A Major Blow to the RN’s Anti-Establishment Credibility

How do you assess the political implications of Marine Le Pen’s conviction and subsequent disqualification from running for office in 2027? Given the National Rally’s efforts to portray itself as a respectable, anti-corruption alternative to the political establishment, to what extent does this judicial outcome represent a decisive rupture in the party’s quest for power—and could it destabilize its electoral momentum ahead of a crucial presidential race?

Professor Philippe Marlière: Le Pen’s conviction—alongside that of up to 20 party members, mostly elected representatives in the European Parliament—is undoubtedly a major blow. It’s especially significant for Le Pen herself. She might not be able to run in 2027. As far as I’m concerned, I don’t think the decision will be overturned on appeal. She likely won’t be a candidate, so someone else will have to step in.

For now, she’s fighting to clear her name, but the conviction is so clear-cut, the corruption charges so substantial, and both her defense and the party’s defense so weak, in my view, that overturning the verdict will be extremely difficult.

This is a serious setback for Le Pen, particularly because she was seen as having a strong chance of winning the 2027 presidential election. It now seems increasingly unlikely that she will be able to run.

But more broadly, it’s also a significant blow for the party. As you mentioned, it has increasingly been seen as a normalized political force—no longer on the extreme fringe, but rather as a party whose ideas, members, and officials have gradually gained a degree of legitimacy. I wouldn’t go so far as to say it fully belongs to the political mainstream—not yet, not entirely—but to some extent, it is certainly no longer the early National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the party that once frightened a large portion of the public.

So it’s a major blow for the party because part of its appeal lay in being increasingly perceived as no longer extreme by a majority of voters—or at least by a solid base of 37 to 40% of the electorate—while simultaneously remaining highly critical of the system; that is, the other mainstream parties, which it portrayed as corrupt and part of a de facto coalition responsible for poor governance in France and for the French people.

So, of course, being convicted and found guilty of corruption is a major blow, especially since much of Le Pen’s rhetoric has focused on attacking other parties—branding them as corrupt, accusing them of collusion, and portraying them as operating within a deeply flawed system. Now, that very charge is being applied to her.

There is evidence, and according to the first opinion polls, many people now view the National Rally as a corrupt party—or at least believe that the initial conviction handed down by the judges last week was justified.

Politicians Are Not Above the Law

Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the end of a polical meeting in Marseille for Rassemblement National party on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.

In a democracy, how should we balance judicial independence with the political fallout when a leading presidential contender like Marine Le Pen is barred from running due to financial crimes? Do you see this ruling as reinforcing or undermining public trust in French institutions? Moreover, is there a risk that—even if legally justified—it will fuel far-right conspiratorial narratives about ‘elites’ silencing dissent? How should mainstream parties navigate this moment without inadvertently legitimizing those populist frames?

Professor Philippe Marlière: As you would expect, Le Pen’s defense—and the party’s defense—was to claim that this is a denial of democracy, that the conviction was politically motivated, that the judges are politicized, and that the goal is to bar her from running because she would likely win. That’s what she said at a large rally last Sunday at Place Vauban in Paris. She made these claims, and throughout the week, Le Pen and her supporters have continued to repeat them. Of course, that is their narrative. But that doesn’t mean the narrative is true. In my view, it should be taken with a large pinch of salt and critically examined.

Let’s start with the heart of the matter. What is that? It’s the conviction of Le Pen and her supporters. She is guilty—guilty of a serious act of corruption. Several million euros of public funds were diverted to fake jobs. So we begin with that fact: she is guilty.

However, I believe that, with the support of some media outlets in France—not all, but some—the discussion has shifted away from Le Pen’s conviction and guilt toward a debate about politicized judges and an alleged denial of democracy. I remain very skeptical, if not outright critical, of Le Pen’s narrative, because it seems to me that the judges simply did their job: they applied the law.

By the way, who passed the law—the one that led to Le Pen’s conviction and its immediate effect? It was the lawmakers themselves. A bill was passed in Parliament in 2016. So it was people like Le Pen who voted for that law. They wanted to be extremely harsh on individuals convicted of acts of corruption.

That’s why I think it would be useful to bring the debate back to the heart of the matter: Le Pen’s conviction. She was found guilty of a serious act of corruption. And secondly, the judges simply did their job. To claim that they politicized the process is incorrect—they applied the law.

This also demonstrates something important: politicians are not above the law. They are treated like ordinary citizens—and rightly so. Why should a politician—even someone intending to run for the presidency, with a real chance of winning—be exempt from the law if condemned by French justice?

That’s the real issue. That’s what we should all be reflecting on, instead of defaulting to claims like “the judges are politicized,” and so on. In my view, that is the real question.

Undermining Justice Would Push Le Pen Back to the Political Fringe

Marine Le Pen has characterized her conviction and political ban as a ‘denial of democracy,’ echoing a broader far-right populist tactic of depicting institutions as tools of political repression. In the light of your critique of ‘political nudges’ like the ‘Islamo-gauchisme’ narrative, do you see a danger that the far right will now instrumentalize this legal verdict to delegitimize the French judiciary and fuel deeper mistrust in liberal democratic institutions?

Professor Philippe Marlière: I think it will be difficult to do that. They have probably already tried—particularly Le Pen. If you heard her speak last Sunday in Paris, when she addressed a rally of supporters, she was, of course, very harsh in her response to the judgment. She said, “Of course I’m innocent, this is a denial of democracy,” and so on. She also claimed that the judges who made the decision were politicized.

But she didn’t, so to speak, issue a broader criticism of the French judiciary. She didn’t say, for example, that the entire justice system is corrupt. She avoided that, because doing so would amount to directly challenging the French judicial system as a whole—and that would be quite serious.

It would indeed be highly problematic for a leading contender for the highest office in French politics to undermine the judiciary through such criticism. In a democracy, when you are a politician, you must respect the decisions of the judiciary. Failing to do so means interfering with justice—and that is a very serious matter.

The French political philosopher Montesquieu, in the 18th century, wrote about the separation of powers—executive, legislative, and judiciary—and he said that no power, executive or legislative, should be in a position to interfere with or encroach upon the power of the judiciary. If you do that, it’s no longer a democracy; it’s a tyranny. So justice must remain independent.

That’s why Le Pen will be very careful before launching a broader attack on the justice system. So far, she hasn’t done that. Some of her supporters have likely been less cautious, but she herself has been careful not to place blame on the judiciary as a whole. Instead, she has focused on specific individuals—the judges who issued the ruling—claiming, for instance, that the presiding judge was a leftist.

But this is a difficult line for Le Pen to walk. She cannot push too far in that direction. If she does, she risks being seen as undermining French justice and, as a consequence, being pushed back to the political fringe. Her opponents will say, “Look, you’re clearly not part of the mainstream. If you were ever elected, you would interfere with the justice system.” And that, of course, would be very serious.

Le Pen Must Defend Herself Without Undermining the Rule of Law

Given your work on the ‘dé–diabolisation’ or “de–demonization” of the Rassemblement National and the normalization of the far right in France, do you think Marine Le Pen’s conviction and political ban will disrupt this process—or could it paradoxically bolster her image as a political martyr and reinforce the RN’s anti-establishment appeal? Does this verdict pose a serious challenge to the RN’s attempt to position itself as a credible party of governance, or might it instead deepen its populist narrative of being targeted by a hostile elite?

Professor Philippe Marlière: Again, this is a difficult situation for Le Pen to handle, because she will, of course, try to defend herself. She has already filed an appeal, and I believe it will proceed very quickly—much faster than it would for ordinary citizens. Normally, an appeal takes two to three years, but in this case, it is scheduled for next year, which is unusually swift.

Why next year? Because it allows time for a decision to be made before the presidential election. This gives Le Pen one last chance to run—if she is cleared on appeal. In that sense, it also serves as further evidence that the judges, or the French justice system more broadly, are not conspiring against her. On the contrary, the legal process is offering her another opportunity to stand as a candidate.

So it’s a very difficult situation, because they have to be extremely moderate in their criticism of the justice system; otherwise, they risk being seen as a party that challenges the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. They simply can’t afford to do that. Someone like Donald Trump may be doing so in the US and getting away with it for now—but in France, where Trump is, by the way, quite unpopular, that approach would not be well received.

So the room for maneuver for Le Pen and her party is quite limited. She can say, “I’m innocent, I’m going to appeal, the judges who made the decision were unfair,” but they cannot go much further than that. They cannot openly criticize the judicial system as a whole.

That’s why I think, in terms of image—since that’s your question—if we look at the initial opinion polls, of course, these will need to be confirmed over time. But according to the polls, people don’t seem to have changed their minds. The party remains quite high in the rankings, and Jordan Bardella appears to have, roughly speaking, the same level of support as Le Pen.

There are two distinct points here. First, it’s clear that the National Rally is currently the leading party in French politics. That was evident in the last two elections—the 2024 European election and the general election—where the party came out ahead of all others.

That’s one thing. The other is the judicial decision. And I think, overall, the opinion polls show that the French public believes the decision was fair. That’s why Le Pen can’t make too much noise about it. It’s seen as a fair judgment. French voters appear to believe that no one should be above the law—including national politicians. If they’ve done something wrong, they should be punished like anyone else would be in similar circumstances.

A Far-Right International Is Emerging—But It Won’t Help Le Pen

In the light of the vocal support Marine Le Pen has received from international right-wing figures like Donald Trump and Elon Musk, to what extent does this signal the emergence of a transnational populist narrative centered on judicial persecution or ‘lawfare’? Are we witnessing a growing global solidarity among populist leaders who frame legal accountability as political victimization by elite institutions and the consolidation of a transnational illiberal alliance?

Professor Philippe Marlière: Well, very likely. The initial signs suggest that there is a kind of de facto reactionary or far-right international that has rallied in support of Le Pen. I think all the major figures—key leaders of that movement in Europe—came out: Orbán in Hungary, Salvini in Italy, Trump, J.D. Vance, Bolsonaro. Many of them made public statements. Even Trump tweeted.

He probably doesn’t know Le Pen very well—perhaps not at all—but someone likely mentioned the case to him, so he tweeted in her support. Of course, he did so because these kinds of far-right leaders seek to undermine the rule of law in liberal democracies. They challenge judicial decisions whenever those decisions go against them, and that’s precisely what Trump has been doing in the US. So, this was more of an opportunity for them to do just that, rather than a genuine expression of support for Le Pen herself.

But yes, there is a de facto far-right international. And every time a decision appears to deprive far-right politicians of power—or simply goes against them—they tend to rally in support of that politician, as they did in this case.

What does that mean, concretely? I think this kind of reaction doesn’t clearly indicate what the future holds, one way or another. It remains very uncertain. When I refer to a far-right international, it shouldn’t be compared to something like the Socialist International, where organized parties met regularly and committed to shared policies. It’s not that structured. It’s more at the level of national leaders or heads of state issuing statements, especially via social media.

So yes, she received that support. But what does it mean for Le Pen in France? I don’t think it means much. As I mentioned, Trump is deeply unpopular in France—on both the left and the right. Almost no one likes him. So I don’t believe receiving support from those far-right figures will benefit Le Pen. I think she has to be very careful. Le Pen wants to be seen as more mainstream, so if she appears to be in cahoots with, or too close to, highly controversial politicians abroad, I don’t think it will help her.

Far Right Is Rising—But Too Divided to Replace Le Pen Easily

Le Pen & Bardella
Leaflets featuring candidates for the 2024 legislative elections in Versailles, France, on June 28, 2024. Photo: Dreamstime.

From the French perspective, does Le Pen’s downfall create space for a new figure on the European far-right, or is her symbolic centrality too embedded in the populist narrative across Europe to be easily replaced?

Professor Philippe Marlière: This highlights the central challenge facing the far-right in Europe. The far-right has been steadily growing—making electoral gains, winning elections, and even holding power in several countries. To start with Europe: they were in power in Poland; they remain in power in Hungary and Italy—a major EU country—and Le Pen and her party are performing very well in France. The AfD in Germany has also been doing well. So there is a clear, steady rise of the far-right, marked by significant gains in the most recent European elections.

That’s one of the reasons why the far-right is no longer seriously considering leaving the EU if it were to come into power. They’ve realized they can fight from within and attempt to redirect the EU’s political course.

So that’s good news for the far-right. However, does this translate into greater coordination or cohesion among far-right parties and governments in Europe? Not necessarily. For example, there are at least two parliamentary groups in the EU that include far-right parties. They were unable to form a single group, which, of course, weakens their influence because their efforts are divided across multiple blocs.

It’s also well known that far-right leaders do not necessarily get along well; they do not necessarily work together. For instance, Marine Le Pen is close to Salvini and La Lega but doesn’t get along well with the Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni—which is strange, because Giorgia Meloni has a legacy that is more similar to Le Pen’s. They both come from far-right parties initially. Of course, they’ve evolved somewhat and are now a little bit different. But whereas La Lega initially wasn’t a far-right party when it was created in the 1990s, it became a far-right party. So it’s very strange, and I can’t necessarily explain the logic of these de facto alliances between far-right leaders and parties.

I think it often comes down to their positions on policy, but it’s also about whether the leaders get along personally. I believe it’s more the latter. And that, in itself, is telling. Political scientists often say that the left has trouble uniting—and if you look at the French left right now, that’s clearly the case. They can’t come together.

But it seems the far right also struggles to unite, for similar reasons: ideological differences and personal rivalries. So this is where things stand at the moment. The far right has become more successful recently, but it remains divided. It is not a unified movement. Instead, it’s a collection of far-right parties spread across various parliamentary groups in the European Parliament—groups that don’t necessarily cooperate well or work together effectively.

Bardella Isn’t a Le Pen—But He May Be Even More Radical

Jordan Bardella, Le Pen’s protégé, is poised to become her replacement. Based on your analysis of generational shifts within the European far right, do you see Bardella as a mere avatar of Le Penism by remaining dependent on the Le Pen name, or does he represent a potentially more radical or technocratic trajectory?

Professor Philippe Marlière: There are differences between Le Pen and Bardella. First of all, he’s not a Le Pen. If Bardella runs in 2027, it will be the first time since Jean-Marie Le Pen launched the National Front in 1972 that no Le Pen is running for the FN/RN party. That’s the first difference.

There’s also a generational difference. Le Pen is 56, and Bardella’s youth could be appealing—particularly to younger voters—by presenting a new, youthful face of leadership. But of course, there’s a downside: he is politically untested and very inexperienced. He’s not known as a strong debater or a skilled orator. Reaching that level in politics takes time—it requires years of experience. Le Pen has improved over the years, and with Bardella, it would be a very different proposition.

There are also political differences. I think Le Pen has been—and still appears to be—more supportive of the de-demonization strategy. Unlike her father, she hasn’t attempted to shift the party to the center—the National Rally remains firmly on the far right—but she has worked to make some of its flagship policies on immigration, Islam, and the interpretation of French laïcité more acceptable to a broader segment of voters.

To make them more acceptable to other parties as well, because de-demonization works both ways. It involves you, as a far-right party, refraining from using aggressive rhetoric or making racist statements—things that generally do not resonate well with the electorate. But it also involves your opponents shifting to the right and adopting some of your policies, particularly on issues like immigration.

So there are differences, as Bardella appears to be somewhat more radical on those issues. His economic policies also differ; he’s more like Jean-Marie Le Pen of the 1980s and 1990s—more neoliberal, more supportive of laissez-faire economics than Marine Le Pen. So, you might think these are merely cosmetic differences.

And who knows what will happen if we assume that Le Pen won’t run? Bardella seems to be in a good position—he holds a strong position as the party leader. But who knows? Something might change. Other candidates might try to enter the race, and there could even be a primary election within the party.

Think, for instance, of Marion Maréchal, the niece of Marine Le Pen. She left the party a few years ago to join Éric Zemmour, but now she seems to have taken a step back from him as well. She attended the rally on Sunday in Paris in support of Le Pen. Who knows? She’s very popular among party voters. She’s a Le Pen, even though she no longer uses the name—she’s Marion Maréchal-Le Pen—and for that reason, her presence could be significant. She’s also a better orator than Bardella.

So, who knows what might happen? Bardella appears to be the front-runner to replace Le Pen, but we might be in for a surprise.

Marion Maréchal and Éric Zemmour
Portrait of French politician Éric Zemmour with Marion Maréchal (formerly Le Pen), leader of the Reconquête party, seen in Toulon during a protest against the arrival of the migrant rescue ship Ocean Viking. Photo: Laurent Coust.

Le Pen’s Legal Struggles Will Have a Limited Impact on Europe’s Far-Right Strategy

And lastly, Professor Marlière, what ripple effects might Le Pen’s conviction and framing as a martyr have on sister far-right movements in Europe, especially in states like Italy, Hungary, and Germany? Could it embolden them or shift their strategies? Do you think this case and its framing could be used by other European populists to delegitimize legal institutions, especially in countries where the rule of law is already under strain?

Professor Philippe Marlière: I might be a little optimistic on this, but I don’t think it will have a significant impact on the political situations in other countries. Of course, some will use Le Pen’s case to talk about so-called politicized judges, to claim a denial of democracy, to argue that the “true patriots”—as they describe themselves—are being sanctioned by their opponents, that they can’t speak the truth to the people, that they are restricted and constrained. You know, all the usual arguments.

I think they might refer to the Le Pen case in national debates to make those points. But I’m optimistic in the sense that each national context is different. And besides, the pace of politics today is very fast. In a few months, who will still be talking about Le Pen’s conviction?

There will be the appeal, so in a year or so, it may come back onto the agenda. But if the appeal is upheld, I think people will move on—there will be a replacement, another candidate, probably Bardella—and Le Pen will be quickly forgotten.

That’s one thing. The other reason I’m optimistic is that, as I said earlier, Le Pen has to be very careful about criticizing the judges and the justice system—not to be seen as undermining the rule of law—because that would be an extreme move. It would place her in a very radical position, one that most of the electorate, particularly conservative voters who are not far-right, would likely reject.

These are the voters who, in the second round of a presidential election, might be tempted to vote for Le Pen or someone from the National Rally against, for instance, a left-wing candidate—if one were to make it to the runoff. This electorate is conservative, right-wing, but not far-right. The National Rally needs to keep them on board and continue appealing to them. If they can’t—if they lose that electorate—they will never get elected. That’s why they have to be extremely cautious. And I think the situation is the same across most European countries—Italy, probably—with one exception: Hungary.

Hungary has been governed by Orbán for a long time, and many people say that while elections still take place, they are not very fair. It’s a highly authoritarian regime—illiberal. So, probably with the exception of Hungary, where the opposition is now quite weak due to all the laws passed by Orbán’s government, I think in other countries there are still counterpowers—opposition parties, trade unions, the media, and most importantly, the public—the electorate.

It’s not because the electorate is putting the National Rally ahead in France that they want an authoritarian regime. It’s a very complex reality to grasp. I think supporting the far right in France today means, above all, rejecting the other parties—both left and right. People believe those parties were once in power and failed. They tried Macron, and they believe he failed too. So it’s more about the idea: let’s try the only party that has never governed—the National Rally.

But that doesn’t mean voters want an authoritarian regime, or a government that will curb public freedoms or take extreme measures. That’s why Le Pen can’t see herself as the new Trump. I don’t think being a Trump figure would go down well in France. Then again, you might say, in the US, who could have predicted what happened there?

You see, that’s why I’m optimistic. But of course, things can sometimes go wrong very quickly. Still, that’s my view. I think that for Le Pen and the party to be successful and ultimately win an election, they will have to stick to their strategy of de-demonization—which means no longer being seen as an extreme or threatening party—so that enough people will be willing to vote for them.

Of course, they will maintain their policies—against immigration, against Islam, and against a number of other things—but they do so because they believe there is probably a majority of people who could support those positions. Just enough. That’s their strategy. It doesn’t mean they have a free pass to establish a dictatorship in France.

German Scholars.

ECPS Panel — Discussing Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge

by Extremism & RadicalisationVideos

Date/Time: Thursday, March 13, 2025 / 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Moderator

Dr. Cengiz Aktar (Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member).

Speakers

“How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?” by Dr. Eric Langenbacher (Teaching Professor and Director of the Senior Honors Program in the Department of Government, Georgetown University).

“How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?” by Dr. Kai Arzheimer (Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz).

“Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election,” by Dr. Hannah M. Alarian (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida).

“The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications,” by Dr. Conrad Ziller (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen).

“Germany’s Far Right: Antifeminism Sells,” by Dr. Sabine Volk (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau).

Photo: Shutterstock.

ECPS Panel — Discussing Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge

by EventsExtremism & RadicalisationPast Events

Date/Time: Thursday, March 13, 2025 / 15:00-17:00 (CET)

 

Click here to register!

 

Moderator

Dr. Cengiz Aktar (Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member).

Speakers

“How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?” by Dr. Eric Langenbacher (Teaching Professor and Director of the Senior Honors Program in the Department of Government, Georgetown University).

“How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?” by Dr. Kai Arzheimer (Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz).

“Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election,” by Dr. Hannah M. Alarian (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida).

“The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications,” by Dr. Conrad Ziller (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen).

“Germany’s Far Right: Antifeminism Sells,” by Dr. Sabine Volk (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau).

Click here to register!

 

Brief Biographies and Abstracts/Outlines

Dr. Cengiz Aktar is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens. He is a former director at the United Nations specializing in asylum policies. He is known to be one of the leading advocates of Turkey’s integration into the EU. He was the Chair of European Studies at Bahçeşehir University-Istanbul. In addition to EU integration policies, Dr. Aktar’s research focuses on the politics of memory regarding ethnic and religious minorities, the history of political centralism, and international refugee law.

How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?

Dr. Eric Langenbacher is a Teaching Professor and Director of Honors and Special Programs in the Department of Government, Georgetown University. His research interests center on political culture, collective memory, political institutions, public opinion and German and European politics. His publications include From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Germany at the Twentieth Anniversary of Unification (co-edited with Jeffrey J. Anderson, 2010), Dynamics of Memory and Identity in Contemporary Europe (co-edited with Ruth Wittlinger and Bill Niven, 2013), The German Polity, 10th, and 11th, 12th edition” (2013, 2017, 2021) (co-authored with David Conradt), The Merkel Republic: The 2013 Bundestag Election and its Consequences (2015), and Twilight of the Merkel Era: Power and Politics in Germany after the 2017 Bundestag Election (2019). He is also Managing Editor of German Politics and Society, which is housed in Georgetown’s BMW Center for German and European Studies.

How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?

Dr. Kai Arzheimer is a Professor of German Politics and Political Sociology at the University of Mainz in Germany. He is particularly interested in European far right parties and their voters.

Abstract: Within just three years, Germany’s Far Right “Alternative for Germany” has managed to double the 2021 result, making them the second largest party in the new parliament. During this period, the party has undergone a bewildering transformation that involved (further) radicalization on the one hand and normalization on the other. In my presentation, I trace this process and will also use (very preliminary) survey data to look into the micro-foundations of the AfD’s meteoric rise.

Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election

Dr. Hannah Alarian is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, where she is also a faculty affiliate with the Center for Arts, Migration, and Entrepreneurship and the Center for European Studies. Dr. Alarian’s research examines questions of immigration, citizenship, and far-right politics in Europe and the United States. Her research appears in the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Politics, and Comparative Political Studies, among others.

Abstract: The 2025 German Federal Election marked a seismic political shift. Voter turnout soared to its highest since reunification, the far-right AfD secured 20.8%, becoming the second-largest party in the Bundestag, and the FDP lost all parliamentary representation for only the second time in history. How did Germany reach this moment of far-right ascendence, and what lies ahead? This presentation addresses these pressing questions, examining the democratic challenges posed by AfD. In particular, I examine the expected driver of far-right support (i.e., immigration) and party strategies regarding accommodation or exclusion of the AfD in parliament (i.e., breaching the Brandmauer). I conclude by discussing the democratic challenges facing the next German government and strategies the coalition may employ to stave off further far-right mobilization.

The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications

Dr. Conrad Ziller is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at University of Duisburg-Essen. His research interests focus on the role of immigration in politics and society, the radical right, and policy effects on citizens, amongst others. More information can be found here: https://conradziller.com/

Outlines: In the 2025 German federal election, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) achieved a historic 20.8% of the vote, doubling its previous performance and marking its strongest postwar result. This surge was particularly pronounced in economically disadvantaged regions, especially in the former East Germany, where the AfD secured up to 46% of votes in certain districts. Notably, the party made significant inroads in traditional Social Democratic Party (SPD) strongholds, such as Gelsenkirchen in North Rhine-Westphalia, a constituency long dominated by the SPD. Additionally, the AfD has gained popularity among young men and even attracted votes from immigrant communities, indicating a substantial realignment of voter bases. The implications for German politics over the next four years are profound. With a stronger parliamentary presence, the AfD’s will continue to challenge the traditional party system and influence debates on immigration, economic reform, and Germany’s role in the European Union. While mainstream parties have ruled out coalitions with the AfD, their electoral losses highlight growing societal divisions. Addressing the economic and cultural divisions fueling the AfD’s rise will be crucial for maintaining political stability and democratic cohesion.

Germany’s Far Right: Antifeminism Sells

Dr. Sabine Volk is a postdoctoral researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau. She is affiliated with the Hub on Emotions, Populism and Polarisation, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki. Her research appears in European Societies, European Politics and Society, Frontiers in Political Science, German Politics, Political Research Exchange and Social Movement Studies, as well as in edited volumes. Her research interests include populism and the far right, party politics and social movements in Germany and Europe. 

Abstract: The issue of immigration surely dominated the German federal election campaign. Mainstream parties adopted an increasingly harsh anti-immigration discourse under the impression of AfD’s increasing strength in the polls. This presentation shifts our attention to yet another important issue of far-right politics in Germany and beyond: antifeminism or ‘antigenderism’. Addressing the puzzle of AfD’s lesbian leader Alice Weidel, it examines how AfD successfully fashions itself as Germany’s key antifeminist actor. Among other things, it traces AfD’s radicalization in the issue areas of women’s reproductive rights as well as trans and gender diverse minority rights.

Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Hough: Mainstream Parties Must Address Issues or Risk Strengthening the AfD

by Editor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Dan Hough warns that mainstream parties must engage with voters’ real concerns or risk further legitimizing the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). “Ignoring the AfD hasn’t worked, and simply adopting their rhetoric hasn’t either,” Professor Hough explains. Instead, he urges democratic parties to develop credible policies that address the economic and social anxieties fueling AfD support. He highlights how discontent—particularly in Eastern Germany—extends beyond migration, with deeper dissatisfaction driving voters toward populist alternatives. As the AfD continues to shape public debate, Professor Hough argues that mainstream parties must lead with solutions rather than reactionary responses. “The discourse must be smart, and the outcomes must be meaningful.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Dan Hough, a leading expert on corruption and populist politics from the University of Sussex, offers critical insights into the Alternative for Germany (AfD)’s electoral gains and the broader implications for German democracy. As the AfD nearly doubled its vote share in Sunday elections compared to the 2021 elections, mainstream parties now face urgent questions about how to respond to the party’s growing appeal. Professor Hough warns that ignoring the AfD has not weakened it—nor has engagement through policy imitation. Instead, he argues that mainstream parties must confront the real grievances driving voter discontent. “The challenge is to find a language that acknowledges the problems the AfD highlights while offering solutions,” he says. “If they fail to do so, the AfD will continue to benefit, pointing to government inadequacies in dealing with these issues on its own terms.”

While the AfD has thrived on anti-elite and anti-immigration rhetoric, Professor Hough emphasizes that its rise is rooted in broader dissatisfaction with Germany’s political establishment. He points to Eastern Germany, where frustration over decades of economic disparity, social change, and political disillusionment has fueled the party’s success. “Migration is an important issue, but the deeper wells of dissatisfaction run much deeper,” Professor Hough explains. He highlights how, in many cases, AfD voters are not driven purely by far-right ideology but rather by a sense of being ignored by the political mainstream. This is why simply branding AfD supporters as anti-democratic is counterproductive—it alienates them further and pushes them deeper into the party’s ranks.

Professor Hough warns that if mainstream parties continue to avoid these tough discussions—or adopt reactionary rhetoric to compete with the far-right—they risk further legitimizing the AfD. Drawing comparisons to Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ), he notes how engaging with populist forces without a clear alternative vision can backfire, as seen in Austria, where the FPÖ has outperformed the AfD. “Ignoring the AfD has not worked. Engaging with them, as Austria has done with the FPÖ, has also not worked. So what do we do?” he asks. Instead of reactive politics, he argues, mainstream parties must lead the debate and provide credible policy responses that resonate with voters before the AfD defines the terms of the discourse.

As the interview unfolds, Hough delves into the role of corruption narratives in populist movements, the paradox of “anti-corruption populism,” and the risks of democratic backsliding if far-right parties continue to reshape public debate. Ultimately, he underscores that Germany’s best defense against the AfD is not exclusion, but better governance and tangible solutions to the concerns that fuel its rise. 

Professor Hough stresses that mainstream parties must acknowledge the grievances the AfD exploits while providing meaningful solutions. “The discourse has to be smart, and the policy outcomes have to be meaningful. If that happens, the AfD’s rise does not have to be unstoppable.” His analysis offers a crucial perspective on the evolving landscape of German and European politics.

Professor Dan Hough, a leading expert on corruption and populist politics from the University of Sussex.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Dan Hough with some edits.

Ignoring the AfD Has Failed—Mainstream Parties Must Find a New Strategy

Professor Hough, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you assess the far-right AfD’s performance in the German elections, where the party nearly doubled its vote share compared to the 2021 elections? What factors do you think contributed most to this surge?

Professor Dan Hough: I thought their performance was expected. I was predicting around 20%, and that’s what they got. So, in the end, the result was not a surprise. We’ve known for a few years that the AfD was going to do well, and they did. The only question was around the details—would they get more or less than 20% and how would they choose to frame that outcome?

In truth, the more pressing issue for German politics was the performance of the smaller parties because whether they entered Parliament was going to have a much larger impact on the government. And, of course, the German government, like many others around the world, faces significant challenges. So, ensuring that Germany has a functioning government moving forward was crucial, and the AfD has no real role to play in that. For me, the focus was actually not so much on the AfD but rather on the smaller parties and the 5% hurdle.

Do you believe the endorsements of the AfD by Elon Musk and U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance had any measurable impact on the election results? Or were their influences more symbolic than substantive?

Professor Dan Hough: I’m not sure about their influence—we don’t know. We haven’t yet analyzed the data in great detail, but the AfD’s performance was exactly as expected, even before Donald Trump won the election and before Elon Musk took on whatever role he now officially believes he holds in American politics. So, there’s no real evidence that they had any impact. Their endorsements were certainly noted and welcomed by the hardcore AfD supporters, but in terms of influencing the overall results, I would need to see evidence demonstrating that they had any effect at all.

You have argued that immigration and refugee policy has become a key battleground for European center-right parties as they compete with center-left and liberal parties. Given that immigration is also a central theme for far-right parties, to what extent do center-right parties risk legitimizing the far right by adopting similar rhetoric and policy positions?

Professor Dan Hough: The challenge that mainstream democratic parties face is that there is no easy answer to questions about who should be allowed to enter a country, under what circumstances, and how they should be treated. I mean, a country like Germany, which has land borders with nine other states and has taken in a couple of million refugees over the last 10 years, will always face challenges in integrating and processing newcomers. 

So, there isn’t a single “right” answer for the CDU to come up with here. Whatever they do, there will be a significant number of people who are unhappy with it—whether those on the left advocating for a more liberal stance or those on the right pushing for a more restrictive one.

What we do know is that ignoring the AfD has not worked at all. The AfD has risen to 20%. However, engaging with the AfD—if we look at Austria, where the Freedom Party (FPÖ) has been heavily engaged by the center-right over the past 20 years—has also not worked. The FPÖ receives even more votes than the AfD does. So, what do we do? If you engage with the AfD, they seem to grow stronger. If you ignore them, they also seem to grow stronger. Somewhere in between, there has to be another option or set of options.

Friedrich Merz is treading a path where he refuses to talk to the AfD but seeks to engage with potential AfD voters. Now, if I were a political strategist, I’m not sure I would necessarily recommend that approach, but I understand why he is trying to take the sting out of the migration issue. We know that when Germans worry less about migration, they are less likely to vote for the AfD. So, this issue requires a policy response that makes sense and is perceived as effective by the public because it is a highly salient issue today.

That’s the challenge—coming up with answers that actually help manage the issue in practice. The other thing about the AfD is that while migration is a key driver of their support, a lot of it also stems from dissatisfaction, particularly in Eastern Germany. This dissatisfaction is linked to the multiple crises that people there have endured over the last 30 years since the collapse of the GDR. So, while migration is a major issue, the deeper wells of dissatisfaction run even deeper, extending beyond just the debate over who should come to Germany and under what circumstances.

Populist Anti-Corruption: A Weaponized Narrative Rather Than a Solution

European Parliamentary election posters of the FPÖ in Vienna, Austria, on May 15, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

The AfD has positioned itself as an anti-elite, anti-corruption party while being embroiled in its own corruption controversies. How does this contradiction affect voter perceptions? How do you explain the relationship between corruption and the rise of far-right movements? What do the German case and the German elections on Sunday tell us about this relationship?

Professor Dan Hough: You’re assuming that people are logical and rational and that if something happens, they will respond in a logical manner. There are plenty of lessons from Austria, a country that is arguably a couple of decades ahead of Germany in dealing with a populist party. We know that some of the scandals the FPÖ has been involved in are truly ridiculous. The Ibiza scandal, for instance, is one that people might want to look into—a truly crazy scandal. But it didn’t really affect the FPÖ in Austria at all, because the main drivers of FPÖ support are general dissatisfaction.

The dissatisfaction of people stems from a government they see as unimpressive and policies they believe are not working. The AfD functions as a vessel for their unhappiness. As long as that dissatisfaction exists, the AfD will be able to get away with much more than people in polite society might imagine. It’s not too different from Donald Trump. Trump says some truly remarkable—let’s put it that way—things. But at this point, it’s factored in. People have gotten used to it, and he can say increasingly outrageous things without changing the opinions of those who either support or loathe him.

The AfD finds itself in a similar position. It’s already factored in that things will not always be logical with them, but they still represent, for enough people, a means to send a strong message to the mainstream elites.

You have written extensively on the role of citizens in anti-corruption efforts. How does corruption—whether real or perceived—fuel support for populist movements, particularly in Europe? How do populist parties, like the AfD, exploit corruption grievances to mobilize support?

Professor Dan Hough: Yeah, and there’s a lot to be said there. Populist parties, of course, like having a dichotomy. They like talking about the elites—how the elites look after themselves but not the people. They thrive on this divide and have a real disdain for the complexities of politics, such as compromise, bargains, and deals. They are not interested in that. For them, there are the good guys—the people—and the bad guys—the elites.

Now, this framework fits very easily onto the issue of corruption: elites look after themselves, they corrupt the political process, and the people are the ones who suffer. So, it’s no surprise that the far right frequently talks about corrupt practices. However, when it comes to actual anti-corruption policies, their stance is much harder to pin down. What they generally end up saying is, “Give us power, and we’ll sort it out,” which, of course, is not really an anti-corruption policy at all.

Many of the things the AfD discusses regarding corruption are not particularly detailed. In fact, they don’t use the word “corruption” as frequently as one might expect. Instead, they heavily rely on the German words for dissatisfaction and disdain. For those who speak German, that is one of their key themes. They argue that the elites have no respect for ordinary people. In this way, they tap into a corruption discourse without being particularly explicit about what they would actually do to fix it—other than saying, “Vote for us, and we will take care of it.”

Citizen-Led Anti-Corruption: A Complex Reality vs. Populist Simplifications

In your work, you discuss the limitations of citizen-led anti-corruption efforts. How do populist parties frame corruption differently compared to traditional anti-corruption movements? How effective are citizen-centered approaches to anti-corruption in countering populist narratives that thrive on corruption scandals?

Professor Dan Hough: Citizen-centered approaches are quite new, and they take very different forms in different parts of the world. In some places, there are websites like ipaidabribe.com in India, where individuals can report instances of bribery they have experienced. However, in countries like the United Kingdom or Germany, such platforms are not really necessary. I have never had to pay a bribe in the United Kingdom, and bribery is not part of the everyday fabric of life here. But, of course, corruption exists in other forms.

The type of citizen-led approach varies depending on the nature of the corruption problem. For example, in the United Kingdom, there are websites where people can see exactly how much politicians earn and how much they receive in donations—down to the last pence—allowing the public to judge whether it is appropriate or corrupt. Because the state functions reasonably well, this data can be collected and made publicly available. Citizens can then decide whether, for instance, Boris Johnson receiving millions of pounds for lecture tours is appropriate or not.

Citizen-led approaches are most successful when they are not isolated. An effective anti-corruption infrastructure requires institutions that can take prosecutions forward and a legal system where the rule of law actually means something—which, in many places, it does not, as it is applied very inconsistently. Without this broader institutional support, citizen-led approaches struggle to make an impact.

Now, all of this is too complex for the far right, which tends to focus on a much simpler narrative. Their arguments center on an undefined elite that supposedly looks after itself at the expense of ordinary people. They use the word corruption as a blunt weapon against that elite, arguing that these people have disdain for the general public. Their message is: Vote for us, and we will change that relationship.

However, the details of how this change would be implemented are rarely well thought out or explained. They do not really propose meaningful citizen-led approaches to anti-corruption. Instead, they talk a lot about direct democracy, which fits into their populist narrative of giving power back to the people—but in practice, not many far-right parties ever reach a position where they can actually implement such measures. As a result, their promises remain quite vague.

Populist leaders often portray themselves as fighters against a corrupt elite. However, many populist leaders claim to fight corruption while simultaneously dismantling institutional checks and balances. How do you assess the paradox of ‘anti-corruption populism’? Based on your research, do such narratives result in actual anti-corruption measures, or are they primarily rhetorical tools?

Professor Dan Hough: They’re not just rhetorical tools; they’re practical tools. But they’re not practical tools to fight corruption. They’re practical tools to empower those who push them forward. Many of the mechanisms that I would call backsliding—which we have seen populist regimes enact—are not really about anything other than dismantling processes that they see as working against them. Instead, they seek to create new processes that do not work against them.

Viktor Orbán is a great example of this in Hungary. His government creates what they argue are institutions that work for the good of the people. However, people like me would argue that these institutions also seem to work really well for him. And that is ultimately where they end up. So, I wouldn’t say this is about anti-corruption at all. It is about empowering those who push these narratives.

Perceived Corruption Outweighs Reality, Fueling Populist Support

AfD demo with slogan Stop Islamization and counter demonstration of the Left in Luetten Klein in Rostock, Germany on May 14, 2018. AfD, Alternative for Germany, is a right wing political party in Germany. Photo: Shutterstock.

Your research suggests that corruption can be a mobilizing grievance, but also that frequent exposure to it can lead to apathy. How does this paradox play out in the context of Germany and the rise of the AfD? To what extent do mainstream parties’ failures in tackling corruption contribute to the rise of far-right parties like the AfD?

Professor Dan Hough: I don’t think the corruption narrative is really that helpful in explaining the rise of the AfD, and it might be a bit odd for me to say that, given that I work in a corruption research center. But for me, anyway, the rise of the AfD is about other things. It’s about dissatisfaction. It’s about disaffection. It’s about people being unhappy with their lot—and often, these grievances are not entirely reasonable. But at the same time, the AfD is very good at speaking to their unhappiness and addressing the feeling that they are not at one with how Germany works.

Now, corruption in any meaningful sense is not really part of that. In a broad sense, there is the argument that elites corrupt the process, they look after themselves, they don’t look after you, but I don’t think corruption in an everyday sense in Germany is a driving force behind this. I believe there are better variables to examine when trying to explain the AfD’s rise.

One of your studies discusses how citizens’ direct experiences with bribery influence their willingness to protest. In Germany, where large-scale bribery is relatively rare, what factors do you think drive the populist anti-corruption discourse?

Professor Dan Hough: Bribery is really rare in Germany, as it is in the UK. But if you ask people whether they think much of it exists, they’ll tell you yes. You often find people saying, “Yeah, there’s a lot of corruption in Germany. Oh, I’ve never experienced it, but there’s a lot of corruption.” So there’s a paradox between what they experience and what they perceive, and this paradox can be really significant and quite obvious when you talk to individuals about it.

I don’t think corruption, in any meaningful sense, is a major theme in German politics. There are simply too many bigger issues dominating the landscape at the moment—whether it be Ukraine, the climate crisis, or the ineffectual government that Germany has just replaced. The anti-corruption narratives tend to appeal more to people who study the subject—people like me, who are interested in the details. I don’t think many Germans are losing sleep over corruption challenges. It’s simply not the primary way they frame the problems they experience.

Ironically, Germany, like many other states, does have corruption problems. They exist, but they’re not visible in everyday life. For example, contracts may be awarded to companies that perhaps shouldn’t receive them, but most people don’t know about that. They don’t read the fine print buried on page 17 of a heavyweight newspaper to find it out. That sort of corruption remains beyond their immediate awareness, and understandably so—they have their own lives to lead.

So, I think the anti-corruption narrative in Germany is rather stilted. It doesn’t have the same dynamic as in other places because there are simply more pressing concerns on people’s minds.

The AfD Exploits Corruption Narratives to Undermine Trust in Democracy

Posters and demonstrators at a protest against the AfD party in Munich on January 21, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

In the recent elections, the AfD nearly doubled its support. Unlike in some Southern or Eastern European contexts, Germany has relatively robust anti-corruption institutions. Why do you think the AfD still manages to frame corruption as a central issue?

Professor Dan Hough: I’m not sure it does. It talks about corruption, but what it really doing is finding a way to explain that your problems, your worries, your concerns—those guys over there in Berlin don’t care.

So, it frames corruption as one part of a much bigger narrative about the political process not working for you, and that’s dangerous. Because if that political process isn’t working, they may suggest alternatives that look a bit more like Orban’s model. And it wouldn’t be in Germany’s interest to go down that route.

It’s worth remembering that 80% of people in Germany last week said they would never, under any circumstances, consider voting for the AfD. So yes, they got 20% of the vote, and many people—including myself—find that deeply disconcerting. But it’s important to keep the context in mind: the majority of Germans have no time for the AfD and don’t buy the snake oil they try to sell.

Mainstream parties often struggle with countering populist claims about corruption. Based on your work, what strategies should democratic institutions adopt to maintain trust while effectively combating corruption?

Professor Dan Hough: Getting corruption right takes time and patience. It took Britain about 300 years to go from being very corrupt to being less corrupt. Denmark and Sweden, which followed what the literature calls a Big Bang approach, took 15 years to implement sweeping institutional changes in the 19th century. That’s 15 years—three electoral cycles—and even then, the reforms didn’t work perfectly overnight. It’s now over a century later that we see Denmark and Sweden as frontrunners in anti-corruption efforts.

So, if you’re looking for quick solutions, you’re going to struggle because changing institutional processes takes time. In truth, the best anti-corruption policy is simply to govern well: give people a little bit more of what they want—whether that’s economic security, safety, or the sense that their voices are being heard.

That takes time, but it’s the most effective method. You can establish new anti-corruption commissions or pass stricter laws, and while those might catch some corrupt actors, for most ordinary people, better governance is the real solution. And that’s something I hope Friedrich Merz understands—he’s not going to solve these problems in a month.

Anti-Corruption Policies Can Backfire When Populists Manipulate Institutions

Is there empirical evidence showing that stronger anti-corruption policies lead to a decline in support for Populist parties? Or do such policies risk being weaponized by Populists themselves.

Professor Dan Hough: Oh, they certainly can be. Poland is a really good example. In 2006, a strong anti-corruption commission was introduced, and the populist government used it to go after its enemies. The irony was that many of these so-called enemies had hardly been in power at all, yet they were accused of abusing their positions in government—an almost surreal situation given that many of them had never held office. So, there is a real danger that anti-corruption institutions can be hijacked, and we see this happening all over the world.

Now, Germany is not really in that position. If you asked Germans what their anti-corruption institutions were, I’m not sure many of them would know. But certainly, there is always a risk that populists could use such institutions for their own ends. The best example of this is Donald Trump—he has attempted to use institutions to serve his own interests.

That’s why democracy is not about any one particular institution; it’s about a network, a mosaic of institutions that work together, sometimes constraining each other, sometimes supporting each other. The real challenge is getting that mosaic right—because when it is strong, it becomes much harder for populists to dismantle it and push their agenda through.

With rising political fragmentation in Germany, do you think anti-corruption efforts will become more partisan, and if so, what are the risks of this for democratic accountability?

Professor Dan Hough: Well, partisanship is always an issue, right? And in many ways, I don’t have a problem with that. Parties represent interests, they represent people, and they try to bring those interests into the political process. Corruption is no different in that regard. But I don’t see anti-corruption being a particularly salient issue in German politics over the next legislative cycle at all. There will be issues linked to potentially corrupt practices, but much more of the focus will be on money—where to find the funds to invest in infrastructure, support Ukraine, and finance other priorities like the climate transition and the Energiewende (shift to sustainable energy). All of this revolves around the kind of daily politics we’re used to—debates about money, influence, and competing interests. The corruption narrative is not at the center of that discussion, and I don’t see the next government having much time to devote to it either. That may be good or bad, but given Germany’s financial challenges, I think it’s inevitable.

The AfD’s Strength Lies in Channeling Dissatisfaction, Not Policy Solutions

Looking ahead, do you see the AfD’s anti-corruption narrative evolving further, and if so, how might this impact broader European trends in populism and governance?

Professor Dan Hough: They may evolve. They like using the word “corruption” because it’s a concept people generally think they understand, although I would sometimes disagree with those understandings.

I think the AfD will use the corruption narrative whenever they can because it helps them point the finger at the government and gain political attention. Whether that will have any meaningful effect, I don’t know. Populist right-wing parties have always talked about corruption, but I’m not sure they’ve always truly benefited from it. It has been one small part of their toolkit.

Austria is a really good example for Germans to look at. The success of the FPÖ has come from highlighting Austrian dissatisfaction with mainstream parties. That’s what it has done—it has provided a vehicle for people to express discontent, even if the party itself isn’t particularly good at explaining what exactly they oppose.

That is where the AfD’s strength lies—as a vehicle for protest and dissatisfaction. They have been very effective at using social media to amplify their message and reach a generation that mainstream politicians are struggling to engage.

Despite ongoing controversies, including investigations into AfD figures for extremism, the party continues to attract voters, as evidenced by Sunday’s election results. To what extent has the AfD succeeded in mainstreaming far-right discourse in German politics, and what implications does this have for the broader political landscape?

Professor Dan Hough: One thing they have done is change the way Germans talk about migration. German politicians really didn’t want to talk about migration until about 15 years ago. It was an issue they all agreed to handle in a very sober, technical way, but that, of course, changed—probably about 20 years ago, but absolutely and definitively in 2015, when over a million asylum seekers arrived in Germany from North Africa and the Middle East.

The AfD has been very effective in introducing language into public discourse that wasn’t there before. This presents a real challenge for all mainstream parties, as they now find themselves engaging in debates they previously avoided. Euroscepticism is another example—criticisms of the EU in Germany weren’t really a thing until relatively recently, and now they are. The AfD has played a role in that shift. It’s not the only reason it has happened, but it has contributed.

This presents a challenge. Mainstream parties must find a language that acknowledges the problems the AfD highlights while offering solutions. If they fail to do so, the AfD will continue to benefit, pointing to government inadequacies in dealing with these issues on its own terms.

Populism Thrives on Dissatisfaction—Only Effective Governance Can Counter It

Photo: Shutterstock.

And lastly, with the AfD’s rise, are we seeing an erosion of public trust in Germany’s democratic institutions, or is this simply a reflection of broader European trends in far-right politics?

Professor Dan Hough: Well, it can be both. I mean, Germany has now become a bit more normal. Most countries have a far-right party polling around 20%. This is nothing new—France, the Netherlands, and several other countries have faced similar challenges. Many countries have had far-right parties operating like the AfD for a long time. So, in that sense, Germany is simply aligning with a broader European trend.

However, Germany has a unique history, and most Germans are not particularly happy with this “return to normality.” Moving forward, the AfD is in a position to build on its current success. In the next election, four years from now, it is highly unlikely that the AfD will be anywhere near government, which means they will continue to play the role of opposition—complaining and criticizing. If the German government fails to make progress in solving or at least appearing to address the major issues of the day, the AfD could perform even better next time. That is the real challenge.

Of course, populism is not just present on the far right. Die Linke had a strong election on the populist left, and another party, the Alliance, narrowly missed entering Parliament. So, there is about 13% of the electorate on the left that also leans populist. There is a lot of populism in German politics right now, and the only way to counter it is through effective governance—delivering policies that improve people’s lives.

Simply labeling populist voters as anti-democratic is not going to work. In fact, it will likely backfire, further alienating them and making them more likely to vote against mainstream parties in the future. That is not difficult to understand—if someone insults me, I am hardly going to turn around and agree with them. Human nature does not work that way. The discourse has to be smart, and the policy outcomes have to be meaningful. If that happens, the AfD’s rise does not have to be unstoppable.

Professor Jonathan Olsen, Chair of the Department of Social Sciences and Historical Studies at Texas Woman’s University.

Professor Olsen: AfD’s Growth Faces a Ceiling Despite Eastern Stronghold

by Editor’s ChoiceEnvironment & ClimateExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviewsMigration

Despite the AfD’s strong performance in Germany’s Sunday elections, securing nearly 21% of the vote and dominating in the East, Professor Jonathan Olsen argues that the party faces a ceiling in its growth. “Opinion polls consistently show that around 80% of Germans do not support the AfD,” he notes, emphasizing its high negative ratings. While the AfD has solidified its base in the East, its influence in the West remains limited, requiring a broader appeal to expand further. Professor Olsen highlights that migration and security remain the party’s key mobilization issues, while economic concerns, though present, rank lower in importance for its voters.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Jonathan Olsen, Chair of the Department of Social Sciences and Historical Studies at Texas Woman’s University, offered his insights into the Alternative for Germany (AfD)’s recent electoral performance. While the party’s near 21% result in the 2025 German elections signals strong support—particularly in eastern Germany—Professor Olsen argues that its growth potential may be reaching a ceiling. “Opinion polls have consistently shown that around 80% of Germans do not support the party,” he noted. “The AfD has the highest negative ratings of any political party in Germany.”

Despite its success, Professor Olsen highlights that the AfD’s ability to broaden its voter base remains uncertain. “They remain the largest opposition party, securing nearly 21% of the vote and mid-30% in Eastern Germany. But moving forward, the key question will be: How do they expand beyond their current level of support?” He suggests that, while the AfD has solidified its position in the East, its influence in the West remains limited. “They receive about twice as much support in the East as in the West. If I were advising the AfD, I would recommend they focus on broadening their appeal in the West and refining their messaging to attract a wider voter base.”

One of the more striking aspects of the AfD’s campaign was its issue selection. Professor Olsen describes the party as a “populist issue entrepreneur,” effectively capitalizing on migration and domestic security as central themes. “I don’t see that the AfD mobilized any new issues except for the economy and the performance of the Ampel coalition (Ampelkoalition). Migration was by far the most important issue driving their vote, followed closely by domestic security,” he explained. Economic concerns ranked much lower in priority, though Professor Olsen points out that 75% of AfD voters expressed concerns about rising prices and future financial security.

Despite some international attention, Professor Olsen downplays the impact of endorsements from figures like Elon Musk and J.D. Vance on the AfD’s performance. “There was no discernible bump from Musk’s endorsement or from J.D. Vance’s and Trump’s implicit support. So, I think it had zero effect,” he stated.

Looking ahead, the AfD’s position within both Germany and the broader European far right remains complicated. While it seeks alliances with transnational populist movements, many European far-right parties still consider it too extreme. “Even Marine Le Pen’s National Rally and Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy have distanced themselves from the AfD,”Professor Olsen noted. As the party continues to grow in the East while struggling to expand in the West, its long-term trajectory remains a crucial question for German and European politics.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Jonathan Olsen with some edits.

The AfD’s Growth Is Strong, but Its Ceiling May Be in Sight

Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Olsen, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: You observed the German elections in Germany. How do you interpret the performance of the AfD in the German elections, in which it almost doubled its vote since the last election in 2021? Did its electoral strategy evolve compared to previous elections?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: I think the AfD’s performance can be considered a strong one. The party is certainly pleased with the outcome. They didn’t exceed some expectations—some thought they might reach 21 or 22%—but they ended up just under 21%, so it can’t be characterized as disappointing. This result may suggest that there is a ceiling for AfD support. They remain the largest opposition party, securing nearly 21% of the vote and reaching the mid-30% range in Eastern Germany. It was a very successful election for them, but moving forward, the key question will be: How do they broaden their voter base? How do they expand beyond their current level of support? Because, in my view, there seems to be a limit to their electoral growth.

As for your second question—did their electoral strategy evolve compared to previous elections? I wouldn’t say it changed significantly. However, if you examine their campaign posters—I spent a lot of time walking around the city analyzing different posters, and I previously conducted research with my co-author on AfD election posters in 2017 and 2021—there is a noticeable shift. While I haven’t done a systematic study of the 2025 election, a first glance at their campaign materials suggests a much more mainstream presentation. Their advertising appears more conventional, more in line with other parties, and lacks the provocative posters seen in 2017.

The 2025 campaign placed significant emphasis on Alice Weidel as their lead candidate. When I examined their posters, nothing stood out as particularly different from other parties. Their strategy largely capitalized on the issues that were already prominent in public discourse—migration and domestic security—particularly following high-profile attacks involving asylum seekers in various parts of Germany. These events effectively handed the AfD its key campaign themes. Additionally, the CDU’s response to these issues, which in some ways reinforced the AfD’s position, made it even easier for the party to highlight its main message.

Do you think Elon Musk and J.D. Vance’s endorsement of the AfD had any effect on the party’s performance?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: No, I don’t think it had any effect. If you look at the AfD’s polling over the last year or so, it has stayed pretty steady, right around 20%. There was no discernible bump from Musk’s endorsement or from J.D. Vance’s and Trump’s implicit endorsement of the party. So, I think it had zero effect. It did not have any negative effect that I could tell—that is, I don’t think it drove people away from the AfD, but it certainly didn’t drive people to vote for the AfD either.

AfD’s National Expansion Remains Uncertain

The Alternative for Germany (AfD) booth in Görlitz, Germany, on August 16, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

The AfD has seen significant support in the elections, particularly in eastern Germany. How do you interpret their latest electoral performance? Does it signal a deepening of their influence or a potential ceiling to their growth?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: Well, to address your last question first, which I partially answered earlier, I see a potential ceiling to the AfD’s growth. Opinion polls have consistently shown that around 80% of Germans do not support the party. The AfD has the highest negative ratings of any political party in Germany.

If you’re looking at people who didn’t vote for the AfD—not always the best way to gauge their future potential—you still have to consider that 80% of Germans did not vote for the AfD in 2025. As part of this election trip, we had a representative from the AfD speak to us, and I asked him what the party could do to broaden its support. He didn’t have much of an answer. It seems the AfD expects political issues to fall into their lap and assumes that the failure of mainstream parties to address key problems will automatically boost their support. But I’m not convinced that’s the case. I don’t see their support growing dramatically unless they take proactive steps to make themselves more appealing to a broader segment of German voters.

Now, in eastern Germany, the situation is different. This is more of a West German problem than an Eastern German one. In Eastern Germany, the AfD is the largest party. If you look at the first vote election results in East and West, it’s predominantly the CDU and CSU in the West, while in the East, it’s primarily the AfD. They secured 35–36% of the vote in Eastern Germany, making them the dominant party there. It reminds me of the vote totals Die Linke was getting 10–15 years ago, but which they no longer achieve.

The AfD has clearly solidified its base in Eastern Germany. Although they perform relatively well in the West, they still lag significantly behind other parties there. They receive about twice as much support in the East as in the West. I believe the average was 34% in the East compared to around 18% in the West. If I were advising the AfD, I would recommend they focus on broadening their appeal in the West and refining their messaging to attract a wider voter base. That’s how I would approach it.

AfD’s Success Driven by Migration and Security, Not New Issues

Your research highlights the AfD as a “populist issue entrepreneur.” What new issues has the party successfully mobilized in this election?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: This was interesting because I don’t see that the AfD mobilized any new issues except for the economy and the performance of the Ampel coalition (Ampelkoalition). If you look at the issues the AfD was running on and that were important to their voters, it was migration and domestic security. After that, it was the performance of the Ampel coalition, specifically regarding the economy and energy.

Whether they have a coherent answer is another question. I don’t think so, and I know that most German voters didn’t find their answers to economic issues particularly convincing. However, that may not matter much to their core voters. For them, the most important thing is that the AfD continues to stress migration and domestic security issues. Whether they can develop their economic message in the future is an important question for broadening their voter base. Finding a coherent and convincing economic platform will be crucial for the AfD if they want to expand their appeal.

I wanted to look at this because there were some interesting exit polls available on Tagesschau. Looking at the issues that were important to voters overall, domestic security was the top issue, tied with economic and social security. After that came migration, followed by economic growth.

For AfD voters specifically, migration was by far the most important issue driving their vote, followed closely by domestic security. Far behind those were concerns about economic growth, rising prices, and other issues. So, it’s clear that for AfD voters, the party’s primary appeal comes from its stance on migration and domestic security, with much of the security debate tied to migration—curbing violence by asylum seekers, for example. Economic issues rank far lower in importance. Right now, this prioritization works for them, but if the AfD wants to broaden its voter base in the future, they will have to develop more convincing economic solutions.

Far-Right Degrowth: A Mix of Nationalism, Eco-Asceticism, and Climate Skepticism

How does the far right’s concept of “degrowth” differ from the left’s vision, and what role does this play in its political messaging?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: So that’s a real shift in gears, moving from the AfD to the broader far right. The AfD, like most populist far-right parties, is more of an anti-environmental party than an environmental one. While they talk about alternative environmental solutions, their primary concern is denying climate change or denying that it is man-made. They advocate for a return to traditional fossil fuels and are strongly opposed to alternative energy sources. There is nothing in the AfD’s program that suggests any real concern for environmental issues.

However, the broader far-right milieu in Germany and elsewhere takes some of these issues more seriously. Unlike the AfD, some far-right groups do not deny climate change or its human causes. They support some use of alternative energies and acknowledge major environmental challenges. The most the AfD does in this regard is to conceptualize a nationalist environmental policy. They frame themselves as the true environmentalists, arguing that only patriots—those who love their homeland—can truly protect the environment. They mention environmental initiatives, but their proposals are quite limited.

This is where degrowth comes in. Unlike the broader far right, the AfD—like almost all other populist far-right parties—does not question economic growth. Degrowth is a concern primarily for other far-right groups and circles that take environmental issues more seriously. That being said, this remains a relatively small segment of the far right.

Their conception of degrowth aligns with what Bernhard Forchtner and I called “eco-asceticism.” This vision promotes self-renunciation, self-control, and a reduction in consumption. In this regard, it is not entirely different from the left’s vision of degrowth. However, where they diverge is in their views on global capitalism. The left firmly identifies global capitalism as the main driver of environmentally destructive economic growth, whereas the far right is more ambiguous. They are certainly against globalism, but not necessarily against all forms of economic growth.

Another key difference is that some segments of the far right that discuss degrowth also tie it to an ethno-nationalist vision of the nation and a concept of ethnocultural purity. You don’t find this element in the left’s vision of degrowth.

AfD Remains an Outlier but Gains Leverage in German Politics

Photo: Shutterstock.

In your view, has the AfD managed to fully integrate into the German political system, or does it remain an outlier? How has the response of mainstream parties impacted its trajectory?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: Well, it still remains an outlier because no other party is willing to form a coalition with it. The AfD is trying to bide its time—returning to a point I made earlier, the AfD’s strategy at this stage seems to be to wait it out. That is, they are not going to do much differently from what they have done before. They are not actively trying to increase their vote share; instead, they are counting on the decline of mainstream party support, which would eventually leave conservatives with no other option than to form a coalition with the AfD. That appears to be their strategy. So, the AfD is definitely still an outlier in the political system. However, its growing vote totals are making it harder for other parties to form coalitions—both at the national and state levels—and to completely ignore the issues it is raising.

How has the response of mainstream parties impacted the AfD? Well, a couple of weeks before the election, Friedrich Merz tried to push through a non-binding resolution on limiting migration in a particular way, and he had to rely on AfD support to get it passed. He didn’t want to; he had expected other parties to support it, but it turned out to be a miscalculation on his part. Many observers saw that as providing a certain degree of legitimation to the AfD and the far right. People have been discussing the Brandmauer—the firewall against the AfD—as if it is not completely down, but at least damaged.

I think the response of mainstream parties is going to be really important for the AfD’s trajectory in the future. If they can continue to marginalize the AfD—treating it as a non-legitimate party—while at the same time addressing the concerns that matter to AfD voters and a broader segment of the German electorate, then they have a chance of decreasing the AfD’s vote share.

In other words, I believe the next four years will be crucial—assuming the coalition lasts its full term. Whatever government forms next, most likely a CDU/CSU and SPD coalition, it will be essential to address key issues in a way that satisfies German voters. If they succeed, I think we will see a decline in the AfD’s vote totals. If they fail—especially if the new coalition resembles the Ampelkoalition in its inability to resolve basic concerns—then the AfD will likely continue to receive 20% or more of the vote.

AfD Support Driven More by Perceived Decline Than Economic Hardship

Many analysts highlight economic anxieties and globalization backlash as drivers of AfD support. How much of their success do you attribute to economic factors versus cultural or identity-based appeals? To what extent did dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of recent crises, such as the economy or migration, contribute to AfD’s support in Sunday’s elections?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: I’ll answer that last question first, and it contributed a lot to the AfD’s support. Migration, as we’ve discussed, was by far the biggest issue. The economy also played a role, even though it ranked lower on AfD voters’ list of concerns. That doesn’t mean it was unimportant. Certainly, the Ampel coalition’s perceived incompetence and inability to get things done had a significant effect on the AfD’s vote.

Regarding economic factors versus cultural and identity-based issues, I don’t think you can completely separate the two. If you look at AfD voters objectively, the majority are not economic losers. In terms of income levels and other economic markers, they are not primarily drawn from the unemployed or lower-income groups. Instead, the AfD’s support comes from middle- and higher-income levels. So, it is not necessarily their objective economic situation that is driving AfD voters. However, there is a strong sense of anxiety among AfD voters that they are losing—that they are falling behind compared to other groups.

This reflects a distinction between subjective perceptions and objective markers of economic status. Looking at the available data, Tagesschau exit polling showed that domestic security played a far larger role among AfD voters than among any other party’s electorate, with 33% citing it as a top concern. Migration, as expected, was twice as significant for AfD voters compared to supporters of any other party. Conversely, economic growth was a much lower priority for AfD voters compared to other parties.

One particularly interesting finding is that 75% of AfD voters expressed strong concerns that rising prices would make it difficult for them to pay their bills. Similarly, 74% feared that their standard of living could not be maintained in the future, and 71% were deeply concerned about having enough money in old age. So, while AfD voters clearly have economic anxieties—especially regarding globalization—these concerns are not necessarily grounded in their objective circumstances but rather in their subjective perceptions and fears about economic decline.

AfD Seeks Alliances but Remains ‘Too Extreme’ for Europe’s Far Right

Hundreds of people demonstrated against hatred and the AfD at a rally organized by Fridays for Future Cologne in Cologne, Germany, on February 1, 2024. Photo: Ryan Nash Photography.

Given the rise of far-right parties across Europe, do you see the AfD aligning more with transnational populist movements, or is its strategy still largely domestically driven?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: I see the AfD trying to align itself more with transnational populist movements. It does seek out international partners, particularly in Europe. However, interestingly enough, the AfD is still viewed as too extreme by many far-right populist parties—certainly by the National Rally in France, which did not want the AfD as part of its group in the European Parliament. It is also seen that way by Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, as the AfD is considered too far to the right. Some of the party’s controversial statements regarding the Nazis, the Holocaust, and the war have contributed to this perception.

As a result, the AfD currently stands somewhat apart from other far-right populist parties in Europe, even though they share many of the same issues. Migration is a central concern for all far-right populist parties, as is globalization. Anti-EU or at least highly EU-skeptical sentiments are common across these parties, as is the cultivation of nationalism and national identity. However, the AfD remains farther to the right than most.

Domestically, the AfD is primarily focused on appealing to East Germans, where some of its more controversial statements on National Socialism have not appeared to harm its electoral support. However, these same controversies have damaged its relationships with other far-right populist parties in Europe.

AfD’s Environmental Stance: Nationalist Framing or Anti-Green Identity?

Farmers and truckers protest against subsidy cuts at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, Germany, on January 14, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

Does the AfD’s environmental discourse resonate with voters, or is it more of a symbolic strategy aimed at rebranding the party’s ideological image?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: Whatever pro-environmental discourse the AfD has is not really something that resonates with voters. When you look at the AfD’s messaging, it is primarily focused on anti-environmental positions. It advocates for a return to fossil fuels, opposes alternative energy sources like wind power, rejects subsidies for electric vehicles, and promotes climate change denial or skepticism.

The environmental aspects of the AfD’s messaging are mostly framed within a nationalist perspective. This includes rhetoric about protecting the German environment, preserving the homeland, and safeguarding natural spaces. However, this nationalist environmentalism is minimal and does not seem to attract many voters.

The interesting question moving forward is whether the AfD—or other populist far-right parties—will attempt to moderate their stance on environmental issues, climate change, and related policies. It remains to be seen whether they will consider such a shift too risky, as their anti-environmental message is distinct from that of any other party. If they were to embrace more pro-environmental policies, they might lose their unique positioning in the electoral marketplace.

And lastly, Professor Olsen, how has the AfD framed issues like sustainability and environmental protection? Does their rhetoric on ecology differ from traditional far-right parties, and how do they position themselves against the German Greens?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: Well, there has been some great work looking at the relationship between the AfD and the Greens. I think the Technical University of Dresden has written a couple of pieces on this. I remember one article that essentially discusses the AfD as the “anti-Greens.” They position themselves as such because they take very distinct, opposing positions from the Greens and view them as their biggest enemy—not necessarily in terms of electoral strength, but certainly in terms of policies and ideology. The image of the Greens and the image of the AfD are diametrically opposed, and the AfD very much positions itself in direct opposition to them.

Issues like sustainability and environmental protection are, again, wrapped within a German nationalist framework. Their rhetoric suggests that, of course, they want environmental sustainability and to protect the environment, as it is part of the natural basis of life and the German homeland. The argument follows that those who love their homeland will naturally want to protect its environment.

This framing allows the AfD to present some environmental policies—such as reducing the use of pesticides or other forms of environmental protection—as being in line with their nationalist agenda. However, where they truly differentiate themselves and cast themselves as the “anti-Greens” is in their opposition to climate protection and alternative energies, particularly as part of a broader climate policy.