Leader of the Syriza party, Alexis Tsipras, delivers a speech during a pre-election campaign event in Thessaloniki, Greece, on May 16, 2023. Photo: Giannis Papanikos.

Economic Malaise and Political Discontent: An Analysis of the 2024 European Parliament Election in Greece

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Please cite as:

Vasilopoulou, Sofia. (2024). “Economic Malaise and Political Discontent: An Analysis of the 2024 European Parliament Election in Greece.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0072

 

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Abstract

The 2024 European Parliament (EP) election in Greece was held against a background of geopolitical instability in Europe’s neighbourhood. However, domestic – rather than European – issues dominated the campaigns, including the economy, inflation and the cost-of-living crisis. The electoral results were primarily an anti-government protest vote and confirmed a trend of electoral fragmentation across the political spectrum. On the right, three relatively new far-right populist parties received parliamentary representation, i.e., the Greek Solution, Victory and the Voice of Reason. On the left, SYRIZA–PA maintained its second place, although its support declined substantively compared to the previous EP election. Course of Freedom and the KKE, on the other hand, were key electoral beneficiaries in the left-wing space. Younger age groups primarily opted for SYRIZA–PA, whereas older groups were more likely to support New Democracy. That said, far-right parties also received votes from younger generations. Geographically, the far right is more successful in the north of Greece. The key message of this election was political discontent and a general feeling of economic malaise posing dilemmas across the political spectrum.

Keywords: elections; public opinion; populism; the left; the right; Greece

 

By Sofia Vasilopoulou* (King’s College London)

Introduction

Greeks went to the polls on Sunday, 9 June 2024, to elect 21 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Although a total of 31 parties competed for Greek citizens’ votes, only eight received enough votes to reach the 3% electoral threshold for parliamentary representation. The elections were held against a background of geopolitical instability with the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza. Yet, domestic questions, such as the economy, inflation and the cost-of-living crisis, influenced the vote.

The electoral results confirmed a trend of electoral fragmentation on both the left and right ends of the politicalspectrum despite the centre-right New Democracy retaining first place. On the right, three far-right parties with populist agendas, including Greek Solution, Victory and Voice of Reason, elected four MEPs in total. The substantive policies of these parties share several similarities, and their narratives are all based on a similar populist logic. However, their 2024 EP election campaigns prioritized different issues. Whereas Greek Solution talked more about its economic agenda and the cost-of-living crisis, Victory focused on religion and family, and Voice of Reason placed emphasis on Islam and the so-called ‘woke culture’.

On the left, the Coalition of the Radical Left–Progressive Alliance (SYRIZA–PA) came second with approximately 15% of the vote, translating into four EP seats. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Course of Freedom secured two and one seats, respectively. These parties vary substantively in their policies. SYRIZA–PA put forward a centre-left agenda, Course of Freedom continued its anti-establishment rhetoric, and KKE maintained its communist agenda.

In what follows, I first analyse the policies of Greek populist parties on domestic and international issues. I then proceed to examine the electoral results, offering a glimpse into some socio-demographic and geographic patterns of the vote. I will finally conclude with some thoughts about the dilemmas presented to parties following the electoral results.

The ‘supply-side’ of Greek populism in the 2024 EP election

Greece has been characterized as a populist democracy (Pappas, 2014), in which populism tends to be observed across the party system and is expressed through blame-shifting and exclusivist narratives (Vasilopoulou et al., 2014). Greek populism cuts across the left–right dimension and is generally concentrated among the political parties that reject the mainstream politics of the ‘old two-party system’ associated with the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy (Tsatsanis et al., 2018). Based on this distinction, this section discusses the ideologies and positions of six populist parties in Greece in the run-up to the 2024 EP election in Greece.

Right-wing populism

Greek Solution (Ελληνική Λύση) – EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists

The far-right populist Greek Solution was founded in 2016 by Kyriakos Velopoulos, a former member of the far-right Popular Orthodox Rally (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός) and the centre-right New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία).

The party rose to prominence amid Greek protests against the Prespa Agreement signed between Greece and North Macedonia to settle an enduring dispute between the two nations. During that time, other far-right parties in Greece were experiencing electoral decline, which favoured Greek Solution. For example, members of the Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή), an extreme right-wing party (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015) were being indicted for running a criminal organization, and the Independent Greeks (Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες) had lost credibility among their voters for participating in an electoral coalition with the left-wing SYRIZA (Συνασπισμός της Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς).

Greek Solution has a prominent anti-establishment narrative glorifying the ‘pure’ Greek people against the ‘evil’ and ‘corrupt’ Greek political elites. Its populist message is combined with an ethnonationalist rhetoric, which is said to derive its strength from ‘Hellenism’. The party’s core beliefs may be summarized by its focus on ‘Greece, religion, family’. During the 2024 EP election campaign, the party leader professed to ‘make Greece and Greeks proud again’, arguing that Greek Solution has ‘clean hands and clean ideas’ (Greek Solution, 2024a).

On the cultural dimension, Greek Solution is critical of immigration, and what it calls ‘the language of rights’ and ‘imposed’ multiculturalism (Greek Solution, 2024b). It is pro-Russian (Dimitropoulos 2022; Wondreys, 2023) and against compulsory vaccinations (in.gr, 2021). While not openly calling for a Greek exit from the European Union (EU), Greek Solution has a vision for a Europe of nation-states extending from Lisbon to Siberia that is Christian and includes Russia, i.e., what the party calls a ‘European Europe’ that gives veto power to all member states (Greek Solution, 2024c). Despite its Eurosceptic position, the leader of Greek Solution argued that EP elections are very important because nine out of ten decisions made in the Greek Parliament derive from EU legislation and that, therefore, abstention would mean support for the national government (Greek Solution, 2024d).

On the economic dimension, the party offers a somewhat blurred policy combination of low taxation mixed with economic intervention and welfare chauvinism (Georgiadou & Mavropoulou, 2022). The party’s EP election campaign primarily focused on the ‘cost-of-living crisis’ framed with a robust anti-establishment narrative. For example, they castigated the government, declaring that ‘Greeks are hungry and poor, but politicians are rich’. In its pre-electoral campaign, the party also focused on the expressed needs and priorities of the primary economic sector, specifically agriculture. Its economic plan consisted of reducing food production costs to support farmers by removing fuel duty, flat taxes and investment in mining to subsidize free schemes for energy self-sufficiency across Greece. Interestingly, and contrary to the cultural model of far-right voting behaviour (Norris & Inglehart, 2019), Greek Solution’s party leader attributes the rise of far-right parties to economic reasons, such as poverty, unemployment and the cost-of-living crisis (Greek Solution, 2024b).

Democratic Patriotic Movement–Victory (Δημοκρατικό Πατριωτικό Κίνημα–Νίκη) – EP group: Non-Attached

The far-right Victory was founded in 2019, shortly after the signing of the Prespa Agreement, which, it argues, has been a betrayal to the Greek people considering that there is only ‘one’ Macedonia, which is ‘only Greek’ (Victory, 2024). The party first competed in the 2023 general election and gained ten seats. It puts forward an ultra-conservative religious narrative premised on an ethnic conception of Greek national identity and a belief in the primacy of the church over the state.

Victory makes populist appeals differentiating between the ‘good’ Greek people (who are equated to the Greek nation) and the elites presented as ‘gangs’ that place their partisan interests over the ‘sacred’ national interest (Victory, 2024). The party rejects left–right ideology, suggests that parties have colluded against the Greek people and the Greek nation, and promises to ‘free’ Greece from these partisan interests. It calls for binding referendums on important questions, the removal of the electoral threshold, and the reduction of the size of the Greek Parliament from 350 to 200 deputies.

On the cultural dimension, the party opposes liberal values, is against minority rights, and talks about Greece’s ‘spiritual, biological and territorial self-destruction’ (Victory, 2020). Its ideology is premised on a strong belief in the Orthodox Christian religious tradition. The party is careful to avoid criticisms that it strategically employs religion in its discourse and argues that ‘We do not have a religion, we have faith’. Victory is firmly against LGBTQ+ rights and abortion, arguing that ‘nature is law’, and proposes to establish a ‘Ministry of National Demographic Growth’ that would ‘ensure the biological future of the Greek nation in our ancestral land’ (Victory, 2020b) and address issues related to family, childbirth, immigration and repatriation. To that end, the party promises birth subsidies, benefits for stay-at-home mothers with two or more children, and tax reductions for families. The party is prone to conspiracy theories, for example, arguing that LGBTQ+ Pride events are supported and subsidized by the US embassy, George Soros and international lobbies (Victory, 2024b). It is also against vaccinations (Newsbeast, 2023).

Victory’s position towards the EU is rather blurry. The party appears to support a Greek exit from the EU so the country is ‘free from its guardians’, but it does not openly advocate for it. It suggests that Greece needs to focus first on being socially and economically stronger and praises the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) for promoting their national interests within the EU (Victory, 2020c). It is noticeable, however, that the EU was not a salient issue in the party’s 2024 European manifesto, which focuses primarily on domestic issues, including measures to support family, population growth, cheap energy and rural communities. Victory is pro-Russian and criticizes Greece’s support for Ukraine in the ongoing conflict.

The party has a staunch anti-globalization agenda, supports strategic investment in agriculture and Greek self-sufficiency in food and energy. While it supports low taxation for both businesses and households, it proposes tax increases on banks and multinational corporations as well as on money transfers to other countries.

Voice of Reason (Φωνή Λογικής) – EP group: Patriots for Europe

Voice of Reason is a relatively new far-right party founded in 2023 by Afroditi Latinopoulou, a former New Democracy candidate. The party describes itself as a contemporary patriotic movement that serves Greek identity and values, such as ‘Homeland, religion, family.’ Like Greek Solution and Victory, it portrays Greece in decline and seeks to appeal to the ‘ordinary Greek’ against the corrupt establishment. The party is against ‘political correctness’ and portrays itself as being censored from Greek media (Latinopoulou, 2024). Interestingly, although the party does not have any known links to the Spartans or the Golden Dawn, Latinopoulou criticized as anti-democratic the decision of the Greek Supreme Court to ban the Spartans from running in the 2024 EP election on suspicion they were being led by Ilias Kasidiaris, a former Golden Dawn member of the Greek Parliament currently serving a prison sentence for directing a criminal organization (Newsbreak, 2024).

The ideology of Voice of Reason draws inspiration from the so-called ‘Great Replacement’ theory. It argues that globalization, atheism, Muslim immigration and a rights discourse are replacing Greek culture and Christianity. It maintains that ‘Brussels’ is a pro-globalization entity whose decisions support global financial interests. The leader claims that she is in favour of a ‘Europe of nations, not a Europe of illegal immigrants and rights’ activists’ (Danikas, 2024). According to the party, migration policy and the so-called ‘woke culture’ were at stake in the 2024 EP election (Voice of Reason, 2024). The party warns about the ‘Islamization of Greece and Europe’. Its policy solutions consist of the deportation of illegal immigrants, the closing of Greek borders, and the relocation of reception centres for migrants outside Greece. The party is staunchly against the acceptance of non-heterosexual sexual orientations, same-sex marriage and adoption rights. It prioritizes demographic growth through measures that support the ‘Greek’ family.

Left-wing populism

Coalition of the Radical Left–Progressive Alliance (Συνασπισμός της Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς – Προοδευτική Συμμαχία, SYRIZA–PA) – EP group: The Left

SYRIZA has been the main opposition party in Greece since 2019. The party was founded in 2004 and remained at the margins of the Greek party system until it rose to power during the Greek crisis. SYRIZA is a radical left populist party that critiques international capitalism and attempts to provide a socially just alternative to it. It is socially progressive, committed to equality and rights, and has historically put forward a version of soft Euroscepticism, criticizing the EU’s democratic deficit. During the Greek crisis, it adopted a fervent populist rhetoric blaming domestic and international elites for the Greek crisis (Vasilopoulou et al., 2014). It embraced an anti-establishment protest strategy, arguing that a different – anti-neoliberal – path was possible to take Greeks out of poverty and social exclusion.

After SYRIZA-PA’s defeat in the 2023 national election, the party elected a new leader, Stefanos Kasselakis, a relatively unknown politician and a former banker. Kasselakis was elected on a ticket prioritizing transparency, justice, labour rights, progressive taxation, and LGBTQ+ rights. The transformation of the party following its new leadership remains to be seen, especially considering that it has led to ongoing debates and factional splits within the party. During the 2024 EP election campaign, the party refrained from strong anti-neoliberal rhetoric and instead talked about a ‘progressive’ political space. The party had a positive message asking Greeks to opt for SYRIZA-PA at the ballot box: ‘For a better life, now’. Instead of an anti-establishment agenda, SYRIZA-PA talked about social protection, security and opportunities for all.

Course of Freedom (Πλεύση Ελευθερίας) – EP group: Non-attached

Course of Freedom is an anti-establishment political party founded in 2016 by former President of the Greek Parliament and SYRIZA MP Zoe Konstantopoulou. Its policy proposals are mixed, making it difficult to firmly place the party on the left–right spectrum. The leader explicitly argues: ‘We look neither right nor left. We look forward’ (CNN, 2024).

On the cultural dimension, the party puts forward an equality and inclusion agenda that tolerates differences and supports human, minority and LGBTQ+ rights (Course of Freedom, 2024b). It supports same-sex marriage and is pro-Palestinian (Chatzikonstantinou, 2024). At the same time, the party adopts a strong sovereigntist narrative seeking to appeal to ‘popular conscience’ with emotive language. For example, it demands reparations from Germany for the Second World War and seeks to ‘shake off the yoke of the memorandum despotism, the totalitarianism of the Eurobureaucracy, the debtocracy, the bankocracy and the interests and oligarchies that support, feed and benefit from this anti-democratic regime’ (Course of Freedom, 2024a). Course of Freedom has also been critical of the Prespa Agreement, appealing to nationalist voters opposed to austerity.

Communist Party of Greece (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας, KKE) – EP group: Non-attached

The KKE was founded in 1918 and is considered an orthodox communist party guided by the ‘revolutionary worldview of Marxism–Leninism’ (KKE, 2013). It is among the few parties in Europe with such an ideological agenda that has maintained a persistent level of electoral success. In line with its communist ideology, the party rejects ‘bourgeois democracy’ and seeks to overthrow capitalism.

The KKE employs populism in its discourse (Hawkins et al., 2020). It has an anti-elite rhetoric arguing that Greek mainstream parties ‘blackmail the people’ and that New Democracy should be ‘afraid of the people’ (902.gr, 2024). On the cultural dimension, whereas KKE is tolerant of immigration, it is fervently against the decriminalization of drug use and exhibits culturally conservative attitudes towards LGBTQ+ rights, including same-sex marriage and adoption (Naftemporiki, 2024).

The party has a hard Eurosceptic stance, supporting Greece’s exit from the EU. It views the EU as imperialistic, anti-democratic, capitalist and exploitative. It perceives the EU’s impact on national sovereignty to be adverse and an impediment to social justice. In his pre-electoral speech, the party leader called the workers and the people to use their vote in order to ‘raise a red flag against the EU, SYRIZA and PASOK’, arguing that these parties satisfy the wishes of their ‘exploiters’ under the ‘delusion’ of social democracy (902.gr, 2024).

The KKE is also anti-American, anti-NATO and anti-EU. It is pro-Palestinian yet views the war in Ukraine as an imperialistic conflict between the ‘bourgeois powers’, i.e., the EU, NATO and the US, and ‘capitalist Russia’ (KKE, 2023). Economically, it proposes the nationalization of all industries and a centrally planned economy.

The campaign context

The 2024 EP election occurred against the backdrop of public dissatisfaction with domestic politics. Based on a Pew Research Centre (2024) opinion poll conducted between January and March 2024, 53 % of Greek respondents reported an unfavourable view towards the EU, which was 3 percentage points higher compared to 2023 and the largest group across the European countries surveyed. The same poll reported that in Greece, in contrast to other EU member states, public Euroscepticism derives primarily from left-leaning citizens. In addition, satisfaction with democracy had dropped from 32 % in 2021 to 22 % in 2024 (Pew Research Centre, 2024b) and was – not for the first time – the lowest across the sample of European countries. It is therefore no surprise that citizen dissatisfaction with the government was prominent among the public. For example, only 35% of respondents thought that their vote in the EP election would change things in Greece, 48% saw it as an opportunity to express protest (Alco, 2024), and 60% as a chance to vote against the government (To Vima, 2024).

Although public interest in the EP election was relatively high at 56% (Alco, 2024), national issues dominated the campaigns and were core to citizens’ decision-making. When presented with a list of issues that would influence their vote in the 2024 EP elections, 53.4 % of respondents answered the cost-of-living crisis and the economy. Other issues included European issues (8.2%), security (7.8%), health (7.6%), foreign policy (6.9%), the Tempi train crash (a deadly head-on collision between two trains in the Thessaly region in 2023) (6.5%), education (2.9%) and same-sex marriage (2.9%) (To Vima, 2024). These responses reflected a feeling of general economic malaise. For example, according to a Metron Analysis survey conducted in May 2024, the top two most important issues facing the country included the cost-of-living crisis (40%) and the economy (27%) (Kathimerini, 2024a). Most parties also devoted their campaigns to national issues. Although there was no official pre-electoral TV debate, on 24 May 2024, there was an informal debate in the Greek Parliament during its last session prior to the EP election, where questions of inflation and the cost-of-living crisis also dominated.

Interestingly, according to the Youth and Democracy Eurobarometer (2024) survey, the top priority for young Greeks is fighting poverty and economic and social inequalities (45%, 9 percentage points above the EU average). This is followed by preserving peace, reinforcing international security and promoting international cooperation (35%), and promoting human rights, democracy and common European values (31%).

Electoral results

Confirming the ‘second-order’ character of EP elections, only 41.39% of the electorate turned out to vote (table 1). Although this followed a general trend of declining turnout (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2012), turnout was particularly low in 2024, i.e., over 12 percentage points lower than the 2023 national election and over 17 percentage points lower than the 2019 EP election.

Prior to the election, New Democracy and SYRIZA-PA had set themselves specific goals. On the one hand, the leader of New Democracy claimed that he was aiming for the same electoral result as in 2019 (Reporter, 2024). On the other hand, SYRIZA-PA’s Kasselakis claimed that he would be satisfied if his party gained over 20% of the vote (EFSYN, 2024). Both leaders’ claims failed to materialize, as the electoral result was overall one of electoral fragmentation both on the right and the left.

On the left, SYRIZA-PA’s electoral result dropped compared to the previous national and EP elections to just under 15%. The KKE received 9.25% of the vote, translating into two MEPs. Lastly, Course of Freedom received 3.4% of the vote, remaining relatively stable compared to the 2023 national election. On the right, three political parties received parliamentary representation, including Greek Solution with 9.3 %, Victory with 4.37 % and Voice of Reason with 3.04%. Together these parties elected 4 out of 21 MEPs.

The socio-demographics of the vote

There were no clear socio-demographic patterns of support for populist parties as defined by age and employment (Tables 2 and 3). Based on the exit poll (Kathimerini, 2024b), younger age groups primarily opted for SYRIZA–PA, whereas older groups were much more likely to support New Democracy. Course of Freedom benefited electorally from the youngest 17–24 age group. Young Greeks also opted for the far right going against the perception that these parties’ strongholds are among the older generations. In fact, older people voted primarily for New Democracy. Whereas Greek Solution received the least votes from the 17–24 age group, Voice of Reason received its second-best outcome in the same group. In addition, Greek Solution was the third most preferred party among the 25–34 age group.

In terms of employment status, SYRIZA–PA attracted support from public and private sector employees as well as pensioners. KKE was mostly successful among private sector employees and farmers. On the right, Greek Solution received significant support from farmers, which is consistent with the party’s strategy to add to its ballot a female farmer from the north of Greece, Galato Alexandraki, who was elected as an MEP. Farmers, nonetheless, were quite fragmented in their political preferences also supporting the left-wing populist Course of Freedom. Pensioners were much less likely to opt for Greek Solution, Victory or Voice of Freedom. Victory was very successful among public sector employees, whereas private sector employees were the top group for Voice of Reason.

There is also an interesting geographic dimension to the far-right populist vote (for a European perspective, see also Ejrnæs et al., 2024). In many districts in Northern Greece, these parties received above-average results. Specifically, Greek Solution came second in six electoral districts of the north, including Imathia (18.42%), Pella (17.28%), Kilkis (16.54%), Thessaloniki B (15.82%), Serres (15.64%), and Drama (15.52%).

Conclusion

The key message of this election is political discontent and a general feeling of economic malaise. Citizen protest against the government and domestic issues, such as inflation, the economy and the cost-of-living crisis, dominated the 2024 EP election in Greece. The results confirmed a trend of fragmentation across the political spectrum, which poses dilemmas both on the right and the left. On the right, the strength of the populist far right limits the electoral potential of a centrist strategy for the centre-right New Democracy. If New Democracy were to move towards the centre, multiple contenders would likely contest for the political space to its right. At the same time the far right is also divided, and it is not clear whether these parties are willing to work together. On the left, there is a discussion on the possibility of SYRIZA–PA joining forces in order to be able to challenge New Democracy. This strategy is also not without complexity: for SYRIZA–PA, it might entail that the party fully loses its radical and populist appeal, whereas PASOK might be seen as disloyal towards its core voters.

 

(*) Sofia Vasilopoulou (PhD LSE) is Professor of European Politics at King’s College London, UK. Her research and teaching interests lie in Comparative Politics, Political Behaviour, Party Politics and European Union Politics. Her work examines the causes and consequences of political dissatisfaction among the public and the ways in which this is channelled through party strategies and party competition. Specific themes include Euroscepticism and far-right politics. She has published articles in leading international peer-reviewed journals, including the European Journal of Political Research, Political Behavior, European Union Politics, the Journal of Common Market Studies, the Journal of European Public Policy and West European Politics. She is the author of Far-Right Parties and Euroscepticism: Patterns of Opposition (ECPR Press and Rowman & Littlefield 2018) and The Golden Dawn’s Nationalist Solution: Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Greece (Palgrave Macmillan 2015 with Daphne Halikiopoulou). She is Joint Editor in Chief of the European Journal of Political Research.

 

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Election poster of Björn Höcke for the AfD party with the slogan roughly translating to "forbidden good" in Sonneberg, Thuringia, Germany, on August 4, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

Germany’s 2024 EP Elections: The Populist Challenge to the Progressive Coalition

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Please cite as:

Arzheimer, Kai. (2024). “Germany’s 2024 EP Elections: The Populist Challenge to the Progressive Coalition.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0071

 

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Abstract

The 2024 European parliamentary election in Germany marked a significant shift in the political landscape, with devastating results for the governing coalition of the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens, and the Liberal Democrats (FDP). Chancellor Scholz’s SPD and the Greens experienced substantial losses, while the opposition Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) saw a modest increase in their vote share. The most notable gains were made by the populist radical-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the newly formed left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a breakaway from the Left (Die Linke), highlighting a growing demand for populist politics in Germany. The Left itself suffered heavy losses. Despite internal scandals and controversies that contributed to a considerable drop in support in pre-election polls, the AfD leveraged anti-immigration sentiments and economic concerns to gain substantial support. The BSW capitalized on left–authoritarian positions, emphasizing welfare and anti-immigration policies. Both parties also criticized Germany’s support for Ukraine and styled themselves as agents of ‘peace.’ The election results underscored the unpopularity of the ‘progressive coalition’ in Germany and reflected the impact of high inflation, energy security concerns and contentious climate policies on voter behaviour. Voter turnout was the highest since 1979, indicating heightened political engagement. Like in previous elections, populist parties were much more successful in the post-communist eastern states. While its impact on the European level is limited, the election sent shock waves through Germany, suggesting a shift in future policy directions, particularly concerning the green transformation and relations with Russia.

Keywords: Alternative for Germany (AfD); Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW); Germany; Russia; Ukraine; east–west differences

 

By Kai Arzheimer* (Institute for Political Science, University of Mainz)

Introduction and background

The result of the 2024 European parliamentary election in Germany was devastating for the governing three-party coalition of the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens, and the Liberal Democrats (FDP). Chancellor Scholz’s SPD lost 2 percentage points compared to the 2019 EP election, polling just 13.9%, the worst result for the party in any national election since the Second World War. The Greens, which had done exceedingly well in the 2019 ‘green wave’, lost nearly half their votes and fell back to 11.9%. The Liberals lost only 0.2 percentage points, but their result of 5.2% put them precariously close to the electoral threshold that applies in national elections (although not in European ones).

Conversely, the main opposition Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) polled a combined 30%, a modest 1.1-percentage-point improvement on their 2019 result. While the result ensures they are the strongest party, it is low given both historical standards (they won 44.5% just 20 years ago) and the abysmal approval ratings of the government parties.

The combined vote share of these mainstream parties was just 61%. At least as far as perceptions were concerned, the big winner in these elections was the populist radical-right ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD, 15.9%), followed by the new left-wing populist ‘Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance’ (BSW, 6.2%). An additional 17% of the vote went to smaller parties, including the arguably populist ‘Left’ (2.7%), the arguably right-wing populist ‘Free Voters’ (FW, 2.7%), and ‘The Party’ (1.9%), a satirical outfit.

These results were almost perfectly in line with pre-election polls. The so-called ‘progressive coalition’ and its policies have been deeply unpopular almost from the get-go (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, n.d.), and the radical-right AfD has been the main beneficiary of this discontent. More specifically, after the initial rally-round-the-flag effect following Russia’s renewed attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the government’s popularity began to decline due to high inflation and worries about (energy) security.

In 2023, things went from bad to worse for the government and have not improved since. The coalition had planned to re-purpose unused special credit lines enacted during the pandemic to fund their programs for a green transformation of Germany’s economy. The intention was to reconcile the Greens’ ambitious plans for climate protection with the SPD’s interest in expanding welfare and the FDP’s insistence on not declaring a ‘budgetary emergency’ for 2024. While such a declaration would have allowed the government to suspend the constitutional ‘debt brake’, abusing the older credit allowances to notionally comply with the deficit rules was a dubious move at best. Following a complaint by the Christian Democrats, Germany’s Constitutional Court declared the federal budget unconstitutional and void, throwing the coalition in disarray just six months before the election (Kinkartz, 2023). With no money left to paper over them, the fundamental conflicts within the coalition were laid bare.

Early in 2023, the Christian Democrats, alongside much of the media, had also launched a campaign against a government flagship policy aimed at reducing Germany’s CO2 emissions by accelerating the phasing out of older oil and natural gas heating systems. Subsequently, all of the opposition parties and much of the media framed this policy as ideological and removed from the lives of ordinary people, making heat pumps a part of the culture wars and forcing the government to water down its proposals.

As previous Christian Democrat-led governments had signed up to the relevant European and international rules and agreements and had enshrined in German law the very climate targets the policy was designed to meet, this was arguably a populist (in a broader sense) move by the main opposition, one that was happily supported by smaller opposition parties and even by some FDP MPs. Both mainstream and populist opposition parties also sided with large-scale farmers’ protests against some cuts to agrarian subsidies that eventually forced another government U-turn (Arzheimer, 2024).

Finally, Germany accepted more than a million Ukrainian refugees after Russia’s 2022 invasion. While this caused few large-scale problems, an ongoing and very public conflict over funding between the federal government, the state governments and the municipalities, as well as the Christian Democrats’ constant push for harsher rules and stricter enforcement, helped to bring the issue of immigration back onto the agenda in 2023, after its salience had been low for several years (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen n.d.). The Israel–Hamas war played only a minor role in the campaign, but a knife attack by an Afghan man on an anti-Islam activist that left a police officer dead just days before the election triggered a fresh debate about immigration, Islamism and the longstanding policy against deportations to Afghanistan (Deutsche Welle, 2024c).

Against this background, the result of the European elections was hardly surprising. Nonetheless, it sent shock waves through the German polity that still reverberate.

The supply side: populist parties in the ascendancy

Alternative for Germany

The AfD was founded in 2013 as a right-of-centre, soft-Eurosceptic outfit that presented an ‘alternative’ to the bailout policies that followed the 2010–2011 Eurozone crisis (Arzheimer 2015). It quickly transformed into a characteristic radical-right populist party that attracted the prototypical electorate (Arzheimer & Berning, 2019). While many radical-right parties are striving to soften their public image, the most radical faction has dominated the AfD since 2017 (Pytlas & Biehler, 2023), and the AfD embraces openly extremist actors both within and outside the party (Arzheimer, 2019). As a consequence, the party as a whole is under surveillance by the domestic intelligence agency, and its youth wing, as well as several state branches, have already been classified as right-wing extremist. Like many other far-right parties in Europe, the AfD also has a longstanding association with Russia and has repeatedly voiced sympathy for Putin and his regime. Although the party toned down its statements immediately after the February 2022 invasion, it has since highlighted the economic consequences of the war and the sanctions for Germany and re-invented itself as a party of ‘peace’ (Arzheimer, 2023), even adopting the classic dove symbol in some of its publicity materials.

In the run-up to the 2024 European elections, the party floated the idea of including a call for the dissolution of the European Union in its manifesto, dropping this idea from the final version after a public backlash. However, the selection of candidates was strongly influenced by the most radical elements within the party. The top spot of the list went to Maximilian Krah, a sitting MEP with well-documented connections to German right-wing extremists, Russia and particularly China. Krah’s membership in the Identity and Democracy (ID) group had previously been suspended over allegations of fraud (Dahm, 2023). Petr Bystron, the second on the list, was a sitting MP in Germany’s Bundestag, known both for his extreme views, his fondness of conspiracy myths, and his support for Putin’s Russia. Asked why he would give up his seat in the Bundestag to become an MEP, he said he needed to get to ‘the source of the poison’ (Fiedler, 2023).

In January 2024, the AfD’s campaign got in trouble even before its official start. Investigative journalists reported on a meeting between representatives of the AfD, members of the extremist ‘Identitarian movement’, and potential donors. At the meeting, the participants had discussed plans for a ‘remigration’ – a euphemism for the expulsion of millions of immigrant-origin Germans. This story triggered a large-scale countermobilization, with hundreds of thousands of Germans taking to the streets to protest the AfD (Deutsche Welle, 2024a). These events contributed to a relative decline of AfD support in the polls, which had risen to an unprecedented 22% in December 2023 but dropped to around 17% over the next six weeks or so. It also negatively affected the relationship between the AfD and Marine Le Pen, who dominates the ID group in the European Parliament.

But his was just the beginning of the campaign’s woes. Two months before the election, a Czech newspaper published audio files that strongly suggested that Bystron had received at least 20,000 euros from the Russian propaganda portal ‘Voice of Europe’. As Bystron was a German MP at the time and vote buying is illegal in Germany, he quickly became the object of a full criminal investigation, which is still ongoing. Just a couple of days later, Krah’s parliamentary offices were searched by the police, and one of his aides was arrested as an alleged Chinese spy. While Krah himself has not been charged so far, a preliminary probe into allegations that he sold his vote to China and Russia is still underway (Deutsche Welle, 2024b).

Things came to a head in mid-May when Krah played down the atrocities committed by the Waffen SS in countries occupied by Nazi Germany in an interview with an Italian journalist. In response, the whole AfD delegation in the EP was excluded from the ID group (Reuters, 2024). Krah resigned his seat on the AfD’s national executive and was formally barred from speaking on the stump by the leadership, leading to the paradoxical situation that the campaign rolled on without the two top candidates.

As much of the AfD’s activities are social media-centric anyway, it probably did not matter too much. The AfD continued to push their core issues – first and foremost immigration, but also the economic impact of the war on Germany, climate denialism and hard Euroscepticism – without too much regard for their invisible candidates.

The Left and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance

The Left party is the product of a merger between the (primarily eastern) PDS, itself the successor of the GDR’s former state party, and the WASG, a mostly western group that broke away from the SPD over welfare reforms enacted in the early 2000s (Hough, Koß & Olsen, 2007). It is considered far left and populist (Rooduijn et al., 2023), although many in the party take a rather pragmatic approach to politics, especially at the local and regional levels.

Sahra Wagenknecht was arguably the party’s most prominent, controversial and charismatic politician. She started out as an orthodox communist in the early 1990s, a position that left her isolated within a decidedly post-communist party even after she changed her views. She gladly embraced the role of the outsider. As a gifted and very telegenic public speaker, she has been one of the most frequently invited guests on political talk shows for decades, although she stands for minority positions within a minor party.

During the so-called immigration crisis of 2015–2016, Wagenknecht became a (moderate) immigration sceptic. In 2018, she helped launch a leftist network that brought together tens of thousands of supporters but collapsed when she abandoned it the following year instead of turning it into a personal party, as many had expected. Wagenknecht was also critical of the anti-COVID measures and began cultivating a sizeable audience on social media during the pandemic (MDR, 2024).

In 2021, Wagenknecht published a book that was widely seen as the manifesto of an upcoming political project. In it, she accused her party of pandering to a ‘lifestyle left’ while ignoring the concerns of true working-class voters: welfare and immigration.

The Left’s reaction to Russia’s attack then provided the final straw. The 2011 basic program stresses the party’s links to the peace movement, highlights its ‘internationalist’ credentials and calls for the dissolution of NATO and a ‘common security architecture’ that would include Russia. However, the sheer scale of human suffering in Ukraine has led many in the Left to reconsider these positions. The Left’s manifesto for the European elections reflects this ambiguity. On the one hand, the document is highly critical of the US and NATO and even claims that the eastern enlargement of NATO has ‘contributed to the crisis’ (Die Linke n.d., 65). On the other, it highlights Ukraine’s right to self-defence, condemns the attack as a war crime, and demands that Russia withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory (without specifying whether that includes Crimea). Wagenknecht, however, took a more clearly pro-Russian stance. She routinely claims that the US and the collective West are blocking a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine for reasons of their own.

In September 2023, Wagenknecht and her supporters in the Left’s parliamentary registered the ‘Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance — Reason and Justice’ (BSW), which legally became a political party on 8 January 2024. Ten of the Left’s 38 MPs in the Bundestag eventually joined the new group. Amongst state-level MPs and the rank-and-file, the rate of defections was much lower.

This new party created much interest amongst political observers even before it was formally founded because it was assumed that it would cater to the so-far neglected demand for left–authoritarian (i.e., pro-welfare but anti-immigrant) politics in Germany (Wagner, Wurthmann, & Thomeczek, 2023). The EP election manifesto published in April 2024 (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, 2024) offers precisely that, dressed up in a populist fashion. The preamble blames politicians and EU elites for broken promises and ignoring the problems of ordinary citizens. The BSW wants to shrink the bureaucracy and, more importantly, the scope of the European Union by shifting back competencies to the member states.

At the same time and somewhat contradictory, they want the EU to enact higher minimum wages, higher corporate tax rates, stricter rules against money laundering, and limits on financial transactions. The BSW also demands new policies that would allegedly strengthen Europe’s industrial base through a ‘reasonable’ approach to climate protection and securing access to cheap energy and raw materials. This policy is framed as a precondition for expanding welfare. The BSW also rejects future enlargements and wants to curb not just illegal migration but also the recruitment of qualified workers from outside the EU. Instead, the party wants to reduce the ‘push factors’ for immigration by creating more equitable conditions globally. While the rejection of Islam is more muted than in the AfD’s statements, and while the AfD in turn keeps their most radical demands out of their manifesto, this is quite similar to the policies that the AfD offers.

However, the highest degree of overlap with the AfD can be seen in the BSW’s approach to Russia’s war on Ukraine. The sanctions, which are mentioned 14 times in a manifesto of 20 pages, are painted as harmful for Germany while having no effect on Russia itself. For the BSW, the attack on Ukraine is a ‘proxy war’ between the US and Russia (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, 2024: 14) that was ‘started on a military level by Russia’ but ‘could have been prevented and stopped by the West’ (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, 2024: 17). The only (alleged) violations of international law that the manifesto addresses are the Western interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria (Ibid.). The BSW even adopts an idea that the AfD previously launched in parliament (AfD Fraktion im Bundestag, 2023: 3) – making support for Ukraine conditional on Kyiv’s willingness to enter negotiations with Russia – albeit with a twist. It would incentivize Russia by offering to stop all military aid for Ukraine immediately should Russia agree to negotiate.

Demand for populism in Germany

Taken together, the AfD (15.9%), Left (2.7%), and BSW (6.2%) achieved a significant (nearly 25%) share of the vote. Moreover, at 64.8%, turnout was the highest since the EP’s first direct election in 1979, which suggests a high degree of interest and political involvement. Put differently, there is considerable demand for populist politics in Germany, even if the level is still lower than in France or Italy.

In line with second-order-election theory (Reif and Schmitt 1980), domestic actors and attitudes (the unpopularity of the federal government in particular) dominated the campaign. In a post-election poll (see ZDF Heute, 2024), just 10% of the AfD’s voters, 38% of the BSW’s voters, but a massive 85% of the Left’s remaining voters said that ‘Europe’ was more important for their decision than ‘Germany’. This poll result suggests that AfD voters are (even) more inward-looking and fundamentally Eurosceptic than the BSW’s. The average across all parties was 47%.

However, the issues at stake (immigration, Russia’s war against Ukraine, social and economic transformations) are international by nature and were often presented within a European frame of reference by the parties. Moreover, the AfD’s ouster from the ID group, as well the overtures of the (German) president of the commission towards Giorgia Meloni and her European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, helped to make this one of the most Europeanized EP elections ever.

Nonetheless, support for all three populist parties showed a striking geographical pattern that is very specific to German politics: they are much more successful in the eastern states (i.e., the territory of the former German Democratic Republic). Outside some university towns and the Berlin/Potsdam region, the AfD became the strongest party in all eastern districts and states, with state-wide results varying between 27.5% in Brandenburg and 31.8% in Saxony. In their heartlands in rural Saxony, they won up to 40% of the vote. Conversely, their best results in the western states were 14.7% in Baden-Württemberg and 15.7% in Saarland. There is no western district where they won more than 21%.

These lopsided results are hardly surprising: the multi-faceted legacy of the GDR, the shock and aftermath of the transformation in the 1990s and specific patterns of outmigration have led to a situation where individual levels of populism, nativism and place resentment — the feeling that one’s locale does not get the recognition and resources it deserves — are substantively higher in the eastern states than in the west even decades after unification (Arzheimer and Bernemann 2024). It is, however, important to note that AfD has made considerable inroads in the west of Germany, particularly in regions and even neighbourhoods that could be described as ‘left behind.’

The AfD also drew more support from men (19%) than women (12%), a gender gap that has been stable since 2014, whereas gender differences for the Left and BSW were within the margin of error. For a decade, the AfD was a party of middle-aged voters that struggled to mobilize the very young and the elderly. The latter is still true, but for the first time, AfD support amongst the under-30s is now (just) above average. The Left remains somewhat more popular (6%) in this group than with older voters, while BSW support hardly varies with age.

In socio-structural terms, workers (25%) and voters with medium levels of education (23%) had the highest propensity to vote for the AfD. For the Left and the BSW, there are no clear patterns, but one must bear in mind that in national polls, relatively few of their voters are sampled. Exit polls also suggest that 29% of the BSW’s voters had previously voted for the SPD and another 24% for the Left, while less than 10% were former AfD voters (Palzer, 2024). However, such transition analyses are fraught with methodological problems.

Across all respondents, the AfD remains deeply unpopular, with an average rating of –2.9 on a scale running from –5 to +5. The average values for the Left and BSW are –1.7 and –1.2, respectively. For comparison, the Greens, which have a smaller voter base than the AfD and are the least popular government party, receive a rating of –0.9. This suggests a considerable level of polarization between populist (and particularly radical-right) voters on the one hand and the voters of non-populist parties on the other.

Discussion and perspectives

Both the AfD and the BSW are nationalist parties, and the BSW, in particular, saw the EP election chiefly as an opportunity to gain media attention and access to public funds in preparation for the upcoming state elections. The AfD is still not welcome in the renamed ID (now Patriots for Europe, PfE) group and was forced to team up with a motley crew of fringe MEPs to reach the requisite number for forming a ‘Europe of Sovereign Nations’ group that gives them access to proper funding. BSW has not managed even that, and their MEPs are now sitting as Non-attached (NA). Nonetheless, both the AfD and the BSW will likely vote against any policies related to the green transformation or support for Ukraine and will push for ‘negotiations’ with – and closer economic ties to – Russia.

At least in the short term, however, their most significant impact will be on German politics. If they end up as the strongest or second-strongest party in one or more of the eastern states that go to the polls in autumn, that will have dramatic consequences not just for the Länder in question but for Germany’s system of decentralized and consensual policymaking, which could leave the country in uncharted waters.

 

(*) Kai Arzheimer is Professor of German Politics and Political Sociology at the University of Mainz. He works in the field of political behaviour, broadly defined and is particularly interested in far-right parties and their voters.

 

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Kinkartz, Sabine (2023). ‘What Is Germany’s Debt Brake?’ Deutsche Welle, 23 November. https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-germanys-debt-brake/a-67587332

MDR (2024, 13 June). Sahra Wagenknecht: from outsider to left-wing icon and party founder, MDR, https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/politik/sahra-wagenknecht-partei-bsw-biografie-100.html

Palzer, Kerstin (2024). ‘Aus dem Stand auf 6,2 Prozent’ Tagesschau, 10 June 2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/europawahl/bsw-linkspartei-100.html

Pytlas, Bartek, and Jan Biehler (2023). ‘The AfD Within the AfD: Radical Right Intra-Party Competition and Ideational Change’. Government and Opposition, online first. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2023.13

Reif, Karlheinz, and Hermann Schmitt (1980). ‘Nine National Second-Order Elections: A Systematic Framework for the Analysis of European Elections Results’. European Journal of Political Research 8: 3–44.

Reuters (2024, 23 May). ‘European Parliament’s Far-Right Group Expels Germany’s AfD After SS Remark’. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/far-right-european-parliament-group-expels-germanys-afd-after-ss-remark-2024-05-23/

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Wagner, Sarah, L. Constantin Wurthmann, and Jan Philipp Thomeczek (2023). ‘Bridging Left and Right? How Sahra Wagenknecht Could Change the German Party Landscape’. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 64: 621–36.

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thema/europawahl-142.html

 

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Geert Wilders (PVV) during an interview at the Plenary Debate in the Tweede Kamer on June 4, 2024, in The Hague, Netherlands. Photo: Orange Pictures.

Waking the Sleeping Populist Giant: The 2024 European Elections and Populism in The Netherlands

by ArticlesEditor’s ChoiceHomeReports

Please cite as:
Verbeek, Bertjan & Zaslove, Andrej. (2024). “Waking the Sleeping Populist Giant: The 2024 European Elections and Populism in the Netherlands.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0086

 

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Abtsract

The results of the 2024 European elections for populist parties in the Netherlands are intimately related to the events in national Dutch politics since 2021. The relative success of the Party for Freedom (VVD) since 2023 has been related to its more moderate position on European integration and Islam. This change of tone was part of increasing the party’s credibility at home and abroad. The European elections were presented as a litmus test for the proposed centre-right government in the Netherlands, and they testified to the increased room for the populist vote in general and the increased competition for that vote between various populist parties in particular. The European elections also proved a defeat for populist contenders such as JA21, Forum for Democracy and the left-wing populist Socialist Party. The impact of Dutch populists on European policies is most likely to be felt via the newly formed government, which contains two populist parties. At the level of the European Parliament, its impact will depend on the success of the newly formed Patriots for Europe (PfE) group.

Keywords: populism; populist radical right; European elections; Dutch national elections; the Netherlands

 

By Bertjan Verbeek* & Andrej Zaslove** (Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands)

On 6 June 2024, the elections for the 31 Dutch seats in the European Parliament were held. The total number of Dutch seats had been expanded first from 26 to 29 in 2020 (because of Brexit) and again in 2023 to 31 (because of a redistribution of the total number of seats based on demographic changes [European Parliament, 2023]). Turnout was slightly higher in 2024 at 46%, which was under the European average of 51% but up from the 2019 Dutch turnout of 42%. The 2024 outcome witnessed the resurgence of Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) while the centre-left held its ground. In this contribution, we argue that the Dutch results must be understood in the context of the political drama that has been unfolding since the provincial and national elections in 2023 and the subsequent formation of a new government coalition in 2024. In what follows, we first describe the landscape of populist parties in the Netherlands and then compare the 2024 results with the previous European, provincial and national elections. We conclude with a brief discussion of the future role of Dutch populists in Brussels.

Varieties of Dutch populism: Between continuity and fragmentation

The Netherlands has long been a breeding ground for populism (especially the right-wing variety) since the appearance of Pim Fortuyn and his party List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in 2002. Over the years, there has been a succession of populist parties competing for populist voters, tapping into different constituencies, ranging from right-wing nativist and left-wing populist to agrarian–populist. Elsewhere, we refer to such a situation as ‘mutating populism’ (Verbeek and Zaslove, 2016). Mutating populism refers to a party system in which new populist parties enter a system where a populist party is already present, thus potentially ushering in a change in outlook. The entry of these additional populist parties forces all populist parties to distinguish themselves not only from the mainstream parties but also from the other populist parties in the system.

Currently, the Netherlands boasts three types of populist parties (see De Jonge et al., forthcoming 2024). The first type is the populist radical right, consisting of the PVV, Forum for Democracy (FvD), and the Right Answer 2021 (JA21). The second is the populist–agrarian Farmer Citizen Movement (BBB). Third is the left-wing Socialist Party (SP), which is, however, often considered a borderline case of populism (Meijers and Zaslove, 2021). Irrespective of their individual orientations, all populist parties adopt a rather Eurosceptic position.

A crowded landscape: three populist radical-right parties in the Netherlands

The PVV is a populist radical-right party, much like other populist radical-right parties in Europe, such as the National Rally (RN) in France, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), and Lega in Italy. Much like these parties, the PVV combines populism with nativism. The core of its ideology pits the ‘good’ people versus the ‘corrupt’ elite in both The Hague and Brussels. The party is critical of excessive immigration, in particular from non-Western countries.

Traditionally, opposing Islam and favouring the Netherlands exiting the European Union (EU) – a so-called ‘Nexit’ – have been part and parcel of the PVV program. However, during the 2023 Dutch and 2024 European elections, the PVV moderated its opposition to Islam and its demands for Nexit. This moderation resulted from the VVD’s opening up to a coalition with the PVV in the Summer of 2023 (see also below). Economically, the PVV takes a more protectionist and welfare state chauvinist position aimed at protecting its voters in specific economic and social sectors, such as voters with lower incomes and those who, for example, suffer from high energy prices.

FvD is also considered to be a populist and nativist party. However, FvD has more radical stances regarding opposition to EU integration and relations with Russia; it favours Nexit and propagates a more pro-Russia and pro-Putin line. FvD is also more free-market oriented than the PVV and most other populist radical right parties in Europe. JA21 is also regarded as a populist radical-right party. JA21 is slightly less populist than the other populist radical-right parties, while it is nativist and more market oriented than the PVV and most other populist radical-right parties in Europe. In a way, JA21 and its leader, Joost Eerdmans, can be seen as the heirs to Pim Fortuyn’s legacy as a populist with some liberal tendencies, especially regarding the economy.

Beyond the populist radical right: agrarian and left-wing populism

Much to the surprise of political pundits, a new type of Dutch populism entered the national parliament in 2021 – the Farmer Citizen Movement (BBB). The BBB can be considered a populist party insofar as it posits the good people versus the corrupt elite, tapping into the latent centre–periphery cleavage in the Netherlands. The BBB pits the ordinary citizen and farmer against ‘oat milk cappuccino drinking city dwellers’ and the unresponsive politicians from the major cities in the country’s west (the so-called Randstad). BBB’s core issues centre on support for farmers and opposition to radical climate policies (in particular, policies to control nitrogen output), while the party also campaigns for the dignity of the regions in the hinterland.

The SP is often considered among the first populist parties in the Netherlands, constituting the only left-wing populist party in the country, albeit less populist than the other populist parties. Although it identifies a clash between the working people and the economic and political elites, it has a less pronounced homogenous view of the people. Over the years, its leaders have strongly varied in their anti-elitist rhetoric. Jan Marijnissen (party leader between 1988 and 2015) was considered the most populist SP leader. Economic issues dominate the party’s ideology, while it always contains a critical stand towards the unequal distribution of wealth due to globalization and neoliberal policies, targeting large corporations, financial institutions and the EU.

The electoral fortunes of populism in the Netherlands

In order to understand the outcome of the 2024 European elections, we need to understand the political space for populism in the Netherlands. Figure 1 shows the electoral results at the national level of the Dutch populist parties since the formation of the PVV in 2006.

Several observations are in order. First, apart from the 2006 elections, the PVV has consistently been the leading populist voice, reaching a peak of 23.5% of the vote in the 2023 national elections, six months before the European elections. Second, due to the increased fragmentation of the Dutch party system, the total space for populism increased to some 38% of the vote in 2023. Third, support for left-wing populism has consistently diminished. Finally, since 2017, a growing number of parties have been competing for the populist vote, forcing them to profile themselves not only vis-à-vis mainstream parties but also each other. The inability of the SP to attract economically left-wing and welfare chauvinist voters is particularly interesting, speaking, perhaps, to what voters may see as the party’s lack of true commitment to an anti-immigrant stance and because the populist radical right’s (i.e., the PVV) focus on creating an economic safety net – as opposed to calling for economic redistribution to combat inequality – is more appealing to populist voters.

 

Figure 2 draws our attention to the European elections. It describes not only the results of those parties that succeeded in obtaining at least one seat but also the percentage of votes for all populist parties. A caveat is in order: the increase in Dutch seats from 26 to 31 complicates comparisons with previous European elections.

 

In the 2024 elections all populist parties combined earned some 28% of the Dutch vote, compared to 18% in 2019 – a considerable gain. Right-wing populists scored 20.1% of the vote in 2024 compared to 14.5% in 2019, again showing a substantial increase. Figure 2 shows that the PVV and the BBB were the only two populist parties that could turn these votes into seats in the 2024 elections, while FvD was the only populist party to obtain seats in the 2019 elections. These figures represent the volatility of the populist vote: between the two European elections, we have seen the rise and fall of FvD, the comet-like rise of the BBB, and the resurgence of the PVV, which failed to win a single seat in the European Parliament in 2019. On the left of the political spectrum, the SP has shown a decline since its success in 2014, when it obtained almost 10% of the vote. At the same time, Dutch mainstream parties succeeded in holding the fort, gaining 51% in 2024 compared to 54% in 2019.

The main question, therefore, is how to explain the extreme volatility in the (right-wing) populist vote and the eventual comeback of the PVV on the European scene. In other words, how do we account for the awakening of the sleeping populist giant? Here, we argue that in order to understand the results of the European elections, we have to take political developments within the Netherlands into account, in particular, the fall of the Rutte IV government in the summer of 2023, the subsequent national elections on 22 November 2023 and the following government formation negotiations, which only formally ended after the European elections with the appointment of the Schoof I government on 2 July 2024. In that sense, the European elections were part and parcel of the political drama that had characterized Dutch politics effectively since the 2021 national elections.

A second-order election? The crucial domestic context of the 2024 EP elections

In Dutch politics, European elections are part of a five-year cycle encompassing municipal, provincial, national and European elections. Since the European elections of 2019, the Netherlands has witnessed national elections in 2021 and 2023, municipal elections in 2022, provincial elections in 2023 and European elections again in 2024.

Our story begins with the 2023 provincial elections, which saw the unexpected emergence of the newest kid on the populist block, the agrarian–populist BBB. Its success, at the time, came at the behest of both the populist PVV and the mainstream Christian democratic party, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). The BBB’s rise was partly the result of the politicization of climate policies in compliance with the European Green Deal of 2019. The Green Deal was particularly important for farmers and fishermen who mobilized against EU climate policies. In addition, the BBB succeeded in exploiting the latent centre–periphery tensions in the Netherlands.

The provincial elections and the rise of the BBB bring us to the second part of our story. In previous years the reputation of governments led by Mark Rutte had been tarnished by political scandal, in particular the tax office’s treatment of socially vulnerable groups and the government’s reluctance to act decisively after reports that gas exploitation in the northern province of Groningen had provoked earthquakes causing severe damage to houses. In 2023 the fourth coalition under Mark Rutte (composed of CDA, CU, D66, VVD) was made vulnerable by the farmers’ protests, the rise of BBB and the troubles these events caused for the CDA. 

Anticipating a potential deadlock within the government over climate policies, Prime Minister Rutte and his VVD sought to profile themselves by politicizing the issue of asylum and migration, exploiting images of overburdened asylum registration centres and the suggestion that family unification of migrants had accelerated migration. The Rutte IV government eventually fell in July 2023 over intra-coalition conflicts over family unification, leading to new elections in November. It also ushered in a leadership change within the VVD. Importantly, two EU-related themes were explicitly selected to dominate the national elections campaign and would also affect the 2024 European elections campaign: EU asylum and migration policies and EU climate policies.

This brings us to the third part of our story: the 2023 Dutch national elections. These elections coincided with several significant developments. First, the change in VVD party leadership produced a change of strategy towards the PVV. Rutte had consistently excluded the PVV as a coalition partner since 2012. The new VVD party leader, Dilan Yeşilgöz, openly suggested that her party would no longer exclude forming a government with Wilders. Second, the mainstream parties suffered from the rise of a new maverick party, New Social Contract (NSC), founded by former CDA MP Pieter Omtzigt. The NSC positioned itself in the centre-right with a major emphasis on good governance, migration and economic security, polling some 20% in the summer of 2023. The NSC drew voters from a broad range of parties, particularly the CDA and VVD. This situation made a future coalition of mainstream parties look increasingly difficult.

Taking advantage of the new situation, Wilders presented himself as a more moderate candidate: he claimed to no longer favour a Nexit, promised to reform the EU from within, and toned down his opposition to Islam. This shift changed the overall political landscape and the nature of party competition, and Wilders profited from the politicization of migration and his ostensible moderation regarding the EU and Islam. No longer perceived as a pariah by former opponents and an increasing number of voters, Wilders’ PVV succeeded in becoming the largest political party, increasing the number of seats in parliament from 17 to 37.

The November 2023 elections were just the beginning of a lengthy government formation process, which would last until July 2024, encompassing the June European elections. This brings us to the fourth part of our story. Initially, the government formation process was characterized by a long-drawn-out testing of the PVV’s democratic credentials. In the end, the four negotiating right-wing parties (the BBB, the NSC, the PVV, and the VVD) were able to find each other on policies aimed at curtailing migration and slowing down EU-required climate policies. This brings us to the fifth and final part of the story: the European elections. These occurred after the four negotiating parties had reached a formal but tentative agreement for a possible government coalition in May 2024. In that sense, the European elections were a litmus test of the legitimacy of the newly proposed coalition.

Indeed, the European election campaign was framed by the centre-left (the GreenLeft–Labour party, GL–PvdA) as an opportunity for voters to express their discontent with the likely government that, in their words, consisted of anti-EU populists and extremists (GroenLinksPvdA, 2024). The actual electoral outcome witnessed a poor performance for the incoming coalition (some 38% of the vote, compared to 56% at the 2023 national elections). It confirmed, however, the PVV’s leading position in that coalition despite the drop in support for the PVV between the general and the European elections. At the same time, the centre-left did not emerge as strong enough to challenge the newly formed coalition despite GL–PvdA’s success in becoming the largest party at the European elections.

The populist campaign for the European elections

The campaign for the European elections was relatively short, even by Dutch standards, lasting about five weeks but never inviting excitement. The PVV canvassed only rarely. Only FvD toured the entire country extensively with their ‘Freedom Touring Bus’, which was, however, ignored by most media outlets. Observers complained that the campaign hardly touched upon party programs and instead focused, for example, on the European friends of Geert Wilders who would profit from a PVV victory (Mudde, 2024). Although Wilders himself did not extensively campaign in the Netherlands, he proved visible at the European level, where he appeared with the likes of Marine le Pen and Matteo Salvini (France 24, 2024).

In this section we first describe those populist parties that were the only two to receive seats in the EU parliament (BBB and PVV). Next, we discuss the party programs of the other relevant populist parties (FvD, JA21 and SP).

In line with its more moderate campaign during the 2023 national elections, the PVV’s European electoral program emphasized the need to reform the EU from within rather than to leave the Union. Within that context, focusing on safeguarding sovereignty, it vehemently called for opt-out possibilities for the Netherlands regarding asylum seekers and migration and for relaxing obligations concerning climate change, especially nitrogen. Importantly, the PVV supported strengthening defence, albeit without singling out Russia as the main threat. In its populist rhetoric the PVV targeted power-seeking Eurocrats who spend money at the expense of ordinary citizens (PVV, 2024).

The BBB’s program reflected its roots in the agrarian sector and its attention to regional interests. It proposed a ‘European Senate’ based on the European Committee of the Regions. At the same time, the BBB campaigned for curbs on the European Commission’s power and to protect member states’ veto rights. It focused on reducing the European Green Deal policies, arguing for a “Real Deal” instead. Notably, it presented itself as the champion of Dutch fishermen, who, according to the BBB, suffer from European fishing policies. Like the PVV regarding asylum and migration policies, the BBB favoured a toughening of asylum policies and an increase of national competences regarding labour migration (BBB, 2024). There are signs that the BBB is moving in the direction of a populist radical-right party. However, at this moment, the party’s core issues concern the rural–urban divide, while it is too early to tell if the party and its voters are as nativist as other populist radical-right parties.

This discussion warrants several important observations. First, the PVV has moderated its position regarding EU integration. Second, the rise of the BBB has broadened the range of populist issues to be represented in Brussels, particularly climate change policies. Despite the moderation of the PVV, both parties remain decidedly Eurosceptic, lambasting Eurocrats as ‘enemies of the people.’

FvD, JA21 and the SP are the three other populist parties that competed in the European elections. FvD was in favour of a, opposed sending troops to Ukraine, and remained critical of sanctions against Russia. It demanded the protection of Europeans from mass immigration from non-Western countries, while it also opposed ‘wokeism’ and climate policies (FvD, 2024). JA21 presented itself as a party of free trade that seeks to reform the EU on the basis of subsidiarity. It called for an immigration policy that resembles the Australian model, implying the regional accommodation of asylum seekers, more robust return policies, and limited access to social programs (JA21, 2024). In short, JA21 presents itself as more market oriented and less Eurosceptic than the other populist radical-right parties. In its electoral program, the left-wing populist SP pleaded for a Europe that does not work at the behest of capital. The party sees the current EU as an entity under the tutelage of international economic elites. Despite the party’s criticism of the current EU model, it is less Eurosceptic than the other populist radical-right parties (SP, 2024). Unlike in other European countries, such as France, where parties such as La france insoumise (LFI) are able to mobilize left-wing opposition to EU integration, there appears to be less room for a left-wing Eurosceptic party among left-wing voters in the Netherlands. At the same time, the populist radical right has solidified the Eurosceptic vote among right-wing voters.

The EU elections were important for Dutch politics for several reasons. First, the elections tentatively confirmed the nascent government coalition. The fact that the PVV was the second-largest party in the EU elections confirmed its credibility among a sizeable number of Dutch voters. Historically, voter turnout among PVV voters at European elections tends to be relatively low. Actually, 56% of those who voted PVV in the 2023 national elections did not vote in the EU elections (NOS, 2024). Despite this lower turnout among PVV voters in comparison with the 2023 national elections, the party emerged as the second-largest party in the European elections. The BBB, a relatively new party, obtained two seats. The populist members of the nascent coalition thus appeared to have passed the litmus test of the European elections.

The populists go to Brussels

What do these election results imply for the positions of the Dutch populists within the EU and, more specifically, within the EP? First, the combination of results of the Dutch national elections and the European elections positions the Netherlands as a more Eurosceptic country than under previous Dutch governments. The incoming Schoof I government has not called for Nexit. However, at the same time, the incoming government has set its mind on demanding special considerations from Brussels, particularly regarding asylum and migration policies, climate policies and the plight of Dutch fishermen.

The role that the Dutch populists will play in Brussels is less clear. The BBB, although a small party, intends to sit with the European People’s Party (EPP). Even though the BBB is an agrarian–populist party, its roots are in the Christian democratic tradition. The degree to which the party will be able to influence the more conservative and more climate-sceptical forces within the EPP remains uncertain.

The influence of the PVV depends in part on the degree to which the populist radical right can form a cohesive group within the EP. Geert Wilders has long had a compelling international reputation among other radical-right populists in Europe, ranging from Orbán in Hungary and Salvini in Italy to Le Pen in France. At the time of writing, the most recent developments have seen the PVV joining Orbán’s newly formed EP group, Patriots for Europe (PfE), whereas, in the last parliament, it belonged to the Identity and Democracy group.

At this moment, the extent to which the PfE will be able to have a tangible impact is uncertain: It does appear that the newly formed group has been able to attract the most important populist radical-right parties, holding 84 seats (at the time of writing this chapter) in the EU parliament. However, the question is: will the PfE group have enough influence to strike deals with, for example, the EPP and thus contribute to the PVV’s domestic success? Moreover, will this group continue to hold together, despite differences on issues such as relations with Russia? The PVV may find it difficult to walk the tightrope between an EU group that has pro-Russian tendencies within the group and forces within the Netherlands that are clearly pro-Ukraine, especially given the PVV’s allies in the new Schoof I government.

In general, the future impact of the Dutch populists in Europe, in particular that of the PVV, is likely to be felt via the intergovernmental route: because of its weight in the new, more Eurosceptic, government coalition, its impact will resonate through meetings within the institutions where member states dominate. Nevertheless, it is also possible that the PVV will play a decisive role within the PfE group in the EP. The PVV is one of the leading actors within the current Dutch government, despite its playing a typical populist strategy by placing one foot in the cabinet and one foot in the parliament (Zaslove, 2012). Nevertheless, the strength and influence that the PVV has within the current Dutch government may strengthen its influence within the PfE in Europe.

 

(*) Bertjan Verbeek is Professor of International Relations at the department of political science of Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands. His research focuses on international organizations and foreign policy decision-making.

(**) Andrej Zaslove is Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at the department of political science of Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands. His research examines populism and political parties, focusing on measuring populism (citizens’ attitudes), as well as populism and democracy, populism and gender and the influence of populism on party systems.

Together, the two authors have published extensively on the relationship between populism and foreign policy. See, for instance, Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove, ‘Populism and Foreign Policy’. In Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul A. Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (eds), Oxford Handbook of Populism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 384–405.

 

References

BBB (2024). BBBeter Nederland. Er staat veel op het spel. Verkiezingsprogramma Europees Parlement 2024–2029. https://boerburgerbeweging.nl/europese-verkiezingen/#verkiezingsprogramma-ep-2024

De Jonge, Léonie, Matthijs Rooduijn, & Andrej Zaslove (forthcoming 2024). The Evolution of Populism in Dutch Politics. In Sarah De Lange, Tom Louwerse, Paul ‘t Hart, and Carolien van Ham (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Dutch Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

European Parliament (2023). 2024 European elections: 15 additional seats divided between 22 countries (13 September 2023). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20230911IPR04910/2024-european-elections-15-additional-seats-divided-between-12-countries

FvD (2024). Verkiezingsprogramma Europese Verkiezingen 2024https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/87863/1/FVD%20Verkiezingsprogramma%20EP%202024.pdf

France 24 (2024). Far-right party leaders meet in Prague ahead of EU vote (25 April 2024). https://www.france24.com/en/20190425-far-right-party-leaders-meet-prague-ahead-eu-vote

GroenLinksPvdA (2024). Ons Europese Verkiezingsprogramma. https://groenlinkspvda.nl/verkiezingsprogramma-europa/

JA21 (2024). Vrijheid door Vrijhandel Voor een EU die werkt voor Nederland. https://stem.ja21.nl/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Verkiezingsprogramma-EP24_A4_final-klein.pdf

Meijers, Maurits J., and Andrej Zaslove (2021). Measuring populism in political parties: Appraisal of a new approach. Comparative Political Studies, 54(2), 372–407.

Mudde, Cas (2024). ‘“De Vrienden van Wilders”; een hypocriete en gevaarlijke campagne’, StukRoodVlees (21 May 2024).  https://stukroodvlees.nl/de-vrienden-van-wilders-een-hypocriete-en-gevaarlijke-campagne/

NOS (2024). Groot deel kiezers coalitiepartijen bleef thuis bij Europese verkiezingen (7 June 2024). https://nos.nl/collectie/13972/artikel/2523459-groot-deel-kiezers-coalitiepartijen-bleef-thuis-bij-europese-verkiezingen

PVV (2024). Nederland op 1, https://www.pvv.nl/images/2024/EP/PVV-Verkiezingsprogramma-EP-2024.pdf

SP (2024). Mensen voorop, niet het kapitaal. Verkiezingsprogramma SP Europese verkiezingen 2024. https://www.sp.nl/sites/default/files/verkiezingsprogramma_sp_ep2024.pdf

Verbeek, Bertjan, and Andrej Zaslove (2016). Italy: a case of mutating populism? Democratization, 23(2), 304–323.

 

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Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the conclusion of a political meeting for the Rassemblement National party in Marseille on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.

A Tipping Point for Far-Right Populism in France

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Please cite as:
Ivaldi, Gilles. (2024). “A Tipping Point for Far-Right Populism in France.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0070

 

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Abstract

The 2024 French European election took place against the backdrop of an economic and cost-of-living crisis in a context marked by global uncertainty arising from the war in Ukraine, social unrest and deep political discontent with President Emmanuel Macron. Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN) emerged as the big winner with 31.4% of the vote, while Macron’s Renaissance list trailed far behind at 14.6%. Meanwhile, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s left-wing populist La France Insoumise (LFI) won 9.9%, reflecting current internal dissent within the party and deep ideological divisions exposed by the Israel–Hamas war. National issues dominated the electoral agenda in June. Populist voting across both sides of the political spectrum was strongly fuelled by political discontent with Macron, making the 2024 European elections primarily a ‘second-order’ national election. A crucial test for Emmanuel Macron, the outcome of the European election led to the decision by the incumbent president to call a snap legislative election. The election confirmed the electoral strength of the RN; however, it showed the revitalization of the Republican Front against the far right, which blocked Le Pen’s party from winning an absolute majority, delivering instead a hung parliament split into three blocks.

Keywords: European elections; populism; France; Le Pen; Zemmour; Mélenchon

 

By Gilles Ivaldi* (Sciences Po Paris-CNRS (CEVIPOF))

Background

The 2024 French European election took place against the backdrop of the economic and cost-of-living crisis in a context marked by global uncertainty arising from the war in Ukraine, social unrest and deep political discontent with President Emmanuel Macron.

The European election showed substantial gains by populist parties, particularly on the right of the political axis, with Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN) emerging as the big winner at 31.4% of the vote. The outcome of the European election led to the decision by Emmanuel Macron to dissolve the National Assembly. The snap election that immediately followed confirmed the electoral strength of the RN; however, it showed the revitalization of the traditional Republican Front (Front Républicain) against the far right by both parties and voters, which had been significantly weakened in the 2022 legislative election. This revival blocked Le Pen’s party from winning an absolute majority, delivering a hung parliament split into three blocks, which more generally reflected the shape and increasing polarization of the French party system since 2017.

This chapter examines the strategies and performances of populist parties and the array of economic, cultural and political factors behind the rise in support for populism in France, particularly on the right of the political spectrum. Based on survey data, the analysis suggests that the 2024 French European election was primarily a ‘second-order’ national election fought on domestic issues, in which voters on both sides of the populist spectrum essentially expressed their political dissatisfaction with the incumbent president.

A topography of populism in France

In Western Europe, populism is predominantly found in the radical left and radical right (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). Reflecting such diversity, three main parties currently dominate the populist scene in France, namely Marine Le Pen’s RN and Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête on the right of the political spectrum, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise (LFI) on the left.

The RN exemplifies the typical radical right-wing variant of populism, operating on its core defining features of nativism and authoritarianism (Mudde, 2007; Pirro, 2022). The 2024 European campaign led by its popular young leader Jordan Bardella emphasized typical RN nativist policies calling for a ‘stop to the immigration flood by controlling borders and expelling illegal immigrants’ and for ‘defence of the security and civilizational values of the French through zero tolerance and the deportation of foreign delinquents and Islamists.’

Under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, the RN has embraced ‘social populism’, namely, a mix of egalitarian social protection and economic nationalism (Ivaldi 2023a). In the 2022 presidential election, this move allowed her to exploit the Russia–Ukraine War-related issues of energy and rising prices among working- and lower-middle-class voters most hit by the crisis (Ivaldi 2023b). The cost of living was again a key issue in the RN’s communication strategy in the 2024 European election, where the party pledged to ‘lower electricity bills’ and ‘reject all European taxes on energy’. Meanwhile, the party continued its economic nationalist agenda, declaring it would ‘prioritize French companies in public procurement’. Riding the wave of discontent among French farmers, the RN also pledged to ‘put an end to punitive ecological policies and fight unfair competition’ to protect farmers’ interests.

Euroscepticism has been a central feature of the FN/RN in France since the mid-1990s (Hainsworth et al., 2004), tapping into a wide range of institutional, economic and cultural issues (Ivaldi, 2018a). Since 2017, the RN has moderated its positions and abandoned its previous policy of ‘Frexit’, adopting, however, a more ambiguous stance vis-à-vis the EU and de-emphasizing European issues to increase its appeal to moderate voters. The RN’s 2024 campaign reiterated the call for ‘a Europe of nations against Macron’s Europe’ while pledging to ‘put an end to European Union enlargement’ and preserve France’s ‘sovereignty and right of veto’ so that ‘no decisions could be made contrary to France’s vital interests.’

Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête shows a populist radical-right profile similar to the RN’s (Ivaldi, 2023a). A well-known political commentator, columnist and author, Zemmour entered national politics at the 2022 presidential election, making nativism and anti-Muslim rhetoric a centrepiece of his presidential bid. In 2024, the Reconquête campaign led by Marion Maréchal, a former member of the RN and Marine Le Pen’s niece, exhibited the central ideological tenets of nativism and authoritarianism alongside populism and Euroscepticism. The manifesto called for a halt to ‘the Islamization of Europe’ and pledged to erect a ‘naval blockade against immigration in the Mediterranean’ while explicitly endorsing the extreme right-wing idea of ‘remigration’ by promising to deport all illegal immigrants, criminals and ‘foreign Islamists.’ Reconquête’s 2024 campaign was significantly hampered, however, by growing disagreement between Zemmour and Maréchal over party strategy and a possible rapprochement with the RN.

On the other hand, Mélenchon’s populist radical left LFI presents a universalistic profile, embracing a more socially inclusive notion of the people, which is essentially pitted against economic and political elites (Ivaldi, 2018b). LFI shows strong anti-establishment features, and its discourse and ideology illustrate radical left populist mobilization, which seeks to offer an alternative to the neoliberal hegemony. In June 2024, the campaign led by the party’s young leader, Manon Aubry, strongly opposed austerity and advocated economic redistribution and public spending.

LFI’s economic policies included higher taxes on capital, the expansion of public services, nationalizing the banking sector to fight speculation, raising the minimum wage and abolishing the 2023 pension reform to return the retirement age to 60. Additionally, the 2024 platform emphasized environmental issues and ecological transition policies, attesting to the more general ‘greening’ of the populist radical left in France since 2017. Like the RN, LFI has toned down its Euroscepticism in recent years, moving away from its previous call to leave the EU and that France should ‘disobey’ the European treaties to ‘preserve the national sovereignty of the French people’ (Ivaldi, 2018b).

LFI took a more radical course in the months before the election, however, reflecting Mélenchon’s ‘revolutionary’ strategy and the controversial stances taken by the party’s leadership concerning the Israel–Hamas war. Following the October 2023 attacks, Mélenchon came under fierce criticism for what was perceived as his ambiguous reaction to the events in Israel, declining to condemn Hamas as a terrorist group and adopting aggressive pro-Palestinian positions. Mélenchon and members of LFI were later accused of antisemitism and of fuelling political anger at Macron and the government while also targeting some of their allies in the newly formed left-wing alliance (New Ecological and Social People’s Union, NUPES) in parliament. Mélenchon’s strategy of radicalization caused enormous turmoil inside the party as prominent leaders such as François Ruffin openly expressed their criticism.

All three populist parties have made significant gains in recent national elections. The April 2022 presidential election saw a surge in electoral support for populism across the political spectrum (Perrineau, 2022). Le Pen won 23.2% of the presidential vote, coming in second place behind incumbent centrist President Emmanuel Macron (at 27.9%), progressing into the run-off where she received a record high 41.5%. In the first round, Zemmour made a significant breakthrough at 7% of the total votes cast. Finally, Mélenchon came in third place with 22% of the vote, taking the lead on the left from the once-dominant Socialist Party (PS).

In the subsequent legislative election of June 2022, the RN received 18.7% of the vote and 89 seats, by far the best result ever achieved by the far right in France, making the RN the largest parliamentary opposition. Mélenchon’s LFI was the dominant player within NUPES, which won a total of 26% of the vote and 157 seats, 75 of which were taken by the LFI.

The context of the 2024 EP elections in France

The 2024 French European election took place against the backdrop of the economic crisis and the rising cost of living in a context marked by global uncertainty arising from the war in Ukraine, social unrest and deep political discontent with President Emmanuel Macron.

Politically, the European elections were located halfway through Macron’s second presidency since April 2022, which had been significantly weakened by the loss of its absolute majority in the 2022 legislative election. Between 2022 and 2024, minority governments led by Élisabeth Borne and Gabriel Attal struggled to find agreements to pass legislation in an increasingly ideologically polarized parliament dominated by LFI and the RN. The Borne government was strongly criticized for repeatedly using the provisions of Article 49(3) of the Constitution, which allows bills to be passed without a vote. Political unrest culminated in March 2023 after the government used Article 49(3) to pass a highly unpopular law raising the retirement age from 62 to 64. Both LFI and the RN opposed the reform, which was overwhelmingly rejected by the French, resulting in mass demonstrations and strikes.

The new Attal government and Emmanuel Macron entered the 2024 election with low popularity ratings: in June, less than a quarter (24%) of the French said they ‘trusted the president to handle the country’s biggest problems’; the comparable figure for Prime Minister Attal was 29% (Elabe, 2024). The European election campaigns of both the RN and LFI tried and capitalized on such political discontent by making the election a referendum for or against Emmanuel Macron and the government, essentially emphasizing domestic concerns over European issues.

Economic fears clearly dominated the campaign, creating a propitious context for populist politics across the board. According to polls, no fewer than 54% of French voters said the cost of living and purchasing power would be important to their vote. Meanwhile, immigration emerged as a salient issue for another 44%, followed by law and order at 26% (CEVIPOF, 2024a). This salience reflected growing public concerns over Islamist terrorism and debates surrounding immigrant integration in France following the urban riots of summer 2023 throughout the country. In December 2023, a vote for a new restrictive immigration law marked a significant shift to the right by the government. The law was widely seen as emulating the nativist policies of the RN, some of which had been brought into the draft bill by the mainstream right, attesting to the radical right turn of the Républicains (LR) under the leadership of Éric Ciotti (Ivaldi, 2024).

Populist voting in the 2024 EP elections

The 2024 French European election saw a rise in electoral support for far-right populism. Turnout was 51.5%, representing a mere increase of about 1.4 points compared to five years earlier and very close to the European average (51.1%). Le Pen and Bardella’s RN emerged as the big winner at 31.4% of the vote (up 8 percentage points compared to 2019), taking 30 of France’s 81 seats in the European Parliament. Macron’s Renaissance list came in a distant second at 14.6%. Meanwhile, Mélenchon’s left-wing populist LFI won 9.9%, a gain of 3.6 percentage points on its previous result in the 2019 EP elections, which was, however, far lower than Mélenchon’s performance in the 2022 presidential election. To the left, LFI was outperformed by the socialist list led by MEP Raphaël Glucksmann in alliance with his Place Publique movement, which came third with 13.8%. Finally, the Reconquête list led by Maréchal received 5.5% of the vote and five seats, making its first entry into the European Parliament.

Polling data confirm that the mix of economic insecurity, immigration fears, and political discontent with Macron may have created a ‘perfect storm’ for far-right populism in the 2024 French European election. Economic grievances and issues have been important factors in the electoral revitalization of far-right populism in France since the early 2010s. Support for the FN has been fuelled by feelings of economic alienation mediated by cultural concerns over immigration and strong anti-elite sentiments (Ivaldi, 2022). In the 2024 EP election, support for the RN was primarily motivated by immigration (77%), the cost of living (67%), and law and order (40%). Similarly, immigration (89%) and security issues (58%) were paramount to Reconquête voters, reflecting the typical far-right agenda. In contrast, LFI voters said they were primarily concerned with the cost of living (61%), social inequalities (49%), and the environment (34%) (CEVIPOF, 2024a).

Polls indicate that the 2024 European election served as a referendum on Macron and the Attal government. Political protest and anti-incumbent sentiments were key to populist voting across the spectrum. While 39% of the French (36% in 2019) said they essentially voted to manifest their opposition to the president and the government, it was 53% among LFI voters, 54% in Reconquête, and no less than 68% among those who had turned to the RN (IPSOS, 2024a). Finally, polls showed a different trade-off between domestic and European issues across voters. Overall, 45% of the electorate said they voted based on domestic concerns, a proportion like the one observed in 2019 (43%). To the left, LFI voters were like the national average at 45%. On the other hand, national issues clearly dominated the electoral agenda of far-right populist voters, with 62% of Reconquête voters and nearly three-quarters (73%) of RN voters saying these issues had been decisive at the ballot box. In contrast, European concerns were paramount to over 80% of Renaissance, socialist, and ecologist voters (IPSOS, 2024a).

Such differences were reflected in attitudes towards Europe, which varied significantly across parties. Overall, only 22% of the French said they opposed European integration, with a majority (57%) saying they supported Europe but would like it to take a different course. Opposition to the EU was substantially stronger among Reconquête (42%) and RN (43%) voters. On the other hand, LFI voters showed more positive views of Europe, with only 16% expressing opposition to further integration (CEVIPOF 2024b).

With nearly a third of the vote, the RN list managed to attract voters across most socio-demographic groups. As in 2022, the RN closed the traditional radical-right gender gap (Durovic & Mayer, 2022), winning 32% and 30% of the vote among men and women, respectively. The Bardella list also did significantly better than the other parties among young voters under 25 years (25%). While consolidating its traditional working- and lower-middle-class constituencies – with no less than 54% of the vote among workers and 40% among white collars – the RN further widened its electoral base by making significant inroads in other occupational groups, winning 29% of the vote among technicians and associate professionals while also going neck-and-neck with the socialists among managers and professionals at 20% of the vote. Finally, the RN won no less than 29% of the vote among pensioners – up to 36% among those from a lower social strata background – thus making significant gains in a group traditionally more resilient to far-right populism in France (IPSOS, 2024b).

To the left, the LFI list led by Manon Aubry essentially overperformed among young voters, receiving a third of the vote (33%) among those aged 18–24 years and 20% among those aged 25–34 years. This result may reflect the strong position taken by LFI on the war in Gaza, which emerged as one of the main concerns in those age groups (IPSOS, 2024b). The salience of the Israel–Hamas conflict was also confirmed by the extremely high level of support (64%) for LFI among the small group of self-declared Muslims in polls (CEVIPOF, 2024a), in line with Mélenchon’s appeal to voters from an immigrant background. More generally, LFI voters showed higher average educational attainment than their RN counterparts, and Aubry’s list achieved a higher level of support amongst voters with a university degree (15%).

The snap legislative election

The outcome of the European election led to the unexpected decision by Emmanuel Macron to dissolve the National Assembly and call a snap election within three weeks despite anticipations of an RN victory and forecasts of a far-right absolute majority. Macron’s political gamble was seen as a strategic move to make parties and voters both face up to their own responsibilities in the event of an RN majority in parliament while also exposing the RN’s unpreparedness for government. Macron called upon the ‘silent majority of voters’ against the ‘disorder’ caused by radical parties (AFP, 2024), hoping to form a new centrist majority by aggregating the centre-left and centre-right against the immediate and tangible threat of the far right gaining power.

Within the extremely short pre-election period, tactical alliances were built across both sides of the political spectrum. Most notably, despite diverging positions on Europe, Gaza and Ukraine, the major parties of the left agreed to form a broad coalition dubbed the Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP), bringing together LFI, the Communist Party, the Greens and the Socialists together with Glucksmann’s Place Publique. While they had all competed individually in the European elections, the NFP member parties agreed to select single candidates (i.e., avoid running against one another) in almost all of France’s 577 constituencies, and there were few dissident left-wing candidates. The breakdown of NFP candidates showed that LFI remained the dominant force (229 candidates), followed by the socialists (175) and the Greens (92).

At the centre, Macron’s Renaissance movement rallied its previous allies in the outgoing parliament inside his Ensemble coalition, i.e., François Bayrou’s centrist Mouvement démocrate (MoDem) and Édouard Philippe’s centre-right Horizons. Further to the right, the 2024 legislative election saw a notable reshuffling of the sub-party system. Éric Ciotti, head of the Republicans, struck an electoral pact with the RN, eventually running a total of 62 candidates with the far right under the new À Droite (To the Right) banner. Other LR leaders vehemently opposed such a decision, including Laurent Wauquiez, a close ally of Ciotti and hardliner within the party. This resulted in bitter infighting and the attempt by LR to expel Ciotti, which was overturned by a Paris court before the election. The Republicans entered the legislative election significantly divided and weakened, running candidates in 305 constituencies.

The results of the first round of the June legislative election showed a surge in voter turnout (to 66.7%), a substantial increase (about 19 percentage points) from the previous 2022 election, reflecting both voter desire for change after seven years of Macron’s presidency, and growing fears of the far right getting closer to power. On election night, the RN was again the big winner, receiving 29.3 % of the vote – its best performance ever in a legislative election – to which one must add the 4% received by Ciotti’s À Droite candidates, giving a total of about a third of the total vote cast for the far right. RN candidates topped the polls in 297 out of 577 constituencies, and they could progress to nearly all the second-round run-offs. This result confirmed the geographical spread of the RN vote across all regions of France, which had already been observed in the European election.

Further to the right, the results of the snap election showed the electoral marginalization of Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête, reflecting growing intra-party dissent and disagreement over party strategy between Zemmour and Maréchal. Ahead of the first round, Maréchal was expelled from the party together with two other vice presidents – Guillaume Peltier and Nicolas Bay – after she had initiated talks with the RN leadership and had publicly called for a union of the two far-right parties. Reconquête entered the election independently and fielded 330 candidates who collectively polled a mere 0.75 % of the vote in the first round, making Zemmour’s party politically irrelevant. To the left, the newly formed NFP came second at 28.5% and took the lead in 159 constituencies. Macron’s Ensemble coalition finished third with 21.8% of the vote cast, topping the polls in 70 constituencies, essentially in the western part of the country and the more bourgeois areas inside and around Paris.

Legislative run-offs were fought in the 501 constituencies where two or more candidates had surpassed the institutional threshold of 12.5% of registered voters to be allowed to progress into the second round. Between the two rounds, the traditional Republican Front – that is, the ad hoc alliances of parties and voters across the spectrum that coalesce whenever the RN is likely to win a decisive round – was revitalized, resulting in 217 candidates withdrawing from three-way races in their constituencies to reduce the chances of an RN victory.

The second round attested to the mobilization of voters against the far right. At 66.6%, voter participation rose to the highest level since the 1997 legislative elections (up from 53.8% in 2022). Between the two rounds, mass protests against the RN were a strong sign of growing public concern about the far right getting into power in France. The second round delivered a hung parliament divided into three blocks. The left-wing NFP secured the most seats after the second round, winning a total of 180, falling short, however, of the 289 seats needed for an overall majority. LFI lost its predominance inside the broad left-wing coalition, taking 72 seats, as opposed to 66 for the socialists and 38 for the Greens. Macron’s centrist Ensemble alliance came third with 163 seats, down 87 seats from the already relative majority it had secured in the 2022 election.

The 2024 legislative election came as a disappointment for the RN after its historical first-round performance and the presence of its candidates in most second-round run-offs. With a total of 143 seats (including Ciotti’s À Droite MPs), Le Pen’s party fell well short of the absolute majority needed to form a government, although this represented a substantial increase in the total number of RN seats compared with 89 in the 2022 elections. Because of the Republican Front put forward by mainstream parties, the number of three-way run-offs featuring the RN and two other parties was reduced from 306 to 89, significantly impacting the outcome for the far right: the RN lost no fewer than 154 constituencies where it had taken the lead in the first round.

Other factors contributing to the RN’s electoral setback included the party’s poor credentials for government and the extreme right-wing profile of its candidates. The campaign exposed the RN’s unpreparedness for the government despite the Matignon Plan – essentially a list of candidates for all 577 constituencies in the National Assembly – put forward in haste by Bardella just before the first round. The election was punctuated with hesitations and U-turns on some of the party’s key economic and immigration policies, such as lowering the retirement age back to 60 and restricting access to public jobs for people with dual citizenship. Meanwhile, the media revealed that many of the RN candidates hastily brought to the campaign from the party rank-and-file had repeatedly posted racist, homophobic, pro-Putin, COVID-19 denial and anti-Semitic comments on social media, casting doubt about Le Pen’s claim that she had detoxified her party. Additionally, some RN candidates had links with violent ultra-nationalist organizations in France, and one of them was found to have a criminal record for armed robbery.

Discussion and perspectives

The 2024 legislative election has left France in a political deadlock, delivering a hung parliament split into three blocks. The outcome of the 2024 European and legislative elections have more generally reflected the shape and increasing polarization of French politics since 2017; that is, a weakened yet still resilient centrist block squeezed between two radical alternatives on the left (LFI) and right (RN) of the party system. While parties of the left have managed to somewhat overcome their ideological and policy divergences, electoral support for the left remains relatively low, casting doubt about the possibility of a credible left-wing alternative while also attesting to the shift to the right that has taken place in French politics, a trend seen in many other European countries.

With an ever more fragmented parliament and no stable government in sight, the outcome of the 2024 elections will undoubtedly prolong uncertainty and political instability in a context marked by social unrest, growing economic anxiety and public debt and deficit. Such uncertainty will likely fuel electoral support for populism across the political spectrum in the forthcoming months, as economic and cultural fears will continue to top the political agenda. Macron and his centrist party face the challenge of building ad hoc alliances across ideologically diverse parties to pass legislation to address such concerns. Meanwhile, both LFI and the RN will need to work on their policy credibility, organization and membership to try and establish themselves as viable alternatives in the 2027 presidential election.

 

(*) Gilles Ivaldi is researcher in politics at CEVIPOF and professor at Sciences Po Paris. His research interests include French politics, parties and elections, and the comparative study of populism and the radical right in Europe and the United States. Gilles Ivaldi is the author of De Le Pen à Trump: le défi populiste (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2019), The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A political Reformation? 2018, Palgrave MacMillan, with Jocelyn Evans. He has recently co-edited The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 2023, with Emilia Zankina. His research has appeared in journals such as Electoral Studies, the International Journal of Forecasting, Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, French Politics, Revue Française de Science Politique or Political Research Quarterly.

 

References

AFP (2024) Macron defends surprise snap-election call as ‘most responsible solution’, 18 June, https://www.france24.com/en/france/20240618-macron-defends-surprise-snap-election-call-most-responsible-solution-france

CEVIPOF (2024a) Enquête électorale française Élections européennes – vague 6, Ipsos, Le Monde, Fondation Jean Jaurès et Institut Montaigne, June.

CEVIPOF (2024b) Enquête électorale française Élections européennes – vague 5, Ipsos, Le Monde, Fondation Jean Jaurès et Institut Montaigne, May.

Durovic, A. & Mayer, N. (2022) Wind of change? The reconfiguration of gender gaps in the 2022 French presidential election: The reconfiguration of gender gaps in the 2022 French presidential election. Revue française de science politique, 72, 463–484. https://doi.org/10.3917/rfsp.724.0463

ELABE (2024) Baromètre ELABE pour Les Échos, 13 June. https://elabe.fr/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/20240613_les_echos_observatoire-politique.pdf

IPSOS (2024a) Comprendre le vote des Français, Enquête Ipsos pour France Télévisions, Radio France, France24/RFI, Public Sénat/LCP Assemblée Nationale, 6–7 June.

Ivaldi, G. (2018a) Contesting the EU in Times of Crisis: The Front National and Politics of Euroscepticism in France, Politics, 38(3): 278–294.

Ivaldi, G. (2018b) Populism in France, in Daniel Stockemer (ed.) Populism around the world: A Comparative Perspective, Cham: Springer, pp.27–48.

Ivaldi, G. (2022) Le vote Le Pen, in Perrineau, Pascal (dir.) Le Vote clivé. Les élections présidentielle et législatives d’avril et juin 2022, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble/UGA éditions, pp.153–164.

Ivaldi, G. (2023a) When far right parties compete: a case study of Éric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen in the 2022 French presidential election, French Politics, online first 13 July 2023.

Ivaldi, G. (2023b) The impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on right-wing populism in France, in Ivaldi, Gilles and Zankina, Emilia (Eds). (2023) The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). 8 March 2023. Brussels, p.141–154.

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Sweden Democrats' Square Meeting in Umeå. Jimmie Åkesson speaks to the people on the city square where opposition left-wingers have formed a chain and protest in Umeå, Sweden on August 14, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

A Speed Bump in the Road or the Start of an Uphill Journey? The Sweden Democrats and the 2024 European Parliament Election Setback

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Please cite as:
Bolin, Niklas. (2024). “A Speed Bump in the Road or the Start of an Uphill Journey? The Sweden Democrats and the 2024 European Parliament Election Setback.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024.https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0085

 

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Abstract

Leading up to the 2024 European Parliament election, much attention was given to the anticipated gains of populist parties across Europe. While some populist parties made significant advances, the overall outcome was more moderate than expected. Sweden deviated from this general trend, witnessing gains for left-wing parties and a surprising setback for the populist radical right. The 2024 elections marked a historic decline for the Sweden Democrats, the first instance since their formation in 1988 that they regressed in comparison to previous national and European Parliament elections. This decline is particularly notable following their strong performance in the 2022 national elections, where they became Sweden’s second-largest party. This article examines these developments, drawing on existing research, media reports and exit polls, with a focus on the Sweden Democrats’ campaign strategies, election results and voter behaviour. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of these election outcomes for both Swedish domestic politics and the broader European political landscape.

Keywords: radical right; populism; Sweden Democrats; European Union; elections, voting behaviour

By Niklas Bolin* (Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Mid Sweden University, Sundsvall, Sweden)

Introduction

The expectations for the European Parliament elections among parties to the right of the mainstream right were certainly high. Media forecasts were clear, proclaiming that ‘a populist wave surges’ (Vinocur, 2024) and ‘a far-right takeover of Europe is underway’ (Vohra, 2024). The question was not whether the disparate group of far-right parties would gain influence but how significant that influence would be. However, while the results must be seen as a success for these parties, it is probably more accurate to describe it as moderate rather than a landslide victory. While some parties – for example, the French National Rally, the Brothers of Italy and the Alternative for Germany – made significant gains, the development was more modest elsewhere.

Sweden was one country bucking the trend. Parties on the left made gains while parties on the right generally fared somewhat worse. Most surprisingly, it was a defeat for the populist radical right. The 2024 European Parliament election will go down in history as the first election ever where the Sweden Democrats regressed compared to the previous election. Until this point, the party was unique in the sense that in all national elections – both to the national and the European Parliament – since its formation in 1988, it had advanced compared to the previous election. The decline is even more remarkable given that the general expectation was for the party to continue its trend of success. Instead of repeating the achievement from the national parliamentary election in 2022, when it attracted more than 20% of the votes and became Sweden’s second-largest party for the first time, the party experienced a shock. On election night, it became clear that they were not only far behind the result of the 2022 national parliamentary election but also lost ground compared to the previous 2019 European election. Rather than continuing its surge, the party only managed to secure 13% of the votes, making them merely Sweden’s fourth-largest party.

Against this background, this chapter addresses party-political populism in Sweden in connection with the 2024 European Parliament election. Specifically, it describes and analyses the populist radical right Sweden Democrats, with a focus on the campaign, the results and voting behaviour. The article is based on previous research, media reports and exit polls.

Populist parties in Sweden

In a European comparison, the successes of party-political populism came late to Sweden. Except for the brief presence of New Democracy in the Swedish Parliament (the Riksdag) from 1991 to 1994, populist representation was absent until 2010, when the Sweden Democrats were first elected to the Riksdag. 

Since then, the Sweden Democrats have monopolized the position of the populist party in Sweden. Although it has occasionally been claimed that the socialist Left Party is populist, a consensus has emerged that the Sweden Democrats is the only Swedish party that unequivocally meets the criteria (Meijers & Zaslove, 2021; Rooduijn et al., 2023). Some believed the newly launched People’s List could become a new populist challenger. The movement, which adamantly rejected the designation of being a party, was founded just over a month prior to the election by a former Social Democratic MP known for winning a reality TV show and a sitting MEP from the Christian Democrats who had been removed from the party’s list. With decent name recognition, the People’s List initially received significant media attention. Interest quickly waned, and with only 0.6% of the votes, the People’s List is destined to become a small footnote in Swedish party history. The initiators announced shortly after the election that they would not continue their involvement with the movement (Rogvall & Nordenskiöld, 2024).

As the only relevant populist party, this article thus focuses on the Sweden Democrats. The party was founded by outright racist groups with neo-Nazi links (Larsson & Ekman, 2001). Because of this history, the party was completely shut out from co-operation with other parties on the national stage for many years due to a cordon sanitaire. This began to change before the 2018 election and, more explicitly, before the 2022 parliamentary election, when three of the centre-right parties expressed a more open stance towards the Sweden Democrats (Bolin et al., 2023). Despite an election outcome in 2022 where these parties lost ground, they managed, with the support of the Sweden Democrats, to regain control of the government after eight years of Social Democratic-led rule. With 20.5% of the votes as the country’s now second-largest party, the Sweden Democrats’ support was crucial for the new government. The party was also rewarded through a far-reaching co-operation agreement. Many observers suggested that the Sweden Democrats had significant influence over the agreement (Aylott & Bolin, 2023). The 2024 European Parliament election was thus the first election in which the Sweden Democrats participated while having formal influence over the government, serving as a potential test of how voters viewed the party’s collaboration with former adversaries from the establishment.

The party’s political profile and priorities resemble those of other parties in the populist radical right family (e.g., Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). Its main priorities have been a restrictive immigration policy and a tough stance on crime. Regarding the EU, the party long favoured exiting the EU. However, following the aftermath of Brexit and a surge in pro-EU attitudes among the electorate, the party moderated its criticism. Prior to the 2019 European Parliament election, the party dropped its demand for a referendum on EU withdrawal (Bolin, 2023a). Despite abandoning its hard Eurosceptic position, it remains the most EU-sceptical party in Sweden, possibly alongside the Left Party.

A key issue, similar to those faced by comparable parties in other EU countries, is the party’s stance on Russia. Despite having taken a stance against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, other parties in Sweden have accused the Sweden Democrats of having an ambiguous attitude towards the Russian regime. Such attacks have not prevented the party from adopting, in turn, a critical stance towards several other similar parties, primarily within the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, precisely because they have shown a more openly friendly attitude towards the Putin regime (Bolin, 2023b).

The party succeeded in entering the European Parliament for the first time in 2014. One of the most decisive issues for the party has been how the Swedish public perceives its actions at the European level. This concern is particularly evident in the party’s group affiliation in the European Parliament, as there are fears of being tainted domestically by association with other populist radical right parties with extreme pasts and reputations (McDonnell & Werner, 2018). After the 2014 election, the Sweden Democrats applied for membership in the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) but were not accepted. Instead, it was admitted into the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), which actively recruited MEPs from elsewhere after the Danish People’s Party left to join the more mainstream ECR (Bolin, 2015). However, a few years later, resistance to the Sweden Democrats decreased somewhat, leading the party to join its Nordic neighbours, the Danish People’s Party and the Finns Party, in the ECR just one year before the 2019 election (Johansson et al., 2024). Despite the Danish People’s Party leaving the group to join ID a few years later, the Sweden Democrats remained in the ECR for the remainder of the parliamentary term.

The election campaign

Over time, the Sweden Democrats have built up a highly effective communications department that has successfully attracted media and public attention. The communication has often been controversial. In a TV advertisement ahead of the 2010 election, for example, the party illustrated the need for economic prioritization by showing a group of niqab-clad women with strollers racing against an elderly woman with a walker to reach the benefit payment first (Bolin et al., 2022). And in 2020, when party leader Jimmie Åkesson travelled to the border between Turkey and Greece, he distributed flyers with the text ‘Sweden is full’ (Fridolfsson & Elander, 2021).

The campaign strategy in the 2024 European Parliament election initially followed previous patterns. A year before the election, the party leadership proposed a ‘referendum lock’, a law stipulating that all major transfers of power and demands for larger payments to the EU must first be approved in a referendum (Åkesson & Weimers, 2024). This move was seen by many as a way to assert the party’s position as the most EU-sceptical. The campaign continued to be characterized by opposition to further transfers of power to the EU. However, the main focus was consistently related to immigration, often with connections to crime. The party invested heavily in the slogan ‘My Europe builds walls’, a paraphrase of the former Social Democratic Prime Minister Stefan Löfven’s statement during the 2015 refugee crisis that ‘My Europe does not build walls.’ The message appeared on the party’s campaign posters and YouTube channel, where it was accompanied by various dramatic videos showing people with seemingly foreign backgrounds engaging in violent protests or otherwise behaving in a disturbing manner. The message was clear: immigration creates problems, so Sweden and Europe need to close their borders.

The campaign initially had the intended effect of creating media attention around the party. The election campaign soon took a new turn when, about a month before the election, it was revealed that the party’s communications department hosted a so-called troll factory, where anonymous social media accounts spread disinformation and derogatory portrayals of other politicians. The revelation was condemned unanimously by all other parties, including those in the government that the Sweden Democrats were co-operating with. The party responded with a strong counterattack through a five-minute ‘speech to the nation’ on YouTube, where Åkesson claimed that the reporting and the following reactions were ‘a massive domestic influence operation by the collective left–liberal establishment’ (Sverigedemokraterna, 2024). Given the Sweden Democrats’ conventional approach of handling troublesome revelations by downplaying or ignoring the accusations, many were surprised by Åkesson’s strong counterattack. After the election, reports also emerged of rare internal criticism regarding how the party leadership handled the situation. It is plausible that the party’s handling of the crisis also contributed to some voters refraining from voting for the party. 

Possibly facilitated by the party’s increased confidence after being given formal influence for the first time, there were also tendencies to express certain controversial positions more openly than before. The party was, for example, once again criticized for its stance on Russia. This recurring discussion was reignited after Åkesson stated that there is an upper limit to how much support Sweden should give to Ukraine (Carlsson, 2024) and, perhaps even more so, after the party’s top candidate, Charlie Weimers, suggested that their own party group, ECR, should be open to co-operating with parties in the ID group, whose stance on Russia has been characterized as relatively friendly (Nordenskiöld, 2024). 

Åkesson also received criticism when, just days before the election, he claimed in an opinion piece that multiculturalism had led to a population replacement in Sweden (Åkesson, 2024). A reference akin to the well-known ‘Great Replacement’ theory within right-wing extremist and conspiratorial circles (Mudde, 2019), despite Åkesson himself having distanced himself from the concept just a year before the election.

The ‘demand side’ of populism

Unlike many other populist radical right parties, the Sweden Democrats failed to make gains in the 2024 European Parliament elections. As illustrated in Figure 1, this is an exceptional occurrence since the party had never previously lost ground compared to a preceding national election. Despite securing 13.2% of the votes and retaining its three MEPs, the party experienced a decline of just over 2 percentage points compared to the 2019 election. The contrast with the 2022 national parliamentary election, the Riksdag, underscores the magnitude of this setback.

The Sweden Democrats usually perform worse in the European Parliament elections than in the Riksdag elections. But even taking this into account, the result must be seen as a disappointment, especially since pre-election polls indicated a clear success for the party. Before the election, the question was whether the Sweden Democrats would succeed in becoming the country’s second-largest party. The images broadcast from the party’s election night event, when the exit poll results indicated that they had not only failed to surpass the Moderates but had also been overtaken by the Green Party, were almost of a party in shock.

Turning to the question of who voted for the party based on the exit poll (SVT, 2024), no major surprises emerge. The sociodemographic patterns from previous elections reappear. While 18% of men voted for the Sweden Democrats, only 9% of women did so—at the voter level, the Sweden Democrats are as many other similar parties still männerparteien (Harteveld et al., 2015). Age-wise, there is no clear profile even though the party performs relatively well among the youngest voters (18–21 years old), much like in the parliamentary election of 2022. The party is overrepresented among the unemployed (20%) and those receiving sickness or disability benefits (24%). The party’s voters are also relatively strong among those with the lowest education levels. Additionally, the party is underrepresented among voters who grew up outside Sweden. The relatively low voter turnout of 53.4%, a decrease of nearly 2 percentage points since 2019, and the fact that the party is overrepresented in some of the groups that typically vote to a lesser extent provide some indication of why the Sweden Democrats did not perform as well as it did in the 2022 parliamentary election.

Additional clues are given if we focus on voter mobilization and issue prioritization. It appears that the Sweden Democrats failed to mobilize their supporters to the polls. The party stands out from the others in that it had the highest proportion of voters (59 % compared to the average of 38%) who had decided which party to vote for before the start of the election campaign. Consequently, the party performed the worst relatively in mobilizing voters in the week leading up to the election (23% compared to the average of 40%). The impression that the party failed to convince its supporters to turn out is strengthened by the fact that the proportion of voters who actually voted for the party was similar to those who said they would vote for the party if there were a parliamentary election today, while other opinion polls on voting intentions for the Riksdag, both shortly before and shortly after the election, showed significantly higher support for the party. So rather than switching to other parties, some Sweden Democrats sympathizers chose to abstain from voting.

The fact that the party supports the incumbent government might partially explain the problem of mobilizing voters. However, the aforementioned troll factory scandal is likely a more plausible partial explanation for why some voters chose to stay home. Even more likely, it was an agenda effect. While crime prevention, one of the party’s more important issues, was just as important to voters in 2024 as it was in the 2019 European election, the party’s main issue, ‘refugees/immigration’, was less significant than it had been in both the previous European election and the Riksdag election of 2022. In the exit poll, it was only ranked 11 out of 17 when voters were asked about the importance they attributed to different issues in their choice of party. Only 36% of voters indicated that this issue was of very great importance, which can be compared to 67% for ‘peace in Europe’, 60% for ‘democracy in the EU’, and 53% for ‘climate’, issues not highly prioritized by the Sweden Democrats.

Similarly, the issue of ‘national independence’, closely related to the Sweden Democrats’ message of resistance to transferring more power to Brussels, decreased somewhat compared to the 2019 election and ranked low on voters’ priority list. At the same time, the party’s positioning as the most EU-sceptical seems to resonate with voters. Among respondents who want Sweden to leave the EU, a significant 54% voted for the Sweden Democrats, compared to 11% for the Left Party, the second Eurosceptic party. The survey also confirms that the European Parliament election is primarily a domestic issue for Sweden Democrats voters. 59% of the party’s voters stated that the Sweden Democrats’ efforts in Swedish politics were very important in their choice of party. The corresponding figure for other parties varied between 19 and 46%.

Implications for the future

The 2024 EP election was a serious blow to the self-image of the Sweden Democrats as the eternal election winners. The result was surprising. However, there is no overwhelming evidence that this is the beginning of the end. Rather, it is reasonable to consider the vote decline as an indication that the party will now face ups and downs like most other parties. Moreover, in many respects, the election took place during a perfect storm that resulted in the party’s underperformance. The political agenda was dominated by issues not prioritized by the Sweden Democrats. The troll factory revelations also overshadowed the campaign and, perhaps even more importantly, how the party mishandled this crisis. In addition, and most likely due to this mishandling, many potential voters opted for abstention.

For the Sweden Democrats, European elections are still second-order elections. What happens in European Parliament elections and in Brussels is important primarily insofar as it has repercussions on their reputation at home. Despite harsh condemnations from the Swedish government parties following the troll factory revelations, they seemed equally inclined to move on. After all, the government parties are entirely dependent on the support of the Sweden Democrats for their continued survival. Despite the electoral defeat in the European Parliament election, it is important to note that the party still holds three seats in the EP. Most likely, these will be used strategically to join the group that offers the best leverage for their domestic agenda. The party will continue to maintain its position as the most EU-sceptical party in Sweden and express opposition to further transfers of power and money to the EU. At least for now, the most reasonable interpretation of the party’s election results seems to be more of a temporary speed bump in the road rather than the start of an uphill journey.

 

(*) Niklas Bolin is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Mid Sweden University, Sundsvall, Sweden. His main research interests include parties and elections, with a specific focus on party organization, leadership, intra-party democracy, youth wings and radical right parties. He has published in high-ranking international journals, including the Journal of Common Market Studies, Party Politics and West European Politics. E-mail: niklas.bolin@miun.se

 

References

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Aylott, N., & Bolin, N. (2023). A New Right: The Swedish Parliamentary Election of September 2022 West European Politics, 46(5), 1049-1062. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2156199

Bolin, N. (2015). A Loyal Rookie? The Sweden Democrats’ First Year in the European Parliament. The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 11(2), 59-77.

Bolin, N. (2023a). Continued Absence: A Case Study of EU Salience in the Swedish Parliamentary Election of 2022. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 61(S1), 102-114. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13529

Bolin, N. (2023b). The repercussions of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on the populist Radical Right in Sweden. In G. Ivaldi & E. Zankina (Eds.), The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-wing Populism in Europe (pp. 303-313). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0031

Bolin, N., Dahlberg, S., & Blombäck, S. (2023). The stigmatisation effect of the radical right on voters’ assessment of political proposals. West European Politics, 46(1), 100-121. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.2019977

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Flag of Finland and the European Union flag displayed in the European Council offices in Brussels, Belgium, on April 10, 2024. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

The Loss of the Populist Radical Right in the 2024 European Parliament Elections in Finland

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Please cite as:

Herkman, Juha. (2024). “The Loss of the Populist Radical Right in the 2024 European Parliament Elections in Finland.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0069

 

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Abstract

In the 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections, the populist radical-right Finns Party had a disappointing result; it came sixth nationally and lost 6.2% of the vote and one seat compared to the 2019 elections. The centre-right National Coalition (NC) party won the elections with 24.8% of the vote and four seats, but the real winner was the Left Alliance, which came second (17.3%) and gained three seats. The elections revealed voters’ deep distrust towards the government, in which the Finns Party supported significant austerity measures and cuts to public spending through its leader and finance minister, Riikka Purra. People’s fear of the rising far right in Europe was also a salient theme in campaign debates, which diminished the Finns Party’s support, alongside a low voter turnout.

Keywords: Election campaign; populist radical right; Finns Party; antagonism; government/opposition

 

By Juha Herkman* (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland)

Introduction

In Finland, one political party is commonly referred to as ‘populist’ – the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset, which was initially called True Finns). However, depending on how populism is defined, other political parties and individual politicians may sometimes be described as being populist when they use provocative language, make unrealistic promises and encourage strong antagonisms (see Herkman, 2022). Therefore, the label ‘populist’ has occasionally been used to refer to liberal green or leftist actors and minor political parties with little or no representation in parliament. Here populism is understood as an affective process in which strong antagonisms are exploited to construct a united political group identity and movement mobilization as ‘the people’ (Laclau, 2005; Herkman, 2022). In this, no other parliamentary party than the Finns Party can be called ‘populist’ as such in Finland.

The Finns Party was established in 1995 as the successor of the Finnish Rural Party, an agrarian populist party created in 1959. The legacy of the Finnish Rural Party (SMP) has made the Finns Party a more normal political player compared to the populist parties of the Nordic countries (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). Under the leadership of Timo Soini (1997–2017), the Finns Party was a rather traditional populist party with an anti-elitist, nationalist and Eurosceptic agenda, as well as left-leaning economic policies. However, in the 2010s, Soini started flirting with actors opposed to immigration, and the party became very popular. Under the leadership of Jussi Halla-aho (2017–2021) and Riikka Purra (2021–present), the party has become a clear example of the European populist radical right, with a strong anti-immigration message and nativist ideology (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Norocel, 2016). Regarding economic policies, the party has also turned to the right. During the Soini’s period, the party followed the SMP legacy as a proponent of the disadvantaged groups as the ‘workers’ movement without socialism’, whereas the new leaders have promoted ‘welfare chauvinism’ and attacked the ‘exploiters of the welfare state as the enemy of the real hard-working people’ in the wake of immigration criticism (see Norocel, 2016).

The Finns Party has traditionally been the only openly Eurosceptic parliamentary party in Finland, although the Centre Party has also promoted Euroscepticism, especially in agricultural policies. However, compared to national elections, in which it has been the second or third largest party in Finland with 17.5–20.1% of the vote between 2011 and 2023, the Finns Party has had limited success in the EP elections (see Figure 1). In the 2019 EP election, the party obtained its best result to date, with 13.8% of the vote, coming in fourth among Finland’s parties. After these elections, the party joined the new Identity and Democracy group, but it moved to the more moderate European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in 2023 because they did not want to be identified with such political parties as France’s National Rally or Italy’s Lega, which were seen far too extreme in Finnish public discussions prior to the 2024 EP elections. In 2019–2024, the Finns Party had two members of the European Parliament (MEPs), Teuvo Hakkarainen and Laura Huhtasaari; as a country, Finland had 14 MEPs (as a result of Brexit, Finland now has 15 MEPs).

Because of geopolitics and its high dependence on European markets, Finland has been among the countries with the most favourable disposition towards the European Union (EU) in the twenty-first century. Based on the figure above, it seems that populist anti-immigration rhetoric and Euroscepticism do not take you as far in the EP elections as in national elections in Finland. In opinion polls, two-thirds of Finns have expressed positive thoughts about EU membership; however, only 22% of Finns Party supporters shared this attitude, and 58% of them were negatively disposed towards EU membership (YLE, 2023). In Finland, the voter turnout is much lower for the EP elections compared to national elections, which usually diminishes the share of the Finns Party’s vote because their voters channel the general disappointment and protest at politics and are therefore unsure of voting. In the 2019 EP elections, the turnout was 42.7% of the voter population living in Finland, whereas it was 72% in the 2023 parliamentary elections and 71.6% in the first round of the 2024 presidential elections.

The 2024 EP elections were very interesting in Finland because the Finns Party has been part of the right-wing government with the NC since 2023. Also, in April 2023, Finland joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since entering government, the Finns Party has diminished its populism and promoted very right-wing economic policies based on strong austerity measures and considerable cuts to public spending thanks to its leader, Riikka Purra, who is currently the finance minister. According to polls, support for the Finns Party has decreased remarkably after the parliamentary elections. In the spring of 2024, the relationship between the government and workers became very polarized, with numerous strikes taking place in response to the government’s actions.

The Finns Party has traditionally been the Eurosceptic party in Finnish EP elections, promoting an agenda opposed to the EU, immigration and climate change policies. However, concerning the war in Ukraine and NATO, the party has been in line with the position of the other major parties in Finland because the population strongly supports Ukraine and criticizes Putin’s Russia. On this point, the Finns Party differs from the European far right, which has often supported Putin’s regime and opposed NATO. Among the parties, the NC – which usually comes first in EP elections in Finland – has been the strongest supporter of the EU and NATO. The constellation of the NC and the Finns Party in government and the liberal Greens and the Left in opposition makes the analysis of the 2024 EP elections extremely interesting from the perspective of populism.

Populist antagonism in the election campaign

EP elections are often seen as second-order elections because, in many countries, national and local issues take precedence over European ones during campaigning (see Reif & Schmitt, 1980). This is not completely true in Finland: in the EP elections, European issues are highlighted, even though they are discussed from a national angle (Herkman et al., 2024).

In total, 232 candidates registered to campaign across all Finnish political parties before the deadline of 10 May 2024. The Finns Party fielded 20 candidates, as did the other major parties. In the campaign, the opinion polls ranked the Finns Party third with an estimated 16%–17% of the vote. The time available for campaigning was rather short – no more than three or four weeks. The parties launched their election manifestos about six weeks before the election.

The Finns Party’s manifesto, Päätetään itse (Let’s Make the Decisions Ourselves), was published on 24 April 2024. It was seen as milder compared to the past, as the party abandoned its long-term goal of withdrawing from the EU as ‘unrealistic’. The manifesto recognized the benefits of the EU for Ukraine and the Common Market, even though it saw the euro as damaging for Finland. However, the document contained several familiar themes, such as a strong anti-immigration agenda, according to which asylum seekers should be sent to third countries outside Europe. The manifesto also criticized what it saw as the EU’s unwise expansionism, failed income-transfer politics and eagerness to meddle in matters that are the preserve of the member states.

During the campaign, the Finns Party repeatedly criticized the recent regulation of plastic bottle tops as a striking example of ‘stupid’ EU policies, and it mocked the regulation in several comments, blog posts and YouTube videos. The previous leader and a key figure in the party, Jussi Halla-aho, argued in a campaign video that the EU makes decisions that do not consider national interests because European decision-makers are not interested in them. According to Halla-aho, a vote for the Finns Party would be a vote for the idea of Finland ‘making the decisions ourselves.’

The Finns Party’s status as a populist radical-right actor coloured the whole campaign of the 2024 EP elections in Finland, and an anti-populist struggle took place against them. The Social Democratic Party’s (SDP) campaign slogan and manifesto title was Jo riittää–pystymme parempaan (This Is Enough–We Can Make It Better) in reference to the challenges to European unity, equal rights, the rule of law and the fight against climate change posed by the far right. The Left Alliance and the Greens spoke of the same issues in their campaign manifestos, underscoring their anti-populist and anti-far-right credentials. Interestingly, the NC, the party of the prime minister and one of the companions of the Finns Party in government, chose security as the most important theme in their election manifesto, entitled Oikealla puolella Eurooppaa (On the Right Side of Europe), in addition to their traditional themes of the free market and innovation. In their program, security also meant strict border controls for asylum seekers that aligned with their long-standing Western orientation and support of NATO but also echoed the collaboration with the Finns Party in the governing cabinet.

Online candidate questionnaires have been popular in Finland for several decades, and all major media outlets publish them during an election campaign (Carlson & Strandberg, 2005). The most influential questionnaires are published by the public broadcaster YLE, the leading newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, the oldest national commercial television channel MTV3, and national tabloid papers. The questions posed to candidates vary across the media outlets; however, their results are generally similar to the value map of YLE’s questionnaire (see Figure 2, YLE, 2024a). Even if there is some variation among the candidates in a party, the value map demonstrates the clear differences among the parties in terms of their economic (left–right axis) and value orientations (conservative–liberal axis).

The more a party is on the right of the map, the more it supports the free market, and vice versa. The higher a party is on the map, the more it holds conservative values, and vice versa. By looking at Figure 2, one can see that the Finns Party and the Christian Democrats are the most conservative actors in Finnish politics, as well as the strongest proponents of the free market. Only their companion in government, the NC, is more to the right economically, although this party is more moderate in terms of values, making it a traditional representative of the centre-right. In contrast, the Social Democrats and the Greens are very liberal and economically left-wing, together with the Left Alliance, which is even more to the left regarding the economy. The figure visually demonstrates how far apart the left–green camp and the Finns Party were in the 2024 EP election.

The same chasm was evident in the election debates aired by the major national television channels. Whereas the most important topic in the 2019 EP elections was climate change, which explains the success of the Greens at the time (Herkman et al., 2024: 103), in the 2024 elections, security was the key theme. This was due to the war in Ukraine and Russia’s influence on asylum seekers’ crossings on Finland’s eastern border. As mentioned above, the support for Ukraine in Finland has been almost unanimous among the country’s parties. Stricter border controls as a result of Russian operations have been supported even by the left–green parties, even though they have made some criticism concerning human rights. The focus on security made the Finns Party the agenda setter during the 2024 EP election campaign.

Despite this, the Finns Party was forced onto the defensive in other areas. Due to the predicted victory of the far right across the continent and its consequences for the EU, the media and the left–green parties constantly discussed these issues on the air. The Social Democrats based their campaign on attacking the far right for its damaging influence on European unity, the support for Ukraine, human rights, climate change policies and the principle of the rule of law. The Left Alliance and the Greens attacked the Finns Party on immigration and environmental issues, accusing it of representing the far right. The NC supported the government’s security policies, developed with the Finns Party, but it tried to keep out of the clash between the liberal opposition and the far right. In this situation, the Finns Party remained a ‘fringe populist movement’ (Herkman & Palonen, 2024: xxix).

The leader of the Finns Party, Riikka Purra, who is also the finance minister, had become a symbol of the government’s austerity policies, which created problems for the party during the campaign debates. Even though the party leaders tried to hold back in the debates, some party members had a more aggressive stance. For example, a well-known Finns Party MP, Sebastian Tynkkynen, used much more provocative rhetoric on immigration than Purra. This division of labour, according to which the leaders appear more moderate when there is a large audience while others are more aggressive in their communications with radical supporters, is typical of the populist radical right (Herkman, 2022: 77).

The populist radical right has often been seen as the political force that benefits the most from social media because these tools help them to use the double-speech strategy mentioned above, bypass journalistic scrutiny and appeal to hardcore far-right supporters (e.g., Krämer, 2017). The Finns Party has also been successful in its social media use, from Halla-aho’s and Soini’s blog posts to the more recent use of TikTok and Instagram by its MPs. Tynkkynen has a popular YouTube channel and successfully used Facebook in his campaigning. However, a study of Twitter use during the 2019 EP elections found that the most active tweeters were from the liberal, pro-EU camp and that Finns Party members mostly retweeted other people’s content and commented aggressively on it (Herkman et al., 2024). During the 2024 EP elections, Palonen and Jokinen (2024) systematically monitored social media campaigns. According to them, the Finns Party was not particularly active. Social media debates focused on attacking the government, of which the Finns Party is a member.

Surprising election results

In Finland, the 2024 EP elections were held on 9 June, but there was an advance voting period between 29 May and 4 June. The electoral district was the whole country for the 15 MEPs elected from Finland, who were chosen with the d’Hondt method. Some hoped the turnout would increase from the previous elections, and there was a significant increase in advance voting. However, in the end, the turnout was just below that of 2019, with 42.4% of those eligible in Finland casting their votes. The results surprised everyone because they differed radically from the polls, which are usually very reliable in Finland (see Figure 3).

As predicted, the NC took first place in the elections with 24.8% of the vote, gaining a couple of percentage points more than the polls had predicted and increasing its seats from three to four. The biggest surprise was the Left Alliance, which came in second with 17.3% of the vote and three seats (previously, they had only one). The Social Democrats were third (14.9%). The Finns Party was the most obvious loser, coming in sixth (7.6%), having taken 13.8% of the vote and fourth place in the 2019 elections.

Overall, it seems that the government/opposition divide remarkably affected the election results. Although the prime minister’s party (the NC) came first, the opposition was arguably much more successful. The Left Alliance, SDP, Centre Party and Greens gained nine seats combined, whereas the NC, Finns Party and Swedish Folk Party obtained only six. Therefore, the 2024 EP elections in Finland reflected the voters’ dissatisfaction with the government’s policies. This dissatisfaction was evident not only in the decline of the Finns Party but also in the success of the liberal left–green bloc.

The media made sense of these surprising results in several ways. The main explanation for the victory of the Left Alliance was the remarkable success of its leader, Li Andersson, a 37-year-old female politician who had already attracted positive attention during Finland’s presidential elections in early 2024. Andersson has been a popular figure beyond party lines. In the EP elections, she alone received an astonishing 13.5% of the vote, and she brought two other party members to the EP with their relatively modest percentages. The defeat of the Finns Party was explained by their participation in government, especially that of their leader, Purra, who has become a symbol of painful cuts to public spending. Also, the low voter turnout may harm the Finns Party, whose voters are unsure about voting and prefer voting in the parliamentary and local elections – an effect of the Euroscepticism promoted by the party.

The Finns Party did not have previous MEPs as candidates because Laura Huhtasaari moved from the European to the national parliament after the 2023 parliamentary elections. Also, the party did not accept its previous MEP, Teuvo Hakkarainen, as their candidate for 2024 because he had received significant negative attention for being very passive and incompetent. However, Hakkarainen campaigned as an unaffiliated candidate, and he received a significant number of votes, which also diminished the Finns Party’s share. Interestingly, the party’s most-voted candidate and only MEP for 2024–2029 was Sebastian Tynkkynen, who adopted a more provocative stance during the campaign compared to party leaders.

Finns Party voters’ social and demographic characteristics have changed over the years. Initially, the party was supported by blue-collar workers, the unemployed and the disadvantaged. Today, its voters are mostly middle-class individuals and small entrepreneurs. This change has been due to the party’s shift from the left to the right. In recent elections, its voters have come from average socioeconomic backgrounds, with a clear male preponderance (Isotalo et al., 2024). In the 2024 EP elections, the party received votes from all parts of Finland, but it lost its position as the most popular party in the northern and eastern parts of the country to the Centre Party. Traditionally, the latter dominated these provinces, but it lost them to the Finns Party in the 2023 parliamentary elections (YLE, 2024b).

Conclusion

The 2024 EP elections were surprising in Finland. Despite the predictions, there was no victory for the populist radical right. The Finns Party obtained about half of the votes they won in the 2019 EP elections and only a third of those they received in the 2023 parliamentary election. The real winner was the Left Alliance with its leader, Li Andersson. This result revealed the people’s dissatisfaction towards the government and the Finns Party’s leader and finance minister, Riikka Purra, who has become a symbol of strict austerity and cuts to public spending.

However, even though the populist radical right failed, the overall context of the election was populist due to the strong antagonism between the Finns Party and the liberal left–green bloc (Herkman & Palonen, 2024, p. xxx). The Finns Party was backed into a corner due to its role in government, which all the opposition parties challenged. The most successful Finns Party candidate, Sebastian Tynkkynen, represented the provocative and radical faction of the party. Therefore, it seems that populism lives on in the anti-hegemonic challenger, whose approach did not help the Finns Party in the 2024 EP elections. Tynkkynen will join the ECR group in EP and continue critical activity on his social media channels. He announced that he would recruit assistants for social media campaigns during his MEP career to make the Finns Party voters aware of what is going on in the EU (YLE, 2024c).

 

(*) Juha Herkman (PhD) is Associate Professor of Media and Communication Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland. He has studied, among other things, the relationship between populism and media, and he has published extensively on the topic in academic articles. Herkman is an author of the book A Cultural Approach to Populism (2022, Routledge) and editor of the book Populism, Twitter and the European Public Sphere: Social Media Communication in the EP Elections 2019 (2024, Palgrave) together with Emilia Palonen. E-mail: juha.herkman@helsinki.fi

 

References

Carlson, T., & Strandberg, K. (2005). The 2004 European parliament election on the web: Finnish actor strategies and voter responses. Information Polity, 10 (3–4), 189–204. DOI: 10.3233/IP-2005-0075

Election Statistics (2024a) Vaalien tieto – ja tulospalvelu. Oikeusministeriö. https://tulospalvelu.vaalit.fi/

Election Statistics (2024b). Europarlamenttivaalit 2024. Oikeusministeriö. https://tulospalvelu.vaalit.fi/EPV-2024/index.html

Herkman, J. (2022). A Cultural Approach to Populism. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003267539

Herkman, J., & Palonen, E. (2024). Introduction: European public sphere, populism and Twitter. In J. Herkman & E. Palonen (eds.) Populism, Twitter and the European Public Sphere: Social media communication in the EP elections 2019(pp. xix–xliv). Palgrave. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-41737-5

Herkman, J., Sibinescu, L., & Palonen, E. (2024). Finland: Populist polarisation of the Finnish political communication. In J. Herkman & E. Palonen (eds.) Populism, Twitter and the European Public Sphere: Social media communication in the EP elections 2019 (pp. 85–113). Palgrave. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41737-5_4

Herkman, J., & Jungar, A-C. (2021). Populism and media and communication studies in the Nordic countries. In E. Skogerbø, Ø. Ihlen, N. Nørgaard Kristensen & L. Nord (eds.) Power, Communication, and Politics in the Nordic Countries (pp. 241–261). Nordicom. DOI: 10.48335/9789188855299-12

Isotalo, V., Sipinen, J., & Westinen, J. (2024). Sukupuolikuilu arvoissa ja puoluevalinnassa. In E.- Kestilä-Kekkonen, L. Rapeli & P. Söderlund (eds.) Pääministerivaalit polarisaation aikana: Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2023 (pp. 245–274). Oikeusminiteriö. http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-400-875-4

Jo riittää – Pystymme parempaan (2024). Sosialidemokraattien eurovaaliohjelma. Sosialidemokraatit. https://www.sdp.fi/uploads/sites/2/2024/05/sdp-n-eurovaaliohjelma-2024.pdf

Jungar, A-C., & Jupskås, A. R. (2014). Populist radical right parties in the Nordic region: A new and distinct party family? Scandinavian Political Studies, 37 (3), 215–238. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12024

Krämer, B. (2017). Populist online practices: The function of the Internet in right-wing populism. Information, Communication & Society, 20 (9), 1293–1309. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328520

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Several people during a rally calling for the contra la amnistía resignation of Pedro Sanchez, at Plaza de Cibeles, on March 9, 2024, in Madrid, Spain. Photo: Oscar Gonzales Fuentes.

Euroscepticism and Populism on Europhilic Soil: The 2024 European Parliament Elections in Spain

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Please cite as: 
Marcos-Marne, Hugo. (2024). “Euroscepticism and Populism on Europhilic Soil: The 2024 European Parliament Elections in Spain.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0084

 

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Abstract

This chapter deals with the association between radicalism, populism and Euroscepticism in the context of the 2024 European elections. It first examines the electoral platforms of leading political parties and shows that Eurosceptic ideas, while not highly prevalent, are more common among forces of the radical right. It also suggests that, as second-order theories expect, national issues dominated the electoral campaign for the European Parliament (EP) in Spain. Second, public opinion data is used to describe the general state of attitudes towards the EU and their association with voting for different political parties. The main results from this section are evidence that voters of radical-right parties are more critical of the EU. They also underline a potential reconfiguration of the radical-right space that now includes Vox and a new anti-establishment, outsider formation, The Party is Over (Se Acabó La Fiesta, SALF).

Keywords: Euroscepticism; populism; radical-right; ideology; Spain

 

By Hugo Marcos-Marne* (Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Salamanca, Spain)

Introduction

The 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections in Spain took place against a backdrop of political polarization and instability. The general elections in July 2023 resulted in a fragmented parliament, requiring the candidate from the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE), Pedro Sánchez, to secure the support of eight different parties and coalitions to be re-elected prime minister. The coalition supporting Sánchez, which included peripheral nationalist parties heavily criticized by right-wing forces, only intensified the existing trends of polarization (Parker, 2022). Political discussions often included accusations of lawfare, insults, and questioning of the government’s legitimacy to a scale not seen before (Jones, 2024). It is no surprise that more than 75% of the population defined the political situation as ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’, according to data gathered in June 2024 by the Spanish Centre of Sociological Research (CIS) (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2024c).

The number and relevance of ongoing national-level political issues often sidelined European ones during the 2024 campaign. Topics recurrently discussed included the amnesty law applied to events referring to the independentist movement in Catalonia between 2012 and 2023, alleged corruption scandals around Sánchez and the PSOE, and international issues not directly related to the European Union (EU), such as Spain’s recognition of the Palestinian State and a diplomatic incident with the Argentinian president Javier Milei. Analysts widely agreed that the electoral campaign was framed as a referendum against Sánchez by the right-wing Partido Popular (PP) and far-right Vox (Kennedy & Cutts, 2024). Still, European issues appeared during the campaign, and special attention was given to the potential success of the radical right and its influence on EP alliances. Relevant in this regard was the emergence of a new anti-establishment, outsider formation in Spain, The Party is Over (Se Acabó La Fiesta, SALF), led by the former political adviser and alt-right influencer Luís Pérez (known as Alvise Pérez). The Spanish party system, once depicted as immune to the radical right (Alonso & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015), included two genuinely radical-right contenders for the EP elections in 2024.

Building upon this background, this chapter focuses on the association between Euroscepticism, radicalism and populism before and during the European elections campaign in Spain. For that, it uses secondary sources and public opinion data from the CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2024b; 2024c). The main results suggest that Euroscepticism was comparatively low in Spain both on the demand and supply side, although it was stronger among radical-right parties and their supporters (see Llamazares & Gramacho, 2007). They also evidence a potential re-composition of the radical-right space with the competition between Vox and SALF, the latter with a more heterogenous voter profile regarding self-positioning on the left–right scale and an even stronger impugning discourse towards mainstream politics.

Euroscepticism and populism in Spain

Spain is depicted as a Europhilic country. Citizens and parties had always had positive perceptions of the EU until 2008 (Powell, 2003; Real-Dato & Sojka, 2020; Vázquez García et al., 2010), and widespread critical positions among the public disappeared with the more negative consequences of the crisis (Gubbala, 2023). In April 2024, the CIS gathered data on attitudes towards the EU (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2024a). This report showed that Spaniards acknowledged the importance of the EU (more than 82% of the respondents thought that EU decisions matter a lot or quite a lot for the life of the Spaniards) and considered that EU membership had been more positive than not for salaries, employment opportunities, culture, development of less developed regions, business opportunities, and the relevance of Spain in world affairs (this was not the case only for one item, the price of consumption goods). In fact, large majorities supported strengthening EU common foreign policy, creating a European army, having a common policy of migration and asylum, harmonizing taxes, having a common policy of rights and obligations, and economically contributing to creating a European welfare state (Table 1).

Table 1. Percentage of respondents in favour or against key EU policies and actions

 In favour%Against%
Strengthen European common foreign policy 83.313.4
Creating a European army 63.532.7
Having a European common policy of migration and asylum78.119.2
Harmonizing taxes62.929
Having a common policy of rights and obligations 87.19.9
Economically contribute to creating a European welfare state 80.716.5

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2024a)

Nevertheless, post-2008 outcomes included a comparatively more Eurocritical party system with the emergence of Podemos and especially Vox. While Podemos mostly targeted neoliberal policies at the EU level, Vox included more explicit references against the EU as a supranational organization, which could have attracted voters who oppose the European integration process (Marcos-Marne, 2023). Data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) confirm that both PSOE and PP had a favourable/strongly favourable position towards EU integration, Podemos had an opinion between neutral and somewhat positive, and Vox had a somewhat opposed one. The most critical party in Spain, Vox, still ranks higher in EU support than other parties of the radical-right family, such as the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), the French Rassemblement National (RN), or the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) (Hooghe et al., 2024). The position of the recently created SALF remains unclear because the candidature did not present a structured manifesto for the EP elections. Still, the strongly nationalist and anti-establishment discourse of its leader anticipates a critical discourse towards the EU that might take different forms and intensities.

Considering that both Euroscepticism and populism are often found at the extremes of the ideological spectrum (Hooghe et al., 2002; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2015), it is no surprise that Podemos and Vox have been more frequently studied regarding populism. According to the ideational approach, populism is found in the intersection between anti-elitism, people-centrism, and a Manichean understanding of politics (Hawkins et al., 2019; Wuttke et al., 2020). Following this definition, Podemos has been said to display a more populist discourse than Vox (Marcos-Marne et al., 2020, 2024), but recent analyses signal a decline in the use of populist ideas by Podemos, which has turned more clearly to radical-left ones (Roch, 2024; Rojas-Andrés et al., 2023). As for Movimiento Sumar (‘Unite Movement’), evidence suggests it does not include populist ideas in its discourse (Thomassen, 2022). Regarding SALF, there is little doubt that anti-elitism, especially against parties of the left, is a fundamental part of its electoral platform, but the use of people-centred ideas is much less clear. At the moment of writing, SALF may be characterized as a far-right protest movement that expresses a demagogic/impugning discourse. It must be acknowledged, however, that there is space for SALF to incorporate populist ideas in a more consistent manner.

Overall, the electoral competition in 2024 Spain seemed better explained by where parties sit in the economic, cultural and centre-periphery axes of competition. This does not mean that populist ideas were irrelevant during the electoral campaign, and it certainly does not preclude populism from again becoming a key component of the political competition in the future. However, it helps to understand that most of the electoral claims, including positioning towards the EU, correlated strongly with left–right positioning in the economic and cultural dimensions. For example, in the Spanish public television debate for the EP elections, Jorge Buxadé (Vox) was the politician who most clearly framed his intervention as an opposition between the interest of Brussels and the Spanish people. Candidates from Podemos and Sumar directed criticisms towards the EU due to its (non)response to the Israel attacks in Palestine but also emphasized the importance of a green and fair Europe that considers the welfare of its peoples. This clearly evidences the relevance of the thick ideology to which populist ideas attach when it comes to EU contestation (Massetti, 2021; Roch, 2020).

The EP 2024 elections: Results, trajectories and electorates

The results of the EP elections in Spain (Table 2) resembled general trends at the European level. A movement towards the right was observed, with the PP being the most-voted force (34% of the valid votes) and parties defending radical-right platforms increasing their vote share (Vox and SALF received together almost 15% of the valid votes). Nevertheless, mainstream forces of the left and right retained most of the MEPs (PP and PSOE secured more than 64.2% of the valid votes and 42 out of Spain’s 62 MEPs). In line with aggregate results, parties integrated into The Left group experienced a decline in electoral support, which can also be attributed to a series of public disputes between Sumar and Podemos.

To put these results into perspective, Vox clearly improved its results from the 2019 EP elections (6.21%), but it lost significant support when compared with the 2023 general elections (12.4%). The emergence and success of SALF are likely to have contributed to this, as according to CIS data, more than 50% of its electorate had supported Vox in the past general elections. Podemos, which together with Izquierda Unida (IU) received 20% of the vote in 2016, only gained two seats in the EP (3.3% of the valid vote). The declining electoral trajectory of Podemos can only be explained by referring to multicausal explanations from punishment to internal divisions, organizational disputes, engagement with institutional power, and the recovery of both macroeconomic indicators and mainstream parties (crucially, PSOE).

Table 2. EP electoral results in Spain

Party or coalition European familyVote share (%)Seats in the EP
Partido Popular (PP)European People’s Party (EPP)34.222
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)Socialists and Democrats (S&D)30.220
VoxEuropean Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)9.66
Ahora Repúblicas Greens–European Free Alliance (EFA) / The Left4.93
Sumar Greens–European Free Alliance (EFA) / The Left4.63
Se Acabó La Fiesta (SALF) Other4.63
Podemos The Left3.32
Junts-UENon-attached (NA)2.51
Coalición por una Europa Solidaria (CEUS)Renew Europe1.61

Source: https://results.elections.europa.eu/es/

To explore the central ideological, attitudinal and sociodemographic differences between voters of different parties, I pay attention to voters of the two mainstream parties of the left and right (PSOE and PP) and the four statewide parties that can be clearly associated with the radical left (Podemos and Sumar) and right (Vox and SALF). This section has used CIS data, particularly the 2024 May barometer (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2024b) (N= 4,013) and the pre-electoral study conducted for the EP elections (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2024c) (N=6,434). The study conducted in May 2024 incorporates different questions that are important to understand the profile of voters, but it did not include voters of SALF.

Relevant differences can be seen in the positions of voters on key issues that affect the EU, such as climate change or the war in Ukraine and Palestina (Table 3). Podemos and Sumar voters were by far the most concerned about climate change, followed by PSOE voters. The percentage of voters of PP and Vox that were very concerned about climate change did not reach 20%, and it was the lowest for Vox, reflecting general associations between attitudes towards climate change and left–right ideology (McCright et al., 2016). Vox and Podemos voters were the least concerned about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These voters perceive the negative consequences of the war to a similar extent as the average population, but they seem less concerned for different reasons. On the one hand, Podemos voters declared higher levels of sympathy towards Russians. On the other hand, Vox voters declared comparatively lower levels of sympathy towards both Russians and Ukrainians.

Accordingly, it could be that more pronounced preferences for one side and indifference towards both contribute to explaining lower levels of concern about the conflict. In any case, this does not speak of a general perception towards international conflict. Podemos voters were also the most concerned about war in the Middle East region. Overall, voters of left-wing forces were clearly more concerned about war in Palestine than Ukraine. This was particularly visible among Podemos voters and can be explained by the association between left-wing ideologies/parties and the Palestinian people in Spain (Musuruana & Hermosa Aguilar, 2022).

Table 3. Percentage of different parties’ voters very concerned about…

 PSOEPPVoxSumarPodemos
Climate change 40.9%19.9%13.2%59.7%61.3%
Russian invasion of Ukraine 32%26.2%15.5%26.6%13.5%
War in the Middle East 41.6%25.6%17.9%52.3%53.3%

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2024b).

Moving to data from the pre-electoral study, Figure 1 shows relevant information regarding voters’ positioning on the left–right scale. Unsurprisingly, voters of Podemos and Sumar were more clearly positioned to the extreme left of the scale. Voters of PSOE were more often situated to the centre-left of the scale, and PP voters were more to the right. Despite the transfer of votes and some attitudinal similarities between Vox and SALF voters, their ideological profiles seemed quite different. Vox voters self-identified with right and especially radical-right positions, but voters of SALF were more numerous at the centre-right of the ideological scale. This raises important questions about the extent to which the voters widely share the radical-right platform of Pérez or whether his electoral success is partially explained by the dynamics of protest voting that is more easily expressed in the European elections (Hix & Marsh, 2007).

Tables 4–6 below show the aggregated sociodemographic and attitudinal characteristics of the supporters of the most-voted parties. Vox and especially SALF had clearly masculinized electorates (only 21% of SALF voters were women), but the profile of their voters differed regarding catholic identification (more Catholics support Vox), level of studies (SALF gathered more support among people with higher education), economic features (SALF was comparatively more popular among employed people and performed the worst among those with the lowest income), and mean age (SALF voters were the youngest in the sample). Voters of SALF were those who more clearly defined themselves as ‘mostly Spanish’ and showed the lowest levels of identification with Europe. Similarly, voters of Vox also thought of themselves mostly as Spanish but showed a comparatively higher level of dual Spanish–European identity. The more cosmopolitan voters were those of Podemos and Sumar (Table 5). Results in Table 6 suggest that voters of Vox and SALF were also the most critical regarding the benefits of EU membership (PSOE voters were the most satisfied).

Table 4. Sociodemographic features in voters for main parties in the EP elections

 PSOEPPVoxSumarSALFPodemos
Female55.9%53.1%39.4%48.1%21.3%52.2%
Catholic 62.1%80.1%72.7%12.2%52.9%14.2%
Higher studies 30%35.1%21.4%49.8%40.2%39.3%
Less than €1,100 13.4%12.5%18.2%9.8%9.2%10.6%
Employed44.2%53.2%59.4%66.8%79.6%57%
Mean age55.85542.947.536.949.2

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2024c).

Table 5. European identity among voters for main parties in the EP elections

 PSOEPPVoxSumarSALFPodemos
Mostly European4.7%2.5%1.5%7.4%0.5%7.3%
Mostly Spanish18.2%31.7%56.6%8.6%64.9%11.8%
Both European and Spanish 54.7%55.9%31.6%39.6%20.5%21.2%
Citizen of the world 21.8%9.6%9.1%43.5%13.7%54.7%

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2024c).

Table 6. Spain mostly benefited from or affected by EU membership

 PSOEPPVoxSumarSALFPodemos
Mostly benefited87.8%79.2%43.5%82.5%33.3%78.3%
Mostly affected8.8%15.9%50.8%12.5%58%18.4%

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2024c).

Conclusion and implications

The results of the 2024 EP elections in Spain resembled larger trajectories unfolding at the EU level. Mainstream parties of the centre-left and right were still the most supported forces, but radical-right forces grew both in number and votes. These forces are characterized by more Eurosceptic discourses that also resonate more strongly with their voters. While populist ideas are sometimes present in their discourses, it is essentially the anti-elitist component of populism that they use more often, sometimes combined with demagogy (especially visible in SALF). While there is no evidence to support a short-term electoral earthquake in Spain that would push forward radical-right forces, mainstream parties should reflect on the extent to which normalizing and incorporating discourses of the radical right complicates both their electoral performance and the project of the EU.

 

(*) Hugo Marcos-Marne is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Salamanca and a member of the Democracy Research Unit (DRU) at the same institution. Before joining USAL, he occupied postdoctoral positions at SUPSI-Lugano (Switzerland), the University of St. Gallen (Switzerland), and UNED (Spain). His research focuses on public opinion, electoral behaviour, populism and national identities. His work has been published in Political Behavior, Political Communication, Political Studies, Politics and West European Politics, among other journals. He is also a co-author of a book recently published by Cambridge University Press.

 

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Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2024a). Estudio 3452: Opiniones y actitudes ante la Unión Europea [Study 3452: Opinions and attitudes towards the European Union]. CIS, April 2024. https://www.cis.es/es/detalle-ficha-estudio?origen=estudio&codEstudio=3452

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Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2024c). Estudio 3458: Preelectoral elecciones al Parlamento Europeo 2024[Study 3458: Preelectoral European Parliament Elections]. CIS, May 2024. https://www.cis.es/es/detalle-ficha-estudio?origen=estudio&codEstudio=3458

Gubbala, S. (2023). People broadly view the EU favorably, both in member states and elsewhere. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/10/24/people-broadly-view-the-eu-favorably-both-in-member-states-and-elsewhere/

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Demonstration at Freedom Square in NATO state Estonia in support of Ukraine and against the Russian aggression while Ewert Sundja was singing at Freedom Square, Tallinn, Estonia on February 26, 2022. Photo: Margus Vilbas.

Populism in the 2024 European Parliament Elections in Estonia

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Please cite as:

Jakobson, Mari-Liis. (2024). “Populism in the 2024 European Parliament Elections in Estonia.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024.
 
 

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Abstract

Although past European Parliament (EP) elections in Estonia have witnessed the success of an anti-establishment candidate, Estonian EP elections are not generally fertile soil for populism. Estonian EP elections tend to be dominated by the liberal and progressive parties and candidates with notable foreign policy track records. The 2024 EP elections generally confirmed this pattern but also witnessed the conservative parties running on a second-order election agenda critical of the government and parties both on the right and left-wing edges of the spectrum tapping into the small but nonetheless committed pool of Eurosceptic voters. Moreover, most parties made use of the stylistic repertoires of populism, attempting to perform various crises. While the election results changed little in the overall composition of the Estonian MEP delegation, the events unravelling immediately after the election suggest that the Estonian populist radical right will become more diverse but also more isolated from its sibling parties on the European level.

Keywords: Estonia, populism, Euroscepticism, sovereigntism, second-order elections, European Parliament

 

By Mari-Liis Jakobson* (School of Government, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia)

Background

In Estonian politics, populism tends to manifest as a discursive or performative strategy or a policy logic rather than an ideological fixture (Jakobson et al., 2012). Only a handful of parties have been dubbed as populist. For example, the Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) has typically been characterized as a populist radical-right party (Petsinis, 2019; Kasekamp et al., 2019; Saarts et al., 2021). It entered the European Parliament (EP) and joined the Identity and Democracy (ID) group in 2019. Historically, the Centre Party under the charismatic leadership of Edgar Savisaar (1991–1995, 1996–2016) was characterized as left-wing populist (Jakobson et al., 2012). However, since 2016, the party has undergone two leadership changes and substantive shifts in both its political style and program. In addition, populism has been a strategy of new protest parties, but most of them have been relatively short-lived (Auers, 2018).

The limits of populist appeals have applied in EP elections, in particular, as they are characterized by a generally low electoral turnout and lower level of populist performance since, typically, the more highly educated voters with a political preference turn out to vote. The notable exception occurred in 2009, when a protest candidate, Indrek Tarand, scored over a quarter of the popular vote on an anti-partitocracy platform, criticizing the cartelization of (established) parties and neglecting the actual will of the people (Ehin & Solvak, 2012). Hence, the present report will also analyse the use of populist strategies across parties regardless of whether they are mainstream or fringe or where they are placed on the socioeconomic (left–right) or sociocultural (GAL–TAN) spectrum.

The 2024 EP elections took place 15 months after the general election in Estonia, and a liberal coalition consisting of the Reform Party, Estonia 200 and the Social Democratic Party were in power. Unlike in the previous electoral cycle, where stable coalition formation was difficult due to the distribution of parliamentary seats, the liberal parties had a comfortable majority during the 2024 EP elections. Nevertheless, there were notable tensions in the air regarding the national budget. Due to the war in Ukraine, where Estonia has been one of the most generous supporters of Ukraine in terms of GDP, Estonia has raised its defence spending to 3% of GDP and now struggles with a looming budget deficit. These budget tensions prompted the new government coalition to plan cuts and propose new taxes (e.g., a previously non-existent car tax) and raise existing ones (e.g., VAT and income tax from 20% to 22%), which has been politically difficult, especially as the Reform Party and Estonia 200 are economically right-leaning parties. Upon formation, the governing coalition christened itself as the Pain Coalition, forced to take painful decisions.

Due to this, also the EP 2024 election followed the logic of second-order elections to a great extent, where many parties tried to pitch the election as a referendum on the government’s policy, although for a large share of voters, this was outshined by issues related to the Russia–Ukraine War. Second-order elections essentially entail a significant share of anti-establishment politics, with the opposition in the national government criticizing the ruling elites and attempting to position themselves as the true representative of the virtuous people (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017). Populism’s emphasis on popular sovereignty also entails Eurosceptic attitudes, although, in Estonia, most parties resort to, at worst, soft Euroscepticism (Taggart & Szerbiak 2001), and this remained true in the 2024 EP election.

In total, Estonia elected 7 MEPs in the 2024 election, and a total of 78 candidates on 9 party lists and as individual candidates ran for the mandates. In addition to the six parties represented in the parliament (four of which were also represented in the 2019–2024 EP), four smaller parties and five individual candidates ran. However, none of the challengers managed to win a mandate.

The supply side of populism

Due to the small number of MEPs Estonia elects (just seven), EP elections in Estonia tend to be candidate-centric, where candidates compete not only concerning the ideological platforms of their parties but as individual candidates, with their personal traits and career tracks playing an important part. This tendency means EP elections are more elitist than populist, with former government ministers and foreign policy experts performing well.

In general, Estonian parties also tend to be notably pro-European integration. In 2019, only two parties, the populist radical-right EKRE (ID group) and the right-wing conservative Isamaa (EPP group), ran soft Eurosceptic campaigns (Ehin et al., 2020). In 2024, Isamaa’s campaign was somewhat less Eurosceptic (the party had meanwhile also changed its leadership), but in addition to EKRE, two new parties complemented the Eurosceptic scene, challenging EU integration and accusing it of overregulation or even harming Estonia’s national interests. Furthermore, many parties touched upon migration and asylum policy, human rights, foreign affairs and, notably, environmental policies (a significant and divisive topic in these elections). However, the main emphasis continued to be the Russia–Ukraine War and defence policy.

EKRE (still a member of the ID group during the campaign) continued to be the leading Eurosceptic party in Estonia in the 2024 EP elections, with a core pledge to maintain the EU as a union of nation-states. It called for better representation of national interests on the EU level (especially for smaller and newer member states like Estonia), ‘preserving Estonian national culture and identity from the attacks of woke-culture’ and stated that in case the EU treaties are opened for discussion, a new referendum over EU membership ought to be held (EKRE, 2024). It also challenged the EU for allegedly moving towards ideological control and suppression of individual rights, the overregulation of all domains (especially vis-à-vis the common market) and objected to introducing EU-level taxation. In addition, EKRE’s platform challenged the EU’s Green Deal as environmental extremism that favours only certain businesses and would ‘hurl majority of the people into poverty’ (Ibid). Another core policy topic in their program was immigration. The party warned that ‘immigration propaganda’ would force the public to accept ‘the rapid rise in numbers of Muslim and Eastern Slavic immigrants’ and asserted that devising immigration policy ought to be the sovereign right of nation-states. EKRE proposed returning immigrants to their countries of origin, also urging the return of Ukrainian refugees after the end of the war in order to avert a demographic crisis there.

Overall, EKRE’s campaign focused on the party’s core national–conservative ideology rather than its populist elements. The party emphasized the need to persuade the more conservative voters to participate in the EP elections, which have been, to date, dominated by more liberally minded voters (which is accurate, as liberal parties tend to perform better in the EP elections compared to national ones).

Founded in 2022 by a group of politicians expelled from the Isamaa party, the economically liberal, right-wing Parempoolsed (‘the Right-wingers’), which positioned itself as a potential member of the EPP group, is not a populist party as such (i.e., does not claim to represent the ‘real’ people) but frequently takes a decidedly anti-establishment position in claiming that the ruling elites are incompetent or not interested in dealing with pressing problems, especially from the entrepreneurs’ perspective. Hence, it somewhat resembles certain technocratic populist parties in Eastern Europe (Guasti & Buštíková, 2020). Their soft Euroscepticism also manifested in a similar genre, namely in their criticism toward overregulation, deepening integration (which can harm the interests of nation-states) and the decline in global competitiveness of the common market. In their platform titled “We protect liberty”, the Right-wingers claimed to be the ‘antidote to socialism’ proliferating in Europe (Parempoolsed, 2024). Similarly to EKRE, the party also took a critical stance toward the current EU-level environmental and immigration policy. However, it proposed different solutions, for example, emphasizing the need to attract international talent (but also keeping refugees in screening camps outside of EU borders) or supporting market-based solutions to the climate crisis. Nevertheless, as technocratic populists do more generally, The Right-wingers also emphasized its candidates’ apolitical, expert background, featuring renowned Estonian defence policy experts and entrepreneurs (among others).

Another newly established party, KOOS (Together), ran on a left-wing conservative platform, which also includes a notable pro-Russian note, especially given that the party’s chairman and only candidate in the 2024 EP elections, Aivo Peterson, is currently on trial for treason due to supporting Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. In the 2024 EP election, the party’s platform called for neutral foreign policy, strengthening international cooperation (but not mentioning with whom), dropping sanctions which they see as harmful to both the sanctioned and the sanctioning countries’ economies), but also protecting traditional family values and fostering multiculturalism. While the party did not campaign from an explicitly Eurosceptic position, the complete avoidance of even mentioning the EU in their manifesto and proposing a sovereigntist, alternative foreign policy program to Euro-Atlantic integration evidently indicates opposition to EU integration. The party’s rhetoric is notably inclusionary, as the party positions itself as the protector of the interests of ‘all Estonia’s inhabitants’, but also sets itself in a notably anti-establishment position, emphasizing that Aivo Peterson, who was in custody during the election campaign ‘demonstrates his will in practice, which does not bend under the pressure of the state.’

The right-wing conservative Isamaa (EPP group) did not run on a Eurosceptic platform per se, although it also criticized the overregulation on the EU level in passing and cited uncontrolled migration and radical Islamism as threats to the foundations of European values alongside authoritarianism and terrorism (Isamaa 2024). However, as the leading opposition party in the national parliament (according to party ratings at the time of the EP election), it took an anti-establishment stance and attempted to frame the election as a vote of confidence against the national-level ruling coalition government. It borrowed one of its election slogans, ‘Enough of false politics and deceiving people’ from an anti-establishment popular movement of 2012 (although at the time, Isamaa’s predecessor, IRL, was in government and subject to public protests). Hence, it cannot be described as a populist party par excellence, but it still utilized some of its stylistic features.

The other moderate left-wing and right-wing liberal parties (namely, the Reform Party, the Social Democrats, the Centre Party and Estonia 200) did not refer to similar Eurosceptic arguments nor emphasized policy positions that could be considered populist. Even the left-wing Centre Party, considered populist in the past (Jakobson et al., 2012), ran on a notably pro-EU integration platform and did not attempt to gain attention with populist topics. However, virtually all parties utilized populism as a performative style in their campaign tactics. According to Moffitt (2016: 8), one core aspect of populism is ‘emphasising crisis, breakdown or threat’. As a result, populists ‘perform crisis’ by ‘spectacularising failure’ and amplifying the looming threats to the level of crisis (Ibid.: 121–122). In addition to Isamaa and the Right-wingers, who campaigned under slogans like ‘Do not let yourself be deceived by those who gave baseless promises the last time’ or ‘A vote to the Social Democrats and [Marina] Kaljurand is support for the government of [Kaja] Kallas. Don’t let yourself be deceived again. Vote for Isamaa!’, the moderate and liberal parties also utilized crisis performance. For instance, candidates of the Reform Party and Social Democrats warned the voters of the ‘radicals’ who would ‘destroy Europe’s unity’ (Social Democrats) or emphasized the fragility or complexity of the security situation in which the EP elections took place (Reform Party).

The demand side of populism

With the notable exception of Indrek Tarand, who scored a mandate as an individual candidate in both 2009 and 2014, populist candidates tend not to fare very well in Estonian EP elections. While Euroscepticism is not prevalent in Estonia – 77–78% of the population supports EU membership (Eurobarometer, 2024; State Chancellery, 2024) – it thrives in certain societal segments, being associated with lower trust in government and lower levels of economic welfare. Euroscepticism is particularly concentrated in the country’s northeast, where the population is predominantly Russian-speaking (State Chancellery, 2024).

The EP 2024 results reflected the same trend, with five out of seven Estonian MEPs maintaining their mandate after the election. EKRE, which became the first Eurosceptic party in Estonia to win a mandate in EP elections in 2019, also maintained its seat, although after the elections, when an internal schism developed in the party prior to party chairman elections, their MEP Jaak Madison left the party and joined the ECR group.

Foreign, defence and security policy took central stage both in the campaigns and in public opinion, with 55% of Estonians seeing the war in Ukraine as the most important issue facing the EU at the moment, while only 15% viewed immigration as such (Eurobarometer, 2024). While economic insecurities are viewed as of the highest importance on the national level, these were not seen as relevant in EU-level politics (ibid).

While the media coverage of the campaign was relatively low-key in general (campaigning mainly took place on social media and other paid advertisements), it also did not amplify the populist messaging of the parties. Instead, the media resorted more to the moderator role, organizing numerous debates and potentially only sensationalizing the personal branding campaign of former prime minister Jüri Ratas (who ran under the Isamaa banner) on various social media channels.

The biggest winner in these elections was Isamaa, who gained a seat for Jüri Ratas (who scored in total the third-best individual result). At the same time, the Reform Party lost a seat of its incumbent MEP Andrus Ansip (also a former prime minister), who did not run in the election due to differences in opinion with the incumbent prime minister, Kaja Kallas. Overall, while the parties identified here as featuring some elements of Euroscepticism gained somewhat in their share of the popular vote, the pro-integration parties still hold the majority of seats (See Table 1).

As there are no exit polls conducted in Estonia, it is not possible to interpret the results in terms of socio-demographic or attitudinal profiles of the voters. However, what is evident from available data is that Isamaa performed best in almost all counties except for the largest cities, Tallinn and Tartu and the predominantly Russian-speaking Ida-Viru County in the northeast. Isamaa’s success has been popularly interpreted both as a result of its antigovernment campaign as well as the success of Jüri Ratas’ personal campaign. However, pre-election survey data suggests that mistrust in the Estonian government was a poor predictor of support for Isamaa and instead predicted support for KOOS and EKRE (Keerma, 2024). Furthermore, Isamaa was perceived as having ownership in defence and foreign policy by lower educated voters, while more highly educated voters perceived the Reform Party as the issue owner (ibid).

EKRE also scored more votes than in 2019 in almost all counties but lost support among external voters and in the rural county of Jõgeva. Their support was largely predicted by anti-immigrant attitudes and mistrust in government (Keerma 2024). Meanwhile, the Right-wingers party scored its best results in larger towns and most likely not among populist voters, but rather more entrepreneurially minded voters who would favour a more minimal state.

Finally, KOOS performed best in regions with the highest share of Russian-speaking voters, particularly in the Ida-Viru County, where more voters are disposed to its sovereigntist foreign policy and pro-Russia messaging. In Ida-Viru County, KOOS scored 19.6% of the vote and in the capital city, Tallinn, 3.9%. Both regions feature a sizeable Russian-speaking population. The Centre Party experienced losses in all other regions except for Tallinn and Ida-Viru County, where it presumably improved its result with the Russian-speaking voters.

Also, electoral participation rose slightly. While in 2019, 332,859 voters cast a ballot, in 2024, 367,975 (37.6% of the electorate) turned out. Electoral turnout in EP elections tends to be higher in the liberal-leaning larger cities of Tallinn (the capital) and Tartu (a university town) and even lower in the predominantly Russian-speaking Ida-Viru County and the rural regions. In 2024, electoral turnout rose in all electoral districts, most notably in liberal-leaning Tartu and Tallinn.

Discussion and perspectives

As a rule, populism does not play a notable role in Estonian EP elections. Almost all parties use certain features of populist performance. However, the ideological core issues of populism, such as Euroscepticism, sovereigntism or overruling minority rights (on the populist right), do not find overwhelming support. This rule also applied in 2024, when voters still tended to prefer candidates who could be described as belonging to the political or intellectual elites and running on moderate and non-populist platforms. As a result, six out of the seven Estonian MEPs will return to Brussels and Strasbourg. Six out of seven MEPs elected in 2024 belong to the three moderate EP groups (EPP, SD and Renew) and one MEP, Jaak Madison – formerly a member of the ID group and the EKRE party in Estonia – will be joining the ECR group as an independent candidate when the parliament reconvenes. Hence, it is relatively unlikely that Estonian MEPs will engage in markedly populist politics in the EP. While the election campaign of Isamaa (EPP) involved some hints of soft Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant positions, neither of their elected MEPs has a notable track record of supporting such a policy line. Jaak Madison, who, as an ECR group member, was likely to continue his earlier anti-immigration and sovereigntist policy line, surprisingly joined the Estonian Centre Party on 22 August 2024, which may signal either a moderation of his stances or a crystallization of the soft Eurosceptic position of the Centre Party, whose members became represented both in the Renew and ECR groups.

With Madison leaving EKRE, the link between EKRE and the populist radical-right parties in the EP is likely weakened. However, with a new conservative nationalist party – the Estonian Nationalists and Conservatives – being established, it is possible that in future EP elections, Estonia will witness both candidates of the ECR as well as the PfE competing for a seat. Furthermore, the 2024 election demonstrated that there are at least two Eurosceptic pockets in the Estonian electorate – one on the radical right appealing primarily to national– conservative voters (with anti-immigrant attitudes), and another among Russian-speaking voters who favour sovereigntist, antigovernment and pro-Russia messaging, which collides with the dominant policy line of both the Estonian government and the EU. The election results in Ida-Viru County demonstrate particularly well the importance of moderate alternatives (in this case, the Centre Party) but also draw attention to the potentially harmful cocktail of low economic welfare, societal marginalization and receptiveness to Russia’s strategic narratives that sits well with populist sovereigntism.

 

(*) Mari-Liis Jakobson is Associate Professor of Political Sociology at Tallinn University, Estonia. Her research interests centre around populism, politics of migration and transnationalism. She is currently the PI for the project ‘Breaking Into the Mainstream While Remaining Radical: Sidestreaming Strategies of the Populist Radical Right’ funded by the Estonian Research Council, which investigates how populist radical-right parties reach out to atypical supporter groups. Her most recent publications include articles on transnational populism in European Political Science, Contemporary Politics, Journal of Political Ideologies and Comparative Migration Studies, and an edited volume, Anxieties of Migration and Integration in Turbulent Times with Springer (2023). E-mail: mari-liis.jakobson@tlu.ee

 

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Former U.S. President Donald Trump and vice-presidential nominee J.D. Vance at a rally in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

Anticipating the Trump Effect: Strengthening the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum Amid Populist Pressures

by ArticlesECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeMigrationPolicy Papers

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Please cite as:
Bottura, Beatrice; O’Keeffe-Johnston, Paris; Gkampeta, Pinelopi; Malai, Ludmila; Lynch, Matt; Park, Joon & Gräf, Leon. (2024). “Anticipating the Trump Effect: Strengthening the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum Amid Populist Pressures.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 24, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0001

 

This policy paper analyzes the potential effects of the 2024 US presidential election on EU politics, particularly the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. A Trump victory may intensify Euroscepticism and lead to more restrictive migration policies among his European allies. Conversely, a Trump defeat could fuel distrust in electoral processes, potentially triggering events similar to the 2021 Capitol attack. The paper recommends regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) to develop tailored migration strategies, anticipating that either election outcome could increase fragmentation and populist influence within EU member states, though with varying degrees of impact.

Authored by Beatrice Bottura, Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston, Pinelopi Gkampeta, Ludmila Malai, Matt Lynch, Joon Park & Leon Gräf

Edited by Beatrice Bottura & Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston

Executive Summary

As the “Common Implementation Plan” for the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum was adopted by the European Commission in June 2024 (European Commission, 2024a), the European and international political landscape was changing. The results of the EU 2024 parliamentary elections revealed a rise of Right-wing populist parties (RPP) on the European scene, a trend which mirrors recent national electoral results (Europe Elects, 2024; Europe Politique, 2024). This right-wing shift is causing a tightening of migration policy across EU countries and affecting the viability of the EU Pact on Migration, with almost half EU countries openly contesting its initiatives and some countries even considering an opt-out, following the Netherlands’ recent opt-out request (Carlson, 2024; Liboreiro, 2024). Simultaneously, former president Donald Trump is running for office once again. 

This policy paper examines how the results of the 2024 presidential election might affect EU politics, especially in regard to the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. Though a horizon scanning methodology, the paper found that Trump’s previous presidency coincided with a period of increased Euroscepticism within member countries (Langlois, 2021; Löfflmann, 2019). Additionally, Trump has built strong connections with RPP leaders which, in the past, have become more vocal as Trump gained power (Fusiek & Marconi, 2021). Given Trump’s stance on political elites, supra-national organizations and migration, the paper predicts that:

– in the case of Trump’s victory: Eurosceptic sentiments and restrictive migration policies might increase across the EU, especially among Trump’s European supporters

– in the case of Trump’s loss: events similar to the 2021 Capitol attack might occur (Abramowitz, 2024) which could further distrust in electoral processes both in the US and the EU. This could be leveraged by populist actors, which, to a lesser extent compared to a Trump victory, could still increase fragmentation across EU member states

Finally, given these findings, the paper provides policy options for the European Commission to take into consideration for a successful implementation of the plan. Among these, the paper focuses on the introduction of regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) which are aimed at creating country-tailored implementation strategies for the Pact. In practice, by shedding light onto nation-specific issues when it comes to migration and asylum, these ICRs would allow national leaders to have more control over the actual implementation of the Pact. This should increase the willingness to cooperate of RPPs as it brings together both national sovereignties, an important value to these parties, and European policy.

 

1. Introduction

Migration is one of the most discussed political and security challenges today. Worsening conflicts, natural disasters, and the hopes of better economic opportunities bring people from across the world to migrate to other areas that are deemed more prosperous or can offer something their homeland cannot. The nature of migration is transboundary, often exacerbating geopolitical issues among countries that are expected to share the burden. This can be illustrated by Trump’s abandonment of the EU during the refugee crisis, leaving Europe alone in dealing with the issue (Koppa, 2017). 

As of 2022, there are 46.1 million migrants in the US (Geiger, 2024). Anti-migration and its link to nationalism are core aspects of Trump’s political campaigns and of his past presidency (Löfflmann, 2019). Indeed, during his past campaigns, Trump had made promises for stricter migration policies. Quotes such as “America First” and “Make America Great Again” were commonplace in his speeches and rallies (Lacatus, 2021; Löfflmann, 2022; Magcamit, 2017; Mirza et al., 2021). Unlike other populists, Trump succeeded in passing several anti-migration policies while in office (Table 1).

Europe has also faced difficulties controlling the increasing numbers of its migrant population. According to the International Organization for Migration (McAuliffe & Oucho, 2024), there are approximately 87 million migrants living in Europe. In the context of migration crises, which often disproportionately impact EU member states, balancing European cohesion has fragmented the Union. Additionally, in recent years, Western politics has witnessed a trend of a right-wing shift (see Figure 1) and increased support for populist leaders, which exacerbates this fragmentation (Europe Elects, 2024; Europe Politique, 2024).

Trump’s US presidency coincided with a period of EU instability which saw the rise of right-wing populist parties (RPP) in Europe and the significant decision for Britain to leave the EU, with migration a core topic for the Leave campaign (Langlois, 2021; Löfflmann, 2019). Authors such as Fusiek & Marconi (2021) argue that the popularity of a nationalistic populist in the US gave confidence to populist political actors in Europe to become more vocal and gather support. In the face of EU fragmentation, the Union must be prepared for leniency with its Pact on Migration and Asylum if it wishes to maintain cohesion. 

Note: Data sourced from European parliament election 2024, by Europe Elects, 2024 (https://europeelects.eu/ep2024/). Data sourced from Parliament Européen (2019, 2014, 2009, 2004, 1999, 1994, 1989, 1984, 1979), by Europe Politique, 2024.(https://www.europe-politique.eu/parlement-europeen.htm).

This paper delivers policy suggestions for the successful implementation of the Pact, especially in the context of the 2024 US Presidential elections and of its possible repercussions. To do so, the paper briefly delves into the 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, focusing on its strengths, its weaknesses, and how it is perceived by EU member states. Following, the paper conducts a horizon scanning methodology to discuss the possible outcomes of the 2024 US elections and how they could affect international politics and the implementation of the Pact. Finally, the paper provides recommendations to the European Commission to ensure readiness and resilience in the implementation of the Pact in any scenario deriving from the result of the upcoming US elections.

2. The EU and Migration

The EU has faced difficulties in dealing with migration, especially as the issue disproportionately affects certain member states. In dealing with this issue, the EU has developed the EU Pact on Migration, for all EU member states to adhere to.

2.1 The Pact on Migration and Asylum

The 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum establishes a comprehensive and flexible framework that addresses border management, asylum processes, and migrant integration while introducing a mandatory yet adaptable solidarity mechanism (European Commission, 2024b). This framework, as shown in Figure 2, aims to distribute responsibilities more fairly among member states, allowing contributions through relocations, financial support, or alternative measures (Ibid.). However, the Pact faces significant challenges, including bureaucratic complexity, varying political will, and potential conflicts with member states resistant to migration, such as those of the Visegrád Group (V4: Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary), which will be discussed in section 2.2 of the paper. 

Note: From Pact on Migration and Asylum, by European Commission, 2024b. (https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en). Copyright 2024 by the European Union.

A SWOT analysis of the Pact (Figure 3) was made by the authors which found that the resource-intensive nature of the Pact may strain member states’ capacities, particularly amid shifting political priorities. Nonetheless, it offers opportunities for enhanced cooperation, stronger external partnerships, and economic benefits through managed migration. These potential gains are counterbalanced by threats such as geopolitical instability, rising anti-immigration sentiment, legal disputes within the EU, and the risk of migrants resorting to more dangerous routes due to increased border controls. The success of the pact will depend on its ability to navigate these complexities while ensuring the protection of human rights and fair distribution of responsibilities.

Note: Authors’ creation.

2.2 Backlash from Member States

The Pact has received severe backlash from a number of actors within the EU for very different reasons. On the one hand, due to its attempt at regulating and partially restricting immigration, many on the political left view the Pact as giving too many concessions to the far right, and failing to protect fundamental rights (Griera, 2024). For example, the German Left MEP Cornelia Ernst called the pact “a pact of shame and disgrace,” while other MEPs from Left and Green parties considered the Pact to be a model for a fortress of Europe and a victory for the far-right (Ibid.). Many NGOs also criticized the Pact, with Amnesty International attesting a “surge in suffering” for asylum seekers, if the Pact was to enter into effect (Nattrass, 2024). On the other hand, right-wing governments and parties across the EU also greatly criticized the Pact.

However, contrary to the above-mentioned examples, their main concern is that the Pact is not strict enough on immigration regulation and forces every EU member state to contribute and show solidarity, hence overruling national sovereignty (Nattrass, 2024). The Visegrád countries in particular – namely: Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary – heavily criticized the Pact and its solidarity mechanisms, with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk promising that Poland will “find ways so that even if the migration pact comes into force in a roughly unchanged form, we will protect Poland against the relocation mechanism” (Nattrass, 2024), while the Hungarian government also pledged to find ways to avoid taking in immigrants and called the Pact “another nail in the coffin of the European Union” (Nattrass, 2024). 

In addition to the Visegrád Group, an increasing number of member countries is expressing its discontent with the Pact, a trend tied to the rise of RPPs throughout Europe (Vinocur et al., 2024). In particular, this is manifesting through a push for tighter deportation and border control measures across Europe (Vinocur et al., 2024). 17 countries in the Schengen area – Austria and the Netherlands and endorsed by Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Sweden. Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein – have recently signed an appeal to the EU executive to toughen return policies when asylum applications are rejected as well as increasing European coordination when it comes to deportations (Carlson, 2024; Liboreiro, 2024). Additionally, numerous countries in the Schengen area – i.e. Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden (Dell’Anna, 2024) – are increasing border controls, which hinders the right to freedom of movement. In addition to these general trends, in countries where RPPs are gaining executive positions, the stance on migration policy is toughening even more (Carlson, 2024; Stekić, 2024; Vinocur et al., 2024). Recent examples of this trend – including the extreme example of the Netherlands’ request to opt-out of the Pact – are shown visually in Figure 4 and a full table is available in Appendix A.

Note: Authors’ creation.

This restrictive stance appears also at the European level where, as illustrated in section 1, right-leaning groups have gained more influence (Vinocur et al., 2024). In particular, members of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and of the European People’s Party (EPP) support the toughening of deportation mechanisms, the increase of asylum-seeker reception centers outside of the EU, and the funding for extra EU border control (Ibid.). 

In sum, the Migration Pact, which is supposed to offer a compromise, is seen negatively by both sides of the political spectrum for respectively leaning too much into the opposite political spectrum, a trend that has led countries to push for a re-draft of the pact (Vinocur et al., 2024). In this context, the main challenge to the successful implementation of the Pact remains to satisfy parties and voters on the left-wing and pro-immigration side and on the right-wing anti-immigration side concurrently. This challenge will be addressed in section 5 of this policy paper, where policy options and recommendations are provided. 

3. Methodology

Horizon scanning is used by building on early warning signs and predictions based on current events, by analyzing political discourse. Geopolitical issues are increasingly complex and interconnected. With such challenges, the use of horizon scanning is crucial to prepare and inform policymakers and decision-makers about potential opportunities and threats (Amanatidou et al., 2012). There are two core aspects of horizon scanning: alerting and creating. Alerting includes the early identification of emerging issues, whereas the creative aspect refers to the reassembly of current issues into a prediction for what might develop into a policy problem. Current political discourse in Europe has centered around a migration debate and discontent towards failing solutions to handle the issue, simultaneously the US Presidential debate has Donald Trump potentially returning for a second term. 

4. Examinations of Findings: The US 2024 Presidential Elections

As a two-party system, there exists only two possible results of the US Presidential election – a Trump victory, or a Harris victory. Regardless, there shall be a possibility of outcomes in either scenario. Having conducted horizon scanning, there are two possible scenarios that may impact European politics on migration: whether Trump should achieve victory, or whether Trump reacts poorly and encourages disruption in the event of a loss.  

4.1 A Trump Victory

In the event that Trump achieves victory, there are two core aspects that will shape the political landscape around migration. Trump has demonstrated an ability to influence and encourage populists in the EU to be more vocal and gather support, as illustrated in Figure 5 (Fusiek & Marconi, 2021). In this regard, it can be expected that the political landscape in Europe will continue to favor populism during a revival of right-wing shift while Trump would have his second term. A second Trump presidential term would likely embolden European populist leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, Jarosław Kaczyński, and even populist parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) or Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) by validating their nationalist, anti-EU, and illiberal policies (Naughtie, 2024). During his first presidency, Trump openly praised some of these leaders, especially Viktor Orbán, Trump was quoted saying “Let me just say about world leaders, Viktor Orbán, one of the most respected men, they call him a strong man” and undermined multilateral bodies, sending a clear signal that illiberal governance and nationalist policies are able to thrive without any significant repercussions from the US (Euractiv, 2024).

Note: Authors’ creation. Purple shows the Visegrád Group countries and yellow shows Western European states.
Politicians who have a direct link or friendship with Trump are highlighted in red.

Trump’s alignment with right-wing ideologies would also likely embolden these leaders to promote policies that further marginalize minority groups, restrict immigration, and consolidate political power by undermining judicial independence and press freedoms. In a second term, Trump’s open disdain for international organizations like NATO and the EU would likely reduce pressure on these populist leaders to adhere to democratic norms (Stekić, 2024). By downplaying concerns over democratic backsliding and encouraging isolationist policies, Trump would create an EU environment where these leaders and parties continue to push their nationalist agendas further, almost completely free from the fear of diplomatic or economic consequences. 

Further issues that may surface from a Trump victory is the implementation of Project 2025: a Republican policy mantra with strict consequences for migration (The Heritage Foundation, n.d.). Core proposals of the project include continued and increased funding of the ‘Border Wall’, the deportation of migrants, and the removal of visa categories for victims of crime and human trafficking (Wendling, 2024). The project calls for the dissemination of the Department of Homeland Security to be replaced with stronger immigration enforcement bodies for stricter border control (Ibid.). Legal migration would also face stricter measures, through increased fees for visa applications (Ibid.). Donald Trump, as a form of populism, has been linked to the Brexit debate and fueling the “politics of anger”, a concept which some believe has contributed to euroscepticism across the Union (Smorag, 2020; Wind, 2017). If Trump were to be re-elected, it could be expected such sentiments may become prevalent in European political discourse again.

Should Trump win and implement Project 2025, the EU could mirror a restrictive stance again. This prediction is increasingly plausible (Vinocur et al., 2024), especially given the latest trends highlighted in section 2b. Overall, Trump’s influence has the power to destabilize democracies through the use of disinformation which causes greater distrust. Trump may prompt RPP leaders and their parties to entrench their power through policies aimed at curbing media freedom, overhauling the judicial system and the rule of law both at the national and supranational level, and even denouncing opposition parties.

4.2 Reactions to A Trump Loss

On the contrary, should Harris be elected as the first woman President, implications will lead to different roads. It is possible that the post-election events of January 2021 – i.e. the Capitol attacks – could have a sequel (Abramowitz, 2024). Many EU leaders took to the media to condemn the attack on the Capitol, denouncing the use of violence in any form of democratic process. Most were outright with their criticism of Trump’s handling of the situation and the consequences of his words. Common responses from RPP leaders and members – i.e. Marine Le Pen, Giorgia Meloni, and Victor Orbán- were to include a condemning of violence, protecting democracy, whilst simultaneously illustrating Trump in a positive light, often as a ‘peacemaker’ for his limited calls to avoid violent attacks during the protest, whilst others excused Trump of any wrongdoing (Herszenhorn et al., 2021). Should a similar situation arise, where Trump would instigate a protest after losing the election, it is expected that the previously mentioned EU leaders would follow similar actions as before. In this scenario, European leaders are likely to hold a consensus view that democracy is the forefront of our political system, not to be undermined. Likewise, it is expected that Harris would share the same sentiments for democracy and condemn his final attempt at power.

Regardless of the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election, Europe is undeniably fragmented politically, which significantly impacts the practical implementation of the EU Migration Pact. In recent months, in Germany, the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) has been vocal about its opposition to migration. It further supports a “remigration” implementation (Hockenos, 2024) that has surged in federal elections. In Austria, the Freedom of Austria Party (FPÖ) won in the recent election. The FPÖ is expected to push a hardline stance on immigration and resist EU-level initiatives. The FPÖ will likely join forces with other mainstream populist parties (Cameron & and Goldstein, 2024). 

In addition to the success of far-right parties across Europe, the ongoing war in Ukraine continues to drive a wedge between nations more friendly and dependent on Russia to take a harder line on accepting Ukrainian refugees, let alone migrants from the Middle East or North Africa. Nations such as Greece and Italy continue to deal with the Mediterranean migration crisis, which is expected to continue for years. These existing crises continue to be a launch pad for far-right populist parties’ rhetoric. 

5. Policy Options 

At the time of writing, there was around one month remaining until the 2024 US Presidential election would be held. Three policy options were created for the European Commission to consider for a smooth and coherent implementation of the 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. 

  1. The European Commission must organize a commonly managed and coordinated European asylum system centered around the wellness of human beings: the EU should work on the defense of fundamental human rights, immigrants’ safety and dignity. It is also suggested that the Union ought to use the reservation of migrants as a last resort and try to create other effective solutions, like open reception centers, since prolonged detention results in devastating effects on migrants’ mental health (International Rescue Committee, 2023).
  2. The European Commission should strengthen the resettlement of refugees in the Union Resettlement Framework (URF): this includes timely and just handling of the reception and integration of refugees and immigrants from day one. More specifically, the Union must offer decent reception conditions throughout the EU, such as providing education and healthcare. Moreover, the Union ought to worry about the progress with an organized and transparent mechanism for monitoring the fundamental rights of asylum seekers. 
  3. The European Commission should fund and conduct regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) to track the impact of the Pact on Migration and Asylum at a national level and allow for country-tailored implementation strategies:similar reviews are already conducted by the Commission such as European Semester reports, the Environmental Implementation Review and economic IDRs annually. These reviews would provide a mechanism for member states to detail the impact of migration in areas that are core concerns for countries. Each country review should conclude with action points and priorities at the member state and EU-level. 

Though all three policy options are of equal importance to ensure the successful and coherent implementation of the plan, this paper proceeds to focus on the last policy option as a strong recommendation to the European Commission, in order to ensure preparedness for the ongoing implementation of the Pact in this time of political uncertainty. The reasons and specifics behind this recommendation follow in the next subsection. 

5.1 Recommendations

The recommendation of ICRs within the context of the implementation of the Pact acts as a preventative method which focuses on three areas and values that are important for European RPPs with the aim of ensuring their increased cooperation in the implementation of the Pact. First, the country-specific analyses yielded by the IDRs would allow national leaders to suggest implementation strategies tailored to each nation’s socio-economic needs and capabilities. These tailored solutions will preserve national sovereignty. Second, through these country-specific analyses and implementation strategies, it would be possible to put a specific attention on a proper cultural integration of migrants, ensuring their wellbeing within society whilst preserving national traditions. This possibility could strengthen social cohesion, hence appeasing any anti-immigration sentiments that are likely to be strengthened by Trump’s influence. Finally, IDRs would strengthen national agency and allow for national interests to be at the heart of policy implementation whilst EU’s core objectives and values are upheld.

In particular, to ensure their above-mentioned purpose, we envision ICRs to present key sections as follows. First, an Economic Contributions and Challenges of Migration section of the review would report statistics relating to the economy, workforce and their welfare states. This will allow member states to further detail shortages in the job market where migration of people with work experiences related to the field are required. For example, countries experiencing shortages of agricultural workers, healthcare, or otherwise may request that their migrant quota includes those able to contribute to those sectors. Migration is often talked about as a burden by RPPs, highlighting the skills and benefits migrants can bring to suffering industries should mitigate this issue.

Second, a section dedicated to reporting on Social Dynamics and Community Integration would allow states to report statistics related to socio-cultural data, such as attendance to language courses, educational attendance, and integration into society through work or social programmed. This would address the common concerns of RPP tied to the erasure of national identity and traditions due to immigration. It is hoped that providing member states an avenue to report on socio-cultural impacts of migration will demonstrate an effort to protect national identity whilst promoting integration  

Finally, a section for Impacts Not Otherwise Stated is proposed. This would allow member states to flag any additional issues they are facing in the implementation of the Pact to EU institutions. Such issues could include difficulties in processing of incoming migrants, including manpower, biometrics, and service availability. Overall, this should help with national governance for the Pact.

All ICRs ought to conclude with a plan for the future. Plans should enable co-working between the Commission and Member States to come up with priorities and action points for each stakeholder going forward with the Pact, as similar EU reports conclude with. With this recommendation, member states can agree with the EU on what is most important and applicable to the individual country, rather than having a “one size fits all” method applied to all EU members. 

Due to the politically sensitive nature of migration, the importance of impartiality was noted. It is recommended that the ICRs are conducted independently, with assistance from the Eurostat peer-review team. The EU has six funding pools that it may draw from that can achieve this recommendation feasibly: (1) Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, (2) Internal Security Fund, (3) European Social Fund Plus, (4) European Regional Development Fund, (5) Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, and (6) Emergency Assistance and Other Ad Hoc Funding.

6. Conclusion

At this stage, the result of the American elections is ambiguous. The scenario of Trump’s re-election to power will bring about unfavorable results both at the overall EU level and on the immigration issue, as a Trump presidency would entail significant disruptions in US-EU relations (Frangeul-Alves & Weber, 2024).  Trump’s troubled relations with the EU and his pursuit of isolationism, as well as his apparent apathy towards immigrants and refugees, mean that the former president will once again leave the Union alone on the issue that plagues it. Therefore, the developments in the field of immigration will differ greatly depending on the US election results.

In any case, the EU should not be complacent, regardless of the election result, as the migrant – refugee crisis plagues Brussels. Migration is one of the most important policy issues (Lovato, 2021) and it has turned into a geopolitical issue. Immigration is a labyrinthine for the EU and a complex problem, thus the solution will not be easy, especially given EU member states’ diverse opinions on the matter (Donceel, 2024). 

To conclude, this policy paper delved into the implementation of this Pact, focusing on how it is susceptible to the rise of populism both in Europe and abroad. In particular, after conducting a SWOT analysis of the Pact and providing an overview of how it is perceived across Europe, the paper focused on how the implementation of the Pact could be affected by the results of the upcoming US presidential elections. Based on previous cases, it is expected that in case of victory Trump will incentivize his EU “allies”, such as Hungary’s Orban, Italy’s Meloni, and Slovakia’s Fico (Naughtie, 2024), resist the Pact in the name of national sovereignty and anti-elitism. In the case of Trump’s loss however, the likely scenario is that the former president would encourage them to challenge the election outcomes and attempt to undermine democratic processes. This could deepen the public’s distrust in representative institutions across the US and the EU, ultimately furthering the disengagement from electoral processes (i.e. increasing voter absenteeism).   

The authors of this paper believe that the recommended introduction of periodic in-depth country reviews (ICRs) would serve as a preventative measure in anticipation of Trump influencing RPPs in Europe. Of course, whilst future outcomes are uncertain due to the vivacity of the electoral campaigns in the US as well as worsening international orders, we are confident that as the European Commission sustains the cooperative nature of the Pact across political spectrums – which we recommend doing by ensuring tailored implementation strategies across member states’ government – its implementation will be successful. 

 

(*) This policy paper is based on research conducted by Beatrice Bottura, Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston, Pinelopi Gkampeta, Ludmila Malai, Matt Lynch, Joon Park and Leon Gräf during the ECPS Case Competition “US Foreign Policy and Populism,” held as part of the ECPS Summer School from July 1-5, 2024. 

Authors’ Biographies

Beatrice Bottura is a Sciences Po master student in Public Policy, specializing in Social Policy and Social Innovation, and a Central European University (CEU) graduate in Philosophy Politics and Economics. Her research interests revolve around the crisis of democracy and how it relates to political attitudes and policymaking. She has explored this in her bachelor thesis “Ethnopopulists’ reaction to crises: the case of Fratelli D’Italia”, from which she derived an article for the Horizon Europe project “AuthLIB – Neo-Authoritarianisms in Europe and the Liberal Democratic Response”, which she is involved in as a research assistant. For this project she has worked with CEU’s Democracy institute and Sciences Po’s Centre d’Études Européennes (CEE). Particularly, she conducted discourse analyses for the working paper “Illiberalism and Social Policy: A Four-Country Comparison”, is authoring an upcoming publication on varieties of illiberalism across policy areas with CEU and has coded speech for the CEE’s work measuring “Ideological configurations”. 

Joon Park is a third-year student at George Washington University, pursuing a bachelor’s in international Affairs and Finance with a minor in Economics. Born to Korean immigrants and raised in Germany, her academic focus spans EU economics, German domestic and foreign politics, U.S. foreign policy, and East Asian geopolitical strategy. She is currently researching the rise of right-wing populism in Europe in collaboration with the Center for Faith, Identity, and Globalization in Washington, D.C. Joon’s passion lies in exploring how global political systems and economic dynamics intersect to shape international relations and policy. 

Matthew Lynch is a Master of Science candidate in Global Studies and International Relations at Northeastern University in Boston. He received a Bachelor of Science in Supply Chain Management from the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. With a background in international business, his current research focuses on how populism creates vulnerabilities in EU defense and security, particularly the potential for external actors to exploit these weaknesses. He also researches German foreign and defense policy.

Leon Gräf holds a BA in Political Science and Philosophy, University of Heidelberg, Germany and an MA in Political Science, University of Mannheim, Germany. He is currently working as Research Fellow at the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law, and as a Research Assistant at the Chair of Empirical Macrosociology at Heidelberg University. Additionally, is has been working as a researcher at the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) since 2021. His MA thesis focused on mediator characteristics and their effect on ceasefire success across different regions. 

Pinelopi Gkampeta is a graduate student in the Advanced M.Sc. in “European Integration” in Brussels School of Governance (VUB) and she currently lives in Brussels. Furthermore, she has obtained a master’s degree in “International and European Governance and Politics” from the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and a bachelor’s degree in “Philosophy” from the same university. She has taken part in the Erasmus+ Program “Maritime Security Common Module “by European Security and Defence College and Hellenic Naval Academy. Moreover, she is a research intern in the Institute of International Relations (Athens, Greece) and also an editor and analyst at the Association of International and European Affairs. Pinelopi worked as a research assistant for the Identity and Conflict Lab (Yale University) for some months. Her areas of interest and research are EU as a Global Actor, EU External Relations, EU Security and Defense Policy, Maritime Security and Immigration Policy.

Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston holds an MA in International Relations, Conflict & Security from Northumbria University. Her research focuses primarily on societal security, with an emphasis on digital threats. Her dissertation explored how EU policy documents framed cybersecurity as an existential threat. Currently, her research interests have expanded to include the societal risks posed by AI. This includes how populists may use generative AI to either gather support or create the illusion of widespread backing, as well as to drive disinformation campaigns. By investigating this area, she aims to uncover how algorithms could be leveraged for early detection and mitigation of polarizing content ahead of elections. 

Ludmila Malai is an experienced EU Project Manager at the Intercultural Dialogue Platform, with a diverse academic background in Economics, Administration, Politics, Diplomacy, and Conflict Resolution. She holds a Master’s in International Law and Security Studies from the Free University of Brussels and is fluent in English, French, Russian, Italian, and Romanian. Over the past six years, Ludmila has specialized in writing and coordinating European projects focused on CVE/PVE, radicalization, combating racism, Antisemitism, Islamophobia, the security of places of worship, women’s empowerment, and youth civic engagement.

 

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Prabowo Subianto sings during a grand campaign at GBK Stadium in Jakarta on March 23, 2014. After four attempts, Prabowo was finally elected President of Indonesia in 2024. Photo: MRNPic.

From Political Pariah to President: Prabowo Subianto and the Perils of Populism in Indonesia

by ArticlesAuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceHomeLeadersProfiles

Please cite as:
Watmough, Simon P. (2021). “From Political Pariah to President: Prabowo Subianto and the Perils of Populism in Indonesia.” ECPS Leader Profiles. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 24, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/lp0011

 

Prabowo Subianto’s victory in Indonesia’s February 2024 presidential election marks a pivotal moment in the nation’s democratic evolution, echoing a global shift towards nationalist populism. As Indonesia’s eighth president, Prabowo’s political journey and ideological stance have sparked concerns about the future of the country’s democratic institutions. His controversial military past, including allegations of human rights abuses in East Timor and Aceh during the 1990s, continues to raise alarms about the potential for authoritarianism under his leadership. Critics fear his presidency may signal a return to repressive practices, with threats to civil liberties and increased polarization. Prabowo’s background as a former military general adds to concerns about a consolidation of power and the erosion of democratic checks and balances in one of the world’s largest democracies.

By Simon P. Watmough

Introduction

Prabowo Subianto’s[1] stunning victory in Indonesia’s presidential elections in February marks a significant moment in the country’s democratic journey, reflecting a global trend towards authoritarian nationalist populism. As he assumes the presidency of the world’s third-largest democracy, Prabowo’s political career and ideological stance have ignited conversations about the potential implications for Indonesia’s democratic institutions and pluralistic society, prompting observers at home and abroad to scrutinize the trajectory Indonesia might take under his administration. This profile joins that conversation, asking: Who is Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia’s eighth president?

If the “peculiarity of populist discourse is to frame politics as an antagonistic confrontation between the people and the oligarchy” (de la Torre, 2007: 389), then Prabowo hits the mark. Known for his assertive rhetoric and strongman persona, Prabowo – a retired lieutenant general in the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) – has successfully tapped into a vein of nationalist sentiment in Indonesia, promising robust leadership in the face of mounting economic and security challenges.

It is scarcely surprising that Prabowo embodies all the qualities of a “warrior populist” in the vein of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, as he has publicly declared his admiration for the late Venezuelan general-turned-dictator (Aspinall, 2015: 2). Equally, as the brother of one of Indonesia’s richest men (and a multimillionaire in his own right), we can see him as the paradigmatic “pluto-populist” in the vein of Donald Trump, the late Silvio Berlusconi and of course, Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra, whom Prabowo openly admires (ibid.).

The country itself is no stranger to populism, which has “deep roots in Indonesia” (Aspinall, 2015: 3). “Diffuse” forms of populist mobilization have played an outsized role in the country’s mass politics since the beginning, even during the “Guided Democracy” of the founding president, Sukarno, and the authoritarian “New Order” period under Suharto (ibid.). Some have even located the roots of Indonesian populism in the country’s birth as an independent nation (van Klinken, 2020). However, Indonesia’s current “populist moment” reflects conditions that have emerged in the 21st century, not least the attenuation of party functioning in the campaigns of political actors and the rise of “media-based populism,” which is “now the default mode of electioneering” (Gammon, 2023: 442). The allure of authoritarian nationalist populism, with its promise of decisive action and appeal to traditional values, poses questions about the future of Indonesia’s open and inclusive political climate. Critics argue that this could lead to a regression in human rights, freedom of the press and minority protections, elements that are foundational to Indonesia’s democratic framework.

This profile offers a comprehensive overview of the factors that have shaped Prabowo’s outlook and approach, including his early life, his military career (including his close links with the Suharto regime and his role in the transition to democracy in 1998) as well as his subsequent business and political ventures, all of which have led him to the seat of ultimate power. Charting his move from political pariah to perennial contender and now president, it sketches the key influences that have shaped his authoritarian populist outlook and the controversies that continue to devil him and give his critics pause for concern. Ultimately, it suggests he is likely to work to centralize power in the hands of the presidency, undermine Indonesia’s independent institutions, take the country backwards and possibly threaten to ignite conflicts far and wide.

A Cosmopolitan “Third Culture Kid” Forged in Exile

Indonesian presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto greets the public during a 2024 general election campaign in Bengkulu City, Indonesia, on January 11, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo was born on 17 October 1951, in Jakarta, Indonesia, into an aristocratic Javanese family “line that goes back centuries” (Connelly & Laksmana, 2018). His grandfather, Margono Djojohadikusumo (1894–1978), a prominent economist and founder of Bank Negara Indonesia (also serving as its first president), was a leading figure in Indonesia’s independence movement, while his father, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (1917–2001), held key positions as Indonesia’s minister of trade and industry. Growing up amidst this political and economic elite exposed Prabowo to the inner workings of government and economics from a very young age (Purdey, 2016).

In the late 1950s, at just seven years of age, Prabowo was forced into exile with his family, his father and grandfather having been central players in an internal rebellion against Sukarno. Exile took the family first to Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, then Switzerland and later to the United Kingdom, where Prabowo studied, graduating from the prestigious American School in London (ASL) in 1968 (Tanu, 2004). This international journey at a young age had a profound impact on Prabowo, exposing him to a wide range of cultures and shaping him into a “third culture kid” (Pollock & Reken, 2009), one who learned precisely how to navigate elite cosmopolitan circles (Tanu, 2004).

After the fall of Sukarno and the rise of the New Order regime in 1966 (headed by Suharto), the family were no longer political exiles. As Aspinall (2015: 3) notes, Prabowo returned to Indonesia “more comfortable speaking English than Indonesian, yet with powerful ambitions” to make something of himself in the country of his birth. Indeed, from a young age, Prabowo displayed a natural aptitude for strategy and a strong aspiration to the grand exercise of political power – a particular fascination in his youth was the Turkish general-turned-founding father Kemal Mustafa Ataturk (Friend, 2003: 323). Recognizing his teenage son’s leadership potential, Sumitro encouraged Prabowo to attend the military academy and pursue a career in the armed forces.

Military Career and Accusations of Human Rights Abuses

Understanding Prabowo’s military career is central to understanding both his outlook and style and the controversies that have dogged him in politics since 2004. His military journey began in 1970 when he enrolled in the Indonesian Military Academy in Magelang. He graduated in 1974, alongside fellow cadets who would go on to hold senior leadership positions, including Indonesia’s sixth president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (widely known as SBY).

After graduation, Prabowo served in elite regiments of the TNI, first in the Indonesian Special Forces (known as Kopassus), which he joined in 1976 and where he gained experience in counterinsurgency operations (Aspinall, 2015: 6). Indeed, during his several tours of East Timor after the Indonesian invasion in December 1975, he was responsible for many human rights violations. At just 26 years old, Prabowo became the youngest commander of a key commando unit operating in East Timor and was implicated in the execution of East Timor’s first prime minister and freedom fighter, Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, in December 1978 (van Klinken, 2014).

Prabowo’s career took off after his marriage to Siti Hediati Hariyadi (“Titiek”) – the daughter of Indonesia’s strongman President Suharto – in 1983. His marriage to Titiek further elevated his status within the ruling political elite and gave him access to important networks and resources, allowing him to rise through the ranks of the Indonesian military more swiftly than many of his peers.

In the early 1990s, Prabowo, now a Major General, led Kopassus Group 3 in its attempts to suppress the East Timorese independence movement. His methods included using irregular troops, known as “ninja” gangs, and militias directed by Kopassus commanders, leading to a rise in human rights abuses. He has also been implicated in killings in Indonesia’s restive province of West Papua, particularly targeting the region’s independence activists (Nairn, 2024). During the dying days of his father-in-law’s regime, “Prabowo emerged as the leader of a palace guard of generals most willing to use coercion to defend the regime” (Aspinall, 2015: 6). In March 1998, Prabowo was appointed as the head of the 27,000-strong Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) – a position Suharto himself once held, which he used to topple Sukarno and propel himself to power in 1965.

Just three months into this role, during the May 1998 riots, Prabowo sought to deploy Kostrad units to restore order in Jakarta. This move was met with controversy as it involved hundreds of individuals trained by Kopassus, Prabowo’s former command. Accusations of importing trouble and seeking to discredit rivals were raised, with some arguing that Prabowo was putting pieces in place for a military coup in which he would assume command of Indonesia. These events escalated tensions and played a role in the resignation of President Suharto on May 21, 1998 (Aspinall, 2005: 212).

In the aftermath of the 1998 riots, investigations revealed allegations of human rights abuses and kidnappings involving Prabowo’s troops, including the torture of democracy activists. He acknowledged responsibility for the abductions (although he continues to deny any role in the activists’ deaths), leading to his discharge from military service in August 1998 (Nairn, 2024).

Second Exile and Business Empire

As soon as he was expelled from the military, Prabowo again went into exile (this time self-imposed), residing in Jordan (Prabowo is reportedly close to King Abdullah). During this time, he downplayed involvement in the 1998 riots and maintained that he was not responsible for betraying his country or its leaders (Tesoro, 2000). On his return to Indonesia in 2004, he immediately began to plot a path to the presidency (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 352).

At the same time, Prabowo ventured into the business world, collaborating with his younger brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo. His business interests reflect a pattern endemic to Indonesia’s “oligarchic” political economy (Winters, 2013). Today, Prabowo’s Nusantara Group oversees an extensive portfolio of 27 companies operating both within Indonesia and internationally. These companies cover a diverse range of sectors, including Nusantara Energy (focusing on oil, natural gas, and coal), Tidar Kerinci Agung (engaged in palm oil plantations), and Jaladri Nusantara (operating in the fishery industry) (Purdey, 2016).

From Political Pariah to Perennial Presidential Candidate

Even as a solider, Prabowo Subianto had established a reputation as a political player, leveraging his connections with President Suharto in the 1990s to engage in efforts to suppress critics in the journalistic and political spheres. In the dying days of the New Order, Prabowo attempted to sway Goenawan Mohamad to sell his controversial Tempo magazine (a leading mouthpiece of popular dissent) and warned various influential figures, including Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known as Gus Dur, who served as Indonesia’s fourth president from 1999 to 2001) and Nurcholish Madjid, against taking a public stand against the regime (Friend, 2003: 203).

By 2004, Prabowo’s political aspirations led him to vie for the Golkar party’s presidential candidacy, but he received minimal support. He speaks of this campaign as a “trial run” that gave him the experience he needed to move forward. In this period, he also began to create grassroots networks, especially among farmers, small traders, and a wide range of other organizations, including “veterans’ associations, labor unions and organizations of village heads, which could provide him with access to a mass base” (Aspinall, 2015: 9) on which to ground a populist political movement.

In 2008, Prabowo’s inner circle established the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), supporting his presidential run in 2009. Hashim Djojohadikusumo serves as party chairman. Despite not winning enough parliamentary seats, Prabowo ran as a vice-presidential candidate alongside Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Sukarno. The pair, known as Mega–Pro, lost to SBY, who succeeded Megawati as Indonesia’s sixth president on 20 October 2004. Unbowed by this failure, Prabowo doubled down on building up Gerindra, his business interests, and his populist networks (Mao, 2024).

The 2014 Presidential Election: The “Battle of the Populists”

President-elect Prabowo Subianto with the 7th President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, at the 79th Indonesian National Armed Forces Anniversary in Jakarta, Indonesia, on October 5, 2024. Photo: Donny Hery.

By 2014, Indonesian politics had reached a critical juncture, one that was ripe for populist mobilization. While SBY’s ten years in office had seen the country bed down several important reforms, recover fully from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and resolve some longstanding regional conflicts, they were largely seen as a lost opportunity, mainly due to the vacillating leadership of President Yudhoyono himself (Aspinall et all., 2015: 1–2). The period of political indecision and policy stagnation that characterized the last years of his presidency set the stage for the rise of a “populist challenger” in Indonesian politics, something “political scientists had been predicting for years” (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 351; see also Anugrah, 2020: 5). Indeed, as Aspinall has rightly noted, “The rise of an authoritarian populist challenger like Prabowo was almost overdetermined in contemporary Indonesia” (Aspinall, 2015: 3)

Scholars widely agree that 2014 was a “watershed” and a “turning point” in Indonesian democracy in the post-Suharto era (see, for example, Anugrah, 2020: 6; Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 347). It was the year that saw Indonesia join “the new wave of illiberal populist mobilization in both established and newer democracies” (Anugrah, 2020: 11). The result was an epic “battle of the populists” – Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”), the incumbent governor of Jakarta, and Prabowo – in the presidential elections in July. While both were clearly populist, each had a distinctive populist style that contrasted with the other. For his part, Jokowi showcased a provincial “everyman” populist style (he promised to meet Yudhoyono’s do-nothing elitism with workaday governance on a platform of good governance and populist policies like cheap healthcare and education). As Aspinall & Mietzner (2014: 351) have noted: “In Jokowi, Indonesians found someone who possessed a popular touch that was the antithesis of Yudhoyono’s wooden formality.” In stark contrast stood Prabowo, who instead offered “‘firm leadership’ as the antidote to Yudhoyono’s hesitant style of leadership” (Ibid.). Despite his impeccable establishment credentials, Prabowo cast himself in classical populist terms as an “outsider” ready to take on the Indonesian elite.

Prabowo ran a lavish campaign funded mostly by his brother, Hashim, a wildly successful businessman and one of Indonesia’s dollar billionaires. Notwithstanding his claims of wanting to fight a corrupt oligarchy, Prabowo’s campaign was “organized using a pattern of cash-driven informal networking” (Aspinall, 2015: 3) that drew in many constituencies. Despite a campaign levelled at “corrupt elites,” Prabowo managed to perfect the game of “patronage democracy” that Indonesia has become known for (Van Klinken, 2009).

Consistent with a turn to “media-based populism” in Indonesia (Gammon, 2023: 442), Prabowo campaigned “with relentless media advertising and set piece mass rallies all stressing a simple message: Prabowo was the man Indonesia needed to lead it towards a desperately needed national renaissance” (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 357). Prabowo’s appeal was enhanced by a “widespread – though diffuse – mood of nostalgia for the certainties of the New Order” regime of his father-in-law Suharto, Indonesia’s longest-serving president (Aspinall, 2015: 3).

His campaign adopted classic populist discursive frames, and he cast himself as Indonesia’s “savior” with promises to rescue the country from a rapacious elite in cahoots with foreigners seeking to exploit Indonesia’s vast natural resources (Hellmann, 2019: 13). His style was avowedly nationalist and sought to both burnish his credentials as a “strong leader” and draw on the symbolism of the populist Sukarno era: “His campaign appearances had a highly theatrical character, with lots of uniforms, marching, and fiery oratory, and with much of the styling obviously based on that of Sukarno and other nationalist leaders from the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s” (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 352).

Moreover, despite his claims to be the answer to the corruption and money politics of the Indonesian campaign system, Prabowo himself marshalled a wide range of constituencies through vote buying. In this way, he was able to galvanize Islamic groups, small businessmen and other mass constituencies. As Aspinall & Mietzner (2014: 359) note, “like his Thai role model Thaksin Shinawatra,” Prabowo “appealed mainly to the rural poor for support” (although in the end, he garnered as much or more urban support). Despite his mass appeal and backing from the outgoing SBY (the president reportedly held Prabowo “unfit to be president” but bowed to pressure and opinion polling to swing his weight behind the former general at the last minute), Jokowi won with 53% of the vote, after a late scramble to get out his base of his voters to the polls.

In the aftermath of the elections, both candidates declared victory. Jokowi’s claim was backed by most independent quick counts, showing a slight lead over Prabowo. The latter, however, citing different polls, also claimed victory, a strategy he would repeat in 2019. However, he withdrew from the race on the day the official tally was to be announced, citing “massive cheating” and declaring the election unconstitutional, a move that sparked legal and political controversies, culminating in an appeal to the Constitutional Court alleging significant voting irregularities, which the court unanimously rejected.

The 2019 Rematch: Islamic Populism and a Promise to “Make Indonesia Great Again”

Indonesian presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto at a campaign event in Jakarta, Indonesia, on April 4, 2014. Photo: Simon Roughneen.

The 2019 campaign set up a “rematch” between the two populists and was even more divisive than their 2014 contest (Arifianto, 2019: 46). As had been the case in 2014, Prabowo’s participation in the 2019 campaign was contentious. He initially claimed victory despite independent counts favoring Jokowi (he was eventually declared the winner with 55.5% of the vote), who later faced violent protests from his supporters challenging the results, which were ultimately upheld by the Constitutional Court (Jakarta Globe, 2019). During the campaign, Prabowo was accused of emulating the tactics used by Donald Trump in his 2016 bid for the US presidency, particularly in emphasizing economic inequalities and foreigners ripping the country off. In a speech given in October 2018, Prabowo echoed Trump’s infamous slogan by declaring his desire to “Make Indonesia Great Again.”

In a pattern that has recurred across his presidential campaigns, Prabowo reinvented himself going into the election campaign, in this case as a pious Muslim, appearing at religious festivals and Islamist rallies and actively courting Muslims: “Unlike in the 2014 election, when the Islamists were just a small contingent of Prabowo’s mainly ultranationalist coalition, the Islamists had now become an integral part of his campaign team” (Arifianto, 2019: 47). He made much of his connections with hardline Muslim groups, notably exemplified by his relationship with Muhammad Rizieq Shihab of the Islamic Defenders Front. Rizieq, in self-imposed exile in Mecca at the time, was a vocal critic of Jokowi and supporter of Prabowo. The former general pledged to facilitate Rizieq’s return to Indonesia if he won the election. Prabowo’s courting of the populist Islamic vote shifted the entire tenor of the campaign, forcing Jokowi to select the “conservative cleric Ma’ruf Amin” (Arifianto, 2019: 46) as his running mate.

Amidst a rancorous campaign, voter turnout in the 2019 elections reached record highs, fueled largely by the populist mobilization of Islam by the two leading contenders: “Religious-based polarization conducted by both sides during their campaigns helped boost total voter turnout to 154 million—approximately 80% of the electorate” (Arifianto, 2019: 49). This was up from the 69% who turned out to vote in the 2014 presidential poll (Anugrah, 2020: 9).

Rapprochement, Political Reinvention, and “Digital Populism” in the 2024 Presidential Campaign

Despite the bitterly fought campaign and Prabowo’s alleged role in violent post-election riots in Jakarta that killed six people (Soeriaatmadja & Chan, 2019), the ex-general opportunistically sought a rapprochement and approached Megawati and Jokowi to see if Gerindra could be included in the governing coalition (Indonesia’s party system is highly cartelized and parties often bandwagon in exchange for spoils; see Slater, 2018). In turn, and notwithstanding the rancor that had characterized their relations for half a decade, Jokowi appointed Prabowo his defense minister in October 2019 “as a gesture of national unity” (Anugrah, 2020: 1). Moreover, “[d]espite earlier tensions, Prabowo and Jokowi found common ground in a nationalist vision that emphasized sovereignty, defense, food security and energy security” (Utama, 2023).

His appointment as defense minister resurfaced criticisms of his past human rights abuses and comments praising charismatic populists who later became dictators, such as Hugo Chavez. Dogged by these criticisms, Prabowo sought to shed his image as a firebrand strongman (see below) in the run-up to the 2024 campaign, which culminated in a landslide win on February 14 (Prabowo took over 58% of the vote with another record turnout of 82%; Strangio, 2024).

Prabowo’s 2024 triumph after successive failed attempts rested on three central (and interrelated) dimensions, all of which contributed to his landslide win. The first was the backing of President Jokowi and the full force of the Indonesian state, which deployed a mix of “retail corruption” and “wholesale coercion” on a scale not seen in Indonesia since the 1970s (Nairn, 2024). This approach was coupled with a populist policy of offering one free meal to every child of school age in order to address malnutrition and stunting. A laudable policy on the face of it, it remains to be seen whether the US$30 billion price tag can be met from Indonesia’s strained central budget (Lindsey, 2024). Jokowi, who was term-limited, saw in Prabowo a chance to “carry forward his plans for a political dynasty and, with it, continued influence” (Utama, 2023). In late 2023, Prabowo skillfully wooed the president, offering the second spot on his ticket to Jokowi’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, whose constitutional ineligibility for the office was overruled by Indonesia’s Supreme Court, headed by none other than Gibran’s maternal uncle, Anwar Usman, in October 2023. Secondly, Prabowo had the backing of Indonesia’s elite, in particular his brother and “an alliance of mining oligarchs and several giant capitalists who … supported the pair behind the scenes” (Hermawan, 2024).

Finally, Prabowo reinvented himself yet again – this time as a “gemoy” (cute) grandpa – and launched a campaign of “digital populism” on social media (primarily the video platform TikTok), featuring him “dad dancing” on campaign stages and adopting an approach vaguely reminiscent of Trump’s rally antics. This “reinvention tour” appealed to thrill Indonesia’s GenZ and millennial voters, who make up the majority of the country’s electorate and have little or no memory of Indonesia’s authoritarian past or Prabowo’s role in the violent end to the New Order in 1998. Here, too, Jokowi’s backing was also critical, not only in furnishing the young Gibran as Prabowo’s campaign sidekick. As Ary Hermawan (2024) has noted, “Prabowo’s new persona as a ‘cuddly grandpa’ [was] manufactured by an army of cybertroopers,” the majority of which were inherited from Jokowi’s political outfit and which the Prabowo camp deftly used to blunt “campaigns targeting the former general’s checkered human rights record—a key issue in the 2014 election” that Prabowo, ironically enough, lost to Jokowi (Ibid.)

Political Style and Controversies

Presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto and vice-presidential candidate Gibran Rakabuming Raka deliver a speech to their supporters in Jakarta, Indonesia, on February 14, 2024. Photo: Prayoga Nugroho.

Prabowo has been famously described as a chameleon, presenting different colors depending on the audience. As one profile put it on the eve of the 2014 presidential campaign, “The pro-business cosmopolitan who can ‘knock Indonesia together’ is the one who shows up to events at posh Jakarta hotels with diplomats and investors. The fist-shaking demagogue is the one who appears in front of the voters” (Tanu, 2004). Prabowo’s past has been a subject of scrutiny, particularly during his presidential campaigns in 2014, 2019 and 2024, with many organizations calling for investigations into his actions during this period. As far as personality is concerned, he is often described as “temperamental,” with “a propensity for outbursts of rage that sometimes involve physical violence, with reports circulating widely of him throwing cellphones, ashtrays, and even punches when angered by his associates or underlings” (Aspinall, 2015: 8–9).

His political style is emblematic of a broader global trend towards authoritarian nationalist populism, a mode of governance characterized by strong leadership, assertive nationalism, and, often, a skepticism towards liberal democratic norms. In Indonesia, Prabowo has cultivated an image of a decisive leader, one who promises to restore order, enhance national pride and protect Indonesian interests from foreign encroachment. This approach has garnered substantial support, particularly among voters disillusioned with the perceived inefficacies of previous administrations.

Despite his impeccable elite credentials (he descends from Javanese aristocracy on his father’s side and is the scion of one of Indonesia’s wealthiest and best-connected families), Prabowo loves to style himself as an “outsider” and a “maverick.” The latter is not actually far from the truth, a personality trait that has been in evidence since his days at the military academy in the early 1970s, where — despite his impressive mastery of military lore and practice — he quickly developed a reputation for independence (his graduation was delayed because he spent some time AWOL), most likely a reflection of his experience as a “third culture kid” in exile around the world in the 1960s.

However, this same political style raises concerns about the potential erosion of democratic principles, including checks and balances, freedom of speech and minority rights. Prabowo’s emphasis on nationalism and sovereignty taps into deep-seated sentiments among the populace, yet it also risks inflaming divisions within Indonesia’s ethnically and religiously diverse society. The manifesto of his Gerindra Party calls for a rollback of the post-Suharto constitutional reforms and a return to Indonesia’s original 1945 Constitution, which Indonesia’s first two presidents, Sukarno and Suharto, had used to establish authoritarian regimes over five decades.

Prabowo’s approach to governance also reflects a skepticism towards liberal internationalism, favoring instead a more insular, Indonesia-first policy. This stance is evident in his critiques of foreign investment and his proposals to reevaluate Indonesia’s participation in international trade agreements, which he argues disadvantage Indonesian workers and compromise national sovereignty. Such positions resonate with nationalist sentiments within Indonesia, promising economic sovereignty and the protection of local industries against global market forces. However, this economic nationalism has sparked debates about the practical implications for Indonesia’s economy, with critics cautioning that protectionist policies could isolate Indonesia from global supply chains and hinder economic growth.

Conclusion: What Can We Expect from a Prabowo Presidency?

After decades of aspiring to lead Indonesia, we can be sure that Prabowo has a clear idea of where he wants to take the country and a clear plan of how to do so. Volatile and mercurial, he is equally pragmatic and will almost certainly be looking to cut deals and build alliances, not least with his major opponent, Megawati’s Indonesian Party of Struggle (PDI–P), which has the largest number of seats in Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR). But at 72 years of age and in less-than-robust health, time is not on his side, and he is likely to quickly lose patience with Indonesia’s messy consensus-building approach or overt political opposition, be it in the DPR or on the streets.

Throughout his political career, Prabowo Subianto has faced numerous controversies, many of which stem from his tenure in the Indonesian military, as detailed above. Allegations of human rights abuses during his leadership of the special forces in the 1990s, particularly in regions like East Timor and Aceh, have dogged him, casting a long shadow over his subsequent political endeavors. While Prabowo has consistently denied any wrongdoing, these allegations have been a focal point for critics who argue that his presidency could signal a return to the repressive practices of Indonesia’s past. This history, combined with his current political rhetoric, feeds into fears of an authoritarian drift should Prabowo consolidate power, potentially leading to a curtailment of civil liberties and a crackdown on dissent.

Prabowo’s casual disregard for democracy has also been on display during his successive presidential bids. For example, his 2014 campaign “espoused an authoritarian populist message suggesting he wanted to recentralize power and dismantle key democratic institutions” (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 347). He has also floated the idea that “the country to do away with direct elections of executive government leaders—which he described as a Western product inappropriate for Indonesia” (Ibid.: 352). Before constitutional reforms in the 2000s instituted popular elections of Indonesia’s president and regional governors, they were appointed by their respective legislatures. As Tim Lindsey (2024) has recently pointed out, much of the work of dismantling the reforms of the last 30 years has already been accomplished: “Many of the elements of the New Order are already in place. Much of the work of dismantling Indonesia’s liberal democracy has already been done by the outgoing president” Jokowi, who has overseen an “illiberal turn in Indonesian democracy” over the last decade (Anugrah, 2019).

These points underscore concerns about the erosion of democratic norms and the potential for increased polarization within one of the world’s most diverse countries. Prabowo’s background as a former military general with a controversial record further compounds fears about the centralization of power and the undermining of checks and balances in governance. As this profile shows, these fears are hardly overblown – Prabowo’s record offers clear pointers as to how he is likely to attempt to govern.

Indonesia now stands at a crossroads. President Prabowo’s leadership will test the resilience of the country’s democratic institutions and its capacity to navigate the tension between strongman governance and pluralistic values. Prabowo’s tenure could bring decisive action on issues like economic sovereignty and national security, but at what cost to civil liberties and political freedoms? His legacy will be determined not just by the policies he enacts but by how he handles the delicate balance between authority and accountability, nationalism and inclusivity. The question that now lingers is whether Prabowo’s leadership will unite Indonesia under a shared vision or deepen the divisions that have long shaped the nation’s complex political landscape.

 

References

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[1] Indonesian naming conventions differ significantly from the Western model of first, middle and last names. Names may consist of one or more words, with one-word names particularly common among the Javanese (e.g., Suharto). Prabowo Subianto is commonly referred to by his first name, “Prabowo,” which aligns with Indonesian naming conventions, where individuals with multiple names are often identified with a single, unique personal name. Thus, he does not generally use the family name “Djojohadikusumo,” in contrast to his father and brother, Hashim. In this profile I introduce each politician with his or her first and second names and refer subsequently to their most commonly used one-word identifier.