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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan watching the August 30 Victory Day Parade in Ankara, Turkey on August 30, 2014. Photo by Mustafa Kirazli.

Professor Barkey: Turkey Has Become a Full-Blown Authoritarian System

September 13, 2025

by ECPS_admin Authoritarianism European Observatory Home Human Rights Interviews

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Henri Barkey—born in Turkey and one of the leading US experts on Middle East politics—warns that Turkey has crossed a decisive threshold under President Erdogan. “Turkey has now become a full-blown authoritarian system,” he stated, arguing that Erdogan has removed the “competitive” element from competitive authoritarianism by subordinating the judiciary, jailing rivals, and even deciding opposition party leadership. While repression deepens, Professor Barkey sees a paradox: “The system is becoming more authoritarian, but society may be resisting much more than we realize.” He highlights youth-led mobilization, fears over arrested Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu’s popularity, and Europe’s limited leverage, concluding that Erdogan’s overreach may ultimately galvanize opposition forces.

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Henri Barkey, a leading scholar of Middle East politics who was born in Turkey, delivered a stark assessment of the country’s current trajectory under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. “Turkey has now become a full-blown authoritarian system,” Professor Barkey stated, emphasizing that the transition from “competitive authoritarianism” to outright authoritarian rule marks a dangerous turning point.

Professor Barkey—Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and holder of the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Chair in International Relations at Lehigh University—has long studied Turkey’s political development. He previously directed the Middle East Center at the Wilson Center and served on the US State Department Policy Planning Staff during the Clinton administration.

Professor Barkey situated Erdogan’s consolidation of power within a broader historical and political context. Turkey’s modern history, he observed, has been marked by cycles of democratic openings and authoritarian retrenchment. Yet, despite repeated interruptions—from military coups to autocratic turns—“the Turkish public, by and large, has adapted and adopted a sense of democratic culture.” The resilience of ordinary citizens, he noted, remains a crucial counterweight to authoritarian encroachment.

At the heart of Professor Barkey’s argument is Erdogan’s dismantling of institutional safeguards. “He is turning Turkey into a complete authoritarian system because he controls the judiciary, and judges and prosecutors essentially do whatever he wants them to do,” Professor Barkey explained. Recent episodes—politically motivated trials, the dismissal of opposition leaders, and the manipulation of party leadership contests—demonstrate, in his view, the collapse of even the minimal competition that previously characterized Turkey’s hybrid regime. “In other words, Erdogan is now deciding who will lead the main opposition party.”

This tightening grip, however, is not without risk. Professor Barkey underscored a paradox: “There’s a kind of dialectic here: the system is becoming more authoritarian, but society may be resisting much more than we realize.” Millions of citizens, particularly the younger generations who have never known a Turkey without Erdogan, have mobilized in protests, demanding change. Professor Barkey noted that such resistance is difficult to gauge because “people are afraid to speak out” and reporting is restricted, but he insisted that “at some point, this is going to break.”

Erdogan’s own fear of rivals, especially Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, reflects this tension. Professor Barkey argued that the regime’s extraordinary measures to sideline Imamoglu—ranging from imprisonment to retroactive annulment of his university degree—offer “the clearest demonstration that he’s terrified.”

Professor Barkey also highlighted the role of external actors in shaping Erdogan’s room for maneuver. In his view, former US President Donald Trump “doesn’t believe in democracy” and effectively gave Erdogan “carte blanche” at home by refusing to criticize his repression. Europe, for its part, remains uneasy with Erdogan’s authoritarian aims and worried about migration pressures, but Professor Barkey noted that Erdogan feels confident he can “withstand European pressure” while focusing on demolishing the opposition. Ultimately, the combination of a permissive US stance under Trump and Europe’s limited leverage has reinforced Erdogan’s sense of impunity.

Ultimately, Professor Barkey’s analysis suggests both danger and opportunity: the danger of entrenched authoritarianism, but also the possibility that Erdogan’s overreach may galvanize opposition forces. As he concluded, “Authoritarian leaders always make mistakes… and I think Erdogan is already making them.”

Professor Henri Barkey is an Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and holder of the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Chair in International Relations at Lehigh University.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Henri Barkey, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Erdogan Realizes He’s Weak: People Are Fed Up and Want Change

Professor Henri Barkey, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Turkish President Erdogan has long relied on a blend of populist narratives and authoritarian tactics to consolidate power. Given the backlash over Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu’s imprisonment, the use of lawfare through corruption investigations, the appointment of trustees to CHP-led administrations, and the wave of nationwide anti-government protests, do you believe this strategy is now undermining rather than sustaining his authority? Could this moment mark a potential inflection point for his populist-authoritarian model?

Professor Henri Barkey: It’s interesting you say that, because I actually had a piece published in Foreign Affairs Online where I basically argued very strongly that Erdogan had made a terrible mistake by imprisoning the mayor of Istanbul, and I thought this was the end of Erdogan. Imamoglu is still in jail, and Erdogan is still the president, and he has gone ahead and imprisoned a lot more people—journalists and other members of the opposition party—and he is also trying to get rid of the leadership of the opposition party.

But to me, all of these are indicators that he realizes, after 23 years in power, that people don’t want him anymore. He has actually lost public support, and he has to resort to these incredible machinations to stay in power. In other words, he realizes that if there were elections any time now, he would not be re-elected, and his party would lose. In fact, in the last municipal elections in 2024, the main opposition party came in comfortably—comfortably for Turkey—as number one, and his party came in second.

What is going on today in Turkey is that Erdogan realizes he’s weak. He has support—it’s not that he doesn’t have support—but of course, he has the state machine, which he can always mobilize to get anything he wants done. However, for him, it must be very difficult to accept that he, who used to be genuinely popular in Turkey and who won elections genuinely, is now losing support. People are fed up. People want change. And it’s natural.

Imagine if you are 25, or maybe even 30 years old. All your conscious years have passed under one leader. People want change. So, it’s partially psychological, but partially also, of course, due to his responsibility for what’s going on in Turkey. The economy is not doing well. Inflation is high. He made terrible mistakes. And naturally, people want change.

The System Is Becoming More Authoritarian, but Society May Be Resisting

In your writings, you describe Erdogan’s evolution from a reformist leader promising EU-style democratization to a populist-authoritarian consolidating near-total power. How has this transformation shaped Turkey’s political trajectory and institutional resilience over the past two decades?

Professor Henri Barkey: Turkey—if you look at its modern history from World War II onwards—has experienced many different variations over the past 80 years. There have been democratic governments, military coups, and repeated interruptions in its political system. But what strikes me is that the Turkish public, by and large, has adapted and adopted a sense of democratic culture. Not perfect, not by any stretch of the imagination, but it exists. The Turkish public has a stake in elections and in the freedom to say what they want and to act as they wish.

Of course, there have been authoritarian periods—Turkey is going through one now—but you still see a certain resilience. The fact that 15 million people, after Istanbul Mayor Imamoglu was arrested, signed a petition to have him declared the candidate of the main opposition party is an incredible demonstration of people’s stake in the democratic system.

So, what’s happening is very interesting. On the one hand, underneath, there is this democratic culture. Again, I don’t want to exaggerate—it’s not perfect. But whose democratic system is perfect these days? Everything exists on a scale. What has happened in Turkey, however, is that Erdogan has essentially transformed the country into a, quote-unquote, “competitive authoritarian” system. Elections still take place, outcomes are largely determined, but there remains some element of competition. Certain offices may be won by the opposition, and the opposition can still win seats in Parliament, and so on.

But now he’s actually taking the competitive part out of competitive authoritarianism and eliminating it altogether. He is turning Turkey into a complete authoritarian system because he controls the judiciary, and judges and prosecutors essentially do whatever he wants them to do. We have seen people sent to jail for no reason whatsoever—simply because he doesn’t like them. Authorities have claimed that the main opposition party engaged in questionable practices in its primaries or conventions, and suddenly the justice system decides that leaders who were elected a few years ago should no longer hold their positions, and someone else should replace them. In other words, Erdogan is now deciding who will lead the main opposition party.

This is partly because he is clearly afraid of the current leadership, and especially of the mayor of Istanbul, who is in jail. Turkey has now become a full-blown authoritarian system, and I don’t think this is going to end well. By that, I mean authoritarian leaders always make mistakes, because there is never anyone around them to say, “Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, you shouldn’t do this; there may be consequences.” People always agree with them. So of course, mistakes are inevitable.

And I think Erdogan is already making mistakes. He has galvanized the opposition in a way that, if truly free elections were held today, he would be seriously doubted—he would not win. People can see that what he is doing is deeply unjust.

So there’s a kind of dialectic here: the system is becoming more authoritarian, but society may be resisting much more than we realize. It’s hard to see this resistance all the time because of restrictions—even on reporting. People are afraid to speak out. But at some point, this is going to break.

Imamoglu’s Jail Proves Erdogan’s Fear

Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu addresses supporters during a protest under the banner “The Nation Stands by Their Will” outside the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality on December 15, 2022. Photo: Tolga Ildun

The mass protests following Imamoglu’s arrest have been driven largely by younger generations who have never known a Turkey without Erdogan. How significant is this demographic factor in shaping the country’s political future, and do you see parallels with youth-led anti-authoritarian movements elsewhere?

Professor Henri Barkey: As I alluded to earlier, if you are 30 years old, Erdogan became your Prime Minister when you were 7 or 8 years old. I’m picking age 30 as an example, but imagine: all your conscious years you’ve seen one leader. And the other thing, of course, is that in terms of the communication systems—television, radio, newspapers—they are completely dominated by Erdogan in Turkey. So, you wake up to Erdogan, you go to bed with Erdogan.

And I’m not saying there isn’t a youth that actually supports Erdogan—there is. But there is certainly a youth that says, “Look, we would like to see somebody else.” In 2023, during the national elections, the main opposition party presented as a presidential candidate Mr. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who was unimaginative, did not appeal to the youth, and gave them no reason to galvanize. Now, for the first time in a long time, you have a leader on the opposition side. People criticize him, and that’s fine—he’s not perfect—but he has managed to capture the youth’s imagination. You see a great deal of mobilization, and that’s why they put him in jail.

Erdogan has many different court cases against him to keep him in jail. And in which country do you see a political leader arrested like this? He didn’t commit murder, he hasn’t done anything dangerous. But he has been in jail since March 19th. It’s been almost six months now, and he’ll be in jail for a very long time, because they don’t let you out—as if you were an axe murderer about to kill people. Journalists and others stay in jail for one or two years, and then suddenly maybe they decide to let you go, find you innocent, but you’ve already spent two years in jail.

We’ve seen this, of course, in the cases of the Kurdish political leader Selahattin Demirtas or the civil society leader Osman Kavala—they’ve been in jail for no reason whatsoever. And in the case of the mayor of Istanbul, they even annulled his university degree 30 years after he got it. Imagine if somebody decided to find some technicality and say, “Oh, my university degree is invalid, and therefore everything else I’ve done since then is invalid.” You can’t do that. But they come up with excuses to prevent an opponent from running against Erdogan.

The fact that Erdogan goes to such lengths to stop Imamoglu from running tells you how afraid he is of him. To me, that’s the best proof, the clearest demonstration, that he’s terrified.

Imamoglu’s Jail Time Only Raised His Standing

A photo from the mass CHP rally in Istanbul on March 29, 2025, protesting the unlawful detention of Ekrem Imamoglu, organized by party leader Ozgur Ozel. The event brought AKP and opposition supporters face to face. Photo: Elif Aytar.

Imamoglu’s repeated electoral victories and rising popularity have made him Erdogan’s most formidable rival. By imprisoning him and pursuing politically motivated trials, has Erdogan inadvertently elevated Imamoglu into a symbol of democratic resistance, similar to Erdogan’s own trajectory after his imprisonment in the late 1990s?

Professor Henri Barkey: He is smart enough to have realized that he owes his popularity, at least in part, to the fact that, as mayor of Istanbul, he was kicked out of his job and spent a short time in prison. That actually enhanced his standing. Moreover, if you remember, not in 2024 but in the previous municipal elections, Imamoglu won with a small majority. Then the Erdogan government came up with an excuse, claiming irregularities in the elections, and ordered that they be held again. People saw through it. What happened? Imamoglu won by a much larger margin against the same candidate. Why? Because people were angered by Ankara’s political interference in their choices. Even those who did not vote for Imamoglu the first time decided to vote for him the second, just to punish Erdogan.

Anyone should have learned that lesson. He hasn’t. The alternative, of course, is that he knows the lesson, and this time he intends to prevent Imamoglu from running. He will find him guilty and keep him in jail so that he can go into the next elections unopposed. He is also trying to destroy the opposition party, aiming for it to nominate, or to be led by, the candidate who ran against him in 2023, because he knows he can outmaneuver him and thinks this is the way to secure another term.

So, I think that’s his intention. I believe he’s made up his mind. He knows he can’t beat Imamoglu, but he can beat the new CHP leadership. And unfortunately, we will see a lot more people going to jail.

Erdogan Wants to Take the Competitive Part Out of Politics

Opposition party deputies, members and the members of civil society organisations had to guard the ballots for days to prevent stealing by the people organized by Erdogan regime in Turkey. The photo was shared by opposition deputy Mahmut Tanal’s Twitter account @MTanal during the Turkish local elections on March 31, 2019.

We’ve seen Erdogan’s government dismiss elected CHP mayors, replace them with trustees, and initiate corruption investigations against opposition-led municipalities. To what extent does this strategy reflect a deliberate effort to transform Turkey into a de facto one-party state, and could it ultimately backfire by strengthening opposition solidarity?

Professor Henri Barkey: I think my previous answers essentially say yes, of course. But you’ve noticed he’s now doing something else. He’s putting pressure on individual mayors of localities and forcing them to change parties and join his party. I saw today—though I forget where—that a deputy mayor was resigning from the main opposition party and joining Erdogan’s party. You can imagine the kind of pressure they must be exerting enourmous force her to do that, because it doesn’t make sense, when CHP is running high, to switch parties. But we’ve seen a number of cases like that.

So he’s not going to completely eliminate the main opposition party; he’s going to completely weaken it. He will make it what it was, let’s say, five years ago, before the opposition’s rejuvenation—when it won a few municipalities and a number of seats in Parliament, but had no influence and couldn’t do anything.

What’s very interesting is that all these corruption investigations have been initiated against opposition parties, opposition mayors, and sub-mayors. Not a single AKP mayor—or municipality—has been similarly treated. Can you really tell me there’s no corruption on the AKP side? No, but they’re all part of the system. That’s what I’m saying.

What Erdogan wants is to take the competitive part out of Turkey’s politics, because in his mind it should no longer be competitive. So it’s going to be only authoritarian. He’s turning Turkey into an authoritarian state.

Erdogan Cannot Control the Exiled Opposition Abroad

With the judiciary, media, and much of the bureaucracy subordinated to the presidency, are there any institutional safeguards left to counterbalance Erdogan’s authority? To what extent has the post-2016 purge of alleged Gulen-affiliated judges, prosecutors, academics, media, and civil servants accelerated Turkey’s democratic backsliding and hollowed out state capacity?

Professor Henri Barkey: Today the judiciary is completely under Erdogan’s control. If a judge rules in a way that Erdogan does not appreciate, he gets kicked out and sent somewhere else. The same applies to prosecutors. And there must be an internal state security apparatus that keeps tabs on all of these people, so that whenever pressure is needed, it can be applied.

So what’s left? What is the source of opposition today? I think, to a large extent, it’s the online environment—whether internet newspapers, journalists, or individuals with blogs and podcasts. Whenever Erdogan feels pressured, he tries to throttle the internet, slow it down, or impose bans on opposition networks by preventing them from broadcasting online. And they don’t have any other outlet, since they are not allowed to appear on mainstream television.

But that’s very hard to sustain all the time. It looks bad, and it can actually increase opposition if overused. When you slow down the internet, you slow it down for everyone—including people who simply want to buy things online. So it’s not clear to me that this is a viable long-term strategy. It’s more temporary and occasional. He did it this week with X, or Twitter.

So the online space remains, essentially, the main source of opposition. And you also have in Turkey a large number of journalists, academics, and public figures who are actively opposing him. This is what I meant earlier: there is still an element of democratic culture.

Now, you mentioned the Gulen movement. I know people who were professors at Gulen-owned universities. They were perfectly good academics, with international reputations, publishing internationally. They were not necessarily Gulenists. If you get a job at a university, you get it through established structures and processes. Yet all these people lost their jobs and became unemployable. That was a major blow to Turkish civil society and to the country’s intellectual world.

The Gulen movement was defeated, yes. But parts of it should not have been touched—for example, the universities. And by the way, I don’t know exactly what happened during the coup. To me, the coup remains an enigma. Maybe Gulenists were involved, but I think there were other factors as well. I suspect Erdogan knew ahead of time that a coup was coming, and when it happened, he took advantage of it. In the process, many people were smeared without due process.

This is something Turkish society will one day have to come to terms with. Gulenists who were guilty, yes—but not everyone was necessarily a Gulenist. And many suffered a great deal.

Another source of opposition, by the way, may be Turks who have emigrated to Europe. Yes, there is a large pro-Erdogan community abroad that tries to organize support. But there are also many dissenters now living in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere. They are a major source of opposition—and unlike in Turkey, Erdogan cannot control them, because he cannot throw them into jail.

You Can’t Have Democracy in Diyarbakir and Fascism in Istanbul

A Turkish man in Hyde Park, London, shows support for protesters in Istanbul following the eruption of nationwide demonstrations—Turkey’s largest anti-government unrest —challenging then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authority in June 2013. Photo credit: Ufuk Uyanik.

The PKK’s recent renunciation of armed struggle and ongoing talks involving Abdullah Ocalan and the DEM party suggest potential openings for renewed negotiations. How do you interpret Erdogan’s ambivalence toward these developments? Could a genuine Kurdish peace process pave the way for democratization, or is it more likely to be instrumentalized for political survival?

Professor Henri Barkey: To me, this is a very interesting situation because, with your question about democratization, how can you have… as a Kurdish leader once said, very correctly: you can’t have democracy in Diyarbakir and fascism in Istanbul. That is to say, what does it mean to democratize? Turkey needs to democratize. Turkey needs to deal with the Kurdish question. Turkey has to recognize that there are people who are not Turks, who have a different language, who would like to live as Turkish citizens but would also like to be able to express themselves in their own language or in any other fashion, and not have to go to jail for that.

The fact that the PKK has decided to renounce armed struggle is a good thing. They should have done it a long time ago, because the armed struggle wasn’t going anywhere. They had been completely defeated. They were just up in the northeast of Iraq, in the Qandil Mountains, stuck there with 158 Turkish bases in northern Iraq that completely dominate the area. One or two attacks a year is not what’s going to make the PKK the PKK. So the PKK was defeated, and they finally came to this realization. It’s good that they abandoned it. But I don’t think there is going to be a peace process. I don’t think this is going to go anywhere.

Because, first of all, Erdogan himself doesn’t believe in democracy. I mean, what did the opposition, the DEM party, say they want? They didn’t ask for anything specific. They would like, of course, prisoners to be released. They want to deal with what to do with the fighters who are abroad, in Iraq, who would like to be able to integrate into society. But basically, what the leadership has said so far is that they want democracy. They want to be able to participate. But this is not something Erdogan wants. Everything Erdogan is doing is, as I said, taking the “competitive” out of competitive authoritarianism and establishing a completely authoritarian state. So this is not going to work.

Now, it turns out that on the Kurdish side, the main leader who’s in jail—Ocalan—doesn’t happen to be a democrat either. So it’s a big question mark. He’s 80 years old now. He must be thinking about his legacy, and that’s why he’s trying to… but he also can’t make a deal that is going to be rejected by the democrats in Turkey. So he’s also stuck. I’m sure Erdogan’s idea was probably to convince the DEM party to vote for either a constitutional change, or more likely for early elections, that Erdogan would make sure he would win. That’s probably still his plan.

Bahceli’s Gamble on Kurdish Talks Faces Dead End

The one interesting question mark here is that, to a large extent, this whole process started with an initiative from Erdogan’s main right-wing coalition partner, the MHP, led by Devlet Bahceli, who used to be the most anti-Kurdish figure in Turkey. He said Ocalan should not be released, but should come to the Turkish Parliament and address Parliament. That was really an amazing statement by him, and he pushed the process.

I wonder if Mr. Bahçeli, who’s at the end of his life and has run the party without much to show for his years in power or as a party leader—what has he done, what has he accomplished?—maybe that was his way of creating an inheritance, if you will, for his followers: that he would bring domestic peace to Turkey. Well, if that’s his incentive, that’s fine. It doesn’t matter how you get there, as long as you do it.

So the big problem Erdogan has is: to what extent is Mr. Bahceli committed to continuing the process? And Mr. Bahceli himself must realize that, the way things are going now, the DEM party is not going to be able to make a deal with Erdogan. There will be talks—we’re going to see a commission has been created, supposedly there will be conversations—but this is not going anywhere. And in the meantime, Erdogan is destroying CHP, and this puts the DEM party in a terrible situation.

Trump Gave Erdogan Carte Blanche

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

And lastly, Professor Barkey, given Washington’s strategic interests—from NATO cohesion to cooperation with Syrian Kurdish forces—how should the US and EU respond to Erdogan’s escalating repression of the opposition? Would stronger political and economic pressure risk reinforcing his anti-Western populist narrative, or is greater confrontation inevitable?

Professor Henri Barkey: Let’s be honest here. What Erdogan has done since March would not have happened if you had a different president of the United States. Here you have Trump, who is upset about Bolsonaro getting tried, and he imposes sanctions even on the judge who is judging him. And then he has not said a word about what’s going on in Turkey. Trump doesn’t believe in democracy. Trump is only interested in himself and his own interests. So, he’s decided that he likes Erdogan, and he can do business with Erdogan, and therefore, Erdogan can do whatever he wants. And that’s what Erdogan is doing.

Let’s say Biden or Kamala Harris had been at the White House today. Erdogan would not have done any of these things, because the US government would have really pushed very hard. Whether it was investments or any other type of help that the Turks would need, they would not get.

The Turkish economy is in terrible shape. Inflation is much higher than the official figures indicate, and it’s still at 30% for a modern economy. The Turkish economy may be in better shape structurally, but I think it is still fairly dynamic. You go to Europe, you see Turkish exports everywhere—and I’m not just talking about tomatoes and agricultural products. I’m talking about sophisticated products, industrial products, electronic products. The Turkish economy has a number of advantages that probably would do a lot better with improved economic management from Ankara. But it has still managed to perform not poorly, given the circumstances.

Biden, or a Democratic president, or even a Republican president who cares about this—I mean, George Bush would have been up in arms about it. Trump has given Erdogan essentially carte blanche. And this is why we have not seen any major Turkish incursions into northern Syria.

Now, it’s not that Trump is attached to the Syrian Kurds. He couldn’t care less about them. But Trump would like to take American troops out of Syria, while also realizing that ISIS is on the mend, ISIS is getting stronger, and he doesn’t want a major ISIS insurrection again like what happened back in 2014. So he’s probably still thinking about it and has decided to reduce the number of troops, but not pull them out. As a result, Erdogan hasn’t gone into Syria.

But the truth is, the Syrian Kurds do not threaten Turkey. It’s just something in some Turks’ minds, and it’s a way of galvanizing the population behind you. The Kurdish problem in Turkey is a long-standing one, and there are many people who still don’t trust the Kurds. And Syrian Kurds are Syrians—people forget that. The Turks complain that Syrian Kurds control a large chunk of territory. Yes, they do. They happen to be Syrian Kurds, by the way. Turkey itself controls an enormous chunk of Syrian territory in the northwest—as big as Lebanon. But that’s okay, Turkey can do that. So you have these anomalies.

Erdogan is careful, because with Trump you don’t know from one day to the next how he might turn on you. So Trump is letting him do everything he wants to do in Turkey, but doesn’t want him to go into Syria and mess things up there. Fine—Erdogan can live with that. So Erdogan is quite happy.

Erdogan Thinks He Can Withstand European Pressure

The Europeans are very unhappy with what’s happening in Turkey, because they realize what Erdogan’s aims are. And you’ve had a huge exodus of Turks who’ve gone to Europe, escaping the Erdogan regime. The immigration problem from the rest of the world through Turkey to Europe has always been Erdogan’s carte majeure. But whatever Europeans do or threaten, Erdogan is going to ignore, because he essentially thinks he has maybe 6 to 12 months in which he has to focus on defanging or demolishing the opposition party. Once he is done with that, he won’t do anything else. So he thinks he can withstand European pressure for this long.

The interesting thing about Trump is that there’s a way in which people are also afraid of him because of his unpredictability and his very tough talk. It doesn’t always mean anything—the Chinese have seen it, and the Russians know exactly how to react—but they’re big powers. Everybody else is afraid. I’ll give you an example. It’s a minor one, but the day before yesterday, the Iraqi Shia militia released an American researcher, Elizabeth Tsurkov, whom they had been holding for two years. They kidnapped her. And I think the only reason they released her—and this is why Trump’s craziness pays off—is that he probably threatened the Iraqi government and said, “You don’t get this person out…” And the Iraqi government said, well, they are the Shia militias, we don’t have control over them. And he probably said, “I know you have control over them, I know you can do it, do it now.” Biden and the Kamala Harris government have not tried very hard to get her out.

So Trump’s unpredictability is why Erdogan has to be careful. As long as Trump gives him, as I said, carte blanche at home, Erdogan is very happy, and he can get away with it. What’s more important to him? Winning the election, staying in power for another term. That’s all he cares about.

So the answer to your question is that not much is going to happen. The Europeans are not going to be very successful. Now, if Turkey were to go through a major economic crisis again, with major demonstrations and instability, that could be different. But given how the whole region is at the moment, I don’t think that’s in the cards right now. The Europeans are going to continue doing some business, they’ll put some constraints on Turkish economic exchanges, but there’s only so much they can do. They can criticize the Turks, but the Turks don’t care. Or I should say, the Turkish government doesn’t care. Erdogan has essentially won.

Dr. Bjånesøy: FrP Turns Economic Frustration in Norway into Populist Momentum

September 10, 2025

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice European Observatory Home Interviews

In Norway’s September 8, 2025, general election, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s Labour Party narrowly held on to power — but the real story was the historic surge of the populist Progress Party (FrP), which doubled its vote share to 24% and became the country’s second-largest party. In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Lise Bjånesøy (University of Bergen) explains how FrP converted economic grievances into populist momentum, capitalizing on anger over wealth taxes, cost-of-living pressures, and distrust of “wasteful elites.” FrP also mobilized younger men through social media, a trend Dr. Bjånesøy calls a key driver of Norway’s new political divides.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In the wake of Norway’s September 8, 2025, general election, the country’s political landscape has been reshaped by growing polarization and the unexpected strength of the populist radical right. While Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s Labour Party narrowly secured another four years in power with 87 out of 169 seats, the populist right-wing Progress Party (FrP) achieved a historic breakthrough, doubling its vote share to 24% and becoming the second-largest party. This surge signals deep currents of economic dissatisfaction and changing voter dynamics, especially among younger men.

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Lise Bjånesøy, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Government, University of Bergen, offers insights into how FrP transformed economic frustration into populist momentum. “Economic issues, such as wealth tax and the cost of living, have been central in this election,” explains Dr. Bjånesøy. “FrP has strongly profiled itself against wasting taxpayers’ money, attracting voters dissatisfied with Labour and consolidating support among those frustrated with rising living costs.”

FrP’s success, however, goes beyond economics. Dr. Bjånesøy highlights the party’s strategic mobilization of young voters, particularly young men, driven largely by social media dynamics. “For young men who get their news from social media, there’s a 28% likelihood of voting FrP, compared to just 14% among those who don’t. Social media plays an important role in mobilizing this demographic.”

Despite this populist surge, Norway remains a centre-left outlier in the Nordic region, diverging from Sweden and Finland, where right-wing governments dominate. Dr. Bjånesøy attributes this partly to narrow electoral thresholds and coalition dynamics, as well as Labor’s recovery under Jens Stoltenberg’s return as finance minister, dubbed the “Stoltenback effect,” which boosted Labor’s popularity by 10 percentage points.

Still, she warns against underestimating FrP’s growing influence: “FrP has benefited from reduced stigma around supporting the party and has mobilized nearly all the voters who don’t dislike them. But their ability to expand further will depend on how effectively Labour manages governing alongside four smaller left-wing parties.”

Looking ahead, Dr. Bjånesøy underscores the urgent need for research on social media’s political impact, calling it a “key driver of generational divides” and shifting populist dynamics.

This interview unpacks the interplay between economic grievances, political polarization, and digital mobilization in shaping Norway’s electoral landscape — and what it reveals about the future of populism in Europe.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Lise Bjånesøy, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Economic Grievances Fuel FrP’s Surge

Two elderly men sit on the street in front of a café in Oslo, Norway, asking for alms on August 1, 2013. This image symbolizes the indifference of society and the state toward poverty. Photo: Medvedeva Oxana.

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: The general elections on Monday (September 8, 2025) saw Labour narrowly retain power while the populist radical right Progress Party (FrP) nearly doubled its vote share to 24%. From your research, what explains FrP’s electoral surge despite being historically the most disliked party in Norway?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: It’s a very good question. I think there are quite a few reasons why the Progress Party (FrP) has been doing so well in this election. First of all, it has been the loudest opposition party to the current government, which helps them attract voters dissatisfied with the Labour government as well as generally discontented voters.

Second, economic issues have been a very important part of this election. It’s been a big, salient topic, and the FrP has benefited from that focus. Another significant factor is that they have gained many voters from the Conservative Party. In fact, a lot of people who previously voted Conservative now support the Progress Party. At least that’s what we’ve seen in earlier data. We’ll have to wait, of course, for the post-election data collection, but when we conducted a large survey in June, we found that 50% of those who said they intended to vote for the Progress Party had previously supported the Conservatives.

Another reason is that they attract more young voters, particularly young men, and social media seems to play an important mobilizing role for this group.

Regarding the Progress Party’s reputation as a very disliked party — which it still is within the Norwegian political system — I think this suggests they may now have mobilized almost all the voters they can. In other words, they’ve consolidated support among those who don’t dislike them, but they remain a highly unpopular party overall.

Media analyses describe the rise of FrP as part of the “MAGA-fication” of Norwegian politics, particularly among young male voters. To what extent does FrP’s messaging reflect a broader Americanization of populist rhetoric, and how much is it rooted in domestic Norwegian grievances?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: That’s a good question. First of all, I think it’s very interesting how a Norwegian election campaign is perceived in other countries. I’ve not heard the word MAGA-fication in any Norwegian newspapers, and I don’t think we would use that term to describe what is going on in Norway. So, I don’t think we can take it that far as being a MAGA-fication. Although the FrP did very well in this election — historically well, indeed — and they are attracting young men in particular, I still don’t think I would use the word MAGA-fication. I think, as you say, the success of the Progress Party in this election can be explained by domestic Norwegian grievances rather than any Americanization of populist rhetoric.

There has been one incident that perhaps comes a little close to the Americanization of populist rhetoric, and that was just a few days before the election, or very close to election night. There was a televised political debate where the leader of the Progress Party, Sylvi Listhaug, blamed the leader of the AUF, the youth wing of the Labour Party, for being a notorious liar, and she repeated over and over again that he is a liar, ‘you’re lying’. This was based on a relatively normal political statement, and yet she labelled him a liar. The Prime Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, who was also part of that debate, responded by saying, essentially, “Okay, so you want to become Prime Minister, but you can’t talk like this.” That, he implied, would represent a new turn for Norway.

So, I think that might be one of those rare events that could be described as an Americanization of populist rhetoric. But other than that, we haven’t really seen this pattern; it hasn’t been a major part of the election campaign, at least in my view.

Norwegian farmers protest government agricultural policies outside parliament in Oslo. Banner targets former Agriculture Minister Sylvi Listhaug. Photo: Dreamstime.

FrP Capitalizes on Economic Anger While Labour Leans on Stoltenberg Boost

The campaign was dominated by debates on the cost of living, wealth taxes, the oil fund’s investment in Israel, and relations with Donald Trump. How did FrP successfully own these issues and deploy populist frames contrasting “the people” with “corrupt elites” or “globalist priorities”?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: The economic issues you mentioned, such as wealth tax and cost of living, are very important political issues for the Progress Party. They attract voters who are against the wealth tax, for instance. The high salience of this issue can probably help explain some of the gains and some of the success of the Progress Party in this election. Another example is that they have strongly profiled themselves as being against wasting taxpayers’ money. On the cost of living, they argue that the current government spends far too much of the taxpayers’ money and simply wastes it away. These have been two key issues for the Progress Party and their voters.

However, issues such as foreign policy and relations with Donald Trump are among the reasons why Labour did so well in this election. It never became quite clear during the campaign whether Listhaug would be a candidate for Prime Minister. She never explicitly said she wanted to be, but she repeated that it was natural for the party with the highest share of votes to take the Prime Minister position. So, it was never a clear yes or no. This created debate about whether she would do a good job as a potential Prime Minister, especially when it came to foreign policy and representing Norwegian interests in relation to Donald Trump, for example. So, I think some of these issues were very good for the Progress Party, but issues like foreign policy worked in favour of Labour and the current government.

Labour’s rebound has been attributed in part to the “Stoltenback effect,” boosting Labour’s popularity by 10 percentage points following Jens Stoltenberg’s return as finance minister. Do you see this as evidence of leadership personalization countering populist momentum, or does it simply mask deeper structural shifts favouring PRR parties?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: There are several reasons that can explain this boosted popularity of the Labour Party. One of the reasons is the one you mentioned — the Stoltenback effect — as we got Jan Stoltenberg back as finance minister. But it’s also important to mention that it was the current Prime Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, who brought Stoltenberg back. So, it was also a boost in popularity for him, showing good leadership skills by bringing Stoltenberg back.

Another important issue is that the agrarian Centre Party, which had previously been in a coalition with the Labour Party, left the government coalition. So now, the Labour Party holds government power alone. It was a minority government, and I think that was very good for Labour.

A third explanation is foreign policy and Trump, as we just talked about. We want competent and highly experienced politicians to navigate this sort of uncertain political world that we are living in.

Finally, I think it’s quite exceptional how the Labour Party — and the current government — was so unpopular for a long time because the economy was performing poorly, yet they still managed to retain power. It makes this quite an exceptional election. A fourth contributing factor is that while the economy had been doing really badly, it is now performing much better. So, they have managed to turn the economy around to a better situation for people.

Norway Balances Populist Surge with Centre-Left Resilience

Despite FrP’s strong gains, Norway remains a centre-left outlier compared to Sweden and Finland. Based on your work on political tolerance, why has Norway diverged from this broader Nordic trend, and what factors have enabled it to resist a full populist breakthrough despite growing polarization?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: It’s important to emphasize that the results of this current election would have looked different if the Green Party, which is part of the left-wing bloc, had not passed the electoral threshold, and if the Liberal Party, which is part of the right-wing bloc, had passed it. In that case, this election could still have been a win for the right-wing bloc. But it ultimately ended up being a win for the left-wing bloc.

One key reason for this outcome is that the Green Party, for the first time, passed the electoral threshold and received what’s called utjevningsmandat — additional seats in the Storting (Norwegian parliament). However, it’s also important to emphasize that the Labour Party, which is now most likely continuing as a minority government, will have to navigate the next four years with four smaller parties. This could prove very challenging and, in fact, represents something of a dream opportunity for the Progress Party, which will likely benefit from Labour having to cooperate with these four much smaller left-wing parties.

Considering how well the Progress Party performed in this election, I don’t think Norway is an outlier, because we see two dynamics unfolding simultaneously. On one hand, there is a clear right-wing wave and a significant boost for the Progress Party; on the other, there is continued support for the current government. These trends coexist, but in the end, the results largely come down to the margins of which parties managed to pass — or failed to pass — the electoral threshold.

In your dissertation, you argue that FrP is both politically tolerated and highly negatively evaluated. How do you reconcile this paradox, particularly in the light of FrP’s breakthrough in the 2025 election?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: I think real tolerance is to allow democratic rights and privileges to those you dislike or disagree with. In that sense, it’s perhaps not a paradox; the Progress Party is still disliked, but we still see high tolerance of the party. However, based on these high levels of dislike for the FrP, the Progress Party might have reached its electoral high at this point. Maybe there are no more voters to mobilize. That said, this can change in the next election. We have seen that the levels of dislike for the Progress Party fluctuate. If I remember correctly, the highest levels were above 60%, and now about 55% of voters dislike the party. So, slightly fewer voters now dislike the party than before. A few more also tend to like it, but this can change.

Still, because of these very high levels of dislike towards the Progress Party, it can be hard for them to mobilize even more voters than they already have. Another important point when discussing the dislike of the Progress Party is that they have to collaborate. If the right-wing bloc had won the election, they would have had to work with parties whose voters dislike them. For the Liberal Party, for instance, many of its voters dislike the Progress Party, which makes collaboration difficult, or at least quite challenging, for a potential governing bloc. For some voters, it would be hard to accept cooperation with the Progress Party. Especially if we go back to the example where Listhaug called the youth wing leader of the Labour Party a liar, a notorious liar — that kind of rhetoric is very difficult for the Liberal Party to accept.

Less Stigma, Digital Mobilization, and a Generational Shift

Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) campaign booth. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your findings show that party institutionalization influences public tolerance of the populist radical right. Given FrP’s long-standing presence in Norway’s political system, does this institutional legitimacy insulate it from the broader backlash against far-right parties elsewhere in Europe?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: This might actually be another reason why the Progress Party did very well in this election. There has been less stigma connected towards voting FrP in this election compared to elections before. It seems like it’s more acceptable to say that you are a Progress Party voter than it has been before. This is not based on data — this is just my hunch — and we haven’t seen this in the data yet, but my hunch says that there is actually less stigma directed towards being a Progress Party voter than there has been before.

One reason might be that the party has moderated itself, particularly after the past government experience. The government experience that they have had might also contribute to less stigma towards them. However, voters still didn’t want Sylvi Listhaug as Prime Minister. That was part of the political debate in this election — whether she was going to be a Prime Minister or not — and most voters didn’t want her as Prime Minister.

So, I don’t think that any political parties are immune to backlash. But I think that the Progress Party benefits a lot from the current political situation, when the Støre government will have to cooperate with these four smaller parties on the left. I think the next election in four years will be extremely exciting. It will be very interesting to see how well the Progress Party does then. Maybe they will get an even better boost of votes — we’ll have to see.

With FrP performing especially well among younger male voters, do you see signs of a generational realignment in Norwegian politics, or is this a temporary reaction to specific economic and identity-based issues?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: In this election, we have seen that young men turn to FrP, while young women turn to the left. That’s a sign of increased polarization among young people — men go one way, and young women go the other. One of the things we’ve seen in our data — we’ve analysed data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel, where we have around 10,000 participants — is that we can look in more detail at how young men and young women vote.

What we’ve found using those data is that both young women and young men actually have an increased likelihood of voting for the Progress Party if they get their news from social media. For young men, there is a 28% likelihood of voting FrP if they get their news from social media. And if you are a young man who does not get your news from social media, there’s only a 14% chance that you will vote for the Progress Party. It’s a huge boost in the likelihood of voting FrP if you are a young man and get your news from social media.

We find the same pattern among young women as well, but it’s a much weaker relationship, so it’s particularly strong among young men. We also find that young men who get their news from social media tend to place themselves further to the right, and they are more dissatisfied with the economy. So, in that case, we can say they’re not being “tricked” into voting for the Progress Party — they genuinely agree with them.

Of course, it might be that those who place themselves further to the right and want to vote for the Progress Party are also those who tend to get their news from social media. But still, I think there’s something going on with social media that is an important explanation for what’s happening among young men.

I also don’t think this is just a temporary shift. But I think we need to learn more about what’s going on, particularly in this case, and also study more closely what’s happening on social media. We’ll just have to wait — we need a lot more research on this particular topic — but there are definitely some very interesting dynamics unfolding among the young.

Positive Views on Immigration Hold

In your 2019 article, you found that public attitudes toward asylum seekers shifted after the 2015 refugee crisis. Has the 2025 campaign, particularly debates on Gaza and Ukraine, triggered similar shifts in threat perceptions and migrant-related framing?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: Immigration issues were not a big part of this election campaign. So, in that case, there was no particular reason to expect any shift in public attitudes based on the campaign itself. But I think it’s interesting how we still remain quite positive towards immigration after receiving a large number of refugees from Ukraine, especially. This means that we did not see the same shift in public attitudes as we did during the 2015 refugee crisis when Norway also received a significant number of refugees.

Looking at trends and opinion data collected in the Norwegian Citizen Panel, we see that 51% of respondents think that immigration is an advantage, which is actually exactly the same level as in 2014. Back then, 51% also said that they viewed immigration positively. So, while the trend fluctuates somewhat over time, at this point, it stands at the same level as when we first started measuring it in 2014.

However, on some other questions we examine, more people today say that they think it should be more difficult to get asylum. We also see an increase in people who believe that the conditions for integrating refugees in Norway are bad, or at least not very good. So, there is some movement and some shifts in attitudes towards immigration and asylum seekers, but I haven’t seen anything specific related to this current election.

Social Media’s Role Needs Deeper Investigation

Your research suggests media framing can normalize exclusionary populist narratives. To what extent did the Norwegian media in 2025 amplify FrP’s populist discourse, and does this signal a shift toward mainstreaming radical right rhetoric?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: That’s a whole research question in itself. Based on what I’ve seen, we had quite a fair election campaign, where the various political parties participated in debates and were given the same opportunities on the same media platforms to debate. But we have been very interested, both in research and in the media, in what’s going on with young men in this election. However, I haven’t seen the same level of interest in young women. So, we have some shifts in the media that affect our focus, I guess. Maybe I would like to see more attention paid to what’s going on with young women as well.

FrP has gained a lot of media attention, particularly because they were doing very well in the polls, so it was natural to be interested in that, but also because they were performing strongly among young men. So, we’ve seen this increase in media attention, but I do think that, if anything, we should pay even more attention to what’s happening on social media. And that would be my hunch, based on your question.

And lastly, looking ahead, what research agenda do you see as most urgent for understanding the evolving relationship between populist radical right parties, public opinion, and democratic resilience in Norway and across Europe?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: I’ve probably also given away what I think is one of the most important areas to focus on now. One of the key research agendas going forward is to learn more about what is happening on social media — how we are affected by it, or not affected by it, and how our experiences on these platforms differ. The algorithms give us more of the content that we already like, and we need to understand what effects this has on political participation, both in Norway and across Europe. I believe this is a very important research agenda, as we currently know too little about the effects of social media on politics.

Chloé Ridel, Member of the European Parliament from the Socialist Group and Rapporteur for transnational repression, during her interview with ECPS’s Selcuk Gultasli. Photo: Umit Vurel.

EP Rapporteur Ridel: EU Should Expand Sanctions Regime to Effectively Target Transnational Repression

July 17, 2025

by ECPS_admin Digital-populism Editor’s Choice European Observatory Home Human Rights Interviews

In an exclusive interview with ECPS, MEP Chloé Ridel, rapporteur for the European Parliament’s forthcoming report on transnational repression, underscores the urgent need for the EU to confront transnational repression—state-organized efforts by authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran to silence critics abroad. Ridel calls for expanding the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime to explicitly include transnational repression and highlights the procedural challenge posed by unanimity voting: “The only people we manage to sanction are mostly Russian… we will have difficulties applying the values we believe in.” She stresses that this is a human rights, security, and democratic issue requiring coordination, oversight of enablers, and stronger protection for vulnerable groups.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a context of intensifying authoritarian encroachment beyond national borders, transnational repression has emerged as a growing threat to Europe’s democratic integrity, sovereignty, and human rights commitments. Authoritarian regimes—including Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran—have refined techniques of intimidation and control targeting exiles, dissidents, and diaspora communities residing in democratic states, employing legal tools such as Interpol Red Notices, coercion-by-proxy against relatives, and increasingly sophisticated forms of digital harassment. In her capacity as rapporteur for the European Parliament’s forthcoming report on transnational repression, MEP Chloé Ridel of the Socialists and Democrats Group has foregrounded the urgency of a robust, coordinated European response.

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), MEP Ridel makes a compelling case for expanding the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime to address transnational repression explicitly. She explains that “there is already an EU sanctions regime that exists, and we want this regime to also apply to states that commit transnational repression.” MEP Ridel’s recommendation is clear: the EU must recognize transnational repression as a distinct pattern of authoritarian interference, codify it in sanctions policy, and ensure it can be enforced consistently across Member States.

MEP Ridel is also critical of the procedural obstacles that blunt the effectiveness of EU sanctions, pointing to the unanimity requirement that has resulted in skewed enforcement patterns: “The only people we manage to sanction are mostly Russian; 70% of those sanctioned under the EU sanctions regime are from Russia.” Without reforms enabling qualified majority voting for sanctions decisions, she warns, “we will have difficulties applying the values we believe in on human rights.”

This approach, MEP Ridel emphasizes, is inseparable from broader efforts to coordinate intelligence, protect vulnerable groups such as women, human rights defenders, and hold enablers—particularly social media platforms—accountable. “States rely on enablers such as social media platforms and spyware businesses, and these enablers must also be held accountable,” she argues. In advocating for expert focal points on transnational repression in both EU delegations and national administrations, Ridel calls for the EU to develop institutional expertise to “help victims of transnational repression” who often “don’t even know they are victims” until attacked.

This interview provides an incisive analysis of the tools and frameworks required to confront transnational repression effectively. EP rapporteur Ridel’s proposals offer a principled roadmap for embedding human rights and democratic sovereignty at the heart of EU foreign and security policy.

Chloé Ridel, Member of the European Parliament from the Socialist Group and EP Rapporteur for transnational repression.

Here is the transcript of our interview with MEP Chloé Ridel, edited lightly for readability.

Transnational Repression Must Be Defined Properly

Chloé Ridel, thank you very much for joining our interview series. First of all, can you please tell us about the fate of the report? You submitted it to the subcommittee on human rights. What will happen next?

MEP Chloé Ridel: I submitted my draft report in June to the Committee on Human Rights, which is a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee here in the European Parliament. Time was then allowed for other political groups to table amendments, which will be discussed throughout September. We will have a vote in the Foreign Affairs Committee in October, followed by the final vote in the plenary session of the European Parliament at the end of November.

Your draft report acknowledges the lack of a universally accepted definition of transnational repression. How should the EU conceptualize this phenomenon in legal and policy terms, especially considering the practices of regimes like Turkey, Iran, China, and Russia, to ensure both legal precision and operational flexibility?

MEP Chloé Ridel: Yes, you’re absolutely right. There is no definition of transnational repression in EU law or international law. Recently, the UN adopted a definition for transnational repression because it’s a growing phenomenon, as I tried to describe in my report. So, I suggest an EU definition for transnational repression because if we don’t know what it is, we cannot fight it properly. We define transnational repression as “state-organized actions that cross borders to coerce, control, or silence individuals through physical, legal, or digital means.”

This is a growing and quite concentrated phenomenon: 80% of all transnational repression actions are committed by just 10 states. Among these states are China, Turkey, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Russia. It is committed by authoritarian regimes that seek to silence members of their diaspora, political opponents, or journalists. For the EU, it’s a significant challenge because it constitutes foreign interference, is a security matter, and targets human rights defenders whom we have an interest in protecting — and we are not doing enough to protect them.

Transnational Repression Is a Security Issue, a Human Rights Issue, and a Democratic Issue

Given that transnational repression by authoritarian and repressive regimes blurs the lines between external authoritarian influence and internal security threats, should the EU frame this challenge primarily as a human rights issue, a security concern, or a hybrid phenomenon demanding an integrated policy response?

MEP Chloé Ridel: I think this is all of it at once. It is a human rights issue, of course, because it targets human rights defenders, and I will return to that. It is also a security and sovereignty issue because we cannot accept that foreign authoritarian regimes come to our streets to threaten people who are legal residents and under our protection. It becomes a threat to us as well. Unfortunately, transnational repression continues to occur in Europe. It includes physical threats, poisoning, and digital surveillance. Take the example of the Russian diaspora: after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, more than 90 Russian journalist agencies came to Europe to continue their work freely. It is in our interest to protect these journalists because they are the last free Russian journalists in the world, and they still speak to the Russian people. We know that Putin expands his power by controlling people’s minds, and if we want to fight this kind of war with Putin, we need free journalism that can still speak to the Russian people back home. So yes, it is a security issue, a human rights issue, and also a democratic issue.

EU’s Digital Services Act Must Hold Platforms Accountable

Authoritarian regimes including China, Russia, Turkey and Iran have weaponized digital platforms to target exiles. How can the EU ensure that the Digital Services Act is effectively enforced to mitigate these risks, particularly protecting vulnerable groups like women human rights defenders from online harassment orchestrated by authoritarian actors?

MEP Chloé Ridel: As you pointed out very well, digital transnational repression is growing and authoritarian regimes use social media to harass opponents, often targeting women, sometimes through the circulation of sexualized content. This is a specific and growing form of violence, and social media platforms are enabling it. They are not doing enough to prevent transnational repression online, and they should. By companies, I mean the platforms themselves, because they now constitute major public spaces where public debate happens.

We need rules because we cannot have such impactful public spaces controlled by private companies without oversight. In Europe, we voted for a strong legislative framework, the Digital Services Act (DSA), but we are still waiting for it to be effectively enforced. For example, an investigation was opened against X (formerly Twitter) two years ago, but there are still no conclusions or sanctions, despite clear violations of the DSA—there is no content moderation, widespread disinformation, and manipulation of algorithms to boost certain types of content. We need effective enforcement of the DSA to hold these big companies accountable. While transnational repression is state-organized, states rely on enablers, such as social media platforms and spyware businesses, and these enablers must also be held accountable for that repression.

Iran, Egypt, Turkey and Tajikistan are notorious for coercion-by-proxy, targeting relatives of exiles to silence dissent abroad. What practical measures can the EU adopt to recognize, document, and respond to this diffuse and intimate form of repression?

MEP Chloé Ridel: You are right, transnational repression can occur when authoritarian regimes target family members who remain in the home country while someone goes abroad to seek exile or refuge. And it’s very difficult. Currently, the EU does not protect family members who may be threatened by authoritarian regimes simply because they are related to a prominent human rights defender or similar figure. So, I think we should enable the EU program called ProtectDefenders.eu to also protect family members of a defender, not just the defender themselves, because we know that authoritarian regimes use threats against family to repress human rights defenders.

A Coordinated EU Response Needed to Stop Abuse of Red Notices

Given that Turkey, Russia, and China systematically abuse Interpol Red Notices and extradition treaties to pursue political exiles, what reforms should the EU promote within its judicial cooperation frameworks and at Interpol to prevent instrumentalization while safeguarding legitimate law enforcement cooperation?

MEP Chloé Ridel: The abuse of Interpol Red Notices is a very important matter for me, and it’s a key part of my report because, as you mentioned, even though Interpol is aware of abuses, the problem persists. Authoritarian regimes continue to send or request Red Notices against human rights defenders, even though these notices are supposedly intended to target terrorists or very serious criminals. For example, there are currently more than 200 Red Notices from Tajikistan targeting human rights defenders living in the EU. So, we need to raise awareness among member states not to arrest or execute these notices and to develop a coordinated EU response on this issue.

In my report, I suggest that transnational repression be included in Europol’s mandate, so that Europol can assess the relevance of Red Notices when they target human rights defenders and provide assessments to member states, exerting pressure on national governments not to execute abusive Red Notices.

For example, there was the case of an Iranian activist in Italy in 2017 who was arrested based on a Red Notice from Iran and later freed. There was also the case of Paul Watson, an environmental activist defending whales, who was targeted by a Red Notice from Japan. He could live freely in France and Germany but was ultimately arrested by Denmark based on this Red Notice. What kind of coordination is this? He was eventually freed, but only after months in jail, and clearly the Red Notice against him was abusive.

We need to stop this abuse, and one way to do so is to involve the EU—not by giving the EU the power to execute Red Notices, which remains a national competence—but by enabling it to assess and declare when a Red Notice is abusive and should not be executed.

“We Must Coordinate at EU Level to Tackle Transnational Repression”

How can the EU promote harmonization of national legal frameworks to ensure that no Member State becomes a permissive jurisdiction or “safe haven” for authoritarian actors from regimes such as Belarus or Egypt, while respecting national sovereignty and legal diversity?

MEP Chloé Ridel: We need more coordination at the EU level to tackle transnational repression. Transnational repression should be more widely discussed among ministers of internal affairs, security, foreign affairs, and heads of state as well. It was discussed recently at the G7 forum, and it is a matter for all democracies because we can see a kind of authoritarian internationalism building itself, notably through transnational repression, where authoritarian regimes help each other control, coerce, and silence their political opposition. We have an interest in protecting this political opposition because they are sometimes the last free voices of civil society in some countries.

We need to do more to coordinate at the European level and to raise awareness at the European level. Sometimes I have noticed during my work on this report that security services have difficulty assessing and recognizing transnational repression. So, I suggested in my report having an expert on transnational repression in each security administration in each member state—a contact point or something like that. For instance, this exists in Canada, Australia, and the US, where they have teams specifically responsible for transnational repression involving many different ministries. It is important that we build expertise within each nation on transnational repression and that all of this be coordinated at the European level.

Oppressive states like Turkey and China often use religious, cultural, and educational institutions abroad as instruments of covert surveillance and influence. How should EU policy distinguish and regulate these activities to protect democratic norms without stigmatizing legitimate diaspora engagement?

MEP Chloé Ridel: Sure. I think this is indeed a problem, and we need to control funds that go to religious institutions, for instance. We cannot allow authoritarian or adverse regimes to fund NGOs or religious institutions on European soil without oversight of how those funds are used. This is something we must address because it’s a growing and concerning phenomenon.

Prevent Discrimination and Promote Integration to Counter Radicalization

Given that authoritarian regimes actively manipulate divisions within diasporas—for example, Turkey’s polarization of Turkish communities in Europe—how should EU integration and anti-radicalization strategies respond to these fractures to avoid inadvertently amplifying authoritarian influence?

MEP Chloé Ridel: This is another topic—it’s not transnational repression per se, but rather manipulation of diasporas to harm a country or create conflict. We can see it in my country, France, where there is a Turkish association called the Grey Wolves, a very dangerous group that was ultimately banned and dissolved. It’s an example because there were violent demonstrations by members of this group, and they exerted a kind of control over the Turkish diaspora in France, dictating how they should behave, which also prevented good integration into French society for Turkish immigrants.

We need to fight back and have state solutions against such extremist associations. We must also ensure that public services and integration services—through work, language learning, and civic values—are available so that we can prevent radicalization. Radicalization happens when there is discrimination; extremists target marginalized people and say, “France is discriminating against you, it doesn’t want you here, so you should abide by this ideology instead.” To prevent that, we must prevent discrimination and ensure that these individuals feel part of the national community in Europe. It’s a matter of integration to fight radicalization, and also a security matter: to be able to identify and prohibit such associations and groups when they form, if they are dangerous.

Coordinated EU Action Key to Protecting Rights Defenders

Your report recommends focal points on human rights defenders within EU delegations. What skills, mandates, and resources will these officers need to respond effectively to transnational repression, particularly from aggressive regimes like Russia and China, in high-risk environments?

MEP Chloé Ridel: It’s important that we have contact points in every EU delegation throughout the world that can gather information on how authoritarian regimes exert transnational repression. Coordination is key to fighting this growing phenomenon. We need contact points both in EU delegations and in each national administration, and through the exchange of information we can tackle it. We are stronger together in Europe; if we gather information and experts across different countries and Europe plays a coordinating role, we can collect valuable intelligence and help victims of transnational repression. Sometimes they don’t even know they are victims—there are people being followed or surveilled until the day they are attacked; people who have spyware on their phones and don’t know it because they are not trained in cybersecurity.

In my report, I want to incentivize and raise awareness about spyware, to emphasize that, first, the EU should ban the export of spyware technologies produced in Europe to authoritarian regimes, because we know this will be used against us and against human rights defenders on our soil. We should also, when we know that a human rights defender is at risk of transnational repression, say: come to our office, we will explain a few security rules to you as a matter of prevention so you can regularly check your phones or computers to ensure there is no spyware, because nowadays it’s very easy to hide spyware on a phone or computer.

And lastly, do you see a role for the EU in spearheading an international legal instrument specifically addressing transnational repression, modeled on Magnitsky-style sanctions, to confront regimes such as Belarus, Saudi Arabia, China and Turkey? How might this enhance global accountability and norm-setting?

Chloé Ridel: Actually, there is already an EU sanctions regime that exists and we want this regime to also apply to states that commit transnational repression. So, I call in my report to enlarge the EU sanctions regime so that it effectively targets transnational repression. There is also a longstanding demand from our group, the Socialists and Democrats group, that EU sanctions be decided by qualified majority and not unanimity, because with unanimity, often you go nowhere. The only people we manage to sanction are mostly Russian; 70% of those sanctioned under the EU sanctions regime are from Russia. I’m sure many more countries I’ve described to you could be sanctioned in the name of human rights and under the EU sanctions regime. So, if we don’t move toward qualified majority, we will have difficulties applying the values we believe in on human rights.

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz, a leading scholar of political communication at the Faculty of Management and Social Communication, Jagiellonian University.

Professor Kasprowicz: Despite Polarization and Populist Gains, Poland’s Democratic Potential Remains Intact

July 9, 2025

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice European Observatory Home Interviews

In an in-depth interview with ECPS, Professor Dominika Kasprowicz of Jagiellonian University offers a measured assessment of Poland’s political trajectory following Karol Nawrocki’s narrow presidential victory. While acknowledging the rise of populism and deepening polarization, she maintains that “there is still substantial democratic potential within the system and society.” Professor Kasprowicz highlights the role of affective campaigning, the normalization of populist narratives, and the growing impact of disinformation as structural challenges to liberal democracy. Yet, she points to the resilience of civil society—especially youth and feminist movements—as a critical bulwark against authoritarian drift. “Civic involvement is one of the most important factors behind societal resilience,” she argues, emphasizing the importance of renewed mobilization in the face of rising illiberalism.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging and analytically rich conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Dominika Kasprowicz—a leading scholar of political communication at the Faculty of Management and Social Communication, Jagiellonian University—offers a nuanced assessment of Poland’s evolving political terrain in the aftermath of Karol Nawrocki’s narrow presidential victory. While acknowledging the rise of populist narratives and affective polarization, she resists the notion that Poland has definitively succumbed to democratic backsliding. “In spite of the many political turbulences along the way,” she states, “I’m convinced there is still substantial democratic potential within the system and society.”

Professor Kasprowicz contends that although Nawrocki’s victory signals a “U-turn” from recent liberal governance, it must be viewed within a broader cycle of disillusionment with the ruling coalition and not solely as an affirmation of authoritarian consolidation. Rather than reading the outcome as a clear-cut shift toward autocracy, she underscores the resilience of democratic institutions and civil society, pointing to the alternation of power as a key indicator: “We saw it happen after the 2023 parliamentary elections, and the recent presidential election also demonstrated this.”

The interview also engages with the civilizational framing and symbolic politics that increasingly shape Polish electoral behavior. Professor Kasprowicz highlights how Nawrocki’s campaign “aligned—both in tone and policy—with figures like Donald Trump and, at times, Viktor Orbán,” tapping into deep-seated cultural cleavages and reframing electoral appeals through affective channels rather than technocratic reasoning. Against this backdrop, she observes that emotions have overtaken policy in shaping political allegiance: “Mr. Nawrocki’s emotionally driven strategy proved more effective… even moderate voters seemed to seek a more assertive, emotionally resonant message.”

Still, Professor Kasprowicz cautions against overlooking structural forces, particularly foreign information manipulation (FIMI), which she describes as “a third actor” in recent Polish elections. Poland, she argues, has become a “testing ground” for new forms of disinformation that remain understudied and underacknowledged politically.

Yet amid the challenges, Professor Kasprowicz finds hope in civil society—particularly youth movements, feminist organizations, and rights-based NGOs. Despite prior government hostility, she emphasizes their enduring relevance: “Engaged, well-trained, highly capable, and deeply connected to European and global networks,” these actors form the backbone of what she terms Poland’s social resilience. Whether this will suffice to resist authoritarian normalization remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: the democratic story in Poland is far from over.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Dominika Kasprowicz, edited lightly for readability.

This Is Not the End of Polish Democracy

President-elect Karol Nawrocki campaigning ahead of Poland’s 2025 presidential election in Łódź, Poland, on April 27, 2024. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you interpret Karol Nawrocki’s narrow presidential victory within the broader trajectory of democratic backsliding in Poland? Does it reflect a recalibration of populist dominance despite the 2023 parliamentary setback for PiS, or does it suggest the consolidation of a hybrid regime model that blends electoral competitiveness with authoritarian resilience?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: That’s a very interesting and complex question that has several underpinnings. To answer it, we should start from the very beginning.

As of mid-2025, Poland as a country—and Poles as a society—are in an unprecedented situation and facing unprecedented global circumstances. I believe that the overarching evaluation of both the society and the political system proves that it’s not as bad as is occasionally suggested in the media, particularly across electronic and online outlets.

Let me begin with a brief reminder that for years, especially in terms of economic growth and political developments, Poland has been seen as a frontrunner among the then-new EU Member States. In spite of the many political turbulences along the way, I’m convinced there is still substantial democratic potential within the system and society.

To support this, I would point out that despite the growing cleavage and deepening political polarization, we still observe alternation of power. We saw it happen after the 2023 parliamentary elections, and the recent presidential election also demonstrated this. The course of events suggests that, while the notion of democratic backsliding is certainly a valid concern, at this moment I would not find enough persuasive arguments to fully agree with that interpretation.

Nevertheless, the result of the presidential election—and the victory of Mr. Karol Nawrocki—is clearly a U-turn, following just a few years of a pro-European, more liberal government in power. It was a narrow but decisive win for opposing narratives.

What we often emphasize when commenting on presidential elections in Poland is that, while it’s certainly about the politicians and candidates, it is mostly about the government in power at that time. What I mean is that, to better understand the wider context of this victory—or the lack of victory—it’s crucial to consider the performance or underperformance of the current government.

This growing sense of disillusionment and the slow but steady loss of public support for the coalition government were clearly reflected in the presidential election. Of course, that’s not the only reason for the 2025 electoral outcome, but without including that variable in the analysis, it’s very difficult to fully understand what actually happened.

Civilizational Realignment and Shifting Cleavages Are Redefining Polish Politics

To what extent did Nawrocki’s ideologically coherent messaging and symbolic alignment with figures such as Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán transcend conventional party cleavages and reconfigure voter alignments along deeper cultural or civilizational lines?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: It’s an interesting question, because since the early 2000s, what we see in Poland is shifting cleavages and changing trajectories. Until then, it was quite obvious—there was a post-communist versus pro-European sentiment among the electorate. Since the early 2000s, when the formerly aligned center and right-leaning parties became the two main opponents, these cleavages have been changing. This shift is actually happening, and the direction and dynamic are quite interesting.

Over the past 25 years, we’ve seen quite a lot of empirically driven studies and commentary pointing to changing moods and trends within the Polish electorate. Nevertheless, the cleavage I believe is now most salient is the one between traditional and liberal lifestyles, and between more socially oriented or liberal economic worldviews.

What is somewhat surprising—or at least unexpected—is the combination of pro-social yet traditional lifestyle attitudes found on the right or among the populist radical right. In contrast, what is more centrist and liberal in terms of economic views—and pro-European, pro-progressive—belongs to the parties currently governing, including centrist and what remains of the left in Poland.

You asked about civilizational realignment. During the electoral campaign, these were indeed prominent reference points, particularly emphasized by Mr. Nawrocki, who frequently aligned—both in tone and policy—with figures like Donald Trump and, at times, Viktor Orbán. It’s important, however, to analyze these two associations separately. Regarding the US and Donald Trump: beyond personal sympathies, Mr. Nawrocki was, in fact, the only candidate in the campaign to be received—albeit briefly—at the White House. Nevertheless, the meeting did take place.

We must keep in mind Poland’s geopolitical situation—as a country on the so-called eastern flank of the EU and NATO. Despite recent political turbulence in the US, Poland has very limited room for maneuver when it comes to security policy. Poland has long been a close ally of the US. Our NATO membership and the US military presence in this part of Europe have been critically important. I believe both candidates—whether openly or subtly—aligned themselves with the American ally. So, I don’t think anyone here was particularly surprised by Mr. Nawrocki’s open and positive stance toward the US and its president. This broader global security context played a significant role.

When it comes to the Hungarian case and Viktor Orbán, it’s no secret that the former government—as well as the outgoing President Mr. Duda and the Law and Justice Party—maintained friendly relations with Orbán and his party. However, if you look at the actions taken in the European Parliament or the European Commission, the relationship was not always as smooth or friendly as campaign rhetoric might suggest.

Still, the model of strong, charismatic populist leadership remains a point of reference for Mr. Nawrocki—and likely will continue to be. But again, we should take a step back and view the situation from a distance.

Just to remind you: Prime Minister Donald Tusk, later this year, visited Serbia and was actively involved in shaping the priorities of the Polish EU Presidency—including efforts to sustain momentum in the EU enlargement process.

The complex nature of the region, and the growing threat from the East—particularly from Russia—add many shades of grey to the performance of all political leaders, not just the presidential candidates during the June 2025 Polish election.

Donald Tusk speaks at an election rally after a televised debate on government television at the end of the campaign in Warsaw, Poland on October 9, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

Emotional Politics Has Overtaken Technocratic Appeals

What structural and discursive limitations inhibited the effectiveness of the liberal-centrist coalition in this electoral cycle? In particular, how might Trzaskowski’s electoral underperformance reflect a broader crisis of technocratic centrism and the limits of rationalist appeals in an emotionally polarized political landscape?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: Of course, emotions play a role. This is not only the case in Poland—I believe we are living in an era of emotional politics.

There is a growing body of academic research showing the short- and long-term impact of political messaging, both offline and online, on social attitudes. An interesting aspect of this phenomenon is that a significant part of this process—the persuasive effects on individual and group behavior—often occurs beneath the surface. It is not necessarily a conscious experience for those receiving the message.

We can say that the recent presidential campaign in Poland clearly tapped into pre-existing emotional undercurrents among the electorate. If you examine the main themes of past electoral campaigns in Poland, you’ll notice that none lacked an emotional appeal—often built on imagined threats, mythical enemies, or existing, highly salient cleavages between centrist-liberal voters and those aligned with the traditionalist/populist/radical right.

There is already a strong emotional charge embedded in the political landscape, and Mr. Nawrocki was definitively more effective at triggering those emotions throughout the campaign. By contrast, Mr. Trzaskowski focused on reconciliation. He promised to be a president for all Poles—a unifying figure capable of bridging the deep divisions shaping contemporary Polish society.

So, if you ask whether emotions played a role in the campaign, the answer is unequivocally yes. Mr. Nawrocki’s emotionally driven strategy proved more effective. In times of crisis, war, and growing polarization, even moderate voters seemed to seek a more assertive, emotionally resonant message—which Mr. Trzaskowski’s campaign failed to deliver.

I would also add that there was a significant imbalance between the two candidates in terms of their online presence and social media strategy. Although both were active on popular platforms, it is clear that Mr. Trzaskowski’s team did not prioritize his social media visibility. As we know, social platforms are not only crucial for reaching younger voters but also for shaping narratives, including the spread of false information, disinformation, or misinformation. I believe this was one of the key strategic missteps in Mr. Rafał Trzaskowski’s campaign.

Systemic Constraints Undermine Technocratic Governance

From a political communication perspective, did the 2025 presidential campaign mark a paradigmatic shift from policy-based deliberation to symbolic and affective personalization? If so, how might this transformation affect democratic accountability and voter agency?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: Poland is a parliamentary system, which means that while the recent presidential elections—held under a majoritarian formula—are important for several reasons, I would not consider them the most crucial factor in the processes you are asking about.

Nevertheless, considering the prerogatives of the President of the Republic, and the ongoing situation of cohabitation between two opposing sides, this will not contribute to the stabilization of the Polish political system, which has already undergone significant destabilization over the past eight years. By this, I mean the changes that have occurred within the judiciary and media systems, as well as in less visible yet important areas of social and political life, such as education and culture.

If you were to ask what supports or undermines a technocratic model of policymaking, I would point to the systemic obstacles that have been left behind—constraints embedded within the system itself—which continue to prevent its stabilization. By stabilization, I also refer to the difficulty of reversing some of the reforms introduced by the Law and Justice Party during their two terms in power.

Nawrocki’s Campaign Mobilized Memory, Fear, and Identity to Activate a Populist Base

Pro-Ukrainian demonstrators protest against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policies during a rally titled “Stop Putin” in Warsaw, Poland on July 27, 2014. Photo: Tomasz Bidermann.

Your work has emphasized the affective potency of populist grievance narratives. How did Nawrocki’s campaign instrumentalize national identity and mnemonic politics to mobilize affective loyalty and consolidate a post-ideological populist base?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: Oh, it’s a very interesting question. When you look at the numbers, Poland to this day remains an example of unprecedented success—whether in terms of GDP per capita, quality of life, or the growing quality of infrastructure. Of course, this is a large country with a sizable population, and that doesn’t mean everything is perfect or without problems. Nevertheless, when you consider and compare the situation of the average Polish citizen over the past 20 years—across almost all demographic groups, whether by age, location, or education level—you can observe enormous progress.

Of course, the war in Ukraine, the Russian invasion, and the escalation of conflict have added an additional layer of anxiety, which now influences political attitudes and behaviors. But when you think about the typical populist message and the typical populist voter in Poland today, the external enemy—Russia—is no longer a dividing line. It’s a point of consensus across the political spectrum. Both Nawrocki and Trzaskowski, both Law and Justice and Civic Platform and their coalition partners, agree that Russia poses the greatest threat to Poland. This was also an important element in Nawrocki’s campaign.

Mr. Nawrocki, formerly Director of the Institute of National Remembrance—a public institution responsible for historical archival research and the promotion of Poland’s national narrative—integrated historical memory into his messaging. He strategically appealed to specific resentments and grievances, which, while not shared by the majority of society, still provided fuel for his campaign, depending on the region in which he was speaking. One example is the historical grievance between Poland and Ukraine over the Volhynia massacres during the final years of World War II—mass killings of Polish citizens that remain a sensitive and painful issue. This theme was used to tap into regional resentment. The second element involved anxiety and fear around refugees and illegal migrants—an ongoing and unresolved issue at the Polish-Belarusian border.

As for other grievances, while they may lack strong empirical grounding, they tap into an anti-EU rhetoric aligned with the idea that Poland should maintain as much independence as possible within the EU—prioritizing national interests and resisting pressure, especially from the European Commission.

None of these three elements—historical resentment (e.g., Polish-Ukrainian relations), fear of migrants or refugees, and anti-EU sentiment—are new in Polish politics. They have been present, more or less visibly, for the past 25 years. But they proved effective again, especially when directed at specific segments of Nawrocki’s electorate. I would not say these are overarching or widely shared attitudes across Polish society—on the contrary. Yet they worked for this specific purpose in this specific context.

Disinformation Is Among the Main Actors Shaping Poland’s Political Landscape

Would you argue that the nationalist-populist rhetoric encapsulated in slogans like “Poland First” has become hegemonically embedded in the Polish political imaginary? If so, what counter-hegemonic discursive strategies remain available to liberal-democratic actors?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: As I said before, these themes and motifs can be seen as recurring ones. I wouldn’t say that they are of growing importance. What is of growing importance is the changing political environment. And this is an unprecedentedly new framework that we should take into consideration when interpreting the course of political action in Poland.

We haven’t yet touched on a topic that is something of an elephant in the room—disinformation and FIMI (foreign information manipulations), the foreign interference that is present not only in Poland. Nevertheless, Poland should be considered a testing ground for many new strategies of that kind. While we are mostly discussing recent electoral outcomes and the two political figures—Mr. Trzaskowski and Mr. Nawrocki—what is overshadowing not only the Polish elections is, let’s say, a third actor or third agent. And I don’t mean only one country, but rather an important and salient factor behind past and current political developments.

And despite the fact that the long-lasting and very effective impact of disinformation during electoral campaigns has been acknowledged—we have examples and plenty of data coming from Ukraine, but also from other countries such as Georgia, Romania, the Balkan countries, and Slovakia—there is still very little research, and far too little political acknowledgment of the importance of this element.

Civil Society Remains the Backbone of Poland’s Democratic Resilience

March of a Million Hearts. Hundreds of thousands march in anti-government protest to show support for democracy in Warsaw, Poland on October 1, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

And lastly, Professor Kasprowicz, in light of the apparent demobilization among progressive constituencies, what role can civil society—particularly youth movements, feminist groups, and rights-based NGOs—play in resisting authoritarian normalization and restoring democratic engagement?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: Let me start with a quick reminder that the parliamentary elections which brought pro-European, more liberal political parties back to power were—putting it simply—won by the youngest voters and by women. This happened with important support from social movements and the NGO sector, which in Poland is large, fairly well institutionalized, and has managed to remain operational despite the previous government’s unfavorable attitude.

It’s not that all NGOs were opposed to the government. Of course, we witnessed the mushrooming of NGOs and mirroring institutions—similar to what we saw earlier in Hungary. But in fact, despite two terms in power, the populist radical right government did not succeed in dismantling the pro-European, liberal-oriented NGO sector, which played a significant role. At the moment, the presence of this segment of society—engaged, well-trained, highly capable, and deeply connected to European and global networks—is of great importance.

On the other hand, when thinking about Polish civil society and the largest NGOs on the ground, they are generally not political. Poles involved in the NGO sector, according to available data, tend to engage more in other forms of activism.

Still, whether political or not, civil involvement—or civic engagement—is one of the most important factors behind societal resilience. And I refer to resilience not only in terms of the political struggle between Law and Justice and the Civic Coalition, but more broadly, as the capacity of society to face global challenges—not just the war in Ukraine and the growing threat from the eastern flank, but also the climate crisis, migration, and other challenges faced by societies worldwide. So, this foundation and interconnectivity of citizens—whether engaged in political or non-political NGOs—is crucial, and it remains intact.

If you ask me whether, in mid-2025, this could serve as a kind of remedy against the rise of populist radical right parties—well, it’s hard to say. As you noted, we are witnessing disillusionment with current policies and growing impatience regarding reforms that were promised but have yet to be delivered. So, it may come down to renewed mobilization—or the search for a political alternative.

ECPS Academy Summer School — Populism and Climate Change: Understanding What Is at Stake and Crafting Policy Suggestions for Stakeholders (July 7-11, 2025)

July 8, 2025

by ECPS_admin Ecps Academy ECPS Youth Past Events

Case Competition Information Pack

Are you interested in global political affairs? Do you wish to learn how to draft policy recommendations for policymakers? Are you seeking to broaden your knowledge under the guidance of leading experts, looking for an opportunity to exchange views in a multicultural, multidisciplinary environment, or simply in need of a few extra ECTS credits for your studies? If so, consider applying to the ECPS Summer School. The European Centre for Populism Studies (ECPS) invites young individuals to participate in a unique opportunity to evaluate the relationship between populism and climate change during a five-day Summer School led by global experts from diverse backgrounds. The Summer School will be interactive, enabling participants to engage in discussions in small groups within a friendly atmosphere while sharing perspectives with the lecturers. You will also take part in a Case Competition on the same subject, providing a unique experience to develop problem-solving skills through collaboration with others under tight schedules.

Overview

Climate change intersects with numerous issues, transforming it into more than just an environmental challenge; it has developed into a complex and multifaceted political issue with socio-economic and cultural dimensions. This intersection makes it an appealing topic for populist politicians to exploit in polarizing societies. Therefore, with the rise of populist politics globally, we have seen climate change increasingly become part of the populist discourse.

Populist politics present additional barriers to equitable climate solutions, often framing global climate initiatives as elitist or detrimental to local autonomy. Thus, populism in recent years has had a profound impact on climate policy worldwide. This impact comprises a wide spectrum, from the climate skepticism and deregulation policies of leaders like Donald Trump to the often-contradictory stances of left-wing populist movements.

We are convinced that this pressing issue not only requires an in-depth understanding but also deserves our combined effort to seek solutions. Against this backdrop, we are pleased to announce the ECPS Summer School on “Populism and Climate Change: Understanding What Is at Stake and Crafting Policy Suggestions for Stakeholders”, which will be held online from 7 to 11 July 2025. This interdisciplinary five-day program has two primary objectives: a) to explore how both right-wing and left-wing populist movements approach the issue of climate change and how they influence international cooperation efforts and local policies, and b) to propose policy suggestions for stakeholders to address the climate change crisis, independent of populist politics.

We aim to critically examine the role of populism in shaping climate change narratives and policies; provide a platform for exploring diverse political ideologies and their implications for climate action; and foster a deeper understanding of the tension between economic, political, and environmental interests in both right and left-wing populist movements. Critically engaging with the key conclusions from the Baku Conference on climate justice and populism (2024), we will particularly look at the impact of authoritarian and populist politics in shaping climate governance.

Methodology

The program will take place on Zoom, consisting of two sessions each day and will last five days. The lectures are complemented by small group discussions and Q&A sessions moderated by experts in the field. Participants will have the opportunity to engage with leading scholars in the field as well as with activists and policymakers working at the forefront of these issues.

Furthermore, this summer school aims to equip attendees with the skills necessary to craft policy suggestions. To this end, a Case Competition will be organized to identify solutions to issues related to climate change and the environment. Participants will be divided into small groups and will convene daily on Zoom to work on a specific problem related to the topic of populism and climate change. They are expected to digest available literature, enter in-depth discussions with group members and finally prepare an academic presentation which brings a solution to the problem they choose. Each group will present their policy suggestions on the final day of the programme to a panel of scholars, who will provide feedback on their work. The groups may transform their presentations into policy papers, which will be published on the ECPS website.

Topics will include:

Climate justice: global dichotomy between developed and developing countries
Local responses from the US, Europe, Asia and the Global South
Eco-colonialism, structural racism, discrimination and climate change
Populist narratives on sustainability, energy resources and climate change
Climate migration and populist politics
Climate, youth, gender and intergenerational justice
Eco-fascism, climate denial, economic protectionism and far-right populism
Left-wing populist discourse, climate activism and the Green New Deal
Technological advancement and corporate responsibility in climate action.

Program Schedule and Lecturers

Monday, July 7, 2025

Lecture One: (15:00-16:30) — Far-right and Climate Change

Lecturer: Bernhard Forthchner (Associate Professor at the School of Art, Media and Communication, University of Leicester).

Moderator: Sabine Volk (Postdoctoral researcher, Institute for Research on Far-Right Extremism (IRex), Tübingen University).

Lecture Two: (17:30-19:00) — Climate Justice and Populism

Lecturer: John Meyer (Professor of Politics, California State Polytechnic University, Humboldt).

Moderator: Manuela Caiani (Associate Professor in Political Science, Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy).

Tuesday, July 8, 2025

Lecture Three: (15:00-16:30) –– Climate Change, Food, Farmers, and Populism

Lecturer: Sandra Ricart (Assistant Professor at the Environmental Intelligence for Global Change Lab, at the Department of Electronics, Information and Bioengineering at the Politecnico di Milano, Italy).

Moderator: Vlad Surdea-Hernea (Post-doctoral Researcher, Institute of Forest, Environmental and Natural Resource Policy, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences Vienna).

Lecture Four: (17:30-19:00) — Ideology Meets Interest Group Politics: The Trump Administration and Climate Mitigation

Lecturer: Daniel Fiorino (Professor of Politics and Director at the Centre for Environmental Policy, American University).

Moderator: Azize Sargın (PhD., Director of External Relations, ECPS).

Wednesday, July 9, 2025

Lecture Five: (15:00-16:30) — Art, Climate, and Populism

Lecturer: Heidi Hart (Arts Researcher, Nonresident Senior Fellow at ECPS).

Moderator: João Ferreira Dias (Researcher, Centre for International Studies, ISCTE) (TBC)

Lecture Six: (17:30-19:00) — Populist Discourses on Climate and Climate Change

Lecturer: Dr. Eric Swyngedouw (Professor of Geography, University of Manchester).

Moderator: Jonathan White (Professor of Politics, LSE).

Thursday, July 10, 2025

Lecture Seven: (15:00-16:30) —Climate Change, Natural Resources and Conflicts

Lecturer: Philippe Le Billon (Professor of Political Geography at the University of British Columbia).

Moderator: Mehmet Soyer (Assistant Professor of Sociology, Utah State University).

Lecture Eight: (17:30-19:00) — Climate Change Misinformation: Supply, Demand, and the Challenges to Science in a “Post-Truth” World

Lecturer: Stephan Lewandowsky (Professor of Psychology, University of Bristol).

Moderator: Neo Sithole (Research Fellow, ECPS)

Friday, July 11, 2025

Lecture Nine: (17:30-19:00) — Populist Narratives on Sustainability, Energy Resources and Climate Change

Lecturer: Robert Huber (Professor of Political Science Methods, University of Salzburg).

Moderator: Susana Batel (Assistant Researcher and Invited Lecturer at University Institute of Lisbon, Center for Psychological Research and Social Intervention).

Who should apply?

This course is open to master’s and PhD level students and graduates, early career researchers and post-docs from any discipline. The deadline for submitting applications is June 16, 2025. The applicants should send their CVs to the email address ecps@populismstudies.org with the subject line: ECPS Summer School Application.

We value the high level of diversity in our courses, welcoming applications from people of all backgrounds.

As we can only accept a limited number of applicants, it is advisable to submit applications as early as possible rather than waiting for the deadline.

Evaluation Criteria and Certificate of Attendance

Meeting the assessment criteria is required from all participants aiming to complete the program and receive a certificate of attendance. The evaluation criteria include full attendance and active participation in lectures.

Certificates of attendance will be awarded to participants who attend at least 80% of the sessions. Certificates are sent to students only by email.

Credit

This course is worth 5 ECTS in the European system. If you intend to transfer credit to your home institution, please check the requirements with them before you apply. We will be happy to assist you; however, please be aware that the decision to transfer credit rests with your home institution.

Brief Biographies and Abstracts

Day One: Monday, July 7, 2025

Far-right and Climate Change

Bernhard Forchtner is an associate professor at the School of Arts, Media, and Communication, University of Leicester (United Kingdom), and has previously worked as a Marie Curie Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences at the Humboldt University in Berlin (Germany), where he conducted a project on far-right discourses on the environment (2013-2015, project number 327595). His research focuses on the far right and, in particular, the far right’s multimodal environmental communication. Publications include the two edited volumes The Far Right and the Environment (Routledge, 2019) and Visualising Far-Right Environments (Manchester University Press, 2023).

Abstract: This lecture will offer an overview of the current state of research on the far right and climate change (with a focus on Europe), considering both political parties and non-party actors. The lecture will discuss both general trends of and the dominant claims employed in climate communication by the far right. In so doing, it will furthermore highlight longitudinal (affective) changes and will discuss the far right’s visual climate communication (including its gendered and populist dimension).

Reading list

Ekberg, K., Forchtner, B., Hultman, M. and Jylhä, K. M. (2022). Climate Obstruction. How Denial, Delay and Inaction are Heating the Planet. Routledge. pp. 1-20 (Chapter 1: ‘Introduction’) and 69-94 (Chapter 4: ‘The far right and climate obstruction’).

– ‘The far right and climate obstruction’ offers a review of research on the far right and climate change, while ‘Introduction’ provides a general conceptual model of how to think about different modes of climate obstruction.

Forchtner, B. and Lubarda, B. (2022): Scepticisms and beyond? A comprehensive portrait of climate change communication by the far right in the European Parliament. Environmental Politics, 32(1): 43–68.

– The article analyses climate change communication by the far right in the European Parliament between 2004 and 2019, showing which claims have been raised by these parties and how they have shifted over time.

Schwörer, J. and Fernández-García, B. (2023): Climate sceptics or climate nationalists? Understanding and explaining populist radical right parties’ positions towards climate change (1990–2022). Political Studies, 72(3): 1178-1202.

The article offers an analysis of manifestos of Western European political parties, illustrating salience and positioning over three decades.

Climate Justice and Populism

John M. Meyer is Professor in the Departments of Politics and Environmental Studies at California State Polytechnic University, Humboldt. As a political theorist, his work aims to help us understand how our social and political values and institutions shape our relationship with “the environment,” how these values and institutions are shaped by this relationship, and how we might use an understanding of both to pursue a more socially just and sustainable society. Meyer is the author or editor of seven books. These include the award-winning Engaging the Everyday: Environmental Social Criticism and the Resonance Dilemma (MIT, 2015) and The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Political Theory (Oxford, 2016). From 2020-2024, he served as editor-in-chief of the international journal, Environmental Politics.

Abstract: Many have argued that an exclusionary conception of “the people” and a politicized account of scientific knowledge and expertise make populism a fundamental threat to effective action to address climate change. While this threat is very real, I argue that it often contributes to a misguided call for a depolicitized, consensus-based “anti-populist” alternative. Climate Justice movements can point us toward a more compelling response. Rather than aiming to neutralize or circumvent the passions elicited by populism, it offers the possibility of counter-politicization that can help mobilize stronger climate change action. Here, an inclusive conception of “the people” may be manifest as horizontal forms of solidarity generated by an engagement with everyday material concerns.

Reading List

John M. Meyer. (2025). “How (not) to politicise the climate crisis: Beyond the anti-populist imaginary,” with Sherilyn MacGregor. Politische Vierteljahresschrift.

John M. Meyer. (2024). “The People; and Climate Justice: Reconceptualising Populism and Pluralism within Climate Politics,” Polity.

John M. Meyer. (2024). Power and Truth in Science-Related Populism: Rethinking the Role of Knowledge and Expertise in Climate Politics, Political Studies.

Additional Recent Readings

Driscoll, Daniel. (2023). “Populism and Carbon Tax Justice: The Yellow Vest Movement in France.” Social Problems, 70 (1): 143–63. https://doi.org/10.1093/socpro/spab036

Lucas, Caroline, and Rupert Read. (2025). “It’s Time for Climate Populism.” New Statesman (blog). February 7, 2025. https://www.newstatesman.com/environment/2025/02/its-time- for-climate-populism

White, Jonathan. (2023). “What Makes Climate Change a Populist Issue?” Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper, no. No. 401 (September). https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/working-paper-401-White.pdf.

Day Two: Tuesday, July 8, 2025

Delving into European’ Farmers Protests and Citizens’ Attitudes Towards Agriculture in a Climate Change Context: Insights from policy and populism

Sandra Ricart is an Assistant Professor in the Environmental Intelligence Lab at the Department of Electronics, Information and Bioengineering at the Politecnico di Milano, Italy. She holds a PhD in Geography – Experimental Sciences and Sustainability by the University of Girona, Spain, in 2014 and performed postdoctoral stays at the University of Alicante (Spain), Università degli Studi di Milano and the Politecnico di Milano (Italy), Université de Pau et des Pays de l’Adour (France), and Wageningen University and Research (Netherlands). She was an invited professor at the Landcare Research Centre in New Zealand and a visiting scholar at the University of California, Los Angeles. As a human-environment geographer, her research focuses on climate change narratives and behavior from farmers’ and stakeholders’ perspectives, delving into how social learning and behavior modelling can be combined to enhance adaptive capacity, robust decision-making processes and trusted policy co-design. Dr. Ricart co-authored more than sixty publications, attended several international conferences, and participated in a dozen international and national research projects. Sandra serves as Assistant Editor of the International Journal of Water Resources Development and PLOS One journal, and she is an expert evaluator by the European Commission and different national research councils.

Abstract: Though there are national differences, farmers across Europe are generally upset about dropping produce prices, rising fuel costs, and competition from foreign imports, but are also concerned by the painful impacts of the climate crisis and proposed environmental regulations under the new CAP and the European Green Deal. These common challenges motivated, in 2024, a series of protests from the Netherlands to Belgium, France, Spain, Germany and the UK, with convoys of tractors clogging roads and ports, farmer-led occupations of capital cities and even cows being herded into the offices of government ministers. Farmers have felt marginalised as they feel overburdened by rules and undervalued by city dwellers, who tend to eat the food they grow without being much interested in where it came from. In this context, farmers started to receive increasing support from a range of far-right and populist parties and groups, who aim to crystallise resentment and are bent on bringing down Green Deal environmental reforms. This talk will delve into the reasons behind farmers’ protests and the link with populism, providing examples, as well as an analysis of citizens’ perspectives on agriculture and climate change strategies, which will enrich the debate on the nexus between policy and populism.

Reading List

Special Eurobarometer 538 Climate Change – Report, 2023, Available here: https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2954

Special Eurobarometer 556 Europeans, Agriculture, and the CAP – Report, 2025. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3226

Zuk, P. (2025). “The European Green Deal and the peasant cause: class frustration, cultural backlash, and right-wing nationalist populism in farmers’ protests in Poland.” Journal of Rural Studies, 119:103708. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2025.103708

Newspapers

What’s behind farmers’ protests returning to the streets of Brussels? https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/19/whats-behind-farmers-protests-returning-to-the-streets-of-brussels

Rural decline and farmers’ anger risks fuelling Europe’s populism. https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/frankly-speaking-rural-decline-and-farmers-anger-risks-fuelling-europes-populism/

From protests to policy: What is the future for EU agriculture in the green transition? https://www.epc.eu/publication/From-protests-to-policy-What-is-the-future-for-EU-agricultre-57f788/

Farmer Protests and the 2024 European Parliament Elections https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2024/number/2/article/farmer-protests-and-the-2024-european-parliament-elections.html

Neoliberal Limits – Farmer Protests, Elections and the Far Right. https://www.arc2020.eu/neoliberal-limits-farmer-protests-elections-and-the-far-right/

Green policies, grey areas: Farmers’ protests and the environmental policy dilemma in the European Union. http://conference.academos.ro/node/1467

How the far right aims to ride farmers’ outrage to power in Europe. https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-farmers-outrage-power-europe-eu-election-agriculture/

Ideology Meets Interest Group Politics: The Trump Administration and Climate Mitigation

Daniel J. Fiorino teaches environmental and energy policy at the School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, DC, and is the founding director of the Center for Environmental Policy. Before joining American University in 2009, he served in the policy office of the US Environmental Protection Agency, where he worked on various environmental issues. His recent books include Can Democracy Handle Climate Change? (Polity Press, 2018); A Good Life on a Finite Earth: The Political Economy of Green Growth (Oxford, 2018); and The Clean Energy Transition: Policies and Procedures for a Zero-Carbon World (Polity, 2022). He is currently writing a book about the US Environmental Protection Agency.

Abstract: The rise of right-wing populism around the world constitutes one of the principal challenges to climate mitigation policies. The defining characteristics of right-wing populism are distrust of scientific expertise, resistance to multilateral problem-solving, and strong nationalism. Climate mitigation involves a reliance on scientific and economic expertise, an openness to multilateral problem-solving, and setting aside nationalist tendencies in favor of international cooperation. At the same time, the Republican Party in the United States maintains a strong affiliation with the interests of the fossil fuel industry. These two factors have led to a Trump administration that is hostile to climate mitigation and participation in global problem-solving. This presentation examines the policies of the Trump administration with respect to climate mitigation and the effects of a right-wing populist ideology when combined with the historical alliance of the Republican Party with the interests of the fossil fuel industry.

Reading List

Fiorino, D. J. (2022). “Climate change and right-wing populism in the United States.” Environmental Politics, 31(5), 801–819. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2021.2018854

Huber, R.A. (2020). “The role of populist attitudes in explaining climate scepticism and support for environmental protection.” Environmental Politics, 29 (6), 959–982. doi:10.1080/09644016.2019.1708186

Lockwood, M. (2018). “Right-wing populism and the climate change agenda: exploring the contradictions.” Environmental Politics, 27 (4), 712–732. doi:10.1080/09644016.2018.1458411

Day Three: Wednesday, July 9, 2025

Art Attacks: Museum Vandalism as a Populist Response to Climate Trauma?

Heidi Hart (Ph.D. Duke University 2016) is a Nonresident Senior Resident (Climate and Environment) with ECPS. She is also a guest instructor in environmental humanities at Linnaeus University in Sweden. Her books include studies of climate grief, sound and music in climate- crisis narrative, and the destruction of musical instruments in ecological context.

Abstract: This lecture explores activist vandalisation of museum artworks, acts that draw attention to the climate emergency as they both subjugate human-made artworks and create new layers of visual and performative aesthetics. “Art Attacks” describes examples of recent art vandalism and subsequent academic responses, most of which remain ambivalent about the effectiveness of art destruction for the sake of ecological awareness. Two questions arise when investigating these interventions: do the actors involved function as environmental populists, as Briji Jose and Renuka Shyamsundar Belamkar have postulated (2024), and are they driven by a sense of climate trauma, a question informed by Katharine Stiles’ work on trauma’s role in destructive forms of art-making (2016)? Answering the first question requires looking at arguments against the convergence of populism and environmentalism and finding places where they do in fact overlap “in unconventional, problematic, and surprising ways” (ECPS Dictionary of Populism). Answering the second question leads to an exploration of how the climate emergency is experienced and mediated as trauma (Kaplan 2016, Richardson 2018). This lecture argues that an embodied sense of present and future emergency can indeed lead to a creative-destructive nexus of climate action, useful even in its ambivalence, in what Bruno Latour has termed “iconoclash” (2002).

Reading List

Jose, Briji and Renuka Shyamsundar Belamkar. (2024). “Art of Vandalism: A Response by Environmental Populists.” In: J. Chacko Chennattuserry et al., Editors, Encyclopedia of New Populism and Responses in the 21st Century. Springer Singapore, 2024, DOI 10.1007/978-981-99-7802-1.

Richardson, Michael. (2018). “Climate Trauma, or the Affects of the Catastrophe to Come.” Environmental Humanities, 10:1 (May 2018), DOI 10.1215/22011919-4385444.

Teixeira da Silva, Jaime A. (2023). “Is the Destruction of Art a Desirable Form of Climate Activism?” Environmental Smoke 6:1 (2023), DOI 10.32435/envsmoke. 20236173-77.

The Climate Deadlock and The Unbearable Lightness of Climate Populism

Erik Swyngedouw is Professor of Geography at The University of Manchester, UK and Senior Research Associate of the University of Johannesburg Centre for Social Change, South Africa. He holds a doctorate from Johns Hopkins University and has been awarded Honorary Doctorates from Roskilde University and the University of Malmö. He works on political ecology, critical theory, environmental and emancipatory politics. He is the author of, among others, Promises of the Political: Insurgent Cities in a Post-Democratic Environment (MIT Press), Liquid Power: Contested Hydro-Modernities in 20^th Century Spain (MIT Press) and Social Power and the Urbanisation of Nature (Oxford University Press). He is currently completing a book (with Prof. Lucas Pohl) entitled Enjoying Climate Change (Verso).

Abstract: Over the past two decades or so, the environmental question has been mainstreamed, and climate change, in particular, has become the hard kernel of the problematic environmental condition the Earth is in. Nonetheless, despite the scientific concern and alarmist rhetoric, the climate parameters keep eroding further. We are in the paradoxical situation that ‘despite the fact we know the truth about climate change, we act as if we do not know’. This form of disavowal suggests that access to and presence of knowledge and facts do not guarantee effective intervention. This presentation will argue that the dominant depoliticised form of climate populism can help to account for the present climate deadlock, and will suggest ways of transgressing the deadlock.

My presentation focuses on what I refer to as Climate Populism. We argue that climate populism is not just the prerogative of right-winged, xenophobic, and autocratic elite and their supporters, but will insist on how climate populism also structures not only many radical climate movements but also the liberal climate consensus. I argue that the architecture of most mainstream as well as more radical climate discourses, practices, and policies is similar to that of populist discourses and should be understood as an integral part of a pervasive and deepening process of post-politicisation. Mobilising a process that psychoanalysts call ‘fetishistic disavowal’, the climate discourse produces a particular form of populism that obscures the power relations responsible for the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. I shall mobilise a broadly Lacanian-Marxist theoretical perspective that permits accounting for this apparently paradoxical condition of both acknowledging and denying the truth of the climate situation, and the discourses/practices that sustain this.

Reading List

Swyngedouw E. (2010) “Apocalypse Forever? Post-Political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change”, Theory, Culture, Society, 27(2-3): 213-232.

Swyngedouw E. (2022) “The Depoliticised Climate Change Consensus.” In: Pellizzoni L., Leonardi E., Asara V. (Eds.) Handbook of Critical Environmental Politics. E. Elgar, London, pp. 443-455.

Swyngedouw E. (2022) “The Unbearable Lightness of Climate Populism.” Environmental Politics, 31(5), pp. 904-925. DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2022.2090636

Jonathan White is Professor of Politics at the London School of Economics. Books include In the Long Run: the Future as a Political Idea (Profile Books, 2024), Politics of Last Resort: Governing by Emergency in the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2019), and – with Lea Ypi – The Meaning of Partisanship (Oxford University Press, 2016).

Day Four: Thursday, July 10, 2025

Climate Change, Natural Resources and Conflicts

Philippe Le Billon is a professor of political geography and political ecology at the University of British Columbia. Prior to joining UBC, he was a Research Associate with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and worked with environmental and human rights organisations. His work engages with linkages between environment, development and security, with a focus on extractive sectors. He currently works with environmental defenders, including on small-scale fisheries and the ‘green transition’.

Abstract: This lecture examines how the rise of populist politics is reshaping the nexus between climate change, natural resources, and conflicts. As climate impacts intensify, populist leaders across the political spectrum have exploited environmental anxieties, fueling nationalist rhetoric, weakening environmental regulations, and framing green transitions as elite-driven agendas. This has deepened social divisions and contributed to violent responses to both fossil fuel extraction and climate mitigation projects. The lecture will explore how populist regimes often repress environmental defenders, delegitimise scientific consensus, and stoke resentment against marginalised groups, further aggravating conflict dynamics. Case studies will illustrate how populism can exacerbate resource-related tensions, undermine international cooperation, and stall urgent climate action. The session will conclude with policy recommendations to counteract these trends, including democratic safeguards, support for “leave-it-in-the-ground” campaigns, and stronger protections for environmental activists. Ultimately, this talk highlights the urgent need to confront populist narratives in the pursuit of climate justice and conflict prevention.

Climate Change Misinformation: Supply, Demand, and the Challenges to Science in a “Post-Truth” World

Professor Stephan Lewandowsky is a cognitive scientist at the University of Bristol, whose main interest lies in the pressure points between the architecture of online information technologies and human cognition, and the consequences for democracy that arise from these pressure points.

He is the recipient of numerous awards and honours, including a Discovery Outstanding Researcher Award from the Australian Research Council, a Wolfson Research Merit Fellowship from the Royal Society, and a Humboldt Research Award from the Humboldt Foundation in Germany. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Science (UK) and a Fellow of the Association of Psychological Science. He was appointed a fellow of the Committee for Sceptical Inquiry for his commitment to science, rational inquiry and public education. He was elected to the Leopoldina (the German national academy of sciences) in 2022. Professor Lewandowsky also holds a Guest Professorship at the University of Potsdam in Germany. He was identified as a highly cited researcher in 2022, 2023, and 2024 by Clarivate, a distinction that is awarded to fewer than 0.1% of researchers worldwide.

His research examines the consequences of the clash between social media architectures and human cognition, for example, by researching countermeasures to the persistence of misinformation and spread of “fake news” in society, including conspiracy theories, and how platform algorithms may contribute to the prevalence of misinformation. He is also interested in the variables that determine whether or not people accept scientific evidence.
He has published hundreds of scholarly articles, chapters, and books, with more than 200 peer-reviewed articles alone since 2000. His research regularly appears in journals such as Nature Human Behaviour, Nature Communications, and Psychological Review. (See www.lewan.uk for a complete list of scientific publications.)

His research is currently funded by the European Research Council, the EU’s Horizon 2020 programme, the UK research agency (UKRI, through EU replacement funding), the Volkswagen Foundation, Google’s Jigsaw, and by the Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC) Mercury Project.

Professor Lewandowsky also frequently appears in print and broadcast media, having contributed approximately 100 opinion pieces to the global media. He has been working with policymakers at the European level for many years, and he was the first author of a report on Technology and Democracy in 2020 that has helped shape EU digital legislation.

Abstract: I examine both the “supply side” and “demand side” of climate denial and the associated “fake news”. On the supply side, I report the evidence for the organised dissemination of disinformation by political operatives and vested interests, and how the media respond to these distortions of the information landscape. On the demand side, I explore the variables that drive people’s rejection of climate science and lead them to accept denialist talking points, with a particular focus on the issue of political symmetry. The evidence seems to suggest that denial of science is primarily focused on the political right, across a number of domains, even though there is cognitive symmetry between left and right in many other situations. Why is there little evidence to date of any association between left-wing political views and rejection of scientific evidence or expertise? I focus on Merton’s (1942) analysis of the norms of science, such as communism and universalism, which continue to be internalised by the scientific community, but which are not readily reconciled with conservative values. Two large-scale studies (N > 2,000 altogether) show that people’s political and cultural worldviews are associated with their attitudes towards those scientific norms, and that those attitudes in turn predict people’s acceptance of scientific. The norms of science may thus be in latent conflict with a substantial segment of the public. Finally, I survey the options that are available to respond to this fraught information and attitude landscape, focusing on consensus communication and psychological inoculation.

Reading List

Cook, J., van der Linden, S., Maibach, E., & Lewandowsky, S. (2018). The Consensus Handbook. DOI:10.13021/G8MM6P.

Sinclair, A. H., Cosme, D., Lydic, K., Reinero, D. A., Carreras-Tartak, J., Mann, M., & Falk, E. B. (2024). Behavioural Interventions Motivate Action to Address Climate Change. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/x3wsb

Lewandowsky, S. (2021). Climate Change Disinformation and How to Combat It. Annu Rev Public Health. 42:1-21. Doi: 10.1146/annurev-publhealth-090419-102409. Epub 2021 Dec 23. PMID: 33355475

Hornsey, M., & Lewandowsky, S. (2022). “A toolkit for understanding and addressing climate scepticism.” Nature Human Behaviour, 6(11), 1454–1464. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01463-y

Day Five: Friday, July 11, 2025

Populist Narratives on Sustainability, Energy Resources and Climate Change

Robert A. Huber is a Professor of Political Science Methods at the Department of Political Science at the University of Salzburg. He earned his PhD from ETH Zurich in 2018. Prior to joining the University of Salzburg, Robert served as a lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Reading. Additionally, he holds the position of co-editor-in-chief at the European Journal of Political Research and the Populism Seminar. Robert’s primary research focus revolves around examining how globalisation poses new challenges to liberal democracy. Utilising state-of-the-art methods, he investigates areas such as trade policy, climate and environmental politics, and populism. His work has been featured in journals, including the British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, the European Journal of Political Research, and Political Analysis.

Abstract: With climate change being a central challenge for humankind and far-reaching action being necessary, populists have decided to position themselves against climate change. But what is it about populists that makes them take this stance? And is it just a political show or rooted in their worldview? This lecture scrutinises how populism, thick ideological leaning and contextual factors lead to climate sceptic positions among populist parties. We also reflect on whether this translates to the citizen level.

Reading List

Forchtner, Bernhard, and Christoffer Kølvraa. (2015). “The Nature of Nationalism: Populist Radical Right Parties on Countryside and Climate.” Nature and Culture, 10 (2): 199–224. https://doi.org/10.3167/nc.2015.100204.

Huber, Robert A., Tomas Maltby, Kacper Szulecki, and Stefan Ćetković. (2021). “Is Populism a Challenge to European Energy and Climate Policy? Empirical Evidence across Varieties of Populism.” Journal of European Public Policy, 28 (7): 998–1017. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1918214.

Lockwood, Matthew. (2018). “Right-Wing Populism and the Climate Change Agenda: Exploring the Linkages.” Environmental Politics, 27 (4): 712–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1458411.

Zulianello, Mattia, and Diego Ceccobelli. (2020). “Don’t Call It Climate Populism: On Greta Thunberg’s Technocratic Ecocentrism.” The Political Quarterly, 91 (3): 623–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12858.

Professor Baskın Oran, a veteran and venerated Turkish political scientist.

Professor Oran on Turkey’s Erdogan Regime: “Let’s Just Call It a ‘Democratic Administration’—So That No Harm Comes to Anyone”

July 8, 2025

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice European Observatory Home Interviews

In an era when even naming an oppressive regime can invite peril, Professor Baskın Oran offers a cuttingly ironic response to a straightforward question: How should we define Turkey’s current political system? His reply—”Let’s just say a ‘democratic administration,’ so that no harm comes to anyone”—encapsulates the climate of fear and repression under Erdogan’s rule. In this wide-ranging interview, the veteran scholar and dissident traces historical fascism’s return through economic crisis, digital dependency, centralism, and xenophobia. With clarity and conviction, Professor Oran explores how Turkey’s authoritarian populism mirrors global patterns while revealing homegrown roots—and why excessive control may ultimately become the regime’s undoing.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Baskın Oran, a veteran and venerated political scientist, offered reflections that resonate deeply with the political climate in Turkey today. In times when truth is often criminalized and words carry the weight of consequences, the choice to speak cautiously is, in itself, a powerful political act. When asked to define the nature of Turkey’s current regime—whether it aligns more with fascism, authoritarian populism, competitive authoritarianism, or autocracy—Professor Oran answered with quiet precision: “Let’s just say ‘a democratic administration,’ so that no harm comes to anyone—shall we?” That one sentence, both ironic and revealing, captures the essence of the repression gripping contemporary Turkey. It also offers a striking entry point into the mind of one of Turkey’s most principled and enduring intellectuals.

As one of the signatories of the “International Declaration Against Fascism,” published on June 13, 2025, alongside Nobel laureates, public intellectuals, and leading scholars of democracy and authoritarianism, Professor Baskın Oran stands out as a figure whose life and career have been deeply shaped by Turkey’s political upheavals. Born in İzmir in 1945, Oran was convicted in 1971 while still a student at Ankara University’s Faculty of Political Science (Mülkiye) for participating in a protest march, resulting in his dismissal from his post as a research assistant. After a successful legal battle, he was reinstated by administrative court order. He later earned a PhD in international relations and completed postdoctoral research in Geneva on international minority rights.

Oran’s struggles did not end with student activism. Following the 1980 military coup, he was once again purged from his university post—only to be reinstated and removed again under martial law provisions. For eight years, he survived by working various jobs, including editing for AnaBritannica. In 1990, he was finally reinstated for good and rose to become a full professor by 1997. In 2004, his authorship of the “Minority Rights and Cultural Rights Report” for the Human Rights Advisory Board led to criminal charges under infamous articles 216 and 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. Though ultimately not convicted, the ordeal reinforced Oran’s image as a courageous dissenter within the Turkish academy.

That lifelong defiance permeates this interview with the ECPS, though it is now tempered with the strategic irony born of experience. In this wide-ranging conversation, Professor Oran explores the structural logic of fascism—“the most extreme and harmful form of capitalism,” as he puts it—and traces its return through today’s economic and geopolitical crises. Comparing the present moment to the capitalist collapse of 1929, he warns: “Back then, everyone tried to protect their own economy by closing to imports—and international trade collapsed. We’re witnessing a very similar process today.”

For Professor Oran, the rise of anti-immigration sentiment in the West and the shift from targeting “internal enemies” to “external threats” signals a reconfiguration, not a disappearance, of fascist logics. In Turkey, he argues, this reconfiguration is expressed through intense centralization, erosion of local governance, and state suppression of Kurdish identity and representation. “Fascism is centralism taken to its extreme,” he observes, linking today’s appointment of state trustees (kayyım) to a long tradition of top-down governance.

Yet even as he traces the parallels between historical fascism and present-day authoritarianism, Professor Oran remains grounded in a nuanced reading of political causality. He credits the excesses of past Kemalist policies—including headscarf bans and cultural repression—as having laid the groundwork for the current regime: “Those oppressive measures prepared the conditions for today’s authoritarianism.”

Despite this sobering diagnosis, Professor Oran ends with a dialectical warning rather than despair: “Excessive centralism and intervention in democratic will—dialectically speaking—mark the first step toward a regime’s self-destruction.”

In a political environment where naming power risks invoking its wrath, Professor Oran’s careful yet cutting answer—“a ‘democratic administration,’ so that no harm comes to anyone”—becomes more than evasion. This subtle yet telling response speaks volumes about the repressive nature of the current regime in Turkey. Coming from a scholar whose life has been marked by principled resistance and personal cost, Professor Oran’s cautious phrasing is itself a reflection of the political climate—one in which even naming the regime carries risk.

What follows is the full transcript of our interview with Professor Baskın Oran, originally conducted in Turkish and lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Fascism Is the Most Extreme and Harmful Form of Capitalism

Photo of a woman protester holding an anti-fascism sign during the Women’s March on January 21, 2017, in Washington, D.C. Photo: Richard Gunion.

Professor Oran, thank you very much for participating in our interview. How do you evaluate the historical continuity emphasized in the anti-rising fascism declaration—which you signed—through the statement, “fascism never disappeared; it merely remained on the sidelines for a while”? In your view, in what ways does today’s fascism differ from the classical fascisms of the 20th century, and what structural similarities does it maintain?

Prof. Dr. Baskın Oran: First of all, I would like to point out that while speaking on this subject, I do not wish to appear overly Marxist, but fascism—which is the most extreme and harmful form of capitalism—is a tool that the capitalist system resorts to when it feels threatened. We have witnessed this in the past as well.

The declaration from Italy, which I gladly signed, reminded us that the fascism of the Mussolini era is now resurfacing. This is a very accurate observation. In fact, it is possible to go even further back to the historical crises of capitalism. Today, we are experiencing a digital revolution. Artificial intelligence is also a significant part of this transformation—just like the Industrial Revolution that began in the late 18th century. That era brought major opportunities, but the working class was severely oppressed.

Today, too, many professions are disappearing due to digitalization. For example, I previously had one of my books translated by an American for publication in the US. Now, there’s no need for that—translation programs can complete it within a few days. These developments can be used for good or bad—technology itself is neutral.

We discussed the emergence of capitalism in the late 18th century and drew parallels with the present day, right? Then, about a hundred years later, in the late 19th century, the imperialist extension of capitalism emerged. They seized regions—especially in Africa and Asia—through every means possible, including military occupation.

We know that the crises of capitalism are inherent in its nature—they arise periodically from within the system itself. For instance, the Great Depression of 1929 was the result of such an internal contradiction. Just like today, all states at that time tried to cope by shutting down imports. What does that mean? It means blocking other countries’ exports, which in turn paralyzes international trade. But countries had no choice due to the crisis they were in. The 1929 crisis began with a stock market collapse in New York and soon spread worldwide. In the end, every country tried to protect its own economy, and the global economy essentially collapsed. We are witnessing a very similar process today.

However, this time there is a crucial distinction: today’s developments stem not only from capitalism’s internal contradictions but also from external pressures. A key example is China, which, despite maintaining Communist Party rule, has largely embraced a capitalist economic model. This shift has deeply unsettled Western powers—particularly during Donald Trump’s presidency. In response, economic protectionist measures were introduced, including attempts to impose significant tariffs on Chinese goods, which in turn posed risks to the European economy as well.

The dynamics we are witnessing today echo those of earlier historical moments—namely, the crises at the end of the 18th and 19th centuries, and the Great Depression of 1929. These parallels make the declaration I signed not merely a warning about present dangers, but a timely reminder that the past continues to shape our political and economic future.

The Real Fear Lies with the Regime Itself

Despite living under the Erdoğan regime, you have once again demonstrated an example of intellectual courage by being among the signatories of the declaration. In your view, how should the responsibility of intellectuals against fascism be defined under today’s conditions? How can the calls in the declaration—such as boycott, strike, and collective action—be concretized for academic and cultural circles?

Professor Baskın Oran: Frankly, I don’t think I’ve shown any major intellectual reaction in this matter. I mean, being afraid of something this small is out of the question. After all, as you know, there’s Article 299 of the Turkish Penal Code—insulting the president. But in this case, such a situation does not exist. No matter how much they try to stretch it, they cannot justify or substantiate such a claim. Therefore, it would not be right to see this as a small act of heroism.

As for the second part of your question: To be honest, I don’t always trust the (Turkish main opposition Republican People Party) CHP. However, the current trajectory of the CHP under the leadership of Özgür Özel is quite positive. This should be acknowledged, and he should be congratulated accordingly. Because he is truly expanding the societal movement to broader masses and succeeding in integrating with the people. He’s going beyond mere declarations and embracing a political approach that translates into action.

And precisely because of this, arrest warrants are being issued for those around him, and attempts are being made to ban political opponents—especially Ekrem İmamoğlu—from participating in elections. The system is clearly afraid of this new, young, and rightly governed CHP. That’s why I believe this process should be supported.

Yes, if one day the CHP reverts to its old ways, then we will resume our criticisms. But for now, I support the CHP under Özgür Özel’s leadership.

Authoritarianism in the West Is Rooted in a Deep Fear of the Consequences of Its Own Imperial Past

What role have the structural ruptures caused by imperialist expansion—gaining momentum in the late 19th century—in underdeveloped countries, and the waves of migration originating from these regions, played in the rise of fascist and authoritarian tendencies currently observed in the West? In this process, how has the concept of “development” undergone an inversion or distortion?

Professor Baskın Oran: Now, what you are actually asking me—albeit implicitly—is the following: In some developed countries, we are witnessing the hardening and spread of authoritarian regimes; however, at the same time, you are reminding us that similar authoritarian tendencies are also emerging in less developed countries. For example, within the European Union, we observe this trend especially in Poland and Hungary. On the other hand, you are also pointing out the grave actions committed by Israel in Gaza and how they are not being sufficiently condemned by the Western world—particularly by the European Union. You are essentially asking, “Why is this happening?” If I’m understanding your question correctly, I’ll respond right away.

This authoritarian turn and drift away from democracy in developed countries actually stems from a deep fear. And the root of that fear lies in the following reality: The desperate people living in countries oppressed by imperialist forces since the late 19th century no longer know what to do. With hope, they head toward more developed countries, seeking asylum.

Considering that the populations of these developed countries are already limited, that their social security systems are strong, and that these systems are also targeted for use by migrants, a major sense of fear has emerged in these societies. This fear has led to the rise of right-wing politics. Especially through the discourse of anti-immigration and anti-asylum seekers, this fear has provided fertile ground for legitimizing authoritarianism. That’s the heart of the matter.

Trump Globalized the Monroe Doctrine

How do you evaluate the United States’ position—particularly in the Middle East—its Israel-backed aggressive stance, and its anti-Iran strategy in the context of a contemporary reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine? What kind of groundwork has the unipolar order that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union laid for this process?

Prof. Dr. Baskın Oran: You brought up a very important point by mentioning Trump. Trump is, in fact, a typical contemporary representative of the Monroe Doctrine. People generally understand this doctrine as follows — this is also how it’s taught in schools: “America should not interfere in European affairs.” Because Europe’s affairs are complicated, and since America was newly founded at the time, getting involved could harm it. That is the first proposition of the doctrine. However, the real significance of the Monroe Doctrine lies in its second proposition: Europe, too, shall not interfere in the developments on the American continent. In other words, there is a principle of mutual non-intervention.

Trump, however, has taken this second proposition and interpreted it in an entirely different way. The issue is no longer confined to the American continent; Trump has extended this principle globally and is essentially saying: “I will intervene anywhere in the world, but no one may interfere with me.” With this mindset, he is trying to exert pressure everywhere — from Canada to Denmark, from China to Iran. One of the tools he uses for this pressure is Israel. By supporting Israel’s authoritarian and fascist policies, he is in fact pursuing his own global strategy. Looking at the current situation, we see that Trump has become an extremely radicalized representative of the second and most important proposition of the Monroe Doctrine: “I will interfere with everyone, but no one may interfere with me.”

Civilizations That Merely Consume Technology Do Not Survive

To what extent has the difference between producing and merely consuming technology throughout history determined whether civilizations survived or not? For instance, what kinds of historical parallels can be drawn between the impact of the Industrial Revolution on underdeveloped societies and the impact of today’s digital revolution on those same societies? Does the asymmetry between producers and consumers of digital technology constitute a new regime of dependency?

Professor Baskın Oran: Of course, it creates dependency—because there is a world of difference between producing technology and merely consuming it. In fact, just recently, in 2024, Çağatay Anadolu wrote a very interesting article. In that piece, he went quite far back in history and offered an eye-opening analysis.

He said something along these lines: As you know, we descend from Homo sapiens. But before Homo sapiens, there were Neanderthals. The Neanderthals were not as skilled as the sapiens in things like tool-making or abstract thinking. And while we cannot be sure whether the Neanderthals were wiped out by the Homo sapiens, he argued that it is entirely logical for the Neanderthals—who ended up in the position of technology consumers in contrast to the technology-producing sapiens—to have vanished over time. I found this interpretation quite enlightening.

We’re talking about the Stone Age—actually not even about humans, but about human-like species, hominids. Even back then, the difference between producing and consuming technology determined the fate of entire species. Today, we are facing a similar situation: In the digital age, the disparity between societies that produce technology and those that only consume it creates a new regime of dependency.

Crushed Societies Give Rise to Authoritarianism and War

Mass protests in Russia demanded the release of Alexei Navalny. Police detained protesters in Moscow, Russia, on January 31, 2021. A girl holds a sign saying “Freedom for Putin from office!” Photo: Elena Rostunova.

How do you interpret the structural and political similarities between the rise of economic protectionism, authoritarian regimes, and the atmosphere of pre-world war following the 1929 Depression, and today’s neoliberal crisis moment? Are figures like Trump, Putin, Erdoğan, etc., representative of an updated form of fascism in this process?

Professor Baskın Oran: There is a very serious similarity here. The process that began with the 1929 crash of the New York Stock Exchange needs to be carefully examined. Why did it collapse? Because the market had suddenly and excessively risen. Such sharp increases followed by steep declines can devastate stock exchanges. In that situation, people panicked, withdrew, and the market collapsed.

As we just discussed, this collapse triggered the 1929 Depression. Following that, all countries tried to overcome the crisis by restricting imports and increasing exports. But that wasn’t possible—because everyone was trying to do the same thing simultaneously. In an instant, international trade collapsed. And this, ultimately, led to the Second World War.

The Treaty of Versailles, which followed the First World War (1914–1918), imposed such severe conditions on Germany that the people could barely breathe. German women were forced to sell their jewelry. Hitler took advantage of this immense pressure and came to power through a democratic election in 1933.

Around the same time, we see a parallel in Turkey: Mustafa Kemal launched the War of Independence in 1919 in response to the unbearable terms imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres on the Ottoman Empire. Just as Versailles had done to Germany, Sèvres imposed unacceptable obligations on the Ottomans.

There is an important lesson here: international treaties cannot be based on crushing one side; if they are, they lead to new crises and wars. Treaties must be mutually acceptable. Lausanne is an example of this. It remains the only World War I peace treaty still in force because it was balanced.

Turning Fear into Power: Populists Redefine the ‘Other’ to Justify Authoritarianism

In your view, does the shift from the rhetoric targeting the ‘internal enemy’ in classical fascism to the perception of an ‘external threat’ through rising anti-immigrant sentiment in developed countries today indicate a transformation in the structural codes of fascism? In this context, what kind of political significance does the redefinition of the ‘other’ carry?

Professor Baskın Oran: Actually, we just talked about this. The main reason why governments in developed countries that push the limits of democracy or verge on fascism come to power through elections is the fear generated by immigrants. The sudden influx of asylum seekers creates a significant perception of threat in these countries. However, the root of this fear is a direct consequence of the imperialist policies initiated in the 19th century.

Populism frequently derives its legitimacy from an artificial conflict constructed between “the people” and “the elite.” How has this form of conflict laid the groundwork for a model of authoritarianism in Turkey? How would you analyze the relationship between the populist rhetoric of the administration under Erdoğan’s leadership and its actual authoritarian practices?

Professor Baskın Oran: Let me begin by saying this: The main factor that brought the Erdoğan regime to power and strengthened it was the excesses of past Kemalist practices. Especially during the military coup periods, the oppressive and denigrating measures laid the groundwork for this process.

One of the most striking examples is the rector and vice-rector of Istanbul University of the time preventing veiled female students from entering the university. Can such a thing be acceptable? A university is a place where a thousand voices echo, a space for thought and freedom of expression. A veiled student should be able to enter the university; both veiled and unveiled should benefit equally from this environment.

So what happens if a veiled student is not admitted? She stays at home, waits to get married, and raises daughters who are veiled just like herself. But if she does enter university, she will take courses like my “Nationalism and Minorities” class and be exposed to new ideas. This is precisely the point: the oppressive excesses of Kemalist policies are what initiated the process that laid the foundations of today’s authoritarian regime in Turkey.

Therefore, we must analyze the emergence of Turkey’s authoritarian regime not solely through the lens of populism, but also within this historical context. Moreover, the Erdoğan regime’s increasingly repressive policies in recent years are actually fueling a process that may bring about its own downfall. Let’s not forget: the logic of dialectics applies to everyone.

Excessive Centralism Marks the First Step Toward a Regime’s Self-Destruction

Do the trustee policy targeting municipalities governed by the DEM Party and the CHP in Turkey, as well as the legislative attempts to transfer municipal powers to provincial governors, align with the classical centralist reflexes of fascism? Could you evaluate these developments in comparison with historical experiences of fascism?

Professor Baskın Oran: Fascism, by definition, is centralism taken to its extreme; in fact, fascism is the most radical form of centralization. After the War of Independence, the implementation of centralist policies in Turkey—specifically Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s, later Atatürk’s, rise to power as a single-man ruler and continuation of that rule—can be understood to a certain extent. Of course, by “understood,” I don’t mean “justified” or “approved.” One of the clearest examples of this excessive centralism was how it was applied to the Kurds. This is a broad topic, but just to give an example: from the Eastern Reform Plan (Şark Islahat Planı) to today, we are talking about a centralism where even speaking Kurdish can still be penalized, albeit indirectly.

As you just mentioned, removing mayors elected by popular vote and replacing them with centrally appointed trustees—either governors or district governors—is a clearly fascist practice. Such actions make the Kurdish issue increasingly intractable and end up strengthening parties like the DEM Party, which advocate against this oppression. Even the CHP, which has long maintained a distant stance on these matters, begins to feel its influence.

In this sense, excessive centralism and intervention in the democratic will—dialectically speaking—mark the first step toward a regime’s self-destruction.

‘Native and National Judiciary’ Is Just a Euphemism for Authoritarian Retreat from Universal Law

Does the frequent emphasis in recent years on a ‘national and native judiciary’ represent a departure from universal legal principles and the instrumentalization of the judiciary? What is the function of such rhetoric in the construction of ideological hegemony by populist-authoritarian regimes?

Professor Baskın Oran: There was a time when there was no ideological framework whatsoever to support people who were under extreme oppression. It was only after World War I that the concept of “minority rights” emerged. In fact, Articles 37 to 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne are titled “Protection of Minorities.” This was the first time such a protection mechanism entered the agenda of international law.

Following the Second World War, this concept evolved further with the emergence of the notion of “human rights.” Especially after the 1950s, efforts to institutionalize human rights gained momentum, leading to the establishment of the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights. Turkey also recognized the jurisdiction of this Court and pledged to comply with its rulings. However, unfortunately, despite this commitment, Turkey largely fails to implement these decisions.

For instance, in cases like those of Selahattin Demirtaş and Osman Kavala, the clear and binding rulings of the European Court of Human Rights are being ignored. The core reason for this is that such decisions are perceived as a threat by the centralized and repressive ideological structure in Turkey. This amounts to an attempt to avoid implementing human rights. But such a stance is not sustainable in the long run.

The frequent emphasis on a so-called “native and national judiciary” must also be understood in this context. This slogan signals a break from universal legal principles and the instrumentalization of the judiciary for political ends. Populist-authoritarian regimes deliberately employ such rhetoric to construct ideological hegemony. In reality, the phrase “native and national” is a euphemism for a regressive, inward-looking, and authoritarian vision that seeks to legitimize distancing from universal values.

Assimilation Backfires Once Identity Forms

Kurdish protesters gather in Taksim Square, Istanbul, on April 13, 2010, following the assault on Kurdish politician Ahmet Türk, who suffered a broken nose. Photo: Sadık Güleç.

Do the pressures on Kurdish citizens in the areas of language, culture, and representation—alongside the appointment of state trustees (kayyım) to municipalities—indicate that Turkey is moving away from a democratic resolution to the Kurdish issue? How do you foresee this approach impacting both national unity and democratization in the long term?

Professor Baskın Oran: Nazism has now reached such a point in the global and Turkish context that I believe Turkey is approaching the end of its centralized structure and its negative effects on Kurdish citizens.

Let me put it this way: you can attempt to assimilate a minority—a group treated as second-class citizens. This is a common historical occurrence. But assimilation has its limits: up until the point when a collective identity emerges within that group. Once that awareness forms, all further efforts at assimilation backfire and only serve to strengthen that group identity.

Turkey reached this point in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but failed to recognize it. Today, with the influence of external dynamics, this collective awareness has become even more visible. In this context, the autonomous Kurdish administration in northeastern Syria must be emphasized. This structure is supported by the most powerful country in the world—the United States—and is also recognized by the Syrian regime.

The current regime in Turkey, out of concern over this development, has initiated a second attempt at reform. The first attempt began in 1993, when Öcalan declared a ceasefire. Now, on July 17, 2025, it is planned that 30-40 PKK members will symbolically lay down their arms in a formal ceremony. This points to a very significant and positive development for Turkey.

“Let’s Just Call It a ‘Democratic Administration’—So That No Harm Comes to Anyone”

The foreign policy of the Erdoğan administration is frequently used as a tool for generating domestic political legitimacy. Does Turkey’s gradual shift away from Western values toward a “Russia-like” model resemble the foreign policy reflexes of fascism?

Professor Baskın Oran: Now, if you pay attention, there are two leaders with whom Erdoğan has very good relations: Trump and Putin. One is the head of the United States, the other of Russia. Although these two countries are fierce rivals and constantly at odds with one another, Erdoğan has managed to establish close ties with both. So, what is the common feature of these two leaders? Both are figures who have established—or are attempting to establish—autocratic regimes. That’s all I have to say.

Lastly, considering current developments, how would you conceptually define the regime in Turkey? Among terms such as fascism, authoritarian populism, competitive authoritarianism, and autocracy, which one do you think best fits today’s Turkey? Why?

Professor Baskın Oran: We’ve actually discussed this before. Let’s just say “a democratic administration,” so that no harm comes to anyone—shall we?

‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches

June 27, 2025

by ECPS_admin Events Past Events

DOWNLOAD PROGRAM

In-Person Programme: July 1-3, 2025. St. Cross College, Oxford University

Virtual Programme: September 2025 – April 2026 via Zoom

Between 2012 and 2024, one-fifth of the world’s democracies disappeared. During this period, “us vs. them” rhetoric and divisive politics have significantly eroded social cohesion. Yet in some instances, democracy has shown remarkable resilience. A key factor in both the rise and decline of liberal democracies is the use—and misuse—of the concept of “the people.” This idea can either unify civil society or deepen social divisions by setting “the people” against “the others.” This dichotomy lies at the heart of populism studies. However, the conditions under which “the people” become a force for democratization or a tool for majoritarian oppression require deeper, comparative, and interdisciplinary analysis. Understanding this dynamic is crucial, as it has profound implications for the future of democracy worldwide. This programme aims to foster a broad and interdisciplinary dialogue on the challenges of democratic backsliding and the pathways to resilience, with a focus on the transatlantic space and global Europe. It aims to bring together scholars from the humanities, arts, social sciences, and policy research to explore these critical issues.

Organiser

European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS)

Partners

The Humanities Division, Oxford University

Rothermere American Institute

Oxford Network of Peace Studies (OxPeace)

European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford University

Oxford Democracy Network

Special thanks to Phil Taylor, Pádraig O’Connor, Freya Johnston, Heidi Hart, David J. Sanders, Clare Woodford, Anthony Gardner, Liz Carmichael, Harry Bregazzi, Hugo Bonin, Benjamin Gladstone, Doris Suchet, Jenny Davies, Justine Shepperson, Daniel Rowe, Katy Long, Julie Adams, Réka Koleszar, Stella Schade, Louise Lok Yi Horner, Jacinta Evans, Contestation of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS), Network for Constitutional Economics and Social Philosophy (NOUS), and Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics (CAPPE).

Zoom Registration Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/bmhkaTKZTuKtqJIur132FA

IN-PERSON PROGRAMME

DAY ONE

(Tuesday, July 1, 2025)

Introduction

(08:45 – 08:50 / London Time)

Sumeyye Kocaman (Managing Editor, Populism & Politics, DPhil, St. Catherine’s College, Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Oxford University).

Opening Address

(08:50 – 09:20 / London Time)

Kate Lyndsay Mavor, CBE (Master of St Cross College, Oxford University).

Janet Royall (Baroness Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, Oxford University).

Roundtable -I-

(09:20 – 11:00 / London Time)

Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe

Chair

Jonathan Wolff (Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy and Public Policy, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford; President of the Royal Institute of Philosophy).

Speakers

“The Reappearance of ‘The People’ in European Politics,” by Martin Conway (Professor of Contemporary European History, University of Oxford).

“The Construction of the Reactionary People,” by Aurelien Mondon (Professor of Politics, University of Bath).

“Christianity in A Time of Populism,” by Luke Bretherton (Regius Professor of Moral & Pastoral Theology, University of Oxford).

Coffee Break

(11:00 – 11:30)

Panel -I-

(11:30 – 13:00 / London Time)

Politics of Social Contract

Chair

Lior Erez (Alfred Landecker Postdoctoral Fellow, Blavatnik School of Government, Nuffield College, Oxford University).

Speakers

“Exploring Human Rights Attitudes: Outgroup Perception and Long-term Consequences,’ by Sabine Carey (Professor of Political Science at the University of Mannheim and Director of the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research); Robert Johns (Professor of Politics at the University of Southampton), Katrin Paula (Postdoctoral Researcher, Technical University Munich) and Nadine O’Shea (Postdoctoral researcher, Technical University Munich).

“Doing Politics Non-politically: Explaining How Cultural Projects Afford Political Resistance,” by Nathan Tsang (Doctoral Candidate in Sociology, University of Southern California).

“From Demos to Cosmos: The Political Philosophy of Isabelle Stengers,” by Simon Clemens (Doctoral Researcher at the Cluster of Excellence “Contestation of the Liberal Script – (SCRIPTS)” and at Theory of Politics at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin).

Lunch

(13:00 – 14:00)

Panel -II-

(14:00 – 15:30 / London Time)

‘The People’ in the Age of AI and Algorithms

Chair

Alina Utrata (Career Development Research Fellow, Rothermere American Institute, St John’s College, Oxford University).

Murat Aktaş (Professor, Political Science Department, Muş Alparslan University).

Speakers

“Navigating Digital Disruptions: The Ambiguous Role of Digital Technologies, State Foundations and Gender Rights,” by Luana Mathias Souto (Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow, GenTIC Research Group, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya).

“The Role of AI in Shaping the People: Big Tech and the Broligarchy’s Influence on Modern Democracy,” by Matilde Bufano (MSc in International Security Studies, Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies and the University of Trento).

Coffee Break

(15:30 – 16:00)

Panel -III-

(16:00 – 18:00 / London Time)

Populist Threats to Modern Constitutional Democracies and Potential Solutions: Research Output of the Jean Monnet Chair EUCODEM

Co-Chairs

Elia Marzal (Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).

Bruno Godefroy (Associate Professor in Law and German, University of Tours, France).

Speakers

“Theoretical Foundations of Modern Populism: Approaches of Heidegger, Laclan and Laclau,” by Daniel Fernández (Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, Universitat Lleida).

“Erosion of the Independence of the Judiciary,” by Marco Antonio Simonelli (Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).

“Referenda as a Biased and Populist Tool: Addressing a Complex Issue in a Binary Way,” by Elia Marzal (Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).

“Pro-Independence Movements as A Populist Way Out in Multinational Contemporary Societies,” by Núria González (Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).

“Potential Solutions: Second Chambers, Demos and Majoritarian Body,” by Roger Boada (Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).

Drinks Reception

(18:15-19:00 — Common Room)

Dinner

(19:00-21:00 — Dining Hall)

DAY TWO

(Wednesday, July 2, 2025)

Panel -IV-

(09:00-10:30 / London Time)

Politics of Belonging: Voices and Silencing

Chair

Azize Sargın (PhD., Director of External Relations, ECPS).

Speakers

“The Scents of Belonging: Olfactory Narratives and the Dynamics of Democratization,” by Maarja Merivoo-Parro (Marie Curie Fellow, University of Jyväskylä).

“Silent Symbols, Loud Legacies: The Child in Populist Narratives of Post-Communist Poland,” by Maria Jerzyk (Graduate student, Masaryk University in Brno, Czechia).

Coffee Break

(10:30-11:00)

Roundtable -II-

(11:00 – 12:30 / London Time)

‘The People’ in and against Liberal and Democratic Thought

Chair

Aviezer Tucker (Director for the Centre for Philosophy of Historiography and the Historical Sciences, University of Ostrava).

Speakers

“Listening to ‘the People’: Impossible Concepts in Political Philosophy,” by Naomi Waltham-Smith (Professor, Music Faculty, University of Oxford).

“Liberal Responses to Populism,” by Karen Horn (Professor in Economic Thought, University of Erfurt) & Julian F. Müller (Professor of Political Philosophy, University of Graz).

“The Living Generation – A Presentist Conception of the People,” by Bruno Godefroy (Associate Professor in Law and German, University of Tours, France).

Lunch

(12:30 – 13:30)

Panel -V-

Governing the ‘People’: Divided Nations

(13:30 – 15:00 / London Time)

Co-Chairs

Leila Alieva (Associate Researcher, Russian and East European Studies, Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, Oxford).

Karen Horn (Professor in Economic Thought, University of Erfurt).

Speakers

“Catholicism and nationalism in Croatia: The Use and Misuse of ‘Hrvatski Narod’,” by Natalie Schwabl (Doctoral Candidate, Faculty of Arts, Languages, Literature and Humanities, Sorbonne University).

“‘Become Ungovernable:’ Covert Tactics, Racism, and Civilizational Catastrophe,” by Sarah Riccardi-Swartz (Assistant Professor of Religion and Anthropology, Northeastern University).

“Is There Left-wing Populism Today? A Case Study of the German Left and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance,” by Petar S. Ćurčić (Research Associate, Institute of European Studies, Belgrade).

Coffee Break

(15:00 – 15:30)

Panel -VI-

The ‘People’ in Search of Democracy

(15:30 – 17:00 / London Time)

Chair

Max Steuer (Principal Investigator at the Department of Political Science of the Comenius University in Bratislava).

Speakers

“Between Antonio Gramsci and Erik Olin Wright: Deepening Democracy through Civil Society Engagement,” by Rashad Seedeen (Adjunct Research Fellow in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Media in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Melbourne).

“Resilient or Regressive? How Crisis Governance Reshapes the Democratic Future of ‘The People’,” by Jana Ruwayha (PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law; Teaching and Research Assistant, Global Studies Institute; University of Geneva).

“The Performative Power of the ‘We’ in Occupy Wall Street and Gezi Movement,” by Özge Derman (PhD., Sciences Po and Sorbonne University).

DAY THREE

(Thursday, July 3, 2025)

Coffee

(09:00 – 09:30)

Panel -VII-

(09:30 – 11:00 / London Time)

‘The People’ in Schröndinger’s Box: Democracy Alive and Dead

Co-Chairs

Ming-Sung Kuo (Reader in Law, University of Warwick School of Law).

Bruno Godefroy (Associate Professor in Law and German, University of Tours, France).

Speakers

“The Matrix of ‘Legal Populism’: Democracy and (Reducing) Domination,” by Max Steuer (Principal Investigator, Department of Political Science, Comenius University).

“Lived Democracy in Small Island States: Sociopolitical Dynamics of Governance, Power, and Participation in Malta and Singapore,” by Justin Attard (PhD Candidate, University of Malta).

“Russia’s War on Democracy,”by Robert Person (Professor of International Relations and Director of curriculum in International Affairs, United States Military Academy).

Coffee Break

(11:00 – 11:30)

Panel -VIII-

(11:30 – 13:30 / London Time)

‘The People’ vs ‘The Elite’: A New Global Order?

Co-Chairs

Ashley Wright (Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Minerva Global Security Programme, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford).

Azize Sargın (PhD., Director of External Relations, ECPS).

Speakers

“We: The Populist Elites,” by Aviezer Tucker (Director for the Centre for Philosophy of Historiography and the Historical Sciences, University of Ostrava).

“Reclamations of ‘We, the People’: Rethinking Civil Society through Spatial Contestations in Turkey,” by Pınar Dokumacı (Assistant Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin) & Özlem Aslan(Assistant Professor in the Core Program at Kadir Has University).

“The Transatlantic Network of Authoritarian Populism: The Rise of the Executive and Its Dangers to Democracy,” by Attila Antal (Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Institute of Political Science, Eötvös Loránd University).

“The French New Right and Its Impact on European Democracies,” by Murat Aktaş (Professor, Political Science Department, Muş Alparslan University); Russell Foster (Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics, King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies).

Discussant

Karen Horn (Professor in Economic Thought, University of Erfurt).

Lunch

(13:30 – 14:30)

Roundtable -III-

(14:30 – 16:00 / London Time)

When the Social Contract Is Broken: How to Put the Genie Back

Co-Chairs

Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of ECPS).

Selçuk Gültaşlı (Chairperson, ECPS Executive Board).

Speakers

Aviezer Tucker (Director for the Centre for Philosophy of Historiography and the Historical Sciences, University of Ostrava).

John Thomas Alderdice (Baron Alderdice of Knock, in the City of Belfast, Founding Director of the Conference on the Resolution of Intractable Conflict, Oxford University; Founder of the Centre for Democracy and Peace Building).

Julian F. Müller (Professor of Political Philosophy, University of Graz).

Closing Remarks

(16:00 – 16:10 / London Time)

Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of ECPS).

Biographies & Abstracts

Irina von Wiese is the Honorary President of the ECPS. She was born in Germany, the daughter and granddaughter of Polish and Russian refugees. After completing her law studies in Cologne, Geneva, and Munich, she secured a scholarship to study for a master’s degree in public administration at the Harvard Kennedy School. Her subsequent legal training took her to Berlin, Brussels, and Bangkok, providing her with initial insight into the plight of refugees and civil rights defenders worldwide. From 1997 to 2019, Irina lived and worked as a lawyer in both private and public sector roles in London. During this period, she volunteered for human rights organisations, advising on migration policy and welcoming refugees into her home for many years.

In 2019, Irina was elected to represent the UK Liberal Democrats in the European Parliament. She served as Vice Chair of the Human Rights Subcommittee and as a member of the cross-party Working Group on Responsible Business Conduct. The Group’s main achievement was the introduction of EU legislation that made human rights due diligence mandatory in global supply chains. During her term, she was also elected to the Executive Committee of the European Endowment for Democracy, which supports grassroots civil society initiatives in fragile democracies.

Having lost her seat in the European Parliament after the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union, Irina returned to the UK, where she was elected to the Council of Southwark, one of London’s most diverse boroughs. Her links to Brussels are maintained through an advisory role at FGS Global, where she works on EU law and ESG issues. In addition, Irina is an Affiliate Professor at the European Business School, the ESCP, teaching international law and politics (including a course entitled ‘Liberalism and Populism’). Irina is the proud mother of a teenage daughter.

Roundtable -I-

Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe

Jonathan Wolff is a Professor at the Blavatnik School, University of Oxford, and President of the Royal Philosophical Society. He is a Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy and Public Policy and a Supernumerary Fellow at Wolfson College. He was formerly the inaugural Alfred Landecker Professor of Values and Public Policy, having been appointed Blavatnik Chair in Public Policy at the School in 2016. Before joining Oxford, Jo was Professor of Philosophy and Dean of Arts and Humanities at UCL. He is a political philosopher who works on questions of inequality, disadvantage and social justice. He has published a book, City of Equals (OUP 2024), co-authored with Avner de-Shalit. His work in recent years has also turned to applied topics such as public safety, disability, gambling, and the regulation of recreational drugs, which he has discussed in his books Ethics and Public Policy: A Philosophical Inquiry (Routledge 2011, second edition 2019) and The Human Right to Health (Norton 2012). His “An Introduction to Moral Philosophy” and an associated edited volume, “Readings in Moral Philosophy,” were published by W. W. Norton in 2018, with new editions forthcoming in 2024. Earlier works include Disadvantage (OUP 2007), with Avner de-Shalit; An Introduction to Political Philosophy (OUP, 1996, fourth edition 2023); Why Read Marx Today? (OUP 2002); and Robert Nozick (Polity 1991), together with several edited collections. His recent work has also explored social equality, poverty, and social exclusion, as well as methodological issues in political philosophy. He is now working on questions of belonging, nationalism, and civil society.

Martin Conway is a Professor of Contemporary European History at Balliol College, University of Oxford. His research has primarily focused on European history from the 1930s to the final decades of the twentieth century. Over the last few years, much of his work has focused on the history of Democracy in twentieth-century Europe. He has published numerous articles on the nature of democracy in post-war Europe and authored a large book, entitled Europe’s Democratic Age: Western Europe 1945-68, with Princeton University Press in the spring of 2020. He is continuing to write about democracy and is completing a collaborative project on the history of Social Justice in twentieth-century Europe. He has also begun a new project on Political Men, which seeks to problematise the forms of male political citizenship which have developed in Europe across the twentieth century. Its focus is consciously comparative, embracing a variety of political regimes and periods. Its underlying thesis is that we need to understand how male forms of political action have had a significant influence on the evolution of both democratic and non-democratic regimes. He also has a strong interest in the concept of the History of the Present, as a distinct era separate from the more familiar span of the twentieth century. He is one of the editors (with Celia Donert and Kiran Patel) of a new book series published by Cambridge University Press, entitled European Histories of the Present.

Aurelien Mondon (he/him) is a Professor of Politics at the University of Bath , specialising in politics, and co-convenor of the Reactionary Politics Research Network. His research focuses predominantly on the impact of racism and populism on liberal democracies and the mainstreaming of far-right politics through elite discourse. His first book, The Mainstreaming of the Extreme Right in France and Australia: A Populist Hegemony? was published in 2013, and he recently co-edited After Charlie Hebdo: Terror, racism and Free Speech, published with Zed. Reactionary Democracy: How Racism and the Populist Far Right Became Mainstream, co-written with Aaron Winter, was published by Verso in 2020. The Ethics of Researching the Far Right, co-edited with Antonia Vaughan, Joan Braune, and Meghan Tinsley, was published in April 2024 by Manchester University Press. His work has been published in various mainstream and expert outlets worldwide, including CNN, The Guardian, The Independent, Libération, Newsweek, Le Soir, Mediapart and Al Jazeera.

Luke Bretherton is Regius Professor of Moral & Pastoral Theology, University of Oxford. Before Oxford, Bretherton was the Robert E. Cushman Distinguished Professor of Moral and Political Theology and Senior Fellow of the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. Before joining Duke in 2012, he was Reader in Theology & Politics and Convener of the Faith & Public Policy Forum at King’s College London. Alongside his scholarly work, he writes in the media on topics related to religion and politics, has worked with a variety of faith-based NGOs, mission agencies, and churches around the world, and has been actively involved over many years in forms of grassroots democratic politics, both in the UK and the US. He also hosts the Listen, Organize, Act! podcast which focuses on the history and contemporary practice of community organizing and the role religion plays in democracy. Specific issues addressed in his work include debt, fair trade, environmental justice, racism, humanitarianism, the treatment of refugees, interfaith relations, euthanasia, secularism, nationalism, church-state relations, and the provision of social welfare.

M. Isabel Garrido Gómez is Titular Professor in Legal Philosophy at the University of Alcalá (Spain) and Director Chair for Democracy and Human Rights, University of Alcalá and Spanish Ombudsman. She is author of Family Policy in the European Union 2000 (Madrid: Dykinson); Criterions for Solution of Interests in Private Law 2002 (Madrid: Dykinson); Rudolf von Stammler´s Theory and Philosophy of Law 2003 (Madrid: Reus)”; Fundamental Rights and Social and Democratic Rule of Law 2007 (Madrid: Dilex); The Law as Normative Process, in collaboration 2007 (Alcalá de Henares (Madrid): University of Alcalá Press); Equality in the Law and in the Application of Law 2009 (Madrid: Dykinson); The Changes of Law in the Global Society 2010 (Navarra: ThomsonAranzadi); Democracy in the Legal Sphere 2013 (Madrid: Civitas); The Function of Judges: Context, Activities and Tools 2014 (Navarra: Aranzadi); (as traslator), in collaboration, Law without True 2005 (Madrid: Dykinson); (as coordinator), with , The Right of Child to Live in his/her Family 2007 (Madrid: Exlibris); (as editor), in collaboration, Social Rights as a Requirement of Justice 2009 (Alcalá de Henares (Madrid): University of Alcalá Press and Spanish Ombudsman); (as editor), in collaboration, Ideological Liberty and Conscientious Objection 2011 (Madrid: Dykinson); (as editor), The Right to Peace as an Emergent Right 2011; (as editor), The Human Right to Development 2013 (Madrid: Tecnos); (as editor), The Efectiveness of Social Rights 2013 (Madrid: Dykinson); (as co-editor), Democracy, Governance, and Participation 2014 (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch); in collaboration Challenges and Paradoxes of Constitutional Democracy 2014 (Granada: Comares).

Roundtable -II-

‘The People’ in and against Liberal and Democratic Thought

Naomi Waltham-Smith is a Professor at the Music Faculty, University of Oxford. Specializing in the politics of listening, she is an interdisciplinary scholar working at the intersection of philosophy (especially recent French, Black radical, and decolonial thought) with music and sound studies. She is interested in how aurality is imbricated in some of the most significant and urgent political issues under contemporary capitalism, including the crises of democracy we are witnessing today, together with antiracist and environmental struggles. She has also worked on the politics of listening in contexts as varied as the Austro-German musical canon and Las Vegas casinos. Beyond academic publication, she works collaboratively in the public sphere to develop these ideas through listening workshops and citizens’ assemblies, multimedia installations in galleries and public spaces, long-term community collaborations, and policy engagement. Prior to joining Oxford in September 2023, she was Professor in the Centre for Interdisciplinary Methodologies and Deputy Chair of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Warwick, where she was also Chair of the Academic Freedom Review Committee. Before that she taught Music and Comparative Literature at the University of Pennsylvania (2012–2018), having held postdoctoral fellowships at City University and Indiana University, and supervised at the University of Cambridge. She is a graduate of Selwyn College, Cambridge and King’s College London.

Karen Horn is a business journalist, publicist and university lecturer. Horn studied economics at Saarland University and the University of Bordeaux III and received her doctorate from the University of Lausanne. From 1995 to 2007, she was a member of the economics editorial team of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. There, she wrote about regulatory policy issues and economics as a science. She was the editor in charge of the page Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft and responsible for the reviews of economics books. From October 2007 to the end of March 2012, she was head of the capital city office of the German Economic Institute in Berlin. From April 2012 to 2013, she was Managing Director of Wert der Freiheit gGmbH, founded by Theo Müller and Thomas Bachofer, Chairman of the Board of Sachsenmilch AG. Horn teaches as a lecturer at the HU Berlin, the University of Witten/Herdecke, the University of Siegen and the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Erfurt. She was appointed honorary professor at the University of Erfurt in 2019. She writes regularly for the debate magazines Standpoint and Schweizer Monat and occasionally for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung.

Julian F. Müller is a Professor of Political Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Graz. His main areas of research are political philosophy and applied ethics. In political philosophy, his work focuses on the themes of reasonable and unreasonable political disagreements. In his book, Political Pluralism, Disagreement, and Justice(Routledge 2019), he develops the concept of Polycentric Democracy, a set of institutions designed to promote justice in the face of widespread disagreements about facts and norms. The book received the Werner von Melle and Roman Herzog Prizes. In more recent work, he has explored unreasonable disagreements, formulating an epistemic theory of populist ideology. Currently, he is investigating the systematic role of the concept of truth in theories of classical liberalism. In applied ethics, he has published on topics including migration ethics, the ethics of emerging technologies, and economic ethics.

Bruno Godefroy is an associate professor in Law and German at the University of Tours (France). His research focuses on constitutional theory, political philosophy, and the history of ideas. Recent publications: “Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology: Legitimizing Authority after Secularization,” Political Theory 53/1 (2025), “Karl Löwith’s Historicization of Historicism” (in H. J. Paul, A. van Veldhuizen (ed.), Historicism: A Travelling Concept, London, Bloomsbury, 2021), La Fin du sens de l’histoire. Eric Voegelin, Karl Löwith et la temporalité du politique (Paris, Classiques Garnier, 2021).

Roundtable -III-

When the Social Contract Is Broken: How to Put the Genie Back

Selcuk Gultasli is the chairperson of ECPS’s executive board. Mr. Gultasli is responsible for the operations of both the ECPS’s academic group and administrative staff. Mr. Gultasli was previously the Brussels Bureau Chief of Zaman daily until the Turkish government confiscated the newspaper on March 4, 2016. He is interested in EU policy, especially expansion, and has written extensively on the EU and the potential expansion process. He also studies Turkish accession to the EU, human rights, rule of law, liberal democracy, Turkish-Kurdish relations, and the history of Armenian-Turkish relations. Mr. Gultasli graduated from Boğaziçi University in 1991; he continued his studies at Middle East Technical University, earning his M.A. with a thesis on the comparison of Turkish dailies in relation to EU membership discussions. He obtained another M.A. degree from the Catholic University of Leuven; he wrote his thesis on the comparison of English and French secularism. Concerned about the rise of illiberal democracies in many democratic countries, Gultasli thinks it is of the utmost importance to study the rise of populism and populist leaders.

Lord John Alderdice has an academic and professional background in medicine, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis. He is the founding Director of the Conference on the Resolution of Intractable Conflict, based in Oxford and with colleagues in Belfast he also established the Centre for Democracy and Peace Building which continues work on the implementation of the principles of the Good Friday Agreement and takes the lessons of the Irish Peace Process to other communities in conflict. More recently, he set up The Concord Foundation with a wider remit in understanding and addressing the nature of violent political conflict and its resolution. Lord Alderdice’s work has been recognised throughout the world with many fellowships, visiting professorships, honorary doctorates, and international awards. Having been appointed to the House of Lords in 1996, he was elected Convenor of the Liberal Democrats for the first four years of the Liberal/Conservative Coalition Government from 2010 to 2014. His international interests had previously led to his election as President of Liberal International, the global network of some 100 liberal political parties and organisations. He served from 2005 to 2009 and remains an active Presidente D’Honneur.

He was a consultant psychiatrist and Senior Lecturer at The Queen’s University of Belfast, where he established the Centre for Psychotherapy with various degree courses, research work and clinical services. He also devoted himself to understanding and addressing religious fundamentalism and long-standing violent political conflict, initially in Ireland, and then in various other parts of the world. This commitment took him into politics, and he was elected Leader of Northern Ireland’s Alliance Party from 1987 to 1998, playing a significant role in the negotiation of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. When the new Northern Ireland Assembly was elected, he became its first Speaker. In 2004, he retired from the Assembly on being appointed by the British and Irish Governments as one of the four members of the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC), appointed to close down the operations of the paramilitary organisations (2003-2011). He continued with this work on security issues when the new Northern Ireland Government commissioned him and two colleagues to produce a report advising them on a strategy for disbanding the remaining paramilitary groups (2016).

Panel -I-

Politics of Social Contract

Exploring Human Rights Attitudes: Outgroup Perception and Long-term Consequences

Sabine Carey is Professor of Political Science at the University of Mannheim and Director of the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. She empirically investigates drivers of different forms of state-sponsored violence, with particular emphasis on the role of political institutions and repressive agents. She is interested in understanding what drives people’s perceptions of peace, security and human rights. Her work has been supported by research grants from the German Science Foundation and the European Research Council, among others.

Robert Johns is Professor of Politics at the University of Southampton. He has twenty years’ experience of research and teaching in the fields of elections, public opinion, political psychology and survey methodology. He is interested in what people think about politics, where those opinions come from, and how we can go about measuring slippery things like beliefs, attitudes and values. Rob has worked on a large number of (often ESRC-funded) survey projects, most notably as a founding investigator on the Scottish Election Study series, and has particular expertise in the design of survey experiments.

Katrin Paula is Professor of Global Security and Technology at the Technical University Munich. She researches and teaches in the field of Human Security and Contentious Politics. A particular focus of her work is how changing information- and communication technologies and their strategic use and control affect political mobilization and violence. Exemplary research areas include the effect of information technologies on the spatial and temporal diffusion of protests, the effect of state censorship on political attitudes, or the strategic use of violence during elections, as well as methods of data collection in the field of conflict studies and statistical modeling of spatial processes.

Nadine O’Shea is a postdoctoral researcher, working with Katrin Paula and Sabine Carey in the DFG project “Security threats and fragile commitments: Stress-testing German support for human rights at home and abroad” at the Technical University Munich since November 2023. Nadine specializes in conducting empirical research within the field of peace and conflict studies, specifically focusing on human rights, civil wars, and foreign policy. She also has a keen interest in research methods. During her Bachelor’s degree in ‘International Relations (B.A.)’ at Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences in Kleve, Nadine completed an internship abroad at the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations in New York and a semester abroad at San Diego State University. In her Master’s degree ‘Political Science with a specialisation in conflicts, power, and politics (MSc.)’ at Radboud University, in the Netherlands, she focused on the research areas of democratisation, populism and peace and conflict research. By participating in the Radboud Honours Academy and completing a research internship, her interest in research grew. From 2018 to 2023, Nadine worked as a research assistant at the University of Greifswald, where she taught introductory and research practice seminars on international relations. Nadine also taught Quantitative Methods at the University West in Sweden as part of the Erasmus programme. In November 2023, Nadine submitted her dissertation entitled ‘External Interference and Violence Against Civilians During Civil Wars’ to the University of Greifswald.

Abstract: People are often willing to embrace rights-restricting policies, particularly if this is seen as necessary to maintain security or to restrain an out-group. These policies are typically framed as security benefits. What happens when the public is prompted to consider the human rights costs – and the possibility that restricting an out-group today might be applied to an in-group tomorrow? Research in this field has rarely tested public responsiveness to an explicit defence of human rights. To shed new light on this, we address two related questions: What arguments can strengthen support for human rights of others? How much does the answer to this question depend on people’s attitudes towards those whose rights are affected? With a novel survey experiment of over 6,000 adults in Germany, we find that highlighting human rights violations does not in general sway people’s opinions about amnesty for excessive police violence. But it does make respondents less supportive of such amnesty when they would be least committed to human rights. Our study paints an optimistic picture that a stronger human rights narrative might reach those who are otherwise least committed to human rights.

Doing Politics Non-politically: Explaining How Cultural Projects Afford Political Resistance

Nathan Tsang is a third-year Ph.D. student in sociology at the University of Southern California. His research interests include cultural sociology, political sociology, and social movement studies, with a focus on the connections and disconnections between culture and politics in everyday situations. He has published on Hong Kong’s fact-checking activism in journalism and journalism studies, as well as on online incivility in social movements in computational communication research and the politics of language in Hong Kong. His forthcoming co-authored book chapter in the Handbook of Hong Kong Studies (published by Brill) discussed how different place configurations inform various conceptualisations of “Hong Kong diaspora.” He currently uses qualitative methods to investigate the cultural preservation projects of Asian immigrants in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Abstract: While the literature on repression, diaspora, and resistance substantially enriches our understanding of how individuals resist secretly and creatively under political pressure, it is still unclear how political resistance survives in nonpolitical organizations. This question is crucial to diasporic migrants from autocratic countries who cannot engage in formal mobilization and use nonpolitical organizations to preserve their collective solidarity. Empirically, this study draws on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork in two cultural organizations by diasporic Hongkongers in the United States. It argues that by comparing two forms of cultural preservation projects—one emphasizing cultural artifacts and another focusing on communal gatherings—collective resistance can exist in organizational life without being deliberately political. Contrary to conventional logic, resistance in the Hong Kong case was neither disguised nor individualized but diffused in cultural activities. To accomplish this, people developed patterned ways to cue political speeches with the help of objects in the physical settings of cultural events. Relying on objects’ material affordances, organizers can regulate political speeches in activities, whereas participants can momentarily shift their speeches into political expressions. As such, organization members can consistently cue a sense of political resistance within their nonpolitical activities. I call this reliance on object-mediated interactions to articulate political concerns “afforded politicization.” The findings contribute to the scholarship by answering the question of when and how isolated, covert forms of everyday resistance can become politically meaningful in organizational life. By showing that diasporic cultural practices are a form of everyday resistance, the study argues that repressed people can mediate politics using objects, and with enough object-mediated interactions, individual resistance can aggregate into collective resistance.

From Demos to Cosmos. The Political Philosophy of Isabelle Stengers

Simon Clemens is a doctoral researcher at the Cluster of Excellence “Contestation of the Liberal Script – (SCRIPTS)” and doctoral student at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin (Theory of Politics). Following a research stay at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, he is currently a research fellow at Brown University. In addition, he is a freelance contributor to the Federal Agency for Civic Education and the German Resistance Memorial Museum. In his dissertation, he examines the concept of democracy within the debate of New Materialism. His research interests include hegemony and democratic theories, (new and old) materialisms, memory culture, resistance and protest movements, environmental humanities, and (theories of) education.

Abstract: Politics, when considering all beings—human and nonhuman—faces challenges in addressing this multiplicity. As climate and ecological crises reveal our mutual interdependence, the need for new democratic models is pressing, yet such political visions remain rare. Cosmopolitics, a concept proposed by Belgian philosopher Isabelle Stengers, offers a way to address this gap by expanding democracy beyond human concerns to include all beings, imagining new forms of collectivity.

Stengers’ cosmopolitics challenges the conventional focus on consensus and antagonism in democracy, presenting a “third way” beyond liberal, deliberative, and populist approaches. The paper unfolds in three parts: first, I contrast Stengers’ approach to heterogeneity with John Rawls’ notion of plurality, introducing her concepts of “ecology of practice” and “cosmopolitics” as alternatives to consensus-based coexistence. While Stengers addresses a problem common to liberal democratic theory, her solution and analysis diverge significantly, offering a distinct perspective. Second, I explore how Stengers’ proceduralism—focused on process rather than consensus—enables a common world without requiring agreement. Unlike Jürgen Habermas’ deliberative proceduralism, which excludes non-communicative beings, Stengers’ approach seeks coexistence without consensus, critiquing the limitations of traditional liberal frameworks. Lastly, I examine Stengers’ ecological framing and the figure of the diplomat, offering a path for pacifying antagonistic relations. Her cosmopolitics seeks to balance democracy with ecological awareness, proposing an inclusive model that avoids the coercion of both consensus and populism.

Panel -II-

The “People” In the Age of AI and Algorithms

Alina Utrata is a Career Development Research Fellow at St John’s College, University of Oxford, an associate member of the Department of Politics and International Relations and a fellow at the Rothermere American Institute. Her research examines technology corporations beyond the traditional political/economic divide, theorizing how and when corporations may enact a kind of political power, from cloud computing to digital payment systems. She received her PhD in Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge and was a 2020 Gates-Cambridge Scholar, where her thesis was awarded the Lisa Smirl PhD Prize.

In addition to her doctoral research, she has published in the American Political Science Review and the Boston Review comparing Silicon Valley’s outer space colonization projects with the histories of colonizing corporations such as the British or Dutch East India Companies. Dr. Utrata grew up in the San Francisco Bay Area, where I received my BA in history from Stanford University with a minor in human rights. She received her MA in Conflict Transformation and Social Justice from Queen’s University Belfast as a 2017 Marshall Scholar. In her free time, she hosts and produces The Anti-Dystopians, a politics podcast about tech.

Reclaiming “The People” in an Age of Algorithms: AI Literacy as a Democratic Virtue

Hossein Dabbagh is an Assistant Professor in philosophy at Northeastern University London and an affiliate member of the Oxford Continuing Education Department. His research spans moral philosophy, applied ethics, political philosophy, and public policy, with a particular focus on AI ethics, AI-human cooperation, and democratic governance in the digital age. His recent work examines how emerging technologies shape public discourse, civic engagement, and social inequalities, emphasising the role of AI ethics education.

He advocates for integrating AI ethics into school curricula to promote critical digital literacy and responsible technology use from an early age. In addition to his academic contributions, he has provided evidence for UK government inquiries and public policy initiatives on AI regulation, misinformation, and social media governance. Beyond academia, he collaborates with interdisciplinary networks, including UNESCO’s Inclusive Policy Lab, contributing to global discussions on ethics, technology, and public policy.

Abstract: “The people” is central to democracy, reflecting ideals of collective decision-making and open debate. Yet algorithmic governance reshapes this concept by determining who participates in public discourse, amplifying some voices while silencing others. This paper argues that AI-driven polarisation calls for new approaches to civic education and engagement.

Drawing on deliberative democracy and epistemic justice, I show how algorithmic systems can weaken rational debate by prioritising viral content over verifiable facts. Social media algorithms often push emotionally charged material, fragmenting discussions and fuelling antagonism. By exploiting cognitive biases, these systems reduce “the people” to passive consumers, deepening divisions and enabling exclusionary populist narratives.

Building on Miranda Fricker’s work, I argue that AI systems can intensify testimonial and hermeneutical injustices, distorting collective meaning-making and marginalising vulnerable communities. This breakdown erodes trust and shared understanding, both essential for democracy to function. To address these issues, I propose AI ethics literacy as a core democratic virtue. Beyond technical skills, AI literacy should cultivate a critical awareness of algorithmic influences, empowering citizens to question manipulative content and preserve meaningful public debate. This interdisciplinary effort—linking philosophy, policy, and education—can help align AI governance with democratic values. Reclaiming “the people” as an active, deliberative force is both a moral and political necessity in our algorithmic era. Only by fostering a critically informed citizenry can democracy survive in a world increasingly shaped by AI.

Navigating Digital Disruptions: The Ambiguous Role of Digital Technologies, State Foundations and Gender Rights

Luana Mathias Souto is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Gender and ICT Research Group at Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Spain. Principal Investigator of the project “Reproductive Health under Algorithm Surveillance (THELMA),” with a Marie Skłodowska-Curie (MSCA) Postdoctoral Fellowship by Horizon Europe. She holds a doctoral and master’s degrees in Law from Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (PUC Minas), Brazil. During her doctoral studies, she analyzed the effectiveness of women’s political rights under Giorgio Agamben’s state of exception theory.

Her research findings also include the study of gender-political violence in Latin America. Since then, her work has analyzed the most recent threads on women’s rights, including how digital platforms increase violations of women’s rights. Her doctoral dissertation received a Magna cum Laude distinction. Her last publication is the chapter “The Biopolitical Perspective in Women’s Legal Education“ in the Routledge-edited book “Biopolitics and Structure in Legal Education.“ Formerly visiting Postdoctoral Researcher at the Max Planck Institute in Frankfurt (MPILHLT/2023) and in Hamburg (MPIPriv/2024), and Research Fellow at the Weizenbaum Institute in Berlin (2024).

Abstract: This paper explores how digital disruptions, particularly in the Rule of Law, ambiguously affect the democratic process and constrain women’s rights. In general, all the foundational elements of modern states- territory, people, and sovereignty – face significant challenges in the digital era, but the concept of people remains the most affected. Cross-border data flows, for example, challenge the principles of territoriality and sovereignty, emphasizing extraterritoriality when tech companies are based in different countries from their data users, making it difficult to protect data rights. The rise of “divisible dividual ” – individuals whose data is fragmented across various platforms – illustrates how personal data fragmentation challenges the concept of people. By examining the political, reproductive, and economic dimensions, this paper aims to shed light on the multifaceted ways digital technologies impact women’s rights. These disruptions ensure that gender inequalities remain embedded in state foundations. Even though technological advances are seen as crucial for democracy, bringing information, connecting people, and uniting diverse communities, they inherit unresolved social dilemmas, which illiberal actors explores to spread anti-gender practices in digital platforms, exacerbating the politics of “us and them ” and using gender issues as a “symbolic glue ” to weaken democracies. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing strategies to protect democratic values and promote gender equality in the digital era. This paper seeks to contribute to this ongoing conversation by providing a comprehensive analysis of the challenges and proposing potential solutions.

The Role of AI In Shaping the People: Big Tech and the Broligarchy’s Influence on Modern Democracy

Matilde Bufano is a graduate student currently finalising an MSc in International Security Studies at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies and the University of Trento. Her interests revolve around the role of AI in society in peace and war times, the exploitation of algorithms for propaganda in wartime. Her work covered the two most discussed current conflicts, namely the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict.

Matilde has an interest in the right-wing extremism in peacetime, trans-exclusionary echo chambers and conspiracy theory bubbles. Theories such as QAnon and the Deep State have sparked particular interest, especially after the violent and undemocratic shifts peaked with the Capitol Hill events in the US. Matilde holds a cum laude bachelor’s degree in political science, International Relations, and Human Rights at the University of Padova.

Abstract: The main application of AI in social media is algorithmic curation based on user-preference data. Such a process creates echo chambers, i.e. bounded and enclosed media spaces in which similar content is infinitely propagated, insulating users from cross-cutting exposure. This effectively creates a distinction between “us” and “them”, grouping users in unescapable bubbles stemming from simply deduced preferences, making the gap between the two groups unbridgeable.

This has been worsened by a simultaneous reduction in fact-checking and the rise of generative AI as a disinformation creator and amplifier, with which anyone can create a video of a non-event to instigate hate and exclusion. Disinformation contains a component of exclusion, often grounded in the stark distinction between an “us” and a “them.” According to Çoksan and Yilmaz (2023), fake news can be divided into six groups: contact-outgroup blaming, represented-outgroup blaming, outgroup derogation, outgroup appreciation, ingroup glorification, and phantom-mastermind blaming.

In recent years, ingroup glorification, outgroup blaming, and derogation have become increasingly common, using minorities as scapegoats for global issues, feeding into conspiracy theories propagated by algorithmic curation like QAnon, and effectively harming democracy not only in online arenas. The rise of the (tech) broligarchy and fall of liberal democracy has been apparent in online spaces. It is now spilling over to real life, with radicalising policies online (e.g. unescapable algorithmic curation) repeating themselves in exclusionary policies in the physical world.

Panel -III-

Populist Threats to Modern Constitutional Democracies and Potential Solutions: Research Output of The Jean Monnet Chair EUCODEM

Elia Marzal is an Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Barcelona. She holds a Ph.D. in Law from the European University Institute in Florence, with a dissertation on comparative constitutional law. Her research has focused on immigration, the historical development of political structures, the tensions between territorial political entities in normative production, the protection of minorities in heterogeneous states, and equality.

Theoretical Foundations of Modern Populism: Approaches of Heidegger, Laclan and Laclau

Daniel Fernández Cañueto is an Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Lleida. Director of the journal Nuevos Horizontes del Derecho Constitucional, Member of the Jean Monnet Chair EUCODEM at the University of Barcelona and junior associate researcher at the Giménez Abad Foundation. He participates in national and international research projects on institutional and democratic quality, rule of law, parliamentarism and populism. He has conducted research stays at the University of Ottawa and the University of Chile. He is also a member of the popular legislative initiatives Control Commission of the Parliament of Catalonia, a member of the Board of Advisors of the Institute for Self-Government Studies since 2021, and a member of the Board of the Association of Constitutional Lawyers of Spain. Author of several monographs and research works such as “Representación política y sistemas sociales,” (2020, CEPC), “La construcción de la representación territorial en Canadá”, (2021, Derechos Humanos, Derecho Constitucional y Derecho Internacional: sinergias contemporáneas), “Chile: de la democracia limitada de Pinochet al proceso constituyente de 2020” (2021, Revista de estudios políticos) or “Realidad constitucional, literatura y pensamiento” (2021, Revista de estudios políticos).

Abstract: Populism is widely studied in political science and constitutional law. We refer to the definition of what constitutes the current populist parties, their actions, and the consequences of their approach to political activity on democracy and constitutionalism. However, their theoretical origins have not been analyzed in depth. In my opinion, there is a connecting thread between the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, the structuralist linguistics of Lacan, and the post-Marxist thought of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe that determines, frames, and defines the concept of populism. The aim of the paper is precisely to make this hitherto veiled connection visible, to make explicit how the critique of the universals of the Enlightenment and the fall of the Soviet Union end up having an impact on thinking about both linguistics and political theory and, from there, it is transformed into an original political thought that spreads first through Latin America and then through the rest of the West. Likewise, understanding this connection also allows us to glimpse how this populist thought is transferred, when it impacts law, into an illiberal doctrine.

Erosion of the Independence of the Judiciary

Marco Antonio Simonelli is an Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Barcelona. He obtained his Ph.D. in Comparative Constitutional Law from the University di Siena, an LL.M. in European Law from the University of Leiden, and a Law Degree from the University of Pisa. He is currently a Schumann Fellow at the University of Münster for 2025-2026 and has also completed research stays at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Public Law in Heidelberg and at the Centre of Comparative and European Constitutional Studies (CECS) of the University of Copenhagen. He was also an intern at the Rome Criminal Court of Appeal and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. Dr. Simonelli’s research interests focus on the multifaceted contemporary challenges to liberal constitutional democracy, with particular attention to counter-majoritarian institutions. He is the author of the book “The European Court of Human Rights and National Constitutional Courts (Springer, 2024)” and co-editor of “Populism and Contemporary Democracy: Old Problems and New Challenges” (Palgrave MacMillan, 2022), as well as several academic articles and commentaries in the field of European constitutional law published in national and international law journals.

Abstract: Since the rise of populism, the role of judges in democratic politics has become one of the major issues of debate. Populism indeed challenges one of the core tenets of constitutional liberal democracy: the idea that the judicial branch shall be separated from the legislative and the executive and that it shall be capable of controlling them. Claiming that unelected bodies cannot override the will of elected ones, populist leaders indeed attempt to depict the judges as “enemies of the people”. Recent developments in both established and emerging democracies—including open challenges to the validity of judicial decisions and questioning the impartiality of courts—demonstrate that no democracy is immune to these pressures. At the same time, the growing polarization of the political arena reverberates also on judicial appointments, further treating the independence of the judiciary and its ability to uphold legal and constitutional principles. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the impact of populism on judicial independence by providing a comparative review of the most common strategies employed by populist governments to undermine judicial independence, such as court-packing, changes in the appointment system, the conferral of disciplinary powers in the Minister of Justice as well the public delegitimization of courts. In parallel, the paper, drawing on national experiences, also explores the most effective strategies for insulating ordinary and constitutional courts from political branches, thereby contributing to the strengthening of constitutional democracy in an era of rising illiberalism.

Referenda as a Biased and Populist Tool: Addressing a Complex Issue in a Binary Way

Elia Marzal Yetano is an Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Barcelona and until 2022 she was professor of Constitutional Law and Legal History at ESADE Law School, Ramon Llull University, Barcelona. She holds a Ph.D. in Law from the European University Institute in Florence, with a dissertation on comparative constitutional law, in which she analyzed the convergence of legislative and jurisdictional entities in the creation of law in the specific field of immigration. Other than on immigration, her research has focused on the historical development of political structures, the tensions between territorial political entities in normative production, the intersection between Constitutional law and history, the protection of minorities in heterogeneous states, and issues on equality. Her research has been published in national and international journals, including the European Journal of Political Research, Managerial Law, Revista de Derecho Político, Revista Crítica de Derecho Inmobiliario, Revista de Estudios Políticos, Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español, Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger or the International Journal of Constitutional Law.

Abstract: For secessionist movements, Canada and the United Kingdom represent examples of overcoming the traditional reluctance of liberal democracies to consider holding secession referendums as a means of resolving territorial conflicts. However, the doctrine established by the Supreme Court of Canada (later echoed in the United Kingdom) does not place the referendum at its core; rather, Parliament holds a prominent position. This paper examines the actual role assigned to Parliament within that doctrine and its potential implications for the framework of constitutional democracy. It analyzes the reasoning found in the key texts that support this doctrine—namely, the 1998 opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada on Quebec’s secession, the 2000 federal Clarity Act, and the 2022 opinion of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom on Scotland’s ability to unilaterally call a new secession referendum—assessing the weight given to Parliament from a social choice perspective. Two main conclusions emerge. First, the doctrine acknowledges the relationship between the legitimacy of a decision and the costs inherent in the decision-making process, which increase as the decision becomes more divisive within the affected community. Second, it implicitly highlights the need to nuance and complicate the liberal democratic fiction of a singular people and a general will, suggesting that in certain contexts, majority-rule democracy should be complemented by consensus democracy.

Pro-independence Movements as a Populist Way Out

Núria González Campañá is an Assistant Professor in Constitutional Law at the University of Barcelona. She received her DPhil in Law from the University of Oxford in 2019. Prior to that, she obtained her M.A. in Law and Diplomacy (The Fletcher School, Tufts University) and her B.A. in Law (University of Barcelona). Her main research interests are: 1) Self-determination and secession in Spanish, comparative and EU constitutional law and 2) Populism, constitutional democracy and rule of law. Among her research, the monograph “Secession and European Union Law. The deferential attitude” (Oxford University Press) was nominated for the 2024 Book of the Year prize awarded by the International Forum on the Future of Constitutionalism. In addition to being a team member in national research projects, she has also been a member of the European project “Democratic Efficacy and the varieties of populism in Europe”, led by Prof. Boda Zsolt, Institute for Legal Studies (Budapest) and funded by the European Commission. She is currently a member of the “core team” of the Jean Monnet Chair in European Constitutional Democracy (EUCODEM) at the University of Barcelona. She has carried out research stays at McGill University and the European University Institute.

Abstract: Spain is not alien to the phenomenon of populist narratives and constitutional erosion. Although probably unnoticed by international audiences, one of the most relevant examples of constitutional erosion that has taken place in Spain in recent years was the Catalan secessionist bid. In this paper, I’ll focus on one populist trait of the pro-independence movement: the illiberal interpretation of democracy. Catalan pro-independence leaders made great efforts to build the case that organizing a referendum on secession is a question of democratic quality. “Voting is normal in a normal country” or “This is about democracy” were some of the most repeated slogans. However, only a few democracies (e.g. Canada and the UK) have permitted a vote on the secession of a part of the country. Other constitutional democracies (e.g., the US, Italy, and Germany) have rejected the idea that one part of the country can organize a referendum on secession.

Catalan pro-independence leaders assumed that democracy, understood as majority rule, should trump any other legal principle, like the rule of law, respect for minorities, or federalism. But democracy is not only about voting or about the wishes of the majority. Constitutional democracy means people decide but do so according to rules that can only be changed following their amendment procedure. However, in the populist narrative of the Catalan pro-independence movement, a majoritarian concept of democratic legitimacy took prevalence over the rule of law, and the popular will was conceived as the only source of power. The implication was that ‘the people’ cannot be wrong, and therefore, leaders and parliaments should find a way to carry out people’s aspirations, regardless of the letter of the law. The referendum became a moral goal, the only tool to allow for the political expression of the people’s will. Oriol Junqueras, former Vice-President of the Catalan government, insisted several times that “voting is a right that prevails over any law” This opposition between purported popular legitimacy and legality implies an illiberal version of democracy. The idea of the government of the people is taken literally, and checks and balances on the popular will are rejected.

Potential Solutions: Second Chambers, Demos and Majoritarian Body

Roger Boada Queralt is an Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at ESADE Law School in Barcelona. He has also been a Visiting Professor at the Centre for Transnational Legal Studies at King’s College London. He received his PhD from ESADE Law School and his LLM from Duke University School of Law. He has devoted much of his research to the constitutional theory developed by the School of Salamanca, particularly that of Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez. His book The Limits on State Power in the Thought of Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez has been published in Spanish by the Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales. In addition, he has written a chapter devoted to counterpowers in the School of Salamanca for a collective work titled Counterpowers in Constitutional Democracy in the Face of the Populist Threat, coordinated by Josep Maria Castellà and Enriqueta Expósito and published in Spanish by Marcial Pons. He has also lectured on the relevance of the notion of common good in contemporary Constitutional Law and its connections with the School of Salamanca. His current research focuses on second chambers in Spanish and Comparative Constitutional Law, with a particular focus on the Senate of Spain as a moderating chamber in the context of an imperfect bicameral system, as well as on the ongoing and potential reforms of the House of Lords.

Abstract: Second chambers in bicameral legislatures have long been debated in constitutional design. Nowadays, they often oscillate between two broad roles, which are not necessarily mutually incompatible. The first one would be that of a territorial chamber, which provides a channel for the participation of regions and federated states in the decision-making process at the national level or that specialises in issues related to regional autonomy or the territorial organisation of power. The second one would be that of a moderating chamber with varying degrees of political power, whose raison d’être would be to provide a check on the lower chamber, improve the quality of legislation, provide for more sober reflection, and pursue a broader consensus on disputed issues. Drawing on the distinction between these two models and adopting a Comparative Constitutional Law perspective, this presentation shall explore their potential as institutions capable of reflecting more complex demos while acting as moderators against the unchecked impulses of purely majoritarian bodies. The presentation will focus on the Senate of Spain and the British House of Lords, with particular emphasis on their role as moderating chambers in a context of imperfect bicameralism, which places them in a position of relative weakness vis-à-vis their respective lower chambers. The analysis will be enriched by relevant political developments and potential constitutional reforms. By integrating lessons from both countries, it shall posit that, even in an imperfect bicameral system, second chambers can enhance deliberation, restraint and stability, countering the risks of populist or unreflective majoritarianism.

Panel -IV-

Politics of Belonging: Voices and Silencing

Azize Sargin is an independent researcher and consultant of external relations for non-governmental organisations. She holds a doctorate in International Relations, with a focus on Migration Studies, from the Brussels School of International Studies at the University of Kent. Her research interest covers migrant belonging and integration, diversity and cities, and transnationalism. Azize had a 15-year professional career as a diplomat in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she held various positions and was posted to different countries, including Romania, the United States, and Belgium. During her last posting, she served as the political counsellor at the Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the EU.

Anne-Margret Wolf is a Fellow at All Souls College, University of Oxford, where she researches authoritarian politics, focusing on the Middle East and North Africa. She has a particular interest in Tunisia, a country where she has researched for over a decade. Dr. Wolf is the author of Ben Ali’s Tunisia: Power and Contention in an Authoritarian Regime (Oxford University Press, 2023) and Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda (Oxford University Press, 2017). She is also the Editor of The Oxford Handbook of Authoritarian Politics.

The Scents of Belonging: Olfactory Narratives and the Dynamics of Democratization

Maarja Merivoo-Parro is a historian dedicated to exploring the history of mentality at the intersection of culture and politics in democratization processes. A Fulbright scholar, she is currently a Marie Curie Fellow at the University of Jyväskylä, where she examines the role of grassroots international relations in shaping civic identities. Her interdisciplinary research combines political history, sensory studies, and oral history to uncover how cultural experiences influence democratic engagement. Beyond academia, Maarja is an active young public intellectual who has recently gained national recognition for her work in bridging scholarly research and society. She has brought complex historical and political topics to wider audiences through television and radio programs, making history accessible and relevant to contemporary debates. She has been a longtime board member of the Baltic Heritage Network and the Estonian Diaspora Academy, contributing to international efforts to document and analyze migration, memory, and transnational cultural connections. Having conducted extensive oral history research across multiple continents, she is committed to preserving lived experiences as vital sources of historical knowledge. She has been awarded with the AABS Emerging Scholar Grant for continuing her contributions to the field.

Abstract: Amid the global erosion of democracies, cultural and sensory dimensions play an often-overlooked role in shaping collective identities and fostering civic cohesion. My research investigates how olfactory heritage – embedded in shared memories, rituals, and environments – historically contributed to defining “the people” in democratic and undemocratic contexts. This paper explores how olfactory cues have served to strengthen the democratic process and, conversely, to fuel divisions.

Through case studies from Finland and (Soviet-)Estonia, I analyze the interplay between olfactory culture and the rhetoric of “us” versus “them.” For instance, how have national and local scents – such as those tied to cross-border communication, industrial heritage, family celebrations, or contested spaces – shaped everyday understandings of democracy?

By combining sensory history with political theory, this study highlights the potential of olfactory heritage to serve as a medium for democratization and social cohesion, offering a novel perspective on the dynamics of civic identity.

This presentation employs an interdisciplinary approach, integrating sensory history, olfactory cultural studies, and political theory. Using archival sources, oral histories, and the media, I trace how olfactory practices have been used to define boundaries of inclusion and exclusion within democratic and authoritarian regimes. The study further explores how olfactory narratives interact with other cultural markers, such as music, art, and public ceremonies, in shaping aspirational and actual civic identities in the long 20th century.

Transnational Solidarity Movements: Autogestion, Community Building and Defining Colonial Alterity between French Algeria and Israel/Palestine

Sara Elizabeth Green is a DPhil candidate in History at the University of Oxford. Her research examines transnational solidarity movements with the Palestinian cause in the wake of decolonisation, particularly how thinking about Palestinian displacement and dispossession reflects and shapes historical memory of settler colonialism; concepts of indigeneity and belonging; gender and affect in anticolonial politics; cultural decolonisation in the era of ‘Third World’ internationalism. She previously completed her undergraduate studies in History at the University of Leeds, followed by the MSt in Global and Imperial History at the University of Oxford, where her thesis focused on the racialised representations of female nudity and modesty in French colonial ethnography of Algeria (1881-1931).

Abstract: This paper will explore cultures of autogestion and democratic community building by Jewish and Muslim actors in Palestinian solidarity movements after the decolonisation of French Algeria (1964-1974). In a context of calculated state restrictions on the political and associative activities of stateless political exiles and immigrant communities, these spaces provided an avenue to discuss and define the parameters of colonial privilege and alterity between French Algeria and Israel/Palestine. Between clandestine networking with anticolonial militants across continents, or the circulation of cassette tapes connecting the Palestinian struggle with racial policing in postcolonial France in factories and worker’s unions, this paper will explore the methods used by activists to foster Muslim-Jewish dialogue under a state apparatus that frequently presumed the perpetual enmity of these communities. In particular, the development of a connected culture of memorialisation of colonial violence connected the displacement of Palestinian ‘undesirables’ to the waves of racially motivated violence and political assassinations that targeted these communities over the course of the 1970s. This reconfigured the notion of ‘the people’ by recentring the humanity of Palestinian, Arab and Jewish victims of racialisation and undermining the separatist logic that defined inequality in Israel/Palestine, particularly beyond the confines of official French perspectives that continued to characterise and surveille militants of the Algerian ‘rebellion’, Muslim and Jewish alike, as ‘subversive’ agents.

Silent Symbols, Loud Legacies: The Child in Populist Narratives of Post-Communist Poland

Maria Jerzyk is a Polish sociology student at Masaryk University in Brno, Czechia. Her research spans populism studies, childhood studies, and the sociology of food, but at its core, it asks one fundamental question: how does the past quietly dictate the present? Viewing social realities through a post-Soviet trauma lens, she investigates how historical experiences of repression and transformation leave echoes in contemporary political rhetoric, cultural anxieties, and even what we eat. She is particularly fascinated by how populist movements weaponize the idea of childhood—simultaneously portraying children as symbols of purity and obedience while excluding those who challenge traditional norms. Beyond politics, she explores how food practices reflect national identity, historical trauma, and power dynamics. Through her interdisciplinary approach, she seeks to uncover the hidden ways inherited fears and unspoken histories continue to shape modern life. By blending political analysis with cultural sociology, her work offers a fresh perspective on how the ghosts of the past find their way into today’s populist narratives and everyday rituals.

Abstract: This paper explores the ambivalent role of children in populist discourse, focusing on Poland’s right-wing populist government (2015–2023) under Law and Justice (PiS). Populist rhetoric constructs childhood through a paradox: children are simultaneously portrayed as obedient, passive figures in need of protection and as “bad” or “dangerous” when they exhibit independence, agency or engage in activism. This dichotomy is further intensified when children’s perceived transgressions align with broader populist social divisions, such as identification with LGBTQ+ communities or participation in wide-variety movements, leading to their symbolic exclusion from the national collective.

The study analyzes political speeches from Law and Justice politicians, illustrating how these narratives frame childhood as a battleground for moral and ideological struggles. Additionally, it situates these discursive strategies within Poland’s post-communist context, where Soviet-era ideals of disciplined and collectivist youth continue to resonate with populist audiences. By examining propaganda films from Polska Kronika Filmowa, the paper traces continuities between communist and populist constructions of childhood, demonstrating how historical narratives are reactivated to legitimize contemporary exclusionary politics. Through this analysis, the paper highlights how the figure of the child becomes a potent symbol in populist storytelling, shaping political identities and reinforcing cultural anxieties in post-communist Poland.

Panel -V-

Governing the ‘People’: Divided Nations

Leyla Aliyeva is an Associate of REES, Oxford School for Global and Area Studies (OSGA), previously Senior Common Room Member and Academic Visitor at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University. She holds a PhD from Moscow University. Originally from Azerbaijan, she founded and directed two think tanks in Baku and held fellowships at Harvard University, UC Berkeley, the Kennan Institute (Washington, DC), the NATO Defence College (Rome), and the IFK (Institut Für Kulturwissenschaften) in Vienna. My research and publications cover Azerbaijan, the Caucasus, Russia, and the broader Former Soviet Union, and range thematically from energy security and conflicts to democracy in oil-rich states, as well as issues surrounding integration into the EU (ENP and EaP) and NATO. Currently, Leyla is analysing the role of religious identities in transition, as well as comparing the role of the opposition in rentier states.

Karen Horn is Professor in Economic Thought, University of Erfurt.

Catholicism and Nationalism in Croatia: The Use and Misuse of “Hrvatski Narod”

Natalie Schwabl is a doctoral candidate at the Faculty of Arts, Languages, Literature and Humanities of Sorbonne University/Paris, under the supervision of Professor Johann Chapoutot. The subject of her thesis is “Violence and Religion in the ‘Independent State of Croatia’ (1941-1945)”, focusing on the role of the Catholic clergy under the Croatian Ustasha regime. She is of German and Croatian origin and grew up and began her studies in Germany after a German-French Bachelor of Arts in History and French (Literature, Linguistics and Translation) at the universities of Mainz (Germany), Dijon (France) and Sherbrooke (Canada), she obtained her Master’s degree in Modern History at Sorbonne University in 2022, where she has been a Junior Lecturer in History since 2021, for classes in Modern History and English.

Abstract: This paper explores the relation between the Croatian state and radical Catholicism, including the role of the Catholic church as an institution, throughout the 20th century, until today. The inextricable link between Catholicism and nationalism in Croatia was fostered by the frequent change of regimes in the 20th century: the “First Yugoslavia” under the Karađorđević dynasty (1918-1929, 1929-1941), the “Independent State of Croatia” (1941-1945) and the fascist Ustasha regime, the “Second Yugoslavia” under Tito who died in 1980 and, after 1991, the new Republic of Croatia. As the most important vector of national identity for the Croatian people and the projection of their feeling of belonging to the West, the Catholic Church was omnipresent in Croatian political, social and cultural life.

By adopting an interdisciplinary and transnational approach, this paper aims at responding to the following questions: in what ways are religion and the question of faith employed and instrumentalized by rulers? How do they become tools of nationalist representation and revisionism, from the 1990s to the present day? By examining the influence of religious actors in the political sphere, how do socio-historical dynamics in Croatia relate to the continuity of old conflicts, still locked in revisionist discourse, and how do they influence the Croatian collective memory? What does this imply for Croatia today, as the youngest member of the European Union?

“Become Ungovernable:” Covert Tactics, Racism, and Civilizational Catastrophe

Sarah Riccardi-Swartz is an Assistant Professor of Religion and Anthropology at Northeastern University. An interdisciplinary scholar, she is trained as a historian, ethnographer, and filmmaker of American religion. She is the author of Between Heaven and Russia: Religious Conversion and Political Apostasy in Appalachia (Fordham University Press, 2022). She is currently completing a book manuscript tentatively entitled Digital Dissidents: Science, Technology, and Orthodoxy in Far-Right Media Worlds. Her work has been supported by the NEH via Fordham University’s Orthodox Christian Studies Center, the Henry Luce Foundation, the Louisville Institute, the Institute for Citizens & Scholars, and the Social Science Research Council, among other organizations.

Abstract: Considering racialized theo-political ideas espoused by far-right Christians in the American South, this paper looks at their paradoxical need for social-moral securitization through nationalist policies and government policing in relationship to their anti-democratic desires to become ungovernable as citizens of heaven. Exploring the notion of an imperiled Christian civilization at the hands of “deep state” elites, this paper shows how far-right Christian anxieties over the “catastrophe” of democracy apocalyptically lead to covert sociopolitical tactics aimed at liberating the far-right self from the assumed system of Western liberal oppression. Specifically, I track the developing interest by American actors, from the VDare founders, to the League of the South, to social media content creators, in Russia illiberalism to advance a transnational conception of “the people” as founded in Christianity and Whiteness, positioning shared bloodlines and a “common faith” as hallmarks of a civilizational culture in contrast to the diversity of democracy that they believe is linked to social decline and catastrophe. In tracing this out, I look at how post-Soviet Russia becomes a salvific geo-political possibility for those fleeing ideological cartographies of assumed white Christian marginalization in the United States. Utilizing ethnographic data and media analysis, I show how transnational, digital flows of religiosity and racism are co-constituted in the illiberal dramaturgy of white panic and mythos of ungovernability that draws together actors from the American South and Putin’s Russia into a global imaginary of anti-democratic political possibilities for disaffected people.

Is There Left-wing Populism Today? A Case Study of the German Left and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance

Petar S. Ćurčić is a Research Associate at the Institute of European Studies in Belgrade, Serbia, where he has been employed since 2021. His academic focus spans political history, particularly of Germany and Central Europe, with a strong emphasis on the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany. Ćurčić’s research interests also encompass international relations, geo-economics, the study of capitalism, the history of ideas, the theory of historiography, as well as narratology and imagology. Ćurčić has contributed to various scholarly works, including book chapters and reviews. Notable publications include his chapter on the German Left and the 2024 elections, as well as reviews on topics such as conservatism, capitalism, social conflict, and political upheaval in Europe. He is an active participant in academic conferences, with recent presentations at the University of Westminster in London on the image of Europe in the political discourse of Alternative for Germany and at the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik, discussing late capitalism and the politics of crisis. He continues to engage in a wide range of scholarly activities, shaping contemporary political discourse through his research.

Abstract: In contrast to the Third Way social democracy and Green movements, radical left-wing parties, such as Germany’s Left Party, have resisted centrist shifts, instead developing distinct responses to neoliberalism. Formed in 2007 through the merger of the Party of Democratic Socialism and Labour and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative (WASG), the Left Party is a key actor in the EU, especially given Germany’s prominence. While critics like Karlheinz Weißmann and Ernst Nolte argue that leftist movements emerged in a period of capitalist expansion rather than worker impoverishment, scholars such as Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau offer a more refined categorization of leftist politics. They distinguish between pure reformism, radical reformism, and revolutionary reformism. The Left Party, as a radical reformist party, opposes oligarchy, bureaucracy, and global capitalism, while advocating for marginalized groups, including workers, migrants, and the LGBT+ community.

Internal divisions, particularly after Sahra Wagenknecht’s departure, have raised questions about the party’s future. Despite accusations of extremism and surveillance by Germany’s constitutional protection agency, the Left Party has become a crucial counterforce to the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). Wagenknecht’s Alliance, often linked to social conservatism, contrasts with the Left Party’s stance. Following a strong performance in the February federal elections, this paper examines whether the Left Party has moved toward the center, reaffirming its democratic commitments and distancing itself from populism, or whether it has adapted left-wing populism to the current political context.

Panel -VI-

The “People” in Search of Democracy

Hugo Bonin is a postdoctoral researcher, specialising in the histories, practices and theories of democracy. Hugo received a PhD in political science from Université Paris VIII and Université du Québec à Montréal on the conceptual history of democracy in nineteenth-century Britain. This led to the publication of a monograph (in French) on the question: ‘At the sound of the new word spoken’: Le mot démocratie en Grande-Bretagne, 1770-1920, Presses universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 2024. His research has appeared in Briths Politics, the Journal of History of Ideas, and Global Intellectual History.

Max Steuer is an Associate Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University, Jindal Global Law School (India, on leave), Principal Investigator at the Department of Political Science of the Comenius University in Bratislava (Slovakia) and a 2024—2025 re:constitution fellow. His research centers on puzzles of democracy in the European Union with focus on Slovakia and Hungary, and thematic specialization on constitutional adjudication, militant democracy and extreme speech. His works appeared in European Constitutional Law Review, European Journal of Risk Regulation, International Journal of Human Rights, Legal Pluralism and Critical Social Analysis, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law and elsewhere. Among his recent editorial responsibilities is a coedited special section of the Jindal Global Law Review on ‘Cultural Expertise and Litigation in South Asia and Europe’ (2023). Max is principal investigator of ‘Harvesting Judicial Reservoirs of Resilience to Autocratization for Rebuilding Democracy in the Visegrad Four’ (Recovery and Resilience Plan as part of Next Generation EU, 2024—2026) and ‘Illiberalism and the Constitution of the Slovak Republic: Political Discourse Analysis’ (Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic, 2023—2025). He is member of the Management Committee and Working Group on Theory of the COST Action ‘K-Peritia (Cultural Expertise Junior Network)’.

The Two Peoples: Why Deliberating and Voting Don’t Belong Together

Théophile Pénigaud is a postdoctoral researcher at the ISPS at Yale. He specializes in political theory, and his research interests include the history of political thought, democratic theory, the theories of justice, and political epistemology. His book The People’s Deliberations: Context and Concepts of Rousseau’s Political Philosophy was published in French by Classiques Garnier in 2024. He holds a Ph.D. from the École Normale Supérieure de Lyon. Just before coming to Yale, he directed a Junior Laboratory on “Changes and Current Trends in Democracies” at the École Normale Supérieure and was a lecturer at Lyon 3 University.

Abstract: There is a widely shared sense, rightly or wrongly, that the grip of (sound) arguments on public debate has waned in recent years. Donald Trump’s victory and Brexit in the UK in 2016 have spurred inquiries about alleged dysfunctions in public communication, including the spread of “fake news,” algorithmically curated social networks, or populist rhetoric. In this paper, I suggest that the problem may run deeper. From the beginning, deliberative democrats have overlooked a crucial distinction: that between deliberating and voting and the fundamentally different rationales underpinning them. In other words, it has been recklessly assumed that the virtues of public deliberation would carry over to voting. Yet many reasons for voting for or against a proposal may be entirely rational and understandable, irrespective of the merit of arguments. Conversely, the motivating power of public justification is considerably muted as soon as one enters the voting booth.

In this paper, I argue that the impact of public deliberation on voting decisions has remained undertheorized, mainly postulated or inferred from the success of heterogeneous settings, such as deliberative mini-publics (Jürgen Habermas 2006). While some proponents of deliberative democracy have worked out the internal relationship between deliberating and voting (Chambers and Warren 2023), there remains a disconnect between the public forum and the voting booth. In response, I attempt to sketch out a voter-centered, realistic, and context-sensitive approach to democratic deliberation.

Between Antonio Gramsci and Erik Olin Wright: Deepening Democracy Through Civil Society Engagement

Rashad Seedeen is an Adjunct Research Fellow in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Media in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at La Trobe University, Melbourne. His research interests are focused on the residual hegemony of the United States, complex-Gramscian theory, and examining theoretical models in deepening democracy in all aspects of life. His current research is focused on the changing relational dynamics within global governance, the Global South and multipolarity, and democracy theory. His first book, The United States’ Residual Hegemony: A complex-Gramscian Examination, was published in 2023.

Abstract: With democracies worldwide in retreat, it is increasingly critical to reconsider our engagement with civil society. Two scholars have provided valuable insights in fortifying democratic institutions: Antonio Gramsci, the Italian cultural Marxist, analysed political change through state formation and its organic links to civil society, while Erik Olin Wright, a Marxist sociologist, conceptualized “deep democracy” and anti-capitalist frameworks through his Real Utopias project. This paper proposes that Gramsci’s concept of the “war of position” and Wright’s models for Real Utopias offer foundational elements for a reimagined, dynamic democracy. Gramsci’s “war of position” advocates for a strategy that exposes the contradictions of capitalism, promoting democratic projects to build a counter-hegemonic movement against the prevailing capitalist order.

Similarly, Wright contends that deep democracy, centred on local empowerment and deliberative processes, can exist within liberal democracies to address public needs. A critical examination of two Real Utopias—associative democracy and participatory budgeting—focuses on the First People’s Assembly of Victoria in Australia and the participatory budget in Seoul, South Korea. The Assembly’s model offers the potential to address the alienation of Indigenous populations in Victoria and to build a more inclusive society through the integration of Indigenous Knowledge. Meanwhile, Seoul’s participatory budget has successfully redistributed wealth to marginalized communities and increased democratic inclusion. By examining these case studies alongside Gramsci and Wright’s theoretical contributions, this paper demonstrates that deepening democracy through such projects can act as a safeguard against existential threats to democratic systems.

Resilient or Regressive? How Crisis Governance Reshapes the Democratic Future of ‘The People’

Jana Ruwayha is a PhD Candidate at the University of Geneva’s Faculty of Law and a Teaching and Research Assistant at the Global Studies Institute. Her research examines how prolonged states of emergency—such as counterterrorism measures and pandemic responses—reshape liberal democracies by blurring the boundaries between crisis governance and ordinary rule. She analyzes how exceptional powers, initially justified as temporary, become entrenched, enabling executive overreach, weakening institutional checks and balances, and transforming the relationship between “the people” and the state.

As a Visiting PhD Researcher at University College London and a member of UCL’s Global Centre for Democratic Constitutionalism, she contributes to interdisciplinary discussions on democratic resilience and the erosion of civil liberties. Her work engages with key debates on populism, majoritarianism, and the instrumentalization of “the people” in legal and political discourse. She examines how emergency rhetoric fosters exclusionary narratives, marginalizing dissenting voices and justifying illiberal shifts in governance.

Abstract: This paper examines how the normalization of states of emergency in liberal democracies reshapes the relationship between “the people” and the state. As part of my doctoral research at the University of Geneva, this study explores how emergency powers, initially temporary, become entrenched in governance, challenging democratic principles such as popular sovereignty, transparency, and accountability.

By situating this shift within the broader context of democratic erosion and resilience, the research highlights how prolonged crises enable executive overreach, weaken checks and balances, and justify power consolidation in the name of security. Using Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) theory, the paper analyzes how legal frameworks adapt to recurring crises, redefining civil liberties and human rights in favor of national security. This trend risks reinforcing an “us vs. them” dynamic, where emergency rhetoric suppresses dissent and fractures social cohesion.

The paper argues for reimagining crisis governance to safeguard democracy, ensuring that “the people” remain central to the system rather than tools for majoritarian or authoritarian control. It advocates for transparent decision-making, periodic review of emergency powers, judicial oversight, and a balanced approach that upholds human rights while addressing contemporary challenges.

The Performative Power of the “We” in Occupy Wall Street and the Gezi Movement

Özge Derman teaches sociology at Sciences Po and Sorbonne University. Qualified as an assistant professor by the CNU (18), she holds a Ph.D. in sociology from the EHESS Paris (2023), exploring creative performativity in post-2010 social movements in her dissertation. She earned a B.A. degree in design (Nuova Accademia di Belle Arti, Milan) and in dance (YTU, Istanbul), along with an M.A. degree in sociology (Galatasaray University) and in social sciences (EHESS). Her research focuses on creative and artistic forms of activism in social movements, intersections of culture, art and politics, political art, visual and performative activism, and the climate movement.

Abstract: This paper analyses the creative appearances of the “we, the people” in the context of two social movements. The idea of “we” was incorporated in various creative and performative forms during Occupy Wall Street in New York (2011) and the Gezi Movement in Istanbul (2013), drawing essentially on collective subjectivity (Diesing 2014) and human togetherness (Arendt 1959). This togetherness, both in its bodily and virtual compositions, brings about the performative power that Butler (2015) underlines, which is critical to creating new spaces for and of politics. The question is to understand how creative performativity (Derman 2023) and activism redefine and shape these spaces even when challenged with the other’s togethernesses.

Voiced, graphic, and bodily performances of the “we” do not represent a homogenic entity but rather potential compositions of collectivity. The “sharing of words and deeds” (Arendt 1959: 198) does not necessarily mean sharing the same ideas at all times. The “Standing Man” and the “Standing Men against the Standing Man” in the Gezi Movement would be illustrative examples of the conflictual aspect of democracy. A single body of an artist/activist acting alone might spur a collective political action by inspiring similar actions at first, which then became collective through the participation of others. The act of standing inspired active citizenship through an everyday gesture that created plural counter-spaces (Derman 2017, 2019). The “we” also emerged as “the 99%” in the Occupy Wall Street and as the “çapulcu” – looter – in the Gezi Movement, which literally appeared in graphical and vocal representations such as the Occupy comics publication and posters of OWS, as well as the graffiti and comics of Gezi (Derman 2024).

The nightly organised General Assemblies of OWS embodied the experience of direct democracy through the practice of the consensus method for collective decision-making without hierarchy. They aimed “to move beyond an exclusionary liberal universalist interpretation of the 99 percent” (McCleave Maharawal 2013: 180) while not ignoring the presence of “apparent consensus” (Urfalino 2007) by not opposing and the interruptor’s dissensus. The use of “people’s mic” and “hand signals” during the assemblies represented embodied and vocal tools of temporary compositions of collectivity and generated democratic decision-making practices. The data presented in this paper draws on my doctoral research on creative performativity between 2015 and 2023 and is collected from semi-structured interviews with activists, participant observation, and archival research, both conventional and digital.

The French New Right and Its Impact on European Democracies

Murat Aktaş is a Professor of Political Science Department at Muş Alparslan University. He graduated from Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, Department of Public Administration in 2000. In 2004, he completed his master’s degree in the Department of Information and Communication Science at Paris 10 Nanterre University. He completed his PhD at the University of Paris 7, Diderot, in Sociology of Politics, in 2011. His PhD focused on the European Union and Turkey. From 2017 to 2018 he was a post-doctoral researcher at Ecole des Haut Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, researching on the National Front (Front National-FN) and Immigrants. He has authored and edited several books, including The European Union and Turkey; The Information Society Globalization and Democracy; The Arab Spring; and Conflict Resolution and Peace. He also served as guest editor of a special issue for International Sociology on “The Rise of the Far Right and Populist Movements in Europe.” His current research focuses on radical right and populist movements in Europe, Artificial Intelligence, techno oligarchy, human rights and democracy.

Russell Foster is a Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies. He has an interdisciplinary academic background. From 2003 to 2006, he studied history at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, specializing in modern European political history and imperial history. He later earned MA degrees in international politics and human geography from Newcastle University (2008–2010).

From 2015 to 2016, Russell was a Marie Skłodowska-Curie International Fellow at the University of Amsterdam’s Department of European Studies, researching the relationship between the EU’s symbols and European identity. From 2016 to 2019, he was a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at King’s College London, where he studied nationalism, European identity, and Brexit. His current research focuses on the relationship between the far right and European identity, the far right and LGBTQ+ politics, the legacy of the British Empire in contemporary politics, and the evolving relationship between identity and politics in the UK, the EU, and beyond.

Panel -VII-

“The People” in Schrödinger’s Box: Democracy Alive and Dead

Ming-Sung Kuo is a Reader in Law at the University of Warwick School of Law. Dr Ming-Sung Kuo’s research interests encompass the fields of constitutional and legal theory, comparative constitutional law (including the United States, Europe, and East Asia), administrative law and regulatory theory, and public international law. His recent scholarship has been focused on the issues of legitimacy in relation to the rise of transnational legal orders and the changing relationship between normalcy and exception in the tendency toward what he terms constitutional presentism in contemporary constitutional developments. He has also written on global constitutionalism and global administrative law (with emphasis on transnational governance and postnational legality), European constitutionalism and integration, and the role of judicial review and its bootstrapping in the context of Taiwan’s democratic transition. Dr Kuo’s publications have appeared in leading law journals in his field, including the Modern Law Review, International Journal of Constitutional Law, European Journal of International Law, Ratio Juris, and Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. The Supreme Court of Canada in R v Albashir ([2021] SCC 48) has approvingly cited his article ‘Between Choice and Tradition: Rethinking Remedial Grace Periods and Unconstitutionality Management in a Comparative Light, 36 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 157 (2019). Dr Kuo’s article ‘Against Instantaneous Democracy’, 17 International Journal of Constitutional Law (I·CON) 54 (2019) is the winner of the 2020 I·CON Best Paper Prize. Dr Kuo is the recipient of the 2025 Prize for Scholarly Excellence in Constitutional Studies, awarded by the Constitutional Studies Program at the University of Texas at Austin in the United States. All of Dr Kuo’s work on SSRN can be accessed at http://ssrn.com/author=1199599. Dr Kuo’s complete publication list can be accessed at orcid.org/0000-0001-8400-0451.

The Matrix of ‘Legal Populism’: Democracy and (Reducing) Domination

Abstract: This contribution identifies the intersections between two competing approaches to populism and law. Populism, for some, undermines pluralism as the lifeblood of democracy built on aspirations of reducing domination; for others, it allows to challenge dominating elites by exposing the harms they cause to ‘the people’. Law, for some, may equally entrench and reduce domination; for others, law inherently aspires to challenge domination. ‘Legal populism’ entrenches antidemocratic domination with the former conceptualization of populism and of law, while its effects are contingent with the latter conceptualization of populism and the former reading of law. In contrast, an aspirational reading of ‘law’ appears incompatible with either conception of populism because, whilst it allows to declare dominating legalism as illegal, it cannot accommodate populism that conceives of law as an elite-driven endeavour. The contribution illustrates the significance of recognizing this matrix in Slovakia, a country with two clear-cut periods of de-democratization after the dismantling of the state socialist autocracy in 1989: one in the 1990s (1994—1998) and another even after the 2004 European Union accession (2023—present). The Slovak developments show how the aspirational reading of law finds little footing and how challenges to dominating elites have mainly been raised by other elites, often having antipluralist ambitions themselves. Acknowledging such populist appeals as ‘legal’ invites getting lost in the matrix. Instead, the matrix exposes their illegality and allows to appreciate the domination-reducing potential of law that is not at odds with the appreciation of ‘the people’.

Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy

Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez is a human rights advocate with experience in international advocacy, civil society engagement, and diplomatic affairs. She currently serves as Global Advocacy Officer at the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), working directly with representatives of minority communities to support their advocacy efforts. She has experience in consular affairs, particularly on migration issues, as well as in cooperation for development and youth participation in public policy-making. She holds an MSc in Diplomatic Studies from the University of Oxford and has a background in diplomatic engagement, focusing on capacity-building, advocacy, and international cooperation. She is also the co-author of the chapter “The Border Issue: From Policy to Cultural Identity” in Continuum Investigativo y diversidad lingüístico-cultural del sur de México (2021), which examines how the delineation of borders has shaped national identities at a nation-state level, often marginalizing identities that do not align with political boundaries.

Abstract: This paper argues that establishing frameworks for broader participation is essential for the future of democracy, advocating for mechanisms that go beyond state-centered diplomacy and amplify all voices. It examines representation and the right to diplomacy as fundamental pillars of democracy, emphasizing their role in ensuring the meaningful inclusion of all peoples in policy formulation and decision-making processes. Diplomacy is often reserved to sovereign states, leaving many unrepresented nations, indigenous groups, and minority communities without access to critical international and institutional platforms. The exclusion of these groups from diplomatic engagement undermines democratic principles by reinforcing a model that fails to reflect the diversity of political and cultural identities.

By analyzing cases where communities are denied representation, this study will focus on the Hmong community in Laos, who face systemic discrimination through an indigenous rights lens; the Ogoni in Nigeria, whose lack of representation is tied to environmental and climate justice struggles; and the people of Guam, who remain disenfranchised under the U.S. territorial rule, highlighting the challenges of decolonization and self-determination. The study will also explore the institutionalization of representation through case studies of organizations such as the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) and Minority Rights Group (MRG), which seek to secure spaces for participation and representation.

The closure of spaces diplomatic spaces contributes to the erosion of democratic participation, the silencing of historically marginalized voices, and reinforces unequal power structures in global governance. Recognizing diplomacy and representation as fundamental rights strengthens democratic resilience by fostering dialogue, inclusion, and peaceful conflict resolution.

Lived Democracy in Small Island States: Sociopolitical Dynamics of Governance, Power, and Participation in Malta and Singapore

Justin Attard is a self-made entrepreneur turned into sociologist, currently pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Malta. With a strong academic background in political sociology, his research explores social class, community resilience, political culture, and the governance dynamics of small island states. His doctoral work focuses on comparative lived democracy in Malta and Singapore. His expertise in governance and policymaking led to his appointment as a board member of Arts Council Malta, where he contributed to the development of the local cultural sector. A dedicated grassroots activist and researcher, he integrates scholarship with community engagement to advocate for deliberative democracy, environmental sustainability, and social equity.

Abstract: By interrogating the applicability of dominant democratic models within demographically and territorially constrained environments, this study advances contemporary debates on democratic erosion, populism, and the role of civil society in sustaining democratic institutions. Using Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence, the study examines how informal and institutional political networks mediate authority, shape political participation, and reinforce majoritarianism in Malta and Singapore. By doing so, it complicates binary distinctions between democratic and authoritarian governance, offering a nuanced understanding of power consolidation, exclusionary politics, and grassroots resistance in small state contexts.

Employing a mixed-methods approach, the research integrates political ethnography, participant observation, semi-structured elite interviews, and quantitative analysis of democracy indices (V-Dem, Freedom House, EIU). These nations serve as microcosms for examining the strengths and vulnerabilities of democratic institutions in an era of political uncertainty. Ultimately, this research contributes to safeguarding democratic governance by identifying pathways for inclusive civic engagement and offering counter-narratives to exclusionary populism, providing valuable insights for scholars and policymakers alike.

Russia’s War on Democracy

Robert Person is a Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy and director of West Point’s curriculum in International Affairs. He teaches courses on Russian and post-Soviet politics, democratic and authoritarian regimes, international political economy, and international relations. His research on Russian politics and foreign policy has been published in various academic and popular media outlets, including Foreign Affairs, International Affairs, The Journal of Democracy, Post-Soviet Affairs, Problems of Post-Communism, The Washington Post, and The National Interest, among others. His commentary on current events in Russia and Ukraine has appeared in The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, NPR, BBC, The Telegraph, Deutsche Welle, Le Monde, Al Jazeera, El País, The Moscow Times, and other international media outlets.

Dr. Person regularly consults as a Russia subject matter expert for the Army, Department of Defense, U.S. Government agencies, and in the private sector. He is a resident fellow at West Point’s Modern War Institute and a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He holds a PhD in political science from Yale University and an MA in Russian and East European Studies from Stanford University. His current book project is titled Russia’s Grand Strategy in the 21st Century. Additional information: https://www.robert-person.com/

Abstract: For the last 25 years, Vladimir Putin has waged an ever-escalating war on democracy, not just in Russia but globally. This war – whether in its overt or covert manifestations – has transformed the nature of Russia’s domestic political regime but also the character of the international system. During this period, a multi-domain assault on democracy as an idea and as a set of institutions has been a central pillar of Putin’s grand strategy, whereby he seeks to restore Russia as a great power in a multipolar international system; establish a privileged and exclusive sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region; and undermine the cohesiveness and capabilities of the democratic West.

Much of Russia’s war on democracy has taken place in the “gray zone” using a well-honed toolkit of hybrid techniques to divide, disrupt, and destabilize Russia’s democratic adversaries. Through information warfare, exacerbation of divisive cleavages, and support of populist and far-right political figures in target countries, the Kremlin’s strategy for many years focused more on weakening adversaries rather than strengthening Russia’s hard power.

Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine marked a turning point as Russia turned toward brutally conventional military methods to subjugate Kyiv and destroy Ukraine’s democracy and sovereignty. However, it is important to recognize that Russia’s war against Ukrainian democracy did not begin in 2022, nor even in 2014. Instead, its origins can be traced back to Moscow’s electoral manipulation that sparked the Orange Revolution in 2004. From this perspective, it becomes clear that that the battle raging in Ukraine is just the latest – and most deadly – of a decades-long global assault on democracy waged by the Kremlin.

The present paper is part of a new book project that explores the themes above. As it becomes more challenging to discuss these perspectives openly in the United States, I look forward to feedback and fruitful discussion with my British and European colleagues at the conference in July.

Panel -VIII-

“The People” vs. “The Elite”: A New Global Order?

Ashley Wright is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Minerva Global Security Programme, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, which focuses on contested cross-b

spaces, illicit flows, and order in the contemporary world. She specialises in data collection and quantitative analysis. Her doctoral research (DPhil, Politics at the University of Oxford) explores how key Congressional committees integrate US foreign assistance with foreign policy and national security priorities and involves the collection of original data on US foreign aid appropriations and elite interviews. She is currently working on a project on US military interventions and contested cross-border spaces for the Minerva Global Security Programme.

Azize Sargin is an independent researcher and consultant of external relations for non-governmental organisations.

We: The Populist Elites

Aviezer Tucker is a political theorist and philosopher. He is the author of: Democracy against Liberalism (Polity Press, 2020), The Legacies of Totalitarianism: A Theoretical Framework, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), and The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence: From Patocka to Havel, (Pittsburgh University Press, 2000), as well asHistoriographic Reasoning, (Cambridge University Press, 2025) and Our Knowledge of the Past: A Philosophy of Historiography (Cambridge University Press, 2004). He is the director of the new Centre for the Philosophy of Historiography at the University of Ostrava in the Czech Republic. Prior to coming to Ostrava, he taught or conducted research at the Central European University, Palacky University, Columbia University, New York University, Trinty College, Long Island University, the Australian National University, Queens University Belfast, the University of Cologne, the University of Texas in Austin, and Harvard University.

Abstract: Populism, as I define it, is the rule of political passions. These passions override political interests and shape political beliefs. Pure passions tend to be self-destructive. For example, when people become very angry and burn their homes, start wars that hurt them more than they hurt their enemies, or demand economic policies that gratify immediately but generate inflation and accumulate debts that destroy the economy soon thereafter. As La Bruyere (quoted in Elster 1999, 337) put it: “Nothing is easier for passion than to overcome reason, but the greatest triumph is to conquer a man’s own interest.”

The political “passionate” characterization of populism I use differs from standard contemporary approaches that associate populism with social movements that emphasize the struggle of homogeneous “people” vs. perfidious “elites.” (Canovan 2005, Muller 2016, Norris & Inglehart 2019) Populism in the United States resulted partly from resentment of elite and expert blunders in starting and managing the Iraq war and in failing to preempt and end the 2008 Great Recession. In this respect, it may be argued that George W. Bush’s administration achieved successfully a regime change, though not the one intended and not in the country targeted, but in the United States. Still, I find this standard approach to populism too broad and too narrow: Popular distrust and resentment of elites and establishments are not distinctive of populism.

Representations of political struggles as the “people” against the elites have been characteristic of all rebels in history, including political dissidents, socialists, anti-colonialists, and religious reformers. Anti-intellectuals who resent better educated, artistically sensitive, and abstract-minded elites include human resource departments of major corporations and entrepreneurs who dislike academic “experimentation.” Since elites are by definition always fewer than “ordinary people,” and their privileges or perceived privileges often generate some resentment, it often makes good democratic politics to attack them. So mere anti-elitist rhetoric is insufficiently distinctive of populism. Anti-elitist concepts of populism are also too narrow because they would exclude some commonly recognized populist movements that admire elite plutocrats (or apparent plutocrats) such as Berlusconi in Italy, Babiš in the Czech Republic, and Trump in the United States. Some contemporary populists seem to admire wealthy elites in general as well as sports and popular music elites. Trump’s fear of divulging his tax returns probably reflects his fear of losing his charisma with his base of supporters if they realize that he is not a member of the rich elite. Populists resent only some elites, including experts, professional politicians, and the educated upper middle classes.

Reclamations of “We, the People”: Rethinking Civil Society through Spatial Contestations in Turkey

Pınar Dokumacı is an Assistant Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin. Before joining UCD in September 2022, she was the Peacock Postdoctoral Fellow (2020-2022) at the School of Political Studies , Queen’s University (Canada) and a Postdoctoral Research Fellow (2019-2020) at the University of York (UK) in the Leverhulme Trust funded project Rethinking Civil Society: History, Theory, Critique led by Prof. Timothy Stanton. Ms. Dokumaci has a Ph.D. in Political Science (2018) from University of Toronto (Canada) with a specialisation in Political Theory and Comparative Politics. She also has degrees in Economics (B.A., Koç University, Turkey), International Relations (B.A., Koç University, Turkey) and European Studies (M.A., Boğaziçi University Turkey). Pinar Dokumaci is both a comparativist and a theorist, examining how contested perceptions of women’s rights, secularism, and religion inform dynamics of collective action and possibilities for social change in deeply divided contexts where Muslim women’s use of religious garments raise heated public debates. Her research is grounded in both ethnography and theory. She is especially interested in bringing together engaged and comparative political theorizing from a critical perspective to re-ground political theory in both Western and non-Western knowledges as well as methods, experiences, and ethnographies. She is interested in feminist disagreements, autonomy and solidarity dynamics in feminist groups, and different understandings of feminist resistance under authoritarian settings. She teaches undergraduate and graduate modules in politics of development, gender and politics, feminist theory, and comparative political theory.

Özlem Aslan is an Assistant Professor in the Core Program at Kadir Has University. Her research is at the intersection of democratic theory, environmental justice, critical spatial theory, and feminist political ecology. She earned her PhD in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto. Her doctoral research adopts an interdisciplinary approach to analyze the political implications of development projects and resistances against them in the context of Turkey. Based on her field work in Artvin, Turkey, she traces how place becomes a ground for political claim-making in the context of resistances against the run-of-the-river hydropower projects in Turkey. Her project received Globalink Research Award in and Ontario Graduate Scholarship in 2014 and doctoral research award from the International Development and Research Centre in 2015. Özlem Aslan received her masters degree from the Department of Political Science, Boğaaziçi University in Turkey.

Abstract: This paper aims to rethink civil society in a relational form based on a politics of care. We examine (1) re-inventive democratic practices in Turkey that assert people’s “right to appear” through appropriation of political spaces and (2) how these practices urge us to rethink the way we conceive civil society under rising authoritarianism and populism. Our argument is two-fold: First, we demonstrate that these sporadic resistances in Turkey operate as an alternative way of confronting injustices and voicing critique by appropriating streets and public spaces. These resistances, “spatial contestations”, arise in response to declining democratic institutional structures to formally address such grievances and demands. Spatial contestations not only serve as a reclamation of “we, the people” against AKP’s “myth of the One”, but also show us the interrelatedness of democratic resilience and resistance beyond institutionalized practices. Second, we argue that these spatial efforts function both as iterative sites of democratic resilience and as potential sites for re-imagining civil society in a relational form based on a politics of care.

The Transatlantic Network of Authoritarian Populism: The Rise of the Executive and Its Dangers to Democracy

Attila Antal is an Associate Professor at Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Law Institute of Political Science. He is a coordinator at the Social Theory Research Group at the Institute of Political History. He is doing his contemporary research in political theory of populism, state of exception, extraordinary governance measures, climate and ecological emergency, theory of democracy, green political thought, constitutionalism, and political history.

Abstract: A remarkable phenomenon is unfolding regarding the international networking of right-wing authoritarian populism (RWAP): the Hungarian Orbán regime has for a long time been looking to the radicalizing American right as a reference point, which after President Donald Trump’s fall is also trying to build a strong international network for authoritarian right-wing tendencies – as it evidenced by Orbán’s appearance at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in 2022. At the heart of these transatlantic ideological networks is the idea of the rise of the executive. There is an emergence of authoritarian executive power, which means on the one hand that the executive power is extremely strengthened, on the other hand, the theory of separation of powers has been totally redesigned, and this has a huge impact on the landscape of democracy. The second Trump administration has boosted these tendencies. In this paper, I will first examine what international right-wing authoritarian populism (IRWAP) represents and how it has begun to internationalize and build transatlantic structures. I then discuss the main theoretical approaches that link authoritarian right-wing populisms, Orbánism and Trumpism. Finally, I will also discuss how the Orbán regime has created an authoritarian right-wing network of conservative intellectuals. To conclude the paper, I will hint at the possible outcomes of the IRWAP phenomenon. The serious threats to representative democracy will be investigated posed by autocratic political leaders who rely on popular will and popular sovereignty.

Professor Rafal Soborski, who teaches International Politics at Richmond American University and serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University.

Prof. Soborski: The Recent Polish Election Shows That Shifting Right Doesn’t Win Over the Right

June 19, 2025

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice European Observatory Home Interviews

In this compelling interview, Professor Rafal Soborski critiques Poland’s liberal democratic actors for mimicking right-wing rhetoric in a failed attempt to broaden appeal. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he warns, urging pro-democratic forces to adopt bold, progressive agendas rooted in class justice and social solidarity. Drawing comparisons to political centrists across Europe, Soborski emphasizes that ideological clarity—not cautious managerialism—is key to countering the far right’s emotional narratives and mobilizing mythologies. His insights offer a timely call for a renewed progressive vision amid the turbulent political landscape in Poland and beyond.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Rafal Soborski offers a trenchant critique of the Polish liberal democratic actors’ strategic missteps in the recent presidential election, arguing that centrist attempts to mimic the right not only fail to capture conservative voters but also alienate the progressive base. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he asserts, summarizing what he sees as a recurring failure of liberal parties not only in Poland but across much of Europe.

Professor Soborski, who teaches International Politics at Richmond American University and serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University, situates this analysis within a broader critique of what he calls “managerial centrism.” For him, this style of governance—technocratic, uninspiring, and devoid of ideological ambition—has become a default mode for centrist parties. “Even when the center wins elections, it then limits itself in office to this very managerialism… without a compelling vision of its own,” he explains.

This was evident in the performance of Civic Platform’s candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski, who lost narrowly to the nationalist Karol Nawrocki in a deeply polarized race in Poland. Rather than galvanizing progressive voters with bold policies, Trzaskowski, Professor Soborski suggests, hedged his ideological bets and made symbolic missteps that demoralized key constituencies. “I don’t think he convinced anyone by hiding the rainbow flag handed to him by Nawrocki during one of the debates,” Professor Soborski notes. “This alienated many people on the left… while not convincing anyone on the right.”

In his view, such political positioning reflects a deeper failure to recognize the need for ideological clarity and courage. Drawing comparisons to Germany’s Olaf Scholz and Britain’s Keir Starmer, Professor Soborski warns that when liberal parties attempt to neutralize far-right narratives by parroting them, they lose both authenticity and voter trust. “It tends to mimic instead the narratives of the right,” he laments.

For Professor Soborski, the path forward lies not in cautious centrism but in a reinvigoration of progressive values—rooted in social justice, pro-Europeanism, and recognition of class dynamics. “I would like to see pro-democratic forces in Poland challenging the right,” he concludes, “rather than hoping in vain that they can occupy some of the right’s discursive territory.”

This interview reveals not only the ideological contours of Poland’s political battleground but also the urgent need for liberal democratic actors to rethink their strategy before the far right consolidates its recent gains.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Rafal Soborski.

Populism Is a Style, Not an Ideology

Posters of 2025 Polish presidential candidates Rafał Trzaskowski (KO) and Karol Nawrocki (PiS) in Kuślin, Poland, on April 6, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Rafal Soborski, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. You’ve argued that populism lacks ideological coherence. How would you categorize Karol Nawrocki’s brand of politics—Trumpian, nationalist, anti-liberal—within your broader critique of the term ‘populism’?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I don’t think mine is a critique of the term populism as such.
But instead, what I would argue—and I am, of course, far from being original here—is that approaching populism as an ideology, even a thin one, is misguided. Incidentally, the author to whom we owe the concept of thin-centered ideology, Michael Freeden, does not think populism qualifies as one, so it doesn’t qualify as a worldview. According to Freeden, thin-centered ideologies have a restricted conceptual core, a restricted range of concepts, and hence need broader, more mature ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism, to serve as their hosts. But the thin-centered ideologies are still more complex than populism. So think of nationalism, feminism, perhaps ecology.

On the other hand, populism revolves merely around the opposition between the decent people and the corrupted elite, and this is not enough to construct a worldview that any ideology is expected to offer. Of course, you can further distinguish between right-wing populism, left-wing populism, and so on. But such distinctions often reveal that populism does not really make much sense as an ideological category. So both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders have been described as populists, but their views are dramatically different.

During the pandemic, I analyzed approaches to COVID-19 that others had categorized as populist, and I showed that there was no consistent pattern or any general similarities in terms of the track record—in terms of the success or otherwise—of so-called populist policies, and that, in fact, the major factor was the degree of neoliberalization. So, I think it is better to keep populism as a description of the type of political communication—the style of political communication—and perhaps also the convention-breaking behavior of some politicians, including dressing down, swearing, smoking—in the case of Nawrocki, sniffing snus during TV debates with Trzaskowski.

But the populist manner may carry very different ideological and political messages, and in that sense it may be better to speak of populist nationalism or populist socialism rather than vice versa—rather than socialist populism. Populism then becomes just a description of the style in which a given ideology is conveyed.

As for Nawrocki, I think all of the adjectives that you have mentioned—Trumpian, nationalist, anti-liberal—could potentially apply, for of course they are different categories.
Trumpism seems to have an obvious meaning. It’s a blend of hostile grievances against all kinds of minorities and some pernicious establishment—which is, of course, ironic, considering Trump’s own status—and Trumpism is expressed more as ephemeral sound bites than coherent ideas. We’ve become used to that with Donald Trump. Trump is also associated with political transactionism, bringing his personal monetary interest quite unashamedly into politics, which also affects what he says and how he says it. So it remains to be seen if Nawrocki tries to emulate this.

Is Nawrocki a nationalist? Certainly. And it is a nationalism that thrives on and stirs up collective fears and collective resentment in a volatile world whose complexities this kind of nationalism oversimplifies.

Anti-liberal? Well, absolutely. However, I think we need to be fair and wait and see who Nawrocki turns out to be ideologically when in office.

We need to remember that until he was selected by Jarosław Kaczyński as an ostensibly nonpartisan candidate—but really the candidate of Law and Justice (PiS)—he had been almost a complete unknown to the wider public. So I think we need to wait and see what happens.

Ideological Balkanization and the Far Right’s Mythmaking Machine

You’ve called for taking ideology seriously in times of crisis. What ideological threads—beyond vague populism—do you see underpinning Nawrocki’s support base and discourse?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Thank you for this question. Yes, I think political ideology should be taken seriously, and I discussed this in my work. For years, however, ideology has undergone a radical transformation, becoming increasingly fragmented, fluid, ephemeral,
reacting haphazardly to rapid social and political changes. So, traditional left-right distinctions have blurred. They have given way to hybrid belief systems and situational politics, featuring often contradictory positions depending on the issue at hand, emerging at any moment. Of course, social media have accelerated this shift as well, favoring meme-driven and personality-centered politics over more durable, collectively held ideological commitments. And, comprehensive worldviews are losing ground to issue-based activism, identity politics, and also algorithmically reinforced echo chambers. So, ideology has changed, and far-right politics provides a particularly revealing lens through which to analyze ongoing ideological transformations.

The far right today combines elements of nationalism, traditionalism, libertarianism, conspiracism, accelerationism—you name it—into an unstable and contradictory but potent political force. The far right also engages in constructing and mobilizing its followers around myths—political myths of civilizational decline, national betrayal, or demographic apocalypse. It offers emotionally charged narratives of victimization and redemption. So, for example, “the Great Replacement” myth frames migration as an existential threat to the West; “the Deep State” conspiracy envisions elites orchestrating some global control or takeover. The far right relies on such narratives, positing a moralized struggle between the people and their perceived enemies, and seems to be capitalizing on the fears that these cause.

Overall, I think what we witness is ideological Balkanization—adherence to tribalism over universalism, feeling over reasoning—and it’s going in that direction. But this does not mean that we should be paying less attention to these fragmented new forms of ideology. Ideology scholars should really be exploring ideology in its different expressions, whether they are sophisticated and structured, or crass and fleeting. For better or worse, this is how we tend to think politically today, and we should be studying this.

However, coming back to Nawrocki, I think it is likely that he will be blending different ideological themes, and it seems certain to me that it will be a narrative mobilizing collective exclusionary emotions over reasoning. But still, as I said earlier, I think we need to wait and see. His political communication thus far has been subject to the pressures of electoral competition much more than it will be when he’s in office, with at least five years of presidency ahead of him. Perhaps he will continue this kind of discourse, or perhaps he will change. We’ll see.

The Far Right Has a Base and a Superstructure—But No Real International

How does Nawrocki’s alignment with Trumpism reflect broader transnational ideological flows between far-right actors across the Atlantic? Are we seeing a global ideological bloc emerging?

Professor Rafal Soborski: That’s a great question. Far-right ideologies take increasingly transnational forms. This includes the emergence of different forms of civilizationism, variously aligning with or transcending nationalism or racism. So, with my colleagues at London Metropolitan University, Professor Michał Garapich and Dr. Anna Jochymek, we’ve been working on a project funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council, studying the emerging transnational Polish-British far right. And we see a significant number of Polish migrants in Britain recruited by British far-right organizations. We also see British far-right leaders and activists visiting Poland, for example, to take part in the Polish Independence March on 11/11, which is probably the world’s largest transnational far-right hub, as well as a symbolic space for the reproduction of political myths.

Far-right cooperation is fast becoming both a matter of ideological synergy and financial benefit. Far-right influencers play an increasingly important role, and there is money around them. So, for example, one Polish-British far-right PR expert has been behind the rightward shift of Elon Musk, and both have promoted the staunchly pro-Israeli, Islamophobic far-right influencer Tommy Robinson.

So, in that sense, I think an ideological bloc has already emerged, and this far right of today does have both its base and its superstructure, using Marxian terminology. But having said all that, far-right nationalism’s logic is not really given to cooperation—to put this mildly—and as we know from history. So, I anticipate all kinds of tensions, potentially conflicts emerging, and I don’t think that a robust, coherent far-right international is likely in that sense.

Populist Nationalism Thrives on Imagined Enemies And PiS Knows This Well

With Nawrocki now positioned to veto progressive reforms by Tusk’s government, are we witnessing a new phase of institutional gridlock engineered by ideological confrontation between liberalism and authoritarian conservatism?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think this is highly likely. But I don’t think, to be honest, that Tusk’s government would have done much, even with a president from its own side. The coalition is too divided on social issues and has been, I have to say this with regret, highly ineffective. And Tusk’s party itself is really right-wing—I mean, by Western standards. This is a neoliberal/neoconservative party. It resembles the Tories under Cameron before their shift in a far-right direction. So, yes, but I don’t think that it would be a very dramatic change in relation to what we have.

Do you foresee PiS leveraging the presidency to engineer a strategic comeback in 2027, thereby locking in illiberal reforms? If so, how might ideology serve as the vehicle of this restoration?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think the broad ideological outlook of Law and Justice (PiS) will remain as it is—traditional, conservative on social issues, and protectionist—some would say drifting towards the left—on economic issues. At the same time, the populist nationalism that PiS represents, as I said earlier, thrives on imagining enemies and hostile forces.
So, at one point it was the LGBT community that PiS stigmatized, with some regions and locations under the control of the party declaring themselves to be LGBT-free zones. At other points, it was refugees from the Middle East, whom Kaczyński presented in a language resembling Nazi rhetoric, really—namely, as carriers of dangerous diseases. So, with the rapid growth of the Ukrainian population in Poland following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, PiS will be keen to capitalize on any emerging fears and tensions between the Polish population and the Ukrainian minority in Poland, and that this will be used to engineer this strategic comeback in 2027.

PiS Is Illiberal—But Let’s Not Mistake It for Neoliberal

Chairperson of Law and Justice, Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Photo: Tomasz Kudala.

In your analysis, how does neoliberalism continue to structure Polish politics even amidst this nationalist, anti-liberal wave? Can we speak of an ‘illiberal neoliberalism’ in the Polish context?

Professor Rafal Soborski: This is an interesting question—questions like this color the debate on whether we still live in a neoliberal era. Trump’s tariffs, Brexit, etc., seem to perhaps contradict this. Neoliberalism—and by this I mean a crass version of 19th-century economic liberalism, not the paradigm in the studies of international relations also known as neoliberalism—has been the hegemonic ideology for so long that, even if we are to assume its terminal decline in the near future, it will continue resonating for some time. By the way, the end of neoliberalism was pronounced a few times before, especially during the 2008 economic crisis—the gravest one since 1929—which revealed the serious flaws of neoliberalism, and then during the pandemic, when suddenly the state, which neoliberals tend to blame for all problems, proved indispensable, and neoliberal regimes coped with the pandemic far worse, far less effectively than the more social-democratic, statist ones.

Now, neoliberalism is compatible with authoritarianism—think of Chile under Pinochet’s rule, for instance—but as far as PiS is concerned, I am not sure if the party represents illiberal neoliberalism. Neoliberals preach that markets are always right, they don’t find inequality to be a problem, they promote austerity and the rolling back of the welfare state. And PiS, on the other hand, is actually quite statist in approach, supportive of the welfare state—for whichever reasons, usually just electoral reasons, but still—and big projects like, for instance, the central airport in Poland, which is now in a bit of a limbo. Economic inequalities—we have to keep this in mind—under the PiS government declined in Poland. The Gini coefficient, which measures inequality, fluctuated during PiS years but was never higher than in 2015 and is now significantly below average. So, I wouldn’t describe them as illiberal neoliberals. They are certainly illiberal, but probably not neoliberal.

Is Poland a Nationalist Haven?

Your recent co-authored work shows how Polish migrants in the UK are co-opted into transnational far-right movements. How might Nawrocki’s presidency reinforce or reshape diasporic nationalism and transnational far-right solidarities?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Thank you very much for this question. This is the topic that I’m working on with Professor Garapich and Dr. Jochymek at LMU.

Poland is often seen by the global far right as a nationalist haven that remains relatively homogeneous ethnically, that remains traditional, conservative, and has also been very economically successful in recent decades, while maintaining a strong identity. And this kind of perception has been articulated and reinforced by all kinds of far-right influencers, but also by Donald Trump. When he visited Warsaw during his first presidency, he chose Warsaw as the location for his main European speech—often described by scholars as the major narrative of Western civilizational populism.

I think this perception of Poland—has been undermined by the 2023 elections and the premiership of the globalist Donald Tusk, as he’s seen by the far right. But if PiS regains power in 2027, then the far-right narrative about Poland as a model country is likely to make a comeback.

I already mentioned our work on Polish migrants in Britain, one of the largest minorities in the country. At this point, approximately 700,000 Poles live in Britain, and their voting patterns are interesting. They are different from how Poles living in, for example, the United States or Canada vote. So in the first round of the presidential elections, almost 36% of those who voted voted for Trzaskowski. But then he was followed by two far-right candidates—Sławomir Mentzen, over 18%, and Grzegorz Braun, who got over 14%—and Nawrocki was only fourth, with just 13%. So it seems that Polish right-wing migrants in Britain prefer either the more extreme narrative coming from Braun, which is messianic, antisemitic, extremely homophobic, or the more economically libertarian far-right views of Mentzen. And the popularity of the latter may be explicable by the fact that many Poles living in Britain are self-employed and hence averse to big state and high taxation. But in the second round, Trzaskowski got almost 61%. So we should keep in mind that the majority of Poles in Britain are not interested in politics and do not vote. Those who vote ultimately voted for the centrist candidate.

Now, coming back to Nawrocki: only time will tell what his win means for transnational far-right solidarities. What we know is that the PiS government until 2023—so for eight years—supported symbolically and financially various initiatives of the Polish diaspora in Britain that were of a far-right nature, and the British press did register this. More broadly, taking a more global perspective, as the far right assumes an increasingly civilizationist posture, transnational far-right ideologies, activism, and symbolism will become more important, I’m sure—reinforcing these solidarities that you’ve asked about. However, as I already said, we should not forget the lesson from history: that collision courses are inherent in nationalism, and such friendships are likely to be subordinated and perhaps ultimately trumped by jingoistic passions.

Shifting Right Won’t Win the Right

What are the ideological weaknesses of the liberal opposition in Poland, particularly in light of Trzaskowski’s narrow loss? Is managerial centrism enough to challenge the far right’s mobilizing narratives?

Professor Rafal Soborski: It certainly is not enough, and this can be seen not just in Poland, but also in other places, including Germany or Britain, where—even when the center wins elections—it then limits itself in office to this very managerialism you mentioned, without a compelling vision of its own. It tends to mimic instead the narratives of the right. Think of Keir Starmer’s shift to the right in recent months, or Scholz when he was Germany’s Chancellor. There are many other examples. And I think this was also a mistake of the coalition government in Poland—the rightward shift in the rhetoric around migration, for example, and no progress whatsoever on the promises made to the LGBT community. And of course, this was caused by the coalition being divided on the question. But why would voters take into consideration the inner workings of the governing coalition? They generally expect results.

Many leftists did vote for Trzaskowski, perhaps with a heavy conscience. I would have liked many more of them to vote for him, just to avoid having a nationalist with a shady past as president of the country. But Trzaskowski himself should have shifted in a more progressive direction. For example, I don’t think he convinced anyone by hiding the rainbow flag that was handed to him by Nawrocki during one of the debates, and then it was quickly taken over from Trzaskowski by a left-wing candidate. This alienated many people on the left—members of the LGBT community, I presume, as well—while not convincing anyone on the right, who had seen Trzaskowski before participating in Pride marches in Warsaw. So, this was inconsistent, and shifting to the right will not work.

Don’t Chase the Right—Reclaim Class Politics and Solidarity

A fatigued factory worker. — A fatigued factory worker experiencing exhaustion, weakness, hopelessness, and burnout. Photo: Shutterstock.

How should pro-democratic forces in Poland reframe their political project to contest both the nationalist cultural agenda and the underlying neoliberal consensus you critique?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think it is evident from what I have said so far that my political views are leftist and progressive. I would like to see pro-democratic forces in Poland challenging the right rather than hoping in vain that they can occupy some of the right’s discursive territory. I would like to see an open, pro-European Poland respecting minorities and celebrating diversity.

But I would also like to see the importance of social class really appreciated by Polish progressive politicians.The liberal center, and even the liberal left, sometimes appear to believe that class is no longer a significant dimension of identity or social stratification. They see class as a concept that was relevant in the industrial era—in the 19th century, early 20th century—but not in an information- and service-based society of today. But the concept of class describes an economic relationship, and anyone working for wages, not living off rent or interest, belongs to the working class. So to appeal to this huge group, pro-democratic forces should start talking about the four-day working week, more loudly about universal income, universal benefits—especially in the context of AI, which will likely eliminate a wide range of professions, a wide range of jobs, or rather, it will replace humans in those jobs.

The Razem (Together) party in Poland has started this conversation, and I think this is the way to go, rather than caring mainly for the interests of a small number of wealthy individuals or entrepreneurs, however important they may be for the economy. We should also remember on this point that some of the people who voted for Law and Justice—I suspect a significant share of the party’s electorate—chose it because of the range of social benefits, welfare benefits that the party has introduced or expanded, hence, as I mentioned, reducing inequalities while at the same time sustaining economic growth. So, I think a social democratic, solidary response—protecting the poor while shifting more of the financial burden towards the privileged few—is what I would recommend, and I would recommend this both in principle and also strategically, as a way to weaken, to defeat PiS.

And finally, Professor Soborski, given the gender and education-based electoral cleavages evident in the runoff, how might intersectional ideological analysis help explain—and perhaps overcome—these divisions?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Most of the cleavages were not that surprising—big cities for Trzaskowski, provincial Poland for Nawrocki, Western Poland for Trzaskowski, Eastern Poland for Nawrocki. Education was, of course, a big factor as well. But what I would like to highlight—what came unexpectedly—was the support far-right candidates Mentzen and Braun received from young people, who then, in the second round, voted primarily for Nawrocki. So clearly, this is a group for whom Civic Platform—the coalition government—does not seem to have a convincing offer, and I already explained what I see as the right response.

Dr. Radoslaw Markowski is Professor of Political Science, Center for the Study of Democracy, Director, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw & Polish Academy of Sciences and Polish National Election Study, Principal Investigator.

Professor Markowski on Poland’s President-Elect Karol Nawrocki: Future Statesman or Mere Footnote?

June 4, 2025

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice European Observatory Home Interviews

In this compelling post-election interview, Professor Radosław Markowski offers a candid, expert analysis of Poland’s newly elected president, Karol Nawrocki. Backed by PiS and inspired by Trump-style politics, Nawrocki’s narrow win poses serious challenges to Prime Minister Tusk’s pro-European government. Professor Markowski dissects the roots of this upset—calling it the result of a “fantastically prepared campaign”—and warns of potential institutional gridlock and democratic backsliding. While describing Nawrocki as “inexperienced” and lacking policy depth, Professor Markowski holds out a sliver of hope that he may rise above partisan loyalties. With sharp insights into Polish society, EU disillusionment, and the dangers of populist overreach, this interview is essential reading on Poland’s increasingly polarized and uncertain political trajectory.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In the aftermath of Poland’s 2025 presidential election, the political landscape remains fraught with uncertainty, ideological tension, and institutional fragility. Karol Nawrocki, a nationalist conservative backed by PiS and inspired by Trump-style politics, narrowly secured victory with 50.89% of the vote, defeating centrist candidate Rafal Trzaskowski. His win delivers a major setback to Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s pro-European government, which has been striving to reverse judicial reforms enacted under the previous PiS administration. With presidential veto power at his disposal, Nawrocki is expected to obstruct key liberal policies, deepening political gridlock and intensifying concerns about democratic backsliding.

In this timely and probing interview, renowned political scientist Professor Radosław Markowski offers a sharp analysis of Nawrocki’s narrow win, calling it the product of a “fantastically prepared campaign” rather than a sign of a lasting ideological shift. Professor Markowski emphasizes that Nawrocki is “definitely inexperienced,” lacking basic knowledge of international relations and economics. Yet despite these limitations, he entertains a faint hope—perhaps naively—that Nawrocki might rise above his campaign alliances and “act reasonably and become a good politician serving the country and society he represents.”

This cautious optimism is tempered by structural concerns about Poland’s democratic integrity. Professor Markowski draws a direct line between the present moment and the legacy of what he has termed “free but unfair” elections. Referencing his article in West European Politics, he highlights the disproportionality of PiS’s 2015 win—where only 18.8% of eligible voters delivered a 51% parliamentary majority—and the subsequent “eight years of structural lawlessness.” Nawrocki’s victory, Professor Markowski argues, does not signal a visionary mandate, but reflects the effective demobilization of liberal voters and the disciplined overperformance of a conservative-nationalist base.

With his strong nationalist rhetoric and pledges to limit EU influence while promoting Polish sovereignty, Nawrocki’s rise has been cheered by Eurosceptic leaders across Central Europe, including Viktor Orbán and Marine Le Pen. Yet his alignment with this populist-right alliance only heightens fears of further democratic erosion in a country once considered a model of post-communist European integration.

Whether Nawrocki becomes a transformative statesman or a forgettable footnote in Polish political history remains an open question. As Professor Markowski underscores, the new president now faces a choice: to entrench polarization and gridlock, or to rise above partisan constraints and define his legacy in the eyes of future generations.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Radosław Markowski.

Democracy at a Tipping Point

Professor Radosław Markowski, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In the light of Karol Nawrocki’s narrow victory, how do you interpret this outcome within your framework of “plurality support for democratic decay”? Does this mark a deepening of democratic vulnerability in Poland, despite Law and Justice party’s (PiS) 2023 parliamentary loss?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let’s first try to recall the facts. In 2023, PiS won the elections against Platforma Obywatelska by nearly 4 percentage points—an equivalent of several hundred thousand votes—but it was unable to govern due to its lack of coalition-building capacity. Today in 2025, they won by a significantly smaller margin—just 1.5% effectively. It is a sort of a tie with a slight edge toward one of the candidates. However, the narrative remains consistent.

Polish society—and this is the focus of my ongoing research, soon to be published—is fundamentally liberal, progressive, and cosmopolitan. This stands in stark contrast to the narratives promoted by pundits and public intellectuals who advocate for a nationalist, conservative, and ultra-religious vision of Poland. The proportion of those who support liberal and progressive values over traditional and nationalistic ones is typically three to one, two to one, or at worst, three to two. Across more than 20 dimensions of this cultural divide, I see no evidence of conservative-nationalist dominance.

The problem lies in the fact that these conservative forces, supported by the Polish Catholic Church and representative of a departing world order, have successfully achieved nearly full mobilization in the last decade or decade and a half. Ninety to ninety-nine percent of all available nationalist-conservative voters turn out for elections.

On the other hand, the liberal-progressive side struggles, occasionally succeeding—as in 2023. Compounding this issue is the fact that PiS supporters are notably older, less educated, primarily from rural areas or outside the labor market by choice or by circumstance and are ill-equipped for success in a meritocratic modern world. They are part of society, of course—this is a description, not a judgment. Their mobilization is straightforward, relying on black-and-white imagery, simplifications, and the narrative of stark Manichean good versus evil.

In contrast, the liberal-progressive side comprises highly educated voters—predominantly individuals with high socioeconomic status, capable people who run their own businesses, academics, entrepreneurs, and the middle class. This is a challenging electorate. They are critical readers who verify information coming from politicians and reject simplistic depictions of the world. They ask not only about the goals but also about the means of achieving those goals. They question; they ask about possible side effects. They ask about alternative policies. They are concerned about trade-offs.

More so, they are very capricious in a way and dissatisfied with trivial answers to complicated matters. And this is precisely why it is so tough to attract these liberal, cosmopolitan, progressive voters. They are knowledgeable people who do not buy simplistic propaganda or demagoguery from politicians.

Eight Years of Structural Lawlessness in Poland

Logo and sign of the PiS (Law and Justice / Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) party in Pruszcz Gdański, Poland, on April 11, 2021. Photo: Dreamstime.

You’ve previously described Polish elections as “free but unfair.” Do the 2025 presidential results reflect a continuity of institutional imbalance, particularly with regard to partisan control over historical institutions like the Institute of National Remembrance?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let me say—this is a subtitle of one of my articles in West European Politics—that the elections were “free but unfair,” with unfair results. What I meant then is that in the 2015 elections, in which PiS won in a free and fair contest, they received 5.7 million votes out of nearly 31 million eligible voters—meaning that only 18.8% of eligible voters supported PiS, yet they gained a 51% parliamentary majority. You know, this kind of miracle almost never happens under proportional representation. But due to 17% of wasted votes and the D’Hondt formula—which eliminated a significant portion of minor votes—it was possible.

There would have been no problem with this kind of translation from 18.8% to 51% parliamentary majority if they had merely run the country in the sense of administrating government affairs. But unfortunately, they behaved after that election as if they had received a qualified majority, and they started changing the constitutional rules of the game.

I like Adam Przeworski’s definition of democracy, which says: democracy is institutionalized uncertainty. There should be frozen, strict, and obeyed rules of the game that never change during the process of electing politicians—but the outcomes of these rules are unknown, and that’s the beauty of democracy.

So, what PiS did illegally since 2015—because they thought this kind of miracle would never happen again—was to bash the Constitutional Tribunal, interfere with the Supreme Court by inventing a new chamber, the “Extraordinary Chamber of Something.” It is “extraordinary” in the sense that nobody in Europe or worldwide recognizes it. We experienced a period of eight years of structural lawlessness in Poland, which excluded us from the community of civilized democracies in the European Union.

We used to enjoy relatively high prestige with people like Jerzy Buzek, former President of the European Parliament, and Donald Tusk, who was President of the European Council. These roles may have even overstated Poland’s influence, but they indicated that Poland was politically important in the EU. That prestige vanished immediately after PiS came to power and began misbehaving in terms of the rule of law and democratic procedures.

Nawrocki’s Win: A Campaign Masterpiece or a Populist Rebrand?

Given Nawrocki’s political inexperience but ideological clarity, how do you interpret his victory as a possible recalibration of Poland’s populist-authoritarian project? Is this a new chapter or simply a rebranding of the PiS legacy?

Professor Radosław Markowski: It’s very hard to say who he is. He’s definitely inexperienced. He lacks basic knowledge about international relations, about economic issues, and so forth. Again, let me reiterate: Poland is a parliamentary democracy in which the executive power lies with the Prime Minister and his government. The president is mainly symbolic in terms of positive policies. He can propose something, but it is up to the parliamentary majority to pay attention to his activities. He, however, has negative powers. He can veto, and this is unfortunately what we expect from him. We’ll talk about that maybe later on.

But back to the campaign, I would say—well, in a way, it is quite interesting, and we’ll probably be teaching students about it in the future. It was a campaign masterpiece by Nawrocki’s electoral team—by the people who managed to craft a serious presidential contender out of almost nothing. Their most notable success was in discouraging turnout for Trzaskowski in the second round. Typically, second-round presidential contests hinge more on demobilizing the opponent’s base than on attracting new voters. In short, this was not a substantial victory in terms of broad public endorsement. Rather, it clearly illustrates how easily a poorly informed segment of the electorate can be—well, if you prefer, persuaded. If you prefer the term manipulated, that works too. Meanwhile, on Trzaskowski’s side, there was a clear failure of his electoral staff.

What does this outcome suggest about the limits of liberal coalition-building in Poland? Could Trzaskowski’s failure be linked to coalition fatigue, perceived elitism, or a lack of emotional mobilization compared to the nationalist right?

Professor Radosław Markowski: I already spoke about mobilization before, so I won’t repeat that here. But yes, the conservative nationalist camp is—quite frankly—astronomically over-mobilized. Virtually everyone in that camp turns out to vote. Unfortunately, the liberal democratic camp is less mobilized, and there are many reasons for that. One contributing factor is the one and a half years of the new government and its difficulties in implementing certain policies. However, it’s important to note that these delays—particularly on issues that matter deeply to many, such as abortion rights and women’s issues—were largely due to the fact that the current president, Andrzej Duda, had already made it clear he would veto such legislation.

So, the government was, de facto, waiting for a new opening—once the president is from their camp, or at least a person who is neutral and capable of reading what are the prerogatives of the president enshrined in the Polish constitution.

So, we have to wait and see. I don’t think I would interpret this win of Nawrocki as anything more than an incident and a fantastically prepared campaign by his staff, rather than something more deeply rooted. But one should also recognize that such victories—unexpected victories of unknown persons—sometimes redefine the political landscape and the political developments, and this should also be taken seriously into account.

Why Trzaskowski’s Campaign Missed the Mark

Rafał Trzaskowski, Mayor of Warsaw and presidential candidate, campaigning in Łódź, Poland, on June 3, 2020. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

To what extent did the personalization of the campaign around symbolic figures (Trzaskowski as elite technocrat vs. Nawrocki as populist traditionalist) reinforce identity cleavages over policy-based electoral competition?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let me reiterate a point about Trzaskowski’s campaign that I mentioned earlier. His team made a fundamental mistake—one I publicly flagged six months ago: they attempted to court the right-wing electorate. This group is a clear minority in Poland and already firmly aligned and mobilized by parties like PiS and Confederacja. The likelihood of swaying voters from that camp was virtually nonexistent.

This approach came at the expense of engaging the left-liberal electorate with progressive, liberal ideas. Trzaskowski is not an ultra-progressive or ultra-liberal, but he is certainly a meritocratic, cosmopolitan liberal—someone who speaks several languages fluently, who comes from an elite Warsaw family. Yet, he and his campaign team decided to pretend he was “one of us”—an average guy. One of the campaign’s obsessions was to ensure that no one mentioned his multilingualism.

This is a typical populist miscalculation—thinking you win elections by downplaying meritocracy. Unfortunately, it backfired. We estimate that around 1.5 million people who voted for the current ruling coalition in 2023 became disillusioned with Trzaskowski due to these mixed signals and overt appeals to the right-wing electorate. It was a real disappointment for them.

In the light of your concept of “Eurodisappointment,” to what extent does Trzaskowski’s loss suggest growing frustration even among pro-European voters with the EU’s perceived ineffectiveness in addressing democratic backsliding?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Together with my co-author, we pointed out in an article in European Union Politics that we began observing, around 2021–2022, a new phenomenon we called “new Euroscepticism” or “Eurodisappointment” among Poles. This isn’t the typical Euroscepticism rooted in xenophobic or nationalist attitudes. Rather, it’s a disappointment driven by frustration with the European Union’s inability to push back against leaders like Orbán and Kaczyński.

That old saying— “Brussels barks but doesn’t bite”— began to resonate, especially among a segment of the Polish population that had long been very enthusiastic about the EU. It fostered a growing suspicion that the EU might not be genuinely committed to upholding its core axiological pillars—democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental values.

Poland’s Populist Path and the Limits of EU Leverage

Has the European Union’s cautious and often delayed response to autocratizing member states like Hungary and Poland amplified the populist portrayal of Brussels as politically impotent? Could Nawrocki’s presidency signal a shift toward a more defiant, nationalist approach to EU engagement—echoing Orbán’s model of selective integration without formal rupture?

Professor Radosław Markowski: It might not be exactly what Orbán has invented, because in Poland—unlike in Hungary—there isn’t a deep-rooted historical sentiment akin to Hungarians’ longing for “Greater Hungary” or resentment over the Treaty of Trianon. In Hungary today, you can walk into nearly any hotel or public space and see maps depicting a pre-Trianon Hungary—three times its current size.

Poland also had its imperial moments in the past, being much larger in both territory and population. But even among nationalists, that imperial history doesn’t serve as a powerful reference point in contemporary politics. So, emulating Orbán isn’t straightforward.

Also, Orbán won a constitutional majority in Hungary’s first free and fair 2010 election. He could legitimately claim the mandate to rewrite the rules—which he did. It’s another matter how he later amended the constitution. But that legitimacy gave him more latitude than PiS or Nawrocki have in Poland.

Back to Polish politics: Nawrocki’s attitude toward the EU is definitely critical. But unfortunately, this is paired with a kind of infantile pro-Americanism—specifically, pro-Trumpism. You hear ideas like Poland leading the Trimarium Pact (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Georgia, North Macedonia, etc.). While maintaining good relations with these countries is important—especially those aspiring to EU membership—this can’t replace engagement with core EU mechanisms.

We should be at the heart of EU decision-making. Poland was recently re-invited by figures like Friedrich Merz and Emmanuel Macron to take a central role in European affairs—particularly because of our prescient warnings about Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine. As early as 2005, 2010, and 2014, we sounded alarms about Putin’s ambitions—warnings largely ignored by Angela Merkel and others in Western Europe. Now, Poland is being taken more seriously, and we should seize that moment.

Let me emphasize once again: Poland is a parliamentary democracy. Executive power lies with the Prime Minister and the government. Foreign policy is handled by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The President can influence foreign affairs symbolically or by refusing to appoint certain ambassadors, which creates problems for individuals and embassies. But in the grand scheme, it’s not a major institutional hurdle.

Nawrocki’s Risky Global Alliances

Nawrocki’s campaign drew symbolic and rhetorical support from leaders like Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán. How do you see Poland’s evolving position in the broader network of global populist-right alliances?

Professor Radosław Markowski: For Poland, this dynamic doesn’t resonate with the PiS electorate—the party’s core support remains around 6 to 6.5 million voters, not the full 10 million who voted for Nawrocki in the second round. While he ultimately secured over 10 million votes, PiS’s true, consistent base is closer to the 29% he garnered in the first round.

Unlike Hungary, Poland—due to its historical experience—cannot accept pro-Russian sentiment. That simply doesn’t resonate here. As PiS and Nawrocki continue aligning with figures like Orbán, Marine Le Pen, Salvini, and even the prime minister of Slovakia, it will become increasingly difficult to justify such alliances to the Polish public. Even on the political right, there is discomfort with someone like Donald Trump, who appears either overly sympathetic to or dangerously naive about Russia.

But again, Polish foreign policy is in the hands of one of Europe’s most talented politicians: Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. So, I see no immediate cause for concern. External affairs will be shaped by the government and Sikorski, not the president.

Let me also point out something almost comical. Just a week ago, on May 25th, Donald Trump finally declared publicly that “Vladimir Putin is insane.” For Poles, this is hardly news. The average high school student here has known that for the last 15 to 20 years. It’s astonishing that it took so long for the most powerful man in the world—surrounded by the CIA and an array of intelligence agencies—to come to that conclusion.

So, in the long run, I believe Nawrocki will lose credibility and support if he aligns too closely with what I would call Kremlin muppets like Orbán, or with those financially entangled with Russia, like Salvini. It’s a very difficult political position in today’s Poland to be seen as a friend of Vladimir Putin.

Nawrocki’s Test: Rise Above Politics or Deepen the Deadlock?

Considering the veto powers of the presidency, how do you expect the new phase of institutional deadlock to evolve under Nawrocki, and what risks does it pose to executive-legislative accountability in Poland?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let’s give Nawrocki a chance. He is not strictly a PiS politician. He has made certain agreements and signed deals with Confederacja and others, and he will formally become Poland’s president in early August this year.

Every person—no matter their troubled CV or ethically questionable behavior in the past—who becomes president of a mid-sized country at the heart of Europe has the opportunity to reflect on how they want to be remembered. Will he be just a short footnote—an irrelevant president who did nothing for Poland—or will he attempt to act reasonably and become a good politician serving the country and society he represents?

Let’s give him that chance. Perhaps he will become less dependent on the political actors who backed him during the campaign. It’s a naïve expectation, I know—but there’s still a bit of the child in me. Sometimes, I deliberately want to be naïve to leave room for optimism. I’ve seen people radically change their political biographies before.

But if not—if he ends up blindly vetoing everything based on ideological conviction—then we’re back to what we’ve had for the last two years: a tense standoff between a combative president and a determined prime minister. That’s not good for Poland. Still, it’s the reality we may face. And if that happens, Nawrocki and his camp will ultimately lose, because it will become clear that they are obstructing the work of the government. It will be easy to demonstrate that things are not getting done in this country because of the president’s stubbornness.

Dr. Bortun: Economic Insecurity Fuels the Rise of the Far Right in Romania

May 27, 2025

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice European Observatory Extremism & Radicalisation Home Interviews

In the wake of Romania’s high-turnout 2025 presidential election, Dr. Vladimir Bortun offers a powerful analysis of how deep-rooted economic insecurity—fueled by decades of neoliberal reform—has driven support for the far right. Despite a centrist victory, nationalist George Simion’s strong performance underscores a broader post-crisis populist consolidation. In this exclusive ECPS interview, Dr. Bortun explores the AUR’s appeal among the diaspora and rural poor, the ideological vacuum left by the mainstream left, and how Romania exemplifies a wider European shift from democratic to authoritarian neoliberalism. A must-read for anyone interested in the structural dynamics behind Europe’s populist realignment.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Romania’s 2025 presidential election represented a pivotal moment for the country’s democratic trajectory and its place within the broader European political landscape. In a high-stakes runoff, centrist candidate and pro-European reformer Nicușor Dan secured a clear victory over George Simion, the leader of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). With the highest voter turnout in a quarter-century and the specter of a previously annulled election looming large, the vote was widely interpreted as a referendum on Romania’s political future—particularly on the tension between liberal democracy and the rising tide of far-right populism. Despite Simion’s defeat, his strong first-round performance and continued popularity signaled a deeper, more durable undercurrent of reactionary politics in Romania.

Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Dr. Vladimir Bortun, a lecturer at the University of Oxford and an expert on European politics, transnational party networks, and left-populist movements. With unique insight into both the structural drivers and class dynamics underpinning political realignments in Romania and beyond, Dr. Bortun offers a compelling analysis of how economic insecurity—rooted in decades of neoliberal reforms, mass emigration, and systemic inequality—has created fertile ground for the rise of the far right.

In this wide-ranging interview, Dr. Bortun reflects on how the socioeconomic legacies of Romania’s post-1989 transition have failed to deliver on their liberal democratic promises, especially for large swaths of the population living in poverty or working precariously. He argues that this deep economic discontent, compounded by the collapse of credible left-wing alternatives and the ideological convergence of the center-left and center-right, has allowed far-right actors like Simion and AUR to present themselves as anti-establishment voices—even as their own policies serve entrenched economic elites.

Crucially, Dr. Bortun situates Romania within a broader European context, where authoritarian neoliberalism is increasingly replacing the post-Cold War liberal consensus. He draws instructive comparisons with Poland, France, and Southern Europe, exploring how the mainstreaming of far-right rhetoric and policy by centrist parties—particularly around immigration and national sovereignty—has reshaped the ideological field.

By examining the rise of AUR’s support among the Romanian diaspora and among marginalized rural voters, Dr. Bortun challenges simplistic narratives about populism and brings attention to the lived realities of class, exclusion, and political abandonment. As he makes clear, the battle over Romania’s future is not only political or cultural—it is fundamentally about economic power, ownership, and whose voices get to shape the nation’s path forward.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Vladimir Bortun.

Neoliberalism Created the Perfect Storm

Professor Vladimir Bortun, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Given Simion’s stronger-than-expected first-round lead and his continued appeal despite being defeated in the runoff, how would you theorize the durability of far-right populism in Romania beyond the electoral cycle? Can this be conceptualized within a broader post-crisis populist consolidation rather than a mere reactionary surge?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a very important question. First of all, thank you again for the invitation. I should clarify that I’m not a professor yet—just a lecturer.

To go straight into the topic: recent academic literature has shed significant light on the key drivers behind the rise of the populist far right across borders. While there are, of course, multiple factors at play—and we will explore some of them—the most consistent driver across all contexts is economic insecurity, rooted in decades of neoliberal globalization.

These conditions have only worsened in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 crisis, which—as you mentioned—took a particularly austerity-driven form in Europe, shaped by how both European institutions and national governments responded. Romania was no exception.

To provide some context on the socioeconomic situation in Romania: after 35 years of neoliberal capitalism and roughly 18 years since joining the European Union—which has brought certain benefits but, for many Romanians (including those who have supported the far right), has failed to fulfill its initial promises—we are now facing deeply concerning indicators.

Approximately 45% of the population lives in poverty or on the brink of it—the highest percentage in the European Union, meaning nearly half the population is affected. Romania also ranks first or second in terms of in-work poverty. Moreover, it allocates the lowest—or among the lowest—shares of GDP to healthcare, education, and social protection.

After Ireland, Romania has the lowest tax collection capacity in the European Union. It also maintains some of the lowest tax rates in the EU. There is a 10% flat income tax, which disproportionately affects workers and employees—particularly because, in addition to this tax, they are also responsible for paying social contributions that were previously covered by employers. These include contributions to healthcare and pensions.

Unsurprisingly, this flat tax structure primarily benefits the wealthier segments of society. In addition, Romania has a corporate tax rate of 16%, one of the lowest in the European Union.

These are clearly the right conditions for economic insecurity—fertile ground for the rise of the far right. But it’s not only the poorest in society that we should consider. Economic insecurity affects various social classes and class fractions.

In Romania, it has had a particularly strong impact on the petty bourgeoisie—small and medium-sized entrepreneurs—who have been closing down their businesses at an increasing rate over the past few years, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic. I believe the pandemic represents another critical crisis that must be factored into any explanation of the far right’s rise. These small and medium entrepreneurs, going bankrupt by the thousands, form a core component of the far right’s social base.

Nationalism Meets Neoliberalism in a Peripheral Economy

People in traditional national costume return from Sunday church service in Maramureș, Romania—a region renowned for preserving its cultural heritage. Photo: Theodor Bunica.

How would you situate the AUR’s electoral messaging—particularly its nationalist-economically neoliberal synthesis—within the wider genealogy of post-2008 far-right formations in Europe? Is there a uniquely Romanian hybrid emerging, or does AUR largely mirror external templates?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: There are certain similarities with the broader profile of the European far right. There is clearly this populist discourse they employ, which is built on the dichotomy between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.”The elite, as in other countries, is portrayed as those who have sold out our country—who don’t represent the interests of our country but rather represent foreign interests, globalist interests. And of course, other undesirable categories in society are targeted as well, such as the LGBTQ community and immigrants from non-European countries, who have started to come to Romania in recent years as cheap labor—these are the usual suspects in far-right rhetoric.

At the same time, there is an element of truth in relation to the domination of foreign interests in Romania. Foreign companies hold a dominant position in key sectors of the economy, such as the energy sector, manufacturing—especially the auto industry—and the banking sector. They make huge profits in Romania, which they then repatriate to their home countries rather than reinvesting, even partially, in the Romanian economy.

Foreign banks, in particular, are guilty of this kind of profit repatriation from Romania, and this has generated a level of dissatisfaction that can also be observed in other countries. For example, in Poland, there is a very interesting study on the role of “comprador bankers” in the rise to power of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), which governed the country for about a decade. These comprador bankers were Polish managers of foreign bank subsidiaries who eventually came to realize that these foreign banks were operating in Poland solely to extract profit—profits that were then repatriated to their home countries, rather than being reinvested in the Polish economy. They did not, for instance, offer affordable or advantageous loans to Polish businesses. In response, some of these managers rebelled against the model and aligned themselves with the national capitalist hegemonic project advanced by PiS.

So, there is an element of what I would call the “comprador professional managerial class” that has served foreign capital in these peripheral Central and Eastern European countries, now fighting back against this foreign capital domination—in coalition with the domestic capitalist class. Particularly, those fractions of the domestic capitalist class that are trying to secure the sectors where they are still dominant—especially in Romania, such as real estate, construction, and hospitality.

The party you mentioned—AUR—led by Simion, who lost the election, is heavily funded by segments of the domestic capitalist class, particularly in the construction, real estate, and hospitality sectors. These actors are seeking to ring-fence and protect their interests from foreign capital, while also attempting to gain state power in order to advance those interests.

This project of the national bourgeoisie reclaiming state power is a common regional feature across Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary, Poland, and now Romania exhibit this pattern. I would even argue that it extends beyond the region—to Turkey, for example. Correct me if I’m wrong, but the Erdogan project seems to share similar characteristics, as far as I understand.

Now, regarding the distinctive features of the Romanian case—since I’ve already outlined some of the common regional characteristics—there are two aspects that stand out about the Romanian far right. I would highlight these two features, and perhaps we’ll focus on one of them in the following questions.

The first is their particular appeal to the diaspora. The diaspora represents a significant portion of their social base, and I’ll elaborate later on why they’ve been so successful in mobilizing this group.

The second distinctive feature is their appeal to farmers. Romania has the highest share of the workforce employed in agriculture in the entire European Union—between 18% and 20% of the total workforce. To give you a sense of how high this is: the second-ranked country in the EU is Poland, with only 10% of its workforce in agriculture. France, despite having a strong agricultural sector, has just 2.4% of its workforce employed in this field.

So, this is a huge sector in Romania, and the vast majority of these people working in agriculture are subsistence farmers. They are small farmers who feel like nobody is looking after their interests. The state is perceived as only overburdening them with regulations and taxation, while favoring the interests of big foreign corporations. And the far right is managing to build inroads into this significant social class in Romania.

A Left in Name, Neoliberal in Practice

Crin Antonescu, the pro-European presidential candidate, speaks during the Social Democratic Party (PSD) Congress in Bucharest, Romania, where he was officially confirmed as the party’s nominee on February 2, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

How do you interpret the apparent paradox between widespread socioeconomic grievances and the relative electoral failure of redistributive political platforms, particularly in the light of the Social Democratic Party’s strategic vacillation and policy convergence with the right?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s the key factor from a subjective perspective. I’ve tried to talk about the objective factors, but in terms of the subjective conditions, clearly the key factor that has facilitated the rise of the far right—not just in Romania, but across the region and beyond—is the lack of a credible left-wing political project.

And the current left party, the center-left party you’ve mentioned—the PSD—is left in name, but not in substance, not in policy. They have actually governed for the majority of these 35 years of neoliberal capitalism—more or less 20 of those 35 years have seen them in government. So, they have implemented some of the very policies I mentioned earlier, which are responsible for the current socioeconomic conditions.

The very minimal social concessions they have made in terms of redistribution while in government have been largely limited to increasing the minimum wage—which is, of course, better than nothing. This partly explains why they remain the most voted-for party in Romania.

However, these measures are far from sufficient. Despite repeated increases over the past six or seven years, the minimum wage remains very low—about 30% below what would be considered a living wage in Romania, that is, the income necessary for a decent standard of living.

Moreover, Romania has the highest share of its workforce earning the minimum wage. Nearly 40% of all workers are on minimum wage—twice the EU average.

So, we are a minimum-wage economy, a low-taxation economy, and a low public spending economy. Romania is pretty much a paradigmatic case of neoliberalism—and the PSD is very much responsible for this. It is arguably the single most responsible political party for this situation.

Proletarians Abroad, Petit Bourgeois at Home

With over 60% of the diaspora backing Simion in the first round, what implications does this have for the dominant narratives that have historically cast diasporic Romanians as liberalizing or pro-European agents?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a significant shift indeed! And it started already in 2020, when the party AUR—which, by the way, stands for the Alliance for the Union of Romanians, but the acronym aur also means “gold” in Romanian— from the very beginning targeted its message toward the diaspora. They even called the diaspora “the gold of Romania” that they wanted to bring back to the country.

The party was launched in the diaspora in December 2019, one year before the first elections in which they stood candidates. Their launch meeting took place in the UK, among Romanians living there—not in Romania. So, from the outset, they were oriented toward the diaspora, and they managed to appeal to it in several ways.

On the one hand, this diaspora is not one unified entity; it consists of several diasporas. We’re talking about five million people, which is a quarter of Romania’s total population. They live very different lives in the West of Europe. Some of them live in quite squalid conditions, working very hard jobs for low wages, in poor environments, with little respect and little sense of being treated equally.

There is a widespread feeling among them that Romanians are treated as second-class citizens. Many are temporary or circular migrants—working on a construction site for three or four months, then returning to Romania, or working seasonal jobs picking vegetables on farms in Italy, Spain, the UK, or Germany, and then going back.

They don’t have a favorable context for integration or for deeper socialization in the host countries. But let’s be honest—those host countries themselves have experienced a surge in far-right politics. The far right is now much more mainstream in Western Europe than it was 10 or 20 years ago, when these migrants may have been sending back more liberal kinds of social remittances.

These societies have shifted significantly to the right. Anti-immigration discourse has become more mainstream, normalized, and legitimized—and Romanians living there have internalized some of that discourse.

In my own fieldwork, I often came across people who, despite being migrants themselves and suffering from anti-immigration attitudes and discourse, were nevertheless against other groups of migrants. They distinguished themselves from them—talking about “good migrants” and “bad migrants.” There is a real cognitive dissonance at play here, where migrants adopt anti-migration attitudes and political preferences.

Another aspect is that many feel Romania is a peripheral country that lacks a real voice in the European Union and in the broader global political stage. They perceive Romania as subordinated economically and geopolitically—which is true.

So, when a populist demagogue like Simion comes along and says, “I will make Romania stand tall again in the EU and in the world,” it resonates. It gives them a sense of restored dignity and pride.

Meanwhile, all the other political parties—including the PSD—are utterly uncritical in their allegiance to the EU, NATO, and the West in general. They refuse to acknowledge the real problems Romanians face, both in terms of their living conditions in the diaspora and in terms of Romania’s position within international power structures.

These parties speak only about the benefits and advantages of being part of these institutions, without addressing the contradictions, the challenges, or the structural disadvantages of Romania’s position in the European and international economic and political system. This, of course, creates a window of opportunity for the far right to come in and capitalize on people’s sense of marginalization and humiliation.

One additional point is that many of these migrants, as I mentioned, are circular or temporary migrants. They may be working blue-collar jobs abroad, but they’ve managed to accumulate enough capital to open a small business back home in their town or village of origin. This means they occupy a complex, dual class position: proletarians abroad, petit bourgeois at home. When they return home, after years of hard work abroad to save capital and open a small guesthouse, café, restaurant, or corner shop, they feel the state does nothing for them.

Instead, they feel overburdened by taxation. Increases in the minimum wage are perceived as a burden because they are now small employers who have to pay two, three, or four salaries. They blame the state—but they also blame those below them: people on minimum wage, or on welfare benefits, whom they see as lazy or asking for too much. They see themselves as the real hard-working people who have sacrificed abroad to invest in the Romanian economy—only to be abandoned by the state, which should be protecting their interests.

I think this is very important. I’m not saying it’s unique to Romania, but it is very salient here—and perhaps not as salient a feature in the social base of the far right in other European countries.

A Race to the Bottom Among Migrants

Building on your work on transnational political mobilization, how should we understand the AUR’s success among emigrants in Italy and Spain? Do these cases indicate a diasporic production of illiberal subjectivities shaped by specific host-country political contexts?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: I think I already touched on this in my previous answer. However, Italy and Spain are particularly illustrative of some of the dynamics I outlined earlier—especially Italy, where the far right has been in power for the past two and a half years.

In that context, migrants often find themselves in a race to the bottom, trying to prove they are more deserving than other migrant groups. I encountered numerous cases of Romanian migrants in Italy—or former migrants who had lived there for many years—expressing very negative attitudes toward Moroccan or Albanian migrants, for example.

Some even told me they had voted for the Northern League, now known as La Lega—Salvini’s party—which was the original far-right populist force before Brothers of Italy surpassed it in popularity. Ironically, this is a party that had made openly anti-Romanian statements in the Italian press. Nevertheless, this became their way of attempting to carve out a place for themselves—by identifying someone “below” them to target as the “bad” migrant.

In Spain, we see a similar surge with the Vox party over the last few years. It is now the third-largest political force in Spain—a country where the far right was outside of Parliament for decades.

Again, we’re talking about a Romanian diaspora that has suffered a lot of discrimination and marginalization. It took a long time for this community to settle. But there is also a split within these diasporas, as I mentioned—between the more settled, integrated diaspora, and the precariously employed, circular, temporary migrants who come and go and who cannot really find a foothold in these countries.

The Center Imitates, but the Far Right Dominates

Comparing Romania’s recent presidential runoff to parallel dynamics in Poland and Portugal, to what extent can we speak of converging or diverging trajectories in the European center-right’s strategy to contain or accommodate far-right surges?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: I think we see a very strong trend of accommodation of the far right—and not just from the center-right, but also from the center-left. In Denmark, for example—going a bit outside the region—the Social Democratic Party currently in government has adopted one of the harshest anti-immigration policies in Europe. And this trend extends further. Even here in the UK, the Starmer-led Labour Party has adopted many of the talking points not just from the Conservative Party but also from Reform UK. Just the other day, Starmer was speaking about Britain being “a country of strangers,” “an island of strangers” due to mass migration, according to him. Apparently, that makes me a stranger here.

There is a growing body of literature—by scholars like Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter—that refers to this as the mainstreaming of the far right: the normalization of reactionary ideas and policies. And this applies not just to rhetoric, but to actual policymaking, with both center-right and center-left parties adopting positions in an attempt to win back voters lost to the far right.

But as the saying goes, “the original is better than the copy.” People who want to vote for the far right for reactionary reasons—because they oppose immigration, for example—are unlikely to switch to the center-left just because it has adopted similar anti-immigration tropes. They will continue to vote for the far right. And we have seen this across the board.

The one Social Democratic party currently in power in Western Europe—in the EU at least—is in Spain. And they have resisted the temptation to go in this reactionary direction on issues like immigration and other topics dear to the far right. On the contrary, in some ways they have been an example of what a progressive government can and should say on key issues of our time, including the atrocities we are seeing in Gaza. They are, of course, not a perfect government—they have many flaws and shortcomings. But they demonstrate that it is still possible to stay true to Social Democratic values and policies and win elections. And that’s just speaking from a pragmatic point of view.

Corruption Isn’t the Cause—It’s the Symptom of a System

Romania protest. — Protesters gather for the 13th consecutive day in front of Victoria Palace, the government headquarters in Bucharest, Romania, on February 12, 2017. Over 50,000 demonstrators rallied against controversial corruption reforms, illuminating the night with their mobile phones and forming the national flag with colored paper and cellophane. Photo: Dreamstime.

What insights might Romania’s 2025 election offer for understanding the evolving relationship between anti-corruption discourse and far-right populism, especially when contrasted with the cases of Poland’s Law and Justice or France’s National Rally?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a very interesting question. I think, on the one hand, the far right’s collusion with corrupt and clientelist practices shows that, after all, they are not such a real alternative to the mainstream parties they criticize. They are quite happy to engage in the same kind of bad politics that the mainstream parties are guilty of.

On the other hand, while corruption is indeed a major issue in Romania—as it is in many other countries—it is often framed in a very legalistic or even moralistic way, as if it’s simply a flaw of character or the result of an inefficient state bureaucracy.

In this sense, corruption is frequently instrumentalized ideologically to justify the further shrinking of the state and additional cuts to public spending. For example, it’s often claimed that there’s widespread corruption in the welfare system—even though Romania already allocates the lowest percentage of its GDP to welfare in the entire European Union.

Nevertheless, this anti-corruption mantra remains highly salient in public discourse.

The anti-corruption discourse has thus been used to legitimize harsh austerity and neoliberal measures. At the same time, when actions are taken against corruption—such as jailing corrupt politicians—they often remain at a superficial, legalistic level.

This approach is ineffective against the far right. In the United States, we saw the democratic establishment spend four years trying to go after Trump through legal channels—and yet Trump still won the election. Le Pen has been barred from standing in elections, and her party continues to grow in the polls. It’s certainly not declining.

In Romania, the Constitutional Court canceled the November election and barred the winning candidate, Georgescu. Yet the person who replaced him—Simion—secured double the percentage in the first round. It didn’t work.

I’m not saying such measures shouldn’t be taken—if there is a legal basis for them, then by all means, pursue them. But we need to recognize that this is not a real solution to tackling the far right.

On the subject of corruption, an important point must be made beyond its ideological instrumentalization. Corruption is a real issue that must be addressed, but it is often decontextualized.

Corruption needs to be understood as a key vehicle for the primitive accumulation of capital—something characteristic of any early stage in the development of capitalism, in any country, at any point in history.

Corruption, along with other violent forms of capital accumulation, has always been present—even in so-called advanced, consolidated democracies that have practiced capitalism for a longer time. Corruption played a massive role in the emergence of capitalism and continues to play a central role in capital accumulation today.

After all, the dirty money of drug cartels, criminal syndicates, and authoritarian regimes around the world is largely laundered through the City of London—the very heart of global capital. So, if we truly want to tackle corruption, we need to go to the root of the problem and understand it as part of a broader structural and systemic issue.

From Democratic Neoliberalism to Its Authoritarian Mutation

Lastly, from a historical-comparative perspective, how does the Dan–Simion runoff recalibrate the ideological field established in the 1990s transition era? Are we witnessing a definitive exhaustion of post-1989 liberal centrism or its tactical reanimation?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: This is a great question. There have been repeated claims about the death of the neoliberal center over the past 15 years—after the financial crisis, for instance. There were suggestions that neoliberalism was coming to an end, and that we would see a return to a more Keynesian type of economic model. That didn’t happen. Instead, we got more neoliberalism—more austerity, more privatizations, more deregulation, more flexibilization of the workforce.

Then, again, after the COVID-19 pandemic, there were claims that this marked the death of neoliberalism, especially given the forceful intervention of the state to keep societies afloat—or more accurately, to keep the accumulation of capital going. But again, that was temporary. Neoliberalism has returned in full force.

Now we are witnessing the militarization of Europe, with promises of spending cuts on the most important public services in society in order to fund military efforts. So, I’m afraid we are not seeing the end of neoliberal centrism, but rather its transformation into something more authoritarian—still neoliberal, but authoritarian. A shift, if you will, from democratic neoliberalism to authoritarian neoliberalism.

This transformation is being endorsed by the political center, which is increasingly adopting authoritarian measures across Europe. Here in the UK, the so-called center-left government has imprisoned individuals not for taking part in a protest, but simply for holding a Zoom meeting to plan one—specifically, a protest against environmental destruction. They were not punished for blocking a motorway, but merely for discussing civil disobedience in response to the climate crisis. This illustrates a clear shift toward authoritarianism. Yet when it comes to economic policy, there is a striking convergence between centrist parties and the far right.

The far right claims to be an alternative to the status quo and capitalizes on the grievances, socioeconomic anxiety, and insecurity of ordinary people. But if we look at their actual policy proposals—or, in places where they are in power, their actual policymaking—it’s more of the same. They might throw a few crumbs to ordinary people, to the popular classes, in order to maintain their support. But the bulk of their economic agenda still serves the business class and the wealthy—just different factions of the business class and wealthy than those typically represented by centrist parties.