Peter Magyar, a popular opposition politician of celebrity status meeting the press at the site of a soccer arena and miniature train station in Viktor Orban's village in Felcsut, Hungary. on May 24, 2024. Photo: Blue Corner Studio.

Dismantling an Embedded Autocracy

by with No Comment CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHome

In this timely and analytically rich commentary, Associate Professor Attila Antal examines the aftermath of Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat and the formidable challenge of dismantling an entrenched authoritarian system. Moving beyond the electoral outcome, Assoc. Prof. Antal argues that the core question is whether Hungary is witnessing a mere сhange of government or a deeper regime transformation. He identifies three interrelated arenas—propaganda and moral panic, institutionalized autocracy, and transnational authoritarian networks—as central to this process. The analysis underscores that while electoral victory is decisive, it is insufficient on its own: the durability of Orbánism lies in its embedded structures. The piece ultimately frames Hungary as a critical test case for democratic resilience and the possibility of reversing authoritarian consolidation within the European Union.

By Attila Antal

The Orbán government, which had been in power since 2010, was defeated in the 2026 Hungarian parliamentary elections. The Tisza Party, which formed a united opposition, will in all likelihood hold a two-thirds, i.e., constitutional, majority in the National Assembly. The most important question for the coming period is whether this strong mandate will be sufficient to dismantle an institutionalized authoritarian regime.

The election resulted in a landslide victory for the opposition, and although final/official results are not yet available and recounts are still underway (98.94% of votes have been tallied), the current results show that Hungarian society has risen up against the Orbán government: the ruling parties’ list received 2,375,468 votes (39.53% of the votes cast), the Tisza Party received 3,128,859 votes, representing 52.1% of the total, and the far-right Mi Hazánk party will also enter parliament with 343,684 votes (5.74% of the total).

All this means that currently (as of April 15, 2026), with 137 members (having won 93 individual districts and 44 seats on the party list), the Tisza Party is the largest faction in the 199-member Hungarian parliament, while the former ruling party, Fidesz-KDNP, received a dramatically small 56 seats (the collapse of the ruling parties occurred at the level of individual constituencies, where they managed to win 14 seats, accompanied by 43 list seats), and the far-right Mi Hazánk party received 6 seats from the party list.

The collapse of the Orbán government was thus caused, on the one hand, by the radical loss of individual constituencies (traditional rural constituencies belonging to Fidesz were lost to the Tisza Party, where non-Orbánist candidates had previously almost never won), and this was compounded by the record-high voter turnout, which can be interpreted within the context of the mood for systemic change: 5,988,778 people cast their votes, representing 79.56% of eligible voters.

In my view, the fact that the authoritarian Orbán government could be removed through an election does not negate the regime’s authoritarian nature, and only time will tell whether what has occurred is merely a change of government or a change of regime. However, despite its very significant mandate, the Tisza Party will have a very difficult task dismantling the remnants of the authoritarian Orbán regime. In what follows, I will examine this from three perspectives: Orbán’s politics of hatred, the institutionalization of autocracy, and the international network of autocracies.

Dealing with the Hatred and Moral Panic Generated by the Orbán Regime

One of the most important challenges in dismantling the authoritarian regime is dismantling the Orbán propaganda machine, which has been a fundamental pillar of Orbán’s power politics since 2010. This culminated in the 2026 campaign, in which the Orbán regime effectively functioned as a tool of Putin’s propaganda.

Starting in 2015, the fabrication of enemy stereotypes was continuous: refugees and immigrants, NGOs and civil society, the EU and Brussels, domestic political opponents, George Soros and his institutions. From 2022 onward, however, the Orbán regime was increasingly defined by overt Putinist hate-mongering and daily moral panic.

All of this led to President Zelenskyy becoming the greatest enemy in the 2026 campaign, with Hungarian propagandists portraying the Tisza Party as if it represented no Hungarian interests whatsoever and served Ukrainian and Brussels interests. The main message was that if the opposition came to power, Hungary would be dragged into the war—in other words, only Orbán could prevent the worst from happening.

All of this had a devastating effect on Hungarian public discourse, and the lies and hatred propagated became unbearable for Hungarian society. Orbán sought to make people believe that he wanted to avoid war, but in reality, from a communicative and ideological standpoint, he had long since entered it—on Putin’s side.

All of this was further underscored by the fact that, in the final stretch of the campaign, unprecedented leaks began to emerge from Western intelligence agencies via the independent Hungarian press. These confirmed that the Orbán regime had committed itself, at the highest levels (including the foreign minister), to representing Russian interests and had attempted to use the Hungarian police and intelligence services to undermine the Tisza Party.

These leaks played a key role in preventing the Orbán regime—which presumably cooperates continuously with the Russians—from successfully carrying out any gray-zone operations, while also reinforcing the Hungarian opposition’s belief that the Orbán regime had committed treason.

It has thus become clear that the Orbán regime is capable of stoking hatred to the extreme, and addressing this both socially and institutionally must be a key task for the next government. Maintaining the remnants of Orbán’s autocracy and failing to hold those responsible to account will create a situation that could pave the way for the next authoritarian backlash.

Dismantling the Institutional and Political Foundations of the Authoritarian Regime

There is no doubt that the next government’s second-biggest challenge will be dismantling the institutionalized autocracy—a task that will not be easy for the new government, even with a supermajority to amend the constitution. For this reason, Péter Magyar called on the most important public officials of the Orbán regime to resign on election night, even though they have so far indicated that they will not step down.

A key issue for the new democracy and constitutional order to be built is the neutralization of the remnants of the Orbán regime embedded in the public and political system. A related question is how the new government will act to ensure accountability and whether it will find a way to reclaim the assets that the oligarchs of the Orbán regime have stashed away in private capital funds.

All of this has significance beyond itself, since it is precisely the nature of law in authoritarian systems to declare solutions and matters that are unacceptable from a democratic perspective to be legal; however, this seriously jeopardizes both the functioning of democracy and the constitutional norms intended to be institutionalized.

The Collapse of Orbán’s Regime in the Context of the International Authoritarian Right

Not only did the Orbán regime collapse unexpectedly in a political sense, but so too did the international authoritarian right-wing structure that Orbán had sought to build. It proved to be a significant sign that, on April 5, 2026, explosives were found on the Serbian section of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, and although Orbán’s propaganda tried to use this against the Ukrainians in line with the campaign, President Vučić surprisingly did not prove to be a partner in supporting Orbán.

Just before the election, on April 7, US Vice President J.D. Vance visited Hungary—a visit in which the government had placed enormous hopes. Vance had already stated at that time that the US would cooperate with a new government, and after the election, he remarked that Orbán’s defeat “did not surprise” him.

The most surprising development, however, was that the Kremlin quickly let go of Orbán’s hand (at least on the surface). Orbán, who had represented Russian interests to the very end, was met with a remark from Putin’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, who stated, “we were never friends,” adding that they were satisfied that Hungary remained open to pragmatic cooperation.

***

The Hungarian opposition’s victory over the Orbán regime could therefore serve as an important lesson in several respects for the European Union and, more broadly, for authoritarian political regimes. On the one hand, it is a significant lesson that illiberal authoritarian regimes operating under one-party hegemony can be defeated through elections; however, the international political environment and the cooperation that supports the opposition through political and other means can play an important and indispensable role in this (as was the case with the Western and Central and Eastern European forces supporting the Tisza Party).

Through the Orbán regime’s constant vetoing, its incitement of hatred against Ukraine, and its representation of Putinist interests within the EU, it has essentially provoked a form of international and Hungarian cooperation that can rightly be described as the first manifestation of a cross-border “militant democracy” within the EU.

The coming period will determine whether the success of the April 2026 election will bring about merely a change of government or something more: the removal of an embedded authoritarian regime. For this to happen, the new Hungarian government and the EU must work together to dismantle the remnants of the Orbán regime; this could deal a decisive blow to the international authoritarian right.

Marine Le Pen

What Orbán’s Defeat Changes—and Does Not Change—for France’s Far Right

by with No Comment CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryExtremism & RadicalisationHome

In this incisive commentary, Dr. Gwenaëlle Bauvois examines the broader European implications of Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat, focusing on its strategic significance for France’s Rassemblement National (RN) ahead of the 2027 presidential race. Moving beyond surface-level interpretations, she argues that Orbán functioned as a crucial “proof of concept” for sovereigntist politics within the EU—an external validation that strengthened the RN’s claims to governability. His defeat, therefore, does not destabilize the party electorally but compels a recalibration of its narrative. By reframing the outcome as democratic alternation rather than ideological failure, the RN preserves its political coherence. The analysis offers a nuanced account of how transnational references shape—and are reshaped within—contemporary far-right strategy.

By Gwenaëlle Bauvois

The defeat of Viktor Orbán is not merely a Hungarian political event. It constitutes a broader stress test for the coherence of the European far right—and, more specifically, for the strategic positioning of the Rassemblement National (RN) ahead of the pivotal 2027 French presidential election. For years, Orbán was more than an ally for Marine Le Pen and her party; he served as a demonstration case—a tangible and living example that a sovereigntist, anti-liberal project could not only attain power within the European Union but sustain it over time.

Orbán as a ‘Proof’ That the Model Works

Hungary under Orbán has long served as a proof of governability, allowing the RN to argue that its political project is not theoretical but already implemented in another EU member state. Marine Le Pen’s participation in the Budapest rally on March 23, 2026, illustrated this alignment. During the event, she explicitly praised Viktor Orbán, describing him as “a visionary” and “a pioneer,” while also referring to him as her “friend” (Le Monde, 2026). This reflects a broader pattern in far-right politics: the use of cross-national examples as legitimacy tools, where foreign governments become narrative evidence of domestic feasibility. However, the RN’s strong endorsement of Orbán, followed by his significant electoral setback, forced the party to reinterpret the result in a way that preserves its own political narrative.

Reframing Defeat as Democratic Confirmation

The RN has strategically reframed the meaning of the defeat. Rather than appearing weakened by its strong support for a losing leader, it presents the outcome as evidence of normal democratic functioning. Orbán is depicted as a legitimate leader who, after a prolonged period in power, is simply being replaced through free elections. In this narrative, he is not discredited; instead, his defeat is recast as part of routine democratic alternation.

RN leading figure Jean-Philippe Tanguy stated: “We see that not only are voters free, but they are free to make a massive choice… After 16 years in power […] it is the desire for alternation expressed by a sovereign people,” (France Inter, April 13, 2026).

In this reading, Orbán’s defeat does not call his political model into question, because it is explained as the result of voters freely exercising their sovereignty. The RN therefore maintains a dual posture: continued political sympathy for Orbán’s project combined with respect for electoral sovereignty. This allows the party to neutralize any potential credibility costs associated with its earlier endorsement, while also reinforcing the idea that national political changes do not disrupt the broader continuity of sovereigntists politics across Europe.

No Electoral Spillover into France

Electorally, the impact on the RN in France is likely to be limited. Despite Orbán’s defeat, the RN remains one of the strongest political forces ahead of 2027 and is consistently ranked as the leading party in voting intention polls. Its support base continues to be shaped primarily by domestic factors, including immigration, cost-of-living pressures, and persistent dissatisfaction with traditional governing parties. Orbán’s setback does not significantly alter these underlying dynamics.

However, it does remove an important external reference point that the RN had used to demonstrate that its political model had already been successfully implemented elsewhere in Europe. Without this example, the argument shifts from demonstrative to more declarative, weakening the party’s comparative narrative without significantly affecting its core electorate.

Orbán’s weakening, therefore, does not destabilize the RN’s position in France, nor does it alter its trajectory toward the 2027 presidential election. What it does affect is a narrative structure—the party’s ability to rely on external validation as evidence of political feasibility. The key development, then, is not an ideological rupture but an interpretative adjustment.

References

Le Monde. (2026, March 23). “Marine Le Pen voices support for her ‘friend’ Viktor Orbán.”
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/03/23/marine-le-pen-voices-support-for-her-friend-viktor-orban_6751749_4.html

France Inter. (2026, April 13). “Interview with Jean-Philippe Tanguy. https://youtu.be/ZzXNS8REZH8?si=h_7Qj50qux6ldvsm

Symposium

The 5th Annual International Symposium — Reforming & Safeguarding Liberal Democracy: Systemic Crises, Populism, and Democratic Resilience

by with No Comment Editor’s ChoiceEventsHomeUpcoming Events

DOWNLOAD PROGRAM

 

Date: April 21–22, 2026 

Online Event | All Sessions in Brussels Time (CEST, UTC+2)

 

Click here to register!

Day One

(April 21, 2026 / 13:00-19:10)

Opening Remarks

(13:00–13:10)

Irina von Wiese (ECPS Honorary President)

 

Keynote Speech

(13:10–14:00)

“The Chicken-and-Egg Dilemma: Systemic Crises and the Rise of Populism,” by Staffan I. Lindberg (Professor of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Founding Director (2012–2025) of V-Dem Institute).

Coffee Break

(14:00–14:10)

Panel 1

From Grievance to Radicalization: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the International Politics of Populism

(14:10–15:40)

Moderator

Guri Rosén (Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo).

Speakers

“‘Driving On the Right’: Analyzing Far-Right Rhetoric,” by Ruth Wodak (Distinguished Professor and Chair in Discourse Studies, Lancaster University; University of Vienna). 

“The Theocratic Blueprint of Christian Nationalism, Reconstructionism, the New Apostolic Reformation, and Catholic Integralism Behind Trump’s Agenda,” by Julie Ingersoll (Professor of Philosophy & Religious Studies and Religious Studies Program Coordinator at the University of North Florida).

“International Organizations in Times of Populism,” by Stephan Klingebiel (Head of the Department of Inter- and Transnational Cooperation at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)). 

“Humiliation, Elite Impunity, and the Anti-System Gamble: Weimar-Type Mechanisms in Contemporary Grievance Politics,” by Benjamin Carter Hett (Professor of History, Hunter College & The Graduate Center, CUNY). 

Coffee Break

(15:40–15:50)

Panel 2

Institutions Under Pressure: Rule of Law, Executive Power, and Democratic Defense

(15:50–17:20)

Moderator

Malgorzata Bonikowska (Professor of European Studies, University of Warsaw).

Speakers

“Democratic Resilience Under Pressure: Institutions, Accountability, and the Return to Robust Democracy,” by Susan C. Stokes (Tiffany and Margaret Blake Distinguished Service Professor and Director of the Chicago Center on Democracy at the University of Chicago).

“To Resist a Coordinated Attack, We Need a Coordinated Defense,” by Robert Benson (Associate Director for National Security & International Policy, Center for American Progress (CAP)).

“The Law and Politics of Fear: Executive Power in 2026,” by Barry Sullivan (The Raymond and Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and the George Anastaplo Professor of Constitutional Law and History at Loyola University).

“Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Regime Change: An Evolutionary Perspective,” by Stephen E. Hanson (Lettie Pate Evans Professor of Government, William & Mary (USA)).

Coffee Break

(17:20–17:30)

Panel 3

Normalizing Authoritarian Populism: Institutions, Algorithms, and Fascist Drift

(17:30–19:00)

Moderator

Werner Pascha (Emeritus Professor of Economics, Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST)). 

Speakers

“The Arc of Authoritarian Populism in the US under Donald Trump, How Far It Has Progressed, and the Prospects of Reversing It,” by Larry Diamond (William L. Clayton Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution; Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy, Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI); Bass University Fellow). 

“The Institutional Enablement of American Populism,” by Bruce Cain (Professor of Political Science, Stanford University; Director, Bill Lane Center). 

“Algorithmic Populism in the Age of the Deep-Fake,” by Ibrahim Al-Marashi (Associate Professor at the American College of the Mediterranean, and the Department of International Relations at Central European University).

“From Populist Capture to Democratic Belonging: Multicultural Nationalism as an
Alternative to Exclusionary Nationalism,” by Tariq Modood (Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy at the University of
Bristol). 

Wrap-up

(19:00–19:10)

 

Day Two

(April 22, 2026 / 13:00-17:15)

Opening 

(13:00–13:05)

Keynote Speech

(13:05–13:50)

“Democratic Resilience in Europe: Can It Be Effective?” by Richard Youngs (Professor, Senior Fellow at Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at Carnegie Europe).

Panel 4

Comparative Regional Pathways of Democratic Backsliding and Far-Right Mobilization

(13:50–15:20)

Moderator

Reinhard Heinisch (Professor of Comparative Austrian Politics, University of Salzburg).

Speakers

“Building an Authoritarian Edifice Step-By-Step,” by Henri J. Barkey (Cohen Professor of International Relations (Emeritus), Department of International Relations, Lehigh University).

“Populism and Transnational Ties of the Far Right in East Asia: Recent Developments in South Korea,” by Hannes B. Mosler (Professor, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Institut für Politikwissenschaft (IfP), Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST)).

“Trumpism, Culture Wars, and the Reinvention of Europe’s Far Right,” by Paweł Zerka (Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations).

“Populist Narratives and Democratic Backsliding: Perspectives from Latin America,” by María Esperanza Casullo (Professor at the Institute of Political Science, Faculty of History, Geography and Political Science, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile).

Coffee Break

(15:20–15:30)

Panel 5 

Democratic Resistance in a Hardening World: Civic Capacity, Strongmen, and Economic Coercion

(15:30–17:00)

Moderator

 Marianne Riddervold (Professor of International Relations, University of Oslo). 

Speakers

“Structural Pressures Behind Strongman Politics,” by Jack A. Goldstone (The Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr., Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, and a Senior Fellow of the Mercatus Center).   

“Changing Democracy’s Address,” by Steven Friedman (Research Professor of Politics, University of Johannesburg; former Director, Centre for the Study of Democracy).

“Return of the Strong Men,” by John Pratt (Emeritus Professor of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington).

“Weaponized Trade Policy: Tariffs, Industrial Policy, and the Future of Global Economic Governance,” by Kent Jones (Professor Emeritus of International Economics, Babson College.)

“The Geopolitics of Right-wing Populism in a Post-hegemonic World Order,” by Edward Knudsen (A doctoral researcher in international relations at the University of Oxford and an Affiliate Policy Fellow in European political economy at the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin).

Closing Remarks

(17:00-17:15)

İbrahim Öztürk (ECPS, Senior Economic researcher, Professor of Economics, Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST)).

 

Click here to register!

Abstracts and Brief Bios

Keynote Speech

Staffan I. Lindberg: “The Chicken-and-Egg Dilemma: Systemic Crises and the Rise of Populism”

Abstract: In this keynote Professor Staffan I. Lindberg discuss the most recent trends in democracy, autocracy, and regime transformation based on Democracy Report 2026. He will show how by some measure the level of democracy is back to 1985; that the global wave of autocratization is intensifying, with 44 countries autocratizing and only 18 democratizing. The outlook is worse than in the last 25 years, includes weakening of democracy in established democracies. These trends are closely tied to increasing disinformation and polarization and driven primarily by far-right, nationalist parties and leaders around the world. Finally, Lindberg will touch on the ongoing process of autocratization in the United States of America (USA) under President Trump, and show that his administration is doing away with American democracy.

Staffan I. Lindberg is Professor and Founding Director of the V-Dem Institute (2012-2025); PI of Varieties of Democracy; Founding Director of the national research infrastructure DEMSCORE (2019-present); Wallenberg Academy Fellow alumni; co-author of Varieties of Democracy (CUP 2020), Why Democracies Develop and Decline (CUP 2022) as well as other books and over 70 scientific articles as well as numerous reports, policy briefs, and think-pieces; extensive experience as consultant on development and democracy, and as advisor to international organizations, ministries, and state authorities. Lindberg is the principal author of the annual Democracy Report,  the Case for Democracy and numerous policy briefs out of the V-Dem Institute. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0386-7390

 

Panel 1 
From Grievance to Radicalization: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the International Politics of Populism

Moderator

Guri Rosén is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo, Norway. She is also a senior researcher at Arena, Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, Norway.

Speakers

Ruth Wodak: “‘Driving On the Right’: Analyzing Far-Right Rhetoric”

Abstract: Much research in EU member-states, the US, and beyond, illustrates that formerly taboo subjects and expressions in mainstream discourse are being accepted more and more (‘normalization’) and have become part and parcel of mainstream politics. Such normalization goes hand in hand with a certain ‘shamelessness‘: the limits of the sayable are shifting regarding both the frequency of lies and the violating of discourse and politeness conventions – as well as regarding repeated attacks on salient democratic institutions.

Discursive strategies of provocation, blame avoidance, denial, Manichean division, victim-perpetrator reversal as well as eristic argumentation and conspiracy theories dominate official communication, accompanied by ever more nativist nationalism and the racialization of space. For example, normalizing the assessment of migrants and refugees (all labelled as “illegal migrants”) as a threat to inner security, a burden on the welfare state and education system must be perceived as an international development – generally instrumentalizing a “politics of fear” and reinforcing a “coarse civility” [rohe Bürgerlichkeit] (@Heitmeyer).

Ruth Wodak is Emerita Distinguished Professor of Discourse Studies, Lancaster Univ. and retired Professor of Applied Linguistics, Univ. Vienna. She is the recipient of many awards such as the Wittgenstein-Prize for Outstanding Research 1996. She has honorary doctorates from Univ. Örebro 2010, Warwick Univ. 2020; since 2020 honorary member of the Senate, Univ. Vienna. She is member of the British Academy of Social Sciences and the Academia Europeae.

 She is co-editor of Discourse & Society and Critical Discourse Studies.

Research interests
Discourse studies, identity politics and politics of the past, populism, media- and political communication, racism and antisemitism. 

Recent book publications

“Babyelefant und Hausverstand”. Wie Krisen produziert werden (Picus; with Markus Rheindorf)

Das kann noch immer in Wien passieren. (Czernin Verlag 2024).

Identity Politics Past and Present. Political Discourses from Post-war Austria to the Covid Crisis (Exeter Press 2022: with Markus Rheindorf). 

The Politics of Fear. The Shameless Normalisation of Far-right Discourses. (Sage 2021).

Österreichische Identitäten im Wandel (with Rudolf de Cillia, Markus Rheindorf & Sabine Lehner; Springer 2020).  

Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Migration Control (edited with Markus Rheindorf; Multilingual Matters 2020).

Julie Ingersoll: “The Theocratic Blueprint of Christian Nationalism, Reconstructionism, the New Apostolic Reformation, and Catholic Integralism Behind Trump’s Agenda”

Abstract: The groups making up the MAGA coalition in the U.S. are varied and contradictory. This talk will focus on three of those groups that solidify the support of Christian Nationalists and provide an underlying shared opposition to social equality and government by consent. Sidestepping discussions of whether or Christian Nationalists are “really Christian,” I’ll suggest rethinking how we understand religion as theology; a step that helps makes sense of why these three divergent groups have a shared ant-democratic vision.

Julie Ingersoll is Professor of Religious Studies at the University of North Florida. She teaches and writes about religion and politics, violence and the Christian right. She is an occasional contributor to Religion Dispatches, The Huff Post, and The Conversation and her work has been widely cited including in the New Yorker, the Washington Post, and the New York Times.

Her books include “Evangelical Christian Women: War Stories in the Gender Battles” (New York University Press, 2003) and “Building God’s Kingdom: Inside the World of Christian Reconstruction” (Oxford University Press, 2015).

Stephan Klingebiel: “International Organizations in Times of Populism”

Abstract: International organizations are under growing pressure from populist governments in multiple ways. The ongoing transformation of global politics has created a situation in which, particularly during the second term of Donald Trump, power and coercion are employed more explicitly and strategically.
Governments may address domestic and/or international audiences by announcing their intention to withdraw or by terminating membership, reducing or delaying financial contributions, promoting a populist agenda, or obstructing decision-making processes. One additional strategy is to exert pressure to refocus mandates on a narrowly defined “core mission.”
The first year of Trump’s second term provides several illustrations of how international organizations are treated in this context — from the United Nations to the multilateral development banks, the OECD, and others. Another approach consists of creating alternative forums in order to undermine existing global governance structures.
 
Stephan Klingebiel is a  Professor of Political Science at University of Turin and Head of the Research Department “Inter- and Transnational Cooperation” at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). His research focuses on the political economy of development cooperation, aid effectiveness, global public goods, and the nexus between security and development. Professor Klingebiel’s work also examines governance and regional cooperation in Africa, with additional regional expertise in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. He has held his current leadership position at IDOS since July 2021, following the institute’s transition from the German Development Institute (DIE).
 

Benjamin Carter Hett: “Humiliation, Elite Impunity, and the Anti-System Gamble: Weimar-Type Mechanisms in Contemporary Grievance Politics”

Abstract: The historical example of the Nazi rise to power in Germany can provide some useful insights into the question of what can fuel authoritarian politics in a liberal democracy. In the Weimar Republic the most significant element fueling the Nazi rise was the pervasive sense of humiliation which millions of Germans experiences in the aftermath of the First World War, combined with the adjacent concept of status anxiety. These feelings operated at both elite and relatively modest levels, and the Nazis were skillful at exploiting them. When this phenomenon is understood it can also provide key insights for understanding authoritarian politics in modern democracies in the 21st century, in North America, Europe, and elsewhere.

Benjamin Carter Hett earned a B.A. at the University of Alberta and a J.D. at the University of Toronto and practiced litigation in Toronto before going back to obtain an MA in history from U of T and finally a Ph.D. in history at Harvard. He has taught at Harvard College and the Harvard Law School and, since 2003, at Hunter College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York (CUNY). He is the author of 6 books, including The Death of Democracy: Hitler’s Rise to Power and the Downfall of the Weimar Republic (Henry Holt, 2018), winner of the 2019 Vine Award for History, named one of the year’s best books by The Times of London and the Daily Telegraph, and was a Jeopardy clue in 2025; and The Nazi Menace: Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, and the Road to War (Henry Holt, 2020) named an editors’ choice by the New York Times Book Review. He is presently finishing a book on criminal policing in Nazi Germany and moving on to a project on Nazi feature films.

 

Panel 2

Institutions Under Pressure: Rule of Law, Executive Power, and Democratic Defense

Moderator

Małgorzata Bonikowska has a Ph.D. in humanities and she specializes in international relations with a particular emphasis on the European Union and communication in public institutions. Dr. Bonikowska, an EU expert, government consultant, and academic fellow, has degrees from Warsaw University (Italian studies), the University of Paris-Sorbonne (history and political sciences), and the PWST (State College of Theatre) in cultural history. She is also the alumnus of two Ph.D. programs: in Poland (Polish Academy of Sciences) and abroad (SSSS, Italy). Dr. Bonikowska completed a specialized program at the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University in New York, on a Fulbright Scholarship. Dr. Bonikowska is the author of more than 150 publications and advised on more than 100 BA, MA, and post-graduate theses.

Speakers

Susan Stokes: “Democratic Resilience Under Pressure: Institutions, Accountability, and the Return to Robust Democracy”

Abstract: The world has experienced a spate of democratic erosion in the past quarter century. In two dozen democracies, presidents and prime ministers have come to power through free and fair elections, only to undermine their own democratic institutions. What have we learned about the causes of democratic backsliding. And, though we are still in the midst of this drama, what have we learned about forces and factors that put the brake on backsliding?

Susan Stokes is Blake Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Faculty Chair of the Chicago Center on Democracy. She is the author of books and articles about democracy, development, political behavior, and Latin American politics. Among her single- and co-authored books are Mandates and Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2001), Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism (CUP 2013), and Why Bother? Rethinking Participation in Elections and Protests (CUP 2019). Her most recent book, The Backsliders: Why Leaders Undermine Their Own Democracies, was published by Princeton University Press in September, 2025. Stokes is the current president of the American Political Science Association. She is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a co-founder of Bright Line Watch.

Robert Benson: “To Resist a Coordinated Attack, We Need a Coordinated Defense”

Abstract: Democratic backsliding rarely unfolds through a single institutional rupture. Instead, it advances through coordinated pressure on multiple pillars of the system—courts, bureaucracies, electoral administration, and oversight institutions. This talk examines the vulnerabilities such strategies exploit and the conditions under which bureaucratic actors, civil society, and democratic institutions can mount effective resistance. Using the upcoming U.S. midterm elections as a focal point, the presentation explores scenarios in which democratic norms come under stress, including potential electoral breaches, the use of intimidation or political violence, and attempts to undermine the legitimacy of electoral administration. It assesses the institutional safeguards designed to respond to these challenges and highlights the critical role that professional civil servants, courts, and civil society networks play in defending democratic procedures. The talk argues that authoritarian actors succeed when democratic institutions respond in isolation. If the attack on the rule of law operates as a coordinated strategy, democratic resilience must also take a coordinated form—linking bureaucratic resistance, institutional safeguards, and civic mobilization. Finally, the presentation situates these developments within a broader geopolitical context. If democratic norms are tested in the United States, the implications will extend beyond domestic politics. The talk considers how such scenarios could shape transatlantic relations, influence political strategy in Brussels and European capitals, and prompt European progressives to articulate a clearer position toward a potential Trump administration.

Robert Benson, D.Phil., is the associate director for National Security and International Policy at American Progress. Prior to joining American Progress, Benson worked as a global relations consultant at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris and as a research fellow at the Social Science Center Berlin. He holds a Master of Science in global politics from the London School of Economics and a doctorate from the Free University of Berlin. Benson is an avid traveler who enjoys a good book and even better food on the road.

Barry Sullivan: “The Law and Politics of Fear: Executive Power in the US in 2026”

Abstract: President Trump was recently interviewed by a group of journalists from the New York Times. During the interview, the President expressed the belief that he is not bound by international law, and that he is indeed limited by only “one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me.” That sentiment may well account for the President’s impulse to upend the post-War international legal order, bully friends and foes alike, both at home and abroad, and deploy American military power on a scale and for purposes that seem unprecedented in modern times. But it does not explain why the President has been so successful in seeing those impulses take root and change the world.

In his presentation, Professor Sullivan will explore some of the reasons why President Trump has been so successful (and so much more successful than in his first term) in altering political discourse and political reality both domestically and internationally in the relatively brief time since he returned to power. Professor Sullivan will explore some of the factors that may account for that success, such as: the four year period when he was out of office, which gave him ample time to plot revenge against his “enemies” and to reflect on what he considered the shortcomings of his first term, such as choosing advisors who would restrain his impulses and plotting against his enemies;  the lessons he learned in his first term about “flooding the zone,” which was a proven technique for keeping his opponents off balance by creating so many issues of major and minor importance to which they felt compelled to respond;  the work done by the Heritage Foundation to provide him with an agenda as well as recommendations as to the personnel necessary to carry it out that a majority of the Supreme Court effectively gave him a blank check by immunizing him from criminal liability for virtually anything he might do as President; congressional disfunction and the fact that the separation of powers does not function as the founders intended, at least when there is substantial political polarization, internal party cohesion, and the presidency and at least one House of Congress is in the hands of one political party.

It is also the case that the President admires and respects leaders who are strong in the sense that he understands strength. He belittles and ridicules others. And he seeks to instill fear in those he does not respect, whether they are leaders of allied governments or members of his  own party in the legislative branch.

Barry Sullivan is the Raymond and Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and the George Anastaplo Professor of Constitutional Law and History at Loyola University Chicago (USA). He previously served as an Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States, Vice President and Dean of the Law School at Washington and Lee University, and a partner in the law firm of Jenner & Block, where he was co-chair of the Supreme Court and Appellate Practice. Professor Sullivan has taught at various law schools in the United States, Canada, and Europe, including Alberta, Bayreuth, Bologna, Dublin, and Warsaw.

Stephen E. Hanson: “Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Regime Change: An Evolutionary Perspective”

Abstract: The global erosion of democracy and of the rule of law over the past two decades has been amply documented in every major database that tracks regime change over time. Yet the most common definitions of “regime” in the political science discipline themselves remain surprisingly static. “Democracy” and “authoritarianism” are implicitly understood as poles on a universal linear spectrum that can be used to determine the placement of political regimes around the world throughout human history. In this talk, I will argue that this schema is not well suited to the task of determining with precision how to differentiate distinct types of democracy and distinct types of authoritarianism, nor does it help us pinpoint just when one “regime” has changed into another. An alternative approach to regime taxonomy, one based on a return to evolutionary theorizing about social and political change, can help us better understand the origin, development, and collapse of regimes over time. I will conclude with a discussion of how an evolutionary approach to regime change can help us better understand how to resist the global wave of anti-liberalism.

Stephen E. Hanson is Lettie Pate Evans Professor in the Department of Government at William & Mary. He served as Vice Provost for International Affairs at W&M from 2011–2021, and as Vice Provost for International & Academic Affairs in 2021–2022. From 2009–2011, he served as Vice Provost for Global Affairs at the University of Washington, Seattle. Hanson received his B.A. in Social Studies from Harvard University (1985) and his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley (1991). A specialist in Russian, post-communist, and comparative politics, Hanson is the author of numerous books and scholarly articles, including Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia (Cambridge University Press, 2010) and Time and Revolution: Marxism and the Design of Soviet Institutions (University of North Carolina Press, 1997). His books include The Assault on the State: How the Attack on Modern Governance Threatens Our Futures (Polity, 2024) and The Evolution of Regimes (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). In 2014, Hanson served as President of the Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES).

Stephen E. Hanson is Lettie Pate Evans Professor in the Department of Government at William & Mary. He served as Vice Provost for International Affairs at W&M from 2011-2021, and as Vice Provost for International & Academic Affairs in 2021-2022. From 2009-2011, he served as Vice Provost for Global Affairs at the University of Washington, Seattle. Hanson received his B.A. in Social Studies from Harvard University (1985) and his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley (1991). A specialist in Russian, post-communist, and comparative politics, Hanson is the author of numerous books and scholarly articles, including Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia (Cambridge University Press, 2010) and Time and Revolution: Marxism and the Design of Soviet Institutions (University of North Carolina Press, 1997). His forthcoming books include The Assault on the State: How the Attack on Modern Governance Threatens Our Futures(Polity, 2024) and The Evolution of Regimes (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). In 2014, Hanson served as President of the Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES).

 

Panel 3

Normalizing Authoritarian Populism: Institutions, Algorithms, and Fascist Drift

Moderator

Werner Pascha is an Emeritus Professor of East Asian Economic Studies, Japan and Korea, and an Associate Member of the Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST) of the University of Duisburg-Essen. He has studied economics at Freiburg University in Germany, the London School of Economics, and Nagoya University. Over the years, he has been invited to several other institutes and universities, including Kyoto University (Japan Foundation Fellowship, 1996), Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP Scholarship, 2007), Doshisha University (JSPS Fellowship, 2011), and Busan National University in South Korea (2013). Among other functions, he is the Vice President of the Japanese-German Centre Berlin (JDZB) and an Honorary Fellow of EastAsiaNet, the European Research School Network of Contemporary East Asian Studies. His research interests include the political economy of institutional change in Japan and Korea, and international economic relations of the region.

Speakers

Larry Diamond: “The Arc of Authoritarian Populism in the US under Donald Trump, How Far It Has Progressed, and the Prospects of Reversing It”

Abstract: Donald Trump’s second term as President of the United States poses a much more serious challenge to democracy than his first term because he lacks the internal restraints on his conduct within his Administration; his authoritarian agents and acolytes had four years out of office to strategize on how to eliminate constraints and achieve authoritarian power the second time; there is significantly greater concentration of wealth and media power now compared to eight years ago; the digital technology entrepreneurs and companies are more favorable to him or at least more subservient; and the Supreme Court has significantly expanded the scope of presidential power along with legal immunity for its abuse.

Fifteen months into the second Trump presidency, there are significant manifestations of authoritarianism, including widespread fear and intimidation; brazen politicization of the Justice Department and other federal agencies; rampant corruption at high levels with impunity for those responsible; the conscious development for the first time in American history of a cult of personality around the President; the dramatic expansion of a poorly trained and rights-abusing federal force (ICE) to detain undocumented immigrants; extensive violation of court orders regarding the Administration’s treatment of immigrants; efforts to construct a vast archipelago of federal detention centers for undocumented immigrants, which could someday be deployed to detain and repress other targeted groups as well; acquiescence if not active cooperation and support from peak sectors of the business community; and abuse of federal power to obtain the compliance or restraint of important nongovernmental institutional actors like universities and law firms—to name only a few examples. 

However, the federal courts have been pushing back against many of these abuses, and recently the Supreme Court as well in its decision on tariffs; civil society has mobilized extensively, including the largest single-day turnouts for protests in American history; and the President, his party, and his policy agenda have become extremely unpopular.

I argue that the most effective way of halting the incremental slide of a democratic system toward autocracy is through the defeat of the incipient authoritarian project at the ballot box. This talk will then assess the prospects and conditions for this, noting the multitude of ways in which the authoritarian populist project in the US seems intent on trying to frustrate a free and fair election in November 2026, and more consequentially, in the presidential election two years later.

Finally, I note that even a decisive set of defeats of the authoritarian project in November 2026 and 2028 will not represent a final victory for democracy because 1) the underlying causal drivers of illiberal populism remain; and 2) as in Poland and Hungary, the democratic alternative, if it comes to power in 2029, will face significant challenges in trying to purge the system of authoritarian mentalities, personalities, precedents, and traps.

Larry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He is also professor by courtesy of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford. He co-chairs the Hoover Institution’s project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and a new Israel Studies Program at FSI. 

Diamond’s principal research focus is on democratic trends and conditions around the world and on policies and reforms to defend and advance democracy. His book, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency, analyzes the challenges confronting liberal democracy in the United States and around the world at this potential “hinge in history.”

Diamond served for 32 years as the founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy and co-chaired the International Forum for Democratic Studies of the National Endowment for Democracy.

Bruce E. Cain: “The Institutional Enablement of American Populism”

Abstract: Many US political reforms are enacted in the immediate aftermath of representative government failure. Scandals and bad policies open opportunity windows for institutional change as reformers seek to prevent the same problems from occurring in the future. One appealing solution is to open government up to more transparency, public participation and letting the people decide matters directly. The US has proliferated direct party primaries for candidates, enacted strong public participation rules for legislative and agency hearings and transformed its political parties into a loose party network of factions and interests. Populist reforms breed more populist candidates. There are of course more angles to the populist story, but the institutional pathway is one important enabler.  

Bruce E. Cain is the Charles Louis Ducommun Professor in Humanities and Sciences at Stanford University. He holds appointments in the Political Science Department, the Public Policy Program, and the Stanford Doerr School for Sustainability. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, and the Precourt Institute for Energy. Before accepting his current position at Stanford, he taught at the California Institute of Technology (1976-1988) and the University of California, Berkeley (1989-2012).  Professor Cain was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2000, and has won various awards for teaching, research, and public service over the course of his career. His book, Democracy More or Less: America’s Political Reform Quandry, examines the unintended consequences of attempts to make government more democratic, including opening the door to more populism.

Ibrahim al-Marashi: “Algorithmic Populism in the Age of the Deep-Fake” 

Abstract: Media theorist Marshall McLuhan’s oft-quoted phrase, “The Medium is the Message,” argues that, irrespective of the messages sent by various forms of media, be it newspaper, radio, or TV, the medium, in and of itself, also contains a message. The message of the AI-deepfake, on the other hand, is that generative AI produces content that enables populism, allowing populist leaders and movements to transcend national borders while bypassing legacy media that served as gatekeepers and watchdogs. Populism is enabled by algorithms and a decentralized, viral digital public diplomacy, both dependent on shares and likes. Analyzing the disruptive potential of deepfakes requires futurist speculation along the lines of dystopian science fiction novels like Orwell’s 1984. More relevant, however, is the year 1983, when science fiction author William Gibson coined the term “cyberspace” in his novel Neuromancer, and described it as a “consensual hallucination.” Deepfakes are the fodder for perpetuating political hallucinations, enabling the populist to generate viral memetic narratives.  

Ibrahim al-Marashi is an Associate Professor of History at California State University, visiting faculty at The American College of the Mediterranean, and the Department of International Relations at Central European University. His publications include Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History (2008), The Modern History of Iraq (2017), and A Concise History of the Middle East (2024).

Tariq Modood: “From Populist Capture to Democratic Belonging: Multicultural Nationalism as an Alternative to Exclusionary Nationalism”

Abstract: Populist, exclusionary nationalism charges that multiculturalism privileges minorities and neglects the normative status of majorities. It is not enough to simply analyse or even oppose these views, one needs to offer a positive, unifying alternative that values majorities and minorities. This does not involve giving up on multiculturalism but, rather, developing a multicultural national identity, to which all citizens can have a sense of belonging without giving up other identities that are important to them. The goal should be that such a multicultural sense of the national can be adapted to be part of an electoral majority on a stable, continuing basis; above all, such a sense of the national allows one to be sensitive to minority identity vulnerabilities and majority identity anxieties within an integrated theoretical and political framework.

Tariq Modood is Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy and the founding (former) Director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at the University of Bristol and the co-founder of the international journal, Ethnicities. He has held over 40 grants and consultancies, has over 35 (co-)authored and (co-)edited books and reports and over 350 articles and chapters. He was awarded an MBE by the Queen for services to social sciences and ethnic relations in 2001, was made a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences (UK) in 2004 and elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 2017. In 2022 he was ranked in the top 20 UK cited scholars in Politics, Law, Sociology and Social Policy. He served on the Commission on Religion and Belief in British Public Life and has been an advisor to the All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, the European Commission on Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and to the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). His latest books are Essays on Secularism and Multiculturalism (2019) and with T. Sealy, The New Governance of Religious Diversity (2024). He has a You Tube Channel and his website is tariqmodood.com

 

Keynote Speech

Richard Youngs: “Democratic Resilience in Europe: Can It Be Effective?”

Richard Youngs is a senior fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, based at Carnegie Europe. He is also a professor of international relations at the University of Warwick and previously held positions in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and as director of the FRIDE think-tank in Madrid. He is co-founder and director of the European Democracy Hub.

Youngs has authored seventeen books, the most recent of which are Democratic Crossroads: Transformations in Twenty First-Century Politics (Oxford University Press, 2024), Geoliberal Europe and the Test of War (Agenda Publishing, 2024), Rebuilding European Democracy: Resistance and Renewal in an Illiberal Age (Bloomsbury/Tauris, 2021) and The European Union and Global Politics (Macmillan, 2021).

Panel 4

Comparative Regional Pathways of Democratic Backsliding and Far-Right Mobilization

Moderator

Reinhard Heinisch is a Professor of Comparative Austrian Politics at the University of Salzburg and head of the Department of Political Science. He received his academic training in the US where he completed his PhD at Michigan State University and then taught at the University of Pittsburgh from 1994 to 2009. Heinisch’s research focuses on the rise of the radical right, populism, democracy, and political parties.

Dr. Heinisch is the author of over 40 research articles and more than 50 other scholarly publications including 14 books. His research appeared in journals such as Journal of European Political Research, Political Studies, Journal of Common Market Studies, Party Politics, West European Politics, Democratization, Representation, and many others.

His book publications include Understanding Populist Party Organization: The Radical Right in Western Europe (Palgrave 2016); The People and the Nation: Populism and Ethno-Territorial Politics in Europe (Routledge 2019), Political Populism. A Handbook, Nomos (2021), and Politicizing Islam in Austria (Rutgers University Press 2024).

He has funded his research with various project grants by including Marie Curie research fellowship by the European Union (2010), a European Union Horizon 2020 grant to study populism and counterstrategies, and a grant by the Austrian Research Fund (2022) on studying populism and conspiracy theories.

Dr. Heinisch is the recipient of Austrian National Science Prize by the Austrian parliament (2017), past president of the Austrian political Science association, and served as the head of Working Group on Democracy by the Austrian Research Association. He continues to be a faculty associate of the University of Pittsburgh and has been a regular visiting scholar with the Renmin University of China in Beijing.

Speakers

Henri J. Barkey: “Building an Authoritarian Edifice Step-by-Step”

Abstract: Populist authoritarianism has the great advantage of being able to construct and institutionalize a dominating structure at a pace that often escapes attention or is overlooked by the population as a whole. Focusing on the use of the judicial system, this paper will compare the recent U.S. experience with Turkey’s travails under Erdogan.

Henri J. Barkey is an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen chair in international relations at Lehigh University (Emeritus). At CFR he works on the strategic future of the Kurds in the Middle East. Previously he was the director of the Middle East Center at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars (2015-2017). Barkey served as chair of the Department of International Relations at Lehigh University for thirteen years. He served on the State Department Policy Planning Staff (1998-2000) working on the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and intelligence-related issues. He was a non-resident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2008-2011). Currently, he also serves on the board of trustees of the American University in Iraq, Sulaimani. He has written extensively on Turkey, the Kurds, and other Middle East issues.

Hannes B. Mosler: “Populism and Transnational Ties of the Far Right in East Asia: Recent Developments in South Korea”

Abstract: This presentation explores the evolving political landscape of East Asian liberal democracies by evaluating the comparative utility of “populism” and “far-right” frameworks in the contemporary South Korean context, assessing which conceptual approach better captures the current trajectory of the South Korean landscape. The analysis focuses on three core dimensions: the radicalization of political actors through anti-constitutional activities, a profound resurgence of historical revisionism regarding authoritarian legacies, and the strategic mobilization of gendered grievances —specifically the role of anti-feminism.

Hannes B. Mosler serves as Chair of East Asian Social Sciences, specializing in Korean politics and society, at the University of Duisburg–Essen (UDE), where he is affiliated with the Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST) and the Institute of Political Science (IfP). His research interests include political systems, civic education, memory politics, foreign policy, and social and political institutional change in East Asia, especially the Korean peninsula. Recent publications include “Causes and sources of South Korea’s fragile democracy” (2025), “Rewriting history, undermining democracy. The role of the New Right in South Korean memory politics” (2025), and “The Incurious Approach to East Asian Populism: Why Studies on Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are Often Overlooked in Political Science” (2025, co-author).

Pawel Zerka: “Trumpism, Culture Wars, and the Reinvention of Europe’s Far Right”

Abstract: From an electoral perspective, Trump represents both an opportunity and a risk for Europe’s far right. On the one hand, he embodies a political “wind of change” from which these parties can benefit. He also serves as a powerful ally, often willing to lend support in their domestic political battles. On the other hand, aligning too closely with Trump may alienate segments of the electorate – particularly in countries that are traditionally skeptical of the United States or especially sensitive to questions of sovereignty, a principle Trump has not always treated with consistency abroad. Yet regardless of how closely Europe’s far-right parties choose to associate themselves with Trump, his presidency has already triggered a broader ideological shift within these movements and among their voters. This shift includes growing Euroscepticism and the increasing salience of cultural issues – issues that were once seen as more distinctly American but have now become central to political conflict across Europe.

Pawel Zerka is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. As the European Council on Foreign Relations’ lead analyst on public opinion, he spearheads the organisation’s polling and data research on foreign affairs. Based in the Paris office, Zerka has been part of the ECFR team since 2017, having worked previously as a foreign policy expert in Poland. He holds a PhD in economics and an MA in international relations from the Warsaw School of Economics. His recent publications include “The European archipelago: Building bridges in a post-Western Europe” (February 2025, with Celia Belin), and “Reality show: Why Europe must not cave in Trump’s culture war” (September 2025).

María Esperanza Casullo:“Populist Narratives and Democratic Backsliding: Perspectives from Latin America”

Abstract: The entire world is undergoing a process of democratic backsliding. It is probably not a coincidence that there is an upsurge in populism happening at the same time. In this presentation, it will be shown how populist narratives are a central driver of the process of democratic backsliding, through their effect on affective polarization, distribution of eliminationist discourses, and legitimation of anti-illiberal movements.

María Esperanza Casullo is a professor at the Institute of Political Science, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile. She has published extensively on populist narratives and performances. Her most recent article is “When the strongman is a woman: female leadership in right wing populism,” in International Journal of Public Leadership. She is currently working on a project centered on the populist baroque.

 

Panel 5

Democratic Resistance in a Hardening World: Civic Capacity, Strongmen, and Economic Coercion

Moderator

Marianne Riddervold is a Research Professor at Arena, Centre for European studies at the University of Oslo and at the Norwegian Institute of international affairs (NUPI). She is also a senior fellow at the UC Berkeley Institute of European studies.

Speakers

Jack A. Goldstone: “Structural Pressures Behind Strongman Politics”

The current wave of strong-man politics is similar to other waves of revolutions and democratic reversals dating back to the crisis of the 17th century.  While individual demagogues play an important role, it is no accident that so many countries around the world are experiencing regime crises, with democratic institutions and norms being threatened or overturned even in countries thought to be long-consolidated democracies.  The structural factors behind this change are well documented by the structural demographic theory of regime crises: they include state fiscal decay, increased inequality combined with declining social mobility, sharply increased intra-elite competition resulting in polarization and government dysfunction, falling trust in government, and widely-felt declines in the affordability of expected private and public goods and services.  But while these structural factors create a crisis situation and opportunity for nationalist authoritarians, they are not determinative; as with past eras of crisis many attempts at regime change will be unsuccessful or reversed.
 
Jack A. Goldstone (PhD Harvard) is the Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr., Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, and a Senior Fellow of the Mercatus Center.  He has received the Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship award from the American Sociological Association, the Arnoldo Momigliano Prize, the Barrington Moore Jr. Award, the Myron Weiner Award, the Ibn Khaldun Award, and fellowships from the MacArthur Foundation, the JS Guggenheim Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Mellon Foundation.  He also served as the Richard C. Holbrooke Distinguished Visitor to the American Academy in Berlin.  Dr. Goldstone’s research focuses on the impact of global population changes on social and economic development.  His new book: 10 Billion: How Aging, Immigration, Women and Youth will Change the World in the 21st Century, will be published in 2026 by Oxford University Press.
 

Steven Friedman: “Changing Democracy’s Address”

Abstract: During the late Twentieth century democratic wave, democracy was implicitly associated with the West. Western Europe and North America were assumed, in the global South as well as the North, to be the epicentre of democracy and its global champions. This was inaccurate, but it enhanced support for democracy, which was associated with Western prosperity and stability. The crisis of Western democracy has made this assumption untenable. Not only are parties whose commitment to democracy is debatable gaining ground. In many Western countries, democratic freedoms are eroding and support for democracy, at least in its current guise, is declining. If formal democracy does survive in the West, it may do so only in a diluted form.  These realities make it imperative to promote an understanding of democracy which is no longer linked to Western-ness, which seeks to persuade Western decision-makers and publics that democracy is not specific to any culture or region and that there are reasons to adopt and preserve it on its own merits.
 
Steven Friedman is a Research Professor in the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Johannesburg. He has published several studies of South Africa’s transition to democracy and his current work focuses on the theory and practice of democracy. He is the author of several books, numerous book chapters, and journal articles. His study of South Africa’s democratic trajectory, Prisoners of the Past: South African Democracy and the Legacy of Minority Rule, was published in 2021. His most recent book, Good Jew, Bad Jew, Racism, Anti-Semitism, and the Assault on Meaning, discusses the use of ostensibly anti-racist language to justify racism. He is also a media commentator on the development of South African democracy and the author of a weekly column for subscribers, Against the Tide.
 

John Pratt: Return of the Strong Men: Populism, Punishment and the Threat to Democratic Order

Abstract: Western liberal democracy seems in retreat, assailed by the emergence of an autocratic ‘strong man’ politics, mistakenly thought to have been consigned to the dustbin of history after the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. This strong man politics is now seen most clearly in the second US presidency of Donald Trump where a different political order altogether is being constructed: one where cardinal principles of liberal democracy such as the rule of law and due process can be discarded as suits, scientific knowledge is discredited, any criticisms of the strong man leader will not be tolerated, and where democratic allies can be tossed aside in favour of the company of other strong men around the globe.  This paper examines the rise of this new authoritarianism and its implications for democratic order. 

John Pratt is Professor of Criminology at the Institute of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. His fields of research are comparative penology and the history and sociology of punishment. He has published in eleven languages and has been invited to lecture at universities in South America, North America, Europe, Asia and Australia. His books include Punishment and Civilization (2002), Penal Populism (2007) and Contrasts in Punishment (2013). In 2009 he was awarded the Sir Leon Radzinowicz Prize by the Editorial Board of the British Journal of Criminology. In 2012 he was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of New Zealand and was awarded the Society’s Mason Durie Medal, given ‘to the nation’s pre-emiment social scientist.’

Kent Jones: “Weaponized Trade Policy and the Future of Global Economic Governance”

Abstract:  Trade policy in the era of Donald Trump has added a new dimension to populism studies: the dismantling of global trade institutions by the populist hegemonic leader of the system.  In his second term as President, Trump has made absolute control over tariffs the centerpiece of his international economic policy, abandoning core principles of non-discrimination and tariff binding.  The challenge for the global trading system is to find a modus vivendi for trade among countries that wish to support a rules-based system in the midst of US unilateralism and intimidation.  Internal political and legal challenges to Trump’s power are growing, and the recent US Supreme Court decision has curbed his tariff power.  Yet even after his departure from the scene, geopolitical and economic faultlines in the global economy will challenge countries to establish new institutional structures to facilitate mutually beneficial trade.

Kent Jones is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Babson College, Massachusetts, USA. He completed his M.A.L.D. degree at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and his Dr. ès sci. pol. (international economics) degree at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies at the University of Geneva.  He is the author of several books on trade policy and the WTO, including Populism and Trade (2021).   Most recently, he published a chapter, “Transatlantic Trade, the Trump Disruption and the World Trade Organization,” in the recent ECPS volume, Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations.

Edward Knudsen: “The Geopolitics of Right-wing Populism in a Post-hegemonic World Order“

Abstract: What happens to global politics—and the use of “soft power” in particular—when the liberal international order loses its central architect and nationalism is rising across the globe? This talk explores the geopolitics of right-wing populism in an increasingly post-hegemonic world. Drawing on comparative analysis across major powers, it argues that both the rise of European nationalism and the retreat of US soft power has accelerated a shift toward a more fragmented, zero-sum international environment, in which cultural diplomacy and external cultural policy are repurposed for national assertion rather than mutual exchange. On one hand, this is an opportunity for Europe, as it could partially step into the vacuum left by the US. On the other, however, a foreign policy hobbled by right-wing populism poses risks for constructive engagement abroad.

Edward Knudsen is a doctoral researcher in international relations at the University of Oxford and an Affiliate Policy Fellow in European political economy at the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin. His research focuses on the political economy and economic history of the US and Europe in the 20th century, specifically how the historical memory of economic events is constructed and deployed. Previously, he worked in the US and the Americas Programme at Chatham House think tank in London on projects which explored the future of transatlantic economic and security relations. He holds a master’s in international political economy from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a Bachelor’s degree with majors in history and economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

 

Closing Remarks

İbrahim Öztürk is ECPS Senior economic researcher & associate member of the Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies(IN-EAST). He is studying developmental, institutional, and international economics. His research focuses on the Japanese, Turkish, and Chinese economies. Currently, he is working on emerging hybrid governance models and the rise of populism in the Emerging Market Economies. As a part of that interest, he studies the institutional quality of China’s Modern Silk Road Project /The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), its governance model, and implications for the global system. He also teaches courses on business and entrepreneurship in the Emerging Market Economies, such as BRICS/MINT countries. Ozturk’s Ph.D. thesis is on the rise and decline of Japan’s developmental institutions in the post-Second WWII era. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8069-4721

 

SummerSchool

ECPS Academy Summer School — Europe Between Oceans: The Future of the EU Trade Between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific (July 6-10, 2026)

by with No Comment EconomicsECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceForeign PolicyHomeUpcoming Events

Are you interested in global trade politics and the future of Europe in a shifting world order? Do you want to understand how populism, great-power rivalry, and geopolitical tensions are reshaping EU trade between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific? The ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 offers a unique five-day program where leading scholars and policymakers explore the EU’s role in an era of economic uncertainty and strategic competition. Participants will engage in interactive lectures, small-group discussions, and a dynamic simulation game on EU trade strategy, gaining hands-on experience in policy analysis and recommendation drafting. Join an international, multidisciplinary environment, exchange ideas with peers worldwide, earn ECTS credits, and become part of a global network studying populism, political economy, and international relations.

Overview

In today’s rapidly shifting global order, the European Union can no longer afford to think in one direction. For decades, the transatlantic relationship has been the backbone of global trade, built on shared institutions, economic interdependence, and liberal values. Yet this foundation is no longer stable. As highlighted in the ECPS report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, domestic political polarization and the rise of populism on both sides of the Atlantic are reshaping trade policy, weakening trust, and challenging the very principles of open markets and multilateralism. The EU now faces a critical question: how to remain a global trade power when its closest partner is becoming less predictable.

At the same time, the center of gravity of global trade is shifting toward the Indo-Pacific. This region has become the epicenter of economic dynamism and geopolitical competition, where the future of global trade rules is increasingly being contested. The growing rivalry between the United States and China is not only a security issue but also a trade and technological struggle shaping supply chains, investment flows, and regulatory standards. As the US adopts more unilateral and strategic approaches to trade, moving away from traditional multilateralism, the EU must navigate a complex environment where cooperation, competition, and coercion coexist. Ignoring the transpacific dimension would mean missing where the future of global trade is being written.

For the European Union, the challenge and opportunity lie in managing both arenas simultaneously. The transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for economic scale, regulatory cooperation, and political alignment, while the transpacific region is crucial for diversification, resilience, and strategic autonomy. As scholars increasingly argue, the EU is no longer just a “junior partner” but an actor that must define its own role within a triangular system shaped by US–China competition. To lead in international trade today means mastering this dual engagement: stabilizing relations with the United States while actively shaping the Indo-Pacific order. This requires not only policy innovation but also a new generation of thinkers who understand trade through a geopolitical lens.

Against this backdrop, ECPS Academy Summer School-2026 brings together leading scholars and policymakers to examine how populism and great-power competition are reshaping EU trade policy across both transatlantic and transpacific arenas. 

It offers a unique opportunity to explore:

  • The future of EU–US trade relations in an era of populism
  • The strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and the US–China trade rivalry for the EU
  • How global trade is being reshaped by geopolitics, security, and ideology
  • The populist discourse around trade, policy, and power, and its implications for the EU’s trade relations
  • It also allows participating in an enjoyable and dynamic simulation game on the EU’s trade relations, trying to bring policy suggestions.

You will learn and actively engage in discussions, develop your own policy ideas, take part in simulation games, have the opportunity to publish on ECPS venues, and become part of an international network working at the intersection of political economy, international relations, and populism studies.

Tentative Program

Day 1 – Monday, July 6, 2026

Theme: The EU in the Global Trade Order: From Liberalism to Geoeconomics

This opening day sets the conceptual stage. It introduces how EU trade policy evolved from embedded liberalism to strategic autonomy, and how trade is now intertwined with security and geopolitics. It also establishes the role of populism and domestic politics in reshaping trade preferences and legitimacy crises in Europe and beyond.

Lecture One: (15:00-16:30) – Evolution of EU Trade Policy and Global Trade Order

Lecturer: Arlo Poletti (Professor of International Relations at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento).

Lecture Two: (17:30-19:00) – Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade

TBC

Day 2 – Tuesday, July 7, 2026

Theme: EU–US Trade Relations under Pressure: Cooperation, Conflict, and Populism

Focuses on the transatlantic pillar, still central but increasingly unstable. It examines tariff disputes, regulatory divergence, and how populist and protectionist politics in the US and Europe challenge long-standing cooperation and WTO-based norms.

Lecture Three: (15:00-16:30) –  Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations

Lecturer: Erik Jones (Professor of European Studies and International Political Economy, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute and Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie Europe).

Lecture Four: (17:30-19:00) – Populism and the Erosion/Reconfiguration of Transatlantic Trade Cooperation

Lecturer: Alasdair Young (Professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech).

 

Day 3 – Wednesday, July 8, 2026 

Theme: The EU Between the US and China: Trade, Power, and Strategic Autonomy

This session introduces the triangular dynamic (EU–US–China) and how the EU navigates between partnership and rivalry. It highlights de-risking, economic security, supply chains, and competing models of globalization.

Lecture Five: (15:00-16:30) – EU–US–China Trade Relations and Global Power Competition

Lecturer: Ramón Pacheco Pardo (Professor of International Relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance of Vrije Universiteit Brussel).

Lecture Six: (17:30-19:00) – Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools

Lecturer: Reuben Wong (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore).

Day 4 – Thursday, July 9, 2026

Theme: The Indo-Pacific Turn: EU Trade Strategy in a Shifting Global Centre

This session shifts focus to the transpacific dimension, emphasizing that the future of trade is increasingly shaped in the Indo-Pacific. It explores how US strategies toward China and the region reshape global trade, and how the EU responds through diversification and partnerships.

Lecture Seven: (15:00-16:30) – US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Trade Implications

Lecturer: Kristi Govella (Associate Professor of Japanese Politics and International Relations in the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies and the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford). 

Lecture Eight: (17:30-19:00) – EU Engagement in the Indo-Pacific (FTAs, Partnerships, Strategic Positioning)

Lecturer: Axel Berkofsky (Associate Professor at the University of Pavia and Co-Head of the Asia Centre at ISPI).

Day 5 – Friday, July 10, 2026

Theme: The Future of EU Trade Power: Between Fragmentation and Leadership

This session will ask whether the EU can become a global trade power amid fragmentation, populism, and great-power rivalry. It also allows for normative and policy-oriented discussions.

Lecture Nine: (15:00-16:30) –  Scenarios for the Future of Global Trade Governance (Fragmentation vs Reform)

Lecturer: Manfred Elsig (Professor of International Relations and Managing Director of the World Trade Institute of the University of Bern). (TBC)

Lecture Ten: (17:30-19:00) – Can the EU lead? Policy Tools, Regulatory Power, and Global Influence

Lecturer: Markus Kotzur (Professor of European and International Law, Vice Dean for International Relations and Chair for Public Law, European and International Public Law, Hamburg University). 

Methodology

The program will take place on Zoom, consisting of two sessions each day and will last five days. The lectures are complemented by small group discussions and Q&A sessions moderated by experts in the field. Participants will have the opportunity to engage with leading scholars in the field as well as with activists and policymakers working at the forefront of these issues.

The final program with the list of speakers will be announced soon.

Furthermore, this summer school aims to equip attendees with the skills necessary to craft policy suggestions. To this end, a simulation game will be organized on a pressing theme within the broader topic to identify solutions to issues related to the future of the EU trade relations.

Who should apply?

This course is open to master’s and PhD level students and graduates, early career researchers and post-docs from any discipline. The deadline for submitting applications is June 16, 2026. As we can only accept a limited number of applicants, it is advisable to submit applications as early as possible rather than waiting for the deadline.

The applicants should send their CVs to the email address ecps@populismstudies.org with the subject line: ECPS Summer School Application.

We value the high level of diversity in our courses, welcoming applications from people of all backgrounds. 

Evaluation Criteria and Certificate of Attendance

Meeting the assessment criteria is required from all participants aiming to complete the program and receive a certificate of attendance. The evaluation criteria include full attendance and active participation in lectures.

Certificates of attendance will be awarded to participants who attend at least 80% of the sessions. Certificates are sent to students only by email.

Credit

This course is worth 5 ECTS in the European system. If you intend to transfer credit to your home institution, please check the requirements with them before you apply. We will be happy to assist you; however, please be aware that the decision to transfer credit rests with your home institution.

Illustration by Lightspring.

Virtual Workshop Series — ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches

by with No Comment Editor’s ChoiceEventsHomeUpcoming Events

 

Virtual Programme: September 4, 2025 – April 16, 2026 via Zoom 

 

Between 2012 and 2024, one-fifth of the world’s democracies disappeared. During this period, “us vs. them” rhetoric and divisive politics have significantly eroded social cohesion. Yet in some instances, democracy has shown remarkable resilience. A key factor in both the rise and decline of liberal democracies is the use—and misuse—of the concept of “the people.” This idea can either unify civil society or deepen social divisions by setting “the people” against “the others.” This dichotomy lies at the heart of populism studies. However, the conditions under which “the people” become a force for democratization or a tool for majoritarian oppression require deeper, comparative, and interdisciplinary analysis. Understanding this dynamic is crucial, as it has profound implications for the future of democracy worldwide. This programme aims to foster a broad and interdisciplinary dialogue on the challenges of democratic backsliding and the pathways to resilience, with a focus on the transatlantic space and global Europe. It aims to bring together scholars from the humanities, arts, social sciences, and policy research to explore these critical issues.

Organiser 

European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) 

Partners

The Humanities Division, Oxford University

Rothermere American Institute

Oxford Network of Peace Studies (OxPeace) 

European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford University

Oxford Democracy Network

 

Special thanks to Phil Taylor, Pádraig O’Connor, Freya Johnston, Heidi Hart, David J. Sanders, Clare Woodford, Anthony Gardner, Liz Carmichael, Harry Bregazzi, Hugo Bonin, Benjamin Gladstone, Doris Suchet, Jenny Davies, Justine Shepperson, Daniel Rowe, Katy Long, Julie Adams, Réka Koleszar, Stella Schade, Louise Lok Yi Horner, Jacinta Evans, Contestation of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS), Network for Constitutional Economics and Social Philosophy (NOUS), and Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics (CAPPE).

 

Session 1  

The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World 

Date/Time: Thursday, September 4, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Click Here to Register

Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni (Professor, Political Science, University of Lausanne; Editor-in-Chief, Populism & Politics). 

Introduction

David J. Sanders (Regius Professor of Political Science, University of Essex, Emeritus).  

Speakers 

“The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism in India and the US: Do Family Dynasties and Big Businesses Really Control Democracy?”  by Dinesh Sharma, Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich, Britt Romagna, Ms. Ayako Kiyota (Fordham University, NYC), Amartya Sharma (Student, George Washington University, D.C.)

“Out-groups and Elite Cues: How Populists shape Public Opinion,”  by Michael Makara (Associate Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations, University of Central Missouri) and Gregory W. Streich (Professor of Political Science and Chair of the School of Social Sciences and Languages, University of Central Missouri). 

“From Economic to Political Catastrophe: Four Case Studies in Populism,” by Akis Kalaitzidis, (Professor of Political Science, Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri).  

“Populism, Clientelism, and the Greek State under Papandreou,” by Elizabeth Kosmetatou (Professor of History, University of Illinois Springfield) and Akis Kalaitzidis (Professor of Political Science, Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri).  

Discussant

João Ferreira Dias (Researcher at the International Studies Centre of ISCTE, in the Research Group Institutions, Governance and International Relations).

 

Session 2

The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989-2025 Poland

Date/Time: Thursday, September 18, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Click Here to Register

Chair

Prof. Mavis Maclean, CBE (St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford).

Speakers

“Varieties of Polish Patriotism: Experience of “Solidarity” 1980-1989 in Context of History and Anthropology of Ideas,” by Joanna Kurczewska (Professor in the humanities, Head of the Sociology and Anthropology of Culture Team at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences).
 
“Single Text, Clashing Meanings: Political Polarization, Constitutional Axiology and the Polish Constitutional Quagmire,” by Kamil Jonski (Economist, PhD in law at the University of Lodz). 
 
“Protection of Human Rights and Its Implications for Women’s and Minority Rights,” by Malgorzata Fuszara (Professor of humanities in the field of sociology, Institute of Applied Social Sciences (IASS), University of Warsaw). 
 
“Who Speaks for Whom: The Issue of Representation in the Struggle for the Rule of Law,” by  Jacek Kurczewski (Professor of humanities in the field of Sociology, Lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Customs and Law at the University of Warsaw). 
 

Discussants

Magdalena Solska (Assistant Professor, Department of European Studies and Slavic Studies, University of Fribourg).

Barry Sullivan (Professor, Institute For Racial Justice, Loyola University Chicago School of Law).

Krzysztof Motyka (Professor, Institute of Sociological Sciences, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)

 

Session 3 

Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 2, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Click Here to Register

Chair

Marietta D.C. van der Tol (PhD, Landecker Lecturer, Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge; Senior Postdoctoral Researcher, Trinity College)

Speakers 

“Religious Freedom as Hungaricum Hungarian iIliberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom,” by Marc Loustau (PhD., Independent Scholar).

“Religious or Secular Freedom? On Pragmatic Politicization of Religion in Post-socialist Slovakia,” by Juraj Buzalka (Associate Professor of Social Anthropology, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at Comenius University).  

“Illiberal Theocracy in Texas? The Incorporation of Evangelical Christian Theology into State Law,” by Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen (First Unitarian Universalist of Houston and Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford).

Discussants

Simon P. Watmough (Freelance academic researcher and editor and serves as a non-resident research fellow at ECPS).

Erkan Toguslu (PhD, Researcher at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven, Belgium).

 

Session 4 

Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging

Date/Time: Thursday, October 16, 2025 – 15:00-17:15 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni (Professor, Political Science, University of Lausanne). 

Speakers 

“We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches,” by Samuel Ngozi Agu (Ph.D., Dean of the MJC Echeruo Faculty of Humanities at Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria).

“Uses and Meanings of ‘the People’ in Service of Populism in Brazil,” by Eleonora Mesquita Ceia (Professor at the National Faculty of Law of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil). 

“The Idea of ‘People’ Within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” by Shiveshwar Kundu (Jangipur College, University of Kalyani).

“We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal,” by Mouli Bentman, Mike Dahan (Sapir College, Israel). 

Discussants

Abdelaaziz Elbakkali (Associate Professor of Media and Cultural Anthropology, SMBA University, Fes; Post-Doc Fulbright visiting scholar at Arizona State University). 

Azize Sargin (Director for External Affairs, ECPS). 

 

Session 5

Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions

Date/Time: Thursday, October 30, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Chair

Heidi Hart (PhD, Arts Researcher and Practitioner based in Utah, US and Scandinavia). 

Speakers

“The Romanian and Hungarian People in Populist Leaders’ Narratives between 2010-2020,” by Gheorghe Andrei (PhD Student, University of Bucharest and Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris). 

“The Application of the Concepts of ‘People’ and ‘Nation’ in Recent Political Developments in Germany: Theoretical Sensitivities and Their Implications for Democracy,”  by Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari (Researcher at the Institute of Sociology, Technische Universität Dresden). 

“Ripping off the People: Populism of the Fiscally Tight-fist,” by Amir Ali (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi).

Discussants

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews). 

Amedeo Varriela (PhD, University of East London). 

 

Session 6

Populism and the Crisis of Representation: Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice

Date/Time: Thursday, November 13, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Chair

Ilhan Kaya (PhD, Visiting Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University in Canada; Former Professor at Yıldız Technical University in Turkey).

Speakers

“De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in an Age of Liberal Backsliding,”  by Jonathan Madison (Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute).

“Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy,” by João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho (Member of the Research Committee of Sociological Theory at the International Sociological Association (ISA) and a researcher at LabPol/Unesp and the GEP Critical Theory: Technology, Culture, and Education).

“Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-politics and Post-democracy,” by Andreea Zamfira (Associate Professor with the Department of Political Science, University of Bucharest). 

Discussants

Amedeo Varriela (PhD, University of East London).

Amir Ali (PhD, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi). 

 

Session 7

Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism

Date/Time: Thursday, November 27, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Chair

Christopher N. Magno (Associate Professor, Department of Justice Studies and Human Services, Gannon University). 

Speakers

“Beyond Fairness: Meritocracy, the Limits of Representation, and the Politics of Populism,” by Elif Başak Ürdem (PhD candidate in political science at Loughborough University).

“Memetic Communication and Populist Discourse: Decoding the Visual Language of Political Polarization,” by Gabriel Bayarri Toscano (Assistant Professor, Department of Audiovisual Communication, Rey Juan Carlos University).

“Paradigms of ‘Popular Sovereignty’: Populism as Part of the Transformative History of the Concept,” by Maria Giorgia Caraceni (PhD Candidate in the History of Political Thought, Guglielmo Marconi University of Rome; Researcher at the Institute of Political Studies San Pio V).

Discussants

Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Oxford).

Thibaut Dauphin (PhD,  Research Associate at the Montesquieu Research Institute, University of Bordeaux).

 

Session 8

Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn  

Date/Time: Thursday, December 11, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Chair

Azize Sargin (Ph.D., Director for External Affairs, ECPS). 

Speakers

Charismatic Populism, Suffering, and Saturnalia,” by Paul Joosse (Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Hong Kong).

 “The Evolution of the Rhetoric of the “Alternative for Germany”: A Comparative Analysis of the Election Campaigns for the European Parliament in 2019 and 2024,”  by Artem Turenko (PhD Candidate, Political Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow).

Discussants

Helena Rovamo (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Eastern Finland).

Jonathan Madison (Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute).

 

Session 9

Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion  

Date/Time: Thursday, January 8, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Chair

Helen L. Murphey (Post Doctoral Scholar at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at The Ohio State University).

Speakers

“From Crime Shows to Power: The Rise of Criminal Populism,” by Christopher N. Magno (Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University). 

“The Legitimization Process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s Migration Policies,” by Russell Foster (Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies). 

“Anti-Party to Mass Party? Lessons from the Radical Right’s Party Building Model,” by Saga Oskarson Kindstrand (PhD candidate, Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, Sciences Po). 

Discussants

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews).

Vlad Surdea-Hernea (Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences in Vienna).
 

Session 10

Resisting the Decline: Democratic Resilience in Authoritarian Times  

Date/Time: Thursday, January 22, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Chair

Amedeo Varriela (PhD, University of East London). 

Speakers

“Resilience in Market Democracy,”  by Peter Rogers (Senior lecturer in Sociology at Macquarie University).

“The Contradictory Challenges of Training Local Elected Officials for the Future of Democracy,” by Pierre Camus (Postdoctoral Fellow, Nantes University).

“The Rise of Women-Led Radical Democracy in Rojava: Global Democratic Decline and Civil Society Resilience Amidst Middle Eastern Authoritarianism,” by Soheila Shahriari (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, (EHESS)).

“Feminist Diaspora Activism from Poland and Turkey: Resisting Authoritarianism, Anti-Gender Politics, and Reimagining Transnational Solidarity in Exile,” by Ecem Nazlı Üçok (PhD Candidate at the Institute of Sociological Studies, Charles University).

Discussants

 Gwenaëlle Bauvois (Ph.D., a sociologist based at the University of Helsinki).

Gabriel Bayarri Toscano (Assistant Professor, Department of Audiovisual Communication, Rey Juan Carlos University).

 

Session 11

Inclusion or Illusion? Narratives of Belonging, Trust, and Democracy in a Polarized Era 

Date/Time: Thursday, February 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Chair

Andreea Zamfira (Associate Professor with the Department of Political Science, University of Bucharest). 

Speakers

“When Identity Politics and Social Justice Procedures Contribute to Populism,” by Saeid Yarmohammadi (University of Montreal).

“Why Do We Trust The DMV? Exploring the Drivers of Institutional Trust in Public-facing Government Agencies,”by Ariel Lam Chan (PhD student in the Department of Sociology at Stanford University).

“Active Citizenship, Democracy and Inclusive Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nexus, Challenges and Prospects for a Sustainable Development,”  by Dr Dieudonne Mbarga (Independent Researcher).

“Silenced Voices in a Democratic Dawn: How the Iranian Constitutional Revolutionaries (1905–1906) Weaponized “the People” Against Minorities,” by Ali Ragheb (PhD., University of Tehran).

Discussants

Jennifer Fitzgerald (Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado).

Russell Foster (Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies). 

  

Session 12 

Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South 

Date/Time: Thursday, February 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Moderator

Neo Sithole (PhD candidate at the University of Szeged in Hungary).

Speakers

 “Africa at the Test of Populism: Identity Mobilisations, Crises of Political Alternation, and the Trial of Democracy,” by Yves Valéry Obame (The University of Bertoua, Global Studies Institute & Geneva Africa Lab) and Salomon Essaga Eteme (The University of Ngaoundéré, Laboratoire camerounais d’études et de recherches sur les sociétés contemporaines (Ceresc)).   

“Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom,” by Oludele Mayowa Solaja (Faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University) and Mr. Busayo Olakitan Badmos (Postgraduate student in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University).

“Viral but Powerless? Digital Activism, Political Resistance, and the Struggle for Governance Reform in Kenya, by Dr. Asenath Mwithigah (United States International University-Africa).

Discussants

Dr. Gabriel Cyril Nguijol (Researcher at the National Institute of Cartography (NIC), and lecturer at the Cameroonian Institute of Diplomatic and Strategic Studies (ICEDIS)).
Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo (Executive Director and Principal Researcher at the Bureau of Strategic Studies — BESTRAT, Yaoundé, Cameroon).

 

Session 13

 Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis 

 Date/Time: Thursday, March 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Chair

Leila Aliyeva (Associate of REES, Oxford School for Global and Area Studies (OSGA)). 

Speakers

 “Reimagining Populism: Ethnic Dynamics and the Construction of ‘the People’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” by Jasmin Hasanović (Assistant Professor and researcher at the Department for Political Science at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Science).

 “Institutionalizing the Assembled People,” by Sixtine Van Outryve (Postdoctoral Researcher, Radboud Universiteit; UCLouvain).

“Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy,” by Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez (Global Advocacy Officer at UNPO, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization).

Discussants

Christopher N. Magno (Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University).

Amedeo Varriela (PhD, University of East London). 

 

Session 14  

From Bots to Ballots: AI, Populism, and the Future of Democratic Participation  

Date/Time: Thursday, March 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Chair

Dr. Paolo Gerbaudo
(Department of Political Science and Administration, Complutense University of Madrid).

Speakers

“Conceptions of Democracy and Artificial Intelligence in Administration and Government: Who Wants an Algorithm to Govern Us?” by Joan Font (Research Professor, Institute of Advanced Social Studies (IESA-CSIC).   

“How Does ChatGPT Shape European Cultural Heritage for the Future of Democracy?” by Alonso Escamilla (PhD Student on Cultural Heritage and Digitalisation, The Catholic University of Ávila in Spain) and Paula Gonzalo (Researcher, University of Salamanca, Spain). 

“The New Elite: How Big Tech is Reshaping White Working-Class Consciousness,” by Aly Hill, (PhD candidate, Department of Communication at The University of Utah).  

“Bubbles, Clashes and Populism: “The People” in an algorithmically mediated world,” by Amina Vatreš (Teaching Assistant, Department of Communication Studies and Journalism, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo).

Discussants

Jasmin Hasanović (Assistant Professor and researcher at the Department for Political Science at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Science).

Alparslan Akkuş (PhD, Teaching Fellow at Institute of Political Science, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen).

 

Session 15 

From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, Crisis, and Democracy   

Date/Time: Thursday, April 2, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Chair

Amir Ali (PhD, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi). 

Speakers 

“Can Democracy (or Anything Else) Rescue Civilization While the Rules Keep Changing?” by Robert R. Traill (PhD in Cybernetics/Psychology at Brunel). 

“The Politics of Manipulated Resonance: Personalised Leadership in Populism,” by Lorenzo Viviani (Professor, Political Sociology, Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy).

Discussants

Azize Sargin (Director for External Affairs, ECPS). 

Ibrahim Ozturk (ECPS, Senior Economic researcher, Professor of Economics, Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST)).

 

Session 16 

Voices of Democracy: Art, Law, and Leadership in the Era of Polarization  

Date/Time: Thursday, April 16, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Chair

Joni Doherty (PhD, Senior program officer for Democracy and the Arts at Kettering Foundation).

Speakers

“’ I Miss My Name’: Why Black American Election Workers Like Ruby Freeman Turn to Defamation Law to Defend Democracy,” by Ciara Torres-Spelliscy (Brennan Center Fellow and Professor of Law at Stetson University). 

“State Institutions in Divided Societies: Religious Policy and Societal Dissatisfaction in the Israeli Military,”  by Niva Golan-Nadir (Postdoctoral Fellow at Reichman University) and Michael Freedman (Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem).

“Pericles’ Funeral Oration: A Populist Rhetoric for War and Politics,” by Elizabeth Kosmetatou (Professor, History Faculty,University of Illinois, Springfield).

“The Exclusionary Identity of ‘The People’ in Radical Right Populism,” by Cristiano Gianolla (Researcher, Center for Social Studies, University of Coimbra; Lisete S. M. Mónico (Associate Professor, Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences, the University of Coimbra) and Manuel João Cruz (Post-doctoral researcher, Center for Social Studies, University of Coimbra).

Discussants

Justin Patch (Associate Professor and Chair of Music at Vassar College).

Amedeo Varriela
(PhD, University of East London). 

 

 

Biographies & Abstracts

Session 1 

The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World

Date/Time: Thursday, September 4, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni is a professor in political science and political sociology at the University of Lausanne where he leads the Research Observatory for regional research. He is currently the principal investigator the international project “Populism and Conspiracy” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Austrian Science Fund. He is co-director of the international research laboratory ‘Parties, political representatives, and sustainable development, at the University of Lausanne in collaboration with Laval University.

His works have been published in several peer-reviewed journals as European Politics and Society, Government and Opposition, Political Studies, Party Politics, Swiss Political Science Review, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Territory, Politics, Governance, Comparative European Politics, Contemporary Italian Politics, Socio-economic Review, Regional and Federal Studies, Journal of Borderlands studies, Revue française de Science politique, and Populism amongst others. He has published 45 books in 4 languages (English, Italian, French and German). His latest volumes include “The People and the Nation. Populism and Ethno-Territorial Politics in Europe (ed. with R. Heinisch and E. Massetti Routledge 2019), “Political Populism. Handbook of Concepts, Questions and Strategies of Research” (ed. with R. Heinisch and C.Holtz-Bacha, Nomos, 2021); “Sovereignism and Populism : Citizens, Voters and Parties in Western European Democracies” (ed. with L. Basile, Routledge 2022); “National Populism and Borders: The Politicisation of Cross-border Mobilisations in Europe” (Elgar 2023); “Populism and Key Concepts in Social and Political Theories” (ed with. C. De la Torre, Brill, 2023), and “Territory and Democratic Politics. A Critical Introduction” (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2024).

He was the principal investigator of many research projects, including four funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. He has pursued an interdisciplinary educational path, earning a degree in sociology and anthropology, as well as a PhD in contemporary history, from the universities of Lausanne and Turin. He was a visiting professor and research fellow at the Universities of Columbia, Laval, Geneva, Groningen, Torino, Sorbonne-Panthéon- Paris, Science-Po-Paris, Valencia, Salzburg, European University Institute of Florence, Cornell University, and La Tuscia. His interests are devoted on political parties, populism, nationalism, regionalism, and Swiss politics in comparative perspective.

Introduction

David J. Sanders is a professor emeritus of political science at the University of Essex. Professor Sanders is an internationally renowned expert on British politics and was appointed the UK’s first Regius Professor of Political Science. Professor Sanders has been a key figure in the achievements of Essex’s Department of Government, which has topped the UK politics rankings for the quality of its research in every national research assessment in the last 25 years.

After studying at Essex as a postgraduate student, Professor Sanders started teaching politics at the University in 1975. He is author of numerous influential books and articles on UK politics, including Lawmaking and Cooperation in International Politics, 1986 and Losing an Empire, Finding a Role, 1990. He co-authored Political Choice in Britain, 2004, Performance Politics and the British Voter, 2009, Affluence, Austerity and Electoral Change in Britain, 2013 and The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain, 2013.

He also co-edited the top UK political science journal, the British Journal of Political Science, between 1990 and 2008.

Professor Sanders is a Fellow of the British Academy and received a Special Recognition Award from the Political Studies Association in 2012 for his commitment to outstanding research, which has shaped public understanding of politics. From 2000 to 2012, he was a Principal Investigator for the British Election Study, which is conducted at every General Election to study electoral behaviour and how elections contribute to the operation of our democracy. This prestigious study was based at Essex from 1974 to 1983 and from 2000 to 2012.

Paper 1: The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism in India and the US: Do Family Dynasties and Big Businesses Really Control Democracy?

Abstract: Both India and the US seem to be in the grip of a populist movement that seems to share power with political dynasties and big business. How is this possible in a democracy? We examine this question by comparing families and dynasties in both countries — Kennedy vs Gandhi, currently out of power; Trump vs Modi, now in power. Both nations claim to be vibrant democracies, where populist nationalists have swept into power. Historically, India has been led by charismatic members of one dynastic family, namely the Gandhis; while the US definitely has political families (such as the Adams, Bushs, Rockerfellers, Clintons and now Trumps) it has not been dominated by one or two family dynasties in the way Asian democracies have been after colonialism ended.

Similarly, businesses have played a major role in politics of India and the US, but the business takeover of democratic institutions has had a bigger hand in the US politics than in India until recently; India was a quasi-socialist country till the 1990s. Both polities seem to be moving closer to big business, playing a major role in shaping policy and trade. Thus, we ask the question: are democracies at this populist moment in global politics controlled by the patricians (robber barons, big-tech, oligarchs) – big business and political dynasties? Our methodological approach is psycho-historical and biographical, while staying abreast of demographic data.

We compare the Kennedys vs. the Gandhis; and Trump vs Modi. The Gandhi family has dominated Indian politics for half of its modern history since gaining independence from British rule in 1947; while at least one member of the Kennedy family has been in power for at least the past fifty years in local or federal office, they’ve never held power in the way the Gandhi family did in India. Here we compare women leaders in both family histories, Indira Gandhi vs Kennedy female leaders. In comparing Trump vs. Modi we see a clear difference between two societies; Modi is not a billionaire, unlike Trump, rather a tea-seller from very humble origins. Yet, their populist governments have given power sharing arrangements to the big-business and big-tech oligarchs. When we compare the narrative of these two leaders we see a strong nationalistic streak that mobilizes populism in favor of nativism and an anti-globalist agenda.  The key question is are these societies converging or diverging? On the question of authoritarianism and populism they are converging, as India rises as an economic power and the US tries to remain a global democratic power, even though their local cultural politics are remarkably different.

Dinesh Sharma,Ph.D., is a social scientist with a Doctorate from Harvard University in human development and psychology. He is currently Director and Chief Research Officer at SteamWorksStudio in Central-Southern Jersey (an edu-tech venture), consultant at Fordham Institute for Research Service and Teaching (FIRST), and contributing faculty at Walden University. He was associate research professor at the Institute for Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, SUNY; a senior fellow at the Institute for International and Cross-Cultural Research in New York City; and a columnist for Asia Times Online, Al Jazeera English and the Global Intelligence among other syndicated publications. His biography, titled “Barack Obama in Hawaii and Indonesia: The Making of a Global President,” was rated a Top 10 Book of Black History for 2012 by the American Library Association. His next book, “The Global Obama” has been widely reviewed and received the Honorable Mention on the Top 10 Black History Books for 2014. His book on Hillary Clinton examined the rise of women politicians before the “Me Too” movement, “The Global Hillary: Women’s Political Leadership in Cultural Context” (Routledge, 2016) and was favorably reviewed.

Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich, is a graduate student from New York City, currently studying at Fordham’s Graduate School of Education. Her academic interests focus on the psychological impacts of early-life trauma and the integration of mindfulness techniques in clinical settings to support emotional, cognitive, and physical integration. She is also engaged in research exploring the relationship between trauma and democracy. Shoshana is passionate about bridging psychological theory with real-world practice and plans to pursue a career in clinical psychology. 

Paper 2: Out-groups and Elite Cues: How Populists Shape Public Opinion

Abstract: Populist leaders claim they are the true representative of “the people” against corrupt elites and various out-groups (very often immigrants) who are thought to threaten the well-being of the nation. If this is so, the leader is simply reflecting the will of the people as they ascend to power and carry out their agenda. From this view, the populist leader answers the call of the people and uses power to protect and restore the country by targeting the elites and out-groups that threaten it. However, populist leaders do not just reflect the will of the people, they actively cultivate public support for their political agenda. From this view, populist leaders deploy their rhetorical powers to persuade, and even manipulate, the people, by tapping into anxieties that build public support for the populist leader’s agenda. Moreover, the power of populist leaders to focus the attention of voters on the threats to their well-being enables them to tap into in-group fears of various socio-demographically different out-groups. Indeed, truly gifted populist orators can manufacture fear and anxiety by targeting specific out-groups as the “cause” of the economic, social, or political problems that, in their view, threaten the nation. 

In this paper, we examine results from a nationally representative survey conducted in the U.S. in October of 2024 to measure the ability of U.S. President Donald Trump to influence public opinion. We examine his ability to increase or decrease public support for a range of policies, specifically refugees and trade. Our survey allows us to compare how respondents view refugees depending on whether those refugees are from Ukraine or from Gaza, and how respondents view trade from Europe or from China. Moreover, our survey allows us to assess whether public opinion is more readily shaped by the cues provided by political leaders (what we call “follow-the-leader” effects) or by the social attributes of the “out-group” (what we call “social attributes” effects), both of which are important components of populist rhetorical appeals.

Michael Makara is an Associate Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations. He received his Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, and his B.A. from Virginia Tech. Professor Makara’s research focuses on politics in authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations, with a regional focus on the Middle East. His research appears in Democracy and Security, Defense and Security Analysis, and the Journal of the Middle East and Africa. At UCM he teaches a variety of courses related to comparative politics and politics of the Middle East. Every year, he leads a study abroad program to Jordan and Israel that aims to challenge students’ perceptions of the region. He recently published an article in the Journal of Political Science Education (with Kinsey Canon) that explores the impact of this program on the extent to which students adhere to common stereotypes of the Middle East. Dr. Makara also sits on the Board of Directors for the International Relations Council (IRC) of Kansas City and is the director the Mideast meets Midwest project to expand opportunities for university students to pursue Middle Eastern Studies.University of Central Missouri & Dr. Gregory W. Streich, University of Central Missouri. 

Gregory W. Streich is Professor of Political Science and Chair of the School of Social Sciences and Languages. He has published on a range of topics, including democratic theory, social capital, justice, and American Exceptionalism. Most notably, he has authored or co-edited three books: Justice Beyond “Just Us”: Dilemmas of Time, Place, and Difference in American Politics, U.S. Foreign Policy: A Documentary and Reference Guide, and Urban Social Capital: Civil Society and City Life. Additionally, he has won several awards for his teaching and research, including the Distinguished Faculty Award from the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

Paper 3: From Economic to Political Catastrophe: Four Case Studies in Populism

Abstract: This paper is meant to be a comparative study between four international crises: the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, Argentina’s 2001, the US’s Great Recession of 2008, and Greece’s Great Depression of 2010. It has been argued by economists, historians, and political scientists that economic crises produce populist movements in the countries that experience them (Kindleberger, 2005; Ferguson, 2012; Hartleb, 2012). Kindleberger argues that all economic crises are a product of a “bubble” or a “mania” and as such the corrective response is an economic crisis in the country that experiences such market inflation. As an economist, however, he says nothing of the impact of the crisis on the politics of the country or the responses to said crisis.

Generally speaking, populism has been at the forefront of countries with great inequalities in places like Latin America or India or in countries under severe socio-economic stress such as Weimar Germany. Yet the European Union may be in a recession but it could hardly be justification for the multitude of populist (anti-EU, anti-globalization, xenophobic, and racist) movements that have sprung up even in countries with solid economies such as Finland, Denmark, and UK. It is thus important to analyze the types of responses to these crises and the types of populism, if any, each country experiences as a result of a given crisis, accounting for its severity and the administrative and decision-making capacity of the state apparatus.

The association of economic crisis and populism seems to hold true in modern times in many areas of the world. In Thailand after the catastrophic collapse of the Thai Baht in 1997, in Argentina in 2001, and in the US after 2010, one can debate whether the bursting of the dot com bubble constitutes a crisis, but mostly after the collapse of the real estate market bubble of 2008 and more recently in Greece in 2010. Yet, in all those countries the experience with populism is different and the pressure created by the economic condition on the ground leads to different outcomes in the politics of those countries. In Thailand, the reaction to post-crisis populism was a coup, in Argentina was an extended period of “Kirchnerismo” , in the US the rise of what Hofstadter the “Paranoid Style in American Politics”, as well as the more traditional non-party political movements hat put enormous pressure on the traditional party structure pushing liberal democracy to the brink, while in Greece populism which is more associated with European populist tradition as experienced in most pre-and post-WWII countries created a hybrid nationalist-leftist populism more akin to early twentieth century European Corporatism. This research intends to highlight the political processes, Institutions, and leaders who have influenced the course of politics and argue that in all four cases, the best predictor for post-crisis behavior is the national political culture.

Akis Kalaitzidis is a professor of political science at the Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri. He received his B.A. from the University of Tennessee-Knoxville in Economics and Political Science, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from Temple University in Philadelphia in Political Science. He joined the UCM faculty in 2004. He teaches a variety of classes, including American Government, The European Union, World Politics, International Organizations, and American Foreign Policy. He was Rotary Peace Fellow at the Rotary Peace Center Chulalongkorn University’s Program in Conflict Resolution and has been the director of the Missouri Ghana program (2011) and Missouri Greece program (2015). He is the author of Europe‘s Greece: A Giant in the Making, published by Palgrave McMillan (2010) and co-edited with Dr. Streich US Foreign Policy: A Documentary and Reference Guide (Greenwood 2012) among others. His work appears in a variety of journals, book reviews/contributions, and conference publications.

Paper 4: Populism, Clientelism, and the Greek State under Papandreou

Abstract: This paper explores the role of populism and clientelism in shaping the Greek state under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou, one of Greece’s most influential political figures. Papandreou served as Prime Minister from 1981 to 1989 and again from 1993 to 1996. His tenure coincided with a period of profound political and economic transformation following the restoration of democracy in 1975. His governance combined populist rhetoric with clientelist practices, crafting a distinctive political strategy that left a lasting impact on Greek politics. At the core of Papandreou’s political success was his ability to mobilize popular support through populist appeals, emphasizing social justice, nationalism, anti-Americanism, and the welfare state. He positioned himself as a champion of the common people, presenting the Socialist Party as the defender of workers’ rights and national sovereignty, even as he reversed course on many of his programmatic policies.

Papandreou’s populism resonated deeply with the large segment of the Greek population that right-wing establishments had marginalized following the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) and the collapse of the military junta (1967-1974). As these disenfranchised groups leaned politically to the left, Papandreou shifted his stance from the center to the left, incorporating a more left-wing faction within his party. His message of social and economic justice empowered these communities, offering them a sense of inclusion and challenging the longstanding dominance of conservative elites. In parallel with his populist narrative, Papandreou employed clientelism as a tool for political stability. The distribution of state resources and public sector jobs—particularly after Greece acceded to the EEC and the influx of investment funds—was often based on loyalty rather than merit. This system of patronage not only secured votes but also fostered a political culture of dependence on the state for material rewards.

This study explores the interaction between populism and clientelism in shaping the Greek state. It investigates Papandreou’s policies’ influence on Greece’s political culture, governance frameworks, and public administration and their enduring effects on the nation’s journey within the European Union. The analysis ultimately provides a critical evaluation of how populist rhetoric and clientelist strategies reinforced democratic institutions in Greece and altered state-society dynamics during the late 20th century.

Elizabet Kosmetatou is a Professor of History at the University of Illinois Springfield. 

 

Session 2 

The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989-2025 Poland

Date/Time: Thursday, September 18, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Abstract: In principle, the Polish transition to democracy initiated in 1981 was understood as liberation from Soviet colonialism, Communist totalitarian state ideology at the national level and “the resurrection of rights” (Kurczewski, 1993) at the individual level.

In practice, it quickly became controversial how the “will” of the nation should be determined and whose rights should be resurrected. The problem was nicely captured by a Christian member of the Polish Parliament, voicing objection to the abortion referendum on the grounds that such fundamental and morally-loaded issues could not be decided by “the accidental society” (in other words, the voting public).

Two decades later, opening debate that will be called “the four hours of anti-philosophy of law” (Safjan, 2015) the honorary speaker of Polish Parliament proclaimed that “law shall serve us. Law that does not serve the nation is lawlessness”. “Poland’s constitutional breakdown” (Sadurski, 2019) dutifully followed, beginning with “war” with the Constitutional Tribunal and ordinary courts.

Panellists will discuss:

-the concept of nation – civil and national} underpinning “Solidarity’s” resistance to the communist rule, and its evolutions after the 1989 breakthrough (Joanna Kurczewska),

-the shifting patterns of the political polarization and its impact on key liberal-democratic institutions like Parliamentary law-making process, Presidency and the Constitutional Court (Kamil Jonski),

-the sociological dimensions of the “rule of law” including the democratic transition, post-2015 backsliding and post-2023 restoration in context of doctrine of separation of powers (Jacek Kurczewski),

-the implications for the protection of human rights, with particular emphasize on woman’s rights (including access to the abortion) and minorities rights (Malgorzata Fuszara).

Varieties of Polish Patriotism: Experience of “Solidarity” 1980-1989 in Context of History and Anthropology of Ideas

Joanna Kurczewska is a full professor in the humanities and head of the Sociology and Anthropology of Culture Team at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Graduated University of Warsaw, Ph.D. at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences (The Problem of the Nation in Polish Sociology at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Centuries. A Comparative Analysis of Selected Concepts), habilitated doctor (Technocrats and the Social World – Analysis of Technocratic Ideas).

In 1981, co-operated with the Centre for Social and Professional Work at the National Commission of NSZZ “Solidarity” Trade Union as co-chair of the Union History Group.

A corresponding member of the Second Faculty of History and Philosophy of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences (since 2011) and vice-president, formerly president of the Commission on Civilization Threats of the above Academy, a member of the Warsaw Scientific Society (since 2009), In 2007, she was awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta. Selected publications: National Identities vis-a-vis Democracy and Catholicism – The Polish Case after 1989 (2005), Researcher vis-a-vis the Local Community (2008), Squeezing Brussels Sprouts? On the Europeanization of Local Communities in the Borderlands (2009).

Single Text, Clashing Meanings: Political Polarization, Constitutional Axiology and the Polish Constitutional Quagmire

Kamil Joński is an economist who graduated from SGH Warsaw School of Economics with a Ph.D. in law at the University of Lodz (Constitutional Tribunal and the Political Conflict – Law & Economics Perspective). He is an assistant at the Collegium of Socio-Economics, SGH Warsaw School of Economics. He works at several research projects financed by Polish National Science Centre, at Cracow University of Economics, SGH Warsaw School of Economics and Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. Jónski worked on Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIA) in Polish Ministry of Justice (2012-2016) and on economic analysis of judicial system in MoJ’s supervised Institute of Justice (2016-2017). Since 2017, he is employed at Polish Supreme Administrative Court. 

Selected papers: Return to Power: The Illiberal Playbook from Hungary, Poland and the United States (2024), Legislative inflation in Poland: bird’s eye view on three decades after the the1989 breakthrough (2024), Evidence-Based policymaking during the COVID-19 Crisis: Regulatory Impact Assessments and the Polish COVID-19 Restrictions (2023), Assessments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal performance: effects of the survey administration method (2023). Co-author of the 2022 report summarizing European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) survey of European judges about their independence.

Protection of Human Rights and Its Implications for Women’s and Minority Rights

Małgorzata Fuszara is full professor of humanities in the field of sociology, Institute of Applied Social Sciences (IASS) University of Warsaw, habilitated doctor in the Sociology of Law, Ph.D. in law. Served two terms as Director of the IASS, joint founder of Poland’s first Gender Studies Program at IASS, head of its Sociology and Anthropology of Custom and Law Chair. In 2014-2015 Plenipotentiary of Polish Government for Equal Treatment. President of Council of Women’s Congress Association, Chairwoman of the Women’s Council under the Mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski, awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta. Authored, co-authored and edited numerous publications in Polish, English, French and German, among others: Polish Disputes and Courts (2004), Women in politics (2007), New men? Changing models of masculinity in contemporary Poland (2008), Cooperation or conflict? The State, the Union and Women (2008), Women, elections, politics (2013), Disputes and their resolution (2017), Mass Aid in Mass Escape. Polish Society and War Migration from Ukraine (2022).

Who Speaks for Whom: The Issue of Representation in the Struggle for the Rule of Law

Jacek Kurczewski is full professor of humanities in the field of sociology, Lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Customs and Law at the University of Warsaw. Editor-in-chief of Societas/Communitas. Specializing in the sociology and anthropology of law and customs, continuator of the Leon Petrażycki’s Polish school of sociology, a student of Adam Podgórecki. Former Academic Director of the Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law. Member of Warsaw Academic Society.

In 1980–1992 an advisor on Rule of Law to the “Solidarity” Trade Union, member of Lech Wałęsa’s Citizens Committee, participant of the Round Table negotiations of 1989 (sub-table for freedom of association). Judge of the Tribunal of the State (1989-1991). Member of Parliament and Deputy Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of the first term (1991–1993). Coauthor of the draft laws: limiting censorship (1981), the law on counteracting drug addiction (1987), the law on assemblies (1990) and the Civil Service Code (2003). In 2007 awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta. Member of the Program Councils of the Polish public TV broadcaster and pollster CBOS Foundation. Author of The Resurrection of Rights in Poland (1993) and numerous research papers.

Chair

Mavis Maclean is a Senior Research Fellow of St Hilda’s College and a Research Associate at Department of Social Policy and Intervention. She has carried out Socio Legal research in Oxford since 1974, and was a founding director of OXFLAP in 2001. She has acted as the Academic Adviser to the Lord Chancellor’s Department, and served as a panel member on the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry between 1998 and 2001, a major public inquiry into the National Health Service. Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire

Discussants

Dr. Magdalena Solska is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Fribourg. She currently directs the research project “Political opposition in post-communist democracies and authoritarianisms,” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (PRIMA Grant) in the period of 2023-2027. Her research focuses on political systems after communism and specifically on forms, strategies and institutionalization of opposition in selected countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Professor Barry Sullivan is the Raymond and Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and the George Anastaplo Professor of Constitutional Law and History. Before joining the Loyola faculty, Professor Sullivan had a varied career in the private practice of law, government legal practice, the teaching of law and public policy, and university administration. Professor Sullivan was Dean of the School of Law at Washington and Lee University from 1994 to 1999 and Vice-President of the University in 1998-99. He was also a long-time litigation partner at Jenner & Block (1981-94, 2001-09), where he focused on appellate practice.

Professor Krzysztof Motyka is a legal philosopher and sociologist of law, Chair of Human Rights and Social Work (earlier: Sociology of Law and Morality) at John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. Fulbright senior scholar in the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California, Berkeley (1994/1995), visiting researcher at the George Washington University, Washington, D.C. (July-October 2015). Member of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ Advisory Board on Human Rights (2001 -2002) and of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2007-2012). Editor of “KUL Research Bulletin,” organizer of annual “Human Rights Days Conference.”

 

Session 3

Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 2, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Marietta D.C. van der Tol is Landecker Lecturer at the Faculty of Divinity, Affiliated Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, and Senior Postdoctoral Researcher at Trinity College, Cambridge.

She studied law and history at Utrecht University (LLM, MA) and the history of Christianity at Yale (MAR) before completing her PhD at Cambridge (2020) on Politics of Religious Diversity, examining tolerance and visibility of religion in constitutional law and politics in France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

She has held research and teaching positions at Oxford (Blavatnik School of Government, St Peter’s, Lincoln College) and Cambridge (Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, 2024–25).

Her current projects include leading interdisciplinary networks on religion, nationalism, and democracy, and co-directing research on Protestant political thought. She has co-edited special issues in Religion, State & Society and The Journal of the Bible and its Reception and convenes the annual Political Theologies conference series.

Discussants

Simon P. Watmough (PhD) is a freelance academic researcher and editor and serves as a non-resident research fellow in the research program on authoritarianism at ECPS. He was awarded his Ph.D. from the European University Institute in April 2017 with a dissertation titled “Democracy in the Shadow of the Deep State: Guardian Hybrid Regimes in Turkey and Thailand.” Dr. Watmough’s research interests sit at the intersection of global and comparative politics and include varieties of post-authoritarian states, the political sociology of the state, the role of the military in regime change, and the foreign policy of post-authoritarian states in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Erkan Toguslu (PhD) is a researcher at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven, Belgium. He received his M.A. and Ph.D. in sociology from Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris. His research focuses on transnational Muslim networks in Europe, the emergence of Islamic intellectuals, interfaith dialogue, the debate on public-private Islam, and the nexus of religion and radicalization.

ErkanToguslu is co-editor of Journal of Populism Studies (JPS) and the editor of Everyday Life Practices of Muslims in Europe (Leuven University Press); Europe’s New Multicultural Identities (Leuven University Press and co-edited with J. Leman and I. M. Sezgin); and Modern Islamic Thinking and Islamic Activism (Leuven University Press and co-edited with J. Leman). His recent publications on violent extremism and Muslim extremism include: “Caliphate, hijrah, and martyrdom as a performative narrative in ISIS’ Dabiq magazine,” Politics, Religion and Ideology, 20 (1), 94-120; and “Capitalizing on the Koran to fuel online violent radicalization: A taxonomy of Koranic references in ISIS’s Dabiq,” Telematics and Informatics, 35 (2), 491-503 (co-authored).

Paper 1: Religious Freedom as Hungaricum Hungarian Illiberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom

Abstract: In 2025, the Hungarian government announced it was creating a “Religious Freedom” caucus in the European Parliament. Domestically, Hungary has claimed a special relationship to the value of religious freedom since at least 2020, when the Hungarian parliament voted to enshrine religious freedom as an intangible value of Hungarian heritage (Hungarikum). On the one hand, the rising prominence of this discourse of religious freedom was precipitated by immediate political concerns as the Hungarian government has tried to distract attention from negative judgements at the European Court of Human Rights. On the other, this paper will go beyond journalistic accounts of political strategizing in order to sketch an outline of the emerging illberal political institutionalization of religious freedom. I will focus on the network of Hungarian institutional political actors that enact this discourse at the European and domestic levels, and detail the forms of publicly acceptable religious practice enabled by these institutions.

Marc Loustau is a cultural anthropologist and journalist reporting on religion and nationalism in Eastern Europe. Based in Budapest, Hungary, he is fluent in English and Hungarian and proficient in Romanian. His reported features and commentary have appeared in major U.S. and European newspapers and magazines. Drawing on his academic research, he provides smart and surprising fact-based commentary on contemporary events. He has delivered invited lectures at universities across Europe and North America and has presented at numerous international conferences. His book Hungarian Catholic Intellectuals in Romania: Reforming Apostles examines how contemporary Hungarian Catholic intellectuals are forging an ethical concept of nationhood.

Paper 2: Religious or Secular Freedom? On Pragmatic Politicization of Religion in Post-socialist Slovakia

Abstract: Since 1989, elements of radical Christian activism in Slovakia that have been frequently characterized as representing the ‘culture of life’ have been challenging the regime of post-socialist liberal constitutionalism represented by the European status quo. This challenge has primarily consisted of accusations that the latter suppresses newly acquired religious freedoms. The most significant counterpart of this radicalism – secular progressivism – has been arguing against expanding ecclesiastical privileges in the sphere of financing, education, and culture. Traditional social-confessional divisions in Slovak society have weakened, reshaping the discussion away from political freedom for all and toward a debate about who is suffering more oppression. In this conflict, the most profitable have been political entrepreneurs, especially current Prime Minister Robert Fico, who utilizes “culture war” discourse in his populist mobilizations.

Juraj Buzalka is Associate Professor of Social Anthropology at Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia, where he has taught since 2006. His research focuses on the anthropology of political movements, exploring intersections of nationalism, populism, religion, and politics, particularly in Eastern and Central Europe. He is also interested in the politics of memory and the cultural dimensions of wine and food movements. Since 2013, he has been based at the Institute of Social Anthropology within the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences. 

Paper 3: Illiberal Theocracy in Texas? The Incorporation of Evangelical Christian Theology into State Law

Abstract: This year, Texas marks three consecutive decades of governance by the Republican Party. In that time, the party has built up what can be described as a theocratic illiberal regime. The theological positions of many of the state’s evangelical Christians have been incorporated into state law, often under the guise of religious freedom. In his paper, our third panelist, the Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, himself a Texas-based clergyman, will reflect how the rhetoric of religious freedom has been used to further the construction of an illiberal state within the United States federal system, eroded supposed the separation of church and state, and undermined freedom of religion itself.

Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, First Unitarian Universalist of Houston and Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford. He earned a Ph.D. in American Studies and an A.M. in History from Harvard University. A graduate of Meadville-Lombard Theological School, he was ordained by the Unitarian Universalist Church of Long Beach in 2007. Since 2018, he has served the First Unitarian Universalist Church of Houston. Before moving to Texas, he served congregations in California, Massachusetts, and Ohio. He has held non-residential fellowships at Rice University and Princeton University. A scholar and social justice activist he has helped organize multiple labor unions—including acting as one of the founders of the Harvard Graduate Student Union. He currently has three books under contract. The first is on contemporary Unitarian Universalist theology (Brill). The second collects his 2019 Minns lectures on American Populism and Unitarian Universalism (Palgrave Macmillan). And the third is focused on the political theologies of populism (Wayne State University Press).

 

Session 4

Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 16, 2025 – 15:00-17:30 (CET)

Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni is a professor of political science and political sociology at the University of Lausanne, where he leads the Research Observatory for Regional Research. He is currently the principal investigator of the international project “Populism and Conspiracy” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Austrian Science Fund. He is co-director of the international research laboratory ‘Parties, political representatives, and sustainable development, at the University of Lausanne in collaboration with Laval University. 

Discussants

Abdelaaziz El Bakkali is an associate professor of Media and Cultural Anthropology at SMBA University in Fes, Morocco, and a Post-Doc Fulbright visiting scholar at Arizona State University in the US (2024/25), a PhD Joint-Sup at SIU, Illinois (2009/10), and a US Dept of State Fulbright Visiting P4T at UD Delaware (2007/2008). He obtained his PhD (2014) in media and communication from MVU, Rabat. His works focus on cultural studies and anthropology, primarily in the areas of media, gender, and religious studies. He has edited some books in these related research areas. Aziz has also written many articles in these related fields. El Bakkali has conducted other educational research, having taught English for over 24 years. He has published numerous articles in this field, which are featured on Publons, Google Scholar, SSRN, and other highly indexed works. 

Azize Sargin is an independent researcher and consultant on external relations for non-governmental organisations. She holds a doctorate in International Relations, with a focus on Migration Studies, from the Brussels School of International Studies at the University of Kent. Her research interest covers migrant belonging and integration, diversity and cities, and transnationalism. Azize had a 15-year professional career as a diplomat in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she held various positions and was posted to different countries, including Romania, the United States, and Belgium. During her last posting, she served as the political counsellor at the Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the EU.

Paper 1: We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches 

Abstract: Democracy is often celebrated as a governance system that ensures citizen participation and accountability. However, in practice, centralized power structures often alienate the people and limit genuine participation, leading to political exclusion, inefficiency, and social unrest. This paper advocates for bottom-up approaches to governance as essential for realizing inclusive democracy and sustainable development. Using Nigeria as a case study, it highlights the limitations of top-down governance, as seen in widespread corruption, economic disparities, and rising public discontent. The study explores key strategies for enhancing participatory governance, including decentralization, civic education, community-based development, digital democracy, and legislative reforms. By shifting decision-making closer to the grassroots, these approaches empower citizens, enhance transparency, and promote equitable resource distribution. Empirical evidence from global case studies, such as participatory budgeting in Brazil and decentralized governance in Uganda, supports the argument that bottom-up models lead to improved governance outcomes. It further demonstrates the interdependence of participatory governance and sustainable development, as nations that prioritize inclusivity experience greater political stability, economic growth, and social cohesion. The persistent challenges in Nigeria – ranging from separatist movements to youth-led protests like #EndSARS – underscore the urgent need for governance reforms that integrate local voices into policymaking. Ultimately, this paper advocates for a fundamental shift in governance – one that places the power of decision-making in the hands of the people. By adopting citizen-driven governance, nations can close the gap between leaders and the governed, ensuring greater accountability, inclusivity, and democratic integrity.

Samuel Ngozi Agu is a distinguished academic and the Dean of the MJC Echeruo Faculty of Humanities at Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria. With a Doctor of Philosophy in Social and Political Philosophy from the University of Port Harcourt, he is also an Inaugural Lecture Laureate, recognized for his impactful scholarship. He holds a postgraduate certificate in Mediation and Democratic Dialogue from the Central European University, Budapest, and a Professional Certificate in Mediation and Democratic Dialogue from the Benjamin Cardozo and Hamline Universities’ Schools of Law, in collaboration with the American Bar Association. With over 16 peer-reviewed journal articles, 15 contributions to university research books, seven authored books, and two co-authored books, Professor Agu’s work spans critical areas in social and political philosophy, with a focus on democracy, good governance, logic, critical thinking and youth entrepreneurship. He has presented his research at numerous national and international conferences, reflecting his commitment to advancing thought leadership in his fields. Professor Agu had served as Director of the Business Resource Centre (Entrepreneurship) and Director of the University Examination Centre at Abia State University. His leadership and academic endeavors continue to shape both the intellectual and administrative landscape of the institution.

Paper 2: Uses and Meanings of ‘The People’ in Service of Populism in Brazil 

Abstract: The implementation of populism is not homogenous among South American countries so populism in this particular region has many variations. Yet, they are similarly determined by episodes of political and social transition – for instance, the crisis of traditional political elites and the appearance of new political actors – along with variables of economic force or instability. Brazil serves as a good example. From the classical populism of Getúlio Vargas in the decade of 1930s until the far-right authoritarian populism of Jair Bolsonaro, all populist experiences in Brazil are linked to important changes in society. 

Brazil has experienced several particular populist leaders: some with marked populist features than others; some exposing a reactionary antagonism while others a mitigated one. This empirical variation produced different uses and meanings of “the people” in service of populism in order to try to secure political support and gain elections. But is this variation observed in the rhetoric of the same populist leader over time? Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a democratic and liberal populist leader, is in his third presidential term (2003-2006; 2007-2010; 2023-). He faced three presidential campaigns forged by the particular contexts and crises of each period. The goal of the paper is to identify and explain the uses and meanings of “the people” by Lula in his three political moments. Do they vary according to social demands and the political context of each period, or does the content of the idea of “the people” remain unchanged because it is used by the same populist leader? 

As to the methods, the qualitative approach is adopted based on bibliographic and documentary research, including online news materials, official campaign speeches and political programmes. This empirical research aims to contribute to the debate on the concept of ‘people’ as a discursive construction, drawing on the work of Ernesto Laclau. Moreover, the paper argues that the Lula case offers complexity that challenges the view within populism studies that populism is committed to opposing liberal democracies.

Eleonora Mesquita Ceia is a Doctor of Law at the Faculty of Law and Economics, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany. Professor of State Theory at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil. Professor in the Postgraduate Program in Contemporary Legal Theories at UFRJ. Currently her research focuses on transitional justice, constitutionalism, democracy, and populism. Her most recently published article was ‘Populism and Constitutionalism in Brazil: An Enduring or Transitional Relationship in Time?’ in Populism and Time: temporalities of a Disruptive Politics edited by Andy Knott.

Paper 3: The idea of ‘People’ within the domain of Authoritarian Populism in India

Abstract: Democracy is considered to be as motherhood and apple pie of any political system (Adam Swift,2014). Till a few years ago, this assumption was challenged mainly by Islamic countries, who were predominantly of the opinion that the West was imposing a liberal democratic set-up on their countries through coercion. Interestingly, during the second decade of the 21st century, the critique of democracy emerged not externally but from the internal system of the democratic political framework. 

The socio-political context of this internal critique is Populism of specific variety. It was the origin of a process of disaffection and disgust with liberal institutions, manifested in the increasing level of abstention and apathy (Chantal Mouffe, 2018). From the triumph of liberal democracy to its failure and its insufficient response toward the aspirations of the public, it created an apolitical social sphere. This vacuum was filled up by populist forces in India in 2014.

This upsurge of Hindu Nationalism is a variant of populism based on the emotional appeal to the psychological dimension of Indian society. Along with the failure of the liberal elites, the subalternisation of the political culture has created fertile ground for this variant of populism to develop (Ashutosh Varshney, 2022). Just like all other variants, Hindu Nationalism is essentially anti-institutionalist and restructuring the logic of liberal institutions is one of its objectives (Ajay Gudavarthy,2019). One of the specificities of this populism in India is its organic emergence from the Unconscious domain of Indian society (Ashis Nandy, 2020). Gradually, it acquires authoritarian tendencies of unique character, which we haven’t witnessed till now.

It is in this context this paper will try to delve on the four sets of questions. Firstly, How the political mobilisation of Hindutva is based on politics of emotion? Secondly, in what ways Populist politics within the framework of Hindu Nationalism is unique (authoritarian) in its form and content? Thirdly, can we think of any ‘alternative’ of Populism within the context of India in particular and the world in general? Lastly, theoretically, what would be the sphere of the revolutionary subject (the idea of people) within the space of re-imagined progressive politics (alternative) that this paper intends to think through?

Shiveshwar Kundu is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Kalyani, West Bengal. His academic interests encompass political philosophy, Indian politics, and psychoanalysis. Kundu has contributed opinion pieces and scholarly articles to publications such as Forward Press, Newslaundry, and The Telegraph India, where he addresses issues related to democracy, caste, and ideological movements in India.

Paper 4: We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal

Abstract: This paper examines the populist redefinition of We, the People and its implications for liberal democracy. Historically an inclusive foundation for democratic citizenship, the phrase has been appropriated by populist movements to delineate a “true people” in opposition to perceived outsiders. Rather than viewing this shift as mere rhetorical manipulation, the paper argues that it reflects a deeper crisis within the liberal-democratic tradition itself. The erosion of a shared conception of citizenship and the common good—exacerbated by identity-driven politics and post-liberal critiques—has facilitated this populist reinterpretation. While populist leaders exploit these fractures, their rise is symptomatic of broader ideological shifts in liberalism, which increasingly prioritizes particular identities over universal democratic ideals. Engaging with contemporary political theory and populism studies, this paper advocates for reclaiming We, the People as a genuinely inclusive democratic principle, emphasizing equality, pluralism, and civic participation as essential to the resilience of liberal democracy.

Mouli Bentman is a researcher and lecturer at Sapir Academic College, specializing in political philosophy and democracy studies. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a DEA from the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) in Paris. His research explores the philosophical foundations of democracy, the relationship between political authority and legitimacy, and the intersection of classical and contemporary political thought. Dr. Bentman’s academic work engages with fundamental questions in political philosophy, including the nature of sovereignty, the evolution of democratic governance, and the role of political myths in shaping collective identities. His scholarship examines both historical and contemporary theories of democracy, with a particular focus on Political Imagination. At Sapir Academic College, he teaches courses on political theory, democratic institutions, and the philosophical underpinnings of modern politics, emphasizing critical engagement with canonical and contemporary texts.

Michael Dahan received his PhD in political science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 2001. Currently his research focuses on two primary areas – the impact of technology on democracy as well as big data, algorithmic regimes and political participation. He provides grounded analysis on a regular basis in both areas and advises on policy issues in his areas of expertise. He is a regular contributor to the media on issues related to technology and politics. Dr. Dahan has extensive first-hand experience in the security and development fields in both policy and practice. At present he lectures on the political and social aspects of hacking and cyber warfare, politics and technology and political populism. He is a senior lecturer in the departments of Public Policy and Public Administration, and Communication Studies, Sapir College, Israel. He has also taught at the Hebrew University, Ben Gurion University, Bar Ilan University, and the University of Cincinnati. 

 

Session 5

Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 30, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Dr. Heidi Hart is an arts researcher and practitioner based in Utah, US and Scandinavia. She holds an M.F.A. from Sarah Lawrence College and a Ph.D. in German Studies from Duke University. She is a Pushcart Prize-winning poet who has also received an ACLS-Mellon Fellowship and local funding for a 2019 conference on the Anthropocene. She completed a postdoc at Utah State University and is a regular guest instructor at Linnaeus University in Sweden.   

Dr. Hart has a dual research focus, on political music during and after the Nazi period, and on sound in environmental media today. Her publications include two recent monographs, Hanns Eisler’s Art Songs and Music and the Environment in Dystopian Narrative. She also does curatorial work and coordinates the Ecopoetic Salon, an international platform for artists and researchers in the environmental humanities. She is currently working with the 68 Art Institute in Copenhagen to develop a project on climate grief and new imaginaries for the future.

Discussants

Hannah Geddes is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews; her research explores how UK policies surrounding support for asylum seekers are understood, reshaped, and delivered at the local level, against the background of outsourcing and high levels of politicisation. She previously completed an MSc in Refugee and Forced Migration Studies at the University of Oxford and a BSc in Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. Hannah has experience working in public sector auditing, and in NGO community organisations which support displaced people in Greece and the UK.

Dr. Amedeo Varriale  earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism. During his academic career, Dr. Varriale contributed as a research assistant to the development of a significant textbook project on the global resurgence of nationalism, titled“The New Nationalism in America and Beyond,” co-authored by Robert Schertzer and Eric Taylor Woods. He has written for ECPS before but has also been published by other academic outlets ranging from the Journal of Dialogue Studies to UEL’s Crossing Conceptual Boundaries. Currently, he is also an “affiliated researcher” for the Centre for the Study of Global Nationalisms (CSGN).

Paper 1: The Romanian and Hungarian People in Populist Leaders Narratives between 2010-2020

Abstract: The paper will analyze the construction of the Romanian and Hungarian people in the speeches of the political leaders of the ruling parties in the two countries between 2010-2020. Considering the centrality of the concept of the people for populist theory, the main question of the paper is how it was constructed and what resources were used in this construction. The hypothesis suggested is that the political leaders used narratives about the past which reflect a historical clash between two visions about how the Romanian and Hungarian people to be built. In order to test the hypothesis will be used the qualitative analysis in a deductive approach. The analysis will try to unravel the narratives and expose the characteristics attributed to the Romanian and Hungarian people. The speeches will be selected considering the significance of the moment when were delivered, like national commemorative or celebration days as well as during electoral campaigns or related to important events.

Gheorghe Andrei is a PhD Student at University of Bucharest and Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales Paris. His research interests include comparative analysis, social studies, local development, and case studies. He has authored a publication titled Discursive Strategies of a Populist Leader in 2020 Romanian Legislative Elections: The Rhetoric and Political Style of George Simion, which examines the rhetorical approaches of populist leaders in Romania.

Paper 2: The Application of the Concepts of ‘People’ and ‘Nation’ in Recent Political Developments in Germany: Theoretical Sensitivities and Their Implications for Democracy

Abstract: This study analyzes the concept of “people” and “nation” within the social and political context of recent years in Germany, focusing on how these concepts have been employed by right-wing groups to create social divisions, particularly in East Germany. The use of these concepts as tools for reinforcing identity distinctions has led to the emergence of “us vs. them” social dichotomies, presenting threats to social cohesion and democracy. This process, particularly in the context of social crises such as the migration crisis, has contributed to the erosion of democratic structures.

Drawing on the philosophical anthropology of Arnold Karl Franz Gehlen, this research emphasizes the human condition of vulnerability and the necessity for social and cultural institutions. This need for belonging, in specific contexts, can transform into a tool for establishing authoritarian orders, while simultaneously holding the potential to significantly strengthen democratic capacities. The study highlights this duality and examines how groups, without fully considering this theoretical sensitivity, have employed the concepts of “people” and “nation,” often inadvertently weakening democratic frameworks.

A deeper understanding of the theoretical foundations of Gehlen’s work has been significantly advanced through the opportunity to engage in scholarly dialogues and academic collaborations with Professor Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, the final assistant of Arnold Gehlen and editor of his collected works, in the Chair of Theoretical Sociology at the University of Dresden. This intellectual engagement facilitated a more profound exploration and development of Gehlen’s concepts in philosophical anthropology, while also linking them to their broader political and social implications for democracy.

Yazddan Keikhosrou Doulatyari is a researcher at the Institute of Sociology, Technische Universität Dresden. As the first place in the Tehran University Entrance Written Exam for the PhD Program in “Iranian Studies” (2010), and studied in the field of “International Relations” at Allameh Tabataba’i University (2017)’; Keikhosrou Doulatyari mainly dealt with the topic of “Emancipation of Human Subjects” during his PhD period. These engagements led him to the completion of a book in 4 volumes “Avay-e-lasst Dar Gûlistan-e-allast”; The essence of his experience in the decade 2010-2020 also included correspondence and active collaboration with Some prominent university professors. His project at the Technical University of Dresden focuses on indicators of social integration. Finding integration indicators and testing the criteria with the principles of MIPEX (The Migrant Integration Policy Index): Basic rights, Equal opportunities, and a Secure Future. Parallel to these criteria, the features of host countries are also crucial, which is why the project also offers preliminary insights into similarities with regard to a historical perspective.

Paper 3: Ripping off the People: Populism of the Fiscally Tight-fist

Abstract: This paper argues that contemporary populism is characterised by three oppositional stances: its being anti-elite, anti-establishment and anti-intellectual. This is then offset by an exaggeratedly pro-people stance that contemporary populism assumes. This is far from being a faithful representation of the people and is more of a deceitful caricaturing. This caricaturing of the people is actually a point borrowed from Hannah Arendt’s 1951 book The Origins of Totalitarianism. The people caricatured, quickly assume the form of an ochlocracy that again, to borrow from Arendt’s argument, form a temporary alliance with the elite. The paper further argues that the anti-elitism of contemporary populism tends to displace an earlier established elite with a new, often worse one, this becoming the proverbial case of the people falling out of the frying pan and into the fire. 

For purposes of historical analysis, the paper will divide populism into two phases. The first was an early to mid-twentieth century phase of predominantly Latin American and more specifically Argentinian populism (Laclau 2005); and the second, a contemporary, 21st century phase of populism. The conceptual distinction between these phases is in terms of a lose fiscally profligate earlier 20th century Latin American form and a tight fiscally prudent 21st century populism. An instance of a more recent fiscally profligate Latin American populism in the first decade of the 21st century would be the significant redistributive element in Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.

Recent examples of populism induced by fiscal prudence that will particularly form the focus of the paper are the Brexit referendum that according to Thimo Fetzer (2019) was created by the austerity cuts of the David Cameron led Conservative government; and the brutal ‘chainsaw’ austerity cuts of Xavier Milei in Argentina (Ovyat, Oncu & Rabinovich, 2025), the transference of which we are witnessing to the US in the Elon Musk led Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). The paper will also bring into consideration the populism of Narendra Modi’s India, where the government’s stance is typically pro-populist in terms of targeting elites and intellectuals, and at the same time partakes of the fiscal prudence that it is argued is a hallmark of contemporary 21st century populism. The Modi government has created a class of beholden beneficiaries of its welfarist largesse that in Hindi are called labharthis who are likely to continue voting for the government. What the Modi government’s populism has done is to transform welfarism from redistributive egalitarian to minimal subsistence.

Amir Ali has been a faculty member at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi since 2007. Prior to this he taught at the Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi for three years. He was Agatha Harrison Memorial Visiting Fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford between the years 2012 to 2014. He has authored two books South Asian Islam and British Multiculturalism (Routledge, 2016) and Brexit and Liberal Democracy: Populism, Sovereignty and the Nation-State (Routledge, 2022). His areas of teaching, research and writing are political theory, multiculturalism, group rights, British politics and political Islam. His work has been published in journals such as Economic and Political Weekly, Ethnic and Racial Studies and the Journal of Human Values. His regularly written political commentary on Indian and global politics has appeared in the Economic and Political Weekly, Al Jazeera English, the Indian periodical Outlook and in Indian broadsheet newspapers such as The Indian Express, The Hindu, and The Telegraph. He has written over 30 book reviews in varied publications.

 

Session 6 

Populism and the Crisis of Representation: Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice 

Date/Time: Thursday, November 13, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Chair

Dr. Ilhan Kaya is a human geographer whose scholarship centers on identity politics, migration, ethnicity, and spatial structures in Turkey, the Middle East, and the wider diaspora. He currently serves as a Remote Visiting Researcher at Wilfrid Laurier University (Canada) and has previously held academic appointments at Ghent University (Belgium) and Yıldız Technical University (Turkey), where he was Professor of Geography.

Dr. Kaya’s research and publications explore the complex intersections of minority politics, democratization, and belonging, with a particular focus on the Muslim minorities in the West and Kurds and other marginalized communities in Turkey. His analyses of Muslim immigration to the West, Kurdish identity politics, and Turkish diaspora formations have been widely recognized for their critical and comparative perspectives.

He is the author of several books, including Immigration, Identity, and Integration: The Case of Turkish Americans and Muslim American: Migration, Identity, and Integration, and co-author of Kurdish Question and Peace Process and Kurdish Question in the International Media. His edited works, such as Pluralism, Multicultural and Multilingual Education, reflect his long-standing engagement with questions of cultural diversity and education policy.

Dr. Kaya has presented his research internationally and has served as a consultant and media commentator on migration, minorities, and regional politics in Turkey. Through his work, Dr. Kaya offers nuanced insights into how space, power, and identity shape the experiences of minorities—particularly Kurds and other ethnic and religious groups—in both Turkey and the diaspora. of Turkey to the EU.

Discussants

Dr. Amedeo Varriale  earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism. During his academic career, Dr. Varriale contributed as a research assistant to the development of a significant textbook project on the global resurgence of nationalism, titled“The New Nationalism in America and Beyond,” co-authored by Robert Schertzer and Eric Taylor Woods. He has written for ECPS before but has also been published by other academic outlets ranging from the Journal of Dialogue Studies to UEL’s Crossing Conceptual Boundaries. Currently, he is also an “affiliated researcher” for the Centre for the Study of Global Nationalisms (CSGN).

Dr. Amir Ali has been a faculty member at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi since 2007. Prior to this he taught at the Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi for three years. He was Agatha Harrison Memorial Visiting Fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford between the years 2012 to 2014. He has authored two books South Asian Islam and British Multiculturalism (Routledge, 2016) and Brexit and Liberal Democracy: Populism, Sovereignty and the Nation-State (Routledge, 2022). His areas of teaching, research and writing are political theory, multiculturalism, group rights, British politics and political Islam. His work has been published in journals such as Economic and Political Weekly, Ethnic and Racial Studies and the Journal of Human Values. His regularly written political commentary on Indian and global politics has appeared in the Economic and Political Weekly, Al Jazeera English, the Indian periodical Outlook and in Indian broadsheet newspapers such as The Indian Express, The Hindu, and The Telegraph. He has written over 30 book reviews in varied publications.

Paper 1: De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in an Age of Liberal Backsliding

Abstract: For much of the modern era, the world has viewed the United States as a paragon of liberal democracy, standing in contrast to developing democracies that struggle with institutional weaknesses, corruption, and executive overreach. However, recent patterns of democratic backsliding suggest a fundamental shift: As American institutions erode under polarization, populism, and elite norm-breaking, the United States is de-exceptionalizing and beginning to resemble the very democracies it was once contrasted against. At the same time, many developing democracies—while still flawed—are showing signs of institutional strengthening, electoral integrity, and greater civic engagement. This paper argues that these two trends represent a global realignment of democratic norms, in which the traditional hierarchy between “established” and “emerging” democracies is increasingly outdated. As Laurence Whitehead suggests, democratization is an “open-ended” process subject to reversals and detours. The erosion of democracy in developed countries like the United States demonstrates that democratic institutions in all contexts—whether long-standing or newly emerging—are vulnerable to similar pressures and should be studied accordingly.

Jonathan Madison is a historian and political analyst specializing in democracy, elections, and governance in Latin America and the United States. He holds a PhD in Global and Imperial History from the University of Oxford, where his research focused on 20th-century democracy in Brazil. His dissertation, The Fourth Republic and the Practicing of Democracy in Brazil, 1930-1968, reexamines Brazil’s post-war democratic experiment and its impact on the country’s political trajectory. Jonathan is currently a Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute, where he researches and advocates for election reforms aimed at improving candidate quality and political incentives. He also provides analysis on political risk, foreign policy, and democratization. His writing appears in Democracy’s Sisyphus, his Substack newsletter, where he explores foreign policy as well as historical and contemporary challenges to democratic governance. He has also contributed to multiple media outlets, podcasts, and newspapers in both the United States and Brazil. Additionally, Jonathan is part-time history instructor at Brigham Young University.

Paper 2: Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy

Abstract: Public discussion about the crisis of democracy has been focused on the institutional approach of politics, normally leading to a dichotomic diagnosis either affirming that we live in an authoritarian tendency, or that the institutions are proving to be resilient, safeguarding democracy. That approach helps to diagnose the present situation of existing democracies. Still, it doesn’t explain the causes of democratic crisis and the non-institutional causes for democratic erosion. This work intends to articulate the institutionalist approach with a sociological interpretation of the causes of the democratic crisis. Drawing back to the construction of democratic State and institutions as a product of modernization, the sociological approach interprets the present crisis as a turning point in the dynamics of social reproduction and trends of social change. It thus analyses populist action as a disruptive force that tries to mobilize popular support in deconstructing institutions and mechanisms of checks and balances for gathering power and excluding opponents. An analysis of populist discourse provides empirical evidence of how populist discourse constructs an image of “the people” as a morally pure and identifiable entity, using it in such a mobilization against democratic institutions. The analysis should not only point to aspects already discussed in the literature about populism, such as the counterposition of “us vs. them”, but also reconstruct how populist discourse gives meaning to the inherent, structural contradictions of modern society to direct political action, outlining a theoretical framework for the interpretation of democratic crisis.

João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho is a Brazilian social scientist. He earned his Ph.D. in Social Sciences in 2019, at the State University of São Paulo (Unesp), where he also taught Political Theory. He is a member of the Research Committee of Sociological Theory at the International Sociological Association (ISA) and a researcher at LabPol/Unesp and the GEP Critical Theory: Technology, Culture, and Education. Currently, he is researching populism and political authoritarianism, focusing on the emergence of the new radical right and its form of online mobilization, as well as the impact of digital media on democracy. His main research interests are Sociological Theory and Political Theory.

Paper 3: Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-Politics and Post-Democracy

Abstract: This paper aims to contribute to a multicausal, comprehensive analysis of the erosion of (representative) democracy, and of the relationship between this process and the one of rising (new) populism in Europe, by exploring mainly the theoretical perspectives advanced by two important political scientists, Daniel Barbu and Peter Mair. In their search for an in-depth understanding of this regressive process of de-democratization, Barbu and Mair have observed and described in detail a series of unexpectedly comparable changes, that have occurred in Western, respectively post-communist countries, since the 1990s: the precarization of the relationship between politics and society; the destructuring and delegitimization of parties as representative bodies; the de-parliamentarization and the tendency towards apoliticism; the personalization of political will; the weakening or hollowing out of res publica; the emergence of new “wooden languages” and “civil religions” (such as the one of “the rule of law”); the pre-eminence of the market logic in relation to the democratic constitutional order; the increasing recourse to unelected entities; the “government by cartel”; the curtailment of individual freedoms and of people’s sovereignty, etc. Against the already general (research) practice, Mair and Barbu suggested that (new) populism needed to be examined first as an associated symptom of the decline of politics and of representative institutions, and second as a cause.

Andreea Zamfira is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Bucharest, an associate researcher at the Regional Centre for Advanced Francophone Studies in Social Sciences, and a member of the editorial board of Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review and Studia Securitatis. She conducted research and completed professional internships at Sciences Po Paris, the University of Lyon, and the Free University of Brussels, among others. Her research interests focus on democracy studies (competing conceptions of democracy, the erosion of party democracy, transnationalization and de-democratization of politics) and ethnic studies (nation-building, nationalism, national minorities, national/ethno-cultural identities, politics of identity). She has a PhD in political and social sciences at the University of Bucharest and the Free University of Brussels. 

 

Session 7

Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism 

Date/Time: Thursday, November 27, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University. He holds a Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from Indiana University Bloomington, with research focusing on criminology, spatial justice, and state violence. His work examines the epidemiology of violence, the intersection of crime and politics, and the criminalization of poverty and race. He coined the term criminal populism to describe how politicians exploit crime as political capital, a concept explored in his publication Criminal Populism: Crime as Political Capital in the Philippines and the United States. His Epidemiology of Violence project has mapped over 7,000 cases of extrajudicial killings in the Philippines using GIS. His research is published in leading criminology journals, and his forthcoming article, From Sociology of Poverty to Criminology of the Elite, explores elite criminality. Dr. Magno has served as a Research Fellow at Philippine Normal University and a Visiting Research Associate at Ateneo de Manila University. A dedicated educator, he has received multiple teaching and service awards for student engagement and community-based learning.

Discussants

Sanne van Oosten (PhD, University of Amsterdam) is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Oxford, where she is involved in the EqualStrength project. This project explores the cumulative and structural forms of discrimination faced by ethnic, racial, and religious minorities in Europe, with a particular focus on Muslims, Roma, and Black minorities. Her work examines how prejudice and hate crimes accumulate across different life domains and generations, as well as the intersection of race, ethnicity, and religion with other forms of inequality such as gender, sexual orientation, and immigration status.

Dr. van Oosten’s PhD research, completed in October 2024 at the University of Amsterdam, investigated the political representation of minority, especially Muslim, politicians in European parliaments. Using quantitative methods and meta-analysis, she explored how voter preferences for politicians with shared religious, migration, and gender backgrounds affect their electoral success. Her findings revealed that the religion of politician and voter plays a significant role in voter preferences; while stereotyping and projection impact the dynamics of political representation.In addition to her academic work, Dr. van Oosten has published widely in both academic and non-academic outlets, including Legislative Studies, Electoral Studies, and The New York Times. She has provided strategic advice to various political bodies and NGOs, including Amnesty UK and the UK Home Office. Dr. van Oosten is also a frequent media contributor, with appearances on BBC, NPR, New York Times and Dutch outlets like Volkskrant, Nieuwsuur and NOS. Link to van Oosten’s CV

Thibaut Dauphin holds a PhD in political science and is a research associate at the Montesquieu Research Institute (University of Bordeaux) and at the CNRS Research Unit 6240 LISA (University of Corsica). He has been certified by the National Council of Universities to serve as a lecturer in political science and philosophy. A specialist in political ideas, particularly the Enlightenment and Voltaire, to whom he devoted his doctoral thesis, he now focuses on republicanism, revolutions, sovereignty and secularism, exploring the inexhaustible connections between modern thought and contemporary aporias. 

Paper 1: Beyond Fairness: Meritocracy, the Limits of Representation, and the Politics of Populism

Abstract: Meritocracy is often celebrated as a fair mechanism for social mobility, yet it functions as a legitimizing ideology that deepens inequalities and restricts democratic representation. By positioning education as both an equalizer and a sorting mechanism, meritocracy imposes an impossible paradox—tasking education with ensuring fairness while simultaneously justifying exclusion. This paper critically examines meritocracy’s political function, arguing that its promise of delayed justice transforms demands for equality into technocratic concerns rather than political struggles. 

Building on Clare Chambers’ “moment of equal opportunity,” I show how meritocracy distorts the purpose of education, shifting its role from emancipating individuals to fitting them into predetermined social and economic hierarchies. Instead of empowering people to voice demands and contest inequalities, education under meritocracy serves as an instrument for maintaining the status quo. Drawing on Jacques Rancière’s argument that equality is an axiom rather than an outcome, I argue that meritocracy’s reliance on future-oriented fairness masks its ongoing reproduction of structural exclusion. 

This paper’s original contribution is to reframe meritocracy as a mechanism of depoliticization, not only by justifying inequality but by restricting political representation itself. Using Nancy Fraser’s framework of redistribution, recognition, and representation, I demonstrate how meritocratic discourse forecloses egalitarian demands within technocratic governance, making them inexpressible through institutionalized politics. As a result, these unmet demands resurface through populist mobilization, not as a rejection of democracy, but as an attempt to reclaim representation from meritocratic elites. Following Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populist articulation, I theorize how populism emerges as a re-politicization of grievances that meritocracy systematically silences. By foregrounding the conceptual contradictions of meritocracy as a political ideal, this paper offers a political theoretical account of how stratified education systems sustain hierarchies, depoliticize inequality, and ultimately contribute to democratic destabilization.

Elif Başak Ürdem is a PhD candidate in political science at Loughborough University, specializing in political theory and data science. Her research explores the intersections of meritocracy, populism, and democratic representation, with a particular focus on how meritocratic ideals legitimize inequalities and depoliticize social struggles. Drawing on theories of justice, recognition, and redistribution, their work critically examines how stratified education systems shape political agency and democratic participation. Başak holds an MA in Legal and Political Theory from University College London (UCL), by being funded by the Jean Monnet Scholarship, and a BA in Political Science from Istanbul Bilgi University, graduating top of their class. She has previously worked as a Senior Child Protection Officer at Refugee Rights Turkey and has research experience at Bilkent University and Infakto Research Workshop. Her broader interests include democratic theory, refugee rights, and the philosophy of education. 

Paper 2: Memetic Communication and Populist Discourse: Decoding the Visual Language of Political Polarization

Abstract: This study explores how memetic communication serves as a critical tool for understanding the core dynamics of populist discourse in contemporary politics. Focusing on right-wing populist movements in Latin America—specifically Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador—the research examines how memes produced and disseminated using generative AI tools (e.g., Stable Diffusion, DALL-E, MidJourney) encapsulate and propagate the central narratives of populism.
Through the analysis of visual data collected between September 2022 and February 2024, this research identifies how memes simplify complex political ideas into emotionally resonant messages that mobilize supporters and reinforce the dichotomous “us vs. them” framework central to populist rhetoric. These memes not only polarize public opinion but also act as bridges, transferring violent and exclusionary narratives into offline political arenas, including parliamentary discourse.

By combining digital ethnography with fieldwork, this study highlights how populist movements utilize generative AI to craft a visual language that dehumanizes marginalized groups—such as women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and racialized communities—while amplifying their populist agendas.This research contributes to understanding the role of digital communication in shaping and sustaining populist discourse, offering insights into how these visual narratives resonate with audiences and impact political processes in under-researched regions.

Gabriel Bayarri Toscano is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Audiovisual Communication at the Rey Juan Carlos University. He is an interdisciplinary researcher working at the intersection of communication and social sciences. His research focuses on the so-called “far right” and current polarized discourses in the public sphere. In recent years, Gabriel has worked in European and Latin American contexts. He has taught regular and master classes at various international centers. He has been a Newton International Fellow of the British Academy at the University of London, and a Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Gabriel Bayarri also has applied political experience working with the United Nations in Rio de Janeiro and as a councilor in the Autonomous Community of Madrid. He is involved with the following research groups and centers: the COMMRADES Group at Rey Juan Carlos University, the Centre for Right-Wing Studies (University of California, Berkeley), the Centre for Research into Global Power, Inequality and Conflict (RGPIC, Macquarie University), the Psychosociology of Social and Gender Violence research group (Complutense University), and the Technopolitics research group (Open University of Catalonia). Gabriel Bayarri has been a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research (JILAR) since 2020.

Paper 3: Paradigms of ‘Popular Sovereignty’: Populism as Part of the Transformative History of the Concept

Abstract: The literature on populism, especially that produced by political scientists and sociologists, is rich with empirical studies focusing on individual cases. In all these studies, when faced with the need to explain the emergence and success of populist politics, scholars tend to refer to the socio-economic transformations that have affected liberal political systems for the past few decades. On the other hand, political theory has tried to contribute by attempting to overcome the fragmentation caused by this vast amount of case-specific studies and deepen the understanding of this heterogeneous phenomenon, trying to identify general concepts through which it can be described. My research, situated within the framework of theoretical studies, aims to take a further step by adopting a long-term perspective. Starting from the assumption that populism can be considered part of the evolutionary history of the concept and practices of popular sovereignty, and using interpretative categories from the history of political thought, I analyse populism as a peculiar answer to the dialectic between the need to affirm or recognize the principle of popular sovereignty, and the need to limit it in order to avoid its excesses. This tension originated with the establishment of the modern principle of sovereignty, which occurred following the modern revolutions. It can be traced back to the earliest theoretical and political reflections on the topic, which can be attributed to Rousseau and Madison. Keeping this in mind, it is possible to transcend explanations based solely on the analysis of contingencies and enrich our understanding.

Maria Giorgia Caraceni a PhD Candidate in the History of Political Thought at Guglielmo Marconi University of Rome and a contract researcher at the Institute of Political Studies San Pio V. She conceived and launched the Permanent Transdisciplinary Seminar for PhD candidates and early-career researchers, held annually since 2024 at Guglielmo Marconi University in collaboration with the University of Foggia. In this context, she coordinates both organizational and scientific aspects, and oversees the publication of the seminar proceedings. Maria earned her B.A. and her M.A. cum laude in Philosophy from the University of Rome Tor Vergata, where she also obtained a post-graduate diploma. After graduation, she taught courses in History of Philosophy and Political Philosophy at the People’s University of Rome for four years.  Additionally, she serves as an editor for two academic journals: “Dialegesthai”, an online journal of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tor Vergata, and “Power and Democracy. International Journal of Politics, Philosophy, and Law”, a journal of the Centro Studi Tocqueville-Acton. Her research interests focus on Political Theory, particularly Democratic Theory and the History of Concepts in Political and Democratic Lexicon.

 

Session 8

Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn  

Date/Time: Thursday, December 11, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)  

Chair

Dr. Azize Sargin is an independent researcher and consultant on external relations for non-governmental organisations. She holds a doctorate in International Relations, with a focus on Migration Studies, from the Brussels School of International Studies at the University of Kent. Her research interest covers migrant belonging and integration, diversity and cities, and transnationalism. Azize had a 15-year professional career as a diplomat in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she held various positions and was posted to different countries, including Romania, the United States, and Belgium. During her last posting, she served as the political counsellor at the Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the EU.

Discussants

Helena Rovamo is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Eastern Finland. In her doctoral thesis, she studied lay people’s perceptions of populism in Finland, focusing particularly on how voters for the radical-right populist Finns Party and other parties constructed social divisions in interview material.
 
In her studies, Dr. Rovamo utilizes qualitative methods and discursive analytical approaches. She is particularly interested in examining, through qualitative research, how people’s representations of themselves and others shape their actions in society and in intergroup relations.
 
Currently, Dr. Rovamo is working on a research project, “Intergroup relations and local encounters,” that examines how Ukrainian, Middle Eastern, and Finnish young people living in the Savo area perceive one another, their lives, and their futures in multicultural Savo.

Jonathan Madison is a historian and political analyst specializing in democracy, elections, and governance in Latin America and the United States. He holds a PhD in Global and Imperial History from the University of Oxford, where his research focused on 20th-century democracy in Brazil. His dissertation, The Fourth Republic and the Practicing of Democracy in Brazil, 1930-1968, reexamines Brazil’s post-war democratic experiment and its impact on the country’s political trajectory. Jonathan is currently a Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute, where he researches and advocates for election reforms aimed at improving candidate quality and political incentives. He also provides analysis on political risk, foreign policy, and democratization. His writing appears in Democracy’s Sisyphus, his Substack newsletter, where he explores foreign policy as well as historical and contemporary challenges to democratic governance. He has also contributed to multiple media outlets, podcasts, and newspapers in both the United States and Brazil. Additionally, Jonathan is part-time history instructor at Brigham Young University.
 

Paper 1: Charismatic Populism, Suffering, and Saturnalia

Abstract: This paper draws on the Nietzschean underlay to Weber’s theory of charismatic revolution—specifically, the saturnalian reversal of values that occurs under the influence of ressentiment—in order to account for the ability of Trump and his followers to undercut and reinvent American moral culture. Reversing what Weber called the “theodicy of good fortune,” charismatic leaders frequently adopt postures of moral abjection within present value systems while at the same time envisioning new social arrangements that will lift them into positions of authority. The condemnation of opponents is key to this process: from the devotionally-skewed perch where charismatic sightlines originate, such rebukes from moral authorities are rendered in parallax view, gaining a function that is opposite to condemnation’s intended purpose insofar as it authenticates the righteousness of the one being condemned. In such circumstances, new charismatic identities are forged, existing amid an exclusive intimacy between leader and follower. Drawing on fieldwork and interviews with Trump supporters throughout the 2024 Presidential campaign, the presentation examines the salience of “garbage” to Trump’s moral entrepreneurship. The case displays the importance of ressentiment for interpreting charismatic revolution, and it illustrates the reactive “thinness” of charismatic identitarian content. Recognition of this feature is, in turn, important for integrating charisma studies with studies of populism (which is itself usually characterized as being ideologically “thin”).

Paul Joosse is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Hong Kong.  His work examines Weber’s theory of domination as it interacts with social movement theory and (critical) criminology. Recent projects have included theorizing the link between gender and charismatic power, using the example of Trump to develop a typology of charismatic counter-roles, and weaving Stanley Cohen’s concept of moral panic with Weber’s theory of charisma to show how charismatic acclamation is intimately linked to the aspersion of ‘folk devils.’ This work has been published in Social Forces, Sociological Theory, Theory and Society, Journal of Classical Sociology, and Sociology of Religion, among others. In connection with his sociological work, he is Chair of the American Sociological Association’s Section for the History of Sociology and Social Thought and he currently serves on the executive board of the International Sociological Association’s Sociological Theory research cluster (RC16).

Paper 2: The evolution of the rhetoric of the “Alternative for Germany”: a comparative analysis of the election campaigns for the European Parliament in 2019 and 2024 

Abstract:  The article focuses on the transformation of the rhetoric of the “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) during two election campaigns to the European Parliament – 2019 and 2024. The author proceeds from the assumption that there is a certain relationship between electoral success and the level of populism expressed in terms of the language the party uses. The populist party will soften its rhetoric during the election campaign when it does not expect electoral success to expand the potential electorate. Otherwise, the rhetoric will be tougher when the party is expected to win. This is clearly the case in the 2024 campaign, when the political weight of the AfD in the European arena has increased compared to 2019. Using various kinds of content analysis, among which sentiment analysis is of key importance, the author points out that the rhetoric shown in electoral programs and posters is in line with the positions of the party and fraction “Identity and Democracy” that is being scrutinized in the article as well. The negative sentiment prevailed in two campaigns, but it has changed slightly. The thematic focus of both programs has not altered much. A distinctive feature of the rhetoric of right-wing populists is still the focus on migration issues. The received results at the junction of linguistics, political science and international affairs may be applicable for a more complex study of the campaigns to the European Parliament employing data from 2014. This article could also be a help for research on German populism, especially in the context of entering the mainstream by a populist actor.

Artem Turenko is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow. His thesis examines “The impact of electoral cycles on the rhetoric of right-wing parties: transformations of the populist agenda (the case of the Alternative für Deutschland). 

 

Session 9

Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion

Date/Time: Thursday, January 8, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Helen L. Murphey is a Post Doctoral Scholar at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at The Ohio State University. She earned a PhD in International Relations from the University of St Andrews in 2023, where she was a Carnegie PhD Scholar. She has previously held an appointment as a Visiting Assistant Professor of Politics at Whitman College. She is a Research Associate at the Institute of Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Studies at the University of St Andrews and an Affiliate at the Center for the Study of Religion at the Ohio State University. Her research interests include populism, conspiracy theories, religious social movements and migration.

Discussants

Hannah Geddes is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews; her research explores how UK policies surrounding support for asylum seekers are understood, reshaped, and delivered at the local level, against the background of outsourcing and high levels of politicisation. She previously completed an MSc in Refugee and Forced Migration Studies at the University of Oxford and a BSc in Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. Hannah has experience working in public sector auditing, and in NGO community organisations which support displaced people in Greece and the UK.

Vlad Surdea-Hernea is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences in Vienna. He holds a Master’s degree in Public Policy from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Central European University. Vlad is a quantitative political scientist with interests in political behaviour, party politics, and historical political economy. His research examines the interaction between proximate and distal factors in shaping how individuals express their political preferences through voting, protesting, or climate change related activism. His work has previously been published in the European Political Science Review, the European Journal of Political Research, Comparative Political Studies, and the Economics of Transition and Institutional Change.  Outside of academia, Vlad has worked as a project manager and consultant in projects funded by the World Bank, the European Commission or the German Development Agency on energy and climate policy issues.

 

Paper 1: From Crime Shows to Power: The Rise of Criminal Populism

Abstract: This study examines criminal populism, a political strategy where leaders gain popularity by exploiting crime, both through direct involvement and by shaping public perceptions of law, justice, and disorder. While many populist politicians use their legal troubles to bolster their outsider image, others leverage media platforms, such as crime-focused television and radio programs, to build public trust and legitimacy before transitioning into political power.

The study explores the rise of politicians who, before holding office, hosted crime and dispute-focused media programs, portraying themselves as champions of justice and order. By sensationalizing crime, offering simplistic solutions, and positioning themselves as the voice of the people against corrupt elites, these figures cultivate a loyal following that translates into electoral success. Case studies include figures from the Philippines and beyond, demonstrating how media-driven crime narratives fuel political ambition.

By blurring the lines between crime reporting, entertainment, and governance, criminal populism subverts democratic institutions and reshapes public perceptions of law and justice. This study critically assesses the long-term implications of media-driven criminal populism, highlighting its role in eroding institutional trust and legitimizing authoritarian tendencies under the guise of law and order.

Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University.  Also see page 43. 

Paper 2: The Legitimization Process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s Migration Policies

Abstract: The Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs-FPÖ), one of the first radical right and populist parties established in Europe after World War II, and the National Rally (known as the Front National from 1972 to 2018) exhibit notable differences due to their distinct historical, cultural, and political backgrounds. However, these two radical right and populist parties, both founded by politicians associated with the Nazis, also share significant commonalities. This is one of the key reasons why we place them at the centre of our research. These two political parties were among the first radical right and populist parties to emerge in the EU member states after World War II, serving as models for their peers. For instance, the Front National was the first radical right party to win local government in 1983. It was also the first radical right party to enter the national parliament after World War II, securing 35 seats in 1986. Similarly, the FPÖ became the first radical right party after World War II to win an election in 1999 and subsequently form a coalition government in an EU member state. Also, both radical right and populist parties gained legitimacy through the support of mainstream political parties. Although they initially embraced anti-communist and anti-Semitic rhetoric and policies, they gradually shifted their focus toward targeting Muslim immigrants, marking another point of convergence. This paper examines the legitimization process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s migration policies and their electoral success through the lens of Gramscian hegemony theory.

Russell Foster is a Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies. He has an interdisciplinary academic background. From 2003 to 2006, he studied history at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, specializing in modern European political history and imperial history. He later earned MA degrees in international politics and human geography from Newcastle University (2008–2010). From 2015 to 2016, Russell was a Marie Skłodowska-Curie International Fellow at the University of Amsterdam’s Department of European Studies, researching the relationship between the EU’s symbols and European identity. From 2016 to 2019, he was a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at King’s College London, where he studied nationalism, European identity, and Brexit. His current research focuses on the relationship between the far right and European identity, the far right and LGBTQ+ politics, the legacy of the British Empire in contemporary politics, and the evolving relationship between identity and politics in the UK, the EU, and beyond.

Paper 3: Anti-Party to Mass Party? Lessons from the Radical Right’s Party Building Model

Abstract: This paper contributes to recent research showing that, contrary to the view of populist parties embodying direct, unmediated representation, some European PRRPs are cultivating robust local networks and reintroducing elements of the 20th-century mass party. While documented across Europe, its implications for populist theory remain unresolved. One key antimony remains unresolved: while the mass party is celebrated as the epitome of representative democracy, defined by party-based linkage, the populist form of representation—with its ‘anti-institutional impulse’—is associated with direct, unmediated forms of linkage. 

To address this tension, I advance the concept of ‘linkage’ as a key framework for understanding how this seemingly contradictory party model functions in practice, focusing on members’ perceptions of their role within the party and the wider democratic system. It draws on an ethnographic study of the PRRP the Sweden Democrats, including interviews and participant observations of party meetings. The analysis concludes that it was the fundamentally populist party-member relationship that most strongly echoed the ethos of the 20th-century mass party, positioning the party as an intermediary between citizens and the state. This raises the broader question of whether populism, emphasising the unity and common interests of ‘the people’ against perceived elites, may provide a foundation for mass-party-like structures to re-emerge, even under postmodern conditions often associated with declining political engagement and partisan identification. By uniquely uniting empirical data with populist theory, this study not only enriches our understanding of how PRRPs mobilise citizens but also offers new insights into the intersection between populism and party organisation.

Saga Oskarson Kindstrand is a first-year doctoral candidate at Sciences Po’s Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, supervised by Professor Colin Hay. Her research examines how political parties function as intermediaries between society and the state, with a particular focus on how European populist radical right parties (PRRPs) develop party-based linkages. She explores how these parties mobilise active memberships despite broader trends of political disengagement and how their claim to represent ‘the people’ is reflected in party organisation.

 

 

Session 10

Resisting the Decline: Democratic Resilience in Authoritarian Times  

Date/Time: Thursday, January 22, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Dr. Amedeo Varriale earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism. During his academic career, Dr. Varriale contributed as a research assistant to the development of a significant textbook project on the global resurgence of nationalism, titled“The New Nationalism in America and Beyond,” co-authored by Robert Schertzer and Eric Taylor Woods. He has written for ECPS before but has also been published by other academic outlets ranging from the Journal of Dialogue Studies to UEL’s Crossing Conceptual Boundaries. Currently, he is also an “affiliated researcher” for the Centre for the Study of Global Nationalisms (CSGN).

Discussants

Gwenaëlle Bauvois is a sociologist based at the University of Helsinki (University Researcher) studying the discursive and digital dimensions of right-wing populism, extremist and far-right movements, conspiracy theories, counter-media, and post-truth politics.  She currently contributes to the EU-funded Horizon Europe projectARENAS (Analysis and Responses to Extremist Narratives), which analyses the evolution and societal impact of extremist narratives across Europe. In 2026, she will start in the KOMKRIS project – Governance and resilience under antagonistic threats in the NB8 region in times of complex crisis. She is also an expert in theEU Knowledge Hub on Preventation of Radicalisation, Thematic Panel 1: Ideologies and Conspiracy Narratives, supporting European efforts to understand and prevent radicalisation. She is affiliated to HEPP-Helsinki Hub on Emotions, Populism and Polarisation, 
RADIA-Finnish Knowledge Center for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism, HELSUS and CEREN-Centre for Research on Ethnic Relations and Nationalism. Dr Bauvois has participated in the Jean Monnet Network project on Post-Truth Politics, Nationalism and the (De)Legitimation of European Integration, fostering European research collaboration on populism, democracy, and disinformation. She has held visiting research positions at Stanford University – to study conspiracy talk in contemporary USA – and the Australian National University. She regularly engages with media and public debates on the far right, populism, extremism, and conspiracy narratives across Europe and internationally, and contributes to public platforms such as The Conversation.
 
Gabriel Bayarri Toscano is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Audiovisual Communication at the Rey Juan Carlos University. He is an interdisciplinary researcher working at the intersection of communication and social sciences. His research focuses on the so-called “far right” and current polarized discourses in the public sphere. In recent years, Gabriel has worked in European and Latin American contexts. He has taught regular and master classes at various international centers. He has been a Newton International Fellow of the British Academy at the University of London, and a Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Gabriel Bayarri also has applied political experience working with the United Nations in Rio de Janeiro and as a councilor in the Autonomous Community of Madrid. He is involved with the following research groups and centers: the COMMRADES Group at Rey Juan Carlos University, the Centre for Right-Wing Studies (University of California, Berkeley), the Centre for Research into Global Power, Inequality and Conflict (RGPIC, Macquarie University), the Psychosociology of Social and Gender Violence research group (Complutense University), and the Technopolitics research group (Open University of Catalonia). Gabriel Bayarri has been a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research (JILAR) since 2020.

Paper 1: Resilience in Market Democracy

Abstract: Many people speak about democratic decline and the resilience of democracy in hard times. In this discussion, resilience has gained traction but consistently defies attempts to unify theories or confine the concept to a singular research or policy portfolio. Instead of seeking to unify resilience, this paper draws on a theory of polysemy to tease out the diversity of encounters one may have. Findings over a decade of research into resilience of different types are used to reframe resilience as an ’emergent institution’ of democracy today. The emerging resilience is becoming a many-headed-hydra – or, in theoretical terms, a ‘polysemic institutional characteristic’ of contemporary democracies. Should we engage with this as a research agenda then futures research into resilience should emphasise the transformative potential, for good or ill, of a fundamental challenge traditional democratic values posed by an ‘institutionalised’ sense of resilience.

Dr. Peter Rogers is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Macquarie University. He previously served as Co-Director of Climate Futures at Macquarie University (2012–2015). His primary research interests focus on resilience (in its various forms), surveillance, social order, and mechanisms of control. In addition, his work explores tabletop role-playing games (TTRPGs), with particular attention to creativity and empathy.

Paper 2: The Contradictory Challenges of Training Local Elected Officials for the future of Democracy

Abstract: Today in France, local elected officials have two training rights to facilitate the execution of their mandates and contribute to the renewal of the local political class. Two funding mechanisms coexist: a collective right funded directly by local authorities, and an individual right of €400 per year, with a maximum cumulative limit of €800. The training market is controlled by the French state, which accredits 240 training providers.

Training of elected officials is regularly presented as a tool for “re-enchanting” local democracy, as it aims to make holding office accessible to everyone. In this sense, it would serve as a skills equalizer, theoretically enabling anyone to “level up” to assume the role. The primary beneficiaries would be those citizens who are less predisposed to handle political responsibilities, finding in it a way to compensate for “gaps” and to catch up with those who can just rely on tacit socialization once in office. 

Nevertheless, the training of elected officials carries a paradox. In seeking to re-enchant political engagement, it also contributes to disenchantment. On one hand, it validates the very principle it aims to combat. By claiming to make holding local office accessible to all, it inherently suggests a prerequisite of skills. Local functions would not be accessible to just anyone without prior preparation or continuous training. On the other hand, since this training is reserved solely for local elected officials, it contributes to the distinction between elected officials and the rest of the citizens by reinforcing their specialization through the acquisition of specific knowledge and skills.

Ultimately, based on statistical data related to the training practices of local elected officials in France in recent years (n=30 000) and several dozen interviews, the aim of this contribution is to show that, although the training of elected officials represents a strategic project to strengthen democracy, its implementation contributes to reinforcing the weak representativeness of local elected officials compared to the rest of the population by reserving the knowledge related to the management of local authorities for a certain “elite.”

Pierre Camus is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Nantes University. He holds a doctorate in sociology from the University of Nantes – CENS (UMR 6025). He is also co-president of the National Observatory for the Training of Local Elected Officials (ONFEL).

Paper 3: The Rise of Women-Led Radical Democracy in Rojava: Global Democratic Decline and Civil Society Resilience Amidst Middle Eastern Authoritarianism 

Abstract: This article investigates the rise of a women-led radical democracy in the region known as Rojava within the context of the Syrian civil war since 2012. Governed under the framework of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), this development is widely referred to by scholars as the “Rojava Revolution.” This shift has unfolded through a bottom-up political project known as democratic confederalism, sustained by diverse forms of civil society resistance in Rojava. This has occurred despite the broader context of war-torn Syria, which has become a battleground for various Islamist opposition groups such as Islamist State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Free Syrian Army (FSA), Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, Hurras al-Din and Al-Tawhid Brigade all of whom have fought both each other and the government of Bashar al-Assad. Despite their nuanced ideological and tactical differences, all these groups share the common objective of establishing an Islamic state founded on Sharia law, marked by gender inequality.

Despite the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the escalation of political violence and chaos, many studies have proved successful and responsive feminist interventions made by Kurdish women activists and academics in Rojava.  These interventions have been accompanied by a strong receptivity to the Rojava project among all its national minorities, as well as “the fierce loyalty of its defenders and its people.”  Rojava has survived significant challenges, including civil war, the fight against the ISIS, enduring occupation, embargoes, a challenging humanitarian situation, and ongoing Turkish invasions. Rojava remains firmly opposed to the former Baath regime, underlying the maximalist involvement of all national minorities in society. This includes engagement in a wide range of local and social activities, “from communes and councils to work in the health sector, women’s movements, and self-defense structures.”   So much so that academics such as Michel Knapp, Anja Flach, and Ercan Ayboga have described Rojava as “one of the most radically progressive societies on the planet.”    

This article argues that the global decline of democracy, particularly in the West, led to the abandonment of Rojava’s nascent democracy, despite Rojava having been a Western ally in the fight against Islamist extremism and sharing democratic values with the West, during the two major Turkish invasions in 2018 and 2019. Despite these challenges, the people of Rojava have continued to resist maintaining their democracy. 

Soheila Shahriari holds a doctorate in political science, awarded by the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in 2024. Her PhD thesis, entitled “Transnational political engagement and gendered reconfiguration of the national imaginary among Kurds in the West in the post-Rojava revolution era”, examines the underlying rationales behind commitment to Rojava by looking at the political socialization of research participants, the rearrangement of the Kurdish political spectrum and the multifaceted dynamics shaping Kurdish political engagement in the transnational context in the aftermath of the Rojava revolution. She has identified three central dynamics: the vigorous mobilization of Kurdish diaspora communities in the West to advocate the removal of the PKK from Western terrorist lists, the transformative ripple effects of the Rojava revolution across the Middle East and its role in the feminization of Kurdish politics, and the emergence of Kurds as an emphatic driving force behind democratization in the region. Furthermore, she brings to the fore the transformative power of the gender revolution in Rojava, in relation to its deep influence on reshaping the Kurdish national imaginary in the West around the principles of gender equality, pluralism and secularism, marked by a decisive rejection of patriarchy, political intolerance, Islamism and Sharia law. Shahriari holds  two master’s degrees: one in sociology from Tehran University in Iran and another in political sociology from Sorbonne University Paris in France.

Paper 4: Feminist Diaspora Activism from Poland and Turkey: Resisting Authoritarianism, Anti-Gender Politics, and Reimagining Transnational Solidarity in Exile

Abstract: This paper examines feminist migrant activism in Poland and Turkey against the backdrop of rising authoritarianism and anti-gender policies (Gwiazda, 2021; Özkazanç, 2020). Under the PiS government in Poland and the AKP regime in Turkey, intensified attacks on gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, and feminist movements have created increasingly hostile environments, forcing many activists into self-exile. This study examines how these activists, through their migration, cultivate new forms of feminist solidarity that transcend national borders while responding to the distinct political contexts of their home and host countries. Drawing on 40 in-depth interviews and three focus groups, the study examines how these women navigate the dual pressures of political repression and displacement, crafting spaces of resistance that challenge both patriarchal norms and nationalist ideologies. These activists embody a transformative politics of possibility (Escobar, 2020), fostering networks of care, solidarity, and alternative visions of belonging in their diasporic communities. The study draws on frameworks of pluriversal political praxis (Escobar, 2020) and prefigurative politics (Monticelli, 2022) to analyze how these women envision and enact futures beyond exclusionary systems. By focusing on the personal and collective experiences of feminist migrant activists, this paper highlights the resilience and creative strategies they employ to reclaim political agency. It emphasizes how their activism not only confronts oppressive structures in their countries of origin but also contributes to reshaping the sociopolitical landscapes of their new environments, offering insights into the broader implications of feminist diaspora activism in times of political uncertainties.

Ecem Nazlı Üçok is a PhD Candidate at the Institute of Sociological Studies, Charles University in Prague. She holds a Master of Science in Sociology and Gender Studies from Lund University, Sweden, and teaches both master’s and bachelor’s level courses at Charles University and ARCHIP. She has been a doctoral fellow at the University of Vienna and Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy. Her research interests include political sociology and psychology, urban sociology, social movements, political activism, anti-gender movements in Europe, far-right politics, transnational migration, and the study of men and masculinities.

 

Session 11

Inclusion or Illusion? Narratives of Belonging, Trust, and Democracy in a Polarized Era

Date/Time: Thursday, February 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Andreea Zamfira is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Bucharest, an associate researcher at the Regional Centre for Advanced Francophone Studies in Social Sciences, and a member of the editorial board of Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review and Studia Securitatis. She conducted research and completed professional internships at Sciences Po Paris, the University of Lyon, and the Free University of Brussels, among others. Her research interests focus on democracy studies (competing conceptions of democracy, the erosion of party democracy, transnationalization and de-democratization of politics) and ethnic studies (nation-building, nationalism, national minorities, national/ethno-cultural identities, politics of identity). She has a PhD in political and social sciences at the University of Bucharest and the Free University of Brussels. 

Discussants

Jennifer Fitzgerald is Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado. A specialist in comparative political behavior, much of Fitzgerald’s work examines the ways in which social context shapes political attitudes and vote choice in advanced democratic societies. Her most recent book, entitled Close to Home: Local Ties and Voting Radical Right in Europe (Cambridge University Press 2018), was published in the Cambridge Series in Public Opinion and Political Psychology. The book develops and tests a localist model of radical right support that roots individuals within their communities. The research is based in part on field work conducted as a Fulbright Scholar to France. Close to Home was named the Best Book of 2018 by the American Political Science Association’s European Politics and Societies Organized Section. Fitzgerald has also been working closely with researchers at Örebro University in Sweden to understand the political behavior of young democratic citizens. Her publications include the book Partisan Families: The Social Logic of Bounded Partisanship in Germany and Britain (with Alan Zuckerman and Josip Dasovic, Cambridge University Press) and articles in journals such as The Journal of Politics, Comparative Political Studies, World Politics, Political Behavior, Electoral Studies, and International Migration Review.

Russell Foster is a Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies. He has an interdisciplinary academic background. From 2003 to 2006, he studied history at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, specializing in modern European political history and imperial history. He later earned MA degrees in international politics and human geography from Newcastle University (2008–2010). From 2015 to 2016, Russell was a Marie Skłodowska-Curie International Fellow at the University of Amsterdam’s Department of European Studies, researching the relationship between the EU’s symbols and European identity. From 2016 to 2019, he was a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at King’s College London, where he studied nationalism, European identity, and Brexit. His current research focuses on the relationship between the far right and European identity, the far right and LGBTQ+ politics, the legacy of the British Empire in contemporary politics, and the evolving relationship between identity and politics in the UK, the EU, and beyond.

Paper 1: When identity politics and social justice procedures contribute to populism

Abstract: The ethnographic perspective as modern initiator of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, identity politics as upside-down governing power and the popular formation of social justice principles are three paths, among others, through which the expansion of populist discourses in liberal democratic contexts could be explored. Although ethnography, the tradition of studying ‘others’ in their respective contexts, and later sociological methodology, has shifted slightly towards Western societies, it has retained its colonial perspective. Identity politics, meanwhile, by essentializing their core values and ignoring others, reinforces the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, which might be juxtaposed with other approaches to otherness, such as that of Carl Schmitt et al. (2005). The third factor is the increasing challenge for bottom-up movements to contribute to principles of social justice. The failure of this process is reflected in a “worldwide erosion of liberal democratic norms, soaring inequality, and intensified anger and anomie” (Lefebvre, 2021). In this ‘zombie liberalism’ scenario, which lies between dead and living states, fundamental human rights are violated, including by public institutions. As a result, a ‘spiritual exercise’, as Rawls (1971) describes it, aimed at seeking principles of justice is problematized and, by undermining people’s agency, the impact of civil society on the liberal democratic sphere diminishes.
Identifying We the People and others as distinct groups, as well as identity politics and the problematic popular quest for principles of social justice, provide fertile ground for populism. By synthesizing these processes, this paper seeks to provide an interdisciplinary analysis of the future of democracy.

Saeid Yarmohammadi is a PhD candidate in religious studies at the Institute of Religious Studies, University of Montreal, Canada. He is currently writing a thesis on individual understandings of social justice in the Iranian context among Shiite Muslim adults living in Tehran. His areas of interest include politics and religion, culture and religion, social inequalities and social justice in its various forms, including the origins and history of this notion. His dissertation proposes an analysis of theories of social justice in different contexts, including liberal democracies, to provide a portrait of the place given to this notion in the context of my research. His thesis project includes an assessment of politics of identity in the context of Iran, which contribute to understandings of social justice in this context. Having training in political science and anthropology in addition to my areas of study and adopting a multidisciplinary approach, he is interested in the analysis of social justice in political contexts, including liberal democracies. Talking about conference participation, He has taken part in several international conferences organized by the International Sociological Association and by different universities in Canada and elsewhere.

Paper 2: Why do We Trust The DMV? Exploring the Drivers of Institutional Trust in Public-facing Government Agencies

Abstract: Scholars widely agree that institutional trust is in crisis across Western developed countries, yet the causes of this decline remain elusive. While extensive research has examined institutional performance and procedural fairness, far less attention has been given to the frontline federal workers who serve as the face of government in daily citizen interactions. This study posits that public trust is not solely a function of institutional structure but is also shaped by the characteristics and behavior of government workers. To assess institutional trust, this study employs a conjoint experimental design, varying six institutional attributes: (1) efficiency, (2) expectations, (3) transparency, (4) accountability, (5) perceived moral disposition of workers, and (6) political affiliation of workers. This study hypothesizes that efficiency will be the strongest predictor of institutional trust, operationalized by the public’s preference to seek assistance from one agency over another. Additionally, it anticipates that citizens will prefer bureaucrats who are perceived as caring and personal, yet politically neutral and impersonal. As institutional legitimacy is increasingly contested in an era of political polarization and social fragmentation, this research highlights the need for governance strategies that go beyond structural reforms, emphasizing the critical role of street-level bureaucrats in fostering public institutional trust.

Ariel Lam Chan is a third-year PhD student in the Department of Sociology at Stanford University. Her current research focuses on understanding the causes of institutional trust in U.S. public-service agencies, exploring how factors such as bureaucratic performance, internal processes, and moral/ political disposition of workers influence public confidence in government institutions. Additionally, Ariel is working on a comparative study of Hong Kong’s educational landscape, particularly examining the National Security Law’s impact on curriculum reform and how it shapes students’ critical thinking and understanding of national identity. In addition to her work on educational policy, Ariel is also conducting research on the consequences of nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) in cases of sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace. Her study investigates how NDAs silence survivors and hinder their ability to seek justice, while also impacting their career trajectories, financial situations, and emotional well-being. Ariel’s interdisciplinary research blends sociological theory with practical policy implications, and she is dedicated to addressing pressing issues of governance, institutional trust, and social justice.

Paper 3: Active Citizenship, Democracy and Inclusive Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nexus, Challenges and Prospects for a Sustainable Development

Abstract: This research explores the relevance of active citizenship in supporting processes of transformation and sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa. It starts from the observation that democratic and governance deficits stem from non-inclusive public policies (in their formulation, implementation and assessment), leading to corruption, social inequalities and undermining peace. In response, she proposes to consider active citizenship as a strategic lever. By valuing non-state social actors, this concept is likely to strengthen participatory dynamics and promote inclusive governance. Active citizenship is thus emerging as an essential paradigm and mechanism for improving the development performance of sub-Saharan African states. A benchmarking  of relevant experiences of active citizenship in the West and elsewhere (such as in Canada, the United States or Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall), is the approach envisaged for its achievement. 

Dieudonne Mbarga is an Independent Researcher.

Paper 4: Silenced Voices in a Democratic Dawn: How the Iranian Constitutional Revolutionaries (1905–1906) Weaponized “the People” Against Minorities

Abstract: The Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1906), often celebrated as a foundational moment for democracy in the Middle East, paradoxically entrenched exclusionary notions of “the people” that resonate with contemporary challenges to liberal democracies. This study interrogates how constitutionalist rhetoric, while invoking unity and citizenship, systematically marginalized religious minorities, ethnic groups, and the working class—a dynamic mirroring modern populist discourses that pit “the true people” against “others.” Employing Pierre Machery’s concept of “the unsaid” and historical discourse analysis, this article examines parliamentary debates, protest narratives, spy reports, photographs and memoirs to reveal how revolutionary elites instrumentalized a vague, Persian-centric nationalism to exclude minorities and consolidate power. Findings demonstrate that the constitutionalists’ strategic ambiguity around “the people” enabled majoritarian oppression, sidelining religious groups (e.g., Zoroastrians, Jews) as sectarian pawns, suppressing labor voices in favor of merchant elites, and erasing ethnic identities (e.g., Kurds, Azeris) from national imaginaries. By situating Iran’s revolution within global patterns of democratic erosion—where appeals to “the people” fracture civil society—this research underscores the enduring tension between democratization and exclusion. It argues that inclusive democratic resilience requires confronting historical legacies of ideological erasure, offering lessons for contemporary struggles against illiberal majoritarianism and divisive populism. 

Ali Ragheb is a sociologist with a PhD, Master’s, and Bachelor’s degree from the University of Tehran, Iran. Ranked 1st in the national PhD entrance exam (2019) and 4th in the Master’s exam (2015), he is a recognized talent by the Iranian National Elites Foundation. His research explores economic inequality, cultural sociology, and critical theory, focusing on Iran’s urban middle class. He is the author of Pasdaran-e Nabarabari (Guardians of Inequality), Mashrute-ye Hamegan (The Constitutional Revolution for All), and Tohi-Shodan az Mashrute (The Erosion of Constitutionalism), alongside numerous peer-reviewed articles. He has also translated works on democracy, digital divides, and Max Weber’s sociology of religion. Ali serves as a regional editorial board member for Global Dialogue (ISA) and is a member of the ISA’s Research Committee on Social Stratification. He is a member of the Iranian Sociological Association (since 2017) and has held editorial roles, including assistant editor of the Journal of Sociology of Art and Literature (University of Tehran, 2021-2022). As president of the University of Tehran’s Sociology Student Scientific Association (2018-2019), he managed the journal Sareh. His work bridges critical cultural studies, historical sociology, and political economy, offering insights into inequality and social transformation.

 

Session 12

Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South 

Date/Time: Thursday, February 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Moderator

Neo Sithole is a PhD candidate at the University of Szeged in Hungary, working on a thesis that explores the history and trends of populism and political communication in sub-Saharan Africa. He has contributed to publications addressing topics such as democracy and democratic legitimation, the influence of populism on Western liberal democracies, and has a keen interest in European populism, Afro-European diplomacy, foreign policy, regional and global security concerns, and the promotion of global solidarity.

Discussants

Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo is a political scientist specializing in international relations and strategic studies at the University of Yaoundé II. He is also Executive Director and Principal Researcher at the Bureau of Strategic Studies — BESTRAT. He also teaches at military academies in Cameroon, including the War School, the Staff College in Yaoundé, the Gendarmerie Officers’ School, and the Center for Advanced Techniques in Law Enforcement (CPTMO). With ten scholarly books and over thirty scientific articles to his name, Dr. Yogo is a prominent scholar in his field. Through his teaching, research, and extensive consultations with the United Nations system, he is dedicated to enriching academic, military, and international arenas with valuable perspectives and insights into political science and international relations.

Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi, a Cameroonian researcher, boasts a broad spectrum of research interests. His areas of focus encompass international relations, regional cooperation, security studies, intelligence, governance, socio-spatial dynamics, terrorism, and para-terrorism across Africa. His Ph.D. studies centered on constructing intelligence cooperation to combat terrorism within the Lake Chad Basin Region. Since 2018, he has been actively involved as a researcher at the National Institute of Cartography (NIC), and starting in 2021, he has been instructing a course titled “Introduction to Security Studies” at the Cameroonian Institute of Diplomatic and Strategic Studies (ICEDIS). Gabriel’s research endeavors find their niche within the overarching context of international and strategic relations. More precisely, he delves into the dynamics of (in)security, conflicts, risks, and socio-spatial challenges, both in Africa and abroad. His work’s primary objective is to unearth perspectives that bring to life the evolution of security situations in Africa, spotlighting the risks and players in local, national, transnational, regional, cross-border, and international spaces. His approach is deeply interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary, intertwining political science, geopolitics, geostrategy, and political geography. This fusion allows him to dissect issues with a lens that accounts for the geographical facets of (in)security, as well as the stakeholders involved in shaping and overseeing contemporary security policies. Notably, his work has already yielded several scientific articles published in national and international journals.

Paper 1: Africa at the Test of Populism: Identity Mobilisations, Crises of Political Alternation, and the Trial of Democracy

Abstract: In a context in which African democracies struggle to consolidate, communal and identity-based populism plays an ambivalent role, serving both as a force of contestation and a tool for reinforcing power. This panel examined its influence on elections, political transitions, and democratic institutions in Africa. Three main areas structure the discussion: the study of populist strategies during electoral periods and their connections to identity-based mobilisations and clientelism; the analysis of populism’s role in political polarisation and the contestation of electoral outcomes; and the exploration of digital media as platforms for the dissemination of populist discourses and political radicalisation. Drawing on case studies and comparative approaches, this panel aims to understand how populism fluctuates between strengthening democratic participation and threatening institutional stability while proposing ways to enhance democratic resilience in the face of the rise of identity-based populism in Africa.

Yves Valéry Obame is a sociologist, holding a doctorate/Ph.D in political sociology obtained from the University of Yaoundé I in 2022. Lecturer-Researcher at the University of Bertoua in the Department of Political Science and also Associate Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Yaoundé I in Cameroon, he is also a member of the Cameroonian Laboratory for Studies and Research on Contemporary Societies (CERESC).His research focuses primarily on how electoral technologies (particularly biometrics), public policies and, more generally, socio-technical transformation processes structure electoral governance, the dynamics of citizenship and political behavior. A Swiss Confederation Excellence Scholar, he joined the Geneva Africa Lab and the Global Studies Institute to lead a postdoctoral project entitled “The making of citizen monitoring of voting in the era of biometrics in Cameroon: the experience of the ’11 Million Citizens’ Movement.” He examined, at ground level, the way in which an associative actor works, in an unprecedented way, to fight against electoral fraud to guarantee the authenticity of the results from the ballot boxes in a context deemed constrained and despite the biometric reform introduced into the electoral process in 2013. More broadly, this project reports on the dynamics of institutionalization of electoral biometrics and the contemporary transformations of political citizenship that they induce, revealing how, in Cameroon, the dominant group in power governs through biometrics.

Salomon Essaga Eteme is a sociologist with a Ph.D. in sociology. He serves as a lecturer at the University of Ngaoundere and an associate lecturer at the Catholic University of Central Africa (UCAC). His research adopts an interdisciplinary approach, focusing on the intersections of social dynamics, environmental issues, and development. He is a researcher at the CERESC Laboratory at the University of Yaoundé I and an associate researcher at the Centre for Environment and Development (CED). Dr ESSAGA ETEME also works as a social engineer and environmental consultant, offering his expertise to field-based projects that integrate social science insights with ecological challenges. He is currently a postdoctoral fellow under the RESSAC project, implemented by the CIFOR–ICRAF–GDA–UYI consortium, where he contributes to the sociological analysis of relationships between local communities and natural resource management policies.

Paper 2: Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom

Abstract: One-fifth of the democracies saw erosion between 2012 and 2024, with ‘us or them ‘ polarisation rising. At the heart of this process lies using ‘the people’ as a unifying force of civil society or as a divider. This paper aims to discuss the contribution of the people in either the democratization process or majoritarian domination, using Nigeria and the United Kingdom as reference countries. The failure of Nigeria to diversify its economy and the UK’s transition to renewable resources are examples of contrasting experiences of resource nationalism impacting environmental structural adjustment. Drawing from the decolonial environmentalism perspective, this paper explored how coloniality persists in shaping resource management, democracy, and socio-spatial injustice. This study adopts a qualitative research methodology through a systematic review of existing literature, policy documents, and case studies on Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 

Using a decolonial environmentalism lens, the paper critically analyzes scholarly debates, reports, and empirical findings to assess democracy, resource governance, and socio-environmental justice. Through focusing on community-based conservation in Nigeria and energy transition in the UK, the paper stresses the social inclusion of indigenous people’s knowledge base in development processes. The studies examined strengthen the principles of decolonial environmentalism in negating the division of the North from the South and the demission of despotic policies as opposed to egalitarianism. Thus, this paper has called for policy reforms in Nigeria’s resource governance, utilization of renewable energy, and fair international cooperation. By positioning justice at the centre of a pyrrhic vision, this paper presents a critical view of what democracy and post-colonial, ecologically just and sustainable environments can mean in the future.

Oludele Mayowa Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University. His research focuses on addressing plastic waste pollution, promoting environmental sustainability, and advancing development and green practices.

Mr. Busayo Olakitan Badmos is a postgraduate student in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University. His research interests span sustainability studies, environmental crime, deforestation, conflict, illegal mining, and development. He is committed to exploring the complex intersections between environmental sustainability and socio-economic challenges, contributing to research that informs policy and promotes sustainable development.

Paper 3: Viral but Powerless? Digital Activism, Political Resistance, and the Struggle for Governance Reform in Kenya

Abstract: As digital activism reshapes civic engagement globally, African Gen Z activists are leading a new wave of political resistance. In Kenya, movements like #RejectFinanceBill2024 and #OccupyParliament have leveraged social media to challenge state policies, mobilising unprecedented digital dissent. Yet, despite their viral success, these movements struggle to translate online mobilisation into tangible governance reforms. This paradox, persistent digital resistance versus limited institutional change, raises urgent questions about the effectiveness of digital activism in strengthening democratic accountability. This study offers a theoretical examination of Kenya’s digital activism through a tri-theoretical lens: Political Process Theory (PPT), Digital Contention Theory (DCT), and Connective Action Theory (CAT). It critically investigates:
• What structural barriers and political opportunities shape the trajectory of digital activism in Kenya?
• Why digital movements persist online despite repression but struggle to institutionalize change?
• How Gen Z activists challenge traditional leadership models by mobilising through
decentralised digital networks?
By situating Kenya’s digital activism within broader global debates on digital resistance, governance, and democratic resilience, this theoretical inquiry develops a conceptual framework for understanding the evolving relationship between online political engagement and structural constraints. It provides insights relevant not only to Africa but also to global policymakers, scholars, and activists seeking to bridge the gap between digital mobilisation and sustainable political transformation.
This paper will provoke critical discussions on the future of digital resistance-can online activism move beyond momentary disruption to drive lasting institutional change?

Asenath Mwithigah is a Graduate student, United States International University-Africa. She is a social development expert with over 10 years of professional experience in working with non-profits organizations nationally, and internationally to strengthen their programming and unlock the organizational potential on Environmental, Social and Governance sectors to contribute to the Development Goals. She is currently the Technical Director of a national youth organization working to document the progress made by young people in Kenya in various sectors contributing to SDGs. 

 

Session 13

Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis 

Date/Time: Thursday, March 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Leila Alieva is an Associate of REES, Oxford School for Global and Area Studies (OSGA), previously Senior Common Room Member and Academic Visitor at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University. She holds a PhD from Moscow University. Originally from Azerbaijan, she founded and directed two think tanks in Baku and held fellowships at Harvard University, UC Berkeley, the Kennan Institute (Washington, DC), the NATO Defence College (Rome), and the IFK (Institut Für Kulturwissenschaften) in Vienna. My research and publications cover Azerbaijan, the Caucasus, Russia, and the broader Former Soviet Union, and range thematically from energy security and conflicts to democracy in oil-rich states, as well as issues surrounding integration into the EU (ENP and EaP) and NATO. Currently, Leyla is analysing the role of religious identities in transition, as well as comparing the role of the opposition in rentier states.

Discussants

Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University. He holds a Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from Indiana University Bloomington, with research focusing on criminology, spatial justice, and state violence. His work examines the epidemiology of violence, the intersection of crime and politics, and the criminalization of poverty and race. He coined the term criminal populism to describe how politicians exploit crime as political capital, a concept explored in his publication Criminal Populism: Crime as Political Capital in the Philippines and the United States. His Epidemiology of Violence project has mapped over 7,000 cases of extrajudicial killings in the Philippines using GIS. His research is published in leading criminology journals, and his forthcoming article, From Sociology of Poverty to Criminology of the Elite, explores elite criminality. Dr. Magno has served as a Research Fellow at Philippine Normal University and a Visiting Research Associate at Ateneo de Manila University. A dedicated educator, he has received multiple teaching and service awards for student engagement and community-based learning.

Dr. Amedeo Varriale  earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism. During his academic career, Dr. Varriale contributed as a research assistant to the development of a significant textbook project on the global resurgence of nationalism, titled“The New Nationalism in America and Beyond,” co-authored by Robert Schertzer and Eric Taylor Woods. He has written for ECPS before but has also been published by other academic outlets ranging from the Journal of Dialogue Studies to UEL’s Crossing Conceptual Boundaries. Currently, he is also an “affiliated researcher” for the Centre for the Study of Global Nationalisms (CSGN).

Paper 1: Reimagining Populism: Ethnic Dynamics and the Construction of ‘the People’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract: The study aims to present the multifaceted nature of ‘the people’ within the ethnopolitical context of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Departing from the traditional focus on ethno-nationalism in the populist framing of ‘the people’ in BiH, the main argument is that understanding ‘the people’ in BiH requires a dialectical relationship encompassing three forms of populism: inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic. While inter-ethnic populism constructs ‘the people’ through an agonistic frontier among ethnic groups in the most common sense, intra-ethnic populism establishes agonistic frontiers within them, positioning ‘the people’ in opposition to their political elites. Finally, cross-ethnic populism seeks to construct ‘the people’ around populist demands that transcend ethnic divisions, uniting groups through shared claims that cannot be expressed within the ethnic framework. By tracing these patterns, this approach offers new insights into conceptualizing populism, seeing it not as a disruptive force but as a potential catalyst for democratic renewal. It highlights how populism may enhance political pluralism by challenging the status quo and affirming democratic capacities around new subjectivities beyond ethnicity.

Jasmin Hasanović is an Assistant Professor and researcher at the Department for Political Science at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Science. His field of research encompasses social and political movements, socialism, (post)Yugoslav studies as well as geopolitics and cyberpolitics. He is also interested in critical political theory, dealing with contemporary debates on democracy and the relationship between activism and the idea of emancipation in contemporary political theory. 

Paper 2: Institutionalizing the Assembled People 

Abstract: For centuries, the task of establishing a democratic system has been monopolised by specialists. The task of making decisions on public affairs has also been reserved for a professional political ruling class. This paper is based on the hypothesis that, in the face of this monopolisation of both instituting and instituted political activity, ordinary individuals are able not only to decide but also to decide how they are going to decide – in other words, to create their own rules collectively.

The contribution will test this hypothesis based on fieldwork conducted over two years within the radical democracy movement in Commercy (Meuse), from the start of the Gilets jaunes assemblies in November 2018 to the presentation of a list in the March 2020 municipal elections, aimed at empowering the popular assembly gathering local residents. Mobilising ethnography, semi-directive interviews and collation of materials, this paper aims to reconstruct the direct democracy system of assemblies both imagined and instituted by Commercy’s actors to replace representative democracy. Since the start of the Yellow Vests movement, the group has carried out extensive theoretical imagining of how this new system might work, the practical problems the assembly would face, as well as the fundamental rules that would frame the assembly’s exercise of power. The aim here is to give an account of this instituting activity by the movement, based on its practice of direct democracy in assemblies. 

While their direct democracy practices of assemblies have been instituted since the beginning of the Gilets Jaunes movement, it is in its electoral phase that the movement will institutionalise what the democratic system it practices could look like if it came to power. It would do what representative government has always refused to do: “give an institutional role to the assembled people”, according to Bernard Manin in Principles of Representative Government. During the election campaign, the Commercy group thus collectively drafted a local Constitution and a Charter of Commitment, created from their practices during the Yellow Vests, which aimed to organise the exercise of power by the popular assembly if their list were to be elected. The group thus reinterpreted fundamental political concepts through the prism of assembly direct democracy. If the concepts of constituent paradox, constituent power, constitutional text (both its interpretation and revision), but also self-limitation, deliberation, representation, execution of decisions and participation, have a particular meaning under representative government, the aim here is to explore the meaning attributed to them in the context of this experiment in assembly direct democracy, and to see how they relate to other democratic conceptions. This chapter therefore takes the actors’ reflections on these fundamental political concepts seriously, as they represent a movement’s reinvention of the political, based on its own practices.

By showing the system devised by the Commercy group, this paper takes seriously Castoriadis’ injunction that “creating forms of democracy that are not alienating, where people participate in modern society, can only be the work of the whole people, not of a theorist”. It aims to show how a movement can create new forms of democracy and answer institutional questions traditionally left either to theorists or to policy-makers, in a perspective of democratising the theorisation of the political.

Sixtine Van Outryve is a J.S.D. candidate at Yale Law School, where she obtained her LL.M. degree as a BAEF fellow in 2018. She is also a lecturer at Radboud Universiteit in The Netherlands, teaching political theory to master’s students. In March 2024, Sixtine defended her Ph.D. in Law at the Centre for Philosophy of Law of U.C.Louvain in Belgium, her home country. In her dissertation, she developed a normative theory of communalist direct democracy – defending that public power be exercised by the assembled people at the local level – and analyzed its practice by social movements through qualitative research methods. During her doctoral journey, she was a visiting researcher at the School of Social and Political Science of Edinburgh University in the United Kingdom (2021-2022) and at the CERAPS of Université de Lille in France (Spring 2023). She also holds a master’s degree in Law from K.U.Leuven in Belgium (2015), as well as a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy (2014) and in Law (2013), both from U.C. Louvain, where she became a teaching assistant in Law at the beginning of her career. 

Paper 3: Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy

Abstract: This paper examines representation and the right to diplomacy as fundamental pillars of democracy, emphasizing their role in ensuring the meaningful inclusion of all peoples in policy formulation and decision-making processes. Diplomacy is often reserved to sovereign states, leaving many unrepresented nations, indigenous groups, and minority communities without access to critical international and institutional platforms. The exclusion of these groups from diplomatic engagement undermines democratic principles by reinforcing a model that fails to reflect the diversity of political and cultural identities.

By analyzing cases where communities are denied representation, this study will focus on the Hmong community in Laos, who face systemic discrimination through an indigenous rights lens; the Ogoni in Nigeria, whose lack of representation is tied to environmental and climate justice struggles; and the people of Guam, who remain disenfranchised under the U.S. territorial rule, highlighting the challenges of decolonization and self-determination. The study will also explore the institutionalization of representation through case studies of organizations such as the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) and Minority Rights Group (MRG), which seek to secure spaces for participation and representation. 

The closure of spaces diplomatic spaces contributes to the erosion of democratic participation, the silencing of historically marginalized voices, and reinforces unequal power structures in global governance. Recognizing diplomacy and representation as fundamental rights strengthens democratic resilience by fostering dialogue, inclusion, and peaceful conflict resolution.

This paper argues that establishing frameworks for broader participation is essential for the future of democracy, advocating for mechanisms that go beyond state-centered diplomacy and amplify all voices.

Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez is is a human rights advocate with experience in international advocacy, civil society engagement, and diplomatic affairs. She is global advocacy officer at UNPO, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization where she works directly with representatives of minority communities to support their advocacy efforts. Nieves has experience in consular affairs, particularly on migration issues, as well as in cooperation for development and youth participation in public policy-making. She holds an MSt in Diplomatic Studies from the University of Oxford and has a background in diplomatic engagement, focusing on capacity-building, advocacy, and international cooperation. She is also the co-author of the chapter “The Border Issue: From Policy to Cultural Identity” in Continuum Investigativo y diversidad lingüístico-cultural del sur de México (2021), which examines how the delineation of borders has shaped national identities at a nation-state level, often marginalizing identiteis that do not align with political boundaries.

 

Session 14

From Bots to Ballots: AI, Populism, and the Future of Democratic Participation 

Date/Time: Thursday, March 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Dr. Paolo Gerbaudo is a sociologist and political theorist at Department of Political Science and Administration and senior researcher in Social Science at Complutense University in Madrid and lead researcher for the After Order project at Alameda Institute.

Discussants

Jasmin Hasanović is an Assistant Professor and researcher at the Department for Political Science at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Science. His field of research encompasses social and political movements, socialism, (post)Yugoslav studies as well as geopolitics and cyberpolitics. He is also interested in critical political theory, dealing with contemporary debates on democracy and the relationship between activism and the idea of emancipation in contemporary political theory. 

Dr. Alparslan Akkus is a Teaching Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Eberhard Karls University Tübingen, Germany. He is an international journalist with more than 20 years’ experience in the field. Akkus has published a Turkish-English edition of The New York Times. As a blogger for The Huffington Post, he writes mainly about freedom of expression, human rights and foreign policy issues. He is the author of “Gezi Park Protestolari ve Twitter Diplomasisi”, or “Gezi Park Protests and Twitter Diplomacy”, a monograph derived from his PhD thesis. Scholarly he focuses on immigration studies and social policy research. His fields of interest are political communication, populism, public diplomacy and networked social movements.

Paper 1: Conceptions of Democracy and Artificial Intelligence in Administration and Government: Who Wants an Algorithm to Govern Us? 

Abstract: This paper examines how varying conceptions of democracy influence citizens’ support for the use of artificial intelligence (AI) at different levels of decision-making authority. We draw on original survey data (June 2023) from over 3,000 individuals in Spain. The survey was designed to capture participants support for AI‐based decision-making across different levels of authority: from administrative tasks to informing political decisions or standing for election. In general, respondents are sceptical about this possibility and show low support for almost all the situations posed – except for routine administrative tasks, where there is a (slim) majority of respondents who would support it. We analyse to what extent distinct democratic conceptions shape support for algorithmic decision-making at these levels, while controlling for other relevant socio-demographic and attitudinal variables (including personality and self-perception). Our findings reveal that individuals who endorse representative and populist-oriented conceptions of democracy are significantly less inclined to support AI in political decision-making, with the former supporting it only for the administrative level and the latter in any case. Conversely, those with authoritarian-oriented conceptions exhibit a higher level of support when AI is used at higher levels of decision-making. Finally, individuals endorsing expert-oriented conceptions support algorithmic decision-making at all levels. These results broadly align with prior research (except in the case of expert-oriented conceptions) and suggest that scepticism towards AI in governance is not uniform but is crucially mediated by citizens’ normative views on democracy.

Joan Font is research professor at the Institute of Advanced Social Studies (IESA-CSIC). His research interests involve any of the different ways public administrations have to know citizen preferences, including elections, surveys, local participation processes, citizen juries, deliberative polls, referendums or advisory councils. His papers about participatory institutions have been published in journals as European Journal of Political Research, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Politics, Public Administration, Political Studies, Politics & Policy or Administration & Society. His books include Font, J, della Porta, D and Sintomer, Y (eds) (2014): Participatory democracy in Southern Europe: causes, characteristics and consequences, Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield or Font, J and Méndez, M (eds) (2013): Surveying ethnic minorities and immigrant populations: methodological challenges and research strategies, Amsterdam University Press Research series, Amsterdam. 

Paper 2: How does ChatGPT shape European cultural heritage for the future of Democracy? 

Abstract: Cultural heritage plays an essential role in shaping our identities and understanding our past, present, and future. However, it is also fragile and vulnerable to the ravages of time, conflict, natural disasters, and now, artificial intelligence. 

The launch of ChatGPT has sparked immense interest both in the opportunities it offers and for the risks involved in its generative artificial intelligence linguistic model. To date, research has been conducted on its use in various fields, from natural language processing to customer service or content creation, as well as in the education and public health sectors. Nevertheless, little has been addressed in the field of cultural heritage.

Based on the above, this article presents the results of a study in which ChatGPT-4 was commissioned to generate thoughts, written representations and visual productions about the importance of European Cultural Heritage values in the future of Democracy. To this end, a battery of tests was developed to assess their interaction, understanding, production and dissemination in relation to European Cultural Heritage and democratic values. 

According to an interpretive-comparative analysis of 30 interactions, ChatGPT-4, while providing answers of sufficient quality to address European Cultural Heritage, is unaware of the values underlying this heritage and the future importance of its preservation for European identity and democracy.

Alonso Escamilla is Manager of European Projects and Research at the Catholic University of Ávila (Spain). For this same institution, he is a PhD Student on Cultural Heritage and Digitalisation and a Member of the Research Group: Territory, History and Digital Cultural Heritage. He have successfully designed, implemented and evaluated numerous projects for, among others, the following international organisations: Council of Europe, European Commission, European Trade Union Confederation, Foundation for European Progressive Studies, European Youth Forum, and United Nations Development Programme.

Paula Gonzalo is Projects Coordinator of the Foundation for Cooperation and Community Development of El Salvador (CORDES) and Researcher at the University of Salamanca (Spain). She has successfully designed, implemented, and evaluated numerous projects for, among others, the following international organisations: the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the European Trade Union Institute, the SALTO Participation and Information Resource Centre, and the Ibero-American Social Security Organisation.

Paper 3:  The New Elite: How Big Tech is Reshaping White Working-Class Consciousness

Abstract: While Silicon Valley elites were once synonymous with liberal, white-collar startup culture, big tech has strategically realigned with the political right during the second Trump Administration. Elon Musk’s leadership in the Department of Government Efficiency highlights the consequences of this shift on U.S. conservatism. Drawing on three case studies—the Trump administration’s mass firing of federal workers, DOGE’s takeover of key government systems, and DOGE’s mass emails to federal employees—I examine how Musk’s outsized role in the second Trump Administration has challenged the working-class consciousness and white identity politics that have fueled Trump’s contemporary success. 

I argue that Musk’s reliance on tech-driven logics of efficiency and optimization to purge so-called ‘elites’ from the federal government has simply replaced technocrats with technology itself, reinforcing the very institutional and bureaucratic structures the political right opposes. By prioritizing technological efficiency at the expense of low- and middle-income federal employees, I show how these logics challenges Trump’s alignment with his white working class by substituting a people-versus-elite framework with an emerging people-versus-tech alternative. The resulting bipartisan dissatisfaction underscores the limits of right-wing populism in the age of big tech.

Aly Hill is a third-year Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Communication at The University of Utah. She specializes in political extremism, harassment, and mass shootings, with a focus on democratic institutions and public discourse. She has published and presented on topics including the Alt-right, QAnon’s digital migration, mass shooting news coverage, the U.S. anti-immigration movement, online harassment, and far-right memes. Aly holds an M.A. in Communication with a concentration in political communication from Johns Hopkins University and a B.S. in Political Science and Communication from The University of Utah. Outside of academia, Aly collaborates with experts in education, government, public policy, and data science to develop frameworks aimed at improving diplomacy and community investment.

Paper 4:  Bubbles, Clashes and Populism: “The People” in an algorithmically mediated world

Abstract: This paper examines how algorithms perpetuate the “us/them” antagonism by creating filter bubbles that isolate users in echo chambers and filter out clashes that intensify conflict between opposing groups. It investigates the implications of these dynamics in the digital realm and their spillover into analogue democratic interactions. By shaping information flows, algorithms redefine collective identity and challenge the cohesion of democratic societies. Populism amplifies these effects by harnessing algorithmic divisions to mobilize support, yet it also serves as a lens to understand how people seek representation in fragmented publics. Focusing on insights from communication science, the aim is to illuminate populism’s complex role in an algorithmically mediated world.

Amina Vatreš is a teaching assistant at the Department of Communication Studies/Journalism at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Sciences. She was awarded with the “Silver Badge of the University of Sarajevo” twice for academic excellence, as one of the best students of both undergraduate and MA studies. Currently she is a PhD candidate enrolled in the interdisciplinary doctoral program, with her dissertation focusing on the field of artificial intelligence and its communicological-philosophical implications. She is the author and co-author of several scientific papers and book reviews indexed in international scientific databases, and has actively participated in a significant number of organizational committees for both international and domestic conferences, as well as in conducting PR activities and promoting numerous scientific events. Her research interests encompass critical topics at the intersection of communication, technology, and society, including algorithmic censorship, the societal impact of artificial intelligence, AI-driven disinformation, and the sociopolitical challenges posed by advanced machine learning systems.

 

Session 15

From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, Crisis, and Democracy  

Date/Time: Thursday, April 2, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Chair

Amir Ali has been a faculty member at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi since 2007. Prior to this he taught at the Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi for three years. He was Agatha Harrison Memorial Visiting Fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford between the years 2012 to 2014. He has authored two books South Asian Islam and British Multiculturalism (Routledge, 2016) and Brexit and Liberal Democracy: Populism, Sovereignty and the Nation-State (Routledge, 2022). His areas of teaching, research and writing are political theory, multiculturalism, group rights, British politics and political Islam. His work has been published in journals such as Economic and Political Weekly, Ethnic and Racial Studies and the Journal of Human Values. His regularly written political commentary on Indian and global politics has appeared in the Economic and Political Weekly, Al Jazeera English, the Indian periodical Outlook and in Indian broadsheet newspapers such as The Indian Express, The Hindu, and The Telegraph. He has written over 30 book reviews in varied publications.

Discussants

Dr. Azize Sargin is an independent researcher an d consultant on external relations for non-governmental organisations. She holds a doctorate in International Relations, with a focus on Migration Studies, from the Brussels School of International Studies at the University of Kent. Her research interest covers migrant belonging and integration, diversity and cities, and transnationalism. Azize had a 15-year professional career as a diplomat in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she held various positions and was posted to different countries, including Romania, the United States, and Belgium. During her last posting, she served as the political counsellor at the Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the EU.

Professor Ibrahim Ozturk is a visiting fellow at the University of Duisburg-Essen since 2017. He is studying developmental, institutional, and international economics. His research focuses on the Japanese, Turkish, and Chinese economies. Currently, he is working on emerging hybrid governance models and the rise of populism in the Emerging Market Economies. As a part of that interest, he studies the institutional quality of China’s Modern Silk Road Project /The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), its governance model, and implications for the global system. He also teaches courses on business and entrepreneurship in the Emerging Market Economies, such as BRICS/MINT countries. Ozturk’s Ph.D. thesis is on the rise and decline of Japan’s developmental institutions in the post-Second WWII era.

Paper 1: Can Democracy (or Anything Else) Rescue Civilization While the Rules Keep Changing? 

Abstract: This paper explores the decision-making process as described by Ross Ashby in his “Design for a Brain”.  This explains how we can build a simple decider-mechanism into a highly adaptive brain-like system, and indeed it tallies with Piaget’s developmental hierarchy of human development.  Stafford Beer showed the same development for “collective brains” of social groups.  On these models, I discuss (i) the thinking and voting processes within democracy, especially the “panic” (populist) choice, when none of the options available seem relevant, and (ii) the options for authoritarian rulers (benign or otherwise) plus their likely decisions, and the reasons for them.  I also consider conflicts of interest within a democracy; and (following Aslaksen) I extend the Ashby/Beer model into international politics — with a table comparing all three. I then apply this approach to two key problems (barely-solvable politically): (1) Climate-change and (2) Limits-to-Growth, and argue that these two causes are largely responsible for ●immigration difficulties, ●minor wars,

●Cost-of-living — and are hence THE CAUSE OF POPULIST “PANICS”.  Next, I consider the power of Mega-Companies, and how we might deal with them — preferably at an international level.

 I conclude by endorsing some basic revisions of democratic procedures, including  

●use of AI (to overcome some serious obstacles such as objections to universal pensions), 

●Ranked choice voting, and 

●Compulsory voting (which also makes identity and fraud checks much easier).                                                  

Robert R. Traill has a PhD in Cybernetics and Psychology at Brunel, while also serving a one-year fellowship in the social sciences at Birmingham University. While teaching science in high schools, he developed an interest in the shortcomings of the political system. Thus, he went back to Melbourne University to do a BA in Economics, Political Science, Psychology, after which he worked in the corporate world. At North Thames Gas Board in London, he negotiated a Buyer-Decision-Model project with Professor Gordon Pask and his “System Simulation” company.  Within NTGB, he also worked in Market Research, and on the side, attended a course on “Biological Bases of Behaviour” with the Open University. He published in the Journal of Psychiatry and Psychiatric Disorders and developed his research interests in Economics and Sociology. 

Paper 2: The Politics of Manipulated Resonance: Personalised Leadership in Populism

Abstract: This article examines the role of personalised leadership in populism, focusing on its impact on the construction of political hegemony within the process of signifying the people. Adopting a political sociological perspective, it integrates theoretical frameworks on the personalisation of politics, leadership, disintermediation, and populism, exploring how populist leaders construct an imagined ‘people’ and establish direct, emotionally charged connections with them. The study highlights how populist leadership represents a specific trajectory within the broader phenomenon of personalisation, shaped by its distinctive conception of politics and democracy. Through the strategic manipulation of resonance, populist leaders politicise social resentment and frame ‘the people’ as a symbolic and homogeneous community, characterised by anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. This dynamic is reinforced through symbolic and performative strategies that unify fragmented societies, leveraging the politics of similarity to forge strong, direct bonds with their constituencies.

A key example of this dynamic is Donald Trump’s leadership, which exemplifies how populist leaders engage in disintermediation, bypassing traditional institutions and media filters to establish an unmediated connection with their supporters. Trump’s rhetoric and communicative style—marked by anti-establishment narratives, the rejection of political correctness, and the strategic use of social media—illustrate how populist leaders transform disintermediation into a challenge to liberal democracy.

While primarily theoretical, this article lays the groundwork for further empirical investigations into the mechanisms and consequences of populist leadership across different cultural and political contexts. By advancing the discourse on political sociology, it offers a nuanced understanding of how populist leaders manipulate resonance and redefine political representation, shedding light on the broader implications of populism for contemporary democracy.         

Lorenzo Viviani is Full Professor of Political Sociology at the Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy. He serves as Secretary of the Political Sociology Section of the Italian Sociological Association (AIS) and is an active member of several other international sociological associations. Currently, he is the Editor-in-Chief of Società Mutamento Politica – Italian Sociological Review (Class A, ANVUR). His recent publications include books, book chapters, and journal articles focusing on the rise of populism in the context of post-representative democracy, with a particular emphasis on the sociology of political parties and leadership.

 

Session 16 

Voices of Democracy: Art, Law, and Leadership in the Era of Polarization 

Date/Time: Thursday, April 16, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Joni Doherty is senior program officer for Democracy and the Arts at Kettering Foundation. Doherty develops, manages, and evaluates programs involving the intersection of democracy and the arts with the aim of supporting the mission, vision, and values of the foundation. Because human experiences involve all the senses, the arts engage with aspects of being human overlooked by analytically based methodologies. This multisensory approach to research can offer fresh insights into democracy’s challenges and the struggle to realize its ideals.

Doherty’s past experiences as a studio artist, teaching in the American studies program at Franklin Pierce University, and conducting research at the intersections of aesthetics and ethics have offered her opportunities to work collaboratively with artists, curators, communities, organizations, and institutions. Since coming to the Kettering Foundation in 2015, she has led research projects that explored the ways in which higher education institutions, humanities councils, libraries, and museums have contributed to strengthening democracy. For example, the multi-year Historic Decisions project involved writing and editing guides for deliberation about historical issues, working with museums across the country as they developed their own historic decisions issue guides and associated programs, leading workshops, and organizing conference presentations.

Doherty’s reviews and essays have been published in Art New England, Deliberative Pedagogy, Deliberation and the Work of Higher Education, First-Year Civic Engagement, Connections, and the Higher Education Exchange.

Doherty earned a BFA in painting at the University of New Hampshire in Durham, an MA in cultural studies at Simmons College, Boston, and a PhD in philosophy and art theory from the Institute for Doctoral Studies in the Visual Arts in Portland, Maine.

Discussants

Dr. Justin Patch studies music in American politics; sound studies; East Asian art music; and music in the African diaspora. He is currently engaged in two projects, a monograph on the artistic practices of contemporary American populism and an ethnographic study of sound and religion in the post-industrial areas of the Hudson Valley. His monograph, Discordant Democracy: Noise, Affect, Populism and the Presidential Campaign, was published by Routledge in 2019, and a sound studies text book Re-Making Sound: An Experiential Approach to Sound Studies, co-authored with Tom Porcello, was published by Bloomsbury in 2021.

Dr. Amedeo Varriale  earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism. During his academic career, Dr. Varriale contributed as a research assistant to the development of a significant textbook project on the global resurgence of nationalism, titled“The New Nationalism in America and Beyond,” co-authored by Robert Schertzer and Eric Taylor Woods. He has written for ECPS before but has also been published by other academic outlets ranging from the Journal of Dialogue Studies to UEL’s Crossing Conceptual Boundaries. Currently, he is also an “affiliated researcher” for the Centre for the Study of Global Nationalisms (CSGN).

Paper 1: ‘I Miss My Name’: Why Black American Election Workers Like Ruby Freeman Turn to Defamation Law to Defend Democracy

Abstract: After the 2020 election, President Trump’s personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani said many outrageous statements about the election which eventually led to his disbarment in two jurisdictions.  Giuliani also defamed two election workers in Georgia named Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss, concocting a bizarre and untrue conspiracy that they added suitcases of outside ballots into the official count in Georgia. They had done nothing of the sort. But based on this defamatory lie, these women’s lives were turned upside down. They faced verbal and physical threats. 

This paper will explore the approach by the legal nonprofit Protect Democracy to fight disinformation by using defamation law in the United States and plaintiffs who are election workers, including Freeman and her daughter Moss. Protect Democracy found that disinformation about the 2020 election was being spread online by a handful of superspreaders like Giuliani, who had large followings on social media. This legal approach on relying on defamation law has been criticized by First Amendment scholar Professor RonNell Jones. Still, this piece will argue that defamation law is an important and effective tool in fighting disinformation like the Big Lie that Donald Trump was the true winner of the 2020 presidential election. 

The victory that Freeman and Moss won against Rudy Giuliani was so eye-poppingly large at over $145 million that it serves as a potent deterrent for other would-be defamatory election deniers. And in a world where other mechanisms of accountability, like the criminal justice systems at the state and federal levels, have been slow or ineffective at holding those who tried to overthrow the 2020 election liable, several defamation cases about 2020 have either settled or ended with impactful judgments. This piece will also note how the attacks on Ms. Freeman and her daughter were racialized and why having access to compensation is particularly needed for middle- and lower-class Black victims of defamatory campaigns. 

Ciara Torres-Spelliscy is a Brennan Center Fellow and Professor of Law at Stetson University. She was counsel in the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and an associate at Arnold & Porter. She is a graduate of Harvard and Columbia Law. She has testified before Congress as an expert on campaign finance. She has also helped draft Supreme Court briefs. She is the author of the books Corporate Citizen (Carolina 2016) and Political Brands (Elgar 2019), and Corporatocracy: How to Protect Democracy from Dark Money and Corrupt Politicians (NYU 2024). She published over 20 law review articles and hundreds of legal op-eds. She was a legal contributor to CNN for the 2024 election. She has been published in Washington Post, New York Times, Slate, L.A. Times, Boston Review, Roll Call, Business Week, Forbes, The Atlantic, USA Today, San Francisco Chronicle, The Hill, Huffington Post, Judicature, The Nation, Salon, Talking Points Memo, Tampa Bay Times, The Progressive, Medium, and Shondaland. She has also been quoted by the media in Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Time, Bloomberg, Mother Jones, SCOTUS Blog, Politico, Slate, L.A. Times, Boston Globe, NBC.com, Vox, VICE, Sirius Radio, NPR, Fox, CSPAN, DNA TV, and NY1.

Paper 2: State Institutions in Divided Societies: Religious Policy and Societal Dissatisfaction in the Israeli Military

Abstract: This study examines state institutional dissatisfaction in democracies, focusing on military institutions in religiously divided societies. We argue that all-encompassing societal dissatisfaction occurs when a state institution in a heterogeneous society applies a single policy to diverse groups with discretion and secrecy. Using a mixed methods design and an original survey, we investigate the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as a case study in a democracy without full separation of state and religion. Our findings reveal significant dissatisfaction with the IDF’s religious practices among both secular and religious Israeli Jews. Paradoxically, this shared dissatisfaction may contribute to institutional stability by preventing any group from feeling privileged. The study contributes to understanding policy implementation in divided societies and has implications for military integration strategies in diverse contexts.

Niva Golan-Nadir is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Reichman University. She  received her Ph.D. from the school of Political Science at the University of Haifa, where she further completed a post-doctoral fellowship at the division of Public Administration and Policy. She is currently a Research Associate at the Center for Policy Research, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy, The University at Albany and at the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University. Her research focuses on a comparative analysis of enduring gaps between public preferences and legal-institutional arrangements in democracies. Her research interests also include comparative politics, public administration, state-religion relations and Israel studies. Her recent book, ‘Public Preferences and Institutional Designs: Israel and Turkey compared’ (2022, Palgrave Macmillan), has been awarded final list and honorary mention (second place) by the Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies and Concordia University Library. During 2024-2025, she is a visiting scholar at the Taub Center for Israel Studies at New-York University.

Michael Freedman is a postdoctoral fellow in the Departments of Political Science and International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from MIT. His research focuses on religion and conflict in Israel and the Muslim world, examining the political behavior of religious actors – including rabbis, imams, and religious social movements – and inquires how they perceive the state, whether they collaborate with it, and how they behave towards actors they perceive as enemies. His research uses sermons and legal rulings produced by religious leaders to explain why some leaders confer the state with legitimacy while others choose to challenge it.

Paper 3: Pericles’ Funeral Oration: A Populist Rhetoric for War and Politics

Abstract: Pericles’ Funeral Oration, delivered in 431 BCE during the Peloponnesian War, is often celebrated as a powerful tribute to Athenian democracy, extolling the virtues of the city-state’s political system and its citizens. However, this paper argues that the oration should not be viewed solely as a celebration of democratic ideals, but rather as a populist and manipulative rhetorical strategy employed by Pericles to justify his failure to achieve a swift resolution to the war, which he had initially promised when persuading the Athenians to engage in the conflict.

Pericles is traditionally depicted as the ideal democratic leader whose populism did not fuel ochlocracy. His nuanced emotional appeal to the Athenian demos, whose decision-making he controlled, ensured that governance remained structured and reasoned.

Drawing on political philosophy, particularly the concept of populism, this paper posits that Pericles’ speech was a political maneuver designed to sustain his authority and maintain public support for a war that was escalating beyond his initial expectations. Political philosophy often reveals how, in the early stages of war, politicians frame it as a manageable, short-term endeavor with limited costs. However, wars frequently spiral out of control, becoming protracted and costly due to miscalculations, shifting political realities, and unforeseen consequences. 

Having initially convinced the Athenians that the Peloponnesian War would be a quick victory, Pericles faced mounting criticism as the war dragged on. In this context, the Funeral Oration was not so much a celebration of democratic values but rather a tactical effort to rally the populace by evoking patriotic sentiments and framing the sacrifices of the dead as part of a noble and necessary cause. By emphasizing the greatness of Athens and its citizens, Pericles attempted to redirect public dissatisfaction, portraying the war as essential to preserving Athenian ideals, even though it was straying further from the swift, decisive victory he had once promised.

In this way, the oration serves not so much as an exaltation of democracy, but as a populist tactic designed to manipulate the masses into supporting a war that was increasingly seen as spiralling beyond the leader’s control. Consequently, Pericles’ rhetoric shifts from celebrating democracy to prioritizing the consolidation of power and shaping public opinion in the face of an escalating and uncontrollable conflict.

Elizabeth Kosmeratou is a Professor in the History Department at the University of Illinois, Springfield.

Paper 4: The exclusionary identity of ‘the People’ in Radical Right Populism

Abstract: The growth of radical right politics raises concerns about authoritarian and exclusionary scenarios, while populism is understood as a logic that articulates democratic demands and strengthens political engagement. There is a lack of research on the democratic views of radical right populism. Moreover, the burgeoning literature on these phenomena generally examines either the supply or demand side of politics, neglecting the narrative dimension that emerges from the two intertwining. This article aims to fill these gaps by using the heuristic of the “emotion narrative” that circulates between the supply and demand sides of radical right populist parties to examine their political culture. 

Assuming that populism creates social identities through the affective articulation of popular demands, focusing on the “narrative of emotions” (and not only on the narrative dimension of particular emotions) allows us to analyse how social and political objects, facts, ideas, and scenarios generate political culture. Through a mixed-methods comparative study of Portugal and Italy, this article assesses the emotion narratives of the parties Chega and Fratelli d’Italia. The dataset includes 14 semi-structured interviews with MPs and an original survey with 1,900 responses regarding political realities (on the democratic system, power structures, ethnic diversity, political history, and role of the media) and hypothetical scenarios (on authoritarianism, the rise of migration and diversity, anti-corruption, securitisation of the state, and expanded use of referendums). The emotion narratives of radical right populist political cultures engender democratic visions rooted in exclusionary identities with positive affection for centralism, authoritarianism, and securitisation of the state, as opposed to innovation and participation.

Cristiano Gianolla is a researcher at the Centre for Social Studies (CES) of the University of Coimbra (UC), where he integrates research thematic line on Democracy, Justice and Human Rights. He obtained a PhD in Sociology and Political Science (cum laude) from Coimbra and Sapienza University of Rome, with a dissertation on Gandhi’s democratic theory and a comparative study of emerging political parties in India and Italy. Cristiano is the Principal Investigator and Work Package leader of PROTEMO (Horizon Europe, 2024-2026) and CO3 (Horizon Europe, 2024-2027, with Vanda Amaro Dias) projects. He was the Principal Investigator (PI) of the UNPOP project (FCT, 2021-2025) and a team member of the ECHOES (H2020, 2018-2021), ALICE (ERC, 2011-2016), and FRANET (2021-2022) projects. He is a co-founding and co-coordinating member of the ‘Inter-Thematic group on Migrations’, editor of e-cadernos scientific journal and a reviewer for scientific journals. Cristiano coordinates the PhD course ‘Democratic Theories and Institutions’ and the MA course ‘Critical Intercultural Dialogue’ at the Faculty of Economics of the UC, where he also teaches on the PhD course ‘State, Democracy and Legal Pluralism’. His publications include authored and edited books, chapters, and articles on democratic theory, populism, emotion, narrative, postcolonialism, intercultural dialogue, citizenship, and migration.

Lisete S. M. Mónico is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences of the University of Coimbra, Portugal, Ph.D. in Social Psychology from University of Coimbra, European Diploma of Advanced Studies in Social Psychology (DEEAPS, Università degli Studi di Bari), teaches courses in Research Methods and Social Psychology since 1999. Mobility Coordinator (2017-2023) and Coordinator of the BSc in Psychology (2021-) at the Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences. Member of The Center for Research in Neuropsychology and Cognitive and Behavioral Intervention (CINEICC), dedicates her professional activity to research in the field of Social Sciences. Author of several books, book chapters, and articles in international peer-reviewed journals.

Manuel João Cruz has a PhD in Communication Sciences and is a post-doctoral researcher at the Center for Social Studies (CES) at the University of Coimbra (UC), where he is part of the Democracy, Justice and Human Rights thematic line. His research focuses on the instrumentalization of trauma in political communication. At CES, Manuel João Cruz was part of the project “UNPOP: Dismantling Populism: Comparing the formation of narratives of emotion and their effects on political behavior”, which has already been completed, and is currently collaborating on the project CO3 – COntinuous COnstruction of resilient social COntracts through societal transformations. He has published on populism, narrative and affect in politics. Her main research interests include Media, Populism, Democracy and Narrative Studies.

Helsinki Pride parade.

The Ripple Effect: How a Finnish Hate Speech Case Fuels Transatlantic Culture Wars

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryGenderHomeHuman Rights

Dr. Gwenaëlle Bauvois shows how a single legal case can reverberate far beyond its national context, becoming a transnational resource in contemporary culture wars. The conviction of Päivi Räsänen by the Finnish Supreme Court—carefully distinguishing between protected religious expression and punishable factual claims—has been rapidly reframed into a simplified narrative of “persecuted faith.” In this process, complex legal reasoning gives way to emotionally resonant claims about censorship and moral decline. Dr. Bauvois highlights how transatlantic conservative networks mobilize such cases to advance broader agendas, transforming local disputes into symbolic battlegrounds. The episode ultimately reveals how culture wars today are not merely domestic conflicts but globally circulated struggles over truth, authority, and the boundaries of legitimate speech.

By Gwenaëlle Bauvois

The Event: A Controversial Verdict

On 26 March 2026, Finland’s Supreme Court convicted Päivi Räsänen, a long-serving Christian Democrat MP and former Minister of the Interior, of incitement against a minority group. The conviction concerned a 2004 pamphlet by Räsänen, whose title roughly translates to “Male and Female He Created Them: Homosexual Relationships Challenge the Christian Understanding of Humanity.” The Court noted that Räsänen described homosexuality as “a disorder of psychosexual development” and a “sexual abnormality.”

The pamphlet’s claims about homosexuality were found to be framed as factual generalizations, not religious expression, and therefore fell within hate speech law. By contrast, her 2019 social media post—which quoted a Bible verse to criticize the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland for sponsoring Helsinki Pride and added that homosexuality was “shameful and sinful”—was deemed protected religious expression.

The political reaction was swift. Riikka Purra, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance from the Finns Party, wrote on social media: “Freedom of speech took another serious hit today through the supreme court’s voting decision.” But the ripple effect extended beyond Finland. The US Embassy in Finland called the verdict “a troubling ruling for religious freedom and freedom of expression.” A Washington Post editorial sharply criticized the decision, opening with: “Finland is often ranked as the happiest country on Earth, but that’s only if you like cold winters and harsh limitations on freedom of expression.” The conviction also drew a response from the Trump administration. Riley Barnes, a top official in the US State Department, argued on X that the conviction is “baseless” and that “in a democracy, no one should face trial for peacefully sharing their beliefs.”

The Context:  Struggles over Gender and Sexuality 

The Räsänen case is not an isolated legal dispute. It exemplifies a broader shift in Western democracies: the growing centrality of culture wars to populist mobilization. Increasingly, conflicts are driven by cultural backlash—a reaction against progressive value change that fuels today’s culture wars (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Nowhere is this more evident than in the transnational struggles over gender and sexuality, which are the central front of contemporary culture wars (Ayoub & Stoeckl, 2024; Goetz & Mayer, 2023).

At stake in the Räsänen case is therefore not only a legal boundary but an epistemic conflict: a struggle over who has the authority to define truth, normality, and the limits of acceptable speech regarding gender and sexuality. On one side stand scientific and legal institutions that define homosexuality as a normal variation of human sexuality – a position codified by the WHO’s removal of homosexuality from its list of mental disorders in 1990. On the other side are religiously grounded claims asserting moral truths, often framed as non-negotiable values.

The Finnish Supreme Court’s reasoning reflects this tension. By classifying Räsänen’s pamphlet statements as factually incorrect generalizations, the court affirms the authority of scientific and legal knowledge. At the same time, it draws a clear line: religious belief remains protected, but its translation into degrading claims about a minority group is not.

“Flagship” for Transatlantic Conservative Networks

The significance of the Räsänen case extends far beyond Finland. It has become a resource in transnational culture wars, especially around gender and sexuality. Contemporary conservative politics are indeed increasingly organized through cross-border networks that coordinate legal strategies, political messaging, and legislative agendas (Cooper, 2017; Du Mez, 2020).

For instance, the Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) —a US-based conservative Christian legal advocacy group classified by the Southern Poverty Law Center as an anti-LGBTQ+ hate group—has supported Räsänen throughout her trial, providing legal aid and raising funds. ADF has framed her case as prime evidence of a growing threat to free speech and religious liberty in Europe.

This framing has reached the highest levels of US politics. On 4 February 2026—over a month before the Finnish Supreme Court’s final conviction—Räsänen testified before the US House Judiciary Committee at a hearing titled “Europe’s Threat to American Speech and Innovation.” She was invited by Republican lawmakers, including Committee Chairman Jim Jordan, who has very strong ties with the conservative Christian think-tank The Heritage Foundation. During her visit, Räsänen also attended a Prayer and Repentance gathering alongside Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, a prominent conservative Republican who has expressed alignment with Project 2025, the ideological and political programme laid out by the Heritage Foundation.

For transatlantic conservative and Christian-right networks, Räsänen functions as a “flagship” —a symbolic figure they can brandish to illustrate how bad things are in Europe. Her experience is a cautionary tale used to support claims that Europe is suppressing Christian expression, that European legal systems are hostile to traditional religious beliefs, and that free speech protections are under threat from European regulatory models. The fact that she was actually acquitted of the Bible-quoting charge is conveniently omitted. The narrative that she was prosecuted for “quoting the Bible” is politically useful, even if factually false.

The Politics of Simplification: From Legal Nuance to Moral Narratives

The Räsänen case illustrates how complex legal judgments are translated into simplified moral narratives. Nuanced legal distinctions—such as the Supreme Court’s careful separation of protected religious speech (the social media post) from punishable factual generalizations (the pamphlet)—are flattened into binary oppositions: freedom versus censorship, faith versus secularism, Christian truth versus gender ideology.

Media coverage sympathetic to Räsänen conveniently ignores the complexity of the ruling—which found that context, framing, and genre matter. Conservative and Christian media outlets such as The European Conservative, Christian Network Europe, and The Hungarian Conservative have covered the case with simplifying headlines like “Is It Hate Speech to Call Homosexuality a Sin?” These outlets frequently refer to hate speech laws as instruments of secular oppression, ignoring the court’s explicit reasoning that religious expression remains protected.  

This simplification is not accidental but constitutive of populist politics. It enables actors to construct clear moral boundaries, mobilize emotions, and reinforce collective identities. The Räsänen case thus functions as a symbolic resource, anchoring abstract claims about moral decline in concrete, personalized narratives that can travel across borders.

The distinction between protected belief and punishable speech is replaced by a more resonant narrative: Räsänen is a respectable Christian politician, a grandmother and physician, sanctioned simply for expressing her faith. This narrative ignores the court’s explicit acquittal on the Bible charge and its careful reasoning. But in the logic of culture war mobilization, accuracy is secondary to affective resonance. A long, complex legal judgment does not rally supporters. A story of martyrdom does.

Conclusion

The Räsänen case is no longer about what she wrote or said, but about what others have made of her. A complex verdict has been simplified and redeployed, its original details mattering less than its political and ideological utility.

The involvement of The Heritage Foundation and the broader MAGA movement is not coincidental. In recent years, The Heritage Foundation has actively cultivated alliances with European conservative, right-wing and far-right actors—politicians, think tanks, and nationalist movements—across Hungary, Czechia, Spain, France, and Germany, and has reportedly engaged with parliamentary groups such as Patriots for Europe.

Räsänen did not become a flagship on her own. Within these conservative circles, some ideas from Project 2025 are seen as transferable to European debates on immigration, sexuality and regulation. Räsänen’s case, her hearing, and her symbolic elevation by US conservative networks are small but significant components of this larger agenda.

The Räsänen case illustrates a wider pattern: culture wars are increasingly produced transnationally, circulating through networks that reframe narratives across borders. A local case becomes a global resource, translated and repurposed for the aims of the culture war.

References

Ayoub, P. M. & Stoeckl, K. (2024). The global fight against LGBTI rights: How transnational conservative networks target sexual and gender minorities. NYU Press.

Du Mez, K. K. (2020). Jesus and John Wayne: How white evangelicals corrupted a faith and fractured a nation. Liveright.

Goetz, J. & Mayer, S. (2023). Global Perspectives on Anti-Feminism. Edinburgh University Press.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press.

Southern Poverty Law Center. (2017, July 24). “Alliance Defending Freedom through the years.” SPLC Hatewatch. https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/07/24/alliance-defending-freedom-through-years

Washington Post. (2026, March 27). “A free-speech farce in Finland.” [Editorial]. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/03/27/finland-free-speech-religion-paivi-rasanen/

Anti-Islam demonstration in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, on January 20, 2017. Protesters carry signs opposing “Islamization.” Photo: Jan Kranendonk.

When Change Becomes Conflict: Immigration and the Politics of Cultural Backlash

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeMigration

This analysis by Yacine Boubia challenges the dominant economic explanations of populism by foregrounding the central role of cultural transformation. Drawing on Ronald Inglehart’s “silent revolution” and the cultural backlash thesis, it argues that immigration has become the most visible and politically charged symbol of broader shifts in identity, values, and social order. Populism, in this account, is not simply a reaction to material deprivation but a response to perceived cultural displacement and status loss. By linking economic disruption with identity-based anxieties, the article demonstrates how immigration functions as a focal point for wider conflicts over belonging, representation, and democratic legitimacy in contemporary Western societies.

By Yacine Boubia

The dominant narrative surrounding the rise of populism in Europe and the United States has long been grounded in economics. Globalization, automation, and trade shocks are often said to have produced a class of “left behind” voters who turned to populist leaders out of material deprivation. While this account captures an important dimension of structural change, it ultimately misdiagnoses the core political dynamics at work. Populism is not simply a reaction to economic hardship. It is, more fundamentally, a response to cultural transformation—one in which immigration has become the most visible and politically salient symbol of broader social change. 

To understand this shift, it is necessary to return to the long arc of value change identified by Ronald Inglehart. Beginning in the postwar decades, advanced industrial societies underwent what he termed a “silent revolution,” as rising prosperity and educational expansion reshaped public priorities. Survival-oriented values gradually gave way to self-expression, autonomy, and cosmopolitan openness (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart & Norris, 2019). Over time, these shifts became embedded in institutions, elite discourse, and policy frameworks, particularly within urban, highly educated populations. 

Yet this transformation was never evenly distributed. Large segments of the population—often older, less formally educated, and more rooted in national or local traditions—did not merely lag behind this shift; they experienced it as a form of displacement. What appeared to some as progress appeared to others as erosion: of authority, of social cohesion, and of a familiar moral order. The political consequences of this divergence became increasingly visible after the late 1960s, when cultural liberalization accelerated across Western democracies and elite consensus around multiculturalism and individual autonomy solidified. 

It is within this context that immigration assumes its central political role. Immigration is not merely one issue among many; it is the issue through which broader cultural transformations are rendered visible, tangible, and politically immediate. Debates over borders, asylum, and integration are simultaneously debates about national identity, social trust, and the pace of cultural change itself. The European migration crisis did not create these tensions, but it crystallized them, transforming diffuse anxieties into direct political conflict across the continent. 

The differential reception of refugee populations further illustrates how cultural categorization shapes political responses. The Ukrainian refugee crisis, following Russia’s 2022 invasion, was widely framed in Europe as a conventional interstate war producing displaced populations that were more easily incorporated into existing asylum systems. By contrast, earlier inflows of refugees from Syria and parts of the Middle East were more frequently politicized through debates over long-term integration, welfare capacity, and security concerns. Material conditions alone cannot explain these differences. They reflect processes of perceived cultural proximity, geopolitical framing, and institutional response mechanisms within the European Union. 

Scholars of migration and political psychology have long noted that public attitudes toward migration are structured not only by economic calculations but also by perceived cultural distance and social trust. Emmanuel Todd’s recent work, La Défaite de l’Occident (2024), contributes to this discussion by emphasizing that societies interpret geopolitical and demographic change through deeper assumptions about cultural cohesion and civilizational identity. From this perspective, differential refugee reception reflects not simply policy design but underlying social narratives about similarity, belonging, and national self-understanding. 

The framework developed by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart captures these dynamics with particular clarity. Their “cultural backlash” thesis argues that support for populist parties is driven less by absolute economic deprivation than by perceived status loss among groups once embedded within dominant cultural hierarchies (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Immigration, in this context, functions not merely as a policy issue but as a symbolic focal point through which broader anxieties about identity and social change are expressed. It becomes the terrain on which struggles over cultural authority are fought. 

The United States exhibits a parallel trajectory. The rise of Donald Trump cannot be fully understood through economic grievance alone. Empirical studies of the 2016 election have consistently shown that attitudes toward immigration, cultural change, and racial identity were among the strongest predictors of support for Trump (Sides et al., 2018). His appeal lay less in policy detail than in his ability to articulate a sense of loss—of border control, national coherence, and institutional trust. Immigration functioned as the central issue through which these concerns were politically mobilized. 

This mobilization was amplified by changes in the digital information environment. Scholars of political communication have highlighted how social media platforms and data-driven campaigning enabled more granular targeting of affective and identity-based grievances. While the precise influence of firms such as Cambridge Analytica is debated in the academic literature, broader research on “computational propaganda” and social listening suggests that political actors increasingly adapt messaging to pre-existing online sentiment patterns rather than shaping them from above (Bennett & Livingston, 2018). 

None of this implies that economic factors are irrelevant. On the contrary, the structural effects of globalization have played a crucial role in shaping the terrain on which cultural conflict unfolds. Trade exposure, deindustrialization, and regional inequality have increased perceptions of economic insecurity in many Western societies (Autor et al., 2013). However, these economic disruptions do not translate mechanically into political outcomes. Their salience is mediated through cultural interpretation. Economic decline becomes politically consequential when it is embedded within narratives of identity, recognition, and perceived neglect. 

In this sense, globalization operates as a force multiplier rather than a primary cause of populism. Communities experiencing economic stagnation are more likely to interpret immigration through lenses of competition and cultural threat, and more likely to view political elites as detached from their lived realities. Populist movements succeed precisely because they fuse economic anxiety with cultural grievance into a single coherent narrative—one that pits “the people” against both external pressures and internal elites (Mudde, 2004). 

Across Europe, parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the National Rally (RN) in France have institutionalized this synthesis. While differing in national context, these movements share a common structure: opposition to immigration, skepticism toward supranational governance, and a broader critique of liberal elite consensus. Their success underscores the extent to which cultural backlash has become embedded within contemporary political competition. 

The policy implications are significant. If populism were driven primarily by economic inequality, then redistribution and growth-oriented policies might be sufficient to mitigate its rise. But if it is rooted in cultural backlash, such measures will prove insufficient on their own. Economic policy cannot resolve conflicts over identity, belonging, and social norms. Nor can these conflicts be dismissed as irrational without further deepening political polarization. 

A more realistic approach begins by recognizing that populism emerges from genuine, if conflicting, experiences of social transformation. The “silent revolution” identified by Inglehart has reshaped Western societies in profound ways, but it has also produced new forms of cultural stratification. In the United States, this process was accelerated by the political economy of the 1980s and 1990s, where deregulation and neoliberal convergence under both Republican and Democratic administrations coincided with the rise of cosmopolitan urban centers and multicultural policy frameworks. These developments, reinforced during the Clinton and Obama eras, contributed to a perception among some voters that cultural and institutional change was occurring without adequate democratic mediation. 

Immigration, as the most visible manifestation of these broader transformations, will therefore remain central to political conflict in advanced democracies. Understanding populism requires moving beyond the false dichotomy between economics and culture. It is the interaction between structural change and subjective perception that drives political behavior. Until this interplay is fully acknowledged, explanations will remain partial, and policy responses will continue to fall short. 

 

References

Inglehart, R. (1977). The Silent Revolution – Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics, Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, Cambridge University Press.

Autor, D., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. (2013). “The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade,” ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, Vol. 8:205-240 (Volume publication date October 2016)  https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015041

Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America, Princeton University Press.

Mudde, C. (2004). “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44483088

Bennett, W. L. & Livingston, S. (2018). “The disinformation order: Disruptive communication and the decline of democratic institutions.” European Journal of Communication, 33(2), 122–139. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323118760317

Todd, E. (2024). La Défaite de l’Occident, Gallimard.

Associate Professor Attila Antal.

Assoc. Prof. Antal: Orbán’s Election Project Seeks Public Backing for Dictatorial Turn, Not Democratic Legitimacy

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

As Hungary approaches the April 12 elections, Viktor Orbán’s long-standing rule faces a critical test shaped by both domestic discontent and geopolitical realignments. In this interview, Associate Professor Attila Antal characterizes the regime as a “constitutional dictatorship,” arguing that the election is not about democratic legitimacy but about securing “public support for its own dictatorial turn.” He highlights how authoritarian legality, sustained through a “dual state” and permanent emergency governance, has hollowed out democratic competition. At the same time, the rise of Péter Magyar and mounting generational and material grievances signal growing resistance. Situated within broader transnational authoritarian networks, Hungary’s election emerges as both a domestic referendum and a geopolitical fault line for European democracy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Hungary approaches its pivotal parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, the country stands at a defining juncture in the trajectory of European populism. After more than a decade and a half of rule by Viktor Orbán, the electoral contest no longer centers merely on party competition, but on whether an entrenched authoritarian-populist regime—characterized by institutional asymmetries, constitutional engineering, and the continuous production of political enemies—can still be meaningfully challenged through democratic means. At the same time, the emergence of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party has introduced new uncertainty into a system long sustained by what Attila Antal describes as a “hegemonic power bloc,” raising the stakes of what increasingly resembles a systemic referendum.

In this context, Attila Antal, Associate Professor at Eötvös Loránd University, offers a sobering interpretation of the current moment. In his view, the Orbán regime has evolved beyond conventional electoral authoritarianism into what he terms a “constitutional dictatorship,” where formal legality coexists with substantive domination. Most strikingly, Assoc. Prof. Antal argues that “the Orbán regime is not seeking democratic legitimacy in the 2026 elections, but rather public support for its own dictatorial turn.” This diagnosis reframes the election not as a mechanism of accountability, but as a plebiscitary instrument designed to consolidate power under conditions of managed legality.

Crucially, Assoc. Prof. Antal situates Hungary’s electoral moment within a broader geopolitical reconfiguration. He underscores that Orbán has increasingly treated foreign and European policy “as a kind of geopolitical playing field,” cultivating alliances with both Eastern and Western authoritarian actors. The alignment with figures such as Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin reflects not only ideological affinity but also strategic positioning within an emerging transnational authoritarian network. As Assoc. Prof. Antal notes, Hungary has come to function as a “Trojan horse” for Putinist influence within the European Union, transforming the election into “a European and Western geopolitical issue and interest.” This external dimension is mirrored internally by a deepening social cleavage, as segments of Hungarian society remain firmly oriented toward the West while the regime consolidates a pro-Russian political base.

This external dimension intersects with internal tensions, including growing social discontent and a generational divide that reflects what Assoc. Prof. Antal describes as “a very strong generational revolt against Orbán’s authoritarian populism.”

At the core of Assoc. Prof. Antal’s analysis is the concept of authoritarian law and the “dual state,” where a formally normative legal order coexists with a politically driven prerogative structure. Under prolonged states of emergency and rule by decree, Hungary has become, in his words, “a contemporary example of dual state,” raising profound questions about whether elections can still function as instruments of democratic alternation. The opposition’s strategy of contesting the regime “by its own rules” thus reflects a deeper dilemma: whether authoritarian systems can be dismantled through participation in the very institutional frameworks they have reshaped.

Assoc. Prof. Antal’s assessment is stark. The durability of Orbánism, he suggests, lies in its capacity to adapt, radicalize, and survive through escalating authoritarianism. As he warns, the regime “can only survive by becoming increasingly dictatorial,” a trajectory that poses not only a domestic challenge but “a grave danger to both Hungarian and European societies as a whole.”

Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Attila Antal, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Geopolitics and Domestic Change Reshape Orbánism

From Left: Hungary PM Viktor Orban, Poland PM Beata Szydlo, Czech PM Bohuslav Sobotka and Slovakia PM Robert Fico pose prior their meeting in Prague on February 15, 2016.

Professor Antal, in your work you describe Hungarian authoritarian populism as a system that fuses political identity construction, executive aggrandizement, and the legal-institutional reorganization of power. In the 2026 campaign, do you see Orbánism still functioning as a hegemonic political project, or has it entered a phase of ideological exhaustion in which its capacity to define “the people” and monopolize popular sovereignty is beginning to weaken?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is a key issue for understanding the Orbán regime as a whole and the current situation. Indeed, Orbán has built an authoritarian regime in which the ruling parties have reigned as a kind of hegemonic center—or, to use Antonio Gramsci’s terminology, as a hegemonic power bloc. However, the transformation of the opposition has changed the situation and shaken this hegemonic project. This is, however, a complex situation: in recent years, Orbán had become so confident that he increasingly focused on geopolitics; more precisely, he treated foreign policy and European policy as a kind of geopolitical playing field, where he built power and political alliances with both Eastern and Western authoritarian regimes. It is no coincidence that the two most significant imperialist powers, Trump and Putin, have both assured Orbán of their support. So, I see the collapse of Orbán’s hegemonic project as only partially attributable to domestic political factors: we are witnessing that Orbán’s downfall has become a European and Western geopolitical issue and interest, and this resonates with the anger of Hungarian society, which, for the most part, remains oriented toward the West.

Enemy Narratives Persist but Face Social Limits

You have argued that authoritarian populism in Hungary relies on permanent enemy-production. In the current election, where Kyiv, Brussels, liberal elites, and domestic opponents are again being woven into a single antagonistic narrative, how should we understand this strategy: as a sign of discursive resilience, or as evidence that the regime has become trapped in repetitive forms of mobilization?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: The enemy creation of the Orbán regime is a highly complex story. There is no doubt that the constant creation of enemy images is one of the most prominent components of the authoritarian populist toolkit. Since 2010, the Orbán regime has operated with the following main enemy images: migrants, George Soros, civil society, Brussels, the gender politics, and the domestic political opposition. 

From this perspective, 2022 marks a turning point, as Putin’s aggression required the construction of a new enemy image – an incredibly difficult task, given that the attacked Ukraine must be transformed into the new enemy. All of this is connected to the “Putinization” that has taken place within the Orbán regime. The propaganda and discursive framework are thus in place, yet creating this new enemy image also means that Orbán and his allies face the reality that a significant portion of Hungarian society is quite averse to Russians due to Hungarian history. At the same time, Orbán and his allies have succeeded in turning their own camp into a pro-Russian faction, which has resulted in an incredibly deep social cleavage.

Anti-Orbánism Unites a Fragmented Opposition

Tisza leader Péter Magyar
Tisza leader Péter Magyar begins a symbolic “one million steps” march to Nagyvárad, Romania, addressing reporters with supporters in Budapest, Hungary on May 14, 2025. Photo: Istvan Balogh / Dreamstime.

To what extent should the April 12 vote be interpreted not simply as a contest between Fidesz and Tisza, but as a referendum on whether a mature authoritarian-populist regime can still be electorally displaced despite media asymmetries, constitutional engineering, and patronage entrenchment?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: As I mentioned earlier, the Orbán regime itself and the new opposition forming against it can be understood within a geopolitical context. One could also say that, in many respects, the European Union has had enough of the Putinist influence that the Orbán regime represents as a “Trojan horse.” At the same time, this dissatisfaction is just as true of Hungarian society: at the moment, the opposition is held together by anti-Orbánism and the fact that the Orbán regime has seriously neglected governance and the basic needs of the Hungarian people. In this sense, the Hungarian election can indeed be interpreted as a referendum on the political system.

Dual State Logic Structures Political Competition

Your recent work on authoritarian law suggests that contemporary autocratic projects do not abolish legality so much as repurpose it. In the Hungarian case, how should we conceptualize the election itself: as a democratic mechanism still capable of producing alternation, or as a legally managed arena whose formal openness coexists with substantive authoritarian constraint?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: I think this is a very important question. When I analyzed the legal system of the Orbán regime, I drew on the “dual state” approach developed by Ernst Fraenkel, who studied the nature of National Socialist law in the interwar period. In this authoritarian state, there exists a legal system that is totally influenced by politics (which Fraenkel calls the Prerogative State), while at the same time there is the Normative State, which is less defined by political influence. 

The Orbán regime has effectively been operating under a state of emergency since 2015, and since 2022, the prime minister has essentially been governing by decree. So, we are facing a contemporary example of dual state.

In my view, there is a very strong dilemma: can this system be overthrown by accepting its rules of the game and participating in the election, or can we overthrow the system as a result of a collective popular decision and establish new democratic electoral rules? It now appears that the opposition side of Hungarian society is choosing the former solution, that is, it wants to defeat the authoritarian system by its own rules. At the same time, it is certain that in the event of a possible change of government, we will have to face the problem posed by authoritarian law.

Enemy Logic Embedded in Governance Structures

Campaign poster of Viktor Orbán ahead of the April 12, 2026, parliamentary elections. Photo: Bettina Wagner / Dreamstime.

You have written about the “Constitutionalized Image of Enemy” embedded in the Hungarian Fundamental Law. How central is this constitutionalized enemy logic to the present campaign, especially in Orbán’s efforts to portray Tisza, Brussels, and Ukraine not as legitimate competitors, but as existential threats to the political community?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: The most recent amendment to the Fundamental Law took place in April 2025. The Hungarian Fundamental Law has indeed been used to create the prevailing political enemy images: certainly, with regard to migration and gender politics. I have termed this as the “Constitutionalized Image of the Enemy.” In this sense, therefore, the image of the enemy enshrined in the constitution did not play a role in the current campaign. At the same time, the 12th Amendment to the Fundamental Law established the Office for the Protection of National Sovereignty in December 2023, which played a very significant role in enabling the Orbán regime to essentially begin using state and bureaucratic tools against its political opponents and Hungarian society. In other words, the “dual state” mentioned earlier operates at the constitutional level as well.

Geopolitical Counterweight Shapes Opposition Rise

From the standpoint of your theory of authoritarian populism, is Péter Magyar best understood as a democratic challenger to Orbánism, or as a post-Fidesz corrective emerging from within the same political and ideological ecosystem?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is a very difficult question, and it would be too early to give any definitive answer at this stage. I would rather point out that the Hungarian election has a very strong geopolitical context. The Péter Magyar phenomenon and the European support structure behind it can also be understood as a geopolitical counterweight to Hungary’s shift toward Orbán and Putin. At the same time, there is no doubt that Orbán’s challenger was socialized within the Orbán regime and, in many respects, is attempting to correct the right-wing conservative politics that Orbán has betrayed. Here, however, it is worth noting once again that the vast camp behind the Tisza Party is far more complex and is currently held together by the constraints of the electoral system and anti-Orbánism.

Youth Revolt Meets Rural Entrenchment

Independent polling and current reporting suggest that younger voters are disproportionately aligning with Tisza, while Fidesz retains stronger support among older and more rural constituencies. Do you interpret this as a generational realignment against authoritarian populism, or merely as a contingent reaction to economic stagnation and elite scandal?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is also a key issue. There is no doubt that the authoritarian populism of the Orbán regime has, intentionally or not, created a generational and regional divide. A significant portion of rural and elderly Hungarian voters is far more susceptible to the enemy stereotypes and messages manufactured by the regime’s propaganda. Thus, there is a very strong generational revolt against Orbán’s authoritarian populism, particularly because Orbán is effectively blackmailing not only the EU but also Hungarian society: the former with constant vetoes, and the latter with constant threats of leaving the EU.

Middle-Class Erosion Fuels Political Backlash

Given your emphasis on the relationship between neoliberal restructuring and authoritarian populism, how important are material grievances—stagnant growth, inflation, deteriorating public services, and corruption fatigue—in weakening the regime’s capacity to maintain consent? Can economic deterioration disrupt a system whose legitimacy has long depended on symbolic conflict rather than policy performance?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: From a political-economic perspective, the Orbán regime was based on a class consensus in which the (upper) middle class and national big business formed an alliance. This was underpinned by pre-COVID-19 economic prosperity and massive amounts of EU funding. During this period of economic prosperity, however, a neoliberal state emerged that systematically dismantled public services, particularly in the healthcare and education sectors. When the polycrisis emerged (EU crises, pandemic, war), the dismantled Orbán state proved unable to handle the crisis: alongside the groups in the worst situations, the declining Hungarian middle class is the biggest loser of the Orbán regime. In other words, the rebellion against the Orbán regime is, in many respects, also of a material nature.

War Narrative Enables Democratic Suspension

How do you interpret Orbán’s continued “peace versus war” framing in light of your broader work on the politics of exception? Is this campaign discourse best seen as a contemporary form of emergency politics—one that converts geopolitical uncertainty into a justification for executive concentration and democratic suspension?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: As I mentioned, since 2022 the prime minister has essentially been governing by decree, encroaching even on areas of public policy where a state of emergency has no place. Meanwhile, political propaganda has constantly claimed that the Orbán regime is the only guarantee of peace. This has come to a head in the current campaign, with the Orbán machine conveying the message that the opposition is on the side of the Ukrainians and is dragging Hungary into the war. Governing through extraordinary measures is thus a political and communicative reframing: the Orbán regime has essentially suspended parliamentary democracy and portrayed the Ukrainian side (including the EU and the Hungarian opposition) as wanting war. I believe that this is not just some kind of fake news campaign, but the pure and frightening manifestation of an authoritarian state.

Sovereigntist Rhetoric Masks Strategic Dependence

Hungary’s pro-Russian posture has become a major campaign fault line. In your view, does Orbán’s Moscow-friendly stance still function as a coherent ideological expression of sovereigntist anti-liberalism, or is it increasingly becoming a liability as the war in Ukraine reshapes the moral and geopolitical boundaries of European politics?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: Orbán’s pro-Russian policy is a complex phenomenon. At least three aspects are worth highlighting. On the one hand, there is no doubt that, with regard to the international authoritarian right, there exists a kind of ideological coalition whose political-theoretical foundation is an anti-liberal conservative approach dating back to Carl Schmitt. Second, the Orbán regime has radically relinquished energy sovereignty in favor of Putinism. Third, there is also no doubt that Orbán and his regime are personally dependent on Putin’s system. Here, then, lies a radical contradiction: the Orbán regime, which is sovereignist at the level of propaganda, has deliberately renounced the sovereignty of the Hungarian state and is weakening European sovereignty in favor of Russia. The deeper implications of this can only be revealed after the election.

Militant Democracy as a Possible Path

You have shown how exceptional governance can become normalized. If Tisza were to win without a constitutional supermajority, would Hungary enter a phase of partial alternation without regime transformation—in other words, a situation in which a new government governs through institutions still structured by the old exception-centered order?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: I believe this is one of the main consequences of the dilemma I mentioned earlier: namely, how to dismantle an authoritarian system – either by adhering to its own rules or through more revolutionary means. If there is a change of government and a two-thirds majority is achieved, dismantling the authoritarian power of the Orbán regime will be a challenge. If, however, the change of government occurs with a simple majority, it may become inevitable to consider how the authoritarian system can be dismantled using the tools of militant democracy.

EU Influence and Domestic Revolt Intersect

Tisza Party volunteer collecting signatures in Mosonmagyaróvár, Hungary on June 5, 2024 during a nationwide campaign tour ahead of the European Parliament elections. Photo: Sarkadi Roland / Dreamstime.

What would a Tisza victory actually reveal about the Orbán system: that authoritarian-populist rule remains vulnerable to democratic challenge, or that only an insider-led revolt from within the regime’s broader political class can break such a system electorally?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: Based on what we’ve seen so far, I believe a potential victory for Tisza would have two implications. On the one hand, it would signal that the EU has had enough of Putinism directly influencing European politics. On the other hand, it would mean that authoritarian populism has become completely detached from social reality, and that Hungarian society has had enough of a political agenda built on constant hatemongering and the suspension of normality.

Authoritarian Consolidation Beyond Legitimacy

Conversely, if Fidesz were to retain power despite signs of economic strain, ideological repetition, corruption exposure, and opposition momentum, what would that tell us about the resilience of contemporary populist rule in Europe? Would it suggest that once authoritarian populism successfully constitutionalizes its power, elections alone become insufficient to dislodge it?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: I believe this is the most important issue of our time. Unfortunately, my grim assessment is that the Orbán regime is not seeking democratic legitimacy in the 2026 elections, but rather public support for its own dictatorial turn. I have long regarded the Orbán regime as a constitutional dictatorship, which means, on the one hand, that contemporary autocracies have a constitutional framework, and on the other hand, that certain segments of society have renounced democracy and accept the exercise of authoritarian power. Overall, therefore, the Orbán regime can only survive by becoming increasingly dictatorial, a trend that poses a grave danger to both Hungarian and European society as a whole.

Competing Visions of European Sovereignty

From the perspective of European integration, do you see this election as a struggle between two models of sovereignty: Orbán’s confrontational, anti-imperial, anti-Brussels sovereigntism and a more cooperative, rule-of-law-based claim to national interest that Tisza is trying to articulate? Or is that dichotomy too neat for the political realities of contemporary Hungary?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: First of all, the Orbán regime is indeed imperialist, and it pursues policies that serve Russian imperialist interests. The Hungarian election is crucial from the perspective of European integration, as the dilemma is whether there exists a European sovereignty that can be relied upon to stand up against authoritarian tendencies such as Trumpism and Putinism. I am committed to the idea, as Karl Loewenstein put it, that democracy must develop its own self-defense mechanisms and fight back – in our case, at both the member state and EU levels.

External Validation Meets Internal Resistance

Matryoshka dolls featuring images of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump displayed at a souvenir counter in Moscow on March 16, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

Hungary has become a reference point within transnational right-wing networks, and Orbán continues to attract symbolic support from US and European conservative actors. In analytical terms, how much does this external validation matter domestically? Does it strengthen the regime’s legitimacy, or does it mainly reinforce Orbán’s self-image as a global ideological entrepreneur?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: From the perspective of ideological and political networking, the Orbán regime truly acts as a mediator between Western and Eastern authoritarian tendencies. This is why organizing the European far right is of key importance to Orbán. All of this undoubtedly has an impact on his own camp. At the same time, Orbán’s status as a “global ideological entrepreneur” represents the very project against which the Hungarian opposition has been able to unite and become committed to a change of government.

De-capture vs. Persistence of Orbánism

Finally, through the lens of your work on authoritarian law and exceptional governance, what would be the most theoretically significant post-election question for scholars to watch: whether electoral alternation occurs, whether institutional de-capture proves possible, or whether the deeper legacy of Orbánism survives regardless of who forms the next government?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is also one of the most important dilemmas of our era from both a Hungarian and a European perspective, as the political and legal consequences of the Orbán regime are toxic to European integration as a whole. On the one hand, just as happened after World War II, we must once again grapple with the question of how to take democratic action against authoritarian legal and political systems. On the other hand, and even more importantly: we must finally prevent the distortion of liberal democracies toward authoritarianism not only through constitutional institutions but also through effective economic and cultural means. In my view, it is crucial to examine how global capitalism and neoliberalism have distorted liberal constitutionalism and how they have eroded the social foundations of democracies through austerity measures and the dismantling of welfare systems.

Associate Professor Robert Csehi.

Assoc. Prof. Csehi: Hungary’s Election to Test the Resilience and Limits of Populist Rule in Europe

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi argues that Hungary’s April 12 election represents a critical test of whether entrenched populist rule can be electorally challenged. While he notes that “it will definitely be a test of incumbency survival,” he emphasizes that deeper dynamics—“ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control”—remain decisive. Assoc. Prof. Csehi highlights growing limits in Orbán’s populist discourse, which “has lost its novelty,” alongside shifting political conditions marked by economic grievances and the rise of the Tisza Party as a credible challenger. Yet, even in the event of electoral turnover, he cautions that deeply embedded institutional structures may persist, potentially leading to “a prolonged struggle over state capacity.” Hungary thus offers a crucial case for assessing the resilience and limits of populist governance in Europe.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Robert Csehi, Associate Professor and Program Director of the Political Science Doctoral Program at the Corvinus University of Budapest, offers a nuanced and theoretically grounded assessment of Hungary’s evolving political landscape on the eve of a pivotal electoral contest.

As Hungary approaches its parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, the country stands at a critical juncture. After sixteen years of rule under Viktor Orbán, the election has come to signify more than routine democratic competition. It represents a broader test of whether entrenched populist governance—characterized by institutional consolidation, discursive dominance, and asymmetrical resource control—can be meaningfully challenged through electoral mechanisms. The campaign unfolds amid deep polarization, intensifying geopolitical tensions, and mounting concerns over democratic resilience, media pluralism, and institutional fairness. At the same time, the emergence of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party has introduced a new dynamic into Hungary’s political competition.

Against this backdrop, Assoc. Prof. Csehi underscores that “it will definitely be a test of incumbency survival,” while emphasizing that the stakes extend beyond electoral turnover to questions of “ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control.” In his view, the durability of Hungary’s populist system is no longer assured. He identifies emerging cracks within the governing discourse, noting that “the supply of the populist worldview… has become less creative” and “has lost its novelty,” with the government increasingly relying on repetitive narratives—particularly around the war in Ukraine—to sustain mobilization.

At the same time, structural shifts on both the supply and demand sides of politics are reshaping the electoral terrain. The rise of the Tisza Party, Assoc. Prof. Csehi observes, has created “a new channel for people to express their grievances,”while also reactivating political engagement at the grassroots level. Concurrently, worsening economic conditions have intensified public discontent, as “people’s everyday grievances are rising,” and the government finds it increasingly difficult to externalize responsibility for inflation, corruption, and declining public services.

Assoc. Prof. Csehi’s analysis situates Hungary within a broader comparative framework, highlighting the uncertain trajectory of mature populist regimes. While electoral defeat could mark “the end of the Orbán regime” in formal terms, he cautions that deeply embedded institutional structures may persist, generating “a prolonged struggle over state capacity and institutional de-capture.” Conversely, a renewed victory for Fidesz would signal that such regimes retain significant resilience, even under conditions of economic strain and ideological fatigue.

Ultimately, as Assoc. Prof. Csehi concludes, the Hungarian case offers a critical empirical test: whether “a mature, populist-authoritarian regime can still be changed… in an electoral process.” In this sense, Hungary’s 2026 election stands as a defining moment not only for the country itself, but for understanding the resilience—and limits—of populist rule across Europe.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Robert Csehi, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Populist Discourse Losing Creativity

Fidesz, Soros.
Poster from political party Fidesz showing the opponents of Hungarian PM Viktor Orban surrounding billionaire philanthropist George Soros, Budapest, April 8, 2017.

Professor Csehi, welcome. Let me begin with the broader picture: In your scholarship, you argue that Hungarian populism has endured through the continuous reconstruction of “the people,” the redefinition of “the elite,” and the rearticulation of popular sovereignty. In the current campaign, do you still see this triadic logic operating effectively, or are its mobilizational limits beginning to emerge?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: I don’t think we do see some limitations to the effectiveness of this renewed populist discourse in Hungary. I think there are fundamentally three changes that actually challenge Orban’s effective populist discourse.

The first one is, in essence, that the supply of the populist worldview in the discourse has become less creative. It has lost its novelty. There were references to the war, for example, in Ukraine already in the 2022 elections—so four years ago. I mean, the war had just broken out, and they already used warmongering during that period. They pushed the campaign to the extreme in 2024 during the European parliamentary elections. They used essentially the same narrative, the same discourse. And they haven’t managed to really renew this discourse, and they keep talking about the same thing. They keep appealing to people’s fear of the war now. So, in comparison to previous elections, where every four years you had a new enemy and a new elite that was conspiring against Hungary and the government, we don’t really see that in 2026 compared to 2022 or 2024. So that’s one major change.

The second one obviously also affects, or concerns, the supply side of politics, and you already mentioned the rise of the opposition Tisza Party, which means there is actually a new channel for people to express their grievances and to mobilize their political demands behind a party which seems to have more legitimacy. It’s probably not the right word, but it resonates with people much better than the old opposition parties, which, on many grounds, have lost the trust of the people over the years—not only because they were ineffective, but also because they were involved in all sorts of scandals throughout the years. And now there is a new party which actually effectively challenges the government on a lot of issues and calls attention to many things that previously the old opposition, as we refer to it now, had not done. Plus, they really go down to the countryside, and they really do talk to people. They are engaging with the people and the electorate, and that makes a huge difference. So these are on the supply side, which are extremely relevant.

And then there is one demand-side feature which really has had a great effect. Since 2022, the Hungarian economy has not been doing very well. So, this has put a lot of things on the political agenda. People’s everyday grievances are rising, from inflation to public services, corruption, etc. It is not like Fidesz or Orban is able to cover these up anymore. We had skyrocketing inflation in the past few years, and it has become extremely difficult for the government to externalize these kinds of problems. And so people don’t shove it off anymore, like, “Oh, well, we’re still doing better no matter what the government does.” “Yeah, they might be corrupt, they might be wrong on certain policy issues, et cetera, et cetera, but we’re still better off than we were four years ago.” They don’t say that anymore. So, effectively, the economy plays a huge role in this entire story as well.

Election Tests Incumbency Survival

To what extent should the April 12 election be understood not merely as a contest between Fidesz and Tisza, but as a broader test of whether long-term populist incumbency can withstand mounting economic pressures, corruption fatigue, and shifting voter expectations?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: That’s a good question. It will definitely be a test of incumbency survival, in a sense, but, in the background, it is really about ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control—namely, the extent to which these can still be maintained and used to hold power. I’m not sure to what extent these can actually withstand all the structural- and agency-based challenges that I’ve mentioned previously. So, it is going to be an interesting test from a political science perspective as well, to see whether they actually manage to survive or not, and to what extent a mature, populist-authoritarian regime can still be changed or won over in an electoral process. The jury is still out, and I’m really looking forward to seeing what happens afterwards.

EU Framed As Background Enemy

Viktor Orban
Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister arrives for a meeting with European Union leaders in Brussels, Belgium on Dec. 13, 2019. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

You have shown that Orbán’s Eurosceptic populism often adopts an anti-imperialist framing, portraying Brussels as an external elite constraining Hungarian sovereignty. How central is this narrative in the current campaign, and does it retain its resonance in a context where access to EU funds and economic stability are increasingly salient concerns?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: It’s a very important point in the elections. Not in terms of the EU being a central topic—by all means, that’s not the case. Really, Orbán’s campaign is focusing on the war in Ukraine. Still, they have managed to somehow link this up with the EU. They have had billboard campaigns showing Ursula von der Leyen and Manfred Weber together with Volodymyr Zelensky, suggesting that the EU is taking the money of Hungarians and channeling it to Ukraine and to President Zelensky. So, they try to mingle these things together, mix them, and bring in the EU as, again, this sort of background power that is mistaken and on the side of war.

They have populist, moralist, discursive division, where Orbán portrays himself as a pro-peace political actor, whereas everybody else who does not agree with him, by definition, becomes pro-war, even if it does not really make sense.

So, in a sense, the EU is still there; it is referenced as, once again, occupying a pro-war position. As I said previously, they try to repeat the same claims as they did in the 2024 European parliamentary elections—drawing these very fine lines between who is on the side of peace and who is on the side of war, and they clearly place Brussels and the EU on the side of the war. And as I said, it is not only about the war per se. They also try to refer to the financial side of it, bringing this back repeatedly—claiming that the EU is taking your money, holding back funds, and channeling them to Ukraine. So, they frame it as financing the war instead of supporting Hungarian people, etc.

So, it is not center stage—I would say it is still the sort of antagonistic relationship between Ukraine and Hungary at the moment—but they do try to bring this into the discussion: that the EU is somewhere in the background, conspiring and doing all sorts of shady and harmful things. And the reason why they do that is that over the past years they have managed to convert their electorate into the most Eurosceptic segment of the population. In comparison to all other party supporters—with the exception of Our Homeland, the far-right party—probably the most Eurosceptic electorate is behind Fidesz at the moment. So it is just natural that they also play those tunes for their voters.

Tisza Promises Policy Reset

Tisza leader Péter Magyar
Tisza leader Péter Magyar begins a symbolic “one million steps” march to Nagyvárad, Romania, addressing reporters with supporters in Budapest, Hungary on May 14, 2025. Photo: Istvan Balogh / Dreamstime.

From the perspective of European integration, do you interpret this election as a confrontation between two competing models of EU membership—one sovereigntist and illiberal, the other oriented toward re-integration through rule-of-law compliance and institutional alignment?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: Yes and no. On the one hand, I would agree that Orban has had a very particular idea of defending sovereignty in the EU. He has thought that the defense of national sovereignty and national interest could only be pursued in a confrontational way. You have to use the channels of the European Council or the Council itself to block things and not really participate in negotiations and deliberations.

There have been multiple occasions where Orban was not present—they sent him out to have a coffee. From research, we know that Council negotiations have shifted somewhat in recent years. What we would describe as a kind of de-Europeanization in the Hungarian approach to EU affairs is what has occurred on multiple fronts.

Compared to that, Tisza and Magyar’s approach are definitely different from Orban’s on some issues. You mentioned the rule of law. Tisza claims that it will join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office as soon as it is in government. It also promises to resolve some of these rule-of-law issues and to bring back the funds that have been frozen under Orban’s regime. So, we can expect a return to more normal relations with the EU. This promise is also supported by the personnel envisioned to lead foreign and European affairs within the party.

That said, I say yes and no because I do think that Tisza also supports a model of European integration based on strengthening intergovernmental relations, as opposed to a supranational takeover in multiple areas. We have seen this time and again. They have run into conflicts on different policy measures, even within the European Parliament and within their own faction in the European People’s Party.

So, on the one hand, there is likely to be an effort to restore relations and the credibility of Hungary as a partner within the EU. On the other hand, there will be areas where they confront and challenge the direction of European policy. It is not going to be a return to the old days where Hungarian representatives simply nodded to everything the European Union demanded from the government. Rather, it will involve a stronger representation of national interests, but in a more cooperative—as opposed to confrontational—manner than Orban has pursued.

Turnover Won’t End Orbánism

If Péter Magyar and the Tisza party were to win, would that necessarily signify the end of the Orbán era, or has Orbánism become sufficiently institutionalized within the state, the media landscape, and patronage networks to persist beyond electoral turnover?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: The easy answer, obviously, is that electorally this would be the end of the Orbán regime, at least temporarily. But when we really look into the structural features, I would say no. This will, in fact, be a very interesting period to study, to see how deep the roots of the regime actually went and grew, and how these roots actually act and behave under a new government. I would say there is fundamentally a deeper institutional structure here, which could make the life of the new government miserable on multiple accounts—from financial oversight to judicial oversight, etc. There are many aspects where the government has to govern effectively with its hands tied behind its back. So it is going to be difficult.

I would imagine that this will be something like a prolonged struggle over state capacity and institutional de-capture. They will try to take back some of these institutions with whatever legal means there are. Nevertheless, the government will have greater room for maneuver in terms of policies in many areas, and I do think that they can make changes that could have a positive outcome or resonance with the public.

And one thing we cannot really exclude as a possibility—again, the poll numbers are all over the place—but most independent pollsters show a 15 to even 20 percentage point lead for the opposition party, which could effectively also mean that Tisza would gain a two-thirds, or constitutional, majority. That would be a completely different ballgame, because with that, they could de-capture those institutions more easily. To what extent this would be done in a democratic way, or whether they would repeat something similar to what we have seen during the Fidesz era, I am not sure. I am just saying that there might be an opportunity for the new government to actually de-root the system, provided that they have a constitutional majority.

No Majority, No Regime Change

Some observers suggest that even a Tisza-led government could face significant institutional constraints stemming from constitutional engineering and entrenched loyalist networks. How should we conceptualize the possibility of electoral alternation without substantive regime transformation?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: This goes in line with my previous answer. Without a constitutional majority, what you will see is that there is likely to be governmental turnover, but there is not going to be a regime transformation. And then, there are different scenarios as to what will happen. If there is a constitutional majority, then we see a re-orientation or a re-democratization. If there is only governmental turnover without real regime transformation, what kind of room for maneuver does the new government have?

How do we conceptualize this? So this is definitely going to be an interesting case to analyze in terms of re-democratization attempts—whether they actually go deep or whether they are just going to hover at the surface, which we have seen before. We even had a study on this, on local governments, examining how they try to re-democratize even under a populist authoritarian regime. We might actually see something of this sort at the national level. But once again, the possible measures might be more confined if there is only a simple majority in Parliament, and that would definitely limit the options of the next government.

Loyalty And Shielding Protect Fidesz

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán gives a speech to convince his respondents in Szeged on March 4, 2014.

Your work on populist resilience to corruption highlights how such regimes adapt to and withstand scandal. In Hungary today, which mechanisms—discursive reframing, institutional shielding, or partisan loyalty—appear most crucial in sustaining support for Fidesz?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: Given that the regime has reached its peak and is really a mature system, from a populist regime perspective, I would say, in line with our theoretical frame, that it is mostly the institutional shielding and the partisan loyalty that dominate at the moment. Let me give you an example, which is essentially a reflection of both. There is this huge scandal about the former governor of the National Bank (György Matolcsy) and his son. There is a scandal going around that hundreds of billions of forints were actually channeled out into private funds—essentially, they were just paid out to… we do not even necessarily know whom. We do know that the governor’s son really benefited from this. And what is happening now is that there is practically no police investigation going on, or, if there is, it is extremely slow. We do not really know what is happening. In the meantime, we already know that, for example, the governor’s son has tried to, or has already started to, ship his luxury car collection to Dubai, and these kinds of things.

So wealth is going out, and in the meantime, nothing is really happening. And nobody is really talking about the Matolcsy family, etc. So there is this partisan loyalty going on, and there is this institutional shielding, which does not allow these institutions to actually do anything about it. There is no prosecution going on. There might be some prosecution, but we do not really know why it is so limited, why it is so slow, why it is kept secret, and why they basically let the governor’s son do anything he pleases, given the fact that we know that hundreds of billions of forints were, in a sense, privatized. So, I do think that these two mechanisms are the most dominant ones.

Discursively, they do not even really try anymore. It is more like, “Well, we have nothing to do with the issue—let the institutions run their course,” but the institutions are not doing anything. So, it is just a sort of bogus narrative behind it.

What has really changed, on the other hand, is Péter Magyar’s rise in politics, because he is essentially an insider. And when he appeared, that was one of his biggest assets in politics, since this insider status was extremely relevant. When he talks about corruption claims against the government, it seems to mobilize anger much more effectively. This is what really matters here, because, on many issues, anger is a very strong motivational factor in politics, including in unseating incumbent governments. This is absolutely not a good feeling, I have to say, but it does trigger mobilization, and mobilization is key, obviously.

Peace Narrative Masks Polarization

The campaign has been strongly shaped by geopolitical narratives, particularly regarding Russia and Ukraine. Has Orbán’s positioning as a “peace-oriented” leader maintained its electoral appeal, or is his perceived proximity to Moscow becoming a source of political vulnerability?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: That’s not an easy question to answer. First of all, his portrayal of himself as “peace-oriented” is really just buying into his populist discourse of being a pro-peace person, while everybody else who does not agree with him is, by definition, pro-war. So, once again, you have this Manichean, moralistic kind of division within politics that populists are very fond of. Essentially, this type of division turns every political discussion and agenda point into a life-or-death situation. Here, it is literally portrayed as such: if we do not want this, then the next day, everybody is sent to the Ukrainian front and people will die there.

But I would not buy into this “peace-oriented leader” narrative at all. There is a columnist in one of the Hungarian weeklies who consistently describes Orbán as aggressor-oriented, and I think that is probably a better portrayal of what he actually is—without taking any normative position. If you ask what he means by peace, the government does not really have a clear idea of what peace would entail or how it should be achieved. In that sense, the aggressor-oriented description may be more accurate.

As for whether this narrative still works, I think it holds up quite well among the core electorate. We know from sociological and political studies that most of Orbán’s supporters come from the countryside, with lower levels of education and generally more limited economic means. Among these groups, the message still resonates. Talking about the war—through fearmongering, warmongering, and similar appeals—continues to be effective.

What they have also done quite effectively, and this is why they remain competitive, is to turn uncertainty around the war into anger. Studies on populism show that fear is not the main driver; anger is. Fear reflects uncertainty, whereas anger is directed—it needs a target. They have managed to convert uncertainty and fear into anger.

To some extent, President Zelensky also inadvertently contributed to this dynamic. A particular quote was picked up and amplified by pro-government media, portraying it as a threat to Orbán. This helped channel anger toward Zelensky and Ukraine.

They also continue to layer in additional discursive elements, such as claims that “they are taking your money.” Recently, the prime minister held town hall meetings across the country, where he accused protesters of siding with Ukraine and attempting to divert Hungarian resources there. This reflects a level of political rhetoric that is, frankly, quite unprecedented. Similarly, incidents such as damage to the Druzhba gas pipeline have been reframed as evidence that Ukraine is withholding Hungary’s energy supplies and weaponizing resources. This contributes to a constant, artificially orchestrated sense of anger directed at Ukraine. In that sense, the narrative still resonates with certain segments. There is some degree of creativity, but in terms of the broader narrative, they have not significantly shifted away from the war-centered discourse seen in 2022 and 2024.

Regarding Trump and Moscow, the situation is more complicated. Trump’s own actions—particularly the wars associated with his leadership—no longer support the earlier framing of him as a “pro-peace” figure. As a result, the government has largely stopped emphasizing this aspect and instead downplays it. Attempts to reinterpret such developments rhetorically have not been particularly convincing.

As for relations with Moscow, recent leaks concerning communications between Hungarian and Russian officials have raised questions. Depending on interpretation, these either reflect pragmatic diplomacy or suggest alignment with Russian interests, including the sharing of sensitive information.

Overall, both the Trump factor and the Russian connection appear to increase the government’s political vulnerability.

Trump Effect Mostly Symbolic

US President Donald Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán arrive for a working dinner at the NATO Summit in Brussels, Belgium on July 11, 2018. Photo: Gints Ivuskans / Dreamstime.

Hungary has long been embedded in a broader transnational network of right-wing populist actors. How significant is the “Trump effect” and Musk’s influence in this election, both in terms of symbolic validation and in reinforcing Orbán’s model of governance?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: I think it is really symbolic. I am not sure that, in terms of governance features, there is much there. Quite the reverse, I would say. It is really some American governors and high-ranking politicians who keep talking about copying this or that from Orbán, when it comes to, for example, dealing with LGBTQ issues in their states, etc. So, Orbán tries to position himself—and to some extent successfully—as a governance genius who should and could be copied by some of these international partners.

On the other hand, the extent to which they actually contribute to Orbán’s success is largely symbolic. As I said, the campaign is mainly about the war at this moment, so it is not really a question of whether there is transnational conservative endorsement or not—it does not matter that much. I do not see it that way. We had CPAC (the Conservative Political Action Conference) Hungary, which is a sort of mimic meeting of CPAC in the US where they invite right-wing politicians and intellectuals. It is a significant event. Just a couple of days ago, they announced that J.D. Vance, the US Vice President, is coming next Tuesday to Hungary. They probably wanted Trump to come but could not manage it, so it will be J.D. Vance. And the American government has already signaled that it supports Orbán’s re-election.

But, what matters most, once again, for the future—or for the short-term political room for maneuver of the government—is really the European partners. The EU and other European right-wing leaders are closely watching the election, because it could fundamentally change dynamics within the European Council and more generally within the integration process in the EU.

Hungary Tests Populism’s Limits

Finally, Professor Csehi, from a comparative perspective, what would each plausible outcome—a renewed Fidesz victory, a Tisza-led breakthrough, or a contested post-election scenario—tell us about the broader trajectory of populist rule in Europe and the capacity of democratic systems to dislodge entrenched illiberal incumbents?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: If Fidesz wins, this is still going to be an interesting scenario and an interesting political experience, which would tell us that, despite economic strains and despite the ideological fatigue that the government shows, and despite a strong challenger—a new challenger party emerging—the system still has some resilience. Then we would need to find out what actually triggered this resilience, or what made this resilience possible.

Now, this resilience, obviously, would send a message that electoral challenge is still possible, even with a populist regime that is extremely mature in its institutional design and structural features, etc. Therefore, none of these populist regimes are actually immune to a more systemic fatigue, and, if they want to survive, they need to be more creative in how they maintain the system.

But definitely, with a Tisza win, we would get very good information on how much democratic backsliding there actually was in the system, across different aspects. Most likely, this would generate immense knowledge that we could gain, and that would be extremely valuable for future studies. So I am very much looking forward to seeing what will happen. Those are my two cents on this point.

Professor Johannes Andersen.

Prof. Andersen: Danish Democracy Grows More Volatile as Voters Drift and Parties Chase Them

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

In this insightful ECPS interview, Professor Johannes Andersen offers a sobering diagnosis of Denmark’s evolving political landscape following the 2026 general election. He argues that the country is undergoing a profound structural transformation marked by voter de-alignment, declining trust, and increasingly fragmented party competition.  While voters remain loosely anchored within traditional blocs, many no longer feel represented by specific parties, resulting in growing electoral volatility. At the same time, political parties are shifting from long-term representation toward short-term, issue-driven strategies. As Professor Andersen warns, this dynamic creates a paradox: expanded democratic choice coexists with rising confusion and distrust—pointing to a more unstable, yet still functioning, democratic system.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Johannes Andersen, Professor of Political Science at Aalborg University, offers a sobering and analytically rich assessment of Denmark’s evolving political landscape in the aftermath of the 2026 general election. Professor Andersen’s diagnosis captures a deeper structural transformation unfolding beneath the surface of what has long been considered one of Europe’s most stable democratic systems.

In the wake of Denmark’s closely contested 2026 general election, the country stands at a pivotal political moment—marked by fragmentation, the resurgence of the populist radical right, and renewed geopolitical tensions over Greenland. While the campaign was driven largely by domestic concerns such as the cost-of-living crisis and migration, the results also point to deeper shifts in political trust, voter alignments, and the structure of democratic competition. Professor Andersen’s analysis situates these developments within a broader transformation of democratic politics, emphasizing that Denmark is no longer experiencing episodic volatility but a sustained process of structural change.

At the core of his argument lies the claim that both voters and political parties are undergoing simultaneous and mutually reinforcing transformations. As he underscores, “we are witnessing really fundamental changes in this system,” driven by evolving voter attitudes and shifting party strategies. Voters, while still loosely anchored within traditional bloc structures, are increasingly detached from specific party identities – “voters no longer feel represented by a political party”—resulting in unprecedented levels of electoral fluidity. The fact that roughly half of the electorate has changed party allegiance in recent elections, with even higher volatility anticipated, illustrates the depth of this de-alignment.

At the same time, political parties have adapted by moving away from long-term representational commitments toward short-term, issue-driven competition. Rather than defending stable constituencies, they increasingly seek to maximize electoral appeal through targeted policy responses – “we are the best at solving this problem”—thereby reinforcing a political logic in which responsiveness replaces representation. This transformation is particularly visible in the growing centrality of migration politics, which now structures competition across both left and right.

Professor Andersen also highlights the gradual erosion of the welfare state as a unifying political project. Once the cornerstone of Danish social democracy, it has receded from the center of political discourse, replaced by fragmented issue politics and competing populist narratives. In this context, even strong executive performance does not necessarily translate into electoral gains, as demonstrated by the limited political returns from Denmark’s handling of the Greenland crisis.

Taken together, these dynamics point to what Professor Andersen describes as a new and inherently unstable political equilibrium—one defined by expanded voter choice but declining trust. As he cautions, “we are developing a new political culture based on growing confusion among voters,” where democratic dynamism coexists with increasing alienation. 

The interview that follows explores these tensions in depth, beginning with the question of whether Denmark’s fragmentation reflects a temporary fluctuation or a more profound transformation of democratic politics.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Johannes Andersen, revised so slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Politics Has Shifted from Representation to Competition for Voters Across Issues

The Danish nation has cast its votes in the parliamentary elections. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Johannes Andersen, welcome. Let me begin with a foundational question: The 2026 election produced a highly fragmented outcome that appears to unsettle Denmark’s historically stable party system. Drawing on your work on political trust and voter attitudes, would you interpret this as a conjunctural fluctuation, or as evidence of a deeper process of de-alignment—where traditional cleavages and partisan loyalties are being replaced by more individualized, volatile, and contingent forms of political engagement?

Professor Johannes Andersen: I would go for the second half of your question, because we are witnessing really fundamental changes in this system, and this has been going on for 10-20 years—perhaps even longer. There are two structural elements here that are very important. The first is that voters have changed their way of looking at politics, partly because political parties, at the same time, have changed their way of thinking about politics, developing politics, and approaching these questions more broadly. So, we have two structural elements that are both changing, and they are intertwined. I will try to explain that a little further.

When it comes to the voters, in the last election, half of the Danish electorate voted for a new political party. They changed their position in that sense. But most of them are still located within the blocs we know: the red bloc, or socialist bloc, and the blue bloc, the liberal or conservative bloc. So, voters are still, to a very large degree, positioned within these blocs. But they are changing parties within the blocs. As I mentioned, half of the voters changed their party in 2022. This time, my guess is that even more people—perhaps 55 percent of the voters—will change political parties.

So, in a way, you can see that voters no longer feel represented by a political party. This is one aspect of the fundamental change we are dealing with: people are becoming more confused and more insecure. They may still have a basic feeling that they are red or blue, but they are no longer linked to a particular political party.

That means that when election time comes, you see a great many voters searching for guidance. Last time, in 2022, up to 70 percent of voters used those tests published in newspapers, where they try to determine which party they should vote for. And many of them, on their first attempt, simply refused to choose the party the test suggested. But this is actually revealing. It points to a fundamental change: the feeling that one is not represented by a political party. That has changed profoundly for voters.

On the other hand, we have the political parties which are no longer oriented toward a particular group they want to defend, fight for, and help build a better society for. They are not trying to represent such groups in the best way they can. Instead, they are trying to compete for voters. They are becoming broader and broader in their appeal, and they are becoming better and better at identifying what a particular group wants. Then they propose political measures accordingly: we are the best at solving this problem; we are the best at solving that problem.

When it comes to issues, for example, water has been very important in the 2026 election. It could be pollution of the water. It could be the question of an ageing population—how should we deal with that? Or it could be the rising prices in the shops, where parties propose giving people a check, an amount of money they can use to buy groceries, especially food.

So, political parties are becoming more and more occupied with single issues, rather than with any structural or strategic project aimed at defending particular groups. On the one hand, then, we have voters who are becoming more insecure and who do not feel represented in any deeper sense. On the other hand, we have political parties that are increasingly eager to win more and more voters, no matter what.

And one of the issues that has become especially important for political parties—both in the red and blue, blocs—is immigration. The immigration question has become central even for the Social Democrats, and now also for the Socialist People’s Party, which is a left-wing party. They are becoming more and more interested in signaling that they do not want immigrants, especially those with a Muslim background. This issue has become very important for all of them, and they are now in competition over who is most eager to throw people out if they are involved in any kind of illegal activity—or perhaps even just visible Muslim religious activity. In that sense, they are eager to expel them, or even to throw them out.

The immigration issue—and especially immigration from Muslim countries—is, in a way, central. All these other issues they deal with—wanting to give people more money so they can buy food, wanting clean water, and so on—are linked to the immigration question in one way or another. They have to make sure that this does not become a way of scaring people.  This is the fundamental structural situation in Denmark: on the one hand, people feel unrepresented; on the other hand, political parties are no longer truly interested in representing anyone. This is the issue, the structural issue, for understanding many of the details.

The Welfare State Has Faded from the Center of Danish Politics

Denmark votes in parliamentary elections in Copenhagen.
Denmark votes in parliamentary elections in Copenhagen, Kastrup, Denmark, on November 1, 2022. Voters head to polling stations to cast their ballots in the general election. Photo: Francis Joseph Dean / Dean Pictures / Dreamstime.

The electoral decline of the Social Democrats raises questions about the durability of catch-all party strategies. To what extent does this trajectory reflect not only the exhaustion of social democratic “big tent” politics under conditions of late modernity, but also a broader erosion of long-term voter attachments and collective identities that historically underpinned social democratic dominance?

Professor Johannes Andersen: I have reflected quite a bit on this question, because it opens up many important dimensions. One of the great strengths of the Social Democratic Party has been its development of the central idea of welfare rights. Citizenship has been understood not only in political and democratic terms, but also in terms of welfare-based social citizenship. The Social Democrats were able, as a strategic defense of workers and society more broadly, to build and expand the welfare state in increasingly comprehensive ways.

However, almost without anyone clearly noticing, this perspective has gradually been left out of both their political practice and public debate. Both the Social Democrats themselves and the organizations behind them, such as the unions, have become less focused on the welfare state—although unions and civil society actors still tend to emphasize universal welfare rights more than political parties do. At the same time, social organizations continue to defend welfare rights, but they face an increasingly difficult struggle. This is largely because the Social Democrats, historically the central defenders of the welfare state, have shifted their focus, becoming more and more preoccupied with the immigration issue.

This creates a highly uncertain electoral trajectory. On the one hand, the Social Democrats could regain support in future elections, perhaps reaching around 30 percent—high by contemporary standards, though still below their historical peak of around 40 percent, when they were the dominant force in defending the welfare state. On the other hand, they could also decline further, potentially falling to 15 percent or even lower. Such volatility is now entirely conceivable.

What we see, then, is a party increasingly focused on maximizing its electoral support by targeting specific issues. The Social Democrats, like other parties, recognize that voters can be mobilized around short-term concerns. If they can create the impression that they are capable of addressing these issues effectively, they may gain support—but they are doing so in direct competition with a growing number of parties.

This helps explain why there are now 12 political parties represented in Parliament. They are competing across a wide range of issues, and in the process, two key elements are eroding: first, the sustained defense of the welfare state system, and second, the belief among voters that the welfare state will reliably support them in times of need.

In turn, this opens the door to what we might describe as a more populist mode of politics. Parties increasingly link specific issues to direct promises – “we will solve this problem,” “we will address that concern”—while often adopting a critical stance toward elites. This dynamic is particularly evident among right-wing parties, especially those drawing support from rural constituencies, but it is also visible among left-wing parties, which similarly frame themselves as defenders of “the people” against elites or against the erosion of welfare state protections.

In short, this is a complex and evolving situation. The welfare state—both its defense and its development as a foundational pillar of Danish politics—has largely receded from the political agenda. Instead, across the 12 parties now represented in Parliament, there is a growing tendency to focus on short-term issues.

Geopolitical Leadership No Longer Guarantees Electoral Reward

Mette Frederiksen
Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen at a press conference during the COVID-19 crisis, Copenhagen, March 17, 2020. Photo: Francis Dean | Dreamstime.

Despite a potential “rally-around-the-flag” dynamic linked to the Greenland crisis, Mette Frederiksen did not translate geopolitical leadership into electoral gains. Does this indicate a growing decoupling between executive performance and electoral reward, suggesting that political trust has become more conditional, situational, and less anchored in traditional forms of leadership legitimacy?

Professor Johannes Andersen: Yes, that is correct. The Greenland issue did not ultimately help, although it appeared to do so at the outset. One of the reasons the election was called is that Mette Frederiksen saw an opportunity to gain additional support, and initially it seemed plausible that this could be achieved. However, the international crisis unfolded within the context of a centrist government composed of the Social Democrats, the Moderates, and the Liberals. While this coalition formally spans traditional bloc divisions, an analysis of Moderate voters suggests that they closely resemble those in the blue bloc. In that sense, one could argue that the government effectively contained two blue bloc parties alongside one from the red bloc.

During the Greenland crisis, the foreign minister was highly visible and active in defending Denmark’s interests as a kingdom, particularly in relation to Greenland. His performance was widely recognized, and voters appeared to acknowledge that he was doing a good job. Yet, when it came to the election, this did not translate into electoral gains. Support shifted within blocs—some voters moved toward the blue bloc, others toward the red—but there was no significant transfer of support across blocs. In effect, the situation resulted in a draw: neither side was able to capitalize electorally on the crisis.

This outcome likely came as a surprise to the government. Mette Frederiksen, who personally decided on the timing of the election, may have expected a more favorable result than what ultimately materialized.

A New ‘Center’ Is Emerging as a Strategic Position Against Extremes

Election campaign posters featuring Liberal leader and former Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen displayed on a street during the campaign period in Copenhagen, Denmark on June 15, 2015. Photo: Francis Joseph Dean / Dean Pictures / Dreamstime.

With Lars Løkke Rasmussen occupying a pivotal position, how should we rethink the notion of “the center” in fragmented multiparty systems? Is it still a sociologically grounded median space, or increasingly a strategic and discursive construction emerging from systemic fragmentation?

Professor Johannes Andersen: As I mentioned, when we look at the voters of the Moderates, their profile is almost identical to that of voters in the blue bloc. Their support base aligns closely with the average blue bloc voter, and their appeal increasingly reflects this orientation. At the same time, they emphasize that they do not belong to either the traditional right or the left. Instead, they construct an image of both sides as “extremes,” positioning themselves as an alternative to these perceived poles.

However, Denmark has a long tradition of a different kind of center, represented by the Radical Left (Radikale Venstre), which is a particularly interesting case. Historically, this party emerged from socially engaged small farmers in the countryside who were struggling to sustain their livelihoods. It represented their political voice during a period of hardship. On the other hand, the party advocated for social rights; and it supported economic liberalism. In this sense, it embodied a form of social liberalism that has been deeply rooted in Danish political tradition. Indeed, social liberalism played a significant role in the development of the welfare state, even if the Social Democrats were the primary force advancing and defending it. This combination of social and liberal ideas constituted what we might call the “classic” center in Danish politics.

Today, with the Moderates and Lars Løkke Rasmussen in the lead, we observe a markedly different conception of the center. Their position is defined less by a substantive ideological synthesis and more by a strategic stance against what they label as “extremism.” They seek to exclude the political extremes and present themselves as the responsible and pragmatic alternative within the system.

In this sense, we are witnessing the emergence of a new kind of center. Unlike the traditional social-liberal center, this formation reflects a different logic of political competition. It could even be described as a form of “centrist populism,” should this tendency continue to develop. In some respects, the Moderates may display more pronounced populist features than some of the traditional right-wing populist parties in Denmark.

Their approach involves defending what might be termed “the good people” and their interests—specifically, those who do not identify with more radical positions. They portray themselves as protecting these citizens from the uncertainty and instability generated by both radical left- and right-wing actors. Rather than targeting conventional elites, they construct a political elite associated with extremism, against which they position themselves as defenders of ordinary citizens.

In this way, we can observe the emergence of a new form of centrism—one that is no longer anchored in a stable sociological base but instead arises from a strategic and discursive effort to represent “the common people” against perceived political extremes.

Stability Is Promised, but Volatility Defines the New Political Landscape

How should we normatively and sociologically assess the growing role of centrist kingmaker parties in proportional systems? Does their pivotality enhance pluralist representation, or does it risk distorting democratic accountability while reshaping citizens’ perceptions of fairness and representation?

Professor Johannes Andersen: You raise an important point, particularly with regard to stability. If we look more closely at the Moderates, for example, a year ago they were close to the threshold of parliamentary representation. Their level of support fluctuates significantly—it rises and falls, almost in a “U-shaped” pattern, if you will—and at present they happen to be near a peak.

However, they have emerged from a position where they were not even represented in some of the polls. It is entirely possible that they could return to that position in the future. This reflects a broader dynamic I mentioned earlier: on the one hand, voters increasingly feel unrepresented, and on the other, parties no longer see themselves as representing clearly defined constituencies. The result is a highly fluid political system.

This is what some scholars describe as “hyperpolitics,” where a wide range of actors are constantly communicating, mobilizing, and competing. In such a context, it becomes possible, within a very short time frame, for new centrist parties or initiatives to emerge. Their strategic objective is often to prevent so-called “extremists” from gaining political influence.

My expectation is that even if the Moderates were to disappear, another actor could readily assume the same role. This is because the underlying logic is politically attractive: it acknowledges the existence of conflict but downplays its depth and seeks to avoid polarization. The core argument is that allowing “extremists” to shape political outcomes would generate uncertainty and instability.

In this sense, these parties offer voters a promise of security and stability. At the same time, however, they are themselves embedded in the same uncertainty that characterizes the broader system. Voters are unsure where to turn, and parties are continuously introducing new issues and policy proposals in an effort to remain competitive.

Overall, this points to an increasingly unstable political landscape—one in which volatility, rather than equilibrium, may become the defining feature.

The Danish People’s Party Has Shifted to a More Symbolic, ‘Aristocratic’ Populism

Denmark politics.
Election posters from various Danish political parties ahead of the June 2019 parliamentary election, Copenhagen, May 20, 2019. Photo: Deanpictures / Dreamstime.

The resurgence of the Danish People’s Party suggests renewed populist energy without systemic takeover. Does Denmark exemplify a model of “contained populism,” and to what extent should this be understood less as a party phenomenon and more as a set of diffuse attitudes embedded within the electorate?

Professor Johannes Andersen: To be honest, I am not entirely sure. The reason is that we are witnessing some rather specific developments in Denmark. The Danish People’s Party, for instance, has undergone a noticeable transformation in its political outlook and style of communication. It has become fundamentally critical of all other political parties, positioning itself as the only authentic representative of “the people.”

At the same time, it has adopted a style that could be described as almost aristocratic. It presents itself as more conservative than even the Conservative People’s Party and seeks to stand above the rest, while claiming to defend all Danes. This stylistic shift is significant. Although it may appear merely rhetorical, it reflects a broader repositioning: the party now frames itself as a guardian of the nation as a whole, rather than as the representative of a specific social group.

In this sense, while the strategy retains a familiar populist logic—defending “the people” against others—it does so in a more generalized and symbolic manner. This marks a departure from earlier, more targeted forms of representation.

At the same time, the Danish People’s Party faces growing competition from the Danish Democrats, who have adopted a more concrete and socially grounded approach. Their focus is on rural communities—people living in small towns who are directly affected by the closure of local shops, medical facilities, and other welfare institutions. These voters often feel that development is bypassing them, that their communities are in decline, and that their economic prospects are increasingly uncertain.

The Danish Democrats seek to give voice to these concerns by advocating for rural development and emphasizing respect for farmers and local livelihoods. In this sense, they represent a more specific, socio-economic form of populism, in contrast to the broader, more symbolic approach of the Danish People’s Party.

What we see, therefore, are two distinct models of populism operating within the right wing of the blue bloc. One is generalized and national in scope; the other is more targeted and rooted in particular social groups. The interaction between these two forms generates a certain degree of turbulence within the political landscape. Rather than cooperating, these parties are engaged in direct competition, each seeking to outmaneuver the other.

Democratic Dynamism Paired with Growing Alienation

And the final question, Professor Andersen. Would you characterize Denmark’s current trajectory as one of adaptive democratic resilience, or do these developments reveal underlying reservoirs of distrust and alienation that could, under specific conditions, enable a more decisive populist radical-right breakthrough?

Professor Johannes Andersen: In a way, I would say that we are developing a new political culture based on growing confusion among voters, with more and more people becoming increasingly uncertain. At the same time, we have what I would call central, government-based mass political parties that are primarily focused on attracting as many voters as possible, without being particularly concerned with their voters’ underlying interests.

This creates a situation in which voters and political parties are constantly moving in and out of alignment with one another. Some voters feel they can no longer trust politicians, while some politicians seek support by claiming to defend all people, fundamental rights, and citizens against major threats. This dynamic opens new opportunities for political parties to gain access to power, while also expanding the range of choices available to voters. As we can see, there are now 12 political parties represented in Parliament, and voters are continually trying to determine which party to support—often changing their choice from one election to the next.

This results in a new and inherently unstable situation which, at its best, may be seen as reflecting positive democratic dynamics, since voters have the freedom to choose among a wide array of alternatives. That is a strength. However, this same instability is also contributing to growing distrust toward politicians. People are becoming increasingly critical of politics and political actors.

As we can observe, the level of voter participation is relatively low and continues to decline. If this trend persists, it could become a serious problem. The Danish electoral system has traditionally been characterized by a high level of voter turnout, but this willingness to participate is now decreasing. We are therefore facing a fundamental challenge.

On the one hand, the system can still be described as a functioning democracy, with voters willing to explore different political options. On the other hand, it is producing increasing confusion among voters, who are becoming more critical of the democratic system as such.