Professor Dušan Spasojević is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Belgrade.

Prof. Spasojević: Without Lustration and Accountability, Serbia’s Former Rulers Will Return

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Dušan Spasojević of the University of Belgrade examines Serbia’s student-led electoral victory and the challenges of democratic consolidation following Aleksandar Vučić’s defeat. While mass mobilization and civic solidarity helped overcome the structural advantages of competitive authoritarianism, Professor Spasojević cautions that entrenched political divisions, Serbian nationalism, and ethnonational tensions persist. He highlights the difficulties of maintaining unity within the ideologically diverse Students’ List and rebuilding democratic institutions. Drawing lessons from Milošević’s overthrow in 2000, he warns that without lustration and accountability, former authoritarian elites may return sooner than expected. Judicial independence, media freedom, and effective enforcement of existing laws, he argues, are essential to preventing renewed authoritarianism.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Serbia’s October 25, 2026, parliamentary elections marked a historic political turning point, with the student-backed Students’ List securing 140 of 250 seats and ending Aleksandar Vučić’s longstanding political dominance. Emerging from protests following the November 2024 Novi Sad railway station tragedy, the movement transformed demands for accountability into a nationwide challenge to institutional capture, political clientelism, and personalized rule. Yet electoral victory raises profound questions about democratic consolidation, institutional reform, and the resilience of entrenched authoritarian networks.

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Dušan Spasojević, Professor of Political Science at the University of Belgrade, offers a nuanced assessment of Serbia’s democratic breakthrough, highlighting both the transformative power of student-led mobilization and the formidable obstacles confronting democratic renewal.

Drawing parallels with Slobodan Milošević’s overthrow in 2000, Professor Spasojević identifies transitional justice as a decisive test. Warning against the complacency that characterized Serbia’s earlier transition, he argues: “If we fail to carry out lustration or establish some form of accountability, they will return, and sooner than we might expect.” Indeed, he cautions that “the return of the previous regime might be even easier now than it was in 2000.” His central recommendation is to prioritize accountability, judicial independence, media freedom, and implementation of existing laws.

Yet Professor Spasojević emphasizes that electoral victory has not erased Serbia’s deep political divisions. Although student mobilization attracted previously disengaged citizens and former government supporters, entrenched urban–rural and socioeconomic cleavages persist. Moreover, the Students’ List encompasses ideological positions ranging from the far right to the far left. Consequently, “Maintaining that unity will be a key challenge for the new government and the list itself.”

The interview also illuminates how mass mobilization can challenge competitive authoritarianism. Through nationwide canvassing, citizen participation, and election monitoring, students countered the ruling party’s institutional advantages. As Professor Spasojević observes, “the elections were ultimately neither free nor fair, but they were sufficiently competitive to make victory possible.”

Importantly, the movement’s anti-authoritarian success did not necessarily entail an ideological rupture with Serbian nationalism. Professor Spasojević argues that students “didn’t challenge Serbian nationalism,” pointing to their ambiguous positions on Kosovo, Russia, and European integration. Similarly, while solidarity between Serbian and Bosniak students represented meaningful civic progress, entrenched ethnonational divisions remain. The movement’s silence surrounding Srebrenica and the limited public participation of Albanian students illustrate the constraints of reconciliation through mobilization alone.

Professor Spasojević’s analysis distinguishes electoral transformation from democratic consolidation. Serbia’s experience demonstrates the importance of solidarity and collective action, but also the necessity of dismantling authoritarian structures. His overarching warning is unequivocal: “Democracy should never be taken for granted,” even after authoritarian incumbents lose power.

Here is our interview with Professor Dušan Spasojević, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Serbia’s Student Revolution Was Two Years in the Making

Serbia protest.
Serbian students and citizens protest against government corruption following the Novi Sad railway station accident, at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on December 22, 2024. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic / Dreamstime.

Professor Spasojević, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with the extraordinary transformation of Serbia’s student movement from civic protest into electoral victory. The student movement that emerged after the November 2024 Novi Sad railway station tragedy culminated in the Students’ List’s electoral victory on October 25, 2026. How do you explain this remarkable transformation from a movement demanding accountability into a nationwide political force capable of defeating Aleksandar Vučić’s entrenched political establishment?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: First of all, we should recognize that this was a two-year-long transformation. Students initiated protests and blockades in late 2024, and even at that early stage, they enjoyed significant public support. According to polls, more than 60% of Serbian voters supported their initial demands for accountability, providing an excellent starting point.

However, transforming a very fluid social movement into a political force capable of competing in and ultimately winning elections required considerable time and resources. Support from different parts of society was also crucial.

Finally, the students largely followed the established rules of electoral campaigning. Of course, this was not a conventional campaign, but by the end, they resembled a proper political party, albeit without notable leaders and with certain distinctive characteristics. Nevertheless, they followed the rules of electoral competition to a significant extent.

Unity Without a Single Leader Was the Students’ Greatest Strength

In your study “Civic Mobilization as a Response to Institutional Deficit,” you examine how student plenums, decentralized leadership, and nonviolent mobilization challenged Serbia’s established political practices. What made these organizational innovations more effective than previous anti-government protest movements?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: I would return to the same point I made in response to the previous question. In the early days, the student plenums were massive. Hundreds of thousands of students gathered, creating a snowball effect and lending legitimacy to the movement itself. This was extremely important at the beginning of the process.

The fact that the students had no single leader and remained united despite their differences was also important. This distinguished them from the Serbian opposition. In the later stages, oligarchic elements emerged, but the oligarchy remained sufficiently pluralistic and democratic to sustain support throughout the process. The students thus used different forms of political organization depending on the stage of the movement and the particular moment in the political crisis.

Electoral Victory Has Not Erased Serbia’s Deep Political Divisions

Students mobilized support well beyond universities through marches, rural outreach, local assemblies, and solidarity networks. How did the movement overcome Serbia’s urban–rural and generational divides, and what role did these grassroots connections play in its electoral success?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: As I mentioned, the movement already enjoyed 60% support by January or February 2025. At that point, we realized that its appeal extended beyond the usual political divisions, attracting a significant number of governing party voters. This was very important.

Door-to-door campaigning and canvassing across Serbia in the later stages of the movement were also extremely important. However, I wouldn’t go too far in claiming that the students overcame traditional political divisions. The government remains much stronger among rural voters and those with lower levels of educational attainment, reflecting a divide that persists.

Nevertheless, the students managed to attract median voters and those further removed from the government’s core constituency. In a sense, they gained what support they could, but the underlying divisions remain and cannot be overcome easily.

Rejecting Traditional Parties Helped Serbia’s Students Win

erbian President Aleksandar Vučić addresses the Socialist Party of Serbia’s anniversary gathering in Belgrade, Serbia, on July 16, 2024. Photo: Milos Peric / Dreamstime.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić addresses the Socialist Party of Serbia’s anniversary gathering in Belgrade, Serbia, on July 16, 2024. Photo: Milos Peric / Dreamstime.

In your article “Antipolitics as a Challenge to Political Parties,” you examine the democratic implications of rejecting conventional politics. Did the students’ refusal of traditional party leadership create a new form of democratic representation, or did their electoral victory ultimately demonstrate the necessity of institutionalized political organization?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: This remains an open question to some extent. The students rejected cooperation with established political parties, which was tactically wise. But there was also an element of anti-politics and anti-partyism that helped attract certain segments of the population. We should probably acknowledge that this contributed to their success. However, in the medium to long run, I wouldn’t conclude that the success of the Students’ List demonstrates the need for new forms of political participation or organization. This appears to be a unique case, shaped by several factors, including the inability of established political parties to challenge the regime.

More concretely, the opposition parties had a good opportunity in the 2023 parliamentary elections but failed to build on that success in the 2024 local elections. Their failure to act when they had the opportunity created more space for alternative forms of political behavior. In that sense, at least for now, this appears to be a genuinely unique phenomenon. I expect that, in two or three years, political parties will once again become the dominant actors. Of course, they will not necessarily be the same parties we know today. But I don’t think this movement has the capacity to fundamentally change the way political organization works in Serbia.

Maintaining Unity Will Be the Students’ List’s Greatest Challenge

The Students’ List won 140 of 250 parliamentary seats in October, displacing both the ruling SNS alliance and established opposition parties. Does this represent a fundamental realignment of Serbia’s party system or an exceptional anti-incumbent coalition whose internal diversity may become a source of instability?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: I would lean toward the second option, as the Students’ List’s key strength was its unity. We knew that its members ranged from the far right to the far left, but they remained united under specific circumstances. Maintaining that unity will be a key challenge for the new government and the list itself.

I don’t expect a split to happen very soon, but in a year or two, differences among them will become more visible to the general public. Of course, we have already noticed these differences. That will be the first major challenge.

When we consider political alignment or realignment, there may be room to rethink Serbia’s political landscape, party system, and key social cleavages. However, if we look at how the movement has functioned so far, it has operated along these existing lines of division. I would therefore expect at least some of them to persist over time, meaning that new political actors will have to confront the same questions as their predecessors.

Some of the most important issues remain unresolved, particularly Serbia’s EU membership and the future status of Kosovo. Numerous other identity politics issues also remain highly salient in Serbian politics.

Electoral Transformation Was Driven by Unprecedented Participation

Your research with Vujo Ilić highlights persistent inequalities in electoral participation. To what extent did the students’ victory depend on mobilizing previously disengaged citizens, particularly younger voters, and what does this reveal about the relationship between civic participation and electoral transformation?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: First-time and younger voters were extremely important, but I think mobilizing people who usually abstain from voting was also decisive. I would identify three key groups: previous abstainers, young voters, and a few hundred thousand voters who switched from the former ruling parties. Mobilizing these groups was essential to winning the elections.

Overall, turnout was exceptionally high, at around 70%. However, we know that of the 6.5 million registered voters, at least one million live abroad and are unlikely to vote, although they remain on the voter rolls. Taking this into account, turnout was effectively closer to 80%, which is remarkable.

This brings us back to our experience with the downfall of Milošević and similar moments of significant political change. High turnout and broad participation are crucial to challenging such a dominant opponent. We knew, and polls also suggested, that the students only had a chance if turnout exceeded 60–65%. Of course, no one could have anticipated such a decisive victory.

Mass Mobilization Can Challenge the Structural Advantages of Authoritarian Regimes

In your research with Jelena Lončar, you characterize Serbia’s political system through the framework of competitive authoritarianism. Given the SNS’s institutional advantages, media influence, and patronage networks, how did the student-backed opposition overcome the structural asymmetries that had constrained previous electoral challenges?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: We have already mentioned some of the key elements. The students relied on their manpower. They canvassed, walked, cycled, and marched across Serbia for more than a year, trying to overcome the ruling party’s advantage in media coverage. They also benefited from strong support from independent and opposition media, particularly Nova TV and N1, which were closely aligned with the students.

Another crucial factor was the massive mobilization of citizens who became involved in the movement from its earliest days and remained engaged throughout the process. The only way to tackle the uneven playing field under competitive authoritarianism is to have sufficient numbers, resources, and people to mobilize, thereby making electoral competition somewhat fairer. Of course, the elections were ultimately neither free nor fair, but they were sufficiently competitive to make victory possible.

Citizen Election Monitoring and Democratic Self-Defense

Students collect signatures in support of calls for early parliamentary elections in Valjevo, Serbia.
Students collect signatures in support of calls for early parliamentary elections in Valjevo, Serbia, on December 28, 2025. Photo: Adam Radosavljevic / Dreamstime.

Reports of extensive citizen-led election monitoring suggest that grassroots observers played a significant role in protecting the October vote. Can this mobilization be understood as a form of democratic self-defense, and what does it reveal about elections conducted under conditions of institutional distrust?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: We had already learned this lesson during the final years of Milošević’s rule, particularly in 2000, when protecting the vote and monitoring elections were essential. The challenge in confronting the Serbian Progressive Party, as with most contemporary hybrid regimes, is that these regimes are becoming smarter, developing methods of electoral fraud that are difficult to anticipate.

For example, the 2024 local elections presented the first major opportunity for Vučić to lose some of his leverage. The SNS essentially stole the Belgrade elections by registering an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 voters in Belgrade just before the vote. These voters did not actually move there; they were simply registered in the city. This was a form of electoral fraud that was difficult to anticipate.

On election day, it was therefore essential not only to protect every vote at polling stations but also to track ballots and voter registers as they were transported to the Central Electoral Commission. We had a veritable army of people on the streets, organized into what we called mobile teams. Traveling in several cars, they monitored every step of the process.

Hundreds of thousands of people were involved, with the aim of protecting the electoral process from beginning to end. Another objective was to limit the SNS’s ability to organize activities near polling stations, where they would typically engage in vote buying or mobilize their voters. The strategy was to prevent these activities, slow down the SNS’s operations, and reduce its influence. Ultimately, that was the central objective: to make the party less effective than it had been in previous elections.

Authoritarian Regime Has Fallen, but Democratic Consolidation Remains Uncertain

In “Transforming Populism—From Protest Vote to Ruling Ideology,” you analyze how populism becomes institutionalized within governing parties. Does the student movement’s victory mark the defeat of Vučić’s authoritarian populism, or merely the electoral interruption of a political system whose ideological foundations remain resilient?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: The victory of the Students’ List marks the end of the authoritarian regime, in the sense that the regime’s levers and mechanisms are no longer in place. The SNS developed an entire system rooted partly in the state and partly in the political party. They blurred the boundaries between the state and the party, allowing them to use state institutions at will. Their electoral defeat has already significantly improved the level of democracy in Serbia because they can no longer misuse these mechanisms.

Whether we will be able to restore a deeper, higher-quality democracy in Serbia, and what the long-term legacy of this transformation will be, remain open questions. I hope we will succeed, but that remains to be seen in the months ahead.

Student Movement Was Too Ideologically Diverse to Be Classified as Populist

The student movement constructed a broad political identity around accountability, justice, and opposition to corruption. How does its conception of “the people” differ from Vučić’s populist discourse, and could the movement’s anti-establishment rhetoric itself develop into a form of democratic or counter-populism?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: If you look at the students’ ideological profile, it is very diverse. You could characterize them as far right, far left, centrist, or anything in between. All these positions are represented within the movement.

In terms of populism, I wouldn’t characterize them as populists because they lacked an anti-elitist or xenophobic stance, as well as other typical elements of populism. To some extent, however, we could argue that there was a form of anti-populism. The students often referred to the people in affirmative terms, but they also contrasted the people with the government, those in power, or Vučić himself. This reflected a somewhat populist, perhaps slightly anti-party or anti-political sentiment. It was a clever move.

Nevertheless, I would still find it difficult to classify the students ideologically. There were significant right-wing elements, particularly in the Serbian context. For example, opposition to sanctions against Russia and a strong interest in the position of Serbian minorities in the post-Yugoslav space are traditionally associated with right-wing parties in Serbia. Therefore, I wouldn’t expect a significant difference in their overall ideological position. However, authoritarianism and populism, in the sense of anti-elitism and the exercise of power, are out of the picture, at least for now.

Students Challenged Vučić Without Challenging Serbian Nationalism

Students and citizens protest against corruption and the Serbian government in Novi Sad, Serbia, on February 1, 2025.
Students and citizens protest against corruption and the Serbian government in Novi Sad, Serbia, on February 1, 2025. Photo: Srdjan Randjelovic / Dreamstime.

Vučić’s political dominance was sustained partly through nationalist narratives, historical grievances, and the identification of internal and external enemies. How did the student movement challenge these ethnonationalist and ethno-populist narratives without alienating voters who remain attached to Serbian national identity?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: They actually didn’t challenge most of these narratives, as is evident in their positions on Russia and Kosovo. The Students’ List also lacks a clear position on Serbia’s membership in the EU. So, they didn’t challenge Serbian nationalism and even tried, to some extent, to adopt a similar approach. But again, we return to the fact that the Students’ List was a very broad catch-all coalition.

The real question is how much this mattered to voters. For example, the majority of Students’ List voters are pro-European, yet they supported the list despite its inability to formulate a clear pro-European position. That’s why I believe the process remains open to some extent, and we will have to see how the list operates under pressure.

Let me give you an example. Yesterday, the list held its first meeting with representatives of the US Embassy in Belgrade, which was symbolically important. However, it also met with representatives of the Russian Embassy on the same day. So, they are trying to maintain a balance as much as possible. They can do that for now, but we will see how this approach works in the months ahead.

Student Mobilization Alone Cannot Overcome Entrenched Ethnonational Divisions

The participation of Bosniak students from Novi Pazar and solidarity across ethnic communities gave the protests a civic dimension. Can this solidarity reshape majority–minority relations in Serbia, particularly concerning Bosniaks in Sandžak and Albanians in the Preševo Valley, or will entrenched ethnonational divisions limit its transformative potential?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: That’s an excellent question and a very good example. During the protests, relations between Serbian and Bosniak students from Sandžak were excellent. For the first time, Bosniak students expressed a sense of belonging to Serbia, and you could see Bosniak flags alongside Serbian flags. That was an extremely strong and positive message.

However, there are limits to interethnic reconciliation. For example, during the summer, there was the usual debate about the genocide in Srebrenica, but the student movement remained silent. Then, when General Ratko Mladić, who was convicted of genocide in Srebrenica, died, some members of the student movement mourned him as a hero. This illustrates just how deep these divisions remain.

The fact that Albanian students from the Preševo Valley were not publicly involved in the student movement is also telling.

There is no doubt that progress will occur, and progress has already been made. Nevertheless, I would be very cautious about expecting long-term change. This is not solely the responsibility of student leaders; it also involves regional relations. These issues cannot be resolved or improved through the actions of a single actor.

Students Won Power but Still Lack a Unified Decision-Making Structure

The Students’ List now faces the challenge of transforming a decentralized protest movement into an effective governing organization. How can it preserve the participatory ethos of student plenums while developing coherent leadership, policy coordination, and democratic accountability?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: The plenums are already largely part of history, having begun to decline in May or June of last year. Power now rests primarily with working groups, although there are numerous such groups at each university and across different levels. So, this remains a movement involving many people.

From a political scientist’s perspective, it is fascinating to observe how they make decisions. They still lack a single center of decision-making and continue to struggle with the relationship between the parliamentary group and the movement itself. This remains an open question, not only because the shift in power has yet to be established but also because they have not decided how that relationship should function.

Similarly, part of the movement is considering becoming a political party. This has not been publicly confirmed, but there are rumors to that effect. An additional problem is that almost everything happening within the student movement remains hidden from public view. I know certain things because I can talk to my students, but this situation needs to change, particularly as the public is already expressing concerns.

For example, people want to know who is proposing the candidate for prime minister. If this were a conventional political party, we would know whether the decision came from the main board, the assembly, or another body. In this respect, the situation remains very fluid. There is some tolerance for this lack of transparency because the movement emerged under an authoritarian regime. Its members faced surveillance and harassment, so they had to operate secretly. However, there is now a growing demand for these processes to become more public as soon as possible. At this point, there is no clear answer.

Of course, some elements of the movement are becoming increasingly effective, but it is still far from being a fully functioning organization capable of responding to a question within a few hours. I therefore hope they will enjoy a relatively long, quiet honeymoon period without pressure to make rapid decisions on crucial issues, because that could make things very difficult.

Removing Vučić’s Control Could Allow Serbia’s Institutions to Function Again

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participates in an SNS political campaign at Hall Čair in Niš, Serbia, on March 30, 2022. Photo: Radule Perisic.

In your research with Irena Fiket, you examine opposition politics under conditions of institutional capture and competitive authoritarianism. Following Vučić’s electoral defeat, what reforms should take priority in restoring judicial independence, media pluralism, electoral integrity, and institutional checks on executive power?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: That’s a huge question. If you look at the students’ program and its key priorities, the judiciary comes first. Strengthening its independence from the executive would be the initial step.

The second priority would be media freedom. The problem is that achieving media freedom takes considerable time. We have just seen the Hungarian experience, where Magyar’s government suspended the national public broadcaster for several days, then hired new staff and granted them some degree of freedom.

In Serbia, however, there is still debate about what the first steps should be. I don’t think we need an out-of-the-box solution. The existing Serbian laws are already good enough; the problem is that they are not being implemented. If you remove the force preventing institutions from functioning—and that force is Aleksandar Vučić—then those institutions will function much better.

This is also evident in the students’ electoral manifesto. Many of its proposals are already part of the existing legal framework. So, we don’t necessarily need new laws; we need to find a way to implement those already in place.

The Return of Former Authoritarian Regime May Be Easier Than After 2000

Serbia’s democratic transition after Milošević’s overthrow in 2000 left significant authoritarian networks and political practices intact. What lessons should the student-backed government draw from that experience regarding transitional justice, lustration, and the danger of reproducing the patronage structures it seeks to dismantle?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: What we have learned over the last decade is that democracy should never be taken for granted and that we must always defend it. Even the strongest democracies can experience democratic backsliding.

In Serbia’s case, drawing on the experience of Milošević’s overthrow, the key lesson is the importance of holding people accountable for what happened over the previous 14 years. When Milošević was toppled, we were so enthusiastic and optimistic that we neglected this aspect. People tend to be forgiving, and when there is so much work to be done, no one wants to deal with someone who was mayor five or ten years earlier.

But this is crucial because these people have the skills, capacity, and considerable financial resources. If we fail to carry out lustration or establish some form of accountability, they will return, and sooner than we might expect. This is especially important because the Students’ List is not necessarily here to stay. By comparison, the coalition that defeated Milošević consisted of political parties that wanted to govern and remained in power for roughly 12 years.

The Students’ List has certain advantages, but when it comes to managerial and governing skills, its members are not yet at the top of their game. They will need substantial support. In that sense, comparing the two situations suggests that the return of the previous regime might be even easier now than it was in 2000. That’s why it is extremely important to invest considerable effort in restoring democracy and reducing the authoritarian capacity of society.

Solidarity and Unity Were the Foundations of Serbia’s October Revolution

And finally, Professor Spasojević, viewed comparatively alongside anti-authoritarian movements in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and the wider Western Balkans, what makes Serbia’s student-led electoral victory distinctive? What lessons can societies struggling under authoritarian populist regimes draw from the movement’s success in transforming civic resistance into electoral victory, and to what extent can the Serbian experience inspire broader democratic renewal?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: It’s clear that the Serbian case is already inspiring people, just as other examples inspired Serbian students. That’s a positive development. However, we need to be very careful because we cannot simply copy and paste methods from one country to another. The fact that students led this movement was partly a result of local circumstances. I don’t see the same conditions, for example, in Albania, where protests are currently taking place.

What we can certainly learn from the Serbian experience is the importance of solidarity and unity. The willingness to support and defend people, even when you strongly disagree with their political positions, was fundamental to the strength of this movement. Solidarity between students and the rest of society was another crucial element. Having a common enemy, so to speak, and a common goal provided the foundation for Milošević’s overthrow 26 years ago, just as they were central to the current struggle. I think that should be the key message drawn from the Serbian October Revolution of 2026.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Andrej Ševo is a student movement activist, researcher at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade, and PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences.

Andrej Ševo: Serbia’s Students Made Democracy Cool Again

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Andrej Ševo, student movement activist and researcher at the University of Belgrade’s Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, examines Serbia’s historic student-led democratic breakthrough following the October 25 elections. Drawing on firsthand experience and scholarly research, Ševo explains how leaderless organization, participatory decision-making, and “Gen Z creativity” challenged Aleksandar Vučić’s personalized authoritarian rule. Arguing that “the students made democracy seem cool again,” he explores the movement’s populist dimensions, unprecedented civic mobilization, and emerging interethnic solidarity. Yet he warns that transforming electoral victory into durable democracy requires institutional innovation, judicial accountability, and lustration to prevent the return of entrenched authoritarian networks and another unfinished democratic transition.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Serbia’s October 25 elections marked a historic political turning point, with the student-backed list securing 140 parliamentary seats and ending Aleksandar Vučić’s longstanding political dominance. Emerging from protests following the November 2024 Novi Sad railway station tragedy, the movement transformed demands for accountability into a nationwide challenge to corruption, institutional capture, and personalized authoritarian rule. Yet electoral victory raises fundamental questions about democratic consolidation, transitional justice, and the resilience of entrenched authoritarian networks.

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Andrej Ševo, a student movement activist, researcher at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade, and PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences, examines this extraordinary transformation. Combining scholarly analysis with firsthand experience as an activist, election observer, and campaign organizer, Ševo explores how decentralized civic resistance evolved into a powerful electoral force.

At the heart of his analysis is the movement’s democratic innovation. Unlike conventional opposition parties, the students relied on plenums, horizontal decision-making, and rotating representation. According to Ševo, the government struggled to confront this unprecedented organizational model because “it did not know whom to attack.” By rejecting personalized leadership, the movement challenged the authoritarian, leader-centered logic of Serbian politics.

Equally important was what Ševo describes as the movement’s “Gen Z creativity.” Memes, humorous videos, songs, and innovative digital communication undermined the government’s established propaganda strategies. As he observes, “We were angry and disappointed, but we were also full of hope, creativity, and original ideas.” This cultural transformation accompanied a deeper democratic awakening: “The students made democracy seem cool again.” Ševo argues that younger generations increasingly embraced democratic participation over authoritarian leadership, while the movement’s deliberative practices helped overcome its own populist tendencies.

Yet the transition from protest to government presents an unprecedented institutional dilemma. Ševo acknowledges that the movement must develop new organizational arrangements without reproducing the hierarchical structures it opposed. “We simply have to try to create a system that has never existed before,” he explains, emphasizing the absence of historical precedents.

Looking ahead, Ševo warns that electoral defeat alone cannot dismantle entrenched authoritarian networks. Drawing on Serbia’s unfinished democratic transition after October 2000, he advocates “thorough criminal prosecutions” and “lustration” to prevent former regime figures implicated in abuses from returning to political power. Without sustained institutional transformation, he cautions, Serbia risks “another great disappointment.”

In sum, the interview examines whether Serbia’s democratic awakening can translate electoral victory, civic solidarity, and participatory innovation into durable democratic institutions.

Here is our interview with student movement activist, researcher Andrej Ševo, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

The Students Succeeded Where Serbia’s Opposition Parties Had Failed

Students gather in Gornji Milanovac, Serbia.
Students gather in Gornji Milanovac, Serbia, ahead of a major protest march to Belgrade on October 18, 2026. Photo: Dejan Krsmanovic / Dreamstime.

Andrej Ševo, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with the origins of this remarkable movement. The November 2024 Novi Sad railway station tragedy transformed public grief into nationwide mobilization against corruption and institutional capture. What explains the students’ success in turning a specific demand for accountability into a broader challenge to Aleksandar Vučić’s political order?

Andrej Ševo: The easiest answer to your question would be that the students approached the public with a very new way of decision-making and problem-solving, one that was unfamiliar to previous opposition actors.

What do I mean by that? If we go back to the 2023 elections and the repeated elections in 2024, the mood among the Serbian public was very lethargic. The great opposition coalition had fallen apart, and people were left feeling helpless because there was no unified and potent challenger to the Serbian Progressive Party’s rule. As you can imagine, the disappointment was very significant. The public was predominantly anti-government, but this sentiment was not represented by a proportionally strong political force.

In such a lethargic climate, we had the canopy collapse and the emergence of the student movement, which was not based on the leadership principle that had been so typical of opposition parties in Serbia. Instead, what emerged was essentially a social movement.

Students formed a social movement in which decisions were made democratically. They voted on every decision, respected the outcomes, and managed to overcome obstacles that opposition parties had been unable to overcome when they organized protests. Previously, opposition-led protests would usually reach a point where the organizers asked, “Well, all right, we are walking around the city, we have a large number of people behind us, but what do we do next?” They were never able to agree on the next step. Some wanted to act violently, others wanted to remain peaceful, and some thought that protesting was no longer necessary. Eventually, everything would fall apart.

This time, however, we had students acting as a unified group with decision-making plenums. All these units respected the decisions of the plenums and the will of the majority. They deliberated, exchanged ideas, and usually the best idea would win by receiving the most votes. The protests would then continue with new vigor and new ideas. I believe this is what made these protests potent and ultimately successful.

The Vučić Regime Did Not Know How to Fight a Leaderless Movement

In Glasovi promene, which you co-edited, the student movement emerges as an experiment in direct democracy and collective political agency. How did student plenums, horizontal decision-making, and rotating representation sustain mobilization, and what limitations did these practices reveal?

Andrej Ševo: Of course, as with anything, there are pros and cons. The most important advantage of such a system was that the government did not know how to respond to something so new and original. The government was accustomed to having political parties and their leaders as its main opponents. It was relatively easy to attack opposition leaders, label them with horrible names, publish false articles about them, and so on. Political labeling was easy. The Serbian Progressive Party controlled most of the media and was able to create and control narratives, making it easy to discredit opposition parties. Not to mention that the opposition parties themselves had made some horribly wrong moves for which they could legitimately be criticized.

But much of the hostility they received was the result of government propaganda. When the students emerged with this new decision-making process, the government was confused. It did not know whom to attack. Who could it blame for everything? Who were these students? Could the government attack all the students? They represented a very large social group. They had parents and grandparents who loved them. They were, as I like to say, the flower of Serbian youth. Their families loved them, and it was not easy to attack them by claiming they were traitors, Ustasha terrorists, and so on. Figuring out how to attack these people therefore became a major problem for the government.

Another significant advantage was that the student movement somehow created a democratic spirit. Even when you disagreed with a decision, as a member of the student movement, you still valued participating, despite being in the minority, because you respected the mechanism. This is something I heard while conducting focus groups with students in Serbia. They would often say, “I would propose something, but it wouldn’t be voted for. I was angry, I hated the movement, and I wanted to leave. But eventually, I would accept the outcome because I knew that the mechanism we had was something new, potent, and original—something that should be cherished.” And eventually, those people stayed, even though their proposals were rejected and others voted against them. These were the main advantages: the government’s inability to attack the students effectively and a decision-making process that created a spirit of democracy, which participants respected and cherished, and whose outcomes they accepted.

I also think the constant rotation was important. The students would regularly change the people who moderated discussions, appeared in the media, and led the protests. These roles always rotated. There was never a stable, recognizable face who could be identified as the leader. So, it remained a leaderless movement until the end. In Serbian politics, the prevailing political logic is authoritarian and very leader-based, not only among government parties but also among opposition parties. The students managed to move beyond that logic, completely confusing both the government and the opposition parties and creating something uniquely new.

Pro-government “Serbia – One Family” rally organized by the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in Belgrade.
Pro-government “Serbia – One Family” rally organized by the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in Belgrade, Serbia, on June 27, 2026. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic / Dreamstime.

The Students United People Across Class and Geographical Divisions

The movement expanded beyond university campuses through marches, blockades, rural outreach, and alliances with teachers, farmers, and other social groups. How did this geographical and social expansion overcome the traditional divide between urban opposition constituencies and provincial Serbia?

Andrej Ševo: The outreach of the student movement was spectacular. They were able to gain votes in places where the opposition had previously been unable to do so. We now have data to prove this, and it’s really striking. For example, I was involved in the 2025 local elections in Kosjerić, in southwestern Serbia, where we lost by about 30 votes. The result was roughly 3,500 votes on each side. It’s a small town surrounded by villages, and now, in these parliamentary elections, we were able to swing more than 1,000 votes in that municipality and win there.

The students, as a social group, brought together people from cities, villages, rural areas, and small-town Serbia, as well as people from beyond Serbia, including Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There were students from wealthy families, poorer families, and working-class backgrounds. The movement as a whole incorporated people of different geographical origins and class backgrounds, and this diversity was reflected in the election results.

For example, if a student active in the movement comes from a working-class family, that student will influence their parents and grandparents, who, in turn, will influence their neighbors. So, the word spreads not only among the wealthy and the middle class but also among the working class. This was very important. The students’ decision to communicate with farmers, education workers, trade unions, and other groups also had a significant impact. They were more successful in reaching these groups than the opposition parties had been.

The students emerged as a popular movement, beloved by people from various backgrounds, and virtually no one refused to speak with them. This contrasted with the opposition parties, which were usually concentrated in cities and urban centers and had been unable to overcome the barriers separating them from rural and small-town Serbia.

Gen Z Creativity Was Crucial to Defeating Vučić Regime

In your research with Krisztina Rácz and Mirjana Nećak Gavrilović, you analyze political memes as instruments of protest mobilization. How did humor, visual symbolism, and digital communication undermine the regime’s narratives, and what ethical challenges emerged with AI-generated content?

Andrej Ševo: The creativity of the student movement was one of the most important and substantial factors that brought down the government in Serbia. Gen Z creativity—the creation of memes, interesting visual content, songs, and promotional videos, such as those produced by students at the Faculty of Dramatic Arts—was immensely important.

This creativity helped a great deal because the government did not know how to respond to it. It was a completely new experience, and the government was confused. Eventually, they began copying the student movement, essentially repeating everything we did. For example, we would make a video ridiculing government members, and they would respond by creating a similar video ridiculing us. But you could clearly see that they lacked the creativity and organic drive to produce such content. We were angry and disappointed, but we were also full of hope, creativity, and original ideas. They simply could not compete with that.

Of course, there was also AI-generated content, which pushed ethical boundaries. AI-generated content is everywhere on the internet, and the question of how to address its ethical challenges is something we still need to resolve. But I would emphasize the immense originality of the content created on social networks and during protests, including billboards, messages written on paper, and drawings used by protesters. There was a strong and substantial creative spirit that the government could not emulate. This only confused them further and prompted them to make more and more mistakes.

The Collapse of the Established Opposition and Party-System Restructuring

The Students’ List won 140 parliamentary seats on October 25, while the established opposition failed to secure representation. Does this result signify a fundamental restructuring of Serbia’s party system, or a temporary convergence of otherwise heterogeneous anti-incumbent forces?

Andrej Ševo: We are witnessing a historic restructuring of Serbia’s political landscape, at least since 1990 and the establishment of the multiparty system. Why do I think that? The opposition parties had a chance to survive. Although they made many mistakes and were not competent enough to challenge the previous government, they were also frequently subjected to a very harsh media campaign. So, it would not be fair to attribute their inability to challenge the government solely to their lack of competence. They were also victims of a huge media machinery that knew how to deal with them.

The opposition still had a chance to unite and form a common front. You should understand that in Serbia, even though the student movement was very popular, there was still a significant proportion of people, somewhere between 8% and 10%, who believed that the students were wonderful but also believed in political parties. They believed that political parties should lead and that we needed established party structures to challenge the government. These people wanted to vote for the opposition parties.

The only condition was that the opposition parties unite and form a single front, just as they did in the 2023 elections, when they managed to secure around 950,000 votes—almost a million. That was not an insignificant result. They secured approximately 24% of the vote. So, people were still willing to vote for a unified opposition. However, the opposition failed to unite. They projected an image of people who were not serious, who did not understand the importance of the moment, and who were too preoccupied with their own internal strife, hatreds, and resentments. People simply concluded, “Well, these are not serious actors. They cannot unite, they are fighting among themselves, and they do not understand the importance of this situation, so I am not going to vote for them.”

Eventually, part of the opposition decided to support the students because they knew they could not cross the 3% electoral threshold. Another part decided to contest the elections and failed miserably. So, we are witnessing a restructuring, and I am happy that we were also able to defeat the opposition parties. As we like to say here in Serbia, the student movement not only defeated the government; it also defeated the opposition. If you ask me, I hope we will not have to see these people in politics again. They had their chance to demonstrate responsibility, but they failed to do so. It is time for them to go. Honestly, I cannot imagine who would vote for them if they decided to run in future elections after what happened here.

Even Vučić’s Own Voters Understood That It Was Time for Change

Students collect signatures in support of calls for early parliamentary elections in Valjevo, Serbia.
Students collect signatures in support of calls for early parliamentary elections in Valjevo, Serbia, on December 28, 2025. Photo: Adam Radosavljevic / Dreamstime.

Vučić’s governing model combined personalized leadership, media dominance, patronage, and nationalist rhetoric. Which mechanisms of this system proved most vulnerable to student-led mobilization, and which remain entrenched despite the electoral defeat of the Serbian Progressive Party?

Andrej Ševo: The Serbian Progressive Party remained entrenched in some media outlets, and some of its local party coordinators managed to retain their influence and voters. But the biggest success of the student movement was that we managed to bring so many more voters to the polls. That was our most important achievement. We mobilized people who had previously abstained from voting, as well as first-time voters, including many young people. Most of them voted for the Students’ List, so that was our biggest success.

Our second-biggest success was persuading around 350,000 regime voters to switch sides. That is also quite important. Compared with the 2023 elections, the Serbian Progressive Party lost around 60,000 voters, which may not seem like much. But you should bear in mind that they had absorbed many satellite parties into their electoral list. They included the Serbian Radical Party, which represents somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 voters. They also managed to attract many voters from the Socialist Party of Serbia.

When we conduct public polling in Serbia, we usually group parties such as the Serbian Progressive Party, the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Movement of Socialists, the Serbian Radical Party, and several smaller parties together under the category of “regime voters.” In previous elections, these parties collectively received between 2.2 and 2.3 million votes. In these elections, they received around 1.8 million votes altogether. So, the Serbian Progressive Party managed to avoid losing a significant number of voters by absorbing satellite parties and attracting voters from its coalition partners. But when you count all these parties together as the regime’s voting base, they suffered significant losses, with around 350,000 people persuaded to vote for us rather than for them.

We now have some data, although I cannot claim they are particularly precise, indicating that around 12% of those who voted for the Serbian Progressive Party in 2023 voted for the Students’ List this time.

I believe our campaigning was very important. We campaigned at a really serious level. We had call centers, called people constantly, and conducted door-to-door campaigning. We campaigned the way campaigning should be done. I could sense on the ground that many Progressive Party voters were reconsidering whom to support in these elections. They understood that it was time for a change. But the only factor keeping them from voting for change was their fear of what would happen if Vučić lost.

Democratic Awakening Is Challenging the Appeal of Authoritarian Leadership

The student movement successfully articulated a broad opposition to corruption and state capture without adopting a comprehensive ideological program. From a populism-theory perspective, does its appeal to citizens against a corrupt ruling elite represent democratic counter-populism, or a form of civic mobilization that transcends populist logic?

Andrej Ševo: That’s definitely a good question. I recognize populist elements in the Students’ List as well. For example, the proposed law banning reality television is a very populist policy, and it’s not the only one. There are others, but this is the first that comes to mind.

However, when it comes to direct democracy or a democratic revolution—perhaps “revolution” is too strong a word, or maybe it’s overused—we experienced a certain revolution of the spirit, in the sense that people now realize that democracy is cool. The students made democracy seem cool again. You can see this empirically when you conduct polls among young people. Young people previously tended to believe that Serbia needed a firm hand, an authoritarian leader. But now, most of them believe that we do not need an authoritarian leader but rather democracy. That’s a huge change.

So, the democratic spirit that emerged here in Serbia is populist in the sense that it seeks to involve a very large number of people in participation, voting, and decision-making. If a very large number of people participate in making decisions, we might describe that as populism per se. Populism not only in the sense that everyone participates but also in the sense that the former political party elites are now being replaced by plenums and zborovi—citizens’ assemblies—by citizens themselves, by the people.

By definition, this movement has a certain populist basis. We were against the elites and the established political parties, and you could even argue that this is an anti-political movement because it fits the definitions of both populism and anti-politics. However, it also transcends the typical understanding of populism because the decision-making processes the students created are very open. We genuinely allow all voices to be heard, even those expressing unpopular views. I know for a fact that sometimes unpopular proposals, when argued convincingly enough in student plenums, were able to pass and were promoted by the student movement, even though they were not necessarily what you would imagine people wanted.

Our democratic spirit also made it important for participants to argue for their proposals. You have to struggle to win people’s votes, to persuade them. If you’re good enough at argumentation, you can swing the votes and even secure support for something unpopular. So, even though the democratic spirit in Serbia is populist per se, in the sense that it attracts large numbers of people and challenges the former political structures and party elites, it also allows us to push through unpopular decisions when they are argued well enough.

The practice of good argumentation developed among students who participated in the movement. It was cherished and praised as a very good and useful skill. So, in a sense, the student movement, although it has a certain populist basis, also possesses mechanisms to overcome populist urges.

Serbia’s Students Must Invent a Political System Without Precedent

Serbia’s transition from decentralized protest to electoral politics raises a fundamental organizational dilemma. How can the Students’ List institutionalize political leadership, parliamentary accountability, and internal pluralism without reproducing the personalization and hierarchical practices it originally opposed?

Andrej Ševo: This is the million-dollar question, and it remains unanswered. To be honest with you, as far as I’m informed, the student movement is still discussing it. I’m not currently participating in the movement, although I did before. But I’m well informed, and I can tell you that we’re still trying to figure out how to make all this work. You have to understand that we haven’t been able to find examples in the literature of anything similar to what happened here in Serbia. This is a unique and experimental situation, and we need to be genuinely original and innovative if we want to make everything work.

I can answer your question with several follow-up questions. We have the student movement, which created its own electoral list of people who are now in the National Assembly, or who will be in a few days. So, the question now is: Should the student movement continue to exist? If it does, should it become some sort of guardian of the revolution? I don’t mean “Guardians of the Revolution” in a literal sense, of course, but as a metaphor. Or should it perhaps become a political party? Should it evolve into one?

The student movement definitely has the infrastructure to become a political party. It has databases, the capacity to call hundreds of thousands of people, and the logistical resources for door-to-door campaigning. It also has many small donors whose combined contributions amount to a significant sum of money. So, it could become a political party. Alternatively, it could persuade those who are now in the National Assembly to form a political party and then provide them with all the resources it has. Or it might simply decide to disband and say, “Well, we did our part. We don’t care anymore. We’re done.” Maybe there’s a fifth possibility. There are probably several others I haven’t mentioned, but we’re still deciding. The question remains unanswered.

The uniqueness of our situation requires us to be very innovative and original. We simply have to try to create a system that has never existed before, one without precedent or an example in the literature to show us what it might look like. It’s completely new territory, and it will take us some time to find an answer. Right now, I have to be honest with you, I still don’t have one. And if I did, I would be the luckiest man alive.

Unprecedented Civic Mobilization Was Crucial to Serbia’s Electoral Breakthrough

Students and demonstrators gather at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 23, 2026.
Students and demonstrators gather at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 23, 2026, for the “You and I, Slavija” protest, calling for early parliamentary elections. Photo: Dejan Krsmanovic / Dreamstime.

Reports of extensive citizen election monitoring suggest that civic mobilization helped compensate for distrust in electoral institutions. To what extent did this bottom-up oversight protect electoral integrity, and can such civic vigilance become a lasting mechanism of democratic accountability?

Andrej Ševo: Social mobilization in Serbia was crucial to winning this election. What was the difference? Unlike in previous elections, when political parties participated, we were able to cover virtually every polling station in Serbia with our election monitors. Only a few polling stations lacked Students’ List monitors. These were very small and located in southwestern Serbia, including parts of Sandžak, where Bosniaks live, and some areas of southeastern Serbia, around Kuršumlija. Almost every other polling station in Serbia was covered by Students’ List monitors.

This was made possible by an unprecedented level of social mobilization. We’re talking about tens of thousands of people across Serbia who voluntarily signed up to undergo training as election monitors, join mobile teams, participate in door-to-door campaigning, work in call centers, and so on. Having such a large base of people willing to participate and help allowed us to fill all the necessary positions in our campaign. We were able to monitor the voting process and run a very efficient campaign, perhaps even more efficiently than the Serbian Progressive Party.

And bear in mind that the Serbian Progressive Party and Vučić knew how to organize and run solid political campaigns. They ran top-notch campaigns. Yet we were able to outclass them even on that ground. We outperformed them in the very areas where they had been strongest: mobilizing people and running campaigns. This was made possible by the students and the Students’ List. The opposition had never managed to generate so much interest among so many people. Never. It was the students’ uniqueness, appeal, and popularity that made people genuinely excited to participate.

For example, I was a member of a mobile team on election day. I also served as an observer and participated in door-to-door campaigning, both as a coordinator and personally. I did all of that willingly. I didn’t do it for money; I didn’t even receive a single dinner for my efforts. Nor did I do it for social popularity or anything of that sort. I did it because I realized this was a great opportunity and that I had to contribute. I wanted to contribute, and I was happy to contribute to something I believed in. I truly believe that the same feeling was shared by all those tens of thousands of people who volunteered as well.

The System Vučić Built Is Collapsing Much Faster Than Anticipated

With the new parliament scheduled to convene on November 17, the Students’ List faces the challenge of translating its parliamentary majority into effective governing authority. How vulnerable is this transition to resistance from entrenched networks within the bureaucracy, police, judiciary, and security services?

Andrej Ševo: If you had asked me that question a month ago, I would probably have told you that the transition would be seriously threatened by people entrenched in Serbia’s political, administrative, and media structures. However, I’m now more optimistic. Since October 25, we have witnessed an awakening of Serbia’s institutions. People who were appointed by the Serbian Progressive Party and had remained silent for years have suddenly begun to realize that they need to do their jobs properly. Now we have prosecutors, judges, digital media regulators, and others who have suddenly started functioning as they should.

Some members of the Serbian Progressive Party have already been arrested, even though, technically, the party still runs the country. After all, the government ministers are still from that party. But the judicial system and digital media regulators have actually woken up. I understand that many of these people, including prosecutors, are trying to make up for years of silence. They’re trying to demonstrate, “Well, here we are, and we’re actually doing a good job, so you should believe in us now.” I’m not sure that’s going to work for them. I think they’ll eventually be replaced.

But I didn’t expect them to be so efficient and thorough in prosecuting members of the old regime, to the point that I genuinely believe the Progressives are afraid. They’re severely afraid. Even Vučić has been called to testify before a court regarding the drug-dealing business, among other things, which is something you couldn’t have imagined happening a month ago.

So, although I expect resistance, particularly at the local level, where some Serbian Progressive Party officials remain influential in their communities and will pose significant obstacles, I believe we will be able to overcome these obstructionist efforts by the Progressives. This is especially true because the system they imposed on Serbia has begun to collapse much faster than we anticipated.

If you had asked anyone in Serbia, no one would have believed that just three weeks after the election, we would already be prosecuting Serbian Progressive Party members at such a pace. It was unimaginable. We are literally arresting municipal leaders, former ministers, and media moguls. We are also regulating their media in ways that should have been implemented long ago. All of this definitely makes me optimistic. It will be difficult, especially when it comes to forming the government—the executive branch.

We will face challenges, but I think those challenges stem more from our own organizational structure. We have the student movement and the representatives on the Students’ List, and the question is how to make it all work. I believe that organizing ourselves and creating the mechanisms necessary to make things function will be a harder task than dealing with obstruction from the Progressives. Those obstructions will certainly exist, however, and we will still have to be careful.

Vučić Will Try to Reinvent Himself as a Trumpist Far-Right Opposition Leader

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participates in an SNS political campaign at Hall Čair in Niš, Serbia, on March 30, 2022. Photo: Radule Perisic.

In “Global Influence of the Contemporary American Far Right: A Case Study of Serbia,” you trace the diffusion of Trumpist narratives, including the “deep state” and anti-globalist discourse. Has the Students’ List victory weakened these ideological networks, or might they reconstitute themselves as a nationalist opposition to the new government?

Andrej Ševo: They will certainly try to do so. They will also try to maintain contacts with the far right in Europe and the United States. One of the reasons Vučić lost is that he had always run in elections as a catch-all candidate—someone who was somewhat nationalist but also pro-European and willing to cooperate with the West. Now, however, we can clearly see that he has shifted completely to the far right. There is absolutely no trace of centrism left in Aleksandar Vučić. He’s no longer a Serbian Progressive; he’s a Serbian Radical. He has come full circle, returning to his Radical roots. I no longer see any difference between Vojislav Šešelj and Aleksandar Vučić. They’re the same again.

Under these circumstances, he’s trying to maintain contacts with the far right in Europe and the United States, and he will attempt to position himself as a nationalist, far-right, Trumpist, or alt-right opposition figure, aligned with Alternative for Germany, Trump’s Republicans, the National Rally in France, and so on. He will try to present himself as that kind of ideological and political force. However, I’m not certain that the Serbian Progressive Party will constitute the future nationalist and far-right opposition, because I’m not even sure the party will exist in a year or two.

I sincerely believe that Vučić will eventually face trial. There is simply too much corruption associated with him, and I find it difficult to imagine that he could somehow survive all of that without consequences. I would be disappointed if we failed to criminally prosecute Vučić, his brother, and his closest associates, whom I consider not only politically corrupt but also, as we have discovered through the Sky communications of mafia members here, heavily involved with mafia chieftains and the drug trade. This is something we really have to pursue until the end. If all these people are prosecuted, I really don’t see how the Serbian Progressive Party could continue to exist. People will simply leave and abandon it.

However, there is still an electoral base for a far-right party in Serbia, and I imagine someone else will eventually take over and keep the spirit of Serbian radicalism, associated with the Serbian Radical Party, alive. But I don’t see how Vučić and his associates could be the ones to do that. They’re simply too compromised, and I sincerely believe that, in the near future, they will probably either leave the country or face criminal charges. The opposition will certainly exist, but I don’t see Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party leading it in the future, no matter how much they try to present themselves in that light. They do this for their own membership, to reassure their supporters that “we’re still here, we’re going to come back.” But I don’t think they will.

Student Movement Has Broken Down Longstanding Ethnic Barriers

Serbia student protests.
Students and citizens protest against government corruption in Zrenjanin, Serbia, on January 25, 2026, demanding justice and accountability for the 16 victims of the tragic railway station canopy collapse in Novi Sad. Photo: Dreamstime.

The student movement mobilized citizens across ideological, generational, and ethnic divisions, including Bosniak students from Sandžak. Can this solidarity evolve into a genuinely inclusive conception of Serbian citizenship, or will unresolved questions of minority rights and Serbian nationalism constrain its transformative potential?

Andrej Ševo: The students have made significant advances in incorporating minorities into their ranks. There was a video produced by the student movement in which members of Serbia’s ethnic minorities spoke in their own languages, including Bosniaks, Hungarians, Slovaks, and others. The only minority that has remained somewhat excluded is the Albanian community. Albanians still haven’t played an important role in the student movement, unlike, for example, the Bosniaks from Novi Pazar, who have played a very prominent role.

They were widely accepted across Serbia, and people generally liked them. In Novi Pazar, you had Bosniaks waving Serbian flags, while in Belgrade, you had Bosniaks waving the flags of Sandžak. No one really cared. We tolerated each other. We said, “Fine, these two flags can work together,” and they did. The Students’ List eventually won the most votes in Novi Pazar, the main center of the Bosniak community in Serbia. They didn’t win in every Bosniak community, but they did win in the largest and most important one.

This spirit of interethnic cooperation within the student movement represents a significant change. We have witnessed things we had never seen before, acts of solidarity we had never experienced before. For example, Muslim students from Sandžak were offered accommodation at the medieval Serbian monastery of Studenica by an important figure in the Serbian Orthodox Church who supported the students. Unfortunately, most of the Serbian Orthodox clergy remained passive or were even opposed to the movement, although many were supportive. This particular clergyman opened the monastery’s doors to the students. They literally slept in a medieval Serbian monastery. No one had a problem with that. Everyone was happy, shared the news, and was thrilled that it had happened.

I had a similar experience when I went to protest in Novi Pazar. People welcomed me and offered me food. Your name is Selçuk, so I assume you’re familiar with baklava, tulumba, and all those sweets. Novi Pazar is the epicenter of that kind of cuisine in Serbia. It’s delicious, and I enjoyed all of it. Everything was free for me, even though I’m neither Bosniak nor Muslim. So, we have created a beautiful spirit. How will it unfold? Will it produce political results? And will those results be significant in the future? That remains to be seen.

However, I believe that certain barriers in interethnic relations have been overcome in the minds of many people. That’s not something that can easily be undone. It cannot be reversed by a single election or a single political statement. Of course, unresolved issues and divisions remain. I don’t have to mention them; we all know what they are, particularly those concerning the 1990s and the wars. So, the situation remains problematic. Nevertheless, many mental boundaries and obstacles in interethnic relations have been overcome, and I believe this is definitely a good investment in the future. We have created a solid foundation for further change, and we have already achieved some changes.

When you see war veterans in Serbia literally standing in front of students from Novi Pazar and saying, “We were in the wars and everything, but we will protect you with our bodies. You’re our children; we love you as much as we love our own,” it’s a profoundly cathartic event, especially coming from war veterans. Let us hope that it will bring even more positive developments in the future.

Serbia Must Prevent the Former Regime’s Return to Political Power

And finally, Andrej Ševo, Serbia’s October 25 election has been compared with the democratic breakthrough of October 5, 2000, whose incomplete institutional transformation you examine in your work on lustration. What must the student-led majority accomplish to prevent another unfinished democratic transition—and ensure that the defeat of personalized authoritarian rule becomes a durable transformation of Serbia’s political system?

Andrej Ševo: Just to return briefly to the previous question, we also managed to attract a significant number of Hungarian votes. Hungarians voted for us in large numbers, as did Slovaks. So, it wasn’t only the Bosniak minority but also Croats and others.

To answer your question, the answer is quite straightforward. First, thorough criminal prosecutions. We need to fill the judicial system with new people who will do their jobs properly and remain persistent in their efforts. Criminal prosecutions are essential, but I also believe in lustration. That’s the second part: lustration understood as an administrative and political measure whereby people responsible for human rights violations are prohibited from participating in political life and accessing public funds. They can work in the private sector. They can establish their own companies and sell whatever they want—clothes, electronic devices, or anything else—but they cannot engage in politics.

This should apply to the entire top hierarchy of the Serbian Progressive Party, its media moguls, businessmen, and others. We really have to be persistent. We have to prosecute them and ban them from politics because these were people who ruled without any restraint. They did whatever they wanted. They created a system in which the state simply does not function; the state effectively does not exist. They created a system in which the mafia serves as a substitute for the state.

I do not see any future for these people in Serbian politics. Their manipulations and control over the media, as well as their entrenched political and administrative positions, were all established through violations of the law and criminal activities. If we allow these people to return to politics as though nothing happened, and if we allow them to retain the positions they built through criminal activities, we will face another great disappointment. These people have accumulated enormous amounts of money. They still control certain media outlets and retain entrenched positions, and we really have to eradicate that influence. We have to ban them from ever engaging in politics again. We have to be persistent and see it through to the end.

To repeat what I’ve already said, because it deserves emphasis, the resources these people possess are substantial. They are by no means insignificant. If we allow them to return to politics, to business as usual, we risk seeing them return to power one day. That risk is very real. They have billions of euros. So, despite all the resources they possess, we have to make sure they cannot return to political life in Serbia. We should do everything we can to criminally prosecute every one of them and do so thoroughly. That’s what we have to do. Otherwise, we will be disappointed.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Anti-Trump protest in London.

Long Read — Trump and the European Right: A Strained Relationship

In this long-read analysis, Dr. Amedeo Varriale examines the increasingly strained relationship between Donald Trump and Europe’s right-wing and far-right leaders, focusing on Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Alice Weidel. Despite enduring ideological affinities over nationalism, immigration, and opposition to progressive liberalism, Dr. Varriale identifies four sources of divergence: Trump’s declining popularity, protectionist trade policies, controversial foreign-policy interventions, and the institutional constraints limiting the transferability of Trumpism to European political systems. Through comparative analysis of Italy, France, Britain, and Germany, he demonstrates how national interests, electoral calculations, and geopolitical considerations increasingly override transatlantic ideological solidarity. The study suggests that future cooperation between Trump and Europe’s nationalist right and far right may become more pragmatic and transactional than ideologically driven.

By Amedeo Varriale

This extensive commentary explores the relationship between US President Donald J. Trump and political figures from the European right who are currently polling strongly in Italy, France, Britain, and Germany. 

The first part of the piece will focus on how and why key right-wing and far right leaders such as Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Alice Weidel have, to varying degrees, recently been distancing themselves from Trump, while simultaneously analyzing their ideological convergences and divergences with him, and speculating about how their relationship may evolve as these leaders exercise, or potentially come to exercise, political power. 

The second part will argue that presently the relationship between Trump and the European right and far right is straineddue to a series of factors, ranging from the unpopularity of the President (at home and abroad), and his tariff dispute with the European Union (EU), to his unconventional foreign policy (particularly concerning Iran and Ukraine) and the limitations of reproducing his political model in the European context. 

The investigation is meant to be timely and pertinent in a moment of broad opposition towards Trump’s second presidency across Europe. In fact, it attempts not only to shed light on the present condition of international right-wing conservatism and populism but also indirectly contributes to ongoing debates surrounding the new right’s domestic and foreign policy vis-à-vis transatlantic relations.

Giorgia Meloni 

Giorgia Meloni.
Giorgia Meloni, Prime Minister of Italy and leader of the Fratelli d’Italia party, speaks at an electoral rally ahead of the national elections in Turin, Italy, September 13, 2022. Photo: Antonello Marangi / Dreamstime.

As a right-wing leader Meloni’s relationship with Trump (and “Trumpism”) has always been ambivalent and has been previously defined as one of only “partial harmony” (Lazar, 2026: 56). While the Italian Prime Minister expressed her support for Trump on several occasions — she attended his second Presidential inauguration, spoke at CPAC 2025, and referred to his politics as “a model for Italy’s center-right” (Valenti, 2020) — her political vision and Italian concrete interests (as interpreted by Meloni’s government) do not always align with the American President’s. 

One reason why Meloni has been accused by political analysts and opponents of being excessively close to Trump is that JD Vance (a staunch promoter of the MAGA/America First platform) prefaced the English version of Meloni’s book (Giorgia’s Vision) as he saw affinities between Trumpism and Meloni’s agenda revolving around national identity, anti-immigration(-ism), and Judeo-Christian values. Actually, clear convergences between Meloni and Trump do not go beyond their opposition to illegal immigration and woke ideology. In fact, the former does not aspire to create an “illiberal democracy” (like Viktor Orbàn’s in Hungary) nor has she resorted to methods like those utilized by Trump’s ICE to tackle immigration in Italy. 

Also, while remaining a fervent sovereigntist, Meloni is substantially aligned with the EU’s elite and is in particularly good terms with Ursula von der Leyen (Alli, 2025: 4) and Manfred Weber’s European People’s Party (EPP) — a liberal-conservative group that does not share Trump’s radical views on globalization, trade, and immigration. To be sure, Meloni distanced herself from Trump on more than one occasion. First, she criticized Trump’s verbal attack on Pope Leo XIV, calling it “unacceptable” (Le Monde with AFP, 2026). Second, Meloni called Trump’s tariffs threat against the European countries that objected to his plans concerning Greenland “a mistake” (AFP & Rapporteur, 2026). Third, Meloni’s unequivocal pro-Ukraine stance is in conflict with Trump’s transactional approach, which is more conciliatory towards Russia. Fourth, Meloni’s government refused to allow Trump’s US to utilize the Italian airbase at Sigonella in Sicily for offensive military operations correlated to the war against Iran (Giuffrida, 2026). 

Together, these incidents led to a gradual deterioration of the relationship between Meloni and Trump. In fact, Trump accused Italy of not doing enough to support the US against Iran (Mazza, 2026) and claimed in an interview that Meloni “begged” for a photo with him at the G7 summit (also calling her unpopular) (Amante & Balmer, 2026; Cheetham, 2026). Trump also shared a meme of Meloni with the caption “restraining order needed” on his social media Truth Social (Duso, 2026). While in the first case Meloni responded to Trump calling him out for making up the story and stating “…neither I nor Italy ever beg” (Amante & Balmer, 2026), in the second case she decided to ignore Trump.

In the following months, personal relations between Meloni and Trump may even worsen, mainly as a consequence of Trump’s unpredictable character. However, they are more likely to stabilize, with the US and Italy continuing to cooperate strategically, as Meloni will possibly do her best to avoid new personal confrontations and prevent any significant diplomatic rupture. In fact, although with some flexibility, Meloni continues to support higher defense spending at a NATO level (Ciriaco & Colombo, 2026; Gagliardi, 2026), and this aligns with Trump’s long-standing demand regarding Europe. 

Even if the relationship between Meloni and Trump remains somewhat strained and they never become full-fledged political and ideological allies, under Meloni the Italian government will maintain the Atlanticist and Europeanist foreign policy pursued since 1945, entailing “a duty to remain close to America and to be among its most reliable and zealous allies” (Lazar, 2026: 55). This will occur regardless of the political color of temporary US administrations and Trump’s behavioral patterns. 

Moreover, Italy’s position at the heart of the Mediterranean exposes it to Russian military and intelligence threats, making continued US support essential for its defense. Concomitantly, the current conservative government fears that reduced US commitment may result in Italy being more dependent on the EU, possibly steering the country towards deeper integration and an additional loss of sovereignty. This scenario is not desirable to Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (FdI) party and most of her political class. Therefore, Italy seeks to balance strong bonds with both the United States and the European Union.

Marine Le Pen

Marine Le Pen
Marine Le Pen delivers a speech at a gathering of European far-right party representatives in Wenceslas Square, Prague, April 25, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.

For several years, the relationship between Le Pen and Trump has been a positive one underpinned by mutual respect and (limited) reciprocal support. In fact, Le Pen was the only French Presidential candidate to openly endorse Trump in the 2016 American electoral competition and was the first to congratulate the tycoon before his victory against Hillary Clinton was even officialized (McAuley, 2016). Similarly, Le Pen’s right-hand man, Jordan Bardella, praised Trump’s nationalist politics, stating his success represented “a wind of freedom, of national pride blowing all over Western democracies” (Gozzi, 2025). Bardella also argued that Trump won because he “defended America’s interests” (Bardella, 2025). More recently, after Le Pen’s conviction in early 2025, Trump expressed his solidarity to the French politician by writing the message “FREE MARINE LE PEN,” and referring to the court’s ruling as a “Witch Hunt” on Truth Social (Solmaz, 2025).

However, a long-standing anti-American sentiment deeply ingrained both within the French general public (81% think Trump is dangerous) (see Odoxa, 2026) and in the ideology and political tradition of the National Rally (RN) (formerly National Front) has prevented Le Pen (and Bardella) from embracing Trump’s program fully. While the RN’s agenda on topics such as immigration, climate change, and the “culture war” against woke and gender ideology perfectly aligns with Trump’s, the French far right has disassociated itself from the American President’s foreign policy, particularly on trade and security. 

Regarding trade, although both Trump and Le Pen are protectionists, the former’s wide-ranging tariffs on imports — including French goods such as wine, luxury products, aerospace components — significantly damage French economic interests as an exporting country. 

Regarding security, while Trump wants European allies to spend much more on defense within the NATO framework, Le Pen instead promotes French strategic independence, calling for a reduced involvement and integration within NATO’s military command. Actually, once the conflict in Ukraine ceases, Le Pen aims to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command altogether (Besch & Varma, 2025: 19). Notwithstanding, it was mainly Trump’s threats to Greenland, his hostile demeanor towards Volodymyr Zelensky’s Ukraine, his overthrow of Nicolás Maduro, and his military actions against Iran that marked a turning point in relations between the US administration, the RN, and much of the European right. 

For example, concerning Iran, Le Pen declared: “Nobody knows what Donald Trump’s ultimate goal is in Iran. Today, this war has taken proportions that were not foreseen, affecting many Gulf countries, and with consequences that directly impact us: the increase in energy prices” (Roundtable, 2026). Instead, concerning Ukraine, Le Pen denounced the “brutality” of Trump’s decision to freeze US aid to the Eastern European country (Guillou, 2025). 

Allegedly, Le Pen even told officials within her party to maintain a distance from Trump as he has turned into a political liability (Caulcutt & Nöstlinger, 2026). The same reasoning had previously led Bardella to cancel his appearance at CPAC after the MAGA ideologue, Steve Bannon, supposedly made a Nazi salute on stage (Reuters, 2025). 

Le Pen’s cautious distancing from Trump may result in a substantial change of the nature of their relationship, making it more withdrawn in public but more transactional — on farming, trade, defense spending, and military activities — in the event of a future Le Pen presidency. This transactional disposition seems very appropriate and likely to prevail since American and French interests do not always align in those areas. However, this does not necessarily mean that Le Pen and Trump will be openly antagonistic towards each other. After all, the two still share a common enemy identified by both in “the international(-ist) left” operating at an elite level within supra-national institutions such as the European Commission, Council of Europe, United Nations (UN), World Health Organization (WHO), and World Trade Organization (WTO). 

Given this, if Trump’s foreign policy shifts back to a more isolationist/non-interventionist one especially with regards to the Middle East (while simultaneously not abandoning Ukraine), there are stronger possibilities of an open rapprochement between Le Pen’s RN and Trump before the next Presidential elections in France and the US. Even so, in the more distant future it will be JD Vance (even more[1] nationalist, populist, and isolationist than Trump himself) who will play a key role in redefining the relationship between the American Republicans and European far right parties such as the RN and others. 

Nigel Farage

Nigel Farage.
Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.

Farage and Trump have been friends and essentially political allies since the latter’s rise to power in 2016. The two partially share a weltanschaaung revolving around capitalism, the defense of borders, law and order, Western exceptionalism, and the preservation of national cultural identity. Moreover, both have always been skeptical of (if not opposed to) the gradual development of the European Union as a political and economic power, and its strategic relationship with China. 

Farage has spoken favorably about Trump on distinct occasions. For instance, he has stressed that Trump is a role model for him (and his party Reform UK) because the American President stands for “national interest” and keeps the promises made to his electorate (Bloomberg, 2025). Also, during a rally in the US, Farage has praised Trump as the “most resilient” and “bravest person” he has ever met (BBC, 2020). Undeniably, Trump holds a positive view of Farage as well, given he has expressed an interest in having him as UK ambassador to the US (Langfitt, 2016) and has always supported the Brexit project (Langlois, 2018: 7).

Against this backdrop, the relationship between the two became colder between late 2025 and early 2026. Today, it appears Farage does not have the same privileged access to Trump, and — at least on one occasion — the American President did not meet the British politician who had purposely traveled to the US expecting to reinforce their “special relationship” (Gross et al., 2026; Cobham, 2026). Since then, not only have Trump’s priorities shifted (he currently focuses on domestic issues rather than securing alliances abroad) but Farage himself discreetly distanced himself from Trump (Gibbons, 2026). 

One reason for this is Trump continues to be very unpopular among voters in Britain (Schofield, 2026; The Economist, 2025), including part of Reform UK’s electoral base (Mitchell, 2025). Research indicates that a significant portion of potential Reform voters — especially women — have trouble understanding why Farage associates with Trump (Dawson, 2026). While they may support the party on other policy issues, this perceived closeness to Trump could dissuade them from voting for Reform UK. After all, Trump’s hardline approach on “law and order,” exemplified by the Minnesota immigration raids (carried out by ICE), may have limited appeal among many moderate voters in Britain and continental Europe (see Wike et al., 2025). 

Another issue that has certainly (negatively) influenced the relationship between the two leaders is the Iran war. Although Farage has refrained from unequivocally condemning Trump’s campaign in the Middle East (which he initially supported) and has even stated Iran is a “bigger danger than Putin” (Mason, 2026), concomitantly, he has warned against British involvement in the war (White, 2026). The conflict with Iran has been devastating for the British economy,[2] mainly due to the sharp rise in oil and gas prices alongside general inflation. Thus, while Farage remains strongly opposed to the Iranian regime for pragmatic reasons, he has also had to state that Trump was badly advised on the war (Elliot, 2026) and that the UK should remain out of the conflict, inevitably distancing himself from the US administration’s position. 

The divergences vis-à-vis the Iran war have been exacerbated by broader economic and foreign policy disagreements. While Farage has always praised free markets, Trump is a pro-tariff protectionist. Additionally, over the years, Farage has endorsed the West supplying weapons to Zelensky’s government more explicitly than Trump. Perhaps these differences have further contributed to the increasing distance between the two political figures. 

Nonetheless, considering a circumstance where Trump remains US President and Farage becomes UK Prime Minister, it is likely the relationship between the two would be largely amicable, with their respective countries expanding collaboration in certain policy areas.By way of illustration, a Trump-Farage synergy is expected to lead to a large-scale UK-US free trade agreement and a general reduction of barriers and regulation for bilateral trade. 

Given this, America and Britain will presumably continue to cooperate at a NATO-level as — notwithstanding his confrontational statements — Trump does not have a concrete plan to withdraw from the transatlantic organization. Actually, it is possible that a Farage-led Britain could embrace Trump’s position on “burden-sharing” and pressure European allies (especially France, Germany, and Italy) to increase expenditure on defense. 

Similarly, Farage and Trump’s agreement on the immigration issue is very likely to result in greater cooperation on intelligence, security, and border control. 

Ultimately, their skepticism regarding climate change and policies to protect the environment could lead them to economize on climate policy and instead pursue an increase of oil and gas production. 

Alice Weidel

Election posters featuring Alice Weidel, co-leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD).
Election posters featuring Alice Weidel, co-leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), displayed during the 2025 German federal election campaign. Such posters are reportedly often torn down or vandalized. Photo: Dreamstime.

Before 2025, direct contact between Trump and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) was relatively limited and intermittent, and to this day, a close relationship between Trump and the AfD’s leader, Alice Weidel, does not appear to have fully developed at either a personal or a direct political level. Be that as it may, in the weeks preceding and months following the 2025 German federal election, high-profile figures from the Trump administration such as Elon Musk, Marco Rubio, and JD Vance have publicly defended or openly expressed support for Weidel’s party. In fact, while interviewing Weidel online, Musk proclaimed, “only AfD can save Germany, end of story” (Le Monde with AFP, 2025). In the same context, Weidel reiterated (as she had previously stated during a Bloomberg interview[3]) that it caused her “physical pain” to see Trump and his entire family “disparaged” by the mainstream media (Alice Weidel, 2025). 

Instead of explicitly endorsing the AfD as Musk did, US Secretary of State, Rubio, disputed Germany’s domestic intelligence agency’s classification of Weidel’s party as “right-wing extremist” (Wertheimer, 2025). The US Vice-President JD Vance went even further, meeting Weidel at the margins of the Munich Security Conference (February 14-16, 2025) to discuss issues ranging from the war in Ukraine to freedom of speech and German politics (Reuters, 2025). Vance’s decision to meet Weidel can be interpreted as an act of legitimization by the Trump administration. 

Beyond pro-AfD statements, Trump’s officials have engaged with AfD politicians/lawmakers through private meetings in Washington D.C. (Pfeifer, 2025). For example, the more “moderate” national-conservative wing of the German party, which includes the popular Beatrix von Storch, is known to have had repeated contacts not only with Vance’s staff but also with representatives of the US State Department and National Security Council (Pfeifer, 2025). Although there are substantial differences between Trump’s distorted form of American exceptionalism and the anti-American latent Eurasianism promoted by the most radical faction of the AfD (mainly led by Björn Höcke), this did not prevent Trump’s loyalists from seeking ties with the AfD and inviting them to the US After all, until recently, Weidel, von Storch, and the AfD’s establishment have looked upon Trump favorably due to his campaign (or “culture war”) against woke ideology, immigration, Islam (Pfeifer, 2025) and liberal-progressivism in general. This alignment was broadly reciprocal. As the Anglo-German journalist Henry Donovan (2026) posits: “In MAGA World, the AfD was increasingly spoken of as Germany’s conservative insurgency – a mirror image of how Trump sees his so-called revolt against liberal elites” (Donovan, 2026).

Weidel and Trump hold common beliefs on several issues. First, both leaders have centered their platform on opposing immigration. Second, Weidel and Trump share a skepticism towards climate change policy and the introduction of renewable energy sources. Third, the two leaders embrace supply-side (or even “trickle-down”) economics and selective forms of protectionism simultaneously — and can be (paradoxically) described as “liberal-protectionist” (for an account of the AfD’s economics, see Cattani, 2016). 

Nevertheless, the ideological affinities between Trump’s MAGA movement and Weidel’s AfD were not sufficient to impede an almost sudden break between the American and German far right earlier this year. Trump’s unpredictability and risky political moves such as armed conflict with Iran, regime-change operation in Venezuela, and repeated threats to Greenland forced AfD leaders and key figures — including co-chair of the party Tino Chrupalla and Weidel herself — to markedly distance themselves from both the tycoon and the “Grand Old Party” (GOP). It was especially the strikes on Iran (highly unpopular among the German electorate[4]) that led Weidel to ask her party’s senior lawmakers to cut back on their trips to the US where they would regularly meet pro-MAGA Republicans (Pitel, 2026). Condemnation of Trump’s actions came from both Weidel and Chrupalla who in a joint statement remarked “renewed destabilization of the Middle East is not in the German interest and must end” (Hoyer, 2026). The fears of the AfD’s elite, particularly Chrupalla, is that Trump — who apparently “started off as a peace president” — would become another American president known for war campaigns and neoconservative interventionism (Hoyer, 2026). 

Overall, far-right parties like the AfD remain largely skeptical about US interventionism (sometimes described as “US imperialism”) due to its economic and migratory consequences, such as recession, higher gas prices, and mass migration towards Europe. This is the main reason why Weidel (sounding like her opponents from the pacifist far-left) also referred to the Iran War as “a catastrophe” (Pitel, 2026). However, the party appears divided, as there have been prominent figures within the AfD — especially Maximilian Krah and (to a lesser extent) Markus Frohnmaier — who continue to unequivocally support Trump despite the Iran war (Pitel, 2026). In early April 2026, the former expressed his opinion on social media: “a break with Trump would be harmful to the AfD in all sorts of ways. It must not be allowed to happen” (Pitel, 2026).

Surprisingly, as of this writing, Trump has not reconsidered his predominantly positive opinion concerning the AfD. In fact, the American President welcomed the AfD’s striking 44% electoral victory in the Saxony-Anhalt region in early September by stating (on Truth Social) “Wow! The Populist Party in Germany just had a really big night” and congratulated the party (Zakharova, 2026). In any case, although a near future (unlikely) scenario where an AfD-led Germany is simultaneous to a Trump-led America is still technically possible, predicting the type of relationship the two countries would have in such a context remains a difficult and problematic endeavor. 

In essence, as the political scientist Marco Tarchi explains, the AfD has three ideological currents: the first, is the national-conservative one, which is also economically liberal and is currently the majoritarian faction in the party led by Weidel; the second, is the “old-school” nationalist one, unfairly (according to Tarchi) labelled as neo-Nazi; the third, is the social-national one which was very successful in the recent elections occurring in the Eastern region(s) of the country and could possibly engage in dialogue with Sahra Wagenknechts’s party (BSW) (Tarchi as cited in Boezi, 2026, my translation). 

Currently, with the party on the rise electorally, it is unclear which one of these three factions will politically prevail and in which manner and degree they will interact with Trump in the event they obtain power. For example, AfD’s “national conservatives” could rekindle their relationship with Trump (especially if the Iran war ends abruptly) and be strongly backed by the latter when they pursue hardline “law and order” policies, including their signature policy, Remigration,[5]which may put Germany at odds with the European Union and part of the international community. Also, notwithstanding some of Weidel’s anti-American rhetoric, the AfD and Washington can have a transactional transatlantic partnership that stems from sovereigntism, meaning Germany would spend more on defense and rearm but buy American weapons (and American LNG[6]). How this very pragmatic settlement would fit in a major bilateral or multi-lateral framework is still uncertain. 

For instance, would the present NATO agreements remain the strategic “umbrella” for Germany yet? Regarding such potential developments from Trump’s perspective, providing AfD’s Germany with preferential treatment, in terms of both security and bilateral trade, America would be promoting the party’s sovereigntist ideology and at the same time even encourage Weidel government’s gradual distancing from the European Union. 

Reversely, in contrast with the EU’s common foreign policy, Weidel’s AfD could pressure an already Ukraine-skeptic Trump administration to realign with Russia, leaving Ukraine to its own fate. The predictability of the above-described scenario — it has to be recognized — is highly dependent on a series of factors, the main of which is the capacity and the will of the most anti-American views in the party to compromise with the idea of a new partnership with the US. Weidel herself should revise some previous hostile attitudes towards the military American presence on German soil.

Why Trump’s Relationship with the European Right and Far Right Is Strained: Four Factors

The relationship between President Trump and significant segments of the European right and far right has become increasingly strained. While — as mentioned previously — a substantial ideological overlap endures (especially opposition towards immigration and progressivism), several developments have resulted in tensions between Trump’s “America First!” agenda and the national interests of the European right-wing and far right parties led by Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel. Today, Trump is no longer the ideological lodestar for Europe’s right and far right: with Meloni, relations are cold at best, while Le Pen keeps the MAGA movement at arm’s length, similarly, Farage is now more cautious in publicly expressing support for the tycoon, and Weidel has distanced herself and limited her party’s contacts with the US administration.

More specifically, there are four factors that have contributed to alienating Trump’s US from the European right and far right. First, Trump’s popularity has significantly declined both domestically and internationally (Hartig & Kiley, 2026; Dionne, Jr., 2025). A recent study shows his approval rating at a very low 32% in America, losing 15 percentage points since the beginning of his second term in January 2025 (Lange, 2026). At the same time, Trump’s approbation among the Republican electorate has also declined, standing at 73% (Lange, 2026). 

Considering the wider context, a YouGov survey (from October 2026) found that 85% of Italians have an unfavorable opinion of Trump, against 83% in France, 86% in Britain, and 85% in Germany (YouGov, 2026). After all, Trump’s political brand has become so toxic for the global right that nearly every time he became directly or indirectly involved in a country’s election — either by threatening annexation, tariffs, or by endorsing a candidate — his engagement has backfired on the candidates he endorsed. 

This occurred in the last Canadian election in April 2025, as Trump suggested Canada could become the US’s “51st state” while concurrently increasing tariffs against the country, and resulted in a Liberal Party victory and an unexpected defeat of the conservative pro-Trump candidate Pierre Poilievre (Dionne Jr., 2025). 

It also occurred in Hungary, precisely a year later, as Vance attended a Viktor Orbàn rally in Budapest with 1,000 supporters on behalf of Trump (Spike, 2026). However, this strategy did not produce the intended outcome as elections were ultimately won by Orbàn’s opponent, Péter Magyar. 

As simply put by two experts — Jeremy Shapiro and Zsuzanna Vegh (2025) — “His [Trumps’s] growing unpopularity means aligning with him may not appear politically advantageous for these forces” (Shapiro & Vegh, 2025). 

Second, Trump’s protectionism, which has taken the form of tariffs as a trade policy against EU nations, has led to an escalation of tension between the US administration and some of its rightist “allies” in Europe. In essence, while far right forces such as the RN and the AfD may embrace economic nationalism or protectionism theoretically, and even practically when it suits their own national economies, they instead wholeheartedly oppose it when US tariffs[7] on European goods risk damaging their own countries’ businesses, industries, and workers. After all, for years populists have presented themselves as the main defenders of rural and blue-collar workers, who now form their core constituency. 

Thus, aligning with Trump over his tariffs and trade measures (even if for purely ideological reasons) would be counter-productive and self-sabotaging for the European right and far right, as they ultimately damage artisans, luxury craft producers, exporters, farmers, manufacturers, and small-medium businesses in general, located in Italy, France, Britain, Germany and so forth. While there have been examples of populist politicians (e.g. Le Pen and Matteo Salvini) on the right defending Trump’s economic strategy (especially anti-China tariffs) the majority of rightists have either awkwardly ignored or condemned his course of action contra the EU. 

Among those who originally supported Trump but criticized him on anti-EU tariffs are Le Pen (who spoke of the American’s “brutal approach”) and Weidel (who called them “far too aggressive and self-defeating” and “fundamentally bad for free trade”) (Pitel, 2025). Instead, the conservative PM Meloni, simply called Trump’s tariffs “a mistaken choice” (Pitel, 2025). In fact, one commentator, writing for The Guardian has shrewdly suggested that “analysts have long noted the difficult challenge that Trump’s policies pose to nationalists in the EU: while they may agree with some of them principle, MAGA is ‘America first’ – while they are ‘France first,’ ‘Germany first’ or ‘Spain first’” (Henley, 2025). 

Third, Trump’s foreign policy — especially regarding Iran — emerged as increasingly at odds with the crypto-isolationist, selectively non-interventionist (see Greene, 2024) and sovereigntist foreign policy stances of the nationalist right in Europe. Trump’s involvement (alongside Israel) in a conflict that expanded beyond the initial strikes (February 2026) and targeting of Iran’s nuclear program became viewed as an indirect threat to Europe by part of the right and far right. This is due to the costs of the war, its negative economic consequences to international trade and oil, gas, and fuel prices, as well as its wider impact on mass migration and population displacement. For evident reasons, a large-scale war in Iran could result in a new wave of migration and increase in the influx of refugees in the Old Continent.

Also, the European nationalist right (but also part of the mainstream right) wants to avoid getting involved in an American-Israeli War that would potentially result in hardship for European soldiers and taxpayers. As discussed previously, far right leaders like Le Pen and Weidel have shown their disdain for Trump’s actions against Iran, whilst Farage called in question Trump’s judgement (Coates, 2026). In essence, Trump’s move against Iran (like the one against Maduro’s Venezuela beforehand) did not consolidate Trump’s “transatlantic alliance” with the European right and far righ but actually contributed to its deterioration (Riccardi & Spike, 2026).

Instead, regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the situation is more complex. Whilst some right-wing parties — inspired by Eurasianists ranging from Alexander Dugin to Alain de Benoist[8] — have remained staunchly pro-Putin and pro-Russia (e.g. AfD) others have shifted to more “mainstream” pro-Ukraine positions (e.g. FdI, RN, Reform UK). Unlike specifically extreme right parties (e.g. AfD), today, conservative (e.g. FdI) and populist radical right parties (e.g. RN, Reform UK) and leaders in Europe are increasingly skeptical of Trump’s conciliatory approach towards Russia. 

Unsurprisingly, Meloni often calls Russia an “aggressor” (Hook Global, 2026) and has clearly criticized Trump’s deal with the Russian President (to import a significant amount of Russian diesel fuel and temporarily lift US sanctions) calling it “a very risky choice” that legitimizes Moscow (Barbati, 2026). In the Italian Parliament, her party has consistently voted to aid Ukraine militarily. 

More surprisingly, the — once Russophile — RN has reassessed its position on Russia, because although the party has opposed sending French troops and military aid (for long-range strikes) both Le Pen and Bardella have publicly supported Ukraine’s right to defend (and recover) its sovereignty (Sandford, 2022; Par Le Parisien avec AFP, 2025; Crone & Klinke, 2025: 24, 44). Also, the RN supposedly interrupted all contacts with the Kremlin after 2022 (Crone & Klinke, 2025: 44). This shift towards more liberal-conservative positions has been prompted by the increasing influence of a new generation of identitarian, Gaullist, and civilizationist thinkers that advise the higher ranks of the party — such as Pierre-Romain Thionnet and few others (Crone & Klinke, 2025: 25). The “new” RN no longer considers Russia a bastion for traditional Christianity and European identity but instead views it as a multicultural melting pot (a “Eurasian empire” with a considerable Islamic population) that represents a menace to the sovereignty of a white, Christian, and Western, “Fortress Europe” (see Crone & Klinke, 2025: 25, 27, 40, 44). 

Shifting the focus to Britain, even Farage — possibly the greatest admirer and supporter of Trump in Europe — has recently spoken against Trump’s new Russian deal (Henrys, 2026) and now is more inclined to back Ukraine (even suggesting NATO adherence) (Keate, 2025) at the cost of disagreeing with the American President. 

It is difficult to say whether these parties and leaders are ideologically or strategically (as some are close to obtaining governmental power) driven to support Ukraine over Russia. However, what is evident is that whilst the US-Iran War is viewed as something occurring far from Europe’s borders and involving a nation that is culturally very distinct and of little interest to the Old Continent, the Russia-Ukraine War is a conflict at the heart of Europe involving a nation that has been invaded by an “alien” superpower. 

Moreover, far right and right-wing parties are much more comfortable with Ukrainian immigration than with Iranian immigration resulting from the War, as the former are perceived as “white” and “Christian” and the latter as “non-white” and “Muslim.” A further concept worth exploring is that introduced by the French political analyst Thibault Muzergues (2026): many of these right-wing and/or far right parties in Europe are presently led by a younger generation of politicians who have become increasingly wary of aligning with Putin’s Russia (France 24 English, 2026). Essentially, this new political elite adopts a different stance towards Russia than its predecessors did fifteen to twenty-five years ago (France 24 English, 2026).

Fourth, Trump’s political model, especially his modus operandi of leadership and exercise of executive power, is difficult (if not impossible) to reproduce in Europe. The particular institutional structure and political-cultural context of the US confer the American President significantly more decisional autonomy, power, and freedom of maneuver compared to the numerous checks and balances, political fragmentation, and institutional constraints characterizing systems such as the European Union. 

In the event that they assume office, leaders such as Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel would operate in a very distinct context from Trump — one that involves specifically European parliamentary mechanisms, proportional electoral frameworks, coalition administrations, independent constitutional tribunals, and supranational regulatory bodies. 

Contrastingly, Trump’s institutional environment is shaped by a two-party system where — although restrained by courts, Congress, and the states — the executive is directly elected by the people and is able to exercise substantial authority without having to necessarily depend on a parliamentary majority. For instance, the American President has the right to pull out from most international agreements without the approval of Congress. Furthermore, Trump utilized executive orders to make US immigration policy stricter (also enforcing mass deportations) without always relying on new legislation. 

In summary, the impracticality of replicating Trump’s model in Europe ineluctably contributed to an increasing estrangement between the American President and the European right. 

Conclusion

This commentary examined the complex political and relational dynamics surrounding President Trump and successful right-wing and far right party leaders in Europe. The analysis revealed that although — overall — the relationship between Trump and the European right and far right is significantly strained, it has yet to reach a breaking point, nor does such an outcome appear imminent. After all, given the American and European economies are largely interconnected, especially considering trade and supply chains, finance, military security, intelligence, energy, and technology, a full rupture between the US and Europe’s major nations (and its potential future leaders) such as Italy, France, Britain, and Germany appears both undesirable and unrealistic. 

In any case, the main takeaway is that although there is strong ideological affinity between at least three of the four leaders discussed and Trump — Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel (more so than Meloni) are closely aligned to the US President’s views on state authority to combat globalization, immigration, woke, and modern liberalism — realpolitik combined with Trump’s trade and foreign policy have forced these parties/leaders to distance themselves from his actions and emerging legacy, primarily to defend their own national interests. 

Considering political realism, Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel have all understood the political cost of aligning too closely with a foreign President who is experiencing a sharp decline in public support (both domestically and internationally) and who always prioritizes pursuing his own national agenda to satisfy his electoral base at home (MAGA) rather than strengthening transatlantic alliances. 

Furthermore, these leaders evidently see no benefit in attempting to imitate or replicate Trump’s failing political model in their own parliamentary (Italy, Britain, Germany) and semi-presidential (France) democracies. Considering Trump’s policies, all of the rightist and far right leaders mentioned above have no choice but to object to the President’s hazardous maneuvers on trade and foreign policy that damage their economies and long-term societal plans. Today, American tariffs on European goods, Russian “appeasement,” and new wars (e.g. Iran) (potentially causing an increase in global immigration), are not looked upon favorably by the leaders of parties who are — above all — sovereigntist (and except for the AfD — FdI, RN, and Reform UK, view Russia as a foreign threat to national sovereignty), nativist, culturally and economically nationalist, and partially isolationist. 

After Trump’s failed midterms election, it is likely the European right will distance itself from him and his political paradigm (namely “Trumpism”) even further. However, it is only natural that — if they take office — the European right and far right will seek coordination and cooperation with Trump’s America on most of the issues mentioned above (trade, security, intelligence, energy, etc.). Nevertheless, such cooperation is likely to become increasingly pragmatic, transactional and driven by strategic considerations rather than ideological affinity. 

As already stated, Trump is no longer considered an ideological point of reference or natural ally by any of the leaders and parties under scrutiny. On the contrary, Trump is perceived as an erratic, precarious, and unpredictable interlocutor whose imperatives and core aims usually diverge significantly from their own, especially on topics such as commercial policy and foreign policy. Ideally, future studies could shift the focus towards other right-wing political actors (e.g. Santiago Abascal, Péter Magyar, and Geert Wilders) and assess their affinity with Trump from a political-strategic and ideological standpoint.


 

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Footnotes

[1] For detailed accounts of JD Vance’s political views refer to Benjamin Wallace-Wells (2024), and Swapna Venugopal Ramaswamy (2025).

[2] For an in-depth account on how the Israel/U.S.-Iran conflict has negatively impacted the UK economy, see Daniel Harari (2026). 

[3] The interview mentioned above can be found online at the following link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IeYB_Hmsu84.

[4] A recent survey shows that most Germans disapprove of Trump’s actions against Iran (and Maduro in Venezuela) — see Claudia Müller (2026).

[5] This particular AfD policy is concisely (yet comprehensively) discussed in a book chapter written by the scholar Ubaldo Villani-Lubelli (2026: 149-151). 

[6] Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). 

[7] Especially the 20% levy on all EU imports (see Hernández-Morales et al., 2025).

[8] Alain de Benoist is not strictly Eurasianist in the Duginist sense. While he supports multipolarity (objecting to American dominance and liberal universalism) and calls for an ethno-pluralist “Europe of the peoples”, he also believes Russia’s role is central in any anti-American, anti-Atlanticist, and illiberal continental project. 

Professor Florian Bieber.

Prof. Bieber: Serbia Must Avoid the Mistakes That Allowed Authoritarianism to Return After 2000

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Florian Bieber, Professor of Southeast European History and Politics at the University of Graz, warns that Serbia’s democratic breakthrough risks repeating the failures of its post-2000 transition unless entrenched authoritarian networks are dismantled. Following the Students’ List’s electoral defeat of Aleksandar Vučić, Professor Bieber emphasizes the need to restore judicial independence, reform security structures, establish genuine media pluralism, and prevent socioeconomic exclusion. Drawing parallels with the aftermath of Slobodan Milošević’s overthrow, he argues that electoral victory alone cannot guarantee democratic consolidation. The challenge, he stresses, is to transform student-led civic mobilization into durable democratic institutions while ensuring that supporters of the defeated regime are not politically marginalized.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Serbia stands at a historic turning point. Following nearly two years of student-led protests against corruption, institutional capture, and Aleksandar Vučić’s personalized authoritarianism, the Students’ List secured a parliamentary majority in October 2026. Yet electoral victory raises fundamental questions about dismantling entrenched clientelist networks, restoring democratic institutions, and sustaining inclusive civic mobilization. Serbia’s experience also offers broader insights into the vulnerabilities of competitive authoritarian regimes.

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Florian Bieber, Professor of Southeast European History and Politics at the University of Graz and Director of its Centre for Southeast European Studies, examines Serbia’s democratic breakthrough through the historical failures of its post-Milošević transition. His central warning is that removing an authoritarian incumbent does not necessarily dismantle the structures that sustained authoritarian rule.

Reflecting on October 2000, Professor Bieber recalls that Serbia never experienced a decisive institutional rupture: “Many of the power holders from the previous regime managed to survive through these negotiations.” The failure to investigate entrenched political, security, and business networks enabled their continued influence and ultimately facilitated democratic reversal. He therefore emphasizes that “this kind of rupture with the previous institutional structures is critical.”

The Students’ List, Professor Bieber argues, now enjoys an important advantage: “It won an outright majority and did not have to make compromises to win the elections.” Unlike established parties, it carries fewer inherited political obligations. Nevertheless, reforming captured institutions remains exceptionally difficult. He identifies the judiciary as perhaps the greatest challenge, stressing the importance of “ensuring that it remains vigilant and that nobody is above the law.”Security structures, patronage networks, and politically dependent media present equally consequential obstacles.

Professor Bieber also warns against repeating the socioeconomic exclusions that undermined democratization after 2000. Citizens who experienced unemployment, poverty, and disillusionment became receptive to renewed authoritarian politics. Accordingly, he argues that those who supported Vučić’s Progressive Party must not be forgotten but instead “brought on board,” lest they become the constituency for another authoritarian resurgence.

Beyond institutional reform, the interview explores the students’ innovative horizontal organization, cross-ethnic solidarity, and prospects for European integration. Professor Bieber highlights their insistence that “We want institutions; we don’t want individuals,” while questioning how participatory practices can coexist with effective representative government.

Ultimately, Serbia’s experience offers lessons extending beyond the Western Balkans. As Professor Bieber observes, “There is no single path out of competitive authoritarian regimes.” What successful transitions share, however, is ideologically broad coalitions and sustained civic mobilization. The challenge now is transforming electoral victory into durable democratic institutions without reproducing the political exclusions and structural vulnerabilities of the past.

Here is our interview with Professor Florian Bieber, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Even Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes Can Be Outmaneuvered by Civic Movements

Students and demonstrators gather at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 23, 2026.
Students and demonstrators gather at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 23, 2026, for the “You and I, Slavija” protest, calling for early parliamentary elections. Photo: Dejan Krsmanovic / Dreamstime.

Professor Bieber, thank you for joining us. In your influential study, Patterns of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans, you identify the structural foundations of authoritarian resilience. How does the Students’ List’s October 25 victory challenge your earlier explanation of Vučić’s political dominance, and which vulnerabilities ultimately proved decisive?

Professor Florian Bieber: The regime’s defeat at the ballot box in October came, of course, after not only two years of massive student mobilization and the wider social movement the students created, but also eight years of previous protests. Dissatisfaction had therefore been growing for a long time and was very deeply rooted. In that sense, there had been a great deal of social mobilization. Still, the regime had governed for 14 years, which is a very long period of time, and had been quite consolidated.

What were its main weaknesses? I guess the weakness of any regime, especially a competitive authoritarian regime, is that despite its attempts to control the entire society, including the media and institutions, it can be outmaneuvered by a movement that organizes in parallel to these control mechanisms. What you realize is that despite the seemingly complete control of society, there are always other channels for reaching out to citizens. This is something the student movement used very effectively.

Perhaps this shows that even under a seemingly very consolidated regime, the ability to mobilize is critical. Again, the students did so not just through social media but also by literally traveling to places around the country and talking directly to citizens. This, of course, was a means of communication that the regime could not control so easily.

And I think it was the level of corruption that really weakened the regime in the end. The regime was seemingly so corrupt that citizens felt, in a certain way, humiliated by it. This sense of humiliation was really captured in the anger and social mobilization over the last two years, and it was critical to weakening the regime in the elections.

Serbia’s Students Mobilized the Voters Traditional Opposition Parties Could Not Reach

Vučić combined electoral competition with media manipulation, clientelism, nationalist mobilization, and institutional capture. Was his defeat primarily the result of accumulated governance failures, the erosion of regime legitimacy, or the emergence of an opposition movement capable of overcoming structural electoral disadvantages?

Professor Florian Bieber: The frustration had been there for a long time. Voter turnout had been low in previous elections, so much of the frustration that had been growing over the years remained untapped. In a certain way, the answer is both. Frustration and structural weaknesses had accumulated, but without an effective movement to capture that frustration, this could have continued for a while. Regimes can exist with high levels of frustration and opposition as long as the opposition remains fragmented.

So, it was really critical to have an ideologically diverse movement capable of incorporating people from very different standpoints in a way that opposition parties had never been able to do. The movement was also able to overcome the structural reservations toward established political parties.

There is a deeply rooted sense of distrust in political parties, which partly has to do with the experience of political parties in post-communist or post-socialist Serbia and the wider region, as well as the way opposition parties were continuously maligned by the regime. All of this made opposition parties unable, and to some degree unwilling, to become effective translators of frustration. Their own fragmentation and inability to form effective coalitions also contributed to this ineffectiveness.

Already in 2023, there was a massive protest movement, and the opposition united but was still able to capture only a relatively small percentage of the overall frustration that was present. This was because they were unable to mobilize non-voters. Turnout was approximately 15% lower than it is now. It was these non-voters whom the student movement managed to attract—people who had been largely passive and had stopped participating in elections.

This is really critical: high turnout and the ability to mobilize people. This is what the movement achieved through a combination of get-out-the-vote campaigns across the country, an ideologically broad coalition, and the advantage of not being tainted by previous political engagement.

Vučić’s Power Pyramid Is Crumbling as Former Loyalists Switch Sides

President of the Peoples Republic of China Xi Jinping on an official visit to the Republic of Serbia, at the invitation of President of Republic of Serbia, Belgrade on June 19, 2016. Photo: Golden Brown.

In your October 2026 analysis, Serbian Elections on a Tightrope, you highlighted the SNS’s shrinking alliances and increasingly defensive electoral strategy. Does the defeat represent the collapse of Vučić’s personalized political project, or could its institutional and clientelist networks survive the loss of parliamentary power?

Professor Florian Bieber: Yes, I think this is critical. As you mentioned, we saw before the elections that some of the regime’s allies had already declined in power. In the end, the Socialist Party, which had been a key ally of Vučić’s Progressive Party throughout their time in power, failed to enter Parliament for the first time ever. So, there was already a degree of erosion, which accelerated after the elections. We are now seeing a number of arrests and people switching sides.

A lot of this is about perception. On election eve, Vučić himself announced that he expected the Students’ List to be chaotic and believed he could return to power within a few months. That is, of course, wishful thinking on his part. But much depends on how far the Students’ List is able to transform the country and whether the power structure consequently crumbles or the new administration is perceived as ineffective, allowing Vučić to preserve his influence.

Early indications, even before the Students’ List actually takes over, suggest that the dynamics favor the Students’ List. The power pyramid is crumbling because many people participated in it for opportunistic reasons. Now that this motivation is gone, they are switching their allegiances. Many institutions in Serbia have also become active, partly because they now can. There are genuine professionals who feel they can do their work without being disrupted, while others are trying, in a certain way, to curry favor with the incoming administration and are acting accordingly.

All of this points to the crumbling of Vučić’s power structures. The arrests also suggest that people around him are coming under pressure from institutions even before the Students’ List takes over.

From that perspective, the current dynamics suggest a collapse, though perhaps not a complete collapse of the party, because an ultranationalist core might remain. This is also an ideological question. The Progressive Party was on the nationalist right, but it was also a kind of catch-all party. Will it now have to refocus on its core electorate, which is more conservative, nationalist, and anti-Western, while also trying to capture voters who might become dissatisfied with the new government’s performance in the future?

So, there is both an ideological and a structural question. But based on current developments, I would expect the power pyramid to continue collapsing, or at least to shrink substantially.

Serbia Offers an Innovative Model for Converting Civic Mobilization into Electoral Power

Your research with Lura Pollozhani emphasizes the importance of mass protests in challenging competitive authoritarianism. What distinguished Serbia’s student-led mobilization from earlier unsuccessful protest waves, and how did it transform widespread dissatisfaction into a decisive electoral majority?

Professor Florian Bieber: We have seen a pattern throughout the region in which social movements are critical to breaking competitive authoritarian patterns. We saw this in North Macedonia and Montenegro, and now we are seeing it in Serbia as well. Somebody writing about Bulgaria referred to a “protest democracy,” in which protests and social movements are an intrinsic part of the political system, serving as a corrective to prevent it from becoming competitive authoritarian.

In the Western Balkans, social movements are necessary for restoring this, but the critical step, of course, is translating social movements into political actors. In Montenegro, protests were directly channeled into multiple political parties. In North Macedonia, one political party in 2015 was the main actor that captured the social movement. In Serbia, smaller political movements had emerged from various protests over the past decades, but these movements were usually too narrow ideologically to capture a broad movement and attract a broad vote.

What happened here was that the social movement directly transformed itself into a political movement, as we saw when the students decided to run. They did so in a strategically smart way by not forming a political party but maintaining the movement element. They even registered as a list of citizens rather than as a party, preserving the integrity of the movement in their candidacy. By not running themselves but instead selecting experts or respected citizens, they also signaled that it was not about their own political power.

So, in a certain way, the conversion of social movements into political agents is critical. Of course, the path taken by Serbia’s social movement to become a political actor is perhaps rather unusual. In most other countries, we see these social movements transform into political parties, either multiple parties or one party that carries the movement’s legitimacy.

But as I noted earlier, political parties in Serbia had lost their credibility and, as a result, were unable to become those carriers. This required the student movement to opt for a rather innovative structure, which also had a basic democratic element built into it.

Serbia’s Students Wanted Functioning Institutions, Not Strong Leaders

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participates in an SNS political campaign at Hall Čair in Niš, Serbia, on March 30, 2022. Photo: Radule Perisic.

Serbia’s students relied on university plenums, horizontal organization, nonviolent resistance, and grassroots networks rather than charismatic leadership. Did these practices create a genuinely alternative model of democratic mobilization, or were their advantages primarily strategic under authoritarian conditions?

Professor Florian Bieber: This basic democratic organization was mostly driven by pragmatic considerations. The student movement was not ideological. It was heterogeneous in terms of its ideology but also, in a certain way, not revolutionary. The students became political through the protests. They learned by doing.

The plenums, as a form of basic democratic decision-making, were more of a pragmatic response to the fact that student parliaments at the universities had also been captured by the ruling party. The existing formal institutions were therefore not available, and the students needed to find creative alternatives for organizing.

Basic democracy was thus more of a pragmatic choice, and this turned out to be, intuitively, a very effective one, despite the difficulties in decision-making, including sometimes very lengthy decision-making processes, and the lack of clearly identifiable spokespeople for the movement. First of all, it meant that the student movement was able to build a coalition in which everybody was included, something that a smaller group of leaders would not have been able to achieve.

Of course, not having leaders and announcing the list of candidates only when the elections were announced meant that individuals were less likely to be targeted than they would have been if the movement had had visible faces who could be targeted by the regime, co-opted, blackmailed, or otherwise pressured. This was a deliberate choice precisely to prevent such risks for individuals who would otherwise have been in a very dangerous position.

So much of it was pragmatic, but it also brought with it, of course, a different vision of politics. This may not amount to an ideology, but the movement was certainly very explicit in saying, “We want institutions to work.” It was not about strong leaders.

The leading slogan, at least initially, was directed toward former President Vučić: “It’s not your competence.” When he was basically in charge of everything, even though constitutionally he was not, the students were saying, “We want institutions; we don’t want individuals.” This strong emphasis on the responsibility of institutions was also more credible because, again, it was not a leadership-driven movement.

In a certain way, these different elements aligned and worked in the student movement’s favor because they all appeared to constitute a credible and strategically functional response to the setting in which the movement operated.

Serbia’s Opposition Parties Had Lost the Credibility Needed to Defeat Vučić

Your comparative research with Claudia Laštro demonstrates that opposition cohesion and extra-institutional mobilization are crucial to defeating competitive authoritarian incumbents. How did Serbia’s students overcome the fragmentation of traditional opposition parties, and what lessons emerge from Montenegro’s 2020 and North Macedonia’s 2017 transitions?

Professor Florian Bieber: In Montenegro, the strategy in 2020 was to bring together three coalitions of opposition parties that had ideological differences but agreed to cooperate and not attack each other, as they had done previously. In North Macedonia, social movements and the main social democratic opposition party were able to form a temporary coalition.

In Serbia, however, what we saw was that the students deliberately sidelined all existing political parties. Some parties chose to support the Students’ List. Several key parties, some long-established and others that had themselves emerged from social movements, basically put their party infrastructure at the disposal of the students but did not run themselves. Two coalitions of opposition parties did run in the elections, but they misjudged the political atmosphere. At that point, the atmosphere was so referendum-like that voters faced a clear choice: either support the regime or the Students’ List. There was really no third option.

Those lists performed extremely poorly, receiving less than 1% of the vote, far worse than their previous showing. This was partly because people punished them for not aligning with the students and partly because voters did not want to waste their votes, fearing that these parties would not meet the electoral threshold. So there was a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy in all of this.

In a certain way, the students’ strategy of not cooperating with existing parties or building a coalition of parties was certainly high-risk. I remember talking to both opposition party leaders and student activists in the run-up to the elections, even before they were announced, and many were quite critical of that choice. The students were often almost confrontational toward the opposition parties, rejecting them.

The opposition parties were taken aback, saying, “We’ve been campaigning, we’ve been active for years, and now you’re rejecting us. Isn’t that a little bit unfair? You’re treating us as if we’re the regime, even though we have been targeted and victimized by that regime over the years.” So that decision certainly had its problems. But it also meant that the Students’ List could remain above the internal divisions among opposition parties and, as a result, forge a new type of coalition.

Certainly, the Students’ List is itself a coalition. Among its candidates, there are clearly identifiable figures positioning themselves as more conservative, perhaps even nationalist, while others are certainly more liberal. But by not forming a coalition through existing structures and instead building one through individual candidates and the plenum structure, this ideological pluralism was not tainted by the institutional legacies that had made cooperation so difficult.

Why the Novi Sad Tragedy Sparked Mass Mobilization

Serbia student protests.
Students and citizens protest against government corruption in Zrenjanin, Serbia, on January 25, 2026, demanding justice and accountability for the 16 victims of the tragic railway station canopy collapse in Novi Sad. Photo: Dreamstime.

The Novi Sad railway station tragedy transformed corruption and institutional negligence into powerful sources of collective indignation. Why did this particular event generate sustained nationwide resistance when earlier scandals and protests failed to produce comparable political change?

Professor Florian Bieber: That is a very critical question because, while it was a tragedy, it certainly was not the first or the only trigger point. I think several factors came together. First of all, people died in a very visible way. The previous year, there had been two mass shootings, but mass shootings also occur elsewhere. While you can hold the government responsible for fostering a culture of violence, those shootings did not link the government as directly to the victims.

Previous incidents had also generated considerable anger, such as the lithium mining project in western Serbia and earlier violence against opposition candidates. But here, individual citizens died in an accident that seemed preventable because it occurred in connection with a key government project in which the government had clearly been negligent.

So it was this clarity that helped: the fact that it linked individuals’ fates to the larger issues of corruption and the rule of law. The rule of law and democracy are very abstract concepts, and it is difficult to mobilize people around them. Here, however, there was an individual tragedy, and a key element of the protests became 16 minutes of silence. Initially, the period of silence was shorter, but as the number of victims increased to 16, it became 16 minutes. This was a very powerful symbol. Joint mourning became a central motif with tremendous emotional power, and this gave the movement strength.

But this is only part of the story. The other part is the previously accumulated frustration and the many earlier social movements that found their way into this protest movement. There were people who had protested against lithium mining and others who had been active in previous protests. All these activists and movements joined forces around the railway station collapse and the tragedy that killed 16 people.

The students then became active, not immediately after the tragedy but several weeks later, when students mourning on a street were beaten up by individuals who turned out to be local politicians from the ruling party. It was the indignation over this violence against people who were silently mourning that really mattered. Because the victims of this violence were students, solidarity developed among fellow students and through their networks. Some of these students were also prominent and well-known, creating a dynamic in which the protests spread like wildfire.

When I spoke with students involved in the movement, they told me that it was really this violence against fellow students that mobilized them. Of course, the tragedy provided the background, but the tipping point was this experience of violence, when they said, “We don’t tolerate being beaten up by thugs, basically.” That was what really pushed people forward.

Then, of course, once students began taking over the universities, a kind of self-mobilization emerged. What we saw was a mutually reinforcing dynamic, especially among students, which then extended beyond the student movement itself. It was this dynamic, going well beyond the individual tragedy, that ultimately triggered the mass mobilization.

The Student Movement Challenged Ethnonationalism but Remained Constrained by Kosovo

Your scholarship on ethno-populism examines how nationalist leaders construct political legitimacy through exclusionary representations of the people. Does the Students’ List embody an inclusive democratic alternative to Vučić’s ethnonational populism, or could its anti-establishment rhetoric eventually reproduce a different form of populist majoritarianism?

Professor Florian Bieber: Indeed, the answer could be both, or either. There are very strong signs that the student movement is trying to overcome the ethnonationalist logic of the regime. It did so in multiple ways. First, the students were accused early on of being foreign agents or being controlled by external actors, part of the classical repertoire of autocrats. They defended themselves by using the Serbian flag as a central symbol. In a way, they claimed the state’s flag for themselves.

This is something earlier protest movements had not done because most had emerged from politically and ideologically more left-wing environmentalist movements, which did not see the flag as a particularly powerful symbol for themselves. By using the flag, the students, in a certain way, reinterpreted its meaning. It no longer represented state power and nationalist rhetoric but rather a demand for accountability and functioning institutions.

The other approach was to deliberately include national minorities in their movement, and these minorities actively participated. The most prominent example was the highly visible inclusion of Bosniaks, who are mostly Muslim, from the Sandžak region in southwestern Serbia. Bosniak students participated in the protests and university blockades, and there were many prominent and highly visible acts of solidarity.

For example, Muslim and Serbian Orthodox students jointly broke the fast during Ramadan, something that had rarely been seen so prominently outside the region. Similarly, when the student movement blocked the state broadcaster over Easter, Muslim students from Sandžak relieved their Serbian Orthodox counterparts of their blockade duties, saying, “Go home, celebrate Easter with your family. We’ll take care of this for you.” There were also iconic pictures of a Serbian student in traditional dress alongside a female Muslim student wearing a headscarf.

What is interesting is not just this solidarity across ethnic lines but also the very strong ethnoreligious symbolism they used. In a certain way, they were not saying, “Oh, we are all secular students, and we don’t care about religion and tradition, and we find ourselves there.” Rather, they were saying, “We particularly affirm these differences as significant but not as obstacles to cooperation.” That is a very interesting approach. They are not, in a certain way, post-national or denying these identities but are instead reclaiming those symbols and claims.

That is the positive side. The negative, or more complicated, side is that Kosovo remains a very fraught issue in Serbian politics, one where it is extremely difficult to demonstrate the same openness toward Albanians. They are a much smaller minority and do not have a university in the same way that there is one in an overwhelmingly Bosniak environment. Moreover, Kosovo remains a territory that the vast majority of Serbian citizens consider part of Serbia. That kind of openness toward Albanians has not emerged and has not been easy to achieve.

This is partly strategic because such openness might be more divisive, but also because it is more difficult to achieve than openness toward other national minorities. There were also occasional references to Kosovo that were more ethnonationalist in character. So, in this sense, the student movement sent two different signals. One was a very explicit openness toward national minorities, representing a clear break with previous traditions. But when it came to Kosovo, its discourse was very similar to the prevailing discourse of the regime. 

Some of this was strategic because it was difficult to discuss this topic in Serbia’s political environment. Talking about it could have hurt the movement. But some of it certainly also reflected the genuine convictions of many participants in the movement.

Cross-Ethnic Solidarity Offers Serbia a Chance to Rethink Its Treatment of Minorities

Serbia protest.
Serbian students and citizens protest against government corruption following the Novi Sad railway station accident, at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on December 22, 2024. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic / Dreamstime.

The student movement attracted support across ideological, regional, and ethnic divisions, including cooperation between Serbian and Bosniak students. Can this civic mobilization produce lasting changes in Serbia’s treatment of Bosniak, Albanian, and Hungarian minorities, or will entrenched ethnonational cleavages reassert themselves after the transition?

Professor Florian Bieber: There is an opening now, and this is very critical. As I mentioned, this highly visible cross-ethnic support was also prominently displayed to voters. During the election campaign, for example, women wearing headscarves were highly visible among the candidates on the Students’ List, making a clear statement that they were included in both the Students’ List and its understanding of Serbia. That certainly marks a shift, and it will not be easy to return to the previous level of exclusion.

There were also early actions by activists after the student movement had won, such as painting over hate speech in public spaces in major cities across Serbia, including graffiti glorifying war criminals such as Ratko Mladić. Several of these acts indicate a clear desire to break with the prevalence of hate speech throughout the country.

It was not just the Students’ List but also citizens who became active after previously being prevented from doing so by thugs supporting the regime. So, it is not just the student movement. There seems to be a broader group of activists who really want to change how these topics are presented and discussed in Serbia. The change of government also provides an opportunity to address these issues.

Over the past 10 or 15 years, these topics had become almost taboo. Talking about Kosovo in any way that differed from the government’s position meant being labeled a traitor and effectively ostracized. Discussing war crimes or other sensitive issues was nearly impossible. So, I would expect these debates to become possible now, also because of the pluralism within the student movement. This opens the door to a more reflective discussion. It does not mean that society will change immediately, but it creates an opportunity for more critical reflection on these issues. That is what the student movement has achieved.

Of course, there are still many blind spots, as I mentioned, particularly regarding Kosovo, where achieving a more sustainable shift in the debate will be much harder. But this opening of space is significant, as is the Students’ List’s commitment to reducing hate speech, not just in the public sphere but also in the media. While much of the hate speech was directed against the Students’ List or other opposition candidates, it also targeted minorities and neighboring nations. If that hate speech is reduced, along with the role of the media that have been promoting it, this will represent both an atmospheric and a structural change in Serbia itself, providing a fresh start in how others are perceived in the current Serbian environment.

The EU’s Support for Vučić Has Tainted Its Image Among Serbian Citizens

In your 2026 article, “Nationalist Visions of Europe,” you explore how the far right appropriates European identity for exclusionary political purposes. Could Serbia’s democratic transition foster a more inclusive understanding of European belonging, or will nationalism continue to constrain the country’s political and geopolitical orientation?

Professor Florian Bieber: It’s an interesting question to consider. Europe was not an important topic in Serbia during these elections. Europe is associated with the European Union, which many in Serbia perceived as supportive of Aleksandar Vučić’s regime. This judgment is not entirely unfair. The European Union certainly did not support everything the regime did, nor did it support the regime all the time, but there were gestures of support for the previous government that have tainted perceptions of the European Union in Serbia itself.

The question is whether the change of government can reset those relations and also change the image of Europe. At the same time, most supporters of the Students’ List do want to see Serbia move closer to the European Union, and there is, overall, a strong sense that Serbia belongs to Europe. When the students sought to communicate their message, they organized an ultramarathon and a bike race to Strasbourg and Brussels.

So, in a certain way, Europe and the European Union are natural points of reference. The question is how, after this change, Serbia can fit its own identity into the larger European puzzle and European debates. The previous government very much fostered the notion that Serbia did not fit in: that Serbia wanted to maintain good ties with Russia, which conflicted with prevailing narratives in the European Union; that Serbia wanted good relations with China; and that it did not want to recognize Kosovo. All of this, in a certain way, placed Serbia at odds with the larger European narrative.

The question is whether, down the road, the new Students’ List can promote not just the formalistic aspects of European integration, such as reforms and the accession process, but also an identity narrative about where Serbia fits into Europe. Into what kind of Europe does it fit? That question may, of course, extend beyond the Students’ List and become more of a long-term issue. But it is critical to understanding how a country, in its own self-understanding, fits into the larger European framework and how Europe talks about itself. This is, of course, also a moving target because the way Europe—meaning its citizens, publics, and politicians—talks about what Europe is has shifted over the last 15 or 20 years.

Restoring Judicial Independence May Be Serbia’s Greatest Democratic Challenge

You warned before the elections that dismantling SNS control over public administration would be exceptionally difficult. What are the greatest institutional obstacles facing the Students’ List, particularly regarding the judiciary, security services, public broadcasting, and entrenched patronage networks?

Professor Florian Bieber: All of these are extremely difficult and challenging. The judiciary is particularly hard to change. On the one hand, it has now become active after the change of government, which is a sign that change is possible. But as we also know from reforms in Hungary and Poland, the judiciary, for good reason, has a certain level of independence from the government. Therefore, when the government changes, even if it becomes more democratic, it is harder to re-democratize the judiciary or restore its independence.

It is easier to make a ministry work than to make the judiciary work because you can simply order officials in a ministry to do their jobs. You cannot do this with the judiciary in the same way. So, the judiciary is much harder to reform, and it is critical not just for investigating past abuses but also for ensuring that it remains vigilant and that nobody is above the law. That is the biggest question.

The other major challenge is, of course, the security structures. They have never been completely reformed, even after the fall of Slobodan Milošević. In a certain way, they have been complicit and have a long history of serving as tools of the authorities. There are extensive links to organized crime, as well as individuals with criminal records going back to the 1990s. So, these structures will be much harder to break open because they are far more deeply entrenched.

There are, of course, other immediate challenges. How can you make ministries work when they are staffed by people hired because of their loyalty to the previous ruling party? Some of these obstacles might be difficult but surmountable through the mere power of opportunism. Again, as we discussed earlier, if people believe that Vučić’s power pyramid is crumbling, many might shift their positions and refrain from obstruction because they want to save their own skins in the future.

Then, of course, difficult questions arise for any movement coming to power after such a period: Where do you accept cooperation from those who were previously opportunistic, and where do you draw the line, saying, “That’s nice that you’re now collaborating with us, but you are tainted by your actions. You’ve committed acts that were illegal”? That also requires legal responses. These will be difficult decisions to make.

Another major issue is that the ruling party controlled nearly all municipalities in the country, and these municipalities remain in the hands of the previous ruling party because local elections are not scheduled for some time. Therefore, there will be a very unusual period in which local authorities continue to operate under the old ruling party while power at the center is now held by the Students’ List. How will that play out, and where might it become a source of tension?

The last major issue to mention is, of course, media freedom. This is also difficult because much of the media loyal to Vučić was privately owned rather than public. The critical question is how to create media pluralism. Some aspects might be easier than expected because post-election reports have revealed that many of these private media outlets received funding from state-owned enterprises, such as the telecommunications company. These subsidies essentially made their survival possible. Cutting those subsidies, for example, might be a relatively simple way to bring about the collapse of this fake media system created by the Vučić government.

But even then, we still do not have pluralistic, alternative media. It will take considerable time to develop media that are not merely free of propaganda but genuinely critical and capable of monitoring the Students’ List as well, which will be necessary. That will probably take quite a while.

A Faceless Students’ List Cannot Remain a Permanent Feature of Democratic Politics

Students and citizens protest against corruption and the Serbian government in Novi Sad, Serbia, on February 1, 2025.
Students and citizens protest against corruption and the Serbian government in Novi Sad, Serbia, on February 1, 2025. Photo: Srdjan Randjelovic / Dreamstime.

The Students’ List must now translate decentralized protest practices into representative government. Can horizontal decision-making and direct democratic participation coexist with effective executive leadership, or does governing inevitably risk reproducing the personalized authority the movement opposed?

Professor Florian Bieber: This is a major debate within the Students’ List right now, particularly about how these different structures can coexist. You will have an elected government, chosen by Parliament in a representative democracy, but which also owes some of its legitimacy to the student movement, an extra-parliamentary group that bases its legitimacy and authority on the plenums. So, you have these different sources of legitimacy: the government, Parliament, and the student movement. The relationship among them remains to be fully defined because a government must also be able to act, sometimes quickly, and cannot always consult with the student movement, which has a much slower and more inclusive decision-making process.

To some degree, the student movement does not seem to want to make its current model of inclusive decision-making a permanent way of operating. Rather, it sees this model as appropriate for the transitional period of restoring democracy in Serbia. In a certain way, the emergence of individuals in the government or Parliament who are more successful or better able to communicate is not in itself a problem.

The expectation is that political parties will emerge from the Students’ List or work with existing political parties, and that in two or three years, depending on the timeframe, there will be elections that are competitive in the classical sense, with different political parties competing against one another. In a certain way, you also need new political actors who can gain the trust of citizens because a faceless Students’ List cannot remain a permanent feature of politics.

That is one aspect. The other question, of course, is how to translate some of these experiences of direct democracy and oversight, which the Students’ List wants to exercise, into permanent features of the political system. The question is whether there is space in Serbia to incorporate these participatory experiences rather than simply treating them as a one-off, temporary experiment during this transitional period. It is also a question of whether citizen engagement of this kind might benefit democracy in Serbia and possibly beyond.

Without a Clear Break from the Old Regime, Serbia Risks Repeating Its Democratic Failures

Serbia’s democratic transition invites comparison with the overthrow of Milošević in October 2000. Why did the post-2000 democratic experiment fail to prevent the subsequent resurgence of competitive authoritarianism, and what institutional safeguards would be necessary to avoid repeating that trajectory?

Professor Florian Bieber: That is a critical question on everybody’s mind: how to avoid the mistakes of the past. In Serbia, it is often said that there was no October 6, meaning the day after the overthrow of Milošević, which would have marked a clear rupture with the previous regime. Instead, it was a highly managed transition. Many of the power holders from the previous regime managed to survive through these negotiations. The absence of a clear rupture and a full investigation of those responsible, whether business interests, security structures, or political actors, made it very easy for them to retain their influence. That also made it possible to roll back the changes. So, this kind of rupture with the previous institutional structures is critical.

I think there is considerable awareness of this now. The Students’ List does not owe anything to anybody. First of all, it won an outright majority and did not have to make compromises to win the elections. It also does not carry the baggage of old political parties that might have favors to repay or deals to honor. That makes things easier, and there are greater opportunities to make this break now. On the other hand, this was an election that brought about a change of government, which makes the idea of a rupture less pronounced than it was in 2000. Back then, there was an election, but in the end, it was civic mobilization and the storming of Parliament that brought about the change. We did not have that this time. The protests took place before the elections, not afterward. So, in that sense, it is easier to say, “Well, this is just an election, and the loser accepted the results.” That makes it harder to prepare mentally for this kind of rupture.

Another reason the transformation after 2000 did not fully succeed was that a large number of citizens were deeply frustrated with the changes that followed. This was already clear in the first elections after 2000, when the Radical Party, the ultranationalist party, became the largest single party. It was from that party that Aleksandar Vučić and his Progressive Party eventually emerged. These frustrated citizens were the classic losers of the transition. They blamed the new authorities for their job losses, poverty, and other difficulties. It was these people who enabled the return of those autocratic structures.

So, what also needs to be kept in mind is not just the rupture with the current system but also the need to ensure that those who have now voted for the Progressive Party are not forgotten and are brought on board. Otherwise, they could become voters for a party that might try to roll back some of the changes that will take place in the coming months and years.

A Democratic Serbia Will Find More Allies in the EU Than in Russia or China

EU flags in EU Council building during the EU Summit in Brussels, Belgium on June 28, 2018. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Your research highlights Vučić’s strategic balancing between the European Union, Russia, and China. Could the student-led transition fundamentally reorient Serbia toward European integration, or will unresolved questions surrounding Kosovo, Russia, and domestic nationalism limit the prospects for geopolitical realignment?

Professor Florian Bieber: The Students’ List has stayed away from foreign policy and made it very clear that this is not its priority. It will undoubtedly be confronted with foreign policy challenges. Relations with Russia will be critical. There is the question of the sale of Serbia’s large energy company, presumably from Russian to Hungarian ownership, due to sanctions. There are also questions surrounding sanctions on Russia, but overall, the student movement is trying to avoid addressing these issues. Certainly, it will not try to resolve relations with Kosovo or find a long-term solution because these issues are too divisive internally, and it does not have a mandate to address them. It has a mandate for domestic reforms, not major foreign policy shifts.

So, what we should expect is that the student movement will naturally look more toward the EU, as we discussed earlier. It is seeking to democratize the country, and in that effort, it will find more allies in the EU than in Russia or China. But it is unlikely to pursue a profound geopolitical reorientation. This challenge will fall more to a future government, depending on the political constellation that emerges once elections are held on the basis of traditional political options. At that point, there might be a clearer mandate to pursue a more concerted geopolitical reorientation of Serbia.

I would therefore expect a more gradual, subtle recalibration simply as a result of having a democratic government, which will naturally look elsewhere. But I would not expect a high-profile, symbolic shift.

Serbia’s Democratic Breakthrough Could Inspire Resistance to Authoritarianism Across the Balkans

Vučić’s support for nationalist actors in Republika Srpska and elsewhere reinforced authoritarian and ethnonational networks across the Western Balkans. How might his electoral defeat affect Milorad Dodik’s political project, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s constitutional stability, and prospects for regional reconciliation?

Professor Florian Bieber: Certainly, with the defeat of Vučić’s Progressive Party, the networks the party has been promoting—including its ties to Dodik, Serbian parties in Montenegro, and the Serbian List in Kosovo—will be disrupted. It will also represent a kind of defeat for the ultranationalist message. The Students’ List has signaled that it will respect the sovereignty of neighboring countries and has already adopted a different vocabulary for talking about Serbia’s neighbors than the Vučić government used.

At the same time, however, these parties have their own power bases. Dodik was successful before Vučić. He has been in charge of Republika Srpska in Bosnia, de facto, for 20 years. So assuming that these political structures will crumble because of Vučić’s defeat would be an overestimation of its impact.

Nevertheless, his defeat will certainly have a weakening effect on these structures and perhaps even a demonstration effect. The grievances that many Serbs in Republika Srpska have toward Milorad Dodik are not that different from those they have toward Aleksandar Vučić. So, we might also see the emergence of social movements, or at least a more visible articulation of frustration with the authoritarian aspects of these political actors.

But again, I would not expect a radical break, but rather a more gradual shift.

There Is No Single Path Out of Competitive Authoritarianism, But…

And finally, Professor Bieber, considering democratic breakthroughs and authoritarian setbacks in Serbia, Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and other competitive authoritarian contexts, what generalizable lessons emerge from Serbia’s experience? Can student-led civic resistance provide a sustainable pathway from populist authoritarianism to democratic consolidation, or does its success depend on exceptional national circumstances?

Professor Florian Bieber: There is no single path out of competitive authoritarian regimes. If we look at different experiences, including Hungary, we see that there are various paths. But one thing that emerges is that successful movements, parties, and coalitions tend to be ideologically broad. This was the case in Hungary. The coalition that overthrew Orbán was not the traditional political opposition but rather a party that retained many elements of Orbán’s ideas while also reaching out to the center and the left.

In Montenegro, it was a broad coalition. In Serbia, it is also a broad coalition. So you cannot replace incumbents simply with an ideological alternative. Rather, you need a broad ideological spectrum to attract people.

You also need to mobilize people. Elections alone are not enough; you need broad civic mobilization. This can take many different forms. It does not necessarily have to be a social movement like the one in Serbia, but you need a broad movement that reaches out to citizens. In all these cases, voter turnout was higher. Therefore, mobilizing people who have become passive and disillusioned with politics is critical.

It is this combination of factors that matters. Serbia represents one way of achieving this, and certainly an innovative one, because of its plenums, democratic structure, and lack of visible political leadership. But there are broader lessons to be learned, lessons that seem to recur across all these cases.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

A statue of Anne Frank.

Does Criticism of Israel Justify the Exclusion of Jewish Historical Memory?

In this commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias examines the troubling intersection of antisemitism, political polarization, and the politics of historical memory through a controversy surrounding a proposed exhibition commemorating three centuries of Jewish life in Amersfoort, the Netherlands. Drawing on debates about collective responsibility, cultural exclusion, and multidirectional memory, Dr. Ferreira Dias explores how criticism of Israeli government policies can become entangled with perceptions of Jewish communities elsewhere. He argues that solidarity with Palestinians and recognition of Jewish historical suffering are not mutually exclusive, warning against the conflation of Jewish identity with Israeli state actions. The commentary underscores the importance of preserving inclusive historical remembrance amid contemporary geopolitical conflicts.

By João Ferreira Dias

Should the history of a Jewish community in Europe become entangled in controversies over the policies of the Israeli government? The question exposes a troubling tension between legitimate criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza and the tendency to hold Jewish communities elsewhere symbolically accountable for those actions. When Jewish cultural heritage and historical remembrance become politically sensitive because of events in the Middle East, the boundary between political solidarity and collective stigmatization begins to blur. A recent controversy in the Dutch city of Amersfoort illustrates how this tension can affect even the commemoration of a centuries-old Jewish community.

Workmen were renovating the synagogue on Drieringensteeg when Alexander van Dijkhuizen spoke to the Dutch newspaper Trouw. The building was approaching its three-hundredth anniversary. For Van Dijkhuizen, chair of Amersfoort’s Jewish community, an exhibition at the city museum was intended to be one of the anniversary’s main events. However, the museum had withdrawn from the project. Its director, Paul Baltus, cited tensions over the Middle East.

Baltus was concerned about the 85 volunteers who interact with visitors. He told Trouw that there had been no specific threat of violence. The museum had neither consulted the police nor conducted a risk assessment, and the exhibition was still at the conceptual stage. A small museum must consider what its volunteers can reasonably handle. In this case, however, the subject itself was deemed a risk before the exhibition had even taken shape.

In one strand of the cultural left, the distinction between oppressors and oppressed has come to do more than explain who exercises power over whom in Gaza. It has become a framework for determining what Jews elsewhere are perceived to represent. One can honor the Jews murdered under Nazism while still placing a contemporary Jewish congregation on the side of the oppressor based on the actions of the Israeli government. David Schraub has examined a related problem in debates about race: when Jews are viewed primarily through their presumed proximity to power, the prejudice they face becomes harder to recognize. In debates over Gaza, even making space for Jewish history in a museum can come to be perceived as taking Israel’s side.

In May 2025, the Bristol venue Strange Brew canceled a concert by Oi Va Voi, a British band whose music draws on klezmer traditions. The Bristol Palestine Alliance had objected to the band’s previous performances in Israel. Campaigners also claimed to discern a coded Zionist message on the cover of a solo album by the band’s Israeli guest singer, Zohara, which depicted her surrounded by watermelons. The venue later acknowledged that the cancellation had been a mistake and that the band’s Jewish identity and its guest singer’s nationality had likely subjected them to a level of scrutiny that other performers would not have faced.

The reporting on the Amersfoort exhibition identifies no comparable campaign. The museum allowed a dispute over Israel to influence what it would exhibit before any confrontation had even occurred. Follow that logic far enough, and a Jewish family could have lived in Amersfoort for generations, yet its place in the city’s museum would still depend on how calm the news from the Middle East happened to be.

Amersfoort’s Council of Churches condemned Israeli violence in Gaza and the West Bank in the same letter in which it called on the museum to reinstate the exhibition. Michael Rothberg has explored how the remembrance of one history of violence can deepen recognition of another. The churches suggested that anger over Gaza need not prevent Amersfoort’s residents from learning about the Jewish families who had lived in their city for centuries.

On November 6, following a meeting convened by the mayor and the councillor for culture, the city announced that it would work with the museum and the Jewish community to find a way to hold the exhibition. Offers of assistance had alleviated some of Baltus’s concerns, although the venue had yet to be determined.

At Borneoplein, a light is illuminated for each of Amersfoort’s Jewish victims of the Second World War on the anniversary of their death. An exhibition could offer visitors a glimpse into the lives commemorated by those lights. Amersfoort once had a Jewish theater society. In 1941, the community established a school for Jewish children excluded from public education. The congregation was reestablished after the war, and by 1949, the synagogue’s damaged interior had been restored. This time, the workmen on Drieringensteeg were preparing the synagogue for a celebration.

The Amersfoort controversy raises a broader question: should Jewish communities in Europe bear the consequences of political conflicts involving Israel? Criticism of Israeli policies and solidarity with Palestinians should not come at the expense of Jewish historical memory or cultural belonging. As the Council of Churches demonstrated, these commitments are not mutually exclusive. A democratic society must be capable of acknowledging different histories of suffering without turning remembrance into a political endorsement. Commemorating three centuries of Jewish life in Amersfoort is not taking Israel’s side; it is recognizing that Jewish history is an inseparable part of the city’s own history.

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky.

Prof. Lewandowsky The AfD Does Not Create Xenophobia, It Amplifies It

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Marcel Lewandowsky, Professor of Government and Public Policy at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, examines the consolidation of Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) and its implications for liberal democracy. Challenging the interpretation of the AfD as merely a protest party, he argues that its electoral resilience reflects deeply rooted political alienation, anti-immigration attitudes, and dissatisfaction with democratic representation. Professor Lewandowsky explains how perceptions of economic crisis activate existing xenophobic sentiments, which the AfD amplifies through populist narratives and scapegoating. He also warns that mainstream parties may inadvertently strengthen the radical right by adopting its rhetoric. Ultimately, he emphasizes that restoring democratic confidence requires socioeconomic reforms, renewed political representation, and stronger democratic engagement.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Germany is undergoing a profound political realignment. Amid economic stagnation, immigration controversies, and growing distrust of established parties, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has consolidated its position as a major political force. Its unprecedented gains in the September 2026 state elections, particularly in eastern Germany, challenge the resilience of democratic institutions and the traditional Brandmauer against the radical right. While populist movements elsewhere have experienced electoral setbacks, the AfD continues to expand its appeal, raising fundamental questions about democratic representation, political alienation, and the normalization of radical-right politics.

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Marcel Lewandowsky, Professor of Government and Public Policy at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, whose research focuses on populism, authoritarianism, and democratic politics, examines the structural foundations of the AfD’s electoral resilience and the challenges facing Germany’s liberal democracy.

Rejecting the conventional interpretation of the AfD as merely an expression of anti-establishment protest, Professor Lewandowsky argues that “the AfD has never been just a protest party. It has always been able to fill a representation gap in the party system.” Its electoral strength, he explains, reflects not only dissatisfaction with democratic institutions but also a durable alignment between voters’ ideological preferences and the party’s political agenda, particularly on immigration.

Central to his analysis is the relationship between economic insecurity, preexisting authoritarian attitudes, and populist crisis narratives. Rather than generating xenophobia independently, the AfD exploits perceptions of economic and cultural threat to reinforce existing prejudices. As Professor Lewandowsky emphasizes, “They do not create it, but they amplify it.” This dynamic becomes particularly consequential when mainstream parties adopt similar rhetoric, inadvertently strengthening the radical right’s ownership of migration as a political issue.

The interview also challenges assumptions about democratic dissatisfaction and electoral accountability. Drawing on experimental research, Professor Lewandowsky explains how voters may prioritize preferred policies over liberal-democratic principles, while AfD supporters display exceptional loyalty even when their party faces political scandals. His research further complicates the presumed relationship between loneliness and radical-right support, finding that social isolation is more closely associated with electoral abstention than with AfD voting.

Looking ahead, Professor Lewandowsky identifies political representation as central to democratic renewal. Criticizing mainstream parties for following rather than shaping the political agenda, he argues that economic and social reforms must address underlying grievances while rebuilding citizens’ confidence in democratic institutions. Above all, he insists that “political parties are at the center of saving democracy.”

In sum, the interview explores whether Germany’s established parties can reclaim their representative functions—or whether the AfD’s consolidation signals an enduring transformation of the country’s political landscape.

Here is our interview with Professor Marcel Lewandowsky, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

The AfD Has Never Been Just a Protest Party

The Alternative for Germany (AfD) booth in Görlitz, Germany, on August 16, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Lewandowsky, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your research on the AfD’s evolution from a Eurosceptic protest party into a populist radical-right movement. Following its extraordinary gains in the September 2026 state elections, has the AfD become a structurally entrenched political force rather than a temporary expression of anti-establishment discontent?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: It absolutely has. Even early studies on the AfD showed that the driving force behind voters’ support for the party was not only protest against the establishment but also congruence with the AfD’s program, especially on the issue of migration. So, what I would say is that the AfD has never been just a protest party. It has always been able to fill a representation gap in the party system.

What we can see now is that AfD voters are among the most loyal in the party system. When we look at the propensity to vote and electoral availability, as studied by Aiko Wagner from the Free University of Berlin and me, we can see that AfD voters have the lowest probability of voting for another party. For example, if you vote for the CDU, there is a certain probability that you might also consider supporting the AfD. If you vote for the SPD, you have a certain propensity to vote for the Greens. But AfD voters have the lowest propensity to vote for any other party.

Why is that so? It has to do with the AfD being the only party that its voters trust. In other words, individuals who vote for the AfD do not trust any of the other parties. This distrust of the political system and its actors is not simply an expression of temporary protest. Rather, it has to do with discontent with democracy and the perception that democracy is in a state of crisis. That is something the AfD can really capitalize on, much like other parties with similar ideologies, such as the FPÖ, Rassemblement National, and others.

Economic Insecurity Activates Existing Authoritarian Attitudes

How would you distinguish the objective socioeconomic drivers of AfD support—economic stagnation, regional inequality, and insecurity—from subjective grievances involving cultural displacement and political alienation? Why have these factors proved particularly powerful in eastern Germany, where the legacies of reunification continue to shape political identities?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: Generally, the basic reasons individuals support the AfD are not so different between West and East Germany, just as they are not that different among AfD voters, FPÖ voters, and even Trump voters. There are certain driving factors that we find in almost all established democracies that explain why individuals vote for populist radical-right parties. These factors are the same in the case of the AfD.

So, to what extent does the economy come into play? The economy—macroeconomic factors—is a driving factor, but these factors essentially activate individual attitudes that are already in place. Let me explain. If you look at a former CDU voter or a non-voter, they might have a negative attitude toward migration. They might be skeptical about asylum seekers but remain non-voters or conservative voters, perhaps even SPD or Social Democratic voters, though to a much lesser extent, as we have seen in the work of Cas Mudde, Max Mitteregger, and Tarik Abou-Chadi.

What we do know is that the perception of an economic crisis—not necessarily being personally affected by that crisis but fearing that people like me could be affected in the future—can be a driving force behind voting for a party like the AfD. This is because such perceptions activate authoritarian or nativist attitudes that were already present but had not previously influenced voting behavior.

Parties like the AfD capitalize on this because they can take voters’ perceptions of crises and not only offer a simple solution but also engage in scapegoating, following a strategy of naming and blaming. They essentially say, “These are the people responsible for this crisis. It is those up there, and it is the ones they let in.”

So, what they capitalize on is an attitude of xenophobia. They do not create it, but they amplify it. And they have the opportunity to amplify it because there is a perception of an economic crisis. That is how these factors at the macro and micro levels work together.

Mainstream Parties Amplify the AfD’s Migration Narrative

AfD demonstrated with slogan “Stop Islamization” in Rostock on May 14, 2018. AfD, Alternative for Germany, is a right wing political party in Germany.

Immigration remains central to the AfD’s political mobilization, even where direct exposure to immigration is relatively limited. How does the party transform perceptions of cultural threat and demographic change into durable political identities, and why have mainstream parties struggled to counter this narrative?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: First of all, I wouldn’t necessarily say that the other parties struggle to counter the narrative. I would say that they struggle to imitate it. If you look at the work of Michael Bayerlein, Tarik Abou-Chadi, Werner Krause, and others, we can see that, in international comparison, conservative parties try to catch up. And it’s not only conservative parties; if you look at Denmark, Social Democratic parties do so as well, though to a much lesser extent. They try to catch up by adopting, to some extent, the narrative that outsiders pose a threat—not necessarily to national identity, but to security.

We know that when conservative parties do this, they strengthen their right-wing competitors. Parties like the AfD, the FPÖ, and the Sweden Democrats have issue ownership over migration, particularly when it comes to taking certain positions and framing the issue in a particular way. When other parties shift to the right on this issue, migration remains prominent in political and media discourse, and its importance is amplified. As Abou-Chadi, Denis Cohen, and Krause have shown, right-wing populist parties either don’t lose votes or even gain votes.

So, what are these parties able to do? I think that connects to what I said before. We know that these parties can offer a particular interpretation of a crisis. A crisis, or the perception of one, must already exist. They cannot create the perception of a crisis; it must already be present within society. What they do is offer a particular framing and certain solutions.

Benjamin Moffitt pointed this out in a 2015 paper in which he analyzed how populist parties use and frame crises. This is what we’re seeing here. These parties take an existing perception of crisis—whether concerning the economy, migration, or asylum seekers, as in 2015—and amplify it, thereby becoming stronger.

Other parties then react, making the perception of crisis permanent. Everybody starts talking about the crisis, but right-wing populist parties retain issue ownership. This is how it works. It shows that, through their own strategies and the shifts of other parties, especially conservative parties, populist radical-right parties no longer remain pariahs. To some extent, they become part of the mainstream—or at least their issues, framings, and rhetoric become mainstream. This is what helps these parties establish their narratives.

AfD Voters Support Democracy but Distrust How It Functions

In your September 2026 interviews, you distinguished between ideologically committed far-right voters and a broader AfD electorate driven by populist resentment. Given your findings on voters’ willingness to trade liberal-democratic principles for preferred policies, does AfD support primarily reflect democratic disaffection, conscious illiberalism, or an increasingly powerful interaction between them?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: All of it. If you look at why individuals vote for the AfD, one factor is dissatisfaction with democracy. But to be dissatisfied with democracy, you also have to have an idea, at least to some extent, of what you expect from it. You cannot be dissatisfied if you never had an expectation. What we see is that AfD voters are dissatisfied with democracy as it currently functions. They do support the idea of democracy; they are not outright anti-democratic. But we also know that they have strong populist attitudes.

Let me give you an example of what that looks like. If you look at voters as a whole and want to determine whether the likelihood of voting for the AfD increases because individuals are right-wing or because they are populist, you find that right-wing individuals without strong populist attitudes do not have a particularly high probability of voting for the AfD.

However, when individuals are both right-wing and populist—when you examine the interaction between their right-wing positions and populist attitudes—we see that the probability of voting for the AfD depends on that interaction. So, it is not simply right-wing individuals, or even necessarily populist individuals, who vote for the AfD; it is individuals who are both right-wing and populist. Those who are right-wing but not populist might be more inclined to vote for the CDU. But I think populism is a very strong driver.

At the same time, what Michael Jankovsky and I found in our 2023 paper is something that, from a normative standpoint of democracy, can be somewhat concerning. We found that when individuals have the option of voting either for a liberal-democratic candidate whose positions on certain issues differ substantially from their own or for an illiberal candidate whose positions align closely with theirs on issues they consider important, they are highly likely to support the illiberal candidate if the alignment is sufficiently strong.

That finding applies across the board. It does not apply only to AfD voters; it applies to all voters. Populist and authoritarian attitudes strongly influence that behavior, but we still observe it across the board.

This means there is a certain willingness to support illiberal candidates, at least according to our experimental design, even among voters who do not themselves hold illiberal attitudes. We do not know whether this means that the AfD, for example, can capitalize on such willingness, because it does not have much to do with ideology. Rather, it concerns a willingness to abandon liberal attitudes or liberal democracy if you believe that the issues important to you will be addressed.

Loneliness Discourages Voting Rather Than Driving AfD Support

Your recent study with Anna-Sophie Heinze finds that loneliness primarily discourages electoral participation rather than increasing AfD support. What does this reveal about the relationship between social isolation, political alienation, and radical-right mobilization, particularly among younger voters?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: First of all, we looked at the 2025 German election, using data from the German Longitudinal Election Study. Since we are looking at just one point in time, our findings are basically correlational. But the important message is that we did not find what other scholars have claimed. We do not find that lonely voters are more inclined to support a right-wing populist party, nor do we find that young, lonely voters are more likely to vote for such a party. If anything, we find that loneliness decreases the likelihood of participating in an election in the first place.

This is an important finding, given the ongoing discussion about what some call a male loneliness epidemic and the claim that lonely young males are voting for the far right. At least we can say that we do not find this in the 2025 German election. Even though the AfD is pretty well established at this point, we still do not see it gaining the support one would expect based on claims that the male loneliness epidemic affects the political behavior of lonely young males. We simply do not find that to be the case.

This means that perhaps it would be more interesting to study what kind of loneliness we are actually looking at. I think, first and foremost, we have a problem measuring loneliness. We ask individuals, using the standard item battery, how lonely they have felt over the past few months, or something like that. What we are actually measuring is the feeling of loneliness, not social isolation.

Measuring social isolation and the perception of social isolation in a more complex, differentiated way is something we should look into. I do not doubt that, in some instances, loneliness affects political behavior. We do find that it has a significant effect on non-voting. But when it comes to cases where individuals do vote in a certain way, support the far right, or support authoritarian alternatives, we would need a more differentiated approach. Because if loneliness is a driving factor, we are not measuring it well enough.

Distrust of Mainstream Media May Protect the AfD from Scandals

Protest against the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Trier, Germany, on January 28, 2024. Demonstrators gathered in support of human rights, diversity, and a society free from discrimination and racism. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your research on voters’ loyalty to corrupt politicians emphasizes the importance of viable political alternatives. Does the AfD benefit from an electorate that increasingly considers mainstream parties unacceptable, making scandals, extremist rhetoric, and violations of democratic norms less electorally consequential?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: The short answer is yes, but you’re not looking for a short answer, so let me put it this way. In our study, Christina-Marie Juen, Michael Jankowski, and I found that individuals who vote for the AfD do not punish the party when there is a scandal. Other voters do—Green voters, SPD voters, and CDU voters, all to varying degrees—but AfD voters don’t. So why is that the case?

It has to do with the AfD being the only alternative in terms of the issues that matter to its voters. Even when there is a scandal, the AfD remains the party closest to their own positions. This is consistent with other studies, including those by Aiko Wagner and me, which show that this perceived proximity between the AfD and its voters’ positions is extremely important in explaining their loyalty to the party. In this case, that proximity means voters do not defect. They stick with the AfD despite a scandal because no other party represents their demands as well as the AfD does.

Something we were unable to examine in our research is whether these voters believe the reports about the scandal. Many voters might learn about a scandal through the mainstream media, but because they do not trust those media outlets, they might not believe the scandal is true in the first place.

The AfD might frame the scandal as a lie fabricated by the mainstream media or by politicians seeking to hurt the party. Voters might be more inclined to believe that explanation. So, this is another factor that may come into play. Overall, we find that this provides further evidence of the loyalty of AfD voters.

For AfD Voters, Migration Overshadows Economic Grievances

While the AfD mobilizes grievances through nationalism, immigration, and cultural identity, Die Linke emphasizes social inequality, redistribution, and economic justice. To what extent do these parties compete for similarly alienated voters, and why do socioeconomic grievances increasingly translate into support for the radical right rather than the populist left?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: The populist left is not only economically left-wing but also socially progressive. Many of its positions, for example, on migration, do not align with those of AfD voters. We do not find much overlap between AfD and Die Linke voters. In some states, there is voter exchange between these parties, but in general, the AfD mostly wins voters from the CDU, sometimes from the SPD, and from non-voters. That is the non-electorate, or the segment of the electorate that the AfD is able to mobilize.

Interestingly, there had been a widespread belief in Germany that Die Linke was pretty much finished. Then, shortly before the 2025 general election, the party was able to make a comeback. It did so, on the one hand, through its frontrunner, Heidi Reichinnek, who had a strong presence on social media, and, on the other hand, by focusing on certain social and economic issues, such as housing prices and rents.

When we look at voters and their propensity to vote, we see that there is little overlap between the AfD and Die Linke. The AfD does not focus much on economic issues. These issues are not particularly important to the party or its voters. The most important issue for these voters, or the main driving factor behind voting for the AfD, is migration. That is something we found even in the AfD’s early stages, when it was not yet a populist radical-right and, in part, right-wing extremist party.

There might be objective factors or conditions under which one might think that, for some voters who currently support the AfD, it would be more rational to vote for a left-wing party. But the problem is that these issues are not as salient to them. They often believe that migration is the major issue and that, once migration is addressed and the political elite is replaced, everything else will fall into place—or they have already lost the belief that everything else might fall into place to begin with.

There is a certain mindset among AfD voters, as among voters of other parties of this kind, that binds them to the AfD. Migration and a populist idea of democracy are at the center of that mindset. That is something that, at least at this point, other parties, including the left, have been struggling to counter.

The AfD Benefits from Its Position Outside Government

As right-wing populist movements have recently encountered electoral defeats or political setbacks in Brazil, Serbia, Hungary, Israel, and the United States, the AfD continues to gain support in Germany. What explains this divergence? Are Germany’s economic conditions, party-system dynamics, and political culture creating unusually favorable circumstances for the radical right?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: In the United States, for example, the radical right is in office and is creating grievances. In Brazil, the left and Lula were able to mobilize, for example, through social media during the second round of the presidential election. In Hungary and Poland, parties like Fidesz and PiS had been in office, so strong opposition movements emerged, capitalizing on the grievances these parties had created while in government.

What we see in Germany, however, is that the AfD remains excluded from government. There is still such a thing as the Brandmauer, or cordon sanitaire, but it is not as strong as it used to be—if it ever was. That is something one can discuss.

Another factor comes into play here, beyond the AfD’s position as an outsider that has not yet held office. It might enter government, most likely in Saxony-Anhalt in December. There is also an extremely unpopular federal government, an equally unpopular chancellor, and a conservative party that has, to some extent, lost its ability to integrate more right-wing voters. All these factors are comparable to those in other countries. The first country that comes to mind is Austria, where the situation is quite similar. Another is France, although there is an additional factor there: extreme polarization between the extreme left and the extreme right.

Overall, I don’t think Germany is necessarily a special case compared with these countries. With the establishment of the AfD, Germany has, at least to some extent, become a normal case in Europe. Its situation is now very similar to that of other countries in the region.

Restoring Democratic Trust Requires More Than Economic Reform

Friedrich Merz
CDU Chairman Friedrich Merz speaks at a campaign event ahead of the North Rhine-Westphalia state election on May 15, 2022. Photo: Paul Ruesing | Dreamstime

And finally, Professor Lewandowsky, looking toward Germany’s next federal election and considering recent democratic developments in Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, and the United States, what would be required to reverse the AfD’s rise? Can socioeconomic reform, renewed political representation, and democratic engagement restore confidence in liberal democracy, or has Germany entered a more enduring phase of radical-right political realignment?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: I would say all of it, including the last option. All these aspects are interconnected. Trust in liberal democracy is, to some extent, linked to confidence in economic well-being. A paper by economists Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch, published in 2016, showed that, over the past hundred years, right-wing populist, extreme-right, or radical-right parties in democracies have mostly been successful under certain conditions of economic crisis. That is something we find here as well. The perception of an economic crisis, at least among some segments of the electorate, is associated with declining trust in democracy and government. So, I think these things are linked.

For the moment, the AfD has a certain momentum, especially after the elections in Saxony-Anhalt. In some eastern German states, the AfD is now polling at 40%. It has also scored more than 40% in the elections in Saxony-Anhalt. One crucial factor is that the other parties no longer see themselves as setting the agenda. Instead, they are essentially following—or chasing—the AfD.

What they need to try to do, although it is extremely difficult, is to address both grievances with liberal democracy and economic grievances through economic and social reforms that are also popular. I do not think Friedrich Merz is the person who can achieve that, nor do I think this government or coalition can do so. But Friedrich Merz believes that he does not need popular reforms. He believes he was elected as someone willing to do unpopular things that will eventually work out. However, as long as his policies remain unpopular, the AfD might gain votes. At this moment, I do not see that changing.

One last thing. What is crucial at this point—and something I have analyzed and argued in a paper coauthored with Anna-Lisa Neuenfeld for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, titled Parteien im Stresstest—is that political parties are at the center of saving democracy.

One aspect here is that the AfD has been able to establish a perception of itself as the representative of “the people.” It presents itself as a party that is present in certain areas, speaks a different language, comes from a different social background, and is able to offer social gatherings where other parties have failed to do so. This is especially important in certain areas of eastern Germany.

Representation through political parties is key to restoring faith in democracy because parties are the key players. At present, the AfD is the only party able, at least in the eyes of its electorate, to present itself as its representative—speaking in Hanna Fenichel Pitkin’s terms, symbolically, descriptively, and substantively. That is something the other parties might want to look at.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Professor Sead Turčalo.

Prof. Turčalo: Serbia’s Student Movement Showed That the Western Balkans Are Not Condemned to Tyranny and Ethnonationalism

In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Professor Sead Turčalo, Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Sarajevo, examines the contrasting implications of Serbia’s student-led democratic breakthrough and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s October 2026 elections. While Serbia’s Students’ List victory challenges entrenched authoritarianism, Bosnia’s results reveal the enduring resilience of ethnonational power-sharing. Professor Turčalo analyzes how Dayton’s institutional architecture reproduces ethnic divisions, how external patronage sustains Dodikism, and why democratic change in Belgrade could reshape regional politics. Emphasizing that Western Balkan societies are not condemned to tyranny and ethnonationalism, he advocates constitutional reform reconciling civic equality with collective cultural protections, offering a pathway from Dayton’s negative peace toward genuine constitutional democracy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Serbia’s October 25, 2026, parliamentary elections marked a historic political turning point in the Western Balkans. Emerging from nearly two years of protests following the November 2024 Novi Sad railway station tragedy, the student-led movement secured approximately 53% of the vote and 140 of 250 parliamentary seats, defeating Aleksandar Vučić’s political bloc. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s October 4 elections revealed the enduring resilience of ethnonational politics: Denis Bećirović secured reelection to the Presidency, HDZ BiH consolidated its dominance among Croat voters, and Milorad Dodik’s SNSD maintained its hegemonic position in Republika Srpska. 

While Serbia’s electoral breakthrough signaled the potential of civic mobilization to challenge entrenched political structures, Bosnia’s results demonstrated how electoral competition can reproduce rather than overcome ethnonational divisions. Together, these contrasting outcomes raise fundamental questions about whether civic mobilization, institutional accountability, and democratic pluralism can challenge authoritarianism and entrenched ethnonational power-sharing across the region.

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Sead Turčalo, Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Sarajevo, examines the implications of Serbia’s democratic breakthrough for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-Dayton political order. His research encompasses ethnonationalism, the far right, radicalization, historical revisionism, genocide denial, and the geopolitical pressures shaping the Western Balkans.

For Professor Turčalo, Serbia’s electoral transformation carries significance beyond its borders. “What it achieved in this election reminded the entire region that citizens in the Western Balkans are not culturally condemned to tyranny and ethnic nationalism,” he argues. “They want institutions that answer to the law rather than to a party boss.” He characterizes the Students’ List victory as a historic civic rupture, emphasizing its rejection of identity polarization in favor of the rule of law and institutional accountability.

Yet Professor Turčalo cautions against assuming that democratic change in Belgrade will automatically transform Bosnia’s political institutions. The October 4 elections exposed the enduring tension between electoral competition and deeply institutionalized ethnic politics. According to Professor Turčalo, Dayton’s consociational architecture continues to reproduce the very divisions it was designed to manage: “The system therefore does not merely reflect ethnic divisions; it actively reproduces them as a precondition for exercising state power in Bosnia.”

Serbia’s transition nevertheless offers an opportunity to reconsider the regional foundations of Dodikism. Professor Turčalo argues that ending Belgrade’s political, financial, and symbolic support for Milorad Dodik could fundamentally alter the balance between external patronage and domestic obstruction. However, entrenched nationalist networks and constitutional veto structures remain formidable obstacles.

Looking beyond immediate electoral developments, Professor Turčalo advocates “a sequenced, functionalist transition toward a hybrid model that reconciles individual civic equality with strictly bounded collective cultural protections.” His proposals include implementing European Court of Human Rights rulings, eliminating discriminatory electoral restrictions, narrowing ethnic veto powers, and strengthening judicial independence and EU conditionality.

In sum, Professor Turčalo sees Serbia’s democratic opening and Bosnia’s growing exhaustion with ethnonational partitocracy as potentially complementary forces for transformation—creating an opportunity to move “from Dayton’s negative peace toward a genuine constitutional democracy in our country.”

Here is our interview with Professor Sead Turčalo, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Bosnia’s Elections Stabilized Rather Than Weakened Ethnonationalism

Bosnia elections.
A voter casts a ballot against the backdrop of the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Photo: Oleg Kachura / Dreamstime.

Professor Turčalo, welcome, and thank you for joining us. Let me begin with the overall picture: The October 4 elections returned Denis Bećirović, strengthened HDZ BiH, and preserved SNSD’s dominance in Republika Srpska. Do these outcomes represent political change within ethnic blocs rather than a weakening of ethnonationalism? Does Dayton’s consociational architecture continue to prevent domination while reproducing the ethnic divisions that obstruct democratic consolidation?

Professor Sead Turčalo: Thank you once again, Selçuk, for inviting me. It’s really a pleasure to be with you. To interpret the October 4 results accurately, we have to start by distinguishing rotation within a segment from fragmentation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political system as a whole.

What we witnessed on October 4 was an asymmetrically distributed pluralization across three ethnic areas: fragmentation and competition primarily within the so-called Bosniak-majority electoral space, alongside the near-monopolistic consolidation of power within the Croat space under HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the preservation of SNSD’s hegemonic control in Republika Srpska.

That’s not a weakening of ethnonationalism. Rather, it’s the stabilization of a cartelized ethnoconsociational order that has existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina for almost 30 years, or at least 20 of those 30 years.

As we all know, Dayton was designed in 1995 as an instrument of conflict termination, not really as a democratic constitution. Its architecture rests on a permanent security dilemma and was intended to prevent any one constituent people from dominating the others. It sought to achieve this by institutionalizing veto points, entity voting, and parity mechanisms.

The real paradox is that the very mechanisms designed to prevent domination make ethnic insecurity the most profitable resource in politics. A party that wins in this system does so not by building cross-cutting civic coalitions, but by convincing its own ethnic electorate that rival blocs are preparing to strip it of its institutional safeguards and that only the most disciplined guardian of the ethnic veto can prevent that outcome.

The system therefore does not merely reflect ethnic divisions; it actively reproduces them as a precondition for exercising state power in Bosnia.

Institutions Shape Political Actors More Than Actors Reshape Institutions

Does Bećirović’s defeat of Bakir Izetbegović indicate a meaningful opening for civic politics, or does Bosnia’s institutional structure continue to force even nominally civic actors to operate within an ethnically defined electoral field?

Professor Sead Turčalo: The fact that Denis Bećirović was reelected, securing roughly 38% of the vote against Bakir Izetbegović’s 34%, with Samir Efendić receiving 25%, confirms that no single party owns the Bosniak presidential mandate by hereditary or historical right. That matters politically. Voters have demonstrated twice in a row, in 2022 and again in 2026, that they are willing to punish leadership fatigue and patronage at the top of the ballot.

But we should not confuse the defeat of an Izetbegović with a triumph of civic constitutionalism. Under the electoral rules, Bećirović ran, by constitutional definition, for the Bosniak seat on the Presidency, elected exclusively by voters in the Federation.

To prevail against both Izetbegović and a surging sovereigntist challenger like Efendić, a candidate from a social democratic party cannot campaign on a post-ethnic platform. He has to occupy the center of state patriotism, emphasize the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, match the rhetoric of national dignity, and reassure conservative and centrist voters that supporting the Social Democratic Party candidate will not weaken the Bosnian position vis-à-vis other political actors.

In other words, Bosnia’s electoral geography forces nominally civic actors to nationalize their discourse to remain competitive, while ethnonational parties appropriate state-building language to defend their own blocs. The institution shapes the actor far more than the actor reshapes the institution.

We have seen this over the past four years in the case of Denis Bećirović and the way he conducted his campaign. In this respect, his campaign no longer differed meaningfully from those of Izetbegović and Efendić.

Party Patronage Remains More Resilient Than Individual Political Leadership

Photo: Dreamstime.

Despite Izetbegović’s presidential defeat, the SDA performed strongly in the parliamentary elections. How do you explain this divergence between the electoral fortunes of individual political leaders and the continuing organizational resilience of ethnonational parties?

Professor Sead Turčalo: This divergence is one of the most revealing empirical facts of the 2026 election cycle. As you already pointed out, the SDA suffered a significant defeat in the presidential race but surged back to over 30% in the parliamentary elections.

The explanation lies in the difference between majoritarian presidential voting and the structural strength of party machinery. A presidential election is a personalized contest in which anti-incumbent sentiment or personal unpopularity can unite a broad, heterogeneous coalition of voters around a single challenger.

Parliamentary and cantonal elections operate according to an entirely different logic. What determines the outcome is party infrastructure on the ground: local municipal boards, veterans’ associations, various networks, public-sector employment ecosystems, and disciplined turnout operations across the ten cantons.

For the past four years, the Troika, formed around the SDP, NiP, and Naša stranka—three very different parties: one social democratic, another closer to the center-right of the political spectrum, and Naša stranka, a more liberal party—has governed the Federation under intense external pressure and internal constraints, often making concessions to HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina and SNSD at the state level.

Their voters interpreted these concessions as institutional retreats that failed to deliver the tangible socioeconomic and European integration benefits the Troika was seeking to achieve. The SDA used its time in opposition not to reform its leadership, which remained heavily personalized around Bakir Izetbegović, but to allow the governing coalition to absorb the costs of compromise while preserving its own grassroots base and ideological infrastructure.

Voters split their tickets—or, rather, the electorate fractured. A broader coalition rejected Izetbegović personally, while the SDA’s organizational machinery on the ground easily outmobilized a fragmented Troika in the proportional parliamentary elections.

That is precisely why we see this divergence between Izetbegović’s performance in the presidential race, and the SDA’s results in parliamentary elections at the cantonal and state levels.

When Ethnic Homogeneity Defines Legitimacy, Internal Pluralism Becomes Treason

Darijana Filipović’s victory for the Croat seat on the Presidency appears to strengthen HDZ BiH’s claim to “legitimate representation.” Does this outcome help resolve the longstanding dispute over Croat political representation, or further institutionalize the principle that democratic legitimacy must be ethnically authenticated?

Professor Sead Turčalo: First, we have to state clearly why Darijana Filipović won roughly 47% of the vote. Željko Komšić, the previous incumbent, was constitutionally barred from running after two consecutive terms. Once we remove the personal factor that determined the outcomes of the 2006, 2010, 2018, and 2022 races, the strong asymmetry between HDZ’s disciplined voter mobilization and the wider civic-left field becomes decisive.

Slaven Kovačević simply could not replicate Komšić’s personal voter base, and the Democratic Front lost half its parliamentary strength in the process.

Does this resolve the dispute over Croat representation? Tactically, it reduces tensions surrounding one specific grievance that HDZ BiH and Zagreb have internationalized for nearly 20 years. Strategically, however, it does not resolve the dispute; rather, it shifts the bargaining baseline.

For Dragan Čović and HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina, winning the Presidency seat under the existing rules does not mean those rules are now acceptable. It means they now control all the institutional levers: the Presidency, the veto mechanisms in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the State House of Peoples, and the critical financial ministries.

More importantly, the narrative surrounding Filipović’s victory reinforces a dangerous normative shift: the idea that democratic legitimacy in Bosnia is derived not from the individuals in power but from ethnic authentication certified by the dominant party of a constituent people.

When representation is considered legitimate only if it reflects pre-political ethnic homogeneity, pluralism within each group is treated as treason. That’s quite a dangerous normative shift.

Citizens who do not belong to the constituent peoples—the very citizens whose exclusion was addressed in the Sejdić–Finci case and subsequent European Court of Human Rights rulings—are erased from the constitutional conversation altogether. That is an additional consequence of the narrative surrounding Darijana Filipović’s victory.

Low Voter Turnout Strengthens the Clientelist Parties

With voter turnout at approximately 42%, should electoral abstention itself be interpreted as evidence of a deeper crisis of representation, reflecting citizens’ disillusionment not merely with political parties but with an institutional order that continues to structure political competition along ethnic lines?

Professor Sead Turčalo: Yes, and we need to consider two figures together: record-low official turnout, hovering around 40–43%, with turnout in the Federation’s parliamentary elections falling below 40%, and an invalid ballot rate of approximately 8%, if I remember correctly, in the parliamentary races.

When we combine these figures with an inflated voter register of 3.44 million people in a country whose resident population is substantially smaller due to sustained emigration, what emerges is a silent secession of the citizenry from the political process. Abstention on this scale is not political apathy in the classical sense. It is a rational judgment about the futility of the entire electoral process.

Consider what citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina have experienced over the last electoral cycle. Even when voters choose change, as many believed they did when the Troika replaced the SDA in executive power after 2022, or when new biometric technologies are introduced to prevent electoral fraud, as they were during this election cycle, the structural outcomes of the system barely change.

Because of the House of Peoples, vetoes, and entity voting, coalition formation after every election comes down to the same mathematical calculation: who will sit across the table from HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina and SNSD? When citizens realize that elections can change the faces representing the Bosniak or civic quota without changing the extractive logic of the system, they respond in one of two ways: they abstain from voting, or they vote with their feet by leaving for the European Union.

Low turnout is the lifeblood of clientelist parties because, as the number of independent voters decreases, the relative weight of dependent, patronage-bound voters increases. We have seen this again in the overwhelming victories of HDZ and SNSD, as well as in what happened to the Troika. As I already pointed out, the Bosniak-dominated political arena remains the only one in Bosnia and Herzegovina where voters are willing to replace the familiar political figures they have seen year after year.

Dodikism Has Become an Institutionalized System of Patronage and Control

Milorad Dodik.
Milorad Dodik greets supporters in Pale, Bosnia and Herzegovina, following a meeting and referendum on Republika Srpska’s National Day, September 25, 2016. Photo: Vladimir Stanisic / Dreamstime.

Željka Cvijanović’s reelection and SNSD’s continued dominance suggest that Dodikism retains considerable institutional strength. Has SNSD evolved beyond Milorad Dodik’s personalized leadership, or does it remain dependent on him? Could a future opposition victory in Republika Srpska produce genuine democratization if the new leadership remained committed to essentially the same Serb-nationalist project?

Professor Sead Turčalo: It remains personalized, with Dodik as its ultimate arbiter. Dodik still monopolizes strategic decision-making and external patronage links, but Dodikism has also become deeply institutionalized as a regime of resource distribution, media control, and administrative control across Republika Srpska. SNSD is not merely a charismatic movement. It is a deeply entrenched entity-level party apparatus that mediates access to public employment, municipal budgets, and public procurement.

As for the opposition in Republika Srpska, even when new coalitions, such as the Za pravdu i red movement, or SDS figures challenge SNSD over corruption and economic decline, we have to assess them in a particular way. In Bosnian Serb politics, opposition parties have consistently tried to outflank or match Dodik on questions of national sovereignty, historicism, and resistance to state-level institutions in Sarajevo to protect themselves against accusations of treason.

If an opposition coalition were to defeat SNSD solely by promising a cleaner, less corrupt defense of Republika Srpska’s autonomy, it might reduce patrimonial kleptocracy. That would be a step forward, but it would not produce genuine democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Democratization requires accepting the constitutional authority of state institutions and the rule of law across the entire territory, rather than merely managing an ethno-territorial system with better accounting, as the opposition in Republika Srpska promises. They cannot really win an election by competing solely on Milorad Dodik’s terrain and employing the same rhetoric he uses.

Three Forms of Ethno-Populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

At what point does ethnonationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina become populism? Is the defining mechanism the construction of an ethnically homogeneous “people” against corrupt elites, rival communities, Sarajevo’s institutions, or international actors, and how does this logic differ across Bosniak, Serb, and Croat political mobilizations?

Professor Sead Turčalo: Ethnonationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina definitely crosses into ethno-populism. What makes Bosnia and Herzegovina fascinating is how this mechanism operates through three distinct grammars of grievance across the three ethnic communities.

In Serb ethno-populism, particularly under SNSD, the authentic people are the Serbs of Republika Srpska, while the corrupt, illegitimate elite is identified with political Sarajevo, the Constitutional Court, the Office of the High Representative, and Western liberal interventionism, alongside domestic opposition parties portrayed as Western proxies. It’s a form of sovereigntist, anti-institutional populism designed to justify autonomy and secession.

When it comes to Croat ethno-populism, articulated by HDZ, the discourse is legalistic and defensive against majoritarianism. The people are the constituent Croat community, while the enemy is Bosniak majoritarianism and unitarianism, personified by civic parties and Sarajevo institutions that allegedly subvert the spirit of Dayton. By framing internal pluralism among Croats as a demographic threat, this discourse turns HDZ’s party monopoly into an existential shield.

On the Bosniak side, populism operates through a moral narrative of statehood. Among Bosniaks, the people are framed as the state-preserving majority and the primary victims of aggression and betrayal. They are pitted against both secessionist enemies and domestic traitors who trade away state sovereignty for ministerial seats, while selective international interventions are portrayed as double standards directed against the Muslim-majority Bosniak population.

In all three cases, the populist move performs the same function: it depoliticizes socioeconomic issues and state capture by turning every policy dispute into an existential question concerning the collective survival of one of the ethnic groups.

Radicalization Begins in Parliamentary Institutions, Not Only among Fringe Groups

The flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina waves in front of the country's Parliament in Sarajevo.
The flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina waves in front of the country’s Parliament in Sarajevo, a city scarred by war and the center of the nation’s political life. Photo: Jerome Cid / Dreamstime.

Your research demonstrates how Bosnia’s fragmented institutions and competing political priorities undermine coherent responses to radicalization. Can the same institutional fragmentation normalize more routine forms of ethnonational polarization, gradually shifting the boundaries of acceptable political discourse before explicitly extremist positions emerge?

Professor Sead Turčalo: Absolutely. In security studies, we make the mistake of examining radicalization only at the tail end of the continuum, when an individual or a fringe group crosses into violent extremism. But radicalization does not happen in a vacuum. It occurs in an ecosystem where the baseline temperature of the political system is constantly elevated by institutional fragmentation.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have fragmented security agencies and 14 ministries of education across the cantons and entities that teach mutually exclusive historical narratives. We also have the phenomenon of two schools under one roof, which is the most visible physical manifestation of this separation of pupils.

We also have a fragmented media market. When the institutional architecture rewards politicians for portraying neighboring communities as ontological threats, what would be considered radical or extremist hate speech in a consolidated democracy becomes ordinary parliamentary rhetoric here.

The mechanism is cumulative. Each unpunished rhetorical breach or institutional provocation tests the system’s threshold for reaction. When there are no sanctions—and we haven’t witnessed any sanctions for this kind of political speech here because the prosecutor’s office is politically constrained or veto mechanisms block institutional responses—the exception becomes the norm.

Mainstream parties do the ideological heavy lifting of polarizing society, demonizing the other, as we witness daily with Milorad Dodik, and delegitimizing shared state institutions. Fringe extremist groups do not need to invent a worldview. They simply take the premises already validated by mainstream ministers, mayors, public figures, and public broadcasters and draw their literal, physical conclusions.

What we really have to focus on when discussing radicalization is the radicalization that occurs within parliamentary institutions and during political leaders’ press conferences, rather than looking only at fringe groups, as we have done in the past.

Parliamentary Ethnonational Parties Provide Institutional Shelter for the Far Right

In your research with Hikmet Karčić, you emphasize the relationship between far-right politics, historical revisionism, and genocide denial. Following the October elections, where should the analytical boundary be drawn between mainstream ethnonationalism and the far right, particularly when exclusionary narratives become embedded in established political parties?

Professor Sead Turčalo: To draw a comparison with Western Europe, for example, we used to track how cordon sanitaire arrangements broke down as center-right parties adopted far-right talking points on migration and identity. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in the wider Western Balkans region, the trajectory was reversed. Narratives of ethnic cleansing, historical revisionism, and biological-territorial purity emerged at the center of state-building projects in the 1990s and never left the mainstream.

When an established governing party systematically denies the established facts of the Srebrenica genocide, as we have witnessed among parties in Republika Srpska, funds revisionists through, for example, independent commissions established to rewrite the history of the 1992–1995 war, or rejects the liberal democratic principle that all citizens have equal rights regardless of ethnic origin, we cannot call that moderate conservatism simply because the party sits in Parliament and is received in Brussels.

The boundary is no longer organizational, separating street movements such as Srpska akcija or the Chetnik Ravna Gora movement on one side from parliamentary parties in Republika Srpska, primarily SNSD, on the other.

Rather, the boundary is functional. Parliamentary ethnonational parties provide institutional shelter or a megaphone for the far right, while extra-parliamentary far-right groups serve as their street-level auxiliaries or transnational networking arms. That is how this relationship has operated in Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout the years.

Mainstream Glorification of War Criminals Threatens Democratic Stability

Ratko Mladić.
Ratko Mladić is depicted on a Serbian flag during a political rally in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 29, 2011. Mladić is a former Bosnian Serb military leader. Photo: Dreamstime.

The commemoration of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić by political actors across the Bosnian Serb spectrum illustrates how historical revisionism and the glorification of war criminals extend beyond explicitly extremist organizations. Does the normalization of such narratives within mainstream politics make them more consequential for democratic stability than openly extremist movements?

Professor Sead Turčalo: Without question, mainstream normalization is far more dangerous to democratic stability than the activities of marginal extremist groups. An openly neo-fascist or fringe parliamentary group can be monitored by intelligence services, sanctioned, or socially isolated. But when the glorification of convicted war criminals, such as Ratko Mladić or Radovan Karadžić—and Ratko Mladić is a particularly relevant case, since we witnessed this just a month ago when he passed away—is practiced by mayors, members of parliament, university professors, and opposition leaders across the Bosnian Serb political spectrum, it ceases to be a subculture. It becomes a form of official civic pedagogy.

In our research, we call this the eleventh stage of genocide: not denial, which involves the defensive claim that a crime did not happen or was exaggerated, but triumphalism—the active celebration of perpetrators and the moral inversion through which genocide is recast as a heroic act of national liberation or preventive self-defense.

And what are the consequences for democracy?

When you socialize a new generation—children born 15 or 20 years after 1995—into believing that mass atrocity was a legitimate and necessary instrument for creating the political entity of Republika Srpska, where they live today, you destroy the normative foundation of democratic coexistence.

You create a moral framework in which any future violence against the out-group, against Bosniaks, is pre-justified as a defense of their ancestors’ legacy, while legal accountability, even after the 2021 Criminal Code amendments prohibiting genocide denial, is itself defined as an attack on national identity.

Anti-Bosniak Nationalism Has Become an Export Product for the Global Far Right

When anti-Bosniak discourse portrays Muslims as demographic, civilizational, or security threats, should it be understood primarily through the frameworks of ethnonationalism, Islamophobia, racism, or a distinctively Balkan form of far-right politics? What are the implications of these competing conceptualizations for understanding radicalization?

Professor Sead Turčalo: We should not treat those frameworks as mutually exclusive categories. What makes contemporary anti-Bosniak discourse so potent is precisely its synthesis of local nationalism, transnational Islamophobia, and cultural racism into a strategic export product.

Historically, anti-Bosniak ideology was rooted in 19th- and 20th-century ethnonationalist mythology that racialized Slavic Muslims as Ottoman remnants or renegades from Christian Europe. Over the last decade, we have seen this again, including in September of this year, when Milorad Dodik traveled to Jerusalem and invoked alleged terrorist threats. Similarly, years earlier, Dragan Čović and Zagreb portrayed a civic Bosnia as an Islamic state. Local ethnonationalist actors realized that purely parochial Balkan arguments no longer resonated in Western capitals.

They therefore repackaged their constitutional and territorial ambitions in the language of global counterterrorism, demographic replacement, and civilizational securitization. By portraying Bosniaks not as a European constituent people demanding equal citizenship but as a latent Islamist security threat on Europe’s borders, they connect directly with the ideological networks of the European and American radical right, from Viktor Orbán to conservative think tanks in Washington that support the MAGA movement, such as the Heritage Foundation.

And remember, this ideological exchange operates in both directions. Figures associated with the global far right, as we have seen with Anders Breivik and Brenton Tarrant, the Christchurch terrorist in New Zealand, explicitly drew inspiration from Bosnian Serb wartime mythology as a template for defending Christian Europe.

When local elites here in Bosnia securitize Bosnian Muslims to gain diplomatic access abroad, they simultaneously feed global white supremacist radicalization and generate real grievances and narratives at home. This approach became particularly intense in the two years following the global surge of the radical right and Donald Trump’s electoral victory in the United States.

Democratic Change in Belgrade Could Fundamentally Weaken Dodikism

Serbia student protests.
Students and citizens protest against government corruption in Zrenjanin, Serbia, on January 25, 2026, demanding justice and accountability for the 16 victims of the tragic railway station canopy collapse in Novi Sad. Photo: Dreamstime.

You have characterized Bosnia and the Western Balkans as arenas of competing European, Russian, Chinese, and Turkish influence. To what extent has SNSD’s political resilience depended on external support, particularly from Russia and Serbia, and could democratic political change in Belgrade alter the regional balance between external influence and domestic institutional constraints?

Professor Sead Turčalo: The external actors you mentioned do not create Bosnia’s internal fractures, but they dramatically alter the expected costs of exploiting them. My argument has long been that Bosnia’s borders are better protected than the state’s ability to enforce decisions within them. Geopolitical competition matters most when it lowers the cost of domestic obstruction.

SNSD’s resilience has relied on a multivector external shield. Russia plays the role of a low-cost spoiler. Moscow lacks the geographic reach to offer Banja Luka a credible military guarantee, but at minimal financial cost, it provides diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council, energy leverage, and geopolitical validation.

Hungary, under Orbán, added a crucial new layer within the EU and NATO. Now, fortunately, Orbán has lost power. Hungary had even stepped in with financial lifelines and threatened to veto European sanctions. The opposition’s victory in Hungary has been a positive development in this particular case.

Meanwhile, in October 2025, we saw Dodik, some of his family members, and his political party associates removed from the OFAC sanctions list in Washington following intensive lobbying. We also witnessed divisions within the Peace Implementation Council after Christian Schmidt’s resignation in May 2026. This inconsistent Western conditionality taught domestic challengers that crisis bargaining and transactional access could secure relief without structural compliance.

Serbia, however, has always been the indispensable material, logistical, and symbolic anchor for Banja Luka because of geographic proximity, economic interdependence, and the doctrine of the Serbian World, codified in the June 2024 All-Serb Assembly Declaration. Belgrade has served as Dodik’s strategic backer.

Therefore, a genuine democratic transition following Vučić’s electoral defeat in Belgrade would represent the single most consequential shift in the regional balance of power—not because it would automatically rewrite Dayton, but because it would deprive SNSD’s strategy of autonomy without secession of its primary regional guarantor and its financial and political hinterland in Serbia.

The student protests in Serbia might therefore have an effect on Bosnian politics that we could even describe as tectonic, provided the new government decides to stop supporting Dodik and no longer serves as his strategic backer, as Vučić has done over the past 14 years.

Serbia’s Students Rejected Identity Polarization in Favor of the Rule of Law

Following the Students’ List victory in Serbia’s October 25 elections, could the movement’s emphasis on civic inclusion and political pluralism fundamentally reshape relations between the Serbian majority and Bosniak and Albanian minorities, particularly in Sandžak and the Preševo Valley? What institutional reforms would be necessary to translate this democratic opening into meaningful minority representation and protection?

Professor Sead Turčalo: Once again, I have to emphasize that the victory of the Students’ List represents a historic civic rupture in Serbia, the biggest since October 5, 2000, when a movement removed Slobodan Milošević from power. The Students’ List emerged from the moral and institutional outrage following the November 2024 Novi Sad railway station canopy collapse. The movement succeeded precisely because it refused to engage in identity polarization, centering its campaign instead on the rule of law, institutional accountability, and the principle that the state belongs to its citizens rather than a ruling party.

We witnessed powerful moments during the student marches and blockades, particularly when students from Novi Pazar, their Bosniak fellow students, came together under the slogan “Our Serbia.”

However, translating the moral solidarity of a protest movement into structural minority inclusion in Sandžak and the Preševo Valley requires moving beyond an anti-corruption consensus toward substantive institutional reform.

Under Vučić’s party, the SNS regime, minority politics was managed through the clientelist co-optation of favored local brokers, alongside structural neglect and the administrative passivization of voter registrations and residential addresses, particularly affecting Albanians in the Preševo Valley.

For the new government in Belgrade to fundamentally reshape majority-minority relations in Serbia, several essential reforms would be required. First, it needs to immediately end and reverse the administrative passivization of residential addresses in the Preševo Valley, which has functioned as a form of bureaucratic disenfranchisement of ethnic Albanians.

It also needs to decentralize public investment and depoliticize minority councils so that infrastructure, healthcare, and, for example, universities in Sandžak and southern Serbia are guaranteed through transparent fiscal formulas rather than through transactional loyalty to Belgrade’s ruling coalition, as was the case over the past 14 years.

I would also argue that breaking with security-oriented policies and judicial double standards, while ensuring proportional representation of Bosniaks and Albanians in the local judiciary, police, and state administration, is an essential step toward transforming majority-minority relations in Serbia.

If the Students’ List is able to achieve this, it will certainly create a Serbia that is more inclusive of its minorities and is perceived more positively by its neighbors than Serbia under Aleksandar Vučić.

The Real Test for Serbia’s New Government Is Its Relationship with Sarajevo

Vučić’s political alliance with Milorad Dodik reinforced a broader pattern of cross-border Serb ethnonationalism. Could Serbia’s student-led democratic transition weaken the political and ideological foundations of Dodikism in Republika Srpska, encouraging greater cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s state institutions? Or might entrenched nationalist networks and competing claims of Serb sovereignty limit the regional consequences of political change in Belgrade?

Professor Sead Turčalo: I expect we will see both effects simultaneously: an immediate disruption of the personal patronage links between Belgrade and Banja Luka, alongside continued structural resistance from entrenched nationalist networks. On the one hand, the Students’ List will disrupt the relationship Vučić built on a personal level. On the other hand, in attempting to do so, it will certainly face structural resistance from nationalist networks on both sides of the Drina River. Remember that, during the Serbian election campaign in October, the regimes in Banja Luka and Belgrade had already spent years reinforcing each other’s media propaganda and bringing voters by bus from Republika Srpska to Serbia to vote for Vučić’s party.

For the Students’ List parliamentary majority in Belgrade, Dodik is not a national guardian. Much of Serbia’s civic movement perceives him as a symbol of the very corrupt, authoritarian party-state system they fought for two years to overthrow. This means that the automatic political, media, and financial support Belgrade provided to SNSD has been disrupted.

At the same time, we must be realistic about the limits of the Students’ List’s ideological consensus. To win almost 54% of the vote against Vučić’s party, the students deliberately set aside divisive geopolitical and regional questions, including Kosovo, sanctions on Russia, and the status of Republika Srpska.

Serbia’s deep state—its intelligence services, the Serbian Orthodox Church, nationalist circles, and parts of the security apparatus—did not disappear on the night of October 25 or in the two weeks that followed. In the short term, these networks may even attempt to position Banja Luka as the last bastion of authentic Serbian nationalism against a civic-liberal Belgrade, leaning more heavily on Moscow.

But the real test for the new government in Belgrade will be whether it conducts relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina strictly through institutional channels in Sarajevo, ending the practice of quasi-state summits that treated Republika Srpska as a sovereign extension of Serbia. That will be the first decisive step for the Students’ List: how it approaches institutional, state-to-state relations between Belgrade and Sarajevo.

Serbia’s Democratic Transition Opens a Window for Change in Bosnia

Students and citizens protest against corruption and the Serbian government in Novi Sad, Serbia, on February 1, 2025.
Students and citizens protest against corruption and the Serbian government in Novi Sad, Serbia, on February 1, 2025. Photo: Srdjan Randjelovic / Dreamstime.

Could Serbia’s democratic breakthrough alter the relationship between Republika Srpska, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the central state by reducing external support for ethnonational confrontation? Might this create opportunities for constitutional reform and cross-ethnic cooperation, or will Dayton’s entrenched veto structures, competing conceptions of sovereignty, and persistent nationalist polarization continue to constrain democratic integration?

Professor Sead Turčalo: Certainly, a democratic, rule-of-law-oriented Belgrade changes the regional climate, and in conflict management, climate matters. When Belgrade stops acting as an amplifier of secessionist threats, the artificially manufactured atmosphere of crisis that fuels reciprocal ethnonationalism within Bosnia and Herzegovina loses one of its main drivers. This deprives SNSD of the credible threat of regional escalation while simultaneously depriving other ethnonationalists of the permanent emergency narrative they use to discipline their own voters.

Yet a favorable regional climate does not automatically dismantle domestic institutional vetoes. As we discussed at the beginning of this interview, the October 4 vote produced a parliamentary balance in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which SNSD and HDZ still hold decisive levers in the House of Peoples and can exercise control over the political system. These veto structures are self-reinforcing because they protect the material interests and legal immunity of domestic political cartels. That is not something that changes simply because of a political transition in Belgrade.

Even without Belgrade’s encouragement, political elites in Banja Luka and Mostar have powerful domestic incentives to engage in ethnically driven obstruction because a functional, independent state judiciary and transparent, EU-aligned public procurement threaten their economic survival. Belgrade’s transition therefore opens a window of opportunity by reducing external geopolitical pressure. But taking advantage of that opportunity still requires breaking the domestic impunity of Bosnia’s veto players.

The Western Balkans Are Not Condemned to Tyranny and Ethnonationalism

And finally, Professor Sead Turčalo, thirty-one years after Dayton, do Bosnia’s election results and Serbia’s emerging democratic transition suggest that the region has an opportunity to move beyond entrenched ethnonational power-sharing? Should Bosnia pursue further refinement of its consociational institutions, a gradual transition toward a more civic constitutional order, or an alternative framework reconciling individual citizenship with collective national protections?

Professor Sead Turčalo: Good question. Thirty-one years after Dayton, the central lesson is that we cannot transform a rigid ethnic consociation into a functional democracy simply by adding more ethnic locks to the door. Every attempt over the past three decades to refine constitutionalism through further territorialization or legitimate representation, as demanded by HDZ, has only enabled state capture and disenfranchised citizens who refuse to be herded into three ethnic camps.

Equally, we have to be realistic as political scientists. A sudden, maximalist leap toward a purely civic model cannot be imposed without triggering severe conflict dynamics, because 30 years of institutional socialization have entrenched deep collective fears that cannot easily be removed. These collective fears provide parties with an easy way to mobilize their ethnic groups. But the path forward has to involve a sequenced, functionalist transition toward a hybrid model that reconciles individual civic equality with strictly bounded collective cultural protections.

When we consider what that would look like in practice, the first step must be to implement the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. There are many of them: Sejdić–Finci, Zornić, Pilav, Šlaku, and so on. Implementing these rulings would allow us to remove ethnic and residency-based restrictions on eligibility for the state Presidency and the House of Peoples, so that every citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina can run for and vote for any office, regardless of ethnicity or place of residence.

To achieve this goal of a functional state, we also have to narrow and clearly define the scope of the vital national interest, which is currently invoked in almost any imaginable situation. Everything is defined as a vital national interest.

Collective protections should exist in such a system, but they must be restricted to genuine questions of identity, such as language, culture, religion, and heritage. They should also be subject to strict constitutional review rather than serving as a general-purpose blockade on budgets, energy interconnectors, European integration laws, and judicial appointments. As we are a candidate for membership in the European Union, we should anchor domestic reform in credible external conditionality.

Just take the example of Serbia’s student movement. What it achieved in this election reminded the entire region that citizens in the Western Balkans are not culturally condemned to tyranny and ethnic nationalism. They want institutions that answer to the law rather than to a party boss.

And the European Union, first and foremost, alongside other actors such as the United States—I hope that after Trump leaves the White House, transatlantic relations will change for the better—should align their instruments to target the financial channels of obstructionist political actors rather than rewarding them with transactional compromises.

Then the combination of Serbia’s democratic opening and Bosnia’s own civic exhaustion with partitocracy can finally become the starting point for moving from Dayton’s negative peace toward a genuine constitutional democracy in our country.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević.

Prof. Vladisavljević: Serbia’s Student Movement Represents Democratic Renewal, Not Another Wave of Populism

In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević of the University of Belgrade examines Serbia’s student-led electoral breakthrough and its implications for populism, competitive authoritarianism, and democratic renewal. Following the October 25, 2026, defeat of Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling coalition, Professor Vladisavljević argues that the Students’ List represents an inclusive democratic movement rather than another manifestation of anti-establishment populism. Highlighting the movement’s commitment to political pluralism, minority inclusion, and the rule of law, he contrasts its grassroots mobilization with Vučić’s personalized authoritarianism, clientelism, and media manipulation. Yet he cautions that electoral victory alone cannot guarantee democratic consolidation. Serbia’s enduring challenge is translating popular resistance into accountable institutions, independent journalism, and sustainable democratic governance.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Serbia stands at a historic crossroads. Nearly two years of student-led protests, sparked by the November 2024 Novi Sad railway-station tragedy, culminated in the October 25, 2026, electoral defeat of Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling coalition. Yet the transition from authoritarian rule to democratic consolidation remains uncertain. Beyond the electoral breakthrough lies a fundamental question: Does Serbia’s student-led movement represent another manifestation of anti-establishment populism, or does it offer a genuinely inclusive alternative to personalized authoritarian rule?

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević, who teaches comparative and Serbian politics at the University of Belgrade and is a former President of the Serbian Political Science Association, examines the relationship between populism, authoritarianism, popular resistance, and democratic renewal. His research encompasses democratization, social movements, nationalism, ethnic conflict, and political communication.

Challenging interpretations that equate popular mobilization with populism, Professor Vladisavljević argues that Serbia’s student movement is fundamentally different from the exclusionary politics associated with Vučić’s personalized rule. “I wouldn’t describe this as an anti-establishment mobilization. The target was Vučić’s authoritarian, personalist rule,” he explains. Rather than rejecting democratic institutions, the movement seeks their restoration through political pluralism, institutional accountability, and the rule of law.

Professor Vladisavljević emphasizes that the movement’s organizational foundations distinguish it from conventional populist mobilization. Unlike Serbia’s democratic breakthrough in October 2000, when political parties dominated the opposition, the recent transformation placed students, universities, and their broader social allies at the center of political resistance. Its explicit goals, he explains, are “democratic renewal and the protection of political pluralism.”

The interview also examines how Vučić’s populist appeals gradually gave way to entrenched clientelism, media manipulation, and institutional abuse. Reflecting on the regime’s declining capacity to mobilize supporters voluntarily, Professor Vladisavljević concludes: “That tells you a great deal about how thin these populist appeals were throughout.”

Equally significant is the movement’s inclusive approach toward Serbia’s national minorities. Cooperation between Serbian and Bosniak students, particularly across Belgrade and Novi Pazar, has opened possibilities for bottom-up democratic integration, challenging longstanding patterns of ethnonational division.

Nevertheless, Professor Vladisavljević cautions that defeating authoritarianism does not automatically guarantee democratic consolidation. The Students’ List must transform its horizontal, deliberative movement into functioning representative institutions while safeguarding independent journalism, reforming the security sector, and dismantling corruption. As he warns, “short-term efforts obviously won’t be sufficient.”

Ultimately, Serbia’s experience raises broader questions for democratic movements confronting competitive authoritarianism elsewhere: whether inclusive civic mobilization can overcome personalized rule without reproducing its exclusionary logic, and whether electoral victory can become the foundation of lasting democratic transformation.

Here is our interview with Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Serbia’s Student-Led Victory Marks the Beginning of Democratic Renewal

Students and demonstrators gather at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 23, 2026.
Students and demonstrators gather at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 23, 2026, for the “You and I, Slavija” protest, calling for early parliamentary elections. Photo: Dejan Krsmanovic / Dreamstime.

Professor Vladisavljević, thank you for joining us. You have compared the Students’ List victory to October 5, 2000, describing it as a turning point in Serbian history. What makes this electoral breakthrough different from the overthrow of Milošević, and what obstacles could prevent it from producing lasting democratic consolidation?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: I think this was more than an electoral breakthrough. It was the culmination of nearly two years of massive protests and popular mobilization against corruption and authoritarian rule. In terms of the outcome, it was not just another change of government, but actually the end of authoritarian rule and the beginning of democratic renewal. So, in a way, the outcome is comparable to what happened in Hungary just a few months ago.

If you compare the two events, in 2000 and more recently, you see that the opposition coalitions were very broad, encompassing not only political but also social actors. However, 26 years ago, political parties formed the core of the opposition, while other actors remained on the margins. This time, political parties were on the margins, while the student movement and its various allies were at the center. So, that’s quite different from what we had before, and in comparative terms, it represents something of a novelty.

The key unknown now is how this leaderless, horizontally organized student movement and its allies, built on deliberation and inclusion, will make the transition to and adapt to political institutions, particularly those of representative democracy. They’re now entering Parliament and will have to form a government and govern. So, it remains to be seen how this will work out.

Students Seek Legal Accountability, Not Revolutionary Justice

In your November 3 RTS interview, you argued that corruption had become a governing practice under Vučić and questioned his controversial last-minute presidential pardons. How can Serbia dismantle entrenched networks of corruption while ensuring that accountability does not turn into politically motivated retaliation?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: That’s a significant challenge because this regime was not simply authoritarian in the sense that it held competitive but not free and fair elections, allowed independent media to exist while systematically undermining media freedoms, and abused public institutions and resources to its own advantage and against the opposition. It was also a deeply corrupt, clientelist regime.

I think there is no danger of revolutionary justice here. If you look at the range of demands put forward by the student movement and its allies, you see that they aim to root out corruption in the short term while building the rule of law in the long term.

The focus is on using legal means to fight corruption, and we’ve seen this in the last few days, as professionals within institutions that previously failed to address corruption have actually begun to do so. The prosecutorial service, the central bank, and other institutions have suddenly started functioning.

This is unfolding through the legal process, so nobody is actually demanding any kind of revolutionary justice. They simply demand that these institutions start operating and do their part to root out clientelism and corruption.

Vučić’s Authoritarianism Rested on Informal Rule

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participates in an SNS political campaign at Hall Čair in Niš, Serbia, on March 30, 2022. Photo: Radule Perisic.

You have emphasized the need to reform Serbia’s police and security services, which you argue were subordinated to partisan interests. Can these institutions be democratized through leadership changes alone, or does the transition require a more fundamental restructuring of civil-military and security-sector relations?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: Leadership change in the security sector is essential because most top officials were loyal followers of Vučić and his ruling party. Obviously, there were quite a few professionals, and there still are, but they had been marginalized for many years. So, changing leadership is the first step, but reforms need to be pursued more broadly.

In Serbia’s case, the problem lies not so much in the institutional setup of the security sector or political institutions more generally. If you look at the key institutions, they resemble those in the West. The point is that Vučić’s regime, just like Milošević’s in the late 1990s, was based on informal rule, which essentially means the selective application of the law. So, what you need to do is ensure that all institutional actors stay within the law and operate on its basis.

That’s why I think the demands of the student movement and the victory it brought have raised expectations among professionals within these institutions, which have suddenly started functioning. There are quite a few professionals within the civil service, judiciary, local government, and public sector as a whole who were simply sidelined. They routinely dealt with minor cases, while all controversial cases were handled by officials loyal to Vučić. So, this change now opens things up.

Again, the question is whether the Students’ List will have the capacity to pursue those goals in the long term, because short-term efforts obviously won’t be sufficient.

Vučić’s Regime Relied More on Media Manipulation than Political Repression

Your research highlights the relationship between media pluralism, political competition, and democratic quality. Following the reported changes at RTS, what reforms are essential to dismantle partisan media control and restore independent journalism without replacing one form of political influence with another?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: Vučić’s regime relied principally on media manipulation and sophisticated spin rather than repression. There was some repression, but it was more selective, targeting key opponents. The focus was on the media, including major electronic media outlets, the public broadcaster, other national television networks, and a range of cable networks targeting different audiences supportive of the regime. Despite all this, there was still considerable space for independent media, although admittedly limited to low-circulation daily and weekly newspapers, cable television networks with restricted reach—accessible to about 30% of the population—and specialized investigative journalism outlets.

Overall, there was quite a lot of high-quality journalism, even under authoritarian rule. The challenge now is to move this high-quality journalism from the margins to the very center of the media landscape, particularly to the public broadcaster and national commercial television networks.

The experience from the Milošević period suggests that those working at the public broadcaster tend to shift their support quickly from one ruling party to another, so there is some danger of that happening again. However, it seems to me that the two-year struggle against the regime helped most people who supported the Students’ List realize how important independent journalism is, because it was part of that struggle. Such massive popular mobilization over the last two years would have been impossible without independent journalism. In a way, the movement and independent journalists protected each other. That is why many people now recognize the importance of independent journalism and will demand it.

The question, again, is whether the Students’ List will have the capacity to achieve this in the long term, because the transformation will take time. It involves not only the public broadcaster but also other commercial television networks with national coverage and a range of cable channels that the regime developed and funded from the public purse. So, there is quite a lot of work to do.

Student Revolution Was the Culmination of a Decade of Popular Resistance

Serbia protest.
Serbian students and citizens protest against government corruption following the Novi Sad railway station accident, at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on December 22, 2024. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic / Dreamstime.

The Novi Sad railway-station tragedy triggered nearly two years of student-led protests that ultimately challenged Vučić’s political dominance. What explains the movement’s success where previous opposition parties and protest campaigns had failed? Was its decisive advantage organizational innovation, moral legitimacy, or the regime’s declining capacity to maintain public consent?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: Obviously, no single factor can explain the movement’s success. I think what really matters is examining the broad mobilization over the last two years. The election campaign and victory were the culmination of this sustained resistance.

You have to understand this popular mobilization as the culmination of previous waves of massive protests over the last decade or so. There were several waves of mobilization in 2018–19, including six months of weekly protests in Belgrade and other cities. Then, in 2023, following the mass murders, there was a similar wave of mobilization. This was followed by a large, more decentralized campaign against lithium extraction across Serbia.

So, in a way, this was just the tip of the iceberg. There were already mobilized constituencies, not only in urban areas but also across the country, as the campaign against lithium extraction had extended into rural areas. The Novi Sad tragedy in November 2024, in which 16 people were killed, was therefore a trigger. It was not simply an accident; it was an accident caused by corruption. The tragedy revived these existing energies.

Now, why was this mobilization broader and more massive than previous protests? One important reason was the involvement of students. Interestingly, Serbia has a tradition of student protests, dating back to 1968 and continuing throughout the 1990s against Milošević. Student mobilization was part of the broader opposition movement during that period, but after 2000, students were no longer involved in politics.

Their renewed involvement was therefore an additional factor. Previously, popular mobilization had been led by opposition parties. This time, several factors came together. As students expanded the mobilization further, their popularity weakened both the regime’s capacity to respond and its public support. So, the movement’s success resulted from a combination of factors coming together at that particular moment.

Students Turned Popular Resistance into Electoral Power

In your research on competitive authoritarianism and popular protest, you emphasize how mobilization can transform political institutions and opposition capacities. How did Serbia’s decentralized student movement convert sustained street protests into an electoral majority, and what does this reveal about the relationship between contentious politics and electoral competition?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: If you look at the mobilization over the last two years, as well as previous waves of mobilization, there has always been an interaction between institutional politics and popular politics outside formal institutions, with spillover from one to the other.

Even during this mobilization, there were such spillovers. People were protesting in the streets, while the opposition was advancing their demands within institutions, including Parliament, local government, and the like. As I mentioned earlier, the election campaign was just the tip of the iceberg of this broad mobilization.

All the key actors—the student movement, organizations, local participant assemblies, and self-organized groups, supported by the logistical resources of opposition parties and civil society organizations—simply shifted their tactics from contentious politics to electoral campaigning.

This transition was not particularly difficult because the students had already shifted their demands. Initially, they demanded accountability from those blamed for the tragedy in Novi Sad. But the government did not respond; it ignored their demands. So, about a year and a half ago, the students began demanding early parliamentary elections.

In a way, everyone expected that elections would eventually take place, and they had been preparing for them through logistical arrangements, training, and other activities. So, the transition was not sudden; everyone had been preparing for it. I think this illustrates a broader point: contentious politics should never be studied separately from institutional politics because the two are closely intertwined.

Opposition Parties Cannot Safeguard Elections Alone

Reports of extensive citizen-led election monitoring suggest that civil society played an important role in protecting the electoral process. Does Serbia demonstrate that defeating competitive authoritarianism requires citizens not merely to mobilize voters but also to compensate for the failures of captured electoral institutions?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: In competitive authoritarian regimes, the political playing field is obviously skewed. This affects not only elections but also involves the ruling party’s abuse of public institutions and resources to its own advantage and against its opponents.

In this context, it is not always easy for opposition parties to mobilize enough well-organized activists to staff polling stations and arrange election monitoring to prevent electoral manipulation, including vote buying. Opposition parties cannot do this on their own; they need others to help. Civil society organizations often provide that support, but these efforts become even more effective when they involve a much broader range of people, including self-organized citizens. In Serbia’s case, this included the student movement and local participant assemblies.

Serbia has never had so many people trained to staff polling stations and monitor elections. There were even mobile groups tasked with protecting polling station personnel and election monitors from regime thugs. Drawing on experiences from local elections, when thugs were used to target these individuals, organizers had to anticipate and address such threats. I think this offers an important lesson for opposition movements in other authoritarian regimes: involve as broad a range of citizens as possible.

Competitive Authoritarian Regimes Unintentionally Create Opportunities for Their Own Defeat

Serbia student protests.
Students and citizens protest against government corruption in Zrenjanin, Serbia, on January 25, 2026, demanding justice and accountability for the 16 victims of the tragic railway station canopy collapse in Novi Sad. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your scholarship argues that competitive authoritarian regimes create institutional opportunities for opposition mobilization even while restricting democratic freedoms. Did Vučić’s electoral defeat expose this inherent vulnerability, or does Serbia represent an exceptional convergence of mass protest, opposition coordination, and declining regime legitimacy?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: This is an interesting issue. I have studied competitive authoritarian regimes in the Balkans during the 1990s, particularly Milošević’s regime, examining how it responded to protests and how protests emerged and developed under competitive authoritarianism.

I concluded that this sort of context, in a way, unintentionally facilitates popular protests. Under competitive authoritarianism, government opponents have legal opportunities to organize and challenge the government, both within and outside institutions. Elections are not free and fair, but they are competitive, and people participate in them. At the same time, opposition actors are systematically suppressed and restricted in their activities. This context creates grievances through the systematic violation of media freedoms and the abuse of public resources against opponents.

So, there is a combustible mix. You have genuine legal opportunities to organize and space for political organization, even though the system is not democratic. At the same time, opposition actors are systematically suppressed in one way or another, creating additional grievances. You also have rapid spillovers between institutional and contentious politics, which often unfold in parallel and create political crises.

What’s particularly interesting is that this permissive context also facilitates nonviolence among protesters, which is useful for democratization. Protests can have immediate consequences, such as regime crises, but they also have long-term effects—what I call constitutive consequences. This means that protests shape the identities, interests, and capacities of both authoritarian elites and opposition forces.

It’s a complex and very interesting process. In Serbia’s case, this permissive context provided space for the opposition to organize and operate, but that’s only part of the story. Another important question is how these opportunities are taken up and by whom, because in some cases, there simply aren’t many actors capable of doing so.

Serbia also has a tradition of popular mobilization. I mentioned the waves of protest over the last decade, but these actually build on the protests against Milošević in the 1990s. So, what we see today is very much what we saw under Milošević in the 1990s. That tradition helps explain the current developments.

Vučić’s Defeat Exposes the Limits of Populism in Sustaining Personalist Authoritarianism

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán meets with Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić during an official visit to Belgrade, Serbia.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán meets with Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić during an official visit to Belgrade, Serbia, on September 5, 2016. Photo: Ognjen Stevanovic / Dreamstime.

In your 2023 article with Aleksandra Krstić, you describe populism as the “soft” face of competitive authoritarianism under Vučić. How did populist appeals help normalize authoritarian practices domestically and internationally? Does the regime’s electoral defeat suggest limits to populism’s capacity to sustain personalized rule?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: When Vučić’s party came to power, he was initially second-in-command to Tomislav Nikolić, who had won the presidential election. However, Vučić used his position as Deputy Prime Minister to launch a massive anti-corruption campaign targeting prominent businessmen, which caused his popularity to skyrocket. He then used his personal popularity as an important political resource to confront institutional and other opponents. He promoted the interests of poorer citizens and advocated inclusive economic policies. As I mentioned, there was the anti-corruption drive, along with patriotic appeals and, in parallel, rhetoric supporting EU integration—much like Erdoğan initially.

However, once Vučić consolidated power, he no longer needed to rely so heavily on these populist appeals. Instead, he used and abused public institutions and resources against his opponents, while corruption and clientelism expanded dramatically. What is particularly significant is that, in the early years after 2012, Vučić was able to mobilize supporters to attend rallies voluntarily. Yet, just a few years later, he needed enormous organizational and logistical efforts by public institutions to bring people to similar rallies.

We saw this clearly over the last two years. While the opposition mobilized literally hundreds of thousands of people in this small country, Vučić could not mobilize even a few thousand without coercion or bribing people to attend. That tells you a great deal about how thin these populist appeals were throughout.

The Students’ List Seeks Political Pluralism and Inclusion 

The Students’ List defeated not only the ruling establishment but also marginalized much of the traditional opposition. How should we distinguish this anti-establishment mobilization from populism itself? Could the movement’s broad appeal against corrupt elites eventually reproduce the exclusionary political logic it opposed?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: I wouldn’t describe this as an anti-establishment mobilization. The target was Vučić’s authoritarian, personalist rule. The democratic opposition—that is, the opposition parties—was not really a target. Rather, these parties were sidelined or marginalized as less effective partners in the struggle against the regime. At the center of the opposition over the last two years were the universities. The student movement was obviously central, but professors fully supported the students, so it was essentially a movement rooted in higher education, further supported by mobilization in primary and secondary education.

If you look at the Students’ List, which emerged from this mobilization, its representatives are now in Parliament. Most of them have PhDs, so we will have not only a government of experts but also a parliamentary majority of experts. There is therefore no real anti-establishment drive. The explicit goals are democratic renewal and the protection of political pluralism. There is also a strong emphasis on the rule of law as an instrument for fighting corruption and clientelism.

I would also say that there is a broadly inclusive approach toward various previously excluded groups, such as national minorities. They were not politically excluded, but they were co-opted through clientelistic and corrupt practices under Vučić. Now, there is an attempt to include them directly. Several Bosniak and Hungarian candidates will serve as members of Parliament on behalf of the Students’ List. So, there is a very open and inclusive attitude rather than a populist drive. I don’t see that as an issue.

Independent Media and Social Networks Were Essential to Breaking Vučić’s Media Dominance

Your studies of political cartoons, media discourse, and smear campaigns demonstrate how political communication shapes authoritarian power and resistance. How important were alternative media, social networks, and symbolic protest performances in overcoming Vučić’s media dominance and transforming public perceptions of political legitimacy?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: As I mentioned earlier, the regime relied primarily on media manipulation, while repression was highly selective. The regime developed various means to maintain this control. However, opponents of the regime responded, and independent media and high-quality journalism played an essential role in popular resistance. Independent journalists were seen as partners in the struggle, and whenever the government attempted to pressure independent media, the broader movement responded. In this sense, independent media became part of a wider political and social coalition.

Another important factor was the global shift from traditional media to social media. The government also tried to exert influence in this sphere. Vučić had an army of trolls attempting to contain the opposition’s influence on social media. Many of these individuals were employed in the public sector but, instead of performing their official duties, engaged in trolling on Vučić’s behalf.

Nevertheless, he could not counter the popular energies expressed through social media. Opinion polls show that, over the last two years, there has been a major shift toward social media as a primary source of information. The opposition clearly had much greater access to social media than to traditional media. So, once again, it was a combination of several factors.

Vučić Abandoned Ideology in Favor of Power

Serbian politics has long been shaped by Kosovo, Orthodox Christianity, historical grievances, and competing narratives of European identity. To what extent did Vučić incorporate these themes into civilizationalist populism? Can the student-led movement establish a more inclusive democratic identity without reigniting nationalist polarization?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: Vučić began his political career in the early 1990s as a member of Vojislav Šešelj’s extremist and chauvinist Serbian Radical Party. Šešelj was later convicted of war crimes. During the 2000s, after Šešelj went to The Hague, the party gradually moved away from its extremism.

Following successive electoral defeats, Vučić and other leading figures moved toward a more moderate conservative position, eventually forming the Serbian Progressive Party. They realized that they could not come to power on a radical nationalist agenda. They therefore moderated their program and adopted many of their rivals’ positions, emphasizing democracy, EU integration, and even post-conflict reconciliation in the region. By and large, these changes gained acceptance among Western actors and governments.

However, once in power, Vučić gradually abandoned ideology altogether. He delivered different messages to different constituencies and even became quite accommodating toward the government in Pristina over Kosovo. For him, what mattered most was consolidating power and remaining in office.

If you look at the students, they have been very inclusive, particularly toward national minorities. One especially important development during the two years of protests was the connection between students in Belgrade and Novi Pazar—that is, between Serbs and Bosniaks. This opened up new possibilities for bottom-up integration.

At this point, the students remain focused on inclusion, and this resonates with both the Serb majority and national minorities. Many members of national minorities actually voted for the Students’ List rather than for national minority parties, which represents something of a novelty in Serbia.

Vučić Used International Alliances to Project Political Importance Beyond Serbia

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić attend a welcoming ceremony in Belgrade, Serbia, on October 10, 2017.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić attend a welcoming ceremony in Belgrade, Serbia, on October 10, 2017. Photo: Dreamstime.

Vučić maintained political relationships with Viktor Orbán and other nationalist and illiberal actors in Europe. How significant were these transnational networks for his political resilience? Could their continued cooperation allow defeated populist leaders to retain influence and obstruct democratic consolidation?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: Obviously, they cooperated for mutual support and protection. Vučić occasionally emphasized his close relationships with Orbán and Fico and claimed to have a similar relationship with Putin.

But I don’t really think these relationships had much influence on his domestic standing. Perhaps his links with Putin mattered to some extent, but those with Orbán mattered less. It was largely an attempt to portray himself as an important figure not only in domestic politics but also on the international stage. However, this was more a matter of appearances than reality.

Student Movement Offers a Bottom-Up Model of Democratic Inclusion

Your research on Yugoslavia and post-conflict societies demonstrates how popular mobilization can produce either democratization or nationalist radicalization. What distinguishes Serbia’s current student movement from earlier nationalist mobilizations, and could democratic renewal create new opportunities for addressing Kosovo and the region’s unresolved ethnic conflicts?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: The international and domestic context today is very different from that of the 1990s and 2000s. In the early 1990s, the disintegration of Yugoslavia reopened all sorts of old issues and animosities. At this point, however, most of these issues have been resolved in one way or another, so many of them will no longer be relevant to the Students’ List.

As I mentioned earlier, the student movement is based on deliberation and inclusion, particularly when it comes to national minorities. This approach will undoubtedly be reflected in broader regional relations. However, whether it will have a lasting effect or become a model for the entire region remains to be seen, because that depends on all sides, not just one.

Again, as I mentioned, the Students’ List advocates a model of integration from below—a bottom-up approach. By contrast, integration efforts proposed in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia, have often followed a top-down approach. So, it remains to be seen how this will work out.

Broad Social Coalitions Are Essential to Challenging Authoritarianism

Your comparative research examines popular protest in Serbia, Ukraine, Poland, and other authoritarian contexts. Which elements of Serbia’s student-led mobilization could inspire democratic resistance in countries such as Turkey, Georgia, or Hungary? What institutional and geopolitical conditions determine whether protest movements can successfully translate mobilization into regime change?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: The breadth of the opposition coalition is essential. Often, a political coalition alone is not sufficient; what is needed is a broader social coalition involving not just political parties but also a wide range of other relevant actors. If you look at Serbia over the last two years, the student movement has obviously been central, but it is not just about the students. The Students’ List brings together a wide range of partners representing a broader social coalition.

You can see similar patterns in other countries. In Georgia, for example, opposition parties have traditionally been weak, while civil society actors play a more significant role, with students also contributing substantially. In Turkey, on the other hand, political parties remain central, so there is a more traditional focus on party politics. Hungary falls somewhere in between, with Tisza, which is formally a political party but essentially functions as a broader social movement.

The general trend is toward broader coalitions than we have seen in the past. New political actors who were previously less important are also emerging. It remains to be seen whether this model will spread to other countries in the coming years. Obviously, such a model cannot easily be transferred from one context to another.

Personalist Authoritarian Regimes Are More Vulnerable Because They Lack Organizational Capacity

Finally, Professor Vladisavljević, your scholarship challenges the assumption that authoritarian regimes are largely immune to pressure from below. Does Serbia’s 2026 experience require us to reconsider prevailing theories of authoritarian resilience and revolutionary change? What broader lessons does it offer for understanding how contemporary autocracies collapse—and why democratization sometimes fails to follow their defeat?

Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević: Some traditional lessons remain highly relevant, although perhaps in a slightly different context. One important factor is the coherence of regime organizations. When you have strong political parties, strong public institutions, and some form of bureaucratic regime supported by ideology, these are difficult for the opposition to confront.

The less coherent these organizations are, the easier they are to challenge. This is particularly true of personalist regimes based on informal rules, such as Milošević’s regime in the 1990s or Vučić’s over the last decade. These regimes are easier for the opposition to confront because they lack organizational capacity.

I also mentioned the breadth and commitment of opposition forces. This has traditionally been an important factor, from classic revolutions to the more urban, nonviolent revolutions of recent decades. However, we now have additional actors who were not previously involved.

The international context also matters, particularly whether autocrats receive substantial external support. At the same time, we are dealing with new types of regimes and political actors.

Many competitive authoritarian regimes differ from the traditional authoritarian regimes that characterized much of the 20th century. They allow considerable space for opposition activities, and this relatively permissive environment facilitates nonviolent action.

So, all these factors come together in different ways, depending on the particular context.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.