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From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding

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The ECPS convened leading scholars to assess how populist movements are accelerating democratic decay and edging toward fascism. Moderated by Professor Cengiz Aktar, the panel featured Professors Mabel Berezin, Steven Friedman, Julie Ingersoll, Richard Falk, and Larry Diamond. Discussions ranged from Christian nationalism and techno-utopianism in the US, to the failures of Western democratic models, to the global hypocrisy of international law. Panelists warned that populism now serves as a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation with worldwide reverberations. They underscored the responsibility of intellectuals to resist euphemism, speak with clarity, and help reimagine democracy in an age of disinformation, mass manipulation, and systemic crisis.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) hosted a panel titled “From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding.” The session gathered distinguished scholars to examine the accelerating erosion of democracy, the potential transition from populism to fascism, and the moral and intellectual duties of those who continue to defend democratic values in dark times.

Selcuk Gultasli, ECPS Chairperson, opened the session by emphasizing the urgency of the theme. He noted that the panel sought not only to analyze the rise of populism but also to confront how authoritarian tendencies may harden into fascism. ECPS, he explained, is committed to making the discussion widely accessible through a detailed report and online recordings, ensuring that policymakers, academics, and engaged citizens can benefit from the insights shared.

Moderator Professor Cengiz Aktar, adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens, then set the tone by recalling ECPS’s mission: to document and analyze how populism threatens democracy worldwide. He warned that populist leaders are not isolated figures but draw legitimacy from mass support, which, in Arendtian terms, provides the essential condition for fascist governance. Today’s task, Professor Aktar concluded, is no longer about building democracy but about preventing its collapse.

Professor Mabel Berezin (Distinguished Professor of Arts & Sciences in Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University) opened with a comparative analysis of populism in Europe and the United States. She argued that American populism, embodied by Donald Trump, is marked by unpredictability and authoritarian experimentation, untethered from coherent historical anchors. The most dangerous development, she suggested, lies not in street militias but in “social authoritarianism”—elite legal and intellectual projects such as Project 2025 that aim to dismantle democracy from within. The elevation of Charlie Kirk as a martyr, she warned, signals a new form of religious-political mobilization with fascistic overtones.

Professor Steven Friedman (Research Professor in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg) challenged the myth of a pristine democratic past. Democracy, he argued, has always been shaped by exclusion, and the Western model itself is failing. By ignoring the dangers of private corporate power and clinging to Eurocentric notions of “consolidation,” democrats have overlooked the deeper roots of disillusionment. For Professor Friedman, the task is to redefine democracy as equal human choice in all decisions that affect people’s lives—a principle that requires confronting both state and private power.

Professor Julie Ingersoll (Professor of Religious Studies and Florida Blue Ethics Fellow at the University of North Florida) provided an ethnographic perspective on Christian nationalism in the United States. She mapped three strands—evangelical dominionism, Catholic integralism, and Pentecostal-charismatic movements—that, despite historical rivalries, now converge in rejecting pluralism and democracy. She also highlighted the convergence of these religious forces with secular techno-utopianism and nihilistic online subcultures. The result, she argued, is a coalition oriented toward collapse and accelerationism, united less by theology than by anti-democratic aspirations.

Professor Richard Falk (Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University) situated the discussion in a global frame. He argued that democracy was tarnished long before populism’s rise, corrupted by Cold War secrecy, US hypocrisy in international law, and the exploitative logic of capitalism. Populism, in his view, compounds these crises by waging an “epistemological war” against truth and expertise. Facing climate change, nuclear peril, and extreme poverty, Professor Falk urged intellectuals to embrace utopian thinking and even revolutionary transformation, reorienting governance toward the global public good.

Professor Larry Diamond (Professor of Sociology and of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University) concluded with a stark warning about the authoritarian project underway in the United States. Drawing lessons from leaders such as Hungary’s Orbán and Turkey’s Erdoğan, he argued that Trump and his allies are pursuing a systematic strategy of democratic dismantling: media capture, judicial purges, lawfare, and gerrymandering. While fascistic elements are present, Professor Diamond stressed the importance of terminological precision. Resistance, he suggested, requires early mobilization, broad coalitions, and a focus on economic issues that resonate with ordinary voters.

Together, the panelists painted a sobering picture: populism today is no longer merely a style of politics but a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation with global reverberations. From Christian nationalism to techno-utopianism, from corporate power to manipulated legal frameworks, the threats are multifaceted. Yet the panel also underscored a common responsibility—that intellectuals must speak with clarity, resist euphemism, and foster new visions of democracy suited to the crises of our age.

 

Professor Mabel Berezin: “Locating the Fight? Strategic Engagement in the United States and Europe”

People gather at Turning Point USA headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona, on September 13, 2025, for a memorial following the fatal shooting of Charlie Kirk during his speech at Utah Valley University in Orem. Photo: Dreamstime.

In her presentation, Professor Mabel Berezin delivered a sobering analysis of the current trajectory of democracy in the United States and Europe. Speaking from the vantage point of an academic who has long studied populism and fascism, she situated the discussion within a comparative framework, but with particular urgency regarding developments in the United States since the 2024 presidential election.

Berezin opened with a reflection on the language used to describe contemporary democratic crises. The term “democratic backsliding,” she argued, now feels wholly inadequate for the American case. Since Donald Trump’s return to power, the country has been subject to what she described as a “high-speed wrecking ball” against its democratic institutions. While democratic erosion is a global phenomenon, its forms vary across national contexts, depending on political histories and institutional resilience. This, she suggested, underscores the need for context-specific strategies of intellectual and civic engagement.

European Populism and American Exceptionalism

Berezin revisited an argument she first articulated in 2017 in her essay “Trump is Not a European-Style Populist and That is Our Problem.” In that piece, she observed that while European far-right populists—such as Marine Le Pen in France or Giorgia Meloni in Italy—often ground their appeals in nostalgia for a stronger nation-state and postwar social protections, the American populist right is marked by unpredictability. European populists, she argued, want “more state, not less,” and their grievances frequently revolve around immigration and monetary issues within the European Union framework. By contrast, the American case lacks a coherent historical anchor, and Trump’s political appeal did not fit neatly into established narratives.

For Professor Berezin, this unpredictability made Trump particularly dangerous. While European populists often pursue recognizable policy goals rooted in the past, Trump’s movement was untethered, fueled instead by volatile grievances and charismatic mobilization. The absence of clearly defined political expectations in the US created fertile ground for authoritarian experimentation.

The Rise of Social Authoritarianism

Turning to the US after the 2020 and 2024 elections, Professor Berezin noted the growing academic consensus that Trumpism bears fascist characteristics. However, she argued that the most pressing threats to democracy are not necessarily the paramilitary groups that rallied in Charlottesville or stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Instead, the greater danger lies in what she termed “social authoritarianism”—a project spearheaded by intellectual cadres aligned with institutions such as the Heritage Foundation, the Federalist Society, and the architects of “Project 2025.”

These actors, she explained, represent the true intellectual core of the movement. Unlike the visible extremists brandishing weapons, these figures deploy law, language, and bureaucracy as instruments of authoritarian consolidation. By targeting institutions and systematically reshaping the judiciary, they seek to dismantle the so-called “deep state” and restrict fundamental freedoms under the veneer of legality. As Professor Berezin quipped, it is easier to imprison someone who fires an AR-15 than it is to restrain a legal strategist whose weapon is a thesaurus.

The Paramilitary of Jesus

While she downplayed the long-term mobilizing potential of armed militias, Professor Berezin identified a new and alarming development: the posthumous elevation of Charlie Kirk, a conservative media figure assassinated in September 2025. Initially dismissing him as a fringe podcaster, Professor Berezin admitted she was shocked by the scale and spectacle of his memorial service, which she described as a “paramilitary of Jesus with the blessings of the state.” The event drew millions of attendees and viewers, including Trump and much of his cabinet, and revealed a level of organization, youthful enthusiasm, and emotional intensity that Professor Berezin found profoundly unsettling.

What struck her most was the fusion of evangelical symbolism with political mobilization. The service emphasized family, reproduction, and communal solidarity, urging followers to “have more children than you can afford” and to embrace family as one’s central role in society. While the rhetoric appeared religious, Professor Berezin suggested it was in fact a form of secular mobilization—anchored less in theology than in a cultural project of authoritarian belonging.

Kirk’s assassination, she argued, paradoxically strengthened the movement. In death, he was transformed into a martyr, his charisma frozen in time, and his image available for endless appropriation by the MAGA movement. This development, she warned, fills a “missing link” in the analytical framework of American authoritarianism, supplying the movement with an emotionally powerful narrative and a mobilizing force that mainstream democratic actors struggle to match.

Intellectual Responsibilities

The central theme of Professor Berezin’s speech was the intellectual responsibility of scholars in confronting authoritarianism. She acknowledged the limitations of academic writing and debate in the face of mobilized authoritarian forces but insisted that silence or timidity is not an option. Universities, law schools, and other institutions must be willing to say “no” to authoritarian incursions, resisting the erosion of academic freedom and democratic values.

Dialogue, she suggested, remains valuable, but only if understood not as a tool of conversion but as a means of fostering engagement. In her own teaching on fascism and nationalism, Professor Berezin frequently encounters conservative students who seek to talk rather than proselytize. Creating spaces for such conversations, she argued, can generate a deeper understanding of democratic principles across divides.

Yet Professor Berezin also warned against complacency. She noted that the rhetoric of Trump’s movement is saturated with appeals to “freedom,” while democracy itself is rarely mentioned. The gap between these two concepts must be addressed directly. For her, one crucial task is rearticulating what democracy actually means in the public sphere. Many Americans, she lamented, support democracy as an abstract good but lack a concrete understanding of its practices and requirements.

Democracy and Education

Professor Berezin concluded by situating intellectual responsibility within the longer history of democratic education. She invoked John Dewey’s Democracy and Education (1916) and the civic initiatives launched in the United States during the onset of World War II, such as the National Foundation for Education and American Citizenship. These historical precedents, she argued, remind us that democracy must be taught, nurtured, and continuously reinforced through education.

For Professor Berezin, the path forward lies not in rhetorical denunciations of fascism but in cultivating a renewed public understanding of democracy itself. Education, both formal and informal, is the most effective channel for resisting the deeply embedded authoritarian forces now at work. If democracy is to be saved—or at least its decline attenuated—scholars, educators, and intellectuals must reclaim their role in shaping civic culture.

Conclusion

Professor Berezin’s presentation offered a bracing assessment of the state of democracy in America and beyond. By contrasting European and American populisms, highlighting the intellectual underpinnings of authoritarianism, and analyzing the symbolic mobilization of figures like Charlie Kirk, she illuminated the complex and evolving threats facing democratic societies. Her call to intellectual responsibility—grounded in education, engagement, and the defense of democratic institutions—underscored the urgent role of scholars in meeting this historical moment.

 

Professor Steven Friedman: “Democracy for All: Rethinking a Failed Model”

The controversial Israeli separation wall dividing Israel from the West Bank, often referred to as the segregation wall in Palestine. Photo: Giovanni De Caro.

In his presentation, Professor Steven Friedman offered a provocative and deeply critical re-examination of contemporary democratic theory and practice. Speaking as both a South African scholar and a citizen who lived through apartheid and the democratic transition of 1994, Professor Friedman challenged prevailing assumptions about democracy’s origins, legitimacy, and sustainability. His core argument was clear: the crisis facing democracy today is not merely the product of authoritarian incursions or populist disruption but the collapse of a flawed model of democracy that has dominated global thinking for the past three decades.

The Myth of a Pristine Democratic Past

Professor Friedman began by dismantling what he called the “myth of the pristine democratic environment.” Many observers, he argued, continue to think of democracy as a fully functioning, well-ordered system that has been corrupted by external “barbarians.” While acknowledging the existence of authoritarian challengers, Professor Friedman insisted that this framing misdiagnoses the problem. According to him, democracy has not simply been hijacked; rather, the dominant model itself is failing. To understand today’s crisis, we must interrogate the assumptions underpinning this model.

Democracy as a Western Export

The first of these assumptions, Professor Friedman argued, is the idea that democracy is inherently Western. For decades, he noted, democracy outside North America and Western Europe has been judged by the extent to which it resembles an idealized Western model. This attitude, embedded in the “transition to democracy” scholarship of the late twentieth century, created a hierarchy in which Africa, Asia, and Latin America were cast as perpetual apprentices striving to approximate Western democracies.

He pointed to the academic obsession with “democratic consolidation” as an example. Despite the proliferation of literature on the subject, there has never been a coherent definition of what a “consolidated democracy” actually is. In practice, Professor Friedman argued, the concept functioned as a mirror: if a country looked like Western Europe or North America, it was deemed consolidated; if not, it was considered deficient. This was less a political theory, he suggested, than an ethnic bias.

Today, the irony of this model is stark. The very Western democracies once held up as exemplars are themselves eroding fundamental freedoms. Professor Friedman shared a telling personal anecdote. During apartheid, South Africans envied Western societies for their freedoms of speech and assembly. Yet today, he noted, German academics fear losing their jobs for participating in discussions critical of Israel, and Americans risk detention for political speech. The “boot,” he observed, “is now on the other foot.” Modeling democracy on the West, he concluded, is no longer tenable.

Palestine as a Democracy Problem

Professor Friedman underscored this argument with a pressing contemporary example: Palestine. He contended that the suppression of pro-Palestinian expression in Western democracies represents a profound democratic failure. Citizens in the UK and elsewhere have been arrested for holding signs opposing genocide, while in many countries, calls for boycotts—an elementary form of democratic speech—are criminalized.

Equally troubling, Professor Friedman argued, is the gap between public opinion and elite policy. Surveys consistently show overwhelming public support for a just resolution to the conflict, yet Western governments either ignore this consensus or offer token gestures while maintaining policies that sustain the crisis. This disconnect illustrates how democracy, when treated as a Western possession, erodes its own legitimacy. For Professor Friedman, the Palestine issue is not peripheral but central to understanding democracy’s current global malaise.

Ignoring Private Power

The second flawed assumption of the dominant model, Professor Friedman argued, is its fixation on the state as the sole threat to freedom. According to this view, democracy exists primarily to constrain state power and ensure accountability to citizens. While important, this perspective ignores another crucial reality: private power can be equally oppressive when left unregulated.

Professor Friedman reminded his audience that this insight is hardly radical. Theodore Roosevelt, in the early twentieth century, warned that unregulated commercial power could dominate and oppress citizens just as much as the state. For much of the postwar period, Western democracies acknowledged this reality, regulating corporate influence to safeguard public interests. Yet in the past thirty years, this recognition has disappeared from mainstream democratic theory. Private power is rarely mentioned in contemporary scholarship or policy debates, leaving citizens vulnerable to corporate domination.

He illustrated this point with evidence from the 2024 US elections. Democratic candidates who campaigned on regulating corporate price gouging outperformed their peers by 8–10 percentage points, sometimes winning in unexpected constituencies. This, Professor Friedman argued, underscores the centrality of addressing private power to democratic renewal. Citizens disengage not because they are seduced by authoritarianism, but because they see mainstream parties as unwilling or unable to improve their material conditions.

The Real Crisis: Disillusionment, Not Populism

Professor Friedman pushed back against the notion that democracy’s greatest threat lies in the rise of populist strongmen. The problem, he suggested, is not the growth of the authoritarian right but the erosion of faith among non-right constituencies. In the US, for example, Trump did not dramatically expand his base between 2020 and 2024. Instead, 17 million former Democratic voters simply abstained. Disillusionment, not conversion, handed Trump his victory.

This phenomenon is not unique to the US. Across Western Europe, too, the crisis of democracy stems less from the swelling of the right than from the alienation of citizens who feel their votes no longer matter. When private power goes unregulated and living standards stagnate, democratic participation declines. Professor Friedman emphasized that this structural disillusionment is a more urgent challenge than the electoral gains of right-wing populists.

Redefining Democracy

In concluding, Professor Friedman turned to the question of intellectual responsibility. Scholars, he argued, must abandon the failed model of democracy and reimagine its meaning. For him, democracy is not a set of institutions or a Western inheritance but a principle: every adult human being should have an equal say in every decision that affects them.

He acknowledged that no society has ever fully realized this ideal. But, citing South African theorist Richard Turner’s essay “The Necessity of Utopian Thinking,” Professor Friedman insisted that such standards must serve as guiding measures. Without them, democrats risk losing sight of their goals.

Placing equal human choice at the center of democracy, Professor Friedman argued, has two transformative implications. First, it erases the Western bias by recognizing democracy as a universal entitlement, not a Western export. Second, it compels recognition that private power must be regulated just as much as state power to ensure genuine freedom. Free speech, free assembly, and other democratic rights flow from this foundational principle.

Conclusion

Professor Friedman’s presentation was both a diagnosis and a manifesto. He rejected nostalgic narratives of a lost democratic golden age, instead locating today’s crisis in the flaws of a dominant model that has privileged Western forms and ignored private power. By highlighting the Palestine issue, he demonstrated how democratic principles are being eroded in the very societies that claim to embody them. By pointing to corporate power, he revealed the blind spots of a state-centered understanding of democracy.

Ultimately, Professor Friedman’s call was for a radical rethinking of democracy as a universal system of equal human choice. Only by embracing this vision, he argued, can democrats move beyond disillusionment and resist both authoritarianism and apathy. His intervention offered a powerful reminder that democracy’s renewal depends not on replication of Western models but on confronting the structural inequalities—both public and private—that undermine it.


Professor Julie Ingersoll: “That Which Precedes the Fall: ‘Religion’ and ‘Secularism’ in the US”

Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.

In her presentation, Professor Julie Ingersoll offered a sobering ethnographic analysis of how religious and ostensibly secular movements in the United States have converged into a powerful populist force. Drawing on more than three decades of field-based scholarship on American religion, Professor Ingersoll explained how seemingly disparate strands of Christianity—along with nonreligious ideological currents—have coalesced into a theocratic, anti-democratic vision that underpins the populist movement known as MAGA. Her intervention highlighted the importance of rethinking how scholars conceptualize religion itself, arguing that theological differences often obscure shared cultural and political commitments.

The Ethnographer’s Lens

Professor Ingersoll situated her perspective within her disciplinary background. Unlike scholars who approach populism through theories of democracy or abstract political models, her work is rooted in ethnography and the close study of religious communities over time. Her aim, she explained, is not to prescribe strategies for saving democracy but to document the lived dynamics of religious movements and to clarify what society is up against. This commitment to description and analysis, she argued, is itself a vital intellectual responsibility: to bear witness, to explain, and to equip others with a deeper understanding of the cultural forces reshaping American politics.

Three Streams of Christian Nationalism

Central to Professor Ingersoll’s presentation was her mapping of Christian nationalism into three distinct but increasingly interconnected traditions.

Evangelical Protestant Dominionism: The first stream emerges from white conservative evangelical Protestantism, particularly the Reconstructionist movement of the 1950s. These groups believe the Bible speaks to every area of life and advocate a theocratic social order rooted in pro-slavery Southern Presbyterianism. They view pluralism and social equality as heretical and insist that Christians are commanded to exercise “dominion” over the world, a mandate they trace back to Genesis. This dominionist vision has informed generations of evangelical activism, positioning biblical law as the sole legitimate foundation for governance.

Catholic Integralism: The second stream arises from Catholic integralism, a minority tradition within Catholicism that rejects church-state separation and seeks to organize society according to Catholic teaching. Integralists draw inspiration from the historic doctrine of the divine right of kings and today align themselves with efforts to dismantle the administrative state. Professor Ingersoll pointed to Leonard Leo and the Federalist Society’s transformation of the US Supreme Court as evidence of integralist influence. Their promotion of the “unitary executive” doctrine reflects a broader ambition to consolidate political power in ways that erode checks and balances.

Charismatic and Pentecostal Movements: The third stream comes from charismatic and Pentecostal Christianity, particularly the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR) that arose in the 1990s. Emphasizing prophecy, apostleship, and spiritual warfare, these groups interpret the world as a literal battlefield between divine and demonic forces. Their “Seven Mountains Mandate” envisions Christians seizing control of key spheres of society, from government and business to media and education. Professor Ingersoll warned that this branch of Christian nationalism, with its apocalyptic worldview and demonization of opponents, is especially prone to violence.

While historically divided and even hostile to one another, these three streams have forged common cause within the MAGA movement. Their theological disagreements, Professor Ingersoll argued, often matter less in everyday practice than their shared opposition to pluralism, egalitarianism, and democracy.

Rethinking Religion

A major contribution of Professor Ingersoll’s presentation was her challenge to conventional understandings of religion. Too often, she argued, scholars and observers treat religion as a coherent set of theological beliefs derived from sacred texts. In reality, religious communities function as shifting assemblages of practices, narratives, and cultural markers that organize social life, demarcate insiders and outsiders, and legitimate particular hierarchies.

She illustrated this with a simple example for her students: when people choose a church, they often do so based on social comfort and community ties, not doctrinal precision. Over time, their beliefs shift to align with the group. In this sense, theology frequently follows social belonging rather than the other way around. Recognizing this dynamic, she argued, helps explain how divergent Christian traditions can set aside doctrinal disputes to advance a shared political project.

The Blurring of Religious and Secular

Importantly, Professor Ingersoll emphasized that Christian nationalism does not exist in isolation. It converges with ostensibly secular ideological movements, most notably Silicon Valley techno-utopianism. Tech futurists, accelerationists, and advocates of the “Dark Enlightenment” envision the collapse of democracy and its replacement by corporate-style governance, with CEOs and elite boards as rulers. They promote building digital and physical enclaves—whether in the cloud, on artificial islands, or even on Mars—where hierarchy replaces equality.

Despite their secular self-image, these movements align with Christian nationalism on core commitments: hostility to egalitarianism, skepticism toward democracy, and openness to societal collapse as an opportunity for renewal. Together, they form a strange but potent coalition, bound less by shared theology than by shared anti-democratic aspirations.

Professor Ingersoll also pointed to nihilistic online subcultures that defy the left-right binary, particularly those implicated in the assassination of Charlie Kirk. These groups embrace collapse and seek to accelerate it, even if what follows is “nothingness.” Though ideologically incoherent, they reinforce the broader accelerationist impulse uniting religious and secular anti-democratic forces.

Theocratic Visions and Apocalyptic Anticipations

Across these groups—whether dominionist, integralist, Pentecostal, techno-utopian, or nihilist— Professor Ingersoll identified a common conviction that society is in chaos and decline, and that collapse is either inevitable or desirable. Some even imagine themselves as agents accelerating history toward apocalyptic ends. Though they may diverge sharply on what comes after collapse—the Kingdom of God, a Mars colony, or nihilistic nothingness—they are united in their rejection of democracy and equality in the present.

This convergence, she warned, explains why observers have underestimated their power. Analysts often dismissed each strand as fringe or mutually exclusive, missing the cultural work that bound them together. Only by reframing religion not as fixed belief but as lived practice can we see the coherence of this coalition.

Intellectual Responsibilities

Professor Ingersoll concluded by reflecting on the intellectual responsibilities of scholars in this precarious moment. She admitted that offering prescriptive solutions has never been her strength, nor does she claim to have a plan for saving American democracy. What she can do, she insisted, is “stay in her lane”: documenting, explaining, and bearing witness to the forces reshaping society.

She acknowledged the difficulty of gaining perspective within the United States, where daily life remains unchanged for many even as democratic institutions crumble. Yet she argued that democracy has already collapsed in significant ways, and the upcoming 2026 election may already be compromised beyond repair.

For academics, the challenge is compounded by growing pressures to remain silent. Universities, law firms, media organizations, and even independent institutions have faced campaigns to suppress dissent. Faculty—tenured, untenured, and even retired—have been fired or disciplined for their speech, often on the basis of accusations tied to social media. The silencing of intellectual voices, Professor Ingersoll warned, represents not just an attack on individuals but an erosion of democracy itself.

Conclusion

Professor Julie Ingersoll’s presentation illuminated the deep entanglements of religion, culture, and politics in the rise of American populism. By tracing the convergence of evangelical dominionists, Catholic integralists, Pentecostal charismatics, techno-utopians, and nihilist subcultures, she revealed a coalition united not by theology but by anti-democratic commitments. Her insistence on reframing religion as lived practice rather than doctrinal belief opened new avenues for understanding how these disparate groups reinforce one another.

Ultimately, her message was both analytical and cautionary. The coalition she described thrives on visions of collapse and acceleration, rejecting democracy and equality in favor of theocratic or technocratic alternatives. For scholars, the responsibility is to continue speaking, documenting, and explaining—even in the face of silencing. As Professor Ingersoll made clear, the stakes are nothing less than the future of American democracy.

 

Professor Richard Falk: “Emancipatory Politics in a Dark Time”

UN Security Council meeting on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, New York, August 25, 2016. Photo: Ognjen Stevanovic.

In his presentation, Professor Richard Falk offered a sobering international perspective on the decline of democracy, the failures of US leadership, and the urgent need to rethink political responsibility in light of global crises. Speaking as a longtime scholar of international law and global order, Professor Falk situated the challenges of populism and authoritarianism within broader structural failures—of US democracy, capitalism, and the international system established after World War II.

The Tarnishing of Democracy

Professor Falk began by challenging the notion that populism alone is the cause of democratic erosion in the US. Democracy, he argued, was already “badly tarnished” long before the rise of Trumpism. For decades, the United States projected itself as the world’s exemplary democracy, yet in practice it offered citizens only a “choiceless democracy.” The two-party system, constrained by Cold War ideologies, provided little space for fundamental debate on the most pressing issues.

Secrecy further hollowed out democratic practice. The CIA and other US agencies subverted democratic movements abroad—staging coups in Iran, Chile, and elsewhere—while concealing these actions from the American public under the guise of national security. By normalizing criminal interventions as necessary for security, Professor Falk argued, the US “permanently corrupted the moral sensibilities of the citizenry.” Democracy was reduced to participation in elections that offered no real alternative, fueling disillusionment among the poor, racial minorities, and other marginalized groups whose grievances were consistently dismissed.

The Global Projection of Hypocrisy

Internationally, the United States squandered the opportunity after World War II to construct a just world order. Instead, it entrenched a system that privileged the victors. The United Nations Security Council institutionalized inequality by exempting the five permanent members from compliance with international law. As Professor Falk emphasized, this design elevated geopolitics over morality and law, undermining the credibility of global governance from the start.

The consequences of this hypocrisy are evident today. In conflicts such as Ukraine and Gaza, international law is selectively invoked: wielded as a weapon against adversaries while ignored when allies commit violations. This double standard, Professor Falk argued, has transformed the US from a supposed champion of the rule of law into “the champion of moral hypocrisy.” The result is widespread alienation across much of the Global South, where US credibility as a promoter of democracy has eroded.

Capitalism, Populism, and the Assault on Truth

A further obstacle to democratic renewal lies in the current stage of global capitalism. Contemporary capitalism, Professor Falk argued, is both exploitative and ecologically destructive. By privileging short-term profits over sustainability, it undermines governments’ ability to act in the public interest. Corporate influence on politics ensures that urgent global challenges—climate change, poverty, and disarmament—are subordinated to private interests.

Within this context, populism becomes not a solution but an amplifier of democratic decay. Trumpism, Professor Falk contended, embodies an “epistemological war against the Enlightenment.” It is hostile to expertise, reason, and evidence, and sanctions those who attempt to tell inconvenient truths. The suppression of international voices speaking out about the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, including United Nations officials, is emblematic of this assault on truth. Words such as “genocide” are rendered almost unspeakable, even as atrocities unfold in real time. By eroding the possibility of truth-telling, populist politics undermines responsible citizenship and corrodes the foundations of democratic accountability.

Toward Emancipatory Politics

Against this backdrop, Professor Falk posed the critical question: what does it mean to be a responsible citizen in such dark times? His answer pointed toward the necessity of utopian thinking and, potentially, revolutionary transformation. Incremental reform within existing structures, he argued, is insufficient. The dominant social forces—military-industrial complexes, corporate lobbies, and entrenched elites—must be displaced by actors committed to the global public good.

For Professor Falk, the form of governance is less important than its orientation toward reality. Addressing existential challenges—climate change, nuclear proliferation, mass poverty—requires political systems that privilege truth, sustainability, and the collective interest over short-term expediency. Intriguingly, he noted, some of the most responsible practices in these areas currently come from China, a state that is highly autocratic and, in many respects, anti-democratic. This paradox raises the possibility that the ecological and geopolitical crises of the twenty-first century may demand post-democratic or post-populist forms of governance if humanity is to survive.

Conclusion

Professor Richard Falk’s presentation was a sweeping indictment of both US democracy and the international order it helped create. He argued that the failures of American democracy—its secrecy, its choicelessness, and its moral corruption—have reverberated globally, eroding trust in the very idea of liberal democracy. Coupled with an ecologically destructive capitalism and a populism hostile to truth, these dynamics leave humanity in a perilous position.

Yet Professor Falk’s talk was not only diagnostic but also prescriptive in spirit. He called for a politics of emancipation grounded in truth-telling, utopian imagination, and global solidarity. Whether through democratic renewal or through new, post-democratic arrangements, he urged that political systems must be reoriented toward the survival and flourishing of the human species. In a dark time, emancipation requires both courage and a willingness to envision radical alternatives.

 

Professor Larry Diamond: “Combatting Authoritarian Populism”

Trump supporters marched toward Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C., USA. Photo: Dreamstime / © Bgrocker

In his presentation, Professor Larry Diamond delivered a sweeping and sobering assessment of the threats facing democracy in the United States and around the world. Framing his remarks against a backdrop of rising authoritarian populism, Professor Diamond emphasized that the global tide of illiberalism is far from cresting. Instead, the forces of democratic backsliding—anchored in right-wing populism—are accelerating across multiple continents, diffusing strategies and legitimizing authoritarian models. Against this international canvas, he examined the United States as a critical battleground, where Donald Trump’s return to power has raised the prospect of a systematic dismantling of liberal democracy.

A Global Wave of Authoritarian Populism

Professor Diamond began by situating current US dynamics within a global context. Across Latin America, he observed, populist models inspired by both Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele are gaining traction. Chile may soon see a populist restoration, Bolivia and Colombia could follow suit, and Ecuador has already taken a hard turn to the right. These trends reflect a wider diffusion effect: just as democratic activists once drew inspiration from leaders such as Mario Soares in Portugal or Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, today’s populist movements model themselves on figures like Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey.

Europe, too, faces serious risks. Marine Le Pen’s National Rally stands poised to take power in France, while Nigel Farage has become a plausible candidate for prime minister in the United Kingdom. Germany, traditionally a bulwark of liberal democracy, now contends with dynamics of polarized pluralism reminiscent of interwar Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe, right-wing parties are resurgent, with Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party threatening hard-won democratic restoration. Taken together, Professor Diamond warned, these developments mark an era of “deeply, dangerously fluid” political polarization.

Trumpism and the Project of Authoritarian Entrenchment

Within this global wave, the United States has reemerged as both a model and a cautionary tale. After returning to the presidency, Trump has pursued a far more methodical strategy to consolidate power, guided by the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025. This playbook, Professor Diamond explained, echoes Orbán’s transformation of Hungary from a liberal democracy to what he termed an “illiberal non-democracy”—a regime that preserves the appearance of competitive elections while hollowing out checks and balances.

Trump’s project, Professor Diamond warned, has advanced along nearly every step of the authoritarian “12-step program” outlined in his earlier book Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency. These steps include extreme polarization, demonization of the opposition, systematic attacks on the media, politicization of the courts, and the purge of independent institutions. What distinguishes the current moment, he stressed, is that these efforts are no longer impulsive but deliberate, refined over four years of preparation.

The Assault on Media, Courts, and Institutions

Professor Diamond catalogued the multiple fronts of authoritarian encroachment. Independent media face unprecedented threats from concentrated ownership by Trump-aligned billionaires, such as the Ellison family’s acquisitions of TikTok and Paramount (including CBS News). Once pillars of journalistic independence, these outlets risk being transformed into regime mouthpieces. The trend mirrors patterns in Turkey, Venezuela, and Hungary, where businessmen allied with ruling parties purchased media outlets to neutralize dissent.

The judiciary has likewise been targeted. Inspectors general across federal agencies were summarily dismissed at the outset of Trump’s new administration. Judge Advocate Generals in the Army, Navy, and Air Force—key advisors on constitutional limits within the military—were purged, raising concerns about the politicization of the armed forces. This, Professor Diamond noted, is a particularly ominous development: authoritarian leaders often seek to secure military loyalty as a safeguard against democratic resistance.

Universities, NGOs, and philanthropic foundations are also under attack. As in Hungary, where Orbán vilified George Soros, Trump’s allies have begun targeting major civil society organizations such as the Open Society Foundations and the Ford Foundation. Lawfare—weaponizing legal mechanisms to intimidate and suppress—has become a defining strategy, extending even to efforts to prosecute political opponents like former FBI director James Comey.

Gerrymandering, Lawfare, and Electoral Manipulation

At the electoral level, Trump’s allies have embraced grotesque gerrymandering to entrench minority rule. By redrawing districts with ruthless precision, they aim to secure durable Republican control of the House of Representatives, even without majority support. Echoing Orbán’s tactics in Hungary, such manipulation risks creating a façade of competition while structurally foreclosing alternation in power.

The broader strategy, Professor Diamond explained, is not to abolish elections but to subvert them—maintaining a veneer of democratic legitimacy while ensuring outcomes favorable to the regime. This is why vigilance over the 2026 midterms and 2028 presidential elections is crucial. Without robust mobilization and institutional safeguards, the US risks sliding into electoral authoritarianism.

Intellectual Responsibilities: Rigor and Precision

Responding to the session’s theme of intellectual responsibility, Professor Diamond underscored the importance of terminological clarity. While Trumpism has fascistic elements—such as the stigmatization of minorities and the elevation of a charismatic leader—he cautioned against prematurely labeling the United States a fascist regime. Misusing charged terms, he argued, risks polarizing discourse further and alienating potential allies in the defense of democracy. Instead, scholars must distinguish carefully between illiberal democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and full-fledged authoritarianism. Intellectual rigor, he insisted, is itself a form of civic responsibility.

Lessons for Resisting Authoritarianism

Professor Diamond concluded with several lessons drawn from global experiences of democratic backsliding.

Mobilize early and vigorously:  The sooner authoritarian projects are resisted, the greater the chance of success. Once the bureaucracy, judiciary, and security services are stacked with loyalists, reversing course becomes exponentially harder.

Combine institutional and civic strategies: Courts, legislatures, and oversight mechanisms remain critical tools, even if weakened. Judicial rulings can still draw lines, and regaining control of congressional committees would enable investigations into corruption. At the same time, civil society mobilization is indispensable: protests such as “No Kings Day,” which drew millions into the streets, exemplify the power of mass resistance.

Build broad electoral coalitions: Ultimately, authoritarian leaders are most often defeated at the ballot box. Opposition coalitions must transcend class and identity divides, adopting inclusive strategies that resonate beyond traditional partisan bases. Professor Diamond cited Turkey’s municipal elections, in which campaigns of “radical love” forged unlikely alliances, as an instructive model.

Prioritize economic performance: Voters care most about material conditions. Autocrats often mismanage economies due to corruption and cronyism, creating openings for opposition campaigns focused on bread-and-butter issues. As James Carville’s dictum reminds us: “It’s the economy, stupid.” Professor Diamond noted that Trump’s approval ratings are underwater across all policy areas, including crime and immigration, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with his governance.

Conclusion

Professor Larry Diamond’s presentation painted a stark picture of democracy under siege. Around the world, populist leaders are modeling themselves not on democratic icons but on illiberal strongmen. In the United States, Donald Trump’s methodical pursuit of power threatens to transform the country into an electoral authoritarian regime. From media capture and judicial purges to gerrymandering and lawfare, the signs are clear: America is far along the authoritarian pathway.

Yet Professor Diamond also offered hope rooted in historical lessons. Authoritarian regimes often collapse under the weight of their corruption, economic mismanagement, and overreach. Intellectuals must contribute with rigor and clarity, resisting hyperbolic labels while documenting authoritarian encroachments. Civil society must mobilize boldly, institutions must be defended, and electoral coalitions must be broadened.

The struggle, Professor Diamond concluded, is urgent but not lost. The fate of American democracy—and its global influence—will hinge on the ability of citizens, scholars, and leaders to confront authoritarianism with courage, precision, and unity.

 

Q&A Highlights 

A Trump flag waves at a pier on Coden Beach in Coden, Alabama, on June 9, 2024. The flag bears the slogan, “Jesus is my Savior. Trump is my President.” Photo: Carmen K. Sisson.

The Q&A session following the panel underscored the urgency and complexity of the challenges facing contemporary democracy. Questions probed deeply into the militarization of politics, the durability of authoritarian regimes, and the prospects for democratic renewal. The exchange illuminated both the dangers at hand and the intellectual responsibility of scholars to frame these dangers with clarity.

Militarization of Politics in the US

The first question raised the issue of Donald Trump’s overt and covert attempts to draw the military into American politics. Referencing the July 4th military parade and the deployment of the National Guard in major US cities including Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, the questioner asked whether such actions risked militarizing US politics or politicizing the armed forces, with potential implications for other struggling democracies.

Professor Larry Diamond responded with grave concern. He described these moves as “serious, intentional, and very dangerous,” with both symbolic and practical consequences. Beyond rallying an exclusionary nationalism, Trump’s efforts have raised fears of outright constitutional violations. Professor Diamond relayed the warning of a senior retired military officer that Trump might attempt to deploy the National Guard in contested districts during the 2026 congressional elections to interfere with ballot access and recounts. Such maneuvers, he stressed, would mark a decisive step toward authoritarianism, as they seek to build a military apparatus personally loyal to Trump and the MAGA movement.

Professor Julie Ingersoll added another dimension, noting the religious undercurrents in Trump’s ties to figures such as Pete Hegseth, whose deep connections to Christian Reconstructionist networks highlight the fusion of military symbolism with theocratic ideologies. This overlap, she argued, further illustrates the blurred boundaries between religion, politics, and authoritarian aspirations in the US.

Can Authoritarian Regimes Be Reversed?

A second question asked whether history offered examples of authoritarian governments being deposed through democratic means, referencing Armitage’s claim that such reversals are rare. Responding, Professor Diamond acknowledged the difficulty but pointed to Poland as a partial example of democratic restoration, albeit one fraught with constitutional landmines left behind by previous authoritarian-minded governments. He predicted that future reversals would similarly confront dilemmas: how to dismantle authoritarian structures without replicating their illiberal methods.

Professor Diamond rejected the notion that authoritarian projects last indefinitely. Their corruption, failures, and reliance on aging leaders such as Erdoğan, he argued, ultimately erode their viability. New democratic moments do emerge, though they face immense challenges. For the US, the fundamental test will come in the 2026 midterm elections, where the integrity of voting and counting remains the essential condition for democracy.

 

Concluding Reflections by Professor Cengiz Aktar

In his closing remarks, moderator Professor Cengiz Aktar reflected on the themes of the discussion with a sobering tone. He observed that the global zeitgeist had shifted dramatically: no longer are scholars debating how to build democracy, but rather how to prevent its collapse. Echoing Richard Falk’s notion of “dark times,” Professor Aktar emphasized that naming the threat accurately—calling fascism by its name—is essential. Euphemisms, he argued, obscure the gravity of the crisis.

Professor Aktar pointed to both danger and paradox. While populist and authoritarian leaders draw significant mass support, their rise reveals the gap between freedom and democracy. He recalled Professor Mabel Berezin’s warning that invocations of “freedom” are often decoupled from democratic commitments, enabling libertarian and extremist actors to weaponize speech through digital platforms. At the same time, freedom of expression is selectively curtailed, as seen in the suppression of voices denouncing atrocities such as the Gaza genocide.

Ultimately, Professor Aktar concluded that the world is entering an especially perilous period marked by democratic erosion, mass manipulation, and authoritarian resilience. In this context, he stressed the vital role of intellectual gatherings like this one, noting that the ECPS will likely need to convene further forums to analyze and resist these trends. His remarks closed the session on a sober but mobilizing note: intellectuals, activists, and citizens alike must remain vigilant and engaged in defense of democracy.

 

Overall Conclusion

The ECPS panel “From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding” offered a sobering yet clarifying examination of the forces eroding democracy across the globe. What emerged most clearly is that populism today cannot be dismissed as a passing style of politics or a democratic “correction.” Rather, it increasingly serves as a vehicle for authoritarian entrenchment, exploiting institutions, culture, religion, and technology in ways that carry fascistic echoes.

Professor Mabel Berezin’s analysis highlighted the transformation of US populism into what she termed “social authoritarianism”—a strategy less reliant on militias than on legal, cultural, and intellectual frameworks that dismantle democracy from within. Professor Steven Friedman dismantled the illusion of a pristine democratic past, reminding us that Western models themselves are faltering, especially when they ignore the power of corporate interests and the structural exclusions on which they rest. 

Professor Julie Ingersoll exposed the convergence of Christian dominionists, Catholic integralists, Pentecostal-charismatics, and techno-utopians into a shared anti-democratic coalition—an unlikely but potent fusion united by hostility to pluralism and democracy. Professor Richard Falk placed these developments in global perspective, underscoring the hypocrisy of US democracy promotion, the corrosive effects of secrecy and capitalism, and the urgent need for emancipatory politics grounded in truth-telling and ecological survival. Finally, Professor Larry Diamond warned of deliberate authoritarian projects in the United States, modeled on Orbán and Erdoğan, that weaponize law, gerrymandering, media capture, and even the military to consolidate power.

The Q&A deepened these concerns, particularly around the militarization of politics under Trump and the fragility of democratic reversals. The possibility of deploying the National Guard for electoral interference, as Professor Diamond relayed, illustrates how quickly democratic norms can collapse.

Moderator Cengiz Aktar closed with a stark reminder: the global zeitgeist has shifted. We are no longer asking how to build democracy but how to prevent its collapse. The panelists converged on a central responsibility—that intellectuals must resist euphemism, call authoritarianism and fascism by their names, and provide frameworks that clarify rather than obscure. In an era marked by disinformation, selective freedoms, and systemic crisis, clarity itself becomes a democratic act.

The challenge, then, is twofold: to defend democracy where it still exists and to reimagine it in forms capable of confronting the structural inequalities, ecological perils, and authoritarian tactics of our age.

Students and academics join a protest march in Haifa on September 9, 2023, against Israel’s controversial judicial overhaul. Photo: Dreamstime.

Authoritarianism Curbed? Populism, Democracy and War in Israel

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Please cite as:
Ben-Porat, Guy & Filc, Dani. (2025). “Authoritarianism Curbed? Populism, Democracy and War in Israel.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 24, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000118

 

Abstract

Since January 2023 hundreds of thousand Israelis took to the streets in an unprecedented wave of protests against the governments’ plan to restrict the power of the Supreme Court. The government, a coalition between the Likud’s populist party, the Ultra-Orthodox and the extreme religious-right announced a legislation package threatening Israel’s institutions’ -limited- liberal constitutionalism, opening the possibility of authoritarianism. Right-wing populism, that in its Israeli version combines populist tropes with religion and nationalism, combined with other radical right parties to form a tight and determined coalition set to transform Israel’s political system into what was described by the government’s opposition as an authoritarian (and theocratic) threat. Notwithstanding the governments’ intentions we argue, using the Israeli case study, that the “slide” from right-wing populism to authoritarianism is not inevitable. First, right-wing populism positions itself as anti-liberal rather than anti-democratic. Consequently, second, it has to contend with a potential opposition, a large one undermining its claim to speak “for the people.” And third, when anti-liberal stance relies also on religious discourse, it not only evokes liberal opposition but also divisions among populists regarding religious authority. These three reasons make authoritarianism a possibility but not an obligatory telos.

Keywords: Israel, populism, democracy, religion, authoritarianism

 

By Guy Ben-Porat & Dani Filc

Introduction

In January 2023 hundreds of thousand Israelis took to the streets in an unprecedented wave of demonstrations against the government’s reform plan depicted as a threat to democracy. The government, a coalition between the Likud, Ultra-Orthodox and the extreme religious-right parties, one hitherto excluded from coalitions, introduced a legislation package that would, according to its opponents, undermine Israel’s democratic institutions, in particular the Supreme Court, and open the way for authoritarianism. The protestors, who took to the streets in the name of liberal democracy, compared the developments in Israel to those in Hungary and Poland, argued that the government plan would not only undermine Israel’s [already limited] democracy but also threaten civil rights, freedom and gender equality. Not only the threat of authoritarianism but also the potential transformation into a theocracy evoked the protests. Coalition agreements and proposed laws, advocated by the religious parties, would, once legislated, it was argued, undermine secular, LGBTQ+, and women’s rights. The protest involved not only large-scale demonstrations for months, but also roadblocks, economic boycotts, appeals to international leaders and media, and even declarations of army reservists they would not report to duty if the proposed legislation would be completed as planned. 

Right-wing populism, that in its Israeli version combines populist tropes with religion and nationalism, combined with other radical right parties to form a tight and determined coalition set to transform Israel’s political system into what was described by the government’s opposition as an authoritarian (and theocratic) threat. Notwithstanding the governments’ intentions we argue, using the Israeli case study, that the “slide” from right-wing populism to authoritarianism is not inevitable. First, right-wing populism positions itself as anti-liberal rather than anti-democratic. Consequently, second, it has to contend with a potential opposition, a large one undermining its claim to speak “for the people.” And third, when anti-liberal stance relies also on religious discourse it not only evokes liberal opposition but also divisions among populists regarding religious authority. These three reasons make authoritarianism a possibility but not an obligatory telos.

It is impossible to predict whether authoritarianism was curbed, even more so in light of the war in Gaza after Hamas attack in October 2023. Rather, our purpose is more modest, to highlight the inconsistencies within right-wing populism that enable opposition and potentially prevent authoritarianism based on the experience from Israel. Accordingly, we ask, first, looking beyond instrumental benefits, what explains the formation of a coalition between different expressions of radical right and religious fundamentalism? Second, how the anti-liberal and anti-democratic trends and commitment to religious ideas and identities combine and contrast in the government’s plan? And third, how have the anti-liberal and anti-democratic threat of Israeli right-wing populism enabled the opposition? 

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Kenneth Roth is the Charles and Marie Robertson Visiting Professor at the Princeton School for Public and International Affairs. Until August 2022, he served for nearly three decades as the executive director of Human Rights Watch, one of the world’s leading international human rights organizations, which operates in some 100 countries.

Professor Roth: Israel Exploits Antisemitism Allegations to Silence Criticism of Genocide in Gaza

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In an exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch and now at Princeton—warns that Israel is cynically using charges of antisemitism to shield what he calls genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” Drawing on three decades of human rights leadership, Professor Roth situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a broader authoritarian playbook: populist leaders tilt elections, capture institutions, and scapegoat minorities while silencing dissent. His central warning is stark: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism, and blurring this line endangers both Palestinians and Jews worldwide.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—longtime executive director of Human Rights Watch and now Charles and Marie Robertson Visiting Professor at the Princeton School for Public and International Affairs—warns that the Israeli government is cynically using allegations of antisemitism to silence criticism of what he describes as genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” For him, conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism not only shields state crimes but also undermines real protections against anti-Jewish hatred.

Professor Roth’s reflections build on more than three decades of global human rights advocacy. At Human Rights Watch, which he directed until August 2022, he oversaw the organization’s expansion into one of the world’s leading rights watchdogs, active in about 100 countries. Earlier, he worked as a federal prosecutor in New York and on the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington. From that vantage, he situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a wider pattern of populist-fueled authoritarianism. Today’s autocrats, Professor Roth argues, “still crave elections but tilt the playing field,”systematically undermining courts, capturing media, restricting NGOs, and intimidating universities. Democracy, he insists, cannot be reduced to ballots alone—it requires freedoms of expression, association, and the rule of law, all under attack.

Even amid authoritarian resurgence, Professor Roth emphasizes the power of coalitions of democratic, rights-respecting states. He recalls decisive breakthroughs such as the treaty banning landmines and the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)—both achieved despite superpower opposition. More recent successes, from UN oversight of the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen to European-Turkish pressure curbing Russian strikes in Syria, show that principled middle-power alliances still matter. NGOs, too, must remain unwaveringly consistent: “Our work doesn’t distinguish between perceived friend and foe—we apply the same standards to everybody,” Professor Roth explains. That consistency, he argues, sustains credibility and strengthens the politics of shaming.

The interview traverses urgent contemporary debates: Trump’s embrace of authoritarian leaders, his sanctions on the ICC, and his “flood-the-zone” tactic of overwhelming institutions with constant shocks. Professor Roth dissects the dangers of scapegoating minorities, the misuse of Holocaust memory to excuse present atrocities, and the precedent of blurring law enforcement with war in extrajudicial killings. At every step, he insists that human rights must not be selectively applied or subordinated to cynical populist narratives.

Taken together, Professor Roth’s insights offer both a sobering indictment and a pragmatic roadmap: exposing the authoritarian logic that links populism, repression, and impunity, while affirming that principled coalitions and civil society can still defend rights. Above all, his warning is clear: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism—and protecting the integrity of that distinction is essential for Jews worldwide, Palestinians under siege, and the universality of human rights.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Kenneth Roth, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Autocrats Still Crave Elections but Tilt the Playing Field

Nested dolls depicting world autocrats Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump and Recep Erdogan on the counter of souvenirs in Moscow

Thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your recent writings, you stress the fragility of checks against authoritarian drift and note how today’s rulers “raise the cost” for defenders by targeting courts, media, and NGOs. What, in your view, makes this current wave of populist-fueled democratic backsliding distinct from earlier authoritarian surges, particularly in the subtler tactics of regulation, funding, and legal harassment?

Professor Kenneth Roth: I’m not sure it’s completely unique, but clearly autocrats are learning from each other. The current wave is characterized foremost by what you might call electoral authoritarianism. That is, autocratic leaders who still want the legitimacy of an election but use the steps of the autocrat’s handbook to undercut checks and balances on their authority and to tilt the electoral playing field in their favor.

It’s pretty straightforward what they do: they target the various potential checks on their authority—courts, lawyers, journalists, academics, civil society—and use different techniques to undermine their independence. With the media, for example, outlets may be owned by large corporate conglomerates vulnerable to government pressure. We’re seeing that in the United States right now. It could also take the form of regulations that make it harder for civil society to secure funding, particularly from abroad. Sometimes it’s direct attacks, such as withholding funding, which we’re now seeing Trump do with universities.

These are variations on a theme, but the aim is always the same: to stymie and weaken the elements that sustain democracy. Because democracy is not just about elections. It is about the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly, as well as the rule of law that holds leaders accountable to the law and to the rights it embodies. And these autocrats are intent on undercutting those checks. It’s pretty clear.

Coalitions of Democracies Can Overcome Superpower Opposition

You have argued that coalitions of mid-sized states—beyond the West—can sometimes defend human rights more effectively than major powers, urging leverage toward countries like India, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, and even China. Two decades on, do you still see these “plural centers of pressure” as the backbone of rights defense, or has today’s fractured multilateralism, intensified authoritarian entrenchment, and the rise of populist geopolitics blunted that strategy—and what would an updated map of leverage look like?

Professor Kenneth Roth: I wouldn’t say that coalitions are better than the major powers, but that they can serve as substitutes when the major powers stand in opposition. At this stage, when the US government has essentially stopped promoting human rights, I don’t think we should just throw in the cards and give up. There have been many cases in the past where coalitions of governments have compensated for the absence—or even the opposition—of the US government, not to mention the Soviet or Russian government, or the Chinese government. I describe this in my book Riding Wrongs, where repeatedly, coalitions of democratic, rights-respecting governments, when banded together, have had the moral authority to overcome superpower opposition.

That’s what happened with the treaty to ban landmines. All the major powers opposed it, yet a group of about 60 governments—a coalition that Human Rights Watch and our colleagues helped to build—overcame that opposition. We ended up sharing the Nobel Peace Prize for that effort. Something very similar occurred with the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). You may recall the Clinton administration was adamantly opposed to a court that could even theoretically prosecute an American. That was not its idea of justice. Yet in the final vote in Rome in 1998, the US lost overwhelmingly—120 to 7—marking a decisive victory for the rule of law.

More recently, as I describe in my book, despite a lack of any assistance, if not outright opposition, from Washington, a group of governments led by the Netherlands secured oversight from the UN Human Rights Council of the Saudi-led coalition’s bombing in Yemen—making a huge difference in terms of saving civilian lives. Another coalition, involving Germany, France, and Turkey, pressured Putin in March 2020 to stop bombing the three million civilians in Idlib province in Syria, the last area at the time held by the armed opposition.

These are just a few among many examples showing how coalitions of governments can effectively defend human rights—not only without Washington, but often despite its opposition.

NGOs Must Be Principled—Apply the Same Standards to All

Since major powers like the US, Russia, and China routinely instrumentalize human rights for geopolitical ends, how should NGOs and the broader rights community rethink their strategy—balancing naming-and-shaming with ally-seeking—while avoiding the slide from principled engagement into complicity in populist or authoritarian projects?

Professor Kenneth Roth: The idea that governments instrumentalize human rights is nothing new. This has always happened. If you just go back historically, there was a tendency during the Cold War to highlight the human rights abuses of one’s opponents and neglect the human rights abuses of one’s allies. So, this has always been a problem. I think the role that NGOs should play is to be principled. That is to say, to ensure that our work doesn’t distinguish between perceived friend and foe, but that we apply the same standards to everybody. That enhances the capacity to shame, because people understand that when human rights groups condemn somebody, when we spotlight a government’s abuse, we’re not pursuing some geopolitical strategy. We are pursuing a universal, principled effort.

Now, shaming is never the only thing that human rights groups do. We also enlist influential allies to try to put diplomatic or economic pressure on a target government, and I describe this in my book. These are important supplements to the process of shaming.

The fact that governments are selective in their defense of human rights does undermine their credibility, but doesn’t preclude our ability to enlist them, because frankly, nobody is consistent. So, we try to enlist allies where we can, push them to be more principled. But we don’t have a rule that you’ve got to be perfect before we enlist you, because then we’d enlist nobody. We’ve got to be a bit more pragmatic than that and try to maximize pressure on a target government from any credible source that we can find.

Trump Isn’t Blurring Lines—He’s Embracing Authoritarianism

This editorial image, captured in Belgrade, Serbia, showcases an array of novelty socks featuring the likenesses of Vladimir Putin, Aleksandr Lukashenko, Viktor Orban, and Donald Trump in Belgrade, Serbia on December 12, 2024. Photo: Jerome Cid.

Trump’s open admiration for autocrats such as Putin, Bolsonaro, Erdogan, and Netanyahu blurs distinctions between democracy and authoritarianism, while also resonating with a global populist style that treats rights as obstacles to “the people’s will.” To what extent has Trump shifted the normative boundaries of US foreign policy on human rights, and what does this mean for the wider contest between populism and rights-based democracy?

Professor Kenneth Roth: First, I would not say that Trump is blurring the distinction between democracy and authoritarianism. He’s simply embracing authoritarianism. I don’t think anybody believes that because Trump embraces Putin, suddenly Putin is a democrat. That’s absurd. Trump, as an aspiring autocrat, admires leaders who have managed to secure autocratic power for themselves. That’s what he does. And we obviously have to push back against that.

This is a bad period for US foreign policy, but it’s not the first time we’ve seen something like this. Think back to the George W. Bush administration, when the so-called global war on terrorism became an excuse not only to support abusive governments but also to engage in severe human rights abuses by the US government itself—systematic torture and the use of Guantanamo for endless detention without trial.

We have seen this flouting, this unwillingness to abide by human rights standards emanating from Washington before. Our job in the human rights movement is to spotlight complicity in human rights violations, or responsibility for them, when the government behaves inconsistently, and to push for it to be even slightly less inconsistent. Fortunately, the American people—and I think this is also true globally—want a more consistent human rights policy.

That’s why spotlighting inconsistency is valuable, because it forces leaders like Trump to pay a political price. When he is seen as aiding and abetting genocide in Gaza, we can already see the effect on US public opinion. People are turning against Israel; they are upset with the unconditional US support for Israel. We’ve seen Trump react to that somewhat already—not sufficiently—but this effort is worthwhile. Ultimately, this is how we can pressure Trump to do the one thing that would end the genocide: suspend or condition massive US arms sales and military aid to Israel until the genocide stops.

Rulings Mean Little Without Government Backing

You’ve argued that “democracy” without rights is easily gamed by “despots masquerading as democrats.” After the ICJ advisory opinion(s) and an emboldened ICC, can international courts still constrain leaders amid intensified lawfare and sanctions against judges/prosecutors? What insulating reforms (treaty, funding, travel protections) matter most?

Professor Kenneth Roth: There’s a lot in that question, so let me try to dissect it a bit. First, when despots masquerade as democrats, it means they still hold periodic elections, but they tilt the playing field so much that the elections become meaningless. This can be a dangerous endeavor. Take Viktor Orban in Hungary or Erdogan in Turkey: they are classic autocrats who still hold competitive elections but with very severe limitations. Orban today faces a serious challenger in Peter Magyar, who is charismatic and has united the opposition. It may not work for him. Erdogan went so far as to lock up his main opponent because, according to the polls, that opponent was going to win. His party had already won the major mayoral elections in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and elsewhere. The more an autocrat moves toward a zombie election—that is, one with zero credibility—the more they lose the very legitimacy they seek. That’s what Daniel Ortega did in Nicaragua, Museveni in Uganda, Putin in Russia, and Lukashenko in Belarus. They hold electoral charades, but no one is fooled, and they simply become dictators.

I don’t view international courts as particularly effective against these kinds of autocratic attacks on democracy. The courts are more useful in addressing mass atrocities. For example, with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) entering the fray in Gaza, and with the ICC charging Putin and four generals for Ukraine, these are important efforts. They may someday lead to actual trials in The Hague. Even short of that, they are incredibly stigmatizing. They mean that these leaders cannot travel to the 125 ICC member states without risking arrest.

Of course, an ICJ judgment or an ICC arrest warrant does not self-execute. They don’t automatically constrain leaders because these Hague-based courts don’t have police forces; they depend on governments for enforcement. That’s always a problem. So, we need governments that claim to uphold the rule of law to act consistently with these rulings. Take the ICJ advisory opinion on the illegality of Israel’s endless occupation: governments should now ensure they do nothing to support that occupation. On the ICC, Trump outrageously imposed sanctions on the ICC prosecutor, the two deputies, and six judges. It’s important, particularly for the European Union, to use its so-called blocking statute to neutralize those sanctions so that judges and prosecutors can continue to access their bank funds and operate normally.

I would also encourage the prosecutor to examine whether this constitutes obstruction of justice—a violation of Article 70 of the Rome Statute—which I think it clearly does. One option would be to actually charge Trump for this blatant interference with an independent institution of justice. So, there is plenty that still can be done, but we shouldn’t deceive ourselves into thinking that international courts, simply by issuing rulings, automatically change the world. They need the backing of governments.

Being a Drug Trafficker Doesn’t Make You a Combatant

In critiquing Trump’s extrajudicial killings of Venezuelan traffickers, you warned of the drift from policing to “war” rules in law enforcement. If such precedents take hold—turning metaphorical wars on drugs or terror into literal grounds for lethal force—what global spillovers do you foresee, and what bright-line doctrines should civil society insist on to prevent their entrenchment?

Professor Kenneth Roth: First, let me explain the two sets of rules that govern the use of lethal force. In war, you’re allowed to shoot combatants on the other side, and unless they’re surrendering or injured and thus out of combat, you can shoot to kill. There is no duty to detain them. By contrast, in law enforcement situations, it’s almost the opposite: lethal force can be used only as a last resort to meet an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury. It is an extremely limited use of lethal force; otherwise, the duty is to arrest and prosecute.

Now, Trump has ignored that distinction. He has declared Venezuelan suspected drug traffickers—people we have no real knowledge about—and has, in three separate incidents, blown up boats and killed those on board, simply on the claim that they were traffickers. But being a drug trafficker does not make you a combatant. There is no war, no armed conflict here. If you believe Trump’s account, these people were committing crimes and should have been arrested and prosecuted. The US Coast Guard is fully capable of interdicting these boats, detaining the suspects, bringing them to Miami or elsewhere, and prosecuting them.

Trump is disregarding the strict law enforcement rules on lethal force by declaring this a “war,” and therefore claiming the right to shoot to kill. That is an incredibly dangerous precedent, because he could label anyone a combatant or terrorist—terms he wrongly uses interchangeably. But even terrorists are criminals who must be prosecuted, not summarily executed. We have to be very careful here, because what’s to stop him from declaring a war on civil society or a war on the political opposition and then justifying killings on that basis?

This is a very dangerous precedent. Even though drug traffickers are unpopular, it is essential to start with the principle: even if they are suspected traffickers, they should not simply be blown up. They have the right to be detained, charged, and prosecuted if the administration’s claims are true. That is why it is crucial not to let metaphorical wars on drugs or terrorism be transformed into literal wars that substitute the narrow rules on lethal force in law enforcement with the much more permissive rules governing armed conflict—which this clearly is not.

How Populist Autocrats Weaponize Minorities to Mask Their Failures

Border Patrol agents monitor an anti-ICE protest in downtown Los Angeles, June 8, 2025. Demonstrators rallied against expanded ICE operations and in support of immigrant rights. Photo: Dreamstime.

You’ve tracked how strongman admiration and majoritarian claims corrode protections for minorities and migrants. Has Trump’s second term normalized an executive theory of unfettered discretion that will outlast him in US foreign policy—and how should allies signal costs early to deter that stickiness?

Professor Kenneth Roth: As you’re suggesting in your question, populist autocrats frequently rally support by demonizing some unpopular minority in their country. It could be immigrants, LGBT people, or Muslims—it varies from country to country. It is very important to push back against this. Typically, they resort to such tactics to divert attention from their lack of a political program that could actually address the economic and political needs of their base. Usually, their base is the ethnic majority working class.

When you see leaders demonizing immigrants or LGBT people, you can almost be certain there is no serious program to help the working class. Trump is a perfect example. He loves to demonize immigrants. Then he puts forward a massive economic plan that cuts taxes for his cronies while eliminating healthcare for many who need it. This doesn’t help the working class—it decimates it.

It’s important to expose this sleight of hand—the use of scapegoating unpopular minorities to distract from harmful economic policies. So, what’s the best way to push back? First and foremost, by defending the rights of these minorities. We cannot pretend that an attack on one unpopular group will stop there. In fact, I often view attacks on LGBT people as the canary in the coal mine for broader assaults on civil society. Those almost always follow.

We need to recognize the path populist autocrats are taking and nip it in the bud. We cannot ignore the early stages just because the victims are unpopular. This is a well-trodden path, and it must be stopped at the outset.

Countering Trump’s Flood-the-Zone Strategy

You’ve described Trump’s “flood-the-zone” strategy—overwhelming opponents and institutions with constant shocks—as a hallmark of autocratic playbooks. From the resistance you’ve observed, what lessons proved transferable to other democracies under stress, and which were context-specific wins?

Professor Kenneth Roth: I’m not sure that Trump’s flood-the-zone strategy is typical. It’s pretty unique to Trump. It especially characterized his first few months in this second term, when there was one outrage after another, day after day, and people were so busy responding to yesterday’s crisis that they didn’t know where to start with today’s. Now it has slowed down a bit, but he continues to use the tactic—finding some new provocation every few days to divert attention from what he had already done.

The key for the targets of these efforts is not to let themselves be overwhelmed but to band together and coordinate their defense. We didn’t always see that in the United States. For example, certain universities, like Columbia, cut deals with the Trump administration, while others have since taken a more principled stand and joined forces. Some big law firms also cut deals, while others chose to fight back in court—and are now winning. Trump has also turned his threats toward civil society, but here too, many large progressive private foundations have banded together, issuing a joint statement declaring that they will not be divided and will fight back collectively.

That kind of collective response—the refusal to let Trump pick off opponents one at a time, as he has done with certain media outlets—is essential. When a powerful government can target one victim at a time, the victims usually lose. But when it faces a coordinated defense, the chances of success rise significantly.

When Sovereignty Becomes Impunity

The flag in front of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands on March 27, 2016. Photo: Dreamstime.

Trump’s sanctions on the ICC—aimed at blocking investigations of Israel and US officials—highlight how powerful states can obstruct accountability through jurisdictional caveats and intimidation. What does this precedent mean for the enforceability of international criminal law, and what enforcement pathways remain viable to safeguard prosecutorial independence?

Professor Kenneth Roth: When you say jurisdictional caveats, I think what you’re referring to is that the Trump administration, like the US government for much of the last 20-plus years, has objected to the International Criminal Court’s so-called territorial jurisdiction. That is, the court can prosecute anybody who commits a crime on the territory of a member state. Going back to the Clinton administration, the US government hated that because it meant that American military personnel could theoretically be prosecuted if they committed a crime on the territory of a member state. That’s why the US government was so outraged, in the first Trump administration, when the ICC opened an investigation into Afghanistan—because there was fear that Bush-era torturers, many of whose worst crimes were committed there, might be subject to prosecution. Now, that turned out to be more of a theoretical concern, but that’s the territorial jurisdiction the US government has always objected to.

Ironically, when that same territorial jurisdiction was used by the ICC to charge Putin for crimes committed in Ukraine, everything changed. Biden called it justified. Lindsey Graham, the leading Republican senator who had always opposed the ICC, suddenly said, “I’ve changed my mind, we support the ICC now.” He even pushed through a unanimous resolution, and the Senate upheld what the ICC had done. That remained the case until that same territorial jurisdiction was used to charge Netanyahu for crimes committed in Gaza, in Palestine—a member state. Then suddenly it was back to outrage. The US position has been utterly unprincipled. Fortunately, nobody else accepts that. As I mentioned, the US lost its efforts to block territorial jurisdiction in Rome at the outset by a vote of 120 to 7. This is a losing proposition, and the key is for the 125 member states to reaffirm their support for territorial jurisdiction.

Of course, a state should be able to say, in a time of crisis, if our courts are not working—if we can’t prosecute people who commit crimes on our territory ourselves—we should be able to delegate that power to the ICC. That should be an inherent aspect of sovereignty. For the US to say, “Oh, well, because we’re American, we can commit a crime on your territory with impunity”—that’s crazy. If I, as an American citizen, were to go to Brussels and murder somebody, is it an affront to American sovereignty if Belgium prosecutes me? Obviously not. So why would it be an affront to American sovereignty if, under extreme circumstances, Belgium delegates that prosecutorial power to the ICC? This is normal. But the US insists on American exceptionalism when it comes to the rule of law. Nobody buys that, and governments should find ways to push back.

The Vanity Lever: Using Trump’s Ego to Pressure for Human Rights

You’ve suggested Trump’s transactional ego—the “vanity lever”—can sometimes be used to pressure him on rights. How realistic is it to constrain authoritarian choices through vanity appeals, and where should we draw the ethical line between pragmatism and entrenching cynical politics?

Professor Kenneth Roth: What I’ve written about is that if you approach Trump frontally and say, support human rights, he’ll probably look at you and say, what are those? This is not a guy who is going to openly support human rights. But, as I describe in my book, the process of shaming always has to look at the target and figure out what they care about. In Trump’s case, what he cares about is his self-declared reputation as a master negotiator. In his book The Art of the Deal, he defines what he thinks is great about himself.

That gives us some leverage. For one, he wants a Nobel Peace Prize. Fine—you’re not going to get a Nobel Peace Prize by endorsing the mass ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza. You’ll get the Nobel Peace Prize by actually securing a just peace, including recognition of a Palestinian state. Another effective strategy is to spotlight how Putin in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Gaza are actually bamboozling Trump. They’re manipulating him, they’re playing games with this supposed master negotiator, and Trump looks naive.

He hates that. This is a guy with a fragile ego who doesn’t like criticism. If people are laughing at him, ridicule is horrible when you’re an autocrat. So, I think that provides an opportunity. We’re already seeing some movement by Trump in Ukraine. He has not yet imposed the so-called severe consequences he promised if Putin continues to obstruct ceasefire negotiations, but his rhetoric has become somewhat tougher. In the case of Gaza, we also see Trump distancing himself in certain ways from Netanyahu—for example, rejecting Netanyahu’s false claim that there is no starvation in Gaza, criticizing him for attacking the Hamas negotiators in Qatar, and twice imposing temporary ceasefires.

So, there is some distance there. I think we just need to keep pushing, with the aim of getting Trump to do the right thing for the wrong reasons. I don’t think that’s cynical—it’s simply pragmatic. If that’s what it takes to stop mass atrocities, I’ll do it.

When Ethnic Cleansing Becomes a Defense to Genocide

Destruction in Shejayia, Gaza City, Gaza Strip. Photo: Dreamstime.

You’ve argued that Israel’s actions in Gaza meet the Genocide Convention through killings and life-destroying conditions, even alongside ethnic-cleansing motives. How do you answer critics who say genocidal intent is unproven, and what evidence most strongly supports its inference under current ICJ standards?

Professor Kenneth Roth: If you look at either the extent of the killing or the imposition of conditions of life designed to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic or national group, what’s going on in Gaza is clearly genocide. At this point, the clearest example is the imposition of mass starvation, mass deprivation, and the wholesale destruction—today of Gaza City, but overall of all Gaza. The aim, quite clearly, is to make Gaza unlivable so that it becomes “humane” to then force everybody out into Egypt. The ultimate aim here is ethnic cleansing, a supposed solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by getting rid of the Palestinians—first in Gaza, and then later in the occupied West Bank. That’s clearly what’s going on.

The only real challenge here—you mentioned the International Court of Justice standards—is that the court ruled in the Croatia v. Serbia case more than a decade ago that if you are going to infer genocidal intent from conduct, it has to be the only possible inference. I think that’s a wrong standard. They are going to have to re-examine it, because in effect what they have said is that the motive of ethnic cleansing becomes a defense to genocide, which makes no sense. To prove genocidal intent, the standard should be absolute: are you clearly demonstrating genocidal intent? The fact that there may be a mixed motive—that there may be genocide in the service of something else—is often how genocide takes place.

So, I do think the ICJ will have to revisit its standards. It will have an opportunity in the Gambia v. Myanmar case concerning the Rohingya, where something very similar occurred. The Myanmar army killed, say, 10,000 Rohingya in order to force 730,000 to flee into Bangladesh. That was genocide as a means to mass ethnic cleansing. I hope the court uses that case, which will come first, to re-examine its standards, to find that the conduct does permit an inference of genocidal intent. That would then also apply positively to the case of Gaza.

Criticism of Israel Is Not Antisemitism

Election billboard showing Netanyahu shaking hands with Trump, with the slogan “Netanyahu. Another League,” in Jerusalem on September 16, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.

You’ve warned that equating criticism of Israel with antisemitism both silences accountability and weakens real protections for Jews. What are the dangers of this conflation, and what concrete standards can help distinguish legitimate criticism from antisemitic incitement without suppressing dissent?

Professor Kenneth Roth: That’s an important question. Let me begin by saying that the problem of antisemitism is an acute one today facing Jews around the world, and it has become much more intense since October 7, 2023. So, this is a genuine problem. But what we’ve seen is that Netanyahu, the Israeli government, and some of its supporters are using charges of antisemitism to try to silence criticism of Israel’s genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza.

That’s a very cynical move, because it cheapens a concept that is badly needed. If people come to see claims of antisemitism as just an effort to change the subject and defend Israel’s inexcusable conduct in Gaza, they will become cynical about antisemitism at the very moment we need it to remain a viable concept. In effect, what Netanyahu and his supporters are doing is sacrificing Jews around the world for the benefit of the Israeli government. They’re basically saying: we’re going to throw Jews worldwide under the bus. Who cares if you face antisemitism? Who cares if we’re cheapening the concept? All we care about is defending the Israeli government. That’s a horrible thing to do—but that, in essence, is what the Netanyahu government is doing.

Now, are there standards on antisemitism? Yes. The standard that legitimizes this cynical approach is the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism. The way it’s been interpreted has lent itself to saying that criticism of Israel, or efforts to demonize Israel, are somehow antisemitic.

There are two far superior definitions of antisemitism: the Jerusalem Declaration and the Nexus Document. The reason they are superior is that they make explicit that mere criticism of Israeli misconduct is not antisemitic. They define antisemitism in positive terms similarly, but they also include negative examples to make clear that antisemitism should never be weaponized to shield Israeli misconduct.

So, if the concern is truly antisemitism, people should adopt the Jerusalem Declaration or the Nexus Document. But if the concern is simply defending Israel while throwing Jews around the world to their fate, then go with the IHRA definition.

“Never Again” Means Never Again for All

You argue that Israel’s invocation of “never again” and its Holocaust halo have been weaponized to justify present atrocities. How has this complicated recognition of genocidal conduct, and how can we honor historical victimhood without letting it serve as a blank check—while restoring legal clarity around proportionality and civilian protection?

Professor Kenneth Roth: As you suggest, the Israeli government, much like the Rwandan government, cites the Holocaust for Jews and the Rwandan genocide to suggest that the current government is somehow above it all. The logic is: how could the victims of genocide, in turn, commit mass atrocities? Obviously, that’s illogical, but they use the argument implicitly to try to defend the indefensible.

For me, “never again” doesn’t mean never again except for Israel, never again except for Rwanda. It means never again for anybody. Part of the advantage the Israeli government has is that when people think about genocide, they tend to focus on the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide, where the aim, after a certain point, was to kill every Jew or every Tutsi that could be found.

But if you read the Genocide Convention—the treaty that defines genocide and that many governments have ratified—genocide can be aimed at destroying a group in whole, as in the Holocaust or Rwanda, or in part. This is where the Holocaust and Rwandan examples can mislead, because it is also genocide if you target part of a group, either for killing or through conditions of life that bring about their partial destruction. That is what defines Gaza today. The Israeli government is not trying to kill every single Palestinian. But it is trying to kill enough Palestinians and deprive them with enough severity that they are forced to flee into Egypt. Genocide with an intent to destroy a group in part is what’s really going on here. The Holocaust leads us astray because that’s not what it was about. So, we need to read the Genocide Convention as written and recognize that the Holocaust alone does not define genocide. There are other forms—such as the one playing out in Gaza today.

Past Genocides Do Not Justify Present Atrocities

And lastly, you’ve drawn parallels between Kagame’s Rwanda and Netanyahu’s Israel in weaponizing past victimhood to justify present crimes. How can the human rights community dismantle such narratives without denying past genocides, and which accountability tools—aid conditionality, arms suspensions, or regional pressure—have proven most effective against such impunity politics?

Professor Kenneth Roth: As I mentioned, both Netanyahu and Kagame play on past genocide to divert attention from their current mass atrocities—Netanyahu in Gaza, and Kagame through both his repression at home and, most acutely, his invasion of Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo through his own forces as well as the proxy M23 rebel group.

The goal of the human rights community is obviously not to deny the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide. These are facts, these are horrific episodes in human history. But the point is to say: “Yes, they happened, but they don’t excuse present abuses.” So, we have to carefully document what’s happening in Congo and in Gaza and press for real pressure to stop it.

That pressure can and should include economic measures. Sadly, the European Union—while many of its members are recognizing a Palestinian state—has yet to suspend Israel’s trade benefits, despite vows from Commission President von der Leyen to do so soon. In eastern Congo, back in 2012, a similar Rwandan invasion via the M23 was stopped in its tracks when the US and British governments told Kagame they would cut off aid unless he withdrew. Within days, the M23 crumbled. Today, that isn’t happening. Trump cut a deal allowing Rwanda to stay and exploit the minerals.

So, we need to look at what has worked in the past, namely intense economic pressure. I would like to see the International Criminal Court (ICC)—which has already acted in part in Gaza—do much more and also extend its action to eastern Congo. It has done so in the past, but not with respect to this current invasion. Plenty of steps remain available to help rein in Kagame and Netanyahu and to stop their misuse of past atrocities as an excuse for committing new ones today.

The municipality office in Inaruwa, Sunsari, lies heavily damaged after protesters targeted it during the nationwide demonstrations against corruption and the social media shutdown on September 9, 2025. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula

Professor Paudel: The Youth Uprising in Nepal Is the Result of Long-Brewing Frustrations

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In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Dinesh Paudel argues that the September 2025 youth uprising in Nepal was “the result of long-brewing frustrations.” Far from a sudden outburst, he situates the revolt at the intersection of elite failure, geopolitical maneuvering, and structural economic decline. Young Nepalis, caught in what he calls a “triple disjuncture” of mass migration, precarious labor markets, and digital mobilization, transformed simmering anger into protest. Yet Professor Paudel cautions against viewing it as a revolution: “It will not fundamentally alter the political structure that produced these conditions.” Professor Paudel highlights corruption as the “governing logic of elite power” and signals volatile struggles over Nepal’s political and economic future.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The September 2025 uprising in Nepal has been described by analysts as a “Gen Z revolution,” but as Professor Dinesh Paudel emphasizes, “It was already brewing. This kind of uprising and discontent had been in the making for a long time.” In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Paudel—Professor in the Department of Sustainable Development at Appalachian State University—offers a critical interpretation of the forces driving this moment of rupture. His central argument is clear: “The youth uprising in Nepal is the result of long-brewing frustrations.”

These frustrations, he explains, stem from a convergence of structural, political, and geopolitical factors. Domestic elites failed to adapt to generational aspirations, leaving young Nepalis alienated from politics and unable to envision themselves in the nation’s future. At the same time, external pressures intensified: “Nepal sits right where these possibilities converge, at the center of the Himalaya and at the heart of what some call a Second Cold War, especially between China and the West.” Such tensions, combined with India’s long-standing dissatisfaction with Nepal’s constitutional framework and a dependent, deindustrialized economy, created the combustible conditions for revolt. Social media then amplified negativity and spread the belief “that nothing works in Nepal and that something else must come—even though that ‘something else’ was never really thought through.”

Professor Paudel situates this eruption within what he calls a “triple disjuncture” confronting Nepal’s youth: mass migration, precarious labor markets, and the expansion of the digital public sphere. These forces, layered onto chronic inequality and unemployment, have generated new forms of political subjectivity—angry, aspirational, yet fragile. “I would not call this a youth revolution—it is not,” Professor Paudel cautions. Instead, he views it as part of a recurring cycle in Nepal’s modern history: “Every decade Nepal has seen movements—the democratic movement, the Maoist movement—and young people have always been at the center.”

At the same time, Professor Paudel underscores that symbolic battles—such as the viral backlash against “nepo-babies”—have sharpened frustrations against entrenched entitlement. These spectacles, he argues, expose the persistence of a “feudal political structure still dominant in the country.” Yet he warns that generational framings risk obscuring deeper inequalities rooted in class, caste, and land.

Ultimately, Professor Paudel interprets corruption not as an aberration but as the very “governing logic of elite power.” For him, corruption sustains both domestic hierarchies and Nepal’s insertion into a regional and global economic order defined by dependency. Without profound restructuring—particularly rebuilding a national productive base—Professor Paudel doubts the present movement will transform Nepal’s political economy.

And yet, he insists that youth frustration is real and points toward new possibilities. “What they are seeking in the future is post-elite—some kind of egalitarian economic and political system.” Whether such aspirations can overcome entrenched interests and regional constraints remains an open question—but the long-brewing discontent that exploded in September 2025 ensures that Nepal has entered a volatile new era.

Professor Dinesh Paudel is a Professor in the Department of Sustainable Development at Appalachian State University.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Dinesh Paudel, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Elite Failure, Geopolitics, and Youth Anger Collide

Professor Dinesh Paudel, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Analysts describe the September 2025 uprising as a Gen Z revolution, yet youth mobilization in Nepal has a long genealogy. From your perspective, what specific social, economic, and political configurations enabled this generation to rupture the cycle of elite reproduction where earlier movements failed—and how do corruption, nepotism, and entrenched elite dominance fit into the deeper structural drivers that made such an eruption possible now?

Professor Dinesh Paudel: Thank you for this great question. It’s long overdue. It was already brewing. This kind of uprising and discontent had been in the making for a long time.
But the current conjuncture has multiple factors coming together, leading to this eruption.

One factor is the internal political dynamics within the parties. They were not able to understand the new generation’s aspirations. They also failed to govern in a way that allowed the young generation to see themselves in politics and in the future of the nation. That’s one of the main factors—the internal failure of the party system. The internal conjuncture of power dynamics ruptured.

The second important point is geopolitical tension. It is about how the government was overthrown and how the young population began mobilizing their force. It was carried away by other interests, creating a kind of popular imagination of revolution. But in reality, multiple bigger powers were trying to secure their interests in a country that is geopolitically strategic—physically between China and India, at the center of the Himalaya, and at the heart of what some call a Second Cold War, especially between China and the West. India’s relationship with the West is not in the best shape at the moment. Nepal sits right where these possibilities converge, and many people anticipated this.

The third point concerns India specifically, which was not happy with the government in Nepal. This discontent started with the promulgation of the constitution 10 years ago. India never wanted Nepal to have that constitution, but the issue escalated when the constitution included part of historical Nepal now controlled by India. Including this in the constitution angered India further.

The fourth point is social media, amplified by intellectual and journalistic voices, which propagated negative perceptions of the governing system. They presented things as not working, and this negativity grew steadily. It spread among the general public, particularly through youth on social media, fostering the belief that nothing works in Nepal and that something else must come—even though that “something else” was never really thought through.

Finally, development programs, NGOs, and modern aspirations led the public to believe they deserved development in a new way. But this remains controlled by an extremely dependent economic system. A very few elites—primarily Indian, some Chinese, and others—control it. The Nepali market is essentially the Indian market. The production system is crumbling, and deindustrialization has been ongoing for many years. This has produced a particular corporate culture that dominates politics, media, intellectual life, and more. It is a system that fostered extraordinary dependence, out-migration, exploitation, and inequality, particularly between rural and urban areas. All of that came together in a moment when people just burst into action.

But the impact resulted not only from the protests. Other interests also infiltrated and pushed the movement further. That’s the current situation. Basically, it reflects the failure of the political regime to institutionalize its agenda, but it has also been pushed by geopolitical forces seeking to destabilize Nepal and secure a stronger footing in the country.

Nepal’s Youth Caught in a Triple Disjuncture

Nepal’s youth today confront what might be called a triple disjuncture: mass migration, precarious labor markets, and the expansion of the digital public sphere. How do these dynamics intersect to produce a new political subjectivity that resists both elite capture and authoritarian closure? In particular, how have structural forces such as economic inequality, chronic youth unemployment, and the dependence on migration shaped the political consciousness and mobilizing capacity of Gen Z in Nepal?

Professor Dinesh Paudel: Very good question, and this is exactly that conjuncture of multiple forces you mentioned that resulted in a particular type of economic precarity. Especially young people’s aspiration was to become economically successful, but the opportunities to do so were really decimated. But you cannot just blame the current political structure. You have to go back almost 30 years to understand what produced this. As soon as Nepal entered multi-party democracy in 1990, the government was forced to adopt an open market economy in such a way that the industrial sector basically collapsed in front of Indian and Chinese industrial and corporate power. That led to massive closures of national industries. The frustration from that also fueled the Maoist Revolution, which started in 1996. The Maoist movement, lasting for 10 years, led to massive out-migration from rural areas, while the open market economy that destroyed the national economy pushed people to migrate abroad.

So, Nepal lost two things: national productive capacity—the industrial base—and the labor force. That severely degraded national production. Over the last two and a half decades, this has produced massive unemployment, while national and international forces facilitated a process by which young people migrated to other countries. In effect, they wanted to solve the Maoist problem by exporting young people, so that they would not join the revolution. But then it became systematic: rural populations moved to urban areas, and from urban areas to other countries, primarily Gulf and Middle Eastern states, numbering in the millions.
Nepal thus lost not only industrial capacity—in terms of organizing, owning, and mobilizing capital—but also massive labor power, which created a lack of farming in rural areas. In some places, more than 70% of land is uncultivated, which used to be farmed in the past, because there is no labor.

This kind of economic situation continues to create chronic problems for generating opportunities in the country. All of this has reinforced political patronage and historical feudalistic conditions within the party system. That, in turn, made young people extraordinarily frustrated. They were frustrated by the economic situation, frustrated by dependency, and frustrated because they could not realize their dream of being modern and advanced. At the same time, the political structure adopted a feudalistic culture in which young people could not find their space. All this is leading to deep frustration, and the danger is that it will create further problems, because there are no coherent responses. Sometimes I feel it could evolve into a kind of gang politics. I am worried, even though it has not yet reached that point. But if this kind of mob-based, violent politics continues, there is real danger. Yet it seems inevitable, because the political structure has not been able to manage, understand, and maintain its hegemonic order. In other words, this is a failure of elite hegemony.

Even though the elites created these conditions, they have also been unable to preserve the very hegemonic structure that favors them. As a result, ruptures have emerged. I would not call this a youth revolution—it is not. Rather, it forms part of a longer trajectory of revolutions. Every decade Nepal has seen movements—the democratic movement, the Maoist movement—and young people have always been at the center. But those earlier uprisings were politically led, whereas this one is somewhat different. Still, I would not call it a revolution, because it will not fundamentally alter the political structure that produced these conditions. Sometimes I describe it instead as a kind of development: a double situation in which the political structure generates upheaval, but the outcome also reinforces the same structure. It will not truly transform the system. That leaves youth aspirations blocked from finding another path. Judging from how events have unfolded so far, it will not reach a transformative point.

The Social Media Ban Was a Trigger, Not the Cause

Social Media

The ban on social media is often cited as the immediate spark of revolt—yet should this be understood as a mere tactical blunder by Oli’s government, or rather as symptomatic of a deeper authoritarian reflex embedded within Nepal’s ruling elite?

Professor Dinesh Paudel: The social media ban… you have to look at it from two perspectives. One is the aspiration of young people and how embedded they are in the social media structure. But at the same time, you have to look at it from the perspective of a smaller country. These social media and multinational companies do not want to recognize, for example, Nepali sovereignty. They do not want to register; they do not want to pay taxes. Even social media companies—Twitter, Yik Yak—officially said that Nepal is a corrupt country, so they cannot register or be taxed. That undermines national pride, nationalism, and everything. We need to understand the positionality of a smaller country. So, people think they must register. Why not? If they registered in India, then they should register in Nepal; it’s the same—a similar sovereignty situation. That’s one aspect of it.

But at that moment, the youth protest against corruption and the demand for good governance was already planned, and social media was used to organize those movements. So yes, it fueled the process, but it was not really the cause. The social media ban did not trigger it. Similar bans had happened in the past as well. They banned TikTok, and TikTok came back, registered, and now pays taxes to the country. But these other companies do not want to do that. Still, there is a Nepali psyche and intellectual understanding that Nepal’s sovereign rights must be respected. Young people support that too, actually. But deeply embedded, long-simmering social frustration, lack of employment, lack of good governance, and systematic corruption—it’s not just the political class, they are part of it. It’s the totality of the system that mobilizes all kinds of power nexuses in building corruption. That is what led to this frustration, and that was the culminating point, rather than it really being about authoritarianism tied to the social media ban.

People haven’t really looked at this. They use the word authoritarianism because they want to make a political point, but in fact, Nepal had been trying to get these companies to register for many years, and that process started long ago. Legislation was passed with 100% support in parliament one year ago, and the government called on these companies regularly to respect the law and comply. I don’t think it was an authoritarian attitude that led to the social media ban. Rather, the ban triggered other frustrations—that’s how I would put it.

Nepo-Babies Symbolize a Feudal Political Structure Still Dominant in Nepal

The viral outrage against “nepo-babies” seems to reveal a moral economy of resentment against elite entitlement. To what extent did the digital spectacle of political heirs flaunting luxury lifestyles crystallize diffuse frustrations into a new form of class politics—one mediated by resentment, spectacle, and digital culture, and distinct from the agrarian or proletarian struggles of earlier eras?

Professor Dinesh Paudel: Right. This is a very fundamental part of it. The corrupt kind of system, this nepo-babies idea, is a good instrument to utilize—not only against politicians, but also other kinds of forma and everything. It really helps people understand how the feudal family structure mobilizes the political structure for its benefit. So, it’s real.

But at the same time, it is not really pervasive. Not every politician managed to make their kids that way. And the corruption in Nepal is actually maintained and regulated by a particular type of corporative capitalist—middlemen business structures that mobilize and consolidate power, creating nexuses. These nepo-babies are part of that; they are enrolled into those nexuses and act as mediators in negotiations through karopsana (patronage brokerage / political fixing in Nepalese) and everything.

So, in that sense, it’s a particular agenda in creating a certain kind of populism. “Nepo-babies” is a very easily sellable term. But there is also a reality: it symbolizes that the feudal political structure is still dominant in the country, and that really helps people to grasp it. However, there is a danger in this kind of new generation movement, because it is framed in generational rather than other forms of inequality. Class, gender, caste, and socialist structures are deeply embedded in South Asia and in Nepal. So, this generational framing risks undermining those other dimensions of inequality. That danger is emerging.

There are generational inequalities, yes, but the young generation in Nepal is often better off than the older generation, especially in rural areas. The subsistence farmers live very hard lives and are the ones doing the lowest-level jobs. By contrast, the young generation leading this movement lives better lives than many others. They are urban, educated, and from well-off families. They are not the everyday working people—those are the millions working abroad in the Middle East in factories.

My worry is that the inequality perpetuated in Nepal through pluralistic land structures and a pluralistic political and economic system requires deep class-based analysis, and this generational lens may obscure that. At the same time, there is an oligarchic attitude toward politics: “Okay, this is for me, next is my wife, then that.” This attitude is dominant. It’s not only in Nepal—it’s big in India, Bangladesh, and many other countries. The symptoms were already present in Nepal, too. This revolt has hit hard against that pattern and may disrupt it temporarily. But it will likely reconfigure within the elite structure, and regardless of which elites dominate, the elite-based political structure will continue unless there is massive restructuring of the economic system that maintains this power balance.

Without a national production system and without mobilizing substantial yields toward the national economy, this is not going to change. In Nepali, they call it Bicholia—basically brokers. It is a broker’s-rule political system. These brokers—traders, contractors, suppliers—are the ones who mobilize everything. Unless those structures are directly addressed and transformed, it will be difficult to imagine a different political and economic system emerging in Nepal or the region.

This also requires understanding at the regional level. It is not only Nepal—it is part of an open economic structure. The majority of traders are from India or other countries, with only local agents in Nepal, who manage the political structure from behind the curtain. One therefore needs to understand the local political dynamics and economic structures, but also their relation to regional systems. In that sense, I consider this a necessary, even natural, kind of revolt. But the optimism that it will lead to deeper restructuring of the country is, I think, very minimal.

Corruption in Nepal Is the Governing Logic of Elite Power

The municipality office in Inaruwa, Sunsari, lies heavily damaged after protesters targeted it during the nationwide demonstrations against corruption and the social media shutdown on September 9, 2025. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula

Corruption in Nepal is often framed as administrative weakness, but your work emphasizes its structural role in reproducing elite hegemony. How should we theorize corruption—not as deviation but as a governing logic—in post-monarchical Nepal? Do you see corruption in Nepal primarily as a symptom of weak institutions, or as an intentional system of elite reproduction and authoritarian consolidation?

Professor Dinesh Paudel: This is a great question. Corruption is deeply embedded, and I would say it mobilizes both kinds of structures. It reproduces elite dominance, and it’s one way of maintaining elite hegemony in the political-economic system. But it is also systematically introduced at every level of society and governance in such a way that it became a ladder for making political-economic progress, from the local to the national elites.

To understand corruption, we must also look at the massive development projects implemented over decades. Nepal was one of the priority countries for international—especially Western—actors to carry out such programs, along with international investments through banks, the World Bank, and others. Instead of focusing on national priorities, these actors pursued their petty geopolitical or other interests. They mobilized elites to implement their programs and, at every scale—from small to large—channeled resources so that they would have better access to contractors. They could harvest trees, collect sand, build roads, construct buildings, or procure everyday goods. In return, they would always provide some kind of commission—“okay, you do this, then I’ll offer you this.” These practices, sustained over decades, systematically developed an internal, informal institutional system that entrenched corruption in the country.

There are also checks and balances, of course. The public watched and pushed back—it was always there. But at the same time, even at the small municipal level, people, even minor officers, would not act without taking bribes. Over decades, corruption became normalized, and it took a long time for everyone to grasp the root causes. For me, corruption is a symptom of how the pluralistic political structure maintains itself, but it is also the result of the particular form of economic system introduced over the last 30 years—one that required sustaining political power structures through bribes and political payoffs. This allowed the larger corporate world to control the economic system and labor production, supplying laborers cheaply to other countries while selling whatever they wanted by shutting down Nepal’s national production system. Industries collapsed—they could not compete with others, or they were simply bought out.

So, corruption is not something that any politician can fix in Nepal. It requires a systematic overhaul—a restructuring at every level with the introduction of a national production system. Otherwise, it will remain deeply embedded in how the state functions every day, at every level. At the same time, there is widespread understanding among the public that corruption is a big problem and must be eliminated. Any slogan with an anti-corruption agenda will therefore gain strong political support from the public. But those who bring such agendas are themselves part of the same political structure; they are not separate from the economic and political system. For this reason, I do not see corruption disappearing soon, unless Nepal achieves economic independence and builds a self-reliant economic structure—which has now been overtaken by the corporate world and is no longer under Nepal’s control.

Populist Agendas in Nepal Will Not Dismantle the Elite Structure

In your work on ethnic identity politics, you demonstrate how elites instrumentalize social divisions to consolidate authority. Do you see a similar risk with today’s anti-nepotism and anti-corruption discourses—that they could be co-opted by authoritarian populists who reframe them as projects of “purification,” while ultimately reproducing exclusionary politics and elite dominance?

Professor Dinesh Paudel:  The answer is yes. The danger of populism is that populist agendas have always been propagated to maintain the elite structure. For me, I would consider this almost as a fight between elites. There is no rural poor people’s mobilization, and real thinking toward an egalitarian political structure is not there. So, populism in South Asia—like Hindu nationalism in India, the recent uprising in Bangladesh, similar things in Myanmar, with some exceptions in Sri Lanka, and now in many other places—has taken a very different route. There are some people-centric agendas, but most of the time in the South Asian context, it looks cultural or political, but it ultimately serves elite interests.

In Nepal, too, the populist mobilization around anti-corruption, youth inclusion, and similar issues is important, as in India. But it will not dismantle the elite structure that has dominated for a long period of time. So, my fear is that there was huge damage under this mobilization this time. Nepal lost billions of dollars and many people. It’s a huge damage. But what will it result in? It will not move outside the elitist structure already in place in Nepal.

Nepal Faces More Instability

The unprecedented state violence of September 2025 raises questions about authoritarian consolidation. Should we interpret the crackdown as a desperate last stand of a collapsing elite order, or as evidence of a longer trajectory in which coercion is becoming normalized within Nepal’s democratic institutions?

Professor Dinesh Paudel: I would say it’s a degradation of the elite structure, in one sense, which has created these ruptures—and the ruptures are already there. It’s a continuous process along this path, which is an interesting thing. Politics is propagated under these ruptures. But it will also create space for another similar elite-based structure. That’s my fear, and I already see it happening.

So yes, it is a pillar within the elite structure that was maintained through a particular type of political party system. But these political party systems also became vulnerable to external pressure and influence. They were always managed by external forces.

Truly national interest and genuine national decision-making haven’t happened on either side—the rebuilding side or the elite side. Therefore, once mobilized, the elite structure continues to be reproduced. I do not imagine that the elitist structure will go away—that is not a possibility. But the current conjuncture of political elites, especially an older generation of political leaders, is now losing ground and space quite drastically. The danger, however, is that those spaces will be filled in ways that probably create even more instability in the country.

My sense is that Nepal will go through more political instability, and that will harm the region more broadly. That harm may in fact serve the interests of some geopolitical forces, because if the political structure is unstable, they can more easily insert their interests. That is the fate of smaller countries in the Global South in particular.

Without Economic Reform, Nepal Risks Mass Youth Exodus

A Nepali farmer at work in a rural field during the monsoon season. As the rains arrive, farmers across Nepal become busy in their fields, though most still rely on traditional farming techniques. Photo: Shishir Gautam.

Your ethnographic work on the Maoist revolution highlights how rural communities once generated alternative political imaginaries. To what extent do you see continuities—or disjunctures—between those insurgent subjectivities and the digitally mediated agency of Gen Z?

Professor Dinesh Paudel: That’s a very good one. There are some continuities in the sense that Nepali people have always sought alternative imaginaries, but there is also a complete disjuncture between the current generation and the past. The current generation does not really know the rural dynamics. They do not understand the moral economic system. They have no clue about present politics.

So the ideas of alternative imagination are almost opposite. Rural imaginaries were more sober, rooted in production and autonomy, while today’s are more connected to modern lifestyles and jobs, moving away from the traditional economic system. Both are alternative imaginations, but what they are looking for is different.

If they could find some kind of synergy, it could lead to real change in the country. But that synergy requires political negotiation and organizing—and that is not going to happen. Primarily, rural areas are heavily influenced by the traditional structures of political parties, while the urban youth are deeply alienated from them. So, the negotiation between the two will likely not happen anytime soon.

That unnegotiated gray space is where all kinds of interests will grow—and that is the danger for Nepali youth, their aspirations, and their inspiration. I would not be surprised if, in the next few years, out-migration of young people from the country increases massively. Without correcting the economic structure, there will not be more jobs. There will not be much of anything. Simply changing the government will not do it, because deeper structural changes are required.

But young people now have big hopes, and those hopes may soon turn to frustration. Either they will leave the country, or Nepal will face further instability and imbalance. So, the future scenario for the next few years looks extraordinarily volatile.

From Red Revolution to Red Neoliberalism

Given the Maoists’ descent into corruption and clientelism, can their revolutionary legacy still serve as a democratic resource for the present, or has it become a cautionary tale of how emancipatory struggles are absorbed into elite circulation?

Professor Dinesh Paudel: This is a wonderful question, because the kind of feudalism and elite-controlled politics was propagated by the Maoists themselves. They became the victims of elitism within their own movement. Yes, they challenged the political conjuncture and elitism of that time, but only to reintroduce their own. So, I would not consider that the old Maoists, in the structures they proposed, were ever going to be non-elitist or truly helpful.

The frustration that young people are expressing today also comes directly from the Maoists. When they entered peaceful politics and the new constitution was introduced, the Maoists became the only party in the country that was always in government—sometimes in coalition with one party, sometimes with another—but their performance was the most miserable.

It is very important to note that while the Maoists had an interesting political vision for the country, they had no vision for the economy. They became victims of the open economic structure, which I call red neoliberalism. They adopted neoliberal policies in such a way that they dismantled national production capacity, especially in industry, and alienated young people. They could not really understand this dynamic, became part of it, and therefore contributed directly to the dissatisfaction we see today.

Young people today have learned some lessons from that history, but they see no real connection to the Maoists’ promises, because they view the Maoists themselves as the problem. The Maoists destabilized rural areas, triggered mass out-migration, and destroyed national productive capacity. So, today’s youth frustration is deeply tied to what the Maoists promised versus what they delivered. And what they delivered was further dependency, out-migration, bad governance, and overall decline.

Crude Nationalism Cannot Satisfy Young People’s Aspirations

Thousands joined a joint morning procession organized by the CPN-UML and Nepali Congress district committees in Inaruwa Bazaar on September 19, 2025, to mark Constitution Day. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula.

Finally, do you see in Nepal’s youth movement the embryonic forms of what might be called a post-elitist or post-authoritarian democracy—an order rooted not in patronage or coercion but in new modes of participatory and inclusive politics?

Professor Dinesh Paudel: I do not see that happening right away. But this has raised a lot of questions for the population, the political elites themselves, and others. The country will suffer more through various challenges, but this is the beginning of a different kind of political imagination that is emerging. Probably it will not find success quickly.

This particular episode may do more harm than good. Looking at the last couple of weeks, I can see it in the way they are now appointing ministers, the way they are appointing political elites back into power, and the way they use military force to enforce their agenda—all of which reflect an extraordinarily feudalistic structure in the country.

Given this, the current moment will not do much to change elite hegemony in Nepal. But no matter what happens, young people’s frustration is directed against elitism. What they are seeking in the future is post-elite—some kind of egalitarian economic and political system. That aspiration is a positive sign toward new possibilities. But this episode alone will not do much other than reintroduce the same elitist structure.

Primarily, young people are not questioning the economic structure. They are not really grasping how the dependent economic system in the country continues to produce an elite-controlled political system. This is similar to Bangladesh, where a major revolt not long ago did little to address the country’s economic situation. A similar pattern is emerging in India, too. Youth-led frustration will continue across South Asia—it will not stop in Nepal. I see big brewing parties emerging in India, which is a major hot spot. I am not sure when it will erupt or in what form, but for decades—almost 70, 80, 100 years—the economic feudalistic structure has not been resolved. I see something coming.

Even though India uses neighboring political instability to its advantage, crude nationalism alone will not satisfy the aspirations of young people, especially amid growing economic inequality. Regional change will happen only if something major occurs in other countries, especially in India and beyond. Still, this is a good symptom: unless elites create space for young people—and some form of inclusive system, even if not fully post-elite—these tensions will persist, not only in Nepal but across the region, for decades to come.

The Zhihu logo displayed on a smartphone screen. Photo: Rafael Henrique.

Diversity, Rationality, and the Diffusion of Online Populism: A Study of Chinese Social Media Discussions

by ArticlesDigital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHomeJournal of Populism Studies

Please cite as:

Su, Yu & Li, Tongtong. (2025). “Diversity, Rationality, and the Diffusion of Online Populism: A Study of Chinese Social Media Discussions.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 21, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000117

 

Abstract

This study asks whether two core dimensions of deliberative quality—viewpoint diversity and rationality—shape the diffusion of online populism on Zhihu, a major Chinese Q&A platform. Using Transformer-based language models and LLMs to operationalize diversity and rationality across threads on ten salient populist issues, and estimating multilevel negative binomial models, we find: (a) diversity is positively associated with diffusion (comments/likes), and (b) rationality is negatively associated with diffusion; moreover, issue-level random effects are substantial, indicating topic-specific virality. We theorize that rationality may dampen the diffusion, and—based on prior literature—this is plausibly because it reduces emotional arousal, increases cognitive load, interrupts outrage cycles, and weakens bandwagon cues typically rewarded by algorithms and users. Theoretically, the paper bridges deliberative democracy and populism by showing that diversity can be a double-edged amplifier in populist contexts, while rationality functions as a diffusion brake; it also recenters analysis on a non-Western, platform-level setting. Practically, the findings caution against diversity-only interventions, support community and design measures that elevate reason-giving (e.g., sourcing, evidence prompts) while accounting for issue-specific virality when governing online populism in China’s digital public sphere.

Keywords: online populism, deliberation, rationality, diversity, social media

 

By Yu Su & Tongtong Li

Introduction

In the digital public sphere, diversity of viewpoints and rationality of discussion are widely recognized as two core features of public deliberation, serving as important mechanisms for promoting healthy democratic discourse (Dryzek, 2000; Habermas, 1996). Diversity emphasizes the inclusion of different opinions and perspectives in the deliberative process, helping to break information echo chambers and reduce the emergence of extreme positions (Mutz, 2006); rationality advocates for providing reasons, evidence, and logical arguments to support one’s viewpoints, thereby facilitating information sharing and cognitive updating in discussions (Stromer-Galley, 2007).

However, today’s online space has witnessed the rapid rise of populism. In China in particular, although the meritocratic political system has to some extent constrained the emergence of populist politicians and effectively precluded top-down populist mobilization, a form of bottom-up populist expression continues to proliferate on the internet (Ma, 2015). Chinese online populism is characterized by grassroots political narratives, with ordinary netizens leveraging anonymity to launch collective criticism against elite misconduct and perceived threats from “the other” (He et al., 2021; Miao et al., 2020). Here, “the elite” refer to those who ostensibly speak on behalf of the people but fail to genuinely represent their interests, having lost the sense of “paternalistic responsibility” (Miao et al., 2020). “the other” are those perceived as threatening societal or collective interests, such as Western countries or “white left” ideologies (Zhang, 2020; Zhang, 2022), reflecting Chinese netizens’ strong exclusionary attitudes and the defense of mainstream values. Thus, anti-elitism and nationalism together form the fundamental tone of Chinese online populism.

The extremely low threshold for participation on Chinese social media has led to the emergence and fermentation of numerous hotly debated topics that are permeated with the aforementioned populist tendencies. For instance, the “Driving a Mercedes into the Forbidden City”1 incident triggered intense public anger toward elite privilege and wealth (He et al., 2025b); similarly, discussions surrounding the “996” work schedule are filled with resistance to excessive overtime and calls for the protection of workers’ rights. There is also the case of the public outcry over foreign brands ceasing to use Xinjiang cotton in their products2 (Tao et al., 2025). However, current communication studies on such populist issues mostly focus on the discursive construction and logic of populist discourse within individual topics (He et al., 2025a; He et al., 2025b; Tao et al., 2025; Zhang & Schroeder, 2024), while there remains a lack of attention to how these populist discourses actually diffuse in the online sphere.

Whether diversity and rationality—two essential elements of deliberation—can curb the diffusion of populist discourse is the central question of this study. When diversity is present, the discussion space accommodates heterogeneous voices, thereby depriving populist discourse—which heavily relies on singular positions and adversarial constructions—of fertile ground for spreading (Sunstein, 2001; Cinelli et al., 2021). Likewise, when discussions are grounded in rationality, participants are more likely to engage with issues prudently and are less susceptible to emotional mobilization, thus hindering the proliferation of populist discourse (Rauchfleisch & Kaiser, 2021).

To examine this relationship, this study integrates computational analysis with traditional statistical testing. First, ten highly influential populist topics from Chinese social media were selected, and all related discussion threads from Zhihu—a major Chinese Q&A platform—were systematically collected as the research corpus. Next, a pre-trained large language model was employed to measure the two key predictor variables: diversity and rationality within the discussions. The number of comments and likes received by each thread were used as quantitative indicators of the extent of “diffusion.” Finally, regression analysis was conducted to explore the relationships among diversity, rationality, and the diffusion of populist discussions, thereby addressing the central research question.

This study makes two primary contributions: first, it deepens the understanding of the applicability and limitations of deliberative democratic theory in the context of non-Western digital platforms, expanding the conceptualization of diversity and rationality; second, it provides a theoretical basis for understanding the diffusion mechanisms of online populist discussions and offers insights for platform governance in China.

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Dr. André Borges is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Brasília.

Dr. Borges: Brazil Is Becoming More Like American Politics, Where Polarization Normalizes Rule-Breaking

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

Brazil’s democracy faces one of its greatest stress tests with former President Jair Bolsonaro sentenced to 27 years for plotting a coup. In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. André Borges, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Brasília, warns that Brazil is “becoming more like American politics, where affective polarization drives citizens to see opponents as existential threats.” Such polarization, he argues, risks normalizing democratic rule-breaking. Yet Dr. Borges also highlights Brazil’s resilience, rooted in its “institutional mix that deconcentrates authority”—federalism, separation of powers, fragmented parties, and an autonomous Supreme Court. This paradox defines Brazil today: resilient institutions confronting dangerously eroding democratic norms.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The conviction of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro to 27 years in prison for plotting a coup has plunged Brazil into one of the most turbulent chapters of its democratic history. While Bolsonaro’s allies denounce the ruling as political persecution, and international far-right figures echo claims of “lawfare,” Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF) has defended the trial as a necessary step to safeguard democracy.

Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Dr. André Borges, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Brasília, whose research focuses on party systems, coalition formation, and right-wing populism. Dr. Borges warns that Brazil is “becoming more like American politics, where affective polarization drives citizens to see opponents as existential threats.” In his view, such dynamics risk normalizing democratic rule-breaking, as voters increasingly rationalize the repression of political adversaries in the name of survival.

At the same time, Dr. Borges stresses that Brazil retains significant institutional defenses against authoritarian capture. “In comparative terms, if I look at other Latin American countries, I would say that Brazilian institutions are, in a sense, more resilient to this kind of attack. The reason for this has to do with several factors, one of which is that Brazil has an institutional mix that deconcentrates authority. It has a federal system, a presidential constitution with separation of powers, and a very fragmented party system. On top of that, there is a relatively autonomous Supreme Court.”

This “institutional mix,” he argues, explains why Bolsonaro could not consolidate authoritarian rule in the style of leaders such as Nayib Bukele in El Salvador or Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Since 1989, no Brazilian president has commanded a legislative majority, forcing presidents—including Bolsonaro—to rely on fragile coalitions with clientelistic parties that are reluctant to rewrite rules that benefit them. “Doing so would simply empower Bolsonaro and his family to the detriment of traditional politicians—and that is not something they would like to see happening,” Dr. Borges notes.

By situating Bolsonaro’s downfall in the tension between institutional resilience and intensifying polarization, Dr. Borges highlights a central paradox: while Brazil’s democracy has thus far resisted authoritarian capture, the country’s deepening affective divides may yet erode the very democratic norms its institutions have preserved.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. André Borges, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

The Supreme Court Stepped In Where Congress Was Lenient

Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF) at night, Brasília, Federal District, Brazil, August 26, 2018. Photo: Diego Grandi.

Professor Borges, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Jair Bolsonaro’s conviction for plotting a military coup marks an unprecedented moment in Brazilian democracy, with the Supreme Court framing his conspiracy as an attempt to “annihilate” the democratic rule of law. How do you see this outcome reshaping the balance of power between elected executives and judicial institutions, and how does it fit within your account of Brazil’s long-run party-system de-institutionalization, where shifting alliances eroded voters’ ability to distinguish governing alternatives and opened space for an authoritarian outsider?

Assoc. Prof. André Borges: That’s a great question. In my view, the Bolsonaro administration was unmistakably illiberal. It deliberately sought to weaken checks and balances, empower the military, and expand the role of the armed forces in national politics. This was evident throughout Bolsonaro’s years in power, as his government aimed to restore to the military some of the authority it had previously lost. For example, the military significantly increased its control over national security institutions.

Because of the Bolsonaro administration’s attacks on democracy, the Supreme Court became more activist. I believe its heightened role in recent years is also a consequence of Congress’s leniency toward Bolsonaro’s anti-democratic agenda. This is crucial to note: on several occasions, Supreme Court could have acted to obstruct this illiberal project. For example, during the pandemic, evidence emerged that top government officials were involved in corruption scandals tied to vaccine purchases. Yet, dominated by center-right, right-wing, and far-right parties, Congress largely sided with Bolsonaro—leaving the Supreme Court to step in.

With regard to party institutionalization, Bolsonaro’s rise to power is closely tied to the weakening of mainstream center-right forces, particularly the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB). Initially a centrist—indeed, at times even center-left—party, the PSDB gradually shifted rightward. Prior to Bolsonaro, it was the principal center-right alternative. Yet over time the PSDB experienced a profound collapse: its electoral base eroded, key leaders departed, and internal fractures deepened. Bolsonaro capitalized on this weakening of the mainstream right.

This is not unique to Brazil. In other countries in the region, such as Chile, we see a similar dynamic: major rival parties like the UDI and National Renovation have lost ground to the far right. More broadly, across Latin America, the mainstream right is losing parts of its conservative electorate. There are many reasons for this, but once conservative sectors no longer feel represented by traditional right-wing parties, it opens opportunities for anti-system, far-right alternatives. This trend is reinforced by a broader climate of distrust in political parties. People feel unrepresented and believe that all parties and politicians are corrupt. That sense of disillusionment creates the conditions in which far-right populist voices can gain ground.

Brazil’s Institutional Mix Makes Democratic Backsliding Harder

In your research on party system erosion and right-wing populism, you highlight the fragility of institutional constraints under populist rule. Does Bolsonaro’s sentencing suggest that Brazil’s institutions have developed greater resilience compared to other cases you have studied, or might this verdict deepen polarization and fuel narratives of political persecution?

Assoc. Prof. André Borges: That’s a great question as well. My take on this is the following. In comparative terms, if I look at other Latin American countries, I would say that Brazilian institutions are, in a sense, more resilient to this kind of attack. The reason for this has to do with several factors, one of which is that Brazil has an institutional mix that deconcentrates authority. It has a federal system, a presidential constitution with separation of powers, and a very fragmented party system. On top of that, there is a relatively autonomous Supreme Court.

In this scenario, it is harder for a far-right populist like Bolsonaro to implement a democratic backsliding project. In this respect, Brazil is different from El Salvador. If you look at what is going on there with Nayib Bukele, it is very clear that El Salvador is no longer a functional democracy: checks and balances have been eroded, the Supreme Court was packed with political allies, and the legislature no longer acts as a check on presidential power. But it would be very difficult to reproduce that in Brazil.

One reason is that illiberal backsliding is more likely when executives can rely on supermajorities—when the president’s party holds a very large majority in the legislature. This is very unlikely in Brazil. Since 1989, none of the presidents elected has had a majority; in reality, all have been minority presidents. Bolsonaro, when elected in 2018, had a party with only 10% of the seats. This makes Brazil very different from cases like Hungary, where Fidesz under Viktor Orbán held a supermajority, making it much easier to implement constitutional changes.

In Brazil, a far-right populist who comes into power is forced to forge a coalition with right-wing parties. Many of these parties are essentially office-seeking, clientelistic organizations rather than programmatic ones. It seems to me that the traditional politicians within these parties are not willing to change the rules of the game, for a very simple reason: the rules of the game benefit them. If you look at Brazil’s recent history, the political right has always held a plurality of the vote in legislative elections for the lower chamber. Considering that the right consistently wins, why would they change the rules of the game? It does not make sense. In the end, doing so would simply empower Bolsonaro and his family to the detriment of traditional politicians—and that is not something they would like to see happening in the coming years. So in this sense, yes, Brazilian institutions are probably more resilient compared to other cases.

Portraying Trials as Persecution Is a Familiar Populist Script

Brick Lane, one of the UK’s most famous locations for street art and graffiti, is synonymous with London’s vibrant urban art scene. Photo: Nicoleta Raluca Tudor.

Bolsonaro and his allies have framed the trial as political revenge, echoing claims of ‘lawfare’ often made by populist leaders across Latin America. To what extent does the framing of accountability as persecution resonate with broader patterns you have identified in multiparty presidential systems?

Assoc. Prof. André Borges: There is nothing new in this kind of narrative. It has been used by different types of populists from both sides of the ideological spectrum. This is the usual script when they face trial: they portray it as political persecution. In the case of Bolsonaro in Brazil, this framing seems likely to resonate mainly with his hardcore supporters. Depending on how you measure it, the so-called Bolsonaristas—Bolsonaro’s followers—represent between 20–25% of voters. That is significant, but it is not enough to win a presidential election, because in Brazil you have runoff rules, and you can only win with 50% plus one of the valid votes. So that base is insufficient.

If Bolsonaro—or another far-right candidate—plans to take over national government, he will need to build an electoral coalition that goes beyond far-right voters. In this sense, I do not think this narrative will help Bolsonaro much, especially given that rejection of him and his family has grown among the electorate. The latest polls show that about 64% of Brazilian voters would never vote for Bolsonaro. When other names are considered, such as his wife, Michele Bolsonaro, or his son, rejection rates are even higher. This makes me think that this narrative will not be enough to gain support beyond the far-right, more extremist space.

Bolsonaro Reinforced a Preexisting Trend of Militarization in Brazilian Politics

The trial revealed detailed evidence of conspiracy, including potential plans to assassinate political rivals. From your perspective, does this reinforce arguments about the militarization of Brazilian politics—an area you have explored in your work on authoritarian inheritance—or does it reflect a unique rupture under Bolsonaro’s leadership?

Assoc. Prof. André Borges: On this question, I must say first that I am not a specialist in military politics, but with that being said, I do think there has been a process of militarization in Brazil, in the sense that civilian control over the military has always been weak. Brazil has not been as successful as other Latin American countries, for instance, in convicting military officers involved in human rights crimes during the dictatorship. In this regard, Brazil differs from Argentina or Uruguay, where there were truth commissions, trials, and many convictions of former officials.

Even before Bolsonaro’s administration, we had already seen an increasing presence of top military officers in civilian posts, especially in the area of public security. This reflects the fact that crime is a major concern among Brazil’s population, as in many other Latin American countries. As a result, there has been a gradual militarization of public security. Brazil’s constitution allows for military intervention in public security under certain circumstances, and one such intervention occurred during the Temer government, which was an interim government just before Bolsonaro, from 2016 to 2018. That intervention took place in Rio de Janeiro, the country’s third-largest state and one with particularly high levels of crime.

It is notable that the general who commanded this intervention, Braga Netto, was later nominated as Bolsonaro’s vice-presidential candidate in the last election. For this reason, I would say that the Bolsonaro government reinforced and accelerated a preexisting trend of greater military involvement in national political affairs. One clear piece of evidence is that no other government since the transition to democracy appointed as many military ministers as Bolsonaro did. He built a cabinet with a very high proportion of military officers—something highly unusual for a consolidated democracy. While this might be politics as usual in a country like Pakistan, it is striking in a country that is classified as a democracy.

There has also been concern about the politicization of the armed forces. This is the main concern, because since the end of the military dictatorship there has been a strong effort by the armed forces toward professionalization, ensuring that the army, navy, and marines would not become involved in politics. That is not the role of the military; they should remain separate from politics. The Bolsonaro government, however, represented a kind of return to the past, as we saw some active generals appointed to political office. This also triggered debate in Congress, because the Brazilian constitution and legislation on military affairs are very clear: if you are part of the military and want to run for political office, or if you wish to be appointed to a ministry or a secretary position at the state level, you must first retire. You cannot serve while remaining active military. Congress even approved a law on this issue to reinforce that rule and prevent such situations.

But yes, the concern is not only the politicization of the armed forces but also the politicization of the police. In Brazil, unlike in many other countries, we have two police branches: the military police, which has a more repressive function, and the civil police, which is responsible for investigating crimes. The military police has close ties to the armed forces, and existing research, as well as events during the Bolsonaro government, show that many police officers are in fact Bolsonaro supporters. Support for Bolsonaro is particularly strong among the lower ranks of the police forces. 

This is troubling, because these officers are ultimately responsible for maintaining law and order during protests—for instance, when far-right supporters take to the streets. We saw what happened in January 2023, when a mob of Bolsonaro supporters invaded Congress and the Supreme Court. It was so easy for them because the police of the Federal District—which, while technically a city, has the status of a state and is home to Brazil’s capital—was responsible for overseeing the demonstration and preventing violence. Yet they were lenient; they essentially allowed the protesters to invade public buildings. As a result, it took considerable time before the situation was brought under control.

Brazil’s former President Jair Bolsonaro poses with anti-riot police agents after cast their ballot in Rio de Janeiro, Brasil on November 29, 2020. Photo: Antonio Scorza.

Bolsonarismo Could Survive Through Party Deals

Given your work on electoral coalitions and incentives in presidential systems, what implications might Bolsonaro’s conviction have for the future strategies of Brazil’s right-wing parties and actors? Could sidelining Bolsonaro encourage institutionalized conservative alternatives, or will his movement continue to dominate the right despite his imprisonment?

Assoc. Prof. André Borges: That’s an excellent question, and one I have asked myself in recent years. I don’t think I have a definitive answer. But what I can say is that Bolsonarismo, if we think of it as a far-right movement, is already rooted in society. Bolsonaro was able to mobilize an electoral base comprised of ultra-conservative voters who support him because they share the same agendas and policy preferences he expressed during his campaign. So, in a sense, the connection is not only based on charisma. In political science, we usually distinguish between two types of linkages between voters and leaders, or between voters and parties: charismatic linkages, which rest on exceptional qualities of the leader and emotional attachment, and programmatic linkages. In the case of Bolsonarismo, I think you have both. There is an emotional connection to Bolsonaro, but also a programmatic one.

This makes me think that even if Bolsonaro is imprisoned and forced to step away from national politics—because, if everything goes as planned, he will not be able to run for office again in his lifetime, having been sentenced to 27 years in prison plus another 8 years of ineligibility—Bolsonarismo will endure. Bolsonaro is now 70 years old, which means he would be over 100 before being eligible again. In this sense, other right-wing leaders could inherit his movement, since the electoral constituency of far-right, extremist voters will remain.

I see two possible scenarios. In one, the political right divides: a candidate from Bolsonaro’s family—his son or his wife—runs, while the rest of the right supports another candidate, most likely Tarcísio de Freitas. This would split the right into a Bolsonarista wing led by his family and a non-Bolsonarista wing. In this scenario, it will be harder to consolidate a strong right-wing party.

The reason is that Bolsonaro and his family have never been able to build a party of their own. Bolsonaro is currently in the PL (Liberal Party), which today represents the far right but was previously a typical office-seeking, clientelistic party. Crucially, the PL is not controlled by Bolsonaro, but by traditional mainstream politicians like Valdemar da Costa Neto. That is the core problem: to create a strong Bolsonarista party, you need an organizational structure, and building one takes time and resources. I doubt the Bolsonaro family has either the capacity or the will to do that. They would likely need to take over an existing party, but all the major right-wing parties are controlled by traditional politicians.

The only feasible path would be some kind of agreement between Bolsonaro’s family and the more radical factions of the PL, which is itself divided between legislators loyal to Bolsonaro and more independent figures. Such a power-sharing arrangement could keep Bolsonarismo politically alive. At this moment, though, I don’t see how that would be possible—but perhaps I am wrong.

Affective Polarization in Brazil Risks Eroding Democratic Norms

In your recent work on the illusion of electoral stability, you discuss how party system erosion paved the way for Bolsonaro. Does his conviction close that cycle, or could institutional breakdown re-emerge in new forms?

Assoc. Prof. André Borges: It’s hard to know what is going to happen. For now, what I can say is that Brazil today is an increasingly polarized society. Brazilian politics is becoming more like American politics, in the sense that people’s political preferences are starting to interfere with their personal lives. This is very unusual for us Brazilians but has been happening in the United States for a long time. For example, you might see a situation in which someone who is a strong Democrat will not accept that his daughter marries a Republican. This is a clear case in which political preferences affect personal life—things that should normally be separate from politics.

The same pattern is now emerging in Brazil, where there is a lot of hatred and stereotyping on both sides. On one side, you have the petistas, supporters of the Workers’ Party, the largest left-wing party in Brazil, which governs the country today. On the other side, you have the Liberal Party and Bolsonaro supporters. The result is a deep clash between these two groups.

I think this is bad for democracy, because when you have this kind of affective polarization, it often leads to the politicization of democratic rules. This is very dangerous, because people start to calculate what is acceptable or not acceptable in day-to-day politics. When two groups hate each other and you have this us-versus-them logic, it becomes easier for voters to rationalize a situation in which, for instance, a president from my party takes action to repress supporters of the other party. Then I might say, “Well, the people on the other side are dangerous, they represent a threat, so why should we respect their political rights? Maybe it is justifiable to break the rules of democracy, because in the end, the other side is evil, and we should not respect their rights.”

I think we are reaching that point in Brazil, which in my view is dangerous. But as for knowing what will happen in the coming years—I don’t know. It wouldn’t be fair to say that I have the answer. 

Trump Treated Brazil as If It Were an Enemy State, Not an Ally

Supporters of Brazil’s former President (2019–2022) Jair Bolsonaro hold signs during a demonstration in São Paulo, Brazil, on September 7, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Trump’s use of tariffs and sanctions to pressure Brazil on Bolsonaro’s behalf highlights an unusual case of international populist solidarity. Does this signal a shift in how external pressures operate on Latin American democracies compared to past US interventions?

Assoc. Prof. André Borges: My impression is that, yes, this represents a departure from US foreign policy in recent decades. It is very unusual for an American president to try to interfere with judicial decisions in another country. I can’t think of any other recent example of this. So, this is very serious. But surely, it has to do with Donald Trump and the more radical wing of the Republican Party. This is worrying.

If we think about what happened during the 2022 elections, support from the Biden government was very important to ensure that we did not have a coup attempt or some kind of mobilization to discredit electoral results. The Biden administration was very quick in recognizing Lula’s victory. In addition, US military officers made very clear in public statements that the United States would not support any kind of military intervention aimed at overturning electoral results. So, it is obvious that this had an impact, especially because military forces in Brazil and in the United States have been collaborating for several decades.

The fact that we now have an American president who is not committed to democracy and the rule of law in countries that are supposedly allies of the United States is alarming. I used to think that Brazil and the United States were allies, and they had been allies for a long time. But the way Donald Trump has been treating Brazil and its top government officials suggests that Brazil is no longer an ally. It is as if Brazil has become like Iran or another country placed by the United States in the so-called “axis of evil,” to use George Bush’s phrase.

This is very strange. We don’t have an atomic bomb. Brazil does not represent a threat to other countries. We never said that we wanted to drop bombs on Argentina, destroy it, or wipe out its population. Brazil is, in the end, a peaceful country. So everything that is going on is just because of politics—because of this transnational far-right network. Trump is using US foreign policy to help Bolsonaro, to help a political ally, which is obviously absurd. I am no specialist in American constitutional law, but I suspect this alone would be grounds for impeachment. This is very serious. So, yes, I think what is going on is very worrying.

The Far Right Is Now a Transnationally Connected Movement

Finally, considering your comparative research on coalition formation and right-wing populism, how should scholars understand the interplay between domestic party realignments in Brazil and the broader international networks of illiberal leaders, from Trump to Orbán and Erdogan?

Assoc. Prof. André Borges: That’s a good question. I have the impression that these transnational far-right, illiberal networks have been very important in the sense that they provide resources to far-right leaders across different regions of the world. There is a kind of mimicking going on: when Viktor Orbán succeeds in weakening checks and balances in Hungary, this becomes an example for other far-right populists in Latin America, Asia, and beyond. I feel this dynamic contributes to introducing new axes of conflict. In the end, once you recognize that there is a far-right international movement, it becomes clear that this is not a local phenomenon. It is something happening across the world, and these actors are connected.

In the case of Brazil, we know that some of these far-right leaders from abroad are trying to interfere in national affairs. Obviously, this is going to affect political divisions and how party systems organize around conflict. In the end, parties and politicians have to take a position and ask themselves: “What do I think about Trump trying to interfere in national political affairs?” Because ultimately, this is about national sovereignty. The whole idea of nationalism is that we cannot accept this. Such interference can have a very substantial impact, especially within the political right, where parties will have to decide where—and with whom—they stand. This could certainly reshape the party system in Brazil, particularly since opinion polls show that a very broad majority of the population is against Trump’s use of sanctions to meddle in internal political affairs. So this raises a clear question for far-right politicians: maybe they have gone too far.

Demonstration organized by KOD in Kraków, Poland, on January 9, 2016, in defense of free media and democracy against the PiS government. Photo: Krzysztof Nahlik.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 2: The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland

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On September 18, 2025, ECPS held the second session of the Virtual Workshop Series — “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy. Chaired by Professor Mavis Maclean (Oxford), the panel examined Poland’s democratic trajectory through themes of patriotism, constitutional conflict, human rights, and representation. Highlights included Professor Joanna Kurczewska’s call to recover Solidarity’s inclusive legacy, Dr. Kamil Joński’s analysis of Poland’s constitutional “quagmire,” Professor Małgorzata Fuszara’s exploration of contested women’s and minority rights, and Professor Jacek Kurczewski’s reframing of judicial representation. Discussants added comparative and moral-philosophical perspectives. The session concluded that Poland’s experience reflects global struggles: reclaiming inclusive traditions, defending institutions, and embedding rights remain vital for democratic renewal.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On September 18, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the second session of its Virtual Workshop Series — ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. The session, titled “The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland,” brought together leading scholars to examine the Polish case as a lens into broader struggles over democracy, representation, and rights. Chaired by Professor Mavis Maclean (University of Oxford), the event highlighted Poland’s experience of post-1989 transformation, the contested legacy of Solidarity, constitutional polarization, and ongoing battles over women’s and minority rights.

Following the introduction of the programme and participants by Reka Koleszar on behalf of ECPS, Prof. Mavis Maclean, CBE (St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford) opened by situating the discussion within a wider European context. Reflecting on Britain’s surge of far-right populism, she posed a dilemma: should mass populist movements be regarded as authentic expressions of civic grievance, or as dangerous forces of hatred and violence? She expressed hope that the Polish experience could illuminate how democracies might redirect discontent toward renewal rather than demagoguery.

The first presentation, delivered by Professor Jacek Kurczewski on behalf of his wife, the absent Professor Joanna Kurczewska (Polish Academy of Sciences), revisited her long-standing work on Polish patriotism. Drawing on the legacy of Solidarity and the role of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, she argued that inclusive, pluralist patriotism once united workers, intellectuals, and clergy, but that its legacy has since weakened. She warned that today’s exclusionary populism thrives on the failure to sustain that inclusive vision.

Dr. Kamil Jonski  (University of Łódź) then addressed Poland’s constitutional polarization. His paper, “Single Text, Clashing Meanings,” traced how the 1997 Constitution, from its inception, was a battleground of rival axiologies. While liberals view it as a rights-based framework, conservatives interpret it through a lens of sovereignty and morality. The 2015 constitutional crisis, resulting in right-wing packing of the Tribunal, offered opportunity to impose one of those visions, and produced a constitutional quagmire with disagreement not only on values, but also legitimacy of institutions (including top judicial bodies).

Professor Malgorzata Fuszara  (University of Warsaw) explored the contested trajectory of human rights. She distinguished between broad consensus on universal rights after 1989 and the divisive politics of women’s and minority rights. Abortion restrictions, stalled LGBTQ reforms, and uneven protections illustrate enduring resistance. Yet she also highlighted progress, including the redefinition of rape law and gender quotas in parliament, underscoring the unfinished task of fully integrating women’s and minority rights into Poland’s human rights framework.

Finally, Professor Jacek Kurczewski (University of Warsaw) presented his own paper on representation and the rule of law. He challenged populist claims that only elected politicians embody the nation, arguing that judges also represent the nation through law, oath, and culture. Reviving lay participation in justice, he suggested, could counteract populist narratives and strengthen judicial legitimacy.

The discussion was enriched by three international discussants. Dr. Magdalena Solska (University of Fribourg) highlighted the need to revisit the legacy of Solidarity for democratic resilience and probed the paradox of women’s electoral behavior. Professor Barry Sullivan (Loyola University Chicago) compared Poland’s constitutional struggles to US debates, raising questions about the gap between cultural appeals and economic policy. Professor Krzysztof Motyka (Catholic University of Lublin) drew attention to the moral-philosophical dimensions of rights discourse, from Father Popiełuszko’s defense of life to the linguistic shift from civic to human rights.

Together, the session illuminated Poland as a microcosm of global struggles: how inclusive traditions are eroded by polarized politics, how constitutions fracture under competing axiologies, and how rights remain contested terrain.

Professor Mavis Maclean: Populism — Authentic Civic Voice or Dangerous Force of Hatred?

Participants of nationalist and anti-Islamic demonstration organized by far-right organisations use smoke races, hold banners in Warsaw, Poland on April 10, 2016. Photo: Wiola Wiaderek.

Mavis Maclean opened her contribution by emphasizing the significance of the discussion, describing it as both urgent and only just beginning to receive the attention it deserves. Reflecting on a recent conversation with a colleague who asked about the figure of Tommy Robinson, Maclean situated him within a broader European surge of far-right populism rooted in anxieties over immigration. She recalled that even British prime ministers had spoken of the country as becoming an “island of strangers.” For Maclean, this illustrates how immigration has become a focal point for rising populist energies that have caught established institutions unprepared.

She posed a central dilemma: should populist movements be valued as authentic expressions of civic sentiment, or feared as destabilizing forces that can slip into violence and hatred? Drawing contrasts with more hopeful movements in other contexts, Maclean warned that in Britain today the populist surge appears more threatening than transformative. Traditional party structures have weakened, with the Conservatives in decline and figures such as Nigel Farage and the Reform Party gaining visibility on the far right. Maclean expressed hope that the day’s presentations would help identify constructive responses—ways to reinforce the rule of law, rebuild political trust, and channel popular discontent into democratic renewal rather than demagoguery. 

Joanna Kurczewska: “Varieties of Polish Patriotism: Experience of Solidarity 1980–1989 in the Context of History and Anthropology of Ideas”

Solidarity logo on a flag during an anti-government demonstration, June 30, 2011, in Warsaw, Poland. Solidarity, a Polish trade union federation, was founded on August 31, 1980, at the Gdańsk Shipyard under the leadership of Lech Wałęsa. Photo: Tomasz Bidermann.

Because of illness, Professor Joanna Kurczewska (Polish Academy of Sciences) could not attend the panel in person. Her paper was instead delivered by her husband, Professor Jacek Kurczewski (University of Warsaw). His presentation offered a rich reconstruction of Kurczewska’s long-term research on the intellectual and cultural legacies of Polish patriotism, with particular attention to the Solidarity movement (1980–1989).

Kurczewski opened with reflections on the difficulty of translating concepts such as “patriotism” and “nationalism” across linguistic and cultural contexts. In Poland, patriotism carries largely positive connotations, while nationalism is often viewed with suspicion. By contrast, in English-language scholarship “nationalism” is frequently a neutral, technical category. Kurczewska’s analysis insists that these terms cannot be divorced from their cultural histories.

The paper revisited her pioneering study from the 1990s, based on interviews with 53 Polish politicians in the early years of the Third Republic. Surprisingly, many of them—whether from the former Communist Party or from the anti-communist opposition—downplayed Solidarity as a living source of political ideas. While acknowledging its historical importance, they treated it as a closed chapter rather than a repertoire for democratic renewal.

From Solidarity to Liberal Patriotism

Today, in a deeply polarized Poland divided between Law and Justice (PiS) and the Civic Coalition, Kurczewska argues it is essential to recall the pluralism and inclusivity that defined Solidarity’s original ethos. Born from the Interfactory Strike Committee in 1980, Solidarity united workers, engineers, intellectuals, and Catholic clergy under a shared platform, symbolized by the charismatic figure of Lech Wałęsa and the Black Madonna emblem on his lapel.

A key focus of Kurczewska’s analysis is the role of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, the Catholic priest murdered by communist security services in 1984. Through his “Masses for the Homeland,” Popiełuszko created spaces that were both liturgical and profoundly civic. These gatherings became cultural products of resistance: religious rituals infused with democratic, republican, and Romantic ideals of truth, justice, courage, and solidarity. Importantly, they were inclusive, drawing believers and non-believers alike, and forging bonds between workers and intellectuals. In this, Kurczewska identifies a crucial anthropological dimension of patriotism—as lived practice and social performance, not just political ideology.

Popiełuszko’s sermons, she argues, advanced a form of “liberal patriotism.” Unlike traditional Polish Romantic nationalism, his vision insisted that the national community must guarantee individual autonomy and human rights. This creative redefinition of patriotism during late communism exemplifies how cultural and religious traditions can be reinterpreted to support democratic values.

Enigmatic Representation and Forgotten Legacies

Kurczewski then turned to the transition of the 1990s, when post-communist social democrats successfully reinserted themselves into politics. By appropriating elements of national tradition, they achieved electoral victories, while radical nationalists were marginalized to the political fringe. Yet, as Kurczewska warns, this era of “inclusive politics” has given way to a new fragmentation. Today, figures from the far-right fringe not only gain parliamentary seats but even sit in the European Parliament, bringing anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and anti-European rhetoric into the mainstream.

The conclusion of the paper introduced the notion of “enigmatic representation.” Kurczewska observed that Polish politicians of the 1990s, whether post-communist or from the Solidarity camp, tended to speak in the name of “the nation” or “society” without genuine interest in citizen voices. Society was treated as an object to be mobilized rather than a subject of representation. She suggested that this top-down approach may have sown long-term frustration, paving the way for today’s populist politics, which relies on exclusive language, sharp polarization, and appeals to younger generations through anti-migrant and anti-EU narratives.

The paper ultimately invites us to reconsider Solidarity not as a nostalgic memory, but as a resource for rebuilding democratic culture. Its pluralism, inclusive patriotism, and agonistic rather than antagonistic style of communication offer lessons for today’s Poland, where politics risks sliding into exclusionary populism. Kurczewska’s anthropological lens underscores that patriotism, when rooted in lived practices of solidarity, can remain a democratic force rather than a vehicle of division.

Delivered with warmth and intellectual care by Professor Jacek Kurczewski, the paper stood as both a historical analysis and a contemporary warning: Poland’s democratic future may depend on recovering the forgotten legacies of inclusive patriotism forged in the crucible of Solidarity.

Dr. Kamil Joński: “Single Text, Clashing Meanings: Political Polarization, Constitutional Axiology and the Polish Constitutional Quagmire”

Dr. Kamil Joński’s presentation offered a penetrating exploration of the Polish constitutional crisis, reframing it as not merely a legal or institutional dispute but as a struggle over political meaning, legitimacy, and the cultural axiology of constitutionalism itself. His central thesis was clear: although the 1997 Constitution has become an accepted normative text in Poland, its interpretation has fractured along deep political, cultural, and religious cleavages. This fragmentation has led to what Dr. Joński called a “constitutional quagmire,” in which the same constitutional text sustains radically divergent visions of democracy, the rule of law, and the legitimacy of the judicial bodies to be recognized as a court of law.

Historical Cleavages and the Rise of Polarization

Dr. Joński began by situating the problem historically. The first decade after the fall of communism was dominated by what scholars call the post-communist cleavage: the political opposition between former regime actors and the dissident opposition. Yet this cleavage reached exhaustion by the early 2000s.

By 2001, two new parties emerged from the younger generation of anti-communists: Civic Platform (PO), founded by Donald Tusk, and Law and Justice (PiS), founded by the Kaczyński brothers. Since 2005, Dr. Joński argued, the rivalry between these two parties has organized not only political life but also the constitutional order itself. 

The Fragile Legitimacy of the 1997 Constitution

 

Dr. Joński turned next to the peculiar circumstances of the 1997 Constitution. Although it has endured for nearly three decades, its legitimacy has always been contested. Drafted by a parliament with an artificial post-communist majority—produced by electoral reform rather than a genuine social mandate—it was opposed by the Christian right, which offered an alternative “citizens’ draft” of the constitution. Finally, the constitution was approved in a referendum by the majority of 53.5% of voters on a 43% turnout. According to its critics, this meant less than one-quarter of eligible Poles endorsed the Constitution,  labeling it not only “post-communist” but also “a minority constitution.” Yet, this contested document functioned relatively effectively for nearly 20 years, providing a framework for governance, EU accession, and steady economic development.

The 2015 Break: From Amendment to Interpretation

This balance collapsed in 2015. For the first time since democratization, one party—PiS—secured both a single-party parliamentary majority and the presidency. This unique constellation of power made it possible to embark on what retired Constitutional Tribunal justice Professor M. Wyrzykowski described as a “war against the Constitution.” Crucially, PiS lacked the supermajorities needed for formal constitutional amendment. Instead, it turned to institutional capture of the Constitutional Tribunal as a means of constitutional change through interpretation.

To this end PiS embarked what Dr. Jonski called “purposeful top-down de-legitimization” of the Tribunal. Initially respected across the political spectrum, and even praised for rulings sympathetic to Catholic doctrine in issues like abortion, the Tribunal was rapidly delegitimized through propaganda campaigns. branding it as an enemy of “the people.” Once PiS nominees assumed control over the Tribunal, it became what Professor Wojciech Sadurski has termed a “governmental enabler.” For PiS supporters, the Tribunal was re-legitimized as a defender of “the people” against liberal elites.

The Long Shadow of 1997

One of the most striking elements of Dr. Joński’s presentation was his demonstration of the continuity between the 1997 referendum and contemporary politics. Using electoral and survey data, he showed that nearly 45% of the variance in the 2025 presidential runoff could be explained by voting patterns from the 1997 constitutional referendum. In other words, attitudes toward the Constitution nearly three decades earlier are still visible on the Poland’s political map.

This persistence suggests that disputes about the Constitution are not only institutional but deeply cultural, rooted in long-standing divisions between religiously practicing conservatives and more secular, liberal constituencies.

Survey Evidence: Religion, Memory, and Constitutional Identity

Dr. Joński enriched his argument examining data from the late 1990s through the 2010s, to  trac how different groups answered the questions related to the Constitution. Due to the shifts in Polish political landscape, he grouped respondents according to two criteria: self-identification on the left-right scale and religious service attendance.

In 1997, opposition to the constitution was heavily concentrated among respondents identifying with political right and declaring weekly service attendance. By 2017, very few Poles openly admitted to opposing the Constitution twenty years earlier—evidence that it had been normalized as a “fact of life.” Yet this apparent acceptance concealed ongoing dissatisfaction. Practicing right-wing voters most frequently expressed the strongest desire for constitutional change.

In 1997, opposition was heavily concentrated among practicing Catholics on the right. By 2017, very few Poles openly admitted to opposing the Constitution—evidence that it had been normalized as a “fact of life.” Yet this apparent acceptance concealed ongoing dissatisfaction. Practicing right-wing voters consistently expressed the strongest desire for constitutional change, arguing that the text was ill-suited to Poland’s needs.

When constitutional amendment proved politically unattainable, these constituencies turned to reinterpretation through institutional capture. This strategy was visible in survey responses during the height of the Tribunal crisis: when asked whether they supported the Tribunal or the government, practicing right-wing voters typically sided with the latter, despite the Tribunal’s earlier record of religiously sympathetic rulings on abortion, “blasphemy” and “conscientious objection.

Competing Constitutional Axiologies

The idea of saturating constitutional text with values is offered by legal doctrines favored on the political left (R. Dworkin’s 1996 “moral reading” of constitution) as well as right (A. Vermeule’s 2022 “Common Good Constitutionalism”).

At the heart of Dr. Joński’s analysis is the idea that such process occurred in Poland, and on both sides of axiological conflict. Thus, Poland faces a paradox: the Constitution can be shared as a text, yet it divides substantively as a contested source of meaning. Each camp projects its values onto the same text, producing parallel constitutional orders.

The Dual-Track Constitutional Order

After 2015 constitutional crisis and its implications, the situation is even worse, as both sides disagree not only on axiological meaning of the constitutional provisions, but also on the institutions legitimized to resolve the disputes (the legality of judicial appointment and the very status of the court of law). Today, Poland operates under what Dr. Joński called a dual-track constitutional regime.

Conclusion: A Constitution without Consensus

In closing, Dr. Joński emphasized the paradoxical nature of Polish constitutionalism. The 1997 Constitution, once derided as illegitimate, has become broadly accepted as a normative framework. Yet this acceptance has not produced consensus. Instead, it has given rise to clashing interpretations, each claiming fidelity to the text while advancing divergent value systems, visions of democracy, sovereignty, and rights.

This “single text, clashing meanings” dynamic illustrates the fragility of constitutional democracy in polarized societies. Poland’s experience suggests that legitimacy is not only a matter of formal adoption but of sustained cultural consensus. Absent that, constitutions risk becoming battlegrounds of identity, leaving societies vulnerable to constitutional crises.

Prof. Małgorzata Fuszara: “Protection of Human Rights and Its Implications for Women’s and Minority Rights”

Women’s strike and protest in Warsaw, Poland, against the abortion ban and the legal changes restricting the right to appeal fines or penalties. Photo: Eryk Losik.

Professor Małgorzata Fuszara delivered a nuanced and historically grounded analysis of the trajectory of human rights in Poland, with particular attention to the contested arenas of women’s rights and minority rights. Her paper carefully distinguished between two categories: the general, universal human rights that gained wide acceptance after 1989, and the more divisive domains of gender equality and minority protection, which remain highly politicized.

Human Rights under Authoritarianism and the Democratic Breakthrough

Professor Fuszara began with a reminder of the authoritarian context before 1989. For half a century, fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, the right to demonstrate, and the freedom to travel abroad were absent or severely restricted. Even trivial matters, such as the minutes of academic meetings, required approval by the censor. Public gatherings of more than five people needed official authorization. Passports were withheld and permission was required for every trip abroad.

Such restrictions underscored how authoritarian regimes can comprehensively curtail freedoms. Against this backdrop, the democratic breakthrough of 1989 brought a remarkable consensus: across the political spectrum, there was broad agreement on the need to enshrine fundamental rights. Drafting regulations for assemblies, for instance, was not a divisive issue. The recognition of basic human rights became part of Poland’s democratic DNA, at least at the level of principle.

From Consensus to Contestation

Yet Professor Fuszara emphasized that the consensus around general human rights did not extend to the rights of women and minorities. Here, division emerged immediately after 1989. The most striking example was reproductive rights. Under communism, abortion had been legal since 1956, earlier than in much of Western Europe. Generations of Polish women grew accustomed to reproductive autonomy. Thus, it came as a shock when the very first legislative proposals in the post-1989 parliament sought to introduce a total ban on abortion.

This debate revealed deep internal fractures. Even within Solidarność, the emblem of democratic opposition, the leadership supported abortion restrictions, while the women’s section opposed them. Since then, reproductive rights have remained one of the most divisive issues in Polish politics. Attempts to tighten abortion laws, particularly through Constitutional Tribunal rulings, repeatedly sparked mass mobilizations. The so-called “Black Protests” drew waves of young women—and many men—onto the streets, reshaping electoral patterns. Yet despite these mobilizations, restrictive laws remain in place, making abortion a symbol of both resistance and regression in contemporary Poland.

Minority Rights: Uneven Trajectories

Turning to minority rights, Professor Fuszara offered a differentiated assessment. The situation of ethnic and national minorities is relatively stable and in line with European Union standards. Legal provisions facilitate their parliamentary representation, and although disputes persist over which groups qualify as national minorities, these are largely managed within democratic debate.

In contrast, sexual minorities remain excluded from full equality. Efforts to introduce marriage equality or even civil partnerships have repeatedly failed. Professor Fuszara recalled attempts made over a decade ago, including during her own tenure as government plenipotentiary for equality, which were ultimately defeated. Although new proposals occasionally emerge, expectations remain low, and Poland continues to lag behind Western Europe in this field.

Professor Fuszara also stressed that formal legal guarantees often diverge from political practice. She recalled episodes when women protesting abortion restrictions faced harsh police repression, highlighting how authorities can undermine rights through coercive enforcement. These instances illustrate the fragility of rights protections in polarized contexts: while the principles of human rights may enjoy rhetorical consensus, their application can be obstructed by partisan or authoritarian impulses.

Recent Advances and Sources of Optimism

Despite these challenges, Professor Fuszara pointed to important achievements. Poland has ratified the Istanbul Convention, strengthening protections against gender-based violence. A major legal reform last month redefined rape in line with feminist jurisprudence, foregrounding the perspective of the victim for the first time. This marked an overdue recognition of the principle that women’s rights are human rights.

She also highlighted the adoption of gender quotas in electoral lists in 2011. Poland is, alongside states of the former Yugoslavia, one of the few post-communist countries to institutionalize such measures. As a result, women now hold slightly over 30% of parliamentary seats—a modest but significant improvement compared to the past, and higher than in several neighboring states, such as Hungary, where women constitute just 15% of parliament.

Nevertheless, Professor Fuszara closed with a sober reflection. Under communism, gender equality had been proclaimed as a principle, but often only formally. Post-1989, this principle was never fully reframed within the human rights paradigm. The slogan “women’s rights are human rights,” first articulated globally at the Vienna Conference in 1993 and reaffirmed in Beijing in 1995, still struggles to gain full resonance in Poland. For many politicians, gender equality remains a marginal issue, subordinated to party competition or cultural conservatism.

Conclusion

Professor Fuszara’s presentation revealed a paradox at the heart of Polish democracy. On one hand, there is a strong, cross-party commitment to universal human rights, born of the shared memory of authoritarian restrictions. On the other, women’s rights and minority rights continue to be arenas of deep contestation, exposing the limits of consensus and the persistence of patriarchal and exclusionary norms.

Her reflections traced both regression—visible in abortion restrictions and stalled progress on LGBTQ rights—and genuine advances, such as the redefinition of rape and the implementation of gender quotas. Above all, she insisted that rights cannot be taken for granted. They must be continuously defended, reframed, and expanded. The challenge remains to integrate women’s rights and minority rights fully into the fabric of human rights, so that they are no longer treated as exceptions but as integral to the democratic promise made in 1989.

Professor Jacek Kurczewski: “Who Speaks for Whom: The Issue of Representation in the Struggle for the Rule of Law”

Modern building of the Supreme Court of Poland in Warsaw, photographed on January 7, 2020. Photo: Dreamstime.

In his presentation, Professor Jacek Kurczewski explored the contested notion of representation at the heart of Poland’s ongoing rule-of-law conflict. Framing the problem through both political sociology and constitutional analysis, he examined how populist rhetoric weaponizes the formula “we, the people” against the judiciary, and how judges themselves may legitimately be understood as representatives of the nation.

Populism, “the People,” and Judicial Autonomy

Professor Kurczewski began by situating the debate in the populist appropriation of democracy. Leaders of the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS) claimed to embody the authentic will of the people, portraying judicial independence as an undemocratic obstacle. Judges, they argued, were relics of communist privilege or elitist guardians hostile to popular sovereignty. The rhetoric was often vulgar—accusations ranged from petty theft to corruption—but also grounded in a doctrinal attack: the judiciary was accused of claiming sovereignty for itself, elevating constitutional interpretation above the elected parliament.

This framing, Professor Kurczewski noted, created a false dichotomy: elected representatives as the sole voice of the people versus judges cast as self-appointed elites. The populist narrative ignored the constitutional and cultural grounds by which judges themselves exercise representative authority.

The Judiciary and Competing Logics of Representation

Drawing on Hanna Pitkin’s classic theory of representation—the idea of representing what is not physically present— Professor Kurczewski argued that judges too represent the nation. They do so not through electoral mandate but through their role as guardians of law, which is itself a core element of national culture. The Polish constitution, party manifestos, and civic tradition define the nation as a community of culture, history, and shared values. Law, he emphasized, is inseparable from this community; to apply and protect it is to embody the nation’s identity.

Judicial oaths reinforce this function. Each Polish judge swears to serve the Republic faithfully, uphold the law, and dispense justice impartially and with dignity. In this way, judges symbolically—and practically—act as representatives of the nation’s legal and moral order, even though they are not chosen by direct election.

Professor Kurczewski highlighted that the tension is not between representation and non-representation but between different forms of representation. Parliamentarians, under the free mandate principle inherited from Burkean tradition, represent the nation as a whole rather than their constituencies. Judges, by contrast, represent justice and the legal order. Both are indirect vehicles of sovereignty, as Article 4 of the Polish Constitution affirms that power derives from the nation and is exercised either directly or through representatives. Thus, the confrontation between politicians and judges is not about legitimacy per se, but about clashing logics of legitimacy—electoral versus legal-constitutional.

Professor Kurczewski also lamented the decline of lay judges in Poland since 1989. Once a significant institution allowing citizens to participate directly in adjudication, lay judges were marginalized in the transition era as professional judges sought to elevate the dignity and autonomy of the judiciary. This, he argued, was a missed opportunity. Strengthening lay participation could provide a democratic bridge between the judiciary and society, countering populist claims that judges are isolated elites.

Conclusion

Professor Kurczewski concluded that defending judicial independence cannot rely solely on institutional autonomy. It must also involve rethinking representation in more inclusive ways. Recognizing judges as representatives of the nation—albeit in a distinct mode from elected politicians—undermines populist accusations of illegitimacy. At the same time, reinforcing lay participation in courts could help reconnect the judiciary with society, blunting populist attacks and deepening democratic legitimacy.

Ultimately, the struggle for the rule of law in Poland is not only a battle over institutions but also over meanings of representation itself. Who speaks for the nation—the politicians who claim its voice, or the judges who embody its law? Professor Kurczewski’s intervention suggested that the answer must acknowledge both, while resisting the authoritarian temptation to silence one in the name of the other.

Discussants’ Contributions

Dr. Magdalena Solska (University of Fribourg)

The first discussant, Dr. Magdalena Solska, Assistant Professor at the University of Fribourg, opened the commentary session by reflecting on the richness of the panel and the uniqueness of the Polish case. She approached her role primarily through questions and reflections designed to stimulate further debate.

Turning first to Prof. Joanna Kurczewska’s paper on Polish patriotism and the legacy of Solidarity, Dr. Solska praised the author’s use of the concept of resistance rather than mere opposition. She underlined that in political science, resistance carries a moral and normative dimension highly relevant to understanding the Solidarity movement of the 1980s. Yet she also raised a challenging question: was it perhaps inevitable that the legacy of Solidarity would weaken in the face of the unprecedented pressures of post-communist transformation—social, political, and especially economic? In her view, the turbulence of systemic change may have eroded the sense of national community that Solidarity once embodied. If so, she suggested, today’s polarized context may offer an opportune moment to revisit that legacy and ask how it could contribute to democratic resilience.

On Dr. Kamil Joński’s analysis of constitutional polarization, Dr. Solska praised the presentation as resourceful and empirically rich, especially in its reconstruction of the long and contentious constitution-making process of the 1990s. She welcomed the reminder that Poland’s constitutional reality long preceded its final text, making the process unique compared with other post-communist countries. At the same time, she offered constructive critiques. First, she encouraged Dr. Joński to state his research question more clearly at the outset, as the central argument—explaining the enduring loyalty of PiS’s electorate—only emerged at the end. Second, she questioned his use of “liberal-democratic” versus “religious-traditional” categories, suggesting that the latter can also be democratic and that alternative labels might better capture the cleavage. Finally, she argued that the desire for constitutional change among practicing conservatives should not automatically be viewed as negative, given the ambiguities of the 1997 constitution. She encouraged deeper engagement with the role of political polarization, which in her view desensitizes electorates to rule-bending practices by their preferred parties.

With respect to Professor Małgorzata Fuszara’s presentation on human rights, women, and minorities, Dr. Solska raised a probing question about electoral behavior: why do significant numbers of women in Poland vote for PiS, often in higher proportions than for the liberal Civic Coalition? This paradox, she suggested, requires careful sociological and political analysis.

Finally, commenting on Professor Jacek Kurczewski’s reflections on representation and the rule of law, Dr. Solska asked how, in a context of deep political polarization, the rule of law might realistically be restored or strengthened. Since the rule of law presupposes broad consensus, she expressed skepticism about whether such consensus is achievable in today’s climate and pressed Professor Kurczewski to consider not if but how this renewal might occur.

Her remarks set the tone for an engaged and critical discussion, highlighting conceptual nuances, empirical puzzles, and the pressing challenge of polarization across all contributions.

Professor Barry Sullivan (Loyola University Chicago School of Law)

The second discussant, Professor Barry Sullivan of Loyola University Chicago, opened his remarks by situating the Polish experience within a comparative perspective shaped by his own work on American constitutionalism. Noting that he often asks his students to grapple with the challenges of interpreting and implementing a constitution written more than two centuries ago, he found Dr. Joński’s analysis of Poland’s constitutional trajectory particularly illuminating. He highlighted the striking continuity Dr. Joński traced between the contested adoption of the 1997 Constitution and today’s disputes over its meaning, emphasizing how early legitimacy deficits continue to reverberate decades later.

Drawing from the US context, Professor Sullivan posed a pointed question: to what extent does the Polish case reveal a disconnect between cultural politics and economic interests similar to that visible in the United States? He observed that in contemporary American politics, ruling parties often cultivate loyalty by appealing to socially conservative values—on issues such as abortion, marriage equality, and education—while simultaneously advancing deregulatory or pro-capitalist policies that may not materially benefit the same constituencies. He asked whether a similar disjunction between value-based appeals and economic outcomes can be seen in Poland’s current political landscape.

Turning to Professor Jacek Kurczewski’s reflections on judicial independence and representation, Professor Sullivan drew an instructive comparison with the US Supreme Court. In recent years, he noted, the Court has increasingly aligned itself with the executive branch, issuing consequential rulings at great speed and often without reasoned explanations. This, he stressed, departs from the traditional American ideal of the rule of law, which requires not only judgments but transparent justifications that anchor decisions in legal reasoning rather than political expediency. Professor Sullivan thus invited further discussion of whether Poland’s embattled judiciary faces parallel challenges, and how judges can maintain legitimacy in the face of politicized attacks.

Finally, Professor Sullivan engaged with Professor Fuszara’s presentation on human rights, women, and minority rights, drawing an analogy to the US struggle over civil society and historical memory. He noted that in Poland, as Professor Fuszara described, the media and public institutions became contested arenas after 1989. Today, in the US, similar dynamics are unfolding as political actors attempt to control not only state institutions but also cultural ones once assumed to be apolitical, such as museums, the Smithsonian, or even the National Park Service. He cited recent reports of efforts to purge references to slavery and racial injustice from park materials, framing this as part of a broader strategy to politicize civil society and restrict critical narratives.

In closing, Professor Sullivan praised the panel for offering a rich comparative perspective on constitutionalism, human rights, and political polarization. While acknowledging his questions as those of an outsider, he emphasized how Poland’s experience provides important lessons for scholars and practitioners wrestling with the fragility of the rule of law in democracies old and new.

Professor Krzysztof Motyka (John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)

The third discussant, Professor Krzysztof Motyka, offered reflections that bridged the three presentations while drawing on historical, theological, and sociological perspectives. He began with a commentary on the legacy of Blessed Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, situating him not only as a figure of anti-communist resistance but also as an early defender of human rights. Professor Motyka underscored that Popiełuszko consistently emphasized the sanctity of life “from conception,” opposing the liberal abortion laws of communist Poland. While not advocating punitive measures, he insisted that the Church’s responsibility lay in both proclaiming the sanctity of life and ensuring social and state support for women in difficult circumstances. Professor Motyka reminded the audience that Popiełuszko remains venerated as a patron of reconciliation and respect for life, symbolized by his inclusion in national commemorations. He also recalled Cardinal Glemp’s 1988 caution that protecting the unborn must not become a tool of political bargaining, highlighting the tension between moral conviction and political instrumentalization.

Turning to Professor Fuszara’s presentation, Professor Motyka focused on the linguistic and conceptual transformation in Poland’s rights discourse. Before 1989, he noted, academic and legal circles predominantly used the language of “civil” or “civic rights,” tied to the framework of citizenship and the state. Only in the late 1980s did the universalist vocabulary of “human rights” gain prominence, a shift that reflected broader philosophical and political change. The adoption of this language after the democratic transition, he argued, signaled a recognition that rights derive from human dignity and nature, not merely from state recognition.

Finally, commenting on Dr. Joński’s analysis of constitutional polarization, Professor Motyka provided a personal reflection. While uncertain of his own vote in the 1997 constitutional referendum, he recalled that many Poles who opposed the text did so less for substantive reasons than for historical or emotional ones. For some, it seemed a bitter irony that a parliament dominated by post-communists was entrusted with drafting and adopting the nation’s new constitution—a task many believed should have belonged to the democratic opposition. For these voters, rejecting the Constitution was less about legal content and more about expressing a sense of historical injustice.

Professor Motyka concluded by thanking the panel, stressing that such interdisciplinary dialogue helps illuminate the deeper moral, cultural, and symbolic dimensions of Poland’s constitutional struggles.

Concluding Assessments by Professor Mavis Maclean

In her closing reflections, Professor Mavis Maclean offered a comparative perspective from the United Kingdom, noting with interest that none of the panelists had raised the issue of money. In the UK, she explained, questions of judicial policy, legal reform, or access to justice are always framed by cost. Having worked as an advisor in the Ministry of Justice, she recalled that every proposal was first judged by whether it offered “value for money”—a narrow and often crude measure for shaping a justice system. By contrast, Australia has adopted a more nuanced framework, discussing reforms in terms of “social return on investment,” yet even there, financial justification dominates policymaking. Maclean observed, with a touch of irony, that Poland must be “so rich” not to worry about such constraints, though she suspected this might not fully be the case.

Turning back to the themes of the seminar, she emphasized how refreshing it was to hear discussions focused on values rather than pounds and pence. In Britain, even debates about immigration, populist protest, and human rights are quickly reduced to questions of affordability—border controls, asylum procedures, or welfare costs. By contrast, today’s conversation had foregrounded principles: rule of law, democracy, patriotism, and social solidarity. She concluded warmly, congratulating the presenters for offering not only answers but also new terms and questions to reflect upon long after the session.

Panelists’ Replies

Professor Małgorzata Fuszara began by addressing the question of why women appeared to support Law and Justice (PiS) more than Civic Coalition (KO). She clarified that this impression is misleading. While PiS did secure more total votes than KO, the gender balance within each electorate shows a different pattern. Among PiS voters, men outnumbered women; conversely, among KO supporters, women outnumbered men. The clearest gender divide emerges at the extremes. In the far-right Confederation electorate, fewer than 30% of voters are women, while over 70% are men. On the left (Lewica), the trend reverses: more than 60% of voters are women. This divide has sharpened since the abortion protests, particularly among younger generations—young women tend to vote for the left, while young men lean to the far right.

Turning to media, Professor Fuszara stressed that control over television, though still significant, is an old debate. The new battlefield lies in social media, which once held the promise of greater freedom of expression but is now vulnerable to manipulation. Disinformation campaigns and far-right influence in digital spaces, she warned, pose a profound threat to democracy.

Dr. Kamil Jonski added a brief but pointed reflection on constitutional politics. He agreed that recognizing the need to amend the Polish Constitution is not problematic in itself. The danger, however, lies in the trajectory: opposition to the Constitution, followed by calls for amendment, then support for court-packing, and finally acceptance of its outcomes. This sequence, he argued, captures the narrative of groups seeking to reshape constitutional law to their advantage.

Replying to Dr. Solska’s question on how to resolve the conflict over the Rule of Law in Poland, Professor Kurczewski said: “I think we need to once again draw on Solidarity’s past experience. As Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Poland’s first non-communist Prime Minister after 1989, said, we need a ‘thick line’ (gruba kreska) to separate the future from the past. A full reset of the machinery of justice and a renewal of the judiciary is the only solution.”

Photo: Dreamstime.

Overall Conclusion

The second session of the ECPS–Oxford University Virtual Workshop Series, “The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland,” revealed Poland as both a distinctive case and a mirror of global democratic challenges.

Professor Joanna Kurczewska’s paper, presented by Professor Jacek Kurczewski, underscored how Solidarity’s inclusive patriotism—once uniting workers, clergy, and intellectuals—has been eclipsed by exclusionary narratives. Dr. Kamil Joński traced the constitutional quagmire created by divergent axiological readings of the 1997 Constitution, showing how a single text can sustain polarized visions of democracy. Professor Małgorzata Fuszara demonstrated that while consensus formed around universal human rights after 1989, women’s and minority rights remain embattled terrain, marked by regression in reproductive rights but tempered by incremental progress such as gender quotas and reforms to sexual violence law. In his own contribution, Professor Jacek Kurczewski reframed the judiciary as a representative institution of the nation, stressing that defending the rule of law requires broadening the democratic meaning of representation.

The discussants deepened the analysis: Dr. Magdalena Solska highlighted the fragility of Solidarity’s legacy and the paradoxes of electoral behavior; Professor Barry Sullivan drew US–Polish comparisons on constitutionalism and the politicization of civil society; and Professor Krzysztof Motyka reminded participants of the moral-philosophical dimensions of rights discourse, linking contemporary struggles to the witness of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko.

As Chair, Professor Mavis Maclean reminded the audience that while populism may reflect civic grievances, it can also corrode democratic institutions. The Polish experience, she argued, offers lessons for how democracies might transform discontent into renewal rather than demagoguery.

This session thus underscored a central theme of the workshop series: that the future of democracy hinges on reclaiming inclusive traditions, defending contested institutions, and embedding rights in both law and culture.

Dr. Mara Nogueira is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences at Birkbeck, University of London.

Dr. Nogueira: Brazil Did with Bolsonaro What the US Failed to Do with Trump

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In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Mara Nogueira (Birkbeck, University of London) argues that Brazil’s decision to convict Jair Bolsonaro for plotting a coup marks a turning point in democratic accountability. “By convicting Bolsonaro, we are doing what the US should have done with Trump and moving in the right direction toward democracy,” she says. Rejecting claims of judicial overreach, Dr. Nogueira stresses: “The Supreme Court is not overstepping but rather fulfilling its role.” She welcomes the unprecedented prosecution of both civil and military senior officers since the 1964–85 dictatorship, while warning that far-right actors are already mobilizing “judicial dictatorship” narratives. For her, the trial sends a crucial signal: “It’s not acceptable to plan a coup d’état—and if you do so, you will face charges.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The conviction of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro to 27 years in prison for plotting a coup has generated both domestic turbulence and international controversy. While his lawyers denounce the ruling as politically motivated, and allies abroad echo claims of persecution, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF) has framed the case as a necessary step to defend democracy against authoritarian threats. Against this backdrop, Dr. Mara Nogueira, Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences at Birkbeck, University of London, reflects on the political and institutional meaning of Bolsonaro’s trial in an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).

Dr. Nogueira underscores that the trial signals democratic resilience rather than overreach: “By convicting Bolsonaro, we are doing what the US should have done with Trump and moving in the right direction toward democracy.” She contrasts Brazil’s approach to accountability with the United States, where Trump has avoided similar consequences: “You had the foot soldiers of the Capitol invasion going to jail, while Trump not only remained free but was also allowed to run for president and become president again.”

In her view, the STF has not exceeded its mandate but fulfilled it: “I think the evidence that Bolsonaro and his conspirators attempted a coup d’état is hard to ignore, so when a crime like that is committed, it needs to be punished. The Supreme Court is not overstepping but rather fulfilling its role.” Importantly, she welcomes the fact that not only Bolsonaro, but also senior officers are facing accountability for the first time since the 1964–85 military dictatorship. “Perhaps Brazil would have had a different history if that had been done sooner,” she notes.

At the same time, Dr. Nogueira remains cautious. She observes that far-right actors are already mobilizing the “judicial dictatorship” narrative: “What they want in this case, however, is impunity. The revenge is already underway, with Congress now voting to expand its protection against legal prosecution.” She also highlights the fragility of Brazilian democracy, pointing to Bolsonaro’s 2018 victory and the January 8, 2023, attack as symptoms of unresolved cleavages. Yet she stresses that the conviction sends a crucial signal: “It does not inoculate against authoritarian relapse, but it does send a message that it’s not acceptable to plan a coup d’état, and if you do so, you will face charges.”

For Dr. Nogueira, Bolsonaro’s conviction represents both accountability and warning. Whether it deepens polarization or strengthens democratic institutions will depend on how political actors and society interpret this landmark moment.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Mara Nogueira, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Dissent Shows Democracy at Work, Not Dictatorship

Supporters of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro protest Supreme Court actions in his trial on Paulista Avenue, São Paulo, Brazil, August 3, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Dr. Mara Nogueira, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you interpret Justice Luiz Fux’s lone vote to absolve Bolsonaro on jurisdictional and evidentiary grounds—arguing lack of proof, improper venue, and unmanageable case files—within Brazil’s broader debates on lawfare? Even as a majority of Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF) has now convicted Bolsonaro for leading a “criminal organisation” to plot a coup, could Fux’s reasoning still provide legal ammunition for appeals, annulment claims, or retrial efforts?

Dr. Mara Nogueira: For anyone following the trial closely, Fux’s vote was not a surprise, since he had been signaling this divergence with the reporting judge for a while. That said, his vote was surprising given his prior positions in the trial of the participants in the invasion of Congress on January 8, 2023, and his overall trajectory in the Supreme Court. So, it was unexpected when considered in light of his own trajectory rather than what was anticipated of him in this trial.

I think he attempted to give a technical veneer to an 11-hour vote that was eminently political. His judgment essentially shifted depending on who was being accused. He was clearly speaking to a wider audience rather than to his peers. But I don’t see his lone vote as an issue; on the contrary, in a democracy with functioning institutions, dissent is part of the process.

The fact that Fux was able to voice his dissent, contrary to what the far right argues, shows that there isn’t a dictatorship in Brazil. In a dictatorship, he wouldn’t be allowed to dissent or he would have faced persecution for doing so. Neither of those things happened. Instead, he is facing criticism from part of the public and being celebrated by others, which is not abnormal in any sense.

But I don’t think his vote changes anything. At the end of the day, Bolsonaro and his co-conspirators were convicted, and I believe, rightly so. In a highly politicized trial such as this, of course, Bolsonaro’s supporters will seize on anything to twist the facts and argue for his innocence. They will push as far as they can, but in the current context, I don’t see how this trial could be overturned, even if it went to the plenary.

That said, a future annulment would obviously depend on how the political landscape in Brazil evolves in the coming years, and it’s very hard to predict, in my opinion. The Supreme Court is not isolated from the broader political climate, and changes in its composition under, for instance, a future far-right government could have consequences. We only need to look at the US to see what that might look like. Still, I think that by convicting Bolsonaro, we are doing what the US should have done with Trump and moving in the right direction toward democracy.

Convicting Bolsonaro and the Military Officers Shows Institutions are at Work

With the STF asserting unprecedented authority—convicting a former president and top generals, placing Bolsonaro under house arrest, and wading into disinformation inquiries—does this expanded role bolster democratic resilience, or risk normalizing states of exception that revanchist actors can exploit as evidence of “judicial dictatorship”?

Dr. Mara Nogueira: As I already mentioned, by looking at the US, you can see the consequences of not prosecuting an attempted coup d’état. The US now has a president with unprecedented authority, backed by a Congress that is essentially on his side, and a very politically aligned Supreme Court. So, you can ask, where are the checks and balances in the US right now? Of course, I’m not an expert in American politics, but the current state of affairs seems to imply that the US president can do as he pleases, including attempts to influence judicial proceedings in a foreign country, as he is trying to do in Brazil.

I think the evidence that Bolsonaro and his conspirators attempted a coup d’état is hard to ignore, so when a crime like that is committed, it needs to be punished. The Supreme Court is not overstepping but rather fulfilling its role. And I see it positively that not only a former president but also the military are, for the first time in Brazil’s history, being convicted for attempting to abolish the democratic rule of law. Perhaps Brazil would have had a different history if that had been done sooner.

But as I said previously, the far right will attempt to exploit what happened to paint a picture that we live in, as you say, a judicial dictatorship. What they want in this case, however, is impunity. The revenge is already underway, with Congress now voting to expand its protection against legal prosecution, for instance. There is also ongoing discussion about a bill aimed at the participants of January 8. This bill is nicknamed the Amnesty Bill, though it should be called, in my opinion, the Impunity Bill, because what Congress is trying to do is to reinterpret the notion of amnesty to appease a political group and perhaps set, what I believe, would be a very dangerous precedent.

This idea that Fux mentioned in his speech—that the January 8 participants were a disorganized or unruly mob—is preposterous and ignores the broader context in which the invasion of Congress occurred. Yes, they were unable to overthrow the state, thank God, but they failed because the rest of the plot didn’t work out, and their leader, Bolsonaro, knowing the plan had failed, fled to the US.

All that said, I’m not a particularly optimistic person, and I am not a big fan of the kind of worship the Supreme Court judges are receiving these days, but in this instance, I think they are performing their duty, which is to safeguard the democratic rule of law in the country. A dictatorship would imply the suppression of other powers and an authoritarian ruler, and this is not what’s happening in Brazil right now. Only those living in far-right bubbles will interpret the context in that way.

No Crisis Between Government and Military Despite Convictions

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro during 74th Anniversary of Parachutist Infantry Battalion held at Military Village in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on November 23, 2019. Photo: Celso Pupo

The conviction encompassed senior military officers for the first time since the 1964–85 dictatorship. How does this reshape Brazil’s civil–military relations, especially in a context where the armed forces remain politically salient and segments of society view them as guarantors of order?

Dr. Mara Nogueira: That’s quite an interesting point. Historically, the military has been behind all the successful coups in Brazil, and there have been several. So, as I already mentioned, I see it positively that after so many other instances, the military is finally facing legal consequences for its actions.

I’ve been following the media coverage of the trial very closely, and I don’t think, at least from my perspective, that this has been a major point of discussion. As far as I can tell, there is no crisis at the moment between the government and the military, or between the Supreme Court and the military, and perhaps that has to do with the surprising fact that the military played an important role in preventing this particular coup d’état from succeeding.

Just one of the military commanders, Almir Garnier Santos, who was the commander of the Navy under Bolsonaro, was convicted. Out of the three military commanders, he was the only one who went along with the plan. For many analysts, the coup failed because it didn’t have the support of the Army and Air Force commanders, who refused to join the plot.

Of course, they could have done more than just say no and could have denounced the coup, which would have given even more credibility to the trial. Still, their role in this case was ultimately positive, and that may help explain why the coup didn’t succeed, and also why the military has not been the main focus of media coverage or public discussion.

Brazil’s Democracy Is Fragile—But Functioning

As school curricula, memorials, and policing doctrines institutionalize January 8, 2023, how do these “memory practices” shape collective political identities? Do they inoculate against authoritarian relapse, or entrench binary cleavages that revanchist actors can instrumentalize?

Dr. Mara Nogueira: I think it’s still very soon to say how this particular event will be narrated in Brazilian history. That’s yet to be seen. But if you take, for instance, the 1964 military coup, the military, to this day, celebrate the date as the day of the revolution. They call it the revolution rather than the military coup. Bolsonaro himself has praised prominent members of the military dictatorship, such as Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, who was notorious for leading torture and repression during this period.

The dominant view of 1964 today, however, is that it was a coup d’état that installed a violent dictatorship in this country, which ended, in fact, quite recently—1985, as you say. It’s not the only view, but it is the one that students, for instance, will learn about in school.

As I said, democracy in Brazil is still young, and one might say it remains quite fragile. I see Bolsonaro’s victory in 2018, despite his authoritarian rhetoric, as a sign of that fragility. The fact that he and his core conspirators felt emboldened enough to attempt a coup also shows how fragile democracy is. But I don’t see his conviction as a demonstration of this fragility. On the contrary, in this instance, I see it as a sign that democratic institutions are working despite that fragility.

I am, like many other social scientists and observers, concerned with the political cleavages in Brazil, but I don’t think this is unique to Brazil right now. The far right is on the rise globally, and one could ask, for instance, whether January 8 in Brazil would have happened if the Capitol invasion hadn’t occurred in the US, or if the real leaders of the Capitol invasion had been punished. One could also ask what would have happened if Trump had been the US president in 2023.

I think punishment in Brazil’s case does not, as you say, inoculate against authoritarian relapse, but it does send a message that it’s not acceptable to plan a coup d’état, and that if you do so, you will face charges. That’s a good message for the country to be showing the world right now.

Tarcísio de Freitas Seeks to Inherit Bolsonaro’s Capital

São Paulo Governor Tarcísio de Freitas attends a pro-amnesty demonstration for former President Jair Bolsonaro in Copacabana, Rio de Janeiro, on March 16, 2025. Photo: Saulo Angelo.

Building on your work on “entitled anger,” how is middle-class resentment mobilized around the trial—particularly in claims that the STF has usurped sovereignty and thwarted the popular will?

Dr. Mara Nogueira: My work on revanchist populism and entitled anger is about the rise of far-right populism globally, and particularly in the Global South. Revanchist populism is a term that I coined with my colleague Ryan Centner. And what we are doing with this is describing what we see as a turn in political imaginations towards the retaking of the nation in line with a powerful discourse of “the people” and righteousness. And we see this mapping onto populations who nostalgically sense they have lost what was rightfully, morally theirs, which might be regained by applying an angry sense of entitlement to an alternative and often authoritarian exercise of government.

In this context, the Brazilian middle class has been particularly described as resentful and an important support base for the far right. But I don’t think alone middle-class resentment can explain recent political cleavages in Brazil. Going back to your question more specifically, as I already mentioned, of course, the Supreme Court decision will be mobilized by the far right to fuel particular understandings of the current political situation in Brazil. There is a group of die-hard Bolsonaro supporters that will buy into any narrative that the far-right leaders produce. But I don’t think the future of Brazilian politics depends on this particular group, but more on the voters who are moderate and will swing their vote depending on a broader understanding of the situation.

It’s clear from his more recent speeches that the current São Paulo governor, Tarcísio de Freitas, is trying to position himself as the heir of Bolsonaro’s political capital and the natural candidate of the far right in the next presidential election. Some of Bolsonaro’s electorate will naturally transfer to whoever he decides to support, and that is significant, but not enough to win the next election. We have to remember that Bolsonaro himself lost the last election to Lula—by a small margin, of course—but he still lost. So, what I think is under dispute is the interpretation of current events by this broader population, who are not loyal to either Lula or Bolsonaro.

And it’s interesting that you touch on sovereignty, because it’s a very hot topic in Brazil at the moment—not because of the Supreme Court decision, but because of Trump’s attempt to interfere with the judicial process in Brazil. Lula’s popularity has recently increased slightly because he was gifted this position of defender of Brazil’s sovereignty in response to Eduardo Bolsonaro’s lobbying that led Trump to raise tariffs on Brazilian products to 50%. So, in this context, it’s difficult for the far right to play the sovereignty card while conspiring with Trump to penalize Brazil’s economy.

Urban Poor in Brazil’s Peripheries Hold the Swing Vote

What spatial patterns (capitals vs. peripheries; South/Southeast vs. North/Northeast) do you observe in post-verdict mobilizations, and how do they map onto Brazil’s longer histories of regional inequality and uneven development?

Dr. Mara Nogueira: I don’t have the data to comment specifically on the geography of how people are reacting to the trial, but if we look at Bolsonaro’s 2018 election, when he was victorious, we can find some evidence of the geographies of far-right voters and supporters in Brazil. The work of Matthew Richmond and Lisa McKenna, colleagues of mine, examined the geography of the votes in 2018.

The interesting thing here is that, unlike in the US, or in the case of the UK and Brexit, the geography of the vote in Brazil is not the traditional urban versus rural pattern. What their work pointed out is that the votes of the urban poor have been decisive in the last elections in Brazil. In particular, the votes of the urban poor in the peripheries of big cities have been swinging between the left and the right throughout the years. The explanation for this has to do with major changes in Brazilian society—from the growth of evangelical church influence to enduring criminality, which affects the urban poor more prominently, for instance.

In my own work, I have focused on changes in the global labor market and how they also play a role in the new political landscape that breeds the far right. Again, if you think of the case of the US and the UK, you see deindustrialization and the loss of stable jobs alongside austerity and neoliberalism, which have impoverished particular groups. Immigration, in these cases, has then been used as the far-right scapegoat to channel this entitled anger into votes.

In the case of Brazil, we have historically had a very stratified labor market with widespread precarity, and this has also grown as a consequence of neoliberalism and deindustrialization. But the traditional left in Brazil grew out of industrial trade unionism, and now there is this huge population of workers outside formal wage relations who don’t feel represented by these traditional left-wing narratives. So, when you think about geography, these spatial inequalities interact with wider social and economic dynamics, and my point is that if progressive politics doesn’t find ways to speak to this new workforce, far-right narratives offering simple solutions to complex problems can fill this gap.

With Bolsonaro confined to house arrest and restricted from social media, how has the street/platform nexus of contention shifted—especially regarding plazas, evangelical pulpits, WhatsApp/Telegram ecosystems, and diaspora mobilization in the US?

Dr. Mara Nogueira: All the arenas you mentioned have long been part of the political landscape in Brazil, and the far right has been very effective at capitalizing on social media, perhaps because their extreme language and rhetoric are well suited to generating engagement—the very thing that drives these platforms. I don’t see this scenario changing with Bolsonaro’s arrest. The main question at the moment, as I already said, is who will inherit Bolsonaro’s political capital and represent this far-right group in the next election.

The Left Must Speak to Precarious Workers or Risk Losing Them to the Far Right

Brazilia’s Luiz Inácio Lula is seen during the 2022 election campaign in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on October 20, 2022. Photo: Aline Alcantara.

How does the trial intersect with the politics of informal work and the gig economy? Are precarious workers—street vendors, delivery app couriers—recalibrating their partisan attachments in light of the conviction, or holding steady?

Dr. Mara Nogueira: Again, I think it’s very soon to say how particular groups of workers are reacting to the trial. We don’t have the data. But as I already mentioned, this mass of precarious workers that characterizes Brazil’s economy plays a key role in current affairs. Of course, they are more than workers, and they have other affiliations that might also impact their political behavior, but the point that I have been trying to make in my own work is that this group feels underrepresented in political debates.

The left tends to view informality solely as an issue of precarity and exploitation, and its responses to the growing changes in the experience of work have been inadequate. In my research, I focus on street vendors who have been criminalized by local governments and feel attacked by exclusionary policies that constrain their ability to work on the streets and earn a livelihood. The left’s response has been to insist on wage work and development as solutions that will eventually incorporate everyone into the regular labor market, but workers are not necessarily on board with that. People’s desires for autonomy and flexibility are often interpreted negatively, in this context, as signs that these workers have been indoctrinated by neoliberalism.

What we need to understand is that for a huge proportion of people in Brazil, wage work was historically either unattainable or represented a precarious inclusion through low-paying jobs, where people had to endure excessive hours and, more often than not, harassment and humiliation. For many, the far-right promise of disruption feels like a real hope for change. Globally, the far right has succeeded in large part because it taps into real suffering and mobilizes genuine frustration by offering the hope of disruption.

Moreover, in some ways, the left has become a conservative political force, protecting abstract values that do not necessarily resonate with people’s everyday struggles. The new realities of the labor market and of society at large demand bolder thinking and out-of-the-box policies that can address the challenges of people’s lived realities. For instance, Zohran Mamdani’s political platform for the New York City mayoral election is a good representation of what I’m talking about. In Belo Horizonte, Brazil, where I do most of my research, there is a bill up for a vote to implement free bus fare, which is also very interesting. So, there are some promising developments, and there is a progressive way out of this tough political landscape that we are living through.

Brazil’s 2026 Race Has Already Begun

Within Bolsonaro’s coalition, how are key pillars—evangelical leaders, police unions, agribusiness lobbies, military clubs—reframing their narratives after the verdict? What does this suggest about the durability or the recomposition of his revanchist base?

Dr. Mara Nogueira: It’s an interesting question. One day after Bolsonaro’s conviction, the Folha de São Paulo, one of Brazil’s most important newspapers, ran a headline on the twin deficit in Brazil and the dangers of Lula’s third mandate for the economy. What happened, essentially, is that Bolsonaro had become an issue, and his conviction was applauded by the major media because they wanted him out of the presidential race. But the big players you mentioned also don’t want a fourth Lula mandate.

In the lead-up to the 2022 election, there was an attempt by the major media to create the idea of a third way. Some had hoped, for instance, that João Doria, the former governor of São Paulo, or even Luciano Huck, a famous TV presenter in Brazil, would be presidential candidates to represent this third way and overcome Brazil’s polarization. But that didn’t happen, and I do not see it happening in 2026 either.

What I think will happen is a repositioning of political support. Tarcísio de Freitas, the current governor of São Paulo, seems to be the natural choice to replace Bolsonaro as Lula’s main opposition in this polarized economic and political landscape. But he will face a very difficult task in his campaign: essentially paying homage to Bolsonaro and capitalizing on his support, while at the same time trying to present himself as a more moderate and market-friendly politician. It will be a hard act for him to pull off.

How successful he is will also depend on what happens in Brazil between now and the election. There is already a sense that the presidential race has begun, and PT, Lula’s party, is currently treating Tarcísio as the main opposition.

Fux’s Vote Echoed the US Pattern of Punishing Followers but Acquitting Leaders

Supporters of Brazil’s former President (2019–2022) Jair Bolsonaro hold signs during a demonstration in São Paulo, Brazil, on September 7, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Do you observe unequal “graduations” of culpability—between January 8 “foot soldiers” and political principals—that echo Brazil’s broader selective enforcement of law (e.g., in housing or labor), thereby reinforcing perceptions of institutional bias?

Dr. Mara Nogueira: I don’t think so. I keep going back to the US, but I think it’s a useful parallel. That happened in the US: as you say, the foot soldiers of the Capitol invasion went to jail, while Trump not only remained free but was also allowed to run for president and become president again. If there is any echo of that in Brazil, it’s in Fux’s vote. As I said in the beginning, he voted for culpability for the January invaders but acquitted Bolsonaro, so his vote reflects a bit of that. But the Supreme Court decision has been coherent in the sense of condemning both the foot soldiers and what they perceive to be the leaders of this movement.

Lastly, Bolsonaro’s defenses—claims of witch-hunts, persecution, procedural overload—resonate with Trumpist repertoires. Where do Brazilian specificities (evangelical media ecosystems, military memory, police syndicates) create distinct discursive frames?

Dr. Mara Nogueira: In terms of the rhetoric, Bolsonaro’s entire act is very much aligned with Trump’s, so I don’t see much difference there. But of course, the content and the way he speaks to his political base are, as you say, shaped by Brazilian specificities, particularly the conservatism of his supporters. The differences between Brazil and the US have more to do with the essentially different composition of the two societies—social, economic, cultural, and, as we already discussed, geographical—and how Brazil differs from the US.

In terms of discursive frames, however, there is a kind of right-wing rhetoric that is common to different political leaders within this spectrum, modulated to speak to particular groups of supporters shaped by their culture and, in the case of Brazil, by religious positions within society.

Dr. Mark Levene is a genocide scholar, peace activist, and Emeritus Fellow in History at the University of Southampton.

Dr. Levene: Dysfunctional International System Enables Israel’s Genocide in Gaza

by Editor’s ChoiceForeign PolicyHomeHuman RightsInterviews

A new United Nations commission of inquiry has concluded that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, citing mass killings, forced displacement, the destruction of essential infrastructure, and even measures to prevent births as evidence of genocidal intent. While Israel has rejected the findings as “distorted and false,” the commission underscored that all states are legally obliged to prevent and punish genocide. Against this backdrop, the ECPS spoke with genocide scholar and peace activist Dr. Mark Levene. In the interview, he warns that genocide is not an aberration but “a dysfunction of the international state system,” arguing that Gaza exemplifies how structural failures and powerful alliances allow atrocities to continue unchecked.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

A United Nations commission of inquiry has concluded on Tuesday that Israel has committed genocide against Palestinians in Gaza, finding “reasonable grounds” that four of the five genocidal acts defined in the 1948 Genocide Convention have been carried out since the war began in October 2023. These include mass killings, inflicting serious bodily and mental harm, deliberately creating conditions to destroy the group, and preventing births. The report cites statements by Israeli leaders, such as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vow to bring “mighty vengeance,” as evidence of genocidal intent reinforced by systematic military actions. Israel has categorically rejected the findings, denouncing them as “distorted and false,” but the commission underscored that all states bear a legal duty under international law to prevent and punish genocide.

It is against this backdrop that the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke in depth with Dr. Mark Levene, genocide scholar, peace activist, and Emeritus Fellow in History at the University of Southampton. In this wide-ranging conversation, Dr. Levene situates Israel’s ongoing war on Gaza within a broader theoretical and historical framework of genocide studies. His intervention goes beyond the binaries of “self-defense” and “terrorism” to expose the systemic dysfunctions of the international state order that allow such atrocities to persist.

The urgency of Dr. Levene’s analysis is underscored by his activism. On September 6, 2025, he was arrested during a peaceful sit-down protest in London’s Parliament Square. Alongside nearly 900 others, he was detained under the Terrorism Act simply for holding a sign declaring, “I Oppose Genocide, I Support Palestine Action.” This lived commitment frames his reflections on Gaza and lends moral force to his scholarly perspective.

The title of this interview—“A Dysfunctional International System Enables Israel’s Genocide in Gaza”—captures its central thesis. For Dr. Levene, genocide is not an aberration but “a dysfunction of the international state system.” Contrary to the dominant framing of genocide as a violation of an otherwise rules-based order, he argues that “you cannot separate what is happening in one state from its relationships with others.” Modern genocides, whether in Myanmar, Rwanda, or China, must be understood within the interlocking political economy of nation-states. Gaza, in this reading, is not exceptional but symptomatic: a structural outcome in which powerful allies shield perpetrators from accountability.

What emerges in this interview is both a historical and moral diagnosis. Dr. Levene emphasizes the asymmetry of power between Hamas and the Israeli state, notes the persistence of genocide despite multiple international rulings, and insists that the key question is systemic: “Why has this been allowed to continue?” His reflections range from the rationalization of mass violence through developmentalist fantasies—such as the so-called “Trump-Riviera Plan”—to the moral responsibilities of genocide scholars. Speaking as both historian and activist, he affirms that “we do have to speak truth to power,” even when power refuses to listen.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Mark Levene, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Genocide Is a Dysfunction of the International State System

UN Security Council meeting on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, New York, August 25, 2016. Photo: Ognjen Stevanovic.

Dr. Mark Levene, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In “The Changing Face of Mass Murder” (2002), you argue that extreme violence cannot be understood solely through the acts of perpetrators but must be situated within broader political and societal conditions. How might this framework help us interpret Israel’s ongoing campaign in Gaza beyond the binaries of “self-defense” and “terrorism”?

Dr. Mark Levene: That’s a big question! Let me go back a little beyond that particular article, which was written quite a long time ago. I’ve always argued that genocide cannot be understood as something attributable to a single actor. There is always a dynamic at play between what we call perpetrators and victims, and I think that kind of categorization is not always helpful.

In the case of Gaza, we can identify two sets of perpetrators, but the asymmetry between them in terms of power and actions is very stark. Hamas can be seen as a perpetrator, if we use that term, but the Israeli state is also a perpetrator—albeit one with vastly greater lethal capacity. So, the dynamic is profoundly unequal.

In genocide—or at least in the mindset of those who commit it—there is always this dynamic with the other party. In law, this often translates into ordinary people being encompassed within broader categories. What is significant is that when there is a political-military struggle between two sides, entire populations become encompassed within that logic. They are punished simply because they are perceived as part of the “other side” of the conflict. And that is what is happening here.

But the point I want to make is that genocide, in the modern world, occurs essentially within the framework of nation-states—not all nation-states, not all the time, but often enough to form a recurring pattern. I see it as happening within an interconnected, interrelated political economy—in other words, within the international system of nation-states. You cannot separate what is happening in one state from its relationships with others. I cannot think of a single modern case of genocide—whether in Myanmar, Rwanda, or even China—that can be understood entirely in isolation, as if it were only about internal dynamics between a state and a population it deems so troublesome that it considers or actualize the destruction of that whole communal population.

Does that help as a starting point? It’s a tricky issue and difficult for us to fully grasp—not least because genocide is so often understood primarily through the prism of the UN Convention on Genocide, as if it were an aberration. It is framed as something that violates the norms of a rules-based, civilized international system of nation-states, in which genocide is presumed not to occur, and any such event is treated as a transgression. I don’t see it in those terms at all. I see genocide rather as a dysfunction of the international state system. In that sense, we have to view what is happening in Gaza, for instance, by asking: how is it that almost two years on from its beginning in October 2023, the genocide committed by Israel is still continuing? I actually warned on October 11, just four days after it began, that Israel was on the cusp of committing genocide.

And I do want to say something about the other side as well, because Hamas also has a role. As I said earlier about perpetrators and victims, the reality is always more complex. But the question we must ask, nearly two years on, is: why has this been allowed to continue? It’s a fundamental issue, because we’ve had so many statements, analyses, and commitments—culminating in the UN grouping, which just yesterday (September 16, 2025) declared this a case of genocide. The ICJ, ICC, and countless scholars weighed in much earlier, affirming the same. Yet it continues. That sense of helplessness felt by so many around the world, horrified by this abomination, stems from precisely this question: why is it still happening?

I think the answer lies in Israel’s relationships—not only what Israel itself is doing, which I see not as exceptional but symptomatic of the world system we inhabit. What is happening is clearly tied to Israel’s relationship with an extremely powerful actor on the international stage, namely the United States, but also with countries such as my own, the United Kingdom, where the response has been, to put it mildly, ambivalent. Why has the UK not been more proactive? On the one hand, the legal framework is very clear: this is genocide, and it has been clear from very early on. Yet on the other hand, we face the evident failures of the political system. This, I believe, reflects the deeper dysfunction of the global order itself.

States That Oppose Genocide Routinely Assist Those Who Commit It

Anti-Israel flyers displayed during a demonstration at Place du Châtelet, Paris, March 28, 2009. Photo: Olga Besnard.

Your essay “Why Is the Twentieth Century the Century of Genocide?” (2000) links genocide to the structural dynamics of the modern international system. Do you see the current assault on Gaza as symptomatic of a systemic dysfunction within the nation-state order, especially when powerful states shield Israel from accountability?

Dr. Mark Levene: The simple answer is yes—I’ve just explained why. Yes, clearly that is the case. But, again, I should say that I have not spent the last two years, or indeed the last 30 or 40 years, just looking at Israel’s relationship with Palestine or Gaza. What is happening here reflects the way that states that commit acts of genocide are often shielded by other states. 

I wouldn’t say it’s normal, but the ambivalence of other states in relation to those committing such acts is rather standard. There is almost a routine process whereby a state might commit genocide, while the rhetoric of other states suggests opposition, yet their actions and policies—through omission or commission—may actively assist that state in what it is doing. And one can think of, indeed I could enumerate, examples in the recent past where this has been the case. 

So, in a way, I have a very gloomy prognosis here: I don’t think what is happening in the case of Israel, and what it is doing as a state in relation to Gaza, is somehow entirely exceptional. It is actually indicative of something broader—a deeper malaise, a wider dysfunction that exists within the international system of nation-states. These are the same states that, on the one hand, created the Genocide Convention, which in effect says, “thou shalt not do this.” That is how I see it, in almost religious terms—an extension of “thou shalt not do this.” But in practice, the system still allows it to happen.

Gaza Is Accelerated Genocide; the West Bank Is Creeping Genocide

In your study of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (1999), you coined the term “creeping genocide” to describe gradual elimination under a developmentalist state agenda. Could Israel’s long-term blockade, de-development of Gaza, and deliberate destruction of infrastructure be understood as a comparable case of creeping genocide?

Dr. Mark Levene: Well, yes and no. I’d say something rather different here. I think what is going on in relation to the entirety of Palestine, i.e. what we would now include as the West Bank, is creeping genocide, though it is accelerating. What I think is happening in Gaza is at the extreme end of accelerated genocide. I don’t think this is creeping, actually, even though it has taken two years to get Israel thus far. And I would emphasize this developmental—you mentioned development. The developmentalist aspect is something we should focus on a little bit. And the way I would approach it is by returning to what is, in my view, highly indicative of what is actually taking place here—and what, to ordinary eyes, might seem completely off the map—namely, the Trump-Riviera Plan. But this is going to be determined, this area is going to be turned into a sort of Riviera of the Middle East. That, to me, is not, in terms of how genocidal actors think things through, off the map. We ought to take it extremely seriously. Because genocide is always, in some ways, linked to the latent ideas, even in the back of one’s head, of states that are trying to envisage transcending the conditions under which they normally exist into something else, into something where they can truly develop themselves as they would like to in their heads. 

Does this make sense? What I’m trying to say here is that states in the modern world, the international system of nation-states—are developmentalist. They have to develop in order to survive within an international system which is, by definition, social Darwinian. It’s a sort of, almost a competitive race to the top, or race to the bottom. Normally, states cannot realize what is unrealizable. If we take the case of Israel, the thinking would be we would really love to have a state which was streamlined, which didn’t have any Palestinians in it, which we could turn into a corporate security entity, as we have it in our heads, which is going to be the Mecca of the Middle East, if I can be a little bit ironic. Before October 2023, Israel was maneuvering around that idea, but no concrete projection of a developmentalist arrangement granting them the totality of Palestine to use as they wished yet existed.

The crisis of October 7th—and it really was that—I mean, I’m sure you’ve spoken to Omar Bartov about the trauma Israel suffered on that day—it’s what I would call the perpetrator’s never-again syndrome. Namely, we have a situation where, in the past, the victim group has attacked us, posing a mortal threat to our existence. This came to pass in a very real way on October 7th with what Hamas did. One could argue that what Hamas was attempting was itself genocidal; it simply lacked the means and capacity to carry it through. This became a green light for the Israeli state to bring out its tucked-away, last-resort plans—to tear up what had been in place up to that point and strike out toward something completely different and new. In other words, even if what Israel was doing up to 2023 was grotesque and hideous in relation to the West Bank and Gaza, after that moment there was a genuine rupture. From then on, Israel was attempting to realize what had previously been unrealizable: sweeping away the population of Gaza and creating something entirely new.

Now, this is hideous, but it is part of the mindset of genocide. It’s a sort of drive toward transcendence. That Riviera plan sits at the extreme end of that developmentalist thinking. You might call it fantasy, but it is fantasy being put into practice. The way the Israeli defense forces are bulldozing Gaza into non-existence—turning it into rubble—is a precondition for that transformation. What is actually happening on the ground is the pulverization of a people, of an entire population, rendering them so destitute and degraded that they can be removed.

Now, again, I can make comparisons. I wouldn’t say this is a unique action of Israel. Israel’s ethnic cleansing of Gaza should be seen within a much broader framework of politically mandated ethnic cleansings in the modern era. But that doesn’t excuse it in any sense, because all those ethnic cleansings—though not listed as elements of genocide in the Genocide Convention—are, in practice, genocidal. I have no doubt of that, even if it puts me at variance with the Convention. 

What is happening in the West Bank, however, is creeping genocide. You could put it like this: Gaza is stage one; the rest—the Bezalel Smotrich plan for the West Bank, which also entails total ethnic cleansing and is unfolding piece by piece, olive grove by olive grove, village by village—is creeping genocide, but under the aegis of the international state system. And the fact that Israel has a powerful ally supporting it, doing nothing to stop this—namely, the United States—means this creeping genocide is accelerating very rapidly. These facts on the ground are intended to sabotage any aspiration of those states and people who advocate a two-state solution. This is precisely what Smotrich and those within the Israeli government are attempting to achieve. That’s the way I see it. It may sound horribly cynical, but then genocide is, by definition, cynical.

Framing Gaza as a ‘Problem Population’: The Logic of Genocide

Pro-Palestinian protesters hold signs. Photo: Oliver Perez.

You argue that genocide is often undertaken by states perceiving a “problem population” as a threat to their developmental or geopolitical survival. How does this resonate with Israel’s depiction of Gaza’s entire civilian population as complicit with terror organization Hamas?

Dr. Mark Levene: That’s a rather tricky question, isn’t it? I’m not sure that I am entirely—again, if we take other historical examples, one closer to home: the Armenian Genocide of 1915 in Turkey. There were groups who were defined as terrorists by the Ottoman state in 1915, and there is still a problem area I have written about: the degree to which insurrectionary groups, or groups challenging the integrity of the Ottoman state in wartime, were clearly—some of them at least—debating or actually practising terrorism against the state. That’s my position. There were other insurrectionary groups in Europe at that time; it was not only Armenian groups.

The difference here is that the Ottoman response—more specifically, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) response—was enacted by a regime that did not represent the Ottoman population as a whole. The Israeli government does not necessarily represent the Jewish population in Israel as a whole. But that CUP regime chose to encompass the entire Armenian population as insurrectionary—despite many complex cross-currents—and pursued a programme of their deportation or elimination. The stated aim was ethnic cleansing—to remove them to the desert regions to the south of the empire—but the result was genocidal.

Now, in the Palestinian population in Gaza, which I’ve never been to, so I can only speak second- or third hand, I’m sure there are a lot of crosscurrents of political, social, and cultural attitudes and feelings, as there are in all societies. Those would include people who were supporters of Hamas, and who—part of the thinking—would like to wipe Israel off the map. Does this, therefore, justify an attack on the whole population of that region: a population that is not just a “problem population,” but one that is co-responsible for what Hamas did? You can hear what I’m saying: I cannot justify what Hamas did. I think it was not only morally wrong but strategically an error. But can one justify treating the whole population as collectively responsible—and therefore punishable—which in effect legitimizes what Israel is now attempting, namely ethnic cleansing that, given there is nowhere else to go, results in creeping elimination day by day, hour by hour?

So again, this is what I’m saying: I hate what I’m saying, but I think there is a general genocidal thinking that goes on here. We almost have to get into the mindset of a perpetrator, and one can read it in, actually, all the various utterances of government ministers, but also social commentators and so on, who have been speaking in the last two years of wiping this “problem population” off the map, of making it disappear somewhere else. This is the mindset of genocide, unfortunately.

Holocaust Memorialization Risks Collapse in the Face of Gaza

In “The Holocaust Paradigm as Paradoxical Imperative” (2022), you warn against a sacralized, exceptionalist reading of the Holocaust that blocks solidarities with other victims of mass violence. How might this paradigm be shaping Western reluctance to acknowledge Gaza as genocidal?

Dr. Mark Levene: So again, it’s a very big question. The brief answer might be this: what I call the Holocaust paradigm refers to the way what happened to the Jewish populations of Europe under the Nazi aegis—not just under Nazi occupation, but, and this is a historical point I would want to develop more fully elsewhere, involving the co-responsibility not only of the Nazis but also of other European states in the destruction of the Jews. That is a major theme of mine.

Looking back retrospectively, the key moment was the 1990s, and I think that timing is significant because it came at the end of the Cold War. From then onward, the West, primarily, elevated this destruction of the Jews, of a key component of the European population, into something sacralized—turned into a kind of sacred act. It was not only made exceptional but also set up as the benchmark by which we ought to understand genocide.

Part of the reason lies in why this memorialization took shape. On one hand, it was tied to notions of tolerance and possibly of a multicultural society, which Europe by that time seemed more willing to embrace. The Holocaust became a peg upon which that notion could be hung. On the other hand, my argument is that this came after the collapse of the West’s number one enemy, the Soviet Union. With the Soviet Union gone, the West needed a figure of antithesis, and the Nazis filled that role—as the most awful, insidious, diabolical example imaginable.

At the same time, in the 1990s, genocides were occurring within Europe—most notably in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the collapse of the Soviet system in the East—which showed how close such horrors could be. And so there emerged an almost edifice of Holocaust memorialization that became very significant. It became, as you say, sacralized. One could not touch it. If you wanted to talk about other genocides, you had to do so by asking whether they fit within the frame of this sacralized genocide.

This shaped interesting directions of travel: one could point to Rwanda and say, yes, here is another genocide we should also recognize and memorialize. But Armenia in 1915, for instance, was always politically fraught, for reasons tied to structural relationships between states, and so it never fully entered the pantheon of what was considered “in” or “out.”

So, to return to your question, the simple answer is yes: Holocaust memorialization became central to a self-referential notion of the West as the “good guys.” The Holocaust carried a significant emotional weight within that way of thinking.

I think what’s striking about the present—and I say this as someone who is Jewish—is that I do not wish Holocaust memorialization ill; on the contrary, I wish it well. It offered us an opportunity, potentially, to recognize that the world has witnessed many genocides. But I believe it is now in danger of being smashed to smithereens by what is happening in Gaza.

There is another aspect here. We are very focused on Gaza, yet Holocaust memorialization in this country—in Britain, for example—still issues statements as if Gaza were not happening. It continues to speak only about what befell the Jews in the 1940s, which of course it should do, but it seems unable to draw any reference to what is unfolding today. That inability is deeply troubling. It creates an obstacle to connecting past genocide to contemporary atrocities.

What is revealing about Holocaust memorialization is that it deals with something fixed in the past. You can point to it and say: this was terrible. But what is terrible now is not being addressed. From a Jewish communal perspective, and from the broader framework of Holocaust memorialization, this represents another catastrophe—a consequence of the many consequences flowing from the genocide in Gaza.

We Have to Speak Truth to Power

Israelis walk next an Israeli election billboard of Likud Party showing US President Donald Trump shaking hands with Likud chairman and Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Beth Shemesh, Israel on September 8, 2019. Photo: Gil Cohen Magen.

Finally, across your scholarship you stress the moral responsibility of genocide scholars not only to analyze but also to warn. In the face of Gaza, what role should genocide scholars play: cautious analysts, public intellectuals, or active witnesses?

Dr. Mark Levene: Again, that’s a very big question, because it involves a whole spectrum of human beings who are “genocide scholars.” And I can’t speak for them. Some see themselves as public intellectuals, while others see our role as being able to have an impact on situations like this through our analysis and what we say. I’d also note, of course, that within the genocide and Holocaust arenas of scholarship there is a lot of unease and fractiousness now about how we view what is happening in Gaza. Not everybody is on the same page, and I think one should acknowledge that there is a multiplicity of viewpoints.

I can only speak for myself here. My background is not only as a genocide scholar but also as a peace activist. I spent my formative years, my late 20s and early 30s, as a peace activist in a Europe which, as we saw it, was on the verge of nuclear annihilation. So, my own position, for what it’s worth, is about speaking truth to power. And the sadness of that, from a personal point of view, is that power is not very interested in listening.

In the end, one has to resort to action, as I did last week. I felt impelled to join Palestine Action, a group in Britain challenging the relationship of the British government to the genocide in Gaza—through what it allows to happen on its soil, or through its engagement in selling components for F-35 planes that have been used to bomb Gaza. Palestine Action has been challenging, non-violently, the British state’s role in this process, as well as companies on British soil, including one just down the road from where I live in the Welsh borders: Elbit Systems, a major Israeli defense manufacturer with an embedded role in the British defense industry.

I felt impelled to support Palestine Action, even though it has been proscribed as a terrorist organization. Ultimately, I can only do what other human beings can do: put my feet non-violently on the ground—and in this case, be arrested under Section 12 or 13 of the Terrorism Act in Britain—for saying no to genocide. I was arrested simply for sitting in Parliament Square in London with a poster saying, “I oppose genocide, I support Palestine Action.” And for that, I am now, apparently, a supporter of terrorism.

We have reached a point where what should be blindingly obvious—that my government, and all governments, should be doing something to stop this—seems to be beyond their capacity. So, I don’t exaggerate my role as a genocide scholar. Most of the time, we are not listened to in high political or elite circles. So, there is a limit. We have to be aware of those limitations. But we still have to speak truth to power.

Illustration by Lightspring.

Virtual Workshop Series — ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches

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Virtual Programme: September 4, 2025 – April 16, 2026 via Zoom 

Between 2012 and 2024, one-fifth of the world’s democracies disappeared. During this period, “us vs. them” rhetoric and divisive politics have significantly eroded social cohesion. Yet in some instances, democracy has shown remarkable resilience. A key factor in both the rise and decline of liberal democracies is the use—and misuse—of the concept of “the people.” This idea can either unify civil society or deepen social divisions by setting “the people” against “the others.” This dichotomy lies at the heart of populism studies. However, the conditions under which “the people” become a force for democratization or a tool for majoritarian oppression require deeper, comparative, and interdisciplinary analysis. Understanding this dynamic is crucial, as it has profound implications for the future of democracy worldwide. This programme aims to foster a broad and interdisciplinary dialogue on the challenges of democratic backsliding and the pathways to resilience, with a focus on the transatlantic space and global Europe. It aims to bring together scholars from the humanities, arts, social sciences, and policy research to explore these critical issues.

Organiser 

European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) 

Partners

The Humanities Division, Oxford University

Rothermere American Institute

Oxford Network of Peace Studies (OxPeace) 

European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford University

Oxford Democracy Network

 

Special thanks to Phil Taylor, Pádraig O’Connor, Freya Johnston, Heidi Hart, David J. Sanders, Clare Woodford, Anthony Gardner, Liz Carmichael, Harry Bregazzi, Hugo Bonin, Benjamin Gladstone, Doris Suchet, Jenny Davies, Justine Shepperson, Daniel Rowe, Katy Long, Julie Adams, Réka Koleszar, Stella Schade, Louise Lok Yi Horner, Jacinta Evans, Contestation of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS), Network for Constitutional Economics and Social Philosophy (NOUS), and Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics (CAPPE).

 

Session 1  

The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World 

Date/Time: Thursday, September 4, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

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Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni (Professor, Political Science, University of Lausanne; Editor-in-Chief, Populism & Politics). 

Introduction

David J. Sanders (Regius Professor of Political Science, University of Essex, Emeritus).  

Speakers 

“The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism in India and the US: Do Family Dynasties and Big Businesses Really Control Democracy?”  by Dinesh Sharma, Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich, Britt Romagna, Ms. Ayako Kiyota (Fordham University, NYC), Amartya Sharma (Student, George Washington University, D.C.)

“Out-groups and Elite Cues: How Populists shape Public Opinion,”  by Michael Makara (Associate Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations, University of Central Missouri) and Gregory W. Streich (Professor of Political Science and Chair of the School of Social Sciences and Languages, University of Central Missouri). 

“From Economic to Political Catastrophe: Four Case Studies in Populism,” by Akis Kalaitzidis, (Professor of Political Science, Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri).  

“Populism, Clientelism, and the Greek State under Papandreou,” by Elizabeth Kosmetatou (Professor of History, University of Illinois Springfield) and Akis Kalaitzidis (Professor of Political Science, Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri).  

Discussant

João Ferreira Dias (Researcher at the International Studies Centre of ISCTE, in the Research Group Institutions, Governance and International Relations).

 

Session 2

The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989-2025 Poland

Date/Time: Thursday, September 18, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

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Chair

Prof. Mavis Maclean, CBE (St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford).

Speakers

“Varieties of Polish Patriotism: Experience of “Solidarity” 1980-1989 in Context of History and Anthropology of Ideas,” by Joanna Kurczewska (Professor in the humanities, Head of the Sociology and Anthropology of Culture Team at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences).
 
“Single Text, Clashing Meanings: Political Polarization, Constitutional Axiology and the Polish Constitutional Quagmire,” by Kamil Jonski (Economist, PhD in law at the University of Lodz). 
 
“Protection of Human Rights and Its Implications for Women’s and Minority Rights,” by Malgorzata Fuszara (Professor of humanities in the field of sociology, Institute of Applied Social Sciences (IASS), University of Warsaw). 
 
“Who Speaks for Whom: The Issue of Representation in the Struggle for the Rule of Law,” by  Jacek Kurczewski (Professor of humanities in the field of Sociology, Lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Customs and Law at the University of Warsaw). 
 

Discussants

Magdalena Solska (Assistant Professor, Department of European Studies and Slavic Studies, University of Fribourg).

Barry Sullivan (Professor, Institute For Racial Justice, Loyola University Chicago School of Law).

Krzysztof Motyka (Professor, Institute of Sociological Sciences, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)

 

Session 3 

Populism, Authoritarianism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 2, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

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Chair

Marietta D.C. van der Tol (PhD, Landecker Lecturer, Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge; Senior Postdoctoral Researcher, Trinity College)

Speakers 

“Religious Freedom as Hungaricum Hungarian iIliberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom,” by Marc Loustau (PhD., Independent Scholar).

“Religious or Secular Freedom? On Pragmatic Politicization of Religion in Post-socialist Slovakia,” by Juraj Buzalka (Associate Professor of Social Anthropology, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at Comenius University).  

“Illiberal Theocracy in Texas? The Incorporation of Evangelical Christian Theology into State Law,” by Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen (First Unitarian Universalist of Houston and Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford).

Discussant

Simon P. Watmough (Freelance academic researcher and editor and serves as a non-resident research fellow at ECPS).

Erkan Toguslu (PhD, Researcher at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven, Belgium).

 

Session 4 

Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging

Date/Time: Thursday, October 16, 2025 – 15:00-17:30 (CET)

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Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni (Professor, Political Science, University of Lausanne; Editor-in-Chief, Populism & Politics). 

Speakers 

“We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches,” by Samuel Ngozi Agu (Ph.D., Dean of the MJC Echeruo Faculty of Humanities at Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria).

“Uses and Meanings of ‘the People’ in Service of Populism in Brazil,” by Eleonora Mesquita Ceia (Professor at the National Faculty of Law of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil). 

“The Idea of ‘People’ Within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” by Shiveshwar Kundu (Jangipur College, University of Kalyani)

“We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal,” by Mouli Bentman, Mike Dahan (Sapir College, Israel). 

Discussants

Abdelaaziz Elbakkali (Associate Professor of Media and Cultural Anthropology, SMBA University, Fes; Post-Doc Fulbright visiting scholar at Arizona State University). 

Azize Sargin (Director for External Affairs, ECPS). 

 

Session 5

Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions

Date/Time: Thursday, October 30, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“The Romanian and Hungarian People in Populist Leaders’ Narratives between 2010-2020,” by Gheorghe Andrei (PhD Student, University of Bucharest and Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris). 

“The Application of the Concepts of ‘People’ and ‘Nation’ in Recent Political Developments in Germany: Theoretical Sensitivities and Their Implications for Democracy,”  by Yazddan Keikhosrou Doulatyari (Postdoctoral Fellow, Technische Universität Dresden). 

“The Role of Nativism in Shaping Populist Movements: Implications for Democracy and Social Integration in Africa,” by Melody Chindoga (Postdoctoral fellow, Midlands State University, Gweru Zimbabwe). 

“Ripping off the People: Populism of the Fiscally Tight-fist,” by Amir Ali (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi).

Discussants

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews). 

 

Session 6

Populism, Authoritarianism and the Crisis of Representation: Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice

Date/Time: Thursday, November 13, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in a Changing World,”  by Jonathan Madison (Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute).

“Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy,” by João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho (Member of the Research Committee of Sociological Theory at the International Sociological Association (ISA) and a researcher at LabPol/Unesp and the GEP Critical Theory: Technology, Culture, and Education).

“Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-politics and Post-democracy,” by Andreea Zamfira (Associate Professor with the Department of Political Science, University of Bucharest). 

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 7

Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism

Date/Time: Thursday, November 27, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

Christopher N. Magno (Associate Professor, Department of Justice Studies and Human Services, Gannon University). 

Speakers

“Beyond Fairness: Meritocracy, the Limits of Representation, and the Politics of Populism,” by Elif Başak Ürdem (PhD candidate in political science at Loughborough University).

“Memetic Communication and Populist Discourse: Decoding the Visual Language of Political Polarization,” by Gabriel Bayarri Toscano (Assistant Professor, Department of Audiovisual Communication, Rey Juan Carlos University).

“Populism and the Evolution of Popular Sovereignty: A Long-Term Theoretical Perspective,” by Maria Giorgia Caraceni (PhD Candidate in the History of Political Thought, Guglielmo Marconi University of Rome; Researcher at the Institute of Political Studies San Pio V).

“Win-Win Politics: Beyond Political Liberalism and Agonistic Pluralism,” by Bosco Lebrun (PhD candidate in Politics at Luiss University, Rome).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 8

Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn  

Date/Time: Thursday, December 11, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)


Speakers

Charismatic Populism, Suffering, and Saturnalia,” by Paul Joosse (Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Hong Kong).

“Going, Going,… Going Populist? Revitalising Membership-Based Politics through Populist Linkage,” by Saga Oskarson Kindstrand (PhD candidate, Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, Sciences Po). 

“Socialism Betrayed Portugal”: Authoritarian Populism and the Far-right,” by Jaime Roque, (PhD candidate, Center for Social Studies – University of Coimbra (CES-UC)). 

 “The Evolution of the Rhetoric of the “Alternative for Germany”: A Comparative Analysis of the Election Campaigns for the European Parliament in 2019 and 2024,”  by Artem Turenko (PhD Candidate, Political Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow).

Discussants

(TBC) 

 

Session 9

Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion  

Date/Time: Thursday, January 8, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews).

Speakers

“From Crime Shows to Power: The Rise of Criminal Populism,”by Christopher N. Magno (Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University). 

“The Legitimization Process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s Migration Policies,” by Russell Foster (Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies) and Murat Aktas (Professor of Political Science at Mus Alparslan University).

“Every Man for Himself: Racism and Sephardism in Spain’s Imaginary and the Holocaust,” by Santiago López Rodríguez (Postdoctoral Fellow, Uppsala Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Uppsala University).

“Us, Them, and the (Hidden) Borders of the Socio-Political World: Art (and Discomfort) Against the Oversimplified Populist Worldview,” by Roberta Astolfi (Postdoctoral researcher and the academic coordinator of the Research Unit “Orders” at the SCRIPTS of the Free University Berlin). 

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 10

Resisting the Decline: Democratic Resilience in Authoritarian Times  

Date/Time: Thursday, January 22, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“Resilience in Market Democracy,”  by Peter Rogers (Professor in the Department of Linguistics at Macquarie University).

“The Contradictory Challenges of Training Local Elected Officials for the Future of Democracy,” by Pierre Camus(Postdoctoral Fellow, Nantes University).

“The Rise of Women-Led Radical Democracy in Rojava: Global Democratic Decline and Civil Society Resilience Amidst Middle Eastern Authoritarianism,” by Soheila Shahriari (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, (EHESS)).

“Feminist Diaspora Activism from Poland and Turkey: Resisting Authoritarianism, Anti-Gender Politics, and Reimagining Transnational Solidarity in Exile,” by Ecem Nazlı Üçok (PhD Candidate at the Institute of Sociological Studies, Charles University).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 11

Inclusion or Illusion? Narratives of Belonging, Trust, and Democracy in a Polarized Era 

Date/Time: Thursday, February 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“When Identity Politics and Social Justice Procedures Contribute to Populism,” by Saeid Yarmohammadi (University of Montreal).

“Why Do We Trust The DMV? Exploring the Drivers of Institutional Trust in Public-facing Government Agencies,”by Ariel Lam Chan (PhD student in the Department of Sociology at Stanford University).

“Active Citizenship, Democracy and Inclusive Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nexus, Challenges and Prospects for a Sustainable Development,”  by Dr Dieudonne Mbarga (Independent Researcher).

“Silenced Voices in a Democratic Dawn: How the Iranian Constitutional Revolutionaries (1905–1906) Weaponized “the People” Against Minorities,” by Ali Ragheb (PhD., University of Tehran).

Discussants

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews).

  

Session 12 

Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South 

Date/Time: Thursday, February 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

 “Africa at the Test of Populism: Identity Mobilisations, Crises of Political Alternation, and the Trial of Democracy,” by Yves Valéry Obame (The University of Bertoua, Global Studies Institute & Geneva Africa Lab) and Salomon Essaga Eteme (The University of Ngaoundéré, Laboratoire camerounais d’études et de recherches sur les sociétés contemporaines (Ceresc)).  

“Towards Decolonizing the Drive for Democracy in Nigeria and Africa,” by Geoffrey Nwaka (Professor of History, Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria). 

“Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom,” by Oludele Mayowa Solaja (Faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University).

“Viral but Powerless? Digital Activism, Political Resistance, and the Struggle for Governance Reform in Kenya, by Asenath Mwithigah (PhD Candidate, United States International University-Africa).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 13

 Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis 

 Date/Time: Thursday, March 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

 “Reimagining Populism: Ethnic Dynamics and the Construction of ‘the People’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” by Jasmin Hasanović (Assistant Professor and researcher at the Department for Political Science at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Science).

“The Two Peoples: Why Deliberating and Voting don’t Belong Together,” by Théophile Pénigaud (postdoctoral researcher at the ISPS, Yale University). 

 “Institutionalizing the Assembled People,” by Sixtine Van Outryve (Postdoctoral Researcher, Radboud Universiteit; UCLouvain).

“Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy,” by Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez (Global Advocacy Officer at UNPO, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 14  

From Bots to Ballots: AI, Populism, and the Future of Democratic Participation  

Date/Time: Thursday, March 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

Brian Ball (Associate Professor, Northeastern University London & University of Oxford,Faculty of Philosophy). 

Speakers

“Conceptions of Democracy and Artificial Intelligence in Administration and Government: Who Wants an Algorithm to Govern Us?” by Joan Font (Research Professor, Institute of Advanced Social Studies (IESA-CSIC).   

“How Does ChatGPT Shape European Cultural Heritage for the Future of Democracy?” by Alonso Escamilla (PhD Student on Cultural Heritage and Digitalisation, The Catholic University of Ávila in Spain) and Paula Gonzalo (Researcher, University of Salamanca, Spain). 

“The New Elite: How Big Tech is Reshaping White Working-Class Consciousness,” by Aly Hill, (PhD candidate, Department of Communication at The University of Utah).  

“Bubbles, Clashes and Populism: “The People” in an algorithmically mediated world,” by Amina Vatreš (Teaching Assistant, Department of Communication Studies and Journalism, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 15 

From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, War, and Democracy   

Date/Time: Thursday, April 2, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers 

“Pericles’ Funeral Oration: A Populist Rhetoric for War and Politics,” by Elizabeth Kosmetatou (Professor, History Faculty,University of Illinois, Springfield).

“Can Democracy (or Anything Else) Rescue Civilization While the Rules Keep Changing?” by Robert R. Traill (PhD in Cybernetics/Psychology at Brunel). 

“The Politics of Manipulated Resonance: Personalised Leadership in Populism,” by Lorenzo Viviani (Professor, Political Sociology, Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy).

“The Exclusionary Identity of ‘The People’ in Radical Right Populism,” by Cristiano Gianolla (Researcher, Center for Social Studies, University of Coimbra; Lisete S. M. Mónico (Associate Professor, Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences, the University of Coimbra) and Manuel João Cruz (Post-doctoral researcher, Center for Social Studies, University of Coimbra).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 16 

Voices of Democracy: Art, Law, and Leadership in the Era of Polarization  

Date/Time: Thursday, April 16, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“Cultivating Democracy through Art: Laibach’s Contribution in Analyzing Nationalisms and Feelings of Ethnic Belonginess,” by Mitja Stefancic (Independent Researcher, Civil Servant, Italy).

“The Hidden Agenda of Bollywood: The Rise of Hindutva Narratives in Indian Cinema,” by Devapriya Raajev (MA candidate, Sociology, South Asian University, New Delhi). 

“’ I Miss My Name’: Why Black American Election Workers Like Ruby Freeman Turn to Defamation Law to Defend Democracy,” by Ciara Torres-Spelliscy (Brennan Center Fellow and Professor of Law at Stetson University). 

“State Institutions in Divided Societies: Religious Policy and Societal Dissatisfaction in the Israeli Military,”  by Niva Golan-Nadir (Postdoctoral Fellow at Reichman University) and Michael Freedman (Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem).

Discussants

(TBC) 

 

 

Biographies & Abstracts

Session 1 

The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World

Date/Time: Thursday, September 4, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni is a professor in political science and political sociology at the University of Lausanne where he leads the Research Observatory for regional research. He is currently the principal investigator the international project “Populism and Conspiracy” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Austrian Science Fund. He is co-director of the international research laboratory ‘Parties, political representatives, and sustainable development, at the University of Lausanne in collaboration with Laval University.

His works have been published in several peer-reviewed journals as European Politics and Society, Government and Opposition, Political Studies, Party Politics, Swiss Political Science Review, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Territory, Politics, Governance, Comparative European Politics, Contemporary Italian Politics, Socio-economic Review, Regional and Federal Studies, Journal of Borderlands studies, Revue française de Science politique, and Populism amongst others. He has published 45 books in 4 languages (English, Italian, French and German). His latest volumes include “The People and the Nation. Populism and Ethno-Territorial Politics in Europe (ed. with R. Heinisch and E. Massetti Routledge 2019), “Political Populism. Handbook of Concepts, Questions and Strategies of Research” (ed. with R. Heinisch and C.Holtz-Bacha, Nomos, 2021); “Sovereignism and Populism : Citizens, Voters and Parties in Western European Democracies” (ed. with L. Basile, Routledge 2022); “National Populism and Borders: The Politicisation of Cross-border Mobilisations in Europe” (Elgar 2023); “Populism and Key Concepts in Social and Political Theories” (ed with. C. De la Torre, Brill, 2023), and “Territory and Democratic Politics. A Critical Introduction” (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2024).

He was the principal investigator of many research projects, including four funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. He has pursued an interdisciplinary educational path, earning a degree in sociology and anthropology, as well as a PhD in contemporary history, from the universities of Lausanne and Turin. He was a visiting professor and research fellow at the Universities of Columbia, Laval, Geneva, Groningen, Torino, Sorbonne-Panthéon- Paris, Science-Po-Paris, Valencia, Salzburg, European University Institute of Florence, Cornell University, and La Tuscia. His interests are devoted on political parties, populism, nationalism, regionalism, and Swiss politics in comparative perspective.

Introduction

David J. Sanders is a professor emeritus of political science at the University of Essex. Professor Sanders is an internationally renowned expert on British politics and was appointed the UK’s first Regius Professor of Political Science. Professor Sanders has been a key figure in the achievements of Essex’s Department of Government, which has topped the UK politics rankings for the quality of its research in every national research assessment in the last 25 years.

After studying at Essex as a postgraduate student, Professor Sanders started teaching politics at the University in 1975. He is author of numerous influential books and articles on UK politics, including Lawmaking and Cooperation in International Politics, 1986 and Losing an Empire, Finding a Role, 1990. He co-authored Political Choice in Britain, 2004, Performance Politics and the British Voter, 2009, Affluence, Austerity and Electoral Change in Britain, 2013 and The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain, 2013.

He also co-edited the top UK political science journal, the British Journal of Political Science, between 1990 and 2008.

Professor Sanders is a Fellow of the British Academy and received a Special Recognition Award from the Political Studies Association in 2012 for his commitment to outstanding research, which has shaped public understanding of politics. From 2000 to 2012, he was a Principal Investigator for the British Election Study, which is conducted at every General Election to study electoral behaviour and how elections contribute to the operation of our democracy. This prestigious study was based at Essex from 1974 to 1983 and from 2000 to 2012.

Paper 1: The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism in India and the US: Do Family Dynasties and Big Businesses Really Control Democracy?

Abstract: Both India and the US seem to be in the grip of a populist movement that seems to share power with political dynasties and big business. How is this possible in a democracy? We examine this question by comparing families and dynasties in both countries — Kennedy vs Gandhi, currently out of power; Trump vs Modi, now in power. Both nations claim to be vibrant democracies, where populist nationalists have swept into power. Historically, India has been led by charismatic members of one dynastic family, namely the Gandhis; while the US definitely has political families (such as the Adams, Bushs, Rockerfellers, Clintons and now Trumps) it has not been dominated by one or two family dynasties in the way Asian democracies have been after colonialism ended.

Similarly, businesses have played a major role in politics of India and the US, but the business takeover of democratic institutions has had a bigger hand in the US politics than in India until recently; India was a quasi-socialist country till the 1990s. Both polities seem to be moving closer to big business, playing a major role in shaping policy and trade. Thus, we ask the question: are democracies at this populist moment in global politics controlled by the patricians (robber barons, big-tech, oligarchs) – big business and political dynasties? Our methodological approach is psycho-historical and biographical, while staying abreast of demographic data.

We compare the Kennedys vs. the Gandhis; and Trump vs Modi. The Gandhi family has dominated Indian politics for half of its modern history since gaining independence from British rule in 1947; while at least one member of the Kennedy family has been in power for at least the past fifty years in local or federal office, they’ve never held power in the way the Gandhi family did in India. Here we compare women leaders in both family histories, Indira Gandhi vs Kennedy female leaders. In comparing Trump vs. Modi we see a clear difference between two societies; Modi is not a billionaire, unlike Trump, rather a tea-seller from very humble origins. Yet, their populist governments have given power sharing arrangements to the big-business and big-tech oligarchs. When we compare the narrative of these two leaders we see a strong nationalistic streak that mobilizes populism in favor of nativism and an anti-globalist agenda.  The key question is are these societies converging or diverging? On the question of authoritarianism and populism they are converging, as India rises as an economic power and the US tries to remain a global democratic power, even though their local cultural politics are remarkably different.

Dinesh Sharma,Ph.D., is a social scientist with a Doctorate from Harvard University in human development and psychology. He is currently Director and Chief Research Officer at SteamWorksStudio in Central-Southern Jersey (an edu-tech venture), consultant at Fordham Institute for Research Service and Teaching (FIRST), and contributing faculty at Walden University. He was associate research professor at the Institute for Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, SUNY; a senior fellow at the Institute for International and Cross-Cultural Research in New York City; and a columnist for Asia Times Online, Al Jazeera English and the Global Intelligence among other syndicated publications. His biography, titled “Barack Obama in Hawaii and Indonesia: The Making of a Global President,” was rated a Top 10 Book of Black History for 2012 by the American Library Association. His next book, “The Global Obama” has been widely reviewed and received the Honorable Mention on the Top 10 Black History Books for 2014. His book on Hillary Clinton examined the rise of women politicians before the “Me Too” movement, “The Global Hillary: Women’s Political Leadership in Cultural Context” (Routledge, 2016) and was favorably reviewed.

Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich, is a graduate student from New York City, currently studying at Fordham’s Graduate School of Education. Her academic interests focus on the psychological impacts of early-life trauma and the integration of mindfulness techniques in clinical settings to support emotional, cognitive, and physical integration. She is also engaged in research exploring the relationship between trauma and democracy. Shoshana is passionate about bridging psychological theory with real-world practice and plans to pursue a career in clinical psychology. 

Paper 2: Out-groups and Elite Cues: How Populists Shape Public Opinion

Abstract: Populist leaders claim they are the true representative of “the people” against corrupt elites and various out-groups (very often immigrants) who are thought to threaten the well-being of the nation. If this is so, the leader is simply reflecting the will of the people as they ascend to power and carry out their agenda. From this view, the populist leader answers the call of the people and uses power to protect and restore the country by targeting the elites and out-groups that threaten it. However, populist leaders do not just reflect the will of the people, they actively cultivate public support for their political agenda. From this view, populist leaders deploy their rhetorical powers to persuade, and even manipulate, the people, by tapping into anxieties that build public support for the populist leader’s agenda. Moreover, the power of populist leaders to focus the attention of voters on the threats to their well-being enables them to tap into in-group fears of various socio-demographically different out-groups. Indeed, truly gifted populist orators can manufacture fear and anxiety by targeting specific out-groups as the “cause” of the economic, social, or political problems that, in their view, threaten the nation. 

In this paper, we examine results from a nationally representative survey conducted in the U.S. in October of 2024 to measure the ability of U.S. President Donald Trump to influence public opinion. We examine his ability to increase or decrease public support for a range of policies, specifically refugees and trade. Our survey allows us to compare how respondents view refugees depending on whether those refugees are from Ukraine or from Gaza, and how respondents view trade from Europe or from China. Moreover, our survey allows us to assess whether public opinion is more readily shaped by the cues provided by political leaders (what we call “follow-the-leader” effects) or by the social attributes of the “out-group” (what we call “social attributes” effects), both of which are important components of populist rhetorical appeals.

Michael Makara is an Associate Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations. He received his Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, and his B.A. from Virginia Tech. Professor Makara’s research focuses on politics in authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations, with a regional focus on the Middle East. His research appears in Democracy and Security, Defense and Security Analysis, and the Journal of the Middle East and Africa. At UCM he teaches a variety of courses related to comparative politics and politics of the Middle East. Every year, he leads a study abroad program to Jordan and Israel that aims to challenge students’ perceptions of the region. He recently published an article in the Journal of Political Science Education (with Kinsey Canon) that explores the impact of this program on the extent to which students adhere to common stereotypes of the Middle East. Dr. Makara also sits on the Board of Directors for the International Relations Council (IRC) of Kansas City and is the director the Mideast meets Midwest project to expand opportunities for university students to pursue Middle Eastern Studies.University of Central Missouri & Dr. Gregory W. Streich, University of Central Missouri. 

Gregory W. Streich is Professor of Political Science and Chair of the School of Social Sciences and Languages. He has published on a range of topics, including democratic theory, social capital, justice, and American Exceptionalism. Most notably, he has authored or co-edited three books: Justice Beyond “Just Us”: Dilemmas of Time, Place, and Difference in American Politics, U.S. Foreign Policy: A Documentary and Reference Guide, and Urban Social Capital: Civil Society and City Life. Additionally, he has won several awards for his teaching and research, including the Distinguished Faculty Award from the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

Paper 3: From Economic to Political Catastrophe: Four Case Studies in Populism

Abstract: This paper is meant to be a comparative study between four international crises: the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, Argentina’s 2001, the US’s Great Recession of 2008, and Greece’s Great Depression of 2010. It has been argued by economists, historians, and political scientists that economic crises produce populist movements in the countries that experience them (Kindleberger, 2005; Ferguson, 2012; Hartleb, 2012). Kindleberger argues that all economic crises are a product of a “bubble” or a “mania” and as such the corrective response is an economic crisis in the country that experiences such market inflation. As an economist, however, he says nothing of the impact of the crisis on the politics of the country or the responses to said crisis.

Generally speaking, populism has been at the forefront of countries with great inequalities in places like Latin America or India or in countries under severe socio-economic stress such as Weimar Germany. Yet the European Union may be in a recession but it could hardly be justification for the multitude of populist (anti-EU, anti-globalization, xenophobic, and racist) movements that have sprung up even in countries with solid economies such as Finland, Denmark, and UK. It is thus important to analyze the types of responses to these crises and the types of populism, if any, each country experiences as a result of a given crisis, accounting for its severity and the administrative and decision-making capacity of the state apparatus.

The association of economic crisis and populism seems to hold true in modern times in many areas of the world. In Thailand after the catastrophic collapse of the Thai Baht in 1997, in Argentina in 2001, and in the US after 2010, one can debate whether the bursting of the dot com bubble constitutes a crisis, but mostly after the collapse of the real estate market bubble of 2008 and more recently in Greece in 2010. Yet, in all those countries the experience with populism is different and the pressure created by the economic condition on the ground leads to different outcomes in the politics of those countries. In Thailand, the reaction to post-crisis populism was a coup, in Argentina was an extended period of “Kirchnerismo” , in the US the rise of what Hofstadter the “Paranoid Style in American Politics”, as well as the more traditional non-party political movements hat put enormous pressure on the traditional party structure pushing liberal democracy to the brink, while in Greece populism which is more associated with European populist tradition as experienced in most pre-and post-WWII countries created a hybrid nationalist-leftist populism more akin to early twentieth century European Corporatism. This research intends to highlight the political processes, Institutions, and leaders who have influenced the course of politics and argue that in all four cases, the best predictor for post-crisis behavior is the national political culture.

Akis Kalaitzidis is a professor of political science at the Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri. He received his B.A. from the University of Tennessee-Knoxville in Economics and Political Science, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from Temple University in Philadelphia in Political Science. He joined the UCM faculty in 2004. He teaches a variety of classes, including American Government, The European Union, World Politics, International Organizations, and American Foreign Policy. He was Rotary Peace Fellow at the Rotary Peace Center Chulalongkorn University’s Program in Conflict Resolution and has been the director of the Missouri Ghana program (2011) and Missouri Greece program (2015). He is the author of Europe‘s Greece: A Giant in the Making, published by Palgrave McMillan (2010) and co-edited with Dr. Streich US Foreign Policy: A Documentary and Reference Guide (Greenwood 2012) among others. His work appears in a variety of journals, book reviews/contributions, and conference publications.

Paper 4: Populism, Clientelism, and the Greek State under Papandreou

Abstract: This paper explores the role of populism and clientelism in shaping the Greek state under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou, one of Greece’s most influential political figures. Papandreou served as Prime Minister from 1981 to 1989 and again from 1993 to 1996. His tenure coincided with a period of profound political and economic transformation following the restoration of democracy in 1975. His governance combined populist rhetoric with clientelist practices, crafting a distinctive political strategy that left a lasting impact on Greek politics. At the core of Papandreou’s political success was his ability to mobilize popular support through populist appeals, emphasizing social justice, nationalism, anti-Americanism, and the welfare state. He positioned himself as a champion of the common people, presenting the Socialist Party as the defender of workers’ rights and national sovereignty, even as he reversed course on many of his programmatic policies.

Papandreou’s populism resonated deeply with the large segment of the Greek population that right-wing establishments had marginalized following the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) and the collapse of the military junta (1967-1974). As these disenfranchised groups leaned politically to the left, Papandreou shifted his stance from the center to the left, incorporating a more left-wing faction within his party. His message of social and economic justice empowered these communities, offering them a sense of inclusion and challenging the longstanding dominance of conservative elites. In parallel with his populist narrative, Papandreou employed clientelism as a tool for political stability. The distribution of state resources and public sector jobs—particularly after Greece acceded to the EEC and the influx of investment funds—was often based on loyalty rather than merit. This system of patronage not only secured votes but also fostered a political culture of dependence on the state for material rewards.

This study explores the interaction between populism and clientelism in shaping the Greek state. It investigates Papandreou’s policies’ influence on Greece’s political culture, governance frameworks, and public administration and their enduring effects on the nation’s journey within the European Union. The analysis ultimately provides a critical evaluation of how populist rhetoric and clientelist strategies reinforced democratic institutions in Greece and altered state-society dynamics during the late 20th century.

Elizabet Kosmetatou is a Professor of History at the University of Illinois Springfield. 

 

Session 2 

The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989-2025 Poland

Date/Time: Thursday, September 18, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Abstract: In principle, the Polish transition to democracy initiated in 1981 was understood as liberation from Soviet colonialism, Communist totalitarian state ideology at the national level and “the resurrection of rights” (Kurczewski, 1993) at the individual level.

In practice, it quickly became controversial how the “will” of the nation should be determined and whose rights should be resurrected. The problem was nicely captured by a Christian member of the Polish Parliament, voicing objection to the abortion referendum on the grounds that such fundamental and morally-loaded issues could not be decided by “the accidental society” (in other words, the voting public).

Two decades later, opening debate that will be called “the four hours of anti-philosophy of law” (Safjan, 2015) the honorary speaker of Polish Parliament proclaimed that “law shall serve us. Law that does not serve the nation is lawlessness”. “Poland’s constitutional breakdown” (Sadurski, 2019) dutifully followed, beginning with “war” with the Constitutional Tribunal and ordinary courts.

Panellists will discuss:

-the concept of nation – civil and national} underpinning “Solidarity’s” resistance to the communist rule, and its evolutions after the 1989 breakthrough (Joanna Kurczewska),

-the shifting patterns of the political polarization and its impact on key liberal-democratic institutions like Parliamentary law-making process, Presidency and the Constitutional Court (Kamil Jonski),

-the sociological dimensions of the “rule of law” including the democratic transition, post-2015 backsliding and post-2023 restoration in context of doctrine of separation of powers (Jacek Kurczewski),

-the implications for the protection of human rights, with particular emphasize on woman’s rights (including access to the abortion) and minorities rights (Malgorzata Fuszara).

Varieties of Polish Patriotism: Experience of “Solidarity” 1980-1989 in Context of History and Anthropology of Ideas

Joanna Kurczewska is a full professor in the humanities and head of the Sociology and Anthropology of Culture Team at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Graduated University of Warsaw, Ph.D. at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences (The Problem of the Nation in Polish Sociology at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Centuries. A Comparative Analysis of Selected Concepts), habilitated doctor (Technocrats and the Social World – Analysis of Technocratic Ideas).

In 1981, co-operated with the Centre for Social and Professional Work at the National Commission of NSZZ “Solidarity” Trade Union as co-chair of the Union History Group.

A corresponding member of the Second Faculty of History and Philosophy of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences (since 2011) and vice-president, formerly president of the Commission on Civilization Threats of the above Academy, a member of the Warsaw Scientific Society (since 2009), In 2007, she was awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta. Selected publications: National Identities vis-a-vis Democracy and Catholicism – The Polish Case after 1989 (2005), Researcher vis-a-vis the Local Community (2008), Squeezing Brussels Sprouts? On the Europeanization of Local Communities in the Borderlands (2009).

Single Text, Clashing Meanings: Political Polarization, Constitutional Axiology and the Polish Constitutional Quagmire

Kamil Joński is an economist who graduated from SGH Warsaw School of Economics with a Ph.D. in law at the University of Lodz (Constitutional Tribunal and the Political Conflict – Law & Economics Perspective). He is an assistant at the Collegium of Socio-Economics, SGH Warsaw School of Economics. He works at several research projects financed by Polish National Science Centre, at Cracow University of Economics, SGH Warsaw School of Economics and Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. Jónski worked on Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIA) in Polish Ministry of Justice (2012-2016) and on economic analysis of judicial system in MoJ’s supervised Institute of Justice (2016-2017). Since 2017, he is employed at Polish Supreme Administrative Court. 

Selected papers: Return to Power: The Illiberal Playbook from Hungary, Poland and the United States (2024), Legislative inflation in Poland: bird’s eye view on three decades after the the1989 breakthrough (2024), Evidence-Based policymaking during the COVID-19 Crisis: Regulatory Impact Assessments and the Polish COVID-19 Restrictions (2023), Assessments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal performance: effects of the survey administration method (2023). Co-author of the 2022 report summarizing European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) survey of European judges about their independence.

Protection of Human Rights and Its Implications for Women’s and Minority Rights

Małgorzata Fuszara is full professor of humanities in the field of sociology, Institute of Applied Social Sciences (IASS) University of Warsaw, habilitated doctor in the Sociology of Law, Ph.D. in law. Served two terms as Director of the IASS, joint founder of Poland’s first Gender Studies Program at IASS, head of its Sociology and Anthropology of Custom and Law Chair. In 2014-2015 Plenipotentiary of Polish Government for Equal Treatment. President of Council of Women’s Congress Association, Chairwoman of the Women’s Council under the Mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski, awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta. Authored, co-authored and edited numerous publications in Polish, English, French and German, among others: Polish Disputes and Courts (2004), Women in politics (2007), New men? Changing models of masculinity in contemporary Poland (2008), Cooperation or conflict? The State, the Union and Women (2008), Women, elections, politics (2013), Disputes and their resolution (2017), Mass Aid in Mass Escape. Polish Society and War Migration from Ukraine (2022).

Who Speaks for Whom: The Issue of Representation in the Struggle for the Rule of Law

Jacek Kurczewski is full professor of humanities in the field of sociology, Lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Customs and Law at the University of Warsaw. Editor-in-chief of Societas/Communitas. Specializing in the sociology and anthropology of law and customs, continuator of the Leon Petrażycki’s Polish school of sociology, a student of Adam Podgórecki. Former Academic Director of the Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law. Member of Warsaw Academic Society.

In 1980–1992 an advisor on Rule of Law to the “Solidarity” Trade Union, member of Lech Wałęsa’s Citizens Committee, participant of the Round Table negotiations of 1989 (sub-table for freedom of association). Judge of the Tribunal of the State (1989-1991). Member of Parliament and Deputy Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of the first term (1991–1993). Coauthor of the draft laws: limiting censorship (1981), the law on counteracting drug addiction (1987), the law on assemblies (1990) and the Civil Service Code (2003). In 2007 awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta. Member of the Program Councils of the Polish public TV broadcaster and pollster CBOS Foundation. Author of The Resurrection of Rights in Poland (1993) and numerous research papers.

Chair

Mavis Maclean is a Senior Research Fellow of St Hilda’s College and a Research Associate at Department of Social Policy and Intervention. She has carried out Socio Legal research in Oxford since 1974, and was a founding director of OXFLAP in 2001. She has acted as the Academic Adviser to the Lord Chancellor’s Department, and served as a panel member on the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry between 1998 and 2001, a major public inquiry into the National Health Service. Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire

Discussants

Dr. Magdalena Solska is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Fribourg. She currently directs the research project “Political opposition in post-communist democracies and authoritarianisms,” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (PRIMA Grant) in the period of 2023-2027. Her research focuses on political systems after communism and specifically on forms, strategies and institutionalization of opposition in selected countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Professor Barry Sullivan is the Raymond and Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and the George Anastaplo Professor of Constitutional Law and History. Before joining the Loyola faculty, Professor Sullivan had a varied career in the private practice of law, government legal practice, the teaching of law and public policy, and university administration. Professor Sullivan was Dean of the School of Law at Washington and Lee University from 1994 to 1999 and Vice-President of the University in 1998-99. He was also a long-time litigation partner at Jenner & Block (1981-94, 2001-09), where he focused on appellate practice.

Professor Krzysztof Motyka is a legal philosopher and sociologist of law, Chair of Human Rights and Social Work (earlier: Sociology of Law and Morality) at John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. Fulbright senior scholar in the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California, Berkeley (1994/1995), visiting researcher at the George Washington University, Washington, D.C. (July-October 2015). Member of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ Advisory Board on Human Rights (2001 -2002) and of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2007-2012). Editor of “KUL Research Bulletin,” organizer of annual “Human Rights Days Conference.”

 

Session 3

Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 2, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Marietta D.C. van der Tol is Landecker Lecturer at the Faculty of Divinity, Affiliated Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, and Senior Postdoctoral Researcher at Trinity College, Cambridge.

She studied law and history at Utrecht University (LLM, MA) and the history of Christianity at Yale (MAR) before completing her PhD at Cambridge (2020) on Politics of Religious Diversity, examining tolerance and visibility of religion in constitutional law and politics in France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

She has held research and teaching positions at Oxford (Blavatnik School of Government, St Peter’s, Lincoln College) and Cambridge (Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, 2024–25).

Her current projects include leading interdisciplinary networks on religion, nationalism, and democracy, and co-directing research on Protestant political thought. She has co-edited special issues in Religion, State & Society and The Journal of the Bible and its Reception and convenes the annual Political Theologies conference series.

Discussants

Simon P. Watmough (PhD) is a freelance academic researcher and editor and serves as a non-resident research fellow in the research program on authoritarianism at ECPS. He was awarded his Ph.D. from the European University Institute in April 2017 with a dissertation titled “Democracy in the Shadow of the Deep State: Guardian Hybrid Regimes in Turkey and Thailand.” Dr. Watmough’s research interests sit at the intersection of global and comparative politics and include varieties of post-authoritarian states, the political sociology of the state, the role of the military in regime change, and the foreign policy of post-authoritarian states in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Erkan Toguslu (PhD) is a researcher at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven, Belgium. He received his M.A. and Ph.D. in sociology from Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris. His research focuses on transnational Muslim networks in Europe, the emergence of Islamic intellectuals, interfaith dialogue, the debate on public-private Islam, and the nexus of religion and radicalization.

ErkanToguslu is co-editor of Journal of Populism Studies (JPS) and the editor of Everyday Life Practices of Muslims in Europe (Leuven University Press); Europe’s New Multicultural Identities (Leuven University Press and co-edited with J. Leman and I. M. Sezgin); and Modern Islamic Thinking and Islamic Activism (Leuven University Press and co-edited with J. Leman). His recent publications on violent extremism and Muslim extremism include: “Caliphate, hijrah, and martyrdom as a performative narrative in ISIS’ Dabiq magazine,” Politics, Religion and Ideology, 20 (1), 94-120; and “Capitalizing on the Koran to fuel online violent radicalization: A taxonomy of Koranic references in ISIS’s Dabiq,” Telematics and Informatics, 35 (2), 491-503 (co-authored).

Paper 1: Religious Freedom as Hungaricum Hungarian Illiberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom

Abstract: In 2025, the Hungarian government announced it was creating a “Religious Freedom” caucus in the European Parliament. Domestically, Hungary has claimed a special relationship to the value of religious freedom since at least 2020, when the Hungarian parliament voted to enshrine religious freedom as an intangible value of Hungarian heritage (Hungarikum). On the one hand, the rising prominence of this discourse of religious freedom was precipitated by immediate political concerns as the Hungarian government has tried to distract attention from negative judgements at the European Court of Human Rights. On the other, this paper will go beyond journalistic accounts of political strategizing in order to sketch an outline of the emerging illberal political institutionalization of religious freedom. I will focus on the network of Hungarian institutional political actors that enact this discourse at the European and domestic levels, and detail the forms of publicly acceptable religious practice enabled by these institutions.

Marc Loustau is a cultural anthropologist and journalist reporting on religion and nationalism in Eastern Europe. Based in Budapest, Hungary, he is fluent in English and Hungarian and proficient in Romanian. His reported features and commentary have appeared in major U.S. and European newspapers and magazines. Drawing on his academic research, he provides smart and surprising fact-based commentary on contemporary events. He has delivered invited lectures at universities across Europe and North America and has presented at numerous international conferences. His book Hungarian Catholic Intellectuals in Romania: Reforming Apostles examines how contemporary Hungarian Catholic intellectuals are forging an ethical concept of nationhood.

Paper 2: Religious or Secular Freedom? On Pragmatic Politicization of Religion in Post-socialist Slovakia

Abstract: Since 1989, elements of radical Christian activism in Slovakia that have been frequently characterized as representing the ‘culture of life’ have been challenging the regime of post-socialist liberal constitutionalism represented by the European status quo. This challenge has primarily consisted of accusations that the latter suppresses newly acquired religious freedoms. The most significant counterpart of this radicalism – secular progressivism – has been arguing against expanding ecclesiastical privileges in the sphere of financing, education, and culture. Traditional social-confessional divisions in Slovak society have weakened, reshaping the discussion away from political freedom for all and toward a debate about who is suffering more oppression. In this conflict, the most profitable have been political entrepreneurs, especially current Prime Minister Robert Fico, who utilizes “culture war” discourse in his populist mobilizations.

Juraj Buzalka is Associate Professor of Social Anthropology at Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia, where he has taught since 2006. His research focuses on the anthropology of political movements, exploring intersections of nationalism, populism, religion, and politics, particularly in Eastern and Central Europe. He is also interested in the politics of memory and the cultural dimensions of wine and food movements. Since 2013, he has been based at the Institute of Social Anthropology within the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences. 

Paper 3: Illiberal Theocracy in Texas? The Incorporation of Evangelical Christian Theology into State Law

Abstract: This year, Texas marks three consecutive decades of governance by the Republican Party. In that time, the party has built up what can be described as a theocratic illiberal regime. The theological positions of many of the state’s evangelical Christians have been incorporated into state law, often under the guise of religious freedom. In his paper, our third panelist, the Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, himself a Texas-based clergyman, will reflect how the rhetoric of religious freedom has been used to further the construction of an illiberal state within the United States federal system, eroded supposed the separation of church and state, and undermined freedom of religion itself.

Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, First Unitarian Universalist of Houston and Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford. He earned a Ph.D. in American Studies and an A.M. in History from Harvard University. A graduate of Meadville-Lombard Theological School, he was ordained by the Unitarian Universalist Church of Long Beach in 2007. Since 2018, he has served the First Unitarian Universalist Church of Houston. Before moving to Texas, he served congregations in California, Massachusetts, and Ohio. He has held non-residential fellowships at Rice University and Princeton University. A scholar and social justice activist he has helped organize multiple labor unions—including acting as one of the founders of the Harvard Graduate Student Union. He currently has three books under contract. The first is on contemporary Unitarian Universalist theology (Brill). The second collects his 2019 Minns lectures on American Populism and Unitarian Universalism (Palgrave Macmillan). And the third is focused on the political theologies of populism (Wayne State University Press).

 

Session 4

Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 16, 2025 – 15:00-17:30 (CET)

Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni is a professor of political science and political sociology at the University of Lausanne, where he leads the Research Observatory for Regional Research. He is currently the principal investigator of the international project “Populism and Conspiracy” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Austrian Science Fund. He is co-director of the international research laboratory ‘Parties, political representatives, and sustainable development, at the University of Lausanne in collaboration with Laval University. 

Discussants

Abdelaaziz El Bakkali is an associate professor of Media and Cultural Anthropology at SMBA University in Fes, Morocco, and a Post-Doc Fulbright visiting scholar at Arizona State University in the US (2024/25), a PhD Joint-Sup at SIU, Illinois (2009/10), and a US Dept of State Fulbright Visiting P4T at UD Delaware (2007/2008). He obtained his PhD (2014) in media and communication from MVU, Rabat. His works focus on cultural studies and anthropology, primarily in the areas of media, gender, and religious studies. He has edited some books in these related research areas. Aziz has also written many articles in these related fields. El Bakkali has conducted other educational research, having taught English for over 24 years. He has published numerous articles in this field, which are featured on Publons, Google Scholar, SSRN, and other highly indexed works. 

Azize Sargin is an independent researcher and consultant on external relations for non-governmental organisations. She holds a doctorate in International Relations, with a focus on Migration Studies, from the Brussels School of International Studies at the University of Kent. Her research interest covers migrant belonging and integration, diversity and cities, and transnationalism. Azize had a 15-year professional career as a diplomat in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she held various positions and was posted to different countries, including Romania, the United States, and Belgium. During her last posting, she served as the political counsellor at the Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the EU.

Paper 1: We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches 

Abstract: Democracy is often celebrated as a governance system that ensures citizen participation and accountability. However, in practice, centralized power structures often alienate the people and limit genuine participation, leading to political exclusion, inefficiency, and social unrest. This paper advocates for bottom-up approaches to governance as essential for realizing inclusive democracy and sustainable development. Using Nigeria as a case study, it highlights the limitations of top-down governance, as seen in widespread corruption, economic disparities, and rising public discontent. The study explores key strategies for enhancing participatory governance, including decentralization, civic education, community-based development, digital democracy, and legislative reforms. By shifting decision-making closer to the grassroots, these approaches empower citizens, enhance transparency, and promote equitable resource distribution. Empirical evidence from global case studies, such as participatory budgeting in Brazil and decentralized governance in Uganda, supports the argument that bottom-up models lead to improved governance outcomes. It further demonstrates the interdependence of participatory governance and sustainable development, as nations that prioritize inclusivity experience greater political stability, economic growth, and social cohesion. The persistent challenges in Nigeria – ranging from separatist movements to youth-led protests like #EndSARS – underscore the urgent need for governance reforms that integrate local voices into policymaking. Ultimately, this paper advocates for a fundamental shift in governance – one that places the power of decision-making in the hands of the people. By adopting citizen-driven governance, nations can close the gap between leaders and the governed, ensuring greater accountability, inclusivity, and democratic integrity.

Samuel Ngozi Agu is a distinguished academic and the Dean of the MJC Echeruo Faculty of Humanities at Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria. With a Doctor of Philosophy in Social and Political Philosophy from the University of Port Harcourt, he is also an Inaugural Lecture Laureate, recognized for his impactful scholarship. He holds a postgraduate certificate in Mediation and Democratic Dialogue from the Central European University, Budapest, and a Professional Certificate in Mediation and Democratic Dialogue from the Benjamin Cardozo and Hamline Universities’ Schools of Law, in collaboration with the American Bar Association. With over 16 peer-reviewed journal articles, 15 contributions to university research books, seven authored books, and two co-authored books, Professor Agu’s work spans critical areas in social and political philosophy, with a focus on democracy, good governance, logic, critical thinking and youth entrepreneurship. He has presented his research at numerous national and international conferences, reflecting his commitment to advancing thought leadership in his fields. Professor Agu had served as Director of the Business Resource Centre (Entrepreneurship) and Director of the University Examination Centre at Abia State University. His leadership and academic endeavors continue to shape both the intellectual and administrative landscape of the institution.

Paper 2: Uses and Meanings of ‘The People’ in Service of Populism in Brazil 

Abstract: The implementation of populism is not homogenous among South American countries so populism in this particular region has many variations. Yet, they are similarly determined by episodes of political and social transition – for instance, the crisis of traditional political elites and the appearance of new political actors – along with variables of economic force or instability. Brazil serves as a good example. From the classical populism of Getúlio Vargas in the decade of 1930s until the far-right authoritarian populism of Jair Bolsonaro, all populist experiences in Brazil are linked to important changes in society. 

Brazil has experienced several particular populist leaders: some with marked populist features than others; some exposing a reactionary antagonism while others a mitigated one. This empirical variation produced different uses and meanings of “the people” in service of populism in order to try to secure political support and gain elections. But is this variation observed in the rhetoric of the same populist leader over time? Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a democratic and liberal populist leader, is in his third presidential term (2003-2006; 2007-2010; 2023-). He faced three presidential campaigns forged by the particular contexts and crises of each period. The goal of the paper is to identify and explain the uses and meanings of “the people” by Lula in his three political moments. Do they vary according to social demands and the political context of each period, or does the content of the idea of “the people” remain unchanged because it is used by the same populist leader? 

As to the methods, the qualitative approach is adopted based on bibliographic and documentary research, including online news materials, official campaign speeches and political programmes. This empirical research aims to contribute to the debate on the concept of ‘people’ as a discursive construction, drawing on the work of Ernesto Laclau. Moreover, the paper argues that the Lula case offers complexity that challenges the view within populism studies that populism is committed to opposing liberal democracies.

Eleonora Mesquita Ceia is a Doctor of Law at the Faculty of Law and Economics, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany. Professor of State Theory at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil. Professor in the Postgraduate Program in Contemporary Legal Theories at UFRJ. Currently her research focuses on transitional justice, constitutionalism, democracy, and populism. Her most recently published article was ‘Populism and Constitutionalism in Brazil: An Enduring or Transitional Relationship in Time?’ in Populism and Time: temporalities of a Disruptive Politics edited by Andy Knott.

Paper 3: The idea of ‘People’ within the domain of Authoritarian Populism in India

Abstract: Democracy is considered to be as motherhood and apple pie of any political system (Adam Swift,2014). Till a few years ago, this assumption was challenged mainly by Islamic countries, who were predominantly of the opinion that the West was imposing a liberal democratic set-up on their countries through coercion. Interestingly, during the second decade of the 21st century, the critique of democracy emerged not externally but from the internal system of the democratic political framework. 

The socio-political context of this internal critique is Populism of specific variety. It was the origin of a process of disaffection and disgust with liberal institutions, manifested in the increasing level of abstention and apathy (Chantal Mouffe, 2018). From the triumph of liberal democracy to its failure and its insufficient response toward the aspirations of the public, it created an apolitical social sphere. This vacuum was filled up by populist forces in India in 2014.

This upsurge of Hindu Nationalism is a variant of populism based on the emotional appeal to the psychological dimension of Indian society. Along with the failure of the liberal elites, the subalternisation of the political culture has created fertile ground for this variant of populism to develop (Ashutosh Varshney, 2022). Just like all other variants, Hindu Nationalism is essentially anti-institutionalist and restructuring the logic of liberal institutions is one of its objectives (Ajay Gudavarthy,2019). One of the specificities of this populism in India is its organic emergence from the Unconscious domain of Indian society (Ashis Nandy, 2020). Gradually, it acquires authoritarian tendencies of unique character, which we haven’t witnessed till now.

It is in this context this paper will try to delve on the four sets of questions. Firstly, How the political mobilisation of Hindutva is based on politics of emotion? Secondly, in what ways Populist politics within the framework of Hindu Nationalism is unique (authoritarian) in its form and content? Thirdly, can we think of any ‘alternative’ of Populism within the context of India in particular and the world in general? Lastly, theoretically, what would be the sphere of the revolutionary subject (the idea of people) within the space of re-imagined progressive politics (alternative) that this paper intends to think through?

Shiveshwar Kundu is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Kalyani, West Bengal. His academic interests encompass political philosophy, Indian politics, and psychoanalysis. Kundu has contributed opinion pieces and scholarly articles to publications such as Forward Press, Newslaundry, and The Telegraph India, where he addresses issues related to democracy, caste, and ideological movements in India.

Paper 4: We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal

Abstract: This paper examines the populist redefinition of We, the People and its implications for liberal democracy. Historically an inclusive foundation for democratic citizenship, the phrase has been appropriated by populist movements to delineate a “true people” in opposition to perceived outsiders. Rather than viewing this shift as mere rhetorical manipulation, the paper argues that it reflects a deeper crisis within the liberal-democratic tradition itself. The erosion of a shared conception of citizenship and the common good—exacerbated by identity-driven politics and post-liberal critiques—has facilitated this populist reinterpretation. While populist leaders exploit these fractures, their rise is symptomatic of broader ideological shifts in liberalism, which increasingly prioritizes particular identities over universal democratic ideals. Engaging with contemporary political theory and populism studies, this paper advocates for reclaiming We, the People as a genuinely inclusive democratic principle, emphasizing equality, pluralism, and civic participation as essential to the resilience of liberal democracy.

Mouli Bentman is a researcher and lecturer at Sapir Academic College, specializing in political philosophy and democracy studies. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a DEA from the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) in Paris. His research explores the philosophical foundations of democracy, the relationship between political authority and legitimacy, and the intersection of classical and contemporary political thought. Dr. Bentman’s academic work engages with fundamental questions in political philosophy, including the nature of sovereignty, the evolution of democratic governance, and the role of political myths in shaping collective identities. His scholarship examines both historical and contemporary theories of democracy, with a particular focus on Political Imagination. At Sapir Academic College, he teaches courses on political theory, democratic institutions, and the philosophical underpinnings of modern politics, emphasizing critical engagement with canonical and contemporary texts.

Michael Dahan received his PhD in political science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 2001. Currently his research focuses on two primary areas – the impact of technology on democracy as well as big data, algorithmic regimes and political participation. He provides grounded analysis on a regular basis in both areas and advises on policy issues in his areas of expertise. He is a regular contributor to the media on issues related to technology and politics. Dr. Dahan has extensive first-hand experience in the security and development fields in both policy and practice. At present he lectures on the political and social aspects of hacking and cyber warfare, politics and technology and political populism. He is a senior lecturer in the departments of Public Policy and Public Administration, and Communication Studies, Sapir College, Israel. He has also taught at the Hebrew University, Ben Gurion University, Bar Ilan University, and the University of Cincinnati. 

 

Session 5

Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 30, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: The Romanian and Hungarian People in Populist Leaders Narratives between 2010-2020

Abstract: The paper will analyze the construction of the Romanian and Hungarian people in the speeches of the political leaders of the ruling parties in the two countries between 2010-2020. Considering the centrality of the concept of the people for populist theory, the main question of the paper is how it was constructed and what resources were used in this construction. The hypothesis suggested is that the political leaders used narratives about the past which reflect a historical clash between two visions about how the Romanian and Hungarian people to be built. In order to test the hypothesis will be used the qualitative analysis in a deductive approach. The analysis will try to unravel the narratives and expose the characteristics attributed to the Romanian and Hungarian people. The speeches will be selected considering the significance of the moment when were delivered, like national commemorative or celebration days as well as during electoral campaigns or related to important events.

Gheorghe Andrei is a PhD Student at University of Bucharest and Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales Paris. His research interests include comparative analysis, social studies, local development, and case studies. He has authored a publication titled Discursive Strategies of a Populist Leader in 2020 Romanian Legislative Elections: The Rhetoric and Political Style of George Simion, which examines the rhetorical approaches of populist leaders in Romania.

Paper 2: The Application of the Concepts of ‘People’ and ‘Nation’ in Recent Political Developments in Germany: Theoretical Sensitivities and Their Implications for Democracy

Abstract: This study analyzes the concept of “people” and “nation” within the social and political context of recent years in Germany, focusing on how these concepts have been employed by right-wing groups to create social divisions, particularly in East Germany. The use of these concepts as tools for reinforcing identity distinctions has led to the emergence of “us vs. them” social dichotomies, presenting threats to social cohesion and democracy. This process, particularly in the context of social crises such as the migration crisis, has contributed to the erosion of democratic structures.

Drawing on the philosophical anthropology of Arnold Karl Franz Gehlen, this research emphasizes the human condition of vulnerability and the necessity for social and cultural institutions. This need for belonging, in specific contexts, can transform into a tool for establishing authoritarian orders, while simultaneously holding the potential to significantly strengthen democratic capacities. The study highlights this duality and examines how groups, without fully considering this theoretical sensitivity, have employed the concepts of “people” and “nation,” often inadvertently weakening democratic frameworks.

A deeper understanding of the theoretical foundations of Gehlen’s work has been significantly advanced through the opportunity to engage in scholarly dialogues and academic collaborations with Professor Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, the final assistant of Arnold Gehlen and editor of his collected works, in the Chair of Theoretical Sociology at the University of Dresden. This intellectual engagement facilitated a more profound exploration and development of Gehlen’s concepts in philosophical anthropology, while also linking them to their broader political and social implications for democracy.

Yazddan Keikhosrou Doulatyari is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Technische Universität Dresden. As the first place in the Tehran University Entrance Written Exam for the PhD Program in “Iranian Studies” (2010), and studied in the field of “International Relations” at Allameh Tabataba’i University (2017)’; Keikhosrou Doulatyari mainly dealt with the topic of “Emancipation of Human Subjects” during his PhD period. These engagements led him to the completion of a book in 4 volumes “Avay-e-lasst Dar Gûlistan-e-allast”; The essence of his experience in the decade 2010-2020 also included correspondence and active collaboration with Some prominent university professors. His project at the Technical University of Dresden focuses on indicators of social integration. Finding integration indicators and testing the criteria with the principles of MIPEX (The Migrant Integration Policy Index): Basic rights, Equal opportunities, and a Secure Future. Parallel to these criteria, the features of host countries are also crucial, which is why the project also offers preliminary insights into similarities with regard to a historical perspective.

Paper 3: The Role of Nativism in Shaping Populist Movements: Implications for Democracy and Social Integration in Africa

Abstract: Populism emerged in the nineteenth century as a response to the evolving concept of democracy, encapsulated in the phrase “government of the people, for the people, and by the people.” In recent decades, populism has gained traction in Africa, with political leaders employing populist strategies to galvanize support through charismatic leadership, anti-elitist rhetoric, and the promise of social inclusion. A significant aspect of African populism is the incorporation of nativist ideologies, which have been used as tools for political mobilization, often through strategies such as anti-imperialism, land redistribution without compensation, and opposition to “White monopoly capital.” These nativist elements resonate deeply with the historical legacy of colonialism and apartheid, which have shaped Africa’s socio-political landscape. In this context, nativism acts as a form of resistance, aimed at countering the colonial legacy and restoring African identity through the reclamation of cultural and political autonomy. However, when nativism is intertwined with populist rhetoric, it poses challenges to democratic values by fostering political polarization, excluding certain groups from the national identity, and undermining social cohesion. This paper explores the role of nativism in shaping populist movements in Africa, analyzing its impact on democratic processes and social integration. It argues that while nativism serves as a means of addressing historical injustices, it also risks reinforcing exclusionary practices that could threaten the future stability of African democracies. The paper calls for policies that promote inclusivity, equality, and integration to counter the divisive effects of nativist populism.

Melody Chindoga is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Public Policy and Devolution at Midlands State University in Zimbabwe. She earned her PhD in Political Science from the University of Fort Hare, where she also completed her Master’s and Bachelor’s degrees in Political Science, as well as a Bachelor of Administration in Public Affairs .Dr. Chindoga’s research interests encompass international relations, peace and governance, comparative politics, democracy, gender and politics, the politics of populism, and climate change . Her scholarly work includes co-authored articles such as “A Comparative Analysis of Nativism in Rural South Africa and Zimbabwe,” which examines how nativist discourse has been utilized by political factions in both countries to maintain power , and “Perceptions of Eastern Cape Rural Citizens on the Zuma-led Faction’s Nativist Discourse in South Africa,” which explores rural citizens’ responses to nativist politics in South Africa. Dr. Chindoga contributes to the academic discourse on post-colonial politics and governance in Southern Africa through her research and publications.​

Paper 4: Ripping off the People: Populism of the Fiscally Tight-fist

Abstract: This paper argues that contemporary populism is characterised by three oppositional stances: its being anti-elite, anti-establishment and anti-intellectual. This is then offset by an exaggeratedly pro-people stance that contemporary populism assumes. This is far from being a faithful representation of the people and is more of a deceitful caricaturing. This caricaturing of the people is actually a point borrowed from Hannah Arendt’s 1951 book The Origins of Totalitarianism. The people caricatured, quickly assume the form of an ochlocracy that again, to borrow from Arendt’s argument, form a temporary alliance with the elite. The paper further argues that the anti-elitism of contemporary populism tends to displace an earlier established elite with a new, often worse one, this becoming the proverbial case of the people falling out of the frying pan and into the fire. 

For purposes of historical analysis, the paper will divide populism into two phases. The first was an early to mid-twentieth century phase of predominantly Latin American and more specifically Argentinian populism (Laclau 2005); and the second, a contemporary, 21st century phase of populism. The conceptual distinction between these phases is in terms of a lose fiscally profligate earlier 20th century Latin American form and a tight fiscally prudent 21st century populism. An instance of a more recent fiscally profligate Latin American populism in the first decade of the 21st century would be the significant redistributive element in Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.

Recent examples of populism induced by fiscal prudence that will particularly form the focus of the paper are the Brexit referendum that according to Thimo Fetzer (2019) was created by the austerity cuts of the David Cameron led Conservative government; and the brutal ‘chainsaw’ austerity cuts of Xavier Milei in Argentina (Ovyat, Oncu & Rabinovich, 2025), the transference of which we are witnessing to the US in the Elon Musk led Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). The paper will also bring into consideration the populism of Narendra Modi’s India, where the government’s stance is typically pro-populist in terms of targeting elites and intellectuals, and at the same time partakes of the fiscal prudence that it is argued is a hallmark of contemporary 21st century populism. The Modi government has created a class of beholden beneficiaries of its welfarist largesse that in Hindi are called labharthis who are likely to continue voting for the government. What the Modi government’s populism has done is to transform welfarism from redistributive egalitarian to minimal subsistence.

Amir Ali has been a faculty member at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi since 2007. Prior to this he taught at the Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi for three years. He was Agatha Harrison Memorial Visiting Fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford between the years 2012 to 2014. He has authored two books South Asian Islam and British Multiculturalism (Routledge, 2016) and Brexit and Liberal Democracy: Populism, Sovereignty and the Nation-State (Routledge, 2022). His areas of teaching, research and writing are political theory, multiculturalism, group rights, British politics and political Islam. His work has been published in journals such as Economic and Political Weekly, Ethnic and Racial Studies and the Journal of Human Values. His regularly written political commentary on Indian and global politics has appeared in the Economic and Political Weekly, Al Jazeera English, the Indian periodical Outlook and in Indian broadsheet newspapers such as The Indian Express, The Hindu, and The Telegraph. He has written over 30 book reviews in varied publications.

 

Session 6 

Populism and the Crisis of Representation: Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice 

Date/Time: Thursday, November 13, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in a Changing World

Abstract: For much of the modern era, the world has viewed the United States as a paragon of liberal democracy, standing in contrast to developing democracies that struggle with institutional weaknesses, corruption, and executive overreach. However, recent patterns of democratic backsliding suggest a fundamental shift: As American institutions erode under polarization, populism, and elite norm-breaking, the United States is de-exceptionalizing and beginning to resemble the very democracies it was once contrasted against. At the same time, many developing democracies—while still flawed—are showing signs of institutional strengthening, electoral integrity, and greater civic engagement. This paper argues that these two trends represent a global realignment of democratic norms, in which the traditional hierarchy between “established” and “emerging” democracies is increasingly outdated. As Laurence Whitehead suggests, democratization is an “open-ended” process subject to reversals and detours. The erosion of democracy in developed countries like the United States demonstrates that democratic institutions in all contexts—whether long-standing or newly emerging—are vulnerable to similar pressures and should be studied accordingly.

Jonathan Madison is a historian and political analyst specializing in democracy, elections, and governance in Latin America and the United States. He holds a PhD in Global and Imperial History from the University of Oxford, where his research focused on 20th-century democracy in Brazil. His dissertation, The Fourth Republic and the Practicing of Democracy in Brazil, 1930-1968, reexamines Brazil’s post-war democratic experiment and its impact on the country’s political trajectory. Jonathan is currently a Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute, where he researches and advocates for election reforms aimed at improving candidate quality and political incentives. He also provides analysis on political risk, foreign policy, and democratization. His writing appears in Democracy’s Sisyphus, his Substack newsletter, where he explores foreign policy as well as historical and contemporary challenges to democratic governance. He has also contributed to multiple media outlets, podcasts, and newspapers in both the United States and Brazil. Additionally, Jonathan is part-time history instructor at Brigham Young University.

Paper 2: Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy

Abstract: Public discussion about the crisis of democracy has been focused on the institutional approach of politics, normally leading to a dichotomic diagnosis either affirming that we live in an authoritarian tendency, or that the institutions are proving to be resilient, safeguarding democracy. That approach helps to diagnose the present situation of existing democracies. Still, it doesn’t explain the causes of democratic crisis and the non-institutional causes for democratic erosion. This work intends to articulate the institutionalist approach with a sociological interpretation of the causes of the democratic crisis. Drawing back to the construction of democratic State and institutions as a product of modernization, the sociological approach interprets the present crisis as a turning point in the dynamics of social reproduction and trends of social change. It thus analyses populist action as a disruptive force that tries to mobilize popular support in deconstructing institutions and mechanisms of checks and balances for gathering power and excluding opponents. An analysis of populist discourse provides empirical evidence of how populist discourse constructs an image of “the people” as a morally pure and identifiable entity, using it in such a mobilization against democratic institutions. The analysis should not only point to aspects already discussed in the literature about populism, such as the counterposition of “us vs. them”, but also reconstruct how populist discourse gives meaning to the inherent, structural contradictions of modern society to direct political action, outlining a theoretical framework for the interpretation of democratic crisis.

João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho is a Brazilian social scientist. He earned his Ph.D. in Social Sciences in 2019, at the State University of São Paulo (Unesp), where he also taught Political Theory. He is a member of the Research Committee of Sociological Theory at the International Sociological Association (ISA) and a researcher at LabPol/Unesp and the GEP Critical Theory: Technology, Culture, and Education. Currently, he is researching populism and political authoritarianism, focusing on the emergence of the new radical right and its form of online mobilization, as well as the impact of digital media on democracy. His main research interests are Sociological Theory and Political Theory.

Paper 3: Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-Politics and Post-Democracy

Abstract: This paper aims to contribute to a multicausal, comprehensive analysis of the erosion of (representative) democracy, and of the relationship between this process and the one of rising (new) populism in Europe, by exploring mainly the theoretical perspectives advanced by two important political scientists, Daniel Barbu and Peter Mair. In their search for an in-depth understanding of this regressive process of de-democratization, Barbu and Mair have observed and described in detail a series of unexpectedly comparable changes, that have occurred in Western, respectively post-communist countries, since the 1990s: the precarization of the relationship between politics and society; the destructuring and delegitimization of parties as representative bodies; the de-parliamentarization and the tendency towards apoliticism; the personalization of political will; the weakening or hollowing out of res publica; the emergence of new “wooden languages” and “civil religions” (such as the one of “the rule of law”); the pre-eminence of the market logic in relation to the democratic constitutional order; the increasing recourse to unelected entities; the “government by cartel”; the curtailment of individual freedoms and of people’s sovereignty, etc. Against the already general (research) practice, Mair and Barbu suggested that (new) populism needed to be examined first as an associated symptom of the decline of politics and of representative institutions, and second as a cause.

Andreea Zamfira is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Bucharest, an associate researcher at the Regional Centre for Advanced Francophone Studies in Social Sciences, and a member of the editorial board of Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review and Studia Securitatis. She conducted research and completed professional internships at Sciences Po Paris, the University of Lyon, and the Free University of Brussels, among others. Her research interests focus on democracy studies (competing conceptions of democracy, the erosion of party democracy, transnationalization and de-democratization of politics) and ethnic studies (nation-building, nationalism, national minorities, national/ethno-cultural identities, politics of identity). She has a PhD in political and social sciences at the University of Bucharest and the Free University of Brussels. 

Paper 4: Overcoming the Demagogic Impasse: The Historical Benefits of Democratic Populism

Abstract: In recent years, the rise of elitist and demagogic discourses alike has posed significant challenges to democratic institutions worldwide. This phenomenon, characterized by divisive rhetoric and the erosion of public trust, has led many to question the resilience of liberal democracies. However, amidst this crisis, a countervailing force is emerging: democratic populism. This paper seeks to explore the radical benefits of democratic populism as a means to overcome the demagogic impasse and revitalize democratic governance.

Democratic populism, rooted in the principles of inclusivity, accountability, and grassroots participation, offers a compelling alternative to the top-down, exclusionary politics of demagoguery. History of ideas shows how this path can achieve great success: most of our liberal institutions indeed come from populist demands, populist stances or even populist movements, such as the three revolutions of liberty in England, USA and France (Raynaud, 2009). By empowering citizens and fostering a more responsive political culture, democratic populism can reinvigorate civic engagement and restore faith in democratic processes. This paper will delve into the theoretical underpinnings of democratic populism as defined by Margaret Canovan, examining its historical antecedents and contemporary manifestations.

Thibaut Dauphin is a French political scientist specializing in Enlightenment political philosophy, comparative politics, and the intellectual history of republicanism and nationalism. He earned his PhD in Political Science from the University of Bordeaux, where his dissertation, titled Le comparatisme politique dans l’œuvre de Voltaire, re-evaluated Voltaire’s political thought through a comparative lens, challenging the notion that Voltaire lacked a coherent political theory. Currently, Dr. Dauphin serves as a postdoctoral researcher at the CNRS-affiliated UMR 6240 LISA at the University of Corsica and is an associate researcher at the Institut de Recherche Montesquieu (IRM) at the University of Bordeaux . His research interests include Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montesquieu; the evolution of republican ideas; populism; and the role of sovereignty in modern democracies.

 

Session 7

Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism 

Date/Time: Thursday, November 27, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University. He holds a Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from Indiana University Bloomington, with research focusing on criminology, spatial justice, and state violence. His work examines the epidemiology of violence, the intersection of crime and politics, and the criminalization of poverty and race. He coined the term criminal populism to describe how politicians exploit crime as political capital, a concept explored in his publication Criminal Populism: Crime as Political Capital in the Philippines and the United States. His Epidemiology of Violence project has mapped over 7,000 cases of extrajudicial killings in the Philippines using GIS. His research is published in leading criminology journals, and his forthcoming article, From Sociology of Poverty to Criminology of the Elite, explores elite criminality. Dr. Magno has served as a Research Fellow at Philippine Normal University and a Visiting Research Associate at Ateneo de Manila University. A dedicated educator, he has received multiple teaching and service awards for student engagement and community-based learning.

Discussants

(TBC)

Paper 1: Beyond Fairness: Meritocracy, the Limits of Representation, and the Politics of Populism

Abstract: Meritocracy is often celebrated as a fair mechanism for social mobility, yet it functions as a legitimizing ideology that deepens inequalities and restricts democratic representation. By positioning education as both an equalizer and a sorting mechanism, meritocracy imposes an impossible paradox—tasking education with ensuring fairness while simultaneously justifying exclusion. This paper critically examines meritocracy’s political function, arguing that its promise of delayed justice transforms demands for equality into technocratic concerns rather than political struggles. 

Building on Clare Chambers’ “moment of equal opportunity,” I show how meritocracy distorts the purpose of education, shifting its role from emancipating individuals to fitting them into predetermined social and economic hierarchies. Instead of empowering people to voice demands and contest inequalities, education under meritocracy serves as an instrument for maintaining the status quo. Drawing on Jacques Rancière’s argument that equality is an axiom rather than an outcome, I argue that meritocracy’s reliance on future-oriented fairness masks its ongoing reproduction of structural exclusion. 

This paper’s original contribution is to reframe meritocracy as a mechanism of depoliticization, not only by justifying inequality but by restricting political representation itself. Using Nancy Fraser’s framework of redistribution, recognition, and representation, I demonstrate how meritocratic discourse forecloses egalitarian demands within technocratic governance, making them inexpressible through institutionalized politics. As a result, these unmet demands resurface through populist mobilization, not as a rejection of democracy, but as an attempt to reclaim representation from meritocratic elites. Following Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populist articulation, I theorize how populism emerges as a re-politicization of grievances that meritocracy systematically silences. By foregrounding the conceptual contradictions of meritocracy as a political ideal, this paper offers a political theoretical account of how stratified education systems sustain hierarchies, depoliticize inequality, and ultimately contribute to democratic destabilization.

Elif Başak Ürdem is a PhD candidate in political science at Loughborough University, specializing in political theory and data science. Her research explores the intersections of meritocracy, populism, and democratic representation, with a particular focus on how meritocratic ideals legitimize inequalities and depoliticize social struggles. Drawing on theories of justice, recognition, and redistribution, their work critically examines how stratified education systems shape political agency and democratic participation. Başak holds an MA in Legal and Political Theory from University College London (UCL), by being funded by the Jean Monnet Scholarship, and a BA in Political Science from Istanbul Bilgi University, graduating top of their class. She has previously worked as a Senior Child Protection Officer at Refugee Rights Turkey and has research experience at Bilkent University and Infakto Research Workshop. Her broader interests include democratic theory, refugee rights, and the philosophy of education. 

Paper 2: Memetic Communication and Populist Discourse: Decoding the Visual Language of Political Polarization

Abstract: This study explores how memetic communication serves as a critical tool for understanding the core dynamics of populist discourse in contemporary politics. Focusing on right-wing populist movements in Latin America—specifically Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador—the research examines how memes produced and disseminated using generative AI tools (e.g., Stable Diffusion, DALL-E, MidJourney) encapsulate and propagate the central narratives of populism.
Through the analysis of visual data collected between September 2022 and February 2024, this research identifies how memes simplify complex political ideas into emotionally resonant messages that mobilize supporters and reinforce the dichotomous “us vs. them” framework central to populist rhetoric. These memes not only polarize public opinion but also act as bridges, transferring violent and exclusionary narratives into offline political arenas, including parliamentary discourse.

By combining digital ethnography with fieldwork, this study highlights how populist movements utilize generative AI to craft a visual language that dehumanizes marginalized groups—such as women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and racialized communities—while amplifying their populist agendas.This research contributes to understanding the role of digital communication in shaping and sustaining populist discourse, offering insights into how these visual narratives resonate with audiences and impact political processes in under-researched regions.

Gabriel Bayarri Toscano is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Audiovisual Communication at the Rey Juan Carlos University. He is an interdisciplinary researcher working at the intersection of communication and social sciences. His research focuses on the so-called “far right” and current polarized discourses in the public sphere. In recent years, Gabriel has worked in European and Latin American contexts. He has taught regular and master classes at various international centers. He has been a Newton International Fellow of the British Academy at the University of London, and a Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Gabriel Bayarri also has applied political experience working with the United Nations in Rio de Janeiro and as a councilor in the Autonomous Community of Madrid. He is involved with the following research groups and centers: the COMMRADES Group at Rey Juan Carlos University, the Centre for Right-Wing Studies (University of California, Berkeley), the Centre for Research into Global Power, Inequality and Conflict (RGPIC, Macquarie University), the Psychosociology of Social and Gender Violence research group (Complutense University), and the Technopolitics research group (Open University of Catalonia). Gabriel Bayarri has been a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research (JILAR) since 2020.

Paper 3: Populism and the Evolution of Popular Sovereignty: A Long-Term Theoretical Perspective 

Abstract: The literature on populism, especially that produced by political scientists and sociologists, is rich with empirical studies focusing on individual cases. In all these studies, when faced with the need to explain the emergence and success of populist politics, scholars tend to refer to the socio-economic transformations that have affected liberal political systems for the past few decades. On the other hand, political theory has tried to contribute by attempting to overcome the fragmentation caused by this vast amount of case-specific studies and deepen the understanding of this heterogeneous phenomenon, trying to identify general concepts through which it can be described. My research, situated within the framework of theoretical studies, aims to take a further step by adopting a long-term perspective. Starting from the assumption that populism can be considered part of the evolutionary history of the concept and practices of popular sovereignty, and using interpretative categories from the history of political thought, I analyse populism as a peculiar answer to the dialectic between the need to affirm or recognize the principle of popular sovereignty, and the need to limit it in order to avoid its excesses. This tension originated with the establishment of the modern principle of sovereignty, which occurred following the modern revolutions. It can be traced back to the earliest theoretical and political reflections on the topic, which can be attributed to Rousseau and Madison. Keeping this in mind, it is possible to transcend explanations based solely on the analysis of contingencies and enrich our understanding.

Maria Giorgia Caraceni a PhD Candidate in the History of Political Thought at Guglielmo Marconi University of Rome and a contract researcher at the Institute of Political Studies San Pio V. She conceived and launched the Permanent Transdisciplinary Seminar for PhD candidates and early-career researchers, held annually since 2024 at Guglielmo Marconi University in collaboration with the University of Foggia. In this context, she coordinates both organizational and scientific aspects, and oversees the publication of the seminar proceedings. Maria earned her B.A. and her M.A. cum laude in Philosophy from the University of Rome Tor Vergata, where she also obtained a post-graduate diploma. After graduation, she taught courses in History of Philosophy and Political Philosophy at the People’s University of Rome for four years.  Additionally, she serves as an editor for two academic journals: “Dialegesthai”, an online journal of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tor Vergata, and “Power and Democracy. International Journal of Politics, Philosophy, and Law”, a journal of the Centro Studi Tocqueville-Acton. Her research interests focus on Political Theory, particularly Democratic Theory and the History of Concepts in Political and Democratic Lexicon.

Paper 4: Win-Win Politics: Beyond Political Liberalism and Agonistic Pluralism

Abstract: According to Chantal Mouffe (2000; 2005, 227–28), Rawls’s political liberalism (1989, 1996) overlooks the antagonistic undercurrents inherent in the pluralism of values. This is why Mouffe rejects “a ‘win-win politics’ that goes beyond the adversarial model by promoting solutions that supposedly benefit all people in society” (2000, 108–28). Should we indeed give up on the idea to conduct win-win politics, that is to find and carry solutions which benefit all people in society? I argue that the agonistic rejection of win-win politics is inappropriate because solutions which benefit all people in society can exist and their promotion is a valuable alternative to political liberalism and agonistic pluralism.

I identify three aspects which are essential to Mouffe’s theory but prove to be erroneous. The first one is the idea that “us” implies always to delineate “them”; the second one is the idea that the nature of the relationship “us/them” is necessarily conflictual; and the third one is a rigid reading of values and visions of goods which is assumed to be fixed over time. I argue that empirical science offers examples of political developments benefiting all people in society. I go on by explaining that not only win-win solutions exist, but their promotion is valuable too. The inevitability of conflict implied by agonistic pluralism has a cost for all parties, in terms of energy, well-being and opportunity. Political liberalism does not promote solutions benefiting all people in society, but only some specifically liberal views. Win-win politics avoids both pitfalls.

Bosco Lebrun is a PhD candidate in Politics at Luiss University, in Rome. After a double training in philosophy and international relations, he specialized in political theory and in particular in democratic theory. His research interests include disagreement, social cohesion, and democratic innovations. The provisional title of his PhD dissertation is: “Weighted Voting: Addressing Disagreements on the Desirability and Feasibility of a Refined Allocation of Voting Rights Based on Affectedness”.

 

Session 8

Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn  

Date/Time: Thursday, December 11, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)  

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: Charismatic Populism, Suffering, and Saturnalia

Abstract: This paper draws on the Nietzschean underlay to Weber’s theory of charismatic revolution—specifically, the saturnalian reversal of values that occurs under the influence of ressentiment—in order to account for the ability of Trump and his followers to undercut and reinvent American moral culture. Reversing what Weber called the “theodicy of good fortune,” charismatic leaders frequently adopt postures of moral abjection within present value systems while at the same time envisioning new social arrangements that will lift them into positions of authority. The condemnation of opponents is key to this process: from the devotionally-skewed perch where charismatic sightlines originate, such rebukes from moral authorities are rendered in parallax view, gaining a function that is opposite to condemnation’s intended purpose insofar as it authenticates the righteousness of the one being condemned. In such circumstances, new charismatic identities are forged, existing amid an exclusive intimacy between leader and follower. Drawing on fieldwork and interviews with Trump supporters throughout the 2024 Presidential campaign, the presentation examines the salience of “garbage” to Trump’s moral entrepreneurship. The case displays the importance of ressentiment for interpreting charismatic revolution, and it illustrates the reactive “thinness” of charismatic identitarian content. Recognition of this feature is, in turn, important for integrating charisma studies with studies of populism (which is itself usually characterized as being ideologically “thin”).

Paul Joosse is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Hong Kong.  His work examines Weber’s theory of domination as it interacts with social movement theory and (critical) criminology.  Recent projects have included theorizing the link between gender and charismatic power, using the example of Trump to develop a typology of charismatic counter-roles, and weaving Stanley Cohen’s concept of moral panic with Weber’s theory of charisma to show how charismatic acclamation is intimately liked to the aspersion of ‘folk devils.’  This work has been published in Social Forces, Sociological Theory, Theory and Society, Journal of Classical Sociology, and Sociology of Religion, among others.  In connection with his sociological work, he is Chair of the American Sociological Association’s Section for the History of Sociology and Social Thought and he currently serves on the executive board of the International Sociological Association’s Sociological Theory research cluster (RC16).

Paper 2: Going, Going,… Going Populist? Revitalising Membership-Based Politics through Populist Linkage

Abstract: This paper contributes to recent research showing that, contrary to the view of populist parties embodying direct, unmediated representation, some European PRRPs are cultivating robust local networks and reintroducing elements of the 20th-century mass party. While documented across Europe, its implications for populist theory remain unresolved. One key antimony remains unresolved: while the mass party is celebrated as the epitome of representative democracy, defined by party-based linkage, the populist form of representation—with its ‘anti-institutional impulse’—is associated with direct, unmediated forms of linkage. 

To address this tension, I advance the concept of ‘linkage’ as a key framework for understanding how this seemingly contradictory party model functions in practice, focusing on members’ perceptions of their role within the party and the wider democratic system. It draws on an ethnographic study of the PRRP the Sweden Democrats, including interviews and participant observations of party meetings. The analysis concludes that it was the fundamentally populist party-member relationship that most strongly echoed the ethos of the 20th-century mass party, positioning the party as an intermediary between citizens and the state. This raises the broader question of whether populism, emphasising the unity and common interests of ‘the people’ against perceived elites, may provide a foundation for mass-party-like structures to re-emerge, even under postmodern conditions often associated with declining political engagement and partisan identification. By uniquely uniting empirical data with populist theory, this study not only enriches our understanding of how PRRPs mobilise citizens but also offers new insights into the intersection between populism and party organisation.

Saga Oskarson Kindstrand is a first-year doctoral candidate at Sciences Po’s Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, supervised by Professor Colin Hay. His research examines how political parties function as intermediaries between society and the state, with a particular focus on how European populist radical right parties (PRRPs) develop party-based linkages. He explores how these parties mobilise active memberships despite broader trends of political disengagement and how their claim to represent ‘the people’ is reflected in party organisation.

Paper 3: “Socialism Betrayed Portugal”: Authoritarian Populism and the Far-right

Abstract: During the fiftieth anniversary of the Portuguese Revolution, the Chega party received around one million votes and more than quadrupled its parliamentary bench. This development as been mostly viewd from the prism of the populist leader’s discursive performances, i.e., an anti-systemic threat to liberal democracy risen from outside the social mainstream. This paper challenges that view by arguing that the far-right’s “politics of fear” is, in reality, deeply imbedded in the economic and cultural logics of neoliberal ideology. Anchored in Stuart Hall’s concept of authoritarian populism, this hypothesis is explored through a frame analysis of the front pages of the first 100 issues of Folha Nacional (Nacional Sheet) – a weekly newspaper published by Chega. The framing of the main social themes found in the sample – corruption, (in)security, and economic failure – reveals a dialectic between societal crisis and authoritarian solutions containing parallels with the post-fascist far-right and the legacy of Thatcherism. In other words, Chega’s ideological repertoire did not emerge from the margins of society, but represents a radicalization of a long political tradition based on market liberalism and moral discipline under the guise of popular grievances.

​Jaime Roque is a PhD candidate in Sociology at the Centre for Social Studies (CES) of the University of Coimbra, Portugal, where he also earned his BA and MA in Sociology from the Faculty of Economics (FEUC). His doctoral research, funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), examines the parliamentary practices of the Portuguese far-right party Chega, focusing on how its discourse and strategies intersect with neoliberalism and authoritarian populism. ​Roque has presented his work at international conferences, including the UNPOP International Colloquium, where he analyzed Chega’s use of media narratives around insecurity as part of a broader “politics of fear.”  He is also a contributing author to the Populism and Emotions Glossary, with a chapter on authoritarian populism. In addition to his research, Roque serves as a guest lecturer at FEUC, teaching the undergraduate course “Poder, Política e Governação” (Power, Politics, and Governance). His academic interests include far-right movements, populism, neoliberalism, political parties, and parliamentary sociology.

Paper 4: The evolution of the rhetoric of the “Alternative for Germany”: a comparative analysis of the election campaigns for the European Parliament in 2019 and 2024 

Abstract:  The article focuses on the transformation of the rhetoric of the “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) during two election campaigns to the European Parliament – 2019 and 2024. The author proceeds from the assumption that there is a certain relationship between electoral success and the level of populism expressed in terms of the language the party uses. The populist party will soften its rhetoric during the election campaign when it does not expect electoral success to expand the potential electorate. Otherwise, the rhetoric will be tougher when the party is expected to win. This is clearly the case in the 2024 campaign, when the political weight of the AfD in the European arena has increased compared to 2019. Using various kinds of content analysis, among which sentiment analysis is of key importance, the author points out that the rhetoric shown in electoral programs and posters is in line with the positions of the party and fraction “Identity and Democracy” that is being scrutinized in the article as well. The negative sentiment prevailed in two campaigns, but it has changed slightly. The thematic focus of both programs has not altered much. A distinctive feature of the rhetoric of right-wing populists is still the focus on migration issues. The received results at the junction of linguistics, political science and international affairs may be applicable for a more complex study of the campaigns to the European Parliament employing data from 2014. This article could also be a help for research on German populism, especially in the context of entering the mainstream by a populist actor.

Artem Turenko is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow. His thesis examines “The impact of electoral cycles on the rhetoric of right-wing parties: transformations of the populist agenda (the case of the Alternative für Deutschland). 

 

Session 9

Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion

Date/Time: Thursday, January 8, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: From Crime Shows to Power: The Rise of Criminal Populism

Abstract: This study examines criminal populism, a political strategy where leaders gain popularity by exploiting crime, both through direct involvement and by shaping public perceptions of law, justice, and disorder. While many populist politicians use their legal troubles to bolster their outsider image, others leverage media platforms, such as crime-focused television and radio programs, to build public trust and legitimacy before transitioning into political power.

The study explores the rise of politicians who, before holding office, hosted crime and dispute-focused media programs, portraying themselves as champions of justice and order. By sensationalizing crime, offering simplistic solutions, and positioning themselves as the voice of the people against corrupt elites, these figures cultivate a loyal following that translates into electoral success. Case studies include figures from the Philippines and beyond, demonstrating how media-driven crime narratives fuel political ambition.

By blurring the lines between crime reporting, entertainment, and governance, criminal populism subverts democratic institutions and reshapes public perceptions of law and justice. This study critically assesses the long-term implications of media-driven criminal populism, highlighting its role in eroding institutional trust and legitimizing authoritarian tendencies under the guise of law and order.

Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University.  Also see page 43. 

Paper 2: The Legitimization Process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s Migration Policies

Abstract: The Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs-FPÖ), one of the first radical right and populist parties established in Europe after World War II, and the National Rally (known as the Front National from 1972 to 2018) exhibit notable differences due to their distinct historical, cultural, and political backgrounds. However, these two radical right and populist parties, both founded by politicians associated with the Nazis, also share significant commonalities. This is one of the key reasons why we place them at the centre of our research. These two political parties were among the first radical right and populist parties to emerge in the EU member states after World War II, serving as models for their peers. For instance, the Front National was the first radical right party to win local government in 1983. It was also the first radical right party to enter the national parliament after World War II, securing 35 seats in 1986. Similarly, the FPÖ became the first radical right party after World War II to win an election in 1999 and subsequently form a coalition government in an EU member state. Also, both radical right and populist parties gained legitimacy through the support of mainstream political parties. Although they initially embraced anti-communist and anti-Semitic rhetoric and policies, they gradually shifted their focus toward targeting Muslim immigrants, marking another point of convergence. This paper examines the legitimization process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s migration policies and their electoral success through the lens of Gramscian hegemony theory.

Russell Foster is a Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies. He has an interdisciplinary academic background. From 2003 to 2006, he studied history at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, specializing in modern European political history and imperial history. He later earned MA degrees in international politics and human geography from Newcastle University (2008–2010). From 2015 to 2016, Russell was a Marie Skłodowska-Curie International Fellow at the University of Amsterdam’s Department of European Studies, researching the relationship between the EU’s symbols and European identity. From 2016 to 2019, he was a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at King’s College London, where he studied nationalism, European identity, and Brexit. His current research focuses on the relationship between the far right and European identity, the far right and LGBTQ+ politics, the legacy of the British Empire in contemporary politics, and the evolving relationship between identity and politics in the UK, the EU, and beyond.

Murat Aktas is a Professor of Political Science at Mus Alparslan University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration. He graduated from Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, Department of Public Administration in 2000. In 2004, he completed his master’s degree in the Department of Information and Communication Science at Paris 10 Nanterre University. He completed his PhD at the University of Paris 7, Diderot, in Sociology of Politics, in 2011. His PhD focused on the European Union and Turkey. From 2017 to 2018 he was a post-doctoral researcher at Ecole des Haut Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, researching on the National Front (Front National-FN) and Immigrants. He has authored and edited several books, including The European Union and Turkey; The Information Society Globalization and Democracy; The Arab Spring; and Conflict Resolution and Peace. He also served as guest editor of a special issue for International Sociology on “The Rise of the Far Right and Populist Movements in Europe.” His current research focuses on radical right and populist movements in Europe, Artificial Intelligence, techno oligarchy, human rights and democracy.

Paper 3: Every Man for Himself: Racism and Sephardism in Spain’s Imaginary and the Holocaust

Abstract: This paper explores the racialized construction of the “Sephardic Jew” as a cultural and political trope in 19th-century Spain and its enduring repercussions throughout the 20th century, particularly during the Holocaust. The idea of the Sephardic Jew was shaped through a contradictory mixture of philosephardism and antisemitism, where Spain claimed a unique historical connection to Sephardic communities while simultaneously reinforcing exclusionary and racialized narratives. This discourse fostered a vision of Sephardic Jews as both culturally Spanish and irrevocably other, which shaped Spain’s diplomatic and social responses during times of crisis.

By examining Spain’s attitudes toward the Sephardic diaspora and the racial arguments embedded in its philosephardic policies, the paper traces how these perceptions influenced the self-identification and survival strategies of Sephardic communities in Europe during the Holocaust. In moments of extreme danger, some members of the Sephardic community internalized this racialized discourse, emphasizing their perceived cultural proximity to Spain as a means of securing protection. Yet despite these efforts, they often faced rejection and abandonment by the very nation that claimed to safeguard them. This duality underscores the tragic consequences of a racialized identity imposed from without and, at times, embraced from within.

Through an interdisciplinary approach that draws on historical analysis, critical race theory, and Holocaust studies, this paper seeks to contribute to the broader discussion on how racialized imaginaries shape national policies and community dynamics. It also reflects on the contemporary implications of this legacy for understanding exclusion, identity, and memory in democratic societies today.

Santiago López Rodríguez (Salamanca, 1991) is a postdoctoral fellow at Uppsala Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Uppsala University (2021-2023), where he is conducting a research project entitled funded by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond: “Witnessing the Holocaust: Spain and Portugal during the Second World War” (2023-2026). His research deals with Franco’s regime and the Holocaust, the focus being on the diplomatic role of Spain in occupied countries. He taught at the University of Extremadura (2017-2020) and was also a visiting researcher at the Complutense University of Madrid (2017-2018) as well as at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris (2019). He graduated in History and Historical Heritage at the University of Extremadura (2009–2013), where he also finished two Masters: one in Teaching (2014) and the other in Research and Humanities (2015). He completed his Ph.D. dissertation “Spanish Foreign Office during the Holocaust in Occupied France (1940-1944)” with a National Research Grant (2016–2020) which obtained the distinctions of Summa Cum Laude, International Mention, and Extraordinary Doctorate Award (2021).

Paper 4: Us, Them, and the (Hidden) Borders of the Socio-Political World: Art (and Discomfort) Against the Oversimplified Populist Worldview

Abstract: We can think about populism as a potentially authoritarian phenomenon that, despite its anti-liberal features, finds a place in a liberal, democratic framework, earning from it part of its legitimacy by electoral consensus. This consensus focusses on the leader and their acclamation. All these factors root in (the need for) an oversimplified worldview strongly linked to a Manichean division between “we, the (real, good) people” and “they, the (evil, corrupted) others”. This division reflects Schmitt’s “friend-foe” interpretation of politics and leads to a society in which the gap between “us” and “them” is impossible to fill. This impossibility inhibits an open political discussion and, thus, the liberal democratic process itself. 

My political-philosophical analysis concentrates on how art and aesthetics can make us aware of borders and limits of the Political and thereby of its plurality but also its grey zones, where the borders between “us” and “them” become clearer and affects us the most. 

I will approach these borders by pointing out (1) how the definition of our socio-political world and our divisions in “us” and “them” depend (also) upon our aesthetic approach, and (2) how the capacity of art—more specifically, of the aesthetical reactions of discomfort—to confront a large number of people with discriminating, excluding, or oppressive phenomena considered “normal” before makes art relevant for addressing the apparently insuperable division between “friends” and “foes” in a plural, changing, and challenging society and therefore for sublating the heavy hurdles that populism presents for a democratic political process. 

Roberta Astolfi is a postdoctoral researcher and the academic coordinator of the Research Unit “Orders” at the Cluster of Excellence “Contestations of the Liberal Script” (SCRIPTS) of the Free University Berlin as well as a lecturer at the “Center of Political and Legal Theory” of the Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political Science of the same University. I gained my doctorate in Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law at the Georg-August-University Göttingen and my MA with highest honours in (Political) Philosophy at La Sapienza University (Rome). Before holding my current position, I was a research assistant at the professorship for Political Theory, History of Ideas, and Political Culture of the Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel and also a lecturer at both the “Center of Political Theory and Philosophy” of the Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political Science (Free University Berlin) and at the Department of Philosophy of the Georg-August-University Göttingen, as well as a SCRIPTS postdoctoral fellow. My current research focuses on the relationship between politics and aesthetics and, more specifically, on the epistemic-critical power of aesthetics in confronting the limits of our socio-political world. Before that, I researched on populism, technocracy, and the impoverishment of the individuals’ political role.

 

Session 10

Resisting the Decline: Democratic Resilience in Authoritarian Times  

Date/Time: Thursday, January 22, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: Resilience in Market Democracy

Abstract: Many people speak about democratic decline and the resilience of democracy in hard times. In this discussion, resilience has gained traction but consistently defies attempts to unify theories or confine the concept to a singular research or policy portfolio. Instead of seeking to unify resilience, this paper draws on a theory of polysemy to tease out the diversity of encounters one may have. Findings over a decade of research into resilience of different types are used to reframe resilience as an ’emergent institution’ of democracy today. The emerging resilience is becoming a many-headed-hydra – or, in theoretical terms, a ‘polysemic institutional characteristic’ of contemporary democracies. Should we engage with this as a research agenda then futures research into resilience should emphasise the transformative potential, for good or ill, of a fundamental challenge traditional democratic values posed by an ‘institutionalised’ sense of resilience.

Peter Rogers is a Professor in the Department of Linguistics at Macquarie University. A medical graduate from the University of Sydney, he received his PhD from the School of Communication Sciences and Disorders at the University of Sydney in 2003. Drawing upon his dual backgrounds in medicine and applied linguistics, his research interests lie in the broad area of health communication, with a particular focus on topics relating to linguistic diversity.  Peter also has a research and PhD supervision profile in the area of second language acquisition, where his specific interests concern the links between language learning, motivation and identity, particularly as these issues relate to today’s rapidly globalising world. His fields of research endeavour are united by the common themes of linguistic diversity and social inclusion.

Paper 2: The Contradictory Challenges of Training Local Elected Officials for the future of Democracy

Abstract: Today in France, local elected officials have two training rights to facilitate the execution of their mandates and contribute to the renewal of the local political class. Two funding mechanisms coexist: a collective right funded directly by local authorities, and an individual right of €400 per year, with a maximum cumulative limit of €800. The training market is controlled by the French state, which accredits 240 training providers.

Training of elected officials is regularly presented as a tool for “re-enchanting” local democracy, as it aims to make holding office accessible to everyone. In this sense, it would serve as a skills equalizer, theoretically enabling anyone to “level up” to assume the role. The primary beneficiaries would be those citizens who are less predisposed to handle political responsibilities, finding in it a way to compensate for “gaps” and to catch up with those who can just rely on tacit socialization once in office. 

Nevertheless, the training of elected officials carries a paradox. In seeking to re-enchant political engagement, it also contributes to disenchantment. On one hand, it validates the very principle it aims to combat. By claiming to make holding local office accessible to all, it inherently suggests a prerequisite of skills. Local functions would not be accessible to just anyone without prior preparation or continuous training. On the other hand, since this training is reserved solely for local elected officials, it contributes to the distinction between elected officials and the rest of the citizens by reinforcing their specialization through the acquisition of specific knowledge and skills.

Ultimately, based on statistical data related to the training practices of local elected officials in France in recent years (n=30 000) and several dozen interviews, the aim of this contribution is to show that, although the training of elected officials represents a strategic project to strengthen democracy, its implementation contributes to reinforcing the weak representativeness of local elected officials compared to the rest of the population by reserving the knowledge related to the management of local authorities for a certain “elite.”

Pierre Camus is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Nantes University. He holds a doctorate in sociology from the University of Nantes – CENS (UMR 6025). He is also co-president of the National Observatory for the Training of Local Elected Officials (ONFEL).

Paper 3: The Rise of Women-Led Radical Democracy in Rojava: Global Democratic Decline and Civil Society Resilience Amidst Middle Eastern Authoritarianism 

Abstract: This article investigates the rise of a women-led radical democracy in the region known as Rojava within the context of the Syrian civil war since 2012. Governed under the framework of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), this development is widely referred to by scholars as the “Rojava Revolution.” This shift has unfolded through a bottom-up political project known as democratic confederalism, sustained by diverse forms of civil society resistance in Rojava. This has occurred despite the broader context of war-torn Syria, which has become a battleground for various Islamist opposition groups such as Islamist State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Free Syrian Army (FSA), Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, Hurras al-Din and Al-Tawhid Brigade all of whom have fought both each other and the government of Bashar al-Assad. Despite their nuanced ideological and tactical differences, all these groups share the common objective of establishing an Islamic state founded on Sharia law, marked by gender inequality.

Despite the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the escalation of political violence and chaos, many studies have proved successful and responsive feminist interventions made by Kurdish women activists and academics in Rojava.  These interventions have been accompanied by a strong receptivity to the Rojava project among all its national minorities, as well as “the fierce loyalty of its defenders and its people.”  Rojava has survived significant challenges, including civil war, the fight against the ISIS, enduring occupation, embargoes, a challenging humanitarian situation, and ongoing Turkish invasions. Rojava remains firmly opposed to the former Baath regime, underlying the maximalist involvement of all national minorities in society. This includes engagement in a wide range of local and social activities, “from communes and councils to work in the health sector, women’s movements, and self-defense structures.”   So much so that academics such as Michel Knapp, Anja Flach, and Ercan Ayboga have described Rojava as “one of the most radically progressive societies on the planet.”    

This article argues that the global decline of democracy, particularly in the West, led to the abandonment of Rojava’s nascent democracy, despite Rojava having been a Western ally in the fight against Islamist extremism and sharing democratic values with the West, during the two major Turkish invasions in 2018 and 2019. Despite these challenges, the people of Rojava have continued to resist maintaining their democracy. 

Soheila Shahriari holds a doctorate in political science, awarded by the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in 2024. Her PhD thesis, entitled “Transnational political engagement and gendered reconfiguration of the national imaginary among Kurds in the West in the post-Rojava revolution era”, examines the underlying rationales behind commitment to Rojava by looking at the political socialization of research participants, the rearrangement of the Kurdish political spectrum and the multifaceted dynamics shaping Kurdish political engagement in the transnational context in the aftermath of the Rojava revolution. She has identified three central dynamics: the vigorous mobilization of Kurdish diaspora communities in the West to advocate the removal of the PKK from Western terrorist lists, the transformative ripple effects of the Rojava revolution across the Middle East and its role in the feminization of Kurdish politics, and the emergence of Kurds as an emphatic driving force behind democratization in the region. Furthermore, she brings to the fore the transformative power of the gender revolution in Rojava, in relation to its deep influence on reshaping the Kurdish national imaginary in the West around the principles of gender equality, pluralism and secularism, marked by a decisive rejection of patriarchy, political intolerance, Islamism and Sharia law. Shahriari holds  two master’s degrees: one in sociology from Tehran University in Iran and another in political sociology from Sorbonne University Paris in France.

Paper 4: Feminist Diaspora Activism from Poland and Turkey: Resisting Authoritarianism, Anti-Gender Politics, and Reimagining Transnational Solidarity in Exile

Abstract: This paper examines feminist migrant activism in Poland and Turkey against the backdrop of rising authoritarianism and anti-gender policies (Gwiazda, 2021; Özkazanç, 2020). Under the PiS government in Poland and the AKP regime in Turkey, intensified attacks on gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, and feminist movements have created increasingly hostile environments, forcing many activists into self-exile. This study examines how these activists, through their migration, cultivate new forms of feminist solidarity that transcend national borders while responding to the distinct political contexts of their home and host countries. Drawing on 40 in-depth interviews and three focus groups, the study examines how these women navigate the dual pressures of political repression and displacement, crafting spaces of resistance that challenge both patriarchal norms and nationalist ideologies. These activists embody a transformative politics of possibility (Escobar, 2020), fostering networks of care, solidarity, and alternative visions of belonging in their diasporic communities. The study draws on frameworks of pluriversal political praxis (Escobar, 2020) and prefigurative politics (Monticelli, 2022) to analyze how these women envision and enact futures beyond exclusionary systems. By focusing on the personal and collective experiences of feminist migrant activists, this paper highlights the resilience and creative strategies they employ to reclaim political agency. It emphasizes how their activism not only confronts oppressive structures in their countries of origin but also contributes to reshaping the sociopolitical landscapes of their new environments, offering insights into the broader implications of feminist diaspora activism in times of political uncertainties.

Ecem Nazlı Üçok is a PhD Candidate at the Institute of Sociological Studies, Charles University in Prague. She holds a Master of Science in Sociology and Gender Studies from Lund University, Sweden, and teaches both master’s and bachelor’s level courses at Charles University and ARCHIP. She has been a doctoral fellow at the University of Vienna and Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy. Her research interests include political sociology and psychology, urban sociology, social movements, political activism, anti-gender movements in Europe, far-right politics, transnational migration, and the study of men and masculinities.

 

Session 11

Inclusion or Illusion? Narratives of Belonging, Trust, and Democracy in a Polarized Era

Date/Time: Thursday, February 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: When identity politics and social justice procedures contribute to populism

Abstract: The ethnographic perspective as modern initiator of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, identity politics as upside-down governing power and the popular formation of social justice principles are three paths, among others, through which the expansion of populist discourses in liberal democratic contexts could be explored. Although ethnography, the tradition of studying ‘others’ in their respective contexts, and later sociological methodology, has shifted slightly towards Western societies, it has retained its colonial perspective. Identity politics, meanwhile, by essentializing their core values and ignoring others, reinforces the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, which might be juxtaposed with other approaches to otherness, such as that of Carl Schmitt et al. (2005). The third factor is the increasing challenge for bottom-up movements to contribute to principles of social justice. The failure of this process is reflected in a “worldwide erosion of liberal democratic norms, soaring inequality, and intensified anger and anomie” (Lefebvre, 2021). In this ‘zombie liberalism’ scenario, which lies between dead and living states, fundamental human rights are violated, including by public institutions. As a result, a ‘spiritual exercise’, as Rawls (1971) describes it, aimed at seeking principles of justice is problematized and, by undermining people’s agency, the impact of civil society on the liberal democratic sphere diminishes.
Identifying We the People and others as distinct groups, as well as identity politics and the problematic popular quest for principles of social justice, provide fertile ground for populism. By synthesizing these processes, this paper seeks to provide an interdisciplinary analysis of the future of democracy.

Saeid Yarmohammadi is a PhD candidate in religious studies at the Institute of Religious Studies, University of Montreal, Canada. He is currently writing a thesis on individual understandings of social justice in the Iranian context among Shiite Muslim adults living in Tehran. His areas of interest include politics and religion, culture and religion, social inequalities and social justice in its various forms, including the origins and history of this notion. His dissertation proposes an analysis of theories of social justice in different contexts, including liberal democracies, to provide a portrait of the place given to this notion in the context of my research. His thesis project includes an assessment of politics of identity in the context of Iran, which contribute to understandings of social justice in this context. Having training in political science and anthropology in addition to my areas of study and adopting a multidisciplinary approach, he is interested in the analysis of social justice in political contexts, including liberal democracies. Talking about conference participation, He has taken part in several international conferences organized by the International Sociological Association and by different universities in Canada and elsewhere.

Paper 2: Why do We Trust The DMV? Exploring the Drivers of Institutional Trust in Public-facing Government Agencies

Abstract: Scholars widely agree that institutional trust is in crisis across Western developed countries, yet the causes of this decline remain elusive. While extensive research has examined institutional performance and procedural fairness, far less attention has been given to the frontline federal workers who serve as the face of government in daily citizen interactions. This study posits that public trust is not solely a function of institutional structure but is also shaped by the characteristics and behavior of government workers. To assess institutional trust, this study employs a conjoint experimental design, varying six institutional attributes: (1) efficiency, (2) expectations, (3) transparency, (4) accountability, (5) perceived moral disposition of workers, and (6) political affiliation of workers. This study hypothesizes that efficiency will be the strongest predictor of institutional trust, operationalized by the public’s preference to seek assistance from one agency over another. Additionally, it anticipates that citizens will prefer bureaucrats who are perceived as caring and personal, yet politically neutral and impersonal. As institutional legitimacy is increasingly contested in an era of political polarization and social fragmentation, this research highlights the need for governance strategies that go beyond structural reforms, emphasizing the critical role of street-level bureaucrats in fostering public institutional trust.

Ariel Lam Chan is a third-year PhD student in the Department of Sociology at Stanford University. Her current research focuses on understanding the causes of institutional trust in U.S. public-service agencies, exploring how factors such as bureaucratic performance, internal processes, and moral/ political disposition of workers influence public confidence in government institutions. Additionally, Ariel is working on a comparative study of Hong Kong’s educational landscape, particularly examining the National Security Law’s impact on curriculum reform and how it shapes students’ critical thinking and understanding of national identity. In addition to her work on educational policy, Ariel is also conducting research on the consequences of nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) in cases of sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace. Her study investigates how NDAs silence survivors and hinder their ability to seek justice, while also impacting their career trajectories, financial situations, and emotional well-being. Ariel’s interdisciplinary research blends sociological theory with practical policy implications, and she is dedicated to addressing pressing issues of governance, institutional trust, and social justice.

Paper 3: Active Citizenship, Democracy and Inclusive Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nexus, Challenges and Prospects for a Sustainable Development

Abstract: This research explores the relevance of active citizenship in supporting processes of transformation and sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa. It starts from the observation that democratic and governance deficits stem from non-inclusive public policies (in their formulation, implementation and assessment), leading to corruption, social inequalities and undermining peace. In response, she proposes to consider active citizenship as a strategic lever. By valuing non-state social actors, this concept is likely to strengthen participatory dynamics and promote inclusive governance. Active citizenship is thus emerging as an essential paradigm and mechanism for improving the development performance of sub-Saharan African states. A benchmarking  of relevant experiences of active citizenship in the West and elsewhere (such as in Canada, the United States or Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall), is the approach envisaged for its achievement. 

Dieudonne Mbarga is an Independent Researcher.

Paper 4: Silenced Voices in a Democratic Dawn: How the Iranian Constitutional Revolutionaries (1905–1906) Weaponized “the People” Against Minorities

Abstract: The Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1906), often celebrated as a foundational moment for democracy in the Middle East, paradoxically entrenched exclusionary notions of “the people” that resonate with contemporary challenges to liberal democracies. This study interrogates how constitutionalist rhetoric, while invoking unity and citizenship, systematically marginalized religious minorities, ethnic groups, and the working class—a dynamic mirroring modern populist discourses that pit “the true people” against “others.” Employing Pierre Machery’s concept of “the unsaid” and historical discourse analysis, this article examines parliamentary debates, protest narratives, spy reports, photographs and memoirs to reveal how revolutionary elites instrumentalized a vague, Persian-centric nationalism to exclude minorities and consolidate power. Findings demonstrate that the constitutionalists’ strategic ambiguity around “the people” enabled majoritarian oppression, sidelining religious groups (e.g., Zoroastrians, Jews) as sectarian pawns, suppressing labor voices in favor of merchant elites, and erasing ethnic identities (e.g., Kurds, Azeris) from national imaginaries. By situating Iran’s revolution within global patterns of democratic erosion—where appeals to “the people” fracture civil society—this research underscores the enduring tension between democratization and exclusion. It argues that inclusive democratic resilience requires confronting historical legacies of ideological erasure, offering lessons for contemporary struggles against illiberal majoritarianism and divisive populism. 

Ali Ragheb is a sociologist with a PhD, Master’s, and Bachelor’s degree from the University of Tehran, Iran. Ranked 1st in the national PhD entrance exam (2019) and 4th in the Master’s exam (2015), he is a recognized talent by the Iranian National Elites Foundation. His research explores economic inequality, cultural sociology, and critical theory, focusing on Iran’s urban middle class. He is the author of Pasdaran-e Nabarabari (Guardians of Inequality), Mashrute-ye Hamegan (The Constitutional Revolution for All), and Tohi-Shodan az Mashrute (The Erosion of Constitutionalism), alongside numerous peer-reviewed articles. He has also translated works on democracy, digital divides, and Max Weber’s sociology of religion. Ali serves as a regional editorial board member for Global Dialogue (ISA) and is a member of the ISA’s Research Committee on Social Stratification. He is a member of the Iranian Sociological Association (since 2017) and has held editorial roles, including assistant editor of the Journal of Sociology of Art and Literature (University of Tehran, 2021-2022). As president of the University of Tehran’s Sociology Student Scientific Association (2018-2019), he managed the journal Sareh. His work bridges critical cultural studies, historical sociology, and political economy, offering insights into inequality and social transformation.

 

Session 12

Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South 

Date/Time: Thursday, February 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: Africa at the Test of Populism: Identity Mobilisations, Crises of Political Alternation, and the Trial of Democracy

Abstract: In a context in which African democracies struggle to consolidate, communal and identity-based populism plays an ambivalent role, serving both as a force of contestation and a tool for reinforcing power. This panel examined its influence on elections, political transitions, and democratic institutions in Africa. Three main areas structure the discussion: the study of populist strategies during electoral periods and their connections to identity-based mobilisations and clientelism; the analysis of populism’s role in political polarisation and the contestation of electoral outcomes; and the exploration of digital media as platforms for the dissemination of populist discourses and political radicalisation. Drawing on case studies and comparative approaches, this panel aims to understand how populism fluctuates between strengthening democratic participation and threatening institutional stability while proposing ways to enhance democratic resilience in the face of the rise of identity-based populism in Africa.

Yves Valéry Obame is a sociologist, holding a doctorate/Ph.D in political sociology obtained from the University of Yaoundé I in 2022. Lecturer-Researcher at the University of Bertoua in the Department of Political Science and also Associate Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Yaoundé I in Cameroon, he is also a member of the Cameroonian Laboratory for Studies and Research on Contemporary Societies (CERESC).His research focuses primarily on how electoral technologies (particularly biometrics), public policies and, more generally, socio-technical transformation processes structure electoral governance, the dynamics of citizenship and political behavior. A Swiss Confederation Excellence Scholar, he joined the Geneva Africa Lab and the Global Studies Institute to lead a postdoctoral project entitled “The making of citizen monitoring of voting in the era of biometrics in Cameroon: the experience of the ’11 Million Citizens’ Movement.” He examined, at ground level, the way in which an associative actor works, in an unprecedented way, to fight against electoral fraud to guarantee the authenticity of the results from the ballot boxes in a context deemed constrained and despite the biometric reform introduced into the electoral process in 2013. More broadly, this project reports on the dynamics of institutionalization of electoral biometrics and the contemporary transformations of political citizenship that they induce, revealing how, in Cameroon, the dominant group in power governs through biometrics.

Salomon Essaga Eteme is a sociologist with a Ph.D. in sociology. He serves as a lecturer at the University of Ngaoundere and an associate lecturer at the Catholic University of Central Africa (UCAC). His research adopts an interdisciplinary approach, focusing on the intersections of social dynamics, environmental issues, and development. He is a researcher at the CERESC Laboratory at the University of Yaoundé I and an associate researcher at the Centre for Environment and Development (CED). Dr ESSAGA ETEME also works as a social engineer and environmental consultant, offering his expertise to field-based projects that integrate social science insights with ecological challenges. He is currently a postdoctoral fellow under the RESSAC project, implemented by the CIFOR–ICRAF–GDA–UYI consortium, where he contributes to the sociological analysis of relationships between local communities and natural resource management policies.

Paper 2: Towards Decolonizing the Drive for Democracy in Nigeria and Africa

Abstract: The paper argues that the practice of democracy in Africa should integrate the traditional knowledge and institutions of local communities in the continent, and that Africa should search within its own knowledge systems for appropriate ideas and approaches to its democratization and development. African knowledge systems have for a long time been undervalued because of the dominance of Eurocentric mindsets and practices. Critics now blame state failure and the development crisis in 

Africa on the “disconnection between formal institutions transplanted from outside, and indigenous institutions born of traditional African cultures”. The prevailing Western model of liberal democracy, especially in the form  introduced in Africa by some authoritarian military and civilian regimes, has not served the continent well; instead it has tended to alienate rather than motivate and mobilize the people. There is now a search for a virile democratic alternative that can reconcile the traditional and the modern, in a partnership that will ensure popular participation, cultural self-determination and democratic legitimacy. Marshall Sahlins has rightly emphasized the need for all peoples “to indigenize the forces of global modernity and turn them to their own ends” as the real impact of globalization depends on the responses developed at the local level.

The paper discusses Nigeria’s recent experience with democracy, especially with respect to the role of traditional leaders and institutions; and in relation to the ongoing debates about a suitable system of democratic local government that will expand the political space, and strengthen the capacity of indigenous institutions and other organizations of civil society at the village/grassroots level.  A number of current government policies are based on the misguided assumption that the position of African traditional rulers and institutions is incompatible with democratic practice. The paper considers how successive post-colonial governments and constitutions in Nigeria have tried to evolve a suitable chieftaincy policy, and to manage relations with traditional leaders at the state and local levels. As well, governance reforms in the country have tended to concentrate on regulating party politics and competitive elections, protecting civil and political rights, anti-corruption and so on. The major gap in the good governance agenda appears to be at the local government level where the major challenges of democratic decentralization and poverty alleviation remain largely unaddressed.

Geoffrey I. Nwaka is an urban historian. He graduated and worked in England and in Canada, and is currently Professor of History at Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria. He has had several years of teaching and research experience in the Nigerian university system, and was at various times guest researcher/visiting scholar at a number of universities and research institutes in Europe, Australia and North America. His research interests are in historical and contemporary urban issues, environmental protection, and African development. He has travelled and published widely and served in government during 1990/91 as Special Adviser to the Governor of Imo State.

Paper 3: Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom

Abstract: One-fifth of the democracies saw erosion between 2012 and 2024, with ‘us or them ‘ polarisation rising. At the heart of this process lies using ‘the people’ as a unifying force of civil society or as a divider. This paper aims to discuss the contribution of the people in either the democratization process or majoritarian domination, using Nigeria and the United Kingdom as reference countries. The failure of Nigeria to diversify its economy and the UK’s transition to renewable resources are examples of contrasting experiences of resource nationalism impacting environmental structural adjustment. Drawing from the decolonial environmentalism perspective, this paper explored how coloniality persists in shaping resource management, democracy, and socio-spatial injustice. This study adopts a qualitative research methodology through a systematic review of existing literature, policy documents, and case studies on Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 

Using a decolonial environmentalism lens, the paper critically analyzes scholarly debates, reports, and empirical findings to assess democracy, resource governance, and socio-environmental justice. Through focusing on community-based conservation in Nigeria and energy transition in the UK, the paper stresses the social inclusion of indigenous people’s knowledge base in development processes. The studies examined strengthen the principles of decolonial environmentalism in negating the division of the North from the South and the demission of despotic policies as opposed to egalitarianism. Thus, this paper has called for policy reforms in Nigeria’s resource governance, utilization of renewable energy, and fair international cooperation. By positioning justice at the centre of a pyrrhic vision, this paper presents a critical view of what democracy and post-colonial, ecologically just and sustainable environments can mean in the future.

Oludele Mayowa Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University. His research focuses on addressing plastic waste pollution, promoting environmental sustainability, and advancing development and green practices. Mr. Busayo Olakitan Badmos is a postgraduate student in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University. His research interests span sustainability studies, environmental crime, deforestation, conflict, illegal mining, and development. He is committed to exploring the complex intersections between environmental sustainability and socio-economic challenges, contributing to research that informs policy and promotes sustainable development.

Paper 4: Viral but Powerless? Digital Activism, Political Resistance, and the Struggle for Governance Reform in Kenya

Abstract: As digital activism reshapes civic engagement globally, African Gen Z activists are leading a new wave of political resistance. In Kenya, movements like #RejectFinanceBill2024 and #OccupyParliament have leveraged social media to challenge state policies, mobilising unprecedented digital dissent. Yet, despite their viral success, these movements struggle to translate online mobilisation into tangible governance reforms. This paradox, persistent digital resistance versus limited institutional change, raises urgent questions about the effectiveness of digital activism in strengthening democratic accountability. This study offers a theoretical examination of Kenya’s digital activism through a tri-theoretical lens: Political Process Theory (PPT), Digital Contention Theory (DCT), and Connective Action Theory (CAT). It critically investigates:
• What structural barriers and political opportunities shape the trajectory of digital activism in Kenya?
• Why digital movements persist online despite repression but struggle to institutionalize change?
• How Gen Z activists challenge traditional leadership models by mobilising through
decentralised digital networks?
By situating Kenya’s digital activism within broader global debates on digital resistance, governance, and democratic resilience, this theoretical inquiry develops a conceptual framework for understanding the evolving relationship between online political engagement and structural constraints. It provides insights relevant not only to Africa but also to global policymakers, scholars, and activists seeking to bridge the gap between digital mobilisation and sustainable political transformation.
This paper will provoke critical discussions on the future of digital resistance-can online activism move beyond momentary disruption to drive lasting institutional change?

Asenath Mwithigah is a Graduate student, United States International University-Africa. She is a social development expert with over 10 years of professional experience in working with non-profits organizations nationally, and internationally to strengthen their programming and unlock the organizational potential on Environmental, Social and Governance sectors to contribute to the Development Goals. She is currently the Technical Director of a national youth organization working to document the progress made by young people in Kenya in various sectors contributing to SDGs.  

 

Session 13

Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis 

Date/Time: Thursday, March 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC)

Paper 1: Reimagining Populism: Ethnic Dynamics and the Construction of ‘the People’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract: The study aims to present the multifaceted nature of ‘the people’ within the ethnopolitical context of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Departing from the traditional focus on ethno-nationalism in the populist framing of ‘the people’ in BiH, the main argument is that understanding ‘the people’ in BiH requires a dialectical relationship encompassing three forms of populism: inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic. While inter-ethnic populism constructs ‘the people’ through an agonistic frontier among ethnic groups in the most common sense, intra-ethnic populism establishes agonistic frontiers within them, positioning ‘the people’ in opposition to their political elites. Finally, cross-ethnic populism seeks to construct ‘the people’ around populist demands that transcend ethnic divisions, uniting groups through shared claims that cannot be expressed within the ethnic framework. By tracing these patterns, this approach offers new insights into conceptualizing populism, seeing it not as a disruptive force but as a potential catalyst for democratic renewal. It highlights how populism may enhance political pluralism by challenging the status quo and affirming democratic capacities around new subjectivities beyond ethnicity.

Jasmin Hasanović is an Assistant Professor and researcher at the Department for Political Science at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Science. His field of research encompasses social and political movements, socialism, (post)Yugoslav studies as well as geopolitics and cyberpolitics. He is also interested in critical political theory, dealing with contemporary debates on democracy and the relationship between activism and the idea of emancipation in contemporary political theory. 

Paper 2: Institutionalizing the Assembled People 

Abstract: For centuries, the task of establishing a democratic system has been monopolised by specialists. The task of making decisions on public affairs has also been reserved for a professional political ruling class. This paper is based on the hypothesis that, in the face of this monopolisation of both instituting and instituted political activity, ordinary individuals are able not only to decide but also to decide how they are going to decide – in other words, to create their own rules collectively.

The contribution will test this hypothesis based on fieldwork conducted over two years within the radical democracy movement in Commercy (Meuse), from the start of the Gilets jaunes assemblies in November 2018 to the presentation of a list in the March 2020 municipal elections, aimed at empowering the popular assembly gathering local residents. Mobilising ethnography, semi-directive interviews and collation of materials, this paper aims to reconstruct the direct democracy system of assemblies both imagined and instituted by Commercy’s actors to replace representative democracy. Since the start of the Yellow Vests movement, the group has carried out extensive theoretical imagining of how this new system might work, the practical problems the assembly would face, as well as the fundamental rules that would frame the assembly’s exercise of power. The aim here is to give an account of this instituting activity by the movement, based on its practice of direct democracy in assemblies. 

While their direct democracy practices of assemblies have been instituted since the beginning of the Gilets Jaunes movement, it is in its electoral phase that the movement will institutionalise what the democratic system it practices could look like if it came to power. It would do what representative government has always refused to do: “give an institutional role to the assembled people”, according to Bernard Manin in Principles of Representative Government. During the election campaign, the Commercy group thus collectively drafted a local Constitution and a Charter of Commitment, created from their practices during the Yellow Vests, which aimed to organise the exercise of power by the popular assembly if their list were to be elected. The group thus reinterpreted fundamental political concepts through the prism of assembly direct democracy. If the concepts of constituent paradox, constituent power, constitutional text (both its interpretation and revision), but also self-limitation, deliberation, representation, execution of decisions and participation, have a particular meaning under representative government, the aim here is to explore the meaning attributed to them in the context of this experiment in assembly direct democracy, and to see how they relate to other democratic conceptions. This chapter therefore takes the actors’ reflections on these fundamental political concepts seriously, as they represent a movement’s reinvention of the political, based on its own practices.

By showing the system devised by the Commercy group, this paper takes seriously Castoriadis’ injunction that “creating forms of democracy that are not alienating, where people participate in modern society, can only be the work of the whole people, not of a theorist”. It aims to show how a movement can create new forms of democracy and answer institutional questions traditionally left either to theorists or to policy-makers, in a perspective of democratising the theorisation of the political.

Sixtine Van Outryve is a J.S.D. candidate at Yale Law School, where she obtained her LL.M. degree as a BAEF fellow in 2018. She is also a lecturer at Radboud Universiteit in The Netherlands, teaching political theory to master’s students. In March 2024, Sixtine defended her Ph.D. in Law at the Centre for Philosophy of Law of U.C.Louvain in Belgium, her home country. In her dissertation, she developed a normative theory of communalist direct democracy – defending that public power be exercised by the assembled people at the local level – and analyzed its practice by social movements through qualitative research methods. During her doctoral journey, she was a visiting researcher at the School of Social and Political Science of Edinburgh University in the United Kingdom (2021-2022) and at the CERAPS of Université de Lille in France (Spring 2023). She also holds a master’s degree in Law from K.U.Leuven in Belgium (2015), as well as a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy (2014) and in Law (2013), both from U.C. Louvain, where she became a teaching assistant in Law at the beginning of her career. 

Paper 3: The Two Peoples: Why Deliberating and Voting don’t Belong Together

Abstract: There is a widely shared sense—rightly or wrongly—that the grip of (sound) arguments on public debate has waned in recent years. Donald Trump’s victory and Brexit in the UK in 2016 have spurred inquiries about alleged dysfunctions in public communication, including the spread of “fake news,” algorithmically curated social networks, or populist rhetoric. In this paper, I suggest that the problem may run deeper. From the beginning, deliberative democrats have overlooked a crucial distinction: that between deliberating and voting, as well as the fundamentally different rationales that underpin them. In other words, it has been recklessly assumed that the virtues of public deliberation would carry over to voting. Yet many reasons for voting for or against a proposal may be entirely rational and understandable irrespective of the merit of arguments. Conversely, the motivating power of public justification is considerably muted as soon as one enters the voting booth. In this paper, I argue that the impact of public deliberation on voting decisions has remained undertheorized, mainly postulated or inferred from the success of heterogeneous settings, such as deliberative mini-publics (Jürgen Habermas 2006). While some proponents of deliberative democracy have worked out the internal relationship between deliberating and voting (Chambers and Warren 2023), there remains a disconnect between the public forum and the voting booth. In response, I attempt to sketch out a voter-centered, realistic, and context-sensitive approach to democratic deliberation.

Théophile Pénigaud is a postdoctoral researcher at the ISPS at Yale. He specializes in political theory, and his research interests include the history of political thought, democratic theory, the theories of justice, and political epistemology. His book The People’s Deliberations: Context and Concepts of Rousseau’s Political Philosophy was published in French by Classiques Garnier in 2024. He holds a Ph.D. from the École Normale Supérieure de Lyon. Just before coming to Yale, he directed a Junior Laboratory on “Changes and Current Trends in Democracies” at the École Normale Supérieure and was a lecturer at Lyon 3 University.

Paper 4: Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy

Abstract: This paper examines representation and the right to diplomacy as fundamental pillars of democracy, emphasizing their role in ensuring the meaningful inclusion of all peoples in policy formulation and decision-making processes. Diplomacy is often reserved to sovereign states, leaving many unrepresented nations, indigenous groups, and minority communities without access to critical international and institutional platforms. The exclusion of these groups from diplomatic engagement undermines democratic principles by reinforcing a model that fails to reflect the diversity of political and cultural identities.

By analyzing cases where communities are denied representation, this study will focus on the Hmong community in Laos, who face systemic discrimination through an indigenous rights lens; the Ogoni in Nigeria, whose lack of representation is tied to environmental and climate justice struggles; and the people of Guam, who remain disenfranchised under the U.S. territorial rule, highlighting the challenges of decolonization and self-determination. The study will also explore the institutionalization of representation through case studies of organizations such as the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) and Minority Rights Group (MRG), which seek to secure spaces for participation and representation. 

The closure of spaces diplomatic spaces contributes to the erosion of democratic participation, the silencing of historically marginalized voices, and reinforces unequal power structures in global governance. Recognizing diplomacy and representation as fundamental rights strengthens democratic resilience by fostering dialogue, inclusion, and peaceful conflict resolution.

This paper argues that establishing frameworks for broader participation is essential for the future of democracy, advocating for mechanisms that go beyond state-centered diplomacy and amplify all voices.

Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez is is a human rights advocate with experience in international advocacy, civil society engagement, and diplomatic affairs. She is global advocacy officer at UNPO, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization where she works directly with representatives of minority communities to support their advocacy efforts. Nieves has experience in consular affairs, particularly on migration issues, as well as in cooperation for development and youth participation in public policy-making. She holds an MSt in Diplomatic Studies from the University of Oxford and has a background in diplomatic engagement, focusing on capacity-building, advocacy, and international cooperation. She is also the co-author of the chapter “The Border Issue: From Policy to Cultural Identity” in Continuum Investigativo y diversidad lingüístico-cultural del sur de México (2021), which examines how the delineation of borders has shaped national identities at a nation-state level, often marginalizing identiteis that do not align with political boundaries.

 

Session 14

From Bots to Ballots: AI, Populism, and the Future of Democratic Participation 

Date/Time: Thursday, March 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC)  

Paper 1: Conceptions of Democracy and Artificial Intelligence in Administration and Government: Who Wants an Algorithm to Govern Us? 

Abstract: This paper examines how varying conceptions of democracy influence citizens’ support for the use of artificial intelligence (AI) at different levels of decision-making authority. We draw on original survey data (June 2023) from over 3,000 individuals in Spain. The survey was designed to capture participants support for AI‐based decision-making across different levels of authority: from administrative tasks to informing political decisions or standing for election. In general, respondents are sceptical about this possibility and show low support for almost all the situations posed – except for routine administrative tasks, where there is a (slim) majority of respondents who would support it. We analyse to what extent distinct democratic conceptions shape support for algorithmic decision-making at these levels, while controlling for other relevant socio-demographic and attitudinal variables (including personality and self-perception). Our findings reveal that individuals who endorse representative and populist-oriented conceptions of democracy are significantly less inclined to support AI in political decision-making, with the former supporting it only for the administrative level and the latter in any case. Conversely, those with authoritarian-oriented conceptions exhibit a higher level of support when AI is used at higher levels of decision-making. Finally, individuals endorsing expert-oriented conceptions support algorithmic decision-making at all levels. These results broadly align with prior research (except in the case of expert-oriented conceptions) and suggest that scepticism towards AI in governance is not uniform but is crucially mediated by citizens’ normative views on democracy.

Joan Font is research professor at the Institute of Advanced Social Studies (IESA-CSIC). His research interests involve any of the different ways public administrations have to know citizen preferences, including elections, surveys, local participation processes, citizen juries, deliberative polls, referendums or advisory councils. His papers about participatory institutions have been published in journals as European Journal of Political Research, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Politics, Public Administration, Political Studies, Politics & Policy or Administration & Society. His books include Font, J, della Porta, D and Sintomer, Y (eds) (2014): Participatory democracy in Southern Europe: causes, characteristics and consequences, Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield or Font, J and Méndez, M (eds) (2013): Surveying ethnic minorities and immigrant populations: methodological challenges and research strategies, Amsterdam University Press Research series, Amsterdam. 

Paper 2: How does ChatGPT shape European cultural heritage for the future of Democracy? 

Abstract: Cultural heritage plays an essential role in shaping our identities and understanding our past, present, and future. However, it is also fragile and vulnerable to the ravages of time, conflict, natural disasters, and now, artificial intelligence. 

The launch of ChatGPT has sparked immense interest both in the opportunities it offers and for the risks involved in its generative artificial intelligence linguistic model. To date, research has been conducted on its use in various fields, from natural language processing to customer service or content creation, as well as in the education and public health sectors. Nevertheless, little has been addressed in the field of cultural heritage.

Based on the above, this article presents the results of a study in which ChatGPT-4 was commissioned to generate thoughts, written representations and visual productions about the importance of European Cultural Heritage values in the future of Democracy. To this end, a battery of tests was developed to assess their interaction, understanding, production and dissemination in relation to European Cultural Heritage and democratic values. 

According to an interpretive-comparative analysis of 30 interactions, ChatGPT-4, while providing answers of sufficient quality to address European Cultural Heritage, is unaware of the values underlying this heritage and the future importance of its preservation for European identity and democracy.

Alonso Escamilla is Manager of European Projects and Research at the Catholic University of Ávila (Spain). For this same institution, he is a PhD Student on Cultural Heritage and Digitalisation and a Member of the Research Group: Territory, History and Digital Cultural Heritage. He have successfully designed, implemented and evaluated numerous projects for, among others, the following international organisations: Council of Europe, European Commission, European Trade Union Confederation, Foundation for European Progressive Studies, European Youth Forum, and United Nations Development Programme.

Paula Gonzalo is Projects Coordinator of the Foundation for Cooperation and Community Development of El Salvador (CORDES) and Researcher at the University of Salamanca (Spain). She has successfully designed, implemented, and evaluated numerous projects for, among others, the following international organisations: the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the European Trade Union Institute, the SALTO Participation and Information Resource Centre, and the Ibero-American Social Security Organisation.

Paper 3:  The New Elite: How Big Tech is Reshaping White Working-Class Consciousness

Abstract: While Silicon Valley elites were once synonymous with liberal, white-collar startup culture, big tech has strategically realigned with the political right during the second Trump Administration. Elon Musk’s leadership in the Department of Government Efficiency highlights the consequences of this shift on U.S. conservatism. Drawing on three case studies—the Trump administration’s mass firing of federal workers, DOGE’s takeover of key government systems, and DOGE’s mass emails to federal employees—I examine how Musk’s outsized role in the second Trump Administration has challenged the working-class consciousness and white identity politics that have fueled Trump’s contemporary success. 

I argue that Musk’s reliance on tech-driven logics of efficiency and optimization to purge so-called ‘elites’ from the federal government has simply replaced technocrats with technology itself, reinforcing the very institutional and bureaucratic structures the political right opposes. By prioritizing technological efficiency at the expense of low- and middle-income federal employees, I show how these logics challenges Trump’s alignment with his white working class by substituting a people-versus-elite framework with an emerging people-versus-tech alternative. The resulting bipartisan dissatisfaction underscores the limits of right-wing populism in the age of big tech.

Aly Hill is a third-year Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Communication at The University of Utah. She specializes in political extremism, harassment, and mass shootings, with a focus on democratic institutions and public discourse. She has published and presented on topics including the Alt-right, QAnon’s digital migration, mass shooting news coverage, the U.S. anti-immigration movement, online harassment, and far-right memes. Aly holds an M.A. in Communication with a concentration in political communication from Johns Hopkins University and a B.S. in Political Science and Communication from The University of Utah. Outside of academia, Aly collaborates with experts in education, government, public policy, and data science to develop frameworks aimed at improving diplomacy and community investment.

Paper 4:  Bubbles, Clashes and Populism: “The People” in an algorithmically mediated world

Abstract: This paper examines how algorithms perpetuate the “us/them” antagonism by creating filter bubbles that isolate users in echo chambers and filter out clashes that intensify conflict between opposing groups. It investigates the implications of these dynamics in the digital realm and their spillover into analogue democratic interactions. By shaping information flows, algorithms redefine collective identity and challenge the cohesion of democratic societies. Populism amplifies these effects by harnessing algorithmic divisions to mobilize support, yet it also serves as a lens to understand how people seek representation in fragmented publics. Focusing on insights from communication science, the aim is to illuminate populism’s complex role in an algorithmically mediated world.

Amina Vatreš is a teaching assistant at the Department of Communication Studies/Journalism at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Sciences. She was awarded with the “Silver Badge of the University of Sarajevo” twice for academic excellence, as one of the best students of both undergraduate and MA studies. Currently she is a PhD candidate enrolled in the interdisciplinary doctoral program, with her dissertation focusing on the field of artificial intelligence and its communicological-philosophical implications. She is the author and co-author of several scientific papers and book reviews indexed in international scientific databases, and has actively participated in a significant number of organizational committees for both international and domestic conferences, as well as in conducting PR activities and promoting numerous scientific events. Her research interests encompass critical topics at the intersection of communication, technology, and society, including algorithmic censorship, the societal impact of artificial intelligence, AI-driven disinformation, and the sociopolitical challenges posed by advanced machine learning systems.

 

Session 15

From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, War, and Democracy  

Date/Time: Thursday, April 2, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC)  

Paper 1: Pericles’ Funeral Oration: A Populist Rhetoric for War and Politics

Abstract: Pericles’ Funeral Oration, delivered in 431 BCE during the Peloponnesian War, is often celebrated as a powerful tribute to Athenian democracy, extolling the virtues of the city-state’s political system and its citizens. However, this paper argues that the oration should not be viewed solely as a celebration of democratic ideals, but rather as a populist and manipulative rhetorical strategy employed by Pericles to justify his failure to achieve a swift resolution to the war, which he had initially promised when persuading the Athenians to engage in the conflict.

Pericles is traditionally depicted as the ideal democratic leader whose populism did not fuel ochlocracy. His nuanced emotional appeal to the Athenian demos, whose decision-making he controlled, ensured that governance remained structured and reasoned.

Drawing on political philosophy, particularly the concept of populism, this paper posits that Pericles’ speech was a political maneuver designed to sustain his authority and maintain public support for a war that was escalating beyond his initial expectations. Political philosophy often reveals how, in the early stages of war, politicians frame it as a manageable, short-term endeavor with limited costs. However, wars frequently spiral out of control, becoming protracted and costly due to miscalculations, shifting political realities, and unforeseen consequences. 

Having initially convinced the Athenians that the Peloponnesian War would be a quick victory, Pericles faced mounting criticism as the war dragged on. In this context, the Funeral Oration was not so much a celebration of democratic values but rather a tactical effort to rally the populace by evoking patriotic sentiments and framing the sacrifices of the dead as part of a noble and necessary cause. By emphasizing the greatness of Athens and its citizens, Pericles attempted to redirect public dissatisfaction, portraying the war as essential to preserving Athenian ideals, even though it was straying further from the swift, decisive victory he had once promised.

In this way, the oration serves not so much as an exaltation of democracy, but as a populist tactic designed to manipulate the masses into supporting a war that was increasingly seen as spiralling beyond the leader’s control. Consequently, Pericles’ rhetoric shifts from celebrating democracy to prioritizing the consolidation of power and shaping public opinion in the face of an escalating and uncontrollable conflict.

Elizabeth Kosmeratou is a Professor in the History Department at the University of Illinois, Springfield.

Paper 2: Can Democracy (or Anything Else) Rescue Civilization While the Rules Keep Changing? 

Abstract: This paper explores the decision-making process as described by Ross Ashby in his “Design for a Brain”.  This explains how we can build a simple decider-mechanism into a highly adaptive brain-like system, and indeed it tallies with Piaget’s developmental hierarchy of human development.  Stafford Beer showed the same development for “collective brains” of social groups.  On these models, I discuss (i) the thinking and voting processes within democracy, especially the “panic” (populist) choice, when none of the options available seem relevant, and (ii) the options for authoritarian rulers (benign or otherwise) plus their likely decisions, and the reasons for them.  I also consider conflicts of interest within a democracy; and (following Aslaksen) I extend the Ashby/Beer model into international politics — with a table comparing all three. I then apply this approach to two key problems (barely-solvable politically): (1) Climate-change and (2) Limits-to-Growth, and argue that these two causes are largely responsible for ●immigration difficulties, ●minor wars,

●Cost-of-living — and are hence THE CAUSE OF POPULIST “PANICS”.  Next, I consider the power of Mega-Companies, and how we might deal with them — preferably at an international level.

 I conclude by endorsing some basic revisions of democratic procedures, including  

●use of AI (to overcome some serious obstacles such as objections to universal pensions), 

●Ranked choice voting, and 

●Compulsory voting (which also makes identity and fraud checks much easier).                                                  

Robert R. Traill has a PhD in Cybernetics and Psychology at Brunel, while also serving a one-year fellowship in the social sciences at Birmingham University. While teaching science in high schools, he developed an interest in the shortcomings of the political system. Thus, he went back to Melbourne University to do a BA in Economics, Political Science, Psychology, after which he worked in the corporate world. At North Thames Gas Board in London, he negotiated a Buyer-Decision-Model project with Professor Gordon Pask and his “System Simulation” company.  Within NTGB, he also worked in Market Research, and on the side, attended a course on “Biological Bases of Behaviour” with the Open University. He published in the Journal of Psychiatry and Psychiatric Disorders and developed his research interests in Economics and Sociology. 

Paper 3: The Politics of Manipulated Resonance: Personalised Leadership in Populism

Abstract: This article examines the role of personalised leadership in populism, focusing on its impact on the construction of political hegemony within the process of signifying the people. Adopting a political sociological perspective, it integrates theoretical frameworks on the personalisation of politics, leadership, disintermediation, and populism, exploring how populist leaders construct an imagined ‘people’ and establish direct, emotionally charged connections with them. The study highlights how populist leadership represents a specific trajectory within the broader phenomenon of personalisation, shaped by its distinctive conception of politics and democracy. Through the strategic manipulation of resonance, populist leaders politicise social resentment and frame ‘the people’ as a symbolic and homogeneous community, characterised by anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. This dynamic is reinforced through symbolic and performative strategies that unify fragmented societies, leveraging the politics of similarity to forge strong, direct bonds with their constituencies.

A key example of this dynamic is Donald Trump’s leadership, which exemplifies how populist leaders engage in disintermediation, bypassing traditional institutions and media filters to establish an unmediated connection with their supporters. Trump’s rhetoric and communicative style—marked by anti-establishment narratives, the rejection of political correctness, and the strategic use of social media—illustrate how populist leaders transform disintermediation into a challenge to liberal democracy.

While primarily theoretical, this article lays the groundwork for further empirical investigations into the mechanisms and consequences of populist leadership across different cultural and political contexts. By advancing the discourse on political sociology, it offers a nuanced understanding of how populist leaders manipulate resonance and redefine political representation, shedding light on the broader implications of populism for contemporary democracy.         

Lorenzo Viviani is Full Professor of Political Sociology at the Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy. He serves as Secretary of the Political Sociology Section of the Italian Sociological Association (AIS) and is an active member of several other international sociological associations. Currently, he is the Editor-in-Chief of Società Mutamento Politica – Italian Sociological Review (Class A, ANVUR). His recent publications include books, book chapters, and journal articles focusing on the rise of populism in the context of post-representative democracy, with a particular emphasis on the sociology of political parties and leadership.

Paper 4: The exclusionary identity of ‘the People’ in Radical Right Populism

Abstract: The growth of radical right politics raises concerns about authoritarian and exclusionary scenarios, while populism is understood as a logic that articulates democratic demands and strengthens political engagement. There is a lack of research on the democratic views of radical right populism. Moreover, the burgeoning literature on these phenomena generally examines either the supply or demand side of politics, neglecting the narrative dimension that emerges from the two intertwining. This article aims to fill these gaps by using the heuristic of the “emotion narrative” that circulates between the supply and demand sides of radical right populist parties to examine their political culture. 

Assuming that populism creates social identities through the affective articulation of popular demands, focusing on the “narrative of emotions” (and not only on the narrative dimension of particular emotions) allows us to analyse how social and political objects, facts, ideas, and scenarios generate political culture. Through a mixed-methods comparative study of Portugal and Italy, this article assesses the emotion narratives of the parties Chega and Fratelli d’Italia. The dataset includes 14 semi-structured interviews with MPs and an original survey with 1,900 responses regarding political realities (on the democratic system, power structures, ethnic diversity, political history, and role of the media) and hypothetical scenarios (on authoritarianism, the rise of migration and diversity, anti-corruption, securitisation of the state, and expanded use of referendums). The emotion narratives of radical right populist political cultures engender democratic visions rooted in exclusionary identities with positive affection for centralism, authoritarianism, and securitisation of the state, as opposed to innovation and participation.

Cristiano Gianolla is a researcher at the Centre for Social Studies (CES) of the University of Coimbra (UC), where he integrates research thematic line on Democracy, Justice and Human Rights. He obtained a PhD in Sociology and Political Science (cum laude) from Coimbra and Sapienza University of Rome, with a dissertation on Gandhi’s democratic theory and a comparative study of emerging political parties in India and Italy. Cristiano is the Principal Investigator and Work Package leader of PROTEMO (Horizon Europe, 2024-2026) and CO3 (Horizon Europe, 2024-2027, with Vanda Amaro Dias) projects. He was the Principal Investigator (PI) of the UNPOP project (FCT, 2021-2025) and a team member of the ECHOES (H2020, 2018-2021), ALICE (ERC, 2011-2016), and FRANET (2021-2022) projects. He is a co-founding and co-coordinating member of the ‘Inter-Thematic group on Migrations’, editor of e-cadernos scientific journal and a reviewer for scientific journals. Cristiano coordinates the PhD course ‘Democratic Theories and Institutions’ and the MA course ‘Critical Intercultural Dialogue’ at the Faculty of Economics of the UC, where he also teaches on the PhD course ‘State, Democracy and Legal Pluralism’. His publications include authored and edited books, chapters, and articles on democratic theory, populism, emotion, narrative, postcolonialism, intercultural dialogue, citizenship, and migration.

Lisete S. M. Mónico is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences of the University of Coimbra, Portugal, Ph.D. in Social Psychology from University of Coimbra, European Diploma of Advanced Studies in Social Psychology (DEEAPS, Università degli Studi di Bari), teaches courses in Research Methods and Social Psychology since 1999. Mobility Coordinator (2017-2023) and Coordinator of the BSc in Psychology (2021-) at the Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences. Member of The Center for Research in Neuropsychology and Cognitive and Behavioral Intervention (CINEICC), dedicates her professional activity to research in the field of Social Sciences. Author of several books, book chapters, and articles in international peer-reviewed journals.

Manuel João Cruz has a PhD in Communication Sciences and is a post-doctoral researcher at the Center for Social Studies (CES) at the University of Coimbra (UC), where he is part of the Democracy, Justice and Human Rights thematic line. His research focuses on the instrumentalization of trauma in political communication. At CES, Manuel João Cruz was part of the project “UNPOP: Dismantling Populism: Comparing the formation of narratives of emotion and their effects on political behavior”, which has already been completed, and is currently collaborating on the project CO3 – COntinuous COnstruction of resilient social COntracts through societal transformations. He has published on populism, narrative and affect in politics. Her main research interests include Media, Populism, Democracy and Narrative Studies.

 

Session 16 

Voices of Democracy: Art, Law, and Leadership in the Era of Polarization 

Date/Time: Thursday, April 16, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC)  

Paper 1: Cultivating Democracy through Art: Laibach’s contribution in Analyzing Nationalisms and Feelings of Ethnic Belongness

Abstract: My paper aims to discuss the role of the arts in both shaping feelings of belonginess and preventing the rise of nationalisms and populisms. To achieve this goal, the role of Laibach’s artistic contribution in staging nationalist feelings and ideas of ethnic belonginess is analyzed. Indeed, it can be suggested that, as Laibach were effective in criticizing the corrupted form of socialism in former Yugoslavia during the 1980s, so they were effective in exposing the origins of nationalist feelings and populism throughout their activity (1980-2020). In the past, Laibach responded to criticisms by arguing that they are “fascists as much as Hitler was a painter”. Moving from this argument, this article aims to understand Laibach’s strategy and the band’s past achievements. In addition, in the final part it furtherly asks what are the lessons that can be nowadays drawn from Laibach’s successful artistic engagement. 

Mitja Stefancic is a fully Independent Researcher and Civil Servant in Italy. He holds an MPhil in “Modern Society and Global Transformations” from the University of Cambridge and a BA in Social Sciences from the University of Essex. His PhD research focuses on the corporate governance and regulation of cooperative banks. He presented his research endeavours at scientific conferences, including EURICSE’s conference on cooperative banking and sustainable finance in Trento, Italy; the ICA 2014 Research conference in Pula, Croatia; and at the 2013 “Potential and Limits of Social Solidarity” conference in Geneva, Switzerland. His scientific contributions are published in journals such as Studi Economici, the Journal of Entrepreneurial & Organizational Diversity, the International Business & Research Journal, and has a forthcoming paper on coop banks in the ICA Review of International Co-Operation.

Paper 2: The Hidden Agenda of Bollywood: The Rise of Hindutva Narratives in Indian Cinema

Abstract: The last decade has witnessed the growing ascendancy of Hindutva nationalism in India, as evident in various government policies, political statements, and social movements. Leaders from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and right-wing groups like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have increasingly referenced the concept of Akhand Bharat—a vision of a united Indian subcontinent encompassing present-day Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other neighbouring regions under Hindu cultural hegemony. Statements from BJP leaders and affiliated groups have fueled religious polarisation, with rising incidents of communal violence, cow vigilantism, and attacks on minorities. The arts, such as literature, film, music, and cultural artefacts, have always been crucial in manufacturing national consciousness and collective identity in accordance with the ruling class ideology. 

Bollywood-the multi-million Hindi cinema industry emerging as a potent space for the generation and proliferation of this nationalist as well as religiously charged narratives. These are reflected in several movies, including The Kashmir Files (2022) and The Kerala Story (2023), which campaign for the ruling establishment’s political persuasion in some of their content. The development of these religiously laced and politically driven narratives in Bollywood is a crucial part of the much more significant paradigm shift toward right-wing nationalism. Movies depicting specific communities as the enemy within, contribute to furthering the divides between different communities. This destroys the very spirit of communal harmony and undermines the pluralistic nature of Indian society. The growing politicisation of Bollywood has exacerbated religious polarisation, leading to a more divisive and less tolerant India. In this paper, I aim to critically analyse the content of religious and nationalist narratives in Indian cinema in the last decade and explain how such cinemas have evolved into a tool that contributes to the polarisation of religious identities, casting religious minorities as the vilified ‘other’, thereby disrupting the secular nature of Indian democracy. The paper concludes by arguing that the politicisation of Bollywood has contributed to the bias towards right-wing nationalism, creating tensions among religious communities and eroding communal spirit.

Devapriya Raajev is currently pursuing my MA in Sociology at South Asian University, New Delhi. Her academic interests lie at the intersection of culture, media, democracy, gender studies, and intersectionality. She conducted fieldwork with the Human Rights Commission and tribal schools. She was also a member of the survey team for the Garima Project on women’s safety, conducted in association with the Gujarat Police. These experiences have shaped her understanding of structural inequalities and informed my academic inquiries. This paper reflects her ongoing engagement with questions around representation, power, and identity in contemporary media landscapes.

Paper 3: ‘I Miss My Name’: Why Black American Election Workers Like Ruby Freeman Turn to Defamation Law to Defend Democracy

Abstract: After the 2020 election, President Trump’s personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani said many outrageous statements about the election which eventually led to his disbarment in two jurisdictions.  Giuliani also defamed two election workers in Georgia named Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss, concocting a bizarre and untrue conspiracy that they added suitcases of outside ballots into the official count in Georgia. They had done nothing of the sort. But based on this defamatory lie, these women’s lives were turned upside down. They faced verbal and physical threats. 

This paper will explore the approach by the legal nonprofit Protect Democracy to fight disinformation by using defamation law in the United States and plaintiffs who are election workers, including Freeman and her daughter Moss. Protect Democracy found that disinformation about the 2020 election was being spread online by a handful of superspreaders like Giuliani, who had large followings on social media. This legal approach on relying on defamation law has been criticized by First Amendment scholar Professor RonNell Jones. Still, this piece will argue that defamation law is an important and effective tool in fighting disinformation like the Big Lie that Donald Trump was the true winner of the 2020 presidential election. 

The victory that Freeman and Moss won against Rudy Giuliani was so eye-poppingly large at over $145 million that it serves as a potent deterrent for other would-be defamatory election deniers. And in a world where other mechanisms of accountability, like the criminal justice systems at the state and federal levels, have been slow or ineffective at holding those who tried to overthrow the 2020 election liable, several defamation cases about 2020 have either settled or ended with impactful judgments. This piece will also note how the attacks on Ms. Freeman and her daughter were racialized and why having access to compensation is particularly needed for middle- and lower-class Black victims of defamatory campaigns. 

Ciara Torres-Spelliscy is a Brennan Center Fellow and Professor of Law at Stetson University. She was counsel in the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and an associate at Arnold & Porter. She is a graduate of Harvard and Columbia Law. She has testified before Congress as an expert on campaign finance. She has also helped draft Supreme Court briefs. She is the author of the books Corporate Citizen (Carolina 2016) and Political Brands (Elgar 2019), and Corporatocracy: How to Protect Democracy from Dark Money and Corrupt Politicians (NYU 2024). She published over 20 law review articles and hundreds of legal op-eds. She was a legal contributor to CNN for the 2024 election. She has been published in Washington Post, New York Times, Slate, L.A. Times, Boston Review, Roll Call, Business Week, Forbes, The Atlantic, USA Today, San Francisco Chronicle, The Hill, Huffington Post, Judicature, The Nation, Salon, Talking Points Memo, Tampa Bay Times, The Progressive, Medium, and Shondaland. She has also been quoted by the media in Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Time, Bloomberg, Mother Jones, SCOTUS Blog, Politico, Slate, L.A. Times, Boston Globe, NBC.com, Vox, VICE, Sirius Radio, NPR, Fox, CSPAN, DNA TV, and NY1.

Paper 4: State Institutions in Divided Societies: Religious Policy and Societal Dissatisfaction in the Israeli Military

Abstract: This study examines state institutional dissatisfaction in democracies, focusing on military institutions in religiously divided societies. We argue that all-encompassing societal dissatisfaction occurs when a state institution in a heterogeneous society applies a single policy to diverse groups with discretion and secrecy. Using a mixed methods design and an original survey, we investigate the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as a case study in a democracy without full separation of state and religion. Our findings reveal significant dissatisfaction with the IDF’s religious practices among both secular and religious Israeli Jews. Paradoxically, this shared dissatisfaction may contribute to institutional stability by preventing any group from feeling privileged. The study contributes to understanding policy implementation in divided societies and has implications for military integration strategies in diverse contexts.

Niva Golan-Nadir is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Reichman University. She  received her Ph.D. from the school of Political Science at the University of Haifa, where she further completed a post-doctoral fellowship at the division of Public Administration and Policy. She is currently a Research Associate at the Center for Policy Research, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy, The University at Albany and at the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University. Her research focuses on a comparative analysis of enduring gaps between public preferences and legal-institutional arrangements in democracies. Her research interests also include comparative politics, public administration, state-religion relations and Israel studies. Her recent book, ‘Public Preferences and Institutional Designs: Israel and Turkey compared’ (2022, Palgrave Macmillan), has been awarded final list and honorary mention (second place) by the Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies and Concordia University Library. During 2024-2025, she is a visiting scholar at the Taub Center for Israel Studies at New-York University.

Michael Freedman is a postdoctoral fellow in the Departments of Political Science and International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from MIT. His research focuses on religion and conflict in Israel and the Muslim world, examining the political behavior of religious actors – including rabbis, imams, and religious social movements – and inquires how they perceive the state, whether they collaborate with it, and how they behave towards actors they perceive as enemies. His research uses sermons and legal rulings produced by religious leaders to explain why some leaders confer the state with legitimacy while others choose to challenge it.