Populist actors often present themselves as defenders of “the people” while strategically boosting state capacity for select groups and undermining it overall, argues Edward L. Knudsen, a doctoral researcher at the University of Oxford and Affiliate Policy Fellow at the Jacques Delors Centre. In an interview with ECPS, Knudsen explains how modern populists “selectively increase governance measures for specific populations while often undermining them in the aggregate,” creating new forms of exclusion and weakening accountability. He highlights fiscal control as the central battleground for populist movements and warns that if democratic actors fail to adapt to the rise of state capitalism, authoritarian forces may fill the void with illiberal governance models.
In recent years, the resurgence of populist and authoritarian politics has profoundly reshaped the relationship between state capacity, democratic accountability, and public goods provision. To unpack these dynamics, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Edward Lawrence Knudsen, a doctoral researcher in international relations at the University of Oxford and an Affiliate Policy Fellow in European political economy at the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin. Knudsen’s research, particularly through his work on the Berggruen Governance Index (BGI), offers a nuanced framework for understanding how governance quality interacts with populist and illiberal strategies in both established and emerging democracies.
Knudsen argues that modern populist and authoritarian actors are not merely dismantling governance structures but “selectively increase governance measures for specific populations while often undermining them in the aggregate.”Rather than speaking for the entire nation, these actors redefine “the people” as a narrower in-group, targeting state capacity and democratic accountability to benefit this constituency. “They argue that democratic accountability should serve this group, that state capacity should be strengthened in certain areas, and that public goods provision should focus on those regions or communities,” Knudsen explains. This selective strategy challenges national-level governance indices and highlights the need for more disaggregated analytical tools.
Drawing on his article “A Falling Star,” Knudsen underscores the mutually reinforcing decline of state capacity and democratic accountability in advanced democracies, particularly the United States. He identifies a “downward spiral” in which decades of underinvestment erode state capacity, fueling dissatisfaction and boosting the appeal of populist leaders. These leaders “capitalize on pre-existing governance weaknesses by offering simple answers,” but once in power, they “rarely improve state capacity and often end up pillaging or plundering the state, further weakening it and deepening the negative spiral.”
A central thread in the interview is Knudsen’s emphasis on the fiscal dimension as the primary target of populist capture. “There’s a reason that in every democratic revolution in history, going back to the French Revolution, the first thing you try to do is seize the treasury from the monarch,” he notes. Fiscal control—both taxation and expenditure—remains the core battleground for insurgent populist movements seeking to consolidate power.
Looking ahead, Knudsen identifies the rise of state capitalism as the defining political-economic trend of the coming decade. He warns that if democratic actors cling to outdated ideas of non-intervention, they risk leaving the field open to authoritarian forces willing to use state power for illiberal ends. “If the center is not willing to counter that with a form of democratic state capitalism, then that’s the real risk for the future in terms of a rising tide of authoritarianism globally.”
This wide-ranging conversation traces how governance weaknesses enable populist exploitation, how technocratic language can mask illiberal intentions, and how democracies might strategically adapt to an era of intensified state intervention.
Edward Lawrence Knudsen is a doctoral researcher in international relations at the University of Oxford and an Affiliate Policy Fellow in European political economy at the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin.
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Edward Lawrence Knudsen, revised for clarity and flow.
Populism Feeds on Governance Decay
Edward Knudsen, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your article “A Falling Star,” you trace the origins of declining state capacity and democratic accountability. How do you conceptualize the causal interplay between these two dimensions, particularly in contexts where populist leaders actively erode horizontal accountability mechanisms while claiming to strengthen state capacity?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: What’s important to note is that, as we conceptualize governance through what we call the governance triangle, all the different elements are deeply interlinked, and there isn’t a clear causal relationship where one always causes the other, or vice versa. In the article “Falling Star,” about the US, we observed that both state capacity and democratic accountability have declined substantially across different political administrations. This article was published before Trump’s re-election, so this isn’t a post-2020 development; rather, both dimensions have been deteriorating for years.
This connects to populism in an interesting way because we can see a kind of downward spiral. Much of this stems from a lack of investment going back decades, which erodes state capacity. That, in turn, fuels disaffection, dissatisfaction, and frustration, increasing the political appeal of populist leaders. They capitalize on pre-existing governance weaknesses by offering simple answers, as is typical of populist rhetoric. However, once in power, they rarely improve state capacity and often end up pillaging or plundering the state, further weakening it and deepening the negative spiral.
In short, some degree of prior erosion opens the door to populist—especially right-wing populist—governments that claim they will fix state capacity but don’t, while often being more willing to erode democratic accountability even further.
Selective Strengthening, Aggregate Erosion
The Berggruen Governance Index (BGI) emphasizes the triangular relationship between public goods provision, democratic accountability, and state capacity. How does this framework help us understand the governance strategies of contemporary populist or authoritarian actors, who often deliver selective public goods while undermining accountability?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: What’s important to mention when we talk about modern populist styles of government and political appeal in relation to our quantitative index of governance indicators is that we designed this system to cover almost the entire world and across different time periods. The measures we use are geared toward capturing as wide a range of political and regime types as possible.
There’s a way in which a particular type of political appeal that emerges in one part of the world or another over specific periods of time doesn’t necessarily challenge quantitative indices outright, but it does make us look at them differently. By that, I mean that these indicators measure governance at the aggregate national level.
What’s so interesting about populism—particularly the more clientelist, right-wing populism surging globally today—is that it explicitly doesn’t try to speak for the entire country. This is where we need to disaggregate from national-level frameworks. Instead of treating “the people” as the whole electorate and assessing democratic accountability and public goods provision for the entire population, these actors explicitly claim, “These are the true people.”
They argue that democratic accountability should serve this group, that state capacity should be strengthened in certain areas, and that public goods provision should focus on those regions or communities. In this sense, populist or authoritarian strategies selectively increase governance measures for specific populations while often undermining them in the aggregate.
Eroded State Capacity Fuels Populist Appeal
Your work identifies long-term stagnation in core state capacities in several advanced democracies. To what extent do such governance weaknesses create structural openings for populist or authoritarian movements, and are there historical cases where strong state capacity has insulated democracies against such pressures?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: This ties back to my first point about the US case, but you also see it across the world, where there’s widespread dissatisfaction with the existing order, leading people to complain about the state of things and become more open to populist appeals. You see this both anecdotally and in a lot of polling, where voters for right-wing, populist, and authoritarian parties often have complaints that dovetail quite closely with a more left critique. They say things like, “The public services are all eroded, there’s not enough opportunity, my kids can’t afford a house.” Those kinds of statements—thinking of the UK context, for example, where people interviewed recently who support the UK Reform Party—sound almost like a Corbynite, left-populist argument. But instead, they’re drawn to the right.
People’s dissatisfaction with elements of state capacity, infrastructure, or the ability of the state to deliver both public goods and services increases the potential appeal of populism. And it’s very difficult to combat these sorts of populist and authoritarian political movements in the short term because, as we know, it takes a long time to build up these capacities. By the time you notice that your eroded state capacity is allowing an opening for a populist or authoritarian party to move in, it’s not necessarily too late, but there’s a lot of ground to cover.
We saw this in the US again, where many in the Biden administration shared the diagnosis of Trump’s appeal in his first term. They scrambled to implement big infrastructure projects—both increasing public goods like infrastructure investment and strengthening state capacity by trying to improve the US bureaucracy and deliver more effectively for people. But it’s very hard to get any of that off the ground in time for the next election, and that can contribute to more dissatisfaction. People say, “There’s all this rhetoric about rebuilding America, build back better, this and that, but I’m not seeing it. Okay, let’s go for the more radical, tear-it-all-down, simple solutions.”
In the short run, it’s hard to think of examples where there’s suddenly a big push into new state capacity that keeps populists away. But as we find in countries with stronger state capacities, there tends to be less appeal. Populist governments have still emerged across even very wealthy, developed countries. That said, the countries—especially in Europe—where the populist right has perhaps peaked or is advancing more slowly are those with more substantial state capacity that haven’t fully embraced the neoliberal reforms of the past several decades and haven’t eroded their state to the same extent as others.
Authoritarian Capture Begins with the Treasury
Photo: Dreamstime.
You emphasize fiscal, coordination, and delivery capacity as key subdimensions of state capacity. Which of these dimensions do populist governments tend to exploit most effectively to consolidate power, and which dimensions are most vulnerable to authoritarian capture?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: The main target of any insurgent power seeking to take control is, of course, the fiscal apparatus. We see this notably and dramatically in the US case, both in terms of taking in state revenues and giving out expenditures. The Trump administration really tried to instrumentalize both sides of that—whether by going after political opponents for alleged tax noncompliance or by trying to keep money from going out the door to perceived political opponents, using that as a kind of threat. There’s a reason that in every democratic revolution in history, going back to the French Revolution, the first thing you try to do is seize the treasury from the monarch. That’s a key measure of democracy: does the parliament have control over the purse strings of the country? If you really boil it down, in many ways that is the core of democracy—who has sovereignty over spending and taxation. This is probably the central element of contestation for many populist and authoritarian governments.
When it comes to delivery capacity, this ties into the idea of favored groups, political allies, and opponents—you want to deliver for one group or another. The story there is somewhat similar to fiscal capacity, but it’s a little more complex to instrumentalize directly. Often, insurgent parties lack the bureaucratic expertise to seize those control levers effectively. This is what’s different with the second Trump administration—it learned on the job and was able to come in more effectively this time around.
However, the ability to coordinate across different agencies and levels of government is often the Achilles’ heel of many populist governments, because they lack experience working within bureaucratic systems. In many cases, from a democratic perspective, this is quite alarming: governments come into power but aren’t able to fully consolidate their rule because of difficulties in seizing coordination capacity. So, fiscal capacity is the main target and one of the most obvious areas they can use to seize power, but this can be undermined by their failure to fully grasp the complexity of coordination capacity in a modern governance context.
Global North Nostalgia vs. Global South Frustration
In your comparative work on Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, you describe how governance challenges can lead to “lost decades.” To what extent can the populist-authoritarian trajectories of leaders such as Bolsonaro or Kirchnerism be read through the lens of state capacity decay, and are similar dynamics visible in parts of Europe and North America?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: It’s always important to distinguish right from left populism. The Argentinian case is quite complex with Peronism and then Kirchnerism, but there are elements of left-wing politics there that have, over the decades, tried to build up the Argentinian state. By contrast, the more right-populist Bolsonaro side of things has much stronger sympathies with libertarianism and is, in that way, more aligned with a Milei-type figure in Argentina. Of course, Milei may share some authoritarian commonalities with Kirchnerism, but they are major political rivals and have emerged from very different political trajectories.
It is therefore always important—especially for an institute that studies populism more broadly—to separate left and right populism. While there are some commonalities, there are also clear differences in their goals and approaches. As you say, the lens of state capacity decay is crucial here. Bolsonaro falls more in line with the Trump approach of seizing on dissatisfaction without necessarily offering meaningful ways to improve it.
His political base also differs significantly from those in many European and North American contexts. Although figures like Trump and Bolsonaro are often compared in a global context, their political bases are actually very different. In Latin America, right-wing populists tend to draw on a more traditional right-wing social base—upper and middle classes—while the working class still largely votes for the left. This pattern is almost inverted in much of Europe and especially North America, where the so-called “Brahmin left” votes for the Democratic Party and much of the working class supports Trump.
So, while there are similarities in their governance approaches, their political bases differ markedly. This reflects different types of dissatisfaction. In the Global North, it’s often a feeling of lost promise—that strong state capacity once existed but has since eroded. In much of the Global South and middle-income countries, it’s more anger that the state has never been effectively built; it’s a desire to accelerate state-building, not nostalgia for a lost golden age. So, while there are parallels, all related to state capacity, the class bases of their support and their historical expectations differ significantly.
Technocratic Inertia and Populist Frustration
In “Stable or Stagnant,” you examine the political economy of governance in the UK, France, and Italy. How has the interaction between technocratic inertia and populist mobilization shaped governance outcomes in these countries, and do they offer lessons for newer democracies confronting similar tensions?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: The word you used there—inertia—is very important. It keeps coming back to an answer I’ve given a few times already, and that’s frustration. In the European context, these appeals have even more power because there’s this perception of Brussels as a kind of bureaucratic monster, which, of course, is not really true. There aren’t that many people who actually work for the European Commission. But there’s this idea of a supranational political body that is stagnating innovation and growth.
That perception contributes to frustration, which relates closely to populist appeals—the notion that there’s something simple and easy to do, the Trump’s “only I can fix it” logic, or “just leave the European Union and everything will get better.” As we’re finding out, these issues are far more complex than that. The mere perception of bureaucratic inertia can be enough—or at least a significant driving force—in the success of populist appeals.
That said, perception alone wouldn’t be enough if people’s lives were genuinely improving. In Europe especially, while the political appeal might focus on the idea of an overweening state, much of the dissatisfaction people feel in their daily lives actually stems from state cutbacks and a lack of investment. We saw this particularly after the 2008 crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crises, when severe austerity was imposed across Europe. That’s when state capacity began to decline significantly, and the rise of many populist parties followed.
These parties often say things like “Brussels is controlling us” or refer to the “EUSSR”—the kinds of simplistic slogans that circulate—but in reality, much of the dissatisfaction politicians harness comes from the state not being active enough.
Endogenous Weaknesses, Exogenous Shocks
How do you interpret the recent surge of sovereigntist populism and illiberalism in Central and Eastern Europe through the lens of the BGI framework? Do these developments reflect endogenous weaknesses in state capacity that populist leaders exploit, or are they primarily authoritarian reactions to exogenous shocks such as migration, EU conditionality, war?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: There are some previous endogenous weaknesses in these cases, such as weaker traditions of an independent judiciary and less entrenched media pluralism. In a way, we could say these are not as consolidated democracies. There is also a kind of civilizational legacy at play, visible in competing understandings of the idea of Europe. Towards the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, you see this rhetoric in much of Eastern Europe with the impending fall of the communist system—this idea of a “return to Europe” and a civilizational understanding of Europe. In Western Europe, especially among people on the left, there was a sense of transcending these older views of civilization and nationalism, whereas in Eastern Europe, they felt like they never quite got to enjoy that.
It’s hard to capture this in terms of governance, but there are competing understandings of what it means to be a modern European state and how much ethnic homogeneity that implies, which triggers very different reactions to migration. This is something you have to be honest about when doing quantitative indicator work—there are historical factors you’re simply not going to capture, which is why we write reports with more qualitative background as well.
That being said, there are many things we do capture in our work. Even something as simple as GDP per capita shows a lot of catch-up growth in Central and Eastern Europe—Poland being one of the best examples. From a Western perspective, it’s easy to say, “Here’s our GDP line, and here’s the Polish one catching up.” It looks striking visually on a graph. But people there ask, “Why aren’t we richer than Germany? When are we going to get there?” Structurally, the way things are set up in the European Union—in terms of supply chains and where value is really added—makes it difficult for them to fully overtake Germany.
This contributes to some of the dissatisfaction. Along with lower GDP per capita, there are lower levels of public goods provision. So, the story is not so much one of decline as of insufficient growth. Combined with less entrenched democratic norms, this allows populist forces to exploit both frustration with the lack of catch-up speed and incomplete democratic consolidation. These two factors together can create a potent and toxic mix.
The Politics of Misplaced Trust
Protests against the government’s economic policy in Syntagma Square, Athens, Greece on October 20, 2011. Photo: Dreamstime.
In “The 21st Century Trust and Leadership Problem,” you argue that declining institutional trust undermines governance. How do populist actors strategically exploit trust deficits to delegitimize institutions, and what tools can democratic leaders use to rebuild trust in polarized societies?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: In politics, trust is a somewhat fuzzy concept. This comes from an article that’s not part of the Berggruen Governance Index, which I co-authored with Professor Helmut K. Anheier, who also leads the INDEX project. Trust is something we’re actually thinking about incorporating into the index more directly because it’s so important. What’s vital to understand is that politics requires some degree of trust—people want to place their trust in something. So, when institutional trust erodes, which is what we’re seeing, this is essentially another way of talking about the decline in state capacity. People see that the state isn’t delivering, and they end up trusting it less.
But their instinct and desire to trust don’t disappear; they get redirected. Often, in the context of populism and authoritarianism, that trust, rather than being placed in institutions that are no longer deemed trustworthy, is transferred to a singular person or party. This is where the “trust me, only I can fix it” narrative or promises of “simple solutions” come in. In many ways, populist appeals can be seen as a form of misplaced or transferred trust that has moved away from more appropriate targets—like independent media or local government services. People want to be able to rely on institutions at different levels. When they no longer can—when they think, “They’re never going to pick up the trash,” or “The media’s always lying to me”—those instincts are redirected toward a more demagogic figure who promises, “I’ll fix everything, and I’m the only one telling you the truth.”
Yes, populists exploit trust deficits, but they also capture people’s desire to trust something. And in many cases, they ultimately betray that trust and fail to deliver, which deepens the problem. They also encourage people to distrust other institutions, even those that are still functioning at a high level—such as research universities. While there may be issues within these institutions, the claim that they’re systematically producing fake science, for example, shows how justified distrust in some areas can be transferred to others where it’s not justified, ultimately undermining the entire system.
Leadership in Times of Governance Crisis
You highlight leadership as a critical factor in reversing governance crises. What institutional safeguards or leadership selection mechanisms might help prevent the rise of authoritarian-populist figures who exploit weak accountability structures for personalist rule?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: The issue of leadership here is really difficult because it’s one of those things that, if you prefer a more structural or material account of the world, feels somewhat unsatisfying and fuzzy to talk about—the importance of leadership. How do you select for that? How do you account for one individual having integrity? It feels very risky from a democratic perspective to say, “We’re going to stake our future on just hoping we get a good guy or a good woman in power.”
That being said, there are important factors to consider. There are actual institutional selection mechanisms, such as greater meritocratic promotion in bureaucracies. That’s an element of state capacity that we capture, and it’s the kind of building block of a modern state that you would, of course, want to have.
On the fuzzier side, there are issues of norms—saying, for example, “No, we’re not going to tolerate more demagogical or corrupt figures.” This ties back to feelings of dissatisfaction, where those norms can break down if people feel they no longer deliver the goods, or if they’re being told to live by a set of norms that elites themselves do not follow. When you see a decline in opportunity, state capacity, and public goods provision, people feel like these rules and norms aren’t delivering anymore. Then they’re more open to a type of appeal that says, “Yeah, it’s all a scam, and I’m a scammer too, but I’ll scam on your behalf.”
So, you can’t necessarily draw a one-to-one connection between a specific level of state capacity decline and the selection of a particular type of leader. However, there are clear patterns where a broader lack of integrity and fairness in society makes the appeal of someone who openly flouts ideas of fairness more likely.
Strong Managers or Strategic Demagogues?
Many populist leaders claim to be “strong managers” while simultaneously undermining institutions—blending technocratic rhetoric with authoritarian tendencies. How can we analytically distinguish between genuine technocratic competence and populist instrumentalization of technocratic language to justify illiberal measures?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: There’s this book that came out a few years ago, which maybe you’re alluding to, Techno-Populism by Carlo Invernizzi Accetti and Christopher J. Bickerton. They speak to this idea of two concepts that seem like they’re at odds with each other. Populism is a sort of mass of people resisting the technocrats, and technocracy is this sort of cloistered room of Davos elites tweaking the economy—those are the stereotypes. But what they point out is that there’s actually a way in which the two can go together, that’s not always obvious, and that’s the populist appeal to technocratic instincts: “We’re just going to get the best and the smartest people in there, and they’ll fix all of this.”
Understanding that there are linkages between those two is very important. There is a tension, though, often in the notion of “strong managers.” The phrasing itself almost seems contradictory because you think of strong leaders and then you think of competent managers, and so “strong managers” has a kind of built-in tension as a phrase and as a concept. The two are often at odds. There are ways in which you might need to rouse a population for a great struggle, but the day-to-day business of government is a lot more bland than that. You don’t need a Winston Churchill “we will fight them on the beaches” kind of speech to figure out how to successfully devolve council taxes to local governments in Britain, for example. They’re very different things, and oftentimes the two don’t really go together.
The struggle for populists is actually creating that linkage between a more nationalist appeal, which can generate large-scale political mobilization, and then implementing that on the ground. Again, to stay with the UK example, there was a Financial Times article recently about UK Reform’s struggles in local councils. They have all this lofty nationalist rhetoric, but when it actually comes to the things people care about, it’s very hard to deliver. For people who are more democratically inclined, that is in some ways a blessing—there’s an opening to discredit some of these more nationalist and populist movements.
Things will become a lot more dangerous if there’s a form of populist authoritarian governance that figures out how to move beyond just the technocratic language you described to actual technocratic competence. That’s when you’ll see a more enduring political form. As it stands now, if people see it’s not working, they’ll throw them out again after a few years. The more politically successful forms of authoritarianism actually are technocratically competent, or at least strive to be for their preferred groups.
Governing in the Age of State Capitalism
Shanghai Aerial View. Photo: Sean Pavone.
And finally, situating your work within the broader global context, how do you see the interplay between governance quality, populism, and authoritarianism evolving over the next decade? Do you anticipate cyclical populist waves, or a more entrenched structural realignment toward illiberal governance models in both established and emerging democracies?
Edward Lawrence Knudsen: It’s hard to say at the global level whether we’ll see a clear wave or not because there are so many local specifics. What we can say on a larger level is that we’re witnessing the rise of state capitalism as a form of political economy. There is a lot more direct intervention of the state in the economy—not in a socialist or communist way, but rather using it for desired political ends in domestic politics, international politics, geopolitics, and geoeconomics, as it’s increasingly called. That’s the main trend.
Of course, populism will come in different forms. It’s a contested term. But I would say that the overall rising tide of liberal democracy is no longer moving in that direction. I wouldn’t say it’s definitely shifting toward complete authoritarianism, either. The challenge will be that, given the likely irresistible rise of state intervention in the economy for the foreseeable future, it will be incumbent on democratic forces to wield that intervention in a way that delivers for people and neutralizes some of the appeals of more authoritarian parties.
One of the main risks would be if more established democratic parties cling to ideas of non-intervention in the economy, rather than recognizing this as the new reality and using it to deliver for people and promote greater equality. If they keep their heads in the sand and cling to these 1980s or 1990s norms of relative non-intervention, it opens the door for more simplistic approaches. You see that in the US case, where many market-liberal types say, “We’re not going to nationalize US Steel,” or “We’re not going to ban AI truck drivers,” while more populist-inclined actors—who often have no real democratic commitments—say, “Of course we’ll do that. Of course we’ll protect the truck drivers. Of course we’ll protect the steel workers.”
When there are changing economic times and increasing uncertainty, people will naturally gravitate toward those kinds of simple appeals. If the center is not willing to counter that with a form of democratic state capitalism, then that’s the real risk for the future in terms of a rising tide of authoritarianism globally.
Professor Vlastimil Havlík warns that the incoming Babiš government “is not good news for the quality of Czech democracy.” Although constitutional majorities are “very unlikely,” he predicts “a slower, incremental decrease in the quality of democracy” through politicization of public service media, weakening of liberal civil society, and the conflation of private business and state power. He describes ANO’s victory as “a consolidation of the illiberal space” and emphasizes that probable coalition partners like the Motorists and SPD share “hostile rhetoric toward NGOs” and key democratic institutions. Strategically, ANO now pursues “a soft version of Euroscepticism,” aligning with median voter preferences while maintaining a pragmatic, catch-all profile.
On October 4, 2025, billionaire populist Andrej Babiš’s ANO party won the Czech parliamentary elections with just under 35% of the vote, securing 80 of 200 seats—an increase from the previous election. Although short of a majority, Babiš is expected to lead coalition talks. His most likely allies are two small right-wing, Eurosceptic parties: the anti-Green Deal Motorists for Themselves and Tomio Okamura’s anti-immigrant Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). While ANO shares the Motorists’ opposition to EU emissions targets, relations with the SPD may prove more complicated due to internal divisions and radical demands. A new Babiš government would likely shift Czech foreign policy, notably by scrapping the Czech ammunition initiative supporting Ukraine.
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Vlastimil Havlík, a leading expert on Czech party politics and populism at Masaryk University and the SYRI National Institute, analyses the electoral outcome and its implications for Czech democracy. He argues that ANO’s 2025 victory represents “a consolidation of the illiberal space,”with the party securing record electoral support and aligning with far-right forces, but without the constitutional majorities that enabled Hungary’s Fidesz to overhaul the political system. Despite this, Professor Havlík warns that the incoming government “is not good news for the quality of Czech democracy.”
According to Professor Havlík, Babiš’s coalition arithmetic now depends on “Eurosceptic and far-right actors such as the Motorists and SPD,” making stable governance uncertain but also potentially dangerous. He cautions that their shared hostility toward public service media and liberal civil society could translate into concrete measures to weaken democratic institutions: “We may see attempts to limit the role and funding of public service media, or even to take it over,” he says. “There has also been very hostile rhetoric from the three parties toward NGOs… essentially liberal, left-leaning civil society organizations.”
Professor Havlík also highlights structural constraints that differentiate the Czech case from Hungary and Poland. A majoritarian Senate system and the presidency of Petr Pavel make constitutional majorities for populists “very unlikely.” Yet he foresees a “slower, incremental decrease in the quality of democracy” through piecemeal institutional changes, politicization of media oversight, and the blurring of boundaries between Babiš’s private business empire and the state.
Economically, Professor Havlík emphasizes continuity. ANO’s electoral base resembles that of the former Social Democrats, with strong support in peripheral regions suffering from economic stagnation. Strategically, the party has embraced “a soft version of Euroscepticism” and aligned itself with the “Patriots for Europe” group, adapting its discourse to a skeptical public while avoiding the radical Czexit positions of SPD.
In sum, Professor Havlík sees both continuity and transformation: ANO has evolved from centrist populism into a dominant illiberal force, constrained by institutions but poised to erode liberal democratic checks incrementally.
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Vlastimil Havlík, revised for clarity and flow.
ANO’s Victory Reflects Continuity Within a Changing Political Context
Andrej Babiš, leader of the ANO party and one of the richest businessmen in the Czech Republic, during a press conference in Prague on March 2, 2013. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Vlastimil Havlík, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Andrej Babiš’s ANO achieved a clear parliamentary plurality in recent parliamentary elections, consolidating its role as the hegemon of the illiberal camp. How do you interpret this outcome in light of your work on the rise of centrist populism and the persistence of cleavage structures in Czech politics? Does this election signify continuity or a critical juncture in party competition?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: Thank you very much for this excellent question. What is clear is that ANO decisively won the election, as you mentioned. It was a kind of landslide victory, with more than 30% of the votes. In fact, in terms of the number of votes, it was the best result in the history of Czech electoral politics.
You asked me to interpret this outcome in the context of centrist populism. I would say I’m not entirely sure whether the party is still centrist populist in the way it was when it was established 12 or 13 years ago. At that time, the party relied on populism, anti-corruption narratives, and anti-establishment arguments, while simultaneously promoting technocracy and its competence to run the state as the solution, deliberately avoiding clear ideological stances. It declared, “We are not on the left, we are not on the right. That is not important anymore. What is important is to get rid of the current politicians.”
Over time, as a consequence of the party’s participation in government and the immigration crises, ANO had to take positions on many political issues. Today, it still employs populism and technocratic narratives. Babiš remains the central figure, continuing to present himself as a skillful manager capable of running the state effectively. The party, however, is highly pragmatic. It follows public opinion and has adopted relatively clear stances on several issues, combining left-leaning positions—such as targeted social policies for pensioners and protectionist measures—with a culturally conservative, even radical-right orientation.
So, when I return to your question about the persistence of cleavage structures, I would say both yes and no. The shift in the party’s ideology and political discourse reminds me of what we saw in the Social Democratic Party 10 or 15 years ago, when it was a major political force. Electorally, ANO’s base is quite similar to that of past social democratic voters. However, the environment is different now, with the rising salience of cultural issues. So, while it is not really a social democratic party, ANO has adopted a position very similar to what the Social Democratic Party once held. It has also placed a strong emphasis on economic issues, which is another sign of continuity. I don’t view this election as a major rupture; rather, I see clear signs of continuity, albeit within a changing political context.
Czech Party Politics Has Become Two-Dimensional: Culture Now Rivals the Economy
The 2025 elections revealed ANO’s shift toward left-leaning conservatism, especially on socio-economic and cultural issues. How significant is this realignment for reshaping the Czech political space, and how does it affect the interaction between populist actors and traditional party families?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: Actually, I can follow what I said a couple of seconds ago. What we have seen in the party landscape of the party system over the last decade is a major increase in the salience of cultural and post-materialist issues, such as immigration, as a clear result of the so-called immigration crisis. There is also much more discussion about minority rights, such as the position of LGBTQ+ groups, the position of women, and environmental protection vis-à-vis global warming.
In general, the party system in the Czech Republic is no longer unidimensional as it used to be, when Czech party politics was defined for at least two decades by conflicts over economic issues, redistribution, taxes, and social policies. Now, clearly, it has become two-dimensional. The economic dimension is still there, but the cultural dimension has become similarly important.
When it comes to ANO and its position toward traditional party families, this is to some extent determined by the party’s populist profile. It is highly polarizing and somewhat hostile toward mainstream political parties. So, in addition to the two dimensions I mentioned, I would add a kind of populist sentiment—perhaps not an entirely independent dimension, but a significant factor nonetheless. There is quite a high level of polarization between ANO and other populist political parties on the one hand and the rest of the party space on the other. As a result, there are not many positive interactions between populist actors and traditional party families, which are often depicted by populist sectors as the “enemy of the people.”
Babiš’s Coalition with Far-Right Parties Poses Risks to Czech Democracy
The Statue of Justice by Marius Kotrba, a modern sculpture located at the Supreme Court building in Brno, Czech Republic, on March 10, 2022. Photo: Evgeniy Fesenko.
Babiš’s coalition arithmetic now depends on Euroskeptic and far-right actors such as the Motorists and SPD. Drawing on your research on populism–anti-populism divides, how feasible is stable governance under such a constellation, and what risks might this pose for the quality of Czech democracy?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: It’s a really good question. I will start with the effects of populist or anti-populist divides. What I meant by that when we wrote about it, it was before the 2021 election, two major electoral coalitions were formed with the aim of defeating ANO, Babiš’s party. They changed their communication strategy and based it on anti-populist arguments. They depicted populism and Babiš, as well as other populist parties and the communists, as a major threat to Czech democracy and as a force that would take the Czech Republic back to the East in foreign policy. This was highly polarizing rhetoric. On the other hand, we saw similarly polarizing rhetoric on the side of populist actors.
Why do I mention that? It seems that there are not many options to form a government after the election as a result of this polarization. So now it really seems that there will be some sort of government collaboration between ANO and Motorists, a far-right or radical-right populist political party.
As for its stability, it’s difficult to predict. There are some shared policy attitudes between ANO and the other parties, but there are also differences, for example, in their attitudes toward the EU and NATO. Economic policies differ as well, and this may be one of the main sources of conflict after the coalition is formed because, on one hand, you have ANO, which is quite good at spending, and on the other, Motorists, who want conservative fiscal policies.
Another issue concerns SPD, which actually involves four political parties, as members of four parties were elected on the SPD list. This creates more space for tensions. Moreover, both SPD and Motorists lack experience in government participation and high politics. They have been in opposition, and Motorists are a new party. So, it’s difficult to say, but there are not many other options, which may push the parties to maintain the coalition and overcome possible conflicts and disagreements.
When it comes to risks for democracy, I can see several. These stem from similar stances of these parties on, for example, public service media. We may see attempts to limit the role and funding of public service media, or even to take it over. There has also been very hostile rhetoric from the three parties toward NGOs, which they call “political NGOs.” This essentially refers to liberal, left-leaning civil society organizations, so we can expect cuts to state funding for them.
Finally, there is Babiš himself. As the owner of large businesses, his main motivation for entering politics is to profit from the state through subsidies. This creates a major threat to democracy: the blurring of lines between Babiš’s private business and the state. Such a conflation of big private business and the state represents a serious risk to the quality of Czech democracy. Therefore, this government is not good news for the quality of Czech democracy.
Illiberal Consolidation Is Clear, But Institutional Limits Remain
The collapse of traditional left-wing parties and SPD’s decline suggest consolidation of the illiberal space rather than its expansion. Do you see this as a Pyrrhic victory—given the fragility of potential coalitions—or as the institutionalisation of ANO’s dominance akin to Hungary’s Fidesz?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: I would call it more of a consolidation of the illiberal space, although it depends. In a way, the electoral support for illiberal or populist forces remained more or less the same compared to the last election. But there is one difference. In the 2021 election, some illiberal forces did not cross the electoral threshold. Now, Motorists were able to cross it, so we have almost 50% of votes translated into parliamentary seats for illiberal parties. In this sense, we can see an expansion of the illiberal space.
At the same time, some SPD voters shifted, so we may say that more voters opted for a slightly more moderate version of illiberalism. If you compare ANO and SPD, ANO is more moderate.
You asked about a comparison between Fidesz and ANO. One difference is that ANO does not hold a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, so its position is weaker compared to Fidesz. On the other hand, its electoral support is higher—indeed, a record level for ANO. Another difference lies in the institutional structure of the Czech political system. There is also an upper chamber of parliament, where ANO is far weaker, partly because of the electoral system, and it is very far from a majority of populist parties in that chamber. So, the position of illiberal forces is weaker compared to Hungary and Fidesz.
Economic Cleavages Remain Central Despite Populist Surge
A demonstration against the Czech government, high energy prices, the Green Deal, and the EU took place in Prague on September 3, 2022. Protesters demanded a change of government amidst the crises. Photo: Helena Zezulkova.
Your recent co-authored work on “Revolution or Evolution” shows remarkable persistence of socio-economic and cultural cleavages despite electoral volatility. How do the 2025 results reflect the resilience or reconfiguration of these cleavages, and what new issue dimensions (e.g. climate policy, migration) are becoming decisive for party competition?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: Thank you very much for mentioning the article we wrote with Lubomír Kopeček and Martin Vérteši for Prominence of Post-Communism. We looked at party manifestos and found that the economy still plays a significant role in party competition, at least in party manifestos, even after the rise of populist political parties. This remains true, but I would also add that the economy may now be framed differently. The rise of populism does not mean it is framed in exactly the same way as before; it has been presented more in a populist and less in an establishment-oriented way since Babiš’s party entered the system.
Regarding the 2025 elections, I would highlight two points. First, cultural or post-materialist issues became more important in campaigning and in debates between party leaders. Second, and more importantly in my view, the economy remains the key explanatory factor—particularly economic difficulties in peripheral areas. One of the most important aspects of the recent election was the notably high turnout, driven by increased mobilization in economically disadvantaged peripheral regions that voted mostly for Babiš’s party. So, the economy continues to be a major issue, and I wouldn’t say there has been a reconfiguration of the cleavages.
Populism vs. Anti-Populism Becomes Key Communication Axis
In your studies of the 2021 election, you identified a populism vs. anti-populism cleavage that temporarily overshadowed left–right competition. To what extent has this divide become entrenched as the primary axis of contestation, and how does this shape the prospects for liberal democratic parties?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: I would be a little bit careful to call the populism–anti-populism divide a cleavage in the sense that it is well structured in society. I would describe it more as a political divide or perhaps a communication strategy. On one hand, you have populist communication or populist actors, and on the other hand, the communication of democratic or pro-liberal democratic parties, which used anti-populist arguments. As I mentioned, they depicted ANO, SPD, and, at that time, in the 2021 election, the communists as a major threat to democracy. They essentially copy-pasted this strategy in the last election, perhaps stressing more the claim that the populist parties in the Czech Republic are clearly pro-Russian forces, turning Czechia back to the East.
You asked whether this was the primary axis of contestation. I would say it was a very important part of the communication of these democratic or pro-liberal democratic parties. On the other hand, ANO’s communication was clearly focused on the economy. They blamed the government for poor economic performance because, if you look at some indicators, the Czech Republic was not doing particularly well during the last four years.
As for the prospects for liberal democratic parties, I see two important points. This anti-populist communication was a highly polarizing strategy, using emotional arguments and depicting populist parties as a real enemy—not just a rival—and a threat to democracy. This limits the space for possible government collaboration across this divide. Not that ANO and Babiš are interested in such cooperation, but the possibilities are limited also because of this type of communication.
As for the future of this divide or communication, it’s not very clear. After the election, there was much discussion about whether the electoral coalitions—I mentioned the coalitions of the pro-democratic camp, in this case, right-wing political parties—would continue, and now it seems that will not be the case. So, we may again see the three parties that formed the coalition together, “Spolu” in Czech, running in the election independently. But this is still uncertain. There will be party congresses and possibly new leadership of the parties, and they will evaluate this strategy.
Babiš’s Model Is Shifting Closer to Radical Right Discourses
In your 2019 article, you argue that ANO’s technocratic populism constitutes a regime alternative by rejecting pluralism and constitutionalism. How do you foresee this model evolving under Babiš’s renewed electoral dominance—toward a more overt illiberalism or continued reliance on managerial, depoliticised discourse?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: That’s a really good question. I think it’s not very clear. To some extent, it’s difficult to say because the party has changed a bit in its communication. It is now closer to radical right discourses, but what has not changed is Babiš’s view of liberal democracy, checks and balances, separation of powers, public service media, and NGOs. He doesn’t care much about these. He actually sees them as annoying, unnecessary obstacles that limit the ability to govern effectively and slow down the process of government.
If a coalition with other populist or radicalized parties is formed, there will be even more radical elements. What we can expect is a number of attacks on liberal democratic institutions, or institutions that guarantee the liberal part of democracy, such as public service media and some NGOs. We may also see attempts to change parliamentary procedures, although this would be difficult.
You mentioned Fidesz and Hungary several times. I think there is a difference because the government will not have enough votes to change the constitution or the majority needed to change electoral laws, since that requires a majority in both parliamentary chambers. So, I don’t expect major structural changes to the political system, but what we can see is liberal democracy being cut into small pieces. Not because there is a complex plan to do this, but because none of the possibly future government parties cares much about liberal democracy, and the rhetoric we have heard from them, including ANO, is close to Fidesz.
Incremental Democratic Backsliding Likely in Czechia
Unlike Orbán’s Fidesz, ANO operates within a fragmented party system checked by the Senate and President Pavel. Based on your research on illiberal tendencies in Central Europe, what forms of democratic backsliding might occur in a Czech context where constitutional majorities are unlikely?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: You’re absolutely right. A constitutional majority for populist parties is not very likely in the Czech context. The reason lies in how the Senate, the upper chamber, is elected. It’s based on a majoritarian, two-round electoral system, and only one-third of senators is elected every two years. So it’s not very likely—actually very unlikely—that there will be a constitutional majority for populist parties. This means no major changes when it comes to altering the constitution or electoral laws, as I mentioned.
However, there will be many opportunities for the future government coalition to limit Czech liberal democracy. For example, regarding public service media, they can change the leadership or the board—the council of Czech TV or Czech Radio—to increase control. There’s also significant discussion about the funding of public service media. Currently, it’s funded by everyone paying a small monthly fee, which is the main source of funding. They want to abolish this or replace it with state funding, which would again increase government control.
A similar logic applies to civil society organizations. There will be several elections of different state institutions and their leadership, which the government can influence. And, of course, there is the conflict of interest between Babiš’s economic interests and the state. So, we will not see revolutionary changes but rather a slower, incremental decrease in the quality of democracy.
Populist Elite Cues Could Undermine Trust in Democratic Institutions
Chamber of Deputies of Parliament of Czech Republic during constituent meeting in Prague on November 25, 2013. Photo: Dreamstime.
Your work highlights the role of anti-establishment attitudes, political distrust, and low efficacy in fueling populist support. How might these underlying attitudes evolve under another Babiš government, and what implications does this have for the long-term resilience of liberal democratic institutions?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: A really good question. It’s a very complex one. There are many sources of public trust in different institutions. I would choose two points to discuss.
The first is the role of the economy. It’s not directly related to the nature of Babiš’s party, or SPD, or Motorists, but what we have seen in the Czech Republic is that when the economy is doing well—and especially when people feel that they are doing better economically—their satisfaction with politics and trust in political institutions is higher. We saw that even during the first Babiš government between 2017 and 2021: satisfaction with politics went up because macroeconomic conditions were much better, inflation was low, unemployment was quite low, and average salaries rose. Dissatisfaction with politics and institutions increased during the COVID crisis, when trust declined because the government mismanaged the situation and insecurity grew.
So, it will first depend on economic performance, which is partly linked to government policies. As I said, Babiš’s victory was fueled by increased turnout in peripheral regions, where people suffered from worsening economic conditions. If I were in Babiš’s place, I would invest in these regions. This would, of course, increase personal support, but it would also, as a side effect, boost satisfaction with politics and political institutions.
The second point is that, as political science and political sociology research shows, elite cues actually work. Over the next few years, we will hear attacks on liberal democracy, checks and balances, and the separation of powers. This can feed people, especially voters of populist parties, with cues that, despite possibly increased satisfaction with politics, can go hand in hand with lower trust in liberal democratic institutions. These are the two points that seem to me important when it comes to Babiš’s government and satisfaction with institutions.
ANO’s Euroscepticism Is Pragmatic, Not Ideological
ANO’s leadership of the “Patriots for Europe” group and its stance on EU climate policy reflect a new Eurosceptic axis. In light of your research on populism and Europeanisation, how should we understand this development? Is ANO’s Euroscepticism primarily strategic—targeting specific policies—or part of a deeper ideological realignment, particularly compared to SPD’s Czexit discourse?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: It’s definitely strategy. It’s very pragmatic—a calculated approach. ANO has tried to catch as many voters as possible. They use the notion of a catch-all party in a somewhat distorted way, but they actively employ it. They want to be a catch-all party to increase their electoral support. When you look at EU-related public opinion in the Czech Republic, you see quite a lot of skepticism. Many people are not very satisfied with EU membership, and general trust in the EU is not very high. There are also clear indications of skepticism toward joining the Eurozone.
So, ANO has adapted its discourse to align closely with the views of the majority of the population. This is interesting because, when the party was established, it was pro-European and quite positive about the Euro and the Eurozone. Now it represents a soft version of Euroscepticism, using populist anti-elite discourse—for example, criticizing “Brussels elites” and specific EU policies such as migration. Migration has become a salient issue, and most of the population holds negative attitudes toward immigration, so ANO has adopted anti-immigration positions as well. The same can be said about the Green Deal. Essentially, the party tries to position itself close to the median voter on these issues. It’s a very pragmatic strategy.
Czech Populism Shares Traits with Hungary and Poland but Remains Distinct
Lastly, Professor Havlík, when viewed comparatively, how does the Czech populist trajectory under Babiš resemble or diverge from developments in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia? Are we witnessing a distinct “Czech model” of illiberal populism?
Professor Vlastimil Havlík: Czech model of populism — I don’t know in what sense. I would say that compared to Fidesz, Law and Justice (PiS), and SMER, we can see some discursive differences. In a way, ANO is more moderate and not as clearly pro-Russian compared to Robert Fico. The discourse of Fico, for example, or Orbán is very different from Babiš. He’s quite careful when it comes to commenting on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
As I mentioned, ANO does not have a constitutional majority, which is different from Hungary. It also differs in the nature of the threats to liberal democracy, which stem largely from Babiš’s private business interests. In this sense, it is similar to Fidesz but in a slightly different way: there’s a much more direct conflation of economic interests and the state, whereas in the case of Fidesz it’s a bit more indirect.
As for similarities, the populist discourses—anti-elitism, moralizing narratives, and anti-liberal rhetoric—are similar. All of the populist parties and discourses strongly resist checks and balances and the separation of powers—those elements that limit their power. So, I don’t know if we can really speak of a distinct “Czech model.” I don’t like to generalize from a single case. But there are both similarities and some differences.
Please cite as: ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 4: Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 16, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00116
On October 16, 2025, the ECPS held the fourth session of its Virtual Workshop Series “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches.” The session examined how political actors construct and mobilize “the people” to legitimize both inclusive and exclusionary political projects. Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni, the session featured presentations by Samuel Ngozi Agu, Shiveshwar Kundu, and Mouli Bentman & Michael Dahan, each exploring different regional and theoretical perspectives. Abdelaaziz El Bakkali and Azize Sargın provided incisive discussant feedback, followed by a lively Q&A. Concluding reflections by Prof. Mazzoleni emphasized populism’s dual nature as both a political strategy and a symptom of structural democratic crises, setting the stage for future interdisciplinary debate.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On October 16, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the fourth session of its ongoing Virtual Workshop Series, titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This series (September 2025 – April 2026) provides a structured forum for interdisciplinary dialogue on the contemporary challenges of democratic backsliding, populism, and the future of liberal democracy across different regions.
The fourth session, titled “Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging,” focused on how political actors construct and mobilize the idea of “the people” to reshape democratic imaginaries, often in ways that blur the line between inclusion and exclusion. Against a backdrop in which one-fifth of the world’s democracies disappeared between 2012 and 2024, the session explored the dual role of “the people” as both a democratic resource and a political instrument used to legitimize exclusionary, often authoritarian projects. The event brought together a diverse group of scholars and practitioners from India, Nigeria, Israel, Morocco, Switzerland, and beyond, reflecting the comparative and interdisciplinary scope of the series.
The session was chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni (University of Lausanne). Following a welcome by Reka Koletzer on behalf of ECPS, Prof. Mazzoleni opened with a conceptual framing that situated the panel within broader debates on populism and democratic legitimacy. He emphasized that there is “no populism without the people,” tracing the notion’s roots to ancient Greece and its evolution as a key source of political legitimation.
Historically, he noted, when “the people” were not central, politics drew on divine authority. Today, however, democratic politics is increasingly intertwined with religion and sacralized notions of a homogeneous people—developments that pose serious challenges to the rule of law and democratic sustainability. Prof. Mazzoleni highlighted how populist leaders exploit these dynamics to consolidate power and reshape belonging, stressing the importance of contextual, cross-regional reflection—linking contributions from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to global debates.
Three scholarly presentations followed, each addressing the theme from a distinct geographical and theoretical perspective: Dr. Samuel Ngozi Agu (Abia State University, Nigeria) presented “We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches,” arguing for decentralization and participatory governance as democratic correctives to elite-dominated political systems. Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu (Jangipur College, University of Kalyani, India) delivered “The Idea of ‘People’ Within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” offering a psychoanalytic and structuralist interpretation of the rise of Hindu nationalist populism. Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr.Mike Dahan (Sapir College, Israel) presented “We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal,” examining how populist movements appropriate the universalist language of liberal democracy to undermine its institutions from within.
The presentations were followed by discussant feedback from Associate Professor Abdelaaziz Elbakkali (SMBA University, Morocco; Fulbright Postdoctoral Scholar, Arizona State University) and Dr. Azize Sargın (Director for External Affairs, ECPS). Their interventions offered comparative perspectives, theoretical reflections, and methodological suggestions, deepening the debate and encouraging the presenters to refine their arguments. A Q&A session allowed for interactive exchanges between the speakers and participants, further probing the conceptual, empirical, and normative implications of the presentations. Finally, Prof. Mazzoleni provided a general assessment, synthesizing the key insights of the session.
This report documents the presentations, discussants’ feedback, Q&A exchanges, and concluding reflections, offering a comprehensive overview of a rich and interdisciplinary scholarly discussion on how “the people” is performed, politicized, and contested in contemporary democratic politics.
Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu: The Idea of ‘People’ within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India
A man chanting songs with a dummy cow in the background during the Golden Jubilee celebration of VHP – a Hindu nationalist organization on December 20, 2014 in Kolkata, India. Photo: Arindam Banerjee.
In his presentation titled “The Idea of ‘People’ within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu explored the philosophical and structural underpinnings of contemporary populism, focusing particularly on the Indian case. His talk was anchored around two central questions: (1) how to understand the rise of populism in India and its philosophical justification, and (2) what kind of alternative conception of “the people” can offer a revolutionary counterpoint to right-wing populism. Through this dual lens, Dr. Kundu aimed to bridge political theory—especially psychoanalytic and structuralist perspectives—with empirical developments in Indian democratic politics.
Dr. Kundu began by noting that, historically, critiques of democracy tended to originate from outside liberal democratic systems—for example, from traditional societies or cultural contexts resistant to liberal political models. However, the current wave of populism represents a distinctive internal critique of liberal democracy, emerging from within its own institutional and ideological frameworks. This shift marks populism as a transformative force, challenging not external impositions but the internal logic and practices of liberal democratic governance.
Focusing on India, Dr. Kundu traced the philosophical roots of populism’s rise to its opposition to Enlightenment-derived ideas of consciousness, rationality, and elite liberal politics. Liberalism and Marxism, he argued, have historically relied on “conscious” language and scientific outlooks to address complex social problems. In the Indian context, this was vividly visible in the 1970s and 1980s when many liberal elites—especially from prestigious institutions such as Jawaharlal Nehru University, St. Stephen’s College, Jadavpur University, and Presidency College—engaged in social outreach projects in rural areas. Their efforts, however, often failed because they approached communities with pre-formulated “scientific” solutions rather than through genuine dialogue. This failure, according to Dr. Kundu, reflected a broader disconnect between liberal political discourse and the emotional, affective, and unconscious dimensions of popular life.
Similarly, in the period leading up to 2014, the language and policies of India’s dominant liberal-progressive forces, notably the Congress Party, were insufficient to prevent the rise of right-wing populism. Dr. Kundu emphasized that Hindu nationalist forces were able to mobilize repressed emotional energies linked to long-standing issues such as the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, the abrogation of Article 370 concerning Kashmir, and debates over the Uniform Civil Code. These issues, though latent in the public consciousness, had been inadequately addressed by previous governments. Right-wing populists successfully activated these emotional reservoirs, enabling their rapid rise to power in 2014.
To make sense of this phenomenon, Dr. Kundu proposed a theoretical hypothesis grounded in Althusserian psychoanalysis. Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, particularly the concepts of the unconscious elaborated by Freud (id, ego, and superego), he argued that populist leaders can be understood as symptomatic expressions of the id—the primal, instinctual component of the human psyche. Liberal and Marxist political traditions have largely ignored or repressed the role of unconscious elements such as desire, fantasy, sexuality, and instinct in the public domain. Populism, by contrast, taps into these unconscious forces, channeling them into political mobilization.
For Dr. Kundu, this psychoanalytic perspective allows for a more structural understanding of emotion in politics. Rather than treating emotions as irrational residues to be overcome through reason, he urged scholars to analyze how unconscious drives are structured and mobilized within political contexts. Authoritarian populism, in this view, thrives where liberalism fails to address or incorporate these unconscious dimensions into its political discourse.
Dr. Kundu also linked the rise of populism to structural inequalities in both economic and political domains. Liberalism’s inability to offer credible redistributive solutions has created fertile ground for right-wing mobilizations. He noted that discussions of redistribution in contemporary democracies have become narrowly focused on land reform, neglecting broader possibilities for income and resource redistribution suited to modern contexts. A renewed focus on redistribution, he suggested, is essential to constructing a progressive alternative to populism.
The second major component of Dr. Kundu’s presentation addressed the question of alternatives: what kind of “people” could function as a revolutionary subject capable of countering right-wing populism? Here he engaged with debates among left theorists such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who emphasized the political construction of “the people” as a central task of progressive politics. Dr. Kundu argued that in India—and indeed in many democracies—progressive forces have struggled to construct such a people. Their presence is often vibrant in student politics, gender activism, and issue-based mobilizations, but they have been unable to translate these energies into sustained electoral strength.
Dr. Kundu illustrated this point by referencing the case of Bernie Sanders in the United States. Sanders’ radical redistributive platform failed to secure the Democratic Party nomination twice, revealing a structural incompatibility between progressive redistribution and prevailing democratic politics. A similar gap exists in India, where progressive movements have not succeeded in transforming localized activism into a broad-based political subject capable of challenging Hindu nationalist hegemony.
Despite these challenges, Dr. Kundu identified signs of potential realignment in the 2024 Indian general election. He presented data from the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) showing that the Congress Party increased its share of Dalit and Adivasi votes in 2024, reversing some of the gains made by the BJP in 2014 and 2019. Specifically, the BJP won 29 Scheduled Caste-reserved seats in 2024, down from 46 in 2019, while the Congress rose from 6 to 20 seats in the same category. The Congress also increased its national vote share from 16.7% in 2019 to 20.8% in 2024. Dr. Kundu interpreted these shifts as evidence that appeals to redistribution and social justice can resonate with marginalized groups, forming the basis for a counter-populist political alliance.
In his concluding reflections, Dr. Kundu reiterated that challenging authoritarian populism requires constructing alliances among marginalized and dispossessed groups—economically, culturally, and politically. The brief resurgence of center-left discourse in 2024 offers some grounds for cautious optimism. However, he emphasized that a durable alternative must address both structural inequalities and the unconscious dimensions of political subjectivity. Authoritarian populism has reshaped the notion of the political subject beyond universal, rationalist language; understanding and engaging with unconscious drives may be essential to forging new forms of democratic politics.
Overall, Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s presentation offered a theoretically rich and contextually grounded analysis of populism’s rise in India. By integrating psychoanalytic theory, structural political economy, and empirical electoral data, he illuminated both the sources of right-wing populism’s appeal and the formidable challenges facing progressive alternatives.
Dr. Samuel Ngozi Agu: ‘We, the People’: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches
Street life and transportation in bustling, tropical Lagos, Nigeria. Photo: Dreamstime.
Due to unforeseen internet connectivity problems during the virtual panel, Dr. Samuel Ngozi Agu’s presentation could not be delivered live. Instead, this report provides a structured summary of his draft article titled “We, the People: Rethinking Governance through Bottom-Up Approaches,” capturing its key arguments, theoretical foundations, and policy recommendations.
The Crisis of Centralized Governance
Dr. Agu begins by interrogating the disjuncture between the ideals and practice of democracy. While democracy is often celebrated as governance “of the people, by the people, and for the people,” in practice, many democratic systems concentrate power at the center. This over-centralization alienates citizens from meaningful decision-making, erodes trust in institutions, and fuels social unrest.
Nigeria, his primary case study, exemplifies this paradox. After more than two decades of democratic rule, the country continues to struggle with corruption, inequality, and exclusionary governance structures. Mass movements such as #EndSARS, #OccupyNigeria, and #EndHardship reflect widespread frustration with a political system that privileges elite interests while sidelining the grassroots. These protests, Dr. Agu argues, are not isolated events but symptoms of a deeper crisis of representation.
To address this gap between citizens and the state, Dr. Agu proposes a shift toward bottom-up governance—an approach that places citizens and communities at the center of governance processes. By devolving decision-making authority, enhancing civic education, promoting community-based development, embracing digital democracy, and enacting inclusive legislative reforms, bottom-up governance can strengthen accountability, improve development outcomes, and restore democratic legitimacy.
Dr. Agu anchors his analysis in a combination of Participatory Governance Theory and Sustainable Development Theory, integrating insights from deliberative democracy and Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach. i) Participatory Governance Theory emphasizes that democracy requires more than periodic elections. Active citizen engagement in decision-making enhances legitimacy, trust, and policy effectiveness. Participation is not merely instrumental; it is constitutive of democracy itself, transforming citizens from passive recipients into co-producers of governance. ii) Sustainable Development Theory stresses that development is most durable when it is inclusive and participatory. Decisions that emerge from the grassroots better reflect local needs and ensure long-term stewardship of resources.
From this synthesis, Dr. Agu develops the Participation–Accountability–Development (PAD) Nexus, which posits that: Decentralization + Civic Engagement → Increased Participation → Strengthened Accountability → Improved Governance Outcomes → Sustainable Development.
This model links governance reforms directly to human flourishing, suggesting that bottom-up governance expands people’s capabilities to lead lives they value.
Bottom-Up Governance: Concept and Rationale
Dr. Agu defines bottom-up governance as a participatory system of administration in which power and authority originate from the grassroots rather than being imposed from above. In this model, citizens directly influence policy formation, implementation, and evaluation. Unlike the top-down model, which treats citizens as passive recipients of elite decisions, bottom-up governance positions them as active co-creators of development outcomes.
This approach reclaims the moral foundation of democracy by restoring to citizens both agency and authorship. It turns governance from “government for the people” into “government with the people,” fostering trust, curbing corruption, and ensuring that policies reflect real needs.
In the Nigerian context, persistent problems such as declining voter turnout, the rise of separatist agitations (e.g., IPOB, Niger Delta movements), and youth-led mobilizations highlight the urgent need for participatory governance rooted in local realities.
Linking Participatory Governance to Sustainable Development
Empirical evidence, Dr. Agu notes, shows a direct relationship between grassroots participation and improved governance outcomes. Nigeria’s Community Social Development Project (CSDP) provides a compelling example. Under this initiative, communities identify their priorities, plan projects, and oversee their implementation. The result has been more inclusive, transparent, and effective local development.
Globally, similar successes abound:
Brazil’s participatory budgeting has improved resource allocation and citizen trust.
Rwanda’s Vision 2020 leveraged community participation (via Umuganda and Imihigo) to drive development.
Uganda’s Local Government Act (1997) empowered rural councils to deliver essential services more efficiently.
These cases demonstrate that bottom-up governance enhances transparency, curbs corruption, and produces more sustainable development outcomes than centralized models.
Nigeria’s Governance Challenges and Social Movements
Dr. Agu situates Nigeria’s governance crisis within this framework. Despite democratic institutions, the country has failed to translate formal democracy into inclusive development. Voter turnout has plummeted from over 69% in 2003 to just 26.7% in 2023, reflecting widespread disillusionment with political elites.
Social movements have increasingly filled this participatory vacuum. #OccupyNigeria (2012) emerged in response to fuel subsidy removal; #EndSARS (2020) evolved from police brutality protests to broader demands for accountability; more recent protests highlight worsening economic hardship. Alongside these movements, separatist agitations and insurgencies reflect deep grievances over political exclusion and resource distribution.
For Dr. Agu, these developments underscore a structural failure of top-down governance. Without meaningful channels for citizen engagement, protests and unrest become the primary means of political expression.
Strategies for Implementing Bottom-Up Governance
Dr. Agu identifies five interlinked strategies to institutionalize participatory governance in Nigeria:
Decentralization: Strengthen local governance through constitutional reforms that devolve fiscal, administrative, and political powers to local authorities. Empower local governments with independent revenue sources and decision-making authority.
Civic Education: Integrate civic learning into educational curricula to cultivate active citizenship. Promote civil society–led public debates, town halls, and participatory forums to bridge citizen–state gaps.
Community-Based Development (CBD): Institutionalize CDD frameworks that prioritize local ownership, inclusivity, and accountability. Target marginalized groups (youth, women, people with disabilities) to ensure equitable participation.
Digital Democracy: Leverage technology for transparency and citizen engagement through participatory budgeting platforms, budget tracking tools, and open data initiatives. Invest in digital inclusion to ensure rural populations are not excluded.
Legislative Reforms: Enact laws mandating community representation in decision-making bodies. Strengthen anti-corruption frameworks and consider electoral reforms (e.g., proportional representation) to enhance inclusivity.
Reclaiming Democracy from Below
Dr. Agu concludes that achieving inclusive democracy and sustainable development in Nigeria requires a fundamental shift from elite-centered, top-down governance toward citizen-centered, bottom-up approaches.
Grassroots participation, underpinned by decentralization, civic education, community engagement, and digital innovation, can bridge the widening gap between state and society. This shift is not merely a policy alternative but a democratic imperative. By empowering citizens as co-authors of governance, Nigeria can foster political stability, social cohesion, and sustainable growth. Ultimately, as Dr. Agu emphasizes, the future of democracy depends on restoring the agency of “We, the People” and making governance a shared enterprise.
Dr. Mouli Bentman & Dr. Michael Dahan: ‘We, the People’: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal
Israelis protest in Tel Aviv, Israel on July 18, 2023, against Netanyahu’s anti-democratic coup as a bill to erase judicial ‘reasonableness clause’ is expected to pass despite 27,676 reservations. Photo: Avivi Aharon.
Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan delivered a jointly structured and intellectually rich presentation that explored how populist movements have appropriated the core language of democracy—particularly the notion of “the people”—to undermine liberal democratic institutions from within. Their central claim was both clear and unsettling: the rise of right-wing populism is not simply a matter of rhetorical manipulation but stems from deep-seated contradictions within liberal democracy itself. By tracing the intellectual genealogy of concepts like legitimacy and universality, and examining contemporary political developments in Israel, the speakers demonstrated how populists have weaponized democratic language to hollow out liberal democracy.
Dr. Bentman opened the presentation by focusing on the paradox at the heart of modern democracy. The phrase “We the People,” once celebrated as the most universal and inclusive expression of collective self-rule, has been turned upside down by populists. Rather than binding citizens across differences, it is now mobilized to divide society between an “authentic” people and its perceived enemies: corrupt elites, minorities, ideological adversaries, and liberal institutions. This shift, he argued, is not merely tactical—it reflects unresolved tensions within the liberal democratic project itself, particularly around questions of legitimacy, universality, and belonging.
To illustrate these tensions, Dr. Bentman offered a concise intellectual history. In the 17th and 18th centuries, debates over political legitimacy revolved around the source of authority. Conservatives grounded legitimacy in divine will, tradition, and natural hierarchy. Liberals, by contrast, rooted legitimacy in the individual—his rights, autonomy, and consent. Thinkers like John Locke argued that governments exist to protect natural rights—life, liberty, and property—while Jean-Jacques Rousseau located legitimacy in la volonté générale, the collective self-rule of the people. Out of this intellectual revolution emerged the liberal democratic order, promising universal rights and collective self-government.
Yet, as Dr. Bentman reminded the audience, critical thinkers from Karl Marx to Simone de Beauvoir exposed the limits of this liberal promise. Marx demonstrated how formal liberty meant little for the working class within a society structured by property and capital. Critical theorists such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno highlighted the dominance of instrumental reason. Postcolonial and feminist thinkers like Frantz Fanon and Beauvoir revealed how liberalism often coexisted with colonialism, patriarchy, and structural violence. By the mid-20th century, figures like Michel Foucault, Edward Said, and Judith Butler deepened the critique, showing how power was embedded not only in the state or capital but in knowledge systems, discourses, and identities themselves.
According to Dr. Bentman, these critiques were not intended to destroy liberal democracy but to deepen it—to expose hidden exclusions and move toward a more just and pluralistic order. However, they inadvertently opened a new political space. If universality had always been partial and exclusionary, could it ever truly include everyone? This unresolved question created an opening for the populist right. Traditionally defenders of hierarchy, the populist right seized upon liberalism’s self-critique, not to expand democracy but to hollow it out. By appropriating the language of postcolonialism, identity politics, and suspicion of elites, they reframed democratic institutions as tools of domination and presented themselves as the authentic voice of “the people.”
Dr. Bentman gave the example of American right-wing activist Charlie Kirk, who appropriated the language of decolonization to depict Christian Americans as the “colonized,” oppressed by secular liberal elites. Similarly, concepts like diversity are inverted to portray universities as discriminatory against conservatives, and the white middle class is recast as a marginalized group. This rhetorical reversal is emblematic of a broader global trend in which the tools of democratic critique are redeployed to legitimize exclusionary majoritarianism.
Dr. Michael Dahan then shifted the focus to Israel as a case study illustrating these dynamics with striking clarity. Ten years ago, Dr. Dahan noted, Israeli politics lacked clear populist parties. This has changed dramatically, particularly over the past two years. Today, two parties embody populist politics: Likud, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Strength) Party, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir, which espouses Jewish supremacism. Over two decades, the Israeli right has reframed liberal universalism as a mask for elite domination, elevating instead a narrow ethno-national identity of “the Jewish people” as the sole legitimate sovereign. Palestinians, Arab citizens, left-wing Israelis, and anyone not fully aligned with this project are cast outside the political community.
The events of October 7, 2023—when the state catastrophically failed to protect its citizens—might have been expected to trigger a profound legitimacy crisis. State security apparatuses, emergency services, and welfare systems all collapsed. Civil society—volunteers, NGOs, local authorities—filled the void, rescuing survivors and supporting displaced communities. Rather than acknowledging this, the government turned against these actors, accusing them of betrayal or complicity. Dr. Dahan interpreted this as a deliberate strategy: by delegitimizing alternative sources of solidarity, the state seeks to monopolize the definition of “the people.” This strategy demonstrates how populism not only survives institutional failure but actively feeds on it, having already replaced a universal civic “we” with an exclusionary ethno-national fiction.
Dr. Dahan then tied these developments to broader theoretical trends. Liberalism’s hold on universality has weakened. Critical theories that once sought to liberate have been hijacked. Foucault’s critique of power is misused to undermine expertise; Butler’s performativity is invoked to question democratic norms; postcolonial critiques justify nationalist withdrawal. Pluralism devolves into fragmentation, and fragmentation is weaponized to justify majoritarianism. Democracy is redefined not as a system of rights, deliberation, and checks, but as the unchecked rule of a self-defined majority.
In concluding, Dr. Bentman and Dr. Dahan argued that reclaiming universality is essential to countering these trends. Drawing on thinkers like John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Hannah Arendt, they underscored that universality is not sameness, but the institutionalization of diversity under shared rules of fairness. “We the people” must mean all of us—not because we are identical, but because we commit to living together under a shared civic framework. Achieving this requires three strategies: (1) building deliberative infrastructures—citizen assemblies and participatory forums—to integrate diverse voices; (2) protecting civil society organizations from delegitimization; and (3) reinforcing constitutional and judicial safeguards to prevent majoritarian overreach.
Their presentation offered a powerful synthesis of political theory and contemporary politics, revealing how liberal democracy’s own internal critiques have become tools for its destabilization—and suggesting pathways to reclaim democratic universality in an era of resurgent populism.
Discussant’s Feedback:Associate Professor Abdelaaziz El Bakkali
Volunteers of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) on Vijyadashmi festival, a large gathering or annual meeting during Ramanavami a Hindu festival in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh on October 19, 2018. Photo: Pradeep Gaurs.
In his role as discussant, Associate Professor Abdelaaziz El Bakkali offered an incisive and comprehensive reflection on the three presentations delivered during the panel. His intervention combined an overall thematic synthesis with targeted commentary on each presentation, situating the papers within broader scholarly debates on populism, democracy, and political participation.
Dr. El Bakkali highlighted that, taken together, the papers moved beyond superficial analyses of populist rhetoric to probe the philosophical, institutional, and psychological foundations that make the performance of “the people” both possible and potent. He noted a common thread: the mobilization of “the people” not as a pre-given democratic sovereign, but as a politically constructed entity, often instrumentalized by leaders who claim to act in the name of democracy while redefining its substance.
Turning to individual presentations, Dr. El Bakkali commended Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s examination of Hindu nationalism as a form of authoritarian populism in India. He observed that Dr. Kundu’s analysis effectively linked the rise of Hindutva populism to disillusionment with liberal democratic institutions, emphasizing the role of emotions and psychological factors in shaping populist subjectivities. Dr. Kundu’s argument that Hindutva is rooted less in formal political strategy than in emotional mobilization and cultural identity was, in Dr. El Bakkali’s view, compelling. However, he suggested several ways to sharpen the analysis:
First, the paper could focus more explicitly on emotion as a political technology—examining how populist leaders strategically use fear, pride, and resentment to define belonging and mobilize support. Second, incorporating empirical data, such as social media discourse or electoral mobilization, would ground the theoretical reflections more robustly. Third, linking the Indian case to global debates on post-truth politics and the psychology of populism could situate it within broader comparative frameworks, rather than treating it as a unique exception.
Despite these suggestions, Dr. El Bakkali described the presentation as “very interesting and rich,” highlighting its contribution to understanding the emotional and psychological underpinnings of contemporary populism.
Dr. El Bakkali then turned to Dr. Samuel Agu’s presentation, which he found both timely and significant, especially for the Global South. Dr. Agu’s argument centered on how top-down governance in Nigeria has produced alienation, corruption, and inequality, and how decentralization, civic education, community-based development, and digital democracy can offer participatory alternatives. While praising the clarity and relevance of the paper, Dr. El Bakkali cautioned against romanticizing grassroots governance as a moral corrective to elite domination. He noted that local participation can itself be entangled with control and clientelism, as local elites may capture power, reproduce inequalities, or create new patronage networks. He suggested that the paper address the risks of elite capture and local clientelism, drawing on evidence from Nigerian municipal politics to strengthen its critique.
He also posed two substantive questions: How can one distinguish between participatory democracy and populist mobilization, given that both claim to speak for “the people”? Why were Brazil and Uganda chosen as comparative cases, and how do their experiences differ from those of other Global South contexts?
Finally, Dr. El Bakkali discussed the paper by Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan, which he found theoretically rich and thought-provoking. He agreed with their argument that populism’s redefinition of “We the People” reflects a deep crisis within liberal democracy, where inclusive universalist ideals have been weaponized to draw exclusionary boundaries between “true” citizens and outsiders. He noted that their paper reveals how populist discourse cannibalizes the Enlightenment’s universalist vocabulary, converting inclusion into exclusion through subtle linguistic strategies. He suggested that this point could be elaborated further. Additionally, he encouraged the authors to integrate non-Western perspectives to avoid reproducing Eurocentric narratives and to expand their discussion on the role of civic education and institutions in reconstructing inclusive forms of belonging beyond ideological polarization.
He concluded with two broad, thought-provoking questions: How can we reclaim the notion of “the people” without reproducing the exclusionary binaries on which populism thrives? Has the concept of “the people” outlived its democratic usefulness?
In conclusion, Dr. El Bakkali praised all three presenters for their illuminating and multifaceted contributions, noting that their work enriched the scholarly conversation on populism, belonging, and democratic governance. His feedback was both analytical and constructive, offering theoretical reflections, methodological suggestions, and comparative perspectives to deepen and sharpen each paper’s contribution.
Discussant’s Feedback: Dr. Azize Sargın
Discussant Dr. Azize Sargın delivered thoughtful and analytically sharp feedback on the three presentations, combining conceptual engagement with practical questions that encouraged further development of each paper. She began by expressing her gratitude to the panel organizers and commended all presenters, highlighting in particular the efforts of the African presenter for ensuring that his research was represented despite technical difficulties. She emphasized that all scholars should have equal opportunities to present their work, framing this as a broader academic responsibility to support inclusive scholarly participation.
Dr. Sargın first turned to Dr. Samuel Agu’s paper, acknowledging that although the presentation itself could not be delivered due to technical issues, the abstract offered a compelling entry point for discussion. She found the argument for bottom-up governance—emphasizing decentralization, civic education, and digital democracy—particularly persuasive.
However, she raised several important conceptual and practical questions for the author to consider in further developing the paper. First, she asked for a clearer definition of “bottom-up governance”: whether it refers primarily to institutional decentralization, or whether it encompasses a broader social process of civic empowerment. This conceptual clarification, she argued, is crucial for understanding how such governance might function in practice.
Second, she commended Agu’s linkage between participatory governance and sustainable development, calling it a “powerful claim” that bottom-up governance can foster inclusivity, stability, and growth. However, she encouraged the author to demonstrate more concretely how these dynamics would work in practice, ideally through specific mechanisms, policy examples, or empirical evidence drawn from Nigeria or other comparative cases.
Third, she suggested that the author consider the challenges to implementing bottom-up governance in Nigeria, asking whether these are primarily political, structural, or related to civic capacity. By addressing these challenges, the paper could offer a more nuanced and grounded account of how bottom-up approaches might be operationalized in real-world governance systems.
Turning to Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s presentation, Dr. Sargın praised the paper for its ambition and depth, especially in examining the conceptual and emotional dimensions of authoritarian populism within India’s contemporary political landscape. She highlighted the paper’s strength in linking the rise of Hindu nationalism to both the failures of liberal democratic institutions and the psychological and emotional undercurrents of Indian society, situating the discussion within the broader global crisis of liberal democracy.
She then offered several constructive reflections. First, she encouraged the author to clarify how these complex theoretical ideas would be operationalized—both methodologically and empirically. She suggested that clearly articulating how the politics of emotion is examined in the Indian context would strengthen the analytical coherence of the paper. Second, she raised an important comparative question: whether Hindu nationalist populism should be understood as a variant of global populism or as a distinct phenomenon rooted in India’s post-colonial and religious context. Finally, she expressed curiosity about the alternatives to populism that the paper hinted at. She asked whether these alternatives in the Indian context might involve a revival of liberal institutions, a grassroots democratic project, or a more radical reimagining of politics. These questions, she noted, could deepen the paper’s contribution to debates on authoritarian populism and democratic renewal.
Dr. Sargın concluded with reflections on Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan’s paper, which she described as “very engaging and conceptually rich.” She highlighted the central argument that populism’s redefinition of “We the People” reflects not mere rhetorical manipulation but a deeper crisis within liberal democracy itself. This framing, she argued, is significant because it positions populism as a symptom rather than a distortion, prompting critical reflection on liberalism’s internal tensions.
She raised two key questions for the authors. First, does the crisis lie within liberalism’s theory of inclusion itself, or in how that theory has been institutionalized and practiced? Second, she asked whether their analysis is grounded in specific empirical contexts—such as particular populist movements in Western democracies—or whether it is meant as a globally applicable conceptual reflection. These questions, she suggested, could help clarify the scope and applicability of their arguments.
Dr. Sargın concluded by thanking all presenters for their contributions, noting that each paper tackled different dimensions of the panel’s central theme with intellectual rigor and originality. Her feedback was structured, probing, and constructive, encouraging the presenters to strengthen conceptual clarity, operationalize their claims empirically, and engage with broader theoretical debates.
Presenter’s Response: Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu
Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu delivered a thoughtful and philosophically grounded response to the comments and suggestions raised by the discussants. His reply offered both clarifications on theoretical positioning and elaborations on how his analysis engages with the emotional and structural dimensions of authoritarian populism in India, as well as reflections on alternative democratic imaginaries.
Dr. Kundu began by thanking Dr. El Bakkali for his constructive suggestions, emphasizing that they aligned closely with aspects he had already sought to highlight in his presentation. In particular, he welcomed the suggestion to further develop the analysis of emotion as a political technology—that is, the ways in which political leaders deploy pride, belonging, and resentment to shape collective identities and mobilize political support. This, he noted, was already a central thread of his argument, and he plans to strengthen this dimension further.
He also acknowledged the importance of incorporating empirical data, such as social media discourse and electoral mobilization strategies, to ground the theoretical reflections. In addition, he agreed that linking the Indian case more explicitly to global debates on post-truth politics and the psychology of populism would situate his work within broader comparative discussions, enhancing its analytical reach.
Responding to Dr. Sargın’s question on the operationalization of his theoretical framework, Dr. Kundu provided an extended explanation of how his work positions emotion within political theory. He observed that modern political philosophy has historically privileged reason over emotion, a hierarchy that can be traced back to Enlightenment thought and its liberal humanist legacy. Both liberalism and Marxism, he argued, have been shaped by this rationalist orientation—liberalism through its focus on institutional reason, and Marxism through its claim to be a “scientific” critique of capitalism.
Dr. Kundu explained that his project seeks to theorize emotion not as the opposite of reason but as an integral dimension of political subjectivity and mobilization. Drawing on Althusser’s post-Marxist intervention, he highlighted how Althusser linked ideology to the unconscious, thus opening a conceptual space where desire, fantasy, and affect become central to understanding political dynamics. By situating ideology within the unconscious, Althusser challenges the dominance of rationalist frameworks and reveals how structures of feeling shape political identification.
For Dr. Kundu, this perspective is essential for understanding the rise of Hindutva nationalism in India after 2014. Hindu nationalist movements, he argued, have strategically mobilized affective sentiments tied to religious identity, historical narratives, and collective grievances. Issues such as the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, the Uniform Civil Code, and the abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir tapped into deep-seated emotional reservoirs and historical resentments. Progressive parties, including the Indian National Congress, largely failed to address or mobilize these sentiments substantively, allowing Hindu nationalist forces to harness and redirect these affective energies for electoral gain.
By bringing psychoanalytic and structural perspectives into the analysis, Dr. Kundu aims to provide a richer theoretical account of how populist movements shape political subjectivities and construct “the people” through emotional infrastructures, rather than merely through rational discourse or institutional politics.
Addressing Dr. Sargın’s question regarding alternative democratic imaginaries, Dr. Kundu clarified that his notion of an “alternative people” refers to social groups and communities marginalized by existing structural logics—political, cultural, and social. In the Indian context, this primarily includes lower-caste communities, whose experiences of marginalization parallel those of racial minorities in other societies. He argued that any democratic reimagining must begin with these dispossessed groups, whose historical exclusion provides the basis for a more inclusive conception of “the people.”
Central to this reimagining is the principle of redistribution. Dr. Kundu stressed that redistribution should not be understood narrowly as land reform but as encompassing the redistribution of income, resources, and welfare benefits. He pointed to the 2024 general elections in India, where the Congress Party and opposition forces effectively mobilized redistributive politics to gain support among marginalized communities. He argued that reviving redistribution as a central political principle is essential for countering the affective and cultural narratives mobilized by populist movements, thereby addressing both material inequalities and symbolic exclusions.
Dr. Kundu concluded by reaffirming his commitment to integrating the discussants’ feedback into his ongoing research. He intends to deepen the empirical base, clarify conceptual frameworks, and further elaborate the normative and strategic implications of his work. His response underscored the theoretical ambition of situating emotional dynamics at the center of political analysis, while also engaging with the practical stakes of democratic politics in contemporary India.
Presenters’ Response: Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan
Protests against judicial reform and religious coercion in Israel. Photo: Dreamstime.
Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan offered a thoughtful and layered response to the feedback raised by the discussants on their joint presentation examining the populist subversion of the universalist ideal encapsulated in the phrase “We the People.” Their response addressed theoretical, methodological, and contextual questions, while also extending the discussion to the role of technology and the current crises of liberalism.
Dr. Bentman began by addressing Dr. El Bakkali’s observation that their paper relied primarily on European political theory, without engaging with non-European perspectives. He candidly acknowledged this as both a limitation and an opportunity. He noted that, as a scholar raised in a context that “pretends to be part of Europe while geographically located in Western Asia,” he had not developed expertise in non-European political philosophies. However, he agreed that integrating non-Western intellectual traditions could enrich the analysis, offering alternative conceptual vocabularies and historical experiences that may shed new light on populist transformations. He expressed genuine interest in pursuing this line of inquiry in future research, acknowledging the validity and importance of the comment.
Dr. Bentman then turned to the core theoretical question raised by both Dr. El Bakkali and Dr. Sargın: whether liberalism can be reconstituted to meet contemporary challenges, or whether it is in a terminal phase. Drawing a provocative historical analogy, he compared the current crisis of liberalism to the crisis of monarchy in the 16th and 17th centuries. Just as monarchies lost their legitimacy when they could no longer command the consent of their subjects, Dr. Bentman argued that liberalism today faces a legitimacy deficit. It struggles to convince citizens that its institutions and principles still offer a viable framework for collective life.
From his perspective, populism represents not an endpoint but a transitional phase, a political and ideological interregnum between the decline of liberalism as the hegemonic model and the emergence of whatever may replace it—whether a renewed form of liberalism or new authoritarian formations. He expressed doubts about whether liberalism can fully recover but left open the possibility of a “Liberalism 2.0,” contingent on liberal thought and institutions recognizing their limitations, reopening themselves to pluralism, and reclaiming political strength without ceding ground to populist forces.
Dr. Bentman pointed to contemporary political dynamics in Europe as illustrative. For example, in France, the collapse of centrist parties has led to unstable coalitions between radical right and left forces. Similar patterns, he observed, are visible across Europe, the United States, Israel, and India. These developments signal the erosion of liberalism’s institutional backbone—a challenge that demands both theoretical innovation and political reorganization.
Methodologically, Dr. Bentman emphasized that their project seeks to bridge political theory with empirical analysis, especially data on trust and legitimacy in democratic institutions. This dual approach is designed to ensure that the philosophical arguments remain grounded in political realities.
Dr. Michael Dahan supplemented Dr. Bentman’s remarks by addressing Dr. El Bakkali’s point on technology. Drawing on his background in technology and internet studies, Dr. Dahan clarified that the role of digital media in their analysis is not deterministic but catalytic. He described technology as functioning like a “chemical catalyst” in political processes—amplifying and accelerating underlying social and political dynamics rather than creating them outright.
In particular, new media platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram play a critical role in disseminating populist rhetoric, often more so than visible public platforms like Twitter or Facebook. Their encrypted, closed-network nature makes them harder to monitor and analyze, but their role in embedding populist narratives in everyday communication is substantial. Dr. Dahan underscored that understanding these dynamics is crucial for any analysis of contemporary populist movements.
Dr. Dahan then turned to what he described as the “elephant in the room”: the mobilization of Jewish supremacist rhetoric and historical imaginaries in Israel. He argued that framing the October 7th attacks as a “second Holocaust” played a decisive role in enabling populist rhetoric to feed and justify acts of mass violence, including widespread participation in the war on Gaza. This, he suggested, illustrates how populist discourses can appropriate historical traumas and collective identities to mobilize support for exclusionary and violent political projects.
The presenters’ reply demonstrated an openness to critical feedback and a willingness to expand their analytical framework. They acknowledged gaps (particularly regarding non-European perspectives), clarified their theoretical stance on the crisis of liberalism, and highlighted the catalytic role of technology and identity narratives in contemporary populist politics. Their response situated their work at the intersection of political theory, empirical analysis, and contemporary political developments, reinforcing the paper’s relevance to ongoing debates about populism, democracy, and liberalism’s future.
Q&A Session
The Q&A session opened with a conceptually rich question from Dr. Bülent Keneş, directed to Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan, which probed the historical and normative tension between pluralism, polarization, and national unity. Referring to the presentation’s guiding motto—“People — Once united, now divided”—Dr. Keneş observed that calls for a “united people” often carry nostalgic undertones, yet history reveals that such unity has frequently been mobilized by fascist and authoritarian movements to suppress pluralism in the name of a singular, homogenous “people.” His question centered on three key points: How should we interpret the contemporary tension between pluralism, which sustains democratic contestation, and polarization, which turns difference into entrenched enmity? To what extent does the longing for a “united people” risk reviving homogenizing impulses that undermine liberal democratic pluralism? What might constitute the optimal balance between pluralism, polarization, and unity in a healthy democracy?
Dr. Dahan began by reflecting on the constructed nature of “the people,” drawing on political theory and comparative examples. He emphasized that “the people” is always imagined—whether as an ethno-national entity or as a pluralist civic collective. Nations, from Czechs to Turks to Serbs, are imagined communities, and the content of this imagination determines whether “the people” is inclusive or exclusionary.
If this imagined construct is filled with pluralist values and a multifaceted vision, democratic contestation can thrive without descending into authoritarianism. However, if the construct is defined in ethno-nationalist terms, history shows that societies eventually devolve toward exclusionary or authoritarian structures. This, he cautioned, is a “very dangerous slope” that has been observed across historical and contemporary contexts.
Dr. Dahan illustrated this tension through American historical imaginaries of “We, the People.” While the ideal was articulated as multifaceted and inclusive, its realization has always been contingent on institutional arrangements. He underscored that the key to achieving pluralist unity lies in building and maintaining institutions that can embody this inclusive vision and in ensuring that public trust in these institutions remains strong.
He cited Canada’s constitutional framework as a partial example of this attempt. Through a multicultural constitutional vision, Canada sought to establish an institutional basis for inclusive belonging. While not perfect—racism and nationalist sentiments persist—Canada demonstrates that institutional design matters in mediating between pluralism and unity.
Importantly, Dr. Dahan noted that political culture and historical trajectories shape how these tensions play out. Countries in Eastern Europe, for example, followed different democratic transitions depending on their political histories, demonstrating that no universal template exists. Any attempt to balance pluralism and unity must therefore take local political cultures seriously.
He concluded by invoking his own hybrid identity as a Moroccan Jew with an American accent to illustrate how multifaceted identities complicate ethno-national definitions of “the people” and point toward the need for inclusive imaginaries in diverse societies.
Dr. Bentman expanded on these themes by examining the conceptual duality of “we” in political thought. He argued that both liberalism and fascism mobilize “we,” but in fundamentally different ways. In liberal thought, “we” refers to individuals choosing to live together, either literally or metaphorically, under shared civic rules. In fascist and authoritarian conceptions, “we” refers to an organic national or racial body, something that transcends voluntary association and instead invokes essentialized cultural or racial unity.
Dr. Bentman observed that the founding liberal “we”—as in the American constitutional moment—was itself exclusive, excluding Black people, women, and many minorities. Over time, liberalism expanded the circle of inclusion. However, he argued that inclusion alone proved insufficient. Inviting marginalized groups into a structure designed for a dominant cultural model revealed deeper structural limitations. As societies became more plural, structural and cultural incompatibilities surfaced, contributing to today’s democratic crises.
He noted that contemporary right-wing actors are not necessarily openly fascist, but they appropriate liberal language—individualism, democracy, rights—strategically, blending it with exclusionary identity politics. This hybrid rhetoric allows them to appeal to citizens without explicitly disavowing democratic norms, making their challenge more insidious.
Dr. Bentman drew historical analogies to moments of deep political transformation, such as the 17th-century crisis of monarchy, when political theory (Hobbes, Locke) and institutional innovation (constitutional monarchy) developed in tandem. By contrast, today, he argued, there is a disconnect between political theory and political practice: political scientists and philosophers have not yet articulated a compelling new framework to address the current crisis, while the radical right has developed a coherent and widely disseminated intellectual infrastructure—often outside traditional academia—that is effectively reshaping political imaginaries.
Dr. Bentman concluded by stressing that liberal democracies face a conceptual and political struggle to articulate a renewed vision of pluralist unity. Without such a vision, the political ground may increasingly be ceded to exclusionary movements.
Dr. Azize Sargın raised an incisive theoretical question regarding the concept of the “revolutionary subject” in Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s presentation on authoritarian populism in India. Specifically, she asked whether the meaning and role of the revolutionary subject differ across contexts, such as between India and Western Europe, and how this concept might be contextually adapted in different socio-political settings.
In his response, Dr. Kundu affirmed that the notion of the “revolutionary subject” is deeply contextual and contingent upon local socio-political cultures. Drawing on the Indian case, he argued that the revolutionary subject comprises the dispossessed and marginalized communities—including Dalits, Adivasis, minorities, women, and other groups excluded from the country’s dominant economic and political narratives. These groups, he explained, are structurally positioned outside the logic of capital and have been systematically marginalized from India’s celebrated “growth story.”
Dr. Kundu emphasized that progressive political forces must engage with these groups if they wish to effectively counter the rise of right-wing populism. He argued that while right-wing populist movements possess strong cultural and nationalist narratives, they lack a coherent economic theory. This absence makes them vulnerable when confronted with structural questions of inequality. For Dr. Kundu, “redistribution” represents the key political discourse capable of challenging the entrenched structures—whether they be economic systems, caste hierarchies, patriarchal relations, or racial discrimination—that sustain inequality.
By centering redistribution, progressive movements can articulate a vision of economic and social justice that mobilizes marginalized groups as active political agents. Dr. Kundu concluded by agreeing with Dr. Sargın’s premise: the definition and composition of the revolutionary subject will vary across different contexts—shaped by specific historical, social, and political circumstances in each society.
Concluding Remarks by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni
Professor Oscar Mazzoleni closed the session with a set of thoughtful reflections that synthesized the key themes of the day’s discussion. He identified two central issues that framed the debate: 1) The hijacking of “the people” by populist movements, particularly those on the right and of an authoritarian character, which often deploy a top-down vision to construct an exclusionary notion of belonging. 2) The democratic responses from below, emphasizing bottom-up strategies, the role of civil society, the defense of pluralism and individual rights, and the promotion of an inclusionary political vision.
Prof. Mazzoleni highlighted the dual nature of populism as both a strategic political project—seeking to mobilize identity and belonging—and a symptom of deeper structural crises within liberal democracies. To understand the global success of populist movements, he argued, it is crucial to analyze three interrelated dimensions:
Rule of Law: Populist movements exploit weaknesses and contradictions within democratic legal systems. While the rule of law embodies universal principles such as pluralism and respect for others, its local variations and inconsistent application create vulnerabilities that populists capitalize on.
Territory and Borders: Questions of belonging are inseparable from territorial and border politics. Defining “who belongs” involves not only political conflict but also emotional dynamics and, in some contexts, war. Borders shape identities and collective imaginaries, becoming a key arena for populist mobilization.
Globalization and Neoliberalism: The neoliberal transformation has not merely reduced the role of the state but has reshaped cultural attitudes, placing competition—both between individuals and between nations—at the core of social relations. This has produced new uncertainties and a heightened desire for belonging, which right-wing populists have adeptly exploited.
According to Prof. Mazzoleni, populist movements thrive by tapping into these tensions, positioning “the people” against democracy, the rule of law, and pluralistic communities. Polarization and hate have emerged as dominant political emotions, deepening democratic fractures. While acknowledging the gravity of these challenges, Prof. Mazzoleni concluded with a measured pessimism: understanding these dynamics clearly is a necessary starting point for rebuilding hope and formulating effective democratic responses in the future.
Overall Conclusion
The fourth session of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a rich and multi-layered examination of how “the people” is constructed, mobilized, and contested across diverse political contexts. Bringing together perspectives from Nigeria, India and Israel, the session illuminated the dual role of “the people” as both a democratic resource and a political instrument leveraged to legitimize exclusionary projects. Throughout the discussions, three interrelated themes emerged.
First, the conceptual construction of “the people” remains central to both democratic renewal and authoritarian subversion. As shown in the presentations, populist actors strategically deploy affective, cultural, and institutional mechanisms to redefine “the people” in exclusionary ways, often by appropriating liberal democratic language itself.
Second, structural dynamics—legal, territorial, and economic—shape the political uses of “the people.” Populist movements thrive where the rule of law is inconsistently applied, where borders and belonging are contested, and where neoliberal globalization has generated competition, insecurity, and a search for identity. These structural tensions are not peripheral but fundamental to understanding contemporary populism.
Third, the responses to populist constructions of “the people” must engage both top-down and bottom-up dynamics. While populism often advances through centralized, leader-driven narratives, democratic resilience depends on revitalizing participatory governance, reinforcing pluralist institutions, and fostering inclusive imaginaries that bridge rather than deepen divisions.
The interplay of theoretical reflections, empirical insights, and comparative perspectives generated a vibrant interdisciplinary dialogue. Presenters offered innovative analyses of participatory governance, psychoanalytic approaches to populism, and the subversion of universalist ideals. Discussants sharpened these contributions through methodological and conceptual critiques, while the Q&A underscored the urgency of rethinking pluralism, polarization, and unity in fractured democracies.
As Professor Oscar Mazzoleni emphasized in his concluding remarks, understanding populism as both a strategic project and a symptom of structural crises is essential for formulating effective democratic responses. This session thus laid a strong foundation for continued interdisciplinary engagement on how “the people” is performed and politicized in the 21st century.
In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Bruce E. Cain—Professor of Political Science at Stanford University—analyzes how Donald Trump has reshaped the Republican Party and advanced classical authoritarian strategies. “There’s no question that, whether by instinct or by deliberate strategy, Trump is playing the classical authoritarian game,” Professor Cain asserts. He situates Trumpism within long-term demographic, institutional, and ideological shifts while underscoring Trump’s unique use of crisis narratives, bullying tactics, and federal coercion. Professor Cain also warns that Trumpism has exploited structural weaknesses in party regulation, executive power, and campaign finance, stressing the urgency of reinforcing democratic guardrails to prevent lasting authoritarian consolidation.
In a wide-ranging and incisive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Bruce E. Cain—Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Director of the Bill Lane Center for the American West—offers a penetrating analysis of how Donald Trump’s leadership has reshaped the Republican Party and pushed American politics toward classical authoritarian strategies. “There’s no question that, whether by instinct or by deliberate strategy, Trump is playing the classical authoritarian game,” Professor Cain observes. “There’s no doubt that’s what he’s trying to do. It suits the way he has run his companies, and it suits the kinds of leaders he admires in other countries. He’s essentially following in their footsteps.”
Professor Cain situates Trumpism within broader structural transformations of American politics, emphasizing long-term demographic, geographic, and institutional shifts that made Trump’s rise possible. He points to “social sorting” and “party sorting” since the 1960s, along with growing racial diversity and economic inequality, as crucial background conditions. These shifts, he argues, preceded Trump and “made his rise possible,” even as his “adroit use of social media” and personal brand amplified their impact.
Central to Professor Cain’s analysis is Trump’s deliberate exploitation of crisis narratives and authoritarian tactics. Reflecting on Trump’s response to crises such as the Charlie Kirk assassination, Professor Cain notes that “Trump is playing the classical authoritarian game” and has escalated his reliance on bullying tactics compared to his first term. He highlights Trump’s willingness to deploy federal forces in Democratic-run cities, calling it “very disturbing and very unusual,” and likens it to the EU sending troops into member states to enforce policy—an action that violates deeply held American principles of state sovereignty.
Professor Cain also examines the evolving coalition underpinning the contemporary Republican Party. He underscores the critical role of the MAGA base, describing it as “maybe, at best, 40%, but more likely 30% of the Republican Party’s support,” driven in part by cultural grievance politics and white nationalist narratives. Yet, he stresses the uneasy alliance between this base and more traditional Republicans, warning of internal tensions that could shape future elections.
Institutionally, Professor Cain warns that Trumpism has both exploited and accelerated structural weaknesses in the American political system—from the weakening of party authority and campaign finance regulation to the expansion of executive power. He cautions that if the Supreme Court legitimizes Trump’s expansive claims of emergency powers and unilateral action, “it’ll be monkey see, monkey do,” with Democrats following suit—leading to instability and democratic erosion.
Professor Cain concludes by emphasizing the urgency of shoring up democratic guardrails, particularly regarding executive power, emergency provisions, and the role of the courts. His analysis offers a sobering reminder that while Trump may be unique, the authoritarian strategies he has deployed are embedded within deeper institutional vulnerabilities that will persist beyond his presidency.
Bruce E. Cain is a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Director of the Bill Lane Center for the American West.
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Bruce Cain, revised for clarity and flow.
How Demography and Party Sorting Paved the Way for Trump
Professor Cain, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Many scholars locate the transformation of the American Right within long-term structural changes dating back to the 1970s—such as realignments in race, region, and party organization—while others highlight the Trump and MAGA era as a moment of acute disruption. How do you conceptually distinguish between these deeper ideological and institutional evolutions and the more contingent, charismatic, and stylistic ruptures introduced by Trump?
Professor Bruce Cain: This is a really important point that you’re making. Because Trump sucks all the oxygen out of the conversation, people tend to think that everything has to do with Trump himself—his personality and his adroit use of social media. But it’s crucial to emphasize that there were larger demographic and political trends behind Trumpism.
Because the list is very long, I’ll focus on a couple that are particularly important. One is what we call social sorting. America is a very mobile society, and because of this mobility, many states—as well as rural and urban areas—have come to reflect the partisan makeup of different parties. We now have heavily Democratic urban areas and heavily Republican rural areas. This is partly enabled by the fact that people tend to move into neighborhoods with others who are like themselves. As a result, you get social sorting that reinforces what happens online, where people similarly find their way into virtual communities that mirror their own demographics.
The second is party sorting, as we describe it in political science. Party coalitions underwent a sorting process beginning in the 1960s and 1970s with the signing of civil rights legislation. From that period forward, the Democratic Party—which had been a coalition of liberal elites in blue areas and, if you like, very conservative, racially conservative Southern Democrats—broke apart. Essentially, the social conservatives, and racial conservatives in particular, moved to the Republican Party, while liberal Republicans shifted to the Democratic Party.
As a result, the parties—rather than remaining more heterogeneous and containing internal breaks within their coalitional structures—became more ideologically consistent along lines of social and political liberalism versus conservatism.
Then there are factors outside the political process per se, though they are partly the result of policies we passed. One is the incredible rise in inequality, largely based on education, as the American economy became increasingly service-oriented and high-tech. Another is the change in immigration policies during the Civil Rights era, which opened the country to groups from all over the world and increased the racial diversity of the United States. That trend continues, partly because once immigrant groups arrive, they tend to have higher birth rates; even if immigration were to be curtailed, diversity would still grow.
Finally, there are the residual racial tensions from the earlier period, particularly around African Americans and, to some extent, Latinos. So yes, Trump made things worse—but crucially, there were demographic and political trends that preceded him and made his rise possible.
Grievance Politics and the New Republican Base
The contemporary Republican coalition increasingly rests on rural, white, non-college-educated constituencies mobilized through identity-based appeals rather than policy commitments. How has this demographic and geographic consolidation reshaped the movement’s ideological core, and to what extent has the strategic shift toward cultural grievance politics weakened traditional party mediation and fostered extra-institutional ecosystems like the alt-right and online mobilization networks?
Professor Bruce Cain: Yes, and again, this is another one of these underlying trends that really is so critical. I’m an old man, and when I was growing up, there was more of a working-class versus non-working-class managerial divide in American politics. Today, it’s much more college-educated versus not college-educated. The problem for the Democratic Party is that, while there are a large number of college-educated people in the United States, the percent of people who’ve graduated from college is about 37%, and those who do not have a college education make up about 60%.
What that means is that, as we moved away from manufacturing, particularly in the middle of the country, we were taking a whole bunch of jobs—union jobs and well-paying non-white-collar jobs—and giving them over to other countries. Our free trade policies were undermining not only the economic basis of the middle of the country but also that of blue-collar workers throughout the United States.
I believe one element of this is just the anger about downward social mobility on the part of people who do not have a university education. But you also mentioned, and I think it’s right to say, that there’s been a shift in terms of cultural grievance. Part of it is that, along with the economic downward mobility, comes social and political loss of power and loss of status, and that certainly contributes to the grievance that you’re talking about.
But there was also the fact that the court got way out ahead on abortion policy and took it away from the states, nationalizing a policy I tend to agree with, but nonetheless, many Catholics and many fundamentalist Protestant groups don’t agree with, which is the right to abortion. Abortion really played a major role, on top of the racial divisions, in creating a divide between the Democratic and Republican Party.
So, yes, absolutely, I think grievance politics is now a very important part of what we’re talking about here.
Typical cold winter scene in the Rust Belt city of Cleveland, Ohio, with a steel mill in the background. Photo: Dreamstime.
Harnessing Crises for Authoritarian Ends
Trump’s response to events such as the Charlie Kirk assassination reveals how crises can be harnessed to justify extraordinary measures. How would you situate Trump’s use of crisis narratives within classical authoritarian playbooks—such as “Reichstag fire” strategies—and do you see this as a deliberate authoritarian project or an improvisational charismatic populism that nonetheless has authoritarian consequences?
Professor Bruce Cain: That involves psychoanalyzing Mr. Trump, which unfortunately I can’t do. I think some of it is absolutely a deliberate strategy, but some of it is simply that this is not a man who controls his emotions very well. And perhaps, if he follows the path of his father into dementia, we may see more of this kind of emotional rollercoaster, because that’s one of the features of dementia. So, believe me, we’re worried about that in the United States.
There’s no question that, whether by instinct or by deliberate strategy, Trump is playing the classical authoritarian game. There’s no doubt that’s what he’s trying to do. It suits the way he has run his companies, and it suits the kinds of leaders he admires in other countries. He’s essentially following in their footsteps.
But I will say this: so far, he is tracking other presidents—the three presidential administrations, including Trump One—in terms of his popularity with the public. His numbers have been dropping; he’s now at about 41% favorability, which is where he was during Trump One, when he suffered a major setback in the by-election that followed his 2016 victory.
There are also many more courts now, particularly below the Supreme Court level, that are blocking his attempts to implement authoritarian measures, whether involving the use of troops or emergency clauses. Admittedly, we still have to wait for the Supreme Court to weigh in on these matters, but it seems the Court is waiting to hear from many of the district and appellate courts. If I were the Trump administration, I would suspect he’s going to lose a fair number of these cases.
Then, of course, the press corps are increasingly angry with him. Most recently, when the Defense Department tried to get journalists to sign pledges not to use leaked information, virtually the entire press—including the right-wing press—rejected the move.
So, yes, there’s no question that he wants to play the authoritarian playbook. The question is whether that’s actually possible in the United States, even in these very divided times.
Trump’s Legacy and the Institutionalization of MAGA
Do you view the MAGA movement as populism evolving toward a stable authoritarian formation, potentially institutionalized through mechanisms like Project 2025, or as a personalist phenomenon tied to Trump’s leadership that may dissipate with his exit? What institutional or cultural legacies do you expect to persist beyond his tenure?
Professor Bruce Cain: Again, it’s a mix. You can’t take Trump out of the equation. His ability to use social media, the fact that he is a self-financed candidate who was able to launch his campaign with his own money, and his status as a TV star on a show that portrayed him as a strong business leader—even if we think that image was fake—all of these factors mattered. It’s not clear that anyone else could have brought all those elements together, so there is a unique dimension to Trump in that regard.
But the reality is that there was a base composed of people who were unhappy about many of the social issues we’ve been discussing and people who were experiencing downward mobility. There was always the potential to mobilize this base, which we now call the Make America Great Again base, or MAGA base. That base is a critical part of the equation, and it likely won’t disappear, even if Trump decides not to contest the next presidential election because he believes he can run a third time. The Constitution says no. But the MAGA base will remain, no matter what happens to Trump.
Another issue we face is the extremely close contestation between the two parties. Many of our most stable periods have occurred when one party held clear dominance. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was the Democratic Party; during the Reagan years, it was the Republican Party. Today, neither party has a firm grip, which means we’re likely to see a lot of back-and-forth, closely contested elections. This dynamic creates opportunities for mischief, as both sides try to extract tactical and strategic advantages from the system.
So yes, much of this will endure even after Trump moves on. But Trump brings a unique element to the equation—one that I don’t see anyone else in the Republican Party being able to duplicate.
Militarizing Politics: A Break with American Norms
46th US Presidential Inauguration in Washington, D.C. — Held on January 20, 2021, under heightened security following the January 6 insurrection. Public access was restricted, and 25,000 National Guard troops were deployed around the US Capitol. Photo: Dreamstime.
Trump’s willingness to deploy more National Guard in major Democratic-run cities raises questions about federal coercion, politicization of armed forces, and the subversion of local democratic autonomy. How might such measures operate within an authoritarian power-consolidation strategy, particularly in delegitimizing urban, racially diverse political centers framed as “internal enemies”?
Professor Bruce Cain: We’re worried about that. There’s no question that what’s different about Trump is his attempt to incite division rather than suppress or mediate it, along with his use of extra-controversial methods—going around the rules in dubious ways—and waiting for the courts to slap his hand. The courts, of course, are very deliberate; they will examine these matters carefully before making decisions that will shape the future.
This is what’s troubling. Compared to Trump One, there is much more bullying. There was always a bullying element in Trump One, but he has really taken that a step further. He’s now extending it into the states, which is a major violation of American political norms. It would be the equivalent of the EU entering Spain, France, and other European countries and deploying military forces to enforce EU policies.
In the United States, we believe that states have sovereign powers over areas such as education, policing, fire services, and other local affairs. For Trump to coerce at that level is both disturbing and highly unusual. I believe it will ultimately be struck down by the courts, but it will take time before these issues are fully litigated.
DEI Backlash and the Toleration of Extremism
“White replacement” and “white genocide” conspiracies have become central to far-right mobilization. How integral are these narratives to sustaining the contemporary Republican coalition, and how do they interact with institutional party strategies versus grassroots extremist currents?
Professor Bruce Cain: For the MAGA base, these narratives are absolutely essential. The MAGA base constitutes, at best, around 40%, but more likely closer to 30% of the Republican Party’s support. I don’t believe that the white replacement and white genocide conspiracies are significantly influencing traditional Republicans. What may resonate with them, however, is concern over what they perceive as overly zealous efforts to implement Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives. But that doesn’t mean they’ve embraced white nationalism.
The Republican Party should be seen as a coalition between those who believe in the white nationalist agenda that Trump is promoting and traditional Republicans who supported him for tax cuts and regulatory relief. Many in the latter group were willing to tolerate the former, using perceived DEI overreach as a justification for accommodating the white nationalist wing of the party.
As a result, these groups exist in an uneasy coalition within the Republican Party. However, I don’t believe the party as a whole is fully aligned with the MAGA agenda on this issue.
The Secular Strongman of a Sacred Cause
A Trump flag waves at a pier on Coden Beach in Coden, Alabama, on June 9, 2024. The flag bears the slogan, “Jesus is my Savior. Trump is my President.” Photo: Carmen K. Sisson.
The intensified fusion of evangelical Christianity and Republican politics under Trump has transformed the political theology of the Right. How has this religious alignment shaped authoritarian tendencies, policy radicalization, and the sacralization of political conflict?
Professor Bruce Cain: The secular–religious divide in America has deepened over the lifetime of many of us. Those of us who were boomers and grew up in the 1960s and 1970s remember a time when the Democratic Party, under Carter, for example, had an evangelical wing. The abortion issue and subsequent legal decisions created a separation, and George Bush Jr. then brought more evangelicals over to the Republican side.
Trump is not a religious man. He pretends to be, but I don’t think anyone seriously believes he is a pious human being. It is striking that perhaps one of the most secular and morally compromised figures imaginable has become the leader of the religious right. But they view him much like someone views their divorce lawyer: they don’t care about the lawyer’s personal morality as long as they get the divorce.
Trump functions in the same way. They know he’s not a decent person, but they appreciate that he stands up for them, and they overlook the fact that he is anything but a religious man himself.
Strategic Ambiguity on White Nationalism
Republican elites have alternated between embracing and distancing themselves from alt-right and white supremacist movements. How should we interpret this oscillation—tactical ambiguity, strategic co-optation, or deeper ideological convergence?
Professor Bruce Cain: I don’t think it’s completely resolved how far they’re willing to go with this sort of white nationalism. I know too many educated Republicans who don’t share that perspective. For example, at Stanford, one of the most powerful people on campus is the head of the Hoover Institute, Condoleezza “Condi” Rice, an African-American woman who is widely respected. She certainly doesn’t tolerate white supremacist beliefs.
So, it’s an uneasy alliance, and as I mentioned before, it’s justified for the time being because there’s a belief that Democrats went a little too far in promoting diversity, equity, and inclusion measures, and that affirmative action went too far as well—leading some to feel that fairness has been denied in the present to redress past injustices.
There’s a clear distinction between Republican skepticism about DEI and outright supremacist thinking. It’s really a small part of the base that genuinely holds those extremist views. This makes for an uneasy coalition, which could become problematic at some point in the future—perhaps as soon as the next presidential election.
The Activist–Billionaire Nexus in GOP Politics
nti-Trump protest during the Labor Day Parade in New York City on September 6, 2025. Demonstrators gathered on Fifth Avenue across from Trump Tower during the annual parade in Midtown Manhattan. Photo: Dreamstime.
Drawing on your work on party autonomy, how has Trumpism altered the internal structure and strategic independence of the Republican Party? Has it hollowed out institutional authority or merely displaced it toward charismatic leadership and movement actors, especially within a nomination system that was reformed to democratize candidate selection but arguably enabled populist capture?
Professor Bruce Cain: There’s definitely, again, an element that is peculiar to Trump and his very strong bullying methods. That’s enabled him to capture the party. But if we step back, we see that there are longer-term trends that made it possible for him to do this. Right at the top of the list is social media. Social media, as we’ve seen, has become a powerful tool for bullying—everything from doxing to the ability to publicly shame people to mobilizing crowds instantaneously. All of these dynamics have made bullying and intimidation much stronger, not only in politics but also in the lives of our children and in our communities. Trump was definitely a beneficiary of that.
But there were also things we did through political reform that weakened parts of the party. In America, we think of the party as having three components: the party in office, namely the partisanship of the officeholders; the party in the bureaucracy, which consists of the people in the Republican National Committee (RNC), the Democratic National Committee (DNC), and the 50 state parties—those who run the machinery of the party; and finally, the activists.
To make a long, complicated story short, political reforms have strengthened the activists, who are by far the most ideological component of the electorate, while weakening the power of officeholders. Congress is now so afraid of party primaries because primaries do not attract all voters; they attract only the most partisan, activist ones. As a result, the control activists have over the primaries skews both parties to either the left or the right.
Another key factor is that the Supreme Court has allowed wealthy individuals to spend as much money as they want, creating almost limitless self-financing. This helped Trump significantly, as he was able to use his own money to catapult himself into the primaries. There is now far more independent spending, which essentially dwarfs the money given directly to candidates. We are awash in ideological and interest group money, and our inability to control campaign finance has unquestionably helped Trump and made the situation much worse.
Emergency Powers and Democratic Stability
The rise of executive-centered partisanship has weakened Congress and elevated the presidency as the primary partisan engine. Do you see this imbalance as reversible through institutional reform, or has it become structurally entrenched within the constitutional order?
Professor Bruce Cain: We’ll know a lot more about the answer to this question over the next year, as the Supreme Court will have to decide how far emergency powers can be used—the use of emergency powers to suspend normal processes, the use of impoundment activities (i.e., deciding upon entering office not to spend the money allocated by the previous Congress), and how much authority the president has to remove people in the bureaucracy who are nonpartisan rather than political appointees. In other words, how much of the Progressive Era reforms designed to create a nonpartisan bureaucracy can be undone.
If the Court condones these actions, it will be a case of monkey see, monkey do, because the Democrats will take whatever powers are given to the president to politicize everything, use emergency powers, and undo everything that Trump is doing. The Democrats will do the same thing, which means there will be far more instability in American positions vis-à-vis Europe, trade, and climate change. Essentially, the system will become much more schizophrenic and variable, and I believe this will ultimately undermine capitalism, investment, and infrastructure. Whether we are headed in that direction—and whether it becomes permanent—will be decided by the Supreme Court over the next year or two.
Money as Speech—and as a Tool of Power
Image of a pile of dollars currency and text of Trump Effect, symbolizing Trump Effect in American economy. Photo: Paulus Rusyanto.
In your work on “dependence corruption,” you highlighted how financial flows shape representation. How do emerging funding ecosystems—around MAGA media, Christian nationalist donors, tech billionaires, and PACs—challenge existing regulatory frameworks and deepen authoritarian tendencies within the movement?
Professor Bruce Cain: I do believe that America, because it has a very liberal interpretation of the First Amendment—i.e., because we believe that money is speech and that we can only restrict it under the narrowest purposes, namely to prevent quid pro quo corruption, meaning money that’s given directly to a candidate—has opened up the floodgates to a lot of money. That can still work if the money is balanced on both sides, and on many issues, that’s true. But what we’re seeing, for example, with digital currencies is that Trump has brought in lots of billionaires—tech billionaires—who want to create meme coins and invest in large server farms to generate value for digital currency.
All of these developments are tied not only to corruption stemming from campaign contributions but also to Trump himself cutting deals, investing in currency, and then making policy that favors those investments. We’re seeing in America now a level of corruption that we didn’t think was possible after the reforms of the 1970s. It’s approaching the levels of the 19th century, with people getting into office or power and then using it to make themselves richer. This is a major concern, and many of us in the legal and political science communities will be thinking seriously about how to strengthen the system against it.
Reinforcing Democratic Guardrails
Lastly, given these structural, ideological, and institutional transformations, what democratic guardrails or institutional reforms do you view as most urgent to counteract potential authoritarian consolidation on the American Right? Are there specific vulnerabilities—such as in party regulation, executive power, or information ecosystems—that should be prioritized?
Professor Bruce Cain: I would say that many people in my world of political reform are going to try to restore some of the institutions we once had, like the filibuster—i.e., supermajority votes that aim to create bipartisanship. They’re going to try to bring that back, but I think this runs up against the underlying political culture in America right now. Where the Court really needs to draw the line to save American democracy is on executive actions—specifically, the degree to which the President can act unilaterally by imaginatively reinterpreting existing legislation and issuing executive actions.
Secondly, emergency provisions. If everything is an emergency, then nothing is a democracy. That’s essentially where we’re headed if we’re not careful, because political parties can pretty much declare anything an emergency—whether it’s somebody being attacked in a city, an immigration issue, or economic downturns. If everything qualifies as an emergency, democratic norms erode. That is a major vulnerability that needs to be addressed.
Lastly, for both the United States and within the EU, there must be a clear understanding that states’ rights—the ability of states to check the federal government, to serve as laboratories of innovation, and to act differently from the federal government—are critically important. It’s essential that the Court continues to recognize the importance of state sovereignty as granted under the Constitution.
These are the most important steps to take right now, and Trump has made it very clear that we need to shore up both judicial interpretations and, potentially, some of the statutory and constitutional language associated with these issues.
Please cite as: Shukri, Syaza & Hassan, Isyraf. (2025). “Anwar Ibrahim’s Civilisational Populism: The Gaza War and Malaysia.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). October 9, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000119
Abstract
This paper examines how Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia’s tenth prime minister, employs civilisational populism in shaping his foreign policy rhetoric, particularly during the Gaza War that started in 2023. Through the lens of civilisational populism defined by Yilmaz and Morieson as a political strategy that constructs “the people” as defenders of a superior but threatened civilisation, the paper argues that Anwar leverages the Gaza/Palestinian cause to project Islamic solidarity and deflect domestic criticisms of liberalism. In doing so, he seeks to consolidate support against the conservative Islamist opposition, PAS, while maintaining international legitimacy. Drawing on the framework of Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM), the study emphasizes the role of individual agency, cognitive calculations, and domestic political pressures in guiding Malaysia’s external stance. Anwar’s rhetorical and symbolic actions such as mass rallies, public condemnations of Israel, and economic restrictions on Israeli-linked entities are analysed not simply as moral positioning but as calculated decisions aimed at managing political survival within a fragmented coalition. The paper highlights contradictions in this approach, such as the BlackRock controversy and local backlash over prioritizing Palestinian aid over domestic needs, revealing the tension between foreign policy idealism and domestic political pragmatism. By integrating FPDM with civilisational populism, the paper provides an understanding of how Malaysia’s foreign policy is not purely reactive or interest-based but shaped by identity politics, leadership perception, and populist imperatives.
The pendulum of civilisationism has swung. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, humanity entered an era of globalisation where connectivity prevailed. However, it did not last, and now that we are in the third decade of the 21st century, we are referring back to Samuel Huntington’s most well-known work, which states that civilisation will be the basis for clashes. In the 1990s, the Washington Consensus fostered a wave of neoliberal globalization, making civilisational divisions seem unlikely. However, following the devastating events of 2001, these divisions have become more apparent, especially against Islamic civilisation. Instead of all-out war, the divisions we are seeing occurs within the framework of national elections. Politicians today are increasingly using civilisationism as part of their populist strategies to win votes.
According to Yilmaz and Morieson, civilisational populism is a political ideology that combines elements of populism with a civilisational framework. It involves a discourse that portrays a particular civilisation—often religious or cultural—as superior and under threat from outsiders or other civilisations. They argued, “populist uses of civilisational discourses differ from non-populist discourses insofar as they use civilisationism to construct internal divisions between an ingroup who they claim belong to ‘our’ civilisation (‘the people’), and outgroups (‘elites,’ ‘others’) who they claim have either betrayed the civilisation of the people or belong to a threatening foreign civilisation,” (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022: 8).
This form of populism appeals to sentiments of cultural heritage, identity, and belonging by positioning “the people” as defenders of their civilisation against perceived existential threats.
For this paper, we are looking at civilisational populism and its impact beyond the nation-state. We argue that Anwar Ibrahim, the tenth prime minister of Malaysia, has been involved with civilisational rhetoric for the purpose of gaining support. Domestically, Anwar’s main political rival is the Islamist Malaysian Pan-Islamic Party (PAS). Shukri (2023) argued that PAS definitely participated in the civilisational narrative of Islam against non-Muslims, specifically non-Muslim Chinese of Malaysia. On the other hand, Anwar, as argued by Shukri (2024), is more of an inclusivist populist. There is heightened political tension in Malaysia between the Islamists that get support from the majority Malay population and Anwar’s own coalition that is usually labelled derogatorily as “liberal” and finds support among non-Muslims and urban Malays. Due to this pressure, Anwar needs to portray himself as a “defender” of Malays and Muslims but in a civilisational way beyond Muslims in Malaysia in order to maintain his inclusivist reputation. Specifically, this paper will look at Anwar’s rhetoric on the Israel-Gaza War that erupted in October 2023.
Anwar has established himself as an Islamist since his days as a youth leader, and he later transitioned to become a Muslim democrat (Malik & Shukri, 2018). However, we observe that his more assertive rhetoric since becoming prime minister is slightly different from his days as the deputy prime minister under Mahathir Mohamad’s first administration. As a result, it may have led to intra-civilisational discord with other Muslim countries, such as with Saudi Arabia, albeit before the start of the ongoing war, when he was unable to meet either the king or the crown prince during his first visit as prime minister.
The next section will look at Malaysian politics and Anwar Ibrahim’s background. Next, we will look at the literature on civilisational populism and foreign policy decision making in order to provide a framework to guide our understanding of Anwar’s rhetoric about Palestine, Gaza, and the Muslim world. Following that, we will delve deeper into Anwar’s civilisational populism and his relationship with other Muslim leaders. The penultimate section will discuss the impact of Anwar’s civilisational rhetoric in the broader Muslim world context.
On October 4, 2025, billionaire populist Andrej Babiš’s ANO party won the Czech parliamentary elections with just under 35% of the vote, setting the stage for coalition talks with two small right-wing, Eurosceptic parties. In this in-depth interview with ECPS, Professor Lenka Bustikova analyzes the implications of this outcome for Czech democracy and the broader Central European political landscape. Warning that “Babiš’s victory is a big win for illiberalism in Europe,” she explains how this election represents both a consolidation of illiberal forces and a strategic shift in Babiš’s populism—from managerialism to paternalism—raising concerns about democratic backsliding and Czechia’s future orientation within the EU.
On October 4, 2025, billionaire populist Andrej Babiš’s ANO party won the Czech parliamentary elections with just under 35% of the vote, securing 80 of 200 seats—an increase from the previous election. Although short of a majority, Babiš is expected to lead coalition talks. His most likely allies are two small right-wing, Eurosceptic parties: the anti-Green Deal Motorists for Themselves and Tomio Okamura’s anti-immigrant Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). While ANO shares the Motorists’ opposition to EU emissions targets, relations with the SPD may prove more complicated due to internal divisions and radical demands. A new Babiš government would likely shift Czech foreign policy, notably by scrapping the Czech ammunition initiative supporting Ukraine.
Against this backdrop, Professor Lenka Bustikova, Director of the Center for European Studies and Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, provides a detailed analysis of the political transformations currently unfolding in Czechia. In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), she warns: “I’m very concerned. Despite the relatively moderate appeal, I do think that Babiš’s victory is a significant win for illiberals in the region. I do not think this will be a bloodbath for Czech democracy, but I do think there’s going to be a lot of bleeding. The patient will survive, but there will be a strong shift.”
Professor Bustikova situates the election within a broader pattern of democratic contestation in Central Europe, describing it as both a consolidation of the illiberal camp and a reconsolidation of the liberal camp. Drawing on her scholarship on technocratic populism, she explains how Babiš has evolved from presenting himself as a competent manager to positioning himself as a paternal figure promising redistribution and state-led solutions to economic grievances. His emphasis on managerial competence now interacts with sovereigntist and anti-Green Deal rhetoric, reflecting a hybrid populist strategy.
Crucially, Professor Bustikova underlines the significance of the far right’s role in the coalition-building process. “If this coalition emerges, it will be the first time in Czech history that the far right is either in coalition or silently supporting the government. That’s a huge breakthrough, and it’s very concerning,” she notes. This development, she argues, marks a major illiberal breakthrough, with potential implications for Czechia’s position in the EU.
Although Czechia retains strong institutional guardrails—including the presidency, the Senate, the Constitutional Court, and a pluralistic media environment—Professor Bustikova expects democratic quality to decline during Babiš’s tenure. Situating these developments in a regional perspective, she warns that the illiberal camp is “numerically much stronger,” making future liberal victories increasingly difficult.
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Lenka Bustikova, revised for clarity and flow.
Professor Lenka Bustikova is the Director of the Center for European Studies and Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida.
Czech Elections Mark a Strategic Shift Toward Illiberalism
Professor Lenka Bustikova, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In light of Andrej Babiš’s decisive electoral victory, how would you interpret the current realignment of Czech party politics? Does this signify a deeper structural shift toward sovereigntist populism, or is it a contingent backlash against liberal governance?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: Thank you for this wonderful and difficult question. I would say that I am not alarmed by the outcome of the Czech elections, but I’m certainly concerned. What happened in this election—and many others have commented on it as well—is the consolidation of two camps. I would call them liberal and illiberal, because what the previous or outgoing government offered was not a particularly liberal government.
In this election, Andrej Babiš and his party, ANO, very successfully and skillfully consolidated voters who are unhappy, struggling, insecure, and also revengeful—and he did so effectively. The encouraging news about the Czech elections is that, in the previous election, about one million votes were wasted on smaller anti-system parties. This time, it was only 400,000. Babiš managed to unite this “coalition of the unhappy” and those seeking change, and he did it well. That camp has now consolidated, will have a voice, and will act as an accountability mechanism.
The liberal camp actually did quite well; the electoral math just didn’t work in their favor as it did four years ago. They were punished for not delivering on certain issues. They could have implemented progressive policies that wouldn’t have cost them much, but they didn’t—partly due to tensions within the coalition. They could have been more proactive on LGBTQ rights, registered partnerships, and perhaps on women’s rights.
More importantly, voters were facing a country with high inflation and high debt. The government did all it could, but it wasn’t enough. While the macroeconomic statistics in the Czech Republic are quite favorable, the government failed to communicate this effectively and neglected key economic issues, such as the housing crisis, that required greater attention. The outgoing coalition also continued to embody a kind of 1990s economic approach—loyal to an era that many voters now question and want to move beyond.
Overall, this election represents both a consolidation of the illiberal camp and a reconsolidation of the liberal camp. What we are seeing—in the Czech Republic and elsewhere—is that the illiberal camp is much stronger. If these patterns of consolidation continue, it will become increasingly difficult for the liberal camp to win elections. This is a major challenge in many countries today.
From Technocrat to ‘Big Daddy’ Populist
Drawing on your concept of technocratic populism, how does Babiš’s blend of managerialism and anti-elite rhetoric differ from classical populist radical right movements in Central Europe? Has this hybrid model evolved since his first premiership (2017–2021)?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: When we wrote the article with Professor Petra Guasti on technocratic populism, we conceived of it as an ideal type—and, of course, every ideal type, when faced with reality, becomes a bit murky and messy. In the original classification, technocratic populism in its pure form did not involve culture wars, nativism, or sovereigntism. It was about the populist utilization of expertise to win elections.
Babiš, who is a very flexible and savvy politician, has certainly evolved. Especially during the 2023 presidential elections, we saw him significantly amplify his nativist appeal—it was quite remarkable. But then he softened his rhetoric again. In the current election, he and his party, ANO, have toned it down.
We also see a shift away from the original technocratic populist model and its managerial appeal. When he first ran, he presented himself as a competent manager. Now, he positions himself more as a “big daddy” figure who will take care of things and spend generously on his constituents. The party he originally founded was fiscally conservative, advocating for running the state efficiently like a firm. That is no longer the platform. The current platform focuses on redistribution and targeted spending toward core constituencies.
This has little to do with efficiency, even though one of his electoral appeals is that the previous coalition was ineffective at managing economic problems—and there is certainly some truth to that. In many ways, this election has centered on pocketbook concerns, poverty, and voters in economically disadvantaged regions. Babiš and ANO have managed to mobilize these voters very successfully and effectively.
Sovereigntist Rhetoric, Pragmatic Strategy
Given Babiš’s membership in the Patriots for Europe and his critiques of the Green Deal, how do you assess the interplay between sovereigntist populism in Czechia and EU-level constraints? Are we witnessing a gradual erosion of the EU’s leverage over domestic political agendas?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: We certainly see that the European Union either lacks the instruments or is unwilling to use the instruments at hand to deal with autocratic or illiberal leaders, unfortunately. Babiš is a very pragmatic politician. He will criticize the Green Deal, but if, for instance, his agro-federate firm can benefit from it, I’m sure he would be open to discussions. One important aspect of the Green Deal debate is the likely involvement of the Motorists party, which is expected to be part of the future coalition and absolutely opposes the Green Deal. There is even a possibility that this party will get the environment portfolio, which would certainly lead to a strong pushback against the Green Deal from the incoming coalition.
The coalition negotiations have just started and will take some time, but resistance is almost certain. However, Babiš, being highly pragmatic, will likely oppose the Green Deal selectively, in ways that suit his political agenda, while also accommodating his coalition partners. I’m sure he will navigate this very skillfully, as part of the Green Deal is rhetorical, but there are also technical aspects that will not be easy to roll back.
A Volatile Marriage of Convenience
If Babiš succeeds in forming a minority government backed by SPD and Motorists, how might this affect the strategic behavior of far-right actors? Does your research on illiberal alliances suggest a stable coalition or a volatile marriage of convenience?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: The negotiations have just started, and one possibility is a coalition of ANO, led by Andrej Babiš, and Motorists. It’s not clear whether the far-right party—Tomio Okamura’s party—or its 10 plus 5 MPs will be part of the government or whether they will silently support the coalition from parliament. It’s possible that, for the far right, Babiš will ask them to nominate experts.
This is likely to be a volatile coalition, but Babiš has shown in the past that he can handle coalitions very well. In fact, anyone considering entering a coalition with Andrej Babiš should be very cautious. Babiš was once in a coalition with the Social Democrats, and he completely destroyed them, siphoning off all their voters. They are basically gone, especially after this election—a dead party for which Babiš can take much of the credit.
The SPD should really think twice about how to approach this future coalition relationship because the election results have shown that Babiš can very skillfully siphon off far-right voters as well. He is a highly strategic politician who has effectively cannibalized his coalition partners in the past.
With Motorists, there are likely to be some tensions. It’s not a stable party; it’s built around a few personalities. The biggest source of tension in the coalition will probably concern budget balance. The party of Motorists is, in a way, the intellectual child of former President Václav Klaus. They want to keep balanced budgets—an idea that has already been signaled as completely unrealistic. There may be some initial friction, but it’s likely they will get over it quickly.
Babiš is one of the most talented politicians in the Czech Republic today, and I expect he will handle this situation quite effectively, using a combination of arm-twisting and incentives. I suspect he will be very successful.
Okamura Overshoots, Babiš Benefits
Czech businessman and SPD leader Tomio Okamura in Prague on May 5, 2010. Photo: Dreamstime.
The SPD underperformed compared to expectations. How do you explain the resilience of Babiš’s populist appeal despite the presence of established far-right actors? Does this reflect a mainstreaming of radical right discourse in Czech politics?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: Okamura underperformed—his party underperformed. Moreover, he has a group of very undisciplined MPs because, in fact, he had three other parties in the coalition, so he has five MPs who are more like coalition MPs than SPD members. He is no longer an authentic politician. Many far-right voters, including those from other parties, no longer see him as a credible nativist fighter—that’s one aspect. But also, he is too extreme for the Czech context. He ran a very vitriolic, pro-Russian campaign and openly declared that he would like the Czech Republic to leave NATO and the European Union. Czech voters absolutely do not have the stomach for that, so he overshot. This is simply too extreme.
As Aleš Michal, one Czech political scientist, insightfully observed, the mobilization against the far right led by the pro-democratic parties and the coalition Together—when they warned Czech voters against parties that would steer the country towards Russia—actually worked. Anti-system and far-right or far-left voters moved under the umbrella of ANO. So, in a way, the strategy worked, but it did not help the coalition Together—it helped Babiš.
Another important aspect is that during the presidential elections, which Babiš lost but which were highly polarized, he managed to attract a significant number of far-right voters. In 2023, these voters grew accustomed to the idea of voting for him. So, although he lost the presidential election, it helped him enormously in this election, as he became an acceptable alternative for the far right.
Cultural Issues Trigger Policy Backlash
In your work on the “Revenge of the Radical Right,” you emphasize how minority accommodation can trigger backlash. To what extent are current Czech political dynamics shaped by cultural issues (e.g., LGBTQ+ rights, immigration, Ukrainian refugees) rather than economic grievances?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: I’ve thought about these issues quite a bit because I do think that with a lot of foreign mobilization today, the appeal of ethnic issues is somewhat subdued. I also have one or two articles with Professor Petra Guasti where we speculate about this. The logic of the book is that backlash ensues after the accommodation of minorities—it’s a backlash against elevating groups and putting forward policies that help them. In that sense, the logic of backlash applies here as well. In the Czech Republic, when you consider the status quo and the pursuit of policies that were genuinely beneficial to Ukrainian refugees, you can anticipate an ensuing backlash. Ukrainian refugees are no longer as warmly welcomed as they once were. There have also been many attempts to advance more robust legislation to protect women against rape and sexual assault, as well as attempts to codify the Istanbul Convention. These are all policies that, in a way, shift the balance of power or policy direction, and we have seen backlash as a result. Similarly, the LGBTQ community is hoping to increase their rights. Much of the public is quite open to this possibility, but the process of getting there involves shifting the balance and policies. Once that happens, advocates on the opposing side are naturally activated. So, I do think the policy backlash logic applies here as well.
Recent scholarship highlights the rise of confessional illiberalism across Central Europe. Do you see religiously inflected sovereigntism gaining ground in Czechia, or does the country’s secular legacy limit this trajectory compared to Hungary and Poland?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: This is an excellent question. It refers to a recent article that I’ve written with Lottam Halevi, who is now at the University of Constance. One important thing to keep in mind is that much of the mobilization around religious issues is actually a mobilization of political identity. It is not necessarily the case that more religiously infused countries will experience a higher mobilization of religious identity or religious activity as political identity. Czechia is a very secular country. However, we do see issues around transgender rights or some LGBTQ questions being framed in ways that are very similar to Hungary and Poland. The culture wars are nowhere near as fierce as in neighboring countries, but the country could potentially develop its own mini culture wars.
Another important point is that in the Czech Republic, the Christian Democratic Party is firmly in a coalition and belongs to the liberal or pro-democratic camp. As long as they remain on the side of parties that respect the rule of law, this creates a kind of firewall against the politicization of some of these issues. Nevertheless, we have seen signs of this dynamic even in a country as secular as the Czech Republic.
Culture Wars Remain Underutilized in Czech Politics
Ukrainian activists protest against the Russian invasion of Ukraine during a peaceful demonstration with flags in support of Ukraine in Prague, Czechia on February 24, 2023. Photo: Dreamstime.
Your article “In Europe’s Closet” discusses how minority rights can catalyze illiberal backlash. Are Czech populist and far-right actors increasingly weaponizing LGBTQ+ issues as part of their sovereigntist narratives? How does this compare to developments in Slovakia or Poland?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: Suddenly, these issues are high on the agenda in Slovakia and Poland, even though in Poland some LGBTQ issues are not as salient as they were a few years ago. However, we do see narratives about protecting children against transgenderism emerging. This rhetoric often appears as part of anti-EU, Euroskeptic discourse—telling people what to do, how to raise their children, promoting a progressive agenda around women, or framing gender rights as a threat to traditional families. The offshoots of these narratives are present, though they are not a particularly dominant strain. Pocketbook issues largely dominated this election. So, the potential is there, but it remains underutilized. Moreover, the Catholic Church in the Czech Republic is quite restrained and does not enter into these debates in the way it does in Slovakia or Poland.
In your co-authored work on “Patronage, Trust, and State Capacity,” you argue that low bureaucratic trust fosters clientelism. How does this dynamic manifest in Babiš’s political strategy, especially considering his corporate background and patronage networks?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: Andrej Babiš cares about one thing only, and that’s his firm, Agrofert, and his political party is his firm. The party is not a regular party; it is a business project and a business offshoot. He has a huge conflict of interest, which nobody knows how he’s going to solve if he’s nominated as prime minister, because the Czech Republic doesn’t have an institute of blind trust. The conflict of interest will always be there because his firm, Agrofert, is a large recipient of state subsidies. That’s not necessarily patronage networks; it’s, in a way, making sure that the state is in a fantastic synergistic position with his firm. That is a particularity of his business background and the setup of the party. It is a vehicle for him to keep political power and be able to use state and EU subsidies, and the conflict of interest is just written all over him.
In terms of ANO as a party strategy, I would not necessarily define it as clientelism. What we saw when Babiš was in power, I would call targeted distribution—targeting pockets of voters, many of whom actually do need this targeting, and it is very beneficial to them. It involves picking out or dissecting groups that will be selected for state help, and again, the budget deficit is going to balloon. I don’t think that’s necessarily patronage, but it’s a targeted exchange that a lot of parties engage in, and it’s bread-and-butter politics. Having said that, aside from the targeted distribution, Babiš will make sure that his agglomerate benefits from him being prime minister again, which is a very likely scenario, as it seems now.
From Fiscal Conservatism to Programmatic Populism
Do you think Babiš’s economic promises—higher pensions, lower taxes, welfare expansion—should be understood as clientelistic appeals rooted in weak state capacity, or as programmatic populism aimed at reshaping public expectations?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: If I were to choose, I would really use more of a frame of programmatic populism or targeted distribution. We saw this between 2017–2021. What’s happening in the region now is that voter expectations have changed—and this applies to Poland and Slovakia as well—so that populist voters now expect redistribution and higher spending. If Babiš stays in power for four years, these expectations will become absolutely entrenched. There is a recent book on Poland by Ben Stanley that talks about this lock-in: basically, the transformation of the Polish party system in such a way that all voters now expect the next party in power to spend, no matter who that might be. If the current governing coalition ever comes back, they will have to do the same thing. They will not be able to promise balanced budgets. If they want to defeat Babiš four years from now, they will also have to promise spending. Good luck with the budgets, but there is a general entrenchment of voters expecting that the state needs to really open up the valves. It will probably have pretty bad long-term consequences, but nobody’s thinking long-term these days.
Given Babiš’s emphasis on managerial competence, how does technocratic rhetoric interact with populist radical right sovereigntist claims in his current coalition-building efforts?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: It’s going to be a big spending spree, and the Motorists will have to hold their noses. The far right really doesn’t care—actually, it supports spending as long as it’s spending on Czechs, or native spending, and not on Ukrainians or migrants. This is going to be a move from manager to, in a way, a paternal figure who is going to take care of everybody, including making appointments for colonoscopy. Part of the big appeal of Babiš was the emphasis on improving the healthcare system.
Having been quite critical about ANO, I do have to emphasize that it’s quite possible that some of the portfolios the coalition will control can be given to very competent people. In the previous government, ANO had some ministers or portfolios that were run quite well. For example, the Ministry of Education underwent some really good changes. It’s also possible that some of the infrastructure projects that started and need to be completed, or the huge shortage of housing stock—if Babiš can really deliver on these issues, that’s going to be very successful, rewarded, and it would benefit the country quite a bit. If he throws in managerial competence and delivers, that would be fantastic, and it’s possible that there might be some policy changes that can be done well and have long-term benefits. But I suspect a big spending spree and a very short-term horizon, given Babiš’s age. We’ll see.
A Historic Breakthrough for the Far Right
Analysts have warned that Babiš could align Czechia with Hungary and Slovakia, forming a sovereigntist bloc inside the EU. Do you view this as a tactical positioning or a substantive ideological shift toward illiberal governance?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: I’m very concerned. Despite the relatively moderate appeal, I do think that Babiš’s victory is a significant win for illiberals in the region. I do not think this will be a bloodbath for Czech democracy, but I do think there’s going to be a lot of bleeding. The patient will survive, but there will be a strong shift. Babiš is also very strategic. If he and his coalition partners drag him to some extreme positions, the Czech public may become accustomed to that. If this coalition emerges, it will be the first time in Czech history that the far right is either in coalition or silently supporting the government. That’s a huge breakthrough, and it’s very concerning. The Motorists are not an extreme party, but they are certainly not rooting for the European rule of law and liberal democratic values. This is very troubling, and it’s a big win for illiberalism in Europe. Babiš’s victory is undoubtedly a big win for illiberalism.
Guardrails Exist, But Democratic Quality May Decline
The Statue of Justice by Marius Kotrba, a modern sculpture located at the Supreme Court building in Brno, Czech Republic, on March 10, 2022. Photo: Evgeniy Fesenko.
What are the potential institutional guardrails against democratic backsliding in Czechia, and how do they compare to Hungary and Slovakia during their own illiberal turns?
Professor Lenka Bustikova: There are a lot of guardrails. The most important actor is the current president, Petr Pavel. He can veto, he can play a huge informal role, and he will have to think very carefully about whether the future prime minister is going to violate the law by being in a position of conflict of interest. This is going to be a hard puzzle to solve. The Czech president is a pro-democratic, centrist figure with good temperament and very high levels of popularity.
The second guardrail is the second chamber, which Slovakia does not have. The Czech Senate is still dominated by so-called liberal or pro-democratic parties. There are a lot of roadblocks. Another institution that’s quite important is the Constitutional Court, which has saved Czech democracy many times. That’s also significant.
The media in the Czech Republic have been independent. Babiš is going to go after Czech Television and Czech Radio, but the country has a robust, pluralistic media scene. It might change, but that’s an important characteristic.
Czech civil society is quite active, although one has to be very careful about what mobilization means. For example, work by Petra Guasti and Aleš Michal showed that populists are sometimes much better at mobilizing. This election has shown that people can be mobilized for and against democracy, or for liberal or illiberal causes. This time, the election mobilized the illiberals more, but there were other elections in the past when the pro-democratic camp was mobilized quite well. Civil society is active. It pays attention.
So, there is hope, but I do expect that the quality of Czech democracy will decline during this period because of disrespect for the rule of law. Babiš does not like the rule of law, and his coalition partners are either extremists or at the fringe of the mainstream. Another thing I would like to mention is that one of the leaders of the Motorist Party has accusations of domestic abuse filed against him. In terms of signaling the moral integrity of political leaders, this also doesn’t bode well for appointing people with questionable moral standing to very high positions of power.
Swerve for Now, But the Future Looks Troubling
Finally, situating Czechia within the broader Central European context, do you see the current developments as part of a cyclical populist wave or a deeper structural illiberal swerve, as discussed in “The Illiberal Turn or Swerve in Central Europe?”
Professor Lenka Bustikova: At this moment, I expect that this is going to be four years’ worth, but I don’t know what’s going to happen at the end of these four years, because what we see in other countries is that when the 2.0 comes back—when populists return to power—they are much more effective. They know what to do, they have their playbooks ready, they have done this before, they are much more revengeful, aggressive, and they know how to get things done. So I expect that Babiš will weaken the rule of law and definitely try to weaken some of the guardrails. I do think that the coalition partners will certainly drag the country more towards the East than towards the West. The real question is going to be: after four years, is there anyone who will be able to beat them? It’s going to be very difficult because this consolidation of camps shows that the illiberal camp is simply numerically much stronger. Either they’ll have to make some terrible mistakes—which they will—and the voters may forgive them or may not, or the liberal camp will have to grow, and we see in other countries that it is a very steep hill to climb. So, swerve for now, but I am very concerned about the future.
Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections mark a pivotal moment in the geopolitical tug-of-war between the European Union and Russia. Despite unprecedented hybrid interference—including disinformation, illicit financing, and the use of new technologies—the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) secured a decisive victory. Dr. Ecaterina Locoman cautions, however, that this success is “more of a temporary setback” for Moscow than a strategic defeat: “Russia will gather its resources again.” In this interview with ECPS, Dr. Locoman analyzes Moldova’s evolving democratic resilience, the adaptive strategies of Russian influence, the role of the diaspora, and the country’s ambitious EU accession goal. She underscores the importance of sustained domestic reform and Western engagement to keep Moldova on its “irreversible European path.”
Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections have emerged as a pivotal moment in the geopolitical contest between the European Union and Russia. Against a backdrop of unprecedented hybrid interference—including disinformation campaigns, illicit financing, and the use of new technologies—Moldova’s pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) secured a decisive victory. Yet, as Dr. Ecaterina Locoman cautions in this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), this success must be understood as both real and fragile: “I expect that Russia will continue to influence domestic politics. It’s part of their strategic goal to regain control over the post-Soviet region, and I don’t think this should be read as a strategic loss. It’s more of a temporary setback, but they will gather their resources again.”
Dr. Locoman, Senior Lecturer at the Lauder Institute and in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, situates Moldova’s electoral resilience within a hybrid framework of domestic determination and external support. “We can interpret the results of the Moldovan elections as a hybrid outcome. On the one hand, they reflect a strong domestic effort—both from political institutions and voters—who showed remarkable resilience in the face of Russian interference and influence. On the other hand, it is also clear that without the support of Western partners, especially the European Union, this success would not have been possible. So, it’s both a domestic and international story.”
This resilience was manifested not only through institutional preparedness—such as stronger oversight of illicit financing and disinformation—but also through robust diaspora engagement and sustained voter mobilization. “The numbers show that 280,000 Moldovans abroad voted in the elections,” Dr. Locoman notes, highlighting how mail ballots and close transnational ties helped bolster the pro-EU vote. She underscores that “the diaspora is relatively young… they maintain very strong links to Moldovan politics and what is happening at home.”
At the same time, Moscow’s influence tactics are evolving. Russia experimented with “the use of AI and alternative financial methods, like cryptocurrency,” to obscure financial flows and spread propaganda. While these efforts ultimately proved less effective this cycle, Dr. Locoman warns against complacency: “Moscow is one of the best students of the post-Soviet region… they will learn from their own mistakes and improve their strategies in the next elections. This fight needs to continue.”
Looking ahead, Moldova’s ambition to join the European Union by 2030 faces both internal and external hurdles. Domestically, slow reforms, corruption, and economic vulnerabilities remain pressing concerns. Externally, geopolitical vetoes—most notably from Hungary—could obstruct accession negotiations. “I have some doubts—not fear, but doubts—about how quickly the situation can move by 2030,” Dr. Locoman admits. Yet she also maintains a note of cautious optimism: “Up until 2022, Moldova had been knocking on the EU’s doors for more than 30 years… and then, in the end, it happened.”
In this interview, Dr. Locoman offers a nuanced analysis of Moldova’s evolving democratic landscape, the adaptive strategies of Russian influence, and the strategic choices facing both Moldovan and European leaders in the years to come.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Ecaterina Locoman, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
Resilience at Home, Support Abroad
National meeting of the Moldovan people with the flags of the European Union and the Republic of Moldova. Chisinau, Moldova, May 21, 2023. Photo: Andrei F.
Dr. Ecaterina Locoman, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Moldova’s parliamentary elections delivered a decisive victory for the ruling pro-European Union PAS despite unprecedented Russian interference. Should we interpret this outcome as a durable consolidation of democratic resilience, or as a contingent success heavily dependent on extraordinary EU and Western support?
Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: Thank you very much for having me. It’s a pleasure to be here. I think we can interpret the results of the Moldovan elections as a hybrid outcome. On the one hand, they reflect a strong domestic effort—both from political institutions and voters—who showed remarkable resilience in the face of Russian interference and influence. On the other hand, it is also clear that without the support of Western partners, especially the European Union, this success would not have been possible. So, it’s both a domestic and international story.
Importantly, if we look back at the 2024 presidential elections and now the 2025 parliamentary elections, voters have chosen a similar direction. This indicates that democracy in Moldova, while perhaps not as strong or stable as one might wish, is nonetheless evolving. Moldovans and their institutions are working every day to strengthen it. We saw a high degree of voter mobilization despite significant Russian efforts, including disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and illicit financing. Voter turnout was relatively high at 52%, demonstrating strong civic engagement.
Compared to the 2024 presidential elections, domestic institutions such as the prosecutor’s office and the police clearly learned from past mistakes. They were better prepared to identify and address unlawful use of illicit funding and electoral violations. This helped build voter confidence in the electoral process. As in previous elections, diaspora engagement was also very strong, further contributing to democratic resilience. Overall, these factors point to an increased resilience among Moldovans in defending their democratic process.
Pro-Russian Messages Losing Ground
To what extent do the results reflect a deepening societal commitment to a pro-European orientation, as opposed to a rejection of entrenched pro-Russian elites such as Igor Dodon and his allies, whose populist appeals often fuse anti-elite rhetoric with civilizational tropes about Russia as Moldova’s “natural” ally?
Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: That’s a very good question. The results show that, again, the recent election, as well as those in 2024 and 2021, reflect a continuing trend that society as a whole is more or less committed to a pro-Western orientation. I travel to Moldova on a yearly basis, and I can see that the country has changed significantly in recent years since Maia Sandu became president. There is a very clear pro-European trend. That said, it’s true that we don’t have precise data on how many Moldovans live abroad. Every summer, many of them return, and perhaps my impression of the country is somewhat skewed because I visit during that period when a lot of diaspora members are back home. Still, the spirit in the country is very much pro-European.
It’s also true that there have been numerous reports on this topic. I have studied how both Russia and the West try to influence domestic politics in post-Soviet states, and my research shows that Russia has long been grooming local political actors in countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. The fact that they were able to attract and cultivate specific types of political figures—such as Igor Dodon, for example, a former president of Moldova who now enjoys little popularity among large segments of the electorate—indicates that Moldovans are increasingly able to distinguish between leaders who genuinely seek to build a democratic, secure, and prosperous future for the country and those who do not.
Pro-Russian actors have not been particularly original or creative in how they promote their message. This message is losing ground, especially because of the war in Ukraine. It is no longer easy to “sell” this narrative. Previously, Moldovan politics often involved strategic shifts between Russia and the West, depending on which side best served domestic interests. Today, this approach is much harder to sustain. The war raging in neighboring Ukraine has made people more aware of the stakes, and Moldova has received a significant number of Ukrainian refugees. As a result, it has become much more difficult for pro-Russian parties to sell their message as effectively as before.
A Blessing in Disguise: Russia’s Unintended Push
Russian military expert at a government operations base, engaged in cyber activities aimed at spreading disinformation and hybrid warfare propaganda. Photo: Dragos Condrea.
With turnout just above 50%, what does this relative disengagement reveal about the durability of PAS’s mandate, and does persistent electoral apathy risk undermining the legitimacy of Moldova’s democratic consolidation over time?
Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: As I mentioned earlier, yes, the turnout was just over 50%, but this number is not unusually low for Moldova. In fact, compared to some recent elections in the region, 52% is relatively solid. However, you are right that it also signals that a significant portion of the electorate remains disengaged, which has implications for the durability of the ruling party’s mandate to govern over the next four years.
The fact that Maia Sandu’s party won elections for the second time is significant. They secured a clear majority of seats and resisted heavy Russian interference and influence. At the same time, much of their enthusiasm is concentrated during election periods, when the central question is whether the country is moving east or west. This enthusiasm does not always last throughout the full four-year governing period.
Moldovans are frustrated with the slow pace of reforms, the persistence of corruption, and the fact that judicial change has not progressed as quickly as many had hoped. Many voters remain disillusioned with these slow reforms, persistent poverty, and daily economic hardships. For this reason, it is especially important for the governing party to deliver results quickly—both to maintain its stated goal of joining the European Union and to ensure that its policies meet the expectations of the electorate.
In some ways, the Russian presence is acting as a “blessing in disguise.” Without the Russian threat at the border, Moldovan political parties might have been more complacent and less willing to pursue reforms. Because the threat is so close, it creates a greater sense of urgency among both political actors and the population to mobilize and align with the European Union.
What has changed significantly compared to previous elections—particularly over the past decade, since around 2010—is the unprecedented level of symbolic, technical, and financial support the European Union has provided to Maia Sandu and Moldovan political institutions. EU leaders have repeatedly visited Moldova and demonstrated their support, which is unprecedented in the country’s history.
In my own research, I found that since 1991, when Moldova declared independence from the USSR, one of its main foreign policy challenges has been ensuring that the West paid any attention to it at all. For many years, Moldova was on the radar only because of the Transnistrian conflict. As long as things were quiet and stable, there was little engagement. Now, however, Moldovan political elites—especially Maia Sandu—have succeeded in breaking through this indifference and convincing European leaders that Moldova is strategically important to the EU and its security.
Transnationalizing Moldovan Democracy
The diaspora played a decisive role in shaping the outcome. How should we understand this transnationalization of Moldovan democracy, especially given populist narratives at home that cast the diaspora as an illegitimate, “externalized” electorate undermining national sovereignty?
Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: That’s true. I like the expression you used—the transnationalization of Moldovan democracy. The numbers show that 280,000 Moldovans abroad voted in the elections. This is because the governing party recognized that much of their support comes from the diaspora, so they facilitated the voting process abroad. The introduction of mail ballots was a smart and strategic move, because people living in countries like the United States find it much easier to vote by mail than to go in person to Moldovan embassies or consulates. This was an important step, reflecting the fact that domestic political elites understood the crucial role the diaspora plays.
Another important factor is that the diaspora is relatively young. Most of those who have moved abroad are in their 50s, 40s, 30s, and 20s. They maintain very strong links to Moldovan politics and what is happening at home. Many have families in Moldova, so they remain deeply engaged, and I was pleased to see the high level of civic engagement among the diaspora, particularly their efforts to support and promote European integration.
It’s true that the more pro-Russia parties tend to portray the diaspora negatively. I think it was Igor Dodon who, at one point during a previous presidential election, referred to the diaspora as a “parallel electorate,” claiming that they don’t know what’s happening at home, that they live in the West and therefore want the country to join the West. He argued that they are disconnected from domestic realities, which is not true. The links between the diaspora and Moldova remain very strong.
If you visit in the summertime, you can see many young people and young families returning. In the 1990s and early 2000s, before Moldova had a visa-free regime with the EU, many Moldovans tried to work in the EU illegally. They often ended up stuck abroad, unable to return home, and the maximum support they could provide was through remittances.
Government building decorated with Moldovan and European Union flags, as well as national and EU symbols, in central Chisinau, Chisinau, Moldova on June 1, 2025. Photo: Gheorghe Mindru.
Now, because the EU has introduced a visa-free regime and many Moldovans have been able to obtain Romanian citizenship—thanks to Romania’s revised citizenship law allowing those who can prove family links from the interwar period when Moldova was part of Greater Romania to apply—many people have Romanian passports. This allows them to live and work legally in the EU.
As a result, many young families now live in European countries such as Germany, Belgium, and Great Britain during the year, but they build homes in Moldova, have parents and siblings there, and remain in close contact. So, it is not accurate to argue that the diaspora is disconnected from events at home. In fact, it is very much a part of what is happening domestically. As long as domestic political actors continue to engage the diaspora and maintain these connections, the pro-European movement will hopefully remain strong.
Hybrid Interference: New Tactics, Old Goals
Observers describe Moldova as a “laboratory” for Russia’s hybrid interference. From disinformation to illicit financing, what does the 2025 electoral cycle reveal about the adaptive limits of Moscow’s toolkit of influence?
Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: Yes, we’ve seen new models of influence that Russia has used in the elections. The use of AI and alternative financial methods, like cryptocurrency, for example, is new. They tried to hide financial links by using cryptocurrency, which, in a way, influenced the process. But, this also revealed the limits of Russian influence. I would add a caveat here: Moscow—indeed the Kremlin—is one of the best students of the post-Soviet region. They know the region very well and have people who have studied it in depth. So, I expect that they will learn from their own mistakes and improve their strategies in the next elections. This means that Moldova’s pro-European victory should not be seen as a sign that we can become complacent or self-sufficient. This fight needs to continue. As I said, Moscow is a very good student of the post-Soviet region. They understand the internal realities of these countries. They know the challenges that people face, the domestic weak points, and they try to exploit these to the advantage of their messages and narratives.
At the same time, many of these tools proved ineffective at this point in time because Moldovan institutions—and civil society as well—were more proactive than in past elections. Moldovan institutions learned important lessons from the last presidential elections. Parties engaged in illicit financing were excluded from the ballot, prosecutions were pursued, and the government was much more transparent in communicating about disinformation campaigns. As a result, people were much more aware of what was going on.
While the Russian toolkit has evolved technologically, its effectiveness is limited when met with resilient institutions, rapid countermeasures, and credible alternatives. If we look at one successful formula that worked in Moldova at this moment, I would still be cautious not to declare this the end of Russian interference. Russian influence will remain strong in the region. But what worked was a credible pro-EU message from domestic political parties, coupled with strong and credible support from the EU, which was very important. Additionally, the pro-Russia parties were not as original in their messaging, and the ongoing war in neighboring Ukraine further strengthened the pro-EU camp.
Exploiting Weak Links: Moscow’s Populist Playbook
The T-34 tank monument and the Parliament building in Tiraspol, Transnistria, Moldova. The tank is a decommissioned T-34, now part of the Memorial of Glory. Photo: Dreamstime.
In the light of your research on Russian influence strategies, how do you interpret Moscow’s reliance on populist-style appeals—framing EU integration as a betrayal of sovereignty, invoking fears of war, or portraying elites as “foreign agents”? Does the Moldovan case suggest a recalibration of these tactics compared to Ukraine or Georgia?
Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: What is happening in Moldova, again, links to what I was just saying in response to the previous question. When I think about Georgia, the support for a pro-EU orientation was very strong. Public opinion support was extremely high, but it was not enough. When Russia was able to find a credible, strong domestic political actor, it was able to promote its own interests inside Georgia. What is different in Moldova’s case right now is that there was both a credible pro-EU party and strong public opinion support for the European Union. Now, Russia does not necessarily rely only on populist-style appeals. They know the weaknesses in each of these countries—the weak links—and they try to use those for their own interests. One thing I have noticed is that as long as domestic political elites are smart and strategic in how they frame their political messaging, it matters a lot.
I will give an example. Since Moldova declared independence in 1991, one very big question has been whether the language spoken in Moldova is Romanian or Moldovan. Political campaigns and electoral strategies were often built around this division. More pro-EU, pro-Romanian parties argued that the language is Romanian, while more pro-Russia parties insisted it is Moldovan. In every electoral campaign, these pro-Russia political parties used such narratives to distract voters from real issues like economic problems and corruption.
What happened in the years since Maia Sandu came to power is that the Moldovan constitution was amended to enshrine that the language spoken in Moldova is Romanian. So now, there is no debate about it. Nobody is questioning it anymore. The point I want to make is that as long as domestic political elites manage to settle these kinds of debates—which are not central to everyday life—then it becomes much harder for pro-Russia political actors to exploit them. People’s income levels or quality of life do not depend on whether they call the language Romanian or Moldovan.
When the Russians spot these kinds of differences, they manipulate public opinion and can win. But if domestic political elites can agree and establish clear positions on such issues, it becomes much harder for pro-Russia actors to influence the public. For example, pro-Russia parties have strong backing in the Orthodox Church in Moldova, which is very influential. There were reports that some priests were used by the Kremlin to influence public opinion. But as long as there is clear messaging from mainstream political parties in Moldova that they are not anti-religion, that religion is respected and people are free to practice their faith, then it becomes harder for pro-Russian narratives—often based on fake realities—to take hold.
When people hear credible messages from their own political elites, it becomes much easier for them to discern truth from lies. Similarly, the narrative about war has become much harder for Russia to sell right now. Why? Because they are waging a war in neighboring Ukraine. It is much harder to claim that moving toward the EU will bring war when there is already a war caused by Russia next door. This narrative was more effective in earlier elections, but now, as long as the West continues to support Ukraine and Ukraine withstands the Russian attack, it will be much easier for Moldova to remain strong and maintain its pro-European orientation and stance.
Without Reforms, Western Support Won’t Be Enough
How sustainable is Moldova’s reliance on Western partners for countering hybrid threats, given persistent vulnerabilities such as corruption, weak institutions, and economic hardship?
Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: This is a very good question. I think about it very often. As much as Russian influence may be a blessing in disguise—in the sense that it mobilizes people at home to work hard and pushes political parties to deliver on their promises and act quickly—the support from the European Union, and even from the United States, is the best thing that can happen to Moldova. As long as the EU remains invested in Moldova, we will be able to maintain our pro-European path more easily.
One fear I have is that we might become complacent, assuming that the EU or the West will always come to our rescue and that we can simply continue doing whatever we are doing internally. When I go to Moldova, I often hear people—business people, entrepreneurs—complaining that not much has changed compared to 10 or 15 years ago. Corruption is still rampant. In order to obtain permits to build something, for example, you still need to pay someone in the government. This is unfortunate, and people are aware of it.
My conclusion is that domestic political parties must understand that this is a “make it or break it” moment. If they do not deliver on the promises they have made, it will become much easier for political actors in Moldova who promote Russian interests to regain power. And once that happens, it will be much, much harder to get Moldova out of Russia’s embrace. So, I think it depends very much on the willingness of the ruling party right now, and Maia Sandu, to deliver on the reforms they have promised.
A Temporary Setback, Not a Strategic Defeat
Do Moldova’s elections signal a broader decline in Russia’s ability to project influence across the post-Soviet space, or should Moscow’s defeat here be read as tactical rather than strategic?
Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: As I shared earlier, I do not think this is a Russian defeat in the long term. Russia is very adept at adjusting its messaging and tactics, not only with respect to the post-Soviet region but also to the wider EU region. They will learn from their mistakes and continue to influence domestic politics in Moldova, as much as we might not like it. Even if the political actors they supported did not win as many seats in Parliament as they initially hoped, we can look at the first four years of Maia Sandu’s party in government.
Basically, these previous four years were devoted to crisis management. Yes, it’s true, initially it was the COVID pandemic, but then the war in Ukraine, caused by Russia, turned everything upside down in Moldova. So instead of focusing on judicial reforms and economic development, as the party had initially promised and as Maia Sandu stated, they had to adjust. I think they managed—they were successful in delivering some of the promises made during the electoral campaign—but it was ten times harder.
I expect that Russia will continue to influence domestic politics. It’s part of their strategic goal to regain control over the post-Soviet region, and I don’t think this should be read as a strategic loss. It’s more of a temporary setback, but they will gather their resources again. Therefore, both Moldovan and European Union leaders need to stay on their toes, remain alert, and be careful about the next steps so they are prepared to counteract those measures.
EU Accession: Between Optimism and Doubt
Nicolae Ciucă (L), President of the National Liberal Party, Ursula von der Leyen (C), President of the European Commission, and Maia Sandu (R), President of Moldova, during the plenary session of the 2024 EPP Congress in Bucharest on March 6, 2024. Photo: Dreamstime.
And lastly, Dr. Locoman, President Sandu has tied her mandate to enshrining an “irreversible European path.” How realistic is Moldova’s aim to achieve EU accession by 2030, given the scale of domestic reforms required and potential geopolitical vetoes within the Union?
Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: Recently, Maia Sandu visited Copenhagen. Denmark hosted a major summit with key EU leaders. Ukraine was there, Maia Sandu was there, and there were reports that they were hoping Hungary would be persuaded not to veto the right of Ukraine and Moldova to start accession negotiations. However, Hungary was not persuaded. So the only hope they have right now is that there will be a political change in Budapest, allowing this to move forward.
A lot of the frustration I hear among policymakers in Moldova, when it comes to the EU, is that they are disappointed the European Union decided to put Moldova and Ukraine in the same bucket for European integration. There were hopes that Moldova would be decoupled, that it would go its own way, and Ukraine would go its own way. But the Europeans still seem to favor moving forward together as a group.
A fear I have is that Moldova is much smaller than Ukraine. Yes, domestic reforms need to be done, but as long as there is political will, it is possible to achieve them. I share a bit of the concern raised in the question. I am afraid that if the situation continues as it is now, Moldova might face the same fate as the Western Balkans over the past 20 years. The door was opened for them too, but then they stalled, and no real progress has been made, apart from Croatia joining the EU.
So, I have some doubts—not fear, but doubts—about how quickly the situation can move by 2030. Is this truly realistic? But then again, up until 2022, Moldova had been knocking on the EU’s doors for more than 30 years, asking for candidate status, and the EU kept saying no. And then, in the end, it happened. Yes, it was because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and it was unfortunate that this was the trigger, but it happened. So I try to stay optimistic and hope that by 2030, Moldova will be able to join the EU.
Please cite as: ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 3: Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 3, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00115
On October 2, 2025, the ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, held the third session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Chaired by Dr. Marietta D.C. van der Tol, the session examined how populist and illiberal actors across Hungary, Slovakia, and the United States instrumentalize the language of religious freedom to consolidate power and reshape national identity. Presentations by Dr. Marc Loustau, Dr. Juraj Buzalka, and Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, followed by reflections from Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, revealed how religion, once central to pluralism, is increasingly politicized as a weapon in culture wars and transnational illiberal strategies.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On October 2, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the third session of its Virtual Workshop Series titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Session 3 explored the entangled relationship between populism, freedom of religion, and illiberal regimes. The session, chaired by Marietta D.C. van der Tol(Landecker Lecturer, University of Cambridge; Senior Postdoctoral Researcher, Trinity College, Cambridge), brought together a diverse set of perspectives, ranging from anthropological and theological insights to political and legal analyses. The session was opened with a welcome speech by ECPS intern Stella Schade, who introduced chair, speakers, and discussant on behalf of the Center.
In her framing remarks, Dr. van der Tol pointed to “the strong connection that we are seeing between, on the one hand, the rise of illiberalism, and on the other hand, the use of Christianity within the narratives that underpin the rise of illiberalism.” For too long, she noted, illiberalism has been seen as a phenomenon of Central and Eastern Europe, associated with Russia, Hungary, or Slovakia. While acknowledging the reasons for that association, she warned against a narrative that renders Eastern Europe “less good than Western Europe.” What made this session distinctive, she argued, was its inclusion of the United States, which allows scholars to “bridge the East–West divide on this matter” and explore illiberalism as a transnational, rather than regionally bounded, phenomenon.
To frame the discussion conceptually, Dr. van der Tol introduced the notion of “Christianism”—a politicized form of Christianity comparable to Islamism—drawing on Rogers Brubaker’s work. She emphasized that Christianism manifests not only at the level of ideas but “increasingly on the level of governance.” This, she suggested, requires interdisciplinary perspectives from politics, theology, anthropology, history, and law to grasp the shifting role of religion in illiberal politics.
The session featured three major contributions: Dr. Marc Loustau on Hungary’s instrumentalization of religious freedom, Dr. Juraj Buzalka on pragmatic politicization in Slovakia, and Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen on the incorporation of evangelical theology into Texas law. Their interventions were followed by commentary from discussants Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, who drew comparative and theoretical connections across the cases.
Together, Session 3 illuminated how the language of religious freedom—once considered central to liberal democracy—has been appropriated by illiberal actors to mobilize cultural symbols, entrench political power, and reshape national and transnational identities.
Marc Loustau: Religious Freedom as Hungaricum: Hungarian Illiberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom
Procession during Easter Holy Mass in the old village of Hollókő, Hungary. Photo: Dreamstime.
In his presentation, Dr. Marc Loustau (Independent Scholar) offered a critical examination of how illiberal regimes—most notably Hungary—instrumentalize the discourse of religious freedom for political ends. His paper, titled “Religious Freedom as Hungaricum: Hungarian Illiberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom,” sought to unsettle long-standing scholarly assumptions that the institutionalization of religious freedom is solely a liberal project.
Dr. Loustau began by situating his intervention within the broader field of religious freedom studies. Traditionally, he explained, much of the critical scholarship has approached the subject as an essentially liberal discourse rooted in international law and Western foreign policy. This body of work, following thinkers such as Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood, often argued that religious freedom regimes operate as “ostensibly neutral” frameworks designed to protect religious minorities but in fact reproduce “Protestant, individualized religious subjectivities.” According to Dr. Loustau, the scholarly task had long been “to unmask the workings of power behind an ostensibly liberal regime of human rights.”
How Illiberal Regimes Reframe Religious Freedom as a Tool of Nationalist Legitimation
Yet, Dr. Loustau stressed, this framing overlooks the way in which illiberal regimes have increasingly co-opted the very language of religious freedom. “It struck us that religious freedom as a discourse, and its institutionalizations, were just as prominent, if not more prominent, in illiberal regimes like Hungary, Russia, and now, ever increasingly, the United States,” he argued. To limit critique only to liberal regimes, therefore, “misses the way that religious freedom is deployed as a central plank of illiberal politics.”
As a case study, Dr. Loustau focused on the Hungary Helps Program, a flagship initiative of Viktor Orbán’s government. The program, he explained, is publicly celebrated as Hungary’s effort to defend persecuted Christians abroad. “Hungary Helps was very active in Syria,” he noted, “alongside the work of Putin’s Russian regime to protect Orthodox Christians in the Middle East.” On the surface, this appears as a humanitarian initiative. Yet Dr. Loustau emphasized its deeper ideological function: “It was actually designed to unify the cause of defending Christians abroad with the cause of defending Christian culture within Europe against supposed persecution by secular Europeans and secular humanists, also in the United States.”
This dual strategy, he argued, effectively blurs the boundaries between international solidarity with persecuted Christians and a domestic culture war against liberal secularism. By presenting Hungary as a defender of a global Christian civilization, Orbán’s government re-frames religious freedom into a tool of nationalist and illiberal legitimation. Dr. Loustau placed this development in comparative perspective, pointing also to Slovakia’s recent illiberal turn under Robert Fico, and to the United States, where Republican leaders increasingly invoke religious freedom in culture-war politics.
Reframing Religious Freedom as a Tool of Power
The broader theoretical question raised by Dr. Loustau concerns how scholars should adapt the critique of religious freedom when liberalism is no longer the presumed framework. “If we cannot presume that liberalism is the institutional framework within which religious freedom emerges as a project,” he asked, “how might we imagine the scholarly project of critique?” His presentation thus invited a reconsideration of how illiberal regimes use religious freedom not to protect pluralism, but to consolidate cultural hegemony.
By highlighting Hungary’s instrumentalization of religious freedom, Dr. Loustau’s intervention underscored the need to extend critiques beyond liberal universalisms and into the realm of illiberal politics, where appeals to faith and persecution are mobilized as powerful tools of authoritarian populism.
Dr. Juraj Buzalka: Religious or Secular Freedom? Pragmatic Politicization of Religion in Post-Socialist Slovakia
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico speaks at a joint press conference with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Uzhhorod, Ukraine, on September 5, 2025. Photo: Yanosh Nemesh.
In his presentation, Dr. Juraj Buzalka, an Associate Professor of Social Anthropology, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at Comenius University, explored the complex intersection of religion, politics, and populism in Slovakia. He argued that the country’s evolving religious landscape cannot be understood merely through statistics on declining religious identification, but must instead be seen through the lens of cultural economy, historical traditions, and global influences that have fueled the pragmatic politicization of religion by illiberal leaders.
A Breakthrough Moment
Dr. Buzalka began by situating his remarks in a very recent political development. “The spectacular clash of religious and secular liberalism took place last Friday,” he explained, “when Slovakia adopted a constitutional law recognizing only biologically defined male and female sexes.” This change, backed by Prime Minister Robert Fico’s far-right government and supported by Christian Democrats representing about ten percent of the electorate, effectively removed legal recognition for transgender citizens. “Transgender people are no longer recognized,” Dr. Buzalka emphasized. “The change of gender, or even a name from female and male in Slovak, is now not possible.”
This was no ordinary legislative amendment. It marked the 23rd change to Slovakia’s constitution since independence in 1993, but unlike previous amendments, it struck directly at the secular foundations of the state. According to Dr. Buzalka, the new law “undermines the secular character of the state, limits freedoms of citizens as defined by a liberal constitution, and even challenges the primacy of EU law.” While experts noted the implications for European integration, public debate largely overlooked this dimension.
The driving force behind the amendment, Dr. Buzalka suggested, was not primarily religious conviction but political opportunism. “The most profitable in this passing of law has been the political entrepreneur Robert Fico,” he said. Once a Social Democrat in the Blairite mold and a self-proclaimed champion of European integration, Fico has reinvented himself as a “National Social Democrat” with far-right leanings. His party, SMER, faces imminent expulsion from the Party of European Socialists. This dramatic ideological shift, Dr. Buzalka argued, is less surprising when seen through the logic of political instrumentalization: religion has become a useful resource for populist leaders seeking legitimacy and mobilization.
The Post-Peasant Setting
Dr. Buzalka framed his analysis in anthropological terms, drawing on the concept of cultural economy and what he described as Slovakia’s “post-peasant condition.” Despite modernization, urbanization, and globalization, Slovak society remains deeply shaped by its rural past. “Slovakia is still much more defined by its rural heritage than neighboring countries,” he explained. “The modern people traveling all around and speaking foreign languages are the children and grandchildren of former peasants.” This agrarian memory, he argued, sustains a cultural imagination in which religion retains moral authority and symbolic capital.
In this setting, religion is often perceived as morally superior to Western-style secular individualism. This moral economy resonates across political divides, making it unsurprising to Dr. Buzalka that former communists have embraced Catholicism or that voters support both progressive presidential candidates and far-right parties in parliamentary elections. “There are contradictions that might seem irrational from the perspective of top-down politics,” he observed, “but they have their own rationality connected to the post-peasant condition.”
To conceptualize this phenomenon, Dr. Buzalka drew on Douglas Holmes’s theory of integralism, a counter-Enlightenment tradition committed to traditional cultural forms but expressed in modern political settings. He argued that Slovakia’s version is a distinctly East European, post-socialist appearance of integralism—rooted in rural memory, family structures, and communal solidarity. “This is the local version of a religiously inspired movement,” he said, “vigorous and modern, but drawing legitimacy from an imagined moral superiority of traditional community.”
From Communism to Catholicism
One of the most striking themes in Dr. Buzalka’s talk was the fluidity of ideological identities in Slovakia. “It is not surprising for an anthropologist to see former communists sitting in church,” he noted. Similarly, Robert Fico’s personal trajectory—from communist youth, to Blairite reformer, to devout Catholic populist—illustrates this adaptability. Many Slovak voters, too, move between supporting liberal and illiberal actors depending on context. As Dr. Buzalka explained, “Believers could vote for a progressive, openly liberal president at one point, while supporting a Fascist party in parliamentary elections at another. These contradictions are easily swallowed.”
This political pragmatism is not a betrayal of tradition but a continuation of it, embedded in the post-peasant cultural economy where ideological boundaries blur. Dr. Buzalka emphasized that the seeming incoherence of Slovak politics must be understood in terms of lived cultural logics, not abstract ideological purity.
Global Dimensions of Religious Populism
While Slovakia’s political shifts are rooted in local traditions, Dr. Buzalka insisted they are also part of a global phenomenon. “Usually, we tend to see globalization coming from the West in the form of markets and democracy,” he noted. “But alongside these came zealous conservative values, carried by religious freedom movements—often financed from abroad.”
He cited reports showing that Slovak conservative associations received around $10 million from US-based evangelical movements,while across the EU similar groups benefitted from €1.1 billion in external funding. These resources have strengthened far-right and religiously conservative networks, embedding Slovakia in what Dr. Buzalka described as “a new alliance of religious extremists, far-right populists, and oligarchic funders.” This alliance, he warned, is “reshaping European politics, directed by private wealth and legitimized through state funding, engineering a long-term authoritarian transformation under the guise of tradition and care.”
The paradox, Dr. Buzalka observed, is that these populists portray progressivism as a decadent Western import, yet their own religious conservatism is itself imported. “They told us progressivism comes from the spoiled West,” he said, “but in fact, their practices and ideologies are also victims of imported beliefs.” This dynamic, he suggested, reveals the hybrid nature of illiberalism: deeply rooted in local cultural traditions, but also energized by transnational flows of ideology and capital.
Religion, Populism, and Hybrid War
In concluding his presentation, Dr. Buzalka returned to the broader stakes of his argument. Religiously motivated radicalism in Slovakia, he argued, succeeds because it draws strength from both local and global forces. Locally, it arises from the post-peasant condition, where communal solidarity and agrarian memory sustain integralist ideologies. Globally, it is reinforced by the flows of funding, ideology, and disinformation that link Slovakia to broader networks of populist and authoritarian politics.
This dynamic, he suggested, should be understood as part of a wider “hybrid war” against liberal democracy, in which religion is mobilized alongside other tools of disinformation and polarization. “What looks like a defense of national tradition,” he concluded, “is paradoxically itself imported from abroad.”
Although a progressive response is emerging, Dr. Buzalka expressed skepticism about its depth. “It is rather shallow,” he warned, “and still questioned by the global situation.” As Slovakia heads toward further electoral contests, including in neighboring countries like the Czech Republic, the struggle between secular liberalism and religious populism remains finely balanced. “We might see quite interesting results,” he observed, “but what is clear is that the liberal democratic order is being questioned by new forms of anti-modernist discourse.”
Dr. Colin Bossen: Illiberal Theocracy in Texas? Evangelical Christian Theology and State Law
A man holds cautionary signs, including one reading “Jesus Or Hellfire!”, in Times Square, New York City, on July 2, 2018. Photo: Erin Alexis Randolph.
In his presentation, Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, First Unitarian Universalist of Houston and Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford, explored how religious pluralism and Christian nationalism collide in contemporary US politics, with Texas as a case study. Drawing on a recent lawsuit filed by members of his own congregation, Dr. Bossen argued that struggles over religion and law in the United States are not merely contests between religion and secularism but rather between competing theological and political visions of religion in public life.
A Case Study from Texas
Dr. Bossen began by recounting how the case emerged directly from his congregation. In August 2023, a member of the First Unitarian Universalist Church of Houston and her daughter joined as plaintiffs in a lawsuit against 11 Texas public school districts. The case challenged Senate Bill 10 (SB10), which sought to require every public classroom to display a framed copy of the Ten Commandments.
Federal Judge Fred Biery issued a preliminary injunction preventing the law from taking effect, citing the First Amendment of the US Constitution: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” On the surface, Dr. Bossen observed, the ruling looked like a straightforward act of secular jurisprudence—a clear demarcation between church and state. But Dr. Bossen suggested otherwise. “My claim is that the lawsuit should not be seen as a contest between a secular understanding of the state and a religious one,” he argued. “Rather, it is best understood as a clash between two different religiously inflected views.”
The first, represented by the bill’s authors, is Christian nationalism. The second, invoked implicitly by the plaintiffs and Judge Biery, is what Dr. Bossen—drawing on historian David Hollinger—called liberalizing religion.
Christian Nationalism vs. Liberalizing Religion
Dr. Bossen outlined these competing visions. Christian nationalism, he explained, is the claim that the United States is fundamentally a Christian nation and that its laws and culture should reflect Protestant Christian values. Quoting Andrew Whitehead and Samuel Perry’s book Taking America Back for God, he emphasized that Christian nationalism blurs religion with race, citizenship, and ideology: “It conflates being Christian with being white, native-born, American, and conservative.” This was evident in the words of Texas Senator Mays Middleton, one of SB10’s authors: “We are a state and nation built on ‘In God We Trust.’”
By contrast, liberalizing religion—rooted in liberal Protestant traditions but now broader—asserts that religion should remain a matter of individual conscience and voluntary association. While maintaining the separation of church and state, liberalizing religion also insists that religiously grounded moral values have a legitimate place in shaping a pluralistic society.
Historically, this current emerged from mainline Protestant denominations—Methodists, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Episcopalians—and became influential through civil rights, women’s rights, immigrant rights, and other social movements. Hollinger has shown that even as mainline church membership declined, their liberalizing influence expanded outside churches, shaping public discourse on anti-racism, anti-sexism, and social justice.
From Liberal Protestantism to Liberalizing Religion
Dr. Bossen illustrated this trajectory through the story of former Texas governor Ann Richards. Richards, a Democrat, had ties to Unitarian Universalism, one of the most liberal religious traditions in the US. She sent her children to a Unitarian preschool in Dallas. Her daughter, Cecile Richards, later led Planned Parenthood, while maintaining ties to Unitarian congregations.
When Roe v. Wade was overturned, the Dallas Unitarian Church reaffirmed reproductive rights as a religious value. Rev. Daniel Cantor declared, “God loves you. You have dignity and worth, and your life is the priority here.” For Dr. Bossen, this demonstrates how liberalizing religion is not limited to Christianity but now includes Jews (especially in Reform and Reconstructionist traditions), Hindus, Buddhists, and even non-religious people committed to pluralism and individual conscience.
The Lawsuit: Rabbi Mara Nathan v. Alamo Heights ISD
The lawsuit against SB10, formally titled Rabbi Mara Nathan v. Alamo Heights Independent School District, exemplified this broader coalition. The plaintiffs included 22 adults and their children: nine Jewish, five Protestant, one Hindu, one Unitarian Universalist, and six non-religious individuals. Even atheists framed their objections in terms consistent with liberalizing religion. One couple argued that they wanted their child “to independently develop decisions on religious matters” rather than have one religious worldview imposed by the state.
The coalition did not withdraw into private schooling or homeschooling; instead, they sought to reform public institutions to ensure pluralism. Judge Biery’s ruling reflected this perspective. He warned against the dangers of “majoritarian government and religion joining hands,” invoking both religious and secular thinkers who advanced pluralist principles. Strikingly, he even suggested that instead of the Ten Commandments, Texas classrooms might post excerpts from Robert Fulghum’s All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten, a popular book associated with Unitarian Universalist moral teaching.
Christian Nationalist Backlash
Unsurprisingly, the ruling provoked backlash from Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, a staunch Christian nationalist. Paxton claimed: “From the beginning, the Ten Commandments have been irrevocably intertwined with America’s legal, moral, and historical heritage.” He dismissed the plaintiffs as “woke radicals” bent on erasing American history—ignoring the fact that most were religious individuals advancing a theological vision at odds with his own.
Dr. Bossen noted that Paxton’s rhetoric exemplifies the Christian nationalist refusal to recognize liberalizing religion as genuinely religious. Instead, it delegitimizes pluralistic theologies by branding them as secular, elitist, or radical.
Political Theology and Populism
Dr. Bossen argued that this clash is best seen through the lens of political theology—the incorporation of theological concepts into state structures. In Texas, the question is whether the state will enshrine the theology of Christian nationalism or liberalizing religion.
He connected this to broader debates on populism: “Elsewhere, populist movements can be understood as efforts to create forms of collective identity that seek to answer the question of who ‘the people’ are for a given polity.” Christian nationalism aligns with white supremacist populism, defining “the people” as white, Christian, and native-born. Liberalizing religion, by contrast, aligns with a pluralist populism that imagines “the people” as multiracial, multiethnic, and religiously diverse.
Thus, the Texas case is more than a local legal battle. It reflects a national struggle over identity, belonging, and democracy. Will the United States be defined by exclusionary Christian nationalist theology or by an inclusive pluralist theology rooted in liberalizing religion?
Toward a Broader Framework
Dr. Bossen concluded by noting that his project is still developing. He expressed interest in deepening the theoretical framework connecting religion, law, and liberal statecraft. “My examination of the contest between Christian nationalism and liberalizing theology, white supremacist and pluralistic populism in my state of residence, is just at its beginning,” he said. “I look forward to perspectives that will help me develop a richer framework around the connections between religion and law.”
For now, however, the Texas case offers a vivid window into how religious freedom, constitutional law, and political theology are being contested in the United States. The struggle is not between religion and secularism, Bossen concluded, but between two rival theologies—one exclusionary, majoritarian, and authoritarian, the other pluralistic, voluntarist, and democratic.
Discussants’ Feedback
A man clasps his hands in prayer during the opening ceremonies of President Donald Trump’s “Keep America Great” rally at the Wildwoods Convention Center in Wildwood, New Jersey, on January 28, 2020. Photo by Benjamin Clapp.
Dr. Simon P. Watmough (Freelance Researcher; Non-Resident Research Fellow, ECPS)
Serving as discussant, Dr. Simon P. Watmough offered a wide-ranging and integrative commentary that placed the three case studies—Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas—into comparative and global perspective. He praised the panelists for providing “three rich case studies” that at first glance might seem disjointed, yet clearly “strike a common thread” in demonstrating the politicization of religious freedom as a tool of illiberalism.
Linking Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas
Dr. Watmough began by highlighting how the Hungarian and Slovak cases reveal the ways in which religious freedom has been instrumentalized as a wedge issue. In Hungary, he noted, post-2010 politics under Viktor Orbán have become the “classic exemplar of the culture war on a European stage.” Initiatives such as Hungary Helps, described in Dr. Marc Loustau’s presentation, exemplify how religion is used simultaneously to mobilize domestic constituencies and divide opponents at the EU level.
Here, Dr. Watmough posed a provocative question: “Does heritage status make religious freedom a national possession rather than a universal right?” If illiberal actors succeed in nationalizing religious freedom, it undermines its universality. He wondered whether EU universalism—anchored in rights-based frameworks—might provide a counter-strategy: “This whole Christian nationalism thing breaks down at some point when you confront it with universal rights and universal values.”
Turning to Slovakia, Dr. Watmough observed striking similarities with Hungary. Robert Fico, he argued, is “kind of Orbán redux”—a political entrepreneur who has reinvented himself across ideological lines, shifting from a socialist orientation to illiberal nationalism. Like Orbán, Fico demonstrates how populist leaders act as political chameleons, continually reshaping their platforms in response to perceived voter demand. “Give the customers what they want, sell, sell, sell, and make a tidy political profit,” Dr. Watmough remarked, framing such politics as a business model of pragmatic populist entrepreneurship.
The Texas Case in Historical Perspective
Addressing Colin Bossen’s Texas case, Dr. Watmough noted both continuity and divergence with Central Europe. The battle over displaying the Ten Commandments in schools represents not only a contemporary struggle but one deeply embedded in “a big strand of traditional American contestation about what America means, going back 250 years.” Whereas Hungary and Slovakia showcase the appropriation of religion for nation-building in post-socialist and EU contexts, Texas reflects long-standing American debates about religious establishment, pluralism, and the meaning of the First Amendment.
Dr. Watmough predicted that such state-level efforts at religiously inflected lawmaking would soon face scrutiny from the US Supreme Court: “There’s no more dodging. The Court is going to have to weigh in on these contestations in American politics very soon.” The question, he suggested, is whether Texas represents an outlier or a bellwether for broader US trends toward illiberal theocracy.
Cross-Cutting Themes
Dr. Watmough then drew out several themes that cut across all three cases. First, he underscored the instrumentalization of law as a mechanism of illiberal politics. Whether through constitutional amendments in Slovakia, legal initiatives in Hungary, or bills in Texas, religious freedom is mobilized not as a universal safeguard but as a weapon to entrench exclusionary visions of the polity.
Second, he returned to the theme of populist political entrepreneurship. Orbán, Fico, and actors in the US all display what he termed a capacity for pragmatic adaptation, reshaping ideology in order to maximize political profit while keeping illiberal projects intact.
Third, Dr. Watmough raised the question of pluralism’s future. Illiberal actors instrumentalize religion to define narrow and exclusionary conceptions of “the people.” In contrast, liberal-democratic traditions struggle to sustain universalist frameworks capable of resisting these wedge strategies.
The International Dimension
Finally, Dr. Watmough emphasized the importance of transnational linkages. He reminded the audience that ECPS has consistently highlighted the “illiberal internationale”—a loose but increasingly coordinated network of right-wing populists, illiberal regimes, and oligarchic funders who reinforce and legitimate one another across borders. He cited Russian financing of European far-right parties, the spread of disinformation campaigns, and the diffusion of Orbán’s governance model to Poland and Slovakia as examples. “The question we can ask ourselves,” he concluded, “is whether this is more than elective affinity. Are we talking about systemic international linkages?”
Dr.Watmough’s intervention provided a powerful comparative and global frame for the panel. By situating Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas within shared dynamics of lawfare, populist entrepreneurship, and transnational illiberal collaboration, he illuminated both the distinctiveness of each case and the broader structural forces connecting them. His remarks pressed the panelists to consider not only the national specificities of religious politicization but also its implications for the future of pluralism, the resilience of liberal universalism, and the rise of an illiberal international order.
Dr. Erkan Toguslu (Researcher at the Institute for Media Studies, KU Leuven, Belgium)
In his discussant remarks, Dr. Erkan Toguslu offered a thoughtful synthesis of the panel’s three case studies—Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas—focusing on how religion and the principle of religious freedom are being redefined and instrumentalized in contemporary illiberal politics. While acknowledging the contextual diversity of the cases, he highlighted common dynamics that reveal religion not as a neutral principle, but as a powerful tool of political entrepreneurship and symbolic politics.
Religion as Instrument and Symbol
Dr. Toguslu began by underscoring that “protecting religious freedom is not a neutral right.” Rather, across the cases, it emerges as a form of political entrepreneurship and the domestication of religion into political projects. In Hungary, for instance, programs such as Hungary Helps link the defense of persecuted Christians abroad to the narrative of Christianity being eroded at home by secular elites. This fusion of domestic and foreign policy, he argued, exemplifies how religious freedom is recast as a cultural weapon in ongoing symbolic battles.
Such strategies, he suggested, challenge the liberal assumption that public space is neutral and open to all. Instead, religion is increasingly imposed in arenas that should remain pluralistic—schools, constitutions, and civic institutions—transforming freedom itself into a contested object.
Redefining Freedom in Illiberal Politics
A key theme in Dr. Toguslu’s comments was the paradoxical role of religious freedom in illiberal settings. “What does it mean,” he asked, “if religious freedom is used to defend a majority rather than a minority, or to impose a single interpretation on the public?” The very principle meant to protect pluralism and diversity is turned into a justification for restricting them.
In Slovakia, as Dr. Juraj Buzalka showed, this dynamic is tied to what Dr. Toguslu called “hybrid ideologies.” Former communists turned Catholics, or ex-socialists aligning with religious conservatism, illustrate a “strange rationality of contradictions.” Yet, such contradictions are sustained by a post-peasant social imaginary in which rural memory and cultural conservatism provide a sense of moral superiority. Here, religion becomes a moral anchor against liberal modernity, even when articulated by actors with seemingly incompatible ideological pasts.
Liberal Democracies and Illiberal Politics
Turning to the United States, Dr. Toguslu emphasized the broader lesson of the Texas case: even within a liberal democratic regime, illiberal politics can take root. The Ten Commandments bill illustrates how legal and theological struggles play out in ostensibly secular institutions. He argued that this should not be seen simply as a clash between secularism and religion, but as “a confrontation between two theologies: Christian nationalism and liberal, individualistic religion.”
The case demonstrates how religious freedom is mobilized both by those seeking to impose a homogenous religious identity and by those defending pluralism. As in Hungary and Slovakia, law becomes a central battleground—whether through constitutional amendments, federal injunctions, or symbolic legislation.
Broader Theoretical Reflections
In closing, Dr. Toguslu connected his observations to broader critiques of secularism advanced by scholars like Saba Mahmood and Talal Asad. Their insights remind us that secular institutions themselves are never neutral; they can also be hegemonic frameworks that shape politics in particular ways. “Doesn’t matter if it’s liberal or illiberal,” he remarked, “somehow religion becomes a political strategy.”
Linking his comments back to Dr. Watmough’s intervention, Dr. Toguslu emphasized that the instrumentalization of religion in public space—whether in Europe or the United States—reflects a common strategy of illiberal actors. It is less about protecting diversity than about mobilizing cultural symbols for political power.
Q&A Heighlights
A “God, Guns, and Trump” sign displayed on an old military bus following the 2020 presidential election in November 2020, Tampa, Florida. Photo by Florida Chuck.
The Q&A session following the panel presentations provided a dynamic exchange of perspectives that deepened the central themes of religion, illiberalism, and populism. Moderated discussion was interspersed with audience interventions, and much of the dialogue focused on the intersections of religion, nationalism, and coalition-building across diverse contexts.
Cross-Religious Alliances and Conservative Convergence
The first question came from Dr. Bülent Keneş, who observed that despite deep doctrinal differences, religious groups across Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism often converge on conservative social issues—particularly around family values, gender roles, and LGBTQ+ rights. He noted that this convergence was evident in the support some Muslim migrants in the United States had shown for Donald Trump. He asked whether there is potential for “a broader cross-religious alliance among conservative religious constituencies” that could collectively challenge liberal democracy.
Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen responded affirmatively: “The short answer is yes. I think that is the major project that a great number of Christian nationalists are trying to engage in.” He pointed to efforts in Texas by leaders such as Governor Greg Abbott and Attorney General Ken Paxton, who not only mobilize around opposition to LGBTQ+ rights but also stoke fears of Islam by manufacturing what he called a “Muslim scare.” For Dr. Bossen, such strategies are designed to “unify that coalition of evangelicals and conservatives” by creating a common enemy. This, he argued, is not merely a possibility but an active project that is already undermining liberal democratic structures.
Dr. Erkan Toguslu added nuance, drawing on European examples. He recalled studies showing that Muslim voters in Belgium and elsewhere had shifted from supporting Socialist or Green parties to aligning with Christian Democrats due to shared traditionalist values. “These moral backgrounds come up during elections, always,” he noted, suggesting that shared cultural conservatism does create “easy connection points.” However, he remained cautious about whether this amounted to a genuine, coordinated cross-religious coalition.
Constitutional Limits and the Role of the Supreme Court
The next intervention came from Dr. Simon Watmough, who picked up on themes from his earlier feedback. He asked Dr. Bossen whether constitutional limits might constrain Christian nationalist projects, and whether the US Supreme Court would ultimately act as arbiter: “Is it going to be the Supreme Court that is going to be the arbiter of that, do you think?”
Dr. Bossen was skeptical. He described Texas as a testing ground for illiberalism in the United States, where state laws are intentionally crafted to provoke Supreme Court review. Drawing parallels to the long-term legal strategy that led to the overturning of Roe v. Wade, he warned that conservative activists are now honing similar approaches on issues like gender rights. “Law is becoming less and less a matter of reasoning, and more and more a matter of power,” Dr. Bossen argued. He foresaw a growing fragmentation of the United States into illiberal and liberal states, with the Supreme Court unlikely to hold the line: “I’m skeptical that the Court, as it is currently constituted, is going to maintain those limits.”
Youth, Education, and Coalition-Building
Nina Kuzniak raised the issue of young people, noting the increasing presence of theologically grounded values in US public schools. She asked Dr. Bossen whether religious freedom could serve as an antidote to Christian nationalism and how young people might be supported in resisting state-sponsored religious conservatism.
Dr. Bossen responded that the key lay in coalition-building across differences. He acknowledged the difficulty of interfaith dialogue but pointed to the diverse coalition of plaintiffs in the SB10 lawsuit—Jews, Protestants, a Hindu, a Unitarian Universalist, atheists, and agnostics—as a model. “Is there a way to expand that coalition to really push back against Christian nationalism on religious freedom as the unifying thread?” he asked. He also suggested that youth-focused initiatives, such as interfaith programs, could be a promising space for cultivating pluralistic values: “It’s a really interesting question to explore… something that we could even think about here in Houston.”
Christian Nationalism, Whiteness, and Inclusion
Finally, Erkan Toguslu returned with a probing question about the racial dynamics of Christian nationalism. He asked how non-white groups, particularly Black Americans, fit into a movement that appears to be overwhelmingly white.
Dr. Bossen acknowledged the centrality of whiteness to Christian nationalism: “The coalition of people that are Christian nationalists are overwhelmingly white.” Yet he also emphasized its fluidity, noting how European immigrant groups once outside whiteness were eventually incorporated. He suggested that some non-Black minorities, including Southeast Asians and Mexican Americans in Texas, may be seeking partial inclusion into whiteness by aligning with Christian nationalist politics. “They’re trying to perform a certain kind of whiteness and be incorporated into that system,” he explained. This dynamic, he argued, reflects how Christian nationalism continues to equate citizenship with whiteness, while offering conditional entry to groups willing to embrace its ideological framework.
Taken together, the Q&A highlighted the complex entanglement of religion, race, law, and politics across contexts. Dr. Bossen underscored the polarization of American religion into two competing camps: one rooted in Christian nationalism, the other in liberalizing religion. Dr. Toguslu and Dr. Watmough, meanwhile, stressed the transnational resonances, with parallels in Central Europe’s religious conservatism and the use of legal instruments to entrench illiberal values.
The Q&A session ended with a sense of both urgency and possibility: the urgency stemming from the active undermining of liberal democracy through cross-religious conservative coalitions, and the possibility residing in countervailing alliances of pluralistic religious and secular actors. As Dr. Bossen put it, the struggle is not merely legal but a contest over what kind of nation—and what kind of people—the United States, and by extension other democracies, will become.
Concluding Reflections by Dr. Marietta van der Tol
Christians raise their hands in worship during a church service. Photo: Joshua Rainey.
In her closing reflections, Dr. Marietta van der Tol offered a wide-ranging analysis that drew together the themes of the panel while situating them within broader questions about religion, illiberalism, and the fragility of constitutional democracy. She emphasized the importance of examining both the fragmentation of political life and the ways in which thin, flexible ideologies can sustain surprising alliances across religious and political divides.
Fragmentation and the Allure of Populist Rhetoric
Dr. van der Tol began by reflecting on the ways fragmentation enables individuals to selectively engage with populist rhetoric without assuming responsibility for its more dangerous implications. “One can identify with one part of the conversation, and sort of not be responsible for the other parts of that same conversation that might be appealing to others,” she observed. This selective embrace, she argued, helps explain the “marriage between Christian nationalism and far-right politics,” as well as the increasing openness to extremist groups in contexts such as the UK and the Netherlands.
From her conversations with those sympathetic to Christian nationalism, she noted that individuals often acknowledge problematic elements of the rhetoric but dismiss them as irrelevant: “They don’t think it is about them, or that it is about somebody else… it’s not in their immediate reference framework, so therefore it’s not that important.” This dynamic, she suggested, provides a crucial clue for understanding both the endurance of such politics and the challenge of dismantling the alliances it sustains.
Thin Ideologies and Transnational Coalitions
A key theme of her remarks was the fluidity of conservative religious and nationalist discourses. She described them as a “thin ideology”—adaptable to varied cultural contexts and capable of mobilizing disparate constituencies. Issues like abortion, feminism, and LGBTQ+ rights can be reframed as “anti-liberal,” “anti-Western,” or “anti-secular,” depending on the audience. “These issues can rally very different groups of people who may not normally see eye to eye,” she explained.
This flexibility helps explain how secular nationalists, Christian conservatives, Muslims, and Hindus sometimes converge in transnational coalitions. Yet Dr. van der Tol cautioned against assuming such actors share identical motivations. “Some people might vote for restrictions of abortion on biblical grounds. That is a very different argument from somebody who says we need the reproduction of the nation to be sped up,” she stressed. Recognizing these distinctions, she argued, is essential both for analytical clarity and for identifying potential fractures within alliances.
At the same time, she remained skeptical of the durability of these coalitions, pointing to their Western—and particularly American—centrism. Many alliances, she argued, are “dominated by Americans, often dominated by American funding.” This creates structural imbalances: non-Western actors may be symbolically included but not taken seriously. She recalled a case where Hindu nationalists were relegated to a marginal panel chaired by an Anglo-American figure, remarking: “It’s an uneven alliance… some of these alliances might not be as long-lived as people would like them to be.”
The Central Role of Law and Constitutionalism
Dr. van der Tol then turned to the role of law in these struggles. She highlighted how right-wing intellectuals often elevate the constitution as the “heart of the nation,” citing Roger Scruton’s claim that constitutionalism itself embodies national identity. This, she argued, explains why culture wars so often manifest through legal battles: “If people are trying to identify and determine what the heart of the nation is, one of the first places they will go is the law, and the Constitution.”
While this focus may seem circular, it is also dangerous. She expressed concern that illiberal actors are not merely amending constitutions but transforming constitutional interpretation itself. Subtle shifts in legal reasoning, rather than headline-grabbing amendments, may prove most consequential. “Paying attention to these technical changes at the level of interpretation requires legal skill, but it cannot live outside the analysis of sociologists, theologians, and political scientists,” she warned. For her, the erosion of constitutionalism risks destabilizing democracy more profoundly than episodic political crises.
Democracy, Pacification, and Religious Freedom
Finally, Dr. van der Tol raised sobering questions about the future of democratic stability. Whereas earlier eras relied on constitutional settlements or compromises—what she called “pacification, where people might exchange certain constitutional goods to pause the culture war”—today’s conflicts may resist such resolution. She cautioned that democracy itself is being redefined, not merely challenged: “The question now is even what is the measure of democracy that the far right thinks is necessary?”
In her conclusion, she reflected on the paradoxical role of Christianity in these processes. It is particularly troubling, she noted, that Christianity—historically a force for constitutional settlement after Europe’s religious wars—is now invoked to undermine constitutionalism. “It’s quite sad to see how Christianity is being used for some of these processes,” she remarked. Yet she also underscored that religious freedom remains key to renewing democratic legitimacy. Even conservative religious communities that are skeptical of liberal democracy have historically accepted it because of guarantees of religious liberty. “Whatever the future of democracy looks like, it’s going to have to take religious freedom seriously to the point where it allows these communities to buy in again.”
Dr. van der Tol’s closing assessment thus underscored the interdisciplinary challenge of analyzing religion, law, and populism in contemporary politics. She highlighted the fragility of alliances, the centrality of legal contestation, and the unsettling transformations of constitutionalism underway. Most of all, she reminded the audience that the stakes are not abstract: “There’s something at stake. Will our democracies ever look like the way they looked 10 or 20 years ago? If not, what will the alternative look like?”
Her reflections left the audience with both caution and urgency: caution, in recognizing the thin and fragile nature of many transnational illiberal alliances; and urgency, in grappling with the profound implications of constitutional and cultural transformations for the future of democracy itself.
Conclusion
Session 3 of the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series made clear that the entanglement of religion, populism, and illiberalism is neither accidental nor confined to any one region. Across Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas, the panelists showed how appeals to religious freedom—once a cornerstone of liberal democracy—are increasingly being redefined as instruments of exclusion, mobilization, and power consolidation.
Dr. Marc Loustau demonstrated how Hungary reframes religious freedom to defend Christian identity at home while projecting humanitarian solidarity abroad, thereby transforming a liberal principle into an illiberal cultural weapon. Dr. Juraj Buzalka revealed how Slovakia’s “post-peasant” cultural economy and opportunistic leadership have enabled the pragmatic politicization of religion, blending global conservative funding with local traditions. Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, meanwhile, highlighted the US case of Texas, where religious freedom is contested not between secularism and faith, but between two theologies—Christian nationalism and liberalizing pluralism.
The discussants, Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, drew the threads together, underscoring how religion is domesticated into politics through lawfare, culture wars, and symbolic politics. Both stressed that these developments form part of a wider “illiberal internationale,” linking actors across borders through shared narratives, funding, and strategies.
In her closing reflections, Dr. Marietta van der Tol warned that these shifts point to deeper transformations of constitutionalism itself. If the constitution becomes not a neutral framework but the very terrain of ideological struggle, then democracy’s foundations may be unsettled in ways more enduring than electoral swings. As she cautioned, “Will our democracies ever look like the way they looked 10 or 20 years ago? If not, what will the alternative look like?”
Ultimately, the session underscored both the fragility and urgency of democratic resilience. Understanding how illiberal actors instrumentalize religion is not only an academic task but a political imperative for safeguarding pluralism, constitutionalism, and the future of democracy.
The conviction of Jair Bolsonaro and senior military officers for plotting a coup marks an unprecedented moment in Brazil’s democratic history. For the first time, both a former president and high-ranking commanders have been held accountable for attempting to subvert constitutional order. In her interview with the ECPS, Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz calls this a “historic” cultural shift: “Brazilian society is no longer willing to tolerate such attacks on democracy.” She emphasizes that this resilience stems from institutional maturity and judicial independence. By focusing on concrete evidence rather than rhetoric, Brazil’s Supreme Court set a vital precedent: authoritarian populism meets its legal limit when courts remain credible veto players.
The conviction of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and senior military officials for plotting a coup marks a watershed moment in the country’s democratic trajectory. For the first time in Brazil’s history, both a former head of state and high-ranking military leaders have been held criminally accountable for attempting to subvert constitutional order. This unprecedented development raises fundamental questions about judicial independence, civil–military relations, and the resilience of democratic institutions under populist pressure.
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz—a legal scholar with a J.D. from the Federal University of Juiz de Fora, a PhD in Law from the University of Brasília, and currently a PhD student in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison—describes the moment as “historic.” As she emphasizes, “I would highlight a cultural shift. Brazilian society is no longer willing to tolerate such attacks on democracy. This makes the moment truly historic for us.”
This “cultural shift,” she argues, reflects both institutional maturation and societal change. For decades, Brazil had maintained a tradition of impunity for military elites. “When the dictatorship ended, we didn’t have transitional justice—no generals were tried, no one was convicted—and this created the perception that they were all above the law,” Dr. da Cruz explains. “Now, that has changed. We have major military players convicted, and we also have a former president convicted of attempting a coup.”
For Dr. da Cruz, this is not only about judicial assertiveness but also about broader institutional cooperation: “It wasn’t just the Supreme Court; the federal police, the federal prosecution, and the courts all worked together effectively to reach this outcome.” This inter-institutional collaboration, she suggests, has been vital in resisting authoritarian populist attempts to erode democratic checks and balances.
Yet, the trial has also exposed risks. Justice Alexandre de Moraes emerged as the central figure in Bolsonaro’s prosecution, raising concerns about over-personalization of judicial power. While Dr. da Cruz acknowledges that this could fuel narratives of “judicial dictatorship,” she maintains that the verdict will likely enhance trust: “If I were to bet, I would say this will strengthen trust in the Supreme Court… it shows the population that they can count on the Court to uphold the Constitution.”
Ultimately, Brazil’s experience highlights both the vulnerabilities and strengths of democracies confronting authoritarian populism. By focusing on hard evidence—charges of armed conspiracy and constitutional subversion—rather than rhetoric or political speech, Brazil’s Supreme Court has set a precedent of judicial accountability rooted firmly in due process. As Dr. da Cruz underscores, “There is a threshold, a limit at which society must say: this is no longer rhetoric, this is now armed conflict, this is now constitutional subversion—and this we will not accept.”
This interview situates Brazil’s democratic resilience in comparative perspective, with lessons for other democracies confronting populist threats.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
A Historic Break with Brazil’s Tradition of Impunity
Alexandre de Moraes, Justice of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil, during a press conference in São Paulo, Brazil, on May 5, 2017. Photo: Dreamstime.
Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Bolsonaro has been sentenced to 27 years for plotting a coup—the first time in Brazil’s history that a president and military leaders involved in such an attempt have been convicted. How does this break with Brazil’s tradition of impunity, and what does it reveal about the maturation of its democratic institutions?
Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz: Thank you so much for having me. It’s such a pleasure to be here. As you just said, this is the first time something like this has happened in the history of Brazil, and it marks a huge break with the tradition of impunity. When the dictatorship ended, we didn’t have transitional justice—no generals were tried, no one was convicted—and this created the perception that they were all above the law. Now, that has changed. We have major military players convicted, and we also have a former president convicted of attempting a coup.
For me, this demonstrates two things above all. First, judicial independence: our Supreme Court has shown that it can and will enforce the Constitution whenever necessary. But perhaps even more importantly, other institutions have matured as well. It wasn’t just the Supreme Court; the federal police, the federal prosecution, and the courts all worked together effectively to reach this outcome. Finally, I would highlight a cultural shift. Brazilian society is no longer willing to tolerate such attacks on democracy. This makes the moment truly historic for us.
Legitimacy Gained, Risks Remain
Justice Alexandre de Moraes meticulously built the case for over two years, defying Bolsonaro’s claims of judicial persecution. From your perspective on judicial politics, does this verdict strengthen long-term trust in the Supreme Federal Court (STF), or risk deepening narratives of “judicial dictatorship”?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: This is the hard question that we are all asking right now, because it can cut both ways. If I were to bet, I would say this will strengthen trust in the Supreme Court, raising both levels of trust and legitimacy, because it is another instance of the court showing it can act under pressure. COVID was the first such instance in the recent past. During COVID, everyone in the government was against the Supreme Court’s measures, yet the Court was able to enforce the Constitution, and it has done the same now. This shows the population that they can count on the Court to uphold the Constitution.
But, there might be a second possibility. Justice Alexandre de Moraes became the face of this prosecution, the face of the inquiry and the conviction. In my opinion, this is problematic for the Court, because it personalizes such an important verdict in one person, which should not be the case. The main verdict involved other justices, of course, but he became the highly visible player in this case. This can fuel arguments of “judicial dictatorship,” which could play out negatively.
That said, if I were to bet, I think this will ultimately be positive for the Supreme Court. The population will see that the Court stands firm, even when the government is not siding with it. But we will have to wait and see.
Authoritarian Populism Meets Its Legal Limit
Bolsonaro’s conviction included charges of armed criminal conspiracy and attempted abolition of the democratic rule of law. How do these charges fit into the conceptual vocabulary of authoritarian populism—are they an appropriate legal reflection of political subversion?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I think they are. For me, this is one of the most important points here, because we could have had a conviction based on opinion or public statements that Bolsonaro made. That would have risked a much more politicized trial. Instead, the court chose to focus only on the concrete facts, which were mainly about the armed conspiracy—an organized and violent attempt against important political figures such as President Lula and Justice Alexandre de Moraes. They focused on the coup plot itself. They didn’t dwell on rhetoric, social media posts, or other statements that might have raised accusations of politicization.
This goes directly to the heart of authoritarian populism. There is a threshold, a limit at which society must say: this is no longer rhetoric, this is now armed conflict, this is constitutional subversion—and this we will not accept. In that sense, the court acted appropriately by applying the criminal code in the most strictly legal way possible.
Bolsonaro and his lawyers insist the trial was politically motivated, echoing populist claims of “witch hunts.” How should scholars distinguish between legitimate judicial accountability and lawfare in cases involving populist leaders?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: If we can take Brazil as an example, the most important guarantee courts should focus on is due process. This is exactly what our Supreme Court did. Every time the defense asked for information or made requests, they were granted, even though there is a strong argument that trying these individuals in the highest instance of the judiciary violates the right to defense. The court, however, had several precedents showing this was not the case, and this was not the first instance in which people were tried in the Supreme Court. Due process was observed at every step. Alongside this, there was strong factual evidence and credible witnesses—in our case, even a whistleblower—that demonstrated this was not a conspiracy or a witch hunt, but a legitimate trial conducted with due process and proportionality. That is the key: showing that the law is being upheld, and that the law allows for this punishment to happen.
Dissent as Democratic Strength, Not Judicial Weakness
Luiz Fux, Justice and President of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil, during a presentation in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, on July 31, 2018. Photo: Joa Souza.
The STF split 4–1, with Justice Luiz Fux voting to absolve Bolsonaro on procedural grounds. Could such dissents provide legal ammunition for appeals and, more broadly, do fragmented judicial opinions undermine institutional legitimacy in high-stakes political trials?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I heard a lot, and I read a lot about this during the last few weeks, and I side with the people who think that this is actually positive and beneficial for our democracy. By having a strong dissent like we had with Justice Fux, it shows that justices are allowed to think otherwise, that there was evidence, and that there were arguments from the defense that could persuade justices to think differently, and that the court is not hunting someone at any cost. So, this dissent demonstrates that the court can dissent, that it can have different arguments, and this is actually positive in a high court such as the Supreme Court.
In terms of appeals, I don’t think this is a huge problem here. We have a specific appeal that would be possible if this decision were a 3–2 decision. So if we had two justices siding with Bolsonaro, then he would have a specific appeal that would apply to this case. With only one dissent, this appeal does not apply, so the idea that it opens the ground for the defense to explore more possibilities of appeals doesn’t apply in this case specifically. In my view, the dissent was too long—it took the entire day to read the vote, and it was much more procedural than based on evidence itself—but it plays in favor of the Supreme Court. It shows that, unexpectedly, someone dissented completely on the verdict, and this demonstrates that the Supreme Court can have a debate, which is positive.
The Militarization of Bureaucracy Was a Legal Process
Then Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro attends the 74th Anniversary of the Parachutist Infantry Battalion at the Military Village in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on November 23, 2019. Photo: Celso Pupo Rodrigues.
Your research shows Bolsonaro strategically militarized bureaucracies while eroding public trust in the Armed Forces. How does the sentencing of senior officers alter Brazil’s civil–military equilibrium, and could it delegitimize the armed forces as political actors?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: We have always had this problem with civilian control over the military. Since the dictatorship, when the new constitution was drafted, so much power was given to the military that we could almost never say they were not allowed to play a specific role. What I call the militarization of bureaucracy was, in fact, a legal process—and this is the problem for me. There were laws that allowed the military to occupy primarily political positions. I’m not just talking here about the Ministry of Health, where a general was appointed to a political position. That was highly problematic; we had never before seen active-duty military in such a high office, and it was questionable.
But that is not the only issue. I’m talking about positions at all levels of the political bureaucracy that the military was allowed to occupy by law. Several changes in federal legislation permitted military personnel to serve up to four or even six years outside of strictly military posts and instead take politically appointed positions. Bolsonaro knew how to exploit this in his favor. An unprecedented number of military officers occupied his bureaucracy, and this undoubtedly laid the groundwork for him to secure the support he needed when the time came.
So, in order to rebuild civilian control over the military, much more is needed than simply changing the Ministry of Defense and appointing a civilian instead of a general. What is needed is legal reform that critically examines and justifies, for example, why we would need a sergeant in the Ministry of Health, or why it would be important to place a soldier in the Ministry of Education. Do these assignments make sense? That is the most important issue right now. We should be questioning the very reasons why legislation allows people to leave military functions and assume civilian roles.
Resilience and Fractured Loyalties Coexist
Bolsonaro’s failed coup was partly foiled because top military commanders withheld support. Should this be read as evidence of institutional resilience, or as a sign of fractured loyalties within Brazil’s security establishment?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I think it’s actually both. If we had the Ministry of Defense plus the three commanders in Brazil—which in the US we would call the Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Army, and Secretary of the Navy—if all of them, along with the Minister of Defense, had said, no, we cannot side with this, it would have been a stronger sign of resilience. But that’s not what happened. In this trial, we had the conviction of the Minister of the Navy and the Minister of Defense. Both sided with Bolsonaro very strongly, saying, we support you, we’ll be by your side. Only the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force said otherwise.
So yes, it’s resilience, because two of the main players showed they don’t want to compromise or play completely political roles anymore. But it’s also fractured loyalties, because out of four, Bolsonaro still managed to get two on his side. The point here is that he could have had all of them siding with him, had he chosen the right commanders, so to speak. So this is resilience, but it is also fractured loyalty—and that’s the problem. If loyalties fracture, the outcome could be very different, and that’s what we don’t want. We want an institution that no longer sides with political groups at any cost.
Military Must Stay in Military Roles
Having served as a legal advisor in the Air Force, how do you assess the prospects of rebuilding robust civilian control in the defense sector after this episode of politicization and militarization?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I guess I will repeat myself a little bit, because from my experience, what I see is that there is a legal foundation—federal rules that allow the military to serve outside of strictly military positions. This means they can serve basically anywhere, as you can imagine. You can have a military officer in the Ministry of Education, or a soldier in the Ministry of Construction or Agriculture, in specific cases. For me, this is what takes control over the military out of the hands of civilians. The military should be serving in essentially military positions.
We could question, for example, why we have military officers serving in a superior military court. Some may think they are needed there, that they can provide an important perspective in those cases, but we should have a civilian structure capable of handling anything that is not entirely military. That civilian structure becomes fractured when you allow the military to leave the barracks, leave their military functions, and take on civilian posts. During Bolsonaro’s government, we had military personnel spread across virtually every civilian and public position you could imagine, and this, in my view, is the biggest problem with civilian control.
As I said, this is about much more than simply changing the Minister of Defense and placing a civilian in charge. What we need is legal reform—legislation that clearly defines when, if ever, the military can leave their military functions for civilian roles. In my view, this is what should not be happening.
Crisis Moments Can Reinforce Judicial Trust
In your article on courts and democracy, you highlight how crises can paradoxically bolster judicial trust. Do you see Bolsonaro’s conviction producing a similar “crisis effect,” strengthening institutional legitimacy, or will it reinforce distrust among his base?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: That’s precisely correct. In my article, I analyzed this crisis effect during COVID. When the federal government opposed vaccination and isolation measures, the court said “no.” It emphasized the need to give autonomy to municipalities and states so they could decide on their own isolation measures—something Bolsonaro was completely against. In that moment, the court upheld the Constitution, even though this meant going against the president of Brazil during a crisis. This proved positive for the court, as the population sided with it for defending constitutional principles.
I think this could be precisely the case here. Right now, the population can—and, if I’m correct, will—recognize that even under strong pressure against the verdict, the court relied on constitutional guarantees to rule and to uphold the Constitution, despite street protests and pressure from Bolsonaro’s side. So, this crisis effect may well be unfolding again in the near future.
Bolsonaro’s Son Fueled Misinformation in the US
Supporters of Brazil’s former President (2019–2022) Jair Bolsonaro hold signs during a demonstration in São Paulo, Brazil, on September 7, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.
Trump has denounced Bolsonaro’s conviction, raised tariffs, and framed the trial as a parallel to his own legal troubles. How might this US intervention reshape Brazil’s democratic trajectory, and what does it reveal about transnational populist solidarity?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I’m not a specialist in American politics—I work mostly on Brazilian politics. Here is my personal opinion: there is a transnational solidarity among leaders who face similar situations, but in this specific case, there was enormous pressure from one of Bolsonaro’s sons, a federal deputy who now lives in the US. He was feeding false information to the US government, and because of this misinformation and the pressure to side with Bolsonaro, I think that was the main reason for the outcome—raising tariffs, public speeches against the Supreme Court in Brazil, punishing Supreme Court judges by revoking visas, etc. This congressman, who is irregular—not completing his functions in Congress and living in the US—was the major player in this huge mess surrounding the verdict.
Courts Must Remain Veto Players Against Populism
From a comparative perspective, what lessons does Brazil’s trial of a former president and generals offer for other democracies facing populist challenges, such as the US, Israel, Turkey, or Hungary?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: The best comparison we can make here is between Brazil, Turkey, and Hungary—I would add Israel as well, given the major reformulation of its judicial system. In those cases, the failure was in guaranteeing that the main body overseeing the Constitution had the independence it needed to do its job. When a populist comes and gradually cuts every possible check the court can exercise over the executive, step by step, by the time you need the court to act, it cannot do so anymore because it is no longer powerful, no longer a veto player. That is what happened in those three cases.
In Brazil, whenever Bolsonaro tried to impeach a judge or push measures that would curb the court, the court showed clearly that this was unconstitutional, not allowed, and it was able to rally popular support against such moves. In this way, the court managed to remain legitimate, even under heavy pressure. In the other countries, however, the curbing was gradual and consistent, to the point where it could no longer be reversed. And when the court was finally needed, it was no longer truly operational.
Brazil Shows How Judicial Independence Can Resist Populism
Bolsonaro’s rhetoric mirrors Trump’s in portraying judicial accountability as elite persecution. Do you see Brazil’s case as a model of democratic resilience, or does it risk setting a precedent where judicial overreach becomes a populist rallying cry?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: This is a question I don’t really have a clear answer for right now, because it will take time for us to understand. What I can say is that internationally, public attention has portrayed Brazil as doing what the US could not do, what the US Supreme Court could not do—that Brazil is a sign, an example of resilience. The main reason for this resilience, I will repeat myself, is that we were able to keep judicial independence throughout Bolsonaro’s tenure. He was not able to change the court in the way he intended, so the court remained independent. This is what we want to show to the world. We had a populist leader who tried attacking the court, but the court survived, and it was able to uphold the Constitution against him shortly thereafter. This is the precedent we want to set. Whether this will create a perception of, or a cry of, judicial overreach is too soon to say. It certainly can, and it probably will, but will that be stronger than the claim that the court was strong? I don’t think so.
And lastly, Dr. Da Cruz, in the US, Trump floated deploying the National Guard in major cities under the guise of “law and order.” From your research on Brazil’s bureaucratic militarization, what hidden agenda do you see behind such proposals—are they about restoring order, or normalizing military involvement in domestic politics?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I’m not an expert in American politics, so what I can say is about what happened in Brazil. The moment we saw those numbers of military bureaucratization growing was during the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro. From that intervention, the military received control over the police in Rio de Janeiro because of claims of drugs and crime, etc. That was something we could not stop anymore. Years later came Bolsonaro and his Minister of Defense, who had once been “the interventor” in Rio de Janeiro, so every military politician traces back to this intervention in the police in Rio de Janeiro that happened years before Bolsonaro’s tenure. When we decided to do this, it backfired against our democracy. So, this is what I can say: it is very problematic when you bring the military into issues and problems that are not meant for the military to handle.
In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Cristian Cantir (Oakland University) described Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections as “a major win for the European Union and a major defeat for the Kremlin.” Despite massive Russian interference—including vote-buying, cryptocurrency transfers, and efforts to incite unrest—Moldovan institutions responded with unprecedented consistency, demonstrating what Dr. Cantir calls a “confirmation of Moldova’s democratic resilience.” Yet, he warns that Moscow remains influential through populist narratives exploiting poverty and weak institutions. The results, he argues, reflect both the enduring popularity of EU integration and the failures of pro-Russian opposition parties. For Dr. Cantir, Moldova offers a striking example of how Russian influence faces diminishing returns when met with institutional strength and sustained Western support.
The outcome of Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections has been widely interpreted as a defining moment in the country’s European trajectory and its long struggle to resist Russian influence. In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Cristian Cantir, Associate Professor of Political Science at Oakland University, framed the results in stark geopolitical terms: “At a macro level, I would say this election represents a major win for the European Union and a major defeat for the Kremlin. I think it’s fair to frame it in those terms as a general way of understanding what happened.”
Dr. Cantir’s assessment reflects not only the electoral success of the pro-European Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), but also the broader resilience of Moldova’s democratic institutions in the face of Moscow’s sustained interference campaigns. International observers judged the elections to be generally free and fair, even amid bomb threats, electoral violations, and widespread attempts at corruption. As Dr. Cantir explains, this points to a “confirmation of Moldova’s democratic resilience,” if not yet full consolidation, as state institutions and law enforcement demonstrated an increased capacity to respond to hybrid threats.
Russia’s interference toolkit—long tested in Moldova—appeared less effective in this cycle. The Kremlin poured more resources into the effort, funding political actors, experimenting with cryptocurrency transfers, and attempting to stoke unrest. Yet, Dr. Cantir argues, these strategies delivered “diminishing returns” in a political environment where institutions had grown more proactive. “Moscow has been somewhat taken aback by the extent to which Moldovan institutions have now responded in such a consistent way to Russian interference,” he observes. The shift suggests that the Kremlin’s approach is increasingly constrained by its own reliance on disinformation and narratives fed by loyal pro-Russian politicians, which often fail to reflect the realities of Moldovan society. As Dr. Cantir notes, “some of the claims you see in Russian propaganda are so laughable and rudimentary… you wonder whether they actually believe them, because they don’t even work as propaganda.”
Still, Russia remains a formidable actor in Moldova’s domestic politics. Populist narratives that exploit socioeconomic hardship, corruption, and weak institutions continue to resonate with segments of the population, leaving Moldova’s pro-European course vulnerable to authoritarian retrenchment. Dr. Cantir highlights the need for PAS and other pro-EU forces to demonstrate tangible benefits of integration to disengaged citizens, warning that otherwise they may fall “much more easily to populist messaging” that is Eurosceptic and pro-Russian in nature.
Ultimately, the Moldovan case illustrates both the persistence and limitations of Russia’s hybrid influence operations in the post-Soviet space. Unlike Ukraine or Georgia, where Moscow has resorted to military force, Moldova demonstrates how resilience is possible when domestic institutions respond effectively and Western partners provide consistent support. As Dr. Cantir emphasizes, this election represents more than just a partisan victory—it is a symbolic moment of geopolitical realignment: a triumph for Europe, and a setback for the Kremlin.
Here is the transcript of our interview with AssociateProfessor Cristian Cantir, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
Moldova’s Elections Confirm Democratic Resilience
A man casts his ballot during parliamentary elections in Moldova, in front of the national flag. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Cristian Cantir, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How would you characterize the broader significance of Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections, particularly in the light of the pro-European Action and Solidarity Party’s (PAS) ability to withstand unprecedented Russian interference campaigns? To what extent can this outcome be read as a genuine consolidation of Moldova’s democratic resilience, and to what degree is it contingent upon extraordinary external support from the EU and its allies?
Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: Thank you very much for inviting me. It’s a pleasure to be here, and I’m always glad to talk about Moldova—a topic that doesn’t usually get much attention in international affairs. At a macro level, I would say this election represents a major win for the European Union and a major defeat for the Kremlin. I think it’s fair to frame it in those terms as a general way of understanding what happened.
To the extent that it was generally a free and fair election, according to most international observers—even in the face of massive Russian interference—it was consistent with Moldova’s tradition of holding competitive elections since independence. I would take this as a positive sign of the relative health of Moldovan democracy. The process was conducted competently, with electoral authorities and law enforcement responding promptly to challenges, including bomb threats, reported violations, and instances of electoral corruption. From that standpoint, it serves as a solid example—not necessarily a consolidation, but certainly a confirmation—of Moldova’s democratic resilience. Of course, there remain significant challenges to Moldova’s democratic consolidation, but overall the outcome is good news for the country’s democracy.
I do think the election results can be partly attributed to external EU support, but it’s important to refine this point by highlighting one individual in particular—Moldovan President Maia Sandu. Sandu is a unique figure, not only in Moldova’s political history but also in the broader Central and Eastern European context. She has consistently been a popular, anti-corruption, reformist, pro-European leader. Many of the criticisms and attacks directed at her by the pro-Russian opposition have not gained much traction. She has remained highly popular within Moldova, due in part to her strong international reputation, especially among EU politicians. In this sense, when we talk about external influence, it is really a combination of two factors: Sandu’s personal popularity and the EU’s admiration for, and support of, her during this campaign. That said, I would not be so confident in giving the ruling party, PAS, too much credit for the victory. There remain fundamental issues with PAS as a pro-EU force, which we can also discuss further.
Moldovans Voted for Europe, Not PAS
Do the results primarily reflect a deepening consolidation of Moldova’s pro-European trajectory, or are they better understood as a rejection of entrenched pro-Russian elites such as Igor Dodon and his allies? In other words, should we interpret the outcome as an ideological commitment to Europe or as an electoral repudiation of discredited political actors?
Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: We could start by noting that EU integration is genuinely popular with a majority of the Moldovan population. Most polls confirm this, and even the 2024 referendum—though decided by a razor-thin margin—pointed to its broad appeal. That narrow margin can be attributed, at least in part, to vote-buying allegations and to the pro-Russian opposition framing the referendum as a judgment on PAS, the ruling party, rather than on the EU itself. Since PAS has become almost synonymous with the pro-EU position, this image has limited the viability of any other pro-European force. As a result, most pro-EU Moldovans voted for PAS, even if they were frustrated with the party’s slow response to major challenges such as poverty or judicial reform. To some extent, then, the outcome reflects support for EU integration combined with the absence of credible alternatives. Much of the vote was strategic: it did not necessarily indicate satisfaction with PAS as a party or with its performance, but rather the lack of any real choice.
The other parties in the election can also be faulted for failing to develop a narrative that offered a genuine alternative to PAS. Many claimed to support some degree of EU integration—even pro-Russian parties promised to negotiate more with Brussels. They tried to emphasize sovereignty and introduced socially conservative themes aimed at countering what they viewed as the EU’s liberal values. Yet this did not resonate with most Moldovans, as it came across as vague messaging—essentially, “we will slow down EU integration,” without explaining what that would mean or why it was necessary. By contrast, tangible benefits such as visa-free travel or lower roaming fees—everyday concerns tied directly to EU integration—proved far more compelling. As a result, the opposition’s alternative was unclear and largely reduced to a promise of “we are not the current political elites.”
The results, therefore, can be attributed both to the continuing popularity of the EU and to the weakness of the opposition leaders. Their campaigns were driven more by resentment of the ruling party and calls to “purge the system,” or what they called “the regime,” than by any proactive or positive electoral platform.
Moldovan President Maia Sandu speaks at a press conference following her meeting with Bulgarian President Rumen Radev in Chișinău, Moldova, on October 27, 2022. Photo: Dreamstime.
Diaspora Has Become the Backbone of Moldova’s Pro-EU Course
The Moldovan diaspora appears to have played a decisive role in shaping the electoral outcome. How should we understand the implications of this phenomenon for the transnationalization of Moldovan democracy, particularly regarding questions of sovereignty, external leverage, and the construction of a political community that extends well beyond national borders?
Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: The question of the Moldovan diaspora is particularly interesting, as it has been essential in consolidating Moldova’s pro-EU course, especially in recent years. Voting has also become much easier for diaspora members, particularly in Western countries, which is where most diaspora ballots are cast. As a result, the Moldovan diaspora is strongly pro-Western in its orientation—overwhelmingly so, judging by the last few elections.
With some exceptions, the Moldovan diaspora is relatively recent, with the first wave beginning in the 1990s. Attachments to the homeland remain very strong, and personal connections are still close. Travel has also become much easier—for example, low-cost airlines have made going back and forth far more accessible. And because most Moldovans abroad now reside legally, there is far less fear than in the 1990s and 2000s, when many migrated illegally or crossed borders without visas and were hesitant to return. For all these reasons, the diaspora’s ties to Moldova remain particularly strong.
The diaspora has not yet developed a separate identity; it remains very much rooted in Moldova. For example, if you visit Moldova in August, it is striking—you hear Moldovan children speaking with Portuguese accents in shops, and it becomes difficult to get a dentist appointment because so many diaspora members return home for treatment. This illustrates how deeply the diaspora remains part of Moldovan society. The ruling PAS, like other parties, has been very friendly and encouraging toward the diaspora. There are events organized exclusively for them, success stories highlighted in the media, and programs inviting them to return and share their experiences. There is also considerable gratitude for remittances, which have helped offset some of the country’s socioeconomic inequalities.
It is also important to remember that Moldovans’ understanding of sovereignty has always carried a transnational dimension. Many have looked to Romania for cultural and ethnic identity markers, while others have looked to Russia. As a result, Moldovans are more accustomed to hybrid and multiple identities. They can remain deeply connected both to the countries where they now live and to Moldovan politics—connections that are further strengthened by technology such as Facebook, online news, and live-streamed broadcasts.
The picture becomes more complicated when we look at the politicization of the diaspora, particularly by pro-Russian forces. Because the diaspora is strongly supportive of pro-Western groups, pro-Russian politicians have advanced a narrative—especially visible in recent years—that Moldovans inside the country oppose PAS, while those abroad support it. The argument is that Moldova’s diaspora is effectively holding those who remain at home hostage to the PAS regime. Pro-Russian groups have been trying to inflame tensions between these two communities. Igor Dodon, Moldova’s most prominent pro-Russian politician, has even described the diaspora as a “parallel electorate.” Another pro-Russian politician, Irina Vlah, has pursued what can only be described as an unusual campaign, promoting narratives such as asking Moldovans to “adopt” a fellow citizen inside the country who is suffering under the pro-EU PAS. I would not be surprised if such narratives continue to spread and further deepen tensions between diaspora communities and Moldovans still at home.
Finally, one more point: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its interference in Moldovan politics has highlighted an unresolved issue concerning the Moldovan diaspora in Russia. Estimates of the diaspora there range from about 100,000 to several hundred thousand people. Because of Russian interference, Moldovan authorities have opened only a minimal number of polling stations, most of them in Moscow. Given the vast size of Russia, this makes it much more difficult for Moldovans living there to cast their ballots. Authorities argue that this limitation is necessary to ensure ballot security, but it leaves unresolved the broader problem of how to guarantee equal voting rights for all members of the diaspora, regardless of where they reside. This remains a pressing question that Moldovan politicians will eventually have to address, even though, for now, it has been overshadowed by Russia’s interference.
Former Moldovan President Igor Dodon attends a Party of Socialists meeting in Bălți, Moldova, on October 17, 2021. Photo: Iuri Gagarin.
Low Turnout Makes Moldova Vulnerable to Populist Messaging
With voter turnout just above 50%, what does the relative disengagement of a significant portion of the electorate reveal about the legitimacy and durability of PAS’s mandate? To what extent does persistent electoral apathy constrain the prospects for long-term democratic consolidation and weaken the societal foundations of Moldova’s pro-European orientation?
Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: I want to make a quick statistical note first. The 2024 Moldovan Census identified about 2.3 to 2.4 million Moldovans in the country with stable residency. Meanwhile, the electoral rolls from the Central Electoral Commission list close to 300,000 Moldovans abroad, which doesn’t quite capture reality. In fact, there are many more Moldovans who still hold residency but live or work abroad. This makes turnout somewhat harder to assess in Moldova, given the fragmented data we have.
That said, the general premise of the question still holds, because the turnout percentage does indicate a degree of disengagement. This poses a problem for PAS and for Moldova’s pro-European orientation. People who are disengaged—who don’t feel invested in Moldova’s pro-EU path or don’t perceive clear benefits from EU integration—are much more susceptible to populist messaging. In Moldova, such messaging tends to be Eurosceptic and pro-Russian. As a result, these citizens may be more easily mobilized by populist politicians, giving those actors greater institutional power to undermine EU integration.
For this reason, demonstrating the tangible benefits of EU integration to more apathetic groups should be a key part of PAS’s strategy. Otherwise, we may see rising support for populist politicians. A few have already begun to gain visibility—there are two in particular I could highlight—but the broader risk of growing populist appeal is certainly there.
Russia May Be Falling Victim to Its Own Propaganda in Moldova
Observers have described Moldova as a “laboratory” for Russia’s hybrid interference strategies. In your assessment, what does the 2025 electoral cycle reveal about both the adaptive capacities and structural limitations of Moscow’s toolkit of influence? Can we speak of a paradigmatic shift in the Kremlin’s approach, or are we witnessing the persistence of familiar strategies with diminishing returns?
Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: That’s a really good question. The simplest answer is that we don’t know yet, and there’s a reason for that. The 2025 election was marked by greater intensity and a wider range of Kremlin interference efforts. They invested more money, backed more political actors, and became more involved in attempts to stoke violence and protests. Yet none of these efforts proved particularly effective.
There are a couple of points to keep in mind here. First of all, Moldovan law enforcement and the broader institutional response have become more active, dealing more effectively—even compared to 2024—with clear cases of electoral interference. This included vote buying, the use of cryptocurrency to transfer funds, and the use of cash for illegal financing. Another important factor in understanding the Kremlin’s difficulties in Moldova is that, for a long time, Russia had grown accustomed to acting with relative impunity there. Even when pro-European or centrist coalitions were in power, Moldovan institutions and politicians were rarely proactive in curbing Russian influence. At best, they ignored Moscow’s efforts; at worst, pro-Russian politicians openly reinforced them. I think Moscow has been somewhat taken aback by the consistency with which Moldovan institutions have now responded to Russian interference.
So, I don’t know if we are going to see a full shift in the Kremlin’s approach, but I do think there is more re-evaluation and discussion about how it might adjust its strategies. One additional point is that the Kremlin actually knows a great deal about Moldova—more so than many in the West. The problem, however, is that it continues to rely heavily on information fed by pro-Russian politicians, who often promote narratives that are simply inaccurate. For example, the claim by some pro-Russian groups that EU integration is not popular in Moldova is simply not true. It’s difficult to tell whether the Kremlin and its allies are falling victim to their own narratives, which distort their understanding of Moldovan dynamics and render their strategies less effective. That’s something I’ve often thought about, because some of the claims you see in Russian propaganda are so laughable and rudimentary. You start to wonder whether they actually believe them, since they don’t even work effectively as propaganda. That’s how rudimentary they are.
Pro-Russian supporters attend Victory Day celebrations on May 9 in Chișinău, Moldova. Alongside World War II veterans displaying their medals, members of the public dressed in Soviet-era military uniforms highlighted the enduring strength of Russian influence. Photo: Dreamstime.
Moldova Now Frames Itself as Belonging in Europe
In the light of your previous work on Moldova’s foreign policy balancing, how would you assess Chisinau’s current capacity to resist Moscow’s strategies of destabilization, particularly given Russia’s reliance on authoritarian-style tactics such as elite capture, patronage networks, and the exploitation of populist narratives?
Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: When it comes to balancing, we’ve seen a noticeable shift. The perception of the EU as a counterbalance to Russia—once more prominent among pro-Russian or centrist groups—was grounded in the idea that Moldova should extract benefits from all its major geopolitical partners. That view has given way to a more cultural and identity-based argument. The ruling pro-European group now frames Moldova as inherently European, emphasizing that the country “belongs in Europe” and should “go home” to Europe.
As a result, the EU is now articulated less as a strategic tool for Moldova’s foreign policy goals and more as a natural place of belonging for Moldovans. Pro-Russian parties still advance the balancing argument, but it has been severely undermined by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. They have not substantially re-evaluated or adjusted their rhetoric since then, but the post-2022 context is fundamentally different. Thus, the balancing argument no longer carries the same weight. While it still registers some support in polling data, it is far less compelling from a political standpoint.
With respect to elite capture, the Kremlin is beginning to understand that Moldovan institutions are responding more coherently to Russian threats. Some of its old patronage networks or elite-capture strategies are not working as effectively because Moldovan law enforcement is pushing back. One example of this would be Russia’s attempts to infiltrate Moldovan politics or encourage spying, which the Moldovan Secret Service has been more proactive in addressing. I’m not sure how the Kremlin will deal with this particular problem.
That said, the Kremlin still retains significant power when it comes to the populist narratives, and the vulnerabilities they exploit. Given Moldova’s socioeconomic issues, including high rates of poverty, these vulnerabilities can be easily leveraged by populist politicians, and consequently by pro-Kremlin groups as well.
Odessa Looms Large in Moldova’s Strategic Calculus
What does the Moldovan case tell us about Russia’s evolving approach to influence operations in the post-Soviet space, especially compared to its tactics in Ukraine or Georgia?
Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: One of the key differences between Ukraine and Georgia is that, where Russia lacks either the ability or the immediate interest to engage in military action—as opposed to what it is doing in Ukraine or what it did in Georgia—its influence operations become less effective when faced with strong institutional responses and consistent support from Moldova’s allies. Because direct military threats are not immediate, Moldova has more space to resist Russian influence.
This dynamic is often reflected in discussions by Moldovan politicians about Odessa. Odessa looms large in Moldovan politics, because if the city were to fall, the strategic calculus would change significantly. If Odessa does not fall, and if Ukraine continues to resist the Russian army in southern Ukraine and around Odessa specifically, it will be considerably easier for Moldova to counter influence operations without the constant pressure of an imminent military threat.
Hybrid Warfare Is a Transnational Problem—It Requires a Transnational Response
Russian military expert at a government operations base, engaged in cyber activities aimed at spreading disinformation and hybrid warfare propaganda. Photo: Dragos Condrea.
How sustainable is Moldova’s reliance on Western partners for countering hybrid threats, given the country’s domestic vulnerabilities such as corruption, weak institutions, and economic hardship?
Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: That’s a good point. Ideally, you would want a sovereign state with strong institutions, fewer socioeconomic problems, and a consistent fight against corruption. That would give it the capacity to resist Russian influence more effectively without significant outside support. The European Union also needs to focus on those factors—tackling corruption, strengthening institutions, and addressing economic hardship.
At the same time, Moldova’s reliance on Western partners to counter Russian hybrid warfare is unavoidable, because this is not only Moldova’s problem. To the extent that it is a transnational challenge, it requires a transnational and coordinated response. Moldova cannot and should not handle this alone. Long-term, institutionalized cooperation with the EU is essential—both because Russian hybrid attacks extend beyond Moldova and because Moldova’s own capacities remain limited. Even if Moldova had strong governance and robust institutions, it would still need to work closely with the European Union to meet this particular threat.
Polarization in Moldova Is Fluid, Not Fixed
How realistic is Moldova’s aim to achieve EU accession by 2030, given both the demanding structural reforms and potential geopolitical vetoes within the Union, and in what ways might deep internal polarization between pro-European and pro-Russian constituencies undermine the legitimacy of this process by opening space for populist mobilization and authoritarian retrenchment?
Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: Internal geopolitical polarization is a serious problem in Moldova, but it is also important to remember that polarization is a fluid phenomenon. Polling, for instance, used to show much stronger support for integration with Russian projects even 10 or 20 years ago, and much less support for NATO membership. This shows that polarization can shift over time.
The strategy of Moldovan authorities has been to make a compelling economic, or quality-of-life, case for EU integration, even in regions where the political dimension of integration is less popular. In places like Gagauzia and parts of northern Moldova, the aim is to erode polarization by demonstrating the tangible economic benefits of closer ties with the EU. If successful, this could help offset some of the effects of geopolitical polarization by easing tensions.
So, the biggest question isn’t really polarization, but whether pro-EU forces can articulate and illustrate the benefits of EU integration clearly to more people, including those in pro-Russian propaganda bubbles. To a large extent, integration by 2030 is driven more by the speed with which Moldovan authorities can enact reforms, by developments in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and also by the situation in Transnistria—which we can talk about—and what exactly Moldovan authorities are going to do with that separatist region.
The Cyprus Model Is a Real Option for Moldova
Monument to Vladimir Lenin in front of the Parliament building in Tiraspol, Transnistria, Moldova. Photo: Dreamstime.
Given the persistence of Russian troops in Transnistria, how does the unresolved status of the region constrain Moldova’s European ambitions and its sovereignty more broadly?
Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: The number of Russian troops in Transnistria isn’t sufficient to threaten Moldova’s European ambitions or its sovereignty. Greater risks could come from a hypothetical mobilization of a large part of the Transnistrian population during a potential conflict, but that scenario carries its own difficulties. Nor does the Russian military presence pose an immediate threat to sovereignty in the sense that Moldova is able to control most of its territory fairly effectively, aside from Transnistria. In that respect, it is not an urgent danger.
The war in Ukraine has also constrained Transnistria’s potentially aggressive orientation, or even its foreign policy toward Ukraine, Moldova, and the EU more broadly. Within Moldova, there is a growing sense that EU integration must move forward and can happen without Transnistria. Moldovan authorities have explicitly stated that it is possible for Moldova to join the EU first, using the Cyprus model. Cyprus is a common example cited by Moldovan officials and has even been echoed by former EU leaders. José Manuel Barroso, for instance, recently affirmed that the Cyprus model is indeed a possibility for Moldova.
At this stage, Chișinău does not view Transnistria as an obstacle to EU integration. Instead, it argues that pre-integration measures demonstrating the economic benefits of EU membership will gradually draw Transnistria closer. If necessary, Moldova can join the EU without Transnistria and then work toward integrating the region into the Union over the longer term.
Populists Give Moscow Veto Power over Moldova’s EU Path
Lastly, Professor Cantir, what scenarios do you consider most plausible for the future of the Transnistria conflict: gradual reintegration under EU auspices, continued limbo, or renewed escalation tied to Russia’s strategic setbacks in Ukraine? And in any of these scenarios, how might populist or authoritarian actors instrumentalize the issue domestically to challenge Moldova’s European orientation?
Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: The most important point to note—the elephant in the room—is that everything depends on how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unfolds. If Ukraine manages to resist in the south and hold Odessa, then what we are most likely to see, at least in the short term, is the maintenance of the status quo. The EU would continue efforts to trade with, develop, and engage local organizations in Transnistria—essentially trying to connect the region more closely to Europe, with the long-term goal of gradual reintegration. That will be the general orientation, or at least the attempt, always contingent on developments in Ukraine and particularly in Odessa.
When it comes to the question of populist or authoritarian actors instrumentalizing the issue, one of the biggest patterns to watch in the next few years in Moldova is how they frame the argument about the Cyprus model. PAS has argued that Moldova can join the EU without Transnistria first. By contrast, many other actors—including pro-Russian politicians in the Patriotic Bloc, the largest opposition group in Parliament, as well as Alternativa, a centrist, self-defined pro-EU bloc—have insisted that Moldova must not enter the EU without Transnistria. In effect, this position grants Transnistria—and, to some extent, Moscow—veto power over Moldova’s EU integration aspirations.
So, populist politicians and authoritarian actors in Moldova will seek to instrumentalize the Transnistria issue by insisting that the country must not—and cannot—join the EU without first resolving the conflict. This, of course, significantly prolongs the timeline and effectively ties Moldova’s European integration to Moscow’s willingness to settle the dispute.
