Associate Professor Hugo Drochon.

Assoc. Prof. Drochon: The Concentration of Oligarchic Power Around Trump May Be Breaking Apart

In an interview with the ECPS, Associate Professor Hugo Drochon, a political theorist at the University of Nottingham and author of Elites and Democracy, examines the relationship between populism, elite circulation, and democratic renewal. Reflecting on Trump’s second presidency and the November 3 midterms, Assoc. Prof. Drochon argues that established American institutions retain significant resilience despite efforts to transform governance. He also explores the concentration of oligarchic power surrounding Trump and Silicon Valley, suggesting that emerging fractures may restore competition among elites. Examining Europe’s radical-right resurgence, Assoc. Prof. Drochon emphasizes that democracy depends on continuous political contestation. Crucially, he warns that populism becomes anti-democratic when it restricts future challenges, undermining the pluralism necessary for democratic renewal.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

As Trumpism reshapes American governance and radical-right populism challenges established elites across Europe, the relationship between popular sovereignty and elite power has become increasingly contested. Can anti-establishment movements genuinely democratize political power, or do they merely replace one ruling minority with another? And when does populist insurgency become a threat to the very political competition that makes democratic renewal possible?

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Associate Professor Hugo Drochon, a political theorist at the University of Nottingham and historian of modern political thought, addresses these questions through his research on democratic theory, liberalism, and conspiracy theories. In his recent book, Elites and Democracy, Assoc. Prof. Drochon revisits classical elite theory to develop a conception of dynamic democracy, emphasizing elite circulation, political contestation, and social mobilization.

Central to Assoc. Prof. Drochon’s argument is that democracy cannot eliminate elites but can institutionalize competition between them. As he explains, “even in modern democracies, the people as such don’t rule.” The democratic question, therefore, concerns which elites govern, how they relate to citizens, and whether political challenges generate greater participation, redistribution, and equality.

Reflecting on Trump’s second presidency and the November 3 midterm elections, Assoc. Prof. Drochon questions whether the administration has fundamentally transformed American governance. Despite Trump’s recruitment of political outsiders and efforts to strengthen executive authority, he observes that “the midterms suggest that the older American institutions still have some strength left in them.” This institutional resilience complicates narratives of irreversible political transformation.

Assoc. Prof. Drochon also examines the convergence of Silicon Valley wealth and executive power, particularly Elon Musk’s alignment with Trump. Acknowledging an element of “oligarchic financial consolidation,” he suggests that this alliance may now be weakening. More fundamentally, he maintains that political, economic, and social elites must remain competitive: “it’s through that contestation that democracy remains possible.”

Extending his analysis to Europe, Assoc. Prof. Drochon explores the National Rally’s alliances with established economic elites, Germany’s political firewall against the AfD, and the increasingly prominent struggle between the center and the extremes. He argues that defending the political center requires substantive alternatives rather than institutional resistance alone: “A purely defensive position is not enough.”

Perhaps most importantly, Assoc. Prof. Drochon identifies the democratic limits of populism’s anti-pluralist tendencies. While populist challenges may expand participation and facilitate elite renewal, they become anti-democratic when they restrict subsequent political competition. The decisive question is whether emerging elites make future challenges easier or harder.

Drawing on cases ranging from MAGA and progressive movements to Serbia and Hungary, the interview ultimately advances a conception of democracy as an unfinished process. For Assoc. Prof. Drochon, meaningful democratic renewal requires not simply electoral turnover but institutions that preserve contestation, enable elite circulation, and continually expand opportunities for political participation.

Here is our interview with Associate Professor Hugo Drochon, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Populist Leaders and the Paradox of Elite Rule

Donald Trump delivers a victory speech after his big win in the Nevada caucus at Treasure Island Hotel & Casino, flanked by his sons Eric (right) and Donald Jr. (left) in Las Vegas, NV. Photo: Joe Sohm.

Professor Drochon, thank you for joining us. In Elites and Democracy, you argue that democracy cannot eliminate elites but can enable their continuous contestation and renewal. How does this framework explain the contemporary paradox of populist leaders claiming to represent ordinary people while themselves belonging to powerful political or economic elites?

Assoc. Prof. Hugo Drochon: It’s only a paradox if you think that the people can actually rule. If you don’t think modern democracy works in that way and recognize that there are always elites, there’s no paradox as such. The question becomes the relationship between the two. This is what I was trying to point out. There’s been a lot of discussion, especially since 2016, about populism being the right way to understand what’s going on in our politics, particularly after Trump in the US and Brexit in the UK—not to be too Anglo-centric about it.

But I wanted to point out that all these so-called populist leaders who claim to speak in the name of the people, as you rightly point out, are themselves elites of some description. Trump was part of the 1% economic elite, a media personality with The Apprentice, and used Twitter. In the UK, Boris Johnson was as establishment as they come.

So, it was about putting the emphasis back on the fact that, even in modern democracies, the people as such don’t rule. They’re always led by elites to a certain degree. Therefore, it may seem like a paradox, but it isn’t if you look at the reality of our modern democratic systems.

The question then becomes: What type of elites come to power? What is their relationship with the people? I wanted to keep those two things in mind. There are elites, and there are people, and we have to think about the relationship between the two.

Trumpism and the Transformation of American Elites

In your recent New York Times conversation, you describe Trumpism as the rise of a new elite challenging the Washington establishment. Has Trump’s second presidency fundamentally transformed the American governing elite, or merely replaced established political elites with a different coalition of economic, technological, and ideological power holders?

Assoc. Prof. Hugo Drochon: Very good question. I think the recent midterms perhaps give us a slightly different answer than if you’d asked me before the elections. Before the midterms, it seemed that there was a true transformation of American politics. The types of people Trump brought into Washington, D.C., were very different. Many of them were outsiders. Obviously, some, like Marco Rubio, had been around, while others, like J.D. Vance, had come in. But a whole generation of both Democrats and Republicans seemed to have been replaced, and Trump brought in new people, most notably somebody like Elon Musk.

So, it looked like a very different group of people, with a very different approach to ruling, including the idea of a very strong executive and Congress being put aside. But the midterms suggest that perhaps they haven’t been able to capture and completely change the system in the way they would have liked. Trump seems to have lost quite a bit of power in both the House and the Senate.

Now, perhaps it looks more like a type of circulation, with new and different elites coming in and replacing the old guard of both the Republicans and the Democrats. There’s certainly been a circulation of elites. But whether this has fundamentally changed American government is another question. The midterms suggest that the older American institutions still have some strength left in them. I think we’ll know more in the next couple of years. There’s obviously been some change, but perhaps the institutions haven’t changed as completely as we might have expected when Trump came to power.

Silicon Valley, Trump, and Oligarchic Power

Caricature: Shutterstock.

You distinguish governing from non-governing elites, highlighting Elon Musk and other technology billionaires entering Trump’s political orbit. Does the growing convergence of Silicon Valley wealth and executive authority represent democratic elite circulation or a new concentration of oligarchic power?

Assoc. Prof. Hugo Drochon: Both, because there is circulation, with new elites coming in. Interestingly, I saw recently that Elon Musk said he wasn’t MAGA anymore, so there seems to be a break from that, too. Normally, the idea behind this kind of elite circulation is elite competition: different forms of elite power—political, economic, and social—compete with one another. There’s always a degree of competition.

Here, specifically, it seems that a certain type of economic power associated with Silicon Valley—and there are other types of economic power that we haven’t discussed—aligned itself with Trump. This seems to have brought about a degree of oligarchic financial consolidation, which may now be starting to break apart.

So, in that specific convergence, yes, there was an element of oligarchic power. But that seems to be breaking up. More generally, the conventional understanding of elite circulation is that these different forms of power compete with one another. You might have social elites, other economic elites, or different types of political elites, all competing with one another. And it’s through that contestation that democracy remains possible.

The People May Never Rule, but Elite Circulation Can Make Them Better Off

Drawing on Pareto’s theory of elite circulation, you explain how rising elites mobilize ordinary citizens to displace established elites. Yet the people rarely govern directly. Under what conditions can populist elite replacement produce substantive democratization rather than simply reproduce existing hierarchies of power?

Assoc. Prof. Hugo Drochon: Pareto has a very simplistic but useful formula. He talks about A, B, and C: A represents the established elite, while B represents the rising elite challenging A and bringing C, the people, over to its side by saying, “Look, A is not representing you. If you come over with us, we’ll overthrow them, and we’ll give you more opportunities.” Of course, B then comes to power, while C never rules. Eventually, D emerges as the new challenging power, and the circulation continues.

But I do want to emphasize that, at that moment of change, in the moment of circulation, there is a possibility of political change and democratization, depending on what you mean by that. If we think of democratization as a movement toward equality, we can judge whether the challenge from the new elite to the established elite increases participation, diversity, and redistribution.

If it does, then you might say that there has been an increase in democratization, though not necessarily in democracy altogether, and that this has benefited the people more generally. C will never rule, but C can be better off with a different type of elite, or even with the existing elite. That is the real question of elite circulation.

Trump’s Takeover of the Republican Party Was Facilitated by Establishment Elites

Your concept of ‘dynamic democracy’ emphasizes three elements: social mobilization, defecting or “rebel” elites, and institutions capable of translating their alliance into political change. How does this framework illuminate MAGA’s success, particularly the decision of establishment Republicans to accommodate Trump rather than resist his takeover of the party?

Assoc. Prof. Hugo Drochon: As you say, you need rebel elites. For me, the key question in 2016, when Trump first launched his political campaign and tried to take over the Republican primaries, was whether he would succeed. I think that was the more interesting moment. He was able to bring in new people, but if the old establishment Republicans had closed ranks and supported more established figures, such as Jeb Bush, would Trump have been able to succeed? That remains an open question.

It was people like Paul Ryan and Senator McConnell who helped facilitate his rise. That process is particularly interesting. There’s accommodation, bit by bit, until eventually there’s a complete takeover. That’s how insurgents come to power.

Without drawing a direct comparison, we often say that Hitler would never have come to power if Germany’s conservative elites at the time hadn’t made concession after concession until it was too late. I don’t want to draw an analogy between the two, but this illustrates how insurgents can come to power.

So, the rebel elites were key. Perhaps that also raises a question about what’s happening today with the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). They seem to be capturing a particular moment, especially with Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC). Could something similar be said about the Democratic Party today? Yes or no.

Why MAGA Succeeded Where Black Lives Matter Struggled

Black People.
Black Lives Matter protesters march around Marion Square during an organized demonstration in Charleston, South Carolina, USA, on July 13, 2016. Photo: Gerald T. Coli / Dreamstime.

In your New York Times discussion, you contrast MAGA’s institutional success with Black Lives Matter’s limited transformation into an enduring political vehicle. Why did BLM struggle to secure comparable support from established Democratic elites? Does this reveal a structural weakness in progressive movement politics?

Assoc. Prof. Hugo Drochon: That’s a nice contrast. You could say MAGA was building on institutions that were already there, namely the Tea Party movement. It had the movement, one of the three elements I talked about, Trump as its leader, rebel elites like Paul Ryan and Mitch McConnell, as we’ve just discussed, and an institution, namely the primaries. So, it had the three elements of dynamic democracy that I talk about.

Why didn’t BLM succeed in the same way? Partly because the Democratic establishment didn’t want to take it on board. There may be two reasons for that. First, some of BLM’s campaign slogans, such as “defund the police,” were not well received, at least by the Democratic establishment. Second, BLM was much more decentralized than the Tea Party, which made it harder to build alliances.

But there’s a real, ongoing question today concerning the Democratic Socialists of America: whether they’re able to bring over some of the more established Democratic Party members and whether somebody like AOC could bring sufficient people over to their side. I think you could say there is a movement behind the Democratic Socialists of America, and they obviously have their leaders.

The question is whether they have rebel elites from the Democratic establishment willing to come over to their side. Secondly, through which institution would this happen? Perhaps through certain primaries. Some Democratic Socialists of America candidates have already gone through the primaries and succeeded. But those two elements are still missing: the rebel elites and the institutions needed for that change to really happen. There are still a couple of years to go, and it could potentially happen.

AOC Needs Rebel Elites from the Democratic Establishment to Succeed

After the November 3 midterms in the US, democratic socialists and other progressive challengers gained significant victories contesting established Democratic leadership. What would constitute genuine elite renewal within the Democratic Party? Could figures such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez generate transformative change without a significant defection from the party establishment?

Assoc. Prof. Hugo Drochon: Yes, I was just trying to address that. For AOC to succeed, if she is serious about it—and this applies not just to AOC but to a number of other progressive candidates as well—she would need, at least according to my theory, a substantial number of rebel elites from the Democratic establishment.

Whether that happens depends on how successful the progressives are considered to be. There’s a debate in America right now about which candidates were more successful: the moderates or the progressives. There’s an argument that moderate candidates actually outperformed progressive candidates.

So, it’s not a given that the Democratic establishment would join them. But for AOC to be successful, she would indeed need those two elements, including members of the Democratic establishment willing to come over to her side. So far, nobody has really done that, although Barack Obama campaigned for El-Sayed. That was an example of a connection between the two, with Obama, an established Democratic politician who is now retired, coming over to help the campaign. You would need more examples of that, with established Democratic politicians actively joining AOC. That’s what you would really need. The institutional question also needs to be thought through: What’s the institution? Will it be the primaries? How will that happen? Those are the two questions that remain open.

Without a Durable Coalition, Serbia’s Student Movement Could Face Serious Difficulties

Students gather in Gornji Milanovac, Serbia.
Students gather in Gornji Milanovac, Serbia, ahead of a major protest march to Belgrade on October 18, 2026. Photo: Dejan Krsmanovic / Dreamstime.

Serbia’s student-led movement has secured a parliamentary majority after nearly two years of protests against Aleksandar Vučić’s government. Does this represent an exceptional example of social movements generating their own governing elites, rather than depending on defections from established political elites? How does it challenge your model of dynamic democracy?

Assoc. Prof. Hugo Drochon: That’s a great challenge, so I’m glad you brought it up. There are a few things to consider. First, some of the movement’s leaders are themselves elites, even if they’re not established political elites. There are lawyers, judges, media figures, university leaders, and others involved. So, it’s not purely a student movement. There are already elites involved, but they come from outside the political establishment.

The one element they’re still missing is rebel elites from the establishment willing to come over to their side. They already have an institution, namely elections, but we’ll have to see how the situation develops. If they don’t attract enough defectors from the establishment—not necessarily politicians, but perhaps people from institutions such as the civil service or the judiciary—I worry about whether the movement will be able to establish itself firmly and continue. It needs a form of institutionalization that it doesn’t yet have.

There’s also a skeptical, perhaps cynical, interpretation of what the leader in Serbia might be thinking: “I’ll step aside and let the students come in. They’ll eventually implode, and then I’ll be able to come back.” So, there’s a real question about the movement’s future.

They need to institutionalize themselves. They’ve won the election, so they clearly have two elements: the movement and the institution. For them to succeed, they now need people to break away from the establishment—not just from politics but more broadly—and come over to their side to build a durable coalition. Otherwise, I fear they’re going to be in trouble.

Europe’s Radical Right and the Politics of Elite Defection

Across Europe, parties such as Germany’s AfD, France’s National Rally, and Reform UK have challenged established political elites. How do their trajectories illustrate the interaction between rising populist elites and traditional conservative establishments? Are elite defections more consequential than mass anti-establishment sentiment in explaining their political influence?

Assoc. Prof. Hugo Drochon: I think you could say anti-establishment sentiment is always present. That’s the nature of modern representative democracy, in a way, because there are always elites, and there’s always a gap between what the people truly want or express—if that can ever be fully identified—and the reality that representative democracy is a form of elite rule.

What my theory tries to emphasize is that we need to be realistic about what’s possible, because the desire to close that gap between elites and the people can be quite dangerous. That gap is a feature of our democracy, and we should resist trying to eliminate it because attempts to do so have led to many disasters throughout the 20th century.

So, anti-establishment populist sentiment is always there, although its intensity increases and decreases. This brings us back to what we discussed earlier about how rising elites may be better equipped to respond to the demands of the people.

I know the French case a bit better, and we’ve seen figures like Le Pen and Bardella courting business leaders. I’ve come across reports of lunches involving Bernard Arnault, the richest man in France. So, they’re trying to bring these defectors over to their side. There’s also been a break within the traditional center-right party, Les Républicains, with Éric Ciotti aligning himself with Le Pen’s campaign.

 We’ve also seen developments in the media, with Bolloré, the billionaire who has been buying up media companies, including CNews, the 24-hour television news channel, as well as some publishing houses, in an effort to legitimize the far right. So, there is an emerging alliance, although the political boundaries have largely held so far. In Germany, too, that kind of firewall hasn’t broken down yet. France is heading toward a very challenging presidential election but maintaining that firewall remains one of the hopes for preventing an extremist takeover of the European political center.

Election posters featuring Alice Weidel, co-leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD).
Election posters featuring Alice Weidel, co-leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), displayed during the 2025 German federal election campaign. Such posters are reportedly often torn down or vandalized. Photo: Dreamstime.

A Defensive Political Center Cannot Survive Without Offering Something New

In your work on Norberto Bobbio, you suggest that contemporary political struggles frequently pit the center against the extremes rather than simply left against right. How does this perspective illuminate Macronism, Le Pen’s National Rally, and Germany’s efforts to maintain a Brandmauer against the AfD? Can centrist elite resistance preserve democracy while inadvertently reinforcing populist grievances?

Assoc. Prof. Hugo Drochon: That’s the central question, isn’t it? I think we’re at a moment when the left-right divide may no longer adequately capture the dynamics of our politics. Take Donald Trump’s rise to power. In many ways, Trump wasn’t simply a left-right phenomenon because he wanted to get rid of not only the Democrats but also the established Republicans. His entire campaign revolved around “drain the swamp.” He wanted to remove the whole Washington, D.C., establishment, left and right, and fundamentally change how American politics operated. That was his program, and when he was most recently elected, it looked as though he might succeed. The midterms have called that into question.

Brexit was similar. In 2016, most of the main political parties—Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and the Conservatives—were, at least officially, campaigning in favor of Remain. Meanwhile, marginal parties such as UKIP, along with rebel elites like Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, broke away and joined these official and semi-official movements. Again, that doesn’t look like a conventional left-right divide but something closer to a center-extremes dynamic. In both cases, Trump and Brexit, something previously considered marginal or extreme became the new center.

The Left-Right Divide No Longer Adequately Explains Today’s Political Realignment

France offers another example. In 2017, Macron embodied the traditional center. But the confrontation with Marine Le Pen illustrates what I think is an important distinction between left-right and center-extremes dynamics. Left-right politics normally involves mutual recognition: you’re a socialist, I’m a conservative, and that’s fine. In center-extremes politics, however, there’s a denunciation of the other, with labels that the other side would reject. 

In 2017, Emmanuel Macron argued that the divide was no longer between left and right. He was effectively saying, “I’m left and right at the same time. The divide is between progressives and reactionaries.” In other words, “I, Emmanuel Macron, am a progressive. You, Marine Le Pen, are a reactionary.” Marine Le Pen, meanwhile, was saying, “No, no, no. I’m a true patriot, and you’re a neoliberal globalist.” These are labels that each side rejects. They no longer see themselves simply as opponents or rivals competing for the same political power. This is why the language becomes much more pronounced in center-extremes politics. The struggle is really about defining the true center ground of politics.

Marine Le Pen claims to represent the true French center ground, the patriotic center, whereas Emmanuel Macron represents a globalist European center ground. Both claim to occupy the center. It’s not a question of one claiming to be in the center and the other on the right. In center-extremes dynamics, the question is which side represents the true center ground. In conventional left-right politics, by contrast, there tends to be agreement about what the center is, with each side offering a right-wing or left-wing version of it.

We’re currently experiencing a period of significant political realignment. These dynamics are not adequately captured by the left-right divide but rather by center-extremes competition: a previously marginal position attempting to become the new center ground, around which a new left and right might eventually reestablish themselves, while the conventional center struggles to hold its position.

But whether that conventional center can succeed remains the question. Can the center ground hold? Bobbio raises this issue, as do many others. In the American context, Arthur Schlesinger spoke about the “vital center,” which represented a defense of liberal democracy, and the “dead center,” which amounted to little more than combining left and right without proposing anything genuinely new.

When the center simply combines elements of left and right without offering a new political vision, it invites the extremes to advance further. For the conventional center ground to hold today, it needs to offer something new—a third position, a new political program, or policies capable of bringing people together. A purely defensive position is not enough, and we’re seeing that across European politics today.

Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the end of a political meeting in Marseille for Rassemblement National party on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.

The Democratic Test of Populism Is Whether It Allows Further Political Contestation

Jan-Werner Müller defines populism through anti-elitism and anti-pluralism, while your framework emphasizes elite competition and renewal. Can populism be democratically productive when it opens political institutions to excluded constituencies, or does its claim to exclusively represent “the people” inevitably threaten the pluralism on which meaningful elite competition depends?

Assoc. Prof. Hugo Drochon: Thank you for bringing up Müller, who was actually one of my reference points at the beginning of this work. From 2016 onward, particularly in the Western world, there was a strong focus on using populism to describe the political events of the time.

I understood my book not as a corrective to that work but as a complement to it. There’s a great deal to learn from the populism literature, as you’ve just pointed out, particularly the division of politics into a kind of “us versus them”: a corrupt elite versus a pure people. What I wanted to bring into that discussion was the recognition that the relationship between democracy and elites is not new. We’ve been discussing it for a long time, including through Pareto’s work at the beginning of the 20th century. I wanted to bring the elite perspective back into the discussion, particularly the fact that populist leaders are themselves elites.

But I think the point about anti-pluralism is particularly interesting. What I want to emphasize is that there’s always a process of circulation, with rising elites challenging established elites. This is part of politics more generally, but it’s also part of democratic politics. We can judge these challenges by whether they’re democratizing or not. Do they contribute to democratization, understood as greater participation, more redistribution, or perhaps more diversity? We can assess different challenges, whether populist or not, according to those criteria.

There’s another important question concerning anti-pluralism: When these challenges occur, do they make it easier or harder for the next challenge to emerge? If the system becomes more closed and subsequent challenges become more difficult, then we can also regard that as an anti-democratic challenge because it restricts the possibility of further contestation. Perhaps this is one of the defining features of populism’s anti-pluralism. Because populism claims to speak in the name of the people, there’s a tendency to prevent subsequent challenges from emerging. That may be one of the anti-democratic elements associated with populism.

You Cannot Build Democratic Politics on Conspiracy Theories

Your comparative research with Annemarie Walter finds that conspiracy thinking is associated with political distrust and rejection of the political system. How do conspiracy narratives about hidden elites or the “deep state” affect democratic accountability? Can they empower challenges to entrenched authority while simultaneously legitimizing authoritarian leadership?

Assoc. Prof. Hugo Drochon: It’s a big question. What’s important to emphasize is that Christopher Hitchens had this great line about conspiracy theories being the exhaust fumes of democracy. What we need in a democracy is a critical public. We need people to hold their leaders accountable. That’s part of the essence of democracy. Within that critical public sphere, there will always be conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists.

The difference between a critical public sphere, or even a cynical one, and a conspiracy theorist public sphere is that the critical or cynical public is willing to keep elites in check and hold them accountable while remaining open to new facts, information, and arguments. Conspiracy theories, by contrast, often have a kind of self-sealing capacity. They’re more like belief systems in which no amount of new information, data, or argument can challenge the fundamental core belief.

Both elements exist within democratic discourse. It would be authoritarian and counterproductive to try to repress conspiracy theories or conspiracy beliefs. That’s not what we’re looking for. But we do want the critical element to prevail over the conspiracy theory element because you cannot build democratic politics on conspiracy theories. They’re a form of belief that resists change, whereas critical engagement is precisely what democracy needs.

There’s also an important distinction between a conspiracy theory account of democracy and the elite-centered account of democracy that I’m trying to offer. In my account, there are always elites, but those elites compete with one another. They’re not a homogeneous, unified group exercising power in the same way. It’s precisely through that competition that democratic renewal becomes possible, along with the potential for democracy understood in terms of redistribution and equality, as I’ve just mentioned.

Conspiracy theories, by contrast, portray political elites as a unified group operating according to a predetermined plan, controlling not only politics but also the economy and the environment. That’s why we encounter conspiracy theories portraying climate change as a hoax. That’s not a conception of politics with which you can meaningfully engage. So, we need to distinguish these two perspectives, both intellectually and conceptually, to develop a realistic and clear-eyed understanding of politics without falling into conspiracy theories or counter-politics.

Democracy Depends on the Continuous Challenge of Established Elites by Rising Elites

Peter Magyar, a popular opposition politician of celebrity status meeting the press at the site of a soccer arena and miniature train station in Viktor Orban’s village in Felcsut, Hungary on May 24, 2024. Photo: Blue Corner Studio.

And finally, Professor Drochon, in your discussion of Elites and Democracy, you suggest that democracy is never fully achieved but must continually be pursued through political contestation. Looking at Trumpism, Europe’s populist resurgence, and Serbia’s recent political transition, what would constitute meaningful democratic renewal beyond electoral turnover? Can your model of dynamic democracy reconcile the permanence of elites with the ideal of popular sovereignty?

Assoc. Prof. Hugo Drochon: There’s a nice Aesop’s fable of a dying peasant who, on his deathbed, tells his children that there’s a buried treasure in the field. He dies, and we would hope the children are sad, but they’re also very excited because they’ve heard there’s a buried treasure in the field. So, they go out and dig, dig, dig, looking for the treasure. Of course, there’s no treasure, but by tilling the land, they’ve made themselves richer.

Those are the two images I want to keep in mind. True democracy, in which the people really rule, is like the buried treasure in the field that you never find. But by striving toward it, which is the essence of my account of dynamic democracy, you may achieve democratic benefits.

To answer your question, I think there’s a broader point: politics can generally be understood as a continuous challenge to established elites by rising elites. This is a historical reality that persists across political systems, not just democracies. What distinguishes democracy is that it institutionalizes this challenge through elections.

Elections make that process clearer, but the challenge itself is always present. It’s a prerequisite for the possibility of positive democratic change. You need the challenge for change to occur, although it doesn’t guarantee that change will happen. It’s only through the possibility of that challenge that positive outcomes can emerge, just as it’s only by tilling the land that you might become richer.

We’ve seen examples of this throughout the world today. I hope I’ve offered at least a yardstick for judging whether these challenges contribute to democratization—whether they involve tilling the land and making people richer, so to speak. We can judge them by whether they increase participation, redistribution, and perhaps diversity, and whether they allow further challenges to emerge afterward. Will they permit continued contestation, or will they try to block it?

One particularly interesting example we haven’t discussed is Hungary. One of the first institutional changes Magyar wanted to introduce was to prevent certain offices, notably that of the prime minister, from being held continuously. In other words, those holding such offices would need to change. That’s an institutional way of putting dynamic democracy into practice: institutionalizing renewal and making it possible.

So, if we take as our starting point this idea of dynamism in politics—the continuous challenge by rising elites to established elites—we have a democratic yardstick for assessing whether such challenges are democratizing or moving toward greater equality. We can then use that yardstick to understand and evaluate what’s happening in the world today.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Dr. Fizza Batool.

Dr. Fizza Batool: You Need to Understand the Society to Understand Populism

In this ECPS Voice of Youth (VoY) interview, Dr. Fizza Batool, Assistant Professor of Social Sciences at SZABIST University in Pakistan, discusses the evolution of populism studies, the methodological challenges of researching populism in diverse political contexts, and the importance of incorporating perspectives from the Global South into comparative political research. Emphasizing that “you need to understand a society in order to understand its populism,” she advocates combining qualitative interpretation with computational methods and moving beyond Western-centered frameworks. Reflecting on her research into Pakistan’s populist politics, academic mentorship, and international scholarly networks, Dr. Batool also explores the relationship between religious nationalism and populism, including her forthcoming comparative research on Pakistan and Israel, while calling for greater attention to the public demand sustaining populist movements.

Interview by Natalia Crane

As populism continues to reshape political landscapes across the world, understanding its diverse manifestations requires moving beyond Western-centered theoretical frameworks and engaging more deeply with the historical, cultural, and political contexts of individual societies. In an insightful interview for the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) Voice of Youth (VoY) series, Dr. Fizza Batool, Assistant Professor of Social Sciences at the Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Institute of Science and Technology (SZABIST) University in Pakistan, reflects on the intellectual, methodological, and institutional challenges confronting contemporary populism research.

Specializing in comparative politics, democratization, peace studies, and populism, Dr. Batool brings an interdisciplinary perspective shaped by more than a decade of experience in research and development. Her academic journey began unexpectedly in the natural sciences, where she studied physics, mathematics, and astronomy before transitioning to political science. Her interest in populism subsequently emerged through research on political participation and Pakistan’s evolving political landscape.

Drawing on Ernesto Laclau’s discursive approach and Francisco Panizza’s understanding of populism as a mode of identification, Dr. Batool challenges the assumption that competing theoretical traditions must be mutually exclusive. Instead, she argues that ideational, stylistic, strategic, and discursive approaches illuminate different dimensions of the same political phenomenon. Her comparative research on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Imran Khan further demonstrates how conventional distinctions between inclusionary and exclusionary populism can obscure the complex intersections of nationalism, religion, and socioeconomic discourse.

Central to her scholarly perspective is the conviction that “you need to understand a society in order to understand its populism.” She emphasizes that computational techniques and quantitative analysis must be complemented by qualitative interpretation and contextual knowledge. Populism in Pakistan, she explains, cannot necessarily be understood through analytical assumptions developed in Europe or the United States.

Looking ahead, Dr. Batool discusses her forthcoming research fellowship at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), beginning in February 2027, where she intends to investigate the relationship between religious populism and religious nationalism. Her proposed comparison of Pakistan and Israel highlights both the intellectual possibilities of cross-regional research and the mobility restrictions confronting scholars from the Global South.

She also advocates greater attention to the demand side of populism, asking why ordinary citizens develop and maintain populist attitudes rather than focusing exclusively on political leaders and their strategies.

Beyond theoretical debates, the interview addresses academic mentorship, international research networks, methodological innovation, and the obstacles facing early-career scholars. Dr. Batool stresses that research collaboration represents a “two-way learning process” through which younger scholars contribute perspectives that established researchers may overlook.

Dr. Batool’s reflections offer a compelling argument for a more globally inclusive, context-sensitive, and methodologically pluralistic study of populism—one that recognizes the distinctive experiences of societies beyond established Western democracies.

Interview with Dr. Fizza Batool lightly edited for clarity and flow.

An Unconventional Academic Journey

PTI supporter at Jinnah Cricket Stadium during a political rally of cricketer turned politician Imran Khan on March 23, 2012 in Sialkot, Pakistan. Photo: Jahanzaib Naiyyer.

To begin, could you introduce yourself, outline your academic and professional journey, and explain how your research interests developed? What initially drew you to comparative politics, democratization, peace studies, and populism?

Dr. Fizza Batool: Thank you, Natalia, and thank you to ECPS for inviting me. I’m currently an Assistant Professor at SZABIST University in Pakistan, although from February 2027 I will be moving to Europe to take up a research fellowship at GIGA. My academic journey might be relatable to students from the Global South, but it was not a particularly conventional one. I initially graduated in the natural sciences, studying physics, mathematics, and astronomy—subjects that seem to have very little to do with populism or political science.

In many parts of the Global South, when students perform well academically, their parents do not necessarily encourage them to pursue the social sciences. It was difficult for me to make that transition, and I probably lost one or two years of my academic life trying to convince my parents that I wanted to study social sciences. Eventually, I was able to make that change, and looking at where I am today, I believe I made the right decision. I would encourage students who are considering popular or demanding fields of study to choose something they genuinely enjoy. In the long run, that will be much more rewarding.

My interest in populism developed almost by coincidence. When I began my PhD in International Relations, I was primarily interested in democracy and democratization. My doctoral research focused on political participation and voting behaviour across liberal and illiberal democracies. It was a comparative project that also incorporated quantitative and computational methods, with Pakistan as one of its case studies.

At the time, populism was not my main focus. However, Pakistan experienced a successful populist movement, and I became interested in understanding it. I kept encountering the term populism in journalistic discussions of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement, and I decided that I needed to study the concept more closely. I eventually wrote a paper on the subject. The findings were quite different from what I had initially expected, and that experience encouraged me to explore populism further. That is how my research journey in this field began.

Understanding Populism: Beyond Competing Definitions

How do you define populism in your own research, and why have you adopted that particular conceptual approach? Has your understanding of populism evolved throughout your academic journey, particularly as you have explored its manifestations in Pakistan?

Dr. Fizza Batool: I began with Ernesto Laclau’s definition of populism as a discursive logic, and I still use it. I consider it one of the most useful definitions we have. I also draw on Francisco Panizza’s work on populism as a mode of identification, applying this perspective to both political leaders and citizens. However, my conceptual understanding has evolved. When I first started researching populism, I treated the different approaches—the ideational, discursive, stylistic, and strategic schools—as separate categories that were competing with one another.

After working on populism for several years and particularly following discussions with Kenneth Roberts during my postdoctoral fellowship, I began to understand these approaches differently. I now see that the differences between Laclau’s understanding of populism and the ideational approach, particularly the definition developed by Cas Mudde, are largely about the questions they seek to answer.

Laclau is more concerned with the process of populist construction: how political actors construct the people as a collective identity. The ideational, stylistic, and strategic approaches, meanwhile, tend to focus more on the outcomes of that process.

I therefore don’t necessarily see these approaches as contradictory. They have different emphases. The process Laclau describes can produce outcomes that are then examined through other approaches. For example, Benjamin Moffitt’s work on populism as a political style helps us understand how the distinction between high and low politics is communicated, while Mudde’s approach highlights the antagonistic division between the people and the elite.

I continue to use Laclau’s definition, but I don’t disagree with the other schools. I see them as offering different ways of understanding the same broader phenomenon.

Theoretical Debates and Misconceptions in Populism Studies

Photo: Dreamstime.

Populism remains one of the most contested concepts in political science. Which theoretical debates do you consider most consequential for the future of the field? And what misconceptions about populism do you encounter most frequently, both inside and outside academia?

Dr. Fizza Batool: I think we have reached a point where the debate about what populism is has become relatively settled. One misconception I frequently encounter in academic writing is the claim that populism has no clear definition. I disagree with that. I believe populism is as well-defined as other concepts in the social sciences. Most concepts begin as relatively general terms used in everyday language, newspapers, and public discussions. Eventually, social scientists begin to develop more precise definitions. This happened with democracy, nationalism, and many other concepts, and the same process occurred with populism.

A lack of complete consensus is therefore not something unique to populism. Most social science concepts have boundaries that are debated, but that does not mean we do not understand what they refer to. In populism studies, we now have a sufficiently developed understanding of the concept and how it differs from other discursive frameworks. I expect future debates to focus increasingly on how populism relates to other phenomena, particularly nationalism and authoritarianism, as well as its impact on democracy.

Outside academia, one common misconception—particularly in Pakistan—is that populism simply means being popular. The term is also frequently used as a negative or insulting label. This can make discussions difficult when engaging with audiences who are unfamiliar with its academic meaning.

There is another misconception that I encounter among people who already study populism. When I explain that I follow Laclau’s definition, some assume that everyone who uses his approach must also be a post-Marxist or must consider populism something inherently positive. I don’t think that is necessarily true. Following Laclau’s conceptualization does not mean that you automatically endorse a particular political position or view populism positively.

Methodological Challenges: Combining Discourse and Computational Analysis

How do you operationalize and measure populism in your own work, particularly when examining different political systems and contexts? What methodological challenges arise when studying populism in Pakistan, and how do you balance qualitative and quantitative approaches?

Dr. Fizza Batool: Since I started with Laclau’s definition, I was initially more interested in the process through which the people are constructed as an identity group. Empirically analyzing populism through Laclau’s approach can be challenging. Studying a process is much more difficult than examining a specific event or outcome. Applying an ideational definition, for example, can be easier because there are already established scales and methods for analyzing political speeches and populist attitudes. The same resources were not as readily available for applying Laclau’s approach.

Nevertheless, this approach also allowed me to develop a broader and more comprehensive analysis. Discourse remains my main source of data because I believe language and discourse are central to the construction of political identities. However, I have combined computational methods, including text analysis, with qualitative approaches such as discourse-historical analysis.

I don’t think computational methods alone are sufficient, particularly when applying Laclau’s framework. You always need qualitative interpretation because populism in Pakistan might mean something quite different from populism in Europe, Turkey, or the United States. Understanding these differences requires contextual knowledge, and that is where qualitative research becomes essential.

The study of populism increasingly relies on digital data, social media, and computational methods. How have these tools influenced your research, and how have they transformed the study of populist movements, particularly in South Asia?

Dr. Fizza Batool: One positive development is that social media has made large amounts of political data much more accessible. Politicians are constantly publishing statements, commenting on events, and communicating with their audiences. Even when a political event is not originally digital, a recording or written transcript of a speech can often be found online. The problem of accessing data has therefore been reduced considerably. However, the growing volume of available information also means that researchers need to enhance their analytical skills.

I began with qualitative research, which requires a great deal of in-depth analysis. I developed my computational research skills much later in my academic journey. This is something I often recommend to my students: build your quantitative and computational skills much earlier in your academic career. We are now dealing with so much information that it is no longer possible for an individual researcher to analyze everything manually. We need computational techniques, but we also need to combine computational analysis with our own understanding of the subject.

Unexpected Findings in Pakistan’s Populist Politics

Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Chairman Imran Khan addresses to his supporters during public gathering held on December 11, 2012 in Lodheran, Pakistan.

In your work examining populism in Pakistan, what has been the most surprising finding? Have you encountered evidence that fundamentally challenged your original assumptions?

Dr. Fizza Batool: My first research project on populism began when I was still relatively unfamiliar with the concept. I selected a theoretical framework that was particularly popular at the time: the distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary populism.

I chose two cases from Pakistan’s political history. I expected Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was a left-wing populist in the 1970s, to represent inclusionary populism. Imran Khan, whom I understood as a right-wing nationalist and populist, seemed likely to represent an exclusionary form. However, when I began analyzing their speeches, I realized that the distinction was not so straightforward. Both leaders drew on religion and religious nationalism. Both used narratives that constructed divisions between Muslims and non-Muslims, including in relation to India. Nationalist discourse was very prominent in Bhutto’s speeches, despite his association with left-wing politics.

At the same time, I found considerable socialist discourse in Imran Khan’s speeches, particularly around social justice and equality. This was surprising because it challenged the categories I had initially expected to find. It also encouraged me to develop a different analytical framework, which I later applied in my first book. In many ways, my involvement in populism studies began with a finding that contradicted my original assumptions.

Researching Politically Sensitive Topics and Maintaining Objectivity

Populism frequently operates in politically polarized environments characterized by disinformation and contested narratives. Have these dynamics affected your ability to collect data and conduct research? How do you approach politically sensitive topics while maintaining scholarly rigor?

Dr. Fizza Batool: This is a particularly important question given the level of polarization we are currently witnessing. Data access, disinformation, and the wider political environment are all concerns. I come from a society where certain subjects are difficult to research. You can face discouragement, obstacles to accessing data, criticism, and even social media campaigns directed against you. However, these pressures were not my greatest concern. What I found more challenging was recognizing my own political opinions and making sure they did not influence my research.

Imran Khan was the main populist case I was studying, but I did not support him or agree with his policies. I was concerned that my personal disapproval of his politics might affect how I analyzed his movement. I, therefore, had to remind myself repeatedly that my responsibility as a researcher was to remain objective. This is a challenge that many scholars face. You might dislike Donald Trump as a person or disagree with his politics, for example, but when researching his political movement, you still need to approach the subject analytically.

There are several tools that can help. Computational analysis can be useful because it allows researchers to examine data systematically before interpreting the results. A clearly defined theoretical framework is equally important, even when conducting qualitative research. You need to operationalize every concept you use. If you are studying democratic backsliding or political polarization, for example, you need to explain precisely what you mean by those terms and how you intend to identify them in your research. You cannot be completely neutral, but you can take steps to make your research more objective.

Academia, Public Debate, and the Role of the Classroom

Given your experience in academic research, policy research, and contributing to English-language newspapers and international publications, do you believe scholars have a responsibility to intervene in public discussions? How do you communicate complex academic findings to broader audiences?

Dr. Fizza Batool: I entered academia after spending several years working in policy research. My first professional engagement was, therefore, with policymakers and public institutions. Later, I began writing academic papers and books.

When I initially moved into an academic career, I thought that policy commentary and newspaper articles would remain my main ways of engaging with the public. However, I have come to believe that the classroom is one of the most important places where scholars can initiate these discussions.

With technological developments and the availability of large language models, access to information is no longer the main problem. Students can find information relatively easily. Therefore, we should not treat the classroom simply as a place where lecturers transfer information. Instead, it should be a space where we initiate debates and inspire students. I try to use my classroom to teach students how to be tolerant of different perspectives and how to engage constructively with disagreement.

Of course, students represent only a relatively small and often highly educated section of society. But they will eventually enter different professions and areas of public life. The discussions they experience in the classroom can therefore influence how they approach disagreements and political debates in the future. I believe this is one of the most important tools available to academics.

Looking Beyond Populism as a Challenge to Democracy

Labour Day celebrations
Labour Day celebrations at Old Town Square in Prague on May 1, 2017, featuring a banner depicting democracy as a leaf eaten by caterpillars labeled Putin, Kaczyński, Orbán, Babiš, Trump, and Fico.
Photo: Jolanta Wojcicka.

Beyond academic publications, what impact would you ideally like your research to have? How can scholarly work contribute to addressing democratic challenges associated with populism, political polarization, and institutional instability, particularly in developing democracies?

Dr. Fizza Batool: One impact I would really like to have is to encourage people to look beyond the idea that populism is the only challenge facing democracy. There is currently considerable attention devoted to populism, but I believe several other forces are working together and contributing to the challenges facing democratic systems. We also need to examine the problems that emerge from within democracy itself.

We need to be critical and progressive in the sense that we should look for practical solutions—not only for established democracies, but also for hybrid regimes and autocracies. How can these societies be transformed? Questions of social justice, economic equality, and other structural factors are important to this discussion.

I also believe scholars should be careful not to become advocates who simply decide what is good or bad. Earlier in my career, I was more inclined to approach research in that way, but I now try to position myself as an analyst. My responsibility is to present the findings of my research rather than provide moral judgements. I want to give readers the results of my analysis and allow them to decide what they make of them.

International Collaboration and Opportunities for Global South Scholars

How has cooperation with other scholars, academic networks, and initiatives such as the ECPS Early Career Researchers Network influenced your research and professional development?

Dr. Fizza Batool: I consider myself fortunate to have been among the scholars in Pakistan who began working on populism and were introduced to international researchers relatively early in their careers. When I submitted my first research paper on populism, I had no idea that one of the reviewers was Ihsan Yilmaz. Because the paper underwent blind peer review, he did not know who had written it either.

Later, when I was looking for a supervisor for my postdoctoral research, I contacted him and shared the paper. He told me that he had been one of its reviewers and that he considered it an excellent piece of research. That was how I was introduced to him, and subsequently to ECPS.

I attended the ECPS Summer School and was able to meet many other scholars working on populism. This was the beginning of a much wider academic network.

I strongly believe that these networks play a very important role, particularly for scholars from the Global South. Researchers in these countries often have limited access to academic databases and research funding, and they may also lack the guidance and institutional support available elsewhere. I would therefore encourage scholars from the Global South to join international networks and become part of the wider academic community working on their research topics.

I have also been fortunate to work with senior scholars such as Kirk Hawkins and Ihsan Yilmaz. During my postdoctoral fellowship at Central European University, I worked with senior academics who became important role models for me. Beyond the knowledge they shared, they showed me how to support early-career researchers. They taught me that mentorship is not only about transferring knowledge, but also about encouraging younger scholars and helping them develop professionally. That is something I now try to do with my own students. I believe this connection between generations of scholars needs to continue and should never be broken.

Professional Challenges and the Importance of Academic Mobility

Having worked for more than a decade in the research and development sector, including in managerial positions, before and alongside your academic career, what have been your greatest personal and professional challenges? How has moving between policy-oriented work and academia influenced your approach?

Dr. Fizza Batool: As someone based in Pakistan, one of the greatest challenges is mobility. Pakistani citizens face significant difficulties in obtaining visas and attending international conferences. Travel grants are not always available, and universities do not necessarily provide financial support for international academic participation. Researchers therefore often depend on grants offered by external organizations and must repeatedly apply for funding to attend conferences and academic events.

This connects to the importance of international collaboration. Academic exchange is always a two-way learning process. It is not simply about providing students with access to international networks; younger researchers also bring perspectives and knowledge that more established scholars may not have considered. A younger student might see something differently, and that perspective can be valuable. This is why academic mobility is particularly important for early-career researchers, even though it remains difficult for many of them.

As scholars progress in their careers, they also face the challenge of balancing research with teaching and administrative responsibilities. These are common difficulties for academics everywhere.

On a personal level, I have been fortunate to have a very supportive family. My first postdoctoral fellowship took place only a few months after my wedding, and my husband was extremely encouraging. He supported my decision to spend eight months away for the fellowship, even though it was at the beginning of our life together.

I therefore experienced fewer personal obstacles, although professional challenges have certainly been present. Ultimately, I believe persistence is essential when navigating these challenges.

The Rewards of Academic Research

SummerSchool
Photo: Matej Kastelic.

Looking back at your academic and professional journey, what has been the most rewarding aspect of your research? Is there anything you would approach differently if you were beginning your academic career today?

Dr. Fizza Batool: One of the most rewarding experiences has been seeing my books published. Holding them in print was a particularly meaningful moment.

Another important experience was receiving my first postdoctoral fellowship. I had spent almost a year contacting scholars, applying for different opportunities, and receiving rejections. When the fellowship finally came through, it was an extremely rewarding moment. Rejection is never easy, and it can be discouraging. However, you need to be prepared for it. With persistence, you can eventually find opportunities.

I also find it very rewarding to see my students develop. When you supervise and teach students and later see them grow in their careers, it is a particularly fulfilling experience.

If I could go back and change something, I would develop my computational skills much earlier and begin publishing sooner. Because I entered academia after working in policy research, I started publishing relatively late. My advice to students would be to begin developing the skills they want to use in their careers as early as possible. It is important to balance learning information with building practical research skills.

Intellectual Influences and Academic Mentorship

Who or what has most profoundly influenced your intellectual development? Are there particular scholars, books, political experiences, or academic traditions that have shaped your thinking about populism, comparative democratization, and peace studies?

Dr. Fizza Batool: When it comes to academic literature, Francisco Panizza’s work has been particularly influential. I sometimes wish he had written more on populism because his application of Laclau’s definition to understand populism at the level of the public was, for me, a very different and valuable approach. I don’t think it has received as much attention as it deserves.

I am also currently working with Kirk Hawkins on a paper, and he has been another important intellectual influence. I have written two books with Ihsan Yilmaz, who has influenced me not only as a scholar but also through his personal qualities. He is an excellent person, and that has been a positive influence on me.

Beyond individual scholars, I also learn from the regions I research. Every region has its own particularities, and my experiences working in different academic, political, and social environments have influenced how I approach my work.

Advice for the Next Generation of Political Scientists

As universities become increasingly internationalized and research more competitive, what skills do young political scientists need most in order to thrive? What advice would you offer to the next generation of scholars entering the field?

Dr. Fizza Batool: I have already mentioned the importance of developing computational and data-analysis skills, as well as understanding that rejection is part of the academic process.

Another thing I would encourage students to do is focus more on theoretical reading. Empirical research is important and rewarding, but young scholars should also learn to question existing theories rather than simply apply them.

Try to think differently and be critical of the theoretical frameworks you encounter. If you begin working on theoretical development early in your academic career, it can help you establish a stronger foundation as a researcher and support your future development.

The Future of Populism Studies: A More Global Perspective

Where do you see populism studies evolving over the next decade? Should greater attention be given to populism beyond Western democracies, particularly in South Asia and other developing political contexts? Which neglected research areas deserve more attention?

Dr. Fizza Batool: I certainly believe that populism studies need to become more global. We need to understand more cases because each one contributes something different to the field.

I also expect to see more debate about the relationship between populism and other political phenomena, including nationalism, securitization, and other ideological and discursive frameworks. I don’t see populism studies losing relevance. On the contrary, I believe it will become increasingly important.

There are, however, several areas that remain under-researched.

One is the demand side of populism. Apart from the populist attitude scales that already exist, we have not explored enough alternative methods for measuring populism among the public. I have tried to address this in one of my books, but I believe we need to develop further qualitative and quantitative techniques to understand and empirically analyze populist demand.

Another area is the relationship between populist leaders in power and the foreign policies they develop. Although foreign policy has received more attention in recent years, there is still considerable room for research.

I am also currently interested in the relationship between religious nationalism and religious populism. There is already a substantial body of work on both subjects individually, but I want to understand how religious nationalism contributes to religious populism, and whether the relationship also works in the opposite direction.

I expect these connections to become increasingly important in future research.

Religious Populism, Nationalism, and the Case of Israel

Election billboards of religious political parties Shas and Otzma Yehudit before Israel’s fourth election in two years in a street of Jerusalem on March 22, 2021. Photo: Gali Estrange.

If resources, time, and institutional constraints were no obstacle, what research project would you most like to pursue? More broadly, what do you hope will be the lasting contribution of your work to scholarship and public understanding?

Dr. Fizza Batool: For the postdoctoral fellowship I will begin in February 2027, I will be working on the relationship between religious populism and religious nationalism. One of my case studies will be Israel, and I would really like to visit the country and study it in person.

I believe Israel shares several important characteristics with Pakistan. Both countries were founded with religion playing a central role in their national projects, and religious nationalism was present from the beginning of their political histories. I would therefore like to compare Pakistan and Israel.

However, as a Pakistani citizen, I cannot currently visit Israel because travel there is not permitted under my passport arrangements. This presents an important practical obstacle, so I will have to rely on publicly available data. If these barriers were ever removed, I would love to spend time in Israel and study its society directly. I have always believed that you need to understand a society in order to understand its populism.

Another important contribution I would like to make is to develop research on the demand side of populism. We already know from existing populist attitude scales that populist attitudes are widespread, but the question of why people develop and maintain these attitudes remains important.

There is considerable research on how populist leaders operate within society, but I think we need to understand more about the public demand that sustains populism. That is an area I would really like to explore further.

Supporters of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Two Sides of the Same Coin: How Bolsonaro and Trump Explain Defeat

In this commentary, Niccolò Capozzi examines how populist leaders respond to electoral defeat, comparing Flávio Bolsonaro’s reaction to Brazil’s October 2026 presidential election with Donald Trump’s response to the November US midterms. Drawing on theories of populist representation and democratic legitimacy, Capozzi explores why Bolsonaro immediately alleged electoral fraud while Trump initially blamed Republican candidates before questioning the results. He argues that these contrasting strategies reflect a common populist logic: electoral defeat is attributed to manipulation, disloyal allies, or institutional failures rather than voters’ rejection. Highlighting the importance of transparent electoral institutions and parties’ acceptance of results, Capozzi warns that delegitimizing elections can undermine public trust and democratic stability.

By Niccolò Capozzi*

Within the span of two weeks, two populist forces suffered electoral defeats in Brazil and the United States: Flávio Bolsonaro in Brazil’s presidential election and Donald Trump’s Republicans in the US midterm elections. Both lost votes and political power, but their reactions differed. In Brazil, incumbent President Lula da Silva won a narrowly contested election on October 25, prompting Bolsonaro to claim that the vote had been rigged. He subsequently flew to Miami, leaving behind legal troubles in Brazil and relying on Trump’s political protection. 

Meanwhile, Republicans lost control of Congress on November 3. Before the vote, Trump had declared that Democrats could win only through electoral fraud. Following the defeat, however, he initially distanced himself from the outcome, arguing that he had not been on the ballot, before questioning the election results a week later. These contrasting reactions raise an important question: Why do populist leaders contest some electoral defeats immediately but challenge others only after a delay?

Political scientist Adam Przeworski argues that democracy depends on losing parties accepting electoral outcomes. For populist leaders who claim to represent the “real people,” however, acknowledging defeat presents a fundamental dilemma. As Jan-Werner Müller observes, such leaders struggle to recognize electoral defeat as legitimate and instead seek alternative explanations. They may allege fraud, claiming that corrupt elites have stolen the people’s vote, or attribute the loss to the failures of candidates, political allies, or their own party.

In Brazil, Lula won with around 51.8 percent of the vote, defeating Flávio Bolsonaro by a margin of 4.4 million votes. Initially, the defeated candidate criticized the extension of polling hours ordered by Supreme Court Justice Cristiano Zanin and implemented by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). However, his campaign had itself requested the extension because of heavy rainfall, flooding, and road closures in several municipalities across São Paulo, Paraná, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and Santa Catarina. Moreover, votes cast after 5:00 p.m. accounted for less than 1 percent of Lula’s victory margin.

Shortly after the vote, the Brazilian Supreme Court ordered him to hand over his passports; nevertheless, he flew to Argentina, then to Ecuador, and finally ended up in Miami, where he enjoys Trump’s political protection. From the American city, he proclaimed himself ‘the true elected president of Brazil,’ called the result fraudulent without providing evidence, and thanked Trump. This story can be traced back to the Bolsonaro family, as his father, Jair Bolsonaro, also heavily criticised the reliability of electronic voting machines in 2022 and then left for Florida. He was eventually sentenced in 2025 to 27 years’ imprisonment for an attempted coup d’état. Thanks to his visa and Trump’s warm welcome for the family, it is easier to voice dissent from afar, with the full support of a powerful foreign ally.

The dynamics of the US midterm elections were different. Before the elections, Trump had already announced that the only way the Democrats could win would be by rigging the elections. He also claimed that Michele Tafoya, the Republican Senate candidate in Minnesota, could only lose if the Democrats cheated. This line of argument is a way of justifying a possible defeat in advance. After the election, the candidate lost. The Democrats took control of both the House and the Senate, dealing a major blow to the Republicans. Furthermore, even in a state like Texas, which is usually Republican, the Democrats won. Immediately after the result, there were no allegations of fraud from Trump; on the contrary, he first claimed that he was not among the candidates and that, had he been, the Republicans would have won, and subsequently attacked the Republican candidates.

In 2020, he lost the presidential election and, in that instance, as the defeat was his own, he spoke of a ‘stolen election.’ Research shows that these accusatory statements have eroded his voters’ confidence in the electoral process, and some Republican voters might believe that elections are rigged and therefore be less motivated to vote. The paradox is that, by attempting to dismiss defeats as invalid, he also risks discouraging his own voters from taking part. However, on November 9, Trump asked on Truth Social: ‘Does anybody really believe that this “election” was honest?’, without presenting any evidence. These provocative statements fell flat and stood alone, as the Republican candidates had already conceded defeat.

The choice between alleging electoral fraud and blaming internal party issues is a tactical one and depends on various factors. In the Brazilian case, Bolsonaro was able to allege electoral fraud because the margin was narrow. Trump, on the other hand, did not initially claim that the election had been rigged, and when he later did, he did not contest the figures but asked how the polls could have been so wrong. 

In Brazil, the TSE certified the result within a few hours, and the Supreme Court ordered the withdrawal of his passports. Therefore, there was no time for a fraud narrative to take hold. In the US, experts noted that the results were consistent across the country, regardless of the voting machine or method used, and that there was nothing anomalous about the way they were reported. 

Flávio’s own party acknowledged Lula’s victory, whilst he remained isolated in Miami. The Republican candidates accepted defeat and some blamed Trump. Even a commentator close to him, such as Megyn Kelly, told him, ‘Just stop.’ In short, if one’s own party does not support its leader, the challenge remains fruitless and without any concrete consequences, such as legal challenges or a refusal to recognise the winner. 

Flávio Bolsonaro lost personally, so he decided to act by mounting an immediate and total challenge. Trump, not being a candidate, initially sought to defend his image as a winner, but shortly afterwards reverted to clinging to the myth of a rigged vote.

The tactic of claiming to have been wronged or blaming others may change, but the logic remains the same: defeat never comes from the people. It is always the fault of others – such as the corrupt elite, weak candidates or inaccurate opinion polls. This is because, if the populist represents the true people, the people themselves cannot have defeated him.

Europe, too, can learn lessons from these events. A related case occurred in Romania in December 2024, when the Constitutional Court annulled the first round of the presidential election following allegations of Russian interference in favour of the far-right candidate Calin Georgescu. He called the decision a ‘coup.’ Therefore, the narrative of a ‘stolen election’ can also take hold in Europe, and the decisions of the institutions can be exploited by populists. Europe could make its electoral institutions more transparent and efficient to leave less room for allegations of vote-rigging. 

Furthermore, the established parties should acknowledge the result immediately. These two conditions are essential if the election is closely contested. From their point of view, populists never lose elections; rather, the votes are stolen from them. When the defeat is too great, they first blame others and then cast doubt on the result.


 

(*) Niccolò Capozzi graduated with a degree in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Florence and obtained a master’s degree in European Studies from Maastricht University, with a thesis on populist communication during crises. He is currently studying for the Joint Master’s in Global Economic Governance and Public Affairs at the LUISS School of Government and CIFE, based in Rome, Berlin, and Nice, and has interests in European politics, populism, political communication, and geopolitics.

Associate Professor Sam Rosenfeld.

Assoc. Prof. Rosenfeld: The Road Back to Democratic Fair Play and Stability in the US Will Be a Long One

In an ECPS interview following the November 3, 2026, US midterm elections, Assoc. Prof. Sam Rosenfeld, political scientist at Colgate University and author of The Polarizers and coauthor of The Hollow Parties, examines the implications of Democratic congressional victories for American democracy. Arguing that electoral backlash against Republicans should not be mistaken for democratic restoration, Assoc. Prof. Rosenfeld warns that “democracy is never fully safeguarded.” He explores the potential weakening of Donald Trump’s personalist control over the Republican Party while emphasizing the enduring influence of the populist Long New Right. Assoc. Prof. Rosenfeld also addresses political polarization, congressional oversight, democratic-socialist organizing, and the institutional hollowness of American parties. He concludes that rebuilding civic organizations, strengthening party accountability, and restoring democratic fair play remain essential long-term challenges.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

The November 3, 2026, midterm elections have reshaped American politics, delivering Democratic majorities in both chambers of Congress while President Donald Trump remains in office. Yet this electoral reversal raises fundamental questions about democratic resilience, institutional checks, and the enduring appeal of Trumpism. As Republicans confront potential internal divisions and Democrats face the challenge of translating electoral victory into effective governance, the future of American democracy remains uncertain.

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Sam Rosenfeld, Associate Professor of Political Science at Colgate University, specializing in party politics and American political development, examines these developments through the analytical frameworks developed in The Polarizers and The Hollow Parties, coauthored with Daniel Schlozman. His central argument challenges the assumption that electoral victories necessarily translate into democratic restoration or meaningful party renewal.

“Democracy is never fully safeguarded,” Assoc. Prof. Rosenfeld cautions, emphasizing that electoral outcomes should not be confused with structural democratic resilience. He argues that Americans’ commitment to democracy remains relatively fragile, particularly when compared with their immediate economic concerns. The Democratic victory, he contends, primarily reflects a backlash against Republican governance and cost-of-living pressures rather than a fundamental transformation of American political attitudes.

Turning to Republican politics, Assoc. Prof. Rosenfeld identifies a potentially consequential development: the erosion of Trump’s personalist control over the party. He argues that Trump’s declining electoral reputation and the approaching post-Trump succession could weaken his longstanding dominance. “That, at least, is now changing,” he observes, suggesting that renewed factional competition might restore internal checks on personalized leadership.

Nevertheless, Assoc. Prof. Rosenfeld distinguishes Trump’s personalism from the deeper ideological currents of the “Long New Right,” a confrontational political tradition that predates Trump and, he argues, will survive his departure. The weakening of personalist domination therefore does not necessarily imply the disappearance of radical-right populism or the restoration of traditional Reaganite conservatism.

Assoc. Prof. Rosenfeld also emphasizes the institutional consequences of party hollowness. He advocates stronger party gatekeeping, more accountable organizational structures, revitalized local party networks, and renewed connections with organized labor and civic associations. As he explains, “we believe parties are essential to democracy.” Their revival as “stewards of democratic contestation and fair play” is indispensable to strengthening democratic institutions.

His assessment ultimately combines cautious optimism about renewed political competition with skepticism toward any definitive democratic restoration. Formal reforms, electoral defeats, and institutional safeguards remain important, but none can permanently eliminate democratic vulnerabilities.

Looking toward 2028 and beyond, Assoc. Prof. Rosenfeld’s analysis underscores a central challenge confronting American democracy: whether the weakening of Trump’s personalist dominance and the rebuilding of hollow political parties can generate durable institutional accountability, meaningful political representation, and a renewed commitment to democratic fair play.

Here is our interview with Associate Professor Sam Rosenfeld, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

The 2026 Midterms Were About Living Costs, Not Democratic Resilience

Anti-Trump protesters.
Anti-Trump protesters gather across from Trump Tower on Fifth Avenue during the annual Labor Day Parade in Midtown Manhattan, New York City, on September 6, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

The November 3 midterms handed Democrats control of both chambers of Congress, reversing Republican dominance. Does this electoral upheaval signal renewed democratic resilience, a temporary backlash against Trump, or a deeper transformation of American party politics?

Assoc. Prof. Sam Rosenfeld: This is a big and difficult question. I think the scale of the electoral backlash against the governing party shouldn’t be confused with a qualitative, transformational realignment of American party politics or with a genuine referendum on the health of democracy and Americans’ commitment to upholding democratic institutions.

Midterm elections in the United States are essentially referenda on governing parties. Over the last two years, Americans have conveyed a very clear message in public opinion polls: Donald Trump won the 2024 election largely because of dissatisfaction with the state of the economy, particularly the lingering effects of post-COVID inflation and the rising cost of living. Trump ran on promises to address those concerns. Yet, over the last two years, he conspicuously failed to address those issues and, in fact, made cost-of-living problems worse.

This election was primarily determined by differences in voter turnout. Many Republicans simply stayed home rather than turn out to support their party. But there was also some conversion among voters who had supported Trump two years earlier but turned out this time to vote for Democrats.

The election unmistakably sent a message about basic bread-and-butter cost-of-living issues, which Democrats consistently emphasized in their campaigns, much more than they emphasized Trump himself, the state of democracy, or democratic resilience. That’s what produced a remarkably massive turnover of congressional seats by American standards.

The results present possibilities and implications for the future of American democracy that are quite profound, even though the underlying electoral motivations were much more pragmatic and less concerned with questions of democracy and democratic resilience.

The Erosion of Democratic Norms Predates Trump but Escalated Under Him

In The Polarizers, you trace the deliberate construction of ideological polarization. Has polarization now moved beyond legitimate partisan competition to become a structural driver of democratic backsliding, particularly through the Republican Party’s embrace of Trumpism?

Assoc. Prof. Sam Rosenfeld: Absolutely. I think stark party polarization has its benefits, but it also poses a potential danger to the norms of democratic fair play and adherence to the rules of the game. Even before Trump, the 21st century had witnessed an escalation of political hardball, what legal scholar Mark Tushnet referred to as “constitutional hardball” in the American context.

This was particularly evident among Republicans, though Democrats responded to some extent as well. As the stakes of electoral competition came to be perceived as increasingly high, with parties becoming ever more ideologically sorted and polarized, more and more norms were rolled back, and efforts to tweak the rules of the game to advantage one side or the other intensified.

All of this preceded Trump. Republicans had already pursued a revival of voting wars, including fights over procedures governing access to voting and efforts to make voting more inconvenient and difficult in many states. Trump’s innovation was to move beyond political hardball, voter suppression, and electoral gamesmanship toward outright efforts to subvert democratic outcomes, including attempts to influence who would count the votes and to politicize the process of counting votes and declaring winners.

That was a real quantum leap into dangerous territory that we’ve seen in other places. But these developments preceded Trump, and at least part of this trajectory follows the logic of political polarization itself. If your opponents systematically stand for so many things that you consider profoundly dangerous for the country, that gives your side ever greater self-justification to bend or subvert the rules to ensure that these dangerous people don’t take power.

US elections.
US left- and right-wing politics and the American electoral divide, symbolized by the Democratic donkey and Republican elephant. Photo: Dreamstime.

Democratic Party Organizations Remain Hollow Despite Electoral Success

In The Hollow Parties, coauthored with Daniel Schlozman, you argue that intense partisanship coexists with weak party organizations. Does the Democratic victory challenge your diagnosis, or does it confirm that electoral success can occur without genuine organizational renewal?

Assoc. Prof. Sam Rosenfeld: I think the second alternative is well put: You can win big victories as the out-party when the in-party—the party in power during a midterm election—screws up as badly as the Republican Party has in managing its own electoral fortunes. Democrats are not popular among Americans, including Democratic voters. This is not a story of the Democratic Party reviving its image or renewing its presence in Americans’ lives. Rather, Democrats are the beneficiaries of a referendum on the Republicans.

That said, I don’t want to discount the organizational skills of national party leadership, particularly when it comes to candidate recruitment and efforts to maximize the potential gains of a wave election by ensuring that credible, decent candidates are running in all the House districts that might come into play.

This became such a big wave that many unexpected candidates found themselves winning congressional seats that nobody thought they could win. But candidate recruitment is definitely one area in which Democratic national party leadership has proven pretty effective over multiple election cycles. There were a couple of very messy and contested primary nomination fights, but by and large, impressive candidates, well-tailored to the states and districts in which they were running, were present across the field. That is, in part, the work of national party organizations, including the campaign committees in the House and Senate, as well as Hakeem Jeffries in the House, now the majority leader and soon to be Speaker, and Chuck Schumer in the Senate.

This stands in contrast to the experience of Republicans in the age of Trump. Among other things, Donald Trump himself has become a central player in contested Republican primaries. He has a proven track record of effectively deciding who the nominee will be, often picking candidates who prove to be electoral losers compared with others who might have won had he not intervened.

Reviving American Political Parties Requires Rebuilding Civic Life

In your April 2026 New York Times article, you and Schlozman called for Democrats to become an actual political party again. What organizational reforms—especially involving unions, grassroots networks, and working-class constituencies—are now essential to turn electoral victory into durable political power?

Assoc. Prof. Sam Rosenfeld: That’s a big question. As scholars who have articulated this notion of party hollowness, we see the changes necessary for party renewal as long-term transformations that I don’t think are realistic to expect in the next two years, as Democrats are in opposition and preparing for the 2028 presidential election.

We see a broader decline in civic life in the United States and other Western societies, dating back many decades, as underlying much of this party hollowness. That decline encompasses organized labor, state and local party organizations, voluntary civil society organizations, and civic and community groups that once had a much more rooted presence in people’s day-to-day lives and face-to-face interactions. Over many decades, technological, social, and spatial changes in where people live and how they interact have caused these organizations to wither on the vine.

This is something people have paid attention to for a long time. We think this long-term hollowing out of civic and civil life has real implications for the political system. For a party to revive, there are various things it can do in the here and now to strengthen its formal organizations. Particularly on the Democratic side, this means channeling more talent, expertise, and activists out of broad, much murkier para-party networks of organizations, super PACs, consulting firms, and think tanks and into more visible and accountable organizations within the formal party structure. Parties can also build up and invest in local organizations with a stronger presence in their communities. There’s no time like the present to start doing that, but the broad-based social changes needed to create the foundation for a revival of civic life will take a long time.

The same applies to organized labor. Anything that can be done now to facilitate new organizing and reverse the very long decline in union density in the United States would be of obvious importance to the Democratic Party programmatically. But it would also be vital to restoring one of the main organizational pillars that once channeled ordinary people without college degrees, professional credentials, or particular engagement in politics into political participation, habituating them to support the Democratic Party. That revival is essential, but it’s also a long-term project.

Congress Must Ensure the Executive Branch Obeys the Law

The Capitol and Reflecting Pool in Washington, DC.
The Capitol and Reflecting Pool in Washington, DC. Photo: Jon Bilous / Dreamstime.

With Democrats preparing to control Congress while Trump remains president, what should their central institutional mission be? Can congressional oversight, investigations, budgetary authority, and legislative initiatives effectively reverse executive overreach and strengthen democratic checks and balances?

Assoc. Prof. Sam Rosenfeld: That’s the $64,000 question for the next two years. What should Democrats prioritize with surprisingly large, robust majorities, a lame-duck president, and a presidential party ripe for considerable internal division and fissuring in the run-up to the first post-Trump election we’ve had in multiple cycles in 2028? What can and should the opposition party focus on?

Congress is now in a position to exercise meaningful checks on presidential power. One of the most alarming developments of the first two years, particularly regarding democratic backsliding and the functioning of the system, has been the degree to which the executive branch has illegally departed from its obligations to spend money and enforce laws passed by Congress, while Congress, under Republican control, has done nothing about it.

Congress will now be much more interested in ensuring that the laws it passes and that the president signs are actually carried out by an executive branch bound by the letter of the law. Congress will be in a position to ensure that happens and can generally expect the courts—which will no longer be filling new vacancies with Trump appointments over the next two years—to be on its side in tethering executive action to what Congress mandates.

Then there’s oversight. Congress faces an embarrassment of riches when deciding what to focus on in its investigations and efforts to uncover scandals. For political reasons, it’s important to prioritize where attention is directed. With House and Senate Democratic caucuses larger than expected and representing many strongly Republican districts and states for the first time in a while, their common ground will be an interest in investigating corruption, self-dealing, looting of the Treasury, selling pardons, and the personal enrichment of the president and his family through various foreign deals, crypto investments, and so forth.

This extends beyond his family to those around the administration who are engaging in enormous amounts of economic corruption through the use of public office. Investigating these activities would be a shared priority across the party. It would also allow Democrats to connect whatever scandals they uncover to an economic message that, broadly speaking, represents common ideological ground among members whose constituencies now range from very liberal to very conservative. That’s where I would expect them to focus their energy in exercising oversight.

Legislation is typically a dead letter during periods of divided government in a polarized era. No legislation can pass without Donald Trump’s signature. Then again, we’re currently in a lame-duck session considering a substantial bill that is likely to pass and would modify the process through which new infrastructure and development projects get off the ground and undergo environmental review. A bipartisan coalition is working together on this legislation, contrary to expectations of polarization, and it looks like the president will sign it.

We might end up with a lame-duck Donald Trump who’s bored with partisan conflict and willing to make some deals, potentially allowing some bipartisan legislation to move forward. But when it comes to a major party project, being in opposition is usually not the time when such initiatives gain significant traction.

Great Policies Alone Cannot Guarantee Democrats Lasting Political Success

Your writings criticize Democrats’ dependence on proceduralism, technocratic policymaking, and opposition to Republicans. How can the new congressional majority articulate a coherent governing project that addresses economic insecurity while rebuilding public confidence in democratic institutions?

Assoc. Prof. Sam Rosenfeld: That follows directly from what we were just saying. I’m skeptical that an opposition party will be in a position to put forward a clear programmatic vision. This is where parliamentary systems differ. You have a shadow government, and the party puts out a manifesto or articulates a critique of the government.

In the American case, congressional Democrats will be in a position to exercise considerable restraint on what the president can do and conduct extensive oversight, both for good governance and political purposes, to expose scandals and wrongdoing within the administration. However, I’m skeptical that congressional Democrats in the House and Senate will be able to articulate a clear programmatic vision of what they would do if they had full control of the government. That’s typically not what congressional parties in opposition manage to do.

For better or worse, that’s what the 2028 presidential nomination contest will generate. You’re going to see factional debates among candidates representing the left and moderates. Policy intellectuals, who play such a prominent role in Democratic political strategy these days, will put forward their white papers and articulate their agendas. That’s where the debate over what a positive agenda should look like will take place.

At that point, the message Daniel Schlozman and I have been trying to articulate is that Democrats should not place all their political and strategic bets on devising great policies and assuming those policies will automatically translate into political benefits. They should heed our advice when that time comes.

Democrats Across Ideological Lines Can Learn from DSA’s Grassroots Organizing

Labor Day protest outside Trump Tower on Fifth Avenue, Midtown Manhattan, September 1, 2025, where demonstrators demanded better wages and working conditions. Photo: Dreamstime.

The 2026 elections expanded the congressional presence of Democratic Socialists of America-endorsed candidates. Does the DSA represent a promising model of grassroots party renewal, or could its growing influence deepen ideological and organizational divisions within the Democratic coalition?

Assoc. Prof. Sam Rosenfeld: The answer is yes to both. The second part is definitely true: The DSA and other left-wing factions within the Democratic Party have a more contestable argument to make that their vision is one the party as a whole should pursue to grow its majority. That’s going to remain a subject of continued factional debate within the party.

Many of the lessons from the DSA, particularly its local chapters and especially the New York City chapter, as demonstrated by Zohran Mamdani’s rise to the mayoralty, could be adopted by all sorts of actors within the party. Doing so doesn’t require embracing socialism or pursuing left-wing ideological goals.

What the New York DSA has done over the last several years is build a real organization with real members who are engaged and committed to electoral and political activity at the local level. They have made participation in that organization fun, increasing what political scientists call the “solidary benefits” of interacting with others in a shared endeavor. In his mayoral campaign, Mamdani made participation both highly engaging and enjoyable, extending well beyond the DSA’s rank-and-file membership.

Building organizations rooted in people’s day-to-day lives that make participation enjoyable, even for those who aren’t necessarily politically engaged on a regular basis, is something political organizations of all stripes and factional orientations should pursue, looking to the DSA as a model. In its own right, this is a very unhollow party.

Mamdani is also a great example of someone who has come to power with a serious set of ideological commitments. So far, he has succeeded in sustaining a successful mayoralty by paying close attention to what ordinary people want from government. This approach goes back to a tradition known as “sewer socialism,” associated with the socialists who governed Milwaukee in the early 20th century.

Pay attention to public services, demonstrate that government can function effectively, and seek to deliver tangible benefits in people’s day-to-day lives. By doing so, you build political support and political power that allow you to continue pursuing broader ideological aims. But you start by solving people’s everyday problems and frustrations. That’s something the Democratic Party in Congress, having just won this huge election on practical cost-of-living, economic, and pocketbook issues, should take to heart. Whatever Democrats do, they need to address people’s actual concerns.

Challenging Concentrated Economic Power Unites the Democratic Party

As Trump’s populist radical right confronts a more assertive democratic-socialist left, can economic left populism offer a credible response to working-class alienation and oligarchic power? What distinguishes its democratic potential from the exclusionary tendencies of right-wing populism?

Assoc. Prof. Sam Rosenfeld: Left populism, by definition, distinguishes itself from the right precisely through its commitment to an egalitarian economic project that encompasses everybody, rather than a circumscribed in-group that excludes an out-group. This is why issues like immigration and, historically, global trade have posed challenges to left-wing egalitarian politics and inclusivity.

In contemporary American politics, there is broad agreement across the center-left party. In this sense, moderates agree with left-wing factions, even if they disagree on the particulars. They share the view that the party’s strength lies in making economic issues salient and centering elections on challenging the concentrated economic power of elites, building a robust social safety net and welfare state, and redistributing power and resources in more egalitarian ways.

This represents shared ideological terrain for a large, heterogeneous party, even if left-wingers believe neoliberal moderates wouldn’t go far enough. It is also more electorally potent ground for the party of the left than questions of culture, identity, and other sociocultural issues. That’s where the whole party is orienting itself.

What this means for the particulars of economic policy remains a big open question. I’ve criticized technocracy, but I’m sympathetic enough to technocratic policymaking that I worry about the phenomenon we’re seeing in both parties, including Democrats, which some people call economic “sloppilism.” Ever since Donald Trump promised to eliminate taxes on tips for waiters and waitresses, there’s been a real vogue for tax cuts targeted at particular popular constituencies. Democrats have gotten into the business of doing this as well.

But for a left-wing or center-left political project, you need tax revenue to fund a welfare state and maintain a government with the capacity to accomplish what you want it to do. Right now, there’s a pervasive tendency to address people’s cost-of-living concerns with policies that, from a technocratic perspective, are pretty dubious and undermine the long-term project of progressive economic policy in the United States. That’s something to be mindful of.

Trump’s Personalist Control of the Republican Party Is Beginning to Break

Donald Trump delivers a victory speech after his big win in the Nevada caucus at Treasure Island Hotel & Casino, flanked by his sons Eric (right) and Donald Jr. (left) in Las Vegas, NV. Photo: Joe Sohm.

Your research on the Long New Right traces the organizational and ideological foundations of contemporary Republican radicalization. Does the 2026 Republican defeat threaten Trumpism’s structural dominance, or can MAGA survive repeated electoral setbacks through its control of party institutions and conservative networks?

Assoc. Prof. Sam Rosenfeld: I think the future of the Republican Party is more up for grabs than anything else after this election. We identify a tradition in postwar American conservative politics, dating back to the mid-20th century, characterized by a highly pugilistic political tendency defined by confrontation with perceived political enemies. This tendency undermines norms of democratic fair play and erodes the durability of collective organizations and institutions, including political parties. We call this tradition the Long New Right. It has a populist character and long predates Trump, but it laid the groundwork for the political template he adopted, and that’s not going away.

What distinguishes the Trump era, however, is personalism: the extent to which Republican Party politics became organized, over several years, around Donald Trump’s personal whims, wants, desires, and leadership. This represents a political tradition foreign to the United States, either imported by Trump or emerging around him.

It rested on the perception that Trump had a real hammerlock on the Republican Party’s mass base and that anyone within the party who crossed him would face the wrath of Republican voters, who would turn against them for defying Trump. That reputation was fairly well earned and plausible, giving him an unprecedented degree of power within the party. He became a genuine populist leader whose movement captured and cowed many Republican Party actors who had been around long before him.

But that reputation only lasts as long as it lasts. Trump is now sufficiently unpopular and has suffered such a resounding electoral defeat in these midterms that his hammerlock of personalist control over the Republican Party, which he has maintained for the past decade, is going to break. That’s partly because of the defeat, but also because he’s old and cannot run for reelection. He’s a genuine lame duck and is unlikely to remain a central figure in American political life for much longer.

The breaking of that personalist control is, in itself, a healthy development. Although the populist tendencies of the Long New Right long predate Trump and will persist well beyond him, it will be healthy for the party to engage in more open internal debates about its direction, with different factions lining up and ambitious politicians seeking the presidency beginning to jockey for position and articulate their disagreements.

That kind of internal competition has helped keep American party politics stable by providing internal checks on the actions of any particular leader or movement. Part of what has been so destabilizing about having one of America’s two major parties under Trump’s personalist leadership is precisely the erosion of those internal competitive checks. That, at least, is now changing.

MAGA Has Not Institutionalized Its Control Over the Republican Party

A Trump supporter holds up a “Make America Great Again” sign at presidential candidate Donald Trump’s rally in the convention center in Sioux City, Iowa, on November 6, 2016. Photo: Mark Reinstein.

Could the Republican defeat trigger an internal struggle among MAGA loyalists, traditional conservatives, business elites, and emerging presidential contenders? Or has Trumpism become so deeply institutionalized that the post-Trump succession will primarily involve competing versions of the same movement?

Assoc. Prof. Sam Rosenfeld: Following on from what we were saying, the Republican Party, as a hollow party, remains relatively uninstitutionalized in many ways. It’s certainly true that Trump installed loyalists in various leadership positions. But the Republican National Committee, some outside super PACs, and other such entities are themselves fairly thin organizations whose leadership will come and go. So, the future of Republican politics remains relatively open and is not necessarily constrained by what MAGA has done to the party’s organizational structure over the last decade.

What that means for American democracy is a great question. Trump initially identified a significant gap between the priorities of conservative and Republican elites and what ordinary Republican voters—the party’s mass base—actually cared about in 2016. Trump was uniquely positioned to recognize and exploit that gap, allowing him to take over the party and remake it in his own image. In government, however, Trump has not addressed or satisfied the commitments and priorities of the Republican base, which partly explains why so many of those voters stayed home earlier this month. But whatever factional debates emerge within the Republican Party, I don’t think we’re going to see a return to traditional Reaganite conservatism or the coalition of interests that dominated Republican politics for several decades.

Among younger conservatives and the Tucker Carlson–J. D. Vance faction on the right, there is a pretty wild and woolly collection of ideas that depart from traditional Reaganite conservatism. These include a strong current of blatant anti-Semitism and, in some circles, openly anti-democratic orientations. These factions now have a voice within a much more open, though still organizationally hollow, party structure, and they’re going to influence what the future of the Republican Party looks like.

Ambition Checking Ambition Prevents Parties from Becoming Personal Tools

In Late to the Party, you and Schlozman emphasized the importance of parties exercising institutional authority over individual leaders. What would genuine Republican Party reform require, and can a party organized around personalized leadership recover the capacity to constrain extremism and defend constitutional rules?

Assoc. Prof. Sam Rosenfeld: Great questions. As a political scientist, there are formal reforms I’d like to see parties undertake that run counter to the direction of internal party reform over the past half-century. It would be good to reestablish certain gatekeeping functions, such as at-large delegates to party conventions—what were called superdelegates on the Democratic side—who could vote as they wished without being pledged to any particular primary winner in a given state. That kind of peer review and formal party input into the selection of nominees would be valuable, but instituting those reforms will be a tall order in an era when people perceive them as undemocratic.

Trump’s discrediting of himself, his loss of a reputation for infallibility among the Republican base, and the erosion of his reputation as a special electoral figure will, in themselves, open things up within the Republican Party again. Even without the formal gatekeeping capacity I’d like parties to have, we’re going to see Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, J. D. Vance, and who knows who else competing to become the nominee in 2028. Trump won’t be in a position simply to designate a successor. That kind of internal competition, with ambition checking ambition, is part of what prevents American parties—which are generally too oriented around the presidency—from becoming the tools of any one person. Competition among different aspirants and ambitious political entrepreneurs within parties helps prevent that concentration of control.

As for the Republican Party, a more open party, no longer shackled to the whims of an authoritarian personality like Trump, will be a little safer for democracy and less of an agent of further democratic backsliding. But the story we tell is a long one, and conservative politics in the United States will continue to exhibit tendencies that corrode norms of political fair play and democratic stability. The road back from that is a long one.

Democracy Is Never Fully Safeguarded, Even After Major Electoral Victories

Trump supporters marched toward Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C., USA. Photo: Dreamstime / © Bgrocker

Looking toward 2028 and beyond, what would distinguish temporary Democratic electoral gains from genuine democratic restoration? Which changes in party organization, political representation, institutional accountability, and democratic norms would be necessary to prevent renewed authoritarian backsliding?

Assoc. Prof. Sam Rosenfeld: Looking at the Trump era and then at developments elsewhere—particularly in Hungary, Poland, and Brazil, which are obviously central to your center’s work—I come away chastened. There is no set of formal reforms, new laws, or new organizational practices that would leave me feeling that democracy has been restored and is safe from here on out. I now think much more about how Trump has demonstrated, in the American context, the ever-present danger to democratic self-government when elites choose, for their own incentives and reasons, to go along with leadership and activities that undermine democracy.

The public, meanwhile, is committed to democracy in the abstract, but that commitment is very thin. Such considerations don’t actually move people electorally in the same way that pragmatic pocketbook issues do. That’s simply the reality we live in: Democracy is never fully safeguarded. A major, definitive electoral defeat in a midterm election is great. But if the Republican Party were to suffer another major defeat in 2028 as a consequence of Trump’s leadership and the party’s association with Trump and MAGA, that, in itself, would represent a major step toward restabilizing the democratic system.

In terms of formal organizational changes, we believe parties are essential to democracy. In the long term, it would be vital to have parties more deeply rooted in people’s everyday lives, less top-heavy at the national level, and supported by more robust and heterogeneous local organizations, with their eyes and ears attuned to what local communities care about. We therefore see the revival of parties as stewards of democratic contestation and fair play as an important part of shoring up the system.



(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

The entrance of Athens Polytechnic University.

The Politics of Forgetting: Populism and the Rewriting of Greece’s Dictatorial Past

In this Voices of Youth (VoY) Commentary for the ECPS, Emmanouela Papapavlou examines how populist narratives reshape Greece’s collective memory of the 1967–1974 military dictatorship. Focusing on the November 1973 Athens Polytechnic uprising, she explores the political implications of historical revisionism, authoritarian nostalgia, and selective national remembrance. By revisiting the dictatorship’s repression and its role in the Cyprus crisis, Papapavlou demonstrates how nationalist narratives can minimize authoritarian crimes while selectively invoking patriotism and national betrayal. Drawing on contemporary theories of populism, she argues that historical memory becomes a political weapon when documented facts are subordinated to ideological loyalties. Her commentary underscores the importance of historical accountability, critical remembrance, and democratic vigilance in confronting authoritarian revisionism.

By Emmanouela Papapavlou*

There is something deeply unsettling about the way a nation remembers its past. We celebrate certain moments, commemorate certain struggles and build our national identity around stories of resistance and courage. Yet, sometimes, the same history becomes uncomfortable when it challenges the image we have constructed of ourselves. And when that happens, remembering can become selective.

In Greece, few historical events carry the symbolic weight of the Athens Polytechnic uprising of November 1973. More than five decades later, it remains a defining moment in the country’s transition towards democracy. Yet, the meaning of the uprising, the crimes of the military dictatorship and even the historical record itself continue to be questioned. The issue is no longer simply how Greece remembers its past, but how that past is used in contemporary political discourse.

To understand this, we must first return to what happened. 

Three Days That Challenged a Dictatorship

On November 14, 1973, students from different faculties gathered at the National Technical University of Athens and began occupying the Polytechnic. What initially developed as a student protest soon grew into a broader uprising against the military dictatorship, which had ruled Greece since the coup of April 21, 1967. The regime, led by Georgios Papadopoulos, Stylianos Pattakos and Nikolaos Makarezos, had suspended democratic institutions, restricted political freedoms, imposed censorship and persecuted those who opposed it.

The occupation quickly became more than a protest over university affairs. Students organized themselves through a coordinating committee, while anti-dictatorship slogans began to fill the building and surrounding streets. Their demands were increasingly political: freedom, democracy and an end to authoritarian rule.

By November 15, the movement had acquired a voice of its own. An improvised radio station began broadcasting messages from inside the Polytechnic, calling on Athenians to support the students. Its broadcasts carried beyond the university walls, turning the occupation into a focal point of resistance. People began gathering outside, bringing food and medical supplies and expressing their solidarity. The Polytechnic was no longer an isolated student movement. It had become a public challenge to the regime.

On November 16, demonstrations spread across central Athens. Students were joined by workers and ordinary citizens, transforming the protest into a mass mobilization. The response of the authorities was violent. Police forces confronted demonstrators, tear gas was used, and gunfire was reported as clashes intensified throughout the city. The situation escalated rapidly, and the military was called in.

During the night of November 16 and the early hours of November 17, tanks surrounded the Polytechnic. Shortly after 2 a.m., an armored vehicle advanced towards the central gate. At approximately 3 a.m., a tank broke through it, while students and other people remained inside the grounds. Military forces entered the university and brought the occupation to an end. The violence, however, did not remain confined to the Polytechnic. Clashes and shootings continued in the streets of Athens, leaving people dead and injured.

Historical research by Leonidas Kallivretakis at the National Hellenic Research Foundation has documented 24 deaths connected to the November 1973 events. It is important to distinguish between the location of those deaths and the events themselves: no death has been conclusively documented within the Polytechnic grounds, but this does not mean that nobody was killed during the uprising and its violent suppression. The victims were part of a wider crackdown across Athens.

The distinction matters because historical accuracy should clarify the past, not provide an excuse to diminish it. The absence of a confirmed death inside the university does not erase the deaths outside it, the wounded, the arrests or the violence inflicted by the dictatorship.

Nor did the uprising immediately bring the regime down. On November 25, 1973, Papadopoulos was overthrown in an internal coup led by Ioannidis, and the dictatorship continued. It eventually collapsed in July 1974, following the catastrophic events in Cyprus. The Polytechnic, however, had exposed the regime’s vulnerability and become a lasting symbol of resistance.

The Contradiction of Authoritarian Nostalgia

Today, the historical record exists alongside a different narrative: that life under the dictatorship was orderly, that the economy was better, that the leaders were patriots, or that, at least, people had enough to eat. Such statements are often presented as harmless nostalgia or as an alternative interpretation of history.

But what exactly is being remembered when the repression is left out?

The dictatorship was not simply a different political administration with a different economic approach. It was a regime that abolished democratic government, censored the press, imprisoned and tortured opponents, and denied citizens fundamental political freedoms. Economic performance, even where particular indicators may be debated, cannot be used to cancel these realities.

This is where historical revisionism becomes politically significant. It does not always require denying every documented event. Sometimes, it works by changing the emphasis: repression becomes an unfortunate detail, resistance becomes exaggeration, and authoritarian rule is recast as a period of national discipline. The contradiction becomes even clearer when we consider Cyprus.

Patriotism, Cyprus and Selective National Memory

The Greek military regime repeatedly invoked patriotism and national unity. Yet, on July 15, 1974, the junta backed a coup against the elected government of Cyprus, carried out by the Cypriot National Guard under the direction of Greek officers. Five days later, Turkey launched its military operation on the island. The subsequent Turkish offensives resulted in the occupation of a substantial part of Cyprus, mass displacement and the division of the island. Greece’s dictatorship collapsed amid the crisis.

The coup and the Turkish invasion must be understood as distinct actions, with distinct responsibilities. Turkey bears responsibility for its military intervention and the occupation that followed. But the Greek junta’s role in overthrowing the legitimate government of Cyprus remains an essential part of the historical record. This raises an uncomfortable question: how can a regime that claimed to defend the nation be remembered without confronting its role in the Cyprus catastrophe?

A similar selectivity can be observed in debates surrounding the 2018 Prespa Agreement. The agreement with what is now North Macedonia remains a legitimate subject of political criticism and public debate. Yet, in some nationalist narratives, it was presented as an unforgivable surrender of national interests, while the junta’s responsibility for the events that led to the Cyprus disaster receives far less attention. The point is not that the two events are equivalent, or that criticism of the Prespa Agreement is illegitimate. It is that national sensitivity appears to be applied selectively. Some political narratives treat certain compromises as historical betrayals while allowing other, far more consequential failures to fade from collective memory.

When History Becomes a Political Weapon

This selective approach to the past connects to a broader feature of contemporary politics: populism. Political scientist Cas Mudde defines populism as a “thin-centered ideology” that divides society into two supposedly homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.” Populist movements claim to represent the authentic will of the people, often portraying their opponents as illegitimate or disconnected from the nation.

Populism can emerge on both the left and the right. However, its radical-right manifestation often combines this division with nationalism and an exclusionary understanding of national identity. In such narratives, patriotism becomes something that one political camp can claim to own, while opponents are portrayed as insufficiently loyal, dangerous or even hostile to the nation.

History becomes particularly useful in this process. Evidence that challenges the preferred national narrative can be dismissed as political propaganda. Accounts of repression become ideological exaggerations. Historical debate is reduced to a confrontation between those who supposedly defend the nation and those accused of undermining it.

The danger is not that people disagree about history. Disagreement is necessary for historical inquiry and democratic debate. The danger emerges when documented facts are treated as matters of political preference, and when acknowledging the crimes of an authoritarian regime is presented as an act of disloyalty. A democracy cannot afford to remember only the parts of its history that make it proud. It must also confront the parts that expose its failures, contradictions and responsibilities.

The Polytechnic is not merely a date in the Greek calendar, nor is its significance dependent on the political identity of those who commemorate it. It is a historical event, with documented victims, a clear context of authoritarian repression and a lasting place in Greece’s democratic history. Perhaps the most dangerous thing a society can do is not forget its past entirely but remember it selectively. Because once history becomes whatever serves the politics of the present, the line between remembering and rewriting begins to disappear. 


 

(*) Emmanouela Papapavlou is a student from Thessaloniki, Greece, deeply passionate about social and political issues. She has actively participated in Model United Nations and other youth forums, serving as a chairperson in multiple conferences and winning awards in Greek debate competitions. Writing is her greatest passion, and she loves using it to explore democracy, civic engagement, and human rights. Her dream is to share her ideas, inspire action, and amplify the voices of young people who want to make a difference. Email: emmanpapapavlou@gmail.com

Professor Venelin I. Ganev.

Prof. Ganev: Bulgaria’s Political System Is Becoming Less Liberal

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Venelin I. Ganev, Professor of Political Science at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, examines Bulgaria’s political transformation following the 2026 elections. Warning that “the Bulgarian political system is showing a tendency to become less liberal,” he distinguishes electoral stability from the erosion of liberal-democratic institutions. Drawing on his scholarship on state predation and soft decisionism, Professor Ganev argues that Prime Minister Rumen Radev is consolidating power while taking over entrenched corrupt networks rather than dismantling them. He also explores mainstream populism, Russian influence, and the diminishing leverage of European integration. Despite these concerns, he emphasizes civil society’s resilience as a democratic counterweight and warns against Eastern Europe’s persistent preference for strong leadership over constitutional checks and balances.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Bulgaria is experiencing a significant political realignment following years of electoral instability, corruption controversies, and declining institutional trust. Iliana Iotova’s presidential victory on November 1, 2026, reinforces Prime Minister Rumen Radev’s parliamentary dominance, raising important questions about democratic consolidation, populism, institutional accountability, and Bulgaria’s geopolitical orientation. Yet exceptionally low electoral turnout suggests persistent problems of political representation and legitimacy.

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Venelin I. Ganev, Professor of Political Science at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, offers a critical assessment of Bulgaria’s evolving political landscape, warning that electoral stabilization may coexist with the erosion of liberal-democratic institutions. Drawing on his influential scholarship on state predation, soft decisionism, and post-communist democratization, Professor Ganev argues that “the Bulgarian political system is showing a tendency to become less liberal.”

Distinguishing electoral democracy from its liberal foundations, Professor Ganev identifies democratic backsliding as Bulgaria’s central institutional challenge. “It’s not so much democracy itself—I don’t think democracy is endangered in Bulgaria—but rather the liberal component of liberal democracy that’s being assaulted,” he observes. Pointing to declining judicial independence, diminishing media freedom, and legislative efforts to restrict civil society, he expresses particular concern about proposals targeting nongovernmental organizations and narrowing public debate.

Professor Ganev also questions whether Radev’s anti-corruption agenda represents genuine institutional renewal. Rather than dismantling entrenched oligarchic structures, he argues, the new leadership is consolidating control over them. “What we are seeing right now is simply a takeover,” he states, suggesting that contemporary state predation increasingly depends on controlling public institutions and redistributing state-held resources rather than weakening the state itself.

Situating these developments within the broader resurgence of populism in Eastern Europe, Professor Ganev characterizes Radev’s political appeal as mainstream rather than radical populism. Nevertheless, he identifies troubling indications of centralized decision-making and the persistence of personalistic governance. His analysis also explores Bulgaria’s ambiguous relationship with Russia, emphasizing the distinction between pro-Kremlin rhetoric and concrete departures from Euro-Atlantic commitments.

Despite these concerns, Professor Ganev underscores the resilience of Bulgarian civil society, which he describes as a durable institutional counterweight capable of challenging governing elites through grassroots mobilization. He also maintains that European integration continues to impose meaningful, although diminished, constraints on domestic powerholders.

In sum, the interview exposes a fundamental tension between democratic consolidation and persistent popular expectations of strong leadership. As Professor Ganev concludes, “The cycle seems to be that we elect a strong leader, he disappoints us, and then we elect another strong leader.” This recurring pattern offers broader insights into the vulnerabilities and resilience of post-communist democracies across Eastern Europe.

Here is our interview with Professor Venelin I. Ganev, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Bulgaria Will Finally Have a Stable Government and Clear Political Leadership

Bulgarian President Rumen Radev.
Then-Bulgarian President Rumen Radev speaks to the media following his meeting with European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker at EU headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, on January 30, 2017. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Ganev, welcome! Drawing on your influential scholarship on state predation, democratic backsliding, and soft decisionism, let me begin with the election itself: Iliana Iotova won Bulgaria’s November 1 presidential runoff with 57.57% of the vote, reinforcing Prime Minister Rumen Radev’s political dominance. Yet turnout was only 28.67%. Does this outcome signify democratic stabilization after years of political fragmentation, or does it reveal a deeper crisis of political representation and legitimacy?

Professor Venelin I. Ganev: In the case of the Bulgarian presidential elections, a major factor contributing to the low turnout was the refusal of some of the major parties to endorse a candidate. Specifically, the party representing the ethnic Turkish minority did not endorse anyone, which is why electoral activity in Bulgaria’s ethnically mixed regions was very low, sometimes in the single digits.

In my view, the outcome of the elections will result in stability. Over the last five or six years, Bulgaria has undergone various electoral cycles marked by fragmented parliaments and unstable governments. Now, however, at least this will be accomplished: There will be a stable government, and it will be fairly clear who is in charge.

Radev’s Consolidation of Power Signals the Persistence of Personalistic Rule

In your influential Journal of Democracy article, “Soft Decisionism” in Bulgaria (2018), you describe how personalistic rule can undermine democratic institutions without dismantling competitive elections. Does Radev’s consolidation of parliamentary power, alongside an allied presidency, suggest the emergence of a new form of soft decisionism?

Professor Venelin I. Ganev: I think it’s too soon to tell, in a sense, because the consolidation of Radev’s influence took place only several weeks ago. However, there are indications that he’s centralizing decision-making power in his own hands and is unwilling to delegate or share power. So, some form of soft decisionism will persist in Bulgarian politics.

Radev Is Taking Over Corrupt Networks Rather Than Dismantling Them

In your book Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria After 1989 (2007), you examine how powerful elites weakened state institutions to advance their interests. Can Radev’s anti-corruption agenda dismantle these entrenched networks, or might the replacement of established elites reproduce familiar patterns of state predation?

Professor Venelin I. Ganev: The situation, not just in Bulgaria but across Eastern Europe, has changed significantly since the 1990s. My book focused on the 1990s, the early stages of post-communism. Today, rather than assaulting and weakening the state, predatory elites use it; they need it. Prevalent forms of corruption now focus on the redistribution of state-held resources, making the state essential to their activities.

As far as Radev’s policies are concerned, it’s clear that he has no interest in dismantling these corrupt networks. He hasn’t done anything meaningful in that regard. What we are seeing right now is simply a takeover. Radev is using his executive power to take over the existing corrupt networks from which he was previously, by and large, excluded.

I mean, it’s all under the label of combating corruption, but I haven’t really seen anything suggesting that he’s serious about it. Quite the opposite: many of his specific appointments clearly imply that he’s not interested in dismantling corruption. Instead, he will simply take over the pre-existing corrupt networks and use them for his own purposes.

Bulgaria’s Liberal Foundations Are Under Assault

Bulgaria protests.
Protesters chant anti-government slogans during a demonstration in central Sofia, Bulgaria on July 26, 2013. Photo: Anton Chalakov / Dreamstime.

Your scholarship distinguishes competitive elections from the broader institutional quality of democracy. Given Bulgaria’s persistent problems with judicial independence, prosecutorial accountability, and oligarchic influence, should the country’s current trajectory be understood as democratic backsliding, institutional stagnation, or an opportunity for democratic renewal?

Professor Venelin I. Ganev: I would go with democratic backsliding. That’s what’s happening. It’s not so much democracy itself—I don’t think democracy is endangered in Bulgaria—but rather the liberal component of liberal democracy that’s being assaulted.

By backsliding, I mean that the judiciary was more independent 15 years ago, publicly owned media were freer, and legislative measures were rarely used to intimidate the opposition. This was one of the positive characteristics of Bulgarian democracy: legislation was not used to intimidate political rivals.

What we see right now, however, are attempts to do exactly that. For example, there is currently a discussion in the Bulgarian parliament about foreign agents. I’m sure you have heard about this law, which was introduced in Russia a decade ago. Clearly, it is a measure that targets civil society and nongovernmental organizations and is intended to restrict the scope of public debate in Bulgaria.

I find this effort very worrisome. We don’t know whether the law will pass. The legislative draft was actually introduced by a different party, not Radev’s party, and so far, he has remained silent about whether he intends to support or reject it. But clearly, there is an effort to restrict public discussion, and the Bulgarian political system is showing a tendency to become less liberal.

Radev Represents Mainstream Populism Rather Than Radical Populism

Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria achieved a remarkable parliamentary breakthrough by mobilizing anti-establishment sentiment across ideological divisions. How would you characterize its political appeal? Does it represent a distinctive form of sovereignty-oriented populism, or does its ideological heterogeneity challenge conventional definitions of populism?

Professor Venelin I. Ganev: I don’t think Radev’s rise should prompt us to challenge conventional definitions of populism. Clearly, what we have in the case of Progressive Bulgaria is a populist phenomenon. But in the Bulgarian context, it’s more a form of mainstream populism than radical populism.

Radev is a politician who avoids extremes. He’s not a risk-taker, an ideologue, or a crusader for any particular cause. There are parties like that, however, such as Revival. This is the dangerous populist party in Bulgaria, which, by the way, lost votes and may therefore be in decline. It would be safe to say that its influence is declining.

Overall, the rise of Radev and his party, along with the subsequent election of Iotova as president, can easily be understood within the broader phenomenon of rising populism in Eastern Europe.

Eastern Europe’s Radical Populists Are Economically Left-Wing

In “Neoliberalism Is Fascism and Should Be Criminalized” (2017), you controversially interpret Ataka’s populism as a form of left-wing radicalism rather than conventional radical-right politics. How does this framework help explain today’s Revival party and the ideological relationship between nationalism, anti-Western sentiment, and economic radicalism?

Professor Venelin I. Ganev: I wrote this piece about neoliberalism and populism in response to the conventional wisdom that populists in Eastern Europe are right-wing. Of course, it depends on how you look at it. But from my perspective—and I think members of my generation would agree—the distinction between left and right is ultimately an economic one. I mean, what is your economic agenda? What economic policies do you champion? If you approach the issue from that angle, these populists are clearly very left-wing. They’re interventionists who seek to undermine property rights and call for the radical redistribution of resources.

That was the reason for my argument. If we apply strictly economic criteria to this phenomenon, which I think is the correct analytical approach, then these are obviously left-wing parties. There’s simply no doubt about it.

Now, when it comes to nationalism and foreign policy, perhaps we can debate that classification. But if you look at the economic policies they favor and campaign on, they’re undoubtedly quite radically left-wing. For example, Ataka, which has now practically ceased to exist but has its successors, called for the nationalization of all foreign companies in Bulgaria, placing them under state control. This is clearly a radical left-wing measure.

With regard to anti-Western sentiment, I think this is a difficult issue to analyze. Certainly, anti-Western sentiments exist and are clearly and aggressively expressed. On the other hand, it’s really hard to identify specific measures or steps that would substantiate the argument that Bulgarian politics is governed or dominated by anti-Western sentiment.

As for economic radicalism, I don’t see such a thing. With regard to the economy, the policies, rhetoric, and discourse are all very mainstream. I don’t see discussions of radical privatization, measures intended to boost markets, or radical redistribution. So, when it comes to the economy, the policies remain mainstream.

Radev Condemns Corrupt Elites Despite Being Part of the Political Elite

In your 2024 book chapter, “From Populist Emplotment to Populist Deeds,” you examine populism through the relationship between political narratives and action. How can we distinguish Radev’s anti-elite rhetoric from genuinely populist governing practices, and what institutional developments would demonstrate that populism is reshaping Bulgarian democracy?

Professor Venelin I. Ganev: The institutional developments I mentioned concern policies toward nongovernmental organizations and civil society. If efforts to restrict the scope of public discussion and to marginalize and assault nongovernmental organizations persist, that would clearly indicate that populism is reshaping Bulgarian politics in a negative way. But I think it’s too soon to tell. So far, I haven’t really seen any radical measures in that regard.

If you consider the two major components of populism, the first is elite-versus-the-people rhetoric and the condemnation of corrupt elites. The second is the rejection of pluralism and the understanding of the people as one homogeneous whole.

From this perspective, Radev clearly talks a lot about corrupt elites, which, of course, is ironic because he’s been president since 2016. In other words, he’s a member of the elite. He cannot plausibly portray himself as an outsider because he’s an insider. Nevertheless, he uses that language: the elites versus the people, the corrupt elites versus the suffering people.

But when it comes to the other component—homogeneity, the radical rejection of pluralism, and the willingness to condemn opponents as traitors or alien elements—I really don’t see much of that. So, as I mentioned, this is a form of mainstream populism.

The European Union’s Democratic Leverage Has Diminished

Bulgaria-EU flags.
Photo: Dreamstime.

Your concept of “post-accession hooliganism” describes how political elites weakened democratic governance once EU accession conditionality diminished. With Bulgaria now fully integrated into Schengen and the eurozone, does European integration still provide meaningful constraints on domestic powerholders, or has its democratizing leverage been exhausted?

Professor Venelin I. Ganev: That’s a great question, and a difficult one to answer because the picture is very mixed. Immediately after accession, when East European countries finally gained full membership in the European Union, there was this hooliganism. By hooliganism, I mean knowing what the rules are but disregarding them. This behavior was rampant, and it seemed, as you put it, that the European Union’s leverage had been exhausted.

However, what subsequently became clear is that East European elites, including those in Bulgaria, who openly disregarded the European Union, flouted its rules, and behaved as if there were no constraints on their actions, began to lose elections. The electorate doesn’t like that, or at least it becomes disillusioned fairly quickly with this form of politics, in which the person at the top disregards all the rules.

Now, as the second decade of Bulgaria’s membership in the European Union draws to a close, some of these constraints still matter. The leverage, to use your language, has not been completely exhausted, although it has diminished because of the European Union’s structure, which gives every member state veto power.

I also think decisionmakers in Brussels were caught by surprise by democratic backsliding and this hooliganism. They didn’t really know how to react to Orbán in Hungary or Kaczyński in Poland. But they have figured that out now. Misbehavior leads to negative consequences, and East European leaders understand that.

Radev and Iotova Are Russophiles, but Their Policies Remain Ambiguous

Radev and Iotova reaffirm Bulgaria’s EU and NATO membership while questioning sanctions against Russia and advocating diplomatic engagement over Ukraine. Should this orientation be understood as pragmatic national-interest politics, a continuation of post-communist Russian influence, or a form of sovereignty-centered populism challenging Euro-Atlantic solidarity?

Professor Venelin I. Ganev: Yes, there’s definitely very strong Russian influence in Bulgarian politics. It would be fair to say that both Radev and Iotova are Russophiles in their instincts, sentiments, and mentality. There’s no doubt about it.

But what we’ve seen so far is ambiguity. They make statements that clearly indicate sympathy for Russia, the Kremlin, and Putin, as well as a desire to distance themselves from Ukraine and the Ukrainian cause. That’s on the one hand. On the other hand, they haven’t really done anything to undermine European unity, veto policies against Putin, or sabotage assistance to Ukraine. So, in my view, they talk the pro-Russian talk.

The reason for that is electoral. There is a sizable minority of Bulgarians who are Russophiles, so if you want to win their votes, you have to praise Russia somehow. But Radev and Iotova haven’t really walked the pro-Putin walk. So far, they haven’t taken any concrete steps in that direction. That remains to be seen, particularly with Iotova, who will now try to exert her power in international relations as president. She wants to be an international player whom everybody has to reckon with.

She campaigned on this issue, arguing that the war in Ukraine should stop and that there must be peace. This is a form of soft pro-Kremlin policy that does not necessarily involve supporting Putin directly but rather emphasizes peace. That was actually her main argument: If elected president, she would never allow Bulgarian troops to be stationed in Ukraine. Of course, this is an irrelevant point because no one has ever suggested that Bulgarian troops should be stationed in Ukraine. Nevertheless, that was her campaign strategy.

It’s a really interesting question, and we have to defer judgment until we see what happens. But so far, that’s what I would say: Yes, there is Russian influence; yes, there is a Russian presence; and yes, there is a very aggressive Russian ambassador in Sofia who constantly meddles in Bulgarian affairs. On the other hand, I really cannot think of a single policy, step, or measure indicating that Bulgaria is willing to break with the West and openly support Putin.

Demonstration commemorating May 9, Russia’s Victory Day over Nazi Germany, with participants expressing their emotions and displaying slogans in Sofia, Bulgaria, on May 9, 2022. Photo: Yulian Staykov.

The Oligarchic Takeover of the Turkish Minority’s Party Could Create Long-Term Problems

In “History, Politics, and the Constitution” (2004), you examine the constitutional protection of minority political representation in post-communist Bulgaria. How resilient is this pluralistic framework today, particularly amid the radical right’s nationalist mobilization and changing political dynamics surrounding the Turkish minority and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms?

Professor Venelin I. Ganev: The model is resilient. I wouldn’t call it ethnic harmony exactly, because that would be too much, but rather ethnic peace and a sort of consensus among elites not to play the ethnic card. That consensus persists, and I don’t think it’s under any serious threat.

Quite the contrary, actually. One phenomenon observable across Eastern Europe is that, with the arrival of immigrants from Syria, North Africa, and elsewhere, the status and standing of traditional historical minorities have improved. The perception now is that we don’t have to fear these minorities because there are other people coming to our countries, and the minorities we already know are actually fine. In Slovakia, we know the Hungarians; in Romania, we know the Hungarians; and in Bulgaria, we know the Turks. So that’s okay. The perceived danger now comes from refugees and immigrants.

The problem in Bulgaria is the split within the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which used to be a very cohesive and functional mechanism for representing the Turkish minority. The Turkish minority had this party, which was welcomed in Bulgarian politics, was influential, and could promote their rights. Now, the party has split and lost its leader. It was taken over by an oligarch who doesn’t really care much about Turkish issues, unlike his predecessor, who was an ethnic Turk and genuinely cared about the rights of Turks. Ahmed Dogan was very corrupt, and I can say all kinds of negative things about him. But there’s no doubt that he defended the rights of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, whereas the new leader, Delyan Peevski, does not.

This could become a problem if the mechanism for representing the Turkish minority becomes dysfunctional, leaving them without full integration or a meaningful voice in Parliament. That might create problems in the long run. I’m very much concerned about this development, in which a functional minority party was practically taken over by an oligarch. I don’t really know what the long-term consequences will be. Right now, the situation appears to be fine. This new oligarch, who is ethnic Bulgarian, has at least surrounded himself with ethnic Turks. But we’ll have to see. If the Turkish minority becomes disillusioned with Bulgarian politics, that may cause problems.

Civic Vigilance Is Restraining Radev from Pursuing Radical Pro-Russian Policies

People protesting on the main streets of the capital, demanding the Prime Minister’s resignation, in Sofia, Bulgaria, on July 14, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

In “Bulgaria’s Year of Civic Anger” (2014), you emphasize the importance of nonelectoral democratic accountability through grassroots mobilization. Considering the protests that preceded Radev’s electoral breakthrough, has Bulgarian civil society become a durable institutional counterweight, or does its mobilization remain dependent on episodic dissatisfaction with governing elites?

Professor Venelin I. Ganev: That’s another great question. I think civil society has become a durable institutional counterweight. This pattern, in which corrupt actions or unacceptable behavior by elites are countered by grassroots mobilization, began in 2013. My article is devoted to that episode, when an effort to hand over the national security apparatus to the oligarch Peevski, whom I mentioned earlier, triggered mass protests. Eventually, the government had to resign. That was the beginning.

Subsequently, this pattern was repeated on several occasions. When the government does something unacceptable, protests and demonstrations follow, and eventually the government resigns. This is how the political career of Boyko Borisov, the previous prime minister, ended—as a result of mass protests.

So, returning to your question, civil society has become an institutional counterweight. It’s a very active player, and its mobilization is not merely episodic. There is a sort of civic vigilance in Bulgaria. Of course, civic vigilance and civic commitment are scarce resources, and they can disappear. Perhaps passivity or apathy will eventually take over. But right now, Radev understands very well that if he goes too far with his pro-Russian policies or further antagonizes the West and NATO, he’ll have to face mass protests. That’s one reason why he’s avoiding radical behavior.

“We Elect a Strong Leader, He Disappoints Us, and Then We Elect Another”

And finally, Professor Ganev, looking ahead, can Bulgaria escape the recurring cycle of electoral upheaval, elite replacement, and institutional weakness that has characterized much of its post-communist development? What would constitute convincing evidence of genuine democratic consolidation, and what broader lessons does Bulgaria offer for understanding populism and democratic resilience in Eastern Europe?

Professor Venelin I. Ganev: The answer to the question of democratic consolidation in Bulgaria depends on how we define democratic consolidation. There are more expansive definitions and more minimalist ones. I personally prefer minimalist definitions, which revolve around a fundamental question: How do we know that a democracy is consolidated?

First, the electoral process must be clean and fair, and those who lose must step down. Second, there must be respect for human and political rights. That’s really all. Obviously, consolidated democracies can still be corrupt and inefficient. But if we apply these two criteria—elections and rights—Bulgaria has been a consolidated democracy since the late 1990s.

I don’t really expect any deterioration in that regard. I don’t think anyone wants to destroy the electoral process, and I don’t see any indications that human, civil, or constitutional rights will come under assault. Of course, you never know.

As for the broader lessons about populism, I don’t really think there is a specifically Bulgarian lesson. What’s happening in Bulgaria is more or less similar to what’s been happening across the region. The lesson is that popular belief in strong leadership persists. It’s not going away.

The cycle seems to be that we elect a strong leader, he disappoints us, and then we elect another strong leader. So, the broader lesson is that popular attitudes in Eastern Europe still favor strong leadership over constitutional concerns and a system of checks and balances.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Professor Maya Tudor.

Prof. Maya Tudor: Without Substantial Liberal Rights, There Is No Democracy

In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Professor Maya Tudor, Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Oxford, examines democratic backsliding, authoritarian resilience, and the challenges of democratic restoration across India, Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, the United States, and Pakistan. Challenging electoral-minimalist conceptions of democracy, Professor Tudor argues that “if you do not have substantial liberal rights, you don’t have a democracy.” She explains how elections can survive while political freedoms erode and warns that defeating authoritarian incumbents does not necessarily dismantle the systems sustaining their power. Emphasizing independent media, political equality, opposition coordination, and institutional safeguards, she concludes that democracy’s ultimate test is whether future opposition forces can compete freely.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

As democratic institutions confront intensifying pressures worldwide, a fundamental question has returned to the center of scholarly debate: Can a political system remain democratic when elections survive but the liberal rights that make political competition meaningful are systematically undermined? In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Maya Tudor, Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government and Fellow at St. Hilda’s College, University of Oxford, offers a compelling comparative assessment of democratic erosion, authoritarian resilience, and the conditions necessary for genuine democratic restoration.

The discussion unfolds against a paradoxical global backdrop. Recent electoral developments in Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, and the United States demonstrate the continuing potential for democratic resistance, even as authoritarian populism, institutional capture, and majoritarian nationalism remain formidable challenges. India’s democratic decline under Narendra Modi and Pakistan’s enduring military dominance further expose the fragility of democratic institutions. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about the boundaries between democracy and autocracy and the prospects for reversing democratic backsliding.

Drawing on her research with Andrea Vaccaro, Professor Tudor challenges electoral-minimalist conceptions of democracy. Her central argument is unequivocal: “If you do not have substantial liberal rights, you don’t have a democracy.” As she explains, democracy concerns not merely elections but what citizens are entitled to do between them. India illustrates this distinction particularly clearly: “Democracy can be hollowed out without elections ever being abolished or becoming meaningless.” Restrictions on opposition mobilization, media independence, and minority rights can fundamentally undermine electoral competition without formally eliminating it.

Turning to Hungary, Professor Tudor cautions against conflating electoral victory with institutional transformation: “Defeating an authoritarian government is not the same as dismantling the authoritarian system the incumbent constructed.” Similar dilemmas emerge in Serbia and Brazil, where civic mobilization and opposition coordination must develop into durable political organization. As she emphasizes, “Power has to be organized before it can be used.”

The United States presents another critical test. Reflecting on Trump’s second presidency and the 2026 midterm elections, Professor Tudor warns that “Elections will certainly interrupt that process, but they cannot, by themselves, repair the institutions and norms weakened by democratic erosion.” Institutional checks, political pluralism, and the recovery of loyal opposition therefore remain indispensable.

Her policy recommendations emphasize independent media, freedom of association, political equality, transparent electoral procedures, and meaningful alternation in power. Ultimately, she argues, democratic restoration must be measured against a demanding standard: “The ultimate test is also whether tomorrow’s opposition will be allowed to compete freely.” Across these cases, Professor Tudor advances a central proposition: democracy’s resilience depends not simply on removing authoritarian incumbents, but on ensuring that their successors cannot monopolize power.

Here is our interview with Professor Maya Tudor, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Elections Alone Cannot Distinguish Democracy from Electoral Autocracy

Nepal elections.
Voter education volunteer instructs residents on using a sample ballot in Ward No. 4, Inaruwa, Nepal, February 17, 2026, as part of a local election awareness program led by the Sunsari Election Office. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula / Dreamstime.

Professor Tudor, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your recent Democratization article, coauthored with Andrea Vaccaro, “Why Liberal Rights Define Democracy.” In this article, you argue that substantial liberal rights are constitutive of democracy. Does this make “illiberal democracy” a conceptual contradiction, and where should we draw the boundary between electoral democracy and electoral autocracy?

Professor Maya Tudor: It’s an important question. We should start with the fundamental insight that many people equate democracy with elections, although many of us know that democracy is much more than just what happens on election day. It also involves what citizens have a right to do between elections.

When you’re able to cast a ballot, but the opposition isn’t on the ballot because it hasn’t been able to organize, key opposition figures have been intimidated, or the media doesn’t give airtime to their stories, that affects democracy. And that’s not a marginal issue; it’s a really core issue for democracy. The core argument of our paper is that if you do not have substantial liberal rights, you don’t have a democracy.

The reason this is an important issue to raise is that research and scholarship increasingly use the term “illiberal democracy” to describe regimes that have elections but substantially lack civil rights.

You asked the really interesting question of how we should think about the difference between electoral democracy and electoral autocracy. Those are labels that democracy watchdog organizations use. Notice that both have elections, but there’s a distinction—and a gray area—between regimes that have substantial civil rights and those that don’t.

It is a gray area, and you’re going to have to make some judgment calls. Many of these democracy watchdogs do a very good job of making those calls. I just think we’re misleading people when we call something an electoral democracy when it actually substantially lacks civil liberties. And that was the point of the paper.

Democracy’s Benefits Are Cumulative, but Its Shortcomings Are Immediately Visible

In “What Democracy Does… And Does Not Do,” you find that democracies generally outperform autocracies in health, education, economic growth, and security. Why, then, is public confidence in democracy declining while authoritarian alternatives are gaining legitimacy?

Professor Maya Tudor: Democracy is no guarantee of good government, but neither is autocracy. The fastest-growing regimes in the world are disproportionately likely to be autocracies, but so too are the worst-performing regimes. That’s what the article discusses: on average, democracies provide a kind of insurance against the absolutely worst outcomes.But many democracies around the world have been declining in quality. We know this from the democratic backsliding literature: they’re becoming less democratic, even while remaining democracies. This links to your previous question because civil rights are often eroding, the independence of non-executive institutions is weakening, and the quality of democracy is declining.

What we’ve been seeing in recent events around the globe, whether in Serbia, Bangladesh, Nepal, or Sri Lanka, are youth-led movements pushing back against institutions that are often captured by older generations. When the opportunities available to younger generations are found wanting, people become dissatisfied with the system that produced that lack of opportunities. 

Democracy’s benefits are cumulative, while its shortcomings are immediately visible. One of those shortcomings is that democracies govern, by definition, on electoral timelines. This makes it harder for democratic governments to develop longer-term plans that they can implement over multiple electoral cycles. But that doesn’t mean they perform worse, and this is why I wrote the article. I wrote it because I teach in a very international environment. This year, we have 59 countries represented in the cohort I teach. Many of those students say, “Well, why should we? Democracy doesn’t deliver.” I wrote this article to say that, actually, yes, it does. It delivers on average, and in many ways, it delivers better than you might think.

Autocracies Can Project Decisiveness While Concealing Their Failures

The Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, is pictured with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, in Goa, India on May 25, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

The analogy I use in the article concerns COVID. In 2020, autocratic regimes looked remarkable in their capacity to deal with COVID. Take China, for example. It shut down, traced people very effectively, built hospitals and infrastructure in a matter of weeks, and sequenced the genome. It seemed to demonstrate what capable authoritarian regimes were able to do. Fast-forward to 2022, though, and the picture looks very different. Interestingly, in 2021, a slew of articles appeared asking, “Do autocracies do better in times of crisis?” 

By 2022—and most people around the world would agree that COVID, on and off, lasted from 2020 to 2022—if you look across those three years, what democracies generally did better than autocracies were adapted to changing circumstances on the ground. As it became clear that children who were out of school were suffering in terms of their learning, and that lockdowns were having negative mental health effects, for example, authoritarian governments generally pivoted. Now, that’s a different story. If you look, for example, at how China performed during COVID in terms of deaths per capita, independently verified estimates vary, but within that range, China doesn’t look better than neighboring democracies such as Japan and South Korea.

So, I would ask your audience, students, and others thinking about this to be consistent in how they approach the question: How should we judge whether democracies are better or worse? That doesn’t mean democracies will always deliver, and we need to be careful here. Autocracies can often present a very compelling narrative of decisiveness and quick action. They can also censor, so their failures are often hidden. One of the studies I cite in the article shows that authoritarian governments tend to overstate their GDP per capita by around one percentage point. One percentage point! It’s extraordinary. So, we need to carefully distinguish between the narrative and what we know to be true on the ground.

The final thing I’ll say is something I think is relatively obvious: there is now a growing number of powerful countries around the globe whose own legitimation depends on delegitimizing democratic forms of government. That is another reason why we’re seeing this narrative. It’s also worth adding that democratic governments, such as the United States, have often used democracy as a cudgel while turning a blind eye to authoritarian governments’ misbehavior when doing so serves their interests. That has undermined the legitimacy of the democratic norm.

Exclusionary Nationalism Creates Second-Class Citizens by Definition

Your research with Dan Slater and Harris Mylonas emphasizes how inclusive and exclusionary national narratives shape political regimes. Under what conditions does nationalism strengthen democratic solidarity, and when does it become an instrument of authoritarian majoritarianism, as seen in Modi’s India, Erdogan’s Turkey, Orbán’s Hungary, or Trump’s America?

Professor Maya Tudor: Nationalism is a narrative of “we the people.” But what building blocks do we use to define this group we call “we the people”? That’s not inherently democratic or autocratic. It depends on how the nation is defined and who’s included in it.

One of the things I argue, both in my work with Dan Slater and in my work with Harris Mylonas, is that all national narratives draw boundaries between “we the people” and everybody else. That’s the boundary of the nation. But many countries also draw internal hierarchies of belonging. Take the United States, for example. For most of American history, if you were a Black American, you were a second-class citizen. You were not fully included in this narrative of belonging, either at the founding or during the Civil War.

Exclusionary nationalism, as we argue—and as I argue in some of my earlier work as well—is a nationalism that creates those internal hierarchies by fusing a fixed narrative of the nation with religion, race, ethnicity, or other social categories that we can’t choose. When those social categories become the basis for belonging to the nation, you create second-class citizens by definition.

The argument we make is that majoritarian nationalism—nationalism that governs in the name of a majority—is particularly dangerous when it becomes fused with exclusionary nationalism. You always have majorities, but those majorities are electorally fluid when they’re not fixed to a social category. But when you say that to be Malaysian is to be Malay, with its ethnic and religious markers, or that in Myanmar, to be Burmese is to be Buddhist and of Bamar ethnicity, you’re creating second-class citizens. And that creates ideological resources for political entrepreneurs who come to power to exclude those second-class citizens.

My theory of politics is that politicians, including would-be politicians in democracies, are always trying to come to power with new narratives. When the history we all share and our sense of who we are become fused with a fixed category, it becomes very easy—even incentivized—for politicians to “other” the group that is not core to the definition of the nation.

India Shows How Elections Can Remain Meaningful but Deeply Unfair

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is showing victory sign with both hand to supporters at Bharatiya Janata Party office amid the results of the Indian General Elections 2024 in New Delhi, India on June 4 2024. Photo: PradeepGaurs.

In “Why India’s Democracy Is Dying,” you explain how democratic institutions can survive formally while their underlying norms deteriorate. Has Modi’s India now crossed the threshold from democratic backsliding into consolidated electoral autocracy, or does meaningful democratic competition remain?

Professor Maya Tudor: I think meaningful democratic competition still remains, but India is an example that reminds us that democracy can be hollowed out without elections ever being abolished or becoming meaningless. In all competitive authoritarian regimes, elections are still meaningful, and incumbents sweat them because, as long as the act of voting is protected, it’s always possible for incumbents to be voted out.

But many of the liberal rights that define a democracy have been substantially eroded. That erosion has occurred through restrictions on the opposition’s ability to mobilize on the streets, as we’ve seen in recent protests; pressure on the media; the acquisition of independent media houses such as NDTV by businessmen close to the government; attacks on minorities, especially when it’s electorally fruitful ahead of state elections; and the use of state institutions, such as the Enforcement Directorate, to target and investigate political opponents through tax proceedings and the like.

However, the existence of competition doesn’t necessarily mean that the process is entirely fair. The analogy I like to use is a football match. Imagine a football match where no one is saying that the players can’t go out and play, but the referee calls all the fouls on only one team. Maybe he’s not allowing one team to practice in advance, while the other team is allowed to practice. Maybe there are penalties called. There are all kinds of ways to tilt the playing field in favor of one side while still respecting the rules of the game.

That’s really important, but it’s hard for people who aren’t paying close attention to see because this is a gray and foggy area. It’s difficult to tell exactly what’s going on because the media itself is captured to a large degree. So, these labels—electoral autocracy versus electoral democracy—are less important because what they have in common is that both have elections and civil liberties have been substantially diminished. Where exactly that boundary lies is less important than the fact that this is a regime in which democracy as a system of government is struggling to survive.

India’s Electoral Rolls and the Manipulation of Political Equality

India’s controversial Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls has generated accusations of mass voter exclusion and politicization of the Election Commission. Does this illustrate a broader authoritarian strategy of manipulating electoral competition through formally legal procedures rather than openly abolishing elections?

Professor Maya Tudor: This is a tricky one. There is absolutely no clarity on this question. For people who may not be familiar with the Indian context, the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls removed 130 million voters in a country of 1.4 billion. That’s almost 10% of the population.

India is a young country, and those electoral rolls certainly needed some attention and updating. No one is doubting that. But if this had been done properly, you would expect openness and transparency about the process. There would also be a means of redress for citizens who had been removed from the electoral rolls, and that is missing.

The state of Bengal held an election earlier this year. The key question people are asking about that election concerns the deletion of voters, which occurred to a greater degree in Muslim-majority districts. According to national voting patterns, one could infer that Muslim-majority districts were less likely to vote for the BJP. Did those deletions swing the state election in favor of the ruling party? This is a state that the Modi government’s party, the BJP, had never ruled. It won for the first time in Bengal’s history.

So, there’s at least prima facie reason to believe that something nefarious might be going on here. And then there’s the situation within India’s Election Commission, which historically had a very different role. India was a country with high levels of illiteracy when the Election Commission came into being, and its job was to go out and register every voter. It wasn’t to say, “Show me your documents.”

The move toward a system that asks voters to show documents, when large proportions of the population are still illiterate and documentation is scarce, changes the situation. Asking people to prove their eligibility to vote changes the function of the Election Commission and the way it operates.

The key issues here are transparency, independent oversight, and appeals. The reason this became such a major issue in India this year is that the Indian Express reported 14 instances in which commissioners within the Election Commission, which led the Special Intensive Revision, had raised objections. These were not outsiders; they were insiders whose objections were overruled by the chief election commissioner. That’s why many of the recent protests called for the chief election commissioner’s resignation.

This is absolutely an ongoing process, and it highlights, in many ways, why modern democratic erosion often operates through the law rather than outside it. The question is whether legal procedures protect political equality or undermine it.

Social Media Can Launch a Movement, but Organization Sustains It

The Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) protest.
Students participate in a peaceful nighttime protest organized by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) in New Delhi, India. Demonstrators sit together on the road, holding placards and posters, chanting slogans, and expressing their demands. Photo: Kamlesh Kumar / Dreamstime.

The emerging Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) movement has mobilized young Indians against alleged electoral manipulation and institutional capture. Drawing on your work on political organization and democratic resilience, can such movements generate lasting democratic renewal without coordinated opposition parties, durable grassroots networks, and clearly defined political demands?

Professor Maya Tudor: That is the million-dollar question. Social media can launch a movement, but organization is what allows it to survive and change politics at the ballot box. What we don’t yet know is whether the CJP can produce that kind of lasting democratic renewal.

Look, we’re seeing this play out in Serbia right now as well. Can a movement that brought people together and threw out an autocratic incumbent actually govern instead? That is very difficult. One reason it’s difficult is that there’s a different logic of politics when you’re banding together to overthrow an existing government or regime. You have all these different groups of people coming together, and what they share is the belief that the government is a problem. So, the governing logic is unity: let’s come together, let’s mobilize, and let’s throw that government out.

Imagine that the government is actually thrown out, as it was in Serbia, and this group of very disparate people then has to govern. Unless they’ve spent some of that time while they were united trying to hammer out what they’ll do when they come to power, governing becomes very difficult because the groups start pulling apart. Some say, “Well, let’s do this policy,” while others say, “No, let’s do that policy.”

When agreement on matters of policy hasn’t been worked out under a logic of unity, it’s much harder to reach that agreement once the logic of unity has given way to people tussling for political power. So, one of the things I teach my students is that power has to be organized before it can be used. Online mobilization is not the same as durable political organization.

Independent Media Are the Connective Tissue of Democratic Resistance

In your recent Journal of Democracy article, “How to Protect the Media in Eroding Democracies” (2026), you characterize independent media as the connective tissue of democratic resistance. How can opposition movements challenge authoritarian dominance over digital platforms, advertising revenues, and information networks, particularly in countries such as India, Turkey, and Hungary?

Professor Maya Tudor: This article examined four countries: India, Sri Lanka, Poland, and Hungary. Two of them have experienced much more severe democratic backsliding in the media space, while the other two have experienced more moderate backsliding. I was trying to compare these two sets of countries, with two countries in each region, to understand the differences between those that experienced much more complete media capture and those that experienced more moderate capture.

I identified five strategies that made a difference. The first was effective digital distribution; the second was diversified funding sources; the third was legal defense; and the fourth was a networked media ecosystem, with journalists and editors well connected across the media space. The fifth was connecting democratic erosion to everyday life, as Peter Magyar had done in Hungary. For example, he connected the decline in EU funding to a lack of investment in hospitals, thereby linking democratic erosion to citizens’ everyday concerns.

One of the things I highlight in that article is that media plays an even more important role in protecting democracies today than it did a generation or two ago. And here’s why. I think of public opinion formation as taking place 100 years ago in physical public squares. People would pass through a public square in the center of a town, where speakers in different corners expressed different views on the politics of the time. We all had a sense of what was being said in one corner or another. We might have gravitated toward one corner more than another, but these conversations were generally in dialogue with one another.

That’s what it looked like when a country had a couple of newspapers and everyone read that handful of newspapers. But now, younger generations are getting all their content online. Even when they follow national media sources, they do so through online platforms. Those platforms have different algorithmic structures that funnel them into smaller and smaller communities. That means we no longer have this public square where people are connected to one another, even if only loosely. Now, you can have very small subcultures that never speak to each other. As I put it, it’s like a mansion with a thousand rooms, and nobody knows what the conversation is like in the next room.

These communities are really siloed, which means our ability as a public to have conversations about what is in the public interest is also much more siloed. That’s a real problem because independent journalism is critical infrastructure for holding governments accountable and providing independent evaluations of what’s actually happening out there that we can trust. So, the core point of that article was to make clear that independent media is like the connective tissue—the highway upon which citizens must travel to discover their mutual interests.

Defeating an Authoritarian Government Is Not Dismantling Its System

Viktor Orban.
Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister arrives to attend in an informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Prague, Czechia on October 7, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Viktor Orbán’s defeat by Péter Magyar in April 2026 demonstrated that even deeply entrenched illiberal governments can lose elections. What explains the limits of Fidesz’s authoritarian resilience, and how can Hungary restore liberal-democratic institutions without reproducing the executive concentration of power that enabled democratic erosion?

Professor Maya Tudor: It’s a great question, and it’s one we all need to think much more about. I don’t have a silver-bullet answer here. One thing this makes very clear is that defeating an authoritarian government is not the same as dismantling the authoritarian system the incumbent constructed. Orbán achieved extensive media and institutional capture, and Péter Magyar showed us the importance of opposition coordination, bringing together disaffected ruling-party supporters, and providing credible alternatives.

But winning an election is only the beginning of this process, which is very difficult. Some of the events in Poland have shown just how difficult it can be. The danger is often that the new government uses its electoral mandate to concentrate power in precisely the manner it previously condemned.

Here’s where being clear about what you were elected to do—what the people elected you to do—is very important, because you cannot achieve everything in one term of government. But if you could choose just a couple of things that you promise to deliver on, then, presumably, that would be enough to win you an electoral mandate to continue doing what you were elected to do in the next term.

Opposition Coordination Converts Protest into Power at the Ballot Box

Serbia’s October 2026 elections delivered a parliamentary majority to the student-backed movement, challenging Vučić’s personalized authoritarianism. What can Serbia and Hungary teach us about the relative importance of opposition coordination, civic mobilization, elite defections, and institutional safeguards in reversing democratic backsliding?

Professor Maya Tudor: The central lesson here is that authoritarian governments can lose when social mobilization connects discontent with credible electoral alternatives. That connection is essential. There’s always discontent bubbling up in any society at any given time.

One of the Achilles’ heels of authoritarian governments is that they don’t actually understand how much disaffection there is. By definition, there is a cost to speaking the truth in an electoral regime where people’s rights and civil liberties are not protected. People are not going to speak truth to power because there’s a cost to doing so. That means authoritarian governments don’t understand what people are frustrated by as well as the opposition coordinating on the ground does.

So, protests generate pressure on the government, but it’s opposition coordination that converts that pressure into political power at the ballot box. I think that’s what Serbia and Hungary teach us.

Democratic Restoration Cannot Depend on the Continued Success of One Leader

Brazilia’s Luiz Inácio Lula is seen during the 2022 election campaign in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on October 20, 2022. Photo: Aline Alcantara.

Lula’s narrow October 2026 reelection victory over Flávio Bolsonaro demonstrated both the resilience of electoral competition and the enduring strength of radical-right populism. Does Brazil suggest that defeating authoritarian-populist candidates at the ballot box is insufficient to reverse the social polarization and institutional vulnerabilities sustaining their movements?

Professor Maya Tudor: You can defeat an authoritarian populist at the ballot box without defeating the political conditions that made that candidate appealing. Brazil was lucky to have Lula around, but who is Lula’s successor? Lula’s 81, isn’t he?

I think polarization isn’t necessarily a problem for democracy in the way the average person might assume when they say, “Oh, it’s a problem; we’re deeply polarized as a society.” One of our key theorists of democracy, Robert Dahl, argued that democracy can resemble a heated family feud. People can disagree deeply about policies, but they need to agree on the boundaries of the nation and recognize that we’re all part of the same political community. Once that shared understanding disappears, polarization really becomes a problem.

When I look at Lula and his victory, I think having these older statesmen who’ve been around for a while is great because it has helped protect some of the core democratic institutions, as illustrated by the court’s decision to send Bolsonaro Sr. to prison. But democratic restoration cannot simply depend on the continued success of one leader.

That’s not a party. So, what is the party beyond Lula? This is true of many opposition parties. The same applies to India’s opposition party, the Indian National Congress. Rahul Gandhi is at the helm, and he’s done some work to bring in opposition voices. He’s also coordinating with the Cockroach Janta Party that we discussed earlier. But ultimately, he needs to make space for young people to reinvigorate the ranks of opposition movements.

Elections Alone Cannot Repair Institutions Weakened by Democratic Erosion

Trump’s second presidency has intensified concerns over executive power, institutional independence, and liberal rights. The November 3, 2026, midterm elections delivered Democratic majorities in both chambers of Congress. Does this electoral setback constrain authoritarian tendencies, or can democratic erosion continue despite renewed institutional checks?

Professor Maya Tudor: Elections will certainly interrupt that process, but they cannot, by themselves, repair the institutions and norms weakened by democratic erosion. 

It looks like the latest count is that, if Alaska goes Democratic, there will be 56 Democratic senators in the US Senate.That still means there are over 40 Republican senators, and during these first two years of Trump’s second presidential term, they have served as no check whatsoever on his power. That represents real institutional erosion because these systems work only if checks and balances continue to hold, and they haven’t held during the first half of Trump’s second term.

So, the deeper test going forward is whether political actors across party lines defend their opponents’ right to disagree. To me, the very concept of loyal opposition needs to be recovered. You can be a Trump supporter and vote for Trump, or a supporter of the Democratic Party and vote for the Democratic Party. But are these groups of people loyal citizens to one another? That is something that needs to be recovered.

Pakistan’s Military Can Lose Legitimacy Without Losing Power

T.J.P members are holding Jinnah Rally on the occasion of Birthday Anniversary of Father of Nation Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah in Karachi on December 25, 2017. Photo: Asianet-Pakistan

In The Promise of Power and your research with Adeel Malik, you examine Pakistan’s historical authoritarian foundations and emerging challenges to military dominance. Can generational change, an aspirational middle class, and digitally mobilized opposition weaken the military establishment without fundamental institutional transformation?

Professor Maya Tudor: Unlikely. The military can lose legitimacy without losing power, and that’s certainly what happened in the last election. The real question is whether societal change can be translated into changes in civilian institutions. As I wrote in The Promise of Power, Pakistan’s military dominance is rooted in an early historical pattern of state formation, when there was considerable political instability and the military stepped into power.

What we know from research is that once the military steps into power and governs, especially for a prolonged period, it’s very difficult to reverse that pattern. The conditional probability of another coup is much higher once you’ve had a first coup. The military often develops very strong economic interests. This is not just true of Pakistan, but also of Myanmar, Egypt, and Thailand. It was also true of Indonesia, and probably still is, even though the military has left power there, at least for the foreseeable future. These vested interests in particular patterns of the economy make it even harder to undertake electoral reforms. If you had a regime that was somewhat independent of those vested interests, such reforms might be easier to undertake.

In my piece with Adeel Malik, I talked about the emergence of a new aspirational middle class, the weakening of traditional authority structures, and mounting economic pressures, particularly those related to climate, as future sources of crises in Pakistan. But that doesn’t mean the military is going to step out of power. The past is not always the best indication of the future, but you have to see something really change. Right now, I don’t see any incentive for the military to relinquish any of its power.

The Ultimate Test of Democracy Is Whether Tomorrow’s Opposition Can Compete Freely

Looking across India, Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, the United States, and Pakistan, what distinguishes temporary electoral setbacks for authoritarian-populist forces from genuine democratic restoration? Which institutional and societal conditions are most essential for sustaining democratic resilience?

Professor Maya Tudor: The process of democratic restoration begins with the removal from office of an incumbent who has eroded democracy. But the ultimate test is not simply whether the opposition can win. That is an important step—a critical step. The ultimate test is also whether tomorrow’s opposition will be allowed to compete freely. That is something we have to watch for whenever there is a turnover in power. There’s a great deal of attention—a glare of attention—focused on electoral moments in any country. But what happens after the election?

An election may represent a setback for an authoritarian-populist movement, but genuine restoration requires protecting the political equality of all citizens. It requires independent media that, by definition, are able to criticize the government. It also requires freedom of association, especially when groups assemble to protest against the government. If they’re simply supporting the government, then those freedoms aren’t, in a sense, really needed.

Genuine restoration requires the possibility of alternation in power and recovering the idea that you can oppose the government while still being a loyal citizen. Democracy is strongest when electoral losers retain their rights and winners accept constraints on their power in future electoral cycles. Democratic restoration should therefore be judged not just by whether an incumbent loses, but by whether the next government makes it harder for any future leader to monopolize power.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Supporters of Brazilian President and Workers’ Party (PT) presidential candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva attend a reelection campaign rally on Avenida Paulista in São Paulo, Brazil, on October 24, 2026.

Brazil After the Ballots: From Lula’s Digital Army to a Democratic Base

In this commentary, Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano examines Brazil’s 2026 presidential election through the interplay of digital populism, social inequalities, and political mobilization. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork and campaign observations, he explores how Lula’s remarkable electoral comeback was supported by André Janones’s Exército do Lula, a digitally coordinated network that mobilized millions of supporters. Moving beyond conventional distinctions between online and offline politics, Dr. Bayarri Toscano analyzes how economic precarity, political identities, and social relationships shape contemporary populist movements. While highlighting the effectiveness of digital campaigning, he questions whether hierarchical online mobilization can evolve into sustainable democratic participation. He argues that Brazil’s central challenge lies in transforming electoral mobilization into enduring collective organization, democratic literacy, and meaningful participation beyond election day.

By Gabriel Bayarri Toscano*

The Material and Ideological Terrain of the Contest

Brazil’s 2026 presidential election cannot be understood without first considering the country’s social complexity. The election took place in a Brazil where the figure of the formal, industrial, unionized worker no longer captured the experience of large segments of the population. As in many countries where informal work is widespread, the growth of digital platforms and the “Uberization” of the economy had expanded self-employment and insecurity: many people pieced together jobs, small businesses, and other activities to make ends meet. In this fragmented labor market, demands for equality and rights coexisted with aspirations for individual prosperity, religious fulfillment, family life, and consumption, without necessarily finding a common political expression.

Nor was Brazilian society divided into two homogeneous blocs. Working classes in urban and peripheral areas, along with large informal sectors, had demands that did not automatically coalesce into a shared political project. Brazil’s bourgeoisie brought together financial, industrial, and commercial interests, as well as those tied to agribusiness, and formed shifting alliances with the urban middle classes. In the countryside, agribusiness and conservative forces held sway alongside rural workers, peasant movements, and Indigenous peoples. Understanding this social composition helps explain why the electoral contest was not simply a confrontation between rich and poor or a competition between online messages. It was also a struggle over what prosperity meant, who could claim to represent working people, and how political actors addressed precarity and insecurity.

We can understand Bolsonarism only in light of this complexity. It did not coalesce around a single social group or rely solely on spreading reactionary messages online; instead, it brought together, often uneasily, experiences of precarity, aspirations for autonomy, conservative values, and promises of prosperity. This coalition did not erase the differences among its supporters, but it gave them a shared language and political identity. For the Workers’ Party (PT), the challenge is not only to oppose Bolsonarism but also to understand why it attracts support and what material future the PT can offer people who do not see their own concerns reflected in the popular demands the party has historically championed.

Theoretical and Methodological Challenges in the Study of Digital Populism

The social complexity outlined in the previous section also became visible during my fieldwork. Over the past several months, I conducted interviews and carried out participant observation at Bolsonarist campaign events. The day before the election, I attended the campaign’s closing rally in Barra da Tijuca, an area where the right enjoys strong support in Rio de Janeiro. The crowd spanned different ages, backgrounds, and life experiences. Attendees wore Brazilian national team jerseys, sang the national anthem, and displayed flags of Israel and the United States. This diversity did not form a uniform social identity, but it showed Bolsonarism’s capacity to bring different symbols and experiences together. The interviews suggested a similar pattern: people connected WhatsApp messages with family conversations, social gatherings, and their experiences of work, religion, insecurity, and the pursuit of prosperity. The digital and the in-person did not appear as separate spheres, but as dimensions of the same political life.

This connection poses a methodological challenge: the tools we use to study politics can also separate the digital from the in-person, metrics from meaning, and content circulation from the relationships that sustain it. Metrics can show a message’s reach, interactions, and speed of circulation, but they cannot explain what it means to those who receive it or why they trust the person sharing it. Interviews help reconstruct these meanings, but on their own they cannot show how many people share them or whether a message influenced their vote. Digital ethnography lets us trace how messages move across platforms and in-person relationships, and how people interpret them in specific situations, but it cannot establish causality on its own either. That is why we need to break down the barriers between quantitative and qualitative approaches, and between studying online networks and observing in-person life. The goal is not to find a method that explains everything, but to combine approaches to understand how circulation, meaning, and political relationships work together.

The theoretical challenge is just as important. A central question in populism theory is how political actors articulate heterogeneous demands into a collective will and define it against an adversary. Studying digital populism means keeping that question in view while developing our own tools to explain what changes when this process unfolds across platforms and in-person relationships. We cannot simply transpose concepts developed for other settings onto social media, as if the digital were just another channel. Platforms reshape the pace and form of political struggle: users repeat and edit political signifiers, linking them to different experiences, while demands come together around shared ideas of work, faith, security, prosperity, and fairness. These moral economies are diverse and sometimes in conflict; they meet and clash through increasingly rapid cycles of circulation.

Hybridity, then, means more than combining online activity with a presence on the street; it is essential to understanding how populist politics works today. Studying it means tracing both the circulation of content and the relationships, interpretations, and experiences that give it meaning. Lula’s comeback offers a concrete case for examining this relationship: the role Janones and the Exército do Lula (“Lula’s Army”) played raises the question of how digital mobilization connects messages and participants, and whether it can build a social base capable of acting beyond election day.

Lula’s Army, Janones, and the Comeback

Brazil elects its president through a two-round system. If no candidate wins more than half of the valid votes in the first round, the top two candidates advance to a runoff. On October 4, 2026, Flávio Bolsonaro received 47.03 percent of the vote, while Lula received 45.16 percent. Three weeks later, Lula won the runoff with 51.79 percent, compared with 48.21 percent for his opponent. The result was truly unexpected and unprecedented in Brazil’s democratic history: Lula had trailed by more than two million votes and ended up with 10,379,615 more votes than in the first round.

Several factors contributed to the comeback, but we cannot understand it without looking at the mobilization led by André Janones, a federal deputy from Minas Gerais. Through the WhatsApp channel Exército do Lula (“Lula’s Army”), Janones coordinated campaign materials and urged supporters to take part on other platforms. The channel amassed 10.8 million followers. On Flávio Bolsonaro’s side, Tropa do Flávio (“Flávio’s Troop”) reached around 2.1 million. A study of the campaign found a substantial difference in response times: some tasks issued through Lula’s channel reached other platforms within seconds, while the fastest responses recorded in the rival channel took several minutes. This comparison covers specific actions and does not, by itself, measure the campaigns as a whole, but it illustrates the scale, speed, and effectiveness of Lula’s operation.

Janones’s channel did more than amass a large audience. Participants followed instructions on how to edit and cut videos, repost them on other platforms, promote hashtags, and share content with their contacts. This coordinated strategy turned followers into active distributors of messages. It helped Lula’s camp regain the initiative after the first round had left many supporters with little hope. The comeback, however, was not the work of a single channel or leader. Individuals and groups outside the PT’s official campaign structure also took part; supporters spoke with people face-to-face; and the campaign drew on social and political networks that were already in place.

From Digital Mobilization to Democratic Participation

Despite the PT’s presidential victory, the Liberal Party, the main Bolsonarist force, and other right-wing parties will hold majorities in both houses of Congress (the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) and retain control of key municipalities and states, including São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Lula will need to build legislative coalitions to advance his agenda in a Congress where the opposition can block reforms, raise the cost of negotiations, and sustain polarization. These disputes will involve budget priorities and policies that directly affect everyday life, from social protection to working conditions. The government’s ability to act will depend on its parliamentary alliances, as well as on the social support it can sustain beyond Congress. The presidential defeat does not mean that Bolsonarism has disappeared. It may instead adapt by putting forward more moderate-looking figures who retain the movement’s original violent rhetoric but use it with less force and brutality than the Bolsonaro family has so far.

The different trajectories of these political camps raise a central question about the recent success of Lula’s Army: how can digital mobilization become a social base capable of acting after the election? The Exército do Lula showed that rapid coordination could change the mood of a campaign and help mobilize millions of people. It also revealed some of the model’s built-in limitations. Its military language (a “general” summoning “soldiers”) allowed organizers to assign tasks and respond quickly, but it also concentrated decision-making. The model’s ability to circulate messages does not guarantee that those sharing them can discuss the organization’s goals, set its priorities, or sustain it once the campaign is over.

The operation provided participants with primarily technical skills: they learned to edit, cut, and repost videos, distribute them across platforms, and drive engagement. During the campaign, many felt they were “breaking the algorithm” and opening new possibilities for digital sovereignty. That feeling did not mean they controlled the platforms or had changed their rules. This hierarchical, binary logic can help campaigns compete for online visibility, but it is not the same as democratic literacy. Democratic literacy requires participants to help shape messages, disagree, make proposals, and make decisions collectively. Janones’s recommendation not to debate Bolsonarist opponents could work as a short-term tactic; for example, when responding to a provocation would only amplify misleading content. But if avoiding opponents becomes a general rule, the strategy reinforces isolation between groups. A democratic base must be able to mobilize while also creating spaces for disagreement.

Building a democratic digital politics also means going beyond learning how to game the algorithm or calling for its regulation. Digital sovereignty means asking who controls the infrastructure, the data, and the conditions under which content circulates, and who gets to make those decisions.

Some Indigenous epistemologies offer a valuable perspective because they understand knowledge as rooted in relationships among community, territory, memory, and responsibility, rather than as a resource detached from the people who produce it. Alongside community networks, independent media, and collective decision-making about communication, these perspectives help us imagine digital infrastructures that communities govern. The Exército do Lulashowed that popular mobilization could, at least temporarily, change who had visibility. The task now is to turn that possibility into spaces where participation means more than sharing messages: it must also mean having a say in decisions.

Lula begins his new term with a presidential victory and a Congress dominated by the right. Legislative negotiations will be difficult, and the Bolsonarist opposition remains strong enough to obstruct, polarize, and pressure institutions. The central challenge is to connect governing and mobilizing without subordinating mobilization to the government or reducing democracy to a permanent campaign. The Exército do Lula showed how digital coordination could help secure an electoral victory. The political challenge is to ensure that those who made it possible can keep organizing, take part in decisions, and sustain shared demands after the election.


 

(*) Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano is a lecturer in the Department of Audiovisual Communication at Rey Juan Carlos University. He is an interdisciplinary researcher working at the intersection of communication and the social sciences. His research focuses on the “far right” and contemporary polarized discourses in the public sphere. In recent years, Dr. Bayarri Toscano has conducted research in European and Latin American contexts. He has also delivered regular courses and guest lectures at various international academic institutions. Email: gabriel.bayarri@urjc.es

Aerial view of the construction of a new artificial intelligence (AI) hub and data center on the outskirts of Columbus, Ohio, USA.

Governing AI’s Creative Destruction: Shared Prosperity, Financial Risks, and Democratic Resilience

In this commentary, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk examines the political economy of artificial intelligence (AI), highlighting its productive potential alongside distributional inequalities, financial vulnerabilities, and environmental costs. Distinguishing infrastructure investment from AI’s diffusion across the economy, he explores how productivity gains affect employment, wages, prices, inflation, and market concentration. The analysis considers how data governance, computing infrastructure, and financing arrangements shape the distribution of benefits and risks. Professor Ozturk also examines how labor displacement and economic insecurity may create opportunities for authoritarian populist mobilization, while AI-enabled surveillance raises concerns about democratic accountability. He advocates policies that distribute technological gains more equitably, strengthen institutional oversight, and protect household security. The central benchmark is a decent, dependable standard of living throughout employment transitions and retirement.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly reshaping the global economy, offering unprecedented opportunities for productivity growth, innovation, and economic transformation while raising profound questions about inequality, financial stability, environmental sustainability, and democratic governance. As investment in AI infrastructure accelerates, the diffusion of its applications across the real economy presents complex challenges concerning employment, wages, prices, inflation, and the distribution of economic gains. While AI can expand productive capacity and reduce costs, its benefits may become concentrated among powerful firms and capital owners, potentially transferring financial and environmental burdens to households. 

These developments also raise concerns about market concentration, labor displacement, economic insecurity, and the political conditions that may facilitate authoritarian populist mobilization. Against this backdrop, this article examines the interconnected macroeconomic, distributional, financial, environmental, and institutional dimensions of AI, emphasizing the importance of effective governance, equitable access to technological benefits, and policies that protect economic security. The central challenge is ensuring that technological progress translates into shared prosperity, allowing households to maintain a decent and dependable standard of living throughout employment transitions and into retirement.

An AI system may help a worker complete a task in half the time. Who gains the other half? A firm may use the savings to lower prices, improve its product, reduce working hours, or cut its payroll. Its technology supplier may capture part of the gain through subscription fees, while shareholders benefit from higher margins. The same improvement in technical capability can therefore produce very different outcomes for workers, consumers, and investors. Those outcomes matter politically because they determine who can withstand disruption and who must depend on the discretion of employers, platforms, or public officials.

The distribution of these gains depends on two processes that unfold at different speeds. The investment cycle commits capital to data centers, chips, power, and networks before their revenues are known. The diffusion cycle depends on whether firms and public institutions can reorganize production around useful applications. Their interaction determines when costs are incurred, when productivity gains appear, and whether firms, households, or public institutions capture them.

Historical Lessons from Technological Transitions

The historical record of major technological transformations provides critical empirical and theoretical insights into the current AI trajectory. Joseph Schumpeter’s paradigm of “creative destruction” details how radical innovations continuously revolutionize the economic structure from within, destroying old industries and creating new ones. However, as Karl Polanyi famously demonstrated in his analysis of the Industrial Revolution, the expansion of the self-regulating market inflicts severe social dislocation during the transition. The pivotal political-economic question centers on the temporal duration of this transition: How long does the period of destruction last before new livelihoods emerge, and who possesses the financial resilience to endure it?

Britain’s Industrial Revolution offers a sobering historical precedent known as “Engels’ Pause.” As Allen documents, for nearly half a century after the initial adoption of industrial technologies, output per worker expanded significantly while real wages remained stagnant. Corporate profits claimed an escalating share of national income, accumulating to early industrial capitalists while working-class households suffered prolonged wage depression and deteriorating living conditions. Even if real wages eventually rise in the long run, the intergenerational timing of gains is central: workers displaced in one decade cannot feed their families on the theoretical equilibrium of a subsequent generation. Similarly, the rollout of electricity as a general-purpose technology (GPT) demonstrates that macro-level productivity acceleration requires extensive, multi-decade investments in complementary machinery, organizational workflows, and human capital. As Perez emphasizes, financial capital frequently accelerates the installation phase of new technological paradigms, driving speculative asset valuations long before real-economy productivity gains materialize. 

The central historical challenge for AI is whether public institutions, labor markets, and non-tech sectors can cultivate human-centric applications as quickly as financial markets build out computational capacity. As Acemogluargues, technological trajectories are not preordained; innovation can be explicitly directed toward augmenting human capabilities rather than merely automating labor to cut immediate payroll costs.

Productivity, Prices and the Cost of Living

The task framework developed by Acemoglu and Restrepo distinguishes between automation that displaces labor and innovation that creates new tasks for people. An occupation often contains both kinds of opportunity. A nurse may spend less time on documentation and more time with patients. A firm could instead use the saved hours to raise staffing ratios. Which outcome follows depends on management decisions, demand for services, and workers’ and service users’ ability to influence deployment. The ILO’s occupational exposure estimates accordingly help identify where tasks may change. Actual displacement depends on adoption, cost, regulation, and work organization.

Evidence of complementarity deserves attention. In a study of customer support, AI assistance raised productivity by about 15 percent on average, with larger benefits for less experienced and lower-skilled agents. Access to advice previously available mainly through experience can help workers learn and perform more complex tasks. At the same time, a firm can use the same technology to change staffing levels or monitor individual performance. A productivity increase observed in one workplace tells us what the tool achieved in that setting. The division of the gain among wages, profits, and consumers is a separate empirical question. Estimates of aggregate productivity are sensitive to the share of tasks affected, the savings actually realized, and the cost of implementation.

The aggregate effect depends on the economic weight of the tasks affected, the savings realized after implementation costs and the scale of adoption. At the firm level, faster completion of a task raises output only when the task constrains production or the resources released can be put to productive use. A hospital that reduces administrative work may be able to see more patients if staff time is the binding constraint. If beds or specialist capacity are scarce, the gain may instead appear in shorter paperwork queues or better service quality. Investment in software, training, and organizational redesign also absorbs resources during the transition.

Control over specialized chips, cloud capacity, models, and distribution channels can influence where profits accrue. Large firms can capture substantial gains when other firms depend on their infrastructure or face high switching costs. Historical evidence on superstar firms links shifts in market share toward firms with lower labor shares to the aggregate decline in labor’s share. In AI markets, the relevant competition questions concern access to inputs and the terms on which firms can switch suppliers or reach customers. Control over training data and intellectual property adds another barrier: contested access to copyrighted works and uncertain licensing terms can favor incumbents with legal and computing scale. High market valuations indicate expectations about future earnings. Evidence of durable rents requires examining realized returns, entry barriers, and the scope for competition.

A decline in unit costs can lower prices when customers have credible alternatives and firms compete for their business. The same gain can widen margins or be captured upstream by providers of models and cloud infrastructure. The effect on the cost of living depends on the prices of goods and services that households actually buy, their budget shares and their disposable incomes. Cheaper digital services may raise consumer welfare while housing, food or utility bills continue to strain household budgets. For that reason, the relevant outcome is real purchasing power after essential expenses.

The inflation effect depends on timing. During the buildout, investment can raise demand for construction, equipment and electricity before new capacity comes online. As adoption spreads, lower unit costs and greater productive capacity can ease price pressures. Stronger investment or household spending can offset part of that effect. A one-time fall in the price of a service lowers its contribution to measured inflation during the adjustment period. A sustained change in aggregate inflation depends on how supply, demand and monetary policy respond.

Data Centers, Environmental Costs and Financial Risk

Data centers make the physical demands of AI visible. New facilities require power connections, cooling, and land. Their local effects depend on the energy mix, water availability, and utility tariff design. A utility may commit to network upgrades before a facility begins operating. If the project is delayed or uses less capacity than contracted, the allocation of the resulting costs depends on the tariff and the developer’s commitments. Local authorities should distinguish temporary construction jobs from continuing employment and compare expected tax receipts with abatements and the cost of public infrastructure. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) analysis underlines the importance of location and grid capacity when assessing data center electricity demand.

Political resistance reaches beyond immediate neighbors. In a May 2026 survey reported by Axios, 49 percent of registered voters supported a temporary moratorium on new data center construction. Among respondents opposed to data centers, 8 percent said they knew of a facility near their home. That figure measures reported awareness of proximity. In July, Navigator Research found that 65 percent of respondents in its survey of competitive congressional districts agreed with a statement accusing AI executives of using their wealth to influence politics for their own benefit. Taken together, these results are consistent with broader distrust of how the investment boom is governed. Local referendums and campaigns in the November midterms gave that distrust a political outlet. 

The scale of financing makes the distribution of risk equally important. Van Nieuwerburgh estimates that a scenario in which the United States builds 188 GW of AI capacity by 2032 would require nearly $9 trillion in investment, equivalent to about 3.2 percent of annual GDP over 2025–2032. The estimate depends on the assumed capacity and costs. Project loans, leases, joint ventures, and private credit spread funding across several parties, and their terms determine where losses fall. An investor who has yet to commit can defer spending. A leveraged project under construction can face continued interest charges while a grid connection or permit delays revenue.

Accounting depreciation spreads an asset’s recorded cost over its useful life. Investment recovery depends on cash flow, while debt maturity determines when creditors must be paid or refinanced. These schedules can diverge. A building and its power connection may serve multiple generations of equipment. Accelerators can lose economic value more quickly as newer chips become available. The project must cover operating costs and equipment replacement as well as debt service. A project that relies on a small number of tenants is also exposed to their capacity to honor commitments. If borrowing costs rise as utilization disappoints, the financing problem can become acute well before the site loses productive value.

Janeway separates the productive legacy of speculative investment from the financial consequences of its collapse. Railways, electricity networks, and fiber networks could continue to serve users after their original investors suffered losses. AI infrastructure may have a similar afterlife, although that possibility varies across power connections, buildings, and rapidly aging chips. The applications that justify investment on a social basis can take longer to spread than the contracts that finance the investment allow. The risk to the wider economy depends on who has financed the buildout and how leveraged those institutions are. Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2015) and Janeway (2026) have shown that historical asset bubbles fueled by credit tended to be followed by deeper recessions. For AI, that finding motivates scrutiny of banks’ direct and indirect exposures, including through private credit. It leaves the scale of those exposures to be established empirically.

A useful test is to compare the operator’s expected return with the project’s wider benefits and costs. The latter include productivity in sectors using AI, net employment and tax benefits in host communities, the resources drawn from local power and water systems, and the opportunity cost of public subsidies. A profitable project can impose costs on households if tariffs transfer network expenses to them. An unprofitable project can leave useful infrastructure behind. The terms of approval and financing determine how much of either outcome is shared with the public.

Electricity and water also link environmental constraints to financing. A delayed grid connection can leave a completed facility unable to earn revenue while interest continues to accrue. If the utility has already expanded capacity and the project is canceled, tariffs and contracts determine whether the developer, the utility or other ratepayers bear the cost. Water availability must be assessed at the basin level, and emissions depend on the generation mix and the power actually added to serve the load.

Income Distribution, Wealth and Economic Security

Four distributional questions follow. The first concerns wages among workers. The second concerns labor’s share of income relative to capital. The third concerns the ownership of assets that generate capital income. The fourth concerns where gains accrue geographically. An AI tool can narrow skill differences among employees while shifting income towards capital owners. The wealth effects can persist if higher capital returns are reinvested and ownership remains concentrated.

International distribution raises another issue. Countries reliant on labor-intensive exports can face weaker demand for some tasks even as firms elsewhere capture automation gains. Access to affordable computing, skills, and local infrastructure can help those countries develop their own uses. Their capacity to tax internationally mobile income also influences whether productivity gains finance public services where workers bear transition costs. US–China semiconductor controls and efforts to build sovereign AI capacity raise the cost of access for third countries, making compute dependence a new channel of geopolitical and developmental inequality. Redistribution within the economies that host the largest technology firms can leave these cross-border effects largely untouched.

Labor income, wealth and security can move in different directions. Labor’s share can decline even as some real wages rise, while higher average wages can coexist with fewer routes into stable employment. Job loss, volatile hours and insecure retirement affect people’s ability to plan and withstand shocks. A distributional assessment should therefore track real disposable income after essential expenses, exposure to income losses and pension adequacy alongside wage dispersion, labor’s share and wealth concentration.

Economic Insecurity, Surveillance and Authoritarian Populism

Workers’ ability to refuse unfavorable terms depends partly on their access to other jobs, savings, and public support. A technological shock can weaken those alternatives before it reduces headline employment. Workers may accept worse conditions because replacement seems more plausible. Younger entrants can face fewer opportunities to gain experience if employers automate the tasks through which they previously learned. The distribution of these risks matters for political trust, particularly where the costs fall on communities that already have few alternatives.

Evidence from previous waves of automation identifies one pathway. Anelli, Colantone, and Stanig find that exposure to industrial robots increased support for the radical right in their study of 13 Western European countries. The study concerns a particular kind of automation and a particular political context. It offers a mechanism to test in the AI transition. Parties can frame economic insecurity as a loss of status or control and promise protection through exclusion or personal loyalty. The strength of that appeal depends on local institutions, political organization, and the narratives that parties and media advance. The backlash against data centers likewise can lead to ordinary democratic demands for transparency and cost sharing. Opposition becomes relevant to authoritarian populism when political actors mobilize it against pluralism or use selective protection to reward supporters.

A second pathway concerns the tools available to governments. Beraja et al. document how procurement of facial recognition technology in China helped strengthen political control and supported further development of the technology. Public demand for surveillance can therefore help create a market for capabilities that reinforce the incumbent’s power. This evidence concerns a specific regime and technology. It illustrates why oversight of procurement, access to personal data, and avenues of legal challenge matter as AI spreads into public administration.

The two pathways can interact when citizens with fewer economic alternatives also face more intrusive monitoring. If access to work or public benefits is mediated by opaque scoring systems, challenging a decision may become costly for people who rely on it. Where the government controls access to benefits or tolerates selective enforcement, it can use economic insecurity to reward loyalty. Opaque models can also amplify bias in credit, hiring and public-benefit decisions, while synthetic media can lower the cost of electoral deception and weaken trust in public evidence. Rights to explanation, appeal, independent review and provenance disclosures matter because they make both automated decisions and manipulated information contestable.

Policies for Sharing Gains and Protecting Independence

The structure of the AI economy creates strong pressures toward faster wealth concentration and a more unequal distribution of income. A central question for democratic political economy is whether these pressures can coexist with a decent and dependable standard of living for the broad majority. That standard has concrete implications: households should be able to meet ordinary expenses without persistent anxiety, withstand a spell of unemployment or a temporary loss of earnings without financial distress, and look ahead to retirement with reasonable confidence. The policy test is whether people can count on that level of security throughout their lives as technological change alters the jobs and income sources on which they depend.

This distinction matters for understanding the appeal of authoritarian populism. When people lose confidence that established institutions can offer a credible path to a secure life, promises of protection from leaders who claim to speak for those left behind can gain force. A dependable income floor, backed by enforceable social rights and adequate pensions, would help restore the material basis for confidence in democratic institutions. How widely that security is shared should be a central criterion for judging the distributional consequences of the AI transition.

The immediate task is to align investment decisions with the costs they create. Utilities and regulators can require large users to cover attributable network upgrades and establish credible payment commitments if demand falls short. Local authorities can publish expected fiscal costs and benefits, assess water use in the affected basin, and tie incentives to measurable commitments. Financial supervisors need visibility into the routes by which leveraged projects can transmit losses. Separately, AI agents linked to payments, national accounts or critical infrastructure introduce operational and cyber risks: unauthorized instructions, data leakage and correlated model failures can transmit shocks even without excessive leverage. These measures clarify who bears the risk before the public is asked to absorb it.

Tax policy can then address who receives the gains. The case for reviewing the treatment of capital income and economic rents becomes stronger if automation shifts the tax base away from wages while raising demand for social protection. The design should distinguish returns needed to finance investment from rents sustained by market power or privileged access to scarce resources. The IMF staff analysis favors strengthening capital income taxation over a general tax on generative AI use. Models that find a role for taxing automation show that the result depends on transition conditions and workers’ ability to move into new occupations. International coordination can help keep mobile profits within reach of taxation, while leaving room for governments to choose how to support local adjustment.

The use of revenue is as important as its collection. Portable benefits and income support can allow workers to change jobs without losing basic security. Education systems must also prepare entrants for AI-complementary judgment, digital literacy, and transferable skills; reskilling is more valuable when it connects to actual demand, and workers can afford to take it up. Collective bargaining can give employees a say in how productivity gains translate into pay, working time, or the quality of services. Broad-based capital ownership, including through independently governed public or worker funds, could extend access to investment returns. Such arrangements require transparent rules for governance and distribution.

Public institutions also influence which applications are developed. Open procurement and access to shared computing resources can expand the pool of firms and researchers able to develop applications. Governments can use procurement to specify observable goals such as reducing administrative burdens, improving service quality, or giving professionals more time with patients and students. Risk-tiered audits, human oversight, data provenance and enforceable rights to challenge automated decisions are especially important when the public cannot choose another provider. Copyright licensing and creator remuneration should be addressed without allowing rights aggregation to entrench dominant platforms. The test is whether these arrangements increase the capacity of people and institutions to make their own decisions as they adopt the technology.

In conclusion, the AI transition will be shaped by the gap between the pace of infrastructure investment and the rate at which useful applications spread. Investment can strain power systems and balance sheets before productivity gains are realized. As those gains arrive, competition, ownership, and bargaining institutions will determine how much reaches households through prices, wages, and public services. The democratic consequences depend partly on whether people can absorb disruption without becoming dependent on discretionary protection. A credible response must link investment risk to the distribution of returns, safeguard critical systems and epistemic integrity, and preserve households’ ability to plan their lives. Without institutions that govern ownership, data, and public accountability, productivity alone cannot guarantee shared prosperity or democratic resilience.

Statue of Cecil Rhodes on the exterior of Oriel College, Oxford, UK.

The Hood on Rhodes and the Politics of Moral Purification

In this commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias examines the controversy surrounding a planned talk by philosopher Nathan Cofnas at Oxford University’s Oriel College, following a protest in which a Ku Klux Klan hood was placed on the statue of Cecil Rhodes. Drawing on debates about academic freedom, safetyism, moral purification, and Popper’s paradox of tolerance, Dr. Ferreira Dias explores the tensions between free expression, institutional responsibility, and the protection of students from discrimination. While rejecting Cofnas’s racial hereditarianism as scientifically unpersuasive and morally objectionable, he distinguishes institutional endorsement from providing a platform for public debate. He argues that universities should apply consistent principles, protect legitimate protest, and encourage critical engagement rather than allowing moral disagreement alone to justify exclusion.

By João Ferreira Dias

On November 12, 2026, a Ku Klux Klan hood appeared on the statue of Cecil Rhodes above the entrance to Oriel College. Below it, a sign read “racists welcome here.” The people who placed it there were protesting against a talk by Nathan Cofnas, scheduled for November 17. Why put the hood on Rhodes? The statue gave the protesters a way to make an accusation about the college. An institution that continues to honor a British imperialist, they suggested, was acting in character when it gave Cofnas a room.

Who invited Cofnas?

Cofnas is a philosopher affiliated with Ghent University. In his public writings, he argues that genetic differences contribute to alleged differences in average intelligence between racial groups. He uses this claim to predict who would reach positions of elite status under what he considers meritocratic selection. There are two questions here. What evidence establishes a genetic explanation for differences between groups? And why should a test score carry the weight in selection that Cofnas gives it? A trait’s heritability within a population, by itself, tells us nothing about the cause of a difference between population averages. Nor would such a difference tell a university what an individual candidate deserves.

The invitation came from the Oxon Universities’ Reform Society, a student association that describes itself as linked to Reform UK. Its public announcement advertised a talk on whether diversity policies affect university hiring and academic quality, with advance booking and questions from the audience. That topic explains why Cofnas’s wider views matter to the controversy, even though the announcement leaves open whether he would present his argument about race. Oriel College described the event as a booking by a registered student society under its freedom of speech code.

A college speaks in its own name when it chooses whom to commemorate. When it makes rooms available under general rules, it exercises authority over access. Of course, Oxford’s prestige can lend weight to an invitation issued by students. That makes the terms of access and the nature of the event worth stating plainly. As Simpson and Srinivasan (2018) argue, academic freedom includes the authority of scholars to decide which work meets disciplinary standards. A political society’s invitation to an academic for a public discussion and a department’s decision to feature his research in a seminar involve different judgements.

When Disagreement Becomes a Safety Question

An open letter reported by Varsity called on Oriel to cancel the invitation or halt the event pending a published risk assessment, an independent review and safeguards for Black students and staff. At a meeting on November 11, student representatives asked how risks had been assessed. A college has a duty to take credible threats and harassment seriously. Those reports leave open what specific dangers the signatories anticipated. The question is what would justify withdrawal if the concern were that hearing Cofnas’s views would itself make students unsafe.

The term safetyism describes what happens when safety expands to override other values (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018). Mounk (2023) identifies a difficulty for free expression when the category of harm comes to include the expression of an objectionable view as such. There is a paradox in the intellectual background to this argument. The suspicion that prevailing accounts of truth are shaped by power can coexist with a remarkable certainty about which views others should be permitted to hear. In a university, that certainty can become paternalism. Students who might ask Cofnas to defend his premises are imagined chiefly as people who need to be shielded from them.

The hood expressed a further claim. If opening the door implicates Oriel in what Cofnas believes, closing it becomes evidence of the college’s moral rectitude. Mary Douglas’s account of pollution and social boundaries helps explain how exclusion can take on that meaning (Douglas, 1966/2002). It also helps explain why a demand for cancellation can benefit the very association it was intended to oppose. Removing the room leaves the argument circulating and gives the organizers a reason to talk about censorship instead of answering for their choice of speaker.

Who May Organize on Campus?

Oxford also has student associations on the left, including the Oxford Labour Club. The university publishes general criteria for registered societies. The harder question is whether a university can apply its rules to a society whose politics many of its members consider objectionable. Progressives may regard their own associations as morally preferable. Institutional legitimacy requires reasons that can also be applied when the people exercising authority have different political sympathies.

This is where Popper’s paradox of tolerance is useful. Popper (1945, chap. 7, note 4) considered suppression unwise while intolerant views could be met by argument and checked by public opinion. He reserved the possibility of restraint for circumstances in which movements sought to prevent argument, including through intimidation or violence. At Oxford, a society can be expected to respect the conditions of participation and contestation it claims for itself. Students must also be free to protest against its events. A request to cancel a talk is itself an exercise of expression. The college’s decision to act on that request requires its own justification.

There is a temptation to think that our generation, after a long history of arriving at better moral judgements, has reached the final version of social morality. Yet convictions about equality can be held firmly while leaving room to test what we believe follows from them. Suppose another student society invites a historian who argues that Rhodes should come down. Opponents claim that giving her a room amounts to endorsing her account of British imperialism. What would we ask Oriel to do? The rule we would accept then should also govern how the college treats the students who invited Cofnas. I find his racial hereditarianism scientifically unpersuasive and morally objectionable. Even if the organizers and their opponents leave with their views unchanged, other students will have had the chance to hear the claims challenged and make up their own minds. 


 

References

Douglas, M. (2002). Purity and danger: An analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo. Routledge. (Original work published 1966)

Lukianoff, G., & Haidt, J. (2018). The coddling of the American mind: How good intentions and bad ideas are setting up a generation for failure. Penguin Press.

Mounk, Y. (2023). The identity trap: A story of ideas and power in our time. Penguin Press.

Popper, K. R. (1945). The open society and its enemies: Vol. 1. The spell of Plato. George Routledge & Sons.

Simpson, R. M., & Srinivasan, A. (2018). “No platforming.” In: J. Lackey (Ed.), Academic freedom, (pp. 186–210). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791508.003.0011