Associate Professor Noam Gidron.

Assoc. Prof. Gidron: Without Cooperation with Arab Parties, Netanyahu’s Opposition Cannot Secure a Knesset Majority

Israel’s October 27 elections have exposed a profound paradox: Netanyahu’s governing coalition has lost its parliamentary majority, yet the opposition remains unable to form an alternative without cooperation from Arab parties. In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Associate Professor Noam Gidron of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem examines the implications of rising Arab electoral participation, entrenched affective polarization, and the resilience of Netanyahuism. He explores Likud’s increasing convergence with European radical-right populism, the long-term decline of Israel’s mainstream left, and persistent vulnerabilities in democratic institutions. Gidron argues that the opposition’s reluctance to cooperate with Arab parties reflects deeper political divisions that complicate coalition formation and prospects for democratic renewal in Israel.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Israel’s October 27, 2026, parliamentary elections have produced a fragmented political landscape, exposing the limits of both Netanyahu’s governing coalition and the opposition’s capacity to translate electoral gains into political power. Although Likud emerged as the largest party with 27 seats, Netanyahu’s religious-nationalist bloc secured only 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset, while the predominantly Jewish-led opposition won 48. The Joint List and Ra’am together captured 19 seats, potentially placing Arab political representation at the center of Israel’s coalition negotiations. Yet the reluctance of major opposition parties to cooperate with Arab factions has created a parliamentary deadlock, raising fundamental questions about political inclusion, democratic representation, and the future of Israeli governance. 

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Associate Professor Noam Gidron of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem examines this impasse through the interconnected dynamics of affective polarization, nationalist politics, and democratic backsliding. Highlighting the significance of increased Arab electoral participation, Professor Gidron observes that “the rising turnout among Arab citizens of Israel is one of the major developments in these elections, if not the most important one.” He emphasizes that this dramatic mobilization is “reshaping the Israeli political landscape,” while Arab parties remain politically marginalized within mainstream coalition calculations.

The central paradox, Gidron argues, is that Netanyahu has lost his parliamentary majority without the opposition acquiring a viable alternative. As he explains, “the opposition’s unwillingness to work with the Arab parties means that it also lacks a majority.” Consequently, “as long as the bloc opposing Netanyahu refuses to work with the Arab parties,”securing a Knesset majority remains exceptionally difficult. The opposition’s internal divisions compound this dilemma: while the progressive Democrats favor cooperation with Arab factions, more hawkish figures, including Avigdor Lieberman, reject such arrangements.

Beyond coalition arithmetic, Professor Gidron identifies affective polarization as a crucial explanation for Netanyahu’s enduring electoral resilience. Despite the October 7 attacks, the Gaza war, and controversies surrounding the judicial overhaul, emotional hostility between political blocs continues to constrain electoral realignment. He further argues that Likud has become increasingly populist, observing that, on relevant measures, it is “more similar to Alternative for Germany (AfD) than to the mainstream center-right Christian Democrats (CDU).”

The interview also explores the long-term decline of Israel’s mainstream left, the political marginalization of Palestinian citizens, and the institutional vulnerabilities of Israeli democracy. While changes in coalition composition could moderate pressures on judicial independence, Professor Gidron cautions that deeper structural weaknesses persist. Ultimately, he captures the democratic dilemma confronting Israel: “fighting for democracy, particularly liberal democracy, is itself polarizing. But it is still a fight worth fighting.”

Here is our interview with Associate Professor Noam Gidron, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Intense Animosity Between Political Blocs Helps Explain Netanyahu’s Enduring Electoral Support

Israelis protest at Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s anti-democratic coup on April 1, 2023. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

Professor Gidron, thank you for joining us. Despite the political fallout from October 7, the Gaza war, and the judicial overhaul, Likud remains Israel’s largest party. How do you explain Netanyahu’s enduring electoral appeal? Does this result demonstrate the resilience of Netanyahuism as a personalized form of populist politics?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: That’s a big question. We are now just a couple of days after the elections, and the issues you raise will be examined over the coming weeks, months, and years. I want to be honest and say that we still don’t have the most recent data on voting patterns in these elections, and we will continue debating these issues.

Just to share some initial thoughts, we knew before these elections that the Israeli electorate was deeply polarized, specifically affectively polarized. There is intense dislike and animosity between the political blocs. Of course, the more strongly you dislike your political opponents, the less likely you are to defect to the opposing political bloc. The Israeli electorate is so deeply divided, with such a strong emotional divide between the two main camps, that it is much harder for voters to move to the opposing bloc.

Now, we should note that Likud is the largest party, but the governing coalition has lost support overall. It previously held a majority in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, but that is no longer the case. So, something has changed.

Who exactly were the voters who switched? That question will be examined over the coming months and years, and I suspect that levels of dislike and animosity between the political blocs will be one explanatory factor in understanding which voters were more willing to switch parties.

Israel Faces Three Possible Scenarios: A Unity Government, Arab-Backed Opposition, or New Elections

With neither Netanyahu’s religious-right bloc nor the predominantly Jewish-led opposition securing a clear majority in the provisional results, what governing alternatives are realistically available? Could an Eisenkot-led coalition overcome its ideological divisions, or might coalition deadlock ultimately prolong Netanyahu’s premiership?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: We are now at a moment when the situation remains unclear, and discussions about what the future may hold are ongoing. We can suggest three scenarios for future political developments, keeping in mind that unexpected events can sometimes occur.

At the moment, one very likely scenario appears to be a unity government in which Netanyahu remains prime minister but adds one of the opposition parties to his coalition, probably from the more centrist elements of the opposition. That would mean Netanyahu remains in power, but with a different, more centrist coalition that does not lean as heavily toward the far right as the current government.

Another scenario, although its chances seem slim at the moment, is that the opposition decides to work formally or informally with the Arab parties, or elements within those parties, to form a government, perhaps even for the short term. This would require some actors within the opposition to break their promise not to work with the Arab parties. However, a unity government would also require them to work with Netanyahu, something they have promised not to do. So, it is hard to know exactly how things will play out.

A third possibility is another election in several months. The chances of this do not seem particularly high, considering that some political actors have a lot to lose from another round of elections. It is not clear whether the opposition could harness the same level of energy again in three or four months in an effort to beat Netanyahu once more. Nevertheless, that remains an option.

Against the background of these political developments, we need to keep in mind that the geopolitical situation in the Middle East is highly unstable. We are hearing some discussion about the potential for another Israeli strike on Iran, perhaps together with the US. Of course, any change in the geopolitical environment could also lead to unexpected political developments here in Israel.

Even the October 7 Massacre Did Not Reduce Affective Polarization

In your recent research with Omer Yair and colleagues, you find that affective polarization persisted despite the exceptional security threats following October 7. How does this finding illuminate the election results? Has hostility toward political opponents become more decisive than assessments of Netanyahu’s performance?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: Oftentimes, we have this implicit or explicit expectation that an external threat would increase domestic cohesion—that different members of a community would come closer together when facing an external security threat. One implication is that, following such a severe security threat, we might expect a decrease in levels of affective polarization—that is, deep animosity across political divides.

The October 7 massacre provided us with an opportunity—a tragic opportunity, of course—to examine whether such a drastic change in the security environment would indeed lead to lower levels of affective polarization. This is not what we find in the data. We analyzed data collected just before and after October 7, in which Israeli respondents reported how they felt toward political opponents.

While we have seen this pooling of civic engagement and collective efforts to help communities affected by October 7 and the war that followed, these efforts did not translate into lower levels of affective polarization.

This suggests that perhaps we need to rethink the expectation that an external threat increases domestic cohesion, or at least consider the scope conditions: Under what conditions should we expect such an effect, and why didn’t we see it in the Israeli case?

In any case, this provides further evidence of how deeply affectively polarized Israeli society has been over the last four years. It also provides important context for understanding what happened in this election, as we discussed earlier, including the current government’s ability to retain support even under such difficult circumstances.

The Decline of Israel’s Mainstream Left Is a Long-Term Development

Election billboards of religious political parties Shas and Otzma Yehudit before Israel’s fourth election in two years in a street of Jerusalem on March 22, 2021. Photo: Gali Estrange.

Israel’s principal electoral competition increasingly occurs among different forms of nationalist, conservative, secular-right, and religious-right politics. Why has the conventional left–right divide been displaced by rival conceptions of right-wing leadership? Does this represent a lasting ideological realignment or a temporary consequence of security politics?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: That’s a difficult question to answer. I would note that we have seen a long-term decline in support for the mainstream left in Israel. This is not just a temporary reaction to October 7 or the war that followed. Rather, it is a process that has been unfolding for the last 30 years or so.

We therefore need to consider long-term developments at both the mass level, in terms of changes in the composition of the electorate, and the elite level, in terms of the willingness of parties left of center to present voters with a clear vision for the future and fight for it against these populist forces on the right.

The answer to what we have seen—the long-term decline of the Israeli mainstream left—lies somewhere in the interaction between these mass- and elite-level factors. This is definitely not a temporary development.

I would also note that those interested in these questions can consult the book I co-edited, The Elections in Israel 2022, in which we analyzed the long-term decline of the Israeli Labour Party from 1992 to the present. We show how this decline unfolded step by step, with each successive election bringing the defection of another constituency from the party.

Likud Today Is More Similar to Germany’s AfD Than to the Mainstream CDU

Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit and Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism retain significant parliamentary representation. How should we distinguish their religious-nationalist radicalism from Netanyahu’s populism? Have these movements transformed Israel’s ideological mainstream, even when their individual electoral strength remains limited?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: Yes, that’s another good question. There was some expectation that Ben-Gvir and his far-right parties would achieve great success in these elections. They haven’t really failed, but I don’t think the election results met their expectations.

To a certain degree, this is because Likud, Netanyahu’s party and the largest party on the right, has become more similar to these far-right elements, narrowing the differences between them. Netanyahu has such strong electoral appeal within the right-wing bloc that he managed to prevent right-wing supporters from defecting to parties further to the right. At the same time, we have seen Likud become increasingly populist over time.

Here, we have evidence from V-Dem, the Varieties of Democracy dataset, and CHES, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, suggesting that Likud today is as populist as radical-right parties in Europe, rather than resembling mainstream Christian Democratic or conservative parties.

If we look specifically at these measures of populism, Likud is, in a way, more similar to Alternative for Germany (AfD) than to the mainstream center-right Christian Democrats (CDU). This is how we should understand the dynamics within the Israeli right-wing bloc.

Military Exemptions Did Not Appear to Be a Decisive Issue for Right-Wing Voters

Shas and United Torah Judaism remain important coalition actors, despite growing controversy over military exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men. Could the conscription dispute fundamentally reshape Israel’s party alignments? Is the secular–religious cleavage becoming more consequential than traditional economic or security divisions?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: Over the years, these ultra-Orthodox parties that you just mentioned have become an integral part of the right-wing bloc and are considered natural members of Netanyahu’s coalition government.

Following October 7 and the subsequent wars in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, there was an expectation that the question of conscription for ultra-Orthodox men would become a defining issue in these elections. I’m not sure that’s what actually happened.

Again, we should be cautious because the election took place only this week, and we still lack direct data to understand voters’ considerations and which parties they switched between. At the moment, however, it doesn’t seem that many voters defected from the right-wing bloc because they were dissatisfied with the exemption of ultra-Orthodox men from military service. So, at least for now, this issue does not appear to have been particularly salient in shaping right-wing voters’ decisions.

Interestingly, these parties did not gain support in the latest elections, even though demographic trends might lead us to expect an increase in their share of the vote.

This also raises questions about where they are heading next. The previous government was supposed to be their dream deal—one in which they could get whatever they wanted. Yet that did not really happen, and the question of military exemptions remained unresolved.

Perhaps some of their voters were disappointed by this, although other factors may also have played a role. We will have more information about these factors in the future. For now, it seems that these elections were something of a disappointment for the ultra-Orthodox parties.

Labour Party Has Been in Gradual Electoral Decline Since the Early 1990s

The once-dominant Israeli Labour Party now survives politically within the Democrats alliance. What explains this profound electoral decline? Has Labour’s association with the Oslo peace process undermined its legitimacy, or have demographic change, class realignment, and the growing salience of national identity been more decisive?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: Yes, this goes back to what we were discussing earlier about the decline of the mainstream left in Israel. There have definitely been demographic shifts, but we also need to be cautious about assuming that demography is destiny. The question is whether parties can attract new constituencies and expand their base of support as some of their traditional constituencies decline demographically. We haven’t really seen that happen. Again, this is not a temporary development. It is not something that emerged in the last five years or following October 7. Rather, it has been a gradual decline since the early 1990s.

These parties are also competing with other opposition parties considered more centrist or liberal. However, it is not clear that there is a distinct ideological difference between the more liberal parties and the Democrats, who represent the more leftist elements of the opposition. It seems that this political bloc is still in flux, searching for its final configuration. But so far, that has not happened.

Mizrahi Jews Remain Underrepresented in Multiple Arenas of Israel’s Elite

Students and academics join a protest march in Haifa on September 9, 2023, against Israel’s controversial judicial overhaul. Photo: Dreamstime.

In Populism as a Problem of Social Integration, co-authored with Peter Hall, you emphasize social marginalization and perceived status loss. Can this framework help explain the enduring appeal of Likud among sections of the Mizrahi electorate and the attraction of radical-right parties? How are historical grievances reproduced across generations?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: The lack of social recognition comes up frequently in the political discourse among supporters of the current government and the coalition that has just lost the election but may remain in power, with Netanyahu continuing as prime minister, as we discussed earlier. We hear many arguments about what is sometimes referred to as the “Second Israel,” suggesting that voters within the right-wing bloc are undervalued and misrecognized by Ashkenazi political elites.

There is certainly something to this. We know that Mizrahi Jews are underrepresented in multiple arenas of the Israeli elite, including academia, business, and other relevant spheres.

At the same time, in our paper with Peter Hall, we assumed that this sense of misrecognition reflects people’s life circumstances and how well they are integrated into society. Perhaps we should also have paid more attention to how messages from political elites can intensify this sense of lower subjective social status—the feeling that opposing elites treat people unfairly or undervalue certain segments of society.

There is something important to be said about how political elites can actively fuel this sense of misrecognition among the electorate. That is something we did not examine in this paper. Hopefully, someone will explore it in the future.

Rising Arab Voter Turnout Is Reshaping Israel’s Political Landscape

The Joint List and Ra’am have emerged as potentially decisive parliamentary actors. Yet major Jewish-led parties remain reluctant to depend on their support. Does this exclusion reveal a structural limitation of Israeli coalition democracy? Could Arab parliamentary participation become essential to overcoming the Netanyahu–anti-Netanyahu deadlock?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: I feel we could have an entire discussion devoted to this specific issue. Certainly, the rising turnout among Arab citizens of Israel is one of the major developments in these elections, if not the most important one. Traditionally, electoral participation has been lower within this sector, but in this election, we have seen a dramatic increase in turnout that is reshaping the Israeli political landscape. The direct outcome is that we now have much larger Arab parties in the Knesset.

It is also important to note that these Arab parties do not constitute a uniform bloc. There are ideological differences between them, and they represent different groups within the Arab sector. Nevertheless, they are often treated as a single bloc in Israeli politics.

Currently, the opposition parties face a significant challenge. On the one hand, the governing coalition has lost its majority, meaning Netanyahu cannot form another government with exactly the same coalition he had before the election. On the other hand, the opposition’s unwillingness to work with the Arab parties means that it also lacks a majority.

We should also recognize the differences among the opposition parties themselves. You mentioned earlier the Democrats, the leftist, progressive part of the opposition. They openly call for a formal coalition with elements of the Arab parties.

By contrast, more hawkish actors within the opposition, such as Avigdor Lieberman, insist that they will never cooperate with Arab parties, either formally or informally. Some of the more centrist elements try to remain vague on this issue, leaving themselves room to maneuver, although this does not currently seem to be a particularly successful strategy.

So, there are clear differences within the opposition. However, as long as the bloc opposing Netanyahu refuses to work with the Arab parties, particularly given the high turnout among Arab citizens in these elections, it is difficult to see how it can secure a majority in the Knesset.

Rising Violent Crime in Arab Communities May Help Explain the Surge in Electoral Turnout

In your research on Israel’s Nation-State Law, you examine how majority-nationalist legislation shapes perceptions of minority citizenship. How do these findings help us interpret the stronger Arab electoral mobilization in 2026? Can increased parliamentary representation translate into substantive political equality for Palestinian citizens of Israel?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: One of the findings I presented with colleagues in the study you mentioned is that the Basic Law declaring Israel a Jewish nation-state had a stronger impact on how Arab citizens of Israel perceive their citizenship than on how Jewish Israeli citizens perceive theirs. This law also left its mark on how Arab citizens perceive their role in Israeli society.

That being said, I’m not sure it was a direct driver of the increased turnout we have seen in these elections, particularly since some time has passed. Again, I want to be cautious because, at this point, we are just speculating. We do not yet have clear data explaining the electoral trends observed in these elections.

One common explanation for the high turnout, however, is the sharp increase in violent crime in Arab communities over the last four years. Crime has become a deeply destabilizing factor in the lives of far too many Arab communities, affecting numerous individuals, families, and neighborhoods.

One common argument is that the increased turnout reflects a reaction to this situation and a demand to replace the minister responsible for the police, currently the far-right Itamar Ben-Gvir, who does not seem particularly concerned about what is happening in the Arab sector.

Security Threats and National Identity Have Dominated Israeli Electoral Politics

Your recent work with Moses Shayo examines how national identity competes with class, ethnicity, and other collective attachments. Does the dominance of Jewish national identity help explain why social-democratic appeals struggle electorally? Under what conditions could economic inequality regain political salience across Israel’s ethnic and religious divisions?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: Asking under what conditions economic inequality could reclaim dominance assumes that it was once a dominant issue, and that is itself open to debate. Different people have different views on the matter, and there are different interpretations of this question.

One dominant argument suggests that, in Israeli politics, questions of security threats and the closely related issue of national identity have consistently dominated other issues and shaped electoral behavior. This has been particularly true since October 7 and the wars we have experienced here.

There is also an alternative argument, although I don’t necessarily find it very convincing. This argument suggests that much of the support for Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc comes from middle-class and lower-middle-class cities and neighborhoods, while upper-middle-class and more affluent voters tend to support centrist and more progressive parties.

According to this interpretation, it is the opposition’s unwillingness to present a social-democratic vision that makes it more difficult for these parties to attract voters from the right-wing bloc.

I’m not sure this argument is particularly convincing, as it is difficult to find evidence supporting this thesis. Nevertheless, it is certainly being debated in the aftermath of the election, particularly because the data show a clear correlation between more affluent, upper-middle-class communities and support for the opposition.

So, this remains a contested question.

Lieberman May Stand Further to the Right Than Some of Netanyahu’s Coalition Partners

Secular nationalist parties such as Yisrael Beytenu challenge ultra-Orthodox privileges while maintaining hardline positions on national security. Does this illustrate a distinctive form of secular right-wing politics? Can secularization advance equal citizenship and institutional liberalism without fundamentally transforming Israeli nationalism or attitudes toward Palestinians?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: Exactly as you noted, there are elements within the opposition that hold rather hawkish views on the conflict, Israel’s place in the Middle East, and related issues. You mentioned Avigdor Lieberman. On some of these issues, his positions may actually place him further to the right than some of Netanyahu’s coalition partners. At the same time, however, he holds a more secular worldview and opposes some of the positions taken by the ultra-Orthodox parties, which creates tensions with important elements of the right-wing bloc.

This suggests that opposition to Netanyahu can bring together different political actors over different issues. At the same time, however, it creates a highly heterogeneous and divided opposition that struggles to agree on many issues beyond its opposition to certain elements within the right-wing bloc.

So, you have actors like Lieberman alongside the Democrats, the more progressive leftist party. Both oppose Netanyahu, but on different grounds. This, of course, makes the opposition very difficult to manage.

Lack of a Constitution Makes Its Democratic Institutional Framework Rather Fragile

Thousands march in Jerusalem against judicial overhaul, March 2025. A broad protest fills the streets at night, with demonstrators calling to save Israeli democracy. Photo: Dreamstime.

In “Israel – Populism, Polarization and the Crisis of Democracy,” co-authored with Yaniv Roznai, you examine the institutional vulnerabilities associated with Netanyahu’s political project. Does the 2026 election suggest a potential democratic recovery, or could Netanyahu’s continued influence sustain pressures on judicial independence and constitutional checks?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: There are long-term structural weaknesses in Israeli democracy. Perhaps the most obvious is that Israel does not have a constitution. Instead, it has Basic Laws, most of which are relatively easy to change. This makes the basic institutional framework within which Israeli democracy operates rather fragile.

These structural weaknesses will not disappear simply because of these elections. However, as we discussed earlier, the current government no longer holds a majority in parliament.

One potential outcome could be some form of unity government between Likud and the more centrist elements of the opposition. In that case, these opposition parties might demand, as a condition for joining Netanyahu’s government, that certain elements of the judicial overhaul—that is, his government’s plan to reshape Israeli democracy—be taken off the table.

So, while the structural weaknesses are here to stay, the immediate threats to the system of checks and balances may diminish as a result of changes in the composition of the next government.

People Adapt Their Understanding of Democracy to the Political Leaders They Support

Your recent study “Resistance to Backsliding: The Role of Democratic Conceptions” finds that citizens with a substantive understanding of democracy were especially inclined to oppose the judicial overhaul. Have these democratic commitments translated into a coherent electoral alternative? Why has the protest movement struggled to produce a stronger liberal-left political realignment?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: There’s a lot to unpack here, so let me highlight two interrelated points. First, the study you mentioned examined participation in protests against the judicial overhaul presented to the Israeli public immediately following the previous elections. We are going back several years, to when the Justice Minister announced a plan to weaken the system of checks and balances, particularly the courts. Immediately afterward, we witnessed the emergence of the largest protest movement in Israel’s history.

In this study, together with colleagues, we examined what explains participation in protests against the judicial overhaul, which we understand as a measure of democratic backsliding. Indeed, as you noted, we found that a thicker understanding of democracy—one that is not purely majoritarian but also recognizes the importance of additional democratic components, such as checks and balances—helps explain not only opposition to the judicial overhaul but also active participation in the protest movement against it.

Our study focused on a relatively narrow timeframe: conceptions of democracy before the plan was announced and participation in the protest movement immediately afterward. We found a strong relationship between the two.

In data we are currently analyzing, we also find that conceptions of democracy are relatively stable. At the same time, however, people adapt their understanding of democracy based on how they feel toward the political leader advancing the backsliding measure—in this case, Netanyahu—and toward their political opponents.

For example, if I supported the previous government and initially held a rather thick understanding of democracy, I might, over time, adopt a more majoritarian understanding because I follow my leader and adapt my conception of democracy to what my political side is advocating. In other words, people adjust how they think about democracy.

This brings me to your question about why the protest movement has not given rise to a larger liberal bloc. As I mentioned, it was the largest protest movement in the country’s history, which also meant that it was highly diverse.

It brought together people with different foreign policy views and different perspectives on the conflict between Israel and its neighbors. What united them was a shared, thicker understanding of democracy.

However, following October 7 and the subsequent war, attitudes toward the conflict became increasingly salient, making it more difficult to keep the protest movement together.

So, when you want to oppose democratic backsliding, you need to build a broad coalition. The challenge is that such a coalition may be divided on other issues, and once those issues become extremely salient, maintaining that broad coalition becomes much more difficult.

An Eisenkot Government Could Respond Differently to Settler Violence in the West Bank

Israeli Parliament Knesset.
Israeli Parliament Knesset. Photo: Dreamstime.

Much of the anti-Netanyahu opposition remains committed to security-centered nationalism and is reluctant to endorse Palestinian statehood. Would an Eisenkot-led government represent a substantive departure from Netanyahu’s approach to Gaza and the West Bank, or primarily a change in leadership? What political conditions could reopen a credible path toward Palestinian self-determination?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: That’s a big question, and I’ll do my best to address it. Let me begin by noting that politics can be unpredictable, and unexpected developments do occur. To give an example from Israeli history, during or immediately after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, it would have been very difficult to imagine that Israel and Egypt would sign a peace treaty in less than a decade. No one could have foreseen that.

So, when we try to make strong claims about the future, we should keep in mind that geopolitical developments can surprise us in ways that are difficult to anticipate. I want to place my comments on this issue within that broader context.

I think your point is well taken. A change in government, which currently does not seem very likely given the election results, as we discussed earlier, may not drastically change Israel’s policy in Gaza.

I do think there could be some changes, for instance, in how Israel responds to violent attacks by settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank. There could be a shift in that regard. However, I don’t think it was very likely that a transition from Netanyahu to Eisenkot would be accompanied by a complete rethinking of what Israel should do in Gaza.

I would also note that President Trump has approximately two more years in office, and we have seen that he is able to influence how Israeli leaders deal with their neighbors.

I don’t think it is entirely impossible that Trump might try to facilitate certain developments in the Middle East, including some that currently seem far-fetched. That is one potential factor that could lead to a change in Israeli policy. However, such a change could also occur under Netanyahu’s government rather than necessarily under Eisenkot’s leadership.

Fighting for Liberal Democracy Is Polarizing, but It Is Still a Fight Worth Fighting

And finally, Professor Gidron, your research demonstrates how polarization, national identity, and coalition arrangements shape democratic politics. Looking beyond the immediate coalition negotiations, do the 2026 results suggest a durable restructuring of Israel’s party system? What developments would indicate meaningful democratic renewal rather than another cycle of personalized rivalry, nationalist competition, and institutional confrontation?

Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: I wish I had a good answer to that. Looking at the current state of Israeli politics, the deep divide between the political blocs is perhaps the most dominant feature of contemporary Israeli politics. Israeli society is paying a real price for this polarization. At the same time, fighting for democracy, particularly liberal democracy, is itself polarizing. But it is still a fight worth fighting.

So, how can we navigate the tension between these two ways of thinking about polarization in Israeli politics? This is a major challenge for all actors in the Israeli political arena, especially those invested in securing Israeli democracy.

US elections.

Trumpism, Democratic Resilience, and the Rise of Democratic Socialism: ECPS Panel Examines the Stakes of the 2026 US Midterm Elections

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “Trumpism, Democratic Resilience, and the Rise of Democratic Socialism: ECPS Panel Examines the Stakes of the 2026 US Midterm Elections.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 30, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00156



Ahead of the November 3, 2026, US midterm elections, the ECPS convened a scholarly panel on October 29 titled “Trumpism, Democratic Resilience, and the Rise of Democratic Socialism.” Moderated by Professor Lane Kenworthy, the discussion brought together Professors Michael Kazin, Sheri Berman, Jennifer McCoy, and Andrew Karch to examine the political, institutional, and socioeconomic forces reshaping American democracy. Addressing the revival of democratic socialism, declining support for Trumpism, pernicious polarization, democratic backsliding, and the constitutional significance of federalism, the panelists explored whether anticipated electoral shifts could produce meaningful democratic renewal. Their analyses converged on a central warning: defeating populist incumbents does not necessarily resolve the grievances sustaining populism. Durable democratic resilience requires credible economic alternatives, institutional accountability, political inclusion, and renewed public trust.

Reported by ECPS Staff

As the United States approaches the November 3, 2026, midterm elections, fundamental questions concerning democratic resilience, right-wing populism, political polarization, and the future of progressive politics have assumed renewed urgency. Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened an international academic panel titled “Trumpism, Democratic Resilience, and the Rise of Democratic Socialism” on Thursday, October 29, 2026. Bringing together distinguished scholars of American politics, comparative democracy, political history, and federalism, the panel examined whether the elections would merely reflect conventional dissatisfaction with incumbent governance or reveal deeper transformations in American democratic institutions, ideological identities, and political-economic arrangements.

The panel was moderated by Professor Lane Kenworthy, Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Yankelovich Chair in Social Thought at the University of California, San Diego. In his opening assessment, Professor Kenworthy situated the American midterms within broader international patterns of right-wing populist mobilization, democratic institutional contestation, and electoral backlash. Drawing comparisons with developments in Hungary, Poland, and Brazil, he examined the relationship between populist governance and democratic resilience while highlighting the growing ideological appeal, but still-limited electoral representation, of democratic socialism in the United States.

Professor Michael Kazin, Professor of History at Georgetown University, delivered a presentation titled “Explaining the Socialist Revival in the US.” Tracing the contemporary resurgence of socialism to the Great Recession, Occupy Wall Street, and the presidential campaigns of Bernie Sanders, Professor Kazin examined how economic inequality and dissatisfaction with neoliberal capitalism had reshaped progressive political mobilization. He emphasized the distinction between revolutionary socialism and the social-democratic policy orientations of prominent American democratic socialists.

Professor Sheri Berman, Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Columbia University, presented “The 2026 Midterms in Comparative Perspective: Shifting Support for Trumpism and the Issues Reshaping the Electoral Landscape.” Drawing on comparative experiences in Europe, particularly Hungary and Germany, Professor Berman examined declining support for Trumpism through the interconnected dynamics of economic dissatisfaction, immigration enforcement, and corruption. She warned that electoral defeats of populist governments would not necessarily resolve the structural grievances sustaining anti-establishment politics.

Professor Jennifer McCoy, Regent’s Professor Emerita of Political Science at Georgia State University, addressed “Democratic Resilience Amid Pernicious Political Polarization.” Her presentation explored the democratic consequences of antagonistic partisan identities, institutional erosion, economic inequality, and declining political trust. Advocating structural democratic reforms, participatory mechanisms, and a renewed social contract, Professor McCoy emphasized the limitations of electoral alternation as a solution to recurring populist mobilization.

Finally, Professor Andrew Karch, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, presented “Beyond Washington, DC: American Federalism and the Midterms.” His analysis highlighted the frequently overlooked significance of state legislative and gubernatorial elections, decentralized electoral administration, redistricting, and partisan federalism in shaping democratic accountability.

Together, the presentations and subsequent discussions offered a multidimensional assessment of the approaching elections, examining whether American democracy could move beyond recurring electoral polarization toward more durable institutional legitimacy, responsive governance, and political representation.

Professor Lane Kenworthy: US Midterms Will Test the Resilience of American Democracy

Professor Lane Kenworthy.
Professor Lane Kenworthy is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Yankelovich Chair in Social Thought at the University of California, San Diego.

Professor Lane Kenworthy, Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Yankelovich Chair in Social Thought at the University of California, San Diego, offered a comparative assessment of right-wing populism, democratic resilience, and the emerging appeal of democratic socialism in the United States. Moderating the discussion, Professor Kenworthy situated the approaching November 3 midterm elections within broader international patterns of populist electoral success, institutional contestation, economic discontent, and ideological realignment.

Opening the panel, Professor Kenworthy introduced four distinguished scholars whose presentations addressed different dimensions of contemporary American politics: Professor Michael Kazin of Georgetown University, examining the revival of socialism; Professor Sheri Berman of Barnard College, Columbia University, analyzing the midterms comparatively; Professor Jennifer McCoy of Georgia State University, discussing democratic resilience amid polarization; and Professor Andrew Karch of the University of Minnesota, exploring American federalism and the significance of state-level politics.

Professor Kenworthy began by situating Trumpism within the international trajectory of right-wing populism. He observed that populist movements had achieved considerable electoral influence across Europe and, more recently, Latin America, while emphasizing the fragility of their political dominance. Referring to developments in Poland, Hungary, and Brazil, he distinguished between short-term electoral fortunes and the potentially enduring institutional consequences of populist governance. Even when populist parties lose office, he suggested, their influence may persist through policy changes and institutional arrangements established during their tenure.

Turning to the United States, Professor Kenworthy discussed the electoral outlook shortly before the November 3 midterms. Citing polling, election forecasts, and betting markets available at the time, he reported expectations of substantial Democratic gains in the House of Representatives and a possible Democratic majority in the Senate. He suggested that Democratic control of Congress could constrain Trump’s ability to alter electoral institutions and democratic procedures, although he anticipated continuing confrontation over institutional rules.

In comparative terms, Professor Kenworthy characterized Trumpism as a form of right-wing populism sharing important features with the political project associated with Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. Despite differences in political systems and international influence, he identified similarities in attempts to reshape institutional arrangements. In his assessment, three particularly consequential features of populist institutional transformation in Poland and Hungary involved weakening judicial independence, reducing media autonomy, and modifying electoral rules and procedures. He argued that Trump had pursued comparable objectives, although with more limited institutional success.

Economic Discontent, Electoral Backlash, and the Growing Appeal of Democratic Socialism

Nevertheless, Professor Kenworthy cautioned against assuming that democratic institutions necessarily constitute voters’ principal concern. While acknowledging that apprehensions about democratic governance influence electoral behavior, he suggested that economic grievances and dissatisfaction with government performance may be more immediately consequential. Rising living costs, inflation, corruption concerns, international conflicts, and controversies surrounding artificial intelligence infrastructure were among the issues he identified.

He also emphasized what political scientists describe as the thermostatic reaction: the tendency of voters to turn against the incumbent president’s party during midterm elections. Such patterns, he suggested, complicate interpretations of electoral outcomes as straightforward endorsements or rejections of democratic norms. Drawing comparisons with Hungary, Professor Kenworthy argued that economic conditions frequently shape both the electoral success and eventual decline of populist governments.

The second major component of his opening assessment concerned the apparent revival of democratic socialism in American politics. Professor Kenworthy distinguished between its growing ideological appeal and its still-limited electoral representation. According to the figures he presented, only nine Democratic nominees for the 435-member House of Representatives identified with socialism, representing approximately 2% of the total. He similarly highlighted the small number of self-identified socialists occupying Senate seats, governorships, and mayoral offices in major American cities.

These figures, however, contrasted sharply with changing public attitudes. Referring to an August 2026 Gallup survey, Professor Kenworthy reported that 65% of self-identified Democrats expressed a positive image of socialism, compared with 35% who viewed capitalism positively. Crucially, he noted that Americans’ attitudes toward capitalism varied considerably according to the economic institutions involved: 93% of Democrats viewed small businesses positively, 65% expressed favorable opinions of free enterprise, while only 17% held positive views of big business.

For Professor Kenworthy, this divergence suggested that support for socialism does not necessarily imply wholesale rejection of markets or private enterprise. Rather, particularly among younger Democrats, socialism increasingly symbolizes economic security, affordable housing, healthcare, childcare, higher minimum wages, and opposition to concentrated corporate wealth. He also noted that debates surrounding Israel and Gaza had become intertwined with contemporary socialist identification, despite their conceptual distinction from socialism itself.

Overall, Professor Kenworthy’s introductory assessment highlighted a central tension in American politics: the coexistence of persistent institutional challenges, widespread economic dissatisfaction, and growing interest in alternative political-economic arrangements. His remarks established a comparative framework for examining whether the 2026 midterms would primarily reflect conventional electoral reactions to incumbent governance or reveal deeper transformations in American political identities, democratic institutions, and the ideological orientation of the Democratic Party.

Professor Michael Kazin: America’s Socialist Revival Reflects a Growing Demand for Economic Security

Professor Michael Kazin.
Professor Michael Kazin is a Professor of History at Georgetown University and Editor Emeritus of Dissent, a leading historian of American populism, social movements, and the Democratic Party.

Professor Michael Kazin, Professor of History at Georgetown University, offered a historically grounded assessment of the contemporary resurgence of socialism in American political life. In his presentation, “Explaining the Socialist Revival in the US,” Professor Kazin traced the movement’s origins to the economic dislocations of the Great Recession, the emergence of Occupy Wall Street, and the electoral breakthroughs of Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. He argued that the growing appeal of socialism reflects widespread dissatisfaction with economic inequality and corporate capitalism, while emphasizing that its most influential American proponents advocate policies closer to European social democracy than to revolutionary socialism.

Socialism’s Resurgence in American Political Life

Professor Kazin began by observing that socialism may currently enjoy greater public acceptance in the United States than at almost any previous point in its history. Referring to recent opinion surveys, he noted that approximately 40% of Americans expressed favorable attitudes toward socialism, with particularly strong support among Democratic voters and younger generations. Nevertheless, he cautioned that public enthusiasm for the term does not necessarily indicate agreement about its ideological meaning or institutional implications.

Central to this transformation is the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), established in 1982 through the merger of the New American Movement and the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee. For decades, the organization remained politically marginal, maintaining approximately 5,000–6,000 members. According to ProfessorKazin, however, its membership has expanded to more than 120,000, reflecting a significant transformation in the organizational landscape of the American left.

He highlighted the growing presence of socialist-affiliated politicians in municipal and congressional politics, including New York City, Seattle, and other progressive urban constituencies. Although their numerical representation remains limited, Professor Kazin argued that their visibility has transformed socialism into a consequential subject of debate within the Democratic Party and an increasingly prominent target of Republican political criticism.

A defining feature of this contemporary resurgence, he explained, is that socialists generally seek office through the Democratic Party rather than through an independent socialist electoral organization. This distinguishes the current movement from much of American socialist history, when socialist candidates contested elections under separate party labels, achieving occasional local successes but relatively little representation nationally.

The Great Recession and the Crisis of Neoliberal Capitalism

Tracing the historical origins of the contemporary socialist revival, ProfessorKazin identified the Great Recession of 2008–2009 as a decisive turning point. The financial crisis destroyed substantial household wealth, increased unemployment, and exposed the vulnerabilities of an economic system increasingly dependent on financial institutions and unequal distributions of wealth and income. For many Americans, particularly younger generations, the crisis generated fundamental questions about the legitimacy and social consequences of the neoliberal economic arrangements supported by successive Democratic and Republican administrations.

ProfessorKazin also examined the disappointment experienced by sections of the progressive left during Barack Obama’s presidency. Although Obama’s 2008 campaign employed language associated with the Civil Rights Movement and progressive reform, his administration’s response to the financial crisis frustrated those who had anticipated more extensive structural changes. According to Professor Kazin, Obama’s decision to appoint figures associated with Wall Street, alongside his reluctance to dismantle major financial institutions or pursue prosecutions sought by some critics, contributed to a lasting sense of dissatisfaction among left-leaning Democrats. This discontent created favorable conditions for renewed political mobilization against economic inequality.

Occupy Wall Street and the Reemergence of Class Politics

Professor Kazin characterized Occupy Wall Street, which emerged in lower Manhattan in autumn 2011, as a critical precursor to the contemporary socialist movement. Although it lacked a conventional organizational structure and did not initially develop into a durable electoral movement, Occupy articulated grievances that resonated far beyond its immediate participants. Its defining political contribution was the popularization of the distinction between the “99%” and the “1%,” which provided a readily understandable framework for criticizing concentrated wealth and economic power.

Professor Kazin stressed that the movement helped reintroduce economic inequality into mainstream American political discourse after decades in which class-based critiques had occupied a comparatively marginal position. He situated these developments within a longer trajectory of economic change, noting that American wages had increasingly lagged behind corporate profits since the 1970s, notwithstanding periods of improvement. Occupy’s significance, therefore, extended beyond its demonstrations and encampments. It helped establish the political vocabulary through which subsequent progressive movements could articulate demands for redistribution, economic security, and institutional reform.

Bernie Sanders and the Electoral Breakthrough of Democratic Socialism

For Professor Kazin, the presidential campaigns of Bernie Sanders in 2016 and 2020 represented the decisive transition from protest-oriented economic discontent to a nationally visible electoral movement. Sanders, a longstanding socialist, succeeded in presenting democratic socialism as a legitimate framework for progressive reform within American electoral politics. Particularly important was his ability to mobilize younger voters across racial backgrounds.

However, Professor Kazin emphasized that Sanders’s understanding of socialism differed significantly from revolutionary traditions advocating the abolition of capitalism. Instead, Sanders associated socialism with extending the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Great Society initiatives of Lyndon B. Johnson, and the economic aspirations of Martin Luther King Jr. His agenda emphasized universal healthcare, employment guarantees, income security, stronger labor rights, and an expanded welfare state. Professor Kazin therefore interpreted Sanders’s program primarily as an American expression of left-wing social democracy.

The electoral success of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in 2018 further consolidated this transformation. Her victory over an established Democratic incumbent demonstrated the potential for explicitly socialist candidates to challenge party elites, particularly in strongly Democratic constituencies. Together, Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez helped expand the visibility of democratic socialism and encouraged the organizational growth of DSA.

Ideological Divisions Within the Democratic Socialists of America

Despite the movement’s expansion, Professor Kazin cautioned against treating American democratic socialism as a unified ideological formation. He identified substantial differences between pragmatic socialists seeking incremental reform through Democratic Party institutions and more radical factions committed to fundamentally transforming or abolishing capitalism.

Some factions within DSA, he observed, explicitly embrace Marxist-Leninist perspectives, positions that differ considerably from the anti-communist democratic socialist tradition associated with Michael Harrington, one of DSA’s founding figures.

Nevertheless, Professor Kazin argued that the organization’s most prominent elected representatives generally emphasize policies that remain compatible with a regulated capitalist economy. Their priorities include affordable housing, publicly financed healthcare, stronger unions, improved wages, and expanded economic security. These objectives, he suggested, resemble the social-democratic arrangements of Scandinavian countries considerably more than the political-economic systems historically associated with the Soviet Union or Maoist China.

He also emphasized the substantial overlap between socialist elected officials and the broader progressive wing of the Democratic Party. In practical legislative terms, differences between democratic socialists and many non-socialist progressives are often considerably narrower than their ideological labels suggest.

Socialism, Social Democracy, and the Future of the Democratic Party

A central argument of Professor Kazin’s presentation concerned the distinction between socialism as a political identity and socialism as a substantive policy agenda. While Republican critics frequently associate socialism with authoritarian communist regimes, Professor Kazin maintained that the proposals advanced by prominent American democratic socialists overwhelmingly resemble established social-democratic reforms. He suggested that the political significance of the socialist revival should therefore be measured less by ideological terminology than by its capacity to influence the Democratic Party’s economic priorities.

At the same time, he expressed skepticism that the Democratic Party would become an explicitly socialist party in the foreseeable future. Although socialism has gained support, substantial sections of the American electorate remain skeptical of the term. Consequently, Democrats continue to face the challenge of maintaining coalitions encompassing left-wing activists, moderates, and voters in politically competitive or conservative states.

For Professor Kazin, the potential achievements of democratic socialism depend partly on whether socialist activists can advance progressive economic policies without generating divisions that undermine broader party cooperation.

An Ideological Revival with Significant Political Constraints

Overall, Professor Kazin presented the contemporary socialist revival as the product of long-term economic grievances, generational political change, and the institutional integration of progressive social movements into electoral politics. His assessment suggested that the movement’s principal historical significance may ultimately lie not in transforming the United States into a socialist society, but in shifting the boundaries of acceptable economic debate. By strengthening demands for healthcare, affordable housing, labor protections, and economic security, democratic socialists have contributed to renewed attention to structural inequality within mainstream American politics.

Nevertheless, Professor Kazin’s analysis also underscored the continuing tension between ideological ambition and electoral coalition-building. The movement’s future influence, in his interpretation, will depend on its ability to translate growing public sympathy into durable institutional achievements while navigating the Democratic Party’s ideological diversity.

His presentation thus situated the resurgence of democratic socialism within a broader struggle over the political meaning of economic justice, the legacy of neoliberal capitalism, and the evolving relationship between progressive mobilization and representative democracy in the United States.

Q&A Session

Democratic Socialism Has Helped Shift the Democratic Party’s Economic Agenda to the Left

During the question-and-answer session, Professor Lane Kenworthy questioned Professor Kazin about the increasingly blurred ideological boundaries between democratic socialism and mainstream progressive politics within the Democratic Party. Referring to Professor Kazin’s recent review in The New York Review of Books, which examined publications concerning the historical legacy of Eugene V. Debs and contemporary conceptions of socialism, Professor Kenworthy raised the question of whether self-identified democratic socialists continued to represent a distinctive political movement or had increasingly converged with the Democratic Party’s progressive mainstream.

Professor Kenworthy argued that the ideological center of gravity among elected Democrats had shifted considerably to the left, particularly during Joe Biden’s presidency. He highlighted the administration’s cooperation with progressive lawmakers and its emphasis on policies traditionally associated with social democracy, including expanded childcare, healthcare provision, and financial support for families.

Responding, Professor Kazin agreed that the Democratic Party had undergone a significant progressive transformation, attributing much of this shift to the political influence of Bernie Sanders’s presidential campaigns in 2016 and 2020. As an illustration, Professor Kazin highlighted Biden’s appointment of Lina Khan as chair of the Federal Trade Commission. Her assertive approach to antitrust enforcement and corporate regulation, including scrutiny of technology giants such as Facebook and Amazon, reflected a departure from the more accommodating regulatory approaches of previous administrations.

Professor Kazin emphasized that Sanders’s campaigns had demonstrated the growing influence of progressive activists within Democratic politics. These grassroots supporters, who contribute through electoral mobilization, canvassing, and small donations, increasingly favored policies addressing economic inequality, corporate concentration, and social welfare. He also noted that frustration with economic inequality extended beyond Democratic constituencies, contributing to the political grievances that Donald Trump had mobilized during his 2016 presidential campaign.

Professor Kazin further argued that President Biden’s progressive economic record remained insufficiently recognized, partly because of his limited effectiveness in communicating his administration’s achievements. He highlighted Biden’s unprecedented appearance on a striking workers’ picket line and his engagement with union leaders in the Oval Office as evidence of a more supportive presidential approach toward organized labor.

Overall, Professor Kazin’s response suggested that the substantive policy distance between democratic socialists and progressive Democrats had narrowed considerably. Rather than transforming the Democratic Party into an explicitly socialist organization, the socialist revival had helped normalize economic priorities previously associated with its left-wing minority. The exchange thus underscored the importance of distinguishing ideological identities from practical policy commitments when assessing the evolving political economy of American progressivism.

American Democratic Socialists Operate More Like European Social Democrats Than Revolutionary Socialists

Dr. Bulent Kenes raised a fundamental conceptual and political question concerning the distinction between democratic socialism and social democracy. Addressing Professor Kazin, Dr. Kenes asked why American progressives continued to embrace the terminology of democratic socialism when social democracy had become widely accepted within European and North American liberal democracies. His question highlighted both the economic objectives of these traditions and the potential electoral consequences of ideological terminology. Specifically, he asked whether democratic socialism represented a substantively distinctive political project or whether its historically controversial associations created unnecessary obstacles to building broader electoral coalitions.

Responding, Professor Kazin began by acknowledging the scholarship of Professor Sheri Berman, who also participated in the panel, describing her as a leading authority on social democracy. He then emphasized the distinctive historical trajectory of socialist terminology in the United States.

According to Professor Kazin, the term “social democracy” has never gained significant political recognition in American public discourse, although he acknowledged uncertainty about the precise reasons for its limited appeal. Democratic socialism, by contrast, has become a recognizable political identity, particularly through the emergence of contemporary progressive movements and elected officials.

Nevertheless, Professor Kazin cautioned against interpreting this terminology as evidence of revolutionary political objectives. He argued that most American politicians identifying as democratic socialists pursue agendas considerably closer to those historically associated with left-wing European social democracy. To illustrate this distinction, Professor Kazin referred to New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani, suggesting that his governing approach resembles the tradition of American municipal socialism rather than revolutionary socialism. He noted that Mamdani had made relatively little use of explicitly socialist terminology following his inauguration.

Professor Kazin drew a historical parallel with the so-called “sewer socialists,” particularly those who governed Milwaukee and other American municipalities during the early twentieth century. These socialist administrations became known for practical municipal reforms, including extending modern sanitation systems to working-class neighborhoods, improving public infrastructure, and protecting workers exercising their right to strike. For Professor Kazin, this tradition demonstrated that socialist political identification in the United States has frequently coexisted with pragmatic approaches to local governance and public service provision.

He nevertheless emphasized the importance of distinguishing contemporary electoral practice from socialism’s historical ideological foundations. Democratic socialism, he observed, originally encompassed revolutionary aspirations involving the overthrow of capitalism. Yet most contemporary American elected officials identifying as democratic socialists do not advocate such a transformation.

Professor Kazin’s central conclusion was that ideological labels should not obscure the substantive character of political programs. In his assessment, the governing priorities of prominent American democratic socialists are better understood through the historical experience of social-democratic reform and municipal progressivism than through revolutionary socialist traditions. The exchange thus illuminated a central tension in contemporary American progressive politics: the distance between the historical meanings of socialism, its contemporary electoral associations, and the pragmatic reform agendas advanced by politicians who embrace the democratic socialist label.

Professor Sheri Berman: Electoral Defeats of Right-Wing Populists May Not End the Cycle of Democratic Disillusionment

Professor Sheri Berman.
Sheri Berman is a Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Columbia University.

Professor Sheri Berman, Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Columbia University, delivered a comparative analysis of the political dynamics shaping the approaching November 3 US midterm elections. In her presentation, “The 2026 Midterms in Comparative Perspective: Shifting Support for Trumpism and the Issues Reshaping the Electoral Landscape,” Professor Berman argued that declining support for President Donald Trump reflected mounting dissatisfaction with economic conditions, immigration enforcement, and perceived government corruption rather than primarily concerns about democratic erosion.

Drawing comparisons with Hungary and Germany, she warned that electoral setbacks for right-wing populists do not necessarily resolve the underlying grievances responsible for their emergence. Unless mainstream democratic parties demonstrate their capacity to address these grievances, she suggested, democracies risk becoming trapped in recurring cycles of populist mobilization, electoral rejection, and renewed disillusionment.

Trump’s Declining Support and the Limits of Democratic Backsliding as an Electoral Issue

Professor Berman opened her presentation by highlighting what she described as a sustained deterioration in President Trump’s public approval. Drawing on polling trends, she argued that this decline represented more than a temporary fluctuation, reflecting an extended erosion of support across significant sections of the American electorate. The central question, she suggested, was not simply whether Trumpism was losing electoral momentum, but why voters were withdrawing their support and what this revealed about the broader political dynamics sustaining right-wing populism.

Professor Berman challenged the assumption that concerns over democratic backsliding constituted the principal explanation. She observed that Trump’s controversial institutional actions, including pardons, administrative purges, and challenges to established democratic norms, had not immediately produced comparable declines in public support. If institutional violations were the dominant factor shaping voter attitudes, she reasoned, polling trends would have shifted more dramatically at the beginning of his presidency. Instead, she identified three interconnected sources of dissatisfaction: the cost of living, immigration enforcement, and corruption.

Economic Frustration as the Central Driver of Electoral Discontent

The first and most consequential factor, according to Berman, was the persistent economic pressure experienced by American households. She emphasized that reducing inflation and improving affordability had been central promises of Trump’s electoral campaign. Voters expected the administration to prioritize these concerns, yet growing numbers appeared dissatisfied with its response.

Professor Berman pointed to polling evidence suggesting that many Americans believed the administration devoted greater attention to symbolic projects, including renovations and monuments in Washington, than to reducing everyday living costs. She also identified gasoline prices as a particularly visible indicator of economic dissatisfaction, observing that fluctuations in fuel costs appeared closely associated with changes in presidential approval.

For Professor Berman, these developments illustrated a broader political principle: voters often evaluate governments primarily through their perceived capacity to improve material living conditions. The political vulnerability of populist governments, she argued, frequently emerges when their promises of economic improvement collide with the continuing difficulties experienced by ordinary citizens.

Immigration: Popular Objectives and Unpopular Enforcement

Professor Berman identified immigration as a second major source of declining support. She distinguished between public approval of stricter border controls and dissatisfaction with the specific methods employed to enforce immigration policy. According to her interpretation of survey evidence, securing national borders and restricting unauthorized immigration continued to enjoy considerable support among American voters. However, she argued that the administration’s deportation practices had generated substantial opposition, particularly where enforcement appeared indiscriminate or disproportionately affected individuals without serious criminal records.

Professor Berman highlighted public unease over deportations involving long-established residents, individuals married to American citizens, and people who had worked, paid taxes, and maintained otherwise law-abiding lives. She also emphasized the political consequences of highly visible enforcement operations in workplaces, courthouses, schools, and urban neighborhoods. In her assessment, confrontational enforcement tactics had weakened support for an immigration agenda whose broader objectives remained popular.

This distinction was particularly relevant to Hispanic voters, whom Professor Berman identified as an important electoral constituency. Having shifted significantly toward Trump in the 2024 presidential election, sections of this electorate appeared, in her reading of contemporary polling, increasingly dissatisfied with both immigration enforcement and economic conditions.

The broader implication was that electoral support for restrictive immigration policies does not necessarily translate into public acceptance of every enforcement measure adopted in their name.

Corruption and the Perceived Misuse of Government Power

The third major factor identified by Professor Berman was growing public concern about corruption. She argued that allegations involving the Trump administration had become increasingly politically salient as dissatisfaction with economic management and immigration enforcement intensified.

Her discussion distinguished between the existence of controversial governmental practices and the point at which voters begin treating those practices as politically consequential. As examples, she referred to reported concerns involving the Hatch Act, political campaigning by administration officials, and allegations concerning the politicization of the Department of Justice. Professor Berman maintained that such controversies contributed to an accumulating perception that public institutions were being used for partisan or personal purposes.

Nevertheless, her broader analytical point was that corruption rarely operates independently of economic dissatisfaction. Rather, it becomes especially damaging when citizens already question a government’s competence and responsiveness. In Professor Berman’s comparative framework, democratic violations become electorally consequential when they are accompanied by perceived corruption, ineffective governance, and failures to improve citizens’ everyday lives.

Comparative Lessons from Hungary and Germany

Turning to Europe, Professor Berman situated the American electoral landscape within broader patterns of support for and opposition to right-wing populism. She devoted particular attention to Hungary, where she interpreted Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat in April 2026 as evidence that even long-established populist governments could become vulnerable when economic dissatisfaction and corruption concerns intensified.

According to Professor Berman, the successful opposition campaign led by Péter Magyar emphasized inflation, economic stagnation, healthcare, education, and corruption rather than focusing primarily on violations of democratic norms. She cited Hungary’s economic difficulties, disputes over European Union funding, and poor performance on corruption indicators as central elements of the political environment confronting Orbán. Professor Berman suggested that emphasizing these concrete concerns enabled the opposition to build a coalition extending beyond traditional anti-Orbán constituencies, including some former supporters.

She then turned to Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), arguing that its electoral appeal could not be explained exclusively through ideological extremism or xenophobia. While acknowledging the presence of explicitly exclusionary attitudes among portions of its electorate, she emphasized the role of frustration with economic conditions and dissatisfaction with established political parties.

These comparisons reinforced her argument that right-wing populism should be analyzed not only through ideology and institutional conflict but also through governmental performance and the perceived failures of mainstream political representation.

Democratic Electoral Gains and the Risk of a Recurring Populist Cycle

In the concluding section, Professor Berman addressed the implications of the approaching American midterms for the Democratic Party. She anticipated substantial Democratic electoral gains but cautioned against interpreting a victory over an unpopular incumbent administration as evidence of renewed public confidence in the opposition. Drawing on survey findings, she argued that the Democratic Party’s public image remained deeply unfavorable, with many independent voters expressing dissatisfaction with both major parties. Consequently, she distinguished between winning elections through positive political appeal and benefiting from voters’ rejection of an incumbent government. This distinction formed the foundation of her most significant warning.

Professor Berman described the possibility of a recurring political cycle in which populist governments lose support because of corruption, ineffective governance, or unmet economic expectations. Mainstream democratic parties subsequently return to power but fail to address the grievances that originally encouraged populist mobilization. The resulting disappointment then creates opportunities for renewed populist success. She interpreted the aftermath of the 2020 US presidential election as an illustration of this vulnerability, suggesting that removing populists from office does not necessarily eliminate the socioeconomic and institutional conditions that facilitated their rise.

Professor Berman also expressed concern that internal divisions between progressive and moderate Democrats could inhibit the party’s ability to formulate a coherent governing program ahead of the 2028 presidential election.

Beyond Electoral Victory: The Challenge of Democratic Renewal

Overall, Professor Berman’s presentation advanced a distinction between the electoral defeat of populism and the deeper reconstruction of democratic political legitimacy. Her comparative analysis suggested that public dissatisfaction with right-wing populist governments may create opportunities for electoral change without necessarily resolving the underlying crises of representation, economic security, and institutional trust.

For Professor Berman, the crucial challenge facing mainstream democratic parties was therefore not merely to defeat populist competitors but to demonstrate that democratic government could respond effectively to citizens’ material concerns.

Her assessment placed the 2026 US midterms within a wider international pattern in which political alternation can coexist with persistent public dissatisfaction and recurring anti-establishment mobilization. The central implication of her presentation was that democratic resilience requires more than electoral turnover: it depends on whether governing parties can translate electoral opportunities into credible policy responses, institutional legitimacy, and sustained public confidence.

Q&A Session

Political Polarization and Limited Public Attention Help Explain the Persistence of Corruption

During the question-and-answer session, ECPS’ Chair Selcuk Gultasli questioned Professor Berman about the extent of corruption in the Trump administration and the apparent inability of established American institutions to constrain presidential misconduct. Referring to Professor Berman’s identification of corruption as one of three principal factors behind declining support for President Trump, Gultasli asked whether the administration could be considered the most corrupt in American history. He also questioned how such practices could persist despite the United States’ traditionally strong checks and balances, independent civil society, and influential universities.

Responding, Professor Berman acknowledged the complexity of historical comparisons. She noted that corruption and political patronage had long been features of American political development, particularly during the era of machine politics. Consequently, she cautioned against directly comparing contemporary practices with those of a century or more ago.

Nevertheless, Professor Berman characterized the scale and breadth of corruption in the contemporary American political system as unprecedented in the modern era. She emphasized that her concerns extended beyond allegations involving Trump and his family to the conduct of the administration more broadly.

Particularly troubling, in her assessment, was the politicization of executive authority, including the alleged use of the Justice Department and other governmental institutions against individuals perceived as the president’s personal or political adversaries. She distinguished such actions from legitimate law enforcement, arguing that personal political grievances should not determine the exercise of state power.

Addressing why these developments had not immediately generated stronger public opposition, Professor Berman identified two principal explanations.

First, she emphasized the limited attention that most citizens devote to everyday political developments. Unlike academics, journalists, and politically engaged observers, ordinary voters often lack the time or inclination to follow the continuous stream of governmental controversies. Consequently, allegations of corruption may initially have limited electoral salience, becoming more consequential as dissatisfaction with government performance accumulates.

Second, Professor Berman highlighted the effects of intense partisan polarization on political perceptions and information processing. Strong partisan identification, she argued, encourages voters to discount information contradicting their established political loyalties. This tendency may have contributed to Republican voters’ initial reluctance to accept critical reporting about Trump.

Importantly, Professor Berman also criticized controversial Democratic electoral practices, referring to a recent case in Alaska reported by The New York Times. She argued that such conduct, even when not technically unlawful, could undermine electoral integrity and provide political opponents with opportunities to dismiss allegations of more extensive misconduct.

Overall, Professor Berman’s response emphasized that corruption becomes politically consequential not simply through its existence, but through public awareness, partisan interpretation, and its interaction with broader dissatisfaction over governance.

America’s Two-Party System Favors Internal Insurgencies Over the Emergence of Third Parties

Natalia Crane raised the possibility that intensifying political polarization and recurring electoral competition between populist and mainstream political forces could eventually fracture America’s established two-party system. Drawing on her observations as a younger participant whose political awareness had developed amid increasing partisan divisions, Crane asked whether the United States might experience the emergence of a viable third party as an alternative to the existing Republican–Democratic configuration.

Responding, Professor Berman acknowledged that such a development was possible but considered it unlikely under existing American political conditions. She emphasized that the institutional structure of the US electoral system makes establishing a competitive third party considerably more difficult than in many other democracies. Nevertheless, ProfessorBerman noted that third parties have appeared throughout American political history. She also referenced Britain, whose electoral arrangements share certain similarities with those of the United States, yet accommodate more than two significant parties.

The central explanation for the persistence of American two-party competition, however, lay in the relative openness of existing parties to internal ideological challenges. Professor Berman illustrated this dynamic through the Tea Party movement, which transformed Republican politics by mobilizing within the party rather than establishing an independent organization. 

She identified a comparable strategy among activists associated with the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), who seek to influence Democratic Party politics through internal organization and electoral participation.

For ProfessorBerman, the relative organizational weakness of American political parties creates opportunities for insurgent movements to reshape established institutions from within. This contrasts with the more cohesive party organizations historically characteristic of postwar Europe.

Consequently, movements dissatisfied with the existing political establishment face two possible strategies: constructing an independent party from local politics upward or seeking to transform an established party through internal mobilization. Professor Berman concluded that although a third-party breakthrough cannot be ruled out, the ability of insurgent movements to pursue influence through existing parties makes such a development comparatively unlikely.

A Democratic Congressional Majority Could Constrain Trump, but Institutional Checks Depend on Political Cohesion

Dr. Bulent Kenes questioned whether a Democratic congressional majority could effectively constrain President Donald Trump’s exercise of executive authority. Challenging conventional assumptions about the resilience of American constitutional institutions, Dr. Kenes emphasized that populist leaders may disregard democratic norms and institutional limitations. He asked what would happen if an unconventional president refused to respect the rules underpinning congressional oversight, even after losing legislative control.

Responding, Professor Berman acknowledged the significance and timeliness of the question, arguing that the effectiveness of American checks and balances depends not only on constitutional design but also on the political behavior of elected representatives. She maintained that the Republican-controlled Congress had demonstrated extensive compliance with Trump’s political agenda, substantially weakening the institutional constraints traditionally associated with the separation of powers.

Professor Berman contrasted this situation with earlier interpretations of American government as an exceptionally fragmented system in which multiple institutional veto points frequently obstructed legislative action. The experience following the 2024 election, she suggested, demonstrated how those constraints could become ineffective when presidential authority was reinforced by a politically compliant legislature.

A Democratic takeover of Congress would therefore impose meaningful, though incomplete, limitations on Trump’s power. Legislative opposition could obstruct presidential initiatives requiring congressional approval, but ProfessorBerman cautioned that Trump might continue pursuing controversial executive actions through alternative means. Such conflicts, she anticipated, would increasingly reach the judiciary, transferring disputes that should ordinarily be resolved through political institutions into the courts and potentially intensifying partisan divisions. 

Professor Berman emphasized that the effectiveness of congressional resistance would also depend on Democratic unity and organizational cohesion.

Ultimately, she argued, the challenge extended beyond restraining presidential authority. Democrats would need to use any congressional majority to develop a credible policy agenda and rebuild public confidence, rather than relying exclusively on opposition to Trumpism. Her assessment underscored that democratic resilience depends on institutional arrangements operating alongside political accountability, partisan independence, and effective collective action.

Overcoming the Populist Cycle Requires Credible Democratic Alternatives

Professor Ilhan Kaya questioned Professor Berman about the broader crisis confronting democratic institutions and mainstream political parties. Drawing on her comparisons of Germany, Hungary, and the United States, Professor Kaya asked whether established democratic parties had become increasingly incapable of responding to citizens’ economic concerns, human rights expectations, and other societal challenges. He also questioned whether alternative political approaches were necessary when mainstream parties appeared to benefit electorally from populist unpopularity rather than their own compelling policy agendas.

Responding, Professor Berman emphasized that breaking the recurring cycle of populist mobilization and democratic disillusionment requires mainstream parties to offer credible and effective political alternatives. She argued that support for radical or anti-democratic movements, whether on the right or left, does not emerge in isolation but frequently reflects frustration with established parties’ inability or unwillingness to address pressing societal problems.

Professor Berman stressed that understanding these grievances did not amount to justifying extremist politics. Rather, it provided an essential explanation for their electoral appeal. She maintained that both center-left and center-right parties must substantially reconsider their approaches to governance. A durable democratic alternative, she argued, must respond effectively to economic insecurity, immigration, technological transformation, and other structural challenges confronting contemporary societies.

Her central conclusion was that populism cannot be sustainably weakened through electoral rejection alone; mainstream democratic parties must demonstrate their capacity to deliver meaningful solutions to citizens’ concerns.

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Democratic Resilience in the US Requires Systemic Reform Beyond Electoral Change

Professor Jennifer McCoy.
Professor Jennifer McCoy is Regent’s Professor Emerita of Political Science at Georgia State University.

Panel’s third speaker, Professor Jennifer McCoy of Georgia State University, offered a structural assessment of American democratic vulnerability ahead of the November 3 midterm elections. In her presentation, “Democratic Resilience Amid Pernicious Political Polarization,” Professor McCoy argued that the United States stands apart from comparable established democracies because of its exceptionally intense political polarization and rapid democratic erosion. Building on Professor Sheri Berman’s analysis of recurring populist cycles, Professor McCoy maintained that electoral alternation alone cannot restore democratic legitimacy. Instead, she called for fundamental institutional reforms, stronger citizen participation, an inclusive redefinition of national identity, and a reconsideration of economic arrangements that concentrate wealth and political influence.

American Exceptionalism: Pernicious Polarization and Democratic Erosion

Professor McCoy began by identifying two characteristics that, in her assessment, distinguish the United States from other established liberal democracies, including those in Europe, Canada, Japan, and Australia.

The first is the exceptional intensity and persistence of what she termed “pernicious political polarization.” ProfessorMcCoy defined this phenomenon as the division of society into mutually antagonistic political blocs, characterized by an entrenched distinction between “us” and “them.” Unlike ordinary ideological disagreement, pernicious polarization becomes particularly damaging when political leaders deliberately portray opponents as existential threats whose legitimacy and right to govern must be denied. Such strategies encourage partisan loyalty even when supporters disagree with particular policies or governmental practices.

Professor McCoy illustrated this dynamic through competing perceptions of political danger. Republican voters may overlook policies they find objectionable because they fear that Democratic opponents will introduce socialism or communism. Conversely, Democratic voters may regard the Republican Party and Trump as fundamental threats to democratic institutions.

The second distinguishing characteristic, according to Professor McCoy, is the rapid deterioration of American liberal-democratic institutions during Trump’s presidency. She argued that the United States had experienced an unusually pronounced decline in democratic performance compared with other wealthy, established democracies.

For Professor McCoy, these developments made the approaching midterms particularly consequential, especially given concerns involving the separation of powers, civil liberties, executive authority, and the rule of law.

Elite Polarization and Public Dissatisfaction

Professor McCoy nevertheless emphasized an important distinction between polarization among political elites and attitudes within the broader electorate. Although party leaders increasingly engage in antagonistic political competition, many ordinary Americans express dissatisfaction with both major parties. She noted that significant numbers of citizens identify with neither party and are frustrated by political hostility, congressional dysfunction, and the perceived inability of elected representatives to address pressing social problems. This creates a paradoxical political environment: intense partisan mobilization coexists with widespread distrust of the political establishment.

Professor McCoy observed that high polarization can stimulate electoral participation, pointing to indications of substantial enthusiasm during early voting. Yet heightened turnout does not necessarily indicate renewed confidence in democratic institutions. It may instead reflect fear of political opponents and anxiety about the consequences of electoral defeat.

Consequently, Professor McCoy suggested that democratic resilience requires transforming the underlying relationships between citizens, political parties, and representative institutions rather than merely increasing electoral participation.

Breaking the Cycle of Populism and Democratic Disillusionment

Building on Professor Berman’s discussion of recurring populist cycles, McCoy argued that electoral victories against populist movements rarely produce durable democratic renewal. She referred to Brazil as an illustration of the difficulties confronting democratic forces when populist competitors retain significant electoral support.

According to McCoy, many countries experience repeated alternation between populist and mainstream political leadership without achieving sustainable improvements in democratic governance. She maintained that the principal limitation of conventional responses is their tendency to prioritize electoral competition while neglecting the institutional and socioeconomic conditions that generate public dissatisfaction.

“I think we need whole system change to get out of this cycle,” Professor McCoy declared. Her argument suggested that durable democratic resilience requires a broader transformation of political representation, institutional incentives, public participation, and economic power.

Grassroots Mobilization and Emerging Cross-Partisan Coalitions

Despite her concerns about democratic deterioration, Professor McCoy identified encouraging developments within American civil society. She observed growing grassroots resistance to the perception that political and economic institutions are systematically structured against ordinary citizens. This dissatisfaction transcends partisan boundaries and reflects shared concerns about housing affordability, childcare, healthcare, energy prices, and political corruption.

Professor McCoy highlighted local opposition to artificial intelligence data centers as an especially revealing example of cross-ideological mobilization. Residents from different political backgrounds have organized against projects they believe could increase electricity costs, strain water resources, and undermine local decision-making.

Particularly important, she suggested, are concerns about negotiations conducted without sufficient public transparency. These movements demonstrate the possibility of political cooperation around concrete community interests despite national-level partisan hostility. For Professor McCoy, such initiatives provide evidence that polarization is not necessarily insurmountable at the grassroots level.

Three Ecosystems of Democratic Renewal

Professor McCoy identified three interconnected areas of civil society activity that could contribute to rebuilding American democracy. The first concerns structural democratic reform, including efforts to revise institutional arrangements that limit political accountability, representation, and electoral competition.

The second involves citizen engagement and deliberative democracy, particularly initiatives enabling people to participate directly in public problem-solving beyond periodic elections. She highlighted citizens’ assemblies as an increasingly significant democratic innovation. Although the United States has lagged behind several European countries in institutionalizing deliberative mechanisms, Professor McCoy noted growing experimentation at local and state levels. She also referenced efforts to organize a national deliberative process before the 2028 presidential election, potentially developing reform proposals supported by broad public participation.

The third area involves economic transformation and the development of thriving, inclusive communities.

Professor McCoy connected these initiatives to efforts promoting multiracial democracy, social belonging, cooperation, and the reconstruction of trust across ideological divisions. However, she cautioned that the economic dimension remained the least developed of the three.

Reconsidering Capitalism, Inequality, and Concentrated Power

Moving beyond institutional reform, Professor McCoy argued that contemporary democratic difficulties cannot be adequately understood without examining prevailing economic arrangements. She questioned an economic paradigm that prioritizes growth, returns on capital, and wealth accumulation while allowing economic and political influence to become increasingly concentrated.

The emergence of powerful technology corporations and exceptionally wealthy individuals, she suggested, has intensified concerns about the relationship between private economic power and democratic accountability. Referring to Elon Musk’s involvement in political and foreign policy debates, Professor McCoy highlighted the expanding influence that concentrated private wealth can exercise over public affairs.

She therefore called for greater public engagement with alternative economic frameworks, including ecological economics and traditions emphasizing reciprocity, cooperation, and environmental sustainability. In particular, she suggested that Indigenous approaches to collective responsibility and harmonious relationships with nature could contribute to rethinking prevailing assumptions about economic development.

Without reconsidering these underlying arrangements, Professor McCoy warned, economic inequality, the influence of money in politics, and inadequate regulation of artificial intelligence could continue undermining democratic governance.

Renewing the Social Contract and Reimagining National Identity

Professor McCoy subsequently emphasized the importance of political leadership capable of transforming public frustration into constructive democratic reform. Such leadership, she argued, must engage citizens directly, listen to their concerns, develop substantive proposals, and facilitate inclusive public deliberation. Central to this process is renegotiating the social contract: reconsidering what citizens owe one another and what obligations the state should fulfill.

She also called for a more inclusive understanding of patriotism and national identity. Rather than abandoning nationalism to exclusionary political movements, Professor McCoy suggested that democratic leaders should articulate forms of national belonging grounded in shared citizenship, solidarity, and respect for diversity. She referenced Péter Magyar’s political approach in Hungary as an example of efforts to combine patriotic language with a more inclusive national narrative.

Electoral Reform and the Limits of the Two-Party System

Professor McCoy also addressed institutional obstacles to political pluralism in the United States. She argued that winner-take-all elections, single-member districts, campaign financing arrangements, and the counter majoritarian characteristics of the Senate and Electoral College constrain meaningful political competition. These structures, in her assessment, make it difficult for new parties to emerge and encourage voters to choose between established parties primarily out of fear of the alternative.

Professor McCoy therefore advocated considering forms of proportional representation capable of expanding political choice without reproducing the fragmentation associated with highly proportional electoral systems. Such reforms, she suggested, could create opportunities for political realignment and reduce the incentives sustaining antagonistic two-party competition.

The Midterms as an Opportunity, not a Democratic Solution

Concluding her presentation, Professor McCoy emphasized that the 2026 midterms alone could not resolve America’s deeper democratic difficulties. Even if Democrats gained control of the House of Representatives, narrow legislative margins, possible Senate opposition, and presidential veto powers would constrain their capacity to enact major reforms.

Congressional investigations could strengthen accountability by exposing corruption, conflicts of interest, and governmental misconduct. However, Professor McCoy warned that such initiatives could also provoke partisan backlash if perceived as politically motivated persecution. She therefore argued that Democratic representatives would need to demonstrate policy coherence, organizational unity, and a credible commitment to institutional renewal.

Looking toward 2028, Professor McCoy suggested that the critical measure of political progress would be whether new candidates, ideas, and civic movements could translate public dissatisfaction into a constructive democratic agenda.

Her central conclusion was that sustainable democratic resilience requires more than defeating populist incumbents. It demands institutional redesign, economic reform, meaningful citizen participation, and a renewed social contract capable of restoring public confidence in democratic government.

Q&A Session

Electoral Reform in the US Does Not Necessarily Require Constitutional Amendment

During the question-and-answer session, Natalia Crane questioned Professor McCoy about the political and constitutional feasibility of reforming America’s electoral system. Referring to Professor McCoy’s advocacy of proportional representation, Crane asked whether such changes would require constitutional amendments and substantial bipartisan agreement.

Responding, Professor McCoy distinguished between reforms achievable through ordinary legislation and those requiring constitutional change. She explained that the Constitution grants states considerable authority over electoral arrangements, while Congress established single-member districts for House elections through legislation in 1967. Professor McCoy situated this requirement within the historical struggle for African American political representation. Southern states had employed multimember districts with bloc voting, allowing white electoral majorities to defeat Black candidates systematically. The adoption of single-member districts was intended to counter these exclusionary practices.

However, Professor McCoy argued that the subsequent development of partisan gerrymandering had contributed to an electoral landscape dominated by safe seats, limiting competition and producing disproportionate political representation. She emphasized that proportional representation could be introduced for state legislatures and the US House of Representatives without constitutional amendment, although congressional legislation would be necessary to alter the federal single-member-district requirement. By contrast, fundamentally restructuring the Senate or abolishing the Electoral College would require constitutional amendments, making such reforms considerably more difficult.

Professor McCoy outlined several alternative electoral arrangements, including multimember districts using ranked-choice voting through the single transferable vote system and mixed-member electoral systems resembling Germany’s model. She also acknowledged existing grassroots initiatives advocating ranked-choice voting but cautioned that introducing it within single-member districts would not necessarily overcome the structural dominance of the two-party system.

Her central argument was that electoral reform remains institutionally feasible if policymakers distinguish attainable legislative changes from more demanding constitutional transformations. By introducing proportional representation and expanding meaningful electoral competition, Professor McCoy suggested, the United States could create greater opportunities for political pluralism and reduce incentives sustaining entrenched partisan polarization. 

Professor Kenworthy: Can Democratic Parties Sustain Electoral Majorities in an Age of Persistent Political Discontent?

Professor Lane Kenworthy raised a fundamental question about the long-term prospects for democratic political stability amid recurring cycles of populist mobilization and electoral dissatisfaction. Building on Professor Sheri Berman’s analysis of the populist cycle and Professor Jennifer McCoy’s proposals for systemic democratic reform, Kenworthy questioned whether mainstream political parties could still construct enduring electoral coalitions capable of sustaining majority support across successive elections.

He observed that right-wing populist movements had gained substantial influence across different institutional contexts. In European countries employing proportional representation, such parties frequently attracted approximately 15–25% of the electorate, while in the United States, Trumpism had secured control of the federal government.

Nevertheless, Professor Kenworthy noted that the anticipated Democratic gains in the November 2026 midterms appeared driven predominantly by dissatisfaction with President Trump and the Republican Party rather than renewed enthusiasm for Democratic policies. This distinction raised a broader theoretical question: Could mainstream democratic parties develop sufficiently attractive and coherent policy programs to overcome recurring electoral backlash and establish durable political majorities?

Professor Kenworthy acknowledged the argument advanced by Professor Berman and Professor McCoy that breaking the populist cycle might require ambitious institutional reforms, substantive economic alternatives, and broader political coalitions. However, he introduced a more fundamental possibility: contemporary political conditions might themselves undermine the prospect of sustained electoral loyalty, regardless of the quality or ambition of governing programs.

Drawing a contrast with the historical dominance of center-left parties in several democracies between the 1930s and 1970s, Professor Kenworthy questioned whether comparable periods of stable electoral support remained achievable. He highlighted the transformative influence of social media, particularly its capacity to circulate continuous negative political messaging, amplify dissatisfaction, and sustain criticism of incumbent governments regardless of their achievements. Professor Kenworthy also pointed to the recurring electoral defeats of governing parties and coalitions over the preceding decade as possible evidence of a structural transformation in democratic competition.

His intervention therefore challenged the assumption that better policies or extensive institutional reforms would necessarily generate lasting electoral majorities. Instead, he suggested that persistent anti-incumbent sentiment might have become an enduring characteristic of contemporary democratic politics. Professor Kenworthy’s intervention left participants with an unresolved question: whether democratic renewal can restore durable political legitimacy or whether contemporary information environments and electoral dynamics increasingly make sustained majority support structurally elusive.

Professor Andrew Karch: American Federalism and State-Level Elections Are Crucial to Democratic Resilience Beyond Washington

Professor Andrew Karch.
Professor Andrew Karch is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.

As last speaker of the panel, Professor Andrew Karch of the University of Minnesota offered an institutional and geographically grounded analysis of the approaching November 3 US midterm elections. In his presentation, “Beyond Washington, DC: American Federalism and the Midterms,” Professor Karch argued that assessments of American democracy must extend beyond presidential politics and congressional competition to encompass the decisive role of states in political representation, electoral administration, and institutional accountability. 

Highlighting approximately 7,400 state legislators, 39 gubernatorial elections, ballot initiatives, and the constitutional authority of states over electoral procedures, he emphasized that American federalism functions simultaneously as a potential constraint on national executive power and a source of significant inequalities in democratic participation. His central argument was that the outcomes of state-level elections may prove as consequential for the long-term trajectory of American democracy as changes in control of Congress.

American Democracy as a Geographically Organized Federal System

Professor Karch began by identifying two foundational characteristics of American political representation that, in his assessment, receive insufficient attention in discussions dominated by national electoral competition. First, political representation in the United States is geographically organized. Electoral outcomes must therefore be understood through variations among states, regions, and local constituencies rather than exclusively through nationwide political trends. Second, the United States operates as a federal, multilevel political system in which state governments exercise substantial constitutional and administrative authority.

These characteristics, Professor Karch argued, make state-level politics indispensable to understanding democratic resilience. He organized his presentation around two principal dimensions: the electoral and policy stakes of state-level contests, and the constitutional responsibilities of states in administering elections. Together, these dimensions illustrated how American democracy is shaped by political developments occurring well beyond Washington.

State Legislative Elections: An Overlooked Arena of Political Competition

Professor Karch emphasized the extraordinary scale of state legislative elections scheduled for November 2026. According to figures presented during his remarks, the United States has approximately 7,400 state legislators, with more than 6,100 legislative seats—roughly 83%—subject to electoral competition during the current cycle. Of the country’s 99 state legislative chambers, 88 were involved in elections. Quoting a characterization from The New York Times, ProfessorKarch described state legislative contests as “the most important elections you haven’t heard about.”

He noted that Republicans controlled the legislatures of 28 states, Democrats controlled 17, and four states had divided legislative chambers. For Professor Karch, this distribution illustrated the territorial dimensions of American political polarization, with partisan control increasingly concentrated within geographically distinct political environments. Although he anticipated potential Democratic gains, he stressed that such advances could assume several forms.

Beyond outright changes in legislative control, reductions in Republican supermajorities could significantly alter political dynamics, particularly in states where governors belong to the opposing party. Supermajorities may enable legislatures to override gubernatorial opposition or substantially constrain executive discretion. Consequently, even relatively modest electoral shifts can affect institutional checks and balances.

Minnesota and the Uneven Geography of Electoral Competitiveness

Professor Karch used Minnesota, his home state, to illustrate the exceptional circumstances in which both legislative chambers remain genuinely competitive. He noted that only approximately 15 of the 88 legislative chambers involved in the 2026 elections were considered moderately competitive. This limited competitiveness reflected a broader characteristic of contemporary American politics: many state legislative outcomes are largely predetermined by existing partisan alignments. Minnesota therefore represented an unusually competitive environment, where relatively small electoral changes could produce significant consequences for legislative control.

Professor Karch also highlighted the importance of potential changes in unified party control, including situations in which governorships and legislative chambers could come under the authority of the same party. Such developments, commonly described as partisan trifectas, can substantially reshape a state’s legislative agenda and institutional relationships.

His analysis demonstrated that the political consequences of state elections depend not merely on aggregate party gains but also on how those gains interact with existing institutional configurations.

Gubernatorial Elections and State Executive Authority

Turning to state executive elections, Professor Karch noted that voters would select governors in 39 states, with 21 contests involving open seats without an incumbent candidate. Open-seat elections, he explained, are frequently more competitive because they lack the electoral advantages typically associated with incumbency. Nevertheless, he observed that relatively few gubernatorial contests had been classified as genuine toss-ups. Among the states attracting particular attention were Alaska, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 

Professor Karch situated these contests within a longer historical pattern of Republican strength in state executive offices. He reported that Republicans held 26 governorships compared with 24 controlled by Democrats, continuing a pattern of Republican numerical advantage that had largely persisted since the mid-1990s.

The significance of these elections, however, extended beyond partisan competition. Governors exercise substantial authority over state policy and can become important institutional actors in disputes between state and federal governments. Their political orientation can therefore influence how states respond to presidential initiatives and national policy changes.

Partisan Federalism as a Check on Presidential Power

One of Professor Karch’s central analytical contributions concerned the relationship between American federalism and democratic accountability. Building on earlier discussions about weakened congressional oversight, he argued that state governments can function as additional institutional checks on national executive authority. Under conditions of intense polarization, this relationship increasingly takes the form of partisan federalism. Republican-controlled states frequently challenge policies introduced by Democratic presidents, while Democratic-controlled states employ similar strategies against Republican administrations.

Professor Karch emphasized the growing political importance of state attorneys general. Historically relatively low-profile officials, attorneys general have become prominent participants in national political and legal disputes. Drawing on a database maintained by Paul Nolette at Marquette University, Professor Karch described the increasing frequency and significance of lawsuits filed by state attorneys general against presidential administrations.

Such litigation has addressed healthcare reform, environmental regulation, immigration, higher education, and election administration. He cited disputes involving the Affordable Care Act and environmental policy under the Obama administration as examples of how state governments can challenge federal priorities. For Professor Karch, these developments demonstrated that the federal structure provides institutional opportunities for resistance even when the national legislature is politically aligned with the president.

Ballot Initiatives and the Democratic Significance of State Policy Choices

Professor Karch also highlighted the importance of direct democracy at the state level. Unlike the national government, where citizens primarily influence policy through elected representatives, many states permit voters to decide substantive policy questions directly through ballot initiatives and referendums. He noted that ballot measures would appear in 39 states during the 2026 elections. These initiatives provide an important indication of changing political priorities.

Comparing the current electoral cycle with 2020, Professor Karch observed that earlier ballot measures frequently addressed marijuana legalization and criminal justice reform. By contrast, the 2026 agenda featured greater attention to election-related issues, including redistricting and ranked-choice voting. He referred to a proposed redistricting measure in Missouri and efforts to repeal ranked-choice voting in Alaska. Other ballot questions concerned taxation and transgender-related policies.

Professor Karch argued that these initiatives reveal how state electorates participate directly in defining the institutional and policy boundaries of American democracy.

Constitutional Authority Over Election Administration

Moving from electoral competition to constitutional structure, Professor Karch examined the Elections Clause of the US Constitution, contained in Article I, Section 4. He emphasized that this provision assigns states responsibility for determining the times, places, and manner of congressional elections, subject to congressional authority to establish or modify applicable regulations. The practical result is an electoral system governed through overlapping federal and state legal frameworks.

Professor Karch drew attention to a particularly consequential constitutional distinction: the Elections Clause explicitly identifies state legislatures and Congress but does not assign comparable election-administration authority to the president. He raised this point in connection with executive orders and Justice Department involvement in election-related matters.

Although acknowledging that he was not a constitutional lawyer, Professor Karch suggested that the constitutional allocation of responsibilities deserved careful consideration amid contemporary disputes over executive influence on electoral administration. His broader argument was that state autonomy in administering elections constitutes a fundamental institutional characteristic of American democracy.

Voting Rights and Unequal Conditions of Democratic Participation

Professor Karch subsequently explored the consequences of decentralized election administration for political participation. He emphasized that the Constitution does not establish a single, comprehensive national framework guaranteeing identical voting procedures across every state. Consequently, citizens encounter substantially different electoral requirements depending on where they reside.

Using voter identification requirements as an example, Professor Karch noted that Minnesota was among 14 states without such requirements, while the remaining 36 imposed some form of voter identification rule. These regulations vary considerably in their restrictiveness.

Professor Karch identified other important differences involving voter registration, automatic registration systems, and the restoration or restriction of voting rights for individuals convicted of felonies. For him, these variations raised fundamental democratic questions about membership in the political community and the practical accessibility of political participation. State legislatures and governors therefore exercise considerable influence over the everyday meaning of democratic citizenship.

Gerrymandering, Redistricting, and the Decline of Electoral Competition

Professor Karch concluded his substantive analysis by examining congressional redistricting. He explained that congressional district boundaries are generally determined through state-level processes involving legislatures, independent commissions, or courts. Although redistricting ordinarily follows the decennial census, he identified mid-cycle redistricting as a distinctive feature of the 2026 elections. Such changes, he emphasized, can influence how votes translate into congressional representation.

Professor Karch suggested that Republican-led redistricting initiatives might affect Democratic performance in the approaching elections. However, his principal concern extended beyond immediate partisan advantage. He warned that increasingly sophisticated district design could undermine meaningful electoral competition by creating constituencies in which outcomes are highly predictable. From the perspective of democratic theory, this raises concerns about accountability, political choice, and the responsiveness of elected representatives.

Professor Karch pointed to his own congressional district as an example of an electoral environment where the likely outcome was effectively known in advance. The deeper democratic problem, he suggested, is not simply which party benefits from redistricting, but whether voters retain meaningful opportunities to influence electoral outcomes.

Federalism and the Future of American Democratic Resilience

In conclusion, Professor Karch urged participants to resist interpreting the November 3 elections exclusively through the composition of Congress or the political standing of the president. State legislative contests, gubernatorial elections, attorney general races, ballot initiatives, election administration, and redistricting decisions all carry substantial implications for democratic governance.

His presentation illuminated the dual character of American federalism. On the one hand, decentralized political authority provides institutional opportunities for states to challenge federal policies and constrain national executive power. On the other hand, decentralization permits significant variation in voting rights, electoral competitiveness, and the practical conditions of democratic participation. These competing dimensions make state politics indispensable to understanding the resilience and vulnerabilities of American democracy.

ProfessorKarch’s central message was that American democratic institutions cannot be adequately assessed from Washington alone. The states are not peripheral actors in national democracy; they are essential sites where political authority is contested, electoral rights are defined, and the long-term conditions of democratic accountability are determined.

Professor Kenworthy: American Federalism Combines National Polarization with State-Level Autonomy and Resilient Local Governance

Professor Lane Kenworthy offered additional reflections on Professor Karch’s analysis of American federalism, emphasizing three frequently overlooked dimensions of the country’s multilevel political system: the contrast between national electoral competitiveness and state-level partisan dominance, the decentralization of election administration, and comparatively resilient public confidence in local government.

First, Professor Kenworthy observed that American politics is characterized by an unusually close partisan balance at the national level, with the two major parties commanding roughly comparable shares of politically active citizens. This equilibrium, persisting since approximately 2000, has contributed to closely contested presidential elections.

However, he stressed that this balance does not extend uniformly across individual states. In states such as California, New York, Oregon, and Washington, Democrats have maintained substantial political dominance, while Republicans have enjoyed comparable advantages in states such as Texas. Unified partisan control of governorships and legislative chambers enables state governments to implement extensive policy agendas despite national political gridlock.

Second, Professor Kenworthy highlighted the democratic significance of decentralized election administration. Because states possess considerable authority over electoral procedures, federal attempts to reshape voting rules may encounter substantial institutional resistance. He pointed specifically to state-level opposition to Trump administration initiatives concerning ballot access, early voting, and voting by mail.

Third, Professor Kenworthy emphasized the often-neglected importance of municipal governance. Although Americans’ trust in national government has declined considerably since the 1960s and 1970s, he noted that survey evidence indicates substantially greater and more stable confidence in local government. According to his interpretation of Gallup and Pew polling, public trust in local institutions has remained relatively consistent since approximately 2000.

Professor Kenworthy’s intervention underscored that American democratic resilience cannot be understood exclusively through national polarization or federal institutional conflict. State governments retain considerable policymaking autonomy, while local institutions continue to exercise authority over every day public services and maintain comparatively strong public confidence, revealing important sources of institutional continuity within an otherwise deeply polarized political system.

Q&A Session

Disputed Midterm Election Results Could Trigger Extensive Litigation and Test America’s Judicial Institutions

During the question-and-answer session, Professor Cengiz Aktar raised concerns about the possibility of a post-election constitutional crisis should President Donald Trump refuse to acknowledge unfavorable electoral outcomes. Referring to speculation that Trump might challenge the results if Republicans suffered significant losses, Professor Aktar asked Professor Karch to assess the potential institutional and political consequences of such a scenario.

Responding, Professor Karch acknowledged the difficulty of predicting developments surrounding a hypothetical rejection of election results, emphasizing the considerable uncertainty involved. Before addressing the question directly, Professor Karch returned briefly to the implications of political polarization for American federalism. He distinguished between the legislative gridlock frequently associated with polarization at the national level and the substantial policy divergence it produces among states. In his assessment, the increasing separation between Republican-controlled and Democratic-controlled states has generated markedly different policy environments, particularly concerning abortion, gun ownership, and electoral regulations.

Turning to Professor Aktar’s central question, Professor Karch suggested that any serious dispute over the legitimacy of election results would likely place the judiciary at the center of the resulting institutional confrontation. He observed that the groundwork for potential post-election disputes was already becoming visible, although he refrained from offering definitive predictions about their consequences.

Should Trump or the Republican Party challenge election outcomes in particular states, Professor Karch anticipated extensive litigation concerning electoral procedures, certification, and the validity of contested results. He also noted that the Supreme Court might be reluctant to become embroiled in an explicitly political electoral confrontation, recalling the institutional controversy surrounding Bush v. Gore in 2000.

Professor Karch’s main assessment was that a contested election could produce significant judicial intervention, although its ultimate consequences would remain uncertain. His response underscored the potential importance of courts in resolving electoral disputes within America’s polarized federal system, while acknowledging the limits of forecasting how such a confrontation might unfold.

Partisan Federalism Is More Likely to Produce Recurring Institutional Conflict Than Secessionism

Dr. Bulent Kenes questioned Professor Karch about whether intensifying conflicts between state and federal authorities could eventually threaten American political unity. Dr. Kenes asked whether federalism, traditionally understood as a safeguard against centralized power, might paradoxically encourage secessionist tendencies. His central question was whether sustained state-level resistance to Washington could ultimately evolve into demands for territorial separation.

Responding, Professor Karch expressed skepticism that contemporary federal-state tensions would generate secessionist movements comparable to those found in parts of Europe. Instead, he emphasized the instrumental relationship between partisan political interests and federalism.

According to Karch, both Republicans and Democrats invoke federal principles selectively, depending on their position within the national political system. When excluded from federal executive power, parties frequently turn to sympathetic state governments as alternative centers of political authority and resistance. He challenged the conventional characterization of Republicans as defenders of states’ rights and Democrats as advocates of centralized government, arguing that such distinctions obscure the strategic calculations underlying political behavior.

Professor Karch suggested that recurring confrontations between state and federal governments were considerably more plausible than outright secession. He linked this prospect to Professor Berman’s analysis of recurring political cycles, suggesting that changes in presidential control could repeatedly reverse the partisan configuration of federal-state resistance.

Finally, Professor Karch emphasized that constitutional ambiguities concerning the distribution of authority between Washington and individual states could sustain these institutional disputes. His assessment thus highlighted the potential persistence of partisan federalism as a source of political contestation rather than territorial fragmentation.

Reducing Partisan Litigation Requires Cross-Party Cooperation and a Less Polarized Policy Agenda

Natalia Crane questioned Professor Karch about the growing frequency of lawsuits filed by state attorneys general against presidential administrations. Referring to the increasingly confrontational relationship between state governments and federal executive authority under Presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump, Crane asked what conditions might reverse this trend or whether litigation would continue increasing or eventually stabilize.

Responding, Professor Karch emphasized the extent to which partisan litigation has become institutionalized within contemporary American federalism. Recalling the Obama presidency, he cited a Republican state attorney general who characterized suing the administration as a routine professional responsibility. Professor Karch suggested that many Democratic attorneys general now approach Republican administrations with a comparable understanding of their institutional role.

He argued that reversing this trajectory would require substantial changes in political polarization and the policy priorities of the major parties. A less adversarial political environment, he suggested, would reduce incentives for state officials to challenge federal initiatives primarily because they originated with an opposing party.

Professor Karch identified opposition to artificial intelligence data centers and concerns about pharmaceutical companies as potential areas of cross-partisan cooperation. Such issues might enable political actors to transcend conventional ideological divisions through shared policy objectives. Nevertheless, he acknowledged the considerable difficulties involved in constructing durable cross-ideological coalitions.

Professor Karch’s conclusion was that reducing litigation between state and federal authorities would depend less on legal adjustments than on broader political realignment and renewed opportunities for bipartisan policy cooperation.

Professor McCoy: Democratic Renewal Requires Structural Reform to Break the Cycle of Political Instability and Economic Disillusionment

During the concluding discussion, Professor Jennifer McCoy addressed two interconnected concerns: the possibility of a post-election constitutional crisis in the United States and the broader challenge of overcoming recurring cycles of democratic backsliding and political instability.

Responding to Professor Cengiz Aktar’s question about a potential constitutional confrontation, Professor McCoy largely agreed with Professor Karch that disputes over election results would most likely unfold through litigation. Recalling Donald Trump’s unsuccessful legal challenges to the 2020 presidential election, she suggested that similar attempts to contest unfavorable outcomes could emerge in individual states.

Professor McCoy referred specifically to anticipated legal disputes in Alaska, where competing Republican candidacies could potentially affect electoral outcomes. She also acknowledged concerns that Trump might invoke emergency powers, the Insurrection Act, or extraordinary security measures in response to political unrest. However, given that early voting was already underway across numerous states, she considered such an extreme scenario less plausible than prolonged legal contestation.

Nevertheless, Professor McCoy identified voter intimidation as an unresolved concern, particularly regarding the potential presence of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel and cooperating local police near electoral activities. Such visibility, she suggested, could discourage some citizens from exercising their voting rights.

Turning to Professor Kenworthy’s broader question about whether democratic parties could sustain public support, Professor McCoy emphasized the structural foundations of contemporary political volatility. She argued that democratic systems increasingly experience recurring alternation between populist governments and mainstream parties without achieving durable democratic renewal. The succession of Trump, Biden, and Trump illustrated, in her assessment, this pattern of electoral turnover without resolution of underlying grievances.

Professor McCoy maintained that breaking this cycle requires fundamentally reconsidering the relationship between democracy and contemporary capitalism. She contrasted today’s economic arrangements with the postwar social contract, when industrial economies, organized labor, and negotiated compromises between capital and workers contributed to greater political stability.

According to Professor McCoy, the transformation of economic structures and the growing concentration of private economic power have weakened democracy’s capacity to respond effectively to citizens’ demands. She therefore advocated renewed democratic institutions, broader citizen participation, and economic frameworks capable of addressing contemporary inequalities.

Her central conclusion was that without substantial institutional and economic transformation, democracies risk remaining trapped in prolonged cycles of polarization, governmental dysfunction, and recurring populist resurgence.

Conclusion: Beyond Electoral Alternation—The Structural Challenges of Democratic Resilience

The ECPS panel on US Midterms entitled “Trumpism, Democratic Resilience, and the Rise of Democratic Socialism”offered a comprehensive examination of the political, institutional, and socioeconomic challenges confronting American democracy ahead of the November 3, 2026, midterm elections. Although approaching these challenges from different disciplinary and comparative perspectives, the participants converged on a fundamental insight: electoral outcomes alone cannot determine the durability of democratic institutions or resolve the structural grievances sustaining contemporary populism.

Panel’s chair Professor Lane Kenworthy situated the elections within broader patterns of right-wing populist mobilization, economic dissatisfaction, and anti-incumbent sentiment. His observations raised an important question about whether electoral backlash reflects substantive democratic renewal or merely the recurrent rejection of unpopular governing parties.

Professor Michael Kazin complemented this analysis by tracing the revival of democratic socialism to longstanding economic inequalities and the political consequences of neoliberal capitalism. His assessment suggested that contemporary democratic socialism’s principal influence lies less in revolutionary transformation than in shifting the Democratic Party toward a more expansive social-democratic economic agenda.

Professor Sheri Berman emphasized the limitations of electoral victories over populist governments. Drawing on comparative experiences, she warned that mainstream parties risk perpetuating cycles of political disillusionment unless they develop credible responses to economic insecurity, immigration, corruption, and governmental dysfunction.

Extending this argument, Professor Jennifer McCoy identified pernicious polarization, institutional vulnerabilities, and concentrated economic power as interconnected obstacles to democratic resilience. Her proposed remedies—including electoral reform, deliberative participation, economic restructuring, and a renewed social contract—underscored the importance of systemic transformation beyond conventional partisan competition.

Professor Andrew Karch, meanwhile, demonstrated that American democratic resilience also depends on federalism’s decentralized institutional architecture. State governments can constrain federal executive authority, yet divergent electoral regulations, partisan litigation, and gerrymandering simultaneously expose significant inequalities in democratic representation.

The discussions further illuminated unresolved questions concerning constitutional checks and balances, potential electoral disputes, political polarization, and the capacity of democratic institutions to maintain legitimacy under sustained partisan confrontation.

Ultimately, the panel highlighted a distinction between electoral accountability and democratic renewal. While the midterms could reshape the balance of political power, their longer-term significance would depend on whether political actors and institutions could address citizens’ material grievances, strengthen democratic representation, and rebuild public confidence.

The panel thus framed the 2026 elections not simply as a contest over congressional control, but as a critical moment for assessing the possibilities and limitations of democratic resilience in an increasingly polarized political order.

Professor Lester Spence.

Prof. Spence: In the United States, Democracy Goes as Black People Go

In an in-depth interview with the ECPS ahead of the November 3 US midterm elections, Professor Lester Spence of Johns Hopkins University argues that the fate of American democracy is inseparable from Black political rights: “In the United States, democracy goes as Black people go.” Examining Trumpism, racialized political hierarchies, democratic backsliding, and the weakening of the Voting Rights Act, Professor Spence emphasizes that restrictions on Black political participation undermine democracy more broadly. Drawing on Reconstruction, the Civil Rights Movement, and contemporary Black activism, he explores the relationship between racial domination and political economy while highlighting the democratic potential of cross-racial solidarity, progressive coalitions, and institutional transformation beyond electoral representation to secure substantive empowerment for working-class communities.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As the United States approaches the November 3, 2026, midterm elections, political competition is increasingly shaped by Trumpism, racial polarization, economic inequality, and conflicts over voting rights and democratic institutions. Beyond the struggle for congressional control, these developments raise fundamental questions about racialized political power, the resilience of American democracy, and the prospects for substantive Black political empowerment. At the heart of these debates lies a crucial question: Can American democracy remain viable when the political rights of historically marginalized communities are increasingly contested?

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Lester Spence, Professor of Political Science and Africana Studies at Johns Hopkins University, offers a historically grounded analysis of the relationship between racial domination, political economy, and democratic backsliding. His central argument is captured in a striking formulation: “In the United States, democracy goes as Black people go.” For Professor Spence, the trajectory of American democracy cannot be understood independently of the political struggles, institutional protections, and democratic participation of Black Americans.

Drawing on the historical experiences of Reconstruction, Jim Crow, the Civil Rights Movement, and contemporary struggles over voting rights, Professor Spence argues that racial exclusion has consequences extending far beyond its immediate targets. As he emphasizes, “It’s not simply that democratic harms inflicted on Black people affect only Black people.” Rather, “for historical reasons, Black people are at the center.” Consequently, “what happens to Black people ultimately ends up hurting everybody.”

This interpretation challenges approaches that treat racial inequality as peripheral to democratic decline. Professor Spence insists that “racial politics are essential to understanding democratic backsliding in the United States,” identifying two competing historical traditions: one that expands democratic participation and another that constrains political representation and governmental responsiveness. He further observes that “the anti-democratizing or de-democratizing tendency has always been associated with forces that have practiced white supremacy.”

Against this historical background, the contemporary weakening of voting rights acquires broader institutional significance. Discussing the Voting Rights Act, Professor Spence warns: “When you weaken or effectively neutralize the Voting Rights Act, you’re not just undermining its protections for Black people; you’re essentially undermining those protections for everybody.” He similarly anticipates that, without electoral reform, “Black political representation” will decline dramatically, particularly in the American South.

Yet Professor Spence’s analysis extends beyond democratic erosion to the possibilities of political renewal. Reflecting on Black Lives Matter, Occupy Wall Street, and emerging progressive coalitions, he argues that “political movements themselves create openings, and institutions then emerge to fill those gaps.” Ultimately, he maintains, meaningful democratic transformation requires more than electoral victories: “It’s not just about electing people; it’s about creating a new model” capable of protecting political participation while generating progressive change and substantive material benefits for working-class communities.

Here is our interview with Professor Lester Spence, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Trumpism Retains Elements of the Previous Era 

Trump supporters marched toward Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C., USA. Photo: Dreamstime / © Bgrocker

Professor Spence, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with Trumpism’s enduring appeal and its relationship to America’s historical racial hierarchies. How should we understand the intersection of racial resentment, economic insecurity, and anti-establishment populism in sustaining Trumpism? Does it represent a distinctive form of racialized authoritarian populism, or does it reproduce longstanding structures of American racial politics under more confrontational leadership?

Professor Lester Spence: First, that’s a really good question, and answering it gives me an opportunity to talk about this moment with an eye toward helping folks understand political dynamics and political change over time, along with political economy: how the market works, how the economy works, how changes in the economy are both produced by politics and, in turn, produce politics, and how racial dynamics play a role in all that.

To understand Trumpism in the short durée, we have to go back to the economic crises that wracked the country and the world in approximately 2008. In the United States, what this meant for a number of folks, including myself, was that our mortgages went underwater. A number of us had our homes taken away from us, particularly at the middle- and upper-income levels. At the working-class level, folks who didn’t own their homes or didn’t have the capacity to own them, and therefore rented, were placed in even more precarious circumstances because many of them lost their jobs. They didn’t have health benefits, and there were a range of other crises.

In addition to these real crises, such as me being in danger of losing my home or working-class folks dealing with difficult material circumstances, there were psychological challenges that people faced as the economy tanked. They didn’t necessarily lose money, but they thought they would. Or maybe they indirectly lost money through stocks, whatever the hell.

Anyway, it’s in this moment that we see the election of Barack Obama. Obama, as the first Black president of the United States, actually had a lot more room to navigate than I think he and others thought. That is to say, those of us who study this academically, serve as political analysts, work in campaigns, and even regular folks never thought that the United States would elect an African American president. I just didn’t think it would happen.

The fact that he’d already overcome that hurdle created more space for him to navigate. The nature of the economic crisis itself also raised questions, for the first time in a broad sense, about how capitalism in the United States functioned. Obama had a lot of latitude to discipline capital, and he generally chose not to.

The Tea Party Created the Conditions for Trump’s Rise

Now, fast-forward to the 2010 election cycle. He ended up losing Congress, while a number of states fell to the GOP. At this moment, we see the rise of what eventually becomes the MAGA movement. It wasn’t called that then. It was called the Tea Party movement.

The Tea Party movement ends up transforming the Republican Party, moving it sharply toward the right. The Republican Party already had racist tendencies. The movement metastasizes these tendencies and creates space for a certain type of capital to gradually dominate the concentrated support for the GOP. All of that, long story short, creates the conditions in which Trump can run as an outsider and win.

What’s similar between Trump and previous iterations of the Republican Party is this racist tendency, which became prominent in the Republican Party as early as the late 1960s and early 1970s. It becomes even more prominent with the election of Ronald Reagan. Reagan runs on implicit racist campaign appeals, creating the space that, by the mid-1980s, makes it possible for a racist populist like Pat Buchanan to run for president.

He does not win, but he helps create a space within the GOP for it to basically become, at best, a white ethnic nationalist party. That’s what it ends up becoming under Trump, who takes this tendency, pushes it further, and transforms it into something that retains elements of the previous era but can also be understood as something new. And that’s one part of it. If you have questions about any of this, just loop back to me.

Now, if we think about the economy over the period I’ve discussed, we transition from the 1960s and 1970s, when we’re an industrial economy dominated by manufacturing, to one increasingly dominated by the FIRE (Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate) sector. By the 1980s and 1990s, the FIRE sector dominates, and this is when the neoliberal turn consolidates.

Corruption Is a Governing Principle for Trump

But what we’re in now is a different economy, even from those earlier economies. It’s deeply post-industrial, deeply connected to platforms and the internet, and it’s here that we see the rise of not just billionaires but, in Elon Musk, the first trillionaire.

These transformations of the economy end up feeding back into politics. Around the time Obama is running, then Clinton is running, and then Biden is running, this growing tech capital sector is splitting its support. They’re splitting their support the way prior sectors did—not all, but some—because they’re thinking, okay, no matter what, we want to hedge our bets. We want to get benefits if the Republican Party wins, and we want to get benefits if the Democratic Party wins. So, we’re kind of split.

But what you see in the United States is that, increasingly, even before Trump gets elected, but definitely afterward, and then with his second election, tech capital moves toward him.

This is another important dynamic: Trump actually uses the state to compel tech to support him because, unlike previous parties and elected officials of both parties, corruption is a governing principle for Trump. Corruption wasn’t a governing principle for prior iterations.

So, those are some of the things that make Trumpism different. I don’t think I covered everything, and I was perhaps a bit more confusing than I’d like to be. So, if you have any questions about any of that, just holler at me.

Race Is a Political Construction with Social Implications

Black People.
Black Lives Matter protesters march around Marion Square during an organized demonstration in Charleston, South Carolina, USA, on July 13, 2016. Photo: Gerald T. Coli / Dreamstime.

Your scholarship challenges explanations that separate racial hierarchy from political economy. How should we interpret the relationship between white racial identity, perceived status loss, and material interests in contemporary Republican electoral behavior? To what extent can economic grievances be analytically distinguished from racial resentment when explaining support for Trump and the contemporary far right?

Professor Lester Spence: That’s a great question. When I was younger, an undergraduate in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the common sense about racial difference was changing. At the time, when I was starting school, people still thought—and were still taught in universities—that race was a real physiological or biological thing. By the time I was in graduate school, the common sense had changed, and we recognized that race was a social construction with political implications. The way I think about race is as a political construction with social implications.

It’s a political construction inasmuch as states and state bureaucracies play an essential role in constructing racial difference. They do so to create a social, economic, and political hierarchy. It’s a political hierarchy inasmuch as populations deemed non-white, and Black populations specifically, are placed at the bottom. Even when Black populations and other non-white populations are citizens, they are deemed unworthy of the rights accorded to white citizens. That puts them in a particular category.

Socially speaking, they’re at the bottom. That means there is a range of social rights that society accords—sometimes, when philosophers and political theorists talk about these rights, they refer to things like dignity—that non-white populations aren’t accorded. Economically, that means they’re placed at the bottom of the labor hierarchy. Even when non-white populations own businesses and the like, they’re still placed at the bottom of that hierarchy.

Racial Hierarchies Provide Political, Social, and Economic Benefits to Whites

Now, that hierarchy itself ends up providing political, social, and economic benefits, both for whites in general and for whites in the middle and near the bottom of their own hierarchy. Those benefits change according to the moment, depending on where we are, where the economy is, and where the political economy is. But the hierarchy is durable. It’s durable.

Now, what do I mean by that? When the South was an authoritarian regime largely shaped by Jim Crow, even as whites were victimized by the agricultural sector that dominated the United States South, they could derive psychological benefits and some limited political benefits from knowing that there was a population below them—a population that didn’t have full citizenship rights and was placed at the bottom of the social hierarchy. This was true even when they were in somewhat similar economic circumstances.

Racial Resentment Makes Whites More Likely to Support Trumpism 

As we transition out of Jim Crow, what we see is that political parties are consistently able to wield the reality of racial difference in ways that make a majority of whites believe that when government functions progressively—when it gives folks the resources to be healthy, to keep their heads above water economically, and to protect themselves against capital—it is acting on behalf of non-whites in general and Blacks in particular.

Race is wielded in such a way that, when government attempts to function like that, whites end up resenting government because they believe it is being used on behalf of these populations. To the extent that governments act on behalf of these populations, whites believe that these populations are undeserving of the benefits government accords them.

This, in turn, makes whites skeptical of government interventions in general and, more specifically, of progressive interventions designed to address some combination of racial and class inequality.

Racial resentment plays a role here. Whites who are racially resentful—that is, who are predisposed not just to believe in the racial hierarchy generally, but to believe intensely that this hierarchy exists because non-white populations in general, and Black populations specifically, are culturally dysfunctional and deeply undeserving—are far more likely to believe that government should not be used for progressive ends. This translates into the present moment, making them far more likely to support Trumpism and its racist elements.

Race Is Central to Both the Democratizing and De-Democratizing Tendencies

Black Lives Matter protesters.
Black Lives Matter protesters demonstrate against police brutality in Oakland, California, USA. Photo: Dreamstime.

With the Trump administration facing renewed scrutiny over executive authority, immigration enforcement, and the independence of democratic institutions, how should scholars conceptualize the relationship between democratic backsliding and America’s historical structures of racial domination? Are contemporary authoritarian tendencies best understood as a departure from American democratic traditions, or as an intensification of exclusionary practices already embedded within them?

Professor Lester Spence: My answer here will be more straightforward. I believe that American democracy, in simplified terms, can be understood as comprising two traditions. One tradition sustains and extends progressive democratic practices, giving regular people the ability to determine who represents them and to have their interests reflected in progressive government policy. That’s one tendency.

The other tendency seeks to constrain people’s ability to elect representatives who reflect their interests and the government’s ability to respond to those interests. If the first tendency is democratizing, the second is anti-democratizing, de-democratizing, or autocratizing.

Race is central to both tendencies. In the first, for historical reasons, Black populations have played a critical role in defending and extending democratic practices and the functioning of democracy in the United States at the local, state, and federal levels. We can see this before and during the Civil War, throughout Reconstruction, in the Civil Rights Movement, and, to a certain extent, in more recent Black Lives Matter organizing.

The anti-democratizing or de-democratizing tendency has always been associated with forces that have practiced white supremacy. They’ve either practiced it explicitly or supported policies that tend to produce it as a byproduct.

If we look at the political science literature, the study of democratic backsliding in the United States has only recently returned to mainstream political science scholarship. For the longest time, political scientists studying this question focused almost everywhere except the United States. The exceptions included scholars of racial politics and Black studies more broadly. There are a couple of other exceptions, but I’ll leave it there.

What we’re trying to do is push the discipline toward recognizing that racial politics are essential to understanding democratic backsliding in the United States. Trump gives us the complicated benefit of bringing this issue into sharper focus.

Actually, race—and here I’m referring more broadly to the ways in which the state differentiates populations using biological or cultural concepts—is essential to understanding democratic backsliding. In the United States, it’s race. In some places, it’s not race but ethnicity. In others, it’s not ethnicity but religion, and so on.

These distinctions are essential to understanding democratic backsliding and authoritarian turns more broadly, both within nations and across regions. For example, when we think about the European Union or its current and former member states, we can examine how immigration and race have been used to generate support for democratic backsliding.

If we look at elections in South America—or at Israel, where the election was just held—we can see, in state after state, how racial or race-like dynamics are used to explain democratic backsliding.

The Republican Party Should Be Understood as an Ethno-Nationalist Party

In your essay “Make Sure It Includes Everyone,” you expressed skepticism about the institutional foundations of cross-racial progressive coalitions, arguing that organizations capable of sustaining solidarity across cities, suburbs, and rural communities had substantially weakened. Nearly a decade later, have the Trump era and its aftermath further entrenched racialized political divisions, or have new possibilities emerged for building durable solidarities across racial and class boundaries?

Professor Lester Spence: That’s a great question. I’d say yes to both. I talked about two tendencies: the democratizing tendency and the de-democratizing tendency. Those tendencies have moved even further apart.

One way to think about this is that if you had conducted a survey maybe 20 years ago, you would have found broad support, across parties and populations, for most of the elements of what we consider a functioning democracy, even among people who express racial resentment. People who are racially resentful might believe that certain populations shouldn’t necessarily be protected by democracy, but they would still express support for broad swaths of what we consider the necessary elements of a functioning democracy.

Now, I don’t think that’s the case anymore. Within the de-democratizing tendency, you have a broad swath of folks who increasingly don’t believe in democratic values. For them, race is being used to reinforce that tendency. Even though that tendency includes non-whites—for example, I’m from Michigan, where the Republican gubernatorial candidate is John James, an African American, and there are other African Americans within the Trump tendency running for office—it’s not quite the same as it was during the Jim Crow era. But even so, that tendency remains disproportionately white, and the Republican Party at this moment should be understood as an ethno-nationalist party. It is a white political party.

Within that dynamic, race is used to bring the coalition together, and the only circumstances in which that coalition accepts people who aren’t white are when those individuals themselves explicitly or implicitly express support for white supremacy. There’s that, and it’s important to note that I’m talking about political parties. 

There’s also a geographic component: this tendency is concentrated outside American cities. If we had a map of the United States in front of us and broke it down by county—a geographic area larger than a city but much smaller than a state—we would see that urban counties, those containing major cities, support the Democratic Party regardless of the state, while areas outside them support the Republican Party, again regardless of the state.

There are racial dynamics layered onto this geographic divide. Metropolitan areas tend to be racially heterogeneous, meaning you can find all different types of racial populations. Areas outside metropolitan regions, by contrast, tend to be really white. The de-democratizing tendency is concentrated in those predominantly white areas, where people are working together on behalf of Trump and Trumpist policies.

Within metropolitan areas, on the other hand, you see increasing efforts to develop cross-racial solidarity, at the very least to defeat the Trump tendency, but also to create space for more progressive forms of politics. It’s this dynamic that elects Zohran Mamdani as mayor of New York. It’s this dynamic that elects Brandon Johnson in Chicago. He’s not DSA, but he’s really progressive. It’s also this dynamic that is emerging in Providence, the largest city in Rhode Island, where it looks like the next mayor is going to be a DSA member.

All of these elections are pushing the Democratic Party further to the left, and they require strong interracial solidarity—not just class solidarity among working-class members of different racial populations, but also inter-class solidarity, because a lot of small business owners and people who make a little bit of money are supporting these tendencies as well.

So, you see both increased interracial solidarity on one hand and increased racial homogeneity on the other.

Black Populism Has Greater Potential in Major Cities

Zohran Mamdani.
Mayor Zohran Mamdani marches up Fifth Avenue during the St. Patrick’s Day Parade in Midtown Manhattan, New York City, USA onMarch 17, 2026. Photo: Dreamstime.

In the same essay, you defined Black populism around the principle that ordinary Black people should have their interests represented in government, while insisting that Black populism must fundamentally be a class project. How would you reformulate that argument in the political circumstances of 2026? Can Black populism offer a democratic counterweight to right-wing populism without reproducing the elitism, personalism, or exclusionary tendencies that populist movements often exhibit?

Professor Lester Spence: That’s a great question. The quick answer is that Black populism—and by that, I mean a movement designed from below to increase the capacity of working-class populations to have their needs met, focusing particularly on Black people in this case—has significant potential. Black populations, in general, tend to be more democratic. I also think the potential for Black populism in major cities is greater now than at any other time.

What will prevent it from devolving into personalism is the necessity of electoral processes, particularly at the city and county levels, to put people in office and bring about these policy shifts. The act of running for office and building political majorities, almost by definition, makes it difficult, at least for Black populations, to turn toward the type of charismatic, populist leadership that lacks democratic mechanisms of accountability.

Neoliberal Common Sense Is No Longer the Prevailing One in American Politics

In Knocking the Hustle you criticized the penetration of neoliberal assumptions into Black political thought and the institutions claiming to represent Black communities. Days before the midterms, to what extent does the Democratic Party remain constrained by the market-oriented political framework you identified? Does its approach to economic inequality, racial justice, and urban governance reveal meaningful ideological transformation, or primarily a repackaging of familiar neoliberal commitments?

Professor Lester Spence: If you read that book—and for your readers, the PDF is available for free—you’ll see that it was written when Black Lives Matter was just beginning, years before Trump was elected, much less elected for a second time. Those Trump elections, along with the growth of Black Lives Matter organizing and, relatedly, Occupy Wall Street organizing, changed the terrain in terms of the common-sense neoliberal approaches that had dominated Black political life and American political life more broadly.

I no longer think that neoliberal common sense is the prevailing common sense. We can see evidence of this in the election of people like Brandon Johnson, Brandon Scott here in Baltimore, and Zohran Mamdani, even though he’s not African American. In addition, Black congressional representatives are moving further and further to the left. They’ve changed the terrain of common sense, so that the types of neoliberal policies I criticized in Knocking the Hustle now face significant opposition when they’re proposed. At the very least, they’re being contested significantly.

Black Political Representation Also Serves as a Firewall Against De-Democratizing Tendencies

You have argued that the growing number of Black elected officials has not necessarily translated into policies that materially improve the lives of working-class Black constituencies. How should we assess this tension in contemporary American politics, particularly in cities governed by Black political leadership? What distinguishes descriptive representation from substantive democratic empowerment, and what forms of institutional accountability might bridge the gap?

Professor Lester Spence: That’s a great question. I might not be able to answer it as quickly as you’d like, but what I’ll say is that what I missed was partly a consequence of the circumstances of my birth. I was born in 1969, when the benefits of the Civil Rights Movement were just beginning to take effect. Most important for this conversation was the Voting Rights Act, which significantly increased Black political representation.

Because of the circumstances of my birth and the way we study these questions, we didn’t fully know how to reckon with the historical lack of Black political representation, nor did we know how to reckon with the dismantling of the Voting Rights Act. Let me explain what I mean.

Usually, when we think about the question you just asked, we say, okay, we elected these Black political representatives to serve our interests. We identify those interests and then examine the gap between what our interests are and what our political representatives have advocated for and accomplished. We can trace the size of that gap over time and identify moments when they’re doing a pretty good job and others when they aren’t doing well at all, when there’s a significant gap.

What we didn’t take into account was the presence of a party that was literally trying to bring us as close as possible to the conditions of 1950, when Black people lacked political power. As a result, we failed to fully understand the extent to which Black political representation is not simply about ensuring that Black populations are represented and their needs substantively met. It’s also about serving as a firewall to prevent the worst de-democratizing tendencies from gaining control and making things significantly worse.

I still think it’s really important to figure out what kinds of mechanisms Black populations need to hold Black representatives accountable. In instances where they’re not represented by Black officials, we also need to understand how they can work both on their own behalf and in concert with other populations to get their needs met. But I’m increasingly of the belief that, even as we continue that work, we need to better understand practices designed not so much to give Black people what they need politically, but to protect them by preventing the worst outcomes from occurring.

That’s a really difficult thing to study, but it’s what we’ve largely missed. Again, it’s because I was born at a moment when it seemed as if we’d won. It seemed as though Black people would have a durable ability to elect representatives of their choice, although that ability remained constrained. But we’re not in that moment anymore. Things are going backwards as we speak, and we have to figure out new tools.

We’re Not as Attentive to the Pro-Democratizing Elements of Black Life as We Should Be

Kamala Harris.
Then-California Senator Kamala Harris announced her candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination in her hometown of Oakland, California, USA. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your critique of respectability politics suggests that emphasizing individual responsibility, entrepreneurial success, and middle-class behavioral norms can obscure structural inequalities within Black communities. How might this framework help explain the appeal of conservative political messaging among some Black voters, particularly younger men? Should such developments be interpreted primarily through gender, class, cultural identity, dissatisfaction with Democratic elites, or changing understandings of political representation?

Professor Lester Spence: That’s a great question, but I’ll actually push back against it. I think it’s a really good question, yet one that also reflects a challenge in studying Black politics, democratization, and de-democratization.

If we look at the 2024 presidential election and acknowledge that, despite the challenges associated with Kamala Harris and the Democratic Party, Harris represented the democratizing tendency while Trump represented the de-democratizing tendency, we see something important.

Two populations gave more support to Kamala Harris and that democratizing tendency than any others. The first was Black women, with approximately 90–92% support. The second was Black men. The gap between Black women and Black men is statistically significant, meaning it’s not due to chance. But that gap is really small, particularly compared with the gap between them and everybody else. If you look at other women—white women, Latino women, and Asian American women—the gap between them and Black women is huge. Similarly, if you look at white men, Latino men, and Asian American men, the gap between them and Black men is enormous. It’s absolutely huge, and it’s statistically significant.

It’s not just Harris; it was also Biden and Obama. This pattern has persisted. People have been talking about the rise of conservative attitudes among Black populations, particularly men, but I actually think that this question shows we’re not as attentive to the pro-democratizing elements of Black life as we should be.

With that said, returning to respectability, I don’t think respectability explains that relatively small gap between Black men and Black women. What probably explains it is a combination of factors. Black men’s economic circumstances are probably the worst among any racial and gender group. What we see among some people is support for Trump simply because they didn’t think Biden spoke sufficiently to their needs.

A second element is that African American populations increasingly include both people born in the United States, whose families have lived here for generations, and people who live in the United States but come from elsewhere. I think that among Black immigrant populations, men are probably more likely to have voted for Trump than for Kamala. But neither of those factors has to do with respectability. I don’t think respectability plays as much of a role in these developments as people think.

When You Weaken the Voting Rights Act, You’re Undermining Protections for Everybody

The Supreme Court’s April 2026 decision in Louisiana v. Callais narrowed challenges to racial vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. How does this ruling fit into America’s history of racial exclusion? Does the distinction between permissible partisan gerrymandering and unlawful racial discrimination enable racial inequalities in political representation to persist under race-neutral justifications?

Professor Lester Spence: The short answer is yes, but I’ll broaden that point. In the United States, even if we narrow democracy to elections and the ability to elect representatives of one’s choice, democracy functions to the extent that the rights of Black people, as Black people, are recognized both in law and in its interpretation.

Going back to the Reconstruction era, if not earlier, we see attempts to protect and extend political possibilities through Black politics, alongside attempts to constrain those same possibilities. Those constraints don’t just affect Black people; they ultimately work to the detriment of democracy more generally.

In the United States, for example, much of the apparatus we have for understanding when democracy is fundamentally broken, particularly in terms of electoral dynamics, is connected to the Voting Rights Act. So, when you weaken or effectively neutralize the Voting Rights Act, you’re not just undermining its protections for Black people; you’re essentially undermining those protections for everybody.

Democracy Goes as Black People Go

Martin Luther King Jr.
Martin Luther King Jr. mural on Broadway, Toledo, Ohio, USA. Photo: David Gaunt | Dreamstime.

The extraordinary wave of mid-decade redistricting ahead of the 2026 midterms has intensified competition over congressional boundaries, with Republican-led states seeking additional advantages and Democratic-led states pursuing countermeasures. How might these developments reshape Black electoral representation, particularly in the South? More fundamentally, when political parties can manipulate district boundaries to protect electoral power, what happens to the democratic principle that voters should choose their representatives rather than representatives effectively choosing their voters?

Professor Lester Spence: Again, what we’re going to see, unless something is done to change the way voting is conducted, is Black political representation dropping like a rock in the South and increasingly elsewhere. More broadly, we’re going to see support for the principle that people should be able to elect representatives of their choice, rather than the other way around, decline just as dramatically.

I cannot emphasize this enough: in the United States, democracy goes as Black people go. One of the challenges for political science as a discipline is to begin to fully understand that what happens to Black people aren’t something that happens somewhere else. It’s not simply that democratic harms inflicted on Black people affect only Black people. Rather, for historical reasons, Black people are at the center. So, what happens to Black people ultimately end up hurting everybody.

Black Voter Turnout, Political Alienation, and the 2026 Midterms

Donald Trump vs Kamala Harris for US President. Photo: Qubix Studio.

Black voters remain a central constituency in the Democratic electoral coalition, yet political representation does not necessarily translate into material improvements in their communities. As the midterms approach, how should we distinguish electoral demobilization rooted in political alienation from genuine ideological realignment? What do contemporary patterns of Black political behavior reveal about the relationship between racial solidarity, class divisions, institutional trust, and perceptions of political efficacy?

Professor Lester Spence: That’s a great question. Going back to the 2024 presidential election, Kamala Harris lost the Electoral College essentially because of Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Michigan. Within those states, she lost because she lost Philadelphia, one of Pennsylvania’s two major metropolitan areas; Detroit, the major metropolitan area in Michigan; and Milwaukee, the major metropolitan area in Wisconsin.

In each of those three instances, it wasn’t a matter of Black people voting for Trump; it was a matter of declining Black voter turnout. So, why did Black voter turnout decline? Part of the answer lies in the question of what exactly the party is doing for us.

Given the Trump tendency and the racism at its core, Black voters basically have two choices: they either vote for the Democratic tendency or stay home. That decision to vote or stay home is shaped partly by mobilization, but also by the issues of institutional trust and political efficacy that you raised.

If we look at the extent to which Black populations feel that their interests are being addressed directly, particularly when the party faces a choice between speaking to Black voters and appealing to white moderates, or even white Republican moderates, some Black voters saw the decision to prioritize white Republican moderates over them and concluded, “Well, if it’s going to be like this, I’ll just stay home.”

That’s one plausible explanation, though certainly not the only one, for why Kamala Harris lost. The real challenge was that she had only a few months to run her campaign. That’s really the challenge. But embedded within that are questions of political efficacy, institutional trust, and what the party actually does for Black voters.

Going forward, what we have to do—and what we’re beginning to see with the election of a number of Black progressive candidates and progressive candidates more generally—is built on these successes and develop durable coalitions that place the material needs of Black and working-class populations at the center. We’ll know more next Tuesday. Even given everything, we have greater potential to do that now than perhaps we’ve had in a long time.

Black Lives Matter, Occupy Wall Street, and Durable Political Institutions

In “Make Sure It Includes Everyone,” you questioned whether Black Lives Matter’s mobilization against state violence could develop into durable institutions capable of transforming local politics and the Democratic Party. Looking back from 2026, how would you assess the movement’s achievements and limitations? Has the changing political environment exposed the fragility of protest-centered mobilization, or have new forms of local political power emerged?

Professor Lester Spence: It’s the latter. New forms of local political power have emerged. In Baltimore, I can name the individuals who have been able to essentially flip the City Council as a result of organizing. I can do the same in other cities. I would point to someone like Brandon Johnson, along with a number of people on the Chicago City Council. I’ve mentioned Providence and New York, and we can also look at the Detroit City Council. There are a number of people in office today who wouldn’t be there without the combined influence of Black Lives Matter and Occupy Wall Street organizing.

I think my critique was right, but what I should have done better in that essay was address the potential of organizing over time. Political movements themselves create openings, and institutions then emerge to fill those gaps. DSA, for example, stepped into the space created by Occupy Wall Street and grew not only numerically but also in its ability to run candidates for office and win elections. We see similar developments emerging from the Black Lives Matter tendency.

At the outset, when you’re involved in a movement, it’s difficult to predict what shape those new institutions will take or how they will function. But what we’ve seen, particularly with the emergence of all these progressive and left-wing candidates, is evidence of people building on those movements and creating something durable.

Anti-Communist Attacks May Backfire Rather Than Achieve Political Success at the Ballot Box

Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.
Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez at the “Bernie Is Back” political rally in Queensbridge Park, Queens, New York, on October 19, 2019. Photo: Aleksandr Dyskin / Dreamstime.

In your July 2026 Counterpublic Papers, you described growing state violence, the targeting of Antifa, and hostility toward democratic socialism as elements of a new Red Scare combining white supremacy and anti-communism. How does this reflect America’s history of political repression? To what extent do anti-socialist narratives restrict legitimate political participation, including within the Democratic Party itself?

Professor Lester Spence: I want to give a shout-out to Charisse Burden-Stelly. More than almost anybody else, she’s been writing about the connections between Black politics, racial politics, communism, and anti-communism. That Counterpublic Paper relied in part on some of her work.

What’s happened in this moment, although it hasn’t been particularly effective, is that people have used the anti-communist label to tar just about anything to the left of the Trump tendency. Historically, that dynamic has been used to delegitimize movements going back to the labor movement, including the Civil Rights and Black Power movements. It’s also been used to delegitimize leaders within Black politics, whether they were integrationists who advocated nonviolence, like Martin Luther King Jr., or held different political positions. And it’s been used to legitimize racist and capitalist domination in American politics.

The challenge, going back to what I mentioned about my age and being born in 1969, is that I’m 57, and I remember when the Soviet Union existed. People today don’t necessarily know what communism and socialism are. Those labels don’t carry the same weight they once did because that political alternative was basically wiped out, with some exceptions. At the very least, in the United States, it was largely erased from our political imagination. So, the use of the anti-communist brush isn’t going to carry the same political weight anymore. In fact, support for socialism among younger voters is higher than at any point since polling on the issue began.

If anything, there’s a risk that this strategy could actually backfire. Again, to point to the same people I’ve been discussing, if you look at the actual governance of somebody like Zohran Mamdani, it doesn’t look anything like what those using the anti-communist or anti-socialist label suggest. It doesn’t resemble what people have been led to expect. People were arguing that immediately after the election, capital would flee New York like nobody’s business. But capital didn’t go anywhere.

People are using these labels rhetorically in ways similar to how they’ve been used in previous eras. They’re also being used politically. Trump controls the state, and he’s been using the FBI and other instruments of state power against radical activists. You can also understand his attacks on the economy as part of that project. But there’s a difference between deploying these attacks and achieving political success at the ballot box. And I just don’t see them being politically successful at the ballot box.

We Have to Prioritize Transforming Elections and State Capacity

And finally, Professor Spence, your scholarship emphasizes the limits of electoral representation without structural change. As Americans prepare to vote on November 3, what would constitute meaningful democratic progress for Black working-class communities beyond partisan electoral victories? How might your conception of Black populism distinguish genuine political empowerment from electoral mobilization without institutional transformation?

Professor Lester Spence: One way to think about this is to return to the weakening of the Voting Rights Act. When Black people first seized political power, they changed the trajectory of the United States through the Reconstruction-era amendments. We see Black people using their political power both to constrain the white Confederacy in the South and to build a new progressive infrastructure. They created the first public schools and began taxing capital.

Fast-forward to the passage of the Voting Rights Act and the creation of the Congressional Black Caucus. Its members were to the left of the Democratic Party and proposed a range of progressive and left-leaning policies deeply connected to labor.

What these two instances demonstrate is that it’s not just about electing people; it’s about creating a new model that protects Black voters and voting rights while expanding the capacity of political power to generate progressive change.

In the current circumstances, with the Voting Rights Act being weakened, this could mean supporting a new Voting Rights Act or something like proportional voting—new voting systems that allow people to vote in different ways, enhancing their ability to act on their own behalf and work with other constituencies.

We have to consider that first. We have to prioritize transforming elections and state capacity because of how virulent, deeply racist, and anti-democratic the Trump tendency is. But beyond that, we need to think not just about changing the electoral system but also about reforming the different components of federal power. That means constraining the executive branch, constraining the judicial branch, and expanding the legislative branch to make it more democratic.

These kinds of reforms help build a constituency that supports them. Once that constituency and political project are established, the project can be linked to working-class policies that not only protect people’s ability to participate in government but also strengthen and further develop their capacity to secure material benefits from government.

Flávio Bolsonaro.

Flávio Bolsonaro’s Exile and the Dream of a MAGA Brazil

In this commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias examines the political significance of Flávio Bolsonaro’s departure for the United States and its implications for Bolsonarism’s increasingly transnational orientation. Drawing on the ideological affinities between Bolsonarism and Trump’s MAGA movement, Dr. Dias explores how narratives of political persecution, electoral illegitimacy, and national salvation can transform foreign intervention into an expression of supposed patriotism. Particular attention is devoted to evangelical conservatism, conspiratorial thinking, and the political instrumentalization of exile. Situating these dynamics within the Trump administration’s renewed assertion of American dominance in the Western Hemisphere, the commentary argues that Bolsonarism’s pursuit of external protection exposes a fundamental contradiction between nationalist rhetoric and political sovereignty, raising broader questions about populism, democratic legitimacy, and foreign influence in Brazil.

By João Ferreira Dias

Flávio Bolsonaro’s departure for the United States can serve several political purposes. It allows a defeated candidate to be presented as a persecuted leader, gives Bolsonarism a platform from which to seek American intervention and connects the movement’s ambitions with Washington’s renewed claim to predominance in the Americas. These possibilities acquire particular significance among supporters who already look to Donald Trump to save Brazil from its own elected government.

The “SOS” appeals posted by Brazilian users in White House comment sections express that expectation of rescue. A foreign president is asked to act as the protector of a nation supposedly held captive by its domestic enemies. There is also a documented precedent beyond social media. During Brazil’s Independence Day demonstrations in September 2025, Bolsonaro supporters displayed American flags and called for US sanctions to continue, despite their potential costs to the Brazilian economy (CNN Brasil, 2025). For those participants, foreign coercion had become an acceptable means of pursuing domestic political objectives.

What, then, does patriotism mean when national salvation depends on the intervention of another country?

The answer requires examining how these supporters understand the nation. If the authentic Brazil is identified exclusively with Bolsonarism, a government elected by its opponents can be treated as an occupying power. Pressure against that government becomes compatible with love of country because the political community has already been reduced to those who belong to the movement. The rights and choices of everyone else lose their authority to define Brazil’s future.

This helps explain the attraction of a Brazilian political order modelled on MAGA. Trump offers these sectors a language of national restoration and a model of leadership organized around confrontation with institutions and internal enemies. Americanization, in this political sense, promises a Brazil in which their own values prevail with the backing of a powerful foreign protector. The resulting dependence can be understood by its supporters as the recovery of a country they believe has been taken from them.

The comparison with MAGA also concerns the capacity to sustain a political reality insulated from contradiction. Within this interpretative framework, electoral defeat is evidence of fraud, judicial proceedings confirm persecution, and leaving the country demonstrates that democracy has ceased to exist. Events that might lead supporters to question their convictions can instead reinforce them. Conspiratorial explanations provide ways of preserving the leader’s innocence and the movement’s claim to represent the nation, however far those explanations depart from verifiable reality.

The evangelical dimension matters within this process. Almeida’s (2019) analysis situates a significant and internally diverse evangelical constituency within Brazil’s conservative mobilization. Where political conflict acquires the language of spiritual warfare, compromise becomes harder to accommodate: opponents can be understood as agents of evil, while leadership assumes a providential significance. Under these conditions, the experience of defeat can strengthen the expectation that the leader has a mission yet to fulfil.

Exile can give that expectation a new political form. The absent leader remains available as the representative of a supposedly captive nation, protected abroad while awaiting the conditions for his return. Distance also allows supporters to imagine him beyond the compromises of ordinary opposition politics. Flávio does not automatically inherit his father’s charisma, but the narrative of persecution offers a means of constructing that inheritance. American protection can become part of the story through which he claims to continue a family mission interrupted at home.

This expectation meets a receptive geopolitical framework in the Donroe Doctrine. The 2025 US National Security Strategy reasserts American predominance in the Western Hemisphere through a Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. It also commits Washington to encouraging regional governments, parties and movements aligned with its principles and strategy (The White House, 2025: 15–16). Ideological affinity therefore has an explicit place within the pursuit of American regional power.

Flávio’s presence abroad can help connect the demand for national rescue with that external agenda. A narrative of persecution supplies a justification for pressure on Brazilian institutions, while American support can reinforce the authority of the leader seeking protection. This convergence does not require assuming that every step has been coordinated or that intervention must take a military form. Sanctions and diplomatic pressure already offer instruments through which foreign power can be brought into a domestic struggle.

The danger is that the restoration promised to supporters comes to depend on political tutelage from Washington. For the bolsonaristas asking Trump to save their country, a MAGA-inspired Brazil under American protection can become more desirable than a sovereign Brazil governed by their opponents.


 

References

Almeida, R. de. (2019). “Bolsonaro presidente: Conservadorismo, evangelismo e a crise brasileira.” Novos Estudos CEBRAP, 38(1), 185–213. https://doi.org/10.25091/S01013300201900010010

CNN Brasil. (2025, September 7). Análise: Em ato, bolsonaristas pedem que os EUA continuem a aplicar sanções. https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/politica/analise-em-ato-b

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva walks among supporters on Augusta Street at São Paulo on the eve of the brazillian election on October 1, 2022. Photo: Yuri Murakami.

Lula’s Historic Comeback: Implications for Brazilian Democracy and the Emerging Global Order

In this commentary, Dr. Prerna Chahar examines the domestic and geopolitical implications of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s historic comeback in Brazil’s October 25, 2026, presidential runoff. Overcoming a first-round deficit, Lula secured a fourth presidential mandate with 51.79 percent of the vote, defeating Flávio Bolsonaro amid persistent polarization and contested electoral legitimacy. Dr. Chahar argues that this outcome underscores both Brazil’s democratic resilience and the continuing challenges posed by political division and institutional distrust. Internationally, Lula’s victory reinforces Brazil’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, multilateralism, and a more representative global order. Particular attention is devoted to BRICS, the G20, South–South cooperation, and relations with the United States, China, and India, highlighting Brazil’s evolving position within an increasingly multipolar international system.

Dr. Prerna Chahar

Brazil’s presidential election of October 25, 2026, has implications extending far beyond Latin America. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won an unprecedented fourth presidential mandate, defeating conservative challenger Flávio Bolsonaro with 51.79 percent of valid votes against 48.21 percent. The result has renewed debates about democratic legitimacy, US influence in the Western Hemisphere, Brazil’s strategic autonomy, and the future of BRICS, the G20 and South-South cooperation. It also demonstrates how domestic electoral choices can influence the foreign-policy orientation of an important emerging power.

Lula’s political career reflects Brazil’s democratic transformation. Born into poverty in northeastern Brazil, he worked as a metalworker before emerging as a trade union leader during labor mobilizations against military rule in the late 1970s. He subsequently helped establish the Workers’ Party (PT), which became associated with labor rights, social inclusion and economic redistribution.

After several unsuccessful presidential campaigns, Lula won the presidency in 2002 and was re-elected in 2006. His governments from 2003 to 2010 prioritized social welfare, poverty reduction and Brazil’s international engagement. His political career was later disrupted by corruption investigations and imprisonment. His convictions were subsequently annulled, restoring his eligibility to contest the presidency. He returned to office after defeating Jair Bolsonaro in 2022. His 2026 victory marks his fourth successful presidential election, following those of 2002, 2006 and 2022.

Timing, Scope and Significance of the Election

Brazil’s general elections took place on October 4, 2026, with a presidential runoff on October 25 because neither candidate secured an absolute majority in the first round. The elections covered the presidency, state governorships, the National Congress and state legislatures. The results therefore determine not only executive leadership but also the legislative balance that will shape the next government’s ability to implement its agenda.

In the first round, Flávio Bolsonaro received 47.03 percent of valid votes, ahead of Lula’s 45.16 percent. Lula subsequently reversed this deficit, becoming the first candidate in Brazil’s current two-round presidential system to finish second in the first round and win the presidency in the runoff. He received 64,256,232 votes against Bolsonaro’s 59,826,041. 

Lula’s victory marks the first time in Brazil’s modern democratic history that a presidential candidate has overturned a first-round deficit to win the presidency. Since the adoption of the two-round presidential election system in 1989, every candidate who led the first round had gone on to win the runoff until Lula’s historic comeback in 2026.

Reactions from Bolsonaro and Trump

Following his defeat, Flávio Bolsonaro initially refused to concede and called for the election to be annulled. He challenged a two-hour extension of voting at some polling stations, authorized to address transport difficulties affecting voters. However, the extension itself did not establish electoral fraud. His position subsequently shifted towards pursuing a legal challenge over alleged abuse of incumbency. Meanwhile, Brazil’s electoral authorities confirmed Lula’s victory. The episode recalls the response of his father, Jair Bolsonaro, to his 2022 defeat. Jair Bolsonaro was subsequently convicted over an attempt to overturn the electoral order and sentenced to 27 years in prison.

The central democratic question is whether electoral disputes are resolved through evidence, judicial review and constitutional procedures rather than unsupported allegations that undermine public confidence. Lula’s victory demonstrates the functioning of electoral competition, but Brazil’s democratic resilience will depend on institutional independence, transparency and the treatment of political opposition.

US President Donald Trump added an international dimension to the controversy by describing Brazil’s election on October 26 as appearing to be “another rigged election,” without providing evidence of irregularities. His comments reflected the ideological proximity between the Trump administration and the Bolsonaro political movement.

Lula’s victory preserves a government committed to an independent Brazilian foreign policy. His assertion that Brazil would not be anyone’s backyard captures its ambition to maintain strategic autonomy while engaging with the United States, China and other major powers.

BRICS, the G20 and South-South Cooperation

Lula’s fourth victory provides continuity for Brazil’s role in BRICS, where it has advocated greater representation for developing economies in global governance, stronger development financing and reform of international financial institutions. Brazil’s engagement with China will remain important for trade, infrastructure, agriculture and energy, without necessarily requiring alignment against Washington.

The G20 offers a broader platform for cooperation between advanced and emerging economies on climate finance, food security, debt sustainability and development. While BRICS can deepen coordination among emerging powers, the G20 can facilitate negotiations across different political and economic groupings. Neither forum, however, guarantees reform; progress depends on members translating shared commitments into practical outcomes.

For India, Brazil is an important partner in both institutions. Stronger India–Brazil cooperation could advance agricultural research, biofuels, renewable energy, digital technologies and climate action. More broadly, Lula’s mandate offers an opportunity to strengthen South–South cooperation through reciprocal trade, technology sharing, development finance and institutional capacity-building. Such cooperation must deliver measurable benefits rather than remain a declaration of political solidarity.

Lula’s fourth presidential victory represents a consequential moment for Brazilian democracy and its international orientation. It preserves Brazil’s commitment to strategic autonomy, multilateral engagement and cooperation through BRICS and the G20, while exposing the challenges of governing a divided electorate.

Ultimately, Brazil’s global influence will depend on economic performance, coalition-building and its ability to translate diplomatic ambitions into practical partnerships. The broader lesson for the emerging global order is that multipolarity depends not simply on resistance to established powers, but on democratic choice, national policy autonomy and effective international cooperation.


 

(*) Dr. Prerna Chahar is a scholar of International Relations whose research focuses on US foreign policy, inter-American relations, regional cooperation, and India’s foreign policy. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Centre for the Study of the Americas (CSA), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

Matteo Salvini, Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the right-wing populist Lega party, which held its extraordinary congress in Milan on October 24–25, 2026. Photo:  Mihail Ivanov / Dreamstime.

Lega’s Changing Tactics, Enduring Populism: Salvini’s Political Reset Ahead of 2027

In this commentary, Niccolò Capozzi examines Matteo Salvini’s political repositioning following Lega’s extraordinary congress in Milan on October 24–25, 2026. Drawing on the party’s responses to the financial, migration, and COVID-19 crises, Capozzi argues that Lega has repeatedly adapted its leadership style, political enemies, and definition of “the people” while preserving its fundamental populist antagonism between ordinary citizens and corrupt elites. Salvini’s reelection, the removal of his name from the party logo, and renewed emphasis on federalism reflect efforts to address internal divisions and declining electoral support. As Lega approaches Italy’s 2027 general election, its criticism of military assistance to Ukraine signals another potential strategic shift. Yet, Capozzi concludes, the party’s underlying populist grammar remains remarkably unchanged.

By Niccolò Capozzi*

On October 24–25, 2026, Italy’s far-right party, known as Lega, held an extraordinary congress in Milan. Its leader, Matteo Salvini, had called it after some northern party members had called for a more federal party that was more attentive to the North. Does this move signal a change of identity or a change of tactics? To find out, we need to look at how Lega has acted and communicated during past crises, where a clear pattern emerges.

During the 2008 financial crisis, the 2015 migration crisis, and the 2020–2023 COVID-19 pandemic, Lega changed its enemies, its leadership style, and the way it exploited each emergency to its own advantage; however, the core of its message remained the same. During the financial crisis, Umberto Bossi was the leader of Lega Nord (Northern League), a regionalist movement that differed from its current form and represented ‘Padania,’ the North of Italy. It pitted the ‘people’ – the productive North – against the elite in Rome (meaning the central state, not Silvio Berlusconi’s government, of which Lega Nord was itself a member) and a South described as parasitic and non-contributing. The EU and the euro remained in the background. This contrast between a ‘pure’ people and a corrupt elite is what the political scientist Cas Mudde identifies as the defining feature of populism.

Every year, Bossi held an annual party rally in Pontida, a small town near Bergamo. He spoke to his supporters about contemporary issues. His bond with them was so strong that he used dialectal words typical of the North and opened rallies with ‘Va Pensiero,’ the chorus from Verdi’s Nabucco that the party had adopted as its anthem instead of Italy’s national anthem. At the party congress in 2012, for example, he complained about having to ‘work six months a year to pay taxes and sustain the waste of the south’ – a sign of the resentment and aversion the party felt towards the other part of Italy. However, the party was soon to change.

In December 2013, Matteo Salvini became the leader and began turning the party into a national force; the word ‘Nord’ would later disappear from its symbol. In 2015, as the migration crisis unfolded, Salvini enjoyed complete tactical freedom because Lega was in opposition to the center-left government of Matteo Renzi’s Democratic Party (PD). During this period, the ‘people’ were identified as workers, the unemployed, and people with disabilities, whilst the enemies were irregular migrants, the NGOs helping them, and the Renzi government. In this instance, the crisis was portrayed as a sort of invasion by illegal immigrants, to the extent that a rally called ‘Stop Invasione’ (Stop the Invasion) was organized in October 2014 in Milan. Salvini called himself ‘Capitano’ and used short slogans designed for television – and thus to attract viewers. Subsequently, he brought the same message to the European Parliament, where he accused the EU of caring about immigrants while it ‘couldn’t care less about the unemployed.’

When the pandemic hit in 2020, Lega was back in opposition, having left Giuseppe Conte’s first government in 2019. Its communication strategy varied considerably; in March 2020, Salvini said that ‘we must shut everything down’; a few months later, he feared that hunger would kill more people than the virus; in 2021, he rejected the Green Pass – Italy’s COVID-19 certificate – saying that the people should not be subject to any kind of obligation. The enemies were Conte’s second government, its scientific advisory committee, virologists and, finally, Brussels, which was failing to act. His style also changed: he no longer addressed the public loudly from a stage but adopted a calmer, more institutional tone – partly because he spoke in the Senate and tabled bills. One detail worth noting: from February 2021, Lega was part of the Draghi government – the same government that introduced the Green Pass – yet it continued to oppose the measures. This is important for understanding how tactics adapt: the party changes its position but continues to present itself as the voice of the people who decide.

In all three crises, two elements have never changed: the opposition between a ‘pure’ people and a corrupt elite, and the moralization of politics. At the same time, the definition of ‘the people,’ the identity of the enemy, and the leader’s rhetoric were constantly shifting. Thus, the tactics changed while the underlying structure remained the same. It is through this lens that this year’s Milan congress should be analyzed.

Salvini had formally resigned in order to stand again and as expected, he was re-elected by secret ballot held on October 25, 2026, with 465 votes to 146 for his challenger, Massimo Garavaglia, a Lega senator and former tourism minister. The first move the ‘new’ leader made was to remove his own name from Lega’s logo and insert ‘Italia Federale,’ a formula first used by Bossi in 1994. Apparently, he made this change because the new electoral law requires coalitions to name their candidate for Prime Minister, and that is currently Giorgia Meloni. However, Salvini’s actions in recent times have sparked tensions within Lega; therefore, his decision is aimed more at reuniting the party around him. Removing the leader’s name is also a change in leadership style – one of the tactical dimensions described above – and shows how tactics depend on a populist party’s institutional position.

During the congress, Salvini also said he regretted joining Mario Draghi’s technocratic government during the pandemic. This is revealing, given that, while in that government, he had spoken as if he were in opposition in order to protect his popularity. The party now disowns the very tactic it used in 2021 – further evidence that tactics can change or be abandoned, even though the core of the message remains intact: Lega as the voice of the people against those in power.

What does the congress mean for the 2027 general election campaign? Lega currently stands at around 5 percent in the polls, compared with 8.8 percent in the 2022 general election. The problem is not limited to the North. Even Lega’s Senate group leader, Massimiliano Romeo, has admitted that people are no longer voting for Lega. Moreover, the northern leaders who had been calling for a change in leadership did not present a united front in the vote, and figures such as Luca Zaia, who governed Veneto for 15 years, ended up backing Salvini’s line. It is foreseeable that Lega will seek a new enemy to rally support for future national elections, and the congress offered a first candidate: aid to Ukraine. Salvini has said that Italy ‘cannot keep sending money’ and weapons to Kyiv. The pattern is the same as in 2015, when the party claimed that money was being spent on migrants rather than on Italians; today, the funds in question are those allocated to Ukraine. The enemy changes, but the pattern remains.

Lega’s congress serves as an example of how populist parties react when the crisis does not stem from external factors – the euro, migrants, or the virus – but from within the party itself. Even if the party tries to change elements such as its symbol, the role of its leaders, the constituency it addresses, and its enemies, the core of its message never changes: the honest people versus a distant elite that betrays them. It has learnt to change everything except its own grammar.


 

(*) Niccolò Capozzi graduated with a degree in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Florence and obtained a master’s degree in European Studies from Maastricht University, with a thesis on populist communication during crises. He is currently studying for the Joint Master’s in Global Economic Governance and Public Affairs at the LUISS School of Government and CIFE, based in Rome, Berlin, and Nice, and has interests in European politics, populism, political communication, and geopolitics.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Long Read: Turkey’s Fund Crisis and the Political Economy of Authoritarian Rule

In this commentary, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk examines Turkey’s 2026 investment-fund crisis as a manifestation of the political economy of populist authoritarian rule under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He argues that the scandal reflects not merely financial misconduct but the cumulative consequences of personalized power, weakened regulatory independence, and politically mediated economic privileges. Drawing on institutional indicators, monetary-policy developments, and the networks connecting political elites, financial regulators, and market actors, Professor Ozturk demonstrates how populist appeals to sovereignty legitimize selective economic protection while ordinary investors bear disproportionate losses. He contends that lasting recovery requires more than financial stabilization or individual prosecutions: it demands institutional reconstruction, independent oversight, transparency, and effective constitutional constraints on presidential authority.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

Turkey’s 2026 investment-fund crisis is a structurally generated, unavoidable outcome of the autocratic regime Erdogan has constructed. The presidential system introduced in 2018 consolidated personalized authority, weakened institutional checks, and subordinated professional judgment to political dependence. Discretionary monetary policy and compromised financial oversight share an allocation logic: access and protection are selective, while losses fall on households and public balance sheets. Populist claims of sovereignty legitimize this arrangement; restrictions on journalism, opposition, and independent scrutiny obstruct its correction. The crisis therefore belongs to a cumulative history of weakened accountability and opportunities for rent extraction. Lasting recovery requires changing the institutions that reproduce these outcomes, which is unlikely under Erdogan’s preferred architecture for regime overhaul.

Populism, Selective State Capacity, and Regime Reproduction

Turkey’s September 2026 fund crisis should be understood as a manifestation of Erdogan’s political-economic order. Its significance extends beyond market participants’ misconduct to the deliberate weakening of institutions that can constrain them. Building on my earlier ECPS work, this commentary argues that recurrent financial crises are endogenous to a regime that concentrates appointment powers, distributes protection selectively and restricts independent challenge. The exact timing of a collapse is contingent; the repeated production of risk and unequal loss is a foreseeable consequence of these institutional choices.

Mudde’s account defines populism through a moral opposition between a virtuous people and a corrupt elite. In office, those who claim to embody the popular will can delegitimize courts, regulators, and professional dissent as obstacles to the national mandate. Under Erdogan, this justificatory language accompanies a governing structure in which loyalty increasingly substitutes for independent judgment. Populism supplies the legitimacy claim; authoritarian institutional reorganization supplies the means of overriding constraints.

Dornbusch and Edwards identify a macroeconomic cycle in which expansionary promises discount inflation and external financing constraints, eventually imposing adjustment costs on intended beneficiaries. Turkey adds a distributional dimension: politically mediated credit, asset ownership and access to protection favour already advantaged groups. Rodrik’s distinction between political and economic populism helps separate legitimate challenges to entrenched privilege from the removal of safeguards against executive predation.

The causal mechanism operates through appointments, incentives and information. Political dependence weakens oversight; privileged access enables selective gains; public intervention can displace losses onto less-protected groups. Restricting scrutiny then lowers the likelihood of correction and permits repetition. Cross-country evidence links populist leadership to institutional erosion and lower long-run income; the Turkish case identifies the channels through which that broader association becomes a governing practice.

This situation reflects a selective state capacity rather than a uniformly weak state: substantial power to mobilize credit, reorganize institutions, and discipline critics coexists with weakened independent capacity to restrain connected interests. My 2022 ECPS analysis traced Turkey’s economic deterioration to the reversal of reforms and the subordination of expertise. The fund scandal extends that diagnosis from macroeconomic management to financial-market governance.

For instance, the broader institutional trajectory, central to the current crisis conundrum, predates the ongoing monetary experiments and the financial sector more broadly. Between 2014 and 2025, V-Dem’s central estimates fell from 0.538 to 0.402 for human rights, from 0.252 to 0.110 for liberal democracy, and from 0.386 to 0.157 for the rule of law. The sharpest declines occurred in 2016–2017; when the highly controversial coup attempt took place, later improvements did not restore earlier levels. Table 1 juxtaposes this deterioration with currency depreciation, accumulated inflation and increased income concentration. The indices describe institutional conditions rather than individual culpability.

From Institutional Reform to the Erosion of Accountability

The 2000–2001 crisis provides an institutional baseline for comparison. Fiscal fragility, public-bank losses and weak banking discipline exposed vulnerabilities that political confrontation triggered. Banking restructuring, stronger supervision and a floating exchange rate subsequently supported recovery under an IMF, World Bank and EU membership-reform framework. The AKP, the current government party, initially benefited from this inherited trajectory. Its later dismantling matters precisely because institutional credibility and international engagement had demonstrated their economic value.

The December 2013 deep successive corruption scandals and investigations, which brought allegations of extensive bribery, illicit gold trading and abuse of public office involving high-profile ministers in Erdogan’s inner circle into public view, also raised broader questions about ruling-party parliamentarians and businessmen allegedly awarded tailor-made public contracts in exchange for financial and political favors sought by Erdogan himself. The subsequent response marked a critical rupture in accountability: despite the gravity of the allegations, Parliament declined to refer four former ministers for trial, closing the route to judicial examination that referral would have opened. The US conviction of Mehmet Hakan Atilla, who served as deputy general manager of the state-owned Halkbank, and the guilty plea of Reza Zarrab, who was a gold trader central to the December 2013 allegations, subsequently established sanctions-evasion offenses in a separate jurisdiction. Although legally distinct, these cases illuminate a connected political-economic mechanism: shielding politically connected actors from independent scrutiny weakens deterrence and entrenches expectations of protection. Impunity becomes cumulative when accountability failures incentivize subsequent abuses.

The 2018 confrontation with Donald Trump’s administration exposed the limits of performed sovereignty to be used as a decisive element in domestic populist politics. In August 2018, US sanctions over the detention of Andrew Brunson, an American pastor held in Turkey on terrorism-related charges that Washington rejected as unfounded, escalated the diplomatic confrontation. Trump’s subsequent 50 percent tariff on Turkish steel, which doubled the existing 25 percent duty and sharply increased the barriers facing Turkish exporters in the US market, added trade pressure to the dispute. These measures aggravated an economy already vulnerable to dependence on external financing and currency mismatches, as the IMF’s assessment documented. The confrontation thus exposed the material limits of sovereignty rhetoric in an economy dependent on international capital and export markets. As a result, depreciation increased import costs and foreign-currency debt burdens. 

The CBRT responded by raising its policy rate from 17.75 to 24 percent. The problem was the durability of stabilization when presidential authority could subsequently displace its institutional basis. Reserve depletion followed a separate policy choice. Reuters reported approximately US$128 billion in dollar sales by state banks over the preceding two years in May 2021; the IMF identified inadequate buffers and negative net reserves after swaps. Obviously, dollar sales against lira do not prove the entire sum was stolen, but they highlight limited public capacity and insufficient transparency about transactions and beneficiaries. Defending a politically preferred exchange-rate path consumed resources while postponing acknowledgment of underlying constraints.

Discretionary Easing, Selective protection, and Costly Stabilization

Political intervention weakened institutional capacity by subordinating professional judgment to presidential preferences. Figure 1 connects successive monetary-policy reversals to the executive’s appointment and removal powers. Following Murat Cetinkaya’s dismissal in July 2019, the policy rate fell from 24 to 8.25 percent under Murat Uysal. Naci Agbal later reversed course, raising it to 19 percent in March 2021, but was dismissed two days after his final increase. His removal showed how vulnerable professional tenure is when monetary decisions conflict with presidential preferences.

Under Sahap Kavcioglu, politically imposed easing reduced the policy rate from 19 percent in September 2021 to 8.5 percent by February 2023. At the November 2022 decision, the rate stood 76.51 percentage points below the latest published annual inflation rate. This nominal gap, rather than a realized return, captures the divergence between monetary policy and prevailing inflation. Cheap lira financing encouraged foreign-currency and asset purchases, contributing to depreciation while offering asset-owning borrowers protections unavailable to wage earners and unhedged savers.

Erdogan legitimized easing by shifting appeals from rhetoric about “sovereignty” and “external enemies” to religious authority. Invoking nas—a binding Islamic injunction—against usury (riba), he framed lower interest rates not only as a religious obligation, but also asserted that interest causes inflation, not vice versa. This shift between nationalist and religious justifications illustrates populism’s adaptability: both appeals shield discretionary authority from scrutiny while society absorbs the costs.

After the 2023 elections, tightening under Hafize Gaye Erkan and Fatih Karahan raised the rate to 50 percent by March 2024; by year-end, it exceeded annual CPI inflation. Figure 2 shows the successive burdens of inflationary erosion and costly stabilization. Inflation initially accelerated despite tightening as depreciation, tax and administered-price increases, wage adjustments and expectations interacted with delayed monetary transmission. This coexistence does not establish that higher rates caused the preceding crisis. More fundamentally, technocratic correction restored a conventional instrument without constraining the executive powers that had enabled its subordination.

Exchange-rate-protected deposits (known as Kur Korumalı Mevduat-KKM) introduced in December 2021 shifted some depreciation risk onto the Treasury and Central Bank balance sheets. Participating savers received publicly underwritten protection unavailable to households without qualifying deposits. Successive policy shifts thus created different opportunities for protection through cheap credit, asset appreciation, KKM guarantees and later high nominal deposit returns. Credit-constrained households and firms instead faced purchasing-power losses, expensive working capital and weaker demand. Establishing that the same connected actors benefited throughout requires linked transaction records; the structural mechanism is the repeated redistribution of gains and losses through discretionary policy.

Distributional indicators reveal unequal capacities to absorb these shocks. The World Bank income Gini rose from 41.2 in 2014 to 43.7 in 2023, while UBS reports a separate wealth Gini of 0.73 for 2025, placing Turkey tenth among covered markets. The OECD Employment Outlook 2026 reports approximately 79 percent growth in CPI-deflated business-sector hourly wages between early 2021 and early 2026, alongside a falling minimum-to-median wage ratio and declining real minimum wages by April 2026. Average wage recovery therefore coexisted with uneven gains; it neither measures median household income nor resolves concerns about the official inflation deflator.

TURK-IS’s November 2025 estimates make this insecurity concrete: the net minimum wage covered only 74.1 percent of a four-person household’s food budget and 57 percent of a single worker’s estimated living costs. These adequacy benchmarks, rather than official poverty rates, demonstrate low-paid workers’ exposure to essential expenses. Limited public provision compounds that exposure. Turkey ranks near the bottom of the OECD’s social-spending comparison, while health expenditure amounted to 4.7 percent of GDP against an OECD average of 9.3 percent. These overlapping measures highlight the opportunity costs of financial guarantees when public services remain comparatively underfunded.

Although the IMF acknowledged that post-2023 tightening reduced crisis risks, changing the monetary instrument leaves politically mediated allocation intact. Recovery must therefore be assessed through investment, distribution and public capacity alongside disinflation.

Persistent price increases also undermine planning. Compounding official inflation rates shows that prices increased approximately 432 percent between end-2020 and end-2024; subsequent disinflation did not reverse that accumulation. Over the longer period, annual-average inflation rose from 8.85 percent in 2014 to 34.88 percent in 2025, while the exchange rate moved from TRY2.19 to TRY39.45 per dollar. The annual-average CPI implies that a fixed nominal lira amount retained only approximately 7.6 percent of its 2014 purchasing power.

Statistical credibility is integral to this institutional problem. TUIK’s repeated leadership changes and its June 2022 replacement of published average item prices with item indices intensified concerns about independence and scrutiny. Because inflation data govern wage bargaining, indexation and policy evaluation, credible measurement requires transparent methods, accessible information and independent review.

Supply and demand continue to operate, but unstable money obscures relative prices and sustainable margins. Firms may postpone productive investment while households seek exceptional nominal returns to recover earlier losses. The resulting demand for financial protection becomes an opportunity for extraction where independent oversight, reliable information, and enforceable investor rights are weak.

The Fund Fraud: Distorted Price Discovery, the Demand for Financial Protection 

The fund crisis follows from the interaction of these conditions. Monetary instability creates demand for protection; concentrated portfolios amplify valuation risk; politically dependent oversight weakens correction. The scandal is therefore part of the regime’s cumulative political economy, not an isolated accident outside it. Institutional responsibility rests on the deliberate construction and maintenance of this incentive structure; individual criminal responsibility still depends on evidence of particular acts.

The crisis emerged after explicit warnings, not in the absence of information. On 4 November 2025, Finance Minister Mehmet Simsek publicly acknowledged manipulation through certain investment funds and promised stronger regulation. MSCI’s June 2026 review subsequently flagged possible coordinated trading and artificially inflated free-float estimates. S&P Dow Jones Indices warned in July about transparency and market-classification risks, while FTSE Russell also raised concerns over transparency and market accessibility. This accumulation of domestic acknowledgment and external warnings shifts the accountability question from whether authorities knew to why their response failed to contain the risks. Early evidence points to political protection or interference obstructing effective intervention, requiring an independent examination of supervisory correspondence and decision records.

After mounting external pressure that, unless decisive corrective measures are taken, Turkey could be isolated from emerging market status, the Capital Markets Board (SPK) placed in September 131 funds associated with seven portfolio-management companies into liquidation, with 455,758 unique investors subsequently identified. Reuters reported affected assets exceeding US$18 billion and a weekly equity-index decline of more than 8 percent. These figures show the scale of exposure and disruption, not the amount stolen or final investor losses.

Other indicators show how stress spread beyond the affected funds. A press compilation of Central Securities Depository data recorded a fall in listed-equity capitalization from TRY22.91 trillion at end-August to TRY19.08 trillion in late September, approximately 16.7 percent. Reporting based on TEFAS data identified net fund outflows exceeding TRY210 billion after August 28. Meanwhile, net purchases through Ziraat Yatirim reportedly reached TRY22.3 billion on September 21, while gross central-bank reserves fell by US$13.8 billion between August 28 and September 18. Valuation changes, withdrawals, brokerage transactions and reserve movements measure different phenomena. They cannot be added into a single damage estimate or attributed entirely to the crisis. Purchases through a publicly owned intermediary also do not establish public expenditure without identifying the underlying accounts.

Valuation Feedback, Liquidity Risk, and Delayed Intervention

In the emerging Ponzi-like scheme, the financial mechanism combines valuation feedback with liquidity risk. Concentrated purchases of thinly traded low-free-float shares can raise quoted prices and reported fund values. Strong apparent performance attracts subscriptions that finance further purchases; higher collateral valuations may also support additional borrowing. Where related parties control funds and portfolio companies, investors’ interests may conflict with the wider group’s financing objectives.

This cycle can widen the gap between quoted prices and realizable portfolio value. Redemption pressure exposes the discrepancy, while sales of liquid holdings transmit stress to other securities. The Financial Stability Board recognizes liquidity mismatch as a general vulnerability of open-ended funds. Turkey’s distinctive problem is whether its institutions could identify and constrain the accumulation of these risks independently of commercial and political pressures.

However, the principal–agent problem in Turkey extends beyond fund management, underlining a broader systemic characteristic. Investors entrust managers with assets; citizens entrust regulators with protection. When the political executive controls supervisory appointments, agents may be incentivized to satisfy influential networks rather than their public mandate. Preferential access and weak sanctions then lower the expected cost of risk-taking and extraction. The formal existence of a regulator is insufficient when its effective independence has been subordinated.

The SPK’s September 18 statement acknowledged abnormal fund-driven movements in low-free-float shares during the final quarter of 2025. The Financial Stability Committee considered the issue on December 2; a working group followed on December 3; the qualified-investor threshold increased on December 18. Comprehensive guide changes came on August 28, 2026. The interval makes supervisory responsibility unavoidable: administrative activity cannot establish that known exposures were adequately constrained or that continuing investors were protected.

The Principal–Agent Problem: Information Asymmetry, Conflicts of Interest and Institutional Protection

The fund crisis exposes a chain of delegated authority: investors entrust assets to managers, citizens entrust protection to regulators, and the executive appoints supervisors. Managers know more than investors; officials control records unavailable to citizens. Under Erdogan’s personalized appointment system, these information asymmetries intersect with political dependence. As a result, the resulting vulnerability is endogenous to the governing architecture: institutions expected to constrain accumulation can instead protect its beneficiaries.

Figure 3 connects ownership, management and inspection within a shared appointment network. Erdogan’s Turkey Wealth Fund chairmanship, Erisah Arican’s overlapping leadership, Mahmut Kayacik’s TVF–Takasbank responsibilities and Yunus Arinci’s move from the State Supervisory Council to Takasbank weaken institutional separation. Salih Tanrikulu’s former Borsa Istanbul role adds retrospective self-review risk. The principal–agent problem becomes acute when citizens’ monitors answer to the political network whose decisions require investigation.

Figure 4 examines delegated stewardship through Kilimci’s Tera roles, Çakmak’s management of insurance and pension assets, and Şener’s separate Interbank Card Center procurement (BKM) proceedings. The latest developments sharpen Çakmak’s conflict-of-interest dimension: after resigning on 15 October, he was remanded in custody on 24 October. Reported allegations include receiving US$1 million in cash for directing institutional resources into Tera funds; further reporting describes personal share transactions tied to institutional placements. His reported repayment of investment-related proceeds neither establishes the amount misappropriated nor resolves responsibility.

Iskender Balci, son of former banking regulator Mustafa Balci and son-in-law of Deputy Finance Minister Osman Celik, held company oversight roles at Ozata Denizcilik and DOF Robotik before his detention. Celik submitted his retirement request on October 19. Administrative departure leaves the central question unresolved: whether licensing, appointments and supervision were insulated from family interests through disclosure and recusal.

The Sayan family illustrates institutional mobility across politics, regulation and diplomacy. Ramazan Sayan, described in contemporary reporting as Erdogan’s longstanding associate, is the father of four siblings. Fatma Betul Sayan Kaya progressed through advisory work, Parliament, cabinet and party leadership. Omer Fatih Sayan moved through Prime Ministry advisory posts, BTK leadership, a deputy ministership and Turk Telekom board leadership before joining EPDK. Ayse Hilal Sayan Koytak advanced through ministerial and diplomatic appointments, including ambassadorships in Kuwait, Bahrain and Finland; Nazmiye Sumeyye Sayan served on Istanbul’s metropolitan council. Together, these trajectories warrant scrutiny of merit, access and appointment criteria.

The financial question is more specific. Reuters reported allegations concerning approximately TRY2.17 billion in combined share-sale proceeds received by Sayan Kaya and her husband before the turmoil. Whether Takasbank-supported liquidity facilitated their exits requires transaction-level evidence. Sale proceeds cannot be treated as profits, and institutional liquidity support alone does not establish preferential treatment.

Mustafa Yazici, son of senior AKP official and former minister Hayati Yazici, introduces distressed-debt collection into this network. The imposition and subsequent lifting of asset restrictions require transparent explanation. His company, Adil Varlik Yönetim, purchases non-performing receivables. Corporate records document a TRY450 million conversion of shareholder receivables into capital, but not their ultimate funding source. A TRY500 million financing bill arranged by Tera Yatirim subsequently generated an MKK non-payment notice. The intersection of connected financing and debt collection merits investigation; borrower complaints alone do not establish unlawful interest charges.

BTK belongs within the accountability analysis because restrictions on online reporting deepen information asymmetry. Reported blocking concerning Batuhan Mumcu and his wife requires examination of judicial orders, requests and implementation. Mumcu joined BTK’s board in August 2026; his wife, Neslihan Mumcu, appears in corporate disclosures concerning Bulls Yatırım Holding. Some reported restrictions predated his appointment; attributing them to his personal intervention would require additional evidence.

Figure 6 places SPK at the center. Ibrahim Omer Gonul, son of former Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul, moved from SPK chairmanship to KGK before being removed on October 20 alongside SPK chair Mahmut Sutcu. Sutcu had submitted his resignation the previous day. Tezmen’s former MKK role and Murat Onuk’s overlapping portfolio-management and Takasbank responsibilities further complicate independent oversight. Personnel changes leave earlier decisions and the executive’s appointment powers requiring scrutiny.

Reports that two SPK officials opposed Tera Yatirim’s flotation, were subsequently replaced, and that the reconstituted board approved the IPO two months later reveal how presidential appointment power can override institutional resistance. In Erdogan’s centralized system, replacing officials changes more than personnel: it reshapes the boundaries of permissible professional judgment. The sequence illustrates a principal–agent inversion in which regulators become accountable upwards to the appointing authority rather than outwards to investors and the public. Repeated failures to investigate politically protected conduct reinforce expectations of impunity, weaken deterrence, and make compliance with political preferences less costly than resistance. Subsequent dismissals cannot resolve this institutional responsibility: accountability must reach the authority that selected supervisors, enabled contested approvals and sustained the system of protection. 

An inquiry must follow beneficial ownership and funding at entry; concentration, related-party transactions and valuation during investment; and information, financing and redemption terms at exit. Early withdrawal alone proves no insider dealing, but withdrawals above realizable asset values can shift shortfalls to remaining investors. Appointment records, supervisory correspondence, access logs and transaction trails are therefore indispensable.

In terms of an ex-post solution, the October 1 SPK announcement provided interim payments of up to TRY1 million per investor per fund for funds founded by four managers. Another announcement addressed liquidation and possible reopening for the other three, while voluntary-return accounts were established for excessive gains. Relief can reduce immediate hardship; it does not demonstrate that the institutional causes have been corrected or establish final recoveries and immunity from prosecution.

On October 6, the SPK disputed the claim of 130 ignored warnings and cited 96 criminal referrals concerning fund transactions in 2026. On October 4, it rejected claims that protection of the Investor Compensation Center’s assets originated in July 2026, citing earlier provisions. Independent review must test these defenses against dated records: aggregate enforcement activity cannot answer whether particular warnings were handled adequately.

The political feedback mechanism is crucial here: economic deterioration threatens consent; legal and administrative pressure limits the conversion of grievance into organized opposition; weaker scrutiny protects the allocation system that generated the damage. Widespread arrests and dismissals, and media censorship, show that intervention under pressure narrows scrutiny precisely when it is most necessary. An inquiry controlled by the same appointment network cannot resolve this problem without independent experts, parliamentary authority and enforceable access to records.

Conclusion

Turkey’s fund crisis is an endogenous outcome of the governing order Erdogan has constructed. Discretionary economic policy creates vulnerabilities; politically dependent institutions suppress corrective scrutiny; privileged access enables selective enrichment while losses reach ordinary investors and public balance sheets. Repeated scandals reflect the cumulative consequences of institutional choices that subordinate professional judgement to presidential authority and weaken deterrence through expectations of protection. Populist appeals to sovereignty, national distinctiveness and religious obligation legitimize this discretion, while restrictions on journalism and opposition obstruct scrutiny of its consequences.

Financial repair must therefore accompany a redistribution of institutional authority. Immediate priorities include independently verified valuations, disclosure of related-party exposures, preservation of supervisory and transaction records, and recovery from those responsible. Any public support must identify its beneficiaries, legal basis and recovery strategy. Protecting vulnerable investors requires preventing further transfers of private losses to society.

Durable recovery, however, requires constraints on the executive itself. Independent courts, effective parliamentary oversight, merit-based appointments and protection for professional disagreement must replace supervision organized around political loyalty. Regulators, auditors and market infrastructure need genuinely independent cross-checks, supported by investigative journalism, academic freedom and competitive opposition. Accountability must follow appointment and decision chains wherever they lead, including into the presidency.

The fund crisis ultimately exposes how Erdogan’s governing order converts public authority into selective private advantage while shielding its beneficiaries from independent scrutiny. Gains sustain politically connected networks; losses fall on investors, wider society and future generations. Breaking this pattern requires restoring the rule of law and subjecting presidential authority to effective institutional checks. Otherwise, replacing officials and prosecuting selected actors leaves intact the structure that enables extraction, protects privilege and reproduces impunity.

Erdogan’s responses to successive crises suggest that meaningful reform from within this governing order is increasingly implausible. The recurrent protection of connected interests supports a political-economic interpretation of corruption as a means of financing and consolidating his regime-building project. As implicated networks expand, independent accountability threatens both their accumulated advantages and the political authority that sustains them, deepening resistance to reform. Expecting Erdogan to dismantle these arrangements therefore overlooks their role in his political survival. Institutional reconstruction requires a democratic reconfiguration of power that can investigate the presidency itself.

Professor Jacob Mchangama.

Prof. Mchangama: Liberal Institutions Are Becoming Increasingly Illiberal in Their Attempts to Fight Populism

In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Professor Jacob Mchangama warns that liberal institutions are becoming “increasingly illiberal” in their efforts to combat populism and disinformation. Examining electoral censorship in Brazil, Germany’s militant democracy, and the EU’s Digital Services Act, he argues that restrictive speech policies risk undermining democratic legitimacy while strengthening authoritarian forces. Emphasizing the democratic significance of independent digital media, particularly in Hungary, he cautions that “imposing government control is ultimately a cure worse than the disease.” Professor Mchangama also examines the dangers of AI-driven censorship, selective free-speech advocacy, and declining institutional trust, advocating decentralization, transparency, and user empowerment as alternatives to increasingly technocratic approaches to regulating the democratic public sphere.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a time when democratic institutions confront populism, disinformation, political censorship, and the growing influence of artificial intelligence and technology giants, freedom of expression has become both a cornerstone of democratic resilience and a deeply contested principle. Brazil’s presidential election and the US midterms offer particularly revealing examples of these tensions. Across liberal democracies, efforts to counter extremist mobilization and digital disinformation raise an increasingly urgent question: Can democracy be protected through restrictions on the very freedoms that sustain it?

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Jacob Mchangama, Executive Director of The Future of Free Speech, Research Professor at Vanderbilt University, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), and author of Free Speech: A History from Socrates to Social Media, examines this paradox. His central concern is that the erosion of public trust has prompted liberal institutions to adopt increasingly illiberal responses. As he observes, “this collapse of trust has led liberal institutions to become increasingly illiberal, responding to mistrust from the demos with mistrust of the demos.” Such efforts to control political narratives, he warns, create “a vicious cycle that, in the long term, will undermine rather than strengthen democracy.”

Professor Mchangama develops this argument through Brazil’s judicial interventions in electoral expression, Germany’s increasingly restrictive speech legislation, and the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA). Questioning the effectiveness of Europe’s militant democracy model, he invokes the Weimar Republic’s historical experience, when emergency powers intended to safeguard democratic institutions were subsequently exploited by the Nazis. His conclusion is stark: “the very instruments intended to protect democracy were used to abolish it.” For Professor Mchangama, contemporary restrictions risk reproducing this institutional vulnerability, particularly when political forces hostile to liberal pluralism acquire governmental power.

The dangers become especially pronounced in the digital sphere. Reflecting on Hungary’s opposition mobilization through independent online media, Professor Mchangama emphasizes that social platforms remain indispensable instruments of democratic dissent, even when dominated by powerful corporations. Although acknowledging the internet’s toxicity and concentrated ownership, he argues that “imposing government control is ultimately a cure worse than the disease.” Similarly, he cautions that Europe, historically central to developing legal protections for expression, is now “creating the blueprint for online censorship,” potentially legitimizing authoritarian restrictions elsewhere.

Beyond censorship, the interview explores artificial intelligence, decentralized factchecking, governmental transparency, and the democratic potential of digital participation. Professor Mchangama distinguishes user empowerment from preemptive safetyism, warning against transforming AI governance into preventive ideological gatekeeping. Ultimately, drawing inspiration from Frederick Douglass, he insists that freedom of expression protects listeners as well as speakers. His overarching democratic principle is unequivocal: “You’re not going to strengthen democracy by hiding that reality.”

Here is our interview with Professor Jacob Mchangama, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Democracies Must Rebuild Trust Instead of Trying to Control the Political Narrative

Luís Inácio Lula da Silva and former President Bolsonaro participate in the debate over Brazil in Sao Paulo on October 16, 2022. Photo: Isaac Fontana.

Professor Mchangama, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your essay on Brazil and the dangers of combating populism through censorship. In your essay, “Don’t Resort to Censorship to Fight Populism,” you argue that censorship can undermine the democracy it claims to protect. With Brazil heading into its October 25 presidential runoff between Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro, how should democratic institutions confront disinformation and anti-democratic mobilization without restricting legitimate political debate?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: That’s a big question. I don’t think anyone has a perfect formula or algorithm, partly because the definition of populism is itself contested, as is the extent to which populism represents a legitimate response to institutions that have failed to address the needs of their populations.

But I think one of the structural problems in many democracies is a collapse of trust—in political systems, elite institutions, and so on. I believe this collapse of trust has led liberal institutions to become increasingly illiberal, responding to mistrust from the demos with mistrust of the demos. In other words, they attempt to control the narrative through increasingly restrictive measures on speech.

This creates a vicious cycle that, in the long term, will undermine rather than strengthen democracy, especially liberal democracy, which is inconceivable without free speech and access to information as central pillars.

So, rather than focusing on technocratic, top-down decisions about how to manage the public sphere, I would focus on examining how governance should function in a digital-age democracy. How can we create modes of governance that cultivate trust? That would be my starting point. For trust to exist, the populace must have the ability to criticize the government and have transparency into how the government operates.

Democratic Institutions Must Punish Attacks on Democracy Without Criminalizing Political Expression

You have criticized Justice Alexandre de Moraes for concentrating extraordinary powers over online political expression. Given Brazil’s continuing judicial interventions in election-related content, where should the boundary lie between protecting electoral integrity and allowing unelected judges to determine the limits of political speech?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: Let me make it easy for myself. When Bolsonaro supporters attack democratic institutions in Brasília, in a sort of rerun of the January 6th attack on the Capitol in the US, that’s obviously not protected speech. The government and authorities must stand firm, not only to prevent such actions but also to punish those who try to stop the peaceful transfer of power in a democracy. That is absolutely unacceptable and should be punished.

But there’s a tendency to argue that spreading what is labeled disinformation leads to such events and that, therefore, we have to crack down on it. The interesting thing is that, in Brazil, the fake news investigation started in 2019, well before the events in Brasília. To me, that suggests that these interventions do not necessarily work and can actually help fuel the narrative of populist forces that view elite institutions as rigging the game.

Of course, the way de Moraes and other Brazilian judges have wielded their powers is anathema to any liberal democratic conception of free speech, even if you agree, as some do, that there was a need to crack down on fake news, however you define it. Giving a judge the power to act essentially as legislator, prosecutor, and judge all in one is simply not compatible with liberal democratic institutions.

I also think the way things have played out has shown that this was not a wise move and that Brazilian judges themselves are not beyond reproach. The 2019 fake news investigations came after reports alleging the judiciary’s involvement in the Car Wash scandal. That, in and of itself, is unlikely to increase trust in the judiciary as an impartial actor in Brazilian politics.

Unequal Content Moderation Does Not Necessarily Mean Political Discrimination

Social Media

Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court has ordered Meta to ensure equal treatment of Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro amid allegations of algorithmic bias and unequal content moderation. Can courts realistically guarantee a level electoral playing field without becoming arbiters of political visibility and editorial discretion?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: That should certainly be the goal. The problem is how to define equal protection and ensure it. Let’s say Meta has its own policies and ways of enforcing them. If one side of the political debate is more likely to violate, for instance, rules on hate speech, then the fact that more content from that side is removed is not necessarily evidence of unequal treatment.

Of course, if you can demonstrate that platforms have an ideological bias and systematically favor one side over the other, that can be problematic. But how do you define such bias, and how do you ensure that the assessment is not based merely on cherry-picked examples? That is an issue.

You also have to take into account the larger media ecosystem. What if one side of a political debate has much better access to traditional media than the other? Then it becomes a broader question of how to ensure an equal playing field.

But the very detailed interventions that the Electoral Court has made in Brazilian politics also affect speech that, at least in my interpretation, constitutes core political expression. Accusing a political candidate of holding certain positions, for example, may sometimes involve exaggeration, but that is a core component of political speech.

Let’s say someone in Hungary accused Viktor Orbán of being a dictator, and a Hungarian electoral court responded, “No, no, you can’t say that because there’s no evidence that Viktor Orbán has ever said he wants to be a dictator, and therefore you have to remove it.” I think most people would say, “Well, that’s outrageous,” because expressing the view that Viktor Orbán is moving toward becoming a dictator in Hungary is a political opinion.

Blanket Restrictions on AI-Generated Political Content Will Mainly Restrict Free Speech

Brazil’s 2026 electoral rules restrict certain AI-generated political content, while recent judicial decisions have required campaign-related material to be removed. Could such interventions unintentionally strengthen populist narratives of persecution? What less restrictive alternatives would better protect electoral integrity?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: As I understand it—and I don’t follow Brazilian politics that closely, since I’m mostly an expert on international human rights and free-speech standards—it seems that these interventions have strengthened populist narratives during the last elections. So, this is one of those situations where such measures can backfire.

I’m also not that afraid of AI-generated content. I remember that, prior to the 2024 global elections, with 2024 being a super election year and around 2 billion people eligible to vote worldwide, there were a lot of dire warnings. The World Economic Forum said that AI-generated deepfakes or disinformation were the largest short-term threat to humanity. There were also breathless warnings from politicians and the media about democracy drowning in deepfakes.

Yet forensic analyses conducted afterward showed that, while there was a lot of AI-generated information, including deepfakes, these had very little impact on election outcomes. In some cases, such as India, AI could even be used by candidates to communicate in other languages, thereby reaching different groups with their political messages.

So, I’m not convinced that deepfakes and AI-generated content online represent an existential threat to the democratic process. That doesn’t mean there can’t be problematic instances. Imagine, for example, someone leaking an audio deepfake of a candidate on election day that purports to show the candidate involved in corruption. In such cases, it could certainly be a problem.

But in general, blanket rules—very elaborate requirements to label or remove AI-generated content—will mainly restrict a lot of speech because this is simply how modern political communication works. Most people who are online will use AI to generate text and create memes, GIFs, and short videos. All of these have a strong expressive element, conveying particular political opinions, whether through satire or otherwise.

Imagine, here in the United States, if all AI-generated criticism of President Trump had to be removed or labeled as such. Whenever I scroll through my feeds, I see lots of memes and videos mocking and criticizing Trump. That’s simply part of how we communicate today, and I don’t think it’s problematic in and of itself.

The Trump Administration Has Demonstrated a Deep Level of Hypocrisy on Free Speech

US President Donald Trump at a rally for then-VP nominee J.D. Vance in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

You have highlighted the contradiction between the Trump administration’s criticism of censorship abroad and its treatment of domestic critics. With a federal court recently blocking restrictions on White House access for CNN, MS NOW, and Politico journalists, has freedom of speech become an increasingly selective political principle rather than a universal democratic commitment?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: Free speech has always been unevenly enforced, but I don’t think there has been a US administration as hostile to free speech as the Trump administration since perhaps the Second Red Scare. Reuters reported in August that the Trump administration had lost around 75 cases in federal courts on First Amendment grounds—that is, involving free-speech restrictions—during Trump’s second term. That’s much, much higher than the number lost by the Biden administration during a comparable period.

This is quite instructive in many ways. First, it reveals a deep level of hypocrisy. We remember J.D. Vance traveling to Munich and criticizing European democracies for restricting speech. He had a point. But when he subsequently traveled to Hungary to support Viktor Orbán without saying a word about the systematic ways in which the Orbán government has restricted the media and protests, shut down universities, tried to intimidate civil society, and banned LGBT protests and content, that demonstrated a high degree of hypocrisy.

The Trump administration has also tried to deport foreign citizens for engaging in political speech that is otherwise constitutionally protected. It has nothing to say about Russian authoritarianism but criticizes Zelensky for not holding elections, and so on. The list is very long. But—and this is the important thing—this is where I get really frustrated with those in liberal democracies who view speech as problematic and are increasingly willing to restrict free speech in order to counter populism.

First, the First Amendment in the United States has been a very powerful roadblock against the Trump administration’s attempts to punish its critics. If constitutional protections for free speech in the United States were equivalent to those in Germany, Trump could have steamrolled many of his critics simply because they insulted him or wrote something critical about him on social media, as is actually happening in Germany.

Second, this shows that when populist politicians come to power, they are absolutely going to restrict their opponents’ free speech. So, if those who claim to be liberal democrats and supporters of democracy essentially create tools that those who are not liberal democrats can use to undermine free speech, pluralism, and so on, they will be playing into the hands of those governments.

But there is a complete denial of this, especially in Europe. If you look at statements from the Commission or from Macron, Merz, or Sánchez, they essentially portray free speech, especially online speech, as an existential danger to liberal democracies, which is hugely misguided.

I mean, what will you do if Le Pen or AfD comes to power with all these speech restrictions that you have adopted or proposed? It will then become very difficult to claim, “No, this goes too far. These speech-restrictive tools were only meant to be used by us because we are on the right side.” I don’t think that’s credible. That’s not something that will convince those parts of the population who have lost faith in traditional political parties and are tempted by more populist politicians.

Free Speech Alone Cannot Save Democracy, but Without It There Can Be No Democracy

As the United States approaches its November 3 midterm elections, disputes over media access, political advertising rules, and federal regulatory power have intensified. How effectively can First Amendment protections prevent political leaders from using governmental authority to disadvantage critical media and electoral opponents?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: Quite effectively so far, as we’ve seen. I just mentioned the 75 cases, and there have been more since. We also have a number of cases in which courts have found in favor of media outlets targeted by the Trump administration.

The First Amendment is a critical component of that, but it’s not enough. Free speech is an absolutely vital component of liberal democracy, but free speech in and of itself is not going to save democracy. Without it, however, there can be no democracy. Obviously, there are many other components that are needed.

I opened by talking about trust. That’s part of the secret sauce of successful, thriving liberal democracies. But how do you legislate trust? Many factors go into creating societies with a high degree of trust. You can’t simply have a majority in Parliament adopt a law declaring that there will be high trust and expect trust to emerge once that law is passed. That’s not how democracy works.

I also think transparency is important. We rightly talk a lot about the need for transparency in big tech platforms, but there’s much less discussion of, and willingness to ensure, transparency in government. A higher degree of transparency in government decision-making is likely to increase trust.

I also think there are ways we can use digital tools to bring democratic decision-making much closer to people and involve them directly. You can have these alignment assemblies, for instance, where local decisions could be informed or even decided upon by people, alongside technological solutions that optimize for agreement rather than outrage among citizens.

Suddenly, you might find that all the disagreement you see online does not necessarily reflect reality and that people actually share far more positions than those that divide them. I think approaches like these are much more likely to be fruitful for liberal democracies than the DSA (Digital Services Act), laws against deepfakes, or similar measures that treat symptoms and where the cure can be worse than the disease.

Younger Generations and Declining Support for Free Speech

Social Media
Photo: Sujin Surakoon / Dreamstime.

Your research documents declining support among younger Americans for controversial and offensive expression. How do you explain this reversal of the free-speech activism historically associated with younger generations? Does it reflect changing understandings of equality, polarization, or a deeper weakening of democratic pluralism?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: That’s a really good question. There are probably a number of contributing factors, although I’m speculating here because I’m not a social scientist and can’t give you a peer-reviewed response. But I suspect several issues are at play.

First, younger generations have taken free speech for granted. It’s been a very long time since people in Western democracies really had to fight for free speech. They don’t remember an era when free speech was threatened by movements. That’s one factor.

Another might be the fact that younger generations have grown up with social media and the internet, where speech is ubiquitous, cheap, and often not very pleasant. As a result, they view the balance between the harms and benefits of free speech differently from previous generations. They encounter a lot of speech they consider hateful, bullying, or otherwise harmful. So they may not appreciate the value of free speech in the same way as older generations because it has always been everywhere, and they’re essentially marinating in it.

Then there’s another viewpoint, which I see quite often in the United States: the idea that free speech and equal dignity are values in tension, or perhaps even mutually exclusive. Yet the views of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, which were also reflected in landmark Supreme Court decisions on the First Amendment, were very much the opposite. Free speech and equality were understood as mutually reinforcing values. Free speech was considered essential to the full and equal protection of the rights of persecuted minorities.

Today, however, you’re much more likely to encounter groups fighting for minority rights that are suspicious of free speech, arguing that their equality depends on the government and social media companies restricting their opponents’ views.

These are some of the factors that may be contributing to this development. But again, this is a hypothesis.

Government Control of Online Speech Is Ultimately a Cure Worse Than the Disease

With Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg exercising enormous influence over political visibility through X, Facebook, and Instagram, have technology billionaires become unelected gatekeepers of democratic debate? How can democracies prevent private concentrations of communicative power without inviting government censorship?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: To a certain extent, they have. Content moderation decisions by big tech platforms have an outsized impact on the practical exercise of free speech in many countries around the world. In that sense, they wield power in ways that can pose real challenges, which is why I think we would be better served by a more decentralized social media ecosystem.

On the other hand, it’s also true that someone like Elon Musk has very directly aligned himself with Trump and the Republicans. But if you go on X, you can find plenty of criticism of Trump and the Republicans. The same is true of Meta platforms. So it’s not as though these platforms are completely one-sided, and I still think they’re essential for mobilizing protests.

Again, I think it would be dangerous to regulate online speech. I keep coming back to Hungary because the opposition’s victory in April, after 16 years of Orbán’s rule, demonstrated something very profound about the power of online speech.

Hungary was a country where Orbán controlled perhaps 80% of the media and 90% of government advertising revenue for the media, had banned universities, weaponized laws against civil society and the opposition, banned protests, and so on. In theory, it should have been impossible for him to lose the election.

But what you saw was a small group of independent online outlets that held the government accountable, exposed corruption scandals, and so on. In fact, Péter Magyar’s political career was launched on Partizán, a YouTube channel that quickly attracted millions of views in a country of 10 million people.

There are several reasons why Orbán lost, but I think it would have been very difficult for the opposition to mobilize and get its message out without the internet and social media. That’s one of the differences between Hungary and Russia, where Putin is very much aware that controlling broadcast media, newspapers, and other traditional media is not enough. He also has to control the online sphere because, without that control, the opposition can organize protests, establish small, nimble online media outlets, spread satire and mockery, and so on.

So, even though the internet can be a toxic place, and even though it would be better to have more, smaller social media platforms, imposing government control is ultimately a cure worse than the disease.

Decentralized Fact-Checking Can Build More Trust Than Decisions Made by a Small Group of Gatekeepers

Illustration by Ulker Design.

You welcomed aspects of Meta’s transition from third-party factchecking to community-based moderation while warning against political accommodation. In light of Brazil’s current dispute with Meta over alleged algorithmic discrimination, how can we distinguish genuine commitments to free expression from politically convenient changes in platform governance?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: That’s a good question. Again, I don’t think we should expect private tech platforms to have a consistent and principled commitment to free speech. Ultimately, they are concerned about their bottom line and are likely to be influenced by a number of factors, including political interference.

It’s interesting that, in Brazil, Lula’s account was suspended for around an hour, which is obviously outrageous. But we also have to remember that Lula’s government threatened to ban entire platforms in the country because of criticism of a fake news law.

This goes to the heart of the problem with political regulation. On the one hand, yes, it’s bad that Lula’s account was suspended during an election. But if, at the same time, you are a government willing to shut down entire platforms, thereby affecting the right to free speech and access to information across the entire country, that suggests you’re not really concerned about an underlying principle. You’re perhaps more concerned about your own ability to reach voters.

This is why I think a more decentralized model works better. Community Notes and crowdsourced factchecking contribute to that model because they allow ordinary people to take a more organic, bottom-up approach, rather than concentrating power in platforms that governments can then pressure.

There was a very strong example of Community Notes following the killing of Alex Pretti by Border Patrol agents during ICE protests in Minnesota in January of this year. Senior public officials in the Trump administration quickly called Alex Pretti a domestic terrorist and claimed he had pulled a gun, and so on.

But there were many people on the streets with smartphones who were livestreaming the events, providing extensive documentation that disproved the administration’s narrative. Very quickly, senior officials, including FBI Director Kash Patel, Stephen Miller, and Kristi Noem, had Community Notes added to their statements.

In other words, on X, a platform that is normally quite friendly to the Trump administration, people were fact-checking the American government in real time. That’s quite powerful and demonstrates some of the benefits of a bottom-up approach.

Now, does that mean Community Notes will save democracy? Obviously not. But the underlying model is preferable to relying on dedicated factcheckers. Of course, factchecking remains important, and many Community Notes will be based on the work of journalists, factcheckers, and so on.

But the model of a bridging algorithm, in which a Community Note depends on people with different political perspectives agreeing on its usefulness, is much more likely to instill trust and acceptance than having a small group of third-party factcheckers make the decisions.

We Must Choose User Empowerment Over Preemptive Safetyism in AI

Your research has documented how leading AI chatbots sometimes refuse to generate lawful but controversial political content. As generative AI increasingly shapes political information and public debate, could these systems become invisible ideological gatekeepers? What would politically neutral AI governance require in practice?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: Yes, that’s absolutely a danger, and it’s already happening. This is not science fiction. China is a very good example. It has detailed rules requiring AI companies to comply with so-called core socialist values, which are set out in various decrees. Essentially, this means that AI companies must respect the red lines of the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping, and those red lines are very strict.

This is why, even though China releases high-quality open-source models, you’ll see these models refusing to answer questions about Taiwan, Tiananmen Square, and so on. As generative AI becomes the interface to the wider ecosystem of information and ideas, government control or filtering would have an outsized impact not only on free speech and freedom of information but potentially even on freedom of thought, because AI is also part of search, word processing, and so on.

The dangers here are very real. There are also risks associated with market concentration. Let’s say Google, OpenAI, and Anthropic collectively control 80% of the market. The decisions and filtering practices of these companies would then have an outsized impact on the practical exercise of free speech, access to information, and potentially even freedom of thought. This is one of the reasons why I think open-source models are important.

Right now, there’s a lot of discussion about AI regulation, which is an important discussion to have. I’m not against regulating AI when it comes to catastrophic risks. We all have, as human beings, a vested interest in mitigating the risk of AI models facilitating the creation of biological weapons by terrorist groups or unleashing devastating cyberattacks that could shut down hospitals or financial systems on a national or global scale. That is absolutely crucial.

What I would warn against is treating disinformation, hate speech, and so on as critical or existential risks. These are not the kinds of things that should be regulated in the same way. AI is also different from social media. If you post something on your social media account, it’s visible to the entire world. But if you have a conversation with a large language model (LLM), you’re essentially having an iterative discussion.

In countries with hate speech laws, you can argue that if someone publishes hateful content on social media, making it visible to the whole world, the rules against hate speech should apply, whether you think those rules are wise in the first place or not. The same applies if someone threatens another person or incites violence on social media.

But you should be able to have a discussion with an LLM. Let’s say you’re interested in the rise of Nazism in Germany. You should absolutely be able to have a conversation with an LLM in which it shows you the rhetoric of the National Socialist Party in Germany or examples of antisemitism that would violate hate speech laws if you published them yourself.

If governments say, “No, we can’t allow AI models to generate hateful content or disinformation because it might potentially be used for nefarious purposes,” then that defeats the purpose of these powerful models. It undermines their potential to act as an exoskeleton of the mind. They can really help you if you use them properly and don’t outsource your brain to them. They can teach you a great deal, and you should be allowed to engage in difficult, controversial discussions and access difficult, controversial content online.

So, I distinguish between what I call user empowerment and preemptive safetyism. Preemptive safetyism can essentially be compared to the way pre-publication censorship was used to control the printing press. Churches and monarchs believed that the printing press was too dangerous. They thought, “If you allow pamphlets to be written that undermine religion or the rule of a monarch, everything will go to hell. Therefore, we have to ensure that everything printed has been vetted before it is circulated to the population.”

We’ve moved away from that model in most democracies. Now, you generally face potential liability only after the fact, once you’ve published or said something.

We need to take the same approach to AI. I might be able to write something or obtain information that could be hateful or otherwise controversial, but only if I use it—if I publish it afterward—should I potentially be held liable, rather than the model itself.

If you adopt that preemptive safetyism approach and try to filter models to avoid potential risks down the line, outside of catastrophic risks, that would be very detrimental to free speech.

Democracies Need Narrow, Targeted Rules Against Electoral Deception

EU-AI
The European Union’s AI Act introduces restrictions on high-risk artificial intelligence applications and requires greater transparency from companies regarding data use and algorithmic practices. Photo: Dreamstime.

In Brazil, electoral authorities have imposed restrictions on synthetic campaign material, while the United States is debating AI-generated political robocalls ahead of its midterms. Where should democracies draw the line between preventing electoral deception and protecting lawful AI-assisted political expression?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: You need to draw very narrow, targeted lines. Consider, for example, robocalls. If a political campaign creates robocalls targeting people in areas where they know their opponents are strongest, falsely claiming that “the election has been canceled” just before election day, that’s something you would want to prevent, and those responsible should face potential legal liability because it’s a direct attempt at voter suppression.

But if you use robocalls to criticize your opponent, employing hyperbole or calling them a dictator or corrupt, I don’t think that should be regulated. So, my approach would be to establish very narrow, targeted rules governing such practices.

The Very Instruments Intended to Protect Democracy Can Be Used to Abolish It

You have questioned whether Germany’s restrictions on hate speech and extremist expression have effectively contained the far right. With the AfD challenging established political boundaries, does Europe’s concept of militant democracy risk empowering the very authoritarian forces it seeks to restrain?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: Yes, I think it does. It’s very interesting. If you look at the German domestic intelligence service, it publishes very detailed reports on political extremists, both on the right and the left, as well as on religious groups. What you’ll see is that, for a decade or so, there has been a constant rise in political extremism and often in political violence, including from the far right.

This has occurred during a period when Germany has introduced increasingly restrictive laws on speech. There was the Network Enforcement Act in 2017, which required social media companies to remove manifestly illegal content or risk fines of up to 50 million euros. There have also been laws expanding restrictions on hate speech and laws specifically protecting politicians against insults. Enforcement has intensified, including raids against people who have written something illegal. There has also been a crackdown since October 7th, and so on.

But none of these initiatives seems to have helped. You can see this in important state and regional elections in Germany, where the AfD has won victories, as well as in the polls and the collapsing support for traditional political parties.

Yet every time, especially in Germany, the response seems to be that we need to do more to restrict these political parties’ ability to speak out. Proposals range from banning the AfD and online anonymity to a recent proposal requiring 20% of algorithmic feeds to consist of approved media.

This is a very top-down, technocratic attempt to address collapsing trust in democratic institutions and mainstream political parties, which is likely to make things worse rather than better. There’s a historical irony here. We all understand why Germany wants, at all costs, to avoid a repeat of a political party coming to power and destroying democracy.

But during the Weimar Republic, there was a move toward increasingly restricting speech and adopting emergency laws that could ban fake news and shut down newspapers. Ultimately, when the Nazis came to power, they used some of these emergency laws, including provisions of the constitution itself that allowed the president to suspend all civil liberties, including freedom of expression.

So the very instruments intended to protect democracy were used to abolish it. That’s why I don’t have much faith in the militant democracy model that has gained the upper hand in Europe. I don’t think there’s a strong historical basis for assuming that it will work.

That doesn’t mean that simply introducing First Amendment-style protections in Europe would cause populists to wither away or guarantee that liberal democracy would always prevail. But such protections would serve as a stronger bulwark than the current trajectory, which treats free speech, especially online free speech, as a kind of Trojan horse that allows democracy’s enemies, both internal and external, to undermine it.

Europe Is Now Creating a Blueprint for Online Censorship

Photo: Andrey Popov.

You have warned that the EU’s Digital Services Act and related regulatory approaches may encourage excessive content removal and provide authoritarian governments with models for controlling online expression. How can Europe counter disinformation, protect vulnerable groups, and hold platforms accountable without undermining the free speech it seeks to defend?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: I’ve outlined some ways forward in my previous answers, particularly decentralization, increasing trust, and transparency, which I consider more fruitful measures than the DSA and other initiatives, such as banning Russian disinformation. These initiatives actually demonstrate weakness on Europe’s part rather than strength.

I understand why such measures may sound good as soundbites, but ultimately, Europe is the continent where free speech was developed. This is where the first legal protections of free speech were established, yet Europe has now become a place that is creating the blueprint for online censorship.

I mentioned Germany’s 2017 Network Enforcement Act earlier. Within a couple of years, that law was being invoked by Russia, Belarus, Iran, and dozens of authoritarian states as a justification for their own online censorship models. We’re seeing something similar with the DSA, as other jurisdictions that are not necessarily open democracies use it as a justification.

We’re also seeing that the European Court of Human Rights, for instance, is increasingly failing to extend free-speech protections to online expression. Earlier this year, the Court considered a case from Georgia involving a food courier who had insulted the mayor of Tbilisi, Kakha Kaladze. Football fans will recognize his name. He was a very successful AC Milan player who won the Champions League twice and now serves as Tbilisi’s mayor.

The food courier had made some really insulting remarks about him on TikTok and was fined. He took his case to the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled that public officials must be protected against vehement and gratuitous insults. The Court also stated that, because of the massive potential reach of social media platforms, governments should enjoy wider powers to regulate online speech.

This was catastrophic because Georgia is in a much worse position than Hungary under Orbán. You have an embattled opposition and pro-European democracy activists who are being suppressed and persecuted by a Putin-aligned government. That government can then use the case law of the European Court of Human Rights to go after its critics.

In fact, it has recently done so. A journalist was sentenced to 30 days in prison for insulting politicians online. Georgia has also created an Office Against Hate Speech, which is being used quite openly for political purposes to target critics of the current Georgian authoritarian government.

One of the only ways Georgians can still express dissent and organize protests is online, through social media and bottom-up mobilization. Yet those are precisely the mechanisms that Brussels is undermining. This demonstrates the unintended consequences of this model of online militant democracy.

US’s Retreat from Defending Dissidents Will Play into the Hands of Russia and China

In “The Voice of America Falls Silent,” you warn that America’s retreat from supporting independent media and dissidents abroad could strengthen authoritarian information control. As Russia and China promote increasingly sophisticated surveillance and censorship systems, who can defend global free speech if both Washington and Brussels compromise their commitments?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: That’s a good question. It’s really sad to see the United States retreating from defending dissidents and free speech globally. J.D. Vance went to Munich and criticized Europe, but then the administration pulled funding for embattled dissidents in authoritarian states who have long been able to do their work thanks to funding from Washington.

It’s ironic that this is happening under a Republican administration, given that the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), for instance, was established by Ronald Reagan, who had a very clear vision of the importance of strengthening and defending democracy around the world.

This is really sad. It will contribute to further eroding the soft power of the United States and the ideals that the country has championed around the world, however imperfectly. It will also definitely play into the hands of Russia, China, and other actors working hard to undermine international norms of human rights and free expression.

Unfortunately, the European Union is not in a good position to fill the void. This is partly because Europe no longer has the same geopolitical clout it once had, but also because it increasingly restricts free speech at home, which undermines its credibility.

It’s difficult to tell other countries that they cannot use laws against disinformation when the European Union itself does so. Even if you view Russian disinformation as a threat, that approach undermines credibility.

So, the responsibility now largely falls to civil society. One of the good things about the digital era is that, with AI, we can create tools that empower dissidents around the world. But at this moment, it’s really up to civil society to strengthen broad institutions that will fight for liberal democracies, including a robust, principled conception of free speech everywhere, and to try to fill the gap as best we can until the free-speech recession has been reversed.

You Are Not Going to Strengthen Democracy by Hiding Uncomfortable Realities

AI, artificial intelligence, and the concept of fake news, misinformation, and disinformation: A man uses his smartphone displaying the red text “Fake News,” surrounded by related keywords. Photo: Dreamstime.

Finally, Professor Mchangama, your book Free Speech: A History from Socrates to Social Media demonstrates how freedom of expression has repeatedly empowered marginalized groups against political authority. In today’s world of authoritarian populism, AI-driven manipulation, concentrated technological power, and selective free-speech advocacy, what principles should guide a genuinely democratic and resilient public sphere?

Professor Jacob Mchangama: We should view free speech and access to information as meta-principles that are essential to liberal democracies. I’m very inspired by the example of embattled minorities, which you mentioned. Perhaps the most underrated, yet one of the most important, champions of free speech was Frederick Douglass, an American orator and abolitionist who was born into slavery but dedicated his career to the fight for human equality.

It’s really incredible to read his speeches and articles spanning four decades because the central thread running throughout his work was the importance of free speech. He was so dedicated to free speech that, during the American Civil War, which was fought over slavery, he defended the right of people to speak out in favor of the Confederacy—in other words, the treasonous rebels who had seceded from the United States to preserve slavery.

He was very clear that the right to free speech is particularly precious to the oppressed. He also said something very profound: restricting free speech is a double wrong because it violates the rights of both the speaker and the listener.

That’s particularly important in our digital age. When you restrict free speech on social media, you don’t just restrict the rights of a particular speaker; you also restrict the broader public’s right to hear ideas that might be uncomfortable, wrong, or constitute disinformation, but that ultimately reflect a reality, however uncomfortable it may be: there are voices out there that don’t share your values and may want something very different.

You’re not going to strengthen democracy by hiding that reality.

Professor Yaniv Roznai.

Prof. Roznai: Israel Would Not Survive Another Coalition Like Netanyahu’s

As Israel approaches the October 27 elections, constitutional scholar Professor Yaniv Roznai warns that another Netanyahu-led coalition could threaten the country’s liberal-democratic future. In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, he declares: “I genuinely fear that Israel, as a country seeking to endure for generations to come, would not survive another coalition like this.” Examining democratic backsliding, judicial independence, political polarization, and the growing influence of religious nationalism, Professor Roznai also cautions that Netanyahu’s defeat would mark only the beginning of democratic restoration. Drawing comparisons with Poland and Hungary, he argues that Israel’s fragmented opposition would face formidable coalition challenges. Meaningful democratic renewal, he maintains, requires constitutional safeguards, stronger institutional checks and balances, and democratic education.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Israel approaches the October 27 elections, its democracy faces profound challenges stemming from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s populist leadership, the growing influence of the religious-nationalist far right, the controversial judicial overhaul, and the devastating consequences of October 7 and the war in Gaza. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about democratic backsliding, constitutional resilience, and whether electoral change can reverse the institutional and societal transformations of recent years.

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Yaniv Roznai, Professor of Constitutional Law and Co-Director of the Rubinstein Center for Constitutional Challenges at Reichman University and Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Professor for Distinguished Teaching at Princeton University’s University Center for Human Values, offers a deeply concerned assessment of Israel’s democratic trajectory. A leading scholar of constitutionalism, populism, and democratic erosion, Professor Roznai warns that another Netanyahu-led coalition could have existential consequences for Israel’s liberal-democratic future.

Reflecting on the possibility of Netanyahu remaining in power, Professor Roznai states: “I genuinely fear that Israel, as a country seeking to endure for generations to come, would not survive another coalition like this.” His warning extends beyond institutional deterioration to the potential departure of Israel’s educated and liberal population. “I’m afraid that if another Netanyahu coalition comes to power, hundreds of thousands of people will leave Israel in the coming years,” he observes, pointing to the already significant emigration of academics, doctors, and other professionals.

Professor Roznai situates these concerns within a broader analysis of populist constitutionalism. Although Israel has not yet crossed the threshold into electoral authoritarianism, he argues that its democratic institutions remain vulnerable to executive encroachment. As he explains, “The more polarized a society becomes, the weaker the commitment to democratic values within a leader’s political base.” He identifies the judiciary, independent legal authorities, and civil society as essential safeguards against the concentration of political power.

Drawing on comparative experiences, Professor Roznai argues that a post-Netanyahu Israel would resemble Poland more than Hungary, primarily because of the fragmentation of its opposition and the complexities of coalition formation. Unlike Hungary, where Péter Magyar emerged as a dominant opposition leader, Israel’s alternative political camp encompasses ideologically diverse parties from the left, center, and right, alongside Arab parties. Even if Netanyahu loses, Professor Roznai cautions, the resulting government would struggle to pursue a unified agenda of democratic restoration. “From a comparative perspective, this would resemble Poland more than Hungary,” he observes, emphasizing that Israel would not have “a single leader winning the elections and exercising overwhelming control over the coalition.” Such fragmentation could complicate efforts to reverse institutional abuses and strengthen democratic safeguards.

Professor Roznai also cautions against assuming that Netanyahu’s electoral defeat would automatically restore democratic governance. “That will not be the end of the story. It will only be the beginning,” he emphasizes. Meaningful restoration, in his assessment, would require completing Israel’s Bill of Rights, strengthening constitutional safeguards, protecting judicial independence, and rebuilding democratic literacy through education.

Ultimately, his assessment presents the coming elections not simply as a contest over political leadership but as a critical juncture in the struggle over Israel’s constitutional identity, democratic institutions, and long-term national future.

Here is our interview with Professor Yaniv Roznai, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Netanyahu Has Used Polarization to Weaken Commitment to Democratic Values

Israelis protest at Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s anti-democratic coup on April 1, 2023. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

Professor Roznai, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your recent research on Israel’s democratic crisis. In your study with Noam Gidron, “Israel – Populism, Polarization and the Crisis of Democracy,” you identify the interaction between populist leadership, affective polarization, and institutional vulnerability as a major driver of democratic backsliding. How has Netanyahu exploited these dynamics, and has Israel crossed the threshold from democratic erosion toward competitive authoritarianism?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: Thank you for this question. The relationship between populism and polarization has been particularly interesting in the Israeli case. Since the early days of the current government, in late 2022 and early 2023, we have seen attempts to undermine various mechanisms of checks and balances. The main target has been the judiciary, but the government has also sought to weaken independent media, institutional gatekeepers such as the Attorney General and the Ombudsman for the Judiciary, civil society organizations, and others.

Of course, the gravest attack has been on the courts, through attempts to limit judicial review and capture the judiciary. Some of these attempts have failed because of the truly outstanding protest movement that emerged in 2023, when hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets against the judicial overhaul and Netanyahu.

What is particularly interesting, however, is how Netanyahu has used polarization. Various surveys conducted in 2023 asked Likud voters whether they supported the proposed constitutional reforms concerning the judiciary. About one-third said they did not support them. Let’s put them aside.

The remaining two-thirds supported the reforms. When asked why they supported these changes to the judiciary—whether because they regarded judges as detached elites or believed democracy was simply about the will of the majority—the strongest predictor of support was how much they loved Netanyahu and how much they hated the opposition. In other words, it was about love and hate. It was about affective polarization.

This analysis worries me greatly because it creates an incentive for populist leaders who want to introduce reforms harmful to democracy and capture the judiciary to deepen polarization. The more polarized a society becomes, the weaker the commitment to democratic values within a leader’s political base.

This is precisely the dynamic we have seen in Israel. On the one hand, Netanyahu has attempted to advance major reforms that would undermine democracy. On the other, he has sought to deepen polarization so that his political base would not punish him for those reforms. This is the mutual symbiosis between populism and polarization that we have observed in Israel.

Now, I do not think Israel has yet crossed the threshold into electoral authoritarianism. We are not there yet, particularly because Netanyahu has failed to implement the vast majority of his program. He has failed to capture the judiciary and to remove the independent Attorney General. We still have relatively independent media and a very strong civil society.

We can discuss this further later, but we have seen how civil society has organized to ensure that the coming elections remain competitive. Netanyahu has certainly managed to enact various problematic laws and undermine civil society in significant ways. I believe we are clearly experiencing democratic erosion, or democratic backsliding.

However, we have not yet crossed that threshold. If Netanyahu is elected again and the same coalition remains in power, it will be a different ballgame. Then, it will be game over for Israel’s liberal democratic project. That is why I very much hope the coming elections will bring about major change.

Personalized Loyalty to Netanyahu Threatens Democratic Rotation of Power

Your research suggests that emotional attachment to Netanyahu and hostility toward his opponents predict support for the judicial overhaul more strongly than ideological commitments. Does this indicate that Netanyahuism has become a form of personalized authoritarian populism in which loyalty to the leader supersedes constitutional principles?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: The answer to that question is certainly yes. It’s quite remarkable. You see this in various street surveys in which voters are asked, “Who are you going to vote for?” And they respond, “Oh, I will vote for Netanyahu.”

When asked, “But wait, he has proposed reforms that could undermine your rights. He hasn’t really won the war in Gaza. Hamas is still standing. We know the situation with thousands of soldiers serving in the reserves, while he is allowing the ultra-Orthodox not to serve in the military. How can you still support him?” people simply respond, “I support Netanyahu because that’s what I do. I just support Netanyahu. No one else can replace him.”

Even when you discuss specific policies, it doesn’t matter. Real-world facts make no difference. Democratic or constitutional values make no difference. It’s entirely personal: “We want Netanyahu. He is all we know. My parents voted for Netanyahu, and I will vote for Netanyahu. No one else can replace him.”

This is deeply frustrating in a democracy because it raises a fundamental question: How are we supposed to convince one another and maintain some form of democratic rotation of power if, regardless of what happens, one side of the political spectrum continues to vote for the same person simply because of who he is?

Israel’s Coalition Has Sought to Create a ‘Frankenstate’

Billboard reading “The Looting Government,” part of a protest campaign against the conservative coalition’s policies in Ra’anana, Israel, May 2023. Photo: Rene Van Den Berg

In “Populist Constitutionalism and the Judicial Overhaul in Israel,” written with Amichai Cohen, you argue that Israel’s institutional architecture makes it particularly vulnerable to populist capture. How have the absence of a rigid constitution, unicameralism, and concentrated executive power facilitated Netanyahu’s attempts to weaken democratic checks and balances?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s a good question. To answer it, I’ll start with how Netanyahu has been abusing comparative constitutional law. The main pillars of the judicial overhaul were to change the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee so that the coalition would control the appointment of all judges; limit the courts’ authority to review laws; enact an override clause that would allow a majority of members of parliament to override various decisions of the Court; change the status and independence of legal advisors in government; and weaken administrative judicial review by abolishing the reasonableness doctrine, which is central to Israeli administrative law.

I emphasize this because one of the key arguments Netanyahu and his coalition members used to justify these reforms was comparative law. Netanyahu repeatedly says, “But look, in the United States, politicians select the judges. Is the US not a democracy? In Canada, there is an override clause. We simply want to enact a similar override clause. What, Canada is not a democracy? In the UK, the courts cannot strike down laws. What, the UK is not a democracy?”

Essentially, the coalition has been doing what Kim Lane Scheppele calls the “Frankenstate.” Through what Rosalind Dixon and David Landau describe as “abusive borrowing,” elements are borrowed from different countries and combined to create a monster state rather than a functioning liberal democracy.

This brings me to the question of checks and balances. It is true that Canada has an override clause, that politicians in the US select Supreme Court justices, and that the Attorney General in the UK does not have the same authority as in Israel. 

However, when you compare democracies around the world, you find various mechanisms of checks and balances designed to ensure that political power is not concentrated in a single body. These may include a presidential system with veto powers, a federal system with a vertical separation of powers between the central government and the states, or a bicameral legislature with upper and lower houses elected differently. In Europe, there are also supranational institutions.

Israel has none of these mechanisms of political checks and balances. We have a unicameral Knesset controlled by the government. Essentially, five or six politicians who lead the coalition can impose their will through coalition discipline. 

There is also no rigid constitution. In a single day, the Knesset can enact or abolish a Basic Law by a simple majority. For example, Basic Law: Human Dignity or Basic Law: The Judiciary could be abolished in a single day by an ordinary majority, even by a vote of two to one.

Because of this weak system of checks and balances, we must be very cautious when making comparative arguments. Given the weakness of Israel’s political checks and balances, the only real constraints on political power are the judiciary and the Attorney General. That is precisely why these institutions are relatively strong in Israel. If you weaken them, you risk creating an unlimited government with absolute powers. That was the fundamental danger of the judicial overhaul.

Netanyahu’s Judicial Overhaul Was Designed to Give His Government Absolute Power

Your work distinguishes legitimate constitutional reform from abusive constitutionalism. Looking at the Netanyahu government’s judicial overhaul since 2023, which measures most clearly reveal an effort to consolidate executive power rather than improve democratic governance?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: Yes, that is true. I’m the last person in Israel who would argue that the judicial system needs no reform, that the office of the Attorney General should remain untouched, or that no changes should be made to constitutional review mechanisms. I’m not saying that the system is perfect.

The problem is that Netanyahu’s reforms had nothing to do with the issues that actually needed correction. The purpose of his judicial overhaul was to provide his government with absolute power, without any mechanisms of checks and balances. That was the fundamental problem, and my concern was precisely the concentration of absolute power in the executive.

We’ll probably discuss this further later, but I believe various constitutional reforms are needed to improve the system. The judicial overhaul, however, was not about such improvements. It was entirely abusive because it would have undermined the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the very democratic identity of the state. It would also have severely undermined, if not completely destroyed, judicial independence. In that respect, it was fundamentally abusive, unfortunately.

As I mentioned earlier, Israel’s constitutional system is extremely flexible, making it remarkably easy to enact a Basic Law. To give you some numbers, Israel has undergone more constitutional changes in the past decade than the United States has experienced throughout its entire history. Since the enactment of our first Basic Law, we have had more than 140 constitutional changes.

Many of these changes have involved ad hoc, personalized amendments, sometimes even temporary ones, introduced for the benefit of incumbents, political convenience, or the government’s narrow political interests. Unfortunately, this is a deeply abusive practice.

Democratic Erosion Has Shifted from Major Constitutional Reforms to Incremental Institutional Changes

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

In “From the Hungarian Blitz to the Polish Salami,” you describe how Israel’s judicial overhaul shifted from rapid institutional transformation to incremental democratic erosion. Has this strategy proved more effective under the cover of the Gaza war, particularly through changes to judicial appointments and the weakening of independent legal authorities?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: Yes, that is indeed the case. In early 2023, Netanyahu’s government, primarily through Minister of Justice Yariv Levin, announced a sweeping judicial reform on national television. This triggered a civil backlash and an unprecedented protest movement, with hundreds of thousands of citizens taking to the streets every week for 10 months to demonstrate against the judicial overhaul.

In mid-2023, these protests prompted Netanyahu to enter negotiations with the opposition under the auspices of the president. When those negotiations failed, the coalition changed its modus operandi. Instead of pursuing a single major package of constitutional reforms, it adopted what I call the “salami system”—introducing changes slice by slice.

The first slice came in July 2023 with the abolition of the reasonableness doctrine in administrative review. This amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary was subsequently invalidated by the Supreme Court in early 2024. However, as the coalition itself indicated, this was merely the amuse-bouche, the first dish in a series of reforms that would follow.

Following October 7 and the war in Gaza, the coalition changed its approach entirely. Rather than pursuing major constitutional reforms, it shifted toward subconstitutional measures, including ordinary laws, regulations, secondary legislation, and, above all, administrative actions, particularly concerning appointments and civil society.

Let me briefly outline the various measures undertaken after October 7, although I can elaborate on each of them if you wish. The government refused to appoint a president of the Supreme Court according to the seniority rule and subsequently refused to recognize Justice Amit’s appointment as president. It does not recognize him as president of the Supreme Court and refuses to address him by that title. The government has also failed to fill four Supreme Court vacancies since October 2023, leaving only 11 justices instead of 15.

The coalition also unlawfully attempted to dismiss the Attorney General and enacted legislation undermining the authority of that office. In 2025, it changed the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee. For many months, the Minister of Justice refused to convene the committee until the Supreme Court compelled him to do so.

The government also changed the law governing the Ombudsman for the Judiciary and the procedure for appointing the Civil Service Commissioner. It introduced legislation to weaken the Israeli Bar Association. The police underwent extensive politicization, primarily through appointments.

In addition, the coalition enacted legislation undermining independent media and made various attempts to ban political parties.

So, what we have witnessed is a broad package of legislative and administrative measures rather than a few sweeping constitutional reforms. That is the fundamental difference.

The Supreme Court and Incremental Democratic Erosion

In your article “When the First Brick Falls of the Fortress of Democracy,” you argue that courts must resist even the earliest stages of authoritarian constitutional change. Has Israel’s Supreme Court adequately defended its institutional independence, or has incremental executive encroachment already weakened its capacity to protect democracy?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: This is a serious problem around the world, not just in Israel. We know that democratic erosion occurs incrementally, step by step. I often refer to what I call the “bald guy paradox.” Imagine a person with a full head of hair who removes one hair every day. We know that eventually this person will become bald, but when exactly can we say that he is bald? We cannot identify the precise day. Democratic erosion works in exactly the same way.

You weaken the courts a little, independent media a little, the opposition, the ombudsman, and civil society. But at what point does this gradual weakening transform a country from a democracy into an autocracy? It is very difficult to draw that line. That is precisely the problem.

Various constitutional doctrines, such as the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine and eternity clauses, are ill-equipped to address this kind of incremental erosion. These doctrines tend to envision a single amendment that explicitly transforms a country into something other than a democracy.

Consider France in July 1940, when a single law granted Marshal Pétain both executive and legislative authority, effectively concentrating all powers in his hands. But this is no longer how democratic erosion typically occurs. We are unlikely to see such an explicit law. Instead, we see multiple laws that, slowly but surely, undermine and ultimately destroy democracy. Courts must therefore recognize this process in their jurisprudence.

They need to shift their judicial thinking away from examining only the individual amendment or law before them. Instead, they must adopt a more aggregated, cumulative approach that also considers the broader context.

This is what I argued in July 2023, when the Knesset enacted a Basic Law amendment undermining the reasonableness doctrine. I maintained that the Court should examine this amendment within its broader context. There were already various other laws awaiting enactment, but the crucial question was why the government was so determined to abolish the reasonableness doctrine.

The reason was that, without the reasonableness doctrine, the government could remove other institutional gatekeepers, most importantly the Attorney General. Once the Attorney General was removed, the government could interfere with elections and pursue other measures. This is why such amendments must be examined within their broader context.

Here, I must say that the Court refused to adopt the idea of aggregated judicial review. Nonetheless, it struck down the amendment concerning reasonableness. The Court concluded that, even when examined on its own, the amendment so seriously undermined the rule of law and the separation of powers that it had to be declared, for the first time in Israel’s history, an unconstitutional constitutional amendment.

So, notwithstanding the various attacks it has faced over the past four years, the Court has remained quite strong and has resisted these threats whenever it could.

Ben-Gvir, Smotrich, and the Rise of the Far Right

Itamar Ben Gvir, speaking in election conference at Ale Zahav in Samaria/Isreal on September 9, 2019. Photo: Barak Shacked.

The political empowerment of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich has elevated religious ultranationalism within Israel’s governing institutions. Are these actors merely radical coalition partners, or do they represent a more fundamental project to replace liberal constitutionalism with an exclusionary, ethno-religious conception of sovereignty?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s an extremely important and troubling question. If you had asked me five years ago, I would have said, “Look, Ben-Gvir is extremely radical. He’s a clown. He has no support.” In earlier election campaigns, Netanyahu himself refused even to be photographed with Ben-Gvir because he was regarded as such an extreme outlier.

Unfortunately, I don’t think that is the case anymore. After four years in power and the trauma of October 7, significant segments of Israeli society have moved further toward the extreme right.

I also want to emphasize the role of social media. Ben-Gvir has been remarkably clever in his use of social media, particularly in influencing young people and young voters. You can now go into schools and hear children shouting “Ben-Gvir” and expressing their support for him. He has been extremely effective on social media, which I find quite frightening.

I’m afraid that Ben-Gvir is gaining more and more supporters. What is particularly troubling is the damage he has done to the police, the fact that Netanyahu has not removed him from office, and the fact that the Court has allowed his appointment to stand rather than removing him. We should remember that this man, who serves as Minister of National Security, has a criminal conviction for assisting a terrorist organization.

To me, this is a complete disaster. Unfortunately, I expect his political support to grow in the coming elections. I can no longer dismiss him as some kind of clown—an extreme figure with no meaningful support. That situation has fundamentally changed over the past few years.

Religious Nationalism and the Coalition Against Judicial Independence

Religious Zionist parties, ultra-Orthodox movements, and Likud approach questions of Jewish identity, religious authority, military service, and territorial sovereignty differently. Despite these differences, have they formed a durable illiberal alliance against judicial independence and constitutional limitations on majority power?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: A useful way to analyze what has been happening in Israel over the past four years, particularly regarding the attacks on democracy, is to examine the different interests of the groups that formed the current coalition.

On the one hand, you have extreme groups led by figures such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. These parties have been pushing for annexation and the deepening of the occupation of the occupied territories. That is one group.

Another powerful group is the ultra-Orthodox. Their primary concerns are twofold: first, securing exemptions from military service for their communities; and second, obtaining budgets for their population through discriminatory budget allocations.

The Supreme Court has been the only central institution that has so far blocked these initiatives—deepening the occupation, exemptions from military service, and discriminatory budget allocations. This explains why these two groups within the coalition have such a strong incentive to weaken or capture the Court, or to introduce an override clause that would allow the coalition to override its decisions.

There are two additional incentives. First, there are people within the coalition, such as Minister of Justice Yariv Levin, who are genuine ideologues. They are populists who believe that democracy is essentially the will of the majority. Their thinking is: “We have the majority. We won the elections. That means we represent the people, and we can do whatever we want because we have the authority of popular sovereignty.” These are genuine ideological convictions.

Then there is Netanyahu. We must remember that he has been undergoing a criminal trial for several years. Previously, Netanyahu had blocked meaningful attempts to undermine the judiciary. It is only since facing his own criminal trial that he has been willing to give the Minister of Justice a blank check to undermine the judiciary and the Attorney General. These developments are interconnected.

If the Attorney General is dismissed and Netanyahu can appoint whomever he wants to that position, the consequences could be significant. In Israel, the Attorney General also heads the prosecution. There is no separation between the offices of Attorney General and Chief Prosecutor; they are effectively the same position.

A newly appointed Attorney General could therefore stop Netanyahu’s criminal trial or at least negotiate a favorable deal for him. This is one of Netanyahu’s major incentives, and it illustrates how these interests are connected.

This provides a useful framework for understanding the situation. And absolutely, the ultra-Orthodox, through their ambition to expand the role of religion in public life and the public sphere, are also directly challenging the liberal and secular way of life. This is certainly a struggle over Israel’s constitutional identity.

The Gaza War Weakened Democratic Protests

Thousands march in Jerusalem against judicial overhaul, March 2025. A broad protest fills the streets at night, with demonstrators calling to save Israeli democracy. Photo: Dreamstime.

In your analysis of the judicial overhaul after October 7, you argue that the security crisis facilitated rather than suspended the government’s populist constitutional project. How did the Hamas attacks and subsequent war weaken democratic resistance while enabling further concentration of executive power?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s a very interesting question because, in the days following October 7, many people in Israel, myself included, believed the judicial overhaul was over. We were convinced that, given the grave security threats, the trauma of October 7, the challenges of the war, and the hundreds of thousands of people displaced from northern and southern Israel, the government would focus on what really mattered: security, the economy, the hostages, and the wounded. We assumed it would set aside its plans and ambitions concerning the judicial system.

But I was wrong. During the first few months of the war, we had a unity government, and during that period, the government indeed pursued only legislation related to the war, rather than other matters. However, soon after the unity government collapsed, the government resumed its attacks on democracy under the fog of war. Essentially, the coalition used the war as an excuse to continue its judicial overhaul.

First, we saw allegations that the judiciary and government lawyers were responsible for October 7. Instead of acknowledging responsibility, the government argued, “It’s because of the Court’s activism, because of Aharon Barak, and because of the legal advisors who tie the hands of the IDF that October 7 happened.”

We also saw allegations that the judiciary and government lawyers were assisting Hamas. Whenever the Supreme Court heard petitions concerning humanitarian aid to Gaza, for example, the government accused the Court of assisting Hamas and being “Nukhba lovers.”

We also need to consider the broader impact on the media and civil society. As I mentioned earlier, throughout 2023, we had major weekly protests against the judicial overhaul for 10 months. But during the war, people were much less willing to take to the streets to protest against the government.

Especially during wartime, we see what is known as the “rally-around-the-flag” effect. People tend to unite around the government rather than protest against it. Although demonstrations continued, they were nowhere near the scale of those before the war. Tens of thousands of people were serving in the military reserves, while others were preoccupied with the economy or the war itself.

Similarly, media and public attention shifted almost entirely toward the war, particularly the hostages. Even most of the protests focused on ending the war and bringing the hostages home rather than opposing the judicial overhaul.

There are two further points worth emphasizing. First, military reservists had played a crucial role in the protest movement. Many had declared that if the judicial overhaul were enacted, they would refuse to serve in the reserves under a dictatorship.

However, during the war, there was understandably enormous reluctance to use military service as a means of protest.

Second, we need to recognize that populism in Israel, unlike in Europe or the United States, is very much security-based. There is an excellent article by Yonatan Levy and Shai Agmon, Security-Based Populism, which shows how the Israeli government has employed friend-versus-enemy rhetoric primarily around questions of security rather than economic or cultural issues.

So, of course, security threats enabled the government to deepen its populist project.

Netanyahu Has Used the War to Strengthen His Political Power

The October 7 attacks exposed profound failures of Israel’s security establishment and political leadership. Yet Netanyahu remains electorally competitive. Has the politics of existential insecurity enabled him to transform accountability for these failures into renewed claims of national leadership and political legitimacy?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: It’s quite remarkable. First, we need to understand just how extraordinary the situation is. Netanyahu has refused to establish a national commission of inquiry into the failures that led to October 7. For three years, he has refused to establish such a commission, while managing to instill in his political base a lack of trust and confidence in the Supreme Court and in the very mechanism of a commission of inquiry.

Under Israeli law, the government usually decides whether to establish a commission of inquiry, while the President of the Supreme Court appoints its members. Netanyahu has repeatedly argued, “We have no trust in the judiciary. We have no trust in the President of the Court. We don’t recognize the President of the Court.” This, in turn, has generated distrust in the very mechanism of a commission of inquiry. I believe that undermining confidence in the President of the Court was part of his intention.

Why does he refuse to establish a commission of inquiry? Because he knows he bears responsibility for October 7. There were dozens of threats and warnings before the attacks, and he ignored them all. He continued providing millions of dollars to Hamas because he wanted to preserve the separation between Gaza and the Palestinian Authority.

Although he knows he bears responsibility, everyone else has paid some kind of price. Senior officials, including the heads of intelligence and the Shin Bet and the Minister of Security, have resigned from office. Netanyahu is the only one who has remained in power since October 7. He has also refused to call elections following the war. No one in Israel imagined that he would remain in power after the war.

Netanyahu has been using the war to strengthen and entrench his political power, primarily through two strategies.

First, he blames the “deep state.” His argument is essentially: “It was you—the military, the security services, the judges, and the protest movement. You deliberately failed to warn me. You didn’t wake me up on the morning of October 7 because you didn’t want me to respond to the threat. You wanted this to happen so that I would abandon the judicial overhaul and my government would fall.” In other words, he blames the deep state for October 7.

Second, he argues, “Look, even if there were failures before October 7, from October 8 onward, I was the one fighting. I fought against Syria, Iran, Lebanon, and Hamas. I was the only one who fought. Everyone else wanted to surrender or give up. I’m the only one who can continue fighting.”

It’s interesting how he makes this shift. Essentially, he claims, “From October 8 onward, I have been the best leader, and no one can replace me.” Unfortunately, many people in Israel still accept what he is telling them. And here, we need to say something about the media.

As I mentioned earlier, Israel still has free and independent media. However, Netanyahu also has what I would describe as his own propaganda channel, Channel 14. It is a propaganda channel par excellence, conveying Netanyahu’s messages almost exclusively. Unfortunately, for many people, this is the only news channel they watch. As a result, his messages and slogans continue to resonate throughout the public sphere.

Developments in the Occupied Territories Are Undermining Democracy Inside Israel

The controversial Israeli separation wall dividing Israel from the West Bank, often referred to as the segregation wall in Palestine. Photo: Giovanni De Caro.

Israel’s devastating military campaign in Gaza, accompanied by mass civilian casualties, displacement, and allegations of war crimes and genocide, raises profound questions about constitutional democracy. Can Israel meaningfully safeguard liberal-democratic principles domestically while maintaining a system of occupation and denying Palestinians political self-determination?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: This is a profoundly important issue in Israel because, for many years, many Israelis have tried to draw a distinction between what is happening in the occupied territories and what is taking place inside Israel, as if developments in the territories had nothing to do with Israel’s domestic affairs.

For decades, many Israelis maintained the illusion that Israel was a liberal democracy. They acknowledged that there were serious problems in the occupied territories but believed that, domestically, Israel remained a liberal democracy.

However, what we have witnessed since the war demonstrates how difficult it is to maintain this distinction. It is not a binary separation. Developments in the occupied territories are increasingly affecting what happens inside Israel. How can a country sustain its identity as a liberal democracy for decades while maintaining control over other territories through occupation?

I don’t think this situation is sustainable in the long term. It has profound implications for the very project of Israel as a liberal democracy. These issues are interconnected.

On the one hand, we have the negative consequences of the occupation, which undermine Israel’s project as a liberal democracy. On the other hand, as we discussed earlier, we have an increasingly influential religious element within Israeli society that is also growing demographically.

I don’t think a liberal democracy can be sustained indefinitely under these two pressures. So, I hope the next government will be able to bring about meaningful changes in both areas.

Higher Arab Voter Turnout Could Transform Jewish-Arab Political Cooperation

Your constitutional scholarship emphasizes the protection of fundamental rights against unchecked majoritarian power. How does the increasing political marginalization of Palestinian Arab citizens, alongside intensified settlement expansion in the West Bank, expose the tensions between Israel’s Jewish-national character and its democratic commitments?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s a very interesting and challenging question, particularly because we’ve also witnessed changes within Israel’s Arab minority. About 22 percent of Israeli citizens are Arab Palestinians. They have suffered more than almost any other group under this government, apart from Palestinians in the occupied territories. I’m referring specifically to Arab citizens living within Israel. They have suffered particularly from violence within their communities. Under Ben-Gvir, we’ve seen large numbers of deaths and shooting incidents, with devastating consequences for the Arab population.

The reason I emphasize this is that, until now, the Arab population has shown relatively limited interest in participating in Israeli politics. Voter turnout among Arab citizens in Knesset elections has generally been quite low. Of course, there is another side to this. Until a few years ago, hardly anyone imagined that Arab parties could play a meaningful role in government or become part of a governing coalition. That changed in 2021 with the government of change, when, for the first time, an Arab party, Ra’am, a Muslim party, joined the coalition.

I emphasize this because we may see another change in the coming elections. According to surveys, given the grave situation facing the Arab population, turnout among Arab voters could increase substantially. I certainly hope so. Until recently, we were discussing turnout rates of around 50–55 percent. Now, surveys suggest turnout could reach 65 percent, which would represent a significant change. If that happens, it will be extremely important and send a powerful message.

It would strengthen the visibility of Arab politicians in the Knesset and perhaps encourage greater collaboration between Jewish and Arab parties. More importantly, for the first time, we have a senior Jewish politician, Yoav Segalovich, who previously served as Deputy Chief of Police and was a member of the major political party Yesh Atid. He has now moved to become the number two candidate in Ra’am, the Muslim Arab party, and is its candidate to replace Ben-Gvir as Minister of National Security.

If Ra’am supports the next government and Segalovich becomes Minister of National Security as a representative of that party, it would be an extraordinary example of Jewish-Arab collaboration. I very much hope the coming elections will also bring meaningful change in the relationship between Arab voters, the broader Arab population, and Jewish political parties.

I should also remind your audience that Israel, like Germany and Turkey, has a legal mechanism for banning political parties. Last month, the plenary of the Central Elections Committee voted to ban all Arab parties—parties representing more than 20 percent of the population. This was purely political propaganda because the coalition knew the decision would be overturned by the Court.

Indeed, the Supreme Court invalidated the decision. But this created a win-win situation for the coalition because it could then accuse the Court of supporting Arabs and terrorists, and so on. From the coalition’s perspective, it was a win-win situation. It was simply political propaganda. Nevertheless, this episode reveals the zeitgeist of the current Israeli coalition toward the Arab minority, which I find deeply saddening.

Netanyahu Could Refuse to Recognize Election Results if He Loses

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his visit to Prague, Czech Republic, on December 5, 2012. Photo: Dreamstime.

In your June 2026 article “The Populist Coalition in Israel Is Stressed from Orbán’s Loss and Is Gaslighting,” you examine the implications of Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat for Netanyahu’s coalition. What lessons does Hungary’s experience offer regarding the defeat of entrenched populist leaders, electoral integrity, and the prospects for democratic restoration in Israel?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: After Orbán lost the elections in Hungary, several members of the Israeli coalition, including Simcha Rothman, chair of the Constitution Committee and one of the leaders of the judicial overhaul, said, “You, Professor Yaniv Roznai, and the protesters were lying to us throughout 2023. You warned that we would become an autocratic government, like Poland or Hungary. But look, Poland held elections and experienced a rotation of power. Now Orbán has lost the elections in Hungary. So what kind of dictatorship have you been trying to convince us we were becoming?”

I tried to explain what had actually happened in Hungary. I also traveled there during the elections to observe and learn from the experience. My point was that Hungary was not an autocracy like North Korea, but its electoral system was neither genuinely competitive nor free and fair. I explained the various ways Orbán had manipulated the electoral system during his 16 years in power. Israel’s situation is different. Institutionally and structurally, Israel still has a competitive electoral system.

That is precisely why I am concerned that Netanyahu and his coalition, lacking substantial public support and certainly not enjoying majority support, will resort to various manipulations and tricks to undermine electoral integrity in the coming elections. We have already seen the creation of fake videos, including deepfakes, designed to influence voters. We know that personal data on voters is being collected in attempts to influence them.

We also know about plans involving intimidation at polling stations, including the possibility of gangs threatening voters, particularly in Arab cities and villages, to discourage Arab citizens from voting. So, there are various plans that concern us. But what I find remarkable about these elections, something we have not witnessed in previous elections, is that civil society has redirected the enormous energy of the 2023 protest movement toward protecting electoral integrity.

We now have tens of thousands of volunteers. To give you an idea of the scale, according to official figures from the Central Elections Committee, 270,000 people have applied to serve as polling station secretaries to ensure that voting is conducted according to the rules. That is an extraordinary number.

Similarly, in the nonprofit civil society organization I work with to ensure that the coming elections remain competitive, tens of thousands of people have expressed interest in volunteering as observers, either inside or outside polling stations, to prevent violence, intimidation, cheating, and other irregularities.

For the first time in Israel’s history, civil society has organized on such a scale to safeguard free and fair elections. This mobilization reflects our concern that Netanyahu may attempt various forms of electoral manipulation.

Over the past six months, we have also witnessed a campaign by Netanyahu and his coalition members to undermine public confidence in the Central Elections Committee and in the electoral process itself. For example, they have portrayed the chair of the Central Elections Committee, who is actually a religious conservative Supreme Court judge, as an extreme left-wing figure. They claim, “This extreme left-wing guy wants to steal the elections.” That is, of course, ridiculous.

But this is the campaign they have been conducting. It appears designed to prepare the ground for what might happen afterward, particularly if Netanyahu loses and refuses to recognize the results. We have seen what happened with Bolsonaro in Brazil and the events at the US Capitol involving Donald Trump. I am concerned that we could witness similar developments in Israel, with Netanyahu refusing to recognize the election results if he loses.

A Post-Netanyahu Government Would Resemble Poland More Than Hungary

Recent polling suggests a highly fragmented electoral landscape, with Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar challenging Likud and opposition parties confronting difficult coalition arithmetic. Given Netanyahu’s resilience and the potential parliamentary importance of Arab parties, which post-election scenarios appear most plausible—and what risks do you foresee for electoral legitimacy and a peaceful transfer of power?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: This is an issue we are all struggling with. Although Netanyahu and Likud have been dramatically weakened since the previous elections, and certainly since October 7, Netanyahu’s bloc remains very homogeneous, united under a single leader: Netanyahu.

On the other hand, the opposition, despite leading in the polls, is highly fragmented. We have Gadi Eisenkot, Bennett, Lapid, the Democrats, Lieberman, and the Arab parties. These are different political forces, and they cannot agree on a single candidate. Anyone hoping that the next government will be a coalition of change, entirely different from the current coalition and capable of reversing all the problematic laws that have been enacted, shifting Israel toward liberal democracy, and strengthening judicial independence, will probably be disappointed.

Even if Netanyahu steps down and another coalition takes power, it will be a very diverse coalition rather than a homogeneous one, bringing together left-wing and right-wing parties. Advancing a common agenda under such circumstances would be extremely challenging.

From a comparative perspective, this would resemble Poland more than Hungary. We would not have a single leader winning the elections and exercising overwhelming control over the coalition. That simply would not be the case.

The situation would be especially challenging if Arab parties were part of the coalition, given the delegitimization of the Arab population by Netanyahu and his political allies. Maintaining a strong coalition that depends on the support of Arab parties would be particularly difficult.

So, I do not envision a scenario in which we could simply say, “That’s it. Like Péter Magyar in Hungary, we’ll win the elections, and then we can do whatever we want.” That is not how things would work.

One possible scenario is that Netanyahu loses and a new, highly complex coalition emerges, one that would have to navigate competing interests and political differences.

A second possibility is some form of national unity government, with or without Netanyahu. One scenario involves Netanyahu receiving a pardon from the president, which could restore his political legitimacy, at least to some extent. Currently, other parties refuse to cooperate with him because he is undergoing a criminal trial.

If he receives a presidential pardon, he would no longer be facing that trial, which would also allow him to serve as a minister. We could therefore imagine a mixed coalition in which Likud joins other Zionist parties to form a national unity government.

Another scenario is that no party or bloc succeeds in forming a government, leading to another cycle of elections. Remember that between 2019 and 2022, Israel held five rounds of elections. That was extraordinary.

Imagine continuing to hold elections while Netanyahu remains prime minister of successive caretaker governments. This is a scenario I very much hope we can avoid.

People understand that these are among the most consequential elections in Israel’s history. Thousands upon thousands of Israelis living abroad, myself included, are returning to Israel specifically to vote. I do not expect this level of mobilization to continue if we enter another prolonged cycle of elections. That is why I sincerely hope the election results will be decisive.

Post-Populist Populism and Democratic Restoration

In your work on post-populist populism, you warn that governments succeeding populist incumbents may reproduce their predecessors’ illiberal governing practices. If Netanyahu loses on October 27, what constitutional reforms would be essential to prevent a new government from perpetuating the institutional abuses it was elected to reverse?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: This is a challenge we see around the world. Professor Amichai Cohen and I wrote a blog post on post-populist populism, and we are now editing a special volume of Constitutional Studies on this topic, bringing together experts from around the world. Post-populism presents a fundamental rule-of-law challenge. On the one hand, you want to restore democracy. Let’s say a populist leader loses an election, and a post-populist government comes to power with the aim of restoring democracy.

But the judiciary has been captured by political judges appointed by the previous government. You have civil servants who are either controlled by or allied with the previous government. You also have media organizations that have been politicized and brought under its control. What do you do to dismantle these structures?

If you start dismissing civil servants and judges or attempting to capture the courts yourself, you risk falling into the trap of using exactly the same methods as the populists. You also expose yourself to accusations such as, “Aha, when we captured the courts, you called it populism, fascism, or dictatorship. But when you do the same thing, it’s acceptable because you’re the good guys. How do you explain that?”

This is the rule-of-law dilemma. The problem is that populism corrupts the entire political playing field, while the populist toolkit remains available. Resisting the temptation to use those tools is an enormous challenge. You want to use them, but for good purposes. This creates a dilemma that we are still not sure how to resolve.

Of course, much depends on how deeply the system has already been corrupted. In Hungary, after 16 years, the corruption is so deeply entrenched that correcting it will take years, and decisive action will be necessary. Looking at Poland and Hungary, one important lesson is that an incoming government has a very narrow window of opportunity during which it has the legitimacy to act quickly and decisively. If it fails to act within that window, it may lose the ability to act effectively.

For a new Israeli government, this means addressing the most pressing issues immediately. Take, for example, the 2025 amendment concerning the Judicial Selection Committee, which completely politicized the system. I believe one of the first things the new government must do is repeal that amendment and restore the status quo ante.

In terms of procedure and due process, there is an important distinction between introducing an entirely new reform and repealing an existing amendment to restore the previous situation. The latter can be accomplished much more quickly. So, I believe the new government must act rapidly on two priorities: establishing a commission of inquiry into October 7 and repealing the three or four principal judicial overhaul laws that were enacted. 

However, when it comes to pursuing more comprehensive reforms, the government must proceed much more carefully to secure the legitimacy required for such changes, especially if it lacks a substantial parliamentary majority. If it has only a narrow majority, I fear that undertaking sweeping reforms would be extremely risky. Nevertheless, it would need to entrench the essential constitutional safeguards to ensure that another judicial overhaul cannot be carried out in the near future.

Trump’s Endorsement Is Unlikely to Change Deeply Polarized Electoral Landscape

Israelis walk next an Israeli election billboard of Likud Party showing US President Donald Trump shaking hands with Likud chairman and Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Beth Shemesh, Israel on September 8, 2019. Photo: Gil Cohen Magen.

What will be the impact of US President Donald Trump’s endorsement of Prime Minister Netanyahu in the Oct. 27 elections?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: Yes, we’ve seen Trump’s intervention in the Israeli elections through his endorsement of Netanyahu. Let me make a few observations. First, we also witnessed US intervention on behalf of Orbán in Hungary, and it did not help him. In fact, it may have made things worse for Orbán.

In Israel, I don’t think Trump’s endorsement will have the same negative effect because Trump is very popular among Israelis. However, I also don’t believe it will make a significant difference. Israeli society is so deeply polarized that voters rarely move between the pro-Netanyahu and anti-Netanyahu camps. Such shifts are particularly unlikely just a week before the elections. So, I don’t expect the endorsement to bring about any major change.

There is also an interesting possibility that I’ve heard discussed. According to a media report published today, Netanyahu wanted to launch an attack on Iran, but Trump prevented him from doing so. One possibility is that Trump’s public endorsement of Netanyahu’s candidacy was offered in exchange for Netanyahu refraining from attacking Iran. I don’t know whether that’s the case. It’s an assumption I’ve heard, and it sounds plausible to me. Nevertheless, I don’t think Trump’s endorsement will make a substantial difference.

Defeating Netanyahu Would Be Only the Beginning of Restoring Israeli Democracy

And lastly, Professor Roznai, looking beyond the elections, would Netanyahu’s defeat and the exclusion of the religious-nationalist far right constitute a genuine democratic turning point, or would meaningful restoration require a deeper constitutional settlement addressing judicial independence, minority rights, executive accountability, and Palestinian self-determination? Are Israel’s democratic institutions sufficiently resilient to withstand another Netanyahu government?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s the million-dollar question. My analysis is that even if Netanyahu loses the elections and the alternative camp—what we call the camp of change or the camp of restoring democracy—wins, that will not be the end of the story. It will only be the beginning.

To truly restore democracy in Israel, we need to undertake various reforms, beginning at the institutional level. First, we must complete our Bill of Rights. Unlike other countries, Israel does not have a comprehensive Bill of Rights. For example, fundamental constitutional rights, such as equality, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion, are not formally enshrined in a Basic Law. We need to complete the Bill of Rights and introduce a Basic Law on legislation that would stabilize our constitutional system. Such a law should ensure that enacting or amending a Basic Law requires a supermajority, as is the case in other countries. Institutionally, we must also strengthen checks and balances and other independent institutional gatekeepers. These are essential reforms at the constitutional level.

But we also need to do much more in education. For many years, we have neglected education about democracy and democratic literacy. Regardless of how strong or independent the Court may be, or how rigid our Basic Laws become, democracy cannot survive without committed small-d democrats—citizens who understand the importance of liberal democracy and what it truly means. So, we have important work to do at both the constitutional and educational levels. We need to strengthen the understanding of liberal democracy within Israeli society.

My aspiration is to establish a unified stream of education. You need to understand that Israel currently has different educational streams: a religious stream, an Arab stream, and a more secular stream. What is remarkable is that large numbers of children in Israeli schools have little understanding of democracy or liberal democracy, while Arab children often have little understanding of what it means to live in a Jewish state. We need a unified educational framework that explains to students that they live in a state that is both Jewish and democratic, and how these two potentially conflicting values are supposed to coexist.

I believe it will take years to repair the damage that the current coalition has inflicted on Israel. And the only way to begin that process of correction and democratic restoration is to win the elections. That is the first step.

I’m afraid that if another Netanyahu coalition comes to power, hundreds of thousands of people will leave Israel in the coming years. That would be a disaster. Already, tens of thousands have left, many of them liberals, academics, and doctors. There was a cartoon in one of the Israeli newspapers depicting a flight attendant asking, “Is there a doctor on the plane?” And everyone on the plane was raising their hands. It’s funny, but at the same time, it isn’t funny because it’s not merely a joke; it reflects reality. I know many academics who have already left Israel, and I’m deeply concerned that many more will leave if another Netanyahu coalition takes power.

According to a recent survey published by News Channel 12, approximately a quarter of opposition voters said they would consider leaving the country if Netanyahu wins. That is an extraordinary number. So, I genuinely fear that Israel, as a country seeking to endure for generations to come, would not survive another coalition like this.

Professor Gideon Rahat.

Prof. Rahat: Netanyahu’s Departure Could Pave the Way for Democratic Renewal in Israel

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Gideon Rahat of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem examines Israel’s democratic prospects ahead of the October 27 elections. He argues that Netanyahu’s departure could enable a redistribution of political power and a return to consensus-based democracy, while warning that deeply personalized parties and weakened institutional checks threaten democratic resilience. Highlighting Netanyahu’s role in legitimizing the religious-nationalist far right, Professor Rahat cautions: “But once you let this genie out of the bottle, which is what Netanyahu did, the genie is here to stay.” Despite these enduring challenges, he sees opportunities for democratic renewal through institutional reform, stronger political parties, and the restoration of checks and balances.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Israel approaches the October 27 elections, its political landscape remains deeply polarized by Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership, the growing influence of the religious-nationalist far right, and the profound consequences of the October 7 attacks and the devastating war in Gaza. Beyond the immediate electoral contest, fundamental questions concern the resilience of democratic institutions, the personalization of political power, and whether a post-Netanyahu government could reverse Israel’s democratic backsliding.

In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Gideon Rahat, holder of the Gersten Family Chair in Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Senior Fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute, offers a nuanced assessment of these challenges. Drawing on his scholarship on political parties, populism, and democratic institutions, Professor Rahat argues that Netanyahu’s departure could create an opportunity for democratic renewal, although Israel’s deeply personalized party system presents formidable structural obstacles.

Central to his analysis is Netanyahu’s consolidation of political authority and his transformation of Likud. According to Professor Rahat, Netanyahu’s populism combines centralized personalism with an antagonistic division between the supposedly authentic people and institutional elites. Yet his removal could fundamentally alter these dynamics. As Professor Rahat explains, “Netanyahu did not allow anyone around him to grow politically.” Consequently, he argues, no obvious successor possesses the capacity to reproduce Netanyahu’s centralized political infrastructure. His departure could therefore allow political power to be redistributed, potentially facilitating a return to consensus-based democracy.

However, Professor Rahat simultaneously warns that Netanyahu has fundamentally transformed Israel’s political landscape by legitimizing previously marginal ultranationalist forces. Examining the rise of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, he emphasizes the decisive role of political elites in enabling radicalization. Referring to Netanyahu’s political elevation of Ben-Gvir, Professor Rahat observes: “But once you let this genie out of the bottle, which is what Netanyahu did, the genie is here to stay.” This normalization of the far right represents an enduring challenge that may survive Netanyahu’s eventual departure.

The interview also explores the weakening of judicial independence, the marginalization of Arab political parties, and the enduring trauma of October 7. Professor Rahat emphasizes that the erosion of institutional safeguards cannot be reversed through leadership change alone, warning that “a court cannot sustain democracy by itself.” Democratic reconstruction, he argues, requires stronger political parties, institutional reforms, and a broader distribution of political authority.

Moreover, Professor Rahat’s analysis distinguishes between the possibility of ending Netanyahu’s personalized rule and the more demanding task of rebuilding Israeli democracy. His cautiously hopeful conclusion underscores the importance of institutional transformation beyond electoral alternation: “Hopefully, this would allow Israel to return to a more consensus-based form of democracy.”

Here is our interview with Professor Gideon Rahat, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Political Personalization Extends Beyond Netanyahu to the Opposition

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his visit to Prague, Czech Republic, on December 5, 2012. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Rahat, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your research on Likud’s personalization under Netanyahu. In your research with Ofer Kenig, you argue that Likud has transformed from an institutionalized leader party into a personal party under Netanyahu. Has this transformation reached the point where Likud’s political identity, organizational survival, and ideological direction have become inseparable from Netanyahu himself? What would remain of Netanyahuism without Netanyahu?

Professor Gideon Rahat: The party might collapse after Netanyahu, but you have to remember that most of the other relevant parties in Israel are also personal. This means that Likud might survive because it still has a brand name and a platform that could remain after Netanyahu. If Likud and Netanyahu were competing against an institutionalized party, Likud might have collapsed. But there are no such alternatives these days. Israeli politics is very personal—not only when it comes to Netanyahu, but also to the opposition to Netanyahu.

Netanyahu Embraced Populism Amid His Legal Troubles

Your recent research with Tristan Klingelhöfer links centralized party personalism to illiberalism and majoritarian conceptions of democracy. To what extent does Netanyahuism exemplify this relationship? Is Israel experiencing a populist challenge to liberal democracy or a more profound transformation toward personalized authoritarian governance?

Professor Gideon Rahat: No, populism in Israel is clear. I must say that until around 2015, Netanyahu was actually blocking populism in Israeli politics. There were many initiatives that he himself blocked. In 2015, this started to change. In 2019, once he began having problems in court over allegations of corruption, he really changed course and became a populist in a very clear and simple sense: There is me, the person who represents the genuine people, and there are these corrupt elites—the courts, the prosecutors, the media, academia, and everybody else, the usual suspects of any populist regime.

So, it is clearly populism. Of course, in Israel, it is blended with centralized personalism. Netanyahu is at the center; he is the symbol of this populist side. His populism is clear, but he is also allied with other populists, such as Viktor Orbán. He was aligned with Bolsonaro and, of course, with Donald Trump.

Religiosity Matters More Than Ethnicity in Netanyahu’s Support

Election billboards of religious political parties Shas and Otzma Yehudit before Israel’s fourth election in two years in a street of Jerusalem on March 22, 2021. Photo: Gali Estrange.

Likud’s historical populism drew heavily on the resentment of marginalized Mizrahi constituencies toward Ashkenazi political elites. Has Netanyahu successfully transformed these historical grievances into a durable anti-establishment identity, even after decades of Likud dominance? How much of his continuing appeal rests on identity rather than political performance?

Professor Gideon Rahat: It’s clear that Netanyahu and Likud receive more support from Mizrahi Jews than from Ashkenazi Jews, who came from Europe and the West. But I must say that the most important factor is not ethnic background but religiosity. Netanyahu’s supporters tend to be more religious, while Mizrahi Jews tend to be more traditional. They generally occupy a middle ground, whereas Ashkenazi Jews may be either very secular or very religious, like the ultra-Orthodox. Many Mizrahi Jews fall somewhere in between. They are not fully religious, but they are clearly not secular, and Netanyahu enjoys considerable support among them.

However, studies show that the growing Mizrahi middle class, which has emerged through economic and social mobility, tends to be more supportive of the opposition. More educated Mizrahi Jews, particularly those with higher incomes, are more likely to support the opposition than those who are more traditional, poorer, and more dependent on patron-client relationships.

Extreme Personalization Threatens Even Likud’s Survival

In your 2026 article Is the Party Perspective Over?, you defend the continued analytical centrality of political parties despite increasing personalization. Does Israel’s 2026 election reinforce that argument, or has competition increasingly become a contest between political personalities rather than coherent ideological and organizational alternatives?

Professor Gideon Rahat: If the entire democratic world looked like Israel, I wouldn’t defend the parties. Israel is an extreme case of political personalization. The only comparable case in the democratic world might be Italy. If Israel were the typical case rather than the exception, I wouldn’t argue that parties remain so relevant to politics. But parties are still relevant in most countries, as even very simple examples demonstrate.

Take Austria, for example. Sebastian Kurz was a very strong, highly personalized leader who took over his party. Once he was found to be corrupt, he was gone. In Japan, prime ministers change frequently because of corruption allegations. The party stays, while the leader goes. This is not, of course, the case in Israel. Elsewhere, parties survive their leaders, which demonstrates that they are institutionalized and not dependent on a specific individual. Even some personal parties become less personalized, or perhaps evolve into leader parties, where the leader remains very strong, but the party survives after their departure. The parties associated with the Le Pens in France are an example.

Israel, however, remains an extreme case where political parties come and go. Just two days ago, Benny Gantz, who led one of Israel’s strongest parties four years ago, had to leave because he found that he no longer had sufficient support to pass the electoral threshold. He had only 1% support, while he needed 3.25%. So, it’s about him, not about a political party.

His party, which was highly personalized, will probably disappear into history with him. If you look at Israeli politics, parties are constantly changing, with new parties emerging around specific leaders. Once those leaders leave, their parties disappear. Likud, of course, is a brand name that might survive Netanyahu. But as I said, it would survive because the other parties do not offer comparable alternatives in terms of brand names, not because Likud itself is not a personal party.

Netanyahu Let the Far-Right Genie Out of the Bottle and It Is Here to Stay

Itamar Ben Gvir, speaking in election conference at Ale Zahav in Samaria/Isreal on September 9, 2019. Photo: Barak Shacked.

The political normalization of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich has brought previously marginal ultranationalist currents into the center of government. Has their participation fundamentally radicalized Israeli politics, or does their growing influence reflect a broader ideological shift already underway within Israeli society?

Professor Gideon Rahat: Both are true. First, there has been radicalization in Israel, especially since October 7. October 7 was a traumatic event. Israelis see themselves as having been exposed to this kind of massacre, and this has produced another shift to the right. The first major shift to the right, the first political earthquake, came in 2001, during the Second Intifada, when suicide bombers attacked buses and about 1,000 Israelis were killed. This time, another thousand Israelis were killed in a single day. They could not defend themselves, and this has moved people further to the right.

However, at the end of the day, political elites are more important. If Netanyahu had not allowed Ben-Gvir to enter politics as he did, I’m not sure Ben-Gvir would have become so strong. But Netanyahu did allow him. Ben-Gvir had, if I remember correctly, around 60,000 votes, which was not enough to pass the electoral threshold, and Netanyahu brought him into the Religious Zionism Party. Now Ben-Gvir himself is very strong. So, I think much depends on how political elites shape the political landscape.

This doesn’t mean that people are not extreme, racist, right-wing, or whatever. They are. But elites often have the ability to moderate these forces. People may accept that, even if they are more extreme than their politicians, their leaders must maintain foreign relations and deal with others. They understand that. But once you let this genie out of the bottle, which is what Netanyahu did, the genie is here to stay.

And Ben-Gvir is here to stay, not because he has been particularly successful. He is the Minister of National Security, and if you look at the number of crimes and killings, nothing particularly good is happening. But he doesn’t need success. His rhetoric alone is enough to attract considerable support.

Smotrich, who is supposed to be somewhat less extreme, actually comes from the more extreme wing of religious nationalism, from a historical perspective. He is more extreme in terms of religion, as well as foreign affairs and security.

So, the national religious movement is moving toward the extremes, and this represents a historical transformation. Once upon a time, the national religious movement in Israel was moderate. It was actually part of what was called a historical alliance with the Labor Party. But after 1967, when Israel took control of the territories, the movement gradually changed course. Today, it occupies the most extreme position in the Israeli political system.

Military Service Divides Religious Nationalists and Ultra-Orthodox Jews

How should we analytically distinguish the religious-nationalist radicalism of Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism from the political objectives of ultra-Orthodox parties such as Shas and United Torah Judaism? Are these movements converging around an illiberal conception of the Jewish state, or do their competing interests limit the coherence of the religious right?

Professor Gideon Rahat: The ultra-Orthodox are different. If you look at public opinion in both communities regarding foreign affairs and xenophobia, their views are almost the same. But the main goal of the ultra-Orthodox elite is to isolate their community from the rest of society. They don’t want its members to modernize or move beyond the boundaries of the ultra-Orthodox community.

This creates an important distinction. While the national religious are the avant-garde, seeking to lead the State of Israel toward their goals, the ultra-Orthodox are primarily concerned with their own community.

This difference is particularly evident in attitudes toward military service. The national religious serve in the military and regard it as something very important, even as a form of serving God. The ultra-Orthodox, by contrast, do not want to serve in the military. They claim this is because they spend their days studying the Torah.

The real reason, however, is their fear that military service would expose members of their community to modernism. They would encounter women who do not dress as women do within their own community. In other words, the ultra-Orthodox leadership does not want them to be exposed to the outside world and therefore opposes their military service.

So, military service represents the main cleavage, the central dividing line between the national religious and the ultra-Orthodox.

Netanyahu’s Coalition Vows to Continue Judicial Overhaul if Reelected

Israelis protest against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s anti-democratic move targeting judiciary in Tel Aviv on March 11, 2023. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

Israel’s judicial overhaul controversy exposed competing understandings of democratic legitimacy: majoritarian sovereignty versus institutional checks and minority protections. Following the October 7 attacks and the Gaza war, has the struggle over judicial independence become secondary to national security, or does it remain the defining conflict over Israel’s democratic future?

Professor Gideon Rahat: It remains a defining conflict because Netanyahu and his coalition want to continue with it, while the opposition remains against it. So, this is a very important issue. What Netanyahu is trying to do, of course, is to reduce the checks and balances on the executive, as other leaders are doing around the world. He is doing this by weakening the courts and confronting the media, academia, and civil society. This is an ongoing process, and members of his coalition are saying that if they win the elections, they will continue with it.

You have to remember that in the previous elections, this judicial coup was not on the agenda. Now, everybody knows about it, and Netanyahu and his coalition are openly saying that they intend to continue with it. This has become a very important part of their agenda.

Israel’s Political Parties No Longer Provide Essential Checks and Balances

Your scholarship demonstrates how personal parties can undermine institutional accountability. To what extent has Netanyahu’s control over Likud facilitated the weakening of democratic checks and balances? Could an electoral defeat reverse these developments, or has democratic backsliding become structurally embedded beyond Netanyahu’s leadership?

Professor Gideon Rahat: On the one hand, Netanyahu has really driven populism, personalism, and the centralization of power. But let’s imagine that he’s no longer there. We still have to remember that political parties in Israel are highly personalized. When parties become highly personalized, they no longer serve as checks and balances; they simply serve their leaders.

This is a problem for democracy, particularly in a system where there are already very few checks and balances. We don’t have federalism or two houses of Congress. We have a highly centralized electoral system with a single nationwide electoral district and very weak legislators. So, when you look at Israel, you see that there are hardly any checks and balances, whereas political parties once played precisely that role.

Returning to a more democratic course would not be easy. Changes would be necessary. But without Netanyahu, I don’t think any single leader would centralize the system to the same extent.

There is also reason for hope. Look at the new Hungarian leader who came to power. He could have become Orbán II, taking all the powers Orbán had accumulated and using them for himself. But instead, he is giving up those powers. So, we can always hope that Israel’s next leader will be generous enough to distribute political power more broadly, allowing checks and balances to be reestablished.

However, political parties in Israel are really in very bad shape. They need to be reconstructed, but you cannot base your entire reform program on political parties alone. You need to consider new reforms, such as giving more power to local governments, perhaps introducing some form of regional government, and developing other creative ideas to ensure that we do not remain in the current situation, with a very strong executive and a relatively strong and courageous court. But a court cannot sustain democracy by itself.

Populism Helps Netanyahu Evade Accountability for October 7

Morning bombing attack on Gaza near the Al-Saraya buildings. Photo: Ahmed Fraije.

The Hamas-led October 7, 2023, attacks represented an extraordinary failure of Israel’s security establishment. Yet Netanyahu retains a substantial electoral constituency. How do you explain his political resilience despite this failure? Has the resulting insecurity strengthened populist leadership identification rather than weakened it?

Professor Gideon Rahat: It plays into the hands of populism because, according to this narrative, Netanyahu is not to blame. Instead, the blame falls on the deep state—the military leadership, the intelligence services, and all these supposedly horrible forces. Netanyahu, meanwhile, presents himself as the representative of the genuine people, someone who is not to blame.

This is precisely how populism works. It allows leaders to escape blame for failures for which they bear responsibility. Even if we imagine that Netanyahu is not personally to blame, he is still the prime minister and therefore bears responsibility. Yet populism enables leaders to claim credit for what they regard as successes while shifting the blame for their failures onto others.

October 7 Trauma Reinforces Israel’s Zero-Sum View of Palestine

Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, involving mass Palestinian civilian casualties, extensive destruction, and accusations of war crimes and genocide, has profoundly damaged its international standing. To what extent have these developments altered Israeli electoral preferences, or has a broad national-security consensus insulated domestic politics from international criticism?

Professor Gideon Rahat: Unfortunately, most Israelis do not see it this way. They regard Israel’s military campaign as a logical consequence of what happened on October 7. They believe that the Palestinians attacked first, that the attacks were particularly cruel, and that Israel’s response was retaliation. This is how they understand the situation. They also do not perceive international criticism in the same way as much of the rest of the world does.

Some international criticism makes more sense than others. For example, when Israelis see demonstrations calling for a Palestinian state “from the river to the sea,” they interpret this as a demand for Israel to disappear. This reinforces the perception of the conflict as a zero-sum game, leaving little room for empathy or sympathy toward the other side.

Even the two-state solution, despite some support for it within Israel, is perceived by many Israelis as a threat to their survival. Israel is still experiencing profound trauma from October 7. For Israelis, this was the most horrific event to happen to Jews since the Second World War.

When you look at the situation from the outside, you might say that around a thousand Israelis were killed, compared with 60,000 or 70,000 Palestinians. Comparing these numbers, you may naturally feel greater sympathy for the Palestinians. But that is not how Israelis see it. Their argument is that there could have been 60,000 Israeli casualties as well if Israel had not responded.

This illustrates the fundamental problem with viewing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a zero-sum game, in which it is either us or them. If anyone wants to begin addressing the conflict, they must give Israelis the feeling that they can have security even if a Palestinian state is established. Without that sense of security, any solution is a nonstarter.

You also have to remember that this is not the first time Israelis have experienced such fears. There was the second Palestinian uprising in 2001. The Oslo Accords had created an opportunity for the Palestinians to begin building their state, but instead, thousands of Israelis were killed in suicide bombings. Then came the Hamas attack. So, Israelis are afraid, and they believe they have reasons to be afraid. Hamas itself presents the conflict as a zero-sum game.

That is how many Israelis perceive the situation. When you look at the conflict from the outside and argue that these two peoples must come together, you have to understand that both sides have their grievances. Bringing them together is extremely difficult. If you want even to begin that process, you have to think about how to change the perception that this is a zero-sum game.

A Post-Netanyahu Government Could Restore Palestinian Property Protections

The Gaza war and intensified settlement expansion in the West Bank have brought competing visions of sovereignty, annexation, and Palestinian statehood into sharper focus. Has the radical right succeeded in shifting the boundaries of legitimate political debate so far that even a post-Netanyahu government would struggle to reverse these trajectories?

Professor Gideon Rahat: For many years, Israel benefited from two factors. First, the Palestinians themselves were divided between Hamas and the PLO, making negotiations extremely difficult. Even if Israel reached an agreement with the PLO, what would that achieve if Hamas refused to respect it? This division worked to Israel’s advantage.

Second, the Israeli Supreme Court did not allow settlers to take privately owned land, only land that was not privately owned. This provided Israel with some protection against international criticism because the Supreme Court was widely respected. However, once the current government began attacking the Supreme Court and disregarding the principle of private property, Israel became much more exposed to international criticism.

Any government other than the current one would probably return to the previous policy. I don’t think there would necessarily be negotiations over Palestinian statehood, but I believe such a government would respect the previous status quo, under which the private property of Palestinians was not to be touched.

Delegitimizing Arab Parties Undermines Israeli Democracy

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

Palestinian Arab citizens constitute roughly one-fifth of Israel’s population, yet their parties face persistent political exclusion. Following the recent controversy over attempts to disqualify Arab-majority electoral lists, does the 2026 election expose a fundamental contradiction between Israel’s Jewish-national identity and its commitment to equal democratic citizenship?

Professor Gideon Rahat: When you look at this issue, you have to remember that the so-called Arab parties are also, in a sense, non-Zionist parties. They do not support the idea that Israel is the state of the Jewish people. However, these parties are not exclusively Arab. Although most of their voters are Arabs, the Communist Party is a Jewish-Arab party. Another party also has a Jewish representative, and there are Arab representatives in Zionist parties as well. So, the situation is not entirely clear-cut.

Nevertheless, you are absolutely right that there is a delegitimization of Arab parties. They are not regarded as legitimate coalition partners, and from my perspective, this is a problem.

Let’s imagine that some of these parties hold positions that are considered illegitimate. That may be the case. But if that is the problem, other parties should make their conditions explicit. They could say, for example, “If Party X from the so-called Arab or non-Zionist camp agrees to certain conditions—one, two, and three—we can cooperate with them.” This would put suspicions of racism aside and make the question one of political opinions and policies. From my point of view, this is what should be done.

On the other hand, you have to understand why some people are suspicious of particular parties. For example, one party has connections to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is a huge movement, encompassing both more moderate elements and others that are openly terrorist. Such connections make some people worry that this party’s ultimate aspiration is a Muslim caliphate rather than the State of Israel.

Then there is the Arab nationalist party, which talks about a state from the river to the sea without any special status for Jews. You have to remember that the State of Israel was established as a safe haven for Jews who had been killed in the Holocaust and persecuted and killed in many other places. The idea was to establish a state for the Jewish people.

So, there is a genuine problem here. Once again, if both sides could show empathy and understand each other’s grievances and the sources of their mutual distrust, there might be opportunities for alliances. My personal view is that such alliances are possible. I don’t see why they should not be.

However, many people carry these feelings and grievances, and after October 7 and everything that has happened since, building a coalition with these parties has become extremely difficult. It is important to distinguish between these particular parties and Arab political participation more generally. Israel has already had a Muslim Arab minister, as well as a Druze minister. Of course, the Druze community is more closely aligned with the state, so the situation is more complex than it might initially appear.

Nevertheless, you are absolutely right that this is a problem. One of the best things that could happen to the State of Israel would be some form of coming together and an effort to build these alliances. Such cooperation would not necessarily have to begin with Arab parties formally joining a coalition. They could remain outside the government and, for example, support a minority government by refraining from voting to bring it down. There are possibilities for cooperation. However, this remains the deepest rift, the most fundamental cleavage in Israeli society: the divide between Jews and Arabs, most of whom are Muslims.

Opposition Fragmentation and Weak Political Parties

Recent polling places Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar party in close competition with Likud, while Naftali Bennett and other opposition figures compete for the anti-Netanyahu electorate. Does this fragmentation reflect healthy democratic pluralism, or does the opposition’s dependence on competing political personalities reproduce the very personalization you identify within Likud?

Professor Gideon Rahat: I must say that Likud at least has an established party organization. In the other parties, there is hardly any organizational structure. You could argue that most opposition parties, with the exception of the Democrats, the left-wing Zionist party, are almost entirely personalized parties that would probably not survive beyond their current leaders.

This is a huge problem because, even if we imagine that these leaders would behave differently from Netanyahu, there would still be no party organization capable of serving as a check and balance. Something important is missing in Israeli politics. Political parties and their organizations can play a crucial role in opposing populist forces.

You can see this in Turkey, for example, where opposition parties continue to exist as established organizations even when their leaders change. These parties remain important. In other countries with populist regimes, political parties also play a significant role. In Israel, however, this organizational dimension has become very weak.

We need to reconstruct political parties. Israel used to be what scholars call a “party state.” In the past, 25 percent of the Israeli population belonged to political parties. But these parties have largely collapsed.

Nobody particularly likes political parties, perhaps because they divide society, represent particular interests, and are associated with internal political struggles. Yet if you look at the empirical evidence from around the world, the stronger political parties are—and I mean parties in the plural—the greater the degree of party organization, or “partiness,” and the stronger democracy tends to be.

It is very important to remember the connection between political parties and democracy. You are absolutely right that we need to reconstruct them to sustain democracy in the long run, even if Netanyahu were to allow democracy to flourish.

The Far Right Would Sacrifice Israeli Children for Greater Israel

Campaign signs for the Israeli government “Shas” party head by Arye Deri, depicting Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, prior to the April 2019 elections in Safed, Israel on March 10, 2019. Photo: David Cohen.

Although leading opposition figures promise to restore institutional accountability and reverse some ultranationalist policies, many remain committed to restrictive positions on Palestinian statehood. Would an opposition victory represent genuine democratic renewal, or primarily a change in leadership within an enduring ethnonational and security-oriented political consensus?

Professor Gideon Rahat: I think there would be democratic renewal. Even if the new government included clearly right-wing forces, such as Bennett, Lieberman, and others, it would still be possible to engage in dialogue with them. There would no longer be an automatic veto by the extreme right.

You have to understand that the extreme right’s veto power over Netanyahu’s government extended beyond the Palestinian issue. It even affected negotiations over the Israeli hostages in Gaza. These parties would not allow Netanyahu to reach a deal to bring Israeli citizens home from Gaza. That is before considering all the other issues. They are extremely nationalistic and are prepared to sacrifice not only others but also their own children and their own people for the sake of Greater Israel. That is their vision.

If these forces were no longer part of the government, some progress would be possible. Would the next government establish a Palestinian state? Forget about it. But there would still be opportunities to move forward. Dialogue could resume, and efforts could begin to explore whether the Palestinian Authority, together with whoever governs Gaza, could start building something that might eventually become a state. Perhaps it would not ultimately become a state, but at least the lives of Palestinians could improve to some extent.

Israel’s Fragmented Party System Makes Coalition Outcomes Unpredictable

Recent polls offer conflicting projections, with some indicating a substantial anti-Netanyahu advantage while others suggest a closely balanced parliamentary landscape. Given the 61-seat coalition threshold, the electoral weight of religious parties, and the potential role of Arab parties, which coalition scenarios do you consider most plausible after October 27?

Professor Gideon Rahat: If neither side secures a majority of 61 seats after the elections, everything remains open. Several scenarios are being discussed. One possibility currently under consideration is for the opposition, together with the Arab non-Zionist parties, to first replace the Knesset speaker and then pass legislation that would prevent Netanyahu from returning to power. This could potentially be followed by another election.

There are many possible scenarios, and you can never be certain what will happen after an election. We might even find ourselves with a unity government involving Netanyahu and Eisenkot. You simply cannot know because this is coalition politics. No single party commands a majority, and Israel does not have large parties. According to opinion polls, the largest party is projected to win just 24 of the 120 seats, or 20 percent. That means a coalition must be built.

When you build a coalition, everyone applies pressure, everyone plays chicken with everyone else, and everyone negotiates. The final outcome is impossible to know in advance. It is like cooking: you bring together many different ingredients, and you cannot be sure what the final result will be. So, if you expect the elections to produce a clear answer, I would be surprised.

Netanyahu’s Departure Could Restore Consensus-Based Democracy

And lastly, Professor Rahat, looking beyond October 27, what would constitute the more consequential outcome for Israeli democracy: Netanyahu’s defeat, the exclusion of the religious-nationalist far right from government, or a deeper institutional transformation that restores pluralism and accountability? Are we witnessing the possible end of Netanyahuism, or the consolidation of a political order that may outlast its founder?

Professor Gideon Rahat: If Netanyahu is ousted, there is a good chance for change because there is no single person who could become the next Netanyahu. Netanyahu did not allow anyone around him to grow politically. If he saw someone who might challenge him in any way, that person was pushed out.

As a result, I don’t think there is anyone who could take over the political infrastructure Netanyahu has built and use it in the same way. So, there is a good chance that once he is removed from power, political power will be dispersed and redistributed among different forces. These forces might even have an interest in dispersing power because none of them would want another leader to become the next Netanyahu.

Only someone who imagines himself as Netanyahu’s successor might want to preserve this centralized power structure. But most political leaders understand that they are unlikely to become the next Netanyahu, so it would be better for them to distribute power more broadly.

Hopefully, this would allow Israel to return to a more consensus-based form of democracy. I also hope that the next government will undertake institutional reforms to establish and consolidate this broader distribution of political power.