Professor Maya Tudor.

Prof. Maya Tudor: Without Substantial Liberal Rights, There Is No Democracy

In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Professor Maya Tudor, Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Oxford, examines democratic backsliding, authoritarian resilience, and the challenges of democratic restoration across India, Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, the United States, and Pakistan. Challenging electoral-minimalist conceptions of democracy, Professor Tudor argues that “if you do not have substantial liberal rights, you don’t have a democracy.” She explains how elections can survive while political freedoms erode and warns that defeating authoritarian incumbents does not necessarily dismantle the systems sustaining their power. Emphasizing independent media, political equality, opposition coordination, and institutional safeguards, she concludes that democracy’s ultimate test is whether future opposition forces can compete freely.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

As democratic institutions confront intensifying pressures worldwide, a fundamental question has returned to the center of scholarly debate: Can a political system remain democratic when elections survive but the liberal rights that make political competition meaningful are systematically undermined? In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Maya Tudor, Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government and Fellow at St. Hilda’s College, University of Oxford, offers a compelling comparative assessment of democratic erosion, authoritarian resilience, and the conditions necessary for genuine democratic restoration.

The discussion unfolds against a paradoxical global backdrop. Recent electoral developments in Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, and the United States demonstrate the continuing potential for democratic resistance, even as authoritarian populism, institutional capture, and majoritarian nationalism remain formidable challenges. India’s democratic decline under Narendra Modi and Pakistan’s enduring military dominance further expose the fragility of democratic institutions. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about the boundaries between democracy and autocracy and the prospects for reversing democratic backsliding.

Drawing on her research with Andrea Vaccaro, Professor Tudor challenges electoral-minimalist conceptions of democracy. Her central argument is unequivocal: “If you do not have substantial liberal rights, you don’t have a democracy.” As she explains, democracy concerns not merely elections but what citizens are entitled to do between them. India illustrates this distinction particularly clearly: “Democracy can be hollowed out without elections ever being abolished or becoming meaningless.” Restrictions on opposition mobilization, media independence, and minority rights can fundamentally undermine electoral competition without formally eliminating it.

Turning to Hungary, Professor Tudor cautions against conflating electoral victory with institutional transformation: “Defeating an authoritarian government is not the same as dismantling the authoritarian system the incumbent constructed.” Similar dilemmas emerge in Serbia and Brazil, where civic mobilization and opposition coordination must develop into durable political organization. As she emphasizes, “Power has to be organized before it can be used.”

The United States presents another critical test. Reflecting on Trump’s second presidency and the 2026 midterm elections, Professor Tudor warns that “Elections will certainly interrupt that process, but they cannot, by themselves, repair the institutions and norms weakened by democratic erosion.” Institutional checks, political pluralism, and the recovery of loyal opposition therefore remain indispensable.

Her policy recommendations emphasize independent media, freedom of association, political equality, transparent electoral procedures, and meaningful alternation in power. Ultimately, she argues, democratic restoration must be measured against a demanding standard: “The ultimate test is also whether tomorrow’s opposition will be allowed to compete freely.” Across these cases, Professor Tudor advances a central proposition: democracy’s resilience depends not simply on removing authoritarian incumbents, but on ensuring that their successors cannot monopolize power.

Here is our interview with Professor Maya Tudor, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Elections Alone Cannot Distinguish Democracy from Electoral Autocracy

Nepal elections.
Voter education volunteer instructs residents on using a sample ballot in Ward No. 4, Inaruwa, Nepal, February 17, 2026, as part of a local election awareness program led by the Sunsari Election Office. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula / Dreamstime.

Professor Tudor, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your recent Democratization article, coauthored with Andrea Vaccaro, “Why Liberal Rights Define Democracy.” In this article, you argue that substantial liberal rights are constitutive of democracy. Does this make “illiberal democracy” a conceptual contradiction, and where should we draw the boundary between electoral democracy and electoral autocracy?

Professor Maya Tudor: It’s an important question. We should start with the fundamental insight that many people equate democracy with elections, although many of us know that democracy is much more than just what happens on election day. It also involves what citizens have a right to do between elections.

When you’re able to cast a ballot, but the opposition isn’t on the ballot because it hasn’t been able to organize, key opposition figures have been intimidated, or the media doesn’t give airtime to their stories, that affects democracy. And that’s not a marginal issue; it’s a really core issue for democracy. The core argument of our paper is that if you do not have substantial liberal rights, you don’t have a democracy.

The reason this is an important issue to raise is that research and scholarship increasingly use the term “illiberal democracy” to describe regimes that have elections but substantially lack civil rights.

You asked the really interesting question of how we should think about the difference between electoral democracy and electoral autocracy. Those are labels that democracy watchdog organizations use. Notice that both have elections, but there’s a distinction—and a gray area—between regimes that have substantial civil rights and those that don’t.

It is a gray area, and you’re going to have to make some judgment calls. Many of these democracy watchdogs do a very good job of making those calls. I just think we’re misleading people when we call something an electoral democracy when it actually substantially lacks civil liberties. And that was the point of the paper.

Democracy’s Benefits Are Cumulative, but Its Shortcomings Are Immediately Visible

In “What Democracy Does… And Does Not Do,” you find that democracies generally outperform autocracies in health, education, economic growth, and security. Why, then, is public confidence in democracy declining while authoritarian alternatives are gaining legitimacy?

Professor Maya Tudor: Democracy is no guarantee of good government, but neither is autocracy. The fastest-growing regimes in the world are disproportionately likely to be autocracies, but so too are the worst-performing regimes. That’s what the article discusses: on average, democracies provide a kind of insurance against the absolutely worst outcomes.But many democracies around the world have been declining in quality. We know this from the democratic backsliding literature: they’re becoming less democratic, even while remaining democracies. This links to your previous question because civil rights are often eroding, the independence of non-executive institutions is weakening, and the quality of democracy is declining.

What we’ve been seeing in recent events around the globe, whether in Serbia, Bangladesh, Nepal, or Sri Lanka, are youth-led movements pushing back against institutions that are often captured by older generations. When the opportunities available to younger generations are found wanting, people become dissatisfied with the system that produced that lack of opportunities. 

Democracy’s benefits are cumulative, while its shortcomings are immediately visible. One of those shortcomings is that democracies govern, by definition, on electoral timelines. This makes it harder for democratic governments to develop longer-term plans that they can implement over multiple electoral cycles. But that doesn’t mean they perform worse, and this is why I wrote the article. I wrote it because I teach in a very international environment. This year, we have 59 countries represented in the cohort I teach. Many of those students say, “Well, why should we? Democracy doesn’t deliver.” I wrote this article to say that, actually, yes, it does. It delivers on average, and in many ways, it delivers better than you might think.

Autocracies Can Project Decisiveness While Concealing Their Failures

The Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, is pictured with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, in Goa, India on May 25, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

The analogy I use in the article concerns COVID. In 2020, autocratic regimes looked remarkable in their capacity to deal with COVID. Take China, for example. It shut down, traced people very effectively, built hospitals and infrastructure in a matter of weeks, and sequenced the genome. It seemed to demonstrate what capable authoritarian regimes were able to do. Fast-forward to 2022, though, and the picture looks very different. Interestingly, in 2021, a slew of articles appeared asking, “Do autocracies do better in times of crisis?” 

By 2022—and most people around the world would agree that COVID, on and off, lasted from 2020 to 2022—if you look across those three years, what democracies generally did better than autocracies were adapted to changing circumstances on the ground. As it became clear that children who were out of school were suffering in terms of their learning, and that lockdowns were having negative mental health effects, for example, authoritarian governments generally pivoted. Now, that’s a different story. If you look, for example, at how China performed during COVID in terms of deaths per capita, independently verified estimates vary, but within that range, China doesn’t look better than neighboring democracies such as Japan and South Korea.

So, I would ask your audience, students, and others thinking about this to be consistent in how they approach the question: How should we judge whether democracies are better or worse? That doesn’t mean democracies will always deliver, and we need to be careful here. Autocracies can often present a very compelling narrative of decisiveness and quick action. They can also censor, so their failures are often hidden. One of the studies I cite in the article shows that authoritarian governments tend to overstate their GDP per capita by around one percentage point. One percentage point! It’s extraordinary. So, we need to carefully distinguish between the narrative and what we know to be true on the ground.

The final thing I’ll say is something I think is relatively obvious: there is now a growing number of powerful countries around the globe whose own legitimation depends on delegitimizing democratic forms of government. That is another reason why we’re seeing this narrative. It’s also worth adding that democratic governments, such as the United States, have often used democracy as a cudgel while turning a blind eye to authoritarian governments’ misbehavior when doing so serves their interests. That has undermined the legitimacy of the democratic norm.

Exclusionary Nationalism Creates Second-Class Citizens by Definition

Your research with Dan Slater and Harris Mylonas emphasizes how inclusive and exclusionary national narratives shape political regimes. Under what conditions does nationalism strengthen democratic solidarity, and when does it become an instrument of authoritarian majoritarianism, as seen in Modi’s India, Erdogan’s Turkey, Orbán’s Hungary, or Trump’s America?

Professor Maya Tudor: Nationalism is a narrative of “we the people.” But what building blocks do we use to define this group we call “we the people”? That’s not inherently democratic or autocratic. It depends on how the nation is defined and who’s included in it.

One of the things I argue, both in my work with Dan Slater and in my work with Harris Mylonas, is that all national narratives draw boundaries between “we the people” and everybody else. That’s the boundary of the nation. But many countries also draw internal hierarchies of belonging. Take the United States, for example. For most of American history, if you were a Black American, you were a second-class citizen. You were not fully included in this narrative of belonging, either at the founding or during the Civil War.

Exclusionary nationalism, as we argue—and as I argue in some of my earlier work as well—is a nationalism that creates those internal hierarchies by fusing a fixed narrative of the nation with religion, race, ethnicity, or other social categories that we can’t choose. When those social categories become the basis for belonging to the nation, you create second-class citizens by definition.

The argument we make is that majoritarian nationalism—nationalism that governs in the name of a majority—is particularly dangerous when it becomes fused with exclusionary nationalism. You always have majorities, but those majorities are electorally fluid when they’re not fixed to a social category. But when you say that to be Malaysian is to be Malay, with its ethnic and religious markers, or that in Myanmar, to be Burmese is to be Buddhist and of Bamar ethnicity, you’re creating second-class citizens. And that creates ideological resources for political entrepreneurs who come to power to exclude those second-class citizens.

My theory of politics is that politicians, including would-be politicians in democracies, are always trying to come to power with new narratives. When the history we all share and our sense of who we are become fused with a fixed category, it becomes very easy—even incentivized—for politicians to “other” the group that is not core to the definition of the nation.

India Shows How Elections Can Remain Meaningful but Deeply Unfair

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is showing victory sign with both hand to supporters at Bharatiya Janata Party office amid the results of the Indian General Elections 2024 in New Delhi, India on June 4 2024. Photo: PradeepGaurs.

In “Why India’s Democracy Is Dying,” you explain how democratic institutions can survive formally while their underlying norms deteriorate. Has Modi’s India now crossed the threshold from democratic backsliding into consolidated electoral autocracy, or does meaningful democratic competition remain?

Professor Maya Tudor: I think meaningful democratic competition still remains, but India is an example that reminds us that democracy can be hollowed out without elections ever being abolished or becoming meaningless. In all competitive authoritarian regimes, elections are still meaningful, and incumbents sweat them because, as long as the act of voting is protected, it’s always possible for incumbents to be voted out.

But many of the liberal rights that define a democracy have been substantially eroded. That erosion has occurred through restrictions on the opposition’s ability to mobilize on the streets, as we’ve seen in recent protests; pressure on the media; the acquisition of independent media houses such as NDTV by businessmen close to the government; attacks on minorities, especially when it’s electorally fruitful ahead of state elections; and the use of state institutions, such as the Enforcement Directorate, to target and investigate political opponents through tax proceedings and the like.

However, the existence of competition doesn’t necessarily mean that the process is entirely fair. The analogy I like to use is a football match. Imagine a football match where no one is saying that the players can’t go out and play, but the referee calls all the fouls on only one team. Maybe he’s not allowing one team to practice in advance, while the other team is allowed to practice. Maybe there are penalties called. There are all kinds of ways to tilt the playing field in favor of one side while still respecting the rules of the game.

That’s really important, but it’s hard for people who aren’t paying close attention to see because this is a gray and foggy area. It’s difficult to tell exactly what’s going on because the media itself is captured to a large degree. So, these labels—electoral autocracy versus electoral democracy—are less important because what they have in common is that both have elections and civil liberties have been substantially diminished. Where exactly that boundary lies is less important than the fact that this is a regime in which democracy as a system of government is struggling to survive.

India’s Electoral Rolls and the Manipulation of Political Equality

India’s controversial Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls has generated accusations of mass voter exclusion and politicization of the Election Commission. Does this illustrate a broader authoritarian strategy of manipulating electoral competition through formally legal procedures rather than openly abolishing elections?

Professor Maya Tudor: This is a tricky one. There is absolutely no clarity on this question. For people who may not be familiar with the Indian context, the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls removed 130 million voters in a country of 1.4 billion. That’s almost 10% of the population.

India is a young country, and those electoral rolls certainly needed some attention and updating. No one is doubting that. But if this had been done properly, you would expect openness and transparency about the process. There would also be a means of redress for citizens who had been removed from the electoral rolls, and that is missing.

The state of Bengal held an election earlier this year. The key question people are asking about that election concerns the deletion of voters, which occurred to a greater degree in Muslim-majority districts. According to national voting patterns, one could infer that Muslim-majority districts were less likely to vote for the BJP. Did those deletions swing the state election in favor of the ruling party? This is a state that the Modi government’s party, the BJP, had never ruled. It won for the first time in Bengal’s history.

So, there’s at least prima facie reason to believe that something nefarious might be going on here. And then there’s the situation within India’s Election Commission, which historically had a very different role. India was a country with high levels of illiteracy when the Election Commission came into being, and its job was to go out and register every voter. It wasn’t to say, “Show me your documents.”

The move toward a system that asks voters to show documents, when large proportions of the population are still illiterate and documentation is scarce, changes the situation. Asking people to prove their eligibility to vote changes the function of the Election Commission and the way it operates.

The key issues here are transparency, independent oversight, and appeals. The reason this became such a major issue in India this year is that the Indian Express reported 14 instances in which commissioners within the Election Commission, which led the Special Intensive Revision, had raised objections. These were not outsiders; they were insiders whose objections were overruled by the chief election commissioner. That’s why many of the recent protests called for the chief election commissioner’s resignation.

This is absolutely an ongoing process, and it highlights, in many ways, why modern democratic erosion often operates through the law rather than outside it. The question is whether legal procedures protect political equality or undermine it.

Social Media Can Launch a Movement, but Organization Sustains It

The Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) protest.
Students participate in a peaceful nighttime protest organized by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) in New Delhi, India. Demonstrators sit together on the road, holding placards and posters, chanting slogans, and expressing their demands. Photo: Kamlesh Kumar / Dreamstime.

The emerging Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) movement has mobilized young Indians against alleged electoral manipulation and institutional capture. Drawing on your work on political organization and democratic resilience, can such movements generate lasting democratic renewal without coordinated opposition parties, durable grassroots networks, and clearly defined political demands?

Professor Maya Tudor: That is the million-dollar question. Social media can launch a movement, but organization is what allows it to survive and change politics at the ballot box. What we don’t yet know is whether the CJP can produce that kind of lasting democratic renewal.

Look, we’re seeing this play out in Serbia right now as well. Can a movement that brought people together and threw out an autocratic incumbent actually govern instead? That is very difficult. One reason it’s difficult is that there’s a different logic of politics when you’re banding together to overthrow an existing government or regime. You have all these different groups of people coming together, and what they share is the belief that the government is a problem. So, the governing logic is unity: let’s come together, let’s mobilize, and let’s throw that government out.

Imagine that the government is actually thrown out, as it was in Serbia, and this group of very disparate people then has to govern. Unless they’ve spent some of that time while they were united trying to hammer out what they’ll do when they come to power, governing becomes very difficult because the groups start pulling apart. Some say, “Well, let’s do this policy,” while others say, “No, let’s do that policy.”

When agreement on matters of policy hasn’t been worked out under a logic of unity, it’s much harder to reach that agreement once the logic of unity has given way to people tussling for political power. So, one of the things I teach my students is that power has to be organized before it can be used. Online mobilization is not the same as durable political organization.

Independent Media Are the Connective Tissue of Democratic Resistance

In your recent Journal of Democracy article, “How to Protect the Media in Eroding Democracies” (2026), you characterize independent media as the connective tissue of democratic resistance. How can opposition movements challenge authoritarian dominance over digital platforms, advertising revenues, and information networks, particularly in countries such as India, Turkey, and Hungary?

Professor Maya Tudor: This article examined four countries: India, Sri Lanka, Poland, and Hungary. Two of them have experienced much more severe democratic backsliding in the media space, while the other two have experienced more moderate backsliding. I was trying to compare these two sets of countries, with two countries in each region, to understand the differences between those that experienced much more complete media capture and those that experienced more moderate capture.

I identified five strategies that made a difference. The first was effective digital distribution; the second was diversified funding sources; the third was legal defense; and the fourth was a networked media ecosystem, with journalists and editors well connected across the media space. The fifth was connecting democratic erosion to everyday life, as Peter Magyar had done in Hungary. For example, he connected the decline in EU funding to a lack of investment in hospitals, thereby linking democratic erosion to citizens’ everyday concerns.

One of the things I highlight in that article is that media plays an even more important role in protecting democracies today than it did a generation or two ago. And here’s why. I think of public opinion formation as taking place 100 years ago in physical public squares. People would pass through a public square in the center of a town, where speakers in different corners expressed different views on the politics of the time. We all had a sense of what was being said in one corner or another. We might have gravitated toward one corner more than another, but these conversations were generally in dialogue with one another.

That’s what it looked like when a country had a couple of newspapers and everyone read that handful of newspapers. But now, younger generations are getting all their content online. Even when they follow national media sources, they do so through online platforms. Those platforms have different algorithmic structures that funnel them into smaller and smaller communities. That means we no longer have this public square where people are connected to one another, even if only loosely. Now, you can have very small subcultures that never speak to each other. As I put it, it’s like a mansion with a thousand rooms, and nobody knows what the conversation is like in the next room.

These communities are really siloed, which means our ability as a public to have conversations about what is in the public interest is also much more siloed. That’s a real problem because independent journalism is critical infrastructure for holding governments accountable and providing independent evaluations of what’s actually happening out there that we can trust. So, the core point of that article was to make clear that independent media is like the connective tissue—the highway upon which citizens must travel to discover their mutual interests.

Defeating an Authoritarian Government Is Not Dismantling Its System

Viktor Orban.
Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister arrives to attend in an informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Prague, Czechia on October 7, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Viktor Orbán’s defeat by Péter Magyar in April 2026 demonstrated that even deeply entrenched illiberal governments can lose elections. What explains the limits of Fidesz’s authoritarian resilience, and how can Hungary restore liberal-democratic institutions without reproducing the executive concentration of power that enabled democratic erosion?

Professor Maya Tudor: It’s a great question, and it’s one we all need to think much more about. I don’t have a silver-bullet answer here. One thing this makes very clear is that defeating an authoritarian government is not the same as dismantling the authoritarian system the incumbent constructed. Orbán achieved extensive media and institutional capture, and Péter Magyar showed us the importance of opposition coordination, bringing together disaffected ruling-party supporters, and providing credible alternatives.

But winning an election is only the beginning of this process, which is very difficult. Some of the events in Poland have shown just how difficult it can be. The danger is often that the new government uses its electoral mandate to concentrate power in precisely the manner it previously condemned.

Here’s where being clear about what you were elected to do—what the people elected you to do—is very important, because you cannot achieve everything in one term of government. But if you could choose just a couple of things that you promise to deliver on, then, presumably, that would be enough to win you an electoral mandate to continue doing what you were elected to do in the next term.

Opposition Coordination Converts Protest into Power at the Ballot Box

Serbia’s October 2026 elections delivered a parliamentary majority to the student-backed movement, challenging Vučić’s personalized authoritarianism. What can Serbia and Hungary teach us about the relative importance of opposition coordination, civic mobilization, elite defections, and institutional safeguards in reversing democratic backsliding?

Professor Maya Tudor: The central lesson here is that authoritarian governments can lose when social mobilization connects discontent with credible electoral alternatives. That connection is essential. There’s always discontent bubbling up in any society at any given time.

One of the Achilles’ heels of authoritarian governments is that they don’t actually understand how much disaffection there is. By definition, there is a cost to speaking the truth in an electoral regime where people’s rights and civil liberties are not protected. People are not going to speak truth to power because there’s a cost to doing so. That means authoritarian governments don’t understand what people are frustrated by as well as the opposition coordinating on the ground does.

So, protests generate pressure on the government, but it’s opposition coordination that converts that pressure into political power at the ballot box. I think that’s what Serbia and Hungary teach us.

Democratic Restoration Cannot Depend on the Continued Success of One Leader

Brazilia’s Luiz Inácio Lula is seen during the 2022 election campaign in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on October 20, 2022. Photo: Aline Alcantara.

Lula’s narrow October 2026 reelection victory over Flávio Bolsonaro demonstrated both the resilience of electoral competition and the enduring strength of radical-right populism. Does Brazil suggest that defeating authoritarian-populist candidates at the ballot box is insufficient to reverse the social polarization and institutional vulnerabilities sustaining their movements?

Professor Maya Tudor: You can defeat an authoritarian populist at the ballot box without defeating the political conditions that made that candidate appealing. Brazil was lucky to have Lula around, but who is Lula’s successor? Lula’s 81, isn’t he?

I think polarization isn’t necessarily a problem for democracy in the way the average person might assume when they say, “Oh, it’s a problem; we’re deeply polarized as a society.” One of our key theorists of democracy, Robert Dahl, argued that democracy can resemble a heated family feud. People can disagree deeply about policies, but they need to agree on the boundaries of the nation and recognize that we’re all part of the same political community. Once that shared understanding disappears, polarization really becomes a problem.

When I look at Lula and his victory, I think having these older statesmen who’ve been around for a while is great because it has helped protect some of the core democratic institutions, as illustrated by the court’s decision to send Bolsonaro Sr. to prison. But democratic restoration cannot simply depend on the continued success of one leader.

That’s not a party. So, what is the party beyond Lula? This is true of many opposition parties. The same applies to India’s opposition party, the Indian National Congress. Rahul Gandhi is at the helm, and he’s done some work to bring in opposition voices. He’s also coordinating with the Cockroach Janta Party that we discussed earlier. But ultimately, he needs to make space for young people to reinvigorate the ranks of opposition movements.

Elections Alone Cannot Repair Institutions Weakened by Democratic Erosion

Trump’s second presidency has intensified concerns over executive power, institutional independence, and liberal rights. The November 3, 2026, midterm elections delivered Democratic majorities in both chambers of Congress. Does this electoral setback constrain authoritarian tendencies, or can democratic erosion continue despite renewed institutional checks?

Professor Maya Tudor: Elections will certainly interrupt that process, but they cannot, by themselves, repair the institutions and norms weakened by democratic erosion. 

It looks like the latest count is that, if Alaska goes Democratic, there will be 56 Democratic senators in the US Senate.That still means there are over 40 Republican senators, and during these first two years of Trump’s second presidential term, they have served as no check whatsoever on his power. That represents real institutional erosion because these systems work only if checks and balances continue to hold, and they haven’t held during the first half of Trump’s second term.

So, the deeper test going forward is whether political actors across party lines defend their opponents’ right to disagree. To me, the very concept of loyal opposition needs to be recovered. You can be a Trump supporter and vote for Trump, or a supporter of the Democratic Party and vote for the Democratic Party. But are these groups of people loyal citizens to one another? That is something that needs to be recovered.

Pakistan’s Military Can Lose Legitimacy Without Losing Power

T.J.P members are holding Jinnah Rally on the occasion of Birthday Anniversary of Father of Nation Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah in Karachi on December 25, 2017. Photo: Asianet-Pakistan

In The Promise of Power and your research with Adeel Malik, you examine Pakistan’s historical authoritarian foundations and emerging challenges to military dominance. Can generational change, an aspirational middle class, and digitally mobilized opposition weaken the military establishment without fundamental institutional transformation?

Professor Maya Tudor: Unlikely. The military can lose legitimacy without losing power, and that’s certainly what happened in the last election. The real question is whether societal change can be translated into changes in civilian institutions. As I wrote in The Promise of Power, Pakistan’s military dominance is rooted in an early historical pattern of state formation, when there was considerable political instability and the military stepped into power.

What we know from research is that once the military steps into power and governs, especially for a prolonged period, it’s very difficult to reverse that pattern. The conditional probability of another coup is much higher once you’ve had a first coup. The military often develops very strong economic interests. This is not just true of Pakistan, but also of Myanmar, Egypt, and Thailand. It was also true of Indonesia, and probably still is, even though the military has left power there, at least for the foreseeable future. These vested interests in particular patterns of the economy make it even harder to undertake electoral reforms. If you had a regime that was somewhat independent of those vested interests, such reforms might be easier to undertake.

In my piece with Adeel Malik, I talked about the emergence of a new aspirational middle class, the weakening of traditional authority structures, and mounting economic pressures, particularly those related to climate, as future sources of crises in Pakistan. But that doesn’t mean the military is going to step out of power. The past is not always the best indication of the future, but you have to see something really change. Right now, I don’t see any incentive for the military to relinquish any of its power.

The Ultimate Test of Democracy Is Whether Tomorrow’s Opposition Can Compete Freely

Looking across India, Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, the United States, and Pakistan, what distinguishes temporary electoral setbacks for authoritarian-populist forces from genuine democratic restoration? Which institutional and societal conditions are most essential for sustaining democratic resilience?

Professor Maya Tudor: The process of democratic restoration begins with the removal from office of an incumbent who has eroded democracy. But the ultimate test is not simply whether the opposition can win. That is an important step—a critical step. The ultimate test is also whether tomorrow’s opposition will be allowed to compete freely. That is something we have to watch for whenever there is a turnover in power. There’s a great deal of attention—a glare of attention—focused on electoral moments in any country. But what happens after the election?

An election may represent a setback for an authoritarian-populist movement, but genuine restoration requires protecting the political equality of all citizens. It requires independent media that, by definition, are able to criticize the government. It also requires freedom of association, especially when groups assemble to protest against the government. If they’re simply supporting the government, then those freedoms aren’t, in a sense, really needed.

Genuine restoration requires the possibility of alternation in power and recovering the idea that you can oppose the government while still being a loyal citizen. Democracy is strongest when electoral losers retain their rights and winners accept constraints on their power in future electoral cycles. Democratic restoration should therefore be judged not just by whether an incumbent loses, but by whether the next government makes it harder for any future leader to monopolize power.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Supporters of Brazilian President and Workers’ Party (PT) presidential candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva attend a reelection campaign rally on Avenida Paulista in São Paulo, Brazil, on October 24, 2026.

Brazil After the Ballots: From Lula’s Digital Army to a Democratic Base

In this commentary, Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano examines Brazil’s 2026 presidential election through the interplay of digital populism, social inequalities, and political mobilization. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork and campaign observations, he explores how Lula’s remarkable electoral comeback was supported by André Janones’s Exército do Lula, a digitally coordinated network that mobilized millions of supporters. Moving beyond conventional distinctions between online and offline politics, Dr. Bayarri Toscano analyzes how economic precarity, political identities, and social relationships shape contemporary populist movements. While highlighting the effectiveness of digital campaigning, he questions whether hierarchical online mobilization can evolve into sustainable democratic participation. He argues that Brazil’s central challenge lies in transforming electoral mobilization into enduring collective organization, democratic literacy, and meaningful participation beyond election day.

By Gabriel Bayarri Toscano*

The Material and Ideological Terrain of the Contest

Brazil’s 2026 presidential election cannot be understood without first considering the country’s social complexity. The election took place in a Brazil where the figure of the formal, industrial, unionized worker no longer captured the experience of large segments of the population. As in many countries where informal work is widespread, the growth of digital platforms and the “Uberization” of the economy had expanded self-employment and insecurity: many people pieced together jobs, small businesses, and other activities to make ends meet. In this fragmented labor market, demands for equality and rights coexisted with aspirations for individual prosperity, religious fulfillment, family life, and consumption, without necessarily finding a common political expression.

Nor was Brazilian society divided into two homogeneous blocs. Working classes in urban and peripheral areas, along with large informal sectors, had demands that did not automatically coalesce into a shared political project. Brazil’s bourgeoisie brought together financial, industrial, and commercial interests, as well as those tied to agribusiness, and formed shifting alliances with the urban middle classes. In the countryside, agribusiness and conservative forces held sway alongside rural workers, peasant movements, and Indigenous peoples. Understanding this social composition helps explain why the electoral contest was not simply a confrontation between rich and poor or a competition between online messages. It was also a struggle over what prosperity meant, who could claim to represent working people, and how political actors addressed precarity and insecurity.

We can understand Bolsonarism only in light of this complexity. It did not coalesce around a single social group or rely solely on spreading reactionary messages online; instead, it brought together, often uneasily, experiences of precarity, aspirations for autonomy, conservative values, and promises of prosperity. This coalition did not erase the differences among its supporters, but it gave them a shared language and political identity. For the Workers’ Party (PT), the challenge is not only to oppose Bolsonarism but also to understand why it attracts support and what material future the PT can offer people who do not see their own concerns reflected in the popular demands the party has historically championed.

Theoretical and Methodological Challenges in the Study of Digital Populism

The social complexity outlined in the previous section also became visible during my fieldwork. Over the past several months, I conducted interviews and carried out participant observation at Bolsonarist campaign events. The day before the election, I attended the campaign’s closing rally in Barra da Tijuca, an area where the right enjoys strong support in Rio de Janeiro. The crowd spanned different ages, backgrounds, and life experiences. Attendees wore Brazilian national team jerseys, sang the national anthem, and displayed flags of Israel and the United States. This diversity did not form a uniform social identity, but it showed Bolsonarism’s capacity to bring different symbols and experiences together. The interviews suggested a similar pattern: people connected WhatsApp messages with family conversations, social gatherings, and their experiences of work, religion, insecurity, and the pursuit of prosperity. The digital and the in-person did not appear as separate spheres, but as dimensions of the same political life.

This connection poses a methodological challenge: the tools we use to study politics can also separate the digital from the in-person, metrics from meaning, and content circulation from the relationships that sustain it. Metrics can show a message’s reach, interactions, and speed of circulation, but they cannot explain what it means to those who receive it or why they trust the person sharing it. Interviews help reconstruct these meanings, but on their own they cannot show how many people share them or whether a message influenced their vote. Digital ethnography lets us trace how messages move across platforms and in-person relationships, and how people interpret them in specific situations, but it cannot establish causality on its own either. That is why we need to break down the barriers between quantitative and qualitative approaches, and between studying online networks and observing in-person life. The goal is not to find a method that explains everything, but to combine approaches to understand how circulation, meaning, and political relationships work together.

The theoretical challenge is just as important. A central question in populism theory is how political actors articulate heterogeneous demands into a collective will and define it against an adversary. Studying digital populism means keeping that question in view while developing our own tools to explain what changes when this process unfolds across platforms and in-person relationships. We cannot simply transpose concepts developed for other settings onto social media, as if the digital were just another channel. Platforms reshape the pace and form of political struggle: users repeat and edit political signifiers, linking them to different experiences, while demands come together around shared ideas of work, faith, security, prosperity, and fairness. These moral economies are diverse and sometimes in conflict; they meet and clash through increasingly rapid cycles of circulation.

Hybridity, then, means more than combining online activity with a presence on the street; it is essential to understanding how populist politics works today. Studying it means tracing both the circulation of content and the relationships, interpretations, and experiences that give it meaning. Lula’s comeback offers a concrete case for examining this relationship: the role Janones and the Exército do Lula (“Lula’s Army”) played raises the question of how digital mobilization connects messages and participants, and whether it can build a social base capable of acting beyond election day.

Lula’s Army, Janones, and the Comeback

Brazil elects its president through a two-round system. If no candidate wins more than half of the valid votes in the first round, the top two candidates advance to a runoff. On October 4, 2026, Flávio Bolsonaro received 47.03 percent of the vote, while Lula received 45.16 percent. Three weeks later, Lula won the runoff with 51.79 percent, compared with 48.21 percent for his opponent. The result was truly unexpected and unprecedented in Brazil’s democratic history: Lula had trailed by more than two million votes and ended up with 10,379,615 more votes than in the first round.

Several factors contributed to the comeback, but we cannot understand it without looking at the mobilization led by André Janones, a federal deputy from Minas Gerais. Through the WhatsApp channel Exército do Lula (“Lula’s Army”), Janones coordinated campaign materials and urged supporters to take part on other platforms. The channel amassed 10.8 million followers. On Flávio Bolsonaro’s side, Tropa do Flávio (“Flávio’s Troop”) reached around 2.1 million. A study of the campaign found a substantial difference in response times: some tasks issued through Lula’s channel reached other platforms within seconds, while the fastest responses recorded in the rival channel took several minutes. This comparison covers specific actions and does not, by itself, measure the campaigns as a whole, but it illustrates the scale, speed, and effectiveness of Lula’s operation.

Janones’s channel did more than amass a large audience. Participants followed instructions on how to edit and cut videos, repost them on other platforms, promote hashtags, and share content with their contacts. This coordinated strategy turned followers into active distributors of messages. It helped Lula’s camp regain the initiative after the first round had left many supporters with little hope. The comeback, however, was not the work of a single channel or leader. Individuals and groups outside the PT’s official campaign structure also took part; supporters spoke with people face-to-face; and the campaign drew on social and political networks that were already in place.

From Digital Mobilization to Democratic Participation

Despite the PT’s presidential victory, the Liberal Party, the main Bolsonarist force, and other right-wing parties will hold majorities in both houses of Congress (the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) and retain control of key municipalities and states, including São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Lula will need to build legislative coalitions to advance his agenda in a Congress where the opposition can block reforms, raise the cost of negotiations, and sustain polarization. These disputes will involve budget priorities and policies that directly affect everyday life, from social protection to working conditions. The government’s ability to act will depend on its parliamentary alliances, as well as on the social support it can sustain beyond Congress. The presidential defeat does not mean that Bolsonarism has disappeared. It may instead adapt by putting forward more moderate-looking figures who retain the movement’s original violent rhetoric but use it with less force and brutality than the Bolsonaro family has so far.

The different trajectories of these political camps raise a central question about the recent success of Lula’s Army: how can digital mobilization become a social base capable of acting after the election? The Exército do Lula showed that rapid coordination could change the mood of a campaign and help mobilize millions of people. It also revealed some of the model’s built-in limitations. Its military language (a “general” summoning “soldiers”) allowed organizers to assign tasks and respond quickly, but it also concentrated decision-making. The model’s ability to circulate messages does not guarantee that those sharing them can discuss the organization’s goals, set its priorities, or sustain it once the campaign is over.

The operation provided participants with primarily technical skills: they learned to edit, cut, and repost videos, distribute them across platforms, and drive engagement. During the campaign, many felt they were “breaking the algorithm” and opening new possibilities for digital sovereignty. That feeling did not mean they controlled the platforms or had changed their rules. This hierarchical, binary logic can help campaigns compete for online visibility, but it is not the same as democratic literacy. Democratic literacy requires participants to help shape messages, disagree, make proposals, and make decisions collectively. Janones’s recommendation not to debate Bolsonarist opponents could work as a short-term tactic; for example, when responding to a provocation would only amplify misleading content. But if avoiding opponents becomes a general rule, the strategy reinforces isolation between groups. A democratic base must be able to mobilize while also creating spaces for disagreement.

Building a democratic digital politics also means going beyond learning how to game the algorithm or calling for its regulation. Digital sovereignty means asking who controls the infrastructure, the data, and the conditions under which content circulates, and who gets to make those decisions.

Some Indigenous epistemologies offer a valuable perspective because they understand knowledge as rooted in relationships among community, territory, memory, and responsibility, rather than as a resource detached from the people who produce it. Alongside community networks, independent media, and collective decision-making about communication, these perspectives help us imagine digital infrastructures that communities govern. The Exército do Lulashowed that popular mobilization could, at least temporarily, change who had visibility. The task now is to turn that possibility into spaces where participation means more than sharing messages: it must also mean having a say in decisions.

Lula begins his new term with a presidential victory and a Congress dominated by the right. Legislative negotiations will be difficult, and the Bolsonarist opposition remains strong enough to obstruct, polarize, and pressure institutions. The central challenge is to connect governing and mobilizing without subordinating mobilization to the government or reducing democracy to a permanent campaign. The Exército do Lula showed how digital coordination could help secure an electoral victory. The political challenge is to ensure that those who made it possible can keep organizing, take part in decisions, and sustain shared demands after the election.


 

(*) Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Audiovisual Communication at Rey Juan Carlos University. He is an interdisciplinary researcher working at the intersection of communication and the social sciences. His research focuses on the “far right” and contemporary polarized discourses in the public sphere. In recent years, Dr. Bayarri Toscano has conducted research in European and Latin American contexts. He has also delivered regular courses and guest lectures at various international academic institutions.

Aerial view of the construction of a new artificial intelligence (AI) hub and data center on the outskirts of Columbus, Ohio, USA.

Governing AI’s Creative Destruction: Shared Prosperity, Financial Risks, and Democratic Resilience

In this commentary, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk examines the political economy of artificial intelligence (AI), highlighting its productive potential alongside distributional inequalities, financial vulnerabilities, and environmental costs. Distinguishing infrastructure investment from AI’s diffusion across the economy, he explores how productivity gains affect employment, wages, prices, inflation, and market concentration. The analysis considers how data governance, computing infrastructure, and financing arrangements shape the distribution of benefits and risks. Professor Ozturk also examines how labor displacement and economic insecurity may create opportunities for authoritarian populist mobilization, while AI-enabled surveillance raises concerns about democratic accountability. He advocates policies that distribute technological gains more equitably, strengthen institutional oversight, and protect household security. The central benchmark is a decent, dependable standard of living throughout employment transitions and retirement.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly reshaping the global economy, offering unprecedented opportunities for productivity growth, innovation, and economic transformation while raising profound questions about inequality, financial stability, environmental sustainability, and democratic governance. As investment in AI infrastructure accelerates, the diffusion of its applications across the real economy presents complex challenges concerning employment, wages, prices, inflation, and the distribution of economic gains. While AI can expand productive capacity and reduce costs, its benefits may become concentrated among powerful firms and capital owners, potentially transferring financial and environmental burdens to households. 

These developments also raise concerns about market concentration, labor displacement, economic insecurity, and the political conditions that may facilitate authoritarian populist mobilization. Against this backdrop, this article examines the interconnected macroeconomic, distributional, financial, environmental, and institutional dimensions of AI, emphasizing the importance of effective governance, equitable access to technological benefits, and policies that protect economic security. The central challenge is ensuring that technological progress translates into shared prosperity, allowing households to maintain a decent and dependable standard of living throughout employment transitions and into retirement.

An AI system may help a worker complete a task in half the time. Who gains the other half? A firm may use the savings to lower prices, improve its product, reduce working hours, or cut its payroll. Its technology supplier may capture part of the gain through subscription fees, while shareholders benefit from higher margins. The same improvement in technical capability can therefore produce very different outcomes for workers, consumers, and investors. Those outcomes matter politically because they determine who can withstand disruption and who must depend on the discretion of employers, platforms, or public officials.

The distribution of these gains depends on two processes that unfold at different speeds. The investment cycle commits capital to data centers, chips, power, and networks before their revenues are known. The diffusion cycle depends on whether firms and public institutions can reorganize production around useful applications. Their interaction determines when costs are incurred, when productivity gains appear, and whether firms, households, or public institutions capture them.

Historical Lessons from Technological Transitions

The historical record of major technological transformations provides critical empirical and theoretical insights into the current AI trajectory. Joseph Schumpeter’s paradigm of “creative destruction” details how radical innovations continuously revolutionize the economic structure from within, destroying old industries and creating new ones. However, as Karl Polanyi famously demonstrated in his analysis of the Industrial Revolution, the expansion of the self-regulating market inflicts severe social dislocation during the transition. The pivotal political-economic question centers on the temporal duration of this transition: How long does the period of destruction last before new livelihoods emerge, and who possesses the financial resilience to endure it?

Britain’s Industrial Revolution offers a sobering historical precedent known as “Engels’ Pause.” As Allen documents, for nearly half a century after the initial adoption of industrial technologies, output per worker expanded significantly while real wages remained stagnant. Corporate profits claimed an escalating share of national income, accumulating to early industrial capitalists while working-class households suffered prolonged wage depression and deteriorating living conditions. Even if real wages eventually rise in the long run, the intergenerational timing of gains is central: workers displaced in one decade cannot feed their families on the theoretical equilibrium of a subsequent generation. Similarly, the rollout of electricity as a general-purpose technology (GPT) demonstrates that macro-level productivity acceleration requires extensive, multi-decade investments in complementary machinery, organizational workflows, and human capital. As Perez emphasizes, financial capital frequently accelerates the installation phase of new technological paradigms, driving speculative asset valuations long before real-economy productivity gains materialize. 

The central historical challenge for AI is whether public institutions, labor markets, and non-tech sectors can cultivate human-centric applications as quickly as financial markets build out computational capacity. As Acemogluargues, technological trajectories are not preordained; innovation can be explicitly directed toward augmenting human capabilities rather than merely automating labor to cut immediate payroll costs.

Productivity, Prices and the Cost of Living

The task framework developed by Acemoglu and Restrepo distinguishes between automation that displaces labor and innovation that creates new tasks for people. An occupation often contains both kinds of opportunity. A nurse may spend less time on documentation and more time with patients. A firm could instead use the saved hours to raise staffing ratios. Which outcome follows depends on management decisions, demand for services, and workers’ and service users’ ability to influence deployment. The ILO’s occupational exposure estimates accordingly help identify where tasks may change. Actual displacement depends on adoption, cost, regulation, and work organization.

Evidence of complementarity deserves attention. In a study of customer support, AI assistance raised productivity by about 15 percent on average, with larger benefits for less experienced and lower-skilled agents. Access to advice previously available mainly through experience can help workers learn and perform more complex tasks. At the same time, a firm can use the same technology to change staffing levels or monitor individual performance. A productivity increase observed in one workplace tells us what the tool achieved in that setting. The division of the gain among wages, profits, and consumers is a separate empirical question. Estimates of aggregate productivity are sensitive to the share of tasks affected, the savings actually realized, and the cost of implementation.

The aggregate effect depends on the economic weight of the tasks affected, the savings realized after implementation costs and the scale of adoption. At the firm level, faster completion of a task raises output only when the task constrains production or the resources released can be put to productive use. A hospital that reduces administrative work may be able to see more patients if staff time is the binding constraint. If beds or specialist capacity are scarce, the gain may instead appear in shorter paperwork queues or better service quality. Investment in software, training, and organizational redesign also absorbs resources during the transition.

Control over specialized chips, cloud capacity, models, and distribution channels can influence where profits accrue. Large firms can capture substantial gains when other firms depend on their infrastructure or face high switching costs. Historical evidence on superstar firms links shifts in market share toward firms with lower labor shares to the aggregate decline in labor’s share. In AI markets, the relevant competition questions concern access to inputs and the terms on which firms can switch suppliers or reach customers. Control over training data and intellectual property adds another barrier: contested access to copyrighted works and uncertain licensing terms can favor incumbents with legal and computing scale. High market valuations indicate expectations about future earnings. Evidence of durable rents requires examining realized returns, entry barriers, and the scope for competition.

A decline in unit costs can lower prices when customers have credible alternatives and firms compete for their business. The same gain can widen margins or be captured upstream by providers of models and cloud infrastructure. The effect on the cost of living depends on the prices of goods and services that households actually buy, their budget shares and their disposable incomes. Cheaper digital services may raise consumer welfare while housing, food or utility bills continue to strain household budgets. For that reason, the relevant outcome is real purchasing power after essential expenses.

The inflation effect depends on timing. During the buildout, investment can raise demand for construction, equipment and electricity before new capacity comes online. As adoption spreads, lower unit costs and greater productive capacity can ease price pressures. Stronger investment or household spending can offset part of that effect. A one-time fall in the price of a service lowers its contribution to measured inflation during the adjustment period. A sustained change in aggregate inflation depends on how supply, demand and monetary policy respond.

Data Centers, Environmental Costs and Financial Risk

Data centers make the physical demands of AI visible. New facilities require power connections, cooling, and land. Their local effects depend on the energy mix, water availability, and utility tariff design. A utility may commit to network upgrades before a facility begins operating. If the project is delayed or uses less capacity than contracted, the allocation of the resulting costs depends on the tariff and the developer’s commitments. Local authorities should distinguish temporary construction jobs from continuing employment and compare expected tax receipts with abatements and the cost of public infrastructure. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) analysis underlines the importance of location and grid capacity when assessing data center electricity demand.

Political resistance reaches beyond immediate neighbors. In a May 2026 survey reported by Axios, 49 percent of registered voters supported a temporary moratorium on new data center construction. Among respondents opposed to data centers, 8 percent said they knew of a facility near their home. That figure measures reported awareness of proximity. In July, Navigator Research found that 65 percent of respondents in its survey of competitive congressional districts agreed with a statement accusing AI executives of using their wealth to influence politics for their own benefit. Taken together, these results are consistent with broader distrust of how the investment boom is governed. Local referendums and campaigns in the November midterms gave that distrust a political outlet. 

The scale of financing makes the distribution of risk equally important. Van Nieuwerburgh estimates that a scenario in which the United States builds 188 GW of AI capacity by 2032 would require nearly $9 trillion in investment, equivalent to about 3.2 percent of annual GDP over 2025–2032. The estimate depends on the assumed capacity and costs. Project loans, leases, joint ventures, and private credit spread funding across several parties, and their terms determine where losses fall. An investor who has yet to commit can defer spending. A leveraged project under construction can face continued interest charges while a grid connection or permit delays revenue.

Accounting depreciation spreads an asset’s recorded cost over its useful life. Investment recovery depends on cash flow, while debt maturity determines when creditors must be paid or refinanced. These schedules can diverge. A building and its power connection may serve multiple generations of equipment. Accelerators can lose economic value more quickly as newer chips become available. The project must cover operating costs and equipment replacement as well as debt service. A project that relies on a small number of tenants is also exposed to their capacity to honor commitments. If borrowing costs rise as utilization disappoints, the financing problem can become acute well before the site loses productive value.

Janeway separates the productive legacy of speculative investment from the financial consequences of its collapse. Railways, electricity networks, and fiber networks could continue to serve users after their original investors suffered losses. AI infrastructure may have a similar afterlife, although that possibility varies across power connections, buildings, and rapidly aging chips. The applications that justify investment on a social basis can take longer to spread than the contracts that finance the investment allow. The risk to the wider economy depends on who has financed the buildout and how leveraged those institutions are. Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2015) and Janeway (2026) have shown that historical asset bubbles fueled by credit tended to be followed by deeper recessions. For AI, that finding motivates scrutiny of banks’ direct and indirect exposures, including through private credit. It leaves the scale of those exposures to be established empirically.

A useful test is to compare the operator’s expected return with the project’s wider benefits and costs. The latter include productivity in sectors using AI, net employment and tax benefits in host communities, the resources drawn from local power and water systems, and the opportunity cost of public subsidies. A profitable project can impose costs on households if tariffs transfer network expenses to them. An unprofitable project can leave useful infrastructure behind. The terms of approval and financing determine how much of either outcome is shared with the public.

Electricity and water also link environmental constraints to financing. A delayed grid connection can leave a completed facility unable to earn revenue while interest continues to accrue. If the utility has already expanded capacity and the project is canceled, tariffs and contracts determine whether the developer, the utility or other ratepayers bear the cost. Water availability must be assessed at the basin level, and emissions depend on the generation mix and the power actually added to serve the load.

Income Distribution, Wealth and Economic Security

Four distributional questions follow. The first concerns wages among workers. The second concerns labor’s share of income relative to capital. The third concerns the ownership of assets that generate capital income. The fourth concerns where gains accrue geographically. An AI tool can narrow skill differences among employees while shifting income towards capital owners. The wealth effects can persist if higher capital returns are reinvested and ownership remains concentrated.

International distribution raises another issue. Countries reliant on labor-intensive exports can face weaker demand for some tasks even as firms elsewhere capture automation gains. Access to affordable computing, skills, and local infrastructure can help those countries develop their own uses. Their capacity to tax internationally mobile income also influences whether productivity gains finance public services where workers bear transition costs. US–China semiconductor controls and efforts to build sovereign AI capacity raise the cost of access for third countries, making compute dependence a new channel of geopolitical and developmental inequality. Redistribution within the economies that host the largest technology firms can leave these cross-border effects largely untouched.

Labor income, wealth and security can move in different directions. Labor’s share can decline even as some real wages rise, while higher average wages can coexist with fewer routes into stable employment. Job loss, volatile hours and insecure retirement affect people’s ability to plan and withstand shocks. A distributional assessment should therefore track real disposable income after essential expenses, exposure to income losses and pension adequacy alongside wage dispersion, labor’s share and wealth concentration.

Economic Insecurity, Surveillance and Authoritarian Populism

Workers’ ability to refuse unfavorable terms depends partly on their access to other jobs, savings, and public support. A technological shock can weaken those alternatives before it reduces headline employment. Workers may accept worse conditions because replacement seems more plausible. Younger entrants can face fewer opportunities to gain experience if employers automate the tasks through which they previously learned. The distribution of these risks matters for political trust, particularly where the costs fall on communities that already have few alternatives.

Evidence from previous waves of automation identifies one pathway. Anelli, Colantone, and Stanig find that exposure to industrial robots increased support for the radical right in their study of 13 Western European countries. The study concerns a particular kind of automation and a particular political context. It offers a mechanism to test in the AI transition. Parties can frame economic insecurity as a loss of status or control and promise protection through exclusion or personal loyalty. The strength of that appeal depends on local institutions, political organization, and the narratives that parties and media advance. The backlash against data centers likewise can lead to ordinary democratic demands for transparency and cost sharing. Opposition becomes relevant to authoritarian populism when political actors mobilize it against pluralism or use selective protection to reward supporters.

A second pathway concerns the tools available to governments. Beraja et al. document how procurement of facial recognition technology in China helped strengthen political control and supported further development of the technology. Public demand for surveillance can therefore help create a market for capabilities that reinforce the incumbent’s power. This evidence concerns a specific regime and technology. It illustrates why oversight of procurement, access to personal data, and avenues of legal challenge matter as AI spreads into public administration.

The two pathways can interact when citizens with fewer economic alternatives also face more intrusive monitoring. If access to work or public benefits is mediated by opaque scoring systems, challenging a decision may become costly for people who rely on it. Where the government controls access to benefits or tolerates selective enforcement, it can use economic insecurity to reward loyalty. Opaque models can also amplify bias in credit, hiring and public-benefit decisions, while synthetic media can lower the cost of electoral deception and weaken trust in public evidence. Rights to explanation, appeal, independent review and provenance disclosures matter because they make both automated decisions and manipulated information contestable.

Policies for Sharing Gains and Protecting Independence

The structure of the AI economy creates strong pressures toward faster wealth concentration and a more unequal distribution of income. A central question for democratic political economy is whether these pressures can coexist with a decent and dependable standard of living for the broad majority. That standard has concrete implications: households should be able to meet ordinary expenses without persistent anxiety, withstand a spell of unemployment or a temporary loss of earnings without financial distress, and look ahead to retirement with reasonable confidence. The policy test is whether people can count on that level of security throughout their lives as technological change alters the jobs and income sources on which they depend.

This distinction matters for understanding the appeal of authoritarian populism. When people lose confidence that established institutions can offer a credible path to a secure life, promises of protection from leaders who claim to speak for those left behind can gain force. A dependable income floor, backed by enforceable social rights and adequate pensions, would help restore the material basis for confidence in democratic institutions. How widely that security is shared should be a central criterion for judging the distributional consequences of the AI transition.

The immediate task is to align investment decisions with the costs they create. Utilities and regulators can require large users to cover attributable network upgrades and establish credible payment commitments if demand falls short. Local authorities can publish expected fiscal costs and benefits, assess water use in the affected basin, and tie incentives to measurable commitments. Financial supervisors need visibility into the routes by which leveraged projects can transmit losses. Separately, AI agents linked to payments, national accounts or critical infrastructure introduce operational and cyber risks: unauthorized instructions, data leakage and correlated model failures can transmit shocks even without excessive leverage. These measures clarify who bears the risk before the public is asked to absorb it.

Tax policy can then address who receives the gains. The case for reviewing the treatment of capital income and economic rents becomes stronger if automation shifts the tax base away from wages while raising demand for social protection. The design should distinguish returns needed to finance investment from rents sustained by market power or privileged access to scarce resources. The IMF staff analysis favors strengthening capital income taxation over a general tax on generative AI use. Models that find a role for taxing automation show that the result depends on transition conditions and workers’ ability to move into new occupations. International coordination can help keep mobile profits within reach of taxation, while leaving room for governments to choose how to support local adjustment.

The use of revenue is as important as its collection. Portable benefits and income support can allow workers to change jobs without losing basic security. Education systems must also prepare entrants for AI-complementary judgment, digital literacy, and transferable skills; reskilling is more valuable when it connects to actual demand, and workers can afford to take it up. Collective bargaining can give employees a say in how productivity gains translate into pay, working time, or the quality of services. Broad-based capital ownership, including through independently governed public or worker funds, could extend access to investment returns. Such arrangements require transparent rules for governance and distribution.

Public institutions also influence which applications are developed. Open procurement and access to shared computing resources can expand the pool of firms and researchers able to develop applications. Governments can use procurement to specify observable goals such as reducing administrative burdens, improving service quality, or giving professionals more time with patients and students. Risk-tiered audits, human oversight, data provenance and enforceable rights to challenge automated decisions are especially important when the public cannot choose another provider. Copyright licensing and creator remuneration should be addressed without allowing rights aggregation to entrench dominant platforms. The test is whether these arrangements increase the capacity of people and institutions to make their own decisions as they adopt the technology.

In conclusion, the AI transition will be shaped by the gap between the pace of infrastructure investment and the rate at which useful applications spread. Investment can strain power systems and balance sheets before productivity gains are realized. As those gains arrive, competition, ownership, and bargaining institutions will determine how much reaches households through prices, wages, and public services. The democratic consequences depend partly on whether people can absorb disruption without becoming dependent on discretionary protection. A credible response must link investment risk to the distribution of returns, safeguard critical systems and epistemic integrity, and preserve households’ ability to plan their lives. Without institutions that govern ownership, data, and public accountability, productivity alone cannot guarantee shared prosperity or democratic resilience.

Statue of Cecil Rhodes on the exterior of Oriel College, Oxford, UK.

The Hood on Rhodes and the Politics of Moral Purification

In this commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias examines the controversy surrounding a planned talk by philosopher Nathan Cofnas at Oxford University’s Oriel College, following a protest in which a Ku Klux Klan hood was placed on the statue of Cecil Rhodes. Drawing on debates about academic freedom, safetyism, moral purification, and Popper’s paradox of tolerance, Dr. Ferreira Dias explores the tensions between free expression, institutional responsibility, and the protection of students from discrimination. While rejecting Cofnas’s racial hereditarianism as scientifically unpersuasive and morally objectionable, he distinguishes institutional endorsement from providing a platform for public debate. He argues that universities should apply consistent principles, protect legitimate protest, and encourage critical engagement rather than allowing moral disagreement alone to justify exclusion.

By João Ferreira Dias

On November 12, 2026, a Ku Klux Klan hood appeared on the statue of Cecil Rhodes above the entrance to Oriel College. Below it, a sign read “racists welcome here.” The people who placed it there were protesting against a talk by Nathan Cofnas, scheduled for November 17. Why put the hood on Rhodes? The statue gave the protesters a way to make an accusation about the college. An institution that continues to honor a British imperialist, they suggested, was acting in character when it gave Cofnas a room.

Who invited Cofnas?

Cofnas is a philosopher affiliated with Ghent University. In his public writings, he argues that genetic differences contribute to alleged differences in average intelligence between racial groups. He uses this claim to predict who would reach positions of elite status under what he considers meritocratic selection. There are two questions here. What evidence establishes a genetic explanation for differences between groups? And why should a test score carry the weight in selection that Cofnas gives it? A trait’s heritability within a population, by itself, tells us nothing about the cause of a difference between population averages. Nor would such a difference tell a university what an individual candidate deserves.

The invitation came from the Oxon Universities’ Reform Society, a student association that describes itself as linked to Reform UK. Its public announcement advertised a talk on whether diversity policies affect university hiring and academic quality, with advance booking and questions from the audience. That topic explains why Cofnas’s wider views matter to the controversy, even though the announcement leaves open whether he would present his argument about race. Oriel College described the event as a booking by a registered student society under its freedom of speech code.

A college speaks in its own name when it chooses whom to commemorate. When it makes rooms available under general rules, it exercises authority over access. Of course, Oxford’s prestige can lend weight to an invitation issued by students. That makes the terms of access and the nature of the event worth stating plainly. As Simpson and Srinivasan (2018) argue, academic freedom includes the authority of scholars to decide which work meets disciplinary standards. A political society’s invitation to an academic for a public discussion and a department’s decision to feature his research in a seminar involve different judgements.

When Disagreement Becomes a Safety Question

An open letter reported by Varsity called on Oriel to cancel the invitation or halt the event pending a published risk assessment, an independent review and safeguards for Black students and staff. At a meeting on November 11, student representatives asked how risks had been assessed. A college has a duty to take credible threats and harassment seriously. Those reports leave open what specific dangers the signatories anticipated. The question is what would justify withdrawal if the concern were that hearing Cofnas’s views would itself make students unsafe.

The term safetyism describes what happens when safety expands to override other values (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018). Mounk (2023) identifies a difficulty for free expression when the category of harm comes to include the expression of an objectionable view as such. There is a paradox in the intellectual background to this argument. The suspicion that prevailing accounts of truth are shaped by power can coexist with a remarkable certainty about which views others should be permitted to hear. In a university, that certainty can become paternalism. Students who might ask Cofnas to defend his premises are imagined chiefly as people who need to be shielded from them.

The hood expressed a further claim. If opening the door implicates Oriel in what Cofnas believes, closing it becomes evidence of the college’s moral rectitude. Mary Douglas’s account of pollution and social boundaries helps explain how exclusion can take on that meaning (Douglas, 1966/2002). It also helps explain why a demand for cancellation can benefit the very association it was intended to oppose. Removing the room leaves the argument circulating and gives the organizers a reason to talk about censorship instead of answering for their choice of speaker.

Who May Organize on Campus?

Oxford also has student associations on the left, including the Oxford Labour Club. The university publishes general criteria for registered societies. The harder question is whether a university can apply its rules to a society whose politics many of its members consider objectionable. Progressives may regard their own associations as morally preferable. Institutional legitimacy requires reasons that can also be applied when the people exercising authority have different political sympathies.

This is where Popper’s paradox of tolerance is useful. Popper (1945, chap. 7, note 4) considered suppression unwise while intolerant views could be met by argument and checked by public opinion. He reserved the possibility of restraint for circumstances in which movements sought to prevent argument, including through intimidation or violence. At Oxford, a society can be expected to respect the conditions of participation and contestation it claims for itself. Students must also be free to protest against its events. A request to cancel a talk is itself an exercise of expression. The college’s decision to act on that request requires its own justification.

There is a temptation to think that our generation, after a long history of arriving at better moral judgements, has reached the final version of social morality. Yet convictions about equality can be held firmly while leaving room to test what we believe follows from them. Suppose another student society invites a historian who argues that Rhodes should come down. Opponents claim that giving her a room amounts to endorsing her account of British imperialism. What would we ask Oriel to do? The rule we would accept then should also govern how the college treats the students who invited Cofnas. I find his racial hereditarianism scientifically unpersuasive and morally objectionable. Even if the organizers and their opponents leave with their views unchanged, other students will have had the chance to hear the claims challenged and make up their own minds. 


 

References

Douglas, M. (2002). Purity and danger: An analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo. Routledge. (Original work published 1966)

Lukianoff, G., & Haidt, J. (2018). The coddling of the American mind: How good intentions and bad ideas are setting up a generation for failure. Penguin Press.

Mounk, Y. (2023). The identity trap: A story of ideas and power in our time. Penguin Press.

Popper, K. R. (1945). The open society and its enemies: Vol. 1. The spell of Plato. George Routledge & Sons.

Simpson, R. M., & Srinivasan, A. (2018). “No platforming.” In: J. Lackey (Ed.), Academic freedom, (pp. 186–210). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791508.003.0011

Doctoral researcher Fabiola Ermer.

Fabiola Ermer: Illiberal Political Ideas Become Socially Embedded Through Less Visible Mechanisms

In this ECPS Voice of Youth interview, Fabiola Ermer, doctoral researcher at the Heidelberg University for Jewish Studies, discusses her comparative research on right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary, the role of education in shaping ethno-national belonging, and the importance of looking beyond political leaders to understand how illiberal ideas become embedded in society. Examining educational programmes, transnational ideological networks, and the societal infrastructures of illiberalism, Ermer highlights the less visible mechanisms through which political narratives acquire legitimacy and become normalized. She also distinguishes illiberalism from democratic backsliding, reflects on the methodological challenges of comparative research, and emphasizes scholarly independence, international collaboration, and critical engagement with education’s role in reproducing political identities and sustaining ideological influence beyond electoral change.

Interview by Natalia Crane

In an era of democratic backsliding and increasingly interconnected illiberal movements, understanding how political ideas become embedded in society requires looking beyond electoral competition, political leaders, and formal institutions. Education, ideological networks, and the construction of national belonging constitute less visible but consequential dimensions of contemporary populism.

Fabiola Ermer is a doctoral researcher at the Ben-Gurion Chair for Israel and Middle Eastern Studies at the Heidelberg University of Jewish Studies and a doctoral fellow of the Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich Scholarship Foundation (ELES). Her doctoral research examines right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary, focusing on how their educational programmes for young adults contribute to the construction of ethno-national conceptions of belonging and form part of broader infrastructures of illiberalism.

In this ECPS Voice of Youth interview, Ermer reflects on the development of her academic interests, the relationship between populism and democracy, and the methodological challenges of comparative research. She also discusses international academic collaboration, education’s role in reproducing political ideas, and the mechanisms through which political narratives become socially embedded.

Drawing on comparative research in Israel and Hungary, Ermer emphasizes the importance of studying the ideological infrastructures operating between governments and society. “We need to look more beyond parties, campaigns, and individual leaders,” she argues, calling for closer examination of how political ideas acquire institutional durability and social legitimacy.

Central to her research is the recognition that education is not inherently democratic or emancipatory. As Ermer explains, “education can also reproduce particular worldviews and ideas of belonging.” She therefore encourages researchers to examine who provides education, which values are communicated, and how educational programmes relate to broader political structures.

Ermer also challenges the tendency to equate illiberalism with democratic backsliding, emphasizing the analytical distinction between rejecting liberal values and the deterioration of democratic institutions. Her comparative approach highlights how think tanks, transnational networks, and educational initiatives contribute to constructing the boundaries of political belonging.

Regarding scholarly responsibility, she advocates methodological transparency, analytical independence, and greater public engagement. Researchers, she argues, should “make complex developments understandable, challenge misleading assumptions, and provide the necessary context.”

Ermer hopes her research will illuminate “the less visible mechanisms through which political ideas become socially embedded and politically normalized, without the need for coercion,” offering a perspective on the societal foundations of illiberalism and the challenges facing contemporary democracies.

Interview with Fabiola Ermer lightly edited for clarity and flow.

From Israel’s Judicial Reform to Comparative Research on Hungary

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

To begin, could you introduce yourself, outline your academic journey, and explain how your research interests developed? What initially drew you to your studies, and why do you believe these areas of research are particularly significant in today’s global political environment?

Fabiola Ermer: Thanks for the invitation again. I’m currently a PhD student at the Ben-Gurion Chair for Israel and Middle Eastern Studies at Heidelberg University for Jewish Studies, and also at Heidelberg University. I’m supervised by two professors: Professor Johannes Becke, who is based at Heidelberg University for Jewish Studies, and Professor Dani Filc, who is a professor at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Israel.

I studied Jewish Studies, Political Science, and Semitic Languages, mostly in Germany, in Düsseldorf and Heidelberg. My interest in this particular topic, and in Israel and Hungary, actually started with an internship in Israel in 2023, before October 7. At that time, judicial reform dominated public and political debates in Israel. There were constant comparisons with Orbán’s judicial changes in Hungary. I became increasingly intrigued by this, and I was looking for a topic for my master’s thesis. I thought it was a perfect opportunity because it was such a current issue. So, I asked whether Hungary could serve as a role model for an illiberal transformation in Israel.

To make it very short, Orbán’s mechanisms would have been quite difficult to replicate in Israel for several reasons. One important difference is that Israel has no constitution, whereas Hungary’s constitutional changes in 2012 played a major role in its transformation.

What I realized while researching was how closely connected many actors, especially those on the right-wing spectrum, were between Hungary and Israel. They were working together, sharing interests, and organizing conferences together. I became very interested in the topic and decided that I wanted to pursue a PhD in this field, maintaining the comparison between Hungary and Israel.

Now I’m researching how right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary use educational programmes, mostly for young adults, to construct ethno-national conceptions of belonging. I’m also asking how and why these programmes may become part of a broader infrastructure of illiberalism. I’m not saying that they are the reason illiberalism is happening, but they are one element within a much broader process.

Populism, Illiberalism, and the Construction of Belonging

Your doctoral research examines think tanks in Israel and Hungary, particularly their role in shaping political and civic understandings of the people. How does your work intersect with broader debates in populism studies? How do you define populism in your own research, and why have you adopted that particular approach? Has your understanding of populism evolved since you began your academic career?

Fabiola Ermer: I’m working mostly with a broad approach to populism, particularly the definition by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. They define populism as a thin-centered ideology that sees society as divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the pure people” and the corrupt elite. It holds that politics should express the general will of the people. This approach is useful for me because it focuses on the content, which is exactly what I’m researching: how actors construct the idea of “the pure people” and, in this case, who belongs and who is excluded.

However, I’m not actually looking at leaders or campaigns. I’m looking more at the structures behind them, such as think tanks and educational programmes. In my framework, populism is therefore one element rather than the whole story. I’m working with four connected dimensions. The first is illiberalism and democratic backsliding as a broader process. The second is ethno-national and national-populist construction. The third is content and hegemony, particularly in a Gramscian sense. And the fourth is education as the medium through which these ideas are transmitted.

I would say that my understanding has changed. Before, I was more focused on how populism is articulated through governments and at the governmental level. Now I’m looking at it from different perspectives. I remember reading about the idea that populism works along a vertical axis, with the people positioned against the elite, while nationalism works along a horizontal axis. I’m essentially combining these two axes. I’ve realized that it isn’t always easy to define them strictly as two separate groups. They are much more interconnected. I think that’s where my understanding has changed most over the last year. I’ve just finished my first year of PhD research, so everything is still developing, but that is probably the biggest shift in my thinking about populism.

The Relationship Between Populism and Democracy

Photo: Shutterstock.

Populism remains one of the most contested concepts in political science. Given your research, which theoretical debates would you consider most consequential for the future of the field? What misconceptions about populism, illiberalism, and democratic backsliding do you encounter most frequently?

Fabiola Ermer: One of the most important debates we are still facing, both in academia and in public discussions, concerns the relationship between populism and democracy. We need to ask how we deal with populism and to what extent it can even nurture democracy by raising questions that might otherwise not be asked. However, especially now, with increasing polarization, illiberal actors are managing more and more to present themselves as the true defenders of democracy, mostly understood through elections and majority rule. Courts, liberal elites, and supranational institutions, such as the European Union, are increasingly framed as obstacles imposed from above.

To connect this, I think of Adam Przeworski, whose work I really admire. He discusses one of the key questions we face when defending democracy: Are we defending democracy itself, or the values we personally attach to it? And what happens when different people attach different values to democracy? This is where the tension between minimalist and maximalist conceptions of democracy becomes much more decisive. From a minimalist perspective, the erosion of liberal safeguards may become visible much later, when democratic backsliding is already happening. Hungary was quite a good example of this. There may now be a change, but it is still far too early to say whether there will be a shift from minimalist to maximalist ideas of democracy.

As for misconceptions, I think one of the most common ones, especially in public debate rather than academia, is that illiberalism and democratic backsliding are treated as synonymous. But technically, they are not the same. Democratic backsliding refers to the deterioration of democratic qualities, such as less competitive elections or restricted participation. We have seen this in Hungary and Serbia, for example. Illiberalism itself refers to the rejection of liberal values. From a minimalist understanding of democracy, an illiberal system may still be considered a valid form of democracy, even if it is not necessarily the form of democracy we personally want. This also raises the question of whether liberal democracy is the only form of democracy we should defend, or whether it is a more Western idea that we sometimes try to impose on systems that may work differently.

Another misconception is that we focus too much on governmental levels and not enough on the population or the actors behind governments. These actors still receive comparatively little attention.

Methodological Challenges in Comparing Israel and Hungary

How do you operationalize populism in your research? What challenges arise when comparing different national contexts, such as Hungary and Israel? And how do you balance qualitative and quantitative approaches?

Fabiola Ermer: I’m still working on my methodology, so there are some things that are changing. At the moment, I have a qualitative and comparative research design, with the individual organization as the unit of comparison. Instead of measuring populism quantitatively, I’m combining two procedures with separate tasks. One is a structured qualitative content analysis, which captures what the programmes actually communicate.

I have four main categories: the construction of the people, identity and belonging, concepts of democracy, and enemies and demarcations. These are closely connected to the populist narrative of “us versus them.” Another important category is the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland, which is relevant to both Israel and Hungary, although in different ways.

The subcategories I will use are likely to be developed from the material itself. In addition, I’m using discourse-analytical reading to capture how meaning is produced, particularly through language, metaphors, and implicit assumptions that make belonging appear natural and apolitical.

One of the main challenges is that both political systems are changing. Another is that the two cases are neither a most-similar nor a most-different design, so I had to look more closely at what makes them comparable in a qualitative analysis. I think I’ve now figured out how to frame this well enough for my PhD. I’m using the distinction between ethnic belonging and formal citizenship, which is anchored in the legal frameworks of both countries. Israel does not have a constitution, but it has a Basic Law with a somewhat ambiguous constitutional character. The distinction is also anchored in the Hungarian constitution. That is where the two cases are most similar. 

They differ, however, in how they draw their boundaries. Following other political scientists, Israel can be classified as an ethnic democracy. We also see this in other countries, such as Slovakia and Estonia. Hungary, on the other hand, is not generally considered an ethnic democracy. It is one of the most homogeneous countries in the European Union. Its inclusive boundary extends to ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries, such as Slovakia and Romania, while its exclusive boundary is drawn against more constructed threats. That is one of the limitations I have to deal with when comparing the two systems.

Do you plan to conduct fieldwork in these countries, particularly by speaking with people about ethnic belonging and related issues?

Fabiola Ermer: I do. The question now is whether I might shift more towards interviews. The difficulty with my research is that I won’t be able to make claims about the effects of these programmes. It would be too broad, and I don’t think it would be academically rigorous to say that someone attended classes at a think tank for a year, for example, and consequently developed more illiberal ideas. I can’t really speak about that effect. 

Instead, I’m looking more at why people, such as the heads of organizations, construct these courses in particular ways. Why are certain topics included? Even the names of subjects and the literature used to frame them can already provide hints. For example, in the Hungarian case, when organizations offer classes about Hungarian minorities, they may use Hungarian terminology for countries that have not been part of Hungary for more than a hundred years. That already communicates a particular idea before the lecture even begins. So, I will conduct fieldwork in the sense that I will speak with people and try to gather as much material as possible.

Digital Research and the Importance of Archiving

Social Media
Photo: Sujin Surakoon / Dreamstime.

The study of populism and contemporary political movements increasingly relies on digital data, social media, and computational methods. Given the importance of political communication and transnational networks in your area of research, what role have these tools played in your own work? How might they help scholars better understand political ideas and the development of movements?

Fabiola Ermer: Computational methods are not necessarily at the center of my methodology, but digital work matters in a different way. I actually didn’t expect this before, but with the changes in Hungary, I’ve become quite experienced in archiving websites. Websites and programmes are often digitalized, and they are among the most important sources for my research. When I want to understand how a class is framed beforehand, for example, and an organization has a Moodle course, I would really like to know how that course is presented. However, with the political changes, some materials are disappearing, particularly when organizations come under political pressure. So, I’ve started archiving relevant websites at regular intervals and working with earlier versions through web archives.

In general, digital methods have expanded considerably. They make it possible to analyze communication across large datasets and trace how messages travel across networks and platforms, sometimes even across countries and continents. But I think we need to be careful not to treat digital visibility directly as political influence. There are many more factors involved. Social media data tell us a lot about communication and mobilization, and they help us identify certain trends. But they do not necessarily tell us how ideas become embedded in institutions or in everyday understandings of society.

There is also the danger of being in certain bubbles all the time. Ideas can suddenly seem more natural, or it can seem as though everybody is saying something, when in reality, you’re only seeing a small bubble that appears much bigger than it is. Nevertheless, I don’t think any academic research field can ignore digital methods completely. They are important sources of data, but we should approach them carefully and make sure to bring other perspectives into the analysis.

Unexpected Discoveries and Changing Research Assumptions

What has been the most surprising finding in your work so far? Have you encountered any evidence that fundamentally challenged your original assumptions or shifted your thinking?

Fabiola Ermer: When I started my PhD, Hungary was still under Orbán’s government, while the Israeli political system was relatively stable, despite the elections and other developments. There was nothing fundamentally changing in the way we have now seen in Hungary. Orbán still had a two-thirds majority and was firmly in power. I think even many political scientists in Hungary would not have expected Magyar to win with such a strong majority in April.

One of my hypotheses was that institutions, once established, could endure even through political changes, particularly if they had been in place for a long time. But I hadn’t really considered what would happen if one two-thirds-majority system shifted into another two-thirds-majority system. With new legislation, defunding, and the creation of new foundations in Hungary, everything became very chaotic. That was one of my main surprises. Perhaps I should have considered it beforehand, but it was so hypothetical that even in April, many people thought such a fundamental change was unlikely.

Another interesting discovery came from comparing the organizations themselves. I’m currently looking at two or three Israeli think tanks, mostly on the right-wing spectrum, that are structured somewhat similarly to the Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Hungary. They offer classes for young adults, mostly between 18 and 26, with the aim of building a new intellectual elite.

What I found particularly interesting was how differently these organizations are structured. Hungary has, in a way, perfected the model of putting everything under one roof: a think tank, an educational sector, and other activities within one institution. In Israel, these activities are more divided between different think tanks, but the organizations are still closely connected. They may have the same lecturers or receive funding from the same organizations.

At first, I wasn’t sure whether this asymmetry would be a problem for comparing the cases. But after discussing it with my supervisor, I decided to approach it as two distinct modes of hegemonic articulation: direct pedagogical formation on one side and mediated ideological dissemination on the other.

I was also surprised by how little political foundations, and their non-governmental activities have been researched. We know quite a lot about institutions such as the Mathias Corvinus Collegium and their role within the Orbán regime, but there is still much less research on what they actually do at the non-governmental level. This is important because democratic backsliding and illiberalism do not necessarily happen only at the highest political level. They can also develop at an intermediary level, between the population and the government.

Researching Politically Sensitive Topics

Viktor Orbán campaign poster ahead of Hungary’s 2026 elections. Photo: Bettina Wagner / Dreamstime.

Populism often operates in politically polarized environments characterized by disinformation campaigns and contested narratives. Do you foresee these dynamics affecting your ability to collect data, access reliable resources, and conduct research? How do you navigate politically sensitive topics while maintaining scholarly rigor and analytical distance?

Fabiola Ermer: These dynamics have mainly affected the actors I’m researching. Internal teaching materials are particularly difficult to obtain, especially when they belong to organizations operating in a system that is undergoing political change. The situation in the Hungarian parliament is still quite heated and polarized, and access requests are currently being declined, often without any explanation.

Some of the materials in the Israeli cases are also difficult to obtain. Think tanks are generally not very willing to share their materials, and the broader polarization of the Israeli political system, as well as the international context, makes this even more complicated. Everything seems to be becoming more exclusive, and organizations are less willing to include outsiders.

Another substantive challenge is that the organizations I’m studying sometimes describe their work in ideological terms. Some openly state what they want to achieve, which can make certain questions easier to answer. But when programmes are presented as civic education, leadership training, or academic excellence, it becomes more difficult to understand their underlying purpose. I also don’t think it is academically sound to assume that because an organization describes its work in a certain way, that is necessarily what happens in practice. That’s why I’m trying to look more closely at why these programmes are constructed, not only how they are constructed.

With polarization more generally, I think it will become increasingly difficult for scholars to access materials. People are also becoming less willing to talk to those who may not share their ideas or worldviews, and this affects journalists and researchers alike.

The Responsibility of Scholars in Public Debate

When controversial topics such as populism generate intense public debate, do you believe scholars have a responsibility not only to produce research but also to intervene in these discussions? How can academics communicate complex findings to policymakers, journalists, civil society, and broader audiences?

Fabiola Ermer: Scholars have a responsibility to take part in public debate, especially when political concepts are used in simplified or highly polarized ways. However, I wouldn’t say our task is necessarily to provide political solutions. We are more the people who provide the facts and the analytical perspective.

The most important thing is that we are able to make complex developments understandable, challenge misleading assumptions, and provide the necessary context. I feel that this is actually a problem in political science. We talk so much about theory that people outside the field, or even people who work in a different academic discipline, sometimes ask themselves: What is actually happening? We need to adapt more to different settings and accept that each format requires something different. Policy advice is fundamentally different from writing about elections for a political journal or having a discussion within a political party and explaining what is happening in a particular country. Each format requires something different. In general, an audience needs a clear argument and a concrete example, so we should make our work as accessible as possible.

I think this is also one reason why populist narratives can be so effective. They are often very simple: they do this, everything else is bad, and we are here. There is no room for anything in between. But there are people in between, and we need to explain why things are not as simple as they may appear. This is where academia should intervene more. At the same time, academia should remain a place where fundamental disagreements can be discussed openly and where discussions are based on evidence and argument.

The debates surrounding Israel, in particular, show how polarization can reach into academic agenda-setting. It can affect which questions are considered legitimate and which perspectives are heard. We should not allow political positions to determine in advance which questions can even be asked. People sometimes misunderstand academia as a place where researchers are necessarily political activists. That can be true for some individuals, but academia should remain grounded in facts, evidence, and arguments rather than feelings.

The Broader Impact of Research on Democracy and Education

Photo: Iryna Kushnarova.

Beyond academic publications and your doctoral thesis, what kind of impact would you ideally like your research to have? How would you like scholarly work to contribute to our understanding of democratic challenges while avoiding becoming politicized itself?

Fabiola Ermer: Ideally, I would like my research to help explain how illiberal ideas become established beyond formal institutions. Democratic backsliding is still usually studied through constitutional reforms, judicial independence, or electoral cycles. All of these things matter, of course, but we also need to understand the societal infrastructures that make such challenges possible or acceptable. That’s where I would really like to contribute. With the Hungarian case, my research is also shifting towards a new question: How durable are these infrastructures once they have become well established? And how durable are they when there is an actual change in government or a fundamental political transformation?

The topic of education is also very personal to me. I would like to encourage a more critical perspective on education because, especially in Western democracies, education is often assumed to be democratic or emancipatory by nature. But we tend to forget that education can also reproduce particular worldviews and ideas of belonging. I don’t want to say that every politically oriented programme is inherently problematic. That’s not what I’m trying to argue. It is important, however, to pay attention to who provides education, which values it communicates, and how it relates to wider political structures. We should also ask why people feel the need to seek out alternative educational infrastructures rather than considering the existing government structures sufficient.

Regarding politicization, it is quite difficult to avoid it completely with my topic. But, in the end, I’m conducting academic research, and I distinguish between political advocacy and academic intervention. Research can contribute to democratic debate by making the mechanisms in both countries visible and hopefully providing evidence. But I’m not telling people what they should think. I’m stating what I have found, and then it is up to them to process that information.

The best protection I know is to be transparent about your methods, your materials, and the limitations of your research. It is also important to take seriously evidence that contradicts your expectations or even your results. In science, it is entirely possible that in ten years everything will have changed so fundamentally that our current findings no longer hold. But they are relevant to the period we are studying now.

International Collaboration and Academic Exchange

How has cooperation with other scholars, academic networks, and transnational initiatives such as the ECPS Early Career Researchers Network influenced your research, professional development, and intellectual outlook? How important are international dimensions to your work?

Fabiola Ermer: As you said, my whole project is international by design. It is co-supervised in Israel, and my co-supervisor primarily researches right-wing populism in Israel. He has already become a very important reference for me. This has shaped certain narratives, questions, and programmes that I’m looking at, particularly in the Israeli context. But it also means constantly moving between two academic environments, with different debates and assumptions.

What I learned quite quickly is that scholars are generally very open to helping if you ask them. Although I’m based in Germany, I speak with professors in Hungary and researchers in Israel. Even when you spend only a few weeks in a country and engage with people there, you can gain new insights, challenge assumptions, make connections, and meet people. Everybody knows someone who might be able to help, and that’s a great benefit of academia.

I also attended the ECPS Summer School, and it was a good example of this. We worked on a policy paper or policy advice in an interdisciplinary group, with people whose backgrounds were very different from my own. It encouraged communication across disciplines and helped us think in policy terms. I found it very enriching, and the connections we made continued even after the course finished. These international connections and regular opportunities to discuss ongoing work help prevent projects from becoming too narrow or one-sided.

To return to populism, it is generally a transnational phenomenon. The actors themselves work across borders, particularly when we look at right-wing networks. Studying populism therefore also requires transnational exchange.

Challenges Facing Early-Career Researchers

US Dollar
Photo: Mar Tas / Dreamstime.

Are there any personal or professional challenges you have faced while pursuing your research, particularly as an early-career scholar? What has enabled you to overcome these challenges? Has working on politically sensitive subjects presented any additional difficulties?

Fabiola Ermer: In general, one of the biggest challenges when starting a PhD or becoming an early-career researcher is the financial aspect. I’m very lucky to have a scholarship now, but in the beginning, there is a period when you don’t know whether your research will actually be financed or whether the funding will be sufficient.

For me, the first six months were particularly challenging because I was trying to obtain a scholarship and applying for different opportunities. Applications are very time-consuming, especially because every foundation wants something different. You write and rewrite applications, and sometimes you suddenly need another recommendation letter when you thought two would be enough.

Another challenge is balancing theoretical ambition with empirical feasibility. My project touches on so many theoretical dimensions: populism, illiberalism, democratic backsliding, nationalism, and education. At some point, it becomes tempting to cover everything, but that’s simply not possible. You sometimes have to overcome your own perfectionism and accept that you need to focus on a particular subject, even if there are many other interesting things you would like to explore. Otherwise, you could easily end up with enough material for several PhDs.

In the beginning, I wanted to compare three countries. Austria was one of the cases I considered because it offered a different ethno-national conception from Israel and Hungary. I thought it would be interesting to include a third case to show the contrast. But I realized quite quickly that the differences would make the comparison very difficult. Focusing on Israel and Hungary would actually make the project stronger.

I think that not losing focus is one of the most challenging things, at least based on my first year of experience. There are so many interesting things happening that it is easy to get lost in the details and become overwhelmed.

The Most Rewarding Aspects of Academic Research

What has been the most rewarding aspect of your work so far during your first year? Is there anything you would approach differently?

Fabiola Ermer: One of the most rewarding things has been starting to feel that people are actually interested in what I’m doing. I’ve been invited to talk about my research, present my ideas, and exchange views with other researchers.

Over the last year, I was invited to speak about the Hungarian system and the changes taking place there. Previously, I had been looking more at right-wing networks in Hungary and how they cooperate with other networks globally. It was really great to be invited and to have people interested in hearing me talk about it. I felt very honored.

I’m also grateful that I can work on something I’m genuinely interested in. I have to admit that when I first started studying Political Science, I hated it. I really didn’t like it. Perhaps I was too young when I started, but many things didn’t make sense to me, particularly political theory and democratic theory. That changed during my master’s degree. Now I’m doing my PhD in this field, and I genuinely look forward to reading and working on these topics. I think being able to work in a field that interests me so much is one of the best things I could have.

If I could start again, I would try to work more systematically with my materials from the beginning. I’m still at an early stage, so I have time to improve things, but the Hungarian case has become particularly challenging because of all the political changes. I suddenly have to archive as much material as possible, as quickly as possible.

I would also have liked to understand earlier that a dissertation does not need to address an enormous number of questions. It needs to address two or three fundamental questions that are important for the research and that ultimately help develop a clear and convincing argument.

Scholars and Ideas That Have Influenced Her Research

Professor Adam Przeworski.
Professor Adam Przeworski is Emeritus Professor of Politics at New York University (NYU).

Are there any particular scholars, theoretical traditions, books, or experiences that have fundamentally shaped your thinking about populism, ethno-nationalism, democratic backsliding, or the relationship between education and politics?

Fabiola Ermer: So far, the most important experience was probably the internship I had in Israel in 2023. That’s where everything started to develop, and I’m pretty sure I wouldn’t have chosen this topic if I hadn’t been there at that particular time.

My supervisors have also been very influential, especially my first supervisor. He brought me back into the political science part of my research when I presented my first draft for what would become my master’s thesis. He later encouraged me to pursue a PhD and supported me throughout the process.

On a theoretical level, Adam Przeworski has been particularly important. He’s a Polish political scientist who has lived in the United States for decades. His distinction between minimalist and maximalist conceptions of democracy is quite simple and logical when you first read it. But it changed a lot for me, especially in terms of the question of what we do with people who attach different values to democracy. It changed not only how I approached my own research topic but also how I engage with political debates when presenting my research and encountering different ideas.

It’s such a fundamental question: how do we deal with people who attach different values to democracy? Perhaps this is also one reason why we are becoming more polarized. We have started to neglect the question of how to deal with different values, and we sometimes assume that the values we attach to democracy are the only ones that matter. Przeworski essentially framed much of the theoretical framework of my PhD.

Other influential scholars include Fareed Zakaria, who helped popularize the distinction between democracy and constitutional liberalism, as well as Wolfgang Merkel and Aurel Croissant, particularly their work on formal and informal institutions.

For the Israeli context, the concept of ethnic democracy has also been important, particularly how it is understood in different countries and compared with European contexts. My second supervisor’s work on how Jewish populism has changed over the centuries has also influenced how I developed my own thinking.

Skills and Advice for the Next Generation of Scholars

As universities become increasingly internationalized and research more competitive, what skills do you believe young political scientists need most in order to thrive? What advice would you offer to the next generation of scholars entering populism studies?

Fabiola Ermer: There are quite a few things, although I’m still figuring them out myself. First, it’s important to be very precise about the definitions you use at the beginning of your research. You need to clearly explain what a concept captures and what it doesn’t. Rather than adopting a new term on every page, you should be clear about the concepts you’re working with.

I also think language skills are extremely important. We live in a world that is so globally connected, and even with AI and translation tools, linguistic skills remain essential. You can understand so many more nuances when you know the language and understand why a particular word is being used instead of another. This is particularly important in populism studies because different forms of populism can be quite subtle. When you’re not researching in your native language, having at least some basic language skills can be extremely helpful.

If there is an opportunity to receive a scholarship or participate in an academic exchange, I would also encourage researchers to spend time in the country they are studying and immerse themselves in its context. That’s one of the best skills we can develop.

Finally, being able to ask for help is an important skill. During bachelor’s and master’s programmes, you’re often expected to work independently, and it may not feel natural to approach your professors with questions all the time. But during a PhD, the expectations change. People ask why you didn’t seek help earlier. It’s important to develop the habit of asking questions and seeking guidance early, rather than continuing in one direction without knowing whether it is the right one.

The Future of Populism Studies

Photo: Dreamstime.

Looking ahead, where do you see populism studies evolving over the next decade? Which research questions or neglected areas deserve greater scholarly attention than they currently receive?

Fabiola Ermer: From an academic perspective, I’m quite optimistic that the topic won’t disappear. We need to look more beyond parties, campaigns, and individual leaders. We should ask more systematically how these ideas become embedded, rather than simply describing that they are becoming embedded.

Transnational networks are another important area. There are increasingly more mapping studies, and this kind of research will continue to develop. Social media also helps connect people globally and can facilitate the spread of populist narratives.

Another question that deserves more attention is what happens when populist governments lose power. Why do people become dissatisfied with the ideas these governments promote? Are they dissatisfied because those governments were populist, or are there other reasons why they decide to vote them out? We should also ask what happens to the infrastructures built during those years. Do they disappear, adapt, move somewhere else, or remain in the background? I think we will have more case studies to explore these questions, and they will become increasingly important.

We are also seeing populism become a much more prominent part of political debates in Western European countries. It will be interesting to compare countries where populist governments are losing power with those where populist movements are gaining influence.

The times are changing very quickly, and developments can be quite surprising. But these are some of the directions in which populism studies could develop.

Looking Beyond Israel and Hungary

If resources, time, and institutional constraints were no obstacle, what research project would you most like to pursue? Would you be interested in expanding your comparative research beyond Israel and Hungary or exploring other dimensions of transnational national-conservative networks? More broadly, what do you hope will ultimately be the lasting contribution of your work to scholarship and public understanding?

Fabiola Ermer: I would actually like to continue working on both countries, perhaps not necessarily as a direct comparison, but within a broader comparative project on how ideas of national belonging are transmitted across borders.

I would also like to focus more on diaspora programmes, transnational political networks, and how these different elements work together. This is particularly interesting in the Israeli case, but perhaps even more significant in Hungary, where these ideas are much more deeply embedded. For example, the whole idea of mystifying or romanticizing Hungarian history, and how that has become embedded in Hungarian society, is something I find very interesting. This is one of the lasting effects of the Orbán regime. The idea of Treaty of Trianon has become much more visible over the last fourteen years. You can see it in monuments standing in small villages, including those near Hungary’s former borders. It is very visible, and it also plays a role in how the idea of the people is constructed.

There is a similar phenomenon in Israel, although it operates in a different and less pronounced way.

I would really like to research the broader idea of romanticizing history and how it is narrated through political contexts. There are so many connected dimensions that could also be explored, such as how schoolbooks are designed and which vocabulary is used. These things are closely connected to my current topic, but there are so many nuances that I cannot examine all of them at the moment without making the project far too broad.

Ultimately, my hope is that my work can contribute to understanding the less visible mechanisms through which political ideas become socially embedded and politically normalized, without the need for coercion, and how these mechanisms shape the transformations taking place in our democracies today.

Professor Frances E. Lee.

Prof. Frances E. Lee: I Anticipate Very Hardball Politics in the US Over the Next Two Years

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Frances E. Lee of Princeton University examines the implications of the November 2026 US midterm elections, which delivered Democratic majorities in both chambers of Congress. Challenging interpretations of Trump’s presidency as consolidated competitive authoritarianism, Professor Lee argues that authoritarian ambitions have encountered significant institutional constraints, particularly decentralized election administration, federalism, and judicial independence. While warning that Trump’s expansive use of emergency and tariff powers has exposed constitutional vulnerabilities, she emphasizes the importance of congressional oversight and bipartisan accountability. Looking toward 2028, Professor Lee questions whether Trump’s personalistic coalition can survive his departure, even as populist rhetoric remains influential. Despite Democratic electoral gains, she anticipates continued polarization and intense partisan confrontation: “I anticipate very hardball politics over the next two years.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

The November 2026 US midterm elections delivered a significant political setback for President Donald Trump, with Democrats securing majorities in both chambers of Congress. Driven partly by public dissatisfaction with inflation, rising prices, and the cost of living, the results underscored the continuing relevance of electoral accountability while raising fundamental questions about democratic backsliding, institutional resilience, and the future of authoritarian populism. With divided government returning in January 2027, the next two years will test Congress’s capacity to constrain presidential power and restore institutional accountability.

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Frances E. Lee, Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, jointly appointed in Princeton University’s Department of Politics and School of Public and International Affairs, offers a nuanced assessment of Trump’s electoral defeat and its implications for American democracy. Drawing on her research into congressional politics, party competition, and institutional constraints, Professor Lee challenges interpretations that equate authoritarian ambitions with successful democratic capture.

Addressing the debate over competitive authoritarianism, Professor Lee distinguishes between the administration’s attempts to undermine democratic institutions and its actual capacity to manipulate electoral competition. Despite serious concerns about attacks on civil society, universities, due process, and the rule of law, she emphasizes that “what the administration attempted to do looked like something straight out of the authoritarian playbook. But what it actually achieved was far more limited.”

Central to this resilience, Professor Lee argues, is America’s decentralized electoral system. State and local control over election administration prevented Republicans from changing electoral rules nationwide, even amid unprecedented mid-cycle redistricting efforts. As she explains, “A key source of that resilience is the decentralization of the US electoral system.” Federalism, judicial independence, and presidential term limits provide additional barriers against authoritarian consolidation.

Yet institutional resilience does not eliminate constitutional vulnerabilities. Professor Lee warns that Trump’s expansive interpretation of emergency authorities and tariff powers has exposed previously unrecognized weaknesses. She urges Congress to “rein in presidential emergency powers” by imposing time limits and reconsidering executive authorities that have enabled presidential overreach. She also advocates restraint in congressional investigations, emphasizing the greater credibility of bipartisan oversight.

Looking toward 2028, Professor Lee questions whether Trump’s personalistic political coalition can survive without its founder. “It may be that the Trump movement has reached its limits,” she observes. Nevertheless, populist rhetoric, anti-establishment appeals, and impatience with liberal-democratic constraints remain deeply embedded in American politics.

Finally, Professor Lee cautions against interpreting Democratic electoral gains as the beginning of partisan reconciliation. Given the continuing intensity of party competition and Republicans’ expectations of recovering power, she predicts: “I anticipate very hardball politics over the next two years.” Her analysis thus presents American democracy as simultaneously resilient, institutionally vulnerable, and politically polarized.

Here is our interview with Professor Frances E. Lee, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

America’s Decentralized Electoral System Is a Source of Democratic Resilience

Source: BBC.

Professor Lee, thank you for joining us. In your September 2026 article, Normal Politics Under Stress, you predicted that the midterms would follow conventional electoral patterns. Following the Democrats’ victories in both chambers, does the outcome simply confirm your expectations, or does it reveal something more significant about American democracy’s resilience against authoritarian populism? 

Professor Frances E. Lee: The election outcomes conform to historical norms. You would have expected the president’s party to lose seats in Congress, given that it was a midterm election and the president’s approval ratings were low. In fact, the president’s party lost roughly the number of seats you would expect based on his approval rating.

Everything proceeded as normal. The elections were held on time, their administration went smoothly, and the results were accepted afterward, with losing candidates conceding. It looked like a normal election. But, of course, the circumstances were not normal. There was considerable anxiety about potential election interference and whether the president would acknowledge his party’s defeat, given his history of refusing to accept adverse election results.

In the lead-up to the elections, the president’s party made a major effort across the country to insulate itself from electoral reversal. This included attempts to gerrymander and redraw congressional district boundaries to reduce the number of seats it was expected to lose in the midterms. This was far outside the norms of American politics. We had never seen this level of change to the electoral system in the middle of a census cycle. Normally, redistricting takes place once every ten years, but these changes were clearly undertaken with the upcoming elections in mind. There were therefore substantial reasons for concern. Nevertheless, the elections proceeded normally. Judging solely by the outcomes, you would never know that anything out of the ordinary had occurred.

What does this tell us? I would argue that there is significant institutional resilience against efforts to stack the deck in favor of one party or another. A key source of that resilience is the decentralization of the US electoral system. The party in power had no mechanism through which it could change the rules of the game nationwide.

Instead, President Trump could pressure states that already leaned Republican to redraw their district boundaries, and some did. But there was less to be gained from this because Republicans already performed well in those states. Meanwhile, he could not persuade Democratic-leaning states to redraw their districts to his advantage. In fact, they did the opposite. California, for example, redrew its district boundaries to benefit Democrats and counter what the administration was doing.

This decentralization makes it impossible for a party holding power at the national level to control the electoral process sufficiently to protect itself against electoral reversal. It is a form of institutional resilience that political scientists do not necessarily favor because the absence of national standards can create problems for election administration. Nevertheless, it is also a source of strength because it protects the electoral system against manipulation.

Trump’s Authoritarian Tactics Have Had Limited Electoral Impact

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have characterized the United States under Trump as a form of competitive authoritarianism. You have questioned this assessment, particularly regarding electoral fairness. Does the 2026 outcome undermine their argument, or can democratic backsliding persist despite an opposition electoral victory?

Professor Frances E. Lee: In assessing the claim that the US has become a competitive authoritarian regime, I would distinguish between what the party in power, or a president, attempts to do and what they can actually achieve in terms of shifting the balance of power in the electoral arena.

There has been considerable pressure on civil society since the administration took office in 2025. We have seen federal funding used as leverage to induce compliance among civil society organizations, universities, and researchers, as well as immigration enforcement used to suppress debate on college campuses. These actions and the pressure exerted by the administration are troubling. Due process has not been respected, and the rule of law has been disregarded in numerous ways. Many of these issues are still being litigated, but the courts are simply too slow to effectively police such actions. These are serious concerns, and they are precisely what Levitsky, Way, and Ziblatt emphasize most strongly.

However, the question is whether these actions actually have the power to tilt the electoral playing field in favor of the governing party. Here, I think the case is much weaker. When the administration pressures news organizations and threatens them through the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), there remains a wide range of media beyond its regulatory reach, including social media and online discussion. Even if we focus exclusively on mainstream broadcast media, they continue to be highly critical of the administration. It receives relatively little positive news coverage, as was documented during Trump’s first administration and is being documented again. In other words, the administration continues to face criticism.

Civil society also remains vibrant. Numerous organizations oppose the administration, and many states are governed by Democrats, the party opposing the president. So, there is still a free-for-all in public debate. Political discourse is not controlled in any meaningful sense.

Moreover, the election was decided largely by issues voters could experience directly, such as rising prices, inflation, and gas prices. These reactions do not require elaborate discussion in the news media. People were frustrated by their everyday experiences and responded by voting against the administration. Ultimately, the administration experienced the electoral reversal normally expected in midterm elections. In many cases, what the administration attempted to do looked like something straight out of the authoritarian playbook. But what it actually achieved was far more limited.

Trump Still Holds Extraordinary Power Over Republican Political Careers

US President Donald Trump applauds from the White House balcony during a welcoming ceremony for the Washington Nationals baseball team on the South Lawn in Washington, D.C., on November 4, 2019. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

In your research on the post-2020 Republican Party, you emphasize how congressional Republicans maintained institutional autonomy while avoiding direct confrontation with Trump. Will the 2026 defeat weaken Trump’s dominance over the Republican Party, or could Trumpism survive independently of his electoral fortunes?

Professor Frances E. Lee: The 2026 election outcomes undoubtedly weaken President Trump in some respects within his own party. It’s clear that his low approval rating was an electoral liability for Republicans. Many incumbents lost because of their association with the president, which harmed their electoral prospects and made it harder for them to win the November general elections.

Another factor is that Trump cannot run for president again. We’re now past the midterm elections of his final term, so the Republican Party must begin looking toward succession. That will increasingly preoccupy members of Congress over time. Both factors weaken the president’s position. The question is how strong Trump’s support remains among voters who still identify with the Republican Party. Congressional Republicans still need those voters. They cannot afford to alienate Trump supporters in their constituencies because they depend on them for their own electoral standing.

This brings us to Trump’s influence over Republican primaries. He has ended the careers of many congressional Republicans, demonstrating an ability that exceeds what we normally see from presidents. Typically, presidents do not succeed in purging their parties of internal opponents to the extent that Trump has. Congressional Republicans will therefore remain attentive to that influence. Nevertheless, Trump’s power is waning because of the constitutional limit on his presidency and the party’s increasing focus on the 2028 election.

America’s Political Parties Remain Vulnerable to Populist Takeovers

In “Populism and the American Party System,” you argue that American institutions constrain organized populist parties while leaving mainstream parties vulnerable to populist insurgencies. Does the Republican Party’s experience under Trump demonstrate the enduring strength or the limits of these institutional constraints?

Professor Frances E. Lee: I would say it’s both. Trump illustrates both the power of populism and its limits. The US system of open primaries is highly vulnerable to populist takeover. To take control of one of the national parties, all you need to do is win the presidential primary by being more appealing than the other candidates in the race. Trump’s success demonstrates that this path remains open to other populists. Others tried it before him, but Trump succeeded where they failed.

Nothing closes off that path, and it is available in both parties. There is also good reason to believe it remains viable in terms of voter preferences. If you listened to the discourse during the 2026 elections, you heard candidates from both parties using considerable populist rhetoric. There was widespread denunciation of the establishment as out of touch. This kind of language pits the establishment against the people and positions the speaker on the side of the people. All these traditional populist tropes were very much in evidence during the 2026 midterms. So, there is still a strong appetite for populism among the American electorate. That path remains open, and there is reason to believe it can succeed. Both establishment parties remain deeply unpopular, leaving them vulnerable to someone like Trump in the future.

Nevertheless, the institutional constraints remain real. At the constitutional level, these include federalism, the importance of the states, and the fact that winning power at the national level is not sufficient to govern. Judicial independence is another constraint. Judicial checks have remained important, even though Democrats have been frustrated that the courts have not blocked more of the administration’s actions. Nevertheless, the courts have prevented many things the administration wanted to do. There is also decentralized election administration, which we discussed earlier, making it difficult to stack the electoral deck.

Then there are term limits. Populist leaders build direct relationships with voters and constituents, often with a strong personalistic dimension. This is certainly true of Trump. Many people admire Trump as a person and political figure. But he cannot remain in office beyond two terms. Consequently, that personalistic connection with his coalition disappears from the presidency and must be rebuilt.

There are many constraints, but I would highlight one final political limitation on populist leaders: the polarization of American politics. No leader has demonstrated an ability to achieve overwhelming popularity in US politics during the polarized era. Trump was unpopular, Biden was unpopular, and Obama had the approval of roughly half the electorate. Obama performed relatively well, but his approval was still around half. George W. Bush became deeply unpopular after the Iraq War and left office with very low approval ratings following the financial crisis. So, we have experienced a series of presidents with limited popularity. That limits what they can accomplish in ways that constrain authoritarianism.

Closely Matched Parties Have Little Incentive to Moderate Their Political Strategies

Your research suggests that intensified party competition can exacerbate polarization rather than encourage moderation. Could the Democrats’ unexpectedly broad electoral gains reduce partisan antagonism, or will heightened competition further radicalize congressional politics?

Professor Frances E. Lee: One of the distinguishing characteristics of contemporary US politics is the close balance of power between the two parties and the fact that every national election seems to offer the prospect of a change in party control of one institution or another. This incentivizes parties in Congress to focus constantly on the next elections. Both parties feel insecure. The party in power worries about losing its majority, while the party out of power looks for a way back in and believes it can succeed.

In this context, the parties amplify their differences. They’re constantly posturing, trying to appeal to their voters, emphasize the stakes, and energize their supporters. I wouldn’t necessarily call this radicalism because the policies they pursue and enact haven’t really been radical. There have been no large-scale changes, at least in domestic policy. There have been some bold actions in foreign policy, but when the parties must reach an agreement in Congress, they check each other. Very little legislation passes solely with the votes of one party. Lawmaking usually requires some degree of bipartisanship, which constrains what either party can accomplish. However, their rhetoric frequently includes appeals such as “This is the most important election of our lives.” These kinds of statements reflect the intense competition between the parties.

The question is whether the 2026 elections change that calculation. I don’t think they do, at least not yet, even though Democrats won very significant majorities. We don’t know the exact numbers because some races remain undecided, but these will be the largest majorities we’ve seen in the polarized era. They’re comparable to, and perhaps slightly larger than, the Democratic majorities during the first two years of Obama’s presidency. So, these are substantial majorities. However, the majorities Democrats secured after the 2008 elections were wiped out in 2010, when Republicans regained control.

I therefore don’t think Republicans see themselves as being out of power for an extended period. They don’t know when they’ll return to power, but I don’t think they’re discouraged. I expect them to pursue the same strategies we’ve seen throughout the polarized era: highlighting disagreements with the Democratic Party, forcing Democrats to take difficult votes, and withholding cooperation in Congress. I anticipate very hardball politics over the next two years.

If Democrats were to win again, and win decisively, Republicans might begin to reconsider their approach, saying to themselves, “We need to do some rethinking here. We’re not going to get right back in at the next elections. Maybe the people have spoken, and we need to cooperate.” We might then see a return to some of the political practices more common in the 20th century. But what I’m describing is essentially how American politics has functioned in the 21st century, with the two parties closely matched in power.

Congress Can Block Trump’s Agenda but Cannot Easily Compel Him to Act

The Capitol and Reflecting Pool in Washington, DC.
The Capitol and Reflecting Pool in Washington, DC. Photo: Jon Bilous / Dreamstime.

You have described divided government as the Constitution’s ordinary remedy for an unpopular president. With Democrats controlling both chambers from January 2027, how effectively can Congress constrain Trump’s executive overreach, particularly regarding immigration enforcement, politicized prosecutions, and institutional accountability?

Professor Frances E. Lee: The party controlling Congress can rarely win a direct confrontation with the president. It cannot force the president to take actions he doesn’t want to take. The president has veto power. Congress can attempt to legislate changes to immigration policy or impose restrictions on the administration, but the president can veto those measures. Overriding a veto would require Republican support. So, it is very difficult for Congress to win a direct confrontation and compel the administration to do something it opposes.

Congress’s power comes primarily from its ability to block the administration’s initiatives. The administration needs funding. In fact, it is currently requesting a supplemental appropriation to fund the war in Iran. It also needs Senate confirmation of its nominees. The administration must therefore come to Congress for these things, and Congress can use that leverage to secure concessions. However, under divided government, both parties must consent. Congress cannot simply force the president to do things he doesn’t want to do. Instead, it can block the president when he requests something. That’s how we should assess what Congress can accomplish under these circumstances. Its power is limited, but it remains important.

I would also add that Congress’s role in shaping political discourse in the US will change after these elections. Criticism from Congress, the hearings it holds, and the investigations it conducts will receive news media coverage, forcing the administration to react and respond. This has the potential to influence public opinion in ways that Congress could not, or would not, when the same party controlled both branches. In that sense, Congress can shape the broader political environment.

Democrats Must Avoid Partisan Overreach

Drawing on your recent book, A Case for Congress, what should be the principal institutional priorities of the incoming Democratic Congress? How should it balance legislative oversight, investigations, institutional reform, and constructive policymaking?

Professor Frances E. Lee: Oversight is going to change the most. Congress’s oversight role will change significantly after these elections because of the Democratic Party’s new agenda-setting power. The kinds of hearings held, the investigations conducted, and the demands for information from Congress will all change.

The main thing Democrats, as the new party in power, need to watch out for is overreach. If they conduct too many investigations, they risk diluting their impact. If those investigations begin to appear highly partisan, the news media may simply roll their eyes and conclude that there’s nothing substantial there. Democrats therefore need to exercise restraint and pursue only the most egregious cases—those that are undeniably important and, ideally, attract some Republican support. Investigations with bipartisan support carry much greater weight with the news media, which regard them as far more credible than investigations pursued solely by the administration’s partisan opponents. That’s the biggest change these elections will bring to Congress’s role.

When it comes to lawmaking, however, it doesn’t matter whether government is divided or unified. Very little legislation passes with support from only one party. Right now, on questions of government funding, the administration meets with the bipartisan, bicameral congressional leadership—the so-called Big Four, consisting of the majority and minority leaders in both chambers. That’s how they’re currently negotiating government funding.

We have unified government at the moment, but the same process will continue under divided government next year. Much about Congress’s role simply doesn’t change. I would characterize that as a kind of institutional strength. Congress serves as a ballast; it is difficult to move. With both parties as unpopular as they are, the fact that they check each other in Congress is quite useful in terms of institutional performance.

Divided Government Makes It Easier for Democrats to Maintain Party Unity

Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.
Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez at the “Bernie Is Back” political rally in Queensbridge Park, Queens, New York, on October 19, 2019. Photo: Aleksandr Dyskin / Dreamstime.

Your research with James Curry demonstrates that intraparty disagreement can obstruct legislative agendas as much as the Senate filibuster. How should Democrats manage divisions between progressive and moderate factions while confronting presidential vetoes and institutional constraints?

Professor Frances E. Lee: The Democratic Party now has an easier task than it would under unified Democratic control. Democrats can get their moderates and progressives on the same page to pass legislation, even when they expect the president to veto it. In other words, divided government allows for considerable symbolic action, through which a party communicates to its constituencies what it would like to accomplish while recognizing that it cannot do so without bipartisan support. This actually makes it easier to hold the party together. What is really difficult is when a party has unified control and the power to enact legislation, provided it can reach agreement internally. That’s when different factions end up holding each other hostage.

We saw Republicans struggle with this under Trump in 2017. Their biggest priority that year was repealing and replacing Obamacare. They spent most of the year trying to do so but ultimately failed because they couldn’t reach an internal agreement. Similarly, under President Biden, following the Democrats’ return to unified control after the 2020 elections, there was the so-called “Build Back Better” agenda. This was a very ambitious domestic policy agenda, encompassing a wide range of measures intended to strengthen what they called the care economy, including healthcare, childcare, elder care, and related areas. But Democrats couldn’t reach an internal agreement. In the end, they passed a significantly watered-down version of the agenda, called the Inflation Reduction Act.

So, parties have difficulty reaching internal agreement when they hold unified control of government. But after these elections, we have divided government. In a sense, that makes things easier for Democrats. They don’t have to negotiate as seriously because much of what they attempt to do cannot become law. That makes it easier to reach internal agreement. The consequences, however, will be very limited at present.

Decentralized Elections Are a Strength of American Democracy

Given the erosion of democratic norms under Trump, which reforms should Congress prioritize to reinforce electoral integrity, judicial independence, congressional oversight, and the constitutional separation of powers?

Professor Frances E. Lee: I wouldn’t actually advocate doing much on the electoral front at the national level. One of the clearest lessons from recent years in American politics is that decentralized election administration, with states and localities running their own elections, is a strength of the American system. So, anything Congress might do to federalize election rules is somewhat dangerous. It’s better to keep election administration decentralized. Congress can provide funding to help administer elections and protect election workers against threats of violence, for example, by involving the FBI. But I don’t think strengthening the national government’s role in election administration is a good idea.

On judicial independence, I don’t anticipate any significant reforms. However, the president will face considerable difficulty getting more of his nominees confirmed to the federal bench. That will help balance things out by leaving some judicial seats vacant. Depending on who wins the next presidential election, we could see greater partisan balance in the judiciary as a consequence of these elections, even without an explicit reform agenda.

I also hope Congress will work to rein in presidential emergency powers, particularly the open-ended emergency powers the president has been claiming, by imposing some form of time limit on them. The president’s tariff powers also need to be restrained in ways that were not previously evident to Congress. The president has been very creative in his use of existing authorities, and I hope Congress will be willing to revisit those powers.

These changes may not happen immediately, but clearly, a vulnerability in the American political system has emerged that had not previously been recognized.

Electoral System Produces More Proportional Outcomes Than Many Would Expect

Your research on geographic representation and electoral institutions highlights structural inequalities in American democracy. What lessons should Democrats draw from the failure of Republican gerrymandering to prevent electoral reversal, and what reforms could strengthen fair representation without reproducing partisan manipulation?

Professor Frances E. Lee: There was considerable pessimism among Democrats and progressive organizations about the way Congress seemed to be tilted in favor of Republicans, making it easier for them to win. The typical state, which, of course, elects senators, was more Republican-leaning than the country as a whole. There were similar concerns about how congressional district lines were drawn for the House of Representatives, making it easier for Republicans to win power. Democrats would need a larger share of the national vote to secure a corresponding share of seats. So, there was considerable anxiety about that. But then came the 2026 elections, and Democrats ended up winning in places where you would never have expected them to win. This weakens the impetus for reform on these issues. Democrats demonstrated that, whatever imbalances exist, they could overcome them quite dramatically. They achieved very large majorities.

We can also compare these with the majorities Republicans have achieved. The Democrats’ House majority is much larger than any Republican majority during the polarized era. It also looks as though their Senate majority will be larger once the final races are called. One of the things I examined in my latest book, A Case for Congress, is that there’s less imbalance between congressional and presidential election outcomes than you might expect. In fact, they correspond quite closely. 

For example, the share of the vote Democrats received in the 2024 elections corresponds fairly closely to the share of seats they won in the House and Senate. The same was true in 2020 and 2016. If we were to move to a proportional representation system, it would be difficult to improve on what we’ve already been seeing in national politics. It’s strange because there’s no particular reason to expect it to work out that way. We have a very old-fashioned electoral system. Nevertheless, the two parties have ended up winning shares of seats that are reasonably proportional to their support in the national electorate.

So, I’m not an advocate for electoral reform based on the patterns we’ve been observing. I understand the problem in theory, but in practice, it hasn’t really manifested itself. As the saying goes, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” So, I’m somewhat skeptical.

The Republican Party Faces a Profound Struggle Over Its Post-Trump Identity

Trump supporters marched toward Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C., USA. Photo: Dreamstime / © Bgrocker

Does the 2026 electoral backlash suggest that authoritarian populism has reached its political limits in the United States, or might Trumpism reconstitute itself through new leaders, grievances, and strategies ahead of the 2028 presidential election?

Professor Frances E. Lee: That’s a big and outstanding question. Is the Trump coalition sustainable without Trump? Is there a successor who can hold together the party he has built?

The Republican Party is going to face a major internal battle looking toward 2028. Many organizations and Republicans at all levels of government in the US would like to return to pre-Trump conservative orthodoxies on trade, entitlements, budget deficits, and other aspects of traditional conservatism against which Trump rebelled. They would like to move back in that direction. So, will the succession produce a Trump-style Republican Party rooted in populist conservatism or a return to more traditional conservatism? That remains very much an open question.

Democrats also face internal battles between progressives and moderates, but I would say the questions are more profound for Republicans. They will have to work them out among themselves.

I personally think much of Trump’s appeal is personalistic, rooted in his unique celebrity and charisma. I have doubts about whether anyone can step into his shoes and continue to hold the party together as he has. So, it may be that the Trump movement has reached its limits.

Nevertheless, as we discussed earlier, populist rhetoric remains popular and widely used. Those kinds of appeals, the impatience with the institutions and processes of liberal democracy, and the tendency to strain against statutory constraints—all these elements of that political style may well continue, given the rhetoric we hear. But who will represent that style of politics and what they will stand for in both parties remain open questions.

Trump’s International Unpopularity Has Turned Political Association Into a Liability

Labour Day celebrations
Labour Day celebrations at Old Town Square in Prague on May 1, 2017, featuring a banner depicting democracy as a leaf eaten by caterpillars labeled Putin, Kaczyński, Orbán, Babiš, Trump, and Fico.
Photo: Jolanta Wojcicka.

And finally, Professor Lee, viewed comparatively alongside the populist radical right in Europe and authoritarian-populist movements elsewhere, how might Trump’s electoral setback affect their political legitimacy, transnational networks, and strategic calculations? Could the American experience offer broader lessons for reversing democratic backsliding?

Professor Frances E. Lee: I think these networks will persist, but I’m not sure what they’ve yielded. Transnational right-wing populist movements collaborate, discuss ideas, and share information. I would expect all of that to continue. But what does it actually get them? Vice President Vance went to Hungary to campaign for Orbán, and yet Orbán lost.

If Trump is no longer president after 2028, and he has already demonstrated the limits of his political appeal here in the US, how inspirational will he be to other figures around the world who might want to pursue similar policies? He doesn’t provide an example of what you would call a path to sustained electoral success. It’s difficult for right-leaning leaders around the world, whether in Europe or Canada, to be friendly with Trump because he is so unpopular internationally. Association with Trump can be embarrassing for these leaders.

It looked as though a conservative in the Trump mold was going to come to power in Canada. All the polls seemed to indicate that. Then Trump launched a trade war against Canada, which rallied the country around the liberal leadership and effectively tanked that conservative leader’s chances.

So, looking around the world, I don’t think Trump has been particularly helpful to the right-wing populist cause. Even where he has tried to help, his efforts have backfired. I’m sure these movements will continue to collaborate, but they are now on the defensive here in the US, and it’s unclear what the future holds.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Professor Dušan Spasojević is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Belgrade.

Prof. Spasojević: Without Lustration and Accountability, Serbia’s Former Rulers Will Return

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Dušan Spasojević of the University of Belgrade examines Serbia’s student-led electoral victory and the challenges of democratic consolidation following Aleksandar Vučić’s defeat. While mass mobilization and civic solidarity helped overcome the structural advantages of competitive authoritarianism, Professor Spasojević cautions that entrenched political divisions, Serbian nationalism, and ethnonational tensions persist. He highlights the difficulties of maintaining unity within the ideologically diverse Students’ List and rebuilding democratic institutions. Drawing lessons from Milošević’s overthrow in 2000, he warns that without lustration and accountability, former authoritarian elites may return sooner than expected. Judicial independence, media freedom, and effective enforcement of existing laws, he argues, are essential to preventing renewed authoritarianism.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Serbia’s October 25, 2026, parliamentary elections marked a historic political turning point, with the student-backed Students’ List securing 140 of 250 seats and ending Aleksandar Vučić’s longstanding political dominance. Emerging from protests following the November 2024 Novi Sad railway station tragedy, the movement transformed demands for accountability into a nationwide challenge to institutional capture, political clientelism, and personalized rule. Yet electoral victory raises profound questions about democratic consolidation, institutional reform, and the resilience of entrenched authoritarian networks.

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Dušan Spasojević, Professor of Political Science at the University of Belgrade, offers a nuanced assessment of Serbia’s democratic breakthrough, highlighting both the transformative power of student-led mobilization and the formidable obstacles confronting democratic renewal.

Drawing parallels with Slobodan Milošević’s overthrow in 2000, Professor Spasojević identifies transitional justice as a decisive test. Warning against the complacency that characterized Serbia’s earlier transition, he argues: “If we fail to carry out lustration or establish some form of accountability, they will return, and sooner than we might expect.” Indeed, he cautions that “the return of the previous regime might be even easier now than it was in 2000.” His central recommendation is to prioritize accountability, judicial independence, media freedom, and implementation of existing laws.

Yet Professor Spasojević emphasizes that electoral victory has not erased Serbia’s deep political divisions. Although student mobilization attracted previously disengaged citizens and former government supporters, entrenched urban–rural and socioeconomic cleavages persist. Moreover, the Students’ List encompasses ideological positions ranging from the far right to the far left. Consequently, “Maintaining that unity will be a key challenge for the new government and the list itself.”

The interview also illuminates how mass mobilization can challenge competitive authoritarianism. Through nationwide canvassing, citizen participation, and election monitoring, students countered the ruling party’s institutional advantages. As Professor Spasojević observes, “the elections were ultimately neither free nor fair, but they were sufficiently competitive to make victory possible.”

Importantly, the movement’s anti-authoritarian success did not necessarily entail an ideological rupture with Serbian nationalism. Professor Spasojević argues that students “didn’t challenge Serbian nationalism,” pointing to their ambiguous positions on Kosovo, Russia, and European integration. Similarly, while solidarity between Serbian and Bosniak students represented meaningful civic progress, entrenched ethnonational divisions remain. The movement’s silence surrounding Srebrenica and the limited public participation of Albanian students illustrate the constraints of reconciliation through mobilization alone.

Professor Spasojević’s analysis distinguishes electoral transformation from democratic consolidation. Serbia’s experience demonstrates the importance of solidarity and collective action, but also the necessity of dismantling authoritarian structures. His overarching warning is unequivocal: “Democracy should never be taken for granted,” even after authoritarian incumbents lose power.

Here is our interview with Professor Dušan Spasojević, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Serbia’s Student Revolution Was Two Years in the Making

Serbia protest.
Serbian students and citizens protest against government corruption following the Novi Sad railway station accident, at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on December 22, 2024. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic / Dreamstime.

Professor Spasojević, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with the extraordinary transformation of Serbia’s student movement from civic protest into electoral victory. The student movement that emerged after the November 2024 Novi Sad railway station tragedy culminated in the Students’ List’s electoral victory on October 25, 2026. How do you explain this remarkable transformation from a movement demanding accountability into a nationwide political force capable of defeating Aleksandar Vučić’s entrenched political establishment?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: First of all, we should recognize that this was a two-year-long transformation. Students initiated protests and blockades in late 2024, and even at that early stage, they enjoyed significant public support. According to polls, more than 60% of Serbian voters supported their initial demands for accountability, providing an excellent starting point.

However, transforming a very fluid social movement into a political force capable of competing in and ultimately winning elections required considerable time and resources. Support from different parts of society was also crucial.

Finally, the students largely followed the established rules of electoral campaigning. Of course, this was not a conventional campaign, but by the end, they resembled a proper political party, albeit without notable leaders and with certain distinctive characteristics. Nevertheless, they followed the rules of electoral competition to a significant extent.

Unity Without a Single Leader Was the Students’ Greatest Strength

In your study “Civic Mobilization as a Response to Institutional Deficit,” you examine how student plenums, decentralized leadership, and nonviolent mobilization challenged Serbia’s established political practices. What made these organizational innovations more effective than previous anti-government protest movements?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: I would return to the same point I made in response to the previous question. In the early days, the student plenums were massive. Hundreds of thousands of students gathered, creating a snowball effect and lending legitimacy to the movement itself. This was extremely important at the beginning of the process.

The fact that the students had no single leader and remained united despite their differences was also important. This distinguished them from the Serbian opposition. In the later stages, oligarchic elements emerged, but the oligarchy remained sufficiently pluralistic and democratic to sustain support throughout the process. The students thus used different forms of political organization depending on the stage of the movement and the particular moment in the political crisis.

Electoral Victory Has Not Erased Serbia’s Deep Political Divisions

Students mobilized support well beyond universities through marches, rural outreach, local assemblies, and solidarity networks. How did the movement overcome Serbia’s urban–rural and generational divides, and what role did these grassroots connections play in its electoral success?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: As I mentioned, the movement already enjoyed 60% support by January or February 2025. At that point, we realized that its appeal extended beyond the usual political divisions, attracting a significant number of governing party voters. This was very important.

Door-to-door campaigning and canvassing across Serbia in the later stages of the movement were also extremely important. However, I wouldn’t go too far in claiming that the students overcame traditional political divisions. The government remains much stronger among rural voters and those with lower levels of educational attainment, reflecting a divide that persists.

Nevertheless, the students managed to attract median voters and those further removed from the government’s core constituency. In a sense, they gained what support they could, but the underlying divisions remain and cannot be overcome easily.

Rejecting Traditional Parties Helped Serbia’s Students Win

erbian President Aleksandar Vučić addresses the Socialist Party of Serbia’s anniversary gathering in Belgrade, Serbia, on July 16, 2024. Photo: Milos Peric / Dreamstime.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić addresses the Socialist Party of Serbia’s anniversary gathering in Belgrade, Serbia, on July 16, 2024. Photo: Milos Peric / Dreamstime.

In your article “Antipolitics as a Challenge to Political Parties,” you examine the democratic implications of rejecting conventional politics. Did the students’ refusal of traditional party leadership create a new form of democratic representation, or did their electoral victory ultimately demonstrate the necessity of institutionalized political organization?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: This remains an open question to some extent. The students rejected cooperation with established political parties, which was tactically wise. But there was also an element of anti-politics and anti-partyism that helped attract certain segments of the population. We should probably acknowledge that this contributed to their success. However, in the medium to long run, I wouldn’t conclude that the success of the Students’ List demonstrates the need for new forms of political participation or organization. This appears to be a unique case, shaped by several factors, including the inability of established political parties to challenge the regime.

More concretely, the opposition parties had a good opportunity in the 2023 parliamentary elections but failed to build on that success in the 2024 local elections. Their failure to act when they had the opportunity created more space for alternative forms of political behavior. In that sense, at least for now, this appears to be a genuinely unique phenomenon. I expect that, in two or three years, political parties will once again become the dominant actors. Of course, they will not necessarily be the same parties we know today. But I don’t think this movement has the capacity to fundamentally change the way political organization works in Serbia.

Maintaining Unity Will Be the Students’ List’s Greatest Challenge

The Students’ List won 140 of 250 parliamentary seats in October, displacing both the ruling SNS alliance and established opposition parties. Does this represent a fundamental realignment of Serbia’s party system or an exceptional anti-incumbent coalition whose internal diversity may become a source of instability?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: I would lean toward the second option, as the Students’ List’s key strength was its unity. We knew that its members ranged from the far right to the far left, but they remained united under specific circumstances. Maintaining that unity will be a key challenge for the new government and the list itself.

I don’t expect a split to happen very soon, but in a year or two, differences among them will become more visible to the general public. Of course, we have already noticed these differences. That will be the first major challenge.

When we consider political alignment or realignment, there may be room to rethink Serbia’s political landscape, party system, and key social cleavages. However, if we look at how the movement has functioned so far, it has operated along these existing lines of division. I would therefore expect at least some of them to persist over time, meaning that new political actors will have to confront the same questions as their predecessors.

Some of the most important issues remain unresolved, particularly Serbia’s EU membership and the future status of Kosovo. Numerous other identity politics issues also remain highly salient in Serbian politics.

Electoral Transformation Was Driven by Unprecedented Participation

Your research with Vujo Ilić highlights persistent inequalities in electoral participation. To what extent did the students’ victory depend on mobilizing previously disengaged citizens, particularly younger voters, and what does this reveal about the relationship between civic participation and electoral transformation?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: First-time and younger voters were extremely important, but I think mobilizing people who usually abstain from voting was also decisive. I would identify three key groups: previous abstainers, young voters, and a few hundred thousand voters who switched from the former ruling parties. Mobilizing these groups was essential to winning the elections.

Overall, turnout was exceptionally high, at around 70%. However, we know that of the 6.5 million registered voters, at least one million live abroad and are unlikely to vote, although they remain on the voter rolls. Taking this into account, turnout was effectively closer to 80%, which is remarkable.

This brings us back to our experience with the downfall of Milošević and similar moments of significant political change. High turnout and broad participation are crucial to challenging such a dominant opponent. We knew, and polls also suggested, that the students only had a chance if turnout exceeded 60–65%. Of course, no one could have anticipated such a decisive victory.

Mass Mobilization Can Challenge the Structural Advantages of Authoritarian Regimes

In your research with Jelena Lončar, you characterize Serbia’s political system through the framework of competitive authoritarianism. Given the SNS’s institutional advantages, media influence, and patronage networks, how did the student-backed opposition overcome the structural asymmetries that had constrained previous electoral challenges?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: We have already mentioned some of the key elements. The students relied on their manpower. They canvassed, walked, cycled, and marched across Serbia for more than a year, trying to overcome the ruling party’s advantage in media coverage. They also benefited from strong support from independent and opposition media, particularly Nova TV and N1, which were closely aligned with the students.

Another crucial factor was the massive mobilization of citizens who became involved in the movement from its earliest days and remained engaged throughout the process. The only way to tackle the uneven playing field under competitive authoritarianism is to have sufficient numbers, resources, and people to mobilize, thereby making electoral competition somewhat fairer. Of course, the elections were ultimately neither free nor fair, but they were sufficiently competitive to make victory possible.

Citizen Election Monitoring and Democratic Self-Defense

Students collect signatures in support of calls for early parliamentary elections in Valjevo, Serbia.
Students collect signatures in support of calls for early parliamentary elections in Valjevo, Serbia, on December 28, 2025. Photo: Adam Radosavljevic / Dreamstime.

Reports of extensive citizen-led election monitoring suggest that grassroots observers played a significant role in protecting the October vote. Can this mobilization be understood as a form of democratic self-defense, and what does it reveal about elections conducted under conditions of institutional distrust?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: We had already learned this lesson during the final years of Milošević’s rule, particularly in 2000, when protecting the vote and monitoring elections were essential. The challenge in confronting the Serbian Progressive Party, as with most contemporary hybrid regimes, is that these regimes are becoming smarter, developing methods of electoral fraud that are difficult to anticipate.

For example, the 2024 local elections presented the first major opportunity for Vučić to lose some of his leverage. The SNS essentially stole the Belgrade elections by registering an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 voters in Belgrade just before the vote. These voters did not actually move there; they were simply registered in the city. This was a form of electoral fraud that was difficult to anticipate.

On election day, it was therefore essential not only to protect every vote at polling stations but also to track ballots and voter registers as they were transported to the Central Electoral Commission. We had a veritable army of people on the streets, organized into what we called mobile teams. Traveling in several cars, they monitored every step of the process.

Hundreds of thousands of people were involved, with the aim of protecting the electoral process from beginning to end. Another objective was to limit the SNS’s ability to organize activities near polling stations, where they would typically engage in vote buying or mobilize their voters. The strategy was to prevent these activities, slow down the SNS’s operations, and reduce its influence. Ultimately, that was the central objective: to make the party less effective than it had been in previous elections.

Authoritarian Regime Has Fallen, but Democratic Consolidation Remains Uncertain

In “Transforming Populism—From Protest Vote to Ruling Ideology,” you analyze how populism becomes institutionalized within governing parties. Does the student movement’s victory mark the defeat of Vučić’s authoritarian populism, or merely the electoral interruption of a political system whose ideological foundations remain resilient?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: The victory of the Students’ List marks the end of the authoritarian regime, in the sense that the regime’s levers and mechanisms are no longer in place. The SNS developed an entire system rooted partly in the state and partly in the political party. They blurred the boundaries between the state and the party, allowing them to use state institutions at will. Their electoral defeat has already significantly improved the level of democracy in Serbia because they can no longer misuse these mechanisms.

Whether we will be able to restore a deeper, higher-quality democracy in Serbia, and what the long-term legacy of this transformation will be, remain open questions. I hope we will succeed, but that remains to be seen in the months ahead.

Student Movement Was Too Ideologically Diverse to Be Classified as Populist

The student movement constructed a broad political identity around accountability, justice, and opposition to corruption. How does its conception of “the people” differ from Vučić’s populist discourse, and could the movement’s anti-establishment rhetoric itself develop into a form of democratic or counter-populism?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: If you look at the students’ ideological profile, it is very diverse. You could characterize them as far right, far left, centrist, or anything in between. All these positions are represented within the movement.

In terms of populism, I wouldn’t characterize them as populists because they lacked an anti-elitist or xenophobic stance, as well as other typical elements of populism. To some extent, however, we could argue that there was a form of anti-populism. The students often referred to the people in affirmative terms, but they also contrasted the people with the government, those in power, or Vučić himself. This reflected a somewhat populist, perhaps slightly anti-party or anti-political sentiment. It was a clever move.

Nevertheless, I would still find it difficult to classify the students ideologically. There were significant right-wing elements, particularly in the Serbian context. For example, opposition to sanctions against Russia and a strong interest in the position of Serbian minorities in the post-Yugoslav space are traditionally associated with right-wing parties in Serbia. Therefore, I wouldn’t expect a significant difference in their overall ideological position. However, authoritarianism and populism, in the sense of anti-elitism and the exercise of power, are out of the picture, at least for now.

Students Challenged Vučić Without Challenging Serbian Nationalism

Students and citizens protest against corruption and the Serbian government in Novi Sad, Serbia, on February 1, 2025.
Students and citizens protest against corruption and the Serbian government in Novi Sad, Serbia, on February 1, 2025. Photo: Srdjan Randjelovic / Dreamstime.

Vučić’s political dominance was sustained partly through nationalist narratives, historical grievances, and the identification of internal and external enemies. How did the student movement challenge these ethnonationalist and ethno-populist narratives without alienating voters who remain attached to Serbian national identity?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: They actually didn’t challenge most of these narratives, as is evident in their positions on Russia and Kosovo. The Students’ List also lacks a clear position on Serbia’s membership in the EU. So, they didn’t challenge Serbian nationalism and even tried, to some extent, to adopt a similar approach. But again, we return to the fact that the Students’ List was a very broad catch-all coalition.

The real question is how much this mattered to voters. For example, the majority of Students’ List voters are pro-European, yet they supported the list despite its inability to formulate a clear pro-European position. That’s why I believe the process remains open to some extent, and we will have to see how the list operates under pressure.

Let me give you an example. Yesterday, the list held its first meeting with representatives of the US Embassy in Belgrade, which was symbolically important. However, it also met with representatives of the Russian Embassy on the same day. So, they are trying to maintain a balance as much as possible. They can do that for now, but we will see how this approach works in the months ahead.

Student Mobilization Alone Cannot Overcome Entrenched Ethnonational Divisions

The participation of Bosniak students from Novi Pazar and solidarity across ethnic communities gave the protests a civic dimension. Can this solidarity reshape majority–minority relations in Serbia, particularly concerning Bosniaks in Sandžak and Albanians in the Preševo Valley, or will entrenched ethnonational divisions limit its transformative potential?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: That’s an excellent question and a very good example. During the protests, relations between Serbian and Bosniak students from Sandžak were excellent. For the first time, Bosniak students expressed a sense of belonging to Serbia, and you could see Bosniak flags alongside Serbian flags. That was an extremely strong and positive message.

However, there are limits to interethnic reconciliation. For example, during the summer, there was the usual debate about the genocide in Srebrenica, but the student movement remained silent. Then, when General Ratko Mladić, who was convicted of genocide in Srebrenica, died, some members of the student movement mourned him as a hero. This illustrates just how deep these divisions remain.

The fact that Albanian students from the Preševo Valley were not publicly involved in the student movement is also telling.

There is no doubt that progress will occur, and progress has already been made. Nevertheless, I would be very cautious about expecting long-term change. This is not solely the responsibility of student leaders; it also involves regional relations. These issues cannot be resolved or improved through the actions of a single actor.

Students Won Power but Still Lack a Unified Decision-Making Structure

The Students’ List now faces the challenge of transforming a decentralized protest movement into an effective governing organization. How can it preserve the participatory ethos of student plenums while developing coherent leadership, policy coordination, and democratic accountability?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: The plenums are already largely part of history, having begun to decline in May or June of last year. Power now rests primarily with working groups, although there are numerous such groups at each university and across different levels. So, this remains a movement involving many people.

From a political scientist’s perspective, it is fascinating to observe how they make decisions. They still lack a single center of decision-making and continue to struggle with the relationship between the parliamentary group and the movement itself. This remains an open question, not only because the shift in power has yet to be established but also because they have not decided how that relationship should function.

Similarly, part of the movement is considering becoming a political party. This has not been publicly confirmed, but there are rumors to that effect. An additional problem is that almost everything happening within the student movement remains hidden from public view. I know certain things because I can talk to my students, but this situation needs to change, particularly as the public is already expressing concerns.

For example, people want to know who is proposing the candidate for prime minister. If this were a conventional political party, we would know whether the decision came from the main board, the assembly, or another body. In this respect, the situation remains very fluid. There is some tolerance for this lack of transparency because the movement emerged under an authoritarian regime. Its members faced surveillance and harassment, so they had to operate secretly. However, there is now a growing demand for these processes to become more public as soon as possible. At this point, there is no clear answer.

Of course, some elements of the movement are becoming increasingly effective, but it is still far from being a fully functioning organization capable of responding to a question within a few hours. I therefore hope they will enjoy a relatively long, quiet honeymoon period without pressure to make rapid decisions on crucial issues, because that could make things very difficult.

Removing Vučić’s Control Could Allow Serbia’s Institutions to Function Again

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participates in an SNS political campaign at Hall Čair in Niš, Serbia, on March 30, 2022. Photo: Radule Perisic.

In your research with Irena Fiket, you examine opposition politics under conditions of institutional capture and competitive authoritarianism. Following Vučić’s electoral defeat, what reforms should take priority in restoring judicial independence, media pluralism, electoral integrity, and institutional checks on executive power?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: That’s a huge question. If you look at the students’ program and its key priorities, the judiciary comes first. Strengthening its independence from the executive would be the initial step.

The second priority would be media freedom. The problem is that achieving media freedom takes considerable time. We have just seen the Hungarian experience, where Magyar’s government suspended the national public broadcaster for several days, then hired new staff and granted them some degree of freedom.

In Serbia, however, there is still debate about what the first steps should be. I don’t think we need an out-of-the-box solution. The existing Serbian laws are already good enough; the problem is that they are not being implemented. If you remove the force preventing institutions from functioning—and that force is Aleksandar Vučić—then those institutions will function much better.

This is also evident in the students’ electoral manifesto. Many of its proposals are already part of the existing legal framework. So, we don’t necessarily need new laws; we need to find a way to implement those already in place.

The Return of Former Authoritarian Regime May Be Easier Than After 2000

Serbia’s democratic transition after Milošević’s overthrow in 2000 left significant authoritarian networks and political practices intact. What lessons should the student-backed government draw from that experience regarding transitional justice, lustration, and the danger of reproducing the patronage structures it seeks to dismantle?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: What we have learned over the last decade is that democracy should never be taken for granted and that we must always defend it. Even the strongest democracies can experience democratic backsliding.

In Serbia’s case, drawing on the experience of Milošević’s overthrow, the key lesson is the importance of holding people accountable for what happened over the previous 14 years. When Milošević was toppled, we were so enthusiastic and optimistic that we neglected this aspect. People tend to be forgiving, and when there is so much work to be done, no one wants to deal with someone who was mayor five or ten years earlier.

But this is crucial because these people have the skills, capacity, and considerable financial resources. If we fail to carry out lustration or establish some form of accountability, they will return, and sooner than we might expect. This is especially important because the Students’ List is not necessarily here to stay. By comparison, the coalition that defeated Milošević consisted of political parties that wanted to govern and remained in power for roughly 12 years.

The Students’ List has certain advantages, but when it comes to managerial and governing skills, its members are not yet at the top of their game. They will need substantial support. In that sense, comparing the two situations suggests that the return of the previous regime might be even easier now than it was in 2000. That’s why it is extremely important to invest considerable effort in restoring democracy and reducing the authoritarian capacity of society.

Solidarity and Unity Were the Foundations of Serbia’s October Revolution

And finally, Professor Spasojević, viewed comparatively alongside anti-authoritarian movements in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and the wider Western Balkans, what makes Serbia’s student-led electoral victory distinctive? What lessons can societies struggling under authoritarian populist regimes draw from the movement’s success in transforming civic resistance into electoral victory, and to what extent can the Serbian experience inspire broader democratic renewal?

Professor Dušan Spasojević: It’s clear that the Serbian case is already inspiring people, just as other examples inspired Serbian students. That’s a positive development. However, we need to be very careful because we cannot simply copy and paste methods from one country to another. The fact that students led this movement was partly a result of local circumstances. I don’t see the same conditions, for example, in Albania, where protests are currently taking place.

What we can certainly learn from the Serbian experience is the importance of solidarity and unity. The willingness to support and defend people, even when you strongly disagree with their political positions, was fundamental to the strength of this movement. Solidarity between students and the rest of society was another crucial element. Having a common enemy, so to speak, and a common goal provided the foundation for Milošević’s overthrow 26 years ago, just as they were central to the current struggle. I think that should be the key message drawn from the Serbian October Revolution of 2026.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Andrej Ševo is a student movement activist, researcher at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade, and PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences.

Andrej Ševo: Serbia’s Students Made Democracy Cool Again

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Andrej Ševo, student movement activist and researcher at the University of Belgrade’s Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, examines Serbia’s historic student-led democratic breakthrough following the October 25 elections. Drawing on firsthand experience and scholarly research, Ševo explains how leaderless organization, participatory decision-making, and “Gen Z creativity” challenged Aleksandar Vučić’s personalized authoritarian rule. Arguing that “the students made democracy seem cool again,” he explores the movement’s populist dimensions, unprecedented civic mobilization, and emerging interethnic solidarity. Yet he warns that transforming electoral victory into durable democracy requires institutional innovation, judicial accountability, and lustration to prevent the return of entrenched authoritarian networks and another unfinished democratic transition.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Serbia’s October 25 elections marked a historic political turning point, with the student-backed list securing 140 parliamentary seats and ending Aleksandar Vučić’s longstanding political dominance. Emerging from protests following the November 2024 Novi Sad railway station tragedy, the movement transformed demands for accountability into a nationwide challenge to corruption, institutional capture, and personalized authoritarian rule. Yet electoral victory raises fundamental questions about democratic consolidation, transitional justice, and the resilience of entrenched authoritarian networks.

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Andrej Ševo, a student movement activist, researcher at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade, and PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences, examines this extraordinary transformation. Combining scholarly analysis with firsthand experience as an activist, election observer, and campaign organizer, Ševo explores how decentralized civic resistance evolved into a powerful electoral force.

At the heart of his analysis is the movement’s democratic innovation. Unlike conventional opposition parties, the students relied on plenums, horizontal decision-making, and rotating representation. According to Ševo, the government struggled to confront this unprecedented organizational model because “it did not know whom to attack.” By rejecting personalized leadership, the movement challenged the authoritarian, leader-centered logic of Serbian politics.

Equally important was what Ševo describes as the movement’s “Gen Z creativity.” Memes, humorous videos, songs, and innovative digital communication undermined the government’s established propaganda strategies. As he observes, “We were angry and disappointed, but we were also full of hope, creativity, and original ideas.” This cultural transformation accompanied a deeper democratic awakening: “The students made democracy seem cool again.” Ševo argues that younger generations increasingly embraced democratic participation over authoritarian leadership, while the movement’s deliberative practices helped overcome its own populist tendencies.

Yet the transition from protest to government presents an unprecedented institutional dilemma. Ševo acknowledges that the movement must develop new organizational arrangements without reproducing the hierarchical structures it opposed. “We simply have to try to create a system that has never existed before,” he explains, emphasizing the absence of historical precedents.

Looking ahead, Ševo warns that electoral defeat alone cannot dismantle entrenched authoritarian networks. Drawing on Serbia’s unfinished democratic transition after October 2000, he advocates “thorough criminal prosecutions” and “lustration” to prevent former regime figures implicated in abuses from returning to political power. Without sustained institutional transformation, he cautions, Serbia risks “another great disappointment.”

In sum, the interview examines whether Serbia’s democratic awakening can translate electoral victory, civic solidarity, and participatory innovation into durable democratic institutions.

Here is our interview with student movement activist, researcher Andrej Ševo, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

The Students Succeeded Where Serbia’s Opposition Parties Had Failed

Students gather in Gornji Milanovac, Serbia.
Students gather in Gornji Milanovac, Serbia, ahead of a major protest march to Belgrade on October 18, 2026. Photo: Dejan Krsmanovic / Dreamstime.

Andrej Ševo, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with the origins of this remarkable movement. The November 2024 Novi Sad railway station tragedy transformed public grief into nationwide mobilization against corruption and institutional capture. What explains the students’ success in turning a specific demand for accountability into a broader challenge to Aleksandar Vučić’s political order?

Andrej Ševo: The easiest answer to your question would be that the students approached the public with a very new way of decision-making and problem-solving, one that was unfamiliar to previous opposition actors.

What do I mean by that? If we go back to the 2023 elections and the repeated elections in 2024, the mood among the Serbian public was very lethargic. The great opposition coalition had fallen apart, and people were left feeling helpless because there was no unified and potent challenger to the Serbian Progressive Party’s rule. As you can imagine, the disappointment was very significant. The public was predominantly anti-government, but this sentiment was not represented by a proportionally strong political force.

In such a lethargic climate, we had the canopy collapse and the emergence of the student movement, which was not based on the leadership principle that had been so typical of opposition parties in Serbia. Instead, what emerged was essentially a social movement.

Students formed a social movement in which decisions were made democratically. They voted on every decision, respected the outcomes, and managed to overcome obstacles that opposition parties had been unable to overcome when they organized protests. Previously, opposition-led protests would usually reach a point where the organizers asked, “Well, all right, we are walking around the city, we have a large number of people behind us, but what do we do next?” They were never able to agree on the next step. Some wanted to act violently, others wanted to remain peaceful, and some thought that protesting was no longer necessary. Eventually, everything would fall apart.

This time, however, we had students acting as a unified group with decision-making plenums. All these units respected the decisions of the plenums and the will of the majority. They deliberated, exchanged ideas, and usually the best idea would win by receiving the most votes. The protests would then continue with new vigor and new ideas. I believe this is what made these protests potent and ultimately successful.

The Vučić Regime Did Not Know How to Fight a Leaderless Movement

In Glasovi promene, which you co-edited, the student movement emerges as an experiment in direct democracy and collective political agency. How did student plenums, horizontal decision-making, and rotating representation sustain mobilization, and what limitations did these practices reveal?

Andrej Ševo: Of course, as with anything, there are pros and cons. The most important advantage of such a system was that the government did not know how to respond to something so new and original. The government was accustomed to having political parties and their leaders as its main opponents. It was relatively easy to attack opposition leaders, label them with horrible names, publish false articles about them, and so on. Political labeling was easy. The Serbian Progressive Party controlled most of the media and was able to create and control narratives, making it easy to discredit opposition parties. Not to mention that the opposition parties themselves had made some horribly wrong moves for which they could legitimately be criticized.

But much of the hostility they received was the result of government propaganda. When the students emerged with this new decision-making process, the government was confused. It did not know whom to attack. Who could it blame for everything? Who were these students? Could the government attack all the students? They represented a very large social group. They had parents and grandparents who loved them. They were, as I like to say, the flower of Serbian youth. Their families loved them, and it was not easy to attack them by claiming they were traitors, Ustasha terrorists, and so on. Figuring out how to attack these people therefore became a major problem for the government.

Another significant advantage was that the student movement somehow created a democratic spirit. Even when you disagreed with a decision, as a member of the student movement, you still valued participating, despite being in the minority, because you respected the mechanism. This is something I heard while conducting focus groups with students in Serbia. They would often say, “I would propose something, but it wouldn’t be voted for. I was angry, I hated the movement, and I wanted to leave. But eventually, I would accept the outcome because I knew that the mechanism we had was something new, potent, and original—something that should be cherished.” And eventually, those people stayed, even though their proposals were rejected and others voted against them. These were the main advantages: the government’s inability to attack the students effectively and a decision-making process that created a spirit of democracy, which participants respected and cherished, and whose outcomes they accepted.

I also think the constant rotation was important. The students would regularly change the people who moderated discussions, appeared in the media, and led the protests. These roles always rotated. There was never a stable, recognizable face who could be identified as the leader. So, it remained a leaderless movement until the end. In Serbian politics, the prevailing political logic is authoritarian and very leader-based, not only among government parties but also among opposition parties. The students managed to move beyond that logic, completely confusing both the government and the opposition parties and creating something uniquely new.

Pro-government “Serbia – One Family” rally organized by the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in Belgrade.
Pro-government “Serbia – One Family” rally organized by the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in Belgrade, Serbia, on June 27, 2026. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic / Dreamstime.

The Students United People Across Class and Geographical Divisions

The movement expanded beyond university campuses through marches, blockades, rural outreach, and alliances with teachers, farmers, and other social groups. How did this geographical and social expansion overcome the traditional divide between urban opposition constituencies and provincial Serbia?

Andrej Ševo: The outreach of the student movement was spectacular. They were able to gain votes in places where the opposition had previously been unable to do so. We now have data to prove this, and it’s really striking. For example, I was involved in the 2025 local elections in Kosjerić, in southwestern Serbia, where we lost by about 30 votes. The result was roughly 3,500 votes on each side. It’s a small town surrounded by villages, and now, in these parliamentary elections, we were able to swing more than 1,000 votes in that municipality and win there.

The students, as a social group, brought together people from cities, villages, rural areas, and small-town Serbia, as well as people from beyond Serbia, including Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There were students from wealthy families, poorer families, and working-class backgrounds. The movement as a whole incorporated people of different geographical origins and class backgrounds, and this diversity was reflected in the election results.

For example, if a student active in the movement comes from a working-class family, that student will influence their parents and grandparents, who, in turn, will influence their neighbors. So, the word spreads not only among the wealthy and the middle class but also among the working class. This was very important. The students’ decision to communicate with farmers, education workers, trade unions, and other groups also had a significant impact. They were more successful in reaching these groups than the opposition parties had been.

The students emerged as a popular movement, beloved by people from various backgrounds, and virtually no one refused to speak with them. This contrasted with the opposition parties, which were usually concentrated in cities and urban centers and had been unable to overcome the barriers separating them from rural and small-town Serbia.

Gen Z Creativity Was Crucial to Defeating Vučić Regime

In your research with Krisztina Rácz and Mirjana Nećak Gavrilović, you analyze political memes as instruments of protest mobilization. How did humor, visual symbolism, and digital communication undermine the regime’s narratives, and what ethical challenges emerged with AI-generated content?

Andrej Ševo: The creativity of the student movement was one of the most important and substantial factors that brought down the government in Serbia. Gen Z creativity—the creation of memes, interesting visual content, songs, and promotional videos, such as those produced by students at the Faculty of Dramatic Arts—was immensely important.

This creativity helped a great deal because the government did not know how to respond to it. It was a completely new experience, and the government was confused. Eventually, they began copying the student movement, essentially repeating everything we did. For example, we would make a video ridiculing government members, and they would respond by creating a similar video ridiculing us. But you could clearly see that they lacked the creativity and organic drive to produce such content. We were angry and disappointed, but we were also full of hope, creativity, and original ideas. They simply could not compete with that.

Of course, there was also AI-generated content, which pushed ethical boundaries. AI-generated content is everywhere on the internet, and the question of how to address its ethical challenges is something we still need to resolve. But I would emphasize the immense originality of the content created on social networks and during protests, including billboards, messages written on paper, and drawings used by protesters. There was a strong and substantial creative spirit that the government could not emulate. This only confused them further and prompted them to make more and more mistakes.

The Collapse of the Established Opposition and Party-System Restructuring

The Students’ List won 140 parliamentary seats on October 25, while the established opposition failed to secure representation. Does this result signify a fundamental restructuring of Serbia’s party system, or a temporary convergence of otherwise heterogeneous anti-incumbent forces?

Andrej Ševo: We are witnessing a historic restructuring of Serbia’s political landscape, at least since 1990 and the establishment of the multiparty system. Why do I think that? The opposition parties had a chance to survive. Although they made many mistakes and were not competent enough to challenge the previous government, they were also frequently subjected to a very harsh media campaign. So, it would not be fair to attribute their inability to challenge the government solely to their lack of competence. They were also victims of a huge media machinery that knew how to deal with them.

The opposition still had a chance to unite and form a common front. You should understand that in Serbia, even though the student movement was very popular, there was still a significant proportion of people, somewhere between 8% and 10%, who believed that the students were wonderful but also believed in political parties. They believed that political parties should lead and that we needed established party structures to challenge the government. These people wanted to vote for the opposition parties.

The only condition was that the opposition parties unite and form a single front, just as they did in the 2023 elections, when they managed to secure around 950,000 votes—almost a million. That was not an insignificant result. They secured approximately 24% of the vote. So, people were still willing to vote for a unified opposition. However, the opposition failed to unite. They projected an image of people who were not serious, who did not understand the importance of the moment, and who were too preoccupied with their own internal strife, hatreds, and resentments. People simply concluded, “Well, these are not serious actors. They cannot unite, they are fighting among themselves, and they do not understand the importance of this situation, so I am not going to vote for them.”

Eventually, part of the opposition decided to support the students because they knew they could not cross the 3% electoral threshold. Another part decided to contest the elections and failed miserably. So, we are witnessing a restructuring, and I am happy that we were also able to defeat the opposition parties. As we like to say here in Serbia, the student movement not only defeated the government; it also defeated the opposition. If you ask me, I hope we will not have to see these people in politics again. They had their chance to demonstrate responsibility, but they failed to do so. It is time for them to go. Honestly, I cannot imagine who would vote for them if they decided to run in future elections after what happened here.

Even Vučić’s Own Voters Understood That It Was Time for Change

Students collect signatures in support of calls for early parliamentary elections in Valjevo, Serbia.
Students collect signatures in support of calls for early parliamentary elections in Valjevo, Serbia, on December 28, 2025. Photo: Adam Radosavljevic / Dreamstime.

Vučić’s governing model combined personalized leadership, media dominance, patronage, and nationalist rhetoric. Which mechanisms of this system proved most vulnerable to student-led mobilization, and which remain entrenched despite the electoral defeat of the Serbian Progressive Party?

Andrej Ševo: The Serbian Progressive Party remained entrenched in some media outlets, and some of its local party coordinators managed to retain their influence and voters. But the biggest success of the student movement was that we managed to bring so many more voters to the polls. That was our most important achievement. We mobilized people who had previously abstained from voting, as well as first-time voters, including many young people. Most of them voted for the Students’ List, so that was our biggest success.

Our second-biggest success was persuading around 350,000 regime voters to switch sides. That is also quite important. Compared with the 2023 elections, the Serbian Progressive Party lost around 60,000 voters, which may not seem like much. But you should bear in mind that they had absorbed many satellite parties into their electoral list. They included the Serbian Radical Party, which represents somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 voters. They also managed to attract many voters from the Socialist Party of Serbia.

When we conduct public polling in Serbia, we usually group parties such as the Serbian Progressive Party, the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Movement of Socialists, the Serbian Radical Party, and several smaller parties together under the category of “regime voters.” In previous elections, these parties collectively received between 2.2 and 2.3 million votes. In these elections, they received around 1.8 million votes altogether. So, the Serbian Progressive Party managed to avoid losing a significant number of voters by absorbing satellite parties and attracting voters from its coalition partners. But when you count all these parties together as the regime’s voting base, they suffered significant losses, with around 350,000 people persuaded to vote for us rather than for them.

We now have some data, although I cannot claim they are particularly precise, indicating that around 12% of those who voted for the Serbian Progressive Party in 2023 voted for the Students’ List this time.

I believe our campaigning was very important. We campaigned at a really serious level. We had call centers, called people constantly, and conducted door-to-door campaigning. We campaigned the way campaigning should be done. I could sense on the ground that many Progressive Party voters were reconsidering whom to support in these elections. They understood that it was time for a change. But the only factor keeping them from voting for change was their fear of what would happen if Vučić lost.

Democratic Awakening Is Challenging the Appeal of Authoritarian Leadership

The student movement successfully articulated a broad opposition to corruption and state capture without adopting a comprehensive ideological program. From a populism-theory perspective, does its appeal to citizens against a corrupt ruling elite represent democratic counter-populism, or a form of civic mobilization that transcends populist logic?

Andrej Ševo: That’s definitely a good question. I recognize populist elements in the Students’ List as well. For example, the proposed law banning reality television is a very populist policy, and it’s not the only one. There are others, but this is the first that comes to mind.

However, when it comes to direct democracy or a democratic revolution—perhaps “revolution” is too strong a word, or maybe it’s overused—we experienced a certain revolution of the spirit, in the sense that people now realize that democracy is cool. The students made democracy seem cool again. You can see this empirically when you conduct polls among young people. Young people previously tended to believe that Serbia needed a firm hand, an authoritarian leader. But now, most of them believe that we do not need an authoritarian leader but rather democracy. That’s a huge change.

So, the democratic spirit that emerged here in Serbia is populist in the sense that it seeks to involve a very large number of people in participation, voting, and decision-making. If a very large number of people participate in making decisions, we might describe that as populism per se. Populism not only in the sense that everyone participates but also in the sense that the former political party elites are now being replaced by plenums and zborovi—citizens’ assemblies—by citizens themselves, by the people.

By definition, this movement has a certain populist basis. We were against the elites and the established political parties, and you could even argue that this is an anti-political movement because it fits the definitions of both populism and anti-politics. However, it also transcends the typical understanding of populism because the decision-making processes the students created are very open. We genuinely allow all voices to be heard, even those expressing unpopular views. I know for a fact that sometimes unpopular proposals, when argued convincingly enough in student plenums, were able to pass and were promoted by the student movement, even though they were not necessarily what you would imagine people wanted.

Our democratic spirit also made it important for participants to argue for their proposals. You have to struggle to win people’s votes, to persuade them. If you’re good enough at argumentation, you can swing the votes and even secure support for something unpopular. So, even though the democratic spirit in Serbia is populist per se, in the sense that it attracts large numbers of people and challenges the former political structures and party elites, it also allows us to push through unpopular decisions when they are argued well enough.

The practice of good argumentation developed among students who participated in the movement. It was cherished and praised as a very good and useful skill. So, in a sense, the student movement, although it has a certain populist basis, also possesses mechanisms to overcome populist urges.

Serbia’s Students Must Invent a Political System Without Precedent

Serbia’s transition from decentralized protest to electoral politics raises a fundamental organizational dilemma. How can the Students’ List institutionalize political leadership, parliamentary accountability, and internal pluralism without reproducing the personalization and hierarchical practices it originally opposed?

Andrej Ševo: This is the million-dollar question, and it remains unanswered. To be honest with you, as far as I’m informed, the student movement is still discussing it. I’m not currently participating in the movement, although I did before. But I’m well informed, and I can tell you that we’re still trying to figure out how to make all this work. You have to understand that we haven’t been able to find examples in the literature of anything similar to what happened here in Serbia. This is a unique and experimental situation, and we need to be genuinely original and innovative if we want to make everything work.

I can answer your question with several follow-up questions. We have the student movement, which created its own electoral list of people who are now in the National Assembly, or who will be in a few days. So, the question now is: Should the student movement continue to exist? If it does, should it become some sort of guardian of the revolution? I don’t mean “Guardians of the Revolution” in a literal sense, of course, but as a metaphor. Or should it perhaps become a political party? Should it evolve into one?

The student movement definitely has the infrastructure to become a political party. It has databases, the capacity to call hundreds of thousands of people, and the logistical resources for door-to-door campaigning. It also has many small donors whose combined contributions amount to a significant sum of money. So, it could become a political party. Alternatively, it could persuade those who are now in the National Assembly to form a political party and then provide them with all the resources it has. Or it might simply decide to disband and say, “Well, we did our part. We don’t care anymore. We’re done.” Maybe there’s a fifth possibility. There are probably several others I haven’t mentioned, but we’re still deciding. The question remains unanswered.

The uniqueness of our situation requires us to be very innovative and original. We simply have to try to create a system that has never existed before, one without precedent or an example in the literature to show us what it might look like. It’s completely new territory, and it will take us some time to find an answer. Right now, I have to be honest with you, I still don’t have one. And if I did, I would be the luckiest man alive.

Unprecedented Civic Mobilization Was Crucial to Serbia’s Electoral Breakthrough

Students and demonstrators gather at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 23, 2026.
Students and demonstrators gather at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 23, 2026, for the “You and I, Slavija” protest, calling for early parliamentary elections. Photo: Dejan Krsmanovic / Dreamstime.

Reports of extensive citizen election monitoring suggest that civic mobilization helped compensate for distrust in electoral institutions. To what extent did this bottom-up oversight protect electoral integrity, and can such civic vigilance become a lasting mechanism of democratic accountability?

Andrej Ševo: Social mobilization in Serbia was crucial to winning this election. What was the difference? Unlike in previous elections, when political parties participated, we were able to cover virtually every polling station in Serbia with our election monitors. Only a few polling stations lacked Students’ List monitors. These were very small and located in southwestern Serbia, including parts of Sandžak, where Bosniaks live, and some areas of southeastern Serbia, around Kuršumlija. Almost every other polling station in Serbia was covered by Students’ List monitors.

This was made possible by an unprecedented level of social mobilization. We’re talking about tens of thousands of people across Serbia who voluntarily signed up to undergo training as election monitors, join mobile teams, participate in door-to-door campaigning, work in call centers, and so on. Having such a large base of people willing to participate and help allowed us to fill all the necessary positions in our campaign. We were able to monitor the voting process and run a very efficient campaign, perhaps even more efficiently than the Serbian Progressive Party.

And bear in mind that the Serbian Progressive Party and Vučić knew how to organize and run solid political campaigns. They ran top-notch campaigns. Yet we were able to outclass them even on that ground. We outperformed them in the very areas where they had been strongest: mobilizing people and running campaigns. This was made possible by the students and the Students’ List. The opposition had never managed to generate so much interest among so many people. Never. It was the students’ uniqueness, appeal, and popularity that made people genuinely excited to participate.

For example, I was a member of a mobile team on election day. I also served as an observer and participated in door-to-door campaigning, both as a coordinator and personally. I did all of that willingly. I didn’t do it for money; I didn’t even receive a single dinner for my efforts. Nor did I do it for social popularity or anything of that sort. I did it because I realized this was a great opportunity and that I had to contribute. I wanted to contribute, and I was happy to contribute to something I believed in. I truly believe that the same feeling was shared by all those tens of thousands of people who volunteered as well.

The System Vučić Built Is Collapsing Much Faster Than Anticipated

With the new parliament scheduled to convene on November 17, the Students’ List faces the challenge of translating its parliamentary majority into effective governing authority. How vulnerable is this transition to resistance from entrenched networks within the bureaucracy, police, judiciary, and security services?

Andrej Ševo: If you had asked me that question a month ago, I would probably have told you that the transition would be seriously threatened by people entrenched in Serbia’s political, administrative, and media structures. However, I’m now more optimistic. Since October 25, we have witnessed an awakening of Serbia’s institutions. People who were appointed by the Serbian Progressive Party and had remained silent for years have suddenly begun to realize that they need to do their jobs properly. Now we have prosecutors, judges, digital media regulators, and others who have suddenly started functioning as they should.

Some members of the Serbian Progressive Party have already been arrested, even though, technically, the party still runs the country. After all, the government ministers are still from that party. But the judicial system and digital media regulators have actually woken up. I understand that many of these people, including prosecutors, are trying to make up for years of silence. They’re trying to demonstrate, “Well, here we are, and we’re actually doing a good job, so you should believe in us now.” I’m not sure that’s going to work for them. I think they’ll eventually be replaced.

But I didn’t expect them to be so efficient and thorough in prosecuting members of the old regime, to the point that I genuinely believe the Progressives are afraid. They’re severely afraid. Even Vučić has been called to testify before a court regarding the drug-dealing business, among other things, which is something you couldn’t have imagined happening a month ago.

So, although I expect resistance, particularly at the local level, where some Serbian Progressive Party officials remain influential in their communities and will pose significant obstacles, I believe we will be able to overcome these obstructionist efforts by the Progressives. This is especially true because the system they imposed on Serbia has begun to collapse much faster than we anticipated.

If you had asked anyone in Serbia, no one would have believed that just three weeks after the election, we would already be prosecuting Serbian Progressive Party members at such a pace. It was unimaginable. We are literally arresting municipal leaders, former ministers, and media moguls. We are also regulating their media in ways that should have been implemented long ago. All of this definitely makes me optimistic. It will be difficult, especially when it comes to forming the government—the executive branch.

We will face challenges, but I think those challenges stem more from our own organizational structure. We have the student movement and the representatives on the Students’ List, and the question is how to make it all work. I believe that organizing ourselves and creating the mechanisms necessary to make things function will be a harder task than dealing with obstruction from the Progressives. Those obstructions will certainly exist, however, and we will still have to be careful.

Vučić Will Try to Reinvent Himself as a Trumpist Far-Right Opposition Leader

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participates in an SNS political campaign at Hall Čair in Niš, Serbia, on March 30, 2022. Photo: Radule Perisic.

In “Global Influence of the Contemporary American Far Right: A Case Study of Serbia,” you trace the diffusion of Trumpist narratives, including the “deep state” and anti-globalist discourse. Has the Students’ List victory weakened these ideological networks, or might they reconstitute themselves as a nationalist opposition to the new government?

Andrej Ševo: They will certainly try to do so. They will also try to maintain contacts with the far right in Europe and the United States. One of the reasons Vučić lost is that he had always run in elections as a catch-all candidate—someone who was somewhat nationalist but also pro-European and willing to cooperate with the West. Now, however, we can clearly see that he has shifted completely to the far right. There is absolutely no trace of centrism left in Aleksandar Vučić. He’s no longer a Serbian Progressive; he’s a Serbian Radical. He has come full circle, returning to his Radical roots. I no longer see any difference between Vojislav Šešelj and Aleksandar Vučić. They’re the same again.

Under these circumstances, he’s trying to maintain contacts with the far right in Europe and the United States, and he will attempt to position himself as a nationalist, far-right, Trumpist, or alt-right opposition figure, aligned with Alternative for Germany, Trump’s Republicans, the National Rally in France, and so on. He will try to present himself as that kind of ideological and political force. However, I’m not certain that the Serbian Progressive Party will constitute the future nationalist and far-right opposition, because I’m not even sure the party will exist in a year or two.

I sincerely believe that Vučić will eventually face trial. There is simply too much corruption associated with him, and I find it difficult to imagine that he could somehow survive all of that without consequences. I would be disappointed if we failed to criminally prosecute Vučić, his brother, and his closest associates, whom I consider not only politically corrupt but also, as we have discovered through the Sky communications of mafia members here, heavily involved with mafia chieftains and the drug trade. This is something we really have to pursue until the end. If all these people are prosecuted, I really don’t see how the Serbian Progressive Party could continue to exist. People will simply leave and abandon it.

However, there is still an electoral base for a far-right party in Serbia, and I imagine someone else will eventually take over and keep the spirit of Serbian radicalism, associated with the Serbian Radical Party, alive. But I don’t see how Vučić and his associates could be the ones to do that. They’re simply too compromised, and I sincerely believe that, in the near future, they will probably either leave the country or face criminal charges. The opposition will certainly exist, but I don’t see Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party leading it in the future, no matter how much they try to present themselves in that light. They do this for their own membership, to reassure their supporters that “we’re still here, we’re going to come back.” But I don’t think they will.

Student Movement Has Broken Down Longstanding Ethnic Barriers

Serbia student protests.
Students and citizens protest against government corruption in Zrenjanin, Serbia, on January 25, 2026, demanding justice and accountability for the 16 victims of the tragic railway station canopy collapse in Novi Sad. Photo: Dreamstime.

The student movement mobilized citizens across ideological, generational, and ethnic divisions, including Bosniak students from Sandžak. Can this solidarity evolve into a genuinely inclusive conception of Serbian citizenship, or will unresolved questions of minority rights and Serbian nationalism constrain its transformative potential?

Andrej Ševo: The students have made significant advances in incorporating minorities into their ranks. There was a video produced by the student movement in which members of Serbia’s ethnic minorities spoke in their own languages, including Bosniaks, Hungarians, Slovaks, and others. The only minority that has remained somewhat excluded is the Albanian community. Albanians still haven’t played an important role in the student movement, unlike, for example, the Bosniaks from Novi Pazar, who have played a very prominent role.

They were widely accepted across Serbia, and people generally liked them. In Novi Pazar, you had Bosniaks waving Serbian flags, while in Belgrade, you had Bosniaks waving the flags of Sandžak. No one really cared. We tolerated each other. We said, “Fine, these two flags can work together,” and they did. The Students’ List eventually won the most votes in Novi Pazar, the main center of the Bosniak community in Serbia. They didn’t win in every Bosniak community, but they did win in the largest and most important one.

This spirit of interethnic cooperation within the student movement represents a significant change. We have witnessed things we had never seen before, acts of solidarity we had never experienced before. For example, Muslim students from Sandžak were offered accommodation at the medieval Serbian monastery of Studenica by an important figure in the Serbian Orthodox Church who supported the students. Unfortunately, most of the Serbian Orthodox clergy remained passive or were even opposed to the movement, although many were supportive. This particular clergyman opened the monastery’s doors to the students. They literally slept in a medieval Serbian monastery. No one had a problem with that. Everyone was happy, shared the news, and was thrilled that it had happened.

I had a similar experience when I went to protest in Novi Pazar. People welcomed me and offered me food. Your name is Selçuk, so I assume you’re familiar with baklava, tulumba, and all those sweets. Novi Pazar is the epicenter of that kind of cuisine in Serbia. It’s delicious, and I enjoyed all of it. Everything was free for me, even though I’m neither Bosniak nor Muslim. So, we have created a beautiful spirit. How will it unfold? Will it produce political results? And will those results be significant in the future? That remains to be seen.

However, I believe that certain barriers in interethnic relations have been overcome in the minds of many people. That’s not something that can easily be undone. It cannot be reversed by a single election or a single political statement. Of course, unresolved issues and divisions remain. I don’t have to mention them; we all know what they are, particularly those concerning the 1990s and the wars. So, the situation remains problematic. Nevertheless, many mental boundaries and obstacles in interethnic relations have been overcome, and I believe this is definitely a good investment in the future. We have created a solid foundation for further change, and we have already achieved some changes.

When you see war veterans in Serbia literally standing in front of students from Novi Pazar and saying, “We were in the wars and everything, but we will protect you with our bodies. You’re our children; we love you as much as we love our own,” it’s a profoundly cathartic event, especially coming from war veterans. Let us hope that it will bring even more positive developments in the future.

Serbia Must Prevent the Former Regime’s Return to Political Power

And finally, Andrej Ševo, Serbia’s October 25 election has been compared with the democratic breakthrough of October 5, 2000, whose incomplete institutional transformation you examine in your work on lustration. What must the student-led majority accomplish to prevent another unfinished democratic transition—and ensure that the defeat of personalized authoritarian rule becomes a durable transformation of Serbia’s political system?

Andrej Ševo: Just to return briefly to the previous question, we also managed to attract a significant number of Hungarian votes. Hungarians voted for us in large numbers, as did Slovaks. So, it wasn’t only the Bosniak minority but also Croats and others.

To answer your question, the answer is quite straightforward. First, thorough criminal prosecutions. We need to fill the judicial system with new people who will do their jobs properly and remain persistent in their efforts. Criminal prosecutions are essential, but I also believe in lustration. That’s the second part: lustration understood as an administrative and political measure whereby people responsible for human rights violations are prohibited from participating in political life and accessing public funds. They can work in the private sector. They can establish their own companies and sell whatever they want—clothes, electronic devices, or anything else—but they cannot engage in politics.

This should apply to the entire top hierarchy of the Serbian Progressive Party, its media moguls, businessmen, and others. We really have to be persistent. We have to prosecute them and ban them from politics because these were people who ruled without any restraint. They did whatever they wanted. They created a system in which the state simply does not function; the state effectively does not exist. They created a system in which the mafia serves as a substitute for the state.

I do not see any future for these people in Serbian politics. Their manipulations and control over the media, as well as their entrenched political and administrative positions, were all established through violations of the law and criminal activities. If we allow these people to return to politics as though nothing happened, and if we allow them to retain the positions they built through criminal activities, we will face another great disappointment. These people have accumulated enormous amounts of money. They still control certain media outlets and retain entrenched positions, and we really have to eradicate that influence. We have to ban them from ever engaging in politics again. We have to be persistent and see it through to the end.

To repeat what I’ve already said, because it deserves emphasis, the resources these people possess are substantial. They are by no means insignificant. If we allow them to return to politics, to business as usual, we risk seeing them return to power one day. That risk is very real. They have billions of euros. So, despite all the resources they possess, we have to make sure they cannot return to political life in Serbia. We should do everything we can to criminally prosecute every one of them and do so thoroughly. That’s what we have to do. Otherwise, we will be disappointed.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Anti-Trump protest in London.

Long Read — Trump and the European Right: A Strained Relationship

In this long-read analysis, Dr. Amedeo Varriale examines the increasingly strained relationship between Donald Trump and Europe’s right-wing and far-right leaders, focusing on Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Alice Weidel. Despite enduring ideological affinities over nationalism, immigration, and opposition to progressive liberalism, Dr. Varriale identifies four sources of divergence: Trump’s declining popularity, protectionist trade policies, controversial foreign-policy interventions, and the institutional constraints limiting the transferability of Trumpism to European political systems. Through comparative analysis of Italy, France, Britain, and Germany, he demonstrates how national interests, electoral calculations, and geopolitical considerations increasingly override transatlantic ideological solidarity. The study suggests that future cooperation between Trump and Europe’s nationalist right and far right may become more pragmatic and transactional than ideologically driven.

By Amedeo Varriale

This extensive commentary explores the relationship between US President Donald J. Trump and political figures from the European right who are currently polling strongly in Italy, France, Britain, and Germany. 

The first part of the piece will focus on how and why key right-wing and far right leaders such as Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Alice Weidel have, to varying degrees, recently been distancing themselves from Trump, while simultaneously analyzing their ideological convergences and divergences with him, and speculating about how their relationship may evolve as these leaders exercise, or potentially come to exercise, political power. 

The second part will argue that presently the relationship between Trump and the European right and far right is straineddue to a series of factors, ranging from the unpopularity of the President (at home and abroad), and his tariff dispute with the European Union (EU), to his unconventional foreign policy (particularly concerning Iran and Ukraine) and the limitations of reproducing his political model in the European context. 

The investigation is meant to be timely and pertinent in a moment of broad opposition towards Trump’s second presidency across Europe. In fact, it attempts not only to shed light on the present condition of international right-wing conservatism and populism but also indirectly contributes to ongoing debates surrounding the new right’s domestic and foreign policy vis-à-vis transatlantic relations.

Giorgia Meloni 

Giorgia Meloni.
Giorgia Meloni, Prime Minister of Italy and leader of the Fratelli d’Italia party, speaks at an electoral rally ahead of the national elections in Turin, Italy, September 13, 2022. Photo: Antonello Marangi / Dreamstime.

As a right-wing leader Meloni’s relationship with Trump (and “Trumpism”) has always been ambivalent and has been previously defined as one of only “partial harmony” (Lazar, 2026: 56). While the Italian Prime Minister expressed her support for Trump on several occasions — she attended his second Presidential inauguration, spoke at CPAC 2025, and referred to his politics as “a model for Italy’s center-right” (Valenti, 2020) — her political vision and Italian concrete interests (as interpreted by Meloni’s government) do not always align with the American President’s. 

One reason why Meloni has been accused by political analysts and opponents of being excessively close to Trump is that JD Vance (a staunch promoter of the MAGA/America First platform) prefaced the English version of Meloni’s book (Giorgia’s Vision) as he saw affinities between Trumpism and Meloni’s agenda revolving around national identity, anti-immigration(-ism), and Judeo-Christian values. Actually, clear convergences between Meloni and Trump do not go beyond their opposition to illegal immigration and woke ideology. In fact, the former does not aspire to create an “illiberal democracy” (like Viktor Orbàn’s in Hungary) nor has she resorted to methods like those utilized by Trump’s ICE to tackle immigration in Italy. 

Also, while remaining a fervent sovereigntist, Meloni is substantially aligned with the EU’s elite and is in particularly good terms with Ursula von der Leyen (Alli, 2025: 4) and Manfred Weber’s European People’s Party (EPP) — a liberal-conservative group that does not share Trump’s radical views on globalization, trade, and immigration. To be sure, Meloni distanced herself from Trump on more than one occasion. First, she criticized Trump’s verbal attack on Pope Leo XIV, calling it “unacceptable” (Le Monde with AFP, 2026). Second, Meloni called Trump’s tariffs threat against the European countries that objected to his plans concerning Greenland “a mistake” (AFP & Rapporteur, 2026). Third, Meloni’s unequivocal pro-Ukraine stance is in conflict with Trump’s transactional approach, which is more conciliatory towards Russia. Fourth, Meloni’s government refused to allow Trump’s US to utilize the Italian airbase at Sigonella in Sicily for offensive military operations correlated to the war against Iran (Giuffrida, 2026). 

Together, these incidents led to a gradual deterioration of the relationship between Meloni and Trump. In fact, Trump accused Italy of not doing enough to support the US against Iran (Mazza, 2026) and claimed in an interview that Meloni “begged” for a photo with him at the G7 summit (also calling her unpopular) (Amante & Balmer, 2026; Cheetham, 2026). Trump also shared a meme of Meloni with the caption “restraining order needed” on his social media Truth Social (Duso, 2026). While in the first case Meloni responded to Trump calling him out for making up the story and stating “…neither I nor Italy ever beg” (Amante & Balmer, 2026), in the second case she decided to ignore Trump.

In the following months, personal relations between Meloni and Trump may even worsen, mainly as a consequence of Trump’s unpredictable character. However, they are more likely to stabilize, with the US and Italy continuing to cooperate strategically, as Meloni will possibly do her best to avoid new personal confrontations and prevent any significant diplomatic rupture. In fact, although with some flexibility, Meloni continues to support higher defense spending at a NATO level (Ciriaco & Colombo, 2026; Gagliardi, 2026), and this aligns with Trump’s long-standing demand regarding Europe. 

Even if the relationship between Meloni and Trump remains somewhat strained and they never become full-fledged political and ideological allies, under Meloni the Italian government will maintain the Atlanticist and Europeanist foreign policy pursued since 1945, entailing “a duty to remain close to America and to be among its most reliable and zealous allies” (Lazar, 2026: 55). This will occur regardless of the political color of temporary US administrations and Trump’s behavioral patterns. 

Moreover, Italy’s position at the heart of the Mediterranean exposes it to Russian military and intelligence threats, making continued US support essential for its defense. Concomitantly, the current conservative government fears that reduced US commitment may result in Italy being more dependent on the EU, possibly steering the country towards deeper integration and an additional loss of sovereignty. This scenario is not desirable to Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (FdI) party and most of her political class. Therefore, Italy seeks to balance strong bonds with both the United States and the European Union.

Marine Le Pen

Marine Le Pen
Marine Le Pen delivers a speech at a gathering of European far-right party representatives in Wenceslas Square, Prague, April 25, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.

For several years, the relationship between Le Pen and Trump has been a positive one underpinned by mutual respect and (limited) reciprocal support. In fact, Le Pen was the only French Presidential candidate to openly endorse Trump in the 2016 American electoral competition and was the first to congratulate the tycoon before his victory against Hillary Clinton was even officialized (McAuley, 2016). Similarly, Le Pen’s right-hand man, Jordan Bardella, praised Trump’s nationalist politics, stating his success represented “a wind of freedom, of national pride blowing all over Western democracies” (Gozzi, 2025). Bardella also argued that Trump won because he “defended America’s interests” (Bardella, 2025). More recently, after Le Pen’s conviction in early 2025, Trump expressed his solidarity to the French politician by writing the message “FREE MARINE LE PEN,” and referring to the court’s ruling as a “Witch Hunt” on Truth Social (Solmaz, 2025).

However, a long-standing anti-American sentiment deeply ingrained both within the French general public (81% think Trump is dangerous) (see Odoxa, 2026) and in the ideology and political tradition of the National Rally (RN) (formerly National Front) has prevented Le Pen (and Bardella) from embracing Trump’s program fully. While the RN’s agenda on topics such as immigration, climate change, and the “culture war” against woke and gender ideology perfectly aligns with Trump’s, the French far right has disassociated itself from the American President’s foreign policy, particularly on trade and security. 

Regarding trade, although both Trump and Le Pen are protectionists, the former’s wide-ranging tariffs on imports — including French goods such as wine, luxury products, aerospace components — significantly damage French economic interests as an exporting country. 

Regarding security, while Trump wants European allies to spend much more on defense within the NATO framework, Le Pen instead promotes French strategic independence, calling for a reduced involvement and integration within NATO’s military command. Actually, once the conflict in Ukraine ceases, Le Pen aims to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command altogether (Besch & Varma, 2025: 19). Notwithstanding, it was mainly Trump’s threats to Greenland, his hostile demeanor towards Volodymyr Zelensky’s Ukraine, his overthrow of Nicolás Maduro, and his military actions against Iran that marked a turning point in relations between the US administration, the RN, and much of the European right. 

For example, concerning Iran, Le Pen declared: “Nobody knows what Donald Trump’s ultimate goal is in Iran. Today, this war has taken proportions that were not foreseen, affecting many Gulf countries, and with consequences that directly impact us: the increase in energy prices” (Roundtable, 2026). Instead, concerning Ukraine, Le Pen denounced the “brutality” of Trump’s decision to freeze US aid to the Eastern European country (Guillou, 2025). 

Allegedly, Le Pen even told officials within her party to maintain a distance from Trump as he has turned into a political liability (Caulcutt & Nöstlinger, 2026). The same reasoning had previously led Bardella to cancel his appearance at CPAC after the MAGA ideologue, Steve Bannon, supposedly made a Nazi salute on stage (Reuters, 2025). 

Le Pen’s cautious distancing from Trump may result in a substantial change of the nature of their relationship, making it more withdrawn in public but more transactional — on farming, trade, defense spending, and military activities — in the event of a future Le Pen presidency. This transactional disposition seems very appropriate and likely to prevail since American and French interests do not always align in those areas. However, this does not necessarily mean that Le Pen and Trump will be openly antagonistic towards each other. After all, the two still share a common enemy identified by both in “the international(-ist) left” operating at an elite level within supra-national institutions such as the European Commission, Council of Europe, United Nations (UN), World Health Organization (WHO), and World Trade Organization (WTO). 

Given this, if Trump’s foreign policy shifts back to a more isolationist/non-interventionist one especially with regards to the Middle East (while simultaneously not abandoning Ukraine), there are stronger possibilities of an open rapprochement between Le Pen’s RN and Trump before the next Presidential elections in France and the US. Even so, in the more distant future it will be JD Vance (even more[1] nationalist, populist, and isolationist than Trump himself) who will play a key role in redefining the relationship between the American Republicans and European far right parties such as the RN and others. 

Nigel Farage

Nigel Farage.
Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.

Farage and Trump have been friends and essentially political allies since the latter’s rise to power in 2016. The two partially share a weltanschaaung revolving around capitalism, the defense of borders, law and order, Western exceptionalism, and the preservation of national cultural identity. Moreover, both have always been skeptical of (if not opposed to) the gradual development of the European Union as a political and economic power, and its strategic relationship with China. 

Farage has spoken favorably about Trump on distinct occasions. For instance, he has stressed that Trump is a role model for him (and his party Reform UK) because the American President stands for “national interest” and keeps the promises made to his electorate (Bloomberg, 2025). Also, during a rally in the US, Farage has praised Trump as the “most resilient” and “bravest person” he has ever met (BBC, 2020). Undeniably, Trump holds a positive view of Farage as well, given he has expressed an interest in having him as UK ambassador to the US (Langfitt, 2016) and has always supported the Brexit project (Langlois, 2018: 7).

Against this backdrop, the relationship between the two became colder between late 2025 and early 2026. Today, it appears Farage does not have the same privileged access to Trump, and — at least on one occasion — the American President did not meet the British politician who had purposely traveled to the US expecting to reinforce their “special relationship” (Gross et al., 2026; Cobham, 2026). Since then, not only have Trump’s priorities shifted (he currently focuses on domestic issues rather than securing alliances abroad) but Farage himself discreetly distanced himself from Trump (Gibbons, 2026). 

One reason for this is Trump continues to be very unpopular among voters in Britain (Schofield, 2026; The Economist, 2025), including part of Reform UK’s electoral base (Mitchell, 2025). Research indicates that a significant portion of potential Reform voters — especially women — have trouble understanding why Farage associates with Trump (Dawson, 2026). While they may support the party on other policy issues, this perceived closeness to Trump could dissuade them from voting for Reform UK. After all, Trump’s hardline approach on “law and order,” exemplified by the Minnesota immigration raids (carried out by ICE), may have limited appeal among many moderate voters in Britain and continental Europe (see Wike et al., 2025). 

Another issue that has certainly (negatively) influenced the relationship between the two leaders is the Iran war. Although Farage has refrained from unequivocally condemning Trump’s campaign in the Middle East (which he initially supported) and has even stated Iran is a “bigger danger than Putin” (Mason, 2026), concomitantly, he has warned against British involvement in the war (White, 2026). The conflict with Iran has been devastating for the British economy,[2] mainly due to the sharp rise in oil and gas prices alongside general inflation. Thus, while Farage remains strongly opposed to the Iranian regime for pragmatic reasons, he has also had to state that Trump was badly advised on the war (Elliot, 2026) and that the UK should remain out of the conflict, inevitably distancing himself from the US administration’s position. 

The divergences vis-à-vis the Iran war have been exacerbated by broader economic and foreign policy disagreements. While Farage has always praised free markets, Trump is a pro-tariff protectionist. Additionally, over the years, Farage has endorsed the West supplying weapons to Zelensky’s government more explicitly than Trump. Perhaps these differences have further contributed to the increasing distance between the two political figures. 

Nonetheless, considering a circumstance where Trump remains US President and Farage becomes UK Prime Minister, it is likely the relationship between the two would be largely amicable, with their respective countries expanding collaboration in certain policy areas.By way of illustration, a Trump-Farage synergy is expected to lead to a large-scale UK-US free trade agreement and a general reduction of barriers and regulation for bilateral trade. 

Given this, America and Britain will presumably continue to cooperate at a NATO-level as — notwithstanding his confrontational statements — Trump does not have a concrete plan to withdraw from the transatlantic organization. Actually, it is possible that a Farage-led Britain could embrace Trump’s position on “burden-sharing” and pressure European allies (especially France, Germany, and Italy) to increase expenditure on defense. 

Similarly, Farage and Trump’s agreement on the immigration issue is very likely to result in greater cooperation on intelligence, security, and border control. 

Ultimately, their skepticism regarding climate change and policies to protect the environment could lead them to economize on climate policy and instead pursue an increase of oil and gas production. 

Alice Weidel

Election posters featuring Alice Weidel, co-leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD).
Election posters featuring Alice Weidel, co-leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), displayed during the 2025 German federal election campaign. Such posters are reportedly often torn down or vandalized. Photo: Dreamstime.

Before 2025, direct contact between Trump and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) was relatively limited and intermittent, and to this day, a close relationship between Trump and the AfD’s leader, Alice Weidel, does not appear to have fully developed at either a personal or a direct political level. Be that as it may, in the weeks preceding and months following the 2025 German federal election, high-profile figures from the Trump administration such as Elon Musk, Marco Rubio, and JD Vance have publicly defended or openly expressed support for Weidel’s party. In fact, while interviewing Weidel online, Musk proclaimed, “only AfD can save Germany, end of story” (Le Monde with AFP, 2025). In the same context, Weidel reiterated (as she had previously stated during a Bloomberg interview[3]) that it caused her “physical pain” to see Trump and his entire family “disparaged” by the mainstream media (Alice Weidel, 2025). 

Instead of explicitly endorsing the AfD as Musk did, US Secretary of State, Rubio, disputed Germany’s domestic intelligence agency’s classification of Weidel’s party as “right-wing extremist” (Wertheimer, 2025). The US Vice-President JD Vance went even further, meeting Weidel at the margins of the Munich Security Conference (February 14-16, 2025) to discuss issues ranging from the war in Ukraine to freedom of speech and German politics (Reuters, 2025). Vance’s decision to meet Weidel can be interpreted as an act of legitimization by the Trump administration. 

Beyond pro-AfD statements, Trump’s officials have engaged with AfD politicians/lawmakers through private meetings in Washington D.C. (Pfeifer, 2025). For example, the more “moderate” national-conservative wing of the German party, which includes the popular Beatrix von Storch, is known to have had repeated contacts not only with Vance’s staff but also with representatives of the US State Department and National Security Council (Pfeifer, 2025). Although there are substantial differences between Trump’s distorted form of American exceptionalism and the anti-American latent Eurasianism promoted by the most radical faction of the AfD (mainly led by Björn Höcke), this did not prevent Trump’s loyalists from seeking ties with the AfD and inviting them to the US After all, until recently, Weidel, von Storch, and the AfD’s establishment have looked upon Trump favorably due to his campaign (or “culture war”) against woke ideology, immigration, Islam (Pfeifer, 2025) and liberal-progressivism in general. This alignment was broadly reciprocal. As the Anglo-German journalist Henry Donovan (2026) posits: “In MAGA World, the AfD was increasingly spoken of as Germany’s conservative insurgency – a mirror image of how Trump sees his so-called revolt against liberal elites” (Donovan, 2026).

Weidel and Trump hold common beliefs on several issues. First, both leaders have centered their platform on opposing immigration. Second, Weidel and Trump share a skepticism towards climate change policy and the introduction of renewable energy sources. Third, the two leaders embrace supply-side (or even “trickle-down”) economics and selective forms of protectionism simultaneously — and can be (paradoxically) described as “liberal-protectionist” (for an account of the AfD’s economics, see Cattani, 2016). 

Nevertheless, the ideological affinities between Trump’s MAGA movement and Weidel’s AfD were not sufficient to impede an almost sudden break between the American and German far right earlier this year. Trump’s unpredictability and risky political moves such as armed conflict with Iran, regime-change operation in Venezuela, and repeated threats to Greenland forced AfD leaders and key figures — including co-chair of the party Tino Chrupalla and Weidel herself — to markedly distance themselves from both the tycoon and the “Grand Old Party” (GOP). It was especially the strikes on Iran (highly unpopular among the German electorate[4]) that led Weidel to ask her party’s senior lawmakers to cut back on their trips to the US where they would regularly meet pro-MAGA Republicans (Pitel, 2026). Condemnation of Trump’s actions came from both Weidel and Chrupalla who in a joint statement remarked “renewed destabilization of the Middle East is not in the German interest and must end” (Hoyer, 2026). The fears of the AfD’s elite, particularly Chrupalla, is that Trump — who apparently “started off as a peace president” — would become another American president known for war campaigns and neoconservative interventionism (Hoyer, 2026). 

Overall, far-right parties like the AfD remain largely skeptical about US interventionism (sometimes described as “US imperialism”) due to its economic and migratory consequences, such as recession, higher gas prices, and mass migration towards Europe. This is the main reason why Weidel (sounding like her opponents from the pacifist far-left) also referred to the Iran War as “a catastrophe” (Pitel, 2026). However, the party appears divided, as there have been prominent figures within the AfD — especially Maximilian Krah and (to a lesser extent) Markus Frohnmaier — who continue to unequivocally support Trump despite the Iran war (Pitel, 2026). In early April 2026, the former expressed his opinion on social media: “a break with Trump would be harmful to the AfD in all sorts of ways. It must not be allowed to happen” (Pitel, 2026).

Surprisingly, as of this writing, Trump has not reconsidered his predominantly positive opinion concerning the AfD. In fact, the American President welcomed the AfD’s striking 44% electoral victory in the Saxony-Anhalt region in early September by stating (on Truth Social) “Wow! The Populist Party in Germany just had a really big night” and congratulated the party (Zakharova, 2026). In any case, although a near future (unlikely) scenario where an AfD-led Germany is simultaneous to a Trump-led America is still technically possible, predicting the type of relationship the two countries would have in such a context remains a difficult and problematic endeavor. 

In essence, as the political scientist Marco Tarchi explains, the AfD has three ideological currents: the first, is the national-conservative one, which is also economically liberal and is currently the majoritarian faction in the party led by Weidel; the second, is the “old-school” nationalist one, unfairly (according to Tarchi) labelled as neo-Nazi; the third, is the social-national one which was very successful in the recent elections occurring in the Eastern region(s) of the country and could possibly engage in dialogue with Sahra Wagenknechts’s party (BSW) (Tarchi as cited in Boezi, 2026, my translation). 

Currently, with the party on the rise electorally, it is unclear which one of these three factions will politically prevail and in which manner and degree they will interact with Trump in the event they obtain power. For example, AfD’s “national conservatives” could rekindle their relationship with Trump (especially if the Iran war ends abruptly) and be strongly backed by the latter when they pursue hardline “law and order” policies, including their signature policy, Remigration,[5]which may put Germany at odds with the European Union and part of the international community. Also, notwithstanding some of Weidel’s anti-American rhetoric, the AfD and Washington can have a transactional transatlantic partnership that stems from sovereigntism, meaning Germany would spend more on defense and rearm but buy American weapons (and American LNG[6]). How this very pragmatic settlement would fit in a major bilateral or multi-lateral framework is still uncertain. 

For instance, would the present NATO agreements remain the strategic “umbrella” for Germany yet? Regarding such potential developments from Trump’s perspective, providing AfD’s Germany with preferential treatment, in terms of both security and bilateral trade, America would be promoting the party’s sovereigntist ideology and at the same time even encourage Weidel government’s gradual distancing from the European Union. 

Reversely, in contrast with the EU’s common foreign policy, Weidel’s AfD could pressure an already Ukraine-skeptic Trump administration to realign with Russia, leaving Ukraine to its own fate. The predictability of the above-described scenario — it has to be recognized — is highly dependent on a series of factors, the main of which is the capacity and the will of the most anti-American views in the party to compromise with the idea of a new partnership with the US. Weidel herself should revise some previous hostile attitudes towards the military American presence on German soil.

Why Trump’s Relationship with the European Right and Far Right Is Strained: Four Factors

The relationship between President Trump and significant segments of the European right and far right has become increasingly strained. While — as mentioned previously — a substantial ideological overlap endures (especially opposition towards immigration and progressivism), several developments have resulted in tensions between Trump’s “America First!” agenda and the national interests of the European right-wing and far right parties led by Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel. Today, Trump is no longer the ideological lodestar for Europe’s right and far right: with Meloni, relations are cold at best, while Le Pen keeps the MAGA movement at arm’s length, similarly, Farage is now more cautious in publicly expressing support for the tycoon, and Weidel has distanced herself and limited her party’s contacts with the US administration.

More specifically, there are four factors that have contributed to alienating Trump’s US from the European right and far right. First, Trump’s popularity has significantly declined both domestically and internationally (Hartig & Kiley, 2026; Dionne, Jr., 2025). A recent study shows his approval rating at a very low 32% in America, losing 15 percentage points since the beginning of his second term in January 2025 (Lange, 2026). At the same time, Trump’s approbation among the Republican electorate has also declined, standing at 73% (Lange, 2026). 

Considering the wider context, a YouGov survey (from October 2026) found that 85% of Italians have an unfavorable opinion of Trump, against 83% in France, 86% in Britain, and 85% in Germany (YouGov, 2026). After all, Trump’s political brand has become so toxic for the global right that nearly every time he became directly or indirectly involved in a country’s election — either by threatening annexation, tariffs, or by endorsing a candidate — his engagement has backfired on the candidates he endorsed. 

This occurred in the last Canadian election in April 2025, as Trump suggested Canada could become the US’s “51st state” while concurrently increasing tariffs against the country, and resulted in a Liberal Party victory and an unexpected defeat of the conservative pro-Trump candidate Pierre Poilievre (Dionne Jr., 2025). 

It also occurred in Hungary, precisely a year later, as Vance attended a Viktor Orbàn rally in Budapest with 1,000 supporters on behalf of Trump (Spike, 2026). However, this strategy did not produce the intended outcome as elections were ultimately won by Orbàn’s opponent, Péter Magyar. 

As simply put by two experts — Jeremy Shapiro and Zsuzanna Vegh (2025) — “His [Trumps’s] growing unpopularity means aligning with him may not appear politically advantageous for these forces” (Shapiro & Vegh, 2025). 

Second, Trump’s protectionism, which has taken the form of tariffs as a trade policy against EU nations, has led to an escalation of tension between the US administration and some of its rightist “allies” in Europe. In essence, while far right forces such as the RN and the AfD may embrace economic nationalism or protectionism theoretically, and even practically when it suits their own national economies, they instead wholeheartedly oppose it when US tariffs[7] on European goods risk damaging their own countries’ businesses, industries, and workers. After all, for years populists have presented themselves as the main defenders of rural and blue-collar workers, who now form their core constituency. 

Thus, aligning with Trump over his tariffs and trade measures (even if for purely ideological reasons) would be counter-productive and self-sabotaging for the European right and far right, as they ultimately damage artisans, luxury craft producers, exporters, farmers, manufacturers, and small-medium businesses in general, located in Italy, France, Britain, Germany and so forth. While there have been examples of populist politicians (e.g. Le Pen and Matteo Salvini) on the right defending Trump’s economic strategy (especially anti-China tariffs) the majority of rightists have either awkwardly ignored or condemned his course of action contra the EU. 

Among those who originally supported Trump but criticized him on anti-EU tariffs are Le Pen (who spoke of the American’s “brutal approach”) and Weidel (who called them “far too aggressive and self-defeating” and “fundamentally bad for free trade”) (Pitel, 2025). Instead, the conservative PM Meloni, simply called Trump’s tariffs “a mistaken choice” (Pitel, 2025). In fact, one commentator, writing for The Guardian has shrewdly suggested that “analysts have long noted the difficult challenge that Trump’s policies pose to nationalists in the EU: while they may agree with some of them principle, MAGA is ‘America first’ – while they are ‘France first,’ ‘Germany first’ or ‘Spain first’” (Henley, 2025). 

Third, Trump’s foreign policy — especially regarding Iran — emerged as increasingly at odds with the crypto-isolationist, selectively non-interventionist (see Greene, 2024) and sovereigntist foreign policy stances of the nationalist right in Europe. Trump’s involvement (alongside Israel) in a conflict that expanded beyond the initial strikes (February 2026) and targeting of Iran’s nuclear program became viewed as an indirect threat to Europe by part of the right and far right. This is due to the costs of the war, its negative economic consequences to international trade and oil, gas, and fuel prices, as well as its wider impact on mass migration and population displacement. For evident reasons, a large-scale war in Iran could result in a new wave of migration and increase in the influx of refugees in the Old Continent.

Also, the European nationalist right (but also part of the mainstream right) wants to avoid getting involved in an American-Israeli War that would potentially result in hardship for European soldiers and taxpayers. As discussed previously, far right leaders like Le Pen and Weidel have shown their disdain for Trump’s actions against Iran, whilst Farage called in question Trump’s judgement (Coates, 2026). In essence, Trump’s move against Iran (like the one against Maduro’s Venezuela beforehand) did not consolidate Trump’s “transatlantic alliance” with the European right and far righ but actually contributed to its deterioration (Riccardi & Spike, 2026).

Instead, regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the situation is more complex. Whilst some right-wing parties — inspired by Eurasianists ranging from Alexander Dugin to Alain de Benoist[8] — have remained staunchly pro-Putin and pro-Russia (e.g. AfD) others have shifted to more “mainstream” pro-Ukraine positions (e.g. FdI, RN, Reform UK). Unlike specifically extreme right parties (e.g. AfD), today, conservative (e.g. FdI) and populist radical right parties (e.g. RN, Reform UK) and leaders in Europe are increasingly skeptical of Trump’s conciliatory approach towards Russia. 

Unsurprisingly, Meloni often calls Russia an “aggressor” (Hook Global, 2026) and has clearly criticized Trump’s deal with the Russian President (to import a significant amount of Russian diesel fuel and temporarily lift US sanctions) calling it “a very risky choice” that legitimizes Moscow (Barbati, 2026). In the Italian Parliament, her party has consistently voted to aid Ukraine militarily. 

More surprisingly, the — once Russophile — RN has reassessed its position on Russia, because although the party has opposed sending French troops and military aid (for long-range strikes) both Le Pen and Bardella have publicly supported Ukraine’s right to defend (and recover) its sovereignty (Sandford, 2022; Par Le Parisien avec AFP, 2025; Crone & Klinke, 2025: 24, 44). Also, the RN supposedly interrupted all contacts with the Kremlin after 2022 (Crone & Klinke, 2025: 44). This shift towards more liberal-conservative positions has been prompted by the increasing influence of a new generation of identitarian, Gaullist, and civilizationist thinkers that advise the higher ranks of the party — such as Pierre-Romain Thionnet and few others (Crone & Klinke, 2025: 25). The “new” RN no longer considers Russia a bastion for traditional Christianity and European identity but instead views it as a multicultural melting pot (a “Eurasian empire” with a considerable Islamic population) that represents a menace to the sovereignty of a white, Christian, and Western, “Fortress Europe” (see Crone & Klinke, 2025: 25, 27, 40, 44). 

Shifting the focus to Britain, even Farage — possibly the greatest admirer and supporter of Trump in Europe — has recently spoken against Trump’s new Russian deal (Henrys, 2026) and now is more inclined to back Ukraine (even suggesting NATO adherence) (Keate, 2025) at the cost of disagreeing with the American President. 

It is difficult to say whether these parties and leaders are ideologically or strategically (as some are close to obtaining governmental power) driven to support Ukraine over Russia. However, what is evident is that whilst the US-Iran War is viewed as something occurring far from Europe’s borders and involving a nation that is culturally very distinct and of little interest to the Old Continent, the Russia-Ukraine War is a conflict at the heart of Europe involving a nation that has been invaded by an “alien” superpower. 

Moreover, far right and right-wing parties are much more comfortable with Ukrainian immigration than with Iranian immigration resulting from the War, as the former are perceived as “white” and “Christian” and the latter as “non-white” and “Muslim.” A further concept worth exploring is that introduced by the French political analyst Thibault Muzergues (2026): many of these right-wing and/or far right parties in Europe are presently led by a younger generation of politicians who have become increasingly wary of aligning with Putin’s Russia (France 24 English, 2026). Essentially, this new political elite adopts a different stance towards Russia than its predecessors did fifteen to twenty-five years ago (France 24 English, 2026).

Fourth, Trump’s political model, especially his modus operandi of leadership and exercise of executive power, is difficult (if not impossible) to reproduce in Europe. The particular institutional structure and political-cultural context of the US confer the American President significantly more decisional autonomy, power, and freedom of maneuver compared to the numerous checks and balances, political fragmentation, and institutional constraints characterizing systems such as the European Union. 

In the event that they assume office, leaders such as Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel would operate in a very distinct context from Trump — one that involves specifically European parliamentary mechanisms, proportional electoral frameworks, coalition administrations, independent constitutional tribunals, and supranational regulatory bodies. 

Contrastingly, Trump’s institutional environment is shaped by a two-party system where — although restrained by courts, Congress, and the states — the executive is directly elected by the people and is able to exercise substantial authority without having to necessarily depend on a parliamentary majority. For instance, the American President has the right to pull out from most international agreements without the approval of Congress. Furthermore, Trump utilized executive orders to make US immigration policy stricter (also enforcing mass deportations) without always relying on new legislation. 

In summary, the impracticality of replicating Trump’s model in Europe ineluctably contributed to an increasing estrangement between the American President and the European right. 

Conclusion

This commentary examined the complex political and relational dynamics surrounding President Trump and successful right-wing and far right party leaders in Europe. The analysis revealed that although — overall — the relationship between Trump and the European right and far right is significantly strained, it has yet to reach a breaking point, nor does such an outcome appear imminent. After all, given the American and European economies are largely interconnected, especially considering trade and supply chains, finance, military security, intelligence, energy, and technology, a full rupture between the US and Europe’s major nations (and its potential future leaders) such as Italy, France, Britain, and Germany appears both undesirable and unrealistic. 

In any case, the main takeaway is that although there is strong ideological affinity between at least three of the four leaders discussed and Trump — Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel (more so than Meloni) are closely aligned to the US President’s views on state authority to combat globalization, immigration, woke, and modern liberalism — realpolitik combined with Trump’s trade and foreign policy have forced these parties/leaders to distance themselves from his actions and emerging legacy, primarily to defend their own national interests. 

Considering political realism, Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel have all understood the political cost of aligning too closely with a foreign President who is experiencing a sharp decline in public support (both domestically and internationally) and who always prioritizes pursuing his own national agenda to satisfy his electoral base at home (MAGA) rather than strengthening transatlantic alliances. 

Furthermore, these leaders evidently see no benefit in attempting to imitate or replicate Trump’s failing political model in their own parliamentary (Italy, Britain, Germany) and semi-presidential (France) democracies. Considering Trump’s policies, all of the rightist and far right leaders mentioned above have no choice but to object to the President’s hazardous maneuvers on trade and foreign policy that damage their economies and long-term societal plans. Today, American tariffs on European goods, Russian “appeasement,” and new wars (e.g. Iran) (potentially causing an increase in global immigration), are not looked upon favorably by the leaders of parties who are — above all — sovereigntist (and except for the AfD — FdI, RN, and Reform UK, view Russia as a foreign threat to national sovereignty), nativist, culturally and economically nationalist, and partially isolationist. 

After Trump’s failed midterms election, it is likely the European right will distance itself from him and his political paradigm (namely “Trumpism”) even further. However, it is only natural that — if they take office — the European right and far right will seek coordination and cooperation with Trump’s America on most of the issues mentioned above (trade, security, intelligence, energy, etc.). Nevertheless, such cooperation is likely to become increasingly pragmatic, transactional and driven by strategic considerations rather than ideological affinity. 

As already stated, Trump is no longer considered an ideological point of reference or natural ally by any of the leaders and parties under scrutiny. On the contrary, Trump is perceived as an erratic, precarious, and unpredictable interlocutor whose imperatives and core aims usually diverge significantly from their own, especially on topics such as commercial policy and foreign policy. Ideally, future studies could shift the focus towards other right-wing political actors (e.g. Santiago Abascal, Péter Magyar, and Geert Wilders) and assess their affinity with Trump from a political-strategic and ideological standpoint.


 

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Footnotes

[1] For detailed accounts of JD Vance’s political views refer to Benjamin Wallace-Wells (2024), and Swapna Venugopal Ramaswamy (2025).

[2] For an in-depth account on how the Israel/U.S.-Iran conflict has negatively impacted the UK economy, see Daniel Harari (2026). 

[3] The interview mentioned above can be found online at the following link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IeYB_Hmsu84.

[4] A recent survey shows that most Germans disapprove of Trump’s actions against Iran (and Maduro in Venezuela) — see Claudia Müller (2026).

[5] This particular AfD policy is concisely (yet comprehensively) discussed in a book chapter written by the scholar Ubaldo Villani-Lubelli (2026: 149-151). 

[6] Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). 

[7] Especially the 20% levy on all EU imports (see Hernández-Morales et al., 2025).

[8] Alain de Benoist is not strictly Eurasianist in the Duginist sense. While he supports multipolarity (objecting to American dominance and liberal universalism) and calls for an ethno-pluralist “Europe of the peoples”, he also believes Russia’s role is central in any anti-American, anti-Atlanticist, and illiberal continental project. 

Professor Bernard Avishai.

Prof. Bernard Avishai Warns: Netanyahu’s Removal Could Trigger Greater Political Violence

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Bernard Avishai of Dartmouth College warns that Benjamin Netanyahu’s removal from power could intensify political violence in Israel. Examining the enduring influence of Netanyahuism, religious nationalism, and the settler movement, Professor Avishai argues that Israel’s democratic crisis extends beyond electoral politics. He highlights the deepening confrontation between “Greater Israel theocrats” and “global Israel liberals and cosmopolitans,” cautioning that meaningful democratic reforms could provoke violent resistance. Advocating constitutional reform, judicial independence, universal civic obligations, and Arab political inclusion, he calls for a fundamental rethinking of Zionism and citizenship. Professor Avishai also emphasizes that lasting democratic renewal requires ending the occupation and establishing reciprocal political rights for Israelis and Palestinians.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Israel faces profound political uncertainty following the October 27 elections. Although Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud remains the largest party, his right-wing and religious coalition has lost its parliamentary majority. Gadi Eisenkot’s efforts to form an alternative government confront deep divisions over Arab political participation, ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, and the enduring influence of religious nationalism. Beyond coalition arithmetic, fundamental questions persist concerning judicial independence, Palestinian rights, and Israel’s democratic identity.

In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Bernard Avishai, visiting professor of political economy at Dartmouth College and former technology and strategy editor of the Harvard Business Review, warns that Netanyahu’s departure could intensify rather than resolve Israel’s political and institutional crisis. “The potential for violence here is really great, regardless of whether Bibi remains in power,” he cautions. “The prospect of violence might be even greater if he’s removed from power.”

For Professor Avishai, the underlying conflict extends beyond Netanyahu’s personalized leadership. “I think Bibi’s world will outlive Bibi,” he argues, emphasizing the entrenched religious-nationalist constituencies and institutional arrangements sustaining Netanyahuism. Comparing a possible Eisenkot government to Abraham Lincoln’s accession to power in 1860, he suggests that substantial democratic reforms could threaten communities whose political identities and material interests depend on the existing order.

Professor Avishai anticipates particularly fierce resistance from ultra-Orthodox communities and armed West Bank settlers. “If the opposition takes power and tries to introduce genuine changes,” he warns, “there will be violence.”Invoking Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination, he underscores the historical precedents for political extremism: “These people have already killed a prime minister. Let’s not forget that.”

Nevertheless, Professor Avishai rejects political violence as a justification for postponing democratic renewal. He advocates constitutional reform, an empowered independent judiciary, universal schooling, and equal civic obligations. A new Basic Law enshrining Israel’s Declaration of Independence, he argues, could establish the foundations for a more inclusive democratic republic.

Central to this transformation is the struggle between what Professor Avishai calls “Greater Israel theocrats” and “global Israel liberals and cosmopolitans.” Arab political participation becomes a defining democratic test. “There’s absolutely no reason why Hebrew Republicans cannot cooperate with Arab parties,” he insists, framing Israel’s predicament as a fundamental choice between “a Jewish theocracy and a Hebrew democracy.”

Drawing on his longstanding scholarship on Zionism and secular republicanism, Professor Avishai also maintains that lasting democratic renewal ultimately requires ending the occupation and developing reciprocal political rights with Palestinians.

The interview thus explores a central paradox of Israel’s post-election moment: electoral alternation may create an opportunity for democratic reconstruction while simultaneously provoking resistance from the very forces that such reconstruction seeks to constrain.

Here is our interview with Professor Bernard Avishai, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Netanyahu Mobilizes Voters Through Fear and Hatred of Arabs

Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel visits the Synagogue of Copacabana in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on December 28, 2018.

Professor Avishai, thank you for joining us. In The Tragedy of Zionism, you argued that unresolved contradictions within Zionism threatened Israeli democracy. Four decades later, how much of Israel’s current crisis reflects these foundational tensions, and how much is attributable to Netanyahu’s personalized, populist style of leadership?

Professor Bernard Avishai: That’s an excellent question. If I understand you correctly, you’re asking how much of Israel’s current crisis we should attribute to an inherent, underlying crisis in the state’s constitutional structure, and how much to Netanyahu’s peculiar, aggressive populist ideas. It’s a little like asking, when somebody gets the flu, how much is attributable to the virus and how much to a lack of antibodies.

So why don’t we start with Netanyahu? Netanyahu has built his career on fomenting suspicion and considerable loathing toward Palestinian Arabs in particular, and the Arab world more generally, although this has been moderated by his efforts in the Gulf. But we can return to that later. Historically, he has fomented fear and loathing toward Palestinian Arabs, both within Israel’s borders, including Palestinian Arab citizens, and among Palestinians living in the territories occupied in 1967.

The question, then, is how this fomenting of hostility produces a strong, nationalist, I would even say ultranationalist, mobilized population. Where does he get his support? People say, “Oh, well, as a politician, he’s a magician,” and so on. He’s not a magician; he’s a one-trick pony. That’s his trick. And to the extent that you study populism, I think we know that this is the trick of populists almost everywhere: to take a country’s difficulties and find someone to hate and someone to blame.

So how does he mobilize this constituency? First of all, Netanyahu’s own supporters are not the only ones who have brought him to power. There are two components of his coalition that have consistently supported him.

Religious Zionists and the Ultra-Orthodox Sustain Netanyahu’s Theocratic Coalition

One is the national Orthodox Religious Zionist world, centered on very hermetically sealed yeshivot and, essentially, the settler community, which has grown almost by inertia over the past 50 years. There were perhaps 5,000 settlers at the end of the 1970s, and now there are more than 650,000, including over 450,000 in the West Bank outside East Jerusalem. That’s a huge constituency, and its members have an inherent interest in maintaining what is now called a right-wing government, although the word “right” is being stretched somewhat here. These are theocrats. They want a messianic version of the country, and they don’t care about democracy. For them, Netanyahu and Likud have always been a ticket to punch.

Then there are the ultra-Orthodox within the Bibi coalition, who were not originally Zionists. These are communities that have inherited the mantle of religious Jews who lived continuously in Jerusalem, in Israel and Palestine, even before Zionist colonies began. Early on, they made a pact with the state apparatus under which the state would support yeshiva study for young men. In many of these religious schools, particularly those for boys, core subjects such as math, English, civics, and science receive limited instruction. Students are essentially kept in a cloister.

Originally, these communities were thought to be a kind of nature preserve that would gradually disappear with modernization. When Ben-Gurion first recognized this group and allowed it to maintain independent study and school systems, there were about 400 young men engaged in Torah study. There are now more than 100,000, and the community around them has grown so substantially, particularly in Jerusalem, that approximately 60% of children entering first grade in the city attend ultra-Orthodox schools. The cost of supporting ultra-Orthodox families is approximately 38 billion shekels annually. It’s effectively three shekels to the dollar. That’s a third more than all the money spent on hospitals and universities in the country. This represents a tremendous burden on the state, and these communities regard Netanyahu and his theocratic allies as their allies.

Historical Resentment and Ethnonationalism Sustain Likud’s Political Base

Together, the national Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox constitute about half of Netanyahu’s Knesset coalition. Then there’s another group: those who vote for Likud and its ultranationalist ideal, who think of Jews largely in terms of a permanent affirmative action program. It’s as though Israel represents a permanent form of retaliation against antisemitism and the Arab world.

The question becomes: Who supports this outlook? Historically, a substantial share of Likud’s support has come from North African Jews who regard themselves as refugees from the Arab world, having been expelled in much the same way that Palestinian Arabs understand their displacement from Palestine during the Nakba. They think, “Why are they complaining? We are also refugees, and we know the Arabs. We understand them. They hate us. They created this terrible dislocation in our lives, so what’s their complaint? We found life here; let them go find life in Arabia.” And it’s important to remember that Israel is a very small sliver of Arabia.

On top of that, they tend to harbor resentment toward the European socialist, secular establishment they encountered in 1956, 1957, and 1958. Their own wives were generally illiterate, and they entered a society dominated by a labor aristocracy that controlled everything. This produced a kind of anti-elitist sentiment, a belief that Europeans looked down their noses at them. Likud became their form of retaliation.

Then there are “the Russians” who arrived in the 1990s. That’s another constituency that tends to support Likud, as well as its own party, including Avigdor Lieberman, whom we’ll probably return to later. Russians, in my view, believe their role is to disabuse us of our fantasies and illusions. They see the world in terms of power politics. They want their Putin, and they think Israel should have its own Putin. They’re not exactly democrats. They’re secular, they like their ham, but that doesn’t mean they believe in a secular, democratic world. They believe the world consists of tribes and power politics, and that Jews are a tribe that must remain strong in the face of their enemies.

War Trauma and Fear of Arabs Reinforce Netanyahu’s Political Support

Finally, there are young people who have been through this war. Young people experience war without necessarily having processed everything they’ve done. Take the documentary film NAZA, which has generated enormous attention in Europe but is received very differently in Israel. The reaction is something like: “What? You’re calling us war criminals? You’ve asked us to serve for three years, and now you’re going to call us war criminals? I’ve just lost my friend, I’ve lost my cousin.” Tens of thousands are suffering from PTSD right now. They see Arabs as having come and killed and slaughtered people on October 7, and they regard themselves as part of the effort to rid the country of that threat. Now they’re being accused of war crimes.

This is not the time, from their perspective. It’s like approaching the American Army during the bombing of Dresden in World War II and asking, “You don’t really feel very bad for the Germans, do you?” That’s simply not how they’re thinking. I’m not trying to justify the commission of war crimes. I’m saying that you have to understand where these people are coming from.

So if you ask how this one-trick pony manages to foment hatred, fear, and loathing toward the Arab world, or to create this Likud constituency whose voters seem unshakable, that’s how he does it. And these votes are not easily shaken.

Can Israel Privilege Jews Over Arabs and Still Be Democratic?

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

In your October 19, 2026, New York Times essay, you distinguish political, religious, and cultural Zionism, arguing that only the latter is fully compatible with liberal democracy. Has Netanyahuism fundamentally transformed Zionism, or does it represent the political ascendancy of its historically illiberal currents?

Professor Bernard Avishai: In a way, that’s the same question in a different guise, because it raises the question of whether there is a form of Zionism that’s compatible with democratic norms. What I’ve described so far is a view of the country that tends to define itself retrospectively in terms of a Zionist challenge. That challenge is to survive in a world where Jews are at risk and, as I said before, to define the state apparatus as a kind of permanent affirmative action program.

So, for anybody who isn’t Jewish, it’s identity politics taken to the level of ideology. You define Jews in ethnic and religious terms, privilege Jewish life on that basis, and use the state apparatus to do so. That’s not really compatible with democratic norms. It’s especially incompatible when you have a population that’s 20% Arab. How can you privilege Jewish life in ethnic and religious terms on the one hand, have a minority population on the other, and still call yourself democratic?

There is, however, a whole other line of Zionist thinking that saw the problem not as, “The bastards won’t let us assimilate. The bastards victimize us; therefore, we need to create a state apparatus to defend ourselves.” Rather, it said, “No, no, our problem is modernization. Our problem is our own rabbis. Our problem is our own inability, as Jews, to confront the challenge of modernization.” And modernization means secular, liberal life, which our religion cannot possibly survive. Because Jewish religion, in spite of all the ways—or maybe because of all the ways—in which it anticipated a certain style of thinking, a liberal style of thinking, modernization subverts us from within. We need a way of surviving in the modern world that the rabbis could not possibly provide.

Cultural Zionism Offers a Path to Arab Equality and a Democratic Israel

At the turn of the 20th century, cultural Zionists began to realize that their real Zionist project was to develop the Hebrew language, put down roots in Palestinian colonies, and create little incubators of Hebrew language and culture as the foundation for a new culture. Ahad Ha’am, the original mentor of the cultural Zionists, said that when he visited Palestine in 1911–1912, he saw these little colonies as cultural generating stations in a grid. They were generating Hebrew culture and would eventually link up in a network, which is exactly what happened.

That kind of Zionism—the notion that you create a Hebrew-speaking republic and that this constitutes the Jewish state—can accommodate a minority that assimilates into it. Consider the Russians who came after the fall of the Soviet Union. Many of them aren’t really Jews. Of the million who came, about 300,000 were Christian, or at least had Christian families. But they could assimilate into Hebrew culture and become members of, as it were, the Israeli nation. And don’t forget, this is called Israel. It’s not called Ishmael. It’s the State of Israel, and Hebrew is the primary language of work, culture, and education in the country.

You now have three generations—actually, four by now—of Arab young people, three of whom were born in the country and speak Hebrew as well as, if not better than, I do. They constitute a fifth of the doctors, a quarter of the nurses, and half the pharmacists in the country. They live in this Hebrew-Israeliness and are knocking at the door, saying, “We want to live fully as citizens in this country. We voted in this election.” They came out in very large numbers in the last election and are saying, “We want to be part of this game. We want a democratic country.” It’s a little like Black people in Mississippi now finally electing a senator. They want to overcome aspects of the state that have been discriminatory against them.

They want to be part of it. And yes, to that extent, Zionism can create a legacy of Hebrew-speaking, secular civil society that can assimilate others and be fully democratic—not only for Arabs but also for idiosyncratic people like myself.

Israel Must Move Beyond Ethnoreligious Supremacy

Your Hebrew Republic envisions a secular, democratic Israel grounded in Hebrew culture rather than ethnoreligious supremacy. Can this vision accommodate full equality for Palestinian citizens while preserving Jewish national self-determination, or does that require a more fundamental constitutional transformation?

Professor Bernard Avishai: I’ve just answered that question, but the issue of constitutional reform relates to the question of antibodies that I never got to in the first place. The Israeli state apparatus rests on a series of Basic Laws that don’t really amount to a liberal constitution. In Israel, you have no immigration law to speak of. What you have is something called the Law of Return.

The Law of Return allows any Jew anywhere in the world—and I don’t know what “Jew” means here—to enter the country and become a citizen immediately. You basically have to sign papers and so on, but you can become a citizen immediately. That devalues Israeliness, doesn’t it? You don’t arrive in America without speaking English and immediately become an American citizen. You have to go through a process of naturalization. Naturalization to what? In Israel, naturalization would mean becoming part of the Hebrew language, Hebrew culture, and Israeliness. But that is not recognized by Israel’s constitutional framework. There is no immigration law to speak of.

All you need to prove is that you had one Jewish grandparent. Why? Why, I ask you, one Jewish grandparent? Because that was the Nuremberg Law. If you had one Jewish grandparent, you were considered a Jew and therefore qualified to be shot. The Israeli state apparatus in the early 1950s determined that if you were someone Hitler would have hunted, you could find a place in Israel. You could become a citizen of Israel. So that’s why we have no immigration law. It made perfect sense in 1950 to have this kind of immigration law. It makes no sense in 2026.

There are other things. There’s the Israel Land Authority, which has borrowed some of the practices of the pre-state Jewish National Fund. This means that if you acquire land from the Israel Land Authority, you can’t sell it to a non-Jew. We still haven’t defined what a Jew is. Okay, but you can’t sell it to a non-Jew. Could you imagine? That made sense in the 1930s and 1940s, when the Jewish National Fund was buying land for colonies and didn’t want people to turn around and sell it to somebody else. They wanted those who acquired land from the Jewish National Fund to actually farm it and live on it rather than turn around and sell it. So it made sense in the 1930s and 1940s. It makes no sense in 2026.

Netanyahu Fears an Independent Judiciary That Could Dismantle His Political Order

Thousands march in Jerusalem against judicial overhaul, March 2025. A broad protest fills the streets at night, with demonstrators calling to save Israeli democracy. Photo: Dreamstime.

So, when I talk about constitutional reform, I’m talking about empowering the judiciary to rely on a liberal democratic constitution, which we would have had if, in 1949, we had enacted a constitution based on the Declaration of Independence. The Israeli Declaration of Independence could have been written by Eleanor Roosevelt. If Israel had enacted a constitution based on its Declaration of Independence, we could have a judiciary today that could examine something like the Law of Return, the Jewish Nation-State Law, or the Israel Land Law and say, “This is unconstitutional. We have to move forward toward Israeliness and away from this ethnic, religious, theocratic solidarity that was somehow allowed to develop within the state over all these years.”

I haven’t even mentioned the occupation yet. Obviously, that has also had an enormous impact on Israeli society because Jerusalem and its immediate settler suburbs have become something like an apartheid state. That’s not true of Tel Aviv, Herzliya, and Haifa. You can’t simply say, “Israel is an apartheid state.” The world of Herzliya, Tel Aviv, and Haifa supports the state apparatus. Seventy-five to 80% of taxes are paid by companies operating in global Israel along the coast, not by the Greater Israel population in Jerusalem and the settlements. But along the coast, people are much more liberal. They don’t want this, yet it’s the people of Jerusalem who have captured the state apparatus and have been exploiting the coastal cities for as long as Bibi has been in power.

Right now, the people of Greater Israel have created this world that the judiciary would be dismantling if it were empowered to do so by a constitution. That’s why constitutional reform is one of the things being promised by the opposition, and why Bibi has taken on the task of disempowering the Supreme Court. He speaks of an activist Supreme Court in much the same way that segregationist senators in the American South were always confounded by the activist Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education and similar cases. What they really mean by an activist Supreme Court is a court that overturns laws that should never have been part of a democratic state in the first place.

That’s why the judiciary is so dangerous to the Bibi world.

Netanyahu’s Political World Will Outlive Him

Netanyahu’s Likud lost its parliamentary majority in October but remains Israel’s largest party. Does this outcome suggest the erosion of Netanyahu’s personal political dominance, or has the populist, anti-institutional political culture associated with Netanyahuism become entrenched beyond his leadership?

Professor Bernard Avishai: I think Bibi’s world will outlive Bibi. I don’t think there’s any question about that. But it’s also true that he’s become the face of it. We have exactly the same issue with Trump in America. Will MAGA outlive Donald Trump? It will, but it will survive on a much smaller scale. The people who voted for Bibi in the last election are a fairly good indication of his residual support. Without Bibi, that support may decline to 30% of the vote instead of 40%. But there will continue to be a political world that outlasts Bibi. The culture war in Israel is not just personal.

If Eisenkot takes over in Israel today, if he manages to take over, it’ll be like Lincoln taking over in 1860. The people who feel threatened by Eisenkot taking over are not simply people who think, “Oh, well, he’s going to cut taxes by 12%. I don’t like that,” or “He’s going to raise taxes.” No, no, we’re talking about people whose entire way of life is profoundly threatened by a government that challenges their commitment to the status quo and to an occupation that gives them a foothold across the entire historic, biblical Land of Israel.

They see themselves in messianic terms, want a kind of theocracy, and fear that if their settlements stop expanding, they will come under siege. They’re desperately afraid of what will happen to them. They live in a world where, unless they continue to make demographic gains and continue not just to colonize the West Bank but also to colonize the Knesset, they’re in a lot of trouble.

One also has to remember that there is a demographic and geographic division here. I spoke earlier about Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and the coast. Something like 75–80% of Bibi’s vote came from Jerusalem and the settlement areas, as well as some development towns where North African Jews lived. But what I’m saying is that, if you look at Jerusalem and its surrounding areas, 75–80% voted for Bibi and the various parties in his coalition. In Tel Aviv, it’s exactly the reverse. Seventy-five to 80% voted for the opposition parties. These places may be separated by only 40 kilometers, but politically and culturally, they’re worlds apart.

Israel’s Culture War Could Turn Violent

And this division could become violent. It absolutely could. If the opposition takes power and tries to introduce genuine changes—and we can discuss in a moment what those changes might be—there will be violence. There will be talk of, I won’t say secession, but certainly resistance in Jerusalem to whatever the new government tries to impose. The Haredim, the ultra-Orthodox of Jerusalem, can shut down the country in a heartbeat simply by occupying the streets, mobilizing tens of thousands of protesters, and blocking highways and railroad lines. It wouldn’t be difficult to shut down the country. And as far as the West Bank settlers are concerned, they’re armed! The army that would be required to suppress their provocative terrorist acts against Palestinians includes many junior officers who are very sympathetic to them and who have been through their own yeshivot and training.

The potential for violence here is really great, regardless of whether Bibi remains in power. The prospect of violence might be even greater if he’s removed from power. I’m not saying that’s a reason not to remove him. I’m just saying we have to be prepared for a tremendous amount of dislocation. These people have already killed a prime minister. Let’s not forget that. They killed the prime minister for exactly this reason. It was a prime minister whose government relied on Arab votes in the Knesset. This is not new.

The Settler Movement Has Become Politically Uncontrollable

Your writings distinguish Israel’s secular national traditions from the increasingly influential religious-nationalist right. How did movements associated with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich progress from ideological marginality to governmental influence, and what explains their continuing electoral resilience?

Professor Bernard Avishai: That’s really the question I was implying earlier. If you don’t have the antibodies to nip this in the bud, these movements just continue to grow. In the early 1970s, when the settler movement was just getting off the ground, there was an opportunity to stop it.

In 1976, during the first Rabin government, when Rabin was a younger man—he had been prime minister since the end of 1974, before resigning over a banking issue involving his wife. Anyway, he resigned, and Shimon Peres ran against Menachem Begin in May 1977. When Rabin’s first government faced a group of settlers trying to establish a settlement near Nablus, called Kedumim or Elon Moreh—it had various names—the government could have stopped it then. But the chief of staff, Mordechai Gur, reported back to the cabinet and said, “There’ll be blood. Do you want to have Jewish blood on your hands?” So the government refrained from ending the settlement project outside the border settlements, which were really not problematic. But that’s what governments always did. The more brazen the settlers’ actions became, the less willing governments were to act against them.

We saw what happened when Ariel Sharon, who had been the architect of the settlement movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s, finally decided, as prime minister, to remove the settlers from Gaza. Only about 6,000–7,000 people were removed from Gaza, yet it tore the country apart. You cannot remove that many people from the settlements without enormous upheaval. So, the settlements have now become an enormous political obstacle that the government is unable to deal with. They have grown and grown in the absence of a government prepared to stifle them and stop them.

They’ve also been able to exploit the sort of quasi-theocratic ideas that the state apparatus has tolerated. In Jewish Israel, there’s no civil marriage. A Jew cannot marry a non-Jew in the State of Israel because marriage, divorce, and burial have all been left in the hands of the rabbinate. That has been true since 1948. It was another compromise made early on, like giving ultra-Orthodox children separate schools.

So, we have a continuing marriage of democratic institutions, on the one hand, with these quasi-theocratic legacy institutions from before the state was formed. How do you resolve this without one side winning and the other losing? The theocratic side has been winning because the occupation has blown back into the country in a way that makes it very difficult to defeat.

But today, it’s absolutely clear that this is a choice. This new government, if it’s formed, had better start acting. It has to act to extend the boundaries of liberal Israeliness against this theocratic world, which has faced no resistance for so long and has had the power and moral prestige of the occupation, of the status quo, behind it.

It’s a very dangerous moment.

Israel’s Real Struggle Is Between Theocrats and Liberals

Election billboards of religious political parties Shas and Otzma Yehudit before Israel’s fourth election in two years in a street of Jerusalem on March 22, 2021. Photo: Gali Estrange.

In your August 2026 New Yorker essay on Lior Schleien, you examine how religious nationalism challenges secular culture and democratic freedoms. Has Israel’s central political cleavage shifted from territorial security toward a deeper struggle between secular citizenship and religious authority?

Professor Bernard Avishai: I absolutely think so, and I’ve explained why. The territorial issue is a dependent variable, not an independent variable. There’s a culture war going on. The real question is: Who’s going to win? Greater Israel theocrats or global Israel liberals and cosmopolitans?

Both groups think of themselves as patriots. Both see themselves as rooted in a Zionist past. But the global Israel types are the country’s elites. They’re more highly educated and tend to be more European, with roots going back to the original pioneering settlements.

That’s the irony. You listen to people on campuses today who think they’re offering highly sophisticated critiques of Israel by invoking the colonialism of the 1920s and 1930s. But actually, those pioneers, along with their grandchildren and great-grandchildren, are the liberals of the country.

They’re the ones who believe in a secular, liberal commonwealth that provides opportunities for the assimilation and integration of all minorities as full citizens. It’s really the people who came after them who tend to support the more ultranationalist and theocratic forces in the country.

Israel Needs Sweeping Reforms to Restore Democracy

Netanyahu’s confrontations with the judiciary have been justified by supporters as restoring democratic accountability, while critics view them as executive aggrandizement. How should we distinguish legitimate institutional reform from populist constitutionalism that undermines judicial independence and liberal democracy?

Professor Bernard Avishai: This raises the larger question of what any new government can do. A new government would have a profound and urgent agenda if Israeliness, Hebrew republicanism, and democratic norms are to prevail.

A new government would have to undertake a series of immediate steps. First, it would establish a judicial commission of inquiry into what happened on October 7. This is symbolically important because it re-empowers the state apparatus, rather than just politicians, and creates the evidentiary basis for determining how to proceed in the future.

You immediately repeal all the laws Netanyahu and his government passed that subvert the Supreme Court and the Attorney General. You also repeal all the laws that subordinate the press and universities to government politicians. You appoint new heads of the police, a new governor of the Bank of Israel, and a new head of the Secret Service.

You create a national system of state schools in which all schools are required to teach core curricula. In effect, no funding would go to religious schools that fail to teach civics, math, science, history, and English.

You introduce universal conscription or national service so that everyone in the country, including Arabs and the ultra-Orthodox, serves for the same number of years that, right now, basically only secular Israelis serve in the army. But if you don’t want to serve in the military—and I presume most Arabs would not, and most Haredim might not—you could perform national service instead, working in hospitals, cultural centers, and so forth.

You’d also have to pass a new Basic Law that enshrines the Declaration of Independence and its democratic norms, giving an independent judiciary a legal basis for determining the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of undemocratic laws.

That’s a huge agenda, but it’s all very doable. And none of it has anything to do with the occupation. People outside the country tend to think that the division between right and left in Israel is entirely about whether you support or oppose a Palestinian state. That’s not really how it’s viewed in Israel.

Right now, if you asked Israelis whether they favor a Palestinian state, you’d probably get 90% saying no, simply because they associate a Palestinian state today with empowering Palestinians to do to them from the West Bank what was done to them from Gaza. So the next Al-Aqsa Flood could come from Qalqilya instead of Gaza. That doesn’t feel like something anyone wants to risk.

But there is nevertheless a distinction within the country. There are people who believe that being part of global Israel means maintaining good relations with the Gulf states and who also believe that a regional plan for Gaza’s reconstruction may, in fact, be possible. Even though you’d be paying the price of allowing a Palestinian Authority-adjacent administration to enter Gaza and take responsibility for administering the territory, you’d do so knowing that Hamas is basically giving its tacit consent. And you’d allow the disarming of Hamas in Gaza to become more a matter of telling its members to take off their Hamas uniforms and put on the uniforms of a new Palestinian administration. Then you give them back their guns and provide them with new leaders.

Hamas will still be influential. Its members will still obviously see themselves within the framework of having joined Hamas, of having joined the steadfast warriors in the first place. That’s inevitable. You can’t avoid that now. But a new administration would mean that the Arab League would essentially provide a moral foundation for that administration. The Arab League would also have the support of Qatar and Turkey, and these are not people Hamas members would want to fire on.

Do you know what I mean? There’s the possibility of an administration that has the endorsement of the Palestinian Authority but is really supported by an outer ring of Arab countries, forcing the issue and pushing Israel and the Palestinians toward some kind of pathway to compromise in which the Palestinians accept Israel and learn to live with it. In the same way, America, under some new administration, would be pushing Israel to accept a pathway to Palestinian independence.

Israeli Democrats Have No Reason to Exclude Arab Parties

Israeli Parliament Knesset.
Israeli Parliament Knesset. Photo: Dreamstime.

Following the October 27 elections, Gadi Eisenkot has received the mandate to form a government, yet his potential majority depends partly on Arab parliamentary support. Does the reluctance of major Zionist opposition parties to cooperate with Arab representatives reveal a deeper contradiction between electoral democracy and ethnonational conceptions of political legitimacy?

Professor Bernard Avishai: The answer is simply yes. There’s absolutely no reason why Hebrew Republicans cannot cooperate with Arab parties.

Golda Meir’s coalition, back in the late 1960s, had four Arab members who were part of an independent Arab party affiliated with the Labor Zionist world. We’ve had minority governments in the past, including Rabin’s government, that relied on Arab parties.

Rabin was asked about this in 1994 or 1995. I saw a short video clip of Rabin talking to a group of reporters. One of them, a very distinguished Arab affairs correspondent who remains highly respected, asked him, “Do you think it’s okay to have Arab parties supporting your government when these parties may, in fact, be beholden to Arafat or perhaps be supporters of Arafat?”

Rabin visibly tensed up and said, “This question infuriates me.”

“Just imagine,” he said, “that an American senator, a Jew, decides to vote to provide money for Israel. How would you feel if the argument were, ‘Oh, this Jewish senator is taking his orders from Jerusalem, taking his orders from Israel’? How would you feel if that were said about Jews in America? Jews have always hated racism, opposed racism, and suffered from racism. And now you’re telling me that, in the Jewish state, we’re going to default to these racist ideas?”

No opposition member right now, except for one, Yair Golan from the Democrats, would say that to a reporter. It kind of breaks my heart. But the truth is, there’s only one opposition party that is absolutely adamant that the opposition should not form a government with the help of Arab parties, and that’s Avigdor Lieberman’s party. It’s largely a hardline secular party that appeals to Russian voters, those Russians I mentioned earlier, who generally vote for Likud but have also voted for Lieberman.

Arab Participation Could Redefine Israeli Democracy

In your October essay, you question whether politicians can meaningfully claim to support a Jewish and democratic state while excluding Arab parties from governing coalitions. Does the record representation of Arab voters in the new Knesset create an opportunity to redefine the boundaries of legitimate democratic participation?

Professor Bernard Avishai: Absolutely. This is what I’m counting on. This is a critical moment for Israel, there’s no question about it. If an opposition government forms today with the support of 19 Arab members, it’s going to redefine what Israeli liberalism means for the liberal world of Israel. It’s a moment to recognize the difference between a kind of Jewish theocracy and a Hebrew democratic republic, a Hebrew democracy. A Jewish theocracy versus a Hebrew democracy. This is a fundamental decision, and we have the possibility of seeing it today.

But I must tell you, the opposite is also true. If, for some reason, Lieberman prevails and doesn’t change his mind, and the opposition groups decide to form a government with the Haredim, the ultra-Orthodox, rather than allow liberals from the Arab bloc in Israel to help form the government, Arab citizens are going to see this as a moment somewhat like the way Herzl viewed the Dreyfus case.

Arab liberals are going to say, “What do you want from us? We’ve done everything we can to prove to you—not just the doctors at Hadassah Hospital and so on, but everything we can—that we want to be, and can be, part of this Hebrew-speaking civil society. We want equality, and you’re telling us that no matter what we do, we’ll always be viewed as a fifth column?” My fear is that they’ll say, “You want to know what a fifth column really looks like?”

We had a measure of that in May 2021, with the so-called War of the Walls, or whatever it was called. There was a Gaza war in May 2021, and there were riots in Acre, Lod, and some Israeli-Arab towns. Sinwar, in my view, was counting on that when he attacked in October 2023. He was counting on the Arabs of Israel rising up, and they didn’t. Among other things, they were so appalled by the terrorism on the border. But they also saw that this was a test for them. They weren’t going to join in that kind of crusade against Israel. They saw themselves as citizens of the country. They’ve proven ever since that they are citizens of the country. Israeli Arabs died on October 7. They die when missiles fall on the northern towns. They’re part of Israel’s world. 

If they see that they’re going to be swatted away at a moment like this, they’re not going to vote in these numbers next time. You can see that young people are going to start reevaluating whether integration into Israel is really something they should be contemplating.

Israel’s Future Requires Universal Schooling and Civic Obligations

Campaign signs for the Israeli government “Shas” party head by Arye Deri, depicting Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, prior to the April 2019 elections in Safed, Israel on March 10, 2019. Photo: David Cohen.

The dispute over ultra-Orthodox military exemptions has become central to post-election coalition negotiations. Does this conflict expose a broader crisis of citizenship, in which competing religious and secular communities increasingly reject a common understanding of civic obligations and political equality?

Professor Bernard Avishai: Of course. If the opposition, in order to take power, makes a deal with the Haredim, the ultra-Orthodox, and refuses to impose universal schooling and a universal draft on them, it will be another missed opportunity. You have to impose these requirements on the ultra-Orthodox, not only for reasons of civic responsibility but also for the country’s economic future. You can’t have such a large population unqualified to participate in public life.

My fear—and it’s not just my fear—is that if the Haredim are not drawn into the wider world, the problem will extend beyond the question of how citizenship is defined. You’re going to have 100,000, 200,000, or even 300,000 of the country’s most educated people leaving. Many of the global Israelis have opportunities elsewhere. They may have an entrepreneurial company registered in Delaware, or they may head a department of urology, and there’s a need for urologists in Buffalo, New York, or elsewhere. These people have the qualifications to leave and find plenty of opportunities elsewhere.

Israeli Democracy Requires Ending the Occupation

Your writings have consistently linked Israeli democracy to Palestinian self-determination. Could an Eisenkot-led government restore domestic democratic safeguards without substantially changing policies toward Gaza and the West Bank, or is democratic renewal inseparable from ending the occupation?

Professor Bernard Avishai: In the long run, obviously, yes. In order to have a democratic Israel, you ultimately have to end what the occupation has become.

The problem is the phrase “self-determination.” I don’t like that phrase. I don’t like “Jewish self-determination,” and I don’t like “Palestinian self-determination.” It’s hubristic to talk about self-determination in the first place, even on an individual level, let alone a national level. The real questions are: What institutional commitments are you making? What norms do you live by? And how do these allow you to thrive as a human being?

We have to end the occupation of the West Bank. That doesn’t necessarily mean saying, “Oh, we care about our democracy, so let’s get out of the West Bank. Maybe they’ll leave us alone.” That’s not going to happen, and I must tell you, I don’t think it should be that way. In order to redeem Israeli democracy, you’ve got to look for and work with democratic and liberal forces in the Palestinian community and find reciprocal ways of creating political institutions that will allow both sides to have the same rights. In other words, neither side should have rights that the other doesn’t have.

But that doesn’t mean complete independence from one another, because that’s ridiculous. You can’t have complete independence when you’re sharing water, bandwidth, spectrum, sewage systems, epidemiological problems, roads, bridges, and financial services. You have to remember that Israel and Palestine together are basically the size of Greater Los Angeles. So the idea that the two can separate, like Japan separates from Korea or something like that, is preposterous. You can’t have that.

What you need to think about is how each side can have rights and responsibilities that are reciprocal with those of the other society. These are two distinct countries. You live in Brussels; you know what the European Union is. This has to be resolved in ways that, in some respects, draw on what the European Union has taught us.

Do all settlers have to leave the West Bank? I think that any settler who thinks of himself as a violent messianist intent on expanding and oppressing neighboring shepherds and Arab towns should obviously be taken and thrown in jail if necessary. But the idea that all Israelis currently living in the West Bank have to come back?

Or that Palestinians whose families lost their homes in 1948 and who have a claim to a particular piece of land can’t possibly live in the Valley of Jezreel if that land is currently unoccupied?

I’m not saying Palestinians should have a claim to the land underneath the Azrieli Towers in Tel Aviv. I’m just saying that, in individual cases, it’s perfectly reasonable for these people to stay in place. But they’ll stay in place in the way we’ve learned from the European Union: you can be a resident, even a permanent resident, of a country without being a citizen of that country. Palestinians can be residents of Israel without being citizens of Israel. Israelis can be residents of Palestine without being citizens of Palestine. And if an Israeli living in Ma’ale Adumim, across the Green Line, wants to vote in an Israeli election, the drive to the Hebrew University to vote would take about seven minutes. So, let’s remember the scale here.

Democratic Reforms Could Fundamentally Transform Zionism

And finally, Professor Avishai, considering Netanyahuism alongside the experiences of Trump, Erdogan, Orbán, and other populist leaders, what makes Israel’s democratic crisis distinctive? Can electoral alternation dismantle entrenched authoritarian practices and religious-nationalist power structures, or does lasting democratic renewal require a fundamental rethinking of Zionism, citizenship, and Palestinian self-determination?

Professor Bernard Avishai: I think the two will go hand in hand. If a new government in Israel implemented all the reforms I outlined earlier, a rethinking of Zionism would be the natural result. Sometimes, intellectual and ideological change comes from reflecting on realities that you now have to deal with. It’s true, to some extent, that there will be forces in a new government that have already undergone that change, experienced an ideological shift toward a more liberal and secular Zionist ideal, and will use this shift to justify and push for these reforms.

But once the reforms come, they take on a life of their own. They begin to shape people’s expectations. Just look at the civil rights movement in the South. You needed ideological champions. But once you have legal changes and new generations growing up and getting used to new realities, the ideological shift happens more broadly. I don’t know if I’m answering your question, but I feel that the idea that you need to have this sort of revolution in thinking before you can have these new realities is inconsistent with my understanding of how human change happens.

Even on the right, you initially had champions of a certain kind of settlement movement. Then, as the settlements grew and grew, and their footprint in the West Bank became bigger and bigger, this began to shape expectations on the Israeli side more generally. That’s what I was trying to say earlier.

I remember in 1974, when I first saw someone use the term “Judea and Samaria” in a liberal newspaper, Haaretz, without scare quotes. I thought, “Oh, they’re winning.” They’re winning because now we’re talking about these territories as though they’re part of this country, and we’re not even questioning it. We’ve stopped calling them “occupied territories” or “the West Bank” and started calling them “Judea and Samaria.” The same can be true in reverse. You start to address new realities, and those realities begin to shape the ways in which you develop political norms and refine your institutions.

If there is a new government that empowers the judiciary through constitutional reform, with a Basic Law that enshrines the Declaration of Independence and its commitment to full equality irrespective of religion or gender, and if that commitment becomes enshrined in law and the judiciary is given the power to begin reinterpreting laws accordingly, it could have the same impact as Brown v. Board of Education had on the American South.

It doesn’t change things immediately. I mean, Brown v. Board of Education was in 1954. The first Black senator from Mississippi was last night. These things take a lot of time. Consider the confessional school system in Quebec, where Protestants were taught in English and Catholics were taught in French. I grew up in Montreal. I went to the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal because I was learning English. I wasn’t Protestant; I was Jewish. We were sort of honorary Protestants in Montreal. The Quiet Revolution in Quebec began in the 1960s, but the confessional school system was finally ended in 1990. So these things take time. But you’re on the right path when you make a certain shift.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.