In this commentary, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk examines whether recent electoral defeats of authoritarian populists in the United States, Hungary, Brazil, and Serbia signal an emerging democratic counterwave or merely temporary setbacks for populism. Arguing that Trumpism’s electoral defeat does not eliminate the structural conditions that produced it, Professor Ozturk explores how economic inequality, institutional capture, globalization, and technological concentration continue to undermine democratic legitimacy. Drawing on comparative political economy and Daron Acemoglu’s scholarship, he emphasizes the urgency of rebuilding political representation, shared prosperity, and democratic control over technological change. Moreover, he warns that electoral victories alone cannot secure democratic renewal: without credible economic alternatives, institutional reconstruction, and effective governance, authoritarian populism may return in more resilient forms.
By Ibrahim Ozturk
Can electoral defeats in the United States, Hungary, Brazil and Serbia become a genuine democratic counterwave—or will populism return unless its structural causes are addressed? Donald Trump’s resounding defeat in the November 2026 midterm elections, following electoral breakthroughs against authoritarian populists in Hungary, Brazil and Serbia, and partly in Israel, though with significant uncertainties, may mark the beginning of a democratic counterwave. Yet elections can remove or constrain leaders without eliminating the structural conditions that produced them. Unless democratic governments rebuild political representation, state capacity and shared prosperity, today’s victories may pave the way for tomorrow’s populist return.
The Democratic victory was much more than an ordinary shift in the congressional balance of power. By taking control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate—including victories in states and constituencies Trump had carried comfortably only two years earlier—Democrats delivered the most consequential institutional rebuke to Trump since his return to the White House.
According to Reuters’ detailed account of the results, Democrats secured at least 54 Senate seats and gained at least 30 seats in the House. The electoral shift extended well beyond established Democratic territory, reaching deeply Republican states such as Texas, Kansas and South Carolina.
The table reveals the election’s two-sided character. On the one hand, the scale and geographical spread of the Democratic victory make it impossible to dismiss the result as a routine midterm correction. Trump-backed Republicans lost support almost everywhere, including in regions that had recently seemed beyond the Democrats’ reach. The outcome has restored Congress’s capacity to investigate abuses, resist presidential appointments and prevent the legislature from functioning as an extension of the executive branch.
This institutional dimension is especially important given the severity of America’s democratic deterioration. The V-Dem Democracy Report 2026 recorded a 24 percent decline in the United States’ Liberal Democracy Index during the first year of Trump’s second term, with the country falling from twentieth to fifty-first place globally. V-Dem identified legislative constraints as the most severely damaged component of American democracy and described the speed of executive aggrandizement as unprecedented in modern American history.
Against this background, restoring an independently controlled Congress is not merely a partisan change. It reactivates one of the principal constitutional mechanisms capable of constraining executive power. It may block further democratic erosion and create institutional space for recovery. But this is still a lifeline, not a democratic restoration—and certainly not the end of Trumpism. Trump remains in the White House. The institutional damage inflicted on the civil service, judiciary, regulatory agencies, universities, media and wider public sphere has not been reversed. Nor have the economic and cultural grievances that returned him to power in 2024 disappeared. Congressional control may constrain Trump’s room to maneuver, but it cannot by itself rebuild public trust, reverse inequality, or restore the social foundations of liberal democracy.
The second half of the table is therefore as important as the first. The Democrats’ victory was broad, but support for the Democratic Party remains relatively shallow. The Associated Press Voter Poll found that many voters who supported Democratic congressional candidates remained dissatisfied with the party itself. Roughly one-fifth of Democratic voters held an unfavorable view of the party they had just voted for. Many were not endorsing a clear Democratic program; they were looking for an instrument to restrain Trump and punish the incumbent government.
The crucial fact, therefore, is that many of the citizens who punished Trump in 2026 were the same economically and culturally frustrated voters who had punished Joe Biden and the Democrats in 2024. Their movement between the parties reflects neither ideological conversion nor a stable embrace of liberal democracy. It reflects a volatile electorate that repeatedly votes against governments perceived to have failed on prices, employment, security, public services, and political integrity.
The election’s economic geography reinforces this interpretation. Voters who reported serious hardship from inflation and everyday costs moved decisively toward Democratic candidates—even in Republican strongholds. They blamed Trump’s tariffs, the Iran war and the failure to fulfill his promise to reduce prices. Corruption also mattered, particularly the perception that the presidency was being used to advance Trump’s personal, family and corporate interests. The outcome was consequently an accountability vote with two connected elements: a demand to restrain presidential power and a demand for economic delivery. Concentrating only on the first would be a serious mistake.
Congressional investigations into corruption, conflicts of interest and executive abuses are indispensable. But if Democrats define their victory primarily as an authorization to investigate Trump, they may constrain one president without weakening Trumpism. Investigations can expose abuses; they cannot make housing affordable, create career-building employment, rebuild declining regions or give working people greater influence over technological and economic change.The midterms should therefore be interpreted neither as a final defeat for American populism nor merely as a temporary anti-incumbent swing. They represent a narrow but historic window in which democratic forces can move from anti-Trump resistance to democratic reconstruction.
Whether this opening becomes a lasting realignment will depend on what Democrats do with their new institutional power. If they combine constitutional accountability with a credible programme addressing affordability, inequality, good jobs, regional decline and technological disruption, the election may become the starting point of a more durable democratic counterwave. If they return to technocratic incrementalism or assume that Trump’s personal unpopularity has solved the problem, the same electorate may swing back in 2028.
The central lesson is therefore not that American populism has been defeated. It is that Trump has become electorally vulnerable because he failed to deliver on the grievances that originally brought him back to power. Those grievances remain politically available. The question is now whether democratic government can finally address them before another authoritarian populist does.
Daron Acemoglu is right to warn that the most difficult work begins after the electoral victory. As he argues in What Happened to Liberal Democracy?, liberal democracy prospered when it was associated with shared prosperity, political voice, social mobility and the broad distribution of opportunity. It entered crisis when liberalism detached from these social foundations and became increasingly associated with technocracy, globalization, and the priorities of highly educated metropolitan elites.
If Democrats cannot respond to extreme inequality, the affordability crisis and the disappearance of secure, career-building employment—especially for workers without university degrees—the political pendulum may swing back in 2028. Neither an exclusive reliance on taxes and transfers, nor centrist attachment to the pre-Trump status quo, nor the fashionable expectation that AI-driven “abundance” will automatically resolve distributive conflict offers an adequate response.
This is precisely why the American midterm result deserves greater attention than a conventional anti-incumbent election. It creates an institutional barrier against Trump’s authoritarian ambitions, but it also places Democrats under an obligation to demonstrate that pluralist democracy can govern and deliver. If they use their congressional majority mainly to investigate Trump while failing to articulate a credible economic and social program, they may constrain him temporarily while inadvertently preparing the next Trump—or a younger, more capable successor.
In my ECPS commentary “Trump and the New Capitalism: Old Wine in New Bottle,” I argued that Trumpism 2.0 represents more than nationalist rhetoric or protectionist trade policy. It combines economic nationalism, corporate oligarchy, technological concentration and elements of digital feudalism. State power is not withdrawn from the economy; it is reorganized to serve politically connected corporations, dominant technology platforms and favored economic interests. The 2026 vote has interrupted this project, but it has not dismantled the political economy that sustains it.
The American result forms part of a wider sequence of authoritarian-populist reversals. In Hungary, the Tisza Party ended Viktor Orbán’s sixteen-year rule and secured a constitutional supermajority. According to the detailed 2026 Hungarian election analysis published by the Institut für Europäische Politik, Tisza won 53.29 percent of party-list votes and 138 of the National Assembly’s 199 seats.
In Serbia, the student-backed opposition movement that emerged from protests following the Novi Sad railway-station disaster defeated Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling alliance. Reuters reported that the movement received 52.7 percent of the vote and secured 139 of the 250 parliamentary seats.
In Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeated Flávio Bolsonaro, although the narrow margin confirmed that Bolsonarismo remains deeply embedded in Brazilian political and social life. As Professor James N. Green warned in an ECPS interview conducted after the election, the Brazilian far right has lost a battle, not the wider political struggle. It retains conservative congressional support, religious networks, digital mobilization capacity and a substantial electorate.
Israel provides a more qualified case. Benjamin Netanyahu’s nationalist-religious bloc won only 53 of the Knesset’s 120 seats, but the process of forming a government remains unresolved. Netanyahu’s parliamentary position has been severely weakened, but it would be premature to describe this as a completed transfer of power.
Taken together, these developments justify speaking cautiously of a democratic counterwave. They show that elections, civic mobilization, coordinated opposition and institutional resistance can still constrain leaders who appeared politically invincible. But they do not demonstrate that authoritarian populism has been ideologically defeated.
In “Populist Attacks on Institutions as a Reaction to Hyper-globalization,” I argued that populist attacks on independent institutions cannot be understood separately from the economic and social dislocations produced by unmanaged globalization. Financial crises, regional decline, inequality, declining social mobility, and the perception that national governments have lost control over economic outcomes generate both demand for populism and the political opportunities populist entrepreneurs exploit.
This argument is consistent with Dani Rodrik’s research on the relationship between globalization and right-wing populism, and with Sergei Guriev and Elias Papaioannou’s extensive study of the political economy of populism. Economic shocks do not translate mechanically into populist politics. They operate through perceptions of status, cultural displacement, political exclusion, and the failure of representative institutions. In “Capitalist Disruptions and the Democratic Retreat: A US–EU–China Comparison,” I developed this argument further by describing a process of authoritarian convergence. Liberal democracies and explicitly authoritarian systems remain different, but widening inequality, technological surveillance, corporate concentration, regulatory capture, and weakened public institutions are narrowing parts of the practical distance between them.The result is a political paradox. Governments remain formally democratic, but citizens increasingly experience economic decisions as matters over which they exercise little meaningful influence. Elections continue, but changing the government does not necessarily alter the underlying distribution of economic power.
The political damage was compounded by the way globalization was governed. Trade integration generated large aggregate gains, but governments too often treated the workers, firms and regions bearing the adjustment costs as if they would automatically move into new and better employment. Autor, Dorn and Hanson’s research on the China shock found that import-exposed local labor markets experienced persistent falls in employment, wages and labor-force participation, while their later work linked greater trade exposure to political polarization. The OECD Employment Outlook 2026 reaches a similar conclusion across advanced economies: the benefits of openness were real, but the losses were geographically concentrated and often endured for years. The resulting backlash was therefore not simply an irrational rejection of trade. It was also a reaction to governments that liberalized markets without constructing adequate mechanisms for regional renewal, worker adjustment, social insurance and political voice.
China’s current growth model has intensified this distributive problem. China is neither the sole cause of Western deindustrialization nor merely an economic threat; its growth has enlarged world trade and accelerated the diffusion of affordable green technologies. Yet weak domestic consumption, state-directed credit, large industrial subsidies, and manufacturing overinvestment now create asymmetric competitive pressure that open market economies cannot ignore. The IMF’s 2025 Article IV consultation warns that export-led adjustment and unwarranted industrial-policy support are producing excess supply and adverse spillovers for trading partners, while the European Commission has documented extensive state-induced distortions and unfair subsidization in strategic sectors. The democratic answer cannot be indiscriminate protectionism, which would raise prices and deepen fragmentation. But passivity would accelerate industrial erosion and feed populist claims that elected governments have surrendered control. A credible response requires rules-based trade defense, reciprocity in market access, coordinated industrial and competition policy, place-based investment and pressure for China to rebalance towards domestic consumption rather than exporting its internal imbalances.
Yet such pressure will be ineffective if exercised through a fragmented, transactional multipolar order in which major powers rely on unilateral tariffs and competing economic blocs. Bringing China closer to fair play requires rebuilding an open, inclusive and enforceable multilateral order, supported by reformed WTO rules on industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises, excess capacity and reciprocal market access. Trump’s electoral defeat should therefore be understood not only as a setback for authoritarian populism, but also as a strategic opportunity to move beyond unilateral protectionism and toward renewed multilateral order and cooperation. If democratic governments use this opening to construct a fairer international system that reconciles openness with social protection, industrial resilience and democratic accountability, they may simultaneously address China’s distortive practices and the domestic grievances on which Trumpism and related populist movements thrive.
Under these conditions, authoritarian populism becomes a distorted form of democratic protest. Citizens support leaders who promise to recover sovereignty and political control, even when those leaders subsequently use that mandate to dismantle the institutions that make democratic correction possible.
Why Some Populists Lose—and Others Survive Failure
The emerging counterwave supports a first proposition: where electoral competition remains meaningful, authoritarian populists who govern badly may eventually be punished. Populists promise that concentrating authority will enable them to break institutional deadlock and deliver rapid results. Once in office, however, many generate corruption, patronage, inflation, declining services, administrative incompetence, and international isolation. When the discrepancy between rhetoric and performance becomes sufficiently visible, even formerly loyal voters may abandon them.
But this mechanism operates only where opposition forces can organize, voters can obtain independent information, and electoral authorities, courts, and security institutions have not been completely subordinated.My comparative study “Confronting Populist Authoritarians: The Dynamics of Lula’s Success in Brazil and Erdogan’s Survival in Turkey” demonstrated why similar economic and political failures can produce different outcomes. Lula’s broad democratic coalition defeated Bolsonaro, though it could not eliminate Bolsonarismo. In Turkey, Erdogan’s institutional capture, control over resources and capacity to fragment the opposition insulated him from the consequences of economic failure.
This leads to a second and more troubling proposition: where a populist leader has captured the state, failure may produce intensified authoritarianism rather than electoral defeat. In “A Lesson from Turkey: Economic Crises as Steppingstones, but Not Exit Routes for Authoritarian Populists,” I argued that economic crises may help populists enter power without subsequently providing an exit route from populist rule. Once leaders have captured the judiciary, media, bureaucracy, security apparatus, and mechanisms for distributing state resources, poor economic performance ceases to be sufficient to remove them.
Leaders who fear prosecution, loss of wealth or exposure of wrongdoing acquire powerful personal incentives to prevent alternation in power. The more offenses committed in consolidating the regime, the more dangerous surrendering office becomes. The regime’s failures therefore deepen its dependence on repression.Turkey illustrates this danger. Freedom House’s 2026 assessment documents the consolidation of power through constitutional engineering, institutional capture and the imprisonment of opponents, journalists and civil-society representatives.
My more recent analysis, “Stealing from the Future,” shows how such a regime may use fiscal transfers, public procurement, credit and inflation to purchase present political support by transferring the costs to future taxpayers. Economic policy becomes a technology of political survival rather than an instrument of long-term development. Consequently, no mechanical sequence in which the defeats of Trump, Orbán, Bolsonaro or Vučić necessarily predict the fall of Erdogan or Narendra Modi. Democratic openings can spread confidence, but national outcomes depend on the depth of institutional capture, the credibility of opposition forces and whether electoral punishment remains possible.
The Acemoglu Challenge: Redirecting Technological Change
The struggle over artificial intelligence will be critical to whether the American midterm victory develops into a durable democratic realignment. An ECPS long read, “The Economist versus Acemoglu: Who Will Govern the Next World Order?”, argues that the controversy surrounding Acemoglu is not simply a dispute over AI productivity. It concerns who directs technological change, who captures its gains, and whether democracy can discipline concentrations of corporate power that markets have themselves created. Acemoglu, David Autor and Simon Johnson’s proposal for “Building Pro-Worker AI” distinguishes technologies that complement workers and create new human tasks from technologies principally designed to replace labor. Acemoglu’s related intervention in Nature warns against organizing the entire technological agenda around artificial general intelligence and the automation of human capabilities.
If AI intensifies workplace surveillance, displaces labor and concentrates income among a few technology companies, it will aggravate precisely the inequalities and insecurities that nourish authoritarian populism. A democratic strategy must instead use public procurement, research funding, competition policy, worker participation and taxation to redirect innovation toward augmenting human capabilities and creating socially valuable employment.This is where the political meaning of Trump’s midterm defeat will ultimately be determined.
Congressional investigations and institutional checks are necessary, but they cannot substitute for a new governing philosophy centered on productive employment, affordable housing and healthcare, regional regeneration, technological democracy and the reconstruction of worker power.
After Victory Comes Democratic Delivery
Democratic successors must restore legality without producing institutional paralysis. They must dismantle state capture without replacing it with partisan revenge. They must defend pluralism while demonstrating that pluralist democracy can govern, coordinate and deliver. The current electoral reversals are therefore openings rather than conclusions. The V-Dem Democracy Report 2026 finds that nearly three-quarters of the world’s population lives under autocratic rule and that democracy, for the average global citizen, has returned approximately to its 1978 level. Only eighteen countries are currently democratizing, while nearly a quarter of the world’s states are undergoing autocratization.
The American midterm victory is therefore historic, but its meaning remains unsettled. It may mark the beginning of democratic reconstruction. Equally, it may be another swing of the electoral pendulum, driven by an electorate that remains economically insecure, politically unrepresented, and willing to experiment repeatedly with anti-establishment alternatives.
If democratic governments cannot address these structural grievances, authoritarian populism will return—perhaps under younger, more disciplined and more competent leaders who have learned from the failures of Trump, Orbán and Bolsonaro. Winning an election can remove or constrain an authoritarian government. Only democratic delivery can weaken the economic, institutional and cultural conditions that continually reproduce authoritarian populism.
In this analysis, Dr. Prerna Chahar, Research Consultant at the Chintan Research Foundation in New Delhi, examines the political and institutional implications of the November 3, 2026, US midterm elections. With Democrats capturing both chambers of Congress, the results represent a significant setback for President Donald Trump, reshaping legislative priorities, congressional oversight, and executive-legislative relations. Dr. Chahar explores how economic discontent, inflation, tariff policies, and the US-Iran war contributed to Republican losses while raising questions about Trumpism’s future and the Republican Party’s political identity. She argues that the elections constitute a critical test of democratic accountability, institutional checks and balances, and political polarization, with consequences extending beyond Washington to global security, international partnerships, and America’s geopolitical leadership.
By Dr. Prerna Chahar*
The American midterm elections are often seen as a referendum on the incumbent president. But the Nov. 3, 2026, elections have proven that they are far more than just a regular election. It’s not just about who occupies the seats in Congress. It’s about who sets the legislative agenda, who provides oversight of the White House, and how much room President Donald Trump has to pursue his domestic and international ambitions in the last two years of his second term.
The results represent a major political blow to the Republicans. The Democrats took control of both houses of Congress, flipping the Republican majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate. The question, therefore, is no longer simply who won the elections. It is what this outcome means for American democracy, Trump’s political authority, the Republican Party’s future.
A Referendum on Trump: The Politics of Public Discontent
Midterm elections have historically been tough for the party in the White House, with losses in Congress. With two exceptions, the president’s party has lost ground in every midterm election since World War II. But the size of the 2026 Democratic gains suggests more than the typical electoral penalty applied to an incumbent administration.
The economy became a defining issue. Inflation, rising living costs, fuel prices and fears of economic uncertainty have shaped voters’ opinions. The Republican campaign was also complicated by Trump’s tariff policies and the economic fall-out from the US-Iran war. A central focus of public anger was the administration’s decision to strike Iran in February 2026 and the subsequent rise in fuel prices. Voters also expressed concern about corruption, executive power and the way the administration governed.
The election also exposed the limits of presidential popularity as a substitute for good governance. Trump’s political influence has remained central to the Republican Party, but the results indicate that presidential endorsements and campaign rallies cannot necessarily insulate congressional candidates from dissatisfaction with the administration.
The scale of participation is equally significant. Preliminary estimates suggest that approximately 122.7 million ballots had been counted, representing around 48.8 percent of the eligible population. It was the second-highest midterm turnout in more than a century, behind only the record of 2018. That turnout suggests voters saw the election as meaningful for the country’s political future.
The Congressional Arithmetic: A New Political Reality
The most immediate consequence of the Democratic victory is institutional. Control of Congress determines much more than the passage of legislation. It determines committee leadership, congressional investigations, budgetary negotiations, confirmation processes and the ability to scrutinize executive decisions.
By January 2027, Democrats will have control of Congress, and the legislative landscape will be very different for the administration. The House can investigate, can subpoena officials to testify, and can look over federal spending. The Senate has constitutional authority over presidential nominations and appointments.
The new Democratic majority also keeps House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries in the race to become the first Black Speaker of the House. His leadership will be tested by the challenge of balancing progressive demands with the priorities of moderate Democrats, particularly on taxation, immigration, healthcare and economic policy.
However, a Democratic-controlled Congress does not mean that Trump has lost executive authority. The president retains the power to veto legislation, direct executive agencies and exercise considerable discretion in foreign affairs. Democrats would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers to override a presidential veto, which they do not possess.
The result, therefore, is not a transfer of presidential power but a redistribution of institutional leverage. The next two years could bring legislative gridlock, vigorous oversight by Congress and new debates over the constitutional boundaries of executive power.
Beyond the Ballot: What’s at Stake?
The election offers Republicans a chance to answer fundamental questions about political identity and leadership. The party has to ask whether its electoral strategy has become too closely tied to the personality and political agenda of Trump.
The results could feed internal tensions between traditional conservatives, populist supporters and Republican lawmakers worried about the party’s future electoral prospects. Vice President JD Vance and other possible Republican leaders also will be asked about the party’s direction leading into the 2028 presidential election.
But it would be premature to read the results as the death of Trumpism. His political base is still an important constituency, and the Republican Party still has considerable clout in state governments and conservative political networks. The question is whether the midterm loss is because people are unhappy with specific policies, the president’s style of governing, or a general change in what voters want.
A Test of American Democracy
The 2026 midterm elections are ultimately about how American democratic institutions function. The US constitutional system includes important elements of separation of powers, congressional oversight, and electoral accountability. Split politics can result in legislative paralysis, but it can also strengthen institutional checks and balances.
The results created a difficult political landscape for Trump in his remaining two years in office. For Democrats they provide congressional power but also the obligation to show that electoral victories can be translated into effective governance.
For the international community, the result is one more piece in an uncertain geopolitical landscape. India’s strategic partnership with the United States, European security, the Indo-Pacific balance of power and Washington’s approach towards global conflicts will all be influenced, to varying degrees, by the new congressional dynamics.
The larger lesson is that American elections are never exclusively domestic events. Decisions taken in Washington affect global markets, diplomatic relationships, security partnerships and international institutions.
But beyond the ballot, a more consequential question looms: Can America’s political institutions reconcile competing visions of national power, democratic accountability, and global responsibility? The 2026 midterms shifted the balance of power in Congress. What Washington does next will determine if they too change the course of American politics and its relationship to the world.
(*) Dr. Prerna Chahar is a Research Consultant at the Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi, India. Her research interests focus on US foreign policy, inter-American relations, and regional cooperation in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific.
In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. Filip Balunović, Research Fellow at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, examines Serbia’s student-led democratic transformation following the October 2026 elections. Arguing that the Students’ List’s parliamentary victory represents more than regime change, he declares that “the idea of a new society has won.” Dr. Balunović explores how a leaderless movement transformed collective grief into political power through nonviolent resistance, grassroots mobilization, and direct democratic practices. He also analyzes how a left-wing populist strategy challenged Vučić’s authoritarian rule while overcoming ideological and ethnic divisions. Yet he cautions that dismantling entrenched oligarchic networks and sustaining participatory democracy remain crucial challenges for Serbia’s democratic future.
Serbia has witnessed an extraordinary political transformation. What began as student-led protests following the deadly Novi Sad railway station collapse in November 2024 evolved into a nationwide movement challenging Aleksandar Vučić’s populist authoritarianism, institutional capture, and entrenched patronage networks. Through decentralized organization, civil disobedience, and unprecedented civic mobilization, students transformed public indignation into electoral power, securing a parliamentary majority in October 2026 and ending fourteen years of SNS dominance. Yet profound questions remain about democratic institutionalization and the durability of this transformation.
In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Filip Balunović, Research Fellow at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, and Assistant Professor at Singidunum University’s Faculty of Media and Communications, examines the democratic significance of Serbia’s student-led political transformation. Moving beyond conventional interpretations of electoral alternation, Dr. Balunović argues that the movement represents a more fundamental challenge to personalized authoritarianism and established political representation. As he observes, “This is not merely a regime change,” emphasizing that the movement’s unprecedented success demonstrates that “the idea of a new society has won.”
Central to this transformation, Dr. Balunović explains, was the movement’s capacity to turn collective mourning into political agency. Following the Novi Sad tragedy, students transformed grief into nationwide resistance through nonviolent mobilization, university occupations, grassroots engagement, and direct democratic decision-making. Their leaderless organization challenged conventional assumptions about political leadership, demonstrating what he describes as “an enviable level of democratic maturity.”
The movement also reconfigured the boundaries of political contestation. According to Dr. Balunović, “right-wing populism was challenged through a left-wing populist strategy,” as students mobilized citizens across ideological, ethnic, and religious divisions. Unlike established opposition parties, they reached neglected communities and built political trust through participatory practices rather than charismatic leadership. Their achievement, he suggests, extended beyond electoral victory: “The students transformed grief into joy,” cultivating a collective imagination of a different democratic future.
Nevertheless, the transition from mobilization to governance presents formidable challenges. Entrenched oligarchic networks, institutional capture, and the potential reproduction of personalized leadership threaten the durability of democratic change. Dr. Balunović emphasizes that the movement’s direct democratic practices must continue to shape political accountability beyond the elections.
In sum, Serbia’s experience raises broader questions about democratic renewal and anti-authoritarian resistance. While cautioning that “one size doesn’t fit all contexts,” Dr. Balunović suggests that the Serbian experiment could inspire societies confronting similar challenges. Its significance lies not only in defeating an entrenched ruling party but also in demonstrating that democratic alternatives can emerge through collective political practice, civic solidarity, and the willingness to imagine a different society.
Here is our interview with Dr. Filip Balunović, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
Serbian Students’ Electoral Victory Goes Beyond Regime Change
Students and citizens protest against corruption and the Serbian government in Novi Sad, Serbia, on February 1, 2025. Photo: Srdjan Randjelovic / Dreamstime.
Dr. Balunović, welcome! In your recent New York Times essay, you framed Serbia’s student movement as a David-and-Goliath confrontation with Aleksandar Vučić’s entrenched political machine. Following the Students’ List’s parliamentary victory on October 25, how do you interpret this outcome? Does it represent a decisive rupture with populist authoritarianism or primarily an electoral defeat for the SNS?
Dr. Filip Balunović: Hopefully, it will be a long-lasting change. When we talk about challenging and contesting authoritarian leaders, we usually focus simply on regime change before elections. However, this is not merely a regime change. What we have witnessed in Serbia and the wider region of Yugoslavia, but also at the European level, is something historic in so many respects. No one expected such an easy victory. The Students’ List actually won an absolute majority in the Serbian Parliament.
Many commentators have noted that this is probably the first time a social movement that decided to run against an authoritarian leader has defeated not only that leader and the corrupt ruling elite but also the opposition. None of the opposition lists actually managed to enter Parliament. The only two lists that succeeded were the so-called Students’ List and the list of the former president, Vučić.
An interesting part of the story is also the way in which they secured this victory. As you mentioned in your introduction, the struggle has lasted for two years. The student movement started as a social actor. Initially, the students mobilized in grief following the deadly collapse at the railway station in Novi Sad, Serbia’s second-largest city. But slowly, step by step, they somehow managed to translate this grief into a political force that ultimately defeated the authoritarian ruler. They applied direct democratic methods in their decision-making process and remained committed to them until the very end.
As you probably know, everyone was talking about this leaderless movement. Unlike many other cases, for instance, in Hungary or other countries where a recognizable figure emerged before the wider public, in this case, we had only a student movement and a wave of contestation composed not only of students but also of broader citizens’ initiatives. We can say, therefore, that the idea of a new society has won.
The path that an idea must follow before becoming reality is, of course, a long one. Now that the system has collapsed, we can see that, in the meantime, there have been some arrests and major turbulence in both the political system and society. We can now say that this first, necessary, and inevitable step has been taken. But whether Serbian society is ready to become a true avant-garde in the democratic world, in my view, remains to be seen in the coming months and even years.
Direct Democracy Rebuilt Trust Where Opposition Parties Failed
The Students’ List reportedly secured approximately 53% of the vote and a parliamentary majority, ending fourteen years of SNS dominance. What explains the movement’s ability to achieve what established opposition parties repeatedly failed to accomplish? Was this fundamentally an electoral realignment, a crisis of regime legitimacy, or the culmination of long-term counter-hegemonic mobilization?
Dr. Filip Balunović: All the factors you just mentioned played a role, probably in combination. It’s very difficult, even for me as a researcher of social movements, to say, “Okay, this was the decisive factor, and the others simply followed.”But I would say that 14 years of rule using such techniques was simply too much. The techniques of rule were really cruel—cruel towards the political community, the public, and free opinion. What we saw was an attempt to reinvent the way we think about politics itself.
What the opposition parties failed to understand in the past was that the only way to contest a regime with such strong and powerful propaganda machinery was to really get down to the people, talk to them, and convince them that change was possible. Most people—and this is something the former president championed—had become convinced that more or less all politicians were the same. There was also widespread disappointment with opposition politicians, and a lack of trust in political parties had become omnipresent among the Serbian public over the past decade and a half.
Looking back at this approach to politics, the students had a campaign called “A Student in Every Village.” They reached even the smallest towns and villages in the country, something no opposition actor had ever done. In retrospect, you can see that this was the only way.
If we think in terms of populism, which I assume is what interests you most, I would say that right-wing populism was challenged through a left-wing populist strategy. The ruling SNS was a catch-all interest group. I wouldn’t even call it a party because it was really an interest group in which various actors, individuals, and groups found it in their interest to participate in the regime.
On the other side, the students realized that they needed the widest possible support to overthrow such a regime. You couldn’t achieve this in conventional ideological or political terms. You couldn’t do it through purely left-wing or purely right-wing politics, let alone through classical liberal means.
Even though the demands of the student movement initially, and later of the Students’ List as a political actor, were liberal—they were talking about the rule of law and institutions doing their jobs properly—what was a game changer was the process itself: the direct democratic process. People participated not only in campaigning and, ultimately, voting, but there were also genuine attempts to ask people what they thought and to make sense of the political process before the election.
This is why mobilization was so widespread, both within the country and in the diaspora. Only three years ago, around 30,000 people in the diaspora had registered to vote. This time, the number was above 100,000. The diaspora also played a very important role in motivating people, producing videos in which they said, “Okay, if I travel 1,000 kilometers to vote, why wouldn’t you vote in Serbia if your polling station is just a couple of meters away from your home?”
There was also this populist strategy. If we refer to Laclau and Mouffe’s understanding of populism as a left-wing strategy, which was later applied by the Indignados and Podemos in Spain and Mediterranean Europe, there was this division framed, as I remember it in Spain, as pueblo versus casta—the people against the casta, or the elite. In the Serbian case, it was Serbia versus mafia.
This strategy actually worked. It unified people from across the ideological spectrum. You could find liberals, far-leftists, even extreme right-wingers, and even some people who used to be close to the former president, Vučić. But the line running through this political space and political endeavor was the line dividing society, the state, fair electoral conditions, and the proper way in which a political community should be governed, on the one hand, from the mafia and the corrupt regime, on the other.
Students Overcame Divisions That Theory Has Struggled to Resolve
Students and citizens protest against government corruption in Zrenjanin, Serbia, on January 25, 2026, demanding justice and accountability for the 16 victims of the tragic railway station canopy collapse in Novi Sad. Photo: Dreamstime.
Vučić’s political system combined personalized leadership, electoral competition, patronage networks, media influence, and institutional capture. How would you conceptualize this regime theoretically—as competitive authoritarianism, populist autocracy, or another form of hybrid rule? Which mechanisms proved most vulnerable to sustained civic resistance?
Dr. Filip Balunović: This regime can be described in different terms, and, of course, it contains elements of each of the categories you just mentioned. For years, European scholars have talked about so-called façade democracy, with authoritarian and autocratic characteristics. What we sometimes risk when discussing autocracy—and this was definitely an autocracy, with one dominant figure and everyone else far below him—is underestimating the power of the oligarchy behind the autocratic ruler. So, these elements need to be considered together. Of course, there is right-wing populism, although I’m hesitant to use the term. Populism as a concept was theoretically developed by left-wing authors, and I see it as a political strategy with clear ways of creating divisions and political cleavages.
The Serbian case illustrates what Umberto Eco discusses in relation to eternal fascism: the simplification of syntax and the creation of clear-cut divisions. There is also the Schmittian understanding of politics as a matter of friends and enemies. This is something Vučić mastered throughout his political career, not just over the past 14 years. Whenever he finds himself in trouble, he starts talking about enemies, both domestic and foreign. This was also the case before these elections.
He accused students of being instruments of foreign secret services. Even on election night, without being asked who had won the elections, he raised the question himself: “So, who won the elections in Serbia? The American Deep State.” He was referring to civil society in the United States, the same civil society that, in his words, is working against Trump. This was the framework within which he operated. But it doesn’t come as a surprise. In the 1990s, Vučić was very active in spreading war propaganda within the Milošević regime, and this is something that never stopped.
One of the students’ greatest achievements at the social level—and hopefully this will also translate into the political level—was overcoming the ethnic, national, and religious divisions that are so prevalent and dominant in the Balkans, particularly in the post-Yugoslav region. They did this by integrating, for instance, the Sandžak region, which is predominantly populated by Muslims who, since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, have never felt fully integrated into Serbian society, let alone the Serbian political community.
Students managed to cut across all these divisions. Symbolically—and we know how important symbolism is in political life—they established connections and rebuilt trust between students from other parts of Serbia and those from the Sandžak region. This really resonated with many people.
Interestingly, this did not follow the established theoretical and conceptual approaches to dealing with the past, including everything we have discussed since the 1990s: transitional justice, overcoming ethnic and national divisions, and so on. They didn’t talk much about these issues. They simply did it.
In a way, the practice of the student movement managed to resolve something that theory has struggled to resolve for decades in the Balkans.
Silence Functioned as an Absolute Equalizer
The movement transformed the Novi Sad tragedy into nationwide resistance through university occupations, commemorative silence, road blockades, long-distance marches, and civil disobedience. Which protest tactics were most consequential in undermining Vučić’s political legitimacy, and how did their effectiveness evolve over nearly two years?
Dr. Filip Balunović: From an academic perspective, there have been several waves of contestation and mobilization in Serbia over the past two decades. The student movement belongs to a wave of contestation rooted in grief. In 2023, there were two major mass shootings in Belgrade and its suburbs, including a school shooting in the very heart of Belgrade, when a 13-year-old boy killed his fellow pupils and a security guard at a primary school. Another mass shooting took place the following day in villages near Belgrade.
That was the first time citizens came out, took to the streets, and adopted the tactic of silence. Silence functioned as an absolute equalizer. When you stand together in grief and silence, you feel a sense of unity despite the ideological differences among the people standing in the street. Silence was also one of the main repertoires of action following the collapse of the railway station in Novi Sad. But the difficult part came when those who had remained silent were expected to speak out, and all the differences among them had to be put on the table.
Nonviolent Resistance Became a Cathartic Moment for Serbian Democracy
This will be studied in the literature on social movements for decades to come: how to translate grief into something politically potent. This is a difficult endeavor and a very sensitive issue. Of course, the government made numerous accusations of misusing and politicizing the tragedy. You really need patience, and you need to remain calm. You need very good organization, as well as organizational development, to overcome these challenges. This is what the students managed to achieve by occupying their universities, using sit-ins and occupation tactics as repertoires of action.
The direct democratic decision-making process also functioned as a unifier. Regardless of what students—whether left-wing, right-wing, or liberal—thought about particular political issues, they were united, first, in grief and, second, in accepting the decision-making bodies they had established. This played a crucial role.
I should also mention an earlier wave of contestation in Serbia: the ecological mobilizations against the Rio Tinto project and lithium mining in western Serbia. This mobilization also cut across ideological differences. There was almost absolute unanimity among Serbian citizens in opposing the ecological threats associated with lithium mining, and the government eventually gave up under enormous pressure. So, there were earlier steps that brought us to the point where this kind of trans-ideological mobilization, or populist mobilization in left-wing terms, became possible.
The diffusion of direct democratic decision-making processes from universities to other parts of society also played a crucial role. At some point, the students—who were tired all the time—felt that they needed support. This is why they invited citizens to organize the so-called zborovi, or citizens’ assemblies, at the neighborhood level. These zborovi continued functioning until the very end, and they still function today.
This is indeed a cathartic moment for Serbian democracy. Another important factor, especially in light of what we are now witnessing in France, Albania, other parts of Europe, and elsewhere in the world, is that this was a purely nonviolent movement. There were virtually no incidents—around 90% of those that did occur, including clashes with the police, were either orchestrated by the state or were isolated incidents that took place here and there.
It is really a miracle that such a regime was defeated without a single victim, apart from, unfortunately, the 16 people who died in the collapse of the railway station in Novi Sad. This is really something spectacular, if you ask me.
Leaderless Movement Challenges the Iron Law of Oligarchy
President of the Peoples Republic of China Xi Jinping on an official visit to the Republic of Serbia, at the invitation of President of Republic of Serbia, Belgrade on June 19, 2016. Photo: Golden Brown.
In your New York Times essay, you describe the student-led candidate selection process as an extraordinary experiment in direct democracy. How did decentralized plenums and collective leadership challenge Serbia’s personalized political culture? Can these participatory practices survive the transition from protest mobilization to parliamentary government?
Dr. Filip Balunović: I wish I had a clear answer to that question: how they survived and managed to remain committed to this leaderless logic. Just the other day, I listened to one of the student activists talking about this, and they continue to insist: “We don’t need new leaders.” In the political world, we are conditioned to think that politics without leadership is impossible. But it’s really a miracle that, after two years of the student movement, not a single faction has broken away, even among those who disagreed with some of the decisions made by the plenums. I spoke to many students who said, “We disagreed with a good number of decisions, but we felt good because we knew that the process behind these decisions was the right one.”
They really demonstrated an enviable level of democratic maturity. Vučić attacked them for being inexperienced, claiming that they didn’t know how to run the state. But they demonstrated something else: they were responding—I don’t know whether consciously—to the unfulfilled promises of representative democracy. It was similar to the European revolutions of 1848, which responded to the unfulfilled promises of the French Revolution: “You promised us universal voting rights. You promised us that we would all be able to vote, and you failed.”
In a sense, there is also this alienation of the political elite after every election. Representative democracy makes sense, especially in larger political communities, but it also has many shortcomings. Serbia is not a big state, obviously. The direct democratic method worked, and, importantly, people started believing in it. They became convinced that this was the right way, and I would even dare to say that it was the only way to regain trust and make a political actor, in this case the Students’ List, trustworthy.
This is also why electoral turnout was so high. It was around 70%, something that had never happened before. There was a comparable level on October 5, when Milošević was overthrown, but such high turnout is really rare, even at the global level.
Even now, we are speaking at a moment when we still don’t have names for the ministerial positions. We still don’t know who will become prime minister or who the presidential candidate will be, because the presidential election should, if I’m not mistaken, be called by the end of this month and held by the end of the year. Of course, the public is now wondering about names, but this shift has already taken place. Instead of the 250 candidates on the Students’ List, we could easily have had another 250 names, and I’m certain the outcome would have been the same. This is a true political novelty.
Of course, the inevitable next step is that we will have ministers, a prime minister, and people responsible for different areas. Naturally, the public will discuss these individuals. But these people should remain aware that it’s not about them. There is always a risk here—the iron law of oligarchy. It happens in every organization, let alone a political organization.
But this time, the process behind it is different. It’s not merely an appeal or a slogan: “It’s not about me, it’s about you. You, the people, brought me to this.” No, this is no longer an empty phrase. It’s really the process and the underlying logic that have a great chance of preventing future state officials from behaving as if they’re alone in the world. The student movement will remain and keep an eye on what they do. This time, it will not only be the student movement but the entire public.
The Students’ Experiment Comes Closest to the Ideal of Democracy
In your study “Social Movements as Producers and Receivers of Knowledge,” you conceptualize movements as producers of political knowledge rather than merely vehicles for existing ideas. What new democratic knowledge, organizational practices, and political imaginaries has Serbia’s student movement generated, and how might these reshape representative democracy?
Dr. Filip Balunović: I touched on this earlier, but perhaps I could elaborate. I studied this relationship in my PhD and later in my book, Revival of the Left in the Balkans. I have always been interested in the interaction between ideas and social and political practice, or activism. I always try to identify which theories and concepts resonate with particular social or political movements. But then, of course, there is the Gramscian concept of organic intellectuals. It’s not only about activists or political practitioners taking existing concepts and theoretical insights and applying them to reality. It’s also about creating new ideas and theories through practice itself.
In this specific case, most of the concepts and findings we have come from practice itself. I’m not entirely happy with this because, as a researcher, I believe—perhaps naively—that people tend to read, try to conceptualize reality, engage in some activity, and then attempt to adapt or find a middle ground between theory and practice.
This time, I’m afraid, things were different. Of course, the students were aware of earlier direct democratic practices, both in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. But this political experiment—and this is what I wrote about in my New York Times piece—in which plenums, as direct democratic decision-making bodies, select future MPs, is unprecedented.
The process was really demanding. It lasted over a year. Every faculty suggested two or three names, followed by discussions. Each faculty or university had veto power. Participants presented their arguments about why a particular candidate should not be on the list, followed by further discussion. If no consensus emerged, they voted.
For instance, two prominent figures, both professors, were seen as frontrunners for the Students’ List. One was the rector of the University of Belgrade, and the other was a conservative professor, also from the University of Belgrade. Vučić’s regime focused on these two names because they didn’t know whom else to attack. But what eventually happened was that neither of them appeared on the list.
The point is that you never know—no one actually knows, including the students themselves—what the outcome of the process will be. The outcome is uncertain and does not depend on existing power relations. Of course, if you observe the plenum as an arena, there are inevitably power relations, but these are relatively minor power relations among students.
We want to believe that the strength of the argument wins. We all know that, even in direct democratic processes, this is not always the case. But this is the closest we can get to the ideal of democracy at this moment.
If I were you, the international public, I would really grab some popcorn and watch what happens next. I have no doubt that the student movement and the Students’ List will surprise us again. There are already some names circulating in public: “Okay, this person will be prime minister, this person will be minister of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, etc.” But I wouldn’t be surprised if our guesses turned out to be completely wrong again.
Authenticity and Honesty Became the Students’ Defining Message
Your research on opposition activism and the attention economy examines how movements compete with powerful political organizations for public visibility. How did students overcome Serbia’s pro-government media environment through humor, digital communication, grassroots networks, and direct engagement with citizens? Did their rejection of charismatic leadership become a strategic advantage?
Dr. Filip Balunović: Yes, absolutely. It became a strategic advantage, as we have already discussed. But perhaps, in light of your question, we should focus more specifically on campaigning. Some years ago, I was interested in celebrity activism and how, even in leaderless movements, there is a tendency to bring in celebrities to increase visibility and draw attention to the movement. The student movement had the support of many celebrities, some of whom spoke at protests and rallies, but the students did not rely on them.
The whole movement functioned as something we imagined to be more powerful than it actually was. The students convinced us that their strength was ten times greater than it really was. This became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The students initially had no power whatsoever. Serbia was a state in which the ruling party governed every single municipality in the country, comparable perhaps only to Belarus. I don’t think we can find a similar example of one party controlling every village in a country, let alone every major city.
What the students achieved was an interesting transformation, particularly when we look at the emotional and affective dimension of the movement. It was a transformation of grief into joy. The movement began with silence and collective grieving, which represented a way of looking into the past. That dimension is still present. On November 1, after the elections, we marked two years since the collapse of the railway station in Novi Sad. Once again, 60,000 people gathered in Novi Sad, and I was there. So that sense of grief remains.
But what the students added was a sense of joy about the possibility of a different future. When you look at people’s reactions on election day and election night, they were genuinely crying. People could hardly believe what had happened. The atmosphere in Belgrade for days after the election was like New Year’s Eve lasting for seven days. Everyone was congratulating one another and celebrating. Of course, this was mainly because of the election results, but the entire atmosphere was remarkable.
The students helped create this atmosphere by making fun of the autocrat. Students from the Faculty of Dramatic Arts, who had been particularly targeted by the government, produced one-minute videos almost daily, making fun of the autocrat for being alone and having no one who liked him. There was some truth to this because Vučić’s campaign revolved almost entirely around himself and perhaps a few other people.
By contrast, the students’ campaign showed thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of people standing behind them. They were innovative and cheerful, but also very serious in certain respects. They combined these elements in a way that ultimately produced the central tone of their message: authenticity and honesty. And that was completely opposite to what Vučić did.
Serbia’s Student Uprising Was No Color Revolution
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić attend a ceremony featuring the national anthems of Russia and Serbia during Putin’s official visit to Belgrade, Serbia, on January 17, 2019. Photo: Ognjen Stevanovic / Dreamstime.
Vučić repeatedly characterized student protests as externally orchestrated destabilization, while protesters emphasized corruption, accountability, and constitutional responsibility. How did competing constructions of “the people,” national sovereignty, and political legitimacy shape this confrontation? Why did the government’s populist counternarratives struggle to contain the movement?
Dr. Filip Balunović: It’s very simple. If there ever was an example of a non-color revolution, this was it. We know that various actors and governments often interfere, engage in lobbying, and try to push one side or another. But in this case, the student movement—and I have written about this elsewhere—was alone in the world until the very end.
The only people standing behind the students were Serbian citizens and perhaps some others who expressed sympathy for their cause. Almost all Western governments, including the European Union, showed no serious signs of support for the student movement for nearly two years.
There were, of course, individual members of the European Parliament who expressed support, and the movement was discussed in the European Parliament. Some politicians here and there also took an interest. But if we look at where power actually resides—Brussels, Paris, Berlin, Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, the capitals of powerful states and major administrative centers—there was no support.
I know this firsthand. They were hesitant to support the students because they didn’t know what to expect. I remember someone once telling me that Brussels didn’t know whom to call. This reminded me of the famous question attributed to Henry Kissinger: “If I call China, I know the phone number in Beijing. If I call the Soviet Union, I know the phone number in Moscow. But whom should I call when I want to speak to the European Union?” There was a similar dynamic of hesitation in this case.
Meanwhile, Vučić had extraordinarily good relations with President Macron and Chancellor Scholz, who had visited Serbia and was interested in lithium. At the same time, Vučić maintained good relations with Putin, who endorsed him before the elections, as well as with Beijing and the Trump administration. Not to mention, of course, one of his most important allies: Israel. After losing the election, Vučić emphasized Serbia’s special relationship with Israel, particularly regarding the supply of arms to Israel for the genocide, both before and, especially, after the genocide began.
So, the students were indeed left alone, and they made it.
The Post-Vučić Transition Has Already Begun
The electoral victory does not automatically dismantle the institutional networks, patronage relationships, or security structures associated with SNS rule. What immediate reforms are essential to prevent authoritarian continuity beneath democratic alternation? How can the new majority pursue accountability without reproducing selective prosecution or partisan institutional capture?
Dr. Filip Balunović: This is a very difficult question, even for political practitioners, let alone for those of us who mostly engage in theory and empirical research. But the process has already started, even though the new institutions are not yet in place. The parliamentary majority has not yet been constituted, and the government has not yet been elected. In practice, Vučić’s people remain in charge of all the institutions.
Despite this, over the past 10 days, we have witnessed almost daily arrests of high-ranking police officials who now face charges related to violence against students and other criminal acts. The owner of Alta Bank has also been arrested. Only later did we learn—some people knew this before, but I must admit I hadn’t paid much attention to this bank—that virtually all state business transactions went through this one bank. If you pay for electricity, the payment goes through that bank. If you buy a ticket with Air Serbia, it goes through the same bank. The police recently entered the bank and discovered that its owner was allegedly about to physically withdraw nearly 400 million euros. We are still wondering how that could even be possible. He is now in custody and will stand trial.
What I want to say is that, even while Vučić’s people remain in charge, some individuals are already trying to buy themselves legitimacy in the post-Vučić era. It was particularly telling to see Serbian national television, which had been one of the main propaganda channels for a decade and a half, issue a public apology. They openly acknowledged that they were sorry for having misinformed the Serbian public in the past. It’s really interesting to observe what is already happening, even before the new government has taken office.
Serbia’s Democratic Experiment Could Inspire Other Societies
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić attend a welcoming ceremony in Belgrade, Serbia, on October 10, 2017. Photo: Dreamstime.
Finally, your New York Times essay concludes that the students have demonstrated the possibility of another Serbia and another democracy. Looking beyond their electoral victory, what would constitute genuine democratic transformation rather than a change of governing elites? Could Serbia’s experiment in participatory, anti-authoritarian politics offer a transferable model for confronting populist autocracies elsewhere in Europe and beyond?
Dr. Filip Balunović: This is always a good question, but a tricky one at the same time. As we know, one size doesn’t fit all contexts. What is also specific to Serbia is the absence of powerful actors such as trade unions. For instance, when you look at what’s happening in Italy, France, or the UK, you see powerful trade unions capable of mobilizing huge crowds. Serbia didn’t have such actors, which is typical of the post-socialist climate. Trade unions are either discredited or completely co-opted by those in power. So, as to whether this experience is transferable to other contexts, I would say that it could serve, at least partially, as an inspiration.
I keep referring to this as an experiment because voting for the Students’ List was indeed a vote for uncertainty. We still don’t know exactly what to expect. Sometimes, as in life, one should choose to change even when you’re not 100% sure what’s behind the door. But if you don’t feel comfortable on this side of the door, you should open it and try something else.
The main message is that not only we as individuals, but also constituencies and people in general, should dare to try. We should not believe that this is the best our political communities can achieve. Maybe it’s time. Maybe it’s also about the new generations, who have zero tolerance and a different attitude towards authority. Maybe they will bring the necessary change not only to Serbia but to other places as well.
(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.
In his commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias examines the growing struggle over religious authenticity and political legitimacy within American Christianity. Focusing on James Talarico and Adam Hamilton, he explores how progressive and moderate Christian voices challenge MAGA’s association of religious identity with conservative political allegiance. Drawing on Norris and Inglehart’s theory of cultural backlash, Dr. Dias analyzes how Christian nationalism mobilizes anxieties over social change while portraying inclusion as a threat to religious authenticity. He argues that connecting LGBTQ inclusion, economic affordability, and social protection to Christian obligations offers an alternative political interpretation of faith. Thus, the commentary highlights religious pluralism as essential to democratic citizenship and challenges claims of exclusive ownership over Christianity.
When Donald Trump described James Talarico as “beyond woke” and “an insult to Jesus,” he was claiming the authority to decide which political positions a Christian may legitimately hold. Talarico’s support for transgender people became grounds for questioning the authenticity of his faith. The accusation reveals a wider dispute over the political ownership of Christianity, in which disagreement with the MAGA movement can be presented as a departure from Christianity itself (Malcolm, 2026).
The emergence of Talarico and Adam Hamilton gives that dispute a particular significance. A Presbyterian politician and a Methodist pastor are drawing on their faith to articulate alternatives to MAGA, connecting Christian responsibility with inclusion and the ability of ordinary people to afford their lives. In doing so, they challenge an association between Christian identity and Republican allegiance that has acquired the force of a moral obligation for parts of the American electorate.
Christianity has, of course, sustained different political traditions in the United States. The Social Gospel and the role of Black churches in the civil rights movement belong to that history. What is at stake today is the public visibility and legitimacy of those alternatives in a political environment where the defense of Christianity is frequently invoked to justify resistance to social change.
The notion of cultural backlash developed by Norris and Inglehart (2019) helps explain this relationship. The expansion of liberal values can be experienced by socially conservative constituencies as the loss of a familiar moral order and of their own authority within it. Under these conditions, political mobilization draws strength from the promise to recover what has supposedly been taken away. The nation’s religious identity becomes part of that promise, giving changes in gender relations or the recognition of sexual minorities the meaning of a threat to the country itself.
Within MAGA Christianity, faith can therefore function as a claim to cultural precedence. The Christian is imagined as the rightful custodian of America, whose place must be restored against institutions and groups accused of displacing him. This gives political leadership a restorative mission: the recovery of a Christian nation whose authentic character is understood to precede, and take priority over, the choices of its increasingly diverse citizens.
But who is entitled to define that authenticity?
The attacks on Talarico and Hamilton show how theological boundaries can be made to follow political ones. Their support for LGBTQ inclusion has been used to question whether they qualify as Christians at all (Jenkins & Ashby, 2026). An interpretation of the duty to love one’s neighbor is treated as evidence that the person advancing it has abandoned the faith. The charge of being “woke” allows the substantive disagreement to be displaced by an accusation of religious illegitimacy.
Talarico and Hamilton contest that exclusion from different positions. Talarico advances a more explicitly progressive argument against Christian nationalism. Hamilton brings a more moderate approach, shaped by pastoral work across political differences. Their convergence lies in understanding Christian obligation as a reason to include people whom the cultural backlash identifies as a threat, and to address the material difficulties that restrict their lives.
This is where affordability becomes important.
A family unable to pay for medical treatment presents a moral question as well as an economic problem. The same applies to people whose wages no longer cover housing, or whose care responsibilities prevent them from earning enough to support their children. Connecting these circumstances with faith gives the commandment to love one’s neighbor a material consequence. Compassion acquires implications for the organization of public life, including the distribution of resources and access to essential services.
Talarico made that connection when he answered Trump’s attack by questioning policies that remove health coverage from sick people while granting tax reductions to billionaires (Malcolm, 2026). The response brings the debate back to the consequences of political choices. It asks what Christian responsibility requires when the people affected are poor or dependent on assistance, rather than allowing religious authenticity to be settled exclusively through positions on sexuality and gender.
Inclusion and affordability can thus form part of the same argument. A person’s dignity is affected by discrimination and by the inability to obtain treatment or maintain a home. For a moderate or progressive Christianity, both circumstances can create obligations towards the neighbor. This gives religious voters a language through which social protection and equal citizenship become coherent expressions of faith.
The democratic significance of this alternative depends on allowing that argument to remain open to disagreement. A progressive Christian claim to exclusive religious authenticity would reproduce the problem it contests. Liberal democracy provides room for religious convictions to inform political participation while requiring citizens to share institutions with people who reach different conclusions, including those who profess no religion.
Talarico and Hamilton matter because they make that possibility visible within Christianity itself. For voters accustomed to hearing that faith requires allegiance to the religious right, their interventions reopen a political choice. The Christian voter can support inclusion and policies that make everyday life affordable while understanding those commitments as part of a religious obligation. MAGA must then defend its political programme before an electorate whose faith it can no longer simply claim to own.
Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108595841
Following the October 25, 2026 electoral defeat of Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling coalition, Serbia offers significant lessons for citizens confronting competitive authoritarianism. In an interview with the ECPS, Associate Professor Jelena Lončar of the University of Belgrade examines how student-led protests evolved into nationwide democratic mobilization through nonviolent resistance, cross-class solidarity, decentralized organization, and grassroots election monitoring. She argues that positive messaging, sustained civic engagement, and direct contact with citizens helped overcome authoritarian strategies of protest containment. Yet she cautions that Serbia’s experience cannot simply be replicated elsewhere, given differences in repression and institutional conditions. Ultimately, democratic consolidation requires independent institutions, political pluralism, and continued public scrutiny beyond electoral victory.
Serbia has entered a potentially transformative political moment. What began as student-led protests following the November 2024 Novi Sad railway-station tragedy evolved into a nationwide movement against corruption, institutional capture, and authoritarian governance, culminating in the October 25, 2026 electoral defeat of Aleksandar Vučić’s autocratic ruling coalition. Yet translating electoral victory into democratic consolidation remains a formidable challenge.
In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Associate Professor Jelena Lončar of the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Belgrade examines how sustained civic mobilization, nonviolent resistance, and grassroots electoral oversight challenged entrenched authoritarian power—and what citizens confronting similar regimes elsewhere might learn from Serbia’s experience. As she emphasizes, “Citizens in other competitive authoritarian regimes could learn a great deal from the student movement.” The most transferable lessons, she argues, include “positive messaging, clear demands, sustained activity across the country, mobilization across social groups, and a commitment to nonviolence.”
For Assoc. Prof. Lončar, Serbia’s experience underscores the democratic potential of political participation beyond established parties and electoral institutions. Neighborhood assemblies, nationwide marches, student blockades, and citizen-led election monitoring helped transform political disillusionment into collective agency. As she observes, “The student movement succeeded in waking citizens up and encouraging them to take responsibility for their communities.”Crucially, these practices challenged not only the ruling coalition but also the political passivity on which authoritarian resilience often depends.
Drawing on her scholarship on competitive authoritarianism, political representation, and the performative dimensions of power, Assoc. Prof. Lončar highlights the significance of solidarity networks and sustained mobilization. “This combination of sustained mobilization and extensive election monitoring helped turn public dissatisfaction into an electoral challenge,” she explains. Yet she cautions against treating Serbia as a universally transferable model: more closed autocracies present different institutional constraints, opportunities for electoral competition, and levels of repression.
The interview also explores the unfinished challenges of democratic transition, including institutional capture, minority representation, gender equality, nationalism, and Serbia’s geopolitical orientation. Assoc. Prof. Lončar warns that replacing incumbents cannot automatically dismantle clientelistic networks or guarantee institutional accountability. As she stresses, “Continued public scrutiny will therefore be essential.”
Serbia’s experience raises a broader comparative question: Can movements that successfully mobilize against authoritarianism translate their moral authority into durable democratic institutions without reproducing the concentration of power they opposed? Assoc. Prof. Lončar’s analysis suggests that the decisive test lies not simply in electoral victory but in institutional pluralism, sustained civic engagement, and the peaceful transfer of power.
Here is our interview with Associate Professor Jelena Lončar, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
Citizens’ Renewed Political Engagement Is Essential to Serbia’s Democratic Transition
Students and citizens protest against government corruption in Zrenjanin, Serbia, on January 25, 2026, demanding justice and accountability for the 16 victims of the tragic railway station canopy collapse in Novi Sad. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Lončar, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with Serbia’s historic electoral breakthrough and the challenges of democratic transition. On October 25, the student-backed list secured 141 parliamentary seats, ending 14 years of dominance by Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Yet networks established under Vučić remain deeply embedded in the judiciary, security services, public administration, and media. What are the principal obstacles to translating this electoral victory into genuine democratic transition and transformation? To what extent could institutional capture survive the defeat of the political forces responsible for sustaining it?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: I’d like to start with what has already been achieved before returning to the obstacles. I’d say that citizens who had become very passive and disillusioned with politics have become politically active again. We saw an extraordinary electoral turnout, but a great deal had already happened before election day.
We’ve seen the formation of neighborhood assemblies, a form of democratic innovation in which citizens participate in discussions of local political issues. They met in squares and parks in different neighborhoods to discuss local issues and how to support the student movement. It’s a form of direct democracy.
We’ve also seen hundreds of thousands of citizens supporting students during their protests and marches, alongside widespread grassroots mobilization during the electoral campaign. Citizens spoke to their colleagues and neighbors about the importance of voting, volunteered to monitor elections, and became very active on social media. This is the first time we’ve seen such huge grassroots mobilization, at least in Serbia.
Immediately after the elections, we even saw citizens painting over graffiti and cleaning up public spaces, demonstrating that they care for the public good and symbolically sending a message that they would remain active even after the student-backed list won the elections.
The student movement succeeded in waking citizens up and encouraging them to take responsibility for their communities. This is a prerequisite for democracy. My hope is that they will remain active and scrutinize the work of the new government and other public institutions. Their continued engagement could help prevent another concentration of power.
Grassroots Mobilization Can Help Prevent Another Concentration of Power
Now, as for the obstacles you asked me about, criminal networks retain considerable influence and control important flows of money. We do not yet know what will happen to these networks. The regime treated the state budget as its own private money, and there are indications that substantial sums have left the country in recent days. The incoming government will face serious economic challenges alongside the task of institutional reform.
People loyal to the outgoing regime also remain in the judiciary, police, and security services. Reforming these institutions will take time. The Progressive Party still has loyal media outlets, and watching them in recent days, you would hardly know that anything had changed in the country. They gave the impression that Vučić was about to return to power.
Then there’s also the question of the student-backed list itself. It is not a political party with an established structure or a history of working together. Many of the candidates have only recently met, have never worked together before, and come from different ideological backgrounds. They have no experience in politics. It’s their first time. Maintaining cooperation and unity within the parliamentary group of 140 MPs, who have never worked together, as well as unity with the student movement, which will not be present in the institutions, will be important if they want to carry out substantial reforms.
As I said, so many of these candidates entering public office have very limited experience with parliamentary and administrative procedures. They will need time to learn, develop these relationships, and turn electoral promises into decisions that citizens expect.
The student movement has already demonstrated considerable organizational capacity. But governing and being present in the institutions will bring further responsibilities, including decisions about limited resources, divisive issues, and competing demands. My first hope is that the institutions will perform their constitutional roles, to start with, and then regain citizens’ trust.
Serbia does have professionals with knowledge and experience. They were very much constrained by political control, and I hope that the new government will quickly create conditions in which expertise and institutional independence become essential parts of the transition.
Justice Must Be Based on Evidence, Not Political Retaliation
In the days following Vučić’s defeat, Serbia has witnessed arrests, resignations, renewed corruption investigations, and challenges to politically appointed officials. How can the incoming leadership dismantle patronage networks and restore institutional accountability without reproducing the politicization of state institutions? Where should the boundary lie between transitional justice and political retaliation?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Yes, that is one of the very important questions we face nowadays, even though the student-backed list has not yet taken power. So many crimes and corruption cases have gone uninvestigated for more than a decade, and citizens in Serbia are hungry for justice. Many people also lost their jobs, faced intimidation, and experienced violence because they refused to obey or dared to resist the regime. Their frustration is entirely understandable.
But certainly, this frustration should not become a justification for individuals to draw up lists of those they believe deserve punishment, as we’ve seen, or to treat arrests as achievements in themselves. We need an independent judiciary that investigates cases on the basis of evidence and respects due process.
Losing a public position does not establish criminal guilt, but holding public office should not provide protection from investigations either. Many of the leaders of the previous regime will now be MPs, members of Parliament, but they should still face investigations if they were involved in any illegal activities.
The credibility of the transition will depend on whether citizens perceive the judiciary as actually doing its job. The student movement has demonstrated patience, unlike the citizens. But again, students will not be the ones taking public positions, and we still do not know who those people in the government will be. So many things are still unknown to us.
Citizen Monitoring Was Crucial to Protecting the Electoral Process
Students collect signatures in support of calls for early parliamentary elections in Valjevo, Serbia, on December 28, 2025. Photo: Adam Radosavljevic / Dreamstime.
A firsthand account of the elections describes approximately 50,000 citizens participating in monitoring across some 8,300 polling locations. Although these figures require independent verification, they suggest an extraordinary effort to protect electoral integrity. Does this indicate that democratic change in competitive authoritarian regimes depends not only on winning votes but also on citizens temporarily assuming oversight functions that captured institutions fail to perform?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Absolutely. If there’s one thing we can learn from the Serbian experience, that’s it. Competitive authoritarian regimes hold elections regularly, but those elections are neither free nor fair. Election observation missions have documented numerous irregularities in previous Serbian elections.
I remember the debate last year about whether students should demand elections at all. Many argued that there was little point under the existing conditions, given vote buying, the use of public office and public money during campaigns, multiple voting, pressure on public sector employees, voter intimidation, the use of unofficial copies of electoral registers to track voters on election day and pressure them to vote, and the photographing of ballot papers to prove how someone had voted.
The students’ response was that they could not resolve all these problems until they took power. The only way to do so under the existing conditions was through elections. However, they could do everything possible to prevent serious irregularities on election day. This made monitoring the voting and counting process extremely important. In previous elections, many polling stations had been monitored only by representatives of the ruling party because the opposition lacked the personnel to cover every location. Manipulation was easier in those places.
The scale of citizen involvement helped address this gap. Of course, election monitoring cannot remove every inequality created during a campaign, but it can certainly make manipulation more difficult and help protect the votes that have been cast. In the longer term, oversight responsibilities must be performed by institutions that citizens can trust. But in the recent elections, citizen involvement, alongside a very high turnout, was the most important factor.
The Students Reached Communities That Opposition Parties Could Not
The student-backed list appears to have displaced Serbia’s established opposition as well as defeated Vučić’s ruling coalition. How do you explain the movement’s ability to mobilize constituencies that conventional opposition parties could not reach? Does this represent a renewal of democratic representation, or could its rejection of established political elites generate a different form of anti-establishment populism?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: The regime’s dominance relied heavily on constantly generating fear of enemies, including the opposition. Years of such messaging contributed to deep distrust of opposition parties. A similar strategy was used against civil society. This strongly affected citizens’ trust in the opposition, their perceptions of it, and their willingness to vote for opposition parties.
Some responsibility also lies with the opposition parties themselves. They were fragmented and often more focused on disputes with one another than on challenging the regime. They also lacked sustained work on the ground and, at times, the courage to take political risks. I would therefore see this result as a renewal of democratic representation rather than a rejection of political parties as such.
Given the lack of control over the media, it was essential to reach citizens directly and convince them that the aim was to improve the country rather than destabilize it, as they constantly heard in the media. The students did this through their marches and cycling journeys, conveying strong emotional messages of patriotism, hope, and love. They reached communities that established opposition parties had struggled to engage.
Now the task is to strengthen institutions and internal democracy within political parties. Parties will probably become more prominent again. The students have not established a long-term structure, and their goal is not to compete in future elections. So we will probably see political parties competing in the next elections, but we can also expect new political parties to emerge. Democracy needs organizations through which different interests can be expressed and contested. Distrust of the existing parties should encourage their renewal rather than become a reason to reject political pluralism.
The Students Turned Demands for Justice into Broad Social Solidarity
Students and citizens participate in the “Your Hands Are Bloody” protest, blocking an intersection near Avala in Zrenjanin, Vojvodina, Serbia, on January 25, 2025. Photo: Ivan Pancic / Dreamstime.
The Novi Sad railway-station disaster transformed demands for accountability into a nationwide movement against corruption and institutional capture. How did students successfully connect a specific tragedy to broader grievances while maintaining support across ideological and social divisions? What made this mobilization different from earlier protest waves that Vučić’s government successfully contained?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Positive messaging was important, as was focusing on issues that connected citizens across ideological divides. The students presented the tragedy as a question of responsibility, justice, and the rule of law that concerned everyone. Citizens did not have to agree on every political issue to demand that institutions establish what had happened and hold those responsible to account.
Over the past two years, moral claims have been central to the movement. The students presented themselves as courageous, socially responsible actors defending the rule of law and justice without seeking personal gain. This messaging distinguished them from opposition parties, which were framed as interest-oriented. The students were seen as having no interest in taking power. They only wanted institutions to do their work and the Constitution to be respected.
Their willingness to make sacrifices further reinforced their moral authority and the sense that they were acting on behalf of all citizens and future generations. They justified their demands by emphasizing institutional accountability and consultation with experts. They argued that negotiating away their demands would violate their values and moral principles. Even when invited to discussions with the government or the president, they would say, “But there’s nothing to discuss. We cannot negotiate about the rule of law. What are we going to say? You should respect one law, but not the other? There’s nothing to negotiate about the principles, about the values, about the laws.”
This broad solidarity gave real legitimacy to their actions. Their sense of unity was reinforced by consistent public messaging and deliberate silence about internal disagreements. This did not mean that these differences had disappeared. Rather, the students kept their shared demands at the center of their public activity. Their sustained presence across the country, together with the relationships built during marches and local gatherings, helped turn that message into something citizens could experience directly. This was very different from what we’ve seen in past protests.
Silence Became a Persistent Act of Resistance to Power
In your 2025 study “Performance, Performativity, and Political Power,” you engage with Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault to understand how power is constituted and resistance performed. How might this framework explain the students’ use of silence, university blockades, decentralized plenums, and symbolic actions? Did these practices generate an alternative form of political power capable of challenging Vučić’s personalized authority?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Silence is very important here. Shortly after the tragedy, students began organizing 15-minute silent commemorations outside the faculties, one minute for each victim. After a 16th victim died from injuries, the commemoration was extended to 16 minutes. The ritual was very simple. Participants would gather at a designated location, someone would announce the beginning and end of the silence, and those present would simply stand silently, blocking the street before dispersing. This happened every day, with other citizens also joining the students.
Every day for almost two years, at 11:52, the exact time of the collapse, citizens gathered at intersections and in public squares across Serbia. Their presence interrupted everyday life and made it difficult to push the tragedy out of public view. Silence also became part of larger protests and demonstrations. On New Year’s Eve in December 2024, for instance, thousands gathered in a central Belgrade square for a silent commemoration instead of partying and listening to music. They chose to commemorate the victims together. The silence began at 11:52 p.m., just a few minutes before midnight. You could hear music and fireworks in the distance, and we all knew that this was the regime’s music.
Silent protests have been organized in many countries before, but what stands out in the Serbian case is the centrality and duration of this practice. It remained central throughout the last two years. While in other countries we’ve seen silence used as a brief commemorative moment, here it became the movement’s principal action, organizing political participation and public engagement.
The authorities’ response to the silent blockades was also particularly harsh. There were several reported incidents of cars being driven into protesters. During the protest on March 15 last year, the reported sonic weapon incident also disrupted the evening silent commemoration.
In my research, I have also been interested in what participants created through this repeated practice. Silence kept the victims and the circumstances of their deaths present in public life, resisting attempts to move on without accountability. In this way, they created a public memory, with citizens themselves deciding what would remain in that memory.
Silence also became a persistent act of resistance to power. Citizens continued to occupy public spaces and challenge authority despite intimidation and violence. Standing together, day after day, helped build relationships of solidarity, mutual recognition, and shared responsibility. Participants began to see themselves differently, as citizens with both the capacity and the responsibility to act. This is where I find the question of political subjectivation particularly useful. Through participation, citizens challenged the passive roles assigned to them and experienced their own political agency.
The plenums and university blockades added another dimension. Students made decisions together, debated responsibilities, and sustained the practical work of collective action. In Hannah Arendt’s terms, we can think of power emerging through acting together. This is what Arendt would describe as the power to do, the power to create.
The Foucauldian perspective draws attention to how resistance challenges established relations of power and changes the ways individuals understand themselves. These practices gave the movement an authority grounded in participation and solidarity. They created a basis from which to challenge personalized rule, but translating that authority into accountable institutions now remains a separate task.
Serbia Shows That Authoritarian Incumbents Are Not Impossible to Defeat
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participates in an SNS political campaign at Hall Čair in Niš, Serbia, on March 30, 2022. Photo: Radule Perisic.
In your research with Dušan Spasojević, particularly “Facing Protests in Serbia: Patterns of New Competitive Authoritarianism” and your study of the 2023 elections, you examine how hybrid regimes adapt to protest through subtle institutional manipulation and selective repression. Why did these mechanisms ultimately fail against the student movement? Does Serbia’s experience challenge existing theories of competitive authoritarian resilience?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: In those two studies, we examined the electoral irregularities I mentioned earlier, as well as the strategies competitive authoritarian regimes use to contain protests. These include strategically ignoring protests rather than banning them, keeping the police out of sight, and constantly producing crises and narratives about vaguely defined international or regional enemies.
Such strategies can be effective when protests remain isolated and participants fail to develop solidarity networks and a collective identity. None of the previous protest waves managed to develop a social movement with a strong collective identity and solidarity, and many began without building on earlier waves.
The student movement made these strategies harder to sustain by maintaining its activities throughout the last two years and reaching citizens across the country. Most previous protests had taken place only in the capital. By contrast, students organized protests across the country and built support among different social groups, which was particularly important. This combination of sustained mobilization and extensive election monitoring helped turn public dissatisfaction into an electoral challenge.
I’d be cautious about treating this as a refutation of theories of authoritarian resilience. These theories help us understand the obstacles the movement faced, but they do not imply that authoritarian incumbents are impossible to defeat. Serbia’s experience shows that demands for justice can mobilize citizens and that protest movements can contribute to electoral change. This is very important to reiterate. Such change requires cooperation, commitment, and a credible prospect of change. However, whether this electoral defeat develops into a long-lasting transformation is something we still need to assess.
The Students’ Demands Offer a Basis for an Inclusive Democratic Project
Vučić’s political discourse frequently relied on claims of popular legitimacy and the portrayal of opponents as threats to national stability. Students, meanwhile, mobilized around demands for accountability and the rejection of corrupt elites. How should we distinguish their competing constructions of “the people”? Can a movement that challenges a populist authoritarian regime through anti-elite discourse avoid reproducing populism’s exclusionary logic?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: I would first distinguish the student movement from the student-backed electoral list. As I said, the students were not on the electoral list, which means they will not be in Parliament or the government. This distinction is important. If we take their stated intentions seriously, the aim is to create conditions for free elections in the next electoral cycle, when political parties can compete fairly.
There’s also a difference between criticizing elites for corruption and claiming that only one movement can legitimately represent all citizens. This is not what the students are claiming. Their demands centered on institutions doing their jobs and rules applying equally to everyone. This offers a basis for an inclusive democratic project.
Still, moral authority should not place anyone above criticism. The student-backed representatives will need to accept disagreement, opposition, and public scrutiny. Their commitment to pluralism will be tested by how they treat those who did not vote for them and how they respond when citizens challenge their decisions. I’m optimistic so far, but we will see.
Gender-Equality Legislation Means Little Without Effective Implementation
Three women hold a rainbow flag bearing the message “Peace and Love” during the Belgrade Pride Parade in Belgrade, Serbia, on September 18, 2016. Photo: Jerome Cid / Dreamstime.
Your article “Autocratic Gender-washing: Gender-Equality Reforms in Serbia” demonstrates how authoritarian governments can instrumentalize women’s representation and gender-equality legislation to cultivate democratic legitimacy while sustaining conservative political agendas. What would distinguish substantive democratization from symbolic reform under Serbia’s incoming leadership? Could the transition expose the limitations of Vučić-era gender-equality policies?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: There needs to be a willingness to implement gender-equality legislation rather than simply adopt it. Having more women in leadership positions or establishing bodies responsible for gender equality really matters. But those bodies need adequate funding, staff, and the authority to carry out their work. That’s what I mean when I say that gender-equality reforms during Vučić’s regime were merely symbolic. The regime would establish a gender-equality institution without providing the funding necessary for it to carry out its work.
The adoption of the gender-equality law under Vučić in 2021 was also presented as evidence of progress, while its implementation remained deeply problematic. The law was not implemented, as its implementation was stopped very soon after it was passed. So, basically, there’s no difference between having the law and not having it if it’s not implemented at all. This gap between formal commitments and everyday practice is very important. Gender analysis in legislative and oversight processes, the use of gender-disaggregated data, and gender-responsive budgeting are all required under the current legislation. These need to become meaningful parts of decision-making, which they have not been so far.
We should assess whether women influence policies. We should also assess spending and how it affects women differently, including women whose interests are rarely represented. It remains to be seen how the new Parliament and government will approach these issues. They will face many competing demands, and gender equality may not be a high priority at the beginning.
That’s precisely why continued pressure from women’s organizations and other civil society actors will matter. A change of government will certainly not guarantee a change in priorities. The new leadership will face many challenges, particularly at the beginning, but the pressure needs to be maintained.
Minority Representation Must Extend Beyond Parliamentary Presence
Your scholarship on political representation and minority rights raises an important question about the inclusiveness of democratic transformation. The student movement united diverse constituencies through broad demands for justice and accountability, but what place do ethnic minorities occupy within its emerging political project? Could an emphasis on national unity reproduce majoritarian assumptions that have historically marginalized minority voices?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: That’s a concern at the moment. Many minority voters supported the student-backed list, as the election results clearly indicate. At the same time, the electoral system provides a lower threshold for minority parties. The three largest minorities—Hungarians, Albanians, and Bosniaks—will have representatives in Parliament following the latest elections. There are no announced plans to change the arrangements for minority parties’ electoral participation. Rather, the aim is to open up opportunities for minority citizens to become more interested in voting for mainstream parties as well. The student movement also addressed this by reaching out to minority citizens, not only majority citizens, which is different from what we’ve seen before.
However, the parliamentary presence of minority parties is only part of the question. Minority representatives will need opportunities to influence decisions, and minority citizens will need to see their concerns taken seriously beyond election campaigns. Because the student-backed list has a very strong majority in Parliament, it will not need to form a coalition to establish a government. This will probably be the first time that minority parties are not part of the governing coalition. That makes the responsibility of the new leadership even more important. They should leave room for the particular experiences of discrimination and exclusion that minorities face.
It remains to be seen how these issues will be addressed once the government is formed. However, some minority parties supported the students during the protests, as did many minority citizens. This gives us reason for optimism about what we can expect from the new government.
Avoiding Kosovo May Preserve Unity but Cannot Replace Political Debate
Photo: Shutterstock.
In your 2023 BIRN interview, following threats over academic cooperation with Kosovo researchers, you warned that elites cultivate fear and deepen ethnic divisions. Does Vučić’s electoral defeat offer an opportunity to challenge the nationalist discourses that enabled such intimidation? Or might the incoming movement’s reluctance to confront Kosovo’s status leave essential foundations of Serbian ethnonationalism untouched?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: The student movement is internally very heterogeneous. We still know relatively little about the positions of the new MPs, and we do not yet know the composition of the government. Those entering office may decide to take greater responsibility for political decisions themselves, relying less on students than they did during the campaign. Once they assume their positions, they may act independently of the students. However, we still do not know their positions on these issues because their names have not yet been announced. Divisions are also possible, both within the student movement and among the newly elected officials.
We remember the broad coalition that came to power after Milošević’s fall in 2000 and how quickly its internal differences became apparent. Once the prime minister and ministers are named, the direction of Serbian foreign policy should become clearer. There’s certainly an opportunity to challenge the intimidation of academics, activists, and others who cooperate across ethnic boundaries. Doing so would require public officials to defend their freedom to work, even when they disagree with their views.
Avoiding the issue of Kosovo may have helped maintain unity during the mobilization process, but it cannot replace a longer-term discussion of nationalism, minority rights, and relationships with neighboring societies. These questions will now come to the forefront, but it will not be the student movement that will have to address them. Rather, the new officials, Parliament, and government will have to confront these challenges.
Solidarity Across Ethnic and Religious Divides Offers a More Inclusive Patriotism
Serbian nationalism has frequently invoked Orthodox Christianity, historical victimhood, Kosovo, and the defense of national sovereignty against perceived Western interference. To what extent has Vučić transformed these narratives into a form of civilizationalist populism? Could the student movement articulate a more inclusive conception of Serbian political identity without alienating nationalist constituencies that contributed to its electoral victory?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Yes, elements of that argument apply, particularly to the final years of Vučić’s rule. It didn’t apply in the first few years, but toward the end of his rule, he increasingly drew on familiar nationalist narratives, presenting Serbia as a defender of sovereignty and traditional values against external pressure.
Orthodox Christianity and conservative morality featured in this discourse, while liberal actors and some Western demands were portrayed as threats to the country. We’ve also seen a rise in anti-gender mobilization, and Kosovo became a symbol of resistance to foreign intervention. At the same time, his use of these narratives was highly pragmatic. He maintained close economic relations with Western partners while cultivating ties with Russia and China. I would therefore be careful about presenting his politics as a consistent civilizational project. These messages also served the more immediate purpose of consolidating power and discrediting opponents.
There is now hope that the new government will articulate a more inclusive understanding of Serbian identity. But I’m not sure it will be able to attract these strongly nationalist constituencies, which will likely remain supportive of Vučić’s party.
What I find more important is the students’ ability to attract minority citizens and groups, as we discussed earlier. There’s something I haven’t mentioned that I consider particularly important: the solidarity shown toward Bosniak students during the marches from Novi Pazar, a town in southern Serbia where Bosniaks constitute the majority.
The Bosniak students from Novi Pazar marched to Belgrade, and many citizens welcomed them along the way. They made efforts to prepare food that the students could eat and learned a great deal about religious and cultural differences. This was a very broad expression of solidarity with minorities, which I find particularly important. It shows that attachment to the country can be expressed through solidarity across ethnic and religious differences. I hope this will become a lasting political approach.
Defeated Authoritarian Leaders Can Retain Influence Through Transnational Alliances
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán meets with Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić during an official visit to Belgrade, Serbia, on September 5, 2016. Photo: Ognjen Stevanovic / Dreamstime.
Only days after their respective electoral defeats, Vučić and former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán publicly reaffirmed their political solidarity, with Vučić declaring, “We will return.” How should we interpret this continuing relationship within the broader transnational networks of populist and illiberal political actors? Can defeated authoritarian leaders retain influence through shared media strategies, ideological alliances, and cross-border political networks?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Authoritarian leaders learn a great deal from each other, and these connections are very strong. We’ve seen Vučić supporting Orbán during the last election campaign in Hungary and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico attending Vučić’s rally during the election campaign in Serbia. Such relationships can help defeated leaders retain visibility, political support, and access to sympathetic audiences.
At the same time, the strengthening of the far right elsewhere in Europe, including Western Europe, could affect developments in Eastern Europe and the possibility of these forces returning to power in countries such as Hungary and Serbia. Much will depend on how much additional influence far-right parties gain in Austria, France, and Germany, as this could have a spillover effect on countries such as Serbia.
Vučić’s party still has a substantial parliamentary presence and loyal media outlets. Its representatives seem confident despite the electoral defeat. Anti-democratic attitudes and populist discourse certainly remain a threat to democratic consolidation. The party may use Parliament to obstruct reforms and its media presence to spread fear and create instability. What makes me somewhat less worried is that much of Vučić’s support rested on clientelistic networks rather than a firm ideological commitment. Those networks may become harder to maintain once access to state resources is reduced.
Much will also depend on how democratic forces address everyday problems, particularly the economy. Authoritarian populist leaders rely on fear, economic hardships, and security crises, all of which could help them regain support. In recent days, we’ve heard Vučić claim that pensions will no longer be paid and that Serbia will soon face electricity cuts. Many citizens believe these warnings, and the incoming government will need to communicate clearly and demonstrate that institutions can meet citizens’ basic needs.
Regional Stability Must Not Justify Support for Autocratization
Vučić maintained relationships with the EU, Russia, and China while benefiting from European concerns about regional stability. The student movement has largely avoided divisive positions on Kosovo, Russia, and European integration. Does this strategic ambiguity facilitate broad democratic mobilization, or could Serbia’s unresolved geopolitical orientation become a major obstacle to democratic consolidation? How should the EU reconsider its longstanding engagement with Balkanstabilitocracies?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Yes, the students’ strategic ambiguity helped them mobilize broad support. This was particularly important because defeating Vučić required such support. That’s why they focused on issues that would bring people together rather than divide them. Citizens with very different foreign policy and ideological views could unite around demands for accountability and functioning institutions. However, the new government will have to be more explicit about its strategic orientation and foreign policy. In my view, a clear pro-European orientation would be important for Serbia’s further democratization.
One source of frustration among citizens in Serbia is that EU support helped sustain Vučić in power. This is what you refer to as stabilitocracy. The EU supported stabilitocrats such as Vučić to ensure regional security and peace in the Balkans. Regional stability certainly matters, but it should not become a justification for supporting autocrats or overlooking autocratization. In the long run, autocratization will also affect stability. This is something we all need to relearn.
The EU needs to engage consistently with questions of electoral integrity, media freedom, and judicial independence, while listening to civil society as well as government officials. Its credibility will depend on whether democratic standards guide its actions, even when they conflict with short-term political or economic interests, such as lithium mining.
Lessons from Serbia for Democratic Movements Elsewhere
University students protest at Beşiktaş Square in Istanbul on March 24, 2025, declaring a boycott in response to the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. Photo: Sadik Gulec.
Serbia’s student movement combined decentralized organization, nonviolent resistance, cross-class mobilization, and extensive election monitoring to challenge entrenched political power. Which elements of this experience might be transferable to movements confronting competitive authoritarianism or autocracies elsewhere, including Turkey, Georgia, or other countries experiencing democratic backsliding? What institutional, cultural, or geopolitical conditions limit the transnational diffusion of Serbia’s example?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Serbia’s experience shows that protests can contribute to a change of government, and this is not limited to Serbia; Brazil is another example. Citizens in other competitive authoritarian regimes could learn a great deal from the student movement. I would particularly emphasize positive messaging, clear demands, sustained activity across the country, mobilization across social groups, and a commitment to nonviolence, which was particularly important.
Extensive election monitoring also matters, as does drawing international attention to what is happening. I’m referring, for instance, to the students cycling to Strasbourg and Brussels. The involvement of the European Parliament was also important in drawing attention to developments in Serbia.
The relationships created through direct contact were especially important. Marches and visits to smaller communities allowed citizens to meet the students themselves and assess claims about the movement against their own experiences. This made it harder for hostile media narratives to undermine the movement.
However, these approaches cannot simply be transferred everywhere. In more closed autocracies, there may be less space to organize, elections may offer fewer openings, and repression can be more severe. Universities, local networks, and independent civic organizations may also differ in their capacity to sustain mobilization.
European countries outside the EU can sometimes benefit from the attention associated with the accession process and EU scrutiny. However, that attention is useful only if international actors are willing to respond. The Serbian case does offer some of these lessons, but we’ll see.
Serbia’s Democratic Future Depends on Citizens Remaining Politically Active
Finally, Professor Lončar, your work on political representation, authoritarian adaptation, and the performative dimensions of power suggests that democracy involves more than replacing incumbents through elections. What would constitute meaningful democratic consolidation in Serbia over the next four years? Can the student movement transform its moral authority and protest-based legitimacy into pluralistic, accountable institutions without reproducing the personalized power and political exclusions it mobilized against?
Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: That is certainly their goal. My first hope is that institutions will start doing their jobs. An independent judiciary, effective checks and balances, and free media would be important signs of progress. They would also shape how citizens perceive reality and the issues facing society. Many citizens believed what they heard in the media, and media control strongly shaped their perspectives.
An end to smear campaigns against civil society, the survival of civic activism, and opportunities for citizens to participate in decision-making would also be very important. These factors contributed significantly to the success of the student movement, and we should build on these resources and citizens’ willingness to become more active in politics. Citizens should also be able to scrutinize the government without fear for their jobs or safety. However, it is difficult to predict the next four years when we are still absorbing the election results and do not yet know what the new government will look like.
The student-backed candidates will have a strong parliamentary majority, giving them considerable room to act. Much will depend on their internal relationships, and maintaining cooperation could be difficult, as I mentioned earlier. Continued public scrutiny will therefore be essential. One of the clearest measures of success would be whether the next election allows citizens to choose freely and whether those in power accept that they can be replaced.
(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.
In this interview for the ECPS Voice of Youth series, Khayyam Rzazade, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Candidate at the University of Genoa and founder of PopuliVerse, argues that populism must be understood as a global political logic rather than a regional pathology. Drawing on his research into Europe’s foreign and defense policies, he examines how populist actors selectively politicize international affairs while often maintaining established strategic commitments. Introducing his concept of foreign policy activation, Rzazade explores the conditions under which foreign policy becomes a site of people-versus-elite contestation. He also discusses PopuliVerse, an innovative research platform connecting fragmented scholarly debates, and advocates a comparative, methodologically rigorous approach that takes citizens’ political motivations seriously across diverse geographical and ideological contexts.
As populist movements increasingly influence international relations, security debates, and defense policy, understanding their political logic has become essential to contemporary political scholarship. In this interview for the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) Voice of Youth (VoY) series, Khayyam Rzazade, founder and editor of PopuliVerse,argues that populism must be approached as a dynamic political phenomenon transcending ideological and geographical boundaries. Reflecting on his experiences across the post-Soviet space and Europe, Rzazade emphasizes that “populism needs to be studied as a global political logic, not a regional pathology.”
Originally from Azerbaijan, Rzazade is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Candidate at the University of Genoa, participating in IDEoPOP, an EU-funded doctoral network examining populism’s international dimensions. Supervised by Professor Fabrizio Coticchia and co-supervised by Professor Christian Lequesne at Sciences Po Paris, he has studied at institutions including Baku State University, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, and the College of Europe. His professional experience spans parliamentary work, European institutions, and university teaching.
Drawing on Ernesto Laclau, Benjamin Moffitt, and Cas Mudde, Rzazade conceptualizes populism not as a fixed ideology but as “a way of constructing politics around a fundamental division between ‘the people’ and an elite that is said to betray them.” His approach identifies three interconnected repertoires: plebiscitarian mobilization, antagonistic identity construction, and crisis performance. Crucially, these practices vary across political contexts, allowing the same actors to adopt populist rhetoric selectively.
This framework informs his doctoral research on how populist actors shape Europe’s foreign and defense policy, particularly amid Russia’s war against Ukraine, European rearmament, and uncertainty in transatlantic relations. Challenging assumptions that populist governments necessarily overturn established international commitments, Rzazade observes that “they pick their battles, making a loud people-versus-elite argument on one foreign policy issue and remaining entirely conventional on the next.”
His concept of foreign policy activation examines when governments transform international questions into populist political conflicts. Despite growing domestic contestation, he argues that institutional commitments to NATO and the European Union frequently constrain radical policy departures. Consequently, populist governments often produce “change within orientation rather than change of orientation.”
Beyond his doctoral research, Rzazade discusses PopuliVerse, an initiative connecting fragmented scholarly conversations through a research library containing more than 8,000 academic works, a monitoring publication, and a commentary platform. His ambition reflects a commitment to making comparative populism research accessible across disciplines and regions.
Ultimately, Rzazade advocates methodological openness and greater attention to understudied political contexts, particularly the post-Soviet world, Asia, and Africa. Rejecting both the pathologization and romanticization of populism, he argues that scholarly rigor requires recognizing that “the people populists speak to are not a research problem. They are citizens with reasons.”
The interview with Khayyam Rzazade is lightly edited to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
From European Foreign Policy to the International Dimensions of Populism
Photo: Dmitry Demidovich.
To begin, could you introduce yourself, outline your academic journey, and explain how your research interests developed? Why do you believe your area of research is particularly significant in today’s global political environment?
Khayyam Rzazade: I am a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Candidate at the University of Genoa, working within IDEoPOP, an EU-funded doctoral network on the international dimensions of populism. My research is supervised by Professor Fabrizio Coticchia in Genoa and co-supervised by Professor Christian Lequesne at Sciences Po Paris. I also founded and edit PopuliVerse, a platform for populism research, or as I like to call it, “the universe of populism.”
I come from Azerbaijan, and my studies have taken me from Baku State University to Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, the European Academy of Diplomacy in Warsaw, and the College of Europe in Bruges, with an exchange year in Minsk in between. I have also interned at the Parliament of Azerbaijan, assisted a Member of the European Parliament, and taught Political Theory and Political Analysis to undergraduates at Baku State University and International Security to master’s students at ADA University. It has been quite a journey, and each of these experiences has left its mark on how I think.
My interests began with European foreign and security policy, particularly how the European Union builds a common response to threats such as Russia. The longer I worked on these questions, the clearer it became that foreign policy is not made only in Brussels or in ministries. It is also contested in parliaments, in the media, and around kitchen tables, and populist parties were frequently the actors challenging the established consensus. When the IDEoPOP position was announced, it felt as if it had been written with me in mind. This is how I arrived at my current research on how populist actors shape foreign and defense policy in Europe.
I believe this research matters a great deal today. Foreign and defense policy were long treated as areas of elite agreement, relatively sheltered from party competition, and that is no longer the case. Populist parties now govern or share power in several European countries, while Europe faces the war in Ukraine, a major debate over rearmament, and an uncertain transatlantic relationship.
These are decisions with long-term consequences, and citizens increasingly expect a say in them. As someone who studies populism, I try never to forget that the word begins with the people. Understanding how populists speak to citizens about security, and why so many citizens listen, is essential if Europe wants its foreign policy to remain both coherent and democratic.
Intellectual Influences: From Political Theory to Personal Experience
Who or what has most profoundly influenced your intellectual development? Are there particular scholars, books, experiences, or even unexpected sources of inspiration that have fundamentally shaped your thinking?
Khayyam Rzazade: My intellectual development has been shaped as much by places as by texts. Growing up in Azerbaijan, a young state in a difficult neighborhood, taught me early that foreign policy is never an abstraction. It touches borders, families, and daily life. Later, working at the European Parliament, I saw from the inside how slowly and carefully common European positions are built, and how fragile they can be. These two experiences still frame how I read everything else.
Among scholars, three have influenced me most. Ernesto Laclau taught me to treat populism as a political logic rather than a fixed set of policies, which is the starting point of my own conceptual framework. Benjamin Moffitt’s work on populism as a political style, and especially on the performance of crisis, showed me that how populists speak and behave matters as much as what they claim to believe. Cas Mudde’s ideational approach, even where I depart from it, gave the field a shared vocabulary without which comparative work would hardly be possible. I would also add my supervisor, Fabrizio Coticchia, whose work on Italian defense policy convinced me that defense is a domain of party politics and public opinion, not only of strategy.
The less expected sources are sport and teaching. Long-distance running and cycling have taught me more about patience and consistency than any methods course, and a doctorate is above all a test of both. Teaching undergraduates in Baku taught me that if I cannot explain an idea to a twenty-year-old in plain words, I probably do not understand it well enough yet. I still apply that test to my own writing.
Studying International Politics Across Different Academic and Cultural Contexts
Having studied and worked in several countries, how have different academic environments and cultural contexts shaped your understanding of international politics? Have these experiences challenged any of your earlier assumptions about the subjects you study?
Khayyam Rzazade: Studying in Baku, Minsk, Venice, Warsaw, Bruges, and now Genoa and Paris have given me something no single institution could: the habit of noticing how differently the same event looks from different parts of the world.
In Baku, international politics was taught and discussed as a matter of survival for a small state between large neighbors. In Minsk, I saw a political system where the gap between official discourse and everyday conversation was wide, and where people had learned to read between the lines. Venice introduced me to the Italian tradition of thinking about politics historically and theoretically. Warsaw taught me how real the Russian threat feels on the EU’s eastern border. Bruges and Brussels showed me the European Union from the inside, with its achievements and its endless compromises. Each place shifted my vantage point a little, and I think that is exactly what a scholar of international politics needs.
These experiences challenged two assumptions I once held. The first was that there is a single “European” view of security. There is not. What looks like excessive caution in Rome looks like dangerous naivety in Warsaw, and both positions are held by serious and well-informed people. This is one reason why I became interested in the domestic contestation of foreign policy.
The second assumption was that populism is mostly a Western phenomenon tied to recent economic or cultural grievances. Coming from the post-Soviet space, where appeals to “the people” against corrupt elites have a long and complicated history, I became convinced that populism needs to be studied as a global political logic, not a regional pathology.
On a more personal level, moving between academic cultures also taught me humility. Each system values different things: the argument in one place, the data in another, the elegance of the prose in a third. I have tried to take a little from each. And I have learned that a good espresso and a long walk solve more research problems than one might expect.
Understanding Populism as a Political Logic
How do you conceptualize populism in your own research, and what led you to adopt that approach? Has your understanding of the concept changed as your research has developed?
Khayyam Rzazade: In my research, I treat populism as a political logic rather than as a fixed ideology or a particular family of parties. By political logic, I mean a way of constructing politics around a fundamental division between “the people” and an elite that is said to betray them.
What makes this logic observable is how it is enacted. Here, I work with three repertoires that actors can deploy to a greater or lesser degree. The first is plebiscitarian mobilization, which means appealing directly to the people over the heads of institutions and intermediaries. The second is antagonistic identity construction, which means defining who belongs to the people and who stands against them. The third is crisis performance, which means presenting the political moment as an emergency that only the populist actor can resolve. I treat all three as gradational, so a party can be more or less populist across time and across issues.
I adopted this approach for a practical reason. My empirical domain is foreign and defense policy, where populist parties often say very little or say contradictory things, and where the question is not whether a party “is” populist but whether it chooses to make a given issue populist. A binary classification of parties cannot capture that. A gradational and issue-sensitive approach can. It also lets me work across quite different cases, from Podemos in Spain to PiS in Poland, without pretending they share an ideology.
My understanding has certainly changed. I began, like many students, with the ideational definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology, which is clear and easy to apply. Working with real speeches and real governments made me less comfortable with it. The same party can be fiercely populist on migration and entirely mainstream on NATO, and I wanted a framework that treats this variation as the interesting part rather than as noise.
I have also become more modest about what any definition can do. Populism is a concept scholars use to make sense of a messy reality, and I try to hold it lightly enough to let the cases surprise me.
The Future of Populism Studies: Beyond Competing Definitions
Populism remains one of the most contested concepts in political science. Which theoretical debates—whether over ideology, discourse, strategy, political style, or something else—do you consider most consequential for the future of the field, and what misconceptions do you encounter most frequently both inside and outside academia?
Khayyam Rzazade: The classic debate between the ideational, discursive, strategic, and stylistic approaches has been enormously productive, but I am not sure it is the one that will matter most in the coming years.
The four camps now largely agree on the core, which is the opposition between the people and the elite, and disagree mainly on where populism “lives”: whether in beliefs, language, organization, or performance.
The debate I consider more consequential is whether populism should be treated as a stable attribute of actors or as something that varies in degree across issues, moments, and audiences. This choice shapes everything downstream. If populism is a property of parties, we label a party populist once and then ask what populist parties do. If populism is instead a property of political action, the same party can be populist on one issue and entirely conventional on another, and the question becomes when and why an actor chooses to make a particular issue populist.
My own work takes the second view. I think the field is moving in that direction too, partly because text-as-data methods now allow us to measure populism speech by speech rather than party by party.
A second debate that deserves more attention concerns the relationship between populism and its host ideology. We still know surprisingly little about which outcomes are driven by populism itself and which are driven by the nationalism, socialism, or conservatism it travels with. In foreign policy, this question is unavoidable, because the “populist” and the “nationalist” explanation often predict the same behavior. Separating them is difficult.
As for misconceptions, outside academia the most common one is that populism simply means the far right, or that it is a polite word for demagogy. This misses left-wing populism entirely and turns an analytical concept into an insult.
Inside academia, the misconception I encounter most often is the assumption that populists have no real foreign policy. My research suggests the opposite. Populist governments frequently have quite coherent foreign policy goals, and the interesting question is why they choose to politicize some of them loudly and leave others untouched.
And perhaps one more, which I say with affection for my own field: we sometimes forget that the people populists speak to are not a research problem. They are citizens with reasons.
How Populist Actors Shape European Foreign and Defense Policy
Your doctoral research examines how populist actors influence foreign and defense policy in Europe, with a particular focus on Italy, Spain, and France. What have you found most interesting about the relationship between populism and foreign policy, and to what extent can populist movements fundamentally change a country’s international orientation once they enter government?
Khayyam Rzazade: What I have found most interesting is how selective populist actors are once they govern. The common expectation is that populists bring their anti-elite style into everything, including foreign policy. Looking closely at populist governments across Europe suggests something more deliberate. They pick their battles, making a loud people-versus-elite argument on one foreign policy issue and remaining entirely conventional on the next.
My current research theorizes this process, which I call foreign policy activation, and asks under what conditions a populist government chooses to turn a foreign policy issue into a populist one.
Two conditions appear central. A government needs the capacity to frame the issue, meaning a credible elite to blame and a leader able to carry the message. It must also not be trapped by its own authorship. A party that has signed a procurement contract or approved a mission while in office cannot later denounce it as an elite betrayal without contradicting itself.
On the broader question, my view is that populist governments rarely change a country’s international orientation in a fundamental sense, at least in Europe. NATO, the EU, and treaty commitments are heavy anchors, and most populist parties, once in office, discover that they value the room for maneuver these frameworks provide.
What populists do change is the politics around foreign policy. They turn settled issues into contested ones, alter the tone of alliances, and make certain commitments harder to deepen even when they do not reverse them. In some cases, such as Poland under PiS, this contestation went quite far.
But the overall picture is change within orientation rather than change of orientation. Whether that holds as populists govern for longer and in more countries at once is, frankly speaking, the question that keeps me working.
From Researching Populism to Building PopuliVerse
How did your interest in populism develop from your early academic studies into your current research, and what eventually led you to take on a more active role in supporting the wider research community through PopuliVerse?
Khayyam Rzazade: My interest in populism grew slowly and then all at once. As a student of international relations in Baku, I was trained to think about states, alliances, and power, and populism barely appeared in the curriculum.
It entered my thinking through the back door. I studied in Italy while the Five Star Movement was in government and wrote my master’s dissertation there on Brexit. Then, in Bruges, I kept running into the same puzzle. The European foreign policy I was studying in seminars was being contested at home by parties who claimed to speak for the people against the elites in Brussels, and the textbooks had little to say about it.
The pattern became impossible to ignore while I was writing my recently published article on the EU’s collective securitization of Russia between 2014 and 2022, which began as my thesis for the advanced master’s degree. National positions on sanctions and defense were shaped by domestic political struggles, and populist parties were often at the center of them. By the time the IDEoPOP position was announced, populism had moved from the margin of my interests to the center.
PopuliVerse came from a more practical frustration. When I began my doctorate, I spent months on a literature review and discovered that research on populism is enormous, scattered across political theory, comparative politics, international relations, communication studies, and sociology, and often invisible from one subfield to the next.
Every doctoral student working on populism was drawing the same map from scratch, alone, and that seemed a pity. I also noticed that populist actors do something new every week, and that there was no single place to follow those developments with a scholarly eye.
So, I decided to build the place I wished had existed when I started. I call it the universe of populism, partly as a joke and partly because I mean it. If it saves one early-career researcher a few of the months it cost me, it will have been worth building.
PopuliVerse: Addressing the Research and Information Gap
What inspired you to create PopuliVerse? Did you identify a gap in the resources available to researchers studying populism, or did your own research experiences reveal particular challenges that you wanted the platform to address?
Khayyam Rzazade: Both, really, and the two are connected. The gap I identified was not a shortage of research on populism but the opposite. There is a vast literature and no good way into it.
A search on any scholarly database returns thousands of results with no indication of which definition of populism a paper uses, which region it covers, or which “populism and X” debate it belongs to. A student interested in populism and foreign policy has to wade through work on populist communication, populist attitudes, and populist economics before finding what they need.
That is the problem the PopuliVerse Library tries to solve. It currently holds more than eight thousand academic works; each tagged along two axes: the approach to populism a piece adopts and the field it connects populism to. This allows someone to filter down to exactly the corner of the literature they care about. We do not host anyone’s PDFs. We point to the published version and let the authors and publishers keep what is theirs.
My own research revealed two further challenges. The first is speed. Populist actors generate news constantly, and scholars rarely have time to follow developments outside their own case. The PopuliVerse Monitor addresses this with a regular issue that records what populist actors did around the world, organized by region, alongside what was published in the field that month.
The second challenge is the distance between academic writing and public argument. There are very few places where doctoral candidates or more senior researchers can publish a short and well-argued scholarly piece. PopuliVerseCommentary is meant to be that place, published quarterly.
All of it is free, carries no advertising, and is designed to be citable, with DOIs and an ISSN application underway. I wanted it to be the kind of resource a serious scholar could cite without embarrassment, and a curious citizen could read without dealing with complicated language.
Building a Research Library Around a Contested Concept
Building a database of populism research involves decisions about which publications to include and how to categorize such a contested concept. How do you approach these methodological challenges, and how do you balance the need for a systematic resource with the diversity of theoretical perspectives within populism studies?
Khayyam Rzazade: The inclusion rule is simple. A work enters the Library if populism is a central object of analysis, not a passing reference, and if it has appeared in a peer-reviewed journal, an academic press, or a recognized policy institution.
I do not screen for theoretical approach, region, or conclusion. The moment a curator starts deciding which understanding of populism is the “right” one, the resource stops being a library and becomes an argument. My job is to make the field visible, and I have no intention of settling it.
The categorization is where the contested nature of the concept actually helps. Rather than imposing a single definition, the Library records the approach each work adopts, whether ideational, discursive, strategic, stylistic, or something else, as one of its tags. That turns the disagreement in the field into a filter.
A reader who works within the ideational tradition can find their colleagues, and a reader who wants to compare traditions can do so in a few clicks. The second axis tags the field populism is connected to, such as foreign policy, communication, or welfare.
Where a work resists classification, and many do, it carries more than one tag rather than being forced into one box. I will not pretend the system is perfect. Tagging eight thousand works involves judgement, and I correct errors as readers point them out. But I would rather have a transparent and improvable structure than no structure at all, and I think most scholars who have spent time drowning in search results would agree.
International Collaboration and the Importance of Academic Networks
Your work on PopuliVerse brings together perspectives from across the international research community. How have collaborations and academic networks influenced your intellectual development, your research, and your experience as an early-career scholar? What role do you think these networks play in advancing populism studies more broadly?
Khayyam Rzazade: I would not be doing this work without networks, and I mean that quite literally. IDEoPOP is itself a network: a group of doctoral candidates spread across several European universities and disciplines, all working on different aspects of populism’s international dimensions.
Having colleagues at the same stage who study the same phenomenon from other angles, such as communication or comparative politics, has corrected many of my assumptions before they reached paper. My supervisors in Genoa and Paris have been generous with their time, which is what an early-career scholar actually needs.
Co-authoring with Fabrizio Coticchia and colleagues in Genoa taught me how a paper is really built, and I am looking forward to a research stay at Monash University to work with Benjamin Moffitt, whose approach to populism has shaped my own. Each of these relationships began with an email I was nervous about sending.
For the field, I think networks do two things that individual scholars cannot. They move knowledge across the subfields that populism research is divided into, and they build the shared vocabulary that makes comparison possible.
Populism studies has grown very quickly and sometimes feels like several conversations happening in parallel rooms. Networks, whether formal projects, conference sections, or something like PopuliVerse, open the doors between those rooms.
That matters most for early-career researchers and for scholars outside the main Western European and North American centers, who often have excellent cases and limited access to the conversation. Bringing them in is not only fair; it is how the field gets better.
Connecting Academic Research with Public Understanding
Beyond academic publications and resources for other researchers, what impact would you ideally like your work to have? How can populism research contribute to understanding and addressing democratic challenges while maintaining scholarly rigor and independence?
Khayyam Rzazade: The impact I would most like to have is on how people talk about populism, inside and outside the seminar room. In public debate, the word is used either as an alarm or as an insult, and neither helps anyone understand what is happening.
If my research can help journalists, policymakers, and citizens see populism as a recognizable political logic with identifiable conditions and consequences, rather than a fever that strikes democracies from nowhere, I will consider that a real contribution.
The question of rigor and independence is one I take seriously, because populism is a field where it is easy to lose both. There is a pull towards treating populism as a pathology, which flatters the researcher and misreads the voters, and an opposite pull towards romanticizing it as the authentic voice of the people. Neither is scholarship.
The protection, in my view, is methodological honesty. Define your concept clearly, measure it transparently, let the cases contradict you, and publish the results even when they are inconvenient for your own politics.
PopuliVerse follows the same principle. It publishes work from every theoretical camp and does not take any editorial position on which is right. A field that studies the people-versus-elite divide should be the last to behave like an elite that already knows the answer.
Skills and Advice for the Next Generation of Political Scientists
Khayyam Rzazade advises young scholars to protect their lives outside the office, as he does through running, cycling, practicing yoga, playing ultimate frisbee, and teaching.
As academic research becomes increasingly international and competitive, which intellectual and practical skills do you believe young political scientists need most? What advice would you offer to early-career researchers entering the field today?
Khayyam Rzazade: I think young political scientists need three things.First, a method they can really do, not just describe. Pick one method and learn it well.Second, the ability to write clearly. Most good ideas in our field are lost in bad sentences. If a reader cannot follow your argument on the first try, the problem is usually the writing, not the reader.Third, patience with theory. It is tempting to jump to data, but a paper with no clear concept behind it will not survive review, and it should not.
On the practical side, my advice is simple. Find a niche where two fields meet and few people stand. Mine is populism and defense policy. It is a small corner, but it is mine.
Send the email you are nervous about. Almost every opportunity I have had began with a message to someone I did not know. Build something that helps others, whether a dataset, a reading list, or a platform, because it teaches you the field faster than reading alone, and people remember you for it.
And protect your life outside the office. I run, cycle, practice yoga, play ultimate frisbee, and teach. A doctorate is a long race, and you cannot sprint the whole way.
The Future of Populism Studies: New Questions and Understudied Regions
Looking ahead, how do you see populism studies evolving over the next decade? Which research questions, geographical contexts, or neglected areas deserve greater scholarly attention?
Khayyam Rzazade: I expect the field to move from asking what populism is to asking what it does and under which conditions. The definitional debates of the last twenty years were necessary, but they have reached the point of diminishing returns.
The more productive questions now concern populism in power over long periods. Most of our theories were built on populists in opposition or in their first term. We know much less about what happens when they govern for a decade, as in Hungary or Poland, or return to office after losing it.
Foreign policy is part of this shift. For a long time, it was a footnote in populism studies, and I think it will become one of the main chapters because the international consequences of populist government are now impossible to ignore.
Methods will change too. Text-as-data tools and large language models will let us measure populism at a scale and precision we could not reach before. This will test many claims that have so far rested on a few well-chosen quotations.
Geographically, the field is still too centered on Western Europe, the United States, and Latin America. The post-Soviet space, where I come from, has a long history of appeals to the people against corrupt elites that fits our definitions poorly and deserves its own theorizing. South and Southeast Asia and much of Africa are similarly understudied.
One more neglected area is the voters. We have thousands of studies of populist leaders and far fewer that take seriously the reasons ordinary people give for supporting them. For a field named after the people, that is an odd gap, and I hope the next decade closes it.
A Global Observatory of Populist Discourse
On your personal website, you describe how increasing your intellectual capacity and learning bring you happiness. If resources, time, and institutional constraints were no obstacle, what research project would you most like to pursue in the future? More broadly, what do you hope will ultimately be the lasting contribution of your work to both scholarship and public understanding?
Khayyam Rzazade: If nothing stood in the way, I would build a global observatory of populist discourse. Imagine every parliamentary speech, party manifesto, and leader’s address in every democracy, continuously collected, translated, and measured for populist framing with transparent methods, and open to anyone who wants to use it.
We would finally be able to see populism rise and fall across issues, countries, and decades in something close to real time, and to test our theories against the whole world rather than a handful of cases we happen to know.
A project of that size needs a team, funding, and years, which is why I say it is a dream. But PopuliVerse is, in a modest way, a first step towards it, and I have learned that first steps tend to lead somewhere if you keep taking them.
As for a lasting contribution, I would be happy with two things. In scholarship, I hope to leave behind a clear theory of when populist actors turn foreign policy into a people-versus-elite struggle and when they leave it alone.
I also hope that my way of defining populism, which is deliberately eclectic and borrows from the ideational, discursive, strategic, and stylistic traditions rather than picking one, proves useful to others who find the camps too narrow for the cases in front of them. Alongside that, I hope to leave a resource that helps the next generation of scholars find their way into the field faster than I did.
In public understanding, I hope people will one day use the word populism more carefully, as a description of a way of doing politics rather than a verdict on the people who vote for it.
That line on my website is true. Learning is what makes me happy, and I would like my work to leave others a little more curious than they were before.
As governments increasingly embrace artificial intelligence as a pathway to technological sovereignty and economic development, its ecological consequences demand greater scrutiny. In this commentary, Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja uses the concept of “algorithmic green grab” to examine how AI-driven infrastructure expansion may concentrate control over electricity, water, and land while disproportionately transferring environmental costs to vulnerable communities. Focusing on Nigeria’s digital ambitions, Dr. Solaja explores the tensions between populist promises of technological independence, corporate interests, ecological justice, and democratic accountability. Drawing on political economy and environmental justice perspectives, he argues that genuine digital sovereignty requires transparent resource governance, meaningful community participation, and equitable distribution of benefits. The commentary calls for integrating ecological responsibility into national strategies for AI development.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly perceived as a tool for national development, economic competitiveness and technological sovereignty. Governments are investing in data centers, cloud infrastructure and digital platforms, sometimes calling them critical to national independence in today’s competitive world economy. But the political rhetoric of “digital transformation” often clouds over the physical circumstances that make it feasible. AI requires electricity, water, land, minerals and wide industrial networks, large infrastructure. The seemingly intangible nature of this footprint therefore hides a more and more significant ecological footprint.
Global electricity consumption by data centers rose about 17 percent in 2025, and consumption by AI data centers grew by about 50 percent, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). It estimates the total electricity used in data centers could reach 950 terawatt-hours by 2030 – compared with about 485 terawatt-hours in 2025 (IEA, 2026). The numbers are not representative of environmental pressures caused by all data centers. They do, however, prove that digitalization is an emerging issue of energy governance and environmental responsibility.
This commentary develops the idea of algorithmic green grab as a way to think about the political-economic dynamic of the expansion of AI and digital infrastructure and its centralization of control over ecological resources, while also potentially shifting ecological costs to communities who have less influence over the decisions being made. It makes the claim that the politics of digital sovereignty requires a consideration of not only who owns data and technology, but also who controls the energy, water and land that supports them.
When Sovereignty Becomes a Political Promise
Digital sovereignty is a very appealing political idea. It offers governments better control of national data, technology infrastructure and strategic capacities, especially in an era of proliferating digital platforms and computing capabilities in the hands of large corporations, geopolitical power players. Such concerns are legitimate. Governments may be limited in policy options by relying on external technology vendors and also may be vulnerable to commercial and geopolitical risks.
Sovereignty may also be a political story, however, in which governments claim that technology investments are a national necessity that must be taken for granted. This is where it meets populism. A populist political rhetoric often creates a separation of a people or a nation and far away or strong forces threatening them. In digital policy, this difference can be harnessed by pushing backs against foreign corporations, international rivals or domestic middlemen for technological control.
The challenge that comes when the language of national empowerment hides inequalities within the nation. A data center can be in the country but not be owned, governed or be democratically accountable within the country. Likewise, the storage of domestic data does not equate with technological independence, and foreign investment does not equate with broadly spread developmental gains.
The notion of the algorithmic green grab is based upon the wider political-economic idea of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003) and the critique of data colonialism formulated by Couldry and Mejias (2019). It expands on these insights by foregrounding ecological resources and environmental relationships that are involved in the accumulation of the digital. The issue is not just that corporations get data from societies, but that digitalization might exacerbate contests for electricity, water and land, and that benefits and costs of this development might not be shared equally.
It’s not a case of saying that all digital sovereignty projects are populist and environmentally destructive. Instead, it highlights a political risk: A technological solution perceived as a necessary means of national affirmation can become subject to checks and balances concerning its distribution and ecological impact, which can be interpreted as a threat to progress. The political is then a sub-genre of technological success.
Nigeria’s Digital Ambition and Its Ecological Test
Nigeria is an important example of this tension. The country’s digital development agenda increasingly focuses on domestic infrastructure, investment and innovation and technological capacity. According to the Federal Ministry of Information and National Orientation (2025), four data centers are being built in Lagos State in April 2025. The Federal Ministry of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy (FMoCID) announced on August 31, 2026, the release of a National Digital Cloud Policy to facilitate investment, digital sovereignty and government transformation, including the development of the nation’s digital capabilities.
These are the good intentions of strengthening the position of Nigeria in digital economy. But there are questions that can’t be resolved based on investments or technology. How will any extra demand for electricity be met? How will water and cooling be controlled? How will land acquisition be evaluated, local infrastructure pressures and environmental risks be evaluated? Who is to gain economically and how will the affected communities be involved in decision making?
These are questions which would need evidence that relates to the project level, and it is too early to declare that, for example, reported facilities have already resulted in specific water depletion, electricity shortages or displacement. However, the lack of available, detailed and accessible environmental data would raise governance issues. Digital infrastructure should not be treated differently to other large-scale industrial projects for transparency and environmental assessment.
The Nigerian situation is another example of why it is important to differentiate ecological sovereignty from national sovereignty. A state can tighten its grip over the infrastructure but cannot guarantee equitable access to the resources on which this infrastructure depends. Algorithmic ecological sovereignty thus means the democratic and institutional power for governments and interested communities to shape the environmental decisions, resource allocation and accountability processes that support digital systems. It does not impose ecological justice as an outside constraint on technological independence, rather than a part of it.
From Digital Sovereignty to Ecological Accountability
Aerial view of a new AI hub and data center under construction on the outskirts of Columbus, Ohio, USA, on November 2, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.
The environmental implications of data infrastructure are not inevitable or uniform. They depend on technological design, energy sources, cooling systems, location, regulatory standards and institutional accountability. The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s account of water reuse in Quincy, Washington, describes a facility developed through collaboration between Microsoft and the city to reduce reliance on potable groundwater. Operational since 2021, the system offsets an estimated 138 million gallons of water demand annually (US EPA, 2023). Although this arrangement cannot simply be transferred to Lagos or other Nigerian locations, it demonstrates that infrastructure design and public regulation can influence the distribution of environmental costs.
Four Governance Principles Stand Out as Especially Significant
First, mandatory environmental transparency should accompany data-center development. Electricity usage, water needs, cooling solutions, emissions impacts and resource management plans should be made public by operators and relevant public agencies. This kind of data helps citizens, researchers and regulators assess the true costs of digital expansion.
Second, cumulative pressures need to be taken into account during environmental assessment. Individual facilities can meet regulatory standards, while the cumulative impacts of several developments can put increased stress on the existing electricity, water and land infrastructures. Assessment must therefore take into account project-specific impacts as well as the broader context of the ecological conditions of host communities.
Third, public incentives must be related to proven public value. Concessions, land allocations and infrastructure should be tied to quantifiable pledges in the areas of energy efficiency, responsible water use, skills development in the local community, environmental protection and community benefits. Investment is not an investment objective.
Fourth, there must be pathways for involvement of affected communities. Consultation should occur prior to making critical decisions, with information being available and mechanisms in place to raise concerns. This is not just a requirement of the procedures. It is at the heart of environmental justice, which has three dimensions: distributive, procedural and recognitional (Schlosberg, 2007).
These principles also offer a means to assess political statements regarding digital sovereignty. Citizens should be able to ask whether technological development bolsters collective control over resources, benefits communities in an equitable manner, and shields communities from environmental costs that fall unequally.
Conclusion
AI’s growth holds exciting potential for economic transformation, innovation and national development. But its environmental base requires a more critical comprehension of technology progress. Measuring digital sovereignty is not just about the placement of data centers or the amount of investments or even national cloud policies. It must also be evaluated in terms of governance of energy, water and land that digital systems rely on.
Algorithmic green grab points to the risk of new technologies re-producing the patterns of old forms of extraction and unequal development, but under the guise of innovation and national empowerment. Political pledges of independence subsumed into digital but not environmental accountability, risk digital sovereignty as a symbolic gesture rather than a substantive democratic state.
The question for Nigeria and other nations with aspirations to enhance their technology, then, is not whether or not technological advancement can be made at the cost of the environment. It is whether or not digital development can be structured to embed ecological resources, public responsibility, and community participation in technological sovereignty. What the societies that support the development of AI can and do say about who benefits, who is hurt, and whose ecological interests are considered will be as important for the future legitimacy of the development of AI as what algorithms can achieve.
References
Couldry, N. & Mejias, U. A. (2019). “Data colonialism: Rethinking big data’s relation to the contemporary subject.” Television & New Media, 20(4), 336–349. https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476418796632
Europe’s migration politics in 2026 reveal a growing convergence between radical-right populism and mainstream migration governance. In this scholarly review, Shaza Khalid and Maryam Hameed examine how grievances over housing, living costs, education, and public services are increasingly reframed through migration-related narratives—a process they conceptualize as the “migrantization of grievance.” Analyzing the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, return hubs, reception conditions, and the October 2026 protest wave, the authors argue that populist influence extends beyond electoral success into institutional policymaking. Through a structural, postcolonial perspective, they further connect Europe’s contemporary border externalization policies to historical interventions and asymmetrical relationships with the Global South, highlighting the tensions between migration control, democratic accountability, and fundamental rights.
By Shaza Khalid & Maryam Hameed*
This review examines the intersection of migration politics in Europe in 2026, focusing on populist radical-right agendas, mainstream policy convergence and Europe’s external relations. It argues that migration functions more as a screen onto which housing, cost-of-living and generational grievances are projected than as the root cause of the current unrest.
The review considers three developments: the Pact on Migration and Asylum and the Returns Regulation, which institutionalize deterrence, speed up returns and establish offshore ‘return hubs’; reception conditions for migrants, which remain far from uniform; and the protest wave that spread across France, Italy, Spain and beyond in October 2026. It situates these developments within a structural, postcolonial interpretation of Europe’s role in the Global South, linking the 2011 intervention in Libya, instability in the Sahel and the outsourcing of border control to Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania. It shows that setting the agenda, rather than holding office, is key to a populist movement’s success, and identifies gaps in research on populism and migration governance.
From Paris to Marseille, from Milan to Madrid, from Lisbon to Tirana, demonstrations spread in the second half of October 2026 across Europe. 1,314 people were arrested in nationwide protests in France just on Saturday, October 24, 2026, over the cost of living and the education system (CBS News/AP, 2026). Italy deployed more soldiers in Milan after looting and clashes, and the Italian government announced harsher punishments for minors (Barry & Associated Press, 2026). These scenes were quickly turned into an immigration story and Al Jazeera (2026) reported that “violence imagery is being used to back anti-immigration claims online, despite the root causes of these.”
This review begins where the gap left by protesters and the public discussion about what they mean lies. Insecurity is so diffuse that it can be filled with a ready-made explanation, and this is what populist actors do. Populism studies have long demonstrated that radical-right parties do well when they offer a ready-made explanation for diffuse insecurity (Mudde, 2007). The present moment implies another step: that unrelated grievances are being narrated in the language of migration, not only by populists but by growing numbers of mainstream governments.
The article proceeds in three steps. First, it examines the agenda of the radical right and how mainstream parties have embraced it. Second, it looks at the new policy design from 2026 and the reception conditions it promises and provides. Third, it raises questions that the prevailing discussion neglects: the historical and current position of Europe in the political economies from which many migrants originate. The argument is structural and does not attribute any instability in other parts of the world to any one European policy. It is also deliberately conceptual, inviting conceptual reflection as well as empirical material.
Populism, Civilizationism, and the Migrantization of Grievance
The populist radical right is a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism, in which “the people” are pitted against “elites” and “culturally threatening outsiders” (Mudde, 2007). Much of the modern right in Europe views this opposition in terms of civilizations, not just ethnic ones, and sees itself as a Christian or liberal Europe against Islam, as Brubaker (2017) notes. This is why the hostility to migrants can be supplemented with the claims to protect women’s rights, secularism or “European values.”
This review suggests that a similar process can be called migrantization of grievance. Housing shortages, stagnant living standards and pressure on public services are real and politically potent. When political entrepreneurs blame them on migrants, they are expressed in terms of membership, border control and issues that can be “solved” by visible state action. After that, mainstream parties use that translation to regain the voters, which in turn gives it respectability. Hans Kundnani has pointed to the influence of far-right ideas on identity, immigration and Islam, with the center-right becoming more like the far right (Ridgwell, 2024). This creates a vicious circle where populist agenda-setting outpaces populist office-holding.
Far-Right Objectives and Mainstream Convergence
This kind of agenda has strong grassroots support. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) achieved its highest result in Ipsos polling up to that point, at 28 percent in August 2026, while other polls in October showed the same result (International News and Views, 2026). In early 2026, France’s National Rally (RN) was reported to be getting more than 30 percent of the vote, and a French restriction on migration coincided with a surge in the far-right vote share, with housing problems and public service stress being key factors in the government’s thinking (Vision of Humanity, 2026). These are poll numbers, not election results, so the volatility of these numbers needs to be recognized.
The content of the agenda is not limited to restrictions. The AfD advocates “remigration” and was deemed an extremist organization by Germany’s domestic intelligence agency (The Conversation, 2026b). In Italy, a citizens’ initiative called “Remigration and Reconquest” garnered more than 50,000 signatures to initiate a discussion in parliament, including incentives for some migrants to leave and expanded deportation policies (Newsweek, 2026). The common thread is that people who are already residents, including second-generation citizens, are potentially removable, rather than controls being limited to who can enter.
Yet convergence is uneven. There is disagreement about Russia and Ukraine within the far right, but there is agreement on migration (Ridgwell, 2024), making migration a unique bridging issue for far-right parties. There is a spectrum of interventions, from restrictive policies to cordons sanitaires, with mixed outcomes. The case for studying convergence rather than party competition is that the policy shifts likely to have the greatest impact in 2026 come from institutions where the radical right does not govern.
The 2026 Policy Architecture: The Pact, Returns, and Externalisation
On June 12, 2026, the Pact on Migration and Asylum, comprising nine regulations and one directive designed to reform the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), entered into force across the EU (Consilium, 2026a; Eurodiaconia, 2026). Its declared objectives are “orderly” arrivals, “uniform” procedures, and a “fair balance” of solidarity and responsibility. Backers cite the real benefits: applicants now have access to free legal advice, and adults can work after 6 months instead of 9 (Eurodiaconia, 2026; Human Rights Watch, 2026a). Critics have replied that the same instruments can be used by states to block access to asylum procedures in vague cases of “mass influx” or “instrumentalization” of migration by third countries, and that states can “accomplish” their solidarity obligations by paying for asylum rather than accepting people (HRW, 2026a: 19).
The Pact is supported by the Returns Regulation. EU negotiators reached a provisional agreement on a new regulation that imposes strong measures on those without a right to stay and allows member states to designate a return hub in a third country as a final destination for migrants or as a transit point (Consilium, 2026b). Deportees could be dispatched to hubs with which they have no connection, and the Netherlands is looking to coordinate the movement with Denmark, Germany, Greece, and Austria, although it is said that discussions with Uganda have stalled (France 24, 2026). Legal analysis highlights that, under the framework, there is greater scope for longer detention, including for children and families, and that there is greater use of an expanded “safe third country” concept, which was adopted in February 2026 (The Conversation, 2026a). The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2025) has set out prerequisites without which return hubs could not comply with EU fundamental rights law.
Legal analysis highlights that, under the framework, there is greater scope for longer detentions, including for children and families, and that there is greater use of an expanded “safe third country” concept, which was adopted in February 2026 (The Conversation, 2026a). The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights [FRA], 2025) has set out prerequisites without which return hubs could not comply with EU fundamental rights law.
The policy justifications are not only political but also administrative: EU institutions have observed that merely 20% of deportation orders are implemented every year (Euronews, 2025). Yet, the design is strikingly similar to a populist idea that migration is, at its core, an issue of deportation. The center has not been taken over by populists, but it has adopted populist means to address real implementation shortcomings.
Reception Conditions and the Politics of “Amenities”
The recast Reception Conditions Directive lays down minimum standards for applicants (Consilium, 2026a; European Commission, n.d.), such as the requirement to provide housing, food, and clothing. The political dimension of the gap between standards and practice is twofold. Shortages and withdrawals are recorded for migrants. The FRA (2026) notes that, in Finland, reception conditions were temporarily reduced for asylum seekers, with their basic needs being met; a High Court judgment in Ireland awarded damages to asylum seekers who were left homeless on their arrival; and an Italian case involved the withdrawal of reception conditions from an asylum seeker and a child who refused a transfer. In the Netherlands, capacity has been under pressure, and there are limited prospects of being reallocated to housing (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2026). There is a description of uneven implementation of the Pact itself, with the legislation largely in place but the capacity for operational implementation limited in some places (Eurodiaconia, 2026). Moreover, there is criticism from advocacy organizations of the approach of placing asylum seekers in large centers away from host communities, which reduces contact with the host population (Jesuit Refugee Service Europe, 2024).
Visible reception arrangements are symbols for host societies. In areas with limited housing, the presence of government-sponsored housing for newcomers may be perceived as a privilege, even when it is of low quality. As AP reported, Spanish protests this autumn were fueled by a housing shortage, driven in part by population growth and the rise of short-term rentals, with the eviction of an 87-year-old tenant becoming a focal point of mobilization (Barry & Associated Press, 2026). The point is not that migrants are to blame, but that scarcity sets the stage for the success of such populist narratives of competition. Reception policy is thus a communication problem rather than a welfare one, and the lack of enough housing for everyone is the common denominator.
The October 2026 Protests: Migration as a Frame, Not a Cause
Students march through the streets of Paris, France, during protests that ended in riots on October 6, 2026.
The “Oct. 17 Movement,” which has just been formed, has been the principal instigator of these demonstrations, along with student federations, grassroots unions, and anti-war coalitions, and the demands include pensions, housing, anti-war activism, education, and corruption (Barry & Associated Press, 2026). Protests against the cost of living and over education in France resulted in 1,314 arrests just on Saturday, October 24, 2026 (CBS News/AP, 2026); another protest, organized by around 50 organizations, including unions, left-wing parties, and student groups, and aimed at a far-right demonstration, was also reported (CBS News/AP, 2026). Police counted 11,000 participants, while organizers claimed 26,000. Mobilization against the radical right is thus part of the protest landscape as well.
Milan is an illustration of the interpretive contest. In addition to foreign nationals, police reported that about 2,000 “very young” protesters took part in the looting, many of whom were “naturalized, second-generation Italians” who had not felt a connection to Italy and lacked prospects, according to a center-left city official (Barry & Associated Press, 2026). In Rome, a right-wing student organization broke away from the violence, and peaceful student demonstrations emphasized that they were not “rioters.” There are several additional factors, such as pension and housing marches in Spain, tenant protests in Lisbon, and student protests in Tirana, as well as a snap election in Spain planned for next month (Barry & Associated Press, 2026).
There are two analytical points to follow. The first is that most of this wave would be misdescribed as an “anti-immigration protest”; treating it as such embodies what this review terms the migrantization of grievance. Second, the actors who benefit from the misdescription are those who profit from making social conflict into border politics. Whether the radical right will gain electoral traction remains an empirical question; early polls offer some indication but should be treated with caution until elections are held.
Europe in the Global South: A Structural and Postcolonial Perspective
Discussions of populism and migration in Europe often begin at the border, overlooking the broader political economy that shapes migration patterns. A structural, postcolonial reading expands this analytical framework without reducing migration to a single cause. Libya provides one of the most extensively studied cases. Scholars link the collapse of Libyan state institutions following the NATO-led intervention in 2011 to the expansion of smuggling routes through the country. They also argue that Europe’s subsequent policy of transferring responsibility for migration control to Libya has facilitated exploitation and abuse (Feldstein, 2018). Pradella and Taghdisi Rad (2017) examine the same sequence of events through theories of imperialism and the global reserve army of labor to analyze migration from Libya. This does not necessarily mean that the intervention itself directly caused displacement—a question that remains contested—but rather that European policy decisions form part of the causal chain, rather than standing outside it.
The Sahel extends the claim. European-funded programs assumed that people migrate from the Sahara to Europe, yet research in the region shows that these initiatives disrupted a centuries-old migration system between Niger and Chad, where people suspected of smuggling were arrested (CORDIS, n.d.). Critics argue that EU migration control in the Mediterranean and military stabilization in the Sahel recreate a colonial asymmetry and geography in which the two regions are kept apart, and that today’s border violence is “a late consequence” of the violent confrontation between Europe and the Global South, as Danewid (2017) puts it.
This trend continues with the current policy package in the form of externalization. In its January 2026 update, the Commission allocated EUR 675 million for the southern neighborhood migration measures for 2025–2027 (borderline-europe, 2026). The 2023 EU-Tunisia memorandum is a template for the arrangements with Egypt and Mauritania (EUobserver, n.d.), and the EU agreed on EUR 210 million with Mauritania in 2024 (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2024). Tunisia was added to the EU list of safe countries of origin in February 2026, and in July 2026, a group of 46 organizations called for the suspension of border and migration-control support for the security forces in Tunisia because of violent interceptions and expulsions (HRW, 2026b). But analysts say that these funds go to the security forces of authoritarian allies rather than to local economies, which could address the drivers of migration (Khan, 2024).
The connection to “populism” runs both ways. Both externalization and return hubs enable governments to project control to domestic audiences while removing the violence from sight. Meanwhile, the populist rhetoric of “invasion” relies on forgetting that the policies it demands and the people those policies affect are historically rooted in the same relationships that explain the movement of people. So, no actors are excused from postcolonial analysis; the border is not the start of a chain; it is the end.
Conclusion and Future Research Agenda
This review has suggested that Europe’s migration politics of 2026 can best be understood as an interplay between three processes: agenda-setting by the populist radical right, convergence of policy in the mainstream, and an ongoing “externalization” of migration with the Global South. Migration as the master explanation of the unrest fails to come to terms with the fact that the grievances concerning housing, pensions, education, and corruption are real, and that their migrantization is more to the benefit of political entrepreneurs than protesters.
Four research gaps are identified below.
First, comparative research is needed to examine the effects of restrictionist policies on support for the radical right, drawing on election results rather than polling data.
Second, empirical studies should test the migrantization-of-grievance hypothesis—for instance, by examining how media coverage and parliamentary attention frame demonstrations over housing and the cost of living.
Third, the operational pressures on fundamental rights guarantees should be assessed through systematic monitoring of the Pact’s implementation and the establishment of the first return hubs.
Fourth, postcolonial studies and populism studies need to be brought into dialogue, as each generally treats the other as background context. As with many political movements, however, populism’s power in Europe lies in the questions it forces the mainstream to confront, while the answers offered by populists reveal as much about Europe’s historical entanglements as they do about the continent’s contemporary borders.
(*) Shaza Khalid is affiliated with Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII), Depok, West Java, Indonesia (ORCID ID: 0009-0009-7331-0329). Maryam Hameed is a student at the same university (ORCID ID: 0009-0001-7424-0459).
Brubaker, R. (2017). “Between nationalism and civilizationism: The European populist moment in comparative perspective.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40(8), 1191–1226. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700
CORDIS. (n.d.). International mobility, local economics and European cooperation policies in the central Sahara (MOLECOPS, Project No. 652755). https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/652755
Danewid, I. (2017). “White innocence in the Black Mediterranean: Hospitality and the erasure of history.” Third World Quarterly, 38(7), 1674–1689. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1331123
Pradella, L., & Taghdisi Rad, S. (2017). “Libya and Europe: Imperialism, crisis and migration.” Third World Quarterly,38(11), 2411–2427. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1350819
Ridgwell, H. (2024, October 2). “Far-right gains in Europe drive debate on migration, Ukraine aid.” Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/far-right-gains-in-europe-drive-debate-on-migration-ukraine-aid-/7808290.html
Brazil’s October 25 presidential runoff delivered a narrow victory for Lula da Silva, but the enduring strength of Bolsonarismo raises profound questions about democratic consolidation. In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor James N. Green, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes Professor of Latin American History Emeritus at Brown University, examines Lula’s electoral comeback, the institutional resilience of Brazil’s radical right, and the continuing threats of authoritarianism. Warning that “the far right in Brazil has not been defeated. It has merely lost a battle,” Professor Green explores conservative congressional obstruction, electoral delegitimation, religious fundamentalism, and democratic backsliding. Drawing on Brazil’s history of military dictatorship and democratic resistance, he emphasizes the indispensable role of grassroots mobilization, inclusive citizenship, and international solidarity in safeguarding democracy beyond electoral victories.
Brazil’s October 25 presidential runoff delivered a remarkable political reversal, with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva securing a historic fourth term after overcoming his first-round deficit against Flávio Bolsonaro. Yet Lula’s narrow victory, with 51.79% of the vote against Bolsonaro’s 48.21%, exposes a fundamental paradox of contemporary Brazilian democracy: electoral resilience coexists with entrenched authoritarian tendencies, institutional polarization, and the enduring political strength of the radical right. Rather than signaling Bolsonarismo’s demise, the election raises profound questions about the fragility of democratic consolidation.
In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor James N. Green, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes Professor of Latin American History Emeritus at Brown University, draws on his scholarship on military dictatorship, democratic resistance, social movements, and political polarization to assess Brazil’s uncertain democratic future. His central warning is unequivocal: “The far right in Brazil has not been defeated. It has merely lost a battle.”
Professor Green situates Bolsonarismo’s resilience within Brazil’s historically conservative political culture and the institutional strength of Bolsonaro-aligned forces in Congress. Although democratic institutions successfully resisted the attempted coup of 2023, he cautions that authoritarian political currents remain deeply embedded. “They want an authoritarian state,” he warns, emphasizing that some radical-right forces seek to undermine the rule of law and the separation of church and state.
The danger extends beyond electoral competition. Professor Green identifies parliamentary obstruction, potential impeachment initiatives, and the delegitimization of electoral institutions as significant threats to Lula’s presidency. Reflecting on the far right’s allegations of electoral fraud, he warns that such narratives undermine democratic participation itself: “If people don’t believe the system is trustworthy, they’re not going to take the time or make the effort to go out and vote.”
Drawing historical parallels with Brazil’s 1964–1985 military dictatorship, Professor Green underscores the indispensable role of grassroots mobilization and international solidarity in resisting authoritarianism. He argues that the social movements instrumental in Lula’s electoral comeback must remain politically engaged beyond election cycles while preserving their capacity to criticize the government.
The interview also examines the growing influence of conservative evangelical Christianity, the vulnerability of LGBT+ rights, and the transnational connections between Trumpism and Bolsonarismo. For Professor Green, democratic consolidation ultimately depends on inclusive citizenship and institutional accountability. As he emphasizes, “If that society doesn’t protect broad democratic rights for everyone, no one’s rights are guaranteed.”
Looking ahead, Professor Green anticipates mounting confrontation between Lula’s governing coalition and the radical right, warning that the next four years could “further intensify tensions between the left and the right and deepen the country’s polarization.” His assessment reveals why defeating authoritarian populism electorally is not equivalent to overcoming its structural foundations.
Here is our interview with Professor James N. Green, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
Grassroots Mobilization Secured Lula’s Victory
Brazilia’s Luiz Inácio Lula is seen during the 2022 election campaign in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on October 20, 2022. Photo: Aline Alcantara.
Professor Green, thank you for joining us. Lula overturned his first-round deficit to defeat Flávio Bolsonaro by 51.79% to 48.21% in the October 25 runoff. What explains this remarkable turnaround? Was it primarily anti-Bolsonaro mobilization, renewed confidence in Lula’s redistributive agenda, or a broader democratic reaction against right-wing populism?
Professor James N. Green: We have to fully understand how polarized Brazilian society is. The elections were close, despite the final victory for President Lula da Silva. In this regard, the coalition that President Lula established sent two messages. The first was a message against the anti-democratic tendencies of the Bolsonaro family, including the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, who is currently under house arrest for being involved in an insurrection against the democratic state. The second was a reaction against the threat of eliminating social programs established under Lula’s governments over the years, which have really transformed the lives of ordinary and poor people.
The polls had shown Lula ahead in the first round of the elections, making his campaign overconfident. When the election results were finally determined on October 5, Lula was 1.9% behind Flávio Bolsonaro, causing panic among his supporters.
Three things then happened. First, there were initially spontaneous and later organized national demonstrations throughout the country, with huge mobilizations in the streets in favor of President Lula. Second, a very sophisticated and effective media and social media campaign was launched to encourage people to move beyond their bubbles and zones of comfort and reach out to others. Third, people individually drew up lists of those who had not voted in the first round and whom they could persuade to go to the polls in the second round.
That made the difference. Ten million more people voted for President Lula in the second round than in the first, while four million more voted for Flávio Bolsonaro. Both sides gained, but Lula secured a larger margin, largely because of the mobilization of his base of support to get out the vote.
Lulism Faces an Uncertain Future Beyond Lula
People wait in a long line to receive food donations for lunch on a downtown street in São Paulo, Brazil, during a severe economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic on June 2, 2020. Photo: Nelson Antoine.
Lula has secured a historic fourth presidential term, yet his narrow victory raises questions about the durability of Lulism beyond his personal leadership. Should Lulism be understood as a form of inclusive left-wing populism, a pragmatic cross-class coalition, or a distinctive model of social-democratic governance? Can it survive politically beyond Lula himself?
Professor James N. Green: It’s all of the above and it’s a very complex situation. At the moment, the Workers’ Party (PT), founded in 1980, is the largest left-wing party in the world with a positive dynamic. While other left-wing parties around the world are shrinking in size, the Workers’ Party remains strong and was able to pull off this tremendous electoral victory.
Lula is a social democrat because that’s the camp in which he has found himself, in the sense that he is clearly dedicated to uplifting the lives of ordinary working-class people. He’s not an ideologue; he’s a very shrewd and excellent negotiator who builds broad coalitions, and that’s precisely what he’s done. He built a broad center-left coalition in the country, taking the air out of a centrist political party that had been important for many years after the return to democracy: the Brazilian Social Democratic Party. Lula basically absorbed that sector of society into this large coalition, further polarizing the country while carrying out a program of reforms that some people think is not enough.
The far right, however, thinks it’s way too much, alleging that Brazil is now under a dictatorship and that communism could emerge in the immediate future. All of these are exaggerated fears and discourses that are far from reality.
Lula has a big challenge ahead of him. He has not successfully found a political heir, and there will therefore be disputes over the next three years about who will be the candidate of the left in the 2030 elections.
At this point, only days after the final results of the second round of the elections, the strongest candidate is the governor of the state of São Paulo, Tarcísio de Freitas, who is part of the Bolsonaro camp. He has the biggest chance of emerging as the leading political force in opposition to Lula’s presidency and of leading the opposition in the 2030 elections.
However, that being said, anything can change in Brazil. It’s a very dynamic country with a very complex history, so it’s hard to predict what’s going to happen in four years when we’re barely getting over the election results and beginning to look at the kind of government the Lula administration will establish for his fourth term in office.
Despite Flávio Bolsonaro’s defeat, nearly half the electorate supported his candidacy, while conservative forces strengthened their congressional position. Does this outcome confirm that Bolsonarismo has evolved into an institutionalized radical-right movement independent of Jair Bolsonaro? What historical and social factors explain its resilience?
Professor James N. Green: In spite of a series of stereotypes portraying Brazil as an open, free, fun-loving country, with its carnival, tropical climate, etc., Brazil has a profoundly conservative political culture. Between 1945 and 1964, an interregnum during which Brazil held democratic elections, although the franchise was still limited, the voting blocs were divided basically into three groups: a third on the right, a third in the center, and a third on the left. And that is basically the situation today.
However, given the way elections work, there is a first round in which anyone can run for president, followed by a second round between the top two candidates. This tends to polarize the electorate between the left and the far right, although there are other candidates and political forces in the center representing that 33%, whose support is not reflected in the final presidential election results.
And so, Lula will have a difficult time in Congress. There are enough votes to initiate impeachment proceedings against the president, although, at this point, there are not enough votes to successfully impeach him. But they will try. The far right will definitely, at some point, try to seize upon a stumble by Lula and draw up impeachment charges against him in the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, before taking them to the Senate, where Lula currently has enough support to prevent his removal from office.
The current Congress is very closely linked to Bolsonaro’s political party, the Liberal Party, and the names of political parties in Brazil often have nothing to do with their ideology. I wouldn’t really call his party a liberal party, but that’s the name they’ve taken for themselves. They will therefore have a large bloc, enabling them to push the agenda to the right and block some of the social agenda that Lula will clearly want to carry out in his fourth and final term in office. And so, there’s going to be tremendous tension.
The Bolsonaro forces will continue to have influence as long as Jair Bolsonaro’s family remains politically effective. However, with two of his sons in exile in the United States, claiming that there is a dictatorship in Brazil and that they’re being politically persecuted, the political capital of the Bolsonaro family has weakened.
It’s possible that their support will shrink to a more normal 33% of the population in terms of congressional representation in the future. But at the moment, as you pointed out, they clearly have a hold on the political system, from the right to the far right.
Democratic Institutions Survive, but Authoritarian Threats Persist
Brazil’s former President Jair Bolsonaro poses with anti-riot police agents after cast their ballot in Rio de Janeiro, Brasil on November 29, 2020. Photo: Antonio Scorza.
Drawing on your scholarship on Brazil’s authoritarian past, how should we interpret Lula’s victory in the context of democratic backsliding? Does the electoral defeat of Bolsonarismo demonstrate the resilience of Brazilian democracy, or does its continuing institutional strength suggest that authoritarian tendencies have merely been contained rather than overcome?
Professor James N. Green: I think we have a situation in which democratic institutions have sustained the democratic system so far and managed to fend off an attempted coup d’état in 2023, when Bolsonaro’s forces invaded the seats of Congress, the Supreme Court, and the executive branch of government. That led to the conviction and imprisonment of Jair Bolsonaro, along with the conviction of certain individuals within the armed forces and his political movement who conspired with him to overthrow the government.
But the fact remains that the Bolsonaro forces have not been defeated. They feel very confident, despite having lost this election. They feel a great deal of strength right now, and their anti-democratic sentiments therefore remain a threat to the consolidation of democracy in Brazil. This is the greatest danger because they do not believe in the rule of law. They want an authoritarian state. Some of them want to eliminate the separation of church and state in Brazil and push for a non-secular government, one shaped by religious ideologies.
And so, there are still threats to democracy in the country. Lula has a very strong popular base of support that will sustain him in office, but democratic forces need to remain alert because the far right has not been defeated. It has merely lost a battle.
International Solidarity Remains Vital to Brazilian Democracy
In We Cannot Remain Silent, you document resistance to Brazil’s military dictatorship and the struggle to restore democracy. How does this historical experience illuminate contemporary Bolsonarismo? What similarities and differences do you identify between authoritarian practices under military rule and today’s radical-right populism?
Professor James N. Green: In 1964, the military took power in Brazil, promising to restore democracy at a time when a left-wing populist government was in power and the country was experiencing high inflation and economic problems. They claimed they would basically clean house, get rid of corruption, and then return the government to the civilian population. But they did not do that. They stayed in power for 21 years. And so, the struggle to end the dictatorship and consolidate a democratic regime has been one of the great challenges people have faced over this period.
Many people ask me why I got involved in Brazil. The simple story is that I met a Brazilian exile in Washington, D.C., in 1973. He had been arrested and tortured in 1970 and 1971. His family helped him leave Brazil and come to the United States. Together with other Brazilian exiles and supporters of Brazil, he had organized a movement to denounce torture and repression in the country. This developed into a grassroots democratic movement throughout the United States, in which academics, religious leaders, politicians, people with connections to Brazil, and a scattering of Brazilian exiles organized a very effective campaign to denounce the military regime and expose the human rights abuses committed during its time in power.
This solidarity, this identification with democratic forces in Brazil, was an important element in containing the excesses of the military regime over time. And so, in recent years, as the far right has once again lifted its head and threatened democracy, a very strong international solidarity campaign with Brazil has developed.
I participated in that movement to a certain extent, and we founded the US Network for Democracy in Brazil and the Washington Brazil Office, a nonpartisan NGO based in Washington, D.C., that advocates on issues concerning Brazil and informs the public about the country’s political and social situation.
What’s significant about this new movement is that in 2022, when Jair Bolsonaro realized he was probably going to lose the elections to Lula, he developed a discourse claiming that the elections were fraudulent and that the voting machines could not be trusted. He therefore tried to mobilize sectors of the armed forces to carry out a coup.
In response, both the Biden administration and forces within Congress sent a clear message to the Brazilian military that the United States would not tolerate a coup d’état or interference in the democratic process. This is very significant because, in 1964, the United States supported the military when it came to power and continued supporting the generals for many years. So, this shift in US foreign policy, coupled with clear denunciations in Congress, created a split within the armed forces. One sector refused to join the attempted coup d’état, and the attempt failed.
This international solidarity, documented in my book We Cannot Remain Silent—which takes its title from the first petition circulated in 1970 about the situation in Brazil—illustrates not only the historical experience of the 1970s and 1980s, when people supported democratic forces in Brazil, but also more recent years, when academics, activists, and others have mobilized significantly to denounce threats to democracy and support democratic forces within the country.
I think they’ve been very successful in that regard. My book shows that this solidarity was very important in the past and remains important today. It is one of the bastions for guaranteeing that Brazil remains a democratic country.
Far-Right Resilience Threatens Brazil’s Political Stability
Brazilian National Congress at sunset. Brasília, Federal District, Brazil, August 26, 2018. Photo: Diego Grandi / Dreamstime.
You have previously traced the intensification of Brazilian political polarization to developments beginning during Lula’s first administration. How does this historical trajectory help explain the exceptionally close 2026 election? Has polarization become structurally embedded in Brazilian democracy, extending beyond the personalities of Lula and Bolsonaro?
Professor James N. Green: The situation in Brazil reflects what’s happening worldwide. We’re seeing intense polarization in Europe and certainly in the United States, although we’re soon going to see a resounding defeat for President Trump’s policies in the elections to Congress and for governors and state legislatures in the United States.
This polarization, evident in Brazil, is also occurring across Europe, where the threat of far-right governments coming to power in France, the rise of the pro-fascist right in Germany, and the presence of conservative or semi-fascist governments in other parts of Europe are creating a very alarming situation for people around the world. We see the possibility of the far right consolidating its position in many parts of the world.
In Latin America, for example, most governments now in power are led by elected far-right or right-wing candidates. This is particularly the case in South America. At the moment, only three countries—Uruguay, Mexico, and Brazil—have center-left political parties in power. So, this threat is real. As you point out, the elections were so close that one cannot speak of a defeat of the far right in Brazil, but merely its containment—and an unsuccessful containment in Congress—which raises serious questions about the future.
Further victories by the far right can encourage its forces, whereas defeats, as will take place in the United States, could potentially discourage them. Brazil finds itself in a middle ground between strong far-right support for the opposition and Lula’s important but still narrow victory. This points to a somewhat unstable situation in Brazil, given the continuing strength of the far right.
Congressional Resistance Could Paralyze Lula’s Agenda
Lula enters his fourth term facing a conservative Congress in which Bolsonaro-aligned forces retain substantial influence. Could parliamentary obstruction and institutional confrontation constrain democratic governance even after the presidential defeat of the radical right? How should we distinguish legitimate legislative opposition from practices contributing to democratic backsliding?
Professor James N. Green: The question concerns the proposals that different political forces will put forward in the new Congress. What legislative proposals will they actually present that will affect the people of Brazil? This is especially important in addressing rising inflation, the high cost of living, a large domestic debt, and a government deficit resulting from huge spending on government programs. These problems could cause a very serious economic crisis in the next two or three years, weakening the legitimacy of the Lula government and opening the door, as I mentioned earlier, to possible impeachment proceedings.
So, the question really is whether Lula, together with his allies in Congress, can build a large enough coalition that, while not necessarily agreeing with all the political positions defended by the Workers’ Party and Lula, is nevertheless deeply concerned about holding back democratic backsliding in the country.
In this regard, Lula is currently putting together his new government, which will include members of centrist political parties that did not field a presidential candidate but remained open to supporting either of the two candidates, depending on who won. These parties will likely receive positions in government ministries, where they will be able to appoint their supporters to key political posts and exercise influence over government policy and practice.
Much therefore depends on Lula’s ability to win over potential opponents and bring them into his government. He did this during his last administration, but there was a problem: he recruited members of opposition political parties into his cabinet who served in the government, while their parties did not support the government in Parliament. Therefore, he has made it a condition for inviting people into his government that their parties commit to supporting government policies throughout his administration. Otherwise, they really shouldn’t be serving in the government.
One of Lula’s main challenges is thus to build a broad enough coalition to reduce some of the opposition to his governance while ensuring that these arrangements do not paralyze his ability to carry out his own political agenda over the next four years.
The Far Right Questions Elections Only When It Loses
Flávio Bolsonaro’s refusal to concede immediately and his challenge to electoral procedures have renewed concerns about institutional trust. In light of Brazil’s experience following the 2022 election, how significant are these developments? Can electoral institutions maintain democratic legitimacy when substantial political constituencies question the credibility of election outcomes?
Professor James N. Green: This is very interesting because the right-wing questions election outcomes when it loses, but when it wins, it doesn’t question the voting system. Brazil has an electronic voting system in which voters enter a booth and punch in numbers corresponding to their political party and its candidates. It’s a very efficient system. We know the results within an hour of the polls closing, and the outcomes have never been seriously challenged by legitimate forces. In this most recent election, there were outside international observers, and no one raised any questions about the outcome.
Moreover, no one on the far right questioned the victory of the majority of its supporters in Congress. So, somehow, the voting machines worked when they elected their supporters but didn’t work when they lost the presidential race. This undermines the electoral process and creates a sense of illegitimacy by casting doubt on the country’s existing voting system, which is extremely trustworthy, in my opinion.
This opens the door to a narrative that the elections were stolen, that Flávio Bolsonaro actually won, and that such a shift in voting between the first and second rounds of the election simply wasn’t possible. This narrative will be used to discredit the Lula government by claiming that it’s illegitimate. That, in turn, affects the entire democratic system in the country.
If people don’t believe the system is trustworthy, they’re not going to take the time or make the effort to go out and vote. This is very alarming for those who believe in consolidating democracy in Brazil rather than undermining it, which is what the far right is actually doing when it questions the final election outcome.
Social Movements Remain Essential to Brazilian Democracy
Brazilian women in Campinas, São Paulo, take part in the nationwide #EleNão (Not Him) protests against far-right presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro on September 29, 2018. Photo: Luiz Gustavo Freitas Rossi / Dreamstime.
Your historical research emphasizes the role of organized labor, students, and social movements in Brazil’s democratization. How important were grassroots organizations and renewed voter mobilization in Lula’s second-round recovery? Can this electoral coalition develop into a sustainable social movement capable of challenging Bolsonarismo between elections?
Professor James N. Green: What’s important to understand is that, before the military came to power in 1964, there was an upswell of social movements, especially around issues of land and workers’ rights, which was cut off when the military took power. Between 1968 and 1977, it was virtually impossible to organize a public demonstration against the military regime.
In 1977, students mobilized after some students and workers involved in leafleting in a working-class neighborhood were arrested and tortured. This sparked national demonstrations against their arrest and treatment in prison, opening the door to further mobilizations. The following year, the labor movement went on strike to demand wage increases in response to high inflation. This sparked a resurgence of the labor movement in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, as the country was transitioning to democracy.
These social movements were extremely important in demanding democracy during the late 1970s and 1980s and, after democracy was re-established, in consolidating social rights through the drafting of a new constitution in 1987–88 and the implementation of its best elements to guarantee broader democratic rights for citizens.
For example, before the Constituent Assembly of 1987–88, people who were not literate were not allowed to vote. That changed when literacy requirements were eliminated, along with prohibitions on Marxist and left-wing political parties. These parties were then allowed to field candidates, run for office, and participate in the electoral system.
This represented a very important consolidation of democracy. Similarly, the movements against the Bolsonaro government when it was in power, as well as the movement to defeat Flávio Bolsonaro, were driven in large part by social movements throughout the country. These included rural movements demanding land rights and urban social movements of all kinds, from those addressing homelessness to those seeking to expand democratic rights for different segments of society.
These movements were very important in mobilizing the additional 10 million people who voted in the second round of the elections. I think they will also provide an important base of support for the Lula government while pushing it to the left when it becomes stalemated or struggles to determine its future direction as it tries to implement policies. So, social movements are very much alive and well and remain strong. They will be a very important component in guaranteeing democracy in Brazil over the next four years.
Conservative Evangelicals Sustain Bolsonarismo’s Social Base
Lula’s social-policy credibility appears to have contributed to his runoff comeback, particularly among economically vulnerable voters. Yet Bolsonarismo retains substantial working-class support. How does this apparent contradiction reflect changes in Brazilian class politics? Can redistributive policies alone sustain progressive political identification amid cultural polarization and economic insecurity?
Professor James N. Green:
This is a very important question, as have been all the others. In 1970, if you had asked people about their religious identification, 90% would have said they were Catholic. There were small percentages of Jews, Muslims, people who supported Afro-Brazilian religions, and Protestants, but the country was overwhelmingly Catholic.
Today, 30% of the population consists of evangelical Christians. They’re fundamentalists, and there are tens of thousands of churches. If you go to a working-class neighborhood, you’ll find four or five small churches on every corner, run by pastors from the community who build a sense of belonging and welcome poor and vulnerable people. They offer social networks and connections that help people make contacts, find employment, and resolve problems they might be facing with their families. This has built a very strong base of support for the conservative social, cultural, and political policies promoted by these evangelical Christians. They formed the base of support for the anti-Lula coalition.
Lula had very strong backing from the Catholic Church, particularly its left wing, during the early years of the Workers’ Party’s formation. But that influence declined as the Catholic Church lost ground to evangelical Christians. Lula also lost support among evangelical Christians from working-class and poor families, which reflect his own origins.
So, one of the big challenges over the years has been balancing the defense of a broadly democratic program with efforts to attract evangelical Christians whose ideas and beliefs are not democratic and who don’t believe in an open, democratic society that guarantees rights for everyone.
This is a dilemma that the Workers’ Party has faced. On the one hand, how do we defend our values and our program? On the other, how do we attract people who, for whatever reason, are not aligned with our political worldview?
This has been really difficult. This time around, some evangelical Christian churches backed away from an enthusiastic endorsement of Flávio. I don’t think they mobilized their base of support as effectively as they could have in the second round of the election. To a certain extent, this is one of the reasons why Flávio lost the runoff to Lula, amid an upsurge in support for Lula’s policies and presidency.
So, the challenges remain. There is a hardcore Christian fundamentalist radical-right movement aligned with the far-right parties in the country. They have influence in Congress, where they hold a bloc of votes, and they’re still strong enough both to impose their political program and to block progressive ideas from the left. This will be one of the many difficulties Lula faces over the next four years.
People take part in the celebration of Yemanjá in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil on February 2, 2019. Photo: Ember Stefano | Dreamstime.
Brazil’s LGBT Movement Can Resist Conservative Backlash
In your recent co-authored study,“LGBT+ Policies in Post-Redemocratization Brazil (1985–2025),”you demonstrate the institutional fragility and discontinuity of federal LGBT+ policies. What does Lula’s reelection mean for protecting these rights? Can his administration create durable institutional safeguards against future conservative reversals?
Professor James N. Green: This is a really good question. During the dictatorship, an LGBT movement emerged in Brazil, particularly in São Paulo and other cities, and it faced major challenges during the transition from dictatorship to democracy. But in the 1990s, the movement grew in size, and today, some of the largest pride parades in the world are organized in Brazil. There are probably 250 to 300 pride parades throughout the country commemorating LGBTQ rights.
At the same time, the movement has achieved specific changes in the law, largely through Supreme Court decisions that have broadened democratic rights. These include the rights to have same-sex partners, inherit from their partners, receive Social Security benefits, and obtain some form of legal recognition for relationships that exist beyond the normative standards traditionally established by society.
There are also a significant number of recently elected LGBTQ members of Congress who are very vocal. Erika Hilton, the transgender candidate elected to Congress with the largest number of votes, received 1.5 million votes, the highest number a woman has received in a congressional election. Other important members of Congress have also been elected throughout the country and are defending these rights.
The big challenge will be confronting a conservative Congress that is interested in rolling back some of the democratic achievements secured over the last 30 to 40 years. I think members of the LGBT community will be among the most vulnerable populations.
They’re very organized and highly mobilized, and they played a very important role in mobilizing support for Lula’s victory. So, this will be an ongoing dispute. It won’t be a simple battle; it will be very contentious over the years. But the movement is strong enough and has enough allies to block any serious rollback of its democratic rights in the country and perhaps even expand those rights during the four years of the Lula administration.
Without Universal Democratic Rights, No One’s Rights Are Guaranteed
Your biography of Herbert Daniel and your work on Brazil’s LGBT+ movement demonstrate how struggles against dictatorship became intertwined with demands for broader democratic inclusion. Following the 2026 election, what lessons do these experiences offer for contemporary coalitions defending minority rights, pluralism, and democratic citizenship against exclusionary populism?
Professor James N. Green: The question really is: What kind of democracy do we believe in? And do we really believe in democracy? People who have lived under authoritarian regimes that outlawed political parties, arrested and tortured political opponents, censored the press, and prohibited any kind of public demonstration against the regime come to value and understand, over time, the importance of democracy as a foundation, a baseline of support necessary to carry out any progressive social agenda.
My study of Herbert Daniel, who was involved in the armed struggle against the dictatorship, later came out as a gay man, and played a very important role in the fight to defend people living with HIV and AIDS, illustrates how people within the left eventually came to understand that we might have a long-term fantasy, a dream, or an aspiration for an economically and socially just society. But if that society doesn’t protect broad democratic rights for everyone, no one’s rights are guaranteed. This realization has helped strengthen the LGBT movement and enabled it to defend itself against the onslaught of the far right.
The big challenge over the next four years will be to consolidate that support and protection, along with the legislative and judicial decisions that guarantee democracy is not just for some people in Brazil, but for everyone, and that everyone has access to democratic rights, not just a select few. This commitment was a very significant part of the dynamic of the movement that defeated Flávio Bolsonaro, and it will help consolidate any advances that the Lula administration manages to achieve during what will be a very challenging next four years.
Bolsonaro’s Alignment with Trump Could Weaken His Movement
Supporters of Brazil’s former President (2019–2022) Jair Bolsonaro hold signs during a demonstration in São Paulo, Brazil, on September 7, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.
You have extensively examined the political connections between Trumpism and Bolsonarismo. How might Flávio Bolsonaro’s defeat reshape this transnational relationship? Could Trump’s political and economic interventions in Brazil unintentionally reinforce Lula’s nationalist appeal while helping sustain the Bolsonaro movement domestically?
Professor James N. Green: In 2025, when Donald Trump was going through his crazy phase of imposing 50% tariffs on countries around the world and then trying to negotiate something, he imposed those tariffs on Brazil, even though the United States has a positive trade balance with the country. The United States doesn’t have a trade deficit with Brazil, so there’s no reason to impose tariffs on Brazilian products entering the United States.
Nevertheless, the tariffs were imposed, and their removal was conditioned on ending the trial of Jair Bolsonaro, who, at the time, was facing charges before the Supreme Court for conspiring to overthrow the government. Lula received a demand that Bolsonaro’s trial be ended and that he be freed in order to eliminate the tariffs. So, already last year, Trump was imposing his political perspective on Brazil, conditioning the removal of high tariffs on freeing one of his allies.
I think the defeat of Flávio Bolsonaro, who immediately traveled to the United States, where he and his brother will now be living outside the law, will weaken them. His brother has certainly been convicted of crimes, and Flávio will likely be convicted of money laundering or other crimes he’s been accused of being involved in, not formally but informally. It’s likely that there will be some indictments in the immediate future.
Their position will be weakened in the United States, and their presence there merely encourages anti-American sentiment. Historically, the United States government has generally supported the wrong side in political battles in Latin America and Brazil. It supported the 1964 coup d’état and the military regime that followed, and it took a long time, until Jimmy Carter’s administration, to begin addressing human rights violations in Brazil and Latin America.
So, every time Trump does something that hurts Brazil, whether through tariffs or attempts to impose his will on the country, there is a strong anti-American backlash. And that helps Lula in the polls. The tariffs the United States has recently imposed on Brazil, which are 37%, are hurting the economy. There’s a strong sentiment that the United States is unjustified in what it’s doing, which gives the Lula administration more room to negotiate or try to change the dynamics of the situation.
The fact that a defeated candidate who claims there was electoral fraud is now in the United States and maintains close contacts with the White House is also unacceptable to some sectors of society that did not necessarily vote enthusiastically for Lula. They find this kind of subservience to the United States unacceptable.
Brazil has a strong sense of its national importance. It knows it’s a large and wealthy country, the eighth-largest economy in the world, with a huge territory and tremendous resources. It’s no longer willing to play a subservient role to the United States. And this will weaken Trump’s ability to impose his will on Brazil, especially if the Democrats win control of the House and perhaps the Senate, delivering a very strong blow to the Trump administration.
So, this is the situation. I think relations between the United States and Brazil will remain tense as long as Trump is in office. But Lula and his foreign ministry are very capable of pushing back and exploring whether they can negotiate tariff agreements and other accommodations with the United States, to the extent possible within this context.
Transnational Civil Society Remains Vital to Democracy
Through your work with the US Network for Democracy in Brazil and the Washington Brazil Office, you have emphasized the importance of international solidarity in defending democratic institutions. How might Lula’s reelection reshape Brazil–US relations under Trump? What role can transnational civil society play when ideological tensions between governments complicate diplomatic cooperation?
Professor James N. Green: What’s been important about the grassroots work of the US Network for Democracy in Brazil and the educational work of the Washington Brazil Office in the nation’s capital, especially in Congress, has been educating people about the situation in Brazil. Unfortunately, very few people know much about the country, its history, culture, and politics. And so, that’s an important element. Over the years, we’ve been very successful in raising awareness among Democratic members of Congress, who have been important allies of the democratic forces in Brazil.
Recently, since Flávio Bolsonaro fled to the United States, members of Congress have asked the Trump administration for clarification about how he was granted a humanitarian visa, what the conditions were, who allowed him into the country, what negotiations took place beforehand, and whether the United States had any involvement in the 2026 elections. Did far-right forces finance Flávio Bolsonaro’s campaign in any way? What are those connections?
All these questions will be investigated by the new Congress, especially if the Democrats win both houses. Even if they win only the House, they’ll still be able to pursue these investigations because there’s a large bloc of members of Congress who are aware of the situation in Brazil. Although this won’t be their top priority in the coming period—the main priorities will be addressing the high cost of living and ending the war in Iran—they’ll nevertheless raise these questions and put pressure on the Trump administration to ease up on its offensive behavior toward Brazil, perhaps by lowering tariffs or establishing a more favorable dialogue between the two countries.
Without these allies in Congress, these Democrats who have been willing to stand up and defend democracy in Brazil, we would have seen a much more cynical situation in the country, including the possibility of a coup d’état in 2023. We managed to avert that because of political forces in the White House, Congress, and civil society in the United States.
So, these movements are very important, both within the institutional structures of the United States, particularly Congress, and among civil society organizations in Brazil, which have learned over the last few years how to articulate their demands and concerns internationally in support of democracy and social justice in the country. These forces will need to remain active because, as I said earlier, we live in a very polarized time in which the balance of forces is constantly in dispute.
BRICS Strengthens Brazil’s Autonomy but Creates Contradictions
Lula’s victory preserves Brazil’s commitment to BRICS, closer economic engagement with China, and a more autonomous foreign policy. How might growing US–China competition affect his administration’s domestic political choices? Could Brazil’s pursuit of strategic autonomy strengthen national sovereignty while creating new economic and political vulnerabilities?
Professor James N. Green: Since the 1950s, the Brazilian government has pursued a policy of remaining largely equidistant and neutral between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. Brazil did not want to align itself too closely with either bloc. When the military came to power, it maintained this idea of autonomy on the one hand, while aligning itself very closely with the United States during the early years of military rule on the other. The US government supplied military and economic aid to the military regime to consolidate its hold on power.
This idea that Brazil needs to remain autonomous fits very interestingly with the concept of BRICS, which was developed by an economist to describe emerging nations that investors might want to consider: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa. The BRICS coalition has expanded to 20 members, and it’s a very interesting bloc because, economically, it represents an attempt to create a counterweight to the United States in the international arena. The United States really controls the international economic system through the dollarization of the world economy and a series of international institutions, including the World Bank, the IMF, and others, that sustain US economic dominance.
China’s role as a countervailing force in this competition between the United States and the BRICS nations is particularly significant. On the one hand, the United States has depended on China over the years as an industrial manufacturing base for producing cheap consumer goods for the American market. On the other hand, this has contributed to the decline of industrialization in the United States, as many companies moved to China and other countries where they could find cheap labor under authoritarian regimes with no labor organizing or union structures to defend workers’ rights. They could therefore produce goods at very low cost and sell them to consumers in the United States.
Over the years, China has become a very important importer of Brazilian agricultural and mineral products and is now Brazil’s largest trading partner, particularly in agribusiness, cattle, and other exported goods. This has really threatened the United States’ ability to maintain its hegemony and control over Latin American economies, which has become a goal of the Donald Trump administration.
So, BRICS and its efforts represent, on the one hand, a reinforcement of Brazil’s independent foreign policy. On the other hand, they represent a shift away from the United States, partly because tariffs have made many Brazilian goods unprofitable to sell in the American market. Brazil has therefore sought new markets and increased its exports to China and other countries around the world. As a result, China’s influence and importance in Brazil have grown, which has also threatened the United States.
In a way, the Trump administration was hoping that Flávio Bolsonaro, if elected, would somehow block China’s growing influence in Brazil. On the other hand, Flávio Bolsonaro relied heavily on agribusiness to sustain his political base, and that sector was not interested in stopping shipments of soy, meat, or other goods to China because it was making a lot of money from those sales.
And so, there’s a very contradictory situation. Brazil wants to maintain close economic and political relations with the United States while also trying to counterbalance its influence by supporting the BRICS countries.
The irony of all this is that, although some BRICS countries can be defended as democracies that guarantee democratic rights for their citizens, other members of the coalition are far from democratic. Brazil therefore finds itself in a very strange position: as one of the world’s largest democracies, it is allying with authoritarian regimes to participate in a bloc challenging US hegemony.
And so, there are many contradictions in this realignment that I think have yet to play out and will become apparent in the immediate future.
Far-Right Resilience Could Deepen Brazil’s Polarization
Thousands of activists unite in protest for democracy and racial equality and against the Bolsonaro government in São Paulo, Brazil on June 07, 2020. Photo: Alf Ribeiro
And finally, Professor Green, your scholarship demonstrates that Brazil’s democratization has historically depended on sustained popular mobilization rather than electoral change alone. Given Lula’s narrow victory, Bolsonarismo’s resilience, and the conservative congressional balance, what would constitute meaningful democratic progress during his fourth term? Can Brazil move beyond recurring electoral confrontation toward more durable democratic institutions and inclusive citizenship?
Professor James N. Green: The challenge of the next four years is precisely what you’re pointing out. It involves both guaranteeing democratic institutions and continuing the socioeconomic programs of the Lula administration, which have had a very significant impact on sectors of society but face the challenges of huge budget deficits and the difficulty of sustaining social programs without raising taxes on the electoral base that supports them.
So, the challenge for the Workers’ Party will be to find the means to implement a successful social program that consolidates Lula’s legacy across his four terms and the term and a half of his successor, Dilma Rousseff, who was subsequently impeached. This will be the big challenge, and the right wing will be doing everything it can to undermine these programs in order to create the kind of economic and political chaos that would justify its return to power in 2030.
Therefore, the real challenge for social movements that are genuinely committed to democracy will be to support and sustain the progressive elements of Lula da Silva’s current and future government without abandoning their political principles, ideals, and values.
The lesson of the election turnaround was that popular mobilization can guarantee democratic processes, and it’s very important to sustain these mobilizations beyond electoral cycles. In other words, how can social movements be actively involved in building the new government while also feeling free to criticize it when it falls short?
This will be the challenge for social movements: to navigate the very complex political balance between support and criticism, while the far right waits for any missteps by the Lula government to immediately pursue impeachment proceedings against him or limit his political powers through Congress.
So, the challenges facing social movements and democratic forces in the coming period are immense. They won a victory with the electoral defeat of Flávio Bolsonaro, but he has not been definitively defeated.
In my view, the problems of the next four years are going to further intensify tensions between the left and the right and deepen the country’s polarization. This makes it very difficult to know to what extent democracy will be consolidated or weakened by the far right’s offensive against the Lula government, aimed at undermining it and thereby regaining power in 2030.
(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.
Israel’s October 27 elections have exposed deepening ideological polarization, parliamentary fragmentation, and mounting challenges to democratic legitimacy. In an interview with the ECPS, Assistant Professor Roi Zur of the University of Essex examines Netanyahu’s electoral resilience, Likud’s transformation into a populist radical-right party, and the normalization of religious-nationalist extremism. Highlighting the growing ideological convergence between Likud and its far-right allies, Dr. Zur warns that prolonged coalition deadlock could further consolidate authoritarian-populist forces. He also examines the political exclusion of Arab parties, the decline of Israel’s liberal-left, and emerging claims of electoral fraud resembling Trumpian populism. Ultimately, the interview explores how political instability and ethnonationalist polarization threaten Israel’s democratic institutions and future political trajectory.
Israel’s October 27 elections have produced a fragmented political landscape, exposing the deepening ideological polarization, institutional vulnerabilities, and shifting boundaries of political legitimacy that characterize Israeli democracy. Although Likud remains the largest party, neither Benjamin Netanyahu’s religious-nationalist bloc nor his opponents have secured a parliamentary majority. The results reveal the resilience of Netanyahuism, the growing dominance of competing right-wing formations, Labor’s historical decline, and the potentially decisive role of Arab parties. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about populism, democratic backsliding, secularism, and Palestinian rights.
In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Assistant Professor Roi Zur of the Department of Government at the University of Essex, whose research examines electoral competition, party strategies, and political polarization, offers a theoretically informed assessment of Israel’s evolving political landscape. His central warning is that prolonged political deadlock could further strengthen the forces responsible for Israel’s democratic deterioration. As Dr. Zur observes, “What seems more likely, in my view, is that we are heading into several months, or perhaps even a year, of political instability.” Crucially, he emphasizes that “Historically, such instability has helped the populist radical right maintain and consolidate its power.”
Dr. Zur situates this danger within Netanyahu’s transformation of Likud from a conventional conservative party into an increasingly radicalized populist formation. By systematically directing public frustration toward judicial authorities, security institutions, and allegedly unaccountable elites, Netanyahu has redefined political accountability through antagonistic populist narratives. As Dr. Zur argues, “Likud is no longer a classic center-right party. It increasingly resembles a European populist radical-right party.”
Equally consequential is the normalization of religious-nationalist extremism. Dr. Zur explains that Netanyahu’s cooperation with Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit and Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism has legitimized positions previously excluded from mainstream political discourse. These developments have fundamentally altered debates over territorial sovereignty, Palestinian rights, military conduct, and international law. Indeed, he argues that the ideological proximity between Likud and its radical-right partners makes it “increasingly difficult to differentiate between them.”
The interview also explores the structural obstacles confronting an alternative government, particularly the exclusion of Arab parties from legitimate coalition-making, disputes over ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, and the weakness of Israel’s liberal-left. Despite unprecedented Arab parliamentary representation, ethnonationalist boundaries continue to constrain coalition possibilities, while the Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains central to ideological competition.
Perhaps most disturbingly, Dr. Zur identifies emerging allegations of electoral illegitimacy as evidence of democratic erosion. He notes that “Likud is making statements claiming that the elections were stolen, much like Trump’s claims in the United States after his electoral defeat.” Against this backdrop, the interview illuminates how electoral fragmentation, populist delegitimation, and radical-right normalization could interact to reshape Israel’s democratic future.
Here is our interview with Assistant Professor Roi Zur, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his visit to Prague, Czech Republic, on December 5, 2012. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Zur, thank you for joining us. Despite the political fallout from October 7, the Gaza war, and the judicial overhaul, Likud remains Israel’s largest party, with approximately 27 seats in the provisional results. How do you explain Netanyahu’s enduring electoral appeal? Does his resilience reflect ideological loyalty, perceived leadership competence, or the personalized nature of Netanyahuism?
Dr. Roi Zur: It is important to put these results into context and perspective. On the one hand, Netanyahu’s party, Likud, lost five seats compared to the 2022 election and nine seats compared to its representation at the end of the previous Knesset, following its merger with a smaller party during the last term. This represents a significant loss in parliamentary seats.
On the other hand, Likud received approximately 50,000 more votes than in the previous election. These are therefore bittersweet results, particularly when considered in light of mainstream media polls conducted immediately before the election. It is quite surprising that Likud secured 27 seats, while media outlets affiliated with Netanyahu had projected around 30 or even 32. So, these results can be interpreted as both a loss and a victory for Netanyahu. From his perspective, the outcome remains ambiguous.
Now, considering everything Netanyahu and Israel more broadly have experienced over the past four years—including the problems preceding October 7, the fallout from the October 7 attacks, the Gaza war, and the judicial overhaul—this period can be characterized as a struggle for Israel’s very existence. Netanyahu, in a sense, has led Israel through these challenges, for better or worse, depending on one’s political perspective.
Within this context, the results suggest a shift in perceptions of Netanyahu among people who previously disliked or did not support him, but relatively little change among his established supporters. This indicates a degree of resilience at both the party and coalition levels.
Although Likud lost a substantial number of seats, we can also observe a rightward shift in Israeli public opinion. For example, research by Liran Harsgor of the University of Haifa shows that younger Israelis are more right-wing than older generations. Similarly, work by Gal Bitton identifies a modest but statistically significant rightward shift in ideological self-placement among Israelis displaced during the war.
Likud appears to have benefited from these developments, attracting voters who have moved to the right or already held more right-wing positions before the election. These gains are understandable, given that many voters identify with Likud’s policies during the war and in the preceding period.
This became particularly evident in the later stages of the campaign, when Netanyahu successfully differentiated himself from his former coalition partner, Gadi Eisenkot. Through Likud’s campaign, Eisenkot came to be perceived by many voters as more willing to cooperate with the Palestinians, including the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and Arab parties in the Israeli parliament.
Neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot Has a Viable Path to Power
The provisional results suggest approximately 53 seats for Netanyahu’s bloc, 48 for the predominantly Jewish-led opposition, and 19 for Arab parties. What governing alternatives are realistically available? Could an Eisenkot-led coalition overcome its ideological divisions, or might coalition fragmentation ultimately sustain Netanyahu’s political influence?
Dr. Roi Zur: Currently, there are no realistic alternatives. The numbers simply do not add up for either Netanyahu or Eisenkot.
To form a coalition, Eisenkot would have to break one of his two promises. On the one hand, he promised not to cooperate with non-Zionist parties. On the other, he promised not to cooperate with any ultra-Orthodox party that maintains its opposition to drafting ultra-Orthodox students into the army. It is unlikely that Eisenkot could pull this off and bring the Arab parties to the table. But even if the Arab parties agreed to support him and he agreed to cooperate with them, there is still Lieberman, the leader of one of the more right-wing opposition parties, who has repeatedly objected to cooperating with the Joint List and the ultra-Orthodox parties. So, there simply are not enough seats for Eisenkot to build a stable coalition without breaking one of his major campaign promises.
On the other hand, Netanyahu is also short of a majority. To form a governing majority, he would need to bring at least one opposition party into his coalition. He is six seats short, meaning that six seats would need to shift from the opposition to a Netanyahu-led coalition. Alternatively, at least 14 members would need to abstain to allow him to form a minority government, which seems unlikely at this point.
So, for either Netanyahu or Eisenkot to gain or retain power, they would have to be extremely creative and break at least one major election promise.
Netanyahu’s Populist Narrative Helped Deflect Responsibility for October 7
In your research on party strategies, you distinguish policy positions from valence attributes such as competence, integrity, and leadership. Following October 7, how did these considerations shape electoral competition? Did dissatisfaction with Netanyahu’s performance benefit alternative right-wing leaders more than parties advocating fundamentally different policies?
Dr. Roi Zur: We don’t yet have updated data showing which issues moved voters toward particular parties. However, we can draw on theoretical understanding and historical trends in Israel to consider what might have happened.
There is a substantial body of political science research dating back to the 1960s showing that voters consider the policy positions of political parties. At the same time, another large body of research demonstrates that voters also consider other party attributes, such as the leader’s popularity, competence, trustworthiness, and so on.
These considerations usually work together. From a voter’s perspective, the best option is someone who advocates policies close to their own preferences and is also competent. Moreover, perceptions of competence and trustworthiness are themselves related to how closely voters identify with a particular party.
In the case of Israel in 2026—and I should emphasize that this assessment is based on historical trends rather than updated data—we can imagine that some voters probably defected to parties further to the right, particularly Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism, which are more extreme than Likud, itself already a far-right party. Together, these two parties gained approximately 100,000 more votes than in 2022.
It seems to me that, following October 7, many voters perceived Likud, and especially Netanyahu, as responsible for what happened. However, during the war, many of these voters returned to Netanyahu’s camp because he was able, in a very populist way, to convince them that October 7 was not his fault and that he was the strong leader willing to fight to protect Israel.
His campaign claimed that it had reshaped the Middle East by removing the leadership of Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and so on. As a result, much of the blame associated with Netanyahu early in the campaign gradually evaporated, particularly among voters who already liked him.
Those who disliked Netanyahu, however, still regard him as one of the principal figures responsible, if not the most responsible, for October 7, the war, and everything that followed. But these voters were not supporting Netanyahu in the first place.
Ideological Polarization Is Deepening Across Israel’s Political Spectrum
Billboard reading “The Looting Government,” part of a protest campaign against the conservative coalition’s policies in Ra’anana, Israel, May 2023. Photo: Rene Van Den Berg
In “The Israeli Parties’ Positions in Comparative Perspective,” co-authored with Ryan Bakker, you demonstrate the distinctive importance of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in structuring left–right competition. Does the October 27 election suggest a lasting rightward ideological realignment? Why has political competition increasingly shifted toward rival versions of nationalist and security-centered politics?
Dr. Roi Zur: Across the board, right-wing parties in Israel seem to have been shifting further to the right over the past few years, especially Likud, which was once a moderate-right party but is now considered a classic European far-right party. I think this process has continued over the past three or four years. However, our updated survey, which Ryan and I are currently conducting, is still in the field, so I don’t yet know exactly where the parties’ positions will fall. Judging from the campaign, though, it seems that the right wing is moving further to the right, the left wing further to the left, while parties in the middle remain in the center.
What I mean is that the structure of the party system, in terms of parties’ ideological positions, is based on an overarching left–right dimension. In politics, people commonly talk about left and right. In the European context, we know that this distinction generally refers to economic issues, such as taxation and housing policies, as well as certain social issues, such as immigration.
In Israel, however, when parties and their voters talk about left and right, they are primarily referring to questions of national identity: Where do we see ourselves as a country? What kind of country are we? Above all, they are referring to security issues. This has always been the case. Obviously, the importance of security increases in some periods and takes second place in others. But security has always been central to Israeli politics, and since October 7, it has probably become the most important dimension distinguishing political parties.
What does this mean in practice? Parties on the right adopt more hawkish positions regarding the territories in the West Bank, or Judea and Samaria. They express stronger opposition to Palestinian statehood and cooperation with the Palestinian Authority and advocate more offensive military strategies in Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, Syria, and elsewhere.
The left, by contrast, is more open to cooperation with Palestinians within Israel and with the Palestinian Authority, more receptive to international negotiations, and more supportive of land-for-peace agreements.
So, I don’t think this is a new reality. Rather, it is reshaping the political spectrum because, quite simply, Israel is part of the Middle East, where there is an ongoing conflict that needs to be resolved. Indeed, the question of the territories and the possibility of land-for-peace agreements have been central issues in Israeli politics since Israel occupied the Palestinian territories previously controlled by Jordan and Egypt in 1967.
Netanyahu Has Transformed Likud into a Populist Radical-Right Party
Netanyahu frequently frames political competition as a struggle between the authentic Israeli people and allegedly unaccountable judicial, media, and political elites. How central is this populist antagonism to Likud’s electoral resilience? Has Netanyahuism transformed the traditional nationalist right into a more explicitly populist political movement?
Dr. Roi Zur: The short answer is yes; he has. We have seen this transformation since the late 2010s and early 2020s, particularly when Netanyahu was first indicted and allegations of corruption against him emerged. Netanyahu made a decisive turn toward a populist agenda, consistently blaming the judicial system for problems in policymaking and accusing it of targeting him personally and attempting to remove him from office as Prime Minister.
This approach is not unique to Likud, but Likud is certainly the largest party and has also been in power for many years. What Netanyahu has managed to do is shift the blame for virtually any policy problem onto these allegedly unaccountable elites, whether within the security apparatus or the judicial system. In that regard, Likud is no longer a classic center-right party. It increasingly resembles a European populist radical-right party.
Likud Is Converging Ideologically with Israel’s Extreme Right
Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit and Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism retain significant parliamentary representation. How should we distinguish their religious-nationalist radicalism from Netanyahu’s populism? Have these parties shifted the boundaries of mainstream political discourse, particularly concerning Palestinian rights and territorial sovereignty?
Dr. Roi Zur: We can look at this in two ways. First, we can consider whether Likud, Otzma Yehudit, or Religious Zionism is closer to the far-right end of the left–right spectrum. In that regard, there is simply not much further to the right to go.
From a comparative perspective, Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism are as far right as parties can possibly be. If you look at the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, one of the largest datasets on political parties’ policy positions, these two parties are positioned as far to the right as the most extreme right-wing parties in Europe or elsewhere in the world. Now, Netanyahu and Likud have, in that sense, caught up with them. This raises questions about what it means to be on the right and what it means to be populist.
In both respects, these three parties are very close to one another. Likud is perceived as slightly less right-wing than Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism, but it remains very close to the far-right end of the spectrum. The three parties are also very similar in terms of their populism. In this regard, it is increasingly difficult to differentiate between them.
Over the past three years, we have seen Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism, but also parts of Likud, pushing the boundaries of the scale itself, making us reconsider where the far-right end of the left–right spectrum actually lies.
In Israeli politics, particularly in response to the war in Gaza, questions about what the Israeli army is allowed or not allowed to do, and to what extent the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) should comply with international law, have become increasingly prominent. The idea of allowing the military to operate without regard for international law—something that was not part of mainstream political discourse before October 7—has become much more mainstream. Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism have popularized such positions as legitimate expressions of political opinion.
From their perspective, it is acceptable to advocate occupying the entire West Bank or reoccupying the Gaza Strip and rebuilding settlements in both the West Bank and Gaza. These positions were neither as mainstream nor as widely popularized before October 7.
Netanyahu Has Mainstreamed Previously Marginal Far-Right Positions
Election billboards of religious political parties Shas and Otzma Yehudit before Israel’s fourth election in two years in a street of Jerusalem on March 22, 2021. Photo: Gali Estrange.
Your research on party competition and ideological positioning offers a framework for examining the normalization of radical political alternatives. Has cooperation between Likud and the religious-nationalist parties of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich mainstreamed previously marginal positions? Does their electoral persistence reflect changing public preferences or the strategic repositioning of established right-wing parties?
Dr. Roi Zur: In addition to what I said earlier, through this cooperation, Netanyahu has legitimized the far-right thoughts, beliefs, and positions of parties and individuals who had previously been on the fringes of the Israeli political system.Since 2019, when the breakdown of the party system was at its height, Netanyahu has increasingly legitimized these positions. Ten or fifteen years ago, people like Ben-Gvir were not considered legitimate politicians. Their positions were regarded as far-right and remained outside the accepted political mainstream.
Since 2019, however, Netanyahu has legitimized them in the eyes of many voters. This is reflected in the fact that both parties have entered government, particularly Otzma Yehudit, which is slightly more extreme than the Religious Zionist Party. These parties have gained governmental power and shaped policies that, just ten or fifteen years ago, would have been considered outside the boundaries of politically legitimate positions.
Ultra-Orthodox Parties Are Losing Their Traditional Kingmaker Role
Shas and United Torah Judaism remain important coalition actors, while military exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men have become increasingly contentious. Could the conscription dispute restructure Israeli party competition? Is the secular–religious divide becoming more electorally consequential than conventional socioeconomic disagreements?
Dr. Roi Zur: There are two important points to make before answering this question. First, the election results show, for the first time in history, that there are more Arab members of the Knesset than ultra-Orthodox members. This represents a major shift in who holds political power and who can act as kingmakers. Historically, the ultra-Orthodox parties played that role and, more often than not, determined whether the center-left or center-right would come to power.
The second major shift is that the ultra-Orthodox parties are no longer in power and are not currently accepted as coalition partners by the center-left or the opposition to Netanyahu. This could change as the government formation process evolves. I have seen media reports suggesting that the ultra-Orthodox parties might allow Eisenkot to control the Knesset by abstaining from important votes, simply to keep things moving and avoid a second election. However, I am not sure they will actually do so.
Now, the second most important dimension of Israeli politics, after issues related to the Arab–Israeli conflict, is indeed the secular–religious divide: whether parties position themselves on the more Jewish or more democratic side of the political spectrum. The ultra-Orthodox parties are obviously at one end of this scale, emphasizing the Jewish character of the state more strongly and its democratic character less.
This divide has always been consequential in Israeli politics, and I think it was particularly important in this election. However, as we have seen, the ultra-Orthodox parties were less successful than in the past, suggesting that some voters who previously supported them preferred more right-wing parties instead.
The question of whether the government should draft ultra-Orthodox students into the army has also long been the second most important issue in Israeli politics, and I think it will remain so.
Returning to one of the earlier questions, if Eisenkot wants to form a government, one option would be to reach an agreement with the ultra-Orthodox parties. He promised not to do that, but it remains an option. If he has to break an electoral promise, he could say, “Okay, we’re going to break this promise to draft ultra-Orthodox students into the army and give them some concessions in return for replacing Netanyahu.”
Israeli Parliament Knesset. Photo: Dreamstime.
Secular Politics Does Not Necessarily Mean Liberal Politics
Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beytenu combines secular positions on military service and religious authority with strong nationalist security policies. How should we locate such parties within Israel’s multidimensional ideological space? Can secularization advance without corresponding liberalization on minority rights or the Palestinian question?
Dr. Roi Zur: We see this quite often in the Israeli political system. Lieberman’s party is somewhat unusual, as you pointed out. If we think about politics in two dimensions—secular versus religious on the one hand and left versus right on the other—secular parties are almost always positioned on the left or in the center of the left–right spectrum, while more religious parties tend to be more right-wing.
Yisrael Beytenu is unusual because it is closer to Likud on issues related to the general left–right dimension, particularly those concerning the Palestinian Authority, peace, and security. On the other hand, it is closer to left-wing parties on issues concerning social groups and the Jewish versus democratic character of the state. So, you are right to highlight this distinction.
When positioning Lieberman within the Israeli political spectrum, we need to be conscious of these differences. This is also what makes Lieberman particularly powerful right now, because he can decide whether to maintain his opposition to both ultra-Orthodox and Arab parties joining the government.
As we discussed earlier, Lieberman, like the other opposition parties, pledged to form a government that would include neither the ultra-Orthodox nor the Arab parties. However, it seems to me that, among the four leaders or parties in the Jewish opposition, Lieberman has the strongest objections to including either the ultra-Orthodox or Arab parties in a governing coalition.
The Failure of the Peace Process Accelerated Labor’s Electoral Decline
The historically dominant Labor Party now survives within the Democrats alliance, far removed from its former centrality in Israeli politics. What explains this profound electoral decline? Has Labor lost its organizational and social foundations, or has the growing salience of security and national identity displaced the economic and redistributive issues on which it once competed?
Dr. Roi Zur: It’s a chicken-and-egg question. What came first? We know that the party’s social power, organizational strength, and institutional foundations have gradually eroded over time. The Labor Party, Meretz, and now the Democrats have long since lost their former control over the government apparatus. They no longer possess the grassroots power they once had.
Labor’s decline essentially began in the early 2000s, when the peace process broke down and the Second Intifada erupted. Many Israelis associated the peace process with deteriorating security, and large numbers of voters abandoned the Labor Party, leading to its rapid electoral decline.
In the current election, however, the Democrats performed slightly better than in the previous one. If we consider the two Zionist left-wing parties that now constitute the Democrats, they received roughly the same number of votes as before but secured seven or eight seats in the Knesset, compared with the four seats they held in the previous parliament.
Centrist Parties Face a Structural Dilemma of Ideological Positioning
In “Stuck in the Middle: Ideology, Valence and the Electoral Failures of Centrist Parties,” you demonstrate that moderate parties can suffer from weak reputations for competence and leadership despite occupying electorally attractive positions. Could this framework help explain Labor’s decline and the limited appeal of the liberal-left? Can ideological moderation compensate for weakened political credibility?
Dr. Roi Zur: In theory, yes. The problem for parties in the center is that they have very little room to maneuver. If they move to the right, they risk being squeezed by more competent right-wing parties. If they move to the left, they face the same challenge from more competent left-wing parties.
In the case of Israel’s Labor Party, two developments occurred simultaneously in the early 2000s. First, Israeli public opinion shifted to the right. The electorate became more right-wing than before, leaving fewer voters who identified closely with Labor. As a result, regardless of whether Labor is perceived as competent or trustworthy, there are simply not enough voters inclined to support it because of this broader shift in Israeli public opinion.
In theory, Labor could moderate its positions and attract more centrist voters at the expense of other centrist parties. However, doing so would also risk losing its distinctive identity as the only Zionist left-wing party.
Ethnonationalist Exclusion Limits Arab Parties’ Coalition Potential
The Joint List and Ra’am could collectively hold approximately 19 seats, potentially making them decisive in government formation. Yet major Jewish-led parties remain reluctant to depend on their support. Does this exclusion reflect a broader ethnonationalist definition of legitimate political representation? Could Arab parliamentary participation become indispensable to forming an alternative government?
Dr. Roi Zur: First of all, the final, updated election results show that the two Arab parties secured 19 seats. As we discussed earlier, this is a unique result. I would not say that Arab voter turnout was the highest in Israeli electoral history, but it was certainly the highest in the last 30 years. Arab parties have also not achieved such electoral success during that period.
Now, about a week after the elections, but before the government formation process has begun, we can see two distinct narratives emerging in the media. The first comes from right-wing media outlets and politicians, who argue that any cooperation with Arab parties is illegitimate. According to this view, Arab parties should neither be included in government formation nor participate in policymaking.
On the other hand, center-left parties and their voters appear more open to cooperation with Arab parties. I saw a survey published a couple of days after the election asking supporters of Jewish opposition parties whether they would prefer forming a coalition with Arab parties, entering a coalition with Netanyahu, or holding another round of elections. A plurality, though not a majority, of these voters indicated that they would prefer a coalition with Arab parties rather than another coalition with Netanyahu and the right wing.
However, there is considerable variation in these ethnonationalist perceptions of political legitimacy. Voters who supported the Democrats are more open to cooperation with Arab parties than supporters of Yashar, Eisenkot’s party, or Bennett’s and Lapid’s parties. Those voters, in turn, are more willing to cooperate with Arab parties than Lieberman’s supporters.
Replacing Netanyahu May Not Transform Israel’s Palestinian Policy
Ramallah, Palestine, surrounded by the controversial Israeli wall that separates the State of Israel from West Bank. Photo: Giovanni De Caro.
Much of the anti-Netanyahu opposition remains committed to security-centered nationalism rather than a negotiated two-state solution. Would an Eisenkot-led government represent a substantive departure from Netanyahu’s approach to Gaza and the West Bank, or primarily a change in leadership competence and governing style? What electoral conditions could make Palestinian self-determination politically salient again?
Dr. Roi Zur: This is the million-dollar question. If a new government were formed, which does not seem likely at this point, would its policies be any different? First of all, it depends on the composition of that government. If it were an opposition government supported by the ultra-Orthodox parties, or the current coalition joined by one of the opposition parties, we would be unlikely to see any significant change.
A Palestinian state has never been popular among Jewish voters in Israel, but since October 7, the idea has become almost a curse for the majority of voters. Of course, attitudes vary both generationally and ideologically, with people on the center-left more open to the idea than those on the right.
If we consider Eisenkot specifically, just this morning I saw a report in which he discussed the options for the day after the war ends. He made it very clear that he considers the Palestinian Authority illegitimate, much like the other right-wing parties in Israel. Instead, he expressed support for what the Americans call the Board of Peace, the technocratic organization intended to deal with Gaza.
So, if we see any change, it will be because Eisenkot, Bennett, and Lieberman have changed their core positions on Palestinian statehood. But for this to happen, we would first need to see a Jewish-Arab coalition, followed by a successful process of changing the situation in Gaza. These developments would take many years. I do not think we are likely to see them in the next couple of years.
Coalition Deadlock and Democratic Backsliding Threaten Israel’s Political Future
And finally, Professor Zur, your research highlights how party positions, issue salience, leadership reputations, and ideological polarization interact in shaping electoral competition. Looking beyond the immediate coalition negotiations, what developments could fundamentally reshape Israel’s party system? Might the country experience a renewed center-left alternative, further populist radical-right consolidation, or prolonged competition among different forms of nationalism?
Dr. Roi Zur: The first priority for the center-left, or the left more broadly, is to gain power and then demonstrate that it can govern successfully. The first step would be to form a coalition, gain control of the Knesset, and provide citizens with, first and foremost, security and, second, economic success. If they can achieve this over a full four-year term, voters may shift back toward them, or at least the Jewish electorate might.
What seems more likely, in my view, is that we are heading into several months, or perhaps even a year, of political instability. Historically, such instability has helped the populist radical right maintain and consolidate its power, contributing to its current strength.
As for the nature of political competition, we will continue to see a classic populist agenda, particularly from the populist right and Netanyahu’s political environment. In fact, we are already witnessing it. Likud is making statements claiming that the elections were stolen, much like Trump’s claims in the United States after his electoral defeat. These statements allege that Arab voters were bribed, that their turnout was illegitimate, that the elections were bought, and that the judicial authorities overseeing the elections were incompetent and failed to do their job.
The next few days will provide a great deal of new information. We will learn which party or political leader receives the first opportunity to form a government, whether that will be Eisenkot, and whether he can gain control of the Knesset and the legislative process.
These two questions will shape Israeli politics over the coming years. I want to emphasize one important point here: if Eisenkot can gain control of the Knesset within the next month, his coalition could repeal much of the judicial overhaul legislation that the previous government worked on for four years.
A substantial portion of the legislation concerning government control over the judicial system is scheduled to take effect on January 1. This, in my view, is the main reason Eisenkot is in such a hurry to gain control of Parliament and the legislative process, even if forming a coalition government takes another three, four, or six months.
(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.