Dr. Javier Sandoval

Dr. Sandoval: The Erosion of Trust Outlasts Electoral Change

In this ECPS interview, Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval examines how democratic erosion is increasingly shaped by forces operating beyond conventional accounts of executive aggrandizement and electoral backsliding. Drawing on his research on global illiberalism, state erosion, populism, political violence, and subnational authoritarianism, Dr. Sandoval argues that the international democratic environment has become less supportive of opposition forces and more permissive of illiberal practices. He warns that while populist leaders may be defeated electorally, the institutional damage they leave behind is far harder to reverse. The interview also explores Mexico’s “ballots, bots, and bullets” dynamic, where digital manipulation and criminal violence reshape democratic competition from below, while declining trust undermines democratic recovery at both domestic and international levels.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The accelerating crisis of liberal democracy is no longer confined to domestic arenas of polarization, institutional decay, or electoral contestation. Increasingly, democratic erosion unfolds within an international environment that has itself become more permissive of authoritarianism, more tolerant of illiberal governance, and less capable of sustaining democratic norms across borders. In this context, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval, Postdoctoral Research Associate in Democracy at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame, whose research explores the intersections of global illiberalism, populism, state capacity, political violence, democratic resilience, and subnational authoritarianism. Across a wide-ranging conversation, Dr. Pérez Sandoval offers a rich analysis of how contemporary democracies are being reshaped not only from above by executive aggrandizement, but also from below through institutional hollowing, criminal governance, digital manipulation, and declining public trust.

At the center of the interview is Dr. Sandoval’s argument that the international democratic order itself has undergone a profound transformation. Drawing on his recent Journal of Democracy article, he argues that the post-Cold War assumption that “linkages to the West” would provide a reliable democratic impetus has weakened considerably. As democratic turbulence intensifies within the United States and Europe themselves, “it is no longer certain that these linkages to the international arena, and specifically to Western democracies, provide robust support for democratic forces around the globe.” In their place, long-established autocracies have become “increasingly organized and much more sophisticated in how they operate internationally,” contributing to what he repeatedly describes as the “normalization of illiberal practices” both domestically and internationally.

This transformation, Dr. Sandoval argues, has profound consequences for democratic oppositions operating in hybrid regimes and eroding democracies alike. Global illiberalism raises the costs of resistance, fragments opposition coalitions, and produces what he terms a “credibility gap,” in which democratic actors may sacrifice long-term democratic commitments for short-term electoral viability. The result is an increasingly zero-sum international environment in which “policy preferences and regime preferences are becoming increasingly aligned.”

The interview also explores Dr. Sandoval’s influential work on state erosion and populist governance. In his collaborative research with Andrés Mejía Costa, he distinguishes democratic backsliding from the “hollowing out” of state institutions through mechanisms such as the dismantling of bureaucracies, the rearrangement of state agencies, fiscal centralization, and judicial reconfiguration. While populist leaders may be removed electorally, the institutional damage they leave behind is far more enduring. As he warns, “state erosion and state damage are much harder to undo.”

Particularly striking is Dr. Sandoval’s discussion of democratic trust in both domestic and international contexts. Reflecting on transatlantic relations, he observes that “a partner that was once regarded as reliable may suddenly appear far less trustworthy,” adding that “even when a government leaves office or is voted out, the damage to trust may already have been done.” This erosion of institutional confidence, he argues, extends from citizens’ relationships with the state to alliances such as those between the United States, NATO, and Europe. Hence the interview’s central warning: the erosion of trust often outlasts electoral change itself.

The conversation further examines Mexico as a paradigmatic case of democratic vulnerability under conditions of criminal governance, digital misinformation, and political violence. Discussing the country’s 2024 elections—described through the now familiar formula of “ballots, bots, and bullets”—Dr. Sandoval analyzes how criminal organizations increasingly shape electoral competition and democratic participation. He warns that when political elites are effectively “vetted by criminal organizations,” the minimal democratic principles of electoral contestation and elite rotation become fundamentally distorted.

Yet despite the gravity of these developments, Dr. Sandoval does not embrace fatalism. Instead, he repeatedly returns to the importance of democratic diagnosis, documentation, institutional rebuilding, and civic cooperation. Democratic resilience, he argues, begins with the ability “to diagnose and call things what they are,” and with the willingness of democratic actors to unite around minimal democratic thresholds rather than maximalist ideological positions. In sum, this interview presents a sobering but deeply illuminating reflection on the contemporary condition of democracy—and on the difficult but necessary work required to defend it.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

The International Arena No Longer Guarantees Democratic Support

US President Donald Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán arrive for a working dinner at the NATO Summit in Brussels, Belgium on July 11, 2018. Photo: Gints Ivuskans / Dreamstime.

Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval, welcome. In your most recent Journal of Democracy article, you argue that global illiberalism reshapes the strategic environment in which democracies operate. How should we conceptualize the transition from a democracy-promoting international order to one that is increasingly permissive—or even enabling—of authoritarian practices?

Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval: That is one of the big questions we have to face and answer, and one that we try to address in the paper. In thinking about this question, my first response is to suggest that we have to acknowledge that it is happening. Sometimes the international environment appears distant or somehow separate from domestic politics. There is already enough happening within domestic politics, and the international environment can seem either too far removed or very static.

The first task in conceptualizing, theorizing, and properly understanding what is happening is to look closely at the changes that have taken place over the last decade or 15 years. In the paper, we suggest that there are at least three key ways in which the international environment has changed. Critically, the point of departure is an idea that was very prominent in the 1990s and early 2000s—namely, the concept developed by Levitsky and Way regarding linkages to the West. The assumption was that the international environment possessed a pro-democratic “flavor,” so to speak, and that one could rely on the international arena to provide a democratic impetus. But given the pressures we now see in the US and Europe, along with their own domestic democratic turmoil, that dynamic has certainly weakened.

So, the argument we present in the paper is that it is no longer certain that these linkages to the international arena, and specifically to Western democracies, provide robust support for democratic forces around the globe.

The second point, very evidently, is that long-established autocracies have become increasingly organized and much more sophisticated in how they operate internationally. They have strengthened their presence within international organizations and become far more adept at navigating the international system.

Ultimately, what this suggests is a certain normalization of illiberal practices. I would not necessarily describe these as openly anti-democratic practices, because I still think the democratic narrative retains the upper hand. You can see this even in the way illiberal and populist leaders continue to adopt the democratic umbrella rhetorically.

So, in narrative terms, democracy still has the upper hand, but there is nonetheless a growing normalization of illiberal practices, both domestically and internationally. That would be my two-part answer to the question.

Global Illiberalism Raises the Costs of Resistance

You highlight that global illiberalism constrains opposition actors by raising the costs of resistance and reducing external support. How do these shifting international conditions alter the prospects for democratic resilience in hybrid regimes?

Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval: This is an interesting question, especially the last part. Because, when we were writing this piece, we were thinking primarily about eroding democracies—democracies facing autocratizing pressures. But the setup of hybrid regimes makes me think that we perhaps have to refine our thinking about what the starting position is for forces that are trying to strengthen democracy domestically. Even so, I would say that the three key areas or domains in which we highlight increasing costs are still applicable to hybrid regimes.  There is the very obvious issue of material and financial support, which might become harder to secure.

But on top of that, we also add the domain of symbolic support. In the paper, we argue that this creates a sense of the narrowing of the international space, in which politics increasingly becomes a kind of zero-sum game. Opposition forces have to compete for international alignment, or they are immediately sidelined by it. And so there is this zero-sum logic that is becoming increasingly present in the international arena when it comes to democratic support.

The immediate consequence of this is the fragmentation of oppositions. Whether you are in an eroding democracy, in a consolidating democracy that is eroding, or in a hybrid regime, this situation fosters the fragmentation of opposition forces. Rather than cooperating and presenting a united democratic front, what happens instead is that these forces begin to fragment and fall apart.

The third cost—which is perhaps the trickiest one because it requires a great deal of strategic thinking—is what we label the credibility gap. This is the idea that some opposition forces will prioritize short-term electoral viability and, in order to achieve that, may compromise their democratic credentials. But what does that imply for democracy-promoting actors in the future if their democratic credentials can later be questioned? It creates a dilemma and a misalignment of incentives between short-term electoral goals and long-term democratic promotion.

It also highlights that, between this fragmentation, the narrowing and zero-sum nature of the international space, and the credibility gap, we may be observing a situation in which both policy preferences and regime preferences are becoming increasingly aligned. Whereas perhaps in the past you would not have compromised your regime preferences if you wanted to support or campaign on a right-wing ideological platform—or a left-wing ideological platform—today, choosing one or the other may also limit what you are then able to stand for in terms of the regime-level question.

Illiberal Practices Now Outlive Their Leaders

Labour Day celebrations
Labour Day celebrations at Old Town Square in Prague on May 1, 2017, featuring a banner depicting democracy as a leaf eaten by caterpillars labeled Putin, Kaczyński, Orbán, Babiš, Trump, and Fico.
Photo: Jolanta Wojcicka.

Your work suggests that illiberal regimes increasingly learn from one another. How significant is this transnational diffusion of strategies for the consolidation of populist and authoritarian rule?

Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval: That is a big question, and the first thing I would say is to return to this idea of normalization. So, not only is there perhaps a learning of strategies, but there is also a normalization of what, in other contexts and historical periods, would have been considered highly abnormal behavior, non-standard behavior, or sometimes even openly illegal behavior. In that sense, this undermines not only the domestic rule of law, but international law itself.

We are seeing—people often describe it as a return to inward-looking politics, a turn toward domestic issues at the expense of international ones—but I also think we are witnessing a very evident shift toward, for lack of a better word, realpolitik, where law, and especially the normative dimension of law, is increasingly sidelined in the face of economic interests and power politics.

The normalization of those practices and values is perhaps one of the most pressing and long-term dangers that we face. Because insofar as this process is generated and reinforced through diffusion, it creates a mechanism through which these practices survive and outlive current leaders. So, this is not only a conjunctural issue, but also a question of duration: how long are we going to remain in this process? How long will it last? I think that is the key danger and the key issue we should continue to watch closely.

State Erosion Is Harder to Undo Than Electoral Defeat

In “Why Populists Hollow Out Their States,” you argue that populists systematically erode state capacity. How does this process differ from more familiar accounts of democratic backsliding focused on executive aggrandizement and institutional capture?

Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval: That is another piece that I had the fortune to write with Andrés Mejía Costa, and you are putting your finger on perhaps the most challenging empirical question we face. Ultimately, this asks us to distinguish between what the political regime is and what the state itself is. And sometimes—indeed, often—these things coexist, and they can be difficult to pull apart. Perhaps the best way to think about it is that you can have measures that erode democracy without necessarily hampering the state, and measures that hamper the state without necessarily damaging democracy. So, I will try to give examples of both in order to answer your question.

One measure that might damage the state without necessarily damaging democracy has to do with one of the examples we discuss in the paper: the centralization of spending. If you centralize public spending, you might not necessarily damage the liberal or electoral aspects of democracy, but you may still facilitate executive aggrandizement in the long term, or hamper accountability and the ability of subnational actors, for example, to exercise budgetary authority. So, there is an aspect in which the state clearly changes, while the regime itself may remain relatively constant and not immediately erode.

Another example is the current debate in the United States over gerrymandering and redistricting. These practices have immediate electoral and democratic consequences, but they do not necessarily have immediate consequences for the state itself. So, there are aspects in which we can analytically tease apart these elements.

In the paper, we present at least four ideas—or four mechanisms—through which we can clearly observe forms of state erosion that differ from democratic backsliding alone. These are the dismantling of bureaucracies, the rearrangement of state agencies, the centralization of spending, and the last one—which is perhaps the closest to democratic backsliding—the dismantling or reconfiguration of the judiciary. Those four mechanisms are the key ideas we present in the piece in order to offer a clearer empirical distinction between democratic backsliding and state erosion.

And I would add that the ultimate concern in the piece is that we see both processes as going hand in hand: the process of state erosion and the process of democratic erosion. Our key concern is that while you can push back against the regime question—you can remove illiberal or populist leaders through elections—state erosion and state damage are much harder to undo.

So, our concern is that by damaging certain state institutions and state capacities, democratic recovery becomes much more difficult in the long term. I think that is perhaps one additional distinction that I would emphasize.

Rebuilding Trust Is Harder Than Removing Populist

Luís Inácio Lula da Silva and former President Bolsonaro participate in the debate over Brazil in Sao Paulo on October 16, 2022. Photo: Isaac Fontana.

You emphasize that state erosion can occur rapidly, whereas state-building is slow and cumulative. What does this asymmetry imply for the long-term prospects of democratic recovery after populist rule?

Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval: You are really putting your finger on the issue. As you said, from what we know from the literature on state-building and state capacity, it takes generations to build autonomous and capable institutions that are able to deliver public goods and services. And there seems to be a profound asymmetry between how long it takes to build and accumulate those capabilities and how quickly they can be dismantled.

One key area in which I see this tension emerging very clearly concerns not only public service delivery but also trust—both among citizens and among international allies and partners. Take, for example, the domestic arena. After a populist leaves office, a pro-democratic government may come in and attempt to rebuild institutions. But if citizens have already come to perceive that the state, and the services it provides, can be easily politicized and quickly stripped away, they may become much more wary of relying on or engaging with the state in the future.

In the international arena, you can perhaps see something similar in the relationships between, for example, the United States, NATO, and Europe. A partner that was once regarded as reliable may suddenly appear far less trustworthy. Even when a government leaves office or is voted out, the damage to trust may already have been done, and I do not think it can be rebuilt so easily. So, there is definitely an underlying tension there. Rebuilding that trust will require commitment on both sides: domestically, from incoming governments trying to reconstruct institutions, and from citizens willing to trust again and reengage politically and publicly. And the same can be said at the international level.

When Reform Becomes a Pretext for Capture

Your analysis suggests that populist leaders often justify institutional weakening through anti-corruption and austerity narratives. How do these discursive strategies help legitimize policies that ultimately undermine democratic governance?

Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval: The key answer to that is that they do work. In most instances, if you look at the trajectories through which populist leaders not only get elected but also manage to get away with these measures, what you usually find behind them is a narrative—a campaign in which, with some degree of truth, the institutions being attacked or dismantled are already widely perceived as corrupt, deficient, problematic, or incapable of fulfilling the duties for which they were originally created.

You see this, for example, in Mexico, across Latin America, but even in the United States, where there are attacks on key institutions based on their past performance, or their perceived performance. Those institutions are then dismantled or significantly weakened, and only afterward do people suddenly realize that, despite their deficiencies, they were still performing important functions.

Here, I cannot help but refer to the Mexican case and the recent reform of the judiciary. We all know that Mexico has extremely high levels of impunity. Only around 2 percent of criminal cases ever receive a judicial sentence. So, there are very high levels of impunity, and the central banner of the campaign became: “Well, we need to reform the judiciary.”

But under that pretense, what ultimately happened was the takeover of the judiciary. The long-term consequence then becomes: how do you reverse that damage? I try to put myself in the position of an incoming government—a non-Morena government, a pro-democratic government—and the question they will likely face is whether they, too, should reform the judiciary under the pretext of restoring democracy. But by doing so, do they then expose themselves to criticism for also trying to reform the judiciary in order to capture it?

So again, trying to connect the dots between the issues raised in the first paper on opposition forces and the issues raised in the second paper on the state, this creates extremely complex scenarios in which the decisions made by democratic forces will be crucial in determining both how quickly and how successfully we are able to recover from certain conditions and situations.

Social Spending Can Become an Electoral Instrument

Volunteers donate food to help homeless and hungry people. Photo: Todsaporn Bunmuen / Dreamstime.

Drawing on the Mexican case, how should we interpret the reallocation of state resources—such as shifts toward social spending at the expense of institutional capacity—in terms of democratic quality and state effectiveness?

Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval: I was once asked whether any and all re-budgeting was necessarily a sign of hollowing out or state erosion. The answer to that is no. In principle, if you were to ask me that question, let’s say in a vacuum—do we think that simply repurposing spending toward welfare and social spending is necessarily a problematic sign for democratic governance? My answer would be no. It is in the context of everything else that is happening, particularly in the Mexican case, where my answer would have to be: Actually, we might need to be worried about it.

Precisely because one of the key things, for example, is that in the Mexican case they are re-shifting the budget and implementing all of these austerity measures, but coincidentally—and I say this ironically—for purposes that are very beneficial to the incumbent government. So, if you redesign social policy in a way that provides beneficiaries with direct, non-conditional cash transfers, the expectation is that you will reap the electoral benefits from those transfers. And not only that, but you are also opposing any sort of strong or robust fiscal reform that would actually expand the size of the pie. By engaging in this kind of budgetary shifting, you are therefore taking resources away from other potentially relevant state activities. 

So, again, in and of itself, it is not necessarily the case that any one of these measures would be problematic, but we always have to situate the analysis within its broader context.

When Elections Face Bots, Bullets, and Criminal Power

In the context of Mexico’s 2024 elections, characterized by “ballots, bots, and bullets,” how do digital misinformation and political-criminal violence interact to reshape electoral competition and citizen participation?

Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval: This is what keeps me up at night, and one of the reasons is precisely because I have the Mexican case very close to home. I am from Mexico, so it feels very immediate to me. But more broadly, Mexico is perhaps a paradigmatic extreme case of the growing relationship between criminal governance, democracy, and the increasing growth and permeability of digital life.

So, I will say two things. First, they have completely reshaped electoral competition, at least in the Mexican case. I can also think of the Brazilian case, particularly at the local level, where it is now pretty hard to win an election if, A, you are not at least on good terms with criminal organizations, and B, you do not have a strong online presence.

There is also the fact that it is hard to collect evidence to ascertain this with 100 percent certainty, but criminal organizations themselves have become quite embedded not only in local politics, but also in terms of their technological reach. The domain of their activities no longer pertains only to drug trafficking. So, it is hard for me to see exactly where the influence ends, if that makes any sense. It is one thing to think about the traditional vision of drug-trafficking organizations as groups simply in charge of moving drugs from point A to point B, and that is basically all they do. Now, however, we are talking about really complex systems of criminal governance.

I recently read a paper that even referred to criminal hybrid regimes, in which state institutions and criminal organizations are conceptualized as fused. And again, in the Mexican case, the now former governor of Sinaloa—who recently stepped away from office—has been accused of having close ties with a criminal organization.

So, absolutely, there has been a reshaping of what elections might allow you to do in a democracy. The question then becomes: how do we protect the electoral mechanism from such complex and disruptive forces as, online misinformation, and criminal organizations? There are ample opportunity and space to learn in terms of candidate selection and campaign monitoring.

Violence Hollows Out Democracy from Below

Mexican soldiers
Mexican soldiers rehearse ahead of the September 16 Independence Day parade in Mexico City. Photo: Alejandro Muñoz / Dreamstime.

Given the documented 401 attacks on political actors during the recent electoral cycle, to what extent does violence function as an alternative mechanism of political selection, effectively hollowing out democracy from below?

Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval: This completely redefines the situation, and you are right to point out that this is not necessarily the kind of executive-led aggrandizement from the top down that we usually conceive of, but rather more of a bottom-up—I do not want to call it grassroots—dynamic. But it completely distorts what the minimal definition of democracy entails, namely the rotation of elites and electoral contestation. So, if the only elites rotating through the system are those effectively vetted by criminal organizations, and if, from their very inception, they already possess what we might call a very lax commitment to the rule of law, then I do not see a very bright future for liberal democracies at the local, subnational, or national level, in Mexico or elsewhere where this might be happening.

Local Politics as a Space of Experimentation and Democratic Defense

To what extent do populist and far-right actors exploit subnational arenas—such as regional governments or municipalities—as laboratories for illiberal experimentation and institutional erosion?

Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval: This is an interesting question, and you will get different answers depending on the case and who you ask. Subnational arenas, or subnational units, have been described both as laboratories of authoritarianism—where exactly the kind of dynamics you mention take place, with parties and politicians experimenting, learning, and seeing what they can get away with—and as arenas of resistance, in which politicians and parties resist and withstand autocratizing pressures from above.

In that sense, it ultimately becomes a matter of the preferences of the actors in power and what they are actually able to push for. The subnational arena allows for experimentation in either direction. It can function in an autocratizing way: actors can learn what the legal framework allows them to do, how they might reshuffle certain budgets, which agencies are absolutely necessary, and which messages resonate with the electorate, and which do not. This can actually catapult actors to the national stage. But it can also serve as a space of resistance—a space in which we learn how to contest autocratization from above.

So, I would try to balance the picture and say that there is evidence for both dynamics. My hope is that we are building enough research and collecting enough evidence regarding best practices in both scenarios: on the one hand, to identify these dynamics early and recognize that certain types of practices tend to lead to autocratizing outcomes; and, on the other hand, to replicate successful efforts toward rebuilding and resisting in defense of democracy.

Trust Is the Long-Term Challenge of Democratic Recovery

Your work suggests that declining state capacity undermines citizens’ trust and fuels disengagement. How does this dynamic contribute to a vicious cycle in which democratic dissatisfaction further empowers populist or authoritarian actors?

Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval: I’ll connect that question to your previous question by saying that there is research showing that the democratic features of the subnational unit in which you live shape citizens’ perceptions of how democratic their country is, and also shape trust in the state, government, and public institutions. In that sense, this broader process of declining state capacity and democratic erosion at multiple levels also affects how we see and relate to the state, the government, and public institutions across different levels.

Trying to connect the two dots, there may still be opportunities, particularly in the subnational arena, where efforts of resistance can serve as bastions for democratic preferences. We may observe national autocratizing trends and the normalization of certain radical ideologies or political preferences, but perhaps the local sphere can still remain a space in which a minimal threshold of democratic practices, norms, and behaviors endures. And that, in turn, can become a baseline from which we can begin rebuilding again from the bottom up.

So, there is this recognition that, as I mentioned earlier, the key issue in the long term is trust. How do you rebuild trust for the future? My hope—and I say this very openly—is that by identifying these very local good practices and efforts, we can find a baseline from which to begin building back up again.

Democratic Defense Begins with Naming the Problem

Illustration: Design Rage.

And finally, considering the combined pressures of global illiberalism, state hollowing, digital manipulation, and political violence, what would a viable strategy for democratic resilience look like in the contemporary era?

Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval: If I nail this question, I probably need to ask for a raise, because this is perhaps the question being asked in a lot of quote-unquote war rooms for the opposition. The broader question is: How do we successfully defend democracy? And there are multiple answers to this. Perhaps I am thinking of two things. One is a very personal answer, in terms of the way I try to approach it myself. The other is a more practical way of thinking about it from the perspective of an opposition movement or political actor.

The way that I try to do it personally is through documenting—trying to track what is happening to democracy in Mexico, in Latin America, and more generally; trying to document, gather, and collect evidence of where democracy is declining and where democracy is able to make a stand and resist. So, if I were to answer that question from my own experience—”how do I see myself as defending democracy?”—that would be my answer: documenting where it erodes, and also documenting where it resists, not only in a cross-country comparative way, but also within countries, through a subnational lens and perspective.

But beyond that and perhaps trying to extrapolate from that experience more broadly, the first thing would also be to document and agree on the diagnosis. Sometimes—I was watching some depositions in the US Congress where some members of the current administration could not even identify a very blatant non-constitutional act as such. We have become so politicized, and partisanship has seemingly trumped everything, that we cannot even agree on what a plain and clear reading of the Constitution is.

So, simply agreeing on the diagnosis, documenting it, and being able to call things by their proper names would already be a great first step. And then, moving forward, it would also be a crucial first step toward finding a common dialogue.

This is one of the calls that we make in the paper on illiberalism and democracy with Maryhen Jiménez and Timothy J. Power. One of the things that history teaches is that democratic defense and democratic oppositions are more likely to coalesce—and therefore more likely to succeed—when they agree on a minimal threshold. Agreeing on a maximalist position or a very high ceiling is always a difficult strategy. But agreeing on the minimal conditions that we can all defend and stand for is a much more feasible strategy and a more realistic act across different contexts.

But unfortunately, we are still in a situation where there is a precondition for that, which is simply the capacity to diagnose and call things what they are. And agreeing on that language today seems even harder than it was in the past. So, if anything, I hope that my work, and the work of my colleagues—and of the Center, for example, in this space—helps us create that common language to diagnose problems and then move forward.

Péter Krekó is an Associate Professor at the Department of Social Psychology; the Research Laboratory for Disinformation & Artificial Intelligence at Eötvös Loránd University.

Assoc. Prof. Krekó: Orbán’s Centralized Media and Propaganda Machine Faces a Striking Collapse, Opening New Possibilities for Democratic Renewal

Hungary’s democratic transition after Viktor Orbán may begin where his regime was once strongest: the centralized media and propaganda machine that sustained sixteen years of illiberal rule. In this ECPS interview, Assoc. Prof. Péter Krekó argues that Orbán’s highly professional disinformation apparatus has suffered a striking collapse, opening new possibilities for democratic renewal, media pluralism, and a more critical public sphere. At the same time, he warns that concentrated political power, polarization, and the dangers of re-autocratization remain serious challenges. Drawing on his expertise in political psychology, populism, and informational autocracy, Assoc. Prof. Krekó examines Hungary’s transformation within broader debates on post-truth politics, democratic resilience, and authoritarian adaptation—asking whether Hungary can evolve from a model of illiberalism into a model of democratic recovery.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The collapse of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government after sixteen years in power has shaken one of Europe’s most influential illiberal regimes and raised a defining question: can Hungary’s democratic renewal begin where Orbán’s system was strongest—its centralized media and propaganda machine? For more than a decade, Hungary served as a laboratory of democratic backsliding, populist governance, and state-sponsored informational manipulation. Yet, as Assoc. Prof. Péter Krekó argues in this ECPS interview, Orbán’s once highly professional disinformation apparatus has suffered a striking failure, losing its capacity to shape public opinion as effectively as before.

Assoc. Prof. Krekó—Associate Professor at Eötvös Loránd University, Director of the Political Capital Institute, and Senior Budapest Open Society Fellow at the CEU Institute for Advanced Study—examines how this collapse opens new possibilities for pluralism, democratic reconstruction, and a more critical public sphere. At the same time, he warns that democratic renewal is not guaranteed. Concentrated power, one-sided tribalism, and the risk of re-autocratization remain serious dangers.

Drawing on his interdisciplinary expertise as both a political scientist and social psychologist, Assoc. Prof. Krekó situates Hungary’s transformation within broader debates on populism, post-truth politics, democratic resilience, and authoritarian adaptation. He argues that Orbán’s system relied not primarily on overt repression, but on the creation of what became “the most centralized and politicized media environment in the entire European Union,” where hundreds of media outlets operated within a politically controlled ecosystem reproducing state-sponsored narratives, fear campaigns, and disinformation.

Yet despite these highly asymmetrical conditions, the Orbán regime’s informational dominance appears to have reached its limits. As Assoc. Prof. Krekó explains, the very machinery that once enabled Fidesz to consolidate power ultimately failed to maintain public trust and political legitimacy. The interview therefore examines not only the weakening of Orbán’s media empire, but also the broader unraveling of the patronage networks, ideological loyalties, and communicative structures that sustained Hungary’s illiberal order for more than a decade.

At the same time, Assoc. Prof. Krekó repeatedly cautions against simplistic narratives of democratic restoration. While Orbán’s centralized propaganda system may be collapsing, the institutional and psychological legacies of illiberalism remain deeply embedded within Hungarian political culture. The conversation explores the persistence of conspiracy narratives, anti-immigration attitudes, and pro-Russian disinformation, as well as the dangers that can emerge when overwhelming electoral legitimacy becomes concentrated in the hands of a new political force.

Importantly, the interview also highlights the possibility that Hungary could evolve from a model of informational autocracy into a model of democratic recovery. Assoc. Prof. Krekó reflects on the prospects for rebuilding media pluralism, depolarizing public discourse, strengthening democratic norms, and resisting the temptation to reproduce the very forms of centralized power that characterized Orbánism.

Ultimately, this conversation presents Hungary not merely as a case of authoritarian decline, but as a crucial test case for understanding whether democracies damaged by prolonged informational manipulation can successfully reconstruct pluralistic political life. Whether Hungary becomes a model for democratic renewal—or drifts toward new forms of hybrid governance—remains uncertain. But as Assoc. Prof. Krekó suggests throughout this interview, the striking collapse of Orbán’s centralized media and propaganda machine has opened political possibilities that only a few years ago appeared unimaginable.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Péter Krekó, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Orbán’s Informational Autocracy Meets Its Limits

Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s Prime Minister, arrives for a meeting with European Union leaders in Brussels, Belgium, on June 22, 2017. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Professor Krekó, welcome. In your work, you conceptualize Hungary as an informational autocracy, where media control and narrative manipulation underpin regime stability. To what extent does Magyar’s electoral victory represent a structural rupture in this system, rather than merely an elite turnover?

Associate Professor Péter Krekó: Thank you very much. It’s a brilliant question. Just as a disclaimer at the outset, the term “informational autocracy,” or “spin dictatorship,” was coined by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman. I merely applied it to Hungary and wrote an article on the subject. So, unfortunately, the term itself is not my brainchild. Nevertheless, I think it is a very important concept, and when it comes to understanding the nature of the Orbán regime, it is definitely helpful.

What has happened in Hungary challenges some of our traditional concepts for describing certain kinds of non-liberal—and indeed non-democratic—regimes. In many respects, the Hungarian regime under Viktor Orbán was a non-democratic system, but that did not mean it was impossible to defeat through elections.

Regarding your question about informational autocracy and systemic rupture, Viktor Orbán never systematically used violence during his rule. There was no imprisonment of political opponents, no imprisonment of journalists, and no violent crackdown on opposition protests. However, he developed an extremely centralized media system. Hungary had the most centralized and politicized media environment in the entire European Union, with more than 400 media outlets concentrated in a pro-government foundation called KESMA (Central European Press and Media Foundation), all under political control. In a country of only 8 million voters, this represented a massive media conglomerate. Combined with the so-called public media and additional aligned outlets, there were nearly 500 media organizations altogether, practically all parroting the same narratives, spreading politically controlled and state-sponsored disinformation.

The manipulation and spinning of information through television, billboards, and social media became the regime’s most important tool for reproducing its legitimacy. Yet Péter Magyar was still able to challenge this informational autocracy. One key rule of informational autocracies is that the side with greater resources generally enjoys greater support. Viktor Orbán possessed enormous resources in terms of media ownership and money spent on political advertising. Although the most recent elections were somewhat affected by social media self-regulation, in earlier elections the government could deploy far more billboards and advertising resources than its opponents.

In the 2022 elections, for example, the governmental side was able to display eight times as many billboards in public spaces as the opposition. So, while the competition appeared formally fair, in reality it was highly unequal. Despite this highly asymmetric and unfair environment, Péter Magyar was nevertheless able to challenge the government.

What we saw in the latest elections was that the highly professional media and disinformation machinery constructed by Orbán and his cronies was ultimately unable to spread its narratives effectively or shape public opinion in the way it once had.

Dismantling Informational Autocracy Requires More Than Victory

Peter Magyar, a popular opposition politician of celebrity status meeting the press at the site of a soccer arena and miniature train station in Viktor Orban’s village in Felcsut, Hungary. on May 24, 2024. Photo: Blue Corner Studio.

Given the deep institutional embedding of Orbán’s system—including media capture and electoral engineering—how reversible is this model in practice, even with a constitutional supermajority?

Associate Professor Péter Krekó: This is a great question. I would argue that it will be possible to dismantle this informational autocracy through a set of measures. First of all, of course, you have to somehow guarantee the plurality of the media environment. Second, you have to reform the state-sponsored media and its editorial standards, because it has effectively functioned as the cheapest pro-government propaganda imaginable. Third, you have to break up the information monopolies, even in the public domain, because many media mergers on the pro-government side were made legal and possible by the authorities, whereas attempts by independent media outlets to merge often faced institutional obstacles. Fourth, you also have to re-regulate the issue of state advertisements. In Hungary, state advertising became a major tool for financing pro-government media, with 95 percent of state advertisements going to pro-government outlets. In addition, substantial investment in media literacy education is necessary, alongside efforts to address hybrid threats. So, this is a multi-sectoral issue that requires a complex response.

I am hopeful that the new government, understanding that this monopolized and highly over-politicized media system primarily served Viktor Orbán’s interests, will recognize that it is not necessarily in their own interest to maintain it. In that sense, I remain cautiously optimistic. At the same time, however, there are also clear dangers ahead.

When you are in government, you are typically less interested in maintaining a diverse and critical information space than when you are in opposition. I do not need to elaborate on that because it is obvious. But with a constitutional majority, a very large parliamentary group full of political novices appointed by Péter Magyar himself, and no real parliamentary alternative outside the right side of the political spectrum, there are clear risks.

In Hungary today, you have the center-right TISZA party, the far-right Fidesz party, and the extreme-right Mi Hazánk party. So, you have one party from the European People’s Party, one from the Patriots group, and one from the European Sovereignists. In other words, only the right exists in parliament. The alternatives being articulated therefore emerge almost exclusively from one side of the political spectrum, often with authoritarian leanings.

Therefore, I think there are dangers ahead—dangers of re-autocratization and of abuse of power. Again, we have to wait and see. The TISZA movement has a much more diverse, younger, and more pro-democratic voter base than Fidesz had, and that gives some reason for optimism. It suggests that they may genuinely wish to dismantle the information monopoly and move toward a form of informational democracy rather than informational autocracy. But again, we have to wait and see.

We can also note that some competent ministers have been appointed, which is another reason for cautious hope. Moreover, the TISZA government is not entirely homogeneous; it includes many civic actors and some liberal public figures as well. So, we will see, but I think there is at least some basis for optimism that the information monopoly will be broken and that Hungary may move toward a more diverse, more pluralistic, and, in many respects, more critical information space.

Orbán’s Networks Are Collapsing Before Our Eyes

Local office of the Fidesz party in Szeged, southern Hungary. Photo: Jerome Cid / Dreamstime.

How should we theorize the resilience of illiberal governance when formal power changes hands but informal networks of patronage and influence remain intact? Moreover, to what extent might segments of the electorate remain psychologically invested in Orbánism, even after its electoral defeat?

Associate Professor Péter Krekó: Again, a brilliant question, and I think we will see the answer in the next few months. When it comes to patronage systems and the hidden networks that Fidesz has built up, they have been extremely important. But as we can see at the moment, the Orbán regime and the remnants of Orbán’s networks and patronage system are collapsing as we speak. Former government spin doctors, for example, have come out and criticized the Orbán regime, while also acknowledging that they themselves were victims of this system.

We can also see leading politicians beginning to criticize Fidesz’s internal affairs, while intellectuals who had been close to Fidesz—mostly for pragmatic reasons—seem to be abandoning it. Generally speaking, the fabric of the Fidesz network appears to be unraveling. Perhaps the reason is that Fidesz became a highly pragmatic and cynical organization driven primarily by nepotistic corruption, while ideology became secondary. And if you lack a strong ideological foundation and suddenly find yourself in opposition, with no more resources to distribute, many former loyalists will inevitably turn against you. That is exactly what we are witnessing in Hungary at the moment.

So, I would say this is definitely a systemic transformation, and Viktor Orbán’s chances of returning to power have diminished almost to zero in the recent period. It is fascinating because no one really expected such an abrupt collapse of Fidesz’s networks, yet it is happening before our very own eyes. In that sense, dismantling the system may prove easier than many anticipated.

At the same time, this also gives even more power to the TISZA Party and Péter Magyar, because their main opponent—Fidesz, now moving into opposition—is collapsing and weakening dramatically.

Coming back to your second question—how loyal Orbán’s core supporters will remain—this is something we still have to see. I would expect Fidesz to become a party with around 20 percent of the vote, or roughly one million votes in a country of eight million voters. Thus, it would become a party with significantly lower support than before, perhaps a medium-sized party. It may even shrink further.

The major challenge, connecting your previous question to this one, is how much Fidesz will be able to preserve voter loyalty if it no longer controls the public media. Many older Fidesz voters, according to research, remained loyal because they consumed only public media. And the public media essentially functioned as a mouthpiece for the Hungarian government and Fidesz, spreading anti-Ukrainian, anti-Brussels, and anti-Western propaganda, alongside a great deal of disinformation.

If those same voters continue watching public television, but public television becomes more independent—or perhaps even more pro-TISZA—then their attitudes may also begin to change. Hungary has been a major experimental laboratory of post-truth politics, and it is now going to become a major experimental laboratory of post-post-truth politics as well in the coming period. What the outcome will be is very difficult to predict at the moment.

Can Hungary Unlearn Illiberalism?

Tisza Party volunteer collecting signatures in Mosonmagyaróvár, Hungary on June 5, 2024 during a nationwide campaign tour ahead of the European Parliament elections. Photo: Sarkadi Roland / Dreamstime.

Your research shows that authoritarian environments can distort perceptions of democratic quality, making illiberal systems appear more democratic than they are; in this context, how might such cognitive biases shape public reactions to reform efforts under Magyar, and to what extent can a new government effectively recalibrate citizens’ understandings of democracy after prolonged exposure to manipulated informational environments?

Associate Professor Péter Krekó: This is again a very good question, but a difficult one—because, on the one hand, we can say that the voter base of the TISZA Party seems to be somewhat more aware of what democracy really means, and this kind of democratic consciousness appears to be at a higher level in that voter camp than it was among Fidesz voters. Within Fidesz, we could observe a strange combination of authoritarian attitudes among voters and a simultaneous denial of authoritarian malpractices.

On the one hand, the argument was that the Hungarian system was absolutely democratic—nothing to see here. In fact, this is the message they continue to repeat: “We could be defeated in elections, therefore the whole regime was democratic.” Any suggestion of authoritarianism was dismissed as far-fetched.

On the other hand, Fidesz clearly had authoritarian instincts. It wanted, for example, to crack down much more brutally on the independent media, NGOs, and think tanks than it ultimately could, but it was constrained by fears of public backlash before the election. So, there was an interesting duality in that respect. Perhaps this is something we can observe in other hybrid regimes as well. On the one hand, such regimes are willing to use authoritarian tactics; on the other hand, they insist that their systems are fully democratic.

Here again, we face both certain dangers and certain opportunities. One opportunity is that Hungary replaced Viktor Orbán’s party with the highest electoral turnout ever recorded in post-transitional Hungarian political history. Turnout reached almost 80 percent, which is nearly 10 percent higher than ever before. Previously, the highest turnout had been 72 percent. During the transition from socialism to democracy in 1989–1990, turnout was only 64 percent, so the level of political enthusiasm this time was significantly greater.

Of course, polarization was also much higher than before, but political engagement—as well as resistance to and rejection of the authoritarian practices of the Fidesz government among opposition voters—was extremely strong. The opposition gained 53 percent of the vote, which is a very substantial majority in raw electoral terms, and this was then translated into a constitutional majority.

This rejection of authoritarian practices opens up avenues for some form of re-democratization—at the level of institutions, public life, and perhaps, in the medium and long term, toward a more pluralistic party system, which would certainly be welcome in Hungary. The Hungarian political and electoral system is highly majoritarian, and it typically produces constitutional majorities, which I personally think is unhealthy.

So, I do believe there is a path toward re-democratization, but again, we have to see what Péter Magyar’s actual goals are. He is not yet in office, so at this stage we can only speculate. He certainly employs a great deal of democratic rhetoric, and if we take that seriously, then he is probably aware that creating a new authoritarian regime would not only be extremely difficult, but also contrary to his own interests.

At the same time, given that he currently possesses almost absolute political power, along with the capacity to redraw the constitutional system, there is always the danger of abusing such a high level of legitimacy. I would not say that we should automatically assume Hungary will simply return to another hybrid regime similar to Orbán’s. But I do think that if TISZA and Péter Magyar lose popularity over time, there is a possibility that he could misuse his overwhelming parliamentary majority, assuming he is able to keep the party united.

So, we will see. My hope is that Hungary, after serving as a model of illiberalism for sixteen years, might instead become a model for re-democratization. But at the moment, I would say that remains somewhat wishful thinking, because we truly have to wait and see. As political scientists, we understand that whenever someone possesses too much power, there is always the danger that they may use that power not only to democratize the system, but also to entrench themselves within it.

Hungary’s Post-Truth Legacy Will Not Disappear Overnight

Viktor Orbán campaign poster ahead of Hungary’s 2026 elections. Photo: Bettina Wagner / Dreamstime.

You argue that misinformation has a “lingering effect” and that even debunked narratives continue to shape attitudes. In a post-authoritarian transition, how can democratic actors overcome the durability of Orbán-era narratives embedded in collective memory?

Associate Professor Péter Krekó: This is one of the biggest challenges we face at the moment, mostly because, in some areas, we can clearly see the damage done to people’s hearts and minds by the Orbán propaganda machinery. State-sponsored disinformation has shaped public attitudes in many domains. To give just a few examples: Islamophobic and anti-immigration attitudes were already strong before the 2014–2015 migration crisis, but they were amplified even further by the Orbán regime. According to international polls, Hungary is one of the most prejudiced countries even within Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which is already a relatively contaminated region in that respect.

The question is how much public opinion can be shifted toward a more open and nuanced position on immigration, and why this is necessary. No European countries are able to reproduce themselves demographically. Without immigration, European societies would eventually die out, to put it bluntly. And yet, the narratives coming from Péter Magyar and the TISZA Party still remain close to the idea of zero migration, much like their predecessors. So, in that domain, I definitely hope there will be a shift toward a more nuanced and complex approach—one where you do not simply say that everyone is welcome, but where you acknowledge that our economy and society require a certain level of immigration and that immigrants must be properly integrated. Any modern society has a far more diverse population than what we typically observe in Hungary.

The other major issue is Russian disinformation—anti-Ukrainian narratives and this highly hypocritical “peace narrative,” according to which Brussels and the West supposedly want to wage war against Russia, while Ukraine, together with Brussels, is portrayed as the warmonger rather than the Russian Federation itself. Over the last few years, many conspiracy theories have also been spread about foreign powers allegedly conspiring against Hungary, while the victim mentality that nationalist politics typically exploits has become very strong within Hungarian public discourse.

So, I would point especially to these two examples: anti-immigration attitudes and pro-Russian conspiracy theories, both of which have had a long-lasting impact on Hungarian society. Undoing this damage requires, on the one hand, political will. The new government, for example, should speak in a more nuanced way about immigration. But on the other hand, it also requires institutional responses—particularly regarding public media, media pluralism, public education, and so on.

Education itself has become increasingly politicized and ideological in recent years, somewhat following the Turkish model. There have even been attempts to make elementary and public education more ideologically indoctrinating. So, it also requires a certain degree of courage to remove some of the harmful nationalist narratives that are now deeply ingrained in the Hungarian curriculum.

Pre-bunking as a Democratic Defense

Tisza leader Péter Magyar
Tisza leader Péter Magyar begins a symbolic “one million steps” march to Nagyvárad, Romania, addressing reporters with supporters in Budapest, Hungary on May 14, 2025. Photo: Istvan Balogh / Dreamstime.

In your work on countering conspiracy theories, you highlight the epistemic, moral, and democratic dilemmas of debunking, including the risk of reactance and backfire effects. How should a Magyar-led government design interventions against disinformation without reinforcing polarization or appearing to curtail pluralism?

Associate Professor Péter Krekó: I would say that the party now coming to government, as well as Péter Magyar, the leading figure of this movement, has already used certain anti-disinformation techniques during the campaign in a very clever way. What do I mean by that? First of all, they relied heavily on pre-bunking and preemptive communication while campaigning against Viktor Orbán before the elections.

For example, they warned in advance that Russian disinformation could spread fake stories about Péter Magyar’s private life, that kompromat (compromising) materials might emerge, and that deepfake videos related to his personal life could appear. They also cautioned voters that the other side might falsely claim that TISZA intended to introduce measures such as pension cuts—things they had never promised and never intended to implement. In other words, they prepared their supporters in advance for the kind of disinformation they expected from their opponents.

One important consequence of this strategy was that governmental disinformation and Russian influence proved highly ineffective during the elections. We could clearly see that the government’s narratives no longer resonated with the public in the way they once had. And I do think—and this is also my hope—that these tools can continue to be used in the future, not only against foreign disinformation but also, to some extent, against domestic disinformation. In the political domain, they handled the disinformation challenge very skillfully.

Of course, once you are in government, you need a much broader toolkit for combating disinformation, including forms of misinformation that affect everyday life—pseudoscience, miracle cures, and COVID- and vaccine-related disinformation, all of which spread extensively during the pandemic in Hungary. There is even an anti-vaccine party, Mi Hazánk, which has been extremely vocal in opposing mandatory vaccinations, including long-established vaccines against diseases such as rubella and polio.

Governments therefore also need to confront geopolitical disinformation originating abroad. For that, institutional responses are necessary. Media literacy education, for example, could incorporate pre-bunking and other new tools designed to teach people about disinformation and strengthen their critical thinking skills when consuming information.

I also believe there is a need for some kind of hybrid threat center capable of addressing the geopolitical disinformation Hungary is facing. During the last elections, for example, Vladimir Putin made serious attempts to influence the outcome through military intelligence services, foreign security networks, and the so-called Social Design Agency—a social media company running dark online PR campaigns using bots, trolls, and disinformation.

Ultimately, these efforts were unsuccessful. But I think they failed partly because European countries helped expose some of Russia’s plans, and also because TISZA used preemptive communication and pre-bunking very effectively during the campaign. Hopefully, these practices can now be incorporated into a broader anti-disinformation strategy.

The Risk of Reproducing Elite Privilege

To what extent does Magyar’s background as a former insider complicate the narrative of democratic rupture and renewal, and in light of recent accusations surrounding his nomination of his brother-in-law as justice minister, how might such decisions affect the legitimacy of a government that claims to restore the rule of law, potentially reproducing patterns of elite privilege associated with the previous regime?

Associate Professor Péter Krekó: Thank you for this question, because I think it is extremely important for two reasons. First of all, yes, there is always a danger of abusing power, and there is also the danger of falling into clientelistic and, in some respects, nepotistic practices that were widespread under the previous government and are becoming increasingly common around the world. We can even look at the United States as an example.

So, that danger certainly exists. At the same time, I do not think that the mere fact that Péter Magyar was once a regime insider automatically makes him a born or socialized autocrat. I am also a social psychologist, so I tend to believe that human beings—not only groups, but individuals as well—can change over time depending on the environment and circumstances surrounding them.

Over the last two years, Péter Magyar has spent a great deal of time among voters, traveling throughout the country, and he has clearly become more socially sensitive. His program has also become much more left-leaning in terms of policy proposals than it was before. At the same time, he has also become somewhat more liberal—even if he remains fundamentally a conservative politician—and somewhat more democratic in the way he talks about institutional reforms and the restoration of autonomy within society.

So, I think he has changed considerably over the last two years, and everyone working closely with him, including his chief campaign manager, has said that he is probably no longer the same person he was two years ago. We have to give people the opportunity to change. So yes, he has changed significantly, and I do not believe that being a former regime insider is necessarily a problem in itself. However, the huge majority he gained in the elections definitely creates certain risks in that respect.

But there is another danger here, and this is the danger of political tribalism—political tribalism that overrides universal norms in politics and turns every principle into something particular and instrumental for gaining and maintaining political power.

What do I mean by that? I genuinely hope that opposition voters, opposition opinion leaders, and the independent media will remain just as strict regarding nepotism, abuses of power, possible corruption, and similar issues under the future government as they were under the previous one. Because there is a danger that, after sixteen years of Orbánism and widespread frustration with it, some voters may begin to believe that any tool is acceptable if it helps dismantle the remnants of the Orbán regime. That is a very dangerous way of thinking.

I sincerely hope that this transition in Hungary will not become a shift from one hybrid regime to another hybrid regime, but rather a transition from a hybrid regime toward a more democratic one. But for that to happen, you need not only self-restraint from politicians in power, but also voters who are willing to punish leaders if they depart from a democratic path.

Again, after sixteen years of increasingly authoritarian rule, this is going to be a huge experiment. I would not be able to predict exactly what will happen. We have to wait and see, but we must maintain the same critical attitude toward the new government that we had toward the previous one, in the sense that the same rules and the same norms must continue to apply.

The Loss of a Role Model for the International Far Right

From Left: Hungary PM Viktor Orban, Poland PM Beata Szydlo, Czech PM Bohuslav Sobotka and Slovakia PM Robert Fico pose prior their meeting in Prague on February 15, 2016.

Given your argument that Orbán’s model has served as a “teacher” for other illiberal regimes, what are the implications of its apparent collapse for transnational populist networks, and does his electoral defeat signal a broader vulnerability in populist radical-right regimes or rather an exceptional case that such movements may reinterpret as a temporary setback and adapt to—particularly in the realm of narrative and identity politics?

Associate Professor Péter Krekó: The main challenge here is that we are witnessing two contrasting tendencies simultaneously. On the one hand, especially within the European Union, we can clearly observe the rise of illiberal, highly nativist populist parties on the right. Across the last three European Parliamentary elections, populist radical-right parties have steadily expanded their representation in the European Parliament.

We also see upcoming national elections in several countries where these forces are currently leading the polls. In France, for example, Rassemblement National (RN) is ahead. In Germany, the AfD is leading. In Austria, the FPÖ is also leading. So, in many important Western European countries, populist right-wing forces with illiberal tendencies are clearly gaining support. The United Kingdom is not an exception either, where the Reform Party is also leading in the polls.

So, this is one very visible broader trend within Europe. What are the main drivers behind it? There is a growing anti-establishment mood, declining public morale linked to economic stagnation, and immigration continuing to remain a major political issue throughout the European Union. At the same time, there are exporters of illiberalism—such as the United States, Russia, to some extent China, and several other countries as well.

And yet, despite this broader zeitgeist, Viktor Orbán was defeated in the Hungarian election. My most important point here is that perhaps we sometimes overestimate the importance of global political trends and zeitgeists. Domestic issues may ultimately be much more decisive in determining the outcome of national elections.

Viktor Orbán was defeated despite being openly supported by Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Benjamin Netanyahu. In the end, it was a sovereign decision made by Hungarian voters. And, in many European elections—and elections elsewhere in the world as well—we may increasingly discover that excessive support from foreign ideological allies can backfire just as much as it can help.

For example, when Donald Trump attempted to intervene politically in Canada, the liberal candidate won. Something similar happened in Australia. In Hungary, J.D. Vance visited the country shortly before the election, but this did not help Viktor Orbán at all.

So, the soft power and sharp power of authoritarian actors—including Trump, but also Orbán himself—may now be diminishing. Viktor Orbán will most likely lose his position as an international role model, and he will no longer be able to use Hungarian state resources to spread his ideology and political influence abroad.

In that sense, this represents both the loss of a symbolic role model and the loss of a financial and ideological resource for the international far right. However, I do not think we can automatically conclude from this that, for example, Marine Le Pen’s party in France is now less likely to win elections. Ultimately, elections are still decided largely by domestic concerns and the priorities of national electorates.

And I think we, as political scientists—myself included, since I am very much part of this field—sometimes place too much emphasis on global tendencies. Of course, such tendencies do exist, but there are also many important exceptions. Hungary was definitely one such exception. But perhaps it is an exception that could itself become a broader rule in the future.

The Danger of One-Sided Tribalism

Peter Magyar, a popular opposition politician of celebrity status meeting the press at the site of a soccer arena and miniature train station in Viktor Orban’s village in Felcsut, Hungary. on May 24, 2024. Photo: Blue Corner Studio.

And finally, Prof. Krekó, in your work on populism in power, you show how populist governance fosters Manichean, tribal political identities that resist compromise. What are the prospects for depolarizing such “tribalized” political cultures after a regime change, and what institutional or discursive tools might facilitate this transition?

Associate Professor Péter Krekó: Thank you again for this question. Many important and fascinating research topics are emerging through this discussion, so it is truly inspirational.

When it comes to polarization and tribalism, you generally need two sides to sustain it. In Hungary, however, I believe the biggest danger in the future may not be symmetrical polarization—where you have a very strong governmental camp and a very strong opposition camp constructing competing realities—but rather one-sided polarization, in which TISZA becomes so dominant in shaping the public narrative that, as we discussed earlier, its supporters may gradually become willing to tolerate democratic transgressions if they are not vigilant enough, simply because they remain focused on fighting the legacy of Fidesz, even if Fidesz itself becomes significantly weaker than before.

So, there is clearly a danger of one-sided tribalism and polarization. At the same time, we cannot exclude the possibility that a new political force may emerge, or that the Mi Hazánk Party—the extreme-right party I mentioned earlier—could become stronger. Polarization therefore depends partly on the direction in which both the political system and the party system evolve. And since these dynamics are changing as we speak, they remain very difficult to predict.

What I would particularly emphasize, however, is the importance of political voluntarism. If you want to weaken polarization and tribalism, you need political will. You have to stop relying on hate rhetoric against your opponents. You have to invest in messages that are more unifying than divisive. And you also have to strengthen the political center.

I actually think that all the preconditions for such a process are currently present. This is a historic opportunity for depolarization—for rebuilding not only the political center, but also the social center, because the center has almost disappeared in vertical economic terms as well. The middle class has weakened considerably in recent years. So, since the democratic transition, there has never been a better opportunity to reconstruct this center.

I can only hope that the new government and Péter Magyar will take advantage of this historic opportunity. But doing so requires self-restraint in the exercise of executive power, and it also requires restraint in the use of campaign strategies and political rhetoric toward opponents. Whether Péter Magyar and the TISZA Party will actually be capable of exercising such restraint remains an open question. Let us hope so.

Dr. Justin Patch is an Assistant Professor of Music at Vassar College.

Dr. Patch: In the Age of Populism, Politics Becomes a Struggle over Aesthetics

In this ECPS interview, Dr. Justin Patch argues that, in the age of populism, politics increasingly unfolds as a struggle over aesthetics. Rather than being peripheral, cultural forms—music, memes, and DIY practices—are central to how “the people” are experienced and constructed. As he notes, “the primary terrain of public contestation becomes aesthetic,” as citizens navigate complex political realities through affect, symbolism, and participation. While democracy depends on the capacity to feel “part of something larger than yourself,” this same impulse creates openings for populist capture. By showing how art can function as both democratic expression and ideological instrument, Patch highlights a central tension: aesthetic experience sustains collective belonging yet also enables its manipulation by populist and authoritarian actors.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this ECPS interview, Dr. Justin Patch, Assistant Professor of Music at Vassar College, offers a powerful account of how politics in the age of populism increasingly unfolds through aesthetics—through sound, image, gesture, affect, and participatory cultural forms. Rather than treating music, memes, art, or DIY production as peripheral to political life, Dr. Patch argues that they are central to how citizens experience belonging, identity, and representation. As he puts it, “the primary terrain of public contestation becomes aesthetic.”

The interview begins by situating democratic culture in practices that emerge from below. Historically, Dr. Patch notes, “the part we celebrate is the work done underneath the state.” From farmers’ organizations to populist gatherings, music, dancing, hymn singing, sewing circles, and potluck dinners created forms of sociability through which “the people” could recognize themselves as political actors. The crucial distinction, he argues, is between culture produced by communities themselves and culture appropriated by state actors or those seeking “state capture.”

This distinction becomes more urgent when Dr. Patch turns to the affective power of political mobilization. Democracy, he argues, depends on people feeling that they are “part of something larger than yourself.” Yet this same need is also democracy’s vulnerability. Populism, authoritarianism, and radical-right movements can offer the same emotional intensity and collective belonging while redirecting it toward exclusionary or leader-centered projects. “Unfortunately,”he warns, “that same need to feel part of something larger can be hijacked.”

A major theme of the conversation is how music and popular culture translate resentment into political identity. Dr. Patch explains that art can become “a proxy for political thought” because of its emotional accessibility. Whether in CasaPound’s punk and hardcore scenes, white-power music networks, or strands of country music, cultural forms can provide “social and emotional cues,” “cognitive shortcuts,” and a language through which grievance becomes durable belonging.

The interview also explores digital populism and the politics of re-signification. In Trump-era memes, parody videos, and online bricolage, Dr. Patch identifies an “aesthetic of domination” in which cultural materials are appropriated, inverted, and weaponized. The ability “to take something associated with one set of values and reframe it entirely,” he argues, becomes a symbolic victory.

Yet Dr. Patch does not reduce popular culture to manipulation. He insists on the democratic importance of self-expression, arguing that “democracy is about a kind of self-expression that communicates with others.” The challenge, then, is to cultivate aesthetic literacy without suppressing popular creativity. Art, he concludes, can be “a pedagogical tool” for learning how to live with difference—and for recognizing humanity “even in the face of profound disagreement.”

Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Justin Patch, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Political Culture Begins with Who Creates It: State or Society

Photo: casapounditalia.org

Dr. Patch, welcome. In your work on the “sound of democracy,” you treat music, noise, affect, and collective embodiment not as ornamental features of politics but as constitutive of democratic experience. How should we understand the role of music and art in forming democratic subjectivities at a time when polarization, distrust, and affective partisanship increasingly structure political life?

Dr. Justin Patch: When we look historically at the democratic aspects of music performance and art-making, the part we celebrate is the work done underneath the state. Even when we are talking about the 19th century—and I am being very specific about the American case here—farm labor organizing, farmers’ organizations, and populist movements, the music, art, and dancing associated with these movements came from the people themselves. It was, and I hesitate to say this, almost like a Johann Gottfried Herder-type phenomenon, where the folk arts of farmers in places like Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, and Minnesota became part of a political movement.

Here, I find the work of a historian named James Turner quite formative for my thinking. He talks about populist gatherings as places of much-needed sociability. In his article Understanding the Populus, which focuses on Texas, instead of looking purely at the economic output of populous counties versus democratic counties, he examines other factors, such as the number of churches and the average number of miles traveled to market. What he finds is that populous counties were actually more spread out, had less commerce from the outside, and had fewer traveling preachers. There were fewer churches coming from outside. Because they lacked established ways of gathering, populist gatherings became extremely important.

People would hold meetings lasting several days, where there were sewing circles, knitting circles, prayer circles, square dancing, hymn singing, and potluck dinners. In other words, there was a great deal of collective activity. But what is important is that these were things people already enjoyed doing, which they then did together in a collective setting.

So what you see is a distinction between music that people are already making within their communities, which is then directed toward a political purpose, and music that state actors—or those seeking some form of state capture—appropriate, repackage, and project onto society. It is a kind of push and pull, and sometimes it involves the same culture. The key difference lies in who initiates it. Is it culture initiated by the state, where the state defines what it means to be a citizen, to belong to “the people”? Or is it culture that people themselves create and practice, which they then bring into the public sphere as part of their political activity? This is a distinction we need to parse carefully.

Of course, things become more complicated when we consider musicians. In Melanie Schiller’s work with Mario Dunkel, for instance, there are cases of artists in Austria who have aligned themselves with the political right. Certainly CasaPound is an organization that uses music very effectively and has what the British once called “movement artists.” In the 1960s United States, for example, Phil Ochs was considered such a movement artist.

So, where I would begin is by distinguishing between music and art that are appropriated by state actors and those that people are already producing for themselves and then bring into the public sphere. If that makes sense.

Democracy’s Emotional Power Can Be Exploited by Populism

You argue that campaign soundscapes generate emotional intensity, collective participation, and a sense of shared political presence. To what extent are these affective atmospheres indispensable to democratic mobilization, and when do they become vulnerable to capture by authoritarian, radical-right, or supremacist political projects?

Dr. Justin Patch: This is where it becomes two sides of the same coin. Michael Kazin, in his book on American populism, writes that populist waves occur in America so often that he is tempted to say populism is built into American democracy.

Part of democracy—essentially being ruled by your peers—is something we tend to romanticize, but in reality it is a difficult position to be in. The system of popular democracy depends on people feeling that they are part of something. You feel part of something larger than yourself, and this is why democracy is often likened to religion. You secularize authority by saying you are not ruled by God but by a political system, yet you still seek what Freud calls an “oceanic feeling.”

You need that feeling for democracy to function effectively. People must feel that they belong to something larger, but this is also the weak link through which populism, authoritarianism, and similar forces can enter. They can provide that same sense of belonging while, at the same time, redistributing wealth upward to the top one percent. It is, in many ways, the same process.

I remember watching a campaign event in New Hampshire in 2024. My brother and I saw the same event and later discussed it on the phone. He was struck by a man they interviewed, who, when asked about January 6, 2020, and what the truth of it was, replied, “Whatever Donald Trump says is the truth.” I felt an immense sense of sadness at that moment. When we look at the Gini coefficient in the United States and the number of people who are struggling, we see individuals who are searching for something to believe in—who want to be part of something larger than themselves.

What troubles me is that what presented itself to them was Donald Trump and the MAGA movement—something that, beneath its rhetoric, is deeply pernicious—instead of something more constructive. As we mark May Day, we are reminded of the history of labor and labor movements in the United States and Europe. There were periods when people rallied around the idea of supporting working people. Even in the 19th century, many middle-class individuals expressed empathy for the plight of workers. There have been powerful movements in which people looked at the underclasses and said, “You deserve something better.”

As the Supreme Court rolls back the last elements of the Voting Rights Act this week in the United States, we are reminded that, in the 1960s, a majority believed that Black Americans deserved better. These are moments we look back on and recognize that there was a form of empathy—perhaps not radical empathy, but empathy nonetheless—which was tied to the need to feel part of something larger than oneself.

Unfortunately, that same need to feel part of something larger can be hijacked. This is part of the democratic process, at least in the United States. I am not sure there is any guarantee—there is no perfect democracy in which the threat of populism does not exist in some form.

Music Transforms Resentment into Political Belonging

Photo: Dreamstime.

In your analysis of music’s political economy, you emphasize how music provides “social and emotional cues,” creates “cognitive shortcuts,” and affirms identities. How does this help explain the power of far-right cultural ecosystems—from CasaPound’s aesthetic politics in Italy to white-power music networks, identitarian media, and nationalist festivals—to transform diffuse resentment into durable political belonging?

Dr. Justin Patch: When people spend time together, it has an effect on them. When I was younger, I played in rock bands, and when you are playing music, other issues inevitably come up in conversation. There is a process through which cultural leaders can become thought leaders. It is not necessarily a one-to-one relationship, but it often happens.

The beauty—and the danger—of this dynamic is that art becomes a proxy for political thought, partly because of its emotional accessibility. Terry Eagleton, in his early 1990s book The Ideology of the Aesthetic, examines how ideologies are embedded in aesthetics and in the social relations that produce them. Although he focuses mainly on visual art and literature, the insight applies here as well.

If we look at white-power music and CasaPound, for example, much of CasaPound’s music is punk rock and hardcore. This appeals to a very specific audience, often predominantly male. The resentment felt by men in the post-industrial West—if we look at the statistics, in Italy, much like in the United States, non-college-educated white men are falling behind—is captured and expressed through this music. Hardcore, in particular, channels that sense of grievance.

To borrow Althusserian language, it “hails” people together, aggregating them and creating a space in which they can think collectively. CasaPound is able to do this effectively. In smaller pockets, white-power music in the United States performs a similar function. However, there are other forms of music with much broader audiences that do something comparable.

In the United States, certain strands of country music, with far larger fan bases, operate in a similar way. Songs like Try That in a Small Town or Rich Men North of Richmond,” which have charted, translate resentment into a popular idiom. They move it out of the language of newspapers and political speeches and embed it in everyday life.

Former Foreign Service officer, David J. Firestein, wrote an article called “The Honky Tonk Gap,” in which he examined George W. Bush and his relationship with Nashville country music. He argued that Bush was able to adopt the vocabulary of country songwriters in his political rhetoric, creating a link between how he spoke, how musicians sang, and how his audience spoke among themselves. This helped build a kind of intellectual ecosystem across those domains. In that sense, he was able to draw on a shared cultural repertoire with his intended voters and use it very effectively. Country music in the United States has done something similar—on a much larger scale—than white-power music does in more limited contexts, particularly in the mid-2000s.

Digital Populism Thrives on Inverting Cultural Symbols

In “Editing for Partisanship,” you describe Trump-era populist art as grounded not in stable formal properties but in a “relational aesthetic” marked by domination, ridicule, violence, and re-signification. How does this concept illuminate the contemporary radical right’s use of memes, parody, music videos, flags, street art, and digital bricolage to produce “the people” against feminists, migrants, racial minorities, liberals, and cosmopolitan elites?

Dr. Justin Patch: When I look at the digital ecosystem, what you have are communities that are, in many ways, pre-made. You have people who follow certain accounts and others who follow each other because they know one another. Within this context, digital culture—music videos, memes, Photoshop, and similar forms—gives people an opportunity to participate.

Part of the language of participation involves familiarity and humor, but there is also something like a culture and aesthetic of domination. This may sound unusual, but we can see a parallel in DJ culture. One of the things DJs do, especially when they know their audiences well, is to play tracks people have not heard for a while, disguise tracks by starting them in unexpected places, or mix together seemingly unrelated pieces. Sometimes they introduce something that feels almost like a non sequitur, but if it works, the audience responds enthusiastically. It demonstrates creativity and a willingness to think outside the box, but it is also a form of control. The DJ exercises aesthetic authority by blending disparate elements—disco and ragamuffin—into something seamless.

I think this aesthetic of domination operates in a similar way. It still relies on humor and ridicule, but the further one can push into unexpected or even transgressive territory—particularly into spaces perceived as belonging to an “enemy.” The more recognition one gains for creativity, the more one can appropriate elements associated with, for instance, left-leaning culture and invert their meaning, the more powerful the result becomes.

In Editing for Partisanship, I use the example of Footloose. For those unfamiliar with it, it is a 1980s feel-good film about tensions between urban and rural life in a conservative Christian town that bans dancing. A young man from the city arrives and mobilizes the youth against the older generation. In the end, as in many films of that era, there is a resolution: the youth are allowed to dance, authority is partially preserved, and the narrative concludes on an optimistic note.

Dan Scavino takes the chorus of Footloose and sets it to footage from Portland showing anti-government, anti-Trump protesters, including an incident in which one protester accidentally sets his feet on fire with a Molotov cocktail. What made that clip go viral, and what made it so striking to me, was the radical re-signification of a song associated with a more conciliatory cultural moment into something distinctly aligned with the MAGA movement.

It is precisely this capacity to invert meaning—to take something associated with one set of values and reframe it entirely—that is highly valued within this particular populist movement. The ability to appropriate and transform cultural material in this way is seen as a significant victory.

Imperfection Becomes the Currency of Political Credibility

Your work suggests that popular culture functions as a medium through which populist communities imagine themselves as authentic, embattled, and morally superior. How do movements such as MAGA, CasaPound, Generation Identity, Hindutva cultural networks, and European radical-right youth scenes use DIY (do it yourself) aesthetics to blur the line between grassroots participation and ideological discipline?

Dr. Justin Patch: DIY is such an interesting concept. George McKay, in his edited volume on DIY, cautions that DIY is not a utopia and is not always a left-leaning phenomenon. There is plenty of conservative DIY as well. The key point about DIY is that it carries a veneer of authenticity. DIY culture is always emblematic of the people who create it, but it also has an aesthetic—and it is this aesthetic that can be co-opted. We see this quite frequently. At the present moment, DIY culture is very important in constructing “the people.”

Let me step back for a moment. Some years ago, probably in the 2010s, I met an EDM (electronic dance music) producer by chance. We were chatting, and he remarked that when everything can be made perfect—when digital tools allow for perfect timing and sound—the real challenge is capturing the imperfection that makes something compelling. When you listen to artists like Aretha Franklin or Marvin Gaye, there is always something slightly off—slightly behind the beat or slightly out of tune—that listeners find appealing.

In a digital environment where perfection is possible, DIY and its associated imperfections become signifiers of authenticity. It is the difference between a perfectly staged shot and a slightly shaky, handheld recording. Even if the latter is less polished, it conveys a stronger sense of authenticity.

What we see now is that political actors are deliberately adopting this veneer of authenticity. Highly polished, “Madison Avenue”-style political advertising increasingly appears inauthentic to younger audiences. During the 2020 US election, for example, Joe Biden’s campaign invited individuals to record themselves explaining why they supported him. These clips were edited into campaign materials and proved more effective than professionally produced advertisements that cost millions of dollars.

The DIY aesthetic, then, becomes a marker of authenticity that political actors seek to harness, because voters respond to what feels genuine. One of the major criticisms of Hillary Clinton in 2016 was that she appeared inauthentic—overly scripted and guarded—which many voters rejected.

What remains, in many ways, is DIY. As Anthony Giddens argued, in the context of postmodernity, trust becomes central. The DIY aesthetic functions as an index of authenticity and humanity. The problem, however, is that it is still an aesthetic—and therefore something that can be appropriated and instrumentalized.

The Key Question Is Not What People Create, but Why

DIY
Photo: Dreamstime.

In your account, citizen-made art is central to the construction of populist identity because it is “by, of, and for the people.” How should we distinguish between genuinely democratic cultural participation and participatory authoritarianism, where citizens voluntarily reproduce exclusionary, supremacist, or leader-centered political imaginaries?

Dr. Justin Patch: This is always the big question. What are cultural outpourings that are essentially top-down, and what constitutes cultural production that is bottom-up—production from the peripheries, and so on?

At a certain point, it becomes difficult to draw that distinction, because if someone genuinely supports populist candidates, there is no straightforward way to say that this is not an authentic voice of the people. When I look at Trump-related art—work produced by very young people, very old people, and those at the margins of the movement—I am hesitant to say that it is all co-opted. There are people who genuinely believe that Trump will be good for them.

For me, as an analyst, it becomes more important to ask why. Where have we failed—in terms of the economy, education, or public awareness—that someone would believe that this person’s policies would benefit them, or that this person genuinely cares about their well-being? In that sense, it becomes a second-order analysis. It is one thing to examine the art people create for a populist cause; it is another to ask why this is happening.

How is it that so many young men believe in this so strongly that they create their own podcasts, memes, graffiti, T-shirts, hats, and bumper stickers, or even decorate their vehicles as shrines? Why do they feel so passionately about this? In many cases, some of the DIY art I have examined expresses messages that run counter to official campaign messaging, yet remains unapologetically pro-Trump. What these individuals believe Trumpism to be can differ significantly from actual policies, but they believe in it nonetheless.

That kind of projection offers a window into how people manage their everyday lives. In Jim McGuigan’s sense, this can be understood as a genuine voice of the people. Whether we like it or agree with it is a separate question. From an analytical perspective, the issue is whether this reflects how people actually think.

I am hesitant to dismiss such expressions outright, unless they are clearly repeating talking points from talk radio or television. If they fall outside that realm, they are worth examining, because they reveal how people understand and experience the world. And that is important to understand.

Citizens Engage More with Feeling than Policy

An elderly woman prays amidst a busy crowd in Sydney, Australia. Photo: Martin Graf.

How should we theorize the relationship between aesthetic experience and democratic legitimacy when citizens feel more directly represented by songs, memes, symbols, and performative rituals than by parties, parliaments, or policy platforms?

Dr. Justin Patch: This is very much a Terry Eagleton question. Eagleton writes about the problems of the modern state: economic, educational, infrastructure, human policy, health policy—all of this is so complex that, as an everyday citizen, you are quite literally not equipped with either the knowledge or the totality of information needed to be a full participant in these discussions.

For those of us who enjoy discussing politics, at some point you have to admit that you do not have the full suite of information even to think about crafting policy. I often tell people that when I was working on Obama’s campaign in Texas, you had these incredibly crafted 45-minute speeches. But in the Texas Democratic Party office, we also had Barack Obama’s white papers—ten small volumes covering education policy, domestic policy, health policy, international policy, and economic policy. You could read through them, if you had the time to read ten books. These are two very different things. How we feel publicly about someone’s persona, how they come across, is very different from how we feel about policy.

Unfortunately, the complexities of the modern state are such that we cannot all fully participate in policy debates. But, to Eagleton’s point, what we can participate in is the aesthetic dimension. We respond to how something sounds, looks, and feels. Someone uses campaign music that makes us feel good; someone presents themselves in a particular way or frames an issue in a certain way. All of these are aesthetic elements.

I was once giving a talk at a conference in the Netherlands, and a political scientist said to me, “How can you call Trump populist? His policies are oligarchic, if anything.” I said, “You are not wrong. But I am talking about how he campaigns as populist, not what his policies are.” His campaign is anti-elite, people-centered, and displays many hallmarks of populism, even if his policies are not anti-elite.

So you can have an aesthetic that is populist, or even radically democratic, without having policies that reflect that. I think one of the dangers of modern society is that the knowledge required to govern is so specialized that the primary terrain of public contestation becomes aesthetic. As a result, we end up with these aesthetic shortcuts. For example, Nashville country becomes coded as conservative, while artists like Bruce Springsteen, Taylor Swift, or throwback Motown become associated with more progressive audiences. That becomes the dividing line, rather than the ability to have a substantive debate about policy.

A good example—just from the news this morning—is vaccine policy. Vaccine policy is remarkably complex, yet it is often reduced to a binary: vaccines are bad on one side and vaccines are good on the other. The actual substantive debate is far more complicated. If I did not know people with PhDs in virology, it would be difficult for me to evaluate those arguments. I am fortunate to have access to that expertise, but most people do not. And so, what remains for public contestation is aesthetics.

Art as a Training Ground for Living with Difference

Photo: Dreamstime.

And finally, Dr. Patch, in an era of democratic backsliding, digital populism, supremacist subcultures, and authoritarian cultural politics, what responsibilities do scholars, artists, educators, and democratic institutions have in cultivating forms of aesthetic literacy capable of resisting manipulation while preserving the democratic vitality of popular culture?

Dr. Justin Patch: I think I am one of those people who, even though I teach at a conservatory, is not concerned with what kind of art people make. I am very concerned that people make art—that they are given the freedom to express themselves—because, ultimately, democracy is about a kind of self-expression that communicates with others.

From the ground up, there has to be a way for people to express themselves and share their ideas in a healthy way. When we look at partisanship, especially as it tilts toward the kind of violence we have seen in the United States, as well as in Australia and Europe, one of the issues is that there is no adequate way for people to express themselves and have healthy encounters with those who think differently.

Art is one way this can happen early on, as a kind of pedagogical training ground. One of my colleagues in Boston once described rap battles and DJ battles as a form of peer review. In academia, we write something, present it at conferences, and receive feedback; he argued that this is exactly what rappers and DJs go through. As they perform, they receive immediate feedback from audiences, who let them know in various ways how they are doing. The same applies to art exhibitions, critiques, and even “battle of the bands” events.

This kind of experience is very important for teaching people how to deal with difference. Many of the issues we face—whether in Europe, particularly regarding Muslim immigrants, or in the United States, where tensions often revolve around race, as well as religion, gender, and LGBTQ issues—reflect an inability to engage with difference and to recognize humanity beyond it.

Art, as a pedagogical tool, provides a way to learn how to engage with difference. From a young age, individuals can be placed in environments where their expressions may differ—sometimes radically—from those of others, and they can learn how to navigate those differences.

I often think about this in relation to my experience as a soccer referee. One of the things I appreciate about youth sports is that you can compete intensely with someone, but once the whistle blows, the competition ends. I think of players like Paul Scholes, who was fierce on the field but known as a genuinely kind person off it. That is, in some sense, my political ideal. People should be able to fight passionately for what they believe in and advocate strongly for what they want to create, but that process should not prevent them from recognizing the humanity of others.

Working with art—engaging in self-expression within a community, not just individually—is how we learn to live with difference. That, to me, is essential for building a society prepared for the realities of the twenty-first century, where difference is not an exception but a constant. It is something we must teach—from young people to older generations—how to engage with difference and how to recognize humanity even in the face of profound disagreement.

People live and sift through garbage at a waste disposal site in Lagos, Nigeria on November 22, 2019.  Photo: Alexey Stiop / Dreamstime.

Decolonizing Populism Theory: Ecological Crisis, Informal Governance, and Democratic Claims in the Global South

This commentary by Dr. Oludele Solaja advances a compelling decolonial critique of populism by relocating its analytical center from ideology to material life. It argues that, in the Global South, democratic breakdown is experienced less through electoral conflict than through ecological failure—flooding, waste accumulation, and infrastructural neglect. In this context, environmental crisis becomes a language of political judgment and a site of democratic contestation. The study highlights how citizens respond by improvising governance, producing forms of “everyday sovereignty” that reconfigure legitimacy around performance rather than formal institutions. By foregrounding environmental citizenship and survival politics, the article calls for a fundamental rethinking of populism theory, emphasizing the material genesis of antagonism and the centrality of ecology in shaping contemporary democratic claims.

By Dr. Oludele Solaja

When Ecology Becomes Politics

Democratic anxiety is being defined by populism everywhere today. With elections becoming increasingly polarized, institutions increasingly distrusted, and elites denigrated by citizens hungry for clear moral answers in an age of uncertainty, contemporary populism theory increasingly defines the crisis of democracy in terms of ideological confrontation between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite.” Influential concepts such as those of Cas Mudde and Ernesto Laclau define this process in terms of party politics, electoral struggles, and discursive clashes, strongly grounded in European experience. The rise of democratic contestation globally necessitates a reassessment of these ideas.

Citizens in many parts of the Global South do not often frame political resentment first and foremost in terms of party politics, immigrant threats or nationalist appeals. For them the crisis of democracy often occurs when streets become inundated, waste accumulates, sanitation collapses, water becomes polluted, food prices spike and the everyday fragility of survival in urban space defines the state’s responsiveness. Citizens experience this failure of government less as a constitutional crisis and more as a systematic material breakdown, turning ecology into language for political dissent.

This is a crucial insight because democratic legitimacy is increasingly negotiated in terms of environmental realities. When storm drainage becomes a source of flooding and waste management failures prevent sanitation, ordinary people perceive these as evidence of the abandonment of the populace, or of their lives being deprivileged by governing authorities. Such environmental breakdown becomes a source of moral judgment, casting doubt upon the moral authority of political elites.

The work of a growing body of scholars is showing that climate and ecological crisis is reframing populist narratives not only through established ideological distinctions. Some argue that the ideational framework of climate populism theory has already failed because it cannot accommodate the varied ways in which ecological grievance leads to different kinds of articulation across various institutions.

The implications are vast: the study of populism cannot be separated from the ecological reality with which it is increasingly tied.

Why Existing Theory Is Not Enough

The existing literature assumes that populist actors are largely capable of mobilizing symbolic opposition against rulers within relatively functioning institutions. In weak democracies the institutional framework is precarious, and the state can be rhetorically present, but materially absent. This creates a unique political terrain.

When institutions routinely fail to provide sanitation, safety and infrastructure, anti-elite discourse emerges less as a battle of ideologies and more as a concrete test of the performance of the state and democratic governance. Citizens criticize rulers not just for corruption, but because roads are impassable, waste remains undeposited and water and electricity do not function properly.

This kind of anti-elite sentiment, in this situation, does not always constitute a threat to democracy. Instead, it constitutes claims to practical citizenship. This is the point at which a decolonial critique must be introduced, for in weak democracies in the Global South the language of populism increasingly derives from everyday experience with ecological neglect.

Environmental Degradation as Democratic Testament

In places of rapid urbanization such as Lagos, Nigeria, environmental crisis has become the defining public face of democratic strain. Repeated flooding, collapsing drainage, rising sea levels, escalating waste accumulation and the spread of disease have increasingly defined the political experiences of urban inhabitants. A recent analysis of flood vulnerability in Lagos highlights how poor waste management, inadequate urban planning enforcement and a lack of community participation continue to undermine efforts to respond to climate risks, despite multiple state interventions. This demonstrates not simply administrative shortcomings, but a failure to provide unequal protection.

Environmental risk in Lagos and elsewhere is socially and materially distributed. Informally governed settlements and the poor suffer greater and more repeated ecological risks than more affluent neighborhoods, yet it is precisely these vulnerable communities that receive slower and poorer infrastructural responses from authorities. Ecology thus becomes a language of inequality and injustice.

The impact of class and settlement vulnerability on flood exposure is reflected in recent studies of urban spatial inequality in Lagos, demonstrating that environmental insecurity is inextricably linked to democratic exclusion. Ecological collapse thus acquires symbolic power: floodwaters signify state abandonment, waste streams become markers of inequality, and infrastructural failures translate into tangible accusations of undemocratic neglect. Citizens may not explicitly define these dynamics as “populist” framework, but the underlying logic is clearly so—a confrontation between the common people and a distant, selectively responsive, and morally indifferent government.

Informal Governance and Everyday Sovereignty

People rarely wait patiently when their formal institutions persistently fail. They improvise governance. Communities organize the cleaning of drainage ditches, youth groups coordinate waste disposal, street vendors pay for sanitation services, religious networks provide disaster relief, and neighborhood committees enforce rules that sustain survival infrastructures. This is not merely emergency survival; it is also a form of practice that demonstrates effective political authority.

This may be understood as everyday sovereignty: the transfer of legitimacy and power from a failing formal state to individuals and organizations that produce concrete solutions to community needs. In weak democracies, citizens increasingly trust those who demonstrate competence in managing crises to produce political order, rather than those who hold office but fail to deliver. This has profound democratic implications. Authority is no longer legitimized primarily by institutions but is increasingly validated by performance. Recent research in Lagos on struggles against displacement-driven urban restructuring shows how communities develop collective strategies to resist state interventions, contest policies, and articulate claims to political belonging as formal governance proves exclusionary.

This demonstrates a radical redistribution of democratic legitimacy from the state to citizens and communities. Waste itself, more than anything else, has become one of the most significant symbolic sites of democratic breakdown. It is immediate, material, accumulating, and unevenly distributed—settling where and when political neglect occurs and public disorder emerges. The prolonged presence of waste in public space signifies delayed state intervention, while its concentrated accumulation in poorer neighborhoods clearly articulates unequal treatment of citizens.

Waste thus emerges as a public inscription of political relations, where the accumulation and persistence of material residue represent not merely sanitation problems but a testament to the priorities governments set in service provision. This sense of abandonment and differentiated citizenship—captured in narratives such as “we contribute but are not protected” or “they rule but do not care”—mirrors populist discourse: the citizenry versus a distant state and ruling elites. Waste has therefore become not only a material problem but also a democratic issue, constituting a core site of political struggle over resource access and state responsibility. It demonstrates that environmental sociology and populist studies must engage more closely to account for the material genesis of antagonism—the very foundation of populism.

A Decolonial Perspective: Three Shifts Required in Populism Studies

For a theory of populism to be decolonized, it needs to abandon some established ideas:

i) Instead of viewing populism as an ideology of the people versus corrupt elites, a material approach to governance can frame political resentment. This recognizes that in fragile democracies, such feelings emerge not from abstract ideas of morality but from tangible experiences of infrastructural failure.

ii) The electoral arena needs to be widened to include the daily life of neighborhood politics, where claims to citizenship are made on the basis of practical survival mechanisms, not solely through party-led contests.

iii) Instead of a detached analysis of the “people,” the concept of environmental citizenship becomes crucial to understanding populism, as citizens engage in political struggle as part of a struggle over their own survival in an ecological context that increasingly determines who has rights and who has a claim to care.

These adjustments do not necessarily invalidate previous research in the field. Rather, they enable populism studies to engage with phenomena that extend far beyond what has until recently been considered “the political.” Increasingly, the theory of populism itself is being reshaped by the recognition of ecological dynamics; this process has arguably already begun in Europe, where ecological movements are contributing to new populist formations. The Global South, however, reveals an even more radical potential, because for its citizens, ecology is often not merely about ideology but about survival itself.

Why Now Is the Critical Moment

Democratic theory needs to acknowledge that political legitimacy is increasingly tied to how effectively the state responds to ecological challenges. In Europe, political disillusionment is fueled by the climate crisis, and the perceived indifference of governments only intensifies citizens’ perceptions of exclusion and corruption. The implications of populist struggles for the state’s capacity and functioning—at both local and international levels—are becoming evident worldwide. The effects are even more pronounced in weaker states, where democratic buffers are less robust and citizens may prioritize life-sustaining functions over procedural norms in demanding effective governance. This underscores that managing drainage systems, coastal defenses, and waste management can no longer be treated as peripheral issues.

Conclusion: Democracy Is Now Being Judged by Its Performance on Ecology

A decolonized approach to the theory of populism must address how it plays out on the ground in contexts where people navigate the daily crises of floods, waste, and uncertain service provision, and where ordinary survival politics are becoming increasingly central struggles that often define the state’s legitimacy in their eyes. It is no longer sufficient for democratic theorists to focus solely on elections and parliamentary institutions when seeking to understand the challenges confronting the globe. The crisis of democracy and the rise of populism in the Global South are, in many respects, a testament to the critical role of ecological and environmental realities in mediating and generating political conflict and claims in everyday life.

Dr. Filip Milacic is a senior researcher at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s "Democracy of the Future” Office.

Dr. Milacic: Outbidding Autocrats on Nationalism Only Strengthens Their Legitimacy

In this ECPS interview, Dr. Filip Milacic argues that democrats should not abandon patriotic language to autocrats. Instead, they must develop inclusive and emotionally resonant national counternarratives. Warning that “outbidding autocrats on nationalism only strengthens their legitimacy,” Dr. Milacic explains how authoritarian incumbents justify democratic erosion through “threat narratives” portraying the nation, sovereignty, or identity as endangered. He emphasizes that dignity, recognition, and belonging are crucial drivers of political behavior often neglected by liberal democratic theory. Drawing on cases from Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Turkey, Israel, Brazil, and the United States, he argues that democratic resilience requires institutions, strategy, and narratives—because politics is “fundamentally a battle of narratives.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a moment when democratic systems across Europe and beyond are increasingly challenged by populist mobilization, identity conflicts, and institutional erosion, the politics of nationalism has re-emerged as a central battleground. Authoritarian and illiberal actors have proven particularly adept at embedding their political projects within emotionally resonant narratives of national protection, sovereignty, and belonging. It is within this contested terrain that Dr. Filip Milacic’s intervention—captured in the striking claim that “outbidding autocrats on nationalism only strengthens their legitimacy”—acquires both analytical urgency and normative significance. His work invites a reconsideration of how democratic actors engage with the nation not as a fixed identity, but as a politically constructed and contested narrative space.

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Milacic—senior researcher at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s “Democracy of the Future” office—offers an empirically rich account of democratic backsliding, authoritarian legitimation, and the role of narrative politics. Central to his argument is the contention that opposition forces face a strategic dilemma when confronting nationalist authoritarianism: to ignore the nation, to mimic exclusionary nationalism, or to construct an alternative vision. While the first two options remain common, Dr. Milacic insists that “the third option is the most promising”—namely, the development of a democratic counter-narrative that is both emotionally compelling and normatively inclusive.

This emphasis on narrative is not merely rhetorical but deeply structural. As Dr. Milacic underscores, authoritarian actors do not simply dismantle democratic institutions; they justify such actions through what he terms “threat narratives.” In these narratives, “the state is under attack” and “the nation, national identity, or national sovereignty [is] threatened,”thereby creating a moral and emotional framework within which democratic erosion becomes acceptable, even necessary. Crucially, these narratives resonate not because citizens misunderstand democracy, but because, as he notes, voters often support such leaders “not because of their authoritarian policies, but in spite of them.” This insight shifts the analytical focus from institutional breakdown alone to the discursive processes that legitimize it.

Equally important is Dr. Milacic’s critique of prevailing assumptions within liberal democratic theory. By foregrounding dignity, recognition, and belonging, he challenges the reduction of political behavior to economic rationality. Instead, he argues that “interests related to self-esteem, dignity, and recognition are significant,” and that the nation remains a powerful source of both identity and security. This helps explain why authoritarian narratives, particularly in contexts marked by “formative rifts” such as territorial disputes or contested identities, gain traction so effectively.

Yet Dr. Milacic resists deterministic conclusions. While some societies may be more structurally susceptible to such narratives, they are not condemned to authoritarian outcomes. Democratic resilience, he argues, depends on political agency and the capacity to craft inclusive, emotionally resonant counter-narratives. Ultimately, the interview advances a compelling thesis: that the defense of democracy today requires not only institutional safeguards but also a re-engagement with the symbolic and affective dimensions of political life—because, as Dr. Milacic concludes, politics is “fundamentally a battle of narratives.”

Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Filip Milacic, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Reclaiming Patriotism Without Exclusion

Photo: Dreamstime.

Dr. Milacic, welcome. In “How to Defeat the Authoritarian Message,” you argue that democrats cannot leave patriotic language to autocrats. How can liberal-democratic actors reclaim national identity without reproducing exclusionary nationalism or validating the authoritarian framing of “the nation under siege”?

Dr. Filip Milacic: What I argue in my book, and also in a recent piece in the Journal of Democracy, is that when the opposition is faced with an authoritarian incumbent who uses national appeals as a justification for the subversion of democracy, it has two or three options. The first is to ignore the issue of the nation. The second is to try to outflank the authoritarian incumbent from the right, meaning to be more nationalist. The third is to create a counter-narrative. I think this third option is the most promising.

However, developing a counter-narrative is not easy. What I have tried to do is offer some guidance to political actors on how to draft such a narrative, based on research I have conducted in several countries. The first criterion is to identify a topic with a strong emotional underpinning. This is crucial. The topic must also be linked to the concept of the nation, because only then can it effectively mobilize voters.

At the same time, this is context-dependent. There is no single topic that fits all cases. It depends on the country. The topic could relate to national history or to contemporary issues. In choosing it, the opposition faces a trade-off. If it wants to defeat the authoritarian incumbent, it needs to win over some of the incumbent’s voters. This requires a narrative that is inclusive not only for its own supporters but also for moderate voters on the other side—those who are willing to switch and are not strongly partisan.

This task is easier in ethnically and religiously homogeneous societies, where it is more feasible to find an inclusive theme. In countries marked by so-called formative rifts—disputes over national identity or territory—it becomes much harder. These rifts are often instrumentalized by authoritarian incumbents as a justification for undermining democracy.

As a result, such issues are very difficult for the opposition to ignore. The Kosovo issue in Serbia or the Kurdish issue in Turkey, for example, is frequently used to legitimize attacks on democracy. The key question is therefore how to approach them. In my research, including cases such as Israel, I find that the opposition faces another trade-off: whether to prioritize inclusion of moderate voters from the majority population or to be more inclusive toward minorities, assuming a deep societal divide between the two.

This depends on the scale and depth of the conflict. In some cases, the divide is so entrenched that the opposition is reluctant to accommodate minority concerns. For instance, the Israeli protest movement in 2023 was more inclusive toward moderate government voters than toward Israeli Arabs. By contrast, in Turkey, the opposition has recently become more inclusive toward the Kurdish minority. Yet this raises another question: will such a strategy also appeal to some government voters? To win elections, the opposition must attract at least a portion of them.

Reconciling these groups is therefore extremely difficult. Finding a topic that addresses a formative rift while remaining sufficiently inclusive is a major challenge. Still, it is not impossible. There are windows of opportunity that allow the opposition to construct an inclusive narrative and even bypass these deeply politicized divides, which authoritarian incumbents rely on to sustain their power.

One example, though not part of my systematic research, is Sri Lanka. Despite strong ethnic cleavages, a presidential candidate recently campaigned on a platform centered on economic progress, good governance, and the provision of public goods for all citizens. However, this approach is often contingent on a severe economic crisis and widespread corruption. In such conditions, these issues acquire strong emotional resonance, extending beyond purely economic concerns.

In this context, it becomes possible to construct a patriotic counter-narrative based on good governance, partially bypassing identity-based conflicts. This is not a universally applicable or particularly reassuring solution, as it implies that such narratives emerge under conditions of crisis. Nonetheless, we observe similar dynamics elsewhere. In Hungary, for example, dissatisfaction with economic performance and corruption has enabled figures like Peter Magyar to develop elements of a counter-narrative centered on good governance.

In some contexts, therefore, widespread corruption and economic failure can open a window of opportunity to bridge divides between electoral groups and construct a patriotic narrative focused on good governance.

Backsliding Is Also a Battle Over the Nation

Photo: Iryna Kushnarova.

Your argument suggests that authoritarian incumbents succeed not simply by attacking institutions, but by embedding those attacks in emotionally resonant narratives of national protection. Should we therefore understand democratic backsliding primarily as an institutional process, or as a discursive struggle over who legitimately embodies the nation?

Dr. Filip Milacic: I do not deny that democratic backsliding is primarily institutional, based on attacks against different elements of democracy, especially so-called executive aggrandizement. However, what I am trying to suggest is that we need to take a step back.

In my work, I have conducted numerous surveys across different countries, and I can say that even voters of parties associated with democratic backsliding—such as Fidesz in Hungary, PiS in Poland, or SNS in Serbia—also endorse and value democracy. This raises an important question: do they perhaps not understand what democracy is? My colleagues and I examined this by asking questions related to so-called democratic competence, and we found that most of them do understand what democracy is and what it is not. Yet they continue to re-elect leaders such as Orbán, Kaczyński previously, and Vučić in Serbia.

So the question becomes: if the majority is pro-democratic and understands democracy, why do they still support these leaders? What I try to do is take a step back and show that they are not voting for these leaders because of their authoritarian policies, but in spite of them. I then investigated this further and found substantial evidence for what I call a “threat narrative.” In the cases I analyzed, before attacks on democracy occurred, there was consistently a narrative suggesting that the state was under attack—that the nation, national identity, or national sovereignty was threatened.

This narrative serves as a crucial justification for attacks on democracy in the name of the nation. In other words, we need to pay attention not only to the institutional dimension of democratic backsliding but also to how such actions are justified. Authoritarian incumbents do not simply undermine democratic institutions and expect voters to accept it; justification is key. My argument is that, before subverting democracy in the name of the nation, these actors construct a narrative in which the nation itself is under threat—and this narrative resonates with voters.

Dignity and Belonging Drive Politics

You emphasize dignity, recognition, and belonging as neglected dimensions of political behavior. To what extent has liberal democratic theory underestimated the affective power of the nation, and how should democratic strategy change once nationalism is understood as a source of personal and collective dignity?

Dr. Filip Milacic: I personally think that we have at least a partially flawed conception of human nature. Much of the literature is based on the assumption that actors are rational individuals whose primary aim is to maximize their economic benefits. While this is partly true, it does not provide a complete picture. There are also interests that are not related to the economy but are nonetheless very important to voters, such as recognition and personal dignity.

These interests may seem abstract. They are not as concrete as wanting more money in one’s pocket or an increase in one’s pension. However, interests related to self-esteem, dignity, and recognition are significant, even if they are less tangible, and this is precisely why they are often overlooked. I believe they are crucial drivers of voting behavior.

If we accept that dignity and recognition matter to voters, we must also acknowledge that people derive a great deal of their self-esteem from group membership. This is why belonging and community are so important. The nation, in particular, is one of the most significant groups. Belonging to a nation contributes not only to individual self-esteem but also to how people perceive their own value.

A simple example illustrates this dynamic. Whether we like it or not, we often feel proud and happy when our country succeeds in international sports competitions. This affects our sense of self-worth, even if we do not fully recognize it. It is a straightforward illustration of how group belonging reinforces self-esteem.

At the same time, groups such as the nation are not only important for self-esteem but also for security. Social psychology shows that belonging to a group provides individuals with a sense of security, which becomes particularly important in times of crisis and uncertainty, such as those we are currently experiencing.

In other words, if we accept that groups like the nation are central to individuals’ self-esteem and sense of security, we can better understand political developments over the past 10 or 15 years. Economic explanations alone are not sufficient.

Identity Conflicts Fuel Authoritarianism

Kurdish people walk by the bombed buildings after the curfew in Şırnak province of Turkey on March 3, 2016. Armed conflict between Turkish security forces and PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) members killed hundreds of people.

In your work on stateness and democratic backsliding, you show that unresolved questions of statehood and national identity create fertile ground for ethno-political entrepreneurship. How should democrats respond when autocrats exploit formative rifts—such as Kosovo in Serbia, the Kurdish question in Turkey, or territorial disputes elsewhere—as justification for concentrating power?

Dr. Filip Milacic: As I mentioned in response to your previous question, context is crucial, particularly in my research. I have found that countries marked by so-called formative rifts—meaning disputed territory or contested national identity—are especially prone to the subversion of democracy in the name of the nation. These disputes generate nationalism and provide a powerful resource for authoritarian incumbents, as it is much easier to develop a so-called threat narrative when such issues remain unresolved. By contrast, where no such issues exist, threats to the nation often have to be constructed.

Let me compare Turkey and Hungary. In Hungary, Orbán had to invent threats to the nation, portraying immigrants or sexual minorities as dangers. For Erdoğan, this was easier because of the ongoing conflict between the Turks and Kurds. The presence of a real, unresolved dispute makes it easier to construct a convincing threat narrative.

How, then, should the opposition respond? As I suggested earlier, it should not attempt to outbid the authoritarian incumbent on nationalist grounds. In Turkey, the opposition initially pursued this strategy but eventually realized that it only reinforced the incumbent’s narrative. Instead, the opposition needs to develop a counter-narrative. A similar dynamic can be observed in Serbia, where Vučić has consistently used the Kosovo issue to justify attacks on democracy. Whenever the opposition tried to outflank him from the right, it failed.

However, developing such a counter-narrative is extremely difficult. When there is a deep conflict between majority and minority groups, the opposition faces a dilemma. To defeat the incumbent, it must win over some of their voters. This requires a narrative that does not ignore the formative rift but is still acceptable to both minority groups and segments of the government’s electorate. This is very challenging, and I do not have a definitive answer on how to resolve it.

What I can suggest is that there are moments when these conflicts become less salient, creating a window of opportunity. The opposition should use such moments to develop a narrative based on good governance, if the context allows. When the economy is underperforming, corruption is widespread, and citizens are dissatisfied with economic outcomes, these issues can become central. In such cases, it is possible to construct a patriotic narrative centered on good governance and strong institutions that deliver for all parts of society. This kind of narrative can be inclusive enough to appeal across different electoral groups.

Legislative Capture Enables Power Consolidation

Your Serbia research identifies “legislative capture” as a pathway through which Aleksandar Vučić transformed nationalist legitimacy into institutional domination. How does this pathway differ from more familiar forms of executive aggrandizement, and what early warning signs should democratic actors watch for?

Dr. Filip Milacic: I do not disagree that in Serbia the key issue is executive aggrandizement, meaning the accumulation of power in the hands of Aleksandar Vučić. However, what I sought to highlight is the role of parliament. Even though we now have a very strong executive at the expense of other branches of government, this process largely unfolded through parliament. Some scholars refer to this as so-called autocratic legalism. In this contemporary process of democratic backsliding, many measures are formally adopted through parliamentary procedures.

This is why it is called legislative capture. Full control of parliament becomes crucial for initiating democratic backsliding, and to achieve that, one must fully control the parliamentary majority. I believe this was the mechanism in Serbia, and in many other countries: a leader who fully controls the party. This is important to emphasize, as the role of political parties in democratic backsliding is often overlooked.

Once Vučić established control over the party and, consequently, over the parliamentary majority, it became much easier for him to implement anti-democratic policies and engage in attacks on various elements of democracy. In my view, the first step was his portrayal of himself as the savior of the nation and of the West as a threat to Serbia, particularly in relation to the Kosovo issue. This strengthened his legitimacy as a so-called savior of the nation, which in turn enabled him to consolidate control over his party, followed by full control of parliament. The final step is that full control of parliament allows the leader to extend control over many nominally independent institutions and to engage in broader power consolidation.

As for early warning signs, I would focus on these threat narratives. If we see an incumbent portraying himself as the savior of the nation while presenting the nation as being under threat, this should be understood as a clear warning sign of potential attacks on democracy carried out in the name of protecting the nation.

Nationalism Outbidding Strengthens Autocrats

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participates in an SNS political campaign at Hall Čair in Niš, Serbia, on March 30, 2022. Photo: Radule Perisic.

In the Serbian case, Vučić’s self-presentation as defender of Kosovo and of the Serbian nation gave him a special legitimacy that facilitated party control, parliamentary capture, and the weakening of oversight institutions. How can opposition forces challenge such “national protector” narratives without appearing indifferent to national concerns?

Dr. Filip Milacic: For me, Serbia is a very interesting case, because Kosovo has played a central role in justifying attacks on democracy. The key question, as I also mentioned in relation to the Kurdish issue or the Israeli–Arab divide in Israel, is how to overcome these divisions and build an electoral majority.

In Serbia, opposition actors at times tried to be more nationalist on the Kosovo issue than Vučić, but this strategy failed. The question, then, is how to address voters’ concerns on these issues—on these formative rifts—without strengthening the authoritarian incumbent. I think the opposition in Serbia may now have an opportunity due to a major tragedy, when part of a railway station collapsed, killing 16 citizens. This event demonstrated that, in the absence of the rule of law and strong institutions, and in the presence of widespread corruption, it can cost lives. It is not only that the system fails to perform; people’s lives are put at risk.

This creates the kind of window of opportunity, allowing the opposition to move beyond the Kosovo issue, which strongly divides the electorate. It can instead construct a counter-narrative based on good governance, the rule of law, and democracy, but framed in patriotic terms. In other words, this tragedy illustrates what happens when a country lacks strong institutions and democratic governance.

These are the kinds of windows of opportunity—often arising from tragic circumstances—that the opposition can use to build a narrative that is inclusive enough to appeal to different segments of the electorate.

No Society Is Doomed to Authoritarianism

Your comparative work suggests that authoritarian threat narratives are most effective when they resonate with preexisting historical memories, territorial losses, demographic anxieties, or narratives of victimhood. Are some societies structurally more vulnerable to authoritarian nationalism, or can democratic counternarratives neutralize these vulnerabilities?

Dr. Filip Milacic: As I noted in response to your earlier question, justification is central to attacks on democracy, and threat narratives play a key role in that process. Research by other scholars also shows that narratives about endangered identity or sovereignty tend to resonate more strongly in societies marked by historical losses of territory or sovereignty, as well as in those shaped by formative rifts and demographic anxieties.

All the cases I analyze in my book exhibit these characteristics, which made it easier for authoritarian incumbents to develop narratives that resonated with the population. This resonance is essential, as it makes voters more willing to accept attacks on democracy in the name of protecting an allegedly endangered nation.

However, this does not imply a deterministic path dependency. Societies marked by these factors are not doomed. Poland is a good example. Despite being characterized by many of these conditions, the opposition managed to develop a counter-narrative in 2023 based on EU membership and its role in shaping Polish identity as part of the West. They also emphasized that PiS was jeopardizing this position through its authoritarian policies. This demonstrates that an inclusive counter-narrative is possible even in societies that are historically and structurally more prone to threat-driven narratives.

Another example, not covered in my book, is the United States. It is not marked by the same historical experiences of territorial or sovereignty loss, yet Donald Trump was able to construct a threat-driven narrative that resonated widely. This suggests that contemporary issues, such as immigration, can also serve as the basis for such narratives.

Ultimately, political agency plays a crucial role. It matters greatly whether the opposition is able to develop a counter-narrative that resonates with the public.

Inclusive Narratives Strengthen Democracy

Inclusion and Diversity.
Photo: Dreamstime.

You argue that democratic resistance must develop a nation-related counternarrative rather than ignore nationalism or try to outbid autocrats ethno-nationally. What distinguishes a democratic patriotic counternarrative from a merely softer version of authoritarian nationalism?

Dr. Filip Milacic: I would return to what I said at the beginning about “the three options.” Sometimes the opposition ignores this issue, but when it does not, it often tries to outbid the authoritarian incumbent or, as you mentioned, develops a softer ethno-nationalist alternative. I believe that is the wrong approach.

So how can we differentiate between trying to outflank the authoritarian incumbent and developing a genuine counter-narrative? It comes down to content. A counter-narrative must be inclusive. I am not suggesting that it needs to include 100 percent of the population, but it should be inclusive of a large majority. This is important not only for practical reasons, such as winning elections, but also because it is morally justified and helps define what an inclusive national narrative should be.

First, the choice of topic and its framing are crucial—they must be inclusive. Second, the purpose of the narrative differs. Threat-driven narratives are used to justify attacks on democracy. A counter-narrative should do the opposite: it should be designed to strengthen and safeguard democracy, rather than to serve as a justification for undermining it.

Political Agency Shapes Counter-Narratives

In Poland, Brazil, Israel, and Hungary, you identify cases where opposition actors used patriotic or nationally rooted language to mobilize resistance. What made these counternarratives persuasive, and why have similar efforts been weaker in cases such as Serbia, Turkey, India, or the United States?

Dr. Filip Milacic: For me, political agency is very important here. I conducted many interviews with political actors while researching my book, particularly from the opposition, and I identified two types of politicians. One group would say that the nation as a topic is not relevant and would therefore avoid addressing it. The second group would acknowledge its relevance but admit that they do not know how to develop a counter-narrative. This is why political agency matters so much.

I understand that developing a counter-narrative is not easy, but if a politician chooses to pursue it, some guidance can be offered. The first criterion is that the topic must be emotional, because this is the only way to mobilize people—not only in the streets but also at the ballot box. The topic may be drawn from national history, but it can also be something contemporary.

For example, in Brazil, President Lula frequently framed the contemporary international context—particularly the role of the United States—as a challenge to Brazilian sovereignty, portraying his opponents as aligned with external interests while presenting himself as a defender of national autonomy. The EU, in the case of Poland—and more recently Hungary—served as another contemporary reference point. Péter Magyar, for instance, framed the election as a choice between Hungary as a European, Western democracy or as what he called an Eastern autocracy. This illustrates how contemporary themes can be effective, although historical references can also play a powerful role.

The Israeli protest movement in 2023 provides another example. Protesters invoked the Israeli Declaration of Independence, emphasizing its vision of Israel as a liberal democracy. They argued that the government, by introducing authoritarian measures, was acting against this founding principle—that Israel is a state of all its citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious background.

These examples show that the choice of topic is highly context-dependent. Each opposition must draw on its own national context. In some cases, the economy can also be important. Where authoritarian incumbents mismanage the economy and corruption is widespread, as in Hungary, good governance can become a powerful basis for a patriotic narrative, as Magyar has demonstrated.

However, I am not suggesting that the economy is always decisive. In some contexts it matters, but not in all. For example, in Poland, GDP grew significantly during the PiS period, yet PiS was still voted out of office. This indicates that economic performance alone is not sufficient. Still, when combined with widespread corruption and public dissatisfaction, economic issues can provide a strong foundation for an inclusive and resonant counter-narrative.

Narratives Must Reinforce Community and Democratic Norms

If both ethno-national and pluralist identity claims can become grounds for democratic trade-offs, how should scholars distinguish between identity politics that strengthens liberal democracy and identity politics that weakens democratic resilience?

Dr. Filip Milacic: For me, the key issue is context. It also depends on whether identity politics is inclusive toward a large majority of citizens or whether it is exclusionary. We can, more or less, clearly distinguish between narratives that are inclusive and those that are exclusionary.

The second criterion is the purpose of these narratives. For authoritarian incumbents, the purpose is to justify attacks on democracy; such narratives serve as a cover for power grabs and as a means of legitimizing violations of democratic norms and principles. For pro-democratic opposition actors, the purpose is the opposite. Their narratives are not only aimed at defeating the authoritarian incumbent but also at strengthening democracy, reinforcing the political community, and protecting the elements of democracy that are under attack.

Politics Is a Battle of Narratives

Collage by Marek Uliasz / Dreamstime.

And finally, Dr. Milacic, looking across Hungary, Poland, Israel, Serbia, Austria, Turkey, and the United States, what does democratic resilience require today: stronger institutions, better opposition strategy, more effective patriotic counternarratives, or a deeper rethinking of liberal democracy’s relationship to nationhood?

Dr. Filip Milacic: I would say all of the above. The struggle for democracy is fought on all of these fronts. However, if I may add, the focus has primarily been on the institutional dimension. This is understandable, as democratic backsliding involves the capture, weakening, or dismantling of institutions.

At the same time, the fight for democracy is also fought through words. We should therefore pay much greater attention to the narrative level. This is precisely what I try to do in my research: to explore how democracy can be defended through narratives. It is not only about electoral mobilization; it is also about strengthening democracy by showing people why it matters and why it is important in an emotionally compelling way. For a narrative to succeed, it must resonate emotionally.

I would also acknowledge that the other side—autocrats—is often more successful in this regard than democratic opposition actors. This is because democratic actors tend to focus primarily on output, on what democracy delivers. I am not suggesting that this is unimportant, but it is not sufficient. We also need to engage with authoritarian-leaning actors at the level of narratives. After all, politics is fundamentally a battle of narratives.

Professor Craig Calhoun.

Ten Years on with Brexit / Prof. Calhoun: Brexit Reveals Regret, Weakened Influence, and Intensified Backsliding

In this ECPS interview, Professor Craig Calhoun, Professor of Social Sciences at Arizona State University, revisits Brexit a decade after the 2016 referendum, arguing that it has revealed “regret, weakened influence, and intensified backsliding.” While Brexit was presented as a remedy for national decline, Professor Calhoun notes that “there is now a degree of regret,” as its economic costs—shrinking growth, declining investment, and reduced productivity—have become clearer. Yet his analysis moves beyond economics, situating Brexit within deeper struggles over English identity, regional inequality, democratic legitimacy, and geopolitical decline. He argues that Brexit has acted as a “catalytic event,” intensifying existing democratic malaise while exposing Britain’s unresolved tensions over belonging, representation, and national purpose in an increasingly unstable global order.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

A decade after the 2016 referendum, Brexit remains a defining fault line in British politics, shaping not only institutional trajectories but also the deeper contours of political identity, democratic legitimacy, and geopolitical orientation. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Craig Calhoun, Professor of Social Sciences, Arizona State University, offers a striking reassessment of Brexit’s long-term implications, foregrounding a central paradox captured in the headline insight: “Brexit reveals regret, weakened influence, and intensified backsliding.” While the referendum was initially framed as a corrective to perceived national decline, Professor Calhoun underscores that “there is now a degree of regret,” as its economic consequences—“shrinkage of the economy, loss of investment and productivity”—have become increasingly apparent.

Yet Brexit’s significance extends beyond material outcomes. Professor Calhoun situates it within a broader transformation of democratic politics, arguing that it has functioned not merely as an event but as an accelerant: “Brexit has functioned as a catalytic event… it has made things worse and intensified democratic backsliding.” In this respect, the UK’s trajectory reflects a wider pattern across Western democracies, where populist mobilization intersects with declining institutional trust and growing dissatisfaction with representation. Although Britain retains relatively robust institutional foundations, he notes a discernible erosion, with the country becoming “less democratic… to a noticeable degree.”

A key contribution of Professor Calhoun’s analysis lies in his emphasis on the persistence of underlying structural and cultural drivers. Far from resolving political tensions, Brexit has entrenched them. “Many of the same factors are still in place,” he observes, pointing to regional inequality, anxieties over English identity, and unresolved questions regarding immigration and belonging. These dynamics have not only sustained polarization but have also contributed to a fragmented party system and a growing perception that “organized politics does not express the concerns that ordinary people have in their lives.”

At the same time, Brexit has come to symbolize a broader narrative of national and geopolitical decline. As Professor Calhoun notes, “the UK appears less powerful, less economically prosperous, and less influential globally,” a perception that has become more visible in the post-2016 period. Crucially, while the Leave campaign acknowledged decline, it promised reversal—a promise that, in his words, “has not occurred.” This disjuncture between expectation and outcome has reinforced both disillusionment and the continued appeal of populist narratives centered on “the people” rather than systemic or institutional considerations.

By placing Brexit at the intersection of populism, nationalism, and democratic transformation, Professor Calhoun’s reflections illuminate the enduring reconfiguration of political subjectivity in contemporary democracies. His analysis suggests that Brexit is not an isolated case but part of a wider shift toward more unstable, contested, and fragmented political orders—where regret, polarization, and uncertainty coexist with persistent demands for recognition, representation, and belonging.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Craig Calhoun, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Britain Remains Stuck on Brexit’s Cultural Divisions

A Brexit Day ‘Independence’ parade was held at Whitehall and on Parliament Square in London to celebrate the UK leaving the European Union on January 31, 2020.

Professor Calhoun, welcome. In your early interpretation of Brexit as “a mutiny against the cosmopolitan elite,” how should we reassess that diagnosis a decade on, particularly in light of the persistence of identity-based polarization and the consolidation of Brexit as a durable axis of political subjectivity rather than a transient electoral cleavage?

Professor Craig Calhoun: Many of the same factors are still in place: regional inequalities and disparities in Britain; anxieties about English identity—often more than British identity—and about White racial identity, though not always openly expressed; and concerns about the place of immigrants and minorities in the country. These factors help explain the Brexit vote and why it was possible to mobilize people for this decision.

What has changed? I think there is now a degree of regret, as it has become apparent that the decision has been economically counterproductive. It has contributed to the shrinkage of the economy, loss of investment and productivity, and even declines in household income and trade. So, there are clear material consequences.

In terms of cultural politics, however, Britain remains stuck on many of the same issues. Efforts to reposition politics after the Brexit vote included an attempt to reassert class in Labour Party politics during the Corbyn years, followed by a reaction against that, such that the Labour Party now can hardly mention it.

More broadly, British politics has become increasingly fragmented. The current government came in with a large majority but has been unable or unwilling to take bold action, making it a weak government despite its numbers.

At the same time, the Conservative Party has been weakened by the rise of Reform UK and defections. There has been some growth in the Liberal Democrats, but not enough to offset this. Britain once appeared closer to a two-party system; now it is more complex, with significant intra-party conflicts.

As a result, fewer people feel that organized politics reflects their concerns. Across the political spectrum, there is widespread frustration that politics in Westminster does not address the everyday issues people face—whether healthcare, the cost of living, immigration, or, for some, race and anxieties about Islam. 

These concerns continue to mobilize people but lack clear expression within party politics, generating ongoing tensions. This dynamic was central to Brexit itself, which represented a move outside the party system. David Cameron allowed the referendum but did not support the outcome, campaigned ineffectively, and assumed it would placate public discontent. It did not. The discontents persist, as do the cultural divisions that drive them. In that sense, Britain remains, in many ways, stuck.

Brexit Reasserted Majority English Identity

To what extent has Brexit transformed political preference into what might be theorized as a “thick” identity—embedding itself in everyday social belonging and moral worldviews in ways analogous to the forms of nationalism you describe as constitutive of modern political communities?

Professor Craig Calhoun: I would say there is a tendency in that direction, but so far it has not fully succeeded. One complication is that strong nationalism, or ethno-nationalism, in this context is English rather than British. Brexit reflected a shift away from foregrounding British identity as inherently multinational—Scots, Irish, Welsh, as well as English—toward a reassertion of a majority English identity.

This kind of majoritarianism is common across countries. Nationalist politics that constitute political communities are rarely without an element of majority identity, which often excludes certain minorities from its conception of the nation. It is never as simple as claiming that everyone is fully united by a single vision. That vision must be reflected in everyday life in multiple ways, which is why it develops over time. At the same time, it is always partly organized around projects of power or domination.

For example, one would not say that Turkish political subjectivity is completely unified by the idea of Turkish identity. It is strong in majoritarian terms, but there are significant minorities, and even within the majority there are differing interpretations of what that identity means. The same is true in Britain, and particularly in England, though the English focus further complicates the situation.

Over a fairly long period, Britain made significant progress in expanding opportunities for minorities to succeed—to attend university, gain employment, and participate in the economy. At the same time, however, there are large concentrations of minority populations, particularly Muslim communities, in specific geographic areas. This makes them highly visible and can generate dynamics of relatively closed communities.

Because populations are not evenly distributed across the country, the development of a unifying democratic nationalism is impeded. These “islands” of difference are reinforced by the dominance of London and a few other metropolitan areas. Cities such as London, and to some extent Manchester, offer more opportunities, enabling people—including minorities—to improve their socioeconomic position.

These relatively cosmopolitan centers tend to favor undoing Brexit, renewing solidarity with Europe, or embracing a more global identity, rather than English nationalism. English nationalism is relatively weak in London but stronger in other regions, and this divide is reinforced by economic disparities. Growth is concentrated in cities rather than in the countryside, which fuels resentment in areas that feel left behind.

This does not necessarily imply poverty. Much of the shift from the Conservative Party to Reform UK involves suburban populations who feel their status and prospects are declining. They are not poor, but they no longer see themselves or their children as future leaders or beneficiaries to the same extent.

As a result, there is a continuing, if partial, alliance between disaffected working-class populations and disaffected suburbanites in various parts of the country. Nigel Farage and Reform UK have been quite effective in building a kind of semi-party that mobilizes these groups through shared fears and resentments, but without offering a clear positive program.

Leave and Remain Became Struggles Over National Identity

Brexit suporters, brexiteers, in central London holding banners campaigning to leave the European Union on January 15, 2019.

Does the enduring entrenchment of “Leave” and “Remain” identities empirically reinforce your argument that nationalism—and adjacent identity formations—are not residual cultural artifacts but actively produced through ongoing political contestation and discursive construction?

Professor Craig Calhoun: Absolutely. The period leading up to Brexit, and even more so the period since the referendum, has been heavily shaped by efforts to forge a stronger sense of national identity. This includes self-declared nationalists—more often English than British—but also those who are concerned about national identity without adopting that label. As a result, the question of who the British people are has become a central political struggle, reinforced not only by the Leave–Remain divide but also by the persistence of the underlying issues that produced it.

Recent polling suggests that around 58 percent of Britons would now vote Remain if given the chance again, indicating that opinions have shifted. This change is largely driven by a growing recognition that people were misled about the material consequences of Brexit. The Leave campaign promised substantial economic benefits—recovering funds sent to Europe, compensating for lost trade through the Commonwealth—but these claims have not been borne out.

The symbolic and cultural dimensions, however, are different. While there is now greater clarity about the material effects of Brexit, identity-related frustrations remain strong for many. Yet political debate has focused primarily on economic conditions, often neglecting the importance of identity and cultural concerns.

It is also important to recognize that these dynamics are not confined to one side. In Scotland, for example, identity politics often take a more cosmopolitan, pro-European form in contrast to English nationalism. Identitarian concerns, therefore, exist across the divide.

At the same time, these issues have not been fully engaged in public debate. For many Britons, they remain somewhat uncomfortable or even taboo. This has enabled right-wing populists to address them more openly than actors on the left. During the Corbyn era, there was greater space for what might be called left-wing populism, but this was followed by a reassertion of control within the Labour Party that marginalized those voices.

For many working-class and less well-off Britons, this shift was experienced as exclusion, reinforcing the perception that urban professional elites dominate Labour and fail to represent their concerns. While the removal of Corbyn increased internal cohesion within the party, it also deepened disaffection among segments of the working class.

These groups engage in identity politics as well. They were not uniformly anti-European a decade ago, nor are they now. The key issue is which political actors provide them with a platform to express concerns that are not merely abstract but tied to lived experiences and ways of life.

Such concerns often originate locally rather than in explicitly national or European debates. For instance, the closure of a local pub due to regulatory or economic changes may be experienced as a loss of community and identity. These grievances can later be framed in nationalist terms, but they typically begin as local concerns.

Frustration intensifies when national political debates appear divided between an urban, metropolitan elite—perceived as disconnected from local realities—and a right-wing populist camp that becomes the primary voice engaging directly with those communities.

Polarization Now Shapes How People Understand Reality

In light of your work on the “degenerations of democracy,” how should we interpret Brexit-era polarization as a case of hyper-partisanship in which epistemic disagreement increasingly shades into ontological division, with opponents cast not merely as adversaries but as existential threats?

Professor Craig Calhoun: You raise three important points, and I agree with all of them. Let me separate them slightly differently, though, and raise a complication about one. I think Britain is highly polarized. The breakdown of the party system means that this polarization is not merely partisan in the traditional sense of competition between major political parties. There are sharp differences in views about how the world works, how things are going, and what is desirable, but these divisions often follow lines such as metropolitan versus non-metropolitan, rather than aligning neatly with party affiliation.

Second, you rightly emphasize the epistemic dimension. People’s basic understandings of how society works—what they take to be facts and valid knowledge—are increasingly contested. The widely discussed breakdown in trust is not simply about attitudes toward politicians; it concerns whether people believe that mainstream media, social institutions, and educational systems provide an accurate account of reality. Many do not, and they question dominant claims about what is true.

This was a major factor in Brexit. Many people accepted statements—often misleading or plainly false—about issues such as the financial relationship between Britain and the EU. Although most academics and journalists demonstrated that these claims were incorrect, this did not persuade a large portion of the electorate. Instead, such corrections were often dismissed as the opinions of pro-European elites, lacking any special epistemic authority. Being an economist or political scientist no longer confers greater credibility than figures such as Nigel Farage.

The erosion of epistemic authority is real. This is not to suggest that experts are always right, but rather that there once existed a broader social consensus about what counts as knowledge and how it should be verified. Today, when individuals encounter claims, the growing tendency is to “do their own research,” not by consulting established media or academic sources, but by browsing a handful of websites or following social media influencers. In this environment, information that is not systematically verified often prevails over more reliable forms of knowledge. This is not unique to Britain; it reflects a broader global trend.

What we often describe as the rise of populism is partly driven by the discrediting of elite claims to knowledge. This, however, raises an immediate question: where can people turn for alternative perspectives that reflect popular concerns while remaining epistemically sound? There is a clear shortage of institutions capable of fulfilling that role. Rather than the emergence of a strong new press, we have seen a proliferation of influencers.

There is, of course, a significant right-wing press, but it is not uniformly populist. It includes some who support more populist positions, alongside others who define themselves as traditional conservatives. This produces a somewhat fragmented and ambiguous informational landscape.

Finally, as you note, this is also the terrain on which political subjectivity is formed. This is not simply about electoral choices; it shapes how individuals understand who they are. Part of the process of polarization involves the development of durable identities. These are not limited to “Leave” and “Remain,” but encompass broader frameworks through which people interpret themselves, their fellow citizens, and what counts as credible knowledge about the world.

To reiterate, the extent to which established mainstream sources have been discredited among large segments of the population is significant. This includes major parts of the media, academia, and political parties. In the past, people tended to trust institutions such as party research offices or political leaders to provide reliable information. That trust has diminished. Many now assume they are receiving partisan messaging from politicians seeking to remain in power, fostering distrust not only toward opponents but also toward those they once supported.

Britain Still Has Institutions, But Democratic Norms Are Eroding

Party leader Nigel Farage speaks during the Brexit Party general election tour event at Little Mill village hall near Pontypool, Monmouthshire, Wales on November 8 2019.

The continued mobilization of Brexit sentiment by actors such as Nigel Farage and the electoral positioning of Reform UK suggest that populism remains a potent force in British politics. Do these developments represent a stabilization of populism within democratic competition, or do they exemplify the longer-term erosion of liberal-democratic norms you associate with populist mobilization?

Professor Craig Calhoun: I think there is a longer-term destabilization of democratic norms. I would hasten to add, however, that norms are not very strong if they exist only as free-floating beliefs rather than being embedded in institutional practices. The good news is that Britain still has relatively strong institutions. The courts, by and large, continue to function with a reasonable degree of independence from politics and with a serious grounding in legal reasoning and precedent.

Although it has suffered some decline, the National Health Service remains an institution to be valued and rebuilt. More broadly, Britain retains institutional foundations that help sustain the norms of a functioning democratic society.

That said, there has been erosion and decline. There are real problems, even if substantial institutional strength remains. I should also note a conceptual concern regarding how populism is often used. It is sometimes treated as a coherent body of thought, analogous to leftism or rightism, socialism or capitalism. I do not think this is accurate. Populism can appear across different points on the political spectrum because it is better understood as a style of mobilization centered on defining “the people” in opposition to elites.

In that sense, one can have both left- and right-wing populism. For example, the Corbyn campaigns represented a more populist alternative to the Starmer approach, even if this is not always recognized. Populism, in this view, prioritizes “the people” over systems—over the economy, the state, or other institutional frameworks—and centers politics on how ordinary people understand their lives and interests.

This helps explain why, during the Brexit debate, few people abandoned a Leave position when it was argued that Brexit would harm the City of London. The response was not to contest the economic analysis but to reject its relevance. Many simply did not care about the City of London; they cared about the English people. While economic consequences may shape material conditions over time, the core populist impulse remains focused on the people rather than on systemic or elite concerns.

Brexit Intensified Britain’s Democratic Backsliding

Would you characterize Brexit primarily as a symptom of deeper democratic malaise—rooted in declining perceptions of citizen efficacy, institutional trust, and representational legitimacy—or as a catalytic event that has itself intensified democratic backsliding in the UK?

Professor Craig Calhoun: I would say the former, though there is also an element of the latter. Brexit has functioned as a catalytic event: it has exacerbated existing problems and intensified democratic backsliding. In some respects, Britain has become less democratic—not to the same extent as the United States, but to a noticeable degree. Other developments, such as the pandemic, have also contributed to this trajectory.

That said, the core issue lies in what Brexit expressed: a prior deterioration in the conditions for democratic solidarity, which the 2016 vote both revealed and reinforced. This includes the factors you mentioned, but it also extends to material foundations and lived conditions. When I refer to metropolitan and non-metropolitan Britain, I use it as shorthand to highlight that people do not simply hold different views; they live under very different material circumstances that shape their priorities and values.

For many living outside major urban centers, aggregate indicators such as gross national product do not meaningfully reflect their experience of prosperity. Much of economic growth is concentrated in London, Manchester, and other large cities, with limited diffusion into local communities. This is not merely an abstract disagreement over economic metrics; it reflects everyday realities. These indicators feel distant from lived experience for material reasons, not simply due to informational deficits.

People’s outlooks are shaped by conditions in their immediate environments—the state of local labor markets, opportunities for younger generations, and access to housing. The housing crisis is particularly illustrative. Rising unaffordability has repeatedly influenced British politics and has eroded what was once a relatively stable upper working-class and middle-class position, weakening the social center.

In the 1970s, Margaret Thatcher promoted homeownership as a means of fostering a society of stakeholders, premised on the idea that property ownership would encourage long-term social commitment. Whatever one makes of that vision, subsequent developments have altered the landscape. After a period of relative accessibility, housing has become increasingly unaffordable due to insufficient supply, higher interest rates, regulatory constraints, and the geographic mismatch between affordable housing and employment centers. These material conditions play a central role in shaping how people interpret what might otherwise appear as abstract or theoretical propositions.

Brexit Made Britain’s Decline More Visible

How does Brexit illuminate the reconfiguration of political identity in ethnonational terms—what you have described as the contemporary shift toward the construction of “majority ethnicities” as politically salient categories?

Professor Craig Calhoun: There are two parts to this. In general, the rise of majoritarian identity politics—whether in Germany, France, England, or elsewhere—is a significant part of what is happening. It is shaping a new right wing that already has considerable political influence and may gain even more, including in the United States.

In framing it this way, I want to emphasize that it is not simply a matter of majorities uniformly embracing such identities. Rather, it involves politically mobilized majoritarian activism carried out in the name of the majority. Actors such as Reform in the UK are not themselves representative of the majority of the population—certainly not of all those who might be categorized as part of the English majority—but they claim to speak for it and mobilize around that claim. This form of mobilization has been growing in importance for decades.

The second part of the story, more specific to the UK, is that the period after Brexit coincides with a perception of decline. The UK appears less powerful, less economically prosperous, and less influential globally. One can debate whether this decline predates Brexit, but it has become more visible since 2016. The Leave campaign itself acknowledged a sense of decline but argued that Brexit would reverse it. That reversal has not occurred.

For many people who are not at the center of political or economic debates, Brexit has come to symbolize this trajectory of decline. At the same time, Europe more broadly is also experiencing challenges and, in some respects, decline. Brexit affected both the UK and the European Union, and the EU has faced internal divisions, including over migration, the war in Ukraine, energy policy, and rearmament.

More broadly, both the UK and Europe are grappling with shifting global power dynamics. The rise of China and India, increasing economic integration across Asia, and a more assertive Russia have all altered the geopolitical landscape. At the same time, the United States has become a less predictable partner, pursuing policies that have at times destabilized international relations and strained alliances.

These geopolitical shifts coincide with economic uncertainty. There is little clarity that current economic transitions will lead to improved outcomes. Even countries like Germany face employment challenges. The long-term decline of skilled manufacturing work continues, and its replacements have not fully materialized. Emerging technologies, including AI, may further intensify these pressures. As a result, personal economic insecurity is increasingly linked to a broader perception that one’s country—and the wider region—is in relative decline compared to rising global powers. 

Brexit Encourages a Dangerous National Myopia

Brexit.
Photo: Dreamstime.

In the current geopolitical context, do you see any viable synthesis between nationalism and cosmopolitanism capable of sustaining the liberal international order, or are we witnessing their progressive decoupling under the pressures of populism and sovereigntism?

Professor Craig Calhoun: We are witnessing a breakdown of the liberal international order. Whether it can be renewed remains an open question. It is not impossible, but what we have seen is a continued erosion in the context of the war in Ukraine, energy politics, conflicts in the Middle East, and related developments.

One feature of the Brexit debates—both in 2016 and in the years since—is that they have reduced attention to the broader ways in which global changes are affecting Britain. If everything is framed in terms of Leave versus Remain, then less attention is paid to ongoing conflicts in the Middle East or to the structural causes of migration. For example, migration is often discussed as simply a matter of people arriving, rather than as the consequence of specific events such as the war in Syria, which displaced large populations.

In this sense, the framing of Brexit encourages a kind of national myopia. A similar pattern can be observed in the United States, where political debates were long focused on internal issues even as international dynamics were shifting significantly. This makes it more difficult to address fundamental questions about what would make a country secure, prosperous, or resilient in a changing global context.

This raises the question of whether the renewal of the liberal international order is either feasible or desirable. It may be possible to reconstruct elements of it, but it could also take a different form. Some argue for protecting the West as a privileged space, accepting reduced global influence while maintaining internal stability. Others point to alternative visions of world order, including those centered on China, which emphasize order rather than liberal norms.

It is not clear that the breakdown of the liberal international order necessarily implies the absence of order altogether. It could lead to a transition toward a new multilateral arrangement or even to a form of hegemonic order. At the same time, there remains the risk of continued fragmentation, with more frequent and proximate conflicts.

These dynamics also affect national self-understandings. In Britain, for instance, there has long been a perception of maritime strength, encapsulated in the idea that “Britannia rules the waves.” The postwar decline of empire already challenged this view, but more recent events have further exposed limitations in military capacity. Such realizations can undermine confidence and reinforce a sense of vulnerability.

This, in turn, raises difficult questions about how national success should be understood in the post-Brexit context. If expectations of renewed strength and autonomy are not matched by material capabilities, the tension between nationalist aspirations and geopolitical realities becomes increasingly apparent.

Populism, Nationalism, and War Politics Are Converging

Finally, looking beyond the British case, do you see Brexit—and the continued resonance of figures like Farage—as indicative of a broader transformation across Western democracies, where populism, nationalism, and democratic dissatisfaction are converging into new, potentially unstable political equilibria?

Professor Craig Calhoun: I think they may not be equilibria. So, instability, yes. There is a very widespread shift away from more or less conventional left-right party politics, and in particular from the dominance of the liberal center, into an unstable era of problematic domestic politics, with parties themselves becoming unstable, new parties emerging, and increasing influence of what is commonly called the populist right, but also of non-populist right-wing currents. Not all of the right wing is automatically populist. There are a variety of extreme right-wing ethno-nationalist movements, particularly on the European continent and in the United States, that are not clearly populist. Some of these operate within frameworks that call for a return to a kind of right-wing, quasi-medieval vision of Europe.

There is also a rise of orthodoxy, not only in regions traditionally associated with it, such as Russia or Greece, but also in the West, where some right-wing thinkers and voices have converted to Orthodoxy. Some have even relocated to other countries and view Orthodoxy as a framework for rethinking the future. Others, like Rod Dreher, have advocated what he calls the “Benedict Option,” a return to forms of quasi-monastic community life. My point is simply that there are multiple kinds of emerging right-wing formations. They vary in how populist they are: some are clearly populist, while others are more explicitly elitist, focused on preserving elite authority.

There has not yet been a corresponding revitalization of left-wing thought. There are strong thinkers on the left, and such a renewal may come, but for now the intellectual and political dynamism appears more pronounced on the right. This development dovetails with broader shifts in international politics and geopolitics. Policies such as increasing tariffs and dismantling trade agreements are nationalist in one sense but are often driven by domestic political concerns that spill over into international relations.

At the same time, the spread of wars and aggressive international actions—sometimes pursued for their own sake, or because they help leaders remain in power—adds another layer of instability. In certain respects, figures like Putin and Netanyahu are in similar positions, where being at war helps sustain their political authority. This kind of dynamic is domestically rooted in nationalist configurations but poses wider global risks.

These actors are not identical to figures like Farage, but they are part of a broader global rise of various right-wing movements, some of which are primarily oriented toward power, while others are more explicitly concerned with the moral state of society. Notably, many of these pro-military, assertive right-wing movements are also strongly masculinist. They express concerns about declining birth rates, oppose expanded roles for women in public life, and often adopt homophobic positions. These stances reflect anxieties rooted in personal and social life within their respective societies, yet they are increasingly linked to broader geopolitical projects.

In that sense, questions that may seem unrelated—such as the connection between foreign policy actions and attitudes toward sexuality—are tied together through a shared emphasis on strength, both in individual, gendered terms and in national terms.

Stop Trump Coalition march, Central London, United Kingdom, September 17, 2025. Protesters dressed as Musk, Farage, Vance, Putin, Trump, and Netanyahu. Photo: Ben Gingell.

Policy Brief: The Conditions for a Democratic Pushback Against Populism

This policy brief by Andrea Guidotti offers a research-based assessment of the conditions under which democratic actors can push back against populism. Synthesizing recent scholarship on populist emergence, incumbency, accountability, and democratic defense, the brief shows that populism thrives amid economic insecurity, cultural backlash, crises of representation, and weak party systems. Yet it also emphasizes that populist power is not immune to constraint: organizational weaknesses, governing responsibilities, institutional resistance, and crisis mismanagement can undermine populist appeal. The analysis cautions that neither confrontation nor accommodation provides a universal solution; both may backfire under specific conditions. Instead, effective democratic defense requires context-sensitive strategies combining institutional robustness, coordinated opposition, citizen engagement, and careful management of polarization. Ultimately, democratic erosion remains reversible, but not automatically so.

By Andrea Guidotti

Introduction

The literature on the study of populism has flourished, building on studies investigating the causes and roots of populism, from the West to Latin America, Southeast Asia, and beyond. On the one hand, scholars have defined different ways to conceptualize populism, notably the ideational (Mudde, 2004; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018), political-strategic (Weyland, 2001 & 2021), discursive (Laclau, 2005a & 2005b), performative (Moffitt, 2015), and socio-cultural approaches (Ostiguy, 2017). On the other hand, there has been a development of historically informed reconstructions of how populism rises in certain contexts, especially after crises (Pappas, 2019; Weyland, 1999; Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

The latter research agenda mirrors comparative and empirical studies reconstructing how mainstream political forces and elected leaders erode institutional norms by fueling polarization and twisting democratic mechanisms (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Valentim et al., 2025; Stokes, 2025; Bunce et al., 2025). A more neglected niche in the academic literature has focused on the possibilities for political actors and the structural constraints they face when fighting against the contemporary surge of populist platforms and rhetoric. Building on academic work focusing on the protection of democratic norms and institutions, this policy brief is dedicated to offering a concise reconstruction of the major findings within this emerging literature and outlining potential policy actions to counter such developments.

Conditions for Populist Success

One of the main drivers of populist emergence concerns economic factors. Periods characterised by economic shocks and recessions favour the rise of populist movements. In the European context, the financial crisis played a key role, increasing the electoral support for populist parties by about ten to fifteen percentage points (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2022). A systematic meta-analysis of the literature confirms that a significant portion of cases of populist emergence is causally associated with economic insecurity (Scheiring et al., 2024).

Cultural shifts and perceived cultural crises are another major driver of populism. Between the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, modern societies with developed liberal democracies experienced unprecedented changes in social attitudes, mainly a shift from material and physical security concerns to post-materialist demands for greater individual liberties and room for self-expression. This triggered what Norris & Inglehart (2019) call a cultural and populist backlash.

Nonetheless, other authors argue that cultural theories should search for different causal explanations, either suggesting that data show how young cohorts, as well as older ones, hold (authoritarian) populist attitudes and electoral behaviours (Schäfer, 2022), or stressing the importance of unresolved issues and older cleavages in explaining support for populist movements (Baro & Todal Jenssen, 2025).

From an organizational and strategic point of view, plebiscitarian populist leaders have gained political power by leveraging three factors (Weyland, 1999). The first is the weakness of the party system. Strong internal disagreement and inconsistencies within mainstream parties constitute a permissive cause for populist movements. The second is the adoption of an adversarial strategy towards political opponents, whereby populist leaders strengthen their position by undermining the credibility of other political actors. The third element is the promotion of a confrontational approach towards structured trade unions and lobbying organizations.

While theories of populist emergence based on economic crises tend to treat political processes as exogenous, this view builds on the idea that the most appropriate indicator to gauge the rise of populism is political crises of representation, mainly endogenous to politics (Pappas, 2012). Such crises are necessary but not sufficient conditions for populism to flourish, and they are sufficient as long as there is adequate political leadership ready to mediate between emergency scenarios and citizens’ demands (Pappas, 2019).

The traction acquired by plebiscitary populist leaders is something not to be underestimated. In Latin America, populist incumbents have often exploited crisis situations so severely as to hamper the space and agency for advancing legitimate political opposition, thus pushing the democratic system towards a competitive authoritarian setting (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013).

Crises of democratic representation are the other side of the coin of populist emergence. While populist leaders capitalize on structural developments and favorable political conjunctures, citizens find ways to express their dissatisfaction with the current state of democracy. Employing longitudinal individual-level data from the European Social Survey (2012–2020), researchers have found that the rise of populism is deeply rooted in democratic dissatisfaction. Populists and non-voters are the most dissatisfied with democratic features, displaying a strong overall mismatch in expectations: European citizens hold very high expectations for democracy, but they perceive that the social and direct democracy dimensions are underperforming (Favaretto & Mariani, 2024).

Some interpretations of the rational voting model help explain why citizens may opt for radical (right-wing) populist parties. Where parties retain a centralized and stable structure and, in parallel, externally project policy effectiveness and competence in their core issue area, voters perceive their decision to electorally support populist outsiders as a strategic way to influence the political agenda when they disagree with the actions of established parties (Betz, 2002).

Populist Accountability in Government

On a general level, personalistic populist parties face three structural constraints while in government: (i) the failure to achieve conflict resolution among major personalities within the party leadership; (ii) the lack of a coherent political platform capable of delivering concrete results; and (iii) the absence of an experienced and skilled governing class. These conditions tend to favor mainstream and conservative parties over populist actors in power (Heinish, 2003).

Nonetheless, the crucial determinant of populist parties’ success during incumbency is their ability to adapt the party’s strategies and priorities to the new goal of office maximization rather than populist vote attraction (Luther et al., 2011). As the Latin American experience shows, another key moment of confrontation arises when populist incumbents face constraints from oppositional forces and the judicial apparatus.

This decisive moment determines whether populists choose to create power asymmetries vis-à-vis other branches of government, thereby becoming an unconstrained governing majority. Throughout this process, populist leaders may mobilize societal organizations or even manufacture state-sponsored confederations to establish hegemonic or authoritarian rule, respectively (Carrion, 2021).

Besides cases of populist governing majorities, there is empirical evidence regarding the cost of converging toward more mainstream political platforms after entering a coalition with other political parties post-elections. Van Spanje (2011) shows that anti-political establishment parties incur an additional cost of governing, in terms of future electoral support, after becoming part of a governing coalition.

Rather than becoming doubtful about the policy compromises made by their populist representatives, supporters are dissuaded by the perceived lack of genuineness in their anti-establishment leitmotifs. Similar findings are presented by other scholars. Katsanidou and Reinl (2020) disprove the correlation between ideological congruence on the left-right and European dimensions and voter support for populist parties in government. Instead, the main driver of populist vote defection is the perception that newly elected representatives are no longer fighting against elites and protecting the people’s interests, thereby breaking the populist link.

Policy accountability for ruling-party populist coalitions follows the same logic. A bank expansion and demonetization policy program implemented in India in 2005 provides an indicative example. Even though individuals from areas most affected by demonetization, due to the presence of fewer banks in the region, were 4.7 percentage points less likely to support the ruling coalition, stronghold areas presented a more nuanced pattern.

Citizens were found to be, on average, unresponsive to the negative externalities of demonetization policies when strongly aligned with the ruling populist party (Khanna & Mukherjee, 2023). The picture changes when populists are confronted with crises.

In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, populist governments were unable to “perform” the crisis, which consequently exposed their political incompetence. This reduced citizens’ support by 10 percentage points throughout the first year of the emergency (Foa et al., 2022), while in parallel decreasing the share of populist attitudes within the population (Daniele et al., 2020).

Opposing and Fighting (Illiberal) Populism

Countering Illiberal Threats

Empirical research reveals a new pattern of regime-type transformation. In this sense, U-turns can be characterized as episodes of autocratization followed by subsequent episodes of democratization. Specifically, Nord et al. (2025) demonstrate that nearly half of the 102 autocratization episodes taking place between 1900 and 2023 reversed course and eventually resulted in a restored or even improved level of democracy.

Data suggest that 85% of democratic regimes sliding into autocratization episodes U-turned into democracy. Accounting for a more recent period—the last three decades—democratic reactions represent 61% of all U-turns. It is thus clear that a window of opportunity for political action aimed at protecting democracy, its rules, and institutions has opened up in recent times.

As Capoccia (2001) puts it, defending democracy denotes “the elaboration and enactment of short-term political strategies, whether inclusive or repressive in nature, which are explicitly aimed at reacting against those political forces that exploit the rights and guarantees of democracy in order to undermine its fundamental bases.”

To properly deliver democratic defense against illiberal actors, some scholars have developed a series of tools and instruments. On a general level, one should be able to assess the level of threat depending on the nature of the organization—whether collective or individual—that is advancing the challenge. In addition, when confronted with a group, it is important to identify leaders and followers, as well as to understand its internal composition, with the aim of differentially targeting radical and moderate members. Finally, it is essential to establish the objective of one’s own actions: whether the goal of democratic defense is to (i) change illiberals’ attitudes and civic competence, (ii) change illiberals’ behavior, or (iii) mobilize democrats (Lurmhann et al., 2020).

On a more sophisticated level, this emerging literature has conceptualized the defense of democracy in different, but interconnected, ways. Merkel and Lührmann (2021) focus on a functionalist understanding of democratic resilience, clarifying how different responses to prevent or react to illiberal challenges—namely, withstanding major changes, adapting through internal reforms, and recovering after initial damage—are necessary but not sufficient conditions for successful democratic defense.

Two other constitutive dimensions to consider carefully are structural and actor-centered. The former examines the institutional relationships among governing bodies: the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. The latter scrutinizes the conditions under which political agents can nurture democratic resilience, distinguishing among political parties, civil society, and citizens as members of a polity.

Tomini et al. (2022) provide a typology of so-called resisters to autocratization—namely institutional, political, and social actors—while highlighting that the regime type critically influences both the actors involved and the degree of their democratic resistance. Gamboa et al. (2023) detail the scope and nature of specific measures implemented by oppositional forces in response to incumbent-led democratic backsliding along two dimensions: strategy type and desired goals.

Briefly, strategies can be either institutional or extra-institutional, and goals can be either moderate or radical. The combination of these key dimensions shapes the incentives and costs faced by democratic defenders.

From a procedural and normative standpoint, democratic defense can be addressed in three different ways (Malkopoulou & Norman, 2018). An elitist conception of democracy informs militant democratic defense, consequently violating the principle of non-domination. A procedural account of democratic defense adopts an inclusionary posture but underestimates the role of ordinary citizens and their agency. By contrast, a social model of democratic self-defense enhances the credibility of civil society actors and their participation in such a process as a baseline condition for the full realization of democracy.

In this context, actor-centered approaches to democratic recession appear to hold strong explanatory power. According to Van Lit et al. (2024), the strategic interaction between elites and citizens is the key element within the two-level game of democratic defense. Following this framework, elites’ decision to defend democracy is a function of their self-interest in maintaining the democratic status quo and the threat of repression by incumbents.

On the other side, citizens’ engagement and considerations result from a comparison between the ambiguity of the incumbent’s threat and the democratic credibility of elite defenders (Van Lit & Meijers, 2025).

Building on these insights, a research agenda and theoretical account have been put forward, offering a comprehensive model for countering illiberalism in liberal democracies. In his framework, Capoccia (2026) refines the understanding of viable countermeasures that can be adopted by a range of actors against illiberal threats and defines the related successful outcomes. His dynamic approach helps to explain how endogenous and exogenous information affect the temporal structure, as well as the sources of variation in institutional legacies across time and space, of pro-democratic interventions.

Countering Populism

Populism has become a defining characteristic of contemporary democracies and has developed in many Western countries. To avoid an even greater surge, liberal democratic actors should reduce the level of polarization, especially on matters related to identity politics. To do so, their objective should be to avoid paternalistic narratives and direct opposition to populist actors. Rather, they should concentrate on shaping norms by allowing populists to enter governing coalitions under certain premises.

In this way, populist actors can be held accountable based on the success of their promised actions within such coalitions (Kendall-Taylor & Nietsche, 2020). By welcoming populist ideas within governing coalitions, mainstream parties can not only broaden their electoral support by adopting some of their core policy positions, but also ostracize the more extremist and divisive elements present in populist political agendas. As empirically shown by Van Spanje and de Graaf (2018), analogous strategies can help increase support and the electoral gains of incumbent parties.

This strategy does not come without risks. The strategies of mainstream parties critically influence the chances of success of emerging niche and populist parties in electoral terms (Meguid, 2005). According to Berman (2021), we can summarize three distinct strategies that mainstream parties can adopt to address the emergence of new populist movements. The first is a dismissive strategy aimed at ignoring the key issues of interest to populist newcomers. The second is an adversarial strategy based on direct and explicit opposition to populist newcomers. The third is accommodative in nature, entailing policy convergence toward the political platforms of emerging populists.

Overall, strategies emphasizing either convergence or polarization can be detrimental to democracy under certain conditions. On the one hand, during periods of economic distress, an emphasis on polarizing cultural issues can push citizens toward populist parties that offer scapegoats and simplistic solutions. On the other hand, when votes tend to disperse toward the extremes of the Gaussian distribution, mainstream parties’ convergence toward populist positions may directly nudge citizens to shift their preferences closer to new populist actors (Berman & Kundnani, 2021).

Safeguards against populist illiberal actors can be found on historical and institutional grounds. Populists’ attempts at strangling liberal democracy may be hampered by high levels of institutional solidity and organizational strength, thereby safeguarding pluralism and even indirectly revitalizing democratic participation and resilience (Weyland, 2024a).

When populists are in power, institutional parameters are not the only drivers enabling a pushback. In such cases, the strategies of oppositional forces largely depend on the strength or weakness of the institutional framework and the initial degree of institutional solidity. Moreover, conjunctural opportunities also play a decisive role. Unexpected favorable economic conditions can boost support for populists and expand their scope of action, while significantly limiting the agency of oppositional forces. Acute crises can also enhance charismatic populist leaders’ popular appeal by obscuring the public standing of democratic opponents (Weyland, 2025b).

There seems to be only negative evidence concerning effective, actionable strategies to implement against populist forces. An experiment in Italian municipalities during a 2020 constitutional referendum proposing a reduction in the total number of Members of Parliament (MPs) from 945 to 600 in the two chambers of the Italian Parliament offers some indications (Galasso et al., 2024). Deploying a two-tier advertisement campaign, Stanig et al. (2022) tested the efficacy of two approaches to opposing populism: (i) a “win the argument” strategy aimed at persuading voters by deconstructing populist ideas; and (ii) a “use the same weapons” strategy attempting to reduce populist parties’ credibility, thereby lowering populist voters’ turnout.

Findings from a follow-up survey conducted in 2023 show that, while the campaign reduced attachment to established populist parties, attempts to counter populism by applying its own tactics increased voter disaffection and ultimately backfired. Notably, individuals targeted by the campaign were more likely to support newer and emerging populist parties (Galasso, 2024).

Conclusion

In sum, the literature suggests that democratic pushback against populism is neither automatic nor uniformly effective, but contingent on a complex interaction of structural conditions, institutional resilience, and strategic agency. While economic insecurity, cultural backlash, and crises of representation create fertile ground for populist mobilization, the durability of such movements in power remains constrained by organizational weaknesses, accountability pressures, and their capacity to adapt from opposition to governance.

At the same time, evidence on counter-strategies reveals no universally effective blueprint. Both confrontational and accommodative approaches by mainstream parties carry significant risks, potentially reinforcing polarization or legitimizing populist agendas. Similarly, attempts to counter populism through its own communicative logic may generate unintended consequences, including increased voter disaffection and the emergence of new populist actors.

Nevertheless, recent patterns of democratic “U-turns” indicate that democratic erosion is not irreversible. Institutional robustness, coordinated opposition, and favorable conjunctural conditions can reopen pathways to democratic recovery. As a result, effective democratic defense depends on context-sensitive strategies that balance institutional safeguards, political competition, and citizen engagement, rather than relying on singular or deterministic solutions.


 

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On April 20, 2026, the ECPS, in collaboration with the Center for American Progress (CAP), convened a closed expert roundtable in Washington, D.C., to examine the evolving nexus between populism and transatlantic relations.

ECPS Roundtable in Washington Examines Populism’s Impact on Transatlantic Relations

A high-level roundtable convened by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) at the Center for American Progress (CAP) on April 20, 2026, brought together leading scholars and policy experts to examine how populism is reshaping transatlantic relations. Held under the Chatham House Rule, the discussion highlighted growing concerns over declining trust, institutional erosion, and the shift toward more transactional and unpredictable forms of diplomacy. Participants emphasized that populism operates less as a coherent ideology than as a governing style marked by rule-breaking and strategic uncertainty, with far-reaching consequences for global cooperation. The exchange pointed to an evolving transatlantic partnership—more selective, fragile, and contingent—while underscoring the need for renewed democratic coordination, institutional resilience, and sustained engagement beyond government channels.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On April 20, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with the Center for American Progress (CAP), convened a closed expert roundtable in Washington, D.C., to examine the evolving nexus between populism and transatlantic relations. Bringing together a select group of scholars, policy analysts, and practitioners, the discussion focused on how contemporary political transformations—particularly the resurgence of populist leadership in the United States—are reshaping the strategic, institutional, and normative foundations of the transatlantic partnership. 

Building on ECPS’s prior engagements in European policy circles, the Washington meeting shifted analytical attention toward the United States as a central agenda-setter in transatlantic relations. The discussion was structured around three thematic blocks: (1) US strategic reorientation, (2) populism and commitment to liberal democracy, and (3) pathways to re-engagement. 

Framing the Discussion: A Relationship at a Turning Point

The roundtable opened with reflections on the ECPS report, which framed the current moment as a potential turning point in transatlantic relations. Participants broadly agreed that the relationship is undergoing a qualitative transformation, characterized by declining trust, shifting strategic priorities, and growing uncertainty about the durability of shared norms.

A central theme emerging from the introductory presentations was the distinction between structural and contingent explanations. While some developments—such as the US pivot to the Indo-Pacific and the relative rise of other global powers—reflect long-term structural changes, others appear closely tied to the political agency of contemporary populist leadership. 

The discussion underscored that these dynamics are not mutually exclusive. Instead, structural pressures and political contingencies interact in ways that amplify uncertainty. In particular, the return of a populist administration in the United States has accelerated tendencies toward unilateralism, transactional diplomacy, and skepticism toward multilateral institutions.

Participants noted that, unlike earlier periods of tension, current disruptions are compounded by a deeper erosion of trust. European actors increasingly perceive the transatlantic relationship as subject to abrupt shifts across electoral cycles, undermining its reliability as a strategic anchor.

Populism as Political Agency: Rule-Breaking and Uncertainty

A key analytical contribution of the discussion concerned the conceptualization of populism. Rather than treating populism as a coherent ideology, participants emphasized its manifestation through political agency—specifically, the capacity of populist leaders to disrupt established norms and institutional constraints.

In this regard, populism was associated with a distinctive governing style characterized by rule-breaking behavior and the strategic use of uncertainty. As one participant argued, populist leaders often derive power from their willingness to challenge established rules, thereby reshaping the expectations that underpin international cooperation. 

This dynamic has profound implications for the transatlantic system. The postwar order was built on a rules-based framework that enabled long-term planning, reduced transaction costs, and facilitated stable cooperation. When key actors repeatedly violate or reinterpret these rules, the system’s self-correcting mechanisms begin to erode.

Participants highlighted the cascading effects of such behavior. Even when most actors continue to adhere to established norms, the actions of rule-breaking leaders can disrupt dispute-resolution mechanisms, fragment global value chains, and generate systemic instability. 

This perspective shifts attention from populism as rhetoric to populism as practice—an approach that foregrounds the operational consequences of leadership choices in shaping international relations.

Trade, Institutions, and the Erosion of Multilateralism

The discussion devoted significant attention to the impact of populist governance on international economic and institutional frameworks. In the domain of trade, participants noted that recent policy shifts—particularly the imposition of unpredictable tariffs—have undermined the predictability essential to global commerce.

These developments reflect a broader move toward transactionalism, in which economic relations are subordinated to short-term political objectives. While the majority of international trade continues to follow established rules, the weakening of dispute-resolution mechanisms has diminished the system’s capacity to manage conflicts effectively. 

A parallel erosion was observed in multilateral institutions. Participants emphasized that these institutions depend not only on formal rules but also on the willingness of major powers to support and sustain them. When leading actors withdraw resources or disengage from cooperative frameworks, institutional effectiveness declines.

Examples discussed included the consequences of reduced US participation in global governance structures, which can create funding gaps, disrupt information-sharing networks, and weaken collective problem-solving capacities. 

Importantly, participants noted that the current crisis of multilateralism is not solely the result of populist leadership. It also reflects longstanding concerns about representation and legitimacy within global institutions. Populist actors have capitalized on these grievances, framing institutional disengagement as a defense of national sovereignty.

Strategic Reorientation: Competition, Cooperation, and Fragmentation

The first thematic block of the discussion addressed the strategic dimension of transatlantic relations. Participants debated whether recent shifts represent a temporary deviation or a more durable realignment.

Several contributors argued that the United States is undergoing a strategic reorientation driven by both domestic politics and global competition. The increasing emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, coupled with a more transactional approach to alliances, suggests a recalibration of priorities that may persist beyond any single administration. 

At the same time, the discussion highlighted the risks of fragmentation. As global value chains are reconfigured to enhance resilience and reduce dependency, they may become less compatible across regions. This process could lead to a form of “competitive strategic autonomy,” in which major actors develop parallel economic systems with limited interoperability.

For Europe, this presents a complex challenge. On one hand, there is a growing recognition of the need to reduce reliance on the United States and to enhance strategic autonomy. On the other hand, the transatlantic relationship remains a critical pillar of security and economic cooperation.

Participants suggested that the most plausible scenario is neither full decoupling nor a return to previous levels of integration, but rather a narrower and more selective partnership. 

Populism and Liberal Democracy: Normative Divergence

The second thematic block focused on the normative dimension of transatlantic relations, particularly the status of shared democratic values. Participants expressed concern that populist politics are contributing to a divergence in commitments to liberal democratic principles.

Key tensions identified included the relationship between geopolitics and democracy promotion, the credibility of values-based foreign policy, and the role of non-state actors in sustaining democratic norms. 

One line of argument emphasized that populist leaders often frame international institutions as constraints on national sovereignty, thereby weakening support for multilateral cooperation. Another perspective highlighted the internal contradictions of populist governance, noting that nationalist policies can lead to conflicts even among ideologically aligned actors.

The discussion also explored the potential for an alternative conception of transatlantic relations grounded in civilizational or cultural affinities rather than universalist values. While such narratives may resonate with certain political constituencies, participants questioned their viability as a basis for stable cooperation.

At the same time, the discussion acknowledged that populism is not inherently antithetical to democracy. Some participants emphasized its roots in legitimate grievances, including perceptions of inequality, corruption, and elite unresponsiveness. This perspective suggests that addressing the underlying drivers of populism is essential for restoring democratic legitimacy.

Pathways to Re-Engagement: Actors and Strategies

The final thematic block examined potential pathways for stabilizing and renewing transatlantic relations. Participants identified a range of actors and mechanisms that could mitigate political volatility and sustain cooperation.

At the governmental level, there was recognition of the need for pragmatic engagement across political divides. While ideological differences may limit the scope of cooperation, targeted initiatives in areas of mutual interest—such as security, trade, and technology—could provide a basis for continued collaboration.

Civil society and academic networks were highlighted as particularly important buffers against political disruption. Universities, think tanks, and research collaborations play a crucial role in maintaining dialogue, generating knowledge, and fostering mutual understanding.

Policy networks and economic stakeholders were also identified as key actors. Business communities, advocacy groups, and transnational partnerships can help sustain cooperation by emphasizing shared interests and interdependencies.

Participants emphasized that these actors are not substitutes for governmental engagement but rather complementary forces that can enhance resilience and adaptability.

Policy Reflections: Toward a More Resilient Partnership

In the concluding segment, participants were invited to propose concrete steps for improving transatlantic relations over the next two to three years. 

Several recurring themes emerged:

Rebuilding Trust: Restoring predictability in policy and communication was identified as a critical priority. This includes strengthening institutional mechanisms that can endure political transitions.

Enhancing Strategic Autonomy: European actors should continue to develop independent capabilities while maintaining cooperation with the United States.

Reforming Multilateral Institutions: Addressing concerns about representation and effectiveness could help restore confidence in global governance frameworks.

Investing in Non-State Networks: Expanding collaboration among civil society, academia, and the private sector can provide stability in times of political uncertainty.

Addressing Domestic Drivers of Populism: Tackling inequality, corruption, and governance deficits is essential for mitigating the appeal of populist narratives.

Conclusion

The ECPS roundtable provided a multidimensional assessment of the challenges facing transatlantic relations in an era of populist resurgence. While the discussion highlighted significant risks—including institutional erosion, normative divergence, and strategic fragmentation—it also identified opportunities for adaptation and renewal.

A central conclusion of the meeting is that the transatlantic relationship is unlikely to return to its previous form. Instead, it is evolving into a more contingent and selective partnership shaped by both structural transformations and political agency.

At the same time, the discussion underscored the enduring importance of shared interests and values. Even as these foundations are contested, they continue to provide a basis for cooperation and resilience.

Ultimately, the future of transatlantic relations will depend not only on the actions of governments but also on the capacity of societies to sustain democratic norms, foster inclusive growth, and engage constructively across borders. In this sense, the challenge is not merely to defend existing institutions but to reimagine them in ways that reflect the complexities of a changing world.

The roundtable thus reaffirmed the need for sustained dialogue, critical reflection, and collaborative action, and essential ingredients for navigating the uncertain terrain of contemporary global politics.

Professor Adam Przeworski.

Professor Przeworski: There Is No Worldwide Crisis of Democracy

In this interview, Professor Adam Przeworski, Emeritus Professor of Politics at New York University, challenges dominant narratives of a global democratic crisis. Against widespread claims of democratic recession and authoritarian resurgence, he argues: “I do not believe there is a worldwide crisis of democracy.” For Professor Przeworski, democracy remains best understood as a mechanism for processing conflict through elections rather than as a system that resolves all social, economic, or moral disagreements. While he acknowledges unprecedented developments—party-system instability, polarization, and the rise of new right-wing parties—he cautions against conflating these shifts with systemic collapse. His analysis highlights democracy’s self-preserving capacity, insisting that while “small transgressions may be tolerated,” major violations of democratic rules eventually encounter resistance.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era increasingly defined by claims of democratic recession, authoritarian resurgence, and the global diffusion of populist politics, few voices carry the analytical weight and empirical authority of Professor Adam Przeworski, Emeritus Professor of Politics at New York University (NYU). A foundational figure in democratic theory, Professor Przeworski has long conceptualized democracy not as a teleological endpoint, but as a contingent institutional arrangement grounded in electoral competition and the management of conflict. His minimalist definition—“a system in which governments can be selected and removed through elections”—offers a parsimonious yet powerful framework for evaluating both democratic resilience and vulnerability. In this interview, conducted against the backdrop of intensifying scholarly and public concern about democratic backsliding, Professor Przeworski advances a deliberately counterintuitive claim: “I do not believe there is a worldwide crisis of democracy.”

This assertion stands in sharp contrast to dominant narratives, including those informed by datasets such as V-Dem, which suggest a global shift toward autocratization. Yet Professor Przeworski challenges both the empirical basis and the interpretive framing of such claims. “What does it really mean to say that a majority of the world’s population lives under authoritarian governments?” he asks, expressing skepticism toward measurement strategies that, in his view, risk overstating crisis dynamics. Instead, he emphasizes a more structural and historically grounded perspective: “There are more democratic regimes—more democratic countries—in the world today than ever before.” For Professor Przeworski, the proliferation of democratic regimes, even amid evident tensions, complicates the narrative of systemic collapse.

At the core of his argument lies a reconceptualization of democratic instability. While acknowledging “recent changes that are indeed unprecedented—such as the weakening of political parties, the instability of party systems, and the emergence of new parties, particularly on the political right,” he resists interpreting these developments as evidence of a generalized breakdown. Rather, they reflect shifting configurations within democratic systems that have always been characterized by conflict, contestation, and dissatisfaction. Indeed, as he notes, “as much as half of the population is always dissatisfied with what democracy produces,” a condition intrinsic to competitive politics rather than indicative of systemic failure.

Crucially, Professor Przeworski situates contemporary democratic challenges within a broader theory of political conflict and institutional equilibrium. Democracy endures not because it resolves all conflicts, but because it provides a mechanism—elections—through which they can be processed and temporarily settled. Even processes of democratic erosion, he suggests, remain bounded by this logic. While incumbents may attempt to “undermine democracy without abolishing elections,” such strategies are neither universally successful nor irreversible. On the contrary, recent electoral developments in countries such as Poland and Brazil illustrate democracy’s capacity for self-correction. “Attempts to usurp power through various means eventually encounter resistance,” he observes, emphasizing that “small transgressions may be tolerated, but major violations of democratic rules are not.”

This perspective invites a more nuanced understanding of both populism and authoritarianism. Rather than external threats to democracy, they emerge as endogenous features of political competition under conditions of inequality, polarization, and institutional strain. At the same time, Professor Przeworski underscores the enduring appeal of democratic choice itself. “The very possibility of choosing who governs us,” he argues, “is an extraordinarily strong value to which people adhere.”

By challenging prevailing assumptions about democratic decline, this interview offers a sobering yet cautiously optimistic account of contemporary politics. It suggests that while liberal democracy faces significant pressures, its foundational mechanisms—and the normative commitments that sustain them—remain more resilient than often assumed.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Adam Przeworski, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Democracy as Conflict Management

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

Professor Przeworski, welcome. Your minimalist conception defines democracy as a system in which governments can be selected and removed through elections. In light of contemporary backsliding, does this procedural definition remain analytically sufficient, or do recent developments compel us to integrate more substantive criteria concerning rights, accountability, and the rule of law?

Professor Adam Przeworski: I think that to understand my view of democracy—the minimalist view of democracy—one has to start with the observation that, in every country, at every time, there is conflict. These conflicts are often normative; that is, people expect democracy to implement certain values, such as those you mentioned. There are also economic conflicts—indeed, most conflicts are economic—dealing with the distribution of income, work, and so on. Sometimes they are purely symbolic. I often cite the example of a government in the Weimar Republic that fell because it changed the colors of the national flag. But the key point is that there was conflict.

The essence of the minimalist conception is that we must find ways to manage these conflicts—ways to resolve them, at least temporarily. After all, different people expect different things from democracy: some emphasize freedom, others equality. So how do we resolve these conflicts? This is where my argument comes in. I contend that we resolve them through elections. Whatever else people expect from democracy, we must have a mechanism through which conflicts are processed and resolved.

No Generalized Crisis of Democracy

You distinguish democracy as a mechanism for processing conflict from democracy as a normative ideal. To what extent has the growing expectation that democracy should deliver not only representation, but also economic equality and moral outcomes contributed to its current crisis of legitimacy?

Professor Adam Przeworski: I am not sure that this represents something new. As long as democracy has existed—in some countries for 200 years, and in at least 13 countries for 100 consecutive years—there have been such divergences. We have always disagreed about what we should expect of democracy, and which values it ought to implement. There is nothing new about that.

From this perspective, some people—and perhaps, in many cases, as much as half of the population—are always dissatisfied with what democracy produces. From time to time, they express this dissatisfaction by voting incumbent governments out. That is the instrument available to them, and that is how the system works.

For this reason, I do not think there is something like a generalized crisis of democracy. That said, there are recent changes that are indeed unprecedented—such as the weakening of political parties, the instability of party systems, and the emergence of new parties, particularly on the political right. These are significant developments, and they should prompt concern. But I would not characterize them as evidence of a new, generalized crisis of democracy. As I said at the outset, I do not believe such a generalized crisis exists.

The US as the Exception

Your work emphasizes that democracy endures when the stakes of losing power are not existential. How should we interpret rising inequality, identity polarization, and winner-takes-all political competition in this regard—do they structurally raise the cost of electoral defeat beyond sustainable thresholds?

Professor Adam Przeworski: The stakes in elections have indeed increased in recent years. At the same time, however, I do not see a generalized threat to democracy. There is, of course, an elephant in the room: the United States. In the United States, democracy is truly in danger. But if we consider similar countries—economically highly developed societies with comparable, perhaps somewhat lower, levels of inequality, significant political polarization, and long democratic traditions—the picture looks different.

In these countries, even when right-wing parties, including those with fascist roots, come to power—at least as members of governing coalitions—they do not necessarily threaten democracy. What strikes me is that, if you look at Italy, for example, where a party with explicit fascist roots is governing, or Austria or Sweden, where such parties have been part of coalitions, they still adhere to democratic values. They may advance unprecedented programs—programs that many of us, including myself, may strongly dislike—but they do not, in themselves, threaten democracy. In that sense, the threat to democracy appears to be largely exceptional to the United States.

Democracy Under Formal Trappings

Following the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, protests erupted across numerous cities in Turkey. Citizens took to the streets to voice their opposition to the decision and express growing discontent.
Photo: Dreamstime.

You have argued that contemporary democratic breakdowns occur primarily through elected incumbents. Does this shift from coups to endogenous erosion indicate that the institutional architecture of modern democracies has become intrinsically vulnerable to strategic capture?

Professor Adam Przeworski: That is an extremely controversial topic, but the answer is probably yes. When you look at the data, military coups have almost completely disappeared in the 21st century. Until around the year 2000, democracies were typically destroyed in a visible way—through military takeovers and coups. Since then, the only democracy that has experienced a coup is Thailand. While there have been many coups in Africa, particularly in North Africa, they have not been directed against democratic regimes. This suggests a new pattern.

It is likely new because some governments have learned that they can remain in power while preserving the formal trappings of democracy—by subordinating institutions other than the executive, controlling the media and economic resources, and employing a degree of repression, as in Turkey. In other words, they have learned to operate under the guise of democracy while using a range of instruments to entrench their rule.

At the same time, these governments do lose elections. They lost an election in Poland, and more recently in Hungary, contrary to many expectations and the more pessimistic forecasts of some analysts. This indicates that, while incumbents have developed strategies to gradually undermine democracy without abolishing elections or fully delegitimizing the opposition, the process is neither complete nor irreversible. For that reason, I would not characterize this as a universal phenomenon, and it remains unclear how durable it will be.

The Dilemma of Democratic Resistance

Within your strategic framework, incumbents choose whether to uphold or subvert electoral competition. How should we conceptualize “stealth authoritarianism,” where legalistic and incremental institutional changes cumulatively undermine democracy without triggering immediate resistance?

Professor Adam Przeworski: Let me begin with the question of immediate resistance. These governments win elections—Erdoğan won elections; Chávez and then Maduro won elections; Orbán won elections; and in Poland, the right-wing party won elections. They come to power on a program, and then the opposition faces a difficult choice. The opposition may see that these governments threaten democracy but opposing them can itself appear undemocratic. After all, these leaders have just won an election. Taking to the streets to say, “No, these people cannot govern,” risks being perceived as an anti-democratic act.

At some point, however, it may become too late. If these governments succeed in consolidating their partisan advantage—as in Venezuela or Turkey—then by the time the opposition decides that it can no longer tolerate the situation because democracy is being undermined, incumbents may already be too strong. They may be able to repress their opponents or otherwise entrench themselves in power. So, strategically, this is a very difficult situation. The opposition must be extremely careful about what to oppose and when to oppose it.

Public Tolerance and Democratic Erosion

Serbia protest.
Serbian students and citizens protest against government corruption following the Novi Sad railway station accident, at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on December 22, 2024. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic / Dreamstime.

You suggest that democratic vulnerability can arise both from highly popular incumbents through populism and from deeply unpopular ones through polarization. How should we interpret cases where these dynamics converge, producing simultaneously mobilized support and entrenched opposition?

Professor Adam Przeworski: The way I think about it is that governments which, in fact, threaten democracy sometimes win elections. We now have extensive evidence, originally due to Professor Milan Svolik at Yale, showing that people are willing to tolerate certain violations of democratic norms and rules in exchange for substantive outcomes they value. As Svolik and Matthew H. Graham demonstrate in a well-known article, the number of unconditional democrats—that is, people who would not tolerate any violation of democratic norms for any substantive outcome—is very small in the United States. If I recall correctly, they estimate it at around 6 percent.

At the same time, evidence from Carlos Boix and his collaborators shows that when the question is framed more broadly—whether people are willing to give up democracy altogether—the answer is strongly negative. In other words, people may tolerate some transgressions, but not a complete abandonment of democracy. This creates a particular dynamic in processes of democratic backsliding. People may accept certain violations, but when governments go too far, they react—they protest, object, and sometimes vote incumbents out of office, as seen in Hungary and Poland.

In this sense, governments sometimes backslide because they can—because such actions are tolerated. At other times, however, they may backslide defensively, because failing to do so could risk electoral defeat. Thus, there are two distinct forms of backsliding: one supported by public tolerance, and another that unfolds in tension with public opinion.

Delegation, Trust, and Anti-Democratic Populism

Populist leaders frequently claim to embody a unified “people” against institutional constraints. In your analytical framework, is populism best understood as a pathology of democratic representation, or as an endogenous feature of electoral competition under conditions of high stakes and limited trust?

Professor Adam Przeworski: This is, again, a theme that is inherent in democracy. We do not like to be ruled. There is always a government that tells us what we can do and, very often, what we cannot do—and we do not like it. There have always been movements demanding a greater voice for the people in governance. As you know, there are many proposals aimed at increasing the role of voters in governing—various kinds of assemblies, referendums, participatory budgeting, and so on. Numerous reforms have sought to expand the role of citizens in their governments.

At the same time, there is a form of right-wing or anti-democratic populism in which people are willing to delegate governance to a leader, as long as that leader governs well. In such cases, people say, “We will place our trust in a government that does what we want.” Both of these tendencies can be dangerous to democracy.

Populism Is Inherent in Democracy

You have argued that citizens may knowingly tolerate democratic erosion when incumbents are perceived as highly appealing. Does this imply that populism is not external to democracy, but rather a rational equilibrium outcome within it?

Professor Adam Przeworski: I think that populism, understood as a desire among voters to have a stronger and more direct voice in governing, is inherent in democracy. Populism is a slippery concept. This is why Mudde, who popularized the term, has described it as a “thin” or weak ideology. At its core, it presents a view of the world that pits elites against the people. Some version of this dynamic has always been present. It was already visible at the time the American Constitution was being written. The Anti-Federalists, for example, were populists in this sense. They advocated very short terms of office—sometimes as short as one year—as well as prohibitions on re-election, reflecting a fear that elites would capture power and use it in their own interests rather than in those of the broader population.

This dynamic is therefore as old as democracy itself, and it resurfaces from time to time. At the same time, when the question is framed more fundamentally—whether people are willing to give up democracy altogether for some alternative—we have overwhelming evidence that they are not. People are not willing to accept that; they will defend democracy.

Dissatisfaction Is Democracy’s Constant

Given your argument that political conflict is structured by the available policy alternatives, how does populism reshape the political agenda in ways that both intensify polarization and foreclose the possibility of compromise?

Professor Adam Przeworski: We do have a great deal of evidence of polarization. The proportion of the electorate willing to change its partisan preferences is almost zero, which is somewhat surprising given that party systems themselves are quite unstable. People are increasingly likely to see one another as enemies, and as a result, they are less willing to accept compromise. That said, I do not think we are living in an era of a generalized crisis of democracy. Democracy continues to function quite well in several countries. The fact that we are often dissatisfied with the outcomes of governments and their policies is nothing new.

Consider that there are almost no democratic elections in which any party wins more than 50 percent of the vote. This means that roughly half of voters are dissatisfied with the result from the outset. Once in power, governments inevitably fail to implement all their promises, and perhaps about half of their own supporters become dissatisfied as well. What we observe, then, is a broad and persistent dissatisfaction with both electoral outcomes and government performance. Yet people continue to expect that next time they will prevail, and that the government will deliver on its promises. Elections are, in a sense, a siren song—they renew our optimism that, even if it did not work this time, it might work next time. This dynamic is inherent in democracy and is likely to persist. That is why I am not inclined to interpret current developments as evidence of a generalized crisis.

Why Some Autocracies Gain Support

The Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, is pictured with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, in Goa, India on May 25, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

Your work challenges the assumption that authoritarian regimes are inherently fragile, highlighting instead their capacity to govern effectively and generate support. Does this require a fundamental revision of democratic theory’s expectations about the instability of autocracies?

Professor Adam Przeworski: It is difficult for democrats to understand why someone would be satisfied with, or even support, an authoritarian regime. We tend to assume that people would not be willing to give up their political freedom—and sometimes more than that, their cultural freedom—and trust that a government will act in their interests. As a result, much of the literature we produce in the West suggests that authoritarian regimes survive only because of misinformation, censorship, and propaganda. I do not think that is entirely true. There are authoritarian regimes that enjoy passive acceptance, and perhaps even passive support. China is one example. Why? Because authoritarian governments still have to govern—and they do govern. They repair streets, issue licenses, collect garbage; in short, they perform the everyday functions of governance. Moreover, people often do not see viable alternatives. In China, for instance, many do not seriously consider a different system; they simply live within the one they have.

So, my view is that we should not be surprised that some authoritarian regimes are relatively successful and enjoy a degree of popular support. Singapore might be one example, China another. This does not mean that all authoritarian regimes do so—many rely heavily on repression, arbitrariness, and violence in the interests of narrow elites. But the broader point is that authoritarian regimes are not sustained only by deception. Some of them do enjoy genuine support.

Development Sustains Democracy, But May Not Create It

If authoritarian regimes can derive legitimacy through economic performance, symbolic politics, or identity appeals, how does this complicate the long-standing modernization thesis linking development to democratization?

Professor Adam Przeworski: This is a long topic on which I have written extensively. What we know from the evidence is that if a democratic regime exists in an economically developed country, it is very likely to endure. That is the central lesson. In a 1997 article co-authored with Fernando Limongi, we observed that no democracy had ever fallen in a country with a per capita income higher than Argentina’s in 1976. Since then, only Thailand has experienced a democratic breakdown at a slightly higher income level. Overall, however, the evidence is clear: when democracy exists in a developed country, it tends to persist.

A different question is whether countries are more likely to become democratic as they develop economically. This was a widespread belief in the 1960s and 1970s and formed the basis of modernization theory. My conclusion, based on empirical research, is that we have no evidence supporting this claim. In other words, higher levels of economic development do not necessarily make a country more likely to become democratic. So, in a sense, one half of modernization theory is supported by the evidence, while the other half is not.

Why Some Autocracies Endure

What, in your view, distinguishes durable authoritarian regimes from fragile ones—particularly in terms of their ability to balance repression, co-optation, and everyday governance?

Professor Adam Przeworski: I do not really know; I have not studied this question directly. My view is more of a conjecture—and it is no more than that, not strongly supported by empirical evidence, largely because we do not yet have sufficient data. My sense is that when authoritarian regimes reach high levels of income, they tend to become more stable. Singapore and China, for me, are illustrative examples.

When we look at the empirical data, authoritarian regimes appear to be most vulnerable at intermediate levels of income. That is when they are more likely to collapse. By contrast, once they reach sufficiently high levels of income—and there are very few such cases—they seem more likely to endure.

At present, there is only one authoritarian regime with a per capita income comparable to that of most democracies, and that is Singapore. China, despite its significant development, has not yet reached that level. So, from this perspective, we still do not know with certainty whether authoritarian regimes are more likely to survive in developed contexts. However, the available empirical patterns suggest that they probably are.

Legitimacy Without Alternatives

You have critiqued formal models of authoritarianism for neglecting the quotidian practices of governance. How should scholars reconceptualize authoritarian stability to account for these routine, non-coercive dimensions of rule?

Professor Adam Przeworski: I have a particular view of legitimacy, which I spelled out many years ago. I think a regime is legitimate when people do not perceive organized alternatives. When you think about China, whatever else may be true, people simply do not see an alternative. More broadly, our regime preferences are, to a large extent, endogenous—endogenous in the sense that people living under particular regimes, unless those regimes are especially flagrant, tend to accept them. They accept them passively because they do not see much chance of changing them.

Someone living in the state of Iowa in the United States does not think, “What if the American system were like the Chinese one?” Similarly, someone living in Guangdong does not think, “What if our system were like the American one?” People live their everyday lives, and they do not perceive politically organized alternatives. That is simply the way things are.

When such alternatives do appear—when there is a genuinely organized democratic opposition—open conflict emerges, and some authoritarian regimes collapse. We saw this in the fall of the communist bloc, where regimes collapsed one after another.

Challenging the V-Dem Crisis Narrative

Recent V-Dem report findings indicate that a substantial majority of the world’s population now lives under authoritarian regimes, with autocracies outnumbering democracies. How should we interpret this reversal in light of your argument that democracy is historically contingent rather than teleologically progressive?

Professor Adam Przeworski: I think this claim is simply false. In a sense, I see V-Dem as a figment of the imagination. What does it really mean to say that a majority of the world’s population lives under authoritarian governments? How is that measured? I do not have much trust in V-Dem’s measurements of democracy. I think they seek media exposure by heralding crises of democracy. I do not believe there is a worldwide crisis of democracy, so I do not take this claim seriously. On the contrary, there are more democratic regimes—more democratic countries—in the world today than ever before. I am not referring to population, but to the number of countries.

Electorates Can Reverse Illiberal Drift

And finally, Professor Przeworski, recent political developments in countries such as Poland, Brazil, and—potentially—Hungary suggest that electorates can reverse authoritarian or illiberal trajectories through democratic means. To what extent do these cases support the view that democracy retains a self-correcting capacity, and what structural or institutional conditions are necessary for such reversals to succeed rather than produce only partial or fragile restorations?

Professor Adam Przeworski: You are right that what has happened in Brazil, Poland, and Hungary shows that democracies possess a kind of self-preserving capacity. When democracy is truly at stake, people are willing to set aside other values and preferences in order to defend it. There is something about the very possibility of choosing who governs us that constitutes an extraordinarily strong value, to which people remain deeply attached. The examples you cited illustrate this clearly. Attempts to usurp power through various means eventually encounter resistance. Small transgressions may be tolerated, but major violations of democratic rules are not.

Stop Trump Coalition march, Central London, United Kingdom, September 17, 2025. A protester holds a sign reading “No to fascists — Trump, Musk, Farage.” Photo: Ben Gingell.

ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 5: Democratic Resistance in a Hardening World — Civic Capacity, Strongmen, and Economic Coercion

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 5: Democratic Resistance in a Hardening World — Civic Capacity, Strongmen, and Economic Coercion.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 28, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00154

 

Panel 5 of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium, moderated by Professor Jocelyne Cesari, offered a comprehensive examination of democratic resistance amid intensifying global pressures. Bringing together perspectives from political sociology, democratic theory, criminology, and international political economy, the panel illuminated how structural inequality, cultural backlash, institutional erosion, and coercive economic practices converge to sustain contemporary strongman politics. Contributions by Professor Jack A. Goldstone, Professor Steven Friedman, Professor John Pratt, and Professor Kent Jones underscored that democratic backsliding is not reducible to leadership alone but reflects deeper transformations in governance, legitimacy, and global order. The panel ultimately highlighted the urgent need to rethink democratic resilience beyond institutional safeguards toward structural and societal renewal.

Reported by ECPS Staff

Panel 5, titled “Democratic Resistance in a Hardening World: Civic Capacity, Strongmen, and Economic Coercion,”concluded on April 22, 2026, the second day of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium, Reforming and Safeguarding Liberal Democracy: Systemic Crises, Populism, and Democratic Resilience.” Moderated by Professor Jocelyne Cesari, Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham and Senior Fellow at Georgetown University’s Berkley Center, the panel examined the structural, ideological, institutional, and economic forces driving contemporary democratic erosion and the resurgence of strongman politics.

Professor Cesari’s moderation situated the panel within the symposium’s broader concern with democratic resilience under conditions of systemic crisis. The session brought together four distinguished scholars whose presentations approached the hardening global political environment from complementary disciplinary perspectives: historical sociology, political theory, criminology, and international political economy. Together, they explored how economic insecurity, democratic disillusionment, punitive politics, cultural backlash, and coercive trade policy have reshaped the terrain on which liberal democracy must now defend itself.

Professor Jack A. Goldstone, Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr. Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University and Senior Fellow of the Mercatus Center, opened the panel with “Structural Pressures Behind Strongman Politics.”Professor Goldstone argued that the rise of authoritarian-populist leaders cannot be explained simply by demagoguery or declining democratic values. Rather, it reflects long-term structural pressures, including globalization, technological displacement, regional inequality, immigration surges, cultural diversification, fiscal stress, and declining confidence in mainstream institutions.

Professor Steven Friedman, Research Professor of Politics at the University of Johannesburg and former Director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy, followed with “Changing Democracy’s Address.” Professor Friedman challenged the assumption that contemporary democratic crises reflect a popular rejection of democracy itself. Instead, he argued that the dominant post-Cold War model of democracy has failed by neglecting private power and by presenting democracy as inherently Western, thereby weakening its legitimacy both in established democracies and across the Global South.

Professor John Pratt, Emeritus Professor of Criminology at Victoria University of Wellington, then presented “The Return of the Strong Men.” Professor Pratt traced the contemporary rise of populist strongmen to the neoliberal restructuring of the 1980s, the resulting legitimacy deficit, and the emergence of penal populism, anti-expert politics, enemy construction, and strongman promises of protection.

Professor Kent Jones, Professor Emeritus of International Economics at Babson College, concluded the presentations with “Weaponized Trade Policy: Tariffs, Industrial Policy, and the Future of Global Economic Governance.” Professor Jones analyzed how Trump’s populist trade agenda undermined the rules-based global trading system, transforming tariffs into instruments of executive power, coercion, and institutional destabilization.

Thıs, Panel 5 offered a wide-ranging account of democratic resistance in an era marked by structural insecurity, institutional erosion, and globalized authoritarian repertoires.

 

Professor Jack A. Goldstone: Structural Pressures Behind Strongman Politics

Professor Jack A. Goldstone, one of the world’s leading scholars of revolutions and social change, holds the Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr. Chair in Public Policy at George Mason University. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Mercatus Center and Director of the Center for the Study of Social Change, Institutions and Policy (SCIP).

Professor Jack A. Goldstone’s presentation offered a structural account of the contemporary rise of strongman politics, situating it within long-term global transformations rather than attributing it to short-term political manipulation or individual leadership alone. Professor Goldstone began by emphasizing that authoritarian-populist leadership is now a genuinely global phenomenon, visible across the United States, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. This global spread, he argued, necessitates a shift in analytical focus: rather than concentrating solely on leaders or rhetoric, scholars and policymakers must examine the underlying structural pressures that have made such leadership politically viable and electorally successful.

Rejecting explanations that attribute democratic erosion to a simple decline in civic values or generational amnesia, Professor Goldstone noted that support for authoritarian-populist movements often comes disproportionately from older voters rather than younger cohorts. Nor, he argued, can the phenomenon be reduced to the manipulative success of demagogues. While acknowledging that leaders such as Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have pursued personalistic and patrimonial forms of governance once in power, Professor Goldstone insisted that their ascent reflects genuine electoral demand for change. This demand, in turn, is rooted in structural transformations that have unfolded over several decades.

At the theoretical level, Professor Goldstone reaffirmed a key insight of modernization theory: rising prosperity and autonomy tend, over the long term, to foster demands for democratic accountability. However, he stressed that this trajectory is not linear. Periods of widespread anxiety and insecurity can reverse democratic inclinations, pushing citizens toward leaders who promise order, protection, and decisive action. Drawing historical parallels, Professor Goldstone suggested that the present moment resembles earlier waves of global instability, particularly the 1930s, when fear and uncertainty contributed to the erosion of democratic norms.

Structural Pressures Behind Strongman Politics

Professor Goldstone identified four principal structural pressures driving this contemporary wave. The first concerns the long-term economic transformations associated with globalization and technological change since the 1980s. These processes have disproportionately harmed working-class communities, particularly those dependent on manufacturing and mid-skill employment. While globalization generated aggregate economic gains, including lower consumer prices and expanded opportunities in high-skill service sectors, its benefits were unevenly distributed. Major metropolitan areas prospered, while rural and small-town regions experienced economic decline, reduced social mobility, and loss of status. Professor Goldstone highlighted the emergence of stark regional inequalities across countries, from the United States to Germany and the United Kingdom. These inequalities have been compounded by policy responses that prioritized corporate competitiveness—through deregulation, tax reductions, and the weakening of labor unions—over the protection of vulnerable communities. The result has been rising inequality, declining life prospects for many citizens, and a growing sense of economic insecurity.

The second structural pressure identified by Professor Goldstone relates to surges in immigration. While acknowledging that immigration can be economically beneficial and socially enriching, he argued that sudden and large-scale increases in migration generate widespread anxiety, even among populations that are generally supportive of immigration. These surges create perceptions of insecurity and loss of control, particularly when political elites fail to respond in ways that address public concerns. According to Professor Goldstone, elite discourse often emphasized tolerance and openness without adequately recognizing the psychological and social impact of rapid demographic change. This disconnect contributed to social tensions, anti-immigrant backlash, and growing distrust toward political elites.

A third factor concerns the broader increase in ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. Professor Goldstone noted that diversification has been a global trend, but its political consequences vary depending on how it is managed. In many cases, right-wing actors have framed diversity as a threat to social cohesion and national identity. At the same time, Professor Goldstone argued that both progressive and conservative elites have struggled to respond effectively. In particular, he pointed to a widening cultural gap between elites and ordinary citizens, especially in relation to religion. Contrary to earlier expectations of secularization, religious identity remains a significant source of meaning and dignity for many individuals. Elite dismissiveness toward religious values, combined with policies perceived as privileging minorities, has fueled resentment and reinforced perceptions of cultural marginalization.

The fourth structural pressure identified by Professor Goldstone involves fiscal constraints and rising public debt. Increasing expenditures on pensions, healthcare, and interest payments have placed significant strain on government budgets. At the same time, political systems have struggled to address these challenges effectively, leading to persistent deficits and intensifying conflicts over resource allocation. According to Professor Goldstone, this fiscal environment has contributed to perceptions of governmental inefficiency and corruption, further eroding public trust in democratic institutions.

Erosion of Trust and the Rise of Populism

Taken together, these structural developments have produced a broad-based decline in confidence in political institutions, mainstream parties, and traditional media. This erosion of trust creates fertile ground for outsider candidates and anti-establishment movements. Professor Goldstone addressed the question of why this discontent has more often translated into right-wing rather than left-wing populism. While acknowledging the presence of left-wing populist movements, he argued that right-wing actors have been more effective in directing public anger toward cultural, intellectual, and political elites, rather than toward economic elites alone. In the current context, many citizens perceive professional and globalist elites as more directly responsible for their grievances than corporate actors.

Professor Goldstone also questioned the adequacy of the concept of “democratic backsliding” in describing recent developments, particularly in long-established democracies. In the case of the United States, he suggested that current dynamics more closely resemble a form of political transformation akin to a revolutionary shift, in which longstanding democratic arrangements are being fundamentally challenged. This perspective underscores the depth of the crisis and the extent of institutional change underway.

Despite this diagnosis, Professor Goldstone rejected the notion that such developments are inevitable or irreversible. Drawing on historical experience, he emphasized that periods of democratic erosion can be countered and reversed. However, he cautioned that removing individual leaders from power is insufficient. Lasting democratic recovery requires addressing the structural conditions that generated widespread discontent in the first place. This includes restoring social mobility, reducing inequality, strengthening public goods provision, and rebuilding trust in political institutions.

Professor Goldstone argued that democratic resilience ultimately depends on the ability of political systems to respond effectively to citizens’ concerns. Policies perceived as favoring corporate interests over workers, or prioritizing minority groups at the expense of broader societal cohesion, risk further undermining public confidence. Conversely, political strategies that focus on widely shared concerns—such as economic security, affordability, and corruption—may help rebuild support for democratic governance.

In his concluding remarks, Professor Goldstone emphasized that the current crisis reflects not only political failures but also deeper misjudgments by global elites in the post-Cold War era. The assumption that economic growth and globalization alone would ensure social and political stability proved misguided. By neglecting issues such as inequality, cultural identity, and social cohesion, elites contributed to the conditions that have enabled the rise of authoritarian-populist movements. Addressing these structural imbalances, Professor Goldstone concluded, is essential for restoring democratic legitimacy and resilience in the years ahead.

 

Professor Steven Friedman: Changing Democracy’s Address

Professor Steven Friedman.
Steven Friedman is Research Professor of Politics, University of Johannesburg; former Director, Centre for the Study of Democracy.

 

Professor Steven Friedman’s presentation offered a critical reflection on the contemporary crisis of democracy from the vantage point of South Africa and the Global South. He situated his remarks within his own experience of having lived under an undemocratic system before South Africa’s democratic transition in the mid-1990s. That transition occurred during the height of the global democratization wave and was accompanied by considerable optimism about the possibilities of democratic renewal. For Professor Friedman, the ideas associated with transition-to-democracy scholarship were deeply inspiring because they appeared to offer a way out of authoritarian rule. Yet, three decades later, he argued, the democratic model that generated such hope is itself in crisis.

Professor Friedman framed his central argument around the collapse of the particular model of democracy that became dominant in the 1990s. He stressed that the current moment should not be understood as a wholesale rejection of democracy itself. Rather, many citizens are rejecting a specific model of democracy that has failed to constrain certain forms of power and has presented democracy as essentially Western. This distinction, for Professor Friedman, is crucial: the problem is not democracy as such, but the limitations of the version of democracy that was globalized after the Cold War.

To illustrate the changing democratic landscape, Professor Friedman recounted an anecdote from his own academic experience. After publishing a book on Jewish identity and Palestine-related issues, he was invited by colleagues in Germany to present his work. Shortly before the seminar, he was informed that several colleagues would not participate because they feared losing their jobs if they joined the discussion. Others were prepared to attend but unwilling to ask questions for the same reason. Professor Friedman found this striking, given that he had once lived in a country without freedom of speech and had envied countries where open debate was possible. He now found himself in a South Africa where he felt able to speak freely, while European colleagues appeared increasingly constrained. This anecdote served as an entry point into his broader argument about the erosion of democratic freedoms in established democracies.

The Failure to Constrain Private Power

Professor Friedman challenged the common explanation that contemporary authoritarian-populist advances reflect majorities turning against democracy. He argued that this claim does not withstand empirical scrutiny. Donald Trump, he noted, was elected with approximately 31 percent of the voting-age population. If 69 percent did not vote for him, the key question is not why the majority chose authoritarianism, but why a minority was able to impose itself politically. Professor Friedman extended this point comparatively, observing that anti-democratic right-wing parties often do not win majority support. Even Narendra Modi, at the height of his power, secured a parliamentary majority with 42 percent of the vote. The problem, therefore, is not necessarily that majorities have embraced authoritarianism, but that minority forces are being enabled to dominate political systems, sometimes because majorities withdraw or disengage.

Professor Friedman attributed this disengagement to two core conditions embedded in the dominant post-1990s model of democracy. The first is the failure to democratize private power. In the prevailing model, democracy is understood mainly as a relationship between government and citizens: public power is held accountable by citizens, while citizens are assumed to be powerless political equals. Yet Professor Friedman argued that this conception ignores the reality that some citizens possess immense private power. Figures such as Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and Mark Zuckerberg cannot plausibly be understood simply as powerless citizens trying to hold government to account. They exercise power over others and shape public life in profound ways. A workable democratic model, Professor Friedman argued, must therefore constrain private power just as it constrains public power.

According to Professor Friedman, the 1990s model largely excluded this dimension. It coincided with a broader hollowing out of democracy in older Western democracies, where parties that had previously constrained private power increasingly stopped doing so. He cited the Clinton administration in the United States and New Labour under Tony Blair in the United Kingdom as examples of this shift. The postwar idea that government should ensure private power remained accountable to citizens gradually eroded. Whether theory followed practice or practice followed theory, Professor Friedman argued, the result was the same: democracy became less capable of meeting people’s needs.

This failure, he suggested, helps explain political disengagement. When citizens find that voting does not change their material conditions, labor market exclusion, or exposure to economic insecurity, they lose motivation to participate. Professor Friedman referred to research suggesting that Trump’s 2024 victory was shaped not only by active support but by the fact that millions who had voted against him in 2020 did not vote against him in 2024. He also noted evidence that Democratic candidates who challenged private power—by addressing high prices, exploitation, and unfair commercial practices—performed significantly better than those who did not. For Professor Friedman, this indicates that democratic renewal requires confronting private power within a liberal democratic framework. He emphasized that constraining private power is not contrary to liberal democracy; rather, it is integral to it when done within the rule of law.

Democracy as a Western Construct: A Contested Assumption

The second condition Professor Friedman identified is the assumption that democracy is inherently Western. He argued that the post-Cold War model often presented democracy as a gift from the West to the rest of the world. While this was rarely stated crudely, it was embedded in scholarly and policy frameworks, particularly in democratic consolidation theory. In his view, such approaches often asked not whether democracies were genuine or durable, but whether they were “Western enough.” This assumption has had damaging consequences, especially in the Global South.

Professor Friedman illustrated this through African debates in which anti-Western actors reject democracy precisely because they view it as Western. He referred to military coups in West Africa, where opposition to French influence has been linked to claims that democracy itself is a Western imposition. In Burkina Faso, he noted, the country’s leader recently dismissed democracy as unsuitable because it is allegedly Western. For Professor Friedman, those who defend democracy in Africa are not helped when Western scholars and policymakers reproduce the same assumption that democracy belongs to the West.

Professor Friedman connected this issue to multiculturalism in Western democracies. He argued that Western elites have struggled to adjust to multicultural realities partly because of an underlying assumption that democracy is culturally Western and that too much non-Western participation creates a problem. This, he suggested, can be empirically demonstrated in debates over immigration, rights, and citizenship.

The Palestine issue, for Professor Friedman, brings together both failures: the inability to constrain private power and the Westernization of democracy. He argued that Palestine has become a core democratic issue in established democracies for two reasons. First, support by Western elites for Israeli state actions in Palestine has provided a rationale for the retrenchment of democratic rights, including restrictions on protest, academic freedom, freedom of speech, and freedom to organize. Second, Palestine reveals a widening gap between citizens and elites. Polls after October 7, 2023, showed significant majorities in many established democracies supporting a ceasefire and an end to violence, yet political leadership often ignored these preferences. Professor Friedman suggested that one reason for this gap is the failure to constrain private power: politicians become more responsive to those with money than to those who vote for them.

Elite Responsibility and the Rightward Drift

Professor Friedman also rejected the tendency to blame ordinary citizens for democratic erosion. He argued that much of the responsibility lies with elites, especially the movement of the democratic center and conservative parties toward the right. In several countries, the traditional alternation between center-left and democratic center-right has weakened because the center-right itself has shifted or collapsed. He cited the United Kingdom, where the political choice increasingly appears to be between Labour and Reform, and France, where the alternative to Macron is no longer a Gaullist democratic right but the far right. This, he suggested, echoes the 1930s, when democratic collapse was substantially an elite failure rather than simply a popular one.

In the final section of his presentation, Professor Friedman developed the metaphor of democracy’s “change of address.” For those outside the West, he argued, the assumption that democracy is inherently Western has lost credibility. The future of democracy can no longer be understood as something decided primarily in the West. This does not mean that Global South democracies are all healthy or that Western democracies are uniformly failing. Rather, because democratic crisis is global, the idea of the West as democracy’s natural beacon has become untenable.

Professor Friedman concluded by calling for a renewed understanding of democracy grounded in its intrinsic value rather than its association with Western modernity, prosperity, or sophistication. Democracy should be embraced because people everywhere desire a share in the choices that affect their lives and because they value the freedoms that make such participation possible. For Professor Friedman, the task facing democratic actors in South Africa, the Global South, and beyond is to defend democracy not as a Western import, but as the most desirable form of social organization yet invented.


Professor Kent Jones: Weaponized Trade Policy — Tariffs, Industrial Policy, and the Future of Global Economic Governance 

Kent Jones is Professor Emeritus of International Economics at Babson College and author of Populism and Trade: The Challenge to the Global Trading System.

Professor Kent Jones’ presentation offered a focused analysis of the relationship between populism, trade policy, and the destabilization of the global trading system under President Donald Trump. Speaking as a trade economist rather than a specialist in populism, Professor Jones explained that his interest in the subject emerged after Trump’s first term, when it became clear that populist politics had become deeply entangled with trade conflict and institutional disruption.

Professor Jones argued that the Trump case represents a special and highly consequential form of populism: one in which a populist leader was uniquely positioned to undermine the institutional foundations of the global trading order. This was possible because the United States had historically been the principal architect, champion, and guarantor of that system. Under Trump, however, the same country that once sustained multilateral trade rules became the central force weakening them.

Populist Narratives and the Politicization of Trade

Professor Jones began by noting that Trump’s populist rhetoric consistently exploited the division between “the people” and “elites.” In the trade context, this meant portraying globalization as a project controlled by foreign and domestic elites at the expense of ordinary Americans. Trump linked trade anxiety to other grievances, especially immigration, presenting both imports and migrants as forms of external invasion. In this narrative, trade deficits became evidence that foreign countries were “cheating” the United States and extracting American wealth.

As an economist, Professor Jones rejected this framing, emphasizing that imports are not exploitation but voluntary exchanges that provide value to consumers and support economic growth. Yet he argued that Trump successfully transformed trade into a populist grievance by presenting imports as part of what Professor Jones described as a “trade-driven replacement theory.” Much like cultural replacement narratives, this economic version encouraged fear that globalization was displacing American workers, industries, and communities.

Professor Jones then distinguished between Trump’s first and second terms. During the first term, several institutional guardrails still constrained trade policy, including WTO rules, negotiated tariff commitments, NAFTA, and domestic trade law. Trump pursued a more aggressive version of traditional trade remedies, such as anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases, but generally operated within recognizable legal frameworks.

However, Professor Jones identified Trump’s first major attack on the global trading system in his use of the national security clause under Article XXI of the GATT. By claiming that lower employment and reduced output in certain industries constituted a national security emergency, Trump used a rarely invoked exception to justify unilateral trade restrictions. For Professor Jones, this exposed a major weakness in the WTO system: once a country defines an issue as a national security concern, it becomes difficult to challenge through dispute settlement. This opened the door for abuse, since any country could potentially invoke national security to justify protectionist measures.

Trump’s second term, in Professor Jones’ account, marked a far more radical phase. Trump became convinced that he could remove the remaining guardrails and assert near-total presidential control over tariffs. Professor Jones emphasized that Trump had long been fascinated by tariffs, dating back to his public statements in the 1980s about Japanese automobile imports. In office, this fascination merged with a broader drive to expand executive power and bypass institutional constraints.

Tariffs as Instruments of Discretionary Power

A key turning point came with the “Liberation Day” tariffs announced on April 2 of the previous year. These were justified through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, based on Trump’s claim that trade deficits constituted an emergency caused by foreign cheating. Professor Jones described the tariff formula used to justify these measures as economically nonsensical. Nevertheless, it enabled the president to impose tariffs of any level, against any country, for any duration.

For Professor Jones, this amounted to a fundamental violation of the core principles of the GATT and WTO system. It undermined non-discrimination by imposing different tariff rates on different countries, ignored binding tariff commitments, and weakened the dispute settlement framework. Trump also used tariffs as leverage to pressure countries into bilateral trade deals, including with the European Union, demanding preferential access for American goods while maintaining US tariffs on European products.

This strategy, Professor Jones argued, effectively gave Trump control over the global trading system insofar as countries traded with the United States. It also generated anger among long-standing American partners that had previously relied on stable, rules-based access to US markets. Average US tariffs, once around 2–3 percent, rose dramatically to roughly 18–19 percent, creating both direct costs and deep uncertainty for businesses and governments.

Professor Jones described this as a “dictatorship of the tariff.” Trump reserved the right to alter tariffs at will, often in response to personal reactions or political moods. This unpredictability, he argued, reflected the autocratic dimension of Trump’s trade policy: tariffs became not merely economic tools but instruments of discretionary presidential power.

A central populist myth in Trump’s trade policy, Professor Jones noted, was the repeated claim that tariffs are paid by foreigners. This claim, despite being economically false, remained politically useful because it allowed Trump to present tariffs as costless punishment of foreign actors. Yet the economic consequences became increasingly visible, including higher costs, uncertainty, and failure to revive US manufacturing and employment as promised.

Patrimonialism and the Politicization of Trade Governance

Professor Jones connected these developments to Max Weber’s concept of patrimonialism. In Trump’s administration, loyalty often outweighed competence, producing corruption, administrative weakness, and policy failure. The tariff regime itself, he argued, was poorly managed and increasingly vulnerable to legal challenge. The Supreme Court’s decision overturning the Liberation Day tariffs provided an important legal backstop, demonstrating that constitutional and judicial limits still retained some force.

Yet Professor Jones warned that Trump responded by attempting to revive his tariff agenda through other legal mechanisms, particularly Section 301. This would enable new tariff measures based on alleged violations of trade practice, including forced labor content in global trade. Professor Jones emphasized the irony that such accusations could apply broadly, including to the United States itself, but would be used selectively to punish other countries. Europe, he noted, was especially concerned about this new route to expanded presidential tariff power.

In the final part of his presentation, Professor Jones turned to the future of the global trading system. He argued that the United States has forfeited its leadership role. This creates a profound challenge because the postwar trading system depended heavily on American hegemonic leadership: an open US market, a deep financial system, and the dollar’s role as a reserve currency helped stabilize global trade and finance.

The question now, according to Professor Jones, is whether the European Union or another coalition of countries can assume leadership. He expressed doubt that any actor can easily replace the United States, while also stressing that the rest of the world still appears committed to preserving a rules-based trading system.

Professor Jones concluded by identifying the need for WTO reform. The existing system, especially its consensus rule and single-undertaking model for multilateral agreements, has become increasingly difficult to sustain. Populism has intensified these challenges by turning globalization into a highly charged political issue. For Professor Jones, the central task is therefore not only to repair trade institutions, but also to understand how populist grievances have transformed trade from a technical policy domain into a battlefield over sovereignty, identity, and democratic authority.

 

Professor John Pratt: The Return of the Strong Men

Professor John Pratt.
John Pratt is Emeritus Professor of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington.

 

Professor John Pratt’s presentation offered a historically grounded and theoretically rich account of the contemporary rise of populist strongmen, situating this development within the long-term transformation of democratic societies. Professor Pratt began by invoking a striking 1961 opinion poll in the United Kingdom, which found that 91 percent of young respondents believed the world would be a better place within a decade. For Professor Pratt, this optimism was not naïve but reflective of a broader post-war democratic settlement characterized by economic security, institutional trust, and a shared belief in progressive improvement.

This post-war order, as Professor Pratt outlined, was built on a combination of full employment policies, expansive welfare states, large public sectors, and significant investment in science and expertise. Governments were also committed to protecting citizens from abuses of state power, particularly in response to the lessons of totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany. These commitments were institutionalized through criminal justice reforms that limited the punitive capacity of the state and elevated the role of academic experts in shaping public policy. In this context, demagogues of the interwar period were widely believed to have been relegated permanently to history.

Neoliberal Transformation and the Rise of “Casino Economies”

Professor Pratt then posed the central question of his presentation: how did societies move from this optimistic and relatively stable democratic moment to the present resurgence of strongman politics? His answer centered on the transformative impact of neoliberal restructuring beginning in the 1980s. According to Professor Pratt, this shift fundamentally altered the economic and social foundations of democratic life, particularly in Anglo-American societies. The transition toward deregulated, market-driven economies created what he described as “casino economies,” in which the distribution of benefits became highly uneven. While some individuals and sectors thrived, many more experienced declining security, reduced opportunities, and a sense of marginalization.

This growing precarity, Professor Pratt argued, generated a profound legitimacy deficit between governments and their electorates. Citizens increasingly felt that democratic institutions were no longer responsive to their needs or capable of ensuring stable and predictable lives. In response, governments sought to restore their authority and credibility through a turn toward punitive governance, most notably through “tough on crime” policies. These policies represented an early manifestation of contemporary populism, as political leaders attempted to demonstrate responsiveness to public anxieties by targeting crime as a visible and emotionally resonant threat.

However, as Professor Pratt emphasized, this turn to penal populism did not resolve the underlying legitimacy crisis. Instead, it contributed to dramatic increases in imprisonment, particularly in Anglo-American democracies from the 1990s onward, while failing to restore public trust. The persistence of economic insecurity and social fragmentation ensured that populist sentiment continued to grow. This process was further intensified by two major developments: the global financial crisis of 2008, which deepened existing inequalities, and rising hostility toward immigration, particularly following increased mobility from Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War.

Within this context, Professor Pratt identified four core themes that define contemporary populist discourse. The first is a commitment to destroying the establishment, often expressed through hostility toward experts, scientists, and technocratic governance. Populist leaders frame the establishment as corrupt and detached, responsible for the insecurities faced by ordinary citizens. In this framework, the strongman leader presents himself as possessing intuitive or innate knowledge that renders expert advice unnecessary.

Restoring Dignity Through Strongman Protection

The second theme is the systematic targeting of critical voices, particularly in the media and political opposition. Professor Pratt noted that in some cases, such as Hungary, this strategy has been largely successful, while in others, including the United States, it remains an ongoing project. By delegitimizing independent sources of information and critique, populist leaders seek to consolidate control over public discourse.

The third theme involves the construction and expansion of “enemies of the people.” Professor Pratt stressed that such enemies are essential to populist politics, as they justify the existence and authority of the strongman. Initially, these enemies were framed as criminals or individuals perceived as threatening public order, such as beggars and the homeless. Over time, however, the category has expanded to include immigrants, asylum seekers, political opponents, and various minority groups. This dynamic reinforces a narrative of constant threat, requiring strong leadership for protection.

The fourth theme is the promise to defend and restore the dignity of “the people,” understood as victims of both crime and broader social change. Populist leaders position themselves as protectors not only against physical threats but also against cultural and demographic transformations perceived as destabilizing. Professor Pratt highlighted how Donald Trump has extended this logic by presenting himself as a victim of institutional persecution, thereby aligning his personal narrative with that of his supporters.

Turning to the consequences of these dynamics, Professor Pratt offered a critical assessment of populist governance. He argued that key populist projects, such as Brexit, have failed to address the grievances that fueled their emergence. Instead of resolving social tensions, they have often exacerbated uncertainty and division. At the same time, Professor Pratt observed signs of democratic resilience, including electoral pushback against populist movements in parts of Europe.

In the case of the United States, Professor Pratt expressed concern about the potential trajectory of Trump’s leadership, particularly in light of suggestions that he might seek to extend his tenure beyond constitutional limits. Such a development, he argued, would represent a profound departure from democratic norms, challenging the very foundations of constitutional governance. This scenario would invert the optimistic vision of democratic consolidation articulated by Francis Fukuyama at the end of the Cold War.

Limits and Contradictions of Strongman Populism

Despite these concerns, Professor Pratt concluded on a cautiously optimistic note. He suggested that the internal contradictions of strongman populism—its reliance on charismatic authority, its policy failures, and its inability to deliver on its promises—may ultimately undermine its durability. In his view, Trump’s political success has depended heavily on personal charisma, which is unlikely to be replicated by potential successors who lack comparable appeal.

As a result, Professor Pratt argued that democratic systems may experience a form of reprieve once the current wave of populist leadership subsides. However, he emphasized that such a reprieve should not be mistaken for a return to the stable and optimistic conditions of the post-war era. The structural conditions that gave rise to populism—particularly economic precarity and the erosion of institutional trust—remain in place.

For Professor Pratt, the central lesson is that democracy’s resilience depends on its capacity to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. If the legitimacy deficit that emerged during the neoliberal era is allowed to persist or deepen, democratic institutions will remain vulnerable to future populist challenges. The task, therefore, is not merely to resist individual strongmen but to address the underlying conditions that make their rise possible.

 

Discussions

Professor Jocelyne Cesari.
Jocelyne Cesari is Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics and Director of Research at the Edward Cadbury Centre for the Public Understanding of Religion at the University of Birmingham, and Senior Fellow at Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs.

 

The discussion session of the fifth panel brought together the central analytical threads of the preceding presentations and situated them within a broader comparative and theoretical framework. Modearor Professor Jocelyne Cesari opened the discussion by offering a synthetic assessment of the panel’s contributions, emphasizing that the diversity of disciplinary approaches reflected the current state of scholarship on democratic backsliding, authoritarianism, and populism. Professor Cesari identified several major explanatory frameworks that have emerged in the literature and were echoed in the panel’s presentations, while also pointing to key gaps and tensions within these approaches.

Professor Cesari first underscored the importance of structural economic transformations, particularly those associated with neoliberal restructuring. Drawing attention to themes raised by Professor John Pratt, Professor Cesari noted that the dualization of labor markets, regional economic decline, and the concentration of wealth have produced a growing imbalance within societies. This imbalance is not merely a matter of generalized impoverishment but rather reflects a widening divergence between those who benefit from globalized economic structures and those who experience diminished opportunities. Professor Cesari emphasized that this structural divergence constitutes a critical background condition for contemporary political discontent. However, she also cautioned against overly deterministic interpretations, noting that existing scholarship does not support a direct causal relationship between inequality and authoritarianism. Instead, economic grievances operate within a more complex constellation of political and cultural dynamics.

Hybrid Regimes and the Erosion of Democratic Standards

Building on this point, Professor Cesari introduced a second analytical perspective centered on cultural backlash. While not always explicitly foregrounded in the panel, she argued that several presentations implicitly engaged with this framework. Drawing on influential empirical studies, Professor Cesari highlighted that political mobilization is often driven less by material deprivation per se than by perceptions of status loss and cultural displacement. In this context, feelings of resentment, moral injury, and loss of social centrality can become powerful drivers of political behavior, even in cases where objective economic conditions are not the sole determinant. Professor Cesari suggested that this dimension is essential for understanding why populist movements are able to mobilize diverse constituencies across different socioeconomic contexts.

Professor Cesari then situated these dynamics within a broader historical trajectory, emphasizing the transformation of the global political order since the end of the Cold War. She noted that the post-Cold War period was marked by a widespread sense of optimism, encapsulated in narratives such as the “end of history,” which posited the universalization of liberal democracy as both inevitable and desirable. However, Professor Cesari argued that the current moment represents a profound backlash against this earlier consensus. The limitations and contradictions of the neoliberal order have become increasingly visible, yet traditional political actors, including mainstream parties and institutional elites, have largely failed to address these shortcomings. In contrast, populist leaders and, notably, religious actors have been more effective in articulating critiques of inequality, dignity, and redistribution. Professor Cesari emphasized that the political appeal of religious discourse in this context should not be dismissed as merely emotional or irrational, but rather understood as a response to perceived deficiencies in the prevailing economic and political order.

Turning to the nature of contemporary authoritarianism, Professor Cesari challenged conventional dichotomies between democracy and dictatorship. She argued that the current wave of democratic backsliding differs fundamentally from earlier historical experiences. Unlike the overtly coercive regimes of the twentieth century, contemporary authoritarian leaders operate within formally democratic frameworks. Elections remain central to their legitimacy, yet electoral competition alone is no longer a sufficient criterion for democratic quality. Professor Cesari pointed to additional dimensions, including elite turnover, redistribution, and the protection of civil liberties, as essential components of democratic governance. In many cases, these dimensions are being eroded not only by overtly authoritarian actors but also by mainstream political forces.

Personalized Leadership in the Digital Age

Professor Cesari further emphasized that contemporary authoritarianism is characterized less by abrupt institutional rupture than by gradual erosion and reorientation of existing institutions. Leaders such as those referenced throughout the panel—including figures in Turkey, India, and Hungary—operate within democratic systems while systematically reshaping them to consolidate power. This process is often accompanied by a shift away from comprehensive ideological frameworks toward more flexible, context-specific forms of populism. In this regard, Professor Cesari highlighted the concept of “thin” ideology, which allows populist movements to adapt to local cultural and social contexts. Religion, in particular, emerges as a key resource in this process, providing a readily available framework for articulating collective identity and political legitimacy.

Another significant transformation identified by Professor Cesari concerns the increasing personalization of political leadership. While charismatic authority has long been a feature of authoritarian regimes, its contemporary manifestations are amplified by the dynamics of the digital media environment. The proliferation of social media and continuous information flows has shifted political communication from traditional propaganda to interactive spectacle. Leaders are required to maintain a constant presence, with style and performance becoming as important as substantive policy content. This transformation, Professor Cesari suggested, has not yet been fully incorporated into existing analytical frameworks, despite its centrality to contemporary political dynamics.

In synthesizing these observations, Professor Cesari concluded that the current global landscape is best understood in terms of “hybrid” regimes, rather than a simple opposition between democracy and authoritarianism. Drawing on comparative insights, she argued that even established Western democracies exhibit significant deficiencies across key dimensions, including electoral participation, redistribution, and civil liberties. These shortcomings contribute to the broader legitimacy crisis that underpins the rise of populist and authoritarian actors. For Professor Cesari, a more productive analytical approach requires a systematic reassessment of democratic performance across multiple dimensions, rather than reliance on idealized models.

Competitive Authoritarianism and Limited Legitimacy

Following this comprehensive synthesis, Professor Jack Goldstone offered a response that introduced a more cautiously optimistic perspective. Professor Goldstone agreed that contemporary regimes are best characterized as competitive authoritarian systems, in which electoral processes remain meaningful, albeit constrained. He emphasized that support for authoritarian leaders typically constitutes a minority of the electorate, often ranging between one-quarter and one-third. This core base is driven by deep resentment toward perceived elite betrayal and seeks transformative leadership capable of disrupting existing institutions.

However, Professor Goldstone highlighted the importance of a broader group of “middling” or swing voters, whose support is more contingent and instrumental. These voters may support authoritarian-leaning leaders not out of ideological commitment but as a response to perceived failures of incumbent governments, particularly in areas such as economic inequality, immigration, and inflation. Crucially, this group remains open to shifting its support, as evidenced by electoral volatility in recent years. For Professor Goldstone, this dynamic suggests that authoritarian leaders remain vulnerable to electoral defeat if they fail to deliver on their promises. In this sense, the persistence of electoral competition provides a potential mechanism for democratic correction, even within constrained systems.

The discussion then moved to a question posed by ECPS-ECRN member Yacine Boubia, which addressed the puzzling tendency for individuals experiencing economic hardship to direct their grievances toward political and cultural elites rather than economic elites. Professor Goldstone responded by emphasizing the role of perception in shaping political attribution. According to Professor Goldstone, many individuals view economic competition as a legitimate “game” in which success is admired rather than resented. As a result, those who succeed within this framework, including wealthy economic actors, are often not perceived as responsible for inequality. Instead, blame is directed toward those who are seen as setting the rules of the game—namely governments and political elites.

Professor Goldstone further noted that this attribution dynamic is reinforced by the narratives advanced by right-wing populists, who emphasize themes such as immigration, globalization, and cultural change. These narratives provide clear and emotionally resonant targets for political mobilization, whereas critiques of economic elites are often less salient or more difficult to translate into effective political messaging. Consequently, left-wing populist movements have generally been less successful in directing public attention toward structural economic inequalities, despite the objective significance of these issues.

The discussion concluded with closing remarks by Professor Ibrahim Öztürk, who formally ended the panel and the broader symposium. The exchanges during the discussion session underscored the complexity of contemporary democratic challenges, highlighting the interplay between structural economic conditions, cultural dynamics, institutional transformations, and evolving forms of political communication. Collectively, the contributions of Professor Cesari and Professor Goldstone, along with the audience engagement, reinforced the need for multidimensional analytical frameworks capable of capturing the hybrid and evolving nature of modern political regimes.


Conclusion

Panel 5 illuminated the multidimensional nature of contemporary democratic crisis, underscoring that the resilience of liberal democracy cannot be secured through institutional defense alone, but requires a deeper engagement with the structural, cultural, and political transformations reshaping societies. Across the presentations, a common thread emerged: the erosion of democratic legitimacy is rooted not merely in the rise of charismatic strongmen, but in long-term shifts that have weakened the social and normative foundations of democratic governance.

Professor Jack A. Goldstone’s structural analysis highlighted how globalization, inequality, and demographic change have generated enduring pressures that fuel demand for authoritarian-populist leadership. Complementing this, Professor Steven Friedman’s critique of the post-Cold War democratic model exposed the failure to regulate private power and the limitations of framing democracy as a Western construct, both of which have undermined its global credibility. Professor John Pratt’s historical perspective further demonstrated how neoliberal restructuring has produced a legitimacy deficit that populist leaders exploit through punitive, anti-establishment, and exclusionary narratives. Meanwhile, Professor Kent Jones’s examination of trade policy revealed how economic governance itself has become a terrain of populist contestation, with significant implications for the stability of the global order.

The discussion, guided by Professor Jocelyne Cesari, reinforced the need to move beyond binary understandings of democracy versus authoritarianism and to recognize the prevalence of hybrid regimes characterized by gradual institutional erosion, personalization of power, and the strategic mobilization of cultural and economic grievances. At the same time, Professor Goldstone’s intervention suggested that democratic systems retain mechanisms of correction, particularly through electoral competition and the volatility of “middling” voters.

Ultimately, the panel underscored that democratic resistance must be grounded in restoring legitimacy—through addressing inequality, rebuilding trust, regulating power, and reimagining democratic inclusion in a global context. Without confronting these underlying conditions, liberal democracy will remain vulnerable to recurring waves of populist challenge.