Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić, a political scientist and Scientific Advisor at the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) in Zagreb, Croatia.

Dr. Šelo Šabić: If the US Under Trump Ceases to Be the Anchor of Stability in the Balkans, the Region Will Wake Up to a Different Future

In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić discusses the shifting geopolitical landscape of the Balkans, emphasizing the critical role of the United States in maintaining regional stability. She highlights concerns over the potential impact of Donald Trump’s second term, arguing that if the US withdraws from its stabilizing role, the region could face new uncertainties. Dr. Šelo Šabić also explores Croatia’s position within the EU and NATO, the rise of populist leaders, and the influence of Russia and China, offering a comprehensive analysis of the region’s evolving political dynamics.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies, Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić, a political scientist and Scientific Advisor at the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) in Zagreb, Croatia, shared her insights on the evolving political landscape of the Balkans. She discussed the role of populist leaders, the future of European integration, and Croatia’s position within NATO and the EU, particularly under President Zoran Milanović.

Dr. Šelo Šabić addressed international concerns regarding Milanović’s rhetoric, especially in relation to NATO, Ukraine, and EU foreign policy. While some accuse him of being a “pro-Russian puppet,” she emphasized: “I always wait to see more evidence that Milanović is a pro-Russian player. He has made statements that could lead to such a conclusion, particularly in discussions about Ukraine, NATO’s engagement in Ukraine, and NATO enlargement concerning Sweden and Finland’s membership. But I have not seen concrete evidence that he could significantly steer Croatian politics away from the European Union or cause a fundamental shift in Croatia’s foreign policy.”

When discussing Milanović’s record-breaking electoral success, she attributed it to his personal appeal rather than an ideological shift: “He did appeal broadly to Croatian citizens. He comes from a social-democratic background, but he also has a distinct personal political character and a very specific way of communicating. This is something that a majority of traditional citizens respect and accept.” She further explained that “while Milanović ran in the parliamentary elections and did not win, citizens overwhelmingly chose him as President. This suggests that they see him in that specific role, rather than as a political leader shaping government policy.”

Dr. Šelo Šabić also reflected on the potential consequences of Donald Trump’s second term as US President, cautioning that a radical shift could have serious implications for the region. “Some leaders in the Balkans are very hopeful, while others are fearful of what a new Trump administration might bring. The United States has been, for the last 30-plus years, a key force in stabilizing this region. If that changes—if the United States ceases to be the anchor of stability in this region—then we will wake up to a different future. I sincerely hope this does not happen and that peace is maintained in the Balkans.”

Beyond Milanović and transatlantic relations, Dr. Šelo Šabić also examined Croatia’s role in EU enlargement, the rise of populist movements, and the growing influence of Russia and China in the region. Her analysis provides a striking perspective on the challenges facing Croatia and the Western Balkans today.

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić, a political scientist and Scientific Advisor at the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) in Zagreb, Croatia.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić with some edits.

The Balkans Turned from Refugee Solidarity to Migration Securitization

Dr. Šabić, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do populist narratives in the Balkans leverage the refugee crisis to deepen divisions and reinforce ethno-nationalism, particularly in relation to the securitization of migration? What role does the portrayal of refugees as cultural or economic threats play in populist movements within the Balkan region, and how does this compare to similar strategies in Western Europe?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: I will try to give a short answer to this complex question. There are three key elements in responding to your question. The first is the personal experience of many Balkan citizens from the 1990s, when they were refugees and displaced persons due to the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Many people still have personal reflections and direct experiences from that time.

The second element is that, since the refugee crisis in 2015, we have seen—at first a more humanitarian or solidarity-based response from most countries in the Western Balkans and Southeast Europe, including Croatia. However, this later transformed into a more securitized and border-focused approach to migration. This shift was also a result of the European Union’s policy and approach, which prioritizes border protection, prevents irregular crossings, and increasingly lacks both the capacity and the willingness to process asylum claims with empathy.

The third emerging element is the trend of new immigrants as foreign workers. Like many other countries in the European Union (EU) and beyond, these nations face a labor shortage. This shift is creating additional social, political, and economic challenges for societies that are unprepared for such changes. The transformation is happening without real policy discussions, and I see that as a problem.

How has the rise of populist leaders in the Balkans influenced policymaking during and after the refugee crisis, especially regarding border security and the treatment of asylum seekers?

A group of war refugees walks through a cornfield on the Serbia-Croatia border on November 3, 2015, as they seek passage to the EU. Many are Syrian refugees fleeing conflict. Photo: Ajdin Kamber.

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: As I mentioned earlier, most governments at the time—except for a few, particularly in the Western Balkans—took a similar stance. Without delving too much into history, if we focus on Croatia, for instance, the country demonstrated a humanitarian approach by accepting, assisting, and facilitating the transit of refugees.

Our concept of humanitarianism was largely defined by our ability to provide aid and ensure safe passage. Even today, most Western Balkan nations remain transit countries for refugees, except for certain foreign workers who settle. In general, refugees continue to move through these countries toward wealthier European nations.

Currently, a radical anti-migrant political force has not fully taken root. However, it is gaining traction due to several factors: the EU’s securitization policies, populist narratives, and the arrival of new legal migrants. The lack of public discourse, education, and engagement with the local population has led many to perceive these migrants as a threat. This is further amplified by the rise of a broader global anti-liberal discourse.

Why EU Rule of Law Reforms Falter in the Western Balkans

You argue that the underlying gap between massive formal transfers and shallow or reversible enforcement of EU rules is particularly evident in the area of the rule of law (RoL) across the Western Balkan countries. Can you explain why this is the case?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: You are referring to an article that I wrote with my colleague, Roald Elbassani, where we compared Croatia and Albania. However, the main theme has been explored by many different researchers and authors.

We see evidence of this issue in a number of what one could call new EU Member States, although by now they have had quite a long membership. The idea has been that EU accession transforms candidate states, and once they fulfill the criteria and conditions set before them, they will reform in a way that enables them to become fully functional members of the European Union.

However, the problem lies in these countries’ low level of democratic development. Many have undergone post-war transitions, as well as post-socialist or post-communist political and economic transitions—from a collective to a market economy—along with dealing with wars and broader global changes. These countries still need assistance in democratic development. At the same time, the EU is facing its own internal problems, where, despite pledges, the promise of enlargement remains distant.

Both sides publicly commit to the process, yet in reality, they remain reserved and not structurally or objectively dedicated to the goal of reform. Many of my colleagues say that the EU pretends it wants to enlarge and admit new members, while candidate countries pretend they genuinely want to reform to join the EU. This creates a kind of “dance of pretense.”

For many reasons, this applies not only to Western Balkan countries but also to any other potential EU candidate states. The EU, as a mechanism for sharing values—normative values of peace, dialogue, cooperation, and solidarity, along with the four key freedoms—has a crucial role to play. These goals remain essential for the sustainability of the EU itself. Hopefully, the EU will be able to incorporate new members in a way that strengthens rather than weakens it.

What has Brexit’s impact been on the Europeanization of Croatia’s foreign and defense policies and the possible advancement or undermining of its Europeanization process?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: Limited. The only fun fact, let’s say, is that when Croatia joined the European Union in 2013, the pre-campaigning for Brexit had already begun. Very soon after, there was a referendum, and a few years later, the United Kingdom officially left the European Union. For Euro-enthusiasts in Croatia, this was hurtful because we were joining a union—an organization that had been the country’s key political goal since gaining independence—while a prominent member was departing. However, in many other aspects, bilaterally, Croatia and the UK were not deeply entangled, so Brexit did not significantly diminish or decrease Croatia’s European aspirations.

‘Euroscepticism in Croatia Is Not a Significant Political Force’

Street view in the city center of Zagreb, Croatia. Photo: Arsenie Krasnevsky.

How have elite and public Euroscepticism in Croatia evolved towards key EU policies such as Eurozone membership, enlargement, common security and defense, and the rule of law? How do populist parties and rhetoric leverage narratives of national identity, sovereignty, and economic or cultural anxieties to shape public opinion and resistance to deeper European integration, both domestically and in comparison with other Balkan countries?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: I think this question is a prospective one, and we will see whether stronger Eurosceptic political parties emerge. In 2016, for example, there was a short period of six months when we had a different parliamentary makeup, with more right-wing or even far-right populist Eurosceptic parties. These parties were not anti-European but rather Eurosceptic. However, this was short-lived.

Currently, all our key political parties remain committed to EU membership. Our key political figures, including the President and the Prime Minister, are pro-EU and pro-NATO. Despite political differences in ideology or preferences and the natural competition among political actors, there are not many significant differences regarding EU membership.

It will be interesting to see if changes occur due to evolving realities within the European Union or, more broadly, in transatlantic relations. However, at present, Euroscepticism in Croatia is not a significant political force. That said, it does not mean that it may not become one in the future.

How does the rise of conservative ideologies and nationalist rhetoric in Croatia reflect broader populist trends, and what role does EU membership play in either amplifying or mitigating these tendencies?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: As in any other EU Member State and even in candidate countries, every society is pluralistic, and we have seen trends of polarization in many societies. Croatia is no exception. Polarization is not a novelty here—it is evident in Germany, France, the results of the American elections, and elsewhere in Europe and the world.

Regarding how EU membership influences these forces, yes, it fosters liberal thought, but it also strengthens conservative thought, as both are strongly present within the European Union. In that sense, liberals, centrists, conservatives, and right-wing individuals all have their interlocutors in other EU Member States and in the European Parliament.

‘Croatia Must Engage More Substantially in Enlargement Discussions’

How has the interaction between populist rhetoric and Euroscepticism in Croatia impacted its role as an advocate for EU enlargement in the Western Balkans?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: Croatia is in the minority within the European Union in advocating for further enlargement, as most Member States and their citizens are generally against it. The UK was actually an exception compared to some other wealthier EU Member States, and in that sense, Brexit was a loss for enlargement. However, the issue I see with Croatian support is that while Croatia is particularly keen on supporting the enlargement of the Western Balkans—specifically the six Western Balkan countries—it needs to engage more actively in the process.

I’m trying to find the right way to phrase this: it is one thing to say, “We want the EU to expand,” but we must recognize that one of the key problems with enlargement is the issue of internal decision-making within the European Union. If a country wants to see the EU admit new members, it should also be willing to discuss the rules—or even consider changing them—regarding decision-making in the EU. For example, if we agree on qualified majority voting, this could alleviate fears of inefficiency and blockades caused by Member States using veto powers. This would lead to a more constructive discussion on enlargement. Croatia remains largely silent on this topic, and I believe we need to engage more substantially in this discussion. If we want to defend and realize our interests, we must also acknowledge the interests of other members—this is still lacking.

What are the key factors driving the rise of populist movements in Croatia, and how do these factors differ from those in Western Europe?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: When you say “populist movements,” it is a broad term, and definitions may vary. However, if I consider political parties that exhibit at least some similarities to those seen elsewhere, certain trends emerge. We have a strong conservative ideology, with a significant influence from the Catholic Church, particularly in terms of upholding and protecting values, norms, and cultural aspects of traditional society—such as family values and language.

Additionally, as I mentioned, the anti-migrant narrative is not yet as prominent in Croatia. While it is developing, it has not been central to populist ideology thus far. One additional factor that may not be as prevalent elsewhere is the legacy of the wars in this part of Europe at the end of the 20th century. There are still many unresolved issues with neighboring countries, and this remains a major driver of populist rhetoric, particularly for citizens who feel these issues strongly on an emotional level.

Reckoning with the Past Is the Only Path to Lasting Stability

To what extent do populist leaders in the Balkans utilize nationalism and historical narratives to consolidate their power, and how does this impact regional stability?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: This builds on your previous question. Ethnic hatred, ethnic distrust among different nations, and exclusive nationalism as an ideology fueled the contested issues in the former Yugoslavia, ultimately leading to violent wars. Even today, we still face unresolved problems and challenges from three decades ago that continue to burden our present reality.

Our societies still need to go through a phase of reckoning, and I hope we will take that path without new conflicts—either in Europe or in our region. This path should involve confronting the past, investing in dialogue with former enemies, and working toward reconciliation and peace with our neighbors and within our own societies.

We can continue insisting on our own version of the truth and our own rights, but if we do so without making an effort to establish channels of communication, understanding, and dialogue with those we disagree with, we will remain closed societies.

The whole idea of the European Union was founded on the decision that wars should no longer be used as instruments for resolving disputes, and I truly hope that one day, Balkan societies will mature enough to follow this path.

How have external actors, such as the European Union, Russia, and China, influenced the trajectory of populist politics in Balkan countries?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: We have already mentioned the EU, as there is a reflection, communication, and sharing of political ideologies within the European Union. Different parties or political families in the EU have their counterparts in this region. Some of these align closely with the political ideology and worldview coming from China and Russia.

They are not necessarily all in the same category, but there are overlaps. I am not sure how much detail you want me to go into regarding Balkan politics, but let’s say that, as elsewhere in Europe and within the European Union, in the Balkans—particularly in Croatia—there are overlaps, similarities, or at least a certain level of sympathy and understanding for different positions in relation to mainstream European politics.

How have Croatian far-right parties employed populist strategies to address economic grievances, such as rising costs of living and inflation, and how effective has this been in broadening their appeal beyond traditional nationalist bases?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: Not successfully—not because these issues are unimportant, but rather because, somewhat unexpectedly, Croatia is currently experiencing a relatively favorable financial situation due to European funds. In this financial framework, Croatia has received substantial support from the European Union, leading to salary increases and higher public spending, including investments in reconstruction and various other projects.

Inflation is a concern, but so far, economic hardship has not become a dominant issue in Croatia. However, this does not mean it won’t in the future, particularly when EU funding is reduced. This is something to monitor closely, as Croatia faces several negative economic trends, including demographic decline, an aging population, deindustrialization, and a heavy reliance on tourism as one of its key industries. Given the impact of climate change and the volatile geopolitical environment, tourism remains a highly sensitive sector. These factors make the economic outlook something to watch closely.

‘Milanović’s Victory Is Unquestionable In Terms of Legitimacy

President of Croatia, Zoran Milanović, addresses a press conference in Ploče, Croatia, on September 14, 2024. Photo: Jure Divich.

Zoran Milanović achieved the highest electoral score for a presidential candidate since Croatia’s independence in 1991. What factors contributed to this remarkable success during his second term?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: Several factors contributed. He appealed broadly to Croatian citizens. While he comes from a social-democratic political background, he also has a distinct personal political character that he brings to the public and a very specific way of communicating with people. This is something that a majority of traditional citizens respect and accept.

Additionally, the Croatian Constitution mandates that the President is popularly elected but holds limited power, as most authority lies with the government in Croatia’s parliamentary democracy. Zoran Milanović also ran in the parliamentary elections, where he did not win, which indicates that citizens overwhelmingly chose him for the presidential role rather than as a parliamentary leader.

His election reflects not only his personal appeal but also his role in maintaining checks and balances within the system. In that sense, his victory is unquestionable in terms of legitimacy, particularly within the constitutional framework of Croatia.

‘If the US Ceases to Be the Anchor of Stability in This Region…’

US Presidential candidate Donald Trump held a campaign rally at PPG Paints Arena in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on November 4, 2024. Photo: Chip Somodevilla.

Milanović is often accused of being a “pro-Russian puppet” who undermines Croatia’s credibility within NATO and the EU. With leaders like Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Robert Fico in Slovakia, how significant is Milanović’s potential influence in weakening the EU’s pro-Ukraine stance?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: I always wait to see more evidence that Milanović is a pro-Russian player. He has made statements that could lead to such a conclusion, particularly in discussions about Ukraine, NATO’s engagement in Ukraine, and NATO enlargement concerning Sweden and Finland’s membership. He has also linked these issues to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, I have not seen concrete evidence that he could significantly steer Croatian politics away from the European Union or cause a fundamental shift in Croatia’s foreign policy. Many of the mutual suspicions and accusations stem from domestic political debates rather than an actual change in the country’s foreign policy orientation.

And lastly, with Donald Trump beginning his second term as US President, how might Milanović and other populist leaders in the region be impacted by Trump’s renewed leadership?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: I don’t think Milanović is in the same camp as other leaders in the region, if we are discussing the broader Balkans, because Croatia is a member of the European Union. We still operate under a collective umbrella that largely determines our transatlantic relationship with the United States.

However, some other leaders in the Balkans are either very hopeful or very fearful of what the new Trump administration might do. The United States has been, for the last 30-plus years, a key force in stabilizing this region. If that changes—if the United States ceases to be the anchor of stability in this region—then we will wake up to a different future. I sincerely hope this does not happen and that peace is maintained in the Balkans.

President of Croatia, Zoran Milanović, addresses a press conference in Ploče, Croatia, on September 14, 2024. Photo: Jure Divich.

Dr. Petsinis: Populism in the Balkans Shaped by Persistent Ethno-Nationalism and Euroscepticism

The Balkans, a region deeply influenced by historical tensions and sociopolitical complexities, has become a breeding ground for diverse populist movements. Dr. Vassilis Petsinis, an authority on Central and Eastern European politics, dissects the dynamics driving populism in Croatia, Serbia, and North Macedonia. According to Dr. Petsinis, the persistence of ethno-nationalism is a defining characteristic that distinguishes Balkan populism from its Western European counterparts. His analysis explores the interplay of nationalism, Euroscepticism, and historical grievances, shedding light on how populist actors consolidate power and reshape political landscapes, offering insights into the unique challenges populism poses in the region.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The Balkans, a region marked by historical tensions and complex political dynamics, has emerged as a fertile ground for populist movements in recent years. In this illuminating interview, Dr. Vassilis Petsinis, Associate Professor of Politics, Corvinus University in Budapest and a prominent scholar specializing in Central and Eastern European politics, delves into the factors driving populism in Croatia, Serbia, North Macedonia, and other nations. According to Dr. Petsinis, regarding differences between the Balkans and Western Europe, one key element is the persistence of ethno-nationalism across Balkan societies. Dr. Petsinis sheds light on how these movements leverage nationalism, Euroscepticism, and historical grievances to shape public narratives and consolidate power.

According to Dr. Petsinis, Balkan populism differs significantly from its Western European counterparts. In Croatia, for instance, the Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement) capitalizes on anti-establishment sentiment and critiques of European Union policies. The party’s focus on defending Croatian sovereignty and opposing perceived EU intervention resonates strongly with voters disillusioned by traditional parties. However, as Dr. Petsinis observes, the Homeland Movement’s transition into a coalition government has tempered some of its anti-establishment rhetoric, reflecting the fluid nature of populist politics.

In Serbia, Dr. Petsinis highlights how the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) under President Aleksandar Vučić employs ethno-nationalist narratives centered on Kosovo. By emphasizing the reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia and the protection of Serbian cultural and historical sites, Vučić consolidates support among nationalist constituencies. Meanwhile, in North Macedonia, left-wing populist movements, such as Levica, incorporate nationalist and anti-imperialist themes, favoring alignment with BRICS nations rather than traditional Western alliances.

Dr. Petsinis also explores the influence of external actors, including the European Union, Russia, and China on Balkan populism. Serbia’s populist actors, for example, view Russia as a key ally, particularly in the context of the Kosovo issue. Conversely, Croatia’s populist rhetoric often distances itself from Russia due to historical alignments with Serbia. Dr. Petsinis emphasizes that China’s economic investments in the region offer populist leaders a viable alternative to EU frameworks, further complicating the geopolitical landscape.

With populist leaders like Zoran Milanović in Croatia combining Euroscepticism with domestic critiques of corruption, Dr. Petsinis underscores the delicate balancing act these figures perform to appeal to diverse voter bases. This interview offers a nuanced analysis of Balkan populism, highlighting the interplay between nationalism, external influences, and shifting political landscapes under Dr. Petsinis’s expert guidance.

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis, Associate Professor of Politics, Corvinus University in Budapest and a prominent scholar specializing in Central and Eastern European politics.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Vassilis Petsinis with some edits.

Ethno-Nationalism and Populism in the Balkans: A Unique Political Landscape

Professor Petsinis, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. What are the key factors driving the rise of populist movements in the Balkan countries such as Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro, and how do these factors differ from those in Western Europe?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think that, depending on the perspective, we should first address the question of defining populism. For example, if we start with Serbia, I would suggest that whether we study populism from a more discursive perspective, like that of Ernesto Laclau, or from the ideational approach, as presented by Cas Mudde, we don’t have genuine populist political actors in these countries.

In Serbia, the leading right-wing Serbian Progressive Party could be seen mostly as a cartel or an established right-wing party with certain anti-establishment rhetoric, especially regarding international, global, and European institutions. However, I wouldn’t classify it as a genuinely populist political actor.

In Croatia, we have the Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement), which is currently a government partner to HDZ (the Croatian Democratic Union). This right-wing party has incorporated powerful anti-establishment rhetoric since its formation in 2020, focusing on ethno-nationalism, gender-related issues, nativism, and relations between the Church and State. It also emphasizes anti-abortion and pro-life stances. However, last spring, the Homeland Movement quickly entered a coalition government with HDZ, thereby alleviating many of its anti-establishment prerogatives. Overall, it could now be classified more as a national conservative party.

As for North Macedonia, we see an interesting case with the left-wing populist party Levica. This party, while left-wing, also incorporates a nationalist component and expresses a preference for the BRICS global alliance in international politics. Additionally, elements of right-wing populism exist under the umbrella of the leading VMRO-DPMNE party, although its new leadership has sought to curb these tendencies.

Regarding differences between the Balkans and Western Europe, one key element is the persistence of ethno-nationalism across Balkan societies. For example, in Croatia, sociocultural factors such as Vatican contracts with the Roman Catholic Church have strengthened anti-LGBT and pro-life tendencies within populist, radical-right, and national-conservative circles. These factors contribute to the unique landscape of populist movements in the region compared to their Western European counterparts.

How do you interpret the relationship between the rise of right-wing populism in Central and Eastern Europe and its influence on domestic ethnopolitics, particularly in terms of shaping public narratives around minority groups and immigration?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it depends on the context. Central and Eastern Europe is such a vast region geographically, politically, and socioculturally. To narrow down the discussion, I would prefer to focus on the countries of the former Yugoslavia, as I have dedicated several reports on Croatia and ethno-nationalism for ECPS.

Starting with ethno-nationalism, there are specific open issues. For instance, in Croatia, for the radical right and the national conservative right, maintaining the country’s national sovereignty is of paramount importance. A common theme in the rhetoric of parties like the Homeland Movement, as well as the right-wing faction within the ruling HDZ in Croatia, is the emphasis on protecting Croatia’s sovereignty. This sovereignty, tied to the country’s independence following the Homeland War of the 1990s, is often framed within the current international context, highlighting the need to maintain autonomy while participating in alliances like NATO and the EU.

In Serbia, the situation revolves around the status of Kosovo, the protection of the ethnic Serbian minority in Kosovo, and the preservation of cultural monuments in the region. These issues fuel ethno-nationalist tendencies and provide substantial material for right-wing populist forces in Serbia.

These specific, contextual ethno-nationalist concerns drive much of the particularistic ethnopolitics in these societies. They fuel ethno-nationalism and provide material for radical right-wing populism, which may not be directly applicable to other societies in Central and Eastern Europe or Europe as a whole.

Populist Rhetoric and Ethnic Identity: Contrasting Strategies in the Baltics and the Balkans

In your comparative analysis of the Baltic States and Western Balkans, what role does populist rhetoric play in framing ethnic minorities as either threats or integral parts of national identity, and how does this rhetoric vary across these regions?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it really depends on the country. Starting with Estonia, the main radical right-wing party there, although its popularity has been declining since 2022, initially securitized the collective status of the ethnic Russian minority in Estonia. However, in recent years, they have also attempted to approach this minority by playing the card of allegedly shared conservative values.

In Latvia, the National Conservative National Alliance Party has also been somewhat suspicious of the ethnic Russian minority. It was only after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that they began calling more emphatically for the securitization of domestic politics in Latvia.

Moving further south to Croatia, the Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement) and the right-wing faction within the ruling HDZ have been very skeptical of the ethnic Serb political party, the Serbian Independent Democratic Party. The Homeland Movement, in particular, has included in its political program calls for the semi-securitization of bilateral relations between Serbia and Croatia. They have also demanded that Serbia pay reparations for the war in the 1990s.

In Serbia, the broader radical right and national conservative circles have primarily focused on Kosovo, which they continue to regard as a constitutional part of Serbia. Domestically, however, there is less emphasis on framing ethnic minorities as threats. For example, the ethnic Hungarian community in Vojvodina is no longer perceived as a threat. While there has been some suspicion about the Bosniaks in Sandžak, the focus has shifted toward Euroscepticism and the protection of Serbia’s sovereignty in European and global politics, rather than targeting ethnic minorities in the same way as in the 1990s.

Given your discussion of Euroscepticism and populism, how do populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe balance their critiques of the EU’s influence on sovereignty with their need to engage with EU frameworks on issues like ethnic minority rights and migration?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it depends. Again, I would like to focus mostly on Croatia and Serbia, as these are the countries I prepared for this conversation.

In the case of Croatia, the Homeland Movement is rather rigid regarding the protection of national borders by the state itself, rather than relying on the EU. They are against the EU’s common defense policies, and since their formation, they have been skeptical of EU intervention, such as that of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, particularly before Croatia’s accession to the EU. This skepticism extends to the enhancement of collective rights for minorities, especially the ethnic Serb minority and their institutional representation in the Croatian Parliament. This is a significant dimension of their emphasis on state sovereignty.

Turning to Latvia, parties such as the National Alliance were, in their early stages, quite skeptical of what they perceived as EU interventionism, which they felt challenged the ethnic democracy model applied in Latvia. A similar sentiment existed in Estonia. However, over time, the context has evolved.

For instance, in Croatia, while nationalist principles are maintained, the focus has shifted primarily to domestic politics, such as efforts to exclude the ethnic Serb minority party from power, without directly blaming the EU for this.

As for Serbia, and also Estonia and Latvia, the context becomes more complex. In Estonia, EKRE (the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia) attempted to approach the ethnic Russian community in recent years. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine significantly altered the situation.

Overall, there is no uniform pattern here. The strategies of these populist parties vary depending on the national and geopolitical context.

Populism’s Role in Power Dynamics and Regional Stability in the Balkans

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participates in an SNS political campaign at Hall Čair in Niš, Serbia, on March 30, 2022. Photo: Radule Perisic.

To what extent do populist leaders in the Balkans utilize nationalism and historical narratives to consolidate their power, and how does this impact regional stability?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it depends on the context. In Serbia, for example, there is the prominent issue of Kosovo. All political parties, including the leading SNS under Aleksandar Vučić, programmatically prioritize the defense of Kosovo, advocating for its effective reintegration into the Serbian state structure. Additionally, they emphasize the protection of the ethnic Serbian minority and Serbian cultural monuments in the region, presenting these as top priorities. This issue holds significant weight in both domestic and international politics.

In Croatia, on the other hand, there is a strong emphasis on the concept of sovereignty. The prevailing notion is that Croatian sovereignty must be staunchly defended and not compromised, whether in relations with Western, Eastern, or other global partners. This focus on sovereignty is a key element of the political narrative.

How have external actors, such as the European Union, Russia, and China, influenced the trajectory of populist politics in Balkan countries?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it really depends on the context. In the case of Serbia, right-wing populist actors have long viewed Russia as a key partner, especially since the 1990s. Political parties, including more recent ones like Dveri, as well as the broader radical and national conservative right-wing spectrum, regard Russia as Serbia’s main ally in international politics.

In Croatia, however, the situation is different. There is a more staunch approach, and while China has been viewed as a more reliable economic partner compared to the EU by the broader right-wing spectrum in Serbia, this perspective is not as prevalent in Croatia. The radical and national conservative right in Croatia has historically been open to a degree of economic cooperation with Russia. However, they have always been somewhat suspicious of Russia, largely due to its perceived partnership with Serbia. This skepticism intensified after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

In North Macedonia, we see the example of the Levica party, which adopts a different approach. They are quite open to cooperation with the BRICS countries, including Russia and China, as well as other nations they associate with the Global South. Levica justifies this stance through a quasi-anti-imperialist platform, presenting it as an alternative to traditional Western alliances.

How Religion Fuels Populist Rhetoric and National Identity in the Balkans

What role does religion play in shaping the rhetoric and appeal of populist parties and leaders in the Balkan countries?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: Well, of course, it does. In Croatia, for example, parties like the Domovinski Pokret, the right-wing faction within HDZ, and smaller parties such as the Croatian Sovereignty Movement, Bloc for Croatia, and Most (Bridge), to the extent that it can be regarded as a national conservative right party, advocate for a partnership-like relationship between the state and the Roman Catholic Church. They also strongly support the protection and continuation of the so-called Vatican contracts.

In Serbia, the broader right-wing political spectrum emphasizes a similar partnership-like relationship between the state and the Orthodox Church. This includes some particularistic interpretations of the Orthodox doctrine, such as Svetosavlje. This Serbian-specific brand of Orthodox theology, rooted in the teachings of Serbian theologian Justin Popović during the interwar period, remains a distinctive and particularistic interpretation of Orthodoxy. It is often espoused by political actors from the radical right, reinforcing their ideological narratives.

How do the national conservative and radical right-wing parties in Croatia use populist rhetoric to mobilize support, particularly regarding issues like the “Homeland War” and minority rights, and how does this compare to similar movements in other Central and Eastern European countries?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: Well, they do. For instance, the Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement), founded in 2020, has been very active in protests, both through demonstrations and online campaigns via their websites. A notable example is their opposition to the public use of the Serbian Cyrillic script in areas like Vukovar. Vukovar holds a central symbolic role in contemporary Croatian nationalism due to the resistance mounted by the Croatian military against the Yugoslav People’s Army and Serbian auxiliary forces in 1991.

The Homeland Movement also incorporates ethno-nationalist principles into its broader anti-establishment rhetoric, targeting Croatia’s two major parties: the center-right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SDP). However, the interplay between ethno-nationalist principles and anti-establishment rhetoric can be quite malleable. For example, since last spring, the Homeland Movement has been a member of a governing coalition with HDZ.

This intersection of ethno-nationalism and establishment politics shows that parties like the Homeland Movement are not always as anti-establishment as they claim to be. It is worth noting that a faction within the Homeland Movement opposed the coalition pact with HDZ, seeing it as a betrayal of the movement’s anti-establishment principles. In response, this faction formed a new party, Domovinski Otpora (Homeland Resistance), in September 2024.

Euroscepticism and National Sovereignty in a Shifting Political Landscape

In a recent chapter, you discuss the soft Euroscepticism of Croatia’s Homeland Movement (DP). How does the populist framing of national sovereignty by this party challenge or reinforce broader European Union integration narratives?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: Well, the Homeland Movement does not have a standard pro-EU stance. They advocate for a Europe of sovereign nations and do not support Eurofederalism.

In your analysis, how have Croatian far-right parties employed populist strategies to address economic grievances, such as rising costs of living and inflation, and how effective has this been in broadening their appeal beyond traditional nationalist bases?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: They have consistently accused the government of mismanaging the economy. Like other political actors on the broader right across Europe, they have also blamed the EU’s Green Deal for the increase in energy prices over the last couple of years.

At the same time, there has been a powerful emphasis on ethno-nationalist underpinnings. The Homeland Movement’s critique of alleged economic mismanagement often focuses on the revitalization of Croatian regions such as Slavonia, Lika, or parts of Dalmatia—areas ravaged by war. These regions have a notable presence of wartime veterans or invalids, making them key target groups for the party.

Alongside its critique of economic mismanagement by HDZ and the Social Democratic Party in the past, the Homeland Movement has also promoted a more concrete program for economic support specifically aimed at these categories of the population, particularly war veterans from the Homeland War.

SDP Voters Back Milanović Despite Diverging Views on Euroscepticism

Croatian President Zoran Milanović attends a ceremony in Vrgorac, Croatia, on July 1, 2022. Photo: Jure Divich.

According to Euractiv, Zoran Milanović achieved the highest score by a presidential candidate since Croatia’s independence in 1991. How do you explain this huge success during his second term as president?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think Zoran Milanović is a rather controversial character, and it’s not easy to pin down his appeal. He has made several contentious statements in the past, particularly regarding relations between Croatia and Bosnia, as well as Croatia and Serbia. He has also expressed doubts about the protection of collective minority rights of ethnic groups in Bosnia. Furthermore, he questioned Serbia’s legitimacy as a candidate for EU membership. More recently, since 2022, he has expressed skepticism about Ukraine’s eligibility for NATO or EU membership. So, he’s been quite a colorful figure, so to speak.

At the same time, his success in the elections likely has several explanations. First, since the constitutional amendments of 2000–2002, the actual powers of the Croatian president have been significantly reduced. The current president has far more limited competencies compared to Franjo Tuđman’s term in office during the 1990s. This semi-parliamentary arrangement doesn’t make the president a purely decorative figure, but the role is definitely less influential compared to the prime minister.

Most likely, Milanović’s success reflects the fact that Croatian voters, who elect the president directly, saw him as a more reliable candidate compared to others.

Last Sunday, after the vote in Zagreb, Milanović criticized Brussels as “in many ways autocratic and unrepresentative,” run by unelected officials. The 58-year-old Milanović regularly blames the HDZ for the party’s long-standing corruption problems and calls Prime Minister Plenković “a Brussels employee.” How much of a role did his attacks on the EU play in his victory in the presidential elections?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think they did play a part, as he managed to create an umbrella for Eurosceptic trends among the Croatian electorate. These are voters who do not necessarily want to align with the national conservative or radical right and do not want to vote for HDZ. This could be one explanation.

Additionally, Zoran Milanović originates from the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which does not necessarily adopt such strong Eurosceptic stances on a party level or share Milanović’s harsh criticism of the EU. However, having a representative from the SDP in the presidential office could enhance the party’s standing vis-à-vis HDZ in Croatian politics. This may have been another incentive for SDP voters to support Milanović, even if they do not entirely agree with his Eurosceptic views.

Donald Trump has just started his second term as president of the US. How do you think the populist Milanović and other populist leaders in the region will be affected by Trump’s second term?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it depends on the context. Milanović has not expressed any real preference, even indirectly, for Donald Trump.

Now, in Serbia, considering the political establishment, particularly the ruling SNS (Serbian Progressive Party) under President Aleksandar Vučić, they may look for a better deal regarding Kosovo during Donald Trump’s term in office. This seems to be what they are aiming for.

Myanmar

Dr. Subedi: Majoritarian Populist Politics Marginalizes Minorities in South and Southeast Asia

Dr. DB Subedi highlights how majoritarian populist politics in South and Southeast Asia marginalizes minorities by leveraging identity politics and ethno-religious narratives. He underscores how populist leaders, from Myanmar to India, utilize state apparatuses to consolidate power, often legitimizing exclusionary policies and fostering polarization. With examples like Hindu nationalism in India, Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar, and Islamist populism in Bangladesh, Dr. Subedi examines how these movements exploit historical grievances and global populist trends while adapting them to local contexts. His analysis sheds light on the fragile state of pluralism and democracy in these multicultural societies.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Dr. DB Subedi, a distinguished lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia, delves deeply into the dynamics of majoritarian populist politics in South and Southeast Asia in an insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Drawing from his extensive academic expertise, Dr. Subedi examines how populist leaders in the region leverage identity politics and state apparatuses to marginalize minorities and consolidate power, often at the expense of democratic institutions and pluralism.

In the interview, Dr. Subedi sheds light on how the historical, cultural, and political landscapes of post-colonial South and Southeast Asia have created fertile ground for nationalist and religious populist ideologies. He highlights the role of religion, ethnicity, and national identity in shaping these populist movements, often leading to the exclusion of minorities and the reinforcement of majoritarian dominance. The cases of India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh serve as pivotal examples, with each showcasing how populism adapts to local contexts while drawing on broader global populist trends.

Dr. Subedi also explores the economic underpinnings of populism in the region, emphasizing the interplay between economic inequality, globalization, and populist rhetoric. He points out that while globalization has lifted millions out of poverty in Asia, it has simultaneously deepened economic divides, creating grievances that populist leaders exploit to craft exclusionary narratives.

Furthermore, the discussion extends to the intersection of nationalism and populism, where Dr. Subedi identifies the trend of leader-centric politics replacing traditional party-led systems. This shift has enabled authoritarian populist leaders to manipulate institutions, bypass democratic norms, and entrench their authority. The examples of Narendra Modi in India, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and the Rajapaksa brothers in Sri Lanka illustrate how such leaders use religion and identity to legitimize their power while marginalizing dissenting voices and minority groups.

The interview provides a comprehensive understanding of how majoritarian populist politics operates in South and Southeast Asia, offering valuable insights into its implications for democracy, social cohesion, and the region’s broader political landscape. Dr. Subedi’s analysis serves as a critical lens through which to examine the challenges posed by populism in multicultural societies.

Dr. DB Subedi, a distinguished lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia.

Here is the transcription of the interview withDr. DB Subedi with some edits.

The Roots of Populism: Religion, Identity, and Authoritarianism in South and Southeast Asia

Professor Subedi, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In the context of South and Southeast Asia, what historical, cultural, and political factors have contributed to the rise of nationalist and religious populism, and how do these dynamics align with authoritarian populism to shape contemporary political narratives?

Dr. DB Subedi: That’s a very important question. When we talk about populism in South and Southeast Asia, to understand the overall dynamics of populism, we need to examine the historical context of post-colonial state formation in this region.

Religion, culture, and national identity have always been contentious issues in South and Southeast Asia. From the time of post-colonial state formation, for example, the role of Islam in Pakistan and Indonesia was heavily debated. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, religion has always been central to defining the majoritarian identity, and this has been deeply contested by minority groups. These dynamics are common across other regions as well.

Religion, history, and culture collectively define the social identity of one group of people, but at the same time, the same applies to minority groups. This creates a form of social polarization. Over time, populist leaders have tapped into these polarizations, mobilizing them to construct and define their own bounded political communities, which they then appeal to, while pursuing populist political narratives, ideas, and policies. The question of religion is particularly central in this regard.

This has also translated into various political discourses, such as the formulation of political ideologies and policies, where religion has often been both a contentious and central element. Countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are key examples, and we see similar instances in other parts of South and Southeast Asia.

The historical context of nation-state formation, the creation of national identity, and the manipulation of collective identities have become key features in defining populism in this region, both in the past and to a large extent in the present. For instance, the first wave of populism in South and Southeast Asia was led by national heroes—what we might call the nationalist leaders of independence movements. Not all of them, of course, but some of these founding fathers of modern nation-states had populist elements in the way they defined national identities, often at the cost of excluding others and mobilizing specific constituencies.

If you like, we could see these leaders as the first generation of populist figures. But times have changed. Over the past 50–70 years, if we look back to the 1950s and 1960s, there have been different waves of populism in this region. However, religion and national identity continue to play a crucial role in defining populist movements in South and Southeast Asia.

The Role of Economic Inequality and Globalization in Driving Populism

What role do economic grievances, inequality, and globalization play in fueling nationalist and religious populism in South and Southeast Asian countries?

Dr. DB Subedi: That’s another very important question. Earlier, I mostly discussed the cultural aspects of the rise of populist politics in this region. However, economic factors also play a significant role. Economic inequalities—both within and between ethnic groups, at national and sub-national levels—are key drivers of grievances. These inequalities often fuel resentment toward groups perceived as affluent or privileged within the community.

Inequality has consistently been a major issue shaping populist movements. For instance, in the 1980s, agrarian populist movements in parts of India were largely driven by economic grievances. Similarly, economic inequalities played a central role in mobilizing support for former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand. In this sense, inequality has always been a central issue in the rise of populism.

Globalization is another critical factor. When addressing inequality, populist rhetoric often targets political elites at the national level, but it frequently extends to external actors, such as multinational corporations and proponents of neoliberal policies, who are portrayed as the “enemies of the people.” Economic grievances stemming from globalization provide fertile ground for populist narratives.

In the contemporary wave of populism, almost all populist leaders in the region have proposed ambitious and transformative economic policies aimed at redistribution. However, these agendas have often failed, with many populist leaders losing power after an average of 4–5 years.

In Asia, the role of globalization is complex. Unlike the “losers of globalization” thesis commonly seen in Western Europe and the US, where certain groups are left behind, globalization in Asia has largely benefited many countries. For example, the globalization of production industries has led to the relocation of manufacturing from the Global North to countries in the Global South, such as India, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This shift has contributed to economic growth and lifted many people out of extreme poverty.

However, this growth has been accompanied by rising inequality. While a segment of the population has profited greatly, the majority have seen only incremental improvements, leaving systemic economic inequality intact. This dynamic fuels public grievances and provides populist leaders with a platform to craft their narratives and agendas.

In this sense, globalization in Asia acts as a double-edged sword. On one hand, it creates opportunities for populist leaders to exploit growing inequality and public frustration, leading to anti-government and anti-establishment protests that propel populist figures to power. On the other hand, globalization has delivered tangible benefits to many in Asia, making the relationship between globalization and populism more ambiguous and requiring further exploration.

The Impact of Populist Nationalism on Marginalized Communities

A man chanting songs with a dummy cow in the background during the Golden Jubilee
celebration of VHP – a Hindu nationalist organization on December 20, 2014 in Kolkata, India. Photo: Arindam Banerjee.

How do nationalist and religious populist ideologies intersect and manifest in countries like India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, shaping the broader sociopolitical landscape, and what are the implications for marginalized communities across Hindu-majority, Muslim-majority, and Buddhist-majority contexts in South and Southeast Asia?

Dr. DB Subedi: When we talk about the intersection of nationalism and religion, we should first look at the interface between ethnicity and religion, in Asian countries, because religion and ethnicity are deeply intertwined in many Asian countries. Take Sri Lanka, for example, where the majority of Sinhalese follow Buddhism, and as a result, historically, since the colonial period and in the post-colonial state formation, Sinhala Buddhism has become a dominant ideology. Sinhala Buddhist leaders of the past, and even more recently, have mobilized that ideology to define their majority political constituency.

We can say similar things about India. India is vast in terms of geography, ethnicity, caste, and so on. Even today, Hindus form the majority population, which provides political parties like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leverage to pursue Hindu nationalist politics both at the center and in the regions. In other words, the intersection of ethnicity and religion constructs the collective social identity of the people, providing leverage for political parties and populist leaders to define their bounded political communities, which they mobilize in their populist politics. One example is the populist nationalist politics of the BJP and its current Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, who many have analyzed as a Hindu nationalist and populist leader.

You can see similar dynamics in Bangladesh, where Islam and politics go hand in hand, and ethnicity obviously comes into play. In the case of the countries you mentioned—Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar—the majoritarian ethno-religious identities of the majority populations have always been central features in attempts to homogenize national identities.

This process of homogenization has been deeply contested by minorities in countries like Myanmar or India, where Muslim minorities, along with secular and liberal-minded political leaders and parties, contest this idea. Similar patterns are evident in Thailand, where the homogenization of national identity, based on Thai national identity drawn primarily from Buddhist culture and religious identities, is contested by other minorities.

As a result, there are multiple effects on the national polity, both from a populist and nationalist point of view. One major implication of this political dynamic is that in most Asian countries, nationalism often hosts populism. In other words, populism travels alongside nationalism in most Asian countries. Of course, the role of religion is present, and we can discuss religious populism separately. However, one prominent feature across the region is populist nationalism.

In terms of policy and political outcomes, minorities have suffered, as this form of politics often shares exclusionary characteristics similar to populist politics seen elsewhere, particularly in Western Europe and North America.

Power Consolidation and Minority Exclusion in South Asia

To what extent do nationalist and religious populist leaders in Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim-majority countries leverage identity politics and state apparatuses to consolidate power, legitimize violence, and exclude minorities, and how do institutional and cultural narratives in post-colonial South Asia justify and sustain these populist-authoritarian practices?

Dr. DB Subedi: That’s another very good question. It actually points to some of the issues I mentioned in my earlier response, particularly the interplay between religious identity and national identity. What we have seen most recently across Asia is that populist leaders have frequently referred to the blending of religious and national identities in these countries to define their sociopolitical landscapes.

Having said that, we should also acknowledge that Southeast Asia and South Asia are vast regions, with diverse sociocultural and sociopolitical contexts, as well as differing historical and contemporary dynamics. These variations shape the realization, aspiration, and respect for pluralism and democracy in this region. Therefore, while identifying common trends, we must be cautious not to overgeneralize.

Despite these differences, one commonality across these countries is the centrality of leaders in shaping the political landscape. In the past, political parties held this central role. However, with the rise of authoritarian, populist, and nationalist politics—from the Rajapaksa regime in Sri Lanka to Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar, Hun Sen in Cambodia, and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines—we have seen strong and powerful leaders dominating the political sphere.

This shift toward leader-centric politics has been a significant trend across South and Southeast Asia. Leaders like Narendra Modi in India connect directly with their followers, often bypassing institutional processes, by mobilizing cultural, religious, or national identities. Similarly, Duterte in the Philippines sought direct engagement with the public, frequently circumventing institutional frameworks.

Populist leaders often appeal to the “will of the people” to justify and consolidate power. They use this direct connection with their political constituencies, defined by religious, national, or ethnic identities, to legitimize their authority. This raises the question: where do institutions stand in this process?

Institutions do matter, and in Asia, as elsewhere, populist leaders often come to power through elections, no matter how free or fair those elections might be. The presence of democratic institutions, even minimally, has been a prerequisite for populist leaders to rise to power. However, once in power, these leaders employ various tactics to manipulate, dismantle, or reform existing political and democratic institutions to consolidate their authority.

For example, in Sri Lanka, the populist-nationalist government of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his predecessor, his brother Mahinda Rajapaksa, pushed for constitutional reforms to concentrate power in the presidency. Similarly, in the Philippines, Duterte passed an anti-terrorism law that weakened civil society organizations, particularly those engaged in peacebuilding in conflict-affected areas like Mindanao. Institutional manipulation and re-engineering of democratic structures have become common strategies for populist and authoritarian leaders to sustain their hold on power.

Contrasting Populisms: Nationalist Narratives in Asia and the Global West

Large protests demand the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government as part of the Anti-Quota Movement and Bangladesh Quota Reform Protests. Thousands took to the streets in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on August 4, 2024. Photo: M.D. Sabbir.

How does the rise of nationalist and religious populism in Asia compare with similar movements in the global West in terms of discourse strategies and mobilization methods, and to what extent are these movements influenced by global populist trends while adapting international narratives to local contexts?

Dr. DB Subedi: Interesting question. Asia, especially South and Southeast Asia, is a unique region in terms of understanding populism. It is unique because, unlike in the West, in South and Southeast Asia, we have seen populist movements and populist styles of politics that involve different varieties of populist movements. There isn’t one singular form of populism.

As I mentioned earlier, nationalism has often hosted populism in Asia, and the two frequently go hand in hand. This is because questions of national identity, ethnicity, and religion are central to defining both nationalist and populist movements. While there are key differences between the two, most populist leaders in the region also embody elements of nationalism to some extent. Narendra Modi is an example, and you can observe similar trends in Thailand, Myanmar, and Indonesia, among others.

This is a unique feature of populism in Asia. However, across the region, we should be cautious when interpreting or explaining populism with the same degree of intensity. By “degree of intensity,” I mean that in some cases, when populism intersects with nationalism, it manifests as what I would call “soft populism.”

When I say “soft populism,” the overall political manifestation or style of a particular populist leader might appear nationalist but incorporates populist orientations or elements. Imran Khan’s politics in Pakistan is a recent example. In Bangladesh, politics under Sheikh Hasina was mostly authoritarian, but in her later years in government, she also played the nationalist card while implementing redistributive economic policies, which had populist undertones. She reached out to Muslim voters and her support base using a populist style of politics. Similar examples can be observed elsewhere.

Soft populism can involve a strong leader or political party that is primarily nationalist or authoritarian but includes populist elements. On the other hand, there are also cases of “hard populist” governments and leaders in the region. Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines is a prime example, as is Thaksin Shinawatra in the past in Thailand. These leaders represent a more pronounced form of populism.

This distinction—between soft and hard populism—is one of the differences between populism in Asia and the populist leaders in Western Europe and North America. The phenomenon in Asia is shaped by the region’s distinct history of post-colonial state formation and its sociopolitical landscape of collective identity and politics.

In this sense, soft populist politics in South and Southeast Asia often appears as an extended form of identity politics.

Finally, when we compare similarities and differences, we observe that during the 1980s and 1990s, there was a rise in left-wing populism. Interestingly, in the last 10 to 15 years, we have seen the emergence of populism that looks more exclusionary, sharing certain elements of right-wing populism seen elsewhere. However, there are still a few examples of left-wing populism in this region.

Comparing Buddhist, Hindu, and Islamist Populist Policies in South Asia

In what ways has Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar influenced the state’s policies towards minorities, and how does it compare to Hindu nationalism in India or Islamist populism in Bangladesh?

Members of Myanmar’s Muslim Rohingya minority walk through a broken road at Shah Porir Deep, at Teknaf in Cox’s Bazer, Bangladesh on September 11, 2017. Photo: Sk Hasan Ali.

Dr. DB Subedi: All these countries have different histories and contexts of post-colonial state formation, although one similarity is that all three countries were colonized. So, they are post-colonial nations with a history of colonial rule. At the same time, they are multicultural countries with both ethnic and religious majorities as well as minorities.

In Myanmar, for a long time, when the military junta was in power—and they remain in power today—they have consistently used ethno-religious nationalism as a key strategy and ideology for ruling the country. This trend has been especially pronounced over the last few decades. When the military first came to power, they seemed to adopt a different kind of socialist policy, and the religious and ethno-religious dimension was not as prominent at that time. However, over time, there has been a growing trend of mobilizing the sentiments of Theravada Buddhist Burmese, which has been deeply contested by other ethnic and religious minorities.

One consequence of this trend has been the subordination and marginalization of ethnic minorities, which has contributed to ongoing civil wars in Myanmar for decades.

In India, the situation is quite different. The BJP came to power relatively recently, whereas before that, the Indian National Congress, which was more oriented toward pluralism and liberal policies toward minorities, held power. Under the current government, however, Hindu nationalist policies have led to the introduction of certain citizenship laws and other policies that discriminate against Muslim minorities.

Similar trends can be observed in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as well. In a nutshell, minorities have often become victims of majoritarian, exclusivist politics when such ideologies are in power.

Map: Shutterstock.

Unveiling China’s ‘Transnational Populism’ and Sharp Power Politics: The Case of the Belt and Road Initiative

Abstract

In a mutually reinforcing context, the rise of multipolarity and the decline of the rules-based liberal multilateral world order have transformed populism from a national phenomenon into one with global dimensions, characterized by transborder transgressiveness. Rooted in nationalist rhetoric that emphasizes independence and sovereignty, this dynamic challenges the norms and values of multilateralism, fuels a vicious cycle of sharp power politics (SPP), and opens new fronts in the competition for national interests. China’s recent political and economic trajectory under President Xi Jinping provides a compelling case for examining the interplay between these factors. Drawing on the evolving theoretical framework of populism and an analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this article argues that Xi Jinping’s strategic framing of SPPs within an appealing populist narrative does not qualify him as a transnational populist leader. Notably, Chinese rhetoric lacks a cohesive ideology, a clearly defined transnational citizenry with shared interests, and a corresponding mechanism for the participatory representation of global citizens.

Keywords: Populism, sharp-power politics, multipolarity, multilateralism, China, governance, development, (in)dependence, global public goods, cooperation.

 

By Ibrahim Ozturk

Introduction

The transformation of global power dynamics, particularly in the post-Cold War era, has exposed vulnerabilities in the Western-dominated liberal multilateral order, leading to a multipolar world (dis)order. This shift has also curtailed the dominance of any single superpower, intensifying competition for influence and resources. This complex landscape has witnessed two notable political phenomena: the global rise of right- and left-wing populism and the adoption of Sharp Power Politics (SPP) by rising powers like Russia and China to enhance their global influence.

The emergence of this geopolitical landscape significantly limits the global cooperation necessary for collective action to effectively secure global public goods. Increasingly characterized by a “negative-sum game,” this environment poses deeply troubling implications for the future. It fosters the development of a causal chain in which populism, typically addressed at the national level, transcends borders and amplifies the influence of sharp-power politics.

While populists often portray themselves as champions of the people, challenging the established order on behalf of the masses, SPP co-opts populist rhetoric to serve the interests of authoritarian regimes, ultimately consolidating their power. A plausible transmission mechanism involves the gradual co-option of a functioning, though flawed, rule-based democracy by exclusionary, interest-driven coalitions of established elites. These elites prioritize their class interests at the expense of long-term efficiency, leading to stagnation. Over time, populist leaders exploit systemic vulnerabilities, using their rhetoric to gain power. If they maintain power long enough, they eventually transform the system into a form of authoritarianism, reinforcing this new status quo through sharp-power tactics both domestically and internationally to expand their influence and national interests.

Within this framework, the central aim of this article is to explore the extent to which the concept of “transnational populism” (TNP) can be considered an intermediate stage linking the progression from national-level populism to authoritarianism and, subsequently, to SPP beyond national borders. Following these theoretical discussions, the article also seeks to examine whether the notion of TNP can be inferred from the extensive use of populist rhetoric within China’s SPP framework, specifically in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The article is organized as follows: The second section explores key theoretical issues, evaluating the existence of a robust concept of transnational populism while examining the intersections, overlaps, and tensions between national populism, transnational populism, and sharp power politics (SPP). The third section builds on these theoretical insights to assess whether China’s foreign policies can be interpreted through the framework of transnational populism within its authoritarian regime. The fourth section connects China’s so-called transnational populism (TNP) to SPP, highlighting their incompatibilities, particularly in the context of the BRI. The final section concludes by summarizing the key findings.

Click to Read the Article

Hundreds of migrants attempt to cross the US-Mexico border as the Texas National Guard works to prevent irregular crossings in Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico on March 21, 2024.
Photo: David Peinado Romero.

The “Awkward Alliance” of the Left and the Right

The politics of immigration in the U.S. reveal peculiar alliances on both sides of the aisle. For Democrats, the coalition spans ethnoracial diversity, balancing ideals of equality with the economic and cultural concerns of immigration. This tension often leaves the Left grappling with its own contradictions. For Republicans, an equally uneasy partnership emerges. Grassroots voters, driven by ethnonationalist anxieties, align with capitalist elites who benefit from cheap immigrant labor. This “awkward alliance” pits anti-immigrant rhetoric against the economic realities of business reliance on immigration, fueling policies that prioritize elite agendas while alienating vulnerable voters.

By Sanne van Oosten*

Politicians of Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP) often cite material scarcity faced by the populations of receiving countries as arguments against immigration. Whether the argument is that ‘they’ are stealing ‘our’ jobspublic services, or housing; materialist concerns are central to their arguments against immigration. The mobilisation of perceived economic injustice has proven to be an effective strategy for attracting voters, with the most recent U.S. elections serving as yet another example.

The U.S. Republican Party now also champions strong anti-immigration narratives, though this has not always been at the top of the party’s political agenda. This shift occurred during the Obama-era. Despite Obama’s first campaign and term being predominantly focused on healthcare reform, beneath the surface of the Republican Party, anti-immigration sentiments swelled, with many voters perceiving Obama as a symbol of immigration. While he didn’t, in reality, let more immigrants in than his Republican predecessors, Bush or Reagan. Although voters are generally positive about Black politicians, Obama’s African roots invigorated the Tea Party, a grassroots movement, leading them to turn to immigration as a response to the latent, smouldering old-fashioned racism his presidency stirred.

Even in the most conservative corners of the U.S., openly admitting to being racist is stigmatised, prompting many to mask such views. Concerns over economic justice often serve as a justification for racism by pointing to the scarcity of ‘our’ jobspublic serviceshousing; or whatever scarce economic resource is the challenge of the moment. By invoking these appeals to economic justice, one can pull off xenophobic claims without the stigma attached to more explicit expressions of xenophobia. These forms of strategic masking not only help avoid stigma in everyday life and political discourse, Republicans also can leverage these strategically against Democrats. After all, weren’t Democrats the ones who were supposed to protect ‘our’ jobs, public services, and housing? Didn’t they claim to care about the people and economic justice? Well, with all the immigrants they’re letting into our country, I guess they don’t!

Besides materialist masking, ‘civilisationist‘ masking serves to destigmatise racist and xenophobic claims while simultaneously dividing Democratic voters. Trump’s call to protect ‘our’ women from Latino immigrant rapists is a prime example of contemporary U.S. femonationalism. His calls to protect American gay people from dangerous Muslims illustrate homonationalism. Amid student protests against the war in Gaza, Trump also invoked the need to protect Jewish safety—what I refer to as Judeonationalism. Essentially, the infamous U.S. election campaign quote, ‘they are eating the pets,’ was also a form of civilisationist masking—what I call animeauxnationalism. These arguments follow the same logic and purpose as materialist justice: they not only serve to avoid stigma in everyday life and political discourse, but they also act as a wedge to internally divide the Democratic electorate.

And the truth is, in Western countries, the Left represents a much more ethnoracially diverse voting coalition, creating an ‘awkward alliance’ as I call it. White Leftists often support the Left out of ‘conviction’ for equal rights for all, including women and gay people, as well as animals and nature, while non-white Leftists tend to stay with the Left out of ‘necessity:’ the opposition denies their identities, yet, they often prioritise other concerns over equal rights and individual freedoms. This uneasy coalition unsettles political elites of the Left, leaving them uncertain about how to navigate this political catch-22.

Indeed, there is an inherent awkwardness in the Democratic claim to champion individual freedoms and equal rights while also supporting (or at least tolerating) immigration of people who do not necessarily hold the same core national values. This awkwardness mirrors the one found in materialist concerns: the Democrats advocate for workers, stronger public services, and affordable housing, yet they also support immigration, which some believe jeopardises jobs, strains public services, and drives up housing prices. Very awkward indeed.

Yet, the alliances on the other side of the aisle might be even more awkward. The Republican Party unites forces from the top-down and the bottom-up. From the bottom-up, Republicans represent an ethnonationally anxious voting base unsettled by ‘demographic panic’ due to immigration, grown from the grass roots Tea Party movement. From the top-down, the Republican alliance consists of large business elites (such as the Koch-network) who benefit from immigration by relying on workers willing to take jobs that many white Americans won’t, such as hard agricultural labour. These forces—both top-down and bottom-up—create another ‘awkward alliance,’ or an ‘uneasy marriage,’ or even ‘strange bedfellows,’ between a voting base riled up by anti-immigration sentiment and capitalist elites who profit from cheap labour and the economic growth that immigration fuels. The racist views that are often masked by arguments of economic justice serve as a ‘godsend’ for capitalist plutocrats, enabling them to mobilise an ethnonationalist electorate. Meanwhile, top-down forces prefer concealing the fact that their voters might not be voting in their own best interest through expressing and fuelling anti-immigrant sentiment by keeping unsettling news about immigration on the national agenda and the back of people’s minds.

These top-down capitalist elites are, however, most interested in boosting business, cutting back on regulations, and shrinking government social spending by, ironically, courting a voting base that is often reliant on Social Security and Medicare. ‘Anti-Obama anger,’ fuelled by racist undertones, proved to be a ‘godsend.’ For instance, by dubbing universal healthcare ‘Obamacare,’ opposition to government spending was built with the help of racism-driven xenophobia, even among those most dependent on the exact same public services, and those who are positive about the policies when not named after the first Black president, but Clinton. Even though immigration helps their businesses grow, these capitalist elites accept Trump’s strong anti-immigration stance as ‘unpleasant ransom’ to advance their libertarian agenda, which benefits capitalism and large corporations to the detriment of the lesser-educated voters riled up by anti-immigration rhetoric. This may be the most ‘awkward alliance’ of all.


(*) Dr. Sanne van Oosten is a postdoctoral researcher at Centre for Migration Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford.

Emirati men perform the traditional Al Ayala dance in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on December 23, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries

Please cite as:

Shewan, Molly. (2025). “Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).January 10, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0094

 

On December 19, 2024, ECPS hosted the 18th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, titled “Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries.” This session examined a number of key contemporary dynamics at the intersection of populism and authoritarianism in the Gulf region. A distinguished panel of experts presented on a wide range of topics, including the evolution of social contracts in Gulf states; autocratization processes; the environmental dimension of authoritarian leadership; and the role of religion in shaping both domestic and international politics. The session thus offered many key critical insights into both the nebulous features of populism itself and the importance of bringing the Gulf region into scholarly conversation regarding populism’s impact across the globe. 

Report by Molly Shewan

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) hosted the 18th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, “Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries,” on December 19, 2024. The session explored the complex dynamics surrounding populism and authoritarianism across the Gulf region. Bringing together a distinguished panel of scholars and practitioners, the discussion focused on a number of key developments, including the environmental and religious dimensions of autocratic leadership in the Gulf States, as well as the evolution of the social contract, in order to examine the diverse causes, manifestations and impacts of populism and authoritarianism in the region.  

Moderated by Dr. Courtney Freer, Assistant Professor at the Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies-Emory University, the panelists included  Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber, Professor of Middle East at the Friedrich Alexander University, Erlangen-Nürnberg-Germany; Dr. Gail Buttorff, Hobby School of Public Affairs-University of Huston;  Dr. Tobias Zumbraegel, senior researcher and lecturer at the Department for Human Geography at Heidelberg University-Germany; Mr. Kardo Kareem Rached, University of Human Development-Iraq, and  Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. 

The panel made a multidisciplinary, wide-ranging, and insightful contribution to the scholarly exploration of populism and autocracy in the rapidly evolving social and political context of the Gulf region. Therefore, this session constitutes a significant and timely addition to the panel series overall, aiding in its goal of generating a more complete understanding of the diverse impact of populism and authoritarianism across the globe. 

Panel Overview 

Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber opened the panel with his presentation on “Key Drivers of Autocratization in the Gulf Region.” Dr. Demmelhuber began by arguing that Gulf regimes are often much too complex to be neatly categorized into a binary division between democracy and authoritarian governance. Rather, he regards autocratization as a fluid, multifaceted process which can occur within a variety of regime types in notably different ways. Dr. Demmelhuber argued that autocratization is primarily driven through the actions of prominent elites at the domestic, regional and international levels. 

At the domestic level, populist discourses can be utilized as a means of consolidating regime power, utilizing affective appeals to the citizenry as a united collective in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime. At the regional level, regimes often learn from one another and adapt their political strategies to mirror their neighbors, which is linked to the emergence of authoritarian gravity centers. On the international level, norm diffusion can occur through transnational networks, promoting authoritarian practices across the globe. Dr. Demmelhuber concluded his insightful presentation by flagging the need for greater scholarly interrogation of the non-material dimension of populist appeals, as well as of the populism which emerges “from below.”

Our second speaker, Dr. Gail Buttorff, a researcher of gender and political participation in the Middle East, followed with an engaging talk titled “The Evolving Social Contract in the GCC” with a particular focus on gender as a key factor. Dr. Buttorf began by offering a succinct overview of the social contract in the GCC up to the 2000s, which was heavily reliant upon strong wealth redistribution and a generous welfare state in exchange for limited political participation by the citizenry. She then went on to note a variety of factors that have put pressure on this institutional arrangement since then: declining oil rents, lower revenue, and growing populations, which led Gulf states to embrace austerity while unemployment was rising. 

In an effort to renegotiate their social contracts in this new contemporary context, Gulf regimes have deployed policies of labor renationalization, which in turn resulted in a significant increase in female employment, as well as “vision statements” which explicitly emphasize “mutuality” between state and citizen responsibility. The gendered impact of these adjustments was particularly visible during the COVID-19 outbreak, as a number of states – including the UAE and Bahrain – passed legislation which illustrated the intersection between labor nationalization and women’s participation in public life. 

Overall, Dr. Buttorff effectively explored the ways in which Gulf states have attempted to retain legitimacy in uncertain economic conditions by adjusting their social contracts, with particularly significant implications for women across the region.  

Dr. Tobias Zumbraegel, who has written extensively on the environmental dimension of state power in the Gulf, turned to focus on the environmental dimension in his presentation: “The New Green Autocrats: How Saudi Arabia and the UAE Redefine Environmental Leadership.” He, too, began by examining the social contract in the Gulf, emphasizing the enhanced role of provision and protection by regimes—made possible through the vast income generated by the oil and gas industries—in exchange for a lack of participation by their citizens. In the wake of growing pressures to lessen their dependence on fossil fuels, Dr. Zumbraegel argued that the emerging “Green Gulf Model” is characterized by strong, personalistic leadership, a techno-utopian vision which perhaps over-exaggerates the potential for new technologies to reverse environmental harm, strong emphasis on the continuing importance of fossil fuels; and a close alignment of environmental goals with other economic diversification projects, such as in sports and entertainment. Dr. Zumbraegel further sought to locate the role of these “green autocrats” in influencing global environmental governance, supported by a strong alliance of transnational corporations whose goals align with those of the Gulf regimes. 

To conclude, Dr. Zumbraegel argued that autocratic regimes in the Gulf have embraced a top-down approach to sustainability. By gradually pivoting towards green energy yet continuing to protect their oil and gas interests, Gulf states are attempting to maintain the rentier welfare state system whilst neglecting the environmental and social justice dimensions of sustainability altogether.  

Mr. Kardo Kareem Rashed, an expert on the intersection between religion and politics in the Middle East, discussed the intersection between religion and authoritarianism in his talk: “The Role of Salafism in the National and International Politics of Gulf Monarchies.” Taking a historical-analytical approach, Mr. Rashed began by tracing the roots of Salafism back to Saudi Arabia, emphasizing its complex role in shaping Saudi Arabian domestic and international politics since 9/11 due to links with Jihadism. He went on to note the relevance of the political decision-making process in Saudi Arabia, a strictly patrimonial regime, wherein power flows downwards through a hierarchical model of authority from the King to tribal sheikhs and army leaders. 

As Saudi Arabia evolved into a rentier state, Mr. Rached argues, Salafism became institutionalized; post-World War II, Salafism was a powerful tool used by Saudi King Faisal to oppose and suppress Arab nationalist movements, bolstered through the establishment of new educational institutions. The Gulf War marked a key turning point, however, as the Salafist movement rejected the presence of US troops on Saudi soil. As a result, the Saudi state began to tighten control over religious institutions and strengthened alliances with other nations on the basis of shared Islamist ideology. Overall, Mr. Rached argued, in a supposedly post-Salafi era, a complex relationship remains between the Saudi state and transnational religious dynamics.  

Finally, Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan, a leading scholar on the politics of Arab Gulf States, presented on the topic “Populism in Gulf Monarchies: Suppression, Cooptation, Adoption,” concluding our discussion with a more direct interrogation of populism itself, its varying definitions and its contemporary manifestations across the Gulf region. 

Dr. Diwan began by discussing salient conceptualizations of populism as a theory of international relations, an approach to economic policy, and a style of political leadership before arguing that populism appears particularly prominently as a discursive form of rhetoric in the Gulf region. Populist rhetoric frequently features direct appeals to “the people” as a virtuous citizenry and depicts a cultural, economic or political elite as a corrupt “establishment.” Dr Diwan aptly noted that populist rhetoric is also often tightly entwined with nationalism, as it punches both downwards, outwards the “undeserving” unproductive class, as well as outwards, targeting migrants and non-citizens too. 

While it might be surprising to see populism emerge in the Gulf states, considering their strong track record of resource distribution, Dr. Diwan argued that both increasing wealth inequality and the emergence of communication technology – e.g. social media – are both important factors in explaining the emergence of populism from below. Detailing a number of examples of populist rhetoric by opposition figures, Dr. Diwan argued that different Gulf Monarchies have responded with varying strategies of suppression, cooptation and adoption. In a particularly interesting case, she noted that Saudi Arabian elites have deployed populist rhetoric from above in an attempt to consolidate their state power, emphasizing the fluid nature of populist discursive strategies.  

Conclusion 

The 18th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series provided an engaging examination of some of the key contemporary features of populism and authoritarianism in the Gulf region. Each speaker presented an insightful contribution to this theme, from conceptualizing autocratization to gendering the social contract to the intersection between autocracy, environmentalism, and religion. Overall, the panel highlighted the pressing need for greater scholarly attention on the region within the field of populism studies, owing largely to the rapidly evolving social, political and environmental landscape of the Gulf states. In particular, scholars emphasized the need to consider both the material and non-material causal factors at play in furthering populist or autocratic trends. For instance, changes in wealth redistribution and affective emotional or discursive appeals were both highlighted as particularly relevant. 

The highly engaging and insightful analysis shared throughout the panel was, therefore, not only successful in representing a number of key developments within current scholarship on the region but also in signposting important avenues for further research. 

Overall, this session constituted an effective contribution to ECPS’s broader goal of advancing our understanding of populism across the globe. It will undoubtedly prove a valuable resource for those looking to enhance their understanding of the way in which populism and autocracy manifest and interact within the Gulf region today.  

In this AI-generated image, US presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump appear. Photo: Shutterstock.

What Do the US Election Results Tell Us about the Global Trajectory of Populism?

Please cite as: 

Sithole, Neo. (2025). “What Do the US Election Results Tell Us about the Global Trajectory of Populism?” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 8, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0093

 

The ECPS panel provided an in-depth exploration of how the 2024 US Presidential Election reflects and impacts global populism. Experts analyzed key dynamics, including economic grievances, cultural shifts, and political polarization. Moderated by Ali H. Aslan, the discussion highlighted the role of evangelical populism, Trumpism’s transatlantic influence, and global democratic erosion. Distinguished panelists emphasized the need for liberal democracies to counter autocratic trends by offering compelling solutions and reinforcing institutions. This timely dialogue shed light on the interplay between economic, cultural, and institutional forces shaping contemporary populist movements worldwide.

Report by Neo Sithole

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened an insightful panel discussion to analyze the implications of the 2024 US Presidential Election on the global trajectory of populism. This critical event, held on Thursday, November 14, 2024, featured leading scholars and experts exploring how the election results reflect shifting political dynamics in the United States and their ripple effects worldwide.

Moderated by Ali H. Aslan, a seasoned Washington-based journalist and former Washington correspondent for Zaman Daily, the panel brings together prominent voices in political science and sociology to dissect key themes shaping contemporary populism. Dr. Alan Abramowitz, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Emory University, delves into the economic underpinnings of the election with his presentation, “It Was (Mostly) the Economy, Stupid: Explaining Trump’s Victory.” Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Regent’s Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University and Research Affiliate at CEU’s Democracy Institute, examines the broader implications of the election for global populism in her talk, “Explaining the US Election Outcome and Its Implications for Global Populism.”  Dr. Marcia Pally, a scholar at New York University and Humboldt University-Berlin, sheds light on the pivotal role of white evangelical voters in shaping the 2024 electoral landscape in her presentation, “The Role of White Evangelicals in the 2024 US Presidential Election: What We Know So Far.”  Dr. Mabel Berezin, Distinguished Professor at Cornell University and Director of the Institute for European Studies, extends the discussion to transatlantic populist trends with her analysis, “Does Trumpism Cross the Atlantic?” Dr. Marina Nord, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, explores the long-term implications of Trump’s return to power for global democracy in her presentation, “The Return of Trump and the Future of Global Democracy.”

This timely panel offered a comprehensive examination of the US election’s domestic and international implications, emphasizing how populist movements and ideologies influence governance, democracy, and political discourse across the globe. Attendees gained valuable insights into the interplay of economic, cultural, and religious factors shaping contemporary populism and its global manifestations.

Mr. Aslan: ‘Trump’s Campaign Successfully Leveraged Anti-establishment Rhetoric, Economic Promises, and Nationalist Appeals’

Moderator Ali H. Aslan began by providing an overview of the constitutional, federal, and governmental structure of the United States, emphasizing that, while minor parties exist, the US predominantly functions as a two-party democracy, with the conservative-leaning Republican Party and the liberal-leaning Democratic Party as the primary contenders. He noted that the recent US elections marked a significant political shift, with voters replacing Democratic President Joe Biden with Republican nominee Donald Trump. 

Mr. Aslan recounted growing concerns about Biden’s age and health, which led him to withdraw from the race months before the election and endorse Vice President Kamala Harris as the Democratic candidate. Trump’s victory over Harris was decisive, securing 312 Electoral College votes and winning the national popular vote by over 3 million. His campaign successfully leveraged anti-establishment rhetoric, economic promises, and nationalist appeals, expanding support among traditionally Democratic groups, including Hispanic, African American, and Muslim voters. The election also saw the Republican Party flipping the Senate with 53 seats and narrowly regaining control of the House of Representatives, consolidating significant political power.

Mr. Aslan noted that this consolidation raises concerns about the potential erosion of democratic institutions, given the Supreme Court’s conservative majority and Trump’s anti-establishment approach. He highlighted that critics warn of authoritarian risks, while others express confidence in the resilience of US constitutional traditions. Trump’s unpredictable leadership style adds further uncertainty as his administration begins shaping policies and making key appointments.

Professor Abramowitz: ‘Democrats’ Electoral Loss Was Primarily Driven by Economic Concerns’

The first contribution to this session was made by Professor Alan Abramowitz who analyzed how the 2024 US Presidential Election underscored critical dynamics shaped in part by Incumbent President Joe Biden’s low approval rating, with a net disapproval of -20%. He argued that the decisive factor in the Democratic Party’s defeat was largely economic, encapsulated in the phrase, “It was (mostly) the Economy, Stupid.” Professor Abramowitz pointed out that the Democrats’ electoral loss was primarily driven by economic concerns, particularly the high inflation that persisted throughout Biden’s term. This followed historical trends in which unpopular presidents often lead their parties to electoral defeats. While recent improvements in job growth, easing inflation, and a resilient labor market offered positive economic indicators, these developments failed to alter public perceptions of economic instability, which were deeply entrenched among key voting blocs and created fertile ground for demands for change.

Professor Abramowitz illustrated how President-elect Donald Trump effectively tapped into this discontent, narrowly winning the national popular vote by 1–2% and flipping pivotal swing states by razor-thin margins. His victory highlighted the enduring polarization of the American electorate, with turnout patterns reflecting deep demographic and geographic divides. While both parties continued to dominate their respective strongholds, competition in battleground states showcased the intensity of partisan loyalties. The election results reflected broader challenges in bridging ideological divides and navigating an electorate fractured along economic and cultural lines. Despite significant policy debates and contrasting visions for the country, economic perceptions and presidential approval ratings remained the dominant forces driving voter behavior, ultimately shaping the trajectory of this closely contested election.

Professor McCoy: ‘Economic Stress and Cultural Disruption Drive Political Shifts’

Professor Jennifer McCoy was the second panelist who explored how sustained duress—whether in the form of threats, economic hardship, or perceived loss—often fosters an “us vs. them” mentality. Professor McCoy highlighted that this psychological shift is a common human response, where the perceived source of harm becomes the target of suspicion and blame. Consequently, individuals may distance themselves from outsiders to protect their own group. This dynamic is particularly evident in populist movements, where economic stress and cultural disruption drive political shifts. She referenced a study of 800 elections across 20 democracies from the 1870s to 2014, demonstrating how financial crises have consistently resulted in significant gains for both far-right and left-wing populist parties. Under such conditions, people often turn to leaders who promise to restore security and address their fears, especially when threats are perceived as originating from outsiders.

Professor McCoy addressed the global trend of anti-incumbent voting, observing that in the US, this phenomenon has skewed rightward due to narrow electoral margins and the structure of the two-party system. She emphasized the need to distinguish between campaign rhetoric and actual policies, raising questions about who benefits from Republican agendas: upper-income earners or working-class voters. She characterized the Republican coalition as a mix of wealthy elites, middle-class supporters, and the religious right. In conclusion, Professor McCoy argued that the same anti-authoritarian and community-focused principles that once contributed to America’s vibrancy have, under current pressures, evolved into suspicion, division, and polarization.

Professor Pally: ‘Anti-authoritarianism, Theological Distrust of Government, and Perceived Cultural Losses Intensify White Evangelicals’ Alignment with Right-wing Populism’

Professor Marcia Pally delivered the third presentation and examined the historical, cultural, and political forces shaping American and white evangelical populism. Professor Pally explained that white evangelicals in the US are influenced by historical and doctrinal frameworks, such as Covenantal Political Theory, Aristotelian Republicanism, and Liberalism, which emphasize skepticism toward government, elites, and outsiders. These traditions, coupled with cultural and economic distress, have fostered deep distrust of authority. The Puritan and covenantal ideals brought to the US emphasized community governance and personal responsibility, with a strong reluctance to depend on external authorities. This perspective has been compounded by a sense of cultural and religious loss in the face of increasing secularism, leading white evangelicals to adopt a defensive “us vs. them” worldview, often perceiving secular government and liberal society as antagonistic.

Professor Pally identified economic stress, technological changes, demographic shifts, and cultural anxieties as key drivers of populism among white evangelicals. She highlighted their struggle with declining cultural dominance in an increasingly secular society, noting that legal changes, such as the legalization of same-sex marriage, have heightened fears of marginalization. For white evangelicals, a mix of anti-authoritarianism, theological distrust of government, and perceived cultural losses has intensified their alignment with right-wing populism. Professor Pally also pointed out the irony that evangelical values, once a force for community and anti-authoritarianism, now contribute to divisive rhetoric in a polarized political climate, further exacerbating challenges to American democracy.

Professor Berezin: ‘Trumpism Emboldened Paramilitary Groups, Fostering a Culture of Intimidation and Fear’

Following Professor Pally was Professor Mabel Berezin who delivered a presentation titled “Does Trumpism Cross the Atlantic?” Acknowledging the evolving nature of the discussion, Professor Berezin noted that the recent US election results had reframed many issues, leaving several aspects too early to fully assess. Reflecting on previous presentations, she traced the rise of anti-democratic, right-wing nationalist trends in Europe while emphasizing the distinct dangers posed by the American context.

Professor Berezin highlighted the global trend of democratic backsliding, where skepticism toward democracy is growing, but she pointed out that the US faces unique “dangerous pulse points.” These include the rise of paramilitary groups, judicial realignments, and intellectual movements advocating for social authoritarianism. She particularly emphasized the concerning legitimization of paramilitary groups under Trump, which had previously been relegated to the fringes of society. Trumpism emboldened these groups, fostering a culture of intimidation and fear. Recalling personal experiences in campaign areas marked by gun culture and economic hardship, Berezin underscored the growing normalization of such groups.

In addition, Professor Berezin warned about the rise of intellectual and institutional movements aimed at dismantling regulatory frameworks and traditional family structures. These movements, she argued, pose an even greater threat than paramilitary groups due to their organized and legally entrenched influence. She also highlighted the weakening of democratic protections and the erosion of international institutions. She cited Marine Le Pen’s call for Europe to defend its interests as an example of the broader challenges posed by Trump’s presidency, warning of its implications for global democratic stability.

Dr. Nord: ‘Many Countries Experience Rising Political Polarization, Disinformation, and Weakening Democratic Standards’

The final presentation was delivered by Dr. Marina Nord who discussed the decline of democracy in the United States, comparing it to global trends and the Liberal Democracy Index. She highlighted that while the US once ranked above the Western European and North American average for democracy, it now falls below, particularly after the Trump presidency. The sharp drop in democratic accountability since 2016 has not been fully reversed under Biden’s administration. Dr. Nord showcased declines in key indicators such as deliberative processes, electoral integrity, and the spread of misinformation, illustrating the significant challenges facing US democracy. She explained that globally, many countries—including the US—are experiencing rising political polarization, disinformation, and weakening democratic standards, all of which contribute to a broader trend of democratic erosion.

This shift aligns with the growing influence of autocracies, with countries like those in the BRICS bloc gaining economic and political power. Dr. Nord concluded by emphasizing the need for liberal democracies to counter populist and autocratic narratives by offering more persuasive solutions. She cited research on the dividends of democracy, particularly in areas like security and media freedom, underscoring the necessity for democracies to adapt to global challenges and strengthen their institutions to prevent further decline.

This ECPS panel highlighted how the 2024 election reflects broader global trends in populism, polarization, and democratic erosion. Through insightful presentations, scholars dissected the interplay of economic, cultural, and institutional factors shaping contemporary populist movements. From economic grievances driving political shifts, as Dr. Abramowitz explained, to the complex role of cultural identity and evangelical populism discussed by Dr. Pally, the event underscored the multifaceted nature of populist influence. The panelists collectively stressed the urgency for liberal democracies to adapt and counter autocratic narratives to safeguard democratic institutions worldwide.

Photo: Shutterstock.

Gouveia e Melo and the Military Messianic Zeitgeist in Portugal

Vice Admiral Gouveia e Melo’s rise from COVID-19 vaccination leader to potential presidential contender reflects Portugal’s cultural heritage of military messianism. His disciplined leadership, amplified by media narratives, crafted a savior image transcending political divides. This phenomenon taps into Portugal’s historical archetypes, where military figures with messianic undertones captivate public imagination. While appealing to a public seeking stability, his trajectory highlights the tension between democratic governance and charismatic authority. This case underscores the risks of media-driven political personas overshadowing pluralism and institutional accountability in democratic systems.

By João Ferreira Dias 

We are living in the age of populism (v.g. Kaltwasser et al., 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The dichotomic distinction between the “good people” and the “corrupt elite” is an old concept, perpetually relevant and adaptable to different historical and political contexts. The division rests on a potent narrative that appeals to collective identity and moral superiority, where the people are depicted as inherently virtuous and the elite as inherently corrupt or self-serving. This framing, though simplistic, resonates deeply with human societies, reflecting a timeless unease with concentrated power and authority. Discomfort in the face of “power,” whether embodied in a monarch, a state, or other ruling structures, has been a persistent theme throughout history. This is particularly significant given that the rule of law, liberal democracy, and pluralism—foundations of modern governance—are relatively recent achievements, fragile in their existence and often under siege.

In this light, the enduring impulse to give “voice” to the voiceless, to free the oppressed, or to emancipate marginalized groups has been a driving force of revolutionary thought and action across eras. Figures such as Jesus Christ, Karl Marx, Zumbi dos Palmares, and the architects of the French Revolution embody this ethos in vastly different contexts yet share the common thread of striving against perceived systems of domination or exploitation. These examples illustrate the universality of the struggle against oppression, transcending specific cultural or economic systems.

Indeed, the concept of “oppression” is not the exclusive domain of capitalist or Western paradigms, as some postmodern critiques suggest. Rather, it reflects a fundamental aspect of human societies—an observable dynamic of dominance and resistance that appears across diverse geographies and historical periods. This suggests that the drive for justice and liberation is an intrinsic part of human behavior, rooted in our collective desire for fairness, equity, and autonomy. As such, the discourse of populism, while modern in its form, taps into an ancient and deeply embedded narrative that continues to shape our political and social realities.

But today, the zeitgeist has shifted, and the narrative of “the will of the majority” has been co-opted by radical right populists, who position themselves as the champions of “the people” against “the elites,” thereby deepening societal divisions. As Mudde (2017) articulates, populism is characterized by four “core concepts”: ideology, the people, the elite, and the general will. These elements form the backbone of populist rhetoric, creating a binary opposition that fuels polarization. However, this polarization has expanded beyond the classic dichotomy of “people vs. elites,” evolving into a broader confrontation of “people vs. democracy” (Mounk, 2018). In this redefined landscape, the struggle manifests as a “culture war” against progressivism, driven by what Norris and Inglehart (2019) describe as a “cultural backlash,” where the illiberal tendencies of radical right movements and parties gain momentum.

This cultural conflict not only pits traditionalism against progressive ideals but also allows radical right populists to portray themselves as defenders of the people’s will. They adopt a performative stance, positioning themselves as the true voice of the people while simultaneously framing their ideological adversaries—progressives and the left—as disconnected elites or as perpetrators of societal decay. This reversal of roles further intensifies societal rifts. Those once perceived as the oppressors claim the mantle of representing popular sovereignty, while the “left,” in their focus on identity politics and critiques of systemic inequality—dismissively labeled as “cultural Marxism” (e.g., Dworkin, 1997; Kellner, 2013; Jamin, 2014)—is portrayed as elitist and divisive.

In this context, radical right populists leverage grievances about cultural and economic change, presenting themselves as custodians of traditional values in the face of perceived threats from globalism, multiculturalism, and liberal progressivism. This strategy not only mobilizes support but also weaponizes nostalgia for a past where societal roles and cultural norms were allegedly more stable. The resulting dynamic is a volatile reconfiguration of populist discourse, where claims of defending “the people” serve to legitimize illiberal practices and undermine democratic norms.

The Charismatic-Messianic Leader and Military Uniforms in Portugal

The association between charismatic leaders and military symbolism has long shaped political narratives in Portugal. The notion of the authoritarian populist, as described by Canovan (1981, 1999), centers on a leader who positions themselves as distinct from traditional elites, embodying anti-elitism (Taggart, 2000). Such leaders often portray themselves as the singular representatives of “the people,” channeling frustrations and grievances while presenting themselves as truth-tellers against a corrupt establishment. This narrative intersects with messianism, rooted in religious traditions. The figure of the Messiah—whether as the warrior-king David or the redeemer Jesus—has laid the groundwork for the Messiah-politician, a charismatic leader claiming to lead the “chosen people” toward peace and justice (Negrão, 2001). In Portuguese and Brazilian cultures, this messianic ideal deeply influences political imaginaries, particularly through Sebastianism, a mythological construct that has left a lasting legacy.

Sebastianism emerged after the disappearance of King Sebastian at the Battle of Alcácer-Quibir in 1578, which triggered a dynastic crisis. The myth of the king’s return, mounted on a white horse amidst the fog, intertwined notions of national salvation with religious messianism. As Oliveira Martins (2014) described, Sebastianism was a “posthumous proof of nationality,” while Lourenço (1978) saw it as emblematic of Portugal’s “irrealistic existence.” Later, Fernando Pessoa associated it with the Arthurian legend, while Teixeira de Pascoaes connected it to the Portuguese sentiment of saudade—a complex mix of absence, longing, and hope (Barros Dias, 2017). Under the Estado Novo regime (1933–1974), Salazar appropriated Sebastianism as a political tool. His leadership, steeped in authoritarianism, was often framed through a messianic lens, consolidating his charismatic authority (Plo, 2006).

Charismatic leadership persists in democratic societies, adapting to contemporary needs. Ferreira da Cunha (2015) notes that Portuguese society’s disillusionment with electoral systems fosters susceptibility to leaders blending personal charisma with symbolic unity. Portugal, historically considered resistant to populism and radical right movements (Carreira da Silva & Salgado, 2018; Santana-Pereira & Cancela, 2020; Valle, 2020), nevertheless exhibits subtler forms of populism. Zúquete (2022) highlights “soft populism” in figures such as Sidónio Pais, Humberto Delgado, and Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. Sidónio Pais, as president in 1918, symbolized military populism, often appearing in uniform and on horseback, claiming to unify the “good people” against partisan elites. Humberto Delgado, running for president in 1958, used his military background to challenge Salazar, portraying himself as a moral alternative to the regime’s corruption. After the 1974 Revolution, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho became a socialist populist figure, advocating for direct democracy and opposing capitalist and imperialist forces (Zúquete, 2022).

These examples illustrate how charismatic military figures resonate within Portuguese political culture, leveraging historical and cultural archetypes to establish authority. Military symbolism, intertwined with messianic undertones, remains a potent element in the public imagination, particularly during crises, reflecting the enduring interplay of history, myth, and leadership.

The Vice-Admiral Gouveia e Melo

Vice Admiral Gouveia e Melo’s rise to prominence during Portugal’s COVID-19 vaccination campaign was undoubtedly shaped by his disciplined leadership and problem-solving approach. However, his transition from a public health figure to a potential presidential contender highlights the significant role of media in constructing political personas. The media’s portrayal of Gouveia e Melo not only amplified his public image but arguably fabricated his emergence as a viable political figure, providing him with disproportionate coverage and framing him as a savior in a time of crisis.

From the outset, media narratives emphasized his charisma, military efficiency, and straightforward communication style, crafting an image of stability and trustworthiness. Frequent headlines lauded his achievements and speculated on his political future, often portraying him as a unifying, non-partisan figure capable of navigating the complexities of national leadership. This excessive attention contributed to a sense of inevitability around his potential candidacy, aligning with the archetype of the charismatic leader rooted in Portugal’s cultural tradition of messianism and military populism (Zúquete, 2022).

Despite his avoidance of explicit political rhetoric or anti-elitist positioning, the media filled this ideological void, elevating his military credentials and projecting him as a figure above the political divide. This media-driven fabrication can be seen as both a response to public demand for strong, competent leadership during a period of uncertainty and an active shaping of public opinion. By consistently spotlighting Gouveia e Melo, news outlets contributed to the perception of his indispensability in the political sphere, even before he expressed any clear intention to run for office. However, the anticipation of his retirement from military functions in the Navy paved the way to make very clear his intentions to run for the presidency, becoming a hot topic in political debate programs, and making the mainstream parties to avoid presenting an early candidate, especially considering that public surveys are giving him a most likely win.

Conclusion

Vice Admiral Gouveia e Melo’s trajectory from a public health figure to a potential presidential contender epitomizes the interplay between charismatic leadership, media-driven narratives, and Portugal’s cultural heritage of (military) messianism. His disciplined leadership during the COVID-19 vaccination campaign, amplified by media narratives, crafted an image of a savior capable of transcending political divides. This phenomenon is deeply rooted in Portugal’s historical and cultural archetypes, where figures associated with military symbolism and messianic undertones have long captured the public imagination.

Gouveia e Melo’s rise highlights the fragile boundaries between democratic governance and the allure of charismatic authority. While his candidacy may appeal to a public yearning for stability and strong leadership in times of crisis, it also underscores the risks of media-fueled political personas overshadowing democratic pluralism and institutional accountability. This case serves as a contemporary reflection of Portugal’s historical relationship with populism, messianism, and the enduring tension between tradition and progress.


 

References

Canovan, M. (1981). Populism. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. Political Studies, 47(1), 2–16.

Carreira da Silva, F., & Salgado, S. (2018). Why no populism in Portugal? In Changing societies: Legacies and challenges. Vol. 2. Citizenship in crisis (pp. 249–268).

Dworkin, D. (1997). Cultural Marxism in postwar Britain: History, the New Left, and the origins of cultural studies. Duke University Press.

Jamin, J. (2014). Cultural Marxism and the radical right. In The post-war Anglo-American far right: A special relationship of hate (pp. 84–103).

Kellner, D. (2013). Cultural Marxism & cultural studies. Critical Quest.

Kaltwasser, C. R., Taggart, P. A., Espejo, P. O., & Ostiguy, P. (Eds.). (2017). The Oxford handbook of populism.Oxford University Press.

Lourenço, E. (1978). O labirinto da saudade. Lisboa: Publicações D. Quixote.

Mounk, Y. (2019). The people vs. democracy: Why our freedom is in danger and how to save it. Harvard University Press.

Mudde, C. (2017). Populism: An ideational approach. In C. R. Kaltwasser, P. A. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of populism (pp. 27–47). Oxford University Press.

Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.

Negrão, L. N. (2001). Revisitando o messianismo no Brasil e profetizando seu futuro. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 16, 119–129.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press.

Oliveira Martins, J. P. (2014). História de Portugal. Edições Vercial.

Plo, A. R. R. (2006). Elecciones presidenciales en Portugal: cavaquismo, sebastianismo e ilusiones colectivas. Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano (ARI)10(1), 1696–3466.

Santana-Pereira, J., & Cancela, J. (2020). Demand without supply? Populist attitudes and voting behaviour in post-bailout Portugal. South European Society and Politics, 25(2), 205–228.

Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Valle, A. L. R. M. N. D. (2020). Populismo nos programas eleitorais dos partidos portugueses para as legislativas de 2019: Uma questão de grau? (Doctoral dissertation).

Zúquete, J. P. (2022). Populismo: Lá fora e cá dentro. Lisboa: Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.

Illustration: Shutterstock.

The Resilience of Multiculturalism: Ideas, Politics and Practice — Essays in Honour of Tariq Modood

Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “The Resilience of Multiculturalism: Ideas, Politics and Practice — Essays in Honour of Tariq Modood.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. December 26, 2024.https://doi.org/10.55271/br0024

 

Tariq Modood’s groundbreaking work on multiculturalism is celebrated in this volume, highlighting his transformative contributions to the field. Through the concepts of “multicultural nationalism” and “moderate secularism,” Modood offers a sophisticated framework that harmonizes diverse identities with a cohesive sense of national belonging. Edited by Thomas Sealy, Varun Uberoi, and Nasar Meer, the book tackles pressing challenges such as populism, globalization, and transnationalism, while situating Modood’s legacy within global debates on identity and citizenship. Although the collection’s depth and interdisciplinary scope are impressive, its Western-centric focus somewhat limits its comparative applicability. Nonetheless, this volume is an indispensable resource for advancing multiculturalism as a counter to the populist radical right in both theory and practice.

Reviewed by Bulent Kenes

The connections between populist radical right ideologies and racism, nativism, nationalism, welfare chauvinism, anti-immigration sentiment, Islamophobia, and anti-minority discourses, actions, and policies are undeniable. One potential countermeasure to this form of homogenizing cultural and racial populism is the establishment of a robust framework for multiculturalism, cultural hybridity, and heterogeneity. This framework should uphold and guarantee individual and collective rights and freedoms, both to and from, for minority groups and peace and comfort for dominant majority culture.

In this context, the contributions of Tariq Modood have garnered significant attention. The European Centre for Populism Studies (ECPS) has recognized the relevance of his work and decided to publish a review of the book The Resilience of Multiculturalism: Ideas, Politics and Practice: Essays in Honour of Tariq Modood. Edited by Thomas Sealy, Varun Uberoi, and Nasar Meer, this volume explores and celebrates Modood’s influential ideas on multiculturalism and its practical implications in contemporary society.

The book serves as a tribute to Tariq Modood’s substantial contributions to the theory and practice of multiculturalism. It offers a wide-ranging exploration of multiculturalism as a concept that continues to evolve, addressing contemporary issues of identity, inclusion, and diversity in diverse societies. Divided into four thematic sections—philosophical orientations, diversity and inclusion, nationalism and transnationalism, and secularism—the book includes contributions from eminent scholars across these fields.

The chapter “Introduction: Modoodian Multiculturalism,” co-authored by the book’s editors, explores Modood’s influential contributions to multiculturalism, situating his ideas within global debates on identity, citizenship, and diversity. It emphasizes Modood’s interdisciplinary approach, blending political theory with sociology to address evolving multicultural challenges. Contextualizing critiques and the perceived decline of multiculturalism, particularly amid populist narratives, cultural “wars,” and political skepticism, the editors highlight its resilience as both a policy and theoretical framework. They underscore multiculturalism’s relevance in tackling racial and ethnic justice, as reflected in movements like Black Lives Matter and indigenous rights debates.

The chapter delves into Modood’s key contributions, particularly his formulation of “Modoodian multiculturalism,” integrating sociological insights with normative political theory. Central concepts include ethno-religious identities and cultural racism, addressing gaps in traditional anti-racism and secularist paradigms. Modood’s advocacy for plural anti-racism and “multicultural nationalism” is pivotal, proposing an inclusive reshaping of national identities to foster minority belonging. By articulating Modood’s innovative approaches to recognition, inclusion, and national belonging, the chapter situates his work as vital to advancing multiculturalism in theory and practice. It effectively introduces the volume, tracing Modood’s intellectual legacy and global relevance, while setting the stage for thematic explorations of multiculturalism’s enduring significance.

In the chapter “Invoking the Idealist World of Ideas,” David Boucher explores Modood’s intellectual engagement with British idealism, particularly the philosophies of Michael Oakeshott and R.G. Collingwood. Boucher highlights how Modood’s grounding in idealist traditions informs his conception of multicultural citizenship, shaping his interdisciplinary synthesis of political theory and sociology. Boucher argues that Modood’s work embodies a “world of ideas” rooted in Collingwood’s hierarchical and overlapping forms of experience and Oakeshott’s philosophical skepticism toward rigid abstraction. Modood’s rejection of the categorical separation between theory and practice, derived from Collingwood, becomes central to his critique of Oakeshott’s anti-essentialism and his emphasis on identity as dynamic and contextual rather than fixed. This conceptual orientation allows Modood to address the practical challenges of multiculturalism while remaining philosophically rigorous.

Boucher demonstrates how Modood adapts the idealist framework to contemporary issues of multiculturalism, such as identity, cultural continuity, and anti-racism. The author also situates Modood’s contributions within a broader philosophical revival, emphasizing his alignment with the idealist principles of “identity in difference” and “continuity through change.” Ultimately, Boucher’s analysis underscores the enduring influence of British idealism on Modood’s theoretical and practical engagement with multicultural citizenship, offering valuable insights into the philosophical underpinnings of his work.

In chapter titled “Intimating or Iterating? Modood on Contextualism and the Danish Cartoons of Muhammad,” Sune Lægaard critically evaluates Tariq Modood’s iterative contextualist methodology through the lens of the Danish Cartoon Affair. Lægaard examines the tensions between Modood’s stated commitment to contextual sensitivity and the practical application of this methodology in his writings on the controversy. Lægaard acknowledges Modood’s contextualism as a theoretically rich approach, particularly in its sensitivity to local norms and iterative refinement of general principles. However, he raises concerns about the selective nature of Modood’s contextual engagement. For instance, Modood’s interpretation of the cartoons, particularly the “bomb-in-the-turban” cartoon, is critiqued for privileging one interpretation—Muslims as targets of racism—while neglecting the cartoonists’ stated intentions, such as criticizing extremism. Lægaard argues that this selective framing undermines Modood’s broader claim to contextual neutrality.

Further, Lægaard challenges Modood’s use of analogies, such as Holocaust denial laws, to justify restrictions on speech targeting Muslims. He points out inaccuracies in Modood’s application of Danish blasphemy and hate-speech laws, which already protected religious groups, including Muslims, thereby questioning the relevance of Modood’s arguments in this specific case. While Lægaard commends the adaptability of Modood’s contextualism, he highlights methodological inconsistencies that weaken its application. These critiques underscore the challenges of balancing context-sensitive analysis with normative commitments in political theory. Lægaard’s analysis reinforces the need for greater precision in contextual methodologies, even as he acknowledges the enduring value of Modood’s broader theoretical contributions.

Simon Thompson’s chapter, “Tariq Modood and the Politics of Recognition,” provides a critical exploration of the role of recognition in Modood’s theory of multiculturalism. The chapter positions recognition as a cornerstone in Modood’s intellectual framework, especially in understanding and addressing the dynamics of multicultural societies. Thompson organizes his analysis around four themes: equality, identity, struggle, and inclusion. He commends Modood for his dual conception of equality—equal dignity and equal respect—and his emphasis on the interplay between individual and group recognition. Thompson also highlights Modood’s nuanced focus on ethno-religious identities, which distinguishes his work from traditional liberal multiculturalist theories. Further, he underscores Modood’s dynamic understanding of identity as a dialectical process shaped by insider self-ascriptions and outsider perceptions, framing struggles for recognition as central to addressing misrecognition and exclusion.

However, Thompson raises critical concerns about Modood’s framework. He critiques the lack of practical guidance on when and how to apply equal dignity versus equal respect and calls for a more robust metric to navigate this distinction. Additionally, he notes Modood’s relative neglect of socio-economic inequalities, arguing that a comprehensive theory of justice should integrate both multicultural and economic dimensions. Thompson also challenges the ambiguity in Modood’s conceptualization of group recognition, urging greater clarity about whether groups deserve recognition for their intrinsic value or for the sake of their members. Nevertheless, Thompson’s critique is constructive, acknowledging Modood’s valuable contributions while suggesting areas for further refinement. 

In chapter titled “What’s to Be Done? Reuniting the People,” Charles Taylor engages with the divisive impact of exclusionary populism, proposing inclusive frameworks to reconcile societal divisions and foster cohesion. Taylor’s chapter is a robust examination of how modern democracies, fractured by inequalities and identity politics, might navigate towards unity through redefining national identity and embracing multicultural and intercultural narratives. Taylor’s analysis is compelling in its multi-faceted approach, identifying the dual fissures in contemporary democracies: the elite-populist divide and the tensions arising from cultural or ethnic differences. He underscores the need for democracies to craft inclusive political identities that honor both equality and historical narratives of national identity. His advocacy for interculturalism, particularly as a counterpoint to misinterpretations of multiculturalism in Europe, provides a roadmap for societal integration, emphasizing dialogue, collaboration, and a rejection of exclusionary policies. However, the chapter is not without shortcomings. Taylor’s solutions, while idealistic and principled, lack concrete mechanisms for implementation, particularly in polarized contexts where identity politics dominate public discourse. His reliance on examples like Canada and Quebec, while illustrative, may not translate seamlessly to societies with entrenched histories of racial and cultural strife, such as the US or France. Furthermore, his critique of exclusionary populism occasionally underplays the structural forces that sustain such ideologies.

In the chapter titled “The Unfinished Tasks of Multiculturalism: Thinking of Multiculturalism, Thinking with Tariq Modood,” Gurpreet Mahajan presents a thorough exploration of Modood’s contributions to multicultural political theory, with a specific focus on the interplay between multiculturalism, religion, and secularism. Mahajan highlights Modood’s approach to integration, which emphasizes the positive recognition of diverse identities, and his advocacy for reframing secularism as compatible with multicultural principles. This chapter stands out for its systematic articulation of “unfinished tasks” within multicultural discourse, inviting further scholarly and public engagement.

Mahajan effectively foregrounds the complexity of Modood’s argument that religion should be seen as a “public good,” thus challenging rigid secularist frameworks and pushing for inclusive policies that integrate minority religious perspectives into public life. However, this proposition raises critical questions regarding the balance between accommodating religious identities and maintaining secularism’s neutrality, especially in contexts where religious orthodoxy may conflict with liberal values. A notable strength of Mahajan’s analysis is her critique of multiculturalism’s perceived alignment with religious resurgence, which has alienated left-liberal allies. She also underscores the need for deeper engagement with intra-group inequalities and the homogenizing tendencies of identity-based discourses. While Mahajan successfully identifies pressing challenges for multiculturalism—such as inter-minority conflicts and the methodological tensions of de-essentializing communities—the chapter could benefit from more concrete proposals to address these gaps. 

In her chapter titled “From the Race Relations Act 1968 to the Great Repeal Act 2018: Back to Square One in 50 Years?” Maleiha Malik presents a deeply analytical and historically grounded examination of the evolution of race relations in the UK, juxtaposing the promise of legislative progress with the regressive realities that culminated in Brexit. Malik’s work underscores the enduring influence of Britain’s imperial legacy on contemporary racial hierarchies, connecting colonial governance to modern racialized exclusion. Her critique of the Race Relations Act (RRA) 1968 reveals its limitations in addressing structural racism, focusing instead on individual acts of discrimination, a pattern that persists through subsequent legal frameworks.

Malik’s critique of Brexit as a racially charged political project is particularly compelling. She argues that populist rhetoric glorifying the British Empire masked the exclusionary nationalism that defined the Leave campaign, fueling a backlash against migrants and minority communities. Her analysis highlights how cultural and religious discrimination—especially Islamophobia—has evolved, amplifying new forms of racialization beyond traditional categories of color or ethnicity. While Malik’s historical framing is powerful, her portrayal of race relations legislation as consistently undermined by nativist anxieties invites further exploration of successful counter-movements. Moreover, her reliance on Brexit as a focal point risks overshadowing broader trends in global populism and anti-immigrant sentiment. Overall, Malik’s chapter is a robust critique of Britain’s struggle to reconcile its imperial past with a truly inclusive multicultural future, urging renewed efforts to combat the structural legacies of racism.

In “Multicultural Nationalism as an Ethics of Social Membership,” Will Kymlicka offers an exploration of the interplay between multiculturalism and nationalism, presenting a potential reconciliation through the concept of “multicultural nationalism.” Drawing from T.H. Marshall’s citizenship framework, Kymlicka contends that national solidarity and multicultural inclusion can coexist by redefining shared societal membership in pluralistic terms. His argument builds on empirical data, highlighting both opportunities and challenges in fostering an inclusive national identity. Kymlicka’s analysis is commendable for addressing the perceived incompatibility between nationalism and multiculturalism. His argument that membership rights can act as a vehicle for inclusivity resonates with Modood’s advocacy for multicultural nationalism. However, the chapter also critically acknowledges the risks inherent in Marshallian politics, particularly its historical tendency to marginalize minorities and reinforce societal hierarchies. The discussion on majority perceptions of minority commitment adds a critical dimension, revealing how perceptions influence support for minority rights. However, this approach risks oversimplifying minority identities and aspirations by framing their inclusion primarily in terms of majority acceptance. Populism surfaces implicitly, as Kymlicka critiques nationalism’s potential for exclusion while emphasizing its capacity for solidarity. 

In chapter titled “Integrating Modood and Kymlicka on National Inclusion,” Geoffrey Brahm Levey undertakes a critical analysis of Modood’s multicultural nationalism and Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism, arguing for a synthesis that leverages the strengths of both approaches to foster inclusive democracies. Levey critiques Kymlicka’s dismissal of significant differences between the two frameworks, as well as Modood’s assertion of the superiority of multicultural nationalism, ultimately advocating for an integrative model. Levey highlights Kymlicka’s recalibration of his cultural rights framework to emphasize minority contributions to society as a means of fostering solidarity. However, he critiques this shift for placing undue responsibility on minorities while neglecting structural adjustments required from majority groups. Similarly, he challenges Modood’s reliance on top-down transformations of national identity, arguing that such efforts often provoke resistance and caricature rather than fostering inclusion. The chapter engages with populism indirectly, critiquing majoritarian tendencies to frame minorities as undeserving or disloyal, which underpins populist rhetoric. Levey’s proposed integration of liberal and multicultural nationalism emphasizes concrete protections for minorities alongside a gradual reshaping of national identity through inclusive symbols and narratives. Levey’s analysis offers valuable insights into multicultural theory, though it underscores the challenges of balancing theoretical ideals with pragmatic strategies for fostering social cohesion.

Riva Kastoryano explores the complexities of transnationalism and its implications for nationalism and multiculturalism in her chapter titled “Transnational Experiences: Redefining Solidarity and Nationalisms.” She critiques state-centric multicultural policies, arguing that transnational belonging fundamentally reconfigures traditional nationalist paradigms by fostering non-territorial solidarities that challenge bounded national identities. Kastoryano draws on historical frameworks, such as Randolph Bourne’s concept of a “transnational America,” to contextualize modern transnational dynamics. She contrasts the civic integration goals of multicultural nationalism, as articulated by Modood, with the deterritorialized identities emerging from transnational networks. This juxtaposition highlights a tension: while multicultural nationalism seeks to integrate diverse groups within a nation-state framework, transnationalism transcends borders, creating new, imagined communities and solidarities based on shared identities or causes.

A key criticism is that state-driven multicultural nationalism may fail to address the non-territorial and fluid identities fostered by globalization. Kastoryano underscores the rise of “diaspora politics,” where states and transnational actors negotiate identities and allegiances, sometimes reinforcing exclusionary or populist discourses. She critiques the resurgence of ethno-cultural nationalism, often rebranded as populism, for exploiting migrants’ transnational solidarities as perceived threats to national sovereignty. Kastoryano’s chapter is a significant contribution to understanding the intersections of globalization, identity, and nationalism. 

Anna Triandafyllidou’s chapter “What Can Migration and National Identity Look Like in the Mid-Twenty-First Century? Transnational Diasporas and Digital Nomads” examines the interplay of migration, digital technologies, and national identity, projecting forward into the mid-21st century. By bridging physical and virtual mobility, she explores how these evolving dynamics redefine notions of belonging, identity, and citizenship. The chapter reflects on theoretical frameworks like Modood’s multicultural nationalism, plural versus neo-tribal nationalism, and everyday nationhood, questioning their applicability in an era shaped by augmented reality and digital nomadism. 

Triandafyllidou identifies a dichotomy between “cosmopolitan nomads,” who navigate globalized systems with ease, and “vagabonds,” marginalized by restrictive migration policies. She underscores the challenge of integrating virtual mobility into theories of migration and identity, noting its potential for both fostering transnational solidarity and amplifying socio-political exclusions. Particularly compelling is her discussion of neo-tribal nationalism, which thrives in the echo chambers of social media, reflecting the populist exploitation of mobility-induced anxieties. While the chapter is innovative in situating digital and physical mobility within broader global transformations, criticisms arise from its speculative tone and lack of empirical substantiation regarding the identity negotiations of digital nomads. Furthermore, the potential environmental and ethical implications of such mobility remain underexplored. Nevertheless, Triandafyllidou’s work opens critical pathways for rethinking nationalism and migration in an increasingly digitized and interconnected world.

Cécile Laborde’s chapter “Rethinking Race and Religion with Rawls and Modood” engages in a critique and synthesis of John Rawls’s and Modood’s perspectives on race and religion, proposing an interpretive framework that seeks to reconcile their divergent approaches. Laborde highlights the limitations of Rawls’s “bifurcated view,” which treats race and religion as separate normative categories rooted in distinct sociopolitical contexts. While Rawls centers religion within his political theory due to its epistemic and moral complexities, he relegates race to the realm of contingent injustice, underestimating its structural and enduring sociopolitical significance. Laborde effectively critiques Rawls for his intellectualist and decontextualized treatment of race, noting its inadequacy in addressing racial inequality and the historical interplay of race and religion.

Conversely, Modood’s integrated view, informed by his British context and the concept of “religio-racial” identity, is presented as a richer framework. Modood’s recognition of the intersectionality between race and religion and his advocacy for extending anti-discrimination protections to Muslims exemplify an inclusive approach to multiculturalism. Laborde deepens this perspective by introducing a dual “First-person” and “Third-person” framework to address individual agency and structural discrimination. While Laborde’s framework is compelling, critics might argue that it remains largely theoretical, with limited engagement with empirical case studies. Furthermore, the application of her dual perspective to real-world conflicts requires further elaboration, particularly in navigating populist discourses targeting religious minorities. Nevertheless, her chapter provides an invaluable contribution to debates on identity, justice, and multiculturalism.

Rajeev Bhargava’s chapter, “On Modood’s Moderate Secularism,” offers a comparative analysis of Modood’s “moderate secularism” and the Indian model of “principled distance,” critically examining their adaptability in addressing religious diversity in modern states. Bhargava acknowledges Modood’s significant contribution in theorizing moderate secularism as a model that accommodates religious pluralism while maintaining the autonomy of political authority. This framework, rooted in European traditions, challenges the rigid binaries of American and French secularism, advocating for an inclusive and multicultural approach.

Bhargava, however, critiques moderate secularism for its limited flexibility, particularly in accommodating deeply diverse societies. He highlights the entrenched biases in European secular frameworks that privilege Christianity, arguing that these models often fail to account for the structural inequities faced by Muslim minorities. Bhargava calls for a shift from mere institutional adjustments to broader conceptual reforms, aligning more closely with the Indian model, which integrates positive and negative engagements with religion to promote equality and mitigate inter- and intra-religious domination. The chapter’s populism-related insights emerge in Bhargava’s critique of European secularism’s inability to counter Islamophobic discourses, exacerbated by populist politics. While his proposal for adapting Indian principles to European contexts is compelling, critics might argue that the complexities of Western secular traditions and socio-political dynamics make such transplantation challenging.

In chapter titled “Secular State: Its Importance and Limits,” Bhikhu Parekh critiques rigid and dogmatic secularism, advocating for a nuanced and pragmatic approach that accommodates the complex interplay of religion and state. He emphasizes the instrumental nature of secularism, whose value lies in fostering liberty, equality, and common belonging in multicultural polities, rather than in adhering to an abstract ideal. Parekh aligns with Modood’s pluralist approach to secularism, commending its flexibility in recognizing religion’s potential contributions to public life. He highlights that secularism must balance the need for separation with the practical realities of mutual influence between religion and state, arguing against an absolutist interpretation. This is particularly significant in multicultural contexts where religion plays a vital role in cultural and communal identity. However, Parekh critiques secularism’s tendency to overreach, potentially alienating religious communities and fostering populist backlash, as seen in the rise of Hindutva politics in India. His critique extends to the failure of rigid secular models, like France’s laïcité, to equitably address diverse religious expressions, suggesting they inadvertently privilege majority traditions. Parekh’s proposal for context-sensitive, relational secularism is compelling, though critics may challenge its reliance on subjective interpretations of cultural and religious practices. 

Tariq Modood’s chapter, “From Then to Now: Some Friendly Responses,” offers a reflective engagement with the contributions to the volume while advancing his key themes of multiculturalism and moderate secularism. This response consolidates Modood’s intellectual trajectory and his pluralist methodology, blending personal narratives with theoretical critiques. Modood adeptly addresses critiques of his contextualism, particularly Sune Lægaard’s challenge regarding its application in the Danish Cartoons affair. While acknowledging the shortcomings in execution, Modood underscores his iterative approach, emphasizing the dialogical and evolving nature of contextual analysis. Similarly, he engages Simon Thompson’s deconstruction of the concept of recognition, embracing its multidimensional framing—equality, identity, struggle, and inclusion—while expanding its relevance to majority identities.

A recurring strength of Modood’s responses lies in his openness to constructive critique. For instance, he engages with Maleiha Malik’s historiography of racial equality in Britain, connecting it to Brexit’s implications for multiculturalism. Yet, Modood avoids reductive binaries, advocating instead for the mutual recognition of majorities and minorities. However, the chapter is not without limitations. Modood’s defense of multiculturalism as a “democratic constellation” is compelling but raises questions about its applicability in non-Western contexts. Similarly, his critique of Charles Taylor’s Quebecan interculturalism as “majoritarian” invites further elaboration on balancing national identity and minority accommodations. Anyway, Modood’s chapter enriches the volume by weaving together critical reflections and advancing his theory of multiculturalism as an inclusive, dialogical framework. It exemplifies a balance of self-critical humility and scholarly rigor, making it an invaluable contribution to the discourse on diversity and inclusion in democratic societies.

Overall, this volume highlights Modood’s transformative contributions to multiculturalism, framing it as a vital and evolving approach to managing diversity in today’s societies. By advocating for “multicultural nationalism” and “moderate secularism,” Modood offers a cohesive model that balances the recognition of distinct group identities with the promotion of a shared sense of national belonging. The book engages with critiques of multiculturalism, demonstrating its resilience in addressing challenges such as globalization, transnational affiliations, and the rise of populist movements. Modood’s work is contextualized within global debates, showcasing the strength of his framework in uniting diversity and fostering collective identity—a cornerstone of his idea of “multicultural nationalism.”

While the volume stands out for its philosophical depth and theoretical insights, some chapters—particularly those on secularism—are heavily centered on Western contexts, offering limited comparative perspectives on non-Western experiences. Furthermore, its focus on philosophical discourse may leave practitioners seeking more tangible policy recommendations. Despite these limitations, the book is an essential resource for scholars in political theory, sociology, and public policy. It underscores Modood’s groundbreaking role in redefining multiculturalism as a versatile and sustainable framework for diversity and inclusion in pluralistic societies. Beyond commemorating Modood’s legacy, the book fosters meaningful scholarly dialogue, ensuring that his ideas continue to shape and influence the ever-evolving discourse on multiculturalism.


Thomas Sealy, Varun Uberoi &Nasar Meer (eds.). (2024). The Resilience of Multiculturalism Ideas, Politics, Practice. Edinburgh University Press. 328 pp. Hardcover $110, Paperback  $23,71, ISBN-13: 978-1399537261

Demonstrators of the Austrian Identitarian movement form a guard of honor of flags in Vienna, Austria on June 11, 2016. Photo: Johanna Poetsch.

Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right

Sargi, Islam. (2024). “Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. December 25, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0023

 

Teun A. van Dijk’s book explores how radical right parties adapt their discourses to cultural, economic, and historical contexts in Chile, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Integrating discourse studies with social cognition theories, van Dijk reveals how nationalism, anti-globalism, and sociocultural backlash drive these narratives. With a focus on populism as a strategic discourse rather than ideology, the book underscores the dynamics of ingroup/outgroup rhetoric and its role in mobilizing support. While highlighting ideological clustering, the work offers valuable insights for scholars of political communication, critical discourse studies, and international relations.

Reviewed by Islam Sargi*

Teon A. van Dijk, a prominent scholar in linguistics, discourse analysis, and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), is the founder of renowned journals such as Discourse Studies and Discourse and Communication. He also established the Center of Discourse Studies in Barcelona in 2017. Van Dijk’s book, Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right, part of the Critical Discourse Studies series, examines the political ideologies and discourse of radical right parties. It explores how these parties adapt their rhetoric to the unique economic, cultural, and historical contexts of four countries: Chile, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The book bridges the gap between political science and discourse studies, providing a theoretically grounded analysis of radical right ideologies. Highlighting the limited research on the discourse of radical political parties, van Dijk incorporates a theoretical framework linking ideology as a form of social cognition to discourse and social structures.

By examining four cases—Chile, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands—the book highlights the primary configurations, divergent ideologies, contextual impacts, populism, and the significance of national contexts. It argues that each country showcases distinct ideological stances. For example, while abortion is a central theme in the radical right discourse in Chile, it plays a less significant role in the Netherlands and Sweden. However, nationalism and anti-immigration sentiments appear to be common across European contexts.

The author employs a mixed-methods approach, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analyses, to investigate election programs from the four countries. Through this lens, the book explores language and discourse, emphasizing ideological positioning and political strategies. The findings reveal reactionary stances against social change, liberalism, and political correctness, framing these as part of a broader cultural backlash.

Through comparative analysis, van Dijk argues that radical right discourse and ideologies are shaped by country-specific contexts. For instance, in Chile, radical right discourse is rooted in Catholic ideologies, emphasizing traditional family values, such as opposition to abortion, and intertwining with the authoritarian historical narratives of the Pinochet era. The radical right in Chile also avoids engaging with the multicultural identities of the Mapuche people in their rhetoric.

In Spain, particularly in the case of the Vox Party, the focus shifts to nationalism, marked by a strict anti-separatist stance opposing the autonomy of Catalonia and the Basque regions. This approach also embodies a strong rejection of modern globalist ideologies.

In the Netherlands, one of Europe’s prominent radical right parties, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV), centers its discourse on Islamophobia, embedding it within broader national themes. Wilders portrays a struggle against liberal elites, who are perceived as eroding Dutch cultural identity and integrity.

In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats (SD) emphasize the preservation of culture, framing it as a social issue linked to crime and immigration. This case exemplifies a broader European pattern, where immigration is associated with security concerns and the preservation of national cultural hegemony.

Van Dijk’s analysis highlights how the radical right adapts its narratives to local contexts while sharing overarching themes such as nationalism, anti-globalism, and opposition to multiculturalism.

The author emphasizes that the electoral strategies of radical right parties in these four countries are shaped by their unique national contexts, cautioning against broadly categorizing them under the blanket term of populism. Populism, as a discursive phenomenon, requires an analysis rooted in discourse strategies rather than mere ideological critiques. This approach encourages a deeper exploration of ideological clustering and its role in fostering the radical right’s broader acceptance and integration within democratic systems.

Regarding the interplay between populism and discourse, the book highlights populism primarily as a strategic use of language by political parties rather than a cohesive ideology. This framework reveals that populist discourse often constructs narratives centered on the dichotomy between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elites.”

Moreover, the book examines the socio-cultural backlash against modern liberal ideologies, demonstrating how the radical right skillfully employs discourse to reassert traditional values. It underscores how radical right narratives leverage this backlash to challenge liberal norms and promote their vision of cultural and societal order, ultimately highlighting the ideological and cultural underpinnings of their discourse strategies.

The book makes a significant contribution to scholarship by offering a fresh perspective on ideological clusters, particularly the interplay of nationalism, racism, and political dynamics within radical right parties. It provides an insightful introduction to understanding how radical right ideologies are constructed, communicated, and situated within broader socio-political contexts, shedding light on their increasing influence.

By integrating discourse studies with social cognition theories, the book appeals to those interested in exploring the psychological and linguistic foundations of political ideologies. Scholars and students in political science, sociology, and international relations will find value in the comparative case analyses, which illuminate the global patterns and localized adaptations of radical right parties and their discourses.

The author effectively integrates theories from discourse studies and social context, providing a comprehensive framework for understanding how political ideologies are constructed and communicated. This approach offers valuable insights into the tactics and strategies employed by radical right movements. By embedding his analysis within a well-articulated theory of ideology, van Dijk explores the cognitive foundations of radical right discourse, adding depth to the study and establishing a clear structure for his investigation.

Through comparative analysis, the author demonstrates how these movements adapt their rhetoric to cultural, economic, and historical contexts, offering readers a nuanced understanding of global patterns and local variations. The book sheds light on the pragmatic role of distinct national contexts in shaping political communication strategies, emphasizing how language is used to construct ingroup/outgroup dynamics. These dynamics are crucial for understanding the populist appeal and the ways radical right parties mobilize support locally.

Van Dijk further illustrates the interconnectedness of various ideologies within the radical right framework, showcasing their ideological composition and adaptability. This comprehensive approach underscores the role of language and context in shaping political narratives, making the book a valuable resource for scholars and students of political communication and ideology.

Although the book provides a broad comparative framework, its specific discourse analysis is somewhat limited. A more in-depth linguistic examination of concrete examples could better substantiate claims regarding the effectiveness or variability of discourse strategies. Additionally, the study’s focus on only four countries, while diverse, does not fully capture the global spectrum of radical right discourses or address the dynamics of emerging movements in other regions.

Methodologically, the book would benefit from greater transparency in its approach to discourse analysis. Clearer details on data collection and the analytical process would enhance the replicability and robustness of its findings. While the book persuasively argues that populism should be viewed as a discourse strategy rather than a fixed ideology, it does not thoroughly investigate the practical implications of this distinction in political behavior and communication.

Despite these limitations, van Dijk’s study remains a well-structured and significant contribution to critical discourse studies of radical right ideologies, offering valuable insights into the intersection of language, ideology, and political strategy.


 

(*) Islam Sargi holds a Ph.D. in Contemporary Comparative History from the University of Szeged. His doctoral thesis examined the Kurdish question and Turkish modernization. iszeged509@gmail.com

van Dijk, Teon A. (2024). Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right. Cambridge University Press, London, pp. 95, Paperback £17.00, Hardback £49.99, ISBN 978-1-009-54993-6 Hardback, ISBN 978-1-009-54991-2, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009549929, Online ISBN: 9781009549929, Print publication: January 2, 2025.