Dr. Taro Tsuda.

Dr. Tsuda: Takaichi’s Ascent to Power Represents Continuity Rather Than a Populist Rupture

In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. Taro Tsuda of Meiji University argues that Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s landslide victory and supermajority mandate signify continuity within Japan’s dominant-party system rather than a populist break. Despite her historic status as Japan’s first female prime minister and her “diligent and tough-speaking” leadership style, Dr. Tsuda stresses that her agenda and career remain rooted in the Liberal Democratic Party’s mainstream. He interprets her electoral success as part of the LDP’s strategy to reclaim drifting conservative voters and preempt challenger movements, with Takaichi herself becoming the party’s central electoral asset. Her rise, he concludes, demonstrates how leadership personalization and institutional resilience can reinforce—rather than disrupt—established structures of governance.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Taro Tsuda—Assistant Professor at the School of Political Science and Economics at Meiji University, Tokyo, and a scholar of Japanese political institutions, party dynamics, and leadership—offers a nuanced interpretation of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s dramatic rise and governing trajectory. His analysis comes at a pivotal moment: PM Takaichi’s landslide electoral victory delivered a two-thirds supermajority for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner, dramatically consolidating executive authority and granting her administration an exceptional legislative cushion. As Japan’s first female prime minister, combining a programmatic conservative agenda with a leadership style widely perceived as both “diligent and tough-speaking,” Takaichi has reshaped the political landscape—strengthening conservative forces while advancing an ambitious policy program that includes fiscal stimulus, proposed consumption-tax cuts, technological and AI-driven industrial strategy, and a more assertive regional security posture. Yet, as Dr. Tsuda emphasizes, these developments should not be misread as evidence of a populist rupture.

Contrary to narratives portraying her ascent as a transformative break, Dr. Tsuda argues that Takaichi’s premiership represents continuity within Japan’s historically institutionalized dominant-party system. “It is definitely the former rather than the latter,” he explains when asked whether the so-called “Takaichi boom” constitutes personalized leadership rather than populism, noting that she emerges from the LDP, “which has been the dominant party in Japan since 1955.”Because populism typically involves an anti-establishment appeal “pitting the population against a harmful elite,” her leadership—rooted firmly within the ruling party’s mainstream—does not fit that model. Indeed, he stresses that her ideas and career path have remained “very much within the mainstream of the LDP,” making it “very hard…to say that her becoming Prime Minister would constitute a populist rupture.” In this reading, even her decisive electoral mandate and willingness to adopt politically risky positions on issues such as Taiwan and China reflect programmatic assertiveness rather than anti-system mobilization.

Dr. Tsuda further contends that Takaichi’s electoral success should be understood as part of the LDP’s adaptive strategy to reabsorb drifting conservative voters and preempt challenger movements. Faced with defections to newer right-leaning parties, the party leadership sought to reconstruct its electoral “big tent,” successfully drawing many of those voters back. This, he argues, forms “a sort of short-term and perhaps longer-term strategy…to prevent that kind of populist challenge to its incumbency.” Her personal popularity proved central to this effort: Takaichi “became the face of the LDP for this election,” attracting independents and younger voters who had previously been skeptical of the party.

By situating Takaichi’s premiership within longer trajectories of LDP dominance, Shinzo Abe’s legacy, and Japan’s evolving security and economic priorities, Dr. Tsuda’s interview highlights how leadership personalization, ideological clarity, and institutional continuity can coexist. The result, he suggests, is not a populist upheaval but a powerful example of how dominant parties renew authority through strategic adaptation—demonstrating that even historic milestones, such as Japan’s first female premiership and a sweeping supermajority victory, may ultimately reinforce rather than disrupt established structures of governance.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Taro Tsuda, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Rebuilding the LDP’s Big Tent to Preempt Populist Challengers

Election candidate campaigning with local residents at Yanaka Ginza, Taito City, Tokyo, on March 13, 2019.
Election candidate campaigning with local residents at Yanaka Ginza, Taito City, Tokyo, on March 13, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.

Dr. Taro Tsuda, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: You characterize the current moment as potentially a “Takaichi boom.” To what extent might this be conceptualized as a form of personalized plebiscitary leadership within a historically institutionalized dominant-party system, rather than a classic populist rupture?

Dr. Taro Tsuda: I would say it is definitely the former rather than the latter. Prime Minister Takaichi is from the LDP, the Liberal Democratic Party, which has been the dominant party in Japan since 1955. There have been several moments when it has lost power, but throughout this whole period—about 70 years—it has remained the dominant or most powerful party. And she comes from that party, so it is difficult , in my definition of populism, that it implies a sort of anti-establishment or anti-elite stance, pitting the population against a harmful elite or establishment, and that is definitely not what Takaichi is doing. So it is very hard for me to say that her becoming Prime Minister would constitute a populist rupture. All her ideas, policy proposals, and her career path have been very much within the mainstream of the LDP, even if one might say they are on the more right-wing or conservative side of the party. So, I would not characterize it as a populist rupture.

In light of your argument that the LDP must reconstruct its “big tent,” can we interpret PM Sanea Takaichi’s strategy as a mode of preventive populism—absorbing and neutralizing anti-system demands before they crystallize into durable challenger movements such as Sanseito?

Dr. Taro Tsuda: I would say, to some extent, that is part of her strategy, or what the LDP’s strategy as a whole was, especially in this past election, the lower house election that took place on February 8. For the past few years, there has been a group of more right-leaning or more conservative voters who have been drifting away from the LDP because of what they perceive as the past few leaders’ more liberal or more centrist approach. Many of them went to new parties like Sanseito. A major goal of the past election was to bring many of those more right-leaning voters back into the LDP, and the results show that, in many ways, they were successful in doing so. Many of the people who were conservative or who had supported Sanseito in previous elections supported the LDP this time.

So I think that this is a sort of short-term and perhaps longer-term strategy of the LDP leadership to prevent that kind of populist challenge to its incumbency.

Downplaying Gender While Subtly Leveraging It

Takaichi’s leadership style appears to combine the novelty of being a prominent female conservative leader with a strong emphasis on themes such as strength, discipline, and national security. Based on your observations, to what extent does she highlight or downplay her gender in shaping her political image and appeal?

Dr. Taro Tsuda: That’s a very interesting and complicated question. From what I’ve seen so far of her leadership since she became LDP party leader and then Prime Minister, it seems that her approach is a delicate balance between downplaying or not explicitly mentioning the gender aspect and, more subtly, sometimes using her gender to gain a favorable impression or to connect with people in Japan. One interesting example is that after becoming Prime Minister, she was asked by an opposition lawmaker to focus on dressing well and wearing Japan’s best materials or textiles, and that as Prime Minister she should not wear rather drab clothes or something like that. In response, she talked about how she is in a difficult position because she has to wear something good so that people take her seriously as a female leader on the international stage, and that she has to think carefully about what she wears.

That was an episode where she usually does not touch upon gender at all, but by talking about things like that—without really focusing on gender itself—she was still using the gender aspect to connect with people. I think that aspect of her leadership is something many of the people who supported her in the recent election appreciate, especially independent or younger voters. They like this personality-based and relatively ordinary style that she often emphasizes, which at times includes a subtle gender aspect. So, I think it is a very subtle approach, not one that explicitly focuses on gender.

Do you think Takaichi’s rise shows that gender matters less in leadership today, or that she succeeds by adopting traditionally masculine leadership traits?

Dr. Taro Tsuda: I would say that it is neither that gender does not matter nor that she is consciously trying to adopt masculine traits. Her example is simply exceptional. On the first point about gender not mattering, I think it still matters a great deal, since Japan, on many measures of gender parity and gender equality, still ranks lower than other advanced industrial countries. There are many barriers for women to achieve leadership positions in Japan, including in politics. She was able to overcome those, and that is part of her appeal to many people.

At the same time, as I mentioned in relation to the previous question, she is not completely denying her gender. She sometimes subtly appeals to people in ways related to it. So I would say it is neither; the fact that she has been able to break some of those barriers is what appeals to many voters in Japan.

Abe’s Legacy as the Informal Architecture of Takaichi’s Rise

Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your work on Satō Eisaku highlights the stabilizing function of informal authority and elder statesmanship in moments of systemic uncertainty. To what extent does Abe Shinzo’s enduring legacy function as a form of posthumous informal governance structuring Takaichi’s political maneuverability?

Dr. Taro Tsuda: From your question, I think you’re referring to the extent to which Shinzo Abe’s legacy is significant for Takaichi and her politics. I would say that, in many ways, Abe’s legacy and his career contributed to her rise to the leadership of the LDP and to the Prime Ministership. Because Takaichi is a protégé of Abe, while he was alive he supported her past attempts— the first attempt was while he was still alive, before she was assigned to become leader of the LDP and potentially Prime Minister. She wasn’t successful at that time, but his support helped her get relatively close to reaching that position then. In the most recent leadership contest, when she was able to secure the leadership of the party and then become Prime Minister, the support of Abe’s former faction members was very important. Even though she was not officially a member of his faction, she was his protégé, and many people around him are also supportive of her politically and ideologically, so in that sense it is very important.

Many of her policy ideas are also continuations of Abe’s policy agenda, such as building a more assertive Japan on the international stage and maintaining close relations with the US, including Donald Trump, who had a close relationship with Abe while he was alive. So in many ways, that legacy is very important.

We also have to point out, however, that Abe’s legacy contributed to those factors that have caused recent difficulties for the LDP, such as the political scandals relating to the party’s ties with the Unification Church and the slush fund scandal that focused on the former Abe faction. In those ways, these issues created difficulties for the LDP that Takaichi had to overcome in order to succeed in this past election. So in many different and complex ways, Abe’s legacy continues to be important for Japan’s politics.

Executive Dominance Rising Amid Residual Factional Power

Are we witnessing a transition from factional oligarchy to leader-centered executive dominance, or do factional networks remain the latent institutional infrastructure of LDP governance?

Dr. Taro Tsuda: That’s also quite a complicated question. We can definitely say that the influence of factions is much less in Japanese politics than previously thought. In the sort of golden age of LDP rule during the Cold War, especially during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, factions were involved in many different aspects of LDP politics and Japanese politics: election strategy, fundraising, and choosing the leader of the LDP, who, because the LDP was the leading party, almost automatically became prime minister. Thus, many aspects of factions were the central units of the LDP’s rule.

But that later diminished because of electoral reform in the 1990s, which, as the election system changed, reduced the factions’ influence in election strategy. Further on, with the scandals I mentioned earlier relating to the Unification Church and ties with the LDP, and especially the slush fund scandal, former Prime Minister Fumiyo Kishida led an effort to dissolve the factions. Almost all of the LDP factions stopped existing, at least on paper, in 2024. One major faction of former Prime Minister Aso Taro still exists, but most of the others have dissolved, which has very much reduced the role of factions.

However, there has been a long history of people in the LDP talking about the need to get rid of factions as a source of corruption and division in the party. There have been earlier efforts to weaken the factions, but what has often happened is that the factions are weakened and then able to come back and become stronger again. So this could happen again in the future, and even if the formal factions are mostly no longer existing, there are still strong informal groupings within the LDP. So, for the moment, factions are much reduced in their influence, but it is still hard to say that they are irrelevant or that they will not become stronger again in the future. At the moment, much less.

Managing Scandal Through Leadership Appeal

Given the LDP’s recent decline due to scandals and erosion of public trust, do you think a strategy of proactively addressing these issues could help restore its credibility, or are patronage-based practices too deeply entrenched for meaningful reform?

Dr. Taro Tsuda: That’s also a very interesting question. A few months ago, I wrote an opinion piece in the Japan Times that addressed this very issue. I wrote it very soon after Takaichi became Prime Minister of Japan, and I argued that this was an opportune moment for her, because she was popular, not only to consolidate support among more conservative voters but also to address the political scandals that had damaged the LDP. I thought her position and her closeness to Abe and Abe’s faction put her in a good position to do this, and that it could also stabilize the LDP’s rule. However, what has happened in the subsequent months is not really what I suggested.

Instead, she has focused more on other policy issues and on her personal appeal with the Japanese public, so the issue of political reform has been put to the side to some extent. She has agreed with the coalition partner—or the coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party, has emphasized this issue as well—but it is no longer at the forefront. At the moment, it seems she has been successful in turning the page on this issue without directly addressing it.

It remains to be seen whether that can continue. There is always a possibility that a similar scandal could emerge again, although I think the likelihood in the near future may be lower because of the lessons some members learned from these past scandals and because the faction system is now, for the moment, defunct. Still, since she has not addressed it directly, it could return in the future. In the long term, this is something that should be addressed for the country itself and for the stability of the LDP’s rule.

Balancing China Through Alliances and Supply-Chain Resilience

Photo: Dreamstime.

Japan’s security posture is evolving amid intensifying US–China rivalry. Would you characterize Takaichi’s foreign policy orientation as a continuation of post–Cold War embeddedness, or as a move toward strategic autonomy within a multipolar order?

Dr. Taro Tsuda: I think that because of the recent dispute between Japan and China, sparked in part by some of Takaichi’s comments about Japan’s response in a hypothetical contingency relating to Taiwan, many assume that she is departing on a very different path in terms of foreign policy. But as I see it, her policy is, at least at the moment, very much a continuation of the path of some of her predecessors, especially starting with Prime Minister Abe. Abe is known for pioneering the idea of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, bringing together not only the US and Japan in their alliance but also like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific to work on a range of economic and security issues, in a form of implicit balancing against China. Some of his successors, such as former Prime Minister Kishida, also committed to boosting defense spending and capabilities in light of the Ukraine war.

I think she is continuing along that path, so I would not say there is a major departure from her predecessors. It is still very much reliant on the US–Japan security alliance, but it also involves reaching out to other countries in the region that share interests and values with Japan, such as India, Australia, and South Korea. She has, perhaps more than her predecessors, forged constructive relations with South Korea, which until recently were quite tense. That is generally the path she is following in terms of foreign policy.

How do you see Japan’s recent focus on economic security and supply-chain resilience — mainly as a response to new global risks, or as part of a broader shift in its economic and industrial strategy?

Dr. Taro Tsuda: In terms of economic security, Japan has always had an interest in it because it is a resource-poor island nation that relies heavily on global trade. Securing vital raw materials and natural resources has therefore always been a major concern and an important factor in its foreign policy.

However, there has been a recent and even greater emphasis on this issue because of developments such as the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and now tensions with China. These events have highlighted Japan’s vulnerability and its reliance on sea lanes and supply chains. There has been an even stronger focus on economic security since the 2020s. The position of Minister of State for Economic Security, now one of the important Cabinet posts, was officially created in recent years; it did not exist before. The creation of this position demonstrates the stronger emphasis on economic security.

Leadership Image as the Engine of Electoral Revival

And finally, Dr. Tsuda, to what degree has Takaichi’s electoral success been mediated through narrative construction—her image as a disciplined, uncompromising, and reformist leader—and how central is this symbolic dimension to sustaining the LDP’s renewed legitimacy in the medium term?

Dr. Taro Tsuda: If you’re referring to the electoral success of this past election in the lower house, that it was very much based on Takaichi herself. Her own brand of leadership and her image were a central part of that election and the success of the LDP. If you compare the support rate of Takaichi with the support rate of the LDP before the election, there was quite a big gap. Even today, there is a gap between the actual support of the LDP and Takaichi’s very high approval rating. So basically, she became the face of the LDP for this election, and many people who liked her and approved of her leadership, but who may have had more skepticism toward the LDP itself, were persuaded to vote for the LDP. This included not only the conservative voters that I talked about earlier, but also many non-party-affiliated voters—people who are not strongly aligned with one party and who can shift their support from election to election—as well as a large number of younger voters, who historically did not support the LDP that strongly. This shows that her image and leadership were very important to the success.

For the medium or longer term, I think that depends on whether she can deliver on some of the things she promised in the election, such as improving the economic situation of the Japanese people and addressing other important issues, including concerns relating to immigration or foreigners in Japan, to mention a few issues that were very prominent in that election. If she can address those issues, I think that will help the LDP in the near future. But if she has trouble addressing them, or if some kind of scandal or other problem emerges, then it may be difficult, even if she herself remains popular, to sustain support for the government as a whole.

Dr. Andrés Mejía Acosta.

Assoc. Prof. Mejía Acosta: State Erosion Is Faster Than State Building and Harder to Reverse

In this interview with the ECPS, Associate Professor Andrés Mejía Acosta (University of Notre Dame, Keough School of Global Affairs) explains why populist leaders often weaken state capacity strategically rather than accidentally. For populists, he argues, “state institutions and agencies get in the way of a more unilateral, discretionary, non-democratic type of governance,” prompting efforts to “ignore, dismantle, bypass, or merge” oversight bodies that constrain executive power. Assoc. Prof. Acosta underscores the asymmetry between construction and destruction: “state building… takes decades and even centuries,” yet “state dismantling… can be done very quickly,” with lasting effects on democratic recovery. He links institutional erosion to patronage politics, discretionary spending, and the weakening of accountability networks—dynamics that make reversals of democratic backsliding harder when “state mechanisms are no longer functioning.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Andrés Mejía Acosta, Associate Professor at the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs, offers a sobering analytical framework for understanding how contemporary populist governance erodes state capacity and, in turn, weakens democratic resilience. Anchored in his influential research on “state hollowing,” Assoc. Prof. Mejía Acosta argues that the weakening of bureaucratic institutions is not an accidental byproduct of populist rule but a deliberate governing strategy. For populist leaders, he explains, “state institutions and agencies get in the way of a more unilateral, discretionary, non-democratic type of governance,” making their dismantling instrumental to consolidating power.

Highlighting the core theme captured in the interview’s title, Assoc. Prof. Mejía Acosta stresses the asymmetry between the slow construction and rapid destruction of state institutions. While comparative politics has long recognized the difficulty of building capable states, he warns that their erosion can occur with alarming speed and lasting consequences: “In the case of state building, we have long understood that it takes decades and even centuries to build and strengthen states, but we are now learning that state dismantling apparently does not take long; it can be done very quickly.” This accelerated dismantling, he argues, produces durable institutional damage that outlives the populist incumbents themselves, making democratic recovery far more difficult. Once oversight agencies, regulatory bodies, and accountability mechanisms are weakened or eliminated, the very infrastructure required for democratic renewal may no longer function.

Throughout the conversation, Assoc. Prof. Mejía Acosta situates state erosion within the broader literature on democratic backsliding while distinguishing it from classical authoritarian consolidation. Whereas backsliding targets elections, media freedom, and political competition, state hollowing undermines the administrative and fiscal capacities that sustain governance itself. The result is a mutually reinforcing cycle: weakening representative institutions enables further bureaucratic dismantling, while eroding state capacity deactivates democratic safeguards. As he notes, this dynamic creates long-term structural damage: “This phenomenon of state erosion will have long-term consequences that make reversals of democratic backsliding more difficult. It will be harder to recover democratic practices when state mechanisms are no longer functioning.”

Drawing on empirical examples from Latin America and beyond, Assoc. Prof. Mejía Acosta also emphasizes how populist regimes selectively weaken oversight institutions while expanding discretionary spending, coercive apparatuses, and patronage networks. Agencies responsible for environmental regulation, poverty evaluation, or fiscal monitoring become targets precisely because they constrain executive discretion. In their place emerges a governance model characterized by informality, opacity, and clientelistic redistribution—conditions that entrench incumbents while undermining public accountability.

Yet the interview is not solely diagnostic. Assoc. Prof. Mejía Acosta concludes with cautious optimism about democratic resilience, underscoring the need for cross-sectoral coalitions, institutional reforms, and sustained civic mobilization. As authoritarian tendencies penetrate deeper into governance structures—“as if the authoritarian illness is spreading through the body”—he calls for a global effort to rebuild the institutional foundations of democracy.

Taken together, this interview provides a theoretically rich and empirically grounded account of how populist leaders hollow out states from within—and why the consequences for democracy may endure long after the political moment has passed.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Andrés Mejía Acosta:, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Populists Dismantle State Capacity to Enable Unilateral Rule

Labour Day celebrations
Labour Day celebrations at Old Town Square in Prague on May 1, 2017, featuring a banner depicting democracy as a leaf eaten by caterpillars labeled Putin, Kaczyński, Orbán, Babiš, Trump, and Fico.
Photo: Jolanta Wojcicka.

Professor Mejía Acosta, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your article “Why populists hollow out their states?”, you argue that populist leaders often weaken state capacity not accidentally but strategically. Could you elaborate on the causal mechanisms through which populist governance transforms capable bureaucracies into politicized instruments of rule?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: Thank you, Selcuk. I welcome this opportunity to speak more about our article, and I am pleased to share this space with you. With regard to your question, the starting premise is that for populists, state institutions and agencies get in the way of a more unilateral, discretionary, non-democratic type of governance. So, the dismantling or weakening of state capacities is, we argue, a strategy to accomplish these goals.

If you think of different examples of state functions, such as environmental regulation or poverty alleviation programs—their implementation and evaluation—or the role that labor health statistics play in the running of government operations, these would be relatively inconvenient if what populist leaders want is to maximize the extractive sector, use poverty alleviation programs for clientelistic purposes, or misreport what labor health statistics indicate. The strategy, therefore, is to ignore, dismantle, bypass, or merge the institutions in charge of these functions.

For example, we cite the case of Mexico, where one of the most renowned and influential agencies evaluating poverty and deprivation programs, CONEVAL, was first weakened, its funding conditioned, and eventually dismantled. This aligns with the goal of delivering poverty reduction programs that are not accountable, measurable, or verifiable. It is consistent with the logic of removing institutions that stand in the way of achieving other objectives.

States Take Decades, Centuries to Build, and Can Be Dismantled in Years

Your work suggests that state erosion under populism involves both institutional capture and the reconfiguration of accountability networks. How do these processes differ from classic forms of authoritarian consolidation studied in comparative politics?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: Yes, one clarification we make from the beginning is that our work is different from, and we are not trying to understand, full forms of autocratic regimes such as those in Russia or China, but rather the dismantling of the democratic state. These are parallel but distinct processes, and it is probably more useful to follow the line of work on democratic backsliding. Both state dismantling and democratic backsliding aim to capture representative institutions and undermine accountability.

The key difference, we argue, is that state erosion is a much more long-term and hard-to-reverse trend. For example, I could elaborate on whether state erosion is a cause or an effect of democratic backsliding, but one thing we can see is that there is extensive literature discussing whether democratic erosion can in fact be reversed and what kinds of institutional reforms or changes are necessary. In the case of state building, we have long understood that it takes decades and even centuries to build and strengthen states, but we are now learning that state dismantling apparently does not take long; it can be done very quickly.

To what extent is the hollowing-out of the state driven by populists’ need to sustain patronage-based coalitions rather than by ideological hostility to liberal institutions?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: They are complementary, I would say. On the one hand, there is ideological hostility to liberal institutions, and we see the discourse of populists going against these liberal—or what they call “woke”—institutions that preserve individual rights, minority representation, etc.

With that in mind, they build clientelistic coalitions to use or manipulate the state for their own private purposes. One example could be the dismantling of aid agencies, where it is argued that it is not a priority for a country to aid others, thereby undermining the rules-based institutional order, whether in democratic promotion, sustainable energy, or the maintenance of democratic practices. Instead, they shift the discourse and government energy toward arming and strengthening defense budgets.

It becomes problematic when this shift toward securitization, defense, or intelligence is built around sustaining patronage-based coalitions. This reflects a move away from the liberal order in order to justify a turn toward patronage-based politics.

State Erosion and Democratic Backsliding Reinforce Each Other

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

 

How does populist state erosion interact with democratic backsliding? Is institutional weakening a precondition for autocratization, or can it emerge as a consequence of already declining democratic norms?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: This is a very good question, and they are interactive but distinct. We have reflected on this, and more empirical work needs to be developed to demonstrate it. But what we are saying is that undermining representative institutions—so, in the democratic backsliding literature, when you weaken elections, intimidate political parties, or undermine freedom of expression—these are democratic attacks that open the way for further state erosion in the manner I described earlier: merging state agencies, ignoring state agencies, dismantling budgets, the bureaucracy, etc.

This is possible when there is less popular freedom or citizens’ freedom to contest, protest, defend, and demand accountability for why these agencies are being undermined. So, certainly, weakening democratic institutions facilitates the dismantling of the state.

But the arrow also goes in the opposite direction: when state institutions erode, such as through compromising the tenure or funding of the judiciary, democratic safeguards are deactivated. If the courts and the judicial system are compromised, accused of corruption, or lack the necessary funding or technocratic expertise, how can they uphold basic democratic values? So, it is a two-way street, in a sense, and one of the issues we are examining more closely is the extent to which there is irreversible damage—how far state erosion produces longer-term harm to the future defense of democracy.

What we argue, therefore, is that this phenomenon of state erosion will have long-term consequences that make reversals of democratic backsliding more difficult. It will be harder to recover democratic practices when state mechanisms are no longer functioning.

Purges in the Name of Efficiency Can Undermine Governance

In several Latin American cases, populist leaders have used anti-corruption rhetoric to justify purges of bureaucratic and judicial institutions. How should scholars distinguish between genuine institutional reform and strategic institutional capture disguised as reform?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: This is a good and difficult question. Reforms are usually justified by these populist leaders who intend to hollow out the state. In the name of government efficiency, you hear these leaders accuse bloated bureaucracy or stress the need to impose austerity regimes and save millions of dollars. You can think of President Javier Milei in Argentina, who began his campaign with a chainsaw in hand, signaling what he intended to do to the state—to institutions he viewed as nonfunctional and unhelpful—and that he wanted to cut bureaucracy and save money.

To determine whether these are genuine institutional reforms, we need to look at the goals and outcomes. Are effective goals achieved, for example, in terms of environmental protections, delivering effective justice, or respecting the rights of minorities? We do not yet have a clear answer, but the state’s capacity to govern, because it is so heavily undermined, will sooner or later affect people when they see that the bureaucracy is not functioning effectively to process their payments, or that judicial institutions are not working properly to hear cases and issue fair sentences.

So, it is in the outcomes and the goals that we will see whether these reforms aimed to enhance government efficiency or were instead a decoy to strengthen, as you said at the beginning, patronage-based networks.

Voters Must Distinguish Performance from Performative Power

Donald Trump.
Donald Trump’s first presidential campaign rally at the Phoenix Convention Center, where thousands gathered to hear him speak as protesters demonstrated outside. Photo: Danny Raustadt.

 

Your research highlights the importance of fiscal and administrative capacity. Do populists hollow out states uniformly across sectors, or do they selectively weaken institutions that constrain executive power while strengthening coercive or extractive apparatuses?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: This is one of the questions that deserves more attention. In the article, we discuss the difference between performative and performance-driven reforms and changes. For example, performative actions could include putting hundreds of immigration enforcement agents on the streets to go after so-called illegal immigrants or deploying the military to patrol the streets and target criminals and drug-dealing networks. This obviously has a very strong performative aspect, because public opinion suddenly says, “Oh, wow, the government is doing something.” But what we need to know is whether these measures actually work and what their performance aspect is.

So, yes, there is a paradox in terms of whether the display of force, the display of state strength to address a problem, is in fact effective or merely theatrical. We argue that these truths will become self-evident when midterm elections, local elections, or the next executive election take place and people assess whether those reforms were justified and needed—whether there are, in fact, fewer illegal immigrants or whether crime rates have dropped. What we are seeing so far is that these major displays of force and state strength are not necessarily moving the needle on actual policy outcomes. In Ecuador, over the past two years, under a government with very strong tendencies to use the military and armed forces to combat crime, this has not only failed to move the needle, but crime and homicide rates have actually increased.

It is at this moment, when the performative does not match actual performance, that I would hope voters become aware of this self-evident truth and become less impressed by theatrics and more interested in actual indicators of performance.

Even Consolidated Democracies Can See Institutions Erode Quickly

Many of your empirical insights come from Latin America. How transferable is the “state hollowing” framework to Western democracies, where bureaucratic autonomy and legal constraints are historically stronger?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: I would love to agree with you, and that is my hope—that certainly Western, more consolidated, older democracies have developed stronger bureaucracies, stronger judicial traditions, and stronger financial safeguards to protect against this dismantling or hollowing of the state. I can tell you two diverging stories. In one case, well-established democracies have suddenly seen foreign aid agencies dismantled within months, if not weeks, while budgetary allocations for independent institutions have been either questioned, frozen, or withdrawn. So that believed resilience of state institutions may turn out to be much weaker than assumed. But I think here an important caveat is the role of, coming back again to the democratic level of analysis, the extent to which elections and parties can provide a meaningful counterweight to prevent the executive from dismantling these institutions.

An interesting transitional example—though I am less familiar with continental Europe—is Britain. It has been the case that Britain’s Reform Party (Reform UK), or variations of it, the populist Farage-type movements, have been trying for a long time, at least 10 years, to take over a much broader policy agenda. Partly, institutions, citizens, and democratic practices have contained this drive of a more extreme populist party from gaining much power in Britain. So, we are seeing a level of state resilience and institutional strength by which voters can make this distinction between performative politics and performance and have put back a more moderate Labour government about two years ago.

So, the fact that we observe some state resilience to these populist temptations is good news, but it is not an assurance. It is not a long-term guarantee, particularly if governments come to power and do not deliver the basic minimal governance reforms that people need. There could again be a backlash. This is something we will see over the coming year—whether Labour or another conventional party is able to maintain and safeguard democratic institutions, or whether Reform UK is going to take over and initiate a process that we anticipate would attempt to dismantle essential state institutions and functions in Britain.

Polarization and Legal Manipulation as Gateways to State Erosion

Photo: Dreamstime.

 

Are contemporary populist movements in Europe and North America reproducing Latin American patterns of institutional erosion, or are they generating a distinct model of democratic decay rooted in polarization and legal manipulation rather than outright state weakening?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: I think there is a similar logic and line of thinking as in the question and in my previous answer. Certainly, this strategy of polarization and legal manipulation serves as an entry point to justify and open the way for further state weakening. So, what we see in Europe and North America is also the temptation to polarize, manipulate legal institutions, weaponize the judiciary, and criticize the media and freedom of expression as a way to entrench power. Whether this leads to outright state weakening will depend on long-standing traditions and on political actors willing to step up and defend the sanctity of the judiciary, the tax bureaucracy, or the defense apparatus.

How do differences in party systems, federalism, and welfare regimes mediate the capacity of populists to capture or erode the state across regions?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: It’s a fantastic question, and it illustrates how much more we need to understand about how, where, and when state erosion works. Certainly, one aspect that we know from the existing literature is that in federal systems, institutional architectures become more resilient than others to state or executive encroachment. State governments, depending on the constitution and their prerogatives and attributions, would have more autonomy to resist. We already saw these dynamics with COVID, when different studies showed how, if the executive had strong policies to prevent the spread of COVID, such as lockdowns and mandatory masks, states would take a different position or opposition. This is different from unitary states, where the reforms and policies adopted by the center ought to be implemented at every step of the way at the local level, and so on.

So, my hope is that strong federalist institutions would be able to withstand and sustain resistance to these temptations of the executive to encroach and further dismantle the state. That is my ideal hope. One thing that we could start observing—and this is an empirical question—is whether we begin to see the formation of vertical coalitions, whereby a populist executive at the federal level combines with a populist executive at the state level. Then you have pillars of state erosion that do not necessarily preserve democracy but rather align with this idea of dismantling state checks and balances and preserving the proliferation of patronage and clientelistic regimes.

Weakened Institutions Enable the Rise of Informal Power Networks

Your broader scholarship emphasizes informal institutions and clientelist linkages. How does the hollowing of formal state institutions reshape the balance between formal governance and informal political networks?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: We argue that state dismantling enhances informality, discretionality, and opacity. So, all the checks, balances, and capacities to oversee, regulate, and ensure representation, etc., are being placed under attack. What we observe with this process of state dismantling is that these trends—dismantling state capacity—further intensify informality, discretionality, and opacity. This has a direct impact on the proliferation of informal political networks. For example, in some countries we can see how tech barons and the owners of the most important technological and media companies have tremendous potential to disrupt and capture any form of regulation in order to maximize profit. So, what I am saying is that when you enhance informality, discretionality, and opacity, the state essentially paves the way for these informal political networks to accomplish their goals and maximize their individual profit, rather than looking out for the common good.

Is there a paradox whereby populist leaders weaken bureaucratic capacity while simultaneously expanding discretionary spending and targeted benefits to maintain political loyalty? What are the long-term developmental consequences of this model?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: Certainly. This is a critical dimension of state capacity that has not received much attention. The literature on democratic backsliding focuses on the dismantling of checks and balances, freedom of expression, and the fairness of political competition, and so forth. But we do not pay enough attention to the fiscal aspect, and one of the instruments used by populists in dismantling state capacity is creating greater discretion in state funding or justifying significant changes in it. For example, I mentioned at the beginning how monies allocated to poverty reduction programs are accounted for and managed. The moment you remove the monitoring and evaluation aspects of that spending; you create a vacuum of discretion where state leaders can allocate those funds for other purposes.

There is a growing trend—one that can be empirically documented—when you look at how much funding for, say, the judiciary has been reduced over time, or how much the state defense apparatus or special police units have discretionary budgets directly connected to the whims of the executive. This is another, less understood mechanism through which spending or targeted benefits can undermine capacity while maintaining political loyalty. Tax exemptions are another case; tax evasion is another. In the book, we mention the case of the current President Daniel Noboa in Ecuador, who not only undermines the capacity of the state collection agency but also creates mechanisms and reforms to secure tax amnesty for his own business group, so that the state revenue-collecting agency forgives the debts of his business groups, and then he appoints one of the top accountants of his business firm to lead the agency.

By the time the executive is handling state collection agencies as if they were the accounting department of his firm, we have come full circle, illustrating how the executive can mismanage spending and benefits to ensure not just political loyalty but the survival of his own coalition.

Performance Failures Can Undermine Hollowed-Out Regimes

Once populist regimes have hollowed out institutional checks, how resilient do these systems become to democratic backlash—whether through elections, protests, or elite defection? Are weakened states paradoxically more durable for incumbents?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: That is certainly the hope—that by weakening the mechanisms for political and democratic participation, state incumbents will become stronger, more embedded, more entrenched, etc. The relevant test here is whether there are scope conditions for stable and durable governance. I go back to the point I mentioned about the performative versus performance-driven type of governance: if the performative outweighs the performance, sooner or later people will feel that their social security checks are not arriving, that they are paying higher prices for the same kinds of goods, or that they feel more insecure on the streets, etc., and this will make incumbent stability much harder to achieve.

So, either populists will need to reconcile this weakening of institutional checks with effective governance, or they will probably go fully autocratic in order to stay in office. But I do not see how this could immediately be a stable equilibrium if leaders continue hollowing out the state and expect to remain in office, unless further action is taken.

Elite Fractures Can Trigger Sudden Regime Collapse

Historical cases show that authoritarian-leaning regimes can collapse suddenly when elite coalitions fracture. What conditions make hollowed-out states vulnerable to reversal versus entrenched in competitive authoritarianism?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: Yes, elite implosion is certainly a possibility, and in a few instances, we have seen countries where top state elites enter into conflict, dispute territories, and dispute alternative versions of budget funding, for example. This would directly undermine the state elite’s ability to survive in office.

My sense is that this has not happened because, collectively, elites have more to gain by sticking together and maintaining the coalition rather than elaborating on their differences. If anything, what could contain this tendency to hollow out states could be outside pressure, as we have seen in the case of Brazilian courts when they issued prison terms for former President Bolsonaro, who aimed to undermine the state, and the courts put a straightforward stop and said this was not feasible. There are also examples from courts in some parts of India, where bureaucracies can offer a containment strategy so that executives find it much harder to encroach on, dismantle, and change institutions.

Another avenue is plebiscites, such as in Ecuador in recent months, where a series of further state reforms to weaken the state were pushed back by voters, who said no in popular consultations, so that these populists could not continue further weakening the state. Internal implosion would be one scenario, but we have to bet on and count on organized pressure from outside to contain this trend.

Democratic Resilience Requires Broad, Cross-Sector Coalitions

A rear view of people with placards and posters on global strike for climate change. Photo: Dreamstime.

 

And lastly, Professor Acosta, looking ahead, what institutional reforms or societal coalitions offer the most promising pathways to rebuild state capacity and democratic accountability after periods of populist erosion? Do you see reasons for optimism regarding democratic resilience globally?

Assoc. Prof. Andrés Mejía Acosta: I do want to remain optimistic. I do want to see the glass half full in the different events of resistance, rebellion, and reconstruction of democratic capacities. I think this is a much-needed condition for development, for political coexistence, for peace, and respect for human dignity and basic values, etc.

I think, in terms of the specifics of your question—what kinds of societal coalitions or institutional reforms—that this is going to take a much more concerted long-term effort. The challenge now, compared to five or ten years ago, when we were talking about the conditions for democratic resilience and how to contain backsliding, is that we are now talking about the next layer down, as if the authoritarian illness is spreading through the body. It is no longer at the skin or organ level but getting into the bloodstream of how our systems are governed. This requires a much more rapid response on the part of academics to produce more understanding, more nuanced knowledge, and a stronger empirical basis.

But also, activism, non-governmental organizations, educational institutions, the teaching of our students, and the development of broader coalitions around basic rights—of ill people, or unfairly treated people in the court systems, or environmental protections. For that, we need to create cross-cutting coalitions so that, for example, a state attempt to undermine the rights of Indigenous people to preserve their lands from further extraction and exploitation is not just a matter for environmentalists or Indigenous communities, but a cross-societal matter. If we do not collectively defend their rights, sooner or later those attacks from the executive will reach each and every one of us.

So, it is both about developing a cross-sectoral, much broader coalition of different actors—some directly affected, others standing in solidarity with them—and this needs to be long-term. How to do that is a very difficult question that will require most of our innovation, creativity, and commitment. The playing field is also tilted against citizens when social media is controlled by fewer and fewer hands, with dominant discourses prevailing and alternative narratives consistently blocked.

The challenge is much bigger, of course, but the need is also much higher for a sustained, global, broad coalition of interests so that democratic resilience—global democratic resilience—is not just a cause for optimism, but a cause for mobilization and sustained action over time.

Dr. Nandini Sundar is a Professor of Sociology at the Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University.

Prof. Sundar: Almost Every Institution in India Has Been Subverted to Advance a Supremacist Agenda

In this interview with the ECPS, Professor Nandini Sundar (Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University) delivers a stark assessment of India’s institutional trajectory under the BJP and its ideological parent, the RSS. Her central claim is unequivocal: “Almost every institution in this country has now collapsed, or has been subverted, in order to further the supremacist agenda.” She situates current developments within the longer history of Hindutva ideology, emphasizing the RSS’s founding goal of a Hindu supremacist state. Professor Sundar argues that a narrative of majoritarian victimhood underpins historical revisionism, institutional capture, and restrictions on academic freedom. She also highlights transnational pressures, noting that a “very active Hindutva diaspora” has targeted scholars abroad, constraining research and debate globally.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Nandini Sundar— Professor of Sociology at the Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University, and one of India’s most prominent sociologists and a leading voice on democracy, violence, and state power—offers a stark assessment of the trajectory of Indian institutions under the rule of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its ideological parent, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Her central claim is unequivocal: “Almost every institution in this country has now collapsed, or has been subverted, in order to further the supremacist agenda.” Situating contemporary developments within the longer history of Hindutva ideology, Professor Sundar argues that the BJP cannot be understood apart from the RSS, “an unregistered, secretive organization” founded in 1925 “to establish a Hindu supremacist state in which all others would be second-class citizens.”

At the heart of this project, she explains, lies a powerful narrative of majoritarian victimhood. RSS discourse portrays Hindus as historical victims of “800 years of colonialism,” conflating Muslim rule with British imperialism and mobilizing a sense of lost civilizational pride. This paradox—an overwhelming majority imagining itself as dispossessed—underpins a wide array of policies, from historical revisionism to institutional capture. According to Professor Sundar, the claim to represent a wronged majority translates into concrete restrictions on academic freedom through ideological appointments, funding pressures, surveillance, and curricular transformation. Universities, in particular, have been reshaped to ensure that “only our narrative, only our voice, should count,” transforming spaces once associated with pluralism into arenas of political conformity and patronage.

The interview highlights how Hindutva governance operates not only through formal state mechanisms but also through diffuse networks of affiliated organizations and vigilante actors. Student groups such as the ABVP (the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad) and other RSS-linked formations function simultaneously as political mobilizers and instruments of intimidation, embedding campuses within what Professor Sundar calls a broader “ecosystem of vigilantism.” Meanwhile, democratic institutions—from courts to electoral bodies and media regulators—are portrayed as formally intact yet substantively hollowed out, enabling what she describes as the preservation of democratic form alongside the erosion of democratic substance.

Professor Sundar also draws attention to the transnational dimension of these dynamics. A “very active Hindutva diaspora,” she notes, has targeted scholars abroad, orchestrating harassment campaigns and reputational attacks that restrict academic inquiry on India globally. As a result, she warns, it has become “very difficult for anyone working on India to be able to research, write, and think freely, whether inside the country or outside the country.”

Taken together, her analysis presents Hindutva not merely as a domestic political ideology but as a comprehensive project of institutional transformation, cultural redefinition, and epistemic control. By foregrounding the links between majoritarian resentment, institutional subversion, and the policing of knowledge, this interview offers a sobering account of how democratic systems can be repurposed to sustain exclusionary rule while maintaining the appearance of constitutional continuity.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Nandini Sundar, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

The BJP Cannot Be Understood Apart from the RSS and Its Supremacist Project

A man chanting songs with a dummy cow in the background during the Golden Jubilee
celebration of VHP – a Hindu nationalist organization on December 20, 2014 in Kolkata, India. Photo: Arindam Banerjee.

Professor Nandini Sundar, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your recent work on majoritarian resentment and the inversion of victimhood, how do you conceptualize the BJP’s claim to represent a historically wronged “majority,” and how does that claim translate into concrete restrictions on academic freedom (appointments, funding, policing, curricula)?

Professor Nandini Sundar: The BJP was founded by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), an unregistered, secretive organization that has proliferated into many different fronts—education, labor, and virtually every sector, each with its own affiliated bodies. The BJP is the political wing of the RSS, which was founded exactly 100 years ago, in 1925, to establish a Hindu supremacist state in which all others would be second-class citizens.

If you look at RSS literature, it consistently portrays Hindus as victims suffering from what they call 800 years of colonialism, because they conflate periods of Muslim rule with British colonialism. This reflects a deep sense that India was ruled by Muslim rulers for many centuries and that a lost Hindu pride must now be regained. The past they invoke—often framed as a glorious Vedic age—overlooks the fact that ancient India consisted of many different communities practicing a variety of religions, rather than a unified “Hindu” civilization.

This constructed sense of victimhood, despite Hindus being the overwhelming majority—over 80 percent of the population—translates into efforts to rewrite history, for example by erasing the Mughal period. Yet it is impossible to understand India without considering the Mughal era or the various sultanates that existed from the 12th to the 18th centuries.

It also manifests in demographic anxieties, such as claims that Hindus are being overtaken by Muslims due to allegedly higher Muslim fertility rates—claims that are not supported by empirical evidence, since fertility rates among Muslims have declined sharply and vary across regions. In short, historical narratives, demographic fears, and broader perceptions of victimhood are mobilized together.

As noted, this translates first into historical revisionism. Second, in universities, vacancies have been systematically filled with individuals aligned with their ideology. This is not simply a matter of feeling victimized, because in the past, although the system was not always perfect, there was at least a perception that appointments were based on merit. If their candidates were not selected, it was often due to a lack of scholarly expertise rather than ideological exclusion.

Now, victimhood is invoked to claim that “our people” were neglected while positions were monopolized by the left. In reality, universities have been systematically reshaped to reflect their ideological preferences, and this has also become a source of patronage for their cadre.

Taken together, these developments reveal not only a discourse of victimhood but also a broader assertion of dominance—the belief that they are now the only legitimate force, and that only their narrative and voice should prevail.

Democratic Institutions Have Been Hollowed Out from Within

Shri Narendra Modi.
Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi addressing the Nation on the occasion of 75th Independence Day from the ramparts of Red Fort, in Delhi on August 15, 2021.

In “Inside Modi’s Assault on Academic Freedom,” you trace how formally democratic institutions can be repurposed to discipline dissent. What are the key mechanisms—legal, bureaucratic, and vigilante—through which democratic form is preserved while democratic substance is hollowed out?

Professor Nandini Sundar: Almost every institution in this country has now collapsed, or has been subverted, in order to further the supremacist agenda. If you look at the judiciary—take the Supreme Court, for instance—we have had several BJP chief ministers issuing hate speeches. There was a recent incident involving the chief minister of Assam, which has quite a sizable Muslim minority, putting out a video of him shooting Muslims with a gun, targeting them so that you could see Muslims in the viewfinder being shot at. People took this to the Supreme Court, and the Court refused to intervene, saying that you are only targeting BJP chief ministers, and has basically refused to do anything about hate speech coming from the highest constitutional authorities. If you look at any number of judicial pronouncements in the last decade and a half, they have consistently favored the BJP.

If you look at the Election Commission, which again has been packed with chosen bureaucrats, right now they are conducting a massive exercise across the country to register voters. Historically, everybody who has been living here has been considered a voter, apart from immigrants or others. The onus used to be on the state to find and register voters. Now the onus is on voters to prove that they are citizens of this country and produce birth certificates of their parents, grandparents, their own exam mark sheets, and a whole range of certificates to show that they are indeed genuine citizens. That has led to the disenfranchisement of large numbers—hundreds of thousands of people in each state. For example, about 600,000 in one state. It is just ridiculous, because these are all actual, genuine voters who have not been able to produce the right certificates, often because they are poor, or especially women who migrate. So, you can see that elections, too, are completely controlled by the BJP.

When it comes to the media, if you look at the Modi government’s spending on advertisements, the amount that goes to favored media, and the way that media critical of the government has repeatedly had court cases slapped on them, with independent journalists arrested—every field is under attack. Universities are one major field—higher education in particular, but education more generally—where the BJP and the RSS have been attacking all conventions, all democratic procedures, and installing their own people.

Precarity in Universities Is Undermining Academic Freedom

How do budget cuts, contractualization, and precaritization in higher education function as governance tools—producing compliance not only through ideology, but also through material dependence and career risk?

Professor Nandini Sundar: There’s been a change in the way universities are funded. Many university colleges are being asked to go autonomous, which means that they will be responsible for raising their own funding. This increases fees for students, and at the same time, minority students—say Muslims and Christians who were receiving fellowships—have seen those fellowships cut down. So, there has been a general reduction in student fellowships.

In terms of faculty recruitment, we see that even earlier there were a number of precarious positions—contractual teachers—and that still continues quite widely across private colleges. Precarious teachers, those without fixed contracts, obviously find it hard to be critical of anything that is going on and hard to teach freely. But you also see that now, whenever the precarity issue among teachers has been addressed, those positions have been filled with their own people.

So, in either situation, both among students and among faculty, contractualization and the reduction of fellowships are making it difficult for there to be a strong autonomous voice from students and faculty.

Terror Laws Are Weaponized Against Democratic Protest

Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University (BAMU)
Protest against the CAA and NRC at Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University (BAMU), Aurangabad, Maharashtra, India, as students and citizens demonstrate in defense of constitutional rights. Photo: Imran Shaikh.

Many accounts emphasize arrests, sedition/terror charges, and prolonged pre-trial detention. Analytically, how should we understand “process as punishment” as a populist-authoritarian technique of rule in India?

Professor Nandini Sundar: Absolutely. The whole judicial system is designed for process without punishment. If you take the case of Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid, two student leaders who have been arrested for over five years now without the case even coming to trial. The charges relate to their involvement in a movement for equal citizenship. In 2019, the government passed an act that would grant citizenship to refugees from every other country except Pakistan and Bangladesh, and to every other religion except Islam. This was also seen as the first step toward disenfranchising Indian Muslims, and there was a massive protest against it—a huge, peaceful, democratic protest, predominantly led by women in many parts of the country, but especially in Delhi.

These students, both from JNU (Jawaharlal Nehru University) and from Jamia (Jamia Millia Islamia), were involved in this democratic protest, and it was actually a very powerful democratic moment in this country’s history. But many students—predominantly Muslim students—were arrested. There were many people who took part in that protest, Muslims and Hindus, but only the Muslim students were arrested, and they have been in jail for the last five years. We have recorded speeches from them talking about the need for unity, upholding the Constitution, and love, yet they have been accused under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, which deals with terror.

They have been accused of terror conspiracies, which is completely ludicrous. The case has not even come to trial, and the evidence against them is completely flimsy. But everyone knows that they are being kept in jail because they are articulate student leaders who had a democratic vision for this country.

Campuses Are Embedded in a Wider Ecosystem of Vigilantism

How do you interpret the role of affiliated organizations (student wings, vigilante groups, informal “sentiment” enforcers) in expanding state capacity to intimidate universities while maintaining deniable distance?

Professor Nandini Sundar: The RSS has the biggest student wing in the whole country, the ABVP, the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, which has been engaged in a number of attacks on other student organizations. It has also attacked various seminars that have gone against BJP ideology. It functions both as a student wing—providing the kind of membership and mobilization for ordinary student activities that any student organization does—and as a vigilante force.

There are also a number of other fronts of the RSS—the Bajrang Dal, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and various other wings—which intimidate students and faculty on campuses. This is part of a more generalized surge in vigilantism, as vigilantes have been attacking Muslim traders, Muslims transporting cattle across state boundaries, Muslim shopkeepers, and Christian pastors. There is a whole range of vigilante forces that the RSS tacitly supports and grants immunity and impunity. So, the university is not free of this; it is completely embedded in that wider ecosystem of vigilantism.

Universities Modeling Diversity Became Central Adversaries

Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU).
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), a public central university in New Delhi, India. Photo: Mrinal Pal.

Why do institutions like JNU become such central targets in majoritarian projects? Is it their historical role in mass politics, their social composition, their epistemic authority—or the way they model pluralism?

Professor Nandini Sundar: All of the above, I should say. Many universities in India were set up as part of a nationalist project. For instance, Jamia, which was established before independence, was founded by nationalist leaders to provide an alternative form of education to the British colonial model, and it has had a very long, rich tradition of scholarship and student mobilization.

JNU was set up in the 1970s on a very distinct model of higher education, where the effort was to bring in students from all across the country, especially from underserved regions. It had an extremely interesting system of deprivation points, whereby students from backward regions would receive extra marks in addition to whatever they obtained in the entrance test. In this way, it managed to achieve a real plurality of students from across the country. They also had excellent faculty, and some departments were truly the best in the country, known for their academic excellence. Even today, it remains one of the strongest universities academically in India.

Partly because of this academic excellence and the pluralism of its students, JNU also developed a very strong left tradition. It is one place where left student unions have consistently won student elections, and it has had a distinctive style of politics in which debates on a wide range of national issues would continue late into the night, alongside campus concerns such as hostel bills, food, accommodation, and fees. So, it has been a very unusual kind of university, an iconic institution for liberal-left education, and that was something the BJP felt it had to attack and destroy.

Rewriting the Past to Control the Nation’s Narrative

How do textbook “rationalization” and selective historical erasure operate as a struggle over national temporality—who gets to narrate the past, and who is authorized to speak for the nation?

Professor Nandini Sundar: The RSS thinks that it is authorized to speak for the nation, and since it has control over the government and textbooks—because under the Indian system education is a matter both for the central (federal) government and for the states—there are also some boards that operate nationally, in addition to the state boards. So, the major producer of textbooks in India is the NCERT, the National Council of Educational Research and Training, which produces textbooks that are then used by these different boards or even used by state boards as models.

What the BJP has been doing is systematically changing these NCERT textbooks. For instance, removing references to caste, removing all traces of Mughal history from middle school textbooks, and giving more space to certain false narratives that promote Hindu rulers at the expense of others. So, it has huge power. I mean, the central government has enormous power to rewrite historical narratives. It is also, if you look at other fields—archaeology, for instance—it underplays the contributions of the South in historical research.

I don’t know how to put it, but it is enormously powerful in rewriting history and rewriting sociology, rewriting politics—everything, really.

National Security as a Catch-All Tool of Suppression

The state’s framing of “internal affairs,” “sensitive issues,” and “national security” often appears deliberately expansive. What does this elasticity reveal about authoritarian boundary-making in the knowledge sphere?

Professor Nandini Sundar: It also reveals something about authoritarian fragility. Just to give you a very recent example. The Wire, which is a news portal, ran a 52-second clip showing Prime Minister Modi running away from Parliament. This was during a debate in Parliament about how he had not taken a resolute stand when the Chinese were coming into India in 2020, and then he claimed that women MPs were threatening to bite him, and that’s why he didn’t attend Parliament. So, this was just a somewhat humorous video about how Modi was supposedly scared of being bitten by women MPs. The Wire’s Instagram page was shut down, there was a privilege motion against them from Parliament, and it was described as a national security issue. Now, there was nothing remotely related to national security about a small cartoon of Modi running away from women MPs.

But anything and everything can be described as a national security issue. People are being arrested, especially journalists in Kashmir, or students in Kashmir, who are really living under a state of terror. It is such a loosely applied concept, and the problem is that the law puts the onus squarely on the person who is accused under such laws. It is very hard to get bail under UAPA (Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act), which is why people like Umar and Sharjeel and other human rights activists in what is called the BK16 case (the 16 individuals locked up without a trial in the Bhima Koregaon case. S.G.), or across the country more generally, are finding it very difficult to get out of this, because they are accused under national security acts.

So, it is a very expansive definition. It is very, very open to abuse, and these laws should have no place in any democracy.

Food, Caste, and Control under Hindutva Governance

Volunteers of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) on Vijyadashmi festival, a large gathering or annual meeting during Ramanavami a Hindu festival in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh on October 19, 2018. Photo: Pradeep Gaurs.

Beyond overt ideological control, what is the relationship between Hindutva governance and everyday disciplinary practices (food regimes, hostel rules, policing intimacy), and how do these practices intersect with gendered and caste-based hierarchies?

Professor Nandini Sundar: One of the things that the RSS, the Hindutva regime, has been trying to promote is the idea that India is a vegetarian country, and that people who eat meat are in some way inferior or should not be eating meat. They have been trying to associate that with Muslims and use it to target Muslims or Dalits, who were formerly called untouchables and who are still treated very badly and exploited by the system.

In fact, about 80% of India is non-vegetarian. But this has become a big issue in certain hostels. For instance, some of the Indian Institutes of Technology have had separate messes in hostels for vegetarians and non-vegetarians. In the past, people were free to eat whatever they wanted, and they could sit together and eat, but this kind of segregation creates a hierarchical divide in which those who eat pure vegetarian food are seen as somehow superior, because historically it has also been a caste issue.

There have been student movements against this segregation and hierarchy, but they have again been suppressed by the administration. A lot of what the Hindutva regime is doing is feeding into existing caste and religious prejudices, aggravating them, and creating a hierarchy in which Hindu upper-caste voices are seen as representing the whole nation.

Just another example: for some strange reason—because it is inconceivable that this government would do anything that progressive—the University Grants Commission (UGC), which governs the higher education space, issued rules mandating equity for students from historically discriminated backgrounds, such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, minorities, and OBCs (The Other Backward Classes). There was a huge protest against this by upper-caste students, who have been coming out on the streets saying that they are under threat and in danger from this equity movement. The Supreme Court has stayed the equity regulations, and the BJP government is really happy, because it has got the Supreme Court to do so. On the one hand, they put out these UGC equity regulations, but they actually did not want to implement them; their constituency of upper-caste people is against it, and fortunately for them, it has been stayed by the Supreme Court.

So, there is a very neat dovetailing between Hindutva upper-caste ideology and the various practices of this government.

Masculinist Power and the Politics of ‘Teaching a Lesson’

How do masculinist styles of leadership and majoritarian “strength” narratives shape state behavior toward universities—especially in the public performance of punishment, humiliation, and “teaching a lesson”?

Professor Nandini Sundar: It is a very masculinist ideology, and historically the RSS did not have room for women as part of its cadre; there was a separate women’s wing.

If you look at the state of Kashmir, for instance, and education in Kashmir—higher education in particular—the entire process has been about this. In 2019, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was stripped of its constitutional autonomy and reduced from a state to a union territory. The whole thing was couched in terms of teaching them a lesson, because it was seen as a source of terrorism, since it is the only Muslim-majority state in India, and there was a conscious effort to show them their place.

When it comes to universities, Kashmiri students in different parts of the country have been especially targeted and victimized, and again this is very much part of showing Muslims their place, showing Kashmiris their place in India. When it comes to women, there are many more subtle ways in which women have been affected. If you look at the entrance exams, thanks to a new system of multiple-choice entrance exams, the number of women entering colleges has dramatically declined. Even if the government officially says that its policy is inclusive of women studying, in fact many of its practical policies discriminate against women.

People wait in queues to cast votes at a polling station during the 3rd phase of Lok Sabha polls, in Guwahati, India on May 7, 2024. Photo: Hafiz Ahmed.

Targeting Scholars Abroad: Hindutva’s Reach Beyond India

To what extent do you see an externalization of repression—through harassment campaigns, institutional pressure, and reputational attacks—aimed at shaping scholarship on India outside India?

Professor Nandini Sundar: There’s a very active Hindutva diaspora that has been targeting academics who work on India in the US, the UK, and Europe. There was this conference called Dismantling Hindutva some years ago, where the active Hindutva diaspora went after the organizers of the conference. They flooded universities with so much hate mail against faculty members who were part of this conference that some of their servers collapsed.

It is really an organized, very virulent Hindutva diaspora, especially in the US, which has links with Zionists and follows the same sorts of procedures as some of the American far right. Unfortunately for them, the American far right, because they are Christian fundamentalists, has no regard for Hindu fundamentalists, so they are not really sure where they stand now. But they are just a very vicious, virulent lot when it comes to attacking people who are working on India.

For instance, there is an American historian called Audrey Truschke, who writes on Aurangzeb, the last Mughal emperor, and she has been relentlessly attacked. One could name various other people who have been singled out and attacked. The Indian government has also denied visas to a lot of academics working on India. This is really kind of inexplicable, because some of these academics have hugely contributed to the understanding of subjects the government itself promotes. For instance, there is a historian who works on Hindi. Now, the BJP government is insistent that everybody in the country should speak Hindi, that everybody should replace their own languages and know Hindi, yet this historian, who has contributed greatly to the understanding and study of Hindi, was denied a visa. There is absolutely no sense in this, even from their own perspective, because it is not like she was studying anything they would consider anti-national; she was studying Hindi literature.

So, it has become very difficult for anyone working on India to be able to research, write, and think freely, whether inside the country or outside the country.

Recasting the Past for Power

How has the language of decolonization and cultural authenticity been retooled to delegitimate critique—both within India and in global academia—while recoding censorship as civilizational self-defense?

Professor Nandini Sundar: That’s a really good question, because if you look at some of these Hindutva ideologues, they’ve adopted the language of decoloniality to claim that whatever has been done in Indian history, for instance, is colonial because it does not go back to ancient Hindu roots or does not adopt an Indic perspective.

In fact, the BJP or the RSS version of history is itself following a completely colonial template. They have adopted a periodization of Indian history based on Hindu, Muslim, and British India, which is a colonial construct, and that is what they have been following in the name of decolonization.

If you look at one major thrust of their programs, it has been to develop what they call Indic knowledge systems. By Indic knowledge systems, they basically mean Hindu and Vedic knowledge systems. This is something they have been pushing in every syllabus revision process, along with organizing a wide variety of seminars on Indic or Indigenous knowledge systems.

They have actually ignored all the work that has been done over the years, because scholars have already been working on different versions of Indian history and Indian society from a variety of perspectives, many of them indigenous. So, to say that they are coming up with some new framework is actually reinventing the colonial wheel while at the same time claiming that they are adopting some kind of great decolonial epistemology.

A Global Crisis of Academic Freedom Requires Collective Resistance

And lastly, Professor Sundar, given the risks of speaking, organizing, and even researching “sensitive” themes, what forms of collective strategy (professional associations, transnational solidarity, union politics, legal defense infrastructures) do you see as most effective—and what ethical obligations do scholars outside India have in confronting these dynamics without reproducing paternalistic frames?

Professor Nandini Sundar: I don’t think it is about scholars outside India or inside India. I think that scholars across the world are now facing similar threats, whether in Turkey, the US, or Europe. We are all being censored. We are all facing the Palestinian exception—nobody can talk about Palestine or teach about Palestine, not just in the US but in Germany and everywhere.

So, I don’t think there are any easy answers as to what can be done. We are all facing similar kinds of issues, so we need to share across countries how people have dealt with this, and work out ways in which we can collectively keep the university going as a space for research and critical thinking, and above all for teaching freely.

And I have hope that students—not the ABVP type, but ordinary students—are keen and curious about what is actually happening in the world, and I have great hope that students will be the ones who keep the university going. That is something that I think we will all have to face collectively, together across the world.

Professor Benjamin Carter Hett.

Professor Hett: Trump Is Vastly Less Astute and Less Ruthless Than Hitler

Professor Benjamin Carter Hett, a leading historian of Nazi Germany at Hunter College and the Graduate Center, CUNY, joins ECPS to reflect on the promises—and pitfalls—of historical analogy in an age of democratic stress. Grounded in his research on Weimar collapse and authoritarian mobilization, Professor Hett argues that humiliation remains a key driver of populist politics, pointing to Trump’s insistence, “I am your retribution,” as a revealing signal of grievance politics. He also draws sharp structural parallels between Nazi attacks on “the system” and contemporary slogans such as “the swamp,” which work to delegitimize democracy from within. Yet Professor Hett resists false equivalence: Trump, he emphasizes, is “vastly less astute and vastly less ruthless than Hitler,” and lacks “any compelling ideological vision,” remaining “totally improvisatory.” The interview probes elite accommodation, “reality deficits,” and backlash dynamics.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era increasingly shaped by populist insurgencies, democratic erosion, and polarized historical analogies, few scholars are better positioned to assess the uses—and abuses—of the past than Professor Benjamin Carter Hett. A leading historian of Nazi Germany at Hunter College and the Graduate Center, CUNY, Professor Hett has devoted his career to analyzing how democratic systems collapse from within. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), he reflects on the dynamics of authoritarian mobilization, the politics of grievance, and the limits of historical comparison—culminating in his striking assessment that “Trump is, of course, vastly less astute and vastly less ruthless than Hitler.”

Professor Hett’s analysis begins not with institutions but with emotions. Drawing on his research into the Nazi rise to power, he argues that humiliation—rather than ideology alone—often supplies the combustible fuel of authoritarian movements. A “core explanation” for Nazism’s ascent, he explains, was a widespread perception among supporters that they had been “humiliated by domestic elites” and by the settlement of World War I. He sees echoes of this dynamic today: “Substantial segments of the electorate in the United States and in European countries appear to be experiencing a sense of humiliation reminiscent of that felt by many Germans in the interwar period.” Trump’s campaign rhetoric, especially the promise “I am your retribution,” exemplifies how perceived loss of status can be politically weaponized.

Yet the interview’s central theme—highlighted by its title—is not crude equivalence but analytical differentiation. Professor Hett repeatedly underscores that, despite structural parallels, Trump lacks the strategic capacity and ideological coherence that made Hitler historically transformative. Whereas Nazism fused charismatic authority with a totalizing worldview—what Nazis called “the Idea”—Trumpism appears improvisational, transactional, and deeply personalist. This distinction, Professor Hett suggests, limits its authoritarian potential. Trump, he argues, possesses “no compelling ideological vision behind him” and is “totally improvisatory,” driven more by a desire for adulation and material reward than by a programmatic project of domination.

The interview also revisits Professor Hett’s influential argument that democratic breakdown can stem from “hollow victory” as well as defeat. Despite America’s triumph in the Cold War, many citizens experienced globalization, automation, and rising inequality as loss rather than success, producing resentment analogous to the disillusionment that followed World War I. Such grievances, once reframed as cultural humiliation rather than economic hardship, become fertile ground for populist mobilization.

Equally significant is Professor Hett’s discussion of elite miscalculation. Just as conservative elites in Weimar believed they could harness Hitler’s popularity, many contemporary political and economic actors initially treated Trump as a manageable aberration. History, he warns, shows how such bargains can backfire—even when the leader in question is less capable than his predecessors.

Ultimately, Professor Hett’s cautiously optimistic conclusion is that the very differences highlighted in the title—Trump’s relative lack of ruthlessness, ideological depth, and strategic discipline—may also constitute democracy’s resilience. Historical patterns may rhyme, he suggests, but they do not mechanically repeat.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Benjamin Carter Hett, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Humiliation as the Hidden Engine of Authoritarian Politics

Adolf Hitler.
A copy of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf (My Struggle), displayed alongside a portrait of the author at the Technology, Aviation and Military Museum in Sinsheim, Germany. Photo: Gepapix | Dreamstime.

Professor Benjamin Carter Hett, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In “The Power of Grievance,” you frame humiliation as the animating force behind authoritarian mobilization. How does this concept refine—or challenge—more institutional explanations of democratic breakdown in The Death of Democracy, particularly in the US case where institutions remain formally intact?

Professor Benjamin C. Hett: Let me begin by saying that I am primarily a historian and a scholar of 20th-century Germany, particularly of the rise of the Nazis. From extensive research on the Nazis’ ascent in Germany during the 1920s and 1930s—I’ve written three books on the subject, among other works—I came to the conclusion that a core explanation for their rise was a widespread sense of humiliation among their constituency: humiliation at the hands of domestic elites, humiliation imposed by the victorious Allies of World War I, and so on.

Given what I do for a living, and the times we are living in, I am often asked about parallels between that historical episode and contemporary developments. The more I examined current events and read widely on American and European politics today, the more I felt that the explanation for much of what is happening now is broadly similar. Substantial segments of the electorate in the United States and in European countries appear to be experiencing a sense of humiliation reminiscent of that felt by many Germans in the interwar period.

As for how this perspective modifies the outlook: there are, of course, countless possible explanations for the rise of authoritarianism. Some are economic-structural, others political, social-psychological, or cultural—suggesting that certain societies may be predisposed to particular forms of authoritarian politics. Nothing in scholarship is ever absolute, and elements of all these factors are likely present in any given case where authoritarianism gains electoral traction.

But, for what it is worth, I am persuaded that if you return to what politicians are actually saying to people—and examine the resulting voting behavior in context—you repeatedly encounter the theme of humiliation. There are many examples we could discuss, but one is particularly telling: the fact that Trump campaigned so heavily on the claim, “I am your retribution.” What do his voters need retribution for? It suggests that they feel they have experienced a significant degree of humiliation in recent years or decades. I think there are many other such examples, but that one captures the point quite clearly.

From ‘The System’ to ‘The Swamp’: Recycling Anti-Democratic Rhetoric

Donald Trump.
Donald Trump’s first presidential campaign rally at the Phoenix Convention Center, where thousands gathered to hear him speak as protesters demonstrated outside. Photo: Danny Raustadt.

You show how Nazi contempt for “the system” delegitimized Weimar democracy from within. To what extent do contemporary slogans such as “the swamp” or “deep state” perform a structurally similar function in Trumpism, even without an explicitly revolutionary ideology?

Professor Benjamin C. Hett: That’s a great point, and you’re quite right, too, about the lack of an explicitly revolutionary ideology. But when Trump talks about draining the swamp and campaigns on that, it is doing exactly—indeed 100% of what Nazi rhetoric in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s did.

Just to give you an example, the Nazis always talked about “the system,” a kind of capital-S System. “The System” was their code word for Weimar democracy, which they worked very hard to paint as corrupt and weak, in very much the sort of Trump-like “swamp” rhetoric they used. Nazi propaganda would, for instance, always highlight what they saw as corruption by the democratic parties, especially by the Social Democrats, the dominant democratic party at that time. They would emphasize corruption, weakness, dysfunction, and the incompetence of democracy, always using corruption as a wedge to say: look how this system is paying off fat cats and criminals; look how this system stands behind war profiteers and gangsters. This is a fundamentally illegitimate system; therefore, you should turn to us, because we represent, in their words, cleanliness and decency.

And Trump makes exactly the same argument. Despite the—to put it mildly—rather glaring corruption of his administration, which probably even outdoes the Nazis in corruption (and the Nazis were plenty corrupt), the rhetoric is just that: rhetoric that conceals, in both cases, a much more profound kind of corruption.

Why Cold War Triumph Did Not Prevent Democratic Discontent

You emphasize that authoritarian grievance can emerge not only from defeat but also from “hollow victory.” How analytically useful is this idea for understanding American populism, given that the US emerged as the undisputed Cold War victor?

Professor Benjamin C. Hett: One thing I think is a bit of a puzzle is why the United States could have achieved, in a sense, a kind of unmitigated triumph at the end of the Cold War, and yet have pretty quickly, in historical time after the end of the Cold War, fallen prey to a movement like Trump’s—a demagogic campaign of resentment that seems to speak to people who feel they are losing from the system. So, for a historian like me, the question arises: this actually looks rather like the 1920s, an increasingly dark time that followed a seemingly spectacular democratic triumph. So, what is it about that?

If you look a little more closely, you find that, for many Americans, the end of the Cold War did not deliver anything that looked like a victory. This is largely due to economic orthodoxy and, to some extent, technological change, which have taken hold since the end of the Cold War. The two things combined—the move to greater globalization, which for many Americans meant offshoring jobs and/or losing domestic jobs in competition with foreign manufacturers—and, coupled with that, technological change, including increasing automation of the workplace. God only knows what AI is going to do to all of us, but there has been a narrative of technological change replacing jobs for some decades now.

What this has done is essentially deprive the vast majority of Americans of real economic gains over a period of the last 50 years. I think it has become acute since the 1990s, but it has been going on since the 1970s. There is quite clear data on this, and it is breathtaking that, for 99% of Americans, there has been no real gain in income or net worth since the 1970s, whereas the top 1% has achieved spectacular gains in income over the same period. And this is a result of politics. It is not anything inevitable in the economic order; it is a result of political decisions that have been made. Although many people who vote for Trump do not really know or understand this, they experience its effects, and that creates a kind of justifiable anger.

But the subtle point—and this is one of the arguments of my piece—is that it then becomes, politically, not exactly a literal economic grievance, because it gets transmuted into something else. What people receive is the message: my country, my society, does not care about me. My society does not pay attention to me; it neglects my interests. There is an elite interest that is taking precedence. That mood has increasingly taken hold in America since the 1990s, at a time when we should have been basking in democratic triumph, but it has not worked that way.

Much as—and here there is a very close parallel again—at the end of World War I, similar things happened. Following a democratic victory, various kinds of economic crises beset the Western democracies. To give an illustrative quote, I remember reading something a British veteran of World War I said, I think sometime in the 1920s: “We were promised homes for heroes at the end of World War I.” This was an election promise by British Prime Minister David Lloyd George in 1918, when he proposed a massive housing program for returning veterans. “So, we were promised homes for heroes. Well, actually, it took a hero to live in it. I would never fight for my country again.” That speaks exactly to the kind of anger—what I call a hollow victory—that Americans have experienced in large numbers since the end of the Cold War.

Hostility to Globalization, Alliance with Wealth

Elon Musk.
Protesters demonstrate against Elon Musk and DOGE over cuts to government funding outside a Tesla showroom in New York City, March 1, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your work highlights how fascist movements selectively appropriated anti-capitalist and socialist rhetoric. How should scholars interpret Trumpism’s simultaneous hostility to globalization and embrace of oligarchic capitalism without collapsing the analogy into false equivalence?

Professor Benjamin C. Hett: In the historical case of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s, the scholar who has put this most clearly and effectively is the great Robert Paxton, who has a terrific book called The Anatomy of Fascism. What Professor Paxton says, quite astutely, is that fascist movements historically moved into the political space where there was room for them, making whatever alliances worked to move them forward at that moment. In the earlier days—you see this with Mussolini in the very early phase of Italian fascism, and with Hitler a few years later—the available space was one of resentment, especially among working- or lower-middle-class people, about the nature of the economic order, with many feeling they were being shafted by a certain kind of capitalism.

So, the Nazis rhetorically moved into that space and positioned themselves as anti-capitalists, some more sincerely than others. There were, weirdly enough—you may have heard the term—we sometimes speak of “left-wing Nazis,” those who took anti-capitalism and anti-elitism more seriously. Hitler was not one of those people; he was what we call a right-wing Nazi. But he was willing to let the left-wing Nazis rhetorically have some leash, as it was politically useful. And then, of course, famously later, he had them all murdered in 1934, which shows what he really thought of that.

Trump is doing something similar without quite realizing it. What is interesting about Trump is that he is so extraordinarily stupid and tactically inept that he does these things on a very obvious level. He is tactically astute enough, usually, to figure out what he can say that will be electorally successful, but he is in no way a strategic thinker capable of putting it into any coherent package. So, with Trump you get, day by day, whatever has just passed through his mind. Especially when he was campaigning, particularly in 2016, you heard not only anti-globalization but quite directly anti-capitalist rhetoric from him.

But, of course Trump is also extremely corrupt, so once in power he wants to find ways for people to give him money. In practice, he cozies up to tech moguls and others; for example, Jeff Bezos giving $40 million for that awful movie about Melania, or Trump receiving a $400 million jet from Qatar. It is sort of mind-blowing.

Trump is both so corrupt and so devoid of tactical sense—and, I guess, of any sense of tact or taste—that he simply does all these things out in the open. So, you see it extremely clearly with Trump. You can see similar patterns with Hitler and Mussolini, though they were astute enough to slightly conceal the extent of their hypocrisy about anti-capitalism. With Trump, what you see is what you get, and what you get is what you see. It is all out there. But the basic tactical and rhetorical pattern is very much the same.

The Illusion of Control: When Elites Enable Authoritarianism

In Weimar Germany, conservative elites believed they could control Hitler. Do you see comparable patterns among US political, judicial, or economic elites who initially treated Trump as a manageable aberration rather than a systemic threat?

Professor Benjamin C. Hett: Yes, very much. Perhaps a bit less now than some years ago. This was particularly an issue in Trump’s first term in office. Back then, I wrote a book called The Death of Democracy, which is actually an account of the Nazis’ rise to power. One of the main themes in that book is that there was a sort of Faustian bargain between what you might call the establishment elites in Weimar Germany—particularly business elites and military elites—who did not like Hitler, did not like his party, and did not respect it, but couldn’t help noticing that Hitler got votes. Especially by 1932, he was getting about a third of the votes, and his party was by far the biggest in terms of electoral support. So, these elites were astute enough to think this was maybe something they could use.

They could make a deal with him, arrange for his electoral constituency to come in behind them, and that would advance their agenda—an agenda of deregulation and anti-union approaches for business, and an agenda of an arms buildup for the armed forces.  Notoriously—probably no one needs me to tell them this—that deal didn’t work out very well, because many of these elite gentlemen profoundly underestimated Hitler. They underestimated his cunning and his ruthlessness. It took arguably not much more than about four weeks for them to be captured by him in power and then pushed aside from all influence.

When I wrote my book—it came out in 2018—although I never mention Trump or current politics anywhere in it, there is meant to be a rather loud subtext, and I’m pretty sure no one who has read the book has missed it. It is about parallels, and the parallel I thought was strongest and most telling was exactly this kind of elite accommodation of a dangerous and potentially authoritarian political movement that they believed would advance their own agenda and that they could control. I had a feeling the same thing would happen—that Trump would overwhelm them. Trump is, of course, vastly less astute and vastly less ruthless than Hitler. But much of the same thing has, in fact, happened. He has basically destroyed the Republican Party as an actual conservative party. There are virtually no moderate Republicans left anymore, certainly at the congressional level.

It has become very much his party, because those elites, in fact, failed to control him. They have failed to control him even more, certainly in his second term. He has done things that most elites don’t want, like tariffs and many other policies. No one is happy about his threats to Greenland; no conventional conservative is happy about his downgrading of America’s alliances or trade interests, but they simply can’t control him anymore.

I do think at least they are starting to become aware of it. There is less self-delusion among American elites now about what Trump is. It’s kind of too late. If we are going to stop this guy from doing more damage, it is not going to be the business elites who do it. We’ve seen in Minneapolis who is going to do it, but that is another question.

From the Big Lie to Algorithmic Disinformation

Social Media

You describe the Weimar Republic as suffering from a fatal “reality deficit.” How does this concept translate into an era of algorithmic misinformation, partisan epistemologies, and the collapse of shared factual baselines?

Professor Benjamin C. Hett: It’s a great question. One of the things that I say a lot—and I don’t know if anyone ever agrees with me, and it’s fine if no one does—but as a historian, I tend to think there is actually never anything really new. The environment we live in of social media– and internet-driven disinformation is not incredibly new. You don’t need the internet for that. As Exhibit A for my contention, I would point to the Weimar Republic, which had a very vigorous media environment.

You see different figures, and it depends how you count them, but there were something like 40 or 50 daily papers in Berlin in the 1920s, covering the whole political spectrum—from communist to Nazi and everything in between. There was also pioneering radio, films—there were many ways for information to circulate. Posters were a very big deal. In my book The Death of Democracy, I discuss how the Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels placed enormous emphasis on posters, saying, “Our election campaign is going to be all about posters.” So, there were all these ways to disseminate information.

And just because something appears in a newspaper does not mean it is not disinformation, and there was plenty of that in Weimar. A prime example is what was called, even then, the Big Lie: the idea that Germany did not really lose World War I—that Germany was on the verge of victory when cowardly, treasonous politicians, liberals, and socialists betrayed the country by surrendering to the Allies. This narrative originated with military leaders such as Field Marshal Hindenburg and General Ludendorff and was then eagerly adopted by figures like Hitler.

There are striking parallels here to Trump’s narrative about the 2020 election, claiming he did not really lose but was betrayed by a democratic establishment. That narrative has been widely circulated, and many Republicans and people on the American right believe it. It has effectively become a loyalty test: if you are to play any role in Trump’s party or administration, you must affirm that he actually won the 2020 election.

Similarly, perhaps half of Germans in the 1920s and 1930s believed that Germany had been on the verge of winning World War I—which is nonsense to exactly the same extent that it is nonsense to claim Trump won the 2020 election. Germany was, in fact, being militarily crushed when the armistice was signed in 1918.

So that Big Lie spread extremely effectively using the media technologies of the time. If the internet had existed then, it is hard to imagine it being more effective than what already existed in propagating that narrative. There is obviously an advantage today in the speed with which electronic communication spreads, but I do not think it represents a profound, fundamental difference from the past.

I do think America today is also a country suffering from a massive reality deficit, much as Weimar did in the 1920s, and for many of the same reasons: dishonest politicians exploiting the media available to them. In that sense, it is very much the same.

Personalist Power Without a Guiding Doctrine

Hitler combined charismatic authority with a coherent—if grotesque—ideological worldview. Trumpism appears far more improvisational and transactional. Does this weaken the authoritarian analogy, or does it suggest a more flexible and therefore resilient form of personalist rule?

Professor Benjamin C. Hett: Probably both, but I’m one of those people who, on these issues, is more of a glass-half-full than a glass-half-empty type. I am, for a number of reasons, fairly optimistic about the longer-term prospects of American democracy. I think we will get through Trump and continue operating as a democracy. One reason for that is exactly your point: It weakens Trump’s ability to be an effective authoritarian that he has no compelling ideological vision behind him. He is, as you put it, exactly right—totally improvisatory.

Part of what made Hitler successful—certainly with his base, his core followers who became the spine of his regime—was his ability to convince them that he was the spokesperson for a powerful idea. The Nazis talked about “the Idea” all the time, a kind of capital-I, the Idea. They internalized it deeply, and that motivated a great deal of their conduct. There is nothing remotely comparable with Trump.

As a matter of fact, the distinguished historian Timothy Snyder wrote a piece sometime last fall that I thought was spot on. He made this point, noting that one of the differences between Trump and Hitler is that Hitler had a sweeping, deeply embedded, fairly all-encompassing ideological worldview. That, in a sense, not only attracted followers but also gave a blueprint for his actions and pushed him toward what he ultimately did.

Trump has nothing remotely like that. Trump basically—among his many attributes is a shockingly profound inferiority complex—just wants to be flattered all the time. He wants to ride around in Air Force One, and he wants people to give him money. It does not go much farther than that. Honestly, for Trump, that is it. Hitler—though I do not think anyone would suggest I am advocating for him—did have a sweeping ideological vision that he worked very hard to fulfill. Trump does not. As I said, Trump wants to ride around on Air Force One, be told he is wonderful, and be given money. Ultimately, that is not something you can really package as a compelling ideology for which people would be willing to die.

Authoritarian Impulses Confront Constitutional Constraints

The US Supreme Court building at dusk, Washington, DC. Photo: Gary Blakeley.

Drawing on your research into emergency decrees and legal normalization under Nazism, how should we interpret contemporary efforts to weaponize prosecutions, executive orders, or “law-and-order” rhetoric in ostensibly constitutional systems?

Professor Benjamin C. Hett: That has definitely been a feature of Trump’s second term. This kind of comes back to what he said about how he would be retribution for his followers. I think what he really means is that he will be retribution for himself. So, we have obviously seen targeted prosecutions of people that Trump feels have insulted him or hurt him in some way.

There is a weak parallel here to Hitler, in the sense that in the famous event of the Night of the Long Knives in 1934, when, as I mentioned earlier, Hitler had a number of people who could be seen as left-wing Nazis murdered, he also, on the same occasion, had murdered a number of people against whom he had some particular kind of grudge, going back in some cases a decade or more. He had been holding these grudges for a while. Trump is like that, except here is where we get to the difference, which is really important.

We still, basically, in America, have a democracy. We still basically have a legal system, although Trump is trying to erode it and is eroding it to an extent, but it is still basically functioning. So, he has to try to prosecute these people through the legal system, and we have seen that it does not work very well, because the legal system basically takes his efforts to corrupt it and spits them out. There have been any number of such cases. He keeps bringing, or getting his Justice Department to bring, charges against people like the former FBI Director Comey or the New York State Attorney General Letitia James. Grand juries that need to approve an indictment will not approve them, or judges will throw them out. Just yesterday, a judge threw out a case against Senator Mark Kelly, who is in a legal battle with the Defense Secretary, Hegseth, for things that he said in a video. Again, the justice system is basically rejecting these efforts. If Trump were more Hitlerian, if he were more ruthless, he would find ways to get these people anyway, but he is not doing that.

The system is, in a sense, holding against his efforts to abuse it. So, I think, so far, so good on that. I mean, what he is doing is horrific. His Attorney General, Pam Bondi, is the most corrupt and probably most incompetent Attorney General the United States has ever had, and she just does whatever he wants her to do. But it is failing. Something we need to keep in mind about Trump is that he does any number of awful things, but most of the awful things he does fail, and they fail because they run up against something in American society that resists them, as in this case with the justice system.

Public Resistance and the Constraints on Authoritarian Consolidation

Weimar politics were marked by overt paramilitary violence, whereas contemporary American politics often operates through a mix of performative menace and state-sanctioned coercion, including the expanded mobilization of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the deployment of the National Guard in ways critics describe as intimidating or terrorizing civilian populations. In your view, how much actual violence—or credible threat of violence exercised through formal state institutions—is necessary for authoritarian consolidation in a mature media democracy?

Professor Benjamin C. Hett: The answer is lots. And here again, I’m sort of a glass-half-full guy. Let me say that there is no one in this country who is more angry than I am about ICE, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, basically a police agency, or the somewhat similar organization Customs and Border Patrol, which also has police officers of a sort that have been on the ground, notably in the last month or so in Minneapolis. There is no one who abhors that more than I do or is more angry about the violence, including the murders they have perpetrated, or the myriad abuses of the Constitution—breaking into homes without a warrant, breaking into cars without a warrant. ICE is basically a criminal organization. That said, I am actually working on writing something right now about this.

The parallel to the violence of the historical fascist era basically fails simply on scale alone. The numbers would go something like this—I have just been looking this up. There are right now about 22,000 ICE agents in the United States. We could compare ICE and the kind of violence it creates and its style—being in military-style uniforms, patrolling the streets, marauding, conducting violence rather randomly against people. That all looks quite a bit like what the Nazi stormtroopers, the famous Brownshirts, were doing in 1933 and 1934.

Except that in 1933 and 1934 there were between 3 and 4 million young men in the Brownshirts in a country that at that time had about 66 million people. If you multiplied that out to be proportional to the American population now, you would have somewhere between 16 to 21 million uniformed paramilitary people roaming the streets of the United States. What we have is 22,000. So, we need to keep in mind the actually quite mind-blowing scale of the violence that the Nazi regime in 1933 and 1934 was meting out to its own people through these stormtroopers and through agencies like the secret police, the Gestapo. In comparison to what we have in the United States now, as terrible as the violence in, for instance, Minneapolis and the murders there have been, the scale is minuscule compared to what the Nazis did. I think we need to keep that in mind.

It would probably take Nazi-scale mobilization and violence for the Trump administration to get itself into the league of being a real dictatorship, and that is just not going to happen. The other thing I want to say quickly is that, as a very close student of what happened in Germany in 1933 and 1934, I can say there was nothing remotely like the mobilization of ordinary people in Minneapolis to create networks to push back against ICE. It has been remarkable how we have been reading and seeing about this in the last month or two—the way these spontaneous networks have gotten organized, where people communicate via cell phones or whatever, and as soon as ICE agents go anywhere, people notify that neighborhood, follow and track them, film them, and put videos on social media.

All of this has hindered ICE in doing what it wants to do, but it has also shredded its public reputation. Americans now are overwhelmingly—polls show roughly two-thirds—against what ICE is doing, and as that has happened, it has also shredded Trump’s approval rating, which is now at pretty much record lows for any president. The only competition Trump has right now for a low approval rating among other presidents is himself in his first term. So, the spectacle of what ICE is doing is really not selling with Americans, and they are pushing back commendably, in ways that one did not see in Germany in 1933 and 1934. All of those differences are quite important.

Can Democratic Pushback Contain Authoritarian Populism?

Protesting Donald Trump.
Protesters demonstrate outside a Donald Trump presidential campaign rally, many criticizing his immigration stance; some hold signs depicting Adolf Hitler alongside other messages and an American flag. Photo: Dreamstime.

Drawing on your work on Weimar Germany and the dynamics of authoritarian mobilization, how resilient do you judge Trumpism and a Trump-led administration to be in the face of potential democratizing backlash—whether through electoral defeat, judicial resistance, elite defection, or mass civic mobilization? More specifically, do historical analogies suggest that such backlash tends to constrain authoritarian projects, or can it paradoxically strengthen them by reinforcing grievance narratives and siege mentalities?

Professor Benjamin C. Hett: That’s an interesting question. As I said before, I am fairly optimistic that we’re going to get through Trump. And in 2028, we’ll have a better president, and we’ll be more or less okay as a country. I don’t want to minimize the people who are really suffering the brunt of this, especially people in immigrant communities or communities of color. There is damage being done to people that is not fixable, but American democracy is going to get through this.

I have also said, pretty much since the beginning of this second Trump term, that although I cannot quite foresee the shape it will take, I do not think we’re going to get through this without a crisis of some kind. The crisis would take the form of Trump doing something—whether it is ordering soldiers onto the streets of American cities, resulting in large-scale violence (this has already happened to an extent), or trying to interfere with a free election. There is, of course, a lot of talk now about ways in which Trump is working to steal the 2026 midterms that we should be having in November. There may well be some crisis around those elections.

My hunch is that when that crisis comes, Trump’s side will lose. If, for instance, he tried to do something to subvert the elections, there would be riots in the streets to such an extent that he would have to back down—which, by the way, he usually does. Notice that on many of the worst things Trump does, he often ends up backing down. This has been true of the Greenland situation. Just yesterday, they announced they are pulling ICE out of Minneapolis. We’ll see if they actually do, but they have announced that. They have quietly pulled National Guard soldiers out of cities they had deployed them to, like Los Angeles and Chicago. They do not really admit they are doing that, but they have, in fact, done it.

Trump is a classic bully who is also weak, and when he meets pushback, he tends to retreat. So, if he tried, or when he tries, to do something questionable about the midterms this November, there will be pushback, and he will be forced off what he is trying to do.

To the other part of your question, Trumpism was not invented yesterday. This is a long current in American history. The ingredients that go into Trump and his constituency have manifested throughout American history. They appeared in the form of the Klan in the 1870s and again revived in the 1920s. They showed up in the form of Jim Crow in the South. They appeared in the form of McCarthyism in the early 1950s. This complex of nativism, racism, hostility to individual rights, and, to some extent, hostility to democracy has always been there in America. It is always going to be there. There will be a core of Trump supporters who will never abandon what they see him standing for. They may reach a point where they abandon him personally, perhaps—especially if there are further revelations from Epstein—but they will not abandon that package of ideas.

There will always be, whatever it may be, 20% or 30% of the American electorate attached to these ideas. My hope is that we can move toward a politics that contains it, so that we can still function as a liberal democracy where rights are protected, minorities feel safe, and we work with our allies. My hope is that we can contain it. I am somewhat optimistic that we can.

Telling Difficult Truths in a Polarized Age

And finally, Professor Hett, given your dual role as historian and public intellectual, how do you navigate the tension between scholarly restraint and moral urgency when historical patterns begin to rhyme in politically dangerous ways?

Professor Benjamin C. Hett: That’s a great question. I do wrestle with that a lot, to be quite honest. Sometimes I feel there are things I could say as a public-facing activist that I don’t really believe as a scholar, so I always feel that tension. I have been quite active in the last year or two. I was active in the election campaign last year with a group called Democracy First, which recruited a bunch of people like me—basically historians, political scientists, journalists, and so on—to speak about some of these issues and parallels at meetings and rallies, especially in swing states. So, I’ve been quite out there saying this stuff.

In a certain sense, to achieve the political effect I want—to rally people to democracy—I might be tempted to play up the threat more. I mean, I could say, oh, Trump’s super scary, he’s winning and so on, which I actually don’t believe. So, I try to be honest about that. I’ll give you another example of a tricky issue I navigate. I was actually just talking to some of my students about this the other day.

There are people on the right in America—Dinesh D’Souza is a prominent one—who argue that Nazism was a movement of the political left, not the right. People like D’Souza do this because they want to use that claim to discredit the political left in the present. They basically say, you liberals call Trump a Nazi, but actually you are the Nazis, and the Nazis were liberals and socialists like you, so you are the ones who bear this bad legacy.

Saying the Nazis were on the left is, in some basic way, wrong. In their time, the Nazis were seen as being on the far right by everyone in the political community. That’s why they found coalition partners on the right, why business and military elites were interested in working with them, and why the German Reich president, von Hindenburg, was willing to bring Hitler into government. They were seen as being on the right. However, it is also not entirely untrue that they drew some elements from the left. If you read the Nazis’ 25-point political program from 1920, there are many ideas that are quite congruent with a kind of social-welfare liberalism, if not something further left—profit sharing in big corporations, better health insurance programs, better educational opportunities for children from poorer backgrounds, old-age pensions, and so forth. There is a social-welfare element there.

And if you look at the name of the party—the full name was the National Socialist German Workers’ Party—if you took the “national” off and had a party called the Socialist German Workers’ Party, you would conclude that it was clearly a party of the left, probably a Marxist party. Once you add “national,” it becomes more complicated—complicated rather than coherently a party of the right. So, I feel, as a historian, that I need to acknowledge that complexity, even though I regret that this may give some oxygen to bad-faith actors like Dinesh D’Souza, who will say, “See? Even Hett says the Nazis were on the left.” That is the kind of thing I feel I am always navigating.

Professor Werner Pascha

Professor Pascha: Western Democracies Should Learn from Japan’s Long-Term Politics

In this interview with the ECPS, Professor Werner Pascha—Emeritus Professor of East Asian Economic Studies—examines Japan’s evolving political economy amid electoral volatility, fiscal strain, and geopolitical uncertainty. Reflecting on the LDP’s supermajority, he cautions against reading the outcome as systemic rupture, arguing instead for “continuity” and warning of a possible “popularity bubble.” Professor Pascha also clarifies how populism operates differently in Japan, where elite–people antagonism is “very rare,” and highlights the persistence of technocratic governance, noting that “the technocratic model remains very much alive.” Framing Japan’s approach as “strategic pragmatism,” he argues that Western democracies should look beyond “short-term electoral cycles” and take East Asia seriously as “highly instructive.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Werner Pascha—Emeritus Professor of East Asian Economic Studies (Japan and Korea) and Associate Member of the Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST) at the University of Duisburg-Essen—offers a nuanced assessment of Japan’s contemporary political trajectory under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. At a time when many advanced democracies are grappling with populist insurgencies, fiscal strain, and geopolitical fragmentation, Professor Pascha suggests that Japan’s experience—particularly under Takaichi’s unexpectedly strong mandate—deserves closer scrutiny: “we should not only look at Europe or the US, but also keep East Asia in mind, as it is highly instructive.”

PM Takaichi’s landslide electoral victory, which delivered a two-thirds supermajority for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner, has dramatically consolidated executive authority and provided her government with an exceptional legislative cushion. As Japan’s first female prime minister, she combines a programmatic ideological profile with a distinctive leadership style that voters perceive as both “diligent and tough-speaking.” Her rapid ascent and decisive electoral endorsement have reshaped the political landscape, strengthening conservative forces and enabling her to advance an ambitious policy agenda. This includes large-scale fiscal stimulus, proposed consumption-tax cuts, a renewed industrial strategy focused on technological innovation and artificial intelligence, and a more assertive security posture in East Asia. Her leadership has also been marked by a willingness to take politically risky positions—particularly regarding Taiwan and China—that have resonated domestically while heightening regional tensions.

At the same time, PM Takaichi’s policy agenda has raised significant concerns about fiscal sustainability and market confidence. Japan’s already elevated public debt—among the highest in the developed world—has made investors sensitive to expansionary fiscal measures, and early market reactions to her proposals have underscored the tension between electoral mandates and macroeconomic credibility. Nevertheless, her overwhelming electoral mandate may also provide political space for policy recalibration and more cautious implementation, a dynamic that Professor Pascha identifies as characteristic of Japan’s long-standing pattern of governance.

Crucially, Professor Pascha cautions against interpreting Sanae Takaichi’s rise as evidence of systemic transformation. Rather than signaling a structural rupture in Japan’s political economy, he emphasizes continuity: “I would regard it as continuity. I do not really see a major change developing in Japan.” Even the scale of the LDP’s victory, he suggests, may partly reflect “a kind of popularity bubble” surrounding Takaichi rather than a durable realignment. 

Importantly, Professor Pascha resists simplistic narratives about Japan’s supposed technocratic decline. Despite electoral promises and fiscal pressures, “the technocratic model remains very much alive.” While no longer operating in the rigid form of the postwar developmental state, policymaking continues to rest on strategic planning—particularly in areas such as artificial intelligence and economic security.

This continuity is best captured, in Professor Pascha’s view, by the concept of “strategic pragmatism”: the capacity to pursue long-term goals while remaining adaptive in implementation. Japan’s 2022 economic security legislation, he observes, reflects a broader and longstanding logic dating back to the 1980 doctrine of “comprehensive security.” The pattern is strikingly consistent: Japan adapts without abandoning strategic orientation.

This framework helps explain how Japan can accommodate electoral responsiveness, conservative policy shifts, and technocratic governance without sacrificing institutional stability. It also highlights the broader relevance of Japan’s experience for Western democracies facing shorter electoral cycles and increasingly volatile political environments. As Professor Pascha suggests, Japan’s model of calibrated, long-term political management—now embodied in Takaichi’s leadership—offers an instructive counterpoint to the reactive and polarized dynamics visible across Europe and North America. In his view, “Western countries might do well to study this concept more closely and to look beyond short-term electoral cycles.” Japan’s political economy, often underestimated, may thus provide a model of long-term calibration under conditions of uncertainty.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Werner Pascha, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

East Asia Is Highly Instructive for Western Democracies

The Sangiin is the upper house of the National Diet of Japan.
The Sangiin is the upper house of the National Diet of Japan, comprising 242 members. Photo: Sean Pavone / Dreamstime.

Professor Werner Pascha, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away the first question: From a political-economy perspective, do the recent election results suggest a structural transformation in Japanese politics, or are we witnessing an adaptive recalibration of long-standing LDP dominance? How should we distinguish between systemic change and elite-managed continuity in Japan’s case?

Professor Werner Pascha: First of all, thank you very much for having me. We are speaking three days after this spectacular election result in Japan, in which the LDP earned a supermajority—two-thirds of the seats in Parliament. I find this very interesting, particularly at a time of significant economic and geopolitical challenges. In an established democracy, for the leading party to secure two-thirds of the vote raises many important questions and lessons for other advanced economies. So we should not only look at Europe or the US, but also keep East Asia in mind, as it is highly instructive.

Now, is this continuity or systemic change? I would regard it as continuity. I do not really see a major change developing in Japan. Why? If we look back at recent elections, there have been quite a few. We had the 2024 general election for the lower house, and in 2025, the upper house elections. So there are several elections to refer to.

The results have been shifting, so there is no clear stability. If there were a systemic change, I would expect something to develop year after year, culminating in a breakthrough of this kind. Instead, this appears to be a somewhat surprising result. There are even voices suggesting that it may represent a kind of popularity bubble surrounding Prime Minister Takaichi.

So while this is an important event, the next election may already look different, depending on the extent to which Takaichi is able to meet the enormous expectations currently placed upon her in Japan.

National Security Is a Long-Term Position, Not Populism

To what extent can the LDP’s current policy mix—large-scale fiscal stimulus combined with nationalist security rhetoric—be analytically described as populist rather than pragmatic? Where would you draw the line between crisis-driven redistribution and populist economic signaling?

Professor Werner Pascha: First of all, I should perhaps explain what I understand by populism. I think there are three important dimensions. The first is a kind of ideology that posits the elite on the one hand and the people—the “true” people—on the other, in whose name policy should be made. The second is a performative style of politics, often involving assertive positioning by politicians. The third consists of rather simplistic ideas about how to solve complex issues.

Taking this into account, if we look at national security, this has long been a view held in Japan. I would therefore not argue that this is populist; rather, it reflects a long-term position that has consistently been maintained.

As regards economic policymaking, the issue is somewhat more difficult. The government’s slogan of pursuing “a proactive and responsible fiscal policy” is a very tricky formulation. It almost appears too simplistic, in my view, because achieving both goals at the same time—being proactive, given the enormous public debt Japan already has, while also being responsible and not overdoing it—is no easy matter.

On the one hand, one might say that Japanese governments under LDP leadership have pursued this approach for many years, suggesting continuity. On the other hand, trying to win an election with that slogan, without a really clear-cut understanding of what it implies, sounds somewhat populist.

Elite vs. ‘True People’ Framing Is Rare in Japan

Crowds on Nakamise Dori, Asakusa, Tokyo, Japan on May 24, 2016. Visitors shop and walk along the historic street leading to nearby temples. Photo: Dreamstime.

How does Japan’s brand of populism—if we can call it that way—differ from European or American populism in terms of its relationship to technocracy, bureaucracy, and expertise?

Professor Werner Pascha: Perhaps it is helpful to return to the earlier distinction—the three aspects of populism I mentioned before. Regarding the contrast between the elite and the “true people,” this is very rare in Japan. We do not often encounter this kind of populist framing, except perhaps to a limited extent on the fringes. Among the more established parties, it is quite uncommon. I think the reason is that Japanese politics and society are not particularly confrontational, and politicians would not gain many votes by being highly controversial. That style is generally not appreciated. People do not behave that way in their everyday lives, and they do not wish to see it reflected in politics.

With respect to the other two dimensions, I do not see major differences compared to the West. In terms of personalities and political performance, we do have some unusual figures—you might describe them as strange or simply interesting—but this is true in other countries as well. Such personalities can be found on the fringes, but also within the political establishment. For example, former Prime Minister Koizumi was known for his somewhat flamboyant hairstyle and was sometimes referred to as “the Lion.” Similar phenomena can be observed in many parties.

As for simplistic views, I also do not think Japan differs significantly from other countries. So, while there is a clear distinction along the first dimension, beyond that Japan is not particularly unique—although that first aspect remains noteworthy.

Economic Factors Alone Do Not Explain Japan’s Resilience

What explains the relative resilience of Japan’s political institutions against anti-system mobilization, despite rising inequality, precarity, and demographic stress? Is this resilience cultural, institutional, or economic in nature?

Professor Werner Pascha: Economic—no. Today, the Japanese economy is not fundamentally different from those of other countries in terms of the macroeconomic and socio-economic challenges it faces. Its underlying mechanisms do not really support the idea that this is the decisive factor.

As for institutional and cultural explanations, I tend to view culture as part of institutions in a broader sense. My understanding of institutions is that they consist of patterns of behavior and mutual expectations among actors that create certain regularities. These can be formal institutions, such as Parliament, or informal ones, such as culture.

Regarding formal institutions, I would argue that the differences compared to other countries are not particularly striking. Take the electoral system as an example. Japan has a mixed system that combines proportional representation with single-member constituencies. If anything, it falls somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of arrangements found in advanced economies.

What remains, then, is culture in the sense of informal institutions. Here, I would again emphasize the lack of a confrontational style. This is also visible in public life. Large-scale demonstrations are rare, and when they do occur, they usually involve very clearly defined groups. They have never really spread to the broader population. This kind of sustained pressure from the streets is simply not present in Japanese politics, and I think that is a very important factor.

Japanese business culture.
Japanese business culture—corporate professionals showing respect in a formal setting. Photo: Dreamstime.

Gender Was Not the Decisive Factor

Japan has elected its first female prime minister. Beyond symbolic representation, does this shift meaningfully alter power relations within the LDP or Japanese political institutions more broadly?

Professor Werner Pascha: Frankly, no, I do not think so. I do not believe that Ms. Takaichi’s election was based on her gender. She has not emphasized it, and in fact, some of her policies run counter to what might be considered feminist ideas. In many respects, she is quite traditional.

What people seem to appreciate about her is her image as a hard worker. She is characterized as diligent and also tough-speaking. In that sense, she brings a certain freshness to what has often been described as a rather stale environment of blue-suited older men in Japanese politics. So yes, gender may play a role, but it is more about style than gender itself.

If anything, her election conveys the message that being hardworking and capable of delivering results can lead to success. Beyond that, however, I do not see any major implications.

Do you see Prime Minister Takaichi’s leadership style as substantively programmatic, or does it rely more on personalized authority and symbolic politics? How does gender intersect with this dynamic?

Professor Werner Pascha: As I mentioned regarding gender, I do not think it has a strong implication in this context.Her leadership style is programmatic in the sense that she has held her views for many years. If you look at her career, it has experienced ups and downs—at times she has been more successful, at others less so. For example, during the most recent government under the former prime minister, she declined a major party or cabinet position. So her approach is programmatic, and I think most people believe that what she says genuinely reflects her own convictions. Of course, that does not mean she cannot also be very strategic, but this would be the main characterization.

Cabinet Appointments Reflect Merit, Not Symbolism

Could the prominence of a female conservative leader paradoxically reinforce rather than disrupt Japan’s deeply gendered political economy?

Professor Werner Pascha: No, I do not think so, because the reasons why Ms. Takaichi is in office are not related to her being female. The way she is conducting her policies, to the extent that we can already observe, also supports this view.

One aspect to consider is the composition of the cabinet, particularly the role of female ministers. She has appointed only two women, although before the election she indicated that she would look to the example of Northern European states and the number of women in their cabinets. Nevertheless, she appointed only two.

After the election, she explained that she wants to uphold a merit-based system, meaning that positions should be given to those who are genuinely qualified. To some extent, this is reflected in her choices. The more prominent of the two female cabinet members is Ms. Satsuki Katayama, who serves as finance minister—a highly powerful position in Japan. She has the appropriate background, having been a career bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance for many years. She even worked in the Budget Bureau, which is considered the most powerful department within the ministry. She is clearly an expert and knows what she is talking about. In that sense, this approach reflects the merit-based system that Ms. Takaichi seeks to follow.

A Decisive Victory as Political Cushion

Japan’s post-election fiscal agenda has unsettled markets. How do you assess the tension between electoral mandates and market discipline in Japan today? Is Japan approaching a critical limit in reconciling democratic responsiveness with macroeconomic credibility?

Professor Werner Pascha: Yes, it is certainly a critical situation. So far, many observers have been surprised that fiscal stimulus measures in Japan have been so significant without triggering a market backlash. Japan’s public debt is enormous—around 250% of GDP.

Now, however, we may be seeing the limits of this approach. After Ms. Takaichi announced in late 2025 that she would lower taxes—an important electoral pledge—markets reacted strongly. Long-term interest rates rose, and the exchange rate declined further. This should be understood as a warning signal.

Given the scale of public debt, rising interest rates—reflecting market distrust and doubts about the sustainability of government policy—would significantly increase interest payments. That, in turn, would leave the government with very limited fiscal room for maneuver. In this sense, the market reaction clearly serves as a cautionary sign.

On the other hand, once it became clear how the election would unfold, interest rates eased somewhat and the exchange rate stabilized. Despite the remarkable electoral victory, markets did not appear to fear a turn toward outright fiscal irresponsibility.

Why might that be? It is always difficult to interpret market expectations, but one possible explanation is that the decisive nature of the victory provides the government with a substantial cushion of public support. This may reduce the need to adopt overly expansionary or politically risky policies in the near term, allowing for a more cautious course. Whether this expectation proves justified remains to be seen.

Demographic Pressure Drives Fiscal Strain

Daytime view of Akihabara in Tokyo, known as “Electric Town” for its many electronics shops, duty-free stores, and vibrant youth culture. Photo: Dreamstime.

Given Japan’s debt levels, aging population, and productivity constraints, are current redistributive promises economically sustainable—or politically unavoidable?

Professor Werner Pascha: To some extent, I think the promises being made are politically unavoidable.

In the past, Japan was often described as a middle-class society in which everyone could enjoy a decent standard of living. However, under the impact of globalization and other structural changes, the Japanese system has evolved. Poverty has become more prevalent, including old-age poverty. It may not be highly visible—if you walk through Tokyo, you may not immediately notice it—but it exists, and old-age poverty in particular is a serious issue.

At the same time, demographic aging is driving substantial increases in healthcare and pension costs. In this sense, efforts to address these challenges are difficult to avoid.

Nevertheless, there are clear limits. How to reconcile these commitments with the promise of a responsible and proactive fiscal policy, as mentioned earlier, remains an open question. So far, no concrete policy framework has been presented. I think Mr. Minoru Kiuchi (Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy) intends to establish a new council to discuss the issue, but that may already be a warning sign. If there is a need to set up a council, it suggests that a very clear-cut strategy is not yet in place.

No Fundamental Shift Toward Short-Termism

Is Japan drifting away from its historically technocratic model of economic governance toward a more voter-responsive, short-term policy framework? What risks and opportunities does this shift entail?

Professor Werner Pascha: I am not entirely convinced that Japan is undergoing a fundamental shift toward more short-term, voter-responsive policymaking. Of course, the country faces serious challenges, and the government must respond. During election periods, promises are inevitably made. However, I would not characterize this as a structural transformation. Such dynamics have always accompanied elections, and when challenges intensify, the number of promises tends to increase. This may reflect correlation rather than a deeper change.

In my view, the technocratic model remains very much alive—albeit no longer in the more rigid form seen in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Ministry of Economy (then MITI, now METI), together with the Bank of Japan, largely shaped the direction of major corporate investment. That era has clearly passed.

Nevertheless, the ambition to guide the economy forward continues to rest on technocratic foundations. In recent years, there has even been renewed interest in a new style of industrial policy, and Japan appears inclined to pursue this course. A key term in this context is artificial intelligence. Japan possesses favorable conditions for supporting AI and its industrial base, and the government seems prepared to move in this direction.

That would be my assessment. There are already signs of a technocratic strategy aimed at advancing this field through a proactive industrial policy.

From Strategic Ambiguity to Clear Signaling

Photo: Dreamstime.

Recent hardline rhetoric toward China has played well domestically. From a political-economy perspective, how risky is this strategy for Japan’s trade-dependent economy?

Professor Werner Pascha: It is certainly risky, but the broader context itself is risky. We are living in very difficult times, characterized by geopolitical tensions involving the US, China, Russia—you name it. In such an environment, any course of action carries inherent risks.

Japan’s specific position is shaped by the peace clause in its constitution, the well-known Article 9, which stipulates that Japan maintains only self-defense forces and, beyond that, should not possess armed forces. Since 2014, under the Shinzo Abe government, this has been reinterpreted to allow for collective self-defense. But the scope of that concept has remained subject to debate.

In the autumn, Ms. Takaichi clarified that this interpretation could entail Japan supporting Taiwan if it were subjected to aggression by China. In many respects, this aligns with prevailing views within the Japanese political environment, yet her statement nevertheless provoked considerable discussion.

Was it a mistake? I do not necessarily think so. By clarifying Japan’s potential stance, it signals to other actors in the region what the stakes would be in the event of a Taiwan contingency, thereby increasing the costs for any potential aggressor. Under certain circumstances, strategic ambiguity can be advantageous. However, given the current geopolitical climate and the specific constraints of Article 9, raising the costs of aggression in East Asia may serve as a deterrent. This appears to be the government’s underlying intention.

Foreign Policy Was Not a Top Voter Priority

How should we interpret Japan’s current China policy: as strategic signaling shaped by electoral incentives, or as a durable reorientation driven by structural geopolitical change?

Professor Werner Pascha: As you may have inferred from my earlier remarks, I would lean toward the latter interpretation. Regarding the electoral dimension, an opinion poll conducted before the election asked voters which issues mattered most to them. Around 46%, if I recall correctly, cited the economic and social situation—particularly high inflation and related concerns. Only about 16% mentioned international matters, such as peace and security in the Western Pacific.

This suggests that foreign policy issues were not at the forefront of voters’ minds. Therefore, such statements were likely not primarily driven by electoral considerations—unless one interprets them as a simple miscalculation. Some observers have proposed that explanation, although I do not find it particularly convincing.

I do not believe that electoral incentives were foremost in Ms. Takaichi’s thinking. If anything, her stance may have worked in her favor not because of the China issue itself, but because it reinforced the perception that she is outspoken and clear about her intentions. This sets her apart from more traditional politicians, and that clarity appears to have resonated with many voters in this election.

The LDP’s Strategy of Absorbing Fringe Agendas

To what extent does the rise of parties like Sanseito—and movements such as Reiwa Shinsengumi on the opposite flank—indicate latent populist demand that the LDP is strategically absorbing?

Professor Werner Pascha: Yes, I think that is a very valid point. Parties on the fringes are indeed more populist than the mainstream parties. This is particularly evident in the simplicity of their ideas—again, if we return to the question of what constitutes populism.

On the right wing, there are very simple proposals targeting the role of foreigners in Japan, arguing that their presence should be reduced. On the left wing, there are equally simplistic claims that increasing income for poorer people will resolve broader economic problems. So we do see populist notions on both fringes.

At the same time, the governing LDP has been quite successful in absorbing some of these tendencies. The party has adopted elements of an anti-foreigner agenda—for example, proposing closer monitoring and regulation of foreign purchases of Japanese real estate. In that sense, it is taking up certain issues raised by the right. On the left, promises such as lowering taxes, particularly for lower-income groups, have also been part of its platform. This strategy appears to have worked, as reflected in the election results.

Both the left- and right-wing parties you mentioned lost votes considerably; in some cases, their support was reduced by half compared to previous elections. There were also specific factors at play. For instance, the somewhat flamboyant chairman of the left-wing Reiwa Shinsengumi fell seriously ill in January, which may partly explain the party’s weaker performance.

More generally, however, your point stands. It is also worth noting that new parties continue to emerge. In this election, a new party called Team Mirai—“Mirai” meaning “future”—won almost four million votes. It promotes artificial intelligence and advocates a more participatory political style. I am sure the LDP will respond to this development in one way or another.

A Dual Strategy: Preserve Washington, Diversify Partnerships

Flags of the Quad countries—Japan, Australia, the United States, and India—symbolizing strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Photo: Sameer Chogale.

How has the return of Donald Trump altered Japan’s strategic calculus regarding the US alliance, especially in relation to Taiwan and regional security guarantees? Is Japan being pushed—implicitly—toward greater strategic autonomy?

Professor Werner Pascha: Yes, certainly. The challenge posed by Trump—particularly the question of whether the United States will remain a reliable partner—is perceived in Japan much as it is in Europe. Perhaps even more so, since Japan has relied heavily on the US nuclear umbrella since the Second World War. In that sense, it is indeed a shock to consider that this arrangement can no longer be taken for granted.

How, then, should Japan respond? There is clearly a move toward greater strategic autonomy—but not in the sense of complete self-reliance. Japan is fully aware that, given potential adversaries such as China and Russia in the region, it cannot manage alone.

Instead, Japan seems to be pursuing a dual strategy. On the one hand, it seeks to preserve strong relations with the United States as far as possible. In this context, Ms. Takaichi’s role as a female leader may even prove advantageous, somewhat comparable to the case of Ms. Meloni in Italy. On the other hand, Japan is reinforcing alternative partnerships. Ties with Australia, for example, have deepened in a manner broadly consistent with US interests. At the same time, Japan maintains longstanding cooperation with European partners such as the UK, France, and Germany, among others.

For now, this dual approach does not appear to create significant tensions. Looking ahead, however, it remains uncertain whether strains might arise—particularly if so-called middle powers, as suggested by the Canadian prime minister at the Davos Conference, move toward closer coordination. Such developments could potentially complicate Japan’s close relationship with the United States.

Transcending Electoral Cycles Through Long-Term Statecraft

And lastly, Professor Pascha, would you characterize Japan’s current response to the converging pressures of rising populist currents, geopolitical fragmentation, and persistent economic uncertainty as one of underreaction or overreaction? More importantly, what underlying political, institutional, or economic logics help explain the nature of Japan’s response at this particular historical moment?

Professor Werner Pascha: You are leaving me with a very difficult question—thank you very much for this. First of all, I would not characterize Japan’s response as either an underreaction or an overreaction. Rather, I would describe it as an appropriate response to the challenges the country is currently facing. As for the underlying logic shaping Japan’s actions, that is more difficult to address, as it touches on broader theoretical considerations. How should we interpret these processes? What conceptual framework is most useful?

Personally, I find the idea of Japan’s so-called “strategic pragmatism” quite persuasive. This term was introduced some 20 or 30 years ago by a German diplomat together with his wife, an international relations specialist. It suggests that Japan pursues long-term strategic objectives while remaining highly pragmatic and adaptive in the way it implements them.

Let me briefly illustrate this with the example of economic security. In response to rising tensions in the Western Pacific, Japan introduced economic security legislation in 2022. Germany, for example, has examined this legislation very closely. The approach moves beyond a narrow focus on military capabilities and instead seeks to strengthen international stability through economic instruments and secure supply chains.

Yet in Japan’s case, this is not an entirely new development. As early as around 1980, under Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, the concept of “comprehensive security” was introduced. Even then, Japan recognized that relying solely on a military umbrella—even from a close ally such as the United States—was insufficient to protect its interests. A broader, more comprehensive understanding of security was required, encompassing economic dimensions and supply-chain resilience. The continuity is quite striking.

Of course, it is not always easy to distinguish strategic pragmatism from simply muddling through—to differentiate adaptive flexibility from a lack of clear direction. That remains a challenge. Nevertheless, to return to my earlier remarks, Western countries might do well to study this concept more closely and to look beyond short-term electoral cycles, which, as we know, pose considerable challenges for advanced democracies.

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes is an invited assistant professor at EEG-UMinho and Iscte-IUL, and an associate researcher at ICS-ULisbon.

Dr. Lopes: Ventura Mobilized ‘Latent Populists,’ but Authoritarian Appeals in Portugal Have Limits

André Ventura’s qualification for the presidential runoff marks a critical moment in Portuguese politics, long viewed as resistant to far-right breakthroughs. In this interview with the ECPS, Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes (EEG-UMinho & Iscte-IUL; ICS-ULisbon) argues that Ventura’s advance is “less a sudden presidential earthquake than a clear manifestation” of an ongoing party-system shift—deepened by fragmentation on the mainstream right and declining abstention. Dr. Lopes explains how Chega mobilized “latent populists” once a viable radical-right option emerged, while also stressing the limits of authoritarian and nativist appeals in a second-round contest that requires broader legitimacy. The result, he suggests, is a normalized but still constrained radical right: agenda-setting and organizationally consolidated, yet facing ceilings shaped by elite incentives, affective polarization, and presidential norms of moderation.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The qualification of André Ventura, leader of the populist radical right party Chega, for the presidential runoff marks a watershed moment in contemporary Portuguese politics. Long regarded as an exception within Southern Europe for its resistance to far-right breakthroughs, Portugal now finds itself grappling with a transformed party system, declining abstention, and the normalization of a radical right actor at the highest symbolic level of the state. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes, an invited assistant professor at EEG-UMinho and Iscte-IUL, and an associate researcher at ICS-ULisbon, offers a nuanced and empirically grounded analysis of what Ventura’s rise does—and does not—signify for the future of Portuguese democracy. 

At the core of Dr. Lopes’s argument is a rejection of the idea that Ventura’s presidential advance represents a sudden rupture. Instead, he situates it within a longer trajectory of party-system transformation. As he notes, Ventura’s runoff presence is “less a sudden presidential earthquake than a clear manifestation of a party-system shift that has already been underway,” one that began with Chega’s parliamentary breakthrough and was accelerated by fragmentation on the mainstream right. In Sartorian terms, Portugal is experiencing increasing ideological distance and fragmentation, dynamics that presidential elections—through personalization and strategic voting—tend to amplify.

A central theme running through the interview is the role of political supply. Dr. Lopes emphasizes that Chega did not emerge because Portuguese voters suddenly radicalized, but because a long-standing gap on the cultural and conservative dimension of party competition was left unfilled. This allowed Ventura, an experienced political communicator with extensive media exposure, to capture what Dr. Lopes describes as “latent populists who were activated once a viable alternative became available.” Importantly, this mobilization was facilitated by institutional conditions—such as a lower effective electoral threshold in 2019—and by Chega’s rapid transition from entrepreneurial project to organizationally consolidated party.

Yet the interview also highlights the limits of Ventura’s appeal. Despite declining abstention disproportionately benefiting Chega, Dr. Lopes stresses that Ventura’s electorate remains strikingly stable rather than expansive. “Ventura is competing against himself,” he observes, as voters from eliminated candidates increasingly coalesce behind his opponent in the runoff. This pattern reflects what he characterizes as a de facto cordon sanitaire driven less by formal elite coordination than by affective polarization and voter hostility toward the far right.

Perhaps most importantly, Dr. Lopes cautions against overestimating the governing potential of authoritarian rhetoric in Portugal. While Chega has successfully imposed issues such as immigration and security on the national agenda, “relying solely on authoritarian and nativist appeals is insufficient” in a second-round presidential contest that demands broader democratic legitimacy. The interview thus paints a picture of a radical right that is normalized, agenda-setting, and organizationally entrenched—but still constrained by institutional structures, elite incentives, and the enduring appeal of moderation in Portuguese presidential politics.

Together, these insights offer a sober prognosis: Chega has reshaped the political landscape, but its path toward governing viability remains uncertain, contested, and far from inevitable.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Assistant Professor Hugo Ferrinho Lopes, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Ventura’s Runoff Is No Shock—It’s the Symptom of a Shifting Party System

André Ventura of the Chega party speaking during the plenary session of the Portuguese Parliament debating the government’s motion of confidence, March 11, 2025.

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopesthank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Ventura’s qualification for the presidential runoff marks an unprecedented moment for the Portuguese far right. How should we interpret his first-round performance in relation to the 2024 snap elections? Should it be understood as a continuation of party-system transformation toward polarized pluralism, or as a distinct presidential dynamic reshaping existing voter coalitions?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: Thank you very much for having me. I would argue that this development largely reflects the ongoing transformation of Portugal’s party system. Ventura’s presence in the runoff is less a sudden presidential earthquake than a clear manifestation of a party-system shift that has already been underway.

What I mean is that, one year earlier, in the general parliamentary elections, Chega’s legislative breakthrough signaled a departure from the traditional two-party system. In the first round of the 2026 presidential election, this shift was further reinforced by a coordination problem on the mainstream right. We witnessed several viable center-right and right-wing candidates competing simultaneously, which fragmented the vote and lowered the threshold for Chega to secure second place—an outcome that Ventura ultimately achieved.

In Sartorian terms, the longer-term trend in Portugal points to increasing fragmentation and growing ideological distance among the main parties and candidates. The distinct dynamics of presidential elections—shaped by personalization and strategic voting—are likely to accelerate a transformation that is already well underway in the Portuguese political system.

Why Declining Abstention Worked in Ventura’s Favor

The decline of abstention has been one of the most striking features of recent Portuguese elections. To what extent does the 2026 first round confirm your earlier finding that increases in turnout disproportionately benefit Chega, and what does this suggest about the political activation of previously disengaged voters?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: There are two main points I would like to emphasize here. First, the incumbent president, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, is constitutionally barred from running for a third term. In Portugal, when presidential elections take place without an incumbent seeking re-election, turnout tends to increase and abstention tends to decline, because the perceived odds of victory for competing candidates are higher. Historically, all Portuguese presidents who have run for a second term have been re-elected. From this perspective, it was expected that abstention would decrease in this election, at least in the first round.

Second, and more importantly, we know that turnout is closely related to voting for the far right in Portugal. In this election in particular, voting-intention data from public opinion polls show that Ventura had the most stable base of support. This means that he retained the largest share of voters who had previously voted for Chega in the legislative elections, compared to any other candidate.

By contrast, António José Seguro, who also advanced to the runoff, was less stable among socialist voters. Similarly, Luís Marques Mendes —supported and endorsed by the center-right PSD and CDS, the governing coalition—lost a significant number of votes from his party to other right-wing candidates.

As a result, we observed a first round in which Ventura amassed the largest number of votes from his own party relative to any other candidate. Other contenders not only needed to mobilize their core constituencies but also attempted to attract voters from different ideological camps. This proved far more difficult for them, and this dynamic is closely related to patterns of abstention.

Issue Ownership Opened the Door for Chega

Sign of the right-wing conservative political party Chega, led by André Ventura, in Faro, Portugal, March 16, 2023. Photo: Dreamstime.

In your work on the 2024 elections, you emphasize the “supply side” of party competition. Which supply-side factors—party fragmentation, leadership credibility, agenda ownership, or organizational reach—were most decisive in enabling Ventura’s advance to the runoff?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: That is a very interesting question. The first factor I would highlight is issue ownership. Applying a supply–demand logic to politics, Portugal experienced, for more than four decades, what is often described as “Portuguese exceptionalism” toward the far right: unlike in many other countries, the far right was unable to break through to Parliament. However, this situation left an opening on the supply side of party competition—particularly in the cultural and conservative dimension—for a new challenger party on the right to emerge.

For example, while the radical left in Portugal has been strong in Parliament for decades and has enjoyed stable representation—indeed, more than one radical left party has been represented—no radical right party managed to enter Parliament until 2019, with the emergence of André Ventura and Chega. Why did this happen?

First, it was due to this long-standing breach on the supply side of party competition. Second, it was related to leadership. André Ventura is an experienced politician who came from the PSD. He left the party following an internal split and benefited from extensive media coverage. Prior to founding Chega, he was a football commentator, which gave him a level of public visibility that previous far-right candidates had lacked.

There is also an additional institutional explanation. In the 2019 elections, the effective threshold of the electoral system was lower, making it easier for parties to enter Parliament with fewer votes than in previous elections. A recent example is LIVRE—a left libertarian party—which failed to enter Parliament in 2015 but secured one MP in 2019. Chega and the Liberal Initiative on the right similarly entered Parliament in 2019 with fewer votes than would have been required in earlier elections.

Once inside Parliament, the media coverage Ventura received and the institutional space to disseminate his message made further growth much easier in the years that followed.

The De Facto Cordon Sanitaire Around Chega

Election night event of the Democratic Alliance (AD)—a coalition of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the CDS–People’s Party—held at the Epic Sana Marquês Hotel, Lisbon, Portugal, on 18 May 2025. Photo: Ricardo Rocha.

Portugal’s presidential elections traditionally reward moderation and cross-party appeal. Does Ventura’s strong showing indicate a weakening of this logic, or has Chega successfully adapted its populist appeal to the presidential arena without fundamentally expanding its social base?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: Ventura’s presidential campaign is, in many ways, a continuation of the strategy he pursued in the parliamentary elections one year earlier. That said, presidential elections in Portugal have historically favored moderation and centrist candidates, and this pattern was still visible in the first round. If we look at the vote shares, candidates occupying moderate ideological positions collectively garnered far more support than Ventura. We are seeing a similar dynamic unfold in the runoff campaign.

Although we have only limited data so far, as the second-round campaign has just begun, most supporters of the eliminated candidates indicate that they are inclined to vote for Seguro rather than Ventura in the runoff. This reinforces my earlier point: Ventura’s support base is remarkably stable, with only marginal expansion beyond his core voters, while supporters of other candidates tend to coalesce around the alternative contender.

What does this imply? Essentially, Ventura is competing against himself, attempting to marginally expand his vote share, while all other candidates—now consolidated behind Seguro, who placed first in the opening round—are effectively competing against Ventura. In this sense, it becomes a contest of Ventura versus everyone else. This pattern aligns with findings in the literature on affective polarization, which show that the far right tends to be the primary target of hostility and negative affect, often to a greater extent than the hostility expressed by right-wing voters toward other parties. In practice, this amounts to a de facto cordon sanitaire around Chega in the second round.

Grievance, Not Poverty, Fuels Chega’s Regional Strength

Chega has performed particularly well in regions historically dominated by the center-right and, in some cases, the left. How do you assess the role of territorial grievance, regional economic restructuring, and perceived political neglect in shaping Ventura’s first-round electoral geography?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: That’s a very good question. Ventura’s electoral geography fits a broader European pattern. Places that feel bypassed by economic growth and unheard by the political center—namely Lisbon—tend to become more receptive to anti-establishment political entrepreneurs. Recent work on Portugal, for example a study by João Cancela and Pedro Magalhães links radical right support in these regions—often rural and formerly left-wing, even communist, strongholds—to perceived political neglect and broader economic transformations, rather than to a simple story of poverty.

What this suggests is that the key mechanism is often mediated: grievance, distrust, and resentment create openness to punitive, nativist, and anti-elite messaging, rather than voting behavior being driven solely by material hardship. In southern Portugal and in rural areas more broadly, voters are therefore more likely to support the radical right because they feel politically neglected and marginalized by decision-makers.

The Youth Gender Gap and Chega’s Electoral Future

Post-2024 analyses highlighted Chega’s disproportionate support among young, less-educated men and the emergence of a “modern gender gap.” How does the 2026 first-round vote confirm or complicate this sociological profile, and what does it imply for long-term ideological realignment?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: At this stage, we have very limited data from the first round, so any assessment must remain tentative. More robust evidence will emerge in the coming months. That said, existing data for Portugal point to a pronounced youth gender gap in far-right support, with young men far more likely than young women to back far-right parties—Chega in particular. This pattern is also consistent with trends observed across other European and Western democracies.

If this profile is reproduced in the second round of the 2026 presidential elections, it would suggest the presence of a pipeline for long-term ideological realignment. If, however, the pattern softens, it would indicate that Ventura’s presidential surge reflects coalition broadening rather than cohort deepening. Ultimately, more data will be needed to assess this dynamic conclusively.

Is Chega Still Expanding—or Hitting Its Limits?

Guarda, Portugal — June 12, 2018: The ancient Jewish quarter (Judiaria) of Guarda, Portugal, where residents live amid streets that retain much of their 14th-century character. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your research on party membership switching suggests that Chega mobilized “latent populists” rather than converting ideologically moderate voters. Does Ventura’s presidential performance suggest that this reservoir of latent support is still expanding, or are we approaching a ceiling effect?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: We may be approaching a ceiling effect, but it is still too early to tell. What we know so far relates to the supply-side dynamics I mentioned earlier. Many party members who were previously housed in other parties switched to Chega once a viable radical-right alternative became available. These were politically interested citizens who had already chosen to participate in politics through the options available to them at the time. When this new option emerged and became electorally viable—which is crucial—they felt able to switch to it.

That said, we do not yet know whether a ceiling effect has been reached, because this would require observing at least one election in which Chega or Ventura stops growing. At this stage, we cannot determine whether citizens’ preferences are stabilizing or continuing to shift over time.

What we do know, however, is that the far right has been increasingly successful in imposing its agenda on the media and on other political parties. These actors are now responding to the incentives set by the far right by prioritizing issues such as security and immigration. Immigration is a good example. For decades, Portugal stood out as one of—perhaps even the—European countries where the salience of immigration was lowest. In the standard Eurobarometer question asking citizens to name the three most important issues facing their country, immigration was frequently mentioned in most European democracies, but far less so in Portugal.

Although immigration remains less salient in Portugal than in many other countries, its importance has increased significantly over the past two years. This signals that Ventura and Chega have been able to place this issue firmly on the political agenda. We have also seen other parties responding to this rising salience, not only by positioning themselves against it, but also through concrete policy responses—for example, government legislation on the issue.

From Abstainers to the Right: A Narrow Path to Expansion

Chega’s rise has been driven largely by voters defecting from the mainstream center-right. How has this pattern shaped Ventura’s claim to leadership of the “non-socialist space” in the presidential election, and what limits does it impose on his runoff strategy?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: Ventura can plausibly claim that he represents the pole of the non-socialist electorate, but there are two important caveats. First, he draws more support from former abstainers than from the mainstream right, even though he does attract some voters from the PSD and CDS. Overall, however, his gains come primarily from previously disengaged voters rather than from direct transfers within the center-right.

Second, the runoff presents a different strategic context. In the second round, Ventura must rely on voters from parties that are unwilling to formally endorse him. A clear example is the PSD leadership, which refused to support either of the two candidates who advanced to the runoff. In this context, mobilizing center-right voters through individual-level choices rather than party-led coordination is far more difficult, creating a ceiling for Ventura’s expansion. Without elite cues and under greater public scrutiny, it becomes harder for Chega—and for Ventura in particular—to move beyond its core protest electorate.

Ventura the Brand, Chega the Machine

André Ventura of the Chega party speaks during a plenary session of the Portuguese Parliament debating the government’s motion of confidence in Lisbon, Portugal on March 11, 2025. Photo: Ricardo Rocha.

Presidential elections personalize politics more strongly than legislative contests. To what extent is Ventura’s success best explained by André Ventura as a political entrepreneur, rather than by Chega as a party organization?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: Ventura is clearly the brand; he is a political entrepreneur, as I have noted before. At the same time, Chega as a party has increasingly become the organizational machine that makes this brand effective. Ventura is electorally viable, and when he is not running, Chega’s results tend to be significantly lower than when he is on the ballot. Still, the party structure matters, and Chega now has a substantial grassroots base actively working on its behalf.

In presidential elections, voters tend to reward candidate-centered campaigns, making the contest highly personalized. In this respect, Ventura’s media skills are a clear asset. Yet Chega’s rise as a major political actor also signals growing organizational penetration and normalized visibility. What we are witnessing is a shift from an initial entrepreneurial breakthrough driven by Ventura toward a gradual—but increasingly solid—process of party institutionalization by Chega itself. This is an incremental development, not one that occurs overnight.

Authoritarian Appeals Mobilize Some—but Not Enough

Your findings indicate that Chega switchers often exhibit higher authoritarian attitudes than first-time party members. How might this shape Ventura’s rhetoric and positioning in a second-round contest that requires broader democratic legitimacy?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: First, my findings suggest that switchers resemble latent populists who were activated by the rise of Chega as a viable alternative. However, when we examine the data in more detail, we see that the higher levels of authoritarian values are driven mainly by former right-wing party members who switched to Chega.

What does this mean? It means that most of Chega’s base—around 74 percent—consists of first-time members who joined the party for a variety of reasons. In contrast, those coming from right-wing parties joined Chega primarily because they felt that the PSD and CDS no longer represented what they considered important in the sociocultural domain, particularly in terms of values and authoritarian preferences. As a result, these attitudes are not evenly distributed across Chega’s grassroots.

Second, in the context of the presidential runoff, Ventura needs to appeal to a much broader electorate. Relying solely on authoritarian and nativist appeals is therefore insufficient, as he must attract voters from the center-right. Voters who have not previously switched electorally to Chega are unlikely to do so based only on authoritarian cues. Consequently, Ventura needs to go beyond these appeals in the second round.

Anti-System Rhetoric Meets Institutional Trust

Some Chega supporters display relatively higher institutional trust than expected for a populist radical right electorate. How does this tension shape Chega’s “anti-system” discourse when competing for an institutionally symbolic office like the presidency?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: Chega’s base within the party generally distrusts politicians and political institutions. However, within its grassroots—at the level of party membership—those who switched from another party to Chega tend to display higher levels of institutional trust. This points to a legacy effect among those who were politically experienced prior to joining Chega, even though overall trust in institutions remains quite low. This suggests that many of these switchers moved to Chega primarily for ideological reasons, not solely because of institutional distrust or anti-elite sentiments. They are therefore mobilized more by ideological cues than by explicitly anti-system appeals.

This tension produces a dual message for the party. On the one hand, Chega needs to argue that the system is broken; on the other, it must present itself as capable of safeguarding the nation’s institutions. This balancing act is particularly difficult in presidential elections, given the debates surrounding the limits of presidential power and the Constitution—whether Ventura embraces those limits or seeks to revise them. Since the president does not hold executive power, the role is closer to that of a moderator. Ventura must therefore convince his electorate that he can still meaningfully influence policy despite not being part of the executive or the cabinet.

Between Containment and Accommodation

The refusal of the PSD to endorse a runoff candidate highlights elite fragmentation on the right. How does Ventura’s runoff presence recalibrate elite incentives around containment, tacit accommodation, or strategic neutrality?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: The PSD’s neutrality is a way of avoiding two risks at once: legitimizing Ventura on the one hand, and alienating voters who might defect if given explicit instructions on the other. In terms of party competition, this reflects a form of elite coordination failure with a strategic rationale. The party is attempting to contain Chega organizationally while allowing individual voters the space to vote strategically in the runoff.

Over time, this situation recalibrates elite incentives. Some elites double down on non-accommodation, while others experiment with selective or tacit accommodation toward Chega. Despite this, most PSD elites are, in practice, supporting Seguro against Ventura in the runoff.

Above all, the governing party is trying to avoid giving Ventura the opportunity to claim that it is aligned with the Socialists or the left, or to be accused of accommodating the left rather than the right. Nevertheless, the reality is that most governing party elites are backing Seguro against Ventura.

This stance is neither full strategic coordination nor outright accommodation; rather, it represents an attempt to occupy a middle ground. That strategy carries risks for PM Luís Montenegro and the governing party, because they do not want Ventura to secure even a single vote more than Chega obtained in the legislative elections. Otherwise, Ventura could claim—despite losing the presidential race—that he enjoys greater electoral legitimacy than the prime minister, on the grounds that more voters support him than the government. There is therefore a shadow form of strategic coordination aimed at preventing Ventura from achieving further electoral success.

Normalizing Chega at the Presidential Level

Photo: Tatiana Golmer.

Portugal’s semi-presidential system grants the president significant agenda-setting and veto powers. Even if Ventura is unlikely to win, how might his normalization as a runoff contender reshape expectations about presidential authority and democratic restraint?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: If Ventura loses the election, then there is no immediate risk. What it does is normalize the idea that a Chega-aligned presence in the presidential arena is thinkable, and it extends the party’s shadow over issues such as veto power, agenda-setting, and signaling—particularly through the president’s ability to publicly highlight certain issues as priorities when meeting weekly with the prime minister. International coverage of this election has often emphasized that the Portuguese presidency, despite frequently being described as largely ceremonial, still retains meaningful powers, including the veto and the dissolution of Parliament, which can be consequential under minority governments, such as the current one. However, with Ventura remaining outside the presidency, it is unlikely that expectations regarding presidential powers themselves—rather than government stability or future alternation in office—will change in any significant way.

An Uncertain Path for Portugal’s Radical Right

And finally, Professor Lopez, taken together—rising turnout, party-system fragmentation, youth realignment, and Chega’s organizational consolidation—what is your best scholarly prognosis for the populist radical right in Portugal? Are we witnessing a durable opposition hegemony, a future coalition actor, or the gradual construction of governing viability?

Dr. Hugo Ferrinho Lopes: That is a very good question, and one to which I do not have a clear answer—both in the absence of a crystal ball and because current government signals point in different directions. The government has been pursuing piecemeal deals with both the Socialists and the radical right to pass legislation, while the opposition often coordinates to block the government, including cooperation between the Socialists and the far right. As a result, the situation remains difficult to assess.

That said, as long as Luís Montenegro remains the leader of the PSD, the party is unlikely to enter a coalition with the radical right or include it in government. However, if Ventura were to win an election at some point, Montenegro would likely resign as PSD leader, and it is unclear who would succeed him or what strategy a new leader would adopt—whether a German-style cordon sanitaire or a path toward accommodation or coalition-building with the far right.

At this stage, the trajectory remains highly unpredictable. I realize this may not be the definitive answer you were hoping for, but it is the most accurate one that can be offered at present.

Flags of the Quad countries—Japan, Australia, the United States, and India—symbolizing strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Photo: Sameer Chogale.

Pax Americana to Pax Silica: Strategic Shifts in US Security Policy

From Pax Americana to Pax Silica, US grand strategy is undergoing a quiet but consequential transformation. In this timely commentary, Dr. Prerna Chahar argues that recent US security documents—the 2025 National Security Strategy and the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act—signal a shift away from global stewardship toward a selective, technology-centered, and leverage-driven order. Rather than underwriting international rules and alliances, Washington is increasingly exercising power through control over strategic technologies, supply chains, and infrastructural chokepoints—a model Dr. Chahar conceptualizes as Pax Silica. This reorientation prioritizes hemispheric consolidation, technological dominance, and transactional partnerships over normative leadership. For partners such as India, the implications are profound: engagement remains valuable but conditional, reinforcing the logic of strategic autonomy, calibrated cooperation, and multi-alignment in a fragmented global order.

By Prerna Chahar*

What is unfolding in US security policy is neither isolationism nor traditional internationalism, but a selective strategy centered on leverage, technology, and regional primacy. American grand strategy is undergoing a quiet yet consequential transformation one that redefines how power is exercised, how partnerships are valued, and how international order is sustained. Recent US strategic documents, the National Security Strategy (NSS), and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) point to a decisive shift away from managing global order toward consolidating national advantage, with far-reaching implications for allies and partners.

The National Security Strategy (NSS), published on December 4, 2025, and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2026, signed into law on December 18, 2025, together confirm that the era of Pax Americana characterized by institutional stewardship, alliance management, and normative leadership is giving way to a more selective, technology-centered, and transactional order. This emerging configuration may be described as Pax Silica: an order grounded less in alliances and rules and more in control over technology, supply chains, and strategic chokepoints.

NSS and NDAA: Reframing US Grand Strategy

The framing of the NSS 2025 itself signals a deliberate break from earlier approaches to American grand strategy. Four recurring themes encapsulate this reorientation.

First, the strategy explicitly rejects “old policies,” portraying past commitments to liberal internationalism, open-ended multilateralism, and interventionism as having diluted US sovereignty, weakened economic resilience, and overstretched strategic focus. This narrative of rupture legitimizes a more restrained and interest-driven approach to global engagement.

Second, the NSS defines what America wants with unusual clarity. Rather than emphasizing the maintenance of international order, it articulates bounded national priorities border security, economic nationalism, technological dominance, and hemispheric stability. Global leadership is no longer treated as an intrinsic responsibility but as a derivative of clearly specified national interests.

Third, both the NSS and the NDAA foreground American strength in material rather than normative terms. The NDAA 2026 authorizes over $900 billion in national defense funding, making it one of the largest defense policy bills in recent history. This level of spending underscores a sustained emphasis on military readiness, industrial capacity, and technological superiority. Military capability, innovation ecosystems, industrial depth, and technological leadership take precedence over values-based diplomacy, institutional rule-making, or normative influence.

The NDAA further operationalizes this shift through enhanced cybersecurity authorities, frameworks for the secure development and deployment of artificial intelligence and machine-learning systems and strengthened protections for US Cyber Command and digital infrastructure. It also expands authorities related to airspace security and counter-unmanned aerial systems under provisions such as the Safer Skies Act broadening civil and federal counter-drone capabilities. Together, these measures reflect the logic of Pax Silica, in which control over technology and infrastructure replaces institutional stewardship as the primary currency of influence.

Fourth, the NSS report clarifies the renewed strategic focus on the Western Hemisphere. While global competition remains important, the strategy prioritizes hemispheric stability, border control, migration management, and economic dominance within the Americas. This represents a modernized revival of Monroe Doctrine logic, where securing influence in the immediate neighborhood is treated as foundational to national security. Engagement beyond the hemisphere is increasingly selective and interest-driven, filtered through considerations of domestic security, economic resilience, and technological advantage rather than assumptions of automatic leadership. The NDAA reinforces this orientation by prioritizing resources for homeland protection, maritime domain awareness in the Atlantic and Caribbean, and defense readiness tied to territorial security. Together, these documents signal a shift from global managerial ambitions toward consolidation of power closer to home.

Taken collectively, these elements reflect a fundamental strategic reorientation. Rather than presenting the United States as the custodian of international order, the NSS positions it as a state intent on consolidating advantage, preserving autonomy, and exercising leverage. This underscores the durability of what may be termed the Trump Corollary: the notion that alliances, institutions, and global engagements are instruments to be justified by tangible returns rather than commitments sustained for systemic stability or normative leadership.

US ‘Pax Silica’: Renewed Instrument of Power

Within this hemispheric and technological reorientation, Pax Silica captures the defining feature of the emerging order: power exercised through technological and infrastructural dominance rather than institutional rule-making. Semiconductors, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, digital platforms, and financial networks now constitute the backbone of strategic competition. Control over access to these systems enables coercion and influence without overt force.

Edward Fishman, in his book Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare, demonstrates how American power increasingly operates through the regulation of markets, technology flows, and supply chains, an approach clearly visible in export controls, investment screening, and technology-denial regimes embedded in both the NSS and the NDAA. Unlike Pax Americana, which relied on openness, predictability, and alliance cohesion, Pax Silica is exclusionary and conditional. Cooperation is granted rather than guaranteed; access replaces inclusion as the principal mechanism of influence.

The most consequential aspect of this transition is the decoupling of power from stewardship. The United States remains pre-eminent, but it no longer seeks to underwrite global order as a public good. Instead, it prioritizes regional consolidation, technological control, and transactional leverage. This is not withdrawal, but re-hierarchization: the Western Hemisphere first, strategic technologies second, and global commitments contingent on domestic advantage.

Implications for India

The renewed US focus on the Western Hemisphere carries important implications for India. While the Indo-Pacific remains relevant, it is no longer the singular organizing theatre of US grand strategy. Engagement in Asia is increasingly shaped by cost-benefit calculations and capability contributions rather than long-term commitments to regional order. For India, this creates both opportunity and uncertainty. Reduced ideological pressure allows greater strategic autonomy, but transactional partnerships demand constant negotiation. Cooperation in defense, technology, and supply-chain resilience particularly in semiconductors and critical technologies remains valuable yet inherently conditional. India’s participation in groupings such as the Quad must therefore be understood as calibrated engagement rather than alignment, reinforcing the logic of multi-alignment and diversification.

Conclusion

The shift from Pax Americana to Pax Silica reflects a profound transformation in US statecraft. The renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere, combined with technological competition and transactional diplomacy, marks a move away from global stewardship toward selective, leverage-based power. For partners such as India, the challenge is to engage without illusion cooperating where interests converge, hedging where vulnerabilities emerge, and sustaining strategic autonomy in a world where leadership is fragmented and power is increasingly exercised through control rather than consensus.


 

(*) Dr. Prerna Chahar is a scholar of International Relations with published research on US foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific, regional coalition-building, and India’s foreign policy. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Centre for the Study of the Americas (CCUS&LAS), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

Emblem of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. Photo: Dreamstime.

From the ‘End of History’ to the ‘End of a Fiction’: What Davos 2026 Really Announced

Davos 2026 revealed a global order no longer converging on a single liberal model, but sliding into a harsher era in which power increasingly outweighs rules and “integration” is reframed as vulnerability. The most striking paradox was that this diagnosis came not from critics at the margins, but from the system’s own architects—transforming elite “candor” into a strategy for managing declining legitimacy. In a world shaped by fragmentation and coercive interdependence, China’s state-capitalist model is increasingly perceived as a more effective crisis-response framework, while the United States and Europe drift toward a troubling hybrid: adopting not China’s developmental strengths, but its coercive instruments of control. This dynamic reflects an emerging logic of reverse convergence—the West is no longer guiding the world toward liberalism, but being pulled toward the governance style of its principal rival.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

The Davos platform can be seen as a stage where dominant actors test narratives, identify legitimacy losses, and modify the public vocabulary they use to govern (or justify governing). It rarely makes formal decisions; instead, it indicates what elites believe they can still publicly defend—and what they can no longer convincingly pretend. Davos 2026, in that sense, can be viewed less as a policy summit and more as a diagnosis of the regime.

In this context, Davos 2026 is significant because the words spoken inside the room seemed less like a reaffirmation of the post-1990 liberal-global order and more like an early draft of its obituary. Larry Fink, Interim Co-Chair of the World Economic Forum (WEF) and CEO of BlackRock—one of the world’s largest asset managers—started with a blunt admission that the world trusts Davos and the WEF’s ability to shape the future “far less,” warning that the forum risks seeming “out of step with the moment: elites in an age of populism” (Fink, 2026). Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, took it even further. He suggested that the problem isn’t just declining trust in institutions; it’s the collapse of the narrative foundations of the “rules-based liberal multilateral order” itself. He described “the end of a pleasant fiction… and the beginning of a harsh reality,” emphasizing that “we are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition” (Carney, 2026).

If anything was “announced,” then it was not a new treaty or a coordinated policy package. It was an elite confession: the old legitimating story no longer works.

What Exactly Is Ending?

The natural questions—What was declared at Davos? Is it the end of the Western system? Is Chinese-style state capitalism rising? —are the right ones. But they require careful separation of the West as power from the West as ideology, and of neoliberal globalization from liberal democracy. What seems to be ending is not “the West” as a geographical or civilizational fact, but a historically specific settlement—visible in three interlocking dimensions.

The end of the convergence myth: One part of the story traces back to assumptions about nineteenth- and twentieth-century modernization. Classical modernization thinking regarded history as a linear, stage-like process where societies would converge toward a single “advanced” model through diffusion, emulation, and integration—so that cross-civilizational differences would eventually appear as “time lags,” not alternative paths (Apter, 1965; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Rostow, 1960). In that framework, modernity was not just one option among many; it was seen as the expected endpoint of development.

Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis—initially presented as an essay and later expanded into a book—was a late-twentieth-century extension of this modernization perspective (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992). After the fall of Soviet-style planning, liberal capitalism seemed not just victorious but final: no significant systemic challengers remained, and future conflicts were seen as minor issues rather than real alternatives.

Davos 2026, however, seemed to quietly acknowledge that this convergence theory has run its course. After decades of “learning-by-doing” globalization, the idea that marketization, integration, and digitization would inevitably lead to liberal-democratic outcomes has become less convincing. Among many others, Öztürk (2025) calls this a fundamental “liberal fallacy,” revealed by post-2008 stagnation, growing inequality, and the resilience of authoritarian governance under capitalist conditions.

The decline of the authority of the “rules-based order” (as performance): A second aspect involves the public authority of institutional rules. Carney’s remarks illustrated a familiar phenomenon: states show belief in a rules-based order—displaying the “sign” publicly—while privately recognizing how often the rules break down in practice (Carney, 2026). His metaphor strongly mirrors Václav Havel’s assessment of late-socialist legitimacy: the system’s survival relied on ritualistic compliance and public participation in an official fiction, even when no one truly believed it (Havel, 1978).

In modern global politics, this is the credibility crisis of liberal internationalism: the rules exist, but enforcement seems selective; the universal language stays, but power distribution shapes outcomes. This is exactly where realism comes back—sometimes openly, sometimes disguised as “values-based pragmatism.”

The end of elite capitalism’s moral economy: Third, Davos 2026 hosted a legitimacy check on elite-led capitalism itself. Fink’s insistence that prosperity cannot be reduced to total GDP gains or stock-market success implicitly admits what critics have argued for decades: growth narratives do not automatically generate social approval when the distribution of wealth is unfair, public services decline, and opportunities disappear (Fink, 2026; Piketty, 2020).

This line closely mirrors Robert F. Kennedy’s well-known critique of national income accounting, asserting that GDP can measure “everything… except that which makes life worthwhile” (Kennedy, 1968). What once seemed like fresh wisdom at Davos in 2026 now appears as delayed recognition: a long-overdue admission that the legitimacy of capitalism cannot rely solely on aggregate indicators. Taken together, these three dimensions do not imply “the end of the West.” They signify the end of the West’s story about itself—the self-description of a system that universalizes its model as destiny, naturalizes its institutions as neutral rules, and considers legitimacy to be the automatic result of growth. Historically, when a hegemonic story collapses, systems rarely vanish overnight; instead, they change and adapt.

The Crisis of Corporate Capitalism as a Reflection of the System

Öztürk’s (2025) “reverse convergence” hypothesis provides one of the clearest ways to interpret Davos 2026. It avoids two lazy conclusions— (1) “China is replacing the West,” and (2) “nothing changes; it’s only noise”—by arguing that the direction of convergence has reversed. Liberal democracies are increasingly adopting illiberal governance techniques (expanded surveillance, executive discretion, securitized policy frames, controlled pluralism), while authoritarian regimes are adopting capitalist tools (market mechanisms, technological dynamism, corporate scale) without liberalizing. This is not ideological convergence through persuasion. It is functional convergence driven by systemic pressure.

Here, Karl Polanyi’s concept of the “double movement” becomes central: disembedded markets cause social division and political backlash, but the protective countermovement can be seized—redirected into nationalist, exclusionary, or authoritarian forms instead of democratic re-embedding (Polanyi, 1944). Fernand Braudel’s distinction is also important: capitalism is not the same as competitive markets; it is often a structure of lasting domination shielded from democratic accountability (Braudel, 1982, 1984).

Add the modern layer of digital political economy. The tools of governance increasingly function through infrastructures of data extraction, algorithmic control, and dependency rather than through persuasion or consent. This is the shared domain of surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2019), vectoral power and information monopolies (Wark, 2004, 2019), and “techno-feudal” rent extraction via digital platforms and cloud infrastructures (Varoufakis, 2023). In this view, Davos 2026 was not just a geopolitical event; it also revealed that corporate capitalism has created a legitimacy gap that traditional liberal narratives can no longer fill.

When Fink’s speech is analyzed through the perspectives of Polanyi and Braudel, it seems to outline a plan to restore legitimacy. He urged the WEF to “regain trust,” boost participation, and modernize the language used to defend capitalism (Fink, 2026). Even if the diagnosis is sound, the messenger presents a problem. The contradiction is structural: the credibility crisis he describes is closely linked to the financial and corporate structures that BlackRock represents. When the “doctor” is also one of the system’s most powerful beneficiaries, criticism is often seen as mere damage control by elites rather than genuine reformist bravery. 

Fink also emphasized that prosperity must become distributive, turning “more people into owners of growth,” not spectators (Fink, 2026). Yet this is where Davos rhetoric regularly stalls: it acknowledges the legitimacy problem but often proposes solutions at the level of communication rather than at the level of reconstruction. The 2026 shift, then, is not the defense of globalization’s moral premise; it is an attempt to rewrite capitalism’s legitimacy contract amid mass distrust.

A key concern running through the Davos discussions about AI is anxiety. The worry is that AI will repeat the distributional betrayal of globalization: early benefits go to owners of data, compute, models, and platforms, while the social costs are spread out to others. Without strong redistribution and governance, AI risks being less of a productivity leap and more of a new enclosure system—worsening dependence instead of expanding opportunities (Zuboff, 2019; Varoufakis, 2023).

From Benign Interdependence to Fortress Logic

Carney’s intervention was more impactful because it explicitly addressed what “trust” rhetoric often overlooks: the geopolitical and geoeconomic rupture of the rules-based order. His speech repeatedly suggested that the liberal promise of mutual interdependence has run its course. Integration can become a source of vulnerability and subjugation, leading states to pursue strategic autonomy in energy, food, critical minerals, finance, and supply chains (Carney, 2026).

At one point, Carney invoked a brutally realistic moral: “the strong can do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.” The phrase echoes the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides—a canonical statement of power politics rationality (Thucydides, trans. 1972). The significance is not the originality of the reference; it is that Davos discourse now treats such realism as publicly speakable.

This is where “weaponized interdependence” becomes relevant: network power can be transformed into coercion when states or firms control critical chokepoints in finance, infrastructure, trade, and digital platforms (Farrell & Newman, 2019). Carney’s prescription—strategic autonomy or a “world of fortresses”—is therefore less a nationalist shift than an acknowledgment that global integration is no longer seen as harmless.

Seen from the broader perspective of globalization discourse, Davos 2026 signifies a significant reversal of the assumptions that characterized the early 2000s. Thomas Friedman’s The World Is Flat summarized the era’s belief that digital connectivity and integrated supply chains were “flattening” the world into a more open, opportunity-filled, and ultimately convergent space (Friedman, 2005). Two decades later, David J. Lynch’s The World’s Worst Bet reads like an obituary for that optimism: globalization now seems less like a benign force for shared prosperity and more like a risky gamble that has weakened industrial resilience, increased inequality, empowered strategic competitors, and fueled political backlash in the West (Lynch, 2025). The transition from “flatness” to “worst bet” reflects the same shift Carney now describes in geopolitical terms: integration is no longer assumed to be mutually beneficial; it is increasingly viewed as a potential pathway to dependence, coercion, and subjugation (Carney, 2026; Friedman, 2005; Lynch, 2025).

This closely aligns with Amitav Acharya’s argument that the liberal “rules-based order” was never entirely universal; it functioned as a Western-centered system with selective membership and inconsistent enforcement. What follows, according to Acharya, is not just “multipolarity,” but a decentralized “multiplex” world—more diverse, more contested, and less controlled by a single hegemon (Acharya, 2017; Acharya, 2018). Even defenders sympathetic to the liberal order acknowledge its historically Western core and its expansion after the Cold War (Ikenberry, 2008, 2018). 

Davos 2026, therefore, seemed like a moment when elites started speaking more openly than before about a world they can no longer describe as heading toward a single institutional model. However, there is a deeper contradiction at Davos: many of the harshest critiques in 2026 were made not by independent critics but by the system’s own architects—CEOs, senior officials, and high-level political leaders. This doesn’t invalidate their diagnosis, but it should change how we interpret it: what looks like honesty may also be a form of preemptive storytelling, a controlled version of systemic self-criticism aimed at maintaining core power structures while giving rhetorical ground.

The US–EU–China Triangle: Three Paths, One Convergent Pressure

Against this backdrop, the question facing mainstream systems is no longer just whether globalization can be “fixed,” but which governance model is increasingly seen as the better response to a high-stress world full of uncertainty, fragmentation, and coercive interdependence. Under conditions of heightened geopolitical competition, supply-chain insecurity, volatility in energy and food, and rapid technological rivalry, the focus is quietly shifting toward the idea that China’s model—often called socialist state capitalism—may provide faster, more disciplined, and more strategically coordinated solutions than the liberal market approach, mainly because it can mobilize resources, direct finance, and prioritize long-term national goals. In this context, Davos 2026 didn’t just expose a legitimacy crisis; it also pointed to a growing competition over “effective modernity,” where resilience and the ability to command are beginning to matter more than openness and procedural legitimacy.

Indeed, an even more concerning sign is emerging from within the West itself: leading trends in the United States and the European Union increasingly indicate that what they are taking from China is not its potentially positive strengths—such as developmental coordination or strategic industrial policy—but rather its negative governance traits: securitization, surveillance expansion, executive centralization, and the normalization of emergency-style rule. This creates a growing zone of hybridization, where liberal democracies preserve electoral rituals while gradually adopting illiberal techniques of control and exclusion. In other words, the West seems to be entering a phase of reverse convergence—a process where the “center” shifts toward the logic of its challenger, often in its most coercive forms—a dynamic that I will explore in detail.

Öztürk’s (2025) structured comparison across five dimensions—surveillance regimes, populist discourse, regulatory architecture, market concentration, and distributional outcomes—acts like a decoder for Davos 2026. It does not claim that the US, EU, and China are becoming identical. Instead, it argues that all three are responding to the same structural pressures—tech-driven control, oligopolistic concentration, legitimacy erosion—while doing so through different institutional legacies.

China’s large-scale integration of state and capital shows that advanced capitalism can exist without liberal democracy. It combines market activity and corporate growth within one-party control, increasingly extending worldwide through infrastructure, standards, and digital systems (Callahan, 2016; Creemers, 2018; Dai, 2020). Its governance tools—such as data-driven monitoring, biometric systems, and ideological control of platforms—provide an attractive model for regimes dealing with insecurity and social unrest, even though it also poses legitimacy challenges (Greitens, 2020).

The United States’ hybrid drift shows how liberal democracy can weaken internally due to inequality, institutional capture, and polarization, especially after the 2008 crisis delegitimized traditional economic promises and heightened distrust between elites and the public (Öztürk, 2025). Illiberal populism has proved to be a resilient narrative ecosystem (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Mounk, 2018). Meanwhile, corporate surveillance and algorithmic governance operate alongside expanding security measures, leading to convergence driven by technique rather than ideology (Zuboff, 2019).

The European Union’s regulatory ambition, even under legitimacy stress, stands as the strongest counterexample to simple convergence claims because it has built the most ambitious rights-based regulatory framework in the democratic world, especially in the digital area (Floridi, 2020; Véliz, 2021). However, it remains vulnerable to legitimacy stress: far-right normalization, internal rule-of-law conflicts, uneven fiscal capacity, and ongoing reliance on US platform power. Regulation can limit domination, but legitimacy ultimately depends on distributive foundations—not just technocracy (Brown, 2019; Piketty, 2020).

If one sentence embodies the West’s strategic trauma, it is this: China demonstrates that sophisticated capitalism can operate without liberal democracy—and at scale. The Davos concern is not just that China competes, but that China’s model is increasingly serving as a reference point for organizing power in the twenty-first century (Öztürk, 2025).

The Hidden Davos Declaration

If we summarize Davos 2026 into a single implicit statement, it is: The global order based on rules-based multilateralism, benign interdependence, and trickle-down legitimacy has reached a final crisis. What comes next is probably going to be centered around: i) strategic autonomy (energy, supply chains, critical minerals, digital sovereignty) (Carney, 2026), ii) narrative legitimacy repair (“inclusive prosperity,” participation, trust) (Fink, 2026). iii) technological control architectures (AI governance, surveillance trade-offs, platform regulation conflict) (Zuboff, 2019; Varoufakis, 2023), and iv) a reduced faith in universalism, and a greater acceptance of bloc rivalry, vulnerability management, and “value-based realism” (Acharya, 2017; Ikenberry, 2018).

This is why Davos 2026 felt like a turning point: elites are no longer pretending we still live in the 1990s. But the new order being outlined is not automatically democratic. It can just as easily shift toward market authoritarianism—combining capital preservation with control-first governance. A democratic solution is still conceptually possible: re-embedding markets in democratic institutions (Polanyi, 1944), rebuilding a distributive social contract (Piketty, 2020), and limiting both corporate and government power through enforceable rights (Floridi, 2020; Véliz, 2021). Davos 2026, however, raises a brutally practical question: Can democracies re-legitimate themselves quickly enough before surveillance, AI, and strategic autonomy become permanent justifications for executive insulation?

That question, more than any speech, was the true “announcement.”


 

References

Acharya, A. (2017). After liberal hegemony: The advent of a multiplex world order. Ethics & International Affairs, 31(3), 271–285. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

Acharya, A. (2018). The end of American world order (2nd ed.). Polity. (Wiley)

Apter, D. E. (1965). The politics of modernization. University of Chicago Press.

Braudel, F. (1982). The wheels of commerce (Vol. 2). Harper & Row.

Braudel, F. (1984). Civilization and capitalism, 15th–18th century: Volume 2—The wheels of commerce (S. Reynolds, Trans.). Harper & Row.

Brown, W. (2019). In the ruins of neoliberalism: The rise of antidemocratic politics in the West. Columbia University Press. (Columbia University Press).

Callahan, W. A. (2016). China dreams: 20 visions of the future. Oxford University Press.

Carney, M. (2026, January). Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting (Davos 2026). World Economic Forum. 

Creemers, R. (2018). China’s social credit system: An evolving practice of control. SSRN.

Dai, X. (2020). Enacting the social credit system: Governance through digital trust in China. Media, Culture & Society, 42(3), 408–423.

Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42–79.

Fink, L. (2026). Remarks as Interim Co-Chair of the World Economic Forum at the 2026 Annual Meeting in Davos. LinkedIn.

Floridi, L. (2020). The fight for digital sovereignty: What it is, and why it matters, especially for the EU. Philosophy & Technology, 33(3), 369–378.

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Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? The National Interest, 16, 3–18.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. Free Press.

Greitens, S. C. (2020). Dealing with demands for surveillance. Journal of Democracy, 31(3), 15–29.

Havel, V. (1978). The power of the powerless. (Essay; English trans. published 1985).

Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). The rise of China and the future of the West: Can the liberal system survive? Foreign Affairs, 87(1), 23–37.

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Lynch, D. J. (2025). The world’s worst bet: How the globalization gamble went wrong (and what would make it right). PublicAffairs.

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Professor António Costa Pinto is a Research Professor (ret.) at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon.

Prof. Costa Pinto: If Victorious, Ventura Would Pursue Orbán-Style Authoritarianism in Portugal

In this in-depth ECPS interview, Professor António Costa Pinto—one of Europe’s leading scholars of authoritarianism—offers a historically grounded analysis of Chega’s meteoric rise and André Ventura’s advance to the second round of Portugal’s 2026 presidential election. Far from an electoral accident, Professor Costa Pinto situates Chega’s breakthrough within long-standing structural conditions, recurrent political crises, and the fragmentation of the center-right. He traces how Ventura mobilizes authoritarian legacies of “law and order,” welfare chauvinism, and anti-elite resentment without openly rehabilitating Salazarism. Immigration, demographic change, and plebiscitary populism emerge as key drivers of Chega’s success. Crucially, Professor Costa Pinto argues that Orbán’s Hungary—not Trump or Bolsonaro—serves as Ventura’s primary model, raising urgent questions about democratic resilience in Portugal as uncertainty on the right deepens.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor António Costa Pinto—Research Professor (ret.) at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, and a leading authority on authoritarianism and the radical right—offers a historically grounded analysis of the unprecedented rise of Chega and its leader, André Ventura. The discussion is anchored in a critical political moment: Ventura’s advance to the second round of the 2026 presidential election, which Professor Costa Pinto describes as neither a mere accident nor a sudden rupture, but the product of deeper transformations within Portuguese democracy.

As Professor Costa Pinto explains, Chega’s breakthrough cannot be understood as an isolated electoral shock. “The Chega Party and André Ventura have, in a way, a short history in Portuguese democracy,” he notes, “but over the last four years, the party has gone from one MP and 1.5 percent to 23 percent.” This rapid ascent, he argues, reflects the convergence of long-standing structural conditions—most notably the persistence of conservative authoritarian values in Portuguese society—with a series of destabilizing political crises that created what he calls “populist junctures.”

A central theme of the interview is the fragmentation of the center-right, which Professor Costa Pinto identifies as a key enabling factor. Portugal now has “three parties representing the right in Parliament,” and Chega’s strategy is explicitly hegemonic: to replace the traditional center-right as the dominant force. Ventura, Professor Costa Pinto observes, has succeeded because “he was able to mobilize his electorate,” even as his capacity to expand it in a runoff remains uncertain.

The interview also situates Chega within Portugal’s authoritarian legacies without reducing it to a simple revival of Salazarism. While Chega does not openly rehabilitate the Estado Novo (the corporatist Portuguese state installed in 1933), Professor Costa Pinto notes that it selectively draws on the past, particularly through “law and order” and moral authority. “Salazar is presented as the example of a non-corrupt dictator,” Professor Costa Pinto explains, adding that Chega appropriates “the idea of a conservative regime in which law and order prevailed,”while avoiding deeper identification with an unpopular dictatorship.

Immigration emerges as the party’s most powerful mobilizing issue. According to Professor Costa Pinto, “the central card that Chega has been playing over the last four years—and one that is closely associated with its electoral success—is immigration.” He links this to recent demographic shifts, especially increased migration from South Asia, and to growing anxieties among working-class voters. These dynamics underpin Chega’s welfare chauvinism, which combines statist social policies with exclusionary nationalism.

Crucially, Professor Costa Pinto frames Ventura within a transnational authoritarian constellation. “In a way, Orbán is the model for Ventura,” he states plainly. “The type of regime that Ventura would seek to consolidate in Portugal… is precisely the kind of competitive authoritarian regime that Orbán has managed to establish in Hungary.” While Trumpist styles and Bolsonaro’s experience in Brazil matter symbolically, Professor Costa Pinto stresses that Ventura adapts these influences pragmatically to Portuguese political culture.

Ultimately, the interview raises pressing questions about democratic resilience. While Professor Costa Pinto believes that Ventura is unlikely to win the presidency, he cautions that “the game is not over” on the right. Portugal, he concludes, faces a period of sustained uncertainty—one in which democratic institutions remain intact, but increasingly contested.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor António Costa Pinto, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

A Historic Runoff and a Fractured Right

André Ventura of the Chega party speaking during the plenary session of the Portuguese Parliament debating the government’s motion of confidence, March 11, 2025.

Professor António Costa Pinto, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: André Ventura’s advance to the second round of the 2026 presidential election marks a historic breakthrough for the Portuguese far right. From a longue durée perspective, how should we interpret this moment: as an electoral shock, or as the culmination of structural shifts long underway within Portuguese democracy?

Professor António Costa Pinto: Let me tell you two things. First, the Chega Party and André Ventura have, in a way, a short history in Portuguese democracy. Over the last four years, the party has gone from one MP and 1.5 percent in legislative elections to 23 percent. The reason why André Ventura will be present in the second round of the presidential elections is therefore more complicated. The Portuguese center-right and right are going through a rather curious period of party fragmentation. We now have three parties representing the right in Parliament: the center-right that is in power, a liberal right with 7.5 percent, and the Chega Party with 23 percent.

The question surrounding this presidential election is, in a way, simple. There was an independent candidate who was expected to be the winner a year ago. Admiral Henrique Gouveia e Melo was a sort of hero of the response to the pandemic a couple of years ago. In this sense, the presidential election is unusual in terms of the number of candidates, with four candidates competing on the right-wing side of the political spectrum.

The reason why Ventura is in the second round is straightforward. The main reason is that he was able to mobilize his electorate. The more difficult challenge for Ventura lies in the second round: whether he will be able to expand his electorate, because, in theory, he is going to lose.

Why the Far Right Arrived Late in Portugal

Portugal was long considered an outlier in Southern Europe for its resistance to far-right populism. In your view, what factors delayed the emergence of a party like Chega, and what has changed—politically, socially, or culturally—to make its rise now possible?

Professor António Costa Pinto: There are structural factors and conjunctural factors. The structural factor is, first of all, that since the 1980s we have known already quite clearly from surveys that around 80 percent of Portuguese society has expressed conservative authoritarian values. That was very clear. The main problem, of course, was the opportunity to express these values in electoral and political terms. Until very recently, the two main parties, especially on the right-wing side of the political spectrum—and particularly the main center-right party—had the capacity, in a way, to frame and absorb this electorate to their right.

What happened in the meantime? There were two general elements. The first was what we could call a populist juncture. A couple of years ago, a Socialist prime minister, António Costa—who now holds a position in the European Union institutions—faced, while in office, an accusation from the court system. Not exactly for corruption but associated with corruption. His response was basically to resign. The president then decided to call early elections. This was the first populist juncture responsible for the initial breakthrough of the Portuguese radical right in Parliament. Over the last four years, there have been three early elections, all associated with this kind of populist juncture.

The most recent one, seven months ago, was also the result of a problem involving a conflict of interests, in which a center-right prime minister was accused in Parliament of maintaining a small family business that was incompatible with the role of prime minister. So, Portugal has experienced several electoral populist junctures over the past four years, and these conjunctural elements have driven the growth of the Chega Party during this period. 

We therefore have structural dimensions, of course, but above all, we have conjunctural dynamics that explain this development. There is also a central element in this process: the leader of the Chega Party. He is a very charismatic figure, extremely well known in the media. He began as a football commentator in the press, closely connected to popular segments of Portuguese public opinion. He then emerged as a party leader, and we must admit that, for the first time in Portugal, a right-wing political entrepreneur managed to establish direct contact with potential voters of a radical right party—and he succeeded in doing so.

Old Repertoires, New Populism?

Sign of the right-wing conservative political party Chega, led by André Ventura, in Faro, Portugal, March 16, 2023. Photo: Dreamstime.

Drawing on your work on the “Estado Novo,” to what extent does Chega represent a reactivation of authoritarian political repertoires—such as moralism, punitive order, and anti-pluralism—rather than a novel populist phenomenon detached from Salazarist legacies?

Professor António Costa Pinto: When we look at populist radical right-wing parties in Europe, discussing their origins can become a political trap. Why? Because the trajectories are highly diverse. We know, for instance, that the Swedish populist party emerged from a very small neo-Nazi group; Fratelli d’Italia in Italy also originated in a marginal neo-fascist party; while in Spain, Vox comes from the center-right.

In the Portuguese case, the Chega Party has a very small core of leaders—essentially one figure—who comes from the political culture of the Portuguese extreme right of the past. However, the majority of its leadership, including André Ventura, comes from the main center-right party, as is also the case in Spain. Ventura himself ran for a municipal position many years ago through the Social Democratic Party, Portugal’s main center-right party, mobilizing a Roma-chauvinistic discourse. He contested a former communist municipality and played on anti-Roma sentiment in very populous suburbs of Lisbon, and this strategy proved effective. That was the starting point of his political career.

When it comes to the past, two elements are particularly important in the radical right’s mobilization of authoritarian legacies. These are not directly tied to Salazarism, but rather to a more homogeneous conception of the nation-state: the glorification of Portugal’s past, the narrative of the “Discoveries,” the Portuguese Empire, and, in many cases, the mobilization of veterans of the colonial wars. Portugal experienced a deeply traumatic decolonization, and this remains the central historical reference in how Chega engages with the past—especially the colonial wars in Africa, in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau.

At the same time, and this is especially interesting, Chega represents a break with the political culture of the conservative right. Traditionally, the conservative right promoted a loose or “tropical” notion of empire, arguing that the Portuguese Empire was not racist and was, overall, a positive historical experience. Chega breaks with this tradition. Its chauvinistic, anti-immigration discourse—targeting African, Brazilian, and Asian immigration—marks a clear rupture with the conservative right’s legacy in Portugal.

What emerges, then, is a new-old conception of national identity. Chega occasionally invokes Salazar, but above all it mobilizes the past through the theme of corruption: fifty years of corruption, fifty years of an oligarchic political class—coinciding, symbolically, with the fifty years of democracy Portugal celebrated last year. Salazar himself poses a problem as a reference, as he is associated with repression and with a period that remains unpopular in Portugal, except in one key dimension: law and order.

These, ultimately, are the two elements Chega draws most clearly from the authoritarian past: the myth of a glorious colonial empire and, above all, the appeal to law and order.

Presidentialization and the Rise of Plebiscitary Populism

Parliament building in Lisbon, Portugal. Photo: Dreamstime.

While Chega does not explicitly rehabilitate Salazar, do you see elements of what you have described as Salazarism’s “politics of order” and depoliticization resurfacing in Ventura’s discourse, particularly his emphasis on discipline, punishment, and national moral renewal?

Professor António Costa Pinto: As I mentioned earlier, Chega draws on Salazar primarily through two elements. First, Salazar is portrayed as an example of a non-corrupt dictator. Second, Salazarism is evoked as a conservative regime in which law and order prevailed. These are essentially the two aspects Chega appropriates from the Salazarist past. However, as I also noted, most of the references to authoritarian legacies are linked less to Salazar himself than to the former greatness of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa.

In your comparative work on charisma and authoritarian leadership, you note that charisma need not be revolutionary or mass-mobilizing. How would you characterize Ventura’s leadership style: as plebiscitary populism, mediated celebrity politics, or a new post-charismatic form of personalization?

Professor António Costa Pinto: Ventura clearly belongs to the plebiscitary, authoritarian populist parties in Europe. By this I mean that the main elements of political mobilization of the Portuguese radical right revolve around law and order, the idea of corruption associated with the oligarchic political class that has dominated Portuguese democracy since its transition, and a set of conservative values typically linked to this form of plebiscitary authoritarian democracy—such as proposals for the sterilization of pedophiles, or even the reintroduction of the death penalty in Portugal.

These are dimensions tied to this broader political vision, and a significant segment of Portuguese society does support such ideas. As a result, this is not primarily about the functioning of parliamentary institutions, but rather about a plebiscitary, referendum-style conception of political power.

This is also how Ventura behaves in the current presidential elections. He seeks, in a sense, to use the powers of the presidency to advance many of these political proposals, through a form of presidentialization within Portugal’s semi-presidential system.

Electoral Strategies of Chega Is Cannibalizing the Right

Salazarism relied on corporatist and technocratic governance rather than mass populist mobilization. Does Chega’s rise suggest a transition from elite-managed authoritarianism to popular authoritarianism, or are we witnessing a hybrid form adapted to democratic institutions?

Professor António Costa Pinto: As with many other radical right-wing parties in Europe, Chega operates within democratic institutions. It is primarily an electoral party. There are very small segments—one could describe them as a residual effect—of neo-fascist and extreme right-wing groups, but these remain marginal. For the most part, Chega plays the electoral card.

In fact, in the current presidential election and campaign, an important dynamic concerns the right-wing side of the political spectrum in Portugal. Ventura and Chega are present, but Ventura is the only right-wing candidate to advance to the second round. His strategy is to combine two approaches: on the one hand, mobilizing the radical right and, at times, even the extreme right; on the other, presenting more conservative and moderate political proposals. The objective is straightforward: to become the main party representing the right-wing side of the political spectrum in Portugal and to cannibalize the conservative right-wing electorate.

The cards have been played, but the outcome remains highly uncertain. We will see what happens in these presidential elections, even if Ventura does not ultimately win.

Selective Moralism in Portugal’s Populist Right

Your research highlights the role of political Catholicism in shaping authoritarian moral frameworks. To what extent does Chega’s moralized discourse on family, crime, and social order echo these traditions, even in a formally secular and pluralist society?

Professor António Costa Pinto: Chega has clear, or very conservative, values associated with religion—not only with the Roman Catholic Church. We should also not underestimate the role of small evangelical groups, particularly among certain popular segments of Portuguese society. Undoubtedly, Chega has adopted pro-life positions, anti-abortion values, and other conservative stances. At the same time, however, Chega is a populist party. For that reason, it does not consistently play the anti-abortion card. Why? Because its leaders look at opinion surveys and recognize that the majority of Portuguese society supports the legalization of abortion, as is currently the case in Portugal.

What we see, then, is a core of conservative values, but above all a strong emphasis on anti-corruption rhetoric, hostility toward the political class, and the idea that Portuguese society is being held back by centrist, non-reformist center-right and center-left governments. So yes, conservative values matter for Chega, but the party does not emphasize all of them when it realizes that they do not translate into electoral gains.

There is, however, one aspect I would like to stress: As in many other European democracies, Chega is a typical social welfare–chauvinistic party. It does not embrace ultra-liberalism, unlike some other right-wing populist figures outside Europe, such as Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil or Javier Milei in Latin America. Instead, Chega clearly plays the card of a welfare state “for the Portuguese,” combined with anti-immigrant narratives that accuse immigrants of exploiting the welfare state and the national health system. At the same time, it advances a vision of social policy that is explicitly not anti-statist.

From Emigration Country to Immigration Backlash

Ventura’s campaign placed immigration at the center of political conflict, despite Portugal’s relatively recent experience as a destination country. How do you explain the salience of immigration in a context historically defined by emigration rather than immigration?

Professor António Costa Pinto: The central card that Chega has been playing over the last four years—and one that is closely associated with its electoral success—is immigration. Portugal was long accustomed to immigration from Portuguese-speaking African countries and to some extent from Brazil. However, over the past five years—a very recent development—there has been a sharp increase in immigration from Asia, which is new in the Portuguese context. Migrants from Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan are now highly visible across different segments of Portuguese society and the economy, from delivery services and other forms of urban transport in major cities to the agro-export sector in the south of the country. In that sector alone, around 70 percent of the labor force now comes from Asian countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh. Similar patterns are visible in tourism as well.

This shift is driven, of course, by economic needs. Portugal is one of the most rapidly aging societies in Europe, and demographic aging is a central structural feature of the Portuguese economy and society. Immigrants already play a crucial role in sustaining pensions, social benefits, and key sectors of the labor market.

However, the social reaction to this new wave of immigration—particularly among lower-middle-class and working-class segments of Portuguese society—is perhaps the most important explanation for Chega’s electoral success. At the same time, as Chega has come to dominate the political agenda on immigration, the center-right government, feeling electorally threatened, has responded by negotiating with the radical right and adopting new restrictive policies on immigration, access to Portuguese nationality, and related issues.

The Crisis of the Traditional Right in Portugal

The PSD’s historically weak performance and its refusal to endorse a runoff candidate point to a crisis of the traditional right. How important is center-right fragmentation in enabling Chega’s claim to leadership of the “non-socialist space”?

Professor António Costa Pinto: Undoubtedly, Chega is cannibalizing segments of the center-right, much more so than voters on the left or the radical left. At the same time, Chega is now present in many areas of Portuguese society—particularly in the South—that were electorally communist in the past. However, this is less significant today, given that the Portuguese Communist Party now represents around 2 percent of the vote.

What is more important is that Chega has increased its vote share in many areas, especially in the south and in the outskirts of Lisbon, which previously voted for the Communists and the Socialist Party. Today, however, Chega has become a national party with a very homogeneous electorate. As a result, it is primarily cannibalizing votes from the right.

The only real challenge to Chega, aside from the center-right, comes from a small right-wing liberal party that appeals mainly to younger and more educated voters. Chega, by contrast, is clearly dominant on the right-wing side of the political spectrum among segments of Portuguese society with less than secondary education. For this reason, any further electoral growth for Chega can only come from right-wing voters.

In the last legislative elections, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the main center-right party, did increase its vote share. It is now in power with a minority government that is forced to negotiate much of its legislation with the radical right. Labor reform is a clear example: the only viable negotiating partner is the radical right, since the center-left has already decided to vote against it.

So yes, the challenge posed by the radical right is very significant, and the game is far from over. While the cards have been played, there remains considerable fluidity and uncertainty on the right-wing side of the political spectrum. On the left, by contrast, the Socialist Party lost the election and many voters, but it has nonetheless survived as the main force of the center-left.

From Trump to Orbán: How Transnational Models Shape Portugal’s Radical Right

Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister arrives to attend in an informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Prague, Czechia on October 7, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Observers have described Ventura’s rise as part of the “Trumpification” of the right. To what extent do transnational populist styles, media strategies, and narratives of cultural grievance matter more today than domestic historical legacies?

Professor António Costa Pinto: Domestic legacies are important, but undoubtedly Chega and Ventura are, first of all, integrated into the radical right political family in the European Parliament. There is a strong sense of identification with Giorgio Meloni, and also with Vox in Spain.

Above all—and this is very important—even when it is not openly emphasized, there is a strong sense of identification with Orbán. In a way, Orbán is the model for Ventura. The type of regime that Ventura would seek to consolidate in Portugal, if he were to win elections and gain access to power, is precisely the kind of competitive authoritarian regime that Orbán has managed to establish in Hungary.

In the Portuguese case, and in Portuguese political culture more broadly, we should not forget Portugal’s strong links with Brazil. Chega was a strong supporter of the Bolsonaro experience in Brazil, firmly anti-Lula and anti-left, and this reflects deeper cultural and political connections between Portugal and Brazil.

More recently, however, Trump’s challenge to NATO and episodes such as the “Greenland affair” have made Ventura more cautious. He is aware that, within Portuguese public opinion, Trump’s positions on NATO and the European Union are problematic. This matters because the Portuguese electorate is generally optimistic about the European Union and not receptive to such positions, so Ventura avoids adopting them openly.

So, as in many other radical right-wing populist experiences in Europe, there is a core of values associated with right-wing authoritarianism, but there is also a popular strategy that plays the cards that are popular and avoids those that are unpopular.

Uncertainty on the Right and the Future of Portuguese Democracy

And finally, Professor Pinto, from the perspective of democratic theory and historical comparison, does the 2026 election represent a critical juncture for Portuguese democracy—or does Portugal still possess institutional and cultural buffers capable of containing far-right populism in the long run?

Professor António Costa Pinto: That is a very interesting question, and it is not easy to answer. For the first time, this presidential election has prompted a clear stance among many figures on the right, including several politicians from the center-right, in support of the moderate candidate of the left. This is the first time such a development has occurred in Portugal. Why? Because in the last legislative elections, seven months ago, the Social Democratic Party completely abandoned any strategy of maintaining red lines against the radical right and entered into negotiations with it.

For the second round of the presidential election, both the prime minister and the main leader of the conservative party supporting the government chose not to take public positions. However, they gave instructions to most local leaders—mayors and other municipal figures—to support the center-left candidate. This was also a very pragmatic decision.

They know that, as president, the center-left candidate would respect democratic norms and the formal and informal rules governing relations between the president and the government. We should not forget that Portugal is a semi-presidential democracy. They also know very clearly that if, by any chance, the radical right was to win the election and Ventura became president—which is not going to happen—it could lead to a presidentialization of the system and favor his party in terms of cabinet influence.

In that sense, Portuguese democracy could be subverted not only through legislative elections but also through presidential ones, if Ventura were to gain presidential power—and that is not going to happen.

Overall, Portuguese democracy will continue to face a degree of uncertainty, particularly on the right-wing side of the political spectrum, where the game is not over. At this stage, we do not know which party will ultimately become the dominant force on the center-right. Will Portugal move toward an Italian-style scenario, in which the radical right dominates and the center-right becomes a junior partner? Or will it continue, as it does today, with a minority center-right government supported by a liberal democratic party such as Iniciativa Liberal? With Chega holding 23 percent of the vote, the future of the right-wing political landscape in Portugal remains highly uncertain.

US President Donald Trump delivers a speech to voters at an event in Phoenix, Arizona. Photo: Danny Raustadt.

From Farce to Tragedy: The First Year of Trump’s Second Term and the Unmaking of America

In “From Farce to Tragedy,” the author traces the first year of Donald Trump’s second term as a turning point in American political life. What once carried elements of chaos and dark comedy has hardened into something more deliberate and consequential. Trump’s return to power, framed by him as total vindication, has brought an unprecedented expansion of executive authority, the systematic weakening of institutions, and the normalization of personal loyalty over law. Drawing on sharp observations from leading journalists and scholars, the piece shows how emergency powers, executive orders, and transactional politics have reshaped governance at home and abroad. The result is not renewed greatness, but a spectacle of democratic erosion—an American tragedy unfolding without the comfort of a happy ending.

By Cemal Tunçdemir*

“What the American public always wants is a tragedy with a happy ending,” the American critic William Dean Howells, who was a central figure in Gilded Age American literature, once said. The second coming of Donald J. Trump to the US Presidency was not an accident of fate, nor even absurdity of democracy. It was a sequel demanded by majority of American voters that having once liked the “first season” and asked upon longer run. The real tragedy was not that Trump was Trump, that was obvious from the start, but that so many Americans mistook his loudness for conviction and saw his challenge to the rules as bravery. 

“The first time around, there was something almost thrilling about Donald Trump as president,” explains American historian and journalist Thomas Frank, “The respectable world came together against him with a gratifying unanimity: the legacy media, the nonprofits, the universities, the think tanks, the tech sector, the intelligence community. Insulting this imbecile became the most rewarding pastime on earth.” By contrast, according to Frank, for much of 2025, the feeling was darker. “Absolute despair” if you will.

The difference in the second term wasn’t just the lack of the thrilling or accidental comedic elements of the first term. Donald Trump viewed his return to the White House as a profound vindication. In his telling, his four years of exile had proven that he was right about everything. About economy, about “stolen” election, about press, about elites, about universities, about institutions. This absolute conviction liberated him from all doubt, and all rules. 

Trump’s unrestrained mind is on full display in a recent letter he sent to the Prime Minister of Norway as he wrote, “Considering your Country decided not to give me the Nobel Peace Prize for having stopped 8 Wars PLUS, I no longer feel an obligation to think purely of Peace.”

“Donald Trump now genuinely lives in a different reality,” observes Anne Applebaum, “one in which neither grammar nor history nor the normal rules of human interaction now affect him.”

“Trump 2.0 is Trump 1.0 in some ways but on steroids,” compares Peter Baker, New York Times’s chief White House correspondent who have covered six US presidents, including Trump in his first term, “A lot of the things that he talked about doing or exploring in the first term -or tried but failed to do or was dissuaded from doing-he’s now doing and in spades.” 

Unlike the first term, in the beginning of his second term, there was less confusion, more intent. And more so preparation. Trump has rolled out many of the Project 2025, 900-page Heritage Foundation-led blueprint, he once claimed he has nothing to do with. Many of Trump’s executive orders reshaping the government were outlined in this right-wing policy plan. From the early days of his tenure, Donald Trump began advancing Project 2025’s primary objective: the “deconstruction of the administrative state,” a term coined by his former chief strategist, Steve Bannon. He has expanded the scope of executive power in ways unparalleled in modern history

By the end of 2025, some 317,000 federal employees were out of the government, according to the Office of Personnel Management. This was the largest reduction of the federal workforce in American history. He even fired members and officials from various independent and bipartisan boards, agencies, and commissions, including dozens of inspectors general, key watchdogs for waste, fraud, and abuse across all government.  

One of the things Trump learned was that it matters who is around him, Peter Baker observes“Many of the people he surrounded himself with in his first term viewed their jobs as keeping him from going off the rails, from doing things they thought were reckless -or illegal even. This term, he’s surrounded by people who not only agree with him but are enabling him and empowering him and want to serve his desires.”

One of the Trump’s most daring test the limits of his presidential power was claiming powers that have typically resides with Congress. In his first year, executive orders have eclipsed actual legislation. Trump has signed 147 executive orders, setting a record for the most signed in any president’s first 100 days of office. By contrast, he has signed only five bills into law, a record low for the first 100 days.  

What is truly worrying is that his blatant misuse of emergency powers, which are meant to temporarily increase executive authority only during urgent and rapidly developing situations. The Brennan Center has identified 123 different laws could be triggered by a presidential emergency declaration. Because these powers are extensive, strong safeguards are needed to prevent misuse. Since The National Emergencies Act lacks safeguards, a president can declare an emergency by executive order and renew it every year indefinitely. Congress may vote to terminate an emergency, but only with a veto-proof majority. This flaw was exposed when Trump declared a fake emergency to fund a border wall Congress had rejected. 

As a striking example, instead of traditional tariff statutes (such as Section 301 or Section 232) he invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which is not a general trade statute, to impose sweeping import taxes. To justify invoking the IEEPA, Trump Administration declared “trade deficits” a national emergency. And this audacity has led to a legal drama that has now reached the Supreme Court.

The question is why the White House team ever invoked IEEPA at all, instead of traditional trade laws? The answer is not only that IEEPA provides the President broad authority to respond to a declaration of national emergency. The real answer probably lies in “political anthropology rather than jurisprudence,” writes Gillian Tett, “Trump’s team has a power structure more akin to a royal court than anything that adheres to 21st-century norms.” He always wants to have king-like powers, and his team is looking for loopholes that would allow him to acquire those powers. 

This is the posture of a man who has looked at the institutions meant to restrain him -the courts, the lawmakers, the prosecutors- have done nothing and he concluded they are toothless. After the surviving of the fallout of January 6, five years ago, he now moves with the confidence of someone who believes he is beyond the reach of the old rules. He wants a power that is feared and given whatever it wants. For this reason, some critics are no longer debating policy; they are discussing a change in the American regime. But a change to what? 

“There is an answer, and it is not classic authoritarianism—nor is it autocracy, oligarchy, or monarchy. Trump is installing what scholars call patrimonialism.” Jonathan Rauch answered the question in his now famous article. “Patrimonialism is less a form of government than a style of governing,” he wrote, “It is not defined by institutions or rules; rather, it can infect all forms of government by replacing impersonal, formal lines of authority with personalized, informal ones.” 

The Art of the Deal-Making Presidency

“Nice woman but she does not listen.” 

After a reportedly tense phone call in early August, President Trump publicly criticized Swiss President Karin Keller-Sutter with this condescending remark and quickly raised tariffs on Swiss imports to a punishing 39 percent. Couple of days later when two Swiss federal ministers and several government executives flew over to DC, but they got nowhere near Trump. Following months all the effort of traditional statecraft couldn’t resolved months of standoff. What ultimately break the deadlock was not diplomacy or policy talks. It was something shinier.

In early November, small delegation of Swiss titans -all male and, all billionaires- sidestepped the usual diplomatic channels, arriving at the Oval Office with a gold-plated Rolex desk clock and a 1-kilogram engraved gold bar. Before the guests had even leaved the White House, Trump shared a social media post announcing progress. Within the days, the previously urgent “national emergency” posed by Swiss trade deficit seemed to lose its urgency, and tariffs were trimmed to a comparatively modest 15 percent. 

As that meeting so strikingly demonstrated, access to the American leader is no longer earned through shared values or sound policy. It is now won through the language of the deal and, above all, the weight of gold.

Trump received gold coated replica of a royal crown from the Silla Kingdom from South Korea President, a golden pager from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a gold-plated golf club from Japan, a golden boxing belt from Ukraine.  Even Apple CEO Tim Cook presented Trump with a special glass disc on a 24-karat gold base in August 2025 and secured an exemption from 100% tariff on imported semiconductors. Apple gift was a favorite for Trump in the Oval Office until the Swiss came to town. “It was tough to beat Apple, but the Swiss did it,” one administration official told Axios.

Trump even kept original 24-karat gold Club World Cup Trophy for himself so FIFA had to give the winner team, Chelsea, a replica. Not only did he receive the trophy, but he was also awarded a gold medal, which FIFA presents to the players of the winning team.

“The golden age” that Trump promised in his second inaguration speech, has never seemed more literal. He wasn’t only for his trademark “Midas touch” flow, he seeks profit in every policy decision he makes. As Jonathan Rauch explained, in patrimonialism, every policy the president values is considered his own personal property. Some experts call it ‘pay-to-play,’ where foreign governments, businesses, and wealthy donors gaining political and financial advantages such as relaxed regulations and federal contracts by investing in the Trump Organization, supporting MAGA causes or by engaging in excessive flattery. 

Trump Towers have been proposed from Damascus to Belgrade. Trump hotels or Trump Resorts are being built in many major cities around the world, primarily in Asia and Africa. As Amy Sorkin puts it Trump has made it clear that no gift is too much for him -even, and maybe especially, someone else’s Nobel Peace Prize medal.

Even presidential pardon power has become big business. In his first-year Trump has pardoned an unusually high numberof wealthy people accused of financial crimes, including money laundering, bank fraud and wire fraud. Wealthy individuals pay millions to lobbying and consulting firms to bring their cases to Trump’s attention. 

Trump pardoned cryptocurrency mogul Changpeng Zhao, months after Zhao’s company has struck a $2 billions deal with World Liberty Financial, the Trump family’s new crypto venture. In another revealing example, executives of Wells Fargo Bank, instead of paying the $8.5 million fine imposed for fraudulent transactions, donated $1 million to Trump’s inauguration ceremony in January, and two months later, their fine was reduced to a mere $150,000. 

In Trump’s World, Europe Is the Villain 

“The foreign policy of President Donald Trump combines the worst of isolationism with the worst of interventionism in a uniquely disastrous way,” says Thomas Reese. He began his presidency as a firm isolationist, but “America First” quickly turned into a wrecking ball -a license to upend America’s role in the world, discarding rules and norms with little restraint. 

“I never thought I’d feel nostalgia for the Iraq War,” said Nesrine Malik in The Guardian, but it turns out that the runup to that war, when American Administration did at least strive to convince the Congress and the world of the righteousness of its cause, was the “good old days.” The US removed Venezuela leader Nicolas Maduro based solely on national interest, bypassing all domestic, international authorization or public consent. Trump didn’t just break the rules it showed there aren’t any. 

“No autocrat likes to see one of their own seized, shackled and renditioned,” wrote Adrian Blomfield in The Daily Telegraph. However, China and Russia are unlikely to be troubled by Maduro’s removal. They may see it as evidence of the US stepping back globally and focusing on regional dominance. A world divided into spheres of influence, where powerful states act freely, could benefit Moscow and Beijing, as noted by Gideon Rachman in the FT.

Even Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) plan within its 33-page framework argues that Russia and China are US peers or potential friends. Instead, it points the finger at a surprising villain: Europe. NSS argues that the real danger isn’t Russian tanks or Chinese factories, but rather the “erasure” of European culture caused by mass immigration and the power of the European Union bureaucracy. The liberal international order, already fragile, found itself mocked not only by adversaries but by its former custodian. 

New Civil War and End of Forth Republic?

“Trump isn’t interested in fighting a new Cold War. He wants a new civilizational war,” wrote Thomas Friedman. Trump’s National Security Strategy language unlike any previous surveys, he observes, “It reveals a deep truth about this second Trump administration: how much it came to Washington to fight America’s third civil war, not to fight the West’s new cold war.” According to Friedman, after the Civil War of the 1860s and the second major civil struggle of the 1960s civil rights movement, America is now experiencing its third civil war. “This one, like the first two, is over the question ‘Whose country is this anyway?’ This civil war has been less violent than the first two—but it is early.”

Although the United States has operated under a single constitution, each civil war has produced a new political order, a new republic in all but name. For that reason, a “third civil war” would not just be another crisis; it would signal the end of what some analysts call the “Fourth American Republic.” 

As Jamelle Bouie pointed, the Civil War and its aftermath constituted the Second Republic. The Third Republic came into this world through the overwhelming victory of the Democrats in the election of early 1930’s. The legacies of the Third Republic had lived on when the fourth republic began with the achievements of the 1960’s Civil Rights Movement, which included a newly open door to the world. “This was an American republic built on multiracial pluralism. A nation of natives and of immigrants from around the world. Of political parties that strove to represent a diverse cross-section of society,” wrote Bouie, “It’s this America that they’re fighting to destroy with their attacks on immigration, civil rights laws, higher education and the very notion of a pluralistic society of equals.” 

A Year of Revelation

The first year of Trump’s second term offered Americans not greatness, but clarity. It showed what happens when empty and noisy demagogic rhetoric substitutes for vision and when power outruns principles. His return to power did not resolve the contradictions of Trumpism; it intensified them. Nationalism that depended on global markets. Capitalism claims to be self-regulating, yet in reality it is owned by the state. Law invoked as rhetoric and rejected as restraint. Freedom of speech demanded abroad and denied at home. Declared himself ‘Peace President’ and change the Department of the Defense name to Department of War. 

His supporters too—with their enduring appetite for loud certainty over quiet competence, find themselves caught in a season of paradox. Cheering the dismantling of the very institutions that once established the order they now claim to want again. They back tariffs, immigration, and social spending policies that heavily impact rural America, the backbone of their movement. And most ironically, this coalition of white Christians is led by one of the least religious presidents ever.

And yet, for all the noise he and his administration generate, the first year of his second term also revealed limits. Courts still blocked some actions. States resisted others. Markets reacted unpredictably. Bureaucracies slowed what they could not stop. Polls indicate declining support for him as the Congressional elections approach. Trump raged against these constraints, calling them sabotage, yet their persistence revealed an uncomfortable truth: even an “unbound president” cannot easily escape the structure of a constitutional federal system. 

Even in the face of repeated failures to “make America great again,” Trump succeeded at making one thing undeniably great again. It was not the greatness of law, restraint, economy, international leadership or wisdom, but the greatness of spectacle. A spectacle of American tragedy, one that may not have a happy ending this time. 


 

(*) Cemal Tunçdemir is a New York–based veteran journalist with extensive experience covering US politics and international affairs.