Andrej Babiš, leader of the ANO party and one of the richest businessmen in the Czech Republic, during a press conference in Prague on March 2, 2013. Photo: Dreamstime.

Prof. Bustikova: Babiš’s Victory in Czechia Is a Big Win for Illiberalism in Europe

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On October 4, 2025, billionaire populist Andrej Babiš’s ANO party won the Czech parliamentary elections with just under 35% of the vote, setting the stage for coalition talks with two small right-wing, Eurosceptic parties. In this in-depth interview with ECPS, Professor Lenka Bustikova analyzes the implications of this outcome for Czech democracy and the broader Central European political landscape. Warning that “Babiš’s victory is a big win for illiberalism in Europe,” she explains how this election represents both a consolidation of illiberal forces and a strategic shift in Babiš’s populism—from managerialism to paternalism—raising concerns about democratic backsliding and Czechia’s future orientation within the EU.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

On October 4, 2025, billionaire populist Andrej Babiš’s ANO party won the Czech parliamentary elections with just under 35% of the vote, securing 80 of 200 seats—an increase from the previous election. Although short of a majority, Babiš is expected to lead coalition talks. His most likely allies are two small right-wing, Eurosceptic parties: the anti-Green Deal Motorists for Themselves and Tomio Okamura’s anti-immigrant Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). While ANO shares the Motorists’ opposition to EU emissions targets, relations with the SPD may prove more complicated due to internal divisions and radical demands. A new Babiš government would likely shift Czech foreign policy, notably by scrapping the Czech ammunition initiative supporting Ukraine.

Against this backdrop, Professor Lenka Bustikova, Director of the Center for European Studies and Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, provides a detailed analysis of the political transformations currently unfolding in Czechia. In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), she warns: “I’m very concerned. Despite the relatively moderate appeal, I do think that Babiš’s victory is a significant win for illiberals in the region. I do not think this will be a bloodbath for Czech democracy, but I do think there’s going to be a lot of bleeding. The patient will survive, but there will be a strong shift.”

Professor Bustikova situates the election within a broader pattern of democratic contestation in Central Europe, describing it as both a consolidation of the illiberal camp and a reconsolidation of the liberal camp. Drawing on her scholarship on technocratic populism, she explains how Babiš has evolved from presenting himself as a competent manager to positioning himself as a paternal figure promising redistribution and state-led solutions to economic grievances. His emphasis on managerial competence now interacts with sovereigntist and anti-Green Deal rhetoric, reflecting a hybrid populist strategy.

Crucially, Professor Bustikova underlines the significance of the far right’s role in the coalition-building process. “If this coalition emerges, it will be the first time in Czech history that the far right is either in coalition or silently supporting the government. That’s a huge breakthrough, and it’s very concerning,” she notes. This development, she argues, marks a major illiberal breakthrough, with potential implications for Czechia’s position in the EU.

Although Czechia retains strong institutional guardrails—including the presidency, the Senate, the Constitutional Court, and a pluralistic media environment—Professor Bustikova expects democratic quality to decline during Babiš’s tenure. Situating these developments in a regional perspective, she warns that the illiberal camp is “numerically much stronger,” making future liberal victories increasingly difficult.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Lenka Bustikova, revised for clarity and flow.

Professor Lenka Bustikova is the Director of the Center for European Studies and Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida.

Czech Elections Mark a Strategic Shift Toward Illiberalism

Professor Lenka Bustikova, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In light of Andrej Babiš’s decisive electoral victory, how would you interpret the current realignment of Czech party politics? Does this signify a deeper structural shift toward sovereigntist populism, or is it a contingent backlash against liberal governance?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: Thank you for this wonderful and difficult question. I would say that I am not alarmed by the outcome of the Czech elections, but I’m certainly concerned. What happened in this election—and many others have commented on it as well—is the consolidation of two camps. I would call them liberal and illiberal, because what the previous or outgoing government offered was not a particularly liberal government.

In this election, Andrej Babiš and his party, ANO, very successfully and skillfully consolidated voters who are unhappy, struggling, insecure, and also revengeful—and he did so effectively. The encouraging news about the Czech elections is that, in the previous election, about one million votes were wasted on smaller anti-system parties. This time, it was only 400,000. Babiš managed to unite this “coalition of the unhappy” and those seeking change, and he did it well. That camp has now consolidated, will have a voice, and will act as an accountability mechanism.

The liberal camp actually did quite well; the electoral math just didn’t work in their favor as it did four years ago. They were punished for not delivering on certain issues. They could have implemented progressive policies that wouldn’t have cost them much, but they didn’t—partly due to tensions within the coalition. They could have been more proactive on LGBTQ rights, registered partnerships, and perhaps on women’s rights.

More importantly, voters were facing a country with high inflation and high debt. The government did all it could, but it wasn’t enough. While the macroeconomic statistics in the Czech Republic are quite favorable, the government failed to communicate this effectively and neglected key economic issues, such as the housing crisis, that required greater attention. The outgoing coalition also continued to embody a kind of 1990s economic approach—loyal to an era that many voters now question and want to move beyond.

Overall, this election represents both a consolidation of the illiberal camp and a reconsolidation of the liberal camp. What we are seeing—in the Czech Republic and elsewhere—is that the illiberal camp is much stronger. If these patterns of consolidation continue, it will become increasingly difficult for the liberal camp to win elections. This is a major challenge in many countries today.

From Technocrat to ‘Big Daddy’ Populist

Drawing on your concept of technocratic populism, how does Babiš’s blend of managerialism and anti-elite rhetoric differ from classical populist radical right movements in Central Europe? Has this hybrid model evolved since his first premiership (2017–2021)?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: When we wrote the article with Professor Petra Guasti on technocratic populism, we conceived of it as an ideal type—and, of course, every ideal type, when faced with reality, becomes a bit murky and messy. In the original classification, technocratic populism in its pure form did not involve culture wars, nativism, or sovereigntism. It was about the populist utilization of expertise to win elections.

Babiš, who is a very flexible and savvy politician, has certainly evolved. Especially during the 2023 presidential elections, we saw him significantly amplify his nativist appeal—it was quite remarkable. But then he softened his rhetoric again. In the current election, he and his party, ANO, have toned it down.

We also see a shift away from the original technocratic populist model and its managerial appeal. When he first ran, he presented himself as a competent manager. Now, he positions himself more as a “big daddy” figure who will take care of things and spend generously on his constituents. The party he originally founded was fiscally conservative, advocating for running the state efficiently like a firm. That is no longer the platform. The current platform focuses on redistribution and targeted spending toward core constituencies.

This has little to do with efficiency, even though one of his electoral appeals is that the previous coalition was ineffective at managing economic problems—and there is certainly some truth to that. In many ways, this election has centered on pocketbook concerns, poverty, and voters in economically disadvantaged regions. Babiš and ANO have managed to mobilize these voters very successfully and effectively.

Sovereigntist Rhetoric, Pragmatic Strategy

Given Babiš’s membership in the Patriots for Europe and his critiques of the Green Deal, how do you assess the interplay between sovereigntist populism in Czechia and EU-level constraints? Are we witnessing a gradual erosion of the EU’s leverage over domestic political agendas?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: We certainly see that the European Union either lacks the instruments or is unwilling to use the instruments at hand to deal with autocratic or illiberal leaders, unfortunately. Babiš is a very pragmatic politician. He will criticize the Green Deal, but if, for instance, his agro-federate firm can benefit from it, I’m sure he would be open to discussions. One important aspect of the Green Deal debate is the likely involvement of the Motorists party, which is expected to be part of the future coalition and absolutely opposes the Green Deal. There is even a possibility that this party will get the environment portfolio, which would certainly lead to a strong pushback against the Green Deal from the incoming coalition.

The coalition negotiations have just started and will take some time, but resistance is almost certain. However, Babiš, being highly pragmatic, will likely oppose the Green Deal selectively, in ways that suit his political agenda, while also accommodating his coalition partners. I’m sure he will navigate this very skillfully, as part of the Green Deal is rhetorical, but there are also technical aspects that will not be easy to roll back.

A Volatile Marriage of Convenience

If Babiš succeeds in forming a minority government backed by SPD and Motorists, how might this affect the strategic behavior of far-right actors? Does your research on illiberal alliances suggest a stable coalition or a volatile marriage of convenience?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: The negotiations have just started, and one possibility is a coalition of ANO, led by Andrej Babiš, and Motorists. It’s not clear whether the far-right party—Tomio Okamura’s party—or its 10 plus 5 MPs will be part of the government or whether they will silently support the coalition from parliament. It’s possible that, for the far right, Babiš will ask them to nominate experts.

This is likely to be a volatile coalition, but Babiš has shown in the past that he can handle coalitions very well. In fact, anyone considering entering a coalition with Andrej Babiš should be very cautious. Babiš was once in a coalition with the Social Democrats, and he completely destroyed them, siphoning off all their voters. They are basically gone, especially after this election—a dead party for which Babiš can take much of the credit.

The SPD should really think twice about how to approach this future coalition relationship because the election results have shown that Babiš can very skillfully siphon off far-right voters as well. He is a highly strategic politician who has effectively cannibalized his coalition partners in the past.

With Motorists, there are likely to be some tensions. It’s not a stable party; it’s built around a few personalities. The biggest source of tension in the coalition will probably concern budget balance. The party of Motorists is, in a way, the intellectual child of former President Václav Klaus. They want to keep balanced budgets—an idea that has already been signaled as completely unrealistic. There may be some initial friction, but it’s likely they will get over it quickly.

Babiš is one of the most talented politicians in the Czech Republic today, and I expect he will handle this situation quite effectively, using a combination of arm-twisting and incentives. I suspect he will be very successful.

Okamura Overshoots, Babiš Benefits

Czech businessman and SPD leader Tomio Okamura in Prague on May 5, 2010. Photo: Dreamstime.

The SPD underperformed compared to expectations. How do you explain the resilience of Babiš’s populist appeal despite the presence of established far-right actors? Does this reflect a mainstreaming of radical right discourse in Czech politics?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: Okamura underperformed—his party underperformed. Moreover, he has a group of very undisciplined MPs because, in fact, he had three other parties in the coalition, so he has five MPs who are more like coalition MPs than SPD members. He is no longer an authentic politician. Many far-right voters, including those from other parties, no longer see him as a credible nativist fighter—that’s one aspect. But also, he is too extreme for the Czech context. He ran a very vitriolic, pro-Russian campaign and openly declared that he would like the Czech Republic to leave NATO and the European Union. Czech voters absolutely do not have the stomach for that, so he overshot. This is simply too extreme.

As Aleš Michal, one Czech political scientist, insightfully observed, the mobilization against the far right led by the pro-democratic parties and the coalition Together—when they warned Czech voters against parties that would steer the country towards Russia—actually worked. Anti-system and far-right or far-left voters moved under the umbrella of ANO. So, in a way, the strategy worked, but it did not help the coalition Together—it helped Babiš.

Another important aspect is that during the presidential elections, which Babiš lost but which were highly polarized, he managed to attract a significant number of far-right voters. In 2023, these voters grew accustomed to the idea of voting for him. So, although he lost the presidential election, it helped him enormously in this election, as he became an acceptable alternative for the far right.

Cultural Issues Trigger Policy Backlash

In your work on the “Revenge of the Radical Right,” you emphasize how minority accommodation can trigger backlash. To what extent are current Czech political dynamics shaped by cultural issues (e.g., LGBTQ+ rights, immigration, Ukrainian refugees) rather than economic grievances?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: I’ve thought about these issues quite a bit because I do think that with a lot of foreign mobilization today, the appeal of ethnic issues is somewhat subdued. I also have one or two articles with Professor Petra Guasti where we speculate about this. The logic of the book is that backlash ensues after the accommodation of minorities—it’s a backlash against elevating groups and putting forward policies that help them. In that sense, the logic of backlash applies here as well. In the Czech Republic, when you consider the status quo and the pursuit of policies that were genuinely beneficial to Ukrainian refugees, you can anticipate an ensuing backlash. Ukrainian refugees are no longer as warmly welcomed as they once were. There have also been many attempts to advance more robust legislation to protect women against rape and sexual assault, as well as attempts to codify the Istanbul Convention. These are all policies that, in a way, shift the balance of power or policy direction, and we have seen backlash as a result. Similarly, the LGBTQ community is hoping to increase their rights. Much of the public is quite open to this possibility, but the process of getting there involves shifting the balance and policies. Once that happens, advocates on the opposing side are naturally activated. So, I do think the policy backlash logic applies here as well.

Recent scholarship highlights the rise of confessional illiberalism across Central Europe. Do you see religiously inflected sovereigntism gaining ground in Czechia, or does the country’s secular legacy limit this trajectory compared to Hungary and Poland?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: This is an excellent question. It refers to a recent article that I’ve written with Lottam Halevi, who is now at the University of Constance. One important thing to keep in mind is that much of the mobilization around religious issues is actually a mobilization of political identity. It is not necessarily the case that more religiously infused countries will experience a higher mobilization of religious identity or religious activity as political identity. Czechia is a very secular country. However, we do see issues around transgender rights or some LGBTQ questions being framed in ways that are very similar to Hungary and Poland. The culture wars are nowhere near as fierce as in neighboring countries, but the country could potentially develop its own mini culture wars. 

Another important point is that in the Czech Republic, the Christian Democratic Party is firmly in a coalition and belongs to the liberal or pro-democratic camp. As long as they remain on the side of parties that respect the rule of law, this creates a kind of firewall against the politicization of some of these issues. Nevertheless, we have seen signs of this dynamic even in a country as secular as the Czech Republic.

Culture Wars Remain Underutilized in Czech Politics

Ukrainian activists protest against the Russian invasion of Ukraine during a peaceful demonstration with flags in support of Ukraine in Prague, Czechia on February 24, 2023. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your article “In Europe’s Closet” discusses how minority rights can catalyze illiberal backlash. Are Czech populist and far-right actors increasingly weaponizing LGBTQ+ issues as part of their sovereigntist narratives? How does this compare to developments in Slovakia or Poland?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: Suddenly, these issues are high on the agenda in Slovakia and Poland, even though in Poland some LGBTQ issues are not as salient as they were a few years ago. However, we do see narratives about protecting children against transgenderism emerging. This rhetoric often appears as part of anti-EU, Euroskeptic discourse—telling people what to do, how to raise their children, promoting a progressive agenda around women, or framing gender rights as a threat to traditional families. The offshoots of these narratives are present, though they are not a particularly dominant strain. Pocketbook issues largely dominated this election. So, the potential is there, but it remains underutilized. Moreover, the Catholic Church in the Czech Republic is quite restrained and does not enter into these debates in the way it does in Slovakia or Poland.

In your co-authored work on “Patronage, Trust, and State Capacity,” you argue that low bureaucratic trust fosters clientelism. How does this dynamic manifest in Babiš’s political strategy, especially considering his corporate background and patronage networks?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: Andrej Babiš cares about one thing only, and that’s his firm, Agrofert, and his political party is his firm. The party is not a regular party; it is a business project and a business offshoot. He has a huge conflict of interest, which nobody knows how he’s going to solve if he’s nominated as prime minister, because the Czech Republic doesn’t have an institute of blind trust. The conflict of interest will always be there because his firm, Agrofert, is a large recipient of state subsidies. That’s not necessarily patronage networks; it’s, in a way, making sure that the state is in a fantastic synergistic position with his firm. That is a particularity of his business background and the setup of the party. It is a vehicle for him to keep political power and be able to use state and EU subsidies, and the conflict of interest is just written all over him.

In terms of ANO as a party strategy, I would not necessarily define it as clientelism. What we saw when Babiš was in power, I would call targeted distribution—targeting pockets of voters, many of whom actually do need this targeting, and it is very beneficial to them. It involves picking out or dissecting groups that will be selected for state help, and again, the budget deficit is going to balloon. I don’t think that’s necessarily patronage, but it’s a targeted exchange that a lot of parties engage in, and it’s bread-and-butter politics. Having said that, aside from the targeted distribution, Babiš will make sure that his agglomerate benefits from him being prime minister again, which is a very likely scenario, as it seems now.

From Fiscal Conservatism to Programmatic Populism

Do you think Babiš’s economic promises—higher pensions, lower taxes, welfare expansion—should be understood as clientelistic appeals rooted in weak state capacity, or as programmatic populism aimed at reshaping public expectations?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: If I were to choose, I would really use more of a frame of programmatic populism or targeted distribution. We saw this between 2017–2021. What’s happening in the region now is that voter expectations have changed—and this applies to Poland and Slovakia as well—so that populist voters now expect redistribution and higher spending. If Babiš stays in power for four years, these expectations will become absolutely entrenched. There is a recent book on Poland by Ben Stanley that talks about this lock-in: basically, the transformation of the Polish party system in such a way that all voters now expect the next party in power to spend, no matter who that might be. If the current governing coalition ever comes back, they will have to do the same thing. They will not be able to promise balanced budgets. If they want to defeat Babiš four years from now, they will also have to promise spending. Good luck with the budgets, but there is a general entrenchment of voters expecting that the state needs to really open up the valves. It will probably have pretty bad long-term consequences, but nobody’s thinking long-term these days.

Given Babiš’s emphasis on managerial competence, how does technocratic rhetoric interact with populist radical right sovereigntist claims in his current coalition-building efforts?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: It’s going to be a big spending spree, and the Motorists will have to hold their noses. The far right really doesn’t care—actually, it supports spending as long as it’s spending on Czechs, or native spending, and not on Ukrainians or migrants. This is going to be a move from manager to, in a way, a paternal figure who is going to take care of everybody, including making appointments for colonoscopy. Part of the big appeal of Babiš was the emphasis on improving the healthcare system. 

Having been quite critical about ANO, I do have to emphasize that it’s quite possible that some of the portfolios the coalition will control can be given to very competent people. In the previous government, ANO had some ministers or portfolios that were run quite well. For example, the Ministry of Education underwent some really good changes. It’s also possible that some of the infrastructure projects that started and need to be completed, or the huge shortage of housing stock—if Babiš can really deliver on these issues, that’s going to be very successful, rewarded, and it would benefit the country quite a bit. If he throws in managerial competence and delivers, that would be fantastic, and it’s possible that there might be some policy changes that can be done well and have long-term benefits. But I suspect a big spending spree and a very short-term horizon, given Babiš’s age. We’ll see.

A Historic Breakthrough for the Far Right

Analysts have warned that Babiš could align Czechia with Hungary and Slovakia, forming a sovereigntist bloc inside the EU. Do you view this as a tactical positioning or a substantive ideological shift toward illiberal governance?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: I’m very concerned. Despite the relatively moderate appeal, I do think that Babiš’s victory is a significant win for illiberals in the region. I do not think this will be a bloodbath for Czech democracy, but I do think there’s going to be a lot of bleeding. The patient will survive, but there will be a strong shift. Babiš is also very strategic. If he and his coalition partners drag him to some extreme positions, the Czech public may become accustomed to that. If this coalition emerges, it will be the first time in Czech history that the far right is either in coalition or silently supporting the government. That’s a huge breakthrough, and it’s very concerning. The Motorists are not an extreme party, but they are certainly not rooting for the European rule of law and liberal democratic values. This is very troubling, and it’s a big win for illiberalism in Europe. Babiš’s victory is undoubtedly a big win for illiberalism.

Guardrails Exist, But Democratic Quality May Decline

The Statue of Justice by Marius Kotrba, a modern sculpture located at the Supreme Court building in Brno, Czech Republic, on March 10, 2022. Photo: Evgeniy Fesenko.

What are the potential institutional guardrails against democratic backsliding in Czechia, and how do they compare to Hungary and Slovakia during their own illiberal turns?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: There are a lot of guardrails. The most important actor is the current president, Petr Pavel. He can veto, he can play a huge informal role, and he will have to think very carefully about whether the future prime minister is going to violate the law by being in a position of conflict of interest. This is going to be a hard puzzle to solve. The Czech president is a pro-democratic, centrist figure with good temperament and very high levels of popularity.

The second guardrail is the second chamber, which Slovakia does not have. The Czech Senate is still dominated by so-called liberal or pro-democratic parties. There are a lot of roadblocks. Another institution that’s quite important is the Constitutional Court, which has saved Czech democracy many times. That’s also significant.

The media in the Czech Republic have been independent. Babiš is going to go after Czech Television and Czech Radio, but the country has a robust, pluralistic media scene. It might change, but that’s an important characteristic.

Czech civil society is quite active, although one has to be very careful about what mobilization means. For example, work by Petra Guasti and Aleš Michal showed that populists are sometimes much better at mobilizing. This election has shown that people can be mobilized for and against democracy, or for liberal or illiberal causes. This time, the election mobilized the illiberals more, but there were other elections in the past when the pro-democratic camp was mobilized quite well. Civil society is active. It pays attention.

So, there is hope, but I do expect that the quality of Czech democracy will decline during this period because of disrespect for the rule of law. Babiš does not like the rule of law, and his coalition partners are either extremists or at the fringe of the mainstream. Another thing I would like to mention is that one of the leaders of the Motorist Party has accusations of domestic abuse filed against him. In terms of signaling the moral integrity of political leaders, this also doesn’t bode well for appointing people with questionable moral standing to very high positions of power.

Swerve for Now, But the Future Looks Troubling

Finally, situating Czechia within the broader Central European context, do you see the current developments as part of a cyclical populist wave or a deeper structural illiberal swerve, as discussed in “The Illiberal Turn or Swerve in Central Europe?”

Professor Lenka Bustikova: At this moment, I expect that this is going to be four years’ worth, but I don’t know what’s going to happen at the end of these four years, because what we see in other countries is that when the 2.0 comes back—when populists return to power—they are much more effective. They know what to do, they have their playbooks ready, they have done this before, they are much more revengeful, aggressive, and they know how to get things done. So I expect that Babiš will weaken the rule of law and definitely try to weaken some of the guardrails. I do think that the coalition partners will certainly drag the country more towards the East than towards the West. The real question is going to be: after four years, is there anyone who will be able to beat them? It’s going to be very difficult because this consolidation of camps shows that the illiberal camp is simply numerically much stronger. Either they’ll have to make some terrible mistakes—which they will—and the voters may forgive them or may not, or the liberal camp will have to grow, and we see in other countries that it is a very steep hill to climb. So, swerve for now, but I am very concerned about the future.

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman is a Senior Lecturer at the Lauder Institute and in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Dr. Locoman: Moldova’s Win Is Real, But Russia Is Not Done Yet

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviewsMigration

Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections mark a pivotal moment in the geopolitical tug-of-war between the European Union and Russia. Despite unprecedented hybrid interference—including disinformation, illicit financing, and the use of new technologies—the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) secured a decisive victory. Dr. Ecaterina Locoman cautions, however, that this success is “more of a temporary setback” for Moscow than a strategic defeat: “Russia will gather its resources again.” In this interview with ECPS, Dr. Locoman analyzes Moldova’s evolving democratic resilience, the adaptive strategies of Russian influence, the role of the diaspora, and the country’s ambitious EU accession goal. She underscores the importance of sustained domestic reform and Western engagement to keep Moldova on its “irreversible European path.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections have emerged as a pivotal moment in the geopolitical contest between the European Union and Russia. Against a backdrop of unprecedented hybrid interference—including disinformation campaigns, illicit financing, and the use of new technologies—Moldova’s pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) secured a decisive victory. Yet, as Dr. Ecaterina Locoman cautions in this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), this success must be understood as both real and fragile: “I expect that Russia will continue to influence domestic politics. It’s part of their strategic goal to regain control over the post-Soviet region, and I don’t think this should be read as a strategic loss. It’s more of a temporary setback, but they will gather their resources again.”

Dr. Locoman, Senior Lecturer at the Lauder Institute and in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, situates Moldova’s electoral resilience within a hybrid framework of domestic determination and external support. “We can interpret the results of the Moldovan elections as a hybrid outcome. On the one hand, they reflect a strong domestic effort—both from political institutions and voters—who showed remarkable resilience in the face of Russian interference and influence. On the other hand, it is also clear that without the support of Western partners, especially the European Union, this success would not have been possible. So, it’s both a domestic and international story.”

This resilience was manifested not only through institutional preparedness—such as stronger oversight of illicit financing and disinformation—but also through robust diaspora engagement and sustained voter mobilization. “The numbers show that 280,000 Moldovans abroad voted in the elections,” Dr. Locoman notes, highlighting how mail ballots and close transnational ties helped bolster the pro-EU vote. She underscores that “the diaspora is relatively young… they maintain very strong links to Moldovan politics and what is happening at home.”

At the same time, Moscow’s influence tactics are evolving. Russia experimented with “the use of AI and alternative financial methods, like cryptocurrency,” to obscure financial flows and spread propaganda. While these efforts ultimately proved less effective this cycle, Dr. Locoman warns against complacency: “Moscow is one of the best students of the post-Soviet region… they will learn from their own mistakes and improve their strategies in the next elections. This fight needs to continue.”

Looking ahead, Moldova’s ambition to join the European Union by 2030 faces both internal and external hurdles. Domestically, slow reforms, corruption, and economic vulnerabilities remain pressing concerns. Externally, geopolitical vetoes—most notably from Hungary—could obstruct accession negotiations. “I have some doubts—not fear, but doubts—about how quickly the situation can move by 2030,” Dr. Locoman admits. Yet she also maintains a note of cautious optimism: “Up until 2022, Moldova had been knocking on the EU’s doors for more than 30 years… and then, in the end, it happened.”

In this interview, Dr. Locoman offers a nuanced analysis of Moldova’s evolving democratic landscape, the adaptive strategies of Russian influence, and the strategic choices facing both Moldovan and European leaders in the years to come.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Ecaterina Locoman, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Resilience at Home, Support Abroad

National meeting of the Moldovan people with the flags of the European Union and the Republic of Moldova. Chisinau, Moldova, May 21, 2023. Photo: Andrei F.

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Moldova’s parliamentary elections delivered a decisive victory for the ruling pro-European Union PAS despite unprecedented Russian interference. Should we interpret this outcome as a durable consolidation of democratic resilience, or as a contingent success heavily dependent on extraordinary EU and Western support?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: Thank you very much for having me. It’s a pleasure to be here. I think we can interpret the results of the Moldovan elections as a hybrid outcome. On the one hand, they reflect a strong domestic effort—both from political institutions and voters—who showed remarkable resilience in the face of Russian interference and influence. On the other hand, it is also clear that without the support of Western partners, especially the European Union, this success would not have been possible. So, it’s both a domestic and international story.

Importantly, if we look back at the 2024 presidential elections and now the 2025 parliamentary elections, voters have chosen a similar direction. This indicates that democracy in Moldova, while perhaps not as strong or stable as one might wish, is nonetheless evolving. Moldovans and their institutions are working every day to strengthen it. We saw a high degree of voter mobilization despite significant Russian efforts, including disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and illicit financing. Voter turnout was relatively high at 52%, demonstrating strong civic engagement.

Compared to the 2024 presidential elections, domestic institutions such as the prosecutor’s office and the police clearly learned from past mistakes. They were better prepared to identify and address unlawful use of illicit funding and electoral violations. This helped build voter confidence in the electoral process. As in previous elections, diaspora engagement was also very strong, further contributing to democratic resilience. Overall, these factors point to an increased resilience among Moldovans in defending their democratic process.

Pro-Russian Messages Losing Ground

To what extent do the results reflect a deepening societal commitment to a pro-European orientation, as opposed to a rejection of entrenched pro-Russian elites such as Igor Dodon and his allies, whose populist appeals often fuse anti-elite rhetoric with civilizational tropes about Russia as Moldova’s “natural” ally?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman:  That’s a very good question. The results show that, again, the recent election, as well as those in 2024 and 2021, reflect a continuing trend that society as a whole is more or less committed to a pro-Western orientation. I travel to Moldova on a yearly basis, and I can see that the country has changed significantly in recent years since Maia Sandu became president. There is a very clear pro-European trend. That said, it’s true that we don’t have precise data on how many Moldovans live abroad. Every summer, many of them return, and perhaps my impression of the country is somewhat skewed because I visit during that period when a lot of diaspora members are back home. Still, the spirit in the country is very much pro-European.

It’s also true that there have been numerous reports on this topic. I have studied how both Russia and the West try to influence domestic politics in post-Soviet states, and my research shows that Russia has long been grooming local political actors in countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. The fact that they were able to attract and cultivate specific types of political figures—such as Igor Dodon, for example, a former president of Moldova who now enjoys little popularity among large segments of the electorate—indicates that Moldovans are increasingly able to distinguish between leaders who genuinely seek to build a democratic, secure, and prosperous future for the country and those who do not.

Pro-Russian actors have not been particularly original or creative in how they promote their message. This message is losing ground, especially because of the war in Ukraine. It is no longer easy to “sell” this narrative. Previously, Moldovan politics often involved strategic shifts between Russia and the West, depending on which side best served domestic interests. Today, this approach is much harder to sustain. The war raging in neighboring Ukraine has made people more aware of the stakes, and Moldova has received a significant number of Ukrainian refugees. As a result, it has become much more difficult for pro-Russian parties to sell their message as effectively as before.

A Blessing in Disguise: Russia’s Unintended Push

Russian military expert at a government operations base, engaged in cyber activities aimed at spreading disinformation and hybrid warfare propaganda. Photo: Dragos Condrea.

With turnout just above 50%, what does this relative disengagement reveal about the durability of PAS’s mandate, and does persistent electoral apathy risk undermining the legitimacy of Moldova’s democratic consolidation over time?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: As I mentioned earlier, yes, the turnout was just over 50%, but this number is not unusually low for Moldova. In fact, compared to some recent elections in the region, 52% is relatively solid. However, you are right that it also signals that a significant portion of the electorate remains disengaged, which has implications for the durability of the ruling party’s mandate to govern over the next four years.

The fact that Maia Sandu’s party won elections for the second time is significant. They secured a clear majority of seats and resisted heavy Russian interference and influence. At the same time, much of their enthusiasm is concentrated during election periods, when the central question is whether the country is moving east or west. This enthusiasm does not always last throughout the full four-year governing period.

Moldovans are frustrated with the slow pace of reforms, the persistence of corruption, and the fact that judicial change has not progressed as quickly as many had hoped. Many voters remain disillusioned with these slow reforms, persistent poverty, and daily economic hardships. For this reason, it is especially important for the governing party to deliver results quickly—both to maintain its stated goal of joining the European Union and to ensure that its policies meet the expectations of the electorate.

In some ways, the Russian presence is acting as a “blessing in disguise.” Without the Russian threat at the border, Moldovan political parties might have been more complacent and less willing to pursue reforms. Because the threat is so close, it creates a greater sense of urgency among both political actors and the population to mobilize and align with the European Union.

What has changed significantly compared to previous elections—particularly over the past decade, since around 2010—is the unprecedented level of symbolic, technical, and financial support the European Union has provided to Maia Sandu and Moldovan political institutions. EU leaders have repeatedly visited Moldova and demonstrated their support, which is unprecedented in the country’s history.

In my own research, I found that since 1991, when Moldova declared independence from the USSR, one of its main foreign policy challenges has been ensuring that the West paid any attention to it at all. For many years, Moldova was on the radar only because of the Transnistrian conflict. As long as things were quiet and stable, there was little engagement. Now, however, Moldovan political elites—especially Maia Sandu—have succeeded in breaking through this indifference and convincing European leaders that Moldova is strategically important to the EU and its security.

Transnationalizing Moldovan Democracy

The diaspora played a decisive role in shaping the outcome. How should we understand this transnationalization of Moldovan democracy, especially given populist narratives at home that cast the diaspora as an illegitimate, “externalized” electorate undermining national sovereignty?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: That’s true. I like the expression you used—the transnationalization of Moldovan democracy. The numbers show that 280,000 Moldovans abroad voted in the elections. This is because the governing party recognized that much of their support comes from the diaspora, so they facilitated the voting process abroad. The introduction of mail ballots was a smart and strategic move, because people living in countries like the United States find it much easier to vote by mail than to go in person to Moldovan embassies or consulates. This was an important step, reflecting the fact that domestic political elites understood the crucial role the diaspora plays.

Another important factor is that the diaspora is relatively young. Most of those who have moved abroad are in their 50s, 40s, 30s, and 20s. They maintain very strong links to Moldovan politics and what is happening at home. Many have families in Moldova, so they remain deeply engaged, and I was pleased to see the high level of civic engagement among the diaspora, particularly their efforts to support and promote European integration.

It’s true that the more pro-Russia parties tend to portray the diaspora negatively. I think it was Igor Dodon who, at one point during a previous presidential election, referred to the diaspora as a “parallel electorate,” claiming that they don’t know what’s happening at home, that they live in the West and therefore want the country to join the West. He argued that they are disconnected from domestic realities, which is not true. The links between the diaspora and Moldova remain very strong.

If you visit in the summertime, you can see many young people and young families returning. In the 1990s and early 2000s, before Moldova had a visa-free regime with the EU, many Moldovans tried to work in the EU illegally. They often ended up stuck abroad, unable to return home, and the maximum support they could provide was through remittances.

Government building decorated with Moldovan and European Union flags, as well as national and EU symbols, in central Chisinau, Chisinau, Moldova on June 1, 2025. Photo: Gheorghe Mindru.

Now, because the EU has introduced a visa-free regime and many Moldovans have been able to obtain Romanian citizenship—thanks to Romania’s revised citizenship law allowing those who can prove family links from the interwar period when Moldova was part of Greater Romania to apply—many people have Romanian passports. This allows them to live and work legally in the EU.

As a result, many young families now live in European countries such as Germany, Belgium, and Great Britain during the year, but they build homes in Moldova, have parents and siblings there, and remain in close contact. So, it is not accurate to argue that the diaspora is disconnected from events at home. In fact, it is very much a part of what is happening domestically. As long as domestic political actors continue to engage the diaspora and maintain these connections, the pro-European movement will hopefully remain strong.

Hybrid Interference: New Tactics, Old Goals

Observers describe Moldova as a “laboratory” for Russia’s hybrid interference. From disinformation to illicit financing, what does the 2025 electoral cycle reveal about the adaptive limits of Moscow’s toolkit of influence?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: Yes, we’ve seen new models of influence that Russia has used in the elections. The use of AI and alternative financial methods, like cryptocurrency, for example, is new. They tried to hide financial links by using cryptocurrency, which, in a way, influenced the process. But, this also revealed the limits of Russian influence. I would add a caveat here: Moscow—indeed the Kremlin—is one of the best students of the post-Soviet region. They know the region very well and have people who have studied it in depth. So, I expect that they will learn from their own mistakes and improve their strategies in the next elections. This means that Moldova’s pro-European victory should not be seen as a sign that we can become complacent or self-sufficient. This fight needs to continue. As I said, Moscow is a very good student of the post-Soviet region. They understand the internal realities of these countries. They know the challenges that people face, the domestic weak points, and they try to exploit these to the advantage of their messages and narratives.

At the same time, many of these tools proved ineffective at this point in time because Moldovan institutions—and civil society as well—were more proactive than in past elections. Moldovan institutions learned important lessons from the last presidential elections. Parties engaged in illicit financing were excluded from the ballot, prosecutions were pursued, and the government was much more transparent in communicating about disinformation campaigns. As a result, people were much more aware of what was going on.

While the Russian toolkit has evolved technologically, its effectiveness is limited when met with resilient institutions, rapid countermeasures, and credible alternatives. If we look at one successful formula that worked in Moldova at this moment, I would still be cautious not to declare this the end of Russian interference. Russian influence will remain strong in the region. But what worked was a credible pro-EU message from domestic political parties, coupled with strong and credible support from the EU, which was very important. Additionally, the pro-Russia parties were not as original in their messaging, and the ongoing war in neighboring Ukraine further strengthened the pro-EU camp.

Exploiting Weak Links: Moscow’s Populist Playbook

The T-34 tank monument and the Parliament building in Tiraspol, Transnistria, Moldova. The tank is a decommissioned T-34, now part of the Memorial of Glory. Photo: Dreamstime.

In the light of your research on Russian influence strategies, how do you interpret Moscow’s reliance on populist-style appeals—framing EU integration as a betrayal of sovereignty, invoking fears of war, or portraying elites as “foreign agents”? Does the Moldovan case suggest a recalibration of these tactics compared to Ukraine or Georgia?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: What is happening in Moldova, again, links to what I was just saying in response to the previous question. When I think about Georgia, the support for a pro-EU orientation was very strong. Public opinion support was extremely high, but it was not enough. When Russia was able to find a credible, strong domestic political actor, it was able to promote its own interests inside Georgia. What is different in Moldova’s case right now is that there was both a credible pro-EU party and strong public opinion support for the European Union. Now, Russia does not necessarily rely only on populist-style appeals. They know the weaknesses in each of these countries—the weak links—and they try to use those for their own interests. One thing I have noticed is that as long as domestic political elites are smart and strategic in how they frame their political messaging, it matters a lot.

I will give an example. Since Moldova declared independence in 1991, one very big question has been whether the language spoken in Moldova is Romanian or Moldovan. Political campaigns and electoral strategies were often built around this division. More pro-EU, pro-Romanian parties argued that the language is Romanian, while more pro-Russia parties insisted it is Moldovan. In every electoral campaign, these pro-Russia political parties used such narratives to distract voters from real issues like economic problems and corruption.

What happened in the years since Maia Sandu came to power is that the Moldovan constitution was amended to enshrine that the language spoken in Moldova is Romanian. So now, there is no debate about it. Nobody is questioning it anymore. The point I want to make is that as long as domestic political elites manage to settle these kinds of debates—which are not central to everyday life—then it becomes much harder for pro-Russia political actors to exploit them. People’s income levels or quality of life do not depend on whether they call the language Romanian or Moldovan.

When the Russians spot these kinds of differences, they manipulate public opinion and can win. But if domestic political elites can agree and establish clear positions on such issues, it becomes much harder for pro-Russia actors to influence the public. For example, pro-Russia parties have strong backing in the Orthodox Church in Moldova, which is very influential. There were reports that some priests were used by the Kremlin to influence public opinion. But as long as there is clear messaging from mainstream political parties in Moldova that they are not anti-religion, that religion is respected and people are free to practice their faith, then it becomes harder for pro-Russian narratives—often based on fake realities—to take hold.

When people hear credible messages from their own political elites, it becomes much easier for them to discern truth from lies. Similarly, the narrative about war has become much harder for Russia to sell right now. Why? Because they are waging a war in neighboring Ukraine. It is much harder to claim that moving toward the EU will bring war when there is already a war caused by Russia next door. This narrative was more effective in earlier elections, but now, as long as the West continues to support Ukraine and Ukraine withstands the Russian attack, it will be much easier for Moldova to remain strong and maintain its pro-European orientation and stance.

Without Reforms, Western Support Won’t Be Enough

How sustainable is Moldova’s reliance on Western partners for countering hybrid threats, given persistent vulnerabilities such as corruption, weak institutions, and economic hardship?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: This is a very good question. I think about it very often. As much as Russian influence may be a blessing in disguise—in the sense that it mobilizes people at home to work hard and pushes political parties to deliver on their promises and act quickly—the support from the European Union, and even from the United States, is the best thing that can happen to Moldova. As long as the EU remains invested in Moldova, we will be able to maintain our pro-European path more easily.

One fear I have is that we might become complacent, assuming that the EU or the West will always come to our rescue and that we can simply continue doing whatever we are doing internally. When I go to Moldova, I often hear people—business people, entrepreneurs—complaining that not much has changed compared to 10 or 15 years ago. Corruption is still rampant. In order to obtain permits to build something, for example, you still need to pay someone in the government. This is unfortunate, and people are aware of it.

My conclusion is that domestic political parties must understand that this is a “make it or break it” moment. If they do not deliver on the promises they have made, it will become much easier for political actors in Moldova who promote Russian interests to regain power. And once that happens, it will be much, much harder to get Moldova out of Russia’s embrace. So, I think it depends very much on the willingness of the ruling party right now, and Maia Sandu, to deliver on the reforms they have promised.

A Temporary Setback, Not a Strategic Defeat

Do Moldova’s elections signal a broader decline in Russia’s ability to project influence across the post-Soviet space, or should Moscow’s defeat here be read as tactical rather than strategic?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: As I shared earlier, I do not think this is a Russian defeat in the long term. Russia is very adept at adjusting its messaging and tactics, not only with respect to the post-Soviet region but also to the wider EU region. They will learn from their mistakes and continue to influence domestic politics in Moldova, as much as we might not like it. Even if the political actors they supported did not win as many seats in Parliament as they initially hoped, we can look at the first four years of Maia Sandu’s party in government.

Basically, these previous four years were devoted to crisis management. Yes, it’s true, initially it was the COVID pandemic, but then the war in Ukraine, caused by Russia, turned everything upside down in Moldova. So instead of focusing on judicial reforms and economic development, as the party had initially promised and as Maia Sandu stated, they had to adjust. I think they managed—they were successful in delivering some of the promises made during the electoral campaign—but it was ten times harder.

I expect that Russia will continue to influence domestic politics. It’s part of their strategic goal to regain control over the post-Soviet region, and I don’t think this should be read as a strategic loss. It’s more of a temporary setback, but they will gather their resources again. Therefore, both Moldovan and European Union leaders need to stay on their toes, remain alert, and be careful about the next steps so they are prepared to counteract those measures.

EU Accession: Between Optimism and Doubt

Nicolae Ciucă (L), President of the National Liberal Party, Ursula von der Leyen (C), President of the European Commission, and Maia Sandu (R), President of Moldova, during the plenary session of the 2024 EPP Congress in Bucharest on March 6, 2024. Photo: Dreamstime.

And lastly, Dr. Locoman, President Sandu has tied her mandate to enshrining an “irreversible European path.” How realistic is Moldova’s aim to achieve EU accession by 2030, given the scale of domestic reforms required and potential geopolitical vetoes within the Union?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: Recently, Maia Sandu visited Copenhagen. Denmark hosted a major summit with key EU leaders. Ukraine was there, Maia Sandu was there, and there were reports that they were hoping Hungary would be persuaded not to veto the right of Ukraine and Moldova to start accession negotiations. However, Hungary was not persuaded. So the only hope they have right now is that there will be a political change in Budapest, allowing this to move forward.

A lot of the frustration I hear among policymakers in Moldova, when it comes to the EU, is that they are disappointed the European Union decided to put Moldova and Ukraine in the same bucket for European integration. There were hopes that Moldova would be decoupled, that it would go its own way, and Ukraine would go its own way. But the Europeans still seem to favor moving forward together as a group.

A fear I have is that Moldova is much smaller than Ukraine. Yes, domestic reforms need to be done, but as long as there is political will, it is possible to achieve them. I share a bit of the concern raised in the question. I am afraid that if the situation continues as it is now, Moldova might face the same fate as the Western Balkans over the past 20 years. The door was opened for them too, but then they stalled, and no real progress has been made, apart from Croatia joining the EU.

So, I have some doubts—not fear, but doubts—about how quickly the situation can move by 2030. Is this truly realistic? But then again, up until 2022, Moldova had been knocking on the EU’s doors for more than 30 years, asking for candidate status, and the EU kept saying no. And then, in the end, it happened. Yes, it was because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and it was unfortunate that this was the trigger, but it happened. So I try to stay optimistic and hope that by 2030, Moldova will be able to join the EU.

Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz is a legal scholar with a J.D. from the Federal University of Juiz de Fora, a PhD in Law from the University of Brasília, and currently a PhD student in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Dr. da Cruz: Brazilian Society Will No Longer Tolerate Attacks on Democracy

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

The conviction of Jair Bolsonaro and senior military officers for plotting a coup marks an unprecedented moment in Brazil’s democratic history. For the first time, both a former president and high-ranking commanders have been held accountable for attempting to subvert constitutional order. In her interview with the ECPS, Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz calls this a “historic” cultural shift: “Brazilian society is no longer willing to tolerate such attacks on democracy.” She emphasizes that this resilience stems from institutional maturity and judicial independence. By focusing on concrete evidence rather than rhetoric, Brazil’s Supreme Court set a vital precedent: authoritarian populism meets its legal limit when courts remain credible veto players.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The conviction of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and senior military officials for plotting a coup marks a watershed moment in the country’s democratic trajectory. For the first time in Brazil’s history, both a former head of state and high-ranking military leaders have been held criminally accountable for attempting to subvert constitutional order. This unprecedented development raises fundamental questions about judicial independence, civil–military relations, and the resilience of democratic institutions under populist pressure.

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz—a legal scholar with a J.D. from the Federal University of Juiz de Fora, a PhD in Law from the University of Brasília, and currently a PhD student in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison—describes the moment as “historic.” As she emphasizes, “I would highlight a cultural shift. Brazilian society is no longer willing to tolerate such attacks on democracy. This makes the moment truly historic for us.”

This “cultural shift,” she argues, reflects both institutional maturation and societal change. For decades, Brazil had maintained a tradition of impunity for military elites. “When the dictatorship ended, we didn’t have transitional justice—no generals were tried, no one was convicted—and this created the perception that they were all above the law,” Dr. da Cruz explains. “Now, that has changed. We have major military players convicted, and we also have a former president convicted of attempting a coup.”

For Dr. da Cruz, this is not only about judicial assertiveness but also about broader institutional cooperation: “It wasn’t just the Supreme Court; the federal police, the federal prosecution, and the courts all worked together effectively to reach this outcome.” This inter-institutional collaboration, she suggests, has been vital in resisting authoritarian populist attempts to erode democratic checks and balances.

Yet, the trial has also exposed risks. Justice Alexandre de Moraes emerged as the central figure in Bolsonaro’s prosecution, raising concerns about over-personalization of judicial power. While Dr. da Cruz acknowledges that this could fuel narratives of “judicial dictatorship,” she maintains that the verdict will likely enhance trust: “If I were to bet, I would say this will strengthen trust in the Supreme Court… it shows the population that they can count on the Court to uphold the Constitution.”

Ultimately, Brazil’s experience highlights both the vulnerabilities and strengths of democracies confronting authoritarian populism. By focusing on hard evidence—charges of armed conspiracy and constitutional subversion—rather than rhetoric or political speech, Brazil’s Supreme Court has set a precedent of judicial accountability rooted firmly in due process. As Dr. da Cruz underscores, “There is a threshold, a limit at which society must say: this is no longer rhetoric, this is now armed conflict, this is now constitutional subversion—and this we will not accept.”

This interview situates Brazil’s democratic resilience in comparative perspective, with lessons for other democracies confronting populist threats.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

A Historic Break with Brazil’s Tradition of Impunity

Alexandre de Moraes, Justice of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil, during a press conference in São Paulo, Brazil, on May 5, 2017. Photo: Dreamstime.

Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Bolsonaro has been sentenced to 27 years for plotting a coup—the first time in Brazil’s history that a president and military leaders involved in such an attempt have been convicted. How does this break with Brazil’s tradition of impunity, and what does it reveal about the maturation of its democratic institutions?

Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz: Thank you so much for having me. It’s such a pleasure to be here. As you just said, this is the first time something like this has happened in the history of Brazil, and it marks a huge break with the tradition of impunity. When the dictatorship ended, we didn’t have transitional justice—no generals were tried, no one was convicted—and this created the perception that they were all above the law. Now, that has changed. We have major military players convicted, and we also have a former president convicted of attempting a coup.

For me, this demonstrates two things above all. First, judicial independence: our Supreme Court has shown that it can and will enforce the Constitution whenever necessary. But perhaps even more importantly, other institutions have matured as well. It wasn’t just the Supreme Court; the federal police, the federal prosecution, and the courts all worked together effectively to reach this outcome. Finally, I would highlight a cultural shift. Brazilian society is no longer willing to tolerate such attacks on democracy. This makes the moment truly historic for us.

Legitimacy Gained, Risks Remain

Justice Alexandre de Moraes meticulously built the case for over two years, defying Bolsonaro’s claims of judicial persecution. From your perspective on judicial politics, does this verdict strengthen long-term trust in the Supreme Federal Court (STF), or risk deepening narratives of “judicial dictatorship”?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: This is the hard question that we are all asking right now, because it can cut both ways. If I were to bet, I would say this will strengthen trust in the Supreme Court, raising both levels of trust and legitimacy, because it is another instance of the court showing it can act under pressure. COVID was the first such instance in the recent past. During COVID, everyone in the government was against the Supreme Court’s measures, yet the Court was able to enforce the Constitution, and it has done the same now. This shows the population that they can count on the Court to uphold the Constitution.

But, there might be a second possibility. Justice Alexandre de Moraes became the face of this prosecution, the face of the inquiry and the conviction. In my opinion, this is problematic for the Court, because it personalizes such an important verdict in one person, which should not be the case. The main verdict involved other justices, of course, but he became the highly visible player in this case. This can fuel arguments of “judicial dictatorship,” which could play out negatively.

That said, if I were to bet, I think this will ultimately be positive for the Supreme Court. The population will see that the Court stands firm, even when the government is not siding with it. But we will have to wait and see.

Authoritarian Populism Meets Its Legal Limit

Bolsonaro’s conviction included charges of armed criminal conspiracy and attempted abolition of the democratic rule of law. How do these charges fit into the conceptual vocabulary of authoritarian populism—are they an appropriate legal reflection of political subversion?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I think they are. For me, this is one of the most important points here, because we could have had a conviction based on opinion or public statements that Bolsonaro made. That would have risked a much more politicized trial. Instead, the court chose to focus only on the concrete facts, which were mainly about the armed conspiracy—an organized and violent attempt against important political figures such as President Lula and Justice Alexandre de Moraes. They focused on the coup plot itself. They didn’t dwell on rhetoric, social media posts, or other statements that might have raised accusations of politicization.

This goes directly to the heart of authoritarian populism. There is a threshold, a limit at which society must say: this is no longer rhetoric, this is now armed conflict, this is constitutional subversion—and this we will not accept. In that sense, the court acted appropriately by applying the criminal code in the most strictly legal way possible.

Bolsonaro and his lawyers insist the trial was politically motivated, echoing populist claims of “witch hunts.” How should scholars distinguish between legitimate judicial accountability and lawfare in cases involving populist leaders?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: If we can take Brazil as an example, the most important guarantee courts should focus on is due process. This is exactly what our Supreme Court did. Every time the defense asked for information or made requests, they were granted, even though there is a strong argument that trying these individuals in the highest instance of the judiciary violates the right to defense. The court, however, had several precedents showing this was not the case, and this was not the first instance in which people were tried in the Supreme Court. Due process was observed at every step. Alongside this, there was strong factual evidence and credible witnesses—in our case, even a whistleblower—that demonstrated this was not a conspiracy or a witch hunt, but a legitimate trial conducted with due process and proportionality. That is the key: showing that the law is being upheld, and that the law allows for this punishment to happen.

Dissent as Democratic Strength, Not Judicial Weakness

Luiz Fux, Justice and President of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil, during a presentation in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, on July 31, 2018. Photo: Joa Souza.

The STF split 4–1, with Justice Luiz Fux voting to absolve Bolsonaro on procedural grounds. Could such dissents provide legal ammunition for appeals and, more broadly, do fragmented judicial opinions undermine institutional legitimacy in high-stakes political trials?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I heard a lot, and I read a lot about this during the last few weeks, and I side with the people who think that this is actually positive and beneficial for our democracy. By having a strong dissent like we had with Justice Fux, it shows that justices are allowed to think otherwise, that there was evidence, and that there were arguments from the defense that could persuade justices to think differently, and that the court is not hunting someone at any cost. So, this dissent demonstrates that the court can dissent, that it can have different arguments, and this is actually positive in a high court such as the Supreme Court.

In terms of appeals, I don’t think this is a huge problem here. We have a specific appeal that would be possible if this decision were a 3–2 decision. So if we had two justices siding with Bolsonaro, then he would have a specific appeal that would apply to this case. With only one dissent, this appeal does not apply, so the idea that it opens the ground for the defense to explore more possibilities of appeals doesn’t apply in this case specifically. In my view, the dissent was too long—it took the entire day to read the vote, and it was much more procedural than based on evidence itself—but it plays in favor of the Supreme Court. It shows that, unexpectedly, someone dissented completely on the verdict, and this demonstrates that the Supreme Court can have a debate, which is positive.

The Militarization of Bureaucracy Was a Legal Process

Then Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro attends the 74th Anniversary of the Parachutist Infantry Battalion at the Military Village in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on November 23, 2019. Photo: Celso Pupo Rodrigues.

Your research shows Bolsonaro strategically militarized bureaucracies while eroding public trust in the Armed Forces. How does the sentencing of senior officers alter Brazil’s civil–military equilibrium, and could it delegitimize the armed forces as political actors?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: We have always had this problem with civilian control over the military. Since the dictatorship, when the new constitution was drafted, so much power was given to the military that we could almost never say they were not allowed to play a specific role. What I call the militarization of bureaucracy was, in fact, a legal process—and this is the problem for me. There were laws that allowed the military to occupy primarily political positions. I’m not just talking here about the Ministry of Health, where a general was appointed to a political position. That was highly problematic; we had never before seen active-duty military in such a high office, and it was questionable.

But that is not the only issue. I’m talking about positions at all levels of the political bureaucracy that the military was allowed to occupy by law. Several changes in federal legislation permitted military personnel to serve up to four or even six years outside of strictly military posts and instead take politically appointed positions. Bolsonaro knew how to exploit this in his favor. An unprecedented number of military officers occupied his bureaucracy, and this undoubtedly laid the groundwork for him to secure the support he needed when the time came.

So, in order to rebuild civilian control over the military, much more is needed than simply changing the Ministry of Defense and appointing a civilian instead of a general. What is needed is legal reform that critically examines and justifies, for example, why we would need a sergeant in the Ministry of Health, or why it would be important to place a soldier in the Ministry of Education. Do these assignments make sense? That is the most important issue right now. We should be questioning the very reasons why legislation allows people to leave military functions and assume civilian roles.

Resilience and Fractured Loyalties Coexist

Bolsonaro’s failed coup was partly foiled because top military commanders withheld support. Should this be read as evidence of institutional resilience, or as a sign of fractured loyalties within Brazil’s security establishment?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I think it’s actually both. If we had the Ministry of Defense plus the three commanders in Brazil—which in the US we would call the Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Army, and Secretary of the Navy—if all of them, along with the Minister of Defense, had said, no, we cannot side with this, it would have been a stronger sign of resilience. But that’s not what happened. In this trial, we had the conviction of the Minister of the Navy and the Minister of Defense. Both sided with Bolsonaro very strongly, saying, we support you, we’ll be by your side. Only the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force said otherwise.

So yes, it’s resilience, because two of the main players showed they don’t want to compromise or play completely political roles anymore. But it’s also fractured loyalties, because out of four, Bolsonaro still managed to get two on his side. The point here is that he could have had all of them siding with him, had he chosen the right commanders, so to speak. So this is resilience, but it is also fractured loyalty—and that’s the problem. If loyalties fracture, the outcome could be very different, and that’s what we don’t want. We want an institution that no longer sides with political groups at any cost.

Military Must Stay in Military Roles

Having served as a legal advisor in the Air Force, how do you assess the prospects of rebuilding robust civilian control in the defense sector after this episode of politicization and militarization?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I guess I will repeat myself a little bit, because from my experience, what I see is that there is a legal foundation—federal rules that allow the military to serve outside of strictly military positions. This means they can serve basically anywhere, as you can imagine. You can have a military officer in the Ministry of Education, or a soldier in the Ministry of Construction or Agriculture, in specific cases. For me, this is what takes control over the military out of the hands of civilians. The military should be serving in essentially military positions.

We could question, for example, why we have military officers serving in a superior military court. Some may think they are needed there, that they can provide an important perspective in those cases, but we should have a civilian structure capable of handling anything that is not entirely military. That civilian structure becomes fractured when you allow the military to leave the barracks, leave their military functions, and take on civilian posts. During Bolsonaro’s government, we had military personnel spread across virtually every civilian and public position you could imagine, and this, in my view, is the biggest problem with civilian control.

As I said, this is about much more than simply changing the Minister of Defense and placing a civilian in charge. What we need is legal reform—legislation that clearly defines when, if ever, the military can leave their military functions for civilian roles. In my view, this is what should not be happening.

Crisis Moments Can Reinforce Judicial Trust

In your article on courts and democracy, you highlight how crises can paradoxically bolster judicial trust. Do you see Bolsonaro’s conviction producing a similar “crisis effect,” strengthening institutional legitimacy, or will it reinforce distrust among his base?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: That’s precisely correct. In my article, I analyzed this crisis effect during COVID. When the federal government opposed vaccination and isolation measures, the court said “no.” It emphasized the need to give autonomy to municipalities and states so they could decide on their own isolation measures—something Bolsonaro was completely against. In that moment, the court upheld the Constitution, even though this meant going against the president of Brazil during a crisis. This proved positive for the court, as the population sided with it for defending constitutional principles.

I think this could be precisely the case here. Right now, the population can—and, if I’m correct, will—recognize that even under strong pressure against the verdict, the court relied on constitutional guarantees to rule and to uphold the Constitution, despite street protests and pressure from Bolsonaro’s side. So, this crisis effect may well be unfolding again in the near future.

Bolsonaro’s Son Fueled Misinformation in the US

Supporters of Brazil’s former President (2019–2022) Jair Bolsonaro hold signs during a demonstration in São Paulo, Brazil, on September 7, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Trump has denounced Bolsonaro’s conviction, raised tariffs, and framed the trial as a parallel to his own legal troubles. How might this US intervention reshape Brazil’s democratic trajectory, and what does it reveal about transnational populist solidarity?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I’m not a specialist in American politics—I work mostly on Brazilian politics. Here is my personal opinion: there is a transnational solidarity among leaders who face similar situations, but in this specific case, there was enormous pressure from one of Bolsonaro’s sons, a federal deputy who now lives in the US. He was feeding false information to the US government, and because of this misinformation and the pressure to side with Bolsonaro, I think that was the main reason for the outcome—raising tariffs, public speeches against the Supreme Court in Brazil, punishing Supreme Court judges by revoking visas, etc. This congressman, who is irregular—not completing his functions in Congress and living in the US—was the major player in this huge mess surrounding the verdict.

Courts Must Remain Veto Players Against Populism

From a comparative perspective, what lessons does Brazil’s trial of a former president and generals offer for other democracies facing populist challenges, such as the US, Israel, Turkey, or Hungary?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: The best comparison we can make here is between Brazil, Turkey, and Hungary—I would add Israel as well, given the major reformulation of its judicial system. In those cases, the failure was in guaranteeing that the main body overseeing the Constitution had the independence it needed to do its job. When a populist comes and gradually cuts every possible check the court can exercise over the executive, step by step, by the time you need the court to act, it cannot do so anymore because it is no longer powerful, no longer a veto player. That is what happened in those three cases.

In Brazil, whenever Bolsonaro tried to impeach a judge or push measures that would curb the court, the court showed clearly that this was unconstitutional, not allowed, and it was able to rally popular support against such moves. In this way, the court managed to remain legitimate, even under heavy pressure. In the other countries, however, the curbing was gradual and consistent, to the point where it could no longer be reversed. And when the court was finally needed, it was no longer truly operational.

Brazil Shows How Judicial Independence Can Resist Populism

Bolsonaro’s rhetoric mirrors Trump’s in portraying judicial accountability as elite persecution. Do you see Brazil’s case as a model of democratic resilience, or does it risk setting a precedent where judicial overreach becomes a populist rallying cry?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: This is a question I don’t really have a clear answer for right now, because it will take time for us to understand. What I can say is that internationally, public attention has portrayed Brazil as doing what the US could not do, what the US Supreme Court could not do—that Brazil is a sign, an example of resilience. The main reason for this resilience, I will repeat myself, is that we were able to keep judicial independence throughout Bolsonaro’s tenure. He was not able to change the court in the way he intended, so the court remained independent. This is what we want to show to the world. We had a populist leader who tried attacking the court, but the court survived, and it was able to uphold the Constitution against him shortly thereafter. This is the precedent we want to set. Whether this will create a perception of, or a cry of, judicial overreach is too soon to say. It certainly can, and it probably will, but will that be stronger than the claim that the court was strong? I don’t think so.

And lastly, Dr. Da Cruz, in the US, Trump floated deploying the National Guard in major cities under the guise of “law and order.” From your research on Brazil’s bureaucratic militarization, what hidden agenda do you see behind such proposals—are they about restoring order, or normalizing military involvement in domestic politics?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I’m not an expert in American politics, so what I can say is about what happened in Brazil. The moment we saw those numbers of military bureaucratization growing was during the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro. From that intervention, the military received control over the police in Rio de Janeiro because of claims of drugs and crime, etc. That was something we could not stop anymore. Years later came Bolsonaro and his Minister of Defense, who had once been “the interventor” in Rio de Janeiro, so every military politician traces back to this intervention in the police in Rio de Janeiro that happened years before Bolsonaro’s tenure. When we decided to do this, it backfired against our democracy. So, this is what I can say: it is very problematic when you bring the military into issues and problems that are not meant for the military to handle.

Dr. Cristian Cantir is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Oakland University.

Assoc. Prof. Cantir: Moldova’s Election a Victory for EU, Defeat for Kremlin

by Editor’s ChoiceForeign PolicyHomeInterviewsMigration

In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Cristian Cantir (Oakland University) described Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections as “a major win for the European Union and a major defeat for the Kremlin.” Despite massive Russian interference—including vote-buying, cryptocurrency transfers, and efforts to incite unrest—Moldovan institutions responded with unprecedented consistency, demonstrating what Dr. Cantir calls a “confirmation of Moldova’s democratic resilience.” Yet, he warns that Moscow remains influential through populist narratives exploiting poverty and weak institutions. The results, he argues, reflect both the enduring popularity of EU integration and the failures of pro-Russian opposition parties. For Dr. Cantir, Moldova offers a striking example of how Russian influence faces diminishing returns when met with institutional strength and sustained Western support.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The outcome of Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections has been widely interpreted as a defining moment in the country’s European trajectory and its long struggle to resist Russian influence. In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Cristian Cantir, Associate Professor of Political Science at Oakland University, framed the results in stark geopolitical terms: “At a macro level, I would say this election represents a major win for the European Union and a major defeat for the Kremlin. I think it’s fair to frame it in those terms as a general way of understanding what happened.”

Dr. Cantir’s assessment reflects not only the electoral success of the pro-European Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), but also the broader resilience of Moldova’s democratic institutions in the face of Moscow’s sustained interference campaigns. International observers judged the elections to be generally free and fair, even amid bomb threats, electoral violations, and widespread attempts at corruption. As Dr. Cantir explains, this points to a “confirmation of Moldova’s democratic resilience,” if not yet full consolidation, as state institutions and law enforcement demonstrated an increased capacity to respond to hybrid threats.

Russia’s interference toolkit—long tested in Moldova—appeared less effective in this cycle. The Kremlin poured more resources into the effort, funding political actors, experimenting with cryptocurrency transfers, and attempting to stoke unrest. Yet, Dr. Cantir argues, these strategies delivered “diminishing returns” in a political environment where institutions had grown more proactive. “Moscow has been somewhat taken aback by the extent to which Moldovan institutions have now responded in such a consistent way to Russian interference,” he observes. The shift suggests that the Kremlin’s approach is increasingly constrained by its own reliance on disinformation and narratives fed by loyal pro-Russian politicians, which often fail to reflect the realities of Moldovan society. As Dr. Cantir notes, “some of the claims you see in Russian propaganda are so laughable and rudimentary… you wonder whether they actually believe them, because they don’t even work as propaganda.”

Still, Russia remains a formidable actor in Moldova’s domestic politics. Populist narratives that exploit socioeconomic hardship, corruption, and weak institutions continue to resonate with segments of the population, leaving Moldova’s pro-European course vulnerable to authoritarian retrenchment. Dr. Cantir highlights the need for PAS and other pro-EU forces to demonstrate tangible benefits of integration to disengaged citizens, warning that otherwise they may fall “much more easily to populist messaging” that is Eurosceptic and pro-Russian in nature.

Ultimately, the Moldovan case illustrates both the persistence and limitations of Russia’s hybrid influence operations in the post-Soviet space. Unlike Ukraine or Georgia, where Moscow has resorted to military force, Moldova demonstrates how resilience is possible when domestic institutions respond effectively and Western partners provide consistent support. As Dr. Cantir emphasizes, this election represents more than just a partisan victory—it is a symbolic moment of geopolitical realignment: a triumph for Europe, and a setback for the Kremlin.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Associate Professor Cristian Cantir, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Moldova’s Elections Confirm Democratic Resilience

A man casts his ballot during parliamentary elections in Moldova, in front of the national flag. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Cristian Cantir, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How would you characterize the broader significance of Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections, particularly in the light of the pro-European Action and Solidarity Party’s (PAS) ability to withstand unprecedented Russian interference campaigns? To what extent can this outcome be read as a genuine consolidation of Moldova’s democratic resilience, and to what degree is it contingent upon extraordinary external support from the EU and its allies?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: Thank you very much for inviting me. It’s a pleasure to be here, and I’m always glad to talk about Moldova—a topic that doesn’t usually get much attention in international affairs. At a macro level, I would say this election represents a major win for the European Union and a major defeat for the Kremlin. I think it’s fair to frame it in those terms as a general way of understanding what happened.

To the extent that it was generally a free and fair election, according to most international observers—even in the face of massive Russian interference—it was consistent with Moldova’s tradition of holding competitive elections since independence. I would take this as a positive sign of the relative health of Moldovan democracy. The process was conducted competently, with electoral authorities and law enforcement responding promptly to challenges, including bomb threats, reported violations, and instances of electoral corruption. From that standpoint, it serves as a solid example—not necessarily a consolidation, but certainly a confirmation—of Moldova’s democratic resilience. Of course, there remain significant challenges to Moldova’s democratic consolidation, but overall the outcome is good news for the country’s democracy.

I do think the election results can be partly attributed to external EU support, but it’s important to refine this point by highlighting one individual in particular—Moldovan President Maia Sandu. Sandu is a unique figure, not only in Moldova’s political history but also in the broader Central and Eastern European context. She has consistently been a popular, anti-corruption, reformist, pro-European leader. Many of the criticisms and attacks directed at her by the pro-Russian opposition have not gained much traction. She has remained highly popular within Moldova, due in part to her strong international reputation, especially among EU politicians. In this sense, when we talk about external influence, it is really a combination of two factors: Sandu’s personal popularity and the EU’s admiration for, and support of, her during this campaign. That said, I would not be so confident in giving the ruling party, PAS, too much credit for the victory. There remain fundamental issues with PAS as a pro-EU force, which we can also discuss further.

Moldovans Voted for Europe, Not PAS

Do the results primarily reflect a deepening consolidation of Moldova’s pro-European trajectory, or are they better understood as a rejection of entrenched pro-Russian elites such as Igor Dodon and his allies? In other words, should we interpret the outcome as an ideological commitment to Europe or as an electoral repudiation of discredited political actors?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: We could start by noting that EU integration is genuinely popular with a majority of the Moldovan population. Most polls confirm this, and even the 2024 referendum—though decided by a razor-thin margin—pointed to its broad appeal. That narrow margin can be attributed, at least in part, to vote-buying allegations and to the pro-Russian opposition framing the referendum as a judgment on PAS, the ruling party, rather than on the EU itself. Since PAS has become almost synonymous with the pro-EU position, this image has limited the viability of any other pro-European force. As a result, most pro-EU Moldovans voted for PAS, even if they were frustrated with the party’s slow response to major challenges such as poverty or judicial reform. To some extent, then, the outcome reflects support for EU integration combined with the absence of credible alternatives. Much of the vote was strategic: it did not necessarily indicate satisfaction with PAS as a party or with its performance, but rather the lack of any real choice.

The other parties in the election can also be faulted for failing to develop a narrative that offered a genuine alternative to PAS. Many claimed to support some degree of EU integration—even pro-Russian parties promised to negotiate more with Brussels. They tried to emphasize sovereignty and introduced socially conservative themes aimed at countering what they viewed as the EU’s liberal values. Yet this did not resonate with most Moldovans, as it came across as vague messaging—essentially, “we will slow down EU integration,” without explaining what that would mean or why it was necessary. By contrast, tangible benefits such as visa-free travel or lower roaming fees—everyday concerns tied directly to EU integration—proved far more compelling. As a result, the opposition’s alternative was unclear and largely reduced to a promise of “we are not the current political elites.”

The results, therefore, can be attributed both to the continuing popularity of the EU and to the weakness of the opposition leaders. Their campaigns were driven more by resentment of the ruling party and calls to “purge the system,” or what they called “the regime,” than by any proactive or positive electoral platform.

Moldovan President Maia Sandu speaks at a press conference following her meeting with Bulgarian President Rumen Radev in Chișinău, Moldova, on October 27, 2022. Photo: Dreamstime.

Diaspora Has Become the Backbone of Moldova’s Pro-EU Course

The Moldovan diaspora appears to have played a decisive role in shaping the electoral outcome. How should we understand the implications of this phenomenon for the transnationalization of Moldovan democracy, particularly regarding questions of sovereignty, external leverage, and the construction of a political community that extends well beyond national borders?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: The question of the Moldovan diaspora is particularly interesting, as it has been essential in consolidating Moldova’s pro-EU course, especially in recent years. Voting has also become much easier for diaspora members, particularly in Western countries, which is where most diaspora ballots are cast. As a result, the Moldovan diaspora is strongly pro-Western in its orientation—overwhelmingly so, judging by the last few elections.

With some exceptions, the Moldovan diaspora is relatively recent, with the first wave beginning in the 1990s. Attachments to the homeland remain very strong, and personal connections are still close. Travel has also become much easier—for example, low-cost airlines have made going back and forth far more accessible. And because most Moldovans abroad now reside legally, there is far less fear than in the 1990s and 2000s, when many migrated illegally or crossed borders without visas and were hesitant to return. For all these reasons, the diaspora’s ties to Moldova remain particularly strong.

The diaspora has not yet developed a separate identity; it remains very much rooted in Moldova. For example, if you visit Moldova in August, it is striking—you hear Moldovan children speaking with Portuguese accents in shops, and it becomes difficult to get a dentist appointment because so many diaspora members return home for treatment. This illustrates how deeply the diaspora remains part of Moldovan society. The ruling PAS, like other parties, has been very friendly and encouraging toward the diaspora. There are events organized exclusively for them, success stories highlighted in the media, and programs inviting them to return and share their experiences. There is also considerable gratitude for remittances, which have helped offset some of the country’s socioeconomic inequalities.

It is also important to remember that Moldovans’ understanding of sovereignty has always carried a transnational dimension. Many have looked to Romania for cultural and ethnic identity markers, while others have looked to Russia. As a result, Moldovans are more accustomed to hybrid and multiple identities. They can remain deeply connected both to the countries where they now live and to Moldovan politics—connections that are further strengthened by technology such as Facebook, online news, and live-streamed broadcasts.

The picture becomes more complicated when we look at the politicization of the diaspora, particularly by pro-Russian forces. Because the diaspora is strongly supportive of pro-Western groups, pro-Russian politicians have advanced a narrative—especially visible in recent years—that Moldovans inside the country oppose PAS, while those abroad support it. The argument is that Moldova’s diaspora is effectively holding those who remain at home hostage to the PAS regime. Pro-Russian groups have been trying to inflame tensions between these two communities. Igor Dodon, Moldova’s most prominent pro-Russian politician, has even described the diaspora as a “parallel electorate.” Another pro-Russian politician, Irina Vlah, has pursued what can only be described as an unusual campaign, promoting narratives such as asking Moldovans to “adopt” a fellow citizen inside the country who is suffering under the pro-EU PAS. I would not be surprised if such narratives continue to spread and further deepen tensions between diaspora communities and Moldovans still at home.

Finally, one more point: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its interference in Moldovan politics has highlighted an unresolved issue concerning the Moldovan diaspora in Russia. Estimates of the diaspora there range from about 100,000 to several hundred thousand people. Because of Russian interference, Moldovan authorities have opened only a minimal number of polling stations, most of them in Moscow. Given the vast size of Russia, this makes it much more difficult for Moldovans living there to cast their ballots. Authorities argue that this limitation is necessary to ensure ballot security, but it leaves unresolved the broader problem of how to guarantee equal voting rights for all members of the diaspora, regardless of where they reside. This remains a pressing question that Moldovan politicians will eventually have to address, even though, for now, it has been overshadowed by Russia’s interference.

Former Moldovan President Igor Dodon attends a Party of Socialists meeting in Bălți, Moldova, on October 17, 2021. Photo: Iuri Gagarin.

Low Turnout Makes Moldova Vulnerable to Populist Messaging

With voter turnout just above 50%, what does the relative disengagement of a significant portion of the electorate reveal about the legitimacy and durability of PAS’s mandate? To what extent does persistent electoral apathy constrain the prospects for long-term democratic consolidation and weaken the societal foundations of Moldova’s pro-European orientation?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: I want to make a quick statistical note first. The 2024 Moldovan Census identified about 2.3 to 2.4 million Moldovans in the country with stable residency. Meanwhile, the electoral rolls from the Central Electoral Commission list close to 300,000 Moldovans abroad, which doesn’t quite capture reality. In fact, there are many more Moldovans who still hold residency but live or work abroad. This makes turnout somewhat harder to assess in Moldova, given the fragmented data we have.

That said, the general premise of the question still holds, because the turnout percentage does indicate a degree of disengagement. This poses a problem for PAS and for Moldova’s pro-European orientation. People who are disengaged—who don’t feel invested in Moldova’s pro-EU path or don’t perceive clear benefits from EU integration—are much more susceptible to populist messaging. In Moldova, such messaging tends to be Eurosceptic and pro-Russian. As a result, these citizens may be more easily mobilized by populist politicians, giving those actors greater institutional power to undermine EU integration.

For this reason, demonstrating the tangible benefits of EU integration to more apathetic groups should be a key part of PAS’s strategy. Otherwise, we may see rising support for populist politicians. A few have already begun to gain visibility—there are two in particular I could highlight—but the broader risk of growing populist appeal is certainly there.

Russia May Be Falling Victim to Its Own Propaganda in Moldova

Observers have described Moldova as a “laboratory” for Russia’s hybrid interference strategies. In your assessment, what does the 2025 electoral cycle reveal about both the adaptive capacities and structural limitations of Moscow’s toolkit of influence? Can we speak of a paradigmatic shift in the Kremlin’s approach, or are we witnessing the persistence of familiar strategies with diminishing returns?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: That’s a really good question. The simplest answer is that we don’t know yet, and there’s a reason for that. The 2025 election was marked by greater intensity and a wider range of Kremlin interference efforts. They invested more money, backed more political actors, and became more involved in attempts to stoke violence and protests. Yet none of these efforts proved particularly effective.

There are a couple of points to keep in mind here. First of all, Moldovan law enforcement and the broader institutional response have become more active, dealing more effectively—even compared to 2024—with clear cases of electoral interference. This included vote buying, the use of cryptocurrency to transfer funds, and the use of cash for illegal financing. Another important factor in understanding the Kremlin’s difficulties in Moldova is that, for a long time, Russia had grown accustomed to acting with relative impunity there. Even when pro-European or centrist coalitions were in power, Moldovan institutions and politicians were rarely proactive in curbing Russian influence. At best, they ignored Moscow’s efforts; at worst, pro-Russian politicians openly reinforced them. I think Moscow has been somewhat taken aback by the consistency with which Moldovan institutions have now responded to Russian interference.

So, I don’t know if we are going to see a full shift in the Kremlin’s approach, but I do think there is more re-evaluation and discussion about how it might adjust its strategies. One additional point is that the Kremlin actually knows a great deal about Moldova—more so than many in the West. The problem, however, is that it continues to rely heavily on information fed by pro-Russian politicians, who often promote narratives that are simply inaccurate. For example, the claim by some pro-Russian groups that EU integration is not popular in Moldova is simply not true. It’s difficult to tell whether the Kremlin and its allies are falling victim to their own narratives, which distort their understanding of Moldovan dynamics and render their strategies less effective. That’s something I’ve often thought about, because some of the claims you see in Russian propaganda are so laughable and rudimentary. You start to wonder whether they actually believe them, since they don’t even work effectively as propaganda. That’s how rudimentary they are.

Pro-Russian supporters attend Victory Day celebrations on May 9 in Chișinău, Moldova. Alongside World War II veterans displaying their medals, members of the public dressed in Soviet-era military uniforms highlighted the enduring strength of Russian influence. Photo: Dreamstime.

Moldova Now Frames Itself as Belonging in Europe

In the light of your previous work on Moldova’s foreign policy balancing, how would you assess Chisinau’s current capacity to resist Moscow’s strategies of destabilization, particularly given Russia’s reliance on authoritarian-style tactics such as elite capture, patronage networks, and the exploitation of populist narratives?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: When it comes to balancing, we’ve seen a noticeable shift. The perception of the EU as a counterbalance to Russia—once more prominent among pro-Russian or centrist groups—was grounded in the idea that Moldova should extract benefits from all its major geopolitical partners. That view has given way to a more cultural and identity-based argument. The ruling pro-European group now frames Moldova as inherently European, emphasizing that the country “belongs in Europe” and should “go home” to Europe.

As a result, the EU is now articulated less as a strategic tool for Moldova’s foreign policy goals and more as a natural place of belonging for Moldovans. Pro-Russian parties still advance the balancing argument, but it has been severely undermined by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. They have not substantially re-evaluated or adjusted their rhetoric since then, but the post-2022 context is fundamentally different. Thus, the balancing argument no longer carries the same weight. While it still registers some support in polling data, it is far less compelling from a political standpoint.

With respect to elite capture, the Kremlin is beginning to understand that Moldovan institutions are responding more coherently to Russian threats. Some of its old patronage networks or elite-capture strategies are not working as effectively because Moldovan law enforcement is pushing back. One example of this would be Russia’s attempts to infiltrate Moldovan politics or encourage spying, which the Moldovan Secret Service has been more proactive in addressing. I’m not sure how the Kremlin will deal with this particular problem.

That said, the Kremlin still retains significant power when it comes to the populist narratives, and the vulnerabilities they exploit. Given Moldova’s socioeconomic issues, including high rates of poverty, these vulnerabilities can be easily leveraged by populist politicians, and consequently by pro-Kremlin groups as well.

Odessa Looms Large in Moldova’s Strategic Calculus

What does the Moldovan case tell us about Russia’s evolving approach to influence operations in the post-Soviet space, especially compared to its tactics in Ukraine or Georgia?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: One of the key differences between Ukraine and Georgia is that, where Russia lacks either the ability or the immediate interest to engage in military action—as opposed to what it is doing in Ukraine or what it did in Georgia—its influence operations become less effective when faced with strong institutional responses and consistent support from Moldova’s allies. Because direct military threats are not immediate, Moldova has more space to resist Russian influence.

This dynamic is often reflected in discussions by Moldovan politicians about Odessa. Odessa looms large in Moldovan politics, because if the city were to fall, the strategic calculus would change significantly. If Odessa does not fall, and if Ukraine continues to resist the Russian army in southern Ukraine and around Odessa specifically, it will be considerably easier for Moldova to counter influence operations without the constant pressure of an imminent military threat.

Hybrid Warfare Is a Transnational Problem—It Requires a Transnational Response

Russian military expert at a government operations base, engaged in cyber activities aimed at spreading disinformation and hybrid warfare propaganda. Photo: Dragos Condrea.

How sustainable is Moldova’s reliance on Western partners for countering hybrid threats, given the country’s domestic vulnerabilities such as corruption, weak institutions, and economic hardship?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: That’s a good point. Ideally, you would want a sovereign state with strong institutions, fewer socioeconomic problems, and a consistent fight against corruption. That would give it the capacity to resist Russian influence more effectively without significant outside support. The European Union also needs to focus on those factors—tackling corruption, strengthening institutions, and addressing economic hardship.

At the same time, Moldova’s reliance on Western partners to counter Russian hybrid warfare is unavoidable, because this is not only Moldova’s problem. To the extent that it is a transnational challenge, it requires a transnational and coordinated response. Moldova cannot and should not handle this alone. Long-term, institutionalized cooperation with the EU is essential—both because Russian hybrid attacks extend beyond Moldova and because Moldova’s own capacities remain limited. Even if Moldova had strong governance and robust institutions, it would still need to work closely with the European Union to meet this particular threat.

Polarization in Moldova Is Fluid, Not Fixed

How realistic is Moldova’s aim to achieve EU accession by 2030, given both the demanding structural reforms and potential geopolitical vetoes within the Union, and in what ways might deep internal polarization between pro-European and pro-Russian constituencies undermine the legitimacy of this process by opening space for populist mobilization and authoritarian retrenchment?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: Internal geopolitical polarization is a serious problem in Moldova, but it is also important to remember that polarization is a fluid phenomenon. Polling, for instance, used to show much stronger support for integration with Russian projects even 10 or 20 years ago, and much less support for NATO membership. This shows that polarization can shift over time.

The strategy of Moldovan authorities has been to make a compelling economic, or quality-of-life, case for EU integration, even in regions where the political dimension of integration is less popular. In places like Gagauzia and parts of northern Moldova, the aim is to erode polarization by demonstrating the tangible economic benefits of closer ties with the EU. If successful, this could help offset some of the effects of geopolitical polarization by easing tensions.

So, the biggest question isn’t really polarization, but whether pro-EU forces can articulate and illustrate the benefits of EU integration clearly to more people, including those in pro-Russian propaganda bubbles. To a large extent, integration by 2030 is driven more by the speed with which Moldovan authorities can enact reforms, by developments in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and also by the situation in Transnistria—which we can talk about—and what exactly Moldovan authorities are going to do with that separatist region.

The Cyprus Model Is a Real Option for Moldova

Monument to Vladimir Lenin in front of the Parliament building in Tiraspol, Transnistria, Moldova. Photo: Dreamstime.

Given the persistence of Russian troops in Transnistria, how does the unresolved status of the region constrain Moldova’s European ambitions and its sovereignty more broadly?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: The number of Russian troops in Transnistria isn’t sufficient to threaten Moldova’s European ambitions or its sovereignty. Greater risks could come from a hypothetical mobilization of a large part of the Transnistrian population during a potential conflict, but that scenario carries its own difficulties. Nor does the Russian military presence pose an immediate threat to sovereignty in the sense that Moldova is able to control most of its territory fairly effectively, aside from Transnistria. In that respect, it is not an urgent danger.

The war in Ukraine has also constrained Transnistria’s potentially aggressive orientation, or even its foreign policy toward Ukraine, Moldova, and the EU more broadly. Within Moldova, there is a growing sense that EU integration must move forward and can happen without Transnistria. Moldovan authorities have explicitly stated that it is possible for Moldova to join the EU first, using the Cyprus model. Cyprus is a common example cited by Moldovan officials and has even been echoed by former EU leaders. José Manuel Barroso, for instance, recently affirmed that the Cyprus model is indeed a possibility for Moldova.

At this stage, Chișinău does not view Transnistria as an obstacle to EU integration. Instead, it argues that pre-integration measures demonstrating the economic benefits of EU membership will gradually draw Transnistria closer. If necessary, Moldova can join the EU without Transnistria and then work toward integrating the region into the Union over the longer term.

Populists Give Moscow Veto Power over Moldova’s EU Path

Lastly, Professor Cantir, what scenarios do you consider most plausible for the future of the Transnistria conflict: gradual reintegration under EU auspices, continued limbo, or renewed escalation tied to Russia’s strategic setbacks in Ukraine? And in any of these scenarios, how might populist or authoritarian actors instrumentalize the issue domestically to challenge Moldova’s European orientation? 

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: The most important point to note—the elephant in the room—is that everything depends on how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unfolds. If Ukraine manages to resist in the south and hold Odessa, then what we are most likely to see, at least in the short term, is the maintenance of the status quo. The EU would continue efforts to trade with, develop, and engage local organizations in Transnistria—essentially trying to connect the region more closely to Europe, with the long-term goal of gradual reintegration. That will be the general orientation, or at least the attempt, always contingent on developments in Ukraine and particularly in Odessa.

When it comes to the question of populist or authoritarian actors instrumentalizing the issue, one of the biggest patterns to watch in the next few years in Moldova is how they frame the argument about the Cyprus model. PAS has argued that Moldova can join the EU without Transnistria first. By contrast, many other actors—including pro-Russian politicians in the Patriotic Bloc, the largest opposition group in Parliament, as well as Alternativa, a centrist, self-defined pro-EU bloc—have insisted that Moldova must not enter the EU without Transnistria. In effect, this position grants Transnistria—and, to some extent, Moscow—veto power over Moldova’s EU integration aspirations.

So, populist politicians and authoritarian actors in Moldova will seek to instrumentalize the Transnistria issue by insisting that the country must not—and cannot—join the EU without first resolving the conflict. This, of course, significantly prolongs the timeline and effectively ties Moldova’s European integration to Moscow’s willingness to settle the dispute.

Memorial for Charlie Kirk outside Turning Point USA Headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona, on September 13, 2025, following his fatal shooting while speaking at Utah Valley University in Orem, Utah. Photo: Dreamstime.

From the Tea Party to MAGA – How White Christian Nationalism Is Taking Control of the US

by AuthoritarianismCommentariesEditor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHome

In this commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias traces the rise of white Christian nationalism from Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” and Reagan’s Moral Majority to the Tea Party and today’s MAGA movement. He argues that what appears as grassroots populism is, in fact, a carefully engineered project to transform fringe radicalism into a national force. Electoral restrictions, demographic anxieties, and evangelical mobilization have converged to produce a politics that is ever more exclusionary, authoritarian, and puritanical. Dr. Dias asks: Is MAGA truly the majority, or is it the triumph of minority rule through strategic manipulation?

By João Ferreira Dias

The Charlie Kirk Memorial was a turning point in the American ideological trajectory for the next decade, leaving the US in a state of social fracture only comparable to the civil rights era and the Vietnam War. We are witnessing the “great awakening” of nationalist evangelism, reminiscent of the peak of that authoritarian fusion between evangelical Christianity and political power in the 1930s, so vividly portrayed in the Perry Mason television series.

Indeed, Jason Stanley (2018) argued early on that Donald Trump revived the 1930s, precisely the period when fascist ideals were in vogue in the United States, with the cult of the “nation” and the strong leader, moral panic, and pamphleteering attacks against minorities and immigrants, as well as the cult of radically conservative religious values.

But is the MAGA movement truly a majority in the US, or are we witnessing a power grab by a minority through carefully engineered political strategy, with Trump serving merely as its face?

From a sociological perspective, there are clear demographic, cultural, and political changes fueling a socio-economic panic over the loss of social status—what Barbara Ehrenreich (1989) called the “fear of falling.” This has led to radicalization around ethnonationalist values, broadly classified in Political Science as nativism (see Art, 2022; Betz, 2019, 2017).

Nowhere has this shift been more evident than in the US, with a well-identified turning point: the civil rights movement, which transformed the Republican Party into what one of its strategists, Stuart Stevens, called the “de facto white party,”its key base being Southern whites, historically Democrats.

Richard Nixon and later Ronald Reagan capitalized on the Southern white vote with the rhetoric of “law and order.”Reagan went further by adding a Christian dimension to the white front, giving rise to the Moral Majority. From then on, the Republican Party was captured by what Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (2024) call the “racially conservative base,” responding to demographic changes in the US from the 20th to the 21st century, as the white population fell to just 58% by 2020 and the proportion of non-white members of Congress quadrupled. A new racial order emerged in America, and the white majority entered into demographic and social panic, exacerbated by progressive shifts in American society.

With non-white Americans voting in growing numbers, Black voter turnout surpassed white turnout for the first time in US history in 2012. Faced with these profound changes, the Republican Party had two options: change its rhetoric/strategy or change the electoral map. It chose the latter. This was done through state-level legislative changes, such as requiring photo ID to vote, disproportionately affecting poor, Black, and Latino citizens—Blacks are twice as likely and Latinos three times as likely not to have photo identification. In Kentucky, Virginia, and Florida, those with a criminal record cannot vote, a maneuver that once again disproportionately impacts racial minorities, in a country marked by racialized incarceration and sentencing disparities. Additionally, attempts were made to pass laws shortening early voting and preventing election extensions in cases of long lines—measures struck down in court for deliberately targeting the African-American electorate.

Yet restrictions continued, with seven of the eleven states with majority African-American electorates and twelve states with majority Hispanic electorates adopting mechanisms that effectively disenfranchised these populations.

Amid demographic change, the Republican Party skillfully read and instrumentalized the fears of a shrinking white population. Many whites interpreted these demographic shifts, combined with changes in the social pyramid, as a threat. A 2015 poll found that 72% of white evangelicals believed America had changed for the worse since the 1960s, alongside another poll showing a growing perception of “anti-white prejudice.”

It was in this context that the Tea Party (Formisano, 2012) — a reactionary movement of mostly middle-aged white evangelicals — emerged in 2009 after Obama’s election, spreading quickly under the slogan of “taking the country back.” The old social order of Jim Crow laws (Tischauser, 2012) was remembered with nostalgia. The Tea Party’s social impact was crucial in shaping the MAGA movement, decisively rooting white Christian nationalism as a core identity marker of Republican politics in America.

Therefore, the answer to the question posed in this text is clear: we are witnessing an electoral and political engineering process that has transformed radicalized fringe electorates into a national electoral force, steering the country toward white Christian nationalism—ever more exclusionary, ever more puritanical, ever more authoritarian.

 

References

Art, D. (2022). “The myth of global populism.” Perspectives on Politics, 20(3), 999-1011.

Betz, H. G. (2019). “Facets of nativism: a heuristic exploration.” Patterns of Prejudice, 53(2), 111-135.

Betz, H. G. (2017). “Nativism across time and space.” Swiss Political Science Review, 23(4), 335-353.

Ehrenreich, B. (1989). Fear of falling: The inner life of the middle class. New York: Pantheon Books.

Formisano, R. P. (2012). The Tea Party: a brief history. JHU Press.

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2024). Tyranny of the minority: Why American democracy reached the breaking point. Random House.

Stanley, J. (2018). How fascism works: The politics of us and them. Random House Trade Paperbacks.

Tischauser, L. V. (2012). Jim crow laws. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma is a researcher in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Sydney and sessional academic at the University of Tasmania, Australia.

Dr. Bishwakarma: Nepal’s Uprising Has Shaken Institutions, Not Transformed Them

by AuthoritarianismDigital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Mom Bishwakarma reflects on Nepal’s September 2025 uprising, widely described as a Gen Z revolution. While youth mobilization toppled a government and ignited debates on corruption and “Nepo baby” privilege, Dr. Bishwakarma warns that deeper inequalities remain untouched. “Basically, we can say this has brought some destruction to political institutions, but not real change,” he stresses. Despite promises of inclusion in the 2015 constitution, caste discrimination and elite dominance persist, leaving Dalits marginalized. Drawing parallels with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, he cautions that without dismantling entrenched structures, Nepal risks repeating cycles of revolt and disappointment rather than achieving a genuine democratic transformation.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The September 2025 youth-led uprising in Nepal, widely framed as a Gen Z revolution, has generated global debate about the prospects for democratic renewal in post-conflict societies marked by entrenched inequality and elite capture. To probe the deeper social and political implications of this moment, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Dr. Mom Bishwakarma, researcher in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Sydney and sessional academic at the University of Tasmania, Australia. A specialist on caste politics and Dalit struggles for justice, Dr. Bishwakarma situates the uprising within Nepal’s broader trajectory of populist-authoritarian bargains and incomplete democratic transformation.

At the heart of the movement, he explains, was not caste or identity politics but a narrowly defined resistance against corruption and “Nepo baby” privilege. As he notes, “To be honest, it has not really addressed the issue of caste inequalities… Instead, they were primarily resisting forms of ‘Nepo baby’ privilege and the elitism of the ruling class.”This narrow focus, centered especially on the government’s attempt to ban social media, created mobilization energy but left deeper structures of inequality intact.

Digital platforms played a pivotal role, enabling new forms of youth subjectivity while simultaneously constraining the scope of protest. “Youth use social media as a means of organization and as a medium to express discontent against various problems,” Dr. Bishwakarma observes, yet he underscores the limits of such digitally mediated politics in a semi-feudal society where caste discrimination remains pervasive. For Dalit youth in particular, visibility remained minimal: “We can’t see even a single person leading the Gen Z movement… This means that the protest was not specifically raising the issue of caste inequalities or other forms of discrimination in Nepal.”

The uprising also revealed the fragility of Nepal’s federal constitutional order. Despite provisions for inclusion, everyday discrimination remains widespread, with law enforcement institutions often biased and ineffective. For Dr. Bishwakarma, this gap underscores a sobering conclusion: “One legal provision alone does not guarantee rights, nor does it prevent the persistence of discrimination nationwide.”

Above all, he stresses that the uprising has not yielded the systemic change many anticipated. “Basically, we can say this has brought some destruction to political institutions, but not real change. People were expecting deeper reform, but this political outcome has not been delivered. I am not very hopeful that it will bring the transformation the country needs.”

Drawing parallels with Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya and Bangladesh’s 2024 uprising, Dr. Bishwakarma warns that Nepal too risks sliding into cycles of disappointment unless its youth movements move beyond symbolic anti-elite populism toward a deeper confrontation with caste, inequality, and authoritarian legacies.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Mom Bishwakarma, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

The Uprising Changed the Government, But Not the System

Photo: Dreamstime.

Dr. Bishwakarma, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Analysts frame the September 2025 uprising as a Gen Z revolution. From your perspective, how did entrenched caste-based inequalities and elite hegemony intersect with rising youth discontent to generate this rupture? And to what extent should we interpret this upheaval as a repudiation of Nepal’s long-standing populist-authoritarian bargains between ruling elites and marginalized publics?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Thank you so much for this opportunity. Of course, we have to look at the recent political uprising in Nepal from different perspectives. From the point of view of caste inequality, this movement could certainly have done much more. To be honest, it has not really addressed the issue of caste inequalities. Basically, Gen Z started this movement against corruption and against any form of elite hegemony in Nepal’s ruling system. In that sense, it was broadly against discrimination, but more specifically it focused on corruption and on the government’s attempt to ban social media.

In this regard, I should say that caste issues have not been central to the Gen Z movement, and they have not been explicitly addressed. I know this is a very difficult and important issue in Nepal, but at this stage Gen Z could not directly confront caste inequalities. Instead, they were primarily resisting forms of “Nepo baby” privilege and the elitism of the ruling class. As a result, the movement did not specifically take up the concerns of marginalized communities. So, I would conclude that the uprising was not directed against caste discrimination or other forms of discrimination per se. It was mainly targeting corruption in Nepal.

Much of the mobilization was digital and youth-led. How do you interpret the relationship between Nepal’s semi-feudal social order and the emergence of digitally mediated political subjectivities among Gen Z, particularly in light of global debates on how new media both enables and disciplines democratic dissent?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Looking at Nepal’s recent development process, social media has been one of the areas where there has been massive change — a significant digital transformation, we might say. Basically, access to phones and social media has been a really important shift. That is the main reason why Gen Z became affiliated with each other in different groups, formed associations, and started creating resistance against corruption and other issues.

But looking at society itself, Nepal is still semi-feudal, with persistent discrimination and many challenges yet to be addressed. Digitalization, moreover, has not penetrated rural areas or many other parts of society. So yes, young people are very comfortable with social media, and they are using this tool to raise issues and push for change. Essentially, youth use social media as a means of organization and as a medium to express discontent against various problems. However, they have not fully engaged with the deeper social issues or the root causes behind them. They could have raised concerns about caste inequalities, other forms of inequality, poverty, underdevelopment, or unemployment — all of which would have been valuable. Instead, they focused mainly on two issues: corruption and the government’s attempt to ban social media.

This narrow focus has not created a real chance for broader change in Nepal, nor has it produced significant transformation in other areas. Yes, of course, the uprising changed the government, but at the end of the day, we are not seeing the outcomes that many people in Nepal were hoping for or expecting.

Nepo Babies Have Been Resisted, But Caste Discrimination Has Been Left Untouched

The discourse against “nepo kids” suggests a moral economy of resentment. Do you see this as a continuation of older struggles against caste privilege and elite reproduction, or as a qualitatively new form of digitally amplified populist class politics rooted in spectacle and affect?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: This Nepo babies movement is essentially rooted in social media. Of course, it stands against any form of elite hegemony in the country, but it is not directly addressing the issue of caste discrimination. We can see that in the leadership of the Gen Z movement, not many youths from so-called marginalized or lower-caste groups are represented. They are not in leadership positions, nor are they given that opportunity.

Many young people from different classes and communities may have joined the resistance, but they remain outside leadership roles. So, in essence, this is more of a symbolic resistance against elite hegemony or authoritarian governance, rather than a movement that specifically addresses caste or other marginalized groups. It is, in effect, resistance against political leaders, Nepo babies, and elite authoritarianism in Nepal.

With symbols of state power set ablaze, some argue the uprising reflected anarchic nihilism, while others see a democratic re-founding. Do you interpret this as a destructive rejection of institutions, or as the embryonic formation of what might be called a post-elitist and post-authoritarian democratic imagination?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: We have to look at this from two perspectives. Yes, of course, we can see it as post-elitist, or an anti-elitist movement, and there is a reimagining of a new democratic process in Nepal. But the way it has unfolded in the political system, particularly after the uprising and the formation of the interim government, shows that they are still working within the current constitution, and there has not been much change in the governance system.

Gen Z demanded a directly elected prime minister or a directly elected president, reforms in the electoral system, and strict action against corrupt political parties, but not much of this is happening. After the uprising, an interim government was formed, led by the former Chief Justice and other independent leaders who are very well known in the country, but they are still operating under the articles of the existing Constitution. This means there has been no suspension of the Constitution.

There is no guarantee of a directly elected prime minister or president. There is no guarantee of a new electoral process that would ensure representation of all communities, including marginalized groups. In other words, there has not been a real outcome from this process. So, basically, we can say this has brought some destruction to political institutions, but not real change. People were expecting deeper reform, but this political outcome has not been delivered. I am not very hopeful that it will bring the transformation the country needs.

What Nepal Needs Is Total Reformation, Not Symbolic Change

A Nepali farmer at work in a rural field during the monsoon season. As the rains arrive, farmers across Nepal become busy in their fields, though most still rely on traditional farming techniques. Photo: Shishir Gautam.

Your book stresses the twin imperatives of redistribution and recognition in the struggle for Dalit justice. Do you see Nepal’s Gen Z revolution as embodying these imperatives—or does its populist anger risk collapsing recognition into resentment and redistribution into vague anti-elitist rhetoric?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Thank you for this question as well. I would again like to emphasize that, yes, we are expecting much more change, deeper change, or reformation. As I stated in my book, to address the issues of Dalit and other marginalized groups in Nepal, there must be total reformation — both redistribution of state resources and recognition of communities like the Dalits in Nepal. But after this youth-led or Generation Z-led uprising, we are still not seeing much redistribution, nor is total reformation likely to happen in the country.

This means there is still a great deal to be done, even though the Constitution of Nepal in 2015 addressed a wide range of issues — for example, social inclusion, the republican system, and different forms of governance, such as local, federal, and state government. Many things were introduced with that new constitution, but there has not been real change regarding caste discrimination and other forms of exclusion.

Young people, in particular, are looking for rapid change and fast development in Nepal, which has not materialized, either after 2015 or, if we look back further, after 2006, when the republican system was introduced in 2008. People expected much more meaningful change so that there would be development, opportunities, and inclusion. Yes, there was some symbolic inclusion in Parliament and in other mechanisms — Dalits and other marginalized groups were included, as were women and other communities — but in rural areas, ordinary people did not feel the impact.

There has continued to be high unemployment and high corruption. So, from that perspective, yes, there is still much to be done in Nepal, and what is needed is total reformation rather than symbolic change. This particular uprising is indeed a revolt or resistance against elite authoritarianism, but it is not producing meaningful change, nor is it bringing about the kind of total reformation Nepal needs.

Despite legal prohibitions, everyday caste discrimination persists. To what degree do Gen Z protests transcend entrenched caste boundaries, and how do you assess whether Dalit youth achieved disproportionate visibility—or conversely remained marginal—in this anti-authoritarian mobilization?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Thank you so much for this very good question. As I stated before, Dalits once again seemed to be marginalized in this process, because we can’t see even a single person leading the Gen Z movement. If you look at the composition of Gen Z leaders, I don’t see any Dalit in that position. Of course, there were a couple of people killed during the protest, and there are other incidents as well, but in terms of leadership, I can’t see any Dalit member included in that process. This means that the protest was not specifically raising the issue of caste inequalities or other forms of discrimination in Nepal. It was more focused on anti-corruption and the ban on social media. Yes, of course, that is really important for the development of the nation, but when it comes to issues like caste inequalities, other forms of discrimination, and many broader social concerns, they have not really been addressed at this stage. That’s why I am again saying that, in the case of caste and other forms of discrimination, we need another form of revolt or resistance that truly addresses the issue of caste, so that there will be no discrimination, and marginalized communities will have more opportunities and be able to develop in Nepal.

Without Effective Mechanisms, Discrimination Persists Nationwide

Federal restructuring and the 2015 constitution promised inclusive representation, yet inequalities remain deeply institutionalized. Did the 2025 uprising expose the limitations of Nepal’s federalism as a tool for substantive equality, or was it more a populist indictment of the state’s moral legitimacy?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: I’ve already mentioned this issue before, but I would like to emphasize again that, yes, the 2015 Constitution specifically addressed social inclusion. Because of that constitution, there is representation of marginalized groups, including Dalits, women, and other ethnic communities, in Parliament as well as in local and state government. But it has not directly addressed caste inequalities or everyday discrimination.

Discrimination remains widespread across the country. The government’s law enforcement mechanisms are either ineffective or deeply biased, which is why existing laws are not being properly implemented. Yes, there is legislation against caste-based discrimination — an act from 2000 that was enforced after 2011 — and the 2015 Constitution also clearly states that caste discrimination is illegal.

There are rights on paper for Dalits and other marginalized communities, but one legal provision alone does not guarantee those rights, nor does it prevent the persistence of discrimination nationwide. What is needed is an effective implementation mechanism, such as police and administrative institutions, that take the issue of discrimination seriously. At the moment, such mechanisms are absent, and there is also a lack of Dalit representation within law enforcement itself. This creates a vacuum and leaves little hope for people, especially those from lower-caste and Dalit communities in Nepal.

Critics warn that anti-corruption and anti-nepotism discourses can be easily co-opted by authoritarian populists who claim to “purify” politics while entrenching new hierarchies. Do you see parallels between the risks inherent in caste-based identity mobilization and the dangers of these new anti-elite narratives?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Of course, I agree with that point, because this present youth uprising, or Gen Z movement, is against elite authoritarian government systems and the leaders who were running the government in Nepal. But there is always the issue of caste identity and representation. Most of the leaders of the Gen Z movement are again from higher castes, and there are not many Dalits or other marginalized groups included in leading positions or processes. This clearly shows that caste inequality and caste identity have not been specifically addressed through this uprising, even though they could have been. The core issues of the movement were essentially anti-corruption and opposition to the social media ban. This means they did not give much attention to other social problems, such as caste discrimination, unemployment, and broader structural inequalities. That is why there is always a risk: if the youth and others involved in such movements do not fully understand Nepal’s social fabric, history, and the deeper changes needed, their mobilization risks remaining superficial.

Another point I want to emphasize is that, even though these young people are driven by social media and digital transformation, their mindset is still shaped by their families, parents, and society. Many come from elite backgrounds and continue to enjoy caste privilege. That is the real risk and danger. It means that, in the future, even if they come to power — whether as ministers or prime ministers — they are unlikely to directly address caste discrimination or other forms of marginalization. That remains a serious danger in Nepal’s current context.

People Expected Faster Progress on Corruption and Development

Many Nepali citizens join Gen Z–led protests in Bhojpur, Nepal on September 9, 2025, showing solidarity with nationwide demonstrations. Photo: Dipesh Rai.

Nepal’s Maoist insurgency once mobilized Dalits and marginalized groups in large numbers, but its legacy was one of institutional capture and elite circulation. How do today’s youth movements relate to—or explicitly repudiate—this Maoist populist-authoritarian inheritance?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Many people now view the Maoist revolt as another form of elite authoritarian process, and in that sense, it did not fulfill expectations. But we also need to look at it from a historical perspective. Nepal was then ruled by a king, opportunities were very limited, and although there was democracy, there was little real progress and no meaningful inclusion. After the Maoist movement, however, many things did change.

For example, the issue of inclusion was strongly raised, and afterward a new constitution was promulgated. That constitution guaranteed social inclusion, secularism, and a republican federal system in the country. Still, these gains did not translate into substantial improvements on the ground. Change was happening, but people were expecting much faster progress in addressing corruption, unemployment, and development. Corruption, in particular, was a major issue, and while the Maoists attempted to address it when they came to power, they ultimately fell short.

This led to political shifts. The main parties, like the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML, came together, formed a coalition, and removed the Maoists from power. So elite resistance was strong. At the same time, many argued that the Maoists themselves had become elitist, were involved in corruption, and failed to deliver real change. That became a major criticism of the Maoist Party.

Another structural issue was the electoral system. The Maoists favored a full proportional system, but the 2015 political settlement established a first-past-the-post system. This system made it almost impossible for any single party to win a full majority, leading to frequent coalition governments and instability. That is also why the recent youth uprising demanded reforms: a directly elected prime minister or president, a different electoral system, and a state-funded electoral process.

But even after this uprising, none of these demands have materialized. With Parliament dissolved, constitutional amendments cannot move forward. We now have to wait and see what the interim government does. One of its mandates is simply to hold another election. After that, we will see whether a single party can secure a majority, or whether a youth-led party will emerge and participate in the elections. These are the developments we will need to watch in the future.

Dalit Politics Requires Both Recognition and Redistribution

Your scholarship emphasizes Dalit demands for recognition alongside material redistribution. Do you think the revolutionary anger of Gen Z risks dissolving such group-specific claims into a homogenized “anti-elite” populism that reproduces old exclusions under new slogans?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: While doing my research, I argued for two key points. First, for Dalit communities in Nepal, there must be total reformation and recognition of the Dalit community. Within the Dalit community itself, there are many different groups, and there is not much unity. To bring them together around their common concerns, there should be recognized group politics. That is why I argued that group politics for the Dalit community should be formally acknowledged by political parties and state institutions.

The second point is redistribution — the redistribution of state resources and state positions, including, for example, land reform and other measures. But even the 2015 Constitution of Nepal did not truly address either redistribution or recognition. Yes, to some extent it recognized Dalit issues, but only superficially.

In terms of representation, because the constitution did not establish a fully proportional electoral system, there is no guarantee of 13% representation for the Dalit community, even though Dalits make up around 13% of the population. In this sense, I always argue that there must be total reformation — one that meaningfully addresses caste discrimination, lack of representation, unemployment, poverty, and related issues. The 2015 Constitution addressed some of these concerns only partially.

The recent uprising and the new process have not specifically addressed caste inequalities or other forms of discrimination. So, I am not very hopeful that the new process — meaning the new election and new parliament — will directly address inequality, since no new constitution is likely to emerge. I don’t know which political parties will return to power or form a government, whether there will be an absolute majority for one party, or whether a youth-led government will emerge. At this stage it is not clear. That is why I am not fully confident that the new process will specifically address caste inequalities or Dalit concerns.

Nepal Risks Sliding Into the Same Disappointments as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh

Sri Lankan protesters storm the prime minister’s office in Colombo on July 13, 2022, demanding the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. Photo: Ruwan Walpola.

Lastly, Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya and Bangladesh’s 2024 uprising both toppled governments but slid toward renewed authoritarian populism or elite restoration. What lessons should Nepal’s Gen Z revolution draw from these trajectories if it is to avoid similar cycles of disappointment?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: You’re right that the recent examples from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, as well as other forms of civic resistance in different parts of the world, show that even when there is revolt or resistance against elite authoritarianism, the outcomes are often disappointing. That is exactly what happened in Sri Lanka, in Bangladesh, and in Nepal. The similarities are clear: young people want total reformation, development, and change. That is what the youth in Bangladesh demanded as well, but at the end of the day, the political process did not move in that direction.

In Bangladesh, for instance, there was a revolt against the government, the prime minister fled to India, and a new interim government was installed. Yet elections have still not been held. The same risks exist in Nepal. Here, an interim government was also formed, and young people demanded an independent figure as prime minister. That is why the Chief Justice was appointed as interim prime minister, with a mandate to organize elections by the given deadline. But looking at the current political process, it is not moving in the right direction. Whether elections will even take place on time is uncertain, and many people are openly speculating about delays.

The problem is that dialogue with political parties has not yet begun. At the end of the day, democracy requires political parties to be central stakeholders. Without them, a democratic election cannot be organized. Elections cannot simply be carried out without agreement among the political parties.

For this reason, I am not hopeful that there will be real change, or that the core demands of the Gen Z movement will be addressed either by the interim government or by the new government after elections. Yes, the uprising was a real resistance against elite authoritarianism in Nepal, but the results so far are not heading in a positive direction. The outcome is not what the people of Nepal had hoped for.

I am also not optimistic that the new process will address deeper issues such as caste inequalities or caste-based discrimination. Until and unless the caste system in Nepal is dismantled, discrimination will persist. If there is no new constitution, or at least no specific program aimed at uprooting the caste system, then marginalized groups such as Dalits will continue to face severe discrimination in the future. We will have to wait and see what happens, but at this stage, it remains very unclear what kind of change will come even after new elections in Nepal.

Labour Party leader Sir Keir Starmer speaking and gesturing in the House of Commons, UK Parliament, at Westminster Palace in London, UK, on February 7, 2024. Photo: Tennessee Witney.

How Should Mainstream Parties Respond to Populism? The Internal Debates of Britain’s Labour Party under Starmer

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHomeLeadership & PersonaVoice of Youth

When Keir Starmer denounced populism as a “snake oil charm” in July 2024, he became the first British Prime Minister to attack it so explicitly in a major parliamentary speech. Yet inside Labour, the strategy is contested. Should populism be called out as corrosive to democracy, or quietly disarmed by fixing everyday grievances? Starmer prefers direct confrontation; his strategist Morgan McSweeney stresses delivery — “potholes, not populism.” Luke Malhi’s interviews with MPs, aides, and journalists reveal a party caught between naming the threat and co-opting parts of its language to blunt Reform UK’s rise. The debate echoes dilemmas across Europe, underscoring a central question: how can mainstream parties defend institutions without alienating the voters populists claim to represent?

By Luke Malhi

On a warm July morning in 2024, as parliament resumed for the first time following the election, Keir Starmer stood at the dispatch box and denounced populism as a “snake oil charm” that promised easy answers but could deliver only division (Starmer, 2024a). It was the first time a British Prime Minister had attacked populism so explicitly in a set-piece moment of national politics. For some, it sounded like the steady voice of reason after years of turbulence. For others, it risked reinforcing the image of a detached mainstream elite who scold rather than persuade the most dissatisfied in society.

Behind the scenes, Labour figures admit the party is still working out how best to handle the populist threat presented by Reform UK, a populist radical right (PRR) party which secured 14.3% of the vote in 2024, and is now polling at around 34% (Ipsos, 2025). In January of 2025, I conducted interviews with MPs, strategists, and senior journalists, with the promise of anonymity to encourage them to speak candidly. What emerged was a picture of a party that both fears the corrosive potential of populist politics and struggles with how directly to confront it.

Exploring these tensions matters because Britain is hardly alone. Across Europe, mainstream parties face the same dilemma of how they should respond to populists who thrive on frustration with the status quo. Do they call out populism as dangerous, risking charges of elitism? Do they try to quietly address the grievances that fuel it? Or do they attempt to co-opt aspects of the populist policy platform and rhetoric in an attempt to diffuse their appeal? Labour’s struggle with this balance offers a case study in how mainstream parties might navigate this populist age, and what that means for the future of democracy.

Labour’s Response to Populism

When asked how Labour’s inner core thinks about populism, one party strategist sighed: “It’s the problem we can’t ignore, but we can’t talk about it either.” On the surface, Starmer has not been shy about naming populism. In his New Year speech, he condemned “the politics of the easy answer” and accused right-wing populists of offering “grievances, not solutions” (Starmer, 2024c). In the King’s Speech, he branded populism a “snake oil charm” that divided communities (Starmer, 2024a). On a train to the 2025 party conference, he described a battle with the “populist Right Reform” for “the soul of the country” (Starmer, as quoted in BBC, 2025, 03:00). Several MPs told me this reflected his genuine conviction that populism corrodes democracy. One said: “he really does think it’s dangerous. He sees it as a slide toward US-style democratic backsliding.”

Yet many Labour elites worry that naming populism head-on risks alienating voters. As one backbencher put it: “You can’t just tell people they’ve been conned. That sounds like you’re calling them stupid.” A Labour strategist was even more blunt: “That was the Remain mistake. They shouted about how bad Brexit would be and people told them to sod off. If we repeat that with populism, we’ll lose again.”

These doubts are rooted in recent history. The failure of the “Stronger In” campaign during the 2016 referendum still looms large. Its warnings of economic collapse were dismissed by many voters as fearmongering, and that experience has left strategists wary of repeating the mistake of lecturing voters. Several MPs pointed out that even the term “populist”risks alienating audiences, since it is almost always used in a pejoratively charged manner, often shorthand for “irrational” or “ignorant.”

This tension has produced what insiders describe as a split between Starmer and his chief strategist, Morgan McSweeney. Starmer leans toward confrontation, “naming and shaming” populists in the words of one MP, while McSweeney takes the opposite view. According to a Labour aide, “Morgan thinks delivery is the only answer. Fix the potholes, raise living standards, and you’ll take the wind out of Reform’s sails. That’s the fight.”

But delivery is only part of the story. McSweeney’s strategy was said to increasingly involve borrowing selectively from populists where feasible, adopting their language on issues like patriotism or immigration, and co-opting policy themes that resonate with disaffected voters. One journalist explained: “It’s not just about competence. Morgan’s theory is giving people some of the populist framing but strip out the nastiness. Show them you hear their anger but redirect it.” 

The difference between the two men is not just tactical but stylistic. Starmer prefers sober warnings about the dangers of populism. McSweeney is more interested in whether voters feel their everyday concerns are being met. As one Labour organiser summarised: “Keir wants to talk about democracy. Morgan wants to talk about potholes. And that’s the real debate inside Number 10.”

Journalists I spoke to consistently described Starmer’s style as technocratic. Some called him “prosecutorial,” others “old-fashioned” or “statesmanlike.” Even sympathetic insiders conceded that he can come across as an “enforcer of the status quo.” Several argued that this style is both personal and political: it reflects Starmer’s legal training, but also Labour’s deliberate attempt to ‘detoxify’ after Jeremy Corbyn. One campaign aide said: “We knew we couldn’t win if we looked like we were promising the moon again. Voters didn’t want grand visions. They wanted someone boring enough to fix the basics.”

That instinct shaped the 2024 campaign. Unlike Boris Johnson, who thrived on flamboyant gestures, or Corbyn, who rallied crowds with populist appeals to the “many not the few,” Starmer positioned himself as the steady alternative. His rhetoric avoided spectacle. His speeches focused on detail, compromise, and delivery. A senior journalist put it this way: “The whole pitch was: ‘We’ll be dull but competent.’ After fifteen years of drama, dull sounded good.”

At times, this meant deliberately lowering expectations. Multiple insiders recalled that Starmer instructed the party to avoid language that might create impossible promises. One MP said: “He didn’t want a repeat of 2017 or 2019, when we wrote cheques we couldn’t cash. He genuinely fears that broken promises feed populism.”

Starmer’s Worldview and the Parliamentary Party

Starmer’s instinct to treat populism as a moral threat is rooted in his background. As a barrister and former Director of Public Prosecutions, he was steeped in the idea that rules and institutions hold society together. Starmer’s choice to appoint Richard Hermer as attorney general in July 2024 was a clear example of this, and something which required ‘considerable effort’ according to one political journalist (Rodgers, 2025). Soon after his appointment, Hermer (2024) gave a speech which made clear his concern about populism and his plans to counter it:

‘We are increasingly confronted by the divisive and disruptive force of populism… We face leaders who appeal to the ‘will of the people’ – as exclusively interpreted by them – as the only truly legitimate source of constitutional authority. Their rhetoric conjures images of a conspiracy of ‘elites’ – an enemy that is hard to define but invariably including the people and independent institutions who exercise the kind of checks and balances on executive power that are the essence of liberal democracy and the rule of law… I hope you take some comfort in the fact that the importance of the rule of law and the constitutional balance is embedded in my DNA and that of a Prime Minister who not only rose to the top ranks of the Bar but served his country as DPP.’

Political journalist Ian Dunt correctly observed that it is rare for British politicians, especially attorney generals, to demonstrate “the kind of political and philosophical depth shown in that speech.” Given their shared history, Dunt (2025) claimed Starmer “had clearly authorised him to do the work they both believed in [to counter populism], in a much more robust and outspoken way.”

Labour’s MPs generally echoed Starmer and Hermer’s worldview. In interviews, many brought up Cas Mudde’s (2017) definition of populism unprompted, describing it as a worldview that pits a virtuous “people” against a corrupt “elite.”They consistently rejected this framing as corrosive to democracy. One MP told me: “The idea that politics is just a battle between good, ordinary people and a corrupt elite goes against how democracy really works – I think we’ve tried to push against that.” Indeed, Labour interviewees’ comments echoed many of the inherent dangers of populism for democracy identified by political scientist Jan Werner Muller (2016). They stressed that compromise and pluralism are essential, that it is impossible to distil the will of the people into a single viewpoint, and that institutions such as the judiciary and Parliament are safeguards, not obstacles. One insider remarked: “Respect for institutions is what sets us apart from the populists. I think for everyone here, that is absolutely key.”

This worldview shaped Labour’s stance on contentious issues. When the Conservatives tried to override the Supreme Court on the Rwanda deportation scheme, Yvette Cooper (2024) chastised a party that wanted to “stop all courts.” When Boris Johnson was accused of breaking lockdown rules during Partygate, Angela Rayner (2024) argued that the Prime Minister had “degraded” Britain’s institutions. When Conservative MPs criticised the International Criminal Court (ICC) for issuing an arrest warrant for Benjamin Neteyahu, David Lammy (2025) passionately argued that the UK’s duty was to uphold international law, no matter what.

For MPs, these moments weren’t simply opportunistic attack lines. Rather, they reflect an institutionalist ethos that sets Labour apart from its populist rivals. Several interviewees contrasted this with both right-wing populism and left-wing ‘Corbynism,’ which, at times, they claimed, flirted with a Manichean and binary view of “the people versus the elite”described by the ideational definition of populism (Mudde, 2017). As one journalist observed: “Starmer doesn’t do binaries. He does compromise. That’s his politics.” This rejection of populism runs deep within the identity of the Parliamentary Labour Party. MPs and advisers alike saw their role as defending the structures and norms of democracy against the polarising logic of populism.

A Compromise Strategy

Despite these convictions, Labour’s public-facing stance has been more muted. The compromise between Starmer and McSweeney means explicit attacks on populism are largely confined to Starmer’s speeches, whilst the wider party message stresses competence and delivery. At the same time, McSweeney’s strategy has steered Labour toward selective co-option of populist themes, borrowing rhetoric on sovereignty, fairness, and security when it helps shore up support against the PRR Reform UK.

MPs are divided over this balancing act. Some welcomed Starmer’s willingness to call out populism explicitly, saying it reassured the new intake that the party was willing to “name the problem.” Others warned that in Leave-voting constituencies such rhetoric could backfire.

A similar divergence in opinion appeared when MPs were asked about McSweeney’s push for Labour to co-opt populist policies and rhetoric in certain areas. Some Labour elites felt that, although it was uncomfortable, it was necessary to reduce the electoral appeal of Reform UK. However, others felt it risked legitimising right-wing populists and alienating their voter base on the left.

Indeed, recent research highlights that mainstream parties risk alienating their core voter bases when co-opting populist policies or rhetoric. A 2024 study on mainstream partisans’ responses to populist radical right parties found that even tactical forms of cooperation can provoke feelings of betrayal among core supporters, while outright exclusion may conversely reassure them that democratic boundaries are being defended (van der Brug et al., 2024). In other words, accepting far-right actors as legitimate competitors may backfire by alienating loyal voters, reinforcing the dilemma that ignoring populism allows it to grow, but engaging with it risks damaging mainstream parties’ own legitimacy.

The result is a fractured Labour elite, and a party that highlights it is not populist, but is simultaneously cautious about declaring itself against populism. As one senior journalist told me: “They’ll quietly fix things, and when it helps, they’ll borrow the populist language.”

The European Dilemma

Labour’s balancing act is part of a wider European story. Both the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) frequently denounce the Freedom Party (FPÖ) as a right-wing populist force that threatens democratic stability. They highlight the FPÖ’s history of extremism and corruption scandals to argue it is unfit to govern. However, some analysts suggest that this moralising tone has also reinforced the FPÖ’s image as an outsider persecuted by the political establishment (Greilinger, 2024). 

In France, Emmanuel Macron has pitched himself as the rational bulwark against Marine Le Pen. His rhetoric helped him win two presidential elections, yet his reputation as the anti-populist “president of the elite” has also fuelled the resentment that benefits her party (Alduy, 2024). 

And in Slovakia, opposition leaders stress the importance of defending institutions against Robert Fico, though appeals to democratic norms often fail to resonate with voters who are more concerned about wages or security (OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, 2025).

Labour’s interviews echo these patterns. Starmer’s decision to call populism a “snake oil” resembles Macron’s confrontational stance, while McSweeney’s “pothole theory” mirrors the German CDU’s instinct to quietly address material grievances. And his tactic of co-opting populist themes recalls centre-left parties across Europe that have edged rightward on migration or nationalism in hopes of undercutting their rivals. Both approaches highlight the same paradox: ignoring populism lets it grow but confronting it risks alienating dissatisfied voters drawn to populist ‘common sense’solutions.

Conclusion: Lessons for Democracy

Labour’s struggle over how to deal with populism reflects a central dilemma facing European democracies. Mainstream parties increasingly recognise that populism threatens democratic norms, yet they are torn between exposing it and addressing the grievances that fuel it.

My interviews reveal a party uneasy about this balance. Starmer is inclined to call out populism for what it is. McSweeney and other strategists argue that delivery, not denunciation, is what keeps populists at bay – along with carefully borrowing some of their language and themes. MPs, often caught in between, worry about how rhetoric plays in their constituencies.

Since my research in January 2025, Starmer appears to have shifted closer to McSweeney’s view. He has grown more willing to co-opt populist policy positions and language in the hope of winning back voters tempted by Reform UK. A YouGov poll in early 2025 showed Reform UK as likely to be the largest party in parliament if a snap election were called, underscoring how desperate party elites have become. But comparative research suggests that Labour’s gamble may backfire. Political scientist Tarik Abou-Chadi has shown that when mainstream parties adopt aspects of populist policies from the far-right, they rarely succeed in winning over these voters. Instead, they might risk normalising the very politics they sought to resist.

Labour’s experience illustrates the challenge facing mainstream parties: how to safeguard democratic principles while competing in a political landscape reshaped by populism. These are not uniquely British problems, but global ones. For young people inheriting these democracies, the question is urgent: how can political actors who genuinely care about democracy confront populism without alienating voters or belittling their grievances?

 

References

Alduy, C. (2024, July 4). “How France Fell to the Far Right: In the End, Le Pen Hardly Had to Moderate to Gain Power.” Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/france/how-france-fell-far-right-le-pen-macron

BBC. (2025, September 28). “Sunday with Laura Kuenssberg: Interview with the Prime Minister [TV broadcast].” BBC iPlayer. https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m002k6hc/sunday-with-laura-kuenssberg-interview-with-the-prime-minister

Cooper, Y. (2024, June 20). “Speech on Supreme Court ruling and Rwanda deportation.” Hansard. https://hansard.parliament.uk

Dunt, I. (2025, February 5). “A good man in government.” Politics.co.uk. https://iandunt.substack.com/p/a-good-man-in-government

Greilinger, G. (2024, January 2). “Normalising the far right: a warning from Austria.” Social Europe.

Hermer, R. (2024, July 25). “Speech as Attorney General on populism and the rule of law.” UK Government. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/attorney-general-richard-hermer-on-populism

Ipsos. (2025, January). “Voting intention poll, January 2025.” Ipsos. https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/polling-voting-intention-2025

Lammy, D. (2025, March 10). “Statement on the International Criminal Court.” Hansard. https://hansard.parliament.uk

March, L. (2018). “Left and right populism compared: The British case.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 20(2), 281–298. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118763892

Müller, J.-W. (2016). What is populism? University of Pennsylvania Press.

Mudde, C. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780190234874.001.0001

OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. (2025, January 28). “Slovakia: Fico’s government in trouble.” https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-01-28/slovakia-ficos-government-trouble

Rayner, A. (2024, April 21). “Referral of Prime Minister to Committee of Privileges.” Hansard. https://hansard.parliament.uk

Rodgers, S. (2025, February 24). “For evidence of Labour doubt in the Starmer project, look no further than his attorney general.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/feb/24/labour-keir-starmer-project-attorney-general-richard-hermer

Russo, Luana & Brock, Paula Schulze. (2025). “Mainstream partisans’ affective

response to (non) cooperation with populist radical right parties.” West European Politics, 48:6, 1389-1427, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2024.2336436

Starmer, K. (2024a, July 17). “Debate on the address.” Hansard. https://hansard.parliament.uk

Starmer, K. (2024b, October 14). “PM International Investment Summit speech.” UK Government. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-international-investment-summit-speech-14-october-2024

Starmer, K. (2024c, January 2). “Keir Starmer’s New Year speech.” Labour Party. https://labour.org.uk/updates/press-releases/keir-starmers-new-year-speech

Dr. DB Subedi is a leading scholar of peace and conflict studies at the University of Queensland, Australia.

Dr. DB Subedi Warns: Transitional Nepal May Face Real Dangers from Rising Religious Populism

by Editor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviewsMigration

“Transitional Nepal may face real dangers from rising religious populism,” cautions Dr. DB Subedi, lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, in an interview with the ECPS. While the September 2025 youth-led uprising signaled a break with entrenched corruption, nepotism, and elite capture, Dr. Subedi warns that Nepal’s weak secularism leaves space for actors seeking to reinstate Hindu statehood. Such a trajectory, he argues, risks fusing populist nationalism with sectarian identity—posing a greater threat than conventional elite dominance. Yet he also sees in Gen Z’s unprecedented mobilization the embryonic signs of a participatory, post-elitist democracy. Much depends, he stresses, on whether Nepal’s interim government can ensure a smooth, accountable transition to elections.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

“Transitional Nepal may face real dangers from rising religious populism,” warns Dr. DB Subedi, a leading scholar of peace and conflict studies at the University of Queensland, Australia. In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Subedi argues that while Nepal’s September 2025 uprising carries the seeds of a more participatory, post-elitist democracy, the country also risks sliding into a form of exclusionary right-wing politics. Having been the world’s only Hindu state until 2015, Nepal is now formally secular but only weakly so in practice. Everyday political life continues to be saturated with religion, leaving space for political actors and interest groups who seek to reinstate Hindu statehood. In Dr. Subedi’s assessment, this trajectory could open the door to religious populism—an outcome more dangerous than other forms of elite capture because it fuses populist nationalism with sectarian identity.

Yet, Dr. Subedi stresses, the September uprising cannot be reduced to a story of risks alone. It is also a product of deep structural inequalities, socioeconomic stagnation, and the frustrations of a digitally native generation. What began as a protest against the Oli government’s ban on 26 social media platforms quickly crystallized into a mass youth-led revolt against corruption, nepotism, and elite reproduction. The protests were unprecedented in scale, non-hierarchical in organization, and notable for their broad public legitimacy. Dr. Subedi sees in this horizontal mobilization the embryonic forms of a post-elitist democracy, rooted less in patronage or coercion and more in inclusive participation.

Placing Nepal within a wider regional frame, Dr. Subedi draws parallels with Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya (2022) and Bangladesh’s anti-quota protests (2024). Across these South Asian contexts, the drivers are strikingly similar: generational exclusion from politics, widening socioeconomic inequality, and a pervasive sense of injustice. In each case, social media functioned both as a catalyst and as connective tissue, transforming diffuse frustrations into coordinated movements. Yet Nepal’s fragile secularism makes it particularly vulnerable to the instrumentalization of religion by authoritarian populists, as has been evident in Bangladesh.

For Dr. Subedi, the stakes of the coming months are therefore clear. Much depends on whether the interim civilian government—tasked with organizing elections within six months under the leadership of former Chief Justice Sushila Karki—can ensure a smooth, legitimate transfer of power. The challenge lies not only in delivering credible elections but also in holding past regimes accountable for corruption and abuses of power, while simultaneously preventing a populist-nationalist hijack of the transitional moment.

In the conversation that follows, Dr. Subedi provides a detailed analysis of Nepal’s September uprising, reflecting on its social, economic, and political roots, situating it in the broader South Asian context, and sounding a critical warning about the dangers of religious populism in Nepal’s fragile democracy.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. DB Subedi, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

A Revolution Born of Structural Inequalities and a Youth Bulge

Nepal Protests 2025 — Demonstrators, largely Gen Z, rally against the government’s ban on 26 social media platforms, including WhatsApp, Instagram, and Facebook. Police presence and Nepalese flags marked the nationwide unrest. Photo: Tetiana Strilchuk.

Professor Subedi, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Analysts describe the September 2025 uprising as a Gen Z revolution, yet youth mobilization in Nepal has a long genealogy. From your perspective, what specific social, economic, and political configurations enabled this generation to rupture the cycle of elite reproduction where earlier movements failed?

Dr. DB Subedi: Thank you so much, I am very happy to be here talking to you about protests in Nepal. As you mentioned, Nepal has experienced different cycles of revolutions in the past. In particular, I would like to highlight two peaceful revolutions that at one point turned violent—those of 1990 and 2006. In between, Nepal also endured Maoist revolutions lasting 10 years, a very violent civil war. This current youth uprising, however, primarily led by Gen Z in Nepal, is driven by a number of structural and systemic issues. In fact, the protests, which began on 7th September, were directed against what protesters identified as corruption, elitism, and the lack of generational change in Nepal’s politics. 

These are much larger structural and systemic issues, driven primarily by three interrelated factors. First, on the economic front: despite Nepal having undergone shifts in political systems in the past—most notably in 2015, when the country transformed from a constitutional monarchy to a federal republic (a decision made in 2008 but further institutionalized with the drafting of new constitution in 2015)—this was indeed a massive political shift. However, when it comes to economic change, Nepal still has a long way to go. Economic and developmental stagnation persists, and the institutions created and re-strengthened after the 2015 constitution have failed to provide meaningful incentives to the broader population, especially young people.

Rather, what we have seen over the past two decades is a deepening of socioeconomic inequalities in the country. These economic factors are further compounded by political and social ones. Politically, even though Nepal has gone through different cycles of democratization, most major parties lack intra-party democratization, as political leadership has not been passed on to younger generations. Thus, there is both a lack of internal party democracy and a lack of generational shift within political parties. At the same time, there are numerous examples of elite capture and domination of the economic and productive sectors, producing what we call cronyism. Nepal has recently experienced a particular form of cronyism that emerged through a nexus between economic elites and political elites.

And the third, social dimension is particularly important in relation to this recent youth revolution. Looking at demographic figures in Nepal over the past decades, we can observe a youth bulge pattern, meaning that a large proportion of the population consists of young people. This demographic trend creates vulnerable conditions for revolutions to emerge.

In a nutshell, the economic, social, and political factors came together and produced structural conditions and political opportunity structures on which this recent youth uprising and revolution have taken place in Nepal.

Gen Z Turns Precarity into Protest

A Nepali farmer at work in a rural field during the monsoon season. As the rains arrive, farmers across Nepal become busy in their fields, though most still rely on traditional farming techniques. Photo: Shishir Gautam.

Nepal’s youth today confront what might be called a triple disjuncture: mass migration, precarious labor markets, and the expansion of the digital public sphere. How do these dynamics intersect to produce a new political subjectivity that resists both elite capture and authoritarian closure?

Dr. DB Subedi: Mass migration and precarious labor markets are, in fact, deeply interconnected. While this is true in other contexts as well, in the case of Nepal the interconnections are much more significant. Moreover, these are not new issues. At one level, there is a trade-off between political elites and the people at large, especially young people, when it comes to migration, because political elites have viewed mass migration as a source of remittances—income sent home by those working overseas, particularly in labor migration. But from a political perspective, this has also functioned as a tactic of social control. When the young population is displaced from the country and moves abroad, only the elderly and very young remain in society. Such a society, from a political point of view, is easier to control, since politicians and elites at both national and local levels face far less political opposition, especially from young people. This trend has persisted for a long time and, as I mentioned earlier, has coincided with the rise of a crony-led economy that has grown exponentially in recent years.

For young people who have migrated and are working in extreme conditions in the Middle East and elsewhere, it is a sort of double-edged sword. On one hand, they see overseas employment and labor migration as a way to support and look after their families. But at the same time, there is also a sense of missing out on engaging in social and political activities locally. This was the situation for about 20–25 years. With the rise of social media and digital platforms in the age of the internet, however, we have also seen the emergence of transnational political activism. Now, even if young people have migrated and been away, they can engage in discussions about the politics of their homeland through social media. This kind of transnational political activism, facilitated by digital platforms, has also been a contributing factor in generating support for youth activism in Nepal.

You mentioned the precarious situations. In fact, among younger generations there is also the perception that a remittance-led economy is very inconsistent. It is not sustainable, as it largely depends on the economies of migrant-receiving countries. Recently, we have seen that young people are increasingly interested in exploring opportunities within the country rather than migrating overseas for short- or long-term employment. As a result, economic conditions in the country have been very precarious, with lands left uncultivated for a long time, especially in the hills and other areas. There are also villages where young people have been absent for years. This has affected the demographic configuration of the country as much as its economic configuration. Altogether, these factors contribute to a sense of vulnerability, and among young people, there is a growing urgency for social, political, and economic change. The September protest was an expression of that urgency for social change, which political parties and elites have so far failed to deliver.

A Tactical Blunder and an Authoritarian Reflex

Many Nepali citizens join Gen Z–led protests in Bhojpur, Nepal on September 9, 2025, showing solidarity with nationwide demonstrations. Photo: Dipesh Rai.

The ban on social media is often cited as the immediate spark of revolt. Should this be understood as a mere tactical blunder by Oli’s government, or as symptomatic of a deeper authoritarian reflex embedded within Nepal’s ruling elite?

DB Subedi: That’s a very good question, and I think it is indeed both. On the one hand, it was what I would call a tactical blunder of the Oli government, because the ban on 26 social media platforms was based on a miscalculation of the possible social and political consequences it could produce. The reason it was a miscalculation is that we have now seen how it actually drove people to take to the streets—not only in Kathmandu but across the country. It was a tactical blunder because it failed to anticipate the reactions, especially from younger generations, Gen Z and others, who are digital nomads and live in the digital space. For them, the digital space is everyday life, not just a platform for networking and entertainment, but increasingly also a space for political competition and contestation. The government failed to predict the potential political and social backlash and consequences of this. Or at least, they were probably not ignorant of it but simply undermined the consequences.

At the same time, this also reflects a symptom of the increasingly authoritarian style of politics of the Oli government. One example I would cite is that when social media was banned on 4th September, news still circulated on the platforms that remained operational at the time—I think this included Viber and a few others—where the frustrations of young people were voiced. Through those platforms, there was a call for a nationwide protest against the government’s decision.

Rather than engaging with the people—especially the younger generation—and explaining to the population at large why the ban would be necessary, for example, as the government claimed, to maintain social cohesion and avert social fragmentation caused by misinformation and disinformation circulating on social media, the Oli government failed to make its case. That could have been a well-intentioned policy, and there may have been good intent behind it. However, the government not only failed to explain this to the people, but at the same time, ex-Prime Minister Oli was seen publicly criticizing and undermining young people’s frustration. This was symbolic and spoke directly to his authoritarian stance on the use of social media. For young people, it was not simply a matter of compliance; they saw it as an attack on their freedom of speech. In my view, then, the decision to ban social media was partly a tactical blunder and partly a symbolic expression of the increasingly authoritarian politics of the ruling elites at that time.

Nepo-Babies as a Symptom of Neo-Elitism

Viral outrage against “nepo-babies” seems to reflect a moral economy of resentment against elite entitlement. To what extent did the digital spectacle of political heirs flaunting luxury lifestyles crystallize diffuse frustrations into a new form of class politics—distinct from the agrarian and proletarian struggles of earlier eras?

Dr. DB Subedi: The outrage against nepo-babies, which we have seen on social media for some time in Nepal, is not unique to Nepal. In Asia, we have also seen similar kinds of outrage against nepo-babies in Indonesia and elsewhere; the Philippines is another example. But in the case of Nepal, this is actually a symptom of a deep cultural conflict within Nepal’s politics. It also points to the inequalities and disparities that have grown between political elites and ordinary people in the past decades.

Of course, nepo-babies are also a symbol of neo-elitism and a growing political culture that endorses elite entitlement and elite resource capture in a resource-poor country like Nepal. In other words, the outrage against nepo-babies—or the framing of nepo-babies as a particular type of social class on social media—is a symptom of growing socioeconomic inequalities and political divides in the country. This has also supported a different kind of elitist political culture, one that people did not expect after the massive political change in 2015.

To put that into context, when the Maoists called for a revolution—armed revolution—in 1996, during the 10 years of insurgency, 17,000 people died. Many hundreds, even thousands, are still missing. And there are thousands upon thousands of families that have been disintegrated or displaced because of the insurgency.

There are also ex-combatants who actively fought in the war—from the Maoist side as well as from the government side—who are now living with disability and carry deep emotional and psychological distress inherited from the war. The memory of those precarious, insecure times has not faded away. For Nepalese society, this is not a very distant event in history. People remain very much aware of what was sacrificed—not just by those who fought in the war, but also by ordinary people during the Maoist insurgency.

Then there was a political shift in 2008 and 2015, but now you can contrast these situations with the children of political elites—politicians who are living a luxurious life and, most importantly, flaunting that life and their privileges on social media. That kind of contrasting scenario is obviously going to be outrageous for people who feel they lost a decade of their lives because of the insurgencies, and who see few opportunities available for the masses.

So, what we have seen in the recent revolutions is the clash of those two types of political cultures, and the very contrasting lives people are living. That is why young people have shown their frustrations against nepo-babies. But again, nepo-babies are a product of bad political culture, rising neo-elitism, and institutional failure to bring about equitable socioeconomic change and transformation in the country.

Different Triggers, Shared Inequalities

Nepal is the third South Asian country in four years to witness mass youth-led uprisings, after Sri Lanka in 2022 and Bangladesh in 2024. What do you see as the common drivers across these cases, and what is unique to Nepal’s trajectory?

Dr. DB Subedi: Actually, there are several common drivers. One of the main ones is that in all three revolutions, there was overwhelming involvement and participation of young people, especially in Bangladesh and Nepal. We have seen Gen Z play a leading role in these kinds of protest movements. In Sri Lanka, in the Aragalaya, it was a bit different because people from three different ethnic groups—Tamils, Sinhalese, and Muslims—came together. This movement was also mostly led by young people, but people from other generations were involved as well in the revolution that toppled the government of Rajapaksa.

Of course, there are contextual differences too—differences in terms of politics, history, and so on. But there are also common structural issues behind the rise of these movements in all three countries. At the center of that structural inequality, that structural issue, is the perception of injustice. In Sri Lanka, the Aragalaya movement was mostly fueled by the government’s failure—economic collapse and the government’s failure to manage the economy when the country transitioned from decades of civil war to peace and stability.

In Bangladesh, this was directed towards a bad government policy by Sheikh Hasina’s government regarding quotas in government jobs and opportunities for young people. So, it was actually aimed at a particular kind of policy. In Nepal, by contrast, it was triggered by another policy decision—the ban on social media.

Regardless of these three different trigger factors, what we have seen is growing socioeconomic inequality, lack of generational change in politics, the perceptions of young people, and the reality of their sense of socioeconomic exclusion, relative deprivation, and frustration toward increasingly elitist types of politics. These are the common issues we can observe in all three countries. And when these issues converge in motivating young people to take to the streets, social media plays an important role as a facilitator of this kind of collective movement.

The Key Is a Proper Handover of Power

Thousands joined a joint morning procession organized by the CPN-UML and Nepali Congress district committees in Inaruwa Bazaar on September 19, 2025, to mark Constitution Day. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula.

In Sri Lanka, the Aragalaya protest movement toppled the Rajapaksas but was quickly reabsorbed into elite politics. What lessons should Nepali youth learn from the Sri Lankan experience to avoid repeating this cycle of betrayal?

Dr. DB Subedi: Sri Lanka’s case is probably somewhat different from that of Nepal, particularly when it comes to the transfer of political authority at the end of the revolutions. There is now a new government that came to power after the elections—a progressive government, distinct from the previous populist nationalist government of Rajapaksa. What we have seen in Sri Lanka is a very quick and relatively smooth transfer of power from the previous regime to the new progressive government, which, as the recent elections show, has received an overwhelming mandate from the Sri Lankan people. The transition was, of course, fragile, but the Sri Lankans managed it very well in terms of shifting power from the previous regime to the new one.

In the case of Nepal, we now have a civil society government, a pattern more or less similar to what we saw in Bangladesh after the 2024 revolution. This civilian government has been given a mandate to hold elections within six months, and it is headed by the former Chief Justice of the country, Sushila Karki. Nepal can actually learn a few things here from Sri Lanka. One is that it will always be in the best interest of the people and the political system to manage these transitions and make them as short as possible, because a proper handover of power from previous governments to the next elected government is the key.

In the meantime, there are also additional challenges for the Nepalese government—the civilian government in power at the moment. Nepal also faces the challenge of holding those from previous governments accountable for the loss of life during the protest movement. Proper investigations into the abuse of power and coercion by the previous regimes are difficult issues, but they need to be addressed. At the same time, there is widespread public frustration and anger about corruption cases. There are dozens of cases dating back as early as the 1990s that have not been properly investigated, and political power has been used, misused, and abused to avoid scrutiny.

So, while the civilian government in power at the moment has many challenges, the main lesson it could learn from Sri Lanka in particular is the importance of ensuring that processes, mechanisms, and systems are in place to transfer power from previous authorities to newly elected authorities.

The Risks of Religious Populism

In Bangladesh, the fall of Sheikh Hasina has opened space for religious extremism and new forms of repression. How should we understand the dangers of authoritarian populists exploiting anti-corruption or anti-elitist discourses in fragile democracies?

Dr. DB Subedi:  That’s a very good question, and Nepal also has—I wouldn’t say a strong possibility, but there may be—some scenarios where certain political forces, either existing or emerging, might use populist rhetoric to exploit the fluid situation in the transitional period. In other words, there may be risks of populist, nationalist kinds of political narratives being circulated as mainstream narratives in the meantime and taking over in the post-revolution political system. The risks are always there. In Bangladesh, we have seen religious extremist narratives circulating in the political domain and influencing politics, and this is typical of Bangladesh because of its sociocultural and socio-religious configurations.

In the case of Nepal, there are two potential scenarios where populist forces seeking to exploit the situation could emerge. In my view, one is that there is probably a lesser risk of right-wing populist politics exploiting culture or ethnicity to advance populist agendas in Nepal. Because Nepal is ethnically diverse, if any populist forces emerge at this stage, one possibility is that they might actually mobilize people across ethnic divides. In that sense, it might look less like the right-wing populism we have seen elsewhere.

But at the same time, the bigger risk is that Nepal was the only Hindu state in the world until 2015. When the new constitution was passed in 2015, it became a secular country. And even though it is now formally secular, it is weakly so, because in practice, in everyday life, religion is still present in the public domain. It has not been retracted into the private sphere. As a result, there are certain political parties and interest groups that want to reinstate the Hindu state in Nepal. That is another risk, where there may be potential for populist politics to emerge in this transition, mobilizing and exploiting religious factors, narratives, and ideologies. If that happens, that sort of populist politics might be more dangerous, because it could share certain elements of right-wing populism we have seen elsewhere, since it would be a form of religious populism in Nepal.

So, yes, like Sri Lanka, Nepal also faces risks. But at the same time, it also has an opportunity, because elections have been called in six months’ time, and if elections take place and there is a smooth transition of power, then Nepali society might be able to navigate these challenges in the days to come.

Unprecedented Support, Uncertain Future

The municipality office in Inaruwa, Sunsari, lies heavily damaged after protesters targeted it during the nationwide demonstrations against corruption and the social media shutdown on September 9, 2025. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula

And finally, Professor Subedi, do you see in Nepal’s Gen Z uprising the embryonic forms of a post-elitist democracy—an order rooted not in patronage or coercion but in participatory, inclusive politics? Or does the violence of the movement suggest that the path forward remains perilously uncertain?

Dr. DB Subedi: At the moment, I would like to be optimistic about your question, and I would say there are signs of a post-elitist kind of politics beginning to emerge in this case. But again, a lot depends on what kind of political institutions will consolidate in the days to come. Looking at the past, one of the major challenges in Nepal is that even though there were political changes—political shifts in 2015, 2008, and even earlier—the change in institutional setup did not result in meaningful socioeconomic transformation. One reason it didn’t happen is because institutions changed, but the institutional culture inherited from the past essentially remained the same. As a result, corruption continued, exclusion continued, and people’s frustrations with the system and political elites deepened.

In these situations, how the voices of younger generations can be institutionalized and established in mainstream politics in the days to come will determine a lot. Still, I would view this change more optimistically than pessimistically, because despite some losses—there was destruction and violence when the protests intensified on the second day—there is nonetheless a sense of awareness among the public that change was inevitable, change was necessary, and that we have come to a time when much more meaningful change is required, both in terms of political institutions, systems of governance, and political participation. But changing political culture is also necessary.

And I think if more and more young people are able to participate in politics, they might be able to foster a political culture that is much more participatory and inclusive, and can establish not only economic systems but also political systems that are fair, inclusive, and capable of bringing about the change desired by those who sacrificed their lives, as well as those who participated in these protest movements. A lot depends on how the state and society will navigate this challenge and crisis, because sometimes past history also gives us a clue to predict the future. Unfortunately, the past record of how Nepalese society has navigated post-revolutionary political space is not very encouraging.

But this time, because the revolution was led particularly by young people outside of the political parties’ participation—it was not hierarchical, as would have been the case if it were led by political parties—at the same time, even though it was a leaderless movement, it very quickly sought some results, some consequences. So, the kind of public support this protest movement has received is unprecedented. In that sense, there is huge public support, and in fact, that kind of public support is also a good indicator of the legitimacy of the current government, and also the government that will take over when it is handed over to an elected government. That kind of legitimacy is good for any government and any political leaders who come to power with the intention of bringing about meaningful social, economic, and political change. And that is what we can hope for at this stage. But a lot depends on how this will be managed, and how society will navigate through it.

Banksy protest mural in Palestine. A mural by the artist Banksy on a wall in the West Bank village of Beit Sahour, June 18, 2014. Photo: Dreamstime.

Queerness, Genocide, and International Law – A Look at Palestine

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceGenderHomeHuman Rights

This commentary examines how queerness intersects with genocide and international law in the context of Palestine. Ass. Professor Izat El Amoor argues that queer Palestinians confront not only Israel’s genocidal violence but also Western pinkwashing narratives that weaponize queerness to justify oppression. By situating pinkwashing and pinkwatching within broader struggles of decolonization, the piece shows how queer analysis exposes the hypocrisy of Western legal and human rights frameworks while offering new tools for resistance. Linking Israel’s use of pinkwashing to global failures of international law—including the ICJ case brought by South Africa—the essay insists that genocide studies must reckon with queerness as central, not peripheral, to understanding both the violence in Gaza and pathways toward Palestinian liberation.

By Izat El Amoor*

In the colossal scope of the annihilation of Palestinians since October 7, queerness is not a mere addendum when positioned in the scholarship and legality of genocide. As Palestinians contested Western discourses of international law and genocide for their liberation, queer Palestinians in parallel challenged Western discourses of queerness – pinkwashing[1] – that have been employed as genocidal tools against all Palestinians. Within the larger Palestinian decolonization struggle, a queer analysis reveals additional shortcomings of the current genocide scholarship and legal frameworks that are useful for Palestinian resistance yet might otherwise remain hidden.

Pinkwashing genocide emerged boisterously from within Israel’s toolbox against an increasing diplomatic and legal global isolating pressure. This pressure entailed a string of legal and humanitarian decisions/actions such as UN Security Council votes for Palestinian statehood and membership; UN Human Rights Council resolutions of crimes against humanity; ambassador recalls and severance of diplomatic relations with many countries; states’ recognition of Palestine; state-calls on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate war crimes against civilians; state-requests for a court opinion on whether Israel’s occupation violates international law. Pinkwatching[2] aims at strengthening this pressure that Israel has been diligently countering via pinkwashing, amongst other schemes. Consequently, pinkwashing and pinkwatching—while contradictory—transpire as instructive of the pretense of Western hypocritical dichotomies tied to human rights, international law, and preventing/ending genocide insofar as Palestinian liberation.

The ICJ Case Through a Queer Lens

Though not obviously connected at first glance, South Africa’s case against Israel at the ICJ—filed on December 29, 2023, regarding Israel’s actions in Gaza and widely considered the most significant diplomatic/legal attempt to isolate Israel—can also be analyzed through this queer framework. South Africa alleged that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, violating the Genocide Convention through 75 years of apartheid, 56 years of occupation, and a 16-year blockade prior to October 7. Specifically in Gaza, South Africa accused Israel of eight “genocidal acts”: killing Palestinians; inflicting serious bodily and mental harm; mass displacement; deprivation of food and water; denial of shelter, clothing, hygiene, and sanitation; blocking medical care; destroying Palestinian life; and imposing measures to prevent births.

On January 11–12, 2024, the Peace Palace in The Hague hosted two days of hearings on South Africa’s request for provisional measures. On January 26, 2024, the Court ordered Israel to take all steps to prevent acts that could qualify as genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention. The Court acknowledged that at least some of South Africa’s claims could fall within the Convention’s scope. However, it did not order Israel to halt its military operations in Gaza, as South Africa requested. Still, both governments declared the ruling a win, each interpreting it as validation of their stance.

Although ICJ rulings carry binding force, they lack enforcement power, and Israel has refused to comply. South Africa’s foreign minister Naledi Pandor emphasized that compliance would be impossible without a ceasefire. On February 26, 2024, Human Rights Watch reported that Israel had not implemented the Court’s provisional measures and had “continued to obstruct the provision of basic services and the entry and distribution within Gaza of fuel and lifesaving aid.” That same day, Amnesty International stated that Israel was “defying” the ICJ ruling. On March 28, 2024, in response to worsening conditions, the ICJ issued additional emergency measures requiring Israel to guarantee basic food supplies to stave off famine. Then, on May 24, 2024 the Court ordered an immediate halt to Israel’s Rafah offensive, which Israel outright rejected.

Because both Israel and South Africa are signatories to the Genocide Convention, jurisdiction is established. South Africa argues that, as a state party, it has a duty to act to prevent genocide and is legally obligated to pursue all necessary measures. The Genocide Convention extends beyond punishment to prevention, recognizing genocide as more than mass killing. South Africa’s petition highlights this obligation, aiming to fulfill the Convention’s purpose. Despite historical precedent of international law failing Palestinians and the slim likelihood of success, the case still carried hope—not only for a ruling in South Africa’s favor but also for a possible end to Israel’s genocidal campaign.

Decolonial Struggles Beyond the Courtroom

Pinkwatching operates on a similar basis of hope for Palestinian collective liberation, even though Israel is unlikely to abandon its pinkwashing efforts. Both South Africa’s ICJ case and pinkwatching contribute to the Palestinian decolonization struggle, offering different tools for globally isolating Israel and its supporters. While pinkwatching may occupy a small place in international legal and political arenas, it nonetheless provides an important pathway for resistance. This resonates with Palestinian scholar Nora Erakat’s (2020) claim that law must work alongside political strategies if it is to meaningfully support Palestine.

Like South Africa’s ICJ case, pinkwatching underscores the divide between legality and morality in international affairs. Western responses to both overlook moral dimensions, thus blocking accountability-based decolonial breakthroughs. Legal efforts are essential to halt genocide, but they remain insufficient to achieve the deeper moral and spiritual transformation necessary in the West to ensure genocide truly stops and does not recur. Treating genocide solely as a legal matter exposes the inadequacy of law when societies, like Israel’s, persist in the immoral conviction of having the right to commit it. Pinkwashers similarly claim false moral authority, reinforcing the Western legal hypocrisy that South Africa challenges. Recognizing this, pinkwatching organizers long ago chose to work outside such flawed structures, rejecting Western queer discourses that cannot deliver Palestinian liberation. Their efforts affirm that a queer-informed path to freedom cannot rely on Western legal or rights-based paradigms.

International law’s stated responsibility to prevent genocide and protect victims has repeatedly faltered due to “realpolitik, the lack of political will, and economic interests,” in the words of scholar Samuel Totten (2011). Historically, Totten says, responses to genocide have been “inconsequential. Nothing that will rock or threaten a [genocidal] government or nation’s well-being. Nothing punitive.” Israel dismissed South Africa’s charges as “baseless,” accusing it of acting as “the legal arm” of Hamas while insisting its actions were self-defense under international law—claims that largely went uncontested.

Pinkwashing, Early Warnings, and the Dynamics of Genocide

A clear example of realpolitik overriding legal and scholarly genocide frameworks came in the US, Germany, and France backing Israel at the ICJ, despite their histories of complicity in past genocides. France declared that accusing Israel of genocide “is to cross a moral threshold.” Germany pledged to defend Israel in light of the Holocaust. The US dismissedthe ICJ case as a distraction from “peace and security.” Beyond a lack of will to prevent genocide, South Africa’s case reveals that failure itself is pursued to serve Western interests.[3] Thus, by undermining their own institutions of “justice” such as international law and the UN, Western powers show themselves not only complicit in but active facilitators[4] of genocide. Their justifications parallel pinkwashing narratives, which weaponize queerness under a veneer of liberal progressivism while disregarding Palestinian lives—queer and non-queer alike.

From a queer perspective, Gaza’s genocide illustrates what scholar Sheri Rosenberg (2013) describes as the “danger of classifications” in genocide prevention. The targeting of queer Palestinians demonstrates that genocide “must be understood as an unfolding process, considered in light of historical, political, and social factors” and recognized as a complex phenomenon rather than reduced to a definition. When genocide is confined to legal definitions “against which unfolding events are to be measured,” it prioritizes “legalism [and] subjects each genocide to a rigid test in order to maintain the integrity of the term and determine criminal culpability.” Seeing genocide in Palestine as dynamic rather than static makes space for analyzing pinkwashing and pinkwatching as integral to genocide studies. Queerness unsettles the field’s fixation on definitional debates and strengthens arguments such as Rosenberg’s for “early warning systems [that] seek to collect, analyze, and communicate information” to identify potential genocides before escalation. For Palestinians, decades of orientalist tropes—including the use of homophobia to dehumanize them—could have served as early warnings had queer experiences been taken seriously.

Beyond South Africa, a queer reading of Gaza’s genocide also pushes genocide studies to destabilize fixed ideas of group identity. Scholars like Lily Nellans (2020) and Patrick Vernon (2021) have noted the Genocide Convention’s failure to recognize groups defined by gender and sexuality. Scholar Matthew Waites (2018) argues that including sexual orientation and gender identity as protected groups allows recognition of violence against queer communities in Nazi Germany, Uganda, and the Gambia as genocidal. Although Israel’s violence in Gaza targets Palestinians indiscriminately, pinkwashing’s use of queerness to normalize genocidal policies highlights how queer identities are manipulated within genocidal contexts. This manipulation, shaped by pinkwashing, differs from past genocides, marking a distinct phenomenon in the Palestinian experience.

Testimonies Erased: Pinkwashing as Justification and Diversion

Scholar Thomas Simon (1996) argues that in the initial legal definitions of genocide, the Convention’s drafters assumed that the groups requiring protection were “permanent, stable, and intractable,” recognizable by all. Because queer Palestinians have historically resisted Western queer visibility politics—centered on recognition, citizenship, and coming out—they cannot be defined as a protected group under this framework. Scholars like Freda Kabatsi (2005) argue that while the drafters treated group existence as a prerequisite for other rights, pinkwashing constructs queer Palestinians as a group only through a savior-like gaze that conditions their rights and protection on Western recognition. By forcibly separating queer Palestinians from the broader society, this group-based framing legitimizes a genocide that in reality indiscriminately targets all Palestinians. This occurs, Kabatsi (2005)  says, when the “group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.” Through pinkwashing, Israel reshapes the definition of the Palestinian collective by isolating its queer members, portraying them as exceptions to the population at large. This narrative enables Israel to justify violence against Palestinians—including queers—while presenting itself as a defender of queer rights.

When examined through pinkwashing and pinkwatching, the instrumentalization of queerness to justify genocide reveals a key distinction between contemporary and historical genocides as studies by Robert Melson (2011) show. While queer people have been killed in earlier genocides, the case in Gaza differs because of the weaponization of both alleged Palestinian heteronormativity and Israel’s homonormativity, the latter being used to claim the role of “savior” of queer Palestinians in the process of ‘othering’ all Palestinians. This demonstrates, to build on Vernon (2021), that both heteronormativity and homonormativity are “relevant to genocidal violence against non-queer people as well as violence against queer people.” 

Genocide, therefore, emerges as a behavior rather than a consistent phenomenon across cases. In Palestine, this “comportment of genocide”—which may either define or obscure genocide—takes the form of pinkwashing (Kabatsi, 2005). Here, pinkwashing functions as both a tool of justification and a means of diversion in the genocidal narrative against Palestinians. This may, in fact, represent the first documented instance of such comportment through pinkwashing.

Queering the analysis of genocide in Palestine beyond legal approaches further underscores the importance of listening to victims. In genocidal contexts, as Melson (2011) argues, “testimonies of victims and survivors must be taken into account in order to better understand the motives of the perpetrators and bystanders” and to give victims and survivors a voice in the narrative of destruction. The testimonies of queer Palestinians and the work of pinkwatching activists, however, remain especially marginalized—not only because queer Palestinians, like all Palestinians, are killed in the genocide, but also because pinkwashing depicts them as either nonexistent or limited to experiencing social death in their communities, thus erasing their capacity to provide testimony. This is particularly relevant in light of the ICJ’s order that Israel preserve evidence of genocide and comply with UN investigations. Instead, Israel has systematically destroyed evidence by blocking journalists from entering Gaza, targeting and killing reporters, and denying UN workers access for documentation.

From Exceptionalism to Resistance: Rethinking Genocide Studies

Israel’s reliance on pinkwashing to avoid accountability has broader consequences beyond the devastation in Palestine. By exploiting queer communities in pursuit of ethnonationalist goals, Israel signals to other states that such practices can be adopted with impunity, without fear of consequences. Condemning Israel and the West’s disregard for international law, Irish MEP Clare Daly stated, “the rules-based order is in roaring form.” Israeli exceptionalism reinforces the fact that the West has always applied one standard of international law for its allies and another for the rest of the world. After months of openly discarding international law in Gaza, the collapse of the post–World War II system—built by the US and Europe to maintain global dominance—has become undeniable. Palestinians, including queer Palestinians and their pinkwatching allies, remain steadfast in their resistance to this destructive order.

Pinkwashing and pinkwatching emphasize the need for genocide studies and international law to adopt queer perspectives in documenting, analyzing, and explaining both Israel’s genocide and the international community’s failure to prevent it. Building on the leadership of pinkwatching activists, scholars must foreground the heteronormative and homonormative structures of Zionism, nationalism, colonialism, orientalism, and imperialism as central to understanding genocidal violence in Gaza and beyond. As scholarship continues to evolve, queerness must be acknowledged as an essential contributor to Palestinian liberation, complementing other political strategies. Since legal approaches alone have repeatedly proven insufficient for advancing decolonization, recognizing queerness at the intersection of law and politics is crucial.


(*) Dr. Izat El Amoor is a self-identified queer Palestinian, and an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Hendrix College studying LGBTQ issues in the Arab world, Palestine included.

 

References

Erakat, N. (2020). Justice for some: Law and the question of Palestine. Stanford University Press.

Kabatsi, F. (2005). “Defining or diverting genocide: Changing the comportment of genocide.” International Criminal Law Review, 5(4), 387–407.

Melson, R. (2011). “Critique of current genocide studies.” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 6(3), 279–286.

Nellans, L. (2020). “A queer (er) genocide studies.” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal, 14(3), 7–16.

Rosenberg, S. P. (2012). “Genocide is a process, not an event.” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 7(1), 16–23.

Simon, T. W. (1996). “Defining genocide.” Wisconsin International Law Journal, 15(2), 243–289.

Totten, S. (2011). “The state and future of genocide studies and prevention: An overview and analysis of some key issues.” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 6(3), 211–230.

Vernon, P. (2021). “Queering genocide as a performance of heterosexuality.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 49(2), 248–279.

Waites, M. (2018). “Genocide and global queer politics.” Journal of Genocide Research, 20(1), 44–67.


Footnotes

[1] To pinkwash, Israel exploits queer rights to project a progressive queer friendly image of itself while concealing its occupation and apartheid of Palestinians.

[2] Pro-Palestine anti-pinkwashing organizing.

[3] Some signs include the May 6th threatening letter by 12 US republican senators, led by Sen. Tom Cotton, to the ICC chief prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan with sanctions and banning ICC “employees and associates” from entering the US over possible warrants against Israel, saying explicitly, “target Israel and we will target you.” South Africa’s Pandor received the same letter. On May 20th, Khan applied for arrest warrants for Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

[4] The US and Germany, Israel’s top arms supplier, saw their weapon manufacturer corporates directly profit from the genocide as their share prices have exponentially risen since October 7.

Kenneth Roth is the Charles and Marie Robertson Visiting Professor at the Princeton School for Public and International Affairs. Until August 2022, he served for nearly three decades as the executive director of Human Rights Watch, one of the world’s leading international human rights organizations, which operates in some 100 countries.

Professor Roth: Israel Exploits Antisemitism Allegations to Silence Criticism of Genocide in Gaza

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceHomeHuman RightsInterviews

In an exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch and now at Princeton—warns that Israel is cynically using charges of antisemitism to shield what he calls genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” Drawing on three decades of human rights leadership, Professor Roth situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a broader authoritarian playbook: populist leaders tilt elections, capture institutions, and scapegoat minorities while silencing dissent. His central warning is stark: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism, and blurring this line endangers both Palestinians and Jews worldwide.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—longtime executive director of Human Rights Watch and now Charles and Marie Robertson Visiting Professor at the Princeton School for Public and International Affairs—warns that the Israeli government is cynically using allegations of antisemitism to silence criticism of what he describes as genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” For him, conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism not only shields state crimes but also undermines real protections against anti-Jewish hatred.

Professor Roth’s reflections build on more than three decades of global human rights advocacy. At Human Rights Watch, which he directed until August 2022, he oversaw the organization’s expansion into one of the world’s leading rights watchdogs, active in about 100 countries. Earlier, he worked as a federal prosecutor in New York and on the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington. From that vantage, he situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a wider pattern of populist-fueled authoritarianism. Today’s autocrats, Professor Roth argues, “still crave elections but tilt the playing field,”systematically undermining courts, capturing media, restricting NGOs, and intimidating universities. Democracy, he insists, cannot be reduced to ballots alone—it requires freedoms of expression, association, and the rule of law, all under attack.

Even amid authoritarian resurgence, Professor Roth emphasizes the power of coalitions of democratic, rights-respecting states. He recalls decisive breakthroughs such as the treaty banning landmines and the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)—both achieved despite superpower opposition. More recent successes, from UN oversight of the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen to European-Turkish pressure curbing Russian strikes in Syria, show that principled middle-power alliances still matter. NGOs, too, must remain unwaveringly consistent: “Our work doesn’t distinguish between perceived friend and foe—we apply the same standards to everybody,” Professor Roth explains. That consistency, he argues, sustains credibility and strengthens the politics of shaming.

The interview traverses urgent contemporary debates: Trump’s embrace of authoritarian leaders, his sanctions on the ICC, and his “flood-the-zone” tactic of overwhelming institutions with constant shocks. Professor Roth dissects the dangers of scapegoating minorities, the misuse of Holocaust memory to excuse present atrocities, and the precedent of blurring law enforcement with war in extrajudicial killings. At every step, he insists that human rights must not be selectively applied or subordinated to cynical populist narratives.

Taken together, Professor Roth’s insights offer both a sobering indictment and a pragmatic roadmap: exposing the authoritarian logic that links populism, repression, and impunity, while affirming that principled coalitions and civil society can still defend rights. Above all, his warning is clear: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism—and protecting the integrity of that distinction is essential for Jews worldwide, Palestinians under siege, and the universality of human rights.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Kenneth Roth, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Autocrats Still Crave Elections but Tilt the Playing Field

Nested dolls depicting world autocrats Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump and Recep Erdogan on the counter of souvenirs in Moscow

Thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your recent writings, you stress the fragility of checks against authoritarian drift and note how today’s rulers “raise the cost” for defenders by targeting courts, media, and NGOs. What, in your view, makes this current wave of populist-fueled democratic backsliding distinct from earlier authoritarian surges, particularly in the subtler tactics of regulation, funding, and legal harassment?

Professor Kenneth Roth: I’m not sure it’s completely unique, but clearly autocrats are learning from each other. The current wave is characterized foremost by what you might call electoral authoritarianism. That is, autocratic leaders who still want the legitimacy of an election but use the steps of the autocrat’s handbook to undercut checks and balances on their authority and to tilt the electoral playing field in their favor.

It’s pretty straightforward what they do: they target the various potential checks on their authority—courts, lawyers, journalists, academics, civil society—and use different techniques to undermine their independence. With the media, for example, outlets may be owned by large corporate conglomerates vulnerable to government pressure. We’re seeing that in the United States right now. It could also take the form of regulations that make it harder for civil society to secure funding, particularly from abroad. Sometimes it’s direct attacks, such as withholding funding, which we’re now seeing Trump do with universities.

These are variations on a theme, but the aim is always the same: to stymie and weaken the elements that sustain democracy. Because democracy is not just about elections. It is about the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly, as well as the rule of law that holds leaders accountable to the law and to the rights it embodies. And these autocrats are intent on undercutting those checks. It’s pretty clear.

Coalitions of Democracies Can Overcome Superpower Opposition

You have argued that coalitions of mid-sized states—beyond the West—can sometimes defend human rights more effectively than major powers, urging leverage toward countries like India, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, and even China. Two decades on, do you still see these “plural centers of pressure” as the backbone of rights defense, or has today’s fractured multilateralism, intensified authoritarian entrenchment, and the rise of populist geopolitics blunted that strategy—and what would an updated map of leverage look like?

Professor Kenneth Roth: I wouldn’t say that coalitions are better than the major powers, but that they can serve as substitutes when the major powers stand in opposition. At this stage, when the US government has essentially stopped promoting human rights, I don’t think we should just throw in the cards and give up. There have been many cases in the past where coalitions of governments have compensated for the absence—or even the opposition—of the US government, not to mention the Soviet or Russian government, or the Chinese government. I describe this in my book Riding Wrongs, where repeatedly, coalitions of democratic, rights-respecting governments, when banded together, have had the moral authority to overcome superpower opposition.

That’s what happened with the treaty to ban landmines. All the major powers opposed it, yet a group of about 60 governments—a coalition that Human Rights Watch and our colleagues helped to build—overcame that opposition. We ended up sharing the Nobel Peace Prize for that effort. Something very similar occurred with the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). You may recall the Clinton administration was adamantly opposed to a court that could even theoretically prosecute an American. That was not its idea of justice. Yet in the final vote in Rome in 1998, the US lost overwhelmingly—120 to 7—marking a decisive victory for the rule of law.

More recently, as I describe in my book, despite a lack of any assistance, if not outright opposition, from Washington, a group of governments led by the Netherlands secured oversight from the UN Human Rights Council of the Saudi-led coalition’s bombing in Yemen—making a huge difference in terms of saving civilian lives. Another coalition, involving Germany, France, and Turkey, pressured Putin in March 2020 to stop bombing the three million civilians in Idlib province in Syria, the last area at the time held by the armed opposition.

These are just a few among many examples showing how coalitions of governments can effectively defend human rights—not only without Washington, but often despite its opposition.

NGOs Must Be Principled—Apply the Same Standards to All

Since major powers like the US, Russia, and China routinely instrumentalize human rights for geopolitical ends, how should NGOs and the broader rights community rethink their strategy—balancing naming-and-shaming with ally-seeking—while avoiding the slide from principled engagement into complicity in populist or authoritarian projects?

Professor Kenneth Roth: The idea that governments instrumentalize human rights is nothing new. This has always happened. If you just go back historically, there was a tendency during the Cold War to highlight the human rights abuses of one’s opponents and neglect the human rights abuses of one’s allies. So, this has always been a problem. I think the role that NGOs should play is to be principled. That is to say, to ensure that our work doesn’t distinguish between perceived friend and foe, but that we apply the same standards to everybody. That enhances the capacity to shame, because people understand that when human rights groups condemn somebody, when we spotlight a government’s abuse, we’re not pursuing some geopolitical strategy. We are pursuing a universal, principled effort.

Now, shaming is never the only thing that human rights groups do. We also enlist influential allies to try to put diplomatic or economic pressure on a target government, and I describe this in my book. These are important supplements to the process of shaming.

The fact that governments are selective in their defense of human rights does undermine their credibility, but doesn’t preclude our ability to enlist them, because frankly, nobody is consistent. So, we try to enlist allies where we can, push them to be more principled. But we don’t have a rule that you’ve got to be perfect before we enlist you, because then we’d enlist nobody. We’ve got to be a bit more pragmatic than that and try to maximize pressure on a target government from any credible source that we can find.

Trump Isn’t Blurring Lines—He’s Embracing Authoritarianism

This editorial image, captured in Belgrade, Serbia, showcases an array of novelty socks featuring the likenesses of Vladimir Putin, Aleksandr Lukashenko, Viktor Orban, and Donald Trump in Belgrade, Serbia on December 12, 2024. Photo: Jerome Cid.

Trump’s open admiration for autocrats such as Putin, Bolsonaro, Erdogan, and Netanyahu blurs distinctions between democracy and authoritarianism, while also resonating with a global populist style that treats rights as obstacles to “the people’s will.” To what extent has Trump shifted the normative boundaries of US foreign policy on human rights, and what does this mean for the wider contest between populism and rights-based democracy?

Professor Kenneth Roth: First, I would not say that Trump is blurring the distinction between democracy and authoritarianism. He’s simply embracing authoritarianism. I don’t think anybody believes that because Trump embraces Putin, suddenly Putin is a democrat. That’s absurd. Trump, as an aspiring autocrat, admires leaders who have managed to secure autocratic power for themselves. That’s what he does. And we obviously have to push back against that.

This is a bad period for US foreign policy, but it’s not the first time we’ve seen something like this. Think back to the George W. Bush administration, when the so-called global war on terrorism became an excuse not only to support abusive governments but also to engage in severe human rights abuses by the US government itself—systematic torture and the use of Guantanamo for endless detention without trial.

We have seen this flouting, this unwillingness to abide by human rights standards emanating from Washington before. Our job in the human rights movement is to spotlight complicity in human rights violations, or responsibility for them, when the government behaves inconsistently, and to push for it to be even slightly less inconsistent. Fortunately, the American people—and I think this is also true globally—want a more consistent human rights policy.

That’s why spotlighting inconsistency is valuable, because it forces leaders like Trump to pay a political price. When he is seen as aiding and abetting genocide in Gaza, we can already see the effect on US public opinion. People are turning against Israel; they are upset with the unconditional US support for Israel. We’ve seen Trump react to that somewhat already—not sufficiently—but this effort is worthwhile. Ultimately, this is how we can pressure Trump to do the one thing that would end the genocide: suspend or condition massive US arms sales and military aid to Israel until the genocide stops.

Rulings Mean Little Without Government Backing

You’ve argued that “democracy” without rights is easily gamed by “despots masquerading as democrats.” After the ICJ advisory opinion(s) and an emboldened ICC, can international courts still constrain leaders amid intensified lawfare and sanctions against judges/prosecutors? What insulating reforms (treaty, funding, travel protections) matter most?

Professor Kenneth Roth: There’s a lot in that question, so let me try to dissect it a bit. First, when despots masquerade as democrats, it means they still hold periodic elections, but they tilt the playing field so much that the elections become meaningless. This can be a dangerous endeavor. Take Viktor Orban in Hungary or Erdogan in Turkey: they are classic autocrats who still hold competitive elections but with very severe limitations. Orban today faces a serious challenger in Peter Magyar, who is charismatic and has united the opposition. It may not work for him. Erdogan went so far as to lock up his main opponent because, according to the polls, that opponent was going to win. His party had already won the major mayoral elections in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and elsewhere. The more an autocrat moves toward a zombie election—that is, one with zero credibility—the more they lose the very legitimacy they seek. That’s what Daniel Ortega did in Nicaragua, Museveni in Uganda, Putin in Russia, and Lukashenko in Belarus. They hold electoral charades, but no one is fooled, and they simply become dictators.

I don’t view international courts as particularly effective against these kinds of autocratic attacks on democracy. The courts are more useful in addressing mass atrocities. For example, with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) entering the fray in Gaza, and with the ICC charging Putin and four generals for Ukraine, these are important efforts. They may someday lead to actual trials in The Hague. Even short of that, they are incredibly stigmatizing. They mean that these leaders cannot travel to the 125 ICC member states without risking arrest.

Of course, an ICJ judgment or an ICC arrest warrant does not self-execute. They don’t automatically constrain leaders because these Hague-based courts don’t have police forces; they depend on governments for enforcement. That’s always a problem. So, we need governments that claim to uphold the rule of law to act consistently with these rulings. Take the ICJ advisory opinion on the illegality of Israel’s endless occupation: governments should now ensure they do nothing to support that occupation. On the ICC, Trump outrageously imposed sanctions on the ICC prosecutor, the two deputies, and six judges. It’s important, particularly for the European Union, to use its so-called blocking statute to neutralize those sanctions so that judges and prosecutors can continue to access their bank funds and operate normally.

I would also encourage the prosecutor to examine whether this constitutes obstruction of justice—a violation of Article 70 of the Rome Statute—which I think it clearly does. One option would be to actually charge Trump for this blatant interference with an independent institution of justice. So, there is plenty that still can be done, but we shouldn’t deceive ourselves into thinking that international courts, simply by issuing rulings, automatically change the world. They need the backing of governments.

Being a Drug Trafficker Doesn’t Make You a Combatant

In critiquing Trump’s extrajudicial killings of Venezuelan traffickers, you warned of the drift from policing to “war” rules in law enforcement. If such precedents take hold—turning metaphorical wars on drugs or terror into literal grounds for lethal force—what global spillovers do you foresee, and what bright-line doctrines should civil society insist on to prevent their entrenchment?

Professor Kenneth Roth: First, let me explain the two sets of rules that govern the use of lethal force. In war, you’re allowed to shoot combatants on the other side, and unless they’re surrendering or injured and thus out of combat, you can shoot to kill. There is no duty to detain them. By contrast, in law enforcement situations, it’s almost the opposite: lethal force can be used only as a last resort to meet an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury. It is an extremely limited use of lethal force; otherwise, the duty is to arrest and prosecute.

Now, Trump has ignored that distinction. He has declared Venezuelan suspected drug traffickers—people we have no real knowledge about—and has, in three separate incidents, blown up boats and killed those on board, simply on the claim that they were traffickers. But being a drug trafficker does not make you a combatant. There is no war, no armed conflict here. If you believe Trump’s account, these people were committing crimes and should have been arrested and prosecuted. The US Coast Guard is fully capable of interdicting these boats, detaining the suspects, bringing them to Miami or elsewhere, and prosecuting them.

Trump is disregarding the strict law enforcement rules on lethal force by declaring this a “war,” and therefore claiming the right to shoot to kill. That is an incredibly dangerous precedent, because he could label anyone a combatant or terrorist—terms he wrongly uses interchangeably. But even terrorists are criminals who must be prosecuted, not summarily executed. We have to be very careful here, because what’s to stop him from declaring a war on civil society or a war on the political opposition and then justifying killings on that basis?

This is a very dangerous precedent. Even though drug traffickers are unpopular, it is essential to start with the principle: even if they are suspected traffickers, they should not simply be blown up. They have the right to be detained, charged, and prosecuted if the administration’s claims are true. That is why it is crucial not to let metaphorical wars on drugs or terrorism be transformed into literal wars that substitute the narrow rules on lethal force in law enforcement with the much more permissive rules governing armed conflict—which this clearly is not.

How Populist Autocrats Weaponize Minorities to Mask Their Failures

Border Patrol agents monitor an anti-ICE protest in downtown Los Angeles, June 8, 2025. Demonstrators rallied against expanded ICE operations and in support of immigrant rights. Photo: Dreamstime.

You’ve tracked how strongman admiration and majoritarian claims corrode protections for minorities and migrants. Has Trump’s second term normalized an executive theory of unfettered discretion that will outlast him in US foreign policy—and how should allies signal costs early to deter that stickiness?

Professor Kenneth Roth: As you’re suggesting in your question, populist autocrats frequently rally support by demonizing some unpopular minority in their country. It could be immigrants, LGBT people, or Muslims—it varies from country to country. It is very important to push back against this. Typically, they resort to such tactics to divert attention from their lack of a political program that could actually address the economic and political needs of their base. Usually, their base is the ethnic majority working class.

When you see leaders demonizing immigrants or LGBT people, you can almost be certain there is no serious program to help the working class. Trump is a perfect example. He loves to demonize immigrants. Then he puts forward a massive economic plan that cuts taxes for his cronies while eliminating healthcare for many who need it. This doesn’t help the working class—it decimates it.

It’s important to expose this sleight of hand—the use of scapegoating unpopular minorities to distract from harmful economic policies. So, what’s the best way to push back? First and foremost, by defending the rights of these minorities. We cannot pretend that an attack on one unpopular group will stop there. In fact, I often view attacks on LGBT people as the canary in the coal mine for broader assaults on civil society. Those almost always follow.

We need to recognize the path populist autocrats are taking and nip it in the bud. We cannot ignore the early stages just because the victims are unpopular. This is a well-trodden path, and it must be stopped at the outset.

Countering Trump’s Flood-the-Zone Strategy

You’ve described Trump’s “flood-the-zone” strategy—overwhelming opponents and institutions with constant shocks—as a hallmark of autocratic playbooks. From the resistance you’ve observed, what lessons proved transferable to other democracies under stress, and which were context-specific wins?

Professor Kenneth Roth: I’m not sure that Trump’s flood-the-zone strategy is typical. It’s pretty unique to Trump. It especially characterized his first few months in this second term, when there was one outrage after another, day after day, and people were so busy responding to yesterday’s crisis that they didn’t know where to start with today’s. Now it has slowed down a bit, but he continues to use the tactic—finding some new provocation every few days to divert attention from what he had already done.

The key for the targets of these efforts is not to let themselves be overwhelmed but to band together and coordinate their defense. We didn’t always see that in the United States. For example, certain universities, like Columbia, cut deals with the Trump administration, while others have since taken a more principled stand and joined forces. Some big law firms also cut deals, while others chose to fight back in court—and are now winning. Trump has also turned his threats toward civil society, but here too, many large progressive private foundations have banded together, issuing a joint statement declaring that they will not be divided and will fight back collectively.

That kind of collective response—the refusal to let Trump pick off opponents one at a time, as he has done with certain media outlets—is essential. When a powerful government can target one victim at a time, the victims usually lose. But when it faces a coordinated defense, the chances of success rise significantly.

When Sovereignty Becomes Impunity

The flag in front of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands on March 27, 2016. Photo: Dreamstime.

Trump’s sanctions on the ICC—aimed at blocking investigations of Israel and US officials—highlight how powerful states can obstruct accountability through jurisdictional caveats and intimidation. What does this precedent mean for the enforceability of international criminal law, and what enforcement pathways remain viable to safeguard prosecutorial independence?

Professor Kenneth Roth: When you say jurisdictional caveats, I think what you’re referring to is that the Trump administration, like the US government for much of the last 20-plus years, has objected to the International Criminal Court’s so-called territorial jurisdiction. That is, the court can prosecute anybody who commits a crime on the territory of a member state. Going back to the Clinton administration, the US government hated that because it meant that American military personnel could theoretically be prosecuted if they committed a crime on the territory of a member state. That’s why the US government was so outraged, in the first Trump administration, when the ICC opened an investigation into Afghanistan—because there was fear that Bush-era torturers, many of whose worst crimes were committed there, might be subject to prosecution. Now, that turned out to be more of a theoretical concern, but that’s the territorial jurisdiction the US government has always objected to.

Ironically, when that same territorial jurisdiction was used by the ICC to charge Putin for crimes committed in Ukraine, everything changed. Biden called it justified. Lindsey Graham, the leading Republican senator who had always opposed the ICC, suddenly said, “I’ve changed my mind, we support the ICC now.” He even pushed through a unanimous resolution, and the Senate upheld what the ICC had done. That remained the case until that same territorial jurisdiction was used to charge Netanyahu for crimes committed in Gaza, in Palestine—a member state. Then suddenly it was back to outrage. The US position has been utterly unprincipled. Fortunately, nobody else accepts that. As I mentioned, the US lost its efforts to block territorial jurisdiction in Rome at the outset by a vote of 120 to 7. This is a losing proposition, and the key is for the 125 member states to reaffirm their support for territorial jurisdiction.

Of course, a state should be able to say, in a time of crisis, if our courts are not working—if we can’t prosecute people who commit crimes on our territory ourselves—we should be able to delegate that power to the ICC. That should be an inherent aspect of sovereignty. For the US to say, “Oh, well, because we’re American, we can commit a crime on your territory with impunity”—that’s crazy. If I, as an American citizen, were to go to Brussels and murder somebody, is it an affront to American sovereignty if Belgium prosecutes me? Obviously not. So why would it be an affront to American sovereignty if, under extreme circumstances, Belgium delegates that prosecutorial power to the ICC? This is normal. But the US insists on American exceptionalism when it comes to the rule of law. Nobody buys that, and governments should find ways to push back.

The Vanity Lever: Using Trump’s Ego to Pressure for Human Rights

You’ve suggested Trump’s transactional ego—the “vanity lever”—can sometimes be used to pressure him on rights. How realistic is it to constrain authoritarian choices through vanity appeals, and where should we draw the ethical line between pragmatism and entrenching cynical politics?

Professor Kenneth Roth: What I’ve written about is that if you approach Trump frontally and say, support human rights, he’ll probably look at you and say, what are those? This is not a guy who is going to openly support human rights. But, as I describe in my book, the process of shaming always has to look at the target and figure out what they care about. In Trump’s case, what he cares about is his self-declared reputation as a master negotiator. In his book The Art of the Deal, he defines what he thinks is great about himself.

That gives us some leverage. For one, he wants a Nobel Peace Prize. Fine—you’re not going to get a Nobel Peace Prize by endorsing the mass ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza. You’ll get the Nobel Peace Prize by actually securing a just peace, including recognition of a Palestinian state. Another effective strategy is to spotlight how Putin in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Gaza are actually bamboozling Trump. They’re manipulating him, they’re playing games with this supposed master negotiator, and Trump looks naive.

He hates that. This is a guy with a fragile ego who doesn’t like criticism. If people are laughing at him, ridicule is horrible when you’re an autocrat. So, I think that provides an opportunity. We’re already seeing some movement by Trump in Ukraine. He has not yet imposed the so-called severe consequences he promised if Putin continues to obstruct ceasefire negotiations, but his rhetoric has become somewhat tougher. In the case of Gaza, we also see Trump distancing himself in certain ways from Netanyahu—for example, rejecting Netanyahu’s false claim that there is no starvation in Gaza, criticizing him for attacking the Hamas negotiators in Qatar, and twice imposing temporary ceasefires.

So, there is some distance there. I think we just need to keep pushing, with the aim of getting Trump to do the right thing for the wrong reasons. I don’t think that’s cynical—it’s simply pragmatic. If that’s what it takes to stop mass atrocities, I’ll do it.

When Ethnic Cleansing Becomes a Defense to Genocide

Destruction in Shejayia, Gaza City, Gaza Strip. Photo: Dreamstime.

You’ve argued that Israel’s actions in Gaza meet the Genocide Convention through killings and life-destroying conditions, even alongside ethnic-cleansing motives. How do you answer critics who say genocidal intent is unproven, and what evidence most strongly supports its inference under current ICJ standards?

Professor Kenneth Roth: If you look at either the extent of the killing or the imposition of conditions of life designed to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic or national group, what’s going on in Gaza is clearly genocide. At this point, the clearest example is the imposition of mass starvation, mass deprivation, and the wholesale destruction—today of Gaza City, but overall of all Gaza. The aim, quite clearly, is to make Gaza unlivable so that it becomes “humane” to then force everybody out into Egypt. The ultimate aim here is ethnic cleansing, a supposed solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by getting rid of the Palestinians—first in Gaza, and then later in the occupied West Bank. That’s clearly what’s going on.

The only real challenge here—you mentioned the International Court of Justice standards—is that the court ruled in the Croatia v. Serbia case more than a decade ago that if you are going to infer genocidal intent from conduct, it has to be the only possible inference. I think that’s a wrong standard. They are going to have to re-examine it, because in effect what they have said is that the motive of ethnic cleansing becomes a defense to genocide, which makes no sense. To prove genocidal intent, the standard should be absolute: are you clearly demonstrating genocidal intent? The fact that there may be a mixed motive—that there may be genocide in the service of something else—is often how genocide takes place.

So, I do think the ICJ will have to revisit its standards. It will have an opportunity in the Gambia v. Myanmar case concerning the Rohingya, where something very similar occurred. The Myanmar army killed, say, 10,000 Rohingya in order to force 730,000 to flee into Bangladesh. That was genocide as a means to mass ethnic cleansing. I hope the court uses that case, which will come first, to re-examine its standards, to find that the conduct does permit an inference of genocidal intent. That would then also apply positively to the case of Gaza.

Criticism of Israel Is Not Antisemitism

Election billboard showing Netanyahu shaking hands with Trump, with the slogan “Netanyahu. Another League,” in Jerusalem on September 16, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.

You’ve warned that equating criticism of Israel with antisemitism both silences accountability and weakens real protections for Jews. What are the dangers of this conflation, and what concrete standards can help distinguish legitimate criticism from antisemitic incitement without suppressing dissent?

Professor Kenneth Roth: That’s an important question. Let me begin by saying that the problem of antisemitism is an acute one today facing Jews around the world, and it has become much more intense since October 7, 2023. So, this is a genuine problem. But what we’ve seen is that Netanyahu, the Israeli government, and some of its supporters are using charges of antisemitism to try to silence criticism of Israel’s genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza.

That’s a very cynical move, because it cheapens a concept that is badly needed. If people come to see claims of antisemitism as just an effort to change the subject and defend Israel’s inexcusable conduct in Gaza, they will become cynical about antisemitism at the very moment we need it to remain a viable concept. In effect, what Netanyahu and his supporters are doing is sacrificing Jews around the world for the benefit of the Israeli government. They’re basically saying: we’re going to throw Jews worldwide under the bus. Who cares if you face antisemitism? Who cares if we’re cheapening the concept? All we care about is defending the Israeli government. That’s a horrible thing to do—but that, in essence, is what the Netanyahu government is doing.

Now, are there standards on antisemitism? Yes. The standard that legitimizes this cynical approach is the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism. The way it’s been interpreted has lent itself to saying that criticism of Israel, or efforts to demonize Israel, are somehow antisemitic.

There are two far superior definitions of antisemitism: the Jerusalem Declaration and the Nexus Document. The reason they are superior is that they make explicit that mere criticism of Israeli misconduct is not antisemitic. They define antisemitism in positive terms similarly, but they also include negative examples to make clear that antisemitism should never be weaponized to shield Israeli misconduct.

So, if the concern is truly antisemitism, people should adopt the Jerusalem Declaration or the Nexus Document. But if the concern is simply defending Israel while throwing Jews around the world to their fate, then go with the IHRA definition.

“Never Again” Means Never Again for All

You argue that Israel’s invocation of “never again” and its Holocaust halo have been weaponized to justify present atrocities. How has this complicated recognition of genocidal conduct, and how can we honor historical victimhood without letting it serve as a blank check—while restoring legal clarity around proportionality and civilian protection?

Professor Kenneth Roth: As you suggest, the Israeli government, much like the Rwandan government, cites the Holocaust for Jews and the Rwandan genocide to suggest that the current government is somehow above it all. The logic is: how could the victims of genocide, in turn, commit mass atrocities? Obviously, that’s illogical, but they use the argument implicitly to try to defend the indefensible.

For me, “never again” doesn’t mean never again except for Israel, never again except for Rwanda. It means never again for anybody. Part of the advantage the Israeli government has is that when people think about genocide, they tend to focus on the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide, where the aim, after a certain point, was to kill every Jew or every Tutsi that could be found.

But if you read the Genocide Convention—the treaty that defines genocide and that many governments have ratified—genocide can be aimed at destroying a group in whole, as in the Holocaust or Rwanda, or in part. This is where the Holocaust and Rwandan examples can mislead, because it is also genocide if you target part of a group, either for killing or through conditions of life that bring about their partial destruction. That is what defines Gaza today. The Israeli government is not trying to kill every single Palestinian. But it is trying to kill enough Palestinians and deprive them with enough severity that they are forced to flee into Egypt. Genocide with an intent to destroy a group in part is what’s really going on here. The Holocaust leads us astray because that’s not what it was about. So, we need to read the Genocide Convention as written and recognize that the Holocaust alone does not define genocide. There are other forms—such as the one playing out in Gaza today.

Past Genocides Do Not Justify Present Atrocities

And lastly, you’ve drawn parallels between Kagame’s Rwanda and Netanyahu’s Israel in weaponizing past victimhood to justify present crimes. How can the human rights community dismantle such narratives without denying past genocides, and which accountability tools—aid conditionality, arms suspensions, or regional pressure—have proven most effective against such impunity politics?

Professor Kenneth Roth: As I mentioned, both Netanyahu and Kagame play on past genocide to divert attention from their current mass atrocities—Netanyahu in Gaza, and Kagame through both his repression at home and, most acutely, his invasion of Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo through his own forces as well as the proxy M23 rebel group.

The goal of the human rights community is obviously not to deny the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide. These are facts, these are horrific episodes in human history. But the point is to say: “Yes, they happened, but they don’t excuse present abuses.” So, we have to carefully document what’s happening in Congo and in Gaza and press for real pressure to stop it.

That pressure can and should include economic measures. Sadly, the European Union—while many of its members are recognizing a Palestinian state—has yet to suspend Israel’s trade benefits, despite vows from Commission President von der Leyen to do so soon. In eastern Congo, back in 2012, a similar Rwandan invasion via the M23 was stopped in its tracks when the US and British governments told Kagame they would cut off aid unless he withdrew. Within days, the M23 crumbled. Today, that isn’t happening. Trump cut a deal allowing Rwanda to stay and exploit the minerals.

So, we need to look at what has worked in the past, namely intense economic pressure. I would like to see the International Criminal Court (ICC)—which has already acted in part in Gaza—do much more and also extend its action to eastern Congo. It has done so in the past, but not with respect to this current invasion. Plenty of steps remain available to help rein in Kagame and Netanyahu and to stop their misuse of past atrocities as an excuse for committing new ones today.