Dr. Cristian Cantir is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Oakland University.

Assoc. Prof. Cantir: Moldova’s Election a Victory for EU, Defeat for Kremlin

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryForeign PolicyHomeInterviewsMigration

In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Cristian Cantir (Oakland University) described Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections as “a major win for the European Union and a major defeat for the Kremlin.” Despite massive Russian interference—including vote-buying, cryptocurrency transfers, and efforts to incite unrest—Moldovan institutions responded with unprecedented consistency, demonstrating what Dr. Cantir calls a “confirmation of Moldova’s democratic resilience.” Yet, he warns that Moscow remains influential through populist narratives exploiting poverty and weak institutions. The results, he argues, reflect both the enduring popularity of EU integration and the failures of pro-Russian opposition parties. For Dr. Cantir, Moldova offers a striking example of how Russian influence faces diminishing returns when met with institutional strength and sustained Western support.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The outcome of Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections has been widely interpreted as a defining moment in the country’s European trajectory and its long struggle to resist Russian influence. In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Cristian Cantir, Associate Professor of Political Science at Oakland University, framed the results in stark geopolitical terms: “At a macro level, I would say this election represents a major win for the European Union and a major defeat for the Kremlin. I think it’s fair to frame it in those terms as a general way of understanding what happened.”

Dr. Cantir’s assessment reflects not only the electoral success of the pro-European Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), but also the broader resilience of Moldova’s democratic institutions in the face of Moscow’s sustained interference campaigns. International observers judged the elections to be generally free and fair, even amid bomb threats, electoral violations, and widespread attempts at corruption. As Dr. Cantir explains, this points to a “confirmation of Moldova’s democratic resilience,” if not yet full consolidation, as state institutions and law enforcement demonstrated an increased capacity to respond to hybrid threats.

Russia’s interference toolkit—long tested in Moldova—appeared less effective in this cycle. The Kremlin poured more resources into the effort, funding political actors, experimenting with cryptocurrency transfers, and attempting to stoke unrest. Yet, Dr. Cantir argues, these strategies delivered “diminishing returns” in a political environment where institutions had grown more proactive. “Moscow has been somewhat taken aback by the extent to which Moldovan institutions have now responded in such a consistent way to Russian interference,” he observes. The shift suggests that the Kremlin’s approach is increasingly constrained by its own reliance on disinformation and narratives fed by loyal pro-Russian politicians, which often fail to reflect the realities of Moldovan society. As Dr. Cantir notes, “some of the claims you see in Russian propaganda are so laughable and rudimentary… you wonder whether they actually believe them, because they don’t even work as propaganda.”

Still, Russia remains a formidable actor in Moldova’s domestic politics. Populist narratives that exploit socioeconomic hardship, corruption, and weak institutions continue to resonate with segments of the population, leaving Moldova’s pro-European course vulnerable to authoritarian retrenchment. Dr. Cantir highlights the need for PAS and other pro-EU forces to demonstrate tangible benefits of integration to disengaged citizens, warning that otherwise they may fall “much more easily to populist messaging” that is Eurosceptic and pro-Russian in nature.

Ultimately, the Moldovan case illustrates both the persistence and limitations of Russia’s hybrid influence operations in the post-Soviet space. Unlike Ukraine or Georgia, where Moscow has resorted to military force, Moldova demonstrates how resilience is possible when domestic institutions respond effectively and Western partners provide consistent support. As Dr. Cantir emphasizes, this election represents more than just a partisan victory—it is a symbolic moment of geopolitical realignment: a triumph for Europe, and a setback for the Kremlin.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Associate Professor Cristian Cantir, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Moldova’s Elections Confirm Democratic Resilience

A man casts his ballot during parliamentary elections in Moldova, in front of the national flag. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Cristian Cantir, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How would you characterize the broader significance of Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections, particularly in the light of the pro-European Action and Solidarity Party’s (PAS) ability to withstand unprecedented Russian interference campaigns? To what extent can this outcome be read as a genuine consolidation of Moldova’s democratic resilience, and to what degree is it contingent upon extraordinary external support from the EU and its allies?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: Thank you very much for inviting me. It’s a pleasure to be here, and I’m always glad to talk about Moldova—a topic that doesn’t usually get much attention in international affairs. At a macro level, I would say this election represents a major win for the European Union and a major defeat for the Kremlin. I think it’s fair to frame it in those terms as a general way of understanding what happened.

To the extent that it was generally a free and fair election, according to most international observers—even in the face of massive Russian interference—it was consistent with Moldova’s tradition of holding competitive elections since independence. I would take this as a positive sign of the relative health of Moldovan democracy. The process was conducted competently, with electoral authorities and law enforcement responding promptly to challenges, including bomb threats, reported violations, and instances of electoral corruption. From that standpoint, it serves as a solid example—not necessarily a consolidation, but certainly a confirmation—of Moldova’s democratic resilience. Of course, there remain significant challenges to Moldova’s democratic consolidation, but overall the outcome is good news for the country’s democracy.

I do think the election results can be partly attributed to external EU support, but it’s important to refine this point by highlighting one individual in particular—Moldovan President Maia Sandu. Sandu is a unique figure, not only in Moldova’s political history but also in the broader Central and Eastern European context. She has consistently been a popular, anti-corruption, reformist, pro-European leader. Many of the criticisms and attacks directed at her by the pro-Russian opposition have not gained much traction. She has remained highly popular within Moldova, due in part to her strong international reputation, especially among EU politicians. In this sense, when we talk about external influence, it is really a combination of two factors: Sandu’s personal popularity and the EU’s admiration for, and support of, her during this campaign. That said, I would not be so confident in giving the ruling party, PAS, too much credit for the victory. There remain fundamental issues with PAS as a pro-EU force, which we can also discuss further.

Moldovans Voted for Europe, Not PAS

Do the results primarily reflect a deepening consolidation of Moldova’s pro-European trajectory, or are they better understood as a rejection of entrenched pro-Russian elites such as Igor Dodon and his allies? In other words, should we interpret the outcome as an ideological commitment to Europe or as an electoral repudiation of discredited political actors?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: We could start by noting that EU integration is genuinely popular with a majority of the Moldovan population. Most polls confirm this, and even the 2024 referendum—though decided by a razor-thin margin—pointed to its broad appeal. That narrow margin can be attributed, at least in part, to vote-buying allegations and to the pro-Russian opposition framing the referendum as a judgment on PAS, the ruling party, rather than on the EU itself. Since PAS has become almost synonymous with the pro-EU position, this image has limited the viability of any other pro-European force. As a result, most pro-EU Moldovans voted for PAS, even if they were frustrated with the party’s slow response to major challenges such as poverty or judicial reform. To some extent, then, the outcome reflects support for EU integration combined with the absence of credible alternatives. Much of the vote was strategic: it did not necessarily indicate satisfaction with PAS as a party or with its performance, but rather the lack of any real choice.

The other parties in the election can also be faulted for failing to develop a narrative that offered a genuine alternative to PAS. Many claimed to support some degree of EU integration—even pro-Russian parties promised to negotiate more with Brussels. They tried to emphasize sovereignty and introduced socially conservative themes aimed at countering what they viewed as the EU’s liberal values. Yet this did not resonate with most Moldovans, as it came across as vague messaging—essentially, “we will slow down EU integration,” without explaining what that would mean or why it was necessary. By contrast, tangible benefits such as visa-free travel or lower roaming fees—everyday concerns tied directly to EU integration—proved far more compelling. As a result, the opposition’s alternative was unclear and largely reduced to a promise of “we are not the current political elites.”

The results, therefore, can be attributed both to the continuing popularity of the EU and to the weakness of the opposition leaders. Their campaigns were driven more by resentment of the ruling party and calls to “purge the system,” or what they called “the regime,” than by any proactive or positive electoral platform.

Moldovan President Maia Sandu speaks at a press conference following her meeting with Bulgarian President Rumen Radev in Chișinău, Moldova, on October 27, 2022. Photo: Dreamstime.

Diaspora Has Become the Backbone of Moldova’s Pro-EU Course

The Moldovan diaspora appears to have played a decisive role in shaping the electoral outcome. How should we understand the implications of this phenomenon for the transnationalization of Moldovan democracy, particularly regarding questions of sovereignty, external leverage, and the construction of a political community that extends well beyond national borders?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: The question of the Moldovan diaspora is particularly interesting, as it has been essential in consolidating Moldova’s pro-EU course, especially in recent years. Voting has also become much easier for diaspora members, particularly in Western countries, which is where most diaspora ballots are cast. As a result, the Moldovan diaspora is strongly pro-Western in its orientation—overwhelmingly so, judging by the last few elections.

With some exceptions, the Moldovan diaspora is relatively recent, with the first wave beginning in the 1990s. Attachments to the homeland remain very strong, and personal connections are still close. Travel has also become much easier—for example, low-cost airlines have made going back and forth far more accessible. And because most Moldovans abroad now reside legally, there is far less fear than in the 1990s and 2000s, when many migrated illegally or crossed borders without visas and were hesitant to return. For all these reasons, the diaspora’s ties to Moldova remain particularly strong.

The diaspora has not yet developed a separate identity; it remains very much rooted in Moldova. For example, if you visit Moldova in August, it is striking—you hear Moldovan children speaking with Portuguese accents in shops, and it becomes difficult to get a dentist appointment because so many diaspora members return home for treatment. This illustrates how deeply the diaspora remains part of Moldovan society. The ruling PAS, like other parties, has been very friendly and encouraging toward the diaspora. There are events organized exclusively for them, success stories highlighted in the media, and programs inviting them to return and share their experiences. There is also considerable gratitude for remittances, which have helped offset some of the country’s socioeconomic inequalities.

It is also important to remember that Moldovans’ understanding of sovereignty has always carried a transnational dimension. Many have looked to Romania for cultural and ethnic identity markers, while others have looked to Russia. As a result, Moldovans are more accustomed to hybrid and multiple identities. They can remain deeply connected both to the countries where they now live and to Moldovan politics—connections that are further strengthened by technology such as Facebook, online news, and live-streamed broadcasts.

The picture becomes more complicated when we look at the politicization of the diaspora, particularly by pro-Russian forces. Because the diaspora is strongly supportive of pro-Western groups, pro-Russian politicians have advanced a narrative—especially visible in recent years—that Moldovans inside the country oppose PAS, while those abroad support it. The argument is that Moldova’s diaspora is effectively holding those who remain at home hostage to the PAS regime. Pro-Russian groups have been trying to inflame tensions between these two communities. Igor Dodon, Moldova’s most prominent pro-Russian politician, has even described the diaspora as a “parallel electorate.” Another pro-Russian politician, Irina Vlah, has pursued what can only be described as an unusual campaign, promoting narratives such as asking Moldovans to “adopt” a fellow citizen inside the country who is suffering under the pro-EU PAS. I would not be surprised if such narratives continue to spread and further deepen tensions between diaspora communities and Moldovans still at home.

Finally, one more point: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its interference in Moldovan politics has highlighted an unresolved issue concerning the Moldovan diaspora in Russia. Estimates of the diaspora there range from about 100,000 to several hundred thousand people. Because of Russian interference, Moldovan authorities have opened only a minimal number of polling stations, most of them in Moscow. Given the vast size of Russia, this makes it much more difficult for Moldovans living there to cast their ballots. Authorities argue that this limitation is necessary to ensure ballot security, but it leaves unresolved the broader problem of how to guarantee equal voting rights for all members of the diaspora, regardless of where they reside. This remains a pressing question that Moldovan politicians will eventually have to address, even though, for now, it has been overshadowed by Russia’s interference.

Former Moldovan President Igor Dodon attends a Party of Socialists meeting in Bălți, Moldova, on October 17, 2021. Photo: Iuri Gagarin.

Low Turnout Makes Moldova Vulnerable to Populist Messaging

With voter turnout just above 50%, what does the relative disengagement of a significant portion of the electorate reveal about the legitimacy and durability of PAS’s mandate? To what extent does persistent electoral apathy constrain the prospects for long-term democratic consolidation and weaken the societal foundations of Moldova’s pro-European orientation?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: I want to make a quick statistical note first. The 2024 Moldovan Census identified about 2.3 to 2.4 million Moldovans in the country with stable residency. Meanwhile, the electoral rolls from the Central Electoral Commission list close to 300,000 Moldovans abroad, which doesn’t quite capture reality. In fact, there are many more Moldovans who still hold residency but live or work abroad. This makes turnout somewhat harder to assess in Moldova, given the fragmented data we have.

That said, the general premise of the question still holds, because the turnout percentage does indicate a degree of disengagement. This poses a problem for PAS and for Moldova’s pro-European orientation. People who are disengaged—who don’t feel invested in Moldova’s pro-EU path or don’t perceive clear benefits from EU integration—are much more susceptible to populist messaging. In Moldova, such messaging tends to be Eurosceptic and pro-Russian. As a result, these citizens may be more easily mobilized by populist politicians, giving those actors greater institutional power to undermine EU integration.

For this reason, demonstrating the tangible benefits of EU integration to more apathetic groups should be a key part of PAS’s strategy. Otherwise, we may see rising support for populist politicians. A few have already begun to gain visibility—there are two in particular I could highlight—but the broader risk of growing populist appeal is certainly there.

Russia May Be Falling Victim to Its Own Propaganda in Moldova

Observers have described Moldova as a “laboratory” for Russia’s hybrid interference strategies. In your assessment, what does the 2025 electoral cycle reveal about both the adaptive capacities and structural limitations of Moscow’s toolkit of influence? Can we speak of a paradigmatic shift in the Kremlin’s approach, or are we witnessing the persistence of familiar strategies with diminishing returns?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: That’s a really good question. The simplest answer is that we don’t know yet, and there’s a reason for that. The 2025 election was marked by greater intensity and a wider range of Kremlin interference efforts. They invested more money, backed more political actors, and became more involved in attempts to stoke violence and protests. Yet none of these efforts proved particularly effective.

There are a couple of points to keep in mind here. First of all, Moldovan law enforcement and the broader institutional response have become more active, dealing more effectively—even compared to 2024—with clear cases of electoral interference. This included vote buying, the use of cryptocurrency to transfer funds, and the use of cash for illegal financing. Another important factor in understanding the Kremlin’s difficulties in Moldova is that, for a long time, Russia had grown accustomed to acting with relative impunity there. Even when pro-European or centrist coalitions were in power, Moldovan institutions and politicians were rarely proactive in curbing Russian influence. At best, they ignored Moscow’s efforts; at worst, pro-Russian politicians openly reinforced them. I think Moscow has been somewhat taken aback by the consistency with which Moldovan institutions have now responded to Russian interference.

So, I don’t know if we are going to see a full shift in the Kremlin’s approach, but I do think there is more re-evaluation and discussion about how it might adjust its strategies. One additional point is that the Kremlin actually knows a great deal about Moldova—more so than many in the West. The problem, however, is that it continues to rely heavily on information fed by pro-Russian politicians, who often promote narratives that are simply inaccurate. For example, the claim by some pro-Russian groups that EU integration is not popular in Moldova is simply not true. It’s difficult to tell whether the Kremlin and its allies are falling victim to their own narratives, which distort their understanding of Moldovan dynamics and render their strategies less effective. That’s something I’ve often thought about, because some of the claims you see in Russian propaganda are so laughable and rudimentary. You start to wonder whether they actually believe them, since they don’t even work effectively as propaganda. That’s how rudimentary they are.

Pro-Russian supporters attend Victory Day celebrations on May 9 in Chișinău, Moldova. Alongside World War II veterans displaying their medals, members of the public dressed in Soviet-era military uniforms highlighted the enduring strength of Russian influence. Photo: Dreamstime.

Moldova Now Frames Itself as Belonging in Europe

In the light of your previous work on Moldova’s foreign policy balancing, how would you assess Chisinau’s current capacity to resist Moscow’s strategies of destabilization, particularly given Russia’s reliance on authoritarian-style tactics such as elite capture, patronage networks, and the exploitation of populist narratives?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: When it comes to balancing, we’ve seen a noticeable shift. The perception of the EU as a counterbalance to Russia—once more prominent among pro-Russian or centrist groups—was grounded in the idea that Moldova should extract benefits from all its major geopolitical partners. That view has given way to a more cultural and identity-based argument. The ruling pro-European group now frames Moldova as inherently European, emphasizing that the country “belongs in Europe” and should “go home” to Europe.

As a result, the EU is now articulated less as a strategic tool for Moldova’s foreign policy goals and more as a natural place of belonging for Moldovans. Pro-Russian parties still advance the balancing argument, but it has been severely undermined by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. They have not substantially re-evaluated or adjusted their rhetoric since then, but the post-2022 context is fundamentally different. Thus, the balancing argument no longer carries the same weight. While it still registers some support in polling data, it is far less compelling from a political standpoint.

With respect to elite capture, the Kremlin is beginning to understand that Moldovan institutions are responding more coherently to Russian threats. Some of its old patronage networks or elite-capture strategies are not working as effectively because Moldovan law enforcement is pushing back. One example of this would be Russia’s attempts to infiltrate Moldovan politics or encourage spying, which the Moldovan Secret Service has been more proactive in addressing. I’m not sure how the Kremlin will deal with this particular problem.

That said, the Kremlin still retains significant power when it comes to the populist narratives, and the vulnerabilities they exploit. Given Moldova’s socioeconomic issues, including high rates of poverty, these vulnerabilities can be easily leveraged by populist politicians, and consequently by pro-Kremlin groups as well.

Odessa Looms Large in Moldova’s Strategic Calculus

What does the Moldovan case tell us about Russia’s evolving approach to influence operations in the post-Soviet space, especially compared to its tactics in Ukraine or Georgia?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: One of the key differences between Ukraine and Georgia is that, where Russia lacks either the ability or the immediate interest to engage in military action—as opposed to what it is doing in Ukraine or what it did in Georgia—its influence operations become less effective when faced with strong institutional responses and consistent support from Moldova’s allies. Because direct military threats are not immediate, Moldova has more space to resist Russian influence.

This dynamic is often reflected in discussions by Moldovan politicians about Odessa. Odessa looms large in Moldovan politics, because if the city were to fall, the strategic calculus would change significantly. If Odessa does not fall, and if Ukraine continues to resist the Russian army in southern Ukraine and around Odessa specifically, it will be considerably easier for Moldova to counter influence operations without the constant pressure of an imminent military threat.

Hybrid Warfare Is a Transnational Problem—It Requires a Transnational Response

Russian military expert at a government operations base, engaged in cyber activities aimed at spreading disinformation and hybrid warfare propaganda. Photo: Dragos Condrea.

How sustainable is Moldova’s reliance on Western partners for countering hybrid threats, given the country’s domestic vulnerabilities such as corruption, weak institutions, and economic hardship?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: That’s a good point. Ideally, you would want a sovereign state with strong institutions, fewer socioeconomic problems, and a consistent fight against corruption. That would give it the capacity to resist Russian influence more effectively without significant outside support. The European Union also needs to focus on those factors—tackling corruption, strengthening institutions, and addressing economic hardship.

At the same time, Moldova’s reliance on Western partners to counter Russian hybrid warfare is unavoidable, because this is not only Moldova’s problem. To the extent that it is a transnational challenge, it requires a transnational and coordinated response. Moldova cannot and should not handle this alone. Long-term, institutionalized cooperation with the EU is essential—both because Russian hybrid attacks extend beyond Moldova and because Moldova’s own capacities remain limited. Even if Moldova had strong governance and robust institutions, it would still need to work closely with the European Union to meet this particular threat.

Polarization in Moldova Is Fluid, Not Fixed

How realistic is Moldova’s aim to achieve EU accession by 2030, given both the demanding structural reforms and potential geopolitical vetoes within the Union, and in what ways might deep internal polarization between pro-European and pro-Russian constituencies undermine the legitimacy of this process by opening space for populist mobilization and authoritarian retrenchment?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: Internal geopolitical polarization is a serious problem in Moldova, but it is also important to remember that polarization is a fluid phenomenon. Polling, for instance, used to show much stronger support for integration with Russian projects even 10 or 20 years ago, and much less support for NATO membership. This shows that polarization can shift over time.

The strategy of Moldovan authorities has been to make a compelling economic, or quality-of-life, case for EU integration, even in regions where the political dimension of integration is less popular. In places like Gagauzia and parts of northern Moldova, the aim is to erode polarization by demonstrating the tangible economic benefits of closer ties with the EU. If successful, this could help offset some of the effects of geopolitical polarization by easing tensions.

So, the biggest question isn’t really polarization, but whether pro-EU forces can articulate and illustrate the benefits of EU integration clearly to more people, including those in pro-Russian propaganda bubbles. To a large extent, integration by 2030 is driven more by the speed with which Moldovan authorities can enact reforms, by developments in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and also by the situation in Transnistria—which we can talk about—and what exactly Moldovan authorities are going to do with that separatist region.

The Cyprus Model Is a Real Option for Moldova

Monument to Vladimir Lenin in front of the Parliament building in Tiraspol, Transnistria, Moldova. Photo: Dreamstime.

Given the persistence of Russian troops in Transnistria, how does the unresolved status of the region constrain Moldova’s European ambitions and its sovereignty more broadly?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: The number of Russian troops in Transnistria isn’t sufficient to threaten Moldova’s European ambitions or its sovereignty. Greater risks could come from a hypothetical mobilization of a large part of the Transnistrian population during a potential conflict, but that scenario carries its own difficulties. Nor does the Russian military presence pose an immediate threat to sovereignty in the sense that Moldova is able to control most of its territory fairly effectively, aside from Transnistria. In that respect, it is not an urgent danger.

The war in Ukraine has also constrained Transnistria’s potentially aggressive orientation, or even its foreign policy toward Ukraine, Moldova, and the EU more broadly. Within Moldova, there is a growing sense that EU integration must move forward and can happen without Transnistria. Moldovan authorities have explicitly stated that it is possible for Moldova to join the EU first, using the Cyprus model. Cyprus is a common example cited by Moldovan officials and has even been echoed by former EU leaders. José Manuel Barroso, for instance, recently affirmed that the Cyprus model is indeed a possibility for Moldova.

At this stage, Chișinău does not view Transnistria as an obstacle to EU integration. Instead, it argues that pre-integration measures demonstrating the economic benefits of EU membership will gradually draw Transnistria closer. If necessary, Moldova can join the EU without Transnistria and then work toward integrating the region into the Union over the longer term.

Populists Give Moscow Veto Power over Moldova’s EU Path

Lastly, Professor Cantir, what scenarios do you consider most plausible for the future of the Transnistria conflict: gradual reintegration under EU auspices, continued limbo, or renewed escalation tied to Russia’s strategic setbacks in Ukraine? And in any of these scenarios, how might populist or authoritarian actors instrumentalize the issue domestically to challenge Moldova’s European orientation? 

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: The most important point to note—the elephant in the room—is that everything depends on how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unfolds. If Ukraine manages to resist in the south and hold Odessa, then what we are most likely to see, at least in the short term, is the maintenance of the status quo. The EU would continue efforts to trade with, develop, and engage local organizations in Transnistria—essentially trying to connect the region more closely to Europe, with the long-term goal of gradual reintegration. That will be the general orientation, or at least the attempt, always contingent on developments in Ukraine and particularly in Odessa.

When it comes to the question of populist or authoritarian actors instrumentalizing the issue, one of the biggest patterns to watch in the next few years in Moldova is how they frame the argument about the Cyprus model. PAS has argued that Moldova can join the EU without Transnistria first. By contrast, many other actors—including pro-Russian politicians in the Patriotic Bloc, the largest opposition group in Parliament, as well as Alternativa, a centrist, self-defined pro-EU bloc—have insisted that Moldova must not enter the EU without Transnistria. In effect, this position grants Transnistria—and, to some extent, Moscow—veto power over Moldova’s EU integration aspirations.

So, populist politicians and authoritarian actors in Moldova will seek to instrumentalize the Transnistria issue by insisting that the country must not—and cannot—join the EU without first resolving the conflict. This, of course, significantly prolongs the timeline and effectively ties Moldova’s European integration to Moscow’s willingness to settle the dispute.

Graffiti artwork promoting religious tolerance, as Bristol City Council consulted the public on whether it should remain or be removed, August 31, 2009, Bristol, UK. Photo: Dreamstime.

European Observatory on Illiberalism and Culture Wars

by European ObservatoryHome

The Observatory monitors and analyses how illiberal politics and culture wars are reshaping democracies across the globe. Through comparative research, expert collaboration, and accessible insights, it highlights threats to rights, pluralism, and democratic resilience.

About the Observatory

The European Observatory on Illiberalism and Culture Wars is a research initiative dedicated to understanding one of the most pressing global challenges: the rise of illiberal politics and the increasing centrality of cultural conflict in democratic life.

Across the world, political and legal disagreements are increasingly reframed as moral and identity-based struggles — the so-called culture wars. These dynamics, often intertwined with populist narratives, directly affect fundamental rights, pluralism, and institutional legitimacy, while eroding the resilience of democratic systems.

The Observatory provides a systematic, comparative, and interdisciplinary platform to map, monitor, and interpret these developments, offering rigorous yet accessible insights for scholars, journalists, policymakers, and the wider public.

Objectives

The initiative is conceived as a collaborative pilot project relying on voluntary coordination. Its objectives are:

  • Monitoring: Track illiberal discourses, legislative regressions, and polarizing events in diverse democratic contexts;
  • Analysis: Examine how cultural conflict is instrumentalized politically to undermine liberal-democratic norms;
  • Knowledge Transfer: Provide timely, research-based commentary and synthesis for both academic and policy debates;
  • Institutional Development: Build the foundations for a permanent programme capable of attracting competitive funding and gaining global visibility.

Thematic Scope

The Observatory focuses on the intersection between illiberal politics, culture wars, and democratic resilience. Key areas include:

  • Attacks on fundamental rights (e.g., freedom of expression, gender equality, minority protection);
  • Political and legislative pressures on the rule of law and constitutional safeguards;
  • The weaponization of debates on national identity, migration, religion, gender, and historical memory;
  • The convergence of populist movements with illiberal narratives that challenge pluralism and institutional legitimacy.

Although special attention will be given to Europe, the Observatory is explicitly global in scope, fostering comparative perspectives across regions such as the Americas, Africa, and Asia.

Methodology

The pilot phase will operate as a flexible, low-cost platform, combining monitoring, comparative research, and collaborative knowledge-sharing. The approach includes:

  • Media and discourse monitoring in selected countries across Europe and beyond;
  • Narrative and legal framing analysis of key themes (e.g., “gender ideology,” “great replacement,” anti-woke policies, memory politics);
  • Collaboration with academic partners and national experts, producing short analyses and thematic updates;
  • Quarterly briefings and alerts, synthesizing trends and offering comparative insights;
  • Outreach and partnership-building to attract institutional collaboration and prepare applications for competitive funding.

The Observatory will begin as a modular initiative requiring only coordination, content curation, and editorial oversight — all ensured on a voluntary basis during the initial stage.

Call for Volunteers

Join the European Observatory on Illiberalism and Culture Wars

The European Observatory on Illiberalism and Culture Wars, hosted within the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), is opening a call for volunteers to join its growing research network.

Why get involved?

By becoming part of the Observatory, you will:

  • Be part of a transnational research initiative mapping and analyzing the rise of illiberalism and culture wars across Europe and beyond;
  • Collaborate with an international network of scholars, experts, and practitioners committed to defending democracy, pluralism, and fundamental rights;
  • Gain visibility and impact through co-authored analyses, thematic briefings, and collaborative outputs published under the Observatory’s platform;
  • Contribute to events, publications, and debates, helping to shape an emerging field of research and influence the public and academic discussion;
  • Strengthen your academic and professional profile by engaging with an institutionally recognized European research center (ECPS).

What we are looking for

We welcome applications from:

  • Early-career researchers, PhD candidates, and postdocs working on democracy, populism, illiberalism, identity politics, or related areas;
  • Established scholars and practitioners who wish to contribute their expertise to a collaborative and policy-relevant research environment;
  • Volunteers with interest in research, content curation, monitoring of national contexts, and transnational comparative analysis.

How we work?

The Observatory operates as a flexible, collaborative platform, initially in pilot phase and with no financial requirements. Volunteers will contribute short analyses, monitoring reports, or thematic updates, coordinated through a common editorial structure. Contributions will be acknowledged and published under the Observatory’s name, ensuring collective visibility and authorship.

Be part of it

If you want to join a pan-European network that bridges academia, media, and policy, and contribute to building a long-term programme within ECPS, we would be delighted to hear from you.

To express interest, please contact us at jfd@populismstudies.org , including a short bio and a note on your research interests.

 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan watching the August 30 Victory Day Parade in Ankara, Turkey on August 30, 2014. Photo by Mustafa Kirazli.

Professor Barkey: Turkey Has Become a Full-Blown Authoritarian System

by AuthoritarianismEuropean ObservatoryHomeHuman RightsInterviews

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Henri Barkey—born in Turkey and one of the leading US experts on Middle East politics—warns that Turkey has crossed a decisive threshold under President Erdogan. “Turkey has now become a full-blown authoritarian system,” he stated, arguing that Erdogan has removed the “competitive” element from competitive authoritarianism by subordinating the judiciary, jailing rivals, and even deciding opposition party leadership. While repression deepens, Professor Barkey sees a paradox: “The system is becoming more authoritarian, but society may be resisting much more than we realize.” He highlights youth-led mobilization, fears over arrested Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu’s popularity, and Europe’s limited leverage, concluding that Erdogan’s overreach may ultimately galvanize opposition forces.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Henri Barkey, a leading scholar of Middle East politics who was born in Turkey, delivered a stark assessment of the country’s current trajectory under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. “Turkey has now become a full-blown authoritarian system,” Professor Barkey stated, emphasizing that the transition from “competitive authoritarianism” to outright authoritarian rule marks a dangerous turning point.

Professor Barkey—Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and holder of the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Chair in International Relations at Lehigh University—has long studied Turkey’s political development. He previously directed the Middle East Center at the Wilson Center and served on the US State Department Policy Planning Staff during the Clinton administration.

Professor Barkey situated Erdogan’s consolidation of power within a broader historical and political context. Turkey’s modern history, he observed, has been marked by cycles of democratic openings and authoritarian retrenchment. Yet, despite repeated interruptions—from military coups to autocratic turns—“the Turkish public, by and large, has adapted and adopted a sense of democratic culture.” The resilience of ordinary citizens, he noted, remains a crucial counterweight to authoritarian encroachment.

At the heart of Professor Barkey’s argument is Erdogan’s dismantling of institutional safeguards. “He is turning Turkey into a complete authoritarian system because he controls the judiciary, and judges and prosecutors essentially do whatever he wants them to do,” Professor Barkey explained. Recent episodes—politically motivated trials, the dismissal of opposition leaders, and the manipulation of party leadership contests—demonstrate, in his view, the collapse of even the minimal competition that previously characterized Turkey’s hybrid regime. “In other words, Erdogan is now deciding who will lead the main opposition party.”

This tightening grip, however, is not without risk. Professor Barkey underscored a paradox: “There’s a kind of dialectic here: the system is becoming more authoritarian, but society may be resisting much more than we realize.” Millions of citizens, particularly the younger generations who have never known a Turkey without Erdogan, have mobilized in protests, demanding change. Professor Barkey noted that such resistance is difficult to gauge because “people are afraid to speak out” and reporting is restricted, but he insisted that “at some point, this is going to break.”

Erdogan’s own fear of rivals, especially Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, reflects this tension. Professor Barkey argued that the regime’s extraordinary measures to sideline Imamoglu—ranging from imprisonment to retroactive annulment of his university degree—offer “the clearest demonstration that he’s terrified.”

Professor Barkey also highlighted the role of external actors in shaping Erdogan’s room for maneuver. In his view, former US President Donald Trump “doesn’t believe in democracy” and effectively gave Erdogan “carte blanche” at home by refusing to criticize his repression. Europe, for its part, remains uneasy with Erdogan’s authoritarian aims and worried about migration pressures, but Professor Barkey noted that Erdogan feels confident he can “withstand European pressure” while focusing on demolishing the opposition. Ultimately, the combination of a permissive US stance under Trump and Europe’s limited leverage has reinforced Erdogan’s sense of impunity.

Ultimately, Professor Barkey’s analysis suggests both danger and opportunity: the danger of entrenched authoritarianism, but also the possibility that Erdogan’s overreach may galvanize opposition forces. As he concluded, “Authoritarian leaders always make mistakes… and I think Erdogan is already making them.”

Professor Henri Barkey is an Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and holder of the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Chair in International Relations at Lehigh University.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Henri Barkey, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Erdogan Realizes He’s Weak: People Are Fed Up and Want Change

Professor Henri Barkey, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Turkish President Erdogan has long relied on a blend of populist narratives and authoritarian tactics to consolidate power. Given the backlash over Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu’s imprisonment, the use of lawfare through corruption investigations, the appointment of trustees to CHP-led administrations, and the wave of nationwide anti-government protests, do you believe this strategy is now undermining rather than sustaining his authority? Could this moment mark a potential inflection point for his populist-authoritarian model?

Professor Henri Barkey: It’s interesting you say that, because I actually had a piece published in Foreign Affairs Online where I basically argued very strongly that Erdogan had made a terrible mistake by imprisoning the mayor of Istanbul, and I thought this was the end of Erdogan. Imamoglu is still in jail, and Erdogan is still the president, and he has gone ahead and imprisoned a lot more people—journalists and other members of the opposition party—and he is also trying to get rid of the leadership of the opposition party. 

But to me, all of these are indicators that he realizes, after 23 years in power, that people don’t want him anymore. He has actually lost public support, and he has to resort to these incredible machinations to stay in power. In other words, he realizes that if there were elections any time now, he would not be re-elected, and his party would lose. In fact, in the last municipal elections in 2024, the main opposition party came in comfortably—comfortably for Turkey—as number one, and his party came in second.

What is going on today in Turkey is that Erdogan realizes he’s weak. He has support—it’s not that he doesn’t have support—but of course, he has the state machine, which he can always mobilize to get anything he wants done. However, for him, it must be very difficult to accept that he, who used to be genuinely popular in Turkey and who won elections genuinely, is now losing support. People are fed up. People want change. And it’s natural. 

Imagine if you are 25, or maybe even 30 years old. All your conscious years have passed under one leader. People want change. So, it’s partially psychological, but partially also, of course, due to his responsibility for what’s going on in Turkey. The economy is not doing well. Inflation is high. He made terrible mistakes. And naturally, people want change.

The System Is Becoming More Authoritarian, but Society May Be Resisting

In your writings, you describe Erdogan’s evolution from a reformist leader promising EU-style democratization to a populist-authoritarian consolidating near-total power. How has this transformation shaped Turkey’s political trajectory and institutional resilience over the past two decades?

Professor Henri Barkey: Turkey—if you look at its modern history from World War II onwards—has experienced many different variations over the past 80 years. There have been democratic governments, military coups, and repeated interruptions in its political system. But what strikes me is that the Turkish public, by and large, has adapted and adopted a sense of democratic culture. Not perfect, not by any stretch of the imagination, but it exists. The Turkish public has a stake in elections and in the freedom to say what they want and to act as they wish.

Of course, there have been authoritarian periods—Turkey is going through one now—but you still see a certain resilience. The fact that 15 million people, after Istanbul Mayor Imamoglu was arrested, signed a petition to have him declared the candidate of the main opposition party is an incredible demonstration of people’s stake in the democratic system.

So, what’s happening is very interesting. On the one hand, underneath, there is this democratic culture. Again, I don’t want to exaggerate—it’s not perfect. But whose democratic system is perfect these days? Everything exists on a scale. What has happened in Turkey, however, is that Erdogan has essentially transformed the country into a, quote-unquote, “competitive authoritarian” system. Elections still take place, outcomes are largely determined, but there remains some element of competition. Certain offices may be won by the opposition, and the opposition can still win seats in Parliament, and so on.

But now he’s actually taking the competitive part out of competitive authoritarianism and eliminating it altogether. He is turning Turkey into a complete authoritarian system because he controls the judiciary, and judges and prosecutors essentially do whatever he wants them to do. We have seen people sent to jail for no reason whatsoever—simply because he doesn’t like them. Authorities have claimed that the main opposition party engaged in questionable practices in its primaries or conventions, and suddenly the justice system decides that leaders who were elected a few years ago should no longer hold their positions, and someone else should replace them. In other words, Erdogan is now deciding who will lead the main opposition party.

This is partly because he is clearly afraid of the current leadership, and especially of the mayor of Istanbul, who is in jail. Turkey has now become a full-blown authoritarian system, and I don’t think this is going to end well. By that, I mean authoritarian leaders always make mistakes, because there is never anyone around them to say, “Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, you shouldn’t do this; there may be consequences.” People always agree with them. So of course, mistakes are inevitable.

And I think Erdogan is already making mistakes. He has galvanized the opposition in a way that, if truly free elections were held today, he would be seriously doubted—he would not win. People can see that what he is doing is deeply unjust.

So there’s a kind of dialectic here: the system is becoming more authoritarian, but society may be resisting much more than we realize. It’s hard to see this resistance all the time because of restrictions—even on reporting. People are afraid to speak out. But at some point, this is going to break.

Imamoglu’s Jail Proves Erdogan’s Fear

Ekrem Imamoglu
Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu addresses supporters during a protest under the banner “The Nation Stands by Their Will” outside the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality on December 15, 2022. Photo: Tolga Ildun

The mass protests following Imamoglu’s arrest have been driven largely by younger generations who have never known a Turkey without Erdogan. How significant is this demographic factor in shaping the country’s political future, and do you see parallels with youth-led anti-authoritarian movements elsewhere?

Professor Henri Barkey: As I alluded to earlier, if you are 30 years old, Erdogan became your Prime Minister when you were 7 or 8 years old. I’m picking age 30 as an example, but imagine: all your conscious years you’ve seen one leader. And the other thing, of course, is that in terms of the communication systems—television, radio, newspapers—they are completely dominated by Erdogan in Turkey. So, you wake up to Erdogan, you go to bed with Erdogan.

And I’m not saying there isn’t a youth that actually supports Erdogan—there is. But there is certainly a youth that says, “Look, we would like to see somebody else.” In 2023, during the national elections, the main opposition party presented as a presidential candidate Mr. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who was unimaginative, did not appeal to the youth, and gave them no reason to galvanize. Now, for the first time in a long time, you have a leader on the opposition side. People criticize him, and that’s fine—he’s not perfect—but he has managed to capture the youth’s imagination. You see a great deal of mobilization, and that’s why they put him in jail.

Erdogan has many different court cases against him to keep him in jail. And in which country do you see a political leader arrested like this? He didn’t commit murder, he hasn’t done anything dangerous. But he has been in jail since March 19th. It’s been almost six months now, and he’ll be in jail for a very long time, because they don’t let you out—as if you were an axe murderer about to kill people. Journalists and others stay in jail for one or two years, and then suddenly maybe they decide to let you go, find you innocent, but you’ve already spent two years in jail.

We’ve seen this, of course, in the cases of the Kurdish political leader Selahattin Demirtas or the civil society leader Osman Kavala—they’ve been in jail for no reason whatsoever. And in the case of the mayor of Istanbul, they even annulled his university degree 30 years after he got it. Imagine if somebody decided to find some technicality and say, “Oh, my university degree is invalid, and therefore everything else I’ve done since then is invalid.” You can’t do that. But they come up with excuses to prevent an opponent from running against Erdogan.

The fact that Erdogan goes to such lengths to stop Imamoglu from running tells you how afraid he is of him. To me, that’s the best proof, the clearest demonstration, that he’s terrified.

Imamoglu’s Jail Time Only Raised His Standing

A photo from the mass CHP rally in Istanbul on March 29, 2025, protesting the unlawful detention of Ekrem Imamoglu, organized by party leader Ozgur Ozel. The event brought AKP and opposition supporters face to face. Photo: Elif Aytar.

Imamoglu’s repeated electoral victories and rising popularity have made him Erdogan’s most formidable rival. By imprisoning him and pursuing politically motivated trials, has Erdogan inadvertently elevated Imamoglu into a symbol of democratic resistance, similar to Erdogan’s own trajectory after his imprisonment in the late 1990s?

Professor Henri Barkey: He is smart enough to have realized that he owes his popularity, at least in part, to the fact that, as mayor of Istanbul, he was kicked out of his job and spent a short time in prison. That actually enhanced his standing. Moreover, if you remember, not in 2024 but in the previous municipal elections, Imamoglu won with a small majority. Then the Erdogan government came up with an excuse, claiming irregularities in the elections, and ordered that they be held again. People saw through it. What happened? Imamoglu won by a much larger margin against the same candidate. Why? Because people were angered by Ankara’s political interference in their choices. Even those who did not vote for Imamoglu the first time decided to vote for him the second, just to punish Erdogan.

Anyone should have learned that lesson. He hasn’t. The alternative, of course, is that he knows the lesson, and this time he intends to prevent Imamoglu from running. He will find him guilty and keep him in jail so that he can go into the next elections unopposed. He is also trying to destroy the opposition party, aiming for it to nominate, or to be led by, the candidate who ran against him in 2023, because he knows he can outmaneuver him and thinks this is the way to secure another term.

So, I think that’s his intention. I believe he’s made up his mind. He knows he can’t beat Imamoglu, but he can beat the new CHP leadership. And unfortunately, we will see a lot more people going to jail.

Erdogan Wants to Take the Competitive Part Out of Politics

Opposition party deputies, members and the members of civil society organisations had to guard the ballots for days to prevent stealing by the people organized by Erdogan regime in Turkey. The photo was shared by opposition deputy Mahmut Tanal’s Twitter account @MTanal during the Turkish local elections on March 31, 2019.

We’ve seen Erdogan’s government dismiss elected CHP mayors, replace them with trustees, and initiate corruption investigations against opposition-led municipalities. To what extent does this strategy reflect a deliberate effort to transform Turkey into a de facto one-party state, and could it ultimately backfire by strengthening opposition solidarity?

Professor Henri Barkey: I think my previous answers essentially say yes, of course. But you’ve noticed he’s now doing something else. He’s putting pressure on individual mayors of localities and forcing them to change parties and join his party. I saw today—though I forget where—that a deputy mayor was resigning from the main opposition party and joining Erdogan’s party. You can imagine the kind of pressure they must be exerting enourmous force her to do that, because it doesn’t make sense, when CHP is running high, to switch parties. But we’ve seen a number of cases like that.

So he’s not going to completely eliminate the main opposition party; he’s going to completely weaken it. He will make it what it was, let’s say, five years ago, before the opposition’s rejuvenation—when it won a few municipalities and a number of seats in Parliament, but had no influence and couldn’t do anything.

What’s very interesting is that all these corruption investigations have been initiated against opposition parties, opposition mayors, and sub-mayors. Not a single AKP mayor—or municipality—has been similarly treated. Can you really tell me there’s no corruption on the AKP side? No, but they’re all part of the system. That’s what I’m saying.

What Erdogan wants is to take the competitive part out of Turkey’s politics, because in his mind it should no longer be competitive. So it’s going to be only authoritarian. He’s turning Turkey into an authoritarian state.

Erdogan Cannot Control the Exiled Opposition Abroad

With the judiciary, media, and much of the bureaucracy subordinated to the presidency, are there any institutional safeguards left to counterbalance Erdogan’s authority? To what extent has the post-2016 purge of alleged Gulen-affiliated judges, prosecutors, academics, media, and civil servants accelerated Turkey’s democratic backsliding and hollowed out state capacity?

Professor Henri Barkey: Today the judiciary is completely under Erdogan’s control. If a judge rules in a way that Erdogan does not appreciate, he gets kicked out and sent somewhere else. The same applies to prosecutors. And there must be an internal state security apparatus that keeps tabs on all of these people, so that whenever pressure is needed, it can be applied.

So what’s left? What is the source of opposition today? I think, to a large extent, it’s the online environment—whether internet newspapers, journalists, or individuals with blogs and podcasts. Whenever Erdogan feels pressured, he tries to throttle the internet, slow it down, or impose bans on opposition networks by preventing them from broadcasting online. And they don’t have any other outlet, since they are not allowed to appear on mainstream television.

But that’s very hard to sustain all the time. It looks bad, and it can actually increase opposition if overused. When you slow down the internet, you slow it down for everyone—including people who simply want to buy things online. So it’s not clear to me that this is a viable long-term strategy. It’s more temporary and occasional. He did it this week with X, or Twitter.

So the online space remains, essentially, the main source of opposition. And you also have in Turkey a large number of journalists, academics, and public figures who are actively opposing him. This is what I meant earlier: there is still an element of democratic culture.

Now, you mentioned the Gulen movement. I know people who were professors at Gulen-owned universities. They were perfectly good academics, with international reputations, publishing internationally. They were not necessarily Gulenists. If you get a job at a university, you get it through established structures and processes. Yet all these people lost their jobs and became unemployable. That was a major blow to Turkish civil society and to the country’s intellectual world.

The Gulen movement was defeated, yes. But parts of it should not have been touched—for example, the universities. And by the way, I don’t know exactly what happened during the coup. To me, the coup remains an enigma. Maybe Gulenists were involved, but I think there were other factors as well. I suspect Erdogan knew ahead of time that a coup was coming, and when it happened, he took advantage of it. In the process, many people were smeared without due process.

This is something Turkish society will one day have to come to terms with. Gulenists who were guilty, yes—but not everyone was necessarily a Gulenist. And many suffered a great deal.

Another source of opposition, by the way, may be Turks who have emigrated to Europe. Yes, there is a large pro-Erdogan community abroad that tries to organize support. But there are also many dissenters now living in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere. They are a major source of opposition—and unlike in Turkey, Erdogan cannot control them, because he cannot throw them into jail.

You Can’t Have Democracy in Diyarbakir and Fascism in Istanbul

A Turkish man in Hyde Park, London, shows support for protesters in Istanbul following the eruption of nationwide demonstrations—Turkey’s largest anti-government unrest —challenging then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authority in June 2013. Photo credit: Ufuk Uyanik.

The PKK’s recent renunciation of armed struggle and ongoing talks involving Abdullah Ocalan and the DEM party suggest potential openings for renewed negotiations. How do you interpret Erdogan’s ambivalence toward these developments? Could a genuine Kurdish peace process pave the way for democratization, or is it more likely to be instrumentalized for political survival?

Professor Henri Barkey: To me, this is a very interesting situation because, with your question about democratization, how can you have… as a Kurdish leader once said, very correctly: you can’t have democracy in Diyarbakir and fascism in Istanbul. That is to say, what does it mean to democratize? Turkey needs to democratize. Turkey needs to deal with the Kurdish question. Turkey has to recognize that there are people who are not Turks, who have a different language, who would like to live as Turkish citizens but would also like to be able to express themselves in their own language or in any other fashion, and not have to go to jail for that.

The fact that the PKK has decided to renounce armed struggle is a good thing. They should have done it a long time ago, because the armed struggle wasn’t going anywhere. They had been completely defeated. They were just up in the northeast of Iraq, in the Qandil Mountains, stuck there with 158 Turkish bases in northern Iraq that completely dominate the area. One or two attacks a year is not what’s going to make the PKK the PKK. So the PKK was defeated, and they finally came to this realization. It’s good that they abandoned it. But I don’t think there is going to be a peace process. I don’t think this is going to go anywhere.

Because, first of all, Erdogan himself doesn’t believe in democracy. I mean, what did the opposition, the DEM party, say they want? They didn’t ask for anything specific. They would like, of course, prisoners to be released. They want to deal with what to do with the fighters who are abroad, in Iraq, who would like to be able to integrate into society. But basically, what the leadership has said so far is that they want democracy. They want to be able to participate. But this is not something Erdogan wants. Everything Erdogan is doing is, as I said, taking the “competitive” out of competitive authoritarianism and establishing a completely authoritarian state. So this is not going to work.

Now, it turns out that on the Kurdish side, the main leader who’s in jail—Ocalan—doesn’t happen to be a democrat either. So it’s a big question mark. He’s 80 years old now. He must be thinking about his legacy, and that’s why he’s trying to… but he also can’t make a deal that is going to be rejected by the democrats in Turkey. So he’s also stuck. I’m sure Erdogan’s idea was probably to convince the DEM party to vote for either a constitutional change, or more likely for early elections, that Erdogan would make sure he would win. That’s probably still his plan.

Bahceli’s Gamble on Kurdish Talks Faces Dead End

The one interesting question mark here is that, to a large extent, this whole process started with an initiative from Erdogan’s main right-wing coalition partner, the MHP, led by Devlet Bahceli, who used to be the most anti-Kurdish figure in Turkey. He said Ocalan should not be released, but should come to the Turkish Parliament and address Parliament. That was really an amazing statement by him, and he pushed the process.

I wonder if Mr. Bahçeli, who’s at the end of his life and has run the party without much to show for his years in power or as a party leader—what has he done, what has he accomplished?—maybe that was his way of creating an inheritance, if you will, for his followers: that he would bring domestic peace to Turkey. Well, if that’s his incentive, that’s fine. It doesn’t matter how you get there, as long as you do it.

So the big problem Erdogan has is: to what extent is Mr. Bahceli committed to continuing the process? And Mr. Bahceli himself must realize that, the way things are going now, the DEM party is not going to be able to make a deal with Erdogan. There will be talks—we’re going to see a commission has been created, supposedly there will be conversations—but this is not going anywhere. And in the meantime, Erdogan is destroying CHP, and this puts the DEM party in a terrible situation.

Trump Gave Erdogan Carte Blanche

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

And lastly, Professor Barkey, given Washington’s strategic interests—from NATO cohesion to cooperation with Syrian Kurdish forces—how should the US and EU respond to Erdogan’s escalating repression of the opposition? Would stronger political and economic pressure risk reinforcing his anti-Western populist narrative, or is greater confrontation inevitable?

Professor Henri Barkey: Let’s be honest here. What Erdogan has done since March would not have happened if you had a different president of the United States. Here you have Trump, who is upset about Bolsonaro getting tried, and he imposes sanctions even on the judge who is judging him. And then he has not said a word about what’s going on in Turkey. Trump doesn’t believe in democracy. Trump is only interested in himself and his own interests. So, he’s decided that he likes Erdogan, and he can do business with Erdogan, and therefore, Erdogan can do whatever he wants. And that’s what Erdogan is doing.

Let’s say Biden or Kamala Harris had been at the White House today. Erdogan would not have done any of these things, because the US government would have really pushed very hard. Whether it was investments or any other type of help that the Turks would need, they would not get.

The Turkish economy is in terrible shape. Inflation is much higher than the official figures indicate, and it’s still at 30% for a modern economy. The Turkish economy may be in better shape structurally, but I think it is still fairly dynamic. You go to Europe, you see Turkish exports everywhere—and I’m not just talking about tomatoes and agricultural products. I’m talking about sophisticated products, industrial products, electronic products. The Turkish economy has a number of advantages that probably would do a lot better with improved economic management from Ankara. But it has still managed to perform not poorly, given the circumstances.

Biden, or a Democratic president, or even a Republican president who cares about this—I mean, George Bush would have been up in arms about it. Trump has given Erdogan essentially carte blanche. And this is why we have not seen any major Turkish incursions into northern Syria.

Now, it’s not that Trump is attached to the Syrian Kurds. He couldn’t care less about them. But Trump would like to take American troops out of Syria, while also realizing that ISIS is on the mend, ISIS is getting stronger, and he doesn’t want a major ISIS insurrection again like what happened back in 2014. So he’s probably still thinking about it and has decided to reduce the number of troops, but not pull them out. As a result, Erdogan hasn’t gone into Syria.

But the truth is, the Syrian Kurds do not threaten Turkey. It’s just something in some Turks’ minds, and it’s a way of galvanizing the population behind you. The Kurdish problem in Turkey is a long-standing one, and there are many people who still don’t trust the Kurds. And Syrian Kurds are Syrians—people forget that. The Turks complain that Syrian Kurds control a large chunk of territory. Yes, they do. They happen to be Syrian Kurds, by the way. Turkey itself controls an enormous chunk of Syrian territory in the northwest—as big as Lebanon. But that’s okay, Turkey can do that. So you have these anomalies.

Erdogan is careful, because with Trump you don’t know from one day to the next how he might turn on you. So Trump is letting him do everything he wants to do in Turkey, but doesn’t want him to go into Syria and mess things up there. Fine—Erdogan can live with that. So Erdogan is quite happy.

Erdogan Thinks He Can Withstand European Pressure

The Europeans are very unhappy with what’s happening in Turkey, because they realize what Erdogan’s aims are. And you’ve had a huge exodus of Turks who’ve gone to Europe, escaping the Erdogan regime. The immigration problem from the rest of the world through Turkey to Europe has always been Erdogan’s carte majeure. But whatever Europeans do or threaten, Erdogan is going to ignore, because he essentially thinks he has maybe 6 to 12 months in which he has to focus on defanging or demolishing the opposition party. Once he is done with that, he won’t do anything else. So he thinks he can withstand European pressure for this long.

The interesting thing about Trump is that there’s a way in which people are also afraid of him because of his unpredictability and his very tough talk. It doesn’t always mean anything—the Chinese have seen it, and the Russians know exactly how to react—but they’re big powers. Everybody else is afraid. I’ll give you an example. It’s a minor one, but the day before yesterday, the Iraqi Shia militia released an American researcher, Elizabeth Tsurkov, whom they had been holding for two years. They kidnapped her. And I think the only reason they released her—and this is why Trump’s craziness pays off—is that he probably threatened the Iraqi government and said, “You don’t get this person out…” And the Iraqi government said, well, they are the Shia militias, we don’t have control over them. And he probably said, “I know you have control over them, I know you can do it, do it now.” Biden and the Kamala Harris government have not tried very hard to get her out.

So Trump’s unpredictability is why Erdogan has to be careful. As long as Trump gives him, as I said, carte blanche at home, Erdogan is very happy, and he can get away with it. What’s more important to him? Winning the election, staying in power for another term. That’s all he cares about.

So the answer to your question is that not much is going to happen. The Europeans are not going to be very successful. Now, if Turkey were to go through a major economic crisis again, with major demonstrations and instability, that could be different. But given how the whole region is at the moment, I don’t think that’s in the cards right now. The Europeans are going to continue doing some business, they’ll put some constraints on Turkish economic exchanges, but there’s only so much they can do. They can criticize the Turks, but the Turks don’t care. Or I should say, the Turkish government doesn’t care. Erdogan has essentially won.

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy

Dr. Bjånesøy: FrP Turns Economic Frustration in Norway into Populist Momentum

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

In Norway’s September 8, 2025, general election, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s Labour Party narrowly held on to power — but the real story was the historic surge of the populist Progress Party (FrP), which doubled its vote share to 24% and became the country’s second-largest party. In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Lise Bjånesøy (University of Bergen) explains how FrP converted economic grievances into populist momentum, capitalizing on anger over wealth taxes, cost-of-living pressures, and distrust of “wasteful elites.” FrP also mobilized younger men through social media, a trend Dr. Bjånesøy calls a key driver of Norway’s new political divides.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In the wake of Norway’s September 8, 2025, general election, the country’s political landscape has been reshaped by growing polarization and the unexpected strength of the populist radical right. While Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s Labour Party narrowly secured another four years in power with 87 out of 169 seats, the populist right-wing Progress Party (FrP) achieved a historic breakthrough, doubling its vote share to 24% and becoming the second-largest party. This surge signals deep currents of economic dissatisfaction and changing voter dynamics, especially among younger men.

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Lise Bjånesøy, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Government, University of Bergen, offers insights into how FrP transformed economic frustration into populist momentum. “Economic issues, such as wealth tax and the cost of living, have been central in this election,” explains Dr. Bjånesøy. “FrP has strongly profiled itself against wasting taxpayers’ money, attracting voters dissatisfied with Labour and consolidating support among those frustrated with rising living costs.”

FrP’s success, however, goes beyond economics. Dr. Bjånesøy highlights the party’s strategic mobilization of young voters, particularly young men, driven largely by social media dynamics. “For young men who get their news from social media, there’s a 28% likelihood of voting FrP, compared to just 14% among those who don’t. Social media plays an important role in mobilizing this demographic.”

Despite this populist surge, Norway remains a centre-left outlier in the Nordic region, diverging from Sweden and Finland, where right-wing governments dominate. Dr. Bjånesøy attributes this partly to narrow electoral thresholds and coalition dynamics, as well as Labor’s recovery under Jens Stoltenberg’s return as finance minister, dubbed the “Stoltenback effect,” which boosted Labor’s popularity by 10 percentage points.

Still, she warns against underestimating FrP’s growing influence: “FrP has benefited from reduced stigma around supporting the party and has mobilized nearly all the voters who don’t dislike them. But their ability to expand further will depend on how effectively Labour manages governing alongside four smaller left-wing parties.”

Looking ahead, Dr. Bjånesøy underscores the urgent need for research on social media’s political impact, calling it a “key driver of generational divides” and shifting populist dynamics.

This interview unpacks the interplay between economic grievances, political polarization, and digital mobilization in shaping Norway’s electoral landscape — and what it reveals about the future of populism in Europe.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Lise Bjånesøy, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Economic Grievances Fuel FrP’s Surge

Two elderly men sit on the street in front of a café in Oslo, Norway, asking for alms on August 1, 2013. This image symbolizes the indifference of society and the state toward poverty. Photo: Medvedeva Oxana.

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: The general elections on Monday (September 8, 2025) saw Labour narrowly retain power while the populist radical right Progress Party (FrP) nearly doubled its vote share to 24%. From your research, what explains FrP’s electoral surge despite being historically the most disliked party in Norway?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: It’s a very good question. I think there are quite a few reasons why the Progress Party (FrP) has been doing so well in this election. First of all, it has been the loudest opposition party to the current government, which helps them attract voters dissatisfied with the Labour government as well as generally discontented voters.

Second, economic issues have been a very important part of this election. It’s been a big, salient topic, and the FrP has benefited from that focus. Another significant factor is that they have gained many voters from the Conservative Party. In fact, a lot of people who previously voted Conservative now support the Progress Party. At least that’s what we’ve seen in earlier data. We’ll have to wait, of course, for the post-election data collection, but when we conducted a large survey in June, we found that 50% of those who said they intended to vote for the Progress Party had previously supported the Conservatives.

Another reason is that they attract more young voters, particularly young men, and social media seems to play an important mobilizing role for this group.

Regarding the Progress Party’s reputation as a very disliked party — which it still is within the Norwegian political system — I think this suggests they may now have mobilized almost all the voters they can. In other words, they’ve consolidated support among those who don’t dislike them, but they remain a highly unpopular party overall.

Media analyses describe the rise of FrP as part of the “MAGA-fication” of Norwegian politics, particularly among young male voters. To what extent does FrP’s messaging reflect a broader Americanization of populist rhetoric, and how much is it rooted in domestic Norwegian grievances?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: That’s a good question. First of all, I think it’s very interesting how a Norwegian election campaign is perceived in other countries. I’ve not heard the word MAGA-fication in any Norwegian newspapers, and I don’t think we would use that term to describe what is going on in Norway. So, I don’t think we can take it that far as being a MAGA-fication. Although the FrP did very well in this election — historically well, indeed — and they are attracting young men in particular, I still don’t think I would use the word MAGA-fication. I think, as you say, the success of the Progress Party in this election can be explained by domestic Norwegian grievances rather than any Americanization of populist rhetoric.

There has been one incident that perhaps comes a little close to the Americanization of populist rhetoric, and that was just a few days before the election, or very close to election night. There was a televised political debate where the leader of the Progress Party, Sylvi Listhaug, blamed the leader of the AUF, the youth wing of the Labour Party, for being a notorious liar, and she repeated over and over again that he is a liar, ‘you’re lying’. This was based on a relatively normal political statement, and yet she labelled him a liar. The Prime Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, who was also part of that debate, responded by saying, essentially, “Okay, so you want to become Prime Minister, but you can’t talk like this.” That, he implied, would represent a new turn for Norway.

So, I think that might be one of those rare events that could be described as an Americanization of populist rhetoric. But other than that, we haven’t really seen this pattern; it hasn’t been a major part of the election campaign, at least in my view.

Norwegian farmers protest government agricultural policies outside parliament in Oslo. Banner targets former Agriculture Minister Sylvi Listhaug. Photo: Dreamstime.

FrP Capitalizes on Economic Anger While Labour Leans on Stoltenberg Boost

The campaign was dominated by debates on the cost of living, wealth taxes, the oil fund’s investment in Israel, and relations with Donald Trump. How did FrP successfully own these issues and deploy populist frames contrasting “the people” with “corrupt elites” or “globalist priorities”?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: The economic issues you mentioned, such as wealth tax and cost of living, are very important political issues for the Progress Party. They attract voters who are against the wealth tax, for instance. The high salience of this issue can probably help explain some of the gains and some of the success of the Progress Party in this election. Another example is that they have strongly profiled themselves as being against wasting taxpayers’ money. On the cost of living, they argue that the current government spends far too much of the taxpayers’ money and simply wastes it away. These have been two key issues for the Progress Party and their voters.

However, issues such as foreign policy and relations with Donald Trump are among the reasons why Labour did so well in this election. It never became quite clear during the campaign whether Listhaug would be a candidate for Prime Minister. She never explicitly said she wanted to be, but she repeated that it was natural for the party with the highest share of votes to take the Prime Minister position. So, it was never a clear yes or no. This created debate about whether she would do a good job as a potential Prime Minister, especially when it came to foreign policy and representing Norwegian interests in relation to Donald Trump, for example. So, I think some of these issues were very good for the Progress Party, but issues like foreign policy worked in favour of Labour and the current government.

Labour’s rebound has been attributed in part to the “Stoltenback effect,” boosting Labour’s popularity by 10 percentage points following Jens Stoltenberg’s return as finance minister. Do you see this as evidence of leadership personalization countering populist momentum, or does it simply mask deeper structural shifts favouring PRR parties?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: There are several reasons that can explain this boosted popularity of the Labour Party. One of the reasons is the one you mentioned — the Stoltenback effect — as we got Jan Stoltenberg back as finance minister. But it’s also important to mention that it was the current Prime Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, who brought Stoltenberg back. So, it was also a boost in popularity for him, showing good leadership skills by bringing Stoltenberg back.

Another important issue is that the agrarian Centre Party, which had previously been in a coalition with the Labour Party, left the government coalition. So now, the Labour Party holds government power alone. It was a minority government, and I think that was very good for Labour.

A third explanation is foreign policy and Trump, as we just talked about. We want competent and highly experienced politicians to navigate this sort of uncertain political world that we are living in.

Finally, I think it’s quite exceptional how the Labour Party — and the current government — was so unpopular for a long time because the economy was performing poorly, yet they still managed to retain power. It makes this quite an exceptional election. A fourth contributing factor is that while the economy had been doing really badly, it is now performing much better. So, they have managed to turn the economy around to a better situation for people.

Norway Balances Populist Surge with Centre-Left Resilience

Despite FrP’s strong gains, Norway remains a centre-left outlier compared to Sweden and Finland. Based on your work on political tolerance, why has Norway diverged from this broader Nordic trend, and what factors have enabled it to resist a full populist breakthrough despite growing polarization?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: It’s important to emphasize that the results of this current election would have looked different if the Green Party, which is part of the left-wing bloc, had not passed the electoral threshold, and if the Liberal Party, which is part of the right-wing bloc, had passed it. In that case, this election could still have been a win for the right-wing bloc. But it ultimately ended up being a win for the left-wing bloc.

One key reason for this outcome is that the Green Party, for the first time, passed the electoral threshold and received what’s called utjevningsmandat — additional seats in the Storting (Norwegian parliament). However, it’s also important to emphasize that the Labour Party, which is now most likely continuing as a minority government, will have to navigate the next four years with four smaller parties. This could prove very challenging and, in fact, represents something of a dream opportunity for the Progress Party, which will likely benefit from Labour having to cooperate with these four much smaller left-wing parties.

Considering how well the Progress Party performed in this election, I don’t think Norway is an outlier, because we see two dynamics unfolding simultaneously. On one hand, there is a clear right-wing wave and a significant boost for the Progress Party; on the other, there is continued support for the current government. These trends coexist, but in the end, the results largely come down to the margins of which parties managed to pass — or failed to pass — the electoral threshold.

In your dissertation, you argue that FrP is both politically tolerated and highly negatively evaluated. How do you reconcile this paradox, particularly in the light of FrP’s breakthrough in the 2025 election?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: I think real tolerance is to allow democratic rights and privileges to those you dislike or disagree with. In that sense, it’s perhaps not a paradox; the Progress Party is still disliked, but we still see high tolerance of the party. However, based on these high levels of dislike for the FrP, the Progress Party might have reached its electoral high at this point. Maybe there are no more voters to mobilize. That said, this can change in the next election. We have seen that the levels of dislike for the Progress Party fluctuate. If I remember correctly, the highest levels were above 60%, and now about 55% of voters dislike the party. So, slightly fewer voters now dislike the party than before. A few more also tend to like it, but this can change.

Still, because of these very high levels of dislike towards the Progress Party, it can be hard for them to mobilize even more voters than they already have. Another important point when discussing the dislike of the Progress Party is that they have to collaborate. If the right-wing bloc had won the election, they would have had to work with parties whose voters dislike them. For the Liberal Party, for instance, many of its voters dislike the Progress Party, which makes collaboration difficult, or at least quite challenging, for a potential governing bloc. For some voters, it would be hard to accept cooperation with the Progress Party. Especially if we go back to the example where Listhaug called the youth wing leader of the Labour Party a liar, a notorious liar — that kind of rhetoric is very difficult for the Liberal Party to accept.

Less Stigma, Digital Mobilization, and a Generational Shift

Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) campaign booth. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your findings show that party institutionalization influences public tolerance of the populist radical right. Given FrP’s long-standing presence in Norway’s political system, does this institutional legitimacy insulate it from the broader backlash against far-right parties elsewhere in Europe?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: This might actually be another reason why the Progress Party did very well in this election. There has been less stigma connected towards voting FrP in this election compared to elections before. It seems like it’s more acceptable to say that you are a Progress Party voter than it has been before. This is not based on data — this is just my hunch — and we haven’t seen this in the data yet, but my hunch says that there is actually less stigma directed towards being a Progress Party voter than there has been before.

One reason might be that the party has moderated itself, particularly after the past government experience. The government experience that they have had might also contribute to less stigma towards them. However, voters still didn’t want Sylvi Listhaug as Prime Minister. That was part of the political debate in this election — whether she was going to be a Prime Minister or not — and most voters didn’t want her as Prime Minister.

So, I don’t think that any political parties are immune to backlash. But I think that the Progress Party benefits a lot from the current political situation, when the Støre government will have to cooperate with these four smaller parties on the left. I think the next election in four years will be extremely exciting. It will be very interesting to see how well the Progress Party does then. Maybe they will get an even better boost of votes — we’ll have to see.

With FrP performing especially well among younger male voters, do you see signs of a generational realignment in Norwegian politics, or is this a temporary reaction to specific economic and identity-based issues?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: In this election, we have seen that young men turn to FrP, while young women turn to the left. That’s a sign of increased polarization among young people — men go one way, and young women go the other. One of the things we’ve seen in our data — we’ve analysed data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel, where we have around 10,000 participants — is that we can look in more detail at how young men and young women vote.

What we’ve found using those data is that both young women and young men actually have an increased likelihood of voting for the Progress Party if they get their news from social media. For young men, there is a 28% likelihood of voting FrP if they get their news from social media. And if you are a young man who does not get your news from social media, there’s only a 14% chance that you will vote for the Progress Party. It’s a huge boost in the likelihood of voting FrP if you are a young man and get your news from social media.

We find the same pattern among young women as well, but it’s a much weaker relationship, so it’s particularly strong among young men. We also find that young men who get their news from social media tend to place themselves further to the right, and they are more dissatisfied with the economy. So, in that case, we can say they’re not being “tricked” into voting for the Progress Party — they genuinely agree with them.

Of course, it might be that those who place themselves further to the right and want to vote for the Progress Party are also those who tend to get their news from social media. But still, I think there’s something going on with social media that is an important explanation for what’s happening among young men.

I also don’t think this is just a temporary shift. But I think we need to learn more about what’s going on, particularly in this case, and also study more closely what’s happening on social media. We’ll just have to wait — we need a lot more research on this particular topic — but there are definitely some very interesting dynamics unfolding among the young.

Positive Views on Immigration Hold

In your 2019 article, you found that public attitudes toward asylum seekers shifted after the 2015 refugee crisis. Has the 2025 campaign, particularly debates on Gaza and Ukraine, triggered similar shifts in threat perceptions and migrant-related framing?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: Immigration issues were not a big part of this election campaign. So, in that case, there was no particular reason to expect any shift in public attitudes based on the campaign itself. But I think it’s interesting how we still remain quite positive towards immigration after receiving a large number of refugees from Ukraine, especially. This means that we did not see the same shift in public attitudes as we did during the 2015 refugee crisis when Norway also received a significant number of refugees.

Looking at trends and opinion data collected in the Norwegian Citizen Panel, we see that 51% of respondents think that immigration is an advantage, which is actually exactly the same level as in 2014. Back then, 51% also said that they viewed immigration positively. So, while the trend fluctuates somewhat over time, at this point, it stands at the same level as when we first started measuring it in 2014.

However, on some other questions we examine, more people today say that they think it should be more difficult to get asylum. We also see an increase in people who believe that the conditions for integrating refugees in Norway are bad, or at least not very good. So, there is some movement and some shifts in attitudes towards immigration and asylum seekers, but I haven’t seen anything specific related to this current election.

Social Media’s Role Needs Deeper Investigation

Illustration by Ulker Design.

Your research suggests media framing can normalize exclusionary populist narratives. To what extent did the Norwegian media in 2025 amplify FrP’s populist discourse, and does this signal a shift toward mainstreaming radical right rhetoric?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: That’s a whole research question in itself. Based on what I’ve seen, we had quite a fair election campaign, where the various political parties participated in debates and were given the same opportunities on the same media platforms to debate. But we have been very interested, both in research and in the media, in what’s going on with young men in this election. However, I haven’t seen the same level of interest in young women. So, we have some shifts in the media that affect our focus, I guess. Maybe I would like to see more attention paid to what’s going on with young women as well. 

FrP has gained a lot of media attention, particularly because they were doing very well in the polls, so it was natural to be interested in that, but also because they were performing strongly among young men. So, we’ve seen this increase in media attention, but I do think that, if anything, we should pay even more attention to what’s happening on social media. And that would be my hunch, based on your question.

And lastly, looking ahead, what research agenda do you see as most urgent for understanding the evolving relationship between populist radical right parties, public opinion, and democratic resilience in Norway and across Europe?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: I’ve probably also given away what I think is one of the most important areas to focus on now. One of the key research agendas going forward is to learn more about what is happening on social media — how we are affected by it, or not affected by it, and how our experiences on these platforms differ. The algorithms give us more of the content that we already like, and we need to understand what effects this has on political participation, both in Norway and across Europe. I believe this is a very important research agenda, as we currently know too little about the effects of social media on politics.

Chloé Ridel, Member of the European Parliament from the Socialist Group and Rapporteur for transnational repression, during her interview with ECPS’s Selcuk Gultasli. Photo: Umit Vurel.

EP Rapporteur Ridel: EU Should Expand Sanctions Regime to Effectively Target Transnational Repression

by Digital-populismEditor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeHuman RightsInterviews

In an exclusive interview with ECPS, MEP Chloé Ridel, rapporteur for the European Parliament’s forthcoming report on transnational repression, underscores the urgent need for the EU to confront transnational repression—state-organized efforts by authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran to silence critics abroad. Ridel calls for expanding the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime to explicitly include transnational repression and highlights the procedural challenge posed by unanimity voting: “The only people we manage to sanction are mostly Russian… we will have difficulties applying the values we believe in.” She stresses that this is a human rights, security, and democratic issue requiring coordination, oversight of enablers, and stronger protection for vulnerable groups.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a context of intensifying authoritarian encroachment beyond national borders, transnational repression has emerged as a growing threat to Europe’s democratic integrity, sovereignty, and human rights commitments. Authoritarian regimes—including Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran—have refined techniques of intimidation and control targeting exiles, dissidents, and diaspora communities residing in democratic states, employing legal tools such as Interpol Red Notices, coercion-by-proxy against relatives, and increasingly sophisticated forms of digital harassment. In her capacity as rapporteur for the European Parliament’s forthcoming report on transnational repression, MEP Chloé Ridel of the Socialists and Democrats Group has foregrounded the urgency of a robust, coordinated European response.

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), MEP Ridel makes a compelling case for expanding the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime to address transnational repression explicitly. She explains that “there is already an EU sanctions regime that exists, and we want this regime to also apply to states that commit transnational repression.” MEP Ridel’s recommendation is clear: the EU must recognize transnational repression as a distinct pattern of authoritarian interference, codify it in sanctions policy, and ensure it can be enforced consistently across Member States.

MEP Ridel is also critical of the procedural obstacles that blunt the effectiveness of EU sanctions, pointing to the unanimity requirement that has resulted in skewed enforcement patterns: “The only people we manage to sanction are mostly Russian; 70% of those sanctioned under the EU sanctions regime are from Russia.” Without reforms enabling qualified majority voting for sanctions decisions, she warns, “we will have difficulties applying the values we believe in on human rights.”

This approach, MEP Ridel emphasizes, is inseparable from broader efforts to coordinate intelligence, protect vulnerable groups such as women, human rights defenders, and hold enablers—particularly social media platforms—accountable. “States rely on enablers such as social media platforms and spyware businesses, and these enablers must also be held accountable,” she argues. In advocating for expert focal points on transnational repression in both EU delegations and national administrations, Ridel calls for the EU to develop institutional expertise to “help victims of transnational repression” who often “don’t even know they are victims” until attacked.

This interview provides an incisive analysis of the tools and frameworks required to confront transnational repression effectively. EP rapporteur Ridel’s proposals offer a principled roadmap for embedding human rights and democratic sovereignty at the heart of EU foreign and security policy.

Chloé Ridel, Member of the European Parliament from the Socialist Group and EP Rapporteur for transnational repression.

Here is the transcript of our interview with MEP Chloé Ridel, edited lightly for readability.

Transnational Repression Must Be Defined Properly

Chloé Ridel, thank you very much for joining our interview series. First of all, can you please tell us about the fate of the report? You submitted it to the subcommittee on human rights. What will happen next?

MEP Chloé Ridel: I submitted my draft report in June to the Committee on Human Rights, which is a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee here in the European Parliament. Time was then allowed for other political groups to table amendments, which will be discussed throughout September. We will have a vote in the Foreign Affairs Committee in October, followed by the final vote in the plenary session of the European Parliament at the end of November.

Your draft report acknowledges the lack of a universally accepted definition of transnational repression. How should the EU conceptualize this phenomenon in legal and policy terms, especially considering the practices of regimes like Turkey, Iran, China, and Russia, to ensure both legal precision and operational flexibility?

MEP Chloé Ridel: Yes, you’re absolutely right. There is no definition of transnational repression in EU law or international law. Recently, the UN adopted a definition for transnational repression because it’s a growing phenomenon, as I tried to describe in my report. So, I suggest an EU definition for transnational repression because if we don’t know what it is, we cannot fight it properly. We define transnational repression as “state-organized actions that cross borders to coerce, control, or silence individuals through physical, legal, or digital means.”

This is a growing and quite concentrated phenomenon: 80% of all transnational repression actions are committed by just 10 states. Among these states are China, Turkey, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Russia. It is committed by authoritarian regimes that seek to silence members of their diaspora, political opponents, or journalists. For the EU, it’s a significant challenge because it constitutes foreign interference, is a security matter, and targets human rights defenders whom we have an interest in protecting — and we are not doing enough to protect them.

Transnational Repression Is a Security Issue, a Human Rights Issue, and a Democratic Issue

Given that transnational repression by authoritarian and repressive regimes blurs the lines between external authoritarian influence and internal security threats, should the EU frame this challenge primarily as a human rights issue, a security concern, or a hybrid phenomenon demanding an integrated policy response?

MEP Chloé Ridel: I think this is all of it at once. It is a human rights issue, of course, because it targets human rights defenders, and I will return to that. It is also a security and sovereignty issue because we cannot accept that foreign authoritarian regimes come to our streets to threaten people who are legal residents and under our protection. It becomes a threat to us as well. Unfortunately, transnational repression continues to occur in Europe. It includes physical threats, poisoning, and digital surveillance. Take the example of the Russian diaspora: after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, more than 90 Russian journalist agencies came to Europe to continue their work freely. It is in our interest to protect these journalists because they are the last free Russian journalists in the world, and they still speak to the Russian people. We know that Putin expands his power by controlling people’s minds, and if we want to fight this kind of war with Putin, we need free journalism that can still speak to the Russian people back home. So yes, it is a security issue, a human rights issue, and also a democratic issue.

EU’s Digital Services Act Must Hold Platforms Accountable

Authoritarian regimes including China, Russia, Turkey and Iran have weaponized digital platforms to target exiles. How can the EU ensure that the Digital Services Act is effectively enforced to mitigate these risks, particularly protecting vulnerable groups like women human rights defenders from online harassment orchestrated by authoritarian actors?

MEP Chloé Ridel: As you pointed out very well, digital transnational repression is growing and authoritarian regimes use social media to harass opponents, often targeting women, sometimes through the circulation of sexualized content. This is a specific and growing form of violence, and social media platforms are enabling it. They are not doing enough to prevent transnational repression online, and they should. By companies, I mean the platforms themselves, because they now constitute major public spaces where public debate happens. 

We need rules because we cannot have such impactful public spaces controlled by private companies without oversight. In Europe, we voted for a strong legislative framework, the Digital Services Act (DSA), but we are still waiting for it to be effectively enforced. For example, an investigation was opened against X (formerly Twitter) two years ago, but there are still no conclusions or sanctions, despite clear violations of the DSA—there is no content moderation, widespread disinformation, and manipulation of algorithms to boost certain types of content. We need effective enforcement of the DSA to hold these big companies accountable. While transnational repression is state-organized, states rely on enablers, such as social media platforms and spyware businesses, and these enablers must also be held accountable for that repression.

Iran, Egypt, Turkey and Tajikistan are notorious for coercion-by-proxy, targeting relatives of exiles to silence dissent abroad. What practical measures can the EU adopt to recognize, document, and respond to this diffuse and intimate form of repression?

MEP Chloé Ridel: You are right, transnational repression can occur when authoritarian regimes target family members who remain in the home country while someone goes abroad to seek exile or refuge. And it’s very difficult. Currently, the EU does not protect family members who may be threatened by authoritarian regimes simply because they are related to a prominent human rights defender or similar figure. So, I think we should enable the EU program called ProtectDefenders.eu to also protect family members of a defender, not just the defender themselves, because we know that authoritarian regimes use threats against family to repress human rights defenders.

A Coordinated EU Response Needed to Stop Abuse of Red Notices

Given that Turkey, Russia, and China systematically abuse Interpol Red Notices and extradition treaties to pursue political exiles, what reforms should the EU promote within its judicial cooperation frameworks and at Interpol to prevent instrumentalization while safeguarding legitimate law enforcement cooperation?

MEP Chloé Ridel: The abuse of Interpol Red Notices is a very important matter for me, and it’s a key part of my report because, as you mentioned, even though Interpol is aware of abuses, the problem persists. Authoritarian regimes continue to send or request Red Notices against human rights defenders, even though these notices are supposedly intended to target terrorists or very serious criminals. For example, there are currently more than 200 Red Notices from Tajikistan targeting human rights defenders living in the EU. So, we need to raise awareness among member states not to arrest or execute these notices and to develop a coordinated EU response on this issue.

In my report, I suggest that transnational repression be included in Europol’s mandate, so that Europol can assess the relevance of Red Notices when they target human rights defenders and provide assessments to member states, exerting pressure on national governments not to execute abusive Red Notices. 

For example, there was the case of an Iranian activist in Italy in 2017 who was arrested based on a Red Notice from Iran and later freed. There was also the case of Paul Watson, an environmental activist defending whales, who was targeted by a Red Notice from Japan. He could live freely in France and Germany but was ultimately arrested by Denmark based on this Red Notice. What kind of coordination is this? He was eventually freed, but only after months in jail, and clearly the Red Notice against him was abusive.

We need to stop this abuse, and one way to do so is to involve the EU—not by giving the EU the power to execute Red Notices, which remains a national competence—but by enabling it to assess and declare when a Red Notice is abusive and should not be executed.

“We Must Coordinate at EU Level to Tackle Transnational Repression”

Chloé Ridel, Member of the European Parliament from the Socialist Group and EP Rapporteur  for transnational repression.

How can the EU promote harmonization of national legal frameworks to ensure that no Member State becomes a permissive jurisdiction or “safe haven” for authoritarian actors from regimes such as Belarus or Egypt, while respecting national sovereignty and legal diversity?

MEP Chloé Ridel: We need more coordination at the EU level to tackle transnational repression. Transnational repression should be more widely discussed among ministers of internal affairs, security, foreign affairs, and heads of state as well. It was discussed recently at the G7 forum, and it is a matter for all democracies because we can see a kind of authoritarian internationalism building itself, notably through transnational repression, where authoritarian regimes help each other control, coerce, and silence their political opposition. We have an interest in protecting this political opposition because they are sometimes the last free voices of civil society in some countries.

We need to do more to coordinate at the European level and to raise awareness at the European level. Sometimes I have noticed during my work on this report that security services have difficulty assessing and recognizing transnational repression. So, I suggested in my report having an expert on transnational repression in each security administration in each member state—a contact point or something like that. For instance, this exists in Canada, Australia, and the US, where they have teams specifically responsible for transnational repression involving many different ministries. It is important that we build expertise within each nation on transnational repression and that all of this be coordinated at the European level.

Oppressive states like Turkey and China often use religious, cultural, and educational institutions abroad as instruments of covert surveillance and influence. How should EU policy distinguish and regulate these activities to protect democratic norms without stigmatizing legitimate diaspora engagement?

MEP Chloé Ridel: Sure. I think this is indeed a problem, and we need to control funds that go to religious institutions, for instance. We cannot allow authoritarian or adverse regimes to fund NGOs or religious institutions on European soil without oversight of how those funds are used. This is something we must address because it’s a growing and concerning phenomenon.

Prevent Discrimination and Promote Integration to Counter Radicalization

Given that authoritarian regimes actively manipulate divisions within diasporas—for example, Turkey’s polarization of Turkish communities in Europe—how should EU integration and anti-radicalization strategies respond to these fractures to avoid inadvertently amplifying authoritarian influence?

MEP Chloé Ridel: This is another topic—it’s not transnational repression per se, but rather manipulation of diasporas to harm a country or create conflict. We can see it in my country, France, where there is a Turkish association called the Grey Wolves, a very dangerous group that was ultimately banned and dissolved. It’s an example because there were violent demonstrations by members of this group, and they exerted a kind of control over the Turkish diaspora in France, dictating how they should behave, which also prevented good integration into French society for Turkish immigrants.

We need to fight back and have state solutions against such extremist associations. We must also ensure that public services and integration services—through work, language learning, and civic values—are available so that we can prevent radicalization. Radicalization happens when there is discrimination; extremists target marginalized people and say, “France is discriminating against you, it doesn’t want you here, so you should abide by this ideology instead.” To prevent that, we must prevent discrimination and ensure that these individuals feel part of the national community in Europe. It’s a matter of integration to fight radicalization, and also a security matter: to be able to identify and prohibit such associations and groups when they form, if they are dangerous.

Coordinated EU Action Key to Protecting Rights Defenders

Your report recommends focal points on human rights defenders within EU delegations. What skills, mandates, and resources will these officers need to respond effectively to transnational repression, particularly from aggressive regimes like Russia and China, in high-risk environments?

MEP Chloé Ridel: It’s important that we have contact points in every EU delegation throughout the world that can gather information on how authoritarian regimes exert transnational repression. Coordination is key to fighting this growing phenomenon. We need contact points both in EU delegations and in each national administration, and through the exchange of information we can tackle it. We are stronger together in Europe; if we gather information and experts across different countries and Europe plays a coordinating role, we can collect valuable intelligence and help victims of transnational repression. Sometimes they don’t even know they are victims—there are people being followed or surveilled until the day they are attacked; people who have spyware on their phones and don’t know it because they are not trained in cybersecurity.

In my report, I want to incentivize and raise awareness about spyware, to emphasize that, first, the EU should ban the export of spyware technologies produced in Europe to authoritarian regimes, because we know this will be used against us and against human rights defenders on our soil. We should also, when we know that a human rights defender is at risk of transnational repression, say: come to our office, we will explain a few security rules to you as a matter of prevention so you can regularly check your phones or computers to ensure there is no spyware, because nowadays it’s very easy to hide spyware on a phone or computer.

And lastly, do you see a role for the EU in spearheading an international legal instrument specifically addressing transnational repression, modeled on Magnitsky-style sanctions, to confront regimes such as Belarus, Saudi Arabia, China and Turkey? How might this enhance global accountability and norm-setting?

Chloé Ridel: Actually, there is already an EU sanctions regime that exists and we want this regime to also apply to states that commit transnational repression. So, I call in my report to enlarge the EU sanctions regime so that it effectively targets transnational repression. There is also a longstanding demand from our group, the Socialists and Democrats group, that EU sanctions be decided by qualified majority and not unanimity, because with unanimity, often you go nowhere. The only people we manage to sanction are mostly Russian; 70% of those sanctioned under the EU sanctions regime are from Russia. I’m sure many more countries I’ve described to you could be sanctioned in the name of human rights and under the EU sanctions regime. So, if we don’t move toward qualified majority, we will have difficulties applying the values we believe in on human rights. 

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz, a leading scholar of political communication at the Faculty of Management and Social Communication, Jagiellonian University.

Professor Kasprowicz: Despite Polarization and Populist Gains, Poland’s Democratic Potential Remains Intact

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

In an in-depth interview with ECPS, Professor Dominika Kasprowicz of Jagiellonian University offers a measured assessment of Poland’s political trajectory following Karol Nawrocki’s narrow presidential victory. While acknowledging the rise of populism and deepening polarization, she maintains that “there is still substantial democratic potential within the system and society.” Professor Kasprowicz highlights the role of affective campaigning, the normalization of populist narratives, and the growing impact of disinformation as structural challenges to liberal democracy. Yet, she points to the resilience of civil society—especially youth and feminist movements—as a critical bulwark against authoritarian drift. “Civic involvement is one of the most important factors behind societal resilience,” she argues, emphasizing the importance of renewed mobilization in the face of rising illiberalism.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging and analytically rich conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Dominika Kasprowicz—a leading scholar of political communication at the Faculty of Management and Social Communication, Jagiellonian University—offers a nuanced assessment of Poland’s evolving political terrain in the aftermath of Karol Nawrocki’s narrow presidential victory. While acknowledging the rise of populist narratives and affective polarization, she resists the notion that Poland has definitively succumbed to democratic backsliding. “In spite of the many political turbulences along the way,” she states, “I’m convinced there is still substantial democratic potential within the system and society.”

Professor Kasprowicz contends that although Nawrocki’s victory signals a “U-turn” from recent liberal governance, it must be viewed within a broader cycle of disillusionment with the ruling coalition and not solely as an affirmation of authoritarian consolidation. Rather than reading the outcome as a clear-cut shift toward autocracy, she underscores the resilience of democratic institutions and civil society, pointing to the alternation of power as a key indicator: “We saw it happen after the 2023 parliamentary elections, and the recent presidential election also demonstrated this.”

The interview also engages with the civilizational framing and symbolic politics that increasingly shape Polish electoral behavior. Professor Kasprowicz highlights how Nawrocki’s campaign “aligned—both in tone and policy—with figures like Donald Trump and, at times, Viktor Orbán,” tapping into deep-seated cultural cleavages and reframing electoral appeals through affective channels rather than technocratic reasoning. Against this backdrop, she observes that emotions have overtaken policy in shaping political allegiance: “Mr. Nawrocki’s emotionally driven strategy proved more effective… even moderate voters seemed to seek a more assertive, emotionally resonant message.”

Still, Professor Kasprowicz cautions against overlooking structural forces, particularly foreign information manipulation (FIMI), which she describes as “a third actor” in recent Polish elections. Poland, she argues, has become a “testing ground” for new forms of disinformation that remain understudied and underacknowledged politically.

Yet amid the challenges, Professor Kasprowicz finds hope in civil society—particularly youth movements, feminist organizations, and rights-based NGOs. Despite prior government hostility, she emphasizes their enduring relevance: “Engaged, well-trained, highly capable, and deeply connected to European and global networks,” these actors form the backbone of what she terms Poland’s social resilience. Whether this will suffice to resist authoritarian normalization remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: the democratic story in Poland is far from over.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Dominika Kasprowicz, edited lightly for readability.

This Is Not the End of Polish Democracy

President-elect Karol Nawrocki campaigning ahead of Poland’s 2025 presidential election in Łódź, Poland, on April 27, 2024. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you interpret Karol Nawrocki’s narrow presidential victory within the broader trajectory of democratic backsliding in Poland? Does it reflect a recalibration of populist dominance despite the 2023 parliamentary setback for PiS, or does it suggest the consolidation of a hybrid regime model that blends electoral competitiveness with authoritarian resilience?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: That’s a very interesting and complex question that has several underpinnings. To answer it, we should start from the very beginning.

As of mid-2025, Poland as a country—and Poles as a society—are in an unprecedented situation and facing unprecedented global circumstances. I believe that the overarching evaluation of both the society and the political system proves that it’s not as bad as is occasionally suggested in the media, particularly across electronic and online outlets.

Let me begin with a brief reminder that for years, especially in terms of economic growth and political developments, Poland has been seen as a frontrunner among the then-new EU Member States. In spite of the many political turbulences along the way, I’m convinced there is still substantial democratic potential within the system and society.

To support this, I would point out that despite the growing cleavage and deepening political polarization, we still observe alternation of power. We saw it happen after the 2023 parliamentary elections, and the recent presidential election also demonstrated this. The course of events suggests that, while the notion of democratic backsliding is certainly a valid concern, at this moment I would not find enough persuasive arguments to fully agree with that interpretation.

Nevertheless, the result of the presidential election—and the victory of Mr. Karol Nawrocki—is clearly a U-turn, following just a few years of a pro-European, more liberal government in power. It was a narrow but decisive win for opposing narratives.

What we often emphasize when commenting on presidential elections in Poland is that, while it’s certainly about the politicians and candidates, it is mostly about the government in power at that time. What I mean is that, to better understand the wider context of this victory—or the lack of victory—it’s crucial to consider the performance or underperformance of the current government.

This growing sense of disillusionment and the slow but steady loss of public support for the coalition government were clearly reflected in the presidential election. Of course, that’s not the only reason for the 2025 electoral outcome, but without including that variable in the analysis, it’s very difficult to fully understand what actually happened.

Civilizational Realignment and Shifting Cleavages Are Redefining Polish Politics

To what extent did Nawrocki’s ideologically coherent messaging and symbolic alignment with figures such as Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán transcend conventional party cleavages and reconfigure voter alignments along deeper cultural or civilizational lines?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: It’s an interesting question, because since the early 2000s, what we see in Poland is shifting cleavages and changing trajectories. Until then, it was quite obvious—there was a post-communist versus pro-European sentiment among the electorate. Since the early 2000s, when the formerly aligned center and right-leaning parties became the two main opponents, these cleavages have been changing. This shift is actually happening, and the direction and dynamic are quite interesting.

Over the past 25 years, we’ve seen quite a lot of empirically driven studies and commentary pointing to changing moods and trends within the Polish electorate. Nevertheless, the cleavage I believe is now most salient is the one between traditional and liberal lifestyles, and between more socially oriented or liberal economic worldviews.

What is somewhat surprising—or at least unexpected—is the combination of pro-social yet traditional lifestyle attitudes found on the right or among the populist radical right. In contrast, what is more centrist and liberal in terms of economic views—and pro-European, pro-progressive—belongs to the parties currently governing, including centrist and what remains of the left in Poland.

You asked about civilizational realignment. During the electoral campaign, these were indeed prominent reference points, particularly emphasized by Mr. Nawrocki, who frequently aligned—both in tone and policy—with figures like Donald Trump and, at times, Viktor Orbán. It’s important, however, to analyze these two associations separately. Regarding the US and Donald Trump: beyond personal sympathies, Mr. Nawrocki was, in fact, the only candidate in the campaign to be received—albeit briefly—at the White House. Nevertheless, the meeting did take place.

We must keep in mind Poland’s geopolitical situation—as a country on the so-called eastern flank of the EU and NATO. Despite recent political turbulence in the US, Poland has very limited room for maneuver when it comes to security policy. Poland has long been a close ally of the US. Our NATO membership and the US military presence in this part of Europe have been critically important. I believe both candidates—whether openly or subtly—aligned themselves with the American ally. So, I don’t think anyone here was particularly surprised by Mr. Nawrocki’s open and positive stance toward the US and its president. This broader global security context played a significant role.

When it comes to the Hungarian case and Viktor Orbán, it’s no secret that the former government—as well as the outgoing President Mr. Duda and the Law and Justice Party—maintained friendly relations with Orbán and his party. However, if you look at the actions taken in the European Parliament or the European Commission, the relationship was not always as smooth or friendly as campaign rhetoric might suggest.

Still, the model of strong, charismatic populist leadership remains a point of reference for Mr. Nawrocki—and likely will continue to be. But again, we should take a step back and view the situation from a distance.

Just to remind you: Prime Minister Donald Tusk, later this year, visited Serbia and was actively involved in shaping the priorities of the Polish EU Presidency—including efforts to sustain momentum in the EU enlargement process.

The complex nature of the region, and the growing threat from the East—particularly from Russia—add many shades of grey to the performance of all political leaders, not just the presidential candidates during the June 2025 Polish election.

Donald Tusk speaks at an election rally after a televised debate on government television at the end of the campaign in Warsaw, Poland on October 9, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

Emotional Politics Has Overtaken Technocratic Appeals

What structural and discursive limitations inhibited the effectiveness of the liberal-centrist coalition in this electoral cycle? In particular, how might Trzaskowski’s electoral underperformance reflect a broader crisis of technocratic centrism and the limits of rationalist appeals in an emotionally polarized political landscape?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: Of course, emotions play a role. This is not only the case in Poland—I believe we are living in an era of emotional politics.

There is a growing body of academic research showing the short- and long-term impact of political messaging, both offline and online, on social attitudes. An interesting aspect of this phenomenon is that a significant part of this process—the persuasive effects on individual and group behavior—often occurs beneath the surface. It is not necessarily a conscious experience for those receiving the message.

We can say that the recent presidential campaign in Poland clearly tapped into pre-existing emotional undercurrents among the electorate. If you examine the main themes of past electoral campaigns in Poland, you’ll notice that none lacked an emotional appeal—often built on imagined threats, mythical enemies, or existing, highly salient cleavages between centrist-liberal voters and those aligned with the traditionalist/populist/radical right.

There is already a strong emotional charge embedded in the political landscape, and Mr. Nawrocki was definitively more effective at triggering those emotions throughout the campaign. By contrast, Mr. Trzaskowski focused on reconciliation. He promised to be a president for all Poles—a unifying figure capable of bridging the deep divisions shaping contemporary Polish society.

So, if you ask whether emotions played a role in the campaign, the answer is unequivocally yes. Mr. Nawrocki’s emotionally driven strategy proved more effective. In times of crisis, war, and growing polarization, even moderate voters seemed to seek a more assertive, emotionally resonant message—which Mr. Trzaskowski’s campaign failed to deliver.

I would also add that there was a significant imbalance between the two candidates in terms of their online presence and social media strategy. Although both were active on popular platforms, it is clear that Mr. Trzaskowski’s team did not prioritize his social media visibility. As we know, social platforms are not only crucial for reaching younger voters but also for shaping narratives, including the spread of false information, disinformation, or misinformation. I believe this was one of the key strategic missteps in Mr. Rafał Trzaskowski’s campaign.

Systemic Constraints Undermine Technocratic Governance

From a political communication perspective, did the 2025 presidential campaign mark a paradigmatic shift from policy-based deliberation to symbolic and affective personalization? If so, how might this transformation affect democratic accountability and voter agency?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: Poland is a parliamentary system, which means that while the recent presidential elections—held under a majoritarian formula—are important for several reasons, I would not consider them the most crucial factor in the processes you are asking about.

Nevertheless, considering the prerogatives of the President of the Republic, and the ongoing situation of cohabitation between two opposing sides, this will not contribute to the stabilization of the Polish political system, which has already undergone significant destabilization over the past eight years. By this, I mean the changes that have occurred within the judiciary and media systems, as well as in less visible yet important areas of social and political life, such as education and culture.

If you were to ask what supports or undermines a technocratic model of policymaking, I would point to the systemic obstacles that have been left behind—constraints embedded within the system itself—which continue to prevent its stabilization. By stabilization, I also refer to the difficulty of reversing some of the reforms introduced by the Law and Justice Party during their two terms in power.

Nawrocki’s Campaign Mobilized Memory, Fear, and Identity to Activate a Populist Base

Pro-Ukrainian demonstrators protest against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policies during a rally titled “Stop Putin” in Warsaw, Poland on July 27, 2014. Photo: Tomasz Bidermann.

Your work has emphasized the affective potency of populist grievance narratives. How did Nawrocki’s campaign instrumentalize national identity and mnemonic politics to mobilize affective loyalty and consolidate a post-ideological populist base?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: Oh, it’s a very interesting question. When you look at the numbers, Poland to this day remains an example of unprecedented success—whether in terms of GDP per capita, quality of life, or the growing quality of infrastructure. Of course, this is a large country with a sizable population, and that doesn’t mean everything is perfect or without problems. Nevertheless, when you consider and compare the situation of the average Polish citizen over the past 20 years—across almost all demographic groups, whether by age, location, or education level—you can observe enormous progress.

Of course, the war in Ukraine, the Russian invasion, and the escalation of conflict have added an additional layer of anxiety, which now influences political attitudes and behaviors. But when you think about the typical populist message and the typical populist voter in Poland today, the external enemy—Russia—is no longer a dividing line. It’s a point of consensus across the political spectrum. Both Nawrocki and Trzaskowski, both Law and Justice and Civic Platform and their coalition partners, agree that Russia poses the greatest threat to Poland. This was also an important element in Nawrocki’s campaign.

Mr. Nawrocki, formerly Director of the Institute of National Remembrance—a public institution responsible for historical archival research and the promotion of Poland’s national narrative—integrated historical memory into his messaging. He strategically appealed to specific resentments and grievances, which, while not shared by the majority of society, still provided fuel for his campaign, depending on the region in which he was speaking. One example is the historical grievance between Poland and Ukraine over the Volhynia massacres during the final years of World War II—mass killings of Polish citizens that remain a sensitive and painful issue. This theme was used to tap into regional resentment. The second element involved anxiety and fear around refugees and illegal migrants—an ongoing and unresolved issue at the Polish-Belarusian border.

As for other grievances, while they may lack strong empirical grounding, they tap into an anti-EU rhetoric aligned with the idea that Poland should maintain as much independence as possible within the EU—prioritizing national interests and resisting pressure, especially from the European Commission.

None of these three elements—historical resentment (e.g., Polish-Ukrainian relations), fear of migrants or refugees, and anti-EU sentiment—are new in Polish politics. They have been present, more or less visibly, for the past 25 years. But they proved effective again, especially when directed at specific segments of Nawrocki’s electorate. I would not say these are overarching or widely shared attitudes across Polish society—on the contrary. Yet they worked for this specific purpose in this specific context.

Disinformation Is Among the Main Actors Shaping Poland’s Political Landscape

Would you argue that the nationalist-populist rhetoric encapsulated in slogans like “Poland First” has become hegemonically embedded in the Polish political imaginary? If so, what counter-hegemonic discursive strategies remain available to liberal-democratic actors?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: As I said before, these themes and motifs can be seen as recurring ones. I wouldn’t say that they are of growing importance. What is of growing importance is the changing political environment. And this is an unprecedentedly new framework that we should take into consideration when interpreting the course of political action in Poland.

We haven’t yet touched on a topic that is something of an elephant in the room—disinformation and FIMI (foreign information manipulations), the foreign interference that is present not only in Poland. Nevertheless, Poland should be considered a testing ground for many new strategies of that kind. While we are mostly discussing recent electoral outcomes and the two political figures—Mr. Trzaskowski and Mr. Nawrocki—what is overshadowing not only the Polish elections is, let’s say, a third actor or third agent. And I don’t mean only one country, but rather an important and salient factor behind past and current political developments.

And despite the fact that the long-lasting and very effective impact of disinformation during electoral campaigns has been acknowledged—we have examples and plenty of data coming from Ukraine, but also from other countries such as Georgia, Romania, the Balkan countries, and Slovakia—there is still very little research, and far too little political acknowledgment of the importance of this element.

Civil Society Remains the Backbone of Poland’s Democratic Resilience

March of a Million Hearts. Hundreds of thousands march in anti-government protest to show support for democracy in Warsaw, Poland on October 1, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

And lastly, Professor Kasprowicz, in light of the apparent demobilization among progressive constituencies, what role can civil society—particularly youth movements, feminist groups, and rights-based NGOs—play in resisting authoritarian normalization and restoring democratic engagement?

Professor Dominika Kasprowicz: Let me start with a quick reminder that the parliamentary elections which brought pro-European, more liberal political parties back to power were—putting it simply—won by the youngest voters and by women. This happened with important support from social movements and the NGO sector, which in Poland is large, fairly well institutionalized, and has managed to remain operational despite the previous government’s unfavorable attitude.

It’s not that all NGOs were opposed to the government. Of course, we witnessed the mushrooming of NGOs and mirroring institutions—similar to what we saw earlier in Hungary. But in fact, despite two terms in power, the populist radical right government did not succeed in dismantling the pro-European, liberal-oriented NGO sector, which played a significant role. At the moment, the presence of this segment of society—engaged, well-trained, highly capable, and deeply connected to European and global networks—is of great importance.

On the other hand, when thinking about Polish civil society and the largest NGOs on the ground, they are generally not political. Poles involved in the NGO sector, according to available data, tend to engage more in other forms of activism.

Still, whether political or not, civil involvement—or civic engagement—is one of the most important factors behind societal resilience. And I refer to resilience not only in terms of the political struggle between Law and Justice and the Civic Coalition, but more broadly, as the capacity of society to face global challenges—not just the war in Ukraine and the growing threat from the eastern flank, but also the climate crisis, migration, and other challenges faced by societies worldwide. So, this foundation and interconnectivity of citizens—whether engaged in political or non-political NGOs—is crucial, and it remains intact.

If you ask me whether, in mid-2025, this could serve as a kind of remedy against the rise of populist radical right parties—well, it’s hard to say. As you noted, we are witnessing disillusionment with current policies and growing impatience regarding reforms that were promised but have yet to be delivered. So, it may come down to renewed mobilization—or the search for a political alternative.

Professor Baskın Oran, a veteran and venerated Turkish political scientist.

Professor Oran on Turkey’s Erdogan Regime: “Let’s Just Call It a ‘Democratic Administration’—So That No Harm Comes to Anyone”

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

In an era when even naming an oppressive regime can invite peril, Professor Baskın Oran offers a cuttingly ironic response to a straightforward question: How should we define Turkey’s current political system? His reply—”Let’s just say a ‘democratic administration,’ so that no harm comes to anyone”—encapsulates the climate of fear and repression under Erdogan’s rule. In this wide-ranging interview, the veteran scholar and dissident traces historical fascism’s return through economic crisis, digital dependency, centralism, and xenophobia. With clarity and conviction, Professor Oran explores how Turkey’s authoritarian populism mirrors global patterns while revealing homegrown roots—and why excessive control may ultimately become the regime’s undoing.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Baskın Oran, a veteran and venerated political scientist, offered reflections that resonate deeply with the political climate in Turkey today. In times when truth is often criminalized and words carry the weight of consequences, the choice to speak cautiously is, in itself, a powerful political act. When asked to define the nature of Turkey’s current regime—whether it aligns more with fascism, authoritarian populism, competitive authoritarianism, or autocracy—Professor Oran answered with quiet precision: “Let’s just say ‘a democratic administration,’ so that no harm comes to anyone—shall we?” That one sentence, both ironic and revealing, captures the essence of the repression gripping contemporary Turkey. It also offers a striking entry point into the mind of one of Turkey’s most principled and enduring intellectuals.

As one of the signatories of the “International Declaration Against Fascism,” published on June 13, 2025, alongside Nobel laureates, public intellectuals, and leading scholars of democracy and authoritarianism, Professor Baskın Oran stands out as a figure whose life and career have been deeply shaped by Turkey’s political upheavals. Born in İzmir in 1945, Oran was convicted in 1971 while still a student at Ankara University’s Faculty of Political Science (Mülkiye) for participating in a protest march, resulting in his dismissal from his post as a research assistant. After a successful legal battle, he was reinstated by administrative court order. He later earned a PhD in international relations and completed postdoctoral research in Geneva on international minority rights.

Oran’s struggles did not end with student activism. Following the 1980 military coup, he was once again purged from his university post—only to be reinstated and removed again under martial law provisions. For eight years, he survived by working various jobs, including editing for AnaBritannica. In 1990, he was finally reinstated for good and rose to become a full professor by 1997. In 2004, his authorship of the “Minority Rights and Cultural Rights Report” for the Human Rights Advisory Board led to criminal charges under infamous articles 216 and 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. Though ultimately not convicted, the ordeal reinforced Oran’s image as a courageous dissenter within the Turkish academy.

That lifelong defiance permeates this interview with the ECPS, though it is now tempered with the strategic irony born of experience. In this wide-ranging conversation, Professor Oran explores the structural logic of fascism—“the most extreme and harmful form of capitalism,” as he puts it—and traces its return through today’s economic and geopolitical crises. Comparing the present moment to the capitalist collapse of 1929, he warns: “Back then, everyone tried to protect their own economy by closing to imports—and international trade collapsed. We’re witnessing a very similar process today.”

For Professor Oran, the rise of anti-immigration sentiment in the West and the shift from targeting “internal enemies” to “external threats” signals a reconfiguration, not a disappearance, of fascist logics. In Turkey, he argues, this reconfiguration is expressed through intense centralization, erosion of local governance, and state suppression of Kurdish identity and representation. “Fascism is centralism taken to its extreme,” he observes, linking today’s appointment of state trustees (kayyım) to a long tradition of top-down governance.

Yet even as he traces the parallels between historical fascism and present-day authoritarianism, Professor Oran remains grounded in a nuanced reading of political causality. He credits the excesses of past Kemalist policies—including headscarf bans and cultural repression—as having laid the groundwork for the current regime: “Those oppressive measures prepared the conditions for today’s authoritarianism.”

Despite this sobering diagnosis, Professor Oran ends with a dialectical warning rather than despair: “Excessive centralism and intervention in democratic will—dialectically speaking—mark the first step toward a regime’s self-destruction.”

In a political environment where naming power risks invoking its wrath, Professor Oran’s careful yet cutting answer—“a ‘democratic administration,’ so that no harm comes to anyone”—becomes more than evasion. This subtle yet telling response speaks volumes about the repressive nature of the current regime in Turkey. Coming from a scholar whose life has been marked by principled resistance and personal cost, Professor Oran’s cautious phrasing is itself a reflection of the political climate—one in which even naming the regime carries risk.

What follows is the full transcript of our interview with Professor Baskın Oran, originally conducted in Turkish and lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Fascism Is the Most Extreme and Harmful Form of Capitalism

Photo of a woman protester holding an anti-fascism sign during the Women’s March on January 21, 2017, in Washington, D.C. Photo: Richard Gunion.

Professor Oran, thank you very much for participating in our interview. How do you evaluate the historical continuity emphasized in the anti-rising fascism declaration—which you signed—through the statement, “fascism never disappeared; it merely remained on the sidelines for a while”? In your view, in what ways does today’s fascism differ from the classical fascisms of the 20th century, and what structural similarities does it maintain?

Prof. Dr. Baskın Oran: First of all, I would like to point out that while speaking on this subject, I do not wish to appear overly Marxist, but fascism—which is the most extreme and harmful form of capitalism—is a tool that the capitalist system resorts to when it feels threatened. We have witnessed this in the past as well.

The declaration from Italy, which I gladly signed, reminded us that the fascism of the Mussolini era is now resurfacing. This is a very accurate observation. In fact, it is possible to go even further back to the historical crises of capitalism. Today, we are experiencing a digital revolution. Artificial intelligence is also a significant part of this transformation—just like the Industrial Revolution that began in the late 18th century. That era brought major opportunities, but the working class was severely oppressed.

Today, too, many professions are disappearing due to digitalization. For example, I previously had one of my books translated by an American for publication in the US. Now, there’s no need for that—translation programs can complete it within a few days. These developments can be used for good or bad—technology itself is neutral.

We discussed the emergence of capitalism in the late 18th century and drew parallels with the present day, right? Then, about a hundred years later, in the late 19th century, the imperialist extension of capitalism emerged. They seized regions—especially in Africa and Asia—through every means possible, including military occupation.

We know that the crises of capitalism are inherent in its nature—they arise periodically from within the system itself. For instance, the Great Depression of 1929 was the result of such an internal contradiction. Just like today, all states at that time tried to cope by shutting down imports. What does that mean? It means blocking other countries’ exports, which in turn paralyzes international trade. But countries had no choice due to the crisis they were in. The 1929 crisis began with a stock market collapse in New York and soon spread worldwide. In the end, every country tried to protect its own economy, and the global economy essentially collapsed. We are witnessing a very similar process today.

However, this time there is a crucial distinction: today’s developments stem not only from capitalism’s internal contradictions but also from external pressures. A key example is China, which, despite maintaining Communist Party rule, has largely embraced a capitalist economic model. This shift has deeply unsettled Western powers—particularly during Donald Trump’s presidency. In response, economic protectionist measures were introduced, including attempts to impose significant tariffs on Chinese goods, which in turn posed risks to the European economy as well.

The dynamics we are witnessing today echo those of earlier historical moments—namely, the crises at the end of the 18th and 19th centuries, and the Great Depression of 1929. These parallels make the declaration I signed not merely a warning about present dangers, but a timely reminder that the past continues to shape our political and economic future.

The Real Fear Lies with the Regime Itself

Despite living under the Erdoğan regime, you have once again demonstrated an example of intellectual courage by being among the signatories of the declaration. In your view, how should the responsibility of intellectuals against fascism be defined under today’s conditions? How can the calls in the declaration—such as boycott, strike, and collective action—be concretized for academic and cultural circles?

Professor Baskın Oran: Frankly, I don’t think I’ve shown any major intellectual reaction in this matter. I mean, being afraid of something this small is out of the question. After all, as you know, there’s Article 299 of the Turkish Penal Code—insulting the president. But in this case, such a situation does not exist. No matter how much they try to stretch it, they cannot justify or substantiate such a claim. Therefore, it would not be right to see this as a small act of heroism.

As for the second part of your question: To be honest, I don’t always trust the (Turkish main opposition Republican People Party) CHP. However, the current trajectory of the CHP under the leadership of Özgür Özel is quite positive. This should be acknowledged, and he should be congratulated accordingly. Because he is truly expanding the societal movement to broader masses and succeeding in integrating with the people. He’s going beyond mere declarations and embracing a political approach that translates into action.

And precisely because of this, arrest warrants are being issued for those around him, and attempts are being made to ban political opponents—especially Ekrem İmamoğlu—from participating in elections. The system is clearly afraid of this new, young, and rightly governed CHP. That’s why I believe this process should be supported. 

Yes, if one day the CHP reverts to its old ways, then we will resume our criticisms. But for now, I support the CHP under Özgür Özel’s leadership.

A Turkish man in Hyde Park, London, shows support for protesters in Istanbul following the eruption of nationwide demonstrations—Turkey’s largest anti-government unrest —challenging then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authority in June 2013.
Photo credit: Ufuk Uyanik.

Authoritarianism in the West Is Rooted in a Deep Fear of the Consequences of Its Own Imperial Past

What role have the structural ruptures caused by imperialist expansion—gaining momentum in the late 19th century—in underdeveloped countries, and the waves of migration originating from these regions, played in the rise of fascist and authoritarian tendencies currently observed in the West? In this process, how has the concept of “development” undergone an inversion or distortion?

Professor Baskın Oran: Now, what you are actually asking me—albeit implicitly—is the following: In some developed countries, we are witnessing the hardening and spread of authoritarian regimes; however, at the same time, you are reminding us that similar authoritarian tendencies are also emerging in less developed countries. For example, within the European Union, we observe this trend especially in Poland and Hungary. On the other hand, you are also pointing out the grave actions committed by Israel in Gaza and how they are not being sufficiently condemned by the Western world—particularly by the European Union. You are essentially asking, “Why is this happening?” If I’m understanding your question correctly, I’ll respond right away.

This authoritarian turn and drift away from democracy in developed countries actually stems from a deep fear. And the root of that fear lies in the following reality: The desperate people living in countries oppressed by imperialist forces since the late 19th century no longer know what to do. With hope, they head toward more developed countries, seeking asylum.

Considering that the populations of these developed countries are already limited, that their social security systems are strong, and that these systems are also targeted for use by migrants, a major sense of fear has emerged in these societies. This fear has led to the rise of right-wing politics. Especially through the discourse of anti-immigration and anti-asylum seekers, this fear has provided fertile ground for legitimizing authoritarianism. That’s the heart of the matter.

Trump Globalized the Monroe Doctrine

How do you evaluate the United States’ position—particularly in the Middle East—its Israel-backed aggressive stance, and its anti-Iran strategy in the context of a contemporary reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine? What kind of groundwork has the unipolar order that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union laid for this process?

Prof. Dr. Baskın Oran: You brought up a very important point by mentioning Trump. Trump is, in fact, a typical contemporary representative of the Monroe Doctrine. People generally understand this doctrine as follows — this is also how it’s taught in schools: “America should not interfere in European affairs.” Because Europe’s affairs are complicated, and since America was newly founded at the time, getting involved could harm it. That is the first proposition of the doctrine. However, the real significance of the Monroe Doctrine lies in its second proposition: Europe, too, shall not interfere in the developments on the American continent. In other words, there is a principle of mutual non-intervention.

Trump, however, has taken this second proposition and interpreted it in an entirely different way. The issue is no longer confined to the American continent; Trump has extended this principle globally and is essentially saying: “I will intervene anywhere in the world, but no one may interfere with me.” With this mindset, he is trying to exert pressure everywhere — from Canada to Denmark, from China to Iran. One of the tools he uses for this pressure is Israel. By supporting Israel’s authoritarian and fascist policies, he is in fact pursuing his own global strategy. Looking at the current situation, we see that Trump has become an extremely radicalized representative of the second and most important proposition of the Monroe Doctrine: “I will interfere with everyone, but no one may interfere with me.”

Civilizations That Merely Consume Technology Do Not Survive

To what extent has the difference between producing and merely consuming technology throughout history determined whether civilizations survived or not? For instance, what kinds of historical parallels can be drawn between the impact of the Industrial Revolution on underdeveloped societies and the impact of today’s digital revolution on those same societies? Does the asymmetry between producers and consumers of digital technology constitute a new regime of dependency?

Professor Baskın Oran: Of course, it creates dependency—because there is a world of difference between producing technology and merely consuming it. In fact, just recently, in 2024, Çağatay Anadolu wrote a very interesting article. In that piece, he went quite far back in history and offered an eye-opening analysis.

He said something along these lines: As you know, we descend from Homo sapiens. But before Homo sapiens, there were Neanderthals. The Neanderthals were not as skilled as the sapiens in things like tool-making or abstract thinking. And while we cannot be sure whether the Neanderthals were wiped out by the Homo sapiens, he argued that it is entirely logical for the Neanderthals—who ended up in the position of technology consumers in contrast to the technology-producing sapiens—to have vanished over time. I found this interpretation quite enlightening.

We’re talking about the Stone Age—actually not even about humans, but about human-like species, hominids. Even back then, the difference between producing and consuming technology determined the fate of entire species. Today, we are facing a similar situation: In the digital age, the disparity between societies that produce technology and those that only consume it creates a new regime of dependency.

Crushed Societies Give Rise to Authoritarianism and War

Mass protests in Russia demanded the release of Alexei Navalny. Police detained protesters in Moscow, Russia, on January 31, 2021. A girl holds a sign saying “Freedom for Putin from office!” Photo: Elena Rostunova.

How do you interpret the structural and political similarities between the rise of economic protectionism, authoritarian regimes, and the atmosphere of pre-world war following the 1929 Depression, and today’s neoliberal crisis moment? Are figures like Trump, Putin, Erdoğan, etc., representative of an updated form of fascism in this process?

Professor Baskın Oran: There is a very serious similarity here. The process that began with the 1929 crash of the New York Stock Exchange needs to be carefully examined. Why did it collapse? Because the market had suddenly and excessively risen. Such sharp increases followed by steep declines can devastate stock exchanges. In that situation, people panicked, withdrew, and the market collapsed.

As we just discussed, this collapse triggered the 1929 Depression. Following that, all countries tried to overcome the crisis by restricting imports and increasing exports. But that wasn’t possible—because everyone was trying to do the same thing simultaneously. In an instant, international trade collapsed. And this, ultimately, led to the Second World War.

The Treaty of Versailles, which followed the First World War (1914–1918), imposed such severe conditions on Germany that the people could barely breathe. German women were forced to sell their jewelry. Hitler took advantage of this immense pressure and came to power through a democratic election in 1933. 

Around the same time, we see a parallel in Turkey: Mustafa Kemal launched the War of Independence in 1919 in response to the unbearable terms imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres on the Ottoman Empire. Just as Versailles had done to Germany, Sèvres imposed unacceptable obligations on the Ottomans.

There is an important lesson here: international treaties cannot be based on crushing one side; if they are, they lead to new crises and wars. Treaties must be mutually acceptable. Lausanne is an example of this. It remains the only World War I peace treaty still in force because it was balanced.

Turning Fear into Power: Populists Redefine the ‘Other’ to Justify Authoritarianism

In your view, does the shift from the rhetoric targeting the ‘internal enemy’ in classical fascism to the perception of an ‘external threat’ through rising anti-immigrant sentiment in developed countries today indicate a transformation in the structural codes of fascism? In this context, what kind of political significance does the redefinition of the ‘other’ carry?

Professor Baskın Oran: Actually, we just talked about this. The main reason why governments in developed countries that push the limits of democracy or verge on fascism come to power through elections is the fear generated by immigrants. The sudden influx of asylum seekers creates a significant perception of threat in these countries. However, the root of this fear is a direct consequence of the imperialist policies initiated in the 19th century.

Populism frequently derives its legitimacy from an artificial conflict constructed between “the people” and “the elite.” How has this form of conflict laid the groundwork for a model of authoritarianism in Turkey? How would you analyze the relationship between the populist rhetoric of the administration under Erdoğan’s leadership and its actual authoritarian practices?

Professor Baskın Oran: Let me begin by saying this: The main factor that brought the Erdoğan regime to power and strengthened it was the excesses of past Kemalist practices. Especially during the military coup periods, the oppressive and denigrating measures laid the groundwork for this process.

One of the most striking examples is the rector and vice-rector of Istanbul University of the time preventing veiled female students from entering the university. Can such a thing be acceptable? A university is a place where a thousand voices echo, a space for thought and freedom of expression. A veiled student should be able to enter the university; both veiled and unveiled should benefit equally from this environment.

So what happens if a veiled student is not admitted? She stays at home, waits to get married, and raises daughters who are veiled just like herself. But if she does enter university, she will take courses like my “Nationalism and Minorities” class and be exposed to new ideas. This is precisely the point: the oppressive excesses of Kemalist policies are what initiated the process that laid the foundations of today’s authoritarian regime in Turkey.

Therefore, we must analyze the emergence of Turkey’s authoritarian regime not solely through the lens of populism, but also within this historical context. Moreover, the Erdoğan regime’s increasingly repressive policies in recent years are actually fueling a process that may bring about its own downfall. Let’s not forget: the logic of dialectics applies to everyone.

Excessive Centralism Marks the First Step Toward a Regime’s Self-Destruction

Do the trustee policy targeting municipalities governed by the DEM Party and the CHP in Turkey, as well as the legislative attempts to transfer municipal powers to provincial governors, align with the classical centralist reflexes of fascism? Could you evaluate these developments in comparison with historical experiences of fascism?

Professor Baskın Oran: Fascism, by definition, is centralism taken to its extreme; in fact, fascism is the most radical form of centralization. After the War of Independence, the implementation of centralist policies in Turkey—specifically Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s, later Atatürk’s, rise to power as a single-man ruler and continuation of that rule—can be understood to a certain extent. Of course, by “understood,” I don’t mean “justified” or “approved.” One of the clearest examples of this excessive centralism was how it was applied to the Kurds. This is a broad topic, but just to give an example: from the Eastern Reform Plan (Şark Islahat Planı) to today, we are talking about a centralism where even speaking Kurdish can still be penalized, albeit indirectly.

As you just mentioned, removing mayors elected by popular vote and replacing them with centrally appointed trustees—either governors or district governors—is a clearly fascist practice. Such actions make the Kurdish issue increasingly intractable and end up strengthening parties like the DEM Party, which advocate against this oppression. Even the CHP, which has long maintained a distant stance on these matters, begins to feel its influence.

In this sense, excessive centralism and intervention in the democratic will—dialectically speaking—mark the first step toward a regime’s self-destruction.

‘Native and National Judiciary’ Is Just a Euphemism for Authoritarian Retreat from Universal Law

Does the frequent emphasis in recent years on a ‘national and native judiciary’ represent a departure from universal legal principles and the instrumentalization of the judiciary? What is the function of such rhetoric in the construction of ideological hegemony by populist-authoritarian regimes?

Professor Baskın Oran: There was a time when there was no ideological framework whatsoever to support people who were under extreme oppression. It was only after World War I that the concept of “minority rights” emerged. In fact, Articles 37 to 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne are titled “Protection of Minorities.” This was the first time such a protection mechanism entered the agenda of international law.

Following the Second World War, this concept evolved further with the emergence of the notion of “human rights.” Especially after the 1950s, efforts to institutionalize human rights gained momentum, leading to the establishment of the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights. Turkey also recognized the jurisdiction of this Court and pledged to comply with its rulings. However, unfortunately, despite this commitment, Turkey largely fails to implement these decisions.

For instance, in cases like those of Selahattin Demirtaş and Osman Kavala, the clear and binding rulings of the European Court of Human Rights are being ignored. The core reason for this is that such decisions are perceived as a threat by the centralized and repressive ideological structure in Turkey. This amounts to an attempt to avoid implementing human rights. But such a stance is not sustainable in the long run.

The frequent emphasis on a so-called “native and national judiciary” must also be understood in this context. This slogan signals a break from universal legal principles and the instrumentalization of the judiciary for political ends. Populist-authoritarian regimes deliberately employ such rhetoric to construct ideological hegemony. In reality, the phrase “native and national” is a euphemism for a regressive, inward-looking, and authoritarian vision that seeks to legitimize distancing from universal values.

Assimilation Backfires Once Identity Forms

Kurdish protesters gather in Taksim Square, Istanbul, on April 13, 2010, following the assault on Kurdish politician Ahmet Türk, who suffered a broken nose. Photo: Sadık Güleç.

Do the pressures on Kurdish citizens in the areas of language, culture, and representation—alongside the appointment of state trustees (kayyım) to municipalities—indicate that Turkey is moving away from a democratic resolution to the Kurdish issue? How do you foresee this approach impacting both national unity and democratization in the long term?

Professor Baskın Oran: Nazism has now reached such a point in the global and Turkish context that I believe Turkey is approaching the end of its centralized structure and its negative effects on Kurdish citizens.

Let me put it this way: you can attempt to assimilate a minority—a group treated as second-class citizens. This is a common historical occurrence. But assimilation has its limits: up until the point when a collective identity emerges within that group. Once that awareness forms, all further efforts at assimilation backfire and only serve to strengthen that group identity.

Turkey reached this point in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but failed to recognize it. Today, with the influence of external dynamics, this collective awareness has become even more visible. In this context, the autonomous Kurdish administration in northeastern Syria must be emphasized. This structure is supported by the most powerful country in the world—the United States—and is also recognized by the Syrian regime.

The current regime in Turkey, out of concern over this development, has initiated a second attempt at reform. The first attempt began in 1993, when Öcalan declared a ceasefire. Now, on July 17, 2025, it is planned that 30-40 PKK members will symbolically lay down their arms in a formal ceremony. This points to a very significant and positive development for Turkey.

“Let’s Just Call It a ‘Democratic Administration’—So That No Harm Comes to Anyone”

The foreign policy of the Erdoğan administration is frequently used as a tool for generating domestic political legitimacy. Does Turkey’s gradual shift away from Western values toward a “Russia-like” model resemble the foreign policy reflexes of fascism?

Professor Baskın Oran: Now, if you pay attention, there are two leaders with whom Erdoğan has very good relations: Trump and Putin. One is the head of the United States, the other of Russia. Although these two countries are fierce rivals and constantly at odds with one another, Erdoğan has managed to establish close ties with both. So, what is the common feature of these two leaders? Both are figures who have established—or are attempting to establish—autocratic regimes. That’s all I have to say.

Lastly, considering current developments, how would you conceptually define the regime in Turkey? Among terms such as fascism, authoritarian populism, competitive authoritarianism, and autocracy, which one do you think best fits today’s Turkey? Why?

Professor Baskın Oran: We’ve actually discussed this before. Let’s just say “a democratic administration,” so that no harm comes to anyone—shall we?

Professor Rafal Soborski, who teaches International Politics at Richmond American University and serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University.

Prof. Soborski: The Recent Polish Election Shows That Shifting Right Doesn’t Win Over the Right

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

In this compelling interview, Professor Rafal Soborski critiques Poland’s liberal democratic actors for mimicking right-wing rhetoric in a failed attempt to broaden appeal. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he warns, urging pro-democratic forces to adopt bold, progressive agendas rooted in class justice and social solidarity. Drawing comparisons to political centrists across Europe, Soborski emphasizes that ideological clarity—not cautious managerialism—is key to countering the far right’s emotional narratives and mobilizing mythologies. His insights offer a timely call for a renewed progressive vision amid the turbulent political landscape in Poland and beyond.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Rafal Soborski offers a trenchant critique of the Polish liberal democratic actors’ strategic missteps in the recent presidential election, arguing that centrist attempts to mimic the right not only fail to capture conservative voters but also alienate the progressive base. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he asserts, summarizing what he sees as a recurring failure of liberal parties not only in Poland but across much of Europe.

Professor Soborski, who teaches International Politics at Richmond American University and serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University, situates this analysis within a broader critique of what he calls “managerial centrism.” For him, this style of governance—technocratic, uninspiring, and devoid of ideological ambition—has become a default mode for centrist parties. “Even when the center wins elections, it then limits itself in office to this very managerialism… without a compelling vision of its own,” he explains.

This was evident in the performance of Civic Platform’s candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski, who lost narrowly to the nationalist Karol Nawrocki in a deeply polarized race in Poland. Rather than galvanizing progressive voters with bold policies, Trzaskowski, Professor Soborski suggests, hedged his ideological bets and made symbolic missteps that demoralized key constituencies. “I don’t think he convinced anyone by hiding the rainbow flag handed to him by Nawrocki during one of the debates,” Professor Soborski notes. “This alienated many people on the left… while not convincing anyone on the right.”

In his view, such political positioning reflects a deeper failure to recognize the need for ideological clarity and courage. Drawing comparisons to Germany’s Olaf Scholz and Britain’s Keir Starmer, Professor Soborski warns that when liberal parties attempt to neutralize far-right narratives by parroting them, they lose both authenticity and voter trust. “It tends to mimic instead the narratives of the right,” he laments.

For Professor Soborski, the path forward lies not in cautious centrism but in a reinvigoration of progressive values—rooted in social justice, pro-Europeanism, and recognition of class dynamics. “I would like to see pro-democratic forces in Poland challenging the right,” he concludes, “rather than hoping in vain that they can occupy some of the right’s discursive territory.”

This interview reveals not only the ideological contours of Poland’s political battleground but also the urgent need for liberal democratic actors to rethink their strategy before the far right consolidates its recent gains.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Rafal Soborski.

Populism Is a Style, Not an Ideology

Posters of 2025 Polish presidential candidates Rafał Trzaskowski (KO) and Karol Nawrocki (PiS) in Kuślin, Poland, on April 6, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Rafal Soborski, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. You’ve argued that populism lacks ideological coherence. How would you categorize Karol Nawrocki’s brand of politics—Trumpian, nationalist, anti-liberal—within your broader critique of the term ‘populism’?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I don’t think mine is a critique of the term populism as such.
But instead, what I would argue—and I am, of course, far from being original here—is that approaching populism as an ideology, even a thin one, is misguided. Incidentally, the author to whom we owe the concept of thin-centered ideology, Michael Freeden, does not think populism qualifies as one, so it doesn’t qualify as a worldview. According to Freeden, thin-centered ideologies have a restricted conceptual core, a restricted range of concepts, and hence need broader, more mature ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism, to serve as their hosts. But the thin-centered ideologies are still more complex than populism. So think of nationalism, feminism, perhaps ecology.

On the other hand, populism revolves merely around the opposition between the decent people and the corrupted elite, and this is not enough to construct a worldview that any ideology is expected to offer. Of course, you can further distinguish between right-wing populism, left-wing populism, and so on. But such distinctions often reveal that populism does not really make much sense as an ideological category. So both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders have been described as populists, but their views are dramatically different.

During the pandemic, I analyzed approaches to COVID-19 that others had categorized as populist, and I showed that there was no consistent pattern or any general similarities in terms of the track record—in terms of the success or otherwise—of so-called populist policies, and that, in fact, the major factor was the degree of neoliberalization. So, I think it is better to keep populism as a description of the type of political communication—the style of political communication—and perhaps also the convention-breaking behavior of some politicians, including dressing down, swearing, smoking—in the case of Nawrocki, sniffing snus during TV debates with Trzaskowski.

But the populist manner may carry very different ideological and political messages, and in that sense it may be better to speak of populist nationalism or populist socialism rather than vice versa—rather than socialist populism. Populism then becomes just a description of the style in which a given ideology is conveyed.

As for Nawrocki, I think all of the adjectives that you have mentioned—Trumpian, nationalist, anti-liberal—could potentially apply, for of course they are different categories.
Trumpism seems to have an obvious meaning. It’s a blend of hostile grievances against all kinds of minorities and some pernicious establishment—which is, of course, ironic, considering Trump’s own status—and Trumpism is expressed more as ephemeral sound bites than coherent ideas. We’ve become used to that with Donald Trump. Trump is also associated with political transactionism, bringing his personal monetary interest quite unashamedly into politics, which also affects what he says and how he says it. So it remains to be seen if Nawrocki tries to emulate this.

Is Nawrocki a nationalist? Certainly. And it is a nationalism that thrives on and stirs up collective fears and collective resentment in a volatile world whose complexities this kind of nationalism oversimplifies.

Anti-liberal? Well, absolutely. However, I think we need to be fair and wait and see who Nawrocki turns out to be ideologically when in office.

We need to remember that until he was selected by Jarosław Kaczyński as an ostensibly nonpartisan candidate—but really the candidate of Law and Justice (PiS)—he had been almost a complete unknown to the wider public. So I think we need to wait and see what happens.

Ideological Balkanization and the Far Right’s Mythmaking Machine

You’ve called for taking ideology seriously in times of crisis. What ideological threads—beyond vague populism—do you see underpinning Nawrocki’s support base and discourse?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Thank you for this question. Yes, I think political ideology should be taken seriously, and I discussed this in my work. For years, however, ideology has undergone a radical transformation, becoming increasingly fragmented, fluid, ephemeral,
reacting haphazardly to rapid social and political changes. So, traditional left-right distinctions have blurred. They have given way to hybrid belief systems and situational politics, featuring often contradictory positions depending on the issue at hand, emerging at any moment. Of course, social media have accelerated this shift as well, favoring meme-driven and personality-centered politics over more durable, collectively held ideological commitments. And, comprehensive worldviews are losing ground to issue-based activism, identity politics, and also algorithmically reinforced echo chambers. So, ideology has changed, and far-right politics provides a particularly revealing lens through which to analyze ongoing ideological transformations. 

The far right today combines elements of nationalism, traditionalism, libertarianism, conspiracism, accelerationism—you name it—into an unstable and contradictory but potent political force. The far right also engages in constructing and mobilizing its followers around myths—political myths of civilizational decline, national betrayal, or demographic apocalypse. It offers emotionally charged narratives of victimization and redemption. So, for example, “the Great Replacement” myth frames migration as an existential threat to the West; “the Deep State” conspiracy envisions elites orchestrating some global control or takeover. The far right relies on such narratives, positing a moralized struggle between the people and their perceived enemies, and seems to be capitalizing on the fears that these cause.

Overall, I think what we witness is ideological Balkanization—adherence to tribalism over universalism, feeling over reasoning—and it’s going in that direction. But this does not mean that we should be paying less attention to these fragmented new forms of ideology. Ideology scholars should really be exploring ideology in its different expressions, whether they are sophisticated and structured, or crass and fleeting. For better or worse, this is how we tend to think politically today, and we should be studying this.

However, coming back to Nawrocki, I think it is likely that he will be blending different ideological themes, and it seems certain to me that it will be a narrative mobilizing collective exclusionary emotions over reasoning. But still, as I said earlier, I think we need to wait and see. His political communication thus far has been subject to the pressures of electoral competition much more than it will be when he’s in office, with at least five years of presidency ahead of him. Perhaps he will continue this kind of discourse, or perhaps he will change. We’ll see.

The Far Right Has a Base and a Superstructure—But No Real International

President-elect Karol Nawrocki campaigning ahead of Poland’s 2025 presidential election in Łódź, Poland, on April 27, 2024. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

How does Nawrocki’s alignment with Trumpism reflect broader transnational ideological flows between far-right actors across the Atlantic? Are we seeing a global ideological bloc emerging?

Professor Rafal Soborski: That’s a great question. Far-right ideologies take increasingly transnational forms. This includes the emergence of different forms of civilizationism, variously aligning with or transcending nationalism or racism. So, with my colleagues at London Metropolitan University, Professor Michał Garapich and Dr. Anna Jochymek, we’ve been working on a project funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council, studying the emerging transnational Polish-British far right. And we see a significant number of Polish migrants in Britain recruited by British far-right organizations. We also see British far-right leaders and activists visiting Poland, for example, to take part in the Polish Independence March on 11/11, which is probably the world’s largest transnational far-right hub, as well as a symbolic space for the reproduction of political myths.

Far-right cooperation is fast becoming both a matter of ideological synergy and financial benefit. Far-right influencers play an increasingly important role, and there is money around them. So, for example, one Polish-British far-right PR expert has been behind the rightward shift of Elon Musk, and both have promoted the staunchly pro-Israeli, Islamophobic far-right influencer Tommy Robinson.

So, in that sense, I think an ideological bloc has already emerged, and this far right of today does have both its base and its superstructure, using Marxian terminology. But having said all that, far-right nationalism’s logic is not really given to cooperation—to put this mildly—and as we know from history. So, I anticipate all kinds of tensions, potentially conflicts emerging, and I don’t think that a robust, coherent far-right international is likely in that sense.

Populist Nationalism Thrives on Imagined Enemies And PiS Knows This Well

With Nawrocki now positioned to veto progressive reforms by Tusk’s government, are we witnessing a new phase of institutional gridlock engineered by ideological confrontation between liberalism and authoritarian conservatism?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think this is highly likely. But I don’t think, to be honest, that Tusk’s government would have done much, even with a president from its own side. The coalition is too divided on social issues and has been, I have to say this with regret, highly ineffective. And Tusk’s party itself is really right-wing—I mean, by Western standards. This is a neoliberal/neoconservative party. It resembles the Tories under Cameron before their shift in a far-right direction. So, yes, but I don’t think that it would be a very dramatic change in relation to what we have.

Do you foresee PiS leveraging the presidency to engineer a strategic comeback in 2027, thereby locking in illiberal reforms? If so, how might ideology serve as the vehicle of this restoration?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think the broad ideological outlook of Law and Justice (PiS) will remain as it is—traditional, conservative on social issues, and protectionist—some would say drifting towards the left—on economic issues. At the same time, the populist nationalism that PiS represents, as I said earlier, thrives on imagining enemies and hostile forces.
So, at one point it was the LGBT community that PiS stigmatized, with some regions and locations under the control of the party declaring themselves to be LGBT-free zones. At other points, it was refugees from the Middle East, whom Kaczyński presented in a language resembling Nazi rhetoric, really—namely, as carriers of dangerous diseases. So, with the rapid growth of the Ukrainian population in Poland following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, PiS will be keen to capitalize on any emerging fears and tensions between the Polish population and the Ukrainian minority in Poland, and that this will be used to engineer this strategic comeback in 2027.

PiS Is Illiberal—But Let’s Not Mistake It for Neoliberal

Chairperson of Law and Justice, Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Photo: Tomasz Kudala.

In your analysis, how does neoliberalism continue to structure Polish politics even amidst this nationalist, anti-liberal wave? Can we speak of an ‘illiberal neoliberalism’ in the Polish context?

Professor Rafal Soborski: This is an interesting question—questions like this color the debate on whether we still live in a neoliberal era. Trump’s tariffs, Brexit, etc., seem to perhaps contradict this. Neoliberalism—and by this I mean a crass version of 19th-century economic liberalism, not the paradigm in the studies of international relations also known as neoliberalism—has been the hegemonic ideology for so long that, even if we are to assume its terminal decline in the near future, it will continue resonating for some time. By the way, the end of neoliberalism was pronounced a few times before, especially during the 2008 economic crisis—the gravest one since 1929—which revealed the serious flaws of neoliberalism, and then during the pandemic, when suddenly the state, which neoliberals tend to blame for all problems, proved indispensable, and neoliberal regimes coped with the pandemic far worse, far less effectively than the more social-democratic, statist ones.

Now, neoliberalism is compatible with authoritarianism—think of Chile under Pinochet’s rule, for instance—but as far as PiS is concerned, I am not sure if the party represents illiberal neoliberalism. Neoliberals preach that markets are always right, they don’t find inequality to be a problem, they promote austerity and the rolling back of the welfare state. And PiS, on the other hand, is actually quite statist in approach, supportive of the welfare state—for whichever reasons, usually just electoral reasons, but still—and big projects like, for instance, the central airport in Poland, which is now in a bit of a limbo. Economic inequalities—we have to keep this in mind—under the PiS government declined in Poland. The Gini coefficient, which measures inequality, fluctuated during PiS years but was never higher than in 2015 and is now significantly below average. So, I wouldn’t describe them as illiberal neoliberals. They are certainly illiberal, but probably not neoliberal.

Is Poland a Nationalist Haven?

Your recent co-authored work shows how Polish migrants in the UK are co-opted into transnational far-right movements. How might Nawrocki’s presidency reinforce or reshape diasporic nationalism and transnational far-right solidarities?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Thank you very much for this question. This is the topic that I’m working on with Professor Garapich and Dr. Jochymek at LMU. 

Poland is often seen by the global far right as a nationalist haven that remains relatively homogeneous ethnically, that remains traditional, conservative, and has also been very economically successful in recent decades, while maintaining a strong identity. And this kind of perception has been articulated and reinforced by all kinds of far-right influencers, but also by Donald Trump. When he visited Warsaw during his first presidency, he chose Warsaw as the location for his main European speech—often described by scholars as the major narrative of Western civilizational populism.

I think this perception of Poland—has been undermined by the 2023 elections and the premiership of the globalist Donald Tusk, as he’s seen by the far right. But if PiS regains power in 2027, then the far-right narrative about Poland as a model country is likely to make a comeback. 

I already mentioned our work on Polish migrants in Britain, one of the largest minorities in the country. At this point, approximately 700,000 Poles live in Britain, and their voting patterns are interesting. They are different from how Poles living in, for example, the United States or Canada vote. So in the first round of the presidential elections, almost 36% of those who voted voted for Trzaskowski. But then he was followed by two far-right candidates—Sławomir Mentzen, over 18%, and Grzegorz Braun, who got over 14%—and Nawrocki was only fourth, with just 13%. So it seems that Polish right-wing migrants in Britain prefer either the more extreme narrative coming from Braun, which is messianic, antisemitic, extremely homophobic, or the more economically libertarian far-right views of Mentzen. And the popularity of the latter may be explicable by the fact that many Poles living in Britain are self-employed and hence averse to big state and high taxation. But in the second round, Trzaskowski got almost 61%. So we should keep in mind that the majority of Poles in Britain are not interested in politics and do not vote. Those who vote ultimately voted for the centrist candidate.

Now, coming back to Nawrocki: only time will tell what his win means for transnational far-right solidarities. What we know is that the PiS government until 2023—so for eight years—supported symbolically and financially various initiatives of the Polish diaspora in Britain that were of a far-right nature, and the British press did register this. More broadly, taking a more global perspective, as the far right assumes an increasingly civilizationist posture, transnational far-right ideologies, activism, and symbolism will become more important, I’m sure—reinforcing these solidarities that you’ve asked about. However, as I already said, we should not forget the lesson from history: that collision courses are inherent in nationalism, and such friendships are likely to be subordinated and perhaps ultimately trumped by jingoistic passions.

Shifting Right Won’t Win the Right

What are the ideological weaknesses of the liberal opposition in Poland, particularly in light of Trzaskowski’s narrow loss? Is managerial centrism enough to challenge the far right’s mobilizing narratives?

Professor Rafal Soborski: It certainly is not enough, and this can be seen not just in Poland, but also in other places, including Germany or Britain, where—even when the center wins elections—it then limits itself in office to this very managerialism you mentioned, without a compelling vision of its own. It tends to mimic instead the narratives of the right. Think of Keir Starmer’s shift to the right in recent months, or Scholz when he was Germany’s Chancellor. There are many other examples. And I think this was also a mistake of the coalition government in Poland—the rightward shift in the rhetoric around migration, for example, and no progress whatsoever on the promises made to the LGBT community. And of course, this was caused by the coalition being divided on the question. But why would voters take into consideration the inner workings of the governing coalition? They generally expect results. 

Many leftists did vote for Trzaskowski, perhaps with a heavy conscience. I would have liked many more of them to vote for him, just to avoid having a nationalist with a shady past as president of the country. But Trzaskowski himself should have shifted in a more progressive direction. For example, I don’t think he convinced anyone by hiding the rainbow flag that was handed to him by Nawrocki during one of the debates, and then it was quickly taken over from Trzaskowski by a left-wing candidate. This alienated many people on the left—members of the LGBT community, I presume, as well—while not convincing anyone on the right, who had seen Trzaskowski before participating in Pride marches in Warsaw. So, this was inconsistent, and shifting to the right will not work.

Don’t Chase the Right—Reclaim Class Politics and Solidarity

A fatigued factory worker.
A fatigued factory worker experiencing exhaustion, weakness, hopelessness, and burnout. Photo: Shutterstock.

How should pro-democratic forces in Poland reframe their political project to contest both the nationalist cultural agenda and the underlying neoliberal consensus you critique?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think it is evident from what I have said so far that my political views are leftist and progressive. I would like to see pro-democratic forces in Poland challenging the right rather than hoping in vain that they can occupy some of the right’s discursive territory. I would like to see an open, pro-European Poland respecting minorities and celebrating diversity. 

But I would also like to see the importance of social class really appreciated by Polish progressive politicians.The liberal center, and even the liberal left, sometimes appear to believe that class is no longer a significant dimension of identity or social stratification. They see class as a concept that was relevant in the industrial era—in the 19th century, early 20th century—but not in an information- and service-based society of today. But the concept of class describes an economic relationship, and anyone working for wages, not living off rent or interest, belongs to the working class. So to appeal to this huge group, pro-democratic forces should start talking about the four-day working week, more loudly about universal income, universal benefits—especially in the context of AI, which will likely eliminate a wide range of professions, a wide range of jobs, or rather, it will replace humans in those jobs. 

The Razem (Together) party in Poland has started this conversation, and I think this is the way to go, rather than caring mainly for the interests of a small number of wealthy individuals or entrepreneurs, however important they may be for the economy. We should also remember on this point that some of the people who voted for Law and Justice—I suspect a significant share of the party’s electorate—chose it because of the range of social benefits, welfare benefits that the party has introduced or expanded, hence, as I mentioned, reducing inequalities while at the same time sustaining economic growth. So, I think a social democratic, solidary response—protecting the poor while shifting more of the financial burden towards the privileged few—is what I would recommend, and I would recommend this both in principle and also strategically, as a way to weaken, to defeat PiS.

And finally, Professor Soborski, given the gender and education-based electoral cleavages evident in the runoff, how might intersectional ideological analysis help explain—and perhaps overcome—these divisions?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Most of the cleavages were not that surprising—big cities for Trzaskowski, provincial Poland for Nawrocki, Western Poland for Trzaskowski, Eastern Poland for Nawrocki. Education was, of course, a big factor as well. But what I would like to highlight—what came unexpectedly—was the support far-right candidates Mentzen and Braun received from young people, who then, in the second round, voted primarily for Nawrocki. So clearly, this is a group for whom Civic Platform—the coalition government—does not seem to have a convincing offer, and I already explained what I see as the right response.

Dr. Radoslaw Markowski is Professor of Political Science, Center for the Study of Democracy, Director, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw & Polish Academy of Sciences and Polish National Election Study, Principal Investigator.

Professor Markowski on Poland’s President-Elect Karol Nawrocki: Future Statesman or Mere Footnote?

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

In this compelling post-election interview, Professor Radosław Markowski offers a candid, expert analysis of Poland’s newly elected president, Karol Nawrocki. Backed by PiS and inspired by Trump-style politics, Nawrocki’s narrow win poses serious challenges to Prime Minister Tusk’s pro-European government. Professor Markowski dissects the roots of this upset—calling it the result of a “fantastically prepared campaign”—and warns of potential institutional gridlock and democratic backsliding. While describing Nawrocki as “inexperienced” and lacking policy depth, Professor Markowski holds out a sliver of hope that he may rise above partisan loyalties. With sharp insights into Polish society, EU disillusionment, and the dangers of populist overreach, this interview is essential reading on Poland’s increasingly polarized and uncertain political trajectory.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In the aftermath of Poland’s 2025 presidential election, the political landscape remains fraught with uncertainty, ideological tension, and institutional fragility. Karol Nawrocki, a nationalist conservative backed by PiS and inspired by Trump-style politics, narrowly secured victory with 50.89% of the vote, defeating centrist candidate Rafal Trzaskowski. His win delivers a major setback to Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s pro-European government, which has been striving to reverse judicial reforms enacted under the previous PiS administration. With presidential veto power at his disposal, Nawrocki is expected to obstruct key liberal policies, deepening political gridlock and intensifying concerns about democratic backsliding.

In this timely and probing interview, renowned political scientist Professor Radosław Markowski offers a sharp analysis of Nawrocki’s narrow win, calling it the product of a “fantastically prepared campaign” rather than a sign of a lasting ideological shift. Professor Markowski emphasizes that Nawrocki is “definitely inexperienced,” lacking basic knowledge of international relations and economics. Yet despite these limitations, he entertains a faint hope—perhaps naively—that Nawrocki might rise above his campaign alliances and “act reasonably and become a good politician serving the country and society he represents.”

This cautious optimism is tempered by structural concerns about Poland’s democratic integrity. Professor Markowski draws a direct line between the present moment and the legacy of what he has termed “free but unfair” elections. Referencing his article in West European Politics, he highlights the disproportionality of PiS’s 2015 win—where only 18.8% of eligible voters delivered a 51% parliamentary majority—and the subsequent “eight years of structural lawlessness.” Nawrocki’s victory, Professor Markowski argues, does not signal a visionary mandate, but reflects the effective demobilization of liberal voters and the disciplined overperformance of a conservative-nationalist base.

With his strong nationalist rhetoric and pledges to limit EU influence while promoting Polish sovereignty, Nawrocki’s rise has been cheered by Eurosceptic leaders across Central Europe, including Viktor Orbán and Marine Le Pen. Yet his alignment with this populist-right alliance only heightens fears of further democratic erosion in a country once considered a model of post-communist European integration.

Whether Nawrocki becomes a transformative statesman or a forgettable footnote in Polish political history remains an open question. As Professor Markowski underscores, the new president now faces a choice: to entrench polarization and gridlock, or to rise above partisan constraints and define his legacy in the eyes of future generations.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Radosław Markowski.

Democracy at a Tipping Point

Posters of 2025 Polish presidential candidates Rafał Trzaskowski (KO) and Karol Nawrocki (PiS) in Kuślin, Poland, on April 6, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Radosław Markowski, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In the light of Karol Nawrocki’s narrow victory, how do you interpret this outcome within your framework of “plurality support for democratic decay”? Does this mark a deepening of democratic vulnerability in Poland, despite Law and Justice party’s (PiS) 2023 parliamentary loss?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let’s first try to recall the facts. In 2023, PiS won the elections against Platforma Obywatelska by nearly 4 percentage points—an equivalent of several hundred thousand votes—but it was unable to govern due to its lack of coalition-building capacity. Today in 2025, they won by a significantly smaller margin—just 1.5% effectively. It is a sort of a tie with a slight edge toward one of the candidates. However, the narrative remains consistent.

Polish society—and this is the focus of my ongoing research, soon to be published—is fundamentally liberal, progressive, and cosmopolitan. This stands in stark contrast to the narratives promoted by pundits and public intellectuals who advocate for a nationalist, conservative, and ultra-religious vision of Poland. The proportion of those who support liberal and progressive values over traditional and nationalistic ones is typically three to one, two to one, or at worst, three to two. Across more than 20 dimensions of this cultural divide, I see no evidence of conservative-nationalist dominance.

The problem lies in the fact that these conservative forces, supported by the Polish Catholic Church and representative of a departing world order, have successfully achieved nearly full mobilization in the last decade or decade and a half. Ninety to ninety-nine percent of all available nationalist-conservative voters turn out for elections.

On the other hand, the liberal-progressive side struggles, occasionally succeeding—as in 2023. Compounding this issue is the fact that PiS supporters are notably older, less educated, primarily from rural areas or outside the labor market by choice or by circumstance and are ill-equipped for success in a meritocratic modern world. They are part of society, of course—this is a description, not a judgment. Their mobilization is straightforward, relying on black-and-white imagery, simplifications, and the narrative of stark Manichean good versus evil.

In contrast, the liberal-progressive side comprises highly educated voters—predominantly individuals with high socioeconomic status, capable people who run their own businesses, academics, entrepreneurs, and the middle class. This is a challenging electorate. They are critical readers who verify information coming from politicians and reject simplistic depictions of the world. They ask not only about the goals but also about the means of achieving those goals. They question; they ask about possible side effects. They ask about alternative policies. They are concerned about trade-offs.

More so, they are very capricious in a way and dissatisfied with trivial answers to complicated matters. And this is precisely why it is so tough to attract these liberal, cosmopolitan, progressive voters. They are knowledgeable people who do not buy simplistic propaganda or demagoguery from politicians.

Eight Years of Structural Lawlessness in Poland

Logo and sign of the PiS (Law and Justice / Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) party in Pruszcz Gdański, Poland, on April 11, 2021. Photo: Dreamstime.

You’ve previously described Polish elections as “free but unfair.” Do the 2025 presidential results reflect a continuity of institutional imbalance, particularly with regard to partisan control over historical institutions like the Institute of National Remembrance?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let me say—this is a subtitle of one of my articles in West European Politics—that the elections were “free but unfair,” with unfair results. What I meant then is that in the 2015 elections, in which PiS won in a free and fair contest, they received 5.7 million votes out of nearly 31 million eligible voters—meaning that only 18.8% of eligible voters supported PiS, yet they gained a 51% parliamentary majority. You know, this kind of miracle almost never happens under proportional representation. But due to 17% of wasted votes and the D’Hondt formula—which eliminated a significant portion of minor votes—it was possible.

There would have been no problem with this kind of translation from 18.8% to 51% parliamentary majority if they had merely run the country in the sense of administrating government affairs. But unfortunately, they behaved after that election as if they had received a qualified majority, and they started changing the constitutional rules of the game.

I like Adam Przeworski’s definition of democracy, which says: democracy is institutionalized uncertainty. There should be frozen, strict, and obeyed rules of the game that never change during the process of electing politicians—but the outcomes of these rules are unknown, and that’s the beauty of democracy.

So, what PiS did illegally since 2015—because they thought this kind of miracle would never happen again—was to bash the Constitutional Tribunal, interfere with the Supreme Court by inventing a new chamber, the “Extraordinary Chamber of Something.” It is “extraordinary” in the sense that nobody in Europe or worldwide recognizes it. We experienced a period of eight years of structural lawlessness in Poland, which excluded us from the community of civilized democracies in the European Union.

We used to enjoy relatively high prestige with people like Jerzy Buzek, former President of the European Parliament, and Donald Tusk, who was President of the European Council. These roles may have even overstated Poland’s influence, but they indicated that Poland was politically important in the EU. That prestige vanished immediately after PiS came to power and began misbehaving in terms of the rule of law and democratic procedures.

Nawrocki’s Win: A Campaign Masterpiece or a Populist Rebrand?

Given Nawrocki’s political inexperience but ideological clarity, how do you interpret his victory as a possible recalibration of Poland’s populist-authoritarian project? Is this a new chapter or simply a rebranding of the PiS legacy?

Professor Radosław Markowski: It’s very hard to say who he is. He’s definitely inexperienced. He lacks basic knowledge about international relations, about economic issues, and so forth. Again, let me reiterate: Poland is a parliamentary democracy in which the executive power lies with the Prime Minister and his government. The president is mainly symbolic in terms of positive policies. He can propose something, but it is up to the parliamentary majority to pay attention to his activities. He, however, has negative powers. He can veto, and this is unfortunately what we expect from him. We’ll talk about that maybe later on.

But back to the campaign, I would say—well, in a way, it is quite interesting, and we’ll probably be teaching students about it in the future. It was a campaign masterpiece by Nawrocki’s electoral team—by the people who managed to craft a serious presidential contender out of almost nothing. Their most notable success was in discouraging turnout for Trzaskowski in the second round. Typically, second-round presidential contests hinge more on demobilizing the opponent’s base than on attracting new voters. In short, this was not a substantial victory in terms of broad public endorsement. Rather, it clearly illustrates how easily a poorly informed segment of the electorate can be—well, if you prefer, persuaded. If you prefer the term manipulated, that works too. Meanwhile, on Trzaskowski’s side, there was a clear failure of his electoral staff.

What does this outcome suggest about the limits of liberal coalition-building in Poland? Could Trzaskowski’s failure be linked to coalition fatigue, perceived elitism, or a lack of emotional mobilization compared to the nationalist right?

Professor Radosław Markowski: I already spoke about mobilization before, so I won’t repeat that here. But yes, the conservative nationalist camp is—quite frankly—astronomically over-mobilized. Virtually everyone in that camp turns out to vote. Unfortunately, the liberal democratic camp is less mobilized, and there are many reasons for that. One contributing factor is the one and a half years of the new government and its difficulties in implementing certain policies. However, it’s important to note that these delays—particularly on issues that matter deeply to many, such as abortion rights and women’s issues—were largely due to the fact that the current president, Andrzej Duda, had already made it clear he would veto such legislation.

So, the government was, de facto, waiting for a new opening—once the president is from their camp, or at least a person who is neutral and capable of reading what are the prerogatives of the president enshrined in the Polish constitution.

So, we have to wait and see. I don’t think I would interpret this win of Nawrocki as anything more than an incident and a fantastically prepared campaign by his staff, rather than something more deeply rooted. But one should also recognize that such victories—unexpected victories of unknown persons—sometimes redefine the political landscape and the political developments, and this should also be taken seriously into account.

Why Trzaskowski’s Campaign Missed the Mark

Rafał Trzaskowski, Mayor of Warsaw and presidential candidate, campaigning in Łódź, Poland, on June 3, 2020. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

To what extent did the personalization of the campaign around symbolic figures (Trzaskowski as elite technocrat vs. Nawrocki as populist traditionalist) reinforce identity cleavages over policy-based electoral competition?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let me reiterate a point about Trzaskowski’s campaign that I mentioned earlier. His team made a fundamental mistake—one I publicly flagged six months ago: they attempted to court the right-wing electorate. This group is a clear minority in Poland and already firmly aligned and mobilized by parties like PiS and Confederacja. The likelihood of swaying voters from that camp was virtually nonexistent.

This approach came at the expense of engaging the left-liberal electorate with progressive, liberal ideas. Trzaskowski is not an ultra-progressive or ultra-liberal, but he is certainly a meritocratic, cosmopolitan liberal—someone who speaks several languages fluently, who comes from an elite Warsaw family. Yet, he and his campaign team decided to pretend he was “one of us”—an average guy. One of the campaign’s obsessions was to ensure that no one mentioned his multilingualism.

This is a typical populist miscalculation—thinking you win elections by downplaying meritocracy. Unfortunately, it backfired. We estimate that around 1.5 million people who voted for the current ruling coalition in 2023 became disillusioned with Trzaskowski due to these mixed signals and overt appeals to the right-wing electorate. It was a real disappointment for them.

In the light of your concept of “Eurodisappointment,” to what extent does Trzaskowski’s loss suggest growing frustration even among pro-European voters with the EU’s perceived ineffectiveness in addressing democratic backsliding?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Together with my co-author, we pointed out in an article in European Union Politics that we began observing, around 2021–2022, a new phenomenon we called “new Euroscepticism” or “Eurodisappointment” among Poles. This isn’t the typical Euroscepticism rooted in xenophobic or nationalist attitudes. Rather, it’s a disappointment driven by frustration with the European Union’s inability to push back against leaders like Orbán and Kaczyński.

That old saying— “Brussels barks but doesn’t bite”— began to resonate, especially among a segment of the Polish population that had long been very enthusiastic about the EU. It fostered a growing suspicion that the EU might not be genuinely committed to upholding its core axiological pillars—democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental values.

Poland’s Populist Path and the Limits of EU Leverage

Has the European Union’s cautious and often delayed response to autocratizing member states like Hungary and Poland amplified the populist portrayal of Brussels as politically impotent? Could Nawrocki’s presidency signal a shift toward a more defiant, nationalist approach to EU engagement—echoing Orbán’s model of selective integration without formal rupture?

Professor Radosław Markowski: It might not be exactly what Orbán has invented, because in Poland—unlike in Hungary—there isn’t a deep-rooted historical sentiment akin to Hungarians’ longing for “Greater Hungary” or resentment over the Treaty of Trianon. In Hungary today, you can walk into nearly any hotel or public space and see maps depicting a pre-Trianon Hungary—three times its current size.

Poland also had its imperial moments in the past, being much larger in both territory and population. But even among nationalists, that imperial history doesn’t serve as a powerful reference point in contemporary politics. So, emulating Orbán isn’t straightforward.

Also, Orbán won a constitutional majority in Hungary’s first free and fair 2010 election. He could legitimately claim the mandate to rewrite the rules—which he did. It’s another matter how he later amended the constitution. But that legitimacy gave him more latitude than PiS or Nawrocki have in Poland.

Back to Polish politics: Nawrocki’s attitude toward the EU is definitely critical. But unfortunately, this is paired with a kind of infantile pro-Americanism—specifically, pro-Trumpism. You hear ideas like Poland leading the Trimarium Pact (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Georgia, North Macedonia, etc.). While maintaining good relations with these countries is important—especially those aspiring to EU membership—this can’t replace engagement with core EU mechanisms.

We should be at the heart of EU decision-making. Poland was recently re-invited by figures like Friedrich Merz and Emmanuel Macron to take a central role in European affairs—particularly because of our prescient warnings about Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine. As early as 2005, 2010, and 2014, we sounded alarms about Putin’s ambitions—warnings largely ignored by Angela Merkel and others in Western Europe. Now, Poland is being taken more seriously, and we should seize that moment.

Let me emphasize once again: Poland is a parliamentary democracy. Executive power lies with the Prime Minister and the government. Foreign policy is handled by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The President can influence foreign affairs symbolically or by refusing to appoint certain ambassadors, which creates problems for individuals and embassies. But in the grand scheme, it’s not a major institutional hurdle.

Nawrocki’s Risky Global Alliances

President-elect Karol Nawrocki campaigning ahead of Poland’s 2025 presidential election in Łódź, Poland, on April 27, 2024. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

Nawrocki’s campaign drew symbolic and rhetorical support from leaders like Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán. How do you see Poland’s evolving position in the broader network of global populist-right alliances?

Professor Radosław Markowski: For Poland, this dynamic doesn’t resonate with the PiS electorate—the party’s core support remains around 6 to 6.5 million voters, not the full 10 million who voted for Nawrocki in the second round. While he ultimately secured over 10 million votes, PiS’s true, consistent base is closer to the 29% he garnered in the first round.

Unlike Hungary, Poland—due to its historical experience—cannot accept pro-Russian sentiment. That simply doesn’t resonate here. As PiS and Nawrocki continue aligning with figures like Orbán, Marine Le Pen, Salvini, and even the prime minister of Slovakia, it will become increasingly difficult to justify such alliances to the Polish public. Even on the political right, there is discomfort with someone like Donald Trump, who appears either overly sympathetic to or dangerously naive about Russia.

But again, Polish foreign policy is in the hands of one of Europe’s most talented politicians: Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. So, I see no immediate cause for concern. External affairs will be shaped by the government and Sikorski, not the president.

Let me also point out something almost comical. Just a week ago, on May 25th, Donald Trump finally declared publicly that “Vladimir Putin is insane.” For Poles, this is hardly news. The average high school student here has known that for the last 15 to 20 years. It’s astonishing that it took so long for the most powerful man in the world—surrounded by the CIA and an array of intelligence agencies—to come to that conclusion.

So, in the long run, I believe Nawrocki will lose credibility and support if he aligns too closely with what I would call Kremlin muppets like Orbán, or with those financially entangled with Russia, like Salvini. It’s a very difficult political position in today’s Poland to be seen as a friend of Vladimir Putin.

Nawrocki’s Test: Rise Above Politics or Deepen the Deadlock?

Considering the veto powers of the presidency, how do you expect the new phase of institutional deadlock to evolve under Nawrocki, and what risks does it pose to executive-legislative accountability in Poland?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let’s give Nawrocki a chance. He is not strictly a PiS politician. He has made certain agreements and signed deals with Confederacja and others, and he will formally become Poland’s president in early August this year.

Every person—no matter their troubled CV or ethically questionable behavior in the past—who becomes president of a mid-sized country at the heart of Europe has the opportunity to reflect on how they want to be remembered. Will he be just a short footnote—an irrelevant president who did nothing for Poland—or will he attempt to act reasonably and become a good politician serving the country and society he represents?

Let’s give him that chance. Perhaps he will become less dependent on the political actors who backed him during the campaign. It’s a naïve expectation, I know—but there’s still a bit of the child in me. Sometimes, I deliberately want to be naïve to leave room for optimism. I’ve seen people radically change their political biographies before.

But if not—if he ends up blindly vetoing everything based on ideological conviction—then we’re back to what we’ve had for the last two years: a tense standoff between a combative president and a determined prime minister. That’s not good for Poland. Still, it’s the reality we may face. And if that happens, Nawrocki and his camp will ultimately lose, because it will become clear that they are obstructing the work of the government. It will be easy to demonstrate that things are not getting done in this country because of the president’s stubbornness.

George Simion

Dr. Bortun: Economic Insecurity Fuels the Rise of the Far Right in Romania

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

In the wake of Romania’s high-turnout 2025 presidential election, Dr. Vladimir Bortun offers a powerful analysis of how deep-rooted economic insecurity—fueled by decades of neoliberal reform—has driven support for the far right. Despite a centrist victory, nationalist George Simion’s strong performance underscores a broader post-crisis populist consolidation. In this exclusive ECPS interview, Dr. Bortun explores the AUR’s appeal among the diaspora and rural poor, the ideological vacuum left by the mainstream left, and how Romania exemplifies a wider European shift from democratic to authoritarian neoliberalism. A must-read for anyone interested in the structural dynamics behind Europe’s populist realignment.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Romania’s 2025 presidential election represented a pivotal moment for the country’s democratic trajectory and its place within the broader European political landscape. In a high-stakes runoff, centrist candidate and pro-European reformer Nicușor Dan secured a clear victory over George Simion, the leader of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). With the highest voter turnout in a quarter-century and the specter of a previously annulled election looming large, the vote was widely interpreted as a referendum on Romania’s political future—particularly on the tension between liberal democracy and the rising tide of far-right populism. Despite Simion’s defeat, his strong first-round performance and continued popularity signaled a deeper, more durable undercurrent of reactionary politics in Romania.

Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Dr. Vladimir Bortun, a lecturer at the University of Oxford and an expert on European politics, transnational party networks, and left-populist movements. With unique insight into both the structural drivers and class dynamics underpinning political realignments in Romania and beyond, Dr. Bortun offers a compelling analysis of how economic insecurity—rooted in decades of neoliberal reforms, mass emigration, and systemic inequality—has created fertile ground for the rise of the far right.

In this wide-ranging interview, Dr. Bortun reflects on how the socioeconomic legacies of Romania’s post-1989 transition have failed to deliver on their liberal democratic promises, especially for large swaths of the population living in poverty or working precariously. He argues that this deep economic discontent, compounded by the collapse of credible left-wing alternatives and the ideological convergence of the center-left and center-right, has allowed far-right actors like Simion and AUR to present themselves as anti-establishment voices—even as their own policies serve entrenched economic elites.

Crucially, Dr. Bortun situates Romania within a broader European context, where authoritarian neoliberalism is increasingly replacing the post-Cold War liberal consensus. He draws instructive comparisons with Poland, France, and Southern Europe, exploring how the mainstreaming of far-right rhetoric and policy by centrist parties—particularly around immigration and national sovereignty—has reshaped the ideological field.

By examining the rise of AUR’s support among the Romanian diaspora and among marginalized rural voters, Dr. Bortun challenges simplistic narratives about populism and brings attention to the lived realities of class, exclusion, and political abandonment. As he makes clear, the battle over Romania’s future is not only political or cultural—it is fundamentally about economic power, ownership, and whose voices get to shape the nation’s path forward.

Vladimir Bortun
Dr. Vladimir Bortun, a lecturer at the University of Oxford and an expert on European politics, transnational party networks, and left-populist movements.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Vladimir Bortun.

Neoliberalism Created the Perfect Storm

Professor Vladimir Bortun, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Given Simion’s stronger-than-expected first-round lead and his continued appeal despite being defeated in the runoff, how would you theorize the durability of far-right populism in Romania beyond the electoral cycle? Can this be conceptualized within a broader post-crisis populist consolidation rather than a mere reactionary surge?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a very important question. First of all, thank you again for the invitation. I should clarify that I’m not a professor yet—just a lecturer.

To go straight into the topic: recent academic literature has shed significant light on the key drivers behind the rise of the populist far right across borders. While there are, of course, multiple factors at play—and we will explore some of them—the most consistent driver across all contexts is economic insecurity, rooted in decades of neoliberal globalization.

These conditions have only worsened in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 crisis, which—as you mentioned—took a particularly austerity-driven form in Europe, shaped by how both European institutions and national governments responded. Romania was no exception.

To provide some context on the socioeconomic situation in Romania: after 35 years of neoliberal capitalism and roughly 18 years since joining the European Union—which has brought certain benefits but, for many Romanians (including those who have supported the far right), has failed to fulfill its initial promises—we are now facing deeply concerning indicators.

Approximately 45% of the population lives in poverty or on the brink of it—the highest percentage in the European Union, meaning nearly half the population is affected. Romania also ranks first or second in terms of in-work poverty. Moreover, it allocates the lowest—or among the lowest—shares of GDP to healthcare, education, and social protection.

After Ireland, Romania has the lowest tax collection capacity in the European Union. It also maintains some of the lowest tax rates in the EU. There is a 10% flat income tax, which disproportionately affects workers and employees—particularly because, in addition to this tax, they are also responsible for paying social contributions that were previously covered by employers. These include contributions to healthcare and pensions.

Unsurprisingly, this flat tax structure primarily benefits the wealthier segments of society. In addition, Romania has a corporate tax rate of 16%, one of the lowest in the European Union.

These are clearly the right conditions for economic insecurity—fertile ground for the rise of the far right. But it’s not only the poorest in society that we should consider. Economic insecurity affects various social classes and class fractions.

In Romania, it has had a particularly strong impact on the petty bourgeoisie—small and medium-sized entrepreneurs—who have been closing down their businesses at an increasing rate over the past few years, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic. I believe the pandemic represents another critical crisis that must be factored into any explanation of the far right’s rise. These small and medium entrepreneurs, going bankrupt by the thousands, form a core component of the far right’s social base.

Nationalism Meets Neoliberalism in a Peripheral Economy

People in traditional national costume return from Sunday church service in Maramureș, Romania—a region renowned for preserving its cultural heritage. Photo: Theodor Bunica.

How would you situate the AUR’s electoral messaging—particularly its nationalist-economically neoliberal synthesis—within the wider genealogy of post-2008 far-right formations in Europe? Is there a uniquely Romanian hybrid emerging, or does AUR largely mirror external templates?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: There are certain similarities with the broader profile of the European far right. There is clearly this populist discourse they employ, which is built on the dichotomy between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.”The elite, as in other countries, is portrayed as those who have sold out our country—who don’t represent the interests of our country but rather represent foreign interests, globalist interests. And of course, other undesirable categories in society are targeted as well, such as the LGBTQ community and immigrants from non-European countries, who have started to come to Romania in recent years as cheap labor—these are the usual suspects in far-right rhetoric.

At the same time, there is an element of truth in relation to the domination of foreign interests in Romania. Foreign companies hold a dominant position in key sectors of the economy, such as the energy sector, manufacturing—especially the auto industry—and the banking sector. They make huge profits in Romania, which they then repatriate to their home countries rather than reinvesting, even partially, in the Romanian economy.

Foreign banks, in particular, are guilty of this kind of profit repatriation from Romania, and this has generated a level of dissatisfaction that can also be observed in other countries. For example, in Poland, there is a very interesting study on the role of “comprador bankers” in the rise to power of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), which governed the country for about a decade. These comprador bankers were Polish managers of foreign bank subsidiaries who eventually came to realize that these foreign banks were operating in Poland solely to extract profit—profits that were then repatriated to their home countries, rather than being reinvested in the Polish economy. They did not, for instance, offer affordable or advantageous loans to Polish businesses. In response, some of these managers rebelled against the model and aligned themselves with the national capitalist hegemonic project advanced by PiS.

So, there is an element of what I would call the “comprador professional managerial class” that has served foreign capital in these peripheral Central and Eastern European countries, now fighting back against this foreign capital domination—in coalition with the domestic capitalist class. Particularly, those fractions of the domestic capitalist class that are trying to secure the sectors where they are still dominant—especially in Romania, such as real estate, construction, and hospitality.

The party you mentioned—AUR—led by Simion, who lost the election, is heavily funded by segments of the domestic capitalist class, particularly in the construction, real estate, and hospitality sectors. These actors are seeking to ring-fence and protect their interests from foreign capital, while also attempting to gain state power in order to advance those interests.

This project of the national bourgeoisie reclaiming state power is a common regional feature across Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary, Poland, and now Romania exhibit this pattern. I would even argue that it extends beyond the region—to Turkey, for example. Correct me if I’m wrong, but the Erdogan project seems to share similar characteristics, as far as I understand.

Now, regarding the distinctive features of the Romanian case—since I’ve already outlined some of the common regional characteristics—there are two aspects that stand out about the Romanian far right. I would highlight these two features, and perhaps we’ll focus on one of them in the following questions.

The first is their particular appeal to the diaspora. The diaspora represents a significant portion of their social base, and I’ll elaborate later on why they’ve been so successful in mobilizing this group.

The second distinctive feature is their appeal to farmers. Romania has the highest share of the workforce employed in agriculture in the entire European Union—between 18% and 20% of the total workforce. To give you a sense of how high this is: the second-ranked country in the EU is Poland, with only 10% of its workforce in agriculture. France, despite having a strong agricultural sector, has just 2.4% of its workforce employed in this field.

So, this is a huge sector in Romania, and the vast majority of these people working in agriculture are subsistence farmers. They are small farmers who feel like nobody is looking after their interests. The state is perceived as only overburdening them with regulations and taxation, while favoring the interests of big foreign corporations. And the far right is managing to build inroads into this significant social class in Romania.

A Left in Name, Neoliberal in Practice

Crin Antonescu
Crin Antonescu, the pro-European presidential candidate, speaks during the Social Democratic Party (PSD) Congress in Bucharest, Romania, where he was officially confirmed as the party’s nominee on February 2, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

How do you interpret the apparent paradox between widespread socioeconomic grievances and the relative electoral failure of redistributive political platforms, particularly in the light of the Social Democratic Party’s strategic vacillation and policy convergence with the right?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s the key factor from a subjective perspective. I’ve tried to talk about the objective factors, but in terms of the subjective conditions, clearly the key factor that has facilitated the rise of the far right—not just in Romania, but across the region and beyond—is the lack of a credible left-wing political project.

And the current left party, the center-left party you’ve mentioned—the PSD—is left in name, but not in substance, not in policy. They have actually governed for the majority of these 35 years of neoliberal capitalism—more or less 20 of those 35 years have seen them in government. So, they have implemented some of the very policies I mentioned earlier, which are responsible for the current socioeconomic conditions.

The very minimal social concessions they have made in terms of redistribution while in government have been largely limited to increasing the minimum wage—which is, of course, better than nothing. This partly explains why they remain the most voted-for party in Romania.

However, these measures are far from sufficient. Despite repeated increases over the past six or seven years, the minimum wage remains very low—about 30% below what would be considered a living wage in Romania, that is, the income necessary for a decent standard of living.

Moreover, Romania has the highest share of its workforce earning the minimum wage. Nearly 40% of all workers are on minimum wage—twice the EU average.

So, we are a minimum-wage economy, a low-taxation economy, and a low public spending economy. Romania is pretty much a paradigmatic case of neoliberalism—and the PSD is very much responsible for this. It is arguably the single most responsible political party for this situation.

Proletarians Abroad, Petit Bourgeois at Home

With over 60% of the diaspora backing Simion in the first round, what implications does this have for the dominant narratives that have historically cast diasporic Romanians as liberalizing or pro-European agents?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a significant shift indeed! And it started already in 2020, when the party AUR—which, by the way, stands for the Alliance for the Union of Romanians, but the acronym aur also means “gold” in Romanian— from the very beginning targeted its message toward the diaspora. They even called the diaspora “the gold of Romania” that they wanted to bring back to the country.

The party was launched in the diaspora in December 2019, one year before the first elections in which they stood candidates. Their launch meeting took place in the UK, among Romanians living there—not in Romania. So, from the outset, they were oriented toward the diaspora, and they managed to appeal to it in several ways.

On the one hand, this diaspora is not one unified entity; it consists of several diasporas. We’re talking about five million people, which is a quarter of Romania’s total population. They live very different lives in the West of Europe. Some of them live in quite squalid conditions, working very hard jobs for low wages, in poor environments, with little respect and little sense of being treated equally.

There is a widespread feeling among them that Romanians are treated as second-class citizens. Many are temporary or circular migrants—working on a construction site for three or four months, then returning to Romania, or working seasonal jobs picking vegetables on farms in Italy, Spain, the UK, or Germany, and then going back.

They don’t have a favorable context for integration or for deeper socialization in the host countries. But let’s be honest—those host countries themselves have experienced a surge in far-right politics. The far right is now much more mainstream in Western Europe than it was 10 or 20 years ago, when these migrants may have been sending back more liberal kinds of social remittances.

These societies have shifted significantly to the right. Anti-immigration discourse has become more mainstream, normalized, and legitimized—and Romanians living there have internalized some of that discourse.

In my own fieldwork, I often came across people who, despite being migrants themselves and suffering from anti-immigration attitudes and discourse, were nevertheless against other groups of migrants. They distinguished themselves from them—talking about “good migrants” and “bad migrants.” There is a real cognitive dissonance at play here, where migrants adopt anti-migration attitudes and political preferences.

Another aspect is that many feel Romania is a peripheral country that lacks a real voice in the European Union and in the broader global political stage. They perceive Romania as subordinated economically and geopolitically—which is true.

So, when a populist demagogue like Simion comes along and says, “I will make Romania stand tall again in the EU and in the world,” it resonates. It gives them a sense of restored dignity and pride.

Meanwhile, all the other political parties—including the PSD—are utterly uncritical in their allegiance to the EU, NATO, and the West in general. They refuse to acknowledge the real problems Romanians face, both in terms of their living conditions in the diaspora and in terms of Romania’s position within international power structures.

These parties speak only about the benefits and advantages of being part of these institutions, without addressing the contradictions, the challenges, or the structural disadvantages of Romania’s position in the European and international economic and political system. This, of course, creates a window of opportunity for the far right to come in and capitalize on people’s sense of marginalization and humiliation.

One additional point is that many of these migrants, as I mentioned, are circular or temporary migrants. They may be working blue-collar jobs abroad, but they’ve managed to accumulate enough capital to open a small business back home in their town or village of origin. This means they occupy a complex, dual class position: proletarians abroad, petit bourgeois at home. When they return home, after years of hard work abroad to save capital and open a small guesthouse, café, restaurant, or corner shop, they feel the state does nothing for them.

Instead, they feel overburdened by taxation. Increases in the minimum wage are perceived as a burden because they are now small employers who have to pay two, three, or four salaries. They blame the state—but they also blame those below them: people on minimum wage, or on welfare benefits, whom they see as lazy or asking for too much. They see themselves as the real hard-working people who have sacrificed abroad to invest in the Romanian economy—only to be abandoned by the state, which should be protecting their interests.

I think this is very important. I’m not saying it’s unique to Romania, but it is very salient here—and perhaps not as salient a feature in the social base of the far right in other European countries.

A Race to the Bottom Among Migrants

Building on your work on transnational political mobilization, how should we understand the AUR’s success among emigrants in Italy and Spain? Do these cases indicate a diasporic production of illiberal subjectivities shaped by specific host-country political contexts?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: I think I already touched on this in my previous answer. However, Italy and Spain are particularly illustrative of some of the dynamics I outlined earlier—especially Italy, where the far right has been in power for the past two and a half years.

In that context, migrants often find themselves in a race to the bottom, trying to prove they are more deserving than other migrant groups. I encountered numerous cases of Romanian migrants in Italy—or former migrants who had lived there for many years—expressing very negative attitudes toward Moroccan or Albanian migrants, for example.

Some even told me they had voted for the Northern League, now known as La Lega—Salvini’s party—which was the original far-right populist force before Brothers of Italy surpassed it in popularity. Ironically, this is a party that had made openly anti-Romanian statements in the Italian press. Nevertheless, this became their way of attempting to carve out a place for themselves—by identifying someone “below” them to target as the “bad” migrant.

In Spain, we see a similar surge with the Vox party over the last few years. It is now the third-largest political force in Spain—a country where the far right was outside of Parliament for decades.

Again, we’re talking about a Romanian diaspora that has suffered a lot of discrimination and marginalization. It took a long time for this community to settle. But there is also a split within these diasporas, as I mentioned—between the more settled, integrated diaspora, and the precariously employed, circular, temporary migrants who come and go and who cannot really find a foothold in these countries.

The Center Imitates, but the Far Right Dominates

Comparing Romania’s recent presidential runoff to parallel dynamics in Poland and Portugal, to what extent can we speak of converging or diverging trajectories in the European center-right’s strategy to contain or accommodate far-right surges?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: I think we see a very strong trend of accommodation of the far right—and not just from the center-right, but also from the center-left. In Denmark, for example—going a bit outside the region—the Social Democratic Party currently in government has adopted one of the harshest anti-immigration policies in Europe. And this trend extends further. Even here in the UK, the Starmer-led Labour Party has adopted many of the talking points not just from the Conservative Party but also from Reform UK. Just the other day, Starmer was speaking about Britain being “a country of strangers,” “an island of strangers” due to mass migration, according to him. Apparently, that makes me a stranger here.

There is a growing body of literature—by scholars like Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter—that refers to this as the mainstreaming of the far right: the normalization of reactionary ideas and policies. And this applies not just to rhetoric, but to actual policymaking, with both center-right and center-left parties adopting positions in an attempt to win back voters lost to the far right.

But as the saying goes, “the original is better than the copy.” People who want to vote for the far right for reactionary reasons—because they oppose immigration, for example—are unlikely to switch to the center-left just because it has adopted similar anti-immigration tropes. They will continue to vote for the far right. And we have seen this across the board.

The one Social Democratic party currently in power in Western Europe—in the EU at least—is in Spain. And they have resisted the temptation to go in this reactionary direction on issues like immigration and other topics dear to the far right. On the contrary, in some ways they have been an example of what a progressive government can and should say on key issues of our time, including the atrocities we are seeing in Gaza. They are, of course, not a perfect government—they have many flaws and shortcomings. But they demonstrate that it is still possible to stay true to Social Democratic values and policies and win elections. And that’s just speaking from a pragmatic point of view.

Corruption Isn’t the Cause—It’s the Symptom of a System

Romania protest.
Protesters gather for the 13th consecutive day in front of Victoria Palace, the government headquarters in Bucharest, Romania, on February 12, 2017. Over 50,000 demonstrators rallied against controversial corruption reforms, illuminating the night with their mobile phones and forming the national flag with colored paper and cellophane. Photo: Dreamstime.

What insights might Romania’s 2025 election offer for understanding the evolving relationship between anti-corruption discourse and far-right populism, especially when contrasted with the cases of Poland’s Law and Justice or France’s National Rally?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a very interesting question. I think, on the one hand, the far right’s collusion with corrupt and clientelist practices shows that, after all, they are not such a real alternative to the mainstream parties they criticize. They are quite happy to engage in the same kind of bad politics that the mainstream parties are guilty of. 

On the other hand, while corruption is indeed a major issue in Romania—as it is in many other countries—it is often framed in a very legalistic or even moralistic way, as if it’s simply a flaw of character or the result of an inefficient state bureaucracy.

In this sense, corruption is frequently instrumentalized ideologically to justify the further shrinking of the state and additional cuts to public spending. For example, it’s often claimed that there’s widespread corruption in the welfare system—even though Romania already allocates the lowest percentage of its GDP to welfare in the entire European Union.

Nevertheless, this anti-corruption mantra remains highly salient in public discourse.

The anti-corruption discourse has thus been used to legitimize harsh austerity and neoliberal measures. At the same time, when actions are taken against corruption—such as jailing corrupt politicians—they often remain at a superficial, legalistic level.

This approach is ineffective against the far right. In the United States, we saw the democratic establishment spend four years trying to go after Trump through legal channels—and yet Trump still won the election. Le Pen has been barred from standing in elections, and her party continues to grow in the polls. It’s certainly not declining.

In Romania, the Constitutional Court canceled the November election and barred the winning candidate, Georgescu. Yet the person who replaced him—Simion—secured double the percentage in the first round. It didn’t work.

I’m not saying such measures shouldn’t be taken—if there is a legal basis for them, then by all means, pursue them. But we need to recognize that this is not a real solution to tackling the far right.

On the subject of corruption, an important point must be made beyond its ideological instrumentalization. Corruption is a real issue that must be addressed, but it is often decontextualized.

Corruption needs to be understood as a key vehicle for the primitive accumulation of capital—something characteristic of any early stage in the development of capitalism, in any country, at any point in history.

Corruption, along with other violent forms of capital accumulation, has always been present—even in so-called advanced, consolidated democracies that have practiced capitalism for a longer time. Corruption played a massive role in the emergence of capitalism and continues to play a central role in capital accumulation today.

After all, the dirty money of drug cartels, criminal syndicates, and authoritarian regimes around the world is largely laundered through the City of London—the very heart of global capital. So, if we truly want to tackle corruption, we need to go to the root of the problem and understand it as part of a broader structural and systemic issue.

From Democratic Neoliberalism to Its Authoritarian Mutation

Lastly, from a historical-comparative perspective, how does the Dan–Simion runoff recalibrate the ideological field established in the 1990s transition era? Are we witnessing a definitive exhaustion of post-1989 liberal centrism or its tactical reanimation?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: This is a great question. There have been repeated claims about the death of the neoliberal center over the past 15 years—after the financial crisis, for instance. There were suggestions that neoliberalism was coming to an end, and that we would see a return to a more Keynesian type of economic model. That didn’t happen. Instead, we got more neoliberalism—more austerity, more privatizations, more deregulation, more flexibilization of the workforce.

Then, again, after the COVID-19 pandemic, there were claims that this marked the death of neoliberalism, especially given the forceful intervention of the state to keep societies afloat—or more accurately, to keep the accumulation of capital going. But again, that was temporary. Neoliberalism has returned in full force.

Now we are witnessing the militarization of Europe, with promises of spending cuts on the most important public services in society in order to fund military efforts. So, I’m afraid we are not seeing the end of neoliberal centrism, but rather its transformation into something more authoritarian—still neoliberal, but authoritarian. A shift, if you will, from democratic neoliberalism to authoritarian neoliberalism.

This transformation is being endorsed by the political center, which is increasingly adopting authoritarian measures across Europe. Here in the UK, the so-called center-left government has imprisoned individuals not for taking part in a protest, but simply for holding a Zoom meeting to plan one—specifically, a protest against environmental destruction. They were not punished for blocking a motorway, but merely for discussing civil disobedience in response to the climate crisis. This illustrates a clear shift toward authoritarianism. Yet when it comes to economic policy, there is a striking convergence between centrist parties and the far right.

The far right claims to be an alternative to the status quo and capitalizes on the grievances, socioeconomic anxiety, and insecurity of ordinary people. But if we look at their actual policy proposals—or, in places where they are in power, their actual policymaking—it’s more of the same. They might throw a few crumbs to ordinary people, to the popular classes, in order to maintain their support. But the bulk of their economic agenda still serves the business class and the wealthy—just different factions of the business class and wealthy than those typically represented by centrist parties.