Dr. Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor in Political Science, Vice Provost for Global Engagement of Temple University, and Dean of Temple University Rome campus.

Professor Zankina: Many Bulgarians Remain Deeply Skeptical of the West

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In an interview with ECPS, Professor Emilia Zankina explains that, despite the financial and mobility benefits of EU membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West” due to Bulgaria’s strong historic ties to Russia. The communist era deeply embedded Russian language, culture, and education in Bulgarian life, and “for many,” Professor Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator.” She observes that while the war in Ukraine initially reduced pro-Russian sentiment in the country, as the conflict continued, some Bulgarians have returned to their original views.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Emilia Zankina, a leading expert in political science and Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University, delves into the intricate landscape of Bulgarian politics. Currently Dean of Temple University’s Rome campus, Dr. Zankina offers an in-depth analysis of Bulgaria’s shifting political dynamics, particularly highlighting the nation’s complex relationship with Russia, the rise of populism, and public sentiment toward the West.

In Bulgaria’s recent parliamentary election, the center-right GERB party secured first place, but will need a coalition partner to govern. GERB garnered 25.52% of the votes, with the reformist We Continue the Change (PP) party in second at 13.74%, and the ultra-nationalist Vazrazhdane (Revival) party in third with 12.92%.

Exploring Bulgaria’s historic affinity with Russia, Dr. Zankina explains that despite the financial and mobility benefits gained through European Union membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.” She attributes this sentiment to the powerful legacy of the communist era, during which Russian language, culture, and education were integral to Bulgarian life. “For many,” Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator, and this view endures across generations, who often make little distinction between Russian people and the government.” She describes how, initially, the war in Ukraine prompted a decline in pro-Russian sentiment, but as the conflict has continued, some Bulgarians have reverted to their original views.

Addressing Bulgaria’s “mushrooming” populist landscape, Dr. Zankina sheds light on why the country has faced seven elections since 2021. The rapid turnover of parties, she explains, is fueled by populism’s promise of quick solutions and charismatic leadership, which attracts voters eager for change but dissatisfied with democratic processes’ slow pace. “This populist formula,” she says, “favors emotional appeals and big promises without real solutions.” In Bulgaria, populism has contributed to a “never-ending cycle” of new parties, each aiming to capture a portion of an electorate constantly shifting its support.

Dr. Zankina also highlights the unique dynamic of female representation within Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties, where women play a “strategic role” in appealing to female voters. However, the PRR remains largely male-dominated, reflecting broader perceptions of these parties as “Männerparteien.” As Bulgaria navigates its future in the EU amidst the influence of both Russian-aligned parties and anti-establishment movements, Dr. Zankina’s insights underscore the complexities of national identity, populism, and external influences in shaping Bulgarian democracy.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Emilia Zankina with some edits.

Populism Fuels Ongoing Volatility in Bulgaria’s Party System

Professor Zankina, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question. With the fragmentation of the Bulgarian parliament and the presence of nine parties, what role does populism play in shaping public perception and voter alignment within Bulgaria’s complex political landscape? Could this be the primary reason why Bulgaria has gone to the polls seven times since 2021? Additionally, what role have populist parties specifically played in contributing to this political crisis?

Professor Emilia Zankina: Populism is a broad phenomenon that has contributed to developments in party systems, not only in Bulgaria but throughout Europe. What we see is that populist appeals favor easy solutions in Manichean rhetoric and salvation narratives that make voters less patient with the difficulty and complexity of the democratic process, making them eager to vote for the next “savior” and the next quick solution. So certainly, the growing penetration of populism, both as a discursive technique and a way of organizing parties, as well as a way of moving away from hardcore ideologies, has contributed to an overall expectation by voters that they could be offered a simple solution by the next new party.

So we have this combination of populism breeding a string of new parties that come in a never-ending cycle with new promises and a core body of voters who move from one new party to the next. There is certainly a lot to be said about populism contributing to an overall volatility of a party system which, in the case of Bulgaria, was never fully stable, as it is a relatively young party system. It’s been 35 years, and we have already seen populist appeals for the last 20 or so years making their way, and these have become even more prevalent in the past four years.

Eastern Europe Tries to Build Party Systems as Western Models Erode

Boyko Borisov at a meeting with the President of Bulgaria in Sofia on April 20, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

How has the shift from traditional political parties to personalistic, charisma-centered leadership impacted Bulgaria’s democratic institutions, and what long-term effects do you foresee? What role do crises play in the rise of charismatic leaders in Bulgaria, and how have leaders like Simeon and Borisov utilized such moments to construct and sustain political charisma? What made GERB and Boyko Borisov so successful in Bulgarian elections since 2006?

Professor Emilia Zankina: Moving away from traditional parties is a significant shift for Western European countries. Central mobilizing themes—often described by the “frozen party thesis” with divisions such as rural versus urban or industrial versus agricultural—have become less relevant as new issues like migration, climate change, and economic crises come to the forefront. In Eastern Europe, however, moving away from traditional political parties holds less relevance because there isn’t a long history of such parties. Eastern Europe emerged from a one-party system that was far from democratic; it could hardly be called a party system—it was essentially an authoritarian regime masquerading as a party system.

In building a party system, Eastern Europe faces a situation where the systems it seeks to emulate in the West are gradually eroding. Now, trends between West and East are less discernible because we also see interparty connectedness, transnational party cooperation, European party families, and so forth, as well as the replication of organizational formulas or personalistic behavior formulas.

In Bulgaria, a major shift occurred with the arrival of Simeon, a charismatic figure with significant legitimacy who attracted a substantial share of votes. During his tenure, he accomplished much and fulfilled many of his promises. At the same time, he established a personalistic model of charisma that Boyko Borisov later emulated in a markedly different style. While the two differ greatly in character, objectives, and persona, Borisov managed to replicate Simeon’s success through his own personal appeal.

Borisov’s approach is less refined and graceful, focusing instead on the image of a “tough guy” capable of handling criminals due to his familiarity with such environments. This approach quickly earned him credibility, not only domestically but also with the European People’s Party, which endorsed him as soon as GERB was formed. In the 2007 elections—Bulgaria’s first for the European Parliament—he gained this support and has continued to benefit from it due to the predictability and stability he brought to Bulgaria.

Borisov’s electoral record is impressive: in 15 years and 11 parliamentary elections, he has only faced defeat twice. His success extends to presidential elections, with his candidates winning twice, as well as to local and European Parliament elections. However, his party, GERB, has been marred by associations with corruption, fueling opposition that combines grassroots protests with a series of populist parties and personalities riding this wave of discontent. This opposition has recently challenged Borisov’s hold on power, while also enabling numerous newcomers to rise on anti-corruption narratives and critiques of GERB. Not all of these actors are necessarily sincere in their appeals, as each has specific political objectives and aims to gain power.

How significant is Boyko Borissov’s ability to distance himself from far-right oligarch Delyan Peevski for GERB’s potential coalition-building efforts, and what does this suggest about the influence of corruption-related sanctions on Bulgarian politics?

Professor Emilia Zankina: He has not shown any willingness to distance himself, even in the aftermath of the elections. On Sunday night, in his speech, he did not exclude Peevski and the MRF(Movement for Rights and Freedoms)-New Beginning from potential coalition-building efforts. Although We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria—the most likely and much-needed potential partner for Borissov—has called for a cordon sanitaire around Peevski, GERB remains one of the few parties in Parliament unwilling to join this exclusion. In fact, every other party has supported the cordon sanitaire except Borissov’s party, which suggests that there may be dependencies between Borissov and Peevski that are not apparent to the broader public. Whether it’s a question of financing or compromising information, he appears reluctant to sever that connection. This stance will undoubtedly create significant challenges in finding other coalition partners and establishing a viable governing coalition.

Far-Right Parties Gain from Alignment and Financial Support from Putin Regime

Demonstration commemorating May 9, Russia’s Victory Day over Nazi Germany, with participants expressing their emotions and displaying slogans in Sofia, Bulgaria, on May 9, 2022. Photo: Yulian Staykov.

Given the rise of pro-Russian and far-right groups like Vazrazhdane, how do you interpret the current balance between Bulgaria’s pro-European aspirations and the growing appeal of populist, anti-Western ideologies? How might Bulgaria’s prolonged political instability impact its path towards EU integration, and do you foresee populist narratives either accelerating or hindering this process within the current coalition negotiations?

Professor Emilia Zankina: The nationalist vote in Bulgaria has traditionally accounted for around 10 to 12%, beginning with ATAKA in 2005. However, in the latest elections, Vazrazhdane and other new parties like March for Justice and Great Glory collectively gathered over 20% of the vote. It’s important to interpret this cautiously, as it doesn’t necessarily reflect purely nationalist sentiment—a significant portion of this vote is protest-driven. Nationalist parties have capitalized on widespread discontent regarding various issues, from the economic crisis to Bulgaria’s stance on the war in Ukraine, becoming a magnet for groups experiencing different types of dissatisfaction. Whether these supporters are genuinely nationalist or simply unhappy is, in some ways, beside the point. If these parties manage to gain power, nationalists, once in government, tend to govern as nationalists.

We have already seen these parties push through two pieces of legislation in the previous parliament: one against so-called LGBT “propaganda” in schools and another targeting “foreign agents,” similar to measures observed in Hungary and Georgia. Additionally, these parties benefit not only from alignment with the Putin regime but also, at times, from its financial support. Examination of their financial reports over the past 10 years reveals that around European elections, unexplained funds—though not substantial—appear in the records of these populist parties. This is particularly notable as the categorization of these funds often shifts from donations to memberships, showing a lack of consistency, which strongly suggests these funds may originate elsewhere.

While directly linking these funds to the Putin regime is complex, it is well-documented that Western parties like Rassemblement National (RN) in France have received similar support. We can therefore reasonably surmise that Russian support reaches these parties, not only financially but also through disinformation campaigns and internet trolls, which amplify their narratives while eroding others, including basic facts.

In your view, what are the primary challenges for pro-European coalitions such as PP-DB in countering populist narratives, especially regarding issues like judicial reform and anti-corruption efforts? Given the “top-down, externally driven” approach to reform in Bulgaria, what specific measures do you believe could enhance the sustainability and local ownership of these reforms?

Professor Emilia Zankina: It doesn’t help that the champions of judicial reform and pro-EU orientation have proven to be quite incompetent themselves and often rely on populist narratives. They also depend on swing votes from the right, left, and center. The first priority is to establish themselves as legitimate political figures capable of predictable political behavior, which they have yet to demonstrate. Despite the sound programmatic appeals behind many of their reforms, their behavior during the campaign has been one of endless bickering with Borisov, and the collapse of the government showed a lack of political experience and acumen. Their inability to inspire trust or project legitimacy and experience doesn’t help their cause.

Furthermore, they face a complex situation: the largest party is GERB, and they have run on an anti-GERB platform, yet now they are in the position of having to uphold the pro-European line, with GERB as their only viable partner. It’s not an easy position, as GERB is both their biggest opponent on corruption—after Peevski—and their strongest ally on European versus pro-Russian orientation. This is a very delicate balance and a difficult task.

They must attempt to form this pro-European coalition while pushing GERB to distance itself from Peevski and commit to anti-corruption reforms. Although complex and challenging, they have no other option but to try to take this difficult step.

Corruption Persists, Demanding Focused and Sustained Solutions

People protesting on the main streets of the capital, demanding the Prime Minister’s resignation, in Sofia, Bulgaria, on July 14, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

How have historical legacies and political choices shaped the challenges in Bulgaria’s public administration reform, particularly regarding transparency and accountability? What is the role of corruption in either consolidating or weakening populist parties in Bulgaria? 

Professor Emilia Zankina: Corruption has been a major mobilizing factor, as there have been numerous corruption scandals involving key GERB figures, some of whom, like Tsvetan Tsvetanov, are no longer in power. Corruption remains a persistent problem, and it’s crucial to focus on and stay committed to solutions.

From experience in other former communist countries with similar bureaucratic legacies—a nomenklatura system, highly politicized, and, after the collapse of communism, highly corrupt—we know that one effective solution is electronic governance. Reforming public administration and expanding e-governance across more sectors and procedures have already made substantial strides in addressing corruption, particularly at lower levels. Currently, however, Bulgaria is dealing with political corruption at the highest levels, embodied by figures like Peevski. Peevski’s influence, demonstrated by his control over both the prosecution and the courts, also extends to swaying party behavior within other political groups.

The fact that he managed to secure more votes than party founder Ahmed Dogan, with only 25% of these votes coming from ethnic Turks and over 50% from the Roma population, suggests he has substantial resources for elections and vote-buying. Many of these votes are indeed purchased. Meanwhile, the splinter party Alliance for Freedom and Rights holds over 50% of the ethnic Turkish vote and the majority of the ethnic Turkish vote abroad, indicating that it is the party most recognized by ethnic Turks as their representative. Nonetheless, Peevski has managed to partially hijack the party, purchasing votes and accumulating around 280,000 votes—a considerable number and a significant financial investment.

How does voter perception of corruption differ from expert evaluations in Bulgaria, and what does this reveal about public tolerance for corruption among political parties? How does the relationship between ethnic identity and party support complicate anti-corruption voting behavior in Bulgaria? Furthermore, what role does voter apathy or ‘fatalism’ about corruption play in shaping the success of anti-corruption parties like “There Is Such a People”?

Professor Emilia Zankina: We have a political culture with low institutional trust, which opens opportunities for anti-establishment rhetoric and allows populist parties across the spectrum to benefit from this general distrust. At the same time, there is a dissonance between actual corruption, perceived corruption, and experienced corruption. Corruption is a significant problem in Bulgaria; at the highest levels, there is political control over prosecution and the distribution of EU funds—both serious corruption issues. These factors make it easy for new parties, like There Is Such a People, to exploit the issue. However, the question remains: what are the solutions, and which of these parties actually offers viable ones?

Judicial reforms were pushed by the last regular government with support from GERB, PP-DB, and Peevski; however, many of these reforms were poorly designed. They are often targeted at specific political situations or figures, and in 10 years, these reforms may prove as problematic as the current laws. We need to move away from witch-hunting and detach reform efforts from specific political figures when considering institutional solutions and mechanisms to combat corruption and prevent such opportunities from arising in the first place.

Pro-Russian Sentiment in Bulgaria Rooted in History and Soviet Legacy

How have the war in Ukraine and the Russian influence in the country affected populism and nationalism in Bulgaria?

Professor Emilia Zankina: This has certainly enabled parties like Vazrazhdane to increase their support tenfold over the past three years. In Bulgaria, there is a blend of genuine pro-Russian sentiment, rooted in the country’s long history, including its war for independence and a communist regime backed by Moscow. This regime benefited large portions of the population, though it also harmed many others. Nevertheless, deep-rooted support for all things Russian persists, embedded in families and generations who feel an affinity for the Russian language, culture, country, and worldview.

Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has placed many people with moderate views—those who may be pro-European but not anti-Russian—in a difficult position, forcing them to choose between their progressive pro-European stance and their affinity for Russia. This dynamic has contributed to the growth of parties like Vazrazhdane.

Interestingly, another strongly pro-Russian party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, has almost disappeared, losing over 1 million voters in just a few years and now falling below 8%, despite holding nearly 30% in the 2017 elections. This indicates a limit to the mobilizing power of both pro-Russian and anti-Russian rhetoric. Roughly a third of the population is likely strongly pro-Russian, while about half supports a position of neutrality in this war. For many Bulgarian voters, the stance of the European Union and the Western world on this conflict is challenging to accept.

How do you explain the mushrooming of populist parties in Bulgaria? What are the similarities and differences with other populist parties in Europe?

Professor Emilia Zankina: There are many similarities and differences, perhaps more than we might expect, with considerable variety. Across Europe—whether east or west, north or south—we see a proliferation of populist parties, and within each country, there is significant variation. In Bulgaria, populist parties emerge from the center and the right, while in other Eastern European countries, like Slovakia, they also emerge from the left.

What has become firmly established, however, is the populist formula: strong emotional appeals, a charismatic figure highlighting sharp divisions and real societal problems, yet offering no real solutions—only big promises and quick fixes that fail to materialize. In the long run, this erodes the foundations of democracy by creating voters who are less patient and loyal, making party identification and loyalty seem like luxuries.

Instead, we see an emphasis on responding to the mood and crisis of the day, with different charismatic figures performing almost in a TV show setting to attract more votes. This is a Europe-wide trend. In a country without a well-established party system, it’s even easier to erode what was never solidly in place to begin with.

Ethnic Turkish Minority in Bulgaria Endured Trauma from Forced Assimilation and Expulsions

The Banya Bashi Mosque, a landmark and the largest mosque in Bulgaria, on September 18, 2013, in Sofia, Bulgaria. Photo: Shutterstock.

Why have populist radical right parties significantly increased their share of the vote in the June 2024 European Parliament elections, and what key issues have driven their success? How has the Turkish minority influenced the mobilization of nationalist votes, and what role does ethnic and nationalist populism play in the strategies of Bulgarian political actors, particularly regarding the Turkish minority and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) party?

Professor Emilia Zankina: Bulgarian nationalism does exploit anti-Turkish rhetoric, but this is not its main mobilizing argument, as there is another minority in Bulgaria, the Roma minority, which actually has a far stronger mobilizing factor—much more so than the ethnic Turks or even external migrants. The Roma minority has traditionally been the primary target of such rhetoric, generating narratives around issues like welfare chauvinism, pensions, schooling, and healthcare, emphasizing access only for taxpayers.

Other issues, like the war in Ukraine and pro-Russian sentiments, also influence the discourse, particularly on topics such as energy policy—decisions around local refineries, the atomic power plant, and related matters. Regarding the ethnic Turkish minority, one key argument fueling nationalist parties is the portrayal of the Ottoman Empire in history books. The ongoing debate centers on whether Bulgaria was under the so-called “Turkish yoke” or merely experienced Turkish presence or dominance, making history books a battleground for these interpretations.

The ethnic Turkish minority, meanwhile, has faced significant historical trauma in Bulgaria, especially during the renaming process, when 800,000 ethnic Turks were forced to leave the country, and the entire minority was subjected to forced assimilation policies, including killings, expulsions, and restrictions on language, culture, and religion. This history has created a deep distrust within the ethnic Turkish community toward all parties, pushing them to continue supporting a corrupt party like the MRF, which understands their loyalty is rooted in a lack of trust for any other party.

Despite attempts from both left and right to reach out to the ethnic Turkish minority, the distrust runs deep, as the wounds are recent and severe, dating back only 30 to 40 years. Many people still hold passports with multiple names, reflecting the forced name changes. It will take time before the ethnic Turkish minority feels confident enough to vote outside an ethnically Turkish party and place their trust elsewhere.

In your recent article for the ECPS report, you note that prior to 2022, 58% of the population reported positive attitudes toward Russia and Putin, suggesting that the war in Ukraine has created fertile ground for PRR parties with strong pro-Russian stances. What are the main reasons behind this pronounced pro-Russian sentiment?

Professor Emilia Zankina: Immediately after the war began, this percentage dropped sharply, but it started climbing again as the conflict continued and Ukrainian refugees arrived in the country. The initial backlash and shift away from strong support for Russia were reversed as refugees from Ukraine came, and as the war extended into a second and third year, people gradually reverted to their original views. Here, we return to the powerful legacy of the communist regime and a party that had 1 million members, with many families still revering Russia regardless of its current regime. Little distinction is made between the Russian people and the Russian government, which becomes problematic; few people object to Russian culture and people, but many oppose Putin’s regime, including within Russia itself.

The historical legacy frames Russia as a liberator, followed by a communist regime that actively promoted Russian culture and language for many years. Many people studied in Russian schools, pursued professional development in Russia, and were raised with that cultural influence. Despite the benefits of the European Union—funds, improved living standards, and mobility—many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.

Populist Radical Right Parties Typically Remain “Men’s Parties”

How do you interpret the discrepancy between the low female representation in Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties and the comparatively high level of activity on women’s issues among PRR women MPs? How might the presence of women in PRR parties in Bulgaria influence broader perceptions of these parties as “Männerparteien,” and what factors contribute to this dynamic?

Professor Emilia Zankina: There is extensive research, not only mine but also by many other authors, showing that populist radical right parties are typically “men’s parties.” They are represented by men, supported by men, and largely serve men’s interests. However, we have also seen a narrative of traditional family values promoted by women within these parties. This trend, while not dominant, has been firmly established, extending from the UK to France and across Eastern Europe.

These parties have also strategically positioned women as a tactic to appeal to female voters and as a more legitimate means of promoting specific policies. When addressing gender issues, reproductive rights, or family services, having a woman advocate for these policies lends greater legitimacy. Consequently, parties have co-opted and promoted more women to the forefront as part of this strategy. Yet, for the moment, the appeal remains predominantly directed toward male voters, and representation within these parties still skews male. Despite these efforts, if you examine the gender balance in these parties, on electoral lists and among MPs, it remains largely male-dominated.

Thousands of people demonstrated in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, on April 13, 2024, demanding the withdrawal of a controversial "foreign influence" bill, which they claim is inspired by authoritarian laws used by neighboring Russia to suppress dissent. Photo: George Khelashvili.

Mapping Global Populism — Panel XVI:  The Challenging Dynamics of Democracy, Authoritarianism & Populism in Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan & Georgia)

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Date/Time: Thursday, October 31, 2024 — 15:00-17:30 (CET)

 

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Moderator

Dr. Cengiz Aktar (Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and Advisory Board Member of ECPS).

Speakers

“The State of Democracy and Populism in Armenia,” by Dr. Nerses Kopalyan (Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas).

“Populism Against Post-war Armenia’s Democratization and European Integration,” by Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan (Professor, Chair of Political Science, Faculty of International Relations at Yerevan State University).

“Hegemonic Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan,” by Dr. Jody LaPorte (Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford).

“Autocracy in Azerbaijan and Its Regional Implications,” by Thomas de Waal (Senior Fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region).

“From Technocratic Facade to Right-Wing Reality: The Evolution of Populism in Georgia,” by Dr. David Aprasidze (Professor of Political Science at Ilia State University).

“The Rotating Populist Discourses of the Post-Soviet Georgia – From the Nationalist Populism to the Conservative Populism,” Dr. David Matsaberidze (Associate Professor at Department of International Relations, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University).

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Bios and Abstracts

Dr. Cengiz Aktar is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board member. He is a former director at the United Nations specializing in asylum policies. He is known to be one of the leading advocates of Turkey’s integration into the EU. He was the Chair of European Studies at Bahçeşehir University-Istanbul. In 1999, Professor Aktar initiated a civil initiative for Istanbul’s candidacy for the title of European Capital of Culture. Istanbul successfully held the title in 2010. He also headed the initiative called “European Movement 2002” which pressured lawmakers to speed up political reforms necessary to begin the negotiation phase with the EU. In December 2008, he developed the idea of an online apology campaign addressed to Armenians and supported by a number of Turkish intellectuals as well as over 32,000 Turkish citizens. In addition to EU integration policies, Professor Aktar’s research focuses on the politics of memory regarding ethnic and religious minorities, the history of political centralism, and international refugee law.

The State of Democracy and Populism in Armenia

Dr. Nerses Kopalyan is an Associate Professor-in-Residence of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. His fields of specialization include international security, geopolitics, paradigm-building, and philosophy of science. He is the author of “World Political Systems After Polarity” (Routledge, 2017), the co-author of “Sex, Power, and Politics” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), co-author of “Latinos in Nevada: A Political, Social, and Economic Profile” (2021, Nevada University Press), and the upcoming “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War (2025, Routledge). His current research and academic publication concentrate on geopolitical and great power relations within Eurasia, with specific emphasis on democratic breakthroughs within authoritarian orbits, and the confluence of security and democratic consolidation. He has authored several policy papers for the Government of Armenia and serves as voluntary advisor to numerous state institutions. Dr. Kopalyan is also a regular contributor to EVN Report.

Abstract: The contours of the concept of populism, and its intrinsic illiberal characteristics, have remained minimal and primarily have failed to take root in post-Velvet Revolution Armenia. Armenia’s democratic breakthrough, and its burgeoning democratic political culture, have served as important guardrails against the development of populism in the country’s political system. This has been buttressed by the country’s severe security environment, facing direct threats from neighboring Azerbaijan and continuous hybrid activities from Russia. As such, the Government’s commitment to democracy is qualified as an important instrument within its nascent security architecture, and in this context, the government has proceeded with a method of governing that has been defined by difficult and unpopular choices, as opposed to relying on the tenets of populism to garner public support. Highly pragmatic, yet unpopular decisions and policies by this Government offer a window into cogently understanding Armenia’s successful in avoiding the trappings of populism, which, in turn, has been strongly enhanced by three important variables: a strong civil society, democratic cultural syndromes, and an illiberal opposition seeking to reverse Armenia’s democratic gains.   

Populism Against Post-war Armenia’s Democratization and European Integration

Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan is Professor and Head of the Chair of Political Science of Faculty of International Relations, as well as Lecturer at the Center for European Studies of Yerevan State University. His main interests are civil society, social partnership, human political rights and freedoms. He has been a DAAD-Visiting Scientist at the Institute of Political Science of Leibniz University of Hannover (2002-2009), DAAD-Visiting Scientist at the Geschwister Scholl Institute of Political Science of Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich (2013) and the Institute for East European Studies of Free University of Berlin (2016), as well as the EU Erasmus Mundus «ALRAKIS» project Visiting Scientist at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (2012). Since 2016, he is an international fellow of the Institute of Political Science at the Institute of Political Science of the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

Abstract: The Velvet Revolution of 2018 and the coming to power of the new prime minister Nikol Pashinyan became a real step towards democratization and deepening of the European political integration of Armenia.

Armenia is a small country and there was great hope that the activities of the new Armenian authorities in relation to the recognized guidelines and standards of consolidation of democracy (separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, transitional justice), it is clear that Pashinyan and his team were able to achieve a breakthrough and are more inclined to adhere to democratic rhetoric.

The 2020 armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh lasted from September 27 to November 9, practically shaping a new reality in both foreign and domestic policy dimensions.

The fundamental question is how dangerous is political populism in post-war Armenia? As the example of Armenia shows, unlimited political populism can lead to victims and tragedies on a national scale. What has happened in the state since 2020, and what was for the new authorities of Armenia and Prime Minister N. Pashinyan, as the opposition political parties of the post-war situation wanted to gradually lead the country to political chaos and populism.

After the tragic events of the 44-day war ended, populist movements began to accuse N. Pashinyan of populism, since the promises made to the people during the period of protest activity and the struggle for high office were not fulfilled. This and a number of related factors raise additional doubts and skepticism among members of Armenian civil society who have been observing the activities of the new people’s leader since the opposition’s victory in May 2018.

Since coming to power, the Prime Minister has been repeatedly accused of demagogy. One of the main opponents of the “icon of the velvet revolution” are former Presidents of Armenia Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, who called the Prime Minister a populist.

What factors produced such unprecedented popular unrest to bring to power a new leader who embodied the discontent of the population? It is the hope for a new beginning, where lawlessness will be replaced by the rule of law, injustice by justice, and corruption by honest public officials.

Hegemonic Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan

Dr. Jody LaPorte is the Gonticas Fellow in Politics and International Relations at Lincoln College, University of Oxford. Previously, she served as a Departmental Lecturer in Politics and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government. Her research focuses on the political and policymaking dynamics in non-democratic regimes, particularly in post-Soviet Eurasia. Dr. LaPorte holds a BA in Russian and East European Studies from Yale University and an MA and PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. Before joining the Blavatnik School, she taught as a Departmental Lecturer in Comparative Government in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Oxford.

Autocracy in Azerbaijan and Its Regional Implications

Tom de Waal is a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region. He is the author of numerous publications, most recently The End of the Near Abroad (Carnegie Europe/IWM, 2024). The second edition of his book The Caucasus: An Introduction (Oxford University Press) was published in 2018. He is also the author of Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide (Oxford University Press, 2015) and of the authoritative book on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (NYU Press, second edition 2013).

From 2010 to 2015, de Waal worked for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. Before that he worked extensively as a journalist in both print and for BBC radio. From 1993 to 1997, he worked in Moscow for the Moscow Times, the Times of London, and the Economist, specializing in Russian politics and the situation in Chechnya. He co-authored (with Carlotta Gall) the book Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus (NYU Press, 1997), for which the authors were awarded the James Cameron Prize for Distinguished Reporting.

From Technocratic Facade to Right-Wing Reality: The Evolution of Populism in Georgia

Dr. David Aprasidze is a Professor of Political Science at Ilia State University. He earned his Ph.D. from Hamburg University in Germany and was a Fulbright scholar at Duke University in North Carolina, USA. Over the years, he has worked with public agencies and international NGOs operating in Georgia. His expertise includes higher education management and reform, with a research focus on political transformation, democratization, and Europeanization.

Abstract: In recent years, Georgia has undergone a stark shift from being a champion of Europeanization and democratization to embracing anti-liberal, populist, and pro-Russian stances. The ruling party, Georgian Dream, led by the country’s richest businessman, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has governed since 2012. Initially, Ivanishvili emphasized technocratic governance, managing the state like a corporation. His party portrayed itself as left-centrist, focusing on addressing bread-and-butter issues while also maintaining Georgia’s commitment to European integration. However, amid growing domestic and international criticism for undermining democratic institutions, both Ivanishvili and Georgian Dream shifted toward openly anti-liberal and radical-conservative narratives. This turn included the introduction of anti-NGO and anti-LGBTQ+ legislation, alongside a promotion of “traditional” and “religious” values, supposedly representing the majority. Georgian Dream has forged alliances with right-wing leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, but given Georgia’s non-EU status, the country is increasingly aligning itself with Russia. What began as technocratic populism – offering a façade of professionalism to mask authoritarian and oligarchic tendencies – has evolved. Now, Georgian Dream is transparent about its goals: to eliminate political opposition, silence critical civil society, and intimidate the public.

The Rotating Populist Discourses of the Post-Soviet Georgia – From the Nationalist Populism to the Conservative Populism

Dr. David Matsaberidze is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Ivane Javakishvili Tbilisi State University. He earned his PhD in Political Science from Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University in 2015 and holds an MA in Nationalism and Ethnicity Studies from Central European University (2008). Between 2015 and 2017, Dr. Matsaberidze completed professional development programs in regional and international security at the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.

Since 2013, he has been a recurrent visiting expert with the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes at the Austrian Ministry of Defense and Sports (Germany-Austria). From 2008 to 2014, he was a recipient of the Academic Fellowship Program under the International Higher Education Support Program of the Open Society Foundations.

Dr. Matsaberidze has authored 15 academic articles, 8 policy papers in international journals, and 2 books, along with 5 book chapters in English, focusing on democratic transitions, conflicts, nationalism, and security in the post-Soviet Caucasus, particularly in Georgia. His research has been conducted in collaboration with various academic and policy institutions in Germany, Austria, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.

Abstract: The prospective talk will deal with the rotating populist discourses of the post-Soviet Georgia and track the main lines of its transformation from the nationalist populism to the conservative populism. In Georgia, it is taken for granted that political leaders are populists because of their emphasis on charisma and personality. However, although circumstances favored the emergence of political populism and a populist discourse of persuasion was a widespread phenomenon, these developments were neither inevitable nor automatic. The case of Georgia attests that populism as a political discourse typically encompasses the charismatic leader, popular societal demands, strong nationalist component, and the usual affirmation of the common people by the elites and the text and talk of professional politicians, or political institutions, includes both the speaker and the audience. This is not only a discursive mode of making policy, but also shapes the overall political agenda and public opinion, which in turn legitimizes policy decision-making. Therefore, reflecting on discursive practices contributes not only to our understanding of customary political practices, but also to their relationship to the social and political context and its detailed properties, including the constraints on discourse itself.

The post-Soviet Georgian populism is a mixture of populism in policymaking and nationalism in ideology, that allows politicians to control the public discourse and public mind. The first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was a redemptive populist who wanted to free the Georgian nation from the Russian yoke, thereby responding to the anti-Soviet sentiments of the time. His successor, Eduard Shevardnadze, was a pragmatic populist who restored order and stability to the ransacked nation after the civil war and ethnic conflicts of the early 1990s by introducing a civil society discourse built on democratization and state-building. The third president, Mikheil Saakashvili, was an idealistic populist who used an idealist, pro-Western discourse to renew the Georgian nation through modernization and democratization in the mode of a Western, civic nation. Since 2012, a kind of loss of the national idea can be observed in the political discourse, as the populist discourses of President Giorgi Margvelashvili (2013-2018) and the incumbent prime minister clashed: The former defended the constitutional backbone of the state, i.e., a functioning democratic state for the people, while the latter propagated left-wing populism to restore dignity and ensure the social well-being of the people, which threatens the national idea. The prime minister’s discourse is more widely accepted in society because politics becomes personal in light of a leader who succeeded in defeating the so-called ‘brutal regime’ of the previous government (Ivanishvili vs. Saakashvili). This aspect is a constant feature of the rhetoric of the post-Saakashvili political leadership of the Georgian Dream party.

The conservative-populist turn since 2020 attests the transformation of the foreign policy rhetoric of the Georgian Dream government towards the EUrope. The demarcation-integration cleavages (Kriesi et al., 2008; 2012) appearing in the Georgian society have superseded the traditional Rokkanian cleavages (that have never been consistent in Georgia) and crystalized into the populist radical right-wing direction by the Georgian Dream party: constructing the Georgian people as a cultural unit confined within the Georgian nation-state and through its traditional-conservatist rhetoric indirectly undermining the idea of the regional/EaP European integration, whilst opposing the normative based approach of the EU/Brussels and siding with Orbán’s Budapest, that defends Christianity and traditional-Conservative society. This is the recent strategy of the ruling Georgian Dream, concentrated on politics of radicalization towards domestic (opposition) and external (Brussels) actors through the strategy of alternative or competitive discourse formation, filling in the empty signifier constantly through changing topics and rhetoric(s).

The political discourse of the Georgian Dream sets the new demarcation-integration cleavages: we – Georgia/Georgians – a sovereign nation-state, against any external interference in our will of free choice of domestic and foreign policies (although very vague and not clearly defined), pursued in the interest of the Georgian people (a very populist discourse and rhetoric). The chosen strategy of the Georgian Dream undermines any sort of the whole of society defense system to contain interference of authoritarian regimes in democracies and puts limits on any sort of new democracy promotion project on the Eastern borderlands of the EU, to be driven internally by local actors and supported externally by IOs and CSOs. This undermines any attempt of forming new international resilience via alignment of national resiliencies whose aim is to contain Russian/Eurasian turn to autocracy, while promoting and advancing Euro-Atlantic integration in the EaP countries.

Religious symbols on sand: Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Orthodoxy Buddhism and Hinduism. Photo: Godong Photo.

Call for Papers – ECPS 4th Annual International Symposium / Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges

by EventsPast Events

 

DOWNLOAD CALL For PAPERS

Date/Location: May 22-23, 2025 / Warsaw, Poland

Organizers

Prof. Jocelyn Cesari (The Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University). 

Prof. Ihsan Yilmaz (Chair in Islamic Studies and research professor of political science and international relations at Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation).

Prof. Ibrahim Ozturk (Professor of Economics at Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies).

Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc (Reader in Psychology, Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences and Law at University of Dundee).

 

Partner Institutions

European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) (Brussels)

Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw (Warsaw)

Georgetown University (Washington DC)

University of Birmingham (Birmingham)

Deakin University (Melbourne)

DAAD / Cambridge University

In-East / University of Duisburg 

Centre for International Relations (Warsaw)

This two-day symposium will explore different aspects of the interplay between populism, religion, and civilizationism from local, national, transnational, international and global perspectives. Evaluating their combined impact on plural societies, intergroup relations, social cohesion and democratic institutions, the symposium will analyze how populists from diverse cultural, geographical, and political contexts both in Global North and Global South interact with and employ religion, civilizationism and digital technologies in their discourses and performances.

Thematic Overview

Populism has emerged as a defining feature of contemporary politics, exerting profound local, national, international, and global influences. Increasingly, it has become part and parcel of states’ transnational activities in constructing and reaching out to their “peoples” outside of their nation-state boundaries. The rise of digital technologies and the rapid advances in AI applications have only intensified the impact of populism, locally, transnationally and globally.

Often characterized as a “thin ideology,” populism operates alongside core/thick ideologies such as socialism, neoliberalism, racism, or religion, serving as a potent force for impacting emotions, mobilizing the masses, shaping public opinion and securing (or seizing) political power. Within this context, civilization —in some cases — serves as a metanarrative through which populists emphasize distinctions and escalate antagonistic relations among ‘the people” and ‘others,’ usually along religious lines. Civilizational populism not only employs the traditional ‘us’ versus ‘them’ rhetoric but also accentuates cultural, civilizational and religious identities, intensifying conflicts within, beyond and between nations. Civilizational populist discourses have also initiated discussions on transnationalism, south-south cooperation, globalization, and multipolarity, thereby potentially influencing international relations. 

In this new and rapidly changing context dominated by uncertainty on many levels, the symposium will focus on the complexity of populism not only from different disciplinary perspectives but also across multiple political, religious, and cultural groups beyond the North/South divide. The symposium also aims to provoke discussions on innovative ways to think about the policy implications of this complex phenomenon in cyberage. 

We welcome paper proposals from scholars, media experts, civil society actors and policymakers to contribute to this critically significant dialogue.

Themes include but are not limited to:

  • Civilizational populism in the Global South and the Global North (proposals about situations in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Indo-Pacific and Southeast Asia are particularly welcome).
  • Digital technologies, including the use of AI, and civilizational populism (e.g., new opportunities to communicate and politically mobilize and the implications for the future of civilizational populism).
  • Local, national and transnational dynamics of civilizational populism and their policy implications.
  • Impact of civilizational populism on intergroup emotions of different ethnoreligious and political groups in societies, social cohesion and civility.
  • The impact of civilizational populism in contexts of acute intergroup conflict, including political violence and war.
  • Authoritarianism, authoritarian state and non-state actors and their modes of promotion of civilizational populism.
  • Foreign policy, inter-state relations and civilizational populism.
  • Neo liberalism, market and civilizational populism.

Target Audience

Policymakers, academics, researchers, civil society organizations, and practitioners in political science, sociology, international relations, and public policy

Expected Outcomes

  • Nuanced and enhanced comprehension of civilizational populism.
  • Identification of best practices and policy recommendations for addressing its complex challenges.
  • Shaping a new research agenda in response to rapid and drastic changes in society and digital technologies, opportunities for networking and collaboration.
  • Publication of selected papers and proceedings to disseminate insights and findings.

Format

Keynote speeches.

Roundtable discussions.

Paper presentations.

Key Dates

  • Extended Deadline for Abstract Submission: 15 November 2024.
  • Notification of Acceptance: 15 December 2024.
  • Paper Draft and PowerPoint Presentation Submission: 15 April 2025.
  • Symposium Dates: 22-23 May 2025.

Submission Guidelines

  • Abstract (600-800 words) and bio submissions (300-400 words) are invited to explore the symposium’s themes. 
  • Submissions should include a clear methodology, theoretical framework, argument and potential contributions to the existing scholarship on populism. 
  • Please indicate the relevance of your research to the symposium themes and its overall focus.
  • Add a few keywords to your abstract.

Contact Information

For inquiries and submissions, please contact the Symposium Coordinator Prof. Ibrahim Ozturk at iozturk@populismstudies.org

We look forward to your contributions and the vibrant discussions ahead.

Sincerely,

Prof. Jocelyn Cesari

Prof. Ihsan Yilmaz

Prof. Ibrahim Ozturk

Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc

Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider, Assistant Professor at the Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna.

Professor Ausserladscheider: Austria Is an Exceptional Case Where Neoliberalism Was a Project of Far-Right Politics

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

Underscoring that Austria represents a unique case where neoliberalism has been driven by far-right politics—a phenomenon not commonly seen in other European contexts—Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider reflects on the FPÖ’s historical trajectory. She explains how the party, initially founded by former National Socialists, positioned itself as a pro-business, liberal alternative to the dominant Socialist and Conservative parties. This liberal economic stance was integrated into government policies when the FPÖ gained power, particularly during its coalition government in the early 2000s, introducing neoliberal measures such as deregulation and market liberalization. “What we’ve seen in Austria,” Professor Ausserladscheider notes, “is an unprecedented case of a far-right populist party significantly influencing economic policymaking.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an engaging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider, Assistant Professor at the Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna, delves into the complex dynamics of far-right populism and neoliberalism in Austria. She underscores that Austria represents a unique case where neoliberalism has been driven by far-right politics, a phenomenon not commonly seen in other European contexts.

Reflecting on the historical trajectory of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), Professor Ausserladscheider explains how the party, initially founded by former National Socialists, positioned itself as a pro-business, liberal alternative to the dominant Socialist and Conservative parties. This liberal economic stance was carried into government policies when the FPÖ entered power, especially during its coalition government in the early 2000s, introducing neoliberal policies such as deregulation and market liberalization. “What we’ve seen in Austria,” she notes, “is an unprecedented case of a far-right populist party significantly influencing economic policymaking.”

The professor also addresses the normalization of far-right parties across Europe, emphasizing the shift in the political spectrum, where far-right positions have become increasingly mainstream. She points to recent electoral successes of the FPÖ, mirroring trends seen in Italy, France, and the Netherlands, which indicate a broader European shift that raises concerns about the effectiveness of measures like the cordon sanitaire. “The FPÖ has long been a role model for other far-right populist movements, influencing the political landscape far beyond Austria,” Professor Ausserladscheider states.

Professor Ausserladscheider also highlights the strategic use of economic nationalism and socioeconomic insecurities by far-right parties, which integrates cultural and economic factors to mobilize support effectively. She warns of the dangers of these developments, noting that while far-right populism often challenges liberal democratic values, it simultaneously adopts neoliberal policies, creating what she terms “exclusionary neoliberalism.” This duality, as she explains, is both a tool for political mobilization and a mechanism for reshaping the economic landscape.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider with some edits.

Rise in FPÖ Votes Most Evident in ‘Left-Behind’ Areas

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: What role do economic inequality and social marginalization play in the appeal of populist and far-right movements in Austria, and how have these factors been exploited by political parties like the FPÖ?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think socioeconomic insecurities and inequalities play a huge role in any kind of party competition and electoral turnout. And, of course, this is also the case for the FPÖ in Austria. Rather than calling it economic inequality and social marginalization, I would frame it under the term socioeconomic insecurities because, very often, it’s a complex set of intertwining factors. Some of these factors might be related to a generally unstable economic situation, which leads to increased perceived insecurities among voters. This means they might be more easily targeted by the FPÖ’s mobilization efforts.

Geography is actually a very good indicator for this. In the recent Austrian elections, we observed a significant gap between people who voted in rural areas versus those who voted in urban places. As some new political science studies suggest, there are “left-behind” places that experience various issues, such as inequality, marginalization, or infrastructural poverty. It’s precisely in these areas that you see a rise in FPÖ votes.

What the FPÖ does is target these specific areas strategically. For example, you’ll see significantly more campaign posters in these areas than in some districts in Vienna because they see a greater chance of mobilizing these electorates. This strategy works well in their favor, and they often suggest that all of these insecurities and economic dissatisfactions are the fault of the centrist parties, political elites, and, very often, migrants. In the FPÖ’s case, this is their key mobilization strategy. The targeting and strategic mobilization are very effective for them, unfortunately.

Connections Between Populism and Business Elites

Signboard of “Bank Austria” in Vienna, January 29, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

What is the relationship between populism and business elites in the context of the global rise of populist parties and actors? How do you perceive the relationship between populism and business elites in Austria? Has the rise of populist parties influenced the strategies and behaviors of Austrian businesses?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: The link between populism and business is an important one, and I think we see this particularly well in the US, especially with the way Trump is supported by various business elites. The most recent example is Elon Musk’s very open support for the Trump campaign. We see this kind of support across the board, but I don’t think it’s a straightforward phenomenon. It’s not simply that all businesses are pro-populism. In fact, it’s much more complicated. Some businesses are actively opposed to the far-right and explicitly express that stance.

Here, we observe a clear rift, particularly among businesses interested in international and transnational trade. They are concerned that if far-right populist leaders like Donald Trump come into power and implement trade tariffs, it could create significant problems for their businesses.

In the specific case of Austria, we have seen in the past that there are links between business and the FPÖ. However, as I mentioned, it’s not as pronounced or tangible as in the American context, which is a representative example. But these links do exist. One of the best examples is the recent announcement that Barbara Kolm will be in Parliament for the FPÖ. Barbara Kolm is the leader of the Hayek Institute in Vienna and was previously the president of several important economic organizations in Austria. As such, she is an important figure within the business network. So yes, there are connections.

In your analysis, you mention that right-wing populism can lead to policy decisions that both challenge and benefit business interests. Could you elaborate on how this duality has manifested in Austrian politics, particularly in relation to the FPÖ?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think we can go back roughly 20 years, to the second time the FPÖ was in power, from 2000 until 2006. Within that coalition with the Conservatives, the FPÖ implemented many business-friendly regulations and also deregulated some sectors, which were beneficial for businesses. This instance shows a significant internationalization of some market sectors within Austria, partially due to Austria’s entry into the European Union in the late nineties, becoming a member of the common market. However, the FPÖ also pushed for business-friendly policies during this period.

At the same time, when the FPÖ entered the government, it was still a novelty to have far-right populists in power, which is, unfortunately, no longer the case today. This novelty led many European member states to impose barriers on trade cooperation with Austria because they found it unacceptable to engage in bilateral or multilateral agreements with a country led by a far-right populist government.

So, the impact can go both ways. However, times have changed, and we have seen a significant mainstreaming and normalization of far-right actors in power. Therefore, I no longer expect this duality to be as pronounced as it was at the beginning of the 2000s.

Neoliberalism as a Far-Right Project in Austria

How and to what extent does far-right populism impact the nation-specific implementation of neoliberal policymaking? What role do far-right populists play in economic policy change? On this topic what does Austrian experience (FPÖ) tell us?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think there are several facets to this, making it quite a complex phenomenon. In economic sociology and political economy, we discuss institutional change—how institutions change, and specifically, how institutions like the state change. The state is a key institution in any political economy. As soon as new governing parties implement different economic policies, you will ultimately see economic policy change. This is not specific to any particular party; it’s inherent to the structure of our liberal democracy.

However, what we have not quite understood until recently, or what has been overlooked, is the power of parties and political forces perceived to be at the margins of the political spectrum—those at the edges. This is no longer entirely true, as we are now witnessing a significant mainstreaming and shift in the political spectrum’s center, which I am happy to discuss further later on.

When the FPÖ came to power in Austria, we saw an unprecedented case of a far-right populist party significantly influencing economic policymaking in a European country. I describe this as neoliberalization. In the early 2000s, partly due to Austria’s entry into the European Union but also because of the FPÖ’s leadership in government, particularly in the Finance Ministry, we saw immense deregulation and the neoliberalization of markets driven by the FPÖ. Until that point, we only understood neoliberalization as a force coming from the center-right rather than the far-right. Austria presents an exceptional case where neoliberalism was a project of far-right politics.

Given your focus on the supply-side of political strategies, how do you see far-right parties in Austria using economic nationalist discourse to frame their policies and mobilize voter support differently than other European countries?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: The way I describe economic nationalism is as a combination of cultural and economic factors that are often tied to economic policies presented as being in the national interest or aligned with national identities. Since nationalism is nation-specific, I would expect that economic nationalism in Italy, for example, would look different from economic nationalism in Austria. It doesn’t necessarily have to be different; similar policies can be described as being in the national interest of any country. 

However, because of the national specificity within economic nationalism, it differs in the sense that Austria’s economic nationalism will have its unique characteristics. This is related to what we call methodological nationalism. Of course, we also observe similarities across different cases, such as the resurgence of policy instruments like trade tariffs—long thought to be obsolete in our globalized economy—that are now being implemented again. So, while economic nationalism doesn’t have to differ drastically between nations, discursively, it is distinct as it appeals to the unique national characteristics of each country.

How do you analyze the link between the rise of far-right parties and economic nationalism beyond economic insecurity and cultural backlash? 

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: One key development, particularly after the great financial crisis of 2008, is that many political economies, especially in cases like Austria, have used economic nationalism as a means to, in a way, rescue neoliberalism. Shortly after the crisis, many countries implemented Keynesian-style demand-side economics, indicating a strong return to demand-side strategies to support economic recovery.

In far-right populist terms, these strategies have often been framed as, or have taken the form of, economic nationalism. Thus, economic nationalism can also be seen as a tool for neoliberal policymaking to maintain stability and persist, even in times of crisis.

Links Between Socioeconomic Insecurities and Cultural Backlash

Jörg Haider, ex-leader of the FPÖ, delivering a speech at Viktor Adler Markt in Vienna, Austria, on June 11, 2004. Photo: Shutterstock.

You argue that the existing literature often separates cultural and economic explanations for far-right support. What methodological approaches would you recommend to better capture the interconnectedness of these factors in studying far-right populism?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think one approach is to examine the supply side of political strategies. If you listen to far-right populists and read their programs, you can clearly see that their cultural backlash arguments—such as claims of losing national identity, displacing traditional norms and values, or losing the Austrian way of life—are often tied to economic visions. For example, anti-immigration slogans are frequently justified through economic concerns like resource scarcity or the potential loss of jobs for Austrians. These discursive and rhetorical constructs effectively integrate cultural and economic values as part of their mobilization discourse.

On the other hand, examining the demand side through public opinion studies, such as surveys and electoral polls, can also be insightful. Researchers in this area have shown links between socioeconomic insecurities and sentiments that may relate to cultural backlash. For instance, Noam Gidron and Peter Hall´s study on the politics of social status highlight the economic-cultural linkages in voters’ opinions. These connections become clearer when viewed in relation to one another. However, many supply-side studies still tend to separate these factors. I believe that demonstrating their interconnection can reveal these concurrent effects more effectively.

In your newly published book ‘Far right populism and the making of exclusionary neoliberal state,’ you basically argue that neoliberalism appeared first as a project of the far right. We study populism as the embodiment of illiberal values which at the first glance seems to be contradictory with your assessment. Can you explain how neoliberalism has been a product of far-right populism?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: Neoliberalism has indeed been a product of far-right populism, at least in the case of Austria, although this may not be true across the board. In Austria, you can see quite clearly that after the Second World War, the FPÖ was founded by former National Socialists, who mobilized as a liberal counterweight to the two other core parties at the time: the Conservatives, who were focused on conserving the status quo, and the Socialists, who represented the workers’ interests. The FPÖ sought to provide this liberal counterweight and promoted pro-business policies that the Conservatives were not advocating for. They also supported European integration, which was a novel position in the Austrian political spectrum at that time.

When neoliberalism began to rise in the 1980s, particularly in the US and the UK, it was actually the FPÖ in Austria that adopted these ideas and brought them into government in 1983. For a brief period in that year, they were the junior coalition partner to the Socialists, who had lost their majority after 12 years in power due to the economic impact of the oil crisis. This opened the door for the FPÖ to introduce neoliberal ideas into Austrian politics.

In contrast, in the UK, it was Margaret Thatcher, a Conservative, who championed neoliberalism, and in the US, it was Ronald Reagan, a Republican. So, while these classic conservative forces brought neoliberalism to power in other countries, in Austria, it was the FPÖ.

I think this is the story of Austria that they have adopted these ideas. Yes, it might seem contradictory in the sense that we describe far-right populists as illiberal when they actually promote neoliberal policies. However, when we refer to these forces as illiberal, we mean that they pose a threat to liberal democracy, which is, of course, true. There is evidence of them implementing policies that clearly contradict the foundations of liberal democracies.

What I think we’ve overlooked, though, is that this also includes an economic ideology, and that ideology can indeed be neoliberal. Some authors describe this as “authoritarian neoliberalism,” while I use the term “exclusionary neoliberalism.” You see this specific strain of exclusion when neoliberalism is promoted by far-right populists.

What is the significance of FPÖ’s victory in the parliamentary elections in terms of far-right parties both in Austria and Europe? Do you think ‘cordonne sanitaire’ still holds?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think it’s a very important development. For a long time, especially since the 1980s and 1990s, the FPÖ has been a role model for far-right parties across Europe. The leader of the Austrian Freedom Party at the time, Jörg Haider, who took leadership in 1986 and led the FPÖ to significant electoral success in the 1990s, was instrumental in this. We even talked about the “Haiderization” of Europe—a concept referring to this new brand of populism that was adopted by other populist parties beyond Austria.

In many ways, the Austrian Freedom Party has been, and continues to be, a model for far-right populism across Europe. Austria’s recent electoral success mirrors what we’ve seen in Italy, the Netherlands, France, and increasingly in regional elections in Germany. This indicates a broader shift occurring in Europe, which is particularly concerning, especially considering efforts to block these parties have not been very effective.

The Far-Right Becoming Normalized and Mainstream

European Union’s reaction to FPÖ’s victory in 1999 and 2024 are quite different. This time around EU has not reacted to the victory of FPÖ in alarmist terms. Do you think far-right parties have been mainstreamed in Europe in the last couple of years?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: Yes, massively. We’ve seen several things happening simultaneously. To talk about the socioeconomic context, ever since the great financial crisis of 2008, there has been a lot of economic instability across various countries. That instability was further exacerbated by several events, particularly in 2014-2015 when there was a significant influx of migrants, which far-right parties used as a mobilizing tool. Then we had the pandemic, inflation, and now a slight recession. This context has created fertile ground for far-right populists to mobilize.

At the same time, there has been a shift in party competition, with more and more conservative politicians seeking to attract far-right voters. They tried to win votes on far-right issues, but the problem with that strategy is that people tend to choose the original. If voters want a nationalist, exclusionary party, they are likely to go for the FPÖ, AfD, Marine Le Pen, and others like them. This shift in party competition has effectively moved the entire political spectrum to the right, even leading centrist parties to try and mobilize on similar issues, such as immigration, though often unsuccessfully.

This rightward shift in the entire political spectrum has made the far-right appear less extreme. We have seen a huge normalization of far-right powers in government, starting with Austria as a role model, as I mentioned earlier, and then spreading to other countries. We saw Brexit, influenced heavily by Nigel Farage and UKIP; Trump’s presidency in the US; Giorgia Meloni governing in Italy; and three separate instances of the FPÖ governing in Austria.

As a result, the far-right now seems more normalized and mainstream, particularly as countries like Austria are still considered liberal democracies. If we can conceive of a far-right populist government operating within a liberal democracy, it contributes to the perception that these movements are more normal and mainstream.

Dr. Felix Roesel, a Professor of Economics, especially Urban and Regional Economics at Technische Universität Braunschweig in Germany.

Professor Roesel: FPÖ Will Remain a Permanent and Strong Force in Austrian Politics

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

Highlighting that the success of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) is rooted in Austria’s long history of far-right politics, with origins tracing back to the post-World War I period, Professor Felix Roesel argues that the FPÖ’s presence as a dominant force in Austrian politics is unlikely to diminish, as historical, social, and political factors continue to bolster the party’s influence. He explains that Austria’s far-right movement is unique compared to other European countries, given its established presence both before and after World War II. According to Professor Roesel, the continuity of this tradition, marked by personal and ideological ties to the Nazi era, sets the FPÖ apart from other modern far-right parties in Europe.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Felix Roesel, a Professor of Economics, especially Urban and Regional Economics at Technische Universität Braunschweig in Germany, provides an in-depth analysis of the political landscape in Austria, specifically focusing on the rise and entrenchment of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Professors Roesel argues that the FPÖ’s presence as a dominant force in Austrian politics is unlikely to diminish, as historical, social, and political factors continue to bolster the party’s influence. He discusses how the FPÖ has effectively capitalized on Austria’s distinct historical context, conservative traditions, and societal anxieties to secure its place in the Austrian parliament for decades.

Professor Roesel highlights that the FPÖ’s success is rooted in Austria’s long history of far-right politics, with its origins tracing back to the post-World War I period. He explains that Austria’s far-right movement is unique compared to other European countries, given its established presence before and after World War II. The continuity of this tradition, marked by personal and ideological ties to the Nazi era, sets the FPÖ apart from other modern far-right parties in Europe.

Moreover, Professor Roesel emphasizes the FPÖ’s anti-establishment and anti-immigration rhetoric as key factors in its continued success. During the 1980s, under the leadership of Jörg Haider, the FPÖ transformed from a minor political party into a significant force, gaining widespread support through its anti-establishment stance. This approach resonated with Austrians who felt disillusioned by the two dominant parties—the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Conservatives (ÖVP)—which had controlled Austrian politics since the post-1945 period. Haider’s populist strategy of appealing to those excluded by the political mainstream, combined with anti-immigration narratives, positioned the FPÖ as a viable alternative for disaffected voters.

Professor Roesel also sheds light on Austria’s unique political system, known as ‘Proporz,’ which historically ensured that both major parties were represented in various aspects of everyday life, creating the perception that there was little difference between them. This lack of differentiation provided the FPÖ an opportunity to position itself as an outsider and criticize the system, further appealing to voters dissatisfied with the status quo.

Looking ahead, Professor Roesel foresees that the FPÖ will remain a significant and permanent force in Austrian politics, as its deep-rooted historical connections, strategic adaptations, and appeal to nationalist sentiments continue to resonate with a substantial portion of the Austrian electorate.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Felix Roesel with some edits.

Many Post-War Parties in Austria Had Direct Links to the Nazi Party

You argue that right-wing populism in Austria has deep historical roots. What historical factors have contributed to the enduring appeal of far-right populism in Austria, and how do these differ from populist movements in other European countries? Could you also elaborate on these historical roots and how they have shaped the modern-day FPÖ?

Professor Felix Roesel: That’s a very good question. Austria is quite distinct compared to other European countries. While many countries have seen a rise in far-right parties, what sets Austria apart is its long-standing tradition of far-right politics. Even during Austria’s first democratic period, following World War I, there was a significant far-right camp. At that time, there was a Conservative camp mainly aligned with the Catholic Church and the Workers’ Party on the left, but also a very strong far-right camp that advocated for Austria’s annexation into Germany, envisioning a larger pan-German state.

This far-right tradition was already well-established before World War II, with the Nazi Party being part of this camp. After World War II, many of those who established the new party structure in Austria had direct links to the Nazi Party. For instance, the first leader of the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) after the war was a former SS member. This continuity from the pre-war period is significant and distinguishes Austria from other countries, such as France’s Rassemblement National or Italy’s Lega, which are more modern parties without predecessors in the pre-war era.

If we compare voting results before and after World War II, we see strong connections and a continuity of far-right influence. In Austria, there has consistently been a far-right party in Parliament in every election since World War II, which is quite different from other countries where far-right parties have only surged recently.

How has the rise of populism in Austrian politics over the past few decades impacted the country’s political landscape, particularly with regard to the success of far-right parties like the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)? 

Professor Felix Roesel: The FPÖ has successfully dominated the political agenda for several years, particularly with its focus on immigration, which has been its most significant topic since the 1980s. A unique aspect of Austria is that, in the 1970s and 1980s, the two major parties—the Conservative Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ)—were incredibly dominant. They were influential in all aspects of society, even down to sports clubs, which were often aligned with either party. You had to take a stand, either supporting the center-right or the center-left, and those unwilling to identify with either were left behind. There was a growing perception that the country was ruled by these two parties, creating a sense of exclusion among those who didn’t align with them.

The FPÖ capitalized on this sentiment by effectively introducing an anti-establishment narrative. They positioned themselves as the alternative to the two main parties, and this anti-mainstream, populist rhetoric resonated with many people. The two main components of the FPÖ’s success are its strong stance on anti-immigration and its anti-establishment messaging—classic populist elements.

This approach proved effective, influencing even the moderate right-wing party, the ÖVP, under Sebastian Kurz, who shifted their policies further to the right, especially on immigration. The FPÖ has had a significant impact on the political debate in Austria, pushing the entire political spectrum to address these populist themes.

The ‘Proporz’ System May Have Contributed to the Rise of the Far-Right

Could you please explain what ‘Proporz’ stand for and how do you think it evolved in the past several decades?

Professor Felix Roesel: ‘Proporz’ is a specific Austrian system where both major parties were historically represented across all aspects of everyday life. This ranged from sports clubs to institutions like workers’ associations. Essentially, there was always a “red” (Social Democrat) and a “black” (Conservative) representation. Moreover, Austria had all-party governments at the state and local levels, though not at the federal level. In these cases, council elections determined the composition of the government, with all parties represented rather than forming classic coalitions. This ensured that both major parties had a share—if you will—of influence and positions in local and state governments.

This system created the impression that it didn’t matter who people voted for because, in the end, both major parties were guaranteed representation in the government. This lack of differentiation between the two parties may have contributed to the rise of the far-right, as parties like the FPÖ could criticize the ‘Proporz’ system and position themselves as the true alternative to the established order.

You argue that Austria’s main far-right party FPÖ is one of the most successful and prominent cases worldwide. Could you elaborate on the peculiar reasons why FPÖ has been so successful?

Professor Felix Roesel: There are several reasons but let me highlight a few. First, there are the historical roots. Austria had a strong far-right camp even before World War II, and it was easy for the FPÖ to connect with this legacy after the war. Secondly, Austria is a very traditional and conservative country, making it easier for a far-right party to resonate by promoting traditional values such as family.

Additionally, Austria has a long history of immigration, including workers from Germany and other countries, long before Germany itself experienced such immigration waves. This made immigration a significant issue in Austrian politics early on, and the FPÖ has consistently leveraged this topic to gain support.

Lastly, Jörg Haider played a pivotal role in the FPÖ’s success. He was instrumental in popularizing populist ideas in the 1980s by combining an anti-establishment stance with anti-minority rhetoric. While the specific minority groups targeted have changed over time, the anti-establishment narrative remained a constant. Haider was a political entrepreneur who identified and filled a gap left by other parties, which explains why this development happened in Austria earlier than in many other countries.

Jörg Haider’s Focus on Immigration Built a Broader Voter Base

Jörg Haider, ex-leader of the FPÖ, delivering a speech at Viktor Adler Markt in Vienna, Austria, on June 11, 2004. Photo: Shutterstock.

You underline that the two main and dominant Austrian parties in the post-1945 period are the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Conservatives (ÖVP). Both parties accounted for up to 95% of all votes until the early 1980s, but their vote shares have declined significantly since then. What happened in 1980s that led to the rise of FPÖ? 

Professor Felix Roesel: I would really emphasize the role of Jörg Haider. He understood how to effectively use populist slogans, transforming the FPÖ from a small party with around 4-6% of the vote into one that gained 20-25% from election to election. It was Haider who made the FPÖ a major political force.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, immigration began increasing, or at least reached levels where it became visible to the general public, making it an accessible topic for political mobilization. However, in the very beginning, Haider didn’t focus much on immigration. Instead, he concentrated on an anti-establishment message: if you didn’t want to align with one of the two big parties, the FPÖ was the alternative, positioning itself as outside the system. This message was very attractive at the time.

It’s also important to note that, before this period, there were hardly any other coalitions other than grand coalitions between the two dominant parties at the federal level. This created a perception among many people that there was no way to avoid the dominance of these two big parties in government. The FPÖ’s anti-establishment stance appealed to those who felt disillusioned with this arrangement.

Later, Haider incorporated anti-immigration rhetoric, which became a central theme. Interestingly, early on, there were some connections or references to the Nazi era, but Haider quickly realized this did not gain widespread support. He found that focusing on immigration was much more effective in building a broader voter base.

In what ways have populist and far-right parties in Austria influenced the mainstream political parties like SPÖ and ÖVP? Have these influences led to shifts in policy or political discourse?

Professor Felix Roesel: Yes, certainly. In particular, the immigration issue has seen a significant shift. The Conservative party, especially under the leadership of former party leader Sebastian Kurz, heavily changed its stance in response to the success of the FPÖ. Kurz adopted policies similar to those promoted by the FPÖ, making it clear that the far-right party had a substantial impact in this area.

As for the government, the FPÖ has been part of the coalition several times. However, when it comes to actual policy impact during their time in government, we do not see major policy shifts. While their involvement led to political consequences, such as scandals—many of which are still unresolved—their influence on concrete policy changes was limited, primarily because they served as a junior partner in these coalitions. The real question now is what will happen in Austria moving forward.

FPÖ’s Nazi History Occasionally Resurfaces, Highlighting Its Roots

Nazis parade in Vienna, Austria, on May Day, 1938. Photo: Shutterstock.

How do you assess the link between the Nazi ideology and FPÖ? How much has FPÖ been influenced by Nazism?

Professor Felix Roesel: The FPÖ was founded in the mid-1950s, and its predecessor, the VdU, was also a right-wing movement with strong personal connections to the Nazi era. As I mentioned, the first FPÖ party leader was a former SS leader. So, there were clear ties in terms of personnel, as well as ideology.

Initially, if you were confirmed as a Nazi, you were ineligible to vote in the very first post-war election. However, by the second election, those restrictions were lifted, and many former Nazis turned to support the FPÖ. This shows the strong connections from the voter base as well.

In terms of ideology, Jörg Haider, for example, would sometimes use phrasing that was reminiscent of Nazi slogans—close enough to evoke the connection but vague enough to avoid direct accountability. The party has often played with these boundaries.

Even today, local FPÖ politicians occasionally become embroiled in scandals involving connections to Nazi symbolism, such as singing Wehrmacht songs. These are things you don’t see with other parties, which indicates a lingering influence. 

However, it’s important to note that the FPÖ has now evolved into a more modern populist party, focusing primarily on anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric rather than Nazi ideology. Despite this shift, the party’s history occasionally resurfaces, reminding us of its roots.

FPÖ Links Sieges of Vienna by Ottoman Turks to Contemporary Issues

A pastry shop in Vienna displays a picture of Ottoman soldiers and tents on the wall to commemorate the Ottoman siege of Vienna (German: Cafe Bäckerei, Zum Türkenloch) on April 5, 2013. Photo: Fatih Yavuz.

How have the two sieges of Vienna by Ottoman Turks resonated with the Austrian public and how have collective memories and historical narratives played a role in the ideology of FPÖ? How did FPÖ instrumentalize these historical tools against the Turkish and Muslim population in Austria?

Professor Felix Roesel: My co-author and I have a paper on this topic. We observed that some villages around Vienna, which were besieged by Ottoman forces in the 16th and 17th centuries, still carry traces of that history. You can find street names like “Türkenschanz” or “Türkenstraße,” which are reminders of those times when these villages suffered; houses were burned down, and there were significant losses. These events are embedded in the local memory.

For centuries, however, these memories remained dormant. As we demonstrated in our paper, it wasn’t until the FPÖ began campaigning against Muslims that this historical context became politically effective. We found that in those areas that had experienced the Turkish invasions 300 years ago, support for the far-right FPÖ increased significantly compared to areas that had not been affected by the sieges. This suggests that the FPÖ was able to reawaken and instrumentalize these collective memories for political gain.

This is a common strategy among populists—they often invoke the past, whether glorious or traumatic, to mobilize support. In Austria, the FPÖ has connected these historical events to contemporary issues. One former FPÖ leader even referred to the need to prevent a “third siege of Vienna” in response to the growing Turkish and Muslim population, playing on these historical fears and sentiments to gain political advantage.

How have the immigration crisis and other recent socio-economic challenges contributed to the rise of far-right populism in Austria, and what parallels can be drawn with similar movements in other parts of Europe?

Professor Felix Roesel: Let me refer to two studies on this topic. One study has shown a robust correlation between immigration and increased votes for the far-right in Austria. The data indicates that as immigration levels rise, support for far-right parties also increases.

A second study specifically examined the large influx of migrants in 2015. It found that areas along the Austrian-German border, which were most affected by this wave of migration, also saw a significant rise in far-right votes. Interestingly, the study noted that in areas where residents had direct, personal contact with refugees in 2015, there was actually a decrease in support for the FPÖ. This suggests that direct interaction with migrants can reduce anti-immigrant sentiment and far-right support.

In comparison, similar patterns have been observed in other countries, such as Germany, where studies show a clear link between increased immigration and a backlash among native populations, leading to a rise in votes for anti-immigration parties. However, findings differ across Europe, and the picture is not entirely uniform.

Overall, at least in Austria and Germany, there is consistent evidence that higher levels of immigration are associated with increased support for far-right populist parties.

Whether FPÖ Can Form a Coalition Remains the Pressing Question

What is the significance of FPÖ’s victory in the parliamentary elections, that were held last week, in terms of far-right parties both in Austria and Europe?

Professor Felix Roesel: The significance of the FPÖ’s victory really depends on the ultimate outcome of the election, particularly on the formation of the next Austrian government. While the far-right FPÖ won the election by a narrow margin—just one or two percentage points—making it the largest party with around 30% of the vote, it’s important to remember that 70% of voters did not choose the far right. Being the largest party does not guarantee leadership of the next government.

The FPÖ’s status as the number one party certainly can’t be ignored, but the real test lies in whether they can successfully form a coalition. There are significant challenges ahead: other parties, including the Conservatives, have already ruled out any coalition with the far right. Additionally, the Conservative Party, traditionally accustomed to having Chancellors for many years, may be reluctant to join as a junior partner in a coalition led by the FPÖ.

The possibility of a grand coalition between the two former main parties remains, but such arrangements have lost favor in Austria, as they are perceived as ineffective in solving problems. If the FPÖ manages to form a coalition, it would signal to other far-right parties across Europe that it is possible to reach government status even without an absolute majority.

Another challenge is the role of Austria’s President, who has considerable influence. The current President is from the Green Party, which is ideologically opposed to the far-right FPÖ. In fact, the Green Party has even refused to support a parliamentary president from the FPÖ. It remains to be seen whether a Green Party President would appoint a far-right Chancellor. The President’s stance will be crucial as coalition discussions unfold. It’s unclear which direction this will take—whether it’s truly possible to form a coalition with the far right or seek an alternative beyond it. This remains the pressing question at the moment.

Criticizing a Third of the Voters Isn’t a Productive Approach

European Union’s reaction to FPÖ’s victory in 1999 and 2024 are quite different. This time around EU has not reacted to the victory of FPÖ in alarmist terms. Do you think far-right parties have been mainstreamed in Europe in the last couple of years?

Professor Felix Roesel: Yes, that’s certainly one point. Another is that we’ve become somewhat accustomed to these kinds of election results. We’ve learned that criticizing a third of the voters, as is the case in Austria, isn’t a productive approach. Moreover, it’s still possible to form a coalition without the FPÖ.

Additionally, there have been previous elections in Austria where the FPÖ was even more successful. For instance, in the last presidential election, there was a head-to-head race between the Green candidate and the far-right candidate, with the latter gaining almost 50% of the vote. We’ve also seen similar outcomes in other countries, such as France, where far-right candidates have garnered a significant share of votes beyond the traditional far-right base.

These factors might explain the EU’s more restrained response. We’ve also learned that outside intervention isn’t particularly effective, especially in a complex political landscape like Austria’s.

There are experts who believe that Herbert Kickl, the leader of FPÖ, would inevitably moderate, à la Giorgia Meloni, the leader of the far-right Brothers of Italy, who has taken a more pragmatic course than most expected since becoming Italy’s prime minister two years ago. Do you think we can witness a ‘Melonization of Kickle’ as FPÖ has now won the elections?

Professor Felix Roesel: That’s an interesting question. The difference is that Meloni had the advantage of a clear alliance and a majority in Parliament, which is not yet certain for Herbert Kickl. However, I wouldn’t underestimate him. Kickl has been the mastermind of the FPÖ for the past 20 years, designing many of its campaigns and having significant influence, even when he wasn’t the frontman.

Since stepping into the spotlight after the major scandals of 2019, when the coalition in Austria collapsed, he has shown his strategic acumen. He is very smart and will undoubtedly do everything in his power to form a coalition under his leadership.

As for whether his leadership would look different, it’s uncertain. He has already served as Minister of the Interior and, during that time, implemented tough, anti-immigration policies, though much of it was rhetoric. The real question is whether things would change if the FPÖ were to lead a coalition. But again, I wouldn’t underestimate him; he will certainly do everything possible to secure his place in the next coalition.

FPÖ Remains a Permanent and Strong Force in Austrian Politics

And lastly, looking ahead, what trends do you see in the future of Austrian populism and far-right movements? Do you expect these movements to gain further traction, or are they likely to diminish in influence?

Professor Felix Roesel: Typically, when the FPÖ enters government, there is a significant drop in their support, as people often become disillusioned soon after they join coalitions. However, after a short period, they tend to recover and often come back stronger. While I can’t say if this is a consistent pattern, it’s worth noting that nearly 50% of the population has, at some point, voted for the far right in Austria, as seen in the recent presidential elections. So, there is certainly a solid base of support to build upon.

There’s also the incumbency advantage to consider. Once a party leads as the Chancellor, they may gain additional votes from those who rally around the flag. It makes strategic sense for the FPÖ to aim for the Chancellor position and lead a coalition to solidify their role as an established part of the Austrian parliamentary system.

Whether this will require the FPÖ to change its policies, I’m skeptical. Herbert Kickl himself has expressed that one of the mistakes made by Jörg Haider, after his significant successes, was not taking on a leadership role within the government. Kickl seems well aware of past errors and will likely try to avoid them. Thus, it’s very probable that we will see the FPÖ remain a permanent and strong force in Austrian politics, at least for the next few years.

Professor Dr. Reinhard Heinisch, a leading expert on Austrian politics from the University of Salzburg.

Professor Heinisch: If You Don’t Want the FPÖ in Government, Hope They Come in First in Austria Polls

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

As Austrians head to the polls on Sunday, Professor Reinhard Heinisch contends that “If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope they come in first.” He explains this paradoxical statement by noting, “If the FPÖ comes in first, there’s a much greater probability that no other party would want to join a government led by someone as radical as Herbert Kickl. The Conservative Party (ÖVP) would have several options available—they could form a coalition with either the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and a smaller party, or with the FPÖ. But why would the ÖVP want to be the junior partner in a coalition under Kickl when they could be the senior partner in a coalition with the SPÖ?”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Austrians head to the parliamentary elections on Sunday, September 29, 2024, the political landscape is tense, with the far-right, anti-immigration Freedom Party (FPÖ) potentially poised to achieve an unprecedented success. Although the FPÖ is unlikely to secure an outright majority in the 183-seat Nationalrat (National Council), the implications of their potential rise to power have sparked widespread debate and concern. 

In a timely interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Dr. Reinhard Heinisch, a leading expert on Austrian politics from the University of Salzburg, provides critical insights into the possible outcomes of this election. Professor Heinisch offers a paradoxical yet intriguing perspective: “If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope that they come in first.” He elaborates on this by explaining that if the FPÖ wins, there is a greater chance that other parties, particularly the Conservative Party (ÖVP), will refuse to join a coalition led by such a radical figure as FPÖ lider Herbert Kickl. “The ÖVP could form a coalition with the Social Democrats (SPÖ) instead, avoiding the complications of being a junior partner under Kickl,” Professor Heinisch notes.

However, Professor Heinisch also highlights the risks if the ÖVP comes in first and the FPÖ follows closely behind. In this scenario, the likelihood of an ÖVP-FPÖ coalition increases, with potentially significant implications for Austria and the European Union (EU). Professor Heinisch warns that Kickl, unlike some other far-right leaders who moderate once in power, has a clear agenda to fundamentally alter Austria and its position within the EU. “I take him seriously when he speaks about his goals,” Professor Heinisch asserts, pointing to Kickl’s past actions and statements that suggest a deep commitment to his radical agenda.

The interview with Professor Heinisch delves into the historical factors that have shaped the FPÖ, the party’s impact on Austria’s political dynamics and the broader European implications of its rise. Heinisch’s analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of the potential consequences of the upcoming election, making it essential reading for anyone interested in the future of Austrian and European politics.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Reinhard Heinisch with some edits.

FPÖ Poised to Emerge as Leading Party in Sunday’s Elections

Professor Heinisch, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Can you elaborate on the historical factors that have contributed to the rise of populist radical right movements in Austria? How far back can we trace these influences?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: That’s a very good question. The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) is a populist radical right party, formed after World War II. However, it inherited a tradition that dates back to the Austrian Empire and the monarchy. Because Austria was not part of the German Empire during the reunification process in the 19th century, some people in Austria became German nationalists who wanted the German-speaking regions of Austria to join Germany. This sentiment laid the groundwork for what would later become the Freedom Party.

The FPÖ was founded after World War II and represented the aspirations of Austrians who identified themselves as Germans, including a significant number of former Nazis. Many of these former Nazi party members, once allowed to vote, did not align with the dominant conservative (Catholic) or socialist/social democratic parties. This led to the creation of a new party—the FPÖ—which was a German nationalist party that initially never exceeded more than 5% of the vote. It was a minor player in a political system dominated by two major parties: the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), a Christian Democratic party and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), which together controlled 95% of the electorate.

Over two generations, as the impact of the war receded, the FPÖ underwent a period of liberalization, attracting new members. In the early 1980s, it even partnered with the Social Democrats in government. However, the party was internally divided and during this time, a charismatic young leader from one of Austria’s provinces, Jörg Haider, recognized that future success depended on transforming the FPÖ from a nationalist, radical right party into a populist party.

A populist party, as Haider understood, positions itself against the elites, claiming that they have robbed ordinary people of their sovereignty. Under Haider’s leadership, the FPÖ rapidly grew, moving from 5-6% of the vote to 27%, largely on the strength of its populist appeal. Populist parties, even those on the right, are often less dogmatic than other radical right parties. For example, the FPÖ was initially pro-European integration, then turned against it; it was initially anti-Catholic, but later defended Europe against Islam. The party was highly flexible, adapting its platform to address societal grievances and attract voters.

Austria’s integration into Europe and the accompanying issues of borders, identity, immigration, globalization and European integration became increasingly important to the FPÖ. This focus allowed the party to capitalize on voter discontent with the dominant parties, particularly during times of political change, uncertainty and insecurity. Events such as the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the war in Yugoslavia—during which Austria, as a border country, experienced significant immigration—further fueled the FPÖ’s rise.

By 2000, the FPÖ had gained 27% of the vote and joined a conservative-led government, which caused a stir in Brussels and led to sanctions against the Austrian government. This was the first time a radical right populist party had become a junior partner in government. However, the FPÖ, as an opposition party, was ill-equipped to govern and its voters quickly became disillusioned. The party split, imploded and the government ended prematurely. After another round of elections, the coalition continued briefly before imploding again. The party split into a more moderate faction and a fundamentalist faction led by Haider. However, after Haider’s death in a car accident, his faction essentially disappeared.

The FPÖ reemerged and moderated itself when seeking office, but radicalized when rebuilding in opposition. In 2017, the FPÖ, once again seeking office, formed a government with the conservatives under the leadership of Sebastian Kurz, a young leader from the People’s Party. However, this government also ended prematurely due to the infamous Ibiza video, in which the FPÖ leader was seen offering influence to someone posing as a Russian oligarch. This scandal led to the collapse of the government and the FPÖ returned to opposition, where it had to reinvent itself once more.

Thanks to issues like the pandemic and problems within the government, the FPÖ rebuilt itself impressively and is now in a position where it is likely—or at least highly probable—that it will emerge as a leading party in the upcoming elections on Sunday, September 29 or at least finish as a close second. That, in a nutshell, is the situation.

FPÖ Takes Inspiration from Viktor Orbán’s Hungary

Protesters gather outside as the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) joins the coalition government in Vienna, Austria, on December 18, 2017. Photo: Shutterstock.

To what extent do socioeconomic issues like unemployment, immigration, economic inequality and globalization contribute to the appeal of the populist radical right in Austria? How do populist attitudes and attitudes based on populist radical right and left host ideologies affect citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: The Freedom Party (FPÖ), if we imagine political contestation along two axes—the socioeconomic and the sociopolitical—traditionally aligns more to the center-left on socioeconomic issues. This alignment has enabled them to form coalitions with the Social Democrats on economic matters. However, on sociocultural issues, they are quite far to the right, which currently gives them a unique selling position.

Both factors, socioeconomic and sociocultural, are important, but Freedom Party voters are probably more concerned with cultural issues, particularly questions of identity and immigration. You cannot completely separate these concerns from socioeconomic factors because the Freedom Party engages in welfare chauvinism. They often mobilize against immigrants or asylum seekers using socioeconomic arguments, such as advocating for cuts to subsidies and benefits for non-citizens, while emphasizing support for native Austrians. This approach is sometimes echoed by the Conservatives, making it a broader discourse that encompasses both socioeconomic and sociocultural issues.

Structurally, the overarching concern among Freedom Party voters is a fear of change and a sense of decline in their future prospects. This anxiety is encapsulated in the party’s election slogan, “Fortress Austria,” which speaks directly to these fears. What makes Austria unique is its historical difficulty in defining national identity, particularly in relation to Germany. In the past, German-speaking Austrians often considered themselves as Germans living in Austria-Hungary, where “Austria” referred to the Habsburg Empire’s territory, not to an ethnicity. It wasn’t until after World War II that Austrians began to see themselves as distinct from Germans.

Given this complex identity, Austrians often define themselves through lifestyle, traditions and customs. In the context of globalization and immigration, these customs and traditions feel particularly under siege. For example, in Vienna, the Freedom Party has mobilized support by highlighting issues such as schools no longer serving pork schnitzel due to the dietary restrictions of Muslims and Jews. While this might seem trivial, these identity issues resonate strongly with those who view their way of life as an authentic expression of Austrian culture. This divides the population, with elites and educated people defining themselves differently from those who see lifestyle as central to their identity.

This debate is not particularly intellectual, but it significantly affects Austria. The Freedom Party, however, is not as radical as the Alterantive for Germany (AfD) in Germany. Unlike in the past, the Freedom Party today does not philosophize about the “Germanness” of Austria. Instead, it is more pragmatic, drawing inspiration from Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and aiming to create an Austrian version of that model, rather than engaging in debates about national identity.

The Freedom Party Poses a Particular Challenge to the Conservatives

You argue that radical right fringe parties often act as agenda setters, with main parties responding by accommodating and adopting their most salient issues. How do you think radical right fringe parties affect the main parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: Well, I think it’s important to distinguish between Central Europe—those countries that were under communism—and those that were not. The main issue in Eastern European countries that were once communist is the contestation over cultural issues. There is very little debate over economic policy because the only consensus is on European Union (EU) integration and foreign investment. There’s not a significant difference in what center-left and center-right parties can offer their voters in economic terms, which is why center-left parties in Eastern Europe are often weak and underdeveloped. Where we do see substantial debate is around identity issues. Many unresolved identity issues exist and centrist conservative parties in these countries must constantly guard their right flank. Fringe parties often mobilize people on identity issues, positioning themselves to the right of mainstream parties. This is why we see so much identity-based populism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

In contrast, Austria has a more developed party system that spans economic and social fault lines. However, identity issues still play a significant role and the discourse around identity is particularly intense. On the right, we have the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria and while there are smaller parties trying to establish themselves, they may not make it into Parliament this time. On the other end of the spectrum, we have the Greens and a small liberal party occupying the left.

The contestation on the identity axis often influences the socioeconomic debate. Traditional parties like the Social Democrats would prefer to focus on social issues, but they are constrained by internal divisions. They must appeal to both progressive urban voters and more traditional constituencies, which often splits the party. The Conservatives face a similar problem, having experienced a split that led to the formation of the small The New Austria and Liberal Forum (NEOS) party.

The radical right poses a particular challenge to the Conservatives, pulling them further to the right. The future of democracy in Europe may well depend on how Conservatives handle this challenge. In Austria, the typical response has been co-option—embracing the radical right and bringing them into the fold. This strategy has led to the Freedom Party’s implosion on three occasions, but it has also validated the Freedom Party’s agenda. When the Freedom Party makes a comeback, they can point to the Conservatives and say, “We’re not saying anything different from what they said five years ago.”

So the question is: What are the risks of validating these parties versus trying to neutralize them through co-option? The verdict is still out, at least in the Austrian context.

As a Hard Eurosceptic Party, the FPÖ Would Advocate for Leaving the EU

How did the radical-right populist Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) construct its sovereignty claims, and how did the mainstream right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) adopt these claims? In doing so, how did the ÖVP significantly narrow the gap with the far-right FPÖ on the national and economic dimensions of sovereignty and largely renounce its previously pro-European and anti-sovereigntist positions?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: The Freedom Party (FPÖ) is a hard Eurosceptic party. We distinguish between hard and soft Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism refers to a stance where a party, if it had the opportunity, would advocate for leaving the European Union. However, the FPÖ knows this is a difficult and still a minority position, as two-thirds of Austrians want to remain in the EU, even if Austria is not a particularly enthusiastic member state.

To navigate this, the FPÖ hedges its bets, a strategy we described as “equivocal Euroscepticism” in an article in the Journal of Common Market Studies. They push their critique of the EU to the brink but stop short of calling for an outright exit. Instead, they vaguely advocate for major reforms and restoring sovereignty to nation-states. The FPÖ aligns itself with European groups like the “Patriots for Europe,” which includes parties like the Rassemblement National (RN) in France, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and figures like Viktor Orbán. They are comfortable in this coalition and aim to weaken the EU as much as possible.

For the FPÖ, sovereignty means that decisions should be made within Austria. They advocate for weakening international judicial bodies like the European Court of Human Rights and the EU Courts, arguing that any international involvement should be strictly voluntary and based on national decision-making. This understanding of sovereignty is almost exclusivist and they push it as far as they can. For example, regarding the Sky Shield initiative—a missile defense system being developed by Austria, Switzerland, Germany and others—the FPÖ claims it’s a backdoor attempt to join NATO, illustrating their strict interpretation of sovereignty.

In contrast, the Conservatives (ÖVP) are fundamentally pro-European. While they might exhibit what we call “soft Euroscepticism,” this typically involves negotiating hard on behalf of national interests, as seen with the “frugal” alliance of countries. The Conservatives are far from the FPÖ’s stance, although they have shifted from their earlier, more enthusiastic pro-European position.

Historically, the ÖVP was the driving force behind Austria’s accession to the EU, even branding themselves as the “Europe party” in Austria. They were the main architects of Austria’s EU membership. However, over time, the ÖVP has moved away from this position. While they are still where most Austrian parties are in terms of EU support, they have significantly distanced themselves from their early 1990s stance. Today, the most pro-European party in Austria is NEOS, a small liberal party that consistently defends the EU. Meanwhile, the ÖVP often adopts a stance of blaming Brussels when things go wrong, while taking credit for EU successes.

Austria: From Islam-Friendly to Islamophobic

Activists from the Identitarian Movement Austria block the access road to the Hungary-Austria border at Nickelsdorf on October 17, 2015. Photo: Johanna Poetsch.

Austria was one of the first European states to officially recognize Islam in 1912. How has the rise of right-wing populism and party competition changed Austria’s policies toward Islam? What role did FPÖ play in this change of policy toward Islam?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: Yes, that’s a very interesting question. Austria has historically had a progressive relationship with Islam, dating back to the monarchy. Islam has been a fully recognized and equal religion, sanctioned by the courts and rooted in the inclusion of Bosnian Muslims in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Traditionally, the Austrian military even had imams, rabbis and Catholic priests. These protections have been carried over and reinforced by the Islam Law of 1912, making it difficult for anyone to weaken the role of Islam in Austria.

Interestingly, Austrian Conservatives and other political parties historically defended the role of Islam and the autonomy of religious institutions. Austria has a tradition of autonomous interest associations, where the state allows these groups to self-govern within their areas of jurisdiction. This applies to labor markets as well as to religious institutions. For instance, religious communities in Austria have the autonomy to organize their own school curricula, appoint teachers, imams and other religious leaders, all within the framework of their contract with the government.

Initially, religion wasn’t a major issue for the FPÖ. Their focus was more on immigration rather than religion. For quite some time, the FPÖ even maintained strong, positive relationships with several Arab countries, such as the ties between Jörg Haider, the FPÖ leader and figures like Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. Even after 9/11, Austrians, including the FPÖ, differentiated between Islam and terrorism, seeing them as two separate issues.

However, as the FPÖ began competing with a splinter party led by Haider, they sought new ways to differentiate themselves. This led to an increasing focus on Islam and Islamophobia began to take root. The existing Islam Law became a focal point of controversy, and identity issues were increasingly linked to it.

At some point, these issues were picked up by the Conservative Party (ÖVP), which was locked in competition with the radical right, particularly in areas with larger concentrations of immigrants. Gradually, these ideas went mainstream. Meanwhile, the Greens and Social Democrats distanced themselves from the issue of religion, leaving it to the Conservatives, who were more traditionally aligned with religious matters.

While in a coalition government with the Social Democrats, the Conservatives began rewriting the Islam Law, largely under pressure from the radical right. Around this time, several Islamist terrorist attacks occurred in different European countries, heightening the sense of insecurity and driving a securitization of the new law. The focus shifted toward “Austrianizing” Islam, which included requirements for official translations of the Quran, preaching in German and school curricula reflecting these changes. The Islamic community was pressured to be more proactive in cooperating with government authorities, as outlined in the new version of the Islam Law.

By the 2016 election campaign, when Sebastian Kurz emerged as the strongman of the ÖVP, the question of Islam and “political Islam” became a central campaign issue for both the Conservatives and the FPÖ. Ironically, the Conservatives amplified this issue so much that the FPÖ had to remind voters that they were the first to raise these concerns. Since then, the ÖVP has continued to use the issue of Islam, even establishing a committee and a website to investigate “political Islam,” though the exact nature of this remains unclear. It became a political tool for them, although recently they seem to have stepped back from this focus, possibly realizing it benefits the radical right more than themselves. However, there remains a faction within the Conservative Party that continues to see Islam as a key issue and uses it opportunistically when they believe it can garner votes.

President’s Potential Actions Remain a Significant Unknown That Could Influence the Outcome

Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen during an interview with Russian television in Vienna on April 26, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

How do you assess the significance of the September 29 elections for the populist radical right in Austria? What are the key factors that could influence their performance this time? Most pundits in the media argue that FPÖ could make a comeback and can win elections on Sunday? What is your take on the elections in terms of the potential success of populist parties?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: I want to start with a paradoxical statement: If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope that they come in first. Let me explain this.

If the FPÖ comes in first, there’s a much greater probability that no other party would want to join a government led by someone as radical as Herbert Kickl. The Conservative Party (ÖVP) would have several options available, as they could form a coalition with either the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and a smaller party or with the FPÖ, but why would the ÖVP want to be the junior partner in a coalition under Kickl when they could be the senior partner in a coalition with the SPÖ?

Kickl has very far-reaching ideas about transforming the state, heavily influenced by the Hungarian model, which are not aligned with the interests of the ÖVP. This would likely result in constant conflict, with the ÖVP being forced to explain the radical actions of the FPÖ, as they have had to do in the past. ÖVP leader Karl Nehammer has ruled out such a coalition so many times that it seems almost impossible for him to go back on that promise—unless he is forced out, which I don’t see happening.

If the ÖVP comes in first and the FPÖ is a close second, the likelihood of a coalition between the ÖVP and the FPÖ increases. In that scenario, Kickl might not insist on becoming Chancellor since his party didn’t win, and he could remain the head of the faction in Parliament while playing both an opposition and government role. The FPÖ is not monolithic; there are members who could be appointed to government positions. In fact, in two Austrian states, including Salzburg, the FPÖ is already in coalition with the Conservatives, so there are experienced individuals who could step up at the national level.

Regardless of what happens, the FPÖ would need to enter a coalition, which would likely dilute its agenda. However, if the FPÖ were to secure the Chancellorship and the Foreign Ministry, it would have significant implications for the European Union. Although Austria is not a major power, a government led by the FPÖ, alongside other like-minded governments such as those of Viktor Orbán in Hungary or Robert Fico in Slovakia, could complicate EU policymaking, particularly on issues like sanctions against Russia, which the FPÖ opposes, or the Green Deal. The more governments embrace FPÖ-like positions, the more difficult it becomes to achieve consensus on critical European policies.

At this stage, I see the radical right as spoilers rather than as architects or agenda setters, at least not on the European level. They can disrupt important initiatives and use certain issues as bargaining chips to extract concessions. The FPÖ could potentially leverage Austria’s role in the EU, although I don’t see that as a likely scenario.

One unknown factor that could play a significant role is the Austrian President. The President has powers comparable to those of the French President, although he typically does not exercise them. However, President Alexander Van der Bellen, who is in his second term and has a popular mandate, has already announced that he would not appoint Kickl as Chancellor and that he would insist on a pro-European government. These declarations could factor heavily into the calculations of the different parties. Since Van der Bellen is from the Green Party and not aligned with the parties likely to emerge on top in the elections, his potential actions remain a significant unknown that could greatly influence the outcome.

FPÖ’s Success Would Be Seen as a Positive Signal by Putin

Media outlet Politico argues that ‘most worryingly, an FPÖ win would establish a populist, Russia-friendly Central European bloc stretching from Ukraine’s border with Slovakia and Hungary to Austria’s frontier with Switzerland, making it easier for President Vladimir Putin to sow discontent at the heart of Europe.’ Do you think a win by FPÖ will create for Putin to make more inroads to EU?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: I would say yes, but with some qualifications. For this scenario to fully materialize, the FPÖ would need to gain 50% of the vote, which I don’t see happening. Additionally, I don’t see any coalition partner the FPÖ could align with that would fully support a pro-Russia stance. Even the Conservatives have defended Ukraine and criticized Russia, so the FPÖ wouldn’t be able to push this agenda on its own.

However, the election or success of a pro-Russian party, or a party friendly to Russia, would certainly be seen as a positive signal by Putin. It would be another piece in the puzzle for Russia, absolutely. If this trend continues, it could indeed lead to closer alignment with Putin.

That said, the upcoming US election is likely to be a much bigger issue on the global stage and will likely overshadow whatever happens in Austria. Given the lengthy negotiations that typically follow Austrian elections, it’s possible that the US election will be over before a new Austrian government is even formed. While the potential for increased Russian influence is there, the FPÖ would need to become much stronger to significantly impact EU-Russia relations. There would also be considerable pushback within Austria against such a shift.

FPÖ Leader Kickl: The Law Must Follow Politics

Some in Austria’s establishment believe that Herbert Kickl, the leader of FPÖ, would inevitably moderate should the FPÖ gain power, à la Giorgia Meloni, the leader of the far-right Brothers of Italy, who has taken a more pragmatic course than most expected since becoming Italy’s prime minister two years ago. Do you think we can witness a ‘Melonization of Kickle’ should FPÖ win the elections?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: Generally, I’m not an alarmist, and I’ve always viewed the radical right as a more heterogeneous group. I should also disclose that one of the radical right leadership figures was a student of mine and I’ve known her for a long time. I’m not suggesting that we’re dealing with pure evil here. However, I do think we should take people at their word. I’m very much persuaded that when people make certain announcements, they mean what they say. When it comes to Kickl, we don’t know much about him, which is surprising for a political figure with his longevity and standing. He has no close allies within the party and we can’t look into his soul.

That said, he is one of the best communicators in Austrian politics. He’s extremely clever and was once known as the brain behind the previous party leader, the architect of many of the hard-right slogans. He skillfully peddles conspiracy theories and uses them to his advantage, but he’s also extremely disciplined. Kickl can tailor his message and say tough, often troubling things with a calm and reflective demeanor.

I believe he has an overarching agenda, one that involves fundamentally changing Austria and the European Union, if given the chance. I don’t think he’s simply interested in power for its own sake. Unlike other leaders who are content with a bit of glory and power, Kickl seems to have a mission. I take him seriously when he speaks about his goals.

If given the opportunity, I think he would go as far as he could to implement his agenda. If not, he might easily shift his stance and claim that his intentions were misunderstood. His brief tenure as Minister of the Interior was quite chilling; for instance, he once stated that “the law must follow politics,” rather than politics adhering to the Constitution. This gives us some insight into his mindset.

So, I believe it’s legitimate to be concerned about the extent of power Kickl might attain. He has surrounded himself with ideologically driven individuals who have become quite dogmatic. He has also used Nazi-era terminology, such as describing himself as a “Volkskanzler” (People’s Chancellor) and claims to represent a silent majority of Austrians. Despite the FPÖ garnering only around 27% of the vote, and survey after survey showing that the majority of Austrians are opposed to the Freedom Party being in government— with Kickl consistently ranking at the bottom of public trust indices—his discourse creates a distinctly different impression.

An Afghan woman in a burqa and locals are seen on the streets of Kabul. Photo: Shutterstock.

Mapping Global Populism — Panel XV: Theocracy, Radicalism and Islamist/Secular Populism in Iran, Afghanistan & Tajikistan

by EventsPast Events

Date/Time: Thursday, September 26, 2024 — 15:00-17:10 (CET)

 

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Moderator

Dr. Simon P Watmough (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a Non-resident Research Fellow at ECPS).

Speakers

“Counter-extremism and Authoritarian Governance in Tajikistan,” by Dr. Hélène Thibault (Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan).

“Radical Islamism vs Extremist Secular State in Tajikistan,” by Dr. Kathleen Collins (Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and a faculty affiliate in Islamic Studies at Minnesota University).

“The Taliban’s Totalitarian Regime: Governance, Extremism, and Control,”  by Dr. Zakia Adeli (Deputy Minister of Justice of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and a Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Kabul University (2018-2021) before joining East-West Center).

“Gender Dynamics and the Plight of Afghan Women under Taliban Rule,”  by Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani (Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science, School of Liberal and Creative Arts, Lovely Professional University).

“The Rise of Populism in Iran: Inequality, Class Conflict, and Nationalist Authoritarianism,” by Amir Hossein Mahdavi (Ph.D. candidate at Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut).

 

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Brief Biographies and Abstracts

Dr. Simon P. Watmough is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a non-resident research fellow in the research program on authoritarianism at ECPS. He was awarded his Ph.D. from the European University Institute in April 2017 with a dissertation titled “Democracy in the Shadow of the Deep State: Guardian Hybrid Regimes in Turkey and Thailand.” Dr. Watmough’s research interests sit at the intersection of global and comparative politics and include varieties of post-authoritarian states, the political sociology of the state, the role of the military in regime change, and the foreign policy of post-authoritarian states in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. His work has been published in Politics, Religion & Ideology, Urban Studies and Turkish Review.

Counter-extremism and Authoritarian Governance in Tajikistan

Dr. Hélène Thibault is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Nazarbayev University. Her research focuses on the politics of Central Asia as well as gender and religious identities. Recent publications include co-edited volumes Uyat and the Culture of Shame in Central Asia and The Political Economy of Education Research in Central Asia (open-access) at Palgrave. Current projects on the repatriation of Central Asian foreign terrorist fighters and the decriminalization of sex work in Central Asia are under way.

Radical Islamism vs Extremist Secular State in Tajikistan

Dr. Kathleen Collins is a Professor in the Department of Political Science and a faculty affiliate in Islamic Studies. She received her Ph.D. from Stanford University in Political Science with a focus on Russia and Muslim Eurasia. Collins received her B.A., summa cum laude, and Phi Beta Kappa, with a dual major in Russian Language and Literature and Government and International Studies from the University of Notre Dame. She also studied Uzbek and Turkish in graduate school. Professor Collins is the author of Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (Cambridge University Press), which won the Central Eurasian Studies Society Award for the Best Book in the Social Sciences on Central Eurasia, 2008. Her second book is Politicizing Islam in Central Asia: From the Russian Revolution to the Afghan and Syrian Jihads (Oxford University Press, 2023).

The Taliban’s Totalitarian Regime: Governance, Extremism, and Control

Dr. Zakia Adeli was the Deputy Minister of Justice of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and a Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Kabul University (2018-2021) before joining East-West Center. With more than ten years of master’s and bachelor’s degree teaching experience at Kabul University. She was a member of the Preparatory Contact Committee for Peace with the Taliban in 2019 in Doha, Qatar, and also served on many senior government commissions in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, including the High Commission for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders of Afghanistan, High Council of Women of Afghanistan, High Commission for the Prevention of Violence Against Women, Political Parties and Civil Society Commission of the Supreme National Reconciliation Council of Afghanistan, and The Commission on Women and Human Rights of the Supreme National Reconciliation Council of Afghanistan.

Dr. Adeli was a member of the leadership board of the Afghan Red Crescent Society from 2020 to 2021 and has played a key role in reviewing and rewriting the organization’s charter. From 2017 to 2021 she was the chairman of the research committee of the Faculty of Law and Political Science of Kabul University and from 2014 to 2017 she was the Dean of the Faculty of Political Science of Katib University. She was the head of the Department of Women Studies of the Andisheh Foundation (2015-2021) and carried out significant activities in promoting the capacity of women and gender equality in Afghanistan. In 2018, she designed and hosted the first National Conference on the Status of Women in Afghanistan, and was a member of the Central Committee for the 2018 National Consensus on Women for Peace.

Dr. Adeli worked as a Senior Officer at the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACCAR), a leading Danish organization in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2003 and has also provided valuable services to Afghan immigrants in Iran, including designing and establishing the first public library for immigrants in Iran with the help of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), securing admission for 300 needy Afghan immigrant students to Birjand University, and establishing and managing a refugee cultural complex in Iran.

Dr. Adeli also served as Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Negah-e Moaser, Editor-in-Chief of Contemporary Thought, Katib Magazine and a member of the editorial board of Katib, Foreign Policy and Middle East Studies from 2013 to 2021. She is the author of three books: UN Security Council and Afghanistan Developments (2007), Postcolonial Situation and the Multiplicity of Afghan Constitutions (2015), and First National Conference pamphlet on Studying the Status of Women in Afghanistan (2009). Dr. Adeli has also written more than thirty scientific articles including: Investigating the Convergence Factors of Afghanistan and South Asian Countries (Foreign Policy Quarterly, 2020), Evolution of diplomacy in Islam and international law (Scientific Journal of Kabul University, 2017), A Comparative Study of the Electoral Laws of Afghanistan in 1964 and 1985 (Quarterly Journal of Contemporary Thought, 2016), Typology of Afghan Constitutions in the Light of the Constitutions (Middle East Research Quarterly, 2016), Pathology of Democracy in Afghanistan (Katib University Quarterly, 2015), UN Security Council Perspectives on the Role of Women in Peace (Foreign Ministry Strategic Studies Quarterly, 2014), The fragility of democracy in Afghanistan (Zahir Shah period and the new period) (Journal of International Relations Research, 2013), How to hold women back from the post-colonial perspective, (World Summit on Women and the Islamic Awakening, 2012), and Good Governance in Farabi Thought (Scientific Journal of Islamic Azad University, 2005).

Abstract: The Taliban’s regime exemplifies a totalitarian system. The consolidation of power and control is facilitated through the instrumental usage of religion. Democratic institutions were dismantled by the Taliban, who replaced them with a centralized non-electoral system led by one authority. The Taliban’s totalitarian regime is characterized by eliminating opposition groups and political parties, suppression of civil society and media, limiting freedoms, and interference in private life. Under the Taliban regime, women face severe restrictions on their rights, such as limitations on education, employment, and even dress code. The eradication of customs such as Nawroz celebration and music, along with imposing the ruler’s language, demonstrates the elimination of cultural manifestations. The presentation analyzes these elements and their influence on governance and life during the Taliban regime.

Gender Dynamics and the Plight of Afghan Women under Taliban Rule

Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Lovely Professional University, Jalandhar, Punjab and a Deputy Editor of South Asia Research (SAGE). He obtained his PhD (2018) from the Central University of Gujarat on the dynamics of the geopolitical triangle involving India, Pakistan and Afghanistan since 2001. His areas of teaching and specialisation, apart from Kashmir Studies, include international politics, political theory and north-western South Asia. He has written about Afghanistan’s Taliban Puzzle, geopolitics of Afghanistan-India-Pakistan triangle, critical theory and Gender and neo-liberalism. 

Abstract: After a prolonged armed conflict with the USA-led NATO forces, which lasted twenty years, the Taliban re-took power and authority in Afghanistan in August 2021, removing NATO and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and immediately declaring Afghanistan an Islamic Emirate. This article examines the impacts of this change of guard in Kabul, specifically analysing the changed condition of Afghan women, the primary victims of this regime change, which is symbolic as well as harshly real. The article argues that the Taliban reconstructs ethno-religious state fundamentally undermines women’s rights and freedoms, confining them to a subordinate status and radically affecting their quality of life. While challenging the normalised form of state because of their ideological rigidity, exclusivity and political conservatism, the Taliban’s unconstitutionally and repressive way of re-establishing its rule and authority to achieve political objectives determines how civilians live their lives, particularly women through their constructed structures, norms and practices of rule. Women who are peacefully protesting for their rights while marching through the streets of Kabul and other neighboring cities are being arrested and beaten as a result of the Taliban’s strict laws and practices.   

The Rise of Populism in Iran: Inequality, Class Conflict, and Nationalist Authoritarianism

Amir Mahdavi is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Connecticut. His research focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimes, with an emphasis on the Middle East. He holds two master’s degrees, one in Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard University and another in History from Brandeis University. In addition to publishing a book chapter and two peer-reviewed journal articles, his analyses of political affairs have appeared in The Washington Post, The Guardian, Foreign Affairs, and Al-Monitor. Before pursuing graduate studies in the US, he worked as a journalist and editor in Iran.

Abstract: What dynamics of Iran’s sociopolitical climate contribute to the rise of populism? I argue that distributive desires, stemming from inequality-based class conflict, and the widespread demand for a nationalist, authoritarian order serve as the respective foundations for left- and right-wing populism in Iran. Two major factors fueling leftist-populist discourse include the unprecedented rise in impoverished populations over the past five years and extreme income inequality, with the ratio between the top 1% and the bottom 10% being higher than in most developed nations, approaching levels seen in the United States. Additionally, the government’s growing inability to deliver public services, along with the failure of major political factions to improve state functionality, has paved the way for right-wing nationalist populist platforms.

Photo: Nico El-Nino.

International Conference on ‘Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific’

by AuthoritarianismDigital-populismEventsPast Events

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We are pleased to announce that the International Conference on ‘Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific’ is scheduled to take place on September 25-26, 2024, both online via Zoom and in person in Melbourne. This significant conference is a collaborative effort organized by the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, Australia; the Department of Communication Sciences at Universitas Indonesia (UI); the Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities at the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN); the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM); the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (UMM); the Department of Political Science at Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM); the State Islamic University (UIN) Salatiga; and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) in Brussels, Belgium.

While digital technologies have revolutionized many aspects of our societies, the promises of inclusivity and progress they bring often do not align with the realities on the ground. These technologies are increasingly being exploited as tools for disinformation, political manipulation, and even digital authoritarianism, posing significant challenges to democratic values and social cohesion.

The Indo-Pacific region is particularly susceptible to these challenges, as disinformation and misinformation spread rapidly across digital platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Telegram, and WhatsApp, exacerbating societal divisions. Moreover, political actors often leverage these platforms to silence criticism, control information flows, and even restrict access to critical digital infrastructure to consolidate their power.

The discussions during this international conference will explore the complex interactions between digital technologies, cyberspace, social media platforms, and political dynamics in the region. Scholars, practitioners, and policymakers from various institutions will offer insights into the impacts of digital disinformation and explore pathways to counter these challenges while promoting digital literacy and inclusivity.

This conference is made possible through the generous support of the Australian Research Council (ARC) via a Discovery Project grant, the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), and the Alfred Deakin Institute (ADI), all of which are committed to fostering academic inquiry into this pressing global issue. The conference aims to serve as a platform for fruitful discussions and meaningful collaboration, enabling us to better understand digital complexity and its implications for democracy in the Indo-Pacific.

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Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the end of a polical meeting in Marseille for Rassemblement National party on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.

Professor Camus: National Rally’s Electoral Success Goes Beyond Protest Votes

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviewsMONITOR

Professor Jean-Yves Camus emphasizes that the social and economic policies of President Emmanuel Macron have driven many voters to the National Rally (NR). However, he cautions against viewing this merely as a protest vote. “When a party remains strong for over 50 years, it cannot be solely due to protest,” he notes. According to Camus, NR’s support base reflects a society grappling with increasing inequalities, where many citizens feel deprived of fair opportunities. This sentiment is compounded by a growing resentment towards foreigners, particularly those from North African, West African and Middle Eastern backgrounds.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era marked by the rising influence of far-right movements across the globe, the unprecedented success of France’s National Rally (NR) in both the European Parliament elections in early June and the first round of national elections on June 30, 2024, has captured widespread attention. Scholars, politicians and citizens are keenly observing this seismic shift in French politics. To delve deeper into this phenomenon, we are joined by Professor Jean-Yves Camus, a political analyst and Associate Research Fellow at The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), who is also a distinguished expert on far-right movements.

Reflecting on NR’s recent successes, Professor Camus emphasizes that the social and economic policies of President Emmanuel Macron have driven many voters to the National Rally. However, he cautions against viewing this merely as a protest vote. “When a party remains strong for over 50 years, it cannot be solely due to protest,” he notes. According to Camus, NR’s support base reflects a society grappling with increasing inequalities, where many citizens feel deprived of fair opportunities. This sentiment is compounded by a growing resentment towards foreigners, particularly those from North African, West African and Middle Eastern backgrounds. NR voters often believe in a clash of civilizations, perceiving a lack of proper assimilation into French society, especially among Muslim immigrants.

In this interview, Professor Camus provides historical context, current dynamics and future projections for the National Rally. He discusses how the NR’s appeal transcends mere protest, touching on deep-seated issues within French society, such as economic disparities, social mobility and national identity. Camus also explores how the NR’s messaging resonates across various demographics, indicating widespread discontent with traditional political parties. He examines the party’s evolution under Marine Le Pen’s leadership, particularly its ‘normalization’ process, which has made it more palatable to a broader segment of voters.

Additionally, Camus sheds light on the influence of cultural and historical factors, including the legacy of France’s colonial past and the Gaullist tradition of national sovereignty, in shaping contemporary far-right and populist movements. He addresses the complexities of European nationalist parties forming cohesive alliances within the European Parliament and the role of external influences, notably from the US and Russia, on the NR and similar movements.

As France stands on the brink of potentially significant political change, this interview offers a thorough analysis of the forces driving NR’s rise and what its continued success could mean for the future of French politics. Professor Camus’s insights are invaluable for understanding the broader implications of this shift and the underlying currents shaping the political landscape.

Professor Jean-Yves Camus, a political analyst and Associate Research Fellow at The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS).

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Jean-Yves Camus with some edits.

NR Has Been “Normalized” with Marine Le Pen

Professor Camus, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. What is the significance of National Rally’s success in the history of the 5th French Republic? What awaits France if NR wins the second round of elections which will, probably, lead to ‘co-habitation’?

Professor Jean-Yves Camus: The significance of this situation, where the Nationally Rally (NR) was voted more than 30% on the first of an election to the lower House of Parliament, is huge. It’s the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic that the extreme right has achieved such success. Back in the 1980s, we used to say in political science that the extreme right was dead. It was believed to have ended in 1945 with the victory against fascism and Nazi Germany and most political scientists considered that it would not be able to resuscitate because there was so much anger from citizens at what fascism stood for.

In spite of this, what we have seen, especially during the time of Jean-Marie Le Pen, between 1972 and 2011, is the re-emergence of the extreme right with some very extreme people and statements. It slowly transitioned from a small fringe movement to parties that initially polled 10%, then 15% and eventually 20%. The National Front even made it to the second round of the Presidential election in 2002 and more or less normalized with Marine Le Pen. Today, it is seen as a far-right party, especially on immigration issues and law and order.

However, the legacy of fascism and the historical extreme right is no more. The generation of people who experienced the Second World War is now deceased. The current members of the party are very young, with figures like Jordan Bardella, who is only 28 years old. For most French people, this is simply a far-right party with a law and order and anti-immigration agenda.

It Would Be a Mistake to Think This Is Only a Protest Vote

How do you explain the enormous success of National Rally both in the European Parliament elections on June 9 and in the first round of French parliamentary elections held on June 30?

Professor Jean-Yves Camus: What is particularly striking is that the National Rally came out ahead among all segments of the population, from people aged 18 to 25 to elderly pensioners and from the upper-middle class to the working class. This indicates that the party has support across almost all segments of French society.

The success of the National Rally can be partly explained by the disaffection of voters with mainstream parties. Whether it be the Socialist Social Democrat left, Macron’s party—which was clearly sanctioned by the voters—or the mainstream conservative right party, Les Républicains, which garnered only 10% of the votes. You have to realize that the party of Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy and François Fillon, which used to be a major conservative force, is now practically dead.

The social and economic policies of Macron have driven many voters to the National Rally. However, it would be a mistake to think this is only a protest vote. When a party remains strong for over 50 years, it cannot be solely due to protest.

First of all, the vote reflects the reality that our society is becoming less and less egalitarian. In France, we have a passion for equality, which doesn’t mean everyone should earn the same wage or have the same education. Instead, it means the Republic should enable anyone from any walk of life to climb the social ladder. For example, someone from the working class should be able to see their children rise to the middle class and then to the upper class and so on. However, this social mobility is becoming less and less possible. Inequalities in terms of income and education are now greater than they were in the 1980s.

The second point is that many citizens feel they do not have fair access to opportunities. They perceive that there is an elite—a political elite, a media elite and an economic elite. On the other side, there are the common people and the gap between these two groups is widening.

To National Rally voters, it seems that democracy is not truly democratic because power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of people. That’s their perspective. While I am not claiming this is the absolute truth, it is the way most National Rally voters see French society.

There is also a wider resentment against foreigners, particularly those from North African, West African and Middle Eastern backgrounds. National Rally voters often believe in a kind of clash of civilizations. They think that assimilation into French society, especially of Muslim immigrants, is not happening as it should.

It is true that France has suffered many terror attacks from radical Islamic groups, which has played a very significant role in shifting many conservative voters, who used to vote for the Republicans, towards more hardline stances on immigration and national identity issues. Many of these voters initially moved to Eric Zemmour’s Reconquête party, but since that party received only 0.7% of the vote in the parliamentary elections, many of those votes have shifted to the National Rally. These voters believe that the country is overwhelmed by immigration and advocate for halting it altogether.

French People Are Longing for the Past

The crowd and supporters with French flags during the campaign meeting (rally) of French presidential candidate Eric Zemmour, on the Trocadero square in Paris, France on March 27, 2022. Photo: Victor Velter.

In what ways has the Gaullist tradition and its emphasis on national sovereignty shaped the contemporary far right and populist radical right movements in France?

Professor Jean-Yves Camus: Sovereignty is a key word here. You might remember that during the era of Charles de Gaulle, sovereignty was a central aspect of his policy. At that time, we had the Common Market, not the EU, which was essentially a loose association of nation-states cooperating on selected issues and projects. This arrangement preserved each country’s sovereignty over foreign policy and the economy and there was no common currency. French legislation was not superseded by EU regulations.

Today, however, around 80% of what is voted in our Parliament must align with standards set by the EU. Consequently, our sovereignty is somewhat limited. While we retain the freedom to send or withhold our troops as we see fit, many citizens feel that the EU imposes constraints on our sovereignty. We now have a common currency and we must often agree with our European partners on important issues, relying on EU funding for various projects. The EU project, to some extent, aims at superseding the sovereignty of member states.

This passion for sovereignty, rooted in the Gaullist era, resonates with the far right and populist radical right movements in France. It also ties into the historical perception of France as a global superpower with colonies around the world. France once saw itself as one of the most important countries globally in terms of budget, military forces and influence.

Nowadays, our influence is less. This doesn’t mean that France cannot send a message to the world in terms of values or that we account for nothing on the international scene. We are now a medium-sized power and this status can bring many positive aspects. However, if you speak to National Front voters, they lament that we used to be one of the biggest countries in the world and have lost our colonial empire. They have a sense of decadency, longing for the past, which I personally do not share.

Given the current political landscape and the shift towards illiberalism, how do you assess the role of cultural and historical factors in shaping the political agendas of far-right movements in France today?

Professor Jean-Yves Camus: The National Rally is a good example of what an illiberal democracy would be like if it were in power.

Cultural factors are significant. The first cultural factor is the notion that in France, becoming French means assimilating to a set of values. Unlike Canada, the United States, or the United Kingdom, where individuals can retain part of their cultural or religious background and still identify as Italian American, Afro-American, Arab American or Jewish American, in France, we do not think that way. We have a set of values that require assimilation, which essentially means forgetting about your past identity and embracing the French way of life. This includes the principle of laïcité or the separation of church and state, which is very important in our secular state. When populations from non-European countries with different sets of values arrived, many French people resented this as an attack on our cultural model.

Then comes history. In France, history inevitably involves reflecting on our colonial past. Our relationships with Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Morocco are rooted in this colonial history. Algeria, for instance, gained independence in 1962 after a war that began in 1954. This conflict, which was a civil war both in Algeria and in mainland France, included an attempted coup in 1961 and resulted in many casualties on both sides. The French army was sent to Algeria to combat the pro-independence movement. How can we have a constructive relationship with Algeria when we have not yet overcome the burden of this past? This remains a significant issue. So, this is the challenge we face.

Of course, we also have issues with other countries from our former colonial empire. The burden of the past may be less pronounced with West African countries, but it still exists. These nations were colonized, and some of them are now asking for apologies for the colonization. For instance, if you look at the National Rally’s voter base, about 99% are nostalgic for the France of the colonial era. They do not support the idea of apologizing or paying reparations. Thus, we are still a country that needs to do a lot of introspection and work regarding our colonial past.

Less Than 50% of the French Think the National Rally Is a Threat

How do you assess the evolution of the National Rally (formerly National Front) under Marine Le Pen’s leadership, particularly in terms of its ‘normalization’ process and its success in attracting voters from Les Républicains? Can you provide us a historical perspective? Has the ‘normalization’ or ‘mainstreaming’ of National Rally been successful in attracting the votes of French middle class?

Professor Jean-Yves Camus: The so-called normalization of the National Rally can be seen in the fact that today, opinion surveys show less than 50% of the French think the National Rally is a threat to democracy. In the past, under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s leadership, more than 70% of the French viewed the party as a threat to the democracy.

Why has this perception changed? First of all, when Marine Le Pen became chairperson in 2011, it was clear she did not share her father’s ideology. She is not anti-Semitic, does not believe in racial inequality, and does not deny the harms that Nazi Germany did to France. Compared to her father, Marine Le Pen is more moderate.

However, she remains the only political leader who wants to stop immigration and make France a fortress closed to any kind of immigration. While she is still radical, she is less so than her father was. This normalization process grew gradually as new generations joined the National Rally, generations that had no political activity during Jean-Marie Le Pen’s era. They are not as obsessed with the party’s past and are drawn to it out of disillusionment with the mainstream political spectrum and resentment towards immigration, albeit in a different way than Jean-Marie Le Pen’s followers.

As a result, the party has slowly become more mainstream. Le Pen is perceived by many French citizens as a relatable political leader, someone who resonates deeply with the everyday struggles of the average person. This perception contrasts sharply with the widespread criticism of politicians who are seen as too detached and distant from the daily concerns of ordinary people. 

Marine Le Pen’s appeal lies in her focus on issues such as the spending power of citizens, job losses and factory closures. She is seen as empathetic towards the struggles of the working and middle classes, who are often overlooked by the political elite. This perception makes her particularly attractive to the middle class, a demographic that feels the brunt of economic stagnation. This group, responsible for paying a substantial portion of taxes, sees their income either stagnating or growing very slowly. They are also the ones unable to assure their children of a better future than their own.

The middle class finds itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, a segment of the French population benefits greatly from globalization and financial markets. On the other hand, the working class receives social benefits and often pays minimal taxes due to lower incomes. Those in the middle, however, feel the weight of heavy taxation and perceive a lack of representation and support.

Main Challenge Far Right Parties Face in the EP Is Their Division

The transnational connections of illiberal movements have been in the spotlight for a considerable amount of time. Do you think trans-European strategies have been successful so far for European illiberal groups and their leaders? In your opinion, what challenges do they face in maintaining a cohesive front within the European Parliament?

Professor Jean-Yves Camus: The main challenge they face in the European Parliament is their division into two political factions: the Identity and Democracy Group (ID Group), led by Marine Le Pen, and the European Conservatives and Reformers (ECR Group), led by Giorgia Meloni. Other figures, such as Viktor Orbán, do not currently belong to any particular group but may join one in the future.

These nationalist parties often do not prioritize establishing strong links with foreign groups due to potential clashes over national interests. For example, putting Hungarian and Romanian nationalists in the same room could lead to disagreements over the Hungarian minority in Romania. Similarly, Italian and Austrian nationalists might clash over territorial issues like South Tyrol.

So, the truth is that in every Parliament around the world, you have to belong to a group. This affiliation provides you with significant benefits: funding, jobs, the ability to convene meetings at the headquarters of the European Parliament and opportunities to travel and meet with fellow nationalists. Without group membership, you are essentially isolated in Parliament. Even when it comes to speaking time, those not affiliated with a group receive very limited opportunities to speak. In contrast, groups are allocated speaking time proportional to the number of seats they hold, enhancing their visibility and influence.

Therefore, it is crucial for members to put aside ideological and national differences to sit in the same room. By doing so, they gain the capacity to speak on the floor, increase their visibility and enhance their overall influence within the Parliament.

There is ongoing discussion about the potential merging of the ECR and ID groups into a supergroup of illiberal nationalist parties. However, personal ambitions and ideological differences make this challenging. For instance, deciding the leading figure among Marine Le Pen, Giorgia Meloni or Orban could be contentious.

So, I think in the next legislature at the European Parliament, we will have at least the two existing groups, ID and ECR, and probably a third one. The German AfD can no longer sit with Marine Le Pen’s French National Rally, as Le Pen does not want her party associated with the AfD. Consequently, the AfD is working on building another, more far-right group with the Hungarians from the Mi Hazánk Mozgalom party and some parties from Eastern Europe, which may include the Forum for Democracy in the Netherlands.

The difficulty in forming a group in the European Parliament lies in meeting the required criteria: having at least 25 members and representing at least one-third of the member countries. While gathering 25 members might be straightforward, assembling members from diverse countries can be challenging.

NR and Putin Regime Stands for the Same Values

An activist of the NLM Katasonova Maria holds a poster with the image of Vladimir Putin, Marine Le Pen, and Donald Trump at the press conference in Moscow, Russia on December 23, 2016. Photo: Shutterstock.

Given the historical context of foreign influences on European politics, how do you view the role of US and Russian influences on the National Rally and other far-right movements in France today? Can you elaborate especially on the role of Putin regime in consolidating the role of far-right parties and illiberal movements? 

Professor Jean-Yves Camus: When it comes to the National Rally, one very important piece of their agenda is the desire for France to withdraw from the military command of NATO. This is significant because, despite French troops being sent abroad, we saw in Sahel in West Africa, under French command, they often have to rely on intelligence gathered by the United States and sometimes the UK. This reliance illustrates the complexities of their stance.

The second point is: What does the National Rally want regarding the Ukraine-Russia war? Marine Le Pen has stated that Russia is a multidimensional enemy. She made this claim a week ago during a TV debate. However, shortly after, she clarified her stance, saying, “Russia is an enemy, but I will not send French troops to train and help Ukrainian soldiers. I shall not allow France to sell missiles to Ukraine because those missiles might kill Russian civilians in Russian cities.”

In terms of strategy, usually when a country is labeled as an enemy, there is an implicit expectation to support the opposing side. In this context, if Russia is deemed the enemy, support should go to Ukraine. However, if Le Pen asserts that Russia is the enemy but simultaneously refuses to send troops or provide essential weapons to Ukraine, she indicates a reluctance to fully back Ukraine. This position effectively means turning her back on Ukraine and showing a preference for Russia over Ukraine.

It’s not only a matter of National Rally having relied on Russian money in the past to run the party. Of course, they did borrow money from a Russian bank, but money does not dictate their relationship with Russia. They are supportive of Russia because they believe the Russian regime stands for the same values. These values include authoritarian democracy, a very strong leader and a firm, vertical way of ruling the country. They claim that Russia stands for traditional family values, a multipolar world and law and order. Russia also fights Islamism, even within its borders. In their view, Russia represents a country where traditional European values are still upheld by the government. In other words, they believe the West is too liberal and that Russia is the most traditional country on our continent.

In an article you wrote for Le Monde Diplomatique back in 2014 with the title ‘Not your father’s far right,’ you argue that extensive research into far-right populism over the last 30 years has yet to find a precise, workable definition for this catch-all term, and we need more information on the political category it covers. Revisiting the debate in 2024, do you think we now have a workable definition for populism?

Professor Jean-Yves Camus: We are still in a similar position as we were back in 2002. There is no consensus on a common definition of populism. Broadly speaking, populism can be divided into two different strands: left-wing populism and right-wing populism. In France, for example, left-wing populism is embodied by figures like Jean-Luc Mélenchon and La France Insoumise, while right-wing populism includes parties like the National Rally.

The only similarity between them is their desire to bypass representative democracy in favor of direct democracy, advocating for referenda on major issues. However, what is specific to the far right is their xenophobic agenda. They scapegoat foreigners, immigrants and refugees for everything that goes wrong in the country. In contrast, the far left does not advocate for different rights for native citizens versus documented immigrants or naturalized citizens. For the far right, this xenophobia is the cornerstone of their agenda, which is the fundamental difference between the two.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen meet in Brussels, Belgium on November 03, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Professor Wiesner: Von Der Leyen and EPP Are Playing a Dangerous Game by Preferring Far-right to Greens

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviewsMONITOR

Professor Claudia Wiesner voices her concerns regarding the troubling trend of the European People’s Party (EPP) and Ursula von der Leyen, showing a preference for collaborating with populist far-right groups over the Greens. Professor Wiesner argues that this strategy is fraught with risks for the European Union. She questions the strategic interest behind such alliances, emphasizing, “These parties would not support strong European integration. They favor a weaker Europe, whereas the Greens support a stronger Europe. It would be in the interest of a strong European Commission to align with parties favoring a stronger European Union.” Wiesner further highlights the potential legitimacy crisis the EU might face if it continues down this path.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an intriguing interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Claudia Wiesner, Jean Monnet Chair and Professor for Political Science at Fulda University of Applied Sciences, discussed the concerning trend of the European People’s Party (EPP) and its leader, Ursula von der Leyen, showing a preference for collaborating with far-right groups such as Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia over the Greens. Professor Wiesner argued that this strategy is fraught with risks for the European Union. She questioned the strategic interest behind such alliances, emphasizing, “These parties would not support strong European integration. They favor a weaker Europe, whereas the Greens support a stronger Europe. It would be in the interest of a strong European Commission to align with parties favoring a stronger European Union.”

Wiesner further highlighted the potential legitimacy crisis the EU might face if it continues down this path. “If the major faction in the European Parliament collaborates with groups that have previously acted against these principles and the rule of law, it will create a legitimacy problem for the EU,” she warned. She raised critical concerns about how citizens could trust von der Leyen’s commitment to defending democracy when she collaborates with leaders like Meloni, who has been accused of undermining media liberty in Italy, or the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS), known for driving democratic backsliding in Poland.

The issue of coalition-building in the European Parliament is another significant challenge. According to Wiesner, the volatility of majorities necessitates a coalition of at least four political groups, including Conservatives, Social Democrats, Liberals, and Greens, to achieve consensus. However, current debates suggest the possibility of excluding the Greens in favor of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which could further complicate efforts to foster a unified and strong European Union.

Professor Wiesner’s insights underscore the complexities and potential pitfalls of current political maneuvers within the EU. Her critique serves as a stark reminder of the importance of adhering to the EU’s foundational values and the risks involved in straying from these principles for short-term political gains. “If the European Union wants to be credible in defending its values, it needs to defend these values internally as well,” she concluded, highlighting the need for consistency and integrity in EU governance and policymaking.

Dr. Claudia Wiesner, Jean Monnet Chair and Professor for Political Science at Fulda University of Applied Sciences.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Claudia Wiesner with some edits.

Rising Populist Parties Seek to Redefine European Identity or Values

How do you define European identity? Is there a European identity? What are the problems and contradictions when we try to define a European identity? Has the EU been successful in constructing a European identity?

Professor Claudia Wiesner: This is a difficult question to answer briefly. So, let me start with a yes or no. The answer isn’t strictly no, but it does resemble the “glass half full or half empty” perspective. 

There are elements of European identity. For instance, people identify with the European Union (EU) as a polity, participate in European elections, and the relatively high turnout in the last European Parliament (EP) elections shows that people find the EU politically relevant. Additionally, events like the current football competition in Germany, with participants from all over Europe and coverage by the German tabloid Bild calling Europe a great country, indicate elements and dimensions of European identity. Eurobarometer data shows that EU citizens feel European and believe that membership in the EU is beneficial. These indicators suggest there is something to this concept of European identity.

Early research on European identity often compared it to national identity, a comparison I believe is unattainable. The question isn’t whether people would die for the European Union, as they might for a nation-state. We must recognize that identification with the EU differs from identification with a nation-state. European identity is a dual identity; people might say, “I’m a German and a European,” or even, “I’m from Frankfurt, I’m German, and I’m European.”

In conclusion, the answer is complex. Despite this complexity, there is a certain degree of European identity.

How does the rise of populist movements within the EU challenge the formation of a cohesive European identity, and what strategies can be employed to mitigate these challenges while promoting democratic values?

Row of EU Flags in front of the European Union Commission building in Brussels. Photo: VanderWolf Images.

Professor Claudia Wiesner: You mentioned three key points here: the rise of populism, European identity and the defense of democratic values. The rise of populism has multiple causes and is a significant field of research, with contributions from many colleagues. There are various triggers for the rise of populism, including social inequality, dissatisfaction with the government, a surge of nationalism and an anti-migration stance.

The success of populist parties and actors generally mobilizes a feeling of “us versus them,” often articulated in nationalist terms. I am currently leading a work package in a Horizon project on resilient social contracts and we recently finished data collection on the European elections. We collected TikTok videos, revealing how populist arguments work. In Germany, a strong right-wing extremist/populist party uses mobilization to emphasize this “us versus them” narrative. In their rhetoric, “us” represents the hardworking German citizens, the taxpayers, and the average citizen, while “them” includes governmental allies portrayed as incompetent or corrupt, and sometimes the European Union.

Interestingly, the “others” are no longer other nations, like the French, the Greeks, or the Belgians, but everyone who doesn’t fit into a right-wing populist worldview. This conflict is not necessarily against European identity but is about defining a different European identity. This is where values come into play. The European Union’s values, outlined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, include liberal representative democracy, freedom, the rule of law, human rights and equality between men and women.

Right-wing extremists or populists criticize these values to some extent but mainly attempt to reformulate them. They might say, for instance, that they support democracy, but it should be democracy as they define it. Or they might claim to support equality between men and women but insist on traditional gender roles, arguing that women staying at home to care for children is natural and doesn’t mean inequality.

Therefore, rising populist parties do not necessarily oppose European identity or values but seek to redefine them, arguing that current practices are not in favor of the good citizens or hardworking people and need reformation.

They would add that this perspective doesn’t mean treating women and men unequally but recognizing their differences. So, rising populist parties wouldn’t explicitly state that they are against European identity or values. Instead, they would seek to redefine these values, arguing that their current enactment is not beneficial for good citizens or hardworking people and thus needs reformation.

Viktor Orban Engages in Conceptual Politics

Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission arrives for a EU Summit, at the EU headquarters in Brussels, on June 30, 2023. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

In the light of your article titled “Actors, concepts, controversies: the conceptual politics of European integration,” how do the conceptual politics of European integration influence the formation of a European identity, especially in the context of increasing populism across member states?

Professor Claudia Wiesner: Conceptual politics is a well-established concept and a significant research focus. It provides a way of looking at and analyzing phenomena in the political realm. Conceptual politics involves being sensitive to how people frame, use, describe and contest political concepts.

For example, the reinterpretation of European values, such as democracy within the European Union, is a case of conceptual politics. It involves the EU claiming certain meanings for concepts like democracy, while others, such as Victor Orban, argue that these concepts should mean something else.

Orban is a case in point. The European Court of Justice has numerous rule of law cases and infringement procedures against Hungary based on the values outlined in Article 2 of the EU Treaty. The Court has ruled against Hungary in many of these cases, questioning Hungary’s adherence to these values.

Orban engages in conceptual politics by claiming he is not against democracy but upholds it more robustly than the EU bureaucrats. He redefines democracy, coining the term “illiberal democracy,” suggesting this is the true form of democracy. Whether he personally believes this or not, his actions exemplify conceptual politics by presenting an alternative idea of democracy. This contestation around the concept of democracy is a common feature in current populism.

In what ways do populist movements challenge the existing conceptual frameworks of EU integration, and how does this affect the EU’s ability to foster a cohesive European identity? Could you please elaborate on the role historical narratives and past conceptual controversies play in shaping current debates on identity and populism within the EU?

Professor Claudia Wiesner: I think it’s okay if we leave out the historical context for a moment and start with a concrete example. I just read about the debate regarding the alignments and collaborations in the next European Parliament. Specifically, there is a discussion on whether the European People’s Party (EPP), the classical Conservatives, will collaborate with the right-wing populists or the very conservative fringe of the Conservatives, such as the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which includes the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) and Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia. Broadly speaking, they can be classified somewhere between very conservative and right-wing populist.

The European Conservatives and Reformists, along with the even more right-wing Identity and Democracy (ID) group, have voted jointly with the European People’s Party on issues like the NextGenerationEU and REPowerEU, the two main policy packages currently in focus. This suggests the emergence of a de facto coalition between the classical conservatives and right-wing populists when it comes to energy policy. They have voted against harsh climate conditions and measures for energy transformation.

There is also a debate on whether all these measures against climate change are necessary. Right-wing populists often argue against climate change measures, pointing out the economic challenges of restructuring industries. These arguments are evident in the ongoing debates.

The challenge for the European Union is clear: the Commission, led prominently by Ursula von der Leyen, has put forward the idea that the EU needs to become the leading world region in climate protection. To achieve this, the EU must change the way its economy is organized, promoting more green industries. This approach faces opposition, especially from the German car industry, which will need to undergo significant changes. Interestingly, this opposition comes from within von der Leyen’s own camp. The European People’s Party wants to dilute this goal, mixing classical populist arguments against climate protection.

I would say it’s a very new cleavage around climate change and climate protection that we see at work here. This cleavage and the debates around it obviously impact the EU and its policies because the EU has promoted this goal and it has been concluded. However, when it comes to the nitty-gritty details, the laws that follow from it, we see a watering down in the European Parliament.

No Tension between National and European Identities

How do the conceptual politics of EU integration address the issues raised by populist rhetoric, especially regarding sovereignty and national identity and what role do these politics play in either exacerbating or alleviating the tensions between national and European identities?

Professor Claudia Wiesner: The interesting thing is that I don’t see many tensions between national and European identities at the moment. Interestingly, not even Marine Le Pen or Giorgia Meloni want to leave the European Union. Viktor Orbán doesn’t want to leave the European Union either, as it is too beneficial.

What we see is that political actors like these tend to say “Hungary first,” “France first,” or “Italy first.” It’s not exactly placing national identity against European identity but rather establishing a priority, saying “Italy first” and then the European Union or “Italy first” meaning Italy needs to lead the European Union.

For instance, Giorgia Meloni would make strong claims for a restrictive migration policy, advocating that the European Union should adopt a policy modeled after Italy’s approach. This is essentially an Italian model, driven by Meloni as the current leader of Italy, suggesting the EU should adopt policies reflecting Italy’s stance.

So, the conceptual politics here don’t create an opposition but rather establish priorities, implying that national identity and interests come first, followed by European interests.

Regarding historical parallels, this prioritization of national identity over European interests is not new. It has been a recurring theme ever since European integration began.

If the EU Wants to Be Credible, It Should Defend Its Values Internally as Well

How would you assess the recent European Parliament elections compared to former elections of EP? Do the results of the EP elections point to a serious crisis of the EU in terms of legitimation?

Professor Claudia Wiesner: Yes and no.

On one hand, we have a very high turnout with many people genuinely interested in European Parliament elections. There isn’t a majority of anti-EU voices in the European Parliament. The estimates regarding the outcome of the European Parliament election were initially much more critical for the Democratic camp. For instance, prognoses predicted a higher percentage for Identity and Democracy than what they actually achieved. So, we have a pro-European majority in the European Parliament, composed of a multi-party coalition.

Given the volatility of majorities in the European Parliament, it is necessary to have four political groups in this majority, which raises difficulties in finding consensus. This coalition would need to bring together Conservatives, Social Democrats, Liberals, and Greens under one common roof. Alternatively, the current debate suggests excluding the Greens in favor of the European Conservatives and Reformists.

This brings me to the challenges these parliamentary elections present. It’s a dangerous game, seemingly still pursued by von der Leyen and the European People’s Party, which shows strong sympathies for collaborating with Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia rather than with the Greens. I struggle to understand the strategic interest behind this, as these parties would not support strong European integration. They favor a weaker Europe, whereas the Greens support a stronger Europe. It would be in the interest of a strong European Commission to align with parties favoring a stronger European Union.

Additionally, the European Union is based on the principles outlined in Article 2 and there are existing rule of law conflicts. If the major faction in the European Parliament collaborates with groups that have previously acted against these principles and the rule of law, it will create a legitimacy problem for the EU. How can citizens trust von der Leyen’s commitment to defending democracy when she collaborates with Giorgia Meloni, who is undermining media liberty in Italy or with Polish PiS, which has driven democratic backsliding in Poland?

Obviously, this idea of defending the rule of law might even appear as a lie. People recognize this issue. I have been in many public discussions and it’s something that even average citizens—not just EU scholars—realize: there is a problem. My point is that if the European Union wants to be credible in defending its values, it needs to defend these values internally as well.

In your book “Politicisation, Democratization and the European Identity,” you argue that the EU appears as a kind of defective democracy. Where do these deficiencies stem from and how can they be fixed? What can be done to reduce democratic deficiency of the EU?

Professor Claudia Wiesner: This is a crucial question. The concept of a “defective democracy” doesn’t originate from EU research but from political science research on the quality of democracy. It refers to a system that falls between fully fledged representative democracies and autocracies. A defective democracy lacks some of the criteria of a fully functioning liberal representative democracy.

An EU politician famously stated that if the EU were to apply for membership, it would have to decline because it doesn’t meet its own rule of law standards. There’s a long-standing debate on the democratic deficit in the European Union, with many criticisms still valid.

My main point at the moment is the lack of transparency and accountability within the European Union (EU). The EU is too complicated and complex, which is a recurring issue. Citizens often don’t understand what’s going on, leading to a legitimacy problem. How can a political system be considered legitimate if people don’t understand how it works? Additionally, this complexity creates an accountability problem because it’s unclear who is responsible for decisions. To support this, I need several research projects that examine citizen views on the European Union.

Brussels, as a political hub, houses many actors, making it challenging to identify who exactly makes decisions. There’s also a transparency deficit, with many political decisions made behind closed doors during negotiations. This lack of visibility makes it difficult for citizens to oversee EU decisions.

One main point is the need to increase transparency and accountability in the EU. This isn’t just about formal accountability but about visible transparency that citizens can perceive. People feel that if they wanted to hold someone accountable, they wouldn’t know where to start.

The remedy would be treaty reform, which is an optimistic perspective at present and fostering more public reasoning and debates within EU institutions.

Critics: “EU Does Not Adhere to Its Own Ideals”

In your article, “The War Against Ukraine, the Changing World Order and the Conflict Between Democracy and Autocracy,” you argue that a world structured around a maximum of two hegemonic great powers has been successively replaced by a world order in which several poles of larger and smaller states confront and compete with each other—politically, territorially, economically, militarily and ideologically. For the EU, this means that its previous global political strategy, which focused strongly on ‘change through trade’ and its role as a ‘normative power Europe,’ no longer looks promising. In this multi-order world, what should EU do to regain its clout and stay relevant?

Professor Claudia Wiesner: In the lecture series that I conduct every winter term, I invite politicians and academics to discuss various topics with my students. About a year ago, we had a Green MEP from Germany who remarked that the European Union must decide whether it wants to “sit at the table or be on the menu.” While this is a harsh way of putting it, the point is significant.

The EU has lost importance, economic power and ideological influence in the world and there isn’t an easy solution to regain it. This challenge encompasses ideological, economic and geopolitical battles. If the EU wants to regain influence, it needs to be attractive and convincing across all these policy fields.

I think this is quite a challenge without an easy answer. A key issue is credibility. Many students from the Global South at my university are strongly critical of the EU. Interestingly, even my German and other European students share this critical view, believing the EU lacks credibility in its defense of democracy and human rights.

When discussing the EU’s role in non-EU countries, former developing countries and the Global South, there is significant criticism and dissatisfaction with the EU’s actions. They argue that the EU does not adhere to its own ideals and is unconvincing in its efforts.

To regain confidence, the EU needs to address this issue. They must work diligently to appear convincing and uphold their promises.

In the same article, you argue that there are several signs that liberal democracy is under threat, not only from outside the EU, but from within the EU itself. What does the recent EP elections tell us about the internal challenges of EU against the liberal democratic order?

Professor Claudia Wiesner: I believe I made my point quite strongly. One internal challenge is the democratic backsliding in several EU member states. Today, I read about a new law passed in Slovakia that restricts media freedom. They dissolved the public TV station and created a new one to replace journalists who did not report favorably on the government. This is similar to what we’ve seen in Hungary and Poland. Interestingly, the government in Slovakia is of a different political color than those in Poland or Hungary.

The European Commission addresses these issues through rule of law reports and, if necessary, infringement procedures, with the Court of Justice of the European Union stepping in. This highlights why the EU and any incoming European Commission and Commission President need to be highly attentive in this area.

In Germany, there is currently a debate about maintaining a “firewall” against right-wing extremists, emphasizing that conservative parties should not collaborate with them. This principle is crucial for the European Union. Right-wing populists, such as Giorgia Meloni in Italy, often limit media freedom and pose significant internal challenges to democracy in the EU.

If centrist politicians, including the European People’s Party (EPP), disregard this firewall and collaborate with right-wing extremists, it becomes more than a matter of political color. It supports democratic backsliding and strengthens the internal threats to democracy in the EU, which is very dangerous for anyone who supports liberal democracy.

Possible Implications of a Probable Le Pen Victory

Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the end of a polical meeting in Marseille for Rassemblement National party on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.

How do you think a likely victory of Le Pen in France would change the EU and EP in particular?

Professor Claudia Wiesner: A likely victory of Le Pen in France would not change the European Parliament immediately because it has just been elected, and its composition is set. Le Pen’s potential victory wouldn’t affect this.

I’m not certain about a likely victory for Le Pen except for the next Presidential elections in France, which are in three years. The next parliamentary elections in France are more uncertain.

I, along with many French commentators, don’t understand why Emmanuel Macron called for snap elections. It seemed like a bad moment for his party, which performed poorly in the EP elections, especially when right-wing extremists in France are strong.

Interestingly, the left in France united very quickly, within four days, forming joint lists and joint candidacies. This sets up an intriguing opposition between Le Pen, Jordan Bardella and the “Nouvelle Union Populaire.” We might see a victory for the left or the extreme right, but it’s unlikely we’ll see a strong showing from Macron’s camp.

If we look at the election results in France, they are not very strong in the French Parliament because the French Parliament is elected through a majority voting system based on constituencies. This means that to win a seat in the National Assembly, you need to win a constituency. Even in this scenario, it’s going to be difficult for Rassemblement National (RN) to win a majority of the constituencies because they are alone. They don’t have many experienced partners with them, except probably the party of Éric Zemmour. So, really, we’ll have to see because there is a right-wing extremist potential of between 35 and 50% in France. Yes, but you need to realize it in every constituency. And I’m not 100% sure this will be the case, so I wouldn’t set my thoughts entirely on a victory of the right-wing extremists.

But, if they win, there would be a Prime Minister from Rassemblement National. I think it wouldn’t be Le Pen, it would be Jordan Bardella, so, the young president of Rassemblement National. It would mean that there would be another right-wing populist government in Europe, in a big founding member state along with Italy. So, probably they would work very well together.

Interestingly, what we see is that collaboration in the European Union has a kind of moderating influence even on those right-wing populists. So, as long as there is no right-wing populist majority in the Council, there wouldn’t be such a massive effect. There would be some effect, but it would be moderated, especially because there is no right-wing majority in the European Parliament.