Tusor, Anita & Escobar Fernández, Iván. (2023). “Mapping European Populism – Panel 7: Populist parties/actors and far-right movements in the Baltic countries and Belarus.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 19, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0009
This report is based on the seventh panel of ECPS’s monthly panel series called “Mapping European Populism,” which was held online in Brussels on December 15, 2022. The panel brought together top-notch populism scholars from three Baltic countries, namely Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Belarus. As a by-product of this fruitful panel, the report consists of summaries of the speeches delivered by the speakers.
By Anita Tusor & Iván Escobar Fernández
This report is based on the seventh panel of ECPS’s monthly panel series called “Mapping European Populism,” which was held online in Brussels on December 15, 2022. The panel brought together top-notch populism scholars from three Baltic countries, namely Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Belarus. As a by-product of this fruitful panel, the report consists of summaries of the speeches delivered by the speakers.
The panel was moderated by Professor Andres Kasekamp, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, and included the following speakers: Dr Jogilė Ulinskaitė, Researcher at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science; Dr Mari-Liis Jakobson, Associate Professor of Political Sociology at Tallinn University; Dr Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik, Head of the Baltic Department at the Institute of Central Europe/the Catholic University of Lublin; Dr Tatsiana Kulakevich, Assistant Professor at the School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, University of South Florida.
Prof Kasekamp started his introduction with a brief overview of the four countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belarus. He pointed out the collapse of the USSR in 1991 as crucial for the four countries: While Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania already existed independently during the inter-war period (1918-1939) and gained their independence back when the Soviet Union collapsed, Belarus, on the other hand, emerged as a new-born state from the USSR. In addition, whilst the three Baltic states moved decisively to an alignment with the Western world, Belarus, ruled by the dictator Alexander Lukashenko, became a dictatorship associated with Moscow. The strategic alliance between Moscow and Minsk has lasted for decades; however, we have witnessed an intensification during the War in Ukraine.
However, the Baltic countries have followed a different path. In 2004, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined the European Union and NATO, and a few years later, they also joined the Eurozone, adopting the common currency. Nonetheless, their domestic politics have been conditioned by the fact that these states host ethnic Russian minorities, resulting in an ethnic cleavage for their home affairs. Prof Kasekamp highlighted that such ethnic composition is crucial in the current geopolitical situation since it reflects the popular opinion regarding the war in Ukraine. In other words, the Baltic states have regarded themselves as frontline states and have become the biggest supporters of Ukraine, measured according to the percentage of GDP per capita that they are currently spending on military and humanitarian assistance.
Prof Kasekamp followed his introduction by providing a brief overview of the current situation of populism in the aforementioned countries. He first stressed the importance of the well-known Cas Mudde’s (2007) framework, which identifies three main features of the populist radical right: nativism, populism, and authoritarianism.
The moderator then provided the audience with a brief overview of each state. First, he addressed Latvia, a state characterized by new political parties doing well in elections. In fact, according to Kasekamp, in 2006, a political party that had not existed until that year won the elections, and ever since then, it has won each of the successive elections in Latvia. In this same line, the scholar also pointed out that new parties have performed well in recent elections. Thus, besides its volatility, the Latvian system has been opened for new populist challengers, namely the populist radical right. For instance, the National Alliance, the equivalent of the Latvian populist radical right party, has been in government for a long time as a junior member of the coalition that has been running the country since 2011.
The case of Estonia is quite particular since there had not been any significant far-right or populist radical right party until 2015. In that year, a political party founded in 2012, known as EKRE, managed to cross the 5 percent threshold, thus entering the Parliament, and has grown since then. Nowadays, EKRE is the third most popular political party in Estonia.
Prof Kasekamp also briefly tackled the case of Lithuania among the Baltic states highlighting that Lithuania has several populist parties from both the right and the left in the political spectrum. Moreover, he also quickly remembered that Lithuania already had a populist president that was impeached and removed from office in 2004.
Lastly, Prof Kasekamp addressed the contemporary situation of populism in Belarus. He first indicated that, due to the authoritarian administration that is currently reigning in Belarus, there is not much political space that allows organized political activities and parties to emerge and thrive without being repressed.
Dr Jogilė Ulinskaitė: “The Legacy of the post-communist transformation in the agenda of Lithuanian populist parties”
Lithuania lacks the so-called cordon sanitaire against populist political parties and most populist political parties, when elected, have frequently joined the government in a coalition. Bearing this in mind, Dr Ulinskaitė identified two interesting elements: she claimed that such populist parties, after having been in the governing coalition, tend to lose their outsiders’ appeal; as a second point, she argued that a distinctive feature of Lithuanian politics that differentiates Lithuanian populism from other Central and Eastern European countries is that the impact on democracies usually stems from populist parties taking over mainstream political parties.
Dr Jogilė Ulinskaitė started her presentation by highlighting that the findings and conclusions extracted from classic model countries where populism has succeeded, such as Hungary and Poland, should not be extrapolated entirely to other states simply because they share a post-communist background. By showing a time series obtained from the Liberal Democracy Index, she demonstrated that the effect of populism on Poland and Hungary has differed from the effects of populism undergone in both Estonia and Lithuania, for instance.
Nonetheless, although the impact of populism has varied across different countries, the researcher argued that Lithuania started experiencing populism quite soon. More specifically, she referred to the case concerning Rolandas Paksas, former Lithuanian President, who was impeached in 2004. Dr Jogilė Ulinskaitė then showed the evolution of populist parties’ success since the early 2000s, pointing out that, in 2004 and 2016, they won more seats in the Parliament than the other principal competing political parties.
Having said this, the researcher then wondered why, despite their success, populist parties have not been able to control state institutions in Lithuania. She identified two main reasons: the ongoing domination of the two main political blocks -the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania and the Homeland Union- due to the historical cleavage set during the post-communist transformation. And second, the inability of populist parties to maintain their voters’ support resulting in an impressive initial success that progressively ends up fading away. Regarding the latter, Dr Ulinskaitė highlighted two possible explanations for the fact that populist parties cannot maintain voters’ support: this could be because such populist parties usually build their electoral campaigns upon a particular project or community, thus failing to develop a comprehensive political program. Another explanation could be the complexity of the Lithuanian parliamentary electoral system, which consists of two rounds; to win in both rounds of the election, a political party has to have a strong political organization and a high number of members. However, populist parties do not meet these requirements and face several challenges when trying to attract new members. Further in this line, the regulations passed and implemented on extensive private funding in electoral campaigns have also limited their campaigns’ potential since political parties now receive public funding for their electoral campaigns according to their share of the vote in previous elections, thus reducing the funds at their disposal.
Nevertheless, Dr Ulinskaitė reminded the audience that Lithuania lacks the so-called cordon sanitaire against populist political parties. The researcher pointed out that most populist political parties, when elected, have frequently joined the government in a coalition. Bearing this in mind, Dr Ulinskaitė identified two interesting elements: she claimed that such populist parties, after having been in the governing coalition, tend to lose their outsiders’ appeal; as a second point, she argued that a distinctive feature of Lithuanian politics that differentiates Lithuanian populism from other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries is that the impact on democracies usually stems from populist parties taking over mainstream political parties.
The researcher then focused her presentation on the recent victory of the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union in 2016, which, through the combination of credibility and the reinvention of their project, became more similar to a social movement than to a traditional political party. The party’s campaign aimed to attract those who did not identify with either the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania or the Homeland Union. Furthermore, in terms of their ideology, the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union combined both right-wing and left-wing values, emphasizing, for instance, the role of traditional family and Christian values as the base of the society, the importance of public health, as well as the ongoing moral decay of contemporary societies. Dr Ulinskaitė then explained that although the party’s voters do not differ significantly in their ideological preferences from voters of other traditional parties, they can be described as citizens who are dissatisfied with the economic situation.
The researcher concluded her presentation by arguing that despite the decline in 2020 of the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union, their legacy is still noticeable in Lithuanian society, as can be observed in their attempts to create a strong leadership, as well as represent the losers of contemporary times.
Dr Mari-Liis Jakobson: “A Blossoming tree: The origins and present-day of the Estonian populist radical right”
Due to the economic and social progress experienced in Estonia, it was believed that there was no room for radical right parties and the far-right upon the electoral margin; however, this belief changed about a decade ago with the foundation of EKRE. Furthermore, it is also worth noting the existence of Blue Awakening, EKRE’s youth branch, which has a more radical and far-right ideology than EKRE itself.
The second presentation was carried out by Dr Mari-Liis Jakobson, Associate Professor at Tallinn University. She tackled the Estonian populist radical right, namely the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE), founded in March 2012. After obtaining 19 seats in the Estonian Parliament in the 2019 national elections, EKRE became the third most important political party in Estonian politics, though as of early 2021, it has clearly become the second most popular party in Estonia.
Due to the recent economic and social progress experienced in Estonia, it was believed that there was no room for radical parties and the far-right upon the electoral margin. However, this belief changed about a decade ago with the foundation of EKRE. Furthermore, it is also worth noting the existence of Blue Awakening, EKRE’s youth branch, which has a more radical and far-right ideology than EKRE itself. Moreover, the Associate Professor also pointed out as part of the contextualization of the Estonian case the discontinuation of the Estonian Independence Party, the creation of the Foundation for the Protection of Family and Tradition, and the transnational "import" of the Nordic right-wing extremist group "Soldiers of Odin", which can be considered as an informal movement of people whose aim is to "protect" the streets from immigrants. This extremist group surfaced in 2016, during the peak of the migration crisis.
Nonetheless, Dr Jakobson stressed the long ethno-nationalist and anti-establishment tradition in Estonian politics, which can be traced back to 1988. This ethno-nationalist and anti-establishment tradition could be observed in the Estonian National Independence Party, founded in 1988, which aimed at the so-called liberation of Estonia and the re-establishment of the Estonian situation in the 1940s. Moreover, she also underlined other political parties, such as the Pro Patria Union and all its successors, which were part of mainstream Estonian politics. The countermovement to the aforementioned parties was the Popular Front of Estonia, which proposed a non-nationalist non-ethnocentric alternative. More recently, the Associate Professor also mentioned the Estonian Centre Party, which was founded in 1991 and with clear populist sentiments as well. Finally, to conclude the background of Estonian politics, Dr Jakobson explained the overall dissatisfaction in Estonia in 2011, resulting in several protests and demonstrations against the political elites for a variety of reasons of different nature; something that was quite rare in Estonia.
Dr Mari-Liis Jakobson resumed her lecture on the populist radical right. She emphasised that -in addition to all the key features of populist radical parties -namely opposition to multiculturalism, defence of cultural nationalism, anti-establishment rhetoric, defence of traditional family values, anti-immigration stances, Euroscepticism, opposition to the US Green Deal, among others-, what made EKRE succeed in Estonian politics was its ability to manage to be on the opposing side alone, which means that no more political parties were embracing the above-mentioned stances as they were.
Furthermore, the Associate Professor also pointed out the bad manners of the Estonian Populist Radical Right, which, for instance, during their participation in the government, they underwent 33 different political crises that were somehow created by themselves. Half of the aforementioned crises were scandals, which were outrageous expressions quite contested that ended up occupying the public discussion. More specifically, they managed to verbally attack the president, the leaders of other countries, the intellectuals, the minorities, as well as domestic policies from third countries, such as the US.
Following her lecture, Dr Mari-Liis Jakobson also highlighted the organisation of EKRE. She said that, although being inherited in parts from the People‘s Union, EKRE built up a well-functioning mass organisation that is based on ideology and conviction. Further in this line, the Associate Professor also mentioned that EKRE has notably democratic internal procedures, in which, for instance, candidates are elected according to popular vote on the district and local level and even their slogans are created by the people. This is why EKRE resembles a social movement as well.
Dr Jakobson concluded her presentation by showing some of the outcomes of the participation of EKRE in politics, such as the platform they created against the Gender-Neutral Civil Partnership Act, their meetings and events during the migration crisis, as well as their institutionalisation in the government. The Associate Professor remarked on the imminent elections Estonia is about to undergo, which will indeed pave the way for the future of EKRE.
Dr Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik: “What attracts people to populism in Latvia?”
“Although populism is a very attractive ideology in Latvia as for a European Union member state, it is less effective than in other parts of Europe. The reason for this is partly the fragmented and unstable nature of the Latvian political system, as well as the fact that these parties have gained huge support relatively fast, but they have lost this support even faster.”
The third presentation was carried out by Dr Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik, who showed Latvia as a more extraordinary case among the three Baltic states despite the many similarities between the mentioned countries. Her lecture asked the question, “What attracts people to populism in Latvia?” and outlined the statement that populism is indeed an ideology which attracts Latvians due to several features of the society which make this phenomenon work.
First of all, there have been high and quite unrealistic expectations about the new democratic regime following 1991. However, after a couple of years, economic problems, and issues with the implementation of democracy pushed society towards an apolitical state, where people were less and less involved in democracy itself. Economic development and gains were expected to be achieved quickly after the democratic transformation, but it proved to be inapproachable during such a short time span. This realization came at a time when social and economic inequalities became more visible. We can interpret this situation in alignment with the disenchantment theory, according to which relatively high social enthusiasm at the beginning of the 1990s became lower and lower because of the poor economic and political performance of state institutions. This “discrepancy between the expected advantages of the new system and the experience with real democracy” (Reykowski, 2020: 155) led to frustration and disillusion among people who experienced worsening economic difficulties, unemployment, political scandals, and corruption. People withdrew from political participation, became apathetic and had little confidence in democratic institutions. We can find several such elements in the political environment of Latvia throughout the 1990s.
Furthermore, Dr Kuczyńska-Zonik highlighted that the country’s demographic situation is another notable feature of Latvian society, making it receptive to populism. The Baltic state is divided into two main ethnic groups: Latvians and Russians. The latter constitute more than 30 percent of the Latvian population, creating another major cleavage, division and form of inequality in the country. Due to this political environment and social inequality, a basis for the attractiveness of populist ideology was created.
Dr Kuczyńska-Zonik then moved on to describe the current populist landscape in Latvia: One of the parties in the current government, National Alliance, established in 2010, is a party which can also be described as a right-wing populist party. It holds a far-right ideology, and it is a conservative, anti-immigrant, and Eurosceptic party. In 2018, the party won 13 seats, which it could also maintain during the 2022 Latvian parliamentary elections. The researcher mentioned two other populist parties, one of which, ‘Who owns the State?’, ran in the 2018 elections and quickly gained 7 percent of support, which was relatively promptly lost. This phenomenon, according to Dr Kuczyńska-Zonik, is significant and typical for Latvia: in a political environment described by an unstable government, a new party appears, which then disappears in a short time.
The other young populist party is Latvia First, which appeared on the scene only in August 2021 and shows similarities with another conservative newcomer party, For Stability! The latter was founded in February 2021 and gained support through its Eurosceptic and anti-vaccination rhetoric. The quick establishment of these parties happened just one year before the parliamentary elections, which is a requirement for running parties according to Latvian law to have the ability to participate in the elections. Both populist parties promote Christian and traditional values and include social integration into their programs. Together, the two smaller parties gained around 13 percent of the votes exemplifying the relatively big support for populist ideology in Latvian society. As a result, it is no surprise that populism is viewed as the biggest threat to democracy, according to the newly elected Latvian President, Egils Levits. Since 1993, 10 to 20 percent of voters have voted for populist parties in the parliamentary elections.
In addition, the Covid-19 pandemic has made populists more and more vocal and visual as populist leaders have decided to organize and/or participate in mass demonstrations and rallies against the government, mandatory vaccination and restrictions. In fact, their activity has succeeded since society got frustrated with the pandemic situation in the country. Although Dr Kuczyńska-Zonik reminds us that among the Baltic states, Latvia had the highest rate of covid cases, and the vaccination rate was less effective than in Lithuania or Estonia. In this sense, Latvian populist anti-vaccination and anti-governmental narratives have worked.
Finally, Dr Kuczyńska-Zonik emphasized that although populism is a very attractive ideology in Latvia, as for a European Union member state, – in the long term -; it is less effective than in other parts of the continent. The reason for this is partly the fragmented and unstable nature of the Latvian political system, as well as the fact that these parties have gained huge support relatively fast, but they have lost this support even faster. In her lecture, the researcher mentioned several factors which are boosting the populist rhetoric in the country. For example, crisis situations like the pandemic have made people more and more vulnerable to such narratives, especially the elderly, the Russian-speaking minority, and people with low social status. Generally speaking, those dissatisfied with their economic situation, social status and politics in the country will present unfavorable attitudes towards the government. If we look at the social trust and support in the government in Latvia, we can realize that it is among the lowest in the EU – scoring around 20 percent (Kuczyńska-Zonik, 2021). This number steadily declines over time, coinciding with the growing support for populist parties.
Dr Tatsiana Kulakevich: “Is populism in decline in Belarus?”
The first pillar of Lukashenko’s populism has been crumbling since 2020: the proximity to the people did not stand anymore as people could see the brutal repression and violence against the protesters. People started to question Lukashenko’s image. Moving on to the second pillar, the guarantor of peace, this image was shattered when the war in Ukraine began. Belarus appeared in the news as the other aggressor in Putin’s war. Finally, as a guarantor of stability, stability of the economy, Lukashenko’s image is also crumbling.
Dr Tatsiana Kulakevich presented the Belarusian case and started by emphasizing that, in the case of Belarusian populism, we do not talk about the far right or the left; we focus on Lukashenko himself. Secondly, to clarify the term, populism is not an ideology but a very ambiguous term, and it can be adopted by the left or the right. In Belarus, there are 15 officially registered political parties, and there are also officially not registered political parties in opposition. The key point here is that because the election process in Belarus is merely an administrative formality, political parties are largely irrelevant.
Dr Kulakevich discussed populism as a strategy and a type of politics that claims to represent the opinions and wishes of ordinary people. This was Lukashenko’s strategy and worked for him for over two decades. He came to power after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1994 and has been in power ever since. His populism has three components: The first is creating a feeling of proximity between the people and the leader. This is exemplified by videos and images of Lukashenko doing agricultural work, meeting people in factories, speaking the informal language of the working people, and all the other actions to show he is a regular man like everybody else. Therefore, it is not surprising that he became known as ‘Batka’, the ‘father of the nation,’ which has only changed after 2020.
The second one was that he is a guarantor of peace. Plenty of books have been written about the strategy and the importance of the Great Patriotic War as a narrative in Belarusian politics which accentuates how much the people have suffered during the Second World War and why this should not be repeated because the Belarusian nation is a peaceful one. Even the national anthem starts with a phrase which asserts this peace-loving image of the nation. This line, “We, Belarusians, are peaceful people,” was adopted and accepted by Lukashenko himself in 2002.
Finally, the third ingredient was stability, that Lukashenko is the guarantor of economic stability. Nonetheless, the Belarusian economy has never been transformed into a market economy, and it is surviving based on Russian subsidies and Lukashenko’s ability to balance the East and the West. So, as Dr Kulakevich stressed, when he did not like what Putin was saying, he released political prisoners in exchange for financial support from the European Union. This balancing policy saw a big challenge in 2019 when the Russian government decided to introduce a tax maneuver and gave an ultimatum during the price negotiations on the upcoming years’ natural gas and oil imports to the Belarusian leader, which resulted in Belarusians saying “that’s enough.” This dispute over oil and gas prices affected the Belarusian economy and pushed Lukashenko to diversify away from the reliance on Russian energy supplies (Kubiak, 2020).
Expanding on her analysis of Belarusian populism, Dr Kulakevich pointed out that populism in Belarus worked because Lukashenko made people believe that the political elite was doing its best for them. However, his image of “not being a good guy” was exposed in 2020. This has not been sudden but gradual and is an ongoing process. What triggered this process? When Covid-19 struck, Lukashenko and his government had already been experiencing economic difficulties due to the Russian introduction of a tax maneuver. Ultimately, the Belarusian government could not handle the pandemic and left people alone. They had to find a way to take care of themselves since the government had abandoned them and did not deliver its promises.
People’s disappointment in their leadership has been reflected in the results of the 2020 presidential elections. Even after Lukashenko tried to suppress these figures, it became clear to everyone that Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya emerged as the new leader partly because no one else was able to run. She could gather large support despite, for instance, the surprising choice of not embracing the historic white-red-white symbols. In her lecture, Dr Kulakevich explained that the Belarusian flag is red and green, but historical symbols are white-red-white. Tsikhanouskaya only embraced these historic colors later on.
Demand for change has become visible; nonetheless, Lukashenko claimed to have won the elections with 80.1 percent of the votes (Belarusian Central Election Commission, 2020). He claimed a landslide victory for the 6th time in a row, and although there have been protests before, this time, it was different. People started to question the three pillars of his populism: guarantor of stability, the man of the people and guarantor of peace. The months-long protest broke out, but protesters met with brutality, suppression, physical violence, and torture, which were internationally documented. The researcher highlighted that Belarus currently has more than 1000 political prisoners (EEAS, 2022), which is unprecedentedly high.
The second half of Dr Kulakevich’s lecture described how the above-mentioned components of Lukashenko’s populism started to crack. The first pillar of Lukashenko’s populism has been crumbling since 2020: the proximity to the people did not stand anymore as people could see the brutal repression and violence against the protesters. People started to question Lukashenko’s image. Moving on to the second pillar, the guarantor of peace, this image was shattered when the war in Ukraine began. Belarus appeared in the news as the other aggressor in Putin’s war. So, Lukashenko lost the delicate balance between the East and the West.
Finally, as a guarantor of stability, stability of the economy, Lukashenko’s image is also crumbling. He has lost his ability to negotiate with the West, completely relies on Russia, the economy is still not transformed into a market-based economy, and he does not receive any external loans. In addition, along with Russia, Belarus is under a number of sanctions. Consequently, IT companies left the country, and no new businesses are coming to Belarus, leaving the economy in a troubled state.
Conclusively, Belarusian people are signaling a need for change. People were protesting the Belarusian regime before but not in this number. They embraced white-red-white symbols, different from the official red and green symbols observed as the ones covered in blood. Dr Kulakevich observed slow changes inside Lukashenko’s regime, which gave hope for change. These changes are also visible to the government, which is maintaining its repressive policies. Nonetheless, the three pillars of Lukashenko’s previously successful populism are crumbling.
References
— (2020). “Lukashenko sworn in as Belarus president.” Belarusian Central Election Commission. September 23, 2020. https://www.belarus.by/en/press-center/news/lukashenko-sworn-in-as-belarus-president_i_119131.html (accessed on December 28, 2022).
— (2022). “Belarus: Statement by the Spokesperson on the political prisoners.” EEAS. January 27, 2022. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belarus-statement-spokesperson-political-prisoners_en (accessed on December 28, 2022).
Kubiak, Mateusz. (2020). “Belarus and Russian Oil: All Is Not as It Seems.” RUSI. July 7, 2020. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/belarus-and-russian-oil-all-not-it-seems (accessed on December 27, 2022).
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