In this commentary, Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja examines the tensions between global climate commitments and the geopolitical interests sustaining fossil-fuel dependence. Drawing on COP31’s failure to secure a final agreement and the Shenzhen Declaration involving the United States, China, and Russia, he explores how populism, authoritarianism, and democratic backsliding intersect with climate governance. From a Global South perspective, Dr. Solaja highlights the inequalities embedded in climate finance, technological dependence, and critical mineral extraction, particularly across Africa. Advocating developmental sovereignty and a just energy transition, he argues that climate justice requires democratic accountability, equitable resource governance, and meaningful community participation. He identifies COP32 in Addis Ababa as an opportunity to advance these priorities.
By Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja
Global climate governance is confronting an increasingly visible contradiction. Governments meet to discuss common solutions to climate change, while powerful states stand up for the economic and geopolitical goals that support fossil-fuel use. This tension is especially manifested in the contrast between the COP31 negotiations in Antalya, Turkey and the reports of a meeting on November 19, 2026, between Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen. The question of who will drive the energy transition, who will reap its rewards and who will pay its price is not just an issue for countries in the Global South—it is a fundamental one.
The document reportedly did not include a clear signal to phase out fossil fuels at COP31 and the earlier demand for US$120 billion a year for adaptation funding by 2035 was also dropped. The talks were extended past the agreed deadline of November 20 due to differences on pledges to fossil fuels and financing for developing countries. In the interim, the Shenzhen declaration pledged a shared approach by the United States, China and Russia to scaling up the production and supply of refined petroleum products, with no mention of targets or a timetable for implementation (Reuters, 2026a, 2026b; The White House, 2026).
Taken together, they indicate a reshaping of the world’s climate deal. Carbon-intensive energy systems remain under the strategic control of the powerful states, whilst the developing world is increasingly burdened with the pressure to develop low-carbon. The pressure to develop low-carbon in a way which is unequal in terms of financial and technological resources is growing on the developing world side, whereas carbon-intensive energy systems remain under strategic control of the powerful states. This imbalance is likely to perpetuate inequalities historically observed in the current incumbent economy, thanks to populist nationalism and fossil fuel vested interests that support authoritarianism.
COP31 and the Limits of Climate Justice
The challenges of COP31 illustrate the fragility of climate justice commitments to political negotiation. In Africa, Asia and Latin America, floods, drought and coastal erosion are exacerbating already existing developmental issues. Climate finance must be both accessible and predictable for countries under the debt burden, with limited fiscal capacity and poor infrastructure, to enable livelihood protection and development sustainability.
The proposal to remove the US$120 billion adaptation finance target from the new negotiating text is a sign of the fragility of financial targets. UNEP (2025) projects the developing world will need between US$310 billion and US$365 billion a year for adaptation by 2035, while in 2023 there was international public adaptation finance of US$26 billion. The difference has real-world implications for flood resilience, crop insurance, public facilities and the ability of climate-vulnerable communities to rebound from climate-related disasters.
The terms of climate finance matter as much as its volume. Relying on debt-based financing is a risk that will put the cost of adaptation on countries with relatively low emissions in the past. Climate justice thus calls for predictable funding, extremely concessional financing and accountable systems that ensure that money reaches communities and local governments facing the latest environmental challenges.
Shenzhen and the Geopolitics of Petroleum
The Shenzhen declaration sheds a light on the geopolitical forces that underpin these paradoxes. Although the US and China have opposing political systems and conflicting strategic agendas, they shared a desire to boost supplies of refined petroleum products and ensure energy supply stability. This convergence is more about the continued strategic importance of petroleum than synergy of ideas, and it is striking that multilateral climate talks are having trouble finding viable routes to post-fossil fuels (The White House, 2026).
Security of energy remains a real problem with energy poverty and fluctuating world energy markets. However, advertising the benefits of petroleum expansion as universal hides a lack of equality within the control of energy production, refining, financing and distribution. The capable states, who have much more financial, technological and geostrategic capital, dominate the global energy landscape. In developing countries, the situation is often different, with energy transition negotiated in context shaped by external markets, investment priorities and technological dependencies.
Although the declaration does not guarantee an increase in petroleum production, it signals the continuing diplomatic importance of fossil fuels. When put in parallel with COP31, it showcases the potential to be the complexity of collective climate commitments when faced with national energy-security priorities. Understanding this contradiction requires closer attention to the domestic political arrangements through which fossil-fuel interests acquire legitimacy and institutional protection.
Populism, Democratic Backsliding and Fossil-Fuel Interests
These contradictions go beyond diplomatic disagreements. Climate policies are often presented by populist radical right movements as schemes imposed on the common people and the security of national industries and households by distant elites. The fossil-fuel dependency associated with jobs, wealth and national sovereignty can make opposition to environmental regulation a political mobilizing issue. The governance of climate change is then caught up in broader national identity, economic insecurity and political authority struggles.
Authoritarianism can enable fossil fuel dependency in various ways. Resource revenues can help pay the bills for public spending, support political patronage and political stability, and incentivize opposition to environmental reforms that jeopardize the interests of existing economic groups. According to Kakenmaster (2025), key factors influencing climate inaction in authoritarian regimes are fossil-fuel wealth and weak institutional restrictions. However, there is no one-to-one relationship between climate policy and authoritarianism or populism. Petroleum interests can unite multiple political systems behind a shared goal, while other political systems take opposing paths in implementing renewable energy development.
Democratic backsliding raises a related concern. As institutions become less effective at holding governments accountable, scientific independence, civic participation, and environmental oversight are weakened, leaving governments with fewer constraints on their support for carbon-intensive industries and interests. The implications extend beyond emissions policy to fundamental questions of environmental justice: whose voices are represented in environmental decision-making, who bears the ecological costs of these decisions, and whose interests receive political recognition and protection.
More complexity comes in geopolitical fragmentation. Unequal power relations and multiple interests limit the effectiveness of multilateral climate diplomacy, as Hafezi and Wood (2026) note. Sovereignty then becomes more or less asymmetrical: Powerful states have considerable autonomy with respect to their energy systems. Meanwhile, developing countries have to engage in negotiating their own development agendas in global institutions and markets in which their influence is relatively low.
Africa and the Struggle for Developmental Sovereignty
It is in Africa that these tensions are more consequential as energy transitions have to cater to deficits in access to electricity, job creation, industrialization and fiscal pressures. The plight of Nigeria is an example of such a dilemma. It pledges to reach net zero emissions by 2060 alongside ongoing energy poverty and reliance on petroleum income, and the continued significance of fossil fuel consumption in domestic energy supply. The challenge is not just decarbonization, but balancing environmental protection with inclusive developmental transformation.
Acknowledging these constraints on development does not excuse the continued expansion of fossil fuels. Capital investments in carbon-intensive infrastructure can lead to future financial obligations and costs, as these investments have a long lifespan. These decisions should be made in the context of methane emissions as well as stranded-asset risks and the allocation of costs and benefits among social groups and generations with respect to natural gas and other transitional fuels.
It is not an automatic solution to these inequalities if renewable energy is being developed. The future of the continent’s critical mineral resources will place Africa as a key element in the emerging low-carbon supply chains. However, a transition based on raw mineral exports, external technological control, and small-scale local production has the potential to repeat the patterns of extractive dependence. The environmental aspect of the green economy can’t cover issues of resource ownership, industrial value creation and the environmental effects experienced by the community of those who are mineral producers.
These tensions underscore the importance of developmental sovereignty—the ability of states and communities to determine their own development pathways, establish the conditions governing resource use and technological change, and ensure an equitable distribution of the resulting benefits. A just energy transition in Africa must strengthen this capacity while ensuring that national development priorities remain responsive to citizens’ needs and the concerns of environmentally vulnerable communities.
Reclaiming the Climate Bargain
The global climate bargain must be recovered, and more than just putting more money into the pot is required. Adaptation finance should be predictable, accessible and largely grants-based, and energy transition partnerships make sure to transfer technologies, enable home production of renewables, and promote responsible mineral processing. These are essential measures for developing countries not to be viewed only as raw material suppliers, but as providers of knowledge, technology and value in the low-carbon economy.
African nations could strengthen their collective negotiating power by coordinating investments in electricity infrastructure, renewable energy industries, critical mineral value chains, and climate adaptation projects. Regional institutions, particularly the African Union and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), could play a pivotal role in advancing these objectives. Moreover, COP32, scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in November 2027, presents a renewed opportunity to amplify the concerns of Africa and the broader Global South and ensure that their priorities receive greater recognition in global climate negotiations. However, developmental sovereignty must also address inequalities within African societies. Empowering domestic elites without ensuring meaningful participation, accountability, and safeguards for affected communities would risk reproducing existing patterns of exclusion and perpetuating environmental injustice.
COP31, despite its failure to secure a final agreement, and the Shenzhen Declaration are significant because they illuminate the distribution of power in global climate governance. For the Global South, the central challenge is whether the transition to a low-carbon economy will address existing inequalities or reinforce them through new forms of technological dependence and resource extraction. Climate justice must therefore encompass not only emissions reductions and climate adaptation finance but also democratic accountability, developmental sovereignty, and the capacity to collectively shape alternative energy futures.
References
Bermeo, N. (2016). “On democratic backsliding.” Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5–19. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012
Federal Government of Nigeria. (2022). Nigeria energy transition plan. https://www.energytransition.gov.ng/
Hafezi, R. & Wood, D. A. (2026). “Reframing climate diplomacy: Power asymmetries, civil society, and the limits of multilateral environmental agreements.” Frontiers in Political Science, 8, Article 1665610. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2026.1665610
Kakenmaster, W. (2025). “The fossil-fueled roots of climate inaction in authoritarian regimes.” Perspectives on Politics, 23(2), 415–433.
Lockwood, M. (2018). “Right-wing populism and the climate change agenda: Exploring the linkages.” Environmental Politics, 27(4), 712–732. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1458411
Reuters. (2026a, November 20). Climate focus: COP31 draft deal strips fossil fuel references. https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-focus-cop31-draft-deal-strips-fossil-fuel-references-2026-11-20/
Reuters. (2026b, November 21). COP31 climate summit risks failure as talks go deep into overtime.
The White House. (2026, November 19). U.S.–Russia–China heads of state declaration toward peace. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/11/u-s-russia-china-heads-of-state-declaration-toward-peace/
United Nations Environment Programme. (2025). Adaptation gap report 2025: Running on empty. https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2025
Rewriting the Global Climate Bargain: COP31, Fossil-Fuel Politics and the Global South
In this commentary, Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja examines the tensions between global climate commitments and the geopolitical interests sustaining fossil-fuel dependence. Drawing on COP31’s failure to secure a final agreement and the Shenzhen Declaration involving the United States, China, and Russia, he explores how populism, authoritarianism, and democratic backsliding intersect with climate governance. From a Global South perspective, Dr. Solaja highlights the inequalities embedded in climate finance, technological dependence, and critical mineral extraction, particularly across Africa. Advocating developmental sovereignty and a just energy transition, he argues that climate justice requires democratic accountability, equitable resource governance, and meaningful community participation. He identifies COP32 in Addis Ababa as an opportunity to advance these priorities.
By Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja
Global climate governance is confronting an increasingly visible contradiction. Governments meet to discuss common solutions to climate change, while powerful states stand up for the economic and geopolitical goals that support fossil-fuel use. This tension is especially manifested in the contrast between the COP31 negotiations in Antalya, Turkey and the reports of a meeting on November 19, 2026, between Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen. The question of who will drive the energy transition, who will reap its rewards and who will pay its price is not just an issue for countries in the Global South—it is a fundamental one.
The document reportedly did not include a clear signal to phase out fossil fuels at COP31 and the earlier demand for US$120 billion a year for adaptation funding by 2035 was also dropped. The talks were extended past the agreed deadline of November 20 due to differences on pledges to fossil fuels and financing for developing countries. In the interim, the Shenzhen declaration pledged a shared approach by the United States, China and Russia to scaling up the production and supply of refined petroleum products, with no mention of targets or a timetable for implementation (Reuters, 2026a, 2026b; The White House, 2026).
Taken together, they indicate a reshaping of the world’s climate deal. Carbon-intensive energy systems remain under the strategic control of the powerful states, whilst the developing world is increasingly burdened with the pressure to develop low-carbon. The pressure to develop low-carbon in a way which is unequal in terms of financial and technological resources is growing on the developing world side, whereas carbon-intensive energy systems remain under strategic control of the powerful states. This imbalance is likely to perpetuate inequalities historically observed in the current incumbent economy, thanks to populist nationalism and fossil fuel vested interests that support authoritarianism.
COP31 and the Limits of Climate Justice
The challenges of COP31 illustrate the fragility of climate justice commitments to political negotiation. In Africa, Asia and Latin America, floods, drought and coastal erosion are exacerbating already existing developmental issues. Climate finance must be both accessible and predictable for countries under the debt burden, with limited fiscal capacity and poor infrastructure, to enable livelihood protection and development sustainability.
The proposal to remove the US$120 billion adaptation finance target from the new negotiating text is a sign of the fragility of financial targets. UNEP (2025) projects the developing world will need between US$310 billion and US$365 billion a year for adaptation by 2035, while in 2023 there was international public adaptation finance of US$26 billion. The difference has real-world implications for flood resilience, crop insurance, public facilities and the ability of climate-vulnerable communities to rebound from climate-related disasters.
The terms of climate finance matter as much as its volume. Relying on debt-based financing is a risk that will put the cost of adaptation on countries with relatively low emissions in the past. Climate justice thus calls for predictable funding, extremely concessional financing and accountable systems that ensure that money reaches communities and local governments facing the latest environmental challenges.
Shenzhen and the Geopolitics of Petroleum
The Shenzhen declaration sheds a light on the geopolitical forces that underpin these paradoxes. Although the US and China have opposing political systems and conflicting strategic agendas, they shared a desire to boost supplies of refined petroleum products and ensure energy supply stability. This convergence is more about the continued strategic importance of petroleum than synergy of ideas, and it is striking that multilateral climate talks are having trouble finding viable routes to post-fossil fuels (The White House, 2026).
Security of energy remains a real problem with energy poverty and fluctuating world energy markets. However, advertising the benefits of petroleum expansion as universal hides a lack of equality within the control of energy production, refining, financing and distribution. The capable states, who have much more financial, technological and geostrategic capital, dominate the global energy landscape. In developing countries, the situation is often different, with energy transition negotiated in context shaped by external markets, investment priorities and technological dependencies.
Although the declaration does not guarantee an increase in petroleum production, it signals the continuing diplomatic importance of fossil fuels. When put in parallel with COP31, it showcases the potential to be the complexity of collective climate commitments when faced with national energy-security priorities. Understanding this contradiction requires closer attention to the domestic political arrangements through which fossil-fuel interests acquire legitimacy and institutional protection.
Populism, Democratic Backsliding and Fossil-Fuel Interests
These contradictions go beyond diplomatic disagreements. Climate policies are often presented by populist radical right movements as schemes imposed on the common people and the security of national industries and households by distant elites. The fossil-fuel dependency associated with jobs, wealth and national sovereignty can make opposition to environmental regulation a political mobilizing issue. The governance of climate change is then caught up in broader national identity, economic insecurity and political authority struggles.
Authoritarianism can enable fossil fuel dependency in various ways. Resource revenues can help pay the bills for public spending, support political patronage and political stability, and incentivize opposition to environmental reforms that jeopardize the interests of existing economic groups. According to Kakenmaster (2025), key factors influencing climate inaction in authoritarian regimes are fossil-fuel wealth and weak institutional restrictions. However, there is no one-to-one relationship between climate policy and authoritarianism or populism. Petroleum interests can unite multiple political systems behind a shared goal, while other political systems take opposing paths in implementing renewable energy development.
Democratic backsliding raises a related concern. As institutions become less effective at holding governments accountable, scientific independence, civic participation, and environmental oversight are weakened, leaving governments with fewer constraints on their support for carbon-intensive industries and interests. The implications extend beyond emissions policy to fundamental questions of environmental justice: whose voices are represented in environmental decision-making, who bears the ecological costs of these decisions, and whose interests receive political recognition and protection.
More complexity comes in geopolitical fragmentation. Unequal power relations and multiple interests limit the effectiveness of multilateral climate diplomacy, as Hafezi and Wood (2026) note. Sovereignty then becomes more or less asymmetrical: Powerful states have considerable autonomy with respect to their energy systems. Meanwhile, developing countries have to engage in negotiating their own development agendas in global institutions and markets in which their influence is relatively low.
Africa and the Struggle for Developmental Sovereignty
It is in Africa that these tensions are more consequential as energy transitions have to cater to deficits in access to electricity, job creation, industrialization and fiscal pressures. The plight of Nigeria is an example of such a dilemma. It pledges to reach net zero emissions by 2060 alongside ongoing energy poverty and reliance on petroleum income, and the continued significance of fossil fuel consumption in domestic energy supply. The challenge is not just decarbonization, but balancing environmental protection with inclusive developmental transformation.
Acknowledging these constraints on development does not excuse the continued expansion of fossil fuels. Capital investments in carbon-intensive infrastructure can lead to future financial obligations and costs, as these investments have a long lifespan. These decisions should be made in the context of methane emissions as well as stranded-asset risks and the allocation of costs and benefits among social groups and generations with respect to natural gas and other transitional fuels.
It is not an automatic solution to these inequalities if renewable energy is being developed. The future of the continent’s critical mineral resources will place Africa as a key element in the emerging low-carbon supply chains. However, a transition based on raw mineral exports, external technological control, and small-scale local production has the potential to repeat the patterns of extractive dependence. The environmental aspect of the green economy can’t cover issues of resource ownership, industrial value creation and the environmental effects experienced by the community of those who are mineral producers.
These tensions underscore the importance of developmental sovereignty—the ability of states and communities to determine their own development pathways, establish the conditions governing resource use and technological change, and ensure an equitable distribution of the resulting benefits. A just energy transition in Africa must strengthen this capacity while ensuring that national development priorities remain responsive to citizens’ needs and the concerns of environmentally vulnerable communities.
Reclaiming the Climate Bargain
The global climate bargain must be recovered, and more than just putting more money into the pot is required. Adaptation finance should be predictable, accessible and largely grants-based, and energy transition partnerships make sure to transfer technologies, enable home production of renewables, and promote responsible mineral processing. These are essential measures for developing countries not to be viewed only as raw material suppliers, but as providers of knowledge, technology and value in the low-carbon economy.
African nations could strengthen their collective negotiating power by coordinating investments in electricity infrastructure, renewable energy industries, critical mineral value chains, and climate adaptation projects. Regional institutions, particularly the African Union and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), could play a pivotal role in advancing these objectives. Moreover, COP32, scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in November 2027, presents a renewed opportunity to amplify the concerns of Africa and the broader Global South and ensure that their priorities receive greater recognition in global climate negotiations. However, developmental sovereignty must also address inequalities within African societies. Empowering domestic elites without ensuring meaningful participation, accountability, and safeguards for affected communities would risk reproducing existing patterns of exclusion and perpetuating environmental injustice.
COP31, despite its failure to secure a final agreement, and the Shenzhen Declaration are significant because they illuminate the distribution of power in global climate governance. For the Global South, the central challenge is whether the transition to a low-carbon economy will address existing inequalities or reinforce them through new forms of technological dependence and resource extraction. Climate justice must therefore encompass not only emissions reductions and climate adaptation finance but also democratic accountability, developmental sovereignty, and the capacity to collectively shape alternative energy futures.
References
Bermeo, N. (2016). “On democratic backsliding.” Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5–19. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012
Federal Government of Nigeria. (2022). Nigeria energy transition plan. https://www.energytransition.gov.ng/
Hafezi, R. & Wood, D. A. (2026). “Reframing climate diplomacy: Power asymmetries, civil society, and the limits of multilateral environmental agreements.” Frontiers in Political Science, 8, Article 1665610. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2026.1665610
Kakenmaster, W. (2025). “The fossil-fueled roots of climate inaction in authoritarian regimes.” Perspectives on Politics, 23(2), 415–433.
Lockwood, M. (2018). “Right-wing populism and the climate change agenda: Exploring the linkages.” Environmental Politics, 27(4), 712–732. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1458411
Reuters. (2026a, November 20). Climate focus: COP31 draft deal strips fossil fuel references. https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-focus-cop31-draft-deal-strips-fossil-fuel-references-2026-11-20/
Reuters. (2026b, November 21). COP31 climate summit risks failure as talks go deep into overtime.
The White House. (2026, November 19). U.S.–Russia–China heads of state declaration toward peace. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/11/u-s-russia-china-heads-of-state-declaration-toward-peace/
United Nations Environment Programme. (2025). Adaptation gap report 2025: Running on empty. https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2025
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