Selcuk Gultasli, Ibrahim Al-Marashi

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Authoritarianism Is the New Normal and the Prevailing Norm

by MultimediaVideos

In this timely and thought-provoking interview, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi explores how authoritarianism has become “the new normal” in the Middle East amid a global retreat from democratic norms. Speaking to the ECPS, Dr. Al-Marashi analyzes the region’s complex landscape shaped by imperial legacies, resource politics, and shifting global alliances. He highlights how populist rhetoric, digital platforms, and transactional diplomacy—especially under Trump-era politics—are empowering authoritarian leaders and weakening democratic institutions. While civil society faces mounting repression, Dr. Al-Marashi suggests that digital activism and “artivism” may offer spaces of survival and resistance. This interview provides essential insight into how populism and authoritarianism intersect in the Middle East—and what that means for the future of governance in the region.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era marked by the erosion of liberal democratic norms and the global resurgence of authoritarian tendencies, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi—Associate Professor at Department of History, California State University, San Marcos—offers a timely and incisive analysis of the Middle East’s evolving political landscape. In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Al-Marashi argues that “authoritarianism has become normalized—it’s now the prevailing norm,” particularly in a world increasingly shaped by populist and transactional leadership.

Drawing from historical legacies and contemporary global shifts, Dr. Al-Marashi underscores how imperial interference and resource wealth have long laid the groundwork for authoritarian populism in the region. “Hydrocarbons enable political elites to generate revenue without relying on taxation,” he explains, allowing regimes to distribute wealth in ways that bypass democratic accountability and reinforce autocratic control. He connects this dynamic to broader regional patterns, noting that even militant groups such as ISIS have employed populist strategies by attempting to dismantle colonial-era borders and mobilize transnational support.

Dr. Al-Marashi highlights the impact of shifting global power dynamics, particularly the rise of multipolarity and the influence of Trumpism, in undermining democratic aspirations. With the US retreating from its rhetorical commitment to democracy, populist-authoritarian leaders find renewed legitimacy. “If the US is adopting these behaviors,” he argues, “this is the new norm—this is the future.” This sets a precedent for regimes that increasingly embrace personalistic and sultanistic rule, with little concern for liberal democratic values.

Transactional diplomacy, particularly under Trump, has also reshaped regional alliances. Dr. Al-Marashi notes that such diplomacy empowers authoritarian actors like Netanyahu, while simultaneously emboldening sectarian militias and weakening traditional state structures. “It’s a double-edged sword—quite literally,” he remarks, especially when it comes to balancing regional power plays and proxy conflicts in places like Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

While the picture appears bleak, Dr. Al-Marashi also points to the resilience of digital resistance. He suggests that civil society and democratizing efforts may survive—if not flourish—through digital activism and what he terms “artivism.” In a region where the state has often failed to provide basic services, digital spaces may serve as the last frontier for democratic imagination and mobilization.

This interview captures the complexity of a region grappling with entrenched authoritarianism amid a globally permissive environment—and offers critical insights into how populist movements and power politics intersect in the 21st century Middle East.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi.

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi—Associate Professor at Department of History, California State University, San Marcos.

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Authoritarianism Is the New Normal and the Prevailing Norm

by AuthoritarianismDigital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In this timely and thought-provoking interview, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi explores how authoritarianism has become “the new normal” in the Middle East amid a global retreat from democratic norms. Speaking to the ECPS, Dr. Al-Marashi analyzes the region’s complex landscape shaped by imperial legacies, resource politics, and shifting global alliances. He highlights how populist rhetoric, digital platforms, and transactional diplomacy—especially under Trump-era politics—are empowering authoritarian leaders and weakening democratic institutions. While civil society faces mounting repression, Dr. Al-Marashi suggests that digital activism and “artivism” may offer spaces of survival and resistance. This interview provides essential insight into how populism and authoritarianism intersect in the Middle East—and what that means for the future of governance in the region.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era marked by the erosion of liberal democratic norms and the global resurgence of authoritarian tendencies, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi—Associate Professor at Department of History, California State University, San Marcos—offers a timely and incisive analysis of the Middle East’s evolving political landscape. In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Al-Marashi argues that “authoritarianism has become normalized—it’s now the prevailing norm,” particularly in a world increasingly shaped by populist and transactional leadership.

Drawing from historical legacies and contemporary global shifts, Dr. Al-Marashi underscores how imperial interference and resource wealth have long laid the groundwork for authoritarian populism in the region. “Hydrocarbons enable political elites to generate revenue without relying on taxation,” he explains, allowing regimes to distribute wealth in ways that bypass democratic accountability and reinforce autocratic control. He connects this dynamic to broader regional patterns, noting that even militant groups such as ISIS have employed populist strategies by attempting to dismantle colonial-era borders and mobilize transnational support.

Dr. Al-Marashi highlights the impact of shifting global power dynamics, particularly the rise of multipolarity and the influence of Trumpism, in undermining democratic aspirations. With the US retreating from its rhetorical commitment to democracy, populist-authoritarian leaders find renewed legitimacy. “If the US is adopting these behaviors,” he argues, “this is the new norm—this is the future.” This sets a precedent for regimes that increasingly embrace personalistic and sultanistic rule, with little concern for liberal democratic values.

Transactional diplomacy, particularly under Trump, has also reshaped regional alliances. Dr. Al-Marashi notes that such diplomacy empowers authoritarian actors like Netanyahu, while simultaneously emboldening sectarian militias and weakening traditional state structures. “It’s a double-edged sword—quite literally,” he remarks, especially when it comes to balancing regional power plays and proxy conflicts in places like Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

While the picture appears bleak, Dr. Al-Marashi also points to the resilience of digital resistance. He suggests that civil society and democratizing efforts may survive—if not flourish—through digital activism and what he terms “artivism.” In a region where the state has often failed to provide basic services, digital spaces may serve as the last frontier for democratic imagination and mobilization.

This interview captures the complexity of a region grappling with entrenched authoritarianism amid a globally permissive environment—and offers critical insights into how populist movements and power politics intersect in the 21st century Middle East.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi.

Imperial Legacies and Oil Wealth Laid the Foundation for Authoritarian Populism in the Middle East

Oil pump jack in the desert of Bahrain. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Ibrahim Al-Marashi, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: What historical and socio-political conditions in Iraq and the broader Middle East have laid the groundwork for the rise of populist authoritarianism in the region?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: The obvious factors are imperial interference and hydrocarbons—oil and gas. The involvement of foreign powers, whether Britain or the US, consistently provides a convenient enemy to rally against. Meanwhile, hydrocarbons enable political elites to generate revenue without relying on taxation. This, in turn, enhances populism, as the revenues can be distributed directly through large-scale projects that bolster support for figures like Saddam Hussein—or any other authoritarian leader—not only in Iraq but across the region.

How have legacies of colonialism, militarization, and post-conflict governance contributed to the entrenchment of populist and authoritarian leadership styles in the Middle East?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: In the case of Iraq, the British were always a convenient target to rally against. In other states ruled by France, for example, populations could similarly rally against the legacy of the colonial power. Even if you look at ISIS as a kind of populist and terrorist group, its goal of dismantling borders was an attempt to mobilize the masses—not just in the Middle East, but across the entire Muslim world. Saddam Hussein framed the invasion of Kuwait as an effort to erase borders established by British colonialism, making it a similarly convenient rallying point. And then, let’s not forget the United States. In the case of the Houthis, for instance, their appeal extends not only beyond Yemen but throughout the region, as they are perceived as one of the last groups seeking agency in a region largely shaped by US control. This is the legacy: there are concrete historical borders that have divided communities, but there is also, in the collective imagination, a persistent target around which to rally. 

Authoritarianism Has Become the New Norm—This Is the Future

From a populism perspective, how are shifting global power dynamics — especially the rise of multipolarity and the return of a nationalist, transactional Trump administration — shaping authoritarian resilience and weakening democratic aspirations in the Middle East? In what ways might these trends bolster authoritarian populist movements across the region?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Authoritarianism has become normalized—it’s now the prevailing norm. Even though the US has often behaved in authoritarian ways, it at least used to pay lip service to the promotion of democratic governance around the world. I think that facade has now been abandoned. As a result, populist leaders can more or less say, “Look, if the US is adopting these behaviors, this is the new norm—this is the future.”

Even in the case of Russia, there appears to be, at the very least, a personalistic rapprochement—a relationship based more on the closeness of individual leaders than shared values. The emerging regime type in this multipolar world is personalistic—what you might call sultanistic—drawing on the term “Sultan,” as used by the academic Houchang Chehabi.

If that’s the case, then there is no longer a democratic model to aspire to. This increasingly looks like the wave of the future—the future of governance.

How has the populist rhetoric of the Trump administrations—particularly their framing of “radical Islam” and their regional double standards—impacted the legitimacy of state institutions and non-state actors in Iraq and the broader Middle East?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: In this case, there are two dynamics at play. This ties back to your earlier question about transactional foreign policy. If Trump makes a deal with Iran over its nuclear program—well, the Iraqi Shia militias are essentially mass mobilization forces for the Shia population, and much of that mobilization is supported by Iran. If Iran enters negotiations with the US, it would have less incentive to continue backing those militias. That’s one example involving non-state actors.

Then there’s the other paradox: an escalation of the war against the Houthis in Yemen. Iran might choose to rein them in, but if not, the Houthis may continue attacking Red Sea shipping as a consequence of these ongoing tensions. This illustrates how transactionalism, populism, and non-state actors intersect in the region.

Transactional Diplomacy Fuels Sectarian Populism

Shiite fighters take position in the Shia village of Al-Zahra, Syria, amid intense clashes involving Hezbollah.
Photo: Ibrahim Khader / Pacific Press.

Could the Trump administration’s emphasis on transactional diplomacy further embolden sectarian and ethnic populism in conflict zones like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and how?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Not okay—on two levels. Transactional diplomacy with Netanyahu might embolden him to act unilaterally in Syria and Lebanon, and perhaps even as far as Yemen. Israel’s actions in these areas could fuel sectarianism in several ways: it could lead to a resurgence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, embolden the Houthis, and prompt Israel to use the Syrian Druze minority as a proxy. That’s one pathway through which sectarianism might be intensified.

Israel might also be emboldened to target Iraq’s Shia militias, which are part of the so-called “axis of resistance.”

On the other hand, if this transactional diplomacy were to result in a grand bargain with Iran, those same actors might be reined in.

So it’s a double-edged sword—quite literally—in terms of how this foreign policy could shape the region.

In your view, how does the militarization of politics via militias such as The Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) reflect populist strategies of political mobilization in the Middle East, especially in terms of bypassing traditional democratic institutions and appealing to ‘the people’?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: The PMU is really a broad body of militias. A good number of them first emerged to resist the US occupation of Iraq. Initially, I don’t think it was about bypassing democratic institutions. Many were mobilized because Ayatollah Sistani was able to rally the masses in response to the ISIS threat.

The way they later contributed to undermining institutions in Iraq was by becoming a parallel force to the Iraqi military, and eventually by playing a role against the protests that called for better governance and technocratic rule.

So it’s complicated. The Popular Mobilization Units emerged in response to the occupation, later served as Iranian proxies, then fought against ISIS, and eventually remained as a force that prevented the Iraqi military from maintaining a monopoly on violence—borrowing from Max Weber’s concept.

Again, we’re at an inflection point. I think it all hinges on a potential deal with Iran: whether these militias will be reined in and subsumed into the army or the security sector, or whether they will continue to act as spoilers to Iraq’s post-conflict governance structure.

When the State Fails, Militias Become the Security Provider

Mahdi Scouts boys during a funeral ceremony in Jannata, southern Lebanon, on February 9, 2017, for a Hezbollah military commander killed in the Syrian war.
Photo: Nabil Kassir.

Considering your work on COVID-19 and militia reinvention, how do crises (like pandemics or conflicts) serve as opportunities for populist-authoritarian actors in the Middle East to entrench power under the guise of serving ‘the people’—and how might this intensify under a second Trump presidency?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Take the case of the pandemic—and I’ll give you an example closer to home, where I am in San Diego. When COVID hit Mexico, you had drug cartels, like those formerly under Guzmán (El Chapo), distributing medical kits—such as masks and water—to people affected by COVID-19. In other words, when the Mexican security sector failed and the health sector also failed, these non-state actors filled the void. They became both the security and health sectors.

That’s exactly what happened with COVID-19 in the Middle East—in places like Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. It was the Houthis, Hezbollah, and the Shia militias that were disinfecting public spaces, distributing masks, and so on. What these places have in common is the collapse of the security sector. As Max Weber said, when the state no longer holds a legitimate monopoly on violence, non-state actors step in and become both the security and health providers.

This is ultimately an indictment of the weak health sectors in those societies. But the weak health sector is a reflection of a weak security sector—you don’t have an army capable of enforcing the state’s monopoly on violence. When the state is unable to provide basic services—what we call biopower, the ability to keep the population alive—you get necropolitics instead. That’s when the state is too weak to deliver health services, and violent non-state actors—cartels or militias—step in to fill the void.

How do Middle Eastern regimes employ especially Islamist populist rhetoric domestically to justify authoritarian practices, especially in an international environment increasingly tolerant of illiberal governance?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Islamist rhetoric is by definition an attempt to mobilize the masses through faith. When governance fails, you turn to divine governance to justify authority and appeal to the imagination. That’s how I would see it. It’s similar to using anti-colonial rhetoric—it’s more or less an appeal to the masses. When the public has very little faith in the structures that govern them, this is where Islamist rhetoric steps in to fill the gap.

Every Power Is Backing Proxies—Democracy Is No Longer the Goal

What role do you foresee for regional actors (such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey) playing in either reinforcing authoritarianism or providing openings for democratic movements under these new global conditions?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: You know, in that regional mix, I would also add Israel—and this is a post-October 7th development. I’ll tell you why. In 2011, during the Arab Spring, for the first time in the region’s history, the US more or less refrained from intervening in the fate of regimes. It allowed the regime of Hosni Mubarak, a longtime ally, to fall. In that vacuum, Saudi Arabia and Iran engaged in a regional cold war, with Turkey also entering the mix. It became, in effect, a three-way conflict.

What followed was a regional cold war accompanied by counter-revolutionary dynamics. One of those counter-revolutionary tendencies eventually prevailed. Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia each chose sides—supporting different counter-revolutionary or revisionist forces. These rivalries played out through proxy conflicts.

Now, after October 7th, Israel has entered the fray.

So the region today looks very different from the era of Arab Spring optimism. Every major power is backing proxies to serve its own interests. And this is especially evident in Syria.

If you want to understand how four actors are shaping Syria’s future: Turkey is deeply invested in the current Syrian government; Israel is working to expand its presence; Saudi Arabia is wiping away Syria’s debts; and Iran is trying to preserve the influence it has lost. None of these four powers are interested in a transition to democratic governance in Syria. All are focused on maintaining their respective spheres of influence. In that sense, each is likely to reinforce autocratic tendencies. They are more inclined to back warlords as proxies than to support any meaningful democratic transition.

Given the historical reliance of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes on external patrons, how might a US foreign policy under Trump 2.0 reshape alliances, especially with regimes facing internal legitimacy crises?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: I think the best case in point is how close the Trump administration was to Saudi Arabia. So it might try, in a second term, a strategy of offshore balancing—essentially carving out spheres of influence in a multipolar system and telling Saudi Arabia: “We’re not really concerned about your human rights issues, but you maintain order in the Gulf.”

The US would provide as many weapons as needed, and of course, Trump would say, “You have to pay for them,” to boost his standing domestically. But the message would be: it’s your job to be the policeman in the Gulf. That’s what I mean by offshore balancing.

The same approach would likely apply to Israel. That doesn’t bode well for the future of Palestinian governance, and Saudi Arabia would have little incentive to address human rights issues—as long as it continues to receive a blank check from Washington.

Authoritarianism Is Not Just Tolerated—The Masses Are Seen to Want It

Protest march in Beirut against Lebanon bombing by Israel. Photo: Sadık Gulec.

Could the erosion of liberal democratic norms in the West, accelerated by populist leaders like Trump, provide ideological “cover” for Middle Eastern populist-authoritarian leaders? How?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Absolutely—especially now that the US doesn’t even go through the motions of paying lip service to human rights.

From the perspective of international relations theory—specifically constructivism—a new norm has been constructed: not only can authoritarian governance be tolerated, but the masses actually want it. It’s no accident that the masses elected someone like Trump. Or, to go further, take the case of El Salvador—you have another kind of authoritarian-populist leader who is more or less aligned with the Trump administration’s approach.

And I think that’s become a model for the rest of the world. Regimes can now say: not only does the US want strongman leadership, but you—the people—want it too. Because a strong hand gets things done.

In what ways might regional populist movements exploit global discourses of “national sovereignty” and “anti-globalism,” championed by Trumpism, to consolidate authoritarian rule?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: When you talk about discourses and global dynamics, there’s an important element here called digital populism. All of this is enabled because politics now also occurs on a digital plane. More or less, digital platforms have become a way for authoritarian regimes to bypass traditional media structures and appeal directly to the masses—especially in cases where traditional media has not yet been fully co-opted by authoritarian leaders. So, to answer your question, digital populism is the key. It’s the mechanism through which these discourses become normalized and reach mass audiences.

Exclusion, Not Sectarianism, Is the Real Threat

Given the weakening of traditional international pressure for democratization, do you foresee populist movements in the Middle East mutating toward more overt forms of sectarianism, ethno-nationalism, or exclusionary politics?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: I would say more toward exclusionary politics. And here’s why: if we look at this in terms of ethno-sectarianism, I wonder if the region has been exhausted by those challenges. Let me explain what I mean. At one point, the so-called “axis of resistance” included Persian Twelver Shia Iran; Arab Twelver Shia militias in Iraq; an Arab Alawite regime in Syria; Arab Twelver Shia Hezbollah; Zaydi Shia Houthis in Yemen; and Arab Sunni Islamist groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Of course, that axis of resistance has been dealt a very heavy blow in recent years. But the fact that such an ideologically diverse coalition could form makes me question whether the ethno-sectarian frame has been over-fetishized. There are other, more complex realities on the ground.

I think ethnic and sectarian identities are securitized—that is, they are instrumentalized when convenient for those in power, and then abandoned when such divisions no longer serve political interests. So, if that’s the case, I see the trajectory more in terms of exclusionary politics. Populism becomes a mask to mobilize the masses—but always at the expense of issue-based politics and inclusive governance. Those who are excluded often include civil society actors, journalists, and ethnic minorities, for example.

In a context where Western powers show declining interest in promoting democracy abroad, is there still space for bottom-up democratization efforts in the Middle East, or are we entering a phase of entrenched authoritarianism?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: I don’t think they’re mutually exclusive. We are indeed facing entrenched authoritarianism, but I would also say—thinking back to digital populism—that if authoritarianism is being entrenched through digital means, then perhaps bottom-up approaches can also survive through digital spaces.

I’m thinking, for example, of the digital hacktivist collective Anonymous. During the Arab Spring, when various regimes tried to crush protests, Anonymous hacked into state systems in support of the protesters. That’s just one example.

Because, of course, ideas can’t be killed, right? And the one sphere that hasn’t been fully subsumed by the state is still the digital realm. I think that’s where these democratic ideas and efforts can continue to exist.

Does that necessarily translate into on-the-ground resistance? That has yet to be seen. But at this particular inflection point, I believe that’s where the ideas will, at the very least, find refuge.

If Silence Is Spreading in the US, Imagine How Much Worse It Is in the Middle East

And finally, Professor Al-Marashi, considering the weakening of global democratic norms, how can civil society actors in the Middle East adapt their strategies for resistance and survival amid a more authoritarian-friendly international environment?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Again, I refer to my previous answer. I think, at the end of the day, these groups might survive digitally. They’ll be able to organize online. But to be honest, if you look at how the region has been transformed since 2011, it does not look good. So many of these actors are barely surviving.

At the end of the day, the ideas might persist—through digital activism, through art, through artivism.

But I’m speaking from the US, where even here, the ability to speak openly—on campuses, for example—is being threatened. If I can sense a wave of silence coming here, I can only imagine how much worse it must be in the Middle East.

Selcuk Gultasli & Robert Benson

Dr. Benson on Trump’s Assault: To Resist a Coordinated Attack, We Need a Coordinated Defense

by MultimediaVideos

On the 100th day of Trump’s second term, ECPS sat down with Dr. Robert Benson of the Center for American Progress to dissect the anatomy of democratic backsliding. In this wide-ranging interview, Dr. Benson warns of a “coordinated assault” on American civil society and urges a “coordinated defense” in response. Drawing comparisons with Turkey and Hungary, he highlights the early stages of authoritarian consolidation and calls for a “whole-of-society” mobilization. “We’re moving faster in the United States than the AKP ever moved in Turkey,” he cautions. From institutional capture to international instability, Dr. Benson’s insights are a timely wake-up call. “Authoritarians have coordinated,” he says—“now it’s time for democrats to do the same.” 

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Marking the 100th day of Donald Trump’s second administration, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) sat down with Dr. Robert Benson, Associate Director for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress (CAP), to discuss one of the most urgent questions of our time: how democracies can defend themselves against coordinated authoritarian assaults. Drawing on comparative insights from Hungary, Turkey, and the United States, Dr. Benson offers a sobering but clarifying analysis of democratic backsliding and populist autocratization.

“This is truly a critical question,” Dr. Benson begins. “We must understand the timeline and scope of democratic backsliding.” While emphasizing the uniqueness of national contexts, he identifies recurring “red flags,” notably the failure of institutions and elites to respond decisively during what he calls the “early window”—the critical phase before authoritarians consolidate power. In the US case, Dr. Benson critiques what he calls a “politics of respectability” within the Democratic Party—an adherence to procedural norms long after the opposing party has abandoned them.

In an increasingly polarized and factionalized America, Dr. Benson warns of the systematic targeting of democratic institutions across civil society. Citing the German term Gleichschaltung—the 1930s strategy of coordinated authoritarian control—he stresses the need for a similarly coordinated democratic defense. “You target them all at once, and they fold,” he says of authoritarian strategy. “So how do we respond effectively? We need to build alliances… Business, universities, media—need to begin communicating with one another.”

Perhaps most striking is Dr. Benson’s comparison between institutional capture in Turkey and current trends in the US, where he argues the pace of democratic erosion is even faster. “We’re moving faster in the United States than the AKP ever moved in Turkey,” he warns. His call to action is clear: without “whole-of-society” mobilization that extends beyond coastal elites and engages Middle America, resistance risks fragmentation.

Dr. Benson does not limit his concern to domestic threats. He sees Trump’s foreign policy and suspension of military aid to Ukraine as emblematic of a broader unraveling of the post-1945 liberal order. “This is a complete victory for Vladimir Putin,” he states bluntly. From global alliances to civil liberties at home, the consequences are profound.

Yet amid the gravity of his analysis, Dr. Benson also sees opportunity—particularly in building transnational democratic networks. “Authoritarians have done a better job at coordinating,” he admits. “But that can change—if democratic actors start sharing tactics, intelligence, and, most importantly, a common purpose.”

The interview with Dr. Benson is a call to strategic clarity—and a coordinated democratic defense.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Robert Benson.

US President Donald Trump delivers a speech to voters at an event in Phoenix, Arizona. Photo: Danny Raustadt.

Dr. Benson on Trump’s Assault: To Resist a Coordinated Attack, We Need a Coordinated Defense

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

On the 100th day of Trump’s second term, ECPS sat down with Dr. Robert Benson of the Center for American Progress to dissect the anatomy of democratic backsliding. In this wide-ranging interview, Dr. Benson warns of a “coordinated assault” on American civil society and urges a “coordinated defense” in response. Drawing comparisons with Turkey and Hungary, he highlights the early stages of authoritarian consolidation and calls for a “whole-of-society” mobilization. “We’re moving faster in the United States than the AKP ever moved in Turkey,” he cautions. From institutional capture to international instability, Dr. Benson’s insights are a timely wake-up call. “Authoritarians have coordinated,” he says—“now it’s time for democrats to do the same.” 

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Marking the 100th day of Donald Trump’s second administration, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) sat down with Dr. Robert Benson, Associate Director for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress (CAP), to discuss one of the most urgent questions of our time: how democracies can defend themselves against coordinated authoritarian assaults. Drawing on comparative insights from Hungary, Turkey, and the United States, Dr. Benson offers a sobering but clarifying analysis of democratic backsliding and populist autocratization.

“This is truly a critical question,” Dr. Benson begins. “We must understand the timeline and scope of democratic backsliding.” While emphasizing the uniqueness of national contexts, he identifies recurring “red flags,” notably the failure of institutions and elites to respond decisively during what he calls the “early window”—the critical phase before authoritarians consolidate power. In the US case, Dr. Benson critiques what he calls a “politics of respectability” within the Democratic Party—an adherence to procedural norms long after the opposing party has abandoned them.

In an increasingly polarized and factionalized America, Dr. Benson warns of the systematic targeting of democratic institutions across civil society. Citing the German term Gleichschaltung—the 1930s strategy of coordinated authoritarian control—he stresses the need for a similarly coordinated democratic defense. “You target them all at once, and they fold,” he says of authoritarian strategy. “So how do we respond effectively? We need to build alliances… Business, universities, media—need to begin communicating with one another.”

Perhaps most striking is Dr. Benson’s comparison between institutional capture in Turkey and current trends in the US, where he argues the pace of democratic erosion is even faster. “We’re moving faster in the United States than the AKP ever moved in Turkey,” he warns. His call to action is clear: without “whole-of-society” mobilization that extends beyond coastal elites and engages Middle America, resistance risks fragmentation.

Dr. Benson does not limit his concern to domestic threats. He sees Trump’s foreign policy and suspension of military aid to Ukraine as emblematic of a broader unraveling of the post-1945 liberal order. “This is a complete victory for Vladimir Putin,” he states bluntly. From global alliances to civil liberties at home, the consequences are profound.

Yet amid the gravity of his analysis, Dr. Benson also sees opportunity—particularly in building transnational democratic networks. “Authoritarians have done a better job at coordinating,” he admits. “But that can change—if democratic actors start sharing tactics, intelligence, and, most importantly, a common purpose.”

The interview with Dr. Benson is a call to strategic clarity—and a coordinated democratic defense.

Dr. Robert Benson, Associate Director for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress (CAP).

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Robert Benson.

Democracies Don’t Fall All at Once—They Fold, Institution by Institution, Unless We Resist in Time

Dr. Benson, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: To what extent do you see parallels between the initial public hesitation to resist Trump’s authoritarian tendencies in the US and the delayed resistance movements in Hungary, Turkey, and Serbia that you describe? How crucial is the timing of resistance in preventing democratic collapse?

Dr. Robert Benson: This is truly a critical question—understanding the timeline and scope of democratic backsliding. It’s important to acknowledge from the outset that the United States, Turkey, and Hungary are each unique cases. There isn’t a simple one-to-one comparison to be made between these systems, given their distinct political cultures, histories, and institutional frameworks. That said, there are certain common denominators—what I would call red flags—regarding how opposition forces respond during moments of constitutional peril. One recurring pattern is an initial hesitancy among those in positions of authority—within institutions—to take the threat seriously.

Let me begin with an American example. There has long been a belief—though I think that belief is starting to shift—that the Democratic Party, as the party of opposition, must adhere to a politics of respectability. That is, “we are not them,” and therefore we will stick to the rules of the game. This approach involves granting the ruling party the benefit of the doubt, even when it repeatedly disregards constitutional norms and even codified laws. This politics of respectability stems from a fundamental belief among many party members that they are still dealing with the Republican Party of 2012—or perhaps even 1995—not with a party that has been overtaken by a revolutionary political movement intent on dismantling the constitutional order. Because once you acknowledge the latter, your behavior must change. You don’t, for example—as the minority leader in the US Senate recently did—vote in favor of a Republican continuing resolution. In other words, you push back.

So why is it that we haven’t necessarily seen that kind of pushback? It stems from a moment of paralysis that often defines the early stages of democratic backsliding—when holding the governing party accountable can seem almost anti-democratic. There’s a reluctance to challenge those in power, a kind of political honeymoon period. But ironically, it’s during that very window that much of the most serious damage is done.

You emphasize the critical “early window” before authoritarians consolidate power. In the current U.S. context under Trump’s second administration, what institutional moves should civil society and opposition forces prioritize to prevent irreversible democratic backsliding? Based on recent U.S. protests, do you believe America is still within the “window of action”—or has it already started slipping into the harder phase of institutional capture?

Dr. Robert Benson: This is really a foundational question. There has to be an element of coordination when dealing with a coordinated attack on democratic institutions. The Germans have a word from the 1930s—originating from the era of state capture by the NSDAP—Gleichschaltung. It means coordination: getting business interests, civil society, universities to toe the government line and to yield to authority—all at once. You target them simultaneously, and they fold.

Now, I’m not making a direct comparison to the 1930s. I’m invoking the term more for what it offers in terms of definition. What we’re seeing today is a coordinated assault by the administration on all facets of American civil society—our universities, our civil service, the media, business interests—all happening at once. That’s intentional.

So how do we respond effectively? We need to build alliances. These individual, often atomized, components of our civil society—business, universities, media—need to begin communicating with one another. There must be an understanding that we need a broad democratic or republican front against this administration.

That’s why it’s so important, for example, for a university like Harvard, with a robust endowment, to stand firm and not capitulate to the administration’s demands. It creates a permission structure for others—whether in the media or private sector—to follow suit. That brings us to what I think is a fundamental law of democratic backsliding. And this idea isn’t mine—it comes from Tim Snyder, in his Twenty Lessons on Tyranny. His first lesson: Do not obey in advance.

Don’t give them what they want without even a fight. That’s exactly what was happening in the US at the beginning—with law firms like Skadden, for instance, capitulating before even receiving a list of demands. Or Columbia University, where the dominoes were falling quickly. The administration settled cases with ABC after the George Stephanopoulos interview, and there was another with CBS after an interview with Kamala Harris that Trump didn’t like.

But now we’re beginning to see a shift. There’s growing resistance to this impulse to obey in advance—and that is, I think, a reassuring sign.

We Only Have Ourselves: Resistance Must Come from Middle America

You noted the critical importance of institutional pushback. Given that some US institutions themselves — like parts of the judiciary or state legislatures — are increasingly aligned with authoritarian currents, how can civil society realistically force institutional resistance when traditional checks and balances are already compromised?

Dr. Robert Benson: The European Union and the United States are obviously two very different systems with two very different capacities for democratic resilience. The European Union has vastly different tools at its disposal compared to the United States.

Take, for example, Article 7 and the withholding of funds. In the Hungarian case, this has been a potent political cudgel that the EU can use to compel rule-of-law behavior. In the US, by contrast, there is no supranational authority that can hold this administration — or even the American courts — accountable for how they comport themselves. We only really have ourselves.

And by the time we reach the point of institutional capture, a lot of damage has already been done. Trump had four years in which to pack the judiciary. And he did — in a manner very reminiscent of what PiS, the Law and Justice party, did in Poland. And when I say similar, I mean strikingly similar. Withholding Merrick Garland’s nomination for 293 days and then ramming through his own nominee, using every tool at the majority’s disposal to pack not just the Supreme Court but also the lower courts.

As a result, about a third of the American judiciary now consists of Trump appointees. That’s a staggering figure — and, depending on your perspective, one of the great “successes” of his administration.

So, lacking any kind of supranational oversight like the EU, the US is left with its domestic institutions — and the most important ones, like the courts, have already been compromised.

Then you move to the legislature, to Congress. This is where it gets even trickier. The US political system has an internal mechanism that enforces party discipline — the primary system. Republicans are afraid to stand up to MAGAism because they face acute primary challenges from the right.

And here’s the really difficult part about democratic backsliding and autocratization: sometimes, especially in the initial phase, it can be popular. Trump won the popular vote. He won all seven swing states. He has a tight grip on one of our two major political parties. Until that grip is broken — and I mean broken from the bottom up, not by pressure from Washington, D.C., or New York or Los Angeles, but from places like Ohio and Middle America — we’re not going to see Congress behaving differently. Because doing so won’t be in their political interest.

In your analysis of European and Turkish cases, mass mobilization alone was often insufficient without elite defections. In today’s US context, do you see any meaningful elite-level breakaways that could help halt Trump’s authoritarian drift — or is elite resistance still too fragmented? What specific lessons can American opposition leaders learn from these cases to build more effective alliances against creeping authoritarianism?

Dr. Robert Benson: Turkey is a fascinating case — and a complex one. You have the AKP effectively in power for over 20 years, with a steady and systematic capture of institutions. As I mentioned in the op-ed, this culminated in the arrest of the mayor of Istanbul, arguably Erdogan’s most formidable challenger in a potential presidential election. Let’s not forget that Erdogan succeeded in changing the Turkish constitution to further consolidate power, shifting the system toward a fully presidential model.

What’s remarkable — and alarming — is that when comparing the Turkish and American cases directly, we’re moving faster in the United States than the AKP ever did in Turkey. That’s startling, but it’s true. And if you consider the damage done in Turkey over that timeline and extrapolate the same arc onto the US, factoring in the potential for at least three and a half more years of Trump — and possibly more, if constitutional meddling occurs, which is not unthinkable given the Republican Party’s trajectory — then the damage here could be decisive. Decisive in the sense of being existential for the Republic.

To return more directly to your question: Why is it that some cases of mass mobilization succeed while others don’t? Mass mobilization has to have a clear, unified aim. Take the Slovak case in 2018, following the assassination of a prominent investigative journalist. That led to a whole-of-society mobilization. And I emphasize that term — whole-of-society. That means unity between labor movements, students, public intellectuals, and crucially, ordinary people who may not identify as political at all. Historically, dissent tends to be concentrated in elite or intellectual circles — in Turkey, for instance, in large cities along the Mediterranean coast or like Istanbul or Izmir.

But if resistance remains confined to these enclaves, it remains too narrow to shift national trajectories. You have to expand the aperture. In the US, this means the opposition to Trump cannot be concentrated just on the coasts, nor can it come solely from universities or the educated elite. It has to emerge from Middle America. That’s when real political challenges begin to register.

The Romanian case against attempts to weaken anti-corruption laws is another example. Protests weren’t limited to Bucharest — they were widespread across cities like Timișoara and Cluj. That geographic spread was essential in forcing parliamentary actors to defect, to break with the government’s agenda and block the legislation. That’s the kind of pressure that needs to be replicated in the American case — to force elite-level defections. In this context, defecting means breaking with President Trump and his agenda. 

Cultural and Economic Dislocation Is the Authoritarians’ Playground

Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.

You describe how conspiracy theories and economic neglect fueled authoritarianism in both the US and Europe. Beyond restoring institutional trust, what societal interventions — if any — do you believe are most critical to reversing the cultural dislocation exploited by the new authoritarians?

Dr. Robert Benson: The question of the genesis of these political movements — how they came to be — is still being debated in the social sciences. This is very much a live debate. By and large, you can summarize the competing perspectives along two poles: culture and economy. I think it’s probably a bit of both.

What do I mean by culture and economy? On the economic side, it’s the classic tale of globalization gone wrong. You have a globalized economy from the late 1990s into the 2000s that resulted in a hollowing out of the middle class across industrial societies — principally in the United States. Think of the American Rust Belt: the industrial heartland losing manufacturing jobs. But also look at Europe. Take the United Kingdom, particularly the North and Northeast.

If you continue to follow the economic thesis, it suggests people experienced a depreciating standard of living. They felt left behind by a political establishment that was inattentive to their concerns — and they began voting for the extremes. Then came the hucksters and charlatans — the Nigel Farages, the Brexiteers, or in the American case, Trump — who said, “I understand your pain. I get it. You’ve been screwed over by a political elite that doesn’t understand how hard it is to get by day to day.”

Then comes the pitch: setting Middle America — or the working-class communities of the Red Wall in the UK — against the elites in London or the elites in Washington and New York. And this is where the cultural element comes in. It’s not only that you’ve been economically neglected and cast aside by this mad embrace of globalization, whatever that means — but on top of that, you’ve been alienated culturally.

There are no cinemas in your town. No one tours there. There are no concerts, no communal activities. No opportunities for you to engage in public debate. You’re isolated. You’re economically disadvantaged. And you don’t share in — not just the national wealth — but the cultural wealth that society produces. And that makes people really mad.

So, it’s the combination of economic and cultural dislocation. The opportunity structures that exist within these two pillars gave us populism as a political phenomenon. But more specifically, authoritarian populism. Because populism on its own isn’t enough. It has to become authoritarian — in the sense that there’s only one solution: our solution. Democracy itself, they argue, has failed us. Therefore, we must look beyond democratic remedies.

The Hegemon Has Withdrawn—Now Comes the Disorder

You argue that Trump’s America First policy has undermined global stability and encouraged aggression. How much damage to the international liberal order is now irreversible, and where should democratic states prioritize defense and rebuilding efforts?

Dr. Robert Benson: If we’re moving from a domestic analysis—looking internally at our societies and what gave rise to authoritarian populism—to the international level, we see that authoritarian populism is highly destructive. It’s destructive because it fundamentally does not believe in cooperation.

The international order that the United States principally helped establish after 1945 was built on cooperation. Some would argue that this order was defined by American hegemony. But that hegemony, for all its flaws, created the conditions for global cooperation.

So, what happens when the hegemon withdraws? That is precisely what’s occurring now. The US is retreating from the international domain. We’re witnessing a descent into multipolarity—and potentially into regional or factional rivalries. This is dangerous for a number of reasons. It introduces a profound element of uncertainty.

In this new world of geopolitical competition, what is to stop an autocrat like Vladimir Putin from not only invading Ukraine but also extending aggression toward the Baltic States? What is to stop Xi Jinping in China from pursuing territorial ambitions in Taiwan?

More to the point—if we consider the realm of political economy—what is to stop nations from retreating entirely into protectionism and national isolationism, shielding their domestic industries to the detriment of their peers and neighbors?

Some might even attempt to annex foreign resources, as we’ve seen hints of US policies toward Ukraine’s critical minerals—or potentially even ambitions involving Canada or Greenland. This marks a retreat from the rules-based international order the US helped to forge after World War II, while simultaneously becoming the principal antagonist to that very order.

How has Donald Trump’s suspension of military aid to Ukraine reshaped not only the war’s dynamics but also the global perception of America’s commitment to democracy and international alliances? Can this policy shift be seen as a strategic victory for authoritarian regimes like Russia’s?

Dr. Robert Benson: Well, we can begin with the latter part of the question. I mean, certainly this is a victory for Russia. It’s a complete victory for Vladimir Putin—he could not have wished for a better outcome. From the beginning, Putin claimed that he didn’t have to win in Ukraine; he just had to wait out the Americans and the West, who he believed would grow tired and fickle in their commitment. And that’s exactly what has happened.

There’s a prevailing attitude among segments of the American public that Ukraine is a boondoggle. Take, for example, the hurricane that hit Asheville, North Carolina, last year and caused extensive damage to an economically deprived region. Trump and his allies on Fox News were able to exploit that moment by drawing a stark comparison: all this money—$60 billion in supplemental aid—is going to Ukraine, while Americans at home receive next to nothing. FEMA famously issued a check for about $750, and the narrative quickly became: $750 for you, even though you lost your home, but $60 billion for Ukraine. Now, that’s a misleading comparison—$750 was just an initial payout—but the narrative stuck. And it was highly effective. This is where Trumpism and MAGAism connect the domestic with the international. But what does this mean for the American-led alliance? At best, it means that alliance is destabilized. At worst, it means it has failed—that it’s over.

The new German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, on election night, said that Europe has to begin preparing for independence from the United States. He actually said this. The Americans have managed to turn the Germans into the French when it comes to strategic autonomy. That’s truly remarkable. There isn’t a more staunchly Atlanticist political culture than Berlin’s, yet there’s now a growing realization in Europe that the United States cannot be counted on.

Even if the Americans come back in 2028 with a new Democratic president and say, “We’re back,” who’s going to believe them? US politics have become so polarized and unpredictable—veering from one extreme to the other—that even that kind of return won’t restore trust.

Frankly, I’m skeptical that a Democrat will win the White House in 2028. The long-term trends point toward a consolidation of MAGA-style Republicanism. So, what do our European partners do in the meantime? They need to prepare for a post–Pax Americana—a world where the United States is no longer the hegemon, where its network of alliances no longer provides a reliable security guarantee. And they need to do this as quickly as possible.

The Far Right Coordinates Better Than Progressives—But Cracks Are Emerging

Giorgia Meloni, leader of Brothers of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia and Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, attend a center-right coalition rally in Rome, Italy on March 01, 2018. Photo: Alessia Pierdomenico.

How do you see the growing alliance between the American and European far right — as highlighted at events like CPAC (Conservative Political Action Conference) — accelerating global disorder? How significant is this transatlantic connection for democratic resilience in both Europe and the United States, and how seriously should mainstream democratic actors take this emerging cross-border coordination? What counterstrategies do you recommend to disrupt this movement before it becomes too entrenched, and is there still a realistic path to reverse its momentum?

Dr. Robert Benson: There’s something ironic—almost bizarre—about the fact that hyper-nationalists and authoritarian nationalists are, in many ways, more effectively internationalizing their political movements than progressives. Intuitively, one would assume that it’s in the DNA of liberal and progressive political parties to coordinate across borders more easily than nationalists, whose worldview is, by definition, insular. But the opposite has happened. The far right—and the authoritarians—have done a much better job at coordinating. This has serious implications. They are learning from one another. There’s a phenomenon called “autocratic learning,” where figures like Viktor Orbán realize that if they replace civil servants with party loyalists, they can more effectively control the machinery of government. Donald Trump observes this, communicates with Fidesz advisors, partners with the Heritage Foundation, and suddenly we see efforts to purge the civil service in Washington, D.C.

This is incredibly concerning—not only are they learning from one another in the abstract, but they are actively communicating, including at venues like CPAC. That said, I would qualify this by noting something interesting is happening. Because nationalists are inherently insular, there is always the risk of rupture in their alliances. And I think we may now be witnessing such a rupture. Look, for example, at how Marine Le Pen has responded to trade war rhetoric—she’s taken a very anti-American, or at least anti-American-administration, stance. AfD leaders like Alice Weidel have openly stated that German national interests are antithetical to those of the United States. So, embedded in these movements is a core belief in national self-interest that makes sustained international coordination inherently fragile. It’s only a matter of time before these tensions come to the fore.

Interestingly, what we’re now seeing—contrary to my earlier expectations—is that Trump may actually be catalyzing division within the European far right. These actors are distancing themselves, saying, “We didn’t sign up for this. We’re not in favor of the trade war. We don’t want to hurt rural workers in France or Germany.” This distancing is notable and worth watching. So, there’s nuance here. While the transatlantic authoritarian alliance is real and dangerous, it may not be as stable or unified as it initially appeared.

You describe the far right’s globalization as a new, coordinated movement. In practical terms, do you see any emerging counter-globalization among pro-democracy forces, or is the liberal democratic camp still acting mostly in isolated national silos?

Dr. Robert Benson: I think this follows nicely from the conversation we were just having. Yes, I do think the far right—and the authoritarian right—has done a better job of coordinating in recent years. There are, as I’ve discussed, vulnerabilities to that coordination.

So how do progressive, pro-democracy forces respond? They respond, first and foremost, by talking to each other. The Democratic Party in the United States has to be in contact not only with the Liberal Party in the United Kingdom and the Social Democrats in Germany—in terms of their common ideological alignment—but, quite frankly, with all parties that believe in the rule of law and democracy.

In particular, I think it would behoove the Americans to start talking to parties that have actually experienced societal democratic backsliding. Talk to the CHP in Turkey. Talk to the Serbian opposition. Talk to Elly Schlein’s PD in Italy, which is contending with Meloni. It’s important that we move beyond viewing the world strictly through the lens of left-to-left or right-to-right dialogues. Instead, we should begin thinking in terms of: who believes in democracy and preserving constitutional order—and who doesn’t? That’s the fundamental question of our time. And then we need to coordinate accordingly with those who share democratic commitments, sharing information, tactics, and messaging on how to effectively push back against incumbent authoritarian threats within our own societies.

Don’t Just Defend Democracy—Explain Why It Matters to Daily Life

Trump supporters marched toward Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C., USA. Photo: Dreamstime / © Bgrocker

Drawing from the examples of Turkey and Hungary that you cited, once authoritarian populists consolidate institutions, reversal becomes nearly impossible. What lessons should US opposition parties urgently learn from these cases to avoid repeating the same mistakes?

Dr. Robert Benson: There seems to be an emerging consensus that talking about democracy alone is probably insufficient. A colleague once told me, “I can’t eat the rule of law. It doesn’t put food on my table. It doesn’t pay for my prescription drugs.” And it may potentially ring hollow when a hyper-educated and cultural elite from Washington, D.C., or any of these national capitals, talks about the rule of law—about democracy—as these kind of abstract concepts that you can’t really concretize.

Maybe we have to do the important intellectual work of connecting these concepts—these abstract notions—to real-world things. What I mean by that is: it’s not just that losing the rule of law is dangerous in itself (which it is), but that it creates permission structures for corruption. Your quality of life is materially worse off when you cannot rely on the state to do what it’s supposed to do—and to do so honorably. So talk about that. Talk about how democratic backsliding undermines public healthcare—how it renders it ineffective—or how it takes away from public education, how it creates different strata of access based on who has connections, based on who can pay and who cannot.

Make it very clear that it’s not just a defense of these concepts in themselves that warrants our attention, but how these concepts intersect and feed into our lived experiences as citizens—of a collective, of a community. Because if we can do that—and do it successfully—we bring so many more people into our camp. So it is a challenge for those who believe in the rule of law, who believe in democracy, not simply to stop there, but to take it one extra step—and just tell us why it matters: to my life, and to the life of my children and my family. Because I think that is the only way we create a robust, whole-of-society resistance.

And lastly, Dr. Benson, reflecting on your comparison of today’s political climate with the pre-WWII appeasement of Nazi Germany, what lessons should US and European leaders draw right now to avoid repeating historical failures, especially when facing coordinated disinformation and populist-authoritarian challenges?

Dr. Robert Benson: History doesn’t repeat itself.  I mean, the famous line is that history repeats itself, but actually, it more accurately rhymes. I don’t think we’re living through some kind of redux of the 1930s. Having said that, that doesn’t mean there aren’t lessons we can derive from the breakup of Czechoslovakia. Kaja Kallas-EU High Representative-famously said that this is 1938 and that we need to act accordingly. I’m not so sure it’s 1938—that would imply the response would have to be complete victory over Russia, the seizing of Moscow. I mean, that’s not where we are. Let’s be honest about where we are. We have echoes of the 1930s in our politics. So I think that means we have to take seriously threats both domestically to our democracies, but also to an international order that is under pressure.

The more appropriate comparison in my mind than the 1930s would actually most likely be the pre-World War I period, where you had incredible inequalities within societies and also between states. You had, for the first time, a truly globalized economy that had undergone an economic shock. And then you had the seemingly unstoppable spiral toward catastrophe—towards a global war. I think these dynamics are the ones that most concern me, and these are the dynamics I think were prevalent in the early 20th century, in the lead-up to the First World War. So I’m not so sure about the utility of making the 1930s comparison per se. But I do think, insofar as it serves as a wake-up call, it’s important for us to realize there’s work to be done.

Photo: Dreamstime.

Populism and EP Elections – Case Finland: Populism Gone Mad from Scissors and Chopping-board to Firing Guns and Latino Rush

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Please cite as:
Lahti, Yannick & Palonen, Emilia. (2025). “Populism and EP Elections – Case Finland: Populism Gone Mad from Scissors and Chopping-board to Firing Guns and Latino Rush.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 28, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0049

 

Abstract

After two relatively successful recent elections, the far-right Finns Party (FP) approached the early summer 2024 European Parliament elections amid a supranational atmosphere suggesting that these elections would mark a “turn for the far right” across both Europe and Finland. After successfully leading her party to a historic victory one year earlier in the national elections of Finland 2023, Riikka Purra was, according to polls and pundit opinions, heading toward a new election record—this time in the European Parliament. Facing a charged political atmosphere in national politics and due to her visible role as the national treasurer, Purra’s FP party adopted the populist radical right strategy of their ID and ECR fellows in the EU, and instead of loudly criticising the Union, as has traditionally been the case with far-right parties, they too adopted the tactic of aspiring to “change the European Union from the inside.” This led their whole campaign strategy to declare the FP as the “most pro-Europe party of Finland.” As neighbouring country Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine had left the FP with a united front, the question of whether to support Ukraine or not did not even enter the elections. FP in this regard was and still remains the most anti-Russian party of the far-right party families in Europe. With media coverage being favourable toward a positive outcome for the FP, the party’s concrete message left something to be desired. The cases of now former FP members Timo Vornanen and Teuvo Hakkarainen, not to mention the “Riikka scissors and chopping-board minister” case, undermined a more coherent message to the Finnish electorate, who just over a year ago had voted for the FP in great numbers. Partly, this led to an overwhelmingly poor result for the Finns Party, which took most politicians and spectators by surprise. The European Parliament elections of 2024 in Finland stand out as an interesting exception within the far-right in Europe, as FP steadily lost support in various constituencies.

Keywords: Finns Party (FP), Populist radical right, Far-right, European Parliament 2024, Riikka Purra, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Finnish populist radical right, populist influence.

 

By Yannick Lahti* & Emilia Palonen**

Introduction – Towards the Elections

The 2024 European Parliament elections were preceded by two intense national contests: the parliamentary elections in 2023 and the presidential elections in January 2024. The National Coalition Party (Kokoomus) emerged first in both but also witnessed a significant rise of the far-right Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset).

The first significant election result of the anti-elitist Eurosceptic party was in 2011 marking a change in the party landscape within the national scale of politics in Finland (Arter, 2011; Palonen 2020). In the subsequent elections, the two opposition parties emerged victorious, and the Finns Party (FP) became one of the key governing parties in the government led by Juha Sipilä from 2015 to 2019. However, the party’s rank and file were dissatisfied, and in 2017, the FP split after electing Jussi Halla-aho as its new leader, marking a radical shift toward a nativist direction. The former party elite and some marginal factions emerged as new splinter groups on the political spectrum and registering as political parties (Fagerholm, 2022; Lahti & Palonen, 2023). By 2021, Jussi Halla-aho had handed over the party leadership to Riikka Purra, who continued to advance a strong nativist agenda. Under her leadership, the party achieved its best-ever result in the 2023 parliamentary elections, becoming the second-largest party in the country with 20.1% of the vote (620,981 votes). The FP then entered government for the second time, this time in coalition with the NCP, the Christian Democrats, and the Swedish People’s Party of Finland. The FP currently holds seven ministerial posts. Purra’s predecessor, Jussi Halla-aho, came from the far-right organization Suomen Sisu, which had established a strong foothold within the FP. Although Halla-aho stepped down in 2021, his nativist line has continued (Palonen, 2021). 

Finland’s next-door neighbour, Russia, and its full-scale war in Ukraine have played a significant role for the Finns Party, even under the leadership of former chair—and current Speaker of the Finnish Parliament—Jussi Halla-aho, who completed his doctoral thesis at the University of Helsinki in Slavic studies. The party first marginalized its pro-Russian faction, notably removing MP Mika Niikko from his position as chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Finnish Parliament as early as December 2021, prior to the attack on Kyiv. In 2023, the Finns Party also shifted from the ID group to the ECR group in the European Parliament (Lahti & Palonen 2023).

According to Heinö (2024), the Finns Party’s move from the ID to the ECR group coincided with its entry into the new Finnish government. Party leader Riikka Purra aimed to avoid unnecessarily provoking the coalition partners—particularly the newly appointed Prime Minister Orpo of the National Coalition Party—by signalling a more moderate and less radical approach to the party’s EU policies. However, just ten days into the new government, one of the Finns Party ministers, Vilhelm Junnila, resigned due to allegations of fascist references and neo-Nazi connections (Kuokkanen, Horsmanheimo & Palonen, 2023). Interestingly, both Junnila and Mika Niikko were candidates on the party list in the 2024 European Parliament elections.

In the presidential elections of January 2024, the Finns Party candidate Jussi Halla-aho finished fourth, securing 18.99 percent of the total vote (615,802 votes). Green Party (Vihreät) MP and former Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto—running as an independent but backed by the Greens—and former National Coalition Party Prime Minister Alexander Stubb advanced to the second round, with Stubb ultimately winning by a narrow margin of 51.62 percent. Despite not making it to the runoff, Halla-aho maintained a strong presence on social media, and widespread opposition to the far right played a notable role in shaping the outcome.

The Finns Party largely fits into the Radical Right category as defined by Mudde (2019), who distinguishes between the anti-democratic Extreme Right and the Radical Right, which operates within democratic systems. However, Heinö (2024) notes that ideologically, the Finns Party is best described as a national conservative party—socially conservative while leaning left on economic issues. The party’s founder, Timo Soini, once famously referred to it as a “workers’ party without socialism” (Demokraatti, 2016). The party’s roots lie in the Finnish Rural Party, which challenged the Centre Party’s realpolitik under President Urho Kekkonen, Finland’s longest-serving president, particularly its friendly posture toward the Soviet Union (Palonen & Sunnercrantz, 2021).

Five new populist Radical Right parties emerged on the Finnish political scene since 2017 (Fagerholm, 2022). These include the Blue Reform movement (now known as the Finnish Reform Movement) and Suomen Kansa Ensin (Finnish People First), which has its origins in the anti-immigration Rajat Kiinni! (“Close the Borders!”) movement. Two personal splinters are on a more general populist line: Valta Kuuluu Kansalle (Power Belongs to the People, VKK), formed around Ano Turtiainen, a former FP member of Parliament, in 2021. The VKK has networks among the leaders and influencers of Finland’s digital pro-Russian counter public. Vapauden Liitto (Freedom Alliance), a splinter of the VKK, was founded in 2022 by a former FP activist, Ossi Tiihonen, who also ran for party chair and has been vocal against Finland’s COVID-19 measures. Ano Turtiainen and his Valta Kuuluu Kansalle party did not get re-elected in the 2023 parliamentary elections, and thus the party lost its only seat. 

In the EP elections, Vapauden Liitto received 0.9% of the total votes (16,717). Also ideologically distinct was the proto-fascist, ethnonationalist Sinimusta Liike (Blue-and-Black Movement), which was also founded in 2022. However, on April 23, 2024, the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland de-registered the movement. In its ruling, the court found that the party’s program was anti-democratic and disrespectful towards human rights, thus strictly contrary to the Finnish Constitution and the European Union’s Charter on Human Rights (Yle, 2024). In the following month, May 2024, the Blue-and-Black Movement re-applied to be re-registered into the official party register by preparing to collect the necessary 5,000 signatures that it would require, but it was not able to nominate candidates for the European parliamentary elections of summer 2024.

Also, the opposition party, Liike Nyt (“Movement Now”), is noteworthy due to its populist tendencies, even as it can by no means be regarded as a populist radical left nor right-wing party. It is an emerging force that fashions itself after Italy’s Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S), which successfully won seats outside the capital in the Finnish regional elections in 2021 (Yle, 2021). While a disproportionate number of the current leading figures of the FP hail from the universities and the teaching professions (Saresma & Palonen, 2022), Liike Nyt’s leadership consists of business elites that have been tied to Russian oligarchs (Luukka, 2022; Lahti & Palonen, 2023), which they now publicly disavow (Nalbantoglu, 2023). In the national elections of spring 2023, Liike Nyt managed to hold on to their one and only seat in the 200-seated parliament. The MP, co-founder, and chair Harry Harkimo also ran for president early 2024, arriving in last place out of 9 candidates with 0.53% of the votes (17,030). In the European Parliament elections, Liike Nyt had an electoral alliance with the Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit), who are serving in Orpo’s government. This alliance created a particular dynamic between an oppositional, rather liberal populist opposition party and a Christian conservative group serving in the government. The Christian Democrats’ candidate Eija-Riitta Korhola was clearly the most successful in this coalition, and with the exception of the multi-party debates, Liike Nyt was not very visible in the electoral campaigning.

Overall, with their two seats in the European Parliament and continuous representation since 2015—when then-party leader Timo Soini was elected—the Finns Party (FP) was the most relevant populist radical right party to observe in these elections.

The Finns Party in the European Parliament 

In the context of the European Parliament, the Finns Party belongs to the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists). The FP has traditionally been at least softly Eurosceptic; it has had a long-term goal of leaving the EU, but in the short term, it argues that Finland needs to remain in the union to defend Finnish interests. In the 2024 elections, this was contested, and the party seemed happy to remain in the EU in the long run. Initially, together with most of the Finnish population and parliamentary parties, the FP was also against NATO membership claiming the need for national sovereignty. The party changed its stance on this matter after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Lahti & Palonen, 2023) and is among the most anti-Russian of Europe’s populist parties (Heinö, 2024). In short, the FP has roots in strong anti-Soviet thinking and lacks the Russophilia of other far-right parties in Europe (e.g., France’s Rassemblement National and Italy’s Lega Nord). This is echoed in the current pro-Ukraine stance, which is also strengthened by the former party leader’s personal history. In this sense, their anti-Sovietism also turned them against Russia and for Ukraine. Finally, Halla-aho’s policy direction testifies to his emergence in the anti-immigration faction of his party (Vaarakallio, 2015). For these reasons, the question about Finland’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war was not a theme in the European Parliament elections of 2024, even though overall security was. The party leader repeatedly raised two issues during the campaigning: Ukraine and migration. The leading MEP candidate MP Sebastian Tynkkynen of the FP also visited Georgia quite prominently during his campaign for the EP.

The MEPs for the Finns Party have included party chairs like Timo Soini and Jussi Halla-aho, but in 2019 two MEPs were elected after significantly successful elections: Teuvo Hakkarainen and Laura Huhtasaari. Eurosceptic Laura Huhtasaari, MP in 2015–2019 and again from 2023, ran for president in 2018 and received 6.9 percent of the vote with over 200,000 personal votes. A year later, running for the EP, she received 92,760 votes, which is a fine score in Finland, where, in the Finnish preferential voting system, voters choose a candidate within a party list to vote for. Teuvo Hakkarainen (29,083 votes in 2019) is an owner of a sawmill in central Finland who originally rose to the national parliament in 2011. Despite his personal popularity among voters since his first days in politics, he has been in the spotlight for perceived problematic language and conduct. Many claimed to have believed he was representing the interests of the forest industry in the EP for Finland. In the most recent news before the 2024 elections, MEP Hakkarainen was presented as largely absent from the parliamentary work, and he admitted having moved to Honduras, South America, in 2020. Laura Huhtasaari returned to the Finnish national parliament and was replaced by Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, a long-term Finns Party activist, who became an MP already in 2007 in the Soini era, serving in the European Parliament from a deputy seat in 2015–2019 and again in 2023–2024.

Indistinct EU-agenda and Other Issues

Even as the political climate as a whole seemed to be fatalistic toward an upcoming far-right surge in the context of the European Parliament elections of 2024, one ruling element alongside this was the fact that the FP party seemed to lack a direct focus and message in the upcoming elections. Events that had little to do with traditional day-to-day politics also emerged, as did some specific incidents such as the shooting affair of FP MP, now former FP member, Timo Vornanen.

FP published its EP2024 election program called “Päätetään itse – Let’s decide for ourselves” on April 24, 2024. The opening paragraph was as follows: The Finns Party is Finland’s most pro-Europe party. The people’s movement which is the Finns Party is uncompromisingly committed to protecting European civilization and to solving the many challenges facing Europe. Just as the Finns Party sees Finland as a refuge for Finns, Europe must first and foremost be the home of European nations.

This turned around the whole Eurosceptic undertones. Riikka Purra was mentioning in election debates the way in which authority in the EU lies within the member states. Moving away from Euroscepticism to a ‘critical European’ stance, as identified by Herkman and Palonen (2024) in the 2019 elections, the Finns Party appeared Eurosceptic, and the Centre Party (Renew) was critical European at home. It is relevant to point out that the FP declared themselves the most pro-Europe—not the most pro-EU—party of Finland.

Also in Finland, the FP EP2024 election campaign for the Finns Party kicked off in a period of hype for the far right in Europe (only that the Finnish media translated it to laitaoikeisto) (De Fresnes & Stenroos, 2024; Yle, 2024; Sutinen, 2024). Some scholarly opinions that were openly sceptical about a “far right tsunami” also emerged, as it was pointed out that the discourse within the European liberal media had been repetitive in this regard, considering the EP elections of 2014 and 2019 (Vaittinen, 2024). Yet, the major narrative remained widely fatalistic towards a “far right landslide” both nationally in Finland and elsewhere within the European Union member states.

Three factors negatively affected the Finns Party’s results: the Cases Vornanen and Hakkarainen, the jubilant Thatcherism of the party chair Purra, and the party list.

By the end of the same week of the official EP24 campaign start, an unfortunate shooting incident happened outside a nightclub. It involved a Finns Party MP since 2023, previously a policeman, Timo Vornanen, who fired his (legal) firearm (illegally carried) outside a bar not far from the Finnish parliament during the early hours of a Friday morning (Toivonen et al., 2024). Vornanen was immediately taken into police custody and later released facing official criminal charges. The incident was the political top news of the weekend and the week to come as the party had their campaign cruise event. Almost a week later, on May 2, 2024, the FP party dismissed Vornanen from its parliamentary group, and on May 9 the governing body of the FP ousted Vornanen from the party altogether, which led to him forming his one-man group in the parliament’s opposition.

Simultaneously with the case Vornanen, some unfavourable news governed the media sphere around the sitting Finns Party MEP Teuvo Hakkarainen as investigative journalists from the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat wrote about Hakkarainen’s de facto absence and lack of fulfilling his duties in the European Parliament (Teittinen, 2024; Teittinen & Elo, 2024). Commenting on his absences, MEP Hakkarainen referred to his “Latinokiireet”—translating as something like “being busy with Latino-related things” or “Latino business.” The news around Hakkarainen led to the party secretary of FP, Harri Vuorenpää, announcing that Hakkarainen would not be among the party’s picks to seek re-election in the upcoming European Parliament elections; the official reasons for his dismissal were never clarified (Harju, 2024). Contrary to his party’s wishes, MEP Hakkarainen claimed that he was seeking re-election anyway as an independent candidate from the list of the above-mentioned splinter group: Vapauden liitto (Freedom Alliance). This move was ultimately too much and resulted in the governing body of FP firing Hakkarainen from the party altogether. Hakkarainen continued to criticize his former political home, claiming that “FP has turned into a beagle (lapdog) of prime minister Orpo’s Central Coalition Party” (Hakahuhta et al., 2024; Sutinen & Toivonen, 2024).

Within the context of national politics, the party chair Purra started to obtain growing criticism about her online behaviour regarding the austerity politics in Prime Minister Orpo’s government and her role as the national treasurer. Purra posted on social media a picture of a gift she had received: two wooden chopping boards in the shape of an axe, with her face and the text “now is the time to cut” printed on them. A few weeks later, an MP of Purra’s party posted another picture on social media with an unapologetic and smiley Purra holding a big pair of scissors. Promoting a tight austerity regime, Purra was heavily criticized for her perceived lack of empathy and even glee towards what were seen as some of the heaviest public sector and social welfare cuts in the history of Finland, leading even to foreign media headlines such as: “Finland’s Thatcher tests limits of local frugality” (Kauranen, 2024). This is in stark contradiction with the historical takes of the Finns Party and its predecessor as guardians of the ordinary and vulnerable people.

With Hakkarainen, Huhtasaari, nor Halla-aho no longer on the list, the Finns Party list for 2024 was composed of less prominent figures but also included the very popular social media politician Sebastian Tynkkynen. FP vice chair and second-term MP Sebastian Tynkkynen stands among the leading figures but was not a minister of the unpopular government. He announced already in February that he was running in the upcoming elections with an “ambitious plan” (STT, 2024). Tynkkynen has been known as a widely skilful and provocative politician in terms of social media. Online video content allows the far right to affectively articulate and perform socio-political identities and construct relations to targeted audiences, and the Finns Party and Tynkkynen have been pioneers in Finland in this (Ekman, 2014; Salojärvi et al., 2023). 

Tynkkynen, who proudly claims to have renewed his seat in the Finnish parliament in 2023 with a budget of 0€—relying only on creating online content—declared in his EP24 candidacy video that he intends to use the assistance money granted to members of the European Parliament in an unprecedented way for extensive framing. Tynkkynen’s bid and the rationale for it was an unprecedented case in Finnish politics, but it was not widely covered. In this case, the far-right politician’s goal was to act in the law-making parliament more as part of the journalists’ challenge and as a replacement for the media than as a legislator (Lahti & Mörttinen, 2024: 33). However, Tynkkynen was widely seen as one of the most potential winners of the upcoming elections, and the polls were favourable both to him and the FP, showing that the party might increase their seats from 2 to 3 (Hara, 2024; Hara & Särkkä, 2024).

Purra claimed the list was the best ever by the Finns Party. It included several figures known for their anti-immigrant and far-right stances, such as the short-lived minister of Orpo’s government in the summer scandal of 2023, MP Vilhelm Junnila. Even if Europe and Ukraine were Purra’s key issues, it also included Mika Niikko, who had been moved from party leadership for his earlier pro-Russian stances. None of these got questioned by the Finnish media. The most notable campaign ad by the FP during the late spring elections was one where traditionally masculine figures—two males working on construction—struggle to open a can of milk during their coffee break. The conclusion of the video is that due to EU regulation, the cork of the milk carton is an unnecessary nuisance. The punchline at the end of the video is the chosen FP party slogan: “Päätetään itse – Let’s decide for ourselves.” The realism behind this stance was also not much discussed. The public discussion around the campaign was focused mainly on the question of Ukraine and security, and the far right in the leadership of the European Parliament.

Given that the Finns Party was already the second party in the Finnish government, the EP elections also became a vote on the government. The opposition discourse was strong. SDP, the leading party of the previous government under PM Sanna Marin, was now the country’s main opposition party and, under the new leadership of MP Antti Lindtman, it was expected to do relatively well in the elections. Lindtman, facing the challenge of leading the SDP after the unprecedented Sanna Marin phenomenon, but also the historically most right-wing government of Finland in terms of fiscal policy since the Second World War, decided to embrace the so-called challenge of the “Rise of the European Far Right” and made the party’s entire campaign for the European Parliament in 2024 about repelling this rising.

Indeed, on May 4, 2024, the SDP announced that they would not collaborate with the far right in the European Parliament, promising that: “Every Finnish voter can be confident that the vote given to the SDP will definitely not promote the far-right’s rise to power in Europe.” Similarly to their self-stated political rivals, the SDP was also on the verge of getting their seat numbers increased from 2 to 3 inside the European Parliament. But they were not the only opposition party, and their party list was not as prominent as those for the Greens, the Left Alliance, or the Centre, who had several sitting or former MEPs and former party leaders. Even the Swedish People’s Party, who was slightly controversially in government again, now together with the Finns Party, had their party leader running for the European Parliament. The Sanna Marin phenomenon did contribute to these elections, boosting several former ministers of her cabinet and women into the Parliament. 

Results of the Election

The momentum and media hype were on their side, but the far-right takeover did not happen in Finland. The election results came almost as a shock to the Finns Party leadership. Even until the last days before the election, the predictions suggested that the party would increase its seats from 2 to 3, even though the exact opposite happened: it lost one of its two seats. The party gained barely over half of their previous results in 2019: 7.6% of the vote (139,160 votes in total) compared to EP2019, where the party received 13.8%. They lost one of their two seats in the European Parliament, with Sebastian Tynkkynen being elected as the only one of his party, and Ruohonen Lerner lost her seat with only 0.4% of the vote (6,902 votes), while Junnila, shortly a minister in Orpo’s government, received 0.9% of the vote (16,357 votes), the second highest for the Finns Party. This came as a surprise to journalists, some media pundits, and researchers, as well as the FP chair Riikka Purra herself, as she commented on the results on election night: “Äärettömän huono – Extremely bad” (Strömberg 2024).

Perhaps more surprising was the success of Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto) chair and MP Li Anderson, who received personally a record number of 247,604 votes (13.5 percent of nationwide personal support), securing three seats for her party with 17.3% nationwide support (316,859 votes). The EPP’s Kokoomus won the elections, increasing their seats from three to four with 24.8% support (453,636 votes). The most popular candidate for Kokoomus was Mika Aaltola, an academic and leader of the Finnish Institute for Foreign Affairs known from his TV commentary, who had run as an independent candidate for president in January 2024: now he increased his personal votes to 95,757 votes, and a total of 5.2% national support. In the presidential elections, Aaltola had received 47,467 votes, a total of 1.5%. MP with expertise in military strategy, Pekka Toveri, with a similar public profile, was the second most popular. Curiously, the strategy adopted by the opposition leader Antti Lindtman for his party SDP did not bring the wished-for result, as the party had to settle for its two current seats without a poll-promised increase. The Greens lost one seat, but their two former party leaders and ministers secured seats in the EP, and the Centre and the Swedish People’s Party also retained two and one seats, respectively.

The splinter group Vapauden liitto (Freedom Alliance) got 0.9% (16,717 votes), with the former FP MEP Hakkarainen gaining 7,414 votes, thus not renewing his seat. Liike Nyt (Movement Now) received 0.5% of the vote share (9,641 votes altogether). Indeed, even though the FP did not do well due to a lack of a clear message, the message of opposing the far right and standing up for liberal democracy also did not resonate strongly with the voters of the SDP. However, the overall result can be seen as a victory for the opposition parties against those in government.

All Finnish citizens and EU citizens with permanent residency in Finland aged 18 and above were eligible to cast a vote. Similarly to the presidential elections, and contrary to the national parliamentary and municipal/regional elections, the entire country functioned as a single polling district. Voter turnout was 42.4%, a minor decrease from the previous elections, where the turnout was 42.7%.

In summary: the FP steadily lost support in various constituencies. In rural areas, where the support of the FP has been strong, the party’s percentage of support almost halved. It weakened significantly across the board in other ways as well, least of all in the core areas of large cities, where the FP generally gets little support.

Changes in electoral support for the FP can be observed as we compare the results of the previous European Parliament elections of 2019 to those of June 2024, gathered by the Suomen vaalidatapalvelu (Finnish election data service).

Outer frame area:                                2019: 16.8% vs. 2024: 9.4%

Inner frame area:                                2019: 14.5% vs. 2024: 8.2%

Countryside:                                       2019: 16.1% vs. 2024: 8.9% 

A suburb or suburban area:                2019: 14.0% vs. 2024: 7.7%

Local center:                                       2019: 10.9% vs. 2024: 5.9%

The core area of ​​big cities:                 2019: 6.7% vs. 2024: 4.2%

Further Analysis: “Smile, You Are in the EU!” – The Finns Party’s Government Participation and Its Potential Influence on the Results

As has been widely established, in recent decades a growing number of various populist parties have succeeded in entering government coalitions with mainstream political parties—or even with other populist parties in Western Europe, such as is the case in Italy, for example. In Finland, the governing National Coalition Party faced the EU elections with a sense of calm and optimistic campaigning, as the party has traditionally been successful in these elections and is often regarded as the so-called EU party. The fact that the second largest party in both parliament and government—the Finns Party—was also fully campaigning under a pro-Europe message cannot be disregarded without underlining the paradoxicality and ironies that political reality sometimes brings forward in our field of studies.

Even as it is evident that a coalition government such as that of Prime Minister Orpo could proceed with the pragmatic “business as usual” attitude from a national politics point of view during another election, the fact remains that the national treasurer Purra was at the same time advocating for a very different future for the European Union. One cannot overlook the fact that the roots of her Finns Party lie fundamentally in the populist discourse of anti-elitism and Euroscepticism. Indeed, the founder of the Finns Party, Timo Soini, coined the phrase “Missä EU, siellä ongelma – Where there is the EU, there is the problem” into the history books of Finnish political rhetoric. Additionally, as mentioned before, just in January of the same year, the National Coalition Party had won the presidential elections with their candidate, former Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, who ran his campaign with a clear and steadfast angle on Finland being international, multilingual, and tolerant. It was also Stubb who, two decades ago, had launched his political career and risen to prominence as a young MEP with a famously unapologetic EU agenda for Finland. Stubb’s—back then still considered a progressive tool for political communication—blog was later published as a book: Hymyile, olet EU:ssa! Europarlamentaarikon päiväkirja – Smile, you are in the EU! A MEP’s Diary (Stubb, 2005; Lahti & Mörttinen, 2024).

This blatant conflict of interest between Prime Minister Orpo and Deputy Prime Minister Purra, as far as their parties’ EU policy was concerned, did not manifest itself publicly as a quarrel, but the undeniable tension on an ideological level politically requires further exploration—especially when analysing why the FP voters voted as they did (or as turned out to be the case: did not show up to vote). In general, when looking at the wide body of research investigating the changes in populist parties once they enter governmental positions, the question of populism’s moderation versus radicalization comes up for debate (Akkerman & de Lange, 2015; Albertazzi & McDonnell 2015; Krause & Wagner 2019).

Within the framework of the Finns Party and the surprising 2024 European Parliament election results, this scenario provides fruitful conditions to consider the weight of the contemporary argument which debates whether populist actors in government can exert a certain degree of influence on their coalition partners or if, conversely, they have to quit their populist and anti-system character under the impact of their “experience in office.” The questions proposed in these cases are often of the nature: “To what extent did populist parties succeed in influencing their government coalition partners, leading them to adopt a populist rhetoric and change their policy positions?” and “Have populist parties been successful in retaining their populist ‘outside mainstream politics’ identity, or have they been assimilated into mainstream parties?” 

In the case of the EP2024 elections, the government of Prime Minister Orpo had not been in power for more than a year, and it had already overcome its most acute crisis: the mentioned summer scandal of 2023, regarding then-Minister MP Vilhelm Junnila, who as a result resigned. During and after this incident, Orpo’s government—under his leadership and his visibly loyal deputy, FP’s chair Purra—became known for repetitively referring to their ironclad commitment to the government’s program in the media. According to a textual analysis using corpus-assisted discourse studies, the results showed that the program was, in fact, very strongly driven and based on policies traditionally imposed and held in high regard by Orpo’s Central Coalition Party, and that Purra’s Finns Party had been given leverage in issues that were important to their core supporters, such as immigration policy, citizenship restrictions, and foreign aid to third-world countries (Lahti & Mörttinen 2023). This ensured that neither party was willing to “rock the boat” unnecessarily. From a practical point of view, it also means that whether populistic influence or, vice versa, non-populist influence was spreading within the coalition partners, it was too early a stage to identify any credible indications of it.

In terms of influence, we can accept Robert Dahl’s definition of it: “a relation among actors in which one actor induces other actors to act in some way they would not otherwise act” (Robert Dahl 1973, in Biard et al., 2019: 5). More widely, the actual concept of “political contagiousness” finds its roots in the field of electoral competition studies (Van Spanje, 2010), and it is firmly associated with the strategies political parties might adopt towards their (newcoming) competitors in an attempt to attract more voters. Direct populist influence, however, can be defined as follows: Populist influence is the impact exerted by populist parties on their government coalition partners in terms of communication contagiousness (people-centrism, anti-elitism, and general will) and policy position change (depending on the populist ideological attachment) (Napoletano, 2022: 60–61).

When investigating whether the FP was somehow assimilated into the mainstream parties from the point of view of the voter, it is relevant to note what happened to the party a decade ago when, in 2015, it entered into a centre-liberal coalition with the result of “a dramatic loss of popular support because it was not able to keep its promises” (Blanc-Noël, 2019: 69). The then leader and founder of the party, Soini, was seen as appeasing the coalition partners by moderating his pre-election agenda. In general, when this type of moderation takes place (Akkerman et al., 2016), populist parties certainly do not succeed in exerting a real influence on their coalition partners and, more extremely, they risk disappearing from the political scenario. Of course, what happened to the FP in 2015 until their splitting into two and later the resurrection into nationwide electoral success again is not explicitly comparable with what happened in the EP 2024 elections, as the context differs, but ignoring the fact that the FP has suffered sufficient loss in support before due to perceived moderation in times of a coalition government cannot be overlooked. It is important to underline that we are not arguing that the FP seriously altered their EU policy or, more prudently, their campaigning in the EP2024 elections due to the fact of political contagiousness—in this case, being in a coalition government with the traditionally pro-EU party of Finland, the National Coalition Party. We, however, note that their incoherent campaigning strategy and unorthodox message for the flagship party of Finnish Euroscepticism affected their traditional voter base, which has historically not been keen on voting in European Parliament elections to start with.

This alternation with the FP’s electoral support also challenges yet again the stances of many researchers between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, as they declared populism in power to be an “episodic” phenomenon that was not bound to last for a significant period of time. Indeed, in 2015, Albertazzi and McDonnell were among the first to argue that this conclusion was inaccurate and that, as a phenomenon, populism in power is here to stay. More interestingly, in regard to this paper, they claimed that populism in power is a “contagious” phenomenon able to make a concrete difference within the Western European political landscape.

Furthermore, Albertazzi and McDonnell claimed that, once in power, populist parties behave according to a combination of “responsiveness and responsibility” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015: 170; Biard et al., 2019). As a consequence of this choice, part of the populist electorate will feel betrayed, although in the long run, populist parties succeed (to different degrees) in maintaining their electorate. Some authors have also tried to explain the variation of such success; Akkerman and De Lange (2012: 578) argued that post-incumbency electoral success of the populist radical right seems to depend on three main factors: 1. policy achievements, 2. the performance of populist radical right ministers, and 3. party strategies to maintain internal coherence. Especially factors 2 and 3 are important as we analyse what has contributed to the end result of the FP’s electoral success in the EP2024 election.

Conclusion

Throughout the elections, the contradiction was the fact that the political discourse and the analysis in the media seemed to concentrate on the unavoidable landslide victory of the far right in Europe as such. Considering first and foremost the diversity inside the so-called far-right family of party groups in Europe, we see that the starting point was missing the point from the get-go. The discourse always remained on a very general level, thus underplaying the different actors and variations which might come into play. In Finland, the populist radical FP was enjoying steady support, and yet the support and seats halved, while overall the national voting turnout remained more or less the same – a difference of 0.3%.

Confusion within the party due to the cases of Vornanen and Hakkarainen and the lack of a strong election strategy, narrative, and mission towards the European Parliamentary elections played a role. The political discourse around the FP was mostly on Purra’s provocative communication, the far-right threat in Europe, and the campaigning of the most successful online politician of the FP group, vice chair and now newly elected MEP, Sebastian Tynkkynen. His political supporters followed him and showed their loyalty during election day, but even his message was more about himself as a politician and his mission to broadcast more effectively and intensively, instead of commenting on what his contribution would be to the Finnish electorate.

As popular as Tynkkynen is among his online audiences and actual voters, it is reasonable to argue that his message might not have been that effective in mobilizing voters outside of the digital sphere. Considering that the FP’s main television ad also aired on various online platforms, with its milk carton EU-regulated corks and the declaration of the FP as the most pro-Europe party of the nation, contributed to the lack of a wholesome message. It is possible that in fact, in that regard, one of the variables in order to ensure party success—as mentioned earlier by Akkerman & De Lange (2012)—the FP did not successfully execute a comprehensive party strategy to maintain internal coherence, not at least from the point of view of the Finnish voter.

It is important to note again that the FP declared themselves the most pro-Europe—not the most pro-EU—party of Finland. This distinction is clear, and it can be hypothesized that this was created as an attempt to redefine what being pro-European and pro-EU meant in a Finnish political context. Whether or not this was a strategy and a bait by the FP, the fact remains that the whole EP election campaign theme went largely unnoticed by the media and political opponents. It bears mentioning that the FP party secretary Harri Vuorenpää had started his tenure by the end of August 2023 and was not as experienced as his predecessors. However, Vuorenpää’s role in the analysis on why the party underachieved in the EP2024 elections should not be overstressed.

Indeed, even as it can be argued that the FP did not moderate their stances on national policy issues towards those of their coalition partner, the National Coalition Party—as was indeed unnecessary from a voter-pleasing strategic point of view, since both parties had strongly committed to the government’s program—it was, however, unexpected and peculiar from a campaign strategy stance to attempt to overshadow the traditional pro-EU party by declaring itself superior in so-called Europe-positivity.

It can also be argued that the stance of being the most pro-Europe party in the country was considered an act of moderation as far as their EU policy was concerned. It is possible that the voters who loyally showed up for the FP during the parliamentary elections of 2023 and the presidential elections later were not convinced of this new direction—in addition to the fact that the FP voter base is the least interested in the EP elections, as is the case for the entire Finnish voter base.

Taking into consideration that the Finns Party candidate came in third place in Finland’s previous—and timewise very recent—presidential elections, all that can be stated at this point is that the zigzag, volatile, and effectively complete change in direction in terms of the rhetoric of the traditionally anti-EU party did not work. If anything, it remains a case in point of a populist party in a coalition government proving that their presence is not contagious to the non-populist parties, but on the contrary, the opposite happened. It is also a finding worthy of further research.

The hybrid threat posed by Russia, in terms of transporting immigrants and asylum seekers to Finland’s eastern border, was considered—and still is—more of a national and defence policy affair rather than something that directly concerns the EU. It should also be noted that the FP voter base prioritizes national, presidential, and lastly regional elections.

In conclusion, we suggest that the predicted far-right threat mobilized opposition party voters on a large scale. Even the Swedish People’s Party held on to their seat (which they were in danger of losing) at a time when their partnership in the Finnish government with the FP was widely criticized by their own electorate. The voter turnout in these elections—almost identical to the previous EP2019 elections—indicates that many FP voters stayed at home instead of casting their votes.

One of the interesting details to note is also the fact that the FP lost support in Lapland—an electoral district where they usually do well. The unprecedented electoral success of the Left Alliance leader Li Anderson also reflected in the results in the area, as she personally received 13.6% (7,049 votes). Additionally, the Centre Party (Keskusta) elected two female MEPs from Lapland, MP Katri Kulmuni and incumbent MEP Elsi Katainen. This can be seen as a less conservative move by the voters in Lapland.

As much as this result came as a surprise, even to the scholars who remained sceptical throughout the election about the so-called “Far right tsunami,” it should be noted that the FP still holds a strong position within national politics in the country and that these elections, with their surprising result, are too recent for us to draw any further conclusions about a far-right downfall in Finland.

Indeed, even as the FP faced the 2025 local and regional elections with challenges of a different nature (due to its core voter base and their unenthusiastic approach towards these elections) and even as they again underperformed greatly coming in at sixth place with an overall 7.6% vote share (overall 184 616 votes) and a 6.8% drop from previous elections it is not credible to announce a general degradation of the Finnish populist radical right, or even the Finns Party. As further analysis in upcoming research will show in greater detail whether these two elections the EP2024 and the following local and regional ones had any similarities as far as the FP party support is concerned, it has to be stated again that only as recently as in 2023 Riikka Purra led her party to an all-time victory in the parliamentary elections – an election which traditionally has been the one were the FP dominates. The future elections will provide more data for analysis in order to make conclusions of the Finnish far right in the long run. So far, there are no concrete indications which would lead us to state that a long-term demand for populist radical right parties would be fading away from the Finnish political landscape.

To conclude, the European Parliament elections of 2024 in Finland stand out as one of the interesting exceptions, as the FP steadily lost support in various constituencies against the most optimistic predictions. In the future, we researchers must remain in our current positions, where we do not feed the narratives often adopted by the liberal news media in which election X is either about the huge victory of the far right or the great defeat of liberal democracy, or vice versa. The issues leading to far-right support (steady and unsteady) are far more complex and multifaceted, as we know. The Finnish case also demonstrated a new emergence of the left in 2024.

 
The authors thank the Research Council of Finland (RCF) for co-funding the Trans-Atlantic Platform Consortium project “ENDURE: Inequalities, Community Resilience, and New Governance Modalities in a Post-Pandemic World” (funding number 352413).

 

(*) Yannick Lahti is a political scientist and a former postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Helsinki. Lahti obtained his PhD-degree in 2022 from the University of Bologna in Italy. In his research, he examined European populism, populist actors, and political communication during the European Union elections of 2019 within the Hybrid Media system. In his work Yannick Lahti departed from the consideration that as populism and populist rhetoric are challenging concepts to define – especially in relation to different media environments; they should be addressed and analyzed through the usage of a combination of methods and theoretical perspectives, namely Communication Studies, Corpus Linguistics, Political theory, Rhetoric and Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies. Recently Lahti was involved with Whirl of Knowledge project and until 2023 conducting research for the transatlantic ENDURE-project funded by the Finnish Academy (Suomen Akatemia). Now as an independent scholar with a funding of C. V. Åkerlund mediafoundation, Yannick Lahti is conducting further research on populist radical right politics and its impacts on democracy. Right now Lahti is also working together with award winning journalist Matti Mörttinen on their third collaboration: a book titled: Jäähyväiset demokratialle (A Farewell to Democracy) which will be published in spring 2026. The researcher-journalist pair has previously published two books called Populismin anatomia / The Anatomy of Populism (2023) and Politiikan pinnan vangit / The prisoners of political shallowness (2024) which both received critical and commercial acclaim in Finland.

(**) Emilia Palonen is Associate Professor, Senior University Lecturer in Political Science, University of Helsinki. Currently Emilia is on research leave as Programme Director in Datafication at the Helsinki Institute for Social Sciences and Humanities and as Leader of HEPPsinki research group. She is PI of Academy of Finland project WhiKnow (2019-2022), Kone Foundation project Now-Time Us Space (2020-24), European Commission funded DRad project (2020-2023), and Academy of Finland and other Trans-Atlantic Partnership project funders’ ENDURE exploring resilience in crisis (2022-2024). Palonen has been evaluated as fit for full and associate professor (2022). She received in 2015 a title of Docent (Adj./Ass. Prof.) in Political Science (spec. Cultural Politics), University of Jyväskylä, where has taught and collaborated in research projects.She is an engaged scholar in media and associations: She is an Executive Committee member and chair of the publications committee of the International Political Science Association (IPSA). She served in 2018-2022 as the Chair of the Finnish Political Science Association. She is a board member of the Finnish Federation of Learned Societies (2021-2023), and Treasurer of the Society of Scientists and Parliament Members, Tutkas ry. (2019-2023).Palonen is a discourse theorist and an expert on politics, polarisation and communication, populism and democracy, local participative governance and planning. She has been working on politics of memory in symbolic urban landscapes but also populist movements and even the far right. Besides her expertise on Hungary since 1999, she has been actively following Finnish politics and authors the EJPR Political Data Yearbook on Finland. Academically she is particularly interested in Europe but also engages worldwide.  She is an active and engaged scholar invited for talks. 

 

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MGP211

Mapping Global Populism — Panel XXI: Ethnic/Sectarian Politics and Populism in Iraq, Syria and Kurdish Regions

by HomeMultimediaVideos

Date/Time: Thursday, April 24, 2025 — 15:00-17:10 (CET)

Moderator

Dr. Ibrahim al-Marashi (Associate Professor of History, California State University).

Speakers

“Syrian Sunni Jihadi Chickens Home to Roost: Assad’s Fatal Gamble in Iraq,” by Dr. Reda Mahajar (Research Fellow at The Conflict Analysis Research Centre (CARC) at the University of Kent).

“Waves of Populism in Iraq,” by Hashim Hayder Khashan Al-Rekabi (Lecturer, University of Baghdad).

“Memory, Fear, and Sectarianism in Syria,” by Dr. Haian Dukhan (Lecturer in Politics & International Relations, SSSHL Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Teeside University).

“The Evolution and Mishaps of Kurdish Identity Politics Under Multiple Dominations,” by Rojin Mukriyan (PhD candidate in the department of Government and Politics at University College Cork, Ireland).

Selcuk Gultasli & Samuele Mazzolini

Dr. Mazzolini: Noboa Turns to Populism Not to Transform Ecuador, But to Survive

by MultimediaVideos

In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Samuele Mazzolini argues that Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa has embraced populism not as a vehicle for transformation, but as a strategy to maintain power amid crisis. Recently re-elected after a snap presidency, Noboa has relied on emergency decrees, militarized crackdowns, and anti-crime rhetoric. “Populism has simply served as a means to cling to power and bolster his personal image,” Dr. Mazzolini asserts. Despite branding himself as a technocrat, Noboa “lacks a coherent national project” and governs through “sheer improvisation.” Dr. Mazzolini warns that Ecuador is entering a “permanent state of exception,” with rising authoritarian tendencies and no clear roadmap for reform.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a sharply observed conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Samuele Mazzolini—Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice—offers a sobering analysis of Ecuador’s evolving political landscape under President Daniel Noboa. Recently re-elected in the April 2025 run-off, Noboa secured a full four-year term after what he called a “historic” victory. He originally came to power in November 2023 through a snap election and has since defined his presidency by launching a militarized crackdown on Ecuador’s powerful criminal gangs—an approach that has dominated his public image as the country became the most violent in the region.

Despite his win, Noboa’s left-wing challenger, Luisa González, rejected the result, alleging fraud without providing evidence. Against this backdrop of tension and insecurity, Mazzolini argues that Noboa’s political style is not grounded in reform, but in survival. “In Noboa’s case, [populism] has simply served as a means to cling to power and bolster his personal image,” he asserts.

Though Noboa projected a moderate and technocratic profile during his initial campaign, his presidency has taken a decisive right-wing populist turn. “He wasn’t the ‘security candidate.’ That was Jan Topić… But the very moment he took office, he took a different turn,” Dr. Mazzolini notes. Noboa’s embrace of penal populism—relying on military force and emergency powers—has so far failed to reduce violence. “Despite tough talk on crime and gangs, the rates haven’t improved,” Dr. Mazzolini observes.

Crucially, Dr. Mazzolini emphasizes the absence of a coherent political vision. “What are his views on industrial relations? Agricultural policy? Same-sex marriage?” he asks. “There are countless areas where he appears to have no defined position.” Unlike Rafael Correa, whose government—though polarizing—pursued a structured national project, Noboa seems adrift, leaning on improvised alliances and securitarian rhetoric.

As Dr. Mazzolini concludes, Noboa’s presidency appears less like a populist transition toward transformation, and more like the entrenchment of a permanent state of exception: “a deliberate effort to take advantage of the situation… because he saw the opportunity was ripe to consolidate his image.”

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Samuele Mazzolini.

Syria

Mapping Global Populism — Panel XXI: Ethnic & Sectarian Politics and Populism in Iraq, Syria and Kurdish Regions

by EventsPast Events

Date/Time: Thursday, April 24, 2025 — 15:00-17:10 (CET)

 

Click here to register!

 

Moderator

Dr. Ibrahim al-Marashi (Associate Professor of History, California State University).

Speakers

“Syrian Sunni Jihadi Chickens Home to Roost: Assad’s Fatal Gamble in Iraq,” by Dr. Reda Mahajar (Research Fellow at The Conflict Analysis Research Centre (CARC) at the University of Kent).

“Waves of Populism in Iraq,” by Hashim Hayder Khashan Al-Rekabi (Lecturer, University of Baghdad).

“Memory, Fear, and Sectarianism in Syria,” by Dr. Haian Dukhan (Lecturer in Politics & International Relations, SSSHL Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Teeside University).

“Gendered Politics and Women’s Status Under Iraqi, Syrian, and Kurdish Authorities,” by Dr. Shilan Fuad Hussain (Marie Sklodowska-Curie Researcher; Research Fellow at the Institute of Domestic Violence, Religion & Migration, UK).

“The Evolution and Mishaps of Kurdish Identity Politics Under Multiple Dominations,” by Rojin Mukriyan (PhD candidate in the department of Government and Politics at University College Cork, Ireland).

Click here to register!

Brief Biographies and Abstracts

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi is Associate Professor of Middle East History at California State University San Marcos, and an advisory board member of the International Security and Conflict Resolution (ISCOR) program at San Diego State University (SDSU), as well as an adjunct lecturer at its School of Public Health. He is also a visiting lecturer with the University of San Diego’s Department of Political Science and International Relations. Al-Marashi received his doctorate from the University of Oxford. He is the co-author of Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History (2008), The Modern History of Iraq (2016), and A Concise History of the Middle East (2024).

Syrian Sunni Jihadi Chickens Home to Roost: Assad’s Fatal Gamble in Iraq

Dr. Reda Mahajar is a research fellow at the Conflict Analysis Research Centre (CARC) at the University of Kent. His current postdoctoral research focuses on how the Hajj rituals reproduce the ‘Sunni’ and ‘Shia’ labels as categories of power in Western Europe. Dr. Mahajar earned his PhD in International Relations from the University of Kent. His PhD dissertation, titled “Shialism: The Historical Persistence of the Sunni-Shia Binary,” examines the historical persistence of the ‘Sunni’/‘Shia’ labels as constructs of power in the ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’ worlds, as well as in the ‘proverbial West.’Dr. Mahajar’s research interests include exploring the ontological, temporal, and epistemological assumptions that underpin conceptualizations of identities as categories of power in the fields of international relations, migration, Middle Eastern studies, and nationalism studies.

Waves of Populism in Iraq

Mr. Hashim Hayder Khashan Al-Rekabi is a lecturer at Baghdad University, where he teaches courses in behavioral statistics and introduction to political science. He also mentors senior students in drafting their capstone research projects. Additionally, he is the founder of the Platform Center for Sustainable Development (PSDIraq), which aims to establish a policy-oriented youth network to drive positive change through policy work. Al-Rekabi holds a Master’s degree in Comparative Politics from Western Illinois University.

Abstract: My presentation challenges the views that post-2003 Iraq should be studied in isolation and demonstrates that many of the pre-2003 dynamics impacted the post-2003 era, mainly populism. It sheds light on the three waves of populism in Iraq, the authoritarian populism of Saddam’s regime being the first, given that he was the leader of a secular and pan-Arab party but frequently used religion and nationalism strategically and selectively under certain conditions, creating the context of modern populism. The second wave is the ethno-sectarian populism post-2003 that created multiple populist actors who demonstrated their allegiance to parliamentary democracy but undermined it by their practices. The third and final wave this paper examines is the modern populism of post-2014, where insiders nurtured nationalist populism due to the declining appeal of sectarianism, the deep political divisions, and widespread disappointment. This paper is based on a field study measuring popular perception of post-2003 political systems, including populist tendencies, level of trust, and other demographic and democratic factors.” 

Memory, Fear, and Sectarianism in Syria

Dr. Haian Dukhan is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Teesside University and a Fellow at the Centre for Syrian Studies, University of St Andrews. He is the author of State and Tribes in Syria: Informal Alliances and Conflict Patterns (Routledge, 2019) and co-editor of Spoils of War in the Arab East: Reconditioning Society and Polity in Conflict (Bloomsbury, 2024). His research focuses on the international relations of the Middle East, with a particular emphasis on the role of non-state actors in armed conflicts. His work has appeared in the International Journal of Middle East Studies, Nations and Nationalism, Small Wars and Insurgency, and others. He has also authored multiple policy reports for USAID, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Middle East Institute, and others on issues related to sectarianism, extremism, and forced migration. Previously, he taught politics and international relations at the universities of Leicester, Edinburgh, and Queen Mary University of London, and held research positions at the Central European University in Austria and Roskilde University in Denmark.

Abstract: The Syrian uprising and subsequent civil war have been extensively studied with a predominant emphasis on sectarianism between the Sunni and Alawite sects. This narrow focus overlooks the profound influence of other religious and ethnic elements within Syrian society. My Presentation aims to broaden the analytical lens by examining the position and attitudes of Christians in the Al-Hasakah governorate regarding the Syrian uprising and opposition forces. My presentation addresses two key inquiries: first, the factors influencing Christians’ position in Al-Hasakah regarding the Syrian uprising, and second, the ramifications of these positions on intercommunal relationships in the region. I will argue that the collective memory of fear experienced by Christians, manipulated by the Syrian regime, has contributed to the emergence of “sectarianism from below” and “sectarianism from above.” The former reflects the construction of sectarian identities by Christians in response to discrimination and marginalization, while the latter pertains to influential institutions perpetuating sectarian identities and divisions. My findings highlight the complex interplay of factors shaping communal attitudes and relations during times of upheaval and conflict.

Gendered Politics and Women’s Status Under Iraqi, Syrian, and Kurdish Authorities

Dr. Shilan Fuad Hussain is dedicated to advancing gender equality and advocating women’s rights. She is a Fellow at the Institute of Domestic Violence, Religion & Migration, and The Integrity Centre. She is an Associate Editor for Brill and Routledge and a Senior Consultant for gender-related societal issues. She is an Associate Fellow of the Higher Education Academy. She was previously a Marie Sklodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow in Gender Studies and Cultural Analysis (UKRI), a Visiting Fellow at the Washington Kurdish Institute (U.S.), and a Doctoral Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Switzerland), where she has published several papers and received tailored training. She holds a Master’s Degree in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Bologna and a PhD in Cultural Analysis from the University of Urbino (Italy). She has developed a track record in Cultural Analysis alongside Middle Eastern Studies. She is an interdisciplinary academic and works on a variety of topics, including cultural representation, production, and practices; gender-based violence, women’s human rights and empowerment; state policies enhancing female equality. She has published 20 articles in peer-reviewed academic journals, 3 special issues, 4 book chapters, one co-edited book, 12 open-access articles online, 10 op-eds; one single-authored book is forthcoming, and an edited book and edited Volume. Personal website: www.shilanfuadhussain.com.

Abstract: This study examines the intersection of gendered politics and women’s status under Iraqi, Syrian, and Kurdish authorities, analysing how political structures, legal frameworks, and societal norms shape women’s rights and participation in governance. Utilizing a comparative approach, the research draws on legal documents, policy analyses, and interviews with activists, policymakers, and scholars to assess the extent to which state and non-state actors influence gender dynamics. The findings reveal stark contrasts between authoritarian regimes, semi-autonomous governance, and stateless political movements in their approaches to women’s rights. In Iraq and Syria, shifting power structures, sectarian conflicts, and legal pluralism have led to inconsistent protections for women, often subordinating gender equality to nationalist or religious agendas. In contrast, Kurdish-led administrations have promoted more progressive gender policies, though challenges remain in implementation and enforcement. The study argues that women’s status is not only a reflection of legal rights but also of broader political ideologies and power struggles. By situating gender within the framework of state-building and governance, this research contributes to the understanding of how political authority affects women’s agency, representation, and security in conflict-affected and transitional societies.

The Evolution and Mishaps of Kurdish Identity Politics Under Multiple Dominations

Rojin Mukriyan is a PhD candidate in the Department of Government and Politics at University College Cork, Ireland. She has also obtained a BA and MSc from University College Cork after fleeing from Iran for political reasons in 2014. For her BA, she double majored in Philosophy and Politics, and wrote a dissertation on the role of ontological insecurity in Turkey’s treatment of the Kurds. She then obtained an MSc in Government and Politics from UCC with a thesis on the application of classical republican conceptions of domination and political liberty to the Kurds of Rojava (West Kurdistan). Presently, her PhD research project is focused on a thorough analysis of jailed Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan’s conceptions of democratic confederalism and democratic civilization.

Rojin’s main research areas are in political theory and Middle Eastern politics, especially Kurdish politics. She has published articles in the Journal of International Political Theory, Philosophy and Social Criticism, and Theoria. Her research has thus far focused on the areas of Kurdish liberty, Kurdish statehood, and Kurdish political friendship. She has published many think tank commentaries and reports on recent political developments in eastern Kurdistan (Rojhelat), or north-western Iran. She has also frequently appeared on a variety of Kurdish and Persian language news channels. 

Abstract: This presentation conducts a critical comparative analysis of populism by examining the PYD-led Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) alongside the PUK and KDP-led Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Drawing upon Ernesto Laclau’s  conceptualization of populism as a strategy for hegemonic struggle and Jan-Werner Müller’s characterization of populism as a ‘permanent shadow’ over representative democracy, this study refrains from adopting a monolithic definition of populism. Instead, it establishes a set of criteria for assessing whether the DAANES or the KRG can be classified as populist governments. The investigation explores the theoretical and ideological frameworks underpinning both political entities, bolstered by qualitative data derived from their public speeches, publications, and policy documents. The analysis argues that DAANES can be viewed as exhibiting left populist characteristics that challenges both existing state institutions and the rise of Islamist extremism. In contrast, the KRG, dominated by the PUK and KDP, does not exhibit the characteristics of left populism, as it fails to challenge the existing system or promote an inclusive notion of peoplehood aimed at equality and freedom. Although some figures within the KRG may display populist tendencies, the KDP and PUK are predominantly formed and controlled by two elite families, thereby offering no anti-establishment prospects; consequently, they do not embody right-wing populism either. It is likely better to view both parties as exhibiting the expected neoliberal tendencies of parties inclined to use the state as a means for laundering their private interests. In turn, following Chantal Mouffe’s line of argument, this paper asserts that the left populism found in the DAANES could effectively challenge the corrupt and clientelist governance within the KRG if it found support within the Kurdish region of Iraq. This paper aims to contribute to a nuanced understanding of populism within the context of Kurdish politics. By doing so, it enriches the field of Kurdish political studies by offering a comprehensive analysis of populism in a context that has been insufficiently explored, thereby advancing the broader discourse on populism.

Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa addresses supporters of his ADN party. Photo: Miles Astray.

Dr. Mazzolini: Noboa Turns to Populism Not to Transform Ecuador, But to Survive

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Samuele Mazzolini argues that Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa has embraced populism not as a vehicle for transformation, but as a strategy to maintain power amid crisis. Recently re-elected after a snap presidency, Noboa has relied on emergency decrees, militarized crackdowns, and anti-crime rhetoric. “Populism has simply served as a means to cling to power and bolster his personal image,” Dr. Mazzolini asserts. Despite branding himself as a technocrat, Noboa “lacks a coherent national project” and governs through “sheer improvisation.” Dr. Mazzolini warns that Ecuador is entering a “permanent state of exception,” with rising authoritarian tendencies and no clear roadmap for reform.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a sharply observed conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Samuele Mazzolini—Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice—offers a sobering analysis of Ecuador’s evolving political landscape under President Daniel Noboa. Recently re-elected in the April 2025 run-off, Noboa secured a full four-year term after what he called a “historic” victory. He originally came to power in November 2023 through a snap election and has since defined his presidency by launching a militarized crackdown on Ecuador’s powerful criminal gangs—an approach that has dominated his public image as the country became the most violent in the region.

Despite his win, Noboa’s left-wing challenger, Luisa González, rejected the result, alleging fraud without providing evidence. Against this backdrop of tension and insecurity, Mazzolini argues that Noboa’s political style is not grounded in reform, but in survival. “In Noboa’s case, [populism] has simply served as a means to cling to power and bolster his personal image,” he asserts.

Though Noboa projected a moderate and technocratic profile during his initial campaign, his presidency has taken a decisive right-wing populist turn. “He wasn’t the ‘security candidate.’ That was Jan Topić… But the very moment he took office, he took a different turn,” Dr. Mazzolini notes. Noboa’s embrace of penal populism—relying on military force and emergency powers—has so far failed to reduce violence. “Despite tough talk on crime and gangs, the rates haven’t improved,” Dr. Mazzolini observes.

Crucially, Dr. Mazzolini emphasizes the absence of a coherent political vision. “What are his views on industrial relations? Agricultural policy? Same-sex marriage?” he asks. “There are countless areas where he appears to have no defined position.” Unlike Rafael Correa, whose government—though polarizing—pursued a structured national project, Noboa seems adrift, leaning on improvised alliances and securitarian rhetoric.

As Dr. Mazzolini concludes, Noboa’s presidency appears less like a populist transition toward transformation, and more like the entrenchment of a permanent state of exception: “a deliberate effort to take advantage of the situation… because he saw the opportunity was ripe to consolidate his image.”

Dr. Samuele Mazzolini —Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Samuele Mazzolini.

Securitarian Populism, Not Technocratic Reform

Professor Mazzolini, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How should Daniel Noboa’s recent electoral victory be interpreted within the broader trajectory of populism in Ecuador? Does it signify a new phase in the evolution of populist politics in the country, or a rearticulation of existing populist paradigms under a technocratic-securitarian guise?

Dr. Samuele Mazzolini: There has certainly been a shift toward a kind of penal populism—one that places heavy emphasis on delivering security, increasing national safety, and attempting to curb the unchecked expansion of criminal gangs in Ecuador. So yes, it is clearly a rearticulation of populism under a securitarian guise. 

However, I wouldn’t say there’s much technocracy at play. If you look at Noboa’s first year and a half in office, it’s been marked by sheer incompetence, indolence, and a general lack of professionalism. There hasn’t been much evidence of technocratic governance—despite the polished image he projects. 

Daniel Noboa is a young figure, fluent in English, US-educated, and he carries himself well. But if you examine his actual decisions and decrees over the past 18 months, they leave a lot to be desired. So, again, I don’t see technocracy; I see a strong security discourse that, in practice, hasn’t delivered. If you look at the numbers, despite tough talk on crime and gangs, the rates haven’t improved. Ecuador remains a very unsafe place, and the population continues to live under the grip of organized crime.

Do you see Noboa’s re-election and hardline tactics as signaling a right-wing variant of the populist-institutional tensions you identified in Rafael Correa’s government?

Dr. Samuele Mazzolini: Certainly. When populist politics is prolonged, it becomes increasingly difficult to construct a stable institutional framework. To put it plainly: unless you succeed in redefining the identity of your adversaries, establishing durable institutions becomes a serious challenge. This requires a transition from a polarizing strategy to one that reintegrates opponents into the emerging order. It’s essential to ensure that the system you build does not unravel or get overturned the moment you leave power.

In that sense, yes, a parallel with Correa can be drawn. Under Correa, there were clear tensions between populist rhetoric and the broader project of institution-building. However, I see two key differences. First, Noboa has been in power for a very short time—just about a year and a half—which is hardly sufficient, even for a populist, to fully articulate a political vision or begin the process of reintegrating adversaries.

Second, and more importantly, Noboa doesn’t appear to have a project for the country. His governance so far seems driven by sheer improvisation. When he was first elected in 2023, I don’t think he expected to win. My impression is that he aimed to perform well to position himself for future elections, but unexpectedly found himself president.

Historically, the Ecuadorian right has lacked a solid, coherent project for the country—aside from capturing the state and bending it to create a more favorable environment for business. In that sense, I doubt he has any clear long-term vision. Let’s see how his plan for a Constituent Assembly develops. He apparently wants to change the current constitutional framework—reversing the progressive constitution drafted under Correa in the early 2000s, which emphasized rights, state planning, and redistribution.

Many fear that his goal is to do away with these provisions and instead draft a new constitution that minimizes rights and reduces the state’s role in planning and redistribution. The intention seems to be to create a more business-friendly climate for both foreign and domestic investors. In short, it looks like a push to take the country back to the neoliberal era.

Noboa’s Populist Signature: Militarization Without Accountability

A soldier peers out from a tank outside a campaign event for Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa. Photo: Miles Astray.

How does President Noboa’s militarized crackdown on crime reflect elements of penal populism, and in what ways does it diverge from traditional Latin American law-and-order populism?

Dr. Samuele Mazzolini: A major difference lies in the involvement of the armed forces. If you recall, from the very beginning of his mandate, he declared a state of conflict—he said there was a war going on with criminal gangs—and brought in the armed forces to collaborate with the police in the fight against organized crime. That’s something new. However, it should be noted that the armed forces are not properly trained for patrolling the streets; their training is very different. So I’m not sure how effective they are in that context, and so far, the statistics do not seem to suggest they’ve been particularly useful.

Another major concern is the blatant disregard for human rights and international law. Take, for instance, the case of the four boys from Las Malvinas, a neighborhood in Guayaquil, who were kidnapped, tortured, and brutally killed by the armed forces. And that is just one example—it reflects a broader climate of impunity for the military and police acting under presidential orders. There have been numerous other reports of abuse and extrajudicial disappearances—people who simply vanish—many of whom have no ties to organized crime. A significant number of these victims are Afro-Ecuadorian or individuals with darker skin tones, introducing a deeply troubling racialized dimension to the violence. 

What’s even more alarming and horrifying is the way Noboa’s government has shielded the armed forces and police when such cases have come to light. His handling of the case of the four boys from Las Malvinas reveals a complete disregard for human rights. Now that he has won the election, I believe he will feel even more empowered to continue these measures, while the armed forces are likely to feel increasingly emboldened and protected in carrying out further abuses.

Another example I want to highlight—one that also illustrates how Noboa interprets populism—concerns a serious violation of international law. Take the case of former Vice President Jorge Glas, who had been subjected to lawfare under previous administrations, including the current one. At one point, he was free and sought refuge in the Mexican Embassy in December of last year, after it appeared that Mexican authorities were prepared to grant him asylum. What followed was extraordinary: Ecuadorian police forces stormed the embassy, forcibly removed Glas, and reportedly mistreated embassy personnel. This was a clear and blatant violation of international law. Noboa clearly showed no concern. You might not agree with how the Mexican authorities handled the situation, but there are certain lines that simply should not be crossed. Noboa clearly doesn’t care. By violating international law so blatantly, he presented himself to the public as a leader who doesn’t hesitate to take bold, forceful action. In doing so, he bolstered his image—but in my view, it was a reckless and dangerous step.

Authoritarian Populism Disguised as Emergency Governance

Can Noboa’s extensive use of emergency decrees and military deployments—especially during the election—be seen as a textbook case of authoritarian populism? What democratic vulnerabilities does this strategy expose?

Dr. Samuele Mazzolini: Yes, definitely. We’re witnessing a clear erosion of democratic standards with the emergence of deeply concerning authoritarian tendencies. The continuous state of emergency, the repeated trampling on the rule of law—these are patterns that go beyond Ecuador and are part of a broader trend in Latin American politics. There has always been a tense relationship between populism and the rule of law, that’s for sure. But I think Noboa is taking it a step further.

We’ve seen extensive use of judicial and electoral institutions for his own political ends. As I mentioned earlier, he has guaranteed impunity for the actions of the armed forces and the police. We also saw the strategic use of state-issued vouchers right before the election to secure electoral support—classic clientelist, patronage politics. All of these elements point to a serious erosion of democracy in Ecuador, and it’s something that must be watched very closely.

The only remaining institutional check on Noboa at this point is the National Assembly. He does not have an overwhelming majority there, so he will face resistance in pushing his agenda through formal channels. Still, as we’ve seen many times, there are ways around the Assembly—whether through buying off deputies, forming opportunistic coalitions with new parties, or simply pushing forward presidential decrees.

In short, yes—this is very much a textbook case of authoritarian populism, carried out under the pretext of combating criminal gangs.

Securitizing Crisis to Consolidate Power

Do you interpret Noboa’s invocation of an “internal armed conflict” and the framing of criminal gangs as terrorist threats as part of a broader global trend of securitizing social crises through populist narratives?

Dr. Samuele Mazzolini: Right-wing populism has long prioritized the promise of law and order, placing strong emphasis on crime—whether real or perceived. Often, it is not actual crime statistics but the perception of insecurity, amplified by media narratives, that shapes political responses. In Ecuador’s case, however, the threat is tangible. Crime is a major issue, and the situation has spiraled out of control. The country currently has the highest homicide rate in the region and one of the highest globally. Noboa has taken advantage of this by going a step further—invoking the notion of an “internal armed conflict” and framing criminal gangs as terrorist threats. These groups are indeed violent and organized, but his approach reflects how power is being exercised.

From an analytical standpoint, social crises and security crises are not synonymous, though they often intersect. One may contribute to the other, but the relationship is not automatic. Ecuador has long suffered from poverty and poor economic indicators; these challenges predate the current security crisis. What we are witnessing now is a specific interpretation of how to address security threats—one that cannot be fully explained by social conditions alone. In Ecuador’s case, several additional factors are at play: the partial end of Colombia’s armed conflict, the decision by Mexican cartels to use Ecuadorian gangs as local proxies, and the retrenchment of the state since the Correa era. Following Correa’s departure, state institutions have become less present and less embedded in local territories, creating space for international criminal organizations to establish and consolidate power.

So, as you can see, this is a multifaceted problem that security experts are actively analyzing. Noboa’s brand of right-wing populism has seized upon it to construct a tough-on-crime persona. But, as I’ve already mentioned, the methods he’s employed—particularly the carte blanche given to armed forces and police—don’t appear to have delivered effective results. To address a security crisis meaningfully, you also need to resolve underlying social issues. What’s needed is a far more integrated, comprehensive approach.

Is Noboa’s security offensive more a case of populist responsiveness to widespread public fear, or is it better seen as a calculated strategy for consolidating executive power under the guise of emergency?

Dr. Samuele Mazzolini: It can be seen both ways. One doesn’t exclude the other. What is striking here is that there seems to be a deliberate effort to take advantage of the situation—a sort of “going populist” because he saw the opportunity was ripe to consolidate his image. When he was a candidate in the previous elections, he came across as a moderate—someone who aimed to rise above the cleavage between Correísmo and anti-Correísmo. He presented himself as a centrist, with even some left-leaning ideas, showing particular concern for the poor.

He wasn’t the “security candidate.” That was Jan Topic—a different figure entirely, who boasted about having worked as a mercenary in various war zones. Of course, everyone talked about crime—it’s been a recurring theme in Ecuadorian electoral campaigns over the last five years—but security didn’t appear to be Noboa’s strongest point, nor the reason people chose him over others.

However, the very moment he took office—and after a fleeting parliamentary collaboration with Correísmo—he took a different turn. He adopted a right-wing populist stance, emphasizing a tough-on-crime approach through extensive deployment of the armed forces, the use of emergency decrees, curfews, and similar measures.

Populism Without a Project Becomes a Tool for Survival

You’ve characterized populism as a “transitional device.” In Noboa’s case, is this transition leading toward a reconfigured institutional logic—or is it entrenching a permanent state of exception?

Dr. Samuele Mazzolini: Yes, I have characterized populism as a “transitional device”—but that’s, of course, when you conceive of populism as a strategy tied to a broader project, a vision for steering society in a particular direction. In that sense, populism serves as a transitional mechanism toward a defined societal transformation. However, not all populists understand or employ populism in that way.

In Noboa’s case, it has simply served as a means to cling to power and bolster his personal image. So yes, I do think he is entrenching a permanent state of exception. We’ll see what happens next—I’m particularly curious whether he’ll try to normalize his authority through the Constituent Assembly. But as I mentioned earlier, I don’t see him as someone with a coherent vision for the country. What are his views on industrial relations? Agricultural policy? Same-sex marriage? There are countless areas where he appears to have no defined position.

This stands in stark contrast to Correa’s project. Whatever one may think of it, that administration had a plan. Its implementation had flaws, certainly, but at least it pursued a clear direction. Noboa, by contrast, seems adrift—focused only on defending his own wealth and that of his class.

In your work on Podemos and M5S, you stress how populism’s success depends on context. Does Noboa’s popularity, despite rising violence and economic decline, suggest that right-wing populism thrives better under structural crisis than left variants like Correísmo?

Guillermo Lasso, presidential candidate of the CREO-SUMA alliance, speaks at an election rally in Quito, Ecuador, on March 26, 2017. Photo: Pablo Hidalgo.

Dr. Samuele Mazzolini:  It must be noted that right-wing populism benefits from significantly more favorable media coverage. In most cases, powerful interests tend to be far more lenient—and even benevolent—toward right-wing populist actors. The kind of pressure they exert is markedly different from what left-wing variants face. In this sense, right-wing populism is often better equipped to withstand structural crises, constraints, and even blatant shortcomings than its left-wing counterparts.

Additionally, it’s important to consider that Noboa has only been in power for a relatively short time. Many people might think, “He’s only been in office for a year and a half—let’s give him some credit and see how he performs over the next few years.”

Another important point is that, despite Noboa’s poor performance during this period, anti-Correísmo remains a powerful political sentiment. Similar dynamics can be observed in other countries—for instance, strong anti-PT sentiment in Brazil or anti-Kirchnerismo in Argentina. These are not coherent political forces—they’re heterogeneous—but they are united in their strong opposition to former left-wing leaders, for a variety of reasons I won’t delve into here. However, once this broad demographic finds a figure who gains some popularity, they’re often willing to extend that figure a political blank check.

Until Noboa, the right wing in Ecuador was highly fragmented. First, there was Guillermo Lasso, who quickly squandered his initial popularity. In the previous election, multiple right-wing candidates competed for prominence. Now, a single figure has emerged. Interestingly, Noboa has undergone a shift. While he was always opposed to Correísmo, he wasn’t initially a staunch anti-Correísta and didn’t emphasize that stance heavily. Now, however, it has become a central theme of his rhetoric. He polarizes the country by framing the political landscape as a battle between good and evil. As he put it the day after the elections: on one side, the good forces; on the other, the evil ones—into which he groups criminal gangs, Correa, his allies, and his candidate, Luisa González. He draws a clear equivalence between them.

That rhetoric has been strongly supported by the media, which has—without any evidence—suggested that Correísmo is tied to drug trafficking and criminal networks. That’s classic populist rhetoric, and it’s paying off. So yes, I do think that, for the time being, even in the face of structural crises, Noboa can maintain high popularity. But let’s see what happens next.

Populists Govern Through Deals, Not Durable Coalitions

Do Noboa’s coalition maneuvers—including fleeting alliances with Correístas—represent pragmatic populist adaptation, or are they symptomatic of Ecuador’s deep political fragmentation?

Dr. Samuele Mazzolini: Populists need to ensure they can actually govern. Remember the example of Alexis Tsipras in Greece back in 2014. The circumstances forced him to form a parliamentary alliance with a right-wing party. Also, as I mentioned before, the initial period of Noboa’s time in power can’t really be considered fully populist. So I think it’s quite typical for populists—especially those without solid backing in parliament—to seek temporary alliances as a way to navigate governance.

Another, much riskier route is what Correa did back in 2007. He didn’t have a majority in parliament—actually, he had no presence at all, since he didn’t run any parliamentary candidates—yet he won the presidency. What he did was call for the election of a Constituent Assembly, which then overrode the National Assembly. In that way, the National Assembly was bypassed. It was a very risky gamble that could have backfired, but in the end, it worked and paved the way for his political rise. However, that’s not something all populist leaders can easily replicate—especially because organizing elections for a Constituent Assembly means you need to win an overwhelming majority.

Let’s see now what happens in parliament and whether Noboa will consider something similar. If he faces significant problems in the National Assembly, he might want to pursue a strategy like Correa’s. I’m just speculating here—there are no current rumors of that sort—but under Correa, the Constituent Assembly took over standard legislative tasks during its term, so that could well be an option.

And lastly, Professor Mazzolini, corruption scandals like Metástasis and Purga have revealed links between state actors and organized crime. How should we understand this intertwinement through the lens of populist governance and criminal co-governance?

Dr. Samuele Mazzolini: To be fair, I’m not so sure populism has much to do with this. If you look at the two scandals, the individuals involved included some politicians, but were mostly state officials—particularly within the judiciary and police—who colluded with organized crime. So I’m not convinced populism is central to this dynamic. It seems more closely tied to weak state institutions, which have historically been fragile and vulnerable to collusion with criminal groups.

Now, the situation is even more dire, as these criminal organizations have become significantly more threatening. Imagine a peripheral judge who is being bribed and simultaneously threatened with violence against himself and his family. If the state lacks the strength to provide protection, if it doesn’t offer stable career paths or a strong institutional culture for its officials, it becomes far more susceptible to this kind of corruption and infiltration.

So again, I wouldn’t necessarily bring populism into the picture here. Honestly, I don’t think it plays a significant role.

Protests in Turkey.

The Erdogan Regime and Its Future Amid Mass Protests: Prospects for Change?

by CommentariesEconomicsEditor’s ChoiceHome

Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political journey reflects a dramatic transformation—from a reform-minded leader once hailed as a model for Muslim democracies to an autocrat presiding over a deeply polarized and economically fragile Turkey. His consolidation of power, particularly after the 2016 coup attempt, has ushered in a regime marked by institutional erosion, economic mismanagement, and authoritarian repression. Recent mass protests sparked by the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu highlight growing public resistance, yet the broader trajectory remains one of democratic backsliding. Erdogan has found space to entrench his rule in an increasingly multipolar world, with Western pressure diluted by competing geopolitical priorities. The critical question now is whether domestic mobilization can meaningfully challenge this entrenched authoritarianism.

By Ibrahim Ozturk 

Populist rhetoric, which denounces the deficiencies of the established order while claiming to embody the will of “the people,” is inherently problematic. Populist leaders typically emerge from within a system of rules, institutions, values, and routines—even if that system is imperfect. Once in power, they frequently seek to undermine the structures that enabled their ascent, engaging in arbitrary and opportunistic governance. Confronted with the inevitable challenges of effective administration, their policies often fail to fulfill their promises and increasingly veer towards autocracy. 

The central irony of populism lies in its capacity to mobilize marginalized or resentful constituencies by implying that the prosperity and freedom typically associated with rule-based institutional governance can instead be achieved through contingent modes of rule—marked by unpredictability, uncertainty, and the personalized authority of charismatic leadership.

Even more concerning is the global diffusion of these populist ‘illusions.’ They have gained traction not only in advanced, affluent societies such as the United States and across Europe—despite the historical entrenchment of robust welfare state institutions—but also in major developing countries of the Global South, including Brazil, Hungary, India, Russia, and Turkey, where similar narratives have found fertile ground.

In the case of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has at times been cited by social scientists as an exemplar of ‘positive’ or ‘progressive’ populism, particularly in light of the early wave of comprehensive reforms undertaken during his initial years in power. However, his governance trajectory over the subsequent decade has increasingly veered toward a regressive and authoritarian model. Notably, following the 2011 general elections—which secured him a third consecutive term—his reliance on contingent and arbitrary modes of decision-making, marked by repetitive ‘trial and error’ and ‘learning by doing’ strategies, contributed to systemic rent-seeking and widespread corruption. These dynamics, in turn, played a significant role in precipitating a deepening economic crisis.

Multiple independent sources suggest that, following the revelation of widespread government corruption during police investigations between December 17 and 25, 2013, the Turkish state apparatus under President Erdogan orchestrated or capitalized on the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016. In its aftermath, and under the guise of heightened security imperatives, Erdogan moved to dismantle the constitutional system of checks and balances, culminating in the 2018 transition to a de facto one-man rule. Much like the instrumentalization of the Reichstag fire in Weimar Germany, this episode marked a turning point that ushered in a prolonged era of political instability and economic decline.

From Democratic Leadership to Absolute Authoritarianism: The Political Trajectory of Erdogan

Lord Acton famously observed that ‘absolute power corrupts absolutely,’ underscoring the inherent risks of unchecked authority in enabling corruption and authoritarianism. This insight resonates strongly with the trajectory of the Erdogan regime, which, after eroding its electoral viability through manipulative tactics and the strategic distribution of financial incentives disguised as ‘election bonuses,’ has increasingly moved to suppress direct opposition and compromise the integrity of the electoral process—ultimately at the expense of the public.

Beyond the prolonged pretrial detention of civil society figure Osman Kavala, attorney Selcuk Kozagacli, and parliamentarian Serafettin Can Atalay, the Erdogan regime has systematically targeted political adversaries across the ideological spectrum—from left-Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtas to right-nationalist party leader Professor Umit Ozdag—often in the absence of substantive judicial proceedings. The latest escalation—the pretrial detention of Ekrem Imamoglu, Mayor of Istanbul, one of the world’s largest metropolitan centers—has significantly exceeded the limits of societal tolerance, triggering a sharp upsurge in public outrage. Imamoglu’s arrest on March 19, 2025, has provoked widespread condemnation: citizens have flooded the streets of Turkey’s major cities, university students have launched campus protests, and demands for ‘rights, law, and justice’ resonate across all social media platforms.

Let us begin with a set of critical questions: How did the Justice and Development Party (AKP), after a decade of seemingly successful governance between 2003 and 2013, descend into authoritarianism and preside over profound economic and political deterioration? How can we account for the stark contrast between President Erdogan’s two political trajectories—first, as a leader widely hailed as a model for the Islamic world, steering a ‘Muslim yet secular, democratic, modern, and European-oriented’ nation with a liberalizing market economy; and later, as the chief architect of accelerated Putinization, complete authoritarianism, and systemic economic decline?

More critically, the question now is: Where is Erdogan’s trajectory headed, particularly in light of the legitimacy afforded by the global rise of authoritarian right-wing populism—most notably in the United States and increasingly within the European Union—amid escalating challenges related to security and migration? In this context, Erdogan occupies a strategically pivotal position. What values, normative frameworks, and strategic latitude does the emerging multipolar world order afford him? Is Turkey gradually evolving into a new ‘Iron Curtain’ state within a reconfigured Cold War landscape—defined by transactional, interest-based relations with its traditional US and EU allies? As some have suggested, was the centennial of the Turkish Republic, founded by Ataturk in 1923, merely a symbolic intermission—now giving way to a neo-Sultanist order governed by a singular authority, one unrestrained by modern institutional checks or even the fixed doctrinal constraints of Sharia, thus allowing for unprecedented levels of conditionality, contingency, and arbitrariness?

In a comprehensive analysis I authored for Project Syndicate and Al Jazeera following Erdogan’s third general election victory in 2011, I acknowledged his government’s relative ‘economic miracle’ but concluded with a note of cautious skepticism: ‘The big question is how Erdogan will use this increasing power in the coming period.’ In the years since, Erdogan’s governance has offered considerable clarity regarding his long-term ambitions—developments that can be analytically divided into three distinct subperiods.

Episode One (2003–2013): The More Orthodox, the Greater the Success

The two successive analyses referenced above emphasized that during the AKP’s first decade in power (2003–2013), the implementation of comprehensive reforms aligned with the European Union accession agenda—coupled with the oversight of the IMF and World Bank—catalyzed substantial economic growth, largely driven by a notable rise in productivity for the first time in decades. In addition to favorable global liquidity conditions, Erdogan’s strong electoral legitimacy and effective leadership further reinforced this period of economic and political consolidation.

Despite rapid growth, the surge in productivity and currency appreciation—both closely tied to capital inflows—underpinned Turkey’s macroeconomic transformation. Decades of chronic inflation, which had hovered in triple digits in the early 2000s, declined to single digits by 2005, while income distribution improved markedly. Supported by wide-ranging structural reforms and sustained macroeconomic stability, the European Union officially recognized Turkey as a ‘functioning market economy’ in 2006. During this period, Turkey’s performance outpaced that of many peers in emerging markets. Declining risk premiums and an increasingly favorable investment climate ushered in a wave of foreign capital across nearly all categories—from long-term credit to record foreign direct investment (FDI) levels. This capital surge was driven by privatization initiatives, mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and substantial greenfield investments.

Source: World Bank data set.

However, this growth model soon revealed its structural limitations. Turkey failed to consolidate its early gains due to emerging signs of reform fatigue, policy reversals, and a gradual shift away from the European Union accession framework after 2007. Additionally, the model became increasingly reliant on short-term foreign capital inflows and debt-fueled expansion, while economic growth was driven largely by currency-induced consumption booms and a surge in construction and service sectors—rather than high-value-added manufacturing. This pattern of deindustrialization rendered the economy particularly vulnerable to external shocks, as evidenced during the global financial crises of 2008 and 2009. As a result, Erdogan entered his second term amid growing policy uncertainty and strategic drift.

Episode Two: Experimenting with a Sui Generis Model

During Erdogan’s second term (2013–2018), a series of significant policy shifts deepened his alignment with loyalist business elites, notably through the preferential allocation of state contracts and the consolidation of crony capitalist networks. The corruption investigations of December 17–25, 2013, exposed the extent of this system, triggering an intensification of political crackdowns and a decisive turn toward authoritarianism. Systematic attacks on institutional autonomy—particularly targeting the judiciary and the Central Bank—undermined the rule of law and eroded policy credibility. Economic growth slowed to a range of 3–5%, while political unrest, exemplified by the mass Gezi Park protests and the controversial 2016 coup attempt (widely seen as orchestrated or exploited by Erdogan), exacerbated instability. Market volatility intensified, compounded by rising US interest rates and Erdogan’s growing interference in monetary and fiscal policy, which together eroded investor confidence, prompted capital flight, and accelerated the depreciation of the Turkish lira (₺). Despite ongoing flagship infrastructure projects—such as the Istanbul Airport and Kanal Istanbul—that remained central to Erdogan’s economic narrative, Turkey shifted from a trajectory of reform-led growth to one of deepening economic and institutional uncertainty, primarily driven by the consolidation of authoritarian governance. This pivotal second period was catalyzed by the revelations of the 2013 corruption investigations.

Despite experiencing his first electoral setback on June 7, 2015, President Erdogan not only obstructed the formation of a coalition government but also exploited a climate of fear—amplified by a series of leveraged terrorist attacks—to regain electoral support under the guise of restoring ‘stability,’ ultimately securing victory in the snap elections of November 2015. This trajectory culminated in the aftermath of the controversial coup attempt on July 15, 2016, which Erdogan leveraged to consolidate his authority further. The event served as a pivotal pretext for the contested and coercively implemented regime transformation of 2018, marking the onset of his third term under a newly centralized executive presidential system.

Source: Author’s compilation from national and international datasets.

 

Episode Three (2018–Present): Crossing the Rubicon with Heterodoxy

Following the comprehensive dismantling of institutional checks and balances through the formal institutionalization of the presidential system in 2018, President Erdogan departed from conventional economic orthodoxy in favor of what he termed a “homemade indigenous model with a nationalistic outlook,”—a framework rooted in heterodox and highly politicized economic policies. The most prominent indicators of this period in the economic sphere included the politicized capture of key institutions such as the state statistical agencies and the Central Bank, accompanied by sustained political pressure that severely undermined their autonomy. Economic policymaking became increasingly unmoored from rational, evidence-based frameworks and was instead dictated by short-term political imperatives. From 2021 onward, this phase was marked by aggressive currency manipulation, credit rationing, the provision of subsidies through public banks, and a range of direct and indirect rent-transfer mechanisms benefiting political insiders aligned with the ruling elite.

The consequences were severe: hyperinflation, wage erosion, currency collapse, and escalating economic instability. The Turkish lira lost over 90% of its value between 2018 and March 2025. Inflation, which stood at 20% in 2021, soared to 85% in 2022, moderated to 43.5% in 2024, and remained high at 39.5% by March 2025. While these dynamics disproportionately burdened the poor and middle classes, they enriched Erdogan’s political allies through preferential access to state contracts and financial mechanisms, exacerbating wealth inequality. Despite this deterioration, the economy experienced short-term growth, driven by elevated public spending and an export boost facilitated by a severely devalued currency. This third era represents the most acute economic crisis under Erdogan’s leadership—one largely self-inflicted through policy mismanagement and institutional degradation.

In summary, Erdogan’s political trajectory can be delineated into three distinct phases. During his first era (2003–2013), he emerged as a pro-business reformer who modernized Turkey, attracted substantial foreign investment, and lifted millions out of poverty. The middle period (2013–2018) was marked by mounting political instability, decelerating economic growth, and an increasing consolidation of authoritarian control. The most recent phase (2018–present) has been defined by self-inflicted economic turmoil, characterized by hyperinflation, financial mismanagement, and institutional erosion. Over time, Erdogan has shifted from being hailed as an economic success story to assuming the role of a crisis manager. At the core of this transformation lies his unwavering determination to retain power and reengineer the political regime through an experimental economic and governance ‘model’—one that he neither fully comprehends nor implements coherently, operating instead through a framework of disorder, contingency, and arbitrariness.

Governance Tragedy

Erdogan’s somewhat surprising—yet, in retrospect, foreseeable—abandonment of his previously successful economic and political development model following the 2011 elections precipitated a profound governance crisis. Echoing, in form if not in content, Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China, Erdogan embarked on a series of self-declared, large-scale experiments characterized by opaque logic, undefined mechanisms, and uncertain causal relationships. Adopting a ‘learning by doing’ approach, he entrusted critical policymaking to inexperienced party loyalists and ideologically driven militants. Whereas the initial phase of governance was marked by competent technocrats and the strengthening of institutional capacity, the subsequent phase, particularly after 2018, was defined by institutional degradation, as unqualified yet ambitious individuals assumed control over key state structures. This transformation has far-reaching implications for the stability and functionality of the Turkish state apparatus.

The government’s patronage practices have extended well beyond large corporations aligned with the ruling party, encompassing individuals deemed politically loyal through strategic appointments to secure and well-compensated public sector positions. The transformation in the scale and composition of Turkey’s civil service is well documented. As of 2024, the number of public employees stands at approximately 5.3 million—more than double the 2 million recorded in 2002. Between 2002 and 2024, an estimated 3.3 million individuals were recruited into the civil service. Notably, of the 2 million civil servants employed in 2002, roughly 1 million have since retired, bringing the cumulative number of civil servants hired during the AKP era to approximately 4.3 million. This dramatic expansion reflects a broader trend of public sector growth under Erdogan’s leadership, characterized by the politicization of state institutions and the instrumental use of public employment as a means of consolidating political loyalty.

As of January 1, 2025, the national monthly minimum wage in Turkey has been set at a net TRY 22,104.67, while the base salary for civil servants has reached approximately TRY 43,726—nearly double the minimum wage. This stark disparity underscores the material privileges afforded to public-sector employees, a cohort that has increasingly been leveraged as a tool of political patronage. In contrast, individuals outside the ruling party’s patronage networks face systemic barriers to accessing public employment and are disproportionately relegated to the lower-wage private sector, where monthly earnings generally fall within the same range as the minimum wage and civil service floor (TRY 22,104.67 to TRY 43,726).

The consequences of Turkey’s governance crisis are clearly reflected across all major governance indicators. According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, which evaluates six key governance dimensions for over 200 economies between 1996 and 2023, Turkey has experienced a marked and persistent decline in performance. Each WGI dimension is measured on a scale ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak governance) to 2.5 (strong governance). Table 3 summarizes Turkey’s scores across selected years, illustrating the country’s overall trajectory of governance erosion. For example, the ‘Control of Corruption’ indicator improved in the early 2000s, rising from -0.45 in 2002 to 0.08 in 2005, reflecting early reform efforts. However, by 2023, this score had deteriorated to -0.50, signaling a reversal of progress and deepening institutional fragility. Similar negative trends are observable across the other five dimensions, underscoring the systemic nature of Turkey’s governance decline.

This sustained decline in governance indicators reflects a broader erosion of Turkey’s rule of law and civil liberties. The Rule of Law Index, published by the World Justice Project, assesses countries based on factors such as constraints on government power, absence of corruption, and protection of fundamental rights. In 2024, Turkey ranked 117th out of 142 countries, significantly deviating from rule-of-law standards. Similarly, the Freedom in the World Index by Freedom House—which evaluates political rights and civil liberties globally—assigned Turkey a score of 33 out of 100, classifying it as ‘Not Free.’ Further underscoring this deterioration, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranks countries on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), shows Turkey’s score declining from 50 in 2013 to 34 in 2024. This sharp drop reflects a growing perception of entrenched public sector corruption and declining institutional integrity.

While definitive assessments are best left to subject-matter experts, President Erdogan’s underlying motives for Turkey’s authoritarian turn can be broadly summarized as follows:

📌 The 2008 Constitutional Court case that sought to dissolve the Justice and Development Party (AKP)—posing a direct threat to Erdogan’s political survival—catalyzed a sustained effort to assert control over the judiciary.
📌 Perceptions of European Union double standards, particularly regarding issues such as the Cyprus dispute, the stalled modernization of the EU–Turkey Customs Union, and persistent delays in the EU accession process, contributed to Turkey’s gradual disengagement from reform commitments. The government also strategically instrumentalized these grievances to avoid implementing critical reforms tied to transparency, inclusivity, and fair competition in public procurement, especially in infrastructure investment tenders.
📌 The collapse of the Kurdish peace initiative resulted in a resurgence of violence, further destabilizing domestic politics and hardening Erdogan’s security-focused posture.
📌 The fallout with the Gulen movement, once a close ally of the regime, culminated in a sweeping purge of state institutions following the 2016 coup attempt, consolidating Erdogan’s unchecked authority.
📌 Facing a shortage of qualified technocrats, Erdogan increasingly staffed key institutions with ideologically driven loyalists, while shifting economic focus toward sectors amenable to centralized control—such as construction, tourism, and rent-seeking industries.
📌 Ideologically influenced by the National View (Milli Görüş) movement, Erdogan has pursued the replacement of Turkey’s Kemalist-secular state tradition with a sui generis, neo-Ottoman model of governance marked by centralized power, religious symbolism, and historical revisionism.
 

Conclusion

Turkey’s recent development trajectory reveals a recurring pattern: periods of economic and political advancement have tended to coincide with phases of openness and integration with the West, while inward-looking, ‘local and national’ strategies have frequently corresponded with stagnation or regression. Given its geostrategic location, Turkey’s engagement with Western institutions and normative frameworks has not been merely opportunistic, but structurally imperative for sustaining reform and modernization. However, shifting global power dynamics have expanded Turkey’s strategic autonomy, simultaneously weakening the external normative pressures that once served as a moderating force on its domestic governance and policy orientation.

Available evidence strongly suggests that President Erdogan has decisively abandoned democratic norms, transparent governance, and the rule of law. The current international environment—marked by growing multipolarity, the global resurgence of populist movements such as Trumpism, and Europe’s acute focus on security and migration—has provided Erdogan with the strategic latitude to expand executive authority with minimal external resistance. Although recent episodes of public dissent may pose temporary tactical constraints, they are unlikely to alter the broader trajectory of authoritarian consolidation that appears poised to define Turkey’s political future.