A group of migrants entered the U.S. from Mexico through an opening in the border fence near Sasabe, Arizona, and turned themselves in to a waiting CBP agent on July 15, 2023. Photo: Aaron Wells.

Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions

by Book ReviewsHomeMigration

Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. November 11, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0021

 

Immigration Realities is a thorough, research-based analysis that examines and debunks widespread myths surrounding immigration while highlighting the contributions of immigrants. Authors Ernesto Castañeda and Carina Cione present an alternative view to common misconceptions by contextualizing migration within broader global frameworks. While the book’s perspective may not align with all viewpoints, its well-supported insights make it a valuable resource for readers interested in a nuanced, evidence-based understanding of migration, encouraging a thoughtful approach to policy and public dialogue.

Reviewed by Bulent Kenes

In their recently released book, Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions, authors Ernesto Castañeda and Carina Cione address some of the most pervasive and misleading assumptions about immigration, inviting readers to critically examine often-repeated beliefs with fresh, research-backed insights. They deconstruct prevalent myths about immigration, providing a research-informed perspective to clarify these misconceptions. Each chapter explores a central question, such as “Is the US-Mexico border truly dangerous?” and “Would a border wall keep undocumented immigrants away?” Further questions tackled include whether immigrants are more likely to commit crimes, if they avoid learning English, and if they are disproportionately dependent on welfare and other government programs. The book also addresses critical issues like remittances and the debate on whether they drain the host economy, the supposed “refugee crisis,” and the broader relationship between globalization and migration.

The book then extends its focus to key questions around Brexit’s impact on immigration to the United Kingdom, examining “Will the decision to leave the European Union stop immigration?” Finally, the authors explore whether immigrants integrate into host societies and what lessons can be learned from different cities and countries regarding immigrant integration. Through these questions, the book provides a robust foundation for a more nuanced understanding of migration issues.

Through this rigorous analysis, Immigration Realities not only dispels common myths but also contextualizes immigration as part of larger global and historical processes. Castañeda and Cione emphasize that migration is not merely a legal issue but a human experience shaped by complex dynamics, including exclusion and belonging. By discussing concepts such as emigration and immigration, they examine how the realities of migration are affected by issues like crimmigration, xenophobic stereotypes, and pushbacks. These discussions are balanced with an exploration of themes such as assimilation, social integration, and cosmopolitanism, revealing how migrants navigate inclusion and exclusion in host societies.

The authors further address how broader forces—globalization and deglobalization, for instance—impact migration patterns and individual experiences, while examining the effects of isolationism in shaping migration policies and public opinion. In this work, readers will encounter discussions of migradollars (remittances sent by immigrants to their home countries) and social remittances (the transfer of ideas and practices across borders), highlighting the multidimensional impact of migration on both host and origin countries.

By integrating these varied concepts, Immigration Realities seeks to bridge the gap between academic research and public understanding, making complex ideas accessible for readers who may be new to contemporary migration studies. This comprehensive approach underscores the importance of viewing migration through a lens that recognizes both its socio-political challenges and its contributions to society.

In the introduction, the authors argue that immigration, especially in the United States, is highly politicized and frequently portrayed in a way that alarms native-born populations. Misleading stereotypes about immigrants, particularly those of color, have fueled negative perceptions, creating an “us vs. them” mentality that often casts immigrants as threats to social and economic stability. The authors emphasize that these misconceptions are not only harmful but also lack factual basis, as only around 3.5% of the global population lives outside their country of birth. Castañeda and Cione also advocate for a broader understanding of migration beyond legal frameworks, viewing it as a fundamentally human experience. 

They emphasize that migration is part of larger historical and global processes, including globalization, cosmopolitanism, and deglobalization. This introductory section lays the groundwork for an in-depth exploration that challenges readers to critically engage with the nuanced realities of migration, making the topic accessible without sacrificing complexity. By framing each chapter around a misconception, the authors aim to equip readers with a factual, empathetic perspective on immigration, positioning the book as both a scholarly work and a timely resource for anyone interested in understanding the multifaceted nature of migration.

Chapter 1 of Immigration Realities, titled “The Southern Border is Safe, but Border Enforcement Makes it Unsafe for Many,” challenges the common portrayal of the US-Mexico border as a dangerous, lawless region. Through secondary data, published research, and surveys of El Paso residents, Castañeda and Cione argue that this image is largely a media-driven myth. In fact, border cities are some of the safest in the US, with lower crime rates than other areas due to heavy surveillance and Border Patrol presence. However, the authors highlight a stark contrast in experiences: while White Americans generally feel secure, migrants and minority communities face disproportionate threats of violence, detainment, and deportation, intensified by far-right rhetoric that criminalizes immigrants.

The authors underscore how populist rhetoric, notably from figures like Donald Trump, has fueled xenophobia and support for restrictive border policies. They link these policies to a border security industry that profits from a militarized approach, reinforcing exclusionary ideologies that endanger marginalized groups and undermine human rights. The chapter invites readers to question the prioritization of safety in border security discourse and raises awareness of the human rights violations inherent in populist-driven enforcement policies.

Chapter 2 of the book, titled “Border Walls Do Not Keep Immigrants Out of a Country,” offers a critical analysis of border walls’ ineffectiveness as immigration deterrents and the negative social, economic, and environmental impacts they impose. Castañeda and Cione argue that these walls, rather than serving functional purposes, act as symbolic tools driven by far-right ideologies equating border security with national identity preservation. Tracing the political momentum for a US-Mexico border wall from Reagan and Clinton through Trump’s administration, they contend that these policies stem more from ideological stances than practical immigration control.

The authors illustrate how Trump’s portrayal of immigration as an “invasion” fueled nationalist fears, leading to measures like the 2019 government shutdown over wall funding. They reveal that border walls, despite their high costs, fail to stop illegal immigration or drug trafficking, which primarily occurs at legal entry points, while also causing severe environmental damage. This chapter critiques the financial interests underlying the wall agenda, noting that private contractors, security firms, and detention centers profit from the manufactured perception of crisis. Castañeda and Cione advocate for redirecting resources toward humane immigration policies that recognize immigrants’ economic and social contributions, underscoring the need for cooperation over confrontation.

In Chapter 3, Castañeda and Cione dismantle the persistent myth that immigrants are more likely to commit crimes than native-born Americans. Through a comprehensive examination of crime data, historical analysis, and social research, the authors argue that this misconception is not only false but rooted in long-standing stereotypes and xenophobic biases. They emphasize that foreign-born individuals, especially Hispanic immigrants, tend to have lower crime rates than their native-born counterparts. For example, border cities like El Paso, which have significant immigrant populations, consistently report lower crime rates than comparable non-border cities. Additionally, immigrants contribute to safer neighborhoods, likely due to strong social networks and a desire to avoid interactions with law enforcement that could endanger their immigration status.

The authors further explore how political rhetoric has fueled the criminal immigrant stereotype, particularly through statements by figures like Trump, who in his 2016 campaign described Mexican immigrants as “bringing crime” and “rapists.” Castañeda and Cione reveal that such narratives are not only misleading but strategically used to justify exclusionary policies. They describe how these stereotypes perpetuate a “crimmigration” system that criminalizes immigrants, with laws such as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) intensifying immigrant detentions and deportations, often for minor infractions that would not result in criminal penalties for US citizens. By debunking the idea that immigration increases crime, the authors point out that as immigration has risen, national crime rates have simultaneously dropped. They advocate for a critical examination of these stereotypes, urging readers to question how political agendas shape public perceptions. 

In Chapter 4 of the book the authors this time confront the prevalent myth that immigrants refuse to learn English and fail to integrate into American society. The authors argue convincingly that immigrants are, in fact, highly motivated to acquire English language skills, viewing it as essential for social and economic mobility in the US. However, they also highlight the many barriers immigrants face, including limited access to language education, financial constraints, and systemic discrimination. They reveal how immigrants often experience prejudice in the classroom and discrimination in daily interactions when speaking their native languages. This “language shaming,” they argue, leads many immigrants to avoid using their native tongues in public, despite the strong desire to maintain a connection to their cultural heritage. 

By addressing the structural factors that limit language learning—such as the high cost of classes, lack of time, and socioeconomic status—the authors debunk the stereotype of the “unwilling immigrant.” They argue that rather than resisting integration, immigrants are often forced to prioritize immediate survival over language acquisition. The chapter makes a compelling case for more robust support systems to assist immigrants with language learning and challenge readers to reconsider simplistic narratives around language and integration, urging empathy and policy reforms to foster a more inclusive society.

The following chapter addresses the widespread misconception that immigrants rely heavily on welfare programs. The authors provide a compelling analysis backed by historical and contemporary data to demonstrate that immigrants generally access fewer social services than native-born individuals, even when eligible. This chapter examines the social and political dynamics that contribute to this myth, such as policies from the Trump administration, which attempted to block “undesirable” immigrants based on financial criteria, using misleading statistics to justify these actions. The authors delve into the structural barriers that limit immigrants’ access to welfare, such as the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which reduced immigrants’ eligibility for programs like Medicaid and SNAP. They highlight that these restrictions disproportionately affect low-income immigrant families and have lasting effects on their well-being, as they often forgo essential services out of fear of jeopardizing their immigration status.

The chapter also expands the discussion to international contexts, including European Union countries and Australia, revealing similar patterns of limited welfare use among immigrants globally. By addressing racial and ethnic stereotypes, such as the stigmatization of Black and Latin American immigrants as “welfare abusers,” Castañeda and Cione illustrate how these prejudices fuel public opposition and restrictive policies. Thus, they challenge readers to reconsider the welfare myth surrounding immigrants, urging for data-driven policies that acknowledge immigrants’ contributions, such as their role in the labor force and taxes, while promoting equitable access to social services. The authors effectively debunk the stereotype of the “dependent immigrant,” emphasizing instead the resilience and economic independence of immigrant communities.

In Chapter 6, Castañeda and Cione tackle the misconception that remittances—money sent by immigrants to family in their countries of origin—drain host economies. The authors highlight that remittances, contrary to popular belief, do not deplete economic resources in host countries but rather enhance the global economy and contribute to local economies in multiple ways. The chapter addresses arguments from political figures, such as Trump, who claimed that remittances should be taxed to fund projects like the US-Mexico border wall. The aurhors argue that such taxes would not only be burdensome to implement but would also drive remittance flows underground, leading to informal, unregulated channels. Furthermore, the authors clarify that the income immigrants remit has already been taxed in the host country, making additional taxation on remittances an unfair “double taxation.” 

Additionally, they emphasize that remittances are not equivalent to foreign aid, as remittances are private, intra-family transactions that meet immediate needs, such as food, education, and health care. These funds contribute directly to the welfare of recipient families without government or bureaucratic interference, unlike traditional aid. While remittances can bolster struggling economies, they are not designed to function as development tools or replace structural support. The authors advocate for respecting the economic agency of immigrants and the crucial support remittances provide to families and economies globally.

In Chapter 7, the authors critique the narrative of a “refugee crisis” as a social construct rooted in xenophobic and colonial attitudes. They argue that labeling refugee arrivals as a “crisis” frames them as societal issues, distracting from the underlying causes of displacement, such as war, imperialism, and economic exploitation by Western powers. This chapter also delves into the impacts of historical and ongoing imperialism, illustrating how Western interference in regions like the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America has destabilized nations, leading to migration and asylum-seeking. The authors point out that Western countries often resist responsibility for these displacements, even as they benefit from economic arrangements that perpetuate inequality. For instance, the term “crisis” is frequently used by media and politicians to justify strict immigration controls rather than address the systemic issues creating forced migration. The chapter advocates for a reframing of refugee discourse, emphasizing the need for policies that prioritize humane treatment and cross-cultural support for refugees, recognizing their agency and dignity. 

The authors explore the often misunderstood relationship between globalization and migration in Chapter 8, emphasizing their independence. They argue that, while globalization and migration can appear interlinked, they are largely distinct processes. According to them, historical evidence shows that economic globalization—characterized by trade liberalization and capital movement—does not necessarily increase migration. Yet, the public often assumes a direct connection between these phenomena due to political rhetoric that conflates them. The chapter discusses how economic downturns, like the 2008 financial crisis, intensified backlash against globalization, which is sometimes unfairly directed at immigrants instead of economic policies. Castañeda and Cione illustrate how globalization’s impact on labor markets has led some politicians to blame immigrants for economic issues, reinforcing xenophobic sentiments rather than addressing systemic inequalities. By dissecting globalization’s influence, the authors advocate for a nuanced understanding that separates migration policy from global economic trends. 

In Chapter 9, the authors critically analyze Brexit’s impact on immigration to the UK. They argue that Brexit’s promise to reduce immigration, championed by anti-EU campaigners, is largely a misconception. Although Brexit allows the UK to impose stricter regulations on European Union immigrants, it has not significantly decreased immigration rates. Instead, Brexit has complicated the legal status of many EU nationals in the UK and disrupted the lives of British expatriates across Europe. In this chapter, the authors explore how Brexit, fueled by xenophobic rhetoric and a desire for “sovereignty,” reflects a deeper issue of misinformation about immigration’s economic and social impact. They underscore that immigrants, especially highly educated ones, contribute positively to the UK’s economy, addressing labor shortages and raising GDP. Despite Brexit’s restrictive policies on EU immigrants, non-EU immigration remains largely unchanged due to existing points-based systems. Thus, the authors challenge the belief that restricting EU immigration will “take back control” of British borders. Instead, it highlights Brexit’s potential for economic drawbacks, such as labor shortages, while debunking myths about immigrants’ supposed drain on resources.

According to the authors, immigrants can effectively integrate into their host societies without sacrificing their cultural identities. They explore in Chapter 10 the concepts of assimilation, acculturation, and integration, highlighting how each affects the immigrant experience differently. Unlike assimilation, which expects immigrants to abandon their heritage, integration allows for cultural coexistence and mutual respect, fostering a more inclusive society. Drawing on case studies from New York, Paris, and Barcelona, the authors illustrate how local policies and civil initiatives can significantly shape immigrants’ sense of belonging and success. For example, according to the authors, New York City’s multicultural framework and high tolerance for diversity make it a model of inclusion, contrasting with the more rigid and assimilationist policies seen in places like Paris. In Barcelona, public policies support cultural differences, helping immigrants maintain their identities while participating actively in society. Castañeda and Cione emphasize the role of cities and civil organizations in promoting integration, encouraging local governments to adopt policies that respect immigrants’ rights and cultural heritage. 

Immigration Realities offers a well-researched, comprehensive analysis that dismantles common myths about immigration while championing immigrants’ rights and contributions. Castañeda and Cione provide a valuable counter-narrative to mainstream misconceptions, effectively contextualizing migration within global economic, political, and social frameworks. However, the book’s left-leaning perspective, though clear and thought-provoking, may limit its appeal to readers with differing political views. The focus on systemic critiques—while essential to understanding many challenges facing immigrants—sometimes overshadows a nuanced discussion on how diverse perspectives might contribute to more balanced immigration policies. Nonetheless, the book’s grounded research and emphasis on compassion make it a crucial resource for readers seeking a deeper understanding of migration beyond divisive rhetoric. By bridging academic insights with accessible language, Immigration Realities encourages readers to see immigration as a multifaceted, enduring human experience that merits both empathy and informed policy reform.

 

Ernesto Castañeda & Carina Cione. (2024). Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions. Columbia University Press. 368 pp. Paperback $30, Hardcover $120, ISBN: 9780231203753, ISBN: 9780231203746

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Mapping Global Populism — Panel XVI:  The Challenging Dynamics of Democracy, Authoritarianism & Populism in Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan & Georgia)

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeMultimediaVideos

Moderator

Dr. Cengiz Aktar (Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and Advisory Board Member of ECPS).

Speakers

“Autocracy in Azerbaijan and Its Regional Implications,” by Thomas de Waal (Senior Fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region).

“The State of Democracy and Populism in Armenia,” by Dr. Nerses Kopalyan (Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas).

“The Rotating Populist Discourses of the Post-Soviet Georgia – From the Nationalist Populismto the Conservative Populism,” Dr. David Matsaberidze (Associate Professor at Department of International Relations, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University).

“Hegemonic Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan,” by Dr. Jody LaPorte (Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford).

“Populism Against Post-war Armenia’s Democratization and European Integration,” by Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan (Professor, Chair of Political Science, Faculty of International Relations at Yerevan State University).

“From Technocratic Facade to Right-Wing Reality: The Evolution of Populism in Georgia,” by Dr. David Aprasidze (Professor of Political Science at Ilia State University).

Founder of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili, seen among supporters during the presidential election in Tbilisi, Georgia, on October 27, 2013. Photo: Gevorg Ghazaryan.

Professor Aprasidze: Ivanishvili Governs Georgia Like His Business Company

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Professor David Aprasidze: In Georgia, the Georgian Dream party exemplifies a technocratic form of populism, treating state governance like corporate management. Founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, a former businessman, brings a non-ideological, efficiency-focused approach, applying principles from his business career to politics. He appoints key officials as “managers” to carry out strategic directives, allowing him to remain distanced while exercising control. This model emphasizes expertise and governance over ideology, with Ivanishvili viewing the state as if it were one of his companies.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a revealing interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. David Aprasidze, political science professor at Ilia State University in Tbilisi, sheds light on how Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of Georgian Dream, has transformed Georgian governance through a “technocratic populism” model. According to Professor Aprasidze, Ivanishvili “treats the state almost as if it were a business,” blending his extensive business experience with politics to establish a unique governance style that sets Georgian Dream apart from other political movements. Ivanishvili, who made his fortune in Russia in the 1990s, sees himself as a “highly successful businessman” who can replicate that success in governing Georgia. 

Professor Aprasidze further highlights how this approach has affected democratic institutions in Georgia, where the judiciary and parliament operate less as independent bodies and more as extensions of Ivanishvili’s centralized authority. This concentration of power, Aprasidze suggests, marks a significant step back for democracy in Georgia and reveals broader trends of democratic backsliding that align with the recent autocratic shift in Georgian Dream’s populist narrative.

Interestingly, Professor Aprasidze points to Georgian Dream’s evolving relationship with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party. Initially, Georgian Dream was aligned with the European Socialists, positioning itself on the center-left, but “especially after the war in Ukraine,” Professor Aprasidze notes, the party quickly pivoted to the far right, embracing nationalist and traditionalist rhetoric. Professor Aprasidze observes that Orbán has become a “close ally and influential mentor to Georgian Dream,” offering a populist playbook that guides their current approach.

Reflecting on the EU’s recent stance, Professor Aprasidze underscores the European Commission’s demands for reform before recommending membership talks with Georgia. Yet he remains skeptical, stating that he and “many observers of Georgia” believe it’s unlikely the current administration will undertake the necessary democratic reforms. With a mixture of caution and insight, Professor Aprasidze’s analysis provides a critical lens on Georgia’s political transformation and its implications for both democratic integrity and EU integration.

Dr. David Aprasidze, political science professor at Ilia State University in Tbilisi.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor David Aprasidze with some edits.

Georgian Case Illustrates How Populism Can Evolve

David, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. How and under what circumstances does technocratic populism emerge in hybrid regimes? What are its principal characteristics, and what strategies do technocratic populists use to stay in power and govern? What is its difference from conventional populist parties? 

Professor David Aprasidze: The Georgian case illustrates how populism can evolve—its color, content, and format can all shift. I believe we could indeed call the initial period of the Georgian Dream a form of technocratic populism. Now, returning to your questions: What are the main features of this type of populism?

A key feature is that those in power, or those aiming to assume power, possess a specific skill or expertise that sets them apart from others. They are, in effect, free from any rigid ideological stance and do not claim to adhere to one. Instead, they emphasize their ability to govern effectively and improve the lives of ordinary citizens. In Georgia, and particularly with the Georgian Dream, this technocratic approach to populism is reflected in their comparison of state governance to corporate governance, treating the state almost as if it were a business model. One of the most influential people in Georgia today, and the founding father of the Georgian Dream, exemplifies this approach. He comes from a business background, having built his fortune in Russia in the 1990s, and sees himself as a highly successful businessman. By bringing his business experience into politics, he positioned himself as someone who could replicate his business success in governing the country. He claimed that the principles he used to run a business would similarly apply to running the country, treating it as if it were one of his companies.

If we combine these features, first, they possess technical expertise. Second, they do not have or embody a strong ideological basis. Third, they bring business experience and apply similar principles to politics. This forms the foundation.

In Georgia, this approach was implemented by Bidzina Ivanishvili, who selected his followers—party members and especially those in government—as he would select managers in his own company. Acting as a stakeholder, he owns the “business” but hires managers to run it on his behalf. He is not involved in every routine decision; instead, his operatives carry out his strategic directives. Thus, the Prime Minister, Ministers, Speaker of the Parliament, and Chairman of the party function as his managers, each responsible for a specific area he has entrusted to them. Naturally, he can replace them based on their performance. If he’s dissatisfied, he can easily remove them and appoint new managers. This, in essence, was how Georgia was governed until 2022.

Technocratic Populism Poses a Serious Threat to Democratic Principles

How has the technocratic populism influenced the balance of power and the role of democratic institutions like the parliament and judiciary in Georgia?

Professor David Aprasidze: That’s a very good question, as technocratic populism has effectively subjugated these institutions. If we accept that this model describes how Georgia was governed, then all authorities—all institutions—become part of a unified mechanism. In this framework, the judiciary functions somewhat like the legal department of a business, while the parliament serves as a procedural body where policies are developed and drafted. Ultimately, however, these institutions do not balance or oversee one another, as the parliament is supposed to do with the executive. Instead, they operate as interconnected components of a single system—as administrative divisions within what resembles a corporate structure.

This approach is, of course, very harmful to democracy because it undermines key institutions. As you mentioned, both the judiciary and parliament are affected: the parliament loses its authority and prerogative to oversee and check the government, or the executive. The judiciary, similarly, becomes merely a registry, simply implementing decisions handed down from the top rather than making independent judgments. Like other forms of populism, this model is detrimental to democracy—though it employs a different method and approach. Ultimately, it poses a serious threat to democratic principles.

What role does the Georgian Dream’s strategy of managing political opposition through loyalty-based appointments and selective prosecution play in shaping an increasingly autocratic governance model in Georgia?

Professor David Aprasidze: Observing how the Georgian Dream developed over time, starting with their rise to power in 2012, we see that it was a weak coalition. Unlike traditional coalitions in European countries or elsewhere, the Georgian Dream wasn’t a coalition in the conventional sense. Instead, it was a unified front that included various opposition parties on a single list, aiming to challenge the previous government. In 2012, rather than competing individually in elections and forming alliances based on outcomes, these opposition parties came together before the elections. This unity created a diverse front in the initial period, with different politicians in Ivanishvili’s government and Parliament, providing a facade of democracy and contestation.

Starting with the second term in 2016, the Georgian Dream began to remove former allies. Some were co-opted, while others were pushed toward the opposition and marginalized. From 2016 through 2020, during this second period of Georgian Dream’s rule, they gradually co-opted or marginalized various politicians. In this process, they used all necessary means to compromise these individuals—whether through the judiciary, the media, or by corrupting them to the extent that they lost legitimacy to function as an opposition or challenge the ruling party.

They employed a range of methods, including controlled media and propaganda against these politicians, as well as selectively applied judicial actions. Those who remained loyal or stayed silent faced no legal challenges, while individuals who dared to criticize or act as opposition saw law enforcement agencies and the judiciary weaponized against them. Through these threats and by shaping public opinion, the Georgian Dream approached the opposition in a calculated manner, gradually silencing a significant portion of it. By the 2020 elections, the opposition was fractured, divided, and in many cases, effectively silenced.

Georgian Population Remains Strongly Pro-European

‘March for Europe’ demonstrations in support of EU integration and membership at Liberty Square in Tbilisi, Georgia, on October 20, 2024. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic.

To what extent do pro-Russian influences within the Georgian Dream party align with or diverge from the public’s pro-European aspirations, and how might this tension impact Georgia’s trajectory toward EU integration?

Professor David Aprasidze: This is a very good question. We could also reframe it slightly and ask, “Is Georgian Dream pro-Russian or not?” But there is no simple answer. I would say that, as with many populist parties across Europe, there is indeed a certain ideological alignment or shared understanding between Russia and this type of populist party, as they promote similar ideas. They both tend to undermine liberal democracy and the Western-style democracy we associate with Western Europe and other parts of the world. In that sense, they may appear to be natural allies.

However, this isn’t always the case. I wouldn’t argue that Georgian Dream is explicitly pro-Russian; rather, it is primarily pro-Georgian Dream. They seize every opportunity to strengthen their hold on power. Until 2020, 2022, or even the onset of the war in Ukraine, Georgian Dream attempted to maintain a pro-Western facade while operating autocratically behind the scenes. As a result, there was no clear stance. Many voices criticized Georgian Dream, claiming the party’s policies or rhetoric were pro-Russian, but it was challenging to make a definitive judgment on this.

Following the war in Ukraine and Georgia’s attainment of EU candidate status with a formal path to membership, Georgian Dream realized that this status would bring pressure to implement deep and far-reaching reforms—reforms they were unwilling to pursue. As a result, they gradually distanced themselves from the EU’s requirements. Step by step, they began shifting toward an anti-Western, anti-European stance, effectively distancing themselves from the Western sphere. Simultaneously, they increasingly adopted rhetoric similar to that currently used by Russia. Since 2020, and especially after the 2024 elections, this alignment of Georgian Dream with Russian policies has become more visible and noticeable than ever before.

As for the Georgian population, it remains strongly pro-European, as confirmed by public opinion polls and surveys. However, the recent election had contested outcomes, both domestically and internationally. I personally believe it was rigged, with Georgian Dream employing various methods to falsify the results. Still, it is now challenging to gauge the true public opinion.

We may learn more in the weeks and months ahead, depending on whether public protests emerge. If many people take to the streets to oppose Georgian Dream’s autocratization efforts, it would confirm that the Georgian population remains Western-leaning, while Georgian Dream acts in opposition to this will, effectively “capturing” the state. However, if there isn’t significant public protest or resistance, we may need to reassess our understanding of public opinion on this issue. Hopefully, this won’t be the case. 

Elections in Georgia Mark a Clear Negative Trend

Given the Georgian Dream party’s recent policies that some compared to Russian-style “foreign influence” laws, how do you see these laws affecting civil society and independent media in Georgia, and are they part of a larger autocratic trend?

Professor David Aprasidze: Absolutely. I am quite certain that this is part of a larger autocratic trend, unfortunately. We saw signs of this when the law was introduced in the spring, just a few months before the elections, and have since witnessed further deterioration. Although there were critical voices and warning signs that the elections would deal another blow to democracy, it is now clear that this decline has continued following the adoption of this law.

The elections demonstrated a decline in the quality of democracy in Georgia, marking a clear negative trend. Will this go further and have a tangible impact on civil society and the media? That remains to be seen. However, if the current trend persists, we can expect Georgian media and civil society to face increased pressure in the coming days and weeks.

Firstly, we see a clear trend of deterioration. Secondly, with the law’s provisions soon to be implemented, if these are fully enforced by the relevant authorities, they will certainly shrink the space for civil society, limit access to independent funding, and may soon lead to a significant reduction in the number of independent media outlets and non-governmental organizations.

The European Commission has stated that it cannot recommend EU membership talks unless Georgia changes course. What specific changes do you believe the Georgian government would need to make to regain the EU’s confidence, and how likely are such reforms under the current/new administration?

Professor David Aprasidze: Unfortunately, I, along with many observers of Georgia, believe that under the current government or administration, it is very hard to imagine a restart of relations with the EU.

When the European Commission issued the requirements—known as the “9 steps”—for Georgia to progress toward membership, they were very specific about opening negotiations. The most important of these 9 points was free and fair elections, with an expectation for Georgia to conduct elections that are free, fair, and competitive. Now, we see those leading countries in the European Union, except Hungary (due to similarities in populist governance between Georgia and Hungary), have condemned the way the elections were organized and held in Georgia. They demand that the Georgian government fully investigate all the irregularities observed both on election day and beforehand.

However, we do not see any signs that the Georgian authorities are prepared to meet this requirement. Therefore, I do not expect that Georgian authorities will be ready to meet the other 8 requirements set by the European Commission. While Georgian authorities officially continue to argue that Georgia is still on the path to integration, the reality and evidence are quite limited. Thus, I do not expect, unless there is a comprehensive change in administration or policy, that these authorities are prepared to make the necessary changes.

Georgian Dream’s Shift to Far-Right Rhetoric Derails Path to EU Integration

Georgia’s President Salome Zurabishvili is welcomed by European Council President Donald Tusk ahead of a meeting at the European Council in Brussels, Belgium, on January 22, 2019. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

How do recent allegations of electoral fraud and interference reflect broader trends of democratic backsliding in Georgia, and what role does populism play in reinforcing this shift?

Professor David Aprasidze: Well, absolutely. We have already talked about the irregularities during elections, and this is an unfortunate confirmation, a proof that Georgia is backsliding on its path of democratization. Actually, Georgia has never been a fully functioning, consolidated democracy. It was moving along a difficult path toward democratization, but now we are undermining all the achievements we have made along the way. Therefore, these elections were a very strong and significant step backward.

Populism—we initially discussed technocratic populism, right? Until around 2022, Georgian Dream exemplified this type of populism, emphasizing expertise and claiming to run the country like a successful business. However, since 2022, especially during the election campaign, we have seen a complete reshaping of this populist narrative. It has shifted toward a far-right, extreme position rooted in traditional values. While I have nothing against family values, this far-right approach frames family and religion in an anti-minority, anti-liberal context, openly attacking liberal values, including the protection of individual and minority rights. This shift from a purely technocratic populism to a far-right, anti-Western, anti-liberal rhetoric has become an important ingredient of Georgian Dream’s electoral campaign. This departure is why Georgian Dream has moved the country so far from its European integration trajectory, and it’s why I believe it’s simply impossible to restart the relationship between Georgia and the European Union under the current administration.

Hungary’s Populist Playbook Guides Georgian Dream’s Strategy

And lastly, David, Hungarian Prime Minister and the term president of European Union Victor Orbán visited Tbilisi and congratulated the leaders of Georgian Dream for their success while other EU’s leading officials criticized the election process. What sort of relationship does Georgian Dream have with Victor Orbán’s Fidesz Party in particular and with other far-right, populist parties in Europe? 

Professor David Aprasidze: When Georgian Dream first embarked on its European trajectory, it joined the European Socialists as an observing member, initially positioning itself on the center-left of the ideological spectrum. However, especially after the war in Ukraine—partly due to geopolitical factors but, I believe, primarily due to domestic political motives and a desire to consolidate power—they quickly shifted toward the far right.

They aligned with and engaged in an exchange of ideas with Hungary’s Fidesz Party, and with Viktor Orbán in particular. Numerous mutual meetings took place; the Georgian Prime Minister met with Hungarian leaders multiple times, and Orbán visited Georgia. These exchanges occurred at various levels—parliamentary and party—making Hungary and its leadership Georgian Dream’s most reliable, if not only, partners in Europe.

Interestingly, if we trace the transformation of Fidesz and the evolution of Orbán himself—from the start of his political career to his current stance—it serves as a model for Georgian Dream. To answer your question directly, Orbán is a close ally and influential mentor to Georgian Dream. The Hungarian model of populist transformation, led by Fidesz, provides Georgian Dream with a playbook on how to proceed.

Data protection concept featuring binary code overlayed with the European Union flag. Photo: KB-Photodesign.

Future Resilience of the European Technology Security Policy Paper

by Digital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHomePolicy Papers

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Please cite as:

Miguel De Vera, Anton; Hamaiunova, Viktoriia; Koleszár, Réka & Pasquettaz, Giada. (2024) “Future Resilience of the European Technology Security.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0004

 

Abstract

This paper explores vulnerabilities in the European Union’s technological security, focusing on Huawei as a case study to illuminate broader security challenges. Amid intensifying US-China tensions, especially under former US President Donald Trump, the EU encountered new risks linked to the strategic positioning of Chinese tech firms within critical European infrastructure. Trump’s “America First” policy targeted China with tariffs and trade restrictions to address perceived unfair practices, triggering disruptions in global supply chains that reverberated through the EU economy. For Europe, heavily reliant on secure, stable trade flows, these events highlighted the urgency of reassessing technological dependencies and reinforcing digital security. The paper presents a series of strategic recommendations for the EU to mitigate such vulnerabilities, emphasizing the need for diversified supply chains, rigorous security standards for tech partnerships, and collaborative policies among EU members to strengthen resilience in the face of geopolitical shifts and technological competition.

Keyword: Populism, EU, Framing, US, China, Technology

 

Authored by Anton Miguel De Vera, Viktoriia Hamaiunova, Réka Koleszár & Giada Pasquettaz

Introduction

In the increasingly uncertain geopolitical climate, the European Union (EU) is facing the challenge of maintaining its technological resilience while protecting its security and autonomy. The fast-paced international competition for technological leadership is closely tied to the bloc’s economic competence and has consequences for its security. Given the importance of transatlantic cooperation in this domain, the upcoming US elections, and the possibility of a second Trump administration should urge policymakers to focus on strengthening the EU’s preparedness. This paper addresses the existing vulnerabilities in the EU’s technological security through the exemplary case of Huawei and outlines recommendations on how to tackle them.

Connectivity, one of the critical technologies of the rapid Fourth Industrial Revolution, has been at the center of heated discussions in recent years. Several nations identified connectivity to be an essential part of their competitiveness and development and, among others, Huawei emerged at the forefront of advanced technologies. The Chinese-owned ICT provider was among the world leaders in rolling out their next-generation telecommunication networks worldwide. Within the EU, the choice of 5G providers has generated crucial debates. Next to the obvious economic interests, building telecommunication networks came with important security considerations. As the US-China rivalry intensified under President Trump, the EU faced an important vulnerability.

Donald Trump’s trade war with China, a key component of his “America First” agenda, had significant repercussions for the EU. By imposing tariffs on Chinese goods, Trump sought to counter what he perceived as unfair trade practices by China. This conflict disrupted global trade and impacted the EU’s economy, which is heavily dependent on stable supply chains.

For the EU, the escalating US-China trade tensions presented both challenges and opportunities. While the trade war resulted in market volatility, it also provided Europe with a chance to strengthen its trade relationships with China. The two reached an agreement in principle on a comprehensive agreement on investment (CAI) in 2020 – although it was later put on hold due to the tit-for-tat sanctions. The prospect of deepening ties with China posed a risk of straining transatlantic relations, particularly as Trump urged European nations to collaborate with the US in pressuring Beijing. Trump’s populist trade policies thus compelled the EU to carefully balance its relationships with both the US and China while prioritizing its own economic and security interests. It is in this context that the debate around Huawei and the EU’s technological security is situated in.

The EU’s 5G Rollout:  Rhetoric Coercion and Uneven Progress

The European Commission identified the possibilities of 5G early on and adopted an action plan in 2016 to launch 5G services in all member states by the end of 2020 (European Commission, 2024). Although some experts warned that the EU is falling behind in technological transformation, member states quickly began catching up and published their roadmaps. However, progress was uneven and fragmented (5G Observatory Quarterly Report 2, 2019). At that time, Huawei was in a prime position in the European market to support the 5G rollout and was already working with several European providers. By 2019, the Chinese company signed memorandums of understanding with wireless providers in at least 9 EU countries, including Germany, Spain, and France (5G Observatory, 2021). For many, it seemed evident that for the EU to stay competitive and meet the plans for 5G coverage, Huawei was the answer.

In parallel, however, concerns about the security of Huawei equipment began circulating. Against the backdrop of the escalating trade war between the US and China, the former began prompting allies to exclude Huawei from their networks (Woo & O’Keeffe, 2018). President Trump labelled Huawei a security risk and threatened to cut off intelligence and information-sharing with allies using the ‘untrustworthy’ 5G vendor (Business Standard, 2020).

US Policy towards China under Donald Trump: Framing as a Strategic Tool

Donald Trump’s political rise is often analyzed through the lens of populism and framing theory, both of which help explain his appeal and communication strategies. Populism, broadly defined, refers to a political approach that pits the “common people” against a perceived corrupt elite (Mudde, 2004). Trump’s rhetoric embodies this populist style, as he frequently claims to speak for ordinary Americans against the political establishment. His 2016 campaign, for instance, centered on “draining the swamp” in Washington, positioning himself as an outsider who would challenge entrenched elites. During the 2024 election, he is still using this populist communication, by portraying himself as “one of the people”, like in one of his recent tweets where he works for one shift in McDonalds.

One of the key aspects of Trump’s populism is his use of framing. He does not only use it on a national level for criticizing his opponents but also in relation to foreign policy issues. Framing theory, as defined by Entman (1993), involves highlighting certain aspects of a reality while downplaying others, effectively shaping how an issue is understood by the public. Trump’s framing of China is a prime example. Throughout his presidency and during his campaigns, Trump consistently framed China as a threat to American economic interests and national security. By doing so, he shaped public discourse and channeled public frustrations about job losses and trade imbalances into hostility toward China.

A prominent example of Trump’s framing of China came during his trade war with the country. He portrayed China as an “unfair” player in global trade, accusing it of “stealing” American jobs and intellectual property. In a 2019 speech, Trump stated, “China has taken advantage of the United States for many, many years. And those days are over.” This framing was effective in galvanizing his political base, particularly among working-class voters who felt economically marginalized by globalization (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). By framing the issue as a battle between patriotic Americans and a foreign adversary, Trump reinforced his populist credentials.

Trump’s framing of China intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, where he repeatedly blamed China for the spread of the virus, referring to it as the “China virus” and the “Kung flu” (The New York Times, 2020). By doing so, he shifted public discourse to portray China as responsible not only for the economic challenges faced by the US but also for the public health crisis, a narrative that resonated with many of his supporters.

A notable example of this framing came in March 2020, when Trump tweeted, “The United States will be powerfully supporting those industries, like Airlines and others, that are particularly affected by the Chinese Virus.” This statement reported widely in the media, sparked accusations of racism and xenophobia (CNN, 2020). However, Trump defended his rhetoric, arguing that it was necessary to hold China accountable for the pandemic’s global spread. His framing successfully linked the frustrations over COVID-19 to broader concerns about China’s role in the world economy, feeding into his populist narrative of protecting American interests.

Framing theory is particularly relevant here because it highlights how political actors shape public perception by focusing on certain narratives. As Entman (2007) notes, framing involves selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in communication. Trump’s framing of China as both an economic competitor and a national security threat played a significant role in justifying his tariffs and aggressive foreign policy stance. Moreover, Trump’s use of this frame was amplified by the media, contributing to rising anti-China sentiments in the US (Goffman, 1974).

By framing China as a direct threat to American prosperity, Trump not only advanced his populist message but also reshaped political discourse, making foreign policy a central issue for many voters. Through this, he created the basis of US trade policy against foreign companies deemed as a threat and towards allies who seemed hesitant to follow this approach.

With all this, the EU faced a two-fold dilemma: giving in to Trump’s strategy and losing out on competitiveness while appearing to have little strategic autonomy or seizing the opportunities with Huawei but straining the transatlantic relationship while potentially endangering critical infrastructure. As of 2024, the EU’s answer has been fragmented and disunited. Only 10 of the 27 member states have excluded Huawei and although almost all states put in place some kind of restrictions, only a handful of them implemented it (European Commission, 2023a). President Trump’s approach of pressuring allies and threatening to cut off intelligence-sharing may have been counterproductive, but it exposed an important weakness of the EU. 

What Next – The Way Forward

With the US elections approaching, the EU has a window of opportunity to address this dilemma. The possibility of a second Trump administration brings the risk of further aggravating the US-China ties and putting the EU into an even more uncomfortable position. The war in Ukraine has heightened the EU’s need and dependence on intelligence-sharing with the US Upcoming challenges in transatlantic relations are likely to have significant repercussions for the EU’s security. At the same time, the EU-China relations are also at a heightened risk of entering into a trade war as the latest developments around the export of Chinese electric vehicles demonstrate. The economic vulnerability of certain European member states to Chinese pressure adds another dimension to the complex nature of achieving united European approaches. Essentially, the EU needs to safeguard its autonomy against unilateral actions while maintaining its competitiveness and ensuring the security of its critical infrastructure. To do that, policymakers should consider the following scenarios and the presented policy recommendations.

If Trump Wins

First, in case of a Trump victory, Europeans have to embrace another period of uncertainty. A second Trump Administration will renew concerns about US support for NATO while the protectionist policies will put direct pressure on transatlantic trade relations. It is expected that President Trump will continue his previous hardline approach towards China leading to an intensified trade war and a bigger volume of Chinese exports being dumped on the European market. All the while, Europeans will increasingly be pulled into a trade and technology war with the Eastern power amid calls from the US to reduce relations. In this scenario, Trump’s rhetorical pressure, as in the previous case of calling to exclude Huawei from the 5G rollout to maintain intelligence-sharing, might turn into actual policies. In 2025, this would come with a huge price given the EU’s dependence on the American intelligence infrastructure to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia’s war. Any threats thus must be taken seriously and addressed accordingly.

Next to that, internally, Trump’s success would galvanize far-right, populist figures and movements. His ideological allies in Europe, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Polish President Andrzej Duda would be emboldened to continue their path after a Trump victory. Far-right, populist politicians would find renewed reassurance to oppose more European integration. Consequently, reaching unity on crucial foreign policy questions might further be hindered.

Faced with the prospect of this challenging situation, European policymakers would do well to address the potential pitfalls early on. Given the foreseeable fragmentations, the EU must strengthen and implement the framework it already has agreed upon (such as the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox and the Digital Services Act). According to the latest assessment of the 5G Toolbox, which was adopted to mitigate security risks, only 10 out of the 27 Member States have restricted or excluded high-risk suppliers from their 5G networks (European Commission, 2023b). Based on its own and Member States’ independent analyses, the European Commission considers Huawei along with another Chinese company, ZTE, to ‘pose materially higher risk than other 5G providers.’ Dependency on these providers for critical infrastructure, which the 5G network is considered, creates a serious risk across the Union. Considering the level of interconnectedness between EU networks, a fragmented policy could jeopardize the entire bloc’s security. For instance, last year Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó highlighted Hungary’s development of 5G networks with the help of Huawei, next to signing additional cooperation agreements with the company (Szijjártó Péter, 2023).  

To address the diverging approaches, the EU should develop a mechanism to actively encourage Member States to implement the existing framework and use the available tools. It should also hold Member States accountable for doing so. Considering the weight of risks in the EU’s technological security, policymakers should call for an EU-wide regulation with clear and urgent deadlines. This would support the EU’s autonomy in making security-related decisions as assessments of risks are done both by Member States and by the European Commission. Transatlantic relations are likely to become more friendly as a result and the EU’s security would increase. One of the downsides of this approach, however, is the expected response from Beijing. China is likely to retaliate for a European policy naming and restricting its companies from the market. Besides, reaching this agreement on a European level will not be easy as Member States’ security priorities and relations with China differ significantly. Nevertheless, this approach offers the EU a starting point to be a proactive actor.

If Harris Wins

If Americans choose a Harris administration for the next four years, the EU would find itself in a similar position as they were during Biden’s administration assuming that Harris will take up a similar approach against China. Despite their opposition to each other, President Joe Biden had taken a similar approach to his Republican predecessor. Biden ordered heavy tariffs on Chinese imports of high-tech items such as semiconductor chips while diversifying its sources for imports such as the EU and Mexico (Davis, 2024; Lovely et al., 2024). In doing so, the United States has become less dependent on China for all types of imported manufactured goods since 2018, according to recently released 2023 customs data (Lovely et al., 2024). 

The EU and China, however, have maintained or increased their reliance on each other for almost all types of imported goods” (Lovely et al., 2024). As such, the EU could potentially clash with the US by maintaining this dependence which showcases some form of limited autonomy. On the one hand, the EU exercises its agency to shift towards maintaining and deepening ties with China. However, on the other hand, the EU’s agency is somewhat limited given its trade dependency with China which may compel it to act in favor of Beijing on certain issues.

A Harris administration would likely maintain the use of tariffs, particularly targeting China, to counter perceived unfair competition as emphasized by Trump, and to drive progress in the US energy transition, supporting its emissions reduction goals. This was evident during the presidential debate between Harris and Trump in September 2024. She highlighted Trump’s failed attempt to subdue China as an economic powerhouse arguing that “under Donald Trump’s presidency, he ended up selling American chips to China to help them improve and modernize their military” (Butts, 2024). She concluded with the statement, ″[he] basically sold us out when a policy about China should be in making sure the United States of America wins the competition for the 21st century” (Butts, 2024). This comment indicates to the EU and other US allies that Harris is likely to continue Biden’s approach if she wins the presidential race.

In this scenario, the EU faces a more predictable transatlantic landscape. This, however, may prove more perilous. Albeit Harris will follow a hardline approach to China and the pressure on allies to not share advanced technology with Beijing will remain, she is unlikely to strongly push the EU. In contrast to the Trump administration, instead of coercive rhetoric, she is likely to use softer means of persuasion. This carries in itself the risk that the EU will sit on its hands for too long instead of addressing the legitimate security threats that China poses. To ensure that the resilience of technological security remains a priority, the European Parliament should establish a sub-committee of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The sub-committee should deal with the security considerations that come with technologies and equipment from third countries and should ensure that the interests of European citizens are considered in tech security-related questions. This would address the risks of de-prioritization and would contribute to enhanced and more nuanced debates. Considering the viewpoints of Members of the Parliament directly through the sub-committee could help the European Commission to propose regulations that are more likely to enjoy support. The only constraining factor to consider is the budget of setting up the sub-committee but the importance of this issue should outweigh that.

Conclusion

This paper highlighted the importance of European technology security and looked at different scenarios European leaders will face during the US presidential election. The example of the rollout of the 5G technology in the EU and the debates around using Chinese Huawei as the technology provider illustrated the EU’s vulnerability when it comes to maintaining its autonomy and competitiveness in the tech sector. In the rapidly changing global landscape, EU leaders are facing a crucial dilemma about the way forward. To maintain technological competitiveness, the EU may have no choice but to rely on Chinese partners while to ensure the continent’s security and stability, it cannot afford to alienate its key transatlantic partner. At the same time, legitimate security risks should not be overlooked and considered as subordinate to trade relations.

This paper offers a concise depiction of the main factors EU leaders should consider as Americans head to the polls. In either scenario, what is crucial for the EU is to be prepared and engage in collective planning. A second Trump administration is likely to bring about a more hectic and turbulent period. His framing of China as a security threat could lead to more pressure on European allies to cut ties with Beijing while his victory could galvanize European populists making it harder to achieve consensus on the European level. To offset this, the paper recommends taking concrete steps to implement the already existing framework and strengthen the available toolbox. In case of a Harris victory, the EU can expect reasonable continuity. Perhaps an important challenge the bloc will face will be finding the impetus to keep the technology security issue in focus. The paper argues that one way to do that would be to set up a dedicated sub-committee within the European Parliament to keep the issue on the agenda and ensure the interests of European citizens.

 

Authors’ Biographies

Anton Miguel De Vera is an MA student in International Business and Economic Diplomacy at IMC FH Krems. He previously earned a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from Central European University in Vienna, where he specialized in International Relations and Economics. His thesis examined the dynamics of Philippine agency within the US-Philippine security alliance and its nuanced relationship with China, entitled “The Faces of Philippine Agency in Foreign Affairs: The Philippines and the United States Security Alliances”. Currently based in Vienna, Anton works at Raiffeisen Bank International, where he combines his academic expertise with practical experience in finance and international relations.

Viktoriia Hamaiunova is a Ph.D. candidate at Newcastle University (UK), where she investigates the role of legal culture in shaping fair trial standards within ECHR member states, focusing on the integration of mediation into judicial systems to enhance human rights protections. Her research combines doctrinal and non-doctrinal approaches, incorporating thematic analysis and insights from interviews with ECtHR judges to examine how legal culture influences judicial reform and access to justice. Viktoriia Hamaiunova holds an MA in International Law and Human Rights from the University of Tartu, enriched by academic exchanges at Masaryk University and Comenius University.  Her legal career includes in-house experience and ECtHR  traineership. An accredited mediator and published author, Viktoriia Hamaiunova has presented her work at prominent conferences, including SLSA Annual Conference and the Human Rights Law Conference at the University of Cambridge. With extensive teaching experience, she leads discussions on topics spanning international law to mediation practices. As an interdisciplinary researcher, Viktoriia Hamaiunova is committed to culturally informed legal reforms, fostering development and facilitating discussions on effective judicial systems and dispute resolution. 

Réka Koleszár is an independent researcher focusing on the relations between the European Union and Asia, in particular East Asia. Her experience spans international organizations and think tanks including working for the Council of the European Union and the European Policy Centre. Réka holds an MSc in Political Science from Leiden University, an MA in International Relations specializing in East Asian studies from the University of Groningen, and a diploma in the Art of Diplomacy from the European Academy of Diplomacy.

Giada Pasquettaz is a doctoral student at the Chair of Political Science and International Politics of Prof. Dr. Dirk Leuffen since October 2023. Her interests are mainly in political communication, international relations, political behavior, comparative politics and quantitative methods. She holds a master’s degree in mass media and politics with a focus on international social movements’ communication from the University of Bologna. She also completed her bachelor’s degree in Sociology at the University of Bologna with a specialization in migration frames used in media. She completed semesters abroad at the University of Sundsvall (Sweden), at UCLouvain (Belgium) and at the UIT Tromsø (Norway).

 

References

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Butts, D. (2024, September 11). “Harris says Trump “sold us out on China”: Highlights from the presidential debate on trade and tariffs.” CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/09/11/harris-vs-trump-on-china-debate-highlights-on-trade-and-tariffs.html

Davis, B. (2024, October 28). “How Washington Learned to Stop Worrying and Embrace Protectionism.” Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/09/10/us-protectionism-biden-trump-tarrifs-harris-china/

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Gordon, J. (2024, September 30). “Kamala Harris and trade: Better than the alternative, but not much.” Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/kamala-harris-trade-better-alternative-not-much

Lovely, M. E. & Yan, J. (2024, August 27). “While the US and China decouple, the EU and China deepen trade dependencies.” PIIE. https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2024/while-us-and-china-decouple-eu-and-china-deepen-trade-dependencies

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). “Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic

have-nots and cultural backlash.” Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659

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Trump, D. J. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2024, October 21). MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN [Tweet]. X. https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1848133172459970889

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ECPS Report: 2024 European Parliament Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism

by ArticlesEditor’s ChoiceHIGHLIGHTSHomeReports

Ivaldi, Gilles & Zankina, Emilia (Eds). (2024). 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 29, 2024. Brussels. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0059

 

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Throughout the first two decades of the 21st century, populism has emerged as one of the most significant global political phenomenons, deeply affecting electoral politics in democracies across the globe, both new and consolidated. In Europe, populism has become a major force, reshaping the political landscape and discourse of the European Union and most of its member states in unprecedented ways. Over the years, the impact of populist parties has been felt both at the level of domestic and European politics, increasingly putting pressure on more established mainstream parties, particularly at the right of the political spectrum.

Populism is found in different locations in the party system, predominantly at the far-left and far-right of the spectrum. All available data of populist parties illustrates the rise in support for populist, far-left, and far-right parties in Europe since the early 1990s. Such parties have made significant electoral gains in recent years. They have joined coalition governments in several countries, including Italy, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Austria, more generally reflecting the mainstreaming of their ideas and themes in party politics and public opinion.

Populist performances typically vary across parties and contexts, reflecting the complex interplay between structural and contextual factors. The electoral support for radical parties is rooted in structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is conditioned by political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. While contemporary populism is generally seen as a response to a wide range of socioeconomic and cultural grievances and issues, it can also be seen as an expression of political discontent largely dependent on the national political cycle and the shorter-term country-specific opportunities produced for populist mobilization.

In this context, the analysis of the European Parliament elections in June 2024 provides a unique opportunity to assess the current wave of populism across all 27 European Union (EU) member states simultaneously. With elections occurring around the same time, we can examine this wave of pan-European populism more closely and comparatively, assessing its scale, dynamics, and impact on national politics and, ultimately, on the EU. Thus, this report by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) examines the electoral performance and influence of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing on country-specific analyses by local experts, the report evaluates populist party performance across all EU member states and discusses the challenges populist politics pose for European institutions and the future of Europe.

The ECPS report illustrates the diversity of populism and the variety of its manifestations across the political spectrum. The current trend is one of increasing mainstreaming and normalization of populist parties as a result of a dual process of modernization and moderation by populists, on the one hand, and accommodation of populist ideas and policies by mainstream parties, on the other hand. The report see that the modernization of populist politics concerns, in particular, the moderation and blurring of those parties’ positions regarding European integration, to increase their appeal to moderate and pro-EU voters and to foster collaboration with mainstream parties.

The results of the 2024 European elections have essentially confirmed the electoral consolidation of the populist phenomenon in Europe. In 2024, these parties won 263 of the 720 seats – approximately 36%. Populists came first in the elections in six countries, with radical right populists winning in four countries, while centrist populists topped the polls in another two countries. Such results reflect the rise in support for populism in recent national elections as well as the increase in the number and geographical spread of populist parties across Europe. No less than 60 populist parties across 26 EU member states gained representation in the European Parliament in June 2024. In comparison, a total of 40 populist parties had won seats in 22 EU countries in the 2019 election. 

Populist party performances varied, however, across countries and different brands of populism. The results of the 2024 European elections have essentially attested to the consolidation of the populist right, while left-wing and centrist populist parties have received comparatively less support across Europe. Moreover, the new distribution of seats should not mask distortions due to the relative weight of national representations in the European Parliament.

The 2024 European elections have delivered a new European Parliament whose centre of gravity has clearly shifted to the right and where the presence of populist actors has increased. However, these parties remain divided in the European Parliament. With a few notable exceptions, such as Fico’s SMER in Slovakia and the German BSW, parties of the populist left are all found in the Left group in the European Parliament. Right-wing populists are currently distributed across three different groups – namely, the ECR, PfE, and ESN. Some populist parties are also found among the Non-inscrits (NI). Finally, somewhat reflecting the diversity in their ideological profile, centrist populist parties are scattered across different groups, including the EPP and Renew Europe.

With the increased representation of right-wing populists in the European Parliament, the report anticipates a growing influence on political debates and policy decisions in areas such as migration, climate change, EU enlargement, and support for Ukraine. It also foresees more ad hoc coalitions on specific issues rather than cohesive positions and policy proposals. The legitimation of radical-right discourse and its impact on both European and national politics is expected to continue. While the current EP majority may effectively maintain a cordon sanitaire around both the far-right and far-left, an overall shift to the right, in both rhetoric and policy, is already evident.

Each chapter of the report provides background information about the main populist forces in the country of focus by examining their history, electoral support and political agenda. This includes populist parties across the spectrum where deemed relevant. With a focus on the 2024 European election, each country chapter looks at the ‘supply side’ of populism (i.e., the positions of populist parties towards the EU in general and vis-à-vis specific policies, such as migration and asylum, fiscal policy, the Schengen system, European citizenship and democracy, the COVID-19 pandemic, human rights, as well as external affairs, including policy towards the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Hamas conflicts). Country analyses ask how populists used Euroscepticism, national sovereignty, ethnic culture, identity, xenophobia and religion during the 2024 EP election campaign and what their discourse was on the composition and working mechanisms of the European Parliament.

Additionally, each chapter examines the ‘demand side’ of populism by looking at how populist parties fared in the elections and which topics played a role in their success or failure. Wherever possible, the country chapters in this report provide public opinion data about critical political issues for populist voters and the characterization of crucial sociodemographics of populist voters across different parties and national contexts.

Finally, each country chapter assesses the impact of populist politics in their respective country and at the EU level (e.g., what kind of populist politics are the elected populist parties going to articulate in the EP and which may be their coalition strategy), allowing for the broader conclusions discussed in this report’s final section.

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Please see the report as divided into 26 country chapters below.

 

Introduction

By Gilles Ivaldi & Emilia Zankina 

 

The Populist Radical-right Freedom Party in the Austrian 2024 EU Elections

By Eric Miklin

 

Populist Radical Parties in Belgium and the 2024 European Elections

By Emilie van Haute

 

Populism and Polycrisis in Bulgaria on the Eve of the 2024 European Parliament Elections

By Emilia Zankina

 

Between ‘Kingmakers’ and Public Indifference: Croatia’s National Conservative Right in the European Elections of 2024

By Vassilis Petsinis

 

Rising discontent with the EU, the Rise of the Right and the 2024 European Parliament Elections in Cyprus

By Andreas Theophanous & Mary Varda 

 

The Race of Populists: The 2024 EP Elections in the Czech Republic

By Vlastimil Havlík & Alena Kluknavská

 

Denmark’s Populism at the Crossroads: Insights into the 2024 European Parliament Election Results

By Susi Meret

 

Populism in the 2024 European Parliament Elections in Estonia

By Mari-Liis Jakobson

 

The Loss of the Populist Radical Right in the 2024 European Parliament Elections in Finland

By Juha Herkman

 

A Tipping Point for Far-Right Populism in France

By Gilles Ivaldi

 

Germany’s 2024 EP Elections: The Populist Challenge to the Progressive Coalition

By Kai Arzheimer

 

Economic Malaise and Political Discontent: An Analysis of the 2024 European Parliament Election in Greece

By Sofia Vasilopoulou

 

A Pyrrhic Victory for the Populist Right in Hungary

By Robert Csehi

 

Ireland After the 2024 EP Elections: The Centre Holds … Just About

By Eoin O’Malley 

 

The Spectrum of Italian Populist Parties in the 2024 European Elections: A Shift in the Balance of Power on the Right

By Cecilia Biancalana

 

Populism and the 2024 European Parliament Election in Latvia

By Daunis Auers

 

Lithuanian Populist Far-right (In)security Discourse During the European Parliament Elections in the face of Russia’s War Against Ukraine

By Jogilė Ulinskaitė

 

Right-wing Populism in Luxembourg During the 2024 EP Election

By Paul Carls 

 

Dashed Hopes and the Success of the Populist Right: The Case of the 2024 European Elections in Poland

By Artur Lipiński

 

The 2024 European Elections and Right-wing Populism in Portugal

By Afonso Biscaia & Susana Salgado

 

Charting Populist Pathways: Romanian Populism’s Journey to the European Parliament

By Sorina Soare

 

Slovakia: Mixed Results of Populist Parties in the 2024 EP Elections

By Marek Rybář

 

Digital Strategies of Political Parties in the 2024 European Elections: The Case of Slovenia

By Tanja Oblak Črnič & Katja Koren Ošljak

 

Euroscepticism and Populism on Europhilic Soil: The 2024 European Parliament Elections in Spain

By Hugo Marcos-Marne

 

A Speed Bump in the Road or the Start of an Uphill Journey? The Sweden Democrats and the 2024 European Parliament Election Setback

By Niklas Bolin

 

Waking the Sleeping Populist Giant: The 2024 European Elections and Populism in the Netherlands

By Bertjan Verbeek & Andrej Zaslove

 

Conclusion

By Gilles Ivaldi & Emilia Zankina 

 

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Dr. Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor in Political Science, Vice Provost for Global Engagement of Temple University, and Dean of Temple University Rome campus.

Professor Zankina: Many Bulgarians Remain Deeply Skeptical of the West

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In an interview with ECPS, Professor Emilia Zankina explains that, despite the financial and mobility benefits of EU membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West” due to Bulgaria’s strong historic ties to Russia. The communist era deeply embedded Russian language, culture, and education in Bulgarian life, and “for many,” Professor Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator.” She observes that while the war in Ukraine initially reduced pro-Russian sentiment in the country, as the conflict continued, some Bulgarians have returned to their original views.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Emilia Zankina, a leading expert in political science and Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University, delves into the intricate landscape of Bulgarian politics. Currently Dean of Temple University’s Rome campus, Dr. Zankina offers an in-depth analysis of Bulgaria’s shifting political dynamics, particularly highlighting the nation’s complex relationship with Russia, the rise of populism, and public sentiment toward the West.

In Bulgaria’s recent parliamentary election, the center-right GERB party secured first place, but will need a coalition partner to govern. GERB garnered 25.52% of the votes, with the reformist We Continue the Change (PP) party in second at 13.74%, and the ultra-nationalist Vazrazhdane (Revival) party in third with 12.92%.

Exploring Bulgaria’s historic affinity with Russia, Dr. Zankina explains that despite the financial and mobility benefits gained through European Union membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.” She attributes this sentiment to the powerful legacy of the communist era, during which Russian language, culture, and education were integral to Bulgarian life. “For many,” Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator, and this view endures across generations, who often make little distinction between Russian people and the government.” She describes how, initially, the war in Ukraine prompted a decline in pro-Russian sentiment, but as the conflict has continued, some Bulgarians have reverted to their original views.

Addressing Bulgaria’s “mushrooming” populist landscape, Dr. Zankina sheds light on why the country has faced seven elections since 2021. The rapid turnover of parties, she explains, is fueled by populism’s promise of quick solutions and charismatic leadership, which attracts voters eager for change but dissatisfied with democratic processes’ slow pace. “This populist formula,” she says, “favors emotional appeals and big promises without real solutions.” In Bulgaria, populism has contributed to a “never-ending cycle” of new parties, each aiming to capture a portion of an electorate constantly shifting its support.

Dr. Zankina also highlights the unique dynamic of female representation within Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties, where women play a “strategic role” in appealing to female voters. However, the PRR remains largely male-dominated, reflecting broader perceptions of these parties as “Männerparteien.” As Bulgaria navigates its future in the EU amidst the influence of both Russian-aligned parties and anti-establishment movements, Dr. Zankina’s insights underscore the complexities of national identity, populism, and external influences in shaping Bulgarian democracy.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Emilia Zankina with some edits.

Populism Fuels Ongoing Volatility in Bulgaria’s Party System

Professor Zankina, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question. With the fragmentation of the Bulgarian parliament and the presence of nine parties, what role does populism play in shaping public perception and voter alignment within Bulgaria’s complex political landscape? Could this be the primary reason why Bulgaria has gone to the polls seven times since 2021? Additionally, what role have populist parties specifically played in contributing to this political crisis?

Professor Emilia Zankina: Populism is a broad phenomenon that has contributed to developments in party systems, not only in Bulgaria but throughout Europe. What we see is that populist appeals favor easy solutions in Manichean rhetoric and salvation narratives that make voters less patient with the difficulty and complexity of the democratic process, making them eager to vote for the next “savior” and the next quick solution. So certainly, the growing penetration of populism, both as a discursive technique and a way of organizing parties, as well as a way of moving away from hardcore ideologies, has contributed to an overall expectation by voters that they could be offered a simple solution by the next new party.

So we have this combination of populism breeding a string of new parties that come in a never-ending cycle with new promises and a core body of voters who move from one new party to the next. There is certainly a lot to be said about populism contributing to an overall volatility of a party system which, in the case of Bulgaria, was never fully stable, as it is a relatively young party system. It’s been 35 years, and we have already seen populist appeals for the last 20 or so years making their way, and these have become even more prevalent in the past four years.

Eastern Europe Tries to Build Party Systems as Western Models Erode

Boyko Borisov at a meeting with the President of Bulgaria in Sofia on April 20, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

How has the shift from traditional political parties to personalistic, charisma-centered leadership impacted Bulgaria’s democratic institutions, and what long-term effects do you foresee? What role do crises play in the rise of charismatic leaders in Bulgaria, and how have leaders like Simeon and Borisov utilized such moments to construct and sustain political charisma? What made GERB and Boyko Borisov so successful in Bulgarian elections since 2006?

Professor Emilia Zankina: Moving away from traditional parties is a significant shift for Western European countries. Central mobilizing themes—often described by the “frozen party thesis” with divisions such as rural versus urban or industrial versus agricultural—have become less relevant as new issues like migration, climate change, and economic crises come to the forefront. In Eastern Europe, however, moving away from traditional political parties holds less relevance because there isn’t a long history of such parties. Eastern Europe emerged from a one-party system that was far from democratic; it could hardly be called a party system—it was essentially an authoritarian regime masquerading as a party system.

In building a party system, Eastern Europe faces a situation where the systems it seeks to emulate in the West are gradually eroding. Now, trends between West and East are less discernible because we also see interparty connectedness, transnational party cooperation, European party families, and so forth, as well as the replication of organizational formulas or personalistic behavior formulas.

In Bulgaria, a major shift occurred with the arrival of Simeon, a charismatic figure with significant legitimacy who attracted a substantial share of votes. During his tenure, he accomplished much and fulfilled many of his promises. At the same time, he established a personalistic model of charisma that Boyko Borisov later emulated in a markedly different style. While the two differ greatly in character, objectives, and persona, Borisov managed to replicate Simeon’s success through his own personal appeal.

Borisov’s approach is less refined and graceful, focusing instead on the image of a “tough guy” capable of handling criminals due to his familiarity with such environments. This approach quickly earned him credibility, not only domestically but also with the European People’s Party, which endorsed him as soon as GERB was formed. In the 2007 elections—Bulgaria’s first for the European Parliament—he gained this support and has continued to benefit from it due to the predictability and stability he brought to Bulgaria.

Borisov’s electoral record is impressive: in 15 years and 11 parliamentary elections, he has only faced defeat twice. His success extends to presidential elections, with his candidates winning twice, as well as to local and European Parliament elections. However, his party, GERB, has been marred by associations with corruption, fueling opposition that combines grassroots protests with a series of populist parties and personalities riding this wave of discontent. This opposition has recently challenged Borisov’s hold on power, while also enabling numerous newcomers to rise on anti-corruption narratives and critiques of GERB. Not all of these actors are necessarily sincere in their appeals, as each has specific political objectives and aims to gain power.

How significant is Boyko Borissov’s ability to distance himself from far-right oligarch Delyan Peevski for GERB’s potential coalition-building efforts, and what does this suggest about the influence of corruption-related sanctions on Bulgarian politics?

Professor Emilia Zankina: He has not shown any willingness to distance himself, even in the aftermath of the elections. On Sunday night, in his speech, he did not exclude Peevski and the MRF(Movement for Rights and Freedoms)-New Beginning from potential coalition-building efforts. Although We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria—the most likely and much-needed potential partner for Borissov—has called for a cordon sanitaire around Peevski, GERB remains one of the few parties in Parliament unwilling to join this exclusion. In fact, every other party has supported the cordon sanitaire except Borissov’s party, which suggests that there may be dependencies between Borissov and Peevski that are not apparent to the broader public. Whether it’s a question of financing or compromising information, he appears reluctant to sever that connection. This stance will undoubtedly create significant challenges in finding other coalition partners and establishing a viable governing coalition.

Far-Right Parties Gain from Alignment and Financial Support from Putin Regime

Demonstration commemorating May 9, Russia’s Victory Day over Nazi Germany, with participants expressing their emotions and displaying slogans in Sofia, Bulgaria, on May 9, 2022. Photo: Yulian Staykov.

Given the rise of pro-Russian and far-right groups like Vazrazhdane, how do you interpret the current balance between Bulgaria’s pro-European aspirations and the growing appeal of populist, anti-Western ideologies? How might Bulgaria’s prolonged political instability impact its path towards EU integration, and do you foresee populist narratives either accelerating or hindering this process within the current coalition negotiations?

Professor Emilia Zankina: The nationalist vote in Bulgaria has traditionally accounted for around 10 to 12%, beginning with ATAKA in 2005. However, in the latest elections, Vazrazhdane and other new parties like March for Justice and Great Glory collectively gathered over 20% of the vote. It’s important to interpret this cautiously, as it doesn’t necessarily reflect purely nationalist sentiment—a significant portion of this vote is protest-driven. Nationalist parties have capitalized on widespread discontent regarding various issues, from the economic crisis to Bulgaria’s stance on the war in Ukraine, becoming a magnet for groups experiencing different types of dissatisfaction. Whether these supporters are genuinely nationalist or simply unhappy is, in some ways, beside the point. If these parties manage to gain power, nationalists, once in government, tend to govern as nationalists.

We have already seen these parties push through two pieces of legislation in the previous parliament: one against so-called LGBT “propaganda” in schools and another targeting “foreign agents,” similar to measures observed in Hungary and Georgia. Additionally, these parties benefit not only from alignment with the Putin regime but also, at times, from its financial support. Examination of their financial reports over the past 10 years reveals that around European elections, unexplained funds—though not substantial—appear in the records of these populist parties. This is particularly notable as the categorization of these funds often shifts from donations to memberships, showing a lack of consistency, which strongly suggests these funds may originate elsewhere.

While directly linking these funds to the Putin regime is complex, it is well-documented that Western parties like Rassemblement National (RN) in France have received similar support. We can therefore reasonably surmise that Russian support reaches these parties, not only financially but also through disinformation campaigns and internet trolls, which amplify their narratives while eroding others, including basic facts.

In your view, what are the primary challenges for pro-European coalitions such as PP-DB in countering populist narratives, especially regarding issues like judicial reform and anti-corruption efforts? Given the “top-down, externally driven” approach to reform in Bulgaria, what specific measures do you believe could enhance the sustainability and local ownership of these reforms?

Professor Emilia Zankina: It doesn’t help that the champions of judicial reform and pro-EU orientation have proven to be quite incompetent themselves and often rely on populist narratives. They also depend on swing votes from the right, left, and center. The first priority is to establish themselves as legitimate political figures capable of predictable political behavior, which they have yet to demonstrate. Despite the sound programmatic appeals behind many of their reforms, their behavior during the campaign has been one of endless bickering with Borisov, and the collapse of the government showed a lack of political experience and acumen. Their inability to inspire trust or project legitimacy and experience doesn’t help their cause.

Furthermore, they face a complex situation: the largest party is GERB, and they have run on an anti-GERB platform, yet now they are in the position of having to uphold the pro-European line, with GERB as their only viable partner. It’s not an easy position, as GERB is both their biggest opponent on corruption—after Peevski—and their strongest ally on European versus pro-Russian orientation. This is a very delicate balance and a difficult task.

They must attempt to form this pro-European coalition while pushing GERB to distance itself from Peevski and commit to anti-corruption reforms. Although complex and challenging, they have no other option but to try to take this difficult step.

Corruption Persists, Demanding Focused and Sustained Solutions

People protesting on the main streets of the capital, demanding the Prime Minister’s resignation, in Sofia, Bulgaria, on July 14, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

How have historical legacies and political choices shaped the challenges in Bulgaria’s public administration reform, particularly regarding transparency and accountability? What is the role of corruption in either consolidating or weakening populist parties in Bulgaria? 

Professor Emilia Zankina: Corruption has been a major mobilizing factor, as there have been numerous corruption scandals involving key GERB figures, some of whom, like Tsvetan Tsvetanov, are no longer in power. Corruption remains a persistent problem, and it’s crucial to focus on and stay committed to solutions.

From experience in other former communist countries with similar bureaucratic legacies—a nomenklatura system, highly politicized, and, after the collapse of communism, highly corrupt—we know that one effective solution is electronic governance. Reforming public administration and expanding e-governance across more sectors and procedures have already made substantial strides in addressing corruption, particularly at lower levels. Currently, however, Bulgaria is dealing with political corruption at the highest levels, embodied by figures like Peevski. Peevski’s influence, demonstrated by his control over both the prosecution and the courts, also extends to swaying party behavior within other political groups.

The fact that he managed to secure more votes than party founder Ahmed Dogan, with only 25% of these votes coming from ethnic Turks and over 50% from the Roma population, suggests he has substantial resources for elections and vote-buying. Many of these votes are indeed purchased. Meanwhile, the splinter party Alliance for Freedom and Rights holds over 50% of the ethnic Turkish vote and the majority of the ethnic Turkish vote abroad, indicating that it is the party most recognized by ethnic Turks as their representative. Nonetheless, Peevski has managed to partially hijack the party, purchasing votes and accumulating around 280,000 votes—a considerable number and a significant financial investment.

How does voter perception of corruption differ from expert evaluations in Bulgaria, and what does this reveal about public tolerance for corruption among political parties? How does the relationship between ethnic identity and party support complicate anti-corruption voting behavior in Bulgaria? Furthermore, what role does voter apathy or ‘fatalism’ about corruption play in shaping the success of anti-corruption parties like “There Is Such a People”?

Professor Emilia Zankina: We have a political culture with low institutional trust, which opens opportunities for anti-establishment rhetoric and allows populist parties across the spectrum to benefit from this general distrust. At the same time, there is a dissonance between actual corruption, perceived corruption, and experienced corruption. Corruption is a significant problem in Bulgaria; at the highest levels, there is political control over prosecution and the distribution of EU funds—both serious corruption issues. These factors make it easy for new parties, like There Is Such a People, to exploit the issue. However, the question remains: what are the solutions, and which of these parties actually offers viable ones?

Judicial reforms were pushed by the last regular government with support from GERB, PP-DB, and Peevski; however, many of these reforms were poorly designed. They are often targeted at specific political situations or figures, and in 10 years, these reforms may prove as problematic as the current laws. We need to move away from witch-hunting and detach reform efforts from specific political figures when considering institutional solutions and mechanisms to combat corruption and prevent such opportunities from arising in the first place.

Pro-Russian Sentiment in Bulgaria Rooted in History and Soviet Legacy

How have the war in Ukraine and the Russian influence in the country affected populism and nationalism in Bulgaria?

Professor Emilia Zankina: This has certainly enabled parties like Vazrazhdane to increase their support tenfold over the past three years. In Bulgaria, there is a blend of genuine pro-Russian sentiment, rooted in the country’s long history, including its war for independence and a communist regime backed by Moscow. This regime benefited large portions of the population, though it also harmed many others. Nevertheless, deep-rooted support for all things Russian persists, embedded in families and generations who feel an affinity for the Russian language, culture, country, and worldview.

Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has placed many people with moderate views—those who may be pro-European but not anti-Russian—in a difficult position, forcing them to choose between their progressive pro-European stance and their affinity for Russia. This dynamic has contributed to the growth of parties like Vazrazhdane.

Interestingly, another strongly pro-Russian party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, has almost disappeared, losing over 1 million voters in just a few years and now falling below 8%, despite holding nearly 30% in the 2017 elections. This indicates a limit to the mobilizing power of both pro-Russian and anti-Russian rhetoric. Roughly a third of the population is likely strongly pro-Russian, while about half supports a position of neutrality in this war. For many Bulgarian voters, the stance of the European Union and the Western world on this conflict is challenging to accept.

How do you explain the mushrooming of populist parties in Bulgaria? What are the similarities and differences with other populist parties in Europe?

Professor Emilia Zankina: There are many similarities and differences, perhaps more than we might expect, with considerable variety. Across Europe—whether east or west, north or south—we see a proliferation of populist parties, and within each country, there is significant variation. In Bulgaria, populist parties emerge from the center and the right, while in other Eastern European countries, like Slovakia, they also emerge from the left.

What has become firmly established, however, is the populist formula: strong emotional appeals, a charismatic figure highlighting sharp divisions and real societal problems, yet offering no real solutions—only big promises and quick fixes that fail to materialize. In the long run, this erodes the foundations of democracy by creating voters who are less patient and loyal, making party identification and loyalty seem like luxuries.

Instead, we see an emphasis on responding to the mood and crisis of the day, with different charismatic figures performing almost in a TV show setting to attract more votes. This is a Europe-wide trend. In a country without a well-established party system, it’s even easier to erode what was never solidly in place to begin with.

Ethnic Turkish Minority in Bulgaria Endured Trauma from Forced Assimilation and Expulsions

The Banya Bashi Mosque, a landmark and the largest mosque in Bulgaria, on September 18, 2013, in Sofia, Bulgaria. Photo: Shutterstock.

Why have populist radical right parties significantly increased their share of the vote in the June 2024 European Parliament elections, and what key issues have driven their success? How has the Turkish minority influenced the mobilization of nationalist votes, and what role does ethnic and nationalist populism play in the strategies of Bulgarian political actors, particularly regarding the Turkish minority and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) party?

Professor Emilia Zankina: Bulgarian nationalism does exploit anti-Turkish rhetoric, but this is not its main mobilizing argument, as there is another minority in Bulgaria, the Roma minority, which actually has a far stronger mobilizing factor—much more so than the ethnic Turks or even external migrants. The Roma minority has traditionally been the primary target of such rhetoric, generating narratives around issues like welfare chauvinism, pensions, schooling, and healthcare, emphasizing access only for taxpayers.

Other issues, like the war in Ukraine and pro-Russian sentiments, also influence the discourse, particularly on topics such as energy policy—decisions around local refineries, the atomic power plant, and related matters. Regarding the ethnic Turkish minority, one key argument fueling nationalist parties is the portrayal of the Ottoman Empire in history books. The ongoing debate centers on whether Bulgaria was under the so-called “Turkish yoke” or merely experienced Turkish presence or dominance, making history books a battleground for these interpretations.

The ethnic Turkish minority, meanwhile, has faced significant historical trauma in Bulgaria, especially during the renaming process, when 800,000 ethnic Turks were forced to leave the country, and the entire minority was subjected to forced assimilation policies, including killings, expulsions, and restrictions on language, culture, and religion. This history has created a deep distrust within the ethnic Turkish community toward all parties, pushing them to continue supporting a corrupt party like the MRF, which understands their loyalty is rooted in a lack of trust for any other party.

Despite attempts from both left and right to reach out to the ethnic Turkish minority, the distrust runs deep, as the wounds are recent and severe, dating back only 30 to 40 years. Many people still hold passports with multiple names, reflecting the forced name changes. It will take time before the ethnic Turkish minority feels confident enough to vote outside an ethnically Turkish party and place their trust elsewhere.

In your recent article for the ECPS report, you note that prior to 2022, 58% of the population reported positive attitudes toward Russia and Putin, suggesting that the war in Ukraine has created fertile ground for PRR parties with strong pro-Russian stances. What are the main reasons behind this pronounced pro-Russian sentiment?

Professor Emilia Zankina: Immediately after the war began, this percentage dropped sharply, but it started climbing again as the conflict continued and Ukrainian refugees arrived in the country. The initial backlash and shift away from strong support for Russia were reversed as refugees from Ukraine came, and as the war extended into a second and third year, people gradually reverted to their original views. Here, we return to the powerful legacy of the communist regime and a party that had 1 million members, with many families still revering Russia regardless of its current regime. Little distinction is made between the Russian people and the Russian government, which becomes problematic; few people object to Russian culture and people, but many oppose Putin’s regime, including within Russia itself.

The historical legacy frames Russia as a liberator, followed by a communist regime that actively promoted Russian culture and language for many years. Many people studied in Russian schools, pursued professional development in Russia, and were raised with that cultural influence. Despite the benefits of the European Union—funds, improved living standards, and mobility—many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.

Populist Radical Right Parties Typically Remain “Men’s Parties”

How do you interpret the discrepancy between the low female representation in Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties and the comparatively high level of activity on women’s issues among PRR women MPs? How might the presence of women in PRR parties in Bulgaria influence broader perceptions of these parties as “Männerparteien,” and what factors contribute to this dynamic?

Professor Emilia Zankina: There is extensive research, not only mine but also by many other authors, showing that populist radical right parties are typically “men’s parties.” They are represented by men, supported by men, and largely serve men’s interests. However, we have also seen a narrative of traditional family values promoted by women within these parties. This trend, while not dominant, has been firmly established, extending from the UK to France and across Eastern Europe.

These parties have also strategically positioned women as a tactic to appeal to female voters and as a more legitimate means of promoting specific policies. When addressing gender issues, reproductive rights, or family services, having a woman advocate for these policies lends greater legitimacy. Consequently, parties have co-opted and promoted more women to the forefront as part of this strategy. Yet, for the moment, the appeal remains predominantly directed toward male voters, and representation within these parties still skews male. Despite these efforts, if you examine the gender balance in these parties, on electoral lists and among MPs, it remains largely male-dominated.

Headquarters of the populist radical-right Chega party in Vila Nova de Gaia, Portugal, on April 4, 2021. Photo: Nuno M. Maia.

Portugal in Cultural War: Racism, Security, and the Social Contract at Stake

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeHuman RightsMigration

Portugal is facing heightened scrutiny after a young, inexperienced policeman fatally shot Odair Moniz, a Black man, under dubious circumstances. This incident has reignited longstanding debates about structural racism and revealed deep-seated cultural and social divides, exposing unresolved issues around race, security, and the state’s role. Reflecting James Davison Hunter’s concept of “culture wars,” these moral conflicts have deepened into societal divisions that erode shared values. Portugal’s colonial legacy further intensifies these tensions, perpetuating systemic racial exclusion and fostering fertile ground for populist narratives. 

By João Ferreira Dias

James Davison Hunter stands as one of the most prominent and enduring authors on the topic of “cultural wars” in the United States. He emphasizes how so-called moral issues tend to undermine the “common ground” that forms societies, with the potential to become an effective war by sharpening citizens’ moral divisions (Hunter, 1991). Conversely, Fiona Morris and other contributors in Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (2005) challenge this view, arguing that polarization largely operates within the media, while society as a whole tends toward consensus.

However, time has lent more credence to Hunter’s perspective and the work of other scholars who focus on cultural wars. Ezra Klein, in Why We’re Polarized (2020), argues that moral values and social identity issues have become central to our political identity, aligning with Cass Sunstein’s arguments in #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media(2018), which highlights how social media has become an echo chamber for tensions around morality and “customs,” amplifying socially divisive themes. But what does this theoretical prelude have to do with recent events in Portugal involving the case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public unrest? Quite a lot, as it turns out, and the reasons are worth exploring.

Among the polarizing issues within society, racial matters stand out prominently. In Portugal, we have engaged in ongoing debates over whether or not racism exists, what constitutes racism, whether Portugal is a racist country, and if structural racism is present. Much of this discussion is either redundant, given the evidence, or overly theoretical. 

In summary:

i) racism exists wherever individuals are differentiated based on race, creating hierarchies of value and access (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Fanon, 2008);

ii) racism operates as a social process in which such differentiation disadvantages some while benefiting a dominant group—typically Caucasian in Western societies due to the legacies of slavery and colonialism. According to Achille Mbembe (2019), colonial histories have left profound imprints on social hierarchies, with racialized groups enduring forms of systemic marginalization that permeate all levels of society. In his concept of “racialized social systems,” Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2014) argues that racism is not a mere individual prejudice but is embedded in societal structures, creating a social order that inherently privileges certain racial groups over others. Theoretical discussions around power, privilege, capitalism, and racialization are ideologically relevant yet often seem to lack practical contributions in tackling urgent issues, though they offer critical insights into systemic challenges (Wynter, 2003).

iii) Portugal is a country where racism is evident, with unique characteristics that should not be oversimplified through comparative analysis with other contexts. Its documented history includes ties to late colonialism and scientific justifications for the supposed cultural, biological, and mental inferiority of Black populations (Mbembe, 2001). The continued influence of colonial narratives has shaped racial and social dynamics within contemporary Portugal, as examined by Carla Rodrigues and Jorge Leal (2009), who reveal how these legacies reinforce discriminatory practices that marginalize racialized communities.

To understand the recent incidents centered in Zambujal – the neighborhood where protesters fired cars and a bus, with latter mimetic acts in some areas of Lisbon – it is necessary to consider a history of misguided policies regarding the inclusion of racialized individuals within Portuguese society, as discussed in O Estado do Racismo em Portugal (2021), edited by Silvia Rodriguez Maeso. Despite critiques of its activist bias, this work rigorously details systemic issues related to racial policies in Portugal, including urban planning and policing, which are directly relevant to this case. Such policies, compounded by socioeconomic inequalities and an enduring colonial mentality, contribute to a racialized social order that perpetuates marginalization and exclusion for racialized communities (Mbembe, 2019; Fanon, 2008).

The decision—albeit somewhat understandable—to address the urban integration of people from former Portuguese colonies by establishing social housing has, as in other countries, led to ghettoization. This pattern has perpetuated social exclusion and generational poverty, with vulnerable families often lacking resources or sufficient parental involvement, leaving children exposed to criminal networks. Meanwhile, underfunded schools and educational neglect further diminish prospects for youth in these areas. Together, these factors create a “social cauldron” that stigmatizes these communities as socially excluded islands, often becoming the target of state policing.

Policing such isolated social islands fosters a cycle of mutual distrust, generating a divisive “us vs. them” mentality. For many in these communities, the police are the sole representatives of the state, fostering stereotypes and resentment. Bonilla-Silva (2014) describes how such dynamics reinforce the racialized social system, where state practices contribute to the social reproduction of racial hierarchies. Furthermore, police violence against racialized individuals in Portugal has been documented in international human rights reports, compounded by reports of far-right groups within the security forces. These conditions highlight a significant state failure on racial matters.

The Cultural War over the Police State

While we await judicial proceedings in the case of Odair Moniz’s death, another discussion has emerged. In summary, Portugal faces an endemic racism problem affecting opportunities for racialized populations, who generally confront the intersection of economic, educational, and gender-related issues. Although white social groups may share some of these challenges, racialized groups face additional disadvantages due to “race.” Portugal also has issues with the rapid and haphazard urban integration of racialized groups, leading to territories where poverty and crime are disproportionately associated with these communities. Consequently, policing efforts, compounded by resentment and distrust as well as racism within segments of the security forces, have sparked a surge in police violence against racialized individuals.

Thus, poverty, social exclusion, urban segregation, and police violence underlie these events, fueling popular outrage. However, as this outrage increasingly manifests as vandalism—absent an organized structure and peaceful leadership—it loses the capacity to garner widespread empathy, as it impinges upon fundamental and primary rights within the rule of law, such as the right to security and private property.

Hence, the “cultural war” over a “police state” or “security state” emerges from chaos. André Ventura’s – radical right Chega party leader – recent calls for a protest supporting the police, framing it as “cleaning the streets” of “criminals,” echo Brazil’s Bolsonaro and his supporters, embodying the mantra, “A good criminal is a dead criminal.” By organizing a pro-police demonstration, Chega openly aligns with a surveillance state model that prioritizes “law and order” over constitutional governance—a step towards a state that surveils citizens beyond constitutional limits. Public support for this stance has been evident on social media, as people trade freedom for order, recalling Alexis de Tocqueville’s warning that in times of chaos, people are prone to sacrifice freedom for the promise of order.

Meanwhile, for the cultural war to thrive, two opposing poles are necessary. Radical elements within the Left, associated with the Bloco de Esquerda party, have seized upon these events to encourage a racial revolution. While motivated by a desire to rectify racial injustices, this rhetoric parallels the radical right’s, both potentially threatening social cohesion and the “common ground” essential for future generations. Social changes addressing racial dynamics should not take a revolutionary approach, which may ultimately intensify racial divisions and compromise democracy.

Thus, it is within democracy and the hard-won social-liberal principles that we must pursue the republican ideal of effective equality—not authoritarian “equality” under radical poles, but the equality promised by constitutional ideals under the banner of human rights. Achieving this requires justice in Odair’s case and others like his, alongside public policies that, while slower than revolutionary impulses, restore the rule of law, social peace, and constitutional norms—enabling us to address what we’ve thus far swept under the rug.

Conclusion

The case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public response illustrate a deep-seated cultural and social rift in Portugal, revealing unresolved tensions around race, security, and the role of the state. This incident aligns with James Davison Hunter’s concept of culture wars, where moral divisions sharpen into polarized conflicts, eroding shared social foundations. In Portugal, these conflicts intersect with a colonial legacy that perpetuates systemic exclusion and racial disparities, creating an environment ripe for populist rhetoric.

As seen in André Ventura’s reaction, populist figures often exploit such moments, promoting a “law and order” narrative that taps into public fears, mirroring strategies observed in other countries. This populist stance risks shifting Portugal toward a security state model that emphasizes control over democratic principles. On the other side, radical responses advocating racial revolution pose their own challenges, as they could polarize society further and jeopardize social cohesion.

Ultimately, meaningful progress requires that Portugal confront these issues within a democratic framework, advancing policies that address structural racism and urban inequality while upholding the rule of law and human rights. Only by fostering genuine social inclusion and resisting polarizing impulses can Portugal hope to rebuild its social contract on a foundation of equality and shared values.

 

References

Bonilla-Silva, E. (2014). Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. Rowman & Littlefield.

Fanon, F. (2008). Black Skin, White Masks. Grove Press.

Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. Basic Books.

Klein, E. (2020). Why We’re Polarized. Simon & Schuster.

Maeso, S. R. (Ed.). (2021). O Estado do Racismo em Portugal. Edições 70.

Mbembe, A. (2001). On the Postcolony. University of California Press.

Mbembe, A. (2019). Necropolitics. Duke University Press.

Morris, F., Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J., & Pope, J. C. (2005). Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. Pearson Longman.

Rodrigues, C. U., & Leal, J. (2009). Portugal não é um país pequeno: Contar o “império” na pós-colonialidade. Edições 70.

Rodrigues, S. R., & Araújo, M. (2019). Racism and Racialization: Experiences in Portugal. In Lentin, A., & Titley, G. (Eds.), Racism and Media (pp. 113–126). Routledge.

Sunstein, C. R. (2018). #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton University Press.

Wynter, S. (2003). Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument. CR: The New Centennial Review, 3(3), 257–337.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump at a rally for then-VP nominee J.D. Vance in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

Dr. Wojczewski: Trump Externalizes US Problems, Presenting Them as Originating from Abroad

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In an ECPS interview, Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski of Coventry University argues Trump uses foreign policy as a tool to externalize US problems, reframing issues like poverty and unemployment as outcomes of foreign influence. Trump’s “American people vs. Washington establishment” narrative, Wojczewski says, fuels populist-nationalist sentiment by attributing domestic challenges to global elites and immigration, aligning with longstanding US nativist narratives. Wojczewski compares this approach to other populist strategies, contrasting it with left-populists like Bernie Sanders, who emphasize multilateralism and solidarity.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski, Lecturer in International Relations at Coventry University, examines how Donald Trump’s foreign policy discourse reframes domestic issues as external threats, solidifying a populist-nationalist coalition. According to Dr. Wojczewski, Trump went beyond the typical “Republicans versus Democrats” divide, framing the political landscape as “the American people versus the Washington establishment.” This re-framing allowed Trump to attribute societal issues, such as “poverty, unemployment, decaying infrastructure, and crime,” to foreign policy decisions driven by “the ‘globalist’ establishment, immigrants, and foreign nations.” Wojczewski notes that “foreign policy became a projection screen for societal problems” in Trump’s rhetoric, attributing America’s domestic challenges to flawed foreign influences.

Dr. Wojczewski  also explains that this tactic of externalizing US issues resonates with longstanding nativist narratives, as Trump portrayed foreigners and the “globalist” establishment as key threats to American interests. Trump’s rhetoric, which framed the elites as an existential threat, blended populist anti-establishment sentiments with nationalist elements that particularly appealed to white Americans. “This approach draws on longstanding nativist themes in US history,” Wojczewski remarks, adding that Trump’s discourse taps into the deeply ingrained idea of America as a civic community threatened by outsiders.

Wojczewski further contextualizes this strategy within a broader populist landscape, referencing other populist actors like Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) and France’s Rassemblement National (RN), who similarly emphasize national identity and seek to project foreign influences as detrimental to national well-being. While AfD plays with Euroscepticism, often highlighting Germany as the “stupid paymaster” within the EU, RN frames the EU as a German-dominated project that harms French interests, showing how national narratives shape distinct yet similar populist approaches.

In contrast, left-populists like Spain’s Podemos and Bernie Sanders in the United States offer a more inclusive notion of “the people.” As Wojczewski points out, “Sanders and Podemos criticize the establishment for securitizing migration,” presenting the people as an open, pluralistic group rather than focusing on an ethnocultural identity. This is reflected in Sanders’ appeals to America’s legacy as a “nation of immigrants,” emphasizing solidarity over isolation. Unlike the extreme nationalism seen in Trump or RN, Podemos and Sanders criticize liberal internationalism as masking a militaristic agenda. Sanders, for example, advocates multilateralism, as “issues like climate change and economic inequality require multilateral action and solidarity,” explains Wojczewski, showing a left-wing populist commitment to international cooperation rather than exclusion.

Through these comparisons, Dr. Wojczewski illustrates the diversity in populist foreign policy, noting that populism can vary widely depending on its ideological combination, from extreme nationalism to global solidarity. Trump’s approach, however, clearly leverages external threats to build a populist-nationalist base, setting a precedent that aligns with right-wing populist movements worldwide.

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski, Lecturer in International Relations at Coventry University.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski with some edits.

Populism and International Relations: A Highly Dynamic Research Field

Professor Wojczewski, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. How do you assess the evolution of populist theory in the field of international relations? What is the impact of far-right ideology on foreign policy beliefs and preferences?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: Populism and international relations has become a highly dynamic research field. If we look back about 10 years, there was minimal research on this topic, but in the last 5 or 6 years, numerous studies, books, and edited volumes have emerged, leading to substantial progress in a relatively short period. We now see increasing theoretical pluralism, with different approaches to conceptualizing populism—as an ideology, a style, political logic, or strategy. Research agendas are also varied, ranging from conventional analyses of populism’s impact on foreign policy preferences to examining how populism influences foreign policy-making style, foreign policy as a space for political mobilization, and populist identity construction. Additionally, factors like international relations, global governance, and regional governance have played roles in populism’s rise, resulting in a diverse and multifaceted research agenda.

That said, there are certain limitations. One major limitation, especially in the field of international relations, is that populism is still largely viewed as inherently negative and dangerous. To some extent, this perception is understandable, as populism can indeed pose risks and challenges to liberal democracy—especially when it comes to the populist radical right, which can be quite destructive, as seen in cases like Donald Trump. However, there are also forms of populism that pose no threat to liberal democracy and, in many ways, can even strengthen it. This perception reflects an “establishment bias” in populism research, where populists are seen as the problem and the establishment as the solution. This binary is problematic, as populism can also serve as a positive force. For example, left-wing populists like Podemos or Bernie Sanders offer a very different political vision compared to the populist radical right. Thus, populism should be approached as a more nuanced phenomenon, rather than being seen as purely negative and dangerous.

Another challenge is distinguishing populism from related phenomena such as authoritarianism, nationalism, and the radical right. Often, the boundaries are unclear—where does populism end, and where do these other ideologies or discourses begin? For instance, how can we differentiate between populism and radical right politics?

Regarding the second part of your question on the impact of far-right ideology on foreign policy beliefs and preferences, this is the focus of my most recent paper. I argue that, as Cas Mudde’s terminology suggests, we should concentrate more on the “thick” or host ideology than on populism’s “thin” ideology. To truly understand the populist radical right, we should focus less on populism itself and more on radical or far-right ideology, which has a far more substantial influence on foreign policy preferences and beliefs.

In far-right ideology, a core belief is a strict adherence to a natural order of inequalities, which significantly shapes its foreign policy outlook. A central component is ultranationalism—a form of nationalism that defines the nation primarily in ethnocultural or racial terms and perceives various groups as being inherently in conflict. This worldview is deeply antagonistic, promoting an “us vs. them” mentality where one ethno-culturally or racially defined nation stands in opposition to others. Such a perspective fosters negative attitudes toward regional and global governance institutions and rejects universal norms, as the primacy of national identity, defined in ethno-cultural or racial terms, logically leads to a dismissal of international or universal principles.

Another related aspect is a chauvinistic foreign policy outlook—a relentless pursuit of a nation’s interests, often encapsulated in slogans like “America First,” which prioritize national interests over the rights, concerns, and interests of others. While there are other elements of far-right ideology that influence foreign policy, I believe ultranationalism is the most crucial. Research in populism and international relations would greatly benefit from a deeper examination of far-right nationalism, as I argue that it plays a far more significant role in shaping foreign policy preferences than populism itself.

Populist Securitization Undermines Democratic Institutions and Fosters Authoritarian Tendencies

Democratic Senator Bernie Sanders speaks at Presidential Rally at Springs Preserve Ampitheater evening before Nevada Caucus, Las Vegas, NV on February 21, 2020. Photo: Joseph Sohm.

How do you see the interplay between securitization and populism shaping the legitimacy of democratic institutions, especially when populist leaders present the establishment as a security threat? Could you elaborate on the role of moral and existential threats in populist securitization strategies, and how these might differ when targeting domestic versus foreign “elites”?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: I think populist securitization—essentially framing elites or the establishment as a security threat—can certainly undermine democratic institutions and foster authoritarian tendencies and policies. Donald Trump is a prominent example using this populist securitization strategy frequently, especially during his 2015–2016 campaign, by presenting the elites and establishment as a security threat.

However, populist securitization is not always harmful. For instance, if we contrast Trump with Bernie Sanders; Sanders also challenged the political establishment or elites. Still, his focus was on the destructive and undemocratic influence of big donors and the billionaire class. He highlighted how large corporations undermine democracy’s core principle of political equality through substantial influence over US politics via campaign donations. This also represents a populist securitization strategy but in a very different way.

We can say that populist securitization is an effective strategy for populist leaders or parties, as it legitimizes them while delegitimizing the establishment. By portraying elites as an existential threat, the populist leader can claim, “I am standing up for you; I am defending democracy and your interests against an elite that no longer represents you.”

Chauvinistic Nationalism in Populist Radical-Right Parties Limits Compromise and Cooperation

How do you assess the interplay between populism and nationalism shaping future cooperation among populist radical-right movements across borders, especially considering their inherently nationalist foundations? Could you elaborate on challenges populist radical-right actors face in building sustained transnational coalitions, given their nationalistic and often anti-globalist stances?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: I think, to some extent, populism can assist the radical right in terms of international cooperation and transnational networking by providing a common enemy. This enemy may take the form of bureaucrats or so-called globalist elites, which helps the radical right mitigate national differences and antagonisms. Particularly in the United States and Europe, the radical right frequently uses the globalist conspiracy theory, suggesting that a globalist elite is disenfranchising ordinary people—an aloof elite disconnected from the common populace. This conspiracy theory is not new; it has existed in far-right discourse for decades and carries a clear anti-Semitic undertone, with “globalists” often serving as a code for Jews. This shared adversary becomes a rallying point that the radical right leverages to build international cooperation. In essence, having a common enemy is essential, and populism, combined with radical-right nationalism, offers this shared target, whether it be globalist elites or Eurocrats.

However, nationalism certainly complicates international cooperation for the radical right. While they may find common ground in shared opposition, significant differences emerge when it comes to proposing comprehensive alternatives, crafting policies, and making concrete policy proposals. This lack of unity is underscored by the fact that there are currently three radical-right factions in the EU Parliament. I would argue that the issue is less about ideology—there are more ideological similarities than differences among Europe’s radical-right groups—and more about national context and political style. Some radical-right parties, such as Italy’s Brothers of Italy (FdI)or France’s Rassemblement National (RN), aim to appear more moderate to attract conservative voters, toning down some of their more radical rhetoric. Meanwhile, Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) is less focused on moderation, which makes other parties hesitant to associate with them, despite few substantive ideological differences.

One challenge, then, is the national differences and the varied political strategies and styles among these movements. Another obstacle is the inherent chauvinistic nationalism within these parties. When parties adopt slogans like “Germany First” or “France First,” they limit their ability to compromise and cooperate, as this mindset prioritizes national interests above all else. This is evident in the contrasting narratives about the EU promoted by Rassemblement National (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD). RN depicts the EU as a German-dominated project with Germany as the hegemon, while AfD claims Germany is the “stupid paymaster” subsidizing other EU countries. This clash of narratives creates further barriers to cooperation, as each party mobilizes distinct political strategies based on differing national narratives.

Conflicting Affective Narratives as Powerful Tools in Populist Radical-Right Rhetoric

What is the impact of affective narratives—such as fear, nostalgia, and moral superiority—within populist foreign policy discourses, and how these emotions shape international relations dynamics?

Dr.  Thorsten Wojczewski: These affective narratives are absolutely crucial in populist radical-right discourses. Whether we look at figures like Donald Trump, Alternative for Germany (AfD), or others, they all, in some way, evoke fear, anxiety, and resentment. Their messaging often revolves around a perceived loss of control: “We’re being overrun by foreigners,” or as Trump famously put it, “Either we win this election, or we lose our country.” Mobilizing such existential fears is essential to their strategy.

However—and this is the interesting aspect—in addition to invoking negative emotions like fear and anxiety, populist radical-right discourses also promise a better future. While mobilizing existential fears, they simultaneously offer hope: if they gain power, they’ll “restore sovereignty” or “make America great again.” This evokes positive emotions, such as hope and nostalgia for the “good old days,” with promises to reverse multiculturalism, globalization, and restore order, identity, and sovereignty. These conflicting affective narratives—fear and hope, nostalgia and moral superiority—are powerful tools in populist radical-right rhetoric. I would argue that this blend of conflicting emotions and narratives partially explains their broad appeal and success.

AfD’s Populist Radical-Right Stance Is Less Eurosceptic than Germany’s Neo-Nazi NPD

Hundreds of people attend the Summer Festival in the center of the town and listen to Citizens’ dialogue with Björn Höcke in Sömmerda, Germany on August 24, 2024. Photo: Ryan Nash.

How does the foreign policy approach of far-right parties like AfD and NPD reflect broader trends in global far-right movements, particularly regarding their stance on supranational institutions like the EU? What factors contribute to the differences in foreign policy outlooks between populist radical-right parties and extreme-right parties, and how do these distinctions impact their real-world diplomatic strategies?

Professor Thorsten Wojczewski: Alternative for Germany (AfD), as a populist radical-right party, is somewhat less dogmatic and less Eurosceptic than the extreme-right National Democratic Party (NPD), a neo-Nazi party in Germany. To start, AfD does not explicitly call for Germany’s immediate departure from the EU. While they entertain the notion of “Dexit,” it’s not a primary objective. Instead, AfD’s position is to first attempt reforms or implement specific changes within the EU rather than advocating for an outright exit. This approach can be partly explained by divisions within AfD’s voter base on EU membership—about 43% of AfD supporters favor Dexit, indicating that many remain uncertain or opposed to it. This lack of strong support for an immediate exit, even among their own voters, likely informs AfD’s cautious stance, as a significant majority of the broader German electorate also opposes Dexit. This approach reflects a degree of opportunism, with AfD keeping the option open without fully committing to it.

At the same time, AfD advocates for reforming, rather than dismantling, the EU. For instance, they support retaining elements like the customs union, free trade zone, and certain aspects of the common market. Thus, while AfD is highly Eurosceptic, it still views specific EU components as beneficial and worth preserving.

In contrast, the NPD demands Germany’s immediate exit from the EU and offers no defense of EU institutions. The only aspect of European cooperation the NPD promotes is a “Fortress Europe,” envisioning Europe as a racially and ethnically homogenous “living space” for white Europeans. According to the NPD, European states should cooperate solely to prevent mass migration and block other so-called destructive foreign influences, such as US hegemony. Unlike AfD, NPD rejects the common market, customs union, and similar EU structures entirely.

This contrast reflects broader trends among European populist radical-right parties, most of which adopt less extreme positions. They maintain a certain ambivalence, being critical of the EU without advocating for its immediate dismantling or exit, likely to appeal to a broader voter base.

Trump Challenges Bipartisan Consensus on Liberal Internationalism in US Foreign Policy

What are the implications of securitization theory in the populist discourse of Donald Trump? In what ways does Trump’s populist approach to “Othering” differ from traditional forms of nationalism in US foreign policy?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: When we look at Trump’s 2015 campaign, two things stand out: first, the unusually prominent role of foreign policy in a US election; second, Trump’s framing of the entire Washington establishment as a security threat. He famously stated, “They have dragged us into foreign wars that have made us less safe, left our borders wide open at home, and shipped our jobs and wealth to other countries,” with “they” referring to the Washington establishment. Thus, in Trump’s rhetoric, the Washington establishment is cast as an existential security threat.

The difference between a populist mode of ‘othering’ and a nationalist mode of ‘othering’ is that, in populism, it’s often the elites within one’s own country who become the security threat, rather than other states or foreign entities. While immigrants, illegal immigration, and countries like China also figured into Trump’s rhetoric, he notably framed the Washington establishment itself as a primary threat to the American people—a “corrupt elite” no longer representing Americans.

By combining populist and nationalist forms of ‘othering’, Trump sought to rally people behind him and redefine who is “American.” His rhetoric primarily appealed to white Americans of European ancestry, positioning them as “real Americans” under threat from mass migration, among other issues. Through this mode of ‘othering’, he also challenged the bipartisan consensus on liberal internationalism in US foreign policy, claiming that a flawed foreign policy, pursued by elites, was responsible for America’s grievances. This, he argued, was why he should become president—to change course and move away from these flawed policies.

There Is No Singular “Populist Foreign Policy” 

How does the framing of “the people” versus “the elite” in left-populist movements differ from that of right-wing populism, particularly in the context of foreign policy? How does left populism reconcile nationalist elements with international solidarity, particularly in areas like trade, immigration, and global governance? What do the cases of Bernie Sanders and Podemos tell us about the relationship between left-wing populism and foreign policy?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: In my recent co-authored paper with colleagues Emmy Eklund and Frank Stengel, we show that Bernie Sanders and Podemos offer a quite different conception of “the people” compared to the radical right, both in Europe and the United States. Left-wing populist discourses from Sanders and Podemos envision the people as a relatively open, pluralistic, and heterogeneous group. In principle, anyone can be part of this group; it’s not closed or essentialized, nor grounded on ethno-cultural or racial criteria. This is a clear distinction between left-wing populism and the populist radical right, where figures like Trump often incorporate ethno-cultural and racial elements into their definition of “the people.”

Furthermore, both Bernie Sanders and Podemos adopt a decisively pro-immigrant stance. This is significant, as populism is often associated with anti-immigration sentiments. However, Sanders and Podemos instead criticize the establishment for securitizing migration. This is noteworthy because it challenges the assumption that only the far left or far right poses a threat; establishment politics itself often exhibits nativist and authoritarian tendencies. Sanders and Podemos highlight this by exposing the establishment’s own authoritarianism and nativism concerning immigration. Sanders, in particular, draws on the classic American narrative of the United States as a nation of immigrants with a moral responsibility to support others in their pursuit of “the American Dream.” He emphasizes that being American means embracing solidarity, openness, and support for those seeking a better life, rather than building border fences.

Another notable aspect is how both Podemos and Sanders criticize flawed liberal internationalism. Sanders, for example, argues that liberal internationalism, as promoted by the US establishment, often conceals a unilateral, militaristic, and neo-imperialist foreign policy, which has caused significant issues in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. For Sanders, the alternative is clear: multilateralism and international solidarity. This focus on multilateralism may seem counter-intuitive, as populism is often associated with isolationism and opposition to multilateral institutions. Yet, Sanders emphasized that cooperation through coalitions would be central to his foreign policy, believing that global challenges like climate change and economic inequality require multilateral action and solidarity. Both Sanders and Podemos seek to promote progressive change beyond their own countries. They do not wish to abolish the nation-state but believe solidarity should extend beyond borders, demonstrating a commitment to fostering progressive change both domestically and internationally.

In terms of left-wing populism and foreign policy, we can conclude that there is no singular “populist foreign policy.” The foreign policy outlooks of populist movements vary greatly depending on the specific ideology and discourse combined with populism. These outlooks can range from extreme nationalism and isolationism to robust international solidarity. Therefore, we are critical of the term “populist foreign policy,” as it suggests a misleading commonality between vastly different political actors like Bernie Sanders and Trump.

How has the Trumpian discourse used foreign policy in creating a platform for the (re)production and consolidation of a populist-nationalist electoral coalition?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: I think, what Trump did, which was quite interesting, was to extend his discourse beyond the classical political divide of “Republicans versus Democrats,” framing it instead as “the American people versus the Washington establishment.” This was a key element of his rhetoric, where he attributed poverty, unemployment, decaying infrastructure, crime, and essentially all that was wrong in the United States to flawed foreign policy. In this way, foreign policy became a projection screen for societal problems.

Foreign policy played a very prominent role in Trump’s campaigns, as he often attributed domestic problems to the US establishment and its foreign policies—military interventions and free trade agreements, for example. This is the populist element in his approach. He combined this with a nationalist angle by scapegoating immigrants, minorities, and other nations for US issues. This blend of populist and radical-right nationalist ‘othering’ was quite effective in his discourse, with the populist side appealing to a broader audience across US society due to widespread anti-establishment sentiments. Meanwhile, his radical-right nationalism particularly resonated with white Americans.

Trump also externalized America’s problems, presenting them as originating from abroad. In his rhetoric, issues stemmed either from the so-called globalist establishment, which he claimed prioritized foreigners over Americans, from immigrants, or from other nations. This discourse effectively attributed everything wrong to a flawed foreign policy and to “foreigners” broadly defined.

In this way, Trump tapped into deeply rooted nativist discourses that have existed in the United States for centuries. Historically, mass migration has often triggered nativist backlash in the US, with the so-called indigenous population mobilizing against newcomers as perceived threats. Trump’s discourse serves as a reminder that the idea of the United States as a civic community has long been contested. Ethno-cultural and racial constructions of American identity have often co-existed with a more civic and pluralistic American nationalism.

Trump Poses a Real Threat to Democratic Institutions, Minorities, and Migrants

Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud

There are those very concerned experts who argue that American democracy will not survive another Trump presidency. Others claim that these concerns are over-blown and American democracy is resilient enough for another possible Trump administration. Where do you stand in this debate?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: I think a very diplomatic answer would be that I stand in the middle. I believe American democracy can likely survive another Trump presidency, but it would undoubtedly suffer severe damage to its core institutions. The reason I’m not extremely pessimistic is that the United States is a consolidated liberal democracy with well-established institutions and an active civil society. Democratic backsliding tends to occur in societies where institutions are still underdeveloped or relatively new. The Weimar Republic in Germany, before the Nazis came to power, is an example; often called a “democracy without democrats,” it had an underdeveloped civil society and contested institutions, creating an environment where fascism could rise more easily compared to the US.

That said, Trump poses a real threat not only to democratic institutions but also to minorities and migrants, who would likely bear the brunt of his anti-immigrant and racist rhetoric. His influence would undoubtedly harm US democracy and endanger specific sectors of society. Additionally, Trump fuels political polarization in the US, making it increasingly ungovernable, as the system of checks and balances requires parties to cooperate. With extreme polarization, such cooperation becomes impossible, leading to dysfunction. This polarization could pave the way for an even more radical leader in the future, one who might promise to restore unity and order in an increasingly ungovernable United States.

The silver lining here is Trump’s age. He likely has limited time left to damage US democracy, as this would likely be his last term. His mental and physical state in the next two to three years may also play a role in limiting the damage he could do.

A woman raises the Tunisian flag during an Ennahda Party-led protest against the Tunisian president in Tunis, Tunisia on February 13, 2022. Photo: Mohamed Soufi.

Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries 

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Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. October 30, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0020

 

In “Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries,” authors Ihsan Yilmaz and Syaza Shukri argue that Islamist parties, at their core, are political entities that prioritize practical governance over strict ideology when necessary, leaving them vulnerable to voter rejection if they fail to address economic and social issues effectively. This adaptability underscores the book’s central argument that policy efficacy often takes precedence over Islamist rhetoric, shaping the evolution of Islamist parties within democratic contexts. While it occasionally includes a wealth of historical details that may seem excessive, the book’s nuanced approach offers a valuable resource for understanding the intersections of Islamism, Islamist populism, authoritarian Islamism, and democracy on a global scale.

Reviewed by Bulent Kenes

In the book titled Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries, authors Ihsan Yilmaz and Syaza Shukri explore the multifaceted strategies of Islamist parties operating within democratic and semi-democratic settings across various Muslim-majority countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. The book examines how these parties adapt ideologically and pragmatically to maintain influence, highlighting a shift from traditional opposition roles to coalition-building and power-sharing with secular or non-Islamist entities. The authors underscore that while Islamist parties share a religious foundation, their approaches to governance and democracy are diverse, challenging simplistic views that position them solely as anti-democratic. 

Yilmaz and Shukri aim to provide a nuanced understanding of how these parties manage power, respond to crises, and navigate issues like minority rights and foreign policy, particularly in today’s globalized and interconnected political landscape. The introduction of the book  under the title of “Islamist Parties Operating in Democracies,” sets the stage by examining the multifaceted nature of Islamist movements, defining them as entities aiming to incorporate Islamic principles into political and social realms. The authors clarify that while these groups are often perceived as monolithic, they are, in fact, a “diverse array of voices” with varying ideological and strategic priorities shaped by unique regional contexts.

One key strength of the introduction is its contextual framing of Islamist parties not just as ideological entities but as pragmatic actors responsive to “evolving conditions and societal expectations.” Yilmaz and Shukri discuss how these groups, while rooted in shared religious values, exhibit adaptability by forming coalitions and engaging in “power-sharing and coalition-building” with secular or even oppositional parties, particularly when in governance roles. This approach marks a significant departure from previous literature, as the authors aim to present Islamists as dynamic participants in democratic systems rather than static opponents to democratic principles.

Furthermore, the introduction highlights the book’s comparative methodology, which sets it apart from similar works that typically focus on a single region. By juxtaposing cases from countries like Turkey, Indonesia, and Tunisia, the authors aim to draw broader insights into “the complex dynamics” of Islamist governance. Yilmaz and Shukri suggest that understanding these dynamics is crucial for a “nuanced understanding” of Islamist politics that moves beyond reductive assumptions. Thus, the introduction promises a rich comparative analysis, shedding light on the strategic adaptability of Islamist parties and their potential to balance ideological goals with pragmatic governance in diverse political settings. 

Islam and Politics

In Chapter 2 which is titled “Islam and Politics in Democratic Muslim-Majority Countries,” Yilmaz and Shukri present an insightful analysis into the complexities of Islamism and its intersection with democratic politics across diverse Muslim-majority nations. By grounding the discussion in scholarly debate, they explore how Islamist movements navigate between mainstream and extremist strands and examine the adaptive strategies employed by these parties in response to their unique political environments.

The chapter explores a critical dichotomy within Islamism, distinguishing between mainstream Islamists who participate in elections and seek gradual reform through democratic means and more extremist groups that often reject democratic processes. This distinction underlines the authors’ main argument about the adaptability of Islamist parties, emphasizing that while many engage in democratic processes, others lean toward authoritarian tendencies. This adaptation, as the authors argue, is driven by both political and socio-economic pressures, shaping Islamist strategies across different contexts.

Moreover, Yilmaz and Shukri delve into the ideological tensions within Islamist politics, such as the potential for majoritarianism and religious hegemony. They caution that unchecked Islamism could risk eroding minority rights and compromising democratic principles, especially in polarized societies. The authors support this claim by discussing the experience of Turkey under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), where populist tendencies and majoritarianism have raised concerns about the preservation of democratic institutions.

Finally, the chapter addresses the broader implications of Islamist governance and the complex role of political Islam. By examining case studies in countries like Tunisia, Indonesia, and Morocco, the authors provide a robust framework for understanding how Islamist parties balance religious principles with governance. This nuanced examination makes Chapter 2 a foundational overview for readers, highlighting both the potential and challenges of Islamism within democratic contexts.

PAS and Malaysia

In Chapter 3, Yilmaz and Shukri provide a comprehensive examination of Malaysia’s Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) under the title of “Seven Decades of PAS in Malaysian Politics,”  tracing its strategic evolution across the nation’s politically complex landscape. The authors explore PAS’ adaptability and pragmatism within Malaysia’s semi-democratic environment, highlighting how PAS has shifted from conservatism to moderate pluralism and, recently, to ethno-religious populism.

The chapter outlines PAS’ historical journey, from its foundation in 1951 as an offshoot of UMNO, focused on Malay-Muslim identity, to its modern status as a dominant Islamist party. PAS’ relationship with UMNO, marked by both rivalry and cooperation, underscores the party’s flexibility. The authors note that PAS has shifted between opposing UMNO’s secular nationalism and forming alliances under banners of “Muslim unity,” depending on political needs. Yilmaz and Shukri point to PAS’ success in adapting its ideology to suit changing political climates, illustrating its willingness to collaborate across the political spectrum for electoral gains.

According to the book, PAS’ governance of Kelantan since 1990 serves as a case study in implementing an Islamist agenda within a multicultural society. Despite advocating for “shariazation” policies, PAS has shown restraint at the federal level, balancing Islamic values with the realities of Malaysia’s diverse demographics. This pragmatic approach, the authors argue, has allowed PAS to maintain its influence, especially during its brief time in federal power from 2020-2022.

Further, the authors discuss PAS’ strategic response to global and national crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, which bolstered its populist appeal through welfare measures. Yilmaz and Shukri conclude that PAS’ electoral flexibility and populist tactics have solidified its position among conservative Malay-Muslims, marking it as a key player in Malaysia’s evolving political landscape. The chapter demonstrates how PAS’ resilience and adaptability, despite operating within Malaysia’s semi-authoritarian framework, have contributed to its growing strength in Malaysian politics.

PKS and Indonesia

Chapter 4 of the book offers a nuanced analysis of Islamism within Indonesia’s multiparty political system under the title of “PKS in Indonesia’s Multiparty System,” by spotlighting the evolution of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and its role as a major Islamist party. The chapter contextualizes PKS within Indonesia’s post-1998 democratization efforts, focusing on how the nation’s rich cultural diversity and democratic constitution impact the moderation of Islamist agendas. Yilmaz and Shukri highlight PKS’s pragmatic approach, noting its blend of Islamic values with democratic ideals as it navigates Indonesia’s secular and religious pluralism.

The authors emphasize that PKS has achieved influence without strictly seeking to impose sharia law, contrasting with more radical movements like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). PKS’s stance on social justice, anti-corruption, and minority rights demonstrates a commitment to Indonesia’s Pancasila foundation, balancing Islamic identity with pluralist values. This adaptability has allowed PKS to participate in coalition governments while maintaining a distinct Islamist identity.

The chapter also explores PKS’s responses to regional and global Islamist trends, highlighting that PKS favors a moderate stance on Islamic solidarity, promoting peaceful international relations and opposing extremist ideologies. However, as the authors note, PKS faces rising pressures from conservative Islamic populism, which challenges Indonesia’s secular state model. They point to the complex balancing act of PKS as it negotiates between religious values and national priorities amid Indonesia’s diverse electorate.

Chapter 4 presents PKS as an example of Islamist pragmatism within a democratic framework, stressing its role in maintaining Indonesia’s status as a moderate Muslim-majority nation. The analysis showcases PKS’s strategic positioning within Indonesia’s political landscape, where moderation often proves more sustainable than radicalism.

Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Pakistan

In Chapter 5 of the book, authors Yilmaz and Shukri provide an in-depth exploration of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), one of Pakistan’s most influential Islamist parties. This chapter, which is titled “A Faithful Force: Jamaat-E-Islami and Islamist Politics in Pakistan,” examines JI’s evolution from a supporter of military regimes to a unique voice advocating social development within an Islamic framework. Describing JI as a “faithful force,” the authors highlight the party’s struggle to reconcile its foundational principles with the realities of ‘Pakistani democracy,’ illustrating both its successes and limitations in influencing national politics.

Initially, JI supported Pakistan’s military leadership, particularly during General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime, which advanced the Islamization process in Pakistan. The authors emphasize how JI’s alliance with Zia enabled it to push for Islamic laws, giving JI a rare moment of influence. However, as the chapter reveals, JI’s strict Islamist stance limited its broader appeal, especially as it encountered Pakistan’s diverse political landscape and increasing calls for pluralism.

Yilmaz and Shukri delve into JI’s organizational structure, describing it as both a strength and a “double-edged sword.” JI’s internal hierarchy, according to the authors, deeply rooted in discipline and loyalty, provides a solid foundation, yet its rigid framework hinders adaptability. Despite its “commitment to democratic principles” and holding intra-party elections, JI has struggled to expand its influence beyond its core supporters, often failing to capture significant electoral success on a national level.

The authors explore JI’s stance on the controversial blasphemy law and its impact on Pakistan’s democracy, particularly in relation to minority rights. JI’s call for the law’s strict enforcement has complicated its image, as it aligns the party with hardline interpretations of Islam that conflict with Pakistan’s aspirations for a more inclusive society. While JI advocates for “social justice, anti-corruption, and anti-imperialism,” its approach has been criticized for not sufficiently addressing the needs of Pakistan’s minority communities, a factor that limits its broader political appeal.

In discussing JI’s ideological adaptability, the authors argue that JI has recently shifted towards a “second-generation Islamism,” with an emphasis on social development and community welfare. The chapter notes JI’s active involvement in charitable work through its Al-Khidmat Foundation, an outreach strategy that has helped it maintain influence despite its limited political successes. This evolution highlights JI’s pragmatic side, as it aligns its goals with broader social issues while retaining an Islamic identity.

Yilmaz and Shukri conclude that JI’s trajectory exemplifies Pakistan’s complex relationship with Islam and democracy, where Islamist parties face the challenge of preserving religious identity while adapting to democratic norms. They suggest that while JI has struggled to secure a dominant political position, it remains a potent force due to its strong organizational base and grassroots support. Ultimately, Chapter 5 sheds light on the “delicate balance” between faith-based politics and the realities of Pakistan’s evolving democratic landscape.

PJD and Morocco

In Chapter 6, titled “Islamist PJD and the Monarchy in Morocco,” the authors delve into the dynamics between Morocco’s monarchy and the Justice and Development Party (PJD), focusing on Morocco’s unique Makhzen system. This system, led by the king as emir al-mu’minin or “commander of the faithful,” establishes him as both a secular and religious authority, allowing the monarchy to manage Islam as an integral part of Morocco’s national identity. The chapter emphasizes how this framework has been crucial in tempering “the potency of political Islamism” and limiting the PJD’s influence, even as it formed a government following its 2011 electoral success.

The chapter examines the PJD’s decade in power, a tenure punctuated by moments of compromise and concession. Initially, the party enjoyed significant popular support, riding the wave of Arab Spring reforms that included expanded parliamentary power. However, as the chapter illustrates, the PJD quickly encountered the limits of its influence. The authors highlight how the monarchy’s interventions in key government functions, especially in “sensitive roles and veto powers,” underscored the persistence of monarchical authority, often stifling the PJD’s ability to implement its agenda fully.

The COVID-19 pandemic further strained the PJD’s position, contributing to its electoral decline in 2021 and symbolizing the end of its era of Islamist governance in Morocco. This chapter argues that the monarchy’s symbolic Islamic leadership, combined with its political authority, successfully framed itself as the true custodian of Moroccan identity, relegating the PJD to “a second-generation Islamist party forced to work within the system.” This analysis reveals that the PJD’s journey reflects the complex interplay of religious and political authority in Morocco, where Islam is strategically woven into the fabric of governance, ultimately ensuring that power remains centered in the monarchy.

Ennahda and Tunisia

Chapter 7, titled “Ennahda as Tunisia’s Muslim Democratic Party,” delves into the rise, evolution, and challenges faced by Tunisia’s Ennahda party, highlighting its remarkable adaptability within the country’s political landscape. Initially, Ennahda emerged from Tunisia’s conservative Muslim roots, but, in the wake of the Arab Spring, it evolved into what the authors describe as Tunisia’s “Muslim Democratic Party.” This transformation underscores Ennahda’s pragmatism and its attempt to blend religious principles with democratic ideals. After winning Tunisia’s first democratic elections in 2011, Ennahda adapted its stance to suit a diverse political landscape, opting for “a practical kind of national reconciliation”with secular parties, which became crucial for political stability.

The authors highlight Ennahda’s ideological moderation, particularly when it decided not to impose Sharia as the foundation of the 2014 constitution. This choice, according to Yilmaz and Shukri, reflected Ennahda’s understanding of “the importance of Maqasid al-Sharia over specific rules,” showcasing the party’s evolving position on Islamic law to resonate with a broader national identity. The shift was further reinforced during the 2016 Tenth General Congress, where Ennahda officially prioritized politics over religious preaching, effectively becoming “a conservative political force capable of handling governance.”

The chapter also sheds light on the recent strain in Tunisian democracy, exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis, which impacted Ennahda’s reputation and led to widespread disapproval. Ennahda’s subsequent absence from the 2023 elections reflects a shift in its strategy, possibly spurred by President Kais Saied’s consolidation of power. In sum, Chapter 7 paints a nuanced picture of Ennahda’s transformation and challenges, illustrating its continued struggle between ideological values and the demands of a pragmatic political approach in Tunisia’s ever-shifting political terrain.

AKP and Turkey

Titled “Islamist Populist AKP and Turkey’s Shift Towards Authoritarianism,” Chapter 8 of the book presents an in-depth analysis of Turkey’s Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, exploring its journey from “Muslim democrat” roots to an authoritarian populist regime. Initially, the AKP championed democratization, economic reform, and EU membership; however, its trajectory shifted post-2011, notably after the “Gezi protests of 2013” and the controversial 2016 coup attempt. These events, according to the authors, paved the way for a clampdown on dissent, particularly targeting journalists, activists, and opposition politicians, marking a stark turn towards authoritarianism.

Erdogan’s leadership has progressively consolidated power, transforming Turkey’s democratic infrastructure into what the authors describe as a “competitive authoritarian regime.” With the 2017 constitutional referendum, the office of the prime minister was abolished, granting the president sweeping executive powers, leading one observer to note that “Erdogan [became] the virtually unassailable ruler of Turkey.” By diminishing checks on presidential authority, Erdogan’s AKP harnessed Islam and nationalism to foster a narrative that secures his base while casting opposition voices as foreign-controlled threats to national unity.

In this chapter, Yilmaz and Shukri also examine the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), highlighting its instrumental role in promoting the AKP’s vision of Islam as a component of Turkish identity. This vision extends internationally, where Turkey navigates a complex geopolitical landscape. According to the authors, through selective alliances, including with Russia and China, the AKP leverages religious and nationalist rhetoric to mitigate Western criticism, particularly regarding human rights issues. Yet, its economic policies, based on unorthodox monetary approaches, have led to high inflation and decreased living standards. The authors note that Erdogan’s insistence on low-interest rates, justified by Islamic teachings against usury, has led to what the text calls an “accelerated currency devaluation” that further strains Turkey’s economy.

In sum, Chapter 8 paints the AKP as a party that, while initially promising democratic reform, has instead pursued populist authoritarianism. This has strained Turkey’s democratic structures and polarized its society, positioning Erdogan as a powerful, divisive figure whose policies reflect both the aspirations and challenges of modern Turkish Islamism.

Trajectory of Islamist Parties

In Chapter 9, the authors overview “Trajectory of Islamist Parties” and synthesize the book’s key findings, examining how various Islamist parties navigate the balance between Islamism and democracy. The chapter delves into how Islamist parties, when allowed political participation, engage in governance yet often struggle with the tension between God’s sovereignty and popular sovereignty. This complex relationship has led to a diversity of outcomes, ranging from authoritarian shifts in Turkey under the AKP to democratic engagement in Malaysia, Morocco, and Tunisia.

The authors highlight the significance of “strategic interaction theory,” which suggests that an Islamist party’s moderation is contingent upon its relationships with secular forces and the military. “Credibility of signals sent by the Islamist party” is crucial in establishing trust with non-Islamist actors, although, as in the AKP’s case, prolonged power can erode democratic practices. The chapter notes that the AKP’s “immoderation was the result of dismantling institutional checks and balances” due to political crises like the Gezi protests and the 2016 coup attempt.

Through comparative analysis, the authors argue that some Islamist parties adapt to electoral losses, as seen in Tunisia and Morocco, where they have “accepted defeat albeit with some resistance.” However, once in power, these parties tend to favor pragmatism over strict adherence to religious principles to sustain governance. This adaptability is essential, particularly in Muslim-majority secular states like Indonesia, where the “balance between Islamic identity and democratic diversity” is necessary for political survival.

The authors suggest in brief that Islamist parties are, at their core, political entities that prioritize practical governance over ideology when necessary, making them susceptible to voter rejection if they fail to deliver on economic and social issues. This adaptability underscores the book’s central argument that policy efficacy outweighs Islamist rhetoric, shaping the evolution of Islamist parties within democratic frameworks. While it occasionally includes abundance of historical details that may seem excessive, the book’s nuanced approach provides an insightful resource for understanding the intersections of Islamism, Islamist populism, authoritarian Islamism and democracy on a global scale.

 

Ihsan Yilmaz & Syaza Shukri. (2024). Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries. Palgrave Macmillan. 313 pp. Hardcover: EUR 139.09. ISBN-10: 9819743427, ISBN-13: ‎978-9819743421.

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Introduction: The ECPS Project ‘Populism and the European Parliament Elections 2024’

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Please cite as: 
Ivaldi, Gilles & Zankina, Emilia. (2024). “Introduction: The ECPS Project ‘Populism and the European Parliament Elections 2024’.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0060

 

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Abstract

This report analyzes the performances and impact of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing from the analyses of country experts, we provide an account of how populist parties across the spectrum performed in each of the EU’s 27 member states, looking at the campaign, issues and demand for populist politics in each country separately and the challenges that populist party success more broadly bears for the future of the EU. In this introductory chapter, we briefly define populism, provide a topographic map of populist parties across all EU member states ahead of the 2024 European elections, and review the main drivers of populism identified in the literature. We then turn more specifically to the general context and outcome of the 2024 EP election, assessing the hypothesis of another ‘populist wave’ while also looking back at the 2019 election to compare populist party success over time.

 

By Gilles Ivaldi* (Sciences Po Paris–CNRS (CEVIPOF), France) & Emilia Zankina* (Temple University, Rome, Italy)

Introduction

Throughout the first two decades of the 21st century, populism has emerged as one of the most significant global political phenomenons, deeply affecting electoral politics in democracies across the globe, both new and consolidated (Moffit, 2017; De la Torre, 2019). In Europe, populism has become a major force, reshaping the political landscape and discourse of the European Union and most of its member states in unprecedented ways. Over the years, the impact of populist parties has been felt both at the level of domestic and European politics, increasingly putting pressure on more established mainstream parties, particularly at the right of the political spectrum (FEPS, 2024).

Populism is found in different locations in the party system, predominantly at the far left and far right of the spectrum (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). The PopuList database of populist parties illustrates the rise in support for populist, far-left, and far-right parties in Europe since the early 1990s (see Figure 1). Such parties have made significant electoral gains in recent years. They have joined coalition governments in several countries, including Italy, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Austria, more generally reflecting the mainstreaming of their ideas and themes in party politics and public opinion (Muldoon & Herman, 2018; Schwörer, 2021; Bale & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021).

Populist performances typically vary across parties and contexts, reflecting the complex interplay between structural and contextual factors. As Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos (2020) show, electoral support for radical parties is rooted in structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is conditioned by political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. While contemporary populism is generally seen as a response to a wide range of socioeconomic and cultural grievances and issues (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Rodrik, 2021), it can also be seen as an expression of political discontent largely dependent on the national political cycle and the shorter-term country-specific opportunities produced for populist mobilization.

The analysis of the European Parliament elections of June 2024 thus provides a unique opportunity to simultaneously assess the current wave of populism across all 27 European Union (EU) member states. With European Parliament (EP) elections all taking place at about the same time, we can look more closely and comparatively at the current wave of pan-European populism, its size, dynamics and impact on national polities and, ultimately, on the EU.

This report analyzes the performances and impact of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing from the analyses of country experts, we provide an account of how populist parties across the spectrum performed in each of the EU’s 27 member states, looking at the campaign, issues and demand for populist politics in each country separately and the challenges that populist party success more broadly bears for the future of the EU.

In this introductory chapter, we briefly define populism, provide a topographic map of populist parties across all EU member states ahead of the 2024 European elections, and review the main drivers of populism identified in the literature. We then turn more specifically to the general context and outcome of the 2024 EP election, assessing the hypothesis of another ‘populist wave’ while also looking back at the 2019 election to compare populist party success over time.

Mapping European populism(s)

Mudde (2004) defines populism as a ‘thin-centered ideology’ that ‘considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’. Populist parties champion the cause of the ‘common man’ against what is perceived as a detached and self-serving political elite. While there are other ontological approaches to populism – e.g., political discourse (Laclau, 2005), political strategy (Weyland, 2001), and performance (Ostiguy et al., 2020) – these different traditions of research generally converge towards the same common essential attributes underpinning populism (Olivas Osuna, 2021). Moreover, the ideational approach allows one to connect the supply and demand side of populism and to study the diversity of its manifestations across Europe.

 In the European political landscape, populism manifests itself in a variety of parties across the political spectrum, from left to right (Ivaldi et al., 2017; Taggart & Pirro, 2021). In Eastern and Central Europe, populism may also be found across a range of ‘centrist’ anti-establishment parties located inside and outside the mainstream (Hanley & Sikk, 2016). Such diversity is shown in Table 1, which provides an overview of the leading populist parties in the current European political landscape.

Table 1 illustrates the diversity of populism. Overall, there were about 90 populist parties across all EU member states on the eve of the 2024 European election, with varying ideological profiles, backgrounds and electoral sizes. Essentially, populism was found both left and right of the European political spectrum, as well as at its centre, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

On the radical right, populism is typically combined with exclusionary nativism and authoritarianism, whereby the people and the elite are primarily defined along cultural lines (Mudde, 2007). Radical-right populist parties essentialize migration not only in their nativist rhetoric but also portray it with terrorism and crime, and in this way, it is put forward as a security issue, as was the case during the Paris and Brussels attacks in 2015–2016 (Mudde, 2019). Such populism is found in parties like France’s National Rally (RN), Lega (formerly Lega Nord) and Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI) in Italy, and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The nativist and authoritarian ideology of the PRR is also found in ‘radicalized’ conservative parties such as Poland’s Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and Hungary’s Fidesz, which have turned to a populist radical right strategy over time (Buštíková, 2017: 575).

The populist radical left has, on the other hand, a universalistic profile embracing a more socially inclusive notion of the people, who are essentially pitted against the economic elites (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Lisi et al., 2019). In Europe, left-wing populism has been particularly electorally successful in the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis (Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2020). Economic issues, bailouts, and austerity programs were the main driving forces behind a transformation of the radical left emphasizing distributive issues in Eurosceptic populist directions (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro & Plaza-Colodro, 2018). Parties such as the Spanish Podemos, SYRIZA in Greece, or Germany’s Die Linke (The Left) are examples of this phenomenon. In those countries, however, there has been a decline in the electoral support for parties of the populist left since 2019 (Ivaldi, 2020).

Finally, in CEE, populism often manifests itself in the form of ‘centrist’ anti-establishment parties (Učeň, 2007; Hanley & Sikk, 2016). Such parties operate in the more volatile party system of the former Communist bloc, where political instability is a long-term phenomenon. They focus on challenging the existing political elite and fighting corruption, and they can be found across the entire political spectrum, both within and outside the ideological mainstream (Engler et al., 2019). This type of populism is found in parties such as Slovakia’s Ordinary People and Independents (OL’aNO), the movement of Paweł Kukiz (Kukiz) in Poland and Change Continues (Prodalzhavame Promyanata, PP) in Bulgaria. Looking more specifically at the Czech Republic, Havlík (2019) sees the rise of the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011 (ANO 2011) as a case of ‘centrist technocratic populism’ based on a denial of political pluralism, anti-partyism, resistance to constitutionalism and the embrace of majoritarianism. In Western Europe, the Italian M5S has been seen as a case of ‘centrist populism’, which does not display the typical ideological profile (Mosca & Tronconi, 2019; Pirro & Van Kessel, 2018).

The populism-Euroscepticism nexus

Given their inherent anti-elite and anti-established stance, populist parties in the European context are also often Eurosceptic. Kneuer (2018) emphasizes such a ‘tandem’ of populism and Euroscepticism as one unifying feature of all successful populist parties in Europe, reflecting in her view the formation of a new transnational cleavage cross-cutting the traditional left-right axis.

A recent study examining parties in 30 European countries from 2018 to 2024 (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2024) finds 77 parties to be both Eurosceptic and anti-establishment. Szczerbiak and Taggart argue that the growth of European integration and its association with a series of crises, such as migration, the Eurozone, Brexit and COVID-19, has bred discontent that fostered anti-establishment positions and the demonization of the EU. At the same time, the study found clusters of parties that are anti-establishment but not Eurosceptic and parties that are Eurosceptic but not anti-establishment, arguing that the link is not always straightforward.

Meijers and Zaslove (2021) also examine populist parties’ positions towards European integration, similarly arguing for a nuanced picture, with some populist parties rejecting the EU outright while others are taking a reformist position. According to their study, populist parties such as the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) and Forum for Democracy (FvD), the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Golden Dawn in Greece and Lega in Italy are highly Eurosceptic. Populist left parties, on the other hand, tend to be more moderate, with the Five Star Movement (M5S) being moderately Eurosceptic and Podemos and SYRIZA having moderate pro-EU positions.

Similarly, Pirro, Taggart and Kessel (2018) find differences between left- and right-wing variants of populist Euroscepticism. Examining the economic and financial crisis (the ‘Great Recession’), the migrant crisis and Brexit, they find left-wing populists attacking the EU’s ‘neoliberal’ agenda and austerity measures, while right-wing populists criticizing the EU on account of increased immigration and multiculturalism. Brexit, on the other hand, is portrayed ‘by various kinds of populist parties as a victory for the ordinary people against unresponsive elites and a rejection of the undemocratic and technocratic decision-making process at the EU level’ (Pirro, Taggart and Van Kessel, 2018). While Euroscepticism is not limited to populist parties alone, neither are all populist parties Eurosceptic. We see a strong correlation between anti-EU positions and populist parties, which is more pronounced to the right than to the left.

More recently, however, there has been a moderating shift in populist Eurosceptic politics both left and right of the spectrum. In the wake of the Brexit referendum of 2016, many populist parties have strategically abandoned their previous plans to drop the Euro or leave the EU altogether, turning to more nuanced or ambiguous positions vis-à-vis European integration in order to increase their appeal to moderate and pro-EU voters, and to collaborate with mainstream parties. As Van Kessel et al. (2020) note, the difficulties in the Brexit process may have dampened public demand for leaving the EU elsewhere in Europe, thus reducing the viability of ‘exit strategies’. Other studies suggest that populist parties, particularly of the radical right, have been shying away from hard Eurosceptic positions. Right-wing nationalist populist parties have adopted ‘alt-Europe’ counternarratives reflecting ‘a conservative, xenophobic intergovernmental vision of a European “community of sovereign states”, “strong nations” or “fatherlands”, that abhors the EU’s “centralized” United States of Europe’ (McMahon, 2021: 10). ‘Taking back control from Brussels’ has been observed to be a common stand of radical right-wing populist parties on the way to the 2024 EP elections (Braun & Reinl, 2023).

As McDonnell and Werner (2018) argue, populist radical right parties ‘remain flexible to perform significant shifts’ on the issue of European integration because of its relatively limited salience. The dampening of their Euroscepticism by populist parties may also be associated with office-seeking strategies. As Ivaldi (2018b) suggests, in the case of the French FN, governmental credibility and coalition potential have been two strong incentives for the FN to tone down its Euroscepticism since the 2017 presidential election.

Drivers of populism: structural and short-term factors

The economic crises of the past decade, coupled with the perceived threats posed by globalization and immigration, have created circumstances that allow for a surge in populist sentiments across various European nations. Populism, characterized by a general distrust towards traditional political institutions and an increasing polarization of society, is fuelled by a complex interplay of socioeconomic, cultural and political factors (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Rodrik, 2021).

Different varieties of populism operate on different types of grievances and issues across the economic and cultural dimensions of electoral competition, however. Socioeconomic issues have traditionally been identified as critical factors of left-wing populism at both the party and the voter level (Charalambous & Ioannou, 2019) and have become increasingly relevant for right-wing populist parties since the 2008 financial crisis (Ibsen, 2019; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Rodrik, 2021). Immigration has long been identified by research as a critical issue for populist radical right parties, and it is typically associated with authoritarian views of society (Mudde, 2007).

While sharing similar populist attitudes, populist voters diverge when it comes to the host ideologies to which their populism is attached (Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). Populist radical right voters are primarily concerned with cultural issues of immigration and law and order and show stronger nativist and authoritarian attitudes. Voters on the populist radical left tend to embrace more egalitarian and universalistic values while often supporting a libertarian agenda on social issues. Finally, centrist populist voters exhibit strong anti-establishment attitudes and are primarily characterized by protest voting but do not generally show the nationalist attitudes found in right-wing populism (Ivaldi, 2020; 2021). Such parties in CEE often take an anticorruption stance, making this the focus of their electoral appeal (Haughton, Neudorfer & Zankina, 2024).

As Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos (2020) demonstrated, the effect of these different sets of long-term, structural determinants is also conditioned by short-term political discontent, most notably when populist parties are in opposition. Such short-term factors are particularly relevant to studying populism in European elections. EP elections are generally considered ‘second-order elections’ (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). That is, citizens give more weight to national elections than European ones on a range of different variables: political trust, interest in politics, attachment and complexity of politics. In European elections: (a) voters tend to trust national institutions instead of European ones; (b) they have a stronger connection to their own nation rather than the EU, and; (c) they think that European politics is too difficult to grasp and that domestic issues are more compelling than European ones (Braun, 2021).

Looking at party-level data from all European elections between 1979 and 2019, Ehin and Talving (2021) find that the second-order election model continues to wield significant explanatory power, with lower participation rates in EP elections compared with first-order national elections and incumbency being associated with electoral losses in most EP election years.

Because of the increasing politicization of European integration, however, the viability of the second-order election model has been called into question, reflecting the growing salience and resonance of EU-related issues in mass politics and party competition (Hutter et al., 2016). The recent analysis of EU issue voting in the 2019 EP election by Goldberg et al. (2024) concludes that such issues matter for all EP political groups under scrutiny (both mainstream and more radical), which speaks against the idea of conditional mobilization by Eurosceptic parties.

Moreover, while Ehin and Talving (2021) see the ‘second-order type as constituting a base for a fragmented parliament with a strong representation of populist and extremist parties, other studies, such as Wondreys (2023), find only limited evidence for a boost in electoral support for extreme parties in European elections. This finding is particularly salient when considering the size of those parties and their changing role and status in European party systems. As Wondreys (2023: 7) argues: ‘[G]iven the overall increase in size, the role of many extreme parties in their respective party systems may have changed…. Voters already vote for these parties in [first-order elections], and thus have fewer incentives to subsequently vote for them in [second-order elections] as well.’

At the same time, several European countries held elections at multiple levels concurrently from 7–9 June 2024. These included Belgium, which held federal elections alongside European Parliament elections; Bulgaria, which held another early national parliamentary election on the same date as the EP one; and several countries that held local elections alongside the European ones (i.e., Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Malta and Romania). In these cases, we can expect to see European issues merge, rendered secondary or disappear altogether as domestic issues take precedence.

Looking back at the 2019 EP elections

The 2019 EP elections took place in the wake of the migration crisis shaped by an unprecedented refugee flow to European countries, mainly from the Middle East and Africa, which peaked in 2014–2016. The crisis fed into the populist parties’ Eurosceptic, nativist and nationalist narratives, which were even embraced by mainstream parties (Mudde 2019; Capozzi et al., 2023; Rodi et al., 2023). With the associated cultural sensitivities and economic, social and demographic concerns, European public interest has always been high in the political discourses on migration. In this sense, how the EU managed the refugee influx stood at the heart of discussions between 2015 and 2019. In parallel with Eurosceptic and populist concerns around European integration and migration, the economic agenda remained prominent during the 2019 EP election (Braun & Schafer, 2022). Finally, Brexit remained an important issue, serving as a benchmark of evaluation for citizens to reflect on the benefits of European membership to their own countries (Hobolt et al., 2022). In this regard, debates on the legitimacy of supranational governance, as heightened in the framework of sovereignty, were the most exploited narrative by populists against the EU (Ruzza and Pejovic 2019).

However, the predicted surge in support for populism did not fully materialize in the 2019 EP elections (Ivaldi, 2020). Despite a slowdown of economic activity, the economic context was somewhat less favourable to populist mobilization, as unemployment and inflation remained relatively low across much of Europe. Meanwhile, the impact of the EU migration crisis that had fuelled support for right-wing nationalist populists seemed to wane: economic issues dominated the 2019 European election agenda, together with climate change and promoting human rights and democracy, while immigration ranked fifth (European Parliament, 2019).

Moreover, in a context of high political uncertainty, polls showed more substantial support for the EU across member states. In the Spring 2019 Eurobarometer survey, 61% of EU citizens said that EU membership was good for their country, a figure at its highest since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Eurobarometer, 2019). Meanwhile, interest in the election was much higher than in 2014, and voter turnout increased in 20 of the then-28 EU member states, most substantially in countries such as Poland (+22 percentage points), Romania (+19), Spain (+17), Austria (+15), and Hungary (+14).

In the 2019 elections, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and centre-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) lost their majority for the first time since 1979, securing 182 and 154 seats, respectively. A significant number of voters dissatisfied with Europe’s ruling grand coalition turned to the Greens and Liberals. The Greens won a total of 74 seats, making significant gains in Western European countries such as Germany, France, Ireland and the UK. Pro-EU liberals secured 108 seats, which made Renew Europe the third largest group in the European Parliament.

Meanwhile, populist parties rose to a total of 241 seats, representing about a third (32%) of all 751 seats in the European Parliament at the time, as opposed to 211 seats (28%) five years earlier. However, the election showed mixed performances for populist party families across EU member states.

The outcome essentially confirmed the electoral consolidation of the populist right: together, these parties won 168 seats in 2019 – their best result ever – compared with 131 seats five years earlier. Support for right-wing populist parties significantly rose in Italy, Germany, Spain, Estonia, Sweden and Belgium and they dominated the polls in countries such as France, Italy and the UK. In Italy, Matteo Salvini’s Lega was the big election winner, with 34.3% of the vote compared with only 6.2% in 2014. The National Rally (RN, formerly Front National) topped the polls in France with 23.3% of the vote. In the UK, Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party made an impressive breakthrough with 30.5% of the vote, taking over as the main Eurosceptic outfit, a role formerly held by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).

In Eastern Europe, ruling conservative parties consolidated electorally: in Poland, Law and Justice (PiS) won 45.4% of the vote, increasing its previous support by 13.6%; in Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz dominated the polls with no less than 52.6%. Smaller, extreme right-wing parties also made gains in Greece and Slovakia. In Greece, Golden Dawn retained two of its previous four seats. In Slovakia, the neo-nazi People’s Party Our Slovakia (L’SNS), headed by Marian Kotleba, won 12.2% of the vote and two seats. In Cyprus, the National Popular Front (ELAM) increased its support to 8.3% (+5.6 percentage points) but failed to secure one of the island’s six seats in the European Parliament.

In contrast, there was a significant drop in support for the populist left, from 43 seats in 2014 to 37 in the 2019 election. Left-wing populist parties had made substantial gains in the wake of the 2008 Great Recession, particularly in countries such as Greece and Spain, hit hardest by austerity policies (see Kriesi & Pappas, 2015: 23). In the 2014 elections, the populist radical left surged in Greece, Spain and Ireland and such parties made significant inroads in Portugal, Italy and France (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016). In 2019, against the backdrop of a timid economic recovery and lower unemployment, these parties lost ground across most EU member states, most notably in countries like Greece, Spain and France. In Eastern and Central Europe, the populist left remained relatively marginal electorally.

Finally, in 2019, centrist populist parties secured 32 of their previous 33 seats. Centrist populists lost momentum in countries of the former Communist bloc, such as Latvia, where Who Owns the State? (KPV) collapsed to less than 1% of the vote, as opposed to their 14.3% showing in the 2018 national elections. In Estonia, the Estonian Centre Party (EK) fell by 8.6%. In the Czech Republic, the governing ANO and its highly controversial leader, Andrej Babiš, took just 21.2% of the vote, down 8.4 percentage points from its previous result. In Bulgaria, electoral support for the ruling GERB fell by 2 percentage points, although Boïko Borissov’s party remained the most potent force in Bulgarian politics with 30.9% of the European election vote. Centrist populist parties also performed badly in Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania and Croatia. In Western Europe, the Five Star Movement (M5S) was the biggest loser of the 2019 Italian EP election, losing 15.6% compared to the 2018 national election.

With a specific reference to Euroscepticism, the 2019 elections were a real success. In almost all member states, except Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Romania, anti-EU movements won seats. The 2019 elections formed a parliament where more than 28% of MEPs belonged to populist or Eurosceptic parties (Treib, 2021: 177).

 

 

The context of the 2024 EP elections

The 2024 EP elections were held in a context characterized by the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, concerns about the EU’s handling of migration and refugee issues, the deteriorating economic situation and inflation crisis in member countries, security challenges posed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the newly erupted Israeli–Hamas war in the Middle East.

The EU faced unprecedented challenges due to the COVID-19 crisis and is still dealing with its economic and social consequences. It adopted a €750 billion recovery fund called NextGenerationEU to support member states’ recovery efforts. However, the implementation of this fund was delayed by political disputes and legal challenges, potentially fuelling political discontent – an issue that also carried onto the 2024 EP elections.

Concerning migration and asylum policy reform, the EU has been struggling to find a common approach to address the influx of migrants and asylum seekers, especially from Africa and the Middle East. The current system, based on the Dublin Regulation, has been criticized for putting too much pressure on the frontline states, such as Greece, Italy and Spain and for failing to ensure solidarity and responsibility-sharing among member states. To address this, the European Commission proposed a new pact on migration and asylum to create a more balanced and comprehensive framework for managing migration flows (European Commission, 2024). The proposal took a long time to go through the necessary legislative process due to the opposition from some member states, such as Hungary, Poland and Austria, who rejected mandatory relocation quotas and favoured stricter border controls.

Challenges were not limited to domestic issues; the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a litmus test for the common foreign and security policy of the Union. The EU was confronted with a deteriorating security situation in Eastern Europe as Russia intensified its military aggression against Ukraine and threatened to cut off gas supplies to Europe. The EU imposed sanctions on Russia, but disagreement elicited among the member states on the extent of support and related issues like grain imports from Ukraine. The ECPS report on the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on populism in Europe concluded that populist radical right parties exploited the war as an opportunity to voice their anti-EU rhetoric with sovereigntist arguments. In this vein, their common stance towards the sanctions had been hesitancy and scepticism, illustrating them as not really in line with economic and security-related national interests (Ivaldi & Zankina, 2023).

Furthermore, the recent terrorist attack of Hamas on Israel and the subsequent outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war bore high risks not only for the Middle East but also for other parts of the world, including Europe. Considering the heavy historical and political baggage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict held, it seemed like a convenient topic to be exploited by populist parties ahead of the elections. Instances such as the terrorist attack in Brussels, in which two Swedish citizens were killed in the days after the start of the war, provided room for populists’ rhetoric in the form of xenophobia, Islamophobia and anti-migration.

However, this ‘polycrisis’ was expected to play out differently in each country. The survey by Krastev and Leonard (2024a), which was conducted in September and October 2023 in 11 European countries (Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Switzerland), suggests that the crises of the economy, security, health, climate and migration, have created distinct political responses and opinions across Europe. While immigration was the key issue in Germany, France and Denmark, people in other European countries identified climate change as the most important crisis. Italians and Portuguese, in turn, pointed to global economic turmoil, while in Spain, Great Britain and Romania, the COVID-19 pandemic was the principal issue. Estonians, Poles and Danes considered the war in Ukraine to be the most serious of crises.

In such context, the 2024 European elections represented a crucial test for both the EU and national governments, as voters would evaluate their handling of the pandemic and the recovery and how they planned to address the long-term challenges of climate change, digital transformation, and social cohesion (Bassot, 2023).

However, public opinion data showed relatively positive views toward the Union among EU citizens. Trust in the EU has increased by 6 percentage points since 2019 and now stands at 49%. The perception of the situation of the European economy has improved since autumn 2023, with 47% of respondents rating it as ‘good’, the highest level since 2019. Nearly two-thirds (62%) also said they were optimistic about the future of the EU, which is a slight increase (+4 percentage points) compared to five years earlier. Feelings of being ‘citizens of the EU’ dominated for 74% of the respondents, the highest level in over two decades. Meanwhile, a majority of respondents said they were satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (58%) and in the EU (57%) (Eurobarometer, 2024).

An anticipated rise in support for right-wing populists across the EU

Populist parties have gained traction in recent years, reflecting a broader trend of rising populism across the continent. This surge in popularity has been particularly noticeable among right-leaning populist parties (Ivaldi & Torner, 2023). Such rise in support has been exemplified by the Alternative für Deutschland’s (AfD) triumph in regional elections in eastern states of Germany, the remarkable success of Le Pen’s NR in the 2022 French elections, Giorgia Meloni’s FdI breakthrough in the 2022 Italian election, as well as by the performances of the Sweden Democrats and Finns Party in the last parliamentary elections, which all point to a further increase in the representation of right-wing populist parties in the next EP. In Italy, Meloni’s FdI and Salvini’s Lega, respectively part of the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists) and Identity and Democracy (ID), were also seen as potentially decisive actors in the alliance formation of the next European Parliament (Massetti, 2023; Maślanka, 2023).

Elsewhere in Europe, right-wing populist parties have become established in countries like Portugal and Spain, and they have topped the polls in Austria and Belgium. In CEE, right-wing populism has been on the rise in Estonia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. In Hungary, Orbán’s Fidesz secured another term in government in the 2022 elections with a clear victory, putting the contested topics between the party and the EU, like the supremacy of the rule of law, immigration, the Russia–Ukraine War, on the agenda of the EP elections. Moreover, Fidezs’s suspension by the EPP and then its departure from this political group has led the party to search for new coalitions after the elections, with talks of joining the ECR group. In Poland, the October 2023 national elections resulted in the opposition parties’ coalition winning over the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) and the new government of pro-EU Prime Minister Donald Tusk. While such an outcome will undoubtedly improve relations between Poland and the EU, PiS has maintained its support at around 30% of the vote, together with Confederation, a heterogeneous extremist group at about 10% of the vote.

Analysts predicted ‘a major shift to the right in many countries, with populist radical right parties gaining votes and seats across the EU and centre-left and green parties losing votes and seats’ (Krastev & Leonard, 2024b). Anti-European populists were expected ‘to top the polls in nine member states (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia) and come second or third in a further nine countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden)’ (Ibid.)

The European Parliament and party groups

While reflecting the existing balance of strength across national contexts, populist party performances at the EU level may significantly impact the configuration of party groups within the EP, which is a key legislative body of the EU, working alongside the Council of the European Union to adopt European legislation following proposals by the European Commission. The EP comprises 705 members (MEPs) – 720 in the new EP – making it the second-largest democratic electorate in the world. These MEPs are elected every five years by the citizens of the EU through universal suffrage.

The structure and operation of the EP are governed by its Rules of Procedure, and the political bodies, committees, delegations and political groups guide EP activities. The representation of citizens is ‘degressively proportional’, with a minimum threshold of six members per member state and no member state having more than 96 seats. Degressive proportionality means that while seats are allocated based on the population of the member states, more populous member states agree to be under-represented to favour greater representation of less populated ones.

Political groups within the EP can be formed around a single European political party or can include more than one European party as well as national parties and independents. Prior to the 2024 EP elections, the existing political groups in the EP were the EPP, the Progressive Alliance of S&D, Renew Europe (previously ALDE), the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), ECR, The Left in the EP (GUE/NGL), and ID.

The outgoing EP was home to both left-wing and right-wing populist parties, that is, while Brothers of Italy (FdI), Vox of Spain, Sweden Democrats, Fidesz of Hungary, Law and Justice (PiS) of Poland, the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset), the AfD, the National Rally of France, stood on the right side of the spectrum, Podemos of Spain and SYRIZA of Greece represented left-wing populism in the 2019–2024 EP. Regarding political group membership, right-wing populist parties tend to choose different political groups, preventing them from having a common voice in the EP. After the 2019 elections, however, their seeking of collaboration has become more evident, especially under the umbrella of ID and ECR.

Questions addressed in the report

Under the auspices of the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), this report examines the electoral performances and impacts of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Based on a compilation of country-specific analyses by local experts, the report looks at populist party performances across all EU member states, and it discusses the challenges of populist politics for European institutions as well as for the future of Europe.

Each chapter provides background information about the main populist forces in the country of focus by examining their history, electoral support and political agenda. This includes populist parties across the spectrum where deemed relevant. With a focus on the 2024 European election, each country chapter looks at the ‘supply side’ of populism (i.e., the positions of populist parties towards the EU in general and vis-à-vis specific policies, such as migration and asylum, fiscal policy, the Schengen system, European citizenship and democracy, the COVID-19 pandemic, human rights, as well as external affairs, including policy towards the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Hamas conflicts). Country analyses ask how populists used Euroscepticism, national sovereignty, ethnic culture, identity, xenophobia and religion during the 2024 EP election campaign and what their discourse was on the composition and working mechanisms of the European Parliament.

Additionally, each chapter examines the ‘demand side’ of populism by looking at how populist parties fared in the elections and which topics played a role in their success or failure. Wherever possible, the country chapters in this report provide public opinion data about critical political issues for populist voters and the characterization of crucial sociodemographics of populist voters across different parties and national contexts.

Finally, each country chapter assesses the impact of populist politics in their respective country and at the EU level (e.g., what kind of populist politics are the elected populist parties going to articulate in the EP and which may be their coalition strategy), allowing for the broader conclusions discussed in this report’s final section.

 

(*) Gilles Ivaldi is researcher in politics at CEVIPOF and professor at Sciences Po Paris. His research interests include French politics, parties and elections, and the comparative study of populism and the radical right in Europe and the United States. Gilles Ivaldi is the author of De Le Pen à Trump : le défi populiste (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2019), The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A political Reformation?, 2018, Palgrave MacMillan, with Jocelyn Evans. He has recently co-edited The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 2023, with Emilia Zankina. His research has appeared in journals such as Electoral Studies, the International Journal of Forecasting, Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, French Politics, Revue Française de Science Politique or Political Research Quarterly.

(**) Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor in Political Science and interim Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University and, since 2020, has served as the Dean of Temple University Rome. She holds a PhD in International Affairs and a Certificate in Advanced East European Studies from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research examines East European politics, populism, civil service reform, and gender in political representation. She has published in high-ranking international journals, including West European Politics, Politics and Gender, East European Politics, Problems of Post-communism, and Representation, as well as academic presses such as the ECPR Press, Indiana University Press, and others. She frequently serves as an expert adviser for Freedom House, V-Democracy, and projects for the European Commission. In the past, Zankina has served as Provost of the American University in Bulgaria, Associate Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh and Managing Editor of East European Politics and Societies.

 

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