German Scholars.

Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge

Please cite as:

Pretorius, Christo. (2025). “Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 26, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0096

 

Following Germany’s pivotal 2025 federal election, the ECPS hosted a high-level panel exploring the rise of the far-right AfD, democratic resilience, and the broader political shifts underway. Held on March 13, 2025, the event featured leading scholars, offering critical insights into the AfD’s electoral surge, its normalization and radicalization, and the East-West divide shaping German politics. Speakers examined key voter demographics—especially youth, working-class, and immigrant voters—and dissected issues like immigration, identity, gender, and economic anxiety that have fueled the far-right narrative. The session also addressed the implications for Germany’s transatlantic ties, institutional stability, and future party strategies. This report captures the panel’s core arguments, raising essential questions about how liberal democracies can respond to populist and authoritarian threats without compromising democratic norms or alienating significant voter blocs.

Report bChristo Pretorius

The 2025 federal election in Germany on February 23, 2025 marked a watershed moment in the nation’s postwar political landscape. Amid record-high voter turnout and deepening societal divides, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) achieved its most significant electoral gains to date. Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened a special panel titled “Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge” to assess the causes, consequences, and wider implications of the vote. Held online on March 13, 2025, the session brought together leading political scientists from Germany and beyond, each offering unique insights into one of Europe’s most closely watched political stories.

Moderated by Dr. Cengiz Aktar, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member, the discussion delved into the normalization and radicalization of the AfD, the party’s growing impact on Germany’s democratic institutions, and the broader realignment of the country’s political and social order. The panel also explored the East-West divide in voting patterns, the role of identity politics, youth and working-class engagement, and how key issues—such as immigration, economic anxiety, and gender—have been instrumentalized by the far right.

Moreover, speakers raised concerns about foreign influence on German politics, the future of the transatlantic alliance, and whether traditional parties should seek to exclude or accommodate the AfD. With contributions from Dr. Eric Langenbacher, Teaching Professor and Director of the Senior Honors Program in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, Dr. Kai Arzheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz, Dr. Hannah M. Alarian, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, Dr. Conrad Ziller, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen, and Dr. Sabine Volk, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences at the University of Passau, the panel offered a comprehensive and sobering look at a country grappling with both internal polarization and global geopolitical uncertainty.

This report summarizes the session’s key discussions and analytical takeaways, providing an in-depth overview of the far-right surge in Germany and its implications for democracy, governance, and European politics at large.

To start off this special session off, Dr. Cengiz Aktar highlighted two major trends that he noticed within Germany’s 2025 federal election results. First, was the rise of populism itself in Germany, and second was the interference of American decision makers, ‘both elected and unelected,’ in the election. He then gave the floor to the first speaker.

How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?

Dr. Eric Langenbacher’s presentation on “The AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship” began with an overview of the election results which highlighted the East-West divide in the country, with the former primarily serving as the Alternative for Germany’s (AfD) voter base in the election. This was followed by a quick look at important factors that affected the final result, such as age demographics of voters, and pointing out that this was the highest turnout since 1987’s election. 

Turning to his own takeaways from the election result, Dr. Langenbacher notes that the AfD has normalized within German politics but also radicalized in their policies. He notes that although the AfD does not have a majority in the Bundestag, they now have a blocking minority, which will make any action requiring a super majority, such as amending the constitution, difficult to do. He also notes that the results show a clear divide in German politics stemming from the old Cold War divisions, and that on a smaller scale these divisions affect AfD candidates from both the East and West. Western members are, in Dr. Langenbacher’s opinion, more pragmatic and willing to compromise if it meant joining a coalition government, juxtaposing their more hardline eastern counterparts. 

Moving onto his analysis of the Transatlantic Relationship, Dr. Langenbacher highlighted Elon Musk’s intervention in German politics but points out that there is no evidence suggesting that his endorsement of AfD had any effect on the result. He questions the Republican Party and right-leaning individuals from the United States’ support of the AfD in general, especially as the party contains many anti-American politicians that speak out against what they see as US hegemony over Germany. Dr. Langenbacher theorizes that this might be due to similarities in the AfD and Trump’s policies, especially regarding Russia and the Ukraine, but it could just as likely be a strategy to weaken the EU’s geo-political power. To conclude, Dr. Langenbacher finds that German foreign policy towards the US has been damaged beyond the point of fixing, and elected officials now seek alternative means to strengthen Germany on the global stage without US support, especially as it remains uncertain whether or not the US will continue to maintain a military presence in Europe and/or support NATO moving into the future. 

How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD?

The next speaker was Dr. Kai Arzheimer, who investigated the question: “How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?” Also pointing out the stark East-West divide in voter support for the AfD, Dr. Arzheimer notes the map most commonly used to highlight the political divisions within Germany is misleading – especially as East Germany is less populated with only one sixth of Germany’s overall population (without Berlin) and only made up a quarter of the total vote. The increase of AfD’s support in Western Germany is more important to analyze. Younger voters made up a significant proportion of the party’s support in the election, especially with young men, but this gender gap seems to be narrowing. The working class also supported the AfD more this time around, mobilizing 1.8 million former non-voters which joined the additional voters the AfD won from the Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats. 

Immigration was still the most important policy issue for voters, especially the rejection of Muslims who are often mistakenly linked to terrorism and an increase in crime. Dr. Arzheimer points out that the AfD tends to play up terrorism and crime as out of control, even though evidence shows that it has gone down. Other ‘Culture War’ issues such as gender and the green transformation also played a part in AfD’s success, but economic anxiety is what pushed many working-class voters towards the party.

According to Dr. Arzheimer, from a geo-political perspective, the AfD had a near monopoly on peace politics, especially as Russia’s renewed attack on Ukraine made it difficult to maintain their main pro-Russian narrative. To this end, they focused on the economy as an issue, and how it became worse after Germany’s involvement with the war, and how Germany’s energy security was being undermined. 

Unlike neighboring country’s right-wing parties, Dr. Arzheimer points out that the AfD is becoming ever more radical in their politics, using examples such as the party’s leader being convicted twice for using Nazi slogans during the European Parliament election campaign, and right-wing extremists from outside the party being staffed in the Bundestag. Identity politics has also radicalized, with some AfD members using the issue of immigration as a means to push their desired agenda of expelling Germans with a so-called ‘migration background’ from Germany. Despite this, their popularity has grown. 

Dr. Arzheimer went on to show a timeline of events in the last few years affecting the AfD’s popularity and concluded that he would estimate 50% of AfD voters have consistently voted for the party, and the other 50% of voters might still be swayable to other parties. He goes on to recommend that Germany’s other political parties should focus on their own policy issues, rather than compete with the AfD ‘on their field’ as they try to win back voters. 

Accommodation or Exclusion? 

The third presentation focused on “Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election,” and was presented by Dr. Hannah Alarian. Building on the previous presentations, she sought to investigate the question of what will happen after the election. Focusing once again on immigration as a key policy issue, Dr. Alarian highlighted the persistence of this issue for the electorate, with as many as one in six voters mentioning it as an important political problem. In the eastern states, more people favored greater restrictions on immigration, which correlates with their vote for AfD. Voters turned to the AfD as they were the party that was most eager to talk about the issue. The AfD’s 2021 party manifesto made more references to the issue than any other comparable party, and this trend continued into the 2025 election where most other parties seemed to have dismissed the issue altogether since they did not want to talk about it lest they draw attention to the AfD. This left a lot of voters to turn to the AfD as the only party addressing this key policy issue, and they controlled the narrative with various anti-migration media, some of which Dr. Alarian presents in her talk by sharing anti-immigration campaign posters used by the AfD. 

Looking forward, Dr. Alarian points out that the questions of democratic legitimacy, and party and government strategy are important – namely, do we accommodate, or do we exclude the AfD? By choosing to exclude the AfD, it excludes a large portion of the voting population, but inclusion allows the AfD access to the policy making space. Exclusionary tactics are already being used, such as the CDU’s refusal to enter a coalition with the AfD, but after the CDU relied on the AfD’s vote for an anti-migration measure, the people came out to protest in mass across the country. Dr. Alarian indicates that perhaps the people can be the ‘firewall’ then. However, according to her data, these made no real change towards people’s attitude of AfD. Similarly, AfD’s exclusion, nor other party’s adaptation to the political climate, also made no real change. 

To conclude, Dr. Alarian makes some recommendations for moving forward, including an acknowledgement of immigration as a political issue by other parties, and addressing socio-economic concerns of voters. In effect this will provide an alternative to the alternative vote. 

Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications

Dr. Conrad Ziller started his presentation on “The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications,” by focusing on who are the new voters, and what motivates them to vote for the AfD. He repeated some of the information from the previous presentations as to why the AfD doubled their votes in a lot of places compared to the last election – mainly the non-voters and policy issues such as immigration, internal security and the economy. 

Three surprising allies who voted for the AfD include immigrant voters, blue collar workers and young men. 10.4% of immigrant voters and 40.2% of post-soviet re-settlers voted for AfD, doubling since the last election. The number of voters lost by the SPD correlates with the amount gained by the AfD, highlighting how the working class shifted to the party this election. Finally, young men aged 18-24 voted overwhelmingly for the AfD. Dr. Ziller highlighted some explanatory frameworks for why these three groups voted the way they did, including: Cultural backlash against universalism, lack of social recognition, nostalgic appeal of the far right, a declining middle, structural transformations in the knowledge economy, transformations of the left parties, and group identities and out-group perceptions. 

Focusing in-depth on some of these frameworks, Dr. Ziller highlights academic research that might explain why the three highlighted groups voted the way they did. Social identity could be a factor as research found that marginalized people didn’t feel that they gained as much from a redistribution party, but by voting of a nationalist one with anti-immigrant views, they believed they would achieve a higher status in society. Arguments made for social belonging highlights how people can find a sense of community in right wing groups, which in particular attracts young men. Progressive policies are found to alienate blue collar workers who often feel they stand to lose from such policies. And finally, those who feel left behind turn to alternative parties to show their discontent at established parties and politics. 

Dr. Ziller provides some empirical insights from a survey he ran on a website in the days leading up to and after the election. 2,568 people responded, and the results closely reflected the election results. Predictors of an AfD vote include a low level of social trust, threat perception particularly against Muslims, and people who felt left behind. How this correlated to the three groups in focus paints the picture that all three groups felt left behind and displayed Islamophobia, although each one had different underlining reasons for voting AfD. To conclude he suggests that investment in left-behind places could regain the trust of disenfranchised voters, but the underlining question is whether or not we can roll back the ‘need for chaos’ preference in radical right-wing populist and authoritarian politics. 

Germany’s Far Right and Antifeminism

The final speaker, Dr. Sabine Volk, focused on the topic “The German Far Right: Antifeminism Sells.” Highlighting that the AfD were already campaigning in 2013 that there is a clear gender divide between men and women, the talk focused on gender issues which became more prominent within the AfD over successive elections. Dr. Volk presented the clear gender gap within the AfD party, which is comprised roughly of 19% women members overall. In the new Bundestag only 11.8% of the AfD’s group are women, and Alice Weidel is the only female AfD member in the Bundesvorstand(Federal Executive Board). As the face of the AfD, Alice Weidel juxtaposes a lot of AfD’s stances on gender and family, especially as she has a same-sex partner. 

AfD’s antifeminist stances have partially modernized on gender equality and sexual diversity, reacting on the processes of emancipation and seeking to maintain heteronormative power relations. Their key messages are heteronormative family relations, ‘Trans panic,’ and the mobilization of masculinity. The topic of gender is important to the AfD, but there is regional diversity within the party, with some more extreme factions being located in eastern Germany. According to Dr. Volk, what is missing from the discussion is the idea of female nationalism and the mobilization of women’s rights as part of an anti-Islam agenda present in previous elections. This allows for antifeminist alliances to be built with conservative and religious actors and groups and appeals to people with antifeminist attitudes – mostly located in eastern Germany. Gender is therefore of particular importance, and Dr. Volk predicts that discussions surrounding this policy area will only grow in the coming years. 

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The Impact of Religious and Nationalist Populism in Israel

Please cite as: 

Stamoglou, Anastasia. (2025). “The Impact of Religious and Nationalist Populism in Israel.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 24, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0095

 
This report examines the key discussions from the 19th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, hosted by the ECPS on February 27, 2025. The session explored the influence of religious and nationalist populism on Israeli politics, media, and education. Prominent scholars analyzed how judicial overhauls, security-driven rhetoric, media manipulation, and educational policy shifts contribute to democratic erosion in Israel. The report highlights the increasing concentration of power, the delegitimization of opposition voices, and the broader global implications of Israel’s populist trends. By drawing comparisons with other global populist movements, the discussion underscored the necessity of protecting democratic institutions, ensuring media freedom, and preserving independent education.

Report by Anastasia Stamoglou

Introduction

The 19th session of the Mapping Global Populism Panel Series, hosted by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), examined the influence of religious and nationalist populism in Israel. The discussion highlighted how populist rhetoric, policy decisions, and institutional changes have shaped the country’s political, educational, and media landscapes. As populist leaders consolidate power, the balance between democratic governance and nationalist ideologies is increasingly at risk. The panel, moderated by Dr. Guy Ziv, Associate Professor at American University’s School of International Service, featured experts including Dr. Yaniv Roznai, Dr. Haleli Pinson, Dr. Shai Agmon, Yonatan Levi, Dr. Ayala Panievsky, and Dr. Tom Lourie. Their insights provided a comprehensive analysis of the challenges facing Israel’s democracy and the broader implications of populist movements.

The Institutional Vulnerabilities of Israeli Democracy

Dr. Yaniv Roznai, Professor of Constitutional Law at Harry Radzyner Law School, Reichman University, opened the discussion by addressing the institutional weaknesses that make Israeli democracy particularly susceptible to populist influence. Unlike many democracies with rigid constitutional frameworks, Israel’s legal system is built upon Basic Laws that can be easily amended by a simple parliamentary majority. This structural fragility allows populist leaders to implement sweeping judicial overhauls and consolidate executive power with relative ease.

Dr. Roznai argued that recent attempts to weaken judicial oversight, particularly through proposed reforms aimed at curbing the powers of the Supreme Court, illustrate the dangers of this malleable legal framework. The Israeli government’s judicial overhaul efforts have been widely criticized as a direct assault on democratic institutions. Proponents of these measures frame them as necessary corrections to an overly interventionist judiciary, while critics warn that they enable executive overreach and threaten the rule of law. The public backlash against these proposed reforms, including large-scale protests, underscores the importance of an independent judiciary in maintaining democratic integrity.

Populism and the Transformation of Israeli Education

Dr. Halleli Pinson, Associate Professor at the School of Education at Ben-Gurion University, examined the role of right-wing populism in reshaping Israel’s education system. Education serves as a powerful tool for ideological reinforcement, and the rise of nationalist and religious populism has had a profound impact on curriculum design and policy decisions. Dr. Pinson identified three key trends in this transformation: the exclusion of critical perspectives, the promotion of nationalist narratives, and the increasing influence of religious ideology in state education.

One of the most notable examples of this shift is the banning of Breaking the Silence, an NGO composed of former Israeli soldiers who provide testimonies on the ethical dilemmas of military service in the occupied territories. The exclusion of such organizations from schools reflects a broader effort to limit exposure to dissenting views and reinforce a singular national narrative. Additionally, right-wing organizations have exerted pressure on the higher education system, targeting academics perceived as left leaning and promoting legislative efforts to curtail academic freedom.

Pinson also highlighted the growing presence of religious-nationalist ideology in Israeli schools. Policies favoring religious institutions over secular ones have facilitated the integration of theological perspectives into public education, further intensifying nationalist discourse. This shift has long-term implications, as it influences young generations’ understanding of national identity, democracy, and civic engagement. The suppression of alternative viewpoints and the promotion of a singular ideological framework contribute to a more polarized society, limiting the space for critical discussion and democratic engagement.

Security and Populist Political Strategy

Dr. Shai Agmon, Assistant Professor in Political Philosophy at UCL, and Yonatan Levi, PhD candidate at European Institute, LSE, explored the intersection of security and populist politics in Israel. Populist leaders frequently use security threats—both real and perceived—to justify policies that concentrate power and marginalize political opponents. Netanyahu’s political strategy has consistently framed opposition voices, civil society organizations, and minority groups as existential threats to national security, reinforcing a sense of urgency that legitimizes authoritarian measures.

Levi emphasized that this security-driven populism creates a climate in which dissent is equated with national disloyalty. Arab citizens, left-wing activists, and human rights organizations are often portrayed as internal threats, weakening their political legitimacy and restricting their participation in public discourse. This strategy not only consolidates power for the ruling elite but also fosters an ‘us vs. them’ mentality that deepens societal divisions.

Dr. Agmon further noted that security populism has led to the normalization of emergency measures that restrict civil liberties. Policies initially implemented as temporary responses to security crises—such as increased surveillance, restrictions on protests, and limitations on press freedoms—have gradually become permanent fixtures of Israel’s political landscape. This entrenchment of security-driven policies reflects a broader global trend in which populist leaders use crisis rhetoric to justify democratic backsliding.

The Role of Media in the Rise of Populism

Dr. Ayala Panievsky, Presidential Fellowship at School of Communication & Creativity, City University of London,provided a critical analysis of how populist leaders manipulate media narratives to control public discourse. The decline of independent journalism in Israel has been exacerbated by both state interference and the rise of alternative media platforms that amplify populist messaging.

One of the most effective strategies used by Netanyahu and his allies is the delegitimization of traditional media. Critical journalists and independent news organizations are frequently labeled as ‘leftist’ or ‘anti-Israel,’ eroding public trust in factual reporting. Simultaneously, government-affiliated media outlets promote a narrative that aligns with the populist agenda, reinforcing partisan divisions.

Social media has also played a crucial role in the spread of populist rhetoric. Netanyahu’s use of direct communication channels, such as Twitter and Facebook, allows him to bypass traditional media and address his supporters unfiltered. This direct engagement fosters a sense of loyalty and reinforces populist claims that mainstream media cannot be trusted. However, it also contributes to the spread of misinformation and the erosion of journalistic integrity.

Dr. Panievsky warned that the combination of media suppression, state influence, and social media manipulation creates an environment in which critical voices are drowned out. The decline of media independence undermines democratic accountability, allowing populist leaders to operate with minimal scrutiny.

Populism as a Survival Strategy

Dr. Tom Lourie, Researcher, Political Science, UC Irvine, examined how populism serves as a political survival strategy for embattled leaders. Netanyahu’s use of populist rhetoric has intensified in response to legal challenges, particularly his ongoing corruption trials. By framing himself as a victim of an elitist conspiracy, Netanyahu has successfully mobilized his base and delegitimized judicial institutions that threaten his hold on power.

Dr. Lourie compared Netanyahu’s tactics to those of other populist leaders, including Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, and Jair Bolsonaro. A common pattern emerges when faced with legal or political crises, populist leaders adopt an anti-elitist stance, rallying their supporters against perceived enemies within the judiciary, media, and opposition parties. This strategy not only diverts attention from legal troubles but also reinforces the populist leader’s position as the true representative of the people.

The personalization of political power in populist movements poses a significant challenge to democratic institutions. Dr. Lourie emphasized that as long as populist leaders successfully frame themselves as indispensable to the survival of the nation, their supporters will continue to defend them against institutional checks and balances. This dynamic creates a feedback loop in which democratic erosion accelerates, making institutional recovery increasingly difficult.

Conclusion

The 19th session of the MGP Panel Series provided a comprehensive exploration of the impact of religious and nationalist populism in Israel. The discussions highlighted how populist rhetoric shapes policy, undermines democratic institutions, and fosters societal divisions. From the erosion of judicial independence and academic freedom to the manipulation of media and the securitization of political discourse, populism has fundamentally altered Israel’s democratic landscape.

The insights shared by the panelists underscore the urgent need for institutional safeguards against democratic backsliding. Strengthening judicial independence, protecting media freedom, and ensuring educational plurality are essential to countering the influence of populist movements. As Israel navigates these challenges, the lessons drawn from this discussion serve as a valuable resource for policymakers, scholars, and civil society organizations committed to preserving democratic governance.

Through its interdisciplinary approach, the session reinforced ECPS’s commitment to fostering critical discourse on the global impact of populism. By examining the mechanisms and consequences of populist governance, the panel contributed to a broader understanding of the threats facing democratic societies worldwide.

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The Future Course of German and Japanese Capitalism in a Multipolar World under Trump 2.0

In his compelling analysis, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk explores how “Trumpism 2.0” and a multipolar world order are challenging the foundations of German and Japanese capitalism. As the US shifts toward protectionism, economic nationalism, and corporate oligarchy, both countries—once revitalized by American support after WWII—must now reassess their strategic and economic futures. Ozturk examines how trade wars, supply chain disruptions, and declining US cooperation threaten their export-driven models. From demographic decline to digital transformation, Germany and Japan face urgent structural reforms. This timely commentary not only maps the common and unique risks confronting these two economic giants but also outlines actionable strategies to maintain resilience in a fragmented world. 

By Ibrahim Ozturk 

I argued in my commentary that “Trumpism 2.0” marks a fundamental shift in global capitalism, blending nationalist protectionism, corporate oligarchy, and digital feudalism. The United States (U.S.) is transitioning from ‘neutral’ state capitalism to a model where government policies explicitly serve dominant private entities, eroding economic democracy and consolidating monopolistic power. This transformation deepens domestic inequality while driving international economic fragmentation, trade wars, and strategic decoupling. Meanwhile, the Global South is asserting greater autonomy, challenging Western dominance, and reshaping economic alliances. If these trends persist, escalating geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions, and financial instability may define the coming decades. Yet, this period of turbulence—reminiscent of the 1930s—also presents an opportunity for systemic change, though it raises the risk of large-scale global conflict.

This process will also challenge German and Japanese capitalism, distinct derivatives of America’s preferences after World War II and shaped by the demands and constraints of the Cold War context and the mentalities and cultural dynamics of German and Japanese societies. 

Considering new challenges, this commentary reveals a potential roadmap for German and Japanese capitalism. First, the article compares the characteristics of American and Japanese capitalism. Next, it examines the role of the US in revitalizing the struggling German and Japanese economies. The third section addresses the common and unique issues these countries face, along with the effects of the Trump Administration and a US-less world. The fourth section summarizes the possible responses from Germany and Japan.

Three Models of Capitalism under Flux

To compare Japanese, German, and American capitalism, one must examine their economic structures, government-business relations, corporate governance, labor markets, and cultural influences. As Robert Gilpin puts it, American, German, and Japanese capitalism embody distinct models shaped by historical, cultural, and institutional contexts. American capitalism, a Liberal Market Economy (LME), is highly market-driven and individualistic, characterized by minimal government intervention, shareholder-focused businesses, a flexible labor market, and a strong entrepreneurial culture, fostering innovation and financial dominance but also leading to corporate volatility, weaker social safety nets, and economic instability. 

On the other hand, German capitalism, a Coordinated Market Economy (CME), follows a stakeholder-oriented model with strong labor unions, long-term investment strategies, and an export-driven manufacturing sector, ensuring stability, high-quality production, and social welfare, though facing challenges in labor market rigidity, trade dependency, and adapting to disruptive technologies. 

Similarly, Japanese capitalism, a form of Developmental State Capitalism, is rooted in state-business coordination, the keiretsu corporate system, lifetime employment traditions, and a focus on incremental innovation, enabling industrial stability and technological leadership but struggling with an aging population, stagnant wages, and slow digital transformation.

Each capitalist model has distinct strengths and weaknesses: US capitalism is highly dynamic, fostering innovation and financial dominance but prone to volatility and inequality; German capitalism offers stability and social equity but lacks flexibility; and Japanese capitalism prioritizes long-term stability and industrial coordination but adapts slowly to change. While each system has trade-offs, nations often adjust their models over time. On the other hand, in the modern era, American influence played a significant role in shaping the German and Japanese models, and it is exerting pressure for change in another direction now.

America’s Revival of Japan and Germany

Germany’s assertive expansionism in Europe and Japan’s in Asia, driven by an obsession with becoming a leading global powerhouse during the first half of the 20th century, led both countries into the catastrophe of World War II. However, despite having inflicted severe defeats on them and initially signing humiliating surrender agreements that deeply restricted their rights to self-governance, independence, and sovereignty, the US, which emerged as the new hegemonic power—replacing Britain—did not choose to “punish” these nations after the war, due to the new global power contestations. Throughout the Cold War, the US considered the spread of communism the greatest threat to its hegemony and democracy, capitalism, and the free market economy. In response, it took steps to rebuild Europe, particularly Germany, and in Asia, Japan. By doing so, the US provided both nations a lifeline after the most devastating destruction in their histories, fundamentally changing their fate in favor of democracy and economic development.

Both countries were rebuilt through American economic aid, market access, and security guarantees, which allowed them to focus on economic growth rather than military spending. In terms of Japan, the US contributed to its economic development and industrialization via its post-war economic reconstruction through Marshall Aids, the war boom that came with the Korean War, and access to the US market with a Most Favored Nation status (MFN).

Starting with Japan, first under US occupation, led by General Douglas MacArthur’s SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers), Japan’s economic reconstruction period (1945–1952) involved

🛑 Structural reforms like the demilitarization and restructuring of its economy.

🛑Land reforms that redistributed land from landlords to tenant farmers improved agricultural productivity.

🛑 The dissolution of Zaibatsu, large conglomerates that supported Japanese atrocities in Asia, aimed to dismantle industrial monopolies; however, later, keiretsu networks emerged, but this time, contributed to the development of a civilian and trade-oriented economy through the formerly well-established discipline and perseverance.

🛑 Labor reforms promoted unionization and strengthened worker rights. However, that measure was reversed after Japan’s alliance with the US against the expansion of communism in Asia.

🛑 Implementing the Dodge Plan 1949 aimed at fiscal austerity to manage inflation and stabilize Japan’s currency. As a result, the plan established a fixed exchange rate (1 USD = 360 yen), making Japanese exports competitive.  

Second, the measures’ first significant and advantageous outcome emerged during the Korean War Boom (1950–1953), when the US war effort in Korea turned Japan into a vital supply base, leading to rapid industrial growth. In this context, heavy industries (steel, machinery, textiles) thrived as Japan became a supplier of military goods. Moreover, US military protection under the US-Japan Security Treaty (1951) freed Japan from defense spending, allowing it to focus entirely on economic growth.  

Third, the expansion of the Japanese production economy, characterized by a strong export focus, extended beyond the market established by the Allied forces in Korea. Notably, the MFN status allowed Japan access to the US market and supported its economic integration from the 1950s to the 1970s. In addition to full access to American markets, which enabled companies like Toyota, Sony, and Honda to grow globally, technology transfers and guidance from US firms helped Japan modernize its industries. Substantial US investment in Japanese sectors facilitated technological upgrades, and by the 1980s, Japan had become the world’s second-largest economy, challenging even the US in some areas. With government-industry coordination (MITI—Ministry of International Trade and Industry), Japan’s Economic Miracle (1955–1980s), focused on export-led growth and high-quality manufacturing, emerged prominently. 

In the case of Germany, first, American support for the war-thorned German economy included the Marshall Plan(1948–1952), which envisaged the disbursement of $1.4 billion (part of Europe’s $13 billion US aid package). The fund helped rebuild factories, roads, and energy infrastructure destroyed during the war. Like Japan, currency reform (1948) helped introduce the Deutsche Mark, replacing the unstable Reichsmark and stabilizing inflation.  

Second, West Germany’s membership in NATO (1955) allowed a US military presence and security umbrella, which meant Germany could spend less on defense and more on industry. The Cold War made West Germany a key US ally, ensuring sustained economic and military aid.  

The third significant contribution stemmed from Germany’s access to the U.S. market. The US encouraged trade with Europe (EEC in 1957, which later became the EU), integrating West Germany into global markets. Moreover, US investments in the German industry strengthened the growth of advanced manufacturing (e.g., Siemens, Volkswagen, BASF).  

Consequently, technological advancements and innovations enabled Germany to become an export powerhouse in manufacturing. They fueled GDP growth at 8–10% annually during the 1950s, culminating in the so-called West German Economic Miracle (Wirtschaftswunder, 1950s–1970s). This era, along with Ludwig Erhard’s free-market policies and US support, led to rising wages and improved living standards. By the 1970s, Germany had emerged as the world’s third-largest economy, boasting robust automobile, machinery, and chemical sectors.

Key Similarities & Differences in US Support for Japan and Germany.

 

The US Impact on specific industries in Japan and Germany

Automobile industry: After World War II, the US played a crucial role in rebuilding and shaping the economies of Japan and West Germany, particularly in industries like automobiles, technology, and finance. This support was driven by Cold War strategy—strengthening allies against communism—and economic pragmatism, ensuring both nations became stable markets and production hubs.  

Technology transfers, quality management, and access to the U.S. market were the three most critical contributions to the automotive industry. Among other factors, introducing modern management and production techniques, such as W. Edwards Deming’s quality control principles, formed the backbone of the Japanese Total Quality Management (TQM) revolution, which enabled Japanese automakers to dominate the global market. Additionally, the US opened its market to Japanese cars, allowing brands like Toyota and Honda to thrive with fuel-efficient, high-quality vehicles, particularly after the 1973 Oil Crisis when American consumers looked for alternatives to fuel-hungry domestic cars. However, Japan’s MFN status almost culminated with the Plaza Accord (1985), when the US pressured Japan to revalue the Yen, making exports more expensive and prompting Japan to establish factories in the US, which led to direct investment and job creation.  

Like Japan, the precise contribution of the US to the automobile industry in Germany originated from the partnership between Daimler-Benz and Ford. Also, American capital and expertise played a pivotal role in revitalizing companies such as Volkswagen, which had fallen into disrepair after WWII. Through transatlantic trade and global expansion, the US emerged as a crucial export destination, allowing German luxury brands like BMW and Mercedes to dominate the premium segment.  

Technology and Electronics: Japan’s electronics giants, such as Sony, Panasonic, and Toshiba, benefited from US military R&D spillovers and Cold War-era procurement. However, the US-Japan trade war in the 1980s later limited their dominance in the semiconductor market. Meanwhile, Germany’s industrial powerhouses, including Siemens and Bosch, regained global market access through US investment, with NATO and defense contracts fueling demand for their precision engineering.

Financial and Banking Sectors: The US tolerated Japan’s keiretsu system, where conglomerates like Mitsubishi and Sumitomo were linked to banks, enabling rapid industrialization. However, in the 1980s, it encouraged Japan to deregulate its banking sector, contributing to the asset bubble that burst in the 1990s. Similarly, the U.S. supported Germany’s financial reintegration by promoting Deutsche Bank’s global expansion and stabilizing the Deutsche Mark through the Bretton Woods system, aiding Germany’s integration into the international economy.

In conclusion, US economic support was crucial in transforming Japan and Germany into global industrial powerhouses, with Japan benefiting from technology transfers and market access. At the same time, Germany rebuilt its engineering and manufacturing sectors through US aid. Without US assistance, market access, and security guarantees, neither nation could have industrialized as rapidly post-WWII, highlighting a US-driven framework that still influences their economies today.

However, to understand how Trump and the emerging multipolar world—discussed in the next section—might shape the future of German and Japanese capitalism, it is crucial to recognize that the US approach to these economies reflects both global dynamics and America’s domestic interests. Since the 1980s, especially after the collapse of communism, the US has influenced the economic trajectory of these nations, which it began to see as “systemic rivals,” through trade disputes, financial pressures, and currency interventions. In the evolving, leaderless global order—often referred to as the “New Cold War Era”—changes in US strategy seem inevitable, bringing significant consequences for both Germany and Japan.

Germany and Japan under the Trump Administration and US-less World

Some of the problems and challenges facing the German and Japanese economies will be structural, some conjunctural, and some, it seems, will be Trump-related. Thus, the German and Japanese economies face a mix of common and unique challenges. Both countries struggle with similar demographic issues, such as aging populations and declining birth rates, leading to labor shortages, pressure on social welfare systems, and increasing healthcare costs, all of which impede long-term economic growth. Additionally, both nations face obstacles in modernizing their economies through digital innovation, with Germany contending with outdated infrastructure and excessive bureaucracy. At the same time, Japan wrestles with traditional work cultures and the slow adoption of AI and digital technologies. Furthermore, both economies heavily depend on exports, making them vulnerable to global slowdowns and geopolitical risks—Germany’s reliance on China and Japan’s exposure to US-China tensions exacerbate these vulnerabilities.

However, each country faces its distinct challenges. Germany’s energy crisis—from the shift away from Russian energy and delays in renewable infrastructure—has increased costs, impacting its industrial competitiveness. The transition to electric vehicles (EVs) and high manufacturing expenses have weakened Germany’s position amid fierce competition from China and the US. Meanwhile, bureaucracy hampers innovation, particularly in the public sector and among SMEs. In contrast, Japan is dealing with stagnant wages and deflation, which restrict consumer spending and hinder economic growth. The country also faces high debt levels, with government debt exceeding 250% of GDP, raising concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability. Additionally, Japan’s dependence on energy imports and raw materials and supply chain vulnerabilities, especially semiconductor disruptions, put its key industries at risk.

With Trump ascending to the presidency for a second time, Germany and Japan are confronted with significant economic and strategic challenges. Their concerns about the Trump administration stem from worries regarding the effects of his protectionist trade policies, geopolitical unpredictability, economic nationalism, and the sidelining of the rule of law in favor of contingency management. Additionally, there is a tendency to exert power and force while ignoring international norms and values.

🛑Trade wars and tariffs caused key economic fears for Germany and Japan. To remind you, Trump previously imposed 25% tariffs on European and Japanese steel and aluminum under national security grounds (Section 232). He has also threatened new tariffs on European and Japanese cars, which could severely hurt Germany’s auto industry (VW, BMW, Mercedes) and Japan’s car exports (Toyota, Honda, Nissan). He has also criticized US trade deficits with both countries, which could lead to harsher trade barriers.  

🛑 The second fear concerns the disruption of global supply chains. Trump’s “America First” policy prioritizes reshoring manufacturing to the US, which could pressure Japanese and German companies to shift production away from their home countries. If Trump weakens or removes from the World Trade Organization (WTO), global trade could become more chaotic and unpredictable.  

🛑 Security concerns are the most common fear in Japan and Germany. Trump has threatened to withdraw the US from NATO, forcing Germany to increase military spending significantly. If US security guarantees weaken, Germany may have to allocate more funds for defense rather than industrial investment. Russia could exploit this security gap, leading to economic instability in Europe. Similarly, Trump has repeatedly criticized Japan for not paying enough for US military protection. If the US reduces its military presence, Japan may have to massively boost defense spending, affecting government budgets and economic growth. 

Potential Economic Scenarios for Germany & Japan Under Trump

Germany and Japan’s Possible Responses

The problems of German and Japanese capitalism go beyond Trump’s negative impact and the rise of the new Cold War era under multipolarity. Germany faces significant structural challenges, including energy dependence, industrial competitiveness, demographic decline, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and gaps in digitalization. Addressing these issues requires comprehensive reforms, strategic investments, and policy changesto enhance long-term economic resilience and competitiveness.

🛑 The expansion of renewable energy should be accelerated while diversifying LNG and nuclear sources, and industries should support green hydrogen to strengthen energy security and industrial competitiveness.

🛑 Strengthening manufacturing demands increased R&D in AI and semiconductors, support for SMEs and startups, and investment in EV and battery production.

🛑 Addressing labor shortages necessitates streamlined immigration policies, expanded childcare and reskilling programs, and greater adoption of automation.

🛑 Reducing bureaucracy through digital public services, tax reforms, and faster permit approvals will improve business efficiency.

🛑 Finally, accelerating digital transformation with nationwide 5G, AI-driven innovation, and enhanced tech education will elevate Germany’s competitiveness in the global economy.

On the other hand, Japan also faces deep-rooted economic challenges, including an aging population, stagnant wages, deflation, high public debt, slow digital transformation, and supply chain vulnerabilities. Addressing these issues requires structural reforms, policy shifts, and innovation-driven strategies to ensure long-term economic resilience.

🛑 Japan must implement bold reforms to address its structural challenges and ensure long-term economic resilience.

🛑 To combat labor shortages and demographic decline, it should expand childcare support, streamline immigration policies, and invest in automation and AI.

🛑 Breaking stagnant wages and deflation requires tax incentives for wage growth, stimulating domestic consumption, and maintaining moderate inflation.

🛑 Reducing public debt calls for gradual fiscal consolidation, efficient public spending, and pension reforms.

🛑 Accelerating digital transformation through 5G expansion, AI adoption, and corporate modernization will enhance productivity and innovation.

🛑 Lastly, strengthening supply chains by diversifying energy sources, investing in domestic semiconductor production, and securing trade partnerships will improve economic stability. By tackling these issues, Japan can sustain its global competitiveness and long-term growth.

More recently, Trump has introduced new dimensions to these challenges in both countries. His return has resulted in increased tariffs, trade barriers, and geopolitical instability, putting pressure on the export-driven economies of Germany and Japan. Both nations must diversify trade, invest in strategic industries, and strengthen their regional alliances to reduce economic risks. The following measures and policy recommendations are plausible and foreseeable solutionsregarding conjunctural progress under the Trump administration and multipolarity. 

Strengthen Trade Ties with Other Regions.

🛑 Germany could deepen EU-China trade or increase ties with India and ASEAN.  

🛑 Japan could increase trade with Southeast Asia, Australia, and the EU. 

Accelerate Industrial and Technological Independence

🛑 Reduce reliance on US markets by boosting domestic demand and innovation.  

🛑 Invest in digital industries, AI, and green tech to diversify economies.  

Strategic Military and Security Adjustments

🛑 Germany may increase defense budgets and push for greater EU military cooperation.  

🛑 Japan may develop stronger regional security partnerships (e.g., with Australia, India, and South Korea).  

Conclusion

The resurgence of “Trumpism 2.0” and the evolving multipolar world are reshaping global capitalism, posing significant challenges for German and Japanese economic models. Historically shaped by American influence, both nations now face increasing pressure from protectionist policies, geopolitical uncertainty, and domestic structural issues. While Germany grapples with energy dependence, digital transformation, and industrial competitiveness, Japan contends with demographic decline, deflation, and technological adaptation. 

To navigate these shifts, both countries must pursue strategic diversification to navigate these shifts—strengthening trade alliances beyond the US, investing in innovation and industrial resilience, and adapting security strategies to new geopolitical realities. 

The coming years will test their ability to maintain economic stability and global influence amid rising fragmentation. However, this era of disruption also presents opportunities for transformation, pushing Germany and Japan toward greater economic autonomy and leadership in a rapidly changing world.

Dr. Eric Beinhocker, Executive Director of INET Oxford and Professor of Public Policy Practice at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford.

Prof. Beinhocker: Populist Politicians Exploit the ‘Psychology of Broken Contracts’ to Gain Political Traction

In a time of rising populism, Professor Eric Beinhocker explains how populist leaders capitalize on economic grievances and social distrust to fuel their movements. “When people feel the system is unfair and rigged, they seek someone to blame,” he says, pointing out how populists exploit feelings of broken social contracts to gain political traction. According to him, trade wars and economic nationalism further exacerbate global instability. “No country can make an iPhone alone,” Professor Beinhocker states, stressing that interconnected supply chains make protectionism self-destructive. Tariffs and trade barriers, he warns, will “lower living standards and harm American competitiveness” rather than protect workers. This insightful discussion unpacks the economic forces fueling populism and the fragility of global trade.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era of rising political polarization and populist movements across the globe, the erosion of trust in institutions has become a defining challenge for democracies. In an intriguing interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Eric Beinhocker, Executive Director of INET Oxford and Professor of Public Policy Practice at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, discusses how populist politicians leverage the breakdown of the social contract to fuel political movements. He introduces the concept of the “psychology of broken contracts” as a key factor in the rise of populism, arguing that when people perceive a fundamental violation of fairness, “some of our strongest emotions arise from fairness violations,” leading to anger, resentment, and a desire to strike back—a phenomenon that populist leaders exploit.

According to Professor Beinhocker, the modern economy has undergone major shifts since the 1970s, particularly in Western democracies, where working-class citizens and those outside major metropolitan centers increasingly feel “the system isn’t working for them—that it is unfair, rigged, and benefits others at their expense.” He argues that these perceived injustices—whether economic or political—create fertile ground for populist rhetoric, which provides “a clear enemy,” often framed as elites, immigrants, or individuals outside of one’s identity group. Populist politicians, he explains, thrive on these grievances, “preying on and exploiting the psychology of broken contracts to gain political traction.”

A crucial factor accelerating this process, Professor Beinhocker contends, is the role of social media. While he does not see it as the primary cause of populism, he acknowledges its role in intensifying moral outrage. “Social media algorithms quickly identify that the content generating the most engagement is that which triggers moral outrage,” he explains, reinforcing tribal identities and making “resetting these emotions incredibly difficult.” Populist leaders capitalize on this dynamic, using divisive narratives to deepen distrust in institutions and erode democratic norms.

To counteract these trends, Professor Beinhocker suggests that restoring trust requires rebuilding fairness and re-establishing a strong social contract. He argues that past leadership, such as Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, demonstrated how governments can “reset the social contract” through economic reforms, symbolic policies, and direct engagement with public concerns. However, he warns that “merely talking about trust is not enough—people need to experience fairness and institutional accountability.”

This interview provides a thought-provoking analysis of the intersection between economic shifts, political trust, and the psychology of populism, offering essential insights for scholars, policymakers, and citizens alike.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Eric Beinhocker with some edits.

Trust Erodes When the Social Contract Is Broken

A fatigued factory worker.
A fatigued factory worker experiencing exhaustion, weakness, hopelessness, and burnout. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Beinhocker, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your article Trust, Populism and the Psychology of Broken Contracts,” you argue that over the last few years, there has been a worrying decline in faith by the citizens of many countries that institutions, including government and the media, are doing what is right. Can you explain the reasons why trust in institutions has eroded?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: I think a good starting point is that our relationships with key institutions like employers and governments are not just economic in terms of costs and benefits, as economists often think of them, but also emotional.

We can think of people as having a social contract with these institutions. I contribute work to my employer, follow their rules and norms, and, in exchange, I receive pay, along with other benefits such as status, social connections, and security. So, there is a two-way deal—a contract between people and institutions.

When people feel that this deal has been broken or violated in some way—what I call the psychology of broken contracts—they perceive fairness as being violated. Some of our strongest emotions arise from fairness violations. Psychologists have shown that this response is deeply biophysical—hormones flood the brain and body, triggering feelings of anger, resentment, and a sense of being taken advantage of. This emotional response can even override rational, thoughtful parts of the brain. Research also shows that people will sometimes strike back in ways that harm themselves, simply to restore a sense of fairness. There is an evolutionary explanation for this: enforcing norms of group cooperation is essential for social stability.

My interpretation of the rise of populism is that it stems from this reaction. Over the past few decades—beginning as far back as the 1970s in the US and parts of Europe—we have seen major changes to the social contract. People’s sense of what they contribute to society versus what they receive in return, particularly among working-class citizens and those with less education, has been disrupted. Many people outside of the large, prosperous cities feel that the system is not working for them—that it is unfair, rigged, and benefits others at their expense.

Often, these “others” are defined as people outside one’s identity group—those of different ethnic or religious backgrounds, immigrants, or elites in big cities with different cultural values. Populist politicians have exploited and preyed on this psychology, using it to fuel their narratives and gain political traction.

What is the relationship between the rise of populism and the lack of trust in institutions?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: When you feel that fairness has been violated, when you feel that the terms of the deal you had have been broken, you lose trust. This is very corrosive, both economically and politically, because our economic and political systems run on trust. They rely on the cooperation of millions of strangers—non-family members—working together in organizations and institutions. If we don’t have trust and that cooperation breaks down, our ability to function effectively is eroded, whether in economic or political spheres.

I argue in my work that at the core of restoring trust is the need to restore fairness and balance. People need to see and feel that they are getting a fair deal and that their expectations are being met. If we look back to Franklin Roosevelt and the Great Depression in the US, I think he understood this psychology very well. The New Deal was an explicit effort to reset the social contract, recalibrate people’s expectations, and, through concrete actions and lived experiences, rebuild trust.

You can’t rebuild trust just by talking about it—although language does play an important role—but rather through what people actually experience.

Fairness Violations Fuel Populism and Tribal Politics

Illustration by Ulker Design.

You argue that the ‘emotions of fairness violation’ may be playing a role in shaping politics and society today, which might be ‘the deeper and more universal explanation for the rise of populism,’ and add that highly emotional, seemingly irrational reactions have an underlying logic to them. Can you elaborate on this underlying logic?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: Well, first—and I’m sure you are studying this at the center—one striking thing about the rise of populism is how it has happened almost simultaneously across a number of quite different countries, economies, and even political systems. And even though the US and (Donald) Trump are getting a lot of attention today, this phenomenon has occurred in countries as diverse as India, Brazil, and Central European nations.

So, we have to ask: what are the more universal phenomena that might be driving this? This is where I come to an explanation at the intersection of economics, politics, and psychology, where changes in the economic and political environment have triggered these psychological reactions of fairness violation, which have then been easy prey for populist politicians.

Another universal phenomenon has been the change in the media landscape, particularly the rise of social media. While I don’t see it as a primary causal factor, it has clearly acted as an accelerant. When feelings of fairness violation occur, they trigger a form of moral outrage. Social media algorithms quickly identify that the content generating the most engagement is that which triggers moral outrage—it gets shared the most and garners the highest interaction, making it the most profitable. This creates a strong incentive for social media companies to fan the flames of these emotions.

Psychology research also shows that when people experience these emotions, it is very difficult to reset them. People literally stop listening when they are in this mode, and they tend to bond together tribally. If you feel wronged, or that someone has broken a deal with you, you become more powerful when you find others who feel the same way and work together to correct things.

To mitigate these responses and change the political landscape, political leaders first need to acknowledge these feelings and the realities behind them. In many center-left parties in the US and Europe, there has been a tendency to either tell people what is good for them or focus on issues that do not necessarily address their core concerns. Second, once these problems are acknowledged with empathy, leaders must credibly work on solutions to rebuild trust.

Populists Exploit Grievances to Deepen Identity-Based Divisions

Why do you think ‘identity-based tribalism’ and ‘inter-group conflict’ have increasingly gone up? Can you explain the link between the economic contract and the political contract and how the breakdown of these contracts plays into the hands of populists?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: As I mentioned, it’s a natural reaction. When people feel they are being treated unfairly by a system or that their trust has been violated, they look for people like them to team up with, strike back, avenge the harm, and try to reset the balance of the deal.

Social media has played an important role in helping people who feel this way find each other. The evidence I’ve seen suggests that many of the changes driving these feelings—such as shifts in employment, income levels, job security, and the role of the welfare state—have been affecting people for a long time. However, in the past, individuals may have felt these concerns in isolation. Someone might have worried about their job security, questioned whether their skills would remain relevant without a university education, or wondered whether their children would have opportunities in a declining area.

Previously, these concerns might have been personal and disconnected. But the internet has allowed people to find others experiencing the same anxieties, making them realize they are not alone. There is also a natural tendency to seek solidarity with those who share an identity group. For instance, white male working-class voters have been a prominent base of support for populists across multiple countries, as they have coalesced around shared grievances and a sense of being left behind. Populists have been highly skilled at linking these emotions with the need for identity and solidarity, capitalizing on the breakdown of both economic and political contracts.

You argue that when the social contract is broken, it is very hard to put the moral outrage genie back in the bottle, yet you give the example of the US as a successful case of containing social outrage. What should Europe do to combat the rise of far-right populism?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: I meant that the US historically, in the 1930s, was a successful case through Roosevelt and the New Deal. Whether it will be successful in putting the genie back in the bottle this time remains to be seen. Right now, the genie is very much out of the bottle in the US, and looking at all the results we’re seeing, the challenge is significant.

If we look at cases where social cohesion has been rebuilt, more research is needed because there have only been a few cases I’ve examined, and nothing systematic. However, what seems to happen is, first, leaders must express real empathy with the emotions involved—not deny them but acknowledge the real causes behind them and understand the people expressing them. Then, they need to outline a pragmatic path forward to restore fairness, rebuild the social contract, and address specific issues.

Sometimes, symbolic actions play a key role in demonstrating a commitment to recovery. For example, Roosevelt’s public works programs during the Great Depression, while large in scale, were not enough on their own to lift the country out of the depression. However, they had a huge symbolic impact in showing that Roosevelt and the government cared and were actively working to address these problems and restore people’s sense of mutual commitment with their government.

I think we need to think creatively about identifying the real underlying issues and what can practically be done to address them. However, the current environment presents a much greater challenge than Roosevelt’s time. The influence of social media has significantly eroded trust in basic ideas of truth and facts. That is a challenge we will need to figure out how to overcome.

The Clean Energy Transition Needs Global Cooperation and Capital

Aerial drone view of a hybrid solar and wind farm in Bannister, NSW, Australia, featuring large wind turbines in the background generating renewable clean energy on a sunny day. Photo: Steve Tritton.

Many clean energy transitions are happening in wealthier nations, while developing countries struggle with financing. What global financial mechanisms or cooperation strategies can ensure a just and inclusive transition? Are we on track for a sustainable and inclusive green transition?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: These are very important questions. A colleague and I at Oxford recently published a piece in The Wall Street Journal arguing that the clean energy transition now has significant momentum, and that the economics and technology behind it are very promising. Even if Trump is re-elected and takes an anti-clean energy stance, he is unlikely to stop the transition entirely—he might slow it down in the US, but at a global level, clean energy technologies will continue to grow.

Despite the fact that these energy sources are now cheaper than fossil fuels in many cases and are getting even cheaper as technology improves, they remain highly capital-intensive. Wealthier countries are increasingly finding ways to mobilize capital to make these investments and accelerate the transition.

However, as you point out, access to capital remains a major issue in developing countries. The shift to clean energy in many of these nations would be highly beneficial both economically and environmentally, yet the capital needed to make this transition is not being mobilized, even though these investments would be positive over time.

For a long time, the proposed solution has been global-level action through the UN process, development banks, and aid agencies. However, this has been a slow and cumbersome political process, and developing countries argue—rightfully so—that the promised capital flows have not materialized. Given the current environment of low global cooperation, particularly with the political situation in the US, I am not optimistic that this will improve significantly in the near term.

That said, perhaps a “coalition of the willing” among certain countries could take steps to improve the situation. The best answer, in my view, is to find ways to attract private capital to these countries and projects. Governments and multilateral organizations can play a crucial role in de-risking private capital flows, and there are various mechanisms to do this. My hope is that as the economics of clean energy technologies continue to improve, we can lower some of the barriers that currently prevent private capital from seeing the opportunities for clean energy investment in developing countries.

Trump’s Trade Policies Could Disrupt Global Supply Chains and Undermine Climate Cooperation

With Trump previously withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, how will his return to office impact global cooperation on initiatives like the Breakthrough Agenda? Will he further undermine international climate agreements?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: It’s clearly not good for international cooperation on climate. But my sense, from talking to folks in that field, is that we made it through the last Trump administration on these issues. While his return may slow things down and cause harm in some areas, we will make it through again. 

The US is an important player in these forums, but it is certainly not the only one. Other countries will need to find ways to keep the momentum going. The good news is that the economic and technological trends behind clean energy provide some tailwinds to support those efforts.

Given Trump’s second-term policies, how would a renewed “America First” approach impact global trade and climate initiatives, particularly in relation to tariffs on China, withdrawal from international agreements like the Paris Accord, and protectionist policies? How might these trade policies affect efforts like the Breakthrough Agenda, which aims to drive down clean energy costs?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: There was a piece by Tom Friedman in The New York Times several weeks ago where he interviewed me on Trump’s tariff plans. I think the part that hasn’t been discussed enough is that, of course, added tariffs increase costs and frictions on trade, reducing trade flows and raising costs for consumers—those are well-known effects. But what has been less appreciated in the analyses of the damage they will cause is just how interconnected global supply chains are.

It’s not like the old days, back in Adam Smith’s time, where one country makes wine, another makes cheese, and trade simply makes both better off. In the modern economy, I can’t even make the wine, and you can’t make the cheese without each other because so many inputs, machines, and supplies come from global supply chains. As I said in that article, no country on earth can make an iPhone alone. There’s probably no country that can make a modern jet aircraft, an automobile, or even many agricultural products without access to global supply chains.

Farmers today get their seeds from one country, fertilizer inputs from another, machinery from yet another, and so on. These trade wars and frictions may result in some restructuring of supply chains, but mostly, they will create difficulties in producing complex products, increase costs, and lower living standards for everyone. They will also severely hurt American competitiveness.

Trump believes that imposing these barriers will increase production in the US, but when you talk to the companies involved—like automakers—they will tell you they cannot operate in a country with these kinds of barriers. They rely on a global supply chain, and if they face trade restrictions, they will simply move production elsewhere to avoid these barriers. It seems quite unambiguous that these policies will be harmful—not just to the global economy, but significantly to US workers, consumers, and overall competitiveness.

Trump’s Tax Cuts Enriched the Wealthy While Exacerbating Inequality and Deficit

Demonstrators gather at the US Capitol on President’s Day to protest the actions of President Trump’s administration and billionaire Elon Musk in Washington, D.C., on February 17, 2025. Photo: Rena Schild.

Your work discusses the need to rethink economic welfare. How might Trump’s tax cuts for corporations and de-regulation affect economic resilience, especially for those most vulnerable to climate change? Could Trump’s fiscal and monetary policies worsen economic inequality and climate vulnerability?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: On the question of the Trump tax cuts, which they are looking to extend in this current congressional session, we actually now have several years of evidence on what the first Trump tax cuts did to the economy. The findings from those analyses are quite clear—they did very little to spur actual investment in productive assets.

The money that corporations received from those tax cuts largely went into stock buybacks, which inflated stock prices and enriched shareholders and CEOs, further exacerbating inequality while doing very little for average people.

Additionally, the tax cuts massively increased the deficit—likely the largest non-wartime increase in the US deficit in history, if I am remembering correctly. It was essentially a huge giveaway to the wealthiest, with minimal benefits for everyone else. Given that evidence, we would expect a renewal of those tax cuts to produce a similar outcome.

At the same time, while cutting taxes for corporations and the wealthy, they are simultaneously slashing other parts of the government. As a result, Americans will see critical services they rely on—such as veterans’ services, healthcare, education, and infrastructure—deteriorate.

Some economists anticipate that the combination of these tax cuts, trade wars, and changes in fiscal policy could lead to a very problematic mix of inflationary pressures and economic stagnation for the US economy.

Global Economic Fragmentation Is the Most Likely Scenario for the Foreseeable Future

And lastly, Professor Beinhocker, trade tensions, economic nationalism, and supply chain disruptions have led to “de-globalization” discussions. Is globalization in decline, and what are the consequences? Do you see a permanent shift toward regional economic blocs, or will globalization find new forms?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: What I would like to see is a kind of smart globalization. I haven’t—I’ve been a critic of the 1980s and 1990s neoliberal model of globalization, which essentially threw open the doors and let the chips fall where they may. We have seen that this approach has produced very mixed results.

On the one hand, globalization has led to increased trade and investment worldwide, yielding many positive benefits, such as helping developing countries and lifting millions out of poverty, particularly in China and other parts of the world. On the other hand, it has also had negative impacts on workers in certain sectors and regions of the US, Europe, and elsewhere.

Moreover, we need to be realistic about the geopolitical and security risks associated with the type of globalization we have had. COVID-19 exposed the vulnerabilities of supply chains that rely too heavily on a single country or supplier. Additionally, geopolitical tensions present risks if, for example, the US is entirely dependent on critical technologies from certain countries.

I believe there is a middle ground between the neoliberal “throw open the doors” approach and the Trump-era strategy of raising trade barriers. We should seek the benefits of globalization and global supply chains while also being strategic about diversification and forming trade relationships with reliable partners.

Janet Yellen, Biden’s Treasury Secretary, gave an insightful speech on this topic, advocating for what she called “friend-shoring”—strengthening trade relationships with the US’s allies and partners. Additionally, trade policies should consider the interests of workers, environmental protections, and broader societal concerns, rather than solely prioritizing corporate profits.

There are smarter ways to approach trade, and the Biden administration was making steps in that direction. Unfortunately, that is not the trajectory we are currently on. In the near term, it seems inevitable that trade will become more fragmented into regional blocs.

I was just listening to a report on how China has responded to Trump’s tariffs by lowering trade barriers with a large group of developing countries, attempting to form its own trading bloc with nations across Asia and other regions. Unfortunately, this kind of economic fragmentation appears to be the most likely scenario for the foreseeable future.

Dr. Roberto Stefan Foa, Assistant Professor in Politics and Public Policy at Cambridge University.

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: A Democratic Revival Is Always Possible

Despite recognizing the difficulties brought by growing authoritarianism, Dr. Roberto S. Foa of Cambridge University maintains a measured optimism regarding the prospects for democratic renewal. He highlights historical patterns of democratization and shifts in public opinion—such as those triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Trump presidency—as indications that democratic principles can regain strength in response to perceived threats. However, he cautions against generalized solutions, stressing that each democracy grapples with distinct institutional and political hurdles that demand context-specific strategies for revitalization.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The resilience of democracy in the face of mounting global challenges has become one of the most pressing questions of our time. As populist leaders continue to gain traction, democratic norms erode, and authoritarian tendencies rise, many scholars and policymakers are left wondering whether these trends signal a long-term shift or a temporary setback in the cyclical evolution of governance. Dr. Roberto Stefan Foa, Assistant Professor in Politics and Public Policy at Cambridge University, has dedicated his research to understanding the dynamics of democratic deconsolidation and the conditions necessary for democratic renewal.

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Foa provides a nuanced perspective on whether the recent wave of democratic backsliding—evident in both Western and emerging democracies—represents an irreversible decline or a phase within a broader historical pattern. He highlights the importance of distinguishing between informal and formal democratic norms, explaining how social media, populist rhetoric, and political polarization have eroded basic principles of civility and accountability. However, he also underscores the resilience of institutions, particularly in Western Europe, where robust political frameworks have mitigated some of the more extreme consequences of democratic decline.

A key theme in this conversation is the role of economic hardship and cultural grievances in shaping voter behavior, particularly among younger generations. Dr. Foa explores how disillusionment with mainstream politics can lead to either political apathy or support for more radical alternatives, including both left-wing and right-wing populist movements. At the same time, he argues that traditional political parties must adapt to these shifting dynamics by engaging in meaningful reform, rather than relying on outdated strategies to counteract the appeal of extremist factions.

While acknowledging the challenges posed by rising authoritarianism, Dr. Foa remains cautiously optimistic about the potential for democratic revival. He points to historical cycles of democratization, as well as recent public opinion shifts following events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Trump presidency, as evidence that democratic values can reassert themselves in reaction to perceived threats. Ultimately, he warns against simplistic, one-size-fits-all solutions, emphasizing that each democracy faces unique structural and political challenges that require tailored approaches to renewal.

This interview provides a thought-provoking analysis of the current state of democracy and the pathways available for its restoration. It is an essential read for scholars, policymakers, and citizens alike who seek to understand the evolving nature of political power in the 21st century.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Roberto Stefan Foa with some edits.

From Democratic Apathy to Democratic Antipathy Among Youths

A group of multicultural, peaceful activists sit outside, holding hands and displaying posters in a demonstration against climate change. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Foa, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your research on democratic deconsolidation, you highlight a decline in public support for democracy in developed nations. Do you see this trend accelerating with the second Trump presidency and with the recent surge of far-right parties in Europe?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: No, not necessarily. I think, in some ways, what we’ve seen since Trump took office in January is that there has actually been a reaction in some countries, and that’s been quite clear. If you look, for example, at the polling of Poirier in Canada. Since then, if you look at the situation here in the UK, regarding Farage’s Reform Party and public support for them, I think you’ve actually seen, to some extent, an inoculating effect.

But whether that continues really depends a lot on the example that the Trump presidency sets—whether it gets mired in deeper and deeper difficulties on the economic side, in pushing forward its domestic reform agenda, in conflicts with the courts or the bureaucracy in Washington, D.C., and in its difficulties to date in delivering on Trump’s promises of peace in the Middle East and in Ukraine. So, I think that’s still very much to be seen.

How do you explain the paradox where younger generations in some countries lean toward populist movements while in others they disengage from politics altogether?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I don’t think there’s a paradox at all. In fact, I would describe it as a two-step process. In the first phase, in some countries, younger generations become disconnected or disillusioned with mainstream politics. This manifests in lower membership in traditional political parties, reduced electoral turnout, and declining interest in politics—what could be termed democratic apathy.

If this disengagement deepens, it can escalate into what might be called democratic antipathy. In such cases, younger generations—particularly young men in the United States and many parts of Continental Europe—become more inclined to support extremist parties, including populist movements on both the left and the right.

The Erosion of Informal Norms and the Failure of Traditional Parties

Given your research on public opinion and authoritarian resilience, how do you assess the impact of far-right leaders on democratic norms and political polarization in Europe and the US​?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: Well, I think these are very different contexts. However, there is one common factor between Europe and the US in how democratic norms have shifted, and that is primarily on the informal side. When populist movements, whether from the left or the right, gain prominence, we often see challenges to basic norms—civility in debate, truthfulness in politics, and accountability for mistakes in political life. These informal norms have eroded in many countries.

In terms of more formal threats to democracy—such as respect for free and fair elections, acceptance of electoral outcomes, intimidation, declining electoral integrity, or the politicization of the judiciary, courts, and civil service—we see these issues more prominently in the US than in Europe, particularly Western Europe. There are specific reasons for this. The political institutions in many parts of Western Europe tend to be more robust, making them more resistant to such erosion.

Does the rise of populist leaders across Western Europe and North America signal a failure of traditional political parties in responding to economic and cultural grievances?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I think it signifies a failure of traditional political parties in responding to voter demands and concerns. That is almost true by definition—whenever new political parties break through, whether they are populist or not, whether they are right-wing, left-wing, or centrist, it clearly signals some failure in the existing party system to deliver what voters are demanding.

Now, whether that is a result of economic and cultural grievances, I think there are many different factors at play. Clearly, in some countries and among certain constituencies, there have been unaddressed economic grievances. Similarly, there have been unaddressed cultural grievances, particularly in Europe regarding immigration. However, I do not think there is a generalized thesis that applies across all countries regarding the specific types of grievances at play.

The Erosion of Accountability in the Age of Social Media

 

How significant is the role of social media and digital platforms in fueling democratic deconsolidation, and are these platforms more influential than traditional media​?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: Okay, I’ll take that one at a time. Yes, I think the rise of social media has had a significant effect, but I would say that its impact is largely limited to the informal norms of democratic life and competition.

It used to be the case that strong media gatekeepers held politicians accountable. If a politician was caught in a corruption scandal or, like Trump, taken to court and found guilty of an offense, there was no way around it. The only option was to acknowledge the fault, take responsibility, resign if necessary, and move on.

In the social media environment we live in now, however, that is no longer the optimal strategy. Trump’s approach to politics is a great example of this. It has become much more effective to double down, continue denying accusations, and keep shifting the conversation from one topic to another—something Trump is particularly skilled at doing on social media. And, of course, Trump is not the only example. Many populist politicians have adopted similar strategies on social media, which has eroded some informal democratic norms, particularly around truthfulness, civility, and responsibility in public life.

However, I do not believe social media is to blame for democratic deconsolidation in terms of the erosion of formal institutions. When we see threats to judicial independence or harassment of civil society activists, I do not attribute that to social media. That is a separate issue and something that does not occur in every country.

A Cycle of Democratic Erosion with No Clear Limits

Your research on America’s shift from “clean” to “dirty” democracy suggests a weakening of democratic norms​. How would a second Trump term impact democratic institutions in the US and beyond?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I think in the US, it’s clear—we are already seeing these trends unfold. As you referenced, my article was about understanding these developments as part of a longer-term process. The United States has been on this trajectory for more than a generation, where both Republicans and, in some cases, Democrats have attempted to change the rules of the game to gain partisan advantage. This includes the breakdown of bipartisan consensus over the political neutrality of Supreme Court appointments and the excessive politicization of the judiciary and civil service.

This shift has contributed to increased polarization, which in turn fuels the next cycle of democratic erosion. If you look at the current Trump presidency, it is evident that there are virtually no limits to what Trump is prepared to do. His administration has been planning for quite some time—through initiatives like Project 2025—to implement sweeping changes. This includes placing pressure on senior civil servants and, in many cases, firing those who are perceived as bureaucratic obstacles within the federal government. Many of these individuals were seen as sources of resistance during Trump’s first term when they attempted to uphold institutional norms.

This process is clearly already in motion, and it will undoubtedly continue at least until the midterms. Even if Republicans do not win the midterms, Trump will still control the executive branch, meaning these trends will likely persist beyond that point.

Outside the US, I do not see this process occurring in exactly the same way. Every country has its own unique political dynamics. For example, in Israel, there have been intense debates over attempts to curtail judicial independence. While democratic backsliding is a concern in multiple contexts, the US remains the primary focus and the number one concern right now.

Europe May Step Up as the US Steps Back

EU flags in EU Council building during the EU Summit in Brussels, Belgium on June 28, 2018. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

How will second Trump presidency affect international organizations like NATO, the EU, and the UN, which traditionally promote democratic norms?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I actually don’t think the effect will be as large as people currently believe or fear it may be. The major impact will be on the United States’ direct influence, which is quite clear—for example, eliminating USAID, canceling democracy promotion programs, and withdrawing US support for liberal internationalism.

However, I don’t believe that an organization like the European Union will be negatively affected in its own capacity to promote democracy. If anything, the opposite is more likely—there will probably be an increase in European solidarity and a greater effort by the EU to take on some of the programs that the US discards. We can already see this in direct support for Ukraine, provided both by European countries and the United Kingdom, including military aid. If US support declines, European countries may be required to increase their contributions in the coming year to compensate.

On the international level, I don’t think Trump’s presidency will have as significant an influence as some fear. The United Nations, however, is a different case. If the Trump administration truly follows through on pulling US funding for the UN, that would present a major problem, given that the US is one of its largest financial contributors. This could create a substantial funding gap. However, what we have seen so far is a trend where other Western democracies step up to fill the void.

Far-Right Unity Is More Myth Than Reality

Given Trump’s anti-globalist stance, what impact do you expect on global democratic solidarity movements or efforts to counter authoritarianism?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I think that will vary depending on the region. Within Europe, where democratic values are already well embedded and the public strongly supports international democratic solidarity, I see less of a threat. In fact, as I mentioned earlier, in Europe, the reaction has largely been to step up and fill the gaps left by the US.

However, in emerging democracies, the situation is quite different. The United States has historically provided significant bilateral support to civil society movements and political actors working to protect and advance democratic norms in many parts of the Global South. In these regions, the withdrawal of US support poses a much greater threat to democratic consolidation and resilience.

But we see a broader alignment between right-wing populist leaders globally, where Trump serves as a rallying figure for European far-right movements?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: No, no. I think this is something that is frequently misunderstood. When conducting comparative analysis across countries or examining international relations, terms like “populism” and “far-right” need to be unpacked, as they encompass a wide range of movements with differing interests that do not always align—nor do they necessarily align with Donald Trump’s agenda in the United States.

For example, within Europe, since Trump’s election, we see leaders like Giorgia Meloni in Italy largely adhering to the European line. This was already the case under Biden, particularly regarding her policy on Ukraine. Even though she personally has connections with figures like Elon Musk and Trump, she has had to navigate Italy’s commitments carefully, including apologizing for the country’s potential withdrawal from certain international agreements.

So, I would not assume there is an automatic far-right international unity. These movements are often driven more by national interests and political differences within their respective countries, making them quite disparate.

Economic Struggles Are Reshaping Youth Political Behavior

Prices of fruit and vegetables in stores: A woman holds euro banknotes against the backdrop of a vegetable stand at a local market. Photo: Andrzej Rostek.

In your study on youth and populism, you argue that economic hardship fuels support for radical movements​. Given the cost-of-living crisis in Europe, do you anticipate a further shift of young voters toward far-right parties?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I think there could be a further shift. It may not necessarily be driven solely by the cost-of-living crisis, but economic factors certainly play a role. For younger generations right now, there is already evidence of economic struggles, particularly in the job market.

With automation and the replacement of jobs through AI, we are already seeing—and will continue to see—these challenges affecting younger generations as they try to establish themselves, pay off debts, secure employment, find housing, and move forward in life.

It is very clear that in countries where these challenges have been acute for a long period—such as France, Greece, and Italy—disillusionment among younger generations began much earlier, 20 to 30 years ago. I would anticipate that similar trends will continue in the US and the UK, where, until now, economic conditions for younger generations had not been seen as quite so dire.

How does the rise of nationalist-populist parties in Europe (e.g., AfD in Germany, Rassemblement National in France) affect the future of the EU and democratic cooperation​?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: Again, I would say it really depends on the party. When looking at far-right parties, I always distinguish between different factions. You have the ultra-conservative far right, which in the European Parliament is represented by the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists) faction. This includes parties like the Conservative Party in the UK and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland. These parties are actually quite pro-Western in their outlook, certainly very Atlanticist in their foreign policy platform. Their fundamental beliefs and views are a continuation of Cold War-era conservatism, structured around social conservatism, tradition, and national sovereignty. Ultimately, they may pose less of a threat to Western solidarity.

The far-right faction I see as most damaging is what I would call the mercantilist populist right. Trump is a prime example of this, as is Orbán in Hungary, and Erdogan in Turkey has increasingly adopted this approach in his international engagements. These leaders view the world through a purely mercantilist lens, focusing on national self-interest and short-term leverage—whether in trade, aid, or diplomatic concessions. As a result, they are quite willing to undermine EU solidarity, Western alliances, or NATO commitments for immediate political or economic gains. This is something we frequently see with Orbán, who consistently seeks to extract concessions at EU summits.

That said, I would not categorize either Rassemblement National (RN) in France or Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany within this mercantilist populist category.

Centrist Politicians Can Learn from Populist Challengers

In your view, what strategies should centrist parties adopt to counteract the far-right’s rise, particularly in countries with increasing voter disillusionment?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: It really depends on the country. In cases where there are proportional representation systems and coalition politics, the far right can sometimes be defused by including them as a minor party within a coalition. I know that this is a controversial stance, as many people support the idea of a cordon sanitaire and believe that far-right parties should never be given even a single ministry in government. However, this approach has been used in Denmark and Austria over time, and in some cases, the experience of governing has actually weakened these parties. A taste of power often delegitimizes them—holding office makes them accountable for scandals, forces them to take responsibility for government actions, and compels them to moderate their positions to remain in the coalition. As a result, they must justify more centrist policies to their voters.

However, this strategy only works in political systems with proportional representation and coalition politics. It is a different situation in presidential systems like the United States or France, or majoritarian systems like the UK,where a far-right party could potentially gain majority power with only a minority of the vote. In these cases, centrist parties must focus on winning elections outright rather than attempting to contain the far right within coalitions.

Looking at successful cases, Macron in France provides an interesting example. He understood the collapse in support for the Socialist Party and recognized that he could position himself as an anti-establishment challenger from the center. By creating a new party and engaging in what was not quite a populist style but certainly a highly personalist political approach, he successfully revived the center and has remained in power for two terms so far. This suggests that centrist politicians can learn from populist challengers, particularly in terms of adopting new styles of political engagement.

No Permanent Shift Toward Illiberalism

Does the rise of authoritarianism in countries like Hungary and other Central European countries indicate a long-term shift, or do you see the possibility of democratic revival​?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: Yes, there is always the possibility of a democratic revival. When discussing democratic backsliding, especially in a global context, there is often a pessimistic view that this decline started around 2005 or 2006—depending on the measure used, such as Freedom House rankings—and has only worsened over time. However, these processes tend to be cyclical. I have long believed that another democratic wave or a restoration of belief in liberal democratic values is possible at some point.

In fact, we have already seen some evidence of this. Earlier in our conversation, we discussed the Trump effect—how witnessing democratic erosion in the United States has led citizens in other countries to reconsider similar political trajectories. Similarly, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, public opinion data showed what could be described as a rally for democracy effect. Across Western countries, there was an increase in support for NATO, Western solidarity, and even liberal democracy—not a dramatic shift, but a noticeable one, particularly on the left. So, I absolutely believe that democratic revival remains a possibility.

Are we witnessing a permanent shift toward illiberal governance, or do you see democracy rebounding in the long run?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I certainly don’t think there is ever a permanent shift in politics. Politics is not kind to those who predict permanent shifts of any kind. I do believe there is a cyclical nature to these trends. Democratization has historically occurred in waves, and we could see another wave at some point—that is always a possibility. Perhaps that is even the lesson of history in some broader sense. So no, I absolutely do not see any kind of permanent shift toward illiberalism. There is always a contest.

No One-Size-Fits-All Solution to Strengthening Democracy

And lastly, Professor Foa, if you could advise policymakers on one crucial reform to strengthen democracy, what would it be?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: You know, Tolstoy famously said that “all happy families are alike, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” I think the same is true for democracies. Stable democracies—like Iceland, Switzerland, or Norway—tend to share similar characteristics. However, failing democracies each have their own unique problems.

These challenges vary: in some cases, the most urgent need might be electoral reform; in others, it could be campaign finance reform—particularly in the United States, where the to-do list is quite long. In some situations, strengthening the independence of the judiciary and civil service or ending clientelism is crucial. So, while every democracy has its own set of necessary reforms, I wouldn’t say there is a one-size-fits-all solution.

 

Professor Stephen E. Hanson, the Lettie Pate Evans Professor in the Department of Government at William & Mary University.

Professor Hanson: Trump’s Patrimonial Rule Treats the State as Personal Property and Undermining Impartial Governance

In a thought-provoking interview with the ECPS, Professor Stephen E. Hanson unpacks how US President Donald Trump exemplifies a growing global trend of patrimonial rule. Professor Hanson argues that Trump governs as if the state was his personal property—distributing power to loyalists, undermining impartial governance, and attacking state institutions. Drawing comparisons to Russia, Hungary, and Brazil, he warns of long-term damage to democratic institutions. Professor Hanson stresses the need for renewed public trust in government and a collective effort to counteract the erosion of modern governance.

 

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Stephen E. Hanson, the Lettie Pate Evans Professor in the Department of Government at William & Mary University, offers a compelling analysis of the erosion of modern governance under US President Donald Trump. Drawing on his co-authored works The Global Patrimonial Wave and The Assault on the State, Professor Hanson argues that Trump’s presidency exemplifies a broader 21st-century resurgence of patrimonial rule—a system in which leaders govern as if the state were their personal property.

Professor Hanson underscores that “the key features [of Trump’s governance] are that the ruler governs the entire state as if it were his personal possession, viewing the state as a kind of family business. He distributes parts of the state and its protection to loyalists, cronies, and even family members directly. At the same time, he attacks the impersonal and impartial administration of the state as an obstacle to his arbitrary power.” This, he argues, is a defining characteristic of patrimonialism, a governance style that many assumed had been relegated to history but is now re-emerging in modern democracies.

Through the course of the interview, Professor Hanson details how Trump’s administration actively worked to dismantle bureaucratic institutions, a trend he links to similar developments in Russia, Hungary, Turkey and Brazil. He explains that Trump’s refusal to accept the 2020 election results—mirroring tactics used by patrimonial rulers—posed unprecedented risks to American democracy, undermining public trust in institutions like the electoral system and the judiciary.

Professor Hanson also addresses the long-term consequences of Trump’s governance, particularly in how it has fueled distrust in expertise and weakened state capacity. He describes how, under Trump, public service was increasingly devalued, discouraging young professionals from pursuing government careers. “At this moment, no one in their right mind would join the federal government—massive layoffs are happening, and every office is being downsized,” he warns, emphasizing that rebuilding state institutions will be a daunting, long-term challenge.

Yet, Professor Hanson remains hopeful, advocating for a reassertion of the state as a force for public good. He stresses the need for new strategies to counteract patrimonialism, urging scholars, policymakers, and civil society to shift the discourse toward defending democratic governance. His insights offer a sobering but essential perspective on the ongoing assault on the modern state—and what can be done to reverse it.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Stephen E. Hanson with some edits.

How Trump’s Governance Undermined the Modern State

US President Donald Trump speaks at a White House press briefing after a Black Hawk helicopter collided with American Airlines Flight 5342 near DCA Airport in Washington on January 30, 2025. Photo: Joshua Sukoff.

Professor Hanson, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In “Understanding the Global Patrimonial Wave,” you discuss the resurgence of patrimonial rule. How does Trump’s presidency fit into this framework, and what long-term effects might his style of governance have on American democracy?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: Thanks for this question. I want to begin by acknowledging my co-author, Jeffrey Kopstein, who, of course, can’t join us for this interview, but everything we’ve done together is a completely equal collaboration. So I always begin by acknowledging his great work.

We do think, sadly, that our predictions in The Global Patrimonial Wave and The Assault on the State, the book we’ve just published, have unfortunately come true. The Trump administration, in its early weeks, has fulfilled these predictions practically, and we believe that our warning was, unfortunately, quite prescient.

Now, what did we see coming down the road? We argued that this new version of patrimonial rule is really a wave of the entire 21st century and quite unexpected. The old literature on patrimonialism—or neopatrimonialism, as it was often called—assumed it was a relic of traditional society destined to be overthrown by modernity. You might see periods of patrimonial interludes, particularly in the developing world, but nobody had predicted patrimonialism of the 19th-century sort, or even earlier, in countries like the US, Israel, the UK, much of Central and Eastern Europe, and now threatening the world.

So, we’ll discuss more details about the Trump administration in this interview, but the key features are that the ruler governs the entire state as if it were his personal possession, viewing the state as a kind of family business. He distributes parts of the state and its protection to loyalists, cronies, and even family members directly. At the same time, he attacks the impersonal and impartial administration of the state as an obstacle to his arbitrary power.

All of this comes directly from Max Weber, and in a way, we are simply applying Weber’s analysis to these unexpected 21st-century cases.

You highlight how strong bureaucratic institutions played a key role in managing the COVID-19 pandemic. How did the Trump administration’s approach to governance impact the US response to the crisis, and do you see lasting damage to state capacity?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: We discuss this extensively in both the book and the article. What we argue is that patrimonial-style politics is fundamentally ill-suited for handling global pandemics. The first casualty of patrimonialism is the public good because governance is not about serving the public—it’s about fulfilling the private will of the ruler.

As a result, we see poor performances in countries governed by patrimonial rulers. If we compare data statistically, countries like Russia under Putin and the US under Trump performed very poorly. Patrimonial states tend to foster both distrust in the government—which discourages people from getting vaccinated or trusting experts—and the arbitrariness of the ruler himself. Trump’s public appearances, for example, where he seemingly endorsed sunlight as a cure for COVID-19 or suggested injecting bleach in front of his expert advisors, contributed to the excess death toll in the US compared to countries like Canada, which handled the crisis much more effectively.

Now, there are instances where patrimonial-style rulers managed certain aspects of the pandemic well. For example, Operation Warp Speed under Trump led to the rapid development of the vaccine, and Netanyahu’s vaccination campaigns in Israel were quite effective. However, we argue that these successes were not the result of patrimonial rule itself but rather the legacy of state-building efforts that predated these leaders. They were able to deploy existing state capacity, experts, and institutions in response to the crisis. But, of course, if the state is eroded too much over time, those resources will no longer be available in the future.

Rethinking Regimes: Why the Democracy-Autocracy Divide Is Not Adequate

Elon Musk speaks at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) at the Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center on February 20, 2025, in Oxon Hill, Maryland. Photo: Andrew Harnik.

Your work discusses the global trend of leaders undermining bureaucratic institutions. How does Trump’s presidency exemplify this, and what challenges does this pose for future administrations attempting to restore trust in expertise?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: The book is called The Assault on the State, and I think one reason it’s now getting some attention is that the title encapsulates what we expected to happen under Trump. Maybe even we were surprised by the extent of the assault on the state. It’s not just an attack on the so-called “deep state” as a rhetorical device—it’s an actual effort to dismantle the entirety of the US federal government. With DOGE, the agency essentially created out of the blue and directed by Elon Musk in all but name, they are now going into every single state agency in the United States. They have very young people, between the ages of 18 and 25, embedded in agencies, looking at files, personnel issues, and money flows.

While there has been some effort lately to cut that back—largely due to the anger of Trump’s Cabinet ministers—it is still in place. The long-term damage to state capacity is incalculable.

So all of this fits within our framework, but in an extreme form. I’ll add one thing that might actually be a bit surprising—and perhaps even, in a strange way, good for those of us who want to restore the state. This is happening so quickly that the damaging effects will become apparent sooner rather than later. If that happens, maybe public opposition can also be mobilized more quickly.

You argue that traditional democracy/autocracy classifications are insufficient. Given Trump’s attempts to subvert democratic norms, where would you place his presidency within your broader conceptual framework?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: One of the arguments in the book that has actually been a little bit controversial—and difficult to convey to people—is that we really don’t think the democracy-autocracy divide is adequate to understand this phenomenon. It’s ingrained in how we think about political regimes; it’s the standard framework used by political scientists, social scientists, and journalists alike.

When we talk about regime types in political science, people assume it’s a scale measured by V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy), Polity, or Freedom House. In each case, there’s a line ranging from positive—representing the most democratic—to negative—representing the most autocratic.

One reason we failed to recognize the rise of patrimonialism earlier is that it doesn’t fit into this framework. A patrimonial-style ruler can win free and fair elections repeatedly. In some cases, they even thrive in electoral competition. Trump is a great example of this, as is Boris Johnson. These leaders leverage populist tropes, portray machismo, and rail against the so-called “deep state” bureaucracy or, in the case of Europe, anti-EU politicians in Brussels. This rhetoric has a strong popular appeal, allowing them to win elections handily.

When they do, it becomes difficult to argue that they are anti-democratic, given that they just won an election. So, we argue that the axis needs to change. Our analysis must shift to a second dimension: impersonal versus personalized state governance. This concept is rooted in Weberian sociology.

If this is an independent axis, it implies that there are four regime types, not just two. You can have bureaucratically rational democracies—Denmark or Canada come to mind. You can also have personalized democracies, which are patrimonial—this is the US under Trump. Similarly, you can have personalized autocracies, which are quite common, and bureaucratic autocracies, like Singapore or the 19th-century Prussian Rechtsstaat model.

If this two-by-two framework holds, then we need to recognize that patrimonialism can exist within democratic systems without immediately eroding their democratic nature. In cases like the Philippines, voters essentially choose which patrimonial clan will rule—whether it’s Duterte’s or the Marcos family’s—but the patrimonial style remains constant. These hybrid forms of governance challenge our traditional political science classifications, requiring us to rethink how we analyze regime types.

The Legacy of Trump’s Election Denial

Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud

Trump’s refusal to accept the 2020 election results mirrors tactics used by patrimonial rulers. How does this compare to other historical or global cases, and what risks does it pose for future US elections?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: Well, connecting to what we just talked about, the January 6th events and Trump’s unwillingness to admit defeat are somewhat unusual in these cases. The reason for that is that, typically, you either have a clear-cut electoral victory—like Orbán in Hungary, where he wins elections that propel him to absolute power, securing a parliamentary supermajority that allows him to amend the constitution over time—or you have leaders who reluctantly step aside without outright denying their defeat. In Orbán’s case, the space for democratic competition clearly erodes, but it happens through legal mechanisms. He doesn’t need to claim the election was fake because, in fact, he won.

There may be some elements of this with Boris Johnson’s departure, where he was reluctant to step down and continued to complain that his downfall was somehow orchestrated by others. However, he never actually claimed he deserved to be the permanent ruler, and, of course, he exited through parliamentary means rather than an election dispute.

In this respect, Trump’s insistence that he never lost the election, that it was all rigged, and that the so-called “deep state” blocked his victory is somewhat unusual in the annals of these regime types. However, it has played a significant role in further undermining trust in US state institutions—particularly in voting systems, ballot counting, and electronic voting machines.

This poses a serious issue going forward. While, as I mentioned earlier, you can have a patrimonial democracy that remains competitive, it does erode the quality of democracy over time. If the public becomes convinced that the ballot box is rigged and that votes are fake, then eventually, supporters can be persuaded that their candidate won even when they actually lost. This, of course, can lead to even worse regime outcomes.

Western Democracy in Crisis

Your research connects US political shifts to broader global patterns. Does Trump’s rise signal a deeper systemic failure in Western democracies, and how can the US counteract these trends moving forward?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: It’s definitely a bad situation. And we should add—Jeff and I are definitely in favor of democracy. Sometimes we get asked this question: “You’re so concerned about the State. Would you rather have a Reichstadt with no democracy than a democracy that’s patrimonial in some ways?” And the answer to that question is that we don’t have to make that choice.

The reality right now is that there’s no Reichstadt or a Singapore-style uncorrupted autocracy on offer. The only options available are populism in a democratic context and patrimonialism in the state context versus the old forms of liberal, rational-legal order, to use Weber’s terminology.

So part of our goal is to reclaim the State as a positive entity. We’ve seen it is bashed for so long from both the left and the right. Libertarians argue that the State is a block to liberty. On the left, critics see the military-industrial complex and the surveillance state as suppressing the people’s will. Religious nationalists believe the State is too secular and is stamping out religious life—and this isn’t just in the US but also in places like Russia. It’s different religious traditionalisms, but with the same kind of complaint.

The idea that the secular modern state is a good thing, that it helps protect the public welfare, is often missing from our political discourse. When you defend the State, you sound like you’re upholding an old, discredited status quo. But we should recognize that it’s not actually the status quo—that’s the whole problem.

This also connects to another issue. We are definitely in the camp that says neoliberalism has a lot to answer for over the last 30 years. The notion that the State should be reconstructed solely in service of markets, that it should be downsized as much as possible to become more efficient, or that the old welfare state was bloated and ineffective—those arguments, we believe, did significant damage. The financial crises of 2008 and then 2010–11 convinced many that the so-called meritocrats were not meritocratic, that the experts weren’t actually experts, that they didn’t know what they were doing, and that they didn’t care about ordinary people.

So now the task is to clarify that what failed was not the welfare state, nor the old establishment—it was a new group who came in, believing the establishment was inefficient and trying to dismantle the State. In some ways, returning to the State as a source and defender of public goods does not take us back to neoliberalism. It takes us further back—to the idea that the people can own the State, that the State can be democratic, and, ironically, that it can be truly republican in the sense of being a public institution that ordinary citizens own and connect to.

The Breaking of the Bureaucratic State: Can US Institutions Recover?

In ‘The Assault on the State,’ you argue that modern government is under attack. How does Trump’s presidency exemplify this trend, particularly regarding the erosion of democratic institutions and bureaucratic expertise?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: What’s happening in my country right now is painful to watch, especially for those of us closely connected to the production of expertise. I’m a university professor, and many of our students and graduate students go on to work in the federal government.

They do things like work on climate change, secure military bases against flooding, prepare for future pandemics, and test new vaccines. Even before the Trump administration, it was sometimes difficult to convince young people to join public service. Many would say, I can make more money in the private sector, or the public sector is too slow, too bureaucratic. But despite these concerns, we still managed to attract a number of brilliant young people every year who were willing to commit their entire careers to public service.

Now, that pipeline is nearly broken. At this moment, no one in their right mind would join the federal government—massive layoffs are happening, and every office is being downsized. But the bigger issue is long-term: How do you convince people that this won’t happen again? How do you get young professionals to invest years in degrees and early-career government positions when they know that the next administration could just come in and fire everyone again?

The damage is much more severe than just a single administration. The US may be the most extreme case, but we see versions of this pattern in every patrimonial system. Take the Tusk government in Poland—they’re struggling to restore trust in the judiciary and undo the changes made by the PiS party. Rebuilding state institutions is incredibly difficult. The old joke applies here: It’s a lot easier to turn an aquarium into fish soup than it is to turn fish soup back into an aquarium.

The destruction of the State leaves behind a mess that takes years, even decades, to repair. So I think we have to be very realistic about the crisis we face. This won’t be fixed with just one or two elections. Those of us who care about democratic states that provide public goods in the modern world—and I hope that’s a lot of people—will have to start with education, collective action, and actively countering this disastrous assault on institutions that truly matter.

Loyalty Is the Most Important Currency in Trump’s America

US President Donald Trump applauds from the White House balcony during a welcoming ceremony for the Washington Nationals baseball team on the South Lawn in Washington, D.C., on November 4, 2019. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

Trump frequently positioned himself against the “deep state,” portraying government institutions as adversaries. To what extent do you see this rhetoric as a deliberate political strategy versus a genuine ideological stance?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: I don’t think patrimonial rulers are best understood as ideological. That’s the big difference between patrimonialism and fascism—certainly compared to Nazism. Leaders like Hitler and Mussolini had ideologies; they had visions of the future. You could say those visions were crackpot or outright evil, and certainly they were. But their argument was: We know where we’re leading this new empire—it will be racially pure, or it will be a resurrection of Roman virtue. Young people will imbibe this spirit, march in step, and be mobilized.

In contrast, patrimonialism tends to demobilize society. This was true of the old Tsarist style of rule, as well as older monarchies and other non-ideological regimes, which essentially said: Let the ruler take care of the state; it’s his personal possession—gender intended. Ordinary people, the Narod in Russian (the masses), were not supposed to have a direct connection to the state, which is the opposite of fascism and other mobilizational ideologies.

When it comes to Trump himself, there’s clearly no coherent ideology. He has shifted positions on all sorts of issues, but people make the mistake of assuming that means he has no center at all. He does—his center is that he alone can fix it. He sees himself as the anointed leader—now even believing that he is divinely chosen—to govern America’s patrimony.

The consistent theme underlying everything he does is that loyalty is the most important currency. If you’re not perfectly loyal, he will punish you. The deep state, those with expertise in impersonal legal norms, are actually “fakers” who need to be destroyed. And the US itself should be treated as the property of the ruling party, the ruling state, and, ultimately, the ruling household—namely, the Trump family.

We even see echoes of imperial-style patrimonialism here. Historically, patrimonial rulers made claims on territories that were supposedly part of their rightful domain. Putin, for example, asserts that Ukraine is inherently part of Russia. Now, with Trump, we start to see similar rhetoric—claims that Greenland, Canada, or even Panama somehow “belong” to the US. This imperialist mindset, tied to a patrimonial vision of governance, is something to watch closely.

Misinformation Thrives When ‘People Are Not Hearing Both Perspectives in Real Time

Your studies highlight how distrust in government is often fueled by misinformation. How did Trump’s presidency contribute to this, and what long-term effects do you foresee on public trust in US institutions?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: It really is a big part of the problem—no question. Social media, the internet more generally, the decline of local newspapers, and, again, the decline of trust in the so-called legacy media have made it much more difficult to get a coherent message out. Not everybody would have agreed with it, but at least elites in local politics across each state in the US, in each major city, used to have some common points of reference.

Back in the day, it was impossible to make a completely baseless claim and have it be repeated by media outlets all over the United States. That simply couldn’t have happened because not only did you have professional journalists reporting in each locality, but there was also the Fairness Doctrine—before the Reagan administration eliminated it. Under this rule, if you made one claim, you had to allow equal space for the opposing claim.

These sound like quaint notions now, but we actually need to return to them. Restoring the Fairness Doctrine would go a long way. I don’t know exactly how you would enforce it in today’s environment, but imagine if every podcaster or news show that put out an outrageous claim—say, all the election machines are rigged—had to give equal time immediately after for someone to say, ‘Actually, there’s no evidence for that whatsoever, and the people making this claim have been thoroughly debunked.’ Right now, people are not hearing both perspectives in real time. They are only hearing their point of view, and that clearly makes rebuilding trust difficult.

One last comparative point: If you look at the history of failed democracies, it’s not just social media that causes breakdowns. Weimar Germany famously fell into extreme party polarization, leading to a situation where budgets couldn’t be passed, and the political deadlock ultimately created the conditions for autocracy and Nazism. And all of that happened well before social media or the internet.

So, while misinformation and echo chambers exacerbate these crises today, they are not the only ways societies break down. However, once polarization takes hold, and each side of a divided society finds its own media outlets to reinforce its perspective—while completely distrusting all others—then it becomes incredibly difficult to restore public trust in government institutions.

Putin Is the Starting Point for the 21st-Century Wave of Patrimonialism

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

You discuss the global assault on modern governance. In what ways did Trump’s administration mirror or influence similar movements in countries like Hungary, Brazil, or the UK under Brexit leadership?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: The question of where it began is part of our book, and we make a claim that people found hard to believe but that we really stand by: it started with Putin.

We argue this partly through chronology. If you look carefully at the evidence before the rise of Putin in 2000 and the decades after, you had populism, of course—as you know better than anyone. There were plenty of populist movements in Europe, and they would rise on the far right or far left. They would sometimes gain parliamentary representation and make coalition-building difficult, but they never formed governments.

They were either systematically excluded from governance by pacts among mainstream parties, or they simply never achieved the electoral success to do so. The one breakthrough before Putin was Berlusconi and Forza Italia, where he briefly became Prime Minister in the 1990s. But his quick loss of power proves the rule—only after 2000, with a very close alliance with Putin, did Berlusconi’s leadership begin to take on more familiar patrimonial features.

So we place a lot of emphasis on Putin’s example. We think this is both emulation and direct support. It’s true that the Putin regime has funded pro-Russian parties worldwide, particularly in Europe. They have also pushed disinformation campaigns that serve the interests of the Russian Federation and its increasingly imperial ambitions.

Take Brexit, for example—the UK Parliamentary Commission concluded that Russia’s role in disinformation mattered in the referendum. Moscow has not been passive in this process. But beyond that, we argue the biggest factor was people simply looking at Putin’s model and realizing: “It never occurred to us before that you could build a 19th-century-style state in the 21st century—but look at what this guy has done.”

People thought Russia was finished. To quote a famous 2001 headline, Russia was seen as a laughingstock. International relations realists ignored it. And yet, Putin managed to reassert Russia as a great power, influencing global events—from Syria to US elections. Those who hated the liberal center, mostly on the right, but also some on the left, began saying: “Whatever’s going on in Russia, we need to figure it out. This guy has proven we no longer have to listen to the experts. We can beat the technocrats. We can restore traditional forms of machismo, religious veneration, and hierarchy.”

This emulation factor was very direct—for Orbán, for Netanyahu, and many others. These are empirical links, not speculation. People were surprised by our argument at first. But now, with recent events—including Trump’s presidency and the invasion of Ukraine—more people are asking us: “Did you really say Russia was the starting point for this?” Yes. That’s exactly what we said.

Patrimonialism Is Gaining Momentum—How Do We Stop It?

Even after his presidency, Trump’s influence may remain strong in shaping Republican politics. Do you see the attack on modern government as a continuing movement, and how might a second Trump term escalate these trends?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: I’m hoping when you say ‘a second Trump term,’ you mean this one—not the one that would come after. There’s already a lot of talk about amending the Constitution in the United States or reinterpreting it in a way that would allow him to serve beyond this term. This is very reminiscent of discussions in Russia in the 2000s, when Putin had to circumvent the official two-term limit in the Russian Constitution—first by installing his Prime Minister and then by changing the Constitution to allow himself to rule indefinitely.

These kinds of discussions matter for your question because, ultimately, these leaders must first be defeated before we can talk about reversing these trends. As long as they remain in power, the patrimonial style of governance will continue to be a dominant force—as everyone in the world can now see.

This is especially problematic when even China under Xi Jinping, while still a Leninist state with Leninist institutions, is increasingly taking on patrimonial features—with Xi posing as the father of the nation and asserting patrimonial rights to territories around China.

When China, the United States, and Russia—and to some extent Turkey, India, and Brazil—all lean in this direction, it becomes extremely challenging for the Macrons, the Scholzes, and the Starmers of the world. The remaining leaders who support modern democratic institutions are now struggling to figure out how to protect what’s left. So, the immediate problem is simply figuring out how to win in an increasingly lopsided world where patrimonialism is gaining momentum.

The longer-term challenge, which we discussed earlier, is about rebuilding a vision for the future—one that defends a modern, liberal state in the US (though, ironically, you can’t even use the word “liberal” anymore without it being dismissed as leftist radicalism or Marxism).

There is an enormous rhetorical and mobilizational challenge ahead—convincing ordinary citizens to resist these trends by making the case that patrimonialism doesn’t serve their public welfare. It doesn’t create a fair society. It fosters corruption, undermines integrity, and ignores public opinion. All of these principles—fairness, accountability, and good governance—depend on the survival of the modern state. Now is the time to spread that message.

The State Itself Is Under Assault—Democracy Comes Next

Demonstrators gather at the US Capitol on President’s Day to protest the actions of President Trump’s administration and billionaire Elon Musk in Washington, D.C., on February 17, 2025. Photo: Rena Schild.

And lastly, Professor Hanson, if modern governance is indeed under siege, what steps can be taken—either by policymakers, scholars, or civil society—to rebuild public trust in democratic institutions and counter the assault on the state?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: We were beginning to speak about this, and it’s the question that we all really have to engage with together. 

We end the book by saying that proper diagnosis helps on its own. One of the key steps is simply getting people to understand that it is the state itself that is under assault—and, in the longer term, democracy as well. Because if you don’t have a modern state, you eventually can’t run free and fair elections. You don’t have the impersonal procedures necessary to count votes fairly. Instead, you end up with what you see in Russia—political pressure to produce vote totals that show the leader receiving 90% or 80% of the vote, or some other absurd outcome. And that isn’t democracy. So, we are absolutely not saying that democratic erosion isn’t a problem—it is a serious problem. But it is a longer-term issue. The immediate, short-term problem is the destruction of state capacity—something that is already happening in the US and other places as well.

So, what can we do about it?

  1. Diagnosis – The first step is recognizing that this is a political issue that must be tackled directly.
  2. Reviving Public Service – The second is getting people to care about public service as a legitimate and worthwhile career—which is incredibly difficult these days, as I mentioned earlier, given the material concerns of young people. But, at the same time, I see many students at William & Mary every day who genuinely want to do good in the world—who want their lives to be dedicated to service.

And the truth is, there are many people like that around the world—especially in modern democracies—who would agree that if we don’t have the institutional capacity to deal with climate change, the next pandemic, immigration, or any number of existential global threats, then we simply won’t be able to solve them. As a species, we will not succeed.

So, I think another crucial step is getting the rhetoric right. Instead of constantly accusing patrimonial leaders and their supporters of being anti-democratic, which only alienates their voters, we should frame the argument differently. If you tell Trump voters, “Trump is an anti-democrat, and you’re an idiot for supporting him,” they will naturally reject that. They will see it as just another elitist telling them what to think—which only fuels the cycle of resentment. But if you frame the issue as “What’s happening is the destruction of the state’s ability to do good in the world,” you can actually win people over. 

Disembarkation of 300 migrants from Libya from the German rescue ship Sea-Watch 3 in Pozzallo, Province of Ragusa, Italy, on June 9, 2022. Photo: Alec Tassi.

The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe

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Please cite as:
Yogo, Edouard Epiphane. (2025). “The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 4, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0048

 

Abstract
This research examines the influence of populism on the redefinition of citizenship and social inclusion for migrants in Europe. It explores how populist movements leverage anti-immigrant sentiments to shape political discourse, laws, and societal attitudes. The study combines qualitative interviews with policymakers, activists, and migrants, and quantitative data from national surveys to analyze changes in citizenship laws and social inclusion challenges. Through case studies, it highlights variations in populist influence across European countries. The research concludes with policy recommendations aimed at fostering a more inclusive European society amidst rising populism.

Keywords: Populism, citizenship, social inclusion, migration dynamics, European societies

 

By Edouard Epiphane Yogo*

Introduction 

The rise of populism in Europe has become one of the most significant political phenomena of the 21st century, fundamentally altering the political landscape and reshaping discussions surrounding citizenship and social inclusion for migrants. According to Arzheimer & Carter (2006), populist movements have emerged across various European countries, characterized by their anti-elite sentiments and a rhetoric that often scapegoats immigrants and minorities for societal issues (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). As these movements gain traction, they exploit and amplify anti-immigrant sentiments, influencing political discourse, legislation, and societal attitudes toward migrants. This dynamic presents a critical need to explore how populism is redefining citizenship and the concept of social inclusion within the broader context of migration (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017).

At the heart of this inquiry lies a fundamental question: How does populism redefine the essence of citizenship? This question invites us to consider the shifts in legal frameworks, societal norms, and public perceptions surrounding the rights and identities of migrants in Europe (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). The changing landscape of citizenship laws particularly the principles of jus soli (right of the soil) and jus sanguinis (right of blood) illustrates how populist narratives can reshape notions of national belonging (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). Moreover, the impact of these changes on the social integration of migrants poses significant implications for the cohesiveness of European societies.

To investigate these pressing issues, this research adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative interviews with policymakers, activists, and migrants with quantitative data derived from national surveys. This comprehensive analysis aims to uncover not only the changes in citizenship laws but also the challenges to social inclusion faced by migrants in various European contexts. By examining the intersection of populism and migration, the study seeks to illuminate how populist movements influence citizenship policies and shape societal attitudes toward migrants.

One of the central themes of this research is the influence of populist narratives on public perceptions of migrants. In today’s polarized political climate, media representations play a crucial role in shaping these perceptions (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). Populist leaders and parties often utilize rhetoric that stigmatizes migrants, framing them as threats to national security, cultural identity, and economic stability (Talani, 2021). Such narratives contribute to the development of negative stereotypes and social divisions, making it increasingly difficult for migrants to achieve social integration in education, employment, and healthcare (Scheiring et al., 2024).

The first section of the study will examine how populist narratives reinforce exclusive notions of citizenship. By analyzing the rhetoric employed by populist movements, the research will highlight the ways in which these narratives seek to define and limit national belonging. Furthermore, it will explore case studies of citizenship policy adjustments in select European countries, illustrating how populism has influenced legislative reforms aimed at restricting migrants’ rights and opportunities.

The second section will focus on the challenges to social inclusion for migrants under the influence of populism. By investigating the critical role of media in shaping public perceptions, the study will analyze the stigmatization of migrants and the resulting impacts on their ability to integrate into society. The research will delve into how negative portrayals in the media can lead to societal attitudes that hinder access to essential services, such as education, employment, and healthcare, ultimately affecting migrants’ social standing and quality of life.

In exploring the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion, the research will address the restrictive measures that impact integration efforts. These policies often prioritize the needs and rights of native citizens over those of migrants, resulting in systemic barriers that prevent meaningful social inclusion. The study will also incorporate case studies that illustrate the differentiated effects of populist policies based on varying economic and historical contexts across European countries. This analysis aims to demonstrate how local conditions shape the outcomes of populist approaches to social inclusion and migration dynamics.

To interpret these dynamics effectively, this research will utilize the phenomenological constructivism framework proposed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (Berger & Luckmann, 2011). According to Berger and Luckmann (2011), this theoretical approach posits that social reality is constructed through human interactions and is deeply influenced by the contexts in which these interactions occur. By applying this framework, the study will explore how populist narratives and policies are socially constructed and how they influence perceptions of citizenship and social inclusion (Mudde, 2014). This perspective will allow us to examine the processes through which migrants are categorized, marginalized, and included or excluded from the social fabric of European societies.

Using Berger and Luckmann’s insights, the research, based on phenomenological constructivism, will analyze how societal constructs surrounding nationality and belonging are negotiated and redefined in the context of populism (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). It will facilitate a deeper understanding of the ways in which individual and collective identities are shaped by populist discourse, as well as the implications of these construct s for migrants’ experiences of citizenship and social integration. By situating our analysis within this theoretical framework, we aim to highlight the significance of social constructions in shaping the realities of migrants in Europe. In addition to phenomenological constructivism, this research will also employ François Thual’s geopolitical method to provide a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between populism, citizenship, and social inclusion (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). Thual’s approach emphasizes the importance of contextual factors such as geography, history, and socio-political dynamics in shaping political behavior and policy decisions. This method allows us to analyze how populist movements are not only a response to immediate political conditions but are also deeply rooted in historical and geographical contexts that influence their evolution and impact (Thual, 1996). 

Thual’s geopolitical method will guide the exploration of how different European countries experience and respond to populism in distinct ways (Loyer, 2019). By examining the geographical and historical backgrounds of specific case studies, we can uncover the localized factors that drive populist sentiments and how these sentiments manifest in citizenship laws and social inclusion policies (Zajec, 2018). This analytical lens will enhance our understanding of why certain countries adopt more restrictive policies while others may strive for inclusivity in the face of populism. 

As the research unfolds, it will emphasize the need for inclusive policies that can counteract the negative effects of populism on citizenship and social inclusion. By synthesizing the findings, the study will conclude with policy recommendations aimed at fostering a more inclusive European society in the face of rising populism. These recommendations will focus on strategies that promote equitable access to rights and opportunities for migrants, thereby enhancing social cohesion and countering the divisive narratives propagated by populist movements.

In summary, this research seeks to illuminate the complex interplay between populism, citizenship, and social inclusion for migrants in Europe. By examining the influence of populist narratives on public perceptions and legislative reforms, the study will provide valuable insights into the challenges migrants face in achieving social integration. Ultimately, the findings will underscore the importance of developing inclusive policies that address the needs and rights of all members of society, fostering a more equitable and cohesive European community amidst the challenges posed by populism.

The Impact of Populism on the Redefinition of Citizenship

In the current global landscape shaped by the rise of populism, discussions around citizenship and national identity have gained renewed significance. Recent changes in citizenship laws reflect the increasing influence of populist movements that seek to redefine national belonging. This document will examine two key aspects: Changes in citizenship laws and principles under populist influence (A) and the relationship between populism and the concept of national identity (B), highlighting the tensions and redefinitions that arise.

Changes in Citizenship Laws and Principles Under Populist Influence

Discussing on changes in citizenship laws and principles leads us to examine two key areas. Firstly, the shifts in jus soliand jus sanguinis citizenship principles (1) and secondly, the influence of populist discourse on recent legislative reforms (2). 

Analysis of Shifts in Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis under Populist Influence

The principles of jus soli (right of the soil) and jus sanguinis (right of blood) are long-established frameworks that define how individuals acquire nationality (Retailleau, 2024). Jus soli grants citizenship to those born within a country’s territory, promoting inclusion and diversity, while jus sanguinis bases citizenship on parentage, linking it to lineage and heritage. Many countries have historically blended both principles to accommodate social and political contexts. However, the rise of populist movements has altered how these principles are applied, with significant implications for citizenship laws (El País, 2024).

Populism, characterized by its anti-immigration and nationalist rhetoric, has shifted the conversation toward more restrictive definitions of citizenship, often challenging jus soli by framing it as too inclusive (Giugni & Grasso, 2021; Le Monde, 2024). Populist leaders argue that automatic birthright citizenship allows individuals with no cultural or historical ties to the nation to gain full membership. For example, in the United States, under the Trump administration, jus solicame under scrutiny, with arguments about “anchor babies” used to portray birthright citizenship as a loophole exploited by immigrants (Schmidt, 2019).

Similarly, in Europe, populist movements have pushed for limiting or abolishing jus soli to preserve national identity. Germany, for instance, had integrated jus soli to respond to globalization, but recent populist pressures aim to reverse these changes.

While jus soli face restrictions, populist leaders have embraced jus sanguinis. This principle aligns with their focus on ethnicity, heritage, and national purity, promoting a more exclusionary form of citizenship based on ancestral ties (Le Monde, 2024). In Hungary, for instance, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s policies prioritize ethnic Hungarian identity, offering citizenship to ethnic Hungarians abroad while maintaining a rigid stance against immigrants and refugees. Likewise, Italy emphasizes jus sanguinis, granting citizenship to individuals of Italian descent but placing increasing scrutiny on migrants and refugees (Le Monde, 2024; Kymlicka, 2001).

The preference for jus sanguinis reflects a broader trend of ethno-nationalism under populist regimes. By favoring bloodline-based citizenship, populists create a narrower definition of national identity, excluding individuals without ancestral ties to the country (Joppke, 2010). This shift has serious consequences for social cohesion, as it marginalizes immigrants and minorities, potentially deepening societal divides.

The erosion of jus soli particularly affects children born to immigrant families, who may face statelessness or legal obstacles to full integration. Meanwhile, the reinforcement of jus sanguinis perpetuates exclusionary notions of citizenship, creating a tiered system where only those with ethnic or cultural ties to the state are considered full citizens (Le Monde, 2024). This dynamic threatens to alienate large segments of the population, especially in multicultural societies, contributing to increased social tensions.

The changes to jus soli and jus sanguinis driven by populist movements illustrate a shift toward restrictive and exclusionary citizenship policies. These alterations not only affect individuals directly impacted by more rigid laws but also have broader implications for the social and political stability of nations grappling with diversity and globalization (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). As populist ideologies continue to shape political discourse, the future of citizenship laws remains a contentious issue.

Influence of Populist Discourse on Legislative Reforms

Populism has significantly impacted global politics, shaping discourse and driving legislative reforms. Defined by its appeal to “the people” against perceived elites, populism thrives on nationalism, anti-globalization, anti-immigration, and protectionism (Destradi & Plagemann, 2019). Populist leaders push simplified solutions to complex issues, leaving lasting effects on policies related to immigration, citizenship, labor laws, and the judiciary. 

Populism views politics as a battle between the “pure” people and the “corrupt” elites, positioning populist leaders as defenders of the common citizen against established institutions. Exploiting grievances over economic inequality, cultural alienation, or fears of losing national identity, populists advocate for radical reforms (Olivas Osuna, 2020). Their emotionally charged rhetoric resonates with voters who feel marginalized, fostering a political environment that supports swift, often divisive, legislative changes.

One of the most significant areas of populist influence is immigration and citizenship policy. Populists frame immigration as a threat to national identity and economic security, pushing for stricter controls. In the US, Donald Trump’s administration implemented controversial policies such as the Muslim Ban and attempted to end birthright citizenship (Inglehart, 2016). These moves, rooted in populist rhetoric, sought to restrict immigration and tighten borders, casting immigrants as burdens on the system. Similarly, in Europe, populist leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán have championed anti-immigration laws, presenting migrants as threats to national security and Christian identity (Dahlgren, 2006). These legislative changes, shaped by populism, have led to a more hostile environment for migrants and refugees, contributing to growing xenophobia.

Economic protectionism is another key area influenced by populism. Populist leaders, responding to fears of globalization and job displacement, advocate for policies that protect domestic industries. Trump’s “America First” rhetoric resulted in tariffs aimed at protecting American jobs, leading to trade wars with countries like China (Jones, 2019). While these policies offered short-term relief to certain industries, they also raised consumer prices and strained international trade relations. In Europe, populist figures like Marine Le Pen in France and Matteo Salvini in Italy have similarly pushed for economic protectionism, though such policies often hinder long-term growth and international cooperation (Destradi & Plagemann, 2019).

Populists also target the judiciary, portraying it as an elitist institution disconnected from the people. This view justifies legislative reforms that increase executive control over the judiciary, undermining democratic checks and balances (Bauer & Becker, 2020). In Poland, the populist Law and Justice Party (PiS) introduced reforms giving the government greater control over judicial appointments, weakening judicial independence. Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan similarly used populist discourse to justify constitutional changes that consolidated executive power and diminished the judiciary’s role (Blokker, 2019). These reforms, driven by populist ideals, threaten democratic governance by reducing the separation of powers and weakening the rule of law.

Cultural nationalism is another area where populist discourse drives legislative changes. Populist leaders often promote national culture while resisting multiculturalism. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government enacted the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) of 2019, which grants citizenship to non-Muslim refugees, marginalizing Muslims and promoting Hindu nationalism (Adamidis, 2021). This, along with the National Register of Citizens (NRC), exemplifies how populist rhetoric can shape exclusionary legislative reforms, reshaping national identity along religious lines (Tushnet, 2020).

Populism’s influence on legislative reforms is profound, particularly in immigration, economics, judiciary control, and national identity. Although populists claim to represent the will of the people, their policies often lead to restrictive, exclusionary measures that challenge democratic principles (Löfflmann, 2022). As populism continues to grow, its influence on legislative processes will likely persist, raising concerns about the future of democratic governance and civil liberties worldwide.

Populism and the Concept of National Identity

This section delves into the relationship between populism and national identity, focusing on two critical aspects: The use of anti-immigrant rhetoric to reinforce exclusive notions of citizenship, highlighting how such discourse seeks to define and limit national belonging (1) and Case studies of citizenship policy adjustments in select European countries (2). 

The Use of Anti-immigrant Rhetoric to Reinforce Exclusive Citizenship

Populist leaders frequently employ anti-immigrant rhetoric to portray immigrants as existential threats to a nation’s cultural, economic, and social fabric. This rhetoric becomes a powerful tool to shape national identity in exclusionary terms, typically casting immigrants as outsiders based on racial, ethnic, or religious differences (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). Through this discourse, populist movements argue that immigrants dilute national culture, displace native workers, and strain public resources, all while posing threats to national security. By framing immigration in such stark terms, populist rhetoric fosters fear and division, creating a political climate in which restrictive and exclusionary citizenship policies can be justified (Mudde, 2014).

At the core of populist anti-immigrant rhetoric lies the concept of an “authentic” national identity one that is rooted in historical, cultural, and sometimes religious heritage. This identity is portrayed as under siege by foreign influences, particularly immigrants who are seen as incapable of integrating into the national fabric (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). Populist leaders often evoke a sense of nostalgia for a perceived golden age when national culture was more “pure” or homogeneous, untainted by external influences. This idealized past is contrasted with the present, where immigration is depicted as eroding the cultural unity and social cohesion of the nation (Talani, 2021). By appealing to this notion of cultural purity, populist leaders can present themselves as defenders of the nation’s true identity, rallying support from those who feel alienated or threatened by globalization and multiculturalism.

Immigrants, particularly those from non-Western or non-Christian backgrounds, are often depicted as fundamentally different from and incompatible with the values, traditions, and way of life of the host country (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This portrayal not only amplifies existing prejudices but also legitimizes exclusionary policies. In many populist narratives, immigrants are scapegoated for a range of societal problems from unemployment and housing shortages to crime and the perceived decline of national values. This scapegoating simplifies complex socio-economic issues, presenting immigration as the primary cause of these challenges and offering a convenient target for public anger and frustration (Varga & Buzogany, 2020).

The distinction between “us” (native citizens) and “them” (immigrants) is a central feature of populist rhetoric. This binary division serves to reinforce a sense of national unity among the “native” population while casting immigrants as a threatening “other” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, 2015). This division is often racialized, with immigrants from non-European or non-Christian backgrounds portrayed as more dangerous or culturally alien. In some cases, populists draw on religious differences, framing Muslim immigrants, for example, as a threat to secular or Christian values (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, 2015). 

These distinctions are used to justify policies that restrict immigrants’ access to citizenship, limit their rights, and reduce their opportunities for social and economic integration (Manatschal et al., 2020). One of the most prominent ways in which this rhetoric translates into policy is through reforms aimed at restricting immigration and tightening citizenship requirements. Populist leaders often advocate for measures that make it more difficult for immigrants to acquire legal status, obtain work permits, or access public services (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). In some cases, they push for the revocation of citizenship for naturalized immigrants who are deemed to have violated national norms or values. These policies are framed as necessary steps to protect the nation’s identity and security, resonating with voters who feel that their cultural heritage and economic opportunities are being undermined by immigration.

This anti-immigrant rhetoric also extends to asylum seekers and refugees, who are often portrayed as economic migrants in disguise, seeking to exploit the nation’s welfare system rather than fleeing genuine persecution (Talani, 2021). By blurring the lines between refugees and economic migrants, populist leaders erode public sympathy for those seeking asylum and create a narrative in which all forms of immigration are seen as illegitimate or dangerous. This narrative provides political cover for policies that deny refugees access to asylum processes, push them back at borders, or place them in detention centers with limited legal rights (Hammar, 1990).

Beyond shaping immigration and asylum policies, populist rhetoric also influences broader social attitudes. By constantly framing immigrants as threats to national security and culture, populist leaders normalize xenophobic and exclusionary attitudes (Löfflmann, 2022). This not only stokes fear and resentment among the native population but also creates an environment in which discrimination against immigrants and minorities is more likely to be tolerated or even encouraged. In some cases, this rhetoric has been linked to increases in hate crimes and other forms of violence against immigrant communities (Varga & Buzogany, 2020).

Moreover, populist anti-immigrant rhetoric undermines the principles of equality and inclusion that are foundational to democratic citizenship. By advocating for policies that exclude certain groups based on their race, religion, or ethnicity, populist leaders challenge the idea of universal citizenship and equal rights for all individuals within a nation (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). Instead, they promote a hierarchical vision of citizenship, where some individuals are deemed more deserving of rights and protections than others based on their cultural or ethnic background.

Anti-immigrant rhetoric serves as a key tool for populist leaders to shape national identity in exclusionary terms. By portraying immigrants as threats to culture, economy, and security, populists legitimize policies that restrict immigration, deny citizenship, and limit the rights of minorities (Talani, 2021). This rhetoric not only fuels fear and division but also reshapes public policy in ways that undermine the principles of equality and inclusion, leading to a more fragmented and polarized society. As populist movements continue to gain traction globally, the challenge of balancing national identity with inclusivity and tolerance remains a pressing issue for modern democracies (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017).

Case Studies of Citizenship Policy Adjustments in Select European Countries

Across Europe, populist movements have played a pivotal role in shaping national identity and citizenship policies, often pushing for more restrictive laws that make it harder for immigrants to gain citizenship or legal residency. This shift reflects the growing influence of populist rhetoric, which frames immigration as a threat to national culture and security. By examining the cases of Hungary, Italy, and France, it becomes evident how populist leaders have redefined national identity and driven legislative reforms that reflect exclusionary views of citizenship.

In Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the government has adopted a strongly anti-immigrant stance, particularly targeting Muslim-majority countries. Orbán’s administration has positioned itself as the defender of Hungary’s Christian identity, presenting immigration as an existential threat to the nation’s cultural and religious fabric (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). The construction of border fences to block refugees, along with Hungary’s refusal to participate in EU refugee resettlement programs, demonstrates the government’s commitment to preventing the settlement of immigrants (Palonen, 2018). This emphasis on exclusion is further reflected in the tightening of citizenship laws, which aim to maintain a homogenous national identity, rooted in ethnic and religious purity.

A key piece of legislation that encapsulates Hungary’s approach to immigration is the “Stop Soros” law, named after Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros, who has supported pro-migrant policies (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). The law criminalizes aid to asylum seekers and organizations working with immigrants, reinforcing the idea that immigrants are unwelcome in Hungary. Orbán’s government has used this law to portray immigrants as threats to the nation, while redefining Hungarian national identity along ethnically and religiously exclusionary lines. By positioning itself as the protector of a pure, Christian Hungary, the government has marginalized anyone perceived as foreign or different, particularly those from Muslim backgrounds (Pappas, 2019).

Italy, another example of populist influence on citizenship policies, has seen significant changes under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, head of the right-wing League party. Salvini, who served as Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister, built his political platform around the idea of protecting Italy’s national identity from the perceived dangers of immigration (Varshney, 2021). His “Italians First” campaign emphasized limiting immigration, particularly from Africa and the Middle East, as a way to safeguard Italy’s cultural and economic interests.

Salvini’s government enacted several legislative changes that made it harder for immigrants to gain legal residency and citizenship. For example, the “security decree” introduced during his tenure tightened residency requirements and made it easier for the government to revoke asylum status. These policies were framed as necessary for maintaining public safety and reducing the immigrant population (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). By casting immigrants as criminals or economic burdens, Salvini tapped into public anxieties about national identity and security, securing popular support for more restrictive immigration and citizenship laws. His efforts also extended to children born to foreign parents in Italy, for whom gaining citizenship became increasingly difficult under the new regulations.

France, under the influence of Marine Le Pen and her National Rally party, has similarly witnessed a rise in populist-driven immigration policies. Le Pen has long advocated for a reduction in immigration and the protection of French identity, positioning herself as a defender of the nation’s cultural heritage (Mayer, 2013). Her party has pushed for laws that would end birthright citizenship, making it harder for children born in France to immigrant parents to acquire citizenship (Soffer, 2022). This approach reflects a broader desire to redefine French citizenship in exclusive terms, prioritizing the interests of native-born citizens over those of immigrants.

Le Pen’s framing of national identity is closely tied to the preservation of France’s cultural and historical legacy, often in opposition to immigration from Muslim-majority countries. During her 2017 and 2022 presidential campaigns, Le Pen emphasized the need to protect French values from external influences, linking immigration to issues of national security, cultural erosion, and economic instability (Bonikowski et al., 2018). While she has not won the presidency, her influence has pushed mainstream political parties in France to adopt stricter stances on immigration and citizenship, showing the broader impact of her populist rhetoric.

In all three countries, populist leaders have successfully reshaped public discourse around immigration and citizenship, using anti-immigrant rhetoric to justify more restrictive policies. By framing immigrants as threats to national identity and security, they have fostered a climate of fear and division, where exclusionary measures are seen as necessary to protect the cultural and social fabric of the nation (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This dynamic not only makes it more difficult for immigrants to integrate and gain citizenship but also redefines what it means to be a member of the nation, often in ways that marginalize racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.

Clearly, populist movements across Europe have significantly influenced citizenship policies by promoting exclusionary definitions of national identity. Whether in Hungary, Italy, or France, populist leaders have used anti-immigrant rhetoric to push for legislative reforms that limit immigration, restrict access to citizenship, and reinforce a narrow conception of national belonging. These changes reflect broader concerns about preserving cultural homogeneity in an increasingly globalized world, where immigration is often framed as a threat rather than a source of enrichment.

Challenges to Social Inclusion for Migrants Under Populism

In today’s polarized political climate, media representations play a crucial role in shaping public perceptions of migrants. These portrayals can significantly influence societal attitudes and policies. This study will explore two key areas: Media representations and public perceptions of migrants (A) and the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion (B), examining how these narratives and policies interact and impact marginalized communities.

Media Representations and Public Perceptions of Migrants

In this section, we investigate the critical role of media in shaping public perceptions of migrants. We focus on two key aspects: first, the influence of populist narratives on the stigmatization of migrants, examining how these narratives contribute to negative stereotypes and social divisions; and second, the impacts of these perceptions on social integration in education, employment, and healthcare, highlighting the challenges migrants face in accessing essential services and opportunities in society.

Influence of Populist Narratives on Migrant Stigmatization

Populist narratives have a powerful influence on the stigmatization of migrants, shaping public perceptions in ways that often fuel fear, division, and hostility. These narratives simplify complex social issues by framing migrants as threats to national identity, economic stability, and security, which amplifies existing societal tensions. In many countries, populist leaders use anti-immigrant rhetoric to galvanize political support, constructing migrants as scapegoats for various social and economic challenges (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2015). This stigmatization has far-reaching consequences, reinforcing negative stereotypes and shaping public policy in exclusionary ways.

At the heart of populist narratives is the concept of “otherness,” where migrants are depicted as fundamentally different from the native population. This otherness is often framed along ethnic, racial, or religious lines, with migrants presented as a homogeneous group that poses a threat to the nation’s cultural identity. In Europe, for instance, populist parties frequently depict Muslim migrants as unwilling or unable to assimilate into Western societies, associating them with extremism or radicalism (Hawley, 2016). This portrayal suggests that migrants are not merely different but incompatible with the nation’s values and way of life. Populist leaders, such as Marine Le Pen in France or Viktor Orbán in Hungary, leverage these fears of cultural erosion to rally support, positioning themselves as protectors of the nation’s authentic identity (Wojczewski, 2019).

Populist rhetoric often goes beyond cultural concerns to frame migrants as economic threats, claiming that they steal jobs, exploit social services, and drain public resources. This portrayal is particularly prevalent during economic downturns, when populist leaders can channel public anxieties about unemployment and financial insecurity into anti-immigrant sentiment (Steele & Homolar, 2019). Migrants are depicted as competitors for scarce resources, pitting them against native citizens in a zero-sum game where the prosperity of one group is seen as coming at the expense of the other. The media plays a significant role in perpetuating this narrative by sensationalizing stories of migrants benefiting from welfare or engaging in criminal activities, often without providing context or balance (Betz, 1994). This selective reporting reinforces the perception that migrants are a burden on society, even when evidence shows their positive contributions to the economy.

In addition to cultural and economic threats, populist narratives often link migrants to security risks, portraying them as potential criminals or terrorists. This is particularly pronounced in countries that have experienced terrorist attacks, where populist leaders frequently draw direct connections between immigration and security (Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021). By framing migrants as dangerous outsiders who pose a threat to national safety, populist leaders can justify restrictive immigration policies and securitization measures. In the United States, for example, President Donald Trump used rhetoric that depicted migrants (Becker, 2019), especially those from Latin America, as criminals and rapists, capitalizing on fears of crime to promote his anti-immigration agenda (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This rhetoric resonates with portions of the electorate who are already concerned about safety and security, amplifying support for exclusionary policies.

Populist leaders skillfully use media platforms to spread these narratives, particularly in today’s highly polarized media landscape. Traditional news outlets, social media, and even political advertisements become conduits for anti-immigrant rhetoric, allowing populist leaders to reach broad audiences with messages that vilify migrants. In this environment, misinformation and sensationalism thrive (Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021). False or exaggerated stories about migrant crime rates, welfare fraud, or cultural clashes circulate widely, reinforcing negative perceptions of migrants. Social media, in particular, has proven to be a fertile ground for these narratives, where algorithms amplify divisive content and create echo chambers that reinforce preexisting biases (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013).

The consequences of this stigmatization are profound and far-reaching. As populist narratives gain traction, public opinion shifts toward greater hostility and mistrust of migrants, making it easier for populist leaders to enact exclusionary policies. This shift in public sentiment often leads to increased support for policies that restrict immigration, limit access to citizenship, and curtail the rights of refugees and asylum seekers (Mudde, 2019). For example, in Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s government has passed a series of laws that severely limit immigration and criminalize activities that support asylum seekers, framing these measures as necessary to protect Hungary’s Christian identity. In Italy, Matteo Salvini’s anti-immigrant rhetoric helped fuel the passage of laws that tightened residency requirements and made it easier to revoke asylum statuses, reflecting a broader European trend of hardening immigration policies.

Beyond policy, the stigmatization of migrants has deep social consequences. It fosters an environment where xenophobia and discrimination become normalized, affecting the daily lives of migrants and their ability to integrate into society (Wodak, 2015). Migrants face prejudice in the workplace, in schools, and in public spaces, often experiencing social exclusion and hostility based on their perceived status as outsiders. This stigmatization also fuels tensions between native populations and migrant communities, deepening social divisions and undermining efforts toward inclusion and cohesion.

Impacts on Social Integration in Education, Employment, and Healthcare

The stigmatization of migrants, fueled by populist narratives, significantly impacts their social integration in key areas such as education, employment, and healthcare. These effects not only hinder the ability of migrants to contribute to society but also exacerbate social divisions, perpetuating cycles of marginalization and exclusion (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). By examining these three critical sectors, we can better understand how negative perceptions of migrants shape their experiences and opportunities in host countries.

In the realm of education, migrant children often face significant challenges that hinder their ability to integrate successfully. Populist rhetoric can create an environment of hostility in schools, where migrant students may be perceived as outsiders or even blamed for the struggles faced by the local population (Palonen, 2018). This stigma can lead to bullying, discrimination, and social isolation, significantly impacting the emotional and psychological well-being of these children (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). Additionally, language barriers and differences in educational backgrounds can further complicate their integration. Schools may lack the necessary resources and training to support non-native speakers, resulting in disparities in academic achievement and engagement (Mayer, 2013). Consequently, many migrant children may fall behind their peers, limiting their educational opportunities and long-term prospects.

Furthermore, the negative perceptions of migrants can influence the attitudes of teachers and school administrators, leading to biased expectations and treatment. In environments where populist sentiments prevail, educators may unconsciously lower their expectations for migrant students, perpetuating a cycle of disadvantage (Soffer, 2022). This systemic bias can result in fewer opportunities for advanced coursework or extracurricular activities, limiting the social networks that are crucial for future success. As a result, the educational system, instead of serving as a vehicle for social mobility, can reinforce existing inequalities, ultimately affecting the broader societal fabric.

In the employment sector, stigmatization often manifests in barriers to job opportunities and professional advancement for migrants. Populist narratives typically portray migrants as competitors for jobs, leading to negative stereotypes that they are less qualified or less committed than native workers (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This perception can result in discriminatory hiring practices, where employers may favor native candidates over equally qualified migrants. Studies have shown that migrants, particularly those from non-Western backgrounds, often face significant hurdles in securing employment, despite possessing relevant skills and qualifications (Pappas, 2019). They may be relegated to low-wage jobs or sectors characterized by high turnover and job insecurity, limiting their economic mobility and integration.

Moreover, even after securing employment, migrants may encounter challenges in the workplace stemming from stigma. They might face harassment, exclusion from social networks, or limited access to professional development opportunities (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This can create a hostile work environment that not only affects job satisfaction but also impacts overall mental health and well-being. The lack of upward mobility can lead to a sense of disillusionment and alienation, reinforcing feelings of being an outsider in their host society (Kymlicka, 2001). 

In terms of healthcare, the stigma surrounding migrants can create significant barriers to accessing essential services. Fear of discrimination or negative treatment can deter migrants from seeking medical care, even when needed (Goodman, 2010). Populist narratives often frame migrants as burdens on public health systems, perpetuating the idea that they are undeserving of resources and services. This perception can lead to healthcare providers exhibiting implicit biases, resulting in inadequate treatment or care (Joppke, 2010). Migrants may experience delays in receiving necessary medical attention, contributing to poorer health outcomes.

Additionally, cultural differences and language barriers can further complicate healthcare access for migrants. Many may struggle to navigate complex healthcare systems or communicate their needs effectively, leading to misunderstandings and misdiagnoses. In some cases, these barriers can prevent migrants from receiving preventive care, increasing their vulnerability to chronic health conditions and exacerbating existing health disparities. 

The impact of these challenges extends beyond individual migrants; it affects families and communities as well. When migrants struggle to integrate into education, employment, and healthcare systems, it creates a cycle of disadvantage that can perpetuate intergenerational poverty and marginalization (Bauer & Becker, 2020). Children of migrants may inherit these challenges, facing compounded obstacles in their own efforts to integrate and succeed. This can lead to a lack of social cohesion, where communities become polarized along lines of nationality, ethnicity, or immigration status. 

To end, the stigmatization of migrants, largely driven by populist narratives, has profound impacts on their social integration across education, employment, and healthcare sectors. These negative perceptions hinder the ability of migrants to access opportunities, contribute to society, and achieve their full potential. The consequences of this marginalization are far-reaching, not only affecting the lives of migrants but also undermining the social fabric of host communities. To foster greater social integration, it is essential to combat harmful stereotypes and promote inclusive policies that recognize and value the contributions of migrants. By addressing these barriers, societies can work towards a more equitable and cohesive future, benefiting everyone involved.

Consequences of Populist Policies on Social Inclusion

Exploring the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion compels us to understand the restrictive measures that impact inclusion and integration. Additionally, it invites us to examine case studies that illustrate the differentiated effects of these policies based on varying economic and historical contexts.

Restrictive Policies on Inclusion and Integration

The rise of populist movements across various countries has led to the implementation of restrictive policies that significantly impact social inclusion and integration, particularly for migrants and marginalized communities (Varshney, 2021). These policies are often framed as necessary measures to protect national identity, security, and the interests of the native population, but they frequently create barriers that hinder the full participation of individuals from diverse backgrounds in society.

One of the most significant aspects of restrictive policies is the tightening of immigration laws, which can result in limited pathways for legal residency and citizenship for migrants. Many populist governments have introduced measures that require higher income thresholds, extensive documentation, or language proficiency tests that disproportionately disadvantage less affluent or non-native speakers (Blokker, 2019). Such requirements not only exclude potential immigrants but also create an environment of uncertainty and fear among those already residing in the country (Adamidis, 2021). The fear of deportation or legal repercussions can deter migrants from seeking essential services, including healthcare, education, and employment, thereby exacerbating their marginalization.

Moreover, these policies often reinforce negative stereotypes about migrants, portraying them as potential threats to public safety or as burdens on social services. Populist rhetoric frequently capitalizes on economic anxieties by suggesting that migrants take jobs from locals or strain public resources (Tushnet, 2020). This narrative is particularly powerful during times of economic downturn, where competition for jobs and services is heightened. As a result, policies that restrict access to social benefits for migrants can lead to a situation where these individuals are excluded not only from economic opportunities but also from social protections that are essential for integration (Hammar, 1990).

In many countries, populist leaders have also targeted specific groups of migrants, often based on their nationality, ethnicity, or religion. For example, anti-immigrant laws may specifically affect those from predominantly Muslim countries or refugees fleeing conflict (Schmidt, 2019). This targeted exclusion fosters a climate of division, where certain communities are systematically marginalized. In schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods, this can lead to increased tension and hostility, making it challenging for migrants to form connections with the broader community and hindering their ability to integrate socially (Ruhs & Vargas-Silva, 2015). 

Furthermore, restrictive policies on inclusion are often accompanied by a lack of investment in programs that promote social cohesion and integration. For instance, funding for language classes, job training, and cultural exchange initiatives may be cut or deprioritized in favor of enforcement mechanisms aimed at controlling immigration (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This lack of support means that even those migrants who wish to integrate and contribute to their new communities face significant obstacles (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). The absence of inclusive policies sends a clear message that diversity is not welcomed, further entrenching social divisions.

In addition to impacting migrants, these restrictive policies can have broader societal implications. By promoting exclusion rather than inclusion, populist policies undermine the social contract that binds communities together (Bonikowski et al., 2018). This erosion of trust can lead to increased polarization within society, where divisions based on nationality, ethnicity, and class are exacerbated. The resultant societal fragmentation can hinder collective action and diminish the capacity for communities to address common challenges, ultimately impacting national cohesion and stability.

To counteract the negative impacts of these policies, it is crucial for governments and civil society to advocate for more inclusive approaches to social integration. This involves not only reforming immigration laws to create fair and accessible pathways to residency and citizenship but also investing in programs that promote understanding and collaboration among diverse communities (Manby, 2018). By fostering an environment of inclusivity, societies can harness the potential contributions of migrants and build resilient communities that thrive on diversity rather than fear.

Case Studies on Differentiated Effects Based on Economic and Historical Contexts

The consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are not uniform; they vary significantly based on the economic and historical contexts of different countries (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Examining case studies from diverse regions provides valuable insights into how populism shapes social inclusion and reveals the complexities of these dynamics.

One notable example is the case of Hungary under PM Orbán. Hungary’s historical context, shaped by its post-communist transition and ongoing struggles with national identity, has made it particularly susceptible to populist rhetoric (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Orbán’s government has employed a narrative that frames immigration as a threat to Hungary’s Christian identity and cultural homogeneity (Becker, 2019). As a result, restrictive policies have been implemented, including the construction of border barriers and the introduction of laws aimed at criminalizing support for asylum seekers.

These measures have had profound effects on social inclusion in Hungary. The narrative of an “us versus them” mentality has resulted in a climate of fear among migrants and refugees, many of whom have faced violence and discrimination (Győrffy, 2018). The historical context of Hungary’s tumultuous past has contributed to a national discourse that prioritizes ethnic homogeneity, leading to the marginalization of diverse groups. Consequently, the restrictive policies have not only limited the rights and opportunities of migrants but have also created a polarized society where fear and hostility thrive (Bugaric & Kuhelj, 2018).

In contrast, the case of Canada illustrates a different approach to populism and social inclusion. While Canada has experienced populist movements, its historical context of multiculturalism and immigration has shaped a more inclusive national identity (Triandafyllidou, 2015). Policies that promote diversity and integration, such as the Multiculturalism Act, have fostered an environment where immigrants are seen as valuable contributors to society (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006). While populist rhetoric has attempted to challenge this narrative, the overall economic and historical framework has led to a more resilient approach to social inclusion.

Canada’s commitment to welcoming refugees and immigrants has resulted in positive economic outcomes, as diverse groups bring varied skills and perspectives that enrich the workforce. However, challenges remain, particularly in addressing the needs of marginalized communities and combating discrimination (Granovetter, 1973). The contrasting experiences of Hungary and Canada underscore how historical narratives and economic conditions influence the outcomes of populist policies on social inclusion.

Another significant case study is Italy, where the rise of populism under leaders like Matteo Salvini has led to restrictive immigration policies that have profoundly affected social integration. Italy’s historical context, marked by economic challenges and high unemployment rates, has fueled a perception of migrants as competitors for scarce resources (UNHCR, 2012). Salvini’s “Italians First” campaign sought to capitalize on these anxieties, leading to policies that restrict access to social services and legal residency for migrants.

The effects of these policies have been particularly pronounced in regions where economic struggles are most acute. Migrants in Italy often face discrimination in the job market, and many are relegated to precarious employment (OECD, 2020). Additionally, populist rhetoric has fostered an environment where xenophobia is normalized, leading to increased violence against migrant communities (ECRI, 2024). This case illustrates how economic conditions, combined with populist narratives, can exacerbate the challenges faced by marginalized groups, resulting in significant barriers to social inclusion.

In summary, the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are shaped by a complex interplay of economic and historical factors. Case studies from Hungary, Canada, and Italy reveal how these dynamics can lead to divergent outcomes in terms of social integration. Understanding these contexts is crucial for addressing the challenges posed by populism and developing strategies that promote inclusivity and social cohesion in increasingly diverse societies. By recognizing the differentiated effects of these policies, stakeholders can work towards creating environments that foster belonging and participation for all members of society.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the role of populism in redefining citizenship and social inclusion for migrants in Europe reveals a complex and often troubling landscape. The emergence of populist movements has significantly influenced citizenship laws and principles, shifting the focus toward more exclusionary practices that prioritize ethnonational identity over inclusive citizenship. Through an analysis of changes in jus soli and jus sanguinis, it is evident that populist rhetoric has led to legislative reforms that reinforce a narrow definition of national belonging, marginalizing migrant communities and reshaping the fabric of European societies.

The implications of these changes extend beyond legal frameworks to the societal level, where public perceptions of migrants are increasingly shaped by populist narratives. These narratives often stigmatize migrants, portraying them as threats to national identity and social cohesion. As a result, migrants face considerable challenges in accessing essential services, such as education, employment, and healthcare, hindering their social integration and reinforcing systemic inequalities.

Furthermore, the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are not uniform across Europe; they vary significantly based on historical and economic contexts. Case studies from countries like Hungary, Italy, and Canada illustrate the divergent effects of populism on social inclusion, revealing how economic anxieties and historical narratives shape the experiences of migrants. While some nations adopt restrictive measures that foster division and exclusion, others maintain more inclusive approaches that recognize the contributions of migrants to society.

Ultimately, this exploration underscores the pressing need for a reevaluation of citizenship and social inclusion policies in the face of rising populism. Addressing the challenges posed by exclusionary practices and fostering a more inclusive understanding of citizenship can enhance social cohesion and resilience in diverse societies. To achieve this, it is essential for policymakers, civil society, and communities to work collaboratively in promoting narratives that celebrate diversity, combat discrimination, and advocate for equitable access to rights and opportunities for all individuals, regardless of their background. In doing so, Europe can navigate the complexities of globalization while ensuring that its commitment to fundamental human rights and social justice remains unwavering. 


(*) Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo is a lecturer of political science and Executive Director of the Bureau of Strategic Studies (BESTRAT). He teaches at the University of Yaoundé II and has over 20 years of experience as a leading consultant in peace, security, and defense. With 11 books and more than 30 academic articles, his research focuses on security dynamics in Central Africa and the Lake Chad Basin, addressing issues like terrorism and conflict management. His expertise has contributed to numerous international peacebuilding efforts, and he regularly consults for organizations such as the United Nations System. Email: edouardyogo@yahoo.fr  


 

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Retailleau, B. (2024). Sur l’immigration, Bruno Retailleau se pose en pourfendeur d’une société multiculturelle. Le Monde. 

Soffer, D. (2022). The use of collective memory in the populist messaging of Marine Le Pen. Journal of European Studies, 52(1).

Steele, B. J., & Homolar, A. (2019). Ontological insecurities and the politics of contemporary populism. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32(3), 1-24. 

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Varga, M., & Buzogany, A. (2020). The foreign policy of populists in power: Contesting liberalism in Poland and Hungary. Geopolitics, 26(1), 1-22.

Wojczewski, T. (2019). ‘Enemies of the people’: Populism and the politics of (in)security. European Journal of International Security, 5(1), 1-24. 

Reports and Institutional Publications

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Manatschal, A., Wisthaler, V., & Zuber, C. I. (2020). Making regional citizens? The political drivers and effects of subnational immigrant integration policies in Europe and North America. Regional Studies, 54(11), 1475-1485.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (2015). Sociocultural dimensions of immigrant integration. In The integration of immigrants into American society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2020). International migration outlook 2020

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Dahlgren, P. (2006). The Internet, public spheres, and political communication: Dispersion and deliberation. Political Communication, 22(2), 147–162.

Destradi, S., & Plagemann, J. (2019). Populism and international relations: (Un)predictability, personalization, and the reinforcement of existing trends in world politics. Review of International Studies, 45(5), 1–20.

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Zajec, O. (2018). Introduction à l’analyse géopolitique : Histoire, outils, méthodes. Éditions du Rocher.

Professor Thiemo Fetzer, an economist at the University of Warwick and the University of Bonn.

Professor Fetzer: Populist Grievances Are More About Perception Than Reality

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Thiemo Fetzer argues that populist grievances are largely shaped by perception rather than lived experience. “Populism is a phenomenon of information overload,” Fetzer explains. “Many grievances amplified by populists are not grounded in demographic or economic realities but are shaped by narratives, particularly those spread through modern media.” Discussing global trade, economic inequality, and the rise of far-right movements, he warns that misinformation fuels discontent, making societies more vulnerable to populist rhetoric. From the future of the liberal order to the geopolitics of energy, Fetzer offers a data-driven perspective on the forces reshaping today’s world.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Thiemo Fetzer, an economist at the University of Warwick and the University of Bonn, argues that populist grievances are largely rooted in perception rather than actual lived experiences. However, as he warns, populists are particularly adept at exploiting these narratives for political gain.

“Populism is a phenomenon of information overload,” Professor Fetzer explains. “Many grievances that populists amplify are not based on actual demographic or economic realities but are shaped by narratives, particularly those spread through modern media.” He highlights how, in many cases, communities most resistant to immigration often have little to no firsthand experience with immigrants—a paradox that underscores the role of perception over reality.

Professor Fetzer’s research delves into the economic, political, and social forces driving contemporary populism. In this interview, he explores the dynamics of global trade, industrial policy, economic inequality, and geopolitical shifts, particularly in the wake of a second Trump presidency.

Discussing global trade realignments, he explains that while China has aggressively localized production and built dominance over key supply chains, the US has primarily specialized in financialization, service-sector trade, and digital technology. This has led to geopolitical tensions, as China’s strategic control over minerals and industrial supply chains threatens US economic leadership.

Regarding the rise of far-right movements like the AfD in Germany, Professor Fetzer stresses that economic grievances alone do not fully explain their appeal. Instead, he argues, populist movements often thrive on a combination of perceived cultural shifts, economic anxieties, and declining trust in institutions.

He also critiques the role of digital media in fueling discontent, stating that “the collapse of traditional media landscapes has created an environment where misinformation and sensationalized narratives shape public perception more than facts.”

Finally, addressing the decline of the liberal world order, he challenges the idea that neo-mercantilism and protectionism signal its end. Instead, he suggests that a shift toward industrial policy—particularly in the energy sector—has long been in motion.

With economic nationalism, trade wars, and geopolitical realignments defining today’s global landscape, Professor Fetzer provides a data-driven perspective on the forces shaping modern populism.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Thiemo Fetzer with some edits.

Global Trade and the US-China Rivalry

A metaphorical image depicting the US-China trade war, economic tensions and tariff disputes on imports and exports. Photo: Shutterstock.

Thank you very much, Professor Fetzer, for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How would a second Trump presidency reshape global trade dynamics? Given his previous and current tariff policies and confrontational trade stance, which sectors and economies are most vulnerable to renewed trade wars?

Professor Thiemo Fetzer: That is an incredibly complex and intriguing question. One important aspect to consider is the evolution of the international division of labor over the past 10–15 years, which provides context for the US trade policy maneuvers. Of course, this is my interpretation of the data and evidence, and I acknowledge that it may not be entirely accurate.

Over the last 20, or even 30 years, a global division of labor has emerged. The US has largely specialized in financialization, focusing on service sector trade, particularly through its digital tech companies, as well as its expertise in knowledge production and innovation. Meanwhile, China has aggressively localized production and strategically established dominance over key supply chains, particularly in industries that are crucial for global priorities such as climate action.

China is undoubtedly a leading player in decarbonization technologies, including renewable energy, photovoltaics, wind power, and electric vehicles. While the US has specialized in service sector trade, China has strategically developed control over value chains in industries that are not only considered the future of global economies but also essential for addressing climate challenges.

This context is key to understanding the confrontational dynamics and geopolitical rivalry between the US and China. While Europe is also engaged in this contest, it has not deindustrialized to the same extent as the US and has pursued a different specialization path.

A crucial element of this geopolitical contest is control over strategic minerals and supply chains. China holds significant leverage due to its dominance in mineral processing and access to raw materials. In response, the US is now aggressively shifting toward industrial policy, making efforts to secure access to critical minerals and supply chains through a mix of policy initiatives and strategic trade measures.

This is happening alongside increasing disputes over trade governance. Countries that specialize in service sector trade—particularly in knowledge production and innovation—rely heavily on intellectual property protections. However, a key point of contention between the US and China is that not all countries adhere to the same intellectual property governance standards. This discrepancy plays a major role in the US’s more aggressive stance in trade policy.

From a strategic perspective, the US has been outmaneuvered in certain areas by other geopolitical players—one of the most prominent examples being critical minerals. Both the US and Europe have been making efforts to develop alternative supply chains for rare earth elements and other crucial materials needed for technologies such as semiconductors and renewable energy infrastructure.

However, China has weaponized its control over these resources, particularly through its dominance in mineral processing and reserves. One interpretation is that China has deliberately disrupted competitors’ efforts to establish alternative supply chains by strategically releasing mineral reserves to drive down prices, thereby making it economically unviable for private enterprises in market-based economies to compete.

This dynamic mirrors what we observed in the early 2010s, when US shale oil and gas production disrupted global energy markets. Historically, energy-exporting countries—such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE—played a dominant role in setting crude oil prices through export relationships with the US. However, the rise of US shale production significantly weakened their influence by creating a new source of swing production capability.

There is a clear parallel here, highlighting the broader clash between economic and social systems. The primary challenge for the US and Western players is the short-term policymaking horizon within democratic systems, where leaders operate within fixed electoral cycles. In contrast, non-democratic regimes—as we define them within representative democracy frameworks—can pursue long-term strategic planning without the same political constraints.

These tensions are now coming to the forefront, and the US is responding aggressively, using trade policy as a key instrument to counterbalance these structural disadvantages.

The Rise of Protectionism and Economic Realignment

3D illustration: Lightspring.

What are the long-term risks of Trump’s trade policies for global economic stability? With the US not only decoupling from China but also distancing itself from the EU and shifting alliances, how might geopolitical fragmentation and economic realignment unfold?

Professor Thiemo Fetzer: Again, there are ways of trying to think about the future path. And I mean, on average, I would like to think that the US’s specialization in service sector trade, which is actually something that the UK, in particular the Brexiteers, strongly advocated, has made both the UK and the US quite vulnerable.

Service sector trade, particularly in the digital economy, digital goods, and so on, has a relatively high degree of localization potential. At the end of the day, many of the digital services we consume are controlled by global tech platforms like Google, Microsoft, and others. However, we have seen, for example, in Latin America, where language was a barrier, strong and competitive local players emerging and capturing parts of these value chains, preventing them from falling entirely under the control of major US brands. A key example is Mercado Libre in Latin America. Similarly, in China, a big tech ecosystem developed independently because the market never fully opened to major US tech players.

This has been a longstanding political tension, particularly between the EU and the US, well before the first Trump administration. Big tech companies generate enormous revenues from highly scalable products, where a single innovation can reach an infinitely large market. However, global governance frameworks around service sector trade have struggled to adapt to this reality, as tax and regulatory systems were originally designed with goods trade in mind.

This has created a wedge issue in Europe, where big tech firms access large markets but transfer profits to offshore tax havens, leading to disputes over digital taxation. Under Trump’s first presidency, both the UK and France attempted to impose digital service taxes, which challenged the US advantage in service sector trade. Currently, the US exports services, knowledge, and innovation while protecting them through intellectual property agreements and benefiting from transfer pricing mechanisms. Meanwhile, the US also absorbs excess global production, leading to imbalances in both goods and services trade.

Trump challenged this structure in 2016, particularly through aggressive tax cuts. As European countries sought to impose digital service taxes, the US responded with tax incentives that enabled American tech firms to repatriate profits from offshore havens. This disrupted the traditional global division of labor, where Europe and China produced goods while the US dominated services. While US tech firms never gained the same market access in China that they had in Europe, these shifts threatened the existing equilibrium.

With a second Trump presidency, I expect a continuation of Trump-era policies, with service sector trade pitted against goods trade. On average, the US economy could become more balanced by leaning into industrial policy and shifting slightly away from services, which has become somewhat excessive. However, the US may struggle to accept that this rebalancing could also prompt other countries to localize their own tech sectors, leading to the regionalization of digital trade.

We have already seen this trend in Latin America and China, where local tech champions have emerged. This could further encourage tech companies with more geographic focus or even explicit localization mandates, potentially driven by differing regulatory frameworks on private data governance. The regulatory landscape itself could create further friction in global trade.

In addition, the tense security situation in Europe, with Russia’s aggressive actions, could accelerate these trends, particularly if the US is no longer seen as a reliable partner but rather as a potential adversary in certain domains.

Three years ago, I warned that a second Trump presidency could end the NATO alliance, a scenario that would pose serious challenges for Europe given its dependence on the US for security. This shift could also disrupt the international division of labor, as Europe has historically granted US big tech firms market access while simultaneously struggling with taxation issues related to these firms’ profits being transferred offshore.

If this equilibrium is disrupted, I expect significant policy shifts in Europe. However, Europe may struggle with its own contradictions, as it lacks a unified tech ecosystem that could compete with US or Chinese tech giants. Unlike the US, where service sector trade is deeply integrated across states, Europe remains a collection of nations with high trade barriers in services.

This contradiction has been highlighted by figures like Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi, as well as in Brexiteer arguments, which claimed that service sector trade is the future and that Europe struggles with integration in this area. This situation is inherently risky, but at some level, perhaps necessary, if global trade is no longer governed by common standards.

Since 2016, we have seen a clear deterioration in global trade governance, accompanied by escalating trade conflicts. The situation today is highly dangerous and challenging.

All of this unfolds amid climate crises, rapid population movements, the weaponization of illicit migration, and demographic challenges. We are navigating an exceptionally fraught and difficult global landscape.

Populism, Economic Discontent, and the Role of Media

A protester holds a banner demanding economic justice. Photo: Shutterstock.

Your research highlights economic discontent as a driver of populism. How might Trump’s policies—such as protectionism or tax reforms—exacerbate or mitigate this trend globally?

Professor Thiemo Fetzer: When we look at discontent, oftentimes it can be attributed not necessarily to people being materially worse off. I mean, if we zoom out, we are actually in a situation where the world has never been richer than before. People are well-off, and we no longer experience the type of abject poverty that existed in the past. Even in Europe, despite the rise of populism, we have seen a gradual but consistent rise in living standards.

The big challenge with populism is that it is very successful in channeling narratives around discontent. This connects to my past research on austerity in the UK, where we saw the withdrawal of the state from many public functions. There was a wave of technological optimism, similar to what we see now with AI, suggesting that automation could make public services more efficient and reduce the financial burden on the economy.

However, all of this happened amid structural changes in consumption patterns due to the rise of the Internet, which accelerated economic transformation. Many people perceived these changes as a decline in their lived environment and a disruption of the status quo.

Across people’s life cycles, older individuals tend to feel more insecure with rapid change. In the UK, for instance, two key pro-populist voting blocs—particularly strong supporters of Brexit—were older people and those expressing dissatisfaction with the status quo. Populism often unites an unlikely coalition of voters, including those who oppose any type of change.

For example, when the high street declines visibly, when shops disappear, or when routine habits are disrupted, older individuals may struggle to adapt to these changes. We lack strong lifelong learning institutions to help older people adjust to a rapidly evolving world. In this context, simplistic populist messages that blame outsiders—such as immigrants, foreign competitors, or geopolitical rivals like China—become an easy and appealing narrative.

However, we know from hard data that in the communities where populism thrives, there are often no significant immigrant populations. This highlights a disconnect between actual demographic data and perceptions, showing that populist narratives shape public opinion more than lived experiences.

A major missing link in this discussion is the role of the media. I studied this in the context of what I call the media multiplier—a phenomenon that has intensified with the rise of social media and the decline of traditional media. Many older populations, who may not be digitally literate, struggle to differentiate between reliable information and disinformation.

This changing media landscape has been weaponized by geopolitical adversaries to influence public sentiment. As a result, populist grievances are more rooted in perception than in actual lived experiences, yet populists excel at exploiting these narratives.

Looking back at austerity, we can see its role in hollowing out state functions. In the UK, for instance, we saw cuts to youth programs, a visible decline in police presence, and reductions in public services. While these changes may have been made rationally, their perceived impact was significant.

Even if crime rates did not rise dramatically, people felt less safe because they were told they were less safe. Isolated violent incidents—such as terror attacks—further reinforce perceptions of chaos and loss of control, which populists exploit to advocate for border closures and nationalistic policies.

If this trend escalates, we are not far from restricting the flow of information, similar to what we see with China’s Great Firewall. This would directly contradict the foundational principles of Western liberal democracy.

It is crucial to recognize that accelerated structural change has visible and tangible consequences, particularly in societies unaccustomed to rapid transformation. In many developing countries, social and economic shifts happen much faster than in Europe.

Our political and governance institutions, however, have not adapted to this new pace of change. While some nations have moved from extreme poverty to relative wealth in a single generation, Western institutions have struggled to keep up with global transformations. This creates a major point of friction that populists exploit. 

We have people who resist any type of change because it happens so quickly that they struggle to process it. At the same time, our political systems—particularly democratic ones—face the constant challenge of power struggles and the difficulty of explaining complex relationships to the average person. As a result, these complexities are often oversimplified into digestible narratives. This is precisely where populists excel—by reducing intricate issues into simplistic, emotionally charged messages. This, I believe, is one of the major challenges we face today. In many ways, populism is a phenomenon driven by information overload—a reaction to the overwhelming complexity of the modern world.

The AfD’s Success and the Geopolitical Fragmentation of Europe

Co-chairpersons of the populist right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla at a meeting in Berlin, Germany on July 4, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

How much role did economic grievances play in the strong showing of AfD in German elections last Sunday?

Professor Thiemo Fetzer: The country has been in recession for the last two or three years. However, if we consider the scale of the economic challenge and the shock caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the country has actually performed quite well in the grand scheme of things. It has cushioned these shocks reasonably well, though in a manner that might be irritating to global partners. This is why I suggest that Putin has weaponized a potential hypocrisy—because with the invasion, Europe, while championing global climate action and striving to build coalitions for sustainability, simultaneously expanded energy subsidies for hydrocarbons to help households and businesses absorb the shock.

Setting that aside, both the country and the continent have managed remarkably well in handling this multi-dimensional crisis. From a comparative advantage perspective, there has been a loss of access to cheap energy, which poses a major challenge for the industrial sector. On the other hand, the security shock and the broader disruption of the international security order have further complicated the situation.

To me, it was entirely predictable that a second Trump presidency could begin to question the foundational pillars of Europe’s security and the international division of labor. That’s why I highlighted this more than three years ago. However, in light of and despite that shock, Europe has, on average, managed quite well. That said, the AfD has been highly effective in channeling this narrative, questioning why Europe should position itself as a global leader in climate action and why the EU should advocate for a rules-based free trade system governed by law rather than force. In the broader context, Europe has performed well, and individual member states have managed to navigate these challenges effectively.

The major contradiction and risk at this moment is that individual European countries are being systematically picked apart, one by one, by geopolitical adversaries. It even appears that, in some ways, the US may be playing a role in this dynamic.

However, given the broader context, I remain cautiously optimistic, as this is truly a make-or-break moment for Germany within Europe and for Europe as a whole. To me, it has never made sense—though these numbers are hypothetical, they are probably not far from reality—for Portugal to maintain an independent air force with just four F-35s and a handful of tanks, when in reality, landing troops on the coast would already be a major challenge.

Now, there is a unique opportunity arising from the geopolitical pressure Europe is facing, both from the war in Ukraine and the uncertainty surrounding its security partnerships. This pressure could serve as a catalyst for Europe to build a common, integrated defense capability, something that has been attempted in the past but never fully realized. In this sense, we could be witnessing the emergence of a stronger European statehood.

Since this is happening within a highly challenging security landscape, it will inevitably drive shifts in industrial policy, sovereignty debates, and strategic planning. Europe must not only develop its defense capabilities with international partners beyond the EU, but also focus on building efficient and sustainable supply chains within Europe itself to ensure long-term resilience.

I am beginning to see emerging partnerships in this context, particularly in the Middle East, which holds strategic significance for Europe. The recent Suez Canal blockade, even though accidental, underscored the region’s critical role. Additionally, Turkey could become a key partner in this evolving dynamic. I also believe this shift could potentially bring the UK closer to Europe again, as it has a vested interest in participating in the expanding European defense cooperation. However, the US appears to be actively trying to pull the UK away from deeper European integration in this regard.

This, to me, defines the broader geopolitical context in which the AfD has been able to thrive. The party has successfully tapped into simplistic narratives that resonate with public sentiment, yet the solutions it proposes are entirely incompatible with the actual challenges that Europe faces. And for that, it’s really important.

Again, populist parties tend to make a country seem bigger than it is. The UK experienced this with populism, attempting to reinvigorate the idea of the old empire. However, when the UK then tries to reestablish ties with its former empire—whether with India or Pakistan—these are now emerging powers and significant players in the global division of labor. The Indians respond, “Well, UK, okay, that’s interesting, but you’re a tiny, tiny country in the grand scheme of things.” This reality applies to each individual EU member state. That is why it is crucial for the broader public to reflect on this: if Germany wants to chart a path that is optimal and beneficial for itself within Europe and the world, it is entirely dependent on working in conjunction and in very close partnership with others.

But again, this is a make-or-break moment, a make-or-break situation. Geopolitical adversaries—whether China, Russia, the UK, or even the US—all have an interest in a divided Europe, and to some extent, we are already seeing this play out. This is where Europe must step up and build a form of sovereignty. To me, this begins with establishing a European fiscal capacity, which is a necessary condition to ensure that many of the founding pillars of the European Union, originally intended to drive European integration, are no longer exploited as tools by adversaries. Key areas that require urgent reform include privacy regulation, the incompleteness of tax frameworks, the lack of integration in national tax systems, and information sharing—all of which must be addressed.

I do think that figures like Enrico Letta and the Draghi report have made it clear that the solutions are obvious. The real question now is whether a pan-European movement or a pan-European critical mass can be built to actually implement these solutions. However, this remains extremely challenging and difficult because economic interest groups within each individual nation-state benefit from maintaining exclusive contracting relationships within their own national jurisdictions. This has been the biggest obstacle to service sector integration and, ultimately, could become the very mechanism of its own downfall. If this continues, it could lead to countries becoming increasingly inward-looking, which in turn could result in the unraveling of the European project itself.

Cultural Backlash vs. Economic Factors in Populism

For right-wing populists in the Western world, “the others” primarily include immigrants but also extend to “welfare scroungers,” regional minorities, individuals with “non-traditional” lifestyles, communists, and others. Photo: Shutterstock.

Many scholars argue that cultural backlash, rather than economic factors, drives populism. How does your research challenge or complement this perspective?

Professor Thiemo Fetzer: Culture is a tricky thing. If we look at the data, the immigration topic is a salient and important one to consider here. Societies in Europe—the whole idea of European freedom of movement—is built on creating an integrated European labor market, fostering the emergence of a European identity and a European culture. This is particularly relevant for smaller countries because, geopolitically and globally, they are relatively insignificant in terms of projecting force or influence. It is much more difficult for them to do so, which makes this context particularly important.

To me, the cultural dimension is a very vague concept—it often serves as a catch-all excuse when the underlying economic or societal mechanisms cannot be precisely identified. Earlier, I alluded to this challenge in the context of immigration. The biggest backlash to immigration comes from communities that have no actual experience with immigration. This highlights how perceptions of different social groups—such as immigrants—are often entirely detached from real lived experience. That, to me, is the big challenge. If one wants to call that culture, so be it.

But consider the food system. One of the biggest successes in terms of food is what is commonly known as the Turkish kebab. My sister lives in a small town in the Swabian Alps in southern Germany, and one of the most successful businesses in her town is the local kebab shop. However, the type of kebab you find in Germany does not actually exist in Turkey. It is a product of cultural integration, a fusion that emerged through the blending of different influences.

This illustrates why perceptions, lived experiences, and the extent to which they are grounded in hard evidence are the most critical battlegrounds of all. I believe that media systems, which facilitate the spread of narratives and stories about “the other” or the unknown, play a crucial role here. This is where we, as societies, must take responsibility for investing in the absorptive capacity of our communities—engaging with different cultures, reaching out, and ensuring that the shaping of stereotypes is not left solely in the hands of those who control media reach and influence.

This is one of the major dividing lines emerging between the US under Trump and Europe, particularly in discussions about how to regulate social media and make it function more effectively. Of course, this is a highly complex and controversial topic.

To put it simply, what we often call culture is largely built on stereotypes, rather than lived experience. The vast majority of individuals who advocate for re-migration or the separation of communities do so based on narratives rather than firsthand interactions. This is a key battleground, but it requires investment in a society’s absorptive capacity and clear mandates for those who migrate—to share and participate in the evolving way of life. Culture is not static; it evolves over time and requires investment from both the receiving and the sending sides.

Germany, in particular, has made significant historical mistakes in this context. Turkish guest workers were regarded merely as temporary guests, with the expectation that they would eventually return home. Similarly, in the early 1990s, many Bosnian refugees arrived, yet little effort was made to facilitate their integration. The same applied to ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union—despite having been entirely socialized in Russia or the Soviet Union, they were presumed to require no language or cultural integration, solely because they possessed German lineage or passports. This was a fundamental fallacy. In more recent years, Germany has invested significantly in improving integration and absorptive capacity, but this primarily benefits medium and large cities, while rural areas remain largely untouched by these efforts.

The same mechanisms that apply to immigration also apply to economic migration trends—entrepreneurial, risk-taking individuals are typically the ones who migrate, while those who prefer stability and familiarity tend to remain in their communities. For individuals in rural areas with limited direct exposure to migrants, the lack of firsthand contact can reinforce perceptions shaped entirely by media narratives rather than real-life experiences.

This is the generational challenge facing every European country. That is why, to me, the term culture is not particularly helpful in these discussions. It often serves as a placeholder for a lack of understanding, when, in reality, there are concrete ways to foster economic integration and investment in assimilation.

Big cities provide excellent examples of how successful integration can work. The real challenge is how to extend these benefits to smaller communities. One potential solution is remote work, which allows individuals to experience the advantages of cultural and economic agglomeration—typically found in diverse urban environments—without the need for physical relocation.

Ultimately, this could help shape a shared future. After all, what we consider German culture today did not exist 200 years ago. Germany was a collection of hundreds of small states and communities, yet over time, a German identity emerged. The same process is now unfolding at the European level, and some even argue that this mechanism should extend to a global level, fostering shared prosperity and understanding in an increasingly interconnected world.

And lastly, Professor Fetzer, the liberal world order, founded on interdependence after the collapse of communism, was once seen as the inevitable future, with Francis Fukuyama declaring the “end of history” and the triumph of liberalism. With the resurgence of neo-mercantilist and protectionist policies, can we now say that history is reasserting itself and that the liberal order has become a relic of the past?

Professor Thiemo Fetzer: What’s implicit in this question is a consideration of the role of the state. Mercantilism, in one interpretation, is based on the idea that the state has a mandate to shape economic development in one way or another. In contrast, the extreme form of liberalism—libertarianism—argues that the state should not exist at all, with everything being guided solely by market forces.

A lot of the tensions we see today, at least from my perspective, revolve around charting a more sustainable future for the planet. We are now realizing that our way of life, particularly in the Global North, imposes negative externalities on communities elsewhere—through global warming, environmental degradation, and the resulting instability. Climate change is already inducing population movements, particularly in Africa, where nomadic communities are struggling to find water for their herds. As they are forced into cities, this disrupts existing societal equilibria, often leading to conflict and instability. Unfortunately, these changes are happening very fast, making adaptation even more difficult.

If we accept this premise, then we must reconfigure how our economies function. This requires a role for the state or supranational institutions to shape incentives and engineer a systemic transition toward a more sustainable equilibrium. Achieving this demands the deployment of a broad economic policy toolkit, often referred to as industrial policy.

Energy Transitions and the Battle Over Industrial Policy

Aerial drone view of a hybrid solar and wind farm in Bannister, NSW, Australia, featuring large wind turbines in the background generating renewable clean energy on a sunny day. Photo: Steve Tritton.

Germany actually pioneered aspects of this transition in the early 2000s, introducing high subsidies for solar and wind energy production. Crucially, these subsidies were designed in a non-discriminatory way, making them compatible with global rules-based trade under WTO regulations. As a result, German subsidies played a key role in creating today’s renewable energy giants in China.

At some level, I find it difficult to view this as a negative development, because it offers a realistic pathway for systemic transition. It presents the possibility of maintaining, or even improving, high living standards, while socializing the benefits of natural resources—such as renewable energy. In the long run, the cost of energy could converge toward the cost of capital, since solar panels and wind farms require minimal ongoing expenses once installed. The world has vast amounts of barren land that could be used for energy production, allowing us to harvest the abundance of the planet. But achieving this required a shift in policy, which, unsurprisingly, faced resistance from economic interest groups.

Traditionally, many would blame oil-rich countries in the Middle East—such as Saudi Arabia or the UAE—for opposing energy transitions. However, in reality, some of the strongest resistance came from hydrocarbon producers with much higher production costs, particularly in the US and other regions.

In the Middle East, the cost of producing a barrel of crude oil is around $10, allowing these countries to continue profiting massively even as global energy markets shift. However, in the US shale industry, production is far more expensive and comes with major externalities, such as methane leakage, which are not properly priced into the system.

For these higher-cost producers, the energy transition poses a major financial threat. The biggest opponents of the transition—originally driven by forward-looking industrial policies in Europe (particularly Germany) and later seized upon by China—were actually mid-tier hydrocarbon producers in Africa, Latin America, and especially the US, where high capital costs create risks of stranded assets.

In contrast, producers in the Middle East are likely to be the last oil suppliers standing, as their low production costs allow them to outcompete higher-cost producers. To me, this transition in the energy system was strategically initiated through industrial policy. However, it was repeatedly disrupted, largely by hydrocarbon interests from mid-cost producers—most notably, those in the US.

This is not an unreasonable conclusion, given the structural nature of the US energy sector. In most countries, oil extraction is a public revenue source or controlled by a state monopoly. However, in the US, landowners hold subsurface mineral rights, a unique legal framework that allows private individuals to profit from oil production. As a result, many small landholders have deeply invested in non-renewable energy and have a strong financial interest in maintaining the status quo. This explains why hydrocarbon interests wield such strong political influence in the US. Meanwhile, oil-rich nations in the Middle East are likely content to let American hydrocarbon interests do the lobbying for them, ensuring continued hydrocarbon production and market stability.

The Future of the Liberal World Order

Stepping back to the broader question—is this the end of history? If we compare liberal economic orders to industrial policy-driven models, we must recognize that hydrocarbon-based industrial policy has always existed. It has simply functioned through market-based mechanisms, where economic interests buy political influence within democratic systems. For this reason, I find it difficult to frame the debate as a binary choice between liberal and non-liberal orders. The key issue is how to engineer a global energy transition in a way that is mutually beneficial, rather than disruptive. This requires strategic global institutional design to create a coalition for action. The goal should be to phase out hydrocarbons in a controlled manner, avoiding economic collapse while simultaneously scaling up renewable alternatives.

To me, industrial policy has always been present in one form or another. The real question is whether this policy should be led by individual nation-states, by regional blocs with shared objectives, or by a truly global framework. What worries me most today is that some key global players are turning their backs on multilateral cooperation, largely because their democratic systems have been captured by powerful special interest groups—particularly hydrocarbon lobbies. This is not merely a debate about liberal versus non-liberal governance. Rather, it underscores the critical need for public intervention to counterbalance vested interests and ensure that policy decisions serve the long-term global good.

Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Hough: Mainstream Parties Must Address Issues or Risk Strengthening the AfD

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Dan Hough warns that mainstream parties must engage with voters’ real concerns or risk further legitimizing the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). “Ignoring the AfD hasn’t worked, and simply adopting their rhetoric hasn’t either,” Professor Hough explains. Instead, he urges democratic parties to develop credible policies that address the economic and social anxieties fueling AfD support. He highlights how discontent—particularly in Eastern Germany—extends beyond migration, with deeper dissatisfaction driving voters toward populist alternatives. As the AfD continues to shape public debate, Professor Hough argues that mainstream parties must lead with solutions rather than reactionary responses. “The discourse must be smart, and the outcomes must be meaningful.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Dan Hough, a leading expert on corruption and populist politics from the University of Sussex, offers critical insights into the Alternative for Germany (AfD)’s electoral gains and the broader implications for German democracy. As the AfD nearly doubled its vote share in Sunday elections compared to the 2021 elections, mainstream parties now face urgent questions about how to respond to the party’s growing appeal. Professor Hough warns that ignoring the AfD has not weakened it—nor has engagement through policy imitation. Instead, he argues that mainstream parties must confront the real grievances driving voter discontent. “The challenge is to find a language that acknowledges the problems the AfD highlights while offering solutions,” he says. “If they fail to do so, the AfD will continue to benefit, pointing to government inadequacies in dealing with these issues on its own terms.”

While the AfD has thrived on anti-elite and anti-immigration rhetoric, Professor Hough emphasizes that its rise is rooted in broader dissatisfaction with Germany’s political establishment. He points to Eastern Germany, where frustration over decades of economic disparity, social change, and political disillusionment has fueled the party’s success. “Migration is an important issue, but the deeper wells of dissatisfaction run much deeper,” Professor Hough explains. He highlights how, in many cases, AfD voters are not driven purely by far-right ideology but rather by a sense of being ignored by the political mainstream. This is why simply branding AfD supporters as anti-democratic is counterproductive—it alienates them further and pushes them deeper into the party’s ranks.

Professor Hough warns that if mainstream parties continue to avoid these tough discussions—or adopt reactionary rhetoric to compete with the far-right—they risk further legitimizing the AfD. Drawing comparisons to Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ), he notes how engaging with populist forces without a clear alternative vision can backfire, as seen in Austria, where the FPÖ has outperformed the AfD. “Ignoring the AfD has not worked. Engaging with them, as Austria has done with the FPÖ, has also not worked. So what do we do?” he asks. Instead of reactive politics, he argues, mainstream parties must lead the debate and provide credible policy responses that resonate with voters before the AfD defines the terms of the discourse.

As the interview unfolds, Hough delves into the role of corruption narratives in populist movements, the paradox of “anti-corruption populism,” and the risks of democratic backsliding if far-right parties continue to reshape public debate. Ultimately, he underscores that Germany’s best defense against the AfD is not exclusion, but better governance and tangible solutions to the concerns that fuel its rise. 

Professor Hough stresses that mainstream parties must acknowledge the grievances the AfD exploits while providing meaningful solutions. “The discourse has to be smart, and the policy outcomes have to be meaningful. If that happens, the AfD’s rise does not have to be unstoppable.” His analysis offers a crucial perspective on the evolving landscape of German and European politics.

Professor Dan Hough, a leading expert on corruption and populist politics from the University of Sussex.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Dan Hough with some edits.

Ignoring the AfD Has Failed—Mainstream Parties Must Find a New Strategy

Professor Hough, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you assess the far-right AfD’s performance in the German elections, where the party nearly doubled its vote share compared to the 2021 elections? What factors do you think contributed most to this surge?

Professor Dan Hough: I thought their performance was expected. I was predicting around 20%, and that’s what they got. So, in the end, the result was not a surprise. We’ve known for a few years that the AfD was going to do well, and they did. The only question was around the details—would they get more or less than 20% and how would they choose to frame that outcome?

In truth, the more pressing issue for German politics was the performance of the smaller parties because whether they entered Parliament was going to have a much larger impact on the government. And, of course, the German government, like many others around the world, faces significant challenges. So, ensuring that Germany has a functioning government moving forward was crucial, and the AfD has no real role to play in that. For me, the focus was actually not so much on the AfD but rather on the smaller parties and the 5% hurdle.

Do you believe the endorsements of the AfD by Elon Musk and U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance had any measurable impact on the election results? Or were their influences more symbolic than substantive?

Professor Dan Hough: I’m not sure about their influence—we don’t know. We haven’t yet analyzed the data in great detail, but the AfD’s performance was exactly as expected, even before Donald Trump won the election and before Elon Musk took on whatever role he now officially believes he holds in American politics. So, there’s no real evidence that they had any impact. Their endorsements were certainly noted and welcomed by the hardcore AfD supporters, but in terms of influencing the overall results, I would need to see evidence demonstrating that they had any effect at all.

You have argued that immigration and refugee policy has become a key battleground for European center-right parties as they compete with center-left and liberal parties. Given that immigration is also a central theme for far-right parties, to what extent do center-right parties risk legitimizing the far right by adopting similar rhetoric and policy positions?

Professor Dan Hough: The challenge that mainstream democratic parties face is that there is no easy answer to questions about who should be allowed to enter a country, under what circumstances, and how they should be treated. I mean, a country like Germany, which has land borders with nine other states and has taken in a couple of million refugees over the last 10 years, will always face challenges in integrating and processing newcomers. 

So, there isn’t a single “right” answer for the CDU to come up with here. Whatever they do, there will be a significant number of people who are unhappy with it—whether those on the left advocating for a more liberal stance or those on the right pushing for a more restrictive one.

What we do know is that ignoring the AfD has not worked at all. The AfD has risen to 20%. However, engaging with the AfD—if we look at Austria, where the Freedom Party (FPÖ) has been heavily engaged by the center-right over the past 20 years—has also not worked. The FPÖ receives even more votes than the AfD does. So, what do we do? If you engage with the AfD, they seem to grow stronger. If you ignore them, they also seem to grow stronger. Somewhere in between, there has to be another option or set of options.

Friedrich Merz is treading a path where he refuses to talk to the AfD but seeks to engage with potential AfD voters. Now, if I were a political strategist, I’m not sure I would necessarily recommend that approach, but I understand why he is trying to take the sting out of the migration issue. We know that when Germans worry less about migration, they are less likely to vote for the AfD. So, this issue requires a policy response that makes sense and is perceived as effective by the public because it is a highly salient issue today.

That’s the challenge—coming up with answers that actually help manage the issue in practice. The other thing about the AfD is that while migration is a key driver of their support, a lot of it also stems from dissatisfaction, particularly in Eastern Germany. This dissatisfaction is linked to the multiple crises that people there have endured over the last 30 years since the collapse of the GDR. So, while migration is a major issue, the deeper wells of dissatisfaction run even deeper, extending beyond just the debate over who should come to Germany and under what circumstances.

Populist Anti-Corruption: A Weaponized Narrative Rather Than a Solution

European Parliamentary election posters of the FPÖ in Vienna, Austria, on May 15, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

The AfD has positioned itself as an anti-elite, anti-corruption party while being embroiled in its own corruption controversies. How does this contradiction affect voter perceptions? How do you explain the relationship between corruption and the rise of far-right movements? What do the German case and the German elections on Sunday tell us about this relationship?

Professor Dan Hough: You’re assuming that people are logical and rational and that if something happens, they will respond in a logical manner. There are plenty of lessons from Austria, a country that is arguably a couple of decades ahead of Germany in dealing with a populist party. We know that some of the scandals the FPÖ has been involved in are truly ridiculous. The Ibiza scandal, for instance, is one that people might want to look into—a truly crazy scandal. But it didn’t really affect the FPÖ in Austria at all, because the main drivers of FPÖ support are general dissatisfaction.

The dissatisfaction of people stems from a government they see as unimpressive and policies they believe are not working. The AfD functions as a vessel for their unhappiness. As long as that dissatisfaction exists, the AfD will be able to get away with much more than people in polite society might imagine. It’s not too different from Donald Trump. Trump says some truly remarkable—let’s put it that way—things. But at this point, it’s factored in. People have gotten used to it, and he can say increasingly outrageous things without changing the opinions of those who either support or loathe him.

The AfD finds itself in a similar position. It’s already factored in that things will not always be logical with them, but they still represent, for enough people, a means to send a strong message to the mainstream elites.

You have written extensively on the role of citizens in anti-corruption efforts. How does corruption—whether real or perceived—fuel support for populist movements, particularly in Europe? How do populist parties, like the AfD, exploit corruption grievances to mobilize support?

Professor Dan Hough: Yeah, and there’s a lot to be said there. Populist parties, of course, like having a dichotomy. They like talking about the elites—how the elites look after themselves but not the people. They thrive on this divide and have a real disdain for the complexities of politics, such as compromise, bargains, and deals. They are not interested in that. For them, there are the good guys—the people—and the bad guys—the elites.

Now, this framework fits very easily onto the issue of corruption: elites look after themselves, they corrupt the political process, and the people are the ones who suffer. So, it’s no surprise that the far right frequently talks about corrupt practices. However, when it comes to actual anti-corruption policies, their stance is much harder to pin down. What they generally end up saying is, “Give us power, and we’ll sort it out,” which, of course, is not really an anti-corruption policy at all.

Many of the things the AfD discusses regarding corruption are not particularly detailed. In fact, they don’t use the word “corruption” as frequently as one might expect. Instead, they heavily rely on the German words for dissatisfaction and disdain. For those who speak German, that is one of their key themes. They argue that the elites have no respect for ordinary people. In this way, they tap into a corruption discourse without being particularly explicit about what they would actually do to fix it—other than saying, “Vote for us, and we will take care of it.”

Citizen-Led Anti-Corruption: A Complex Reality vs. Populist Simplifications

In your work, you discuss the limitations of citizen-led anti-corruption efforts. How do populist parties frame corruption differently compared to traditional anti-corruption movements? How effective are citizen-centered approaches to anti-corruption in countering populist narratives that thrive on corruption scandals?

Professor Dan Hough: Citizen-centered approaches are quite new, and they take very different forms in different parts of the world. In some places, there are websites like ipaidabribe.com in India, where individuals can report instances of bribery they have experienced. However, in countries like the United Kingdom or Germany, such platforms are not really necessary. I have never had to pay a bribe in the United Kingdom, and bribery is not part of the everyday fabric of life here. But, of course, corruption exists in other forms.

The type of citizen-led approach varies depending on the nature of the corruption problem. For example, in the United Kingdom, there are websites where people can see exactly how much politicians earn and how much they receive in donations—down to the last pence—allowing the public to judge whether it is appropriate or corrupt. Because the state functions reasonably well, this data can be collected and made publicly available. Citizens can then decide whether, for instance, Boris Johnson receiving millions of pounds for lecture tours is appropriate or not.

Citizen-led approaches are most successful when they are not isolated. An effective anti-corruption infrastructure requires institutions that can take prosecutions forward and a legal system where the rule of law actually means something—which, in many places, it does not, as it is applied very inconsistently. Without this broader institutional support, citizen-led approaches struggle to make an impact.

Now, all of this is too complex for the far right, which tends to focus on a much simpler narrative. Their arguments center on an undefined elite that supposedly looks after itself at the expense of ordinary people. They use the word corruption as a blunt weapon against that elite, arguing that these people have disdain for the general public. Their message is: Vote for us, and we will change that relationship.

However, the details of how this change would be implemented are rarely well thought out or explained. They do not really propose meaningful citizen-led approaches to anti-corruption. Instead, they talk a lot about direct democracy, which fits into their populist narrative of giving power back to the people—but in practice, not many far-right parties ever reach a position where they can actually implement such measures. As a result, their promises remain quite vague.

Populist leaders often portray themselves as fighters against a corrupt elite. However, many populist leaders claim to fight corruption while simultaneously dismantling institutional checks and balances. How do you assess the paradox of ‘anti-corruption populism’? Based on your research, do such narratives result in actual anti-corruption measures, or are they primarily rhetorical tools?

Professor Dan Hough: They’re not just rhetorical tools; they’re practical tools. But they’re not practical tools to fight corruption. They’re practical tools to empower those who push them forward. Many of the mechanisms that I would call backsliding—which we have seen populist regimes enact—are not really about anything other than dismantling processes that they see as working against them. Instead, they seek to create new processes that do not work against them.

Viktor Orbán is a great example of this in Hungary. His government creates what they argue are institutions that work for the good of the people. However, people like me would argue that these institutions also seem to work really well for him. And that is ultimately where they end up. So, I wouldn’t say this is about anti-corruption at all. It is about empowering those who push these narratives.

Perceived Corruption Outweighs Reality, Fueling Populist Support

AfD demo with slogan Stop Islamization and counter demonstration of the Left in Luetten Klein in Rostock, Germany on May 14, 2018. AfD, Alternative for Germany, is a right wing political party in Germany. Photo: Shutterstock.

Your research suggests that corruption can be a mobilizing grievance, but also that frequent exposure to it can lead to apathy. How does this paradox play out in the context of Germany and the rise of the AfD? To what extent do mainstream parties’ failures in tackling corruption contribute to the rise of far-right parties like the AfD?

Professor Dan Hough: I don’t think the corruption narrative is really that helpful in explaining the rise of the AfD, and it might be a bit odd for me to say that, given that I work in a corruption research center. But for me, anyway, the rise of the AfD is about other things. It’s about dissatisfaction. It’s about disaffection. It’s about people being unhappy with their lot—and often, these grievances are not entirely reasonable. But at the same time, the AfD is very good at speaking to their unhappiness and addressing the feeling that they are not at one with how Germany works.

Now, corruption in any meaningful sense is not really part of that. In a broad sense, there is the argument that elites corrupt the process, they look after themselves, they don’t look after you, but I don’t think corruption in an everyday sense in Germany is a driving force behind this. I believe there are better variables to examine when trying to explain the AfD’s rise.

One of your studies discusses how citizens’ direct experiences with bribery influence their willingness to protest. In Germany, where large-scale bribery is relatively rare, what factors do you think drive the populist anti-corruption discourse?

Professor Dan Hough: Bribery is really rare in Germany, as it is in the UK. But if you ask people whether they think much of it exists, they’ll tell you yes. You often find people saying, “Yeah, there’s a lot of corruption in Germany. Oh, I’ve never experienced it, but there’s a lot of corruption.” So there’s a paradox between what they experience and what they perceive, and this paradox can be really significant and quite obvious when you talk to individuals about it.

I don’t think corruption, in any meaningful sense, is a major theme in German politics. There are simply too many bigger issues dominating the landscape at the moment—whether it be Ukraine, the climate crisis, or the ineffectual government that Germany has just replaced. The anti-corruption narratives tend to appeal more to people who study the subject—people like me, who are interested in the details. I don’t think many Germans are losing sleep over corruption challenges. It’s simply not the primary way they frame the problems they experience.

Ironically, Germany, like many other states, does have corruption problems. They exist, but they’re not visible in everyday life. For example, contracts may be awarded to companies that perhaps shouldn’t receive them, but most people don’t know about that. They don’t read the fine print buried on page 17 of a heavyweight newspaper to find it out. That sort of corruption remains beyond their immediate awareness, and understandably so—they have their own lives to lead.

So, I think the anti-corruption narrative in Germany is rather stilted. It doesn’t have the same dynamic as in other places because there are simply more pressing concerns on people’s minds.

The AfD Exploits Corruption Narratives to Undermine Trust in Democracy

Posters and demonstrators at a protest against the AfD party in Munich on January 21, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

In the recent elections, the AfD nearly doubled its support. Unlike in some Southern or Eastern European contexts, Germany has relatively robust anti-corruption institutions. Why do you think the AfD still manages to frame corruption as a central issue?

Professor Dan Hough: I’m not sure it does. It talks about corruption, but what it really doing is finding a way to explain that your problems, your worries, your concerns—those guys over there in Berlin don’t care.

So, it frames corruption as one part of a much bigger narrative about the political process not working for you, and that’s dangerous. Because if that political process isn’t working, they may suggest alternatives that look a bit more like Orban’s model. And it wouldn’t be in Germany’s interest to go down that route.

It’s worth remembering that 80% of people in Germany last week said they would never, under any circumstances, consider voting for the AfD. So yes, they got 20% of the vote, and many people—including myself—find that deeply disconcerting. But it’s important to keep the context in mind: the majority of Germans have no time for the AfD and don’t buy the snake oil they try to sell.

Mainstream parties often struggle with countering populist claims about corruption. Based on your work, what strategies should democratic institutions adopt to maintain trust while effectively combating corruption?

Professor Dan Hough: Getting corruption right takes time and patience. It took Britain about 300 years to go from being very corrupt to being less corrupt. Denmark and Sweden, which followed what the literature calls a Big Bang approach, took 15 years to implement sweeping institutional changes in the 19th century. That’s 15 years—three electoral cycles—and even then, the reforms didn’t work perfectly overnight. It’s now over a century later that we see Denmark and Sweden as frontrunners in anti-corruption efforts.

So, if you’re looking for quick solutions, you’re going to struggle because changing institutional processes takes time. In truth, the best anti-corruption policy is simply to govern well: give people a little bit more of what they want—whether that’s economic security, safety, or the sense that their voices are being heard.

That takes time, but it’s the most effective method. You can establish new anti-corruption commissions or pass stricter laws, and while those might catch some corrupt actors, for most ordinary people, better governance is the real solution. And that’s something I hope Friedrich Merz understands—he’s not going to solve these problems in a month.

Anti-Corruption Policies Can Backfire When Populists Manipulate Institutions

Is there empirical evidence showing that stronger anti-corruption policies lead to a decline in support for Populist parties? Or do such policies risk being weaponized by Populists themselves.

Professor Dan Hough: Oh, they certainly can be. Poland is a really good example. In 2006, a strong anti-corruption commission was introduced, and the populist government used it to go after its enemies. The irony was that many of these so-called enemies had hardly been in power at all, yet they were accused of abusing their positions in government—an almost surreal situation given that many of them had never held office. So, there is a real danger that anti-corruption institutions can be hijacked, and we see this happening all over the world.

Now, Germany is not really in that position. If you asked Germans what their anti-corruption institutions were, I’m not sure many of them would know. But certainly, there is always a risk that populists could use such institutions for their own ends. The best example of this is Donald Trump—he has attempted to use institutions to serve his own interests.

That’s why democracy is not about any one particular institution; it’s about a network, a mosaic of institutions that work together, sometimes constraining each other, sometimes supporting each other. The real challenge is getting that mosaic right—because when it is strong, it becomes much harder for populists to dismantle it and push their agenda through.

With rising political fragmentation in Germany, do you think anti-corruption efforts will become more partisan, and if so, what are the risks of this for democratic accountability?

Professor Dan Hough: Well, partisanship is always an issue, right? And in many ways, I don’t have a problem with that. Parties represent interests, they represent people, and they try to bring those interests into the political process. Corruption is no different in that regard. But I don’t see anti-corruption being a particularly salient issue in German politics over the next legislative cycle at all. There will be issues linked to potentially corrupt practices, but much more of the focus will be on money—where to find the funds to invest in infrastructure, support Ukraine, and finance other priorities like the climate transition and the Energiewende (shift to sustainable energy). All of this revolves around the kind of daily politics we’re used to—debates about money, influence, and competing interests. The corruption narrative is not at the center of that discussion, and I don’t see the next government having much time to devote to it either. That may be good or bad, but given Germany’s financial challenges, I think it’s inevitable.

The AfD’s Strength Lies in Channeling Dissatisfaction, Not Policy Solutions

Looking ahead, do you see the AfD’s anti-corruption narrative evolving further, and if so, how might this impact broader European trends in populism and governance?

Professor Dan Hough: They may evolve. They like using the word “corruption” because it’s a concept people generally think they understand, although I would sometimes disagree with those understandings.

I think the AfD will use the corruption narrative whenever they can because it helps them point the finger at the government and gain political attention. Whether that will have any meaningful effect, I don’t know. Populist right-wing parties have always talked about corruption, but I’m not sure they’ve always truly benefited from it. It has been one small part of their toolkit.

Austria is a really good example for Germans to look at. The success of the FPÖ has come from highlighting Austrian dissatisfaction with mainstream parties. That’s what it has done—it has provided a vehicle for people to express discontent, even if the party itself isn’t particularly good at explaining what exactly they oppose.

That is where the AfD’s strength lies—as a vehicle for protest and dissatisfaction. They have been very effective at using social media to amplify their message and reach a generation that mainstream politicians are struggling to engage.

Despite ongoing controversies, including investigations into AfD figures for extremism, the party continues to attract voters, as evidenced by Sunday’s election results. To what extent has the AfD succeeded in mainstreaming far-right discourse in German politics, and what implications does this have for the broader political landscape?

Professor Dan Hough: One thing they have done is change the way Germans talk about migration. German politicians really didn’t want to talk about migration until about 15 years ago. It was an issue they all agreed to handle in a very sober, technical way, but that, of course, changed—probably about 20 years ago, but absolutely and definitively in 2015, when over a million asylum seekers arrived in Germany from North Africa and the Middle East.

The AfD has been very effective in introducing language into public discourse that wasn’t there before. This presents a real challenge for all mainstream parties, as they now find themselves engaging in debates they previously avoided. Euroscepticism is another example—criticisms of the EU in Germany weren’t really a thing until relatively recently, and now they are. The AfD has played a role in that shift. It’s not the only reason it has happened, but it has contributed.

This presents a challenge. Mainstream parties must find a language that acknowledges the problems the AfD highlights while offering solutions. If they fail to do so, the AfD will continue to benefit, pointing to government inadequacies in dealing with these issues on its own terms.

Populism Thrives on Dissatisfaction—Only Effective Governance Can Counter It

Photo: Shutterstock.

And lastly, with the AfD’s rise, are we seeing an erosion of public trust in Germany’s democratic institutions, or is this simply a reflection of broader European trends in far-right politics?

Professor Dan Hough: Well, it can be both. I mean, Germany has now become a bit more normal. Most countries have a far-right party polling around 20%. This is nothing new—France, the Netherlands, and several other countries have faced similar challenges. Many countries have had far-right parties operating like the AfD for a long time. So, in that sense, Germany is simply aligning with a broader European trend.

However, Germany has a unique history, and most Germans are not particularly happy with this “return to normality.” Moving forward, the AfD is in a position to build on its current success. In the next election, four years from now, it is highly unlikely that the AfD will be anywhere near government, which means they will continue to play the role of opposition—complaining and criticizing. If the German government fails to make progress in solving or at least appearing to address the major issues of the day, the AfD could perform even better next time. That is the real challenge.

Of course, populism is not just present on the far right. Die Linke had a strong election on the populist left, and another party, the Alliance, narrowly missed entering Parliament. So, there is about 13% of the electorate on the left that also leans populist. There is a lot of populism in German politics right now, and the only way to counter it is through effective governance—delivering policies that improve people’s lives.

Simply labeling populist voters as anti-democratic is not going to work. In fact, it will likely backfire, further alienating them and making them more likely to vote against mainstream parties in the future. That is not difficult to understand—if someone insults me, I am hardly going to turn around and agree with them. Human nature does not work that way. The discourse has to be smart, and the policy outcomes have to be meaningful. If that happens, the AfD’s rise does not have to be unstoppable.

Professor Jonathan Olsen, Chair of the Department of Social Sciences and Historical Studies at Texas Woman’s University.

Professor Olsen: AfD’s Growth Faces a Ceiling Despite Eastern Stronghold

Despite the AfD’s strong performance in Germany’s Sunday elections, securing nearly 21% of the vote and dominating in the East, Professor Jonathan Olsen argues that the party faces a ceiling in its growth. “Opinion polls consistently show that around 80% of Germans do not support the AfD,” he notes, emphasizing its high negative ratings. While the AfD has solidified its base in the East, its influence in the West remains limited, requiring a broader appeal to expand further. Professor Olsen highlights that migration and security remain the party’s key mobilization issues, while economic concerns, though present, rank lower in importance for its voters.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Jonathan Olsen, Chair of the Department of Social Sciences and Historical Studies at Texas Woman’s University, offered his insights into the Alternative for Germany (AfD)’s recent electoral performance. While the party’s near 21% result in the 2025 German elections signals strong support—particularly in eastern Germany—Professor Olsen argues that its growth potential may be reaching a ceiling. “Opinion polls have consistently shown that around 80% of Germans do not support the party,” he noted. “The AfD has the highest negative ratings of any political party in Germany.”

Despite its success, Professor Olsen highlights that the AfD’s ability to broaden its voter base remains uncertain. “They remain the largest opposition party, securing nearly 21% of the vote and mid-30% in Eastern Germany. But moving forward, the key question will be: How do they expand beyond their current level of support?” He suggests that, while the AfD has solidified its position in the East, its influence in the West remains limited. “They receive about twice as much support in the East as in the West. If I were advising the AfD, I would recommend they focus on broadening their appeal in the West and refining their messaging to attract a wider voter base.”

One of the more striking aspects of the AfD’s campaign was its issue selection. Professor Olsen describes the party as a “populist issue entrepreneur,” effectively capitalizing on migration and domestic security as central themes. “I don’t see that the AfD mobilized any new issues except for the economy and the performance of the Ampel coalition (Ampelkoalition). Migration was by far the most important issue driving their vote, followed closely by domestic security,” he explained. Economic concerns ranked much lower in priority, though Professor Olsen points out that 75% of AfD voters expressed concerns about rising prices and future financial security.

Despite some international attention, Professor Olsen downplays the impact of endorsements from figures like Elon Musk and J.D. Vance on the AfD’s performance. “There was no discernible bump from Musk’s endorsement or from J.D. Vance’s and Trump’s implicit support. So, I think it had zero effect,” he stated.

Looking ahead, the AfD’s position within both Germany and the broader European far right remains complicated. While it seeks alliances with transnational populist movements, many European far-right parties still consider it too extreme. “Even Marine Le Pen’s National Rally and Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy have distanced themselves from the AfD,”Professor Olsen noted. As the party continues to grow in the East while struggling to expand in the West, its long-term trajectory remains a crucial question for German and European politics.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Jonathan Olsen with some edits.

The AfD’s Growth Is Strong, but Its Ceiling May Be in Sight

Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Olsen, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: You observed the German elections in Germany. How do you interpret the performance of the AfD in the German elections, in which it almost doubled its vote since the last election in 2021? Did its electoral strategy evolve compared to previous elections?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: I think the AfD’s performance can be considered a strong one. The party is certainly pleased with the outcome. They didn’t exceed some expectations—some thought they might reach 21 or 22%—but they ended up just under 21%, so it can’t be characterized as disappointing. This result may suggest that there is a ceiling for AfD support. They remain the largest opposition party, securing nearly 21% of the vote and reaching the mid-30% range in Eastern Germany. It was a very successful election for them, but moving forward, the key question will be: How do they broaden their voter base? How do they expand beyond their current level of support? Because, in my view, there seems to be a limit to their electoral growth.

As for your second question—did their electoral strategy evolve compared to previous elections? I wouldn’t say it changed significantly. However, if you examine their campaign posters—I spent a lot of time walking around the city analyzing different posters, and I previously conducted research with my co-author on AfD election posters in 2017 and 2021—there is a noticeable shift. While I haven’t done a systematic study of the 2025 election, a first glance at their campaign materials suggests a much more mainstream presentation. Their advertising appears more conventional, more in line with other parties, and lacks the provocative posters seen in 2017.

The 2025 campaign placed significant emphasis on Alice Weidel as their lead candidate. When I examined their posters, nothing stood out as particularly different from other parties. Their strategy largely capitalized on the issues that were already prominent in public discourse—migration and domestic security—particularly following high-profile attacks involving asylum seekers in various parts of Germany. These events effectively handed the AfD its key campaign themes. Additionally, the CDU’s response to these issues, which in some ways reinforced the AfD’s position, made it even easier for the party to highlight its main message.

Do you think Elon Musk and J.D. Vance’s endorsement of the AfD had any effect on the party’s performance?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: No, I don’t think it had any effect. If you look at the AfD’s polling over the last year or so, it has stayed pretty steady, right around 20%. There was no discernible bump from Musk’s endorsement or from J.D. Vance’s and Trump’s implicit endorsement of the party. So, I think it had zero effect. It did not have any negative effect that I could tell—that is, I don’t think it drove people away from the AfD, but it certainly didn’t drive people to vote for the AfD either.

AfD’s National Expansion Remains Uncertain

The Alternative for Germany (AfD) booth in Görlitz, Germany, on August 16, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

The AfD has seen significant support in the elections, particularly in eastern Germany. How do you interpret their latest electoral performance? Does it signal a deepening of their influence or a potential ceiling to their growth?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: Well, to address your last question first, which I partially answered earlier, I see a potential ceiling to the AfD’s growth. Opinion polls have consistently shown that around 80% of Germans do not support the party. The AfD has the highest negative ratings of any political party in Germany.

If you’re looking at people who didn’t vote for the AfD—not always the best way to gauge their future potential—you still have to consider that 80% of Germans did not vote for the AfD in 2025. As part of this election trip, we had a representative from the AfD speak to us, and I asked him what the party could do to broaden its support. He didn’t have much of an answer. It seems the AfD expects political issues to fall into their lap and assumes that the failure of mainstream parties to address key problems will automatically boost their support. But I’m not convinced that’s the case. I don’t see their support growing dramatically unless they take proactive steps to make themselves more appealing to a broader segment of German voters.

Now, in eastern Germany, the situation is different. This is more of a West German problem than an Eastern German one. In Eastern Germany, the AfD is the largest party. If you look at the first vote election results in East and West, it’s predominantly the CDU and CSU in the West, while in the East, it’s primarily the AfD. They secured 35–36% of the vote in Eastern Germany, making them the dominant party there. It reminds me of the vote totals Die Linke was getting 10–15 years ago, but which they no longer achieve.

The AfD has clearly solidified its base in Eastern Germany. Although they perform relatively well in the West, they still lag significantly behind other parties there. They receive about twice as much support in the East as in the West. I believe the average was 34% in the East compared to around 18% in the West. If I were advising the AfD, I would recommend they focus on broadening their appeal in the West and refining their messaging to attract a wider voter base. That’s how I would approach it.

AfD’s Success Driven by Migration and Security, Not New Issues

Your research highlights the AfD as a “populist issue entrepreneur.” What new issues has the party successfully mobilized in this election?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: This was interesting because I don’t see that the AfD mobilized any new issues except for the economy and the performance of the Ampel coalition (Ampelkoalition). If you look at the issues the AfD was running on and that were important to their voters, it was migration and domestic security. After that, it was the performance of the Ampel coalition, specifically regarding the economy and energy.

Whether they have a coherent answer is another question. I don’t think so, and I know that most German voters didn’t find their answers to economic issues particularly convincing. However, that may not matter much to their core voters. For them, the most important thing is that the AfD continues to stress migration and domestic security issues. Whether they can develop their economic message in the future is an important question for broadening their voter base. Finding a coherent and convincing economic platform will be crucial for the AfD if they want to expand their appeal.

I wanted to look at this because there were some interesting exit polls available on Tagesschau. Looking at the issues that were important to voters overall, domestic security was the top issue, tied with economic and social security. After that came migration, followed by economic growth.

For AfD voters specifically, migration was by far the most important issue driving their vote, followed closely by domestic security. Far behind those were concerns about economic growth, rising prices, and other issues. So, it’s clear that for AfD voters, the party’s primary appeal comes from its stance on migration and domestic security, with much of the security debate tied to migration—curbing violence by asylum seekers, for example. Economic issues rank far lower in importance. Right now, this prioritization works for them, but if the AfD wants to broaden its voter base in the future, they will have to develop more convincing economic solutions.

Far-Right Degrowth: A Mix of Nationalism, Eco-Asceticism, and Climate Skepticism

How does the far right’s concept of “degrowth” differ from the left’s vision, and what role does this play in its political messaging?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: So that’s a real shift in gears, moving from the AfD to the broader far right. The AfD, like most populist far-right parties, is more of an anti-environmental party than an environmental one. While they talk about alternative environmental solutions, their primary concern is denying climate change or denying that it is man-made. They advocate for a return to traditional fossil fuels and are strongly opposed to alternative energy sources. There is nothing in the AfD’s program that suggests any real concern for environmental issues.

However, the broader far-right milieu in Germany and elsewhere takes some of these issues more seriously. Unlike the AfD, some far-right groups do not deny climate change or its human causes. They support some use of alternative energies and acknowledge major environmental challenges. The most the AfD does in this regard is to conceptualize a nationalist environmental policy. They frame themselves as the true environmentalists, arguing that only patriots—those who love their homeland—can truly protect the environment. They mention environmental initiatives, but their proposals are quite limited.

This is where degrowth comes in. Unlike the broader far right, the AfD—like almost all other populist far-right parties—does not question economic growth. Degrowth is a concern primarily for other far-right groups and circles that take environmental issues more seriously. That being said, this remains a relatively small segment of the far right.

Their conception of degrowth aligns with what Bernhard Forchtner and I called “eco-asceticism.” This vision promotes self-renunciation, self-control, and a reduction in consumption. In this regard, it is not entirely different from the left’s vision of degrowth. However, where they diverge is in their views on global capitalism. The left firmly identifies global capitalism as the main driver of environmentally destructive economic growth, whereas the far right is more ambiguous. They are certainly against globalism, but not necessarily against all forms of economic growth.

Another key difference is that some segments of the far right that discuss degrowth also tie it to an ethno-nationalist vision of the nation and a concept of ethnocultural purity. You don’t find this element in the left’s vision of degrowth.

AfD Remains an Outlier but Gains Leverage in German Politics

Photo: Shutterstock.

In your view, has the AfD managed to fully integrate into the German political system, or does it remain an outlier? How has the response of mainstream parties impacted its trajectory?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: Well, it still remains an outlier because no other party is willing to form a coalition with it. The AfD is trying to bide its time—returning to a point I made earlier, the AfD’s strategy at this stage seems to be to wait it out. That is, they are not going to do much differently from what they have done before. They are not actively trying to increase their vote share; instead, they are counting on the decline of mainstream party support, which would eventually leave conservatives with no other option than to form a coalition with the AfD. That appears to be their strategy. So, the AfD is definitely still an outlier in the political system. However, its growing vote totals are making it harder for other parties to form coalitions—both at the national and state levels—and to completely ignore the issues it is raising.

How has the response of mainstream parties impacted the AfD? Well, a couple of weeks before the election, Friedrich Merz tried to push through a non-binding resolution on limiting migration in a particular way, and he had to rely on AfD support to get it passed. He didn’t want to; he had expected other parties to support it, but it turned out to be a miscalculation on his part. Many observers saw that as providing a certain degree of legitimation to the AfD and the far right. People have been discussing the Brandmauer—the firewall against the AfD—as if it is not completely down, but at least damaged.

I think the response of mainstream parties is going to be really important for the AfD’s trajectory in the future. If they can continue to marginalize the AfD—treating it as a non-legitimate party—while at the same time addressing the concerns that matter to AfD voters and a broader segment of the German electorate, then they have a chance of decreasing the AfD’s vote share.

In other words, I believe the next four years will be crucial—assuming the coalition lasts its full term. Whatever government forms next, most likely a CDU/CSU and SPD coalition, it will be essential to address key issues in a way that satisfies German voters. If they succeed, I think we will see a decline in the AfD’s vote totals. If they fail—especially if the new coalition resembles the Ampelkoalition in its inability to resolve basic concerns—then the AfD will likely continue to receive 20% or more of the vote.

AfD Support Driven More by Perceived Decline Than Economic Hardship

Many analysts highlight economic anxieties and globalization backlash as drivers of AfD support. How much of their success do you attribute to economic factors versus cultural or identity-based appeals? To what extent did dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of recent crises, such as the economy or migration, contribute to AfD’s support in Sunday’s elections?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: I’ll answer that last question first, and it contributed a lot to the AfD’s support. Migration, as we’ve discussed, was by far the biggest issue. The economy also played a role, even though it ranked lower on AfD voters’ list of concerns. That doesn’t mean it was unimportant. Certainly, the Ampel coalition’s perceived incompetence and inability to get things done had a significant effect on the AfD’s vote.

Regarding economic factors versus cultural and identity-based issues, I don’t think you can completely separate the two. If you look at AfD voters objectively, the majority are not economic losers. In terms of income levels and other economic markers, they are not primarily drawn from the unemployed or lower-income groups. Instead, the AfD’s support comes from middle- and higher-income levels. So, it is not necessarily their objective economic situation that is driving AfD voters. However, there is a strong sense of anxiety among AfD voters that they are losing—that they are falling behind compared to other groups.

This reflects a distinction between subjective perceptions and objective markers of economic status. Looking at the available data, Tagesschau exit polling showed that domestic security played a far larger role among AfD voters than among any other party’s electorate, with 33% citing it as a top concern. Migration, as expected, was twice as significant for AfD voters compared to supporters of any other party. Conversely, economic growth was a much lower priority for AfD voters compared to other parties.

One particularly interesting finding is that 75% of AfD voters expressed strong concerns that rising prices would make it difficult for them to pay their bills. Similarly, 74% feared that their standard of living could not be maintained in the future, and 71% were deeply concerned about having enough money in old age. So, while AfD voters clearly have economic anxieties—especially regarding globalization—these concerns are not necessarily grounded in their objective circumstances but rather in their subjective perceptions and fears about economic decline.

AfD Seeks Alliances but Remains ‘Too Extreme’ for Europe’s Far Right

Hundreds of people demonstrated against hatred and the AfD at a rally organized by Fridays for Future Cologne in Cologne, Germany, on February 1, 2024. Photo: Ryan Nash Photography.

Given the rise of far-right parties across Europe, do you see the AfD aligning more with transnational populist movements, or is its strategy still largely domestically driven?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: I see the AfD trying to align itself more with transnational populist movements. It does seek out international partners, particularly in Europe. However, interestingly enough, the AfD is still viewed as too extreme by many far-right populist parties—certainly by the National Rally in France, which did not want the AfD as part of its group in the European Parliament. It is also seen that way by Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, as the AfD is considered too far to the right. Some of the party’s controversial statements regarding the Nazis, the Holocaust, and the war have contributed to this perception.

As a result, the AfD currently stands somewhat apart from other far-right populist parties in Europe, even though they share many of the same issues. Migration is a central concern for all far-right populist parties, as is globalization. Anti-EU or at least highly EU-skeptical sentiments are common across these parties, as is the cultivation of nationalism and national identity. However, the AfD remains farther to the right than most.

Domestically, the AfD is primarily focused on appealing to East Germans, where some of its more controversial statements on National Socialism have not appeared to harm its electoral support. However, these same controversies have damaged its relationships with other far-right populist parties in Europe.

AfD’s Environmental Stance: Nationalist Framing or Anti-Green Identity?

Farmers and truckers protest against subsidy cuts at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, Germany, on January 14, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

Does the AfD’s environmental discourse resonate with voters, or is it more of a symbolic strategy aimed at rebranding the party’s ideological image?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: Whatever pro-environmental discourse the AfD has is not really something that resonates with voters. When you look at the AfD’s messaging, it is primarily focused on anti-environmental positions. It advocates for a return to fossil fuels, opposes alternative energy sources like wind power, rejects subsidies for electric vehicles, and promotes climate change denial or skepticism.

The environmental aspects of the AfD’s messaging are mostly framed within a nationalist perspective. This includes rhetoric about protecting the German environment, preserving the homeland, and safeguarding natural spaces. However, this nationalist environmentalism is minimal and does not seem to attract many voters.

The interesting question moving forward is whether the AfD—or other populist far-right parties—will attempt to moderate their stance on environmental issues, climate change, and related policies. It remains to be seen whether they will consider such a shift too risky, as their anti-environmental message is distinct from that of any other party. If they were to embrace more pro-environmental policies, they might lose their unique positioning in the electoral marketplace.

And lastly, Professor Olsen, how has the AfD framed issues like sustainability and environmental protection? Does their rhetoric on ecology differ from traditional far-right parties, and how do they position themselves against the German Greens?

Professor Jonathan Olsen: Well, there has been some great work looking at the relationship between the AfD and the Greens. I think the Technical University of Dresden has written a couple of pieces on this. I remember one article that essentially discusses the AfD as the “anti-Greens.” They position themselves as such because they take very distinct, opposing positions from the Greens and view them as their biggest enemy—not necessarily in terms of electoral strength, but certainly in terms of policies and ideology. The image of the Greens and the image of the AfD are diametrically opposed, and the AfD very much positions itself in direct opposition to them.

Issues like sustainability and environmental protection are, again, wrapped within a German nationalist framework. Their rhetoric suggests that, of course, they want environmental sustainability and to protect the environment, as it is part of the natural basis of life and the German homeland. The argument follows that those who love their homeland will naturally want to protect its environment.

This framing allows the AfD to present some environmental policies—such as reducing the use of pesticides or other forms of environmental protection—as being in line with their nationalist agenda. However, where they truly differentiate themselves and cast themselves as the “anti-Greens” is in their opposition to climate protection and alternative energies, particularly as part of a broader climate policy.