Panel 1, titled “Politics of Social Contract,” takes place during the ECPS Conference 2025 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1. Chaired by Dr. Lior Erez (Blavatnik School of Government, Nuffield College), the panel features presentations by Sabine Carey, Robert Johns, Katrin Paula, Nadine O'Shea, Nathan Tsang, and Simon Clemens.

ECPS Conference 2025 / Panel I — Politics of Social Contract

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “ECPS Conference 2025 / Panel I — Politics of Social Contract.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 8, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00102

 

Panel I – Politics of the Social Contract at the ECPS Conference 2025 brought together diverse approaches to examine how democratic legitimacy, resistance, and pluralism are evolving in the face of global democratic backsliding. Chaired by Dr. Lior Erez (Oxford University), the panel featured Professor Robert Johns and collaborators presenting experimental research on public support for human rights under repression; Nathan Tsang (USC) explored how Hong Kong diaspora communities engage in covert resistance through cultural expression; and Simon Clemens (Humboldt University) introduced Isabelle Stengers’ cosmopolitical philosophy, proposing a radical politics of coexistence over consensus. Together, the presentations reflected on how the idea of “the people” is being contested, reimagined, and mobilized across social, empirical, and philosophical registers.

Reported by ECPS Staff

Panel 1 of the ECPS Conference “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy,”—titled Politics of the Social Contract—offered a rich, interdisciplinary exploration of how democratic legitimacy, group identity, and political resistance are being reimagined in response to the erosion of liberal democratic norms. Held at St. Cross College, Oxford, and chaired by Dr. Lior Erez (Alfred Landecker Postdoctoral Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government and Nuffield College, Oxford), the session brought together empirical, ethnographic, and philosophical perspectives on the contested meanings of citizenship and coexistence in our contemporary moment.

The social contract—once the symbolic foundation of liberal democracy—has come under intense pressure in recent years. The rise of exclusionary populist movements, the securitization of public discourse, and the erosion of trust in institutions have all complicated the relationship between citizens and the state. Yet, even as these developments undermine traditional models of political legitimacy, new forms of democratic practice and resistance are emerging. This panel offers an interdisciplinary examination of how these tensions play out in empirical and philosophical terms.

The panel began with a presentation by Professor Robert Johns (University of Southampton), who—alongside co-authors Sabine Carey, Katrin Paula, and Nadine O’Shea—shared findings from an innovative survey experiment conducted in Germany. Their study investigated public support for police violence across various protest scenarios and tested whether different rhetorical frames—rooted in human rights, democracy, or universalism—could reduce support for repression. Strikingly, they found that traditional rights-based arguments were only modestly effective, and that democratic appeals had greater persuasive power. The research revealed the fragility of rights discourse and the challenge of mobilizing public support across group divides.

The second paper, by Nathan Tsang (University of Southern California), shifts the focus to diasporic resistance under authoritarian threat. Drawing from rich ethnographic fieldwork with Hong Kong communities in the US, Tsang reveals how cultural activities can serve as subtle yet powerful platforms for political expression—especially under the shadow of transnational repression. His analysis shows how everyday practices blur the line between political and non-political, reshaping our understanding of what resistance can look like.

Finally, Simon Clemens (Humboldt University of Berlin) invites us into the philosophical realm of cosmopolitics, drawing on the work of Isabelle Stengers to rethink pluralism, coexistence, and the political beyond the demos. Clemens challenges both liberal and radical democratic assumptions, offering a vision of politics rooted in heterogeneity, co-presence, and what he calls “cosmic proceduralism.”

Together, these papers open vital questions about power, belonging, and democratic futures in an unsettled world.

Professor Robert Johns: “Exploring Human Rights Attitudes: Outgroup Perception and Long-term Consequences 

Robert Johns, Professor of Politics at the University of Southampton, presents the paper of his research team on human rights attitudes and outgroup perceptions during Panel I, Politics of Social Contract, at the ECPS Conference 2025 held at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1, 2025.

In his empirically grounded and theoretically ambitious presentation, Robert Johns, Professor of Politics at the University of Southampton, examined the complexity of public attitudes toward human rights, with particular attention to how such attitudes are influenced by group identity, discursive framing, and rhetorical context. Delivered during Panel 1 of the ECPS Conference at Oxford University, his talk—titled “Exploring Human Rights Attitudes: Outgroup Perception and Long-term Consequences”—was a candid reflection on both the possibilities and limitations of persuasion in bolstering public support for human rights protections.

Professor Johns opened with an acknowledgment of the methodological diversity of the symposium and introduced his team’s (Sabine Carey, Katrin Paula and Nadine O’Shea) “quantitative persuasion experiment,” aimed not merely at observing public opinion but at exploring how to strengthen democratic and rights-based commitments in an age of populist backlash. He critiqued the prevailing notion that rights-supporting attitudes are stable, arguing instead that they are often thin, situationally dependent, and subject to manipulation by both rhetorical framing and group biases.

At the heart of Professor Johns’s research was a large-scale survey experiment conducted in Germany, designed to examine public reactions to the use of excessive police force against demonstrators. As Professor Johns explained during his presentation, respondents were randomly assigned to read a vignette describing peaceful protests, with the identity of the protestors varied across conditions—Muslim groups, climate activists, right-wing demonstrators, or an unspecified group. The primary dependent variable was the level of support for a hypothetical proposal to grant police amnesty for using excessive force in such scenarios.

Crucially, the study tested whether various types of arguments opposing this policy—framed in terms of human rights, democratic norms, universalism, or slippery-slope reasoning—could diminish public support for repression. As Professor Johns noted, a control group received no normative framing, providing a baseline against which the persuasive impact of each justificatory appeal could be assessed. 

Professor Johns’ findings were striking. Across the sample, about one-third of respondents supported the repressive measure. Yet, surprisingly, most of the interventions—particularly those grounded in explicit human rights language—had only modest or negligible persuasive effects. The strongest rhetorical appeal was not a rights-based argument at all, but rather an appeal to “democratic rights,” suggesting that public support may be more easily activated by the language of democratic norms than by abstract invocations of “human rights.”

The study also explored how group attitudes shaped policy support. Respondents who harbored negative views toward the outgroup mentioned in the vignette—especially Muslims and climate activists—were significantly more likely to support repressive policies. However, even among this subgroup, some framing interventions, particularly those emphasizing universality or future consequences, slightly reduced support for police impunity. Intriguingly, the only subgroup where the interventions had a noticeable effect were those respondents who had previously signaled a willingness to deny rights across multiple domains—those least committed to human rights. This paradoxical finding suggested that even people initially inclined to restrict rights might be susceptible to targeted persuasion, while those who profess stronger commitments often remain unmoved.

Professor Johns also acknowledged the broader discursive challenge facing human rights advocacy. He pointed to the structural asymmetry between “urgent,” emotionally charged justifications for repression (e.g., national security, law and order) and the often abstract, long-term nature of rights-based arguments. In public debates, human rights defenders are frequently forced into reactive positions, which are temporally and rhetorically disadvantaged. As Professor Johns noted, in televised or political discourse, “rights” advocates often lose momentum by having to concede moral complexity or nuance in response to emotionally powerful narratives focused on threats, danger, or victimhood.

In concluding, Professor Johns emphasized that the lack of strong persuasive effects in the study was not necessarily a failure but an invitation to recalibrate both the content and the communication of human rights advocacy. He posed several provocations for future research and political practice: Should we reframe human rights in terms more resonant with popular democratic identity? Can rights-based arguments be made more immediate, urgent, or emotionally compelling? And how do we bridge the psychological gap between “us” and “them” when advocating for truly universal rights?

Ultimately, Professor Johns’ presentation underscored the fragility of rights-based norms in the public imagination and the difficulty of mobilizing support across group boundaries in polarized societies. Yet it also suggested that with careful framing, strategic messaging, and attention to underlying group perceptions, there remains space to expand public commitment to inclusive democratic principles. His empirical approach—rigorous yet normatively engaged—offered a valuable contribution to ongoing debates about how best to defend and revitalize the language of rights in a climate of democratic uncertainty.

Nathan Tsang: “Doing Politics Non-politically: Explaining How Cultural Projects Afford Political Resistance” 

Umbrella Movement protesters gather in Admiralty, Hong Kong, after the launch of Occupy Central on September 28, 2014, demanding democratic reform and public consultation. Police blocked key access routes. Photo: Mike K.

Nathan Tsang, a doctoral candidate in sociology at the University of Southern California, presented his ongoing ethnographic research titled “Doing Politics Non-politically: Explaining How Cultural Projects Afford Political Resistance.” The project explores how diasporic Hong Kongers in the United States engage in political resistance within seemingly non-political cultural contexts. Drawing on two years of fieldwork, Tsang’s analysis offers a nuanced sociological account of how diasporic communities under threat of transnational repression navigate and perform political expression in the everyday.

Tsang’s inquiry originates in an empirical puzzle he encountered while attending a Chinese New Year festival organized by Hong Kong immigrants in the US. Amid the food stalls and traditional decorations, he noticed politically charged banners and banned books—materials overtly critical of the Chinese regime. What struck him was the blending of cultural celebration with veiled political protest. Why, he asked, do diaspora Hong Kongers embed political messaging in cultural settings? And how is political resistance sustained under the constraints of surveillance and repression from abroad?

The backdrop to this phenomenon is the 2019 Hong Kong protest movement, followed by intense repression by the Chinese and Hong Kong governments. Many activists fled and now live in exile, facing both psychological trauma and the threat of transnational repression. As Tsang noted, diaspora Hong Kongers wish to remain politically engaged without exposing themselves or loved ones to state retaliation. This has led them to embed resistance within cultural forms—New Year fairs, movie clubs, and community centers—allowing them to “do politics non-politically.”

While this blending of culture and politics in exile has precedent—similar dynamics have been observed in the Turkish, Iranian, and Tibetan diasporas—Tsang argues that existing literature leaves gaps. Most notably, while repression is often theorized as a top-down force that curtails public expression, less is known about how individuals interpret and navigate repression in real-time, social contexts. Furthermore, scholars have yet to fully explore how individual acts of covert resistance become collectively legible and politically potent. Tsang’s intervention centers on this “how” question: How do individuals under threat of repression switch between cultural and political modes of engagement in everyday life? How does resistance become collectively cued and sustained?

To answer this, Tsang adopts an interactionist ethnographic methodology. He embedded himself in two diasporic Hong Kong cultural organizations located in a major US West Coast city: a movie club that promotes Hong Kong cinema and a community center offering social gatherings and workshops. Both organizations were founded by former activists from the 2019 movement and operate in the same local network. By selecting highly similar cases—geographically co-located, ideologically aligned, and socially overlapping—Tsang sought to isolate the micro-interactional dynamics that differentiate more successful political cueing from less effective ones.

These dynamics, Tsang argues, demonstrate that political speech in diasporic communities under repression is contingent not only on intention but on a shared ability to “read the room.” Through repeated participation in communal settings, individuals learn when it is safe—and expected—to shift from being cultural consumers to political actors. These micro-cues and switches, often mundane and unnoticed, are the mechanisms through which political communities are built and sustained under repression.

A third case, from the US Pacific Northwest, further supported this argument. There, a movie screening group resembled the earlier movie club, but with one key difference: a small stand offering books on Hong Kong politics. This unassuming addition, not even strategically planned, catalyzed in-depth public discussions about resistance and community formation. Tsang concluded that such material cues—books, spatial layouts, symbolic gestures—can serve as powerful anchors for interactional shifts toward political engagement.

Theoretically, Tsang’s research bridges social movement theory, diaspora studies, and the sociology of culture. While concepts such as abeyance (from movement scholarship) and hidden transcripts (James Scott) capture aspects of suppressed activism, Tsang insists on the importance of micro-sociological analysis: the cues, environments, and interactions through which resistance becomes collectively meaningful. His work contributes to the growing body of scholarship that treats culture not merely as a resource or backdrop, but as an active site of political negotiation.

Tsang concluded with a sobering reflection. While his findings highlight creative resistance, he also cautioned against romanticizing these efforts. In recent fieldwork, he has observed “Hong Kong Trumpists”entering the same cultural spaces to reshape diasporic narratives in line with right-wing populism. This underscores that the same interactional dynamics that enable resistance can also be harnessed to spread illiberal ideologies. Hence, understanding how political meaning is cued in everyday life is crucial not only for recognizing resistance but also for identifying the incubation of populist backlash.

Tsang’s presentation, rich in ethnographic detail and theoretical insight, offered a compelling portrait of how politics persists—and is transformed—in spaces where it is ostensibly absent. His work sheds light on the subtle yet powerful ways diasporic communities negotiate identity, solidarity, and resistance in an era of transnational repression.

Simon Clemens: “From Demos to Cosmos: Isabelle Stengers’ Cosmopolitical Philosophy and Democratic Pluralism”

Simon Clemens, Doctoral Researcher at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, presents his paper titled “From Demos to Cosmos: The Political Philosophy of Isabelle Stengers” during Panel I at the ECPS Conference 2025, held at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1, 2025.

Simon Clemens, a doctoral researcher at the Cluster of Excellence “Contestation of the Liberal Script” (SCRIPTS) and the Theory of Politics program at Humboldt University of Berlin, delivered a nuanced presentation exploring the political philosophy of Belgian philosopher Isabelle Stengers. Titled “From Demos to Cosmos: The Political Philosophy of Isabelle Stengers,” the presentation aimed to reinterpret democratic politics and pluralism through the lens of what Stengers calls “cosmopolitics.”

Clemens contextualized his talk within his broader dissertation research, which interrogates the political significance of the so-called “new materialisms”—a theoretical tradition that reconsiders the relationship between nature and culture, particularly in light of climate crisis and transformations in the sciences. Through this framework, Clemens argued that Stengers offers an alternative imagination for politics that departs from liberal and utilitarian frameworks, introducing a politics grounded not in consensus or inclusion, but in co-presence and heterogeneity.

Clemens began by contrasting Stengers’ approach to pluralism with that of John Rawls, the quintessential liberal theorist. Rawls, in his theory of “reasonable pluralism,” acknowledges the coexistence of diverse worldviews in a democratic society, held together by an “overlapping consensus” of reasonable doctrines. Clemens noted that for Rawls, this consensus emerges from the institutional conditions of liberal democracy, enabling a coherent political framework that respects difference within bounds of reasonableness.

Stengers, however, rejects this premise. Rather than viewing pluralism as stemming from reasonable disagreement about a shared world, she posits that the world itself is fundamentally heterogeneous. Drawing from her work with Nobel laureate Ilya Prigogine in the philosophy of science, Stengers argues that even the natural sciences—particularly physics and thermodynamics—offer conflicting and irreducibly divergent perspectives on the nature of reality. Thus, heterogeneity is not just a social fact or epistemological disagreement but an ontological condition.

To conceptualize how such radical heterogeneity can coexist politically, Stengers develops two central concepts: the “ecology of practices” and “cosmopolitics.” An “ecology of practices” refers to the co-existence of diverse knowledge systems, ways of life, and forms of evaluation that interact without collapsing into a singular hierarchy. Each practice is embedded in specific environments, produces its own modes of meaning, and carries internal logics that cannot be subordinated to universal standards. This ecology does not demand consensus but mutual awareness and the maintenance of relations that allow different practices to endure.

Cosmopolitics, meanwhile, names the political moment in which these ecologies interact. Importantly, Clemens emphasized that Stengers departs from Kantian cosmopolitanism, which seeks universal moral order. Instead, cosmopolitics resists universalization and instead foregrounds what she calls “co-presence”: the simultaneous, non-hierarchical existence of entities and practices that assert their heterogeneity. It is, in her view, a political response to the “generalized state of war” imposed by projects of global homogenization, including capitalist globalization and abstract universalism.

Clemens then turned to what he termed “cosmic proceduralism”—Stengers’ approach to political process that eschews quick resolutions and seeks to create space for heterogeneity to express itself. The core practice here is “slowing down”: a deliberate deceleration of decision-making and political composition to make room for those whose practices and values are often excluded or marginalized.

Slowing down, Clemens explained, is not inertia but attentiveness. It is the art of “paying attention to those inhabiting the land,” to borrow Stengers’ phrase. In practical terms, it introduces hesitation into otherwise mobilized, goal-oriented political processes. This aligns with Stengers’ critique of “mobilization” in both scientific and political contexts, where speed and efficiency often override careful consideration of affected actors.

Complementing this is her interest in the figure of the “diplomat,” who negotiates among divergent worlds not by imposing unity but by pacifying potentially hostile interactions. Through diplomacy and slowing down, a fragile mode of coexistence is made possible—a cosmos that is always emergent and never fully known.

In the final section, Clemens addressed the implications of Stengers’ cosmopolitics for democratic theory, particularly the concept of the demos. Drawing on thinkers like Jacques Rancière and Claude Lefort, he noted that radical democratic theory defines the demos as inherently open and contestable. “We, the people” is never a closed category; it is always subject to expansion and redefinition.

However, Clemens argued that Stengers moves away from the inclusion-oriented logic of radical democracy. Her concern is not with expanding the demos to include the excluded, but with preserving the heterogeneity of forms of life without subsuming them into a unified political subject. In this sense, her cosmopolitics does not seek to rule “in the name of the people,” but to enable the coexistence of radically diverse actors—what might be called the rule of the heterogeneous.

This leads to a provocative claim: the liberal and even radical democratic emphasis on inclusion can become coercive when it imposes a shared ontology or worldview. Inclusion, in this view, risks annihilating difference under the guise of universality. Thus, Stengers’ cosmopolitics can be read as a post-democratic or even anti-democratic gesture—not in the sense of rejecting democracy, but of shifting its foundation from shared rule to plural coexistence.

Clemens concluded by noting that Stengers’ political philosophy makes an important intervention in both democratic theory and broader discussions of pluralism. It challenges the consensus-seeking, universalist tendencies of liberalism and radical democracy alike. By proposing a cosmopolitical proceduralism rooted in heterogeneity, slowing down, and non-hierarchical co-presence, Stengers reimagines political life as the careful negotiation of difference rather than its resolution.

In an era of planetary crisis, epistemic conflict, and social fragmentation, Clemens suggested, such a rethinking may be not only timely but necessary. Cosmopolitics, in this light, becomes a radical democratic gesture that centers the right to exist differently—not just for people, but for practices, worlds, and beings too often ignored by traditional political thought.

Conclusion

Panel I of the ECPS Conference 2025 at Oxford University illuminated the evolving tensions within the modern social contract by offering deeply complementary empirical, ethnographic, and philosophical insights. Each presentation underscored the ways in which democratic legitimacy is not only being tested but reconfigured in response to exclusionary populism, transnational repression, and ontological pluralism. From Robert Johns’ sobering data on the limits of rights-based persuasion to Nathan Tsang’s compelling ethnography of diasporic resistance and Simon Clemens’ philosophical reimagining of democracy through Stengers’ cosmopolitics, the panel revealed the fragility and adaptability of democratic norms under contemporary pressure.

Chair Dr. Lior Erez skillfully moderated a session that moved fluidly between grounded data, lived experience, and theoretical provocation. What emerged was a picture of “the people” not as a unified voice, but as a contested terrain—shaped by identity, institutional trust, and the search for meaningful participation. The session called not for nostalgia over lost democratic certainties but for rigorous engagement with the evolving forms of political subjectivity, belonging, and resistance. As the crisis of the liberal script deepens, such interdisciplinary dialogues remain vital in charting pathways toward inclusive, resilient, and plural democratic futures.


 

Note: To experience the panel’s dynamic and thought-provoking Q&A session, we encourage you to watch the full video recording above.

Participants of the ECPS Conference 2025 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, gather for a group photo on July 1, 2025.

Opening Session of the ECPS Conference 2025: ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy – Interdisciplinary Approaches

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff (2025). “Opening Session of the ECPS Conference 2025: ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy – Interdisciplinary Approaches.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 8, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00101

The ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford began with a timely and thought-provoking opening session that explored the evolving meaning and political utility of “the people” in democratic discourse. Sümeyye Kocaman offered a nuanced welcome, highlighting how the term has been used across history to empower, exclude, and politicize identity. Kate Mavor, Master of St Cross College, underscored the value of interdisciplinary exchange in addressing democratic challenges, noting how the College’s diverse academic environment aligned naturally with the conference’s aims. Baroness Janet Royall then delivered a compelling keynote, warning of the double-edged nature of “the people” as both democratic ideal and populist tool. Her address emphasized the need for inclusion, institutional integrity, civic renewal, and interdisciplinary cooperation in the face of democratic erosion. The session set the stage for critical and globally relevant dialogue across disciplines.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The opening session of the ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford commenced with a series of remarks that collectively set an intellectually rich and politically urgent tone for the days ahead. Sümeyye Kocaman, DPhil candidate at St. Catherine’s College and conference coordinator on behalf of the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), offered a thoughtful and inclusive welcome, grounding the event in the contested and evolving significance of “the people.” She reflected on how this concept—invoked across diverse historical, geographical, and ideological contexts—has served both emancipatory and exclusionary purposes. Drawing on her research and recent electoral analyses, she highlighted the growing resonance of populist narratives and the imperative to examine how democratic rhetoric shapes lived experience beyond the ballot box.

Following Kocaman, Kate Mavor, CBE, Master of St Cross College, welcomed participants on behalf of the host institution. Emphasizing the interdisciplinary character of St Cross—a graduate college home to scholars from over 60 fields—she noted the alignment between the conference’s aims and the College’s commitment to cross-disciplinary dialogue.

Baroness Janet Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, then delivered an incisive keynote, urging participants to confront the dual nature of “the people” as both democratic foundation and potential populist weapon. Her address called for rigorous, interdisciplinary engagement and collective democratic renewal.

Welcome Address by Conference Coordinator Sümeyye Kocaman

Sümeyye Kocaman, Managing Editor of Populism & Politics, and the coordinator of the ECPS Conference 2025 on behalf of the European Center for Populism Studies, opened the event with a thoughtful and inclusive welcome. Expressing gratitude to participants for arriving so promptly, she framed the conference around the contested nature of “the people.” Kocaman also highlighted the plurality and political weight of the term across time and place. From 19th-century American democratization to Cold War securitization and from the ideological symbolism of Albania’s People’s Republic to contemporary struggles for women’s rights and labor justice, she emphasized that invocations of “the people” are never ideologically neutral.

Kocaman noted that in populism studies, “the people” remains a central but fluid category—emerging in various forms such as “digital populism,” “climate populism,” and others. This terminological proliferation, she argued, speaks to the field’s theoretical dynamism but also to its increasing relevance in everyday political life. Drawing from her own research, she underscored the need to interrogate how notions of “the people” function not just in electoral discourse, but in the daily lived experiences of individuals and communities. This perspective, she asserted, is especially urgent in light of rising populist rhetoric across both Eastern and Western Europe, as recently documented in ECPS’s report on the EU elections.

Kocaman closed by acknowledging the collaborative support of academic and institutional partners—including the Rothermere American Institute, the European Studies Centre, Oxford’s Democracy Network, and scholars from Berlin and Brighton—and expressed solidarity with scholars unable to attend due to geopolitical crises. Her closing remarks served as a poignant reminder of the stakes of the conference: engaging critically with the idea of “the people” under conditions of global instability and democratic uncertainty.

Welcome Address by Kate Mavor on Behalf of the Host College

Kate Mavor, CBE, delivers the opening remarks at the ECPS Conference 2025 held at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1, 2025.

Kate Mavor, CBE, Master of St Cross College, opened the Conference with a warm and appreciative welcome to all participants. She expressed genuine delight that the conference was taking place at St Cross and extended her congratulations to Sümeyye Kocaman for organizing what she described as an exceptionally rich and meaningful academic program. She also offered thanks to Ben Gladstone, Junior Dean at St Cross, for his role in helping bring the event to the college.

Mavor took a moment to reflect on the nature of St Cross College itself—an entirely graduate institution at the University of Oxford, with approximately 620 students representing over 60 academic disciplines. She noted that this unique breadth makes the College an especially fertile ground for interdisciplinary dialogue, and she emphasized that hosting events like the ECPS Conference is very much in line with the College’s mission to encourage rigorous, open, and diverse scholarly conversations.

She acknowledged the topic of the conference—centered on the idea of “the people” and its implications for contemporary democracy—as both pressing and, in some respects, deeply unsettling. Yet she expressed hope that the conference would provide space for thoughtful, evidence-based discussion at a time when such engagement is more necessary than ever. She concluded by welcoming attendees once again and graciously passed the floor to Janet Royall, Baroness Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, Oxford University.

Keynote Address by Janet Royall (Baroness Royall of Blaisdon)

Baroness Janet Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, delivers the keynote address during the opening session of the ECPS Conference 2025 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1, 2025.

Baroness Royall, in her opening address, brought to the fore a compelling blend of political insight, institutional experience, and democratic advocacy. While modestly noting her non-academic background, she framed her intervention with both humility and urgency—an acknowledgment of the significance of the moment and the thematic depth of the conference.

Speaking from her current role as Principal of Somerville College and her former position as Chair of the People’s History Museum in Manchester—a self-declared “museum of democracy”—Baroness Royall underscored the symbolic and practical weight of convening such a conference at a time when democracy is under unprecedented strain. Her address moved fluidly from personal reflection to systemic critique, offering a panoramic view of the challenges and possibilities that define our democratic era.

Baroness Royall opened by commending the ECPS and conference organizers for their vision and rapid execution of a robust program. She recalled an early conversation in January 2025 with the conference coordinator, Sumeyye Kocaman, about an “embryonic” idea to convene a gathering on the theme of “We, the People.” In less than six months, that idea had matured into an intellectually rigorous and internationally inclusive conference. She highlighted the potential of this initiative to lay the groundwork for a broader academic and civic endeavor, notably the proposed Oxford Democracy Network—a platform to foster long-term collaboration around democratic renewal.

At the heart of Baroness Royall’s speech was the concept of “the people”—both as a foundational democratic ideal and as a source of contemporary political peril. She asked, pointedly, whether the title of the conference might have been better framed as “We, the People and the Precarious Future of Democracy.” This rhetorical shift captured her broader concern: that the invocation of “the people” has become a double-edged sword in today’s political landscape.

Baroness Royall cited the alarming statistic that one-fifth of the world’s democracies have declined or disappeared between 2012 and 2024, pointing to a structural crisis in democratic governance. This regression, she argued, is not attributable to a singular cause but reflects a toxic convergence of polarizing narratives, us-versus-them mentalities, and the erosion of social cohesion. Crucially, she emphasized that these trends do not signal the end of democracy, but rather call for its reinvention—grounded in inclusion, resilience, and renewed solidarity.

Drawing on her political experience, Baroness Royall articulated how the phrase “we the people,” while historically empowering—as in the US Constitution—can also be weaponized. When deployed inclusively, the phrase serves as a unifying force, anchoring citizenship in shared values and a common public life. However, in the hands of authoritarian populists, the same phrase is used to divide, exclude, and delegitimize. By framing political opponents as enemies of the people, populist leaders transform democratic mechanisms into tools of domination. Royall cited cases such as Hungary, India, Turkey, and the United States, where the language of majoritarian legitimacy is used to undermine pluralism, erode judicial independence, and roll back minority rights. In such contexts, democracy may persist in name but is hollowed out in substance.

To confront these challenges, Baroness Royall stressed the necessity of interdisciplinary engagement. No single field, she argued, can adequately diagnose or respond to the crisis of democracy. Political science and law illuminate how constitutions shape and channel power; sociology and anthropology explore the socio-cultural dimensions of exclusion and cohesion; history and philosophy provide the longue durée through which the evolution of “the people” can be understood; and media and technology studies reveal how digital platforms both fracture and connect public discourse. She notably added science to this list—an unusual but thought-provoking inclusion—arguing that scientific knowledge and the practices of truth-seeking are indispensable to democratic life. Citing Nobel Laureate Sir Paul Nurse, she affirmed that “democracy is built on truth and trust,” and that science, in its ideal form, sustains both.

Baroness Royall’s address was marked by a tone of constructive realism. While expressing concern over democratic decline, she rejected fatalism. Instead, she outlined a multidimensional agenda for democratic renewal. First, she called for a redefinition of “the people” as an inclusive and dynamic community, one capable of accommodating diversity without retreating into fragmentation. Here, she invoked the post-Apartheid experience of South Africa as a model for constructing cross-cutting civic identities that transcend ethnic or sectarian divisions.

Second, Baroness Royall underscored the need to reinforce institutional integrity. This involves defending the independence of the judiciary, safeguarding electoral systems, and protecting a free press—all vital bulwarks against the authoritarian temptation of majoritarian rule.

Third, she emphasized civic renewal through grassroots participation, deliberative assemblies, and public education. Democracy, in her view, is not merely a set of institutions but a culture of engagement—a shared commitment to dialogue, complexity, and the common good.

Fourth, she called for global solidarity. Authoritarian populism is a transnational phenomenon and demands coordinated international responses. Civil society watchdogs, transnational legal norms, and cross-border academic partnerships must be part of the democratic arsenal.

Turning to her own political reflections, Baroness Royall acknowledged the widespread disillusionment with politicians. She argued, however, that this disaffection is often rooted in unrealistic public expectations. Voters demand lower taxes, higher pensions, and expanded public services—expectations that cannot be reconciled without trade-offs. Populists exploit this cognitive dissonance by offering simple solutions to complex problems. In contrast, genuine democracy, she insisted, requires honesty—about limits, about governance, and about the costs of collective decisions.

She also lamented the decline of local journalism and the rise of disinformation—particularly via AI-generated content—which has fractured the public sphere. Without a shared reality, she warned, the very possibility of democratic deliberation is undermined. In this context, she called for renewed investment in the civic infrastructure of knowledge: public media, media literacy, and forums for reasoned debate.

Baroness Royall then addressed a structural limitation of democracy often left unspoken: the influence of global capital. She noted that the need to placate financial markets can restrict democratic choice, creating a form of “attenuated democracy” where formal procedures persist but real power is constrained. This reality, she argued, highlights the need for vigilance and adaptation to preserve meaningful democratic sovereignty.

In her concluding remarks, Baroness Royall affirmed the value of the ECPS conference and its role in advancing a crucial intellectual and political mission. The “We, the People” program, she said, addresses the central paradox of modern democracy: that the very concept designed to empower citizens can also be used to erode their rights. By combining rigorous scholarship with policy-relevant insights, the conference aims not only to diagnose democratic decay but also to formulate strategies for renewal.

Baroness Royall closed on a note of cautious optimism, invoking Antonio Gramsci’s famous formulation: “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.” While the threats to democracy are serious, she maintained that collective action, informed deliberation, and institutional resilience can chart a path forward. She expressed hope that the conference would inspire not only intellectually stimulating discussions but also concrete contributions to policy and democratic reform.

Conclusion 

The opening session of the ECPS Conference 2025 laid a compelling foundation for the days ahead, offering both a sobering diagnosis of democratic fragility and an urgent call for renewal grounded in intellectual rigor and interdisciplinary collaboration. Anchored by the interventions of Sümeyye Kocaman, Kate Mavor, and Baroness Janet Royall, the session deftly mapped the theoretical and practical stakes of examining “the people” as a contested and evolving concept at the heart of democratic politics.

Kocaman’s remarks highlighted the historical plurality and ideological malleability of “the people,” urging participants to interrogate its use not only in electoral campaigns but also in shaping everyday political experiences. Mavor emphasized the role of academic institutions in fostering open dialogue on questions of urgent public concern. Baroness Royall, meanwhile, offered a far-reaching keynote that moved from democratic theory to global political realities. Her speech underscored the double-edged nature of “the people” in democratic discourse—capable of both mobilizing collective agency and justifying exclusionary populism.

Collectively, these addresses set a tone of cautious optimism. While acknowledging the pressures of democratic backsliding, disinformation, and socio-political fragmentation, each speaker reaffirmed the possibility of renewal through civic education, institutional reform, and cross-sector dialogue. The session concluded with a clear message: that democracy cannot be taken for granted, and that critical, interdisciplinary engagement is essential not only for understanding the present crisis, but also for envisioning democratic futures that are more inclusive, participatory, and resilient. As the conference moves forward, the intellectual commitments voiced in the opening session will serve as both compass and challenge—calling participants to contribute meaningfully to the urgent task of democratic revitalization.

Religious symbols on sand: Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Orthodoxy Buddhism and Hinduism. Photo: Godong Photo.

Fourth Annual International Symposium on ‘Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges’

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) successfully convened its Fourth Annual International Symposium at the University of Warsaw on May 22–23, 2025. The event brought together leading scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to examine the evolving dynamics of civilizational populism and its wide-ranging implications on local, national, transnational, and global levels.

Over two days of intensive dialogue and critical reflection, the symposium explored how populism—particularly in its civilizational form—interacts with religion, digital technologies, and identity-based narratives to shape political behavior, influence democratic institutions, and impact social cohesion across plural societies. Special attention was paid to the varied manifestations of populism in both the Global North and Global South.

The concept of civilizational populism—which deploys civilizational identity as a metanarrative to heighten antagonism between ‘the people’ and constructed ‘others,’ often along religious and cultural lines—was a central focus. Participants analyzed how this form of populism contributes to the intensification of intra- and inter-group conflicts and how it reshapes the discourse on globalization, South-South cooperation, and multipolar international relations.

Panels addressed the following core themes:

  • The relationship between civilizational populism and democratic backsliding.
  • The use of religion and civilizational rhetoric by populists to legitimize exclusionary policies.
  • The strategic role of digital technologies and artificial intelligence in amplifying populist messages.
  • Transnational linkages between populist actors and their impact on global governance frameworks.

The symposium further emphasized that while populism is often characterized as a “thin ideology,” it operates alongside thick ideologies—such as neoliberalism, nationalism, socialism, or religion—and plays a significant role in shaping emotions, mobilizing public sentiment, and reconfiguring political power structures.

Speakers highlighted that civilizational populist narratives, far from being confined to national borders, are increasingly embedded in global communication circuits, shaping diasporic politics, influencing foreign policy, and challenging multilateral norms.

Ultimately, the symposium fostered rich interdisciplinary discussions and called for innovative, inclusive, and ethically grounded strategies to address the challenges posed by civilizational populism in today’s digitally interconnected and ideologically polarized world.

Organizing Institution

European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) (Brussels)

Hosting Institution

Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw (Warsaw)

Partner Institutions

Georgetown University (Washington DC)

University of Birmingham (Birmingham)

Deakin University (Melbourne)

DAAD / Cambridge University

University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of East Asian Studies 

Centre for International Relations (Warsaw)

 

DAY ONE – May 22, 2025

Opening Speech

Dr. Adam Bodnar (Minister of Justice of Poland / (Video Recording).

 

Keynote Speech

“A Relational Approach to Religion and Populism: Recontextualizing Civilizational Narratives in National and Global Contexts,” by Dr. Jocelyne Cesari (Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham, UK, and Senior Fellow at the Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).

 

Panel 1

Populism: Is It a One-way Route from Democracy to Authoritarianism?

Moderator

Dr. Erkan Toguslu (Researcher at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven, Belgium).

Speakers

“Making Sense of Multiple Manifestations of Alternatives to Liberal Democracies,” by Dr. Radoslaw Markowski (Professor of Political Science, Center for the Study of Democracy, Director, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw & Polish Academy of Sciences & Polish National Election Study, Principal Investigator).

“Constitutional Intolerance: The Fashioning of ‘the Other’ in Europe’s Constitutional Repertoires,” by Dr. Marietta van der Tol (Politics & International Studies, DAAD-Cambridge).

Dr. Erkan Toguslu moderates a panel featuring Dr. Radoslaw Markowski and Dr. Marietta van der Tol, exploring alternatives to liberal democracies and the role of constitutional narratives in shaping ‘the Other’ in Europe. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

 

Panel 2

Civilizational Rhetoric, Emotions, and Societal Cohesion

Moderator

Dr. Erin K. Wilson (Professor, Chair of Politics and Religion, the Faculty of Religion, Culture, and Society, University of Groningen).

Paper Presenters

Populism, Civilization, and Restorative Nostalgia,” by Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow, Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization).

“Emotional Dimensions of Civilisationist Populism: A Comparative Analysis of Erdogan, Modi, and Khan with Transformer-Based Classification,” by Dr. Matthew Belanger (Lecturer in Substance Use Sociology, Social Policy, and Criminology Faculty of Social Sciences University of Stirling) and Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc (Reader in Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law at the University of Dundee).

Dr. Erin K. Wilson moderates Panel 2 on “Civilizational Rhetoric, Emotions, and Societal Cohesion,” featuring Professor Ihsan Yilmaz, Dr. Nicholas Morieson on populism and restorative nostalgia, and Dr. Matthew Belanger & Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc on the emotional dynamics of civilisationist populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

 

Keynote Speech

Kamil Wyszkowski, Director of the UN Global Compact, delivers the keynote speech highlighting the challenges and responsibilities of global institutions in defending human rights amid rising populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

The Role of the UN in Fighting for Human Rights in This Populist Age,” by Kamil Wyszkowski (Director of UN Global Compact).

 

Panel 3

Religion and Populism: Local, National, and Transnational Dimensions

Moderator

 Dr. Jocelyne Cesari (Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).

Speakers

“Remember to be Jewish: Religious Populism in Israel,” by Dr. Guy Ben-Porat (Professor of International Relations and Politics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev).

“Religious Populism and Civilizationalism in International Politics: An Authoritarian Turn,” by Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz (Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations and Chair in Islamic Studies at Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization) & Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow, Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization).

Paper Presenters

“National Populists of Christian Europe, Unite? Civilizations Dimensions of Far-right Populist Alliances in Post-Brexit Britain,” by Dr. Rafal Soborski (Professor of International Politics, The Department of Social Science at Richmond American University and Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University).

“Anwar Ibrahim’s Civilisational Populism: Between the Muslim World and Malaysia,” by Dr. Syaza Shukri (Assoc. Professor & Head of Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia).

Dr. Jocelyne Cesari moderates Panel 3 on “Religion and Populism: Local, National, and Transnational Dimensions,” presented by Dr. Bulent Kenes, and featuring contributions from Dr. Guy Ben-Porat on religious populism in Israel; Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz & Dr. Nicholas Morieson on civilizational authoritarianism; Dr. Rafal Soborski on Christian far-right alliances; and Dr. Syaza Shukri on Anwar Ibrahim’s civilizational populism. Photos: Muhammed Gemi.

DAY TWO – May 23, 2025

Keynote Speech 

Dariusz Mazur, Deputy Minister of Justice of the Republic of Poland, delivers a keynote speech addressing the challenges to the rule of law and the role of justice institutions in safeguarding democracy in an era of rising populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

Dariusz Mazur (Deputy Minister of Justice of the Republic of Poland).

 

Panel 4

Impacts of Civilizational Populism on the Market and Globalization

Moderator

Antoine Godbert (Affiliate Professor of Law, Economics & Humanities at ESCP Business School, Paris, and Director of International Affairs at the Rectorat of Île-de-France – Paris).

Speakers

“On the Nature of Economics and the future of Globalization under Civilizational Populism,” by Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk (Professor of Economics, Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST), Germany, Senior Economic Researcher at the ECPS, Brussels).

Populism as a Reaction to Neoliberal Technocratism,” by Dr. Krzysztof Jasiecki (Professor of Economic Sociology at the Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw).

“Far-Right Populism and the Making of the Exclusionary Neoliberal State,” by Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider (Associate Professor, Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna and Research Affiliate, Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge).

Antoine Godbert moderates Panel 4 on “Impacts of Civilizational Populism on the Market and Globalization,” with Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk examining the future of globalization, Dr. Krzysztof Jasiecki analyzing populist responses to neoliberal technocracy, and Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider exploring the rise of the exclusionary neoliberal state. Photos: Muhammed Gemi.

 

Panel 5

Religion and Identity Politics

Moderator

Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc (Reader in Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law at the University of Dundee).

Speaker

“Religion and Power in an Age of Identity Politics,” by Dr. Erin K. Wilson (Professor, Chair of Politics and Religion, the Faculty of Religion, Culture, and Society, University of Groningen).

Paper Presenters

“Civilizational Populism and the Making of Sexualized Cultural Christianity,” by Dr. Ludger Viefhues-Bailey (Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Gender, and Culture, Le Moyne University, NY).

“Imagine No More Small Boats in the Channel’: How Populist Parties and Their Leaders Normalize Polarization in Their Communication on Social Media Platforms, a Multimodal Discourse Analysis,” by Dr. Valeria Reggi (Post-doc Researcher at the University of Venice and Adjunct Professor and Tutor at the University of Bologna).

Populism from a Double Perspective. Timo Soini and the Finnish Version of Populism,” by Dr. Jarosław Suchoples (Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw, Former Polish Ambassador to Finland).

Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc moderates Panel 5 on “Religion and Identity Politics,” featuring Dr. Erin K. Wilson on the intersection of religion and power, Dr. Ludger Viefhues-Bailey on sexualized cultural Christianity, Dr. Valeria Reggi on populist polarization via social media, and Dr. Jarosław Suchoples on the Finnish model of populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

Gala Dinner

During the gala dinner, a short video clip was presented featuring a biopic on the Romani poet Papusza and Birds Are Singing in Kigali, two acclaimed Polish films directed by Joanna Kos-Krauze. Following the screening, Dr. Małgorzata Bonikowska moderated a brief conversation with the director and two other participants. (Photos: Muhammed Gemi)

Participants

During the coffee and lunch breaks, conference participants had the opportunity to connect, exchange ideas, and get to know one another better. They also engaged actively in the Q&A sessions, contributing thoughtful questions and insights to each panel discussion. (Photos: Muhammed Gemi.)

Dr. Richard Falk, Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University, and former UN Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights.

Professor Richard Falk: The US Is Experiencing a ‘Weimar Moment’

In this urgent ECPS interview, Professor Richard Falk warns that the US is facing a “Weimar moment”—a fragile liberal democracy under siege by a resurgent ultra-right. A signatory of the International Declaration Against Fascism, Professor Falk links today’s “techno-fascist enthusiasts” to a global authoritarian drift. He critiques surveillance capitalism, weaponized nationalism, and soft authoritarianism, highlighting leaders like Trump, Modi, Erdoğan, and Netanyahu as drivers of this ideological mutation. Despite this grim trajectory, Professor Falk calls for renewed “normative resistance”—a defiant civic ethics rooted in critical thinking, international law, and solidarity. This interview is a vital reflection on the future of democracy, authoritarianism, and global justice.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a political climate increasingly marked by creeping authoritarianism, disinformation, and democratic fragility, Dr. Richard Falk, Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University, and former UN Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights, offers a powerful and sobering warning: the United States, he says, is currently undergoing a “Weimar moment.” This, he explains, refers to “a democratic superstructure and a liberal opposition, but one that is weak and unable to really mount effective resistance to a rising, ultra-right political formation.” Drawing on history and contemporary global trends, Professor Falk suggests we are witnessing not merely a democratic crisis, but the possible prelude to a systemic authoritarian transformation.

This interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) comes in the wake of the “International Declaration Against Fascism,” published on June 13, 2025. Professor Falk was one of the signatories, alongside Nobel laureates, public intellectuals, and leading scholars of democracy and authoritarianism. Echoing the spirit of the 1925 Anti-Fascist Intellectuals’ Manifesto, the declaration warns that “the threat of fascism is back—and so we must summon that courage and defy it again.” It urges citizens worldwide to resist not only overt autocracy, but also the instrumentalization of law, culture, media, and technology in the service of “techno-fascist enthusiasts.”

In our interview, Professor Falk elaborates on how the architecture of 21st-century power—surveillance capitalism, digital disinformation, populist polarization—is reshaping classical authoritarian strategies. While differing in structure and aesthetic from 20th-century fascism, he argues today’s movements share its core ambitions: the monopolization of political space, the stigmatization of dissent, and the erosion of checks and balances under charismatic strongmen. He points to figures like Trump, Modi, Erdoğan, and Netanyahu as examples of a new ideological formation—what he elsewhere calls a “mutation of soft authoritarianism” that weaponizes nationalism, racialized resentment, and neoliberal precarity.

Yet Professor Falk is not entirely pessimistic. He highlights the enduring relevance of “normative resistance”—a civic and intellectual defiance rooted in critical inquiry, public ethics, and transnational solidarity. In an age of disinformation and partisan moralism, he calls for a recommitment to truth, international law, and the unfinished democratic project, warning that the erosion of global governance and international legal norms risks a regression “to an era of colonialism, suffering, and destruction.”

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Richard Falk, edited lightly for readability.

The Threat of Fascism Is Real, but the Form Has Mutated

Professor Richard Falk, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: You were among the signatories of the recent declaration warning of the return of fascism. In your view, how does the current resurgence of authoritarian-nationalist politics differ in structure, aesthetic, and operational logic from the classical 20th-century fascism? Can we still meaningfully use the term “fascism” across such divergent historical contexts without diminishing its analytical precision?

Professor Richard Falk: That’s a very tough starting question and requires a good deal of reflection and nuance to do justice to it. It’s important—of course, a crucial question.

One of the striking differences is that the resurgence of especially autocratic tendencies in the West is less focused on internal class relations than on the threats of migration and immigration, and the outsider rather than the enemy inside, which was a feature particularly of the Nazi version of fascism. But generally, the struggles in Italy and Spain that resulted in fascist emergence as dominant forces were essentially internal in their vital strategy.

Furthermore, there was a different technological environment in the early decades of the 20th century than what exists currently. The forms of control and resistance are really radically different. In the present world situation, due to the innovative technology that we group under the phrase “digital age.”

But the core features of militarism and a single charismatic leader that exert control over the political space and do not respect divergent views—I think that feature is present. Also, the resistance of the state to dissent and protest is characteristic of this new wave of far-right politics.

Whether it’s useful to connect this current wave with the problems that underlay World War II is something that needs exploration and debate. I’ve sometimes referred to the situation in my country, the US, as experiencing what I call a “Weimar moment.” That is, where you have a democratic superstructure and a liberal opposition, but it’s weak and unable to really mount effective resistance to a rising, ultra-right political formation. It takes advantage of crises in the domestic economy and in the success or failure of state undertakings. But it’s essentially concerned with a monopolizing of political power and economic influence and control. And in that sense, there is a continuity. The German and Spanish versions of fascism particularly stress this alliance between the state and the military. In the Spanish case, you had the Catholic Church. There was a kind of anti-communist element in the struggle.

I don’t know as much about the Italian political atmosphere accompanying the rise of Mussolini, but I think there was also a right-left division in the country—a polarization. So each of these fascist narratives of the past has its own originality and characteristics, and in one sense even grouping them together may be questionable because it overlooks those differences.

So, on balance, it is useful to warn of the emergence of a new phase in the encounter between liberal democracies and fascist movements. However, it can be misleading to treat this phenomenon as uniform, given its inherently heterogeneous nature. The situation in the United States, for example, differs markedly from that in major European countries—and even more so from key Global South contexts such as India, or, in a different way, China and Russia. While these cases may fall outside the conventional scope of what is typically labeled “fascism,” they share certain characteristics: a concentration of power in the hands of a single leader, systematic surveillance, the stigmatization of dissent, and a concerted effort to monopolize the political sphere through an alliance between economic elites and political leaders.

Techno-Authoritarianism Has Already Arrived in Some States

Photo: Shutterstock

The declaration warns of “techno-fascist enthusiasts.” How do you interpret the convergence of surveillance capitalism, algorithmic governance, and digital disinformation ecosystems with authoritarian statecraft? Are we witnessing the emergence of a new modality of domination—a digital totalitarianism—beyond Orwellian metaphors?

Professor Richard Falk: I think that is a threat; whether it will materialize in that kind of absolutist form is not yet clear or certain. We are at a period, I believe, of transition in which resistance—and even a reversal of these tendencies—remains a possibility. In other words, I don’t think we’re predetermined at this stage to have that future, though there are alarming signs that this is where the major liberal democracies are headed.

Some of the more organized autocratic societies have already more or less arrived at those points. I would mention India, China, and Russia as being very well organized to manage a kind of techno-authoritarianism that, in the Chinese case, produces some pretty impressive results for its population. It is not war-prone in the way that fascism is usually portrayed. So, again, it may be misleading to group autocratic tendencies in various states into one category, because the originality of the Chinese path is quite notable and seems to have some advantages compared to the liberal democratic path.

Today’s Fascistic Movement Has a Blueprint, Opposition Does Not

A century after the Manifesto of the Anti-Fascist Intellectuals in 1925, what enduring ethical and strategic lessons can today’s democratic societies extract from those who risked everything to confront fascism at its inception? Are there analogues today to the cultural complicity and intellectual appeasement that enabled fascist ascendancy then?

Professor Richard Falk: I think again, speaking first about the United States, which I know best, there’s definitely that similarity of a weak liberal opposition and a very impassioned autocratic, fascistic movement that has very dedicated conceptions of what it wants to achieve. Trump came to his second presidential term with a very worked-out plan or blueprint of how to govern in the light of the acceptance of this autocratic, authoritarian, anti-democratic set of aspirations, and he seems to have at least temporarily neutralized the economic oligarchs by having them—for opportunistic reasons—join with his MAGA movement. And that does suggest a drift toward this kind of consolidated authoritarian governance structure.

There are some glimmers of light that suggest it may not be so simplistic to fulfill these autocratic ambitions. One of the glimmers of light was the outcome in New York City of the race to become mayor, which surprised most Americans—and even most New Yorkers—by selecting, by an impressive margin, the Muslim son of a mixed parental background, a self-proclaimed Democratic Socialist, who seemed to defy all the traditional biases associated with the drift to the ultra-right. And it’s at least being welcomed in the US as a warning to the Democratic establishment that they better get their oppositional act together or they’ll be bypassed by this more progressive alternative politics. I happen to know the parents of Zohran Mamdani quite well, and it’s very thrilling for people who had these progressive hopes.

Normative Resistance Persists in a Structurally Degraded Public Sphere

In a political landscape defined by polarization, truth decay, and performative resistance, what forms of civic defiance remain normatively defensible and strategically viable? Is there still space for what you have elsewhere called ‘normative resistance’ within a structurally degraded public sphere?

Professor Richard Falk: It’s a very interesting question, marked by contradictory tendencies. There is a clear effort to shrink the space for critical discourse, alongside a growing recognition that the ultra-right project is largely incompatible with knowledge-based politics. One of its defining features—and here we see continuity with earlier fascist movements—is a preference for mobilizing people through emotional and belief-based appeals, with little regard for empirical truth. It is therefore unsurprising that leading universities in the United States have become primary targets of this ultra-right agenda.

Equally unsurprising is the simultaneous embrace of an aggressive nationalism and a retreat from internationalism—whether in the form of the UN or collaborative responses to global challenges like climate change. These forces coexist in a contradictory political landscape where tensions are mounting but remain unresolved.

The harsh treatment of undocumented immigrants—who are nonetheless vital to key sectors of the economy—reveals some of these contradictions. Even Trump has had to walk back elements of his anti-immigration stance when it came to essential labor in agriculture, restaurants, and other industries where undocumented workers are difficult to replace.

Predatory Capitalism Fuels Authoritarian Resentment

A protester holds a banner demanding economic justice. Photo: Shutterstock.

You have long emphasized the dangers of ‘soft authoritarianism’ embedded within liberal orders. From Modi to Erdoğan, from Netanyahu to Trump, do you regard contemporary populist authoritarianism as a transitional phase toward a more explicit fascist ethos—or does it represent a distinct ideological mutation altogether?

Professor Richard Falk: Well again, that’s a very hard question which requires a clearer crystal ball than one in my possession. In other words, it can go either way—or both ways—and differently in different places. I think one of the interesting recent developments is the normalization of the language of genocide as applied to Israel’s violence in Gaza. That was—and still is—a prohibited terminology on the part of the governments supporting Israel, and it’s used selectively as a way of punishing protesters. But still, within societies at large, that terminology—the naming of the violence—is no longer abnormal or extreme: to refer to it as genocide, or to refer to the pre-October 7th situation as apartheid.

And that represents a victory of sorts for those who want a truth-based mode of governance, which is associated with liberalism, the tradition of the Enlightenment, and the whole role of science. So you have this peculiar attitude of the ultra-right, which on one side uses instrumentally the politics of surveillance—a kind of fascist variant of a surveillance state—and on the other side is very unsupportive of scientific research, technological innovation, and really of knowledge acquisition within leading centers of learning. And the hostility, for instance, to foreign students that is taking hold here—which was one of the tendencies of the Trump presidency—is emblematic of this tendency.

Your scholarship on global capitalism critiques the deep structural inequalities produced by neoliberal orthodoxy. How do you see these economic dislocations—especially the evisceration of public goods, precaritization of labor, and austerity—as constituting fertile ground for authoritarian-populist narratives and politics of resentment?

Professor Richard Falk: It has created those fertile grounds, and Trump and others around the world have known how to take advantage of them to win support from those elements of society that are most victimized by what I call ‘predatory capitalism’. This model is highly exploitative toward vulnerable sectors of society and facilitates growing inequalities between a tiny number of successful entrepreneurial individuals and the broader population. At the same time, it is fiscally stingy toward those at the bottom of the economic scale. This dynamic exacerbates class-based polarization and generates widespread alienation and resentment—sentiments that are effectively mobilized by belief-driven, strong leaders like Trump, Modi, or Erdoğan, as you mentioned.

Resistance Depends on Forces Outside the Bipartisan Order

Can the anti-fascist imperative itself become captive to ideological co-optation or instrumentalization? How can progressive actors preserve the ethical clarity of anti-fascist struggle without succumbing to partisan reductionism or performative moralism?

Professor Richard Falk: Of course, that remains to be seen—how strong they are. I don’t have much confidence in the liberal wing of the political spectrum, represented here by the Democratic Party and elsewhere, for instance, in the UK by the Labour Party. Those who accept the structure of capitalism and nationalism tend not to have the political will to maintain resistance in the face of strong repressive policies. That creates my fear that these autocratic, fascistic movements will test the resilience of the political system, and that resistance will depend on a surge of affiliation and commitment to what I call the progressive portions of society—those outside the framework of the bipartisan political structures that dominate most sovereign states.

In the light of Israel’s recent military operations in Gaza and the structural conditions of Palestinian dispossession, how would you assess the extent to which settler-colonial regimes today deploy fascistic methods under the rubric of democratic self-defense or counterterrorism?

Professor Richard Falk: That really depends on whether you consider Israel an anomaly or something more menacing globally as part of this regressive trend. I tend to view it as an anomaly because of the additional influence of Zionist ideology added onto the settler-colonial project, and that gives it a dehumanizing focus on dominating the other in the name of racial supremacy. And that’s why a Zionist state like Israel turns into an apartheid regime, treating the resident population as a persecuted presence in their own homeland.

It’s really a repetition of the story of settler colonialism in the white breakaway British colonies of North America, Australia, and New Zealand, where apartheid practices gave way to the embrace of a genocidal strategy in order to achieve the ends of a purified ethnic hierarchy that completely marginalizes the native population.

But I don’t see that happening beyond Israel—certainly not in as crude a form. You have some of it in India, with the treatment of Muslims by the Hindu nationalist orientation of the Modi government, especially in Kashmir, where many of these same tendencies are evident. But I don’t find it a general characteristic.

International Law as Sword for Enemies, Shield for Friends

And lastly, Professor Falk, you have consistently critiqued the asymmetries of global governance. Does the international community’s paralysis in the face of enduring Palestinian suffering reflect not only political hypocrisy but a deeper erosion of the normative foundations of international law itself?

Professor Richard Falk: Yes, I’m guilty of all those things. And I think the comparison between the Western reaction to the Russian attack on Ukraine and its reaction to Israel’s behavior in Gaza and the West Bank is illustrative of using international law and the UN as a sword against enemies while using international law and the UN as a shield protecting friends.

So you have complete double standards between how law is working when you’re dealing with an adversary, and how law works when you’re dealing with your own behavior or that of your close allies. You have that dualism in the reaction—on the one side, to Ukraine, where there are impassioned appeals to the UN and to the International Criminal Court; and with Israel, where the UN is denounced and the International Criminal Court is repudiated when it issues arrest warrants.

So it undermines law as a regulative framework that governs behavior and turns it into a policy instrument with inconsistent use for friends and enemies.

Professor Larry Diamond, a renowned expert on democratic development and Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Professor Diamond: Fascism Isn’t Back—But Its Features Are

In this timely and wide-ranging interview, Stanford University’s Professor Larry Diamond explores the resurgence of authoritarianism and the global diffusion of fascistic features. “We don’t have the fully formed, classic version of fascism today,” he explains, “but there is a lot of fascistic behavior, organization, and intent spreading worldwide.” Drawing on his democratic theory expertise and recent support for an international declaration warning that “the threat of fascism is back,” Professor Diamond dissects how elected strongmen exploit polarization, subvert institutions, and erode epistemic authority. From Erdoğan to Orbán to Trump, he examines the authoritarian playbook and offers paths forward—through institutional reform, global alliances, and deliberative democracy—to defend liberal norms before they are incrementally strangled into irrelevance.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an age of democratic erosion and the rise of authoritarian populism across continents, Professor Larry Diamond, one of the world’s foremost scholars on democracy, joins the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) to assess the contemporary mutations of fascism. As a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Professor Diamond brings a deeply informed and historically grounded perspective to the question that frames this conversation: Are we witnessing a return of fascism—or something disturbingly adjacent?

Reflecting on the recent international declaration signed by Nobel laureates and leading intellectuals warning that “the threat of fascism is back,” Professor Diamond strikes a careful but urgent tone. “I think it’s better to talk about fascistic properties or features rather than fascism per se,” he explains, “because I don’t think we have the fully formed, classic version of it in many places today. But there is a lot of fascistic behavior, organization, and intent that’s spreading around the world today.”

Throughout the interview, Professor Diamond underscores the ways in which elected strongmen—from Narendra Modi in India to Viktor Orbán in Hungary, from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey to Donald Trump in the United States—gradually dismantle liberal-democratic norms. This process, which he calls the “incremental strangulation” of democratic institutions, shares strategic continuities with the fascist playbook of the 20th century, even if it is less overtly violent in form.

The interview also addresses the weaponization of cultural and religious norms, the co-optation of far-right discourse by centrist parties, and the epistemic breakdown that enables authoritarian actors to dominate public narratives. Professor Diamond warns of “a mode of thinking and reasoning that puts blind faith in a single leader and party,” a dynamic echoed in the declaration’s call to “uphold facts and evidence” in the face of disinformation.

The Declaration Against the Return of Fascism, published on the centenary of the original 1925 anti-fascist manifesto, serves as a timely and powerful backdrop to this conversation. Signed by a wide array of Nobel laureates, leading scholars, and cultural figures, the declaration urges renewed commitment to democratic values, multilateralism, and human rights. It warns of a “renewed wave of far-right movements” that threaten to erode hard-won liberties under the guise of nationalism and moral purity.

As Professor Diamond makes clear, the danger we face today is not merely political—it is civilizational. And while the forms may differ from the 1930s, the stakes are every bit as high.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Larry Diamond.

We’re Not Seeing Classic Fascism

Hitler and Mussolini in Munich, Germany, June 18, 1940. Photo: Everett Collection.

Professor Larry Diamond, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: As a signatory of the recent international declaration warning that “the threat of fascism is back,” how would you characterize the most empirically robust indicators of this re-emergence? To what extent do contemporary manifestations differ from classical fascism in terms of institutional form and sociopolitical function?

Professor Larry Diamond: I thought it was a very good statement. I had reservations about it because I think the term fascism is used too casually. It’s a very specific historical phenomenon that involves elements of extreme authoritarianism, deprivation of civil liberties, contradiction of the rule of law, individual rights, and the very principle of individuality.

There are certainly a number of regimes around the world that manifest those characteristics or have been moving in that direction. But fascism is also ultra-nationalistic and typically quite aggressive and expansionist. It celebrates violence as a means of acquiring and maintaining rule and political domination, including the violence of extreme shock troops or irregular forces that do the bidding—celebrating and elevating the leader while intimidating anyone who would challenge them. Fascist regimes freely use violence or the threat of violence to suppress and silence the opposition and to threaten their neighbors as well.

So, I think there is no pure form of fascism in the world today that is entirely similar to what we saw in Germany or Italy in the 1930s. But there are a number of regimes that have fascistic elements or properties—certainly Vladimir Putin’s in Russia, and there are others, in Turkey and India. And now certain features of what Donald Trump has been trying to construct in the United States—in terms of the intimidation of opposition, threats to opposition, the invitation to violence, and the celebration of violence by his followers—have fascistic properties.

I think it’s better to talk about fascistic properties or features rather than fascism per se, because I don’t think we have the fully formed, classic version of it in many places today. But there is a lot of fascistic behavior, organization, and intent that’s spreading around the world today.

Authoritarian Regimes Are Repackaging Masculinity, Identity, and Power to Redraw Citizenship

The declaration identifies a resurgence of “manufactured traditional authority,” rooted in religious, gender, and national identity constructs. How do you see these cultural logics being instrumentalized within modern illiberal or authoritarian-populist regimes to reshape the boundaries of political legitimacy and citizenship?

Professor Larry Diamond: Well, you certainly see a kind of resurrection and celebration of extreme masculinity, and of very traditional—even martial or militaristic—notions of what constitutes male identity and the male role, and the effort to subjugate women, and to draw artificially rigid boundaries around sexual identity and sexual behavior, and just put people into rigid, state-sponsored, movement-sponsored boxes.

These are also elements of an extreme authoritarian or, in some ways, fascistic mentality. You see this in China too—although it’s kind of odd to call a Communist regime fascistic—but they share certain properties in terms of hierarchy, domination, chauvinism, militarism, and aggressive threats to their neighbors.

So I find it more useful personally—and I think we’re drifting in that direction in the world, and the phenomenon, with its many component parts, seems to be more relevant these days—but I find it more useful to break it apart into its pieces and analyze where these pieces are emerging or gaining momentum, and what it means for the character and dynamics—internally and internationally—of authoritarian behavior.

Autocrats Strangle Democracy in Stages

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

In your analysis of democratic regression, you emphasize the process of “incremental strangulation” of liberal institutions by elected executives. How does this slow erosion align with the historical trajectory of fascism, and would you consider today’s authoritarianism to be a technocratic mutation of the fascist archetype—less overtly violent, but no less repressive?

Professor Larry Diamond: It certainly is in most places less repressive than the classic instances of fascism, particularly in Nazi Germany. But some of them have been creeping in that direction. It didn’t take long between the time that Hitler entered power in early 1933 to the time, really just months later, that he had eliminated opposition and begun to throw his opponents in jail—and before too much longer, the emergence of concentration camps. I would not describe the collapse of the liberal and constitutional state in Germany after Hitler’s rise to the Chancellorship as an incremental process. It happened in stages, but they came very rapidly and very brutally.

Italy was a little bit more incremental, but not in the same way as we’ve seen under Orbán in Hungary, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, under Narendra Modi in India—which remains sufficiently incremental so that people still debate whether we can call India an electoral democracy. I tend to think it’s crossed the line into authoritarianism.

It took a while in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. It didn’t take very long this most recent time in power for Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. It happened pretty quickly under Bukele in El Salvador.

So it varies. But in the classic instance of a country that has been a democracy for some time—whether a liberal democracy or not—it usually is an incremental process that may move step by step over a period of years: to demonize the opposition, undermine the independence of the legislature, and certainly the judiciary, which must be quashed if authoritarian regimes are to have kind of free rein to emerge. And the ultimate elimination of all independent sources of power—regulatory institutions in the executive branch, civil society, the professional civil service, the business community, the mass media, and so on. Usually, it takes a few years, and sometimes a number of years, for an emerging autocrat to sufficiently conquer and crush these independent institutions in government and civil society so that they can have unchecked power.

Moreover, even when they’ve crossed the line into authoritarianism—which I think Erdoğan did within some number of years after taking power around 2003, more than two or three perhaps, but considerably less than ten—even after the line had been crossed from electoral democracy into electoral or competitive authoritarianism, the incremental descent can proceed. And the regime can become more authoritarian, more abusive, more terroristic, more domineering, more hegemonic—and, to use a word that is increasingly in vogue—with more and more frequent manifestations of fascism.

Authoritarianism Thrives Where Truth Dies

The declaration posits a growing epistemic crisis—an erosion of truth, science, and critical inquiry. Are we witnessing a systemic undermining of epistemic authority as a strategy of soft authoritarianism, and how does this epistemic degradation relate to the collapse of public trust and the spread of disinformation?

Professor Larry Diamond: I think the causation moves in both directions. It’s a collapse of trust in all kinds of institutions and sources of information that helps pave the way for authoritarian populism to come into power and elevate a leader—a “great leader”—as the source of all wisdom and authority, to try and rescue the country from various forms of treason, greed, sabotage, corruption, however they depict the ruling elite, the ruling establishment.

Then, of course, once in power, these kinds of leaders and parties further accentuate public distrust in science, in objective sources of knowledge, in alternative sources of information—in anything we know to be true, independent of what the dear leader and the ruling party say is true.

So, I think what you describe as an epistemic crisis typically precedes, to some degree, the coming to power of an authoritarian, hegemonic, extremely illiberal populist political party, with deeply authoritarian, if not fascistic, intentions and ambitions. And then they drive it—they drive the people—further into distrust and cynicism, and into a mode of thinking and reasoning that puts blind faith in a single leader and party.

Why Democracy Must Lead the Fight Against Authoritarian Drift

The declaration calls for renewed multilateralism grounded in human rights and the rule of law. With international institutions facing legitimacy crises, what new or reformed global mechanisms might be necessary to counteract the diffusion of authoritarian norms and “sharp power” influence?

Professor Larry Diamond: There are many dimensions to the crisis we’re facing globally regarding the rule of law and the liberal international order. And obviously, these have worsened with the multiple conflicts in the Middle East over the last two and a half years, if not more.

I worry deeply about the damage that’s been done to the United Nations and the overall erosion of liberal international institutions, which are being undermined from all directions—by Russia and China, by Iran, and by Donald Trump in the United States, with his contempt for multilateral institutions and for the liberal international order itself. After all, that order has helped keep peace in Europe for 80 years—until Vladimir Putin shattered it. I believe it still remains our best hope for international peace, security, and individual freedom.

At present, international multilateral institutions are in serious distress. The United Nations has appeared quite feeble in response to the recent Middle East crisis. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization are all under significant strain. The entire nuclear nonproliferation regime—which, in my view, did a relatively poor job of restraining Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons—has also faltered.

To my mind, we need to begin with the democracies of the world and try to build outward from there, reaffirming commitments to the rule of law, international order, and collective security. That must include a reassertion of peace and security mechanisms in the Middle East, as well as a clear and unified message to the People’s Republic of China that the international community opposes any use of force to resolve the Taiwan conflict or differing interpretations of sovereignty across the strait. Certainly, it also means that Vladimir Putin cannot be allowed to forcibly dissolve Ukraine into a greater imperial Russia.

We need a stronger NATO, a reinforced alliance of liberal democracies, a renewed commitment to the integrity of borders, and shared principles of collective defense. These are the building blocks for reconstituting global order. But we cannot begin rebuilding while the United States is in retreat from that very order.

In my view, we must not only deepen cooperation with our NATO and EU allies—as well as partners like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and, where feasible, India—but also revitalize and relaunch the United States’ instruments of international engagement. This includes agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Voice of America, and other channels of diplomacy, assistance, and cultural exchange. We should be offering scholarships, promoting global educational exchange, and ensuring that our scientific, technological, and medical innovations are shared worldwide.

They Need to Polarize Politics to Seize Power

In “The Electoral Reform Imperative,” you diagnose affective polarization as a destabilizing force for democratic governance. How do populist actors exploit this emotional antagonism to reframe pluralism as moral corruption and consolidate plebiscitary rule under the guise of majoritarianism?

Professor Larry Diamond: They do it pretty much as your question describes. It’s very important to understand that people who want to crush democracy—and who seek to do so through politics, by winning power via competitive elections—need to create an atmosphere of fear and desperation. In other words, they need to polarize politics in order to seize power.

All of the agents of illiberal or authoritarian populism—Orban, Erdoğan, Robert Fico in Slovakia, certainly Modi in India, Andrés Manuel López Obrador during his six-year presidency in Mexico, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, and now his successor, Nicolás Maduro—they all polarize politics. They must generate fear and hatred for the other side, because rational politics—deliberation, compromise, reason—(these) are the enemies of their project to conquer and entrench total power.

So they manufacture fear, animosity, and hatred. They deploy memes and narratives that divide people on an emotional level and manipulate symbols of fear, violence, militarism, and extreme ambition to pit citizens against one another. They typically identify a dangerous “other” within the country. Often it’s a minority group or outsider—it could be immigrants, a marginalized group like the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, or a religious minority of some kind. But they always need someone to scapegoat, someone to vilify and rally people to fear.

Deliberation Works—If You Create the Right Setting

Your collaborative work on “America in One Room” suggests that structured deliberation can depolarize attitudes and restore democratic norms. How scalable are these models of deliberative democracy in politically fragile or culturally heterogeneous societies—especially where civic trust is already eroded?

Professor Larry Diamond: We think the methods are scalable. The problem with scalability is not that you can’t bring people with very different political orientations or racial and religious backgrounds into one room. When you step outside the white-hot glare of politics and mass media polarization and simply invite people to deliberate, to share their views and listen to others, it often works. You don’t need to persuade people—it’s the setting that matters.

The real challenge is that in-person deliberation is very expensive. You have to fly people to a location, manage the logistics of in-person gatherings, and hire moderators to facilitate small-group sessions.

Now, at our Deliberative Democracy Lab at Stanford University, we have an online platform—very similar to the one we’re using now—that can accommodate 10, 15, or even 20 participants. If it can handle 12, that’s already enough. This platform uses a simple form of artificial intelligence to manage the discussion: it poses questions, ensures everyone has a chance to speak, maintains respectful dialogue, and balances participation.

It’s a flexible, intuitive, and fair tool that has opened up dramatic new possibilities for scaling deliberation—provided the questions and the framework for engagement are well-designed.

Electoral Systems Must Temper, Not Amplify, Polarization

Illustration by Lightspring.

Given the weaponization of electoral legitimacy by populist incumbents to hollow out liberal checks and balances, do you view institutional reforms such as proportional representation or open primaries as viable defenses against democratic backsliding—or might they risk unintended consequences?

Professor Larry Diamond: It’s a good question. When you start tinkering with institutions—certainly including electoral systems—you do risk unintended consequences. I think this should counsel some degree of humility on the part of institutional reformers.

In countries like India, the US, and the United Kingdom—where simple majoritarian, first-past-the-post systems prevail—allowing a candidate to win with just 35 or 38 percent of the vote, as has occurred in Britain with the Labour Party, is not particularly democratic. In an era of deep political polarization, requiring voters to choose only one candidate often results in leaders who command the support of just a third of the electorate. This outcome fuels political cynicism by granting disproportionate power to figures lacking broad public backing. And keep in mind what can happen: maybe in one election a moderate Labour Prime Minister comes to power, but four or five years later a more extreme party might win an absolute majority of seats due to the bonus effect inherent in first-past-the-post system.

In a social and psychological context of polarization—driven by rising economic inequality and social media—you don’t want an electoral system that exacerbates polarization further. So, I favor at a minimum moving to the Australian system of preferential voting, or what we call ranked-choice voting in the US. Another option is proportional representation. Although moving to proportional representation would be very hard for the US, if a country adopts it, I think a moderate version is preferable—one that avoids excessive party fragmentation and promotes open-list voting, so parties aren’t entirely in control of who within the party gets elected. For countries struggling with polarization, the Irish system of the single transferable vote is a good model to consider.

Co-Opting Without Capitulating

And lastly, Professor Diamond, to what extent does the co-optation of far-right discourse by centrist parties accelerate the normalization of authoritarian populism? Is this a short-term electoral tactic or a structural accommodation with long-term implications for the ideological boundaries of democratic politics?

Professor Larry Diamond: It’s another good question. And since these projects have really been gaining momentum over the last 15 years or so, it’s still too soon to answer definitively. It’s even more recent in terms of right-of-center parties trying to co-opt some of the voters and agenda of the extreme right.

I will say this: on the one hand, right-of-center parties—and even progressive ones—are beginning to respond. A recent and insightful commentary by a progressive British analyst in The New York Times argued that progressive parties would be well-advised to take immigration management more seriously. His central point was that a cohesive sense of national identity is often necessary to foster the social solidarity required to support the disadvantaged—the poor, the marginalized, and others in need. That solidarity, however, becomes more difficult to sustain when segments of the population perceive that social benefits are increasingly directed toward newcomers who have not yet become part of the national fabric.

I think Europe, the United States, and other advanced industrial democracies need humane and generous immigration policies. For one thing, they need the labor. With declining populations or slowing growth rates, they will face labor shortages of various kinds. But they also need to be serious about preserving the integrity of borders. If you don’t have borders, you don’t really have a country.

So, on the one hand, it is right and proper for political parties—not only of the right but also of the center-left—to recognize the frustrations surrounding unchecked immigration that the far right, often tinged with fascistic overtones, has been fanning. These concerns should be acknowledged and addressed. But that does not mean adopting the racism, hatred, or xenophobia of the far right.

Being humane, decent, respectful, and committed to the dignity of all people, regardless of origin, is essential. But that doesn’t necessarily mean—and I don’t think it is sustainable for liberal democracies to assume it should mean—purely open borders. That’s just one example where mainstream or progressive parties can respond to some of the legitimate issues the far right has exploited.

The far right is also raising concerns about economic inequality and injustice—issues that are central to progressive platforms. So, I think this has to be approached on an issue-by-issue basis.

Professor Rafal Soborski, who teaches International Politics at Richmond American University and serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University.

Prof. Soborski: The Recent Polish Election Shows That Shifting Right Doesn’t Win Over the Right

In this compelling interview, Professor Rafal Soborski critiques Poland’s liberal democratic actors for mimicking right-wing rhetoric in a failed attempt to broaden appeal. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he warns, urging pro-democratic forces to adopt bold, progressive agendas rooted in class justice and social solidarity. Drawing comparisons to political centrists across Europe, Soborski emphasizes that ideological clarity—not cautious managerialism—is key to countering the far right’s emotional narratives and mobilizing mythologies. His insights offer a timely call for a renewed progressive vision amid the turbulent political landscape in Poland and beyond.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Rafal Soborski offers a trenchant critique of the Polish liberal democratic actors’ strategic missteps in the recent presidential election, arguing that centrist attempts to mimic the right not only fail to capture conservative voters but also alienate the progressive base. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he asserts, summarizing what he sees as a recurring failure of liberal parties not only in Poland but across much of Europe.

Professor Soborski, who teaches International Politics at Richmond American University and serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University, situates this analysis within a broader critique of what he calls “managerial centrism.” For him, this style of governance—technocratic, uninspiring, and devoid of ideological ambition—has become a default mode for centrist parties. “Even when the center wins elections, it then limits itself in office to this very managerialism… without a compelling vision of its own,” he explains.

This was evident in the performance of Civic Platform’s candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski, who lost narrowly to the nationalist Karol Nawrocki in a deeply polarized race in Poland. Rather than galvanizing progressive voters with bold policies, Trzaskowski, Professor Soborski suggests, hedged his ideological bets and made symbolic missteps that demoralized key constituencies. “I don’t think he convinced anyone by hiding the rainbow flag handed to him by Nawrocki during one of the debates,” Professor Soborski notes. “This alienated many people on the left… while not convincing anyone on the right.”

In his view, such political positioning reflects a deeper failure to recognize the need for ideological clarity and courage. Drawing comparisons to Germany’s Olaf Scholz and Britain’s Keir Starmer, Professor Soborski warns that when liberal parties attempt to neutralize far-right narratives by parroting them, they lose both authenticity and voter trust. “It tends to mimic instead the narratives of the right,” he laments.

For Professor Soborski, the path forward lies not in cautious centrism but in a reinvigoration of progressive values—rooted in social justice, pro-Europeanism, and recognition of class dynamics. “I would like to see pro-democratic forces in Poland challenging the right,” he concludes, “rather than hoping in vain that they can occupy some of the right’s discursive territory.”

This interview reveals not only the ideological contours of Poland’s political battleground but also the urgent need for liberal democratic actors to rethink their strategy before the far right consolidates its recent gains.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Rafal Soborski.

Populism Is a Style, Not an Ideology

Posters of 2025 Polish presidential candidates Rafał Trzaskowski (KO) and Karol Nawrocki (PiS) in Kuślin, Poland, on April 6, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Rafal Soborski, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. You’ve argued that populism lacks ideological coherence. How would you categorize Karol Nawrocki’s brand of politics—Trumpian, nationalist, anti-liberal—within your broader critique of the term ‘populism’?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I don’t think mine is a critique of the term populism as such.
But instead, what I would argue—and I am, of course, far from being original here—is that approaching populism as an ideology, even a thin one, is misguided. Incidentally, the author to whom we owe the concept of thin-centered ideology, Michael Freeden, does not think populism qualifies as one, so it doesn’t qualify as a worldview. According to Freeden, thin-centered ideologies have a restricted conceptual core, a restricted range of concepts, and hence need broader, more mature ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism, to serve as their hosts. But the thin-centered ideologies are still more complex than populism. So think of nationalism, feminism, perhaps ecology.

On the other hand, populism revolves merely around the opposition between the decent people and the corrupted elite, and this is not enough to construct a worldview that any ideology is expected to offer. Of course, you can further distinguish between right-wing populism, left-wing populism, and so on. But such distinctions often reveal that populism does not really make much sense as an ideological category. So both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders have been described as populists, but their views are dramatically different.

During the pandemic, I analyzed approaches to COVID-19 that others had categorized as populist, and I showed that there was no consistent pattern or any general similarities in terms of the track record—in terms of the success or otherwise—of so-called populist policies, and that, in fact, the major factor was the degree of neoliberalization. So, I think it is better to keep populism as a description of the type of political communication—the style of political communication—and perhaps also the convention-breaking behavior of some politicians, including dressing down, swearing, smoking—in the case of Nawrocki, sniffing snus during TV debates with Trzaskowski.

But the populist manner may carry very different ideological and political messages, and in that sense it may be better to speak of populist nationalism or populist socialism rather than vice versa—rather than socialist populism. Populism then becomes just a description of the style in which a given ideology is conveyed.

As for Nawrocki, I think all of the adjectives that you have mentioned—Trumpian, nationalist, anti-liberal—could potentially apply, for of course they are different categories.
Trumpism seems to have an obvious meaning. It’s a blend of hostile grievances against all kinds of minorities and some pernicious establishment—which is, of course, ironic, considering Trump’s own status—and Trumpism is expressed more as ephemeral sound bites than coherent ideas. We’ve become used to that with Donald Trump. Trump is also associated with political transactionism, bringing his personal monetary interest quite unashamedly into politics, which also affects what he says and how he says it. So it remains to be seen if Nawrocki tries to emulate this.

Is Nawrocki a nationalist? Certainly. And it is a nationalism that thrives on and stirs up collective fears and collective resentment in a volatile world whose complexities this kind of nationalism oversimplifies.

Anti-liberal? Well, absolutely. However, I think we need to be fair and wait and see who Nawrocki turns out to be ideologically when in office.

We need to remember that until he was selected by Jarosław Kaczyński as an ostensibly nonpartisan candidate—but really the candidate of Law and Justice (PiS)—he had been almost a complete unknown to the wider public. So I think we need to wait and see what happens.

Ideological Balkanization and the Far Right’s Mythmaking Machine

You’ve called for taking ideology seriously in times of crisis. What ideological threads—beyond vague populism—do you see underpinning Nawrocki’s support base and discourse?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Thank you for this question. Yes, I think political ideology should be taken seriously, and I discussed this in my work. For years, however, ideology has undergone a radical transformation, becoming increasingly fragmented, fluid, ephemeral,
reacting haphazardly to rapid social and political changes. So, traditional left-right distinctions have blurred. They have given way to hybrid belief systems and situational politics, featuring often contradictory positions depending on the issue at hand, emerging at any moment. Of course, social media have accelerated this shift as well, favoring meme-driven and personality-centered politics over more durable, collectively held ideological commitments. And, comprehensive worldviews are losing ground to issue-based activism, identity politics, and also algorithmically reinforced echo chambers. So, ideology has changed, and far-right politics provides a particularly revealing lens through which to analyze ongoing ideological transformations. 

The far right today combines elements of nationalism, traditionalism, libertarianism, conspiracism, accelerationism—you name it—into an unstable and contradictory but potent political force. The far right also engages in constructing and mobilizing its followers around myths—political myths of civilizational decline, national betrayal, or demographic apocalypse. It offers emotionally charged narratives of victimization and redemption. So, for example, “the Great Replacement” myth frames migration as an existential threat to the West; “the Deep State” conspiracy envisions elites orchestrating some global control or takeover. The far right relies on such narratives, positing a moralized struggle between the people and their perceived enemies, and seems to be capitalizing on the fears that these cause.

Overall, I think what we witness is ideological Balkanization—adherence to tribalism over universalism, feeling over reasoning—and it’s going in that direction. But this does not mean that we should be paying less attention to these fragmented new forms of ideology. Ideology scholars should really be exploring ideology in its different expressions, whether they are sophisticated and structured, or crass and fleeting. For better or worse, this is how we tend to think politically today, and we should be studying this.

However, coming back to Nawrocki, I think it is likely that he will be blending different ideological themes, and it seems certain to me that it will be a narrative mobilizing collective exclusionary emotions over reasoning. But still, as I said earlier, I think we need to wait and see. His political communication thus far has been subject to the pressures of electoral competition much more than it will be when he’s in office, with at least five years of presidency ahead of him. Perhaps he will continue this kind of discourse, or perhaps he will change. We’ll see.

The Far Right Has a Base and a Superstructure—But No Real International

President-elect Karol Nawrocki campaigning ahead of Poland’s 2025 presidential election in Łódź, Poland, on April 27, 2024. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

How does Nawrocki’s alignment with Trumpism reflect broader transnational ideological flows between far-right actors across the Atlantic? Are we seeing a global ideological bloc emerging?

Professor Rafal Soborski: That’s a great question. Far-right ideologies take increasingly transnational forms. This includes the emergence of different forms of civilizationism, variously aligning with or transcending nationalism or racism. So, with my colleagues at London Metropolitan University, Professor Michał Garapich and Dr. Anna Jochymek, we’ve been working on a project funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council, studying the emerging transnational Polish-British far right. And we see a significant number of Polish migrants in Britain recruited by British far-right organizations. We also see British far-right leaders and activists visiting Poland, for example, to take part in the Polish Independence March on 11/11, which is probably the world’s largest transnational far-right hub, as well as a symbolic space for the reproduction of political myths.

Far-right cooperation is fast becoming both a matter of ideological synergy and financial benefit. Far-right influencers play an increasingly important role, and there is money around them. So, for example, one Polish-British far-right PR expert has been behind the rightward shift of Elon Musk, and both have promoted the staunchly pro-Israeli, Islamophobic far-right influencer Tommy Robinson.

So, in that sense, I think an ideological bloc has already emerged, and this far right of today does have both its base and its superstructure, using Marxian terminology. But having said all that, far-right nationalism’s logic is not really given to cooperation—to put this mildly—and as we know from history. So, I anticipate all kinds of tensions, potentially conflicts emerging, and I don’t think that a robust, coherent far-right international is likely in that sense.

Populist Nationalism Thrives on Imagined Enemies And PiS Knows This Well

With Nawrocki now positioned to veto progressive reforms by Tusk’s government, are we witnessing a new phase of institutional gridlock engineered by ideological confrontation between liberalism and authoritarian conservatism?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think this is highly likely. But I don’t think, to be honest, that Tusk’s government would have done much, even with a president from its own side. The coalition is too divided on social issues and has been, I have to say this with regret, highly ineffective. And Tusk’s party itself is really right-wing—I mean, by Western standards. This is a neoliberal/neoconservative party. It resembles the Tories under Cameron before their shift in a far-right direction. So, yes, but I don’t think that it would be a very dramatic change in relation to what we have.

Do you foresee PiS leveraging the presidency to engineer a strategic comeback in 2027, thereby locking in illiberal reforms? If so, how might ideology serve as the vehicle of this restoration?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think the broad ideological outlook of Law and Justice (PiS) will remain as it is—traditional, conservative on social issues, and protectionist—some would say drifting towards the left—on economic issues. At the same time, the populist nationalism that PiS represents, as I said earlier, thrives on imagining enemies and hostile forces.
So, at one point it was the LGBT community that PiS stigmatized, with some regions and locations under the control of the party declaring themselves to be LGBT-free zones. At other points, it was refugees from the Middle East, whom Kaczyński presented in a language resembling Nazi rhetoric, really—namely, as carriers of dangerous diseases. So, with the rapid growth of the Ukrainian population in Poland following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, PiS will be keen to capitalize on any emerging fears and tensions between the Polish population and the Ukrainian minority in Poland, and that this will be used to engineer this strategic comeback in 2027.

PiS Is Illiberal—But Let’s Not Mistake It for Neoliberal

Chairperson of Law and Justice, Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Photo: Tomasz Kudala.

In your analysis, how does neoliberalism continue to structure Polish politics even amidst this nationalist, anti-liberal wave? Can we speak of an ‘illiberal neoliberalism’ in the Polish context?

Professor Rafal Soborski: This is an interesting question—questions like this color the debate on whether we still live in a neoliberal era. Trump’s tariffs, Brexit, etc., seem to perhaps contradict this. Neoliberalism—and by this I mean a crass version of 19th-century economic liberalism, not the paradigm in the studies of international relations also known as neoliberalism—has been the hegemonic ideology for so long that, even if we are to assume its terminal decline in the near future, it will continue resonating for some time. By the way, the end of neoliberalism was pronounced a few times before, especially during the 2008 economic crisis—the gravest one since 1929—which revealed the serious flaws of neoliberalism, and then during the pandemic, when suddenly the state, which neoliberals tend to blame for all problems, proved indispensable, and neoliberal regimes coped with the pandemic far worse, far less effectively than the more social-democratic, statist ones.

Now, neoliberalism is compatible with authoritarianism—think of Chile under Pinochet’s rule, for instance—but as far as PiS is concerned, I am not sure if the party represents illiberal neoliberalism. Neoliberals preach that markets are always right, they don’t find inequality to be a problem, they promote austerity and the rolling back of the welfare state. And PiS, on the other hand, is actually quite statist in approach, supportive of the welfare state—for whichever reasons, usually just electoral reasons, but still—and big projects like, for instance, the central airport in Poland, which is now in a bit of a limbo. Economic inequalities—we have to keep this in mind—under the PiS government declined in Poland. The Gini coefficient, which measures inequality, fluctuated during PiS years but was never higher than in 2015 and is now significantly below average. So, I wouldn’t describe them as illiberal neoliberals. They are certainly illiberal, but probably not neoliberal.

Is Poland a Nationalist Haven?

Your recent co-authored work shows how Polish migrants in the UK are co-opted into transnational far-right movements. How might Nawrocki’s presidency reinforce or reshape diasporic nationalism and transnational far-right solidarities?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Thank you very much for this question. This is the topic that I’m working on with Professor Garapich and Dr. Jochymek at LMU. 

Poland is often seen by the global far right as a nationalist haven that remains relatively homogeneous ethnically, that remains traditional, conservative, and has also been very economically successful in recent decades, while maintaining a strong identity. And this kind of perception has been articulated and reinforced by all kinds of far-right influencers, but also by Donald Trump. When he visited Warsaw during his first presidency, he chose Warsaw as the location for his main European speech—often described by scholars as the major narrative of Western civilizational populism.

I think this perception of Poland—has been undermined by the 2023 elections and the premiership of the globalist Donald Tusk, as he’s seen by the far right. But if PiS regains power in 2027, then the far-right narrative about Poland as a model country is likely to make a comeback. 

I already mentioned our work on Polish migrants in Britain, one of the largest minorities in the country. At this point, approximately 700,000 Poles live in Britain, and their voting patterns are interesting. They are different from how Poles living in, for example, the United States or Canada vote. So in the first round of the presidential elections, almost 36% of those who voted voted for Trzaskowski. But then he was followed by two far-right candidates—Sławomir Mentzen, over 18%, and Grzegorz Braun, who got over 14%—and Nawrocki was only fourth, with just 13%. So it seems that Polish right-wing migrants in Britain prefer either the more extreme narrative coming from Braun, which is messianic, antisemitic, extremely homophobic, or the more economically libertarian far-right views of Mentzen. And the popularity of the latter may be explicable by the fact that many Poles living in Britain are self-employed and hence averse to big state and high taxation. But in the second round, Trzaskowski got almost 61%. So we should keep in mind that the majority of Poles in Britain are not interested in politics and do not vote. Those who vote ultimately voted for the centrist candidate.

Now, coming back to Nawrocki: only time will tell what his win means for transnational far-right solidarities. What we know is that the PiS government until 2023—so for eight years—supported symbolically and financially various initiatives of the Polish diaspora in Britain that were of a far-right nature, and the British press did register this. More broadly, taking a more global perspective, as the far right assumes an increasingly civilizationist posture, transnational far-right ideologies, activism, and symbolism will become more important, I’m sure—reinforcing these solidarities that you’ve asked about. However, as I already said, we should not forget the lesson from history: that collision courses are inherent in nationalism, and such friendships are likely to be subordinated and perhaps ultimately trumped by jingoistic passions.

Shifting Right Won’t Win the Right

What are the ideological weaknesses of the liberal opposition in Poland, particularly in light of Trzaskowski’s narrow loss? Is managerial centrism enough to challenge the far right’s mobilizing narratives?

Professor Rafal Soborski: It certainly is not enough, and this can be seen not just in Poland, but also in other places, including Germany or Britain, where—even when the center wins elections—it then limits itself in office to this very managerialism you mentioned, without a compelling vision of its own. It tends to mimic instead the narratives of the right. Think of Keir Starmer’s shift to the right in recent months, or Scholz when he was Germany’s Chancellor. There are many other examples. And I think this was also a mistake of the coalition government in Poland—the rightward shift in the rhetoric around migration, for example, and no progress whatsoever on the promises made to the LGBT community. And of course, this was caused by the coalition being divided on the question. But why would voters take into consideration the inner workings of the governing coalition? They generally expect results. 

Many leftists did vote for Trzaskowski, perhaps with a heavy conscience. I would have liked many more of them to vote for him, just to avoid having a nationalist with a shady past as president of the country. But Trzaskowski himself should have shifted in a more progressive direction. For example, I don’t think he convinced anyone by hiding the rainbow flag that was handed to him by Nawrocki during one of the debates, and then it was quickly taken over from Trzaskowski by a left-wing candidate. This alienated many people on the left—members of the LGBT community, I presume, as well—while not convincing anyone on the right, who had seen Trzaskowski before participating in Pride marches in Warsaw. So, this was inconsistent, and shifting to the right will not work.

Don’t Chase the Right—Reclaim Class Politics and Solidarity

A fatigued factory worker.
A fatigued factory worker experiencing exhaustion, weakness, hopelessness, and burnout. Photo: Shutterstock.

How should pro-democratic forces in Poland reframe their political project to contest both the nationalist cultural agenda and the underlying neoliberal consensus you critique?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think it is evident from what I have said so far that my political views are leftist and progressive. I would like to see pro-democratic forces in Poland challenging the right rather than hoping in vain that they can occupy some of the right’s discursive territory. I would like to see an open, pro-European Poland respecting minorities and celebrating diversity. 

But I would also like to see the importance of social class really appreciated by Polish progressive politicians.The liberal center, and even the liberal left, sometimes appear to believe that class is no longer a significant dimension of identity or social stratification. They see class as a concept that was relevant in the industrial era—in the 19th century, early 20th century—but not in an information- and service-based society of today. But the concept of class describes an economic relationship, and anyone working for wages, not living off rent or interest, belongs to the working class. So to appeal to this huge group, pro-democratic forces should start talking about the four-day working week, more loudly about universal income, universal benefits—especially in the context of AI, which will likely eliminate a wide range of professions, a wide range of jobs, or rather, it will replace humans in those jobs. 

The Razem (Together) party in Poland has started this conversation, and I think this is the way to go, rather than caring mainly for the interests of a small number of wealthy individuals or entrepreneurs, however important they may be for the economy. We should also remember on this point that some of the people who voted for Law and Justice—I suspect a significant share of the party’s electorate—chose it because of the range of social benefits, welfare benefits that the party has introduced or expanded, hence, as I mentioned, reducing inequalities while at the same time sustaining economic growth. So, I think a social democratic, solidary response—protecting the poor while shifting more of the financial burden towards the privileged few—is what I would recommend, and I would recommend this both in principle and also strategically, as a way to weaken, to defeat PiS.

And finally, Professor Soborski, given the gender and education-based electoral cleavages evident in the runoff, how might intersectional ideological analysis help explain—and perhaps overcome—these divisions?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Most of the cleavages were not that surprising—big cities for Trzaskowski, provincial Poland for Nawrocki, Western Poland for Trzaskowski, Eastern Poland for Nawrocki. Education was, of course, a big factor as well. But what I would like to highlight—what came unexpectedly—was the support far-right candidates Mentzen and Braun received from young people, who then, in the second round, voted primarily for Nawrocki. So clearly, this is a group for whom Civic Platform—the coalition government—does not seem to have a convincing offer, and I already explained what I see as the right response.

A distressed Black woman professional faces gender discrimination and workplace bullying, as male colleagues point fingers and place blame. The image highlights the emotional toll of inequality and harassment in professional environments. Photo: Dreamstime.

“No One Can Make You Feel Inferior Without Your Consent”: Is Eleanor Roosevelt Right?

Can we truly choose not to feel inferior? In this thought-provoking commentary, Syed Yousha Haider critically examines Eleanor Roosevelt’s famous quote, “No one can make you feel inferior without your consent.” Blending insights from psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and social theory, Haider explores the limits of agency in the face of trauma, social conditioning, and structural inequality. While celebrating resilience and self-determination, he also challenges oversimplified notions of empowerment. This essay invites readers to reflect on the complex dynamics of self-worth, consent, and resistance in a world where internal struggles are often shaped by forces far beyond the individual.

By Syed Yousha Haider*

Eleanor Roosevelt’s much-quoted maxim—”No one can make you feel inferior without your consent”—has traveled a long way from its origins as a personal empowerment mantra. The quote says that individual choice is more important than what other people think, based on ideas about agency, dignity, and self-concept. But beneath its catchy simplicity lies a philosophical paradox: is it ever in our choice to refuse consent to feelings of inferiority? Are these kinds of feelings, at least in part, caused by social, psychological, and even neurobiological processes that we can’t control? This essay argues that Roosevelt’s maxim, as inspiring as it is, is only partially true. Individual agency is essential to self-perception, but the action of structural forces, psychological conditioning, and automatic cognitive processes complicate the idea that one can simply choose not to feel inferior.

The Appeal of Personal Agency

People still use Roosevelt’s quote because it fits with the liberal humanist idea of the self-governing person. For example, Stoic philosophy heard Epictetus say, “It’s not what happens to you, but how you react to it that matters.” It seems like there is strength inside despite what is going on outside. Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) is probably the most scientifically-based type of psychotherapy. It also believes that how we feel is based on how we think about things, not the events themselves. This view says that changing the way you talk to yourself can help you get over feelings of inferiority and move on.

Also, there are literally countless examples from history of people who have overcome feelings of inferiority even though the system tried to make them feel less important. Viktor E. Frankl, a survivor of the Holocaust, famously said in his book Man’s Search for Meaning that the last of the human freedoms is “to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances.” Many people point to Frankl’s ability to survive extreme dehumanization as proof that accepting one’s inferiority is a choice..

After serving 27 years in prison for refusing to change his beliefs to suit apartheid’s demands, Nelson Mandela came out of prison with his dignity unharmed and guided South Africa through a peaceful transition. The strength of agency against humiliation is demonstrated by the fact that he was able to maintain his dignity despite institutional racism. After surviving a Taliban assassination attempt, Malala Yousafzai transformed personal hardship into a global movement for girls’ education. Her refusal to submit in the face of patriarchal violence is a brilliant illustration of how victims can become empowered..

The idea that people are powerless in the face of hardship is refuted by the resilience philosophy. The study of learned optimism by Dr. Martin Seligman emphasizes how our mental habits can influence how we react to criticism and failure. People can develop what Seligman refers to as “psychological immunity”—a defense against internalized inferiority—by confronting negative internal monologues and redefining failures as temporary and external. Roosevelt’s ideal can then be seen as psychologically realized through the development of optimism and internal locus of control.

Limits of Consent: Neuropsychological Constraints

However, this utopian vision is obscured by current psychological and neuroscientific research. Cognitive processes related to self-worth are not always under conscious control. The Default Mode Network (DMN) is primarily outside of conscious awareness and is active during self-referential cognition and daydreaming. In order to construct a cohesive sense of self, it is known to combine memories, emotions, and imagined situations, maintaining negative self-beliefs without conscious consent.

Furthermore, unconscious bias affects how we view ourselves from an early age. Implicit Association Tests demonstrate how years of exposure to social stereotypes can cause people to internalize group stereotype attitudes toward members of their own group, such as women being biased against women in positions of power. These are kept in the brain areas responsible for moral and emotional judgments, the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala, demonstrating the neurobiological basis of negative self-perceptions.

Though unconscious, the trauma survivors feel ashamed and inferior. It has been observed that distorted self-perceptions, such as guilt and worthlessness, are more potent than logical thought in people with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). These are neurophysiologic reactions rather than choices, and correcting them usually requires a lengthy therapeutic intervention. In these situations, inferiority is more neurologically motivated than widely accepted.

Additionally, early attachment orientations are crucial in determining self-esteem and vulnerability to feelings of inadequacy, according to affective neuroscience research. A child who experiences emotional abuse or neglect may grow up with a persistent internal schema of worthlessness. The internalized, which was solidified during brain-sensitive developmental stages, restricts the person’s capacity to “withdraw consent” from inferiority complexes as an adult.

Second, feelings of inferiority might have adaptive roots, according to evolutionary psychology. Humans were made to live in small communities where access to resources and partners depended heavily on status and belonging. One adaptation that might have developed in order to survive is hypersensitivity to social rejection. However, this evolutionary baggage now shows up as irrational and habitual feelings of inferiority, especially in hierarchical environments like online forums, workplaces, and schools.

Social and Structural Determinants of Inferiority

In addition to the psychology of the individual, social structures also produce and enforce inferiority. Language, the media, and institutions are all infused with heteronormativity, which tends to dictate who is capable, desirable, or deserving. Symbolic violence, as defined by Pierre Bourdieu, describes how dominant social groups impose meanings that are internalized as acceptable. For example, colonial education systems used to portray colonized people as intellectually inferior; this claim is still present in the disparities in academic accreditation around the world.

Erving Goffman studied how stigma, or the discrediting of people for supposedly deviating from the norm, contributes to feelings of shame and undesirableness. According to his theory, the stigmatized individual absorbs society’s scrutiny and agrees to being inferior out of social pressure rather than choice. This consent is not voluntary; it is coerced.

According to the “stereotype threat,” as defined by social psychologist Claude Steele, people perform less well when they are concerned about reinforcing unfavorable stereotypes about their identity category. For instance, when race is emphasized on tests, African American students do worse—not because they think they are less capable, but rather because the cultural script instills fear, which impairs performance. Such scripts can effectively short-circuit the will by altering behavior and thought.

Another sociocultural phenomenon is groupthink. People will repress contradictory self-concepts in order to preserve group harmony, embracing the flawed consensus. Conventional instances, like discouraging women’s aspirations for education or politics, demonstrate how social norms can force internalization of inferiority.

Furthermore, social media has given rise to new channels for the propagation of inferiority. Social media platforms like Instagram and TikTok propagate idealized beauty standards and manufactured lives, creating a culture of comparison that undermines self-worth. Younger generations, particularly teenage girls, are disproportionately targeted by algorithmic promotion of idealized imagery, which contributes to the rise in anxiety and depression. Here, inferiority is fostered by repeated exposure to distorted norms rather than being elected outright.

Such effects are amplified by intersectionality. The accumulation of marginalization experiences is demonstrated by Kimberlé Crenshaw’s intersectional matrix of oppressive systems, which includes racism, sexism, and classism. Black women who are economically marginalized may encounter overlapping social messages that portray them as inferior in multiple ways. These messages, which are delivered through cultural imagery and institutional norms, carry a cumulative psychological burden that is difficult to deny.

Resisting Inferiority: Possibility and Limits

Resistance is evident in opposition to these limits. The recovery of the imposed identity of inferiority has already been demanded by feminist and postcolonial theorists. “Caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation,” as Audre Lorde insists, is a rejection of internalizing the condemnation of the world. Black Pride and LGBTQ+ affirmations are just two examples of grassroots movements that have successfully challenged hegemonic discourses and empowered people to reject internalized oppression.

The solution to this difficulty lies in education. According to Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, the oppressed must be able to recognize internalized inferiority brought on by systemic injustice and recover their dignity via critical thinking, or conscientization. Only with time, resources, and support groups—things that not everyone has access to—can it be accomplished.

The ability to challenge hegemonic narratives and reinterpret value on their own terms has been made possible by cyberspace. Default inferiority narratives are countered by discourses like #BlackGirlMagic and #DisabledAndProud. In addition to being empowering in and of themselves, these claims also have a cumulative effect by changing the broader cultural environment.

However, not all attempts at resistance are successful. The enduring resilience of systemic powers is demonstrated by the continued existence of racial profiling, wage inequality, and underrepresentation in leadership positions. One’s identity is typically determined by societal approval, even if you fight valiantly against subordinating ideologies. The internal conflict gets harder to sustain when one lacks acceptance and a sense of belonging.

However, resilience-building programs enable psychological resistance. Education and mental health programs that promote self-advocacy, growth mindsets, and trauma-informed care are essential. Instead of opposing systemic forces, these empower individuals to challenge internalized narratives. Roosevelt’s assertion is interpreted by adults as an invitation to build internal strength in tandem with structural change, rather than as a rejection of putting up with oppression.

The Philosophical Implications of Consent

Roosevelt only used the word “consent” to refer to a deliberate action. However, in ethics and the law, consent must be given voluntarily and free from coercion. Consent to be in a subordinate position cannot be based on psychological conditioning, neurobiology, or societal power dynamics that reduce one’s agency and awareness.

Here, it’s important to distinguish between “responsibility” and “causality.” One can be held accountable for facing their own shortcomings over time, even if they were never the direct cause of them. This nuanced stance maintains the moral requirement of agency while rejecting the all-powerful forces that exist within our inner selves.

The “dialogical self” theory of philosopher Charles Taylor makes consent more difficult to understand. According to Taylor, identity is socially constructed through interactions with other people rather than something that is determined for oneself. Feelings of inferiority could be exogenously programmed rather than endogenously generated if selfhood is relational. Roosevelt’s statement may therefore be exaggerated in light of the extent to which an individual can create their own sense of self-worth.

Jean-Paul Sartre and other existentialist philosophers support radical freedom and self-creation. His theory that “existence precedes essence” holds that people must create their identities consciously since they are not born with predetermined natures. According to this viewpoint, willpower alone is sufficient to overcome inferiority complexes. But Sartre also introduced the idea of “bad faith,” which acknowledges the limitations of volition and refers to people lying to themselves in order to escape the responsibility that comes with freedom. In The Ethics of Belief, philosopher William Clifford makes the case that it is immoral to hold beliefs in the absence of adequate evidence. When used in this context, inferiority complexes that are based on erroneous social or psychological assumptions are illogical and ought to be disregarded. However, Thomas Nagel argues that human subjectivity cannot be avoided; irrational feelings, such as inferiority, are.

Conclusion

A powerful affirmation of human dignity and inner strength is the Eleanor Roosevelt maxim. However, it would be oversimplifying the combined influence of psychological, biological, and social factors on self-perception to claim that no one can ever make us feel inferior if we do not consent. Although agency still functions, it must be understood in the context of limitations. Since Roosevelt’s assertion that reassertion of value is as much a matter of will as it is of struggle against forces of inheritance, the reality is not so much a question of its complete cancellation or confirmation. Therefore, empowerment is more about knowing on what terms to give consent than it is about refusing it.


 

(*) Syed Yousha Haider is a student with a growing interest in understanding the human mind and behavior. In his own words, he has always been curious about what drives people to think, feel, and act the way they do. This curiosity, combined with his desire to understand himself and others better, naturally led him to explore the field of psychology. While he is still learning, he finds joy in asking questions, noticing patterns in emotions, and reflecting on the deeper reasons behind everyday choices. For him, psychology is more than a subject—it is a way to connect with people, understand their stories, and perhaps even help make sense of his own.

Several thousand protesters marched in Bristol, UK, on February 4, 2017, opposing President Trump's scheduled state visit to the UK and his executive order banning travel to the US from seven Muslim-majority countries. Photo: Dreamstime.

Impact of Civilizational Populism on Intergroup Emotions, Social Cohesion, and Civility in the UK

Please cite as:
Wathtuwa-Durayalage, Sudeshika. (2025). “Impact of Civilizational Populism on Intergroup Emotions, Social Cohesion, and Civility in the UK.”
Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). June 11, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000115



Abstract

This study investigates the impact of civilizational populism on intergroup emotions, social cohesion, and civility in the United Kingdom using quantitative analysis of British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) 2021 data. The findings reveal significant correlations between exposure to populist rhetoric and heightened negative emotions, such as fear and anger, toward ethnoreligious and political minorities (r = 0.56). While political affiliation demonstrates a weaker direct influence (r = 0.14), perceptions of migration as culturally and economically beneficial are strongly associated with higher social cohesion (r = 0.69). Minority groups report elevated levels of exclusion and fear, yet national pride correlates with inclusive attitudes in some cases (r = -0.64, with prejudicial views). Civil society organizations play a critical role in mitigating divisive effects by fostering inclusivity and dialogue. These insights inform strategies to counteract the polarizing impacts of civilizational populism, emphasizing the importance of inclusive narratives and policy interventions to enhance social cohesion in diverse societies. The study’s limitations include reliance on secondary data and challenges in establishing causality, highlighting the need for further research using more direct measures of populism and contemporary datasets. Despite these constraints, the findings contribute empirical evidence to the growing literature on the social and emotional consequences of populism, offering a foundation for policies aimed at promoting harmony and reducing polarization in the UK.

Keywords: Civilizational populism, intergroup emotions, social cohesion, civility

 

By Sudeshika Wathtuwa-Durayalage

Introduction

This study investigates the influence of civilisational populism on intergroup emotions and attitudes towards ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK. Specifically, it examines the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility at the local and national levels, and how individuals and communities respond to and resist populist rhetoric. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the emotional responses elicited by civilisational populism, such as fear, anger, and resentment, and the strategies civil society organisations employ to mitigate its divisive effects. 

While there has been extensive research on the general impact of populism on political attitudes and intergroup relations, there is a significant gap in understanding the specific emotional and social consequences of civilisational populism, particularly in the UK context. Civilisational populism differs from other forms of populism by framing political discourse regarding civilisational identities and perceived existential threats to cultural values and ways of life. Current literature inadequately addresses how this form of populism shapes intergroup emotions, such as fear and resentment, and its implications for social cohesion. Furthermore, there is a paucity of research on how communities and civil society organisations respond to civilisational populism, especially in fostering social cohesion and civility in the context of rising divisive rhetoric. 

This research is significant as it aims to provide a nuanced understanding of how civilisational populism influences emotional and social dynamics within ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK. By focusing on emotional responses and community reactions to civilisational populism, this study offers critical insights into how populist rhetoric shapes social cohesion and civility in diverse societies. Additionally, identifying the coping mechanisms and resistance strategies employed by communities will contribute to policy and intervention strategies aimed at mitigating the divisive impacts of populism. Ultimately, this research could inform efforts to strengthen social cohesion and civility in increasingly pluralistic and politically polarised societies.

The research questions are as follows:

How does civilisational populism influence intergroup emotions and attitudes toward ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK?

What are the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility in local and national contexts?

How do individuals and communities respond to populist rhetoric, and what coping mechanisms or resistance strategies are employed to maintain social cohesion?

There are three research objectives aligned with this research, as follows:

To explore how civilisational populism impacts the emotional responses (e.g., fear, anger, and resentment) of different ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK.

To analyse the relationship between civilisational populism and social cohesion, focusing on the extent to which it promotes or undermines community trust and cooperation.

To identify the strategies utilised by civil society organisations and communities to counteract the divisive effects of populism and foster civility.

Civilisational populism, as defined in this research, uniquely frames political discourse around existential threats to cultural values, in contrast to general populism that targets the elite. This study explores its significant emotional and societal impacts on social cohesion, particularly among ethnoreligious and political minorities. The central argument posits that civilisational populism exacerbates fear, anger, and resentment toward minority groups, undermining local and national social cohesion. Civil society and communities can mitigate these divisive impacts by fostering civility and employing coping mechanisms. Through a robust quantitative approach utilising British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) data, this research seeks to empirically establish correlations between populist rhetoric and intergroup emotions.

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A woman votes at a polling station on general election day in Palma de Mallorca. Photo: Dreamstime.

Do Muslims Have Different Attitudes and Voting Behaviour Than the Majority Populations of France, Germany and the Netherlands?

DOWNLOAD REPORT

Please cite as: 

van Oosten, Sanne. (2025). “Do Muslims Have Different Attitudes and Voting Behaviour Than the Majority Populations of France, Germany and the Netherlands?” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). June 10, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00100

 

Abstract

The political preferences of Muslims are often the source of contention and misinformation. In continental Europe, there is not much data available on political preferences of Muslims due to strict privacy regulations, creating a knowledge lacuna allowing for misinformation to fester. In this report, I focus on three countries where privacy regulations are particularly longstanding: France, Germany, and the Netherlands. I use a novel sampling method that complies with privacy regulations while achieving a large enough sample of minority respondents to conduct statistical analyses. Regarding policy preferences, I find that respondents with a Muslim minority background have more conservative attitudes towards same-sex adoption, while showing very similar attitudes to white majority respondents when it comes to gender equality. Respondents with a Muslim minority background are, however, more progressive on immigration and religious freedoms for Muslims. Regarding voting preferences, Muslims show very similar patterns to their majority counterparts, with a few exceptions (La France Insoumise (FI) in France, and in the Netherlands DENK and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)). This paper seeks to put an end to persistent speculation about the political preferences of Muslims, particularly Muslims, in France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

 

By Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher at University of Oxford, COMPAS, sanne.vanoosten@compas.ox.ac.uk)

Introduction

The political preferences of Muslims in western countries are the subject of recurring speculation (Turnbull-Dugarte and Lopez, 2024; Turnbull-Dugarte et al., 2025; van Oosten, 2025a; 2025b). Political leaders often claim that Muslims vote for them to present themselves as legitimate leaders of all people, while at the same time, some political leaders claim that Muslims and other minorities have been imported by elites to vote for pro-immigrant parties and change society from within (Bracke and Aguilar, 2022; van Oosten, 2025a). Political actors also often point to the attitudes of Muslims to justify their exclusion from national communities (Glas, 2023; Spierings, 2021; De Lange and Mügge, 2015). These claims focus on issues like opposition to gay rights (Puar, 2013), perceived sexism (Farris, 2017), antisemitism (van Oosten, 2024a) or animal cruelty (Backlund and Jungar, 2022; van Oosten, 2024b). Far-right parties use these examples to argue that Muslims do not share core liberal values, and therefore do not belong in liberal societies (van Oosten, 2024b; 2022). These claims, however, are rarely supported by data. This report examines whether Muslims in France, Germany, and the Netherlands hold different political preferences from their white majority counterparts.

Standard sampling strategies do not yield enough minority participants for statistical analyses (Font and Méndez, 2013). Moreover, strict European privacy regulations limit the availability of sampling frames for racial/ethnic and religious minorities in the European context (Simon, 2017). To overcome these challenges, I surveyed a large sample of Kantar-panellists and used a mini-survey to oversample voters from France, Germany, and the Netherlands with a migration background in Turkey (France, Germany, and the Netherlands), North Africa (France), Sub-Saharan Africa (France), the Former Soviet Union (Germany), Surinam (the Netherlands), and Morocco (the Netherlands). I sampled a high number of minority respondents, with 1889 out of a total N of 3058 respondents having a migration background, of which 649 self-identify as Muslim. I asked these respondents for their propensity to vote (PTV) for all political parties in the French, German and Dutch parliament at the time of data collection, as well as their attitudes towards 8 key policy preferences spanning socio-cultural and socio-economic themes. 

In this paper, I test whether Muslims and other minority groups differ from majority voters in their support for political parties in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. I find that Muslim voters are much less likely to support PVV in the Netherlands but are just as likely to vote for the RN in France or AfD in Germany (all three far right). Minority and majority voters are equally likely to support mainstream left parties, such as PS in France, the SPD in Germany, and PvdA in the Netherlands. Muslim minority voters are more likely to support left-populist parties DENK in the Netherlands and FI in France. In terms of policy preferences, respondents with a Muslim minority background hold more conservative views on same-sex adoption but show similar attitudes to majority respondents on gender equality. They are, however, more progressive on immigration and Muslim religious freedoms.

This report aims to contribute to the debate about the voting behaviour of Muslims in Western Europe, a debate that is often speculative and not based on data from academic scholars. Far right party leaders, thinkers and pundits have fuelled misunderstandings about minority voting patterns. In reality, the political preferences of Muslims, a minority, are very similar to the political preferences of the majority population. This report seeks to provide clarity and offer a data-driven response to counter the narrative that some political leaders might use to exploit the supposed voting behaviours of minorities for their political gain. Through empirical analysis, this study contributes to a more accurate understanding of ethnic minority political preferences and aims to challenge rhetoric with factual evidence.

Sampling Method and Sample Composition

I conducted this research in France (van Oosten et al., 2024a), Germany (van Oosten et al., 2024b) and the Netherlands (van Oosten et al., 2024c), three countries with key differences. In France, there is a strong emphasis on citizenship, secularism and a strong division between church and state (Kuru, 2008). In Germany, Christian political parties have had a longstanding presence (Ahrens et al., 2022) and the approach towards Muslims is characterised by the history of integration of guestworkers (Yurdakul, 2009). The Netherlands has a host of Christian parties (Kešić and Duyvendak, 2019), a tradition of high minority representation in politics (Hughes, 2016: 560), increased by the emergence of a political party run by Muslim parliamentarians and voicing Muslim interests in 2017, DENK (van Oosten et al., 2024d). All three countries have a history of parliamentarians from mainstream and populist radical right parties espousing Islamophobic rhetoric, with France and the Netherlands having a longer and more vociferous history of populist radical right parties and Germany being relatively new to the game and taking on a comparatively less strident tone (Brubaker, 2017).

I oversampled respondents with specific migration backgrounds to make group-specific statistical inferences (Font and Méndez, 2013: 48) and chose minoritised groups: numeric minorities that state experiencing discrimination to the largest extent (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017: 31). In France, the oversampled groups of ethnic minority citizens consist of French citizens with a North-African (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria), Sub-Saharan African (Niger, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, French Sudan, Senegal, Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo) and Turkish background. In Germany, I oversampled German citizens with a Turkish and Former Soviet Union (FSU) background. In the Netherlands, I oversampled Dutch citizens with a Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese background. Some groups have come to France, Germany or the Netherlands as a result of the colonial ties between host and home country, some came as guest workers (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017: 93). I also oversampled French citizens with a Turkish background and German re-migrants from the FSU. Some, but not all, of the oversampled migration backgrounds are countries with Muslim-majority populations, making it possible to disentangle whether differences are either religiously or ethnically/racially driven. In this paper, I present data for the Muslim subgroup, but the data also includes other minoritised groups and analyses by these groups are also available for researchers. 

After running pilots and obtaining the ethics approval, (see appendix: van Oosten, 2025c), I gathered data between March and August of 2020 amongst 3058 citizens of France, Germany and the Netherlands, administered by survey agency Kantar Public (for all replication materials and appendices, see van Oosten, 2025b). One important challenge in surveying ethnic/racial minority groups comes from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a European law legally restricting saving data on race and ethnicity (European Commission 2018). I overcame this challenge by employing a large-scale filter question to the representative Kantar-panels in all three countries. I asked a very large sample to participate in a mini survey. The first and only question of this mini survey asks where their mother and father were born. If either one of their parents were born in a country of origin I wanted to oversample, I redirected this respondent to the full survey. If not, I either terminated the survey or redirected a small percentage to the full survey. This enabled us to form sizable groups of minority citizens for our final survey, ensuring ample diversity, a feature so often missing from survey research (e.g. Coppock and McClellan, 2018). Though there is still a chance of selection bias (see van Oosten, 2025d for a discussion on the selection bias in this sample), I have variables to weight the data on gender, migration background, education, age, urbanisation and region, and the findings are broadly the same with and without weights.

Respondents received so-called ‘LifePoints’ (France and Germany) or ‘Nipoints’ (the Netherlands) for the completion of the survey. With these points, respondents can periodically convert their saved points to an online gift card. The survey took about fifteen minutes to complete, which translated to an equivalent of two euros in gift card value. I ended up with the following number of respondents in each group:

I assessed migration background by inquiring about the birthplaces of respondents’ mothers and fathers. It was necessary to ask this question first for sampling purposes. To minimise potential ordering effects on the data, I randomised the order in which respondents viewed the policy questions and experimental profiles (for the full questionnaire, see appendix in van Oosten, 2025c). To mitigate acquiescence bias, where respondents tend to agree with statements, I randomised the wording of the policy questions. For instance, one half of the sample saw the statement: “the taxes for this rich should be raised” and the other half saw “the taxes for the rich should be lowered” and I recoded the variables accordingly. I prepared the data using R-package ‘tidyr’ (Wickham, 2020, see all code and replication materials here: van Oosten, 2025c).

Minorities’ Policy Preferences

In the following section, I first present the policy preferences of two groups: non-religious ethnic majority respondents and Muslim ethnic minority respondents (for other subgroups see appendix at van Oosten, 2025c). I present the distribution of the responses in a histogram, with a black line indicating the mean score. I asked respondents to indicate their agreement with a series of policy statements using an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). The statements covered a broad range of topics, including attitudes towards state intervention, immigration, Islam, gender and sexuality. The attitudes towards state intervention are as follows: “The tax rate for the rich must be higher/lower,” “Our government should raise/lower support for the unemployed,” “Our government should do less/more to combat climate change than now,” and “Our government needs to lower/raise fuel prices.” Attitudes towards immigration and Islam are as follows: “Immigrants are a burden/an asset to our country,” “Islam should (not) be restricted by law.” I measure gender attitudes as follows: “That men and women receive equal pay for equal work should (not) be regulated by law,” and sexuality as follows: “Homosexual couples should (not) be allowed to adopt children.” 

I compared the responses of non-religious ethnic majority respondents with those of ethnic minority respondents who self-identified as practicing Muslims. Differences between the groups were negligible for most policy areas, including taxation, unemployment, climate policy, fuel prices, and gender equality. However, Muslim respondents were more likely to oppose adoption rights for same-sex couples, and more supportive of immigration and religious freedoms for Muslims.

Subsequently, I present data for voting preferences. I asked respondents about their willingness to vote for a wide range of political parties in their respective countries using so-called “Propensity to Vote” (PTV) questions. Respondents were asked: “Please indicate the likelihood that you will ever vote for the following parties. If you are certain that you will never vote for this party then choose 0; if you are certain to vote for this party someday, then enter 10. Of course you can also choose an intermediate position.” In France, the list of parties included LREM, LR, PS, MoDem, FI, PCF, RN (formerly Front National), and MR. In Germany, I asked about CDU, SPD, AfD, FDP, Die Linke, Grüne, and CSU. In the Netherlands, the full list consisted of CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, FvD, GroenLinks, PvdA, PvdD, PVV, SGP, SP, and VVD. 

In the figures below, I present histograms of the responses for two parties per country: FI and RN in France, Die Linke and AfD in Germany, and DENK and PVV in the Netherlands. These pairs were selected to contrast parties often associated with the ethnic majority versus those associated with minority or immigrant support. Full results for all parties are available in the appendix (van Oosten, 2025c). Our findings show that there are relatively few differences in voting propensities between non-religious ethnic majority respondents and Muslim ethnic minority respondents in France and Germany. In France, Muslims are about as likely as non-religious majority respondents to consider voting for both RN and FI. Similarly, in Germany, I find little difference between these two groups in their willingness to vote for Die Linke or AfD. The Netherlands stands out in this regard: Muslim respondents are significantly more likely to consider voting for DENK, a party with strong minority and Muslim support, while being far less likely to vote for the PVV, a party known for its anti-Muslim rhetoric. This suggests that differences in vote propensity by group are more pronounced in the Dutch context than in France or Germany.

Minorities’ Voting Preferences

Conclusion

In terms of policy preferences, the differences between Muslims and non-religious ethnic majority respondents are generally small, except in a few areas. Muslims tend to be more supportive of immigration and Muslim rights and less supportive of same-sex couples adopting children. There are no major differences on issues like gender equality, though. When it comes to voting preferences, there are bigger differences in the Netherlands compared to France and Germany. In the Netherlands, Muslims are much less likely to vote for the PVV, but more likely to vote for DENK. In France and Germany, there are fewer differences between Muslims and non-religious ethnic majorities, with both groups showing similar preferences for parties like RN and FI in France, and AfD and Die Linke in Germany.

This paper addresses the ongoing speculations about the policy and voting preferences of Muslims in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Political leaders and commentators regularly spread misinformation; possibly unintentionally, possibly deliberately (van Oosten, 2025a). This false information about minority voting habits can mislead the public and fuel xenophobic views. In reality, Muslims often share similar political preferences with the majority population, though not always. This paper presents descriptive statistics to challenge false narratives. Combating misinformation is vital for the health of democracies, as it helps maintain informed discussions and trust in democratic institutions.

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Billboard reading “The Looting Government,” part of a protest campaign against the conservative coalition's policies in Ra'anana, Israel, May 2023. Photo: Rene Van Den Berg

Professor Ben-Porat: Israel’s Rightward Shift Is More Than Political Strategy

In a candid and comprehensive interview with ECPS, Professor Guy Ben-Porat warns that Israel’s political rightward shift is not simply a strategic maneuver, but the product of deeper ideological currents. Describing the current coalition as “a unification of several forces,” Professor Ben-Porat highlights its populist hostility toward liberal institutions, minorities, and judicial independence. He draws direct parallels to Hungary and Poland, identifying a shared authoritarian trajectory. Professor Ben-Porat also reflects on how the October 7 attacks have further racialized political discourse, with Arab-Palestinian citizens facing intensified securitization. Yet, he sees hope in mass democratic mobilization: “Thousands of people have taken to the streets every week… the fact that many Israelis are still fighting for democracy means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a period marked by growing polarization, religious populism, and democratic backsliding, Israel’s political landscape has undergone a profound transformation. In a wide-ranging and timely interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Guy Ben-Porat—an expert in comparative politics and political sociology at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev—offers a critical diagnosis of Israel’s sharp rightward turn. “It’s more than strategy,” Professor Ben-Porat asserts, describing the current government as “a unification of several forces that make a very strong right-wing government,” rooted in anti-liberalism, exclusionary nationalism, and religious traditionalism.

At the center of this transformation is a coalition led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, flanked by ultra-Orthodox parties and far-right figures such as Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. Their political agenda, Professor Ben-Porat explains, has taken aim at core liberal-democratic institutions. “From the get-go, this government was determined to undermine the power of the Supreme Court… What they’re proposing is a majoritarian government that will stamp upon the rights of minorities.”

This encroachment on judicial independence is not merely an Israeli phenomenon. Professor Ben-Porat highlights the striking parallels with populist regimes in Hungary and Poland, noting that “Orbán and what happened in Poland before the last elections were good examples for Israel… this was a copycat.” The broader objective is to reconfigure Israeli democracy into a more ethnocratic and majoritarian model—where Jewish identity increasingly overrides civic inclusion and pluralism.

In a particularly sobering observation, Professor Ben-Porat warns that the October 7 Hamas attacks have only deepened the state’s securitized and racialized posture toward its Arab-Palestinian citizens. “There’s much more securitization of political statements and actions of Arab citizens,” he notes. And yet, despite populist figures like Ben Gvir hoping to use the crisis as justification for repression, Israel’s Arab citizens “did not play the game as expected”—remaining distant from Hamas and at times even risking their lives to protect Jewish compatriots.

Still, Professor Ben-Porat cautions that democratic decline is not inevitable. “Thousands of people have taken to the streets every week. That should not be discounted.” Though the protest movement remains largely focused on “Jewish democracy,” he sees the potential for it to evolve, to challenge systemic inequalities and the ongoing occupation. “It’s hard to be hopeful now,” he concludes, “but the fact that many Israelis are still on the streets, still fighting for democracy, means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.”

Professor Guy Ben-Porat—an expert in comparative politics and political sociology at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Guy Ben-Porat.

It’s More Than Strategy: A Unified Assault on Liberal Democracy

Professor Guy Ben-Porat, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you understand the convergence of neo-Zionist ideology and populist rhetoric in the post-2022 electoral landscape, particularly under the Ben Gvir–Smotrich axis within Netanyahu’s coalition?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s a big question, with many terms—neo, Zionist, etc.—which I’m not sure I understand or use all of them. It’s a right-wing government that has several elements within it. Likud, Netanyahu’s party, is a populist party which has become an exclusionary populist party in recent years, centered on anti-Arab, anti-immigrant, and anti-liberal sentiments.

Alongside it are the ultra-Orthodox parties, which have a very special perspective on Israel’s future and on church–state relations. You mentioned Ben Gvir and Smotrich. This is a united party combining into an extreme right-wing party—maybe akin to some things you see among the extreme right in Europe. So, major populism is the main theme here. I think it’s a right-wing, religious government with populist elements within it.

To what extent can the recent rightward shift in Israeli politics be interpreted as a populist response to long-standing ethnic and religious cleavages rather than a mere electoral strategy?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think it’s more than strategy. I think the government has a common interest in undermining some of the established democratic features of Israel—namely, the Supreme Court in particular. And if you look at the internal scene, or the internal politics, from the get-go, this government was determined to undermine the power of the Supreme Court and what we call the checks and balances. Now each part of the government has a different take on the Supreme Court. 

For the ultra-Orthodox, the Supreme Court is perceived as liberal and as undermining their coalitional achievements, which they gain—particular gains for their own good—whether it is exemption from military service, whether it’s budgets for religious institutions, etc.

For the extreme right, the Supreme Court is perceived as slowing down the annexation of the West Bank and the territories. The Supreme Court is perceived as putting some blocks on the military and on the settlement movement—which, one could argue, it does not—but that’s the way they perceive it.

And for Netanyahu, being involved in a series of trials, the Supreme Court is perceived—or is depicted—as an attempt to remove an elected leader by the elites.

So each part of this government has its own take on democracy, kind of combining together into this coalition.

Now, what unites them is, first, a very right-wing perspective in terms of Palestinians and Arab citizens; a more religious attitude or more traditional attitude towards religion; and a strong dislike of what they describe as elites and liberal democracy. So all this together makes it more than a fluke, more than a conjecture. It’s a unification of several forces that make a very strong right-wing government.

Religion Is Used to Draw Boundaries—Not Just to Guide Lives

Does the growing prominence of religious populism in Israel suggest a broader transformation in the political culture, where the ethno-religious identity of “the people” overrides civic and pluralistic conceptions of citizenship?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think here it’s a bit more complex, and that’s what we do—Dani Filc and I—in our work. For some of the religious right, religion is about demarcating boundaries. Religion is used as a way to define the Jewish state, to defend Jewish privileges, and to exclude those who are not Jewish. But if you look at their perception of religion as a way of life—as an ethical way of living—then some of them are not religious, or not religious in the way that orthodoxy perceives religion. To make this a bit more clear: if you look at issues like LGBTQ rights or issues about women’s rights within the Jewish camp, they can be somewhat liberal.

So, in this government, there is a clear divide between those for whom religion is a genuine way of life—shaping their daily practices, beliefs, and ethical system—and those who use religion primarily to draw boundaries and assert identity. Take, for example, the policy issue of exempting yeshiva students from military service: for the ultra-Orthodox, this is entirely natural and self-evident. For Likud members, however, it is far less obvious. That’s where you see differences between what religion is for these people.

Ehud Olmert, former Israeli Prime Minister, in his article published in Haaretz/The Guardian recently, warns of Israel’s potential international isolation and prosecution over war crimes, describing a state policy of starvation and indiscriminate violence. How does the normalization of such extreme policies reflect the convergence of populist ethno-nationalism with authoritarian state practices and what are the long-term implications for democratic institutions and minority rights in Israel?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think we need to make a little separation of things. First, Olmert’s warning is true and real. Israel’s actions in Gaza are dangerous. Many civilian lives are lost, and one could say—in very careful terms—without good reason. Not that there’s ever a good reason, but this war has definitely gone to extremes.

Now, why is this war continuing? Well, I think there are some reasons. One: it’s the government’s policy. And for Netanyahu, as long as the war goes on, the government stays intact. It keeps the government together. If the war ends, then some of the more extreme elements of the government might pull it apart, which means that Netanyahu would have to stand trial without the protection of being Prime Minister. It means there’ll be new elections. It means that Jews will begin debating what happened on October 7th—who’s responsible for this debacle. So for the government, the continuation of the war serves several purposes.

For some, the war should be continued because “we should not stop before the final victory,” which I’m not sure what it means—but for them, it’s the annihilation of Hamas. And I’m not sure that’s even possible. For others, maybe we should end the war on better terms for Israel. Again, I have no idea what that means.

But you could say there’s a mixture of ideology—of extreme right-wing ideology—of political interests, and mainly the fact that the government, for reasons that relate to what I said before, has never really introduced a strategy for how to end this war. If you ask Netanyahu: when does this war end? What will be in Gaza? Who will rule Gaza? Where will Israel be? What’s the role of the Palestinian Authority? What’s the role of other countries? What’s going to happen in Gaza once this war ends? What are the goals of this war? What is the strategy? We don’t know.

A Coherent Network of Right-Wing Advocacy Is Shaping Israel’s Future

Protests against judicial reform and religious coercion in Israel. Photo: Dreamstime.

How has the increasing influence of religiously conservative diaspora-funded NGOs and settler movements shaped the neo-Zionist agenda, particularly under populist governance?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Within Israel, money from abroad is not a new thing. NGOs—from both the left and the right—are supported from abroad. That’s not a new phenomenon. The same goes for the government. The Jewish diaspora has always maintained strong ties with Israel and influenced Israeli politics.

You can see NGOs on the so-called left and on the right receiving funding from abroad. Now, from the right-wing perspective, it’s the money from abroad that’s financing the left. So if you look at the populist kind of discourse, it’s about international elites supporting leftist, anti-Zionist forces who are opposing the government. It depends on which side is telling the story.

But to be more precise, I think what we’re seeing today is a very strong connection between the Israeli right and the Trump administration, as well as right-wing organizations in Europe. That’s where you see, perhaps, a new development: a more coherent network of right-wing advocacy that also has influence on Israel.

In your analysis of ‘good citizenship’ among new religious movements, how do such actors reframe legitimacy within a populist framework that delegitimizes secular or liberal opponents?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: There are several ways this is conducted. Begin with “good citizenship” in Israel—the republican equation, as we call it—has often been about military service. Many on the right pride themselves on being the foot soldiers: “We are carrying out the mission of defending Israel. We are paying the price in blood,” whether it’s through settlement in the West Bank or military service. Hence, we are the good citizens.

They blame the other side for not doing as much. By the way, statistics don’t necessarily support that, but that’s the claim. So being a good citizen is framed around military service and combat. That’s how they define good citizenship.

Now, this of course has implications for issues of gender and ethnicity—namely, for non-Jewish citizens. This whole concept of good citizenship is used by populists to describe themselves as the good, contributing, fighting citizens, in contrast to the “detached elites”—those who are global, more fluid, who can use their money to escape responsibility.

Now, this is a myth—a fable. The Israeli center-left has been fighting on the streets for democracy for two years now. So the whole notion of detached elites is complete baloney. But it makes for a compelling narrative on the right: We are the good citizens. We are the ones who sacrifice. We are truly committed to the country, while you—the elites—are global cosmopolitans. This, by the way, echoes classic anti-Semitic tropes once used in Europe against Jews. Put that aside—but the story they tell is that we are the good people, and they are the detached elites with less commitment to the country’s welfare.

A Different Government Might Have Chosen Strategy Over Messianic Dreams

Had a centrist or center-left coalition prevailed in the 2022 elections, how might the Israeli state have handled the aftermath of the October 7 attacks differently—in terms of military response, international diplomacy, and internal discourse?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s hard to talk about things that didn’t happen. The “what if” is always very difficult. I can say one thing: if the October 7th debacle had happened under a center-left government, the right would have used all its power to force that government out, to place the blame squarely on them, and to sell the narrative that this is what happens when you have a left-leaning government—one that is weak and unequipped to fight. A left-wing government would have been discredited to the bones.

That hasn’t happened with the right. Netanyahu’s government has been fighting for almost two years now to shed responsibility. “It’s not us, it’s the military, it’s the intelligence.” They’ve been working very hard since October 7th—October 8th even—to deflect responsibility.

Now, what would a different government do? Hard to say. But what a sensible one would do is, at some stage early in the war, begin to form a strategy. On October 8th, right after October 7th, we had very strong international support. We could have fought Hamas, brought an alternative government to Gaza, brought back the hostages, and started thinking of a new future for the Middle East. We could have pursued Middle East alliances—with the Saudis, with the Gulf countries. There were opportunities on the table. This government, because of its right-wing, messianic, and ultra-nationalist agenda, simply threw that out the window. What we would have had instead is maybe a strategy—not messianic dreams. A strategy.

Would an alternative government have challenged the securitization logic that you argue has long shaped Israeli-Arab relations, or merely adopted a more technocratic or liberal gloss?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Again, hard to tell. I would take anything that improves the current situation. Gloss might become, at some point, substance. But I think the previous government—at least on one issue that I’m researching, internal security—had a different approach.

We have an ongoing crisis within Arab neighborhoods in Israel. Arab citizens make up about 20% of the country’s population, and they account for more than 50% of the murders in this country. The numbers are skyrocketing.

The previous government, through an attempt to create a strategy, was able for the first time to slightly reduce the number of people murdered among Arab citizens. In this government, the police are in the hands of Itamar Ben-Gvir, an extreme right-wing nationalist and, if I may say, a convicted criminal. Under his office, the numbers have doubled since the last government. So yes, a different government could have made a difference.

Copying Orbán: Undermining Democracy in the Name of Sovereignty

To what extent is the judicial overhaul effort by the Netanyahu-led coalition part of a broader pattern of populist institutional capture akin to what we have seen in Hungary or Poland?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s been mentioned many times, and the comparison has been made by many people. The connection between Orbán and Netanyahu is well known. Netanyahu’s son has been advocating and has become something of a poster child for some of these movements. So there’s a strong relationship between the Israeli right and the right in Europe and the US.

To a large extent, this was the playbook of the right: undermine liberal democratic institutions and give more power to the government. Orbán—and what happened in Poland before the last elections—were good examples for Israel. And I think, to some extent, this was a copycat. Yes, we saw this in Europe; we can do the same things here. It’s a kind of logic that follows its own lead—it doesn’t really need the examples from abroad. Still, I think the fact that this is happening on a global scale has some meaning.

Do you view the weakening of judicial independence in Israel as a calculated step toward majoritarian rule under the guise of popular sovereignty? How does this resonate with your broader work on state-minority relations?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: They’ve said it explicitly—so it’s not a mystery. Their position is clear: they want to transfer power from the judiciary to the government. That’s not a secret—it’s the stated policy of this government. The Supreme Court may have its faults, and liberal democracy can certainly be debated. But what they’re proposing is a majoritarian government that tramples the rights of minorities. Again, this isn’t hidden. Some members of the government openly declare that Israel is a Jewish state in which Jewish citizens should enjoy privileges over non-Jews.

Israel has long debated how to reconcile being both a Jewish state and a democracy. It’s an ongoing tension—these principles often clash. Liberal Israelis—and one can debate whether they were right or wrong—have tried to argue that the two can be balanced. A Jewish state, they’ve said, can still be fair toward its Arab citizens. It may not be perfect, it may have flaws, but the contradictions can be managed, even if not fully resolved.

Under the current government, however, there is a clear and explicit shift toward prioritizing the Jewish character of the state. If being both Jewish and democratic comes into conflict, their answer is unequivocal: it is a Jewish state, and democracy comes second. For some in this government, that’s not incidental—it’s ideological. That’s what they believe.

Annexation of Gaza Is No Longer a Whisper—It’s a Declared Agenda

Do you see a fundamental shift in the far right’s approach to governing Palestinians under occupation—moving from ‘managing’ the conflict to accelerating irreversible annexation?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Absolutely. And again, these are things that are being said explicitly. You don’t really have to search—it’s not hypothetical. These are statements made by Smotrich, Ben Gvir, and others: that it’s time to annex the West Bank. So, it’s almost obvious. The only thing that has prevented it so far is international pressure. But under Trump, they believed the time had come—an opportunity to do what they always wanted: annex the West Bank. They’ve announced plans to build more settlements, to use more force against Palestinians, to expel so-called top terrorists—which can mean many things. So while these ideas are not yet fully implemented as policy, they are being openly discussed.

Thousands march in Jerusalem against judicial overhaul, March 2025. A broad protest fills the streets at night, with demonstrators calling to save Israeli democracy. Photo: Dreamstime.

Given the current political trajectory, do you believe Israel’s liberal democratic elements are in structural decline, or are there still viable pathways for democratic resilience—perhaps through civil society, judicial pushback, or international pressure?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think the jury is still out on this question. For many years, we’ve been lamenting the death of the left-liberal spectrum in Israel. The prevailing notion was that these people were tired—they were busy with themselves, individualistic, global, cosmopolitan. While the right appeared united and committed, the liberal left seemed aloof and less engaged.

However, over the past two years, we’ve witnessed something remarkable: thousands of people have taken to the streets every week. I think that should not be discounted. I’m not sure who will win, but two or three years ago, if you had told Israelis there would be large weekly rallies in defense of democracy, most would have dismissed it as impossible. Yet, when Israelis perceived that democracy was in danger, they rose up.

There is still a question about how far and how open this movement is. For the moment, it is focused on Jewish democracy. It does not yet address the occupation or fully include the rights of Palestinian citizens—that remains on the margins of the demonstrators’ consensus. The movement is centered on defending Israel’s democracy, and to maintain broad support, it has set aside, at least for now, the occupation and non-Jewish rights.

However, once a movement like this begins to grow and starts to confront the deeper implications of occupation and inequality, then maybe there is room for optimism. It’s hard to be hopeful right now—given the war and two years of ongoing struggle—but the fact that many Israelis are still on the streets, still fighting for democracy, means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.

Fear Is Driving Policy—But That’s Exactly What Ben Gvir Wants

To what extent does the current populist ascendancy reflect a systemic recoding of Israel’s founding ethno-religious cleavages into a majoritarian regime logic, rather than a contingent electoral maneuver?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think it’s more contingent. We’ve had many years of cleavages and schisms that have come to the fore with the last elections, and we are seeing a very strong cleavage between center-left and right. But within those camps, there are divisions. People on both the right and the left can change their opinions.

Especially in the last 18 months—after October 7th—there has also been the fear factor. People are acting out of fear. Let’s look at the Palestinians, or Arab citizens, or the world. There is still a memory of October 7th. This trauma still lingers.

So, I think what needs to happen now is the restoration of hope and the development of a strategy—reaching out to people on the other side of the spectrum and trying to convince them that there is another option. Maybe then there’s room for change.

To answer your question: no, it’s not merely a contingency. It is the result of many years of struggles and cleavages. Netanyahu was able to position himself as a defender of “the true people” in a very populist sense. But the war has also somewhat shattered that image—being Mr. Security and managing the economy. So, while these shifts are, at the moment, tragic, they may in the future provide some room for change.

In the light of your work on the ‘shrinking of citizenship,’ how has the October 7 Hamas attack provided a discursive and policy framework for intensifying the racialized securitization of Arab-Palestinian citizens under the guise of national unity and collective trauma?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s a good question. And again, it has several layers that we need to look at. To begin with—yes, Israel became more securitized. People are more afraid, which, of course, also shapes opinions and perceptions. When you’re afraid, it’s very hard to think things through and look at the long term. In that sense, it’s become more securitized. For example, political dissent is much less tolerated. There’s much more securitization of political statements and actions of Arab citizens.

At the same time, Ben Gvir was expecting Arab citizens to join in the October 7th events. That would have given him the reason to use more force against them. So, from Ben Gvir’s perspective or hopes, October 7th provided an opportunity to crack down on Israeli Arab citizens. This has not happened. Arab citizens did not play the game as expected. They remained very detached from Hamas. On October 7th, they were saying, “That is not us. We don’t condone these things.” More than that—among the hostages were Arab citizens, Bedouins from the Negev, who were taken by Hamas to Gaza, and some were killed by Hamas. Arab citizens on October 7th, in some cases, saved Jewish citizens.

The whole story became more complex. But now Gaza makes it more difficult—because those citizens are saying, “Those people in Gaza are our brothers.” When people are dying in Gaza in scores, “We can’t stand aside. People are starving in Gaza. We have to speak our mind. We have to protest.” And that’s the test for Israel. Can Jewish citizens be tolerant toward that? Or do their fears make them see those protests as pro-Hamas—which they are not? 

Now we’re in a very difficult situation where Arab citizens who are protesting against the war in Gaza feel themselves threatened by the government. It has not exploded yet. But that’s exactly what Ben Gvir wants. For him, that would be a good day—one in which he can make the connection: Arab citizens, Palestinians, Hamas—they’re all the same, and they’re all here to destroy us. “Now we have legitimacy to use all means.” That’s the scare right now.

Evangelical Backing Fuels Israel’s Right-Wing Populism

Election billboard showing Netanyahu shaking hands with Trump, with the slogan “Netanyahu. Another League,” in Jerusalem on September 16, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.

And lastly, Professor Ben-Porat, what role have transnational, religiously conservative, and diaspora-funded networks played in amplifying the settler-theocratic undercurrents of neo-Zionist populism, particularly in relation to territorial maximalism and cultural hegemony?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: For many years there were relations between settlers and right-wing movements in Israel and similar or supportive movements abroad. As I said before, that is not unique in Israel. All movements—left, right, and center—have often found alliances abroad, whether among Jewish diasporas or liberals in America. So in that sense, what the right wing is doing is not unique.

This transnationality, to be fair, is something used by many groups in Israel for different purposes and reasons. You can say whether it’s good or bad, but the use itself is not unique. Where it is unique is in the US. If you look at Trump supporters in the US, the Evangelicals were a very strong element in his campaign. They provide very strong support for Israel, the right wing, and the settlers. That’s where the connection is important.

It’s more dramatic than it seems—because for many years, Israel was very careful to maintain a bipartisan approach in the US, having support from both Democrats and Republicans. Also remember, the Jewish community in the US is mostly pro-Democratic. So Israel traditionally refrained from taking sides in American politics. Israel was above the Republican–Democratic divide and maintained a relationship with the Jewish diaspora in the US, who are mostly pro-Democrats.

In the last decade or so, things have begun to change. Netanyahu has put his weight on the Republican camp—anti-Obama, anti-Biden, and pro-Trump in the US. His support came in many cases from either right-wing Jews, religious Jews, or right-wing Christians. So, the whole dynamic changes here. Before, it was bipartisan with strong support from the Jewish community. Now, it’s Republican—with support from right-wing Christians and Jews—and an alienation of a large part of the liberal Jewish community.

That’s a strange turn of events. But I think the important religious factor here is the right-wing religious Christians in the US. That’s probably the most important development in Israel’s foreign relations.