Matryoshka dolls for sale in souvenir shop in Budapest, Hungary on December 21, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

How China’s Rise as a ‘Civilization State’ Spurs European States to Challenge US Political Dominance

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Please cite as:
Yilmaz, Ihsan & Morieson, Nicholas. (2024). “How China’s Rise as a ‘Civilization State’ Spurs European States to Challenge US Political Dominance.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 10, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0041         

 

Abstract 

This article explores how China’s rise as a ‘civilization state’ encourages some European states to challenge US political dominance. While countries like Russia and Turkey have also employed civilizational populist rhetoric in domestic and foreign policy issues, this article focuses on Xi Jinping’s recent visits to France, Hungary, and Serbia and examines how European leaders like Emmanuel Macron, Viktor Orbán, and Aleksandar Vučić find inspiration in China’s civilizational model. Further research is needed on the growing civilizational competition between these states and the West, particularly in Africa, where China, Russia, and Turkey project all variants (soft, smart, sharp and hard) of power to assert influence and challenge Western dominance in international relations and global politics.

By Ihsan Yilmaz & Nicholas Morieson

Xi Jinping’s Trip to France, Hungary, and Serbia

The Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to Europe sees him visit three “unlikely” – to quote the New York Times – countries: France, Hungary, and Serbia (Cohen & Buckley, 2024; Hawkins & O’Carroll, 2024).). While it is no surprise that Xi should visit France, Europe’s second-largest economy and one of the dominant powers within the European Union (EU), his decision to visit Hungary and Serbia, both comparatively smaller and economically less significant nations, raises important questions about China’s strategic interests in Europe. France, with its historical influence, advanced economy, and status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, is a logical destination for a leader looking to engage with the political and economic powerhouses of Europe. However, Hungary and Serbia, despite their more modest economic profiles, have become increasingly important players in Europe, particularly in relation to China’s broader geopolitical and civilizational goals (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022, 2023a; Yilmaz, 2023).

We argue that the rationale for Xi’s visits to Hungary and Serbia lies not solely in economic opportunities, though both nations have benefitted from Chinese investment in recent years, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Rather, the visits are reflective of a deeper shift in the political landscape of these nations, which are characterized by an increasingly anti-American posture and skepticism toward the traditional liberal democratic order (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024a). Both Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and Serbia, under President Aleksandar Vučić, have expressed dissatisfaction with the dominance of the US and the EU in international and regional politics. This is where China’s appeal as a rising power offering a multi-polar global order becomes particularly significant. The governments of these countries see China as a potential ally in their efforts to challenge US hegemony and reshape the international system (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024a).

The political leadership of France, Hungary, and Serbia increasingly align themselves with a worldview that emphasizes the decline of US dominance, and the rise of a multipolar order dominated by ‘civilization states’ (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; Yilmaz, 2023). This notion, which China has skillfully promoted, posits that the world is not merely divided by economic or political blocs, but by civilizations that possess distinct values, histories, and trajectories. China, under Xi Jinping, has positioned itself as the archetypal civilization state, drawing on thousands of years of history to assert its leadership on the global stage and present itself as an alternative to the Western liberal order. In this model, China seeks not only economic and political influence but also cultural and ideological legitimacy as a civilizational power.

For France, under President Emmanuel Macron, China’s rise presents both a challenge and an opportunity. Macron, while wary of China’s authoritarian tendencies, sees in China’s civilizational narrative a model for Europe’s own reawakening. The Chinese emphasis on unity, heritage, and the assertion of national and cultural identity resonates with Macron’s broader vision for Europe. Macron, like Xi, sees the dangers of the “false universalism” of the Anglo-American liberal order and is increasingly advocating for a European identity that stands apart from American influence. In this sense, China’s rise is not merely an economic partner for France but also a philosophical model for reclaiming European civilizational values (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023b).

In Hungary, Viktor Orbán has long positioned himself as a critic of Western liberalism and American cultural hegemony. Orbán’s vision of Hungary as a bastion of traditional Christian civilization aligns well with China’s civilizational discourse. Orbán’s government has openly embraced the notion of a multipolar world where civilization states—rather than liberal democracies—are the dominant actors. The rise of China, along with Russia and Turkey, serves Orbán’s populist narrative that Hungary must resist the pressures of conforming to Western norms and, instead, forge its own path, drawing strength from its civilizational heritage (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023b; Yilmaz, 2023).

Similarly, Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić has distanced his nation from the Western liberal democratic order, positioning Serbia as a state that is culturally and politically distinct from the EU and the US. Vučić does not explicitly frame Serbia’s political trajectory in terms of a clash of civilizations, but his rejection of Western interference and his embrace of Chinese investment and political support suggest that he sees in China an alternative model of governance—one that allows for authoritarian control without the need to submit to Western-style liberalism. The Chinese concept of a civilization state provides Vučić with the ideological justification to resist Western pressures, strengthen his own rule, and maintain Serbian autonomy in a world increasingly defined by civilizational competition (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024b).

This civilizational approach is not limited to China. Both Russia and Turkey have embraced the notion of a civilization state to justify their geopolitical ambitions and internal governance models (Yilmaz, 2023; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024a). Russia, under Vladimir Putin, has adopted a civilizational discourse that emphasizes the uniqueness of Russian Orthodoxy, culture, and history. Putin’s Russia positions itself as a bulwark against Western liberalism, framing its foreign and domestic policies in terms of defending its civilizational values against a Western world it views as morally and politically degenerate. This framing allows Putin to justify both his authoritarian rule at home and Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, including its interventions in Ukraine and Syria.

Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has similarly embraced a civilizational discourse, one that draws on Turkey’s Ottoman past and its Islamic heritage. Erdogan’s vision of a neo-Ottoman Turkey asserts independence from the West and emphasizes Turkey’s role as a leader in the Muslim world. Turkey’s turn toward Islamist populist authoritarianism, justified by Erdogan as a defense of Turkish and Islamic values against Western liberalism, mirrors the civilizational narratives employed by both China and Russia (Yilmaz, 2021; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023c).

While Russia and Turkey’s adoption of civilizational rhetoric has certainly influenced their foreign policies and global politics, particularly in their respective regions, this article focuses specifically on China and its impact on Europe. We examine how Macron, Orbán, and Vučić find inspiration in China’s civilizational narrative and explore how China’s rise as a civilization state is reshaping the political and civilizational self-perception of these European nations. The emergence of a civilization-based framework in international relations is significant, not only for understanding China’s role in Europe but also for assessing the future of US-European relations (Yilmaz and Morieson 2024b).

Thus, we will take a closer look at Xi’s visits to France, Hungary, and Serbia and explore how the leaders of these countries are engaging with China’s civilizational narrative. We will examine how this engagement influences their domestic policies, foreign relations, and how this emerging partnership may affect the broader geopolitical landscape in Europe and beyond.

France: Drawing Inspiration from China’s Rise to Rejuvenate ‘European Civilization’

Emmanuel Macron and his wife Brigitte Macron welcoming chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan for thier state visit in France at the Elysee Palace in Paris on March 25, 2018. Photo: Frederic Legrand.

Xi’s visit to France is ostensibly to discuss trade issues with the populist French president, specifically those affecting China’s ability to sell electric vehicles in the European Union. Macron, for his part, also has economic issues to address with China, particularly regarding China’s restrictions on French agricultural goods. He has used this opportunity to urge Xi to stop supporting Russia and to pressure Putin into negotiating an end to the war in Ukraine. However, Xi’s decision to visit Serbia and Hungary – the European nations most sympathetic towards Moscow – suggests that Putin can expect continued support from China in their efforts to annex Ukraine.

These issues aside, there is a deeper purpose behind Xi’s visit and Macron’s enthusiastic reception, one that increasingly aligns with Macron’s views on the future of Europe and global politics. Indeed, Xi’s statement about France-China relations being a “model” for the world to follow suggests that something far more significant is taking place (Cohen & Buckley, 2024). Moreover, according to Xi, China “will work with France to deepen China-Europe mutually beneficial cooperation,” and the two are “major forces in building a multipolar world, two big markets that promote globalization, and two great civilizations that advocate cultural diversity” (Xi, 2024), a remark that underscores his civilizational perspective on global politics.

The leaders of both China and France, despite their differences, are drawn together by a shared antipathy towards the US and a shared civilizational perspective on global affairs, a perspective intrinsically connected with their anti-American politics. Naturally, China and France do not share the same opinion of the US. China views America as a rival; France views America, perhaps, as a perfidious ally, forcing ‘Anglo-Saxon’ culture upon an unwilling French people. However, both would prefer a world in which American culture was less pervasive, Western universalism abandoned, and American power reduced. Both believe that soon, the rise of civilization-states will drastically diminish American power and prestige globally.

Xi has dedicated himself to the rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation (sometimes understood as the Chinese ‘race’), which includes not only citizens of the People’s Republic of China but also Han Chinese globally (Carrai, 2021). At the same time, Xi portrays China not merely as a nation-state but as a continuation of Ancient Chinese culture merged with Marxism (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018). Unlike Putin, he does not use the term “civilization state” to describe his country (Putin, 2023). However, much like Putin, Xi is adamant that China must draw on its civilizational heritage and reject the values of Western civilization, which he argues are not universal but particular to the West and thus unsuitable for China (Blackburn, 2021; Passeri, 2020). Civilizationism is thus a tool of liberation, through which Xi intends to free China of non-indigenous values and ideas, allowing it to overcome the US and establish the Chinese nation as Asia’s dominant power.

China’s increasing assertiveness in Asia is justified by Xi Jinping, if not motivated, as part of the necessary rise of Chinese civilization and its return to its rightful place as Asia’s hegemon, including the reclamation of traditional Chinese territories, such as Taiwan. Simultaneously, his regime’s repression of non-Han peoples, including the Muslim Uyghurs—a Turkic people—in Xinjiang, and the people of Tibet, is justified on the grounds that these regions have always been part of Chinese civilization. Therefore, the peoples of these regions are considered part of Chinese civilization, whether they accept it or not. In fact, those who resist must be coerced into this civilization, as evidenced by the ‘re-education’ camps in Xinjiang.

Moreover, Chinese leaders evidently believe that Western-style nation-states, particularly the small states of Europe, whatever their utility in the past, today prevent the West from gathering its true strength. In contrast, the large civilization-states of China, Russia, and India gain strength from their large populations and the ability to unite peoples who speak different languages under a single identity. In other words, Europe – despite its 300 million people – is weak because it is made up of many small nations, which would be far more powerful if they were to unite into a single polity. 

French leader Macron appears to agree with this assessment. Writer Aris Roussinos (2020), who seems somewhat sympathetic to Macron’s project, is among the few who have remarked on the importance Macron places on rejuvenating what he calls European Civilization. Indeed, while right-wing populist Marine Le Pen calls for the protection of France’s Judeo-Christian yet secular civilization (Morieson, 2021; 2022), Macron is moving beyond the nation-state paradigm, advocating for centralizing power within the EU to protect an otherwise moribund European civilization. Macron is perhaps best understood as a technocratic populist, but this label may not fully explain his complex and shifting political positions and may give the impression that he lacks core beliefs or policies (Perottino & Guasti, 2020). However, a close reading of his speeches reveals that Macron is deeply concerned about the future of European civilization and believes it represents the best of humanity, thus must protect its ‘humanist’ values.

One might ask from whom Macron proposes to protect European civilization. For Macron, European civilization has many enemies, but perhaps the key adversary is the US, which he views as an enemy precisely because it is an anti-civilizational power that defends the nation-state paradigm, insists that its values are universal, and desires a relatively weak Europe. Macron does not believe that American values are universal. He does not even believe that the US and other ‘Anglo-Saxon’ nations, such as Great Britain, can be included within European civilization. In this way, Macron reveals that he does not believe in Western civilization per se, but rather that continental Europeans possess their own civilization, which is quite different from the traditions of the Anglos, particularly in that continental Europeans do not embrace the market economy and the nation-state paradigm as wholeheartedly.

Roussinos (2020) observes that in 2019, Macron gave a speech to France’s ambassadors in which he argued that “China, Russia, and India were not merely economic rivals but genuine civilization states… which have not just disrupted our international order, assumed a key role in the economic order, but have also very forcefully reshaped the political order and the political thinking that goes with it, with a great deal more inspiration than we have” (Roussinos, 2020). Warning his ambassadors that ‘civilizations,’ including European civilization, are ‘disappearing,’ Macron declined to condemn states that draw on their cultural heritage and proclaim themselves heirs to great civilizations. Instead, he suggested that Europeans should take inspiration from the ‘civilizational projects’ of Russia and Hungary, praising what he referred to as their ‘inspiring’ ‘cultural and civilizational vitality’ (Roussinos, 2020). According to Macron, such nations “take a logical approach to the world, they have a genuine philosophy, a resourcefulness that we have, to a certain extent, lost” (Roussinos, 2020). Furthermore, France has a mission to construct a “collective narrative and a collective imagination” among Europeans, meaning that his national project of rejuvenating France “must be undertaken as a project of European civilization” (Roussinos, 2020).

Later, in April 2024, Macron told an audience at Sorbonne University that “the European spirit” was essentially tired and “left to those who attacked it.” Macron admits that Europe has “lost its self-esteem,” which he regards as “strange” given its achievements (Macron, 2024). However, he says a defining aspect of European civilization is this self-doubt and “culture of confession,” worsened by the continent’s “demographic decline” – an obvious existential threat (Macron, 2024). His solution to Europe’s problems is to build “a more united, more sovereign, and more democratic Europe” in order to “assert ourselves among the other powers and in light of the century’s transitions” (i.e., the transition of power from Western nation-states to the civilization-states of the East) (Macron, 2024). Equally, Macron says European civilization is “humanist,” and to survive, it must reject the “Anglo-American model,” which permits the private sector to gain enormous power over human life, but also reject the Chinese model, in which the government is given total control over human life (Macron, 2024). Macron promises to challenge the Anglo-American model by taking control of cyberspace and enforcing European norms by banning hate speech and inappropriate content of various kinds, something he calls “a cultural and civilizational combat” (Macron, 2024).

Macron’s meeting with Xi thus brings together two men with civilizational perspectives on global affairs, both of whom believe that the age of Anglo-American universalism is coming to an end and that the nation-state paradigm must give way to something more vibrant, something that binds together past and present: the civilization-state, or in the case of Europe, a kind of supercharged, centralized EU. Despite the vast differences between the two men and their respective ‘civilizations,’ and the fact that Macron ultimately views China as a civilization Europe must challenge in the emerging multipolar world, they share a common belief in civilizationism that unites them in opposition to the US.

Fighting Liberal ‘Elites’ and Defending Judeo-Christianity by Drawing Hungary Closer to China

Chinese and Hungarian flags fly in the sky. Photo: Andy Liu.

When Xi visits Hungary, he will encounter a nation and a prime minister, Viktor Orbán, eager for Chinese investment, particularly in the form of an electric car plant that the Hungarian leader hopes the Chinese will build in partnership with his country. However, for Xi, this visit and whatever trade deals result from it are partly a reward for Orbán’s pro-China policies, his ambivalent attitude toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and his increasing anti-Western rhetoric, as well as his praise for China’s civilizational rejuvenation project. Equally, the visit demonstrates to Washington that Hungary cannot be relied upon to defend Western interests against Chinese aggression, and that Washington is growing increasingly isolated in its opposition to China’s rise.

Orbán is drawn to Xi in much the same way as Macron: both believe the rise of civilization-states like China is ineluctable, and both see China’s rise as an opportunity for their respective states – if not civilizations – to free themselves from Anglo-American norms. However, Orbán differs widely from Macron, and indeed the two might be understood as political enemies. While Macron calls for power to be centralized in Brussels, Orbán is a nationalist who rejects any notion that Hungary should comply with EU norms (Toomey, 2020). And although Orbán possesses a civilizational rejuvenation project, it is of an entirely different nature from Macron’s ‘humanist’ plan for Europe. Rather, Orbán calls for the re-Christianization of Europe, the strengthening of the nation-state and its borders, and he speaks not so much of European civilization but of Judeo-Christian civilization, a term that encompasses a different group of nations, possibly including Russia and the ‘Anglosphere’ nations. Where Macron sees the rejuvenation of European civilization as a way to defy growing autocracy in the East and the domination of the market in the West, Orbán is increasingly enamored with authoritarians abroad and authoritarian rule at home. Both believe that Europe’s demographic problem is existential, and that action is required to repopulate the continent. However, where Macron rejects ‘blood and soil’ ethno-religious nationalism, Orbán considers it a prerequisite for any successful plan to save Europe.

Furthermore, Morieson and Yilmaz (2024) observe that Orbán argues that “the EU and, particularly, the United States [are] so bent on forcing liberal culture on the world that they were inextricably moving all nations toward civilizational conflict: a conflict between the liberal West and ‘civilization-states’ that refused to liberalize, such as China and Russia” (Orbán, 2023). According to Orbán, the future of the world will be decided by this conflict, and therefore “the US ought to permit illiberal states – such as Hungary – to determine their own futures rather than impose ‘universal values’ upon them in an effort to prevent war” (Morieson & Yilmaz, 2024; Orbán, 2023).

Orbán is known for his opposition to allowing Muslims to enter Hungary, either to stay or settle in Western Europe (Ádám & Bozóki, 2016). According to Orbán, Muslims belong to a religion and civilization incompatible with Judeo-Christian values and, therefore, should not be allowed to live in Europe – especially considering Europeans’ rapid demographic decline – in great numbers (Ádám & Bozóki, 2016). However, Muslims are not really Orbán’s core enemy. Rather, it is Western political and cultural elites that he blames for Europe’s problems, especially its fertility problem. Orbán claims that elites have caused the West’s decline in power and loss of self-esteem by embracing liberalism. Liberalism is corrosive, according to Orbán, because it creates societies that do not produce citizens willing to have children and reject their societies’ traditional values – the values that made their societies superior in the past. Liberalism, because it teaches the equality of all peoples, encourages cosmopolitanism and individualism, robbing people of their unique national and religious identities (Morieson, 2022). As a result of this cosmopolitanism and the declining birth rates, Western societies have opened themselves to foreigners who not only do not share their liberal values but also have larger families. Consequently, Europe has paved the way for its own downfall by abandoning Judeo-Christian values in favor of liberalism and failing to assimilate Muslim migrants into a secular, liberal society (Morieson, 2022).

Orbán’s civilizational rejuvenation project is inextricably linked to his admittedly illiberal, authoritarian style of governance. Indeed, Orbán’s solution to the problems allegedly brought about by liberalism is to marginalize his liberal and Marxist opponents, centralize power, dominate Hungarian media, and replace, wherever possible, the liberal cultural and bureaucratic elite with his own supporters, a populist plan Orbán speaks of openly and with pride. To combat corrosive liberalism, Orbán claims that authentic Europeans must combat the influence of Washington and Brussels – the two great liberal powers, in Orbán’s estimation – and re-orient Western civilization towards post-liberal Judeo-Christian values, which he argues are still compatible with democracy and freedom (Morieson, 2022). In Orbán’s Hungary, women are thus encouraged with cash payments to have more children (a project that has met with only modest success), and post-Marxist investigations that critically examine Western culture are defunded in the nation’s universities. LGBTQ people are tolerated, but increasingly marginalized. All in all, ‘wokeness’ is not welcome in Orbán’s Hungary and is understood as the ultimate product of liberalism (Morieson, 2022).

It is easy to understand Orbán’s enthusiasm for China. China’s rise comes at the expense of Orbán’s liberal democratic foes (i.e., Washington and Brussels), decreasing their ability to pressure Hungary to return to liberal democratic norms. Similarly, because China is both an authoritarian state led by the populist Xi Jinping and approaches international relations from a civilizational perspective, its rise legitimizes Orbán’s own authoritarianism and his project of civilizational rejuvenation. Indeed, for Orbán, China’s rise proves that authoritarianism and civilizational rejuvenation projects help create strong nations that can stand against American cultural hegemony and prevent corrosive liberalism from eroding traditional identities and values. As a result, although Hungary will remain within the EU, we might expect Orbán to draw the country closer to China in the future. This means that China will have a friendly nation within the EU in Hungary, sowing disharmony and forming alliances with other nationalist states to prevent the centralization of power in Brussels and thwart Macron’s plans for the civilizational rejuvenation of Europe as a liberal-humanist power.

Serbia: Defying International Liberal Order by Embracing Chinese Civilization State

President of the Peoples Republic of China Xi Jinping on an official visit to the Republic of Serbia, at the invitation of President of Republic of Serbia, Belgrade on June 19, 2016. Photo: Golden Brown.

It should come as no surprise that the date Xi Jinping has chosen to visit Serbia coincides with the 25th anniversary of the American-led NATO bombings of Belgrade’s Chinese embassy. This apparent mistake by Western forces has long been viewed in China as a deliberate attack and part of the West’s – particularly the US’ – attempts to prevent the rise of China. Equally, Xi is no doubt aware of the prevalence of pro-Russian, anti-American attitudes in Serbia, largely the result of the belief that NATO and the US treated Serbs unfairly during the 1999 conflict, but also due to the conservative values held by many Serbs, which sometimes conflict with American liberal values, particularly on issues related to LGBTQ rights and religious freedom.

It is not merely shared resentment toward NATO and the US’ conduct during the Kosovo War that has brought Serbia and China closer. The two nations have become increasingly close since the 2012 election victory of the governing populist Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which sees China as both a source of economic growth and technological development, but also as a partner less likely to criticize Serbia’s refusal to sanction Russia following its attempted annexation of Ukraine and its often socially conservative politics. The SNS has welcomed Chinese investment in mining operations and key infrastructure projects such as the construction of roads and bridges, making Serbia increasingly indebted to China as a result. At the same time, Western states’ criticism of Serbia, and a widespread belief among many Serbs that the US and NATO – representing the liberal order – are inherently hostile to Serbia, has driven the nation closer to China. Indeed, the SNS and its leader, Aleksandar Vučić, have positioned Serbia between the West and China, using its close relationship with China to improve its bargaining position with Brussels.

Although Serbia has sought EU membership, its democratic backsliding under populist rule has made this increasingly unlikely, and Vučić himself has campaigned against joining the EU. Moreover, EU states are increasingly critical of the so-called electoral autocracy that characterizes SNS rule (Seebass, 2024). For example, the German Federal Foreign Office considers the 2023 national elections in Serbia to have been fraudulent and “unacceptable for a country with EU candidate status” (X, 2023). According to the German Council on Foreign Relations, under SNS rule “the erosion of institutions that were only just democratizing has picked up pace.” The SNS now controls “Serbia’s media landscape… personal ties link the president to organized crime groups and well-coordinated hooligans prone to violence,” and “public discourse is marked by vicious rhetoric that has an especially detrimental effect on young people” (Seebass, 2024).

These trends have led to increasing criticism of Serbia by Western powers and NGOs, prompting the SNS to defy the West by maintaining good relations with Russia and deepening ties with China. Xi’s visit to Belgrade, and the extraordinary welcome provided by the SNS government, demonstrates Vučić’s desire to draw his nation closer to autocratic regimes that do not criticize his anti-democratic actions. Vučić received Xi in Belgrade with a ceremony during which he promised the Chinese leader that he would receive in Serbia a degree of “reverence and love” not “found anywhere else” and vowed that his government would only increase cooperation with Beijing, saying “the sky is the limit” (Hajdari, 2024).

Vučić is alleged to have instructed employees of state-owned companies to join the crowds welcoming the Chinese president, employing around 50 buses to increase crowd numbers and create the impression that the vast majority of Serbs love and revere Xi. Moreover, Xi authored an article in Serbia’s Politika (2024) news outlet describing China-Serbia relations as “ironclad” and noting that “China and Serbia have similar positions on many important international and regional issues” and that “facing the international situation intertwined with changes and turbulence,” the two nations “should continuously strengthen coordination… and stand together for an equal and orderly multipolar world” (Politika, 2024).

It is not difficult to read between the lines and recognize that Xi is calling for Serbia to assist China in challenging US and Western dominance in the international sphere. As Vedran Dihic (Cvetkovic & Heil, 2024) put it, “aside from any trade and economic benefits, there is a political message underlying Serbia’s hosting of Xi that is connected to broader efforts – notably by Moscow and Beijing – to challenge US influence and potentially reshape the international order. …Serbia is striving to deepen relations with actors outside the West and, in that sense, is a kind of autonomous player in the new geopolitical constellation.”

Serbia and China thus find themselves drawn together for similar reasons: both wish to challenge Western liberal dominance in the international sphere and to legitimize authoritarianism at home. China’s civilizational rejuvenation project is useful to Serbia, insofar as China’s insistence that Western values are anything but universal helps to legitimize the SNS’s turn against liberal democracy, the separation of powers, and the rule of law by portraying these principles as mere Western liberal constructs that have no place beyond Western Europe, and may even hold back the development of states like Serbia that exist beyond the West and East, or at their crossroads. 

Conclusions

Xi Jinping’s tour of France, Hungary, and Serbia demonstrates the growing influence of China in Europe. But it also tells us much about how Europeans are responding to China’s rise as a self-styled civilizational power, especially insofar as the rise of China is inspiring some European leaders to challenge US dominance in international politics and embrace the core values of “European civilization.”

For Xi, this civilizational turn is a means to legitimize China’s rise as a global superpower, positioning China not only as an economic force but as a civilization that challenges the universalism of Western values. His outreach to countries like Hungary and Serbia, where populist leaders see benefits in aligning with China’s vision, strengthens this narrative. Serbia, in particular, exemplifies a country striving to balance its ambitions of EU integration with a deepening relationship with China, fueled by shared anti-Western sentiments and authoritarian tendencies.

The convergence of leaders like Macron, Orbán, and Vučić with Xi Jinping highlights the emerging trend of civilizational politics in global affairs. Despite their distinct national interests and ideological differences, these leaders share a skepticism towards the liberal international order championed by the US and NATO, and see the rise of China as a pivotal moment in redefining the global balance of power. Macron, with his vision of a centralized European civilization, and Orbán, with his push for a Judeo-Christian resurgence, both view the nation-state paradigm as inadequate for addressing contemporary challenges. In their own ways, they envision a future in which civilizational identity shapes the global political landscape.

For Macron, the rise of authoritarian China might not be entirely desirable, but it does provide France with an opportunity not just to grow its largely stagnant economy—finding in China a new market for its agricultural goods—but also to reflect on China’s civilizational assertiveness. Macron believes that China’s success, grounded in its ancient heritage and values, suggests that Europe must become more like China: united, assertive, and willing to stand up for its particular values against the false universalism of the Anglo-American world.

For Orbán, civilizationism is primarily a tool of populist discourse, used to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ with the ‘self’ represented as the traditional Christian Hungarian identity, and the ‘other’ as the Muslim or liberal West. However, like Macron, Orbán views the rise of civilization states as both inevitable and welcome. He believes this shift will create a multipolar world that weakens US and EU power, liberating Hungary from the burden of conforming to Western ‘universal’ norms.

Aleksandar Vučić may not explicitly frame his nation’s conflicts with the EU and the US as a clash of civilizations, but like Orbán, he rejects Western political interference in Serbian affairs. He appears to see in the rise of the Chinese self-proclaimed civilization state a way to challenge the US-dominated liberal international order and solidify his own authoritarian rule.

This civilizational approach is not confined to China alone. Russia, under Vladimir Putin, has embraced a similar narrative, framing itself as a protector of Orthodox Christian civilization, distinct from the West and immune to its liberal values. Turkey, under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is another example, promoting a neo-Ottoman vision that emphasizes Turkey’s Islamic and Turkic heritage in contrast to the West. Both Russia and Turkey have strategically positioned themselves as civilization states seeking to challenge US and Western dominance, much like China.

While China’s civilizational model seems to inspire many of Europe’s populist and authoritarian leaders, it also reveals how the notion of a civilization state is being used to reject Western (particularly Anglo-American) norms. Whether these leaders seek to emulate China or simply leverage its rise to challenge US hegemony, China’s growing influence seems to validate the belief that nations must turn to their own traditional values and culture to overcome American imperialism and cultural dominance.

Ultimately, the alliance between these diverse leaders reflects a growing resistance to the liberal democratic norms that have dominated the global order since the end of the Cold War. By positioning themselves against American cultural and political hegemony, these leaders are contributing to the emergence of a new multipolar world, where civilizational states challenge the legitimacy of Western universalism and aim to reshape global governance according to their own values and interests. As this trend continues to unfold, the dynamics of international relations are likely to shift in significant and unpredictable ways, with far-reaching implications for the future of global order.

Yet, despite the clear allure of civilization-state rhetoric, whether rejecting liberal democratic and Western/Anglo-American norms and embracing ‘our’ civilizational values can increase fertility, provide peoples with a shared purpose, or inspire reindustrialization remains an open question. The rise of civilization states has certainly helped leaders like Macron, Orbán, and Vučić resist US-led globalization and liberalism, but the long-term consequences of these shifts are still uncertain.

One final point that deserves attention is the way the discourse of the civilization state is particularly useful to populist and authoritarian leaders. It allows them to legitimize authoritarian rule by rejecting liberal democracy on the grounds that it is not part of ‘our’ traditional values. Moreover, this discourse legitimizes bellicose foreign policies by justifying the annexation or control of territories that were once part of ‘our’ civilization. In this way, civilizationism creates a populist narrative of the ‘people’ vs. the ‘elites,’ often transnationalized to portray American or Western elites as the enemies preventing ‘our’ rise.

Furthermore, beyond Europe, China, Russia, and Turkey are increasingly extending their civilizational influence into Africa. All three are active in Africa through various soft, smart, sharp and hard power initiatives and projections, from China’s Belt and Road infrastructure projects, Russia’s security alliances, and Turkey’s cultural and religious diplomacy in addition to their Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs) all over the world (Yilmaz et al, 2023). These activities reflect not only their economic and political ambitions but also an ongoing civilizational competition with the West for influence on the continent.

China, for instance, promotes its model of development without political liberalization, offering African nations an alternative to Western aid conditionality. Russia has focused on military and energy cooperation, while Turkey emphasizes religious and educational connections, seeking to revive its historical ties to Africa. Each of these actors brings a distinct civilizational narrative to Africa, challenging Western norms and promoting alternatives to the liberal international order.

As these three powers expand their influence, the competition between civilization states and the West will likely intensify, not only in Europe but across the Global South. Further research is needed to better understand how these powers are positioning themselves in Africa and how their civilizational frameworks interact with local political, economic, and cultural dynamics. Understanding this evolving landscape is crucial for comprehending the broader implications of the civilizational turn in global politics.


Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion.


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From National to Manufactured: The Evolution of the AKP’s Victimhood Narratives

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Morieson, Nicholas; Yilmaz, Ihsan & Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “From National to Manufactured: The Evolution of the AKP’s Victimhood Narratives.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 6, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0040        

 

Abstract

This paper explores the dynamic interplay of victimhood narratives, populism, and civilizational rhetoric in Turkish Islamist politics, centering on the tenure of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Tracing the historical trajectory of Islamist victimhood and its evolution, the study reveals how the AKP strategically fused domestic victimhood politics with Islamist civilizational populism. These narrative positions the AKP as the advocate for the victimized Sunni Muslim Turkish nation against a perceived pro-Western, secular, and corrupt elite. This narrative extends beyond the national level, portraying the AKP as the defender of the Muslim ummah against alleged Western conspiracies. Challenging existing literature that characterizes the AKP’s current victimhood discourse as a mere continuation of its Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative, this paper argues for its significant evolution. It introduces two additional layers constituting a ‘new’ victimhood: 1) a national victimhood discourse and 2) manufactured victimhood. In the post-Gezi Protests era, the AKP not only revisits its Islamist victimhood mindset, inclusive of anti-Western conspiracies, but also adopts a nationalist victimhood discourse through a mimetic process, seamlessly integrating it with its existing Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative. Furthermore, with the AKP’s rise to hegemonic status, the party strategically manufactures a novel victimhood narrative, rooted in conspiracy theories alleging Western opposition to the leader of the Muslim World, Turkey. This narrative strategy enables the AKP to deflect criticism, legitimize crackdowns, and solidify its grip on power. By unpacking these layers of victimhood, this paper provides a nuanced understanding of the AKP’s evolving narrative strategy and its implications for the political landscape in Turkey.

Keywords: victimhood, manufactured victimhood, Islamism, conspiracy theories, Turkey, Erdogan, populism, religious populism, civilizational populism 

 

By Nicholas Morieson,  Ihsan Yilmaz Bulent Kenes

Introduction

Within Turkish politics, the fusion of populist victimhood narratives has emerged as a potent force, catalyzing shifts in ideologies, political strategies, and societal perceptions. This paper embarks on a multifaceted exploration of these developments, by dissecting the evolution and strategic amalgamation of victimhood discourses, populism, and civilizational rhetoric within Turkish Islamist politics. Central to this study is an in-depth analysis of these narratives, with a particular focus on their manifestation and transformation during the AKP’s tenure. Historical grievances, intertwined with conspiratorial narratives and appeals to the victimhood of the Sunni Muslim Turkish nation, form the bedrock of these ideologies.

Beginning with a historical exposition of perceived injustices and pivotal events that sowed the seeds of Turkish Islamist victimhood, this paper navigates the roots of these victimhood narratives. Within these, segments of conservative society are portrayed as historically oppressed under the Kemalist elite, casting the AKP as the sole and genuine representative of the victimized Sunni Muslim Turkish nation. Moreover, this study illuminates the confluence of victimhood with populist rhetoric, epitomized by the AKP’s portrayal of itself as the champion of the people against a corrupt and oppressive elite. Furthermore, the analysis delves into civilizational populism, where the AKP constructs itself as the guardian of Turkish identity, fending off alleged Western conspiracies and positioning Turkey as a bulwark against external threats. Importantly, this analysis demonstrates how these narratives have transitioned victimhood from a solely national to a transnational experience by framing the ummah as under threat – and Turkey as its savior. 

In societies entrenched in prolonged and unresolved conflicts, perceptions of victimhood emerge as integral within the narratives of populist political parties. Members of the in-group engage in a subjective process of branding the out-group as morally unjust and assigning blame to the group for perceived and actual harms. In contrast, the members of the in-group are presented as the sole victims of these supposed internal and external threats. This subjective process is associated with a higher degree of conspirational thinking. A strong correlation has been identified between a sense of victimhood and a propensity to embrace conspiracy theories. Collective experiences of perceived victimization, in particular, heighten susceptibility to adopting conspiracy stereotypes (Bilewicz & Sedek, 2015). 

Following instances of perceived discrimination, disadvantage, or being targeted by crime or violence, groups may formulate theories that allege certain out-groups are conspiring against the in-group. Victimhood tends to generate its own moral framework, which legitimizes the actions and potential revenge of the victims. It also encourages the victim to identify scapegoats and attribute blame to them. Scapegoating solidifies the identity of an enemy and their negative characteristics, helping victims avoid feelings of ambiguity or moral doubt. (Tepeli & Demirok, 2014; Parlak & Uz, 2015). Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s populism has effectively utilized scapegoating and conspiracy theories to achieve his goals (Yabanci, 2016). 

Narratives of victimhood play a pivotal role within Turkey’s national discourse, yet the absence of dialogue about its diverse victimhood narratives presents a notable gap in Turkish political history research. Accordingly, the inadequate analysis of various victimhood claims has hindered a thorough understanding of the AKP’s recent authoritarian shift. Existing literature tends to perceive the AKP’s current victimhood discourse as a continuum of earlier Islamist victimhood narratives, overlooking its evolution which has seen the addition of two additional layers. These new layers, ‘national victimhood discourse/victimhood nationalism’ and ‘manufactured victimhood’, have helped create a distinct form of victimhood prevalent in contemporary Turkey.

This paper primarily examines the AKP’s use of victimhood discourses since 2002. Initially, these discourses gained momentum following tangible events such as ‘the February 28 post-modern coup process,’ headscarf ban, and discrimination against minorities. However, with the AKP’s third election victory and Gezi Park protests in 2013 (which led to anti-government mobilization), the party shifted to manufacturing victimhood narratives and employing anti-Western conspiracy theories to deflect failures. This manufactured victimhood, now centralized in official discourse and campaigning, aided in contradicting and distancing the party from its true status as the dominant national power. This paper highlights a shift from genuine to manufactured victimhood discourses by first exploring the historical development of victimhood in Turkey, then delving into its discursive evolution and its impact on Turkish politics.

The Vertical and Horizontal Dimension of Erdogan’s Populism

Numerous scholars concur that populism constitutes a distinct set of core ideas, often referred to as a thin ideology, rather than a comprehensive belief system with explicit guidelines addressing social, political, and economic issues, such as liberalism, social democracy, and communism. This thin ideology revolves around two central elements: (i) the antagonism between ‘the pure people’ and the elites, and (ii) the moral and normative supremacy of popular will (Mudde, 2004: 543). Populists interpret the concept of ‘the people’ in a manner that aligns with their political agenda. They assert that it is they alone that can represent the people against a perceived ‘corrupt’ elite seeking to exclude them from power. It’s important to note that this ‘unified and virtuous people’ represents an exclusionary political project and does not encompass the entire population of a given country (Lefort, 1988).

Populism manifests itself in two dimensions: vertical and horizontal (Taguieff, 1995: 32-35). The vertical dimension revolves around a binary of the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt, evil elite’, while the horizontal dimension involves a binary opposition between insiders and outsiders. The outsiders, who curiously may be citizens, are nevertheless perceived as foreigners or internal enemies based on their identities (Taguieff, 1995: 32-35). Within the ‘people,’ there exists a distinction between ‘people like us’ and those outside ‘our’ group, who are seen as threats to ‘our’ way of life. Across various political and social contexts, populism tends to designate certain out-groups, such as minorities, migrants, dissidents, and opposition parties and politicians, as scapegoats. In this regard, populism adopts a Manichean perspective, dividing society into opposing poles of ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ or ‘friends’ versus ‘enemies.’ (Mudde, 2004: 543).

A recent study (Lewis et al., 2019) highlighted that Erdogan is the only right-wing leader who can be labelled as being ‘very populist.’ Since working in the National Outlook (Milli Gorus) years during the 1970s and 1980s, Erdogan’s worldview consistently featured Islamist populist elements, framing himself and practicing Muslims as the true owners of the homeland, who had been victims of the oppressive Kemalist establishment. Erdogan’s populism has intensified significantly in recent years and has become a core feature of his political narrative (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018). This intensification was particularly noticeable following key political moments such as the nation’s economic challenges in 2009 and the Gezi protests in 2013. Post-Gezi, Erdogan’s populism merged with a revived Islamist ideology, marked by strong anti-Western rhetoric and conspiracy theories (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018). This ideological shift is rooted in former Prime Minister’s Erbakan’s National Outlook Islamism and the totalitarian ideology of Erdogan’s influential role model, Necip Fazil Kisakurek. Together, these elements provide a strong religio-moral component, asserting that ‘the people’ they represent include not only those who were exploited, excluded, oppressed, and victimized but also practicing Muslims who are regarded as morally superior (Tugal, 2002).

In Erdoğan’s populist vision, the Kemalist elite, along with non-Kemalist secular Turks—including leftists, liberals, democrats, and many urban-educated individuals—constitutes the vertical dimension of populism. These are often portrayed as ‘elites’ (referred to as Beyaz Turkler or White Turks) who are perceived as disconnected from the ‘real’ and authentic values of ‘the people.’ They are frequently caricatured as sipping whisky by the Bosporus while the ‘real Turks’ endure hardships. They are typically accused of imposing historical traumas on ordinary people in the name of Westernization or progress. Turkish-Islamist media intellectuals have particularly popularized the pejorative figure of the White Turk, depicting them as arrogant, elitist, and anti-Islamist. The White Turk is constructed as someone who views practicing Muslims as provincial, lower class, and ignorant to define their own (secular, civilized, and Westernized) identity and justify their authority. In the Erdoganist narrative, the White Turks are held responsible for any issues in the country, with the specter of the past Kemalist regime playing a crucial role in illustrating the potential consequences for ‘the people’ if Erdogan were to lose power (Yilmaz, 2021).

The horizontal dimension is also significant in Erdogan’s populism, and his policies aimed at fostering a pious in-group. This is particularly the case in the recent manifestation of victimhood, which poses that the AKP, Erdogan and the in-group are being threatened and attacked by a range of conspiring internal and external enemies. Alevis, Kurds, Armenians, Jews, liberals, and notably, the Gulen movement became targets within this resurrected discourse, fueling the ‘resentment/revenge of the Sunni constituency against the Westernized elite and citizens practicing a Western lifestyle, perceived as responsible for the banishment of religion itself’ (Yilmaz et al., 2023).

Erdoganist Victimhood and Resentment: Kemalists as the Oppressors

Turkish victimhood discourse has been shaped by several key narrative themes. These themes provide shape to claims of victimhood by describing who the oppressors are, who is being threatened (victimized), and how historical, political or other contextual factors justify and legitimize these narratives.

Turkish victimhood has a long history in the national political arena and there is a degree of continuity between earlier Islamist victimhood, Kemalist victimhood and contemporary Erdoganist victimhood. The insecurities, anxieties, and fears within Erdoganism bear a striking resemblance to those found in Kemalism. Much like their Kemalist counterparts, Turkey’s Islamists harbor their own insecurities, feelings of victimhood, fears, and a siege mentality towards the West. They attribute the decline of revered institutions, namely the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate, to the West, as documented by Akkoyunlu and Oktem (2016: 510). However, in the Islamist and Erdoganist narrative, Kemalists are viewed as products of Western cultural imperialism—self-colonizing pawns of the godless West fixated on eroding Turkey’s Islamic identity and threatening its Muslim population (Akkoyunlu & Oktem, 2016: 510). Thus, Erdogan’s populism finds its roots in Turkish Islamist victimhood. It positions itself against the Kemalist hegemony by purporting to represent the demands, interests, victimhood, resentments, and frustrations of practicing Muslims, whom Erdogan frames as the true owners of the country. In this context, the potential for democratization of Turkey only exists if democracy is conceived as the ‘power of the people’ or ‘popular sovereignty’ (Yilmaz, 2021). 

Historically, victimhood discourses have held a central place in Islamist ideology in Turkey. The Turkish Islamist victimhood discourse argues that Islamists have been the true victims of the modernization process in Turkey (Yilmaz Z., 2017: 483). At the core of the Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative lies the transformative events of 1923, involving the destruction of the Ottoman State and the establishment of the secular Republic. Kemalist reforms in education, social interactions, and politics dealt a severe blow to the status and wealth of the Islamic establishment. 

Consequently, the Kemalists, particularly represented by the Republican People Party (CHP) in political life, became the primary oppressor and threat in Turkish Islamist victimhood discourse. The persecution of leading Islamist intellectuals like Necip Fazil Kisakurek, Said Nursi, and Sezai Karakoc, made possible by new laws, generated deep resentment and disillusionment among intellectuals and their followers toward the existing political order in Turkey. These intellectuals perceived themselves as “alienated in their own country,” forced into “estrangement,” and cast as “pariahs” (Aktay, 2003; see also Singer, 2013). In this Islamist imagination, the history of modern Turkey is entirely framed as the “victimhood of devout Muslims” (Yilmaz Z., 20174: 87).

The Kemalist animosity towards Islamists during the Kemalist decades, exemplified by the Constitutional Court’s frequent closure of Erbakan’s political parties, the “Republican Rally” in 2007, headscarf bans at universities, and continuous demonization of Islamist figures in the media, served to solidify Islamists’ perception of Kemalists as adversaries. This has cultivated a sense of “resentment and victimhood” among Islamists (Yılmaz Z., 2017). 

The conspiratorial anxieties and resentments of pro-Erdoganists related to the authoritarian secularism of Kemalism were not entirely unfounded. However, Erdogan’s discourse successfully manipulated these anxieties, fears, and resentments and leveraged them in sweeping narratives of the threat they posed to the fate of the nation and, more broadly, to the Muslim world. These narratives gained intense traction following the Gezi Protests in 2013 and, most prominently, the 2016 coup attempt. In Turkey’s current socio-political climate, even the slightest criticism is now framed as a terrorist activity masterminded by external enemies determined to destroy Turkey, Islam, and the Muslim World.

Islamist Civilizational Populism: Framing the EU and West as Civilizational Enemies

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ali Erbas, the head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) is seen during a public rally in Istanbul on the second anniversary of failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. Photo: Shutterstock.

While civilizationism has been interpreted as a form of nationalism, the boundaries of belonging and the semantics of ‘self’ and ‘other’ undergo a reconceptualization when framed in civilizational terms. This perspective presents an alternative to nationalism, wherein the imagined community or nostalgic utopia is situated at a different level of cultural and political space compared to national discourse. It’s crucial to note that civilizationism doesn’t replace nationalism; instead, it becomes intertwined with nationalism (Brubaker, 2017: 1211).

‘Civilizational populism’ (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; 2023) is defined as a set of ideas that asserts politics should reflect the “volonté générale” (general will) of the people. It posits that society is divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: ‘the people’ and ‘the corrupt elite,’ who collaborate with dangerous outsiders from other civilizations. These outsiders are portrayed as hostile and a direct threat to the people’s civilization and way of life (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; 2023).

A civilisational populist perspective became prevalent in AKP politics following the decline of pro-European Union (EU) reforms and a weakening of ties with the EU. Firstly, it moved away from the prioritization of Westernization and relations-building with the West but, more significantly, it also placed a civilizational perspective at the core of Turkey’s interactions with the EU. This perspective framed Islamic civilization as being fundamentally opposed to Western civilization (Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020: 173-175).

The AKP’s Islamist victimhood narrative portrays a vision of a united Muslim world (the Ummah) threatened by conspiracies orchestrated by “the Crusader West.” This narrative not only designates the ruling Islamist regime as a victim but also frames Turkey as a nation and country under threat. The concept of Islamist victimhood enables the AKP to present itself simultaneously as a target of Western conspiracies and as the foremost defender of Turkey and the entire Muslim world against these perceived conspiracies. This has led to the AKP adopting a transactionalist foreign policy approach towards the EU, stripping away the former ideational or identity-related significance of Turkey-EU relations (Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020: 173-175).

The Arab Spring also presented a crucial opportunity for the AKP, as it offered hope regarding the fall of pro-Western authoritarian regimes, allowing Islamist forces to rise and potentially restore Islamic national identities. In response to the Arab Spring, the AKP identified a strategic window and began defining its civilizational identity in starkly anti-Western terms. This move aimed to address and appeal to anxieties, insecurities, and fears regarding Western retaliation. The AKP embraced its civilizational discourse more vehemently, categorizing the West and Islam as mutually exclusive and antagonistic enemies. Erdogan and his party increasingly employed a civilizational discourse that depicted Turkey as an exclusively Muslim nation. While presenting themselves and their supporters (AKP voters) as native and national, they categorized other political classes and their constituents as non-native due to their allegedly “alien” Western paradigms. Simultaneously, anti-Westernism escalated, with the AKP denouncing the EU/West for undermining Turkey’s alleged rise under AKP rule.

Religio-nationalist Victimhood

Another layer of the AKP’s victimhood discourse converges with the Kemalist national victimhood discourse that portrays Turkey as the prime target of Western powers and their local collaborators. The notion of a national victimhood discourse is deeply ingrained in the Turkish national psyche, emphasizing collective victimhood experienced by the Turkish people, especially at the hands of Western imperialist forces. This narrative, rooted in events dating back to 1908 and exacerbated during WWI, is also propagated through institutional mechanisms like the national curriculum.

Central to Turkey’s victimhood nationalism is what has been termed the Sevres Syndrome – a collective victimhood and siege mentality with roots in the signing of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. This treaty marked the gradual and tumultuous collapse of the Ottoman State. Over time, the memory of this treaty and its associated fears and losses metamorphosed into Sevres Syndrome, giving rise to numerous anti-Western conspiracy theories grounded in nationalism and anti-imperialism. Scholars suggest that the perception of unique in-group victimhood, such as that developed in the Sevres Syndrome, often solidifies national identities, fostering a siege mentality in which certain nations perceive the world as inherently against them.

Both the late Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic grappled with the need to rationalize their defeats and challenges, resorting to a narrative involving external forces and internal adversaries. In the late Ottoman Empire, adversaries included Greece, Armenia, Russia, and the UK. Over time, this narrative evolved to include Kurds, Jews, communists, and Christians as victims of an enduring demonization campaign. Despite changing actors, the narrative has remained fundamentally consistent. Identifying enemies and incorporating conspiracy theories has become an ingrained aspect of the collective mindset, observed among both secularist and Islamist factions within Turkish society (Yilmaz, 2021).

National Victimhood Discourse

Interpreting the world through the narrative lens described above provides both secular and Muslim Turks with a framework that absolves them from extending empathy to other victimized groups, such as the Armenians. Combined with the Sevres Syndrome, it also allows them to present themselves unequivocally as the true victims of historical events. For instance, rather than confronting the reality of the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish state projected Turks as historical victims, portraying them as targets of both murderous Armenians and the depredations of imperial powers. This framework is what we term the national victimhood discourse.

The national victimhood discourse has typically been (ab)used by the ruling elite within Turkish politics. This stands in contrast to the Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative, which emerged as an oppositional underdog narrative. The distinction lies in the requirement of victimhood nationalism for the claimant to represent both the nation and the state, necessitating a position of power to do so. The nation and state are the primary targets of victimization in this context, diverging from Turkish Islamist victimhood, where Islamists and their conservative constituents are the focus. Consequently, those invoking Turkish Islamist victimhood should ideally only speak on behalf of these particular segments.

Victimhood Narratives – and Their Evolution – During the AKP’s Rising Hegemony

Erdogan supporters are seen during the commemorations for the second anniversary of the 2016 coup attempt in Istanbul on July 15, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

The discussion above briefly outlined the key actors held responsible in AKP’s victimhood discourse, and the key influential factors that have shaped its narratives. In the following section, the content of these narratives and their evolution will be analyzed, investigating the initial articulations of victimization which were primarily in response to various socio-political and historical events. It will then examine their transformation and adoption of manufactured narratives and an increased reliance on conspiracy theories, which have been necessary to maintain a victimhood status—even as the AKP has become the most powerful hegemon in contemporary Turkey.

The evolution of the AKP’s contemporary victimhood narrative is marked by the integration of victimhoods associated with religio-nationalism, Turkish nationalism and Islamist populism. The party positions itself as a victimized yet conversely hegemonic entity speaking on behalf of the entire nation and, in an imagined sense, the Ummah. The contemporary manifestation of their claim to victimhood goes beyond these components to encompass an additional discursive layer of manufactured victimhood.

The AKP’s narrative of victimhood persists despite governing the country for twenty-one uninterrupted years and having acquired extensive political powers. When faced with challenges like economic downturns due to its policies or evidence of corruption, the party resorts to blaming external entities, such as foreign forces or interest lobbies, deflecting responsibility. 

Initial Era of Victimhood Narratives: Predominantly Anti-Kemalist 

The AKP’s rise to power in the 2002 general elections marked a significant departure from the long-standing dominance of Kemalists in Turkish politics. Utilizing the discontent of pious Muslims and broader dissatisfaction stemming from economic challenges, the AKP employed a potent populist discourse that perpetuated the belief that the majority were victims of the established order. 

In the early 2000s, the AKP successfully portrayed itself as the victim of the ‘White Turks,’ referencing the Kemalist hegemony and military tutelage that discriminated against conservative segments of society. Turkish Islamists described themselves as the ‘Black Turks’ (Bilici, 2009; Demiralp, 2012; Arat-Koc, 2018), claiming to have endured oppression at the hands of the Kemalist hegemony since the establishment of the Republic. In constructing this opposition (Black Turks vs White Turks), the AKP was able to portray themselves as the voice of the Black Turks. Erdogan consistently asserted his identity as a ‘Black Turk,’ for instance stating on one occasion, “In this country, there is a segregation of Black Turks and White Turks. Your brother Tayyip belongs to the Black Turks.” On another occasion, he expressed, “I am honored to be a Black Turk” (Sabah, 2015).

During its two initial terms, the AKP’s victimhood discourses effectively highlighted Kemalist-era policies, including the February 28, 1997 “post-moder coup,” the headscarf ban, and discrimination in bureaucratic and military sectors. This political period saw a distancing from overtly Islamist victimhood references, and it was during this time that Erdogan famously stated the party had shed the garment of Islamism. 

In its initial phase of governance, the AKP maintained a pro-Western stance while focusing on its primary objective of challenging the Kemalist establishment. The primary resentment of Turkish-Islamist subjects was initially directed at White Turks, Kemalist elites, and CHP cadres. It persistently asserted that its struggle against the establishment was fundamentally a fight for democracy and human rights—a strategic move, considering the fate of its predecessors. The victimization under the Kemalist regime extended beyond conservative Muslims, encompassing Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims, liberals, and socialists to varying degrees throughout the Republican period. 

Around the turn of the millennium, especially within the context of a military tutelage system, it became evident that a broader community needed to unite around a general democratization agenda. This unity was crucial for the AKP to address specific demands and gain power, resulting in the AKP and various victimized segments of society becoming mutually dependent in challenging the Kemalist tutelage regime. To garner support and demonstrate inclusivity, the AKP invited a broad spectrum of political actors, predominantly from center-right and liberal backgrounds, to participate in the party’s decision-making processes. Their narratives of Turkish victimhood incorporated discourses addressing long-standing issues faced by minorities under the Kemalist reign (Acikel, 1996; Demiralp, 2012; Yılmaz Z., 2017; Grigoriadis & Dilek, 2018). This discursive period of victimhood was grounded in real events and did not rely on conspiracy theories. 

Aligning with its conservative democratic discourse, the AKP did not focus solely on expressing Muslim resentment but sought to empathize with other victimhood narratives and attempted to build a coalition among various marginalized groups. The party collaborated with actors such as the Gulen movement, religious Kurds, some Alevis, and the liberal democratic segments of society. These groups consistently supported the AKP, at least until the Gezi events in 2013, and benefited from the opportunity structures that emerged following the AKP’s election in 2002

Articulating Narratives of Human Rights Abuses

The AKP government responded to the demands of their coalition of victims by implementing reforms aimed at safeguarding human rights, especially in minority affairs. Between 2004 and 2013, significant openings were created in response to non-Muslim, Kurdish, and Alevi issues. Erdogan – the leader of this coalition of victims – opportunistically attempted to redirect the resentments of the non-Muslims, Kurds and Alevis toward blame attribution towards the CHP and Kemalism.

The AKP strategically anchored its victimhood claims in human rights discourses during the pre-Gezi period. Articulations of human rights (and human rights abuses) became a crucial tool for the AKP to assert and maintain its victimhood status. In a domestic political context, human rights arguments can be powerful in evoking a sense of ‘victimhood,’ portraying the state as an all-encompassing hegemon inflicting pain on less powerful groups. The AKP effectively utilized this argument, leveraging the balance of power in Turkish politics and events under the Kemalist regime, such as party closure cases, the headscarf ban, Erdogan’s short-term imprisonment, and the military’s rejection of Abdullah Gul’s presidential election due to his wife’s headscarf, which lent legitimacy to their rhetoric (Grigoriadis & Dilek, 2018: 299).

Victimhood Claims Taking on New Dimensions in Response to Key Political Events

In the pre-Gezi period, Turkish Islamist victimhood was primarily domestic, focusing on its underdog status against the Kemalists. However, the government response to the 2013 Gezi protests marked a significant departure from the predominantly anti-Kemalist and victimhood narratives that the AKP had been disseminating since coming into power. Erdogan perceived and presented the Gezi protests as a severe threat to his personal power, prompting a desperate need for new rhetoric to counter the peaceful civil protests. As Kemalist-centric victimhood narratives lost appeal, the AKP sought a new political discourse to reassert its victimhood status. During the Gezi protests, Erdogan resorted to civilisationist Islamist rhetoric, portraying not only the government but Turkey in its entirety as a victim of an international conspiracy orchestrated by the West and its local allies. This narrative amalgamated elements of ‘national victimhood discourse’ and ‘Turkish Islamist victimhood’ and positioned itself as a perpetual victim of various groups, countries, and interests, including Germany, the US, the UK, and media outlets Otpor! and CNN. The AKP also deployed a discourse of needing to protect itself and the ummah against imaginary enemies, including the ‘supreme intelligence,’ ‘interest rate lobbies,’ and foreign adversaries (Yilmaz, 2021). 

In the same year as the Gezi Protests, the 2013 military coup in Egypt against the Muslim Brotherhood-supported presidency of Mohammad Morsi dealt both a geopolitical and psychological blow to the AKP leadership (Akkoyunlu & Oktem, 2016: 518). The fall of a crucial Islamist ally and the imprisonment of its elected leader undermined the AKP’s regional aspirations, contributing to a deeper level of insecurity and an alarmist reading of domestic and regional dynamics. Importantly, the event validated Turkish Islamist’s deep mistrust and resentment towards the West. They perceived the muted response of Western media and governments to the coup, compared to the extensive attention given to the Gezi Protests, and the swift endorsement of the military-backed regime in Egypt, as proof of its double standards regarding democracy in the Muslim world (Akkoyunlu & Oktem, 2016: 518).

The controversial coup attempt on July 15, 2016, was also a traumatizing event for millions of Erdoganists (Adisonmez & Onursal, 2020: 298). Erdogan adeptly turned the failed coup attempt into an extraordinary source of popular support, using the event as a rallying and mobilizing opportunity. More importantly, he gained the unwavering support of conservative religious and nationalist segments of society by articulating a discourse that instilled fear and anxiety, portraying all opposition and criticism as detrimental to their interests, lifestyles, and even to their existence (Ozen, 2020: 1-3). He consistently used a discourse of securitization to maintain this anxiety and fear, framing opposition to his government as an attack against Islam, the nation’s unity, the flag, and all sacred national values. 

Islamist Populism and Historical Islamist Victimhood

The political events detailed in the previous section have contributed significantly to the victimhood narratives propagated by Erdogan and the AKP. Although these events intersect with religious populism, there is also a distinct layer of victimhood that stems directly from Islamism and historical Islamist victimhood and addresses the perceived victimization of Muslims at the hands of various oppressors. Victimhood accounts within Turkish Islamism assert that Islamists have been the true casualties of Turkey’s modernization process, with a particular focus on the demise of the Ottoman State and the subsequent establishment of the secular Republic in 1923. Islamist populism plays a significant role in shaping AKP’s key narratives about friends and foes, and victims and victimizers. It has also allowed Erdogan and his party to create a victimhood discourse that connects to broader and transnational Muslim victimhood themes and narratives. 

Turkish Islamist victimhood is rooted in historical experiences of victimization, stretching back to the early Republican period and, for the AKP, encompassing party closures, military coups, detainment, and headscarf bans. At the core of this victimhood narrative lies the profound impact of secular Kemalist reforms in education, social structures, and politics, which dealt a severe blow to the prior status and wealth of the Islamic establishment. The oversight of all religious education and preaching was centralized under the state-affiliated Diyanet, and numerous religious institutions, including dervish lodges and Islamic charities, were prohibited or abolished. The new Turkish Criminal Code criminalized almost all forms of non-state (non-Diyanet) religious dissemination, leading to the persecution of various religious groups.

While certain historical events during the Kemalist era did disadvantage Islamists, the core of Islamist ‘victimhood’ in the Turkish case is primarily grounded in an ‘imaginary’ context. The articulation of these victimizations powerfully combines factual events with imaginary elements. This blending serves to amplify and sanctify their significance, contributing to narratives of victimhood that resonate emotionally and symbolically within the broader Islamist community. Within this Islamist imagination, modern Turkish history is framed as witnessing the ‘victimhood of devout Muslims.’ This framing is deeply embedded within the political imagination of Islamists, existing in a realm where the boundaries between reality and fiction are blurred, and encompasses material practices, emotions, symbolic efficacy, performances, and dramatizations. 

Although neither the AKP nor Turkey are officially the leader of the Muslim world, the Turkish Islamist imaginary envisions them as such (Cinar, 2018; Sezal & Sezal, 2017). Consequently, attacks against Turkish Islamists are portrayed as direct attacks against the Muslim world. President Erdogan, considered by many as the ‘heir presumptive’ of the caliphate and the leader of the Muslim world, plays a central role in legitimizing and disseminating this idea. In his famous balcony speeches following election victories, Erdogan claimed “Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul. Beirut won as much as Izmir. Damascus won as much as Ankara. Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, [and] Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir” (Phillips, 2017: 29). This suggests that his political victory in Turkey is a success for all Muslim lands. In this narrative, even minor losses for the AKP are construed as significant blows to the Muslim world. 

Transitioning to a Manufactured Victimhood

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has transitioned from being a model of democratic political Islam to an Islamist populist autocrat. Photo: Mustafa Kirazli.

While Turkish Islamist victimhood encompasses both real and imagined accounts of events, it is important to note that this perception is not necessarily deliberate. It is a product of how Islamists interpret their political environment. In contrast, manufactured victimhood strategically combines the imagined Turkish Islamist victimhood with deliberately constructed falsehoods. Unlike Turkish Islamist and nationalist victimhood narratives, which originate from real events and their dramatizations, manufactured victimhood deliberately fabricates narratives—often in stark contradiction to the AKP’s hegemonic status—to create a sense of victimhood where none exists.

Despite the persuasiveness of the AKP’s victimhood claims, during its first decade in power, its overreliance on them eventually took its toll. Since their 2011 election victory, the AKP’s own supporters found it difficult to consolidate victimhood narratives that claimed the party was an underdog in Turkish politics. Regardless, even in 2014, the AKP continued to depict itself “as the oppressed blacks” and “eternal underdogs of Turkish society” (Yilmaz, 2021). Eventually, though, AKP’s Islamist victimhood vis-à-vis the Kemalists, which relied on human rights discourses, ceased to yield favorable political results. 

The persuasiveness of this messaging took an even steeper dive after 2016, when the AKP became the nation’s primary hegemonic power in Turkish politics and succeeded in marginalizing the Kemalist tutelage (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018). At this juncture, the AKP needed a new ‘anchor’ to re-establish itself as a victim, which it found in anti-Western conspiracy theories. The AKP no longer required the support of the EU, as the pressure for democratization, anti-corruption measures, and transparency had become burdensome. By this point, the AKP deemed transactional relations with the EU to be sufficient (for a detailed analysis, see Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020).

It was during this time that the AKP’s victimhood acquired more imaginary dimensions, and the party began constructing an imaginary victimhood narrative combined with Islamist civilizationism. These narratives rely on perpetuating anti-Western conspiracy theories to rationalize its problems, failures, and inefficiencies. This narrative shift allows the AKP to deflect criticism, attribute internal challenges to external actors, and maintain a sense of being besieged, despite holding significant political power. For the AKP, the West became a convenient rhetorical foil against which it sought to define the struggle of the faithful and the “national will” (Hoffman et al., 2018: 5).  

Erdogan played a crucial role in creating momentum for this discursive shift in victimhood. As the leader acquired significant power, he shifted blame away from himself, propagated the belief that the AKP was being threatened or attacked by internal and external enemies, and disseminated securitization narratives (Lancaster, 2014: 1684). These narratives became more entrenched in the years that followed. For instance, on July 21, 2020, while reflecting on the second anniversary of the new presidential system, he passionately declared: “The Turkish nation and the Republic of Turkey are undergoing a historical period. In this period, there are all kinds of traps, attacks, conspiracies, betrayal, pain, and trouble. The Turkish Nation, with its citizens and security forces, is carrying out its struggle for independence and future, step by step to victory. We are determined to continue this struggle forever for the future of all our friends and brothers (the Muslim World) … Yes, we, as a nation that shed our sweat and blood, when necessary, believe that we will be gifted with God’s good tidings. We are well aware that the attacks that we have been experiencing for the last 7 years have aimed at our belief, history, culture, unity, togetherness, ezan (call to prayer), flag, and all our sacred values. We have no doubt that from the turmoil in the streets to the coup attempts, each attack meant shotgun shots for the same target. Our nation with its wisdom acquired through a thousand years of experience has seen this reality and has decided to join the ranks of its future and independence. It is our duty to pay our debt against this sacrifice of our nation by working with sacrifice, diligence and perseverance that will spoil all the conspiracies” (Erdogan, 2020: 2, 7).

Manufactured victimhood encompasses multiple layers, incorporating not only its own manufactured narratives but also elements of Turkish Islamist and nationalist victimhood. Major events like the Gezi Protests and the attempted coup illustrate the utilization of all three layers within different arguments presented by the AKP. This multifaceted approach serves to perpetuate the victimhood narrative, projecting the party as simultaneously oppressed despite wielding significant power. The strategic use of manufactured victimhood allows the AKP to shape public perception, maintain a sense of solidarity among its supporters, and deflect attention from internal challenges or criticisms.  

The above discussion highlights how the AKP’s strategic move to adopt anti-Western conspiracy theories navigates the changing dynamics of Turkish politics. This new narrative angle resonates with a segment of its support base, explaining economic challenges, international scrutiny, and internal dissent. This new narrative anchor helps sustain victimhood rhetoric, even as the AKP’s political landscape and power dynamics undergo significant transformations.

Conclusion

To trace the trajectory of the AKP’s discourse of victimhood, it is essential to first acknowledge its roots in the broader historical context of Turkish Islamist ideology. For decades, Islamist discourse depicted its adherents as the oppressed ‘Black Turks,’ enduring discrimination under Kemalist rule since the Republic’s founding. Discriminatory practices in public service recruitment, the disapproval of conservative traditions by Kemalist leaders, and pivotal events like the February 28 process, the headscarf ban, and Erdogan’s imprisonment collectively fueled and solidified the Islamist victimhood narrative by the turn of the millennium.

The AKP’s electoral triumphs have been intricately linked to the strategic deployment of victimhood discourses, casting its opposition as antagonists while presenting the party and its support base as victims. Initially directed at Kemalists, particularly the main opposition CHP, the AKP’s victimhood narrative evolved into a multi-layered framework post-Gezi, seamlessly and concurrently adopting anti-Western conspiracy theories. Notably, the party expanded its narratives of victimization beyond domestic boundaries, aligning its fate with the Muslim Ummah and employing victimhood to legitimize crackdowns on domestic opposition. This narrative shielded the AKP from criticism and effectively stifled dissent, especially in the face of corruption scandals.

An intriguing aspect of the AKP’s narrative is its dual portrayal, presenting itself as a domestic hegemon and protector of the nation, while simultaneously depicting itself as an underdog and target in global politics against the West. The adept utilization of conspiracy theories is an attempt to maintain the AKP’s image as the sole representative of Turkey and casting the West as an omnipotent hegemon in the geopolitical arena.

The multifaceted functions of victimhood claims within the political sphere are evident in the AKP’s narrative. Pre-Gezi, victimhood, coupled with human rights discourse, bolstered the AKP’s moral standing against Kemalists and the West. This narrative not only resonated with the conservative masses but also justified the party’s crackdowns on opposition, both internally and externally. The narrative’s evolution into an internationalized victimhood, seamlessly merging historical grievances with contemporary political maneuvering, showcases the adaptability and resilience of the AKP’s discursive strategy within the ever-shifting landscape of Turkish politics.

The political benefits of claiming victimhood—providing moral superiority, absolving guilt and shame, justifying misdeeds, enabling unfair behavior, and evading responsibility—is evident in the political sphere, as seen in the AKP’s narrative.


 

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Sinn Féin leader Mary Lou McDonald meets with supporters at the Cost of Living Coalition protest in Dublin, Ireland, on September 24, 2022. Photo: Liam Murphy.

Populism in Ireland: Sinn Féin and the Alternative to Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s Political Dominance

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Pretorius, Christo. (2024). “Populism in Ireland: Sinn Féin and the Alternative to Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s Political Dominance.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0039       

 

Abstract

This article seeks to investigate populism in Ireland, but more specifically the populist left-leaning party Sinn Féin. Although having a checkered past, in the last decade the party has seen a surge in popularity as the alternative voting option. Up until now academic literature discussing the populist nature of Sinn Féin often struggles to define it as such, and so, using political psychology and a clear definition of populism, this article not only categorizes the party as a populist, but also discusses its history and what effect it has had (or lack thereof) on its popularity in the leadup to the last few elections. Furthermore, the article concludes by investigating why the momentum the party had as the alternative choice slowed down, and how this vacuum allowed other fringe populist parties to see greater success during the 2024 elections. 

Keywords: Populism, Ireland, Sinn Féin, Irish elections

 

By Christo Pretorius

Introduction

On the periphery of Europe is the small island nation of Ireland – often overlooked due to its much larger, and arguably more internationally important neighbor, the United Kingdom (UK). Despite this overshadowing, Ireland is no less important when studying the rise of populism on the European continent. Having faced numerous issues since the 2008 economic crisis, particularly with the provision of healthcare, housing, and more recently immigration, dissatisfaction with the two historically important rival parties – Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil – has boosted the popularity of the populist alternatives. One such party on the left of the political spectrum is People Before Profit – Solidarity (PBP-S), contrasted by the parties Aontú and Independent Ireland on the right. However, the best-case study for the growth of populism in the lead up to the joint 2024 European Parliament and local elections is Sinn Féin – a controversial left-leaning populist party who has a long history of relevance in the Republic, but only recently has begun shaking off its connection to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a paramilitary organization seeking Irish reunification with Northern Ireland.

Delving into the history of Sinn Féin will highlight why a generational divide exists between voters, and why the party is considered controversial. Building on this, the article will primarily focus on Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric and campaigning using political psychology to analyze how they have used emotionally provocative language to sway the electorate to vote for them. As PBP-S and Aontú failed to make any significant gains in the 2020 and 2024 elections, they will only briefly be looked at. The new Independent Ireland party, founded as of December 2023, does however require a longer investigation at the end of this article, as they managed to gain one seat in the EU Parliament elections in 2024. Finally, while independent politicians are politically relevant in Ireland, this article will focus solely on Irish political parties. Analyzing independents in depth would require a separate, dedicated piece of work.

Historical Context of Sinn Féin

It might seem odd to those outside of Ireland that to understand modern Sinn Féin one must first return to 1913 when Ireland was still a part of the UK. In this year the Irish Volunteers, a paramilitary organization of Irish nationalists and republicans, was founded in direct response to the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (Martin, 2013: 1-4). Whilst the latter sought to oppose domestic self-government on the island, the Irish Volunteers sought to secure and maintain the ‘rights and liberties common to the whole people of Ireland’ (Martin, 2013: 4). After a failed military coup in 1916 by rebels, who were predominantly Irish Volunteers, widespread dissatisfaction with British rule began to emerge across the island, both in the response to the British execution of the revolutionaries, but specifically to the Conscription Crisis of 1918 which sought to impose a British military draft within Ireland during the First World War (WWI) (Irish Times, 2017; Laffan, 1999: 122-168). 

Sinn Féin, founded in 1905 as a conservative party advocating for a dual monarchy with the UK, saw many of its members join the Irish Volunteers during the 1916 Easter Rising, resulting in the Irish Times (1917) dubbing it the ‘the Sinn Féin Rebellion.’ Various republicans across the political spectrum flocked to the party thereafter, and in 1918 Sinn Féin changed political direction – now committed to achieving an independent Irish republic (Laffan, 1999: 4). The first post-WWI (and post-Rising) election in 1918 saw Sinn Féin win a landslide victory with 46.9% of the vote on the island, whilst in the north only securing 19% of the vote (de Bromhead et al., 2020: 890). In 1919, the independent Irish state sought by the rebels of 1916, became a step closer to reality with the formation of the elected Irish assembly named the Dáil Éireann (Farrell, 1971).

Figure 1: A 1918 electoral map of Ireland. Green are Sinn Féin seats, orange are Unionist seats and white represents the Irish Party (RTÉ, 2015).

 

Following the brutal Irish War of Independence, peace negotiations between the members of the Dáil and the British government concluded in 1921 with a treaty that saw the partition of the island between the republican south and the unionist north, the latter of whom was to remain within the UK (Saorstát Eireann, 1922). Amongst other terms, Ireland would also remain within the British Commonwealth under a Dominion status, similar to that of Canada, and required members of the Dáil to swear an oath of allegiance to the British monarch. Both Sinn Féin and its military wing, the IRA, was split on whether or not to accept the treaty. More hardline elements argued that the fight should continue until the entire island was free from British rule and recognized as a free and independent republican nation. However, a narrow vote of 64 votes to 57 saw the treaty ratified in the Dáil, resulting in a nearly yearlong bloody civil war between the pro-treaty IRA (reorganized as the ‘Defense Forces’) and the anti-treaty IRA. Sinn Féin had been marred by the civil war as anti-treaty politicians abstained from partaking in the Dáil, whilst pro-treaty politicians founded the new political party Cumann na nGaedheal (which would later merge with two other organizations in 1933 to form Fine Gael). Sinn Féin disintegrated thereafter, losing all relevance once its anti-treaty leader, Éamon de Valera, left the party to found Fianna Fáil – primarily abandoning their abstentionist stance towards the Dáil (Laffan, 1999: 441). 

A surprise victory by Fianna Fáil in 1932 put the remaining IRA on the backfoot, as initially Fianna Fáil legalized the organization and freed all the post-civil war prisoners, but ultimately refused to dispute the partitioned north and failed to declare a republican Ireland (Coogan, 2008: 29). De Valera criminalized the IRA once again in 1936 following high profile murders, but at this stage the organization was a shadow of its former self (Laffan, 1999: 448). During the 1930’s the more left-leaning IRA had founded their own rival organization, the Republican Congress, and the fascist right-wing members joined with Cumann na nGaedheal and their ‘Blueshirts’ modelled on the Italian fascist paramilitary militia nicknamed the ‘Blackshirts’ (Laffan, 1999: 448). IRA numbers decreased even more significantly when a large majority of its republic seeking members left the organization once Fianna Fáil introduced a republican constitution in 1937, abolishing the Oath of Allegiance to the British monarchy, introducing an elected president as head of state, and making a territorial claim to Northern Ireland (Constitution of Ireland, 1937).

Although the remaining members of the IRA were unified by the goal of ending the partition in Northern Ireland, they were on the fringes of both the left- and right-wings of the political spectrum. As is evident by members leaving to form their own political parties in the previous decade, in the aftermath of the Second World War the IRA was struggling to maintain its numbers and believed political organization was necessary to rebuild. Its leadership voted and passed the resolution instructing IRA members to join the irrelevant Sinn Féin party, and repurpose it as the political party of the IRA (Maillot, 2015: 128). With such a wide range of political beliefs amongst its remaining members, the party’s nearly sole political priority was that of reunification. Thereafter, the IRA began conducting armed operations in Northern Ireland, initially receiving political support from the south which most evident in the election of four new Sinn Féin TDs to the Dáil in 1957 (Maillot, 2015: 10). 

This militaristic momentum was ultimately lost by the 1961 election with the introduction of internment without trial, both in Northern Ireland and the Republic. The failed military campaign was called off and the IRA became dominated by new, younger, left-leaning members, which cumulated in the election of the Marxist Cathal Goulding as Chief of Staff. These left-wing members split from Sinn Féin to establish the Worker’s Party following disagreements over how to frame the struggle for unification in Northern Ireland. The more traditional Northern ‘Provisional IRA’ sought to frame the conflict through a nationalist and religious lens, as Catholic Irish against Protestant British, whilst the socialist/communist ‘Official IRA’ of the Republic sought to frame it through class warfare, and believed unification could be solved through political means (Gregory, 2010; Maillot, 2015: 169). The Provisionals would continue in the same year to conduct a thirty-year armed campaign against what they described as a British occupation of Northern Ireland, today known as ‘the Troubles.’ The conflict only officially ended in 1998 with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, claiming the lives of roughly 3,532 individuals, with the IRA being responsible for more than half this number (CAIN, n.d.).

Figure 2: Distribution of Catholics, at ward level, across Northern Ireland in 2001 (Prasannan, 2003).

 

Methodology

Defining ‘populism’ is often a difficult endeavor. For this article the widely accepted ‘the people’ vs ‘the elite’ narrative used by populist parties will be the primary qualifier to defining a party as populist. This theory argues that populists present “‘the people’ as a morally good force and contrasts them against ‘the elite,’ who are portrayed as corrupt and self-serving” (ECPS, n.d.). Investigating how modern Sinn Féin use this type of language against their rivals, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, will therefore be paramount in establishing them as one such populist party. But what type of language can be considered populist, especially when one man’s populist can be another man’s regular definition of a politician? In this case, the use of emotionally charged language will be used as the basis for investigation, primarily built on the ideas of political psychology that study the affect that emotions have of political mobilization (Aytac et al., 2024). Guillem Rico, Marc Guinjoan and Eva Anduiza’s article of how anger is mobilized will be the baseline for judging whether or not a statement or claim is populist (Rico et al., 2017). In their words: “Anger is linked to the perception that a frustrating event is certain, externally caused, and unfair… chiefly, the external attribution of blame and its fierce moral and confrontational outlook” (Rico et al., 2017: 445).

Using this foundation, we can deduce that Sinn Féin’s populist messaging revolves around being anti-establishment and anti-corporate, most evident in blaming the previous Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil governments for Irelands political issues by being ‘beholden to corporate interests’ (Sinn Féin, 2019). This article will only consider discourse that explicitly highlights an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ narrative as populist, meaning that which does not only state something a former government did, but actively generalizes and paints the opposition as the enemy in some manner. The following example highlights what this means: “In addition, the maintenance grant was cut and restricted under Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael Governments during the economic downturn and no sufficient attempts have been made by either party to restore them. Our third-level education system is simply not accessible to all. It is becoming less accessible to many on the basis of financial means” (Sinn Féin, 2020: 36).

In this paragraph arguing for free education in Sinn Féin’s 2020 manifesto, it is clearly stated that the party believes that previous governments are at fault for making education less accessible. However, while some may consider there to be populist undertones to this paragraph, there is no explicit discourse used that can be considered as emotionally charged. Compared to this paragraph from the same manifesto: “Without a government policy that is framed by climate justice and a just transition, the leadership and direction of climate action will become the plaything of bankers and corporate investors. They will be concerned with only one thing, how to make a buck out of the crisis. That is what they do, and it is killing the planet” (Sinn Féin, 2020: 25).

We can clearly see that it uses a strong anti-establishment and anti-corporate message to evoke an emotional response by broadly claiming corporations only wish to make money from crises. This supports the previous definition of ‘anger’ which includes ‘moral evaluations constitut[ing] a key component of the populist belief system’ (Rico et al., 2017: 449). To this end, an appendix will be included at the end of this article to show which pieces of texts were considered to be populist. Some researchers may argue that Sinn Féin’s manifestos and campaigns contain more (or less) populist language, but the key issue is that it is present in the first place—and, as will be shown, to a much greater extent than in the other two mainstream political parties in Ireland.

When investigating the demographic details of supporters for populist parties, exit polls often provide the best answer. Yet, to support this information, this article will also delve into the opinion pieces written by party supporters as they often give a more personal and grounded view on what issues they find pressing, and why they urge other voters to vote the same way. This is yet another attempt to gauge the emotions that populist parties tap into during their campaigns. Readers must be made aware that Ireland has a unique system of voting which is termed the ‘single transferable vote’ (STV), which is even used for the European Parliamentary elections. In summary, this voting system allows individuals to rank politicians on the ballot and, in theory, seeks to ensure that the electorate has at least some representation in government (Electoral Reform Society, n.d.). 

STV most often results in coalition governments, sometimes even excluding the party with the most votes if they fail to form a coalition with the various other parties and independent politicians elected to parliament. An extreme example of this was the first Irish inter-party government following the 1948 general election which saw a grand coalition of five different political parties, and independent politicians, all led by Fine Gael to keep de Valera and his Fianna Fáil party out (McCullagh, 1998). Here, Fianna Fáil was six seats short of a majority, and up to then had been winning successive elections since 1932. For this reason, the popular vote is often gauged by the first preference of voters, not by the coalition government that claims majority in the Dáil. 

The Popular Populist Leftist Party

Sinn Féin’s populist anti-establishment and anti-corporate messaging is clearly seen in the party’s manifestos. Particularly looking at when Mary Lou McDonald took over the party, there are blatant examples such as in the 2019 EU election manifesto: “EU banking policy, which is driven by unelected officials, favors banks and corporate elites at the expense of ordinary people;” the 2020 general election manifesto: “Without public broadcasting, we will be left with billionaire media moguls pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power;” and the 2024 EU election manifesto: “There are two competing visions for the future of the European Union. One is of an EU that continues to enlarge, becomes more centralized and bureaucratic, more militarized, lacks transparency, is under undue influence from corporate interests and lobbyists, and seeks to take ever more powers from Member States. Sinn Féin’s vision, in contrast, is for a European Union that works better for the people of Europe, that focuses on common challenges which we are best dealing with collectively – the cost-of-living crisis, food security, regional development, and climate change.”

Counting the number of times, we see the clear use of emotionally provocative and ‘us’ vs ‘them’ language being used, 10 instances can be found in their 16 paged 2019 EU Parliament election manifesto, 19 instances in their 110 paged 2020 general election manifesto, and three instances in their 27 paged 2024 EU Parliament election manifesto (See Appendix). Comparatively, there was no similar language used in both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’s manifestos from the same time (See Manifesto section in the bibliography for sources).

Manifestos only provide one avenue of investigation, their annual Ard Fheis, or annual party conference, is rife with emotionally charged discourse that portray Sinn Féin as the best party for the people to fight back against a corrupt elitist government. Take this example from McDonald’s speech in 2021: “I know you have had it with governments giving tax breaks to millionaire executives while homeless children eat dinner off cardboard on the street. Governments for the developers and bankers, for the cozy club and the insiders. It’s time now for a government for you and your family” (McDonald, 2021). Similarly, in 2023: “We ask for our chance. The others have had theirs. The longer they remain in power the worse things get. I’m asking you to back Sinn Féin. To back change and the future that you and your family deserve” (McDonald, 2023)

Such discourse builds into the larger political campaign that seeks to win votes by tapping into the ‘angry vote,’ the vote that seeks to disrupt the status quo, or as one voter puts it: “to send a message to the establishment” (Frayer, 2024). The younger generation played a key role in Sinn Féin’s strategy, which naturally involved leveraging social media to boost their popularity. Through various platforms, they were able to sustain the narrative that they represented the best chance for real change:

Figure 3: Screenshot example of Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric in Facebook posts (Sinn Féin, 2024).

 

Sinn Féin in a Post-Troubles Ireland

Clearly meeting the definition of populism, Sinn Féin’s use of emotionally provocative language attracts angry voters. However, the party is still affected by its historic links to the IRA. For instance, during his 2017 trial over his involvement in the killing of David Byrne a year earlier, Sinn Féin Teachta Dála (TD) Jonathan Dowdall was found guilty of membership in the IRA (BBC, 2017). Sinn Féin had already begun distancing itself from Dowdall after his resignation from the party in 2014—a move he attributed to bullying but could be seen as the party proactively managing the issue (Fegan, 2015).

On February 10, 2018, in a further attempt to shake off its bloody past, Mary Lou McDonald succeeded the controversial Gerry Adams, an individual who may have been a leading member of the IRA, despite his continuous denial of these allegations (O’Neill, 2019). McDonald differs from other leading members of Sinn Féin as she is a career politician with seemingly no ties to the paramilitary organization and was once part of Fianna Fáil but left the party due to policy differences and a strong support for Irish Unity – the latter issue of which she seemed to be undecisive about during Brexit (McCormack, 2020). More recently, during a televised national RTÉ’s Prime Time leaders’ debate a month before the 2020 election, McDonald was confronted with a question regarding a murder investigation that the victim’s family strongly claims was perpetrated by the IRA (BBC, 2020b). In the same election, after finding out he had been elected to the Dáil, Sinn Féin’s David Cullinane celebrated by ending his speech with: “Up the Republic, Up the ‘Ra. Tiocfaidh ár Lá” – the latter translating to ‘our day will come,’ a popular IRA slogan, alongside the show of support to the IRA that “Up the ‘Ra” displays (McGee & Leahy, 2020). 

Since the Good Friday Agreement and their decision to end its support for the IRA’s armed struggle, Sinn Féin’s popularity has been steadily increasing (Adams, 1996). Within the national elections Sinn Féin obtained 2.55% of the vote in 1997, 6.5% in 2002, 6.94% in 2007, 9.94% in 2011, and 13.85% in 2016. The targeting of ‘those left behind’ has been the cornerstone of their campaigning in the post-2008 political climate, as affordable housing and accessible healthcare became the pressing issues over the last decade (Brennan, 2023).

Despite lingering links to the IRA, modern support for Sinn Féin comes from three primary sources. Staunch grassroot supporters of the party still have the primary goal of a united Ireland, dissatisfied that Northern Ireland is still part of the UK. The Irish Times investigated how these supporters viewed the change of leadership in 2018, and found they were excited by the prospect of McDonald offering a fresh new perspective, as long as policy remained the same – “…Irish unity, reconciliation, a shared republic, a big change in social conditions” (McGee, 2018). In an election exit poll conducted by The Irish Times, RTÉ, TG4 and University College Dublin after the 2020 general election, it was found that new Sinn Féin voters were predominantly younger, aged between 18-35, showing the effectiveness of Sinn Féin’s described strategy of ‘playing down the paramilitary legacy but without irking the republican base’ (Boyce, 2024; Collins, 2020). This could explain how the party can draw younger generations to vote for the party, as they do not have the same connection to ‘the Troubles’ that older generation might have, whilst retaining their ultimate goal of reunification. Polls and opinion pieces highlight that younger people feel let down by the continued dominance of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael in Irish politics – with housing and cost of living being the dominant pressing issues for this generation (IPSOS, B&A & The Irish Times, 2024; Haverty, 2022; Irish Times, 2022; Taylor, 2024). Finally, ‘those left behind’ also includes the working class that support the party’s leftist policies and have been one of the long-time supporters of Sinn Féin. The Think Ireland 2024 election poll provides concrete evidence of this as 61% of Sinn Féin voters described themselves as working class – the second highest group of working-class voters, right behind the ‘other right’ voters (Cunningham, 2024).

Sinn Féin During the Irish 2020 General Elections – The Time for Change?

In the lead up to the Irish general election of 2020 the fallout from Brexit had been one of the dominant political situations, but surprisingly it had very little impact on the campaign trail (Murphy, 2021). Instead, domestic issues—namely housing and healthcare—were the primary focus for all Irish parties. In healthcare, waiting times for appointments and admittance to inpatient hospital beds were at an all-time high, having increased year by year since 2016 (Department of Health, 2019). Housing is an issue resulting from rising rent and house prices. In 2020 the Irish Times explained: “Since 2012, house and apartment prices in Dublin have risen by 90 percent and 80 percent respectively (a little less in the country at large), while wages have increased by only 18 percent” (McWilliams & Taylor, 2020). Too few new housing builds, high prices for lower-priced apartments, all compound this issue (Tedin & Faubert, 2020). 

The Irish general election of 2020 took place on February 8, roughly a month before the country-wide Covid-19 lockdown (Carroll, 2020). In a surprising turn, Sinn Féin received 24.5% of first preference votes, more than Fianna Fáil (22.2%) and Fine Gael (20.9%), and was set to form a majority coalition government if they could find allies to do so (Robertson, 2020). Ultimately Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, together having 72 of the 81-seat required for majority, formed a coalition alongside the Green Party. This kept Sinn Féin from governing, much to the party’s outrage and protests (BBC, 2020a). But why did Sinn Féin surge in popularity in this particular election? 

The tipping point came from young people, especially those in the 18-35 year demographic that voted primarily with the housing issue in mind (Collins, 2020; Ní Aodha, 2020). This, coupled with dissatisfaction with how Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil had been running the country since the financial crisis, offered Sinn Féin an opportunity as the alternative vote. One analysis indicates that in the leadup to the election, the decision of RTÉ to initially exclude Sinn Féin in the televised Leader’s Debate, coupled with the refusal of the other two parties to form a coalition with Sinn Féin in case they gained enough votes, help to form a self-fulfilling prophecy that Sinn Féin was being excluded by the ‘old boys club’ of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’ (BBC, 2020b; Brennan & McConnell, 2020). The issues, the generational shift, coupled with the traditional left-leaning voting base of Sinn Féin, all paved the way for the party to receive the most first preferential votes in the election. The question now was whether they could keep this momentum going into the 2024 EU Parliament and local elections.

Sinn Féin and Europe Before 2024

Sinn Féin’s stance towards European integration started in 1967 with deep distrust – believing that Ireland should align itself with ‘the third world’ rather than the “inward-looking, protected, monopoly dominated group of rich industrial countries.” They also believed: “If Ireland joined the [common market] with Britain we would thus have to recognize the territorial frontiers of the United Kingdom. Yet the Constitution lays claim to part of the territorial area of the UK. Is the Dublin Government wiling to abandon also its claim for a politically united Ireland?” (Irish Left Archive, 2011).

By the 2004 European Parliament elections Sinn Féin had softened their approach to a ‘Eurocritical, not Eurosceptic’ stance. They supported EU expansion, but ensured voters knew the party stood ‘for change in the EU,’ placing emphasis on nation’s rights to self-determination and promising to ‘argue our case for a United Ireland and for an end to all military occupation in the EU’ (Sinn Féin, 2004). They also highlight: “Critical engagement is not an anti-European approach. Indeed, Irish republicanism has its origins in a broader European democratic movement. Today Sinn Féin continues to build cooperative links with like-minded democratic movements throughout Europe and beyond.”

The 2024 election continues this trend, but by now Ireland is firmly committed to the EU, a fact Sinn Féin realizes in a post-Brexit landscape: “It is time for the EU to focus on what matters to workers and families: the cost-of-living crisis, improving wages and conditions, regional development, and economic development. It’s time for the EU to play its part in advocating for and planning for Irish unity” (Sinn Féin, 2024). It should be no surprise that the second item mentioned in the manifesto is ‘Standing up for Irish Unity’ and a call for the ‘EU institutions to become advocates for Irish reunification, consistent with their position on Cyprus.’

Sinn Féin can be seen using populist language once again in their manifesto for the joint 2024 European Parliament and local elections, but this time to a lesser extent than previous elections. Of the three instances of populist language being used to aggravate voters, all three have a stark anti-corporate, anti-elitist message (Sinn Féin, 2024). The media campaign online mirrors this: 

Figure 4: Examples of Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric in the leadup to the elections (Sinn Féin, 2024).

 

One video posted by Sinn Féin explicitly states that Fine Gael, Fianna Fail, and the Green Party are ‘the party of homelessness, the party of rising house prices, rising rents, the party of institutional investors and vulture funds,’ and Sinn Féin is the one to ‘deliver tens of thousands of genuinely affordable homes’ if you vote for them (Sinn Féin, 2024). 

Sinn Féin During the Joint 2024 EU Parliamentary Elections and Local Elections – Steady as She Goes?

In the lead-up to the 2024 election, Ireland’s national public service broadcaster, RTÉ, highlighted that the key issues facing Ireland in 2024 are health, housing, migration, cost of living, the economy, and climate change (Cunningham, 2023). Sinn Féin’s 2024 European Parliament manifesto continues to address these challenges while also highlighting other issues considered important to Ireland at the European level, including Irish neutrality, Ireland’s stance on the Israel–Hamas conflict and the Ukraine war, human and workers’ rights, migration, and the environment (Sinn Féin, 2024). 

During the same election, voters would be asked to vote in the local elections, which would see individuals elected to local government positions across the country. Unlike the 2020 general elections which saw a turnout of 62.88%, the 2024 elections only had 50.65% of the population turn up to vote (European Parliament, 2024; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, n.d.). Sinn Féin managed to secure 11.8% of the first preference votes in the local elections, compared to Fine Gael’s 23%, and Fianna Fáil’s 22.9%, a performance nearly echoed by the EU Parliament elections which saw the parties receive 11.8%, 29.6%, and 16.6% respectively (RTÉ, 2024). To Sinn Féin this came as a shock, with party member Matt Carthy stating during a radio interview: “There was a sense over the last number of weeks that there was a drop coming. To be quite frank nobody saw these results” (Halpin, 2024a). Despite the results Sinn Féin still managed to have two candidates elected to the European Parliament where they opted to join The Left in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL Group with other leftist European populist parties such as the Italian Five Star Movement and France’s La France Insoumise (European Parliament, 2024).

Commentators point to one leading cause of Sinn Féin’s less-than-stellar performance: immigration (O’Doherty, 2024; Pogatchnik, 2024). On November 24, 2023, three children and one woman were injured in a knife attack outside a Dublin school (Kwai & Satariano, 2023). Although Irish news outlets did not identify the man, rumors quickly spread online that he was an Algerian immigrant, escalating into a call to action that resulted in “tens of millions of euro worth of criminal damage” following an anti-immigration riot (Foy, 2023; Lally et al., 2023). Subsequently, there was the ongoing removal of “tent cities,” where migrants had gathered in tents due to the ongoing housing crisis and the government’s inability to find accommodation for the 1,780 unhoused migrant men as of May 14 (Figure 4) (Ehl, 2024). Taoiseach Simon Harris of Fine Gael supported these removals, stating: “We do not live in a country where makeshift shantytowns are allowed to just develop” (Halpin, 2024a). Reportedly, Sinn Féin failed to “reflect the concerns of ordinary people on immigration,” with reports suggesting that McDonald warned party members not to post anything contrary to her immigration stance, which remained unclear for a long time (Halpin, 2024b). Immigration became one of the key issues leading up to the 2024 elections, exacerbated by the housing crisis and the UK’s hardline immigration stance, which saw 80% of new applicants crossing the border from Northern Ireland (Finnegan & Conlon, 2024). UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak claimed this was due to the successful deterrent effect of his Rwanda deportation plan.

Figure 5: Asylum seekers’ tents near the International Protection Office and Refugee Legal Service on Lower Mount Street, Dublin, Ireland, on July 7, 2023. Photo: Derick P. Hudson.

However, this is not the only reason support for Sinn Féin has declined. Since the 2020 election, Sinn Féin has flip-flopped on many of its policy positions, losing “angry” supporters as a result of the decisions they made. Beginning with the coalition talks post-election, Sinn Féin alienated many grassroots voters by considering the possibility of forming a government with either Fine Gael or Fianna Fáil (Allen, 2023). This, combined with increased interaction with businesses, has led many to comment that their policies have been drifting economically more toward the center, thereby alienating their traditional left-leaning supporters (Brennan, 2023; Weckler, 2022). The party’s focus on the “wrong” social issues has also been problematic. They supported the “Family” and “Care” referendums, which aimed to modernize two articles within the constitution (39th and 40th) to be more vague about what constitutes a family unit and to remove a reference to a woman’s role within the home (University College Dublin, 2024). Before the referendum, Sinn Féin vowed to re-run them should they fail, but they did not anticipate that both acts would be resoundingly rejected, with 67% and 74% of voters casting a “No” vote on the amendments, respectively (O’Connell, 2024).

Adding to this, despite accusing “billionaire media moguls of pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists, and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power,” Sinn Féin has pursued a campaign of silencing critics, including The Irish Times and its political correspondent, Harry McGee, as well as the national broadcaster RTÉ (The Journal, 2023). The international community responded directly, with several journalist organizations and academics signing a joint letter to Sinn Féin and McDonald expressing their concerns about censorship (Reporters Without Borders, 2023). Additionally, Sinn Féin overestimated its success in the 2024 elections and fielded too many candidates, causing a split in the vote (McClafferty, 2024). These issues combined led supporters to turn to other populist options, namely PBP-Solidarity, Aontú, and Independent Ireland.

The Alternative to the Alternative Vote

Immigration has become the word du jour and many voters during the 2024 election that would have voted for Sinn Féin decided to turn to parties who are unapologetic in their hardline stance against immigration. Self-described as ‘a “comfortable alternative” to Sinn Féin,’ Independent Ireland was founded to focus on rural voters, but quickly became the right-wing populist party that attracted anti-immigration voters alongside Aontú (Ryan, 2023). The populism in both party’s stances on migration is clear: Independent Ireland states “We will secure Ireland’s borders by enforcing our immigration laws and end profiteering by vested interests at the expense of the Irish taxpayer” (Independent Ireland, n.d.); Whereas Aontú, ‘The Only Party Listening To The People,’ wish to solve the issue by tackling the various other crises facing Ireland, compensating communities where asylum seekers are moved into, and enforce stronger border control policies that will include more deportations (Aontú, n.d.). 

Of the three alternative populist parties, only a candidate from Independent Ireland was elected to the EU Parliament, but divisions and criticisms quickly started to appear as MEP Ciaran Mullooly opted to join the liberal Renew Europe group (Independent Ireland, 2024). On a local level Independent Ireland preformed the best, gaining 2.8% of the first preference vote in their first election year, compared to PBP-S’ 1.2% and Aontú’s 2.1%. Overall, all three parties have seen an increase of seats on a local level, with each party now having 23, 13, and 8 seats respectively. Sinn Féin also gained 21 seats for a total of 102 during the local election, but with only 11.8% of the first preference votes, clearly their momentum from 2020 has slowed down (Irish Times, 2024). 

Whether or not Sinn Féin will experience a resurgence in next year’s general election remains uncertain. Their historical connection to the IRA is now nearly irrelevant to most younger voters, and it appears that any news of Sinn Féin’s ties to the paramilitary organization primarily affects older voters who have a living connection to the violence. This generational divide is evident in a letter exchange between Irish Times readers discussing younger voters’ preference for Sinn Féin (Irish Times, 2022).

As for the other populist parties in the nation, while politically irrelevant and on the fringes for now, they stand to gain the most from Sinn Féin’s loss. Independent Ireland’s Ciaran Mullooly’s decision to join a pro-European parliament group despite the party’s Eurosceptic stance has raised the eyebrows of many, which might negatively affect the party’s ability to win over disgruntled voters in the next election. PBP-S continually fails to make any headway during elections, although left-leaning working-class voters may cast their lot in with PBP-S should they decide to stop supporting Sinn Féin. Most of all, Aontú stands to gain the most, offering disgruntled voters a new alternative to the alternative Sinn Féin, and attracting working class voters away from Independent Ireland, particularly given that The Think Ireland 2024 election poll suggests that this group predominantly support ‘other right’ parties (Cunningham, 2024). 

However, Sinn Féin shouldn’t be counted out just yet, as they currently hold the majority in the Northern Irish Assembly—an unprecedented result that may drive further election promises in the Republic advocating for reunification (Pogatchnik, 2024). If Sinn Féin successfully refines its policies and regains public support, it could have a chance at making gains in the upcoming general election, reversing its currently declining popularity in polls, which now place them behind Fine Gael for the first time since September 2021 (REDC & Business Post, 2024). That said, Fine Gael’s response to immigration could explain their rise in the polls, a trend that might continue into the next election if the momentum persists (Clarke, 2024). While predicting the results of the next election may be futile, it is certainly one to watch closely.

Appendix: Populist Language Used in Sinn Féin’s Manifestos

2019 European Parliament Election Manifesto

QuotePage
“Our MEPs now need to continue that fight – for communities, for ordinary working people and families.” 4
“In contrast, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael belong to the Right-wing EPP and ALDE groups which want to create a Superstate centralizing power in Europe far away from ordinary people. These groups are also determined to create an EU army with more military spending rather than investing to tackle the cost of living and provide quality public services. They are advocates of austerity and beholden to corporate interests.” 5
“Sinn Féin reject increased militarization and related spending and will fight for ordinary people.” 5
“It is only by voting for Sinn Féin that you will get credible and effective MEPs who will fight for ordinary Irish people’s interests in Europe, challenge vested interests and insiders and work for a radically and progressively reformed European Union.” 5
“EU banking policy, which is driven by unelected officials, favors banks and corporate elites at the expense of ordinary people.” 7
“The ECB’s quantitative easing programme is pumping billions into the banks to the benefit of corporations and major polluters.” 7
“Sinn Féin is opposed to PESCO and to Irish money being used to fund companies who are exporting arms and fueling conflicts around the world.” 10
“We call for a State Aid exemption for rural areas in light of Brexit and urge the reduction of bureaucracy so that a greater portion of EU funding for things like broadband actually reaches the intended beneficiaries instead of being pocketed by middlemen.” 10
“Local fisheries are suffering while profit-driven super-trawlers controlled by multi-nationals devastate our environment, fish stocks and coastal communities.” 11
“Sinn Féin MEPs oppose the Commission’s proposal to invest in militarization by plundering Regional Development Funding.” 11

2020 General Election Manifesto

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“In that time, we have had Governments for the wealthy, Governments for the privileged, Governments for the property developers, Governments for the banks. Sinn Féin believes that it’s time that we had a government for the people.”3
“Successive governments have delivered for their friends and cronies. They have delivered for big business, for vested interests and for golden circles. In Government, Sinn Féin will deliver for the people.” 4
“Sinn Féin wants to be in Government to deliver for ordinary, working people. But we don’t want to be part of the system. We want to change the system.” 4
“Sinn Féin will take on the cartel-like beef processing sector that is pushing family farms out of business, reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) so that it supports the farmers who need it the most and ensure farmers are assisted in the transition towards a greener, more sustainable agriculture sector.” 13
“Without a government policy that is framed by climate justice and a just transition, the leadership and direction of climate action will become the plaything of bankers and corporate investors. They will be concerned with only one thing – how to make a buck out of the crisis. That is what they do, and it is killing the planet.” 25
“Without public broadcasting, we will be left with billionaire media moguls pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power.” 30
“Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labor are the yes men of Europe. Whatever Brussels and Frankfurt propose, they support. Their MEPs are the EU’s representatives in Ireland, promoting the agenda of the EU institutions rather than the interests of people in Ireland in the EU.” 44
“It is time to stand up for Ireland and the interests of all of the people who share this island. It is time to end the Brussels power grab, to reign in the Commission, and return powers to the member states. It is time to halt the attack on the wages and conditions of working people and to promote a basic threshold of decency for all. It is time to rebuild our public services and defend our public utilities.” 44
“Sinn Féin will build a fairer and more democratic European Union that works for the people of Europe, not for the EU insiders, middlemen and corporate interests.” 44
“Sinn Féin are determined that ordinary people in working class and rural communities must be protected from criminals… “Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil before them have abandoned working class and rural communities to organized crime gangs. They both starved the Gardaí of the resources they need to protect communities and they both failed to tackle garda corruption. They have not taken the necessary steps to ensure consistent and appropriate sentencing by judges. They are both soft on crime.” 69
“Sinn Féin in Government will demand probity and accountability from all who hold positions of power and responsibility. We will take on white collar crime and we will uphold the common good.” 71
“To make matters worse, the Fine Gael Government, supported by Fianna Fáil, have hitched their wagon to costly, risky Public Private Partnerships. This is despite the fact that we know they do not provide value for money. The Government knows this too, which is why we have no published reports on the value for money of these initiatives.” 91
“Sinn Féin in Government would not tolerate such abuse of political power, and our proposals set out to restore confidence in politics and ensure that those in power are working for the people and not for money or the vested interests of the golden circle establishment.” 96
“The public have lost confidence in the Dáil, this must be a priority focus for political reform.” 96
“For years, the insurance industry has pursued an aggressive campaign to portray sky-high premiums as the result of claims and fraud. Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil have served the industry by peddling their spin.” 104
“It is only a decade since the banks of this state crashed our economy. Poor regulation, an arrogant banking class, and a parasitic relationship between the banks and Government of the time created a dangerous climate for customers, taxpayers, and our democracy.” 105
“It is time the banks gave something back to the Irish people. Government must be vigilant and hold the banks to account.” 105
“Sinn Féin will challenge the arrogance and contempt for customers that persists at the core of our banking system. We do not believe that banks should exist only to increase their profits and deliver handsome dividends and bonuses for their managers. Banks should exist to support Irish society, its customers and businesses.” 105
“The effects of the economic crisis and property crash still live with us today. Our housing and property sector should have been rebuilt in the interests of citizens, renters and homeowners. Instead, Fine Gael rolled out the red carpet to vulture funds and international investors, allowing them to hoover up assets from distressed families and buy up commercial property in our towns and cities. They have allowed these vultures and funds to transfer wealth out of Ireland to hidden international investors using low-tax arrangements.” 106

2024 European Parliament Manifesto

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“There are two competing visions for the future of the European Union. One is of an EU that continues to enlarge, becomes more centralized and bureaucratic, more militarized, lacks transparency, is under undue influence from corporate interests and lobbyists, and seeks to take ever more powers from Member States.” 5
“We have already seen worrying levels of de-regulation brought in with these crises used as an excuse. Lessons that had been learnt about the need for regulation of the financial sector seem to have been forgotten. Some like Fine Gael are openly pushing for further rules to help vulture funds and banks. Only Sinn Féin can be trusted to stand up to this agenda.” 13
“Focus to be placed on those large corporate interests that are responsible for the climate crisis rather than undue burdens being imposed on ordinary citizens.” 19

 

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Weckler, A. (2022). “Mary Lou hitches up Sinn Féin partymobile for Silicon Valley drive-by.” Independent. September 11, 2022. https://www.independent.ie/business/technology/mary-lou-hitches-up-sinn-fein-partymobile-for-silicon-valley-drive-by/41975672.html (accessed on August 5, 2024).

Manifestos

Sinn Féin

— (2019). Fighting For Ireland, Ag Troid Ar Son Na Héireann; All Ireland In Europe/Éire Ar Fad San Eoraip: Sinn Féin European Election Manifesto 2019. Sinn Féin. https://www.sinnfein.ie/files/2019/EU_Manifesto1.pdf

— (2020). General Election Manifesto: A Manifesto for Change, Giving workers & families a break. Sinn Féin.  https://www.sinnfein.ie/files/2020/Giving_Workers_and_Families_a_Break_-_A_Manifesto_for_Change.pdf

— (2024). Taosíonn Athrú Anseo/Change Starts Here: Sinn Féin European Parliament Manifesto 2024. Sinn Féin. https://vote.sinnfein.ie/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Sinn-Fein-European-Election-Manifesto-2024.pdf

Fine Gael

— (2019). European Election Manifesto 2019: Let’s Take Ireland Forward Together. Fine Gael. https://www.finegael.ie/app/uploads/2019/05/European-Manifesto-2019-PRINT.pdf

— (2020). General Election Manifesto 2020: A Future To Look Forward To: Building the Republic of Opportunity. Fine Gael. https://www.finegael.ie/pdf/FG_GE20_Manifesto.pdf

— (2024). Manifesto: European Election 2024. Fine Gael. https://www.finegael.ie/app/uploads/2024/05/Fine-Gael-European-Election-Manifesto-2024.pdf

Fianna Fáil

— (2019). European Parliament Elections Manifesto 2019: Making Europe Work For You. Fianna Fáil. http://michaelpidgeon.com/manifestos/docs/ff/Fianna%20Fail%20EE%202019.pdf

— (2020). Manifesto 2020: An Ireland for all/Éire do Chách. Fianna Fáil. https://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/31572/1/Fianna-Fail-General-Election-Manifesto-2020.pdf

— (2024) European Manifesto 2024: Europe Matters. Fianna Fáil. https://7358484.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na1.net/hubfs/7358484/Euro_Manifesto_May24-1.pdf

Figure Sources

Figure 1: https://www.rte.ie/centuryireland/index.php/articles/election-results-in-irish-voters-favour-an-independent-republic

Figure 2: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/images/maps/map12.htm

Figure 3: https://www.facebook.com/sinnfein/videos/rt%C3%A9-to-exclude-sinn-f%C3%A9in-from-leaders-debate/459587158067050/

Figure 4: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1484509658817817 // https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=857897529506644 // https://www.facebook.com/reel/776873617923511

 

Funeral of a Turkish soldier who was martyred. Photo: Shutterstock.

Blame Avoidance through Necropolitics and Religious Populism: Autocratic Responses to Nationwide Crises in an Authoritarian Islamist Polity

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Please cite as:
Erturk, Omer; Yilmaz, Ihsan and Smith, Chloe. (2024). “Blame Avoidance through Necropolitics and Religious Populism: Autocratic Responses to Nationwide Crises in an Authoritarian Islamist Polity.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 3, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0038      

 

Abstract

Blame avoidance, a strategic distancing from culpability following events resulting in the deaths of citizens of a country, has often been studied in democratic contexts, yet its manifestation in authoritarian scenarios remains understudied. This study addresses this gap by scrutinizing empirical data derived from Turkey’s party in power, the AKP, and their political narratives and policies concerning these fatalities. Synthesizing the concepts of blame avoidance and necropolitics, it investigates how Turkey’s ruling competitive authoritarian party uses blame-shifting strategies to account for deaths resulting from negligence. Employing a conceptualization of martyrdom intertwined with religious populism, the party appeals to both religious and nationalistic sentiments and succeeds in sidestepping responsibility and accountability for these tragic incidents.

Keywords: religious populism, death, martyrdom, accountability, blame avoidance, competitive authoritarianism, elections, AKP, Turkey

 

By Omer Erturk*, Ihsan Yilmaz and Chloe Smith

Introduction

Accidents or violent conflicts resulting in fatalities have a profound impact on individuals, communities, and societies, especially when these tragedies are linked to government failure or negligence. Such events often provoke significant criticism and challenge the government’s legitimacy. To manage the fallout and sustain their position, incumbents typically employ several strategies: controlling the media, calling for national unity, appealing to patriotism, using nationalistic rhetoric, promoting solidarity, implementing censorship, or putting the blame on others and so on. These methods are used to deflect criticism, manage public perception, and maintain authority in the face of government shortcomings, a practice commonly known as blame avoidance.

Blame avoidance generally refers to any actions taken by leaders and officials to distance themselves from situations that could result in blame or jeopardize their objectives (Hinterleitner, 2017: 243). This behavior can be observed across various levels, ranging from national governance to community leadership (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2017; Li et al., 2021). Numerous studies have analyzed blame avoidance behaviors and strategies in both democratic and authoritarian or competitive authoritarian contexts, particularly during administrative, financial, security, or electoral crises (Weaver, 1986; Hood, 2002, 2011; Hood et al., 2015; Ellis, 1994; Mortensen, 2012). This strategy is important because it helps leaders—whether autocrats or democrats—deflect public criticism, ease social tensions, and legitimize their prolonged rule, ultimately turning such crises to their advantage. However, there is a gap in the literature regarding how autocrats use necropolitics, martyrdom, and religious populism narratives as a strategy of blame avoidance in response to nationwide accidents, catastrophes, and conflicts resulting in fatalities.

Specifically, while blame avoidance has emerged as a strategic tool frequently employed by Turkey’s competitive authoritarian ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), limited attention has been given to this phenomenon within the Turkish context. Only a handful of studies, such as those by Aytac (2021) and Soylemez & Angin (2023), have examined blame avoidance, focusing on economic and financial crises. Zahariadis, on the other hand, analyzed its role during the COVID-19 pandemic, demonstrating how leaders deflected government responsibilities (Zahariadis et al., 2020; Aytac, 2021; Soylemez-Karakoc & Angin, 2023). While necropolitics has been studied independently within the Turkish political landscape (Bargu, 2016; Akinci, 2018; Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Islekel, 2017), its intersection with blame avoidance remains underexplored. 

In this research, we will focus on how autocrats use necropolitics and religious martyrdom narratives alongside blame avoidance to navigate nationwide calamities, such as accidents or violent conflicts resulting in fatalities, to shape public perceptions and deflect government accountability. This article aims to bridge this gap by examining empirical data derived from the political populist narratives and policies of Turkey’s current leadership. By integrating the concepts of blame avoidance and necropolitics and applying this combined framework to the data, the paper reveals the strategies used by Turkey’s ruling competitive authoritarian party, the AKP. It assesses the extent to which these strategies are effective in a competitive authoritarian context and explores how the party seeks to avoid blame, evade responsibility, and deflect accountability for fatalities resulting directly from its negligence.

Turkey’s political trajectory under the ruling AKP has witnessed a notable shift from undemocratic responses to the Gezi Park protests in 2013 towards what many scholars now characterize as an Islamist populist competitive authoritarian regime (Yilmaz, 2018; 2021a). Scholars have given an understanding of the role of religion in shaping the party’s populist appeal, evident in analyses of Friday sermons and the strategic mobilization of diverse populist movements. These academic works insightfully map out Turkey’s socio-political landscape, particularly scrutinizing the dynamics within Erdogan’s tenure. By fusing elements of personal identity, political leadership, and national and religious affiliation, Erdogan orchestrates a narrative wherein allegiance to his policies is associated with religious devotion. This elevates Erdogan beyond the realms of conventional political figures, positioning him as a symbolic embodiment of Turkish identity itself. The mix of political leadership and religious identity engenders a transformative shift, fundamentally altering the contours of Turkish identity and governance. This recalibration fosters a symbiotic relationship between political allegiance and religious identity (Yilmaz, 2021a; Yilmaz, 2021b; Yilmaz et al, 2021; Yilmaz & Erturk, 2021a; Yilmaz & Erturk, 2021b; Yilmaz et al, 2021a). 

In this article, we argue that the incumbent party adopts a strategic approach by framing deaths from accidents, clearly under its own responsibility, as acts of martyrdom, thereby deflecting accountability while appealing to both the religious and nationalistic sentiments of the Turkish populace. This tactic serves to deflect blame by recontextualizing fatalities as acts of martyrdom, intertwining them with religious and patriotic ideologies. In doing so, the party attempts to distance itself from culpability and obfuscate its accountability for these incidents. Through this lens of blame avoidance and the incorporation of necropolitics, the article sheds light on the strategies employed by the incumbent party to navigate and manipulate public perceptions surrounding these sensitive and politically charged events.

A structured approach is used in this paper to illustrate this argument. Initially, we look at the realms of the blame avoidance theory, establishing the theoretical and conceptual framework guiding our exploration. This foundation serves as a crucial backdrop for the subsequent analysis. Moving forward, the focus shifts to a comprehensive explanation of necropolitics and martyrdom, focusing on the definitions, characteristics and scholarly discourse surrounding these concepts. We add depth to this analysis by offering a brief yet impactful examination of martyrdom’s significance within Islam and its historical utilization by political figures in the Turkish context.

In the empirical analysis section, we focus our attention on evaluating how the AKP strategically integrates necropolitics with two pivotal blame avoidance strategies in incidents that result in fatalities. First, we delve into the AKP’s utilization of the presentational strategy, elucidating how they manipulate narrative presentation to deflect culpability and evade accountability. We then shed light on the AKP’s engagement in bargaining via rewards as another tactic employed to circumvent blame, showcasing how the party navigates and manages public perception amidst tragic events leading to fatalities. Through this empirical examination, we aim to provide concrete examples and critical insights into the AKP’s strategic maneuvering to avoid blame, supporting our argument regarding the convergence of necropolitics and blame avoidance strategies used in the Turkish political landscape.

Blame Avoidance Theory and Necropolitics

Politicians opportunistically highlight their successful policies to gain or maintain favor. However, they also often attempt to deflect blame when their failures come under scrutiny, especially in regimes with competitive but flawed electoral processes. This strategy is crucial for politicians, as voters are more likely to remember experiences of loss and suffering than instances of progress or success (Weaver, 1986; Hood, 2002; 2011). This is described in psychological studies which indicate a human inclination towards remembering adverse, harmful, or traumatic events over positive ones, a phenomenon commonly termed as negativity bias (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Kanouse & Hanson, 1987). For those in office, shouldering blame can lead to significant political setbacks and, especially in contexts with multiple competing political parties, could even result in a loss of power (Hansson, 2015).

In his seminal work, The Politics of Blame Avoidance (1986), Weaver identifies eight strategic approaches that politicians utilize to evade responsibility in the face of potential blame. These strategies encompass agenda limitation, issue redefinition, resource investment after failure, delegation of blame-inducing decisions, scapegoating, aligning with popular alternatives, diffusing blame among multiple actors, and persisting in harmful actions despite recognition of their detrimental consequences.

First, agenda limitation serves as an attempt by policymakers to suppress blame-generating issues from gaining prominence in public discourse. However, when such issues cannot be entirely suppressed, issue redefinition becomes a secondary strategy, where policymakers introduce new policy narratives that obscure potential political damage. In scenarios where attempts to avoid loss have already failed, the strategy of “throwing good money after bad” is employed, whereby policymakers inject further resources into problematic situations in an effort to offset negative outcomes.

Moreover, when facing blame for undesirable outcomes, political leaders often seek to delegate decision-making authorityfor controversial matters to other actors, thereby distancing themselves from accountability. In cases where delegation is not feasible, they may resort to scapegoating—shifting the blame onto individuals or groups perceived as responsible. Another tactic commonly observed is blame diffusion, which involves dispersing accountability across multiple actors, thereby diluting personal culpability.

Finally, despite recognizing the wrongful nature of certain actions, policymakers may choose to persist in their course of action to avoid publicly acknowledging their mistakes. These interrelated strategies illustrate the multifaceted nature of blame avoidance and underscore the lengths to which political leaders will go to maintain their standing by deflecting or mitigating accountability in politically sensitive situations (Weaver, 1986).

Christopher Hood’s concept of the presentational strategy adds another dimension to the array of techniques political actors employ to navigate blame avoidance. This strategy revolves around the deliberate manipulation of information, spin, and persuasive rhetoric to deflect responsibility for blameworthy outcomes (Hood, 2011). As studied by some other scholars, these presentational strategies serve as crafty tools wielded by policymakers to manipulate the public narrative in several ways. Firstly, they succeed in redefining, reshaping, and spinning issues, working to divert public attention away from the heart of the matter. These strategies delve deeper into the realms of information control and manipulation, where policymakers impose restrictive measures on dissenting voices within the media landscape, effectively diminishing oppositional views and reinforcing the government’s narrative. Often, they craft narratives that border on fabrication, using these persuasive stories to evade responsibility (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2017: 428). Alternatively, storytelling can be employed to portray governmental actions or responses as commendable or necessary, with the acceptance of blame serving as a strategic move to maintain political legitimacy or rationalize policy decisions (Hood, 2011: 47–49; Weaver, 1986: 385–86).

In authoritarian regimes, presentational strategies often hinge on secrecy, involving the restriction of information flow and stringent control over media outlets to influence how incidents are accessed and perceived. In contrast, in democratic settings, these strategies may manifest through media priming, where incumbents manipulate public perception by leveraging media platforms to frame issues favorably (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2017: 428).

The presentational strategy aims to reframe what might be perceived as a blameworthy issue into a strategic advantage—for instance, by portraying short-term crises as catalysts for long-term benefits (Hood, 2011: 17). Particularly in authoritarian regimes, incumbents often suppress oppositional voices and control the narrative surrounding incidents, transforming situations that might otherwise attract blame into justifications for their continued political rule (Hood, 2011: 18). Through these efforts, political actors shape public perceptions and influence how blame is assigned, ultimately using these strategies to safeguard their legitimacy and maintain control in the face of political adversity.

Building on this literature, our exploration reveals the AKP’s concerted efforts to intertwine necropolitics with two primary strategies in evading blame amid incidents that have resulted in fatalities: First, the presentational strategy and second, the technique of turning blame into credit and bargaining via rewards (an extension of Weaver’s ‘throwing good money’ after a bad situation). Before establishing these strategies empirically, it’s crucial to first establish a foundational understanding of necropolitics and martyrdom. Necropolitics, a concept that intertwines governance and death, demands comprehensive exploration. This theoretical framework demonstrates how power structures manifest in controlling not just lives of the citizenry, but also the circumstances of death, and how this can be wielded as a tool for political agendas. 

Moreover, within the context of Islam, martyrdom holds profound significance, deeply embedded in religious narratives and revered as a noble sacrifice. Historically, martyrdom has resonated within Islamic cultures, serving as a powerful symbol to unite and galvanize communities. In modern times, however, martyrdom has been popularized primarily by violent Islamic groups in their armed struggles at both local and global levels, often within a jihadist framework. This contemporary use emphasizes the sacrifice of the self, devaluing life while highlighting the rewards of the afterlife. Understanding its significance within Islamic faith, alongside its current pro-Sharia and jihadi associations (Yilmaz, 2019a; 2019b; 2021b; Yilmaz et al., 2023), is crucial to grasping its utilization by AKP politicians in Turkey, given their historically close ideological and organic ties with these movements (See Erturk, 2002; 2023). Politicians in Turkey, aware of the emotional and ideological power of martyrdom, have strategically harnessed its symbolism to reinforce their narratives, influence public opinion and attack the opposition (Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2022). This practice intertwines religious sentiments with political aims, leveraging the reverence for martyrs within society to consolidate power and garner support.

Necropolitical Use of Martyrdom by the AKP and Popularization of Death

Necropolitics, as defined by Mbembe (2003; 2019), refers to the sovereign’s authority to control both the lives and deaths of individuals, encompassing the power to decide who lives and who dies. This concept has found application in various contexts, notably within the Turkish landscape, as described in works by Ahmetbeyzade (2008), Bargu (2016; 2019), Zengin (2016), and Islekel (2017). These contributions have broadened the understanding of necropolitics, introducing novel dimensions that demonstrate its complexity and influence in contemporary political landscapes (Bargu, 2019: 5-6).

Within the realm of Turkish politics, the AKP has strategically harnessed martyrdom narratives, employing them as powerful tools that normalize and celebrate death when the deaths are perceived or explained as being on behalf of the masses (Carney, 2018; Bakiner, 2019; Yilmaz & Erturk, 2021a; 2021b; 2023). In the AKP’s discursive and representational necropolitics, the notion of death for the nation – epitomized through martyrdom – is elevated to a fetishized status (Carney, 2018: 94, 101). This fusion of necropolitical discourse with martyrdom narratives by the AKP indicates a calculated effort to both celebrate and sanctify the notion of death, evoking profound emotional responses within the populace, and intertwining cases of death with nationalist and religious fervor. 

The Evolution of Martyrdom and Its Contemporary Application by the AKP

Funeral of a Turkish soldier killed by PKK militants on December 12, 2009, in Istanbul, Turkey. Photo: Thomas Koch.

The concept of martyrdom has a rich etymological and cultural history, with roots that trace back to the Greek word “martus” or “martyr,” meaning “witness.” While the term initially held a broader significance, it gradually acquired a religious connotation, coming to represent the act of sacrificing one’s life for God, especially within Christianity and Judaism (Freamon, 2003: 319). In the Islamic tradition, this concept is mirrored by the Arabic term “shahadah,” which also translates to “to witness.” The individual who carries out this act is known as a “shahid,” a title bestowed not just in Arabic but in many non-Arab Muslim societies as well (Hatina, 2014: 19). This evolution of the term across linguistic and religious boundaries highlights the profound and universal significance of martyrdom as a symbol of ultimate commitment to faith and principles.

Historically, martyrdom is deeply rooted in ancient civilizations such as Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Greece, evolving across religious and cultural landscapes throughout time. This archetype of the warrior-hero finds expression in diverse ideologies and conflicts, from kamikaze pilots in World War II to self-immolating Buddhist monks protesting the American occupation of Vietnam, and from Irish Republican Army (IRA) hunger strikers to freedom fighters in Middle Eastern liberation movements (Hatina, 2014: 2). Christianity and Islam significantly shaped the archetype of the martyr, offering promises of immortality, absolution, exemption from Judgment Day, and even direct communication with prophets as rewards for their sacrifice (Hatina, 2014: 2). These religious incentives imbue martyrdom with powerful emotional and spiritual weight, further solidifying its role in political and military narratives.

Scholars across disciplines have examined martyrdom’s global manifestations, emphasizing how this concept transcends cultural and religious boundaries. Martyrdom serves as a powerful mythological figure, often invoking revolutionary goals and legitimizing struggles, both secular and religious (Hatina, 2014: 7; Szyska, 2004). The adaptability of martyrdom across diverse contexts is particularly significant—it functions not only as a religious ideal but also as an emotional and motivational resource in secular struggles, helping individuals endure sacrifice for nationalistic or political causes (Sluka, 2000: 49; Anderson, 1983: 15). Whether in national liberation movements, ideological conflicts, or religious wars, martyrdom emerges as a central narrative that justifies extreme sacrifice.

In the Turkish context, martyrdom assumes a multifaceted role. It serves as a tool for mythmaking, helping to shape collective memory, ignite religious populism and nationalistic fervor, promote militarism, and facilitate collective mobilization (Altinay, 2006; Azak, 2007; Degirmencioglu, 2014a; 2014b). In particular, as our research explores, the ruling AKP has employed the concept of martyrdom as a form of blame avoidance. By assigning martyrdom to deaths that occur under contentious circumstances—such as accidents or conflicts—the AKP not only deflects blame but also reframes these tragedies as noble sacrifices for the nation or religion. 

This paper establishes that assigning martyrdom also provides the AKP with an opportunity to manipulate public narratives and shift accountability, thus enhancing its political legitimacy. By intertwining religious symbolism with political agendas, the AKP leverages the revered status of martyrs in Turkish society to maintain public support and consolidate power in times of crisis. This rhetorical maneuver serves to bolster the regime’s legitimacy, blending religious sentiment with political strategy to maintain public support in the face of adversity.

The Co-optation of Religion by the Secular State

Turkish Islamist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks in Van province of Turkey as holding a holy Quran on April 14, 2015. Photo: Shutterstock.

Despite its officially secular stance, the leadership of Turkey has long intertwined Islam with state operations at multiple levels since its foundation (Cagaptay, 2006; Yegen, 2007; Sakallioglu, 1996; Kaplan, 2002: 665; Yilmaz, 2021a). A key example of this is the state’s efforts to cultivate a devout and patriotic military force, which might seem contradictory to the secular image of the state (Kemerli, 2015: 282; Kaplan, 2002; Gurbey, 2009).

Rather than discarding the historical religious associations tied to soldiering, the Turkish state has effectively co-opted Islamic notions such as jihad and martyrdom to foster a sense of duty and militarism within society (Yilmaz, 2021a). These religious concepts have been reinterpreted to serve the goals of secular nationalism (Kemerli, 2015: 282), and more recently, have been redirected towards advancing an Islamist populist agenda. During times of national crisis, even secular leadership has sporadically invoked religious discourse to bolster public support. For instance, during the Cypriot intervention of 1974, the use of Islamic terminology such as “jihad,” “mujahids,” and “martyrs” revealed how religion could be tactically deployed to legitimize military actions. This paradoxical use of religious language by a state that claims to uphold secularism has conferred substantial religious legitimacy on the Turkish military, traditionally regarded as the staunch protector of secularism. Furthermore, since the 1980s, this religious rhetoric has also bolstered public support for conscription, even amid the protracted Turkish-Kurdish conflict, where significant loss of life continues to be a reality (Kemerli, 2015: 282). The integration of religion into state affairs—especially in the military sphere—demonstrates how the Turkish state has consistently navigated the tension between secularism and religious symbolism to achieve political and military objectives.

Beyond the historical military context, the AKP under Recep Tayyip Erdogan has strategically re-focused its discourse on martyrdom, particularly in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in July 2016. During this period, martyrdom became not only a symbol of national and religious sacrifice but also a powerful political tool to legitimize authoritarian populist and repressive measures and consolidate the ruling party’s authority (Yanik & Hisarlioglu, 2019: 57; Baykan et al., 2021). Erdogan and the AKP capitalized on the emotionally charged symbolism of martyrdom, aligning it with their broader political objectives, which allowed them to reframe public perceptions around death in a manner that reinforced their narrative of religious populism, resilience and divine purpose.

Building upon this shift, the AKP expanded the traditional understanding of martyrdom beyond the military realm, reimagining it to encompass civilian spheres. The party’s redefinition of martyrdom demonstrates a broader and more calculated approach to managing social and political realities. As Bakiner (2019) outlines, the AKP has employed four distinct strategies in controlling the narrative surrounding death. First, the party broadened the scope of martyrdom, extending its definition to include civilian deaths, with material benefits being provided to survivors through both formal laws and informal state mechanisms. Second, they normalized untimely deaths by framing them as natural consequences of citizens’ occupational, socioeconomic, or gender positions, thereby reducing the likelihood of public dissent. Third, the AKP actively depoliticized death to suppress any mobilization of opposition, particularly in the wake of state-linked fatal incidents. Finally, the party tightly controlled public discourse, ensuring that the narrative surrounding martyrdom remained aligned with the AKP’s ideological objectives and reinforced its discursive dominance (Bakiner, 2019).

Category One: Religious Narratives and Strategic Blame Avoidance—Redefining, Reshaping, Spinning, and Manipulating Death-Related Incidents

A coal mine in the Soma district of Manisa province, Turkey, exploded on May 13, 2014. This disaster remains the deadliest labor catastrophe in Turkish history, claiming the lives of 301 miners. Photo: F. Polat.

The AKP’s initial reaction to tragic incidents resulting in loss of life typically involves absorbing the immediate shock within society, followed by a narrative that attempts to normalize such events. The Soma mining disaster in Manisa on May 13, 2014, stands as a poignant example, marking the deadliest labor catastrophe in Turkish history, which claimed the lives of 301 miners. Revelations surrounding the incident indicated the role of governmental corruption within the AKP, with media reports highlighting close ties between the mining company’s owners and the AKP, along with documented safety concerns that had been circumvented by the company (Yetkin, 2014). Instead of assuming responsibility, Erdogan attempted to downplay the incident’s severity by characterizing the catastrophe as a typical ‘work accident,’ and ‘the nature of the work’ by asserting that mine explosions are common throughout the world (Cumhuriyet, 2014; Daloglu, 2014). This strategy aimed to evade liability and minimize the government’s role in the disaster in the eyes of the public.

The AKP adopted a similar presentational blame avoidance strategy following the tragic Aladag boarding girls’ Qur’anic school fire in 2016, which resulted in the deaths of eleven students and a teacher. Revelations indicated that the dormitory had not been subjected to the required comprehensive inspections, primarily due to its management by a pro-AKP religious community. The AKP again sought to diminish its responsibility, by labelling the catastrophe as an ‘act of fate’ (Shafak, 2016). This narrative tactic attempted to deflect accountability by framing the incident as an unforeseeable and uncontrollable occurrence, to sidestep the deeper scrutiny of the regulatory oversights or negligence that might have contributed to the tragedy.

The AKP once again employed a blame avoidance strategy in the aftermath of two Turkish soldiers losing their lives in 2018. The soldiers died due to freezing conditions in the eastern province of Tunceli (Dersim), a situation that occurred outside of wartime and sparked extensive debate and media coverage within Turkish politics. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of main opposition Republican People Party (CHP), demanded the responsibility of ruling party officials and bureaucrats for this failure, prompting criminal complaints alleging negligence against top government figures including President Erdogan and other key ministers (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018).

In response, Erdogan employed the presentational strategy to deflect accountability for the government’s shortcomings in safeguarding these soldiers’ lives. He sought to normalize the soldiers’ deaths caused by hypothermia by equating it with the risks faced in martyrdom, remarking that “in martyrdom, there are bullets to be taken, as well as freezing” (Erdogan, 2018). To justify this narrative, Erdogan referenced his grandfather’s freezing to death during World War I, attempting to craft a narrative that would diminish the significance of soldiers succumbing to freezing temperatures (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018). These comments demonstrate a discursive effort to reshape the narrative about these tragic deaths. They dilute the government’s accountability by placing the deaths within the context of martyrdom and divert attention from any potential governmental oversights or failures in safeguarding soldiers’ safety. 

Erdogan also invoked the concept of martyrdom to undermine the credibility of the main opposition leader, Kilicdaroglu, and to discredit his criticism. Erdogan accused Kilicdaroglu of not believing in martyrdom and publicly chastised him, stating, “You have no right to devalue this nation and this country. You already lack any belief in martyrdom. But the families [of the fallen soldiers] believed in martyrdom. You, however, have no such sense” (BBC, 2018).

The case of the captured, tortured, and then murdered soldiers by ISIS terrorists in 2016 provides another example of how the AKP’s blame avoidance strategy. In this case, instead of taking any responsibility for its failure to save the two soldiers or providing details of any efforts to save them, the AKP manipulated (‘spun’) how the event was communicated to the public on social media and conventional media, which is under its control. After ISIS streamed the video of killing the soldiers, the AKP immediately restricted access to social media and related news. After, the AKP proclaimed that the footage was fabricated (Sputnik, 2016; Hurtas, 2017). An AKP lawmaker, Samil Tayyar, also declared that the murdered soldiers were members of ISIS, and they had voluntarily joined the group (Sputnik, 2016). Almost a year later, the AKP informed the murdered soldiers’ fathers they would be rewarded with martyrdom privileges and their murdered sons would be bestowed with official martyrdom status.

As part of its presentational strategy, the AKP government promptly enforces media bans and restricts news that could potentially incite dissent, opposition, or mass protests. In the incidents described above, journalistic reporting was prohibited with the government reasoning that coverage might incite disruptive acts and protests, posing threats to the peace, safety, and public order throughout the country (BBC Turkce, 2016).

The restriction of opposing voices was highlighted again following the tragic deaths of high-ranking Turkish Air Force (TAF) officers, including two intelligence officers, in Libya. Traditionally, in situations where blame is attributed to groups like the PKK, the AKP government orchestrates official funeral ceremonies. These ceremonies often draw the upper echelons of military and political power, who strategically deliver speeches that transform the funeral into a moment of national credit and sympathy, and then broadcast live on television for public viewing. However, in this instance, the bodies of the officers were clandestinely interred without any public funeral rites.

Adding to the clandestine nature of this burial, journalists who reported on this event faced immediate repercussions. They were swiftly arrested the day after the incident, and their homes were raided in early morning police operations, severely restricting the ability to disseminate news regarding the incident (BBC Turkce, 2020). Media outlets critical of the government were branded disloyal and treasonous by pro-AKP media (Sabah, 2020). When details of the deaths eventually surfaced in the media, widespread complaints and criticisms targeting the AKP government ensued. The public discourse questioned the fundamental reason for Turkish soldiers’ involvement in Libya, labelling it ‘unnecessary’ and ‘adventurous’ (Euronews, 2020).

In response to the mounting criticisms, President Erdogan again instrumentalized martyrdom, acknowledging the fatalities by stating, “We have a few martyrs [in Libya]” (Euronews, 2020). He also attempted to normalize the deaths in his comment, “My brothers and sisters, we should never forget that the martyrs’ hill (cemetery) will not be empty” (Euronews, 2020). Contextualizing the fatalities through the language of martyrdom represents an attempt to shift public perception away from scrutiny and critique of the government’s decisions and actions by elevating the status of the deaths and assigning them with religious significance. 

The night of July 15, 2016, marked a pivotal political moment as the AKP was targeted during the attempted coup, ostensibly becoming its victim. However, opposition parties raised pertinent questions about the neglectful stance and actions of the AKP government both preceding and following the event. The suspicion surrounding the coup led the leader of the main opposition to characterize it as a ‘controlled coup,’ insinuating that Erdogan and a select few, including the Head of National Intelligence Service (MIT) and the Chief of General Staff, were aware of the attempt and instead of thwarting it, orchestrated it in a manner to derive maximum advantage. The AKP hindered a comprehensive investigation into the coup attempt, barring the Head of MIT and the Chief of General Staff from testifying before the parliamentary committee, and withheld the committee’s report from publication, despite AKP lawmakers forming the majority and chairing the committee. The opposition contends that Erdogan and his close circle knowingly permitted the coup attempt, resulting in civilian casualties that night (Tas, 2018).

Moreover, rather than engaging with critical inquiries or allowing an open, thorough investigation, the AKP consistently employs these narratives to steer attention away from potential negligence or failures. This tactic serves to not only evade responsibility but also to maintain a strong grip on the public discourse, framing the narrative in a manner that aligns with the party’s interests and political survival.

In the subsequent section, we will examine how religious narratives and strategic blame avoidance are leveraged not only to deflect blame but also to transform it into a form of political credit. Building on Weaver’s and Hood’s theories, we will explore how these strategies are integrated into the broader context of necropolitics and martyrdom. This analysis will reveal how the AKP employs religious and political narratives to shift public perception, turning criticisms into affirmations of political legitimacy. Additionally, we will delve into how these narratives are coupled with mechanisms of bargaining and rewards, further extending traditional theories of blame avoidance. This exploration will provide insight into the complex interplay between religious symbolism and political strategy in the AKP’s approach to maintaining power amidst crises.

Category Two: Religious Narratives and Strategic Blame Avoidance—Transforming Blame into Credit and Bargaining via Rewards

Turkish soldiers on patrol during winter on January 3, 2017. Photo credit: Shutterstock.

The second category of strategies explored in this article delves into how the AKP transforms blame into credit and leverages bargaining rewards through religious narratives. A key tactic involves the use of martyrdom to reshape public perceptions of fatal incidents for which the government is solely responsible. By elevating certain deaths to the status of martyrdom—a revered religious honor—the AKP reframes these tragedies as symbols of triumph and honor, effectively turning blame into a form of credit.  

This approach not only alters the narrative surrounding the victims but also influences how society and the victims’ families perceive these events. The popularization and necropolitical use of martyrdom make the results of these incidents more palatable to the public, allowing them to digest and accept the government’s role in these events. Instead of addressing criticisms or facilitating impartial investigations, the AKP employs a strategic discourse to deflect blame, suppress opposition, and galvanize support. By embedding martyrdom narratives into the political and social fabric, the AKP consolidates its legitimacy and mitigates dissent.

The transformation of blame into credit was evident in the case of the death of Eren Bulbul. In August 2017, the local 15-year-old boy lost his life at the hands of the outlawed PKK while in the presence of Turkish military officers, who had reportedly employed him as an informant. The boy’s grieving mother publicly declared the responsibility to belong to the government, prime minister, ministers, and other authorities for the tragic loss of life (Gazete Duvar, 2017). In response to the outcry, President Erdogan publicly praised Bulbul’s mother during a mass gathering and praised her for mothering thirteen children: “You have fulfilled the order of Allah and His messenger [by giving birth to many Muslims]. What a beautiful mother you are!” (Beyazgazete, 2017). This praise, steeped in religious and moral overtones, demonstrated a clear attempt to pacify the mother and to create a public perception of unity between the leader and the grieving mother. 

Erdogan also drew on martyrdom, communicating to Bulbul’s mother that she possessed greatness due to her son’s status as a ‘martyr’: “Thanks to the ‘martyr’ Eren, you are guaranteed to enter Heaven together with your thirteen children”(Beyazgazete, 2017). This rhetoric served to divert attention from the failure to protect the boy, reframing the tragedy as a sacrifice for a higher cause and transforming the mourning mother into a figure of honor within a religious context.

In another instance, Erdogan conveyed to the mother of a soldier, captured and killed during a rescue operation, that she had attained an exceptional honor: “Not every mother can have such an honor, but you have this honor now as a neighbor of the Prophet and the martyrs in the hereafter” (Sozcu, 2021). This religious rhetoric attempts to transform the loss into a revered status, offering solace through the lens of martyrdom.

The AKP’s prolonged dissemination of martyr stories serves as a deliberate effort to embed a specific narrative within the public consciousness. This has allowed the party to solidify its political stance while strategically mitigating any potential scrutiny or dissenting views. It also serves to leverage emotional connections to nationalistic sentiments and a reverence for sacrifice.

By emphasizing the martyrs’ sacrifices and portraying their deaths in a manner that exalts their devotion to the nation, the AKP manipulates the collective memory and perception of these events. This deliberate and ongoing narrative construction aims to create a shield against any potential scrutiny or doubts about the party’s actions or policies.

Co-optation and Cooperation in Blame Avoidance: Bargaining via Rewards

In this segment, we delve into the AKP’s necropolitical strategy of deflecting blame through a technique we term “bargaining via rewards,” an extension of Weaver’s “throw good money after a bad situation” approach. This strategy involves the strategic use of various incentives—referred to as carrots—to co-opt the families of victims and bolster the party’s narrative. The AKP strategically employs these incentives, which include financial aid, assurances, privileges, and promises of elevated social standing, to align with its broader necropolitical agenda. 

A notable element of this strategy is the official designation of martyrdom. This status is often conferred upon civilians whose deaths occur in incidents where the government is implicated in preventing such tragedies. By granting martyrdom status, the AKP not only elevates the victims’ families with unique material rewards but also integrates these incidents into a revered national narrative. This designation serves to mollify and placate the affected families, while simultaneously deflecting criticism and managing public perception, thereby reinforcing the government’s position and mitigating the fallout from its actions.

In the Turkish legal framework, the designation of ‘martyrdom’ (şehitlik) lacks an explicit definition or criteria for who qualifies as a ‘martyr’ (şehit). The Turkish Anti-Terror Law No. 3713 outlines specific guidelines that primarily pertain to support for the families of individuals (both military and civilian servants) who have been wounded or lost their lives due to terrorist acts. The authority to declare someone officially a martyr typically resides with the Turkish Armed Forces or the Turkish Judiciary (Yilmaz & Erturk, 2023).

During the AKP’s tenure, this authority appears to have been utilized more liberally. Notably, in 2012, the AKP government revised the regulations related to martyrdom, allowing civilians who lost their lives due to terrorist attacks to be classified as martyrs. This definition was subsequently expanded by the AKP to encompass victims of natural disasters, large-scale incidents resulting in fatalities, and the COVID-19 pandemic (Yilmaz & Erturk, 2023).

An illustrative instance was observed following the Soma mining accident, where an immediate announcement declared the deceased as ‘civil martyrs’ or ‘martyrs of the mine.’ Their direct relatives were then granted the benefits outlined in Terror Law No. 3713, entailing financial support, employment opportunities, and educational scholarships. In another instance, President Erdogan announced that the annual proceeds from the newly inaugurated Eurasia Tunnel would be directed to the families of the martyrs, exemplifying the government’s priority towards supplying financial benefits to these families.

It is crucial to recognize the selective application of this law in the Turkish context. Law 3713 was not invoked uniformly for families of mining incident victims. Instead, the AKP selectively used the legal framework in those incidents which garnered widespread public attention. This emphasizes the AKP’s propensity to utilize the notion of martyrdom for specific populist purposes, rather than as a consistent response to the death of Turkish employees.

The mechanisms overseeing financial aid, and its allocation predominantly fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services. Under the AKP’s tenure, there has been a noticeable elevation in the stature of the Presidency of Relatives of Martyrs and Veterans, which was upgraded to the status of a General Directorate. Minister Zehra Zumrut Selcuk highlighted a significant surge in employment, revealing that as of December 2020, the ministry had provided jobs for 44,781relatives in the civil service, a substantial increase from the 6,315 recorded before the AKP assumed office in 2002 (Aile ve Sosyal Hizmetler Bakanligi, 2020). 

In addition to the customary rewards associated with legal martyrdom, policymakers have gone so far as to pledge homes to these families. Shockingly, reports emerged revealing instances where veterans and martyr families signed documents and petitions relinquishing the pursuit of compensation cases against the government in exchange for these promised residences. This unsettling revelation underscores how the assurance of housing was leveraged to dissuade families from seeking rightful recourse through legal avenues.

Bargaining via rewards thus emerges as a deliberate strategy employed by the government to publicly reward the families of ‘martyrs’. The term ‘martyrdom’ itself holds significant weight, not merely as a religious attribution but as a symbol bolstered by official and tangible assurances. Without material guarantees, martyrdom alone may not suffice for these families. Therefore, policymakers reinforce the revered status of martyrdom with a rewarding strategy, offering substantial monetary or material resources. This serves multiple aims including appeasing the affected families, fostering or solidifying their allegiance to the ruling authority, and pre-empting any potential dissent they may express online, via the media, or by aligning with oppositional political parties. 

These endeavors underscore how necropolitical blame avoidance is reinforced by financial provisions, rewards, and the bestowment of privileged status, effectively elevating the status of victims’ families within societal ranks. This strategic utilization of martyrdom and its accompanying rewards serves as a mechanism through which families absorb blame in a way that diminishes blame toward the government. This bargaining process is often conducted in a public setting, frequently covered by the media, and broadcast on television. By presenting these ‘bargaining’ exchanges as transparent, equitable, and mutually agreed upon between the government and the affected families, it is possible for public blame to be neutralized, and criticism deflected. 

Combined, the strategy of turning blame into credit and bargaining via rewards sees the AKP not only absolving itself of direct responsibility but also maneuvering the narrative by portraying these losses as emblematic of sacrifice for the nation’s greater good. By offering these rewards and privileges, particularly the esteemed status of martyrdom, the government aims to forge an emotional connection with the affected families while simultaneously solidifying its narrative in the eyes of the public. This strategy effectively co-opts the victims’ families, aligning their sentiments with the AKP’s narrative, thereby furthering the party’s blame avoidance tactics.

Conclusion

This study explores the underexamined dynamics of blame avoidance in political contexts marked by fatal incidents, using the Turkish incumbent government as a case study. It addresses the gap in scholarly attention regarding governmental responses to deaths, focusing on how the ruling competitive authoritarian party employs strategic blame avoidance tactics within an authoritarian setting.

Our findings reveal that in a Muslim-majority country, a populist electoral authoritarian Islamist party can effectively use religious elements—such as martyrdom, belief in the hereafter, and the devaluation of worldly life—to craft compelling narratives that bolster its blame avoidance strategies. The Turkish ruling party strategically combines these religious concepts with Weaver’s and Hood’s presentational strategies, including redefinition, reshaping, spinning, manipulation, and rewarding victims’ families. By bestowing martyrdom status and offering material rewards such as financial aid, social privileges, and promises of elevated standing, the AKP transforms blame into credit, deflecting responsibility for fatal incidents.

This approach not only mitigates the emotional and political implications of blame but also strengthens the party’s political legitimacy amidst crises. The AKP’s tactic of “bargaining via rewards” aligns with necropolitical principles, offering incentives to victims’ families to suppress dissent and deflect calls for accountability. This strategic use of religious and material rewards serves to shift public perception, making government-induced fatalities more palatable to the public.

This research bridges existing literature by applying blame avoidance theories to authoritarian regimes and integrating them with necropolitical and martyrdom discourses. It uncovers deliberate strategies employed by the Turkish ruling party to evade accountability for deaths caused by government negligence, highlighting how authoritarian and populist strategies can exploit religious elements and rewards to maintain power and legitimacy in the face of fatal crises.


 

(*) Omer Erturk is working as an Independent Researcher in Berlin, Germany with interests in Turkish politics, Islamist movements in Turkey, relations between politics and religion, radicalism, and autocracy.


 

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Hayrettin Karaman, a prominent Islamic law professor and columnist for the pro-Erdogan daily Yeni Safak, has become one of the most influential figures in supporting Erdogan’s parallel legal system. Karaman is pictured here on January 5, 2012. Photo: Shutterstock.

Fatwas as Tools of Religious Populism: The Case of Turkish Islamist Scholar Hayrettin Karaman

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Kenes, Bulent & Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2024). “Fatwas as Tools of Religious Populism: The Case of Turkish Islamist Scholar Hayrettin Karaman.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 1, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0037     

 

Abstract

This paper investigates the entanglement of religious authority, religious populism, political narratives, and societal transformation within the complex terrain of Turkish politics, through the influential role of Hayrettin Karaman, an Islamist scholar closely aligned with the AKP government under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Karaman’s fatwas and writings, disseminated through various media channels, have significantly impacted AKP supporters, fostering a radicalization that manifests in hate speech, intimidation, and reported acts of aggression toward political dissenters. The fusion of religious interpretations with political discourse has been crucial in legitimizing controversial governmental actions and policies, extending beyond domestic issues to global dynamics and defense strategies, including Karaman’s advocacy for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

Keywords: religious populism, radicalism, Islamism, fatwas, unofficial law, Turkey, Erdogan, AKP, Hayrettin Karaman

 

By Bulent Kenes & Ihsan Yilmaz

Introduction: AKP’s Religious Populism and Radicalization 

Recent scholarly works have explored the convergence of authoritarianism, democracy, and Islamic movements across diverse regions. These studies delve into religious and pro-violence populism and assess the societal impacts of various far-right Islamist movements. Additionally, there’s a significant emphasis on the collaboration between Islamist populist parties and secularist far-right parties, examining how these partnerships influence and shape political landscapes. Further academic investigations have probed the relationship between populism, violence, and the stability of authoritarian regimes, including consideration of the concept of necropolitics within specific national contexts. Studies also dissect the role of religion in generating populist appeal, examining, for instance, the impact of the Friday sermons and the utilization of diverse populist narratives for political mobilization (Barton et al., 2021a; Barton et al., 2021b).

The Erdogan regime has cultivated a parallel legal system underpinned by unofficial and clandestine fatwas. To appease its religious constituents, the regime seeks validation for its actions from Islamist legal scholars. This article uses the case study of one such scholar, Hayrettin Karaman, to demonstrate how these Islamist figures can generate an ideological defense and validation for repressive Erdoganist policies, appeals and practices. 

The Legitimizing Role of Hayrettin Karaman for the AKP

Hayrettin Karaman, a prominent Islamic Law professor and columnist for the pro-Erdogan daily Yeni Safak, has become one of the most influential figures in supporting the Erdogan’s parallel legal system. Karaman serves as an Islamist authority issuing fatwas which often legitimize illicit and corrupt practices among Islamist politicians and businessmen. These fatwas are connected to a range of political and social agendas, such as obtaining interest-based credit from banks and funneling substantial donations to politicians’ charities in exchange for lucrative public tenders and contracts.

Aligned with Karaman, numerous pro-Erdogan Islamist preachers espouse the belief that Turkey exists within a dar al-harb, an un-Islamic territory where their activities are considered jihad. In light of this argument, they argue for the circumvention of Islamic rules out of necessity, and they disregard official laws, which they perceive as products of the “infidel West.” They assert that the Erdogan’s AKP is the sole political representation of Islam in Turkey, and argue it is a religious duty for Muslims to vote for the party to prevent the division (fitnah, tafriqa) of the ummah, which is seen as being a graver offence than killing a fellow Muslim. The preachers propagate the idea that winning elections is akin to winning a jihad.

Political observers recognize the significant influence of figures like Karaman and the preachers supporting him within the AKP government and Erdogan’s inner circle. His fatwas and policy recommendations are perceived as authoritative in Islamic contexts, giving his statements substantial weight and warranting serious consideration. The remainder of this article presents and analyzes various statements, fatwas, and opinions provided by Karaman, which have helped legitimize and entrench Islamist ideas in Turkish society and support the Islamist populist agenda of the ruling AKP and authoritarian Erdogan regime.

Karaman’s support for the AKP and Erdogan extends to justifying even their controversial or morally contested actions, using interpretations of Islamic principles that benefit the ruling party. An illustrative instance is the 2010 incident involving Deniz Baykal, the former leader of the main opposition party, Republican People Party (CHP), and the release of a purportedly scandalous sex video he participated in. The surfacing of this scandal provoked reactions and criticisms from both sides, but significantly from those with the view that prying into an individual’s private life contradicts Islamic values.

The AKP and Erdogan defended the video’s release and were interestingly supported by Karaman, who stepped in to provide religious legitimacy to their defense. Karaman’s argument revolved around the idea of prioritizing the state’s interests over individual rights to privacy, aligning with the AKP’s stance that the exposure of such scandalous content was warranted for the greater good. Karaman wrote in his column: 

If one committing a sin in secret is a public office holder or trying to be one, in this case, ‘the duty of protecting people from its harm’ forestalls the duty of concealing of dishonor. The related people should be informed regarding the scandal. This sin and dishonor should not be concealed. If the law, without permission, forbids the prying and recording of the private activity, this law must be respected, unless there is no state of necessity (zaruret). According to Islamic ethic, it is also forbidden to attempt for prying and disclosing the secret behaviors of the individuals. However, if the concealed sin and misconduct bear upon the public and the act of concealing harms the public, the state of necessity becomes effective. In this case, this sin or misconduct can be released and publicized within the limits of the state of necessity allows” (Karaman, 2011).

His interpretation offered religious legitimacy by emphasizing the preservation of Islamic values within the context of governance and the political landscape. 

Karaman’s Defense for the AKP During the 2013 Corruption Probe

Hundreds protest in Istanbul on December 22, 2013, against the country’s worst corruption scandal in years, which was linked to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Photo: Sadık Gulec.

During the notorious corruption probe of December 17-25, 2013 Karaman staunchly supported Erdogan and the AKP, fabricating religious fatwas in favor of the party’s politicians (Karaman, 2014a). Under this proposed system, elected Islamist officials may receive bribes, such as a 10—or 20 percent commission on billion-dollar public tenders from construction contractors, a practice Karaman likens to the share of “alms collectors” in the early days of Islamic civilization.

Karaman’s articles following the December 17-25, 2013, graft and bribery investigations take an intriguing turn, openly addressing the bribery and corruption associated with Erdogan. In an apparent effort to sway religious Erdogan supporters, Karaman endeavored to portray these actions not as personal misconduct but as contributions to the Islamic cause – a form of dawah and jihad, ostensibly carried out for the Islamist movement rather than Erdogan’s personal gain. Karaman defended the AKP’s actions in his minimizing statement that “corruption is not theft” (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018).

Karaman’s Framing of the 2017 Referendum as a Religious Obligation

Intensifying his explicit support for the AKP and Erdogan, Karaman was also notably involved in discriminating against voters based on their political choices before the April 2017 referendum on Turkey’s Constitution, which facilitated the shift to an executive presidential system. His statements aligned voters’ preferences with fatwas, adding a religious connotation to the political decision. Karaman disseminated the view that casting a “yes vote” was not just a political act but also an Islamic obligation, intertwining religious obligation with the referendum. In another article, he openly states that Naysayers are those who are standing against the Islam (Karaman, 2017f). 

This stance concurred with that of Erdogan and his affiliated media outlets, who emphatically emphasized that a devout Muslim should support the “Yes” vote, and that “No voters will go to hell.” The entanglement of religious authority and political discourse was crucial to the public debate, with religious rhetoric explicitly influencing the referendum’s outcome (Yayla, 2017). According to Karaman, since Erdogan’s actions are aimed at fulfilling a religious obligation (to form an Islamic state), “every action that brings us closer to this goal is a religious obligation (fardh), including a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum.”

Karaman as a Key Agitator Against the West

Karaman has been outspoken in his disdain and distrust towards the West. Karaman utilizes his platform to critique the behavior of Western countries, particularly regarding their interactions with Turkey under Erdogan regime, and has become an important figure in broader discussions on international relations and perceptions of Turkey within global contexts (O’Brien, 2017).

In a statement attributed to the scholar, Karaman blames the US for employing strategies that contradict conscience, religious values, and legal principles (Karaman, 2017b). He reflects on the perceived intentions and actions of the US in the Middle East and globally, suggesting that the US sought dominance over the Middle East and the entire world, driven by insatiable interests. Karaman implies that any entity attempting to challenge or impede US interests faced coercion, manipulation, and subjugation through various, potentially unethical means (Karaman, 2017b). He accuses the US of using alliances and collaborations within different countries to incite unrest, create chaos, provoke conflicts, propagate terrorism, and manipulate perceptions to serve its agenda (Karaman, 2017b).

Karaman is also a vocal critic of Western countries, particularly in Europe, for their negative attitudes towards Turkey and Islam. In an online post for instance, Karaman addressed Christian countries in the West, accusing them of egotism and racism and claiming their negative sentiments towards Turkey have been rapidly escalating (O’Brien, 2017). In another statement, Karaman (2017a) shares his perspective on Europe’s attitude toward religion, particularly Islam, and the economic aspects associated with it. He portrays Europe as a continent disconnected from a fulfilling religion that guides human life in both this world and the afterlife. He criticizes Europe for rejecting its original religion, conforming religious beliefs to fit personal desires, and even embracing atheism when conformity fails.

Karaman also alleges that Europe does not welcome Islam as a potential replacement for this void in religious guidance. He draws parallels between historical exploitation, mentioning the use of workers from Muslim countries for labor-intensive jobs, and a contemporary narrative where Europe, facing economic decline, turns its attention to the assets of Muslims residing in the continent (Karaman, 2017a). 

Pushing an Islamist Agenda for Turkey, the Muslim World and the Ummah

Karaman has also disseminated a range of Islamist ideas that often align with or presumably generate interest in Erdoganist Islamist populism. He portrays Turkey under Erdogan rule as representing an Islamic movement that can liberate the Ummah from various forms of perceived oppression and take a stance against exploitation and subjugation (Karaman, 2017b). Karaman has also made statements that deepen religio-political tensions in society, such as in his writing about the Gulen movement, when he insinuated that the movement acts against the state’s interests, fostering division (fitnah), thus legitimizing state intervention to counter it (Yilmaz, 2015b).

Moreover, a sense of Islamist victimhood is identifiable in the scholar’s statements. His statements evoke a sense of crisis, which helps justify the Islamist agenda in Turkish politics and beyond. In one statement, for example, he claims, “the opposition and enmity that began when our prophet openly started to invite people to Islam in Mecca, has, to date, found members from almost all corners of the world, and their destructive activities are ongoing. They have tried everything to destroy Islam and Muslims or to deviate the religion from its original form to achieve their aims. One of their methods was to divide Muslims and ensure that the divided parts consume each other” (Karaman, 2017d). 

Promoting the View that Turkey Should Strengthen Its Military and Acquire WMDs

The Turkish Army and Free Syrian Army operated in Afrin, Syria, on February 23, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

 

Karaman’s discourse reflects a strong belief in the need for Turkey to strengthen its military capabilities. He underscores the necessity for Turkey to maintain comprehensive power, including a robust military, to safeguard its interests. Karaman expresses hope that Turkey will become powerful across various domains, emphasizing the importance of strength in addressing geopolitical challenges (Karaman, 2017c).

Karaman pushes his view that Turkey needs to achieve a balance with the Western and non-Muslim world, and this will be achieved in part by matching or attaining comparable weaponry to counter potential adversaries (Karaman, 2017c). He envisions the unification of all Muslims, the ‘ummah,’ as a force to deter external threats, particularly those stemming from the West (Karaman, 2017c). 

Concerningly, the Islamist scholar has expressed a deep interest in Turkey acquiring nuclear capabilities, which he positions a a means of establishing a balance of power against imperialist forces and as a deterrent against oppression (Karaman, 2017c). Karaman’s stance, as articulated in the Yeni Safak daily, strongly advocates for Turkey’s acquisition and production of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), including nuclear arms, to counter the perceived dominance of Western powers (Karaman, 2017c). He emphasizes the need for Turkey to consider creating these weapons autonomously, disregarding any opposition or constraints from Western entities (Karaman, 2017c).

In a notable example, Karaman not only sanctioned the government’s acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) but also urged Turkish leadership to pursue this path. The gravity of his statements shouldn’t be underestimated, considering their potential impact on policy directions, especially concerning the alarming proposal for WMDs (Bozkurt, 2017).

Karaman justifies this perspective by advocating for a realist approach in world politics, suggesting that smaller states with nuclear arsenals can exert considerable influence over larger populations (Karaman, 2017c). Karaman claims that the US and the West have attempted to control or restrict Muslim nations like Pakistan (possessing nuclear weapons) and have concerns about Iran acquiring similar capabilities. However, Karaman highlights a perceived shift in Turkey’s approach under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He presents Erdogan as a determined leader who seeks to resist oppression and support the oppressed. Indeed, in 2018 President Erdogan expressed Turkey’s initiative in producing similar military capabilities as Western nations (El, 2018). 

Conclusion

The context of Turkey’s political landscape involves a multifaceted interplay between religious authority, political narratives, and societal dynamics. Hayrettin Karaman’s influential role as an Islamist scholar and his ideological alignment with the AKP government under Islamist authoritarian populist Erdogan underscore a significant fusion of religious interpretation and political discourse. Karaman’s fatwas and writings, disseminated through media channels, have wielded substantial influence, particularly among the supporters of the Erdogan regime.

The influence of excommunicative fatwas and the narratives propagated by Islamist figures like Karaman within the media have had a notable impact on AKP/Erdogan followers. Karaman’s interpretations have bolstered the Erdogan regime’s stance on contentious issues and contributed to a radicalization of AKP/Erdogan followers. This radicalization is evident in the propagation of hate speech, intimidation tactics, and reported instances of physical aggression toward those holding opposing political affiliations. 

Furthermore, Karaman’s narratives have extended beyond domestic matters, delving into geopolitical dynamics, defense strategies, and international relations. His assertions advocating the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and narratives concerning global powers highlight a vision of Turkey reliant on a robust stance against perceived adversaries.

The significance and widespread impact of Karaman’s controversial religious fatwas and recommendations within Islamist circles in Turkey and among Muslims should not be underestimated. They also have the potential to influence Turkey’s foreign policy and its relationships with other nations, particularly in defense and regional dynamics.


 

References

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People wait in a long line to receive food donations for lunch on a downtown street in São Paulo, Brazil, during a severe economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic on June 2, 2020. Photo: Nelson Antoine.

Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism: Lessons from Brazil

Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism: Lessons from Brazil.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. August 26, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0017


The book, edited by Professor Natália Sátyro, provides a comprehensive examination of how neoliberal and populist radical right ideologies and politicians have reshaped Brazil’s social policy landscape. Through a detailed analysis of various policy areas, the contributing authors reveal the destructive impact of these ideologies on social protections and democratic institutions. For scholars and policymakers, this book is an essential resource for understanding the interplay between austerity, populism, and social policy in Brazil, as well as its broader implications for the global rise of the populist radical right. While the book is dense with figures, statistics, and technical financial and economic data, it remains essential reading for anyone interested in these critical issues. Sátyro and her Brazilian colleagues offer valuable insights that are well worth attention.

Reviewed by Bulent Kenes

Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism: Lessons from Brazil,” edited by Natália Sátyro, provides a comprehensive analysis of the significant shifts in Brazil’s social policies during the turbulent period spanning Michel Temer’s and Jair Bolsonaro’s presidencies. Beginning with Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016 and concluding with Bolsonaro’s departure in 2022, this era was marked by profound changes driven by neoliberal economic policies and the rise of populist radical right ideologies. As the title suggests, the book explores the intersection of radical right populism and austerity measures in Brazil, particularly under Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency. Featuring cutting-edge research by Brazilian scholars, previously inaccessible to English-speaking audiences, the book offers a timely and authoritative multidisciplinary examination of social policies during Temer’s austerity measures and Bolsonaro’s populist rule. 

The diverse range of policies analyzed in the book provides critical insights into the political agenda, preferences, and strategies that shaped this tumultuous chapter in Brazil’s history. Therefore, readers encounter concepts from various disciplines throughout the book such as ‘distributive deservingness,’ ‘disinformation order,’ ‘disinformation,’ ‘misinformation,’ ‘malinformation,’ ‘infodemic,’ ‘social inclusion,’ ‘retrenchment populism,’ and ‘bancarization,’ among many others, reflecting the complexity and breadth of the topics addressed. However, this review focuses solely on the perspectives of neoliberalism and populist radical right approaches, highlighting how these ideologies have influenced the dismantling and reconfiguration of social policies in Brazil. Specifically, it examines how Bolsonaro’s populist radical right policies contributed to the erosion of social protections, mirroring trends seen among right-wing populist leaders globally. The review deliberately omits technical discussions on economic, financial, and social policies not directly related to the core theme of populism.

The book tackles several critical questions within the Brazilian context, such as whether there has been a deliberate effort to dismantle or reshape social policies. It explores whether populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in Brazil are genuinely distinct from the mainstream right, particularly in their stance on the welfare state, and if so, how they differ. The book also delves into how political parties’ positions on state intervention, redistribution, and social policymaking differentiate the left from the right in Brazil. Furthermore, it examines the ways in which the populist radical right diverges from the traditional right on economic, cultural, and social issues.

Given the success of the leftist Workers’ Party (PT) governments in politicizing inequality, the book investigates how right-wing actors have responded, particularly in terms of expanding or reducing the welfare state. It also considers how emerging anti-system, radical right forces have distinguished themselves from the traditional right in their approaches to redistribution, social policies, and increasingly significant cultural issues. Additionally, the book explores the impact of populist radical right parties on family policies, among other related topics. Overall, the book addresses a wide range of social policies, including social security, healthcare, education, environmental protection, indigenous rights, and gun control. Each chapter is grounded in empirical research, providing in-depth analysis of the effects of Bolsonaro’s policies.

Sátyro’s work is divided into four parts, focusing on social policy changes in Brazil, particularly from 2015 to 2022. The first section, “Contextualization,” offers an overview of Brazil’s political and economic conditions leading up to Bolsonaro’s presidency. It highlights the influence of the neoliberal agenda—marked by fiscal austerity, deregulation, and market-driven policies—on the transformation of social policies. The analysis begins with austerity measures under Temer, setting the stage for further cutbacks under Bolsonaro. The introduction discusses the political shift from the PT to Temer’s right-wing coalition after Rousseff’s impeachment, initiating significant reductions in social welfare. It also covers Bolsonaro’s rise in 2018, driven by populist rhetoric, anti-corruption campaigns, and support from neo-Pentecostal groups. His government further dismantled social policies, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, exacerbating the crisis through denialism and poor coordination. Sátyro frames the erosion of Brazil’s social protection system within neoliberal and authoritarian values under both Temer and Bolsonaro, raising questions about the dismantling of the welfare state and the role of right-wing populism in these processes. The introduction chapter sets the stage for the book’s exploration of how right-wing governments have reshaped social protection in Brazil.

In Chapter 2, “Social Policies in Brazil: An Introduction,” Natália Sátyro discusses the foundations of social protection in Brazil since the 1988 Federal Constitution (CF88), which followed the return to democracy in 1985. She places Bolsonaro’s actions within the broader context of global right-wing populism and highlights the ongoing exclusion of informal workers, particularly descendants of enslaved Africans, from social and political rights—a legacy of Brazil’s history as the last country in the Americas to abolish slavery. Sátyro also examines the complexities of Brazil’s federal system, where smaller states have disproportionate influence, complicating national policymaking and limiting presidential power. She critiques the fragmented implementation of policies across Brazil’s 26 states, particularly in education, due to the lack of a unified system. The chapter also addresses the Bolsonaro administration’s inconsistent approach to social policies during the COVID-19 pandemic, which worsened the crisis due to a lack of national coordination. It concludes by outlining the central themes of Bolsonaro’s government plan, including his use of religion and patriotism to appeal to conservative voters, supported by neo-Pentecostal leaders. This sets the stage for the book’s detailed exploration of specific policy areas impacted by these political shifts.

Chapter 3, “Political Parties, Ideological Preferences and Social Policy: Accounting for Right-Wing Strategies in Brazil after the Left Turn,” by André Borges, maps the political landscape, focusing on the interactions between the Executive and Legislative branches and the rise of right-wing influence. Borges draws parallels between Bolsonaro and populist leaders like Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán, highlighting their use of populist rhetoric to dismantle social protections and undermine democratic institutions. The chapter explains how the populist radical right’s emphasis on cultural issues allows them to avoid direct conflict with neoliberal policies, which might alienate their base. Traditionally, Latin American politics has focused more on economic issues due to high inequality, but recent years have seen a shift toward cultural issues, driven in part by the growing influence of evangelical churches in electoral politics. This shift facilitated the rise of far-right populist leaders, including Bolsonaro in 2018.

Borges divides Brazil’s right-wing into two groups: the mainstream right and the populist radical right (PRR). Through statistical analysis, he shows that while both groups align on economic issues, they differ sharply on cultural matters, with the PRR adopting more extreme conservative positions. The chapter illustrates how the Brazilian right has reorganized around religious and anti-political movements, leading to the successful mobilization of diverse electoral coalitions. Bolsonaro’s rise is linked to this realignment, with his campaign centered on cultural conservatism and anti-establishment rhetoric, mirroring broader trends in Latin America.

Chapter 4, “The Political Economy of the Brazilian Economic Crisis (2014–2022): Economic Policy, Ideas, and the Limits of Neoliberal Austerity Measures,” by Alexandre Queiroz Guimarães and Marco Flávio da Cunha Resende, explores the limitations of neoliberal austerity measures in Brazil. Although these policies reduced public spending, they failed to achieve sustainable economic growth, resulting in increased inequality and social unrest. This discontent set the stage for Bolsonaro’s rise, as his populist rhetoric appealed to a population weary of economic hardship. The chapter traces the backlash against neoliberal reforms, which initially led to the rise of center-left governments in Latin America, including Brazil’s PT. Despite initial successes under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil struggled with high interest rates and domestic debt. Bolsonaro’s 2018 election brought a radical liberal agenda of privatization and austerity, but the COVID-19 pandemic forced a policy shift toward increased public spending to bolster his reelection chances. His administration’s poor governance, especially in social and environmental areas, contributed to his defeat in 2022. The chapter concludes with Lula’s return to power in 2023, highlighting his focus on social spending, environmental reforms, and economic recovery.

Chapter 5, “Disinformation and Democracy,” authored by Eliara Santana and Isabele Mitozo, examines the use of disinformation as a political strategy of obfuscation, highlighting the significant threat it poses to democracy and, specifically, to social policies. They delve into how disinformation was institutionalized in Brazil during Bolsonaro’s presidency (2018–2022) and used as a strategy to dismantle democratic institutions. The chapter highlights the establishment of a coordinated disinformation ecosystem, which became particularly evident during the 2018 election and the COVID-19 pandemic. This ecosystem was aligned with the federal government and fueled distrust in traditional media, while promoting misinformation, especially regarding public health measures. Bolsonaro’s administration actively undermined democratic institutions by leveraging disinformation, notably through social media platforms like WhatsApp and Telegram. The chapter also discusses the role of Bolsonaro’s “Hate Cabinet,” a group that spread misinformation to attack critics and destabilize democratic processes. This systemic disinformation campaign helped consolidate Bolsonaro’s power and left a lasting impact on Brazilian democracy. Even after Bolsonaro’s 2022 electoral defeat, the disinformation network remains a significant challenge, requiring a concerted effort to restore credibility to institutions and reliable information sources. The authors underscore that any current analysis of PRRPs must consider fake news as a deliberate tool with specific political objectives. 

Chapter 6, authored by Pedro H. G. Ferreira de Souza, examines income inequality and poverty in Brazil since its re-democratization in the 1980s. The 1988 Federal Constitution marked a significant shift in Brazil’s political landscape, emphasizing poverty eradication and inequality reduction as core goals. Despite these ambitions, progress has been uneven. While Brazil has made notable strides in reducing poverty, addressing income inequality has proven more challenging. The country experienced significant poverty reduction and narrowing inequality from the early 2000s until the mid-2010s, but these gains were undermined by the 2014–2016 recession and the COVID-19 pandemic. Under the rule of Bolsonaro, welfare spending reached unprecedented levels, particularly through the expansion of the Auxílio Brasil program in 2022. Despite Bolsonaro’s conservative stance, electoral incentives drove this welfare expansion. The Lula administration, taking office in 2023, continued this trajectory by rebranding the program as Bolsa Família and introducing new benefits. Sustaining these improvements may be difficult without further budget expansions.

The second part of the book, focusing on Compensatory Policies, examines the impact of key events like the 2014–2015 economic crisis, the Temer administration’s New Fiscal Regime, Bolsonaro’s rise, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Chapter 7, by Arnaldo Provasi Lanzara and Fernanda Pernasetti, explores the dismantling of Brazil’s social security system under Bolsonaro within the context of authoritarian populism and fiscal austerity. Despite facing congressional opposition, Bolsonaro implemented significant reforms that mirrored and expanded upon Temer’s unapproved proposals, particularly targeting pension systems. The chapter employs Nadia Urbinati’s concept of “authoritarian populism” to describe Bolsonaro’s approach, which combined populist rhetoric with strict fiscal discipline to gain market confidence while undermining social security. According to the authors, Bolsonaro’s strategy involved exploiting divisions within society, using austerity as a justification to reduce labor and social security benefits, and promoting privatization. The authors argue that, although the reform did not achieve its intended financial savings, it prompted a shift toward private pension plans. This reform, rooted in fiscal austerity, disproportionately impacted low-income workers and the elderly, reflecting a broader trend where economic efficiency was prioritized over social justice. This “expansionist dismantling” weakened essential income supports for poor wage-earner families. The long-term impact of these policies underscores the enduring threat posed by authoritarian populist regimes to social rights and democratic institutions. 

Chapter 8, authored by José Angelo Machado and Mauro Lúcio Jerônymo, discusses the significant risks posed to Brazil’s Unified Health System (SUS) during Bolsonaro’s presidency, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic response highlighted how neoliberal policies, when coupled with populist denialism, can devastate public health infrastructure, particularly for marginalized communities. Bolsonaro’s administration was marked by a blatant disregard for scientific and technical guidelines, instead promoting disinformation, ineffective treatments, and delaying vaccine acquisition. This strategy, driven by a “parallel cabinet” around Bolsonaro, undermined the cooperative federalism that had traditionally guided SUS operations. The Ministry of Health, under successive ministers, saw increased militarization, disregard for expert advice, and a breakdown in coordination with state and municipal governments. These actions led to severe institutional damage, including the erosion of public trust, loss of qualified personnel, and weakened epidemiological surveillance. According to the authors, Bolsonaro’s administration, with its focus on “deconstructing” existing systems, left a lasting negative impact on Brazil’s public health infrastructure, exacerbating the challenges faced during the pandemic and undermining the foundations of the SUS.

Chapter 9, written by Natália Sátyro, Eleonora Schettini Martins Cunha, Bruno R. Pinheiro, and Fernanda Silva, explores the detrimental effects of austerity and political changes on socio-assistance services in Brazil, particularly under far-right populist leadership. The chapter reveals how these essential services, especially for vulnerable populations, have been progressively undermined since 2014. Initially impacted by budget cuts during Rousseff’s presidency, socio-assistance services faced further challenges under Temer’s administration, which introduced a long-term spending cap that severely limited social spending. The situation deteriorated further under Bolsonaro, whose administration neglected these services and dismantled social participation mechanisms. Bolsonaro’s approach to governance involved discrediting social programs as corrupt or inefficient, using this narrative to justify deep cuts that exacerbated poverty and inequality. The chapter also identifies six distinct social welfare regimes across Brazil’s municipalities, reflecting varying levels of social protection. The COVID-19 pandemic compounded these challenges, intensifying poverty and food insecurity. Overall, the chapter highlights the vulnerability of socio-assistance services to political and economic shifts, particularly under right-wing governments.

Chapter 10, written by Joana Mostafa, analyzes the evolution of Brazil’s two main non-contributive cash transfer programs: Bolsa Família (PBF) and Continuous Benefit Programme (BPC). The chapter tracks changes from the impeachment of Rousseff in 2016 through to Lula’s narrow victory in 2022, highlighting how these programs were affected by political and economic shifts. PBF designed to alleviate poverty by supplementing household incomes, faced discrediting campaigns and reductions in coverage under Bolsonaro’s government, which sought to undermine the program’s structure. Bolsonaro’s administration introduced Auxílio Brasil, a replacement for PBF, emphasizing merit and privatization over social rights, while sidelining social assistance policies and increasing financial vulnerability for beneficiaries. The chapter underscores how Bolsonaro’s government used populist rhetoric to manipulate public perception of poverty, while altering the foundational elements of social assistance, turning the program into a vehicle for neoliberal and conservative ideologies.

The third part of the book, “Social Investment Policies,” includes Chapter 11, where Sandra Gomes and Catarina Ianni Segatto examine Bolsonaro’s symbolic strategies in education policy and how they reinforced his ideological agenda. Elected in 2018 with a far-right populist platform, Bolsonaro framed education as a cultural battleground against leftist ideologies, targeting higher education with budget cuts and promoting conservative values. Despite his rhetoric, Bolsonaro’s administration achieved limited success in enacting structural changes, as many proposals faced resistance in Congress. While minor policy changes occurred, Brazil’s educational framework, rooted in the 1988 Constitution, largely withstood his attempts at a conservative shift. The chapter concludes that Bolsonaro struggled to build a coalition capable of implementing radical education reforms.

Bolsonaro’s populist radical right ideology extended beyond economic policies to cultural and moral issues, particularly in family policies. In Chapter 12, Gabriel Penna and Natália Sátyro explore how his administration reshaped Brazilian family policies under far-right neo-conservatism. The chapter highlights Bolsonaro’s promotion of a traditionalist family structure, opposing gender equality and LGBTQ rights championed by previous governments. His approach emphasized reinforcing patriarchal norms, reducing state involvement in care services, and increasing privatization. By diminishing federal influence and shifting responsibilities to local governments, Bolsonaro’s policies weakened support for non-traditional families and expanded the privatization of childcare services. This reflects the populist radical right’s strategy of aligning social policies with an exclusionary, nationalist vision. The chapter warns that far-right ideologies may continue to obstruct policies supporting sexual and gender minorities and non-traditional families even after Bolsonaro’s presidency.

Chapter 13, by Regina Coeli Moreira Camargos and Pedro M. R. Barbosa, examines labor market policy changes in Brazil from 2015 to 2022, focusing on the erosion of labor protections. The chapter investigates whether this reflects a broader trend of welfare state retrenchment in Brazil. Following Temer’s pro-market reforms, Bolsonaro continued similar policies, especially with the 2019 Social Security reform. However, Bolsonaro prioritized budgetary control to secure legislative support rather than pursuing full austerity. The deterioration of labor conditions disproportionately impacted vulnerable groups, particularly Black women, who faced rising unemployment, poverty, and hunger. Although Bolsonaro sought to further deregulate the labor market, his administration mainly extended the policies initiated under Temer, including weakening labor protections and halting minimum wage increases. Neglect of both active and passive labor market policies deepened workforce inequalities, with the authors highlighting how these reforms reflected a strong neoliberal agenda, increasing risks for workers.

The fourth part of the book, “Policies Outside the Traditional Welfare State Scope,” includes Chapter 14 by Maria Dolores Lima da Silva and Ana Luiza Martins de Medeiros, which examines the strategic dismantling of Brazilian environmental policies under Bolsonaro, particularly targeting forests and indigenous populations. Building on actions from Rousseff and Temer’s governments, Bolsonaro aggressively weakened environmental protections and indigenous rights through financial defunding, regulatory rollbacks, and bureaucratic changes. His administration promoted deregulation, undermined institutions like FUNAI, and appointed ideological allies to key positions, further eroding protections. The use of symbolic and low-visibility strategies catered to powerful economic sectors by dismantling regulatory barriers to economic expansion. The chapter concludes that these policies have caused significant, potentially irreversible damage to Brazil’s environmental protections and indigenous territories, with long-term consequences that will be difficult and costly to address.

Chapter 15, by Ludmila Ribeiro, Valéria Oliveira, Rafael Rocha, and Alexandre Diniz, explores the deterioration of gun control policies in Brazil, particularly under Bolsonaro. Supported by the firearms industry and the “bullet caucus” in Congress, Bolsonaro significantly weakened the Disarmament Statute, leading to a surge in firearms. His administration issued decrees that relaxed restrictions, including increasing the number of firearms civilians could own and removing the need to justify purchases. These changes likely worsened violent crime, with firearms already accounting for over 70% of homicides in Brazil. In 2023, President Lula began reversing these policies, reinstating stricter gun control. However, the authors stress that addressing the weapon proliferation from Bolsonaro’s era will require more than just reverting to previous laws.

In sum, between 2015 and 2022, Brazil’s democracy faced significant challenges, especially in social policy, leading to major shifts in the welfare state. The administrations of Rousseff, Temer, and Bolsonaro each influenced the evolution of social protection differently. The book highlights a departure from the inclusive welfare state established after the 1988 Constitution, which had reduced poverty and inequality until the mid-2010s. From 2015 onward, poverty and inequality rose, particularly under Bolsonaro, who prioritized dismantling policies, reducing equality, and weakening social protections through austerity, deregulation, and erosion of key programs like pensions and healthcare. While some welfare elements, like non-contributory cash transfers, remained resilient, the overall impact was a weakened welfare system, greater inequality, and significant social costs.

In a sense, Brazil stands as a compelling case of resilience, with its institutions having endured significant challenges. Despite the current state of Brazilian democracy being far from ideal, it has withstood a violent and explicit attack. However, more time is needed to fully assess the resilience of the system as a whole and the long-term consequences of the processes analyzed in this book. The authors underscore the urgent need to defend social protections against the encroachment of authoritarian and neoliberal agendas, highlighting the dangers posed by the populist radical right to democracy and social welfare worldwide. While the book is overly dense with figures, statistics, and technical financial and economic information, it is an essential reading for anyone interested in understanding these critical issues. Natália Sátyro and her Brazilian colleagues offer valuable insights that deserve attention.


 

Natália Sátyro. (2024). Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism: Lessons from Brazil. Routledge. 412 pp.Paperback £36.99, Hardback £135.00, ISBN 9781032758374 

A sign for the Apartheid Museum stands next to the entrance. The exhibition is dedicated to the apartheid regime and the 20th-century history of South Africa. Artistic retouching was done in Johannesburg, South Africa, on March 30, 2016. Photo: Shutterstock.

Peacemaking & Peacebuilding in South Africa: The National Peace Accord, 1991-1994 

Sithole, Neo. (2024). “Peacemaking & Peacebuilding in South Africa: The National Peace Accord, 1991-1994.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. August 26, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0016

 

In her book, Reverend Dr. Liz Carmichael unpacks the events, personalities, and socio-cultural, political, and economic realities during South Africa’s peace and transition negotiations from 1990 to 1998. She details the challenges faced by the country’s early popular mass movements and provides insights into the Manichean divide between political organizations. Through a reflective lens, Carmichael addresses the often-overlooked high emotions, ethnic-based societal cleavages, and split-second decisions that characterized the politics of the time. Crucially, the work demonstrates that the discussions surrounding the National Peace Accord were vital not only for bringing a decisive end to the political violence of that period but also for other significant reasons.

Reviewed by Neo Sithole

Violence in South Africa reached a zenith in 1990,  the culmination of internal progressive active resistance carried out by civic society, workers unions, religious bodies and then-banned political organizations in the forms of mass protests, strikes, marches or sit-ins. Former President P.W. Botha’s notions of ‘total onslaught,’ that South Africa was under siege by militarized communist forces that threatened the security of Apartheid South Africa and the white political domination and privilege it upheld and its counterpart ‘total strategy,’ the required combination of reform and repression made necessary the formation of military wings ties to banned liberation movements. In a move to douse socio-political tensions, State President de Klerk decides to lift the ban on political parties and release political prisoners. Instead of introducing calm South Africa saw a shift of violence from the domain brutal Apartheid regime to adversarial political parties the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party. From massacres on trains and to wars between rival township settlements, ‘black on black’ violence was quickly spreading. Prompted by the scale and absurdity of mass violence various churches galvanized, organizing themselves to bring political parties together to engage in peace talks, a step that would see the adoption of the National Peace Accord, a linchpin document in South Africa’s relatively peaceful transition to a full democracy. 

Due to its examination of political life influenced by some of South Africa’s earliest and largest popular movements (even being viewed as populist by scholars of transitioning South Africa) Reverend Dr. Liz Carmicheal’s work subtly examines themes of direct interest to populist scholars such as the Manichean ‘good vs evil’ and an inclusionary Left battling against an exclusionary Right. Additionally, the book offers examples of ethnic divides that materialize politically often seen in populist rhetoric or strategies. 

In the introduction, author Carmichael offers the book’s aim as being “first full account of the Peace Accord” (pg.1) and how under NPA structures South Africans took part in directly birthing and developing peace and contributing to what would be seen globally as a remarkable transition from a horrific Apartheid regime to an inclusive and uplifting non-racial democracy. Upon review, this is somewhat misleading. Not because the text doesn’t fulfil this, but because when reading what is presented is an extensive detailing of the socio-political environment(s) that surrounded the accord generated continuous shifts in peace talks, the people and personalities that for better or worse had an immediate impact on the outcomes of negotiations, objectives that influenced informed decisions taken by political parties and civic/religious organizations, and the how agreed upon political configurations relied upon principles cooperation between ordinary citizens for their functionality. There exists a reflective habit to ‘telescope’ the period between the unbanning of political parties in 1990 and 1994 when the country held its first, closely watched free and fair elections which is often done by spotlighting a few key moments based on the discretion of who something the book aids in rectifying.

As the title suggests, the book’s central themes are peace-making and peacebuilding, providing what these meant and looked like in South Africa during the peak of internal conflict. A third theme not explicitly mentioned but vividly shown is ‘peace-selling,’ where we see the extent to which the state, in cooperation with business and political parties, knowing that for peace to take root the notion of peace needs to be circulated by means that would be far-reaching and see peace be synonymous with the popular culture to subvert still existing political, regional and racial tensions. Outside of these, there are additional themes that, decades after South Africa transitioned into a democracy, remain salient and prominent within the country’s political, social and economic sphere like the dire need for enduring political tolerance, the touchy relationship between the government, political organizations, and businesses, how realpolitik can supersede ideological cleavages, how political expansion often generates animosity between parties that may hold similar ideological foundations or how certain political organizations built legacies on the kind of support/opposition received from the Apartheid government. 

Carmichael informs readers about how the people at the national level responded to what was very visibly aimed to be a shift in South Africa’s political dispensation and while doing so recognizes some who may not have been immortalized by previous works as being concerned with the business of peacemaking and peacebuilding on the ground. 

The book places significant emphasis on the dynamic between the African National Congress (ANC), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the Apartheid government, primarily due to their pivotal roles in the ongoing political violence of the time. The IFP, initially a cultural organization, transformed into a quasi-political party after the ANC was banned, with the intention of continuing the ANC’s work. However, tensions arose between the IFP and the ANC over ideological differences. The main points of contention included the ANC’s shift toward violent resistance, its calls for intensified boycotts and sanctions against the South African economy (which IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi believed would harm Black South Africans the most), and its increasing alignment with communist influences, which the IFP strongly disapproved of. 

The disputes, primarily stemming from friction between the IFP leadership—centralized around Zulu Chief and party leader Buthelezi—and the ANC leadership in exile, created a complex and multifaceted tension between the two organizations. These disagreements not only served as significant obstacles to peace during the period of violence but also influenced the negotiations leading up to South Africa’s first democratic election. The book highlights key aspects of the ANC-IFP conflict, including the controversial linkages between the IFP and the apartheid regime, which led many to view Inkatha as an extension of the regime’s security apparatus and collaborators in maintaining racial segregation. Additionally, the ANC’s refusal to disband its military wing, which the IFP viewed as a private army and thus a violation of peace accords, further fueled the strain between the two parties.

International sanctions, some in place since the instalment of the National Party in 1948, boycotts had limited the reach of South Africa goods and had caved under mounting internal pressure (notably the student movements) to leave Apartheid South Africa. These mirrored the economic forces internally that demanded change, spurred on by massive losses in profits brought on by stunted productivity, a shrinking market to sell to and crippling hikes in taxes introduced by the government in attempts to boost internal revenue and stave off total economic collapse. The widespread political violence and instability across the country significantly discouraged workers from attending their shifts, as they risked being attacked by rival political factions or killed by an elusive group of unknown assailants. Later in the text, Carmichael reveals that this shadowy group, commonly referred to as the ‘Third Force,’ was a combination of rogue elements within state security, members of political parties, and former liberation militants.

The recurring display of the ANC-IFP rivalry is recounted to have played out in forms across numerous occasions, the rivalry played out reinforces the understanding that for peace to be realistically achieved both parties needed to find themselves politically satisfied with their visions of the space they held in the country’s present and its future.  

Ahistorical oversimplifications of the Left-Right divide present in South Africa at the time are also tackled by the text. The book unpacks the various political parties and organizations that fell across the Left-Right spectrum, in line with their role and relevance during that moment/event and shares their ideological underpinnings or contextualizes any conflicts between them where necessary, and it often is. 

The deep ideological divide that shaped attitudes toward the peace process is thoroughly explored in the text. Dr. Carmichael highlights a notable example during the negotiations of the Peace Accord, where extreme right-wing factions rejected the Accord, labeling it a “communist trap” and a dangerous step toward handing over power to communist forces. They argued that there could be no peace without freedom for their respective “nations” (pg. 135). This rejection was mirrored on the far left by parties such as the Pan-African Congress and the Azanian People’s Organization, along with their allied unions. Initially participating in the peace negotiations as observers, these groups later withdrew from both the peace and future constitutional negotiations, believing that engaging with those they saw as the primary perpetrators of violence against the Black majority undermined the broader struggle for freedom.

Carmichael recounts some of the significant challenges of the peace process, noting that while getting all the necessary parties into the same room was difficult, an even greater challenge was getting leaders to genuinely communicate rather than talking past each other to score political points with their constituencies. On one occasion, a member of the far-right stood up during negotiations and argued that if the talks were truly open to dialogue, they must also entertain the possibility of allowing those who wished to remain segregated to do so.

The involvement of foreign organizations, including the United Nations and the Commonwealth Organization of African Unity, was strongly opposed by the South African government, as many of these entities had, in principle, sided with the ANC, which had called for the continuation of sanctions. Another theme explored in the book is the negotiations that took place outside the official talks. Away from their constituents and the media, where official positions often hindered progress, political leaders would engage in informal discussions at family homes, churches, or even during tea breaks, allowing them to clear disputes and build relationships more freely.

The National Peace Accord (NPA) was primarily a response to the widespread political violence in South Africa, aiming to prevent further bloodshed. Carmichael effectively breaks down how the Accord, once signed, was made functional and enforced. He details the evolution of the NPA, noting that the final agreement included chapters focused on addressing the structural issues contributing to national instability. These included socio-economic development, the restructuring of security forces to better represent the forthcoming democratic South Africa, and, crucially, the establishment of a code of conduct for political parties, the government, and unions.

Carmichael notes that for parties emphasizing consultative consensus with their constituents, there was discomfort with the ‘top-down’ approach taken in the accord negotiations. However, he cites that due to the immediacy and decisiveness demanded by the situation, it was the only viable option. That said, the book highlights that the real work for the NPA and the peace process occurred at the grassroots level, particularly in regions where violence had become entrenched, such as KwaZulu-Natal. This underscores an appreciation for the acknowledgment by NPA officers (many of them volunteers) of the need for varied approaches, as success in some areas relied on personalities and relationships for the effective establishment of NPA structures.

In discussing the sporadic nature of the clashes between party members, the book reveals that much of the political violence was either denied by political leadership or was the result of communities trying to defend themselves, taking pre-emptive action, or retaliating against previous political violence. It also addresses the challenges in finding effective ways to consolidate political cohesion between parties and their leaders on the ground, noting the frequent disruptions to negotiations caused by outbreaks of violence or retaliatory actions. Along these lines, sentiments of skepticism towards the accords are highlighted. Despite the accords being welcomed, there was widespread concern, particularly at the grassroots level, about whether the agreement would be adhered to. This skepticism was fueled by instances where signatories violated the principles of earlier peace agreements, thereby undermining both their commitment to peace and the accord as a whole.

It is shown that the NPA and surrounding discussions proved vital for a reason other than bringing a decisive end to the political violence; it was the prelude to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations that painted the blueprint for what the post-Apartheid South Africa would look like. For many in attendance, the peace accord talks presented chances to vent frustrations as well a platform for political maneuvering- in both of these cases, the underlying logic was that it was becoming increasingly clear that political and economic power was rapidly restructuring and that involved parties needed to actively mark their places to avoid being left out. 

Critically, the book clarifies how churches and businesses (capital) became pillars not only of the accords themselves but also of sustaining the negotiation process as early as 1990. These two groups, either independently or jointly, were pivotal in breaking down negotiation or communication deadlocks. They served as points of contact in violence-prone areas where neutrality was essential for quelling conflicts, highlighting the significance of churches, religious organizations, and collective businesses in facilitating the entire NPA process. The book provides insight into how large business groups shouldered much of the administrative burden behind the negotiations, offering resources such as boardrooms, cars, office buildings, and private jets. Regarding religious leaders, it reveals their shrewdness and acute understanding of the relative goodwill and reduced hostility afforded to them by their positions. They leveraged this to counsel political leaders, cool heated tensions, and, in some cases, bring political leaders of different denominations together through interfaith initiatives, thus bypassing the political divisions that would typically hinder such interactions.

While South Africa’s foreign policy and international presence have become characterized by principles of peace, universal human rights, and the need for dialogue, the book provides a background on the young democracy’s history of negotiation, highlighting its role in quelling international conflicts and paving the way for sustained peace and collective development. Dr. Carmichael contributes to crafting a holistic account of earlier populist movements by examining South Africa’s Manichean divides and ethnic-turned-political societal cleavages. Through reflective and detailed accounts of the events leading up to the peace talks, the relationships between key figures, and the short timeline between events, Carmichael illustrates that the period from 1990 to 1994 can be considered the most politically intense in the country’s recent history.


 

Liz Carmichael. (2023). Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in South Africa: The National Peace Accord, 1991-1994. Boydell and Brewer. 518 pp. $36.95, ISBN: 9781847013682

Hagia Sophia was converted into a mosque by the Erdogan regime in Turkey on July 10, 2020. Following the decision, several groups gathered in front of Hagia Sophia to celebrate. Photo: Ugur Ferhat Baloglu.

Claiming the People’s Past: Populist Politics of History in the Twenty-First Century

Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Claiming the People’s Past: Populist Politics of History in the Twenty-First Century.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. August 21, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0015

 

The book examines the populist use of history through a blend of case studies and thematic analyses spanning various geographical and socio-cultural contexts. It highlights how populist politics often adopt an anti-elitist stance, particularly against academic historians. Populists tend to favor simplified, decontextualized, or ambiguous historical narratives infused with strong emotional appeals—such as pride, anger, fear, or nostalgia—over the rigorous, evidence-based approach of professional historiography. Despite populism’s strong orientation toward the past, the academic exploration of its relationship with history has been relatively sparse so far. This book makes a notable contribution to addressing and bridging that gap.

Reviewed by Bulent Kenes

How do populists relate to history and address the past? How do they represent history and frame particular historical events, periods, or the dimensions of the past, present, and future? Why is the politics of history an important aspect of populism? What drives populists to engage in the politics of history, and what exactly is the appeal of history for populist politics? How do practices of ‘past presencing’ facilitate a populist political logic? What political and emotional mechanisms facilitate the mobilization of historical knowledge in populism? How do emotions like patriotism, fear, guilt, comfort, and indifference contribute to this mobilization, and what role do they play in populist narratives? Conversely, what emotions are avoided, and why? These are the questions that the editors and authors of the comprehensive volume “Claiming the People’s Past: Populist Politics of History in the Twenty-First Century” seek to answer.

The book edited by Berber Bevernage, Eline Mestdagh, Walderez Ramalho and Marie-Gabrielle Verbergt offers a rich array of concepts related to its central themes, including ‘fake history,’ ‘fictionalization of politics,’ ‘historiographic emotivism,’ ‘emotive historiography,’ ‘collective emotions,’ ‘collective narcissism,’ ‘past presencing,’ ‘presentism,’ ‘teleological presentism,’ ‘emotivism,’ ‘emotional truth,’ ‘memorial populism,’ ‘Manichean nostalgia,’ ‘progressive nostalgia,’ ‘nostalgia for the future,’ ‘reactionary nostalgia,’ ‘moral remembrance,’ ‘chronosophies,’ ‘updatism,’ ‘historical Russia,’ ‘deep people,’ ‘mutual deception,’ and ‘identity fusion,’ among many others.

The book explores the populist politics of history through a combination of case studies and thematic analyses across diverse geographical and socio-cultural contexts. Divided into two parts, the first part presents case studies that examine how specific populist parties, movements, or leaders engage with history. These cases cover a range of populisms globally, including the AfD in Germany, Islamic populism in East Africa, Vox and Podemos in Spain, and populists in power such as the Kirchners in Argentina, the Awami League in Bangladesh, Erdogan in Turkey, Trump in the US, Bolsonaro in Brazil, and Putin in Russia.

The second part focuses on thematic reflections that highlight key aspects of populist historical politics. These include the emotional and affective dimensions of populism’s approach to history, the use of ‘affective repertoires’ to promote specific historical narratives, and the role of emotions like nostalgia in right-wing mobilization. The book also examines the concept of ‘historiographic emotivism’ and the intertwined relationship between ethnic nationalism and populism. Additionally, it discusses how populists claim or reject epistemic authority, often showing a disregard for academic historiography. 

Ensuring consistency in an edited volume is challenging, as it can be difficult to review such collections from a unified perspective. However, the editors of this book have successfully met that challenge, distilling the essence of 16 articles that combine case studies with thematic and theoretical discussions. The editors also successfully overcome the ‘Atlantic bias’ in populism studies by offering a global perspective with case studies from the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Europe. The book also effectively represents both right- and left-wing populisms, as well as those in opposition and in power. From the case studies and conceptual analyses, the editors identify five recurring features of how populists engage with history: (a) vagueness and decontextualization, (b) a logic of equivalence, (c) antagonism, (d) moral and emotional appeals, and (e) rejection of representational pluralism.

As Jan-Werner Müller noted in the book’s foreword, populists often invoke specific historical events or figures to represent their vision of ‘the people’ while also signaling exclusions. They rewrite history textbooks, invest in monuments, and reshape the built environment to evoke past glories and reinforce symbolic exclusions—such as Erdogan’s transformation of Turkish urban landscapes in the Seljuk-Ottoman style. The book provides numerous examples of this glorification of the past, including populist reinterpretations by Narendra Modi, the AfD, PiS, and Donald Trump. Many right-wing populists promise a “rebirth” through these historical re-imaginings.

The book notes that it is common for politicians to engage with history to support their policies, and this is true for both right-wing populists like Narendra Modi and left-wing populists like Evo Morales. Despite their differing agendas, they share a similar approach: using history in the name of the people, against the elite, to divide society into opposing camps. From Holocaust revisionism in Germany to anti-communism in Viktor Orban’s Hungary and PiS’s Poland, far-right populists frequently push controversial historical interpretations. In the US and Brazil, Trump and Bolsonaro’s populist uses of the past have drawn criticism from historians. Similarly, left-wing populist leaders in Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have used history to focus on the legacies of colonialism and military dictatorships.

According to the editors, populists present the past in a decontextualized and vague manner, drawing equivalences between otherwise unrelated historical events while antagonistically representing history and historians. Their relationship to the past is driven by emotion, and they reject pluralism in historical representation. Populist references to history are often anachronistic, too. Additionally, the book argues that populists do not present history chronologically. Instead, they organize a heterogeneous mix of events, periods, and figures around empty signifiers like ‘heroism,’ ‘resistance,’ ‘foreignness,’ and ‘threat,’ weaving them into a narrative of equivalence. Unlike ideologies such as nationalism or socialism, which invest heavily in creating their own historiographies, populists generally show little interest in developing distinct historical narratives. Notable exceptions include Hindutva in India and PiS’s authoritarian conservative populism in Poland, where there is significant investment in historiographical production. However, even in these cases, the book finds that populist historical revisionism relies more on judicial or physical repression of dissent than on scholarly debate. 

The book underscores that most populist depictions of history revolve around morally charged binaries of ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ Populists often claim to protect history from being stolen, corrupted, or erased, or they present themselves as restoring a glorious past. For instance, the book cites a comic published by Austria’s FPÖ that depicts Heinz-Christian Strache alongside 17th-century Prinz Eugen defending Vienna from the Turks in 1683, echoing similar rhetoric seen in the Brexit campaign, which invoked Britain’s resistance to ancient Roman invasion. Donald Trump accused those advocating of the removal of Confederate statues of erasing history, positioning himself and his supporters as defenders of American heritage. Similarly, Erdogan regime claims to ‘give back’ history to the people, suggesting it was stolen by the West and previous governments. The book highlights how both left- and right-wing populists engage in this narrative hijacking, often targeting ‘the elite’ as the culprits behind the neglect or corruption of historical consciousness.

Populist politics of history frequently involve an anti-elitist stance against academic historians. According to the book, populists prefer unambiguous, decontextualized, or vague histories filled with strong emotional overtones such as pride, anger, fear, or nostalgia, rather than engaging with the fact-finding mission of professional historiography. For example, Pawel Machcewicz’s chapter discusses how Poland’s PiS promotes narratives of Polish heroism in helping Jews during World War II to counteract the negative affects of critical historiography. Populists often frame themselves as liberators, returning a glorious past to the people, making pride and nostalgia key elements in their historical narratives.

The book highlights how populist people, leaders and parties, such as Rodrigo Duterte, Lega Nord, Vox, and the Kirchnerists, often reject pluralism in historical representation. The book reminds readers that populists tend to mythologize history, rejecting alternative narratives not because they are factually incorrect, but because they conflict with the moral and emotional narratives they promote. Beyond tales of heroism, stories of victimhood and suffering are also effective tools for populists to moralize politics. Decontextualized narratives of historical victimhood can emphasize the innocence of ‘the people’ and highlight the evilness of the enemy, helping populist leaders maintain an underdog status even while in power. For example, the book discusses the reconversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque, showing how Erdogan and his regime use decontextualized narratives of historical victimhood to legitimize their rule and distract from present-day human rights abuses.

The empirical chapters of the book offer numerous examples of how right-wing populists selectively and effectively use the past. For instance, Klaus Neumann’s chapter on the AfD shows that their approach to history is driven by two aims: to create a genealogy for themselves and to contrast the problematic present with an idealized past that promises a better future. To achieve this, the AfD downplays the Nazi past, instead aligning themselves with the Conservative Revolution and claiming the legacy of Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, who attempted to assassinate Hitler in 1944. Despite this, they still attack Germany’s Holocaust memorial culture.

Chintia Bale and Gustavo Guille emphasize in their chapter on Argentina that memory plays a crucial role in power struggles, defining who belongs on each side of the political divide. They describe “memorial populism” as a subtype where the memory of a specific event is emptied of its original meaning, and a past charismatic leader is resurrected as the “eternal sovereign,” akin to the sovereignty of God in theocratic populism. 

Julian Kuttig and Bert Suykens, in their chapter on Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh, highlight how the manipulation of history and memory is central to Bangladeshi politics. According to the chapter, Mujib’s personal legacy (body personal) has been downplayed, allowing a populist memory of his political legacy (body politics) to dominate.

Pawel Machcewicz’s chapter on Poland illustrates how PiS has used history as a key tool to shape political and emotional narratives, defining enemies and rallying grassroots support. Central to PiS’s cultural agenda is the portrayal of Poland’s glorious past as under constant threat from corrupt elites and external foes who undermine Polish martyrdom and heroism. PiS’s “politics of history” involves accusing liberal elites and professional historians of promoting a “pedagogy of shame,” which critically examines darker episodes of Polish history, particularly Polish wrongdoings against other nationalities like Jews, Germans, and Ukrainians.

Neeladri Bhattacharya, in his chapter on the Hindu right, argues that populist regimes worldwide seek to reshape what is considered history. He describes how, under nationalist pressure, authors and publishers have faced attacks leading to apologies, book destructions, and increasing hostility since Modi and the Hindu right came to power in 2014. The assault extends beyond professional history writing to all academic institutions. Violence, including book burnings, online abuse, physical attacks, and even killings of thinkers and journalists, has become commonplace. According to the chapter, while secular nationalism in India aimed to create a multicultural memory, the Hindu right builds its nationalism on memories of religious antagonism. Professional historians are seen as obstacles to the Hindutva agenda, raising inconvenient questions and offering counter-narratives. As a result, they face sustained attacks, stigmatization, and accusations of being anti-national. This new regime of “historical truth” silences intellectual inquiry, normalizes censorship, and forges a connection between the populist ‘savior’ and the people.

Yagmur Karakaya, in her chapter on Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman nostalgia, argues that nostalgic populism is a common feature of populist historicities. Focusing on Erdogan’s speech during the reopening of Hagia Sophia as a mosque, Karakaya identifies three key discursive elements of nostalgic populism in Turkey: the legalization of history, the monopolization of history, and the revival of a “stolen” past. This analysis provides insight into the deeply rooted and comprehensive authoritarian Islamist populism of Erdogan.

In her chapter, Felicitas Becker notes that in East Africa, particularly in Tanzania and Kenya, most populist Islamist spokespeople are outsiders to the political establishment. 

In Oz Frankel’s chapter on the Trump era, right-wing populists accuse elites of betraying the American people and erasing the nation’s glorious past, fostering shame and guilt among the young, particularly white Americans. The chapter explores Trump’s populist portrayal, linking him to biblical figures, prophecies, and conspiracy theories. Frankel also examines key works of racist, far-right, and alt-right literature.

In their chapter, Mateus Henrique de Faria Pereira and Valdei Lope de Araujo explore the “updatist” use of history, a key element of Bolsonarist populism that underpins its historical denialism and spread of fake news. According to the authors, Bolsonaro’s far-right authoritarian populism in Brazil relies on denying and falsifying history, labeling all political opponents as ‘leftists’ or communists. This approach revives Cold War-era rhetoric, allowing Bolsonaro’s supporters to falsely depict Nazism as a left-wing movement and portray any opposition as communist.

Andrey Oleynikov’s chapter on Vladimir Putin’s Russia highlights the conservative and presentist use of history, centered on the concept of “historical Russia.” Oleynikov argues that Putin legitimizes his rule by claiming a mandate from a supposed “thousand-year-old historical state,” positioning contemporary Russia as the successor to both pre-revolutionary and Soviet Russias. This construction of “historical Russia” also serves foreign policy interests, justifying actions like the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Additionally, Putin’s regime has crafted the notion of a “deep people” to reinforce the belief that the nation is on the right path under his leadership.

In his chapter on Spain, Pablo Sanchez Leon examines the relationship of left-wing populist Podemos and right-wing populist Vox, which has voiced fears of an Islamic reinvasion of Andalusia, a region with a significant North African Muslim immigrant population, with the past and history. Leon argues that Vox’s historical narratives shed light on the overlap between nationalism and populism, two distinct yet often intertwined ideologies. Vox actively promotes counter-narratives against the so-called Black Legend, which highlights Spain’s cruelties in America. Leon also emphasizes that understanding populism requires attention to its use of historical narratives.

Laurajane Smith, in the first chapter of the thematic section, highlights nostalgia as a central emotion in the mobilization of revisionist history. She argues that nostalgia is key to the appeal and expression of various forms of populism, particularly right-wing populism. By invoking revisionist, mythologized, or selective histories that emphasize heroism and national pride while avoiding ambiguity, these narratives manage present-day emotions. Heritage, too, plays a similar role by historicizing emotions to legitimize contemporary ideologies. Alongside nostalgia, fear is also crucial for right-wing populism, which often rejects nuance to avoid feelings of shame and guilt.

Aviezer Tucker, in his chapter titled “Historiographic Populist Emotivism,” argues that populists view historiography as a narrative driven by passions rather than facts. For populists, the more emotionally charged a historical narrative, the more “authentic” it is. Tucker contends that populists lack the will to control their passions, leading to self-destructive policies. This is evident in the rise of “post-truth” (old “wishful thinking”) where beliefs are shaped by strong emotions rather than evidence. As a result, populist historiography cannot be evaluated through traditional historiographic methods. Populists may exert power by dismissing professional historians, as seen in Hungary, or by inciting social media “lynch mobs.” According to Tucker, to advance their agendas, populist leaders encourage historical amnesia, erasing inconvenient truths. In her chapter, Lea David echoes this sentiment, noting that official memory requires both the art of forgetting and remembering to be effective.

Allan Megill notes in his chapter that academic historians rarely attract the attention of populists, who typically use “the past” to evoke emotions that unite “the people” and motivate them toward action. Another chapter’s author, Chris Lorenz, adds that populist leaders, consistently framing the present as a time of crisis, aim to restore their people’s supposed past greatness. Leaders like Trump, Putin, Orban, and Erdogan frequently invoke a narrative of past glory, recent decline, and future resurrection, shaping a populist timeline of rise, fall, and redemption.

As we look at the other (namely critical) side of the coin, the editors of the book adopt Ernesto Laclau’s formal definition of populism as a ‘political logic’ and allowed the chapter authors to choose the approach that best suited their case studies. As a result, many chapters are preoccupied with lengthy and repetitive discussions on the definition of populism, alongside deep philosophical deliberations that can feel excessive. Additionally, since some chapters were written in 2020 and 2021, the book does not address the most recent political developments in countries like Brazil, US and Argentina, where the situation has changed dramatically. Furthermore, as Megill points out in his chapter, some of the empirical studies in the book focus more on nationalist ‘historicity’ than on populist narratives. 

As one of the chapter authors notes, although populism is ‘essentially past-directed,’ the academic literature on its relationship with history has remained limited so far. From an overall perspective, this book represents a significant attempt to address and fill that gap.

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Berber Bevernage, Eline Mestdagh, Walderez Ramalho and Marie-Gabrielle Verbergt. (2024). Claiming the People’s Past: Populist Politics of History in the Twenty-First Century. (Cambridge University Press). 343 pp. $110, ISBN: 978-1-009-45363-9

Demonstration of the political movement called "Forza Nuova" held in Rome in the EUR zone on November 4, 2017. Photo: Shutterstock.

Populism and the Extreme Right in Comparative Perspective: The French Rassemblement National and the Italian Forza Nuova

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Varriale, Amedeo. (2024). “Populism and the Extreme Right in Comparative Perspective: The French Rassemblement National and the Italian Forza Nuova.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). August 12, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0036    



Abstract

Populism, especially “radical right-wing populism,” and the Extreme Right are often explicitly or implicitly conflated or at least observed together (see Ignazi, 2000; Mudde, 2000; Rydgren, 2005; Carter, 2005; Griffin, 2018; Stavrakakis et al., 2019). While this contribution acknowledges that these two sets of ideas may occasionally overlap, they should still be understood as distinct concepts. Therefore, any deliberate and forceful conflation of their academic definitions, political histories, or traditions is usually misleading and inappropriate. Although many political scientists have recently attempted to clearly distinguish between the two phenomena by proposing separate definitions, some still suggest that populism and the extreme right are essentially two sides of the same coin (see Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018). To shed more light on this issue (or “war of words,” as Cas Mudde once called it) and to provide a better understanding of these two important ideologies—one that has greatly impacted the last century and another that will likely continue to influence the current one—this article will compare and contrast right-wing populism and the extreme right from an entirely ideational perspective. This will be done by borrowing from a theoretical framework originally adopted by senior scholar Marco Tarchi (2015) and taking his approach one step further by empirically testing his theories through discourse and manifesto analysis of two contemporary European parties—one supposedly belonging to the populist (or “neopopulist”) party family and the other to the extreme right (or “neofascist”) family. Specifically, the positions of the French Rassemblement National (“National Rally” – RN) and the Italian Forza Nuova (“New Force” – FN) will be examined to determine whether there are more similarities or differences between the two ideologies. The analysis will focus on the RN’s and FN’s discourse and policies related to the role of the people, the nation, the state, society, the individual, the leader, the elite, democracy, and the market.

By Amedeo Varriale*

Introduction: Generic Reflections, Theoretical Framework, and Method

Generic Reflections

In 1992, the academic experts Piero Ignazi and Colette Ysmal (1992) wrote that the Italian MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano – Italian Social Movement) and the French Front National (National Front) “are the most significant parties of the extreme right in Europe” (Ignazi & Ysmal, 1992: 101). At the time, this was not only an accurate statement, but it was also an incredibly important and influential one for the field of political science, as it provided scholars with two archetypal case studies that could be empirically treated for reference. Today, this claim would be – to say the least – contentious. One issue is that the MSI no longer exists, and its direct successor(s) AN (Alleanza Nazionale – National Alliance) and FDI (Fratelli d’Italia – FDI) can hardly be categorized as “extreme right” parties. In 2003, AN’s leader, Gianfranco Fini, visited Yad Vashem in Israel and repeatedly declared that fascism as an ideology was “an absolute evil in history” (Corriere della Sera, 24 November 2003; Caretto, 2022). Whereas, more recently, FDI’s leader, Giorgia Meloni (currently Italian Prime Minister) has clearly stated that her party is incompatible with anyone nostalgic of the fascist regime (also calling them “useful idiots for the Left”) and that she is committed to not only democracy but pro-Western, anti-authoritarian, liberal conservatism[1] (Bracalini, 2021; Farrell, 2022). Taking this into account, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, some of the “old guards” of the MSI gradually developed neofascist movements relying on the political vacuum left by the defunct MSI giving birth to much more extreme subjects (see Broder, 2023: 118-141) such as Fiamma TricoloreCasaPound, and of course – FN (Forza Nuova – FN) which will be later examined in-depth. I shall return to this point in the following sections. 

The same argument can be made regarding the French Front National. This party no longer exists under that banner, as it has been recently renamed RN (Rassemblement National – RN) in an open effort from Marine Le Pen to “detoxify” (and expel extremists) from what use to be an extreme right party, in order to turn it into a more respectable “right-wing” populist force (Gaffney, 2012). In fact, some popular commentators argue she has (to some extent) successfully managed this operation (see Murray, 2017). Therefore, not only are the parties Ignazi and Ysmal mentioned and studied no longer existent, but their heirs are usually no longer considered as full-fledged extreme right parties. Not to mention, in Europe there are very few (if any) truly extreme right/neofascist parties that are electorally relevant to this day – the German Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) perhaps being an exception.  

Another factor that might challenge Ignazi’s and Ysmal’s claim, if reconsidered today and applied to the successors of the MSI and Front National by scholars of radical parties, is the emergence of a new populist zeitgeist over the last twenty to thirty years (see Mudde, 2004). This public mood of disenchantment with traditional politics has contributed to the success of several parties that were originally isolated on the fringes of the spectrum. Almost suddenly, once marginalized groups such as the Lega Nord, FPÖ, and the Sweden Democrats, became electorally relevant and more mainstream (Tarchi, 2002). Their “mainstreaming” makes it considerably more difficult for the “extreme” label to be attached to them. Moreover, not all parties that once belonged to the extreme right can be considered exclusively “right-wing” today; some, like Jobbik, have adopted syncretic populist positions. As the Italian scholar Marco Tarchi (2015) contends, their current populist forma mentis often takes them ideologically beyond the Right-Left dichotomy (Tarchi, 2015: 52). Nonetheless, casting aside those organizations that Luke March (2008: 3-4) classifies as “social populist” or “socialist populist,” many of these newly successful parties or rising movements are said to be either populist, or extreme right, or both at the same time (e.g. Backes, 1991; Betz, 1994; Ignazi 2000; Carter 2005; Mudde, 2000; Griffin, 2018). 

Taking this into account, it is precisely this ambiguous conflation that has become a problem. In fact, as Mudde (2000) states: “All in all, most definitions of (whatever) populism do not differ that much in content from the definitions of right-wing extremism…with the various terms often used synonymously and without any clear intention” (Mudde, 2000: 13). While extreme right parties that are unequivocally neofascist are largely being ignored in scholarly literature, a growing number of scholars are erroneously labeling populist right parties as “extreme right” parties (for example, see Passarelli & Tuorto, 2018). In any event, the objective of this article is not to engage in an exhaustive – and sometimes counter-productive – debate originating from academic circles which Cas Mudde (1996) famously termed the “war of words.” This complex debate has aimed to describe the various political subjects that have monopolized the political space to the right of liberal-conservative forces and to especially determine the most appropriate term to define these “new” populist parties (Mudde, 2000: 11-16). Some of the terms proposed in the past include “progress-hostile forces” (Hartmann et al., 1985), “right-wing extremism” (Macridis, 1989; Mudde; 1995; 2000); “right-wing radicalism” (Oswalt, 1991; Weinberg, 1993), “radical-right” (Sprinzak, 1991), “radical right-wing populism” (Betz, 1993; Mudde, 2007), “post-industrial extreme right” (Ignazi, 2000), “New Populism” (Taggart, 1996), “neopopulism” (Yoshikazu, 2018), “national populism” (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018), and finally, the most misleading of all – “extreme right-wing populism” (Rydgren, 2005; Stavrakakis et al., 2019). If all those terms were utilized to label different parties, such as either the ones that have a substantially populist core ideology and the ones that have a substantially fascist (or neofascist) one, this would by now be a non-substantive issue or a false dilemma. However, over the course of the last decades, all those terms have been applied to the same or a remarkably similar set of parties in Western Europe and the Americas, when in reality populism and extreme right (neofascism) are – ideologically speaking – mutually exclusive (Tarchi, 2015: 117-126). New academic research should instead be dedicated to distinguishing between the parties that belong to either one party family (e.g. the “populist” one) or the other (the “extreme right” one). 

Regardless, the objective of this article is to compare the positions of the French Rassemblement National (RN) and the Italian Forza Nuova (FN) from an entirely ideational perspective and offer comprehensive insight on the key differences between the two ideologies. To maintain clarity, I shall utilize the words populism (but I also use “right-wing populism” or “populist right” for the RN interchangeably), and extreme right (but I also use “right-wing extremism” or “neofascism” for the FN interchangeably) to describe two distinct ideological phenomena. A full-fledged and in-depth analysis of the populist and extreme right ideological positions will be present in the second part of the contribution; however, I will first provide some generic preliminary information that is equally important. 

In essence, populism (or even “right-wing populism”) and right-wing extremism are not identical. In fact, it has already been recognized that they substantially differ in a number of ways (Taggart, 1996: 35). As a primary example, Paul Taggart (1996) has argued that neofascist parties “tend to have some direct link to the fascist parties of the previous era while New Populist parties appear to lack such a historical link” (Taggart, 1996: 35). This is especially true for active extreme right organizations in countries like Britain, France, Spain, Greece and elsewhere in Europe. For instance, in Britain, the contemporary National Front (NF) is a result of a gradual political evolution that saw the party come into being after a merger of two older extremist factions – the neo-Nazi British National Party (BNP) active in 1960 and the League of Empire Loyalists (LEL). The BNP and LEL were themselves preceded by movements that revolved around pre-war (and post-war) fascist leaders like Sir Oswald Mosley and A.K. Chesterton. Another example relating to the differences between populism (or “New Populism” as Taggart calls it) and neofascism regards the issue of immigration (Taggart, 1996: 36). Certainly, both the populist right and the extremist right are anti-immigration(-ist), however, the former are not as fixated with the issue as the latter (Taggart, 1996: 36). Populists rarely (if ever) resort to ultra-authoritarian policies that may lead to ethnic cleansing or political violence through paramilitarism (Finchelstein, 2019: 45; Eatwell, 2017: 365). Parties like the Lega Nord (Northern League) in Italy serve as a perfect example of this non-violent attitude as they have a vast program that (apart from anti-immigration) also comprises fiscal federalism, anti-tax measures for small business, and the legalization of prostitution (Programma di Governo Salvini Premier, 2018). These are all issues completely unrelated to immigration. Hence, whilst this contribution acknowledges that the two sets of ideas may occasionally appear alike[2] – as scholars like Taggart (1996: 36) recognize – the two should still be understood as overall distinct concepts. Thus, any deliberate and forceful conflation of their academic definitions, political history, or tradition is per se usually misleading and inappropriate.

Theoretical Framework and Method 

The most appropriate way to differentiate between (right-wing) populism and extreme right is not by merely providing the most popular definitions of the two ideologies by the most prominent academics. Instead, it is to carefully observe the distinct views both ideologies maintain of politics overall. Disregarding the fact that populism is rather “unpolitical” (refer to Taggart’s reflections on unpolitics[3]) and extreme right/neofascism is highly political by design, populist parties (in this case the RN) and extreme right parties (in this case FN) hold specific views on the peoplethe nationthe statesocietythe individualthe leaderthe elitedemocracy, and the market that make the two ideologies – as we shall see – more incompatible than compatible (Tarchi, 2015: 125). The specifics of this theoretical framework, which were originally put forward in a seminal text on populism by Tarchi (2015), will be discussed throughout the next section. Taking this into consideration, after briefly touching upon the generic issues surrounding the academic definitions of populism and extreme right and providing a short historical account of both parties under scrutiny, the core of this article will focus on a discourse and manifesto analysis (which will occur concomitantly) of the RN and FN parties, respectively. Subsequently, all findings will be discussed conjunctly, to produce conclusive statements on both populism and extreme right. 

For the RN, as for the FN party, the discourse analysis will include statements made by their leaders (Marine Le Pen and Roberto Fiore, respectively) over the course of the last five to ten years. The reason for this is that populist and extremist parties of the right are often structured in a highly centralized manner with a pre-eminence of key individuals (Taggart, 2003: 6), therefore it makes sense to give higher relevance to the statements and opinions of those directly in charge. Regarding the manifesto analysis, the manifestos chosen for analysis are the ones obtainable through the RN’s and FN’s websites (rassemblementnational.fr and forzanuova1997.it, respectively) as they can easily be located by the reader, and this is beneficial for transparency. Even if they have been released over a year ago, they still largely reflect their current positions. In any event, the RN’s manifesto is simply named “Les 22 Mesures” (“22 Measures”) whilst FN’s one is called “8 punti” (“8 points”). However, as FN’s manifesto is much shorter, during the analysis sporadic mention is also made to the party’s older political program for the important (post-debt crisis) Italian general election that took place in February 2013. This document (also easily accessible online) was named “Programma Per Le Elezioni Politiche 2013 Di Forza Nuova E Di Nomina Del Capo” (“Program for The Political Elections of 2013 of Forza Nuova and Its Appointed Head”). For clarity, each time I refer to this above-mentioned document using in-text citations I shall refer to it simply as: “FN general elections program, 2013.” Overall, the manifesto analysis occupies a dominant position in relation to the discourse analysis, this is because party programs and manifestos in general are “considered to represent and express the policy collectively adopted by the party” (Borg, 1966: 97; see also Anckar & Ramsted Silén, 1981). Fundamentally, not only are manifestos or programs (the second are generally more detailed and promoted before an election) officially endorsed by the members of a party – as Mudde reminds us – but are also widely utilized in academia as a form of data to determine party ideology (Mudde, 2000: 20). 

Defining Populism and Extreme Right

Populism

Photo: Shutterstock.

Objectively defining this protean and unusual concept commonly known as “populism” has never been simple. To this day, scholars disagree on whether it is a political strategy, a form of discourse/performance or effectively an ideology (Moffitt, 2020: 25-26), thus, let alone do they agree on a fixed definition. To add to the confusion, some scholars state that “populism has many of the attributes of an ideology, but not all of them” (Taggart, 2000: 1). Notwithstanding, it must be recognized that lately the so-called ideational approach has garnered a significant amount of traction in academia to the point of replacing old economic notions (e.g. populism as state intervention, “overspending,” or a set of neoliberal financial policies) of the phenomenon that 20th century scholars (especially in the Latin American cases) insisted upon (Weyland: 2017: 51). This is why Taggart (2018) argues that today the ideational approach is “winning” from a theoretical standpoint (Taggart, 2018a). 

One of the foremost pioneers of the ideational approach is the prominent Dutch scholar Cas Mudde (2004) who defines populism “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale(general will) of the people (Mudde, 2004: 543). Whilst it must be acknowledged that this definition is fundamental to any in-depth and scientific understanding of modern populism, in this contribution abiding by a generic definition of the phenomenon per se is not as important as considering specific aspects of populism which make it a distinct ideology possessing its very own weltanschauung. After all, considering diverse cases globally, contemporary populism appears to have both a comprehensive program of political change and “staying power,” making it effectively resemble other “thick”[4] ideologies founded in past centuries (e.g. liberalism, communism, fascism) (Schroeder, 2020: 13, 27-28). Taking this into account, instead of focusing on the ideational approach’s concepts of “the people,” “the elite,” and “general will” alone, we encompass – as mentioned earlier – other elements of its ideological repertoire that go beyond those three.

In summary, at this point in history, Tarchi (2002) contents that populism represents an entirely “alternative model” to the extreme right. According to Tarchi, in populist ideology, the people represent a cohesive and virtuous community which functions as the basis of legitimation for government action (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Whereas the nation is the product of the cultural traditions of a people to whom it provides a stable identity (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Instead, when it comes to the conceptualization of thstate, this is understood to be the administrator of the public interest subordinated to the will of the people who must control its action (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Moreover, for populists, society itself is nothing more than the natural context in which the life of the people unfolds, it is autonomous from the state and is prioritized in respect to it (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Populists also have a specific view of the individual, as they believe this is the cornerstone of social life which finds the natural context of its needs within the people (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Whereas in populist ideology the leader is perceived as a spokesperson for the people, an interpreter of their needs, endowed with ordinary qualities in extraordinary measures (Tarchi, 2015: 125). At the same time, the elite is (as expected) negatively regarded as a power block that must be kept under control by the people to protect their rights (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Also, populists hold a definite opinion of democracy, where democracy is considered an ideal regime to be implemented entirely through tools of direct popular expression and without institutional mediation (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Ultimately, the conceptualization of the market is that of something positiveto be tempered through protective measures reserved for the indigenous population – essentially, welfare chauvinism (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Subsequently, it will become clearer how all these concepts directly related to populism will apply to a right-wing populist party like the RN but not to a right-wing extremist party like FN. 

Extreme Right

Demonstration of the political movement called “Forza Nuova” held in Rome in the EUR zone on November 4, 2017. Photo: Shutterstock.

In academic discourse, the term “extreme right” is frequently employed to describe parties or movements encompassing a range of political orientations, which renders the study of this subject particularly complex and nuanced. For instance, scholars – who have observed the phenomenon consistently – such as Elisabeth Carter (2005; 2018), provide a useful minimal definition of the term but are too inclusive (regarding classification), and tend to include subjects that are neither “extreme” nor truly “right-wing” in the party family. To exacerbate the ambiguity, even if only as a secondary element, Carter adds populism in the mix as an element to consider when describing extreme right ideology (see Carter, 2005: 21-23, 56-60). Given the circumstances, the definition Carter provides is an optimal starting point to understand the key features of extreme right ideology – authoritarianismanti-democracy, and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism(Carter, 2018: 157). However, if one abides by this definition, it already becomes clear that extreme right politics are not all that similar to populist politics, given the latter does not reject democracy altogether, and does not necessarily have to be authoritarian or exclusionary in terms of nationalism. In simple terms, “populism is pro-democracy but anti-liberal democracy” (Mudde, 2021: 579). Historically, we have witnessed the rise of “liberal” or libertarian populist parties (as well as socialistic ones, see March, 2007) that are only civically nationalist and view forms of plebiscitarian (direct) democracy as a real promise (e.g. PDL in Italy, and Lijst Dedecker in the Netherlands).

More specifically, excessive breadth given to the terminology certainly becomes an issue when you group together (under the same umbrella term “extreme right”) parties that outrightly reject the democratic system (e.g. NPD, now renamed Die Heimat) with parties that accept the rules of democracy but want to reform it by making it either more democratic and less statist (e.g. Lega dei TicinesiLega Nord) or less democratic and more statist (e.g. Vlaams Blok, now renamed Vlaams Belang) (see Carter, 2005: 45). Ideally the parties that are anti-democratic and illiberal cannot be part of the same family as those that are illiberal but at the same time still democratic. Also, it is a problem to cluster ultra-authoritarian Neo-Nazi and neo-fascist parties with others that are simply neoliberal (but still xenophobic and anti-immigrant, according to Carter) or “neo-liberal populist” that do not adhere to any form of biological or cultural racism but are – in Carter’s own words – “not racist” whatsoever (Carter, 2005: 50-51). 

Carter is not the only author who associates the neofascist extreme right with (elements of) populism. Indeed, one of the most renowned scholars of fascism, Roger Griffin (2018), explicitly identifies populism as a distinctive feature of the ideology, defining fascism as a “political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism” (Griffin, 2018: 46). Although Griffin embraces populism in his definition of fascism, he is more careful to not narrow the gap between fascist or neofascist parties and populist parties in his work. Notwithstanding, the distinction to be made between populism and extreme right is an essential one, because although populism is today more often associated with the political right, it is not inherently right-wing but is chameleonic (Taggart, 2003: 9) to the point that it can also manifest itself alongside left-wing ideologies (Hudson & Shah, 2022). 

Using Tarchi’s theoretical scheme, it has been established in the section above what the generic views of populism are in relation to important aspects of society, such as the role of the state, the role of the elites and so forth. Unlike in populist ideology, in the extreme right the general (elitist) view of “the people” is more negative than positive (Tarchi, 2015: 125). In fact, the people are a mass to be educated under the guidance of the elite and merged with the nation and the nation itself is a spiritual community that has the task of forming and directing the people by assigning them a common destiny (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Also, according to extreme right neofascist ideology, the state represents the embodiment of the principle of authority, the fundamental principle of social organization superordinate to both the people and nation (Tarchi, 2015: 125).Uncoincidentally, it was the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini himself who famously stressed “Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State!” (Delzell, 1988: 127). This would be the exact opposite worldview to that of some neoliberal (pro-capitalism and pro-market) right-wing populist parties present in the European political sphere during the last decades (see Taggart, 1996: 34).

Beyond the state, society is according to right-wing extremists a raw material that must be formed, controlled, and guided by the state to which it is subordinated (Tarchi, 2015: 125). When compared to populism, the extreme right also has a much more negative or pessimistic view of the individual – which is merely considered a component of the nation whose needs must conform to avoid manifesting selfish interests (Tarchi, 2015: 125). In regard to the central ideological tenet of the leader right-wing extremists believe this figure to be the guide of the people and of the nation, to whom he indicates the destiny, and is endowed with extraordinary and charismatic qualities (Tarchi, 2015: 125). When it comes to how they view the elite, it said that these extremists believe the elite is a spiritual aristocracy that supervises the people and directs them to fulfill their duties (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Moving on to their conceptualization of democracy,Tarchi posits that they believe it is a regime that is criticizable because it reverses the principle of authority and is subject to the fickleness of the masses (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Last but not least, the market is deemed as something negative that must be subordinated to the needs of the nation and controlled through nationalizations or state-guided corporatism (Tarchi, 2015: 125).

Rassemblement National (RN): A History

 

Jean-Marie Le Pen during the meeting of his daughter Marine Le Pen for the celebration of May 1, 2011 in Paris, France. Photo: Frederic Legrand.

The Beginnings (1970s)

The history of the RN is complex. Or better, the history of the RN’s directly related predecessor (Front National) is both long and complex. Nevertheless, it is essential to outline this party’s historical background in order to comprehend why today it is more often treated as a “right-wing” populist party rather than an extreme right one by scholars (see Ivaldi & Pineau, 2022; Genga, 2017; Stockemer & Barisione 2016; Tarchi & De Feudis, 2015). Undeniably, the old Front Nationalwas an extreme right party (Tarchi, 2022: 12) – which occasionally even made use of esoteric fascist propaganda; symbols[5], myths, and imagery (Eatwell, 2017: 365). The party was born out of marginalized (and neofascist) Ordre Nouveau movement, when on October 5,  1972 its Mussolini-sympathizing leader Alain Robert joined forces with former Poujadist[6] MP and Algeria War veteran Jean-Marie Le Pen to form what became officially known as the Front National pour l’Unité Française. As Le Pen had more institutional experience and was perceived as more “moderate” by the public, he would eventually become the sole leader of the political group (Stockemer, 2017: 10). This early Front National was a haven for the whole French extreme right, from miscellaneous nationalists (of Bonapartist, Boulangist, Petainist, Poujadist or even Tixierist[7] extraction) to ex pro-French Algeria “freedom fighters” and anti-system extremists (from the movements OccidentEurope-ActionJeunesses Patriotes, etc.) who idolized a form of internationalist or Europeanist “new fascism” (Stockemer, 2017: 8-11; Ignazi, 2000: 180-186). 

The more than 50-year-old history of the Front National/Rassemblement National can essentially be divided into six phases (which sometimes overlap) – The Beginnings (1970s), The Minor Successes Phase (1980s), The Reaganite-Neoliberal Phase (1982-1993), The Crossroads Phase (late 1990s), The Apex Phase (early 2000s, 2002) and the Dédiabolisation / ‘New Front Phase (2012-). In the first phase, during the whole of the 1970s, the Front was completely marginalized and trapped in what Kurt Weyland (2017) would define as the extreme right “ideological ghetto” (Weyland, 2017: 62-63). In fact, no real electoral gains were made by the early “Le Penist” Front (Ignazi, 2000: 186-190). The 1973 legislative and 1974 presidential elections were a complete failure, with the party counting less than 300 members and never even achieving one percent of the vote. In the 1978 legislative ones, a similar trend recurred, with a mere 0.33% obtained in the first round (Genga, 2017: 36). Throughout the 1970s, the Front only manifested “an ideology that included racism, militarism, anti-democracy[8], and virulent anti-communism” (Stockemer, 2017: 12). Taking this into account, Le Pen was mainly interested in the small businessmen and craftsmen vote, therefore he combined authoritarian policies on crime, state security, and immigration with a more flexible (not typically neofascist) anti-tax approach on the economy.

The Minor Successes Phase (1980s)

Only in the 1980s, during the second phase, did Le Pen’s mixed political positions begin to bear fruit. De facto, in 1983 (more than 10 years after its formation) the Front performed positively in supplementary local elections achieving more than 16% in certain municipalities of northern France (such as Dreux) and as far as 12% in others in a nearby region (Genga, 2017; 38-38). One year later, in 1984, another electoral breakthrough occurred, as Le Pen’s party achieved 11% in the European elections (Stockemer, 2017: 16). This was an “outstanding” result for an extreme right fringe party. Some scholars attribute the (minor) successes of the Front in the 1980s (from 1982-83 onwards) to the bad decision-making of D’Estaing’s and Mitterrand’s – respectively centrist and socialist governments – on law-and-order (e.g. the unpopular amnesty reforms), a spike in immigration, alongside a heightened sensitivity against Islam and an economic crisis (two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979) that included an increase in unemployment, public debt, and inflation (see Perrineau, 1996; 1997; Genga, 2017). All of these issues, in tandem with Le Pen’s recurring invitations to speak on television[9], helped the Front to reach out to a wider (and less ideologically motivated) audience. By the late 1980s, Le Pen could finally cast himself as the politician to represent the working and middle classes who felt France was changing for the worse. Also, in 1987 Le Pen publicly stated that “gas chambers were a minor detail in the second world war” (Genga, 2017: 55). Surprisingly, this highly controversial statement did not backfire on him at all, but perhaps attracted even more attention and votes from the angry and disillusioned electorate (Genga, 2017: 55-56). Ultimately, in the important 1988 presidential elections Le Pen garnered almost 14.38 % of the vote in the first-round alone (Stockemer, 2017; Genga, 2017).

The Reaganite-Neoliberal Phase (1982-1993)

It must be noted that between 1982 (after the VI party congress) and 1993, Le Pen began to take a different approach towards fiscal policy, setting aside the state interventionism, economic nationalism, and protectionism that had been ever present within the Front to incorporate laissez faire positions that are alien to the neofascist corporatist and dirigiste tradition (Genga, 2015: 95). The expert Nicola Genga (2015) summarizes Le Pen’s views during this period as favorable to a “natural order based on inequality, which justifies the existence of a capitalist system of production” (Genga & Algisi, 2015). During the Reaganite-Neoliberal Phase – which partially overlapped with the 1980s Minor Successes Phase – Le Pen self-described his party as “socially left-wing but economically right-wing” (Genga & Algisi, 2015). Notwithstanding this peculiar (and contradictory) statement, it is evident that this shift was more tactical than ideological given during this period the best way for the Front to succeed was to present itself as a direct alternative to the socialists/communists in power (Genga & Algisi, 2015). To be sure, Le Pen’s picture taken with US President Ronald Reagan perfectly encapsulates this neoliberal phase (Tarchi, 2015). Within scholarship, the consensus is that this phase came to an end abruptly in 1993 when Le Pen turned his back on economic liberalism, in order to return to more welfare chauvinist and statist policies (Genga, 2017: 97) that resemble those of his daughter Marine Le Pen today (some go as far as suggesting Marine is a “social populist,” see Ivaldi & Pineau, 2022).

The Crossroads Phase (late 1990s)

In the fourth phase, the Front found itself at a crossroads due to internal squabbles (see Déze, 2012: 125). The (almost) unquestioned chief Le Pen was challenged by the “moderate” wing of the party led by the delegate Bruno Megret (Taggart, 2002: 78, 87). This politician had an alternative and opposite vision for the future of the party, and convinced part of the membership that the only way forward to achieve serious electoral relevance was to leave the “ideological ghetto” and marginalization once and for all (Stockemer, 2017: 21). Essentially, Mégret argued that only by shifting its attitudes on most issues the Front would become a respectable center-right party that could form alliances with other parties – especially the neo-Gaullists (Stockemer, 2017: 21). As a result, Mégret and other MPs who backed him, were thrown out by Le Pen, and forced to form a smaller party that had no real leverage (Whitney, 1998; Stockemer, 2017: 22).

The Apex Phase (early 2000s, 2002)

This takes us to the Apex Phase. In April 2002, by softening some of his positions temporarily, and concomitantly reworking his discursive patterns through more populistic and “inclusive” appeals to French people “of all socio-economic backgrounds,” “of all religions,” and “of all skin colors,” Le Pen made it to the run-off of the presidential election (Tarchi, 2015: 135). By this point, he was perceived by the public as the only real anti-establishment candidate who had a chance at the presidency. Strikingly, he managed to obtain nearly 18% of the vote. Although incumbent President Jacques Chirac refused to share a platform with the Front’s leader and to officially debate him (see Henley, 2002) he still beat Le Pen. Nevertheless, the year 2002 marked the highest point for Le Pen and his extreme right party. 

The Dédiabolisation / ‘New Front’ Phase (2011 –)

After subsequent years of worse performances, in January 2011 during the Front’s Congress of Tours Jean-Marie’s daughter Marine Le Pen is finally confirmed as official president of the party after beating her opponent (who was also close to her father) Bruno Gollnisch (Genga, 2017). From thereafter the dédiabolisation era begins, this culminates with Jean-Marie being expelled from the party by M. Le Pen herself after making inappropriate comments regarding the holocaust and WW2 (Genga, 2017: 171; BBC News, 20 August 2015). Synchronously, many more extremist figures (especially deriving from the youth wing) are distanced from the party in the hope to build a new moderate image (Genga, 2017). As M. Le Pen’s favorite advisor – the libertarian crypto-technocrat Florian Philippot – had anticipated, this major repositioning proved to be electorally successful (Genga, 2017: 175). Although some (such as political advisor and analyst Patrick Buisson) argue the brand of Marine’s party is still far too “toxic” to rule the country (Samuel, 2016), she has still come closer than her father when it comes to winning the presidency. Her electoral result at the 2022 Presidential elections was overall regarded as positive by her supporters, because even if she lost to Emmanuel Macron for the second time consecutively, in the second round she garnered 31.7 % of the vote (Voce & Clarke, 2022). Prior to that, in the run-off of the 2017 Presidential elections she had performed even better, given she obtained 33.9% of the vote against the same opponent (Statista Research Department, March 11, 2024). 

Under M. Le Pen, the party’s political project took shape as a means to provide French voters with an ideological alternative to the “mainstream parties” – namely (the neo-Gaullist) Les Républicains, the Socialist Party, President Macron’s En Marche! (subsequently Renaissance party), and the radical left/green groupings. Whereas some scholars highlight that there has been a degree of continuity between this new party and her father’s old Front National (see Mammone, 2015; Stockemer, 2017), others argue there has been a clear philosophical demarcation of the “new Front” from its extreme right past (see Gaffney, 2012; Genga, 2017; Tarchi, 2022). For instance, the specialist on lepénismeDaniel Stockemer (2017) explains that there are specifically three aspects that have improved (or “softened”) the party’s image as M. Le Pen took over its leadership (Stockemer, 2017: 39-40). First, she has regularly repudiated the “extreme right” label (Stockemer, 2017: 39). The evidence suggests that all intellectual references to thinkers like Maurice Barrès, Charles Maurras, Robert Brasillach and others have suddenly disappeared from the party’s discourse (Stockemer, 2017: 39). Second, any comments made by her father that could be deemed as intolerant, antisemitic, or generically racist, have also been instantly disavowed with fervor (Stockemer, 2017: 39-40). When it comes to antisemitism particularly, M. Le Pen’s discreet realignment in favor of Israel on foreign policy speaks volumes about the party’s moderation (Abboud, 2023). Third, she has embraced a traditional(-ist) form of French republicanism (a French version of neo-conservative American exceptionalism) that has its intellectual foundations in post-1789 universalist, liberal (although M. Le Pen opposes economic liberalism) and secular thought (Stockemer, 2017: 40). This approach is philosophically distant from the anti-intellectualist and anti-bourgeois ideological mapping of fascism and neofascism that often pushed for a return to pre-French revolution moral codes (see Paxton, 2005; Dagnino, 2016). Amid 2018, the party was officially renamed Rassemblement National in a move to put the organization’s distant past and father’s legacy behind once and for all.

Rassemblement National (RN): Ideological Profile

Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the end of a polical meeting in Marseille for Rassemblement National party on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.

Populist, “right-wing” or both?

M. Le Pen’s party has a comprehensible ideological profile. Whilst the RN still fails to meet the criteria to be evaluated as a (classical) “center-right” party – as it is not Atlanticist enough nor does it abide to the values of free-market capitalism or consider the liberal rule of law one of its core tenets (see Trippenbach & Johannès, 2022) – the party can instead be classified as “right-wing” populist. If the primary (and paramount) ingredient in the RN’s political cocktail is populism, the secondary one is a form of nationalist social conservatism. On one hand, at the center of its ideology and discourse we first find a commitment to popular sovereignty (the will of the people, volonté générale) inextricably linked to a heavy critique of national and international – both political and financial – “corrupt elites.” On the other hand, adjacent[10] to its anti-elitist ethos, we also find a strong nationalist rhetoric (although state nationalist[11] instead of ethnic nationalist[12]) that can be simplified by the slogan “Les Français d’abord!” (“The French First!”) (see Fraser, 2011). This slogan alone explains the RN’s positions against mass immigration and in favor of a strong interventionist state that regularly distributes resources (but to the native French only) in the name of an inter-classist welfare chauvinism

If one considers the definition Norberto Bobbio (1994) confers to the political right, where he suggests right-wing movements (unlike leftist ones) accept the existence of societal hierarchies and inequalities and may even consider them as positive, both as a premise and as a natural outcome to social and economic competition, then we can deduce that the RN is only partially “right-wing.” After all, many of M. Le Pen’s statist-interventionist policies (anathema to center-right liberal-conservatives) are quintessential of populist formations with a social conscience that aim to foremostly represent the lower classes and ameliorate living and working conditions for them through redistribution (Moffitt, 2020). This is where the welfare chauvinism derives from a complex ideological synthesis between nationalist populism, cultural conservatism, and economic socialism (see Ivaldi & Pineau, 2022). It is no coincidence that M. Le Pen once said: “we are absolutely not a rightist party; those who believe it make a colossal interpretation error” (Le Pen as cited in Stockemer, 2017: 39).

The People and the Elite

In any event, the RN’s populist weltanschauung becomes evident if we consider the nine important aspects from Tarchi’s theoretical framework. As explained above, populists view “the people” as a cohesive and virtuous community which functions as the basis of legitimation for government action. This view is coherently reflected in the RN’s party manifesto (the “22 Measures” on its website), given we find within it not only the promotion of private property (essentially “facilitation of access” to it), but also that of social housing for French citizens – excluding immigrants (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 17). Government action is justified on the basis that large infrastructure developments, and the construction of 100,000 (plus 20,000 for young people) new social housing units, will only be provided for those struggling citizens who are legally French (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 17). Under these circumstances, immigrants/foreigners are not a priority, as they are considered to be part of an “outgroup”[13] that is neither “cohesive” (as migrants in France may originate from distinct “non-homogeneous” countries) nor “virtuous” (as populists perceive them as a burden to the public resources system). The idea is that regarding economic state protection they do not deserve to have the same rights of the French, who are part of an “organic community” (Zanatta, 2016: 65-80), thus supposedly both cohesive and virtuous at the same time. Moreover, even if M. Le Pen states that she “has nothing against foreigners,” her party clearly opposes free education to the children of illegal immigrants (The Guardian, December 8, 2016). Supposedly under foreign influence, French elites (the “UMPS[14] system”) have disproportionately provided privileges (such as social housing) to immigrants that should have never been welcomed into France initially (Dézé, 2014: 24).

This takes us to the negative view of the elite these right-wing populists hold. According to M. Le Pen, it is “time to free the French people from arrogant elites” (see Acton, 2017). Even though the RN’s manifesto currently lacks explicitly anti-EU statements—aside from the aim to “protect the economy” from “unfair competition” and to revise EU trade agreements—one of its major immigration policies is tied to the inherently anti-elitist principle of direct democracy. Through constant referendums, “the people” will be able to put an end to “settlement immigration/reunification” (of immigrant families), scrap residence permits for those who have not worked for a year and decide whether the processing of asylum applications should (or should not) occur in French territory (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 1). In summary, for the RN, anti-elitism primarily involves “giving people a voice.” While the manifesto conveys a positive view of popular decision-making, it simultaneously portrays professional politicians and technocratic elites in a very negative light. As previously mentioned, in populism, elites are seen as a dangerous power bloc that must be kept in check by the people through instruments of direct democracy (Tarchi, 2015: 125).

The Nation and the State

As Tarchi argues (and as we already know), in populist ideology the concept of people and nation are inextricably interconnected though the nation comes after the people (both as “hard-working” individuals and as a “homogenous” collective) given the nation is simply product of the cultural traditions of a people to whom it provides a stable identity(Tarchi, 2015: 125). In other words, it is the people and their cultural traditions that form the nation and not vice-versa. Interestingly, in the RN’s latest manifesto the concept of nation becomes conveniently – but also ideologically – almost indistinguishably linked and blurred with that of the state. As outlined earlier, the state is understood as nothing more an administrator of public interest that is entirely subordinate to the will of the people (Tarchi, 2015: 125). In fact, within the manifesto it is the state that works for the nation because a virtuous homogenous community composes the nation: theFrench people. Thus, the RN’s ideal state is people centric. Similarly to the American proto-populist Gettysburg Address – “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” This longing for an active and interventionist state becomes apparent in the RN’s policies regarding Islam. In the manifesto, a new strict law is proposed to combat Islamism (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 2). Islam itself is not regarded as French but is instead perceived as alien to the “cultural tradition” of French secular Republicanism (in the sense that this religion cannot be assimilated within it), and therefore is also an enemy to the nation-state (Genga, 2017). Nor is Islam regarded as something able to provide a “stable identity,” given populists suspect the presence of Muslims and Christians (as well as atheists) within the country concomitantly may stir religious and racial tensions among the populace. From a populist perspective, a populace should be monolithic and homogenous (Hameleers & Vliegenthart, 2019: 22).  

Proceeding to economic matters, all the anti-tax proposals the RN includes in its 22-point manifesto are aimed at French businesses owned by French businessmen (rassemblementnational.fr, Measures 4, 5, 8, and 12). The RN’s pledge to “support French families” through the removal of inheritance tax for low-middle income families (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 8), as well as its proposals to increase welfare support for French mothers with one or more children (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 8), is particularly symbolic of a strong state (that intervenes to improve people’s lives) for two reasons. The first has to do directly with populism and the second with social conservatism. Firstly, the RN wishes to present itself as a populist party therefore is required to pursue economic policies (such as subsidies and tax cuts) that favor the petite bourgeoisie and especially the working-class (see Kyle & Gultchin, 2018)Although the old Front National (like its successor today) was overall an inter-classist party, experts such as Nonna Mayer (1998) have pointed out that the vote for Le Pen in the 1995 Presidential elections was effectively a “class vote” – with several youngsters moving away from the PCF[15] towards the Front’s pseudo-socialist nationalism (Surel, 2002: 143-144). This author later coined the term “worker Le Penism” (Mayer, 1994). Following the same conceptual lead, Pascal Perrineau (1995) referred to this same phenomenon as “left Le Penism” (Perrineau, 1995: 243-261). These observations remain relevant today, as M. Le Pen enjoys broad consensus among the working classes from whom she consistently courts political support. Secondly, the RN is also inherently socially conservative (partially right-wing) and is therefore expected to financially assist single-mothers or larger   families with children to promote a “battle for births”[16], which is allegedly necessary to demographically boost the so-called “pure people” (term borrowed from Cas Mudde) of France. 

Society, the Individual, and the Leader

Moving on from the populist view of nation intertwined with that of state to that of society, it must be stressed that the RN’s positions on this matter are rather specific. M. Le Pen herself has notoriously stated that “multi-cultural societies are multi-conflict societies” (see Viscusi, 2017). This party is known to take a more (typically populist) exclusionary than inclusionary stance when it comes to society and its collectivist communitarian features. Parties like the RN view their country, its rural towns, metropolitan districts, provinces, and regions, as essentially constituting not only a sacred homeland, but also something of a heartland. Taggart defines a heartland as “a territory of the imagination…the heartland is that place, embodying the positive aspects of everyday life” (Taggart, 2002: 95). It is self-evident who belongs and who does not belong to this heartland (and society) (Taggart, 2002: 96-98). In this case, immigrants, religious fanatics, career politicians (M. Le Pen was a lawyer before entering politics), left-wing (anti-RN) activists, plutocrats with internationalist vocations, fifth columnists and foreign bodies, are certainly not part of the populist heartland (Taggart, 2002: 94). As a result, they are not included in the broader vision for French society that the RN upholds.

However, paradoxically, by observing the party’s manifesto for an ideal society we are also confronted with a more “liberal” or libertarian aspect of populist ideology. For example, populists recognize that people’s lives should often come before politics and the state. People are allowed to flourish economically and intellectually, to unleash their individual potential – “Voila, we’re all molded by our personal paths, which forge our sensibilities” argues the RN’s leader (see Gourevitch, 2015). M. Le Pen is supposedly pro-abortion (as long as it occurs within 14 weeks of pregnancy), pro-divorce, and pro-gay rights (as long as civil unions do not become marriage) (see Poirer, 2017). Contrastingly, she has also spoken out against a purely consumerist neoliberal individualism from an economic standpoint: “Our project is based on rejecting individualism and the power of money” (Smith, 2018). 

Furthermore, closely observing the RN, one can deduce that the party acknowledges individuals are the cornerstone of social life. M. Le Pen ardently defends the civil individual rights of the French people. For instance, unlike Jean-Marie’s old Front, the RN’s positions are now – to a limited extent – sometimes feminist (see Schurts, 2024). On one occasion, the RN’s leader expressed that utilizing a headscarf to meet an Islamic leader (the Grand Mufti of Lebanon) would be in conflict with the values of French republicanism and those of a free (liberal egalitarian) society, where both sexes enjoy equal rights (see Balkiz & Masters, 2017). “I will not cover myself up” M. Le Pen stressed while referring to her meeting, which eventually was cancelled (Balkiz & Masters, 2017). For the same reasons, she proposes a complete ban on headscarves and burkas in public spaces (see France24, April 7, 2022). Populist crypto-individualism also played a role in her decision to not support a ban on abortion – any mention to this issue is absent in her “22-measures” as well as in her self-authored books (Tarchi, 2022: 13). Also, M. Le Pen unequivocally condemned those religious fundamentalists who despise gay people (Wildman, 2017). 

Taking this into account, to cast herself as a spokesperson and interpreter of the needs of the people, her leadership style embodies the populist ideal. The policies outlined for the RN not only position her as a leader close to the people, but her personal traits, which emphasize “ordinary qualities” like “common sense” and a “strong work ethic” (see Ivaldi & Mazzoleni, 2019: 1), also resonate positively with the populace. Moreover, in order to appeal to a more moderate base of working-class conservative supporters, she often reiterates that she is (like many others in France) a woman and a mother (Geva, 2020: 13-14). In the eyes of the many, M. Le Pen has become a “woman in a captain’s suit,” just as popular as Margaret Thatcher and Evita Peron in the past (Geva, 2020: 6,14). In a typically populist fashion, this female politician wants to demonstrate that she has both ordinary and extraordinary qualities that can both represent and lead the populace at the same time. As a natural guide, it is common for her to remind her potential voters that “Peuple de France, l’heure est venue de te lever” (Le Pen, April 21, 2022, Twitter). This is an invitation for “the people” of the French nation to rise-up. To rise not only against the neoliberal elite in France, but also against the diktats of the elite-backed European Union that are supposedly promoting and funding mass immigration, and finally against the traditional parties (neo-Gaullists, socialists, and communists) that are engaged in destroying the social fabric of the “homogenous” French nation.

Democracy and the Market

Marion Marechal Le Pen at the European election campaign launch meeting of the far-right “Reconquete” party in Paris, France, on March 10, 2024. Photo: Victor Velter.

To conclude this section, the relationship that M. Le Pen’s party has with democracy and the market is ambiguous, to say the least. Like all populists, the RN has an impatience with checks and balances (the formalities of liberal constitutionalism – e.g., political mediation and procedural legitimacy) that are an essential aspect of liberal democracy (see Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2017: 327). Nevertheless, this party does not reject representative democracy overall. The RN’s view of democracy is simply of one that is direct and majoritarian. In its manifesto, referendums and plebiscites occupy the first position (in terms of “22 measures” to be taken). Accordingly, people will be able to decide on issues that affect their lives, ranging all the way from immigration to social housing and labor regulation (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 1). 

Regarding the market, the sociologist Lorenzo Cattani (2017) has appropriately suggested that M. Le Pen’s party is a “bearer of neoliberal values ​​regarding the national economy but at the same time also strongly critical of globalization and the more internationalist principles of neoliberalism.” Following this logic, it can be assumed that even though M. Le Pen’s technically opposes both unrestricted free trade and autarky, she still considers the market an overall as “somethingpositive and therefore advocates for protectionism as a middle-way (Cattani, 2017). Her economic positions have been significantly influenced by the French Eurosceptic economist Maurice Allais (1911-2010), which explains her past critique of the single currency, European integration, and the European constitution. Similarly, M. Le Pen’s niece and (now former) important party representative, Marion-Maréchal Le Pen, has very clearly expressed that “a form of protectionism should be enforced at a national level, at least on strategic areas such as agriculture” (The Sydney Morning Herald, August 3, 2013). 

The RN accepts (and even welcomes) the existence of private property, entrepreneurship, and a social-market economy, given the party is not fully anti-capitalist. Notwithstanding, the core idea is that small and medium businesses should be taxed much less and allowed to operate under a diminished amount of bureaucracy and regulation (especially EU regulation) whereas large, delocalized business (especially multinationals, a product of so-called “rootless capitalism”) should be increasingly taxed and monitored by the state (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 18; see also Cattani, 2017). The latter are suspected to conspire against the interests of the working people (and their small-medium businesses) and the French nation (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 18). In the RN’s rhetoric, the evils of globalized capitalism are juxtaposed to the virtues of national-capitalism (Cattani, 2017), practiced day-to-day by the petite bourgeoisie – mainly craftsmen, tradesmen, fishermen, landowning farmers, and smaller-scale (local) entrepreneurs. They are ultimately considered to be the only “pure people” (to borrow Mudde’s term once more) of the nation.

Forza Nuova (FN): A History

Anti-fascist demonstration against the Candidate in the Primaries of the fascist part of Forza Nuova in Turin, Italy on March 1, 2018. Photo: Stefano Guidi.

The Early Years 

Unlike the French populists, the extreme right party Forza Nuova (FN) does not have a particularly long or complex history. True to its name, this party can be considered a “new force” with a relatively brief history. This history is deeply embedded in the tradition of Italian Fascism and appears quite transparent and straightforward to external observers. However, the brevity of its history does not make it unremarkable. On the contrary, being an organization founded by two alleged “terrorists”—Roberto Fiore and Massimo Morsello (also a musician alongside his political activism)—FN has attracted significant interest from journalists and political analysts who study the European extreme right. In 1980, both Fiore and Morsello fled Italy to seek political asylum in Britain as they were being investigated for the Bologna Massacre (August 2, 1980, which resulted in 85 deaths and 200 injuries), one of the darkest moments in the political history of the Italian Republic (Corriere della Sera, October 10, 2021; Nazzi, 2021).

In London, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Fiore had the opportunity to develop political and economic networks with British neofascist groups, supposedly with the help of BNP frontman Nick Griffin, and to establish successful businesses in the hospitality sector before returning to Italy without facing prosecution (Biondani et al., 2017). Due to these factors, along with the fact that the organization and its leader, Fiore, are openly fascist, FN represents an atypical example of an extreme right party. Founded in late September 1997, on the feast day of St. Michael the Archangel (Nazzi, 2017), FN aimed to reflect a niche form of Italian neofascism that was clerical (and fervently Roman Catholic) rather than secular (unlike CasaPound, another Italian neofascist movement) and traditionalist rather than futurist (Albanese, 2022: 317-318). Thus, ideologically, FN can be unequivocally placed on the ultra-authoritarian extreme right. More importantly, since its inception, FN has refused to adopt the ideological syncretism and flexibility of other 1990s Italian neofascist movements, such as Pino Rauti’s Fiamma Tricolore. This is why it positions itself on the far right of the artificial spectrum of Italian neofascism, which, as writer Giano Accame (1990) argues, includes both “right-wing” and “left-wing” elements. In any case, with FN, both Fiore and Morsello—who “cut their teeth” during the dark days of the Anni di Piombo through participation in violent actions of extra-parliamentary groups like Terza Posizione (“Third Position”) and the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (“Armed Revolutionary Nuclei” – NAR)—aimed to project fascism into the third millennium (Nazzi, 2017; Albanese, 2022: 317).

First Set of Elections: Failure in Pursuit

Like many European neofascists who wish to compete electorally, their primary objective was (and still is, as Fiore is alive, unlike Morsello) to turn their ideology in an “incubator for a new political model based on an old-fashioned design” – as the scholar Matteo Albanese (2002: 321) posits. However, if we solely consider FN’s electoral results, and compare them to other contemporary parties who have instead evolved from extreme right to moderate right (such as Alleanza Nazionale or FDI in the recent past) FN failed miserably. The only times it competed at a national level (in 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2018) it merely achieved less than one percent (the highest score was in 2006 with 0.67% in the Chamber of Deputies of Italy) with none of its candidates ever entering parliament (Ministero dell’Interno, Eligendo L’Archivio, 2024). Only in the 2004 European elections, by presenting a joint list of candidates alongside Alessandra Mussolini’s (the granddaughter of the DuceAlternativa Sociale did FN perform slightly better, managing to obtain 1.23% (Ministero dell’Interno, Eligendo L’Archivio, 2024). Notwithstanding, the only seat available in the EU Parliament went to the most prominent figure from the grouping – Mussolini herself. 

Alliances, Assaults, and Attempts 

However, Fiore eventually managed to become a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) through FN and its alliances, serving in Brussels and Strasbourg from May 2008 to July 2009. Fiore’s activism at a supranational level involved consolidating his ties with other European neofascists within the EU Parliament. Together with the notorious Nick Griffin, he founded an ultra-nationalist group called the Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF), which was also pan-European and “anti-Zionist.” The APF included the extreme right United Romania Party, the Romanian-Moldovan Noua Dreaptă (New Right), several Spanish Falangist parties, and Neo-Nazi organizations from Germany, Greece, Czechia, and Slovakia (see www.memri.org, April 18, 2024).

Nonetheless, throughout the 2010s, FN remained on the fringes of Italian and European politics. However, the party gained attention after some of its members, including Fiore, were involved in violent acts, such as the assault on the Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGIL), the country’s oldest and most important trade union, on October 9, 2021. This incident brought FN back into the spotlight, drawing scrutiny from the public, media, police, judiciary, and other authorities (Il Sole 24 Ore, December 20, 2023). As a result, in the winter of 2023, Fiore and others involved were sentenced to over eight years in prison, though FN itself was not disbanded (Il Sole 24 Ore, December 20, 2023; Girardi, 2022). In an interview following a small political gathering in Isernia, Molise, where he was praised by supporters, Fiore stated that despite his criminal charges, FN would attempt to participate in the 2024 European Elections (Fiore, TVI Molise, December 23, 2023). He emphasized the importance of this period for Italy, possibly hinting at a resurgence of fascism with a pseudo-populist tone (Fiore, TeleRegione TV, December 23, 2023). However, FN failed to gather enough preliminary signatures to present a candidates list for the EU elections in June 2024. With Fiore’s sentencing, the future of FN and Italian militant neofascism remains uncertain. 

Forza Nuova (FN): Ideological Profile

Hitler and Mussolini in Munich, Germany, June 18, 1940. Photo: Everett Collection.

Marginal and Controversial, but not Irrelevant

Forza Nuova (FN) is an extreme right party that is both marginal and controversial in Italian politics. It is marginal because, despite consistently participating in Italian general elections since 1997, FN has never reached the four percent threshold required to enter parliament. It is controversial due to its semi-personalist leadership and historical ties to the militant, violent, and subversive Italian neofascist movement active during the “Anni di piombo” (“Years of Lead”) (Biondani et al., 2017). Fiore, the party’s leader, openly expresses admiration for Mussolini’s twenty-year dictatorship and the Italian Social Republic (RSI), as well as for other authoritarian leaders like Juan Perón in Argentina (Fiore, La7, October 28, 2012). In a 2012 television appearance discussing fascism and neofascism, Fiore admitted, “I’ve always defended fascism; every time I was asked whether I would have sided with the Americans or the RSI (during WWII), I’ve always responded – with the RSI” (Fiore, La7, October 28, 2012). Despite differentiating his ideology from National Socialism, he also refused to distance himself from Neo-Nazi movements like Golden Dawn when questioned during the same show (Fiore, La7, October 28, 2012).

Taking all of this into account, FN’s electoral marginality does not render it irrelevant in the political arena or diminish its potential threat to a liberal-democratic polity. First and foremost, some party members have engaged in premeditated attacks on immigrants over the years—between November 2012 and November 2013, there were more than fifty racially motivated assaults (Fiano and redazione Roma Online, 2016). Second, in addition to Fiore, two key FN representatives—Giuliano Castellino and Luca Castellini—along with five other extreme right activists indirectly connected to the party, were officially charged for their violent assault on the CGIL in October 2021 (Il Sole 24 Ore, December 20, 2023). This incident was taken very seriously by Italian public opinion, politicians, the judiciary, and other state authorities. Graphic images of the violent protest circulated in the press, raising concerns among parts of the population about a possible resurgence of neofascism, even if on a limited scale.

Authoritarian, Anti-democracy, and Nationalist?

If we reconsider the three/four elements that Carter (2005) argues constitute the ideological core of the extreme right, it becomes clear that FN is unequivocally an extreme right party, as these elements are integral to its ideological repertoire. First, FN is explicitly authoritarian, advocating for the forced repatriation of all immigrants, regardless of their legal status in Italy (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 3). Second, it is anti-democratic because the majority of its policies are impossible to implement within a rule-of-law system upheld by Italian (anti-fascist) constitutionalism, where the parliament plays a crucial role. Third, FN embraces both exclusionary and holistic nationalism. Its recurring propaganda posters, which depict black people as “rapists” or sub-human, exemplify exclusionary nationalism (see Il Fatto Quotidiano, September 2, 2017). In contrast, its calls for an “organic state”—a statist and corporatist model where the state, nation, religion, people, and “blood and soil” are so interwoven that they cannot be separated—demonstrate holistic nationalism (see Vercelli, 2018). Any reformulation that separates the Italian nation-state from its people’s religion, culture, territory, and biological characteristics would, in FN’s view, lead to the decay and eventual death of the nation. After all, fascists have always been obsessed not only with the idea of palingenesis (see Griffin, 1996) but also with that of decay or decadence (for a full account, see Schulman, 2006). Moreover, when adapting FN’s manifesto and discourse (primarily that of leader Fiore) to Tarchi’s (2015: 125) comprehensive scheme that examines nine aspects of party ideology—such as the people, nation, state, and society—it becomes undeniably clear where Fiore’s organization stands politically.

The People, the Nation, and the State

To begin this party’s analysis by observing its view of the people, it should be noted that – as a party influenced by fascism – FN unsurprisingly does not hold a particularly optimistic perspective of human nature or the masses per se. In Mussolini’s words: “The Fascist conception of the State is all embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value…the Fascist State – interprets, develops, and empowers the whole life of a people” (Mussolini & Gentile, 1932: 847). In FN’s case, although people are functional to its long-term statist political aspirations, unless they are forcefully guided, either by a charismatic leader or a strong state’s elite, they can never be trusted to willingly find their path or positively serve the country. Ironically, it was the proto-liberal Rousseau (in 1762) and not a fascist intellectual that stated, “people need to be forced to be free,” still this appears to be FN’s idea if we observe its policies such as the nationalization of banks (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 5). If such policy is carried forward, the forzanovisti[17] insist that “all the people of the earth can be free from their usurpers” (Ibid). This phrase is present in their online manifesto and appears to contain an implicit reference to the centenarian Jewish world-domination conspiracy theory. A much more explicit reference can, however, be found in a 2019 la7 (private television network) interview provided from FN’s “National Vice-Secretary” Luca Castellini who claims that “they control the world” when Jews are mentioned in relation to a rise in antisemitism (Castellini, La7, October 18, 2019). 

Another conception of the people that FN’s appears to have is that all European nations (hence also Italian people) should be freed from the shackles of the European Union (EU), which is to be replaced with a much more authoritarian confederation loosely based around the ethics of Blut und Boden (“Blood and Territory”) but also with inspiration from the Romano-Greek classical model (Fiore, Forza Nuova, YouTube, March 9, 2011). As a proud fascist, Fiore inevitably sees Italy as a direct cultural (and perhaps even political) product of that millenarian historic tradition and perceives Italians as the direct descendants of Ancient Romans and Ancient Greeks (Ibid). In essence, FN’s ideal Europe is a “Europe of free peoples” (FN general elections program, 2013, point 18). He goes into more detail throughout an interview closely preceding the 2019 European elections where he states that “we cannot have a liberal-masonic Europe with no values at the heart of it…we cannot have a neo-internationalism which is a re-formulation of Marxism in a European form, we need patriotism, we need religious values, but more importantly: we cannot destroy the family because family is the primary cell for the national and European re-construction” (Fiore, Porta a Porta, May 16 2019). 

FN’s idea of a (culturally, morally, spiritually and perhaps racially) purified and independent nation explains its decades-old anti-globalist campaign. According to FN, leaving the EU, NATO, the UN, and other strategic alliances and international bodies means liberating Italy from the influence of inimical foreign powers that do not share the same destiny with Italy (FN general elections program, 2013, point 18). Not merely the Germans and the French who supposedly run the neoliberal and market-oriented EU, but especially the Americans (sworn enemies of the fascists since WW2) who serve the interests of their own military-industrial complex (FN rejects US-led war campaigns abroad) but also prone to the whims of big capitalists (e.g. Wall Street) who are – following an antisemitic conspiratorial “logic” – mostly Jewish (Fiore, ANSA, January 20, 2024; Berizzi, 2023). Nevertheless, a monist homogenous nation cannot exist without a strong authoritative state. FN unapologetically supports corporatism (in all areas of the economy) to “defend workers” (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 8). Also, protectionist measures and economic nationalism in general are recommended by the forzanovisti and its leadership. FN is averse to neoliberalism (both cultural and economic) and condemns the EU for embracing several aspects of the neoliberal economy, especially the third sector which is not regarded as highly as the first (raw materials, agriculture) and second (manufacturing) sectors of the economy (FN general elections program, 2013, point 12).

Society: “God, Homeland, and Family”

Regarding society, the societal vision of FN encompasses the “GodHomeland, and Family” value triad (Berizzi, 2019). This was popularized under Mussolini’s regime however the slogan itself is much older as it was coined by the philosopher-activist Giuseppe Mazzini as he and his men forged Italy as one nation (Gnocchi, 2022). God as FN was founded under the supposed protection of St. Michael the Archangel (on the day of the recurring religious feast) with the intent of being a party with a robust attachment to Christianity and the Roman Catholic Church (Albanese, 2022: 317; Il Cittadino, September 30, 2017). FN’s online manifesto includes a restoration of the Concordat between Catholic Church and Italian State, where Church and State are not entirely divided, and the former serves the purpose of positively influencing future generations (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 8). In such context, Christianity itself is presented as something identitarian (rather than purely religious) as it is the unifying trait of this morally pure “Europe of the free people.” It serves the person of uniting[18] (white) Europeans for a new crusade against everything deemed “Un-European” (see Albanese, 2022: 321). Currently, particularly Islam, but also Judaism. More specifically, Fiore considers Islam excessively “archaic and fundamentalist” (Fiore, Forza Nuova YouTube, March 10, 2011). Homeland is also included in the triad because FN strongly believes that the primary purpose of any Italian political party should be that of fostering Italian culture and defending the rights and access to state resources of all native Italians (viewed as more important and perhaps even “superior”[19]) when juxtaposed to (non-European) foreigners (La Gazzetta di San Severo, May 6, 2017).

Last but not least, family occupies an important position in FN’s ideology as it is clearly tied to the fascist obsession with national rebirth (see Griffin, 1995). In fact, the term “national rebirth” unequivocally appears in FN’s manifesto (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 2). In the forzanovisti mindset, like in the animal kingdom, a people’s (or species’) survival (and “civilizational greatness”) depends on its ability of reproduction and survival. The Darwinian conception at the core of fascist ideology (see Hawkins, 2009) equates human society with the animal kingdom, where the strong prey upon the weak, and only the fittest survive. This “survival of the fittest” notion was even more pronounced in German National Socialism than in Italian Fascism (see Menton, 1994). In fact, 19th-century Prussian proto-fascists like Friedrich von Bernhardi argued that war was a “biological necessity” (Menton, 1994). As history unfolded, the Nazis began to idolize societies like Sparta, which strictly regulated births (favoring males while rejecting those with congenital defects) and was effectively a war-oriented society—a model admired by Nazi Joseph Goebbels (see Roche, 2013; Sciarri, 2020). Spartans were always ready to defend themselves but were also prone to clash with other civilizations. Similarly, the traditionalist society that FN envisions is one with rigid hierarchies, modeled after the nuclear family unit, where a woman’s role is confined to household chores, reproduction, and motherhood (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 2).

The Individual and the Leader

Moving on from society to the individual, it is certain that FN sees consumerism, hedonism, and egotistic individualism (supposedly encouraged by multi-cultural societies like the US) as abnormal and decadent (for an account of FN’s “anti-Americanism,” see Centin, 2020). Unsurprisingly, from this perspective, homosexuality is also considered abnormal and should be rebuked. One FN local propaganda poster from a small town in Tuscany (Lajatico) reads: “Lajatico needs children, not homosexuals” (La Nazione, February 28, 2023). Moreover, to protect a presumed social “order against chaos” (as another propaganda leaflet states) a country where there is a strong state that limits excess freedoms (especially of those considered abnormal) and individual rights is envisaged (Bologna Today, September 24, 2015). For instance, FN argues that abortions in all circumstances should be banned (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 1). Fiore himself is a devout Catholic and a father to 11 children (Fiore, as cited in Madron, 2015).

This takes us to FN’s fascistic idea that, regardless of what the circumstances are, a nation revolves around its leader. In a Weberian sense, as far as his supporters are concerned, Fiore is semi-charismatic. In a British documentary[20] he was defined as “highly charismatic” by British neofascists who knew him personally. He is generally perceived as a virile and stereotypically Mediterranean man who contributed to the national cause by fighting for a “third way” (Eatwell, 2017: 372-374; Bhen-Ghiat, 1996: 293) and a “new state” (a fascist one, purified from the sins of post-war capitalism and communism) and also by producing many offspring. Also, notwithstanding his age, Fiore has shown dedication to his militant street squads as he actively participates in the anti-globalist protests hosted by FN where clashes with groups of anti-fascists (the Italian branch of “Antifa”) and the police are expected (Journeyman Pictures, YouTube, December 10, 2018). Naturally, there is a fascistic aesthetic of violence in these demonstrations as FN’s representatives like Castellino claim that they use their “bodies as shields” against the political enemy (Castellino, La7, October 17, 2021), namely anti-fascists, communists, but also the Italian police working for the institutions neofascists repudiate.

Democracy and the Market

Given FN’s stance on democracy, it’s unsurprising that such a relationship is essentially nonexistent. Although FN participates in elections (unlike Fiore’s earlier subversive movement Terza Posizione), its leader has publicly stated, “we respect fascism” (Fiore, YouTube, February 19, 2018). This explains the manifesto’s policies, which are permeated with nostalgia for dictatorship and aim to eliminate the anti-fascist Scelba and Mancino Laws (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 7). The Scelba Law, established in 1952, was designed to constitutionally prevent the formation of a new fascist party that might attempt to reestablish Mussolini’s Partito Fascista Nazionale (PNF) and instill a dictatorship through revolutionary and violent means. The Mancino Law (1993) is broader, condemning any incitement of hatred based on racial, religious, or sexual discrimination. For evident reasons, FN opposes both laws (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 7).

Remaining on the issue of democracy, it’s notable that direct democracy and referendums are not mentioned even once in FN’s recent party manifestos (see forzanuova1997.it; FN general elections program, 2013). Furthermore, it’s evident that the Forzanovisti view freedom of association with suspicion. The manifesto outlines FN’s plan to ban all secret societies or sects, particularly those of a Masonic nature (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 4). These groups are seen as being in collusion with internationalist interests, ranging from Jewish financiers to high-end magnates like Carlo De Benedetti and George Soros, and other so-called “corrupt” (anti-Italian) elite groups—labeled as the “traitors of the homeland” (La Voce Del Trentino, August 26, 2022). Despite this, FN, as (neo-)fascists, aim to forge a “new man” and a new elite (Eatwell, 2010). This spiritual aristocracy, based on the theories of the reactionary intellectual Julius Evola, is expected to emerge from Fiore’s small but loyal group of supporters, including his close associates Castellino, Cabras, and Taormina (Berizzi, 2021). In fact, during and after the Covid-19 pandemic, FN’s alarming plan was to form an emergency “shadow government for national liberation,” with Fiore as “Foreign Secretary,” to replace the elite from the Giuseppe Conte government and potentially put on trial those politicians (mainly left-leaning) who served in it (Berizzi, 2021).

Ultimately, when it comes to the market, FN’s positions are – as mentioned earlier – fully protectionist. According to this party, free markets are dangerous, since they are prone to the control of neoliberal elite interests and of the US, through Wall-Street (Fiore, Il Sole 24 Ore, January 20, 2024). Of course, alongside the US, Israel is also a sworn enemy (Berizzi, 2023). These anti-market tendencies are also displayed in FN’s 2013 program where it is postulated that there should be a “special court for crimes of financial (banking) nature” (FN general elections program, 2013, point 6). FN’s affinity for the concept of economic sovereignty emerges from their anti-ECB, anti-IMF, and anti-international “debt collectors” positions (forzanuova1997.it, point 5). The older 2013 program also states that there should be full state “control of the strategic sectors of the economy” (FN general elections program, 2013, point 4). However, even whilst FN is a pro-state illiberal party that yearns to control the Italian economy thoroughly, it does include in its agenda measures to tackle excessive bureaucracy to please the (national) small-medium businesses belonging to the first two sectors of the economy (FN general elections program, 2013, points 2, 14). Hypothetically, these anti-bureaucracy and anti-tax policies are listed in the hope of attracting a minority of lower-middle-class voters who remain nostalgic for fascism and the era when the trains supposedly “ran on time.”

Discussion and Conclusion: Why Populism and Extreme Right Differ

Discussion

As the emeritus professor Roger Eatwell (2017) appropriately argues “of all the major ‘-isms’, fascism and populism are the most elusive” (Eatwell, 2017: 363). Taking this into account, both are not elusive to the point that scholars would not be able to discern their distinctive and incongruous features. Specifically, as it has been demonstrated in previous paragraphs, even if the RN and FN do hold minor ideological similarities, the two parties have major conflicting views on how the state, society, and other aspects of politics per se should function. For the RN, the people are a cohesive group of free individuals who should always be given a voice, given they are considered to be at the center of political decision-making processes, regardless of whether such processes take place at a national or supranational (e.g. the EU) level. The direct democracy ideal that M. Le Pen’s party promotes (see Quencez and Michelot, 2017: 6) is an evident demonstration of the French populist’s attachment to a majoritarian form of popular sovereignty and traditional republican principles. “Direct democracy permits a true exercise of democracy itself” is what M. Le Pen exclaimed on one occasion (Finchelstein, 2017).  In essence, as right-wing populists harbor a positive sentiment towards the populace, they believe people can be vertically integrated into the legislative and executive spheres of governance (see Mohrenberg et al., 2019). The people are trusted to make the correct (“common-sense”) decisions when asked to vote on critical issues concerning the EU, immigration policy, and/or taxes. 

Contrastingly, being clearly located on the extreme right fringe of the spectrum, Fiore’s FN does not give the same amount of attention to popular sovereignty. In this Italian case, the people are not a primary aspect of politics and are overall viewed in a subtly more negative light. References to direct democracy practices are not present in FN’s discourse and electoral manifesto(s). In a classical fascist (but also neofascist) worldview, people (as an indifferent, “plebian and insubordinate mass”) can rarely be trusted to make the correct decisions (see Landa, 2018). Fully statist, authoritarian measures, from the “top-down” are usually preferred to the “bottom-up” instruments of direct democracy on a regular basis. It is no coincidence that historically fascists used to ban elections rather than expand them through referenda (Finchelstein, 2017). However, on rare occasions, fascist regimes did support plebiscites when popular consensus was already on their side, in order to further consolidate their power, when in reality important political decisions had already been made from a nationalist elite at the top (Finchelstein, 2017; Ben-Ghiat, 2023). This explains Fiore’s intentions to put in place an unelected “emergency government” (with a pre-defined elite taken from FN’s ranks) to set the country’s direction. 

In fact, the elite is fundamental to the extreme right’s long-term political project, as it must dictate the correct path for the masses. Unlike right-wing populists, right-wing extremists do not aim to replace the elite with popular rule and tend to despise any form (primitive or modern) of ochlocracy (Landa, 2018). Naturally, from this perspective, both direct democracy and representative democracy are viewed as dangerous and decadent liberal (post-French revolution) bourgeois inventions. In the past, scholars like Mudde have argued that there are two opposites to populism: pluralism and elitism (Mudde, 2017: 34). For obvious reasons, the extreme right is not pluralist (and under this specific aspect it is similar to populism), but it is instead elitist (Mudde, 2015), and this is where right-wing extremism diverges from right-wing populism. 

Furthermore, although it may appear that RN’s and FN’s idea of nation is similar, as both promote a homogenous community with a stable cultural identity that resists the fast-paced changes of modernity brought about by neoliberalism, multi-culturalism, and social progressivism, even on this matter FN’s positions are more extreme. M. Le Pen’s party is opposed to multi-culturalism as accordingly there should only be one defining culture in France shared by all French people, and this should directly derive from the country’s historical republican tradition (Genga, 2017). Such tradition may be old-fashioned or partially conservative but is also distinctly democratic and anti-fascist. Thus, the cultural traditions of the people occupy a paramount position in the idea of what the French nation should appear like. Instead, FN’s vision of nation is necessarily minoritarian, mainly because fascism in Italy (unlike republicanism in France) is not embraced by the majority of the populace, but merely by a small authoritarian minority of dictatorship nostalgics (Senatore, YouTrend, March 24, 2018). Constitutionally, with its many checks and balances, Italy remains a staunchly anti-fascist country (D’Ascenzo, 2018). 

Regarding the RN, the “Français d’abord!” slogan essentially implies that second and third generation immigrants who were born in France are effectively part of “the people” and community (or heartland) hence it is not required of them to leave (see Lesueur, 2024). Additionally, whilst under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s management the party’s principal slogan was “France belongs to the French!” it appears that under M. Le Pen another slogan has become predominant (Fini, La7, November 13, 2015). This would be the more moderate (and somewhat neo-Gaullist) motto “France belongs to those who love it!” (Fini, La7, November 13, 2015). Interestingly, under this aspect the FN differs from the RN as well. It transpires from the agenda and discourse of the former party that even those who were born in Italy to foreign parents should be repatriated, as they are not considered Italian due to their ethnicity (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 3). One can deduce that while right-wing populist parties (as the RN) oppose multi-culturalism but not necessarily multi-racialism(e.g. someone with foreign parents but who is born in France is considered French), extreme right parties (as FN) object to both multi-culturalism and multi-racialism (see Berizzi, 2017). Uncoincidentally, Fiore’s party campaigned against the Ius Soli[21] and is only in favor of the Ius Sanguinis[22] when it comes to citizenship (Fiore, la Nuova Provincia, 2013). Slogans and posters of FN (such as those where African males are seen raping women) do not exist in the propaganda of M. Le Pen’s RN as this party does not stand for biological racism. Whilst right-wing populists may be “culturist” (see Taguieff, 1993: 101), and believe that some cultures (supposedly Western democratic liberalism) are “superior” to others, unlike right-wing extremists they will rarely ever express that certain races are (genetically) superior to others. Nevertheless, FN appears less concerned about immigration from white-majority Christian countries perceived to be similar to Italy (Fiore, la Nuova Provincia, 2013). 

According to the RN’s ideology, the state occupies an important position and should intervene where and whenever necessary. However, in its populist (and “non-fascist”) conception, the state is always subordinate to the volonté générale (Tarchi, 2015: 125). In other words, the state should only mediate to ameliorate the living and working conditions of the people (especially working class and lower-middle class citizens) when free market fails to do so. This occurs through “social-populist” measures such as state-funded healthcare programs, public welfare benefits, and state subsidies or tax cuts for poorer families and individuals. Like the RN, FN envisions an actively interventionist state. However, FN takes this concept further, as fascists see the state as superordinate to both the people and the nation. In other words, the state shapes the nation, even artificially, if necessary, as historically seen in classical fascism, and grants the people only a limited set of rights. This is different from populist ideology as in populism the existence of people’s rights precedes that of the formation of a state. Unlike in populism – where individuals are expected to remain unpolitical and “get on with their lives” – in fascist ideology the individual (both men and women, in distinct ways) is expected to participate in politics and public life. In fact, Italian fascist philosopher Giovanni Gentile, who wrote one of fascism’s foundational texts alongside Mussolini, spoke of an ethical state to “teach core values to the new man, unlike the liberal state with its relativist distinction between private and public spheres” (Eatwell, 2017: 372).

The neofascists of the FN want a corporatist state that controls most (if not all) areas of the economy. Whereas the populists of the RN expect the state to control only certain strategic sectors and support interventionism (under the form of protectionism) in areas such as agriculture supposedly under threat from the EU’s bureaucratic regulation. This RN outlook may be considered authoritarian but is not as authoritarian as FN’s. After all, as one historian wrote, populism awkwardly lies “between democracy and dictatorship” but is still not dictatorial (Finchelstein, 2017: 175). To be sure, FN does not support globalization and free markets at all. In relation to the market, it takes on a crypto-autarchic (Fiore’s admiration for Iceland’s economy speaks volumes) and corporatist tradition of economic self-sufficiency (especially in terms of agriculture, construction, manufacturing) that is inspired by classical fascism (Fiore, Porta a Porta, May 29, 2009). As shown before, FN is extremely critical of internationalist capitalism. Instead, the RN’s position towards free markets and trade is more flexible and less negative than FN’s. However, in similar fashion to FN it does advocate for protectionism and state dirigisme in certain strategic areas of the economy, principally the first sector. Nonetheless, both right-wing populist and right-wing extremist parties believe in forms of taxation that cannot be considered fully socialist. 

Overall, right-wing populists and right-wing extremists also hold different views when it comes to society. The society RN envisions is more liberal than FN’s. Even critiques to immigration (particularly Islamic immigration) derive from a universalist, republican, and partially liberalist standpoint (Genga, 2017; see also Brubaker, 2017, who defines this stance “civilizationism”). For example, the defense of women’s rights and those of the “LGBTQ+” community occupies a relevant position in the RN’s political-societal agenda. The same thing cannot be said about FN, a party that – unlike the RN – is not at all secular and is openly hostile to homosexuality. In fact, it is interesting to note that apart from sporadic statements claiming certain aspects of Islam are “archaic” the Italian neofascists do not give much attention to Islam or criticize it excessively. One hypothesis is that they derive this attitude directly from classical fascist ideology. It is known that Mussolini self-proclaimed himself the “protector of Islam” after he was granted a sword from the chief of a Libyan Berber tribe (Alpozzi, 2017). Although there were Muslims detained in Nazi Germany’s concentration camps (see Starr, 2020), Hitler, too, was not always Islamophobic, and allowed many Muslim soldiers to be recruited in the Waffen-SS(Trigg, 2012; Bougarel, 2017). In more recent times, FN and Fiore have been strong supporters of not only the pro-Palestine movement (also unapologetically defending Hamas, see Berizzi, 2023) but have also championed countries that are Arabic and Islamic (e.g. Assad’s Syria) or not Arabic but still Islamic (e.g. Iran), as they see them as potential allies in the struggle against Americanism and Zionism (Strickland, 2018). In any case, paradoxically, this does not mean that the forzanovisti welcome immigration from Muslim countries (Il Fatto Quotidiano, January 10, 2015). Fiore’s FN is vehemently anti-Atlanticist, whilst under M. Le Pen the RN has undergone an ideological mutation becoming less hostile to the Atlantic alliance compared to her father, who supported Reagan’s domestic policy (Tarchi, 2015: 123) but not US foreign policy.

Based on the analysis, we can also infer that whilst populism is understood to be a much more communitarian (and sometimes even collectivist) ideology rather than an individualistic one (see Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: Chapter 1). Populists do not expect to control individuals through the state and acknowledge the fact that party and politics should not be involved in all aspects of private life (Taggart, 2002: 97; 2018). As already mentioned, as a peculiar populist party, the RN tolerates abortion, divorce, homosexuality (to some degree) and certain feminist positions (for an account of M. Le Pen’s “new feminism” see Shurts, 2024). Instead, as an extreme right and/or neofascist party, the FN accepts none of those things. FN’s ideological attachment to the ultra-conservative “GodHomeland, and Family” triad means that if individuals do not actively practice their Christian religion, serve their nation, and engage in heterosexual relationships that through social conformism lead to the birth of children, they cannot ever be a positive “component of the nation.” Therefore, they automatically become part of an (unwanted and unnecessary) “outgroup.”

When it comes to leadership, both the right-wing populist RN and right-wing extremist FN have semi-charismatic leaders. Evidently, without M. Le Pen in charge, the RN would be a very different party reflecting different positions. It is possible (or even likely) that having a divorced female and mother as leader, the RN has been able to expand its message to attract the votes of French women, but also of those segments of the electorate that do not identify as “right-wing” but are not located on the left either. With her semi-personalist leadership (but also relying on the advice of loyal subordinates like Bardella and Philippot) holds a firm grip on her party (governing with an “iron fist”) and determines most of its policies (Stockemer, 2017: 47-48). Currently, she faces almost no challenge from the minoritarian Catholic-Conservative faction of the party that feels closer to her niece Marion-Maréchal Le Pen (Genga, 2017: 209), as since May 2017 Marion has not been part of the RN but has lately joined a rival party on the right called Reconquête! (Darmanin, 2022). 

Similarly, within FN Fiore faces no internal competition, and is considered to be (as one of the veterans of the 1970s neofascist militias) the only one able to guide the Italian nation and put an end to its (supposed) cultural and economic decay. However, there is an important distinction to be made, M. Le Pen is understood to be herself part of the ordinary people who as well as possessing ordinary qualities (such as being a mother to three children) is also blessed with the gift of being able to be a political animal and influence France’s current affairs – by being a bulwark against the elitist neo-Gaullist and socialist parties. Contrastingly, non-populist extreme right parties like FN are generally unable to attract a large number of followers, therefore rely only on winning over “converts” or “fervid disciples” (see Weyland, 2017: 63-65). Within his organization Fiore (who is understood to possess fascist extraordinary qualities, rather than populist ordinary ones) plays essentially the same role Mussolini played within the 1920s PNF. He is expected to spiritually inspire and guide both the nation and the people to indicate a common destiny for all Italians. A destiny that according to the FN’s leader will have to necessarily lie outside the boundaries of the EU and the American (NATO) sphere of influence (Fiore, ANSA, January 20, 2024).

Conclusion

In this contribution, Tarchi’s theoretical framework, along with a manifesto and discourse analysis methodology, was utilized to compare the ideological positions of a French populist party and an Italian extreme right party. Results of the manifesto and discourse analysis palpably show that while Forza Nuova (FN) is unequivocally a neofascist party belonging to the extreme right, the position of the Rassemblement National (RN) on the political spectrum is slightly more difficult to discern. While the RN certainly embraces a radical understanding of politics – incompatible with center-right neoliberal and center-left social-democratic parties – it is also undeniably more moderate ideologically compared to the Italian FN. In all circumstances, when it comes to specific attitudes towards the peoplethe nationthe statesociety,the individualthe leaderthe elitedemocracy, and the market, “right-wing” populism is less extreme than “right-wing” neofascism. De facto, Mudde recently highlighted that populism may simply be “an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism” (Mudde, 2021: 5). 

Thus, we can deduce that even if some of the RN’s political positions may theoretically be “illiberal” and authoritative (or even semi-authoritarian, particularly on immigrant rights), they are not altogether undemocratic. In contrast, FN is not only illiberal and resolutely authoritarian but also undemocratic. This comes as no surprise, as fascism and neofascism are inherently undemocratic. Nonetheless, under M. Le Pen’s leadership, the RN has transformed from an extreme right party to a populist right party in an attempt to become more moderate, even embracing the universalist values of republicanism and democratic conservatism, as stressed by Genga (2017: 176-180). The RN is embarrassed by its “toxic” past and wants to gradually overcome it. On the other hand, under Fiore, FN has maintained an ideological attachment to the political history, culture, myths, and symbols of Italian Fascism, proudly emphasizing its links to the Republic of Salò and Mussolini’s twenty-year dictatorship. 

It is apparent that M. Le Pen’s party occupies a middle position peculiarly between those European parties like FN on the extreme right and those much more liberal-oriented on the center-right. This relatively new and complex position on the spectrum should today be understood as “right-wing populism” or “radical right-wing populism” (for those who prefer a slightly older or more precise academic terminology) and is occupied not only by M. Le Pen’s RN but also by many other parties on the European political landscape, such as the FPÖ, Lega Nord, PVV, Reform UK, Fidesz, and many others. All the parties mentioned are significantly more ideologically “moderate” compared to parties from the extreme (neofascist) right-wing family, such as FN itself, as well as CasaPound, España 2000, the NPD (now called Die Heimat), the BNP, Golden Dawn, Ergue-te and the “National Bolshevik” neo-Nazi groups present in modern-day Russia. 

In conclusion, to comprehend the implications for liberal-democratic settings worldwide during and after this new wave of populism, it is crucial to first distinguish how populism differs from its outdated (and more revolutionary) “predecessor,” fascism. Future comparative studies ideally could involve detailed analysis of how populist parties and extreme right parties similarly or distinctly affect a democratic country’s rule of law and individual rights when in power.


(*) DR. AMEDEO VARRIALE earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. He previously obtained a Bachelor of Arts with Honors in Politics and International Relations from Kingston University in 2016 and a Master of Arts from the University of Westminster. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism. During his academic career, Dr. Varriale contributed as a research assistant to the development of a significant textbook project on the global resurgence of nationalism, titled “The New Nationalism in America and Beyond,” co-authored by Robert Schertzer and Eric Taylor Woods. He has written for ECPS before but has also been published by other academic outlets ranging from the Journal of Dialogue Studies to UEL’s Crossing Conceptual Boundaries


 

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Taggart, P.A. (1996). The New Populism and the New Politics. Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Macmillan Press. 

Taguieff, P.-A. (1993). “From race to culture: the new right’s view of European identity.” Telos, pp. 99–123. 

Tarchi, M. (2002). “Dal neofascismo al nazionalpopulismo. La parabola dell’estrema destra europea.” Italiani Europei. September 2, 2002. https://italianieuropei.it/en/component/k2/item/1045-dal-neofascismo-al-nazionalpopulismo-la-parabola-dellestrema-destra-europea.html (accessed on July 8, 2024).

Tarchi, M. (2015). Italia populista. Dal qualunquismo a Beppe Grillo. 2nd edn. Il Mulino. 

Tarchi, M. (2022). “Il sovranismo di Meloni non è il populismo di Le Pen.” Scenari. December 9, 2022. pp. 12–13. 

Tarchi, M. and De Feudis, M. (2015). ‘L’intervista. Tarchi: “La Le Pen? Per l’Eliseo non basta essere leader del partito più votato”.” Barbadillo

Eatwell, R. (2009). “The nature of ‘generic fascism’: the ‘fascist minimum’ and the ‘fascist matrix’.” In: C. Iordachi (Ed.), Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives. Routledge.

Trigg, J. (2012). Hitler’s Jihadis: Muslim Volunteers of The Waffen-Ss (Hitler’s Legions). Illustrated Edition. The History Press. 

Trippenbach, I. and Johannès, F. (2022). “Marine Le Pen wants to govern by referendum, bypassing Parliament and the Constitutional Council.” Le Monde. April 14, 2022. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/2022-presidential-election/article/2022/04/14/marine-le-pen-wants-to-govern-by-referendum-bypassing-both-parliament-and-constitutional-council_5980497_16.html (accessed on July 2, 2024). 

Veltrone, A. (2019). La Strategia Della Paura: Eversione e Stragismo nell’Italia del Novecento. Mondadori. 

Vercelli, C. (2018). Neofascismi. Edizioni del Capricorno. 

Viscusi, G. (2017). “Marine Le Pen calls multiculturalism a weapon for Islamic extremists.” The Sydney Morning Herald. April 11, 2017. https://www.smh.com.au/world/marine-le-pen-calls-multiculturalism-a-weapon-for-islamic-extremists-20170411-gvi6vz.html (accessed on July 2, 2024). 

Voce, A. and Clarke, S. (2022). “French election 2022: full second round results.” The Guardian. April 25, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2022/apr/24/french-election-2022-live-results-projection-second-round-emmanuel-macron-marine-le-pen (accessed on July 4, 2024). 

Weinberg, L. (1993). “Introduction.” In: P. H. Merkl and L. Weinberg (eds), Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right, Boulder, Westview, pp. 1–15.

Weyland, K. (2017). “Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach.” In: P. Ochoa Espejo, C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart and P. Ostiguy, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press, pp.48-72.

Whitney, C.R. (1998). “Le Pen Feud with Key Deputy Has French Right in Upheaval.” The New York Times. December 13, 1998.

Yoshikazu, N. (2018). “Global Syndrome of Neopopulism: A Symptom of Authoritarian Reaction in the Era of ʻAfter Globalizationʼ.” Ritsumeikan Law Review. pp. 75–93. 

Zanatta, L. (2016) Il Populismo. 2nd ed. Roma, Italia: Carocci editore.

“PROGRAMMA PER LE ELEZIONI POLITICHE 2013 DI FORZA NUOVA E DI NOMINA DEL CAPO” (no date). Roma, Italia: Forza Nuova Segreteria Nazionale (www.forzanuova.org).


 Footnotes

[1] In fact, she has often expressed affinity for Anglo-Saxon versions of liberal-conservatism, particularly Sir Roger Scruton and G.K Chesterton in her speeches (see Esposito for la Repubblica in October 2002).

[2] Tarchi (2015: 122) has even argued that there have been so-called borderline cases (such as the old Front National, the British National Party, and the old Vlaams Blok) where it has not been clear whether the parties in question were ultimately populist or extreme right. This is a debatable but also plausible argument.

[3] Taggart (2018b) asserts that unpolitics is “the repudiation of politics as the process for resolving conflict” (Taggart, 2018b: 3)

[4] The opposite argument would be found in Mudde’s work (2017; 2021). The Dutch scholar argues that populism is actually a “thin-centered ideology” (Mudde, 2021: 578) and very much unlike other 19th and 20th century ideologies (liberalism, socialism, etc.) given it cannot exist by itself and is dependent upon a combination of its people-centric anti-elitism with other more sophisticated “…normative and normative-related ideas about the nature of man and society as well as the organization and purposes of society” (see also Sainsbury, 1980: 8).

[5] The party’s logo itself reflects the tricolor flame (with the colors of the French flag), but the idea was copied from the MSI in neighboring Italy (Kauffmann, 2016). This esoteric symbol was chosen purposely as it was meant to represent the idea of rebirth or “palingenesis,” the flame of fascism which either never fully extinguishes itself or a new fascism that rises from the ashes (for an account of fascism and the idea of rebirth, see Griffin, 1996).

[6] Pierre Poujade’s populist party (active in the 1950s) was called L’Union de défense des commerçants et artisans (UDCA).

[7] “Tixierist” as in pertaining to the politics of the former Parisian lawyer (and right-wing firebrand) Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour.

[8] This is the “anti-democracy” of the extreme right which is clearly distinct from the “illiberal (and direct) democracy” of the populist right (see Mudde, 2018).

[9] On February 13, 1984, Jean-Marie Le Pen made his official debut on French public television. He was invited by the political debating show L’Heure de Vérité after President François Mitterrand put pressure on the Communications Minister to give Le Pen some airtime. In this context, Mitterrand’s behavior was influenced both by an ideological attachment to liberalism (particularly to freedom of speech) and a broader political strategy to destabilize and divide the national right-wing vote (between the neo-Gaullists and Le Penists) so the French left could win.

[10] This is an indirect reference to Michael Freeden’s (1996) famous theoretical approach where ideologies are considered to function through “core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts.”

[11] State nationalist: “Within a state nationalist view the state precedes the ethnic community (they generally use the term ‘nation’), in the sense that the nation is not a fixed entity. One can either be born into it, by being born on the territory of the state or by having two (or one) parents with that nationality, or one can become a member of the nation” (Mudde, 2000: 131).

[12] Ethnic nationalist: “As is typical for ethnic nationalists, the ethnic community is placed over the state: the state should serve the interests of the ethnic community and not the other way around” (Mudde, 2000: 96).

[13] For the concepts of “ingroups” and “outgroups” in sociology (but still applicable to political science) refer to Howard Giles and Jane Giles (2013). 

[14] Historically, both Jean-Marie Le Pen and M. Le Pen frequently criticized the traditional political establishment in France by referring to the “UMPS,” implying that both the UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) and the Socialist Party are indistinguishable in their policies and governance. However, this critique has been more difficult to make since 2015, as the UMP was succeeded (hence changed its name) by les Républicains (LR). 

[15] This is an abbreviation for the French Communist Party (PCF).

[16] The “battle for births” was a government sponsored pro-natalist campaign in Mussolini’s Fascist Italy during the 1920s and 1930s (see Forcucci, 2010). However, similar pro-natalist efforts have been carried forward more recently not only by right-wing dictatorships but also by conservative governments working within the sphere of liberal democracy.

[17] Forzanovisti is an Italian term used to refer to Forza Nuova’s members, supporters, or active militants.   

[18] This is also why FN maintains strong links with other European neofascists, and in Poland rallied in the company of Eastern European Neo-Nazis carrying flags with Celtic crosses, swastikas, and other political symbols as they protested against the status quo (see La7 AttualitàYouTube, November 26, 2017).

[19] Although Fiore rejects this proposition, articulating that the difference between fascists and nazis is exactly linked to this idea of racial superiority that parties like FN apparently deny (Fiore, La7, October 28, 2012).

[20] The Plain Sight Productions documentary is available on YouTube at the following link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SAQFZlrnJw0.

[21] Ius Soli: “in legal theory, the rule of law that provides that cirtizenship is acquired by birth within the territory of the state, regardless of parental citizenship” (Rafferty, 2024).

[22] Ius Sanguinis: “right of blood, which grants citizenship on the basis of the citizenship possessed by one’s parent or parents” (Rafferty, 2024).

P&P

Populism & Politics Workshop – The Interplay Between Migration and Populist Politics Across Europe Ahead of European Parliament Elections

DOWNLOAD WORKSHOP PAMPHLET

 

Date

May 22, 2024 (in person) / May 23, 2024 (virtual)

Organizing Institutions

European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Belgium

European Studies Centre (ESC), University of Oxford, UK  

Oxford Democracy Network, University of Oxford, UK

Organizers

Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director of the European Studies Centre, University of Oxford).

Sumeyye Kocaman (DPhil Researcher in Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Oxford and Executive Editor of Populism & Politics).

George Hadjipavli (DPhil Candidate in Area Studies and Research Associate at Southeast European Studies at Oxford).

Hosts

Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director of the European Studies Centre).

Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of the ECPS).

Venue

European Studies Centre, 70 Woodstock Rd, Oxford OX2 6HR 

 

Populism & Politics (P&P) is a digital journal dedicated to advancing the study and understanding of populism-related phenomena and populist challenges in historical and contemporary contexts. 

Migration, with its multifaceted socio-economic and political implications on voting behavior, stands at the nexus of the factors that have fueled the demand for populism in Europe and beyond. As the 2024 European Parliamentary elections approach, comprehending the trends in voting behavior and the role of immigration-related populism necessitates an interdisciplinary approach. 

The central theme of the workshop revolves around elections and anti-immigration populism in the European context. This two-day workshop will be held in hybrid format and will bring leading scholars and researchers in the field of populism and migration to discuss the interplay between populism and migration and their socio-economic and political repercussions.  

Some of the papers that will be presented at the workshop will be looking at:

-Populism, Fast and Slow – A Dual Thinking Approach to Populist Attitudes.

-Recalibration, Not Austerity: The Interplay of Populism, Neoliberalism, and Welfare States in the Struggle for Liberal Values.

-Voting for Populist Radical Right Parties amongst Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands.

-The Moral Panic Button (MPB) and the Road to the 2022 Election in Hungary.

-Migration Challenge and Populist Responses: A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Elections in Hungary and Turkey.

-Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Kin-State Minorities in the Hungarian State’s Diaspora Engagement.

-Nationalist Myths and The Emergence of Anti-Immigration Discourses.

-Gendering Conflict: A Comparative Study of How Palestinian Civilians and Arab European Refugees Are Portrayed within Europe Parliamentarian Narratives.

-Scandinavian Countries and the Rise of Extremism.

-The Victory Party at the Crossroads of Asylum Policies and Populist Discourse in Turkey.

-The Populist Origins of Migration Politics in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973-1983.

-European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism.

-Emigration and Political Party Membership in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from a Difference-in-Differences Design.

 

Editorial Team for Special Issue of Populism & Politics (P&P) on Migration

Dr. Azize Sargin (Director for External Relations, ECPS).

Dr. Jafia Naftali Camara (British Academy Research Fellow, University of Cambridge).

Dr. Ilhom Khalimzoda (Postdoctoral Researcher, University of Jyväskylä, Finland).

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate in Management, University of St. Andrews).  

Timor Landherr (PhD Candidate in Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University, London). 

Iuliana Nyerges (MPhil Candidate, Politics and International Relations, Balliol College, University of Oxford).

Maria Christofidis (MPhil Candidate, Philosophy, Mansfield College, University of Oxford). 

 

DAY ONE 

Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 08:30-17:00 (UK Time)

To register for in-person sessions in Oxford please email by May 14, 2024: skocaman@populismstudies.org.

Register for Zoom: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZUrceCurDovH9w3vFc7saBUSHBggbs7zDe4

 

Opening Remarks

08:45-09:00 (UK Time)

Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director of the European Studies Centre).

Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of the ECPS).

 

Panel 1 – Supply and Demand Sides of Populism: Political Psychology, Neoliberalism and Xenophobia

Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 09:00-10:45 (UK Time)

Venue: European Studies Centre, 70 Woodstock Rd, Oxford OX2 6HR

Chair 

Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of the ECPS). 

Discussant

Dr. William L. Allen (British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, and Nuffield College, University of Oxford). 

Papers

“Populism, Fast and Slow – A Dual Thinking Approach to Populist Attitudes,” by Dr. Filipa Figueira (Lecturer at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College London) & George Hajipavli (DPhil Candidate in Area Studies and Research Associate at Southeast European Studies at Oxford).

“Recalibration, Not Austerity: The Interplay of Populism, Neoliberalism, and Welfare States in the Struggle for Liberal Values,” by Jellen Olivares-Jirsell (PhD Candidate in Politics at Kingston University).

In-group Love Explains Voting for Populist Radical Right Parties amongst Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands,by Dr. Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher, Equal Strength, COMPAS, University of Oxford).

 

Panel 2: Hungary: A Case Study for Migration, Elections and Diaspora

Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 11:00-13:00 (UK Time)

Venue: European Studies Centre, 70 Woodstock Rd, Oxford OX2 6HR

Register: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZUrceCurDovH9w3vFc7saBUSHBggbs7zDe4

Chair

Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director, European Studies Centre, Oxford University).

Discussant

Dr. Márton Gerő (Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University).

Papers

“You Don’t Even Have to Press It Anymore” – The Moral Panic Button (MPB) and the Road to the 2022 Election in Hungary,” by Dr. Márton Gerő (Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University) & Dr.Endre Sik (Research Professor at the Institute of Sociology – Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence).

“Migration Challenge and Populist Responses. A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Elections in Hungary and Turkey,” by Dr. Tamas Dudlak (Researcher at the Contemporary Arab World Center, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University).

“Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Kin-State Minorities in the Hungarian State’s Diaspora Engagement,” by Judit Molnar (DPhil Candidate in Anthropology at the University of Oxford).

 

Panel 3 – Anti-Migrant Perceptions and Populist Reactions Across Europe

Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 14:30-16:30 (UK Time)

Venue: European Studies Centre, 70 Woodstock Rd, Oxford OX2 6HR

Register: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZUrceCurDovH9w3vFc7saBUSHBggbs7zDe4

Chair

Rob McNeill (Deputy Director of Migration Observatory, Compas Researcher, University of Oxford).

Discussants

Jafia Naftali Camara (British Academy Research Fellow, University of Cambridge).  

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate in Management, University of St. Andrews).  

Papers

“Nationalist Myths and The Emergence of Anti-Immigration Discourses,” by Luca Venga (Post-graduate Student at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford).

“Scandinavian Countries and the Rise of Extremism,” by Priscilla Otero Guerra (Postgraduate Student at the University of Oxford).

“Gendering Conflict: A Comparative Study of How Palestinian Civilians and Arab European Refugees Are Portrayed within Europe Parliamentarian Narratives,” by Arunima Cheruvathoor (MPhil in Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford).

“Digital Engagement and Political Voices: A Comparative Analysis of Skilled Immigrant Women in Ottawa and Stockholm,” by Ayshan Mammadzada (PMP, PhD Candidate at uOttawa).

 

Concluding Remarks 

Time: 16:30-17:00 (UK Time)

Venue: European Studies Centre, 70 Woodstock Rd, Oxford OX2 6HR

Register: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZUrceCurDovH9w3vFc7saBUSHBggbs7zDe4

Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director of the European Studies Centre, University of Oxford).

Rob McNeill (Deputy Director of Migration Observatory, Compas Researcher, University of Oxford).

 

DAY TWO 

Panel 4 – Intersection of Populist Politics, Far Right and Asylum Policies

Date/Time: May 23, 2024 / 09:00-11:00 (UK Time)

Venue: European Center for Populism Studies (Virtual)

Register: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZUrceCurDovH9w3vFc7saBUSHBggbs7zDe4

Co-chairs

Dr. Ilkhom Khalimzoda (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Language and Communication Studies, University of Jyväskylä, Finland).

Dr. Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher, EqualStrength, COMPAS, University of Oxford).

Discussants

Dr. Simon Watmough (Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a non-resident research fellow at ECPS).

Dr. Tamas Dudlak (Researcher at the Contemporary Arab World Center, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University).

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate in Management, University of St. Andrews).

Papers

“The Victory Party at the Crossroads of Asylum Policies and Populist Discourse in Turkey,”  by Dr. Ezgi Irgil (Postdoctoral Research Fellow within the Global Politics and Security Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs – UI) & Dr. Zeynep Sahin Mencutek (Senior Researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies).

“Populist Politics Kills Asylum Policies: How Populist Discourses About Migration in Bulgaria Invent the ‘Refugee Crisis’,” by Dr. Ildiko Otova (Assistant Professor in International Migration at New Bulgarian University) & Dr. Evelina Staykova (Associate professor in Political Science at New Bulgarian University).

“‘The More Refugees, the More Votes’: The Role of Migration on the AfD Growth,” by Dr. Avdi Smajljaj (Assistant Professor and lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirana, Albania).

“Between Gastfreundschaft and Überfremdung: The Populist Origins of Migration Politics in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973-1983,” by Simon Ahrens (MPhil in Development Studies, University of Oxford).

 

Panel 5 – The Influence of Populist Anti-Immigration Narratives on European Self 

Date/Time: May 23, 2024 / 12:30-14:30 (UK Time)

Venue: European Center for Populism Studies (Virtual)

Register: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZUrceCurDovH9w3vFc7saBUSHBggbs7zDe4

Co-Chairs

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj (Assistant Professor and lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirana, Albania).

Dr. Marieke van Houte (Assistant Professor for Anthropology and Development Studies, Radboud University).

Papers

“Refugees and the Eurosceptics: Understanding the Shifts in the Political Landscape of Europe,” by Dr. Amrita Purkayastha (Assistant Professor at Bangalore, India).

“Populist Discourse and European Identity: A Poststructuralist Analysis,” by Nazmul Hasan (PhD Candidate in the Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, West Bengal, India).

“Nationalism and Anti-Immigration Sentimentalism in Europe,” by Sulagna Pal (PhD Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, India).

“A Critique of Eurocentric Conceptualisations of Social Cohesion in Academia, Refugee Policy, and Refugee Settings,” by Basma Doukhi (PhD Candidate in Migration Studies at the University of Kent).

 

Panel 6 – Diverse Aspects of Anti-Migrant Populism in Europe

Date/Time: May 23, 2024 / 15:00-17:00 (UK Time)

Venue: European Center for Populism Studies (Virtual)

Register: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZUrceCurDovH9w3vFc7saBUSHBggbs7zDe4

Co-Chairs

Dr. Tamirace Fakhoury (Associate Professor of International Politics and Conflict, Fletcher School, Tufts University).

Dr. Zeynep Sahin-Mencutek (Senior Researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies).

Discussants

Dr. Jafia Naftali Camara (British Academy Research Fellow, University of Cambridge).

Dr. Azize Sargin (Director for External Relations, ECPS).

Papers

“Enemies Inside: European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism,” by Dr. Ana Paula Tostes (Senior Fellow at the Brazilian Center of International Relations and Professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro).

“Emigration and Political Party Membership in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from a Difference-in-Differences Design,” by Melle Scholten (PhD Candidate at the University of Virginia).

“Digital Engagement and Political Voices: A Comparative Analysis of Skilled Immigrant Women in Ottawa and Stockholm,” by Ayshan Mammadzada (PMP, PhD Candidate at uOttawa).

“The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe,” by Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo (Lecturer-Researcher in Political Science at the University of Yaoundé, Cameroon).

 

Concluding Remarks & Thanks

Time: 17:00-17:30 (UK Time)

Dr. Azize Sargin (Director for External Relations, ECPS). 

Sumeyye Kocaman (DPhil Researcher in Asian and Middle East Studies and Executive Editor of Populism & Politics).

 

Abstracts and Brief Biographies

 

Panel 1

Supply and Demand Sides of Populism: Political Psychology, Neoliberalism, and Social Media

 

Populism, Fast and Slow – A Dual Thinking Approach to Populist Attitudes

Filipa Figueira (The School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College London).

George Hajipavli (Southeast European Studies at Oxford).

This article applies the concept of dual thinking to understand the psychological mechanisms driving demand for populism. Dual thinking theories posit that human thinking can take two forms: Type 1 – fast, intuitive, and emotional, and Type 2 – slow, considered, and elaborate. Through a behavioral experiment, we examine whether, when prompted to adopt Type 1 thinking, respondents display greater attraction to populism than when prompted to adopt Type 2 thinking. 

Following Reinhard’s typology, we test four types of populism that adhere to the minimalist definition of populism as ‘the people’ versus ‘the others.’ These are populism as a reaction to a) the psychological inability to adapt to rapid change (‘the people versus the transnational elite driving globalization’); b) the perceived overreach of the ‘administrative’ state and the corrupt and arrogant elite (e.g., the out-of-touch elite ‘Remainers’); c) an experience or fear of decline (e.g., Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’), and d) a threat to their identity through immigration (‘the people versus the immigrants’). This approach further enables us to test for correlation between the various populist groups as posited in theory. This is of additional utility given the topic of the workshop, as it will enable us to gauge both whether psychological mechanisms are applicable to migration-driven populism, and whether migration-driven populism is a unique phenomenon or forms part of a broader cluster of populist dynamics. In our experiments, we control for alternative explanations to populist party support, such as cross-national cultural differentials, factors pertinent to migration (perceptions of and exposure to migratory flows), personality types, the role of ideology, trust in political institutions, standard socio-economic and demographic controls, and the ‘need for chaos’ variable. 

By considering the link between intuitive thinking and attraction to populism, our findings carry significant implications for our understanding of the psychological processes behind the phenomenon of populism. Overall, this novel approach will significantly inform our understanding of the mechanism behind migration-driven populism, and how it relates to broader anti-establishment and populist attitudes. Consequently, gaining a better understanding of the psychological processes behind the phenomenon will enable us to counter migration-driven populism through carefully tailored approaches with the help of mass and social media ahead of a critical election year.

Filipa Figueira is a Lecturer at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES) at University College London (UCL). Her main areas of expertise are the European Union and public policy. She is particularly interested in bounded rationality and the effectiveness of EU policymaking, EU governance and the allocation of policy competencies between the EU and the national level, and populism/Brexit. Her interdisciplinary research aims to offer novel combinations of political and economic theoretical frameworks. She is also a Senior Adjunct Researcher at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), within the Brussels School of Governance (BSoG), and a Senior Member of the SSEES-based Centre for New Economic Transitions (CNET). She has contributed to many high-impact journals, such as European Review, British Politics, the Journal of European Public Policy, and the European Journal of Government and Economics.

George Hajipavli is a Research Associate at Southeast European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) based in St Antony’s College, Oxford. George’s research interests primarily lie in area studies and political sociology. He has recently written on public opinion, such as the electoral attitudes underpinning the paradoxical relationship between the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Russian Orthodox Church, and the determinants of Orthodox Church support in contemporary Russia, with a particular emphasis on the aspect of communist legacies and the secularization thesis. He has presented at conferences, such as the annual conferences of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES), the World Association of Public Opinion Research (WAPOR), and the British Association of Slavonic and East European Studies (BASEES). His interest in the present topic derives from his curiosity about the psychological determinants of public opinion and his doctoral research on the impact of religious identities on political outcomes. George enjoys complementing his academic research with his prior experiences in policymaking, which included stints in the European Parliament, and the Cypriot House of Representatives.

 

Recalibration, not Austerity: The Interplay of Populism, Neoliberalism, and Welfare States in the Struggle for Liberal Values

Jellen Olivares-Jirsell (Kingston University).    

This paper challenges the idea that the effectiveness of welfare states should be measured solely based on their universality of provision. The author argues that focusing on universality conceals issues with the workings of welfare states. The paper also suggests that welfare states are undergoing recalibration, not retrenchment and that abandoning the aim for universality is essential to protect those who need it the most. Overall, the paper highlights the importance of welfare states in protecting vulnerable populations and argues for a more nuanced approach to measuring their effectiveness.

Keywords: Populism, recalibration, welfare states, workfare, austerity, producerism.

Jellen Olivares-Jirsell is a doctoral candidate in Politics at Kingston University, UK. Before joining Swansea University (Wales) as a Research Assistant, she was engaged in research projects at the Technical University of Munich (Germany) and Malmo University (Sweden). Scholarly contributions include publications in Global Affairs and Populism journals. Her research interests encompass politics, norms, and ideologies, focusing on populism, neoliberalism, welfare states, trust, liberalism, and polarization.

 

In-group Love Explains Voting for Populist Radical Right Parties amongst Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands

Dr. Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher, EqualStrength, COMPAS, University of Oxford).

Populist Radical Right Parties’ (PRRP) politicians and supporters often claim ethnic minorities vote for their parties, possibly in an effort to legitimize their parties’ policy positions. In mainland Europe, where gathering quantitative data on ethnic minorities poses challenges, it is very difficult to disprove such statements. Do ethnic minorities and majorities tend to vote for PRRP and what dimensions of ethnocentrism explain their (lack of) support? I surveyed voters in France, Germany and the Netherlands and ask them about their propensity to vote for Rassemblement National (RN) in France, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands. Thanks to a novel oversampling method, I can compare ethnic minority and majority groups. The findings clearly state that ethnic minority voters are very unlikely to vote for PRRP, with the exception of Dutch Hindustani Surinamese voters and German voters with a migration background in the Former Soviet Union. Besides these two exceptions, the French Maghrebi, French Black and French Turkish, German Turkish, Dutch Turkish, Dutch Moroccan and Dutch non-Hindustani Surinamese voters are very unlikely to vote for PRRP. Ethnic majorities are much more likely to vote for PRRP. I find in-group love explains their support to a much larger extent than out-group hate. Though immigration attitudes predict PRRP voting in all three countries, in-group love explanations explain PRRP voting much more. In France, PRRP voting is driven the most by a preference for putting French interests first. In Germany, it is a preference for not mixing with other groups. In the Netherlands, it is the feeling of not being accepted as belonging in the Netherlands that predicts voting the most. These indicators of in-group love explain PRRP voting amongst majority groups much more than immigration attitudes, attitudes towards Islam, gender equality, LGB rights, green policies, or economic redistribution. Feeling close or distant towards ethnic in- or out-groups does not predict PRRP voting in any of the cases. These findings contribute to our understanding of PRRP voting in Europe.

Dr. Sanne van Oosten is a political scientist interested in the impact of anti-Muslim racism in politics and society. She is an expert on anti-Muslim narratives and policies in post-9/11 societal debates, the political representation of Muslim politicians in European parliaments, the electoral implications of anti-Muslim discrimination, and voter discrimination against Muslim politicians. Dr. van Ossten is completing her PhD in political science at the University of Amsterdam, where she taught and researched the role of Muslims in politics. Her current research focuses on discrimination against minorities by employers, landlords, and childcare facilitators and the resultant impact on the well-being and identification of these minorities. This research is part of the Horizon 2020 project EqualStrength. Her work has been published in journals such as Legislative Studies, Electoral Studies, and Acta Politica. https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/people/sanne-van-oosten

 

Panel 2

Hungary: A Case Study for Migration, Elections, and Diaspora

 

‘You Don’t Even Have to Press It Anymore’ – The Moral Panic Button (MPB) and the Road to the 2022 Election in Hungary

Márton Gerő (Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University).

Endre Sik (Research Professor at the Institute of Sociology – Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence).

In this paper, we aim to show how the moral panic button contributed to the incumbent party, Orbán Viktor’s Fidesz, a landslide electoral victory in Hungary in 2022. The moral panic button is a concept based on Stanley Cohen’s idea of ‘moral panic.’ However, instead of a single event, the moral panic button is viewed as a governance technology typical of populist and autocratzing governments. The moral panic button aims to increase the cohesion of the voter base, applying a mode of political communication based on threats and enemy images. In Hungary, the moral panic button was triggered by portraying immigration and immigrants as an existential threat to the ‘Hungarian Nation’ following the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015. Since then, it has served as a central issue for the propaganda machine of Fidesz. 

This paper will show how the Fidesz electoral bloc was “made.” We use the data from four population surveys conducted between 2017 and 2021 to demonstrate how the Fidesz propaganda machine secured the number of voters needed to win the 2022 elections almost independently of the current campaign themes and messages. A central theme in our surveys is the portrayal of terrorism and immigration as an existential threat and immigrants as enemies, along with other threats and enemies (as George Soros, the European Union’s Bureaucrats, or the opposition). In this analysis, we use binomial regression analysis to examine how strongly agreement or disagreement with the variables associated with framing the moral panic button affects the likelihood of belonging to the Fidesz, or oppositional constituency. 

The analysis will show the importance of the moral panic button as the leading tool for creating and maintaining the Fidesz bloc, leading to the increasing polarization of society. First, the constant maintenance of moral panic helps to develop and ‘maintain’ a constituency based on loyalty and identification with the leader. Second, the Fidesz world is created amorphous in terms of social background but homogeneous in terms of political behavior, whose members primarily – if not exclusively – enforce the aspects of belonging to the camp in their political identity and behavior. 

Endre Sik is a Research Professor at the Institute of Sociology – Centre for Social Sciences (TK) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence (MTA), and professor emeritus at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. He has a Ph.D. (1985) and a Doctor of Sciences (2006) in Sociology from the MTA. He was also Deputy Chair of the Committee of Sociology at MTA and President of the Hungarian Sociological Association. He has lectured at the University of Toronto, Notre Dame University, the Central European University in Prague, and the Global Camps of Human Rights in Venice. He is a member of IMISCOE’s Maria Baganha Committee. He is the head of research of several projects funded by TK and the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund. He has participated in EU-funded projects such as CEASEVAL, STYLE, Concordia Discourse, Euborderegions, and Workcare Synergy. His interests include migration, xenophobia, border studies, network and content analysis, and economic sociology.

Márton Gerő is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Sociology, Centre for Social Sciences (TK) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence (MTA). He is also an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University. His main research interests include civil society, social movements, and political integration processes. He has published in the Journal of Civil Society, Central and East European Politics and Society and Czech Political Science Review. Currently, he is developing a postdoctoral project on ‘Civil Society, enemy images and redistribution: The interplay between structural factors and political action in the process of de-democratization (NKFIH – 132768) and serves as a principal investigator of the project titled ‘(De-) democratization and the trajectories of civil society’ at TK. 

 

Migration Challenge and Populist Responses. A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Elections in Hungary and Turkey

Tamas Dudlak (The Contemporary Arab World Center, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University).

Over the last decade, there has been a growing interest in issues related to illiberal governance systems, primarily referring to Hungary and Turkey. Beyond superficial comparisons, however, the similarities of the trajectories and policies followed by the lengthy political career of Viktor Orbán and Recep Tayyip Erdogan and their respective political systems generally have not gained much academic attention. Similarly, investigations are missing from the literature to understand the relationship between the Hungarian and Turkish migration policy. To fill this gap, this research assesses the circumstances and motivations that shaped the Fidesz and the AKP governments’ policies and discourse on immigration during the last electoral campaigns (in 2022 and 2023, respectively). 

While Hungary and Turkey are relatively distant countries, their cases are comparable as they constitute stable populist regimes in the periphery of the European Union and have intensive and direct contact with significant migration and trafficking routes. They are situated next to unstable regions (such as the Balkans and Ukraine in the case of Hungary and Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan in the case of Turkey) and accept refugees in large numbers.

Although populism can be defined as a political practice, a discursive strategy, or an ideology in ‘mainstream’ research, it is primarily associated with a country’s domestic politics. Populism’s connection to migration policy is still undertheorized in social sciences. Exceptionally rare is research that examines how populism can be connected to the political and discursive practices of different Middle Eastern actors. Despite a growing literature on populism, illiberalism, and authoritarian tendencies in the ‘Western periphery,’ there is a lack of context-sensitive analysis of how Erdogan and Orbán use migration discourse to seek alternative identity formations in their political pursuit of the Syrian and Ukrainian refugee crises. This circumstance prompts the researcher to utilize a new, migration-specific reading of the existing primary and secondary sources.

Generally, or theoretically, this paper seeks the reference points (the narrative background) of the two governments in migration-related issues. In this respect, I am particularly interested in the governmental framing of securitization, sovereignty, humanitarianism, and bordering. The goal of this article is to understand how migration policies have been formulated in Hungary and Turkey during the last parliamentary elections, what are the current circumstances that shape the outcome of governmental decisions (political practice), and discourses (political theory) on how to deal with the mass movement of peoples in these countries.

The underlying narratives are examined by discourse and content analysis. For this purpose, I focus on the official statements and speeches of the two leaders. The analysis seeks to understand the logic of cooperation and similarities between illiberal populist regimes. All in all, explaining the differences and similarities might shed light on the workings of these populist systems and theorize how illiberal populist governments design their migration policies and how their ideological background (internal constraints) and Europeanization (external constraints) limit or extend their political maneuverability.

Tamas Dudlak is a Doctor of International Relations based in Budapest, Hungary and affiliated with the ELTE Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest as a researcher in the Contemporary Arab World Center. He previously received degrees in History, Arabic, and Turkish and studied geopolitics. His main research interest lies in the Middle East; he analyses contemporary Turkish politics from a comparative perspective. He focuses on the similarities and differences betweenTurkey and Hungary in various fields, such as migration policies, the characteristics of the populist regimes, electoral strategies of the incumbents and the oppositions, and the role of religion and civilizational discourse as the underlying ideologies of the Hungarian and Turkish governments.

 

Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Kin-State Minorities in the Hungarian State’s Diaspora Engagement

Judit Molnar (The University of Oxford).

“Fidesz received 94% of the votes of Hungarians living outside the borders,” reported the InfoStart online portal after the 2022 elections in Hungary. The statistics might come as highly surprising, looking at the character of recent emigration from the country. As a response to the autocratic and populist government, which growingly infringes on the principles of democracy, migrants have been documented to increasingly ‘vote with their feet’ (Somin, 2011; Meardi, 2012; Triandafyllidou & Gropas, 2014), with politically motivated emigration slowly and steadily replacing the economic emigration of Hungarians first triggered by the 2008 economic crisis. Hallmarked by events like the expulsion of forward-thinking educational institutions like the Central European University, the aggressive campaign to push women into traditional childbearing roles, and the severe limitations placed on the LGBTQ+ community, many people have opted for a more liberal atmosphere when deciding to start a new life outside the country.

Therefore, it is important to understand who these voters are. According to Brubaker (1996), there are two types of diasporas: those that emerge by people crossing boundaries and those that are formed by boundaries crossing people. When the treaty of Trianon detached two thirds of Hungary’s territory in 1921, many ethnically Hungarian people found themselves outside the borders overnight. According to Waterbury (2010), the loss was especially acute as some of the lost territories were perceived as the cradle of Hungarian civilization and their inhabitants the carriers of the most authentic form of Hungarian culture. Trianon has stayed framed as a national trauma by Hungarian politics and motivated by an ethnic approach to the nation, since 1989, a plethora of schemes have been set up to tie the Hungarian population of these territories to Hungary. The experience of being removed from Hungary despite a strong consciousness as Hungarians made this group keen to embrace the state’s call and to support the Fidesz’s nationalist agenda. 

In Fidesz’s discourse, kin-state minorities are the exemplary communities of national consciousness and the kind of ideal citizens that all emigrants should aspire to become. While historically, emigrants’ treatment by the Hungarian state went from “fascist criminals, class enemies, and useless, work-shy rabble” (Kunz 1985:102) in 50s and 60s to traitors who placed their well-being above that of the homeland after 1989 (Herner-Kovács, 2014), kin-state minorities have stayed framed as loyal victim communities. Therefore, ever since diaspora outreach schemes aimed at emigrants were first devised by Hungarian state in 2010 in the hope of reconnecting them to the homeland to tap them for brain gain, remittance and political lobby potential, kin-state minorities have been involved as key players. For example, 60-70% of the facilitators sent to diasporas through the Kőrösi programme, the flagship scheme of diaspora engagement, have been from pre-Trianon territories of Hungary. Their role is to reconnect emigrant communities to Hungary by organizing emigrants around a shared Hungarian culture and language and boosting the preservation of traditions even though some have never lived in Hungary.

In my paper, I would like to explore how these two remarkably different experiences of ethnic identity and connectedness to the homeland are bridged by Hungarian populist discourse in the country’s attempt to govern its diasporas across borders and reconstruct the long-lost historic nation. Furthermore, relying on the framework of state-led transnationalism, I set out to investigate how such narratives impact the dynamics of the Hungarian emigrant diaspora and, ultimately, whether trying to fit the emigrant population into the kin-state minority mold can be productive to align emigrant citizens with Fidesz’s ideology. To answer these questions, I will rely on the ethnographic data from my recently completed one-year fieldwork in London, the United Kingdom, and reflections on similar research projects in Ireland and Argentina. 

Judit Molnar is a DPhil candidate of Anthropology at the University of Oxford, with an interest in migration, diasporas, transnationalism, and the anthropology of the state. Her doctoral research investigates the correlations between home-state ideologies and the cultivation of diaspora subjectivity through ethnographic case studies of Hungarian and Venezuelan migrant communities in London. Prior to coming to Oxford, Molnar worked for the Hungarian State Secretary for Nation Policy as a cultural facilitator delegate to the Hungarian diaspora in Argentina and completed a traineeship at the Cabinet of Education, Culture, Youth and Sport of the European Commission. She holds an MLitt in Cultural Studies from the University of St Andrews and an MA in Anthropology from the University of Vienna.

 

Panel 3

Anti-Migrant Perceptions and Populist Reactions Across Europe

 

Nationalist Myths and The Emergence of Anti-Immigration Discourses

Luca Venga (St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford).

The fall of the Berlin Wall lulled a majority of Europeans into thinking they had consigned nationalism and war to the dustbin of history. The ascent of the EU seemed to have ushered in an era of rational, peaceful dialogue based on universal values and on tolerance for differences. Nationalism, tainted by the World Wars, had been discredited as a serious political philosophy, becoming little more than a fringe view or a touristic attraction.

But autocratic tensions, Brexit, and the return of war on the continent have demonstrated that nationalism is more alive than ever, and it is already reshaping our societies and our institutions. Nationalist narratives, above all else, have caused a discernible shift in attitudes towards migrants, contributing to the rise of anti-immigration sentiment across the continent and stoking the fires of xenophobia and racism. 

This paper critically examines the dynamic interplay between the creation and reinterpretation of nationalist myths and the emergence of anti-immigration discourses within the European context. By analyzing the construction of invented histories, contemporary retellings and ahistorical myths, this study elucidates the processes through which these discourses have shaped public perceptions and policy responses toward immigration.

Drawing on a comprehensive review of historical and contemporary literature, this paper underscores how ambitious and unscrupulous politicians have utilized certain actors (think tanks, political parties, media organizations) to deliberately construct and revise nationalist myths. This re-writing of history has allowed them to present themselves as scions of holy dynasties, saviors of the fatherlands, or redeemers and avengers. 

In their quest to gain the favor of public opinion by reasserting a sense of collective identity and cultural superiority predicated on the exclusion of ‘The Other,’ however, these political figures have caused old and new cleavages to spread across societal divides, contributing to a climate of polarization and intolerance.

Through the selective commemoration of historical events, figures, and symbols, nationalist narratives have fostered a sense of cultural exceptionalism and entitlement, positioning the foreign as a threat to the national fabric. This narrative framing has, most evidently, caused a reduction of the options available when confronting the question of immigration, as certain courses of action have become politically radioactive.

My essay will then delve deeply into the multifaceted ways in which the reinterpretation of nationalist myths has been instrumental in shaping the rhetoric of exclusion and securitization within public discourse and policy-making processes. The selective deployment of historical narratives to construct narratives of victimhood, cultural purity, and national resurgence has facilitated the normalization of anti-immigration rhetoric but needs to be understood in the context of economic uncertainty, cultural anxieties, and the impacts of globalization. Thus, this study will also touch upon the ways in which nationalist myths have been harnessed as a reactionary response to socioeconomic insecurities and the fast pace of change that has invested most societies. 

In conclusion, this study provides a comprehensive analysis of the intricate nexus between the construction and reinterpretation of nationalist myths and the rise of anti-immigration sentiments in Europe. This will be achieved by illuminating the ways in which nationalist narratives have shaped public attitudes and policy responses toward immigration, while also considering the myriad other forces that shape and mold public opinion. Finally, this research proposes as a partial solution the recuperation and galvanization of a different set of myths, which are based on inclusion, on cross-cultural contamination, and on the richness of human experience, as a way to bring about closer integration and stem the rising, worldwide tide of intolerance that will truly and finally reject nationalism.

Luca Venga is a postgraduate student at St. Antony’s College, Oxford. He have lived in Italy, the United States and Germany, before moving to England where he obtained his Bachelor’s degree in Politics and International Relations from the University of Manchester with a comparative thesis on the relative strengths and weaknesses of various multilateral institutions. Having always been extremely interested in Latin America, its cultures and its people, he decided to expand his knowledge and enrich his understanding of this wonderful region through the MPhil in Latin American studies at the University of Oxford. At Oxford he has had the chance to explore a variety of themes and trends that span the continent, while designing and carrying out his own independent research geared towards the completion of a 30,000-word thesis. This original contribution to the scholarly literature has been enriched by a multi-month period of fieldwork in Mexico, during which he collected dozens of hours of interviews and ethnographic observation. 

Venga is particularly interested in questions of nationalism, political participation, authority and security, and he is committed to exploring these issues through a variety of means, both within and beyond academia. He collaborated with Italian think-tank IARI (Istituto Analisi Relazioni Internazionali) as Editor in Chief of the Latin American Desk, publishing a number of accessible articles in collaboration with other scholars. More recently, he has joined AKE International as part of a team focusing on political and personal risk in Latin America, providing detailed and relevant analyses to business leaders, policymakers and other stakeholders. An avid reader, sports enthusiast, and traveler, he is always looking forward to the next adventure, such as rowing for his college or beginning a Portuguese language course.

 

Scandinavian Countries and the Rise of Extremism

Priscilla Otero Guerra (University of Oxford).

This article examines the impact populist parties have had on health policies and health social issues of the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, and Finland). This is important, given the rise of immigration in the past decade. How do populist attitudes shape health policies? Does health governance change significantly? I highlight the importance of government support for globalization regarding health, interconnecting the Nordic Model to populist parties, ideology, and practice. Health governance, a crucial topic in the politics of migration, is at the intersection of the welfare state and capitalism; thus, the right and left support nationalist and populist attitudes that shape health politics.

Scandinavian countries have a robust history of nationalism. The Nordic region is familiar with political extremism in its right-wing strains. The countries selected and discussed in this paper have historically supported political institutions with ideologies that have espoused the natural genetic superiority of individuals of Nordic descent. So much so that presently, the region has been experiencing a robust rise in far-right political support in the past decade. Since 2016, several of these far-right organizations have been documented by international human rights groups to be of substantial Nazi influence. The establishment of the Nordic paramilitary group Nordic Strength of Sweden in 2019 of the cross-country Nordic Resistance Movement is a nationalist reflection of the most extreme ideas against inward non-Nordic migration.  

To understand the rise of far-right extremism, we need to unfold sentimental and practical roots for the domestic support for populist political parties. Populism is not a novel occurrence in Scandinavia. The working classes have traditionally supported political beliefs that are of populist dimensions. The success of socialist policies is a common characteristic of the region. Left-oriented policies would not have been established if not for the organization of the working classes against the perceived economic elites.  

The Nordic Model combines features of capitalism with social benefits. Immigration, populism, and political parties with ideologies that are pro-welfare have traditionally been supported. Globalization was once supported in the region, and support for globalist policies has been drastically declining. There is a sharp contrast in the region’s support of left-supportive policies as decreased disgruntled members of the working classes change their political orientations. As exemplified in The Battle Over Working-Class Voters (2021) by Sanna Salo and Jens Rydgre, generations of capitalism have created a sentiment of discord and dissatisfaction.  

To conclude, this article attempts to document and analyze the evolution of the working classes of Scandinavian countries. Whilst the working classes once supported left ideologies, the rise of immigration from non-Nordic countries has increased support for anti-globalist, nationalist, and anti-immigration policies tied to nationalist nativist rhetoric.   

Priscilla Otero Guerra is a postgraduate student at the University of Oxford. She is a member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford and is interested in state-society relations, political violence, geopolitics, and the politics of development. Her research interests include political regimes, state capacity, political parties, and socio-political determinants of development. Priscilla’s additional interests in political/economic history and philosophy navigate topics that intersect comparative and international affairs disciplines, analyzing liberties, policies, and strategies. She obtained her bachelor’s degree in political science and philosophy from Gustavus Adolphus College with high honors and distinctions. Her regions of specialization include the United States, Latin America, and Europe. Priscilla is working on a book on philosophy of mind and a project on Latin American affairs.  

 

Gendering Conflict: A Comparative Study of How Palestinian Civilians and Arab European Refugees Are Portrayed Within Europe Parliamentarian Narratives 

Arunima Cheruvathoor (Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford).

The Israel-Palestine issue has emerged as central to the geopolitical foci of candidates contesting the 2024 European Parliament Elections. Historically, the representatives of the 27 states in the Parliament have struggled to find a common stance on the decades-long issue. The five major political groups within the Parliament articulate distinct objectives they seek to advance concerning the treatment of Palestinians and more recently, schisms in geopolitical ‘goal’ alignment were noted in the responses given by parliamentarians in the face of the increasing violence in Gaza since October 7, 2023. More intriguingly, the discourses on the treatment of Palestinian civilians, with its multiple variations in the European Parliament, have been non-uniform in many respects except one: the construction and simultaneous imposition of an assumed (and indeed, uninterrogated) gendered performance upon Palestinian female civilians, who are framed solely as victims, within the European Parliamentarians’ narratives. 

This paper utilizes Van Dijk’s (2005) methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine statements and press releases issued by political groups within the European Parliament and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from October 7, 2023. The primary aim of this paper is to discern the conceptualizations of Palestinian female subjectivities within these discourses, whilst simultaneously comparing it to the discoursal subject-positions of (other, non-Palestinian) Arab female refugees in Europe. Contributing to the existing academic literature on the gendered conceptualizations of Arab refugees in Europe within European state discourses (building upon the works of Yuval-Davis, 2007; Abu-Lughod, 2015; Spijkerboer, 2017 and others), this paper highlights and timely addresses an academic lacuna by delving into the intricate ways in which the recent discourses of MEPs and political groups construct Palestinian female subjectivities—which has largely been academically unexplored— and how these discoursal constructs intersect with the prevailing gendered conceptualizations of Arab refugees in Europe within parliamentarian narratives. 

Building upon the works of decolonial scholars such as Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), Saba Mahmood (2005), and Gayatri Spivak (2009 and 2023), among others, this paper excavates how within the heterogeneous opinions of MEPs, the uninterrogated and continually evoked gendered Palestinian identities, has resulted in the surfacing of the female Palestinian body as a discoursal vacuum upon which expected performances of victimhood are interpellated, framing her solely in terms of her perceived vulnerability. Postulating that the uninterrogated conceptions of Palestinian gendered citizenship within parliamentarian discourses simultaneously parallels the discoursal subject-positions of Arab refugees in Europe, this paper forwards the argument that largely, Arab women are seen solely as victims that need to be saved by European state intervention, ultimately diminishing Arab women’s self-expression, who are then framed solely as victims of (masculine) state and non-state actions. Furthermore, this paper will evidence how, within discourses of the European Parliament, narrative-building on the Israel-Palestine conflict actively utilizes controlled constructs of Palestinian female identity to secure consensus on geo-political intervention whilst perpetuating similarly constructed (and uninterrogated) gendered conceptualizations of Arab refugees in Europe within discourses about the refugee crises in the European Union.

Arunima Cheruvathoor is a young researcher with a Master of Philosophy in Global and Area Studies (2023) from the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford. She also has a Bachelor of Arts (Honors) in Political Science (2021) and a diploma in Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding (2021) from Lady Shri Ram College for Women, University of Delhi. Her MPhil thesis, titled ‘Masculinization of Politics: Gendering India and China’ used Van Dijik’s methodological framework of Critical Discourse Analysis to examine the construction of female identities within the nationalist narratives of Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, based on a constructed database of 577 Mandarin, English, and Hindi videos, as well as several keynote speeches and press releases by the political leaders. She has previously worked with think-tanks, government organizations, and NGOs in India, Bangladesh and the United Kingdom. Her area of academic expertise is the interpellation of nationalism and gender in elite political discourses. She continues writing academically whilst currently employed as a Program Officer for the Rhodes Trust, whilst also working as a Project Assistant for Dr Jane Gingrich.

 

Digital Engagement and Political Voices: A Comparative Analysis of Skilled Immigrant Women in Ottawa and Stockholm  

Ayshan Mammadzada (The University of Ottawa).

This study delves into how digital platforms are vital for skilled immigrant women in Ottawa, Canada, and Stockholm, Sweden, to engage in political discourse and counter populist narratives. Ottawa and Stockholm are chosen for their unique positions in the global landscape of immigration and digital innovation and their encounters with populist movements.

Ottawa, as Canada’s capital, is not only the political heart of the country but also a burgeoning tech hub. It boasts a significant number of tech firms and start-ups, contributing to a vibrant digital economy. The city’s immigration policy is one of the most progressive, with Canada welcoming over 300,000 immigrants annually, fostering a multicultural environment where skilled immigrants play a crucial role in the socio-economic fabric. Despite this openness, Canada has not been immune to the global rise of populism, with increasing debates on immigration policy and national identity affecting political discourse.

Stockholm, on the other hand, stands as a beacon of innovation in Europe, home to numerous tech unicorns such as Spotify and Skype. Sweden’s immigration policy has been notably generous, particularly in response to the Syrian refugee crisis, positioning Stockholm as a key destination for skilled and asylum-seeking immigrants alike. However, like Ottawa, Stockholm has witnessed the growth of populist sentiments that challenged the country’s immigration stance and contributed to a polarized political climate.

The selection of Ottawa and Stockholm for this study is rooted in their similarities as progressive, tech-savvy cities with robust immigrant populations, and their differences in handling the challenges posed by populist politics. Both cities offer a rich context for exploring how skilled immigrant women leverage digital platforms for political engagement. For example, initiatives like Ottawa’s Digital Inclusion Strategy aim to bridge the digital divide, a crucial step for ensuring equitable access to digital platforms for political activism. Similarly, Stockholm’s innovative public-private partnerships in digital infrastructure provide fertile ground for political engagement among immigrants.

By employing a mixed-methods approach, this research aims to uncover the strategies skilled immigrant women in these cities use to navigate digital platforms for political activism, their challenges, and their successes. This includes examining the role of social media campaigns, digital forums, and online communities in shaping political participation and countering populist narratives.

The expected outcomes include a deeper understanding of digital engagement’s role in empowering skilled immigrant women politically, offering insights into the broader implications for democratic participation and policymaking in the face of rising populism. This comparative analysis between Ottawa and Stockholm will highlight effective practices and potential barriers to digital political engagement, providing a blueprint for leveraging technology to enhance democratic inclusion and resilience against populist challenges.

In conclusion, Ottawa and Stockholm serve as compelling case studies for examining the intersections of immigration, digital engagement, and political activism. This research not only contributes to the academic discourse on digital democracy and immigration but also offers practical insights for policymakers, activists, and community organizers aiming to foster inclusive political environments.

Ayshan Mammadzada is a PhD candidate in Geography, specializing in Canadian Studies at the University of Ottawa. Her thesis examines the resilience of skilled immigrants in Ottawa: the role of gender, occupation, and place of settlement. She serves as a Data, Research, and Policy Analyst at the Ottawa Local Immigration Partnership, working on improving immigrant integration and policy development. With over 12 years of experience in different sectors of Canada, the USA, China, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, she also worked as a consultant at immigrant-based companies to localize their businesses. Fluent in Azerbaijani and English, proficient in Russian and Turkish, and with reading knowledge in French learning, her research reflects her interdisciplinary and international background. Addressing the challenges skilled immigrants face and contributing to creating more equitable and inclusive societies motivates her research on immigration. 

 

Panel 4

Intersection of Populist Politics, Far Right and Asylum Policies

 

The Victory Party at the Crossroads of Asylum Policies and Populist Discourse in Turkey

Ezgi Irgil (Postdoctoral Research Fellow within the Global Politics and Security Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs).

Zeynep Sahin Mencutek (Ph.D., Senior Researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies).

This paper delves into the intricate interplay between immigration-related populism and political dynamics in Turkey, specifically focusing on the Victory Party. Established in 2021, the party became quite vocal during the 2023 national election campaign as a purely anti-immigrant and populist political party. Although the party’s share of the vote remained tiny, it propelled the anti-refugee narrative and pushed other parties to embrace more radical discourses and seek alliances with them in the second round of the 2023 election. Given this context, the study scrutinises the multifaceted relationship between asylum policies and populist rhetoric aiming to influence public opinion. By analysing the discourse surrounding refugees, the research seeks to unravel the complex web of influences that shape public sentiment and anti-immigrant and pro-repatriation discourse in Turkey’s political agenda through the rise of the Victory Party. 

Existing studies that analyse immigration-related populism and political parties focus either on the national level refugee politics in countries hosting larger numbers like Egypt, Pakistan, Colombia, Lebanon (Ahmad, 2017; Fakhoury, 2021; Freier & Parent, 2019; Nassar & Stel 2019; Norman, 2019, 2020; Tsourapas, 2017), or the populist political parties’ influence in domestic politics that adopt anti-immigrant discourse in the Western contexts (Dennison & Geddes, 2019; Hameleers, 2019; Norris, 2019; Stetka et al., 2021; Wodak, 2019). Yet, what has been overlooked is the domestic political impact of refugee rentierism as an issue through anti-immigrant political party discourse and how it is used to influence the domestic political agenda through populist rhetoric in a country with a protracted refugee situation. Thus, in this paper, we ask: how does a newly emerged populist party influence the domestic political agenda and discourse in Turkey? What does this interplay tell us about the refugee rentierism’s dynamics in domestic politics? 

To answer this question, we use discourse analysis of the media speeches (or broader media coverage) of the party leader, focusing on the period after the foundation of the Victory Party and until the elections (2021-2023). Thus, we demonstrate the extent to which factors contribute to shaping the political agendas of various parties, with a spotlight on the strategies employed by analysing the Victory Party within the context of refugee rentierism and how this rentierism manifests itself as an outcome in domestic politics. We argue that the Victory Party uses the issue of refugee commodification in domestic politics through populist discourses to obtain and create a platform for anti-refugee political strategies as a means to extract votes regardless of if the party secure seats in the parliament or not. Hence, we further argue that the Victory Party uses refugee commodification as a bargaining chip within domestic politics, either using the existing one or creating a new one, through three ways: (1) by becoming an agenda-setter on populist narratives and debates over refugees, (2) by enabling other political parties to adopt anti-refugee rhetoric and shape other political parties’ agendas on the refugee issue, and (3) by making use of the institutional context in anti-refugee rhetoric. 

Overall, the findings aim to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics shaping immigration-related policies and their implications on political strategies in migration studies and populism studies, which may be generalisable to the cases in similar contexts. Although refugee commodification/rentierism is often addressed in relation to foreign policy and aid, the study indicates its relevance in domestic politics, particularly with election times, further elaborating the link between refugee rentierism and domestic politics.

Ezgi Irgil is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow within the Global Politics and Security Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). Her work lies at the intersection of politics and forced migration, particularly focusing on migration diplomacy and migration management in the Middle East and the European Union and everyday politics of forced migration. She is a member of EuroMeSCo Euro-Mediterranean Research, Dialogue, Advocacy Network and IN2PREV Project’s Frontline Practitioners Network. She received her PhD in Political Science from the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, her MA in International Affairs from the George Washington University, Washington, DC, and her BA in Political Science and International Relations from Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey.

Zeynep Sahin Mencutek is currently Senior Researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies (BICC). She co-leads a Horizon Europe project, called GAPs on migrant returns and return policies with Uppsala University. She is also Research Affiliate with Canadian Excellence Research Chair in Migration and Integration, Toronto Metropolitan University and conducts joint research on the thematic area of Governance of Migration in a Globalizing World.  She held the prestigious Alexander von Humboldt Research Fellowship for Experienced Researchers (June 2020–May 2021) and an international fellowship at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research in Duisburg (2019–2020). She also served as Senior Researcher for the Horizon 2020 project RESPOND: Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond. Previously, she worked as an Assistant Professor in Turkey, and in 2018, she achieved the rank of Docent in international relations.  

Dr. Mencutek received her PhD in politics and international relations from the University of Southern California in 2011. Her research interests include politics of migration, migration governance, diaspora studies and return migration. She has published in a wide variety of international peer-reviewed journals in the area of migration, such as the Journal of Refugee Studies and Comparative Migration Studies, as well as journals in the area of international politics, including Geopolitics, Journal of Global Security Studies, and International Studies Review. Besides dozens of book chaptersshe published a monograph, Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East (Routledge 2018). Sherecently co-authored a book, Syrian Refugees in Turkey (IMISCOE Series, 2023).

 

Populist Politics Kills Asylum Policies: How Populist Discourses About Migration in Bulgaria Invent the ‘Refugee Crisis’

Dr. Ildiko Otova (Assistant Professor in International Migration at New Bulgarian University).

Dr. Evelina Staykova (Associate professor in Political Science at New Bulgarian University).

Migration is a highly politicized phenomenon. It is one of the favourite topics of populists who create crises with their discourses about it, which they instrumentalise for their own gain. The Bulgarian case is particularly interesting. A country of immigrants, with an acute demographic problem, whose politicians (re)discover immigrants and turn them into the most convenient other. The lack of experience with “visible” immigrant communities and the (mis)presentation of immigration processes as a national catastrophe in the poorest of the EU member states, against the background of dominant populist discourses, lead to negative public attitudes towards asylum seekers. Political anti-immigrant discourse is translated into policies or lack thereof, creating a crisis in both cases. This article focuses on one of the most vivid periods not only in the Bulgarian migration experience but also in the European one, which goes down in history as the ‘Long Summer of Migration’ (Kasparek & Spear, 2015). The analysis illustrates the politicization of migration in Bulgaria during this particular period. This process was internalized at the time but was a turning point in policymaking and public opinion for a long period.

Ildiko Otova is an Assistant Professor of international migration at New Bulgarian University. Dr Otova holds a PhD in Political science from the New Bulgarian University and is a laureate of the Mozer Scholarship for Excellence in Political Science and Civil Courage. Her main academic and scientific interests are migration and refugee issues, integration, urban policies, (е)citizenship, far right and populism, and current forms of antisemitism. ORCID ID: 0000-0002-3620-3067

Evelina Staykova is Associate Professor in political sciences at New Bulgarian University. She is head of the Department of Political Sciences and coordinator of CERMES (Centre for Refugees, Migration and Ethnic Studies). Her teaching and research interests include migration and urban studies, citizenship and e-democracy, populism, and far-right extremism. Dr. Staykova is experienced in coordinating and participating in various national and international projects on the quality of democracy, integration of migrants and refugees, development of city policies, populist strategies, and counter-movements. Her last projects are “MATILDE – Migration Impact Assessment to Enhance Integration and Local Development in European Rural and Mountain Regions” (Horizon 2020), “ReCriRe – Representations of the Crisis and Crisis of Representation” (Horizon 2020); “CEASEVAL – Evaluation of the common European asylum system under pressure and recommendations for further development” (Horizon 2020). She has publications in English, French, Russian and Bulgarian languages. Her last book is Migration and Populism in Bulgaria. Routledge, 2022. ORCID ID: 0000-0001-9155-3169

 

The More Refugees, the More Votes’: The Role of Migration on the AfD Growth

Avdi Smajljaj (Assistant Professor and lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirana, Albania). 

Recently there has been an increased likelihood of significant neo-Nazi leaning of the electorate in Germany. This is best proved by the continuous increase of the number of votes Alternative für Deutschland / Alternative for Germany (AfD) is getting, not just in Eastern Germany but country wide. The growth of AfD is being consistently driven by migration waves, especially the one in 2015 and later. AfD started against the Euro as a single-issue political party, to switch to an anti-migration and Eurosceptic political party after the Euro crisis was managed successfully. The paper will look at migration’s role in the development and expansion of the AfD. How does AfD use migration as a tool for increasing electoral support? What is the AfD approach toward migration? And how does the AfD populist party impact the party politics and democracy in Germany and broader at the EU level? 

Avdi Smajljaj is an Assistant Professor and a lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirana, Albania. His research interests include political parties, electoral systems, EU integration, public policy, political theory, democracy, and democratization. His latest publications evaluated populism in the Balkans.

 

Between Gastfreundschaft and Überfremdung: The Populist Origins of Migration Politics in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973-1983.  

Simon Ahrens (The University of Oxford).

This paper offers a rare historical account of the interplay between populist politics and migration in Germany. It traces how national identity discourses among political parties in West Germany shaped an increasingly populist immigration and foreigner policy between 1973 and 1983. After World War II, West Germany became one of the world’s largest migrant-receiving countries. In addition to ethnic German war refugees, expellees and East German refugees, the government recruited fourteen million guest workers between 1955 and 1973, predominantly from Italy, Turkey, Spain, Greece, and Yugoslavia. This labour migration was meant to ameliorate the recovering economy’s labour shortages temporarily. Yet it inadvertently laid the groundwork for the permanent settlement of three million guest workers and their families. 

Drawing on Critical International Relations theory, this paper argues that guest worker immigration blurred West Germany’s national boundaries of belonging. Most political parties denied the young Federal Republic’s status as a country of immigration. They mobilised populist narratives to construct guest workers as a foreign ‘Other’ in relation to an ethnically defined national ‘Self’. From the guest worker recruitment stop in 1973 to the federal elections of 1983, national identity discourses turned immigration policy vis-a-vis the ‘new ethnic minorities’ into a political battlefield on which the future of the nation-state was negotiated.  Controversial parliamentary debates on sovereignty and citizenship initially neglected and then aggressively politicised and securitised the national membership of guest workers. 

Existing research has emphasised the economic outcomes of West German guest worker policies rather than their populist origins. By highlighting party-political debates on immigration, this paper fills this gap. It explores how and why particular concepts of nationhood affected policymaking once the permanent settlement of guest workers dominated German ‘high politics’ after 1973. Through a discourse analysis of immigration and foreigner laws, party programmes, and parliamentary speeches, I identify three critical junctures of emerging populist migration politics: the recruitment stop in 1973, the Kuehn Memorandum in 1979, and the federal elections in 1983. These critical junctures, in turn, expose three hegemonic national identity discourses, which powerfully shaped immigration and foreigner policies: economic, humanitarian, and ethnocentric. 

The recruitment stops of guest workers in 1973 marked a transition from economic ‘cost-benefit’ discourses on immigration to political portrayals of the immigrant ‘Other’ as a harbinger of social instability. A humanitarian discourse of Gastfreundschaft (hospitality) in the SPD-sponsored Kuehn Memorandum of 1979 demanded the liberalisation of immigration policy by emphasising foreigners’ post-national membership rights. The backlash of an ethnocentric discourse reinvigorated the ethno-culturalist identity politics of Überfremdung (foreign infiltration) during the federal election campaign of 1983. As permanent multiculturalism became inevitable, the CDU/CSU-led government framed guest workers as a security threat from within the nation. Post-war debates on immigration signalled a partial restoration of Germany’s ethnocentric past rather than a comprehensive introduction of a new national identity oriented at the country’s multicultural future. 

The nexus between national identity discourses and immigration policy between 1973 and 1983 had a long-term impact on populist migration politics in Germany. Despite political recognitions of Germany’s status as a country of immigration and changes to citizenship and migration laws in the early 2000s, decades of reform hesitancy by conservative governments entrenched ethnocentric conceptions of nationhood and rendered them vulnerable to populist mobilization. Since the European refugee ‘crisis’ of 2015, the increasingly popular Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has rooted its anti-immigration rhetoric in the alleged erosion of German sovereignty during the guest worker period. To make sense of this resurging ethnocentrism ahead of the European Parliament elections in 2024, this paper provides a starting point for more systematic research on historical constructions of the ‘foreigner problem’ in Germany and beyond.  

Simon Ahrens has recently graduated with an MPhil in Development Studies (Distinction) from the University of Oxford as a Clarendon Scholar. In his thesis, he conducted fieldwork in Botswana’s Ministry of Education. Using elite interviews and document analysis, he explored how civil servants reflect on nationhood, particularly the construction of official nationalisms through curriculum development and language policymaking in education. 

 

Panel 5

The Influence of Populist Anti-Immigration Narratives on European Self 

 

Refugees and the Eurosceptics: Understanding the Shifts in the Political Landscape of Europe

Amrita Purkayastha (Assistant Professor at Bangalore, India).

Europe has experienced an extraordinary inflow of refugees since 2015, which raised many questions regarding the inefficiency of the region as a whole in tackling the crisis and changing the region’s political consciousness. There were debates among countries that polarized the region regarding accepting refugees as it would allocate sufficient resources to the new entrants. Although the pressure of the influx of refugees has lessened over the years, the region has been polarized into three zones- the liberal countries of Western Europe, the moderate countries of the Mediterranean region and the erstwhile communist countries of Eastern Europe. 

A visible securitization of the region proves the tensions created due to the large influx of refugees in the region. The tensions and xenophobic tendencies against the arrival of refugees can be reflected in the sudden rise of right-wing populist parties throughout the European region. The sudden surge has led to a shift in the choices and perceptions of the voters in many countries, including both Eastern and Western Europe. Eurosceptic right-wing parties indulge in negative, uncivil campaigns that result in fearmongering among people towards a particular issue or a community. The issue of refugees from Middle Eastern and North African countries in the last decade has been the biggest issue dividing the Eurosceptic and Europhile parties and electoral campaigns, especially by the far-right parties. While each of these parties has different policies and their electoral campaigns vary, the prime issue in their agenda remains the influx of refugees having a different ethnicity from the Middle Eastern and North African countries, which has resulted in the loss of homogenous stability in Europe. 

Many people have been echoing the populist opinions and extreme ideas of the right-wingers regarding the influx of refugees. Reference can be provided to the infamous speeches of the Hungarian and Dutch leaders who openly spoke about their fear of refugees altering the homogenous structure of Europe. Political parties have played a pivotal role in provoking the citizens against the reception of refugees in Europe. In this scenario, the research wants to highlight the rise of Euroscepticism among the member countries fueled by the right-wing parties. It will further try to analyze the effect of Euroscepticism on the youth of these countries and how far it affects the elective behavior of these young voters. Additionally, the research wants to examine the changes that have taken place in the political landscape of Europe. 

Amrita Purkayastha is an Assistant Professor at Bangalore, India and an independent researcher. Her research interest includes areas like refugee laws, migration, and European regional affairs. After completing her doctorate degree from Jawaharlal Nehru University, Amrita is currently working as a freelance “Academic Writer” for two companies. Previously, she worked as a content writer and translator before starting her present jobs. She has three peer-reviewed publications centering on different issues of refugees around the world.

 

Populist Discourse and European Identity: A Poststructuralist Analysis

Nazmul Hasan (Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, West Bengal, India).

Discourse theory emerged in the late 1970s as a response to the challenges of mainstream theory following critiques of structuralist language, culture, and the crisis of Marxism amid the rise of neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies. Discourse theory didn’t aim to provide a new fixed theoretical framework but offered a flexible analytical perspective. It focused on the rules and meanings shaping social, political, and cultural identity construction.

There is a recognition of the social nature of identity, particularly within modernity, where human identity is inherently social. This entails an understanding of identity as socially constructed. From a discourse theory perspective, the issue of identity is not about actively constructing it. The rejection of the obviousness and essentialism of social identities brings attention to the political dimension of identity formation, emphasizing its reliance on contingent hegemonic struggles and processes of inclusion or exclusion. It also reveals that the ongoing political construction of social identities never leads to a closed, self-contained, and absolute identity. According to Ernesto Laclau, understanding this process is the psychoanalytic category of identification. This concept explicitly posits a lack at the root of any identity with something such as a political ideology or ethnic group because there is an inherent and insurmountable lack of identity. The act of identification arises from a fundamental absence or incompleteness in one’s sense of self. This psychoanalytic perspective helps shed light on the dynamics of identity construction in both personal and political realms.

Exploring Freud’s insights on identification and group formation can contribute to understanding questions related to collective identity. Freud suggests that the cohesive power of groups, as seen in examples like the church and the army, is rooted in symbolic meaning and discourse and the libidinal organization of groups. In collective identification, individuals are bound by libidinal ties to both the leader and other group members.

Lacan builds on Freud’s focus on the affective side of identification, redirecting it to the paths of enjoyment (jouissance). In Lacan’s framework, jouissance, an excessive and charged satisfaction bordering on pain, aligns with Freud’s concept of libido. Lacan reconceptualizes sexual energy in terms of jouissance, distinguishing between the symbolic (representation and discourse) and the real (jouissance), the subject of representation is associated with unconscious desire, while the subject of affect or the ‘enjoyment subject’ is linked to jouissance. So, identification operates on both discursive structural or representation and jouissance.

Ole Waever employs poststructuralist discourse theory to analyze how major European powers, particularly Germany and France, construct distinct ‘we’ – identities. This construction involves integrating notions of ‘state’, ‘nation’, and ‘Europe’ into their self-defining narratives. Yannis Stavrakakis supplements discourse theory with Lacanian insights to delve into the contemporary paradoxes and dilemmas surrounding constructing a European identity.

This article explores what contributes to the appeal of identity construction, why people collectively identify with specific formations and the implications of such identification. The goal is to pave the way for a more sophisticated discussion of identity formation, particularly in the context of European identity. The article emphasizes the incorporation of psychoanalytic considerations, particularly the problem of enjoyment, to enrich the discourse-theoretical account of identification. This includes not only formal or discursive but also substantive or affective identification conditions, termed as ‘obscene dimension’.

Nazmul Hasan has a post-graduate degree in Philosophy. He is a doctoral researcher in the Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, West Bengal, India. His area of research interest is mainly political philosophy. His current research project is titled Populist Reason: A Philosophical Enquiry. He published papers on political activism, democracy, and populism in India. 

 

Nationalism and Anti-Immigration Sentimentalism in Europe

Sulagna Pal (PhD Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, India).

This study attempts to demonstrate how trajectories of nationalism and anti-immigration sentimentalism in Europe are seen through the philosophical ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder, Rabindranath Tagore, David Miller, Kieran Oberman and others. While Herder’s idea of nationalism was rooted in cultural, linguistic and ethnic identities, Tagore was keen on challenging what he called ‘narrow-centric’ nationalism and racism. Tagore’s cosmopolitan and universal humanistic values sought to transcend narrow parochial boundaries in favour of a broader understanding of humanity. His legendary short story Kabuliwala, written in 1892, depicts the life of a migrant from Afghanistan who chose to live in Calcutta for social and economic reasons (Eggel et al., 2007; Panjabi et al., 2023). This study suggests that Herder’s ‘brotherhood of humanity,’ Tagore’s pro-migration Kabuliwala narrative and Oberman’s classical liberal principles of freedom of movement and anti-coercion might help combat the growing anti-immigration sentimentalism in Europe in nuanced ways.

Keywords: Anti-Immigration, David Miller, Johann Gottfried Herder, Kieran Oberman, Kabuliwala, Nationalism, Rabindranath Tagore  

Sulagna Pal is a PhD candidate in the Philosophy Department of the University of Delhi. She worked as an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Janki Devi Memorial College, University of Delhi, from July 2017 to March 2023. She has an M.Phil. in Philosophy in Environmental Ethics from Delhi University in 2016. Following are her areas of interest: Ethics, Meta-Ethics, Normative Ethics, Applied Ethics, Buddhism, and Philosophy of Religion. She was a part of the International Conference of Philosophy, held in the Philosophy Department, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, EU, in 2013, funded by a Travel and Maintenance Grant from the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi. She was part of a Buddhist Conference held in Sri Lanka in 2013. She has many papers published in various journals and a book on the gendered body and environmental pluralism published by the Lambert Academic Publishing House, Germany.

 

A Critique of Eurocentric Conceptualizations of Social Cohesion in Academia, Refugee Policy, and Refugee Settings

Basma Doukhi (The University of Kent).

This paper applies a postcolonial approach to contest Eurocentric ways of thinking and approaches the contemporary phenomenon of mass displacement, tracing the origins of this thinking to history, power, and colonization (Said, 1993). This approach allows for a critical understanding of social cohesion as a Western construct, which can be challenged by examining the concept’s application in diverse contexts (Lemberg-Pedersen et al., 2022). Mainstream social cohesion is a politically and socially contested concept that has been deployed by scholars, policymakers, and practitioners to define, and can be operationalized in two distinct discourses. The first is an academic and theoretical discourse which has emerged in sociology and social psychology fields (Norton & de Haan, 2013). The second is a policy-oriented discourse, which offers a Western top-down and problem-driven perspective to examine solutions to diverse challenges undermining social cohesion (Norton & de Haan, 2013). Bernard (2000: 2-3) commented on social cohesion’s deployment within these two discourses by defining it as a ‘quasi-concept’ or ‘concept of convenience’ that is “flexible enough to allow the meanderings and necessities of political action from day to day.” This flexibility has allowed the promotion of social cohesion as an agenda within these discourses leading to “…a move away from multiculturalism to a social cohesion agenda” (Gozdecka et al., 2014: 56).

This paper is a critical review that contests Western conceptualizations of social cohesion across Western and English-speaking policy and academic contexts including North America and Europe (Jenson, 1998; Markus, 2010; de Berry & Roberts, 2018; Ozcurumez & Hoxha, 2020). It argues that the concept, as presented in the discourses above, is rooted in Western sociology and follows a Western framework (Ozcurumez & Hoxha, 2020). Reviewing literature, it shows how limited knowledge about social cohesion’s application is limited and undermined in refugee contexts and argues how understanding the practices of community from the perspectives of displaced people, beyond achieving social cohesion as defined in Western academic and policy discourses, should be a priority (Delhey et al., 2018). 

Discussions and understanding of social cohesion by refugees in a refugee setting have been under-researched (Delhey et al., 2018, Fiddian- Qasmiyeh et al., 2022). Instead, social cohesion has become an elastic term co-opted into a buzzword for the institutions of the Global North within academic and policy discourses, rather than as a concept to understand the lived experiences of the people at the forefront (Seyidov, 2021). Looking beyond these discourses, the paper examines possible context-aware alternative conceptualizations of the concept, such as ”harmonization,’ that have been explored by researchers on refugee integration in Türkiye (Hoffmann & Samuk 2016: 10). Exploring Türkiye highlights how this Western understanding of social cohesion has contributed to  limited applicability, measurements, relevance, and vagueness in low and middle-income countries (Gray Meral & Both, 2021) and to new forced displacement and migration, conflict-affected and refugee contexts (Ozcurumez & Hoxha, 2020; Finn, 2017; de Berry & Roberts, 2018), ‘risk[ing] the effectiveness of the word – and the outcome – altogether’ (Mookherjee & Easton-Calabria, 2017).

Basma Doukhi is a Ph.D. Candidate in Migration Studies at the University of Kent. She is a Palestinian academic, human rights activist, and humanitarian practitioner. She worked for more than fourteen years in humanitarian and development with displaced people with UN agencies and international NGOs in the MENA and the UK. Basma was raised and lived in Al Rashideh Palestinian Refugee Camp in the South of Lebanon and is currently based in Canterbury, UK.  Basma obtained a Chevening Scholarship to pursue a master’s degree in the Development and Emergency Practice at Oxford Brookes University, and She is recently pursuing her PhD in Migration Studies at the University of Kent as the first Palestinian refugee woman specialized in this topic from the camps in the MENA. Her Ph.D. explores the role of Refugee-Led Organizations in providing protection and assistance for displaced communities in Turkey. She published the first chapter, under the title, “The Moment We Arrived to Saida [City in the South of Lebanon] in the Afternoon, We Became Refugees’ – (Kanafani, 2015: 75) ” about the resilience and power of Palestinian Refugee women in the camps of Lebanon. Basma is also a Dabke dancer and a founder of Roouh social enterprise, which is a platform for female refugee artisans to tell their stories in their own words through their craft, and it is addressed to UK audiences to listen to these stories in the way that they want to be told. 

 

Panel 6

Diverse Aspects of Anti-Migrant Populism in Europe

 

Enemies Inside: European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism 

Ana Paula Tostes (Senior Fellow at the Brazilian Center of International Relations and Professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro).

Despite the apparently undeniable impact of regional integration on domestic politics, national societies and the European party systems, scholars have engaged in lengthy debates on the levels, limits, and importance of such an impact (e.g. Kitschelt, 1992; Gabel, 2000; Mair, 2005, 2007; Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996). Taggart (1998), Marks et al. (2002) and Marks et al. (2006) found evidence that national political parties’ position on the regional integration process in Europe is a variable that explains voter preferences. Along the same lines, Stefano Bartolini (2007) sustained that no other issue in “post-war electoral history” has had the same broad and standardizing effects across the European party system as the regional integration process. The authors examine voter preferences in national elections based on the level of support for regional integration. In a disaggregated manner, the authors rate the ideological and party positions according to the level of support for integration in the economic and political spheres. The emergence of issues related to identity, sovereignty, safety, etc. – that is, “non-material” issues in ideological positions on both the right and the left – proved to be variables that influence the preferences of European voters.  

Since the early 2000s, it became remarkable that criticisms of economic integration that strongly opposed economic integration, such as the far-left political parties, did not see significant popularity among voters. Criticisms of the liberal model for a single market did not create obvious costs or harm for citizens distant from the integration process and did not perceive any economic losses. On the contrary, throughout the 1990s, countries most affected by the 2008 financial crisis benefitted from the transfers of European resources from the European Structural Funds. A similar situation happened after the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in an unprecedented economic contraction in 2020. 

In the two cases, the EU’s response to transfer benefits, policies, and funds was fast, forceful, and well-coordinated at all levels. 

We cannot say the same about the social and political integration contestants once the migration crises appeared as a yeast to make intolerance grow in the region, on the one hand, and populism on the other. In the context of the European migration crisis that began in 2015, it is possible to notice a considerable increase in the politicization of the issue of defending national identity and culture, especially by new far-right political parties (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019; Halikioupolou & Vlandas, 2020). 

Despite the ambiguities of populism (Judis, 2016; Müller, 2016; Kaltwasser, 2012), we seek to analyze the dimensions and consequences of Euroscepticism by classifying populist political parties and examining electoral data. For this article, we use the national electoral results for extremist political parties over the period when the European new extreme right emerged in the 1980s to 2022.  

By identifying differences between countries and in the range of ideological positions from the right to the left in the EU-15, it will be possible to conclude the EU crises’ impacts on support for new populist ideologies. We use data on electoral support and the analysis of far-right and far-left parties, their political platforms, and strategies as our object of investigation to gain a better perspective on the current state of Euroscepticism in the region. Finally, we hope to confirm that even though the dimensions of diffuse or specific Euroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002) may be complementary at times, we see that the difference between the two is reproduced in the Eurosceptic ideological positions defended by the left and those defended by the right.

Ana Paula Tostes is Jean Monnet Chair (Project: 101127443 EUgac) and Professor at the Graduate Program in Political Science at the Institute of Social and Political Studies of the State University of Rio de Janeiro (IESP-UERJ) and Senior Fellow at the Brazilian Center of International Relations (CEBRI). She holds a PhD in Political Science (IUPERJ, currently IESP) and Postdoc at University of São Paulo (USP). She was a visiting researcher (2016-2017) at the Free University of Berlin (FUB) and Professor at Michigan State University (MSU). Currently holds Productivity Scholarships from FAPERJ (Prociência/UERJ) and CNPq (n.316785/2021-0), and she is coordinator of Program for International Cooperation (PROBRAL CAPES/DAAD Edital n. 9/2023) between IESP/UERJ and the German Institute for Global Studies and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg, Germany.

 

Emigration and Political Party Membership in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from a Difference-in-Differences Design 

Melle Scholten (The University of Virginia).

How does large-scale emigration affect politics in the peripheral states of the European Union? While a large amount of literature looks at the political consequences of immigration in the more affluent Western and Northern member states, comparatively few scholars have taken up the mantle of examining the political effects of large-scale emigration in Central and Eastern Europe. Since emigration ranks higher among the concerns of non-migrants in these countries than immigration, this question is not without import. It could potentially help explain democratic backsliding in the Union. From a political economy perspective, high levels of emigration, concentrated in the younger, more progressive parts of society, change the makeup of the electorate. This project investigates how emigration, and its associated economic and political consequences affect policymaking and politics in CEE countries. Evidence is provided from panel data and a generalized difference-in-differences estimator. The findings presented here matter for the future of democracy in what is arguably the international organization most concerned with promoting democracy among its members. They also contribute to the study of the political economy of the Single Market and intra-European migration.

Melle Scholten is a PhD candidate at the University of Virginia (UVA). His research projects examine international and comparative political economy, primarily focusing on the effects of migration and remittances on migrant-sending societies, employing quantitative methods and causal inference. 

 

The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe

Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo (Lecturer-Researcher in Political Science at the University of Yaoundé, Cameroon).

This research critically examines how populism in Europe impacts the redefinition of citizenship and social inclusion for migrants, considering the rise of populist movements and their influence on political discourse, policies, and societal attitudes. The study aims to unravel the intricate ways in which populist ideologies shape the treatment of migrants in European societies, focusing on citizenship redefinition and social inclusion challenges. The literature review explores historical and theoretical aspects of populism in Europe, emphasizing how populist leaders leverage anti-immigrant sentiments to frame migrants as threats to national identity. The mixed-methods approach integrates qualitative interviews with policymakers, activists, and migrants, providing rich insights into subjective experiences. Quantitative data from national surveys complements qualitative findings, offering a broader understanding of trends.

The research delves into citizenship redefinition, analyzing changes in laws and rhetoric under populist influence, especially regarding jus soli and jus sanguinis principles. Social inclusion challenges are scrutinized, considering populist narratives portraying migrants as cultural threats and their impact on public perceptions, media representations, and policy measures affecting integration in education, employment, and healthcare.

Case studies from select European countries showcase variations in populist influence on citizenship and social inclusion policies, considering historical context, economic conditions, and populist movement strength. The research concludes with policy implications, recommending strategies to address challenges posed by populism to migrant populations. The study aims to contribute valuable insights for policymakers, scholars, and advocates working towards a more inclusive and equitable European society amid populist challenges.

Edouard Epiphane Yogo is a lecturer-researcher at the University of Yaoundé, holding a PhD in political science. A specialist in international relations and strategic studies, he has authored over thirty publications, including ten books. His expertise covers security, defense, and geopolitics, with a particular interest in issues related to state fragility, violent extremism, and terroris