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Gouveia e Melo and the Military Messianic Zeitgeist in Portugal

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Vice Admiral Gouveia e Melo’s rise from COVID-19 vaccination leader to potential presidential contender reflects Portugal’s cultural heritage of military messianism. His disciplined leadership, amplified by media narratives, crafted a savior image transcending political divides. This phenomenon taps into Portugal’s historical archetypes, where military figures with messianic undertones captivate public imagination. While appealing to a public seeking stability, his trajectory highlights the tension between democratic governance and charismatic authority. This case underscores the risks of media-driven political personas overshadowing pluralism and institutional accountability in democratic systems.

By João Ferreira Dias 

We are living in the age of populism (v.g. Kaltwasser et al., 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The dichotomic distinction between the “good people” and the “corrupt elite” is an old concept, perpetually relevant and adaptable to different historical and political contexts. The division rests on a potent narrative that appeals to collective identity and moral superiority, where the people are depicted as inherently virtuous and the elite as inherently corrupt or self-serving. This framing, though simplistic, resonates deeply with human societies, reflecting a timeless unease with concentrated power and authority. Discomfort in the face of “power,” whether embodied in a monarch, a state, or other ruling structures, has been a persistent theme throughout history. This is particularly significant given that the rule of law, liberal democracy, and pluralism—foundations of modern governance—are relatively recent achievements, fragile in their existence and often under siege.

In this light, the enduring impulse to give “voice” to the voiceless, to free the oppressed, or to emancipate marginalized groups has been a driving force of revolutionary thought and action across eras. Figures such as Jesus Christ, Karl Marx, Zumbi dos Palmares, and the architects of the French Revolution embody this ethos in vastly different contexts yet share the common thread of striving against perceived systems of domination or exploitation. These examples illustrate the universality of the struggle against oppression, transcending specific cultural or economic systems.

Indeed, the concept of “oppression” is not the exclusive domain of capitalist or Western paradigms, as some postmodern critiques suggest. Rather, it reflects a fundamental aspect of human societies—an observable dynamic of dominance and resistance that appears across diverse geographies and historical periods. This suggests that the drive for justice and liberation is an intrinsic part of human behavior, rooted in our collective desire for fairness, equity, and autonomy. As such, the discourse of populism, while modern in its form, taps into an ancient and deeply embedded narrative that continues to shape our political and social realities.

But today, the zeitgeist has shifted, and the narrative of “the will of the majority” has been co-opted by radical right populists, who position themselves as the champions of “the people” against “the elites,” thereby deepening societal divisions. As Mudde (2017) articulates, populism is characterized by four “core concepts”: ideology, the people, the elite, and the general will. These elements form the backbone of populist rhetoric, creating a binary opposition that fuels polarization. However, this polarization has expanded beyond the classic dichotomy of “people vs. elites,” evolving into a broader confrontation of “people vs. democracy” (Mounk, 2018). In this redefined landscape, the struggle manifests as a “culture war” against progressivism, driven by what Norris and Inglehart (2019) describe as a “cultural backlash,” where the illiberal tendencies of radical right movements and parties gain momentum.

This cultural conflict not only pits traditionalism against progressive ideals but also allows radical right populists to portray themselves as defenders of the people’s will. They adopt a performative stance, positioning themselves as the true voice of the people while simultaneously framing their ideological adversaries—progressives and the left—as disconnected elites or as perpetrators of societal decay. This reversal of roles further intensifies societal rifts. Those once perceived as the oppressors claim the mantle of representing popular sovereignty, while the “left,” in their focus on identity politics and critiques of systemic inequality—dismissively labeled as “cultural Marxism” (e.g., Dworkin, 1997; Kellner, 2013; Jamin, 2014)—is portrayed as elitist and divisive.

In this context, radical right populists leverage grievances about cultural and economic change, presenting themselves as custodians of traditional values in the face of perceived threats from globalism, multiculturalism, and liberal progressivism. This strategy not only mobilizes support but also weaponizes nostalgia for a past where societal roles and cultural norms were allegedly more stable. The resulting dynamic is a volatile reconfiguration of populist discourse, where claims of defending “the people” serve to legitimize illiberal practices and undermine democratic norms.

The Charismatic-Messianic Leader and Military Uniforms in Portugal

The association between charismatic leaders and military symbolism has long shaped political narratives in Portugal. The notion of the authoritarian populist, as described by Canovan (1981, 1999), centers on a leader who positions themselves as distinct from traditional elites, embodying anti-elitism (Taggart, 2000). Such leaders often portray themselves as the singular representatives of “the people,” channeling frustrations and grievances while presenting themselves as truth-tellers against a corrupt establishment. This narrative intersects with messianism, rooted in religious traditions. The figure of the Messiah—whether as the warrior-king David or the redeemer Jesus—has laid the groundwork for the Messiah-politician, a charismatic leader claiming to lead the “chosen people” toward peace and justice (Negrão, 2001). In Portuguese and Brazilian cultures, this messianic ideal deeply influences political imaginaries, particularly through Sebastianism, a mythological construct that has left a lasting legacy.

Sebastianism emerged after the disappearance of King Sebastian at the Battle of Alcácer-Quibir in 1578, which triggered a dynastic crisis. The myth of the king’s return, mounted on a white horse amidst the fog, intertwined notions of national salvation with religious messianism. As Oliveira Martins (2014) described, Sebastianism was a “posthumous proof of nationality,” while Lourenço (1978) saw it as emblematic of Portugal’s “irrealistic existence.” Later, Fernando Pessoa associated it with the Arthurian legend, while Teixeira de Pascoaes connected it to the Portuguese sentiment of saudade—a complex mix of absence, longing, and hope (Barros Dias, 2017). Under the Estado Novo regime (1933–1974), Salazar appropriated Sebastianism as a political tool. His leadership, steeped in authoritarianism, was often framed through a messianic lens, consolidating his charismatic authority (Plo, 2006).

Charismatic leadership persists in democratic societies, adapting to contemporary needs. Ferreira da Cunha (2015) notes that Portuguese society’s disillusionment with electoral systems fosters susceptibility to leaders blending personal charisma with symbolic unity. Portugal, historically considered resistant to populism and radical right movements (Carreira da Silva & Salgado, 2018; Santana-Pereira & Cancela, 2020; Valle, 2020), nevertheless exhibits subtler forms of populism. Zúquete (2022) highlights “soft populism” in figures such as Sidónio Pais, Humberto Delgado, and Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. Sidónio Pais, as president in 1918, symbolized military populism, often appearing in uniform and on horseback, claiming to unify the “good people” against partisan elites. Humberto Delgado, running for president in 1958, used his military background to challenge Salazar, portraying himself as a moral alternative to the regime’s corruption. After the 1974 Revolution, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho became a socialist populist figure, advocating for direct democracy and opposing capitalist and imperialist forces (Zúquete, 2022).

These examples illustrate how charismatic military figures resonate within Portuguese political culture, leveraging historical and cultural archetypes to establish authority. Military symbolism, intertwined with messianic undertones, remains a potent element in the public imagination, particularly during crises, reflecting the enduring interplay of history, myth, and leadership.

The Vice-Admiral Gouveia e Melo

Vice Admiral Gouveia e Melo’s rise to prominence during Portugal’s COVID-19 vaccination campaign was undoubtedly shaped by his disciplined leadership and problem-solving approach. However, his transition from a public health figure to a potential presidential contender highlights the significant role of media in constructing political personas. The media’s portrayal of Gouveia e Melo not only amplified his public image but arguably fabricated his emergence as a viable political figure, providing him with disproportionate coverage and framing him as a savior in a time of crisis.

From the outset, media narratives emphasized his charisma, military efficiency, and straightforward communication style, crafting an image of stability and trustworthiness. Frequent headlines lauded his achievements and speculated on his political future, often portraying him as a unifying, non-partisan figure capable of navigating the complexities of national leadership. This excessive attention contributed to a sense of inevitability around his potential candidacy, aligning with the archetype of the charismatic leader rooted in Portugal’s cultural tradition of messianism and military populism (Zúquete, 2022).

Despite his avoidance of explicit political rhetoric or anti-elitist positioning, the media filled this ideological void, elevating his military credentials and projecting him as a figure above the political divide. This media-driven fabrication can be seen as both a response to public demand for strong, competent leadership during a period of uncertainty and an active shaping of public opinion. By consistently spotlighting Gouveia e Melo, news outlets contributed to the perception of his indispensability in the political sphere, even before he expressed any clear intention to run for office. However, the anticipation of his retirement from military functions in the Navy paved the way to make very clear his intentions to run for the presidency, becoming a hot topic in political debate programs, and making the mainstream parties to avoid presenting an early candidate, especially considering that public surveys are giving him a most likely win.

Conclusion

Vice Admiral Gouveia e Melo’s trajectory from a public health figure to a potential presidential contender epitomizes the interplay between charismatic leadership, media-driven narratives, and Portugal’s cultural heritage of (military) messianism. His disciplined leadership during the COVID-19 vaccination campaign, amplified by media narratives, crafted an image of a savior capable of transcending political divides. This phenomenon is deeply rooted in Portugal’s historical and cultural archetypes, where figures associated with military symbolism and messianic undertones have long captured the public imagination.

Gouveia e Melo’s rise highlights the fragile boundaries between democratic governance and the allure of charismatic authority. While his candidacy may appeal to a public yearning for stability and strong leadership in times of crisis, it also underscores the risks of media-fueled political personas overshadowing democratic pluralism and institutional accountability. This case serves as a contemporary reflection of Portugal’s historical relationship with populism, messianism, and the enduring tension between tradition and progress.

 

References

Canovan, M. (1981). Populism. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. Political Studies, 47(1), 2–16.

Carreira da Silva, F., & Salgado, S. (2018). Why no populism in Portugal? In Changing societies: Legacies and challenges. Vol. 2. Citizenship in crisis (pp. 249–268).

Dworkin, D. (1997). Cultural Marxism in postwar Britain: History, the New Left, and the origins of cultural studies. Duke University Press.

Jamin, J. (2014). Cultural Marxism and the radical right. In The post-war Anglo-American far right: A special relationship of hate (pp. 84–103).

Kellner, D. (2013). Cultural Marxism & cultural studies. Critical Quest.

Kaltwasser, C. R., Taggart, P. A., Espejo, P. O., & Ostiguy, P. (Eds.). (2017). The Oxford handbook of populism.Oxford University Press.

Lourenço, E. (1978). O labirinto da saudade. Lisboa: Publicações D. Quixote.

Mounk, Y. (2019). The people vs. democracy: Why our freedom is in danger and how to save it. Harvard University Press.

Mudde, C. (2017). Populism: An ideational approach. In C. R. Kaltwasser, P. A. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of populism (pp. 27–47). Oxford University Press.

Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.

Negrão, L. N. (2001). Revisitando o messianismo no Brasil e profetizando seu futuro. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 16, 119–129.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press.

Oliveira Martins, J. P. (2014). História de Portugal. Edições Vercial.

Plo, A. R. R. (2006). Elecciones presidenciales en Portugal: cavaquismo, sebastianismo e ilusiones colectivas. Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano (ARI), 10(1), 1696–3466.

Santana-Pereira, J., & Cancela, J. (2020). Demand without supply? Populist attitudes and voting behaviour in post-bailout Portugal. South European Society and Politics, 25(2), 205–228.

Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Valle, A. L. R. M. N. D. (2020). Populismo nos programas eleitorais dos partidos portugueses para as legislativas de 2019: Uma questão de grau? (Doctoral dissertation).

Zúquete, J. P. (2022). Populismo: Lá fora e cá dentro. Lisboa: Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.

Social Media

How Identity Shapes Perception in a Polarized World: Insights from an Online Survey Experiment with AI-Enhanced Media

by AuthoritarianismCommentariesDigital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHome

Who do people trust in politics, and why? Our online survey experiment reveals that trust and credibility are driven less by emotional victimization narratives and more by partisanship. Political messages resonate most when they align with the audience’s ideological beliefs, overshadowing the impact of emotional appeals. These findings highlight the power of identity in shaping perceptions and the challenges of bridging partisan divides in today’s polarized landscape. Tailored messaging that speaks to shared values remains key to building trust and engagement.

By  Ihsan Yilmaz, Ana-Maria Bliuc & Daniel S. Courtney*  

Introduction: A New Battleground for Ideas

In today’s hyperconnected world, the arena of political debate has shifted from parliaments and rallies to the digital stage of social media. Here, every post has the potential to build trust or spark outrage, amplifying voices and emotions in ways that redefine public discourse (Huszár et al., 2021; Yarchi et al., 2020). Our study examines this dynamic space, exploring how political affiliation and narratives of victimhood shape perceptions of credibility and emotional engagement.

At the heart of this research lies a fundamental question: “How do people decide whom to trust?” Furthermore, we ask, “How do identity and emotion shape these judgments?” To explore these questions, we conducted an experiment that reflects the digital realities of political communication. Using AI-generated posts, participants were exposed to messages from representatives of two ideologically distinct UK political parties: the right-wing populist Reform UK and the progressive Green Party. Some posts portrayed the communicators as victims of political persecution, while others focused solely on party platforms. By combining new technology with real-world political dynamics, the study examines the intersection of emotion, trust, and identity. As social media increasingly becomes the dominant arena for political persuasion (De Zúñiga et al., 2022a, 2022b), understanding how these factors influence public opinion is essential for addressing the challenges of modern democracy.

The Online Survey Experiment

Imagine scrolling through your social media feed, where political messages compete for attention amid a sea of hashtags and soundbites. This study aimed to replicate that environment by exposing participants to custom-designed posts that mirrored the type of content people encounter daily on platforms like X. After engaging with these posts, participants provided their reactions through a survey, enabling us to measure two critical factors: the extent to which they trusted the messages and their emotional responses.

The experiment was designed to explore the relationship between political affiliation and emotional appeals. To achieve this, we introduced a fictional candidate representing either the Green Party or Reform UK. The fictional candidate either portrayed themselves as a victim of political persecution or focused solely on communicating their party’s agenda, avoiding any mention of personal hardship. This deliberate design allowed us to investigate how the intersection of identity politics, emotional narratives, and party alignment shapes perceptions of trust and credibility in the digital age.

By simulating the dynamics of online political discourse, the study offers insights into how emotional and ideological cues influence the way people perceive and engage with political messaging. In a world where social media serves as the primary battleground for political persuasion, understanding these mechanisms is more critical than ever.

Trust and Emotions in A Polarized World

In the polarized world of politics, trust and credibility are often elusive goals. Our preliminary findings offer intriguing insights into what makes political messages resonate—or fail—depending on the audience. Messages framed as coming from a Green Party candidate consistently inspired higher trust and credibility compared to those attributed to a Reform UK candidate, particularly among our predominantly left-leaning sample. This trend held true regardless of whether victimization narratives were employed. In essence, partisanship outweighs narrative.

Interestingly, our findings suggest that victimization narratives—often a powerful emotional tool in political rhetoric—didn’t significantly influence trust or credibility within the same political frame. Instead, political ideology appears to be an effective barrier to rhetorical strategy, lending credence to the idea of partisans being stuck in echo-chambers, preventing them from accepting opposing messages.

But there’s another layer to this story: political alignment. For left-leaning individuals, the Green Party’s message was consistently rated as more trustworthy and credible than Reform UK’s, across all scenarios. On the other hand, right-leaning individuals were less swayed by the policy frame, though they showed a slight preference for Reform when victimization narratives were included. This dynamic highlights how deeply our ideological beliefs shape the way we perceive political communication, with certain rhetorical strategies being effective for some but not others.

These findings carry a potentially important lesson for political strategists and communicators. Tailoring messages to match the values and priorities of a target audience is not just effective—it’s essential. While the Green Party’s approach seemed to appeal broadly, Reform struggled to build credibility, especially among left-leaning individuals. Furthermore, it seems that relying on victimization narratives alone may not be enough to shift perception among those not already susceptible to such rhetoric. Ultimately, it’s more likely that the strength of the policy message and its alignment with the audience’s worldview could make the real difference.

These preliminary findings are interesting because they remind us that politics isn’t just about policies; it’s about people. To win trust and build credibility, politicians need to understand the hearts and minds of those they seek to persuade. And that means crafting messages that resonate not only with their base but with the broader public.

Implications for Politics and Polarization

In an era of deepening political divides, understanding the dynamics of trust and credibility in communication is essential. This study highlights a key insight: the identity of the messenger often outweighs the content of the message. For political actors, this reality carries significant implications, particularly in creating narratives that resonate across ideological lines.

Reassessing Victimhood Narratives

While victimhood is often portrayed as a powerful rhetorical device (Armaly & Enders, 2021; Hronešová & Kreiss, 2024), this research suggests that its impact on trust and credibility may be overstated, particularly when the core message lacks alignment with the audience’s values. Although victimization can evoke empathy, it is not a panacea for overcoming ideological divides. Rather than relying on emotional appeals, politicians must recognise that the framing of their policies—and their alignment with the audience’s worldview and expectations—plays a far more critical role in shaping (positive) perceptions.

The Polarizing Force of Echo Chambers

The findings also bring to attention the risks of echo chambers. People are far more likely to trust narratives that align with their political affiliations, reinforcing a selective feedback loop that limits exposure to diverse perspectives. This dynamic can deepen polarisation, narrowing opportunities for meaningful dialogue (Bliuc et al., 2024). As trust becomes a partisan commodity, the gap between ideological groups grows, making it increasingly difficult to foster a shared sense of reality.

The Emotional Costs of Division

The emotional divide between ideological camps is another sobering takeaway. Messages from one’s political in-group are often met with admiration and pride, while those from the out-group trigger anger and distrust. This emotional schism exacerbates societal divisions, perpetuating cycles of antagonism (Harteveld, 202; Whitt et al., 2020). Over time, these entrenched emotional responses weaken the potential for compromise, dialogue, and understanding.

A Broader Context of Political Messaging

Beyond immediate political debates, the study hints at broader social trends, including the role of nostalgia and perceived cultural threats. Those who feel their heritage or values are under siege may be particularly vulnerable to messaging framed around urgency or loss. In this context, the study shows a troubling tendency in modern politics: the weaponization of emotion (see also Hidalgo-Tenorio & Benítez-Castro, 2021). When political narratives prioritize emotional impact over substantive discussion, the space for genuine policy debate diminishes.

Concluding Remarks: Toward a Healthier Democracy

If we are to support a more informed and less polarized democracy, we must move beyond strategies that merely stoke division. This begins with critical media literacy: citizens must learn to question not only the content of political messages but also the emotional appeals embedded within them. For political leaders, the challenge lies in promoting narratives that resonate without exploiting emotions or deepening divides. Authenticity, truthfulness, and a commitment to civil disagreement should guide political communication.

Overall, political narratives are likely to achieve their greatest impact when they resonate strongly with a partisan audience by aligning with its values, beliefs, and identity. Such tailored appeals foster emotional engagement and reinforce shared purpose among supporters. Without this initial alignment, narratives will likely fail to mobilize the base or sustain its commitment.

At its heart, this research reflects an increasing complexity of the relationship between emotion, trust, and political identity. It reminds us that our perceptions of credibility are shaped as much by how we feel as by what we hear. To navigate the volatile waters of modern politics, we must prioritize intellectual humility and create spaces for open dialogue. Only by bridging ideological divides can we build a society where trust transcends partisan loyalties, paving the way for a more inclusive and informed democracy.

 

Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion and Gerda Henkel Foundation, AZ 01/TG/21, Emerging Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World.

 

(*) Daniel Sebastian Courtney is a PhD candidate in Psychology at the University of Dundee, focusing on the impact of publicly sharing opinions on overconfidence. His research interests include social media behavior, conspiracy ideation, misinformation, polarization, and nationalism. He holds an MSc in Developmental Psychology from the University of Dundee, with a dissertation on nonlinguistic context effects on reading times in social media posts, and an MA in Applied Linguistics from the University of Birmingham, where he explored metaphor and metonymy in English and Japanese. Courtney has published on vaccine hesitancy and collective action, and has extensive teaching experience in psychology and English, including positions at Meiji Gakuin, Sophia, Obirin, and Josai International universities in Japan.

References

Armaly, M., & Enders, A. (2021). ‘Why Me?’ The Role of Perceived Victimhood in American Politics. Political Behavior, 44, 1583 – 1609. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-020-09662-x.

Bliuc, A. M., Betts, J. M., Vergani, M., Bouguettaya, A., & Cristea, M. (2024). A theoretical framework for polarization as the gradual fragmentation of a divided society. Communications Psychology, 2(1), 75. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-024-00125-1

De Zúñiga, H., González-González, P., & Goyanes, M. (2022a). Pathways to Political Persuasion: Linking Online, Social Media, and Fake News With Political Attitude Change Through Political Discussion. American Behavioral Scientist.https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642221118272.

De Zúñiga, H., Marné, H., & Carty, E. (2022b). Abating Dissonant Public Spheres: Exploring the Effects of Affective, Ideological and Perceived Societal Political Polarization on Social Media Political Persuasion. Political Communication, 40, 327 – 345. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2022.2139310.

Harteveld, E. (2021). Fragmented foes: Affective polarization in the multiparty context of the Netherlands. Electoral Studies. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ELECTSTUD.2021.102332.

Hidalgo-Tenorio, E., & Benítez-Castro, M. (2021). Trump’s populist discourse and affective politics, or on how to move ‘the People’ through emotion. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 20, 86 – 109. https://doi.org/10.1080/14767724.2020.1861540.

Hronešová, J., & Kreiss, D. (2024). Strategically Hijacking Victimhood: A Political Communication Strategy in the Discourse of Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump. Perspectives on Politics. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592724000239.

Husz’ar, F., Ktena, S., O’Brien, C., Belli, L., Schlaikjer, A., & Hardt, M. (2021). Algorithmic amplification of politics on Twitter. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 119. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2025334119.

Whitt, S., Yanus, A., Mcdonald, B., Graeber, J., Setzler, M., Ballingrud, G., & Kifer, M. (2020). Tribalism in America: Behavioral Experiments on Affective Polarization in the Trump Era. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 8, 247 – 259. https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2020.29.

Yarchi, M., Baden, C., & Kligler-Vilenchik, N. (2020). Political Polarization on the Digital Sphere: A Cross-platform, Over-time Analysis of Interactional, Positional, and Affective Polarization on Social Media. Political Communication, 38, 98 – 139. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2020.1785067.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses a rally organized by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) at Istanbul Ataturk Airport ahead of the local elections in Istanbul, Turkey on March 24, 2024. Photo: Tolga Ildun.

The Transmission of Nostalgia, Threat and Unity in Populist Communication: Using AI to Analyze Erdogan and Supporters’ Speech

by AuthoritarianismCommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHome

How does Erdogan’s populist rhetoric resonate with his supporters? Our study dives into his use of nostalgia, threat, and unity to rally his base. We found that while Erdogan and his followers align on “threat” messaging—framing enemies as existential dangers—supporters amplify this far more than his calls for unity. Nostalgia for Turkey’s Ottoman past adds a powerful emotional pull, fueling his vision of a revived Islamic identity. These findings reveal how populist language not only connects leaders to their base but also reshapes grassroots narratives, driving division and loyalty in equal measure.

By Matthew J. Belanger*, Ana-Maria Bliuc, John Betts** & Ihsan Yilmaz 

Populist movements have reshaped politics worldwide, and language lies at their heart. This study explores how rhetoric may drive these movements by focusing on Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s President, and examining three key strategies in his communication style. Crucially, it also looks at how these strategies echo in the voices of his supporters.

Populism is often defined as a specific political communication style that emphasizes proximity to the “people,” takes an anti-establishment stance, and stresses the homogeneity of the people by excluding certain segments or subgroups of the public (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Populist communication is typically polarizing (Bliuc et al, 2024) and juxtaposes the virtuous “people” against a “corrupt elite,” portraying the people as the sole legitimate source of political power (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016). It combines key messages (content) with stylistic devices (form), often using social media platforms rather than traditional media (Engesser et al., 2017; Ernst et al., 2019).

Moreover, populism is often used as a strategic tool by political challengers, particularly those distant from the center of power, to mobilize support by positioning themselves as outsiders (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016). Populist communication styles can be understood through the dimensions of identity construction, rhetorical style, and media relationship, and they can influence power relations and political actors of both right and left (Block & Negrine, 2017).

Erdogan has long been established as a populist leader. His communication during critical national events from 2013 to 2023 (for example, national and local elections, the 2016 coup attempt, or the 2017 constitutional referendum) provides an opportunity to understand what rhetorical constructions are present in his discourse and how they can be transmitted and reflected among the population.

Nostalgia has been well-documented in populist rhetoric and typically idealizes collective memories from a supposed golden age (Kenny, 2017; Karakaya, 2018; Elçi, 2021; Menke & Wulf, 2021). Threat, or division, is a further rhetorical device that describes external or internal dangers to create solidarity among supporters as well as a sense of urgency, with xenophobia and racism typically supporting such developments (Rydgren, 2003).

This paper investigates how such rhetorical devices manifest in the rhetoric of both Erdogan and his supporters. Using a combination of thematic analysis and machine learning, we analyze speeches from Erdogan alongside interview data from his grassroots supporters. This study uniquely addresses both the supply of political narratives (the leader’s messaging) and the demand for these narratives (the grassroots reception and reproduction). This allows for a direct comparison of how Erdogan’s language resonates with and influences his supporters.

Erdogan’s Populism

Erdogan’s leadership has reshaped Turkey’s political landscape through a distinctive form of populism often referred to as “civilizational populism.” As the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), Erdogan has framed political conflicts as existential struggles between civilizational identities, casting himself and his party as defenders of Islamic values against the perceived encroachments of secular and Western influences (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022).

Erdogan’s populist narrative constructs a stark dichotomy between the “righteous people” and the “corrupt elite.” The latter, often characterized as Westernized secularists, are portrayed as detached from Turkey’s authentic Islamic identity (Yilmaz, 2021). These narrative leverages historical grievances, particularly the exclusion of religious conservatives during the Kemalist era, to rally support (Morieson et al., 2024). By drawing upon Turkey’s Ottoman-Islamic heritage, Erdogan positions himself within a broader narrative of resistance against Western hegemony and secular modernity, aligning his leadership with the defense of an Islamic civilization (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023; Morieson et al., 2024).

Central to Erdogan’s rhetoric is the portrayal of Turkey as besieged by both external adversaries and internal subversives. He often attributes domestic challenges to foreign conspiracies and malign influences, framing himself and his administration as the bulwark against these existential threats (Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2021; Yilmaz et al., 2021). This narrative fosters a siege mentality, consolidating support through fear and the promise of protection (Tas, 2020; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023).

Following the failed 2016 coup attempt, Erdogan framed the incident as a plot by foreign and domestic enemies, thereby justifying widespread purges within the state and society (Yilmaz, 2021). He depicted the AKP as the ultimate safeguard of Turkey’s sovereignty and Islamic values, branding critics and opponents as traitors and adversaries of both the state and religion (Tas, 2020). He emphasizes national unity, urging all segments of society to come together under his leadership to strengthen Turkey’s cohesion. He calls for solidarity against perceived enemies, emphasizing the need to transcend ethnic, sectarian, and ideological divides to protect the “true people” of Turkey led by himself. By framing himself as the sole political force capable of safeguarding this unity, Erdogan consolidates his support base while marginalizing dissenters as disruptors of national harmony (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023).

Erdogan frequently evokes a romanticized restorative nostalgic vision of the Ottoman Empire, portraying it as a pinnacle of Islamic grandeur and cultural richness. This deliberate invocation of the past serves to cultivate a collective yearning among supporters for a return to Turkey’s former glory (Karakaya, 2018; Elçi, 2021; Yilmaz, 2021). By aligning his leadership with this illustrious heritage, Erdogan crafts a narrative suggesting his governance continues the Ottoman legacy, aiming to reestablish Turkey’s prominence on the global stage (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022).

The Study – What We Did

Our study forms part of an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant project, led by Ihsan Yilmaz and Ana-Maria Bliuc. As a component of the broader project, Erdogan’s speeches from 10 significant national events between 2013 and 2023 were systematically collected. Additionally, 52 of his supporters in Istanbul were interviewed using semi-structured format. The interviews were transcribed and translated into English. The data gathered from Erdogan’s speeches and interviews forms the foundation of our study.

The language analysis was conducted in two primary stages. An inductive thematic analysis was first performed to manually identify examples of two a priori rhetorical devices: nostalgia and threat. These two themes were then used as inputs into a seeded sequential Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model (Watanabe & Baturo, 2024) which was then used to identify language (words) associated with themes in Erdogan’s speeches. This process also revealed a third residual rhetorical device present in his discourse: unity.

Using a dictionary of thematic labels (terms related to each rhetorical device) identified using LDA, zero-shot text classification (Alcoforado et al., 2022) was then used to identify the presence of these key rhetorical sentiments in Erdogan’s speeches and his supporters’ discourse. The analysis used the xlm-roberta-large-xnli classification model (Hugging Face, 2024; Conneau, 2018) to categorize sentences into the predefined themes: Unity, Nostalgia, Threat, or None, depending on their thematic alignment. A confidence threshold of 0.85 was set to ensure classification accuracy whereby sentences above this threshold were deemed to contain these themes. The comparative analysis then identified the thematic alignment between the leader’s rhetoric and his supporters’ discourse, highlighting similarities and differences in the prevalence of the three rhetorical themes.

Results & Implications

This research quantitatively evaluates the rhetorical alignment and divergence between a populist leader and his supporters. The findings reveal that Unity (8735 sentences; 8.41%) and Threat (8500 sentences; 8.19%) were the most prevalent rhetorical devices in Erdogan’s speeches, with Nostalgia being comparatively less prominent (506 sentences; 0.49%).

Examining the sentences identified as Nostalgia, Unity, and Threat over time, it appears that the proportions of all three remained relatively consistent over time, apart from 2016 which had the highest proportion of threat discourse (i.e., during the 2016 coup).  See Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Proportion of Unity, Threat, and Nostalgia discourse within Erdogan’s speeches over time.

Similarly, the interview data from his supporters shows Threat (1563 sentences; 5.51%) as the dominant rhetorical device, followed by Unity (700 sentences; 2.47%) and Nostalgia (52 sentences; 0.18%). These results indicate both alignment and divergence between Erdogan and his supporters, with alignment in the overall prevalence of Threat and Nostalgia, but a notable divergence in the frequency of Unity rhetoric.

The findings suggest that supporters may either amplify threat rhetoric while deprioritizing or underutilizing unity-based messaging. This could reflect a selective resonance with certain aspects of Erdogan’s rhetoric. Threat amplification (i.e., conflict-oriented narratives) may signal the emotional or strategic appeal of threat rhetoric within populist movements, while less emphasis on unity could indicate that it has limited perceived relevance or applicability in grassroots contexts.

This combination of alignment and divergence demonstrates a bit of a dichotomy with respect to rhetorical transmission. On one hand, the alignment demonstrates how populist rhetoric enters supporters’ discourse, and embeds themes of exclusion, moral division, and collective identity into their language. But, on the other hand, the divergence shows that supporters may prioritize certain themes over others based on their own interpretations or circumstances. It could also be the case that unity messaging does not carry the same level of emotional urgency that threat-based rhetoric does. While unity messaging is often framed as positive and affirming, it can lack the intensity that divisive and threatening language provides. Threat rhetoric, on the other hand, inspires more emotional responses such as fear and anger, which are more likely to provoke immediate and powerful reactions. This emotional charge may make threat-oriented messages more compelling and memorable, especially in the context of populist movements where a sense of crisis or danger is central to the narrative.

Through representations of nostalgia, threat, and unity, Erdogan builds a collective identity that contrasts many virtuous “people” with corrupt elites and this method reflects the key themes of populist communication. Our study shows that these themes are not only present in Erdogan’s speeches but are also, somewhat proportionally, internalized and reproduced in the language of his supporters. The language used by political leaders can be viewed as a tool for identity formation, as it can become embedded into the daily speech and thoughts of their followers, as demonstrated within this study. This promotes feelings of solidarity, legitimizes political power, and motivates action.

Overall, our findings show that political leaders can sustain influence over their supporters through carefully crafted rhetorical constructions that resonate with their audience’s values, emotions, and social identities. While far-right populist leaders may claim to promote unity and cohesion, their strategies often involve exploiting social divisions and consolidating national identity in ways that can ultimately reduce social trust and increase tensions between groups (Jay et al., 2019). For example, populism’s rise is closely linked to xenophobia and political violence through mechanisms of power consolidation, symbolic violence, and socio-political grievances. On top of this, nostalgic constructions create a narrative that contrasts a glorified past with a troubled present, which can further cause unrest. Understanding these dynamics is essential for addressing the challenges posed by populist movements and mitigating their impact on society.

 

Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion and Gerda Henkel Foundation, AZ 01/TG/21, Emerging Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World.

 

(*) Dr Matthew J. Belanger is a Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Social Policy, and Criminology at University of Stirling, United Kingdom. He serves on the research advisory board at the Recovery Outcomes Institute and is on the board of directors at Recovery Scotland. He has a BSc in Kinesiology (2017) from the University of Massachusetts – Amherst, an MSc in Brain Sciences (2019) from the University of Glasgow, and a PhD in Addiction Psychology/Data Science (2024) from the University of Dundee, where he studied biopsychosocial factors influencing addiction recovery. Previously, he worked as a research scientist in the Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy at Universitaetsklinikum Carl Gustav Carus in Dresden Germany, undertaking research concerning environmental influences on behaviour. Beyond addiction recovery, Belanger’s interdisciplinary research also heavily involves the application of machine learning in sociological and political contexts.

(**) Dr. John Betts is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Data Science & AI at the Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Australia. He holds a PhD in Operations Research from Monash University, alongside qualifications in statistics, mathematics, and education. His expertise lies in computational modeling, optimization, simulation, and data science, with applications spanning social sciences, medicine, and manufacturing. His research has made significant contributions to areas such as online political behavior, prostate cancer treatment, and Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing. Noteworthy collaborations include studies on the influence of online influencers in societal polarization and the effects of local socio-political events on far-right online communities.

 

References

Alcoforado, A., Ferraz, T. P., Gerber, R., Bustos, E., Oliveira, A. S., Veloso, B. M., … & Costa, A. H. R. (2022) ‘ZeroBERTo: Leveraging zero-shot text classification by topic modeling’, International Conference on Computational Processing of the Portuguese Language, pp. 125-136. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Bliuc, A-M., Betts, J. M. & Yilmaz, I. (2024) ‘Agent-Based Simulation and Linguistic Analysis of Populist vs. Non-Populist Rhetoric: Insights on Polarization and Cohesion’, European Center for Populism Studies. Available at: www.populismstudies.org/ (Accessed: 6 December 2024).

Block, E. & Negrine, R. (2017) ‘The populist communication style: Toward a critical framework’, International Journal of Communication Systems, 11, pp. 178-197.

Bonikowski, B. & Gidron, N. (2016) ‘The populist style in American politics: Presidential campaign discourse, 1952–1996’, Social Forces, 94(4), pp. 1593-1621.

Conneau, A., Khandelwal, K., Goyal, N., Chaudhary, V., Wenzek, G., Guzmán, F., … & Stoyanov, V. (2020) ‘Unsupervised Cross-lingual Representation Learning at Scale’, Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, pp. 8440–8451. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Elçi, E. (2021) ‘Nostalgia as a Political Tool: The Use of Ottoman Imagery in Turkish Populism’, Middle East Critique, 30(1), pp. 47–62.

Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F. & Büchel, F. (2017) ‘Populism and social media: How politicians spread a fragmented ideology’, Information, Communication & Society, 20(8), pp. 1109-1126.

Ernst, N., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Blassnig, S. & Esser, F. (2017) ‘Extreme parties and populism: An analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries’, Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), pp. 1347-1364.

Jagers, J. & Walgrave, S. (2007) ‘Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties’ discourse in Belgium’, European Journal of Political Research, 46(3), pp. 319-345.

Jay, S., Batruch, A., Jetten, J., McGarty, C. & Muldoon, O. T. (2019) ‘Economic inequality and the rise of far‐right populism: A social psychological analysis’, Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 29(5), pp. 418-428.

Karakaya, Y. (2018) ‘The Conquest of Hearts: The Central Role of Ottoman Nostalgia within Contemporary Turkish Populism’, Middle Eastern Studies, 54(5), pp. 790–813.

Kenny, M. (2017) ‘Back to the Populist Future? Understanding Retrogressive Politics in the United States and Europe’, American Affairs, 1(2), pp. 58–72.

Menke, M. & Wulf, T. (2021) ‘The dark side of inspirational pasts: An investigation of nostalgia in right-wing populist communication’, Media and Communication, 9(2), pp. 237-249.

Morieson, Nicholas; Yilmaz, Ihsan & Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “From National to Manufactured: The Evolution of the AKP’s Victimhood Narratives.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 6, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0040        

Rydgren, J. (2003) ‘Meso-level reasons for racism and xenophobia: Some converging and diverging effects of radical right populism in France and Sweden’, European Journal of Social Theory, 6(1), pp. 45-68.

Tas, H. (2020). “The chronopolitics of Erdogan’s populism in Turkey.” International Political Science Review, 41(4), 632–646. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119885444

Watanabe, K. & Baturo, A. (2024) ‘Seeded sequential LDA: A semi-supervised algorithm for topic-specific analysis of sentences’, Social Science Computer Review, 42(1), pp. 224-248.

Yilmaz, I. & Morieson, N. (2023). “Civilizational Populism: Definition, Literature, Theory, and Practice.” In: Religions and the Global Rise of Civilizational Populism. (pp. 1-22). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4262-6_2

Yilmaz, I., & Bashirov, G. (2018). “The AKP after 15 years: Emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey.” Third World Quarterly, 39(9), 1812–1830. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1447371

Yilmaz, I., & Morieson, N. (2022). “Civilizational Populism in Domestic and Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey.” Religions, 14(5), 631. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14050631

Yilmaz, I., & Shipoli, E. (2021). Use of past collective traumas, fear and conspiracy theories for securitization of the opposition and authoritarianisation: the Turkish case. Democratization, 29(2), 320–336. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1953992

Yilmaz, I., Shipoli, E., & Demir, M. (2021). Authoritarian resilience through securitization: an Islamist populist party’s co-optation of a secularist far-right party. Democratization, 28(6), 1115–1132. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1891412

Yilmaz, I. (2021). Creating the Desired Citizen: Ideology, State and Islam in Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern speaks at the Memorial Service for the Muslim victims of the Christchurch shootings, held in Christchurch, Canterbury, New Zealand, on March 29, 2019, with a significant police presence. Photo: Sheryl Watson.

Agent-Based Simulation and Linguistic Analysis of Populist vs. Non-Populist Rhetoric: Insights on Polarization and Cohesion

by AuthoritarianismCommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHomeLeadership & Persona

Our agent-based simulations show that non-populist rhetoric, exemplified by former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, fosters societal cohesion through positivity, inclusivity, and broad audience engagement. By maintaining a “middle ground,” it promotes civil discourse and prevents ideological divisions from deepening into polarization. Inclusive language ensures all groups feel recognized, addressing societal fractures. In contrast, populist rhetoric, typified by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reinforces divides through negativity and exclusion. By antagonizing outgroups and amplifying grievances, it fosters conflict and consolidates ingroup loyalty at the expense of societal harmony. This sharp contrast highlights the stabilizing potential of inclusive rhetoric versus the fragmenting impact of populist communication.

By Ana-Maria Bliuc*, John Betts** & Ihsan Yilmaz

Introduction

Charismatic leaders hold extraordinary influence over their audiences, shaping the emotional and ideological contours of polarization. Their rhetoric can intensify divisions when it is extreme or reduce tensions when it emphasizes inclusivity and moderation (Betts & Bliuc, 2022; Bliuc et al., 2023; Bliuc et al., 2024). Through emotional appeals, they cultivate trust, admiration, and even anger, channeling these emotions into collective action. However, this influence is complex: emotional appeals often create feedback loops that deepen loyalty while perpetuating divisive rhetoric. The “awestruck effect,” where followers suppress their emotions in response to a leader’s overwhelming presence, highlights the intensity of this dynamic. Additionally, charisma can be contagious, fostering intra-group cohesion while amplifying intergroup polarization.

This article explores how populist and non-populist rhetoric influences societal polarization, focusing on the speeches of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern between 2017 and 2023. We present preliminary findings from our ongoing research, which uses linguistic analysis and computational modelling to understand how their communication styles shape societal dynamics. Erdogan’s speeches often reflect populist tendencies, using divisive language to define “the people” in opposition to “the elite” and “the others,” reinforcing group divisions. In contrast, Ardern’s rhetoric emphasizes inclusivity and optimism, promoting unity and social cohesion. These contrasting approaches offer valuable insights into the role of leadership communication in fostering either polarization or cohesion.

Our analysis uses tools such as Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) and Natural Language Processing (NLP) to examine the tone, content, and inclusivity of their speeches. Additionally, we apply an agent-based model (ABM) to simulate how these rhetorical styles influence societal divisions over time. The ABM treats individuals as “agents” with distinct responses to messages, allowing us to explore how individual reactions can shape larger societal trends like polarization or unity. This ongoing research aims to shed light on how leaders’ rhetoric impacts societal cohesion or division. This preliminary analysis offers critical insights into how political communication shapes group dynamics, paving the way for further exploration of its long-term effects on societal cohesion or division.

Populists and Polarization

Populism is often a significant driver of societal polarization. Populist leaders, particularly those with charismatic appeal, play a central role in driving polarization. Their rhetoric often mobilizes emotions such as anger and fear, framing societal divides as existential battles (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Right-wing populists tend to focus on issues like immigration and national sovereignty, while left-wing populists emphasize economic inequality and social justice. Regardless of ideological orientation, their communication strategies frequently amplify societal divisions by fostering in-group loyalty and out-group hostility (Hawkins, 2009).

Populist leaders often employ divisive rhetoric that frames societal conflicts as a struggle between a virtuous “people” and a corrupt “elite,” thereby deepening societal divisions. This “us versus them” narrative simplifies complex issues and fosters an environment of distrust and animosity among different social groups. The emotional and moralistic language used by populists can exacerbate polarization by reinforcing in-group solidarity while marginalizing out-groups. The relationship between populism and polarization is particularly acute in contexts where political institutions are weak or trust in governance is low.

Erdogan’s Populism

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses a rally organized by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) at Istanbul Ataturk Airport ahead of the local elections in Istanbul, Turkey on March 24, 2024. Photo: Tolga Ildun.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s populism has become a defining feature of Turkey’s contemporary political landscape. His leadership, particularly as head of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), illustrates a shift towards “civilizational populism.” This approach frames political conflicts not merely in terms of domestic divides but as existential struggles between competing civilizational identities, with Erdogan positioning himself and the AKP as defenders of Islamic values against secular and Western influences (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022).

Erdogan’s populist rhetoric constructs a binary between the “pure and virtuous people” and the “corrupt elite,” with the latter often described as Westernized secularists who are portrayed as out of touch with Turkey’s authentic Islamic identity. This narrative draws on historical grievances, including the marginalization of religious conservatives during the Kemalist era, to galvanize his base. By invoking Turkey’s Ottoman-Islamic heritage, Erdogan aligns himself with a broader “Islamic civilization” and situates his leadership within a narrative of resistance to Western domination and secular modernity (Yilmaz & Morieson 2023; Morieson et al., 2024).

One hallmark of Erdogan’s populism is his strategic use of crises to consolidate power and deepen polarization. For example, in the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup attempt, Erdogan framed the event as an existential threat orchestrated by foreign conspirators and domestic traitors, which justified the purging of perceived enemies within the state and society. His narrative positioned the AKP as the sole protector of national sovereignty and religious values, marginalizing dissenters as enemies of the state and Islam (Tas, 2020). Civilizational populism also extends to Erdogan’s foreign policy. His rhetoric frequently portrays Turkey as the leader of the Muslim world, defending Islamic interests against a hostile West (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018).

Jacinda Ardern’s Leadership and Inclusive Rhetoric

Jacinda Ardern’s leadership as Prime Minister of New Zealand (2017–2023) offers a compelling example of how inclusive and empathetic rhetoric can foster societal cohesion in a world increasingly divided by polarization. Unlike populist leaders who often amplify divisions through exclusivity and antagonism, Ardern’s communication style is characterized by optimism, inclusivity, and a focus on collective well-being. Her leadership emphasized unity over division and shared values over antagonistic narratives.

One of the defining moments of Ardern’s tenure was her response to the 2019 Christchurch Mosque attacks, in which 51 people lost their lives in an act of white supremacist terrorism. Ardern’s immediate response, marked by empathy and solidarity, included public expressions of grief, wearing a hijab to demonstrate respect for Muslim communities, and categorically denouncing hate. Her government’s “Wellbeing Budget,” introduced in 2019, shifted the focus of governance from traditional economic indicators to measures of societal well-being, such as mental health, child poverty, and environmental sustainability. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Ardern’s empathetic communication style played a pivotal role in maintaining public trust and compliance. Her use of direct communication through social media, coupled with clear and consistent messaging, fostered a sense of unity and shared purpose (Craig, 2021). 

Unlike the divisive strategies often employed by populist leaders such as Erdogan, Ardern’s rhetoric consistently avoided antagonism, focusing instead on fostering dialogue and inclusivity. Her communication style offers an alternative to traditional populism, highlighting the capacity of empathetic and inclusive leadership to bridge divides and promote societal cohesion.

Contrasts in Rhetorical Styles

The analysis of speeches delivered by Erdogan and Ardern highlights striking contrasts in their rhetorical styles. Erdogan’s speeches are characterized by brevity, negativity, and exclusivity, with an average length of 430 words compared to Ardern’s more expansive 2,051 words. His frequent appeals to a specific ingroup and the simultaneous exclusion or demonization of outgroups reflect a populist approach. This rhetoric employs divisive language that frames societal dynamics in binary terms: a virtuous “us” versus a corrupt or threatening “them.” Language tokens show the content of his speeches to be focused on Turkey’s prominence in the world (“nation,” “future,” “great,” “world”). This type of communication reinforces group boundaries, creating a heightened sense of identity among ingroup members while fostering animosity toward outgroups.

By contrast, Ardern’s speeches are characterized by inclusivity, positivity, and a focus on shared national identity. Her use of inclusive language, such as incorporating Māori terms like “koutou” (you all) and “katoa” (all), underscores her commitment to addressing diverse audiences as part of a unified whole. This rhetoric not only bridges ideological and cultural divides but also actively works to foster cohesion. By framing political challenges as collective issues requiring mutual effort, Ardern cultivates a sense of solidarity and reduces the potential for societal polarization.

Emotional Tone

A key finding of our study is the role of emotional tone in driving or mitigating polarization. Erdogan’s speeches often employ fear, anger, and grievance to mobilize his base. He also makes a greater use of words belonging to categories such as “power,” “politics,” “authority” compared to Ardern. These emotional appeals resonate strongly with ingroup members but simultaneously alienate outgroup members, fostering an antagonistic environment. The cyclical nature of such rhetoric—where repeated exposure reinforces emotional divides—intensifies polarization over time.

Ardern’s positive emotional appeals focus on empathy, hope, and collective well-being. This is evident in the greater prevalence of terms from categories like “perception,” “authentic,” “insight” compared to Erdogan. These messages resonate across diverse groups, creating an emotional connection that fosters trust and mutual respect. This ability to evoke positive emotions while addressing collective concerns makes inclusive rhetoric particularly effective in promoting cohesion and mitigating polarization.

Audience Reach

Another critical factor is the scope of a leader’s audience reach. Erdogan’s targeted approach speaks primarily to his ingroup, limiting the broader appeal of his message. This narrow scope ensures that his rhetoric resonates deeply with a specific subset of society but fails to engage or persuade others. His targeted communication exacerbates divisions by leaving outgroups feeling excluded and marginalized.

In contrast, Ardern’s broad reach allows her rhetoric to address diverse segments of society. By framing her messages in inclusive terms, she creates a sense of belonging among a wider audience. This broad appeal reduces the likelihood of polarization by fostering dialogue and understanding across ideological and cultural divides.

Broader Implications of Leadership Communication

The findings illustrate that the tone and reach of a leader’s rhetoric are as critical as its content in shaping societal dynamics. Erdogan’s populist approach leverages exclusionary narratives to consolidate ingroup loyalty but at the cost of societal cohesion. Ardern’s inclusive style demonstrates the potential for leadership to bridge divides and foster unity, even in challenging contexts.

These results have implications for understanding the role of political communication in contemporary society. They highlight the dual-edged nature of rhetoric: while it can mobilize and inspire, it can also divide and alienate. Leaders, therefore, carry a significant responsibility in shaping the emotional and ideological landscape of their societies.

Agent-Based Simulation: A Window into Long-Term Impacts

The Agent-Based Model (ABM) is a powerful analytical tool that simulates the way individuals interact within a society. In this case, we used it to explore how different rhetorical styles may shape public beliefs over time. This method allowed us to test the long-term effects of leaders’ communication styles in a controlled virtual environment, offering insights into their potential societal impact.

The agent-based simulations provide a unique perspective on the long-term effects of rhetorical styles. They show how individual responses to rhetoric can aggregate into broader societal trends. In Erdogan’s case, targeted, negative rhetoric creates a feedback loop of polarization. Even if the frequency of such rhetoric decreases, its polarizing effects persist due to the entrenched divisions it creates.

In contrast, Ardern’s inclusive rhetoric has a stabilizing effect. By fostering dialogue and promoting mutual understanding, her communication style helps build resilience against external shocks that might otherwise exacerbate societal divisions. These findings highlight the potential of positive, inclusive rhetoric to mitigate the destabilizing impact of populist communication.

The results show stark contrasts between these approaches. Ardern’s speeches were longer, more positive, and emphasized inclusivity and shared national identity. Her frequent use of inclusive language, including Māori terms reinforced this approach. Erdogan’s speeches, by contrast, were shorter, more negative, and often appealed to a specific in-group while excluding the out-group. When modelled over time using agent-based simulations, these rhetorical styles produced markedly different effects. Erdogan’s negative, targeted rhetoric deepened societal divisions, driving bipolarization. His exclusionary language reinforced pre-existing divides, ensuring polarization persisted even when communication was less frequent. Ardern’s inclusive and positive rhetoric, however, promoted cohesion by stabilizing the “middle ground,” where disagreements occurred without escalating into entrenched polarization. Her approach acted as a mitigating force, countering the effects of external shocks or crises that might otherwise deepen divisions.

Our study also highlights the importance of context in shaping the effects of rhetoric. Erdogan’s rhetoric resonates strongly in a political environment marked by economic challenges, geopolitical tensions, and cultural divisions. These conditions amplify the appeal of populist narratives that frame societal problems as the fault of external adversaries or internal enemies.

Ardern’s rhetoric, on the other hand, is tailored to a context emphasizing collective well-being, inclusivity, and national identity. Her communication style aligns with New Zealand’s cultural emphasis on egalitarianism and community, enhancing its effectiveness in fostering cohesion. These contextual factors demonstrate that the impact of rhetoric is not solely determined by the leader’s style but also by the broader social and political environment in which it is delivered.

Conclusion

The findings of this study underscore the profound impact of political rhetoric on societal polarization. Non-populist rhetoric, characterized by its positive tone, inclusivity, and broad audience reach, emerges as a critical tool for fostering societal cohesion. By maintaining a “solid middle ground,” such rhetoric enables civil disagreements while preventing ideological divisions from escalating into entrenched polarization. Inclusive language ensures that both ingroups and outgroups feel recognized and valued, addressing the psychological and ideological fractures that often underlie societal tensions.

In contrast, populist rhetoric, with its negative tone and narrow audience focus, deepens divides by reinforcing group boundaries and antagonizing outgroups. The polarizing effect of this rhetoric lies not only in its content but in its delivery—its ability to heighten conflict, amplify grievances, and consolidate ingroup loyalty at the expense of broader societal harmony. By appealing to exclusionary identities and emotional grievances, populist leaders exacerbate societal fragmentation, leading to a more divided and contentious public sphere.

For policymakers and practitioners, these findings highlight the necessity of prioritizing communication strategies that unite rather than divide. The tone and delivery of a leader’s message can determine whether disagreements are addressed constructively or exacerbate social cleavages. This calls for a re-evaluation of political discourse, focusing on strategies that emphasize shared values and mutual respect. While these preliminary findings highlight the power of rhetoric to shape group dynamics, further investigation is needed to fully understand the long-term implications of these communication styles in diverse contexts.

 

Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion.

 

(*) Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc is an Associate Professor of Social and Political Psychology in the Psychology Department at the University of Dundee, where she has been a faculty member since 2019. Her research explores how social identities influence behavior across various contexts, including health, environmental issues (such as climate change), and socio-political domains (such as collective action and social change). Recently, her work has focused on online communities, investigating how collective identities and behaviors are shaped through digital interactions.

(**) Dr. John Betts is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Data Science & AI at the Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Australia. He holds a PhD in Operations Research from Monash University, alongside qualifications in statistics, mathematics, and education. His expertise lies in computational modeling, optimization, simulation, and data science, with applications spanning social sciences, medicine, and manufacturing. His research has made significant contributions to areas such as online political behavior, prostate cancer treatment, and Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing. Noteworthy collaborations include studies on the influence of online influencers in societal polarization and the effects of local socio-political events on far-right online communities.

 

References  

Betts, J. M. & Bliuc, A. M. (2022). “The effect of influencers on societal polarization.” In: 2022 Winter Simulation Conference (WSC) (pp. 370-381). IEEE.  

Bliuc, A. M.; Betts, J. M.; Vergani, M.; Bouguettaya, A. & Cristea, M. (2024). “A theoretical framework for polarization as the gradual fragmentation of a divided society.” Communications Psychology, 2(1), 75. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-024-00125-1

Bliuc, A.M.; Cristea, M. & Betts, J. (2023). The role of charismatic influencers in polarisation: an agent-based modelling approach. Paper presented at 19th General Meeting of the European Association of Social Psychology (EASP), Krakow, Poland.

Craig, G. (2021). “Kindness and Control: The Political Leadership of Jacinda Ardern in the Aotearoa New Zealand COVID-19 Media Conferences.” Journalism and Media, 2(2), 288-304. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia2020017

Hawkins, K. A. (2009). “Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective. “Comparative Political Studies, 42(8), 1040–1067. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009331721

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). “Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash.” HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659

Morieson, Nicholas; Yilmaz, Ihsan & Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “From National to Manufactured: The Evolution of the AKP’s Victimhood Narratives.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 6, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0040        

Tas, H. (2020). “The chronopolitics of Erdogan’s populism in Turkey.” International Political Science Review, 41(4), 632–646. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119885444

Yilmaz, I., & Bashirov, G. (2018). “The AKP after 15 years: Emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey.” Third World Quarterly, 39(9), 1812–1830. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1447371

Yilmaz, I., & Morieson, N. (2022). “Civilizational Populism in Domestic and Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey.” Religions, 14(5), 631. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14050631

Yilmaz, I. & Morieson, N. (2023). “Civilizational Populism: Definition, Literature, Theory, and Practice.” In: Religions and the Global Rise of Civilizational Populism. (pp. 1-22). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4262-6_2

Republican presidential nominee, former U.S. President Donald Trump arrives to speak during a campaign rally at Suburban Collection Showplace on October 26, 2024 in Novi, Michigan. Photo: Anna Moneymaker.

Trump 2025: Dystopia and Fascism – The Rise of Authoritarianism in the New Government?

by AuthoritarianismCommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHome

Donald Trump’s first campaign and election were not merely a triumph for populism but a “game-changer,” bringing it to the forefront not just as an ideology but as a method of governance. Trump’s rise reshaped Western democracies, fostering a culture where political norms were no longer stable foundations but tools to be discarded when inconvenient. This commentary seeks to analyze Trump’s prospective second administration and its potential to deepen existing fractures in governance. By examining the cabinet figures, controversies, and projected policies, this analysis will explore their implications for the balance of powers, climate policy, immigration, justice, and international relations.

By João Ferreira Dias

The return of Donald Trump to the White House in 2025 raises profound concerns about the future of democracy in the United States. With a cabinet composed of figures associated with populism, climate denial, extreme nativism, and allegations of serious criminal conduct, the emerging government signals a shift towards authoritarianism.

Authors like Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (2019) and Yascha Mounk (2018) have noted the far-reaching impact of Trump on contemporary politics. His first campaign and election were not merely a triumph for populism but a “game-changer,” bringing it to the forefront not just as an ideology but as a method of governance. Trump’s rise reshaped Western democracies, fostering a culture where political norms were no longer stable foundations but tools to be discarded when inconvenient.

This commentary seeks to analyze Trump’s prospective second administration and its potential to deepen existing fractures in governance. By examining the cabinet figures, controversies, and projected policies, this analysis will explore their implications for the balance of powers, climate policy, immigration, justice, and international relations.

Populism, Resentment, and the White Working Class

The literature on populism emphasizes the “us vs. them” dichotomy as central to the ideology and practice of populist movements. This narrative is not merely rhetorical but structural, enabling populist leaders to redefine democratic politics around exclusionary lines. As Mondon and Winter (2020) observe, male anxiety—rooted in fears of economic insecurity and immigration—was pivotal in mobilizing support for both Brexit and Trump’s 2016 election. This anxiety, framed as a defense of cultural and economic stability, has become a powerful driver of populist coalitions.

Yascha Mounk (2018) identifies the declining economic security of the white working class as a critical backdrop to this shift. This demographic, comprising rural laborers and displaced urban workers, has been profoundly affected by globalization and industrial outsourcing, which have hollowed out the economic foundations of entire communities. These “losers of globalization,” marginalized by liberal economic policies, have turned to populist leaders who promise to restore not just jobs but dignity and identity. Begum, Mondon, and Winter (2021) argue that this group has become the symbolic “people” populist radical-right movements claim to represent. This realignment echoes historical fascist strategies, where economic grievances were redirected into nationalist and exclusionary frameworks, undermining class solidarity in favor of cultural antagonism.

Trump’s “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) slogan was the masterstroke that consolidated these sentiments, offering a promise of cultural revival that transcended purely economic appeals. Fukuyama (2018) notes that this shift reflects a reconfiguration of the political spectrum, as economic discontent has increasingly been reframed as a cultural battle. The rise of “culture wars” (Hunter, 1991; Hartman, 2019) has enabled populist leaders like Trump to weaponize moral and cultural grievances, portraying the left as a threat to traditional values and national identity. Concepts such as “woke culture” (McWhorter, 2021) and “cultural Marxism” (Jamin, 2014) are invoked to delegitimize progressive movements, presenting them as enemies of the “common man.”

The “cultural backlash” phenomenon, as described by Norris and Inglehart (2019), plays a crucial role here. By amplifying fears of moral alienation and cultural displacement, Trump crafted a coalition that opposed not only the policies of the left but the foundational principles of liberal democracy itself. This backlash was not an aberration but a calculated strategy to consolidate power, mobilizing resentment to erode the very norms that sustain democratic institutions.

The Collapse of Democratic Norms and the Dismantling of Checks and Balances

Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2019) framework on democratic backsliding highlights how democracies often erode through gradual institutional decay rather than abrupt authoritarian takeovers. Trump’s presidency exemplified this process, as his persistent attacks on the judiciary, the media, and electoral integrity undermined the legitimacy of these institutions.

Trump’s rhetoric, especially his false claims of election fraud, was not merely an expression of personal grievance but a deliberate strategy to delegitimize the rule of law. These narratives culminated in the January 6th Capitol riot, an unprecedented attack on democratic governance in the modern United States. By encouraging insurrectionist behavior, Trump signaled his willingness to destabilize institutions rather than accept their role as checks on executive power.

Policies such as mass deportations further illustrate this erosion of norms, creating an environment of fear and division that undermines trust in governance. At the same time, Trump’s environmental agenda—typified by proposals to expand oil drilling in Alaska—exemplifies his administration’s disdain for scientific expertise. As Mondon and Winter argue, this confluence of environmental degradation and exclusionary nationalism, or “bio-cultural nativism,” reflects a broader authoritarian project that sidelines expertise in favor of ideological loyalty.

Nativism, Class, and the Fragmentation of Liberal Democracy

Mondon and Winter (2020) highlight the centrality of nativism in Trump’s political strategy. For the white working class, nativist rhetoric offers both cultural validation and a channel for economic grievances, reinforcing the “us vs. them” framework. Trump’s appeal lies in his ability to present himself as the protector of “real Americans” against perceived threats from immigrants, elites, and progressive activists.

Mounk (2018) warns that the separation of democracy from liberalism creates fertile ground for authoritarianism. While democracy centers on majority rule, liberalism safeguards minority rights and institutional checks on power. Under Trump, this decoupling fosters a dangerous “tyranny of the majority,” in which populist policies—such as border walls and mass deportations—erode the pluralism that underpins liberal democracy.

This fragmentation of liberal democracy has broader implications, as populist leaders exploit cultural and economic insecurities to dismantle the institutional norms that sustain democratic governance. The result is a political landscape where nativism and exclusionary policies are not fringe elements but central features of mainstream governance.

Trump’s Cabinet: A Microcosm of Authoritarian Drift

Trump’s prospective 2025 cabinet crystallizes his administration’s authoritarian tendencies. Jason Stanley (2018) identifies the vilification of out-groups and the consolidation of power among loyalists as hallmarks of authoritarian regimes. Trump’s cabinet appointments reflect this dynamic, blending ideological extremism with personal loyalty at the expense of institutional norms and expertise.

J.D. Vance emerges as a key figure in this trajectory. As an intellectual voice for the radical right, Vance bridges populist grievance with the cultural warfare central to Trump’s appeal. His rhetoric, centered on the “decline of traditional values,” positions him as an architect of the culture wars that sustain Trump’s coalition. Vance’s influence extends beyond policy, shaping a narrative that frames the MAGA movement as the defender of American identity against the perceived excesses of progressivism.

Elon Musk, another prominent figure in Trump’s circle, wields outsized influence as both a deregulation advocate and a media magnate. Through his dominance of platforms like X (formerly Twitter), Musk amplifies misinformation, weakening public trust in institutions and expertise. His inclusion in the cabinet signals a shift toward governance driven by individual power rather than institutional accountability, further undermining democratic norms.

Robert F. Kennedy Jr., a vocal climate change skeptic, exemplifies the administration’s disregard for scientific consensus. Kennedy’s presence underscores Trump’s strategy of sidelining expertise in favor of ideological alignment, with significant implications for environmental policy and institutional credibility.

Finally, figures like Matt Gaetz, despite their legal controversies, illustrate Trump’s prioritization of loyalty over ethical standards. This normalization of controversial and compromised figures signals a broader erosion of accountability, mirroring the dynamics of historical authoritarian regimes.

Conclusion: The Authoritarian Future of Liberal Democracy

Trump’s cabinet is not just a collection of individuals; it is a reflection of his administration’s authoritarian vision. By prioritizing ideological conformity, cultural grievance, and personal loyalty, Trump’s appointments deepen the erosion of democratic norms and institutional credibility. The profiles of figures like Vance, Musk, and Kennedy illuminate how populism and nativism are reshaping the American political landscape, with long-term consequences for the principles of liberal democracy.

Resisting this drift requires more than institutional safeguards; it demands a societal recommitment to pluralism, expertise, and the rule of law. Without such efforts, the United States risks cementing a political model where authoritarianism thrives under the guise of democratic legitimacy.

 

References

Begum, N., Mondon, A., & Winter, A. (2021). “Between the ‘left behind’ and ‘the people’: Racism, populism and the construction of the ‘white working class’ in the context of Brexit.” In: Routledge handbook of critical studies in whiteness(pp. 220-231). Routledge.

Cammaerts, B. (2022). “The abnormalisation of social justice: The ‘anti-woke culture war’ discourse in the UK.” Discourse & Society, 33(6), 730-743.

Duffy, B., Gottfried, G., May, G., Hewlett, K., & Skinner, G. (2023). Woke vs anti-woke? Culture war divisions and politics. https://doi.org/10.18742/pub01-163.

Hartman, A. (2019). A war for the soul of America: A history of the culture wars. University of Chicago Press.

Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture wars: The struggle to define America. Basic Books.

Hunter, J. D. (1993). Before the shooting begins: Searching for democracy in America’s culture war. Free Press.

Jamin, J. (2014). Cultural Marxism and the radical right. In The post-war Anglo-American far right: A special relationship of hate (pp. 84-103).

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2019). How democracies die. Crown.

McWhorter, J. (2021). Woke racism: How a new religion has betrayed Black America. Penguin.

Mirrlees, T. (2018). “The Alt-right’s discourse on “Cultural Marxism”: A political instrument of intersectional hate.” Atlantis: Critical Studies in Gender, Culture & Social Justice, 39(1), 49-69.

Mondon, A., & Winter, A. (2020). “Whiteness, populism and the racialisation of the working class in the United Kingdom and the United States.” In: Whiteness and Nationalism (pp. 10-28). Routledge.

Mounk, Y. (2018). The people vs. democracy: Why our freedom is in danger and how to save it. Harvard University Press.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press.

Paternotte, D., & Verloo, M. (2021). “De-democratization and the politics of knowledge: Unpacking the cultural Marxism narrative.” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, 28(3), 556-578.

Stanley, J. (2018). How fascism works: The politics of us and them. Random House.

Headquarters of the populist radical-right Chega party in Vila Nova de Gaia, Portugal, on April 4, 2021. Photo: Nuno M. Maia.

Portugal in Cultural War: Racism, Security, and the Social Contract at Stake

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeHuman RightsMigration

Portugal is facing heightened scrutiny after a young, inexperienced policeman fatally shot Odair Moniz, a Black man, under dubious circumstances. This incident has reignited longstanding debates about structural racism and revealed deep-seated cultural and social divides, exposing unresolved issues around race, security, and the state’s role. Reflecting James Davison Hunter’s concept of “culture wars,” these moral conflicts have deepened into societal divisions that erode shared values. Portugal’s colonial legacy further intensifies these tensions, perpetuating systemic racial exclusion and fostering fertile ground for populist narratives. 

By João Ferreira Dias

James Davison Hunter stands as one of the most prominent and enduring authors on the topic of “cultural wars” in the United States. He emphasizes how so-called moral issues tend to undermine the “common ground” that forms societies, with the potential to become an effective war by sharpening citizens’ moral divisions (Hunter, 1991). Conversely, Fiona Morris and other contributors in Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (2005) challenge this view, arguing that polarization largely operates within the media, while society as a whole tends toward consensus.

However, time has lent more credence to Hunter’s perspective and the work of other scholars who focus on cultural wars. Ezra Klein, in Why We’re Polarized (2020), argues that moral values and social identity issues have become central to our political identity, aligning with Cass Sunstein’s arguments in #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media(2018), which highlights how social media has become an echo chamber for tensions around morality and “customs,” amplifying socially divisive themes. But what does this theoretical prelude have to do with recent events in Portugal involving the case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public unrest? Quite a lot, as it turns out, and the reasons are worth exploring.

Among the polarizing issues within society, racial matters stand out prominently. In Portugal, we have engaged in ongoing debates over whether or not racism exists, what constitutes racism, whether Portugal is a racist country, and if structural racism is present. Much of this discussion is either redundant, given the evidence, or overly theoretical. 

In summary:

i) racism exists wherever individuals are differentiated based on race, creating hierarchies of value and access (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Fanon, 2008);

ii) racism operates as a social process in which such differentiation disadvantages some while benefiting a dominant group—typically Caucasian in Western societies due to the legacies of slavery and colonialism. According to Achille Mbembe (2019), colonial histories have left profound imprints on social hierarchies, with racialized groups enduring forms of systemic marginalization that permeate all levels of society. In his concept of “racialized social systems,” Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2014) argues that racism is not a mere individual prejudice but is embedded in societal structures, creating a social order that inherently privileges certain racial groups over others. Theoretical discussions around power, privilege, capitalism, and racialization are ideologically relevant yet often seem to lack practical contributions in tackling urgent issues, though they offer critical insights into systemic challenges (Wynter, 2003).

iii) Portugal is a country where racism is evident, with unique characteristics that should not be oversimplified through comparative analysis with other contexts. Its documented history includes ties to late colonialism and scientific justifications for the supposed cultural, biological, and mental inferiority of Black populations (Mbembe, 2001). The continued influence of colonial narratives has shaped racial and social dynamics within contemporary Portugal, as examined by Carla Rodrigues and Jorge Leal (2009), who reveal how these legacies reinforce discriminatory practices that marginalize racialized communities.

To understand the recent incidents centered in Zambujal – the neighborhood where protesters fired cars and a bus, with latter mimetic acts in some areas of Lisbon – it is necessary to consider a history of misguided policies regarding the inclusion of racialized individuals within Portuguese society, as discussed in O Estado do Racismo em Portugal (2021), edited by Silvia Rodriguez Maeso. Despite critiques of its activist bias, this work rigorously details systemic issues related to racial policies in Portugal, including urban planning and policing, which are directly relevant to this case. Such policies, compounded by socioeconomic inequalities and an enduring colonial mentality, contribute to a racialized social order that perpetuates marginalization and exclusion for racialized communities (Mbembe, 2019; Fanon, 2008).

The decision—albeit somewhat understandable—to address the urban integration of people from former Portuguese colonies by establishing social housing has, as in other countries, led to ghettoization. This pattern has perpetuated social exclusion and generational poverty, with vulnerable families often lacking resources or sufficient parental involvement, leaving children exposed to criminal networks. Meanwhile, underfunded schools and educational neglect further diminish prospects for youth in these areas. Together, these factors create a “social cauldron” that stigmatizes these communities as socially excluded islands, often becoming the target of state policing.

Policing such isolated social islands fosters a cycle of mutual distrust, generating a divisive “us vs. them” mentality. For many in these communities, the police are the sole representatives of the state, fostering stereotypes and resentment. Bonilla-Silva (2014) describes how such dynamics reinforce the racialized social system, where state practices contribute to the social reproduction of racial hierarchies. Furthermore, police violence against racialized individuals in Portugal has been documented in international human rights reports, compounded by reports of far-right groups within the security forces. These conditions highlight a significant state failure on racial matters.

The Cultural War over the Police State

While we await judicial proceedings in the case of Odair Moniz’s death, another discussion has emerged. In summary, Portugal faces an endemic racism problem affecting opportunities for racialized populations, who generally confront the intersection of economic, educational, and gender-related issues. Although white social groups may share some of these challenges, racialized groups face additional disadvantages due to “race.” Portugal also has issues with the rapid and haphazard urban integration of racialized groups, leading to territories where poverty and crime are disproportionately associated with these communities. Consequently, policing efforts, compounded by resentment and distrust as well as racism within segments of the security forces, have sparked a surge in police violence against racialized individuals.

Thus, poverty, social exclusion, urban segregation, and police violence underlie these events, fueling popular outrage. However, as this outrage increasingly manifests as vandalism—absent an organized structure and peaceful leadership—it loses the capacity to garner widespread empathy, as it impinges upon fundamental and primary rights within the rule of law, such as the right to security and private property.

Hence, the “cultural war” over a “police state” or “security state” emerges from chaos. André Ventura’s – radical right Chega party leader – recent calls for a protest supporting the police, framing it as “cleaning the streets” of “criminals,” echo Brazil’s Bolsonaro and his supporters, embodying the mantra, “A good criminal is a dead criminal.” By organizing a pro-police demonstration, Chega openly aligns with a surveillance state model that prioritizes “law and order” over constitutional governance—a step towards a state that surveils citizens beyond constitutional limits. Public support for this stance has been evident on social media, as people trade freedom for order, recalling Alexis de Tocqueville’s warning that in times of chaos, people are prone to sacrifice freedom for the promise of order.

Meanwhile, for the cultural war to thrive, two opposing poles are necessary. Radical elements within the Left, associated with the Bloco de Esquerda party, have seized upon these events to encourage a racial revolution. While motivated by a desire to rectify racial injustices, this rhetoric parallels the radical right’s, both potentially threatening social cohesion and the “common ground” essential for future generations. Social changes addressing racial dynamics should not take a revolutionary approach, which may ultimately intensify racial divisions and compromise democracy.

Thus, it is within democracy and the hard-won social-liberal principles that we must pursue the republican ideal of effective equality—not authoritarian “equality” under radical poles, but the equality promised by constitutional ideals under the banner of human rights. Achieving this requires justice in Odair’s case and others like his, alongside public policies that, while slower than revolutionary impulses, restore the rule of law, social peace, and constitutional norms—enabling us to address what we’ve thus far swept under the rug.

Conclusion

The case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public response illustrate a deep-seated cultural and social rift in Portugal, revealing unresolved tensions around race, security, and the role of the state. This incident aligns with James Davison Hunter’s concept of culture wars, where moral divisions sharpen into polarized conflicts, eroding shared social foundations. In Portugal, these conflicts intersect with a colonial legacy that perpetuates systemic exclusion and racial disparities, creating an environment ripe for populist rhetoric.

As seen in André Ventura’s reaction, populist figures often exploit such moments, promoting a “law and order” narrative that taps into public fears, mirroring strategies observed in other countries. This populist stance risks shifting Portugal toward a security state model that emphasizes control over democratic principles. On the other side, radical responses advocating racial revolution pose their own challenges, as they could polarize society further and jeopardize social cohesion.

Ultimately, meaningful progress requires that Portugal confront these issues within a democratic framework, advancing policies that address structural racism and urban inequality while upholding the rule of law and human rights. Only by fostering genuine social inclusion and resisting polarizing impulses can Portugal hope to rebuild its social contract on a foundation of equality and shared values.

 

References

Bonilla-Silva, E. (2014). Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. Rowman & Littlefield.

Fanon, F. (2008). Black Skin, White Masks. Grove Press.

Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. Basic Books.

Klein, E. (2020). Why We’re Polarized. Simon & Schuster.

Maeso, S. R. (Ed.). (2021). O Estado do Racismo em Portugal. Edições 70.

Mbembe, A. (2001). On the Postcolony. University of California Press.

Mbembe, A. (2019). Necropolitics. Duke University Press.

Morris, F., Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J., & Pope, J. C. (2005). Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. Pearson Longman.

Rodrigues, C. U., & Leal, J. (2009). Portugal não é um país pequeno: Contar o “império” na pós-colonialidade. Edições 70.

Rodrigues, S. R., & Araújo, M. (2019). Racism and Racialization: Experiences in Portugal. In Lentin, A., & Titley, G. (Eds.), Racism and Media (pp. 113–126). Routledge.

Sunstein, C. R. (2018). #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton University Press.

Wynter, S. (2003). Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument. CR: The New Centennial Review, 3(3), 257–337.

A poster for the 2024 European elections featuring Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in Rome, Italy on May 4, 2024. Photo: Stefano Chiacchiarini.

The Role of Mainstream Parties in the Success of Radical Right Populists 

by CommentariesECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have been gaining votes in recent decades, votes that were once almost exclusively given to mainstream parties. At the same time, voter turnout has declined. Regardless of the analytical reasons, mainstream parties are losing ground and are not convincing as many people as they once did. While it’s easy to blame external factors like misinformation or divisive rhetoric, that’s not enough in a democratic system. Our system is straightforward: parties and politicians need to win votes. If people aren’t convinced, they will shift their support to other parties. Blaming factors beyond their control will only further harm liberal democratic mainstream parties. 

By Maël Jones

The issue of radical right populism (RRP) has exploded onto the political science scene in the last two to three decades. Naturally, this was to be expected after the success of these parties in elections across western democracies. As a result, a flurry of different opinions on the causes of the success of RRP parties have emerged, some mutually inclusive others less so. 

Much of the focus has been on the voter, the so-called demand-side. Here the big divide is generally between those who believe that RRP parties succeed because of economic reasons, while others believe the main driver to be cultural issues (Engler & Weisstanner, 2020; Bornschier, 2018: 213). Some other researchers have focused specifically on the supply-side: the parties (Mols & Jetten, 2020; Russo & Brock, 2024). In this case the focus is generally on the role of the radical right parties themselves (Mols & Jetten, 2020), or in rarer cases, the way in which other parties have interacted with RRPs (Russo & Brock, 2024). By focusing too much on the phenomenon of RRP itself, students of this discipline have forgotten much of what surrounds it. Because, while RRPs do influence voter decisions, voters do not only vote for RRPs they also vote against those parties that they, and the generations before them, trusted for decades – mainstream parties. To avoid lengthy definitions, we will consider mainstream parties as those broadly situated in the middle of the political spectrum and encompassing the country’s political establishment. In the EU, these parties are generally affiliated with the S&D, EPP, Renew, or the Greens. 

Since the onset of the liberal democratic model, mainstream parties have been central actors of the system – parties played an important role in simplifying the political process, representing a large amount of people and pulling people into the political process (Stokes, 1999: 243-244). Of course, the system of parties is imperfect, but the division of the political system into segments of society that were more or less adequately represented by said parties made for a stable system (Lipset, 2000: 50-51). Generally, left-wing parties represented the poorer working class while richer, middle- and upper-class voters opted for right-wing parties. Some systems also had a divide along race lines or religious beliefs (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; 2000: 50) Yet, in recent years, the decline of these parties has been apparent (Casal Bértoa & Rama, 2021: 37). At times, the green or liberal parties attracted voters away from the mainstream. Increasingly, though, as the latter have been integrated into the political establishment (Burchell, 2014), it has been the radical right that has taken over many of the votes previously held by mainstream parties. One of the main reasons for why this has happened, is due to political disaffection (Ziller & Schübel, 2015: 382; Söderlund & Kestilä‐Kekkonen, 2009: 174, Hooghe et al., 2011).

The first strong indicator of such disaffection emerged in the decades around the end of the cold war: declining rates of voter turnout (Hay, 2007; Mair, 2011). Today, this issue is still at the heart of many political debates despite slowing down and even showing some signs of improvement (IDEA, 2024). In its stead, in the last 20 or so years we have seen votes for the radical right populists increase drastically across the board (Ivaldi, 2024). 

Political Disaffection

European Parliament offices and European flags in Brussels, Belgium on July 20, 2020. Photo: Lena Wurm.

Let us first analyze what has driven political disaffection before turning to how voter turnout and the success of RRPs are linked.

There are multiple drivers for political disaffection. What is clear is that for people to feel implicated in a system and for that system to be of interest to them, they must feel like they have some power within it (Harder & Krosnick, 2008: 538). Thus, drivers of disaffection would cause people to doubt their importance within the political system and abandon it or look for ways to regain this power. Yet, increasingly, mainstream parties have taken steps to decrease the power of the people (Mair, 2011).

First, is the convergence of mainstream parties on policy issues. Some might be surprised by the claim that parties are “converging” when we are constantly being told that our democracies and societies are becoming increasingly polarized (Nguyen & Vu, 2019). But one must not automatically exclude the other. A convergence can exists on policy issues even when political rhetoric is as divided as ever. Additionally, the attention here is specifically on mainstream parties.

For decades, a body of literature has argued that the more political parties converge to the center, the better they will perform electorally (Spoon & Klüver, 2019: 1023). The theory holds merit and cannot entirely be dismissed. Yet, while maximizing their votes in order to win over the ‘median voter,’ mainstream parties have failed to represent those with more radical values. This creates a more volatile political arena that is more inclined to turn to the extremes (Bartolini & Mair, 1990: 1).

As some have remarked, Germany might be the best example for this in Western Europe. For decades now, the CDU and the SPD have moved towards the center (Berman & Kundani, 2021: 23). The former – a family and Christian-oriented party – increasingly moved left on social issues, while the latter – a left-wing workers’ party – increasingly moved to the right on certain economic issues. Both forming a ‘Grand Coalition’ and working together across most of the beginning of the 21st Century (Berman & Kundani, 2021).

But even France, an oftentimes divided society with historically strong labor movements, experienced a neoliberal transformation that transcended party politics. As some of the biggest neoliberal decisions were taken by socialist Presidents François Mitterand and François Hollande (Masquelier, 2021; Pinçon & Pinçon Charlot, 2014). Other countries have seen similar trends within their borders as well. Tony Blair’s Labor Party and Bill Clinton’s democrats both became important drivers of neo-liberalization in their respective countries, with little protest from opposition parties on that particular matter (Rieger, 2021: 113; Meerpool, 2019). 

Today, as Mair (2011: 72) notes, the question between state-controlled and market-controlled economies has been answered: the winners are market-controlled economies. The left-right divide on this issue has thus eroded and the current positions present a far less clear distinction. Therefore, mainstream parties attempt to find distinctions somewhere else: they insist on personalities, character traits and rhetorical differences. But these significantly impoverish the possible policy changes once in power and thus deprives electors of a feeling of potential change (Hay, 2007: 56-58).

In parallel to party convergence, a similar but distinct phenomenon has also been changing Western European societies: the depoliticization of many issues and the rise of the regulatory state. The effect of this is that many decisions which once lay with elected politicians – and thus by extension with the people – have been removed from the political sphere and into the bureaucratic and/or the market-controlled sphere. 

For example, a case of this is Central Bank independence. Central Banks originally emerged in very different circumstances depending on the countries and their history – some were private, others independent, and some were dependent on the national treasury (Wachtel & Blejer, 2020). But today, the idea that these institutions must be independent has been dominant for decades and remains almost entirely unchallenged. This idea was first formulated in 1962 by Milton Friedman (Wachtel & Blejer, 2020), an economist dubbed by Krugman (2007) as an “ideologue [and] the great popularizer of the free-market doctrine.” He was incidentally the man who went on to advise Raegan and Thatcher for their economic policies. While he remains one of the most influential and knowledgeable economists ever to live, he can hardly be described as neutral or apolitical. Yet, his long-term fight to make Central Banks independent has today been made to seem exactly that: neutral and apolitical. In turn, this has justified the depoliticization of central banks and its removal from public decision-making.

In the UK, the Bank of England was one of the last Central Banks to remain under the responsibility of the treasury, but in 1998, under Tony Blair’s Labor government, this changed, and the Bank was granted independence to set interest rates (Burnham, 2001). In a more global study encompassing 155 countries, Romelli (2024: 3), found that out of 370 reforms to central bank designs between 1923 and 2023, over 75 percent of them increased the bank’s independence. In the European Union (EU), the Maastricht treaty required EU countries to have an independent Central Bank. This was in addition, of course, to the European Central Bank (ECB) which is also independent and covers all 27 EU countries (Bruni, 1997).

The EU has not only pushed the depoliticization of central banks, but it has also brought about many depoliticizing policies within its member states. In the early 1990s, the European Commission began heavily banking on regulation and became a powerful actor in restraining an increasingly privatized market; thus began the regulatory state in Europe (Majone, 1994). 

Regulation became a way for a Commission with a low budget to increase its decision-making powers without changing the rules of the game. At the beginning, this did not really pose too many problems. The Commission played a role which, in other democracies, was often taken on by independent agencies and this role was limited in scope (Majone, 1994). But with years passing, the Commission became more powerful, and the roles it took on, outgrew those that made it possible to overlook the institution’s undemocratic nature (Majone, 2014: 1217). Because after regulation came financial control. Of course, member states signed up to this. For example, they agreed to adhere to the so-called ‘Fiscal Stability Treaty’ in 2012 which significantly restrained individual state’s fiscal policies. States must for example avoid excessive public debt and must also submit their budget plans to the Council in order for them to be scrutinized (and possibly asked to be altered). This constrained governments’ actions and put more power into the hands of those with little to no accountability (Majone, 2014: 1220).

While it may seem that the blame is being shifted onto the EU and away from mainstream parties, this is not entirely accurate for two main reasons. First, as Mair (2011: 127) rightly argues, the EU did not grow organically, instead it was built by its architects. These architects were primarily the foreign ministers and leaders of European countries and thus members of the political establishment. Second, critique of the EU has been very constrained, especially in Western Europe. When governments disagree with EU policies, they blame Brussels without calling for real change. When they are happy with these policies, they take credit for them. The only real critics of the EU have been populist parties from both the left and the right (Grzymala-Busse, 2019: 43). Thus, anyone who does not entirely agree with the European project or with the direction it has taken, has to either accept it or vote for populists.

Some other factors can also be named which originate from the political establishment and foster disaffection. Some examples of this are globalization which has deeply affected western societies but has been regarded by the political establishment as the only way forward (even though, in recent years, this enthusiasm has been curtailed slightly); as well as the metamorphosis of mainstream parties, going from ones representing specific groups and interests to catch-all parties with a hugely eroded identity (Mair, 2011: 79-85). 

Consequences of Political Disaffection

Photo: Shutterstock.

Having established the factors of political disaffection, we can move our focus to attempting to understand its consequences.

As mentioned earlier, lower voter turnout has been one of the main symptoms of political disaffection in the last few decades. The direct impact of the latter onto the former is of course hard to assess analytically because it contrasts a subjective state (disaffection) with a phenomenon that is directly and objectively quantifiable (turnout). 

Whether the existence of a link between low turnout and political disaffection needs to be “proven” is debatable. One could argue that the theoretical framework of representative democracy is sufficient to establish this connection. After all, the election of politicians to represent us is fundamental to the functioning of our system. This does not mean that those who do not vote are necessarily apolitical, indeed, many other ways to express one’s opinions exist. Yet, within the formal system, voting is the only universal way of making one’s opinions heard. Choosing not to vote – whether out of apathy or out of protest – can thus be seen as a symptom of disaffection from the present political system.

Based on this though, a vote for radical right populists must not necessarily be a sign of disaffection. And this is true, it is not per se a vote of disaffection, many other reasons exist to vote for RRPs, from authoritarian tendencies to a simple agreement with the party’s policies (Tillman, 2015). But what is of interest to us is specifically the rise of RRPs and why people today are far more likely to vote for such parties than they were 40 years ago. Here, it seems extremely likely that the disaffected have played an important role.

Not all scholars agree on the idea that those who are more dissatisfied will vote for RRPs. This is in large parts because those academics seem to associate disaffection with the idea of ‘protest votes,’ the latter of which is seen as an extension of ‘non-ideological votes’ (Arzheimer, 2008; Van der Brug et al. 2000). Yet, a protest vote must not necessarily be non-ideological. Voters can feel dissatisfaction with a political system because the parties that once represented them do not align with them anymore and thus their ideology is not represented anymore. In this case, an ideological vote simultaneously becomes a protest vote. 

In addition, in the likely case that parties do truly influence political opinion (Slothuus & Bisgaard, 2021), voters who might once have felt only some affinities to RRPs are likely to have developed a stronger ideological overlap over time – Thus distorting studies based on ideological overlap.

It thus seems obvious that when defined right and seen from a broader angle, disaffection from the political system and distrust of its main actors is a central driver of this political movement. People are more likely to vote for the radical right when politicians lose their trust and in turn radical right voters trust mainstream politicians less (Ziller & Schübel, 2015: 382; Söderlund & Kestilä‐Kekkonen, 2009: 174). We know from Germany for example that “turnout surges benefit the populist right ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD) in contexts of widespread political distrust” (Schulte-Cloos & Leiniger, 2022: 431) meaning that those who did not go out to vote in past elections and were dissatisfied with the system voted in large parts for the AfD. Additional research such as Hooghe et al.’s work (2011: 265) in Belgium also showed how those who are dissatisfied or distrustful are more likely either not to vote or to vote for populist radical right parties.

More simply though, radical right parties have been winning over votes in recent decades, votes that once were almost exclusively given to mainstream parties. Additionally, turnout has dwindled. Whatever the analytical reason, mainstream parties are losing ground and are not winning over or convincing as many people as they once were. One can always blame external factors such as misinformation or divisive rhetoric for this but that is not sufficient in our democratic system. Our system is simple, it requires parties and politicians to win votes. People thus need to be won over and convinced, if they are not, they will defect to other parties. Blaming elements out of their control will only make matters worse for liberal democratic mainstream parties.

Conclusion 

Having established a link between mainstream parties and disaffection with the political system in a first instance, and then between disaffection and radical right votes in a second; one can see a clear link between the mainstream’s failures and the success of RRPs. This link is important to make for a number of reasons. Firstly, simply because it has been overlooked by researchers. Secondly because it shifts a part of the responsibility from the voters onto the political establishment. This matters because the often-used argument that those who vote for RRPs are simply ill-informed or racist is analytically and politically rather unhelpful and oftentimes overlooks important components of the RRP vote. Lastly, establishing this link gives mainstream parties the tools to recenter their fight against the radical right. Many have attempted to fight this fight, but a misunderstanding of the causes seems to have led most of these efforts to failure. To truly fight RRPs, mainstream parties must know their voters, aim to truly represent them, and ensure that their policies – rather than their rhetoric – truly stand out and distance themselves from their political opponents and rivals.

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UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson arrives in 10 Downing Street in London ahead of flying to Brussels for Brexit trade talks on December 09 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

Many Facets of Medical Populism: British Political Tradition (BPT) and Covid-19

by CommentariesECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

The traditional British political style and rhetoric were utilized by both former Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage of UKIP as tools to communicate their approaches to managing the COVID-19 crisis. This demonstrates the resilience of established political traditions while highlighting the volatility and ambiguity of populist strategies. Notably, populist narratives varied significantly depending on whether the leader was in power or in opposition, which influenced their responsibility towards citizens and their ability to connect populist grievances with pre-existing political arguments in the context of the pandemic. In particular, Johnson’s actions reflect a ‘government knows best’ approach to the crisis, blending epistemic and political authority in determining the necessary measures to address the pandemic.

By Andrea Guidotti*  

Introduction

This paper analyzes the role and significance of the Covid-19 pandemic in the development and behavior of British populist parties. It aims to observe how and when the so-called British Political Tradition (BPT) has been used by these parties as a guiding principle warranting the actions and policies implemented during the Covid-19 crisis in the UK. First, it will briefly introduce medical populism from a general perspective and within the specific situation of the Covid-19 pandemic. Second, it will analyze the overall actions taken by the two main British (right-wing) populist parties at the time and their leaders: the Conservatives in power under Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage’s UKIP party. This piece is not intended to be a theoretical discussion regarding the populist status of the considered parties and assumes that both can be meaningfully characterized as consistently (but differentially) populist on a variety of issues – such as health, immigration, economics or Brexit. The final section discusses the relationships between populists’ responses to the pandemic and the BPT. It evaluates if populists’ attitudes towards COVID-19 and its political management are positively affected by the BPT.

Populism and the Pandemic

One must first understand what kind of crisis the COVID-19 pandemic was and, thus, what kind of phenomena populists were dealing with at the time. Some scholars conceive a crisis as a moment of saliency for systemic contradictions and a consequent perceived need for structural change and strong interventions to take place. In such a situation, political agents are overwhelmed by the unfolding events and there is no common recognized rationality for handling the crisis-driven situation (Bobba & Hubé, 2021: 3).

Under a dynamic conception of crises, populist actors may be better conceived not just as passively reacting to given external shocks, but “as actors that actively perform and spread a sense of crisis” (Bobba & Hubé, 2021: 6). This is a general characterization of an endogenous crisis, where all the contradictions are generated within the political system, and in which political agents are acting. In other words, when confronted with such a scenario, populists from all over the political spectrum usually tend to at least trigger or even manufacture the crisis themselves to gain some leverage in the political system (Ringe & Rennó, 2023: 4). Being an exogenous crisis with respect to populism, the pandemic is harder to politicize than other political shocks or events that are at least partially originated inside the system itself. In addition, it should also be noted that the pandemic has a peculiar nature: as a public health crisis, no one is free from its consequences and implications. 

Bobba & Hubé (2021: 9-10), drawing from other authors, use the following general framework to better understand health crises such as Covid-19. Health crises are thought to be divisible into three parts: (a) an initial phase in which you are confronted with the emergence of the problem; (b) a confrontation phase in which some actors blame other actors for being responsible for what is happening; (c) a managing phase in which who is blaming responsibility upon others generally tries to propose and claim its solutions.

Moving to populism to connect it with the pandemic, a meaningful characterization of the term in the context of public health crises is needed. Following Gideon Lasco’s argument (2020: 1), one could say that “medical populism” is “a political style based on performances of public health crises that pit ‘the people’ against ‘the establishment’.” Different examples of medical populism can be given, going from Jair Bolsonaro downplaying the threat of the virus and pitting the economy against public health policies, to Donald Trump paving the way for conspiracy theories about the virus’ creation and blaming illegal immigrants for its spread around the country. 

With specific reference to Covid-19, we can distinguish some main features of populist strategies acting within such a crisis: (i) the simplification of the pandemic, offering the simplest (and most simplistic) solutions to the problems that the health emergency is posing; (ii) the dramatization, distortion and spectacularizing the threats posed by the crisis; (iii) the forging of societal divisions claiming to be on the side of the ‘real people’ quite often opposed to an unspecified ‘otherhood’; (iv) the invocation of knowledge claims: for example with regards to the virus’ origins, about the most appropriate methodologies to prevent its spreading or on how to treat it consistently (Lasco, 2020: 2-3). 

Investigating the second feature of populism (ii), we can add the fact that populist actors must not be obscured by the coverage of the pandemic itself. They need to spectacularize the crisis with their messaging, a strategy that allows them to stand out as relevant and influential figures in the public and online media to claim reliability and legitimacy properly (Ringe & Rennó, 2023: 5). 

Regarding the third feature (iii), it is difficult to frame the populist concept of the ‘real people’ alongside the strategy of pitting them against other groups or entities when the virus indiscriminately affects everyone. Being aware of this problem, “‘the people’ are imbued with various characteristics, biomedical and otherwise [with populists] claiming that their citizens are less susceptible to the virus” (Lasco, 2020: 4-7). Thus, the ‘others’ against which populists claim to fight in representation of the “real people” during the pandemic are generally international and supranational actors such as the WTO or other states such as China – if not intellectual elites such as academics, journalists or public health experts (Bobba & Hubé, 2021). 

Points (i) and (iv) are strictly intertwined in that simplification goes hand in hand with false claims and controversial scientific statements. In other words, we observe a “widespread deployment of scientific language and imagery – and a selective deployment of scientific consensus” (Lasco, 2020: 8).

British Populism and Covid-19

To better connect British populism with the case of the pandemic, it is useful to get a brief and general background of the previous relationships between populism and healthcare policies in the UK before Covid-19. There is a distinction between healthcare systems that are more or less resistant to populist performances. The former are well-resourced, present a developed network-based model of governance, and involve professions in the policy processes. On the contrary, the latter are poorly financed, present high levels of command along the line of the New Public Management-type (NPM) governance model and display low trust in healthcare providers (Speed & Mannion, 2020: 3). 

But the most important thing to recall regarding the evolution of the British healthcare system (NHS) and populism is the BREXIT process. During those years, right-wing populists argued that by leaving the European Union (EU) more funds could be allocated to better finance the NHS. Specifically, they framed the unsustainability of the NHS and its underdevelopment (mostly in terms of funds and available high-skilled personnel) as a problem of immigration, as the blame was directed towards immigrants enjoying health services paid for by British citizens (Speed & Mannion, 2020: 8). 

Johnson and the Conservatives

The Conservatives, led by then Prime Minister Boris Johnson, were in power when Covid-19 became a global medical problem, and remained so until the end of the pandemic. For some authors (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021), the first wave of the pandemic, from February 2020 to roughly July 2020, can be divided in three phases. The ‘breakout’ phase was characterized by state authorities acting in a relaxed way, without invasive governmental control over people’s freedoms. This moment corresponds to the public’s response to the news about the virus’ spreading. During the ‘confrontation’ phase, the virus’ infection began widely spreading, and the number of people testing positive to Covid-19 began to grow exponentially. The final, ‘managing,’ phase is characterized by attempts to stabilize the situation and enforce measures in order to cope and coexist with the virus while waiting for the development of vaccines. 

During the first two phases the Conservative Party did not take the risks seriously and showed a libertarian way of thinking, arguing against a strict and hard response to the crisis in terms of closures and restrictions. In particular, Prime Minister Johnson did not attend the meetings dedicated to the government’s response to the pandemic in early February 2020 and criticized some warnings made by the British Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) (Bale, 2023: 69-70). An explanation for that could be that his actions and public statements were influenced and warranted by ‘misplaced optimism’ and regressive and nationalistic ideas, historically speaking, of the British role in the world – stressing the narrative around the exceptionality and efficiency of the NHS (Sim & Tombs, 2022: 6). 

Starting from the end of March and the beginning of April, things became more dramatic, and the Prime Minister Johnson’s attitude changed. Around this time the first lockdown was issued, disregarding the idea of ‘herd immunity’ where the virus is left to spread in the population to lower its virulence (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 21). In general, the government stressed conventional public measures and followed international guidelines along other major Western and European states (Bale, 2023: 70). Additionally, Johnson’s Cabinet avoided using tropes potentially contributing to the politicization of the crisis, and attempted to emphasize the importance of scientific guidelines (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 26). 

Analyzing the rhetorical repertoire that has been used, the governmental discourse historically situated Covid-19 in mainly three different ways. To do so, the Cabinet used so-called ‘temporal claims,’ as defined in narrative discourse theory. Following the construction of a (i) radically discontinuous time, the virus has been described as a moment of generational significance. The pandemic was to be seen as an unprecedented event disrupting people’s habits and usual social behavior, in order for new economic, social and political initiatives to be ruled and legitimized. From another point of view, events have been plotted with a (ii) linear timeline, positing a unidirectional and cumulative development. Here, a descriptive account of some sequences and a principle of evaluation of the events and by which to assess the correctness of the action leading to their unfolding have been invoked. Lastly, the construction of a (iii) cyclical time helped the government to depict everyday life after the pandemic in a radically different way. In this respect, narratives were prospecting and sketching the idea of a ‘new normalcy’ bringing the emergence of new habits for everyone (Jarvis, 2021: 27-31).

To conclude this investigation of Johnson’s political communication during the pandemic, it is notable that he also employed daily governmental press briefings, using so-called the ‘numbers arms race’ and more broadly the already cited ‘war language.’ Both of them served as an enforcement to the claim of fighting for Britain in a once in a lifetime event. The key mantra has been the following statement: “Stay Home, Protect the NHS, Save Lives” (Sim & Tombs, 2022: 9-10). 

Farage and the UKIP

Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.

In contrast to Johnson, who avoided politicizing the pandemic, Nigel Farage opted to fully utilize a populist political communication style typically associated with right-wing parties. Despite taking a cautious stance at the beginning of the breakout, he started acting as a radical libertarian, opposing public health restrictions and showing his open skepticism about government actions towards the pandemic (Bale, 2023). 

Two major critiques can be identified. The former critique strictly concerns the governmental actions taken when the health situation started being very problematic. Farage accused Johnson’s government of incompetency and indecisiveness in dealing with the crisis, framing his actions as a lack of leadership on the side of the Prime Minister (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 27). His arguments are composed by a mixture of “support for draconian measures on ‘law and order’ and ‘Britain’s borders’,” and “its essentially libertarian opposition to ‘political correctness gone mad’ as well as ‘red tape’ and the ‘faceless bureaucrats’” (Bale, 2023: 71). Resorting to well-known populist grievances, alongside other world leaders such as Trump, he adapted the issue of immigration and the concerns associated with it in claiming that migrants could enter and spread the virus if police enforcement on British borders were not sufficiently severe or incoming international flights were to be easily allowed for foreign travelers coming from high-risk countries (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 23). He also denounced the ‘herd immunity’ strategy initially sought to be pursued by the government, although he maintained a libertarian posture by stressing the fact that measures taken to stop the virus’ transmissibility were not meant to become a “house arrest” for the entire nation (Bale, 2023: 72). 

The latter part of his narratives, and the second critique he posed, is about the role of the UK in the world and the attempt to identify responsible actors for the pandemic to occur. In other words, he blamed China for not telling the truth about Covid-19’s emergence in the first place and for its deliberate suppression of key information and the intentional delaying of their communication to the international community (Bale, 2023: 71). Concisely: “While the government undermined the seriousness of the crisis mostly because of economic concerns, Farage opportunistically used the COVID-19 crisis to suggest a scale down to the UK’s relations with the EU and China” (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 26).

The British Political Tradition in Times of Crisis

According to Lijphart (1999), the British Westminster Model presents nine core tenets: (1) the concentration of the executive power in one party; (2) cabinet dominance; (3) a two-party system, where parties produce manifestos and seek a mandate to govern; (4) a majoritarian electoral system; (5) a unitary and centralized government; (6) interest group pluralism; (7) the concentration of legislative power in Parliament; (8) constitutional flexibility; (9) the central bank is controlled by the executive. Following Hall (2011: 9-10) and Richards and Smith (2002)  we can add two more tenets: (10) the doctrine of ministerial responsibility; (11) a permanent, neutral, and anonymous civil service. 

What is important to us here is the fact that the Westminster Model emphasizes some peculiar aspects. First, a linear and gradual development of the British political system and its institutions. Second, it stresses a great degree of British exceptionalism, and the superior nature of its system compared to other Western ones. Third, it is warranted by the idea that power is to be concentrated and exercised with a top-down approach. Warranting this system, according to Hall (2011: 124-125), the British Political Tradition (BPT) could be characterized as presenting the following main themes: (i)A discourse that stresses a limited liberal notion of representation and the elitist view that politicians are best suited to make decisions on behalf of the populace […] and are willing to act against the expressed will of the public or in the face of substantial public opposition; (ii) A discourse that stresses a conservative notion of responsibility and the view that a strong, decisive government is the most effective, efficient and desirable form of government. […] (iii) A discourse about change which emphasizes the virtues of continuity, gradualism, flexibility and stability. […] (iv) A discourse concerning a sense of British distinctiveness and superiority politically (Hall, 2011: 124-125)

Regarding discourse (i), it must be added that the BPT is sustained by an elitist conception of democracy, particularly the famous ‘Westminster and Whitehall know best’ statement, which itself reflects the interest of the political elite, thus reinforcing their status and power (Marsh & Hall, 2016: 128). The BPT reifies over time already existing inequalities and asymmetries in the British political system between citizens. Therefore, these ideas and beliefs have been mostly supported by most of the population. This results in the populace developing a somewhat deferential attitude towards politics, where politicians are seen as the best holders of the right to take the most important and crucial decisions for all (Hall, 2011: 159). Moreover, Marsh and Hall rightly highlight that the BPT not only served the interest of the political elite, but also of the socio-economic one. Specifically, regarding discourse (ii) above, the climax of political conservatism made it easier for the working class to accept the status quo. Furthermore, the dominance of the executive power helped political elites to enact policies more favorable to the socio-economic ones without too much opposition (Marsh & Hall, 2016: 135). 

Johnson and the BPT

The discussion seems to beg the question: Has the BPT influenced the populist (Johson and Farage) behavior described above? Following Finlayson et al. (2023), we can observe the employment of several traditional tropes dating back to the language and discourse of the BPT. Particularly, Prime Minister Johnson’s behavior indicates the presence of a ‘government knows best’ approach to the crisis, merging epistemic and political authority over the actions needed to cope with the pandemic. For example, the invocation of the concept of ‘the people’ is used to hide the public’s limited political agency and retain the rights and legitimacy over the enactment of the counteracting measures. All of this is also related to the low participatory governance tradition inherent in the British State, but also shows how Johnson proved to strategically build its narrative of the pandemic to advance and increase the further legitimization of past policy decisions, and in particular the ones connected with the Brexit process (Wellings et al., 2023: 238). The former British premier revitalized the concept of the ‘British people’ within the public imagination, employing the sustainability and functioning of the NHS and other health issues as an element of continuity in his narratives from the beginning of the ‘Leave Campaign’ for Brexit to their management during the pandemic (Welling et al., 2023: 242). 

To better understand the British government’s communicative repertoire, the authors identify four main figurations of ‘the people’ (Finlayson et al., 2023: 344). First, we have ‘statistical realities.’ Here, ‘the people’ are represented and aggregated numerically, thus appearing more as abstract elements that legitimize the quest for acquiescence from the government (Finlayson et al., 2023: 345-346). Put another way, this kind of framing not only confers to the Cabinet epistemic authority because numbers don’t need further explanations, but also certifies its tight cooperation with the scientific community (Massidda & Sacca, 2023: 222). 

Second, we have the figuration of ‘suffering families.’ This narrative aims to develop a public ‘ethos’ via which it can acquire the rights and legitimacy required to advance its policies. The BPT here is involved and works when this communicative strategy properly connects governmental instructions with people’s feelings, needs, and emotions – knowing what is best to accomplish them (Finlayson et al., 2023: 347). 

Third, ‘the people’ are framed as responsible individuals. This one is seen as a rule follower, encapsulated in a hierarchical structure that crystallizes a top-down and vertical conception of the people/state relationships. Once again, the BPT widens the divide between the elites and the public. ‘The people’ are required to follow the moral claims encouraged by the elite to fulfill their individual and collective responsibilities and duties towards resolving the crisis. The individual responsibility regards the task that people are assigned to complete, such as wearing protective masks in public spaces while avoiding unnecessary contact with strangers. The collective responsibility is rooted in utilitarian reasoning: complying with the rules means a faster crisis resolution (Finlayson et al., 2023: 348-349). 

The second and third depictions help understand the way in which Johnson tried to preserve its populist-driven consensus from the backlash of its unpopular decisions during the crisis. He tried not only to highlight the community as a collective as the real protagonist of the effort to fight against the virus’ infection, but also to present himself as a transparent and compassionate leader (Massidda & Sacca, 2023: 209-215). 

The fourth and final depiction utilized is ‘freedom-loving citizens.’ This time, citizens are represented as rights holders and interests to be appropriately recognized. Consequently, the government has a duty to protect these fundamental freedoms and, by showing the truth about them, affirm the legitimacy of its guidelines (Finlayson et al., 2023: 350). 

Farage and the BPT

The case of Farage is different. Being an oppositional force during the COVID-19 pandemic breakout, it was much easier for him to resort to typical and proven to be more effective populist grievances. However, the BPT resonates consistently in Farage’s discourses during the crisis: I’m convinced that its influence is evident when the UKIP’s leader blamed Johnson for his lack of leadership and inefficient management in the initial months of the crisis development. Specifically, Farage used his oppositional platform on health policies to rally against the government and exploit the newly achieved consensus to fuel support around the rebranding of UKIP in ‘Reform UK’ (McManus, 2021: 148-150). 

Relating to discourse (ii) presented before, I argue that Farage somewhat recalls the necessity for the executive to be strong and decisive in its actions on behalf of the State. Second, and about discourse (iv) discussed above, I argue that Farage recalls the BPT when he stresses the role of the UK in the world vis-à-vis the actions and warnings undertaken towards China by other Western leaders. Put another way, he tried to point out the distinctiveness and peculiarity of the British political system as opposed to others, especially in the Western World, while asking for a different resolution path for the crisis (Bale, 2023; Sahin & Ianosev, 2021). 

Overall, even if Farage was not in a position that favored traditional forms of British political thinking, the BPT proves to have (at least) partially influenced his claims and actions during Covid-19’s unfolding. 

Conclusion

To recall the main points of the argument above, there is clear evidence that the British Political Tradition (BPT) still influences how politicians behave in ordinary British political life and their policy-making choices. Even in the face of essential shifts and changes caused by the Covid-19 crisis, many political actors tried to adapt these new challenges to the long-standing historical and common way of interpreting political actions and decision-making in the UK (Hall et al., 2018: 15). 

The aim of this article was to check for the influence of the BPT on populist leaders. As we observed, the British traditional political style and tropes served both Johnson and Farage as a means to instill their ideas about how to manage the crisis. This proves the resilience of established political tradition and clarifies the volatility and ambiguity of the populist repertoire and strategies. Regarding the latter point, populist narratives varied a lot depending on two factors: (i) the position of the leader – being in charge or standing as an oppositional force – and hence its responsibility towards citizens; (ii) the ability to legitimately connect populist grievances in the context of the pandemics with already existing lines of political reasoning. Some examples exemplifying the second point are the case of migration and the issue of border control regarding the likelihood of importing and spreading the virus uncontrolled. 

(*) Andrea Guidotti is a master’s student at the University of Pavia and an intern at the ECPS.

References

Bale, T. (2023). “The United Kingdom: The Pandemic and the Tale of Two Populist Parties.” In: Ringe N. & Rennó L. (Eds.), Populists and the Pandemic: How Populists Around the World Responded to COVID-19. Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003197614

Bobba, G. & Hubé, N. (2021). “COVID-19 and Populism: A Sui Generis Crisis.” In: G. Bobba & N. Hube (Eds.), Populism and the Politicization of the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 17-30. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66011-6

Finlayson, A.; Jarvis, L. & Lister, M. (2023). “COVID-19 and ‘the public’: U.K. government, discourse and the British Political Tradition.” Contemporary Politics. 29(3). pp. 339-356. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2022.2162206

Hall, M. (2011). Political Traditions and UK Politics, Palgrave Macmillan: London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230336827

Hall, M.; Marsh, D. & Vines, E. (2018). “A changing democracy: contemporary challenges to the British political tradition.” Policy Studies. 39(4). pp. 365-382. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2018.1451504

McManus, I. (2021). “The Case of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).” In: Falkenbach, M., Greer, S.L. (eds). The Populist Radical Right and Health. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70709-5_8

Marsh, D. & Hall, M. (2015). “The British Political Tradition and the Material-Ideational Debate.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 18(1), 125-142. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-856X.12077

Massidda, L. and Selva, D. (2023). “Correction to: Boris Johnson’s Approach to the Pandemic, In: European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis.” Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_13

Jarvis, L. (2022). “Constructing the coronavirus crisis: narratives of time in British political discourse on COVID-19.” British Politics. 17. pp. 24-43. https://doi.org/101057/s41293-021-00180-w  

Lasco, G. (2020). “Medical Populism and the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Global Public Health. pp. 1417-1429. https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2020.1807581

Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale University Press: New Haven. https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300189124

Richards, D. & Smith, M. (2002). Governance and Public Policy in the UK, Oxford University Press.

Ringe, N. & Rennó, L. (2023). “Populists and the Pandemic: How Populists Around the World Responded to COVID-19.” In: Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy, Routledge: New York. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003197614

Sahin, O. & Ianosev, B. (2021). “UK: Between Managed Moderation and Far-Right Conspiracy Theories.” In: G. Bobba & N. Hube (Eds.). Populism and the Politicization of the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe, Palgrave Macmillan: London. pp. 17-30. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66011-6

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Wellings, B.; Bonotti, M.; Rublee, M. R. & Zech, S. T. (2024). “Correction to: Narrative fusion and layering: statecraft and the shaping of Boris Johnson’s pandemic narrative, 2020–2021.” British Politics. 19(2), 253–253. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41293-023-00241-2

Venezuela's controversial President Nicolas Maduro speaks during a rally on the 22nd anniversary of the coup against Hugo Chavez in Caracas, Venezuela, on April 13, 2024. Photo: StringerAL.

Once Dictators Seize Power, They’re Hard to Remove: Venezuela’s Elections

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHomeMONITOR

Some observers believe Nicolás Maduro will follow in the footsteps of Nicaragua’s dictator, Daniel Ortega, by transforming his government into an isolated, repressive regime. Like Ortega, Maduro has already intensified his crackdown on the opposition through increased repression, including arrests, expulsions, and even stripping citizens of their nationality to consolidate control. As this authoritarian trend continues, more Venezuelans will likely flee in search of opportunities and freedoms abroad, exacerbating the already severe migration crisis in the region and beyond.

By Imdat Oner*

“Lacking personal charisma and booming oil revenues, Nicolás Maduro has struggled to obtain his predecessor’s popular support and failed to legitimize his rule at the polls. Instead, Maduro consolidated his power through sharing it with elites and the military.” 

In a profile I wrote about Nicolás Maduro three years ago, I emphasized that his grip on power was not rooted in broad popular support but rather in strategic alliances with elites and the military. This reality has been starkly highlighted by the recent presidential election in Venezuela, which revealed Maduro’s limited base of popular support.

The National Electoral Council (CNE) officially declared Maduro the winner, claiming he secured 52 percent of the vote compared to 43 percent for his main challenger, Edmundo González. However, despite Maduro’s declaration of victory three weeks ago, the CNE has yet to present credible evidence to substantiate this claim. In contrast, Venezuela’s opposition, represented by the Unitary Platform (PUD), has challenged the outcome by publishing a detailed vote count online. This data shows that Edmundo González actually received more than 7.3 million votes—approximately 67% of the total. The opposition’s numbers indicate that González is ahead by over 4 million votes, with Maduro losing in every state. Some reports are even calling this election manipulation one of the biggest electoral frauds in Latin American history. Although Maduro has faced similar allegations of election fraud before, the evidence against him has never been as overwhelming as it is now.

Lacking popular support, Maduro has resorted to familiar tactics. Instead of transparently sharing election results table by table, he requested that the Electoral Chamber of Venezuela’s Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) review and certify the official results. The government is attempting to present the TSJ as a neutral body to resolve the controversy. Yet, Venezuela’s judiciary has long been co-opted by Maduro, functioning more as a tool to preserve his legitimacy than as an independent institution. Although the court has yet to announce its decision, it’s highly likely it will support the results from Maduro’s controlled CNE.

As the government delays the process to buy time, Maduro continues to rely on military support. His legitimacy has always been anchored in alliances with domestic elites, particularly the military, whose loyalty is crucial to the regime’s survival. The military, having historically shaped Venezuela’s political landscape, remains key to any potential transition of power. Following the disputed elections, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino reaffirmed the military’s “absolute loyalty” to Maduro, further solidifying their role as a pillar of his regime. Opposition leaders have called on the army to intervene, but this seems unlikely. Since taking power, Maduro has worked to ensure the military remains staunchly pro-government. Those officers who showed even slight disloyalty have been imprisoned, while loyalists have been generously rewarded with significant economic and political favors.

With the military solidly behind Maduro, along with the backing of the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Supreme Court, Venezuela is going to slide further into dictatorship. Since Maduro’s 2013 election, the country has gradually grown more authoritarian, with opposition politicians, activists, and journalists consistently targeted by his regime. Yet, in recent days, the repression has intensified significantly. The government’s rhetoric and the actions of its security services signal to tighten its authoritarian grip further on the country, even at the cost of becoming a pariah in the region.

Some observers believe Maduro will follow in the footsteps of Nicaragua’s dictator, Daniel Ortega, by transforming his government into an isolated, repressive regime. Like Ortega, Maduro has already intensified his crackdown on the opposition through increased repression, including arrests, expulsions, and even stripping citizens of their nationality to consolidate control. As this authoritarian trend continues, more Venezuelans will likely flee in search of opportunities and freedoms abroad, exacerbating the already severe migration crisis in the region and beyond.

Venezuela’s elections once again serve as a warning to other authoritarian populist regimes that once dictators seize power, they become extremely difficult to remove—though not entirely impossible.

 

(*) Dr. Imdat ONER is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International University (FIU). He holds a Ph.D. from FIU, where he completed a dissertation titled “Great Power Competition in Latin America Through Strategic Narrative.” Prior to joining FIU, he served as a Turkish diplomat, most recently at the Turkish Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, where he was the Deputy Head of Mission and Political Officer. His expertise lies in International Relations, with a primary focus on Latin American politics. Dr. Oner has published extensively on Venezuelan politics and Turkish foreign policy, with articles appearing in War on the Rocks, The National Interest, Americas Quarterly, Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, and the Miami Herald. He is also a frequent contributor to Global Americans. His analyses have been featured in international media outlets, including Bloomberg, Al Jazeera, Miami Herald, and Agencia EFE.

Former US President Donald Trump at a rally with VP nominee J.D. Vance in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

J.D. Vance, Populism, and Culture Wars

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHomeMONITOR

The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party, exemplified by J.D. Vance’s rise, raises serious concerns about the future of American democracy. This development reflects broader shifts within American conservatism, where cultural and moral issues have become central to political identity and strategy. The implications of this shift are profound, raising concerns about increased polarization and the potential for democratic backsliding. As the Republican Party continues to evolve in this direction, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric have never been higher.

By João Ferreira Dias

The rise of J.D. Vance in American politics signifies a critical juncture in the Republican Party, underscoring the entrenchment of right-wing populism and culture wars within its agenda. While seemingly modern, this phenomenon has deep roots in political history (Hicks, 1931) and must be understood within the broader context of populism and the moral conflicts that characterize contemporary American society. 

Populism: A Brief Overview

Populism is a multifaceted and highly debated concept in political science, with various scholars offering different interpretations and definitions. At its core, populism can be understood as a political approach that frames politics as a struggle between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” a conceptualization popularized by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). However, this definition, while widely accepted, does not capture the full complexity of the phenomenon.

Mudde’s (2004) characterization of populism as a “thin-centered ideology” suggests that populism lacks the comprehensive nature of other ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism, and instead attaches itself to various political doctrines. This view is further explored by Hawkins and Kaltwasser (2017), who emphasize the ideational approach, focusing on the content of populist rhetoric and its distinction from mainstream political discourse. However, some scholars argue against categorizing populism strictly as an ideology. For instance, Aslanidis (2016) refutes the notion of populism as an ideology, proposing instead that it be seen as a discursive frame or a political strategy that can be employed by various ideological camps.

The debate extends to whether a minimum definition of populism is necessary for its study. De la Torre and Mazzoleni (2019) argue that a clear, minimal definition helps to prevent conceptual stretching, while others, like Benveniste, Campani, and Lazaridis (2016), suggest that the concept’s fluidity is essential to capturing its diverse manifestations across different contexts.

Furthermore, populism is often discussed in relation to its opposition to globalization and elite-driven policies. Steger (2019) maps the rise of anti-globalist populism, highlighting its ideological underpinnings and its appeal to those who feel disenfranchised by global economic and cultural changes. Similarly, Abts and Laermans (2018) explore the relationship between populism and the crisis of political parties, particularly in the context of Europe’s far-right movements.

Peter Diehl (2022) advocates for a more nuanced understanding of populism, acknowledging its complexity and the various forms it can take. This perspective aligns with the broader literature that sees populism as a reaction to perceived political failures, often articulated through a rhetoric of exclusion and opposition to the status quo (Taggart, 2018; Fukuyama, 2017). Anselmi (2017) and Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) provide further insights into the adaptability of populism across different political contexts, reinforcing the idea that populism is not a fixed ideology but a versatile tool in the hands of diverse political actors.

United States, Populism, and Culture Wars

In the American context, populism has historically manifested in various forms, from the agrarian populism of the late 19th century to the right-wing populism of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The latter, exemplified by figures like Donald Trump and, more recently, J.D. Vance, capitalizes on cultural and economic anxieties, often framing issues in terms of a struggle between ordinary, hardworking citizens and a corrupt, out-of-touch elite. This form of populism erodes democratic norms by exploiting resentment to foster political and social polarization, embodying the adage “divide and conquer.”

The term “culture wars” refers to the ideological and moral conflicts that have increasingly defined political discourse in many Western democracies, particularly the United States. These conflicts revolve around issues such as abortion, LGBTQ+ rights, immigration, gun control, and the role of religion in public life (Hunter, 1991, 1993; Hartman, 2019). Culture wars are not merely debates over policy; they are battles over a society’s very identity and values. They tap into deep-seated beliefs and emotions, often leading to highly polarized and intractable conflicts. As Ezra Klein (2020) notes, these cultural and moral divisions have become so entrenched that they now shape political preferences and social identities. Political affiliation has become a proxy for a broader cultural identity, making compromise and dialogue increasingly difficult.

The convergence of populism and culture wars has significant implications for contemporary politics. Populist leaders often weaponize cultural issues to mobilize their base, framing themselves as defenders of traditional values against the perceived threats of liberal elites and progressive movements. This strategy is evident in J.D. Vance’s political trajectory.

Senator from Ohio and author of the bestseller Hillbilly Elegy, a work that depicts the reality of poor white populations in non-urban America, J.D. Vance, 39, is the face of a new generation of politicians who have embraced conservative populism as a successful political strategy, transitioning from a critic to a proponent of Trumpism. Vance’s rise and his involvement in the so-called “culture wars”—advocating for more restrictive immigration policies, being a fierce critic of progressive education in schools and universities (such as critical race theory and gender studies), defending the traditional American family by opposing abortion and same-sex marriage, and emphasizing that Hollywood is an industry destroying the “good old American values”—reflect a profound shift in the identity and priorities of the Republican Party, raising questions about the future of the party and American politics as a whole.

Vance’s transformation from a critic of Trump to an advocate of Trumpist populism reflects a broader trend within the Republican Party, where cultural conservatism has become a central pillar of political strategy. Vance’s positions on immigration, education, and family values are not merely policy preferences but are presented as part of a larger cultural battle to “save” America from moral decay. By emphasizing issues like opposition to abortion and same-sex marriage and critiquing progressive education and Hollywood’s influence, Vance taps into the anxieties of a conservative base that feels alienated by the rapid cultural changes of the past few decades.

This fusion of populism and culture wars has transformed the Republican Party’s identity, moving it away from its traditional focus on free-market economics and foreign policy and toward a more nationalistic, culturally conservative agenda. Traditionally marked by a commitment to free-market policies, military interventionism, and fiscal conservatism, the Republican Party is now undergoing a “Trumpification.” This shift aligns the party with nationalist agendas that evoke the nostalgic imagery of a bygone era, appealing to a working-class white electorate that yearns for the “happy golden days” of baseball games and hot dogs. Political scientists Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter (2020) have highlighted how this focus on a particular electorate was crucial for Trump’s victory and the success of Brexit.

However, this agenda, rooted in ideological nostalgia, poses a significant threat to American republicanism. By undermining liberal democratic principles—such as the separation of powers, freedom of the press, and protection of fundamental rights—this brand of politics could irreversibly alter the landscape of American democracy. The risks are heightened when cultural conflicts are involved, as these issues often carry a zero-sum mentality, where compromise is seen as a betrayal of core values. The parallels with countries like Hungary under Viktor Orbán are stark, suggesting that the US may be on a path toward illiberal democracy, potentially ushering in an era of recycled authoritarianism.

The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party, exemplified by J.D. Vance’s rise, raises serious concerns about the future of American democracy. This development reflects broader shifts within American conservatism, where cultural and moral issues have become central to political identity and strategy. The implications of this shift are profound, raising concerns about increased polarization and the potential for democratic backsliding. As the Republican Party continues to evolve in this direction, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric have never been higher.

Implications for American Democracy

The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party poses significant challenges to American democracy. The populist rhetoric of defending “the people” against “the elite” often undermines democratic norms, as it tends to delegitimize political opposition and erode trust in institutions. Furthermore, the emphasis on cultural and moral issues exacerbates societal polarization, making it difficult to find common ground on even the most basic issues of governance.

As Daniel Ziblatt and Steven Levitsky argue (2019), the erosion of democratic norms is a gradual process, often facilitated by populist leaders who, once in power, seek to weaken institutional checks and balances. The risks are heightened when cultural conflicts are involved, as these issues often carry a zero-sum mentality, where compromise is seen as a betrayal of core values.

J.D. Vance’s rise within the Republican Party, therefore, is not just a personal political success but a symptom of broader trends that could have long-lasting consequences for American democracy. The intertwining of populism and culture wars represents a shift toward a more divisive and potentially authoritarian political landscape, where the foundational principles of liberal democracy—such as the rule of law, protection of minority rights, and respect for institutional norms—are increasingly under threat.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the rise of J.D. Vance within the Republican Party underscores a significant transformation in American politics, where populism and culture wars have become central to political identity and strategy. This shift reflects broader trends within conservative movements globally, where appeals to cultural nostalgia and opposition to progressive values are increasingly shaping political discourse. While these dynamics have proven effective in mobilizing certain segments of the electorate, they also pose substantial risks to the stability of liberal democratic principles, fostering division and eroding the common ground necessary for effective governance.

As the Republican Party continues to evolve under the influence of figures like Vance, the future of American democracy may hinge on how these tensions are navigated. The intertwining of populism and culture wars raises critical questions about the direction of American politics and the resilience of democratic institutions in the face of growing polarization. As these issues continue to unfold, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric remain exceedingly high, demanding careful consideration and active engagement from all corners of society.

 

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