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Dr. DB Subedi Warns: Transitional Nepal May Face Real Dangers from Rising Religious Populism

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“Transitional Nepal may face real dangers from rising religious populism,” cautions Dr. DB Subedi, lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, in an interview with the ECPS. While the September 2025 youth-led uprising signaled a break with entrenched corruption, nepotism, and elite capture, Dr. Subedi warns that Nepal’s weak secularism leaves space for actors seeking to reinstate Hindu statehood. Such a trajectory, he argues, risks fusing populist nationalism with sectarian identity—posing a greater threat than conventional elite dominance. Yet he also sees in Gen Z’s unprecedented mobilization the embryonic signs of a participatory, post-elitist democracy. Much depends, he stresses, on whether Nepal’s interim government can ensure a smooth, accountable transition to elections.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

“Transitional Nepal may face real dangers from rising religious populism,” warns Dr. DB Subedi, a leading scholar of peace and conflict studies at the University of Queensland, Australia. In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Subedi argues that while Nepal’s September 2025 uprising carries the seeds of a more participatory, post-elitist democracy, the country also risks sliding into a form of exclusionary right-wing politics. Having been the world’s only Hindu state until 2015, Nepal is now formally secular but only weakly so in practice. Everyday political life continues to be saturated with religion, leaving space for political actors and interest groups who seek to reinstate Hindu statehood. In Dr. Subedi’s assessment, this trajectory could open the door to religious populism—an outcome more dangerous than other forms of elite capture because it fuses populist nationalism with sectarian identity.

Yet, Dr. Subedi stresses, the September uprising cannot be reduced to a story of risks alone. It is also a product of deep structural inequalities, socioeconomic stagnation, and the frustrations of a digitally native generation. What began as a protest against the Oli government’s ban on 26 social media platforms quickly crystallized into a mass youth-led revolt against corruption, nepotism, and elite reproduction. The protests were unprecedented in scale, non-hierarchical in organization, and notable for their broad public legitimacy. Dr. Subedi sees in this horizontal mobilization the embryonic forms of a post-elitist democracy, rooted less in patronage or coercion and more in inclusive participation.

Placing Nepal within a wider regional frame, Dr. Subedi draws parallels with Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya (2022) and Bangladesh’s anti-quota protests (2024). Across these South Asian contexts, the drivers are strikingly similar: generational exclusion from politics, widening socioeconomic inequality, and a pervasive sense of injustice. In each case, social media functioned both as a catalyst and as connective tissue, transforming diffuse frustrations into coordinated movements. Yet Nepal’s fragile secularism makes it particularly vulnerable to the instrumentalization of religion by authoritarian populists, as has been evident in Bangladesh.

For Dr. Subedi, the stakes of the coming months are therefore clear. Much depends on whether the interim civilian government—tasked with organizing elections within six months under the leadership of former Chief Justice Sushila Karki—can ensure a smooth, legitimate transfer of power. The challenge lies not only in delivering credible elections but also in holding past regimes accountable for corruption and abuses of power, while simultaneously preventing a populist-nationalist hijack of the transitional moment.

In the conversation that follows, Dr. Subedi provides a detailed analysis of Nepal’s September uprising, reflecting on its social, economic, and political roots, situating it in the broader South Asian context, and sounding a critical warning about the dangers of religious populism in Nepal’s fragile democracy.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. DB Subedi, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

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ECPS Panel — From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding

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Date/Time: Thursday, September 25, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Moderator

Dr. Cengiz Aktar (An Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens).

Speakers

“Locating the Fight? Strategic Engagement in the United States and Europe,” by Dr. Mabel Berezin (Distinguished Professor of Arts & Sciences in Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University). 

“Democracy for all: Rethinking a Failed Model,” by Dr. Steven Friedman (Research Professor in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg).

“That Which Precedes the Fall: ‘Religion’ and ‘Secularism’ in the US,” by Dr. Julie Ingersoll (Professor of Religious Studies and Florida Blue Ethics Fellow at the University of North Florida).

“Emancipatory Politics in a Dark Time,” by Dr. Richard Falk (Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University).

“Combatting Authoritarian Populism,” by Dr. Larry Diamond (Professor of Sociology and of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University).

Read the full ECPS Panel Report here

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Professor Roth: Israel Exploits Antisemitism Allegations to Silence Criticism of Genocide in Gaza

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In an exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch and now at Princeton—warns that Israel is cynically using charges of antisemitism to shield what he calls genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” Drawing on three decades of human rights leadership, Professor Roth situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a broader authoritarian playbook: populist leaders tilt elections, capture institutions, and scapegoat minorities while silencing dissent. His central warning is stark: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism, and blurring this line endangers both Palestinians and Jews worldwide.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—longtime executive director of Human Rights Watch and now Charles and Marie Robertson Visiting Professor at the Princeton School for Public and International Affairs—warns that the Israeli government is cynically using allegations of antisemitism to silence criticism of what he describes as genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” For him, conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism not only shields state crimes but also undermines real protections against anti-Jewish hatred.

Professor Roth’s reflections build on more than three decades of global human rights advocacy. At Human Rights Watch, which he directed until August 2022, he oversaw the organization’s expansion into one of the world’s leading rights watchdogs, active in about 100 countries. Earlier, he worked as a federal prosecutor in New York and on the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington. From that vantage, he situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a wider pattern of populist-fueled authoritarianism. Today’s autocrats, Professor Roth argues, “still crave elections but tilt the playing field,”systematically undermining courts, capturing media, restricting NGOs, and intimidating universities. Democracy, he insists, cannot be reduced to ballots alone—it requires freedoms of expression, association, and the rule of law, all under attack.

Even amid authoritarian resurgence, Professor Roth emphasizes the power of coalitions of democratic, rights-respecting states. He recalls decisive breakthroughs such as the treaty banning landmines and the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)—both achieved despite superpower opposition. More recent successes, from UN oversight of the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen to European-Turkish pressure curbing Russian strikes in Syria, show that principled middle-power alliances still matter. NGOs, too, must remain unwaveringly consistent: “Our work doesn’t distinguish between perceived friend and foe—we apply the same standards to everybody,” Professor Roth explains. That consistency, he argues, sustains credibility and strengthens the politics of shaming.

The interview traverses urgent contemporary debates: Trump’s embrace of authoritarian leaders, his sanctions on the ICC, and his “flood-the-zone” tactic of overwhelming institutions with constant shocks. Professor Roth dissects the dangers of scapegoating minorities, the misuse of Holocaust memory to excuse present atrocities, and the precedent of blurring law enforcement with war in extrajudicial killings. At every step, he insists that human rights must not be selectively applied or subordinated to cynical populist narratives.

Taken together, Professor Roth’s insights offer both a sobering indictment and a pragmatic roadmap: exposing the authoritarian logic that links populism, repression, and impunity, while affirming that principled coalitions and civil society can still defend rights. Above all, his warning is clear: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism—and protecting the integrity of that distinction is essential for Jews worldwide, Palestinians under siege, and the universality of human rights.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Kenneth Roth, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

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Professor Paudel: The Youth Uprising in Nepal Is the Result of Long-Brewing Frustrations

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In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Dinesh Paudel argues that the September 2025 youth uprising in Nepal was “the result of long-brewing frustrations.” Far from a sudden outburst, he situates the revolt at the intersection of elite failure, geopolitical maneuvering, and structural economic decline. Young Nepalis, caught in what he calls a “triple disjuncture” of mass migration, precarious labor markets, and digital mobilization, transformed simmering anger into protest. Yet Professor Paudel cautions against viewing it as a revolution: “It will not fundamentally alter the political structure that produced these conditions.” Professor Paudel highlights corruption as the “governing logic of elite power” and signals volatile struggles over Nepal’s political and economic future.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The September 2025 uprising in Nepal has been described by analysts as a “Gen Z revolution,” but as Professor Dinesh Paudel emphasizes, “It was already brewing. This kind of uprising and discontent had been in the making for a long time.” In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Paudel—Professor in the Department of Sustainable Development at Appalachian State University—offers a critical interpretation of the forces driving this moment of rupture. His central argument is clear: “The youth uprising in Nepal is the result of long-brewing frustrations.”

These frustrations, he explains, stem from a convergence of structural, political, and geopolitical factors. Domestic elites failed to adapt to generational aspirations, leaving young Nepalis alienated from politics and unable to envision themselves in the nation’s future. At the same time, external pressures intensified: “Nepal sits right where these possibilities converge, at the center of the Himalaya and at the heart of what some call a Second Cold War, especially between China and the West.” Such tensions, combined with India’s long-standing dissatisfaction with Nepal’s constitutional framework and a dependent, deindustrialized economy, created the combustible conditions for revolt. Social media then amplified negativity and spread the belief “that nothing works in Nepal and that something else must come—even though that ‘something else’ was never really thought through.”

Professor Paudel situates this eruption within what he calls a “triple disjuncture” confronting Nepal’s youth: mass migration, precarious labor markets, and the expansion of the digital public sphere. These forces, layered onto chronic inequality and unemployment, have generated new forms of political subjectivity—angry, aspirational, yet fragile. “I would not call this a youth revolution—it is not,” Professor Paudel cautions. Instead, he views it as part of a recurring cycle in Nepal’s modern history: “Every decade Nepal has seen movements—the democratic movement, the Maoist movement—and young people have always been at the center.”

At the same time, Professor Paudel underscores that symbolic battles—such as the viral backlash against “nepo-babies”—have sharpened frustrations against entrenched entitlement. These spectacles, he argues, expose the persistence of a “feudal political structure still dominant in the country.” Yet he warns that generational framings risk obscuring deeper inequalities rooted in class, caste, and land.

Ultimately, Professor Paudel interprets corruption not as an aberration but as the very “governing logic of elite power.” For him, corruption sustains both domestic hierarchies and Nepal’s insertion into a regional and global economic order defined by dependency. Without profound restructuring—particularly rebuilding a national productive base—Professor Paudel doubts the present movement will transform Nepal’s political economy.

And yet, he insists that youth frustration is real and points toward new possibilities. “What they are seeking in the future is post-elite—some kind of egalitarian economic and political system.” Whether such aspirations can overcome entrenched interests and regional constraints remains an open question—but the long-brewing discontent that exploded in September 2025 ensures that Nepal has entered a volatile new era.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Dinesh Paudel, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

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Virtual Workshop Series — Session 2: The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland

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On September 18, 2025, ECPS held the second session of the Virtual Workshop Series — “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy. Chaired by Professor Mavis Maclean (Oxford), the panel examined Poland’s democratic trajectory through themes of patriotism, constitutional conflict, human rights, and representation. Highlights included Professor Joanna Kurczewska’s call to recover Solidarity’s inclusive legacy, Dr. Kamil Joński’s analysis of Poland’s constitutional “quagmire,” Professor Małgorzata Fuszara’s exploration of contested women’s and minority rights, and Professor Jacek Kurczewski’s reframing of judicial representation. Discussants added comparative and moral-philosophical perspectives. The session concluded that Poland’s experience reflects global struggles: reclaiming inclusive traditions, defending institutions, and embedding rights remain vital for democratic renewal.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On September 18, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the second session of its Virtual Workshop Series — ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. The session, titled “The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland,” brought together leading scholars to examine the Polish case as a lens into broader struggles over democracy, representation, and rights. Chaired by Professor Mavis Maclean (University of Oxford), the event highlighted Poland’s experience of post-1989 transformation, the contested legacy of Solidarity, constitutional polarization, and ongoing battles over women’s and minority rights.

Following the introduction of the programme and participants by Reka Koleszar on behalf of ECPS, Prof. Mavis Maclean, CBE (St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford) opened by situating the discussion within a wider European context. Reflecting on Britain’s surge of far-right populism, she posed a dilemma: should mass populist movements be regarded as authentic expressions of civic grievance, or as dangerous forces of hatred and violence? She expressed hope that the Polish experience could illuminate how democracies might redirect discontent toward renewal rather than demagoguery.

The first presentation, delivered by Professor Jacek Kurczewski on behalf of his wife, the absent Professor Joanna Kurczewska (Polish Academy of Sciences), revisited her long-standing work on Polish patriotism. Drawing on the legacy of Solidarity and the role of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, she argued that inclusive, pluralist patriotism once united workers, intellectuals, and clergy, but that its legacy has since weakened. She warned that today’s exclusionary populism thrives on the failure to sustain that inclusive vision.

Dr. Kamil Jonski  (University of Łódź) then addressed Poland’s constitutional polarization. His paper, “Single Text, Clashing Meanings,” traced how the 1997 Constitution, from its inception, was a battleground of rival axiologies. While liberals view it as a rights-based framework, conservatives interpret it through a lens of sovereignty and morality. The 2015 constitutional crisis, resulting in right-wing packing of the Tribunal, offered opportunity to impose one of those visions, and produced a constitutional quagmire with disagreement not only on values, but also legitimacy of institutions (including top judicial bodies).

Professor Malgorzata Fuszara  (University of Warsaw) explored the contested trajectory of human rights. She distinguished between broad consensus on universal rights after 1989 and the divisive politics of women’s and minority rights. Abortion restrictions, stalled LGBTQ reforms, and uneven protections illustrate enduring resistance. Yet she also highlighted progress, including the redefinition of rape law and gender quotas in parliament, underscoring the unfinished task of fully integrating women’s and minority rights into Poland’s human rights framework.

Finally, Professor Jacek Kurczewski (University of Warsaw) presented his own paper on representation and the rule of law. He challenged populist claims that only elected politicians embody the nation, arguing that judges also represent the nation through law, oath, and culture. Reviving lay participation in justice, he suggested, could counteract populist narratives and strengthen judicial legitimacy.

The discussion was enriched by three international discussants. Dr. Magdalena Solska (University of Fribourg) highlighted the need to revisit the legacy of Solidarity for democratic resilience and probed the paradox of women’s electoral behavior. Professor Barry Sullivan (Loyola University Chicago) compared Poland’s constitutional struggles to US debates, raising questions about the gap between cultural appeals and economic policy. Professor Krzysztof Motyka (Catholic University of Lublin) drew attention to the moral-philosophical dimensions of rights discourse, from Father Popiełuszko’s defense of life to the linguistic shift from civic to human rights.

Together, the session illuminated Poland as a microcosm of global struggles: how inclusive traditions are eroded by polarized politics, how constitutions fracture under competing axiologies, and how rights remain contested terrain.

Read the Full Report on the Workshop

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Dr. Borges: Brazil Is Becoming More Like American Politics, Where Polarization Normalizes Rule-Breaking

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Brazil’s democracy faces one of its greatest stress tests with former President Jair Bolsonaro sentenced to 27 years for plotting a coup. In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. André Borges, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Brasília, warns that Brazil is “becoming more like American politics, where affective polarization drives citizens to see opponents as existential threats.” Such polarization, he argues, risks normalizing democratic rule-breaking. Yet Dr. Borges also highlights Brazil’s resilience, rooted in its “institutional mix that deconcentrates authority”—federalism, separation of powers, fragmented parties, and an autonomous Supreme Court. This paradox defines Brazil today: resilient institutions confronting dangerously eroding democratic norms.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The conviction of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro to 27 years in prison for plotting a coup has plunged Brazil into one of the most turbulent chapters of its democratic history. While Bolsonaro’s allies denounce the ruling as political persecution, and international far-right figures echo claims of “lawfare,” Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF) has defended the trial as a necessary step to safeguard democracy.

Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Dr. André Borges, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Brasília, whose research focuses on party systems, coalition formation, and right-wing populism. Dr. Borges warns that Brazil is “becoming more like American politics, where affective polarization drives citizens to see opponents as existential threats.” In his view, such dynamics risk normalizing democratic rule-breaking, as voters increasingly rationalize the repression of political adversaries in the name of survival.

At the same time, Dr. Borges stresses that Brazil retains significant institutional defenses against authoritarian capture. “In comparative terms, if I look at other Latin American countries, I would say that Brazilian institutions are, in a sense, more resilient to this kind of attack. The reason for this has to do with several factors, one of which is that Brazil has an institutional mix that deconcentrates authority. It has a federal system, a presidential constitution with separation of powers, and a very fragmented party system. On top of that, there is a relatively autonomous Supreme Court.”

This “institutional mix,” he argues, explains why Bolsonaro could not consolidate authoritarian rule in the style of leaders such as Nayib Bukele in El Salvador or Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Since 1989, no Brazilian president has commanded a legislative majority, forcing presidents—including Bolsonaro—to rely on fragile coalitions with clientelistic parties that are reluctant to rewrite rules that benefit them. “Doing so would simply empower Bolsonaro and his family to the detriment of traditional politicians—and that is not something they would like to see happening,” Dr. Borges notes.

By situating Bolsonaro’s downfall in the tension between institutional resilience and intensifying polarization, Dr. Borges highlights a central paradox: while Brazil’s democracy has thus far resisted authoritarian capture, the country’s deepening affective divides may yet erode the very democratic norms its institutions have preserved.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. André Borges, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

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Dr. Nogueira: Brazil Did with Bolsonaro What the US Failed to Do with Trump

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In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Mara Nogueira (Birkbeck, University of London) argues that Brazil’s decision to convict Jair Bolsonaro for plotting a coup marks a turning point in democratic accountability. “By convicting Bolsonaro, we are doing what the US should have done with Trump and moving in the right direction toward democracy,” she says. Rejecting claims of judicial overreach, Dr. Nogueira stresses: “The Supreme Court is not overstepping but rather fulfilling its role.” She welcomes the unprecedented prosecution of both civil and military senior officers since the 1964–85 dictatorship, while warning that far-right actors are already mobilizing “judicial dictatorship” narratives. For her, the trial sends a crucial signal: “It’s not acceptable to plan a coup d’état—and if you do so, you will face charges.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The conviction of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro to 27 years in prison for plotting a coup has generated both domestic turbulence and international controversy. While his lawyers denounce the ruling as politically motivated, and allies abroad echo claims of persecution, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF) has framed the case as a necessary step to defend democracy against authoritarian threats. Against this backdrop, Dr. Mara Nogueira, Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences at Birkbeck, University of London, reflects on the political and institutional meaning of Bolsonaro’s trial in an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).

Dr. Nogueira underscores that the trial signals democratic resilience rather than overreach: “By convicting Bolsonaro, we are doing what the US should have done with Trump and moving in the right direction toward democracy.” She contrasts Brazil’s approach to accountability with the United States, where Trump has avoided similar consequences: “You had the foot soldiers of the Capitol invasion going to jail, while Trump not only remained free but was also allowed to run for president and become president again.”

In her view, the STF has not exceeded its mandate but fulfilled it: “I think the evidence that Bolsonaro and his conspirators attempted a coup d’état is hard to ignore, so when a crime like that is committed, it needs to be punished. The Supreme Court is not overstepping but rather fulfilling its role.” Importantly, she welcomes the fact that not only Bolsonaro, but also senior officers are facing accountability for the first time since the 1964–85 military dictatorship. “Perhaps Brazil would have had a different history if that had been done sooner,” she notes.

At the same time, Dr. Nogueira remains cautious. She observes that far-right actors are already mobilizing the “judicial dictatorship” narrative: “What they want in this case, however, is impunity. The revenge is already underway, with Congress now voting to expand its protection against legal prosecution.” She also highlights the fragility of Brazilian democracy, pointing to Bolsonaro’s 2018 victory and the January 8, 2023, attack as symptoms of unresolved cleavages. Yet she stresses that the conviction sends a crucial signal: “It does not inoculate against authoritarian relapse, but it does send a message that it’s not acceptable to plan a coup d’état, and if you do so, you will face charges.”

For Dr. Nogueira, Bolsonaro’s conviction represents both accountability and warning. Whether it deepens polarization or strengthens democratic institutions will depend on how political actors and society interpret this landmark moment.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Mara Nogueira, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

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Dr. Levene: Dysfunctional International System Enables Israel’s Genocide in Gaza

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A new United Nations commission of inquiry has concluded that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, citing mass killings, forced displacement, the destruction of essential infrastructure, and even measures to prevent births as evidence of genocidal intent. While Israel has rejected the findings as “distorted and false,” the commission underscored that all states are legally obliged to prevent and punish genocide. Against this backdrop, the ECPS spoke with genocide scholar and peace activist Dr. Mark Levene. In the interview, he warns that genocide is not an aberration but “a dysfunction of the international state system,” arguing that Gaza exemplifies how structural failures and powerful alliances allow atrocities to continue unchecked.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

A United Nations commission of inquiry has concluded on Tuesday that Israel has committed genocide against Palestinians in Gaza, finding “reasonable grounds” that four of the five genocidal acts defined in the 1948 Genocide Convention have been carried out since the war began in October 2023. These include mass killings, inflicting serious bodily and mental harm, deliberately creating conditions to destroy the group, and preventing births. The report cites statements by Israeli leaders, such as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vow to bring “mighty vengeance,” as evidence of genocidal intent reinforced by systematic military actions. Israel has categorically rejected the findings, denouncing them as “distorted and false,” but the commission underscored that all states bear a legal duty under international law to prevent and punish genocide.

It is against this backdrop that the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke in depth with Dr. Mark Levene, genocide scholar, peace activist, and Emeritus Fellow in History at the University of Southampton. In this wide-ranging conversation, Dr. Levene situates Israel’s ongoing war on Gaza within a broader theoretical and historical framework of genocide studies. His intervention goes beyond the binaries of “self-defense” and “terrorism” to expose the systemic dysfunctions of the international state order that allow such atrocities to persist.

The urgency of Dr. Levene’s analysis is underscored by his activism. On September 6, 2025, he was arrested during a peaceful sit-down protest in London’s Parliament Square. Alongside nearly 900 others, he was detained under the Terrorism Act simply for holding a sign declaring, “I Oppose Genocide, I Support Palestine Action.” This lived commitment frames his reflections on Gaza and lends moral force to his scholarly perspective.

The title of this interview—“A Dysfunctional International System Enables Israel’s Genocide in Gaza”—captures its central thesis. For Dr. Levene, genocide is not an aberration but “a dysfunction of the international state system.” Contrary to the dominant framing of genocide as a violation of an otherwise rules-based order, he argues that “you cannot separate what is happening in one state from its relationships with others.” Modern genocides, whether in Myanmar, Rwanda, or China, must be understood within the interlocking political economy of nation-states. Gaza, in this reading, is not exceptional but symptomatic: a structural outcome in which powerful allies shield perpetrators from accountability.

What emerges in this interview is both a historical and moral diagnosis. Dr. Levene emphasizes the asymmetry of power between Hamas and the Israeli state, notes the persistence of genocide despite multiple international rulings, and insists that the key question is systemic: “Why has this been allowed to continue?” His reflections range from the rationalization of mass violence through developmentalist fantasies—such as the so-called “Trump-Riviera Plan”—to the moral responsibilities of genocide scholars. Speaking as both historian and activist, he affirms that “we do have to speak truth to power,” even when power refuses to listen.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Mark Levene, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

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Professor Barkey: Turkey Has Become a Full-Blown Authoritarian System

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In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Henri Barkey—born in Turkey and one of the leading US experts on Middle East politics—warns that Turkey has crossed a decisive threshold under President Erdogan. “Turkey has now become a full-blown authoritarian system,” he stated, arguing that Erdogan has removed the “competitive” element from competitive authoritarianism by subordinating the judiciary, jailing rivals, and even deciding opposition party leadership. While repression deepens, Professor Barkey sees a paradox: “The system is becoming more authoritarian, but society may be resisting much more than we realize.” He highlights youth-led mobilization, fears over arrested Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu’s popularity, and Europe’s limited leverage, concluding that Erdogan’s overreach may ultimately galvanize opposition forces.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Henri Barkey, a leading scholar of Middle East politics who was born in Turkey, delivered a stark assessment of the country’s current trajectory under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. “Turkey has now become a full-blown authoritarian system,” Professor Barkey stated, emphasizing that the transition from “competitive authoritarianism” to outright authoritarian rule marks a dangerous turning point.

Professor Barkey—Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and holder of the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Chair in International Relations at Lehigh University—has long studied Turkey’s political development. He previously directed the Middle East Center at the Wilson Center and served on the US State Department Policy Planning Staff during the Clinton administration.

Professor Barkey situated Erdogan’s consolidation of power within a broader historical and political context. Turkey’s modern history, he observed, has been marked by cycles of democratic openings and authoritarian retrenchment. Yet, despite repeated interruptions—from military coups to autocratic turns—“the Turkish public, by and large, has adapted and adopted a sense of democratic culture.” The resilience of ordinary citizens, he noted, remains a crucial counterweight to authoritarian encroachment.

At the heart of Professor Barkey’s argument is Erdogan’s dismantling of institutional safeguards. “He is turning Turkey into a complete authoritarian system because he controls the judiciary, and judges and prosecutors essentially do whatever he wants them to do,” Professor Barkey explained. Recent episodes—politically motivated trials, the dismissal of opposition leaders, and the manipulation of party leadership contests—demonstrate, in his view, the collapse of even the minimal competition that previously characterized Turkey’s hybrid regime. “In other words, Erdogan is now deciding who will lead the main opposition party.”

This tightening grip, however, is not without risk. Professor Barkey underscored a paradox: “There’s a kind of dialectic here: the system is becoming more authoritarian, but society may be resisting much more than we realize.” Millions of citizens, particularly the younger generations who have never known a Turkey without Erdogan, have mobilized in protests, demanding change. Professor Barkey noted that such resistance is difficult to gauge because “people are afraid to speak out” and reporting is restricted, but he insisted that “at some point, this is going to break.”

Erdogan’s own fear of rivals, especially Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, reflects this tension. Professor Barkey argued that the regime’s extraordinary measures to sideline Imamoglu—ranging from imprisonment to retroactive annulment of his university degree—offer “the clearest demonstration that he’s terrified.”

Professor Barkey also highlighted the role of external actors in shaping Erdogan’s room for maneuver. In his view, former US President Donald Trump “doesn’t believe in democracy” and effectively gave Erdogan “carte blanche” at home by refusing to criticize his repression. Europe, for its part, remains uneasy with Erdogan’s authoritarian aims and worried about migration pressures, but Professor Barkey noted that Erdogan feels confident he can “withstand European pressure” while focusing on demolishing the opposition. Ultimately, the combination of a permissive US stance under Trump and Europe’s limited leverage has reinforced Erdogan’s sense of impunity.

Ultimately, Professor Barkey’s analysis suggests both danger and opportunity: the danger of entrenched authoritarianism, but also the possibility that Erdogan’s overreach may galvanize opposition forces. As he concluded, “Authoritarian leaders always make mistakes… and I think Erdogan is already making them.”

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Henri Barkey, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

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Dr. Bjånesøy: FrP Turns Economic Frustration in Norway into Populist Momentum

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In Norway’s September 8, 2025, general election, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s Labour Party narrowly held on to power — but the real story was the historic surge of the populist Progress Party (FrP), which doubled its vote share to 24% and became the country’s second-largest party. In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Lise Bjånesøy (University of Bergen) explains how FrP converted economic grievances into populist momentum, capitalizing on anger over wealth taxes, cost-of-living pressures, and distrust of “wasteful elites.” FrP also mobilized younger men through social media, a trend Dr. Bjånesøy calls a key driver of Norway’s new political divides.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In the wake of Norway’s September 8, 2025, general election, the country’s political landscape has been reshaped by growing polarization and the unexpected strength of the populist radical right. While Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s Labour Party narrowly secured another four years in power with 87 out of 169 seats, the populist right-wing Progress Party (FrP) achieved a historic breakthrough, doubling its vote share to 24% and becoming the second-largest party. This surge signals deep currents of economic dissatisfaction and changing voter dynamics, especially among younger men.

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Lise Bjånesøy, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Government, University of Bergen, offers insights into how FrP transformed economic frustration into populist momentum. “Economic issues, such as wealth tax and the cost of living, have been central in this election,” explains Dr. Bjånesøy. “FrP has strongly profiled itself against wasting taxpayers’ money, attracting voters dissatisfied with Labour and consolidating support among those frustrated with rising living costs.”

FrP’s success, however, goes beyond economics. Dr. Bjånesøy highlights the party’s strategic mobilization of young voters, particularly young men, driven largely by social media dynamics. “For young men who get their news from social media, there’s a 28% likelihood of voting FrP, compared to just 14% among those who don’t. Social media plays an important role in mobilizing this demographic.”

Despite this populist surge, Norway remains a centre-left outlier in the Nordic region, diverging from Sweden and Finland, where right-wing governments dominate. Dr. Bjånesøy attributes this partly to narrow electoral thresholds and coalition dynamics, as well as Labor’s recovery under Jens Stoltenberg’s return as finance minister, dubbed the “Stoltenback effect,” which boosted Labor’s popularity by 10 percentage points.

Still, she warns against underestimating FrP’s growing influence: “FrP has benefited from reduced stigma around supporting the party and has mobilized nearly all the voters who don’t dislike them. But their ability to expand further will depend on how effectively Labour manages governing alongside four smaller left-wing parties.”

Looking ahead, Dr. Bjånesøy underscores the urgent need for research on social media’s political impact, calling it a “key driver of generational divides” and shifting populist dynamics.

This interview unpacks the interplay between economic grievances, political polarization, and digital mobilization in shaping Norway’s electoral landscape — and what it reveals about the future of populism in Europe.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Lise Bjånesøy, lightly edited for clarity and readability.