Dr. Cengiz Aktar (An Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens).
Speakers
“Locating the Fight? Strategic Engagement in the United States and Europe,” by Dr. Mabel Berezin (Distinguished Professor of Arts & Sciences in Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University).
“Democracy for all: Rethinking a Failed Model,” byDr. Steven Friedman(Research Professor in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg).
“That Which Precedes the Fall: ‘Religion’ and ‘Secularism’ in the US,” by Dr. Julie Ingersoll(Professor of Religious Studies and Florida Blue Ethics Fellow at the University of North Florida).
“Emancipatory Politics in a Dark Time,” by Dr. Richard Falk (Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University).
“Combatting Authoritarian Populism,” by Dr. Larry Diamond(Professor of Sociology and of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University).
Dr. Cengiz Aktar is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens and a former UN director specializing in asylum policies. A leading advocate of Turkey’s EU integration, he has been active in major civil initiatives, including Istanbul’s European Capital of Culture bid and the “European Movement 2002.” His research focuses on EU integration, refugee law, political centralism, and the politics of memory concerning ethnic and religious minorities.
Speakers
Locating the Fight? Strategic Engagement in the United States and Europe
Dr. Mabel Berezin is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University. A comparative sociologist, her work examines challenges to democracy, nationalism, and populism in Europe and the United States. She is the author of Making the Fascist Self, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times, and co-editor of Europe without Borders. Her forthcoming book, The End of Security and the Rise of Populism (Oxford University Press), explores the global resurgence of nationalism and its implications for democratic practice.
Abstract: Democratic backsliding in its various authoritarian forms is a global phenomenon that demands a response in the academy and beyond. This talk will argue that the threat to democracy varies depending on national context and the struggle to overcome these threats will depend on specific political histories.
Democracy For All: Rethinking a Failed Model
Dr. Steven Friedman is Research Professor in the Humanities Faculty at the University of Johannesburg. A political scientist, he has written extensively on South Africa’s transition to democracy and more recently on the relationship between democracy, inequality, and economic growth. He is the author of numerous books and articles on democratic theory and practice and writes Against the Tide, a weekly column in Business Day on current political trends.
Abstract: I will argue that democracy is currently threatened because the model of democracy which has reigned over the past three decades has made the current backlash against it inevitable. While the model has, rightly, insisted on the need for citizens to hold public power to account, it has ignored the need to do the same to private power. This has handed excessive power to the wealthy and has left citizens at their mercy. While proclaiming democracy as a universal system which enables all human beings to exercise choice, it associates democracy with Western-ness. This has weakened its appeal outside the West and left it unable to cope with racial and religious diversity within it. The solution is a democracy which recognises the need to restrain private and public power and is unabashedly universal.
That Which Precedes the Fall: ‘Religion’ and ‘Secularism’ in the US
Dr. Julie Ingersoll is Professor of Religious Studies and Florida Blue Ethics Fellow at the University of North Florida. She is a foremost scholar of Christian Reconstructionism, a 20th century movement that underpins much of today’s Chrisitan Nationalism. She is author of Building God’s Kingdom: inside the world of Christian Reconstruction and Evangelical Christian Women:: war stories on the Gender Battles. She has written broadly on religion and politics, religion and violence and related topics.
Abstract: I’ll discuss how seemingly contradictory social movements (both “religious” and “secular” share immediate, earthly concerns, values, and perspectives that have brought them together in the US despite their differences. As factions they have been dismissed as “fringe” groups, but I’ll show why what they share matters more than their differences, and how combined they’ve become a profound threat to democracy.
Emancipatory Politics in a Dark Time
Dr. Richard Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus, at Princeton University, and former Visiting Distinguished Professor in Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. A leading scholar of international law and global governance, he has served on the Independent International Commission on Kosovo and on the editorial boards of The Nation and The Progressive. He is also Chair of the Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.
Abstract: I will explain briefly why authoritarianism has flourished, and seems trending toward fascism in many parts of the world. My main attempt will be to argue that an emancipatory political future for the Global West seems ‘impossible,’ but that the impossible happens (e.g. Mandela release, Soviet collapse, Arab Spring) and the future unknowable, making it rational for those of democratic and progressive inclination to struggle for what they believe. The alternative of silence in the face of evil in such a convulsive period is as Gramsci put is to nourish ‘monsters.’ I want to insist that at such historical and political crisis ‘angels’ can also emerge.
Combatting Authoritarian Populism
Dr. Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, where he leads programs on global democracy, Arab reform, and Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. He is founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy and a senior consultant at the National Endowment for Democracy. His research focuses on democratic trends, challenges, and reforms worldwide. His most recent book, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency, examines threats to liberal democracy and strategies to defend it.
Abstract: This talk will explain how and why authoritarian populists gain power and seek to expand it to erode or destroy democracy, and how democratic forces can resist this project.
Please cite as: Ben-Porat, Guy & Filc, Dani. (2025). “Authoritarianism Curbed? Populism, Democracy and War in Israel.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 24, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000118
Abstract
Since January 2023 hundreds of thousand Israelis took to the streets in an unprecedented wave of protests against the governments’ plan to restrict the power of the Supreme Court. The government, a coalition between the Likud’s populist party, the Ultra-Orthodox and the extreme religious-right announced a legislation package threatening Israel’s institutions’ -limited- liberal constitutionalism, opening the possibility of authoritarianism. Right-wing populism, that in its Israeli version combines populist tropes with religion and nationalism, combined with other radical right parties to form a tight and determined coalition set to transform Israel’s political system into what was described by the government’s opposition as an authoritarian (and theocratic) threat. Notwithstanding the governments’ intentions we argue, using the Israeli case study, that the “slide” from right-wing populism to authoritarianism is not inevitable. First, right-wing populism positions itself as anti-liberal rather than anti-democratic. Consequently, second, it has to contend with a potential opposition, a large one undermining its claim to speak “for the people.” And third, when anti-liberal stance relies also on religious discourse, it not only evokes liberal opposition but also divisions among populists regarding religious authority. These three reasons make authoritarianism a possibility but not an obligatory telos.
In January 2023 hundreds of thousand Israelis took to the streets in an unprecedented wave of demonstrations against the government’s reform plan depicted as a threat to democracy. The government, a coalition between the Likud, Ultra-Orthodox and the extreme religious-right parties, one hitherto excluded from coalitions, introduced a legislation package that would, according to its opponents, undermine Israel’s democratic institutions, in particular the Supreme Court, and open the way for authoritarianism. The protestors, who took to the streets in the name of liberal democracy, compared the developments in Israel to those in Hungary and Poland, argued that the government plan would not only undermine Israel’s [already limited] democracy but also threaten civil rights, freedom and gender equality. Not only the threat of authoritarianism but also the potential transformation into a theocracy evoked the protests. Coalition agreements and proposed laws, advocated by the religious parties, would, once legislated, it was argued, undermine secular, LGBTQ+, and women’s rights. The protest involved not only large-scale demonstrations for months, but also roadblocks, economic boycotts, appeals to international leaders and media, and even declarations of army reservists they would not report to duty if the proposed legislation would be completed as planned.
Right-wing populism, that in its Israeli version combines populist tropes with religion and nationalism, combined with other radical right parties to form a tight and determined coalition set to transform Israel’s political system into what was described by the government’s opposition as an authoritarian (and theocratic) threat. Notwithstanding the governments’ intentions we argue, using the Israeli case study, that the “slide” from right-wing populism to authoritarianism is not inevitable. First, right-wing populism positions itself as anti-liberal rather than anti-democratic. Consequently, second, it has to contend with a potential opposition, a large one undermining its claim to speak “for the people.” And third, when anti-liberal stance relies also on religious discourse it not only evokes liberal opposition but also divisions among populists regarding religious authority. These three reasons make authoritarianism a possibility but not an obligatory telos.
It is impossible to predict whether authoritarianism was curbed, even more so in light of the war in Gaza after Hamas attack in October 2023. Rather, our purpose is more modest, to highlight the inconsistencies within right-wing populism that enable opposition and potentially prevent authoritarianism based on the experience from Israel. Accordingly, we ask, first, looking beyond instrumental benefits, what explains the formation of a coalition between different expressions of radical right and religious fundamentalism? Second, how the anti-liberal and anti-democratic trends and commitment to religious ideas and identities combine and contrast in the government’s plan? And third, how have the anti-liberal and anti-democratic threat of Israeli right-wing populism enabled the opposition?
In an exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch and now at Princeton—warns that Israel is cynically using charges of antisemitism to shield what he calls genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” Drawing on three decades of human rights leadership, Professor Roth situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a broader authoritarian playbook: populist leaders tilt elections, capture institutions, and scapegoat minorities while silencing dissent. His central warning is stark: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism, and blurring this line endangers both Palestinians and Jews worldwide.
In this exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—longtime executive director of Human Rights Watch and now Charles and Marie Robertson Visiting Professor at the Princeton School for Public and International Affairs—warns that the Israeli government is cynically using allegations of antisemitism to silence criticism of what he describes as genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” For him, conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism not only shields state crimes but also undermines real protections against anti-Jewish hatred.
Professor Roth’s reflections build on more than three decades of global human rights advocacy. At Human Rights Watch, which he directed until August 2022, he oversaw the organization’s expansion into one of the world’s leading rights watchdogs, active in about 100 countries. Earlier, he worked as a federal prosecutor in New York and on the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington. From that vantage, he situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a wider pattern of populist-fueled authoritarianism. Today’s autocrats, Professor Roth argues, “still crave elections but tilt the playing field,”systematically undermining courts, capturing media, restricting NGOs, and intimidating universities. Democracy, he insists, cannot be reduced to ballots alone—it requires freedoms of expression, association, and the rule of law, all under attack.
Even amid authoritarian resurgence, Professor Roth emphasizes the power of coalitions of democratic, rights-respecting states. He recalls decisive breakthroughs such as the treaty banning landmines and the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)—both achieved despite superpower opposition. More recent successes, from UN oversight of the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen to European-Turkish pressure curbing Russian strikes in Syria, show that principled middle-power alliances still matter. NGOs, too, must remain unwaveringly consistent: “Our work doesn’t distinguish between perceived friend and foe—we apply the same standards to everybody,” Professor Roth explains. That consistency, he argues, sustains credibility and strengthens the politics of shaming.
The interview traverses urgent contemporary debates: Trump’s embrace of authoritarian leaders, his sanctions on the ICC, and his “flood-the-zone” tactic of overwhelming institutions with constant shocks. Professor Roth dissects the dangers of scapegoating minorities, the misuse of Holocaust memory to excuse present atrocities, and the precedent of blurring law enforcement with war in extrajudicial killings. At every step, he insists that human rights must not be selectively applied or subordinated to cynical populist narratives.
Taken together, Professor Roth’s insights offer both a sobering indictment and a pragmatic roadmap: exposing the authoritarian logic that links populism, repression, and impunity, while affirming that principled coalitions and civil society can still defend rights. Above all, his warning is clear: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism—and protecting the integrity of that distinction is essential for Jews worldwide, Palestinians under siege, and the universality of human rights.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Kenneth Roth, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
Autocrats Still Crave Elections but Tilt the Playing Field
Nested dolls depicting world autocrats Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump and Recep Erdogan on the counter of souvenirs in Moscow
Thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your recent writings, you stress the fragility of checks against authoritarian drift and note how today’s rulers “raise the cost” for defenders by targeting courts, media, and NGOs. What, in your view, makes this current wave of populist-fueled democratic backsliding distinct from earlier authoritarian surges, particularly in the subtler tactics of regulation, funding, and legal harassment?
Professor Kenneth Roth: I’m not sure it’s completely unique, but clearly autocrats are learning from each other. The current wave is characterized foremost by what you might call electoral authoritarianism. That is, autocratic leaders who still want the legitimacy of an election but use the steps of the autocrat’s handbook to undercut checks and balances on their authority and to tilt the electoral playing field in their favor.
It’s pretty straightforward what they do: they target the various potential checks on their authority—courts, lawyers, journalists, academics, civil society—and use different techniques to undermine their independence. With the media, for example, outlets may be owned by large corporate conglomerates vulnerable to government pressure. We’re seeing that in the United States right now. It could also take the form of regulations that make it harder for civil society to secure funding, particularly from abroad. Sometimes it’s direct attacks, such as withholding funding, which we’re now seeing Trump do with universities.
These are variations on a theme, but the aim is always the same: to stymie and weaken the elements that sustain democracy. Because democracy is not just about elections. It is about the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly, as well as the rule of law that holds leaders accountable to the law and to the rights it embodies. And these autocrats are intent on undercutting those checks. It’s pretty clear.
Coalitions of Democracies Can Overcome Superpower Opposition
You have argued that coalitions of mid-sized states—beyond the West—can sometimes defend human rights more effectively than major powers, urging leverage toward countries like India, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, and even China. Two decades on, do you still see these “plural centers of pressure” as the backbone of rights defense, or has today’s fractured multilateralism, intensified authoritarian entrenchment, and the rise of populist geopolitics blunted that strategy—and what would an updated map of leverage look like?
Professor Kenneth Roth: I wouldn’t say that coalitions are better than the major powers, but that they can serve as substitutes when the major powers stand in opposition. At this stage, when the US government has essentially stopped promoting human rights, I don’t think we should just throw in the cards and give up. There have been many cases in the past where coalitions of governments have compensated for the absence—or even the opposition—of the US government, not to mention the Soviet or Russian government, or the Chinese government. I describe this in my book Riding Wrongs, where repeatedly, coalitions of democratic, rights-respecting governments, when banded together, have had the moral authority to overcome superpower opposition.
That’s what happened with the treaty to ban landmines. All the major powers opposed it, yet a group of about 60 governments—a coalition that Human Rights Watch and our colleagues helped to build—overcame that opposition. We ended up sharing the Nobel Peace Prize for that effort. Something very similar occurred with the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). You may recall the Clinton administration was adamantly opposed to a court that could even theoretically prosecute an American. That was not its idea of justice. Yet in the final vote in Rome in 1998, the US lost overwhelmingly—120 to 7—marking a decisive victory for the rule of law.
More recently, as I describe in my book, despite a lack of any assistance, if not outright opposition, from Washington, a group of governments led by the Netherlands secured oversight from the UN Human Rights Council of the Saudi-led coalition’s bombing in Yemen—making a huge difference in terms of saving civilian lives. Another coalition, involving Germany, France, and Turkey, pressured Putin in March 2020 to stop bombing the three million civilians in Idlib province in Syria, the last area at the time held by the armed opposition.
These are just a few among many examples showing how coalitions of governments can effectively defend human rights—not only without Washington, but often despite its opposition.
NGOs Must Be Principled—Apply the Same Standards to All
Since major powers like the US, Russia, and China routinely instrumentalize human rights for geopolitical ends, how should NGOs and the broader rights community rethink their strategy—balancing naming-and-shaming with ally-seeking—while avoiding the slide from principled engagement into complicity in populist or authoritarian projects?
Professor Kenneth Roth: The idea that governments instrumentalize human rights is nothing new. This has always happened. If you just go back historically, there was a tendency during the Cold War to highlight the human rights abuses of one’s opponents and neglect the human rights abuses of one’s allies. So, this has always been a problem. I think the role that NGOs should play is to be principled. That is to say, to ensure that our work doesn’t distinguish between perceived friend and foe, but that we apply the same standards to everybody. That enhances the capacity to shame, because people understand that when human rights groups condemn somebody, when we spotlight a government’s abuse, we’re not pursuing some geopolitical strategy. We are pursuing a universal, principled effort.
Now, shaming is never the only thing that human rights groups do. We also enlist influential allies to try to put diplomatic or economic pressure on a target government, and I describe this in my book. These are important supplements to the process of shaming.
The fact that governments are selective in their defense of human rights does undermine their credibility, but doesn’t preclude our ability to enlist them, because frankly, nobody is consistent. So, we try to enlist allies where we can, push them to be more principled. But we don’t have a rule that you’ve got to be perfect before we enlist you, because then we’d enlist nobody. We’ve got to be a bit more pragmatic than that and try to maximize pressure on a target government from any credible source that we can find.
This editorial image, captured in Belgrade, Serbia, showcases an array of novelty socks featuring the likenesses of Vladimir Putin, Aleksandr Lukashenko, Viktor Orban, and Donald Trump in Belgrade, Serbia on December 12, 2024. Photo: Jerome Cid.
Trump’s open admiration for autocrats such as Putin, Bolsonaro, Erdogan, and Netanyahu blurs distinctions between democracy and authoritarianism, while also resonating with a global populist style that treats rights as obstacles to “the people’s will.” To what extent has Trump shifted the normative boundaries of US foreign policy on human rights, and what does this mean for the wider contest between populism and rights-based democracy?
Professor Kenneth Roth: First, I would not say that Trump is blurring the distinction between democracy and authoritarianism. He’s simply embracing authoritarianism. I don’t think anybody believes that because Trump embraces Putin, suddenly Putin is a democrat. That’s absurd. Trump, as an aspiring autocrat, admires leaders who have managed to secure autocratic power for themselves. That’s what he does. And we obviously have to push back against that.
This is a bad period for US foreign policy, but it’s not the first time we’ve seen something like this. Think back to the George W. Bush administration, when the so-called global war on terrorism became an excuse not only to support abusive governments but also to engage in severe human rights abuses by the US government itself—systematic torture and the use of Guantanamo for endless detention without trial.
We have seen this flouting, this unwillingness to abide by human rights standards emanating from Washington before. Our job in the human rights movement is to spotlight complicity in human rights violations, or responsibility for them, when the government behaves inconsistently, and to push for it to be even slightly less inconsistent. Fortunately, the American people—and I think this is also true globally—want a more consistent human rights policy.
That’s why spotlighting inconsistency is valuable, because it forces leaders like Trump to pay a political price. When he is seen as aiding and abetting genocide in Gaza, we can already see the effect on US public opinion. People are turning against Israel; they are upset with the unconditional US support for Israel. We’ve seen Trump react to that somewhat already—not sufficiently—but this effort is worthwhile. Ultimately, this is how we can pressure Trump to do the one thing that would end the genocide: suspend or condition massive US arms sales and military aid to Israel until the genocide stops.
Rulings Mean Little Without Government Backing
You’ve argued that “democracy” without rights is easily gamed by “despots masquerading as democrats.” After the ICJ advisory opinion(s) and an emboldened ICC, can international courts still constrain leaders amid intensified lawfare and sanctions against judges/prosecutors? What insulating reforms (treaty, funding, travel protections) matter most?
Professor Kenneth Roth: There’s a lot in that question, so let me try to dissect it a bit. First, when despots masquerade as democrats, it means they still hold periodic elections, but they tilt the playing field so much that the elections become meaningless. This can be a dangerous endeavor. Take Viktor Orban in Hungary or Erdogan in Turkey: they are classic autocrats who still hold competitive elections but with very severe limitations. Orban today faces a serious challenger in Peter Magyar, who is charismatic and has united the opposition. It may not work for him. Erdogan went so far as to lock up his main opponent because, according to the polls, that opponent was going to win. His party had already won the major mayoral elections in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and elsewhere. The more an autocrat moves toward a zombie election—that is, one with zero credibility—the more they lose the very legitimacy they seek. That’s what Daniel Ortega did in Nicaragua, Museveni in Uganda, Putin in Russia, and Lukashenko in Belarus. They hold electoral charades, but no one is fooled, and they simply become dictators.
I don’t view international courts as particularly effective against these kinds of autocratic attacks on democracy. The courts are more useful in addressing mass atrocities. For example, with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) entering the fray in Gaza, and with the ICC charging Putin and four generals for Ukraine, these are important efforts. They may someday lead to actual trials in The Hague. Even short of that, they are incredibly stigmatizing. They mean that these leaders cannot travel to the 125 ICC member states without risking arrest.
Of course, an ICJ judgment or an ICC arrest warrant does not self-execute. They don’t automatically constrain leaders because these Hague-based courts don’t have police forces; they depend on governments for enforcement. That’s always a problem. So, we need governments that claim to uphold the rule of law to act consistently with these rulings. Take the ICJ advisory opinion on the illegality of Israel’s endless occupation: governments should now ensure they do nothing to support that occupation. On the ICC, Trump outrageously imposed sanctions on the ICC prosecutor, the two deputies, and six judges. It’s important, particularly for the European Union, to use its so-called blocking statute to neutralize those sanctions so that judges and prosecutors can continue to access their bank funds and operate normally.
I would also encourage the prosecutor to examine whether this constitutes obstruction of justice—a violation of Article 70 of the Rome Statute—which I think it clearly does. One option would be to actually charge Trump for this blatant interference with an independent institution of justice. So, there is plenty that still can be done, but we shouldn’t deceive ourselves into thinking that international courts, simply by issuing rulings, automatically change the world. They need the backing of governments.
Being a Drug Trafficker Doesn’t Make You a Combatant
In critiquing Trump’s extrajudicial killings of Venezuelan traffickers, you warned of the drift from policing to “war” rules in law enforcement. If such precedents take hold—turning metaphorical wars on drugs or terror into literal grounds for lethal force—what global spillovers do you foresee, and what bright-line doctrines should civil society insist on to prevent their entrenchment?
Professor Kenneth Roth: First, let me explain the two sets of rules that govern the use of lethal force. In war, you’re allowed to shoot combatants on the other side, and unless they’re surrendering or injured and thus out of combat, you can shoot to kill. There is no duty to detain them. By contrast, in law enforcement situations, it’s almost the opposite: lethal force can be used only as a last resort to meet an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury. It is an extremely limited use of lethal force; otherwise, the duty is to arrest and prosecute.
Now, Trump has ignored that distinction. He has declared Venezuelan suspected drug traffickers—people we have no real knowledge about—and has, in three separate incidents, blown up boats and killed those on board, simply on the claim that they were traffickers. But being a drug trafficker does not make you a combatant. There is no war, no armed conflict here. If you believe Trump’s account, these people were committing crimes and should have been arrested and prosecuted. The US Coast Guard is fully capable of interdicting these boats, detaining the suspects, bringing them to Miami or elsewhere, and prosecuting them.
Trump is disregarding the strict law enforcement rules on lethal force by declaring this a “war,” and therefore claiming the right to shoot to kill. That is an incredibly dangerous precedent, because he could label anyone a combatant or terrorist—terms he wrongly uses interchangeably. But even terrorists are criminals who must be prosecuted, not summarily executed. We have to be very careful here, because what’s to stop him from declaring a war on civil society or a war on the political opposition and then justifying killings on that basis?
This is a very dangerous precedent. Even though drug traffickers are unpopular, it is essential to start with the principle: even if they are suspected traffickers, they should not simply be blown up. They have the right to be detained, charged, and prosecuted if the administration’s claims are true. That is why it is crucial not to let metaphorical wars on drugs or terrorism be transformed into literal wars that substitute the narrow rules on lethal force in law enforcement with the much more permissive rules governing armed conflict—which this clearly is not.
How Populist Autocrats Weaponize Minorities to Mask Their Failures
Border Patrol agents monitor an anti-ICE protest in downtown Los Angeles, June 8, 2025. Demonstrators rallied against expanded ICE operations and in support of immigrant rights. Photo: Dreamstime.
You’ve tracked how strongman admiration and majoritarian claims corrode protections for minorities and migrants. Has Trump’s second term normalized an executive theory of unfettered discretion that will outlast him in US foreign policy—and how should allies signal costs early to deter that stickiness?
Professor Kenneth Roth: As you’re suggesting in your question, populist autocrats frequently rally support by demonizing some unpopular minority in their country. It could be immigrants, LGBT people, or Muslims—it varies from country to country. It is very important to push back against this. Typically, they resort to such tactics to divert attention from their lack of a political program that could actually address the economic and political needs of their base. Usually, their base is the ethnic majority working class.
When you see leaders demonizing immigrants or LGBT people, you can almost be certain there is no serious program to help the working class. Trump is a perfect example. He loves to demonize immigrants. Then he puts forward a massive economic plan that cuts taxes for his cronies while eliminating healthcare for many who need it. This doesn’t help the working class—it decimates it.
It’s important to expose this sleight of hand—the use of scapegoating unpopular minorities to distract from harmful economic policies. So, what’s the best way to push back? First and foremost, by defending the rights of these minorities. We cannot pretend that an attack on one unpopular group will stop there. In fact, I often view attacks on LGBT people as the canary in the coal mine for broader assaults on civil society. Those almost always follow.
We need to recognize the path populist autocrats are taking and nip it in the bud. We cannot ignore the early stages just because the victims are unpopular. This is a well-trodden path, and it must be stopped at the outset.
Countering Trump’s Flood-the-Zone Strategy
You’ve described Trump’s “flood-the-zone” strategy—overwhelming opponents and institutions with constant shocks—as a hallmark of autocratic playbooks. From the resistance you’ve observed, what lessons proved transferable to other democracies under stress, and which were context-specific wins?
Professor Kenneth Roth: I’m not sure that Trump’s flood-the-zone strategy is typical. It’s pretty unique to Trump. It especially characterized his first few months in this second term, when there was one outrage after another, day after day, and people were so busy responding to yesterday’s crisis that they didn’t know where to start with today’s. Now it has slowed down a bit, but he continues to use the tactic—finding some new provocation every few days to divert attention from what he had already done.
The key for the targets of these efforts is not to let themselves be overwhelmed but to band together and coordinate their defense. We didn’t always see that in the United States. For example, certain universities, like Columbia, cut deals with the Trump administration, while others have since taken a more principled stand and joined forces. Some big law firms also cut deals, while others chose to fight back in court—and are now winning. Trump has also turned his threats toward civil society, but here too, many large progressive private foundations have banded together, issuing a joint statement declaring that they will not be divided and will fight back collectively.
That kind of collective response—the refusal to let Trump pick off opponents one at a time, as he has done with certain media outlets—is essential. When a powerful government can target one victim at a time, the victims usually lose. But when it faces a coordinated defense, the chances of success rise significantly.
When Sovereignty Becomes Impunity
The flag in front of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands on March 27, 2016. Photo: Dreamstime.
Trump’s sanctions on the ICC—aimed at blocking investigations of Israel and US officials—highlight how powerful states can obstruct accountability through jurisdictional caveats and intimidation. What does this precedent mean for the enforceability of international criminal law, and what enforcement pathways remain viable to safeguard prosecutorial independence?
Professor Kenneth Roth: When you say jurisdictional caveats, I think what you’re referring to is that the Trump administration, like the US government for much of the last 20-plus years, has objected to the International Criminal Court’s so-called territorial jurisdiction. That is, the court can prosecute anybody who commits a crime on the territory of a member state. Going back to the Clinton administration, the US government hated that because it meant that American military personnel could theoretically be prosecuted if they committed a crime on the territory of a member state. That’s why the US government was so outraged, in the first Trump administration, when the ICC opened an investigation into Afghanistan—because there was fear that Bush-era torturers, many of whose worst crimes were committed there, might be subject to prosecution. Now, that turned out to be more of a theoretical concern, but that’s the territorial jurisdiction the US government has always objected to.
Ironically, when that same territorial jurisdiction was used by the ICC to charge Putin for crimes committed in Ukraine, everything changed. Biden called it justified. Lindsey Graham, the leading Republican senator who had always opposed the ICC, suddenly said, “I’ve changed my mind, we support the ICC now.” He even pushed through a unanimous resolution, and the Senate upheld what the ICC had done. That remained the case until that same territorial jurisdiction was used to charge Netanyahu for crimes committed in Gaza, in Palestine—a member state. Then suddenly it was back to outrage. The US position has been utterly unprincipled. Fortunately, nobody else accepts that. As I mentioned, the US lost its efforts to block territorial jurisdiction in Rome at the outset by a vote of 120 to 7. This is a losing proposition, and the key is for the 125 member states to reaffirm their support for territorial jurisdiction.
Of course, a state should be able to say, in a time of crisis, if our courts are not working—if we can’t prosecute people who commit crimes on our territory ourselves—we should be able to delegate that power to the ICC. That should be an inherent aspect of sovereignty. For the US to say, “Oh, well, because we’re American, we can commit a crime on your territory with impunity”—that’s crazy. If I, as an American citizen, were to go to Brussels and murder somebody, is it an affront to American sovereignty if Belgium prosecutes me? Obviously not. So why would it be an affront to American sovereignty if, under extreme circumstances, Belgium delegates that prosecutorial power to the ICC? This is normal. But the US insists on American exceptionalism when it comes to the rule of law. Nobody buys that, and governments should find ways to push back.
The Vanity Lever: Using Trump’s Ego to Pressure for Human Rights
You’ve suggested Trump’s transactional ego—the “vanity lever”—can sometimes be used to pressure him on rights. How realistic is it to constrain authoritarian choices through vanity appeals, and where should we draw the ethical line between pragmatism and entrenching cynical politics?
Professor Kenneth Roth: What I’ve written about is that if you approach Trump frontally and say, support human rights, he’ll probably look at you and say, what are those? This is not a guy who is going to openly support human rights. But, as I describe in my book, the process of shaming always has to look at the target and figure out what they care about. In Trump’s case, what he cares about is his self-declared reputation as a master negotiator. In his book The Art of the Deal, he defines what he thinks is great about himself.
That gives us some leverage. For one, he wants a Nobel Peace Prize. Fine—you’re not going to get a Nobel Peace Prize by endorsing the mass ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza. You’ll get the Nobel Peace Prize by actually securing a just peace, including recognition of a Palestinian state. Another effective strategy is to spotlight how Putin in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Gaza are actually bamboozling Trump. They’re manipulating him, they’re playing games with this supposed master negotiator, and Trump looks naive.
He hates that. This is a guy with a fragile ego who doesn’t like criticism. If people are laughing at him, ridicule is horrible when you’re an autocrat. So, I think that provides an opportunity. We’re already seeing some movement by Trump in Ukraine. He has not yet imposed the so-called severe consequences he promised if Putin continues to obstruct ceasefire negotiations, but his rhetoric has become somewhat tougher. In the case of Gaza, we also see Trump distancing himself in certain ways from Netanyahu—for example, rejecting Netanyahu’s false claim that there is no starvation in Gaza, criticizing him for attacking the Hamas negotiators in Qatar, and twice imposing temporary ceasefires.
So, there is some distance there. I think we just need to keep pushing, with the aim of getting Trump to do the right thing for the wrong reasons. I don’t think that’s cynical—it’s simply pragmatic. If that’s what it takes to stop mass atrocities, I’ll do it.
When Ethnic Cleansing Becomes a Defense to Genocide
Destruction in Shejayia, Gaza City, Gaza Strip. Photo: Dreamstime.
You’ve argued that Israel’s actions in Gaza meet the Genocide Convention through killings and life-destroying conditions, even alongside ethnic-cleansing motives. How do you answer critics who say genocidal intent is unproven, and what evidence most strongly supports its inference under current ICJ standards?
Professor Kenneth Roth: If you look at either the extent of the killing or the imposition of conditions of life designed to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic or national group, what’s going on in Gaza is clearly genocide. At this point, the clearest example is the imposition of mass starvation, mass deprivation, and the wholesale destruction—today of Gaza City, but overall of all Gaza. The aim, quite clearly, is to make Gaza unlivable so that it becomes “humane” to then force everybody out into Egypt. The ultimate aim here is ethnic cleansing, a supposed solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by getting rid of the Palestinians—first in Gaza, and then later in the occupied West Bank. That’s clearly what’s going on.
The only real challenge here—you mentioned the International Court of Justice standards—is that the court ruled in the Croatia v. Serbia case more than a decade ago that if you are going to infer genocidal intent from conduct, it has to be the only possible inference. I think that’s a wrong standard. They are going to have to re-examine it, because in effect what they have said is that the motive of ethnic cleansing becomes a defense to genocide, which makes no sense. To prove genocidal intent, the standard should be absolute: are you clearly demonstrating genocidal intent? The fact that there may be a mixed motive—that there may be genocide in the service of something else—is often how genocide takes place.
So, I do think the ICJ will have to revisit its standards. It will have an opportunity in the Gambia v. Myanmar case concerning the Rohingya, where something very similar occurred. The Myanmar army killed, say, 10,000 Rohingya in order to force 730,000 to flee into Bangladesh. That was genocide as a means to mass ethnic cleansing. I hope the court uses that case, which will come first, to re-examine its standards, to find that the conduct does permit an inference of genocidal intent. That would then also apply positively to the case of Gaza.
Criticism of Israel Is Not Antisemitism
Election billboard showing Netanyahu shaking hands with Trump, with the slogan “Netanyahu. Another League,” in Jerusalem on September 16, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.
You’ve warned that equating criticism of Israel with antisemitism both silences accountability and weakens real protections for Jews. What are the dangers of this conflation, and what concrete standards can help distinguish legitimate criticism from antisemitic incitement without suppressing dissent?
Professor Kenneth Roth: That’s an important question. Let me begin by saying that the problem of antisemitism is an acute one today facing Jews around the world, and it has become much more intense since October 7, 2023. So, this is a genuine problem. But what we’ve seen is that Netanyahu, the Israeli government, and some of its supporters are using charges of antisemitism to try to silence criticism of Israel’s genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza.
That’s a very cynical move, because it cheapens a concept that is badly needed. If people come to see claims of antisemitism as just an effort to change the subject and defend Israel’s inexcusable conduct in Gaza, they will become cynical about antisemitism at the very moment we need it to remain a viable concept. In effect, what Netanyahu and his supporters are doing is sacrificing Jews around the world for the benefit of the Israeli government. They’re basically saying: we’re going to throw Jews worldwide under the bus. Who cares if you face antisemitism? Who cares if we’re cheapening the concept? All we care about is defending the Israeli government. That’s a horrible thing to do—but that, in essence, is what the Netanyahu government is doing.
Now, are there standards on antisemitism? Yes. The standard that legitimizes this cynical approach is the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism. The way it’s been interpreted has lent itself to saying that criticism of Israel, or efforts to demonize Israel, are somehow antisemitic.
There are two far superior definitions of antisemitism: the Jerusalem Declaration and the Nexus Document. The reason they are superior is that they make explicit that mere criticism of Israeli misconduct is not antisemitic. They define antisemitism in positive terms similarly, but they also include negative examples to make clear that antisemitism should never be weaponized to shield Israeli misconduct.
So, if the concern is truly antisemitism, people should adopt the Jerusalem Declaration or the Nexus Document. But if the concern is simply defending Israel while throwing Jews around the world to their fate, then go with the IHRA definition.
“Never Again” Means Never Again for All
You argue that Israel’s invocation of “never again” and its Holocaust halo have been weaponized to justify present atrocities. How has this complicated recognition of genocidal conduct, and how can we honor historical victimhood without letting it serve as a blank check—while restoring legal clarity around proportionality and civilian protection?
Professor Kenneth Roth: As you suggest, the Israeli government, much like the Rwandan government, cites the Holocaust for Jews and the Rwandan genocide to suggest that the current government is somehow above it all. The logic is: how could the victims of genocide, in turn, commit mass atrocities? Obviously, that’s illogical, but they use the argument implicitly to try to defend the indefensible.
For me, “never again” doesn’t mean never again except for Israel, never again except for Rwanda. It means never again for anybody. Part of the advantage the Israeli government has is that when people think about genocide, they tend to focus on the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide, where the aim, after a certain point, was to kill every Jew or every Tutsi that could be found.
But if you read the Genocide Convention—the treaty that defines genocide and that many governments have ratified—genocide can be aimed at destroying a group in whole, as in the Holocaust or Rwanda, or in part. This is where the Holocaust and Rwandan examples can mislead, because it is also genocide if you target part of a group, either for killing or through conditions of life that bring about their partial destruction. That is what defines Gaza today. The Israeli government is not trying to kill every single Palestinian. But it is trying to kill enough Palestinians and deprive them with enough severity that they are forced to flee into Egypt. Genocide with an intent to destroy a group in part is what’s really going on here. The Holocaust leads us astray because that’s not what it was about. So, we need to read the Genocide Convention as written and recognize that the Holocaust alone does not define genocide. There are other forms—such as the one playing out in Gaza today.
Past Genocides Do Not Justify Present Atrocities
And lastly, you’ve drawn parallels between Kagame’s Rwanda and Netanyahu’s Israel in weaponizing past victimhood to justify present crimes. How can the human rights community dismantle such narratives without denying past genocides, and which accountability tools—aid conditionality, arms suspensions, or regional pressure—have proven most effective against such impunity politics?
Professor Kenneth Roth: As I mentioned, both Netanyahu and Kagame play on past genocide to divert attention from their current mass atrocities—Netanyahu in Gaza, and Kagame through both his repression at home and, most acutely, his invasion of Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo through his own forces as well as the proxy M23 rebel group.
The goal of the human rights community is obviously not to deny the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide. These are facts, these are horrific episodes in human history. But the point is to say: “Yes, they happened, but they don’t excuse present abuses.” So, we have to carefully document what’s happening in Congo and in Gaza and press for real pressure to stop it.
That pressure can and should include economic measures. Sadly, the European Union—while many of its members are recognizing a Palestinian state—has yet to suspend Israel’s trade benefits, despite vows from Commission President von der Leyen to do so soon. In eastern Congo, back in 2012, a similar Rwandan invasion via the M23 was stopped in its tracks when the US and British governments told Kagame they would cut off aid unless he withdrew. Within days, the M23 crumbled. Today, that isn’t happening. Trump cut a deal allowing Rwanda to stay and exploit the minerals.
So, we need to look at what has worked in the past, namely intense economic pressure. I would like to see the International Criminal Court (ICC)—which has already acted in part in Gaza—do much more and also extend its action to eastern Congo. It has done so in the past, but not with respect to this current invasion. Plenty of steps remain available to help rein in Kagame and Netanyahu and to stop their misuse of past atrocities as an excuse for committing new ones today.
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Dinesh Paudel argues that the September 2025 youth uprising in Nepal was “the result of long-brewing frustrations.” Far from a sudden outburst, he situates the revolt at the intersection of elite failure, geopolitical maneuvering, and structural economic decline. Young Nepalis, caught in what he calls a “triple disjuncture” of mass migration, precarious labor markets, and digital mobilization, transformed simmering anger into protest. Yet Professor Paudel cautions against viewing it as a revolution: “It will not fundamentally alter the political structure that produced these conditions.” Professor Paudel highlights corruption as the “governing logic of elite power” and signals volatile struggles over Nepal’s political and economic future.
The September 2025 uprising in Nepal has been described by analysts as a “Gen Z revolution,” but as Professor Dinesh Paudel emphasizes, “It was already brewing. This kind of uprising and discontent had been in the making for a long time.” In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Paudel—Professor in the Department of Sustainable Development at Appalachian State University—offers a critical interpretation of the forces driving this moment of rupture. His central argument is clear: “The youth uprising in Nepal is the result of long-brewing frustrations.”
These frustrations, he explains, stem from a convergence of structural, political, and geopolitical factors. Domestic elites failed to adapt to generational aspirations, leaving young Nepalis alienated from politics and unable to envision themselves in the nation’s future. At the same time, external pressures intensified: “Nepal sits right where these possibilities converge, at the center of the Himalaya and at the heart of what some call a Second Cold War, especially between China and the West.” Such tensions, combined with India’s long-standing dissatisfaction with Nepal’s constitutional framework and a dependent, deindustrialized economy, created the combustible conditions for revolt. Social media then amplified negativity and spread the belief “that nothing works in Nepal and that something else must come—even though that ‘something else’ was never really thought through.”
Professor Paudel situates this eruption within what he calls a “triple disjuncture” confronting Nepal’s youth: mass migration, precarious labor markets, and the expansion of the digital public sphere. These forces, layered onto chronic inequality and unemployment, have generated new forms of political subjectivity—angry, aspirational, yet fragile. “I would not call this a youth revolution—it is not,” Professor Paudel cautions. Instead, he views it as part of a recurring cycle in Nepal’s modern history: “Every decade Nepal has seen movements—the democratic movement, the Maoist movement—and young people have always been at the center.”
At the same time, Professor Paudel underscores that symbolic battles—such as the viral backlash against “nepo-babies”—have sharpened frustrations against entrenched entitlement. These spectacles, he argues, expose the persistence of a “feudal political structure still dominant in the country.” Yet he warns that generational framings risk obscuring deeper inequalities rooted in class, caste, and land.
Ultimately, Professor Paudel interprets corruption not as an aberration but as the very “governing logic of elite power.” For him, corruption sustains both domestic hierarchies and Nepal’s insertion into a regional and global economic order defined by dependency. Without profound restructuring—particularly rebuilding a national productive base—Professor Paudel doubts the present movement will transform Nepal’s political economy.
And yet, he insists that youth frustration is real and points toward new possibilities. “What they are seeking in the future is post-elite—some kind of egalitarian economic and political system.” Whether such aspirations can overcome entrenched interests and regional constraints remains an open question—but the long-brewing discontent that exploded in September 2025 ensures that Nepal has entered a volatile new era.
Professor Dinesh Paudel is a Professor in the Department of Sustainable Development at Appalachian State University.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Dinesh Paudel, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
Elite Failure, Geopolitics, and Youth Anger Collide
Professor Dinesh Paudel, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Analysts describe the September 2025 uprising as a Gen Z revolution, yet youth mobilization in Nepal has a long genealogy. From your perspective, what specific social, economic, and political configurations enabled this generation to rupture the cycle of elite reproduction where earlier movements failed—and how do corruption, nepotism, and entrenched elite dominance fit into the deeper structural drivers that made such an eruption possible now?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: Thank you for this great question. It’s long overdue. It was already brewing. This kind of uprising and discontent had been in the making for a long time. But the current conjuncture has multiple factors coming together, leading to this eruption.
One factor is the internal political dynamics within the parties. They were not able to understand the new generation’s aspirations. They also failed to govern in a way that allowed the young generation to see themselves in politics and in the future of the nation. That’s one of the main factors—the internal failure of the party system. The internal conjuncture of power dynamics ruptured.
The second important point is geopolitical tension. It is about how the government was overthrown and how the young population began mobilizing their force. It was carried away by other interests, creating a kind of popular imagination of revolution. But in reality, multiple bigger powers were trying to secure their interests in a country that is geopolitically strategic—physically between China and India, at the center of the Himalaya, and at the heart of what some call a Second Cold War, especially between China and the West. India’s relationship with the West is not in the best shape at the moment. Nepal sits right where these possibilities converge, and many people anticipated this.
The third point concerns India specifically, which was not happy with the government in Nepal. This discontent started with the promulgation of the constitution 10 years ago. India never wanted Nepal to have that constitution, but the issue escalated when the constitution included part of historical Nepal now controlled by India. Including this in the constitution angered India further.
The fourth point is social media, amplified by intellectual and journalistic voices, which propagated negative perceptions of the governing system. They presented things as not working, and this negativity grew steadily. It spread among the general public, particularly through youth on social media, fostering the belief that nothing works in Nepal and that something else must come—even though that “something else” was never really thought through.
Finally, development programs, NGOs, and modern aspirations led the public to believe they deserved development in a new way. But this remains controlled by an extremely dependent economic system. A very few elites—primarily Indian, some Chinese, and others—control it. The Nepali market is essentially the Indian market. The production system is crumbling, and deindustrialization has been ongoing for many years. This has produced a particular corporate culture that dominates politics, media, intellectual life, and more. It is a system that fostered extraordinary dependence, out-migration, exploitation, and inequality, particularly between rural and urban areas. All of that came together in a moment when people just burst into action.
But the impact resulted not only from the protests. Other interests also infiltrated and pushed the movement further. That’s the current situation. Basically, it reflects the failure of the political regime to institutionalize its agenda, but it has also been pushed by geopolitical forces seeking to destabilize Nepal and secure a stronger footing in the country.
Nepal’s Youth Caught in a Triple Disjuncture
Nepal’s youth today confront what might be called a triple disjuncture: mass migration, precarious labor markets, and the expansion of the digital public sphere. How do these dynamics intersect to produce a new political subjectivity that resists both elite capture and authoritarian closure? In particular, how have structural forces such as economic inequality, chronic youth unemployment, and the dependence on migration shaped the political consciousness and mobilizing capacity of Gen Z in Nepal?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: Very good question, and this is exactly that conjuncture of multiple forces you mentioned that resulted in a particular type of economic precarity. Especially young people’s aspiration was to become economically successful, but the opportunities to do so were really decimated. But you cannot just blame the current political structure. You have to go back almost 30 years to understand what produced this. As soon as Nepal entered multi-party democracy in 1990, the government was forced to adopt an open market economy in such a way that the industrial sector basically collapsed in front of Indian and Chinese industrial and corporate power. That led to massive closures of national industries. The frustration from that also fueled the Maoist Revolution, which started in 1996. The Maoist movement, lasting for 10 years, led to massive out-migration from rural areas, while the open market economy that destroyed the national economy pushed people to migrate abroad.
So, Nepal lost two things: national productive capacity—the industrial base—and the labor force. That severely degraded national production. Over the last two and a half decades, this has produced massive unemployment, while national and international forces facilitated a process by which young people migrated to other countries. In effect, they wanted to solve the Maoist problem by exporting young people, so that they would not join the revolution. But then it became systematic: rural populations moved to urban areas, and from urban areas to other countries, primarily Gulf and Middle Eastern states, numbering in the millions. Nepal thus lost not only industrial capacity—in terms of organizing, owning, and mobilizing capital—but also massive labor power, which created a lack of farming in rural areas. In some places, more than 70% of land is uncultivated, which used to be farmed in the past, because there is no labor.
This kind of economic situation continues to create chronic problems for generating opportunities in the country. All of this has reinforced political patronage and historical feudalistic conditions within the party system. That, in turn, made young people extraordinarily frustrated. They were frustrated by the economic situation, frustrated by dependency, and frustrated because they could not realize their dream of being modern and advanced. At the same time, the political structure adopted a feudalistic culture in which young people could not find their space. All this is leading to deep frustration, and the danger is that it will create further problems, because there are no coherent responses. Sometimes I feel it could evolve into a kind of gang politics. I am worried, even though it has not yet reached that point. But if this kind of mob-based, violent politics continues, there is real danger. Yet it seems inevitable, because the political structure has not been able to manage, understand, and maintain its hegemonic order. In other words, this is a failure of elite hegemony.
Even though the elites created these conditions, they have also been unable to preserve the very hegemonic structure that favors them. As a result, ruptures have emerged. I would not call this a youth revolution—it is not. Rather, it forms part of a longer trajectory of revolutions. Every decade Nepal has seen movements—the democratic movement, the Maoist movement—and young people have always been at the center. But those earlier uprisings were politically led, whereas this one is somewhat different. Still, I would not call it a revolution, because it will not fundamentally alter the political structure that produced these conditions. Sometimes I describe it instead as a kind of development: a double situation in which the political structure generates upheaval, but the outcome also reinforces the same structure. It will not truly transform the system. That leaves youth aspirations blocked from finding another path. Judging from how events have unfolded so far, it will not reach a transformative point.
The Social Media Ban Was a Trigger, Not the Cause
The ban on social media is often cited as the immediate spark of revolt—yet should this be understood as a mere tactical blunder by Oli’s government, or rather as symptomatic of a deeper authoritarian reflex embedded within Nepal’s ruling elite?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: The social media ban… you have to look at it from two perspectives. One is the aspiration of young people and how embedded they are in the social media structure. But at the same time, you have to look at it from the perspective of a smaller country. These social media and multinational companies do not want to recognize, for example, Nepali sovereignty. They do not want to register; they do not want to pay taxes. Even social media companies—Twitter, Yik Yak—officially said that Nepal is a corrupt country, so they cannot register or be taxed. That undermines national pride, nationalism, and everything. We need to understand the positionality of a smaller country. So, people think they must register. Why not? If they registered in India, then they should register in Nepal; it’s the same—a similar sovereignty situation. That’s one aspect of it.
But at that moment, the youth protest against corruption and the demand for good governance was already planned, and social media was used to organize those movements. So yes, it fueled the process, but it was not really the cause. The social media ban did not trigger it. Similar bans had happened in the past as well. They banned TikTok, and TikTok came back, registered, and now pays taxes to the country. But these other companies do not want to do that. Still, there is a Nepali psyche and intellectual understanding that Nepal’s sovereign rights must be respected. Young people support that too, actually. But deeply embedded, long-simmering social frustration, lack of employment, lack of good governance, and systematic corruption—it’s not just the political class, they are part of it. It’s the totality of the system that mobilizes all kinds of power nexuses in building corruption. That is what led to this frustration, and that was the culminating point, rather than it really being about authoritarianism tied to the social media ban.
People haven’t really looked at this. They use the word authoritarianism because they want to make a political point, but in fact, Nepal had been trying to get these companies to register for many years, and that process started long ago. Legislation was passed with 100% support in parliament one year ago, and the government called on these companies regularly to respect the law and comply. I don’t think it was an authoritarian attitude that led to the social media ban. Rather, the ban triggered other frustrations—that’s how I would put it.
Nepo-Babies Symbolize a Feudal Political Structure Still Dominant in Nepal
The viral outrage against “nepo-babies” seems to reveal a moral economy of resentment against elite entitlement. To what extent did the digital spectacle of political heirs flaunting luxury lifestyles crystallize diffuse frustrations into a new form of class politics—one mediated by resentment, spectacle, and digital culture, and distinct from the agrarian or proletarian struggles of earlier eras?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: Right. This is a very fundamental part of it. The corrupt kind of system, this nepo-babies idea, is a good instrument to utilize—not only against politicians, but also other kinds of forma and everything. It really helps people understand how the feudal family structure mobilizes the political structure for its benefit. So, it’s real.
But at the same time, it is not really pervasive. Not every politician managed to make their kids that way. And the corruption in Nepal is actually maintained and regulated by a particular type of corporative capitalist—middlemen business structures that mobilize and consolidate power, creating nexuses. These nepo-babies are part of that; they are enrolled into those nexuses and act as mediators in negotiations through karopsana (patronage brokerage / political fixing in Nepalese) and everything.
So, in that sense, it’s a particular agenda in creating a certain kind of populism. “Nepo-babies” is a very easily sellable term. But there is also a reality: it symbolizes that the feudal political structure is still dominant in the country, and that really helps people to grasp it. However, there is a danger in this kind of new generation movement, because it is framed in generational rather than other forms of inequality. Class, gender, caste, and socialist structures are deeply embedded in South Asia and in Nepal. So, this generational framing risks undermining those other dimensions of inequality. That danger is emerging.
There are generational inequalities, yes, but the young generation in Nepal is often better off than the older generation, especially in rural areas. The subsistence farmers live very hard lives and are the ones doing the lowest-level jobs. By contrast, the young generation leading this movement lives better lives than many others. They are urban, educated, and from well-off families. They are not the everyday working people—those are the millions working abroad in the Middle East in factories.
My worry is that the inequality perpetuated in Nepal through pluralistic land structures and a pluralistic political and economic system requires deep class-based analysis, and this generational lens may obscure that. At the same time, there is an oligarchic attitude toward politics: “Okay, this is for me, next is my wife, then that.” This attitude is dominant. It’s not only in Nepal—it’s big in India, Bangladesh, and many other countries. The symptoms were already present in Nepal, too. This revolt has hit hard against that pattern and may disrupt it temporarily. But it will likely reconfigure within the elite structure, and regardless of which elites dominate, the elite-based political structure will continue unless there is massive restructuring of the economic system that maintains this power balance.
Without a national production system and without mobilizing substantial yields toward the national economy, this is not going to change. In Nepali, they call it Bicholia—basically brokers. It is a broker’s-rule political system. These brokers—traders, contractors, suppliers—are the ones who mobilize everything. Unless those structures are directly addressed and transformed, it will be difficult to imagine a different political and economic system emerging in Nepal or the region.
This also requires understanding at the regional level. It is not only Nepal—it is part of an open economic structure. The majority of traders are from India or other countries, with only local agents in Nepal, who manage the political structure from behind the curtain. One therefore needs to understand the local political dynamics and economic structures, but also their relation to regional systems. In that sense, I consider this a necessary, even natural, kind of revolt. But the optimism that it will lead to deeper restructuring of the country is, I think, very minimal.
Corruption in Nepal Is the Governing Logic of Elite Power
The municipality office in Inaruwa, Sunsari, lies heavily damaged after protesters targeted it during the nationwide demonstrations against corruption and the social media shutdown on September 9, 2025. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula
Corruption in Nepal is often framed as administrative weakness, but your work emphasizes its structural role in reproducing elite hegemony. How should we theorize corruption—not as deviation but as a governing logic—in post-monarchical Nepal? Do you see corruption in Nepal primarily as a symptom of weak institutions, or as an intentional system of elite reproduction and authoritarian consolidation?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: This is a great question. Corruption is deeply embedded, and I would say it mobilizes both kinds of structures. It reproduces elite dominance, and it’s one way of maintaining elite hegemony in the political-economic system. But it is also systematically introduced at every level of society and governance in such a way that it became a ladder for making political-economic progress, from the local to the national elites.
To understand corruption, we must also look at the massive development projects implemented over decades. Nepal was one of the priority countries for international—especially Western—actors to carry out such programs, along with international investments through banks, the World Bank, and others. Instead of focusing on national priorities, these actors pursued their petty geopolitical or other interests. They mobilized elites to implement their programs and, at every scale—from small to large—channeled resources so that they would have better access to contractors. They could harvest trees, collect sand, build roads, construct buildings, or procure everyday goods. In return, they would always provide some kind of commission—“okay, you do this, then I’ll offer you this.” These practices, sustained over decades, systematically developed an internal, informal institutional system that entrenched corruption in the country.
There are also checks and balances, of course. The public watched and pushed back—it was always there. But at the same time, even at the small municipal level, people, even minor officers, would not act without taking bribes. Over decades, corruption became normalized, and it took a long time for everyone to grasp the root causes. For me, corruption is a symptom of how the pluralistic political structure maintains itself, but it is also the result of the particular form of economic system introduced over the last 30 years—one that required sustaining political power structures through bribes and political payoffs. This allowed the larger corporate world to control the economic system and labor production, supplying laborers cheaply to other countries while selling whatever they wanted by shutting down Nepal’s national production system. Industries collapsed—they could not compete with others, or they were simply bought out.
So, corruption is not something that any politician can fix in Nepal. It requires a systematic overhaul—a restructuring at every level with the introduction of a national production system. Otherwise, it will remain deeply embedded in how the state functions every day, at every level. At the same time, there is widespread understanding among the public that corruption is a big problem and must be eliminated. Any slogan with an anti-corruption agenda will therefore gain strong political support from the public. But those who bring such agendas are themselves part of the same political structure; they are not separate from the economic and political system. For this reason, I do not see corruption disappearing soon, unless Nepal achieves economic independence and builds a self-reliant economic structure—which has now been overtaken by the corporate world and is no longer under Nepal’s control.
Populist Agendas in Nepal Will Not Dismantle the Elite Structure
In your work on ethnic identity politics, you demonstrate how elites instrumentalize social divisions to consolidate authority. Do you see a similar risk with today’s anti-nepotism and anti-corruption discourses—that they could be co-opted by authoritarian populists who reframe them as projects of “purification,” while ultimately reproducing exclusionary politics and elite dominance?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: The answer is yes. The danger of populism is that populist agendas have always been propagated to maintain the elite structure. For me, I would consider this almost as a fight between elites. There is no rural poor people’s mobilization, and real thinking toward an egalitarian political structure is not there. So, populism in South Asia—like Hindu nationalism in India, the recent uprising in Bangladesh, similar things in Myanmar, with some exceptions in Sri Lanka, and now in many other places—has taken a very different route. There are some people-centric agendas, but most of the time in the South Asian context, it looks cultural or political, but it ultimately serves elite interests.
In Nepal, too, the populist mobilization around anti-corruption, youth inclusion, and similar issues is important, as in India. But it will not dismantle the elite structure that has dominated for a long period of time. So, my fear is that there was huge damage under this mobilization this time. Nepal lost billions of dollars and many people. It’s a huge damage. But what will it result in? It will not move outside the elitist structure already in place in Nepal.
Nepal Faces More Instability
The unprecedented state violence of September 2025 raises questions about authoritarian consolidation. Should we interpret the crackdown as a desperate last stand of a collapsing elite order, or as evidence of a longer trajectory in which coercion is becoming normalized within Nepal’s democratic institutions?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: I would say it’s a degradation of the elite structure, in one sense, which has created these ruptures—and the ruptures are already there. It’s a continuous process along this path, which is an interesting thing. Politics is propagated under these ruptures. But it will also create space for another similar elite-based structure. That’s my fear, and I already see it happening.
So yes, it is a pillar within the elite structure that was maintained through a particular type of political party system. But these political party systems also became vulnerable to external pressure and influence. They were always managed by external forces.
Truly national interest and genuine national decision-making haven’t happened on either side—the rebuilding side or the elite side. Therefore, once mobilized, the elite structure continues to be reproduced. I do not imagine that the elitist structure will go away—that is not a possibility. But the current conjuncture of political elites, especially an older generation of political leaders, is now losing ground and space quite drastically. The danger, however, is that those spaces will be filled in ways that probably create even more instability in the country.
My sense is that Nepal will go through more political instability, and that will harm the region more broadly. That harm may in fact serve the interests of some geopolitical forces, because if the political structure is unstable, they can more easily insert their interests. That is the fate of smaller countries in the Global South in particular.
Without Economic Reform, Nepal Risks Mass Youth Exodus
A Nepali farmer at work in a rural field during the monsoon season. As the rains arrive, farmers across Nepal become busy in their fields, though most still rely on traditional farming techniques. Photo: Shishir Gautam.
Your ethnographic work on the Maoist revolution highlights how rural communities once generated alternative political imaginaries. To what extent do you see continuities—or disjunctures—between those insurgent subjectivities and the digitally mediated agency of Gen Z?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: That’s a very good one. There are some continuities in the sense that Nepali people have always sought alternative imaginaries, but there is also a complete disjuncture between the current generation and the past. The current generation does not really know the rural dynamics. They do not understand the moral economic system. They have no clue about present politics.
So the ideas of alternative imagination are almost opposite. Rural imaginaries were more sober, rooted in production and autonomy, while today’s are more connected to modern lifestyles and jobs, moving away from the traditional economic system. Both are alternative imaginations, but what they are looking for is different.
If they could find some kind of synergy, it could lead to real change in the country. But that synergy requires political negotiation and organizing—and that is not going to happen. Primarily, rural areas are heavily influenced by the traditional structures of political parties, while the urban youth are deeply alienated from them. So, the negotiation between the two will likely not happen anytime soon.
That unnegotiated gray space is where all kinds of interests will grow—and that is the danger for Nepali youth, their aspirations, and their inspiration. I would not be surprised if, in the next few years, out-migration of young people from the country increases massively. Without correcting the economic structure, there will not be more jobs. There will not be much of anything. Simply changing the government will not do it, because deeper structural changes are required.
But young people now have big hopes, and those hopes may soon turn to frustration. Either they will leave the country, or Nepal will face further instability and imbalance. So, the future scenario for the next few years looks extraordinarily volatile.
From Red Revolution to Red Neoliberalism
Given the Maoists’ descent into corruption and clientelism, can their revolutionary legacy still serve as a democratic resource for the present, or has it become a cautionary tale of how emancipatory struggles are absorbed into elite circulation?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: This is a wonderful question, because the kind of feudalism and elite-controlled politics was propagated by the Maoists themselves. They became the victims of elitism within their own movement. Yes, they challenged the political conjuncture and elitism of that time, but only to reintroduce their own. So, I would not consider that the old Maoists, in the structures they proposed, were ever going to be non-elitist or truly helpful.
The frustration that young people are expressing today also comes directly from the Maoists. When they entered peaceful politics and the new constitution was introduced, the Maoists became the only party in the country that was always in government—sometimes in coalition with one party, sometimes with another—but their performance was the most miserable.
It is very important to note that while the Maoists had an interesting political vision for the country, they had no vision for the economy. They became victims of the open economic structure, which I call red neoliberalism. They adopted neoliberal policies in such a way that they dismantled national production capacity, especially in industry, and alienated young people. They could not really understand this dynamic, became part of it, and therefore contributed directly to the dissatisfaction we see today.
Young people today have learned some lessons from that history, but they see no real connection to the Maoists’ promises, because they view the Maoists themselves as the problem. The Maoists destabilized rural areas, triggered mass out-migration, and destroyed national productive capacity. So, today’s youth frustration is deeply tied to what the Maoists promised versus what they delivered. And what they delivered was further dependency, out-migration, bad governance, and overall decline.
Crude Nationalism Cannot Satisfy Young People’s Aspirations
Thousands joined a joint morning procession organized by the CPN-UML and Nepali Congress district committees in Inaruwa Bazaar on September 19, 2025, to mark Constitution Day. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula.
Finally, do you see in Nepal’s youth movement the embryonic forms of what might be called a post-elitist or post-authoritarian democracy—an order rooted not in patronage or coercion but in new modes of participatory and inclusive politics?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: I do not see that happening right away. But this has raised a lot of questions for the population, the political elites themselves, and others. The country will suffer more through various challenges, but this is the beginning of a different kind of political imagination that is emerging. Probably it will not find success quickly.
This particular episode may do more harm than good. Looking at the last couple of weeks, I can see it in the way they are now appointing ministers, the way they are appointing political elites back into power, and the way they use military force to enforce their agenda—all of which reflect an extraordinarily feudalistic structure in the country.
Given this, the current moment will not do much to change elite hegemony in Nepal. But no matter what happens, young people’s frustration is directed against elitism. What they are seeking in the future is post-elite—some kind of egalitarian economic and political system. That aspiration is a positive sign toward new possibilities. But this episode alone will not do much other than reintroduce the same elitist structure.
Primarily, young people are not questioning the economic structure. They are not really grasping how the dependent economic system in the country continues to produce an elite-controlled political system. This is similar to Bangladesh, where a major revolt not long ago did little to address the country’s economic situation. A similar pattern is emerging in India, too. Youth-led frustration will continue across South Asia—it will not stop in Nepal. I see big brewing parties emerging in India, which is a major hot spot. I am not sure when it will erupt or in what form, but for decades—almost 70, 80, 100 years—the economic feudalistic structure has not been resolved. I see something coming.
Even though India uses neighboring political instability to its advantage, crude nationalism alone will not satisfy the aspirations of young people, especially amid growing economic inequality. Regional change will happen only if something major occurs in other countries, especially in India and beyond. Still, this is a good symptom: unless elites create space for young people—and some form of inclusive system, even if not fully post-elite—these tensions will persist, not only in Nepal but across the region, for decades to come.
In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Mara Nogueira (Birkbeck, University of London) argues that Brazil’s decision to convict Jair Bolsonaro for plotting a coup marks a turning point in democratic accountability. “By convicting Bolsonaro, we are doing what the US should have done with Trump and moving in the right direction toward democracy,” she says. Rejecting claims of judicial overreach, Dr. Nogueira stresses: “The Supreme Court is not overstepping but rather fulfilling its role.” She welcomes the unprecedented prosecution of both civil and military senior officers since the 1964–85 dictatorship, while warning that far-right actors are already mobilizing “judicial dictatorship” narratives. For her, the trial sends a crucial signal: “It’s not acceptable to plan a coup d’état—and if you do so, you will face charges.”
The conviction of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro to 27 years in prison for plotting a coup has generated both domestic turbulence and international controversy. While his lawyers denounce the ruling as politically motivated, and allies abroad echo claims of persecution, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF) has framed the case as a necessary step to defend democracy against authoritarian threats. Against this backdrop, Dr. Mara Nogueira, Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences at Birkbeck, University of London, reflects on the political and institutional meaning of Bolsonaro’s trial in an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).
Dr. Nogueira underscores that the trial signals democratic resilience rather than overreach: “By convicting Bolsonaro, we are doing what the US should have done with Trump and moving in the right direction toward democracy.” She contrasts Brazil’s approach to accountability with the United States, where Trump has avoided similar consequences: “You had the foot soldiers of the Capitol invasion going to jail, while Trump not only remained free but was also allowed to run for president and become president again.”
In her view, the STF has not exceeded its mandate but fulfilled it: “I think the evidence that Bolsonaro and his conspirators attempted a coup d’état is hard to ignore, so when a crime like that is committed, it needs to be punished. The Supreme Court is not overstepping but rather fulfilling its role.” Importantly, she welcomes the fact that not only Bolsonaro, but also senior officers are facing accountability for the first time since the 1964–85 military dictatorship. “Perhaps Brazil would have had a different history if that had been done sooner,” she notes.
At the same time, Dr. Nogueira remains cautious. She observes that far-right actors are already mobilizing the “judicial dictatorship” narrative: “What they want in this case, however, is impunity. The revenge is already underway, with Congress now voting to expand its protection against legal prosecution.” She also highlights the fragility of Brazilian democracy, pointing to Bolsonaro’s 2018 victory and the January 8, 2023, attack as symptoms of unresolved cleavages. Yet she stresses that the conviction sends a crucial signal: “It does not inoculate against authoritarian relapse, but it does send a message that it’s not acceptable to plan a coup d’état, and if you do so, you will face charges.”
For Dr. Nogueira, Bolsonaro’s conviction represents both accountability and warning. Whether it deepens polarization or strengthens democratic institutions will depend on how political actors and society interpret this landmark moment.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Mara Nogueira, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
Dissent Shows Democracy at Work, Not Dictatorship
Supporters of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro protest Supreme Court actions in his trial on Paulista Avenue, São Paulo, Brazil, August 3, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.
Dr. Mara Nogueira, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you interpret Justice Luiz Fux’s lone vote to absolve Bolsonaro on jurisdictional and evidentiary grounds—arguing lack of proof, improper venue, and unmanageable case files—within Brazil’s broader debates on lawfare? Even as a majority of Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF) has now convicted Bolsonaro for leading a “criminal organisation” to plot a coup, could Fux’s reasoning still provide legal ammunition for appeals, annulment claims, or retrial efforts?
Dr. Mara Nogueira: For anyone following the trial closely, Fux’s vote was not a surprise, since he had been signaling this divergence with the reporting judge for a while. That said, his vote was surprising given his prior positions in the trial of the participants in the invasion of Congress on January 8, 2023, and his overall trajectory in the Supreme Court. So, it was unexpected when considered in light of his own trajectory rather than what was anticipated of him in this trial.
I think he attempted to give a technical veneer to an 11-hour vote that was eminently political. His judgment essentially shifted depending on who was being accused. He was clearly speaking to a wider audience rather than to his peers. But I don’t see his lone vote as an issue; on the contrary, in a democracy with functioning institutions, dissent is part of the process.
The fact that Fux was able to voice his dissent, contrary to what the far right argues, shows that there isn’t a dictatorship in Brazil. In a dictatorship, he wouldn’t be allowed to dissent or he would have faced persecution for doing so. Neither of those things happened. Instead, he is facing criticism from part of the public and being celebrated by others, which is not abnormal in any sense.
But I don’t think his vote changes anything. At the end of the day, Bolsonaro and his co-conspirators were convicted, and I believe, rightly so. In a highly politicized trial such as this, of course, Bolsonaro’s supporters will seize on anything to twist the facts and argue for his innocence. They will push as far as they can, but in the current context, I don’t see how this trial could be overturned, even if it went to the plenary.
That said, a future annulment would obviously depend on how the political landscape in Brazil evolves in the coming years, and it’s very hard to predict, in my opinion. The Supreme Court is not isolated from the broader political climate, and changes in its composition under, for instance, a future far-right government could have consequences. We only need to look at the US to see what that might look like. Still, I think that by convicting Bolsonaro, we are doing what the US should have done with Trump and moving in the right direction toward democracy.
Convicting Bolsonaro and the Military Officers Shows Institutions are at Work
With the STF asserting unprecedented authority—convicting a former president and top generals, placing Bolsonaro under house arrest, and wading into disinformation inquiries—does this expanded role bolster democratic resilience, or risk normalizing states of exception that revanchist actors can exploit as evidence of “judicial dictatorship”?
Dr. Mara Nogueira: As I already mentioned, by looking at the US, you can see the consequences of not prosecuting an attempted coup d’état. The US now has a president with unprecedented authority, backed by a Congress that is essentially on his side, and a very politically aligned Supreme Court. So, you can ask, where are the checks and balances in the US right now? Of course, I’m not an expert in American politics, but the current state of affairs seems to imply that the US president can do as he pleases, including attempts to influence judicial proceedings in a foreign country, as he is trying to do in Brazil.
I think the evidence that Bolsonaro and his conspirators attempted a coup d’état is hard to ignore, so when a crime like that is committed, it needs to be punished. The Supreme Court is not overstepping but rather fulfilling its role. And I see it positively that not only a former president but also the military are, for the first time in Brazil’s history, being convicted for attempting to abolish the democratic rule of law. Perhaps Brazil would have had a different history if that had been done sooner.
But as I said previously, the far right will attempt to exploit what happened to paint a picture that we live in, as you say, a judicial dictatorship. What they want in this case, however, is impunity. The revenge is already underway, with Congress now voting to expand its protection against legal prosecution, for instance. There is also ongoing discussion about a bill aimed at the participants of January 8. This bill is nicknamed the Amnesty Bill, though it should be called, in my opinion, the Impunity Bill, because what Congress is trying to do is to reinterpret the notion of amnesty to appease a political group and perhaps set, what I believe, would be a very dangerous precedent.
This idea that Fux mentioned in his speech—that the January 8 participants were a disorganized or unruly mob—is preposterous and ignores the broader context in which the invasion of Congress occurred. Yes, they were unable to overthrow the state, thank God, but they failed because the rest of the plot didn’t work out, and their leader, Bolsonaro, knowing the plan had failed, fled to the US.
All that said, I’m not a particularly optimistic person, and I am not a big fan of the kind of worship the Supreme Court judges are receiving these days, but in this instance, I think they are performing their duty, which is to safeguard the democratic rule of law in the country. A dictatorship would imply the suppression of other powers and an authoritarian ruler, and this is not what’s happening in Brazil right now. Only those living in far-right bubbles will interpret the context in that way.
No Crisis Between Government and Military Despite Convictions
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro during 74th Anniversary of Parachutist Infantry Battalion held at Military Village in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on November 23, 2019. Photo: Celso Pupo
The conviction encompassed senior military officers for the first time since the 1964–85 dictatorship. How does this reshape Brazil’s civil–military relations, especially in a context where the armed forces remain politically salient and segments of society view them as guarantors of order?
Dr. Mara Nogueira: That’s quite an interesting point. Historically, the military has been behind all the successful coups in Brazil, and there have been several. So, as I already mentioned, I see it positively that after so many other instances, the military is finally facing legal consequences for its actions.
I’ve been following the media coverage of the trial very closely, and I don’t think, at least from my perspective, that this has been a major point of discussion. As far as I can tell, there is no crisis at the moment between the government and the military, or between the Supreme Court and the military, and perhaps that has to do with the surprising fact that the military played an important role in preventing this particular coup d’état from succeeding.
Just one of the military commanders, Almir Garnier Santos, who was the commander of the Navy under Bolsonaro, was convicted. Out of the three military commanders, he was the only one who went along with the plan. For many analysts, the coup failed because it didn’t have the support of the Army and Air Force commanders, who refused to join the plot.
Of course, they could have done more than just say no and could have denounced the coup, which would have given even more credibility to the trial. Still, their role in this case was ultimately positive, and that may help explain why the coup didn’t succeed, and also why the military has not been the main focus of media coverage or public discussion.
Brazil’s Democracy Is Fragile—But Functioning
As school curricula, memorials, and policing doctrines institutionalize January 8, 2023, how do these “memory practices” shape collective political identities? Do they inoculate against authoritarian relapse, or entrench binary cleavages that revanchist actors can instrumentalize?
Dr. Mara Nogueira: I think it’s still very soon to say how this particular event will be narrated in Brazilian history. That’s yet to be seen. But if you take, for instance, the 1964 military coup, the military, to this day, celebrate the date as the day of the revolution. They call it the revolution rather than the military coup. Bolsonaro himself has praised prominent members of the military dictatorship, such as Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, who was notorious for leading torture and repression during this period.
The dominant view of 1964 today, however, is that it was a coup d’état that installed a violent dictatorship in this country, which ended, in fact, quite recently—1985, as you say. It’s not the only view, but it is the one that students, for instance, will learn about in school.
As I said, democracy in Brazil is still young, and one might say it remains quite fragile. I see Bolsonaro’s victory in 2018, despite his authoritarian rhetoric, as a sign of that fragility. The fact that he and his core conspirators felt emboldened enough to attempt a coup also shows how fragile democracy is. But I don’t see his conviction as a demonstration of this fragility. On the contrary, in this instance, I see it as a sign that democratic institutions are working despite that fragility.
I am, like many other social scientists and observers, concerned with the political cleavages in Brazil, but I don’t think this is unique to Brazil right now. The far right is on the rise globally, and one could ask, for instance, whether January 8 in Brazil would have happened if the Capitol invasion hadn’t occurred in the US, or if the real leaders of the Capitol invasion had been punished. One could also ask what would have happened if Trump had been the US president in 2023.
I think punishment in Brazil’s case does not, as you say, inoculate against authoritarian relapse, but it does send a message that it’s not acceptable to plan a coup d’état, and that if you do so, you will face charges. That’s a good message for the country to be showing the world right now.
Tarcísio de Freitas Seeks to Inherit Bolsonaro’s Capital
São Paulo Governor Tarcísio de Freitas attends a pro-amnesty demonstration for former President Jair Bolsonaro in Copacabana, Rio de Janeiro, on March 16, 2025. Photo: Saulo Angelo.
Building on your work on “entitled anger,” how is middle-class resentment mobilized around the trial—particularly in claims that the STF has usurped sovereignty and thwarted the popular will?
Dr. Mara Nogueira: My work on revanchist populism and entitled anger is about the rise of far-right populism globally, and particularly in the Global South. Revanchist populism is a term that I coined with my colleague Ryan Centner. And what we are doing with this is describing what we see as a turn in political imaginations towards the retaking of the nation in line with a powerful discourse of “the people” and righteousness. And we see this mapping onto populations who nostalgically sense they have lost what was rightfully, morally theirs, which might be regained by applying an angry sense of entitlement to an alternative and often authoritarian exercise of government.
In this context, the Brazilian middle class has been particularly described as resentful and an important support base for the far right. But I don’t think alone middle-class resentment can explain recent political cleavages in Brazil. Going back to your question more specifically, as I already mentioned, of course, the Supreme Court decision will be mobilized by the far right to fuel particular understandings of the current political situation in Brazil. There is a group of die-hard Bolsonaro supporters that will buy into any narrative that the far-right leaders produce. But I don’t think the future of Brazilian politics depends on this particular group, but more on the voters who are moderate and will swing their vote depending on a broader understanding of the situation.
It’s clear from his more recent speeches that the current São Paulo governor, Tarcísio de Freitas, is trying to position himself as the heir of Bolsonaro’s political capital and the natural candidate of the far right in the next presidential election. Some of Bolsonaro’s electorate will naturally transfer to whoever he decides to support, and that is significant, but not enough to win the next election. We have to remember that Bolsonaro himself lost the last election to Lula—by a small margin, of course—but he still lost. So, what I think is under dispute is the interpretation of current events by this broader population, who are not loyal to either Lula or Bolsonaro.
And it’s interesting that you touch on sovereignty, because it’s a very hot topic in Brazil at the moment—not because of the Supreme Court decision, but because of Trump’s attempt to interfere with the judicial process in Brazil. Lula’s popularity has recently increased slightly because he was gifted this position of defender of Brazil’s sovereignty in response to Eduardo Bolsonaro’s lobbying that led Trump to raise tariffs on Brazilian products to 50%. So, in this context, it’s difficult for the far right to play the sovereignty card while conspiring with Trump to penalize Brazil’s economy.
Urban Poor in Brazil’s Peripheries Hold the Swing Vote
What spatial patterns (capitals vs. peripheries; South/Southeast vs. North/Northeast) do you observe in post-verdict mobilizations, and how do they map onto Brazil’s longer histories of regional inequality and uneven development?
Dr. Mara Nogueira: I don’t have the data to comment specifically on the geography of how people are reacting to the trial, but if we look at Bolsonaro’s 2018 election, when he was victorious, we can find some evidence of the geographies of far-right voters and supporters in Brazil. The work of Matthew Richmond and Lisa McKenna, colleagues of mine, examined the geography of the votes in 2018.
The interesting thing here is that, unlike in the US, or in the case of the UK and Brexit, the geography of the vote in Brazil is not the traditional urban versus rural pattern. What their work pointed out is that the votes of the urban poor have been decisive in the last elections in Brazil. In particular, the votes of the urban poor in the peripheries of big cities have been swinging between the left and the right throughout the years. The explanation for this has to do with major changes in Brazilian society—from the growth of evangelical church influence to enduring criminality, which affects the urban poor more prominently, for instance.
In my own work, I have focused on changes in the global labor market and how they also play a role in the new political landscape that breeds the far right. Again, if you think of the case of the US and the UK, you see deindustrialization and the loss of stable jobs alongside austerity and neoliberalism, which have impoverished particular groups. Immigration, in these cases, has then been used as the far-right scapegoat to channel this entitled anger into votes.
In the case of Brazil, we have historically had a very stratified labor market with widespread precarity, and this has also grown as a consequence of neoliberalism and deindustrialization. But the traditional left in Brazil grew out of industrial trade unionism, and now there is this huge population of workers outside formal wage relations who don’t feel represented by these traditional left-wing narratives. So, when you think about geography, these spatial inequalities interact with wider social and economic dynamics, and my point is that if progressive politics doesn’t find ways to speak to this new workforce, far-right narratives offering simple solutions to complex problems can fill this gap.
With Bolsonaro confined to house arrest and restricted from social media, how has the street/platform nexus of contention shifted—especially regarding plazas, evangelical pulpits, WhatsApp/Telegram ecosystems, and diaspora mobilization in the US?
Dr. Mara Nogueira: All the arenas you mentioned have long been part of the political landscape in Brazil, and the far right has been very effective at capitalizing on social media, perhaps because their extreme language and rhetoric are well suited to generating engagement—the very thing that drives these platforms. I don’t see this scenario changing with Bolsonaro’s arrest. The main question at the moment, as I already said, is who will inherit Bolsonaro’s political capital and represent this far-right group in the next election.
The Left Must Speak to Precarious Workers or Risk Losing Them to the Far Right
Brazilia’s Luiz Inácio Lula is seen during the 2022 election campaign in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on October 20, 2022. Photo: Aline Alcantara.
How does the trial intersect with the politics of informal work and the gig economy? Are precarious workers—street vendors, delivery app couriers—recalibrating their partisan attachments in light of the conviction, or holding steady?
Dr. Mara Nogueira: Again, I think it’s very soon to say how particular groups of workers are reacting to the trial. We don’t have the data. But as I already mentioned, this mass of precarious workers that characterizes Brazil’s economy plays a key role in current affairs. Of course, they are more than workers, and they have other affiliations that might also impact their political behavior, but the point that I have been trying to make in my own work is that this group feels underrepresented in political debates.
The left tends to view informality solely as an issue of precarity and exploitation, and its responses to the growing changes in the experience of work have been inadequate. In my research, I focus on street vendors who have been criminalized by local governments and feel attacked by exclusionary policies that constrain their ability to work on the streets and earn a livelihood. The left’s response has been to insist on wage work and development as solutions that will eventually incorporate everyone into the regular labor market, but workers are not necessarily on board with that. People’s desires for autonomy and flexibility are often interpreted negatively, in this context, as signs that these workers have been indoctrinated by neoliberalism.
What we need to understand is that for a huge proportion of people in Brazil, wage work was historically either unattainable or represented a precarious inclusion through low-paying jobs, where people had to endure excessive hours and, more often than not, harassment and humiliation. For many, the far-right promise of disruption feels like a real hope for change. Globally, the far right has succeeded in large part because it taps into real suffering and mobilizes genuine frustration by offering the hope of disruption.
Moreover, in some ways, the left has become a conservative political force, protecting abstract values that do not necessarily resonate with people’s everyday struggles. The new realities of the labor market and of society at large demand bolder thinking and out-of-the-box policies that can address the challenges of people’s lived realities. For instance, Zohran Mamdani’s political platform for the New York City mayoral election is a good representation of what I’m talking about. In Belo Horizonte, Brazil, where I do most of my research, there is a bill up for a vote to implement free bus fare, which is also very interesting. So, there are some promising developments, and there is a progressive way out of this tough political landscape that we are living through.
Brazil’s 2026 Race Has Already Begun
Within Bolsonaro’s coalition, how are key pillars—evangelical leaders, police unions, agribusiness lobbies, military clubs—reframing their narratives after the verdict? What does this suggest about the durability or the recomposition of his revanchist base?
Dr. Mara Nogueira: It’s an interesting question. One day after Bolsonaro’s conviction, the Folha de São Paulo, one of Brazil’s most important newspapers, ran a headline on the twin deficit in Brazil and the dangers of Lula’s third mandate for the economy. What happened, essentially, is that Bolsonaro had become an issue, and his conviction was applauded by the major media because they wanted him out of the presidential race. But the big players you mentioned also don’t want a fourth Lula mandate.
In the lead-up to the 2022 election, there was an attempt by the major media to create the idea of a third way. Some had hoped, for instance, that João Doria, the former governor of São Paulo, or even Luciano Huck, a famous TV presenter in Brazil, would be presidential candidates to represent this third way and overcome Brazil’s polarization. But that didn’t happen, and I do not see it happening in 2026 either.
What I think will happen is a repositioning of political support. Tarcísio de Freitas, the current governor of São Paulo, seems to be the natural choice to replace Bolsonaro as Lula’s main opposition in this polarized economic and political landscape. But he will face a very difficult task in his campaign: essentially paying homage to Bolsonaro and capitalizing on his support, while at the same time trying to present himself as a more moderate and market-friendly politician. It will be a hard act for him to pull off.
How successful he is will also depend on what happens in Brazil between now and the election. There is already a sense that the presidential race has begun, and PT, Lula’s party, is currently treating Tarcísio as the main opposition.
Fux’s Vote Echoed the US Pattern of Punishing Followers but Acquitting Leaders
Supporters of Brazil’s former President (2019–2022) Jair Bolsonaro hold signs during a demonstration in São Paulo, Brazil, on September 7, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.
Do you observe unequal “graduations” of culpability—between January 8 “foot soldiers” and political principals—that echo Brazil’s broader selective enforcement of law (e.g., in housing or labor), thereby reinforcing perceptions of institutional bias?
Dr. Mara Nogueira: I don’t think so. I keep going back to the US, but I think it’s a useful parallel. That happened in the US: as you say, the foot soldiers of the Capitol invasion went to jail, while Trump not only remained free but was also allowed to run for president and become president again. If there is any echo of that in Brazil, it’s in Fux’s vote. As I said in the beginning, he voted for culpability for the January invaders but acquitted Bolsonaro, so his vote reflects a bit of that. But the Supreme Court decision has been coherent in the sense of condemning both the foot soldiers and what they perceive to be the leaders of this movement.
Lastly, Bolsonaro’s defenses—claims of witch-hunts, persecution, procedural overload—resonate with Trumpist repertoires. Where do Brazilian specificities (evangelical media ecosystems, military memory, police syndicates) create distinct discursive frames?
Dr. Mara Nogueira: In terms of the rhetoric, Bolsonaro’s entire act is very much aligned with Trump’s, so I don’t see much difference there. But of course, the content and the way he speaks to his political base are, as you say, shaped by Brazilian specificities, particularly the conservatism of his supporters. The differences between Brazil and the US have more to do with the essentially different composition of the two societies—social, economic, cultural, and, as we already discussed, geographical—and how Brazil differs from the US.
In terms of discursive frames, however, there is a kind of right-wing rhetoric that is common to different political leaders within this spectrum, modulated to speak to particular groups of supporters shaped by their culture and, in the case of Brazil, by religious positions within society.
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Henri Barkey—born in Turkey and one of the leading US experts on Middle East politics—warns that Turkey has crossed a decisive threshold under President Erdogan. “Turkey has now become a full-blown authoritarian system,” he stated, arguing that Erdogan has removed the “competitive” element from competitive authoritarianism by subordinating the judiciary, jailing rivals, and even deciding opposition party leadership. While repression deepens, Professor Barkey sees a paradox: “The system is becoming more authoritarian, but society may be resisting much more than we realize.” He highlights youth-led mobilization, fears over arrested Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu’s popularity, and Europe’s limited leverage, concluding that Erdogan’s overreach may ultimately galvanize opposition forces.
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Henri Barkey, a leading scholar of Middle East politics who was born in Turkey, delivered a stark assessment of the country’s current trajectory under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. “Turkey has now become a full-blown authoritarian system,” Professor Barkey stated, emphasizing that the transition from “competitive authoritarianism” to outright authoritarian rule marks a dangerous turning point.
Professor Barkey—Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and holder of the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Chair in International Relations at Lehigh University—has long studied Turkey’s political development. He previously directed the Middle East Center at the Wilson Center and served on the US State Department Policy Planning Staff during the Clinton administration.
Professor Barkey situated Erdogan’s consolidation of power within a broader historical and political context. Turkey’s modern history, he observed, has been marked by cycles of democratic openings and authoritarian retrenchment. Yet, despite repeated interruptions—from military coups to autocratic turns—“the Turkish public, by and large, has adapted and adopted a sense of democratic culture.” The resilience of ordinary citizens, he noted, remains a crucial counterweight to authoritarian encroachment.
At the heart of Professor Barkey’s argument is Erdogan’s dismantling of institutional safeguards. “He is turning Turkey into a complete authoritarian system because he controls the judiciary, and judges and prosecutors essentially do whatever he wants them to do,” Professor Barkey explained. Recent episodes—politically motivated trials, the dismissal of opposition leaders, and the manipulation of party leadership contests—demonstrate, in his view, the collapse of even the minimal competition that previously characterized Turkey’s hybrid regime. “In other words, Erdogan is now deciding who will lead the main opposition party.”
This tightening grip, however, is not without risk. Professor Barkey underscored a paradox: “There’s a kind of dialectic here: the system is becoming more authoritarian, but society may be resisting much more than we realize.” Millions of citizens, particularly the younger generations who have never known a Turkey without Erdogan, have mobilized in protests, demanding change. Professor Barkey noted that such resistance is difficult to gauge because “people are afraid to speak out” and reporting is restricted, but he insisted that “at some point, this is going to break.”
Erdogan’s own fear of rivals, especially Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, reflects this tension. Professor Barkey argued that the regime’s extraordinary measures to sideline Imamoglu—ranging from imprisonment to retroactive annulment of his university degree—offer “the clearest demonstration that he’s terrified.”
Professor Barkey also highlighted the role of external actors in shaping Erdogan’s room for maneuver. In his view, former US President Donald Trump “doesn’t believe in democracy” and effectively gave Erdogan “carte blanche” at home by refusing to criticize his repression. Europe, for its part, remains uneasy with Erdogan’s authoritarian aims and worried about migration pressures, but Professor Barkey noted that Erdogan feels confident he can “withstand European pressure” while focusing on demolishing the opposition. Ultimately, the combination of a permissive US stance under Trump and Europe’s limited leverage has reinforced Erdogan’s sense of impunity.
Ultimately, Professor Barkey’s analysis suggests both danger and opportunity: the danger of entrenched authoritarianism, but also the possibility that Erdogan’s overreach may galvanize opposition forces. As he concluded, “Authoritarian leaders always make mistakes… and I think Erdogan is already making them.”
Professor Henri Barkey is an Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and holder of the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Chair in International Relations at Lehigh University.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Henri Barkey, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
Erdogan Realizes He’s Weak: People Are Fed Up and Want Change
Professor Henri Barkey, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Turkish President Erdogan has long relied on a blend of populist narratives and authoritarian tactics to consolidate power. Given the backlash over Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu’s imprisonment, the use of lawfare through corruption investigations, the appointment of trustees to CHP-led administrations, and the wave of nationwide anti-government protests, do you believe this strategy is now undermining rather than sustaining his authority? Could this moment mark a potential inflection point for his populist-authoritarian model?
Professor Henri Barkey: It’s interesting you say that, because I actually had a piece published in Foreign Affairs Online where I basically argued very strongly that Erdogan had made a terrible mistake by imprisoning the mayor of Istanbul, and I thought this was the end of Erdogan. Imamoglu is still in jail, and Erdogan is still the president, and he has gone ahead and imprisoned a lot more people—journalists and other members of the opposition party—and he is also trying to get rid of the leadership of the opposition party.
But to me, all of these are indicators that he realizes, after 23 years in power, that people don’t want him anymore. He has actually lost public support, and he has to resort to these incredible machinations to stay in power. In other words, he realizes that if there were elections any time now, he would not be re-elected, and his party would lose. In fact, in the last municipal elections in 2024, the main opposition party came in comfortably—comfortably for Turkey—as number one, and his party came in second.
What is going on today in Turkey is that Erdogan realizes he’s weak. He has support—it’s not that he doesn’t have support—but of course, he has the state machine, which he can always mobilize to get anything he wants done. However, for him, it must be very difficult to accept that he, who used to be genuinely popular in Turkey and who won elections genuinely, is now losing support. People are fed up. People want change. And it’s natural.
Imagine if you are 25, or maybe even 30 years old. All your conscious years have passed under one leader. People want change. So, it’s partially psychological, but partially also, of course, due to his responsibility for what’s going on in Turkey. The economy is not doing well. Inflation is high. He made terrible mistakes. And naturally, people want change.
The System Is Becoming More Authoritarian, but Society May Be Resisting
In your writings, you describe Erdogan’s evolution from a reformist leader promising EU-style democratization to a populist-authoritarian consolidating near-total power. How has this transformation shaped Turkey’s political trajectory and institutional resilience over the past two decades?
Professor Henri Barkey: Turkey—if you look at its modern history from World War II onwards—has experienced many different variations over the past 80 years. There have been democratic governments, military coups, and repeated interruptions in its political system. But what strikes me is that the Turkish public, by and large, has adapted and adopted a sense of democratic culture. Not perfect, not by any stretch of the imagination, but it exists. The Turkish public has a stake in elections and in the freedom to say what they want and to act as they wish.
Of course, there have been authoritarian periods—Turkey is going through one now—but you still see a certain resilience. The fact that 15 million people, after Istanbul Mayor Imamoglu was arrested, signed a petition to have him declared the candidate of the main opposition party is an incredible demonstration of people’s stake in the democratic system.
So, what’s happening is very interesting. On the one hand, underneath, there is this democratic culture. Again, I don’t want to exaggerate—it’s not perfect. But whose democratic system is perfect these days? Everything exists on a scale. What has happened in Turkey, however, is that Erdogan has essentially transformed the country into a, quote-unquote, “competitive authoritarian” system. Elections still take place, outcomes are largely determined, but there remains some element of competition. Certain offices may be won by the opposition, and the opposition can still win seats in Parliament, and so on.
But now he’s actually taking the competitive part out of competitive authoritarianism and eliminating it altogether. He is turning Turkey into a complete authoritarian system because he controls the judiciary, and judges and prosecutors essentially do whatever he wants them to do. We have seen people sent to jail for no reason whatsoever—simply because he doesn’t like them. Authorities have claimed that the main opposition party engaged in questionable practices in its primaries or conventions, and suddenly the justice system decides that leaders who were elected a few years ago should no longer hold their positions, and someone else should replace them. In other words, Erdogan is now deciding who will lead the main opposition party.
This is partly because he is clearly afraid of the current leadership, and especially of the mayor of Istanbul, who is in jail. Turkey has now become a full-blown authoritarian system, and I don’t think this is going to end well. By that, I mean authoritarian leaders always make mistakes, because there is never anyone around them to say, “Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, you shouldn’t do this; there may be consequences.” People always agree with them. So of course, mistakes are inevitable.
And I think Erdogan is already making mistakes. He has galvanized the opposition in a way that, if truly free elections were held today, he would be seriously doubted—he would not win. People can see that what he is doing is deeply unjust.
So there’s a kind of dialectic here: the system is becoming more authoritarian, but society may be resisting much more than we realize. It’s hard to see this resistance all the time because of restrictions—even on reporting. People are afraid to speak out. But at some point, this is going to break.
Imamoglu’s Jail Proves Erdogan’s Fear
Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu addresses supporters during a protest under the banner “The Nation Stands by Their Will” outside the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality on December 15, 2022. Photo: Tolga Ildun
The mass protests following Imamoglu’s arrest have been driven largely by younger generations who have never known a Turkey without Erdogan. How significant is this demographic factor in shaping the country’s political future, and do you see parallels with youth-led anti-authoritarian movements elsewhere?
Professor Henri Barkey: As I alluded to earlier, if you are 30 years old, Erdogan became your Prime Minister when you were 7 or 8 years old. I’m picking age 30 as an example, but imagine: all your conscious years you’ve seen one leader. And the other thing, of course, is that in terms of the communication systems—television, radio, newspapers—they are completely dominated by Erdogan in Turkey. So, you wake up to Erdogan, you go to bed with Erdogan.
And I’m not saying there isn’t a youth that actually supports Erdogan—there is. But there is certainly a youth that says, “Look, we would like to see somebody else.” In 2023, during the national elections, the main opposition party presented as a presidential candidate Mr. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who was unimaginative, did not appeal to the youth, and gave them no reason to galvanize. Now, for the first time in a long time, you have a leader on the opposition side. People criticize him, and that’s fine—he’s not perfect—but he has managed to capture the youth’s imagination. You see a great deal of mobilization, and that’s why they put him in jail.
Erdogan has many different court cases against him to keep him in jail. And in which country do you see a political leader arrested like this? He didn’t commit murder, he hasn’t done anything dangerous. But he has been in jail since March 19th. It’s been almost six months now, and he’ll be in jail for a very long time, because they don’t let you out—as if you were an axe murderer about to kill people. Journalists and others stay in jail for one or two years, and then suddenly maybe they decide to let you go, find you innocent, but you’ve already spent two years in jail.
We’ve seen this, of course, in the cases of the Kurdish political leader Selahattin Demirtas or the civil society leader Osman Kavala—they’ve been in jail for no reason whatsoever. And in the case of the mayor of Istanbul, they even annulled his university degree 30 years after he got it. Imagine if somebody decided to find some technicality and say, “Oh, my university degree is invalid, and therefore everything else I’ve done since then is invalid.” You can’t do that. But they come up with excuses to prevent an opponent from running against Erdogan.
The fact that Erdogan goes to such lengths to stop Imamoglu from running tells you how afraid he is of him. To me, that’s the best proof, the clearest demonstration, that he’s terrified.
Imamoglu’s Jail Time Only Raised His Standing
A photo from the mass CHP rally in Istanbul on March 29, 2025, protesting the unlawful detention of Ekrem Imamoglu, organized by party leader Ozgur Ozel. The event brought AKP and opposition supporters face to face. Photo: Elif Aytar.
Imamoglu’s repeated electoral victories and rising popularity have made him Erdogan’s most formidable rival. By imprisoning him and pursuing politically motivated trials, has Erdogan inadvertently elevated Imamoglu into a symbol of democratic resistance, similar to Erdogan’s own trajectory after his imprisonment in the late 1990s?
Professor Henri Barkey: He is smart enough to have realized that he owes his popularity, at least in part, to the fact that, as mayor of Istanbul, he was kicked out of his job and spent a short time in prison. That actually enhanced his standing. Moreover, if you remember, not in 2024 but in the previous municipal elections, Imamoglu won with a small majority. Then the Erdogan government came up with an excuse, claiming irregularities in the elections, and ordered that they be held again. People saw through it. What happened? Imamoglu won by a much larger margin against the same candidate. Why? Because people were angered by Ankara’s political interference in their choices. Even those who did not vote for Imamoglu the first time decided to vote for him the second, just to punish Erdogan.
Anyone should have learned that lesson. He hasn’t. The alternative, of course, is that he knows the lesson, and this time he intends to prevent Imamoglu from running. He will find him guilty and keep him in jail so that he can go into the next elections unopposed. He is also trying to destroy the opposition party, aiming for it to nominate, or to be led by, the candidate who ran against him in 2023, because he knows he can outmaneuver him and thinks this is the way to secure another term.
So, I think that’s his intention. I believe he’s made up his mind. He knows he can’t beat Imamoglu, but he can beat the new CHP leadership. And unfortunately, we will see a lot more people going to jail.
Erdogan Wants to Take the Competitive Part Out of Politics
Opposition party deputies, members and the members of civil society organisations had to guard the ballots for days to prevent stealing by the people organized by Erdogan regime in Turkey. The photo was shared by opposition deputy Mahmut Tanal’s Twitter account @MTanal during the Turkish local elections on March 31, 2019.
We’ve seen Erdogan’s government dismiss elected CHP mayors, replace them with trustees, and initiate corruption investigations against opposition-led municipalities. To what extent does this strategy reflect a deliberate effort to transform Turkey into a de facto one-party state, and could it ultimately backfire by strengthening opposition solidarity?
Professor Henri Barkey: I think my previous answers essentially say yes, of course. But you’ve noticed he’s now doing something else. He’s putting pressure on individual mayors of localities and forcing them to change parties and join his party. I saw today—though I forget where—that a deputy mayor was resigning from the main opposition party and joining Erdogan’s party. You can imagine the kind of pressure they must be exerting enourmous force her to do that, because it doesn’t make sense, when CHP is running high, to switch parties. But we’ve seen a number of cases like that.
So he’s not going to completely eliminate the main opposition party; he’s going to completely weaken it. He will make it what it was, let’s say, five years ago, before the opposition’s rejuvenation—when it won a few municipalities and a number of seats in Parliament, but had no influence and couldn’t do anything.
What’s very interesting is that all these corruption investigations have been initiated against opposition parties, opposition mayors, and sub-mayors. Not a single AKP mayor—or municipality—has been similarly treated. Can you really tell me there’s no corruption on the AKP side? No, but they’re all part of the system. That’s what I’m saying.
What Erdogan wants is to take the competitive part out of Turkey’s politics, because in his mind it should no longer be competitive. So it’s going to be only authoritarian. He’s turning Turkey into an authoritarian state.
Erdogan Cannot Control the Exiled Opposition Abroad
With the judiciary, media, and much of the bureaucracy subordinated to the presidency, are there any institutional safeguards left to counterbalance Erdogan’s authority? To what extent has the post-2016 purge of alleged Gulen-affiliated judges, prosecutors, academics, media, and civil servants accelerated Turkey’s democratic backsliding and hollowed out state capacity?
Professor Henri Barkey: Today the judiciary is completely under Erdogan’s control. If a judge rules in a way that Erdogan does not appreciate, he gets kicked out and sent somewhere else. The same applies to prosecutors. And there must be an internal state security apparatus that keeps tabs on all of these people, so that whenever pressure is needed, it can be applied.
So what’s left? What is the source of opposition today? I think, to a large extent, it’s the online environment—whether internet newspapers, journalists, or individuals with blogs and podcasts. Whenever Erdogan feels pressured, he tries to throttle the internet, slow it down, or impose bans on opposition networks by preventing them from broadcasting online. And they don’t have any other outlet, since they are not allowed to appear on mainstream television.
But that’s very hard to sustain all the time. It looks bad, and it can actually increase opposition if overused. When you slow down the internet, you slow it down for everyone—including people who simply want to buy things online. So it’s not clear to me that this is a viable long-term strategy. It’s more temporary and occasional. He did it this week with X, or Twitter.
So the online space remains, essentially, the main source of opposition. And you also have in Turkey a large number of journalists, academics, and public figures who are actively opposing him. This is what I meant earlier: there is still an element of democratic culture.
Now, you mentioned the Gulen movement. I know people who were professors at Gulen-owned universities. They were perfectly good academics, with international reputations, publishing internationally. They were not necessarily Gulenists. If you get a job at a university, you get it through established structures and processes. Yet all these people lost their jobs and became unemployable. That was a major blow to Turkish civil society and to the country’s intellectual world.
The Gulen movement was defeated, yes. But parts of it should not have been touched—for example, the universities. And by the way, I don’t know exactly what happened during the coup. To me, the coup remains an enigma. Maybe Gulenists were involved, but I think there were other factors as well. I suspect Erdogan knew ahead of time that a coup was coming, and when it happened, he took advantage of it. In the process, many people were smeared without due process.
This is something Turkish society will one day have to come to terms with. Gulenists who were guilty, yes—but not everyone was necessarily a Gulenist. And many suffered a great deal.
Another source of opposition, by the way, may be Turks who have emigrated to Europe. Yes, there is a large pro-Erdogan community abroad that tries to organize support. But there are also many dissenters now living in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere. They are a major source of opposition—and unlike in Turkey, Erdogan cannot control them, because he cannot throw them into jail.
You Can’t Have Democracy in Diyarbakir and Fascism in Istanbul
A Turkish man in Hyde Park, London, shows support for protesters in Istanbul following the eruption of nationwide demonstrations—Turkey’s largest anti-government unrest —challenging then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authority in June 2013. Photo credit: Ufuk Uyanik.
The PKK’s recent renunciation of armed struggle and ongoing talks involving Abdullah Ocalan and the DEM party suggest potential openings for renewed negotiations. How do you interpret Erdogan’s ambivalence toward these developments? Could a genuine Kurdish peace process pave the way for democratization, or is it more likely to be instrumentalized for political survival?
Professor Henri Barkey: To me, this is a very interesting situation because, with your question about democratization, how can you have… as a Kurdish leader once said, very correctly: you can’t have democracy in Diyarbakir and fascism in Istanbul. That is to say, what does it mean to democratize? Turkey needs to democratize. Turkey needs to deal with the Kurdish question. Turkey has to recognize that there are people who are not Turks, who have a different language, who would like to live as Turkish citizens but would also like to be able to express themselves in their own language or in any other fashion, and not have to go to jail for that.
The fact that the PKK has decided to renounce armed struggle is a good thing. They should have done it a long time ago, because the armed struggle wasn’t going anywhere. They had been completely defeated. They were just up in the northeast of Iraq, in the Qandil Mountains, stuck there with 158 Turkish bases in northern Iraq that completely dominate the area. One or two attacks a year is not what’s going to make the PKK the PKK. So the PKK was defeated, and they finally came to this realization. It’s good that they abandoned it. But I don’t think there is going to be a peace process. I don’t think this is going to go anywhere.
Because, first of all, Erdogan himself doesn’t believe in democracy. I mean, what did the opposition, the DEM party, say they want? They didn’t ask for anything specific. They would like, of course, prisoners to be released. They want to deal with what to do with the fighters who are abroad, in Iraq, who would like to be able to integrate into society. But basically, what the leadership has said so far is that they want democracy. They want to be able to participate. But this is not something Erdogan wants. Everything Erdogan is doing is, as I said, taking the “competitive” out of competitive authoritarianism and establishing a completely authoritarian state. So this is not going to work.
Now, it turns out that on the Kurdish side, the main leader who’s in jail—Ocalan—doesn’t happen to be a democrat either. So it’s a big question mark. He’s 80 years old now. He must be thinking about his legacy, and that’s why he’s trying to… but he also can’t make a deal that is going to be rejected by the democrats in Turkey. So he’s also stuck. I’m sure Erdogan’s idea was probably to convince the DEM party to vote for either a constitutional change, or more likely for early elections, that Erdogan would make sure he would win. That’s probably still his plan.
Bahceli’s Gamble on Kurdish Talks Faces Dead End
The one interesting question mark here is that, to a large extent, this whole process started with an initiative from Erdogan’s main right-wing coalition partner, the MHP, led by Devlet Bahceli, who used to be the most anti-Kurdish figure in Turkey. He said Ocalan should not be released, but should come to the Turkish Parliament and address Parliament. That was really an amazing statement by him, and he pushed the process.
I wonder if Mr. Bahçeli, who’s at the end of his life and has run the party without much to show for his years in power or as a party leader—what has he done, what has he accomplished?—maybe that was his way of creating an inheritance, if you will, for his followers: that he would bring domestic peace to Turkey. Well, if that’s his incentive, that’s fine. It doesn’t matter how you get there, as long as you do it.
So the big problem Erdogan has is: to what extent is Mr. Bahceli committed to continuing the process? And Mr. Bahceli himself must realize that, the way things are going now, the DEM party is not going to be able to make a deal with Erdogan. There will be talks—we’re going to see a commission has been created, supposedly there will be conversations—but this is not going anywhere. And in the meantime, Erdogan is destroying CHP, and this puts the DEM party in a terrible situation.
Trump Gave Erdogan Carte Blanche
Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
And lastly, Professor Barkey, given Washington’s strategic interests—from NATO cohesion to cooperation with Syrian Kurdish forces—how should the US and EU respond to Erdogan’s escalating repression of the opposition? Would stronger political and economic pressure risk reinforcing his anti-Western populist narrative, or is greater confrontation inevitable?
Professor Henri Barkey: Let’s be honest here. What Erdogan has done since March would not have happened if you had a different president of the United States. Here you have Trump, who is upset about Bolsonaro getting tried, and he imposes sanctions even on the judge who is judging him. And then he has not said a word about what’s going on in Turkey. Trump doesn’t believe in democracy. Trump is only interested in himself and his own interests. So, he’s decided that he likes Erdogan, and he can do business with Erdogan, and therefore, Erdogan can do whatever he wants. And that’s what Erdogan is doing.
Let’s say Biden or Kamala Harris had been at the White House today. Erdogan would not have done any of these things, because the US government would have really pushed very hard. Whether it was investments or any other type of help that the Turks would need, they would not get.
The Turkish economy is in terrible shape. Inflation is much higher than the official figures indicate, and it’s still at 30% for a modern economy. The Turkish economy may be in better shape structurally, but I think it is still fairly dynamic. You go to Europe, you see Turkish exports everywhere—and I’m not just talking about tomatoes and agricultural products. I’m talking about sophisticated products, industrial products, electronic products. The Turkish economy has a number of advantages that probably would do a lot better with improved economic management from Ankara. But it has still managed to perform not poorly, given the circumstances.
Biden, or a Democratic president, or even a Republican president who cares about this—I mean, George Bush would have been up in arms about it. Trump has given Erdogan essentially carte blanche. And this is why we have not seen any major Turkish incursions into northern Syria.
Now, it’s not that Trump is attached to the Syrian Kurds. He couldn’t care less about them. But Trump would like to take American troops out of Syria, while also realizing that ISIS is on the mend, ISIS is getting stronger, and he doesn’t want a major ISIS insurrection again like what happened back in 2014. So he’s probably still thinking about it and has decided to reduce the number of troops, but not pull them out. As a result, Erdogan hasn’t gone into Syria.
But the truth is, the Syrian Kurds do not threaten Turkey. It’s just something in some Turks’ minds, and it’s a way of galvanizing the population behind you. The Kurdish problem in Turkey is a long-standing one, and there are many people who still don’t trust the Kurds. And Syrian Kurds are Syrians—people forget that. The Turks complain that Syrian Kurds control a large chunk of territory. Yes, they do. They happen to be Syrian Kurds, by the way. Turkey itself controls an enormous chunk of Syrian territory in the northwest—as big as Lebanon. But that’s okay, Turkey can do that. So you have these anomalies.
Erdogan is careful, because with Trump you don’t know from one day to the next how he might turn on you. So Trump is letting him do everything he wants to do in Turkey, but doesn’t want him to go into Syria and mess things up there. Fine—Erdogan can live with that. So Erdogan is quite happy.
Erdogan Thinks He Can Withstand European Pressure
The Europeans are very unhappy with what’s happening in Turkey, because they realize what Erdogan’s aims are. And you’ve had a huge exodus of Turks who’ve gone to Europe, escaping the Erdogan regime. The immigration problem from the rest of the world through Turkey to Europe has always been Erdogan’s carte majeure. But whatever Europeans do or threaten, Erdogan is going to ignore, because he essentially thinks he has maybe 6 to 12 months in which he has to focus on defanging or demolishing the opposition party. Once he is done with that, he won’t do anything else. So he thinks he can withstand European pressure for this long.
The interesting thing about Trump is that there’s a way in which people are also afraid of him because of his unpredictability and his very tough talk. It doesn’t always mean anything—the Chinese have seen it, and the Russians know exactly how to react—but they’re big powers. Everybody else is afraid. I’ll give you an example. It’s a minor one, but the day before yesterday, the Iraqi Shia militia released an American researcher, Elizabeth Tsurkov, whom they had been holding for two years. They kidnapped her. And I think the only reason they released her—and this is why Trump’s craziness pays off—is that he probably threatened the Iraqi government and said, “You don’t get this person out…” And the Iraqi government said, well, they are the Shia militias, we don’t have control over them. And he probably said, “I know you have control over them, I know you can do it, do it now.” Biden and the Kamala Harris government have not tried very hard to get her out.
So Trump’s unpredictability is why Erdogan has to be careful. As long as Trump gives him, as I said, carte blanche at home, Erdogan is very happy, and he can get away with it. What’s more important to him? Winning the election, staying in power for another term. That’s all he cares about.
So the answer to your question is that not much is going to happen. The Europeans are not going to be very successful. Now, if Turkey were to go through a major economic crisis again, with major demonstrations and instability, that could be different. But given how the whole region is at the moment, I don’t think that’s in the cards right now. The Europeans are going to continue doing some business, they’ll put some constraints on Turkish economic exchanges, but there’s only so much they can do. They can criticize the Turks, but the Turks don’t care. Or I should say, the Turkish government doesn’t care. Erdogan has essentially won.
Ozturk, Ibrahim. (2025). “Capitalist Disruptions and the Democratic Retreat: A US–EU–China Comparison.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 11, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000116
Abstract
The accelerating erosion of regulatory safeguards, widening wealth inequality, entrenched elite influence, and the proliferation of surveillance regimes mark a new phase in the global crisis of corporate capitalism—one that is narrowing the normative and institutional gap between liberal democracies and authoritarian states. Building on Karl Polanyi’s notion of thedouble movementand Fernand Braudel’s distinction between market exchange and capitalist domination, this article develops a comparative political economy framework to examine how structural disruptions in capitalism are reshaping global governance and fueling the rise of populist authoritarianism. The analysis contrasts the institutional trajectories of the United States, the European Union, and China, highlighting both convergent and divergent patterns in their responses to this systemic crisis. By integrating insights from political economy, comparative governance, and authoritarian studies, the paper advances a theoretical synthesis that explains the mechanisms of “authoritarian convergence” without reducing them to a deterministic path. It concludes that resisting this drift requires re-embedding markets within democratic institutions and forging a renewed, inclusive global social contract capable of constraining both corporate and state power.
Keywords: Corporate Capitalism, Authoritarian Convergence, Populism, Democratic Backsliding, Karl Polanyi, Double Movement, Fernand Braudel, Global Governance, Inequality, Regulatory Failure, Comparative Political Economy
By Ibrahim Ozturk*
1. Introduction: Capitalism, Crisis, and the Convergence of Systems
With the collapse of central planning and the global decline of communist ideology in the early 1990s—preceded by the wave of neoliberal deregulation in the early 1980s associated with the so-called Washington Consensus—liberal democracies came to be viewed not only as models of modern governance, marked by openness, transparency, and institutional pluralism, but also as systems capable of guiding countries such as China and, later, Russia toward a liberal worldview grounded in free-market economics and democratic governance.
After an initial period of reform—primarily in the economic sphere—beginning in China in the early 1980s and later in Russia in the early 1990s, developments appeared to support the anticipated trajectory of convergence, broadly continuing until the mid-2000s. However, the post-2008 Great Stagnation marked a decisive turning point, dispelling the “liberal fallacies” rooted in overoptimism and ideological faith in inevitable convergence. Not only did several countries once expected to converge begin diverging from liberal democratic norms, but many established democracies with market economies also started adopting features traditionally associated with authoritarian governance. Moreover, regimes long regarded as illiberal—such as China and Russia—demonstrated remarkable adaptability by integrating market mechanisms, digital innovation, and populist rhetoric into their authoritarian rule. Taken together, these developments underscore that liberal and authoritarian regimes are not merely coexisting but, in significant ways, are converging.
That is, as liberal regimes increasingly adopt features characteristic of illiberal governance, illiberal regimes have, in turn, successfully integrated into the market and globalization processes driven by corporate capitalism, while maintaining their authoritarian political systems. This two-way process—referred to in this article as reverse convergence—is rooted in a common underlying factor: the systemic crisis of corporate capitalism.
Economic activity, which ought to be embedded within society and regarded as an integral part of social life (Polanyi, 1944; Braudel, 1982; Block, 2003; Sandel, 2012), has instead come to be perceived as a narrow, detached sphere shaped by the immunization of the corporate capitalism (Greider, 1992 & 2003) through “financial fundamentalism” that Vickrey (1998) warned against. Increasingly, it is viewed as a domain dominated by elites, operating contrary to the broader public interest—or at least perceived as such by large segments of society.
Especially in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, this perception has fueled a countermovement marked by diverse forms of critique. Despite their ideological differences, these critiques converge on a common theme: the call to restore the will of the “virtuous people” against unaccountable elites (Mudde, 2004; Laclau, 2005; Müller, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2019)—a formulation closely aligned with the core definition of populism. In this sense, the global reaction against corporate capitalism has been effectively appropriated and redirected by authoritarian populist forces (Fraser, 2017; Zuboff, 2019; Piketty, 2020; Brown, 2019).
Recent political and economic developments in the United States (US), the European Union (EU), and China—where these transformations are particularly pronounced—reflect dynamics long anticipated by scholars, most notably Karl Polanyi (1944) and Fernand Braudel (1984). Polanyi, through his concept of the “double movement,” explored how societies historically respond to the destabilizing effects of unregulated markets by demanding protective social and political countermeasures. Braudel, in turn, distinguished between market economies and hierarchical capitalism, highlighting how modern economic elites operate within spheres largely insulated from democratic accountability.
More recently, these foundational frameworks have been extended by scholars analyzing the rise of digital capitalism. Zuboff’s (2019) theory of surveillance capitalism, Wark’s (2019) notion of the vectoralist class, and Varoufakis’s (2023) concept of techno-feudalism each offer critical insights into how corporate power, digital infrastructures, and state capture are reshaping the structures of political authority. Building on the approaches of Polanyi and Braudel, this article investigates how structural transformations in global capitalism—particularly under the pressures of digitalization, the expansion of cyberspace, rising wealth and income inequality, and the ensuing populist backlash—have increasingly blurred the boundaries between regime types.
This study uses comparative case analysis to examine the US, EU,andChina as key regions where the disruptions caused by corporate capitalism align with the rise of authoritarian populist strategies. Each case offers a unique way of managing, challenging, or exploiting the structural pressures of global capitalism. Through this comparative approach, the paper aims to explain why and how different political systems are increasingly adopting illiberal norms, such as centralized authority, elite entrenchment, and norm erosion, even as they officially support divergent ideologies.
The structure of the paper is outlined as follows. After this introduction, the next section details the theoretical framework behind the concept of reverse convergence. Section 2 examines the contributions of Polanyi, Braudel, and other key scholars, situating their ideas within the context of current global trends. Section 3 presents a comparative empirical analysis of governance patterns in the US, the EU, and China, utilizing policy documents, governance indicators, and regulatory frameworks. The final section presents the normative implications of these findings in a nutshell. The article ends with key policy implications and recommendations.
Please cite as: ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 1: The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 6, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00113
The ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, launched its Virtual Workshop Series on “The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World” on September 4, 2025. Spanning 16 sessions through April 2026, the series examines how populist strategies reshape democracy across diverse contexts. Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni, the opening session featured Professor David Sanders’ keynote on six structural drivers fueling populism and its growing threats to liberal democracy. Case studies explored populist dynamics in the US, India, Greece, Thailand, and Argentina, highlighting intersections of dynasties, corporate power, elite cues, and economic crises. Discussant Dr. João Ferreira Dias emphasized three takeaways: populism as performance, polarization over persuasion, and the enduring impact of national political cultures.
Reported by ECPS Staff
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, inaugurated its Virtual Workshop Series with the opening session, “The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World,” held on Thursday, September 4, 2025. Spanning 16 sessions from September 2025 to April 2026, the programme brings together leading scholars to examine the contested meanings of “the people” and their pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of democracy across diverse political, cultural, and institutional settings. Designed as a continuation of the successful three-day in-person conference at St. Cross College, Oxford University (July 1–3, 2025) — “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches,”— the series deepens and extends those debates, fostering comparative, cross-disciplinary dialogue on democratic backsliding, resilience, and transformation in a rapidly shifting global landscape.
Opening on behalf of ECPS, Stella Schade outlined the series’ comparative and cross-disciplinary ambition: to move beyond regional silos and examine how populist projects travel, adapt, and entrench themselves within distinct political and media ecologies.
Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni (University of Lausanne), a leading authority on populism and party systems, the session framed populist authoritarianism not as a single doctrine but as a repertoire of strategies—discursive, organizational, and institutional—deployed under diverse conditions.
Professor David Sanders (University of Essex, Emeritus) set the analytical agenda with a wide-ranging keynote that argued populism poses greater risks to liberal democracy today than in earlier cycles, owing to transnational diffusion of tactics and the erosion of shared standards of truth. He identified six structural drivers—declining left–right anchors, post-truth dynamics, politicized immigration, identity fragmentation, globalization’s discontents, and norm subversion through strategic learning—and outlined five fronts for democratic response, from inclusive immigration policy and rebalanced rights discourse to retooled economic governance, renewed state capacity, and robust platform regulation.
The panel that followed translated these themes into concrete case studies. Dr. Dinesh Sharma and Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich (Fordham University) traced the entanglement of family dynasties, corporate finance, and “outsider” populist narratives in India and the United States, highlighting the paradox whereby leaders mobilize anti-elite sentiment while constructing elite power networks of their own.
Professor Gregory W. Streich and Dr. Michael Makara (University of Central Missouri) examined how elite cues and out-group framing shape opinion formation, showing that populist endorsements polarize more than they persuade and exert greatest influence on low-salience issues where prior beliefs are weak.
Professor Akis Kalaitzidis (University of Central Missouri) offered a comparative analysis of Thailand, Argentina, Greece, and the United States to argue that economic dislocations catalyze distinct populist trajectories, each filtered through national political cultures and institutional constraints.
Professor Elizabeth Kosmetatou (University of Illinois Springfield), in joint work with Kalaitzidis, revisited the Papandreou era to illuminate how charismatic leadership, clientelism, and European integration jointly reconfigured Greece’s political economy, leaving a durable imprint on state capacity and party competition.
Serving as discussant, Dr. João Ferreira Dias synthesized the contributions around three cross-cutting claims: populism functions as performance more than program; polarization, not persuasion, is its primary mass effect; and national political cultures mediate how populist styles are institutionalized. His commentary linked micro-level mechanics (elite cues, media incentives) to macro-level outcomes (executive aggrandizement, clientelist normalization), underscoring the session’s central lesson: understanding populist authoritarianism requires attention to both the technologies of mobilization and the structures that enable their entrenchment.
As the series unfolds, ECPS and its partners will continue to probe these dynamics comparatively, asking not only how democracies backslide, but also how they can be renewed.
Prof. Oscar Mazzoleni, Prof. David J. Sanders, Dr. Dinesh Sharma, Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Michael Makara, Prof. Gregory W. Streich, Prof. Akis Kalaitzidis, Prof. Elizabeth Kosmetatou, and Dr. João Ferreira Dias are seen on the workshop’s Zoom screen.
Introductory Speech by Professor David J. Sanders: From Post-Truth to Power—Risks and Remedies
The session began with a keynote intervention by Professor David Sanders(Regius Professor of Political Science, University of Essex, Emeritus), a renowned scholar of political behavior and public opinion. Framing the discussion for the subsequent panel presentations, Professor Sanders delivered a wide-ranging and analytically rich lecture on the global rise of populist authoritarianism, examining its causes, dangers, and potential counterstrategies. Speaking in an urgent yet measured tone, Professor Sanders argued that populism has always posed risks to democratic stability, but it is “more dangerous now than ever before.” He attributed this heightened threat to the increasing transnational interconnectedness of populist actors, who share strategies, rhetoric, and institutional models across borders, accelerating the erosion of democratic norms. His lecture was structured around three central questions: Why has support for populism grown so dramatically? Why is populism especially dangerous for contemporary democracies? What can be done to contain its advance?
Explaining the Rise of Populism: Six Structural Drivers
Professor Sanders identified six interrelated drivers behind the global surge of populism, focusing primarily on Europe and North America but emphasizing broader international patterns.
The Decline of Left-Right Political Anchors: Professor Sanders argued that traditional left-right ideological cleavages have eroded, especially since the collapse of Soviet communism in 1990. With voters less able to situate themselves within stable ideological frameworks, political affiliations have become fluid, creating fertile ground for populist appeals. “Without these anchors,” Professor Sanders noted, “voters are far more susceptible to movements promising simple answers to complex problems.”
The Rise of Post-Truth Politics: The fragmentation of epistemic authority has, in Professor Sanders’ view, created a “post-truth environment” where empirical evidence is devalued and “multiple truths” proliferate. This shift, exacerbated by social media platforms, has empowered “liars, conspiracists, and fantasists” while weakening evidence-based policymaking. Populists thrive in this environment by framing facts as opinions and dismissing scientific consensus as “elitist bias.”
Immigration and Political Avoidance: ProfessorSanders highlighted immigration as a critical yet mishandled political issue in Western democracies. For decades, mainstream parties feared being perceived as illiberal, leading to a reluctance to engage substantively with public concerns. Populists, by contrast, capitalize on voter frustrations, using immigration narratives to construct “us vs. them” dichotomies and mobilize distrust toward elites.
Identity Fragmentation and Social Cohesion: The digital era has amplified group-based identity politics, reducing the sense of common national belonging. As shared civic identities weaken, Professor Sanders warned, populists exploit social fragmentation, scapegoating out-groups and deepening polarization.
Globalization and Economic Discontent: Populism has also gained traction from the failures of mainstream economic discourse to address the negative externalities of globalization. While global integration benefited elites, many communities experienced declining living standards and job precarity. Populists seize on these grievances, positioning themselves as defenders of “ordinary people” against globalist elites.
Norm Subversion and Strategic Learning: Finally, Professor Sanders underscored the willingness of populist leaders to bend or break constitutional norms, often learning from one another across contexts. He cited Donald Trump’s attempts to undermine US democratic institutions and Boris Johnson’s efforts to sidestep parliamentary constraints, framing these as part of a “global playbook of democratic erosion.”
Why Populism Is Uniquely Dangerous Today
Professor Sanders then turned to the three main dangers posed by contemporary populism:
Erosion of Social Cohesion: By demonizing minorities, populists heighten intergroup conflict and weaken the foundations of inclusive citizenship.
Authoritarian Drift: Populist leaders often centralize power, eroding judicial independence and institutional checks, leading to counterproductive repression against dissent.
Policy Failure and Disillusionment: Populists typically offer simplistic solutions to complex problems. When these fail, public disillusionment deepens, further undermining confidence in democratic governance.
“Populists,” Professor Sanders warned, “rarely solve the problems they promise to address, but they succeed in leaving democracies weaker than they found them.”
Countering Populist Authoritarianism: Five Strategic Priorities
In the final part of his lecture, Professor Sanders outlined five strategic pathways for safeguarding democratic resilience:
Addressing Immigration Through Inclusive Policy: Mainstream parties must reclaim the immigration debate with evidence-based, humane policies that both uphold human rights and ensure adequate state support for newcomers. Failing to do so, Professor Sanders cautioned, “hands the narrative to populists by default.”
Reframing Human Rights Discourses: Professor Sanders advocated a shift from purely individualistic frameworks toward a balance that also emphasizes collective and community rights, countering populist narratives that depict liberal values as detached from social realities.
Reforming Globalization and Economic Governance: To undercut populist grievances, governments should restructure trade and investment rules to prioritize domestic employment and social protections, using multilateral cooperation rather than unilateral disruption.
Restoring Trust in State Capacity: Democracies, Professor Sanders argued, must “talk up the role of the state” in solving collective problems — from infrastructure and education to social security and environmental resilience — demonstrating the state’s relevance to everyday wellbeing.
Regulating Social Media and Combating Disinformation: Finally, Professor Sanders called for draconian reforms to social media governance, including penalties for platforms that facilitate misinformation. Without systemic regulation, he warned, populists will continue to weaponize digital ecosystems to bypass accountability.
Conclusion: A Call for Interdisciplinary Action
Professor Sanders closed by emphasizing the urgency of collective scholarly engagement. Combating populist authoritarianism, he argued, requires interdisciplinary collaboration across political science, sociology, communication studies, and law. The ECPS Virtual Workshop Series, he noted, offers an ideal platform to generate context-specific solutions, enabling comparative insights into how different democracies resist or succumb to populist pressures.“Populism,” Professor Sanders concluded, “is not merely a passing disruption but an existential challenge. Our intellectual and civic responsibility is to confront it directly — with evidence, clarity, and democratic resolve.”
Donald Trump delivers a victory speech after his big win in the Nevada caucus at Treasure Island Hotel & Casino, flanked by his sons Eric (right) and Donald Jr. (left) in Las Vegas, NV. Photo: oe Sohm.
Dr. Dinesh Sharma and Ms. Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich: “The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism in India and the US: Do Family Dynasties and Big Businesses Really Control Democracy?”
The session featured a joint presentation by Dr. Dinesh Sharma and Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich (Fordham University, NYC), of a work done with contributions from Britt Romagna, Ms. Ayako Kiyota, and Amartya Sharma. Their talk, titled “The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism in India and the US: Do Family Dynasties and Big Businesses Really Control Democracy?” examined the interplay between political dynasties, corporate power, and populist narratives in shaping democratic governance across two of the world’s largest democracies.
Drawing on material from Dr. Sharma’s forthcoming book The Orphan Paradox (Bloomsbury, forthcoming), the presentation explored the historical weight of inherited political capital, the growing influence of corporate financing, and the paradoxical rise of populist “outsiders” who simultaneously mobilize anti-elite sentiment while forging their own elite power structures.
Dynastic Politics and Democratic Capture
Dr. Sharma began by situating India and the United States within a comparative framework, emphasizing both convergences and divergences in their democratic trajectories. In India, dynastic politics remains deeply entrenched. Since independence, the Nehru-Gandhi family has dominated national electoral politics, holding power for more than half of the country’s post-1950 history. Beyond the national level, numerous regional dynasties — such as the Yadav family in Uttar Pradesh, the Thackerays in Maharashtra, and the DMK in Tamil Nadu — wield significant influence over state and local politics, shaping party structures and patronage networks.
In the United States, Dr. Sharma noted, dynastic influence has historically been less centralized but nonetheless persistent. Families like the Kennedys, Roosevelts, Bushes, Clintons, and, more recently, the Trumps, have leveraged name recognition, financial networks, and inherited legitimacy to secure enduring political influence. While American political culture celebrates self-made leaders, Dr. Sharma observed that brand recognition and elite networks remain powerful assets in electoral politics.
Corporate Power, Campaign Financing, and Policy Capture
A key theme of the presentation concerned the growing role of big business and corporate lobbying in shaping democratic outcomes. Dr. Sharma highlighted the landmark US Supreme Court ruling Citizens United v. FEC (2010), which effectively removed limits on corporate spending in political campaigns, institutionalizing the dominance of corporate financing. In India, similar trends emerged under the now-invalidated electoral bond scheme, which allowed opaque funding streams that disproportionately benefited ruling parties backed by large corporations.
According to Dr. Sharma, these developments represent a global convergence in which wealthy donors, multinational corporations, and media conglomerates exert outsized influence on electoral agendas, policy priorities, and political narratives. Media ownership — from the Ambani empire in India to the Murdoch network across the US, UK, and Australia — amplifies populist messaging, channels public anger, and fosters resentment toward elites while simultaneously serving elite interests.
The Populist Outsider Paradox
Perhaps the most striking insight in Dr. Sharma’s presentation concerned what he termed the “orphan paradox”: the tendency of voters to support leaders who position themselves as political outsiders or underdogs, even when they later consolidate their own elite power bases.
In India, Narendra Modi has long fashioned his public image as a “self-made son of the soil,” rising from modest beginnings outside the Nehru-Gandhi establishment to challenge entrenched dynastic power. In the United States, figures like Donald Trump similarly leveraged outsider narratives — despite being deeply embedded within elite business and political networks.
Dr. Sharma argued that this paradox reveals a deep tension in democratic psychology: voters oscillate between skepticism toward entrenched elites and admiration for disruptive figures who claim authenticity and independence from the system. Yet, as Dr. Sharma noted, many of these “outsiders” eventually replicate the same patterns of institutional capture they campaign against.
Resistance, Institutions, and the Future of Democracy
While dynasties and corporations exert significant influence, Dr. Sharma emphasized that democratic capture is not inevitable. Countervailing forces — from civil society movements and grassroots protests to independent courts, election commissions, and free media — remain critical in constraining elite dominance. Historical examples such as India’s anti-corruption mobilizations and the US civil rights movement demonstrate that organized citizen activism can challenge concentrated power, though sustaining such momentum remains difficult.
Dr. Sharma concluded by underscoring the fragility of democratic institutions in both contexts. In India, the Supreme Court and Election Commission face mounting pressures, while in the United States, corporate lobbying, partisan polarization, and media fragmentation undermine public trust. Populist leaders like Modi and Trump amplify this institutional strain, mobilizing resentment against “elites” while consolidating their own networks of influence.
A Psychodynamic Drama of Rivalry, Mourning, and Repetition
In her contribution, Ms. Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich (Fordham University) offered a distinctive literary-theoretical and psychoanalytic perspective on political succession, exploring how leadership transitions in authoritarian and revolutionary contexts can be interpreted through Freud’s Oedipus complex and trauma theory. Her analysis framed political power as a psychodynamic drama marked by rivalry, mourning, and repetition.
Ms. Baraschi-Ehrlich argued that succession crises often involve a form of symbolic “patricide,” where the paternal figure — whether a dynastic leader, revolutionary founder, or state authority — must be displaced or replaced. Yet paradoxically, successors frequently reproduce the very structures they sought to dismantle, perpetuating cycles of control. Drawing on trauma theory, particularly the work of Cathy Caruth and Dominick LaCapra, she explained that unresolved historical wounds resurface belatedly and repetitively, shaping patterns of political instability and repression.
Her analysis was grounded in three illustrative cases. First, revolutionary movements — such as the Cuban Revolution — often enact an Oedipal rupture against paternal authority, only to reconstruct new patriarchal orders, as seen under Castro. Second, in North Korea, dynastic succession is framed as filial devotion, yet marked by anxiety over legitimacy and loss, with citizens participating in rituals of mourning that sustain authority. Third, leaders like Lenin and Mao cultivated images of rupture while demanding absolute loyalty, embodying the ambivalence of rejecting and replicating paternal power.
Contrastingly, Ms. Baraschi-Ehrlich highlighted that democratic systems can mitigate these dynamics, enabling peaceful transitions that transform rivalry into continuity rather than trauma. Concluding, she underscored that political authority is haunted by unresolved loss — revolutions often reproduce the structures they oppose, dynasties rely on filial rituals, and democracies, at their best, offer pathways to healing through institutional stability.
Conclusion
Dr. Dinesh Sharma and Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich’s presentation offered a multifaceted exploration of the forces reshaping democratic governance in India and the United States, highlighting the intertwined roles of political dynasties, corporate power, and populist narratives. Sharma demonstrated how inherited political capital and opaque corporate financing create structural advantages that enable elites to shape policy agendas and electoral dynamics, even as populist leaders mobilize resentment against these very systems. Yet, as he underscored, the “outsider” paradox reveals a deeper democratic tension: figures like Narendra Modi and Donald Trump ascend by presenting themselves as authentic disruptors, but frequently replicate the same networks of influence they claim to oppose.
Baraschi-Ehrlich’s psychoanalytic lens added a distinct theoretical depth, framing leadership transitions as a “psychodynamic drama” marked by rivalry, mourning, and repetition. By invoking Freud’s Oedipus complex and trauma theory, she illuminated how unresolved historical wounds shape cycles of rebellion and restoration, particularly within authoritarian and revolutionary contexts. Her comparative insights revealed why revolutions often reproduce hierarchical structures and why dynasties rely on rituals of loyalty to sustain authority, contrasting these patterns with democracy’s potential to transform rivalry into institutional continuity.
Together, their analysis situates the rise of populist authoritarianism within a broader global challenge: resisting elite capture while navigating voter ambivalence toward power, authenticity, and belonging. The question, they concluded, is whether democratic institutions and civic movements can still provide pathways to resilience in an era where populism both contests and consolidates authority.
Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.
Professor Gregory W. Streich and Dr. Michael Makara: “Out-Groups, Elite Cues, and Populist Persuasion: How Populists Shape Public Opinion”
In their joint presentation, Professors Gregory W. Streich(Professor of Political Science and Chair of the School of Social Sciences and Languages, University of Central Missouri) andDr. Michael Makara (Associate Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations, University of Central Missouri) explored the mechanisms through which populist leaders influence public opinion, focusing on the interaction between elite cues, perceptions of out-groups, and the salience of policy issues. Their research, presented under the title “Out-groups and Elite Cues: How Populists Shape Public Opinion,” forms part of a broader project examining how voters reconcile competing influences when forming political attitudes, especially in the context of Donald Trump’s presidency.
Competing Theories of Public Opinion Formation
Professor Streich started presentation by framing the research within two dominant theories of opinion formation:
Social Attributes Theory — Individuals’ policy preferences are shaped by their demographic identity and attitudes toward specific groups. For example, support or opposition to immigration policy often depends on whether voters perceive certain ethnic, religious, or socio-economic groups as beneficiaries or threats.
Elite Cues Theory — Also called the “follow-the-leader effect,” this perspective argues that voters align their policy preferences with cues from political leaders or parties they trust. When elites endorse a policy, their supporters are more likely to back it, even when it contradicts long-standing ideological positions.
The research seeks to understand what happens when these forces pull voters in opposite directions. Do citizens defer to elite endorsements, or do their social identities dominate? This question becomes especially salient under populist leadership, where leaders like Donald Trump often adopt positions that diverge sharply from traditional party orthodoxy.
Populism, Partisan Realignment, and Donald Trump’s Role
Professor Streich highlighted Trump’s ability to reorient Republican priorities, often in ways that defy the party’s historical platforms. For example:
Trade Policy: Trump’s tariffs represented a stark departure from Republican free-trade orthodoxy.
Immigration: Whereas Ronald Reagan framed America as a “shining city on a hill” and signed limited amnesty measures in 1986, Trump’s rhetoric emphasized exclusion and restriction.
According to Professor Streich, Trump’s deviations highlight his populist strategy: positioning himself as the authentic voice of “the people” against “corrupt elites,” while simultaneously forging new ideological coalitions. The study aimed to test empirically how persuasive this strategy has been across different issues.
High-Salience vs. Low-Salience Issues
Dr. Michael Makara expanded on the theoretical framework by introducing the concept of issue salience — the degree to which voters already hold well-formed, emotionally charged opinions on a topic.
High-Salience Issues — Highly visible, polarizing debates such as immigration evoke strong ideological divides.
Low-Salience Issues — Less publicly debated policies, such as trade, generate weaker prior attitudes and are thus more open to elite influence.
Their central hypothesis predicted that elite cues — in this case, endorsements by Donald Trump — would exert greater influence on low-salience issues (e.g., trade) than on high-salience issues (e.g., immigration), where voters’ views are already entrenched.
Research Design and Methodology
The researchers conducted a national survey in September 2025, using two factorial experiments. Respondents read short policy vignettes describing fictional immigration and trade proposals and were randomly assigned different conditions:
Endorsement Cues: Some were told Donald Trump supported the policy, while others received no elite cue or were told it was backed by generic officials.
Framing Effects: In the immigration vignette, immigrants were alternately described as “illegal aliens” or “undocumented immigrants” to test whether language influenced responses.
Respondents indicated whether they supported or opposed each policy. Logistic regression analyses measured the interaction between ideology, Trump’s endorsement, and issue salience.
Key Findings
Strong Elite Cues Effect
Trump’s endorsement significantly shaped conservative opinion across both policy areas:
Immigration Policy: Conservatives informed that Trump supported a proposal were four times more likely to support it compared to those receiving no cue.
Trade Policy: Trump’s endorsement similarly increased conservative support, demonstrating the persuasive power of elite cues even when policies contradict traditional Republican priorities.
Elite Cues and Polarization
While Trump mobilized conservatives, his endorsements also intensified liberal opposition. In both vignettes, liberals exposed to Trump’s support were significantly less likely to back the policy.
Salience Moderates Influence
Consistent with the authors’ hypothesis, elite cues proved more influential on low-salience issues like trade: On immigration, voters’ pre-existing ideological commitments dominated, limiting Trump’s persuasive reach. On trade, where voters lacked strong priors, Trump’s endorsement created substantial opinion shifts.
The Role of Information Gaps
Dr. Makara emphasized that voters with limited knowledge about trade policy were especially susceptible to elite influence. This finding suggests that populists thrive in policy domains where uncertainty is high and narratives can be shaped more freely.
Implications for Populist Mobilization
The study highlights how populist leaders leverage elite cues and out-group framing to reshape political landscapes:
Redefining Party Orthodoxy — By combining contradictory policy stances, populists like Trump create hybrid ideological platforms that mobilize cross-cutting constituencies.
Targeting Out-Groups — Populists amplify fears around immigration and cultural threats, using emotionally charged narratives to reinforce group identity and deepen divides.
Exploiting Low-Salience Issues — Populists strategically mobilize opinion on less familiar policy domains where facts are contested, and leaders’ cues carry disproportionate weight.
Future Directions
Professor Streich and Dr. Makara noted several areas for ongoing research:
Cross-Leader Comparisons: Testing whether similar elite cue effects emerge when policies are endorsed by other figures, such as Joe Biden or state-level leaders.
Media Ecosystems: Examining how different information sources shape susceptibility to elite cues.
Out-Group Framing: Integrating more detailed measures of identity-based threat perceptions.
Conclusion
Professor Streich and Dr. Makara’s findings illuminate the psychological and informational mechanisms through which populist leaders mobilize public opinion. While elite cues strongly shape attitudes, their influence is conditional: populists are most persuasive when voters lack strong priors, allowing leaders to frame issues and define narratives unchallenged.
In high-salience contexts, such as immigration, polarization constrains persuasion, reinforcing existing divides rather than shifting positions. By contrast, in low-salience policy domains like trade, populists wield significant power to shape voter attitudes and reconfigure partisan alignments.
The broader implication is sobering: populist influence thrives where knowledge gaps are greatest and where leaders exploit identity-based divisions alongside uncertainty. As the authors concluded, understanding these dynamics is critical for explaining not only Trump’s continued hold over Republican politics but also the global rise of populist-authoritarian movements.
Fans wave flags during Alexis Tsipras’s final public speech before the elections in Athens, Greece on September 18, 2015: Photo: Vassilis Anastasiou.
Professor Akis Kalaitzidis: “From Economic to Political Catastrophe: Four Case Studies in Populism”
In his insightful presentation, Professor Akis Kalaitzidis, a political scientist from the University of Central Missouri, analyzed how economic crises in Thailand, Argentina, Greece, and the United States catalyzed the rise of distinct forms of populism. Drawing on comparative analysis, he argued that financial dislocations—from collapsing currencies to sovereign debt defaults—create fertile ground for populist movements, but the resulting forms of populism diverge significantly depending on cultural values, institutional structures, and historical trajectories.
Professor Kalaitzidis’s central thesis is that economic catastrophe often triggers political catastrophe, dismantling established political orders and reshaping governance models. Across the four cases, populist leaders capitalized on social grievances, deploying a mixture of policy populism, rhetorical populism, organizational strategies, charismatic leadership styles, and media mobilization techniques. Yet, despite their contextual differences, these cases reveal a common pattern: populism thrives by framing “the people” against entrenched elites while promising rapid relief to the most vulnerable sectors of society.
Thailand: Rural Populism and the Thaksin Model
Professor Kalaitzidis began with Thailand, which he described as the most challenging case due to language barriers and limited direct research. Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the collapse of the baht, Thaksin Shinawatra, a billionaire businessman, rose to power by forging a coalition between rural farmers and urban working classes.
Thaksin’s policy populism centered on concrete economic benefits: Universal healthcare via a symbolic “30 baht” ($1) hospital fee, direct cash transfers of one million baht per rural village, and debt relief for farmers, enabling significant poverty alleviation. His rhetorical populism framed the struggle as “rural masses versus Bangkok elites,” positioning himself as the defender of marginalized communities against urban dominance. Institutionally, he created the Thai Rak Thai Party, a personal political vehicle, consolidating control through charismatic CEO-style leadership and media dominance.
Despite repeated military coups and Thaksin’s exile, his political network remains influential. As Professor Kalaitzidis noted, “the populist version of the Thai Rak Thai Party continues unabated,” reflecting the enduring power of rural-based populism in Thailand.
Argentina: Kirchnerism and Anti-IMF Populism
In Argentina, the 2001 economic collapse—marked by sovereign default and skyrocketing unemployment—triggered another form of populism. Néstor Kirchner and, later, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner led Kirchnerismo, a political project combining expansive welfare policies with defiant anti-IMF rhetoric. Their policy populism included: Increased social spending on pensions and welfare, subsidies for energy and public transportation, and aggressive debt renegotiations with international creditors.
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s leadership style was symbolically confrontational, presenting herself as the “defender of Argentina against foreign exploitation.” Professor Kalaitzidis highlighted a revealing interview with her former economics minister, who told him directly: “Don’t believe the IMF—they’re lying.”
Media strategy further amplified their narrative: while state-controlled outlets promoted Kirchnerism, opponents were framed as neoliberal agents undermining Argentine sovereignty. Even as Argentina later elected Javier Milei, an exclusionary populist, Kirchnerism remains deeply entrenched, reflecting the enduring centrality of anti-IMF populism in Argentina’s political identity.
Greece: Syriza and the Anti-Austerity Movement
Professor Kalaitzidis next turned to Greece, where the 2008 global financial crisis and EU-imposed austerity created fertile ground for Syriza’s left-wing populism. Led by Alexis Tsipras, Syriza built a broad anti-austerity coalition of pensioners, students, and social movements demanding relief from EU-imposed fiscal constraints. Key policy populism measures included: Promising debt relief and pension restoration, halting privatizations mandated by the “Troika” (IMF, EU, and ECB), and holding a national referendum on whether Greece should remain in the Eurozone.
Tsipras cultivated an anti-establishment image, symbolized by his refusal to wear a tie, signaling resistance to EU norms and domestic elites. His rhetorical populism framed the conflict as “Greeks versus the Troika,” appealing to national sovereignty amid external economic pressures.
However, Syriza’s eventual concessions to EU demands fractured its base and weakened its populist momentum. Today, Greece hosts a fragmented populist landscape, where multiple exclusionary and inclusionary movements—from the far left to the far right—compete for influence, illustrating populism’s institutional diffusion even after Syriza’s decline.
United States: Trumpism and Permanent Campaign Politics
The final case focused on the United States, where Donald Trump’s presidency (2017–2021) redefined populism in a highly polarized democracy. Professor Kalaitzidis characterized Trumpism as a right-wing, exclusionary populism rooted in white working-class, rural, and disaffected conservative constituencies. Trump’s policy populism emphasized: Tax cuts and deregulation, protectionist tariffs under “America First” trade policy, and restrictive immigration measures framed as defending “real Americans.”
His rhetorical populism weaponized the narrative of “real Americans versus corrupt Washington elites,” encapsulated in the slogan “Drain the Swamp.” Meanwhile, his organizational strategy involved capturing the Republican Party via the MAGA movement, transforming it from Reagan-era conservatism into a personalist political vehicle.
Trump leveraged social media mastery to bypass traditional gatekeepers, embracing a “permanent campaign” style based on real-time polling, online mobilization, and conspiratorial counter-narratives. Professor Kalaitzidis stressed that Trumpism’s influence extends beyond Trump himself, reshaping electoral rules, redistricting strategies, and policymaking for the foreseeable future.
Populism’s Legacy: Structural Shifts and Unresolved Tensions
Professor Kalaitzidis concluded by emphasizing that populism is not merely rhetorical performance but a structural response to globalization’s disruptions. In all four cases, populists emerged as mediators between national sovereignty and global economic pressures, but their methods and outcomes diverged: In Thailand, rural-based populism survives despite elite pushback; in Argentina, populism remains central to political identity, whether inclusive or exclusionary; in Greece, Syriza’s decline fragmented but did not extinguish populist forces; in the United States, Trumpism has permanently reshaped party politics and electoral norms.
Yet, across these contexts, populism’s strategies—mobilizing “the people,” rejecting establishment elites, and exploiting economic dislocation—share a common DNA. As Professor Kalaitzidis observed, “Economic crises highlight the tensions between national democracy and global markets, and populism thrives in this gap.”
Greek postage stamp depicting Andreas G. Papandreou, circa 1997. Photo: Sergei Nezhinskii.
Proefessor Elizabeth Kosmetatou:“Populism, Clientelism, and the Greek State under Papandreou”
In her detailed and engaging presentation, Professor Elizabeth Kosmetatou(Professor of History, University of Illinois Springfield) examined the political trajectory, leadership style, and enduring legacy of Andreas Papandreou — one of Greece’s most charismatic yet polarizing leaders. Drawing from archival research, declassified CIA documents, and historical accounts, she explored how Papandreou’s populism and clientelist practices reshaped Greek politics during his premierships (1981–1989, 1993–1996) and left a lasting imprint on Greece’s democratic institutions, political culture, and economic trajectory.
Professor Kosmetatou framed Papandreou as a transformative yet controversial figure, whose governance combined populist mobilization with entrenched patronage networks. His leadership marked a critical juncture in Greece’s modern history, defined by democratization after the fall of the junta, accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), and struggles over modernization and European integration. Yet, she argued, Papandreou’s blend of charismatic authority, populist narratives, and systemic clientelism simultaneously empowered marginalized groups while deepening structural vulnerabilities that still shape Greek politics today.
Early Life, Political Formation, and Exile
Born in 1919 into a prominent political family, Andreas Papandreou was the son of George Papandreou, one of Greece’s most influential liberal statesmen, nicknamed “the Old Man of Democracy.” Despite growing up under his father’s towering shadow, Andreas forged his own path, first as a Harvard-trained economist and later as a professor at elite US universities including Minnesota, Northwestern, and Berkeley, where he chaired the economics department.
Papandreou’s early political experiences were shaped by Greece’s turbulent mid-20th century history: authoritarianism under Metaxas (1936–1941), the Greek Civil War (1946–1949), and the deep polarization between left and right. Arrested in 1939 for links to a Trotskyist group, he fled to the US and reinvented himself academically before returning to Greece in 1963 to enter politics under his father’s Center Union Party.
By the mid-1960s, Papandreou had already cultivated an image as a radical reformer within the establishment. However, the 1967 military coup disrupted his rise: he was arrested, imprisoned, and later exiled to Sweden and Canada. It was during this exile that he founded PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) in 1974, marking a decisive ideological break from his father’s centrist tradition. Six years later, in the 1981 elections, PASOK surged from 13% to 48% of the vote — an unprecedented transformation in Greek political history.
Charismatic Leadership and Populist Narrative
Professor Kosmetatou emphasized Papandreou’s mastery of charismatic authority, placing him within the Weberian framework of “extraordinary leaders” who derive legitimacy not from institutions but from personal magnetism. His style combined academic intellect with performative populism, making him both an elite economist and a fiery nationalist orator.
His political discourse blended anti-elitism, social justice, and sovereignty. Papandreou portrayed Greece as a “dependent country” shackled by foreign powers, casting “the people” against corrupt domestic elites and imperialist outsiders — first the United States (blamed for supporting the junta and mishandling Cyprus) and later Germany (associated with austerity and economic conditionality).
One of Papandreou’s slogans, “Η Ελλάδα στους Έλληνες” (“Greece belongs to the Greeks”), became emblematic of his populist framing. He called for “change” (αλλαγή), promising to restore national dignity, expand welfare protections, and empower ordinary citizens. His rallies drew hundreds of thousands — sometimes over a million attendees — turning politics into mass performance. His speeches, delivered in simple, emotive language infused with slang, created a sense of collective ownership over history, epitomized by PASOK’s iconic slogan: “Ραντεβού με την Ιστορία” (“Appointment with History”).
Professor Kosmetatou argued that Papandreou’s charisma and mobilization techniques placed him within a global tradition of populist leadership, comparable to Perón in Argentina, Chávez in Venezuela, or Narendra Modi in India. However, his brand of populism was distinctly Greek, rooted in historical grievances, cultural narratives, and the lingering trauma of civil conflict.
Clientelism, Patronage, and Institutional Transformation
A central theme of the presentation was Papandreou’s use of clientelism — the exchange of public resources for political loyalty — as both a tool of governance and a mechanism of populist inclusion.
Papandreou’s governments expanded the public sector dramatically, appointing thousands of loyalists to state jobs, often bypassing competitive exams. Subsidies, pensions, and direct resource allocations were distributed along patronage networks spanning unions, rural constituencies, and marginalized groups historically excluded from power.
While this empowered underrepresented communities, Professor Kosmetatou stressed, it also entrenched dependence on the state and weakened institutional autonomy. Ministries became politicized, bureaucratic turnover soared, and policymaking increasingly relied on informal personal networks rather than transparent procedures. Papandreou frequently handpicked ministers and dismissed them abruptly — most famously firing Deputy Foreign Minister Asimakis Fotilas in 1982 for diverging from his directives at a European Community meeting.
Over time, clientelist governance blurred into systemic corruption. Major scandals, such as the Koskotas affair, implicated senior officials and eroded public trust. By normalizing patronage, Papandreou reshaped Greek political culture: all major parties adopted similar practices, embedding clientelism as a defining feature of the Greek state well beyond his premiership.
Economic Policy, European Integration, and Fiscal Vulnerability
Professor Kosmetatou situated Papandreou’s populism within Greece’s shifting economic and European context. After joining the European Economic Community in 1981, Greece received massive inflows of EU structural funds with minimal oversight. Papandreou used these resources to expand welfare spending, subsidize key sectors, and support clientelist distribution — while maintaining low taxation levels. Public debt, however, escalated sharply: In 1981, debt was 23% of GDP, by 1991, it had risen to 71%, and by 2002, when Greece entered the Eurozone, it stood at 117%.
Professor Kosmetatou highlighted how populist fiscal policies, combined with persistent trade deficits and weak administrative controls, laid the groundwork for Greece’s 2010 sovereign debt crisis. Declassified CIA reports from the 1980s had already warned of structural vulnerabilities, citing unsustainable populist spending and limited regulatory oversight.
Despite his anti-European rhetoric, Papandreou pragmatically kept Greece within the EEC and NATO, using nationalist themes to negotiate aid and favorable military balances, especially vis-à-vis Turkey. This dual strategy — radical discourse paired with pragmatic diplomacy — epitomized Papandreou’s political adaptability.
Reforms and Contradictions
Papandreou’s governments were not solely defined by patronage and debt; they also enacted significant social reforms that reshaped Greek society: Establishing a National Health Service to expand hospital access; liberalizing family law, strengthening women’s rights in marriage and divorce; introducing student participation in university governance, transforming academic culture; and officially recognizing the Greek Resistance during the German occupation, granting symbolic justice to excluded generations. Yet these reforms coexisted with instability and scandals. Between 1981 and 1989, his cabinets reshuffled 13 times, reflecting the fragility of decision-making within an intensely personalized political system.
Professor Kosmetatou argued that Papandreou’s contradictory legacy—progressive reforms alongside deepened clientelism and fiscal imbalances—continues to shape Greece’s governance and economic trajectory today.
Legacy and Polarization
Nearly three decades after his death in 1996, Papandreou remains one of Greece’s most polarizing figures. To admirers, he was the liberator who brought αλλαγή (“change”), consolidated democracy after the junta, and gave voice to marginalized groups. To critics, he was the architect of systemic corruption, unsustainable debt, and institutional decay.
Nevertheless, Professor Kosmetatou stressed, Papandreou’s mastery of populist charisma fundamentally transformed Greek political culture. His ability to mobilize mass enthusiasm, personalize governance, and redefine national identity created a template for subsequent Greek leaders, including Alexis Tsipras of Syriza, who consciously modeled aspects of his style on Papandreou’s performative populism.
PASOK’s decline after Papandreou’s death underscores the personalized nature of his power. Without his leadership, the party fragmented, highlighting the structural risks of politics built on charismatic authority rather than institutional strength.
Conclusion
Professor Kosmetatou concluded that Andreas Papandreou’s legacy embodies the paradox of populism: it can simultaneously democratize and destabilize. Through charisma, clientelism, and mass mobilization, Papandreou transformed Greek politics, empowered excluded constituencies, and reoriented the nation’s relationship with Europe and the global order. Yet, his fiscal policies, personalized governance, and embedded patronage systems created enduring vulnerabilities — economic, institutional, and cultural — that continue to shape Greece’s trajectory well into the 21st century.
Papandreou’s story illustrates a broader lesson about populism’s dual edge: while it can energize democratic participation, it often weakens institutional capacity, leaving states exposed to future crises. As Professor Kosmetatou concluded, understanding Papandreou’s era is essential not only to explaining Greece’s recent past but also to grappling with the long-term consequences of charismatic populism in contemporary democracies.
BJP supporters celebrate Narendra Modi’s victory during the 2019 assembly elections in Bhopal, India. Photo: Dreamstime.
Discussant Dr. João Ferreira Dias: Is Populism Offspring of Crisis—or Accelerant?
Dr. João Ferreira Dias offered a brisk, conceptually grounded set of remarks that stitched the panel’s papers into a broader argument about what populism is and how it works. He opened by defining populism less as a doctrine than as a discourse and performance that can be grafted onto multiple ideologies. In his view, it thrives amid social and political polarization and is frequently entangled with ethno-nationalism, his own area of research. Populist drama, he suggested, often promises a kind of psychological or spiritual renewal for the nation.
On Dynasties, Big Business, and Outsider Rhetoric
Responding to the first paper, Dr. Dias praised the conceptual pairings—“orphans,” “patricians,” and “entrenched elites”—as analytically fertile. The “orphan” posture lets leaders claim proximity to “the people,” while elite lineage can be reframed as stability, experience, and success. He urged the authors to sharpen the paradox of Trump and Modi: both channel anti-elite narratives while forging tactical alliances with powerful political and economic actors (e.g., tech and corporate lobbies). Historically, dynasties are part of the democratic “furniture”; what is new, he argued, is the coincidencia oppositorum—the coupling of oligarchic networks, family power, and anti-establishment populism—that uses national drama to claim, and then consolidate, power.
On Out-groups and Elite Cues
Turning to the second paper, Dr. Dias underscored the centrality of in-group/out-group framing in populist strategy, noting how leaders in the US and Europe defend a supposed “biocultural identity” against migrants and minorities. He welcomed the distinction between “follow-the-leader” (elite cues) and “social attributes” effects, but argued they often operate together. Drawing on Portugal, he described how André Ventura is portrayed as a “weather vane,” echoing bottom-up talk from taxis, taverns, and social media, even as top-down moral panics about migration are manufactured by elites and amplified by media competition for audience share. He found the study’s results striking: Trump’s cues polarize rather than persuade—conservatives rally, liberals recoil—implying that the real mechanism is mobilization and polarization, not cross-cutting persuasion. A qualitative agenda, he added, should test whether “follow-the-leader” is the DNA of MAGA, a coordinated reaction to social change, economic anxiety, and migration pressures that Trump effectively orchestrated.
On Economic Crisis and Divergent Populisms
Addressing the comparative paper on Thailand, Argentina, Greece, and the US, Dr. Dias lauded its robust design, showing how economic dislocation yields different populist species: military intervention in Thailand, Kirchnerismo in Argentina, left-nationalist forms in Greece, and Trumpism in the US. He suggested extending the arc to Milei’s libertarian populism in Argentina, which flips the economic script (anti-state, radical market) while retaining the populist grammar of “the people” vs. “the caste.” Populism, he argued, is reshaped by successive crises rather than produced once and for all. Likewise, the post-2008 surge of Europe’s radical left often subsided as party systems re-sorted (he cited Portugal’s sharp contraction from a 19-seat bloc to a single deputy). He floated Brazilian parallels (Collor’s campaigning among the “shirtless” and urban poor) to show how stylistic outreach can reposition populist appeals. The larger theoretical question he posed: Does populism require economic crisis, or do crises simply accelerate latent cultural and socioeconomic grievances that populists voice and mobilize?
On Papandreou: Charisma, Clientelism, and Executive Populism
Dr. Dias called the historical reconstruction excellent and asked whether charisma mainly legitimized clientelism or constituted an independent source of appeal. He proposed reading Andreas Papandreou as an instance of “cabinet” or “executive” populism: not merely oppositional rhetoric, but a mode of governing—concentrating power, distributing state resources, and embedding patronage. Comparing Portugal, he noted how the Socialist Party lost voters amid perceptions of clientelism and corruption, illustrating how left populisms that once represented “the people” can later cede ground to the right. His key questions for Greece were pointed: To what extent did Papandreou strengthen democracy while simultaneously entrenching clientelist practices? And how did European integration and EU funds help mask or magnify the paradox of populism plus clientelism?
Cross-cutting themes and closing provocations. Across the papers, Dr. Dias returned to three through-lines:
Performance over program: Populism is stylistic and strategic, injected into left, right, or libertarian projects as needed.
Polarization over persuasion: Elite cues rarely convert opponents; they harden camps and energize bases.
National political cultures matter: Populism travels, but local institutions, histories, and media ecosystems shape its form, targets, and durability.
He encouraged further work on media logics (how competition and virality make charismatic leaders “fashionable”), on the feedback loop between grassroots talk and elite cue-setting, and on the institutional afterlives of populist governance—especially where clientelist distribution becomes routine statecraft. His final challenge to the panel distilled his critique: Is populism the offspring of crisis, or the accelerant that turns smoldering cleavages into open fire?
Overall Conclusion
Session 1 underscored a clear, sobering consensus: populist authoritarianism is less a fixed ideology than a flexible toolkit that exploits uncertainty, identity conflict, and institutional weakness. Across cases—from India and the US to Greece, Thailand, and Argentina—speakers showed how leaders fuse outsider performances with insider alliances (dynasties, corporate finance), mobilize elite cues to polarize rather than persuade, and convert economic shocks into durable political change. Professor Sanders’ structural diagnosis (eroded left–right anchors, post-truth dynamics, migration politics, identity fragmentation, globalization’s losers, and strategic norm-bending) aligned with panel evidence that national political cultures filter these pressures into distinct, yet rhyming, trajectories.
The session also pointed toward remedies. Reclaiming immigration with humane, evidence-based policy; rebalancing rights discourse to include community goods; rewiring globalization to protect social contracts; rebuilding state capacity; and enforcing platform accountability emerged as mutually reinforcing priorities. Methodologically, participants called for comparative, mixed-methods research that links micro-level opinion formation and media incentives to macro-level patterns of executive aggrandizement and clientelist governance.
As the series proceeds, ECPS will move from diagnosis to design: testing what institutional guardrails, civic coalitions, and communicative strategies actually bend polarization downward and restore democratic problem-solving. The challenge is long-term, but the session showed a path—empirical, interdisciplinary, and resolutely comparative.
In a wide-ranging ECPS interview, Ben-Gurion University scholar Halleli Pinson argues that Israel’s Gaza policy is intertwined with an illiberal turn at home. “The polarization we saw before October 7 around judicial reform,” she notes, “is now translated into how people understand the war and the hostages,” adding that “the continuation of the war serves this broader agenda… to reconstruct the Israeli regime into an illiberal one.”Dr. Pinson details how curricula sideline liberal democracy while NGOs and academics face a shrinking space for dissent. Media framings and social media echo chambers deepen an “epistemic polarization.” Though anti-war discourse is growing, she warns that animosities are hardening: “It may take a generation to shift the discourse toward a more liberal, mainstream orientation.”
The ongoing Gaza war has not only reshaped regional geopolitics but has also profoundly transformed Israel’s political culture, educational discourse, and democratic institutions. In this exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Associate Professor Halleli Pinson, a political sociologist of education at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, provides a compelling analysis of the interplay between right-wing populism, illiberalism, and knowledge production in Israel, revealing how the conflict intersects with broader ideological projects.
At the heart of her argument lies a critical assessment of the government’s use of the war to advance structural political changes. As Dr. Pinson observes, “The polarization that we experienced in the year and a half before October 7th around the judicial reform is, in a sense, translated into how people understand the government’s policy regarding the war and the hostages.” She highlights a direct link between the government’s attacks on democratic institutions — such as the Supreme Court and the Attorney General — and its broader populist strategy: “The continuation of the war serves this broader agenda, attempting, in a way, to reconstruct the Israeli regime into an illiberal one.”
For Dr. Pinson, this illiberal turn is deeply embedded in Israel’s educational and discursive transformation. Over the past decade and a half, she argues, populist discourse has profoundly reshaped curricula, civic education, and public understanding of democracy. Discussions of liberal values, multiculturalism, and human rights are increasingly sidelined, while “illiberal democratic models” are emphasized. As she explains, Israel is being redefined “as primarily Jewish first and democratic only when it aligns with that identity,” a shift that has normalized the erasure of the Green Line and reframed settlements as integral parts of Israel.
The interview also delves into the shrinking space for dissent in both schools and universities. NGOs like Breaking the Silence and other human rights groups are excluded from classrooms, while academics face growing pressures under proposed legislation that would allow universities to dismiss professors “accused of supporting terrorism” — a definition so vague, Dr. Pinson warns, that “saying that there is starvation in Gaza or standing with photographs of children who lost their lives could be considered as support for terrorism.”
Finally, Dr. Pinson reflects on Israel’s fractured society and the growing epistemic polarization intensified by the war. While public criticism of the government has increased, she is concerned about entrenched animosities: “The level of hatred being cultivated between camps is deeply concerning… I’m not very optimistic, and I believe it’s going to take a generation to shift the discourse toward a more liberal, mainstream orientation.”
This conversation offers an essential lens for understanding how the Gaza war intersects with Israel’s democratic backsliding, populist rhetoric, and societal divides.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Associate Professor Halleli Pinson, edited lightly for readability.
Populist Discourse Is Reshaping Education and Normalizing the Occupation
Professor Pinson, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How has the rise of right-wing populism in Israel shaped curriculum design, educational policy, and civic education? In what ways does this curricular engineering affect how younger generations understand Gaza, Palestinian society, and the broader conflict?
Associate Professor Halleli Pinson: Let me start by saying that populist discourse over the past decade, or even longer, has significantly influenced curriculum and educational discourse — not only in high schools and schools in general but also within higher education institutions. While it is somewhat speculative to assess precisely how this shapes views of Gaza, I can offer a few examples of how such populist discourse has manifested in the field of education. For instance, just this week we learned that the civic education curriculum — specifically the matriculation exam for next year — will exclude discussions of liberal democracy, human rights, and related topics. Although it does not explicitly state that these subjects are being removed from the curriculum, the Ministry of Education sets annual focus areas, and this year, these topics have simply been omitted from that focus.
On the other hand, when it comes to defining Israel as a Jewish state, its commitment to the Jewish people, and other models of democracy referenced in textbooks or the curriculum — what I would term “illiberal democratic models” — these are increasingly emphasized at the expense of discussions on liberal democracy, multiculturalism, civil rights, and human rights. This reflects the particular type of populism characteristic of Israel, which prioritizes defining Israel as a Jewish state rather than as a democratic one, effectively reducing its democratic nature to a very thin model of democracy. These changes are consistently reflected in school curricula.
I would argue that this shift — from understanding Israel as both Jewish and democratic, or democratic and Jewish, to viewing it as primarily Jewish first and democratic only when it aligns with that identity — has, over the past decade and a half, become fully normalized within educational discourse and the production of knowledge in education. It began with significant changes to the civic curriculum but extended further, such as the complete erasure of the Green Line from geography and history textbooks, effectively normalizing settlements in the West Bank as integral parts of Israel.
I am quite certain that if you asked the average high school student in Israel, or even an undergraduate, many would neither know where the Green Line is nor recognize that places like Ariel are located in occupied territory. They are unlikely to use the language of “occupied territories” or acknowledge that understanding at all. In my generation, people debated whether Israel should continue the occupation or not, but it was at least understood as an open question. Today, however, the occupation has been so normalized that most people no longer perceive it as occupation. This, without doubt, has significant ramifications for how the conflict in Gaza — and the ongoing war there — is understood and discussed, if at all, in education today.
Shrinking Space for Dissent: Populism Redraws the Boundaries of Legitimate Discourse
The exclusion of NGOs such as Breaking the Silence and growing pressures on left-leaning academics point to shrinking intellectual pluralism. To what extent do these measures reflect a broader populist strategy to control knowledge production and suppress dissent?
Associate Professor Halleli Pinson: I want to broaden the discussion beyond knowledge production to consider how actions such as the exclusion of NGOs like Breaking the Silence, the Forum for Grieving Families, and other left-wing or human rights organizations from schools reflect a broader process. I see this as part of a deliberate redrawing of the boundaries of legitimate discourse within the Israeli education system. It is not only about knowledge production itself, which primarily occurs through curriculum design, but also about the types of discourse and political perspectives to which students are exposed. In this regard, the boundaries have been significantly reshaped — a process that began before October 7th but has deepened even more profoundly over the past two years.
Several practices are being employed by right-wing populist organizations and politicians. The first is portraying groups like Breaking the Silence as “traitors.” Especially during wartime, they are framed as supporters or enablers of terrorism. In such an environment, if you do not want to be associated with terrorism, you are compelled to distance yourself from these discourses. This is not only about shifting the boundaries of discourse but also about redefining what is considered legitimate political conversation within schools — what you are allowed to question and what you are not.
To illustrate, I’ll give an example from the last two weeks. A group of school principals and high school teachers published a video calling for an end to the war, criticizing the government’s policies, and expressing concern over the humanitarian crisis and death toll in Gaza, as well as demanding the release of hostages. Following the video, about 20 principals were summoned to the Ministry of Education for what was essentially a disciplinary warning, even though it was not an official hearing. They were cautioned that they had crossed the boundaries of what is considered permissible for educators to say. The same applied to teachers.
Then, on September 1st — the first day of the school year in Israel — students at several schools organized a strike calling for an end to the war, the release of hostages, and an end to the suffering in Gaza. The response from Education Minister Yoav Kish was twofold. First, he instructed schools to mark these students as absent in their personal files, introducing a punitive element. Second, he publicly addressed the striking students, accusing them of jeopardizing national unity and being divisive.
From my perspective, as someone who studies the effects of populism on both schools and higher education, this demonstrates how the space for criticism and democratic discourse is constantly shrinking. A year ago, it was more mainstream to discuss the hostages openly. Now, combining discussions about hostages with calls to end the war is framed as crossing the boundaries of legitimate discourse established by the Ministry of Education.
This extends beyond schools to higher education institutions. Less than two weeks ago, during a nationwide strike organized by the campaign to end the war and release the hostages, many university professors — including heads of major Israeli universities — declared they would personally participate. The Minister of Education responded by instructing the Ministry of Finance to dock their pay for the day of the strike.
These measures, especially when directed at principals and teachers who are more vulnerable than university professors, create a powerful chilling effect on critical discourse and dissent within Israel’s educational system.
Public Opinion Shifts, but Denial and Division Persist
Israelis protest at Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s anti-democratic coup on April 1, 2023. Photo: Avivi Aharon.
How has Israeli public opinion evolved throughout the Gaza war, and to what extent do these shifts reflect deeper sociopolitical cleavages within Israeli society—such as ethnic, ideological, or generational divides?
Associate Professor Halleli Pinson: This is a very good question, and there has indeed been some evolution in how the Israeli public responds to the war. To some extent, there is a change, and I’ll try to explain what I mean by that. The war itself is now more heavily criticized. A large part of the Israeli Jewish population, according to public polls, seems to understand that the continuation of the war is political, serving the interests of the current government, and particularly Benjamin Netanyahu. In this sense, there has been an evolution.
A year ago, or even right after October 7th, the majority of the Israeli public believed the war was justified — that it was the only solution and what needed to be done. Now, however, there is a more critical understanding of the continuation of the war. People are increasingly critical of the burden that many reserve soldiers are paying as the price of sustaining it, and there is a deep concern about the fate of the hostages as the conflict drags on. In that sense, there has been a significant shift in public opinion.
But what hasn’t changed much, or not to the same extent, is the ability of the Israeli public to actually understand, acknowledge, or be critical of what’s happening in Gaza. I think Jewish-Israeli public opinion can be divided into groups — setting aside those on the far right who openly support the continuation of Gaza’s destruction and even talk about plans such as building a Riviera there once they “get rid of everyone.” For the majority, however, there is either complete denial of what’s happening in Gaza or apathy toward it.
In that respect, I’m not sure how much public opinion has truly changed. There are cracks, yes — more attempts by left-wing activists and organizations to bring the issues of starvation, rising death tolls, and widespread destruction into the public sphere. But there is also widespread disbelief, with some dismissing reports about starvation as “AI-generated” or fake, while others say, “Yes, it’s regrettable, but it’s their fault because of October 7th.” Some express even harsher views, saying, “After October 7th, I lost all ability to be compassionate about the other side.”
For me, this is extremely difficult to hear and accept, but I think it reflects ongoing processes in Israeli society that began long before October 7th and whose consequences we are now witnessing.
I would also say there’s a strong correlation between the people who, before October 7th, were out on the streets protesting the judicial overhaul and the actions of the current government against the Supreme Court and other democratic gatekeepers, and those who are now protesting the continuation of the war. But it’s important to note that many of these protesters are not necessarily motivated by concern for the humanitarian crisis in Gaza; rather, they oppose the war because they believe it harms Israel’s own interests, undermines its security, and jeopardizes its democracy.
Competing Truths and Growing Epistemic Polarization
Israeli newspapers and magazines on display in the streets of Tel Aviv, December 12, 2018. Photo: Jose Hernandez.
To what degree has the Israeli media ecosystem—spanning state-controlled outlets, private mainstream channels, and social media—contributed to the construction of competing “truth regimes” around the Gaza war? Are we witnessing a process of epistemic polarization that reshapes how different publics understand the conflict?
Associate Professor Halleli Pinson: Let’s start with the mainstream media. The mainstream media has completely failed in its role of exposing the Israeli public to the full picture of what’s going on, including the costs for everyone. For the better part of at least the first year and a half, there were very rarely any reports about what was happening in Gaza. And, when there were reports from Gaza, they were almost always from the perspective of the soldiers. You’d have a reporter or reporters joining one of the units serving in Gaza — Israeli journalists — and all of this was always coordinated by the IDF spokesperson unit. As a result, the majority of the Israeli public was not really exposed to what was actually happening in Gaza. Even now, when there is a bit more discussion and slightly greater exposure, it is still presented in a very limited way and within a very specific narrative that avoids placing any blame on the actions of Israel.
So, just to give you an example — I don’t remember the exact phrasing, but when the international reports about starvation in Gaza started to appear, one of the Israeli channels — I think it was Channel 13 — reported, kind of “revealing” that the majority of the children who died of starvation had pre-medical conditions that probably contributed to them dying from starvation. The way it was framed, it was like, “Hey, here we reveal the big lie. There is no starvation; people are not dying of starvation in Gaza. Actually, those who died from starvation were dying because they had pre-medical conditions.” And that was, in a way, saying to the Israeli public, “Hey, look, it’s not our fault.”
When it comes to social media, I sometimes feel almost like I’m in my own bubble because this is the way social media works. So, I see reports of the destruction in Gaza — and I’m exposed to this sort of information, and the majority of my social media friends, followers, or the people I follow are in agreement with me. But when you look a bit outside, you’ll see — and I’ve heard it from people at the university whom I would consider smart, critical people — they’ll say, “This is fake news; this is AI. The whole starvation photographs are all AI-generated. There’s no real starvation.”
There’s great disbelief in the reports coming from Gaza and a lack of critical questioning, like, “How come we don’t get independent reports from Gaza, for instance?” This is a question I’d like my students to ask — why we don’t know. And so, this is something where we see a great epistemic crisis, in a sense, or polarization between those who are 100% aware and exposed to what’s going on in Gaza and what’s going on in the rest of the world, and, on the other hand, those who are kind of completely blind or in denial about what’s going on.
I’ll just give you an example. This polarization is also visible in political activism in the streets. In the past several months, there’s been an initiative in Tel Aviv during the big weekly demonstration — the one for the release of the hostages and against the continuation of the war. There’s a growing group of people who stand with photographs of children who were killed in Gaza. And this is amidst a crowd that’s there to say they’re against the war. In that instance, I think it made people think and reflect, like, “Okay, maybe it’s not just our suffering.”
But when this sort of vigil went to other parts of the city — not during the weekly demonstration — and I stood in those vigils, the level of contempt and hatred it attracted was intense because it put a mirror in front of people in Israel. We were standing with photographs of children, and the responses would be either disbelief or accusations: “You’re Hamas supporters.” Or, “Well, even if they are children, they’ll grow up to be Nukhba (the special forces unit of Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas)and they’ll do the next massacre.”
So, again, there’s this movement between denial and justification, for lack of a better word. And I’ll give you another example. There’s also a campaign against starvation, which is, again, a vigil where we stand holding empty pots and pans in the street. There was a video released two days ago of about 15 chefs and restaurateurs standing with empty pots and pans and calling for an end to starvation. This was just two days ago. The chefs of these restaurants have been under attack for the last two or three days. Their Google rankings dropped because people are condemning them. Again, anything you say that expresses concern and empathy is immediately — in the public discourse, even among those who object to the war — seen as coming at the expense of caring for the hostages or “our own kind.” It is immediately framed as, “You support the other side.” So, again, there’s this sense that you cannot be compassionate toward both.
From Judicial Reform to Gaza: Populism Driving Israel’s Illiberal Turn
Massive protests against Netanyahu’s government predated the Gaza war but have intersected with it in complex ways. How do these demonstrations reveal competing conceptions of democracy in Israel, and do they indicate a growing rift between state policy and societal norms?
Associate Professor Halleli Pinson: The short answer is definitely yes. You can clearly see the polarization — and I mentioned it before — that we experienced in the year and a half before October 7th around the judicial reform being, in a sense, translated into how people understand the government’s policy regarding the war and the hostages. There are also many connections being made between the government’s attacks on the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and other democratic institutions, and how the continuation of the war serves this broader agenda, attempting, in a way, to reconstruct the Israeli regime into an illiberal one.
Going back to populism and the first question you asked me, we can see that many of the justifications the government uses draw directly on this populist discourse of “us against them,” “the will of the people,” “the true people,” and identifying those who are singled out as the “enemy within” or the “objective enemy,” and so on. These sorts of practices are used both in the context of the judicial reform and in justifying the continuation of the war.
The Catch-22 of International Boycotts
Pro-Palestinian protesters hold signs. Photo: Oliver Perez.
How does international criticism—including accusations of genocide by prominent scholars and institutions—shape Israeli public opinion and elite discourse? Do external pressures generate defensive consolidation around government narratives, or do they stimulate critical reflexivity among Israeli publics?
Associate Professor Halleli Pinson: This is something that I find very difficult to respond to. First, I would focus even more on the calls for an academic boycott of Israel. And let me say, to begin with, that I understand why people — my colleagues in other places around the world, university students, or academic associations — feel that they need to do something about what’s going on in Gaza. Whatever label we put on it, genocide or not, what’s going on in Gaza is on a scale that is unimaginable, and I wouldn’t like to see people being silenced globally in the face of what’s happening there.
But then, when I look at how this sort of criticism is being perceived in Israel, it’s more complex than that, and the political effectiveness of such measures is problematic. Just to explain, there’s a sort of Catch-22. I spoke about how Israeli media and the Israeli public perceive what’s going on in Gaza and about the movement of the majority of the public between denial, apathy, and justification — but with little, if any, self-reflection or sense of responsibility.
When this narrative is so strong — and it is a very strong narrative, even among those who oppose the continuation of the war — then, when people, organizations, or states call for sanctioning or boycotting Israel, the way it’s interpreted is: “Okay, here again, this is another proof that the world is against us.”
I had numerous conversations with people whom I greatly respect, and they would say things like, “Israel is being held to higher standards, and this is why we are attacked,” and, of course, they argue that this is no more than another expression of anti-Semitism. So, these are the sorts of ways this is perceived among the Israeli public. I’m not necessarily saying that people who oppose the government or Netanyahu will rally around him, but it is definitely not perceived as something helpful in terms of shaping public opinion or making people in Israel more aware or more reflective about their role or responsibility.
When it comes to the academic boycott — and this is, again, something I feel uneasy saying because, obviously, I am directly affected as an Israeli academic — I can only reflect on my own experience. I would say that, in a way, Israeli universities, and especially professors in the social sciences and humanities, have been targeted by the government for at least the past decade and a half. We’re being portrayed either as “the enemy within” or directly targeted through legislative measures intended to narrow or restrict the boundaries of legitimate discourse and sanction academics.
There is one very important piece of legislation currently under discussion — it has already passed its first reading in the Knesset — which states that universities will have to fire, without any due process, any professor accused of supporting terrorism. On the face of it, it sounds like, “Okay, of course, no country can allow anyone who supports terrorism to teach in a university.” But the way it’s framed in this legislation is problematic. First, it’s important to note that it essentially seeks to change the legislation around the autonomy of the Council of Higher Education, which is, in itself, a very problematic and populist move, taking a page out of Orbán’s book in Hungary. But basically, it doesn’t define what “supporting terrorism” means. And in the eyes of the government, as I explained before, saying that there is starvation in Gaza or standing with photographs of children who lost their lives in Gaza is considered support for terrorism. So, if this legislation passes, someone from a right-wing organization could accuse me — Halleli Pinson — of supporting terrorism, and the university would be obliged to fire me without compensation, without my pension. And if the university refuses to fire me, the government would cut its funding.
This legislation hasn’t fully passed yet, and it probably won’t pass in its harshest form, but even in its current form, it has a chilling effect. And again, right-wing organizations like Im Tirtzu and others are actively targeting university professors — not just for what we teach or don’t teach in the classroom, but also, not in my case personally, for what we post on our Facebook pages, demanding that universities fire professors who “don’t say the right thing.”
There’s also similar legislation being discussed to restrict student activities, which, of course, puts Palestinian professors and students at even greater risk than people like me who are identified as left-wing. So, I’m saying all this to explain that, in a way, it feels like, in the past year, we are being attacked by our colleagues abroad for not taking enough action or responsibility, and the calls for boycotting are growing stronger and stronger. But at the same time, I’m not sure the international community fully understands that we are also being attacked from within for speaking out about what’s going on in Gaza.
I’m not sure that boycotting us will actually make a difference in terms of policy because this government already has its vendetta against universities to begin with. And definitely, if I have less power within Israel and also have to worry about my collaborations outside Israel, then my ability to influence change becomes questionable — whether it grows or is, in fact, reduced. And I think that’s the Catch-22 here, which is problematic when it comes to calls for boycotting and sanctioning Israel. The real question is whether it’s effective — and I’m not sure that it is.
Gaza War Deepens Divides, A Generation Needed for Democratic Renewal
And lastly, Professor Pinson, looking beyond the immediate conflict, how might the Gaza war transform Israeli political culture, intergroup relations, and trust in democratic institutions? Do you foresee the entrenchment of a security-oriented populist paradigm, or is there potential for societal reimagining and reconciliation?
Associate Professor Halleli Pinson: I would say that I’m very much encouraged by the growing discourse in Israel against the war, and this is something that has been evolving over the past six months, or even more, over the past year. But I’m quite certain that, at some point, the war will end, as wars tend to. However, the damage being done to Israeli society internally is profound — both in terms of what has already happened and what is yet to come. Will people actually realize what has been going on in Gaza, come to terms with it, or will denial no longer be possible?
There is also the deepening rift that has been created, which is becoming even more pronounced, between those who support the continuation of the war and those who don’t — between the heads of the right-wing parties and their supporters, on the one hand, and segments of the more mainstream public on the other. The level of animosity and hatred that is, in a sense, being cultivated between these two camps is deeply concerning.
So, I’m not very optimistic, and I believe it’s going to take a generation to shift the discourse toward a more liberal, mainstream orientation.
In this incisive conversation, Brookings scholar Professor William A. Galston argues that America’s decentralized system remains a crucial brake on executive overreach. While warning of real risks, he maintains, “We’re not there yet,” distinguishing the US from harder cases of institutional capture abroad. Professor Galston spotlights federalism and the courts as the decisive arena of resistance—urging institutions to defend their prerogatives through litigation, “not street protests but the law.” He assesses the influence of Project 2025, redistricting fights in Texas/California, and the politics of immigration, crime, and DEI, noting potential backlash among centrist voters. The result is a clear-eyed appraisal of democratic resilience—and the legal contests that will shape whether the US moves toward or away from competitive authoritarianism.
Giving an in-depth interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS),Professor William A. Galston — senior fellow and the Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in the Governance Studies program at Brookings Institution and a leading authority on American governance, populism, and institutional resilience — provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolving dynamics of US democracy under President Donald Trump’s second administration. Drawing on his deep expertise in political institutions and constitutional law, Professor Galston examines how federalism, legal contestation, and civil society remain central to safeguarding checks and balances amid mounting executive centralization.
As the title emphasizes, “US. Federalism Slows the Shift Toward Competitive Authoritarianism,” Professor Galston underscores that America’s decentralized political structure continues to serve as a buffer against executive overreach. He stresses that, despite concerns about democratic backsliding, the US is not yet on par with countries such as Hungary, Turkey, or India, where institutional capture has been far more extensive. “We’re not there yet,” Professor Galston explains, “and I am hopeful that we’ll never get there.”
A recurring theme throughout the interview is the growing role of law as the principal arena of political struggle. Professor Galston argues that the resilience of US democracy increasingly depends on institutions defending their legal prerogatives: “Pushing back, using not street protests but the law, will be the most important venue of contestation.”
This dynamic is vividly illustrated in his discussion of a recent legal battle involving Harvard University, which challenged the Trump administration’s attempt to withhold federal research funds. A federal judge sided with the university, ruling that the administration’s actions were unconstitutional. For Professor Galston, this episode demonstrates that institutions “with the will to defend their legal rights can push back — and push back effectively.”
The interview also delves into the strategic influence of Project 2025 and the Heritage Foundation in shaping Trump’s second-term agenda. Professor Galston notes that the initiative has successfully translated its ideas into both institutional frameworks and personnel appointments, allowing the administration to pursue expansive interpretations of executive authority while testing the limits of constitutional constraints.
Additionally, Professor Galston examines redistricting battles, such as those in Texas and California, highlighting how federalism enables both parties to counterbalance each other’s maneuvers, thereby slowing the concentration of power at the national level.
Finally, Galston reflects on the broader trajectory of US democracy, warning that the coming years will be decisive in determining whether constitutional norms can withstand mounting pressures. Yet he remains cautiously optimistic, noting that state governments, universities, professional associations, and civil society are “waking up” to the importance of defending democratic principles.
This interview offers a nuanced, scholarly perspective on the complex interplay between institutional resilience and executive ambition, providing crucial insights into America’s democratic future.
Professor William A. Galston is a senior fellow and the Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in the Governance Studies program at Brookings Institution and a leading authority on American governance, populism, and institutional resilience.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor William A. Galston, edited lightly for readability.
Executive Power Expands, but the Rule of Law Faces Its Test
Professor Galston, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How has Trump’s second-term agenda accelerated the concentration of executive power relative to his first term? Do you see evidence of a shift from ad hoc populist mobilization toward more institutionalized mechanisms of executive aggrandizement?
Professor William A. Galston: I certainly do. There has been a dramatic shift from President Trump’s first term to his second, largely because those around him who share his general worldview used those four years to craft a highly detailed agenda — not only a policy agenda but also an institutional and legal one — aimed at expanding the perimeter of executive power. They are pursuing this through the strategic use of existing laws and mechanisms. They are not coming in and declaring the Constitution invalid or claiming that the laws do not count. Rather, they are saying, “Here’s how we interpret the law,” in order to give the president the authority to do things that previous presidents did not attempt. This has created a legal struggle, which I believe lies at the heart of the current divisions in American politics.
In your statement to the NYT, you argue that Trump has pushed the role of the president far beyond what his predecessors would have ever tried. There are already respected scholars who call Trump ‘a dictator.’ Would you agree with this characterization?
Professor William A. Galston: No, I would not — at least not yet. The president has said that if the Supreme Court rules against him in a particular matter, he will respect that ruling and will no longer do what he is forbidden to do. That promise has not yet been tested. But the moment of truth will come sometime in the next 12 months. The Supreme Court, I believe, is very likely — and I can’t tell you which rulings it’s going to be — to rule against the president in some areas of his assertion of presidential authority. And if that happens, and I think the odds are very high that it will come sometime in the next 12 months, we will see whether President Trump intends to keep his word and respect the holding of the court. If he does keep his word, then I would have to say that, like some presidents before him, he has used every device to try to expand his power, but in the end, he recognizes that he is constrained by the rule of law. If he says, “The Supreme Court has made its decision, but I disagree with it, and I’m not going to obey it,” at that point, he will be asserting non-constitutional powers. And if he gets away with it, at that point, I would be willing to call him — if not a dictator — an authoritarian ruler who is ruling outside the law. That hasn’t happened yet.
Trump Moves to Institutionalize Power and Reshape Electoral Rules
To what extent does Trump’s governance illustrate a transition from charismatic populism to incipient authoritarianism, and which institutional indicators best capture this trajectory?
Professor William A. Galston: Well, this, in a way, extends the first question you posed to me, namely the difference between the first Trump term and the second. There is certainly an effort to institutionalize not only a more powerful presidency but also a stronger Republican Party that has been reshaped in the president’s image. The efforts to change the electoral rules of the game between now and the midterm elections through state-based redistricting represent an attempt to institutionalize an advantage for his party.
Similarly, the president is seeking to reshape the laws that govern elections — who can vote, how they can vote, and what the requirements are for voting — all with the aim of securing an edge over the Democratic Party. These are clear attempts to institutionalize not only his authority as chief executive but also the power of his party. Some of these efforts may succeed, while others will fail. It’s hard to predict.
Certainly, the president has the right to ask a particular state to engage in redistricting, and many, though not all, states will be able to respond to that in one way or another. So that’s certainly within existing political bounds. President Franklin Roosevelt, for example, tried to use an election to purge members of his party with whom he disagreed. His party fought back, and he was rebuffed. So this is not the first time a president has tried to institutionalize greater power and authority for himself and his party. Previous efforts have not succeeded, at least not entirely. For example, Roosevelt attempted in 1935 to do what President Trump is trying to do in 2025 — eliminate independent agencies whose leaders are exempt from firing simply because the president dislikes them or disagrees with some of their decisions. The Supreme Court said no to Roosevelt in 1935, and he respected that. He wasn’t happy about it, he grumbled, but he respected the decision. We’ll see what happens this time. Those of us with some knowledge of American political history recognize aspects of what’s going on now — not all of it, but some of it.
Culture Wars and Power Plays Redefine US Political Fault Lines
A Trump flag waves at a pier on Coden Beach in Coden, Alabama, on June 9, 2024. The flag bears the slogan, “Jesus is my Savior. Trump is my President.” Photo: Carmen K. Sisson.
Trump has repeatedly sought to limit congressional oversight and weaken checks and balances. Do these efforts signal a temporary partisan strategy or a structural erosion of US democratic institutions?
Professor William A. Galston: The erosion of congressional oversight has occurred through political processes rather than institutional changes and, therefore, could be reversed by a president with a different attitude. Just this week, for example, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Mark Warner of Virginia, was scheduled to conduct oversight at one of the intelligence facilities under the aegis of the Department of Defense, and reportedly, the Secretary of Defense intervened and canceled the site visit that Senator Warner was going to make. That was a clear effort to reduce congressional oversight. However, there was nothing institutional about it.
By the way, I misstated earlier: Senator Warner used to be the chairman of the Intelligence Committee and is now the leading Democrat on a committee chaired by a Republican colleague, with whom he has worked very well. So, I don’t think that the reduction of Congress’s oversight capacity has been institutionalized. I do think it reflects the will of the current president and the unwillingness of members of his own party in Congress to challenge his will. For a very simple reason: they’re afraid of him. They’re afraid of what he can do to them—to damage their political careers—and perhaps for other reasons as well. That’s not an institution; that’s an individual set of relationships.
How do you assess the strategic deployment of culture wars in Trump’s political agenda? Are they primarily an ideological project, or do they function as a power-consolidation tool to reshape voter alignments and institutional priorities?
Professor William A. Galston: Both. And certainly, President Trump, as a candidate and as a president, has been very good at discerning the fundamental fault lines or cleavages in American political culture and defining those fault lines in a way that maximizes the number of people who will be on his side of the line. Part of effective leadership is to define controversies that work to your advantage. In the cultural arena, President Trump has an instinct for those conflicts. I don’t think all of them that he’s picked have worked to his advantage, but certainly, the three that he emphasized in the 2024 presidential election, and again in the early months of his administration—namely immigration, crime, and so-called DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) initiatives—have all worked to his advantage so far.
Having said that, there are signs that voters in the middle of our political spectrum—and yes, there are still many of them—are beginning to conclude that the president may be going too far in the tactics he’s using. That’s demonstrably the case in immigration, where there is widespread disapproval not of the president’s objectives but of the means he’s using to achieve those objectives, which many citizens in the middle of the political spectrum view as unnecessarily cruel and as failing to provide potential candidates for deportation with sufficient legal rights to challenge the grounds of their deportations. And while Americans, generally speaking, align with the president’s goals on crime and some of the measures he’s used to reduce it, there isn’t the kind of mass support for the use of federal troops in American cities that the president imagines. At this point, I would say that probably a narrow majority of Americans believe that’s not the right long-term approach to fighting crime.
Project 2025 Drives Trump’s Institutional Power Agenda
How do you evaluate the role of Project 2025 and the Heritage Foundation’s allied networks in shaping Trump’s second-term policy framework? Are these actors contributing to the institutionalization of authoritarian governance through ideologically driven restructuring of federal institutions?
Professor William A. Galston: I believe the Heritage Foundation, through Project 2025, has been enormously successful in shaping the second Trump administration. If you listen to current Heritage leaders — as well as former leaders who now hold senior positions in the administration — their argument isn’t that they’re overturning the Constitution, but rather that they’re correcting what they see as improper interpretations of it.
For example, more than half a century ago, Congress passed a law preventing the president from withholding funds appropriated for specific purposes. In my view, the president has acted in ways inconsistent with that law. Yet his leading budget advisor — the head of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) — has stated flatly that this law is unconstitutional. They are determined to use this controversy to take the matter to the Supreme Court, arguing that the statute improperly restricts presidential authority.
All of this was carefully planned in advance by senior members of the Heritage Foundation. In fact, the current head of OMB was one of the architects of Project 2025. There has been a direct translation of Project 2025’s core ideas into both the institutions and the personnel of Trump’s second term. The Heritage effort has effectively served as a recruitment mechanism: identifying individuals aligned with the president’s agenda, testing their loyalty, and placing them in key policymaking and policy-executing roles.
It has been a tremendous success — we’ve rarely seen anything like this. And speaking as a member of a rival think tank, the Brookings Institution, I must admit: although I disagree with much of what the Heritage Foundation proposed in Project 2025, I have to tip my hat to them. They’ve been enormously effective and have played their cards extremely well.
Comparing Trump with Orbán, Erdoğan, and Modi: Similar Rhetoric, Weaker Grip
Matryoshka dolls featuring images of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump displayed at a souvenir counter in Moscow on March 16, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.
In comparative perspective, how does Trump’s reliance on identity-based polarization and his governing style align with global populist-authoritarian trajectories — such as those of Orbán in Hungary, Erdoğan in Turkey, and Modi in India — particularly regarding institutional capture, media control, and judicial weakening?
Professor William A. Galston: I would say that, in his use of identitarian and nationalist policy themes, he is very similar to them. He has not yet, however, achieved the degree of control over the institutions that you just listed that we see in places like Hungary and Turkey, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, but still considerable, in India.
The press right now is not under Trump’s control to the extent that it is in Hungary. You do not have the state owning, either directly or indirectly, the share of the media landscape that Mr. Orbán has been able to create through docile intermediaries.
Nor has Mr. Trump been able to achieve the mastery of the judiciary that, certainly, Orbán and Erdoğan have achieved. The judiciary remains independent, and you can see that that’s the case because of the number of court decisions that have gone against President Trump just in the past few weeks.
Now, it is quite possible that the Supreme Court will end up ratifying the President’s position in some of those cases. Still, it has not been a complete takeover.
If you look at the direction in which the United States is heading, certainly down a very long road yet to be traveled lies the kind of political systems that we now see in the three countries that you listed. But there are many miles to go before this president enjoys that kind of authority, and, frankly, I personally believe that he is unlikely to get to the end of the road. I don’t think the American people or the American legal system will permit him to do so.
Having said that, I think, at the end of his second term — and I’m making the optimistic assumption that he will not violate the Constitution and try to run for a third term — he will leave behind him an enlarged presidency with much more robust executive powers.
Then his successor will have to decide whether to use that expanded authority for purposes of his own or recommend reforms that would create new legal limits on executive authority. So, that issue will be determined by the outcome of the 2028 election, and I expect it to be one of the major debates in that election.
Federalism Acts as a Guardrail Against Competitive Authoritarianism
Given your analysis of the 2026 midterms, how pivotal is the Texas redistricting battle in shaping Republican prospects, and what does it reveal about the role of electoral engineering in sustaining partisan dominance? To what extent might such aggressive gerrymandering strategies erode democratic legitimacy and push the US toward a ‘competitive authoritarian’ model?
Professor William A. Galston: Once again, and I feel I’m giving you versions of the same answer to all of your questions, I am distinguishing between the direction of change that we can discern, on the one hand, and its proximity to full competitive authoritarianism on the other. I don’t think we’re there. One reason we’re not there yet, and I expect won’t get there, is, as you know, the United States has a very strong federal system — unlike, say, countries at the other extreme, like France, where almost all power flows from the center. In the United States, the 50 states have robust powers of their own, and there are constitutional and legal limits on the ability of the national government to direct the states to do things that they don’t want to do. If I had an hour, I could explain all of the details, but the headline is that federalism serves as a check on presidential authority and on the power of the president’s party. So, to take a simple example, Texas, responding to President Trump’s suggestion, has undertaken and has just enacted a redrawing of legislative boundaries that will probably, but not necessarily, lead to a gain of up to five Republican seats in the House of Representatives.
That would make it harder for Democrats to regain the majority because the Republican majority would expand from three seats to eight seats. On the other hand, and in response, the governor of California, a state that’s heavily dominated by Democrats, has said, “Well, if you’re gonna do that, then we’re going to counter with our own redistricting plan that will increase the number of Democratic seats in the state of California going to the House of Representatives by five.”
Okay, so if that effort to counterbalance Texas succeeds in November in California — and the new maps are being submitted directly to the voters for their approval or disapproval — if they’re approved, then California will have nullified what Texas did, and there would be no net gain. Now, the Republicans are trying to expand this redistricting effort to other states, but there the potential gains are smaller. Perhaps one seat or two seats.
But here again, Democrats are countering with outreach to states where they control the governorship and the legislature, such as my home state of Maryland. Right now, Maryland has eight seats in the US House of Representatives, seven of them occupied by Democrats, and one lonely seat occupied by a Republican. Now, it is probably the case that Maryland could redraw its boundaries to eliminate that eighth seat and bring it under Democratic control.
For all sorts of reasons, I’m not sure that the governor of Maryland or the state Democratic Party really wants to go down that road, but they may feel, in a month or two, or three, that they have no choice. So, I think it’s important to see how, at the very least, our system of federalism slows the movement towards competitive authoritarianism.
And let me add one other thing. If you look at the language of the Constitution, who gets to control the time, the place, and the manner of elections, it’s the Congress of the United States and the state governments. The President of the United States has no role whatsoever to play in that.
And so, if President Trump says, “I’m going to issue an executive order forbidding the use of voting machines, forbidding the use of mail-in ballots, or requiring every citizen to show certain kinds of identification before voting,” well, that’s fine — he’s issued that order — but he has no legal authority to enforce it because the Constitution doesn’t give him that power.
So, you know, I read all of the same journals that I suspect you do, and the issue of competitive authoritarianism is very much in the air, and it’s a very real issue. And there are real and important examples of it around the world. But I want the people who will listen to (or read) this interview to understand that, although there are real constitutional risks in the United States today, and many things are drifting in the wrong direction, I don’t think we are as far away from constitutional government or as close to competitive authoritarianism as many people think we are, and as the other nations, like Hungary, Turkey, India, and others, already are.
Economic Pressures Overshadow Trump’s Cultural Appeals
With rising opposition to Trump’s tariffs, even among his base, do you foresee economic discontent weakening his political legitimacy, or will identity cleavages continue to override economic self-interest in voting behavior?
Professor William A. Galston: The single most important issue in the 2024 presidential election was inflation and high prices. I monitor public opinion surveys on a daily basis, and that has not changed. If President Trump thinks that he can use identitarian issues or cultural issues to neutralize public concern about high and rising prices, he’s fooling himself. That won’t happen. He’ll try to make it happen unless prices come down over the next year, in which case he’ll brag about bringing prices down, and the American people will, if those price reductions are real, give him a lot of credit, and they’ll give him their vote. But the economy — the affordability of basic things like housing, transportation, energy, and food — still looms over the entire political landscape.
Defending Democracy Requires Law, Not Street Protests
Frontal view of the U.S. Supreme Court Building in Washington, D.C., on February 10, 2024. Photo: Gualberto Becerra P.
And lastly, Professor Galston, what strategies should democratic institutions, civil society actors, and the media adopt to safeguard checks and balances and reinforce democratic resilience in the face of rising executive centralization?
Professor William A. Galston: All of those institutions should use their cultural power and their legal power to defend their integrity and their independence, which goes all the way back to my answer to your first question. I think that the principal venue of contestation in America today is the law. It is the law, ultimately, and the willingness of institutions to use their legal power to contest expansions of executive power that they don’t like. That will make the difference between the preservation of constitutional checks and balances and their erosion.
I’ll give you a very recent example from Wednesday’s newspaper. I think most people in Europe are aware of Harvard University, which is probably America’s most famous and prestigious university, and Harvard, a few months ago, decided that the Trump administration was making some demands that they could not yield to without forfeiting their institutional independence and their raison d’être as an academic institution. So they drew a line and said, “This far and no farther,” and they went to court to try to get legal reinforcement for where they’d drawn the line, and on Wednesday, a federal judge gave it to them and said that most of what President Trump was doing to Harvard was unconstitutional.
The administration was ordered to restore the $2.2 billion in research money that the judge said was arbitrarily and unconstitutionally withheld from them. Now, is that the last word? Absolutely not. Donald Trump believes in litigating everything as high as he can go in the hopes of achieving a more favorable verdict someplace. But that’s an example of how an institution that has the will to defend its legal prerogatives can push back — and push back effectively.
And I think that pushing back, using not street protests but the law, will be the most important venue of contestation. The extent to which the law is used to reinforce constitutional norms will determine the extent to which the United States goes down the road towards competitive authoritarianism. But, to repeat, we’re not there yet. We’re not even close to a decline into competitive authoritarianism. And I am hopeful that we’ll never get there. I can’t promise anybody that we won’t, but I do know that institutions in America outside the federal government — the states, universities, professional associations, civil society — are waking up.
And they are beginning to understand that unless they are willing to assert their legal rights, nobody else is going to protect them. They must act firmly, but legally, for themselves, and if they do, I think the outcome will be a very challenging situation for the adherents of liberal democracy in the United States. Don’t get me wrong. I won’t say it’s an emergency. It’s not quite an emergency, but it is a moment that challenges citizens who’ve taken liberal democracy for granted to realize that it’s not been handed down like the tablets to Moses on Mount Sinai. It’s a human creation, and all human creations are subject to human erosion and human destruction.
We know one of the few lessons from history that I think is impossible to deny and very clear to all who care to read it. And so, the quote that everybody is using, when Benjamin Franklin was asked after the Constitutional Convention, “What form of government have you created, Mr. Franklin?” — and his answer was, “A republic, if you can keep it.”
Well, those words now are a challenge to citizens of the United States today. Can we keep what we inherited? Sometime in the next decade, we’ll find out the answer to that question.
