Shewan, Molly. (2025). “Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).January 10, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0094
On December 19, 2024, ECPS hosted the 18th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, titled “Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries.” This session examined a number of key contemporary dynamics at the intersection of populism and authoritarianism in the Gulf region. A distinguished panel of experts presented on a wide range of topics, including the evolution of social contracts in Gulf states; autocratization processes; the environmental dimension of authoritarian leadership; and the role of religion in shaping both domestic and international politics. The session thus offered many key critical insights into both the nebulous features of populism itself and the importance of bringing the Gulf region into scholarly conversation regarding populism’s impact across the globe.
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) hosted the 18th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, “Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries,” on December 19, 2024. The session explored the complex dynamics surrounding populism and authoritarianism across the Gulf region. Bringing together a distinguished panel of scholars and practitioners, the discussion focused on a number of key developments, including the environmental and religious dimensions of autocratic leadership in the Gulf States, as well as the evolution of the social contract, in order to examine the diverse causes, manifestations and impacts of populism and authoritarianism in the region.
Moderated by Dr. Courtney Freer, Assistant Professor at the Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies-Emory University, the panelists included Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber, Professor of Middle East at the Friedrich Alexander University, Erlangen-Nürnberg-Germany; Dr. Gail Buttorff, Hobby School of Public Affairs-University of Huston; Dr. Tobias Zumbraegel, senior researcher and lecturer at the Department for Human Geography at Heidelberg University-Germany; Mr. Kardo Kareem Rached, University of Human Development-Iraq, and Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.
The panel made a multidisciplinary, wide-ranging, and insightful contribution to the scholarly exploration of populism and autocracy in the rapidly evolving social and political context of the Gulf region. Therefore, this session constitutes a significant and timely addition to the panel series overall, aiding in its goal of generating a more complete understanding of the diverse impact of populism and authoritarianism across the globe.
Panel Overview
Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber opened the panel with his presentation on “Key Drivers of Autocratization in the Gulf Region.” Dr. Demmelhuber began by arguing that Gulf regimes are often much too complex to be neatly categorized into a binary division between democracy and authoritarian governance. Rather, he regards autocratization as a fluid, multifaceted process which can occur within a variety of regime types in notably different ways. Dr. Demmelhuber argued that autocratization is primarily driven through the actions of prominent elites at the domestic, regional and international levels.
At the domestic level, populist discourses can be utilized as a means of consolidating regime power, utilizing affective appeals to the citizenry as a united collective in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime. At the regional level, regimes often learn from one another and adapt their political strategies to mirror their neighbors, which is linked to the emergence of authoritarian gravity centers. On the international level, norm diffusion can occur through transnational networks, promoting authoritarian practices across the globe. Dr. Demmelhuber concluded his insightful presentation by flagging the need for greater scholarly interrogation of the non-material dimension of populist appeals, as well as of the populism which emerges “from below.”
Our second speaker, Dr. Gail Buttorff, a researcher of gender and political participation in the Middle East, followed with an engaging talk titled “The Evolving Social Contract in the GCC” with a particular focus on gender as a key factor. Dr. Buttorf began by offering a succinct overview of the social contract in the GCC up to the 2000s, which was heavily reliant upon strong wealth redistribution and a generous welfare state in exchange for limited political participation by the citizenry. She then went on to note a variety of factors that have put pressure on this institutional arrangement since then: declining oil rents, lower revenue, and growing populations, which led Gulf states to embrace austerity while unemployment was rising.
In an effort to renegotiate their social contracts in this new contemporary context, Gulf regimes have deployed policies of labor renationalization, which in turn resulted in a significant increase in female employment, as well as “vision statements” which explicitly emphasize “mutuality” between state and citizen responsibility. The gendered impact of these adjustments was particularly visible during the COVID-19 outbreak, as a number of states – including the UAE and Bahrain – passed legislation which illustrated the intersection between labor nationalization and women’s participation in public life.
Overall, Dr. Buttorff effectively explored the ways in which Gulf states have attempted to retain legitimacy in uncertain economic conditions by adjusting their social contracts, with particularly significant implications for women across the region.
Dr. Tobias Zumbraegel, who has written extensively on the environmental dimension of state power in the Gulf, turned to focus on the environmental dimension in his presentation: “The New Green Autocrats: How Saudi Arabia and the UAE Redefine Environmental Leadership.” He, too, began by examining the social contract in the Gulf, emphasizing the enhanced role of provision and protection by regimes—made possible through the vast income generated by the oil and gas industries—in exchange for a lack of participation by their citizens. In the wake of growing pressures to lessen their dependence on fossil fuels, Dr. Zumbraegel argued that the emerging “Green Gulf Model” is characterized by strong, personalistic leadership, a techno-utopian vision which perhaps over-exaggerates the potential for new technologies to reverse environmental harm, strong emphasis on the continuing importance of fossil fuels; and a close alignment of environmental goals with other economic diversification projects, such as in sports and entertainment. Dr. Zumbraegel further sought to locate the role of these “green autocrats” in influencing global environmental governance, supported by a strong alliance of transnational corporations whose goals align with those of the Gulf regimes.
To conclude, Dr. Zumbraegel argued that autocratic regimes in the Gulf have embraced a top-down approach to sustainability. By gradually pivoting towards green energy yet continuing to protect their oil and gas interests, Gulf states are attempting to maintain the rentier welfare state system whilst neglecting the environmental and social justice dimensions of sustainability altogether.
Mr. Kardo Kareem Rashed, an expert on the intersection between religion and politics in the Middle East, discussed the intersection between religion and authoritarianism in his talk: “The Role of Salafism in the National and International Politics of Gulf Monarchies.” Taking a historical-analytical approach, Mr. Rashed began by tracing the roots of Salafism back to Saudi Arabia, emphasizing its complex role in shaping Saudi Arabian domestic and international politics since 9/11 due to links with Jihadism. He went on to note the relevance of the political decision-making process in Saudi Arabia, a strictly patrimonial regime, wherein power flows downwards through a hierarchical model of authority from the King to tribal sheikhs and army leaders.
As Saudi Arabia evolved into a rentier state, Mr. Rached argues, Salafism became institutionalized; post-World War II, Salafism was a powerful tool used by Saudi King Faisal to oppose and suppress Arab nationalist movements, bolstered through the establishment of new educational institutions. The Gulf War marked a key turning point, however, as the Salafist movement rejected the presence of US troops on Saudi soil. As a result, the Saudi state began to tighten control over religious institutions and strengthened alliances with other nations on the basis of shared Islamist ideology. Overall, Mr. Rached argued, in a supposedly post-Salafi era, a complex relationship remains between the Saudi state and transnational religious dynamics.
Finally, Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan, a leading scholar on the politics of Arab Gulf States, presented on the topic “Populism in Gulf Monarchies: Suppression, Cooptation, Adoption,” concluding our discussion with a more direct interrogation of populism itself, its varying definitions and its contemporary manifestations across the Gulf region.
Dr. Diwan began by discussing salient conceptualizations of populism as a theory of international relations, an approach to economic policy, and a style of political leadership before arguing that populism appears particularly prominently as a discursive form of rhetoric in the Gulf region. Populist rhetoric frequently features direct appeals to “the people” as a virtuous citizenry and depicts a cultural, economic or political elite as a corrupt “establishment.” Dr Diwan aptly noted that populist rhetoric is also often tightly entwined with nationalism, as it punches both downwards, outwards the “undeserving” unproductive class, as well as outwards, targeting migrants and non-citizens too.
While it might be surprising to see populism emerge in the Gulf states, considering their strong track record of resource distribution, Dr. Diwan argued that both increasing wealth inequality and the emergence of communication technology – e.g. social media – are both important factors in explaining the emergence of populism from below. Detailing a number of examples of populist rhetoric by opposition figures, Dr. Diwan argued that different Gulf Monarchies have responded with varying strategies of suppression, cooptation and adoption. In a particularly interesting case, she noted that Saudi Arabian elites have deployed populist rhetoric from above in an attempt to consolidate their state power, emphasizing the fluid nature of populist discursive strategies.
Conclusion
The 18th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series provided an engaging examination of some of the key contemporary features of populism and authoritarianism in the Gulf region. Each speaker presented an insightful contribution to this theme, from conceptualizing autocratization to gendering the social contract to the intersection between autocracy, environmentalism, and religion. Overall, the panel highlighted the pressing need for greater scholarly attention on the region within the field of populism studies, owing largely to the rapidly evolving social, political and environmental landscape of the Gulf states. In particular, scholars emphasized the need to consider both the material and non-material causal factors at play in furthering populist or autocratic trends. For instance, changes in wealth redistribution and affective emotional or discursive appeals were both highlighted as particularly relevant.
The highly engaging and insightful analysis shared throughout the panel was, therefore, not only successful in representing a number of key developments within current scholarship on the region but also in signposting important avenues for further research.
Overall, this session constituted an effective contribution to ECPS’s broader goal of advancing our understanding of populism across the globe. It will undoubtedly prove a valuable resource for those looking to enhance their understanding of the way in which populism and autocracy manifest and interact within the Gulf region today.
Portugal is facing heightened scrutiny after a young, inexperienced policeman fatally shot Odair Moniz, a Black man, under dubious circumstances. This incident has reignited longstanding debates about structural racism and revealed deep-seated cultural and social divides, exposing unresolved issues around race, security, and the state’s role. Reflecting James Davison Hunter’s concept of “culture wars,” these moral conflicts have deepened into societal divisions that erode shared values. Portugal’s colonial legacy further intensifies these tensions, perpetuating systemic racial exclusion and fostering fertile ground for populist narratives.
James Davison Hunter stands as one of the most prominent and enduring authors on the topic of “cultural wars” in the United States. He emphasizes how so-called moral issues tend to undermine the “common ground” that forms societies, with the potential to become an effective war by sharpening citizens’ moral divisions (Hunter, 1991). Conversely, Fiona Morris and other contributors in Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (2005) challenge this view, arguing that polarization largely operates within the media, while society as a whole tends toward consensus.
However, time has lent more credence to Hunter’s perspective and the work of other scholars who focus on cultural wars. Ezra Klein, in Why We’re Polarized (2020), argues that moral values and social identity issues have become central to our political identity, aligning with Cass Sunstein’s arguments in #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media(2018), which highlights how social media has become an echo chamber for tensions around morality and “customs,” amplifying socially divisive themes. But what does this theoretical prelude have to do with recent events in Portugal involving the case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public unrest? Quite a lot, as it turns out, and the reasons are worth exploring.
Among the polarizing issues within society, racial matters stand out prominently. In Portugal, we have engaged in ongoing debates over whether or not racism exists, what constitutes racism, whether Portugal is a racist country, and if structural racism is present. Much of this discussion is either redundant, given the evidence, or overly theoretical.
In summary:
i) racism exists wherever individuals are differentiated based on race, creating hierarchies of value and access (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Fanon, 2008);
ii) racism operates as a social process in which such differentiation disadvantages some while benefiting a dominant group—typically Caucasian in Western societies due to the legacies of slavery and colonialism. According to Achille Mbembe (2019), colonial histories have left profound imprints on social hierarchies, with racialized groups enduring forms of systemic marginalization that permeate all levels of society. In his concept of “racialized social systems,” Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2014) argues that racism is not a mere individual prejudice but is embedded in societal structures, creating a social order that inherently privileges certain racial groups over others. Theoretical discussions around power, privilege, capitalism, and racialization are ideologically relevant yet often seem to lack practical contributions in tackling urgent issues, though they offer critical insights into systemic challenges (Wynter, 2003).
iii) Portugal is a country where racism is evident, with unique characteristics that should not be oversimplified through comparative analysis with other contexts. Its documented history includes ties to late colonialism and scientific justifications for the supposed cultural, biological, and mental inferiority of Black populations (Mbembe, 2001). The continued influence of colonial narratives has shaped racial and social dynamics within contemporary Portugal, as examined by Carla Rodrigues and Jorge Leal (2009), who reveal how these legacies reinforce discriminatory practices that marginalize racialized communities.
To understand the recent incidents centered in Zambujal – the neighborhood where protesters fired cars and a bus, with latter mimetic acts in some areas of Lisbon – it is necessary to consider a history of misguided policies regarding the inclusion of racialized individuals within Portuguese society, as discussed in O Estado do Racismo em Portugal (2021), edited by Silvia Rodriguez Maeso. Despite critiques of its activist bias, this work rigorously details systemic issues related to racial policies in Portugal, including urban planning and policing, which are directly relevant to this case. Such policies, compounded by socioeconomic inequalities and an enduring colonial mentality, contribute to a racialized social order that perpetuates marginalization and exclusion for racialized communities (Mbembe, 2019; Fanon, 2008).
The decision—albeit somewhat understandable—to address the urban integration of people from former Portuguese colonies by establishing social housing has, as in other countries, led to ghettoization. This pattern has perpetuated social exclusion and generational poverty, with vulnerable families often lacking resources or sufficient parental involvement, leaving children exposed to criminal networks. Meanwhile, underfunded schools and educational neglect further diminish prospects for youth in these areas. Together, these factors create a “social cauldron” that stigmatizes these communities as socially excluded islands, often becoming the target of state policing.
Policing such isolated social islands fosters a cycle of mutual distrust, generating a divisive “us vs. them” mentality. For many in these communities, the police are the sole representatives of the state, fostering stereotypes and resentment. Bonilla-Silva (2014) describes how such dynamics reinforce the racialized social system, where state practices contribute to the social reproduction of racial hierarchies. Furthermore, police violence against racialized individuals in Portugal has been documented in international human rights reports, compounded by reports of far-right groups within the security forces. These conditions highlight a significant state failure on racial matters.
The Cultural War over the Police State
While we await judicial proceedings in the case of Odair Moniz’s death, another discussion has emerged. In summary, Portugal faces an endemic racism problem affecting opportunities for racialized populations, who generally confront the intersection of economic, educational, and gender-related issues. Although white social groups may share some of these challenges, racialized groups face additional disadvantages due to “race.” Portugal also has issues with the rapid and haphazard urban integration of racialized groups, leading to territories where poverty and crime are disproportionately associated with these communities. Consequently, policing efforts, compounded by resentment and distrust as well as racism within segments of the security forces, have sparked a surge in police violence against racialized individuals.
Thus, poverty, social exclusion, urban segregation, and police violence underlie these events, fueling popular outrage. However, as this outrage increasingly manifests as vandalism—absent an organized structure and peaceful leadership—it loses the capacity to garner widespread empathy, as it impinges upon fundamental and primary rights within the rule of law, such as the right to security and private property.
Hence, the “cultural war” over a “police state” or “security state” emerges from chaos. André Ventura’s – radical right Chega party leader – recent calls for a protest supporting the police, framing it as “cleaning the streets” of “criminals,” echo Brazil’s Bolsonaro and his supporters, embodying the mantra, “A good criminal is a dead criminal.” By organizing a pro-police demonstration, Chega openly aligns with a surveillance state model that prioritizes “law and order” over constitutional governance—a step towards a state that surveils citizens beyond constitutional limits. Public support for this stance has been evident on social media, as people trade freedom for order, recalling Alexis de Tocqueville’s warning that in times of chaos, people are prone to sacrifice freedom for the promise of order.
Meanwhile, for the cultural war to thrive, two opposing poles are necessary. Radical elements within the Left, associated with the Bloco de Esquerda party, have seized upon these events to encourage a racial revolution. While motivated by a desire to rectify racial injustices, this rhetoric parallels the radical right’s, both potentially threatening social cohesion and the “common ground” essential for future generations. Social changes addressing racial dynamics should not take a revolutionary approach, which may ultimately intensify racial divisions and compromise democracy.
Thus, it is within democracy and the hard-won social-liberal principles that we must pursue the republican ideal of effective equality—not authoritarian “equality” under radical poles, but the equality promised by constitutional ideals under the banner of human rights. Achieving this requires justice in Odair’s case and others like his, alongside public policies that, while slower than revolutionary impulses, restore the rule of law, social peace, and constitutional norms—enabling us to address what we’ve thus far swept under the rug.
Conclusion
The case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public response illustrate a deep-seated cultural and social rift in Portugal, revealing unresolved tensions around race, security, and the role of the state. This incident aligns with James Davison Hunter’s concept of culture wars, where moral divisions sharpen into polarized conflicts, eroding shared social foundations. In Portugal, these conflicts intersect with a colonial legacy that perpetuates systemic exclusion and racial disparities, creating an environment ripe for populist rhetoric.
As seen in André Ventura’s reaction, populist figures often exploit such moments, promoting a “law and order” narrative that taps into public fears, mirroring strategies observed in other countries. This populist stance risks shifting Portugal toward a security state model that emphasizes control over democratic principles. On the other side, radical responses advocating racial revolution pose their own challenges, as they could polarize society further and jeopardize social cohesion.
Ultimately, meaningful progress requires that Portugal confront these issues within a democratic framework, advancing policies that address structural racism and urban inequality while upholding the rule of law and human rights. Only by fostering genuine social inclusion and resisting polarizing impulses can Portugal hope to rebuild its social contract on a foundation of equality and shared values.
References
Bonilla-Silva, E. (2014). Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. Rowman & Littlefield.
Fanon, F. (2008). Black Skin, White Masks. Grove Press.
Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. Basic Books.
Klein, E. (2020). Why We’re Polarized. Simon & Schuster.
Maeso, S. R. (Ed.). (2021). O Estado do Racismo em Portugal. Edições 70.
Mbembe, A. (2001). On the Postcolony. University of California Press.
Mbembe, A. (2019). Necropolitics. Duke University Press.
Morris, F., Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J., & Pope, J. C. (2005). Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. Pearson Longman.
Rodrigues, C. U., & Leal, J. (2009). Portugal não é um país pequeno: Contar o “império” na pós-colonialidade. Edições 70.
Rodrigues, S. R., & Araújo, M. (2019). Racism and Racialization: Experiences in Portugal. In Lentin, A., & Titley, G. (Eds.), Racism and Media (pp. 113–126). Routledge.
Sunstein, C. R. (2018). #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton University Press.
Wynter, S. (2003). Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument. CR: The New Centennial Review, 3(3), 257–337.
Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. October 30, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0020
In “Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries,” authors Ihsan Yilmaz and Syaza Shukri argue that Islamist parties, at their core, are political entities that prioritize practical governance over strict ideology when necessary, leaving them vulnerable to voter rejection if they fail to address economic and social issues effectively. This adaptability underscores the book’s central argument that policy efficacy often takes precedence over Islamist rhetoric, shaping the evolution of Islamist parties within democratic contexts. While it occasionally includes a wealth of historical details that may seem excessive, the book’s nuanced approach offers a valuable resource for understanding the intersections of Islamism, Islamist populism, authoritarian Islamism, and democracy on a global scale.
In the book titled Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries, authors Ihsan Yilmaz and Syaza Shukri explore the multifaceted strategies of Islamist parties operating within democratic and semi-democratic settings across various Muslim-majority countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. The book examines how these parties adapt ideologically and pragmatically to maintain influence, highlighting a shift from traditional opposition roles to coalition-building and power-sharing with secular or non-Islamist entities. The authors underscore that while Islamist parties share a religious foundation, their approaches to governance and democracy are diverse, challenging simplistic views that position them solely as anti-democratic.
Yilmaz and Shukri aim to provide a nuanced understanding of how these parties manage power, respond to crises, and navigate issues like minority rights and foreign policy, particularly in today’s globalized and interconnected political landscape. The introduction of the book under the title of “Islamist Parties Operating in Democracies,” sets the stage by examining the multifaceted nature of Islamist movements, defining them as entities aiming to incorporate Islamic principles into political and social realms. The authors clarify that while these groups are often perceived as monolithic, they are, in fact, a “diverse array of voices” with varying ideological and strategic priorities shaped by unique regional contexts.
One key strength of the introduction is its contextual framing of Islamist parties not just as ideological entities but as pragmatic actors responsive to “evolving conditions and societal expectations.” Yilmaz and Shukri discuss how these groups, while rooted in shared religious values, exhibit adaptability by forming coalitions and engaging in “power-sharing and coalition-building” with secular or even oppositional parties, particularly when in governance roles. This approach marks a significant departure from previous literature, as the authors aim to present Islamists as dynamic participants in democratic systems rather than static opponents to democratic principles.
Furthermore, the introduction highlights the book’s comparative methodology, which sets it apart from similar works that typically focus on a single region. By juxtaposing cases from countries like Turkey, Indonesia, and Tunisia, the authors aim to draw broader insights into “the complex dynamics” of Islamist governance. Yilmaz and Shukri suggest that understanding these dynamics is crucial for a “nuanced understanding” of Islamist politics that moves beyond reductive assumptions. Thus, the introduction promises a rich comparative analysis, shedding light on the strategic adaptability of Islamist parties and their potential to balance ideological goals with pragmatic governance in diverse political settings.
Islam and Politics
In Chapter 2 which is titled “Islam and Politics in Democratic Muslim-Majority Countries,” Yilmaz and Shukri present an insightful analysis into the complexities of Islamism and its intersection with democratic politics across diverse Muslim-majority nations. By grounding the discussion in scholarly debate, they explore how Islamist movements navigate between mainstream and extremist strands and examine the adaptive strategies employed by these parties in response to their unique political environments.
The chapter explores a critical dichotomy within Islamism, distinguishing between mainstream Islamists who participate in elections and seek gradual reform through democratic means and more extremist groups that often reject democratic processes. This distinction underlines the authors’ main argument about the adaptability of Islamist parties, emphasizing that while many engage in democratic processes, others lean toward authoritarian tendencies. This adaptation, as the authors argue, is driven by both political and socio-economic pressures, shaping Islamist strategies across different contexts.
Moreover, Yilmaz and Shukri delve into the ideological tensions within Islamist politics, such as the potential for majoritarianism and religious hegemony. They caution that unchecked Islamism could risk eroding minority rights and compromising democratic principles, especially in polarized societies. The authors support this claim by discussing the experience of Turkey under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), where populist tendencies and majoritarianism have raised concerns about the preservation of democratic institutions.
Finally, the chapter addresses the broader implications of Islamist governance and the complex role of political Islam. By examining case studies in countries like Tunisia, Indonesia, and Morocco, the authors provide a robust framework for understanding how Islamist parties balance religious principles with governance. This nuanced examination makes Chapter 2 a foundational overview for readers, highlighting both the potential and challenges of Islamism within democratic contexts.
PAS and Malaysia
In Chapter 3, Yilmaz and Shukri provide a comprehensive examination of Malaysia’s Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) under the title of “Seven Decades of PAS in Malaysian Politics,” tracing its strategic evolution across the nation’s politically complex landscape. The authors explore PAS’ adaptability and pragmatism within Malaysia’s semi-democratic environment, highlighting how PAS has shifted from conservatism to moderate pluralism and, recently, to ethno-religious populism.
The chapter outlines PAS’ historical journey, from its foundation in 1951 as an offshoot of UMNO, focused on Malay-Muslim identity, to its modern status as a dominant Islamist party. PAS’ relationship with UMNO, marked by both rivalry and cooperation, underscores the party’s flexibility. The authors note that PAS has shifted between opposing UMNO’s secular nationalism and forming alliances under banners of “Muslim unity,” depending on political needs. Yilmaz and Shukri point to PAS’ success in adapting its ideology to suit changing political climates, illustrating its willingness to collaborate across the political spectrum for electoral gains.
According to the book, PAS’ governance of Kelantan since 1990 serves as a case study in implementing an Islamist agenda within a multicultural society. Despite advocating for “shariazation” policies, PAS has shown restraint at the federal level, balancing Islamic values with the realities of Malaysia’s diverse demographics. This pragmatic approach, the authors argue, has allowed PAS to maintain its influence, especially during its brief time in federal power from 2020-2022.
Further, the authors discuss PAS’ strategic response to global and national crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, which bolstered its populist appeal through welfare measures. Yilmaz and Shukri conclude that PAS’ electoral flexibility and populist tactics have solidified its position among conservative Malay-Muslims, marking it as a key player in Malaysia’s evolving political landscape. The chapter demonstrates how PAS’ resilience and adaptability, despite operating within Malaysia’s semi-authoritarian framework, have contributed to its growing strength in Malaysian politics.
PKS and Indonesia
Chapter 4 of the book offers a nuanced analysis of Islamism within Indonesia’s multiparty political system under the title of “PKS in Indonesia’s Multiparty System,” by spotlighting the evolution of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and its role as a major Islamist party. The chapter contextualizes PKS within Indonesia’s post-1998 democratization efforts, focusing on how the nation’s rich cultural diversity and democratic constitution impact the moderation of Islamist agendas. Yilmaz and Shukri highlight PKS’s pragmatic approach, noting its blend of Islamic values with democratic ideals as it navigates Indonesia’s secular and religious pluralism.
The authors emphasize that PKS has achieved influence without strictly seeking to impose sharia law, contrasting with more radical movements like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). PKS’s stance on social justice, anti-corruption, and minority rights demonstrates a commitment to Indonesia’s Pancasila foundation, balancing Islamic identity with pluralist values. This adaptability has allowed PKS to participate in coalition governments while maintaining a distinct Islamist identity.
The chapter also explores PKS’s responses to regional and global Islamist trends, highlighting that PKS favors a moderate stance on Islamic solidarity, promoting peaceful international relations and opposing extremist ideologies. However, as the authors note, PKS faces rising pressures from conservative Islamic populism, which challenges Indonesia’s secular state model. They point to the complex balancing act of PKS as it negotiates between religious values and national priorities amid Indonesia’s diverse electorate.
Chapter 4 presents PKS as an example of Islamist pragmatism within a democratic framework, stressing its role in maintaining Indonesia’s status as a moderate Muslim-majority nation. The analysis showcases PKS’s strategic positioning within Indonesia’s political landscape, where moderation often proves more sustainable than radicalism.
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Pakistan
In Chapter 5 of the book, authors Yilmaz and Shukri provide an in-depth exploration of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), one of Pakistan’s most influential Islamist parties. This chapter, which is titled “A Faithful Force: Jamaat-E-Islami and Islamist Politics in Pakistan,” examines JI’s evolution from a supporter of military regimes to a unique voice advocating social development within an Islamic framework. Describing JI as a “faithful force,” the authors highlight the party’s struggle to reconcile its foundational principles with the realities of ‘Pakistani democracy,’ illustrating both its successes and limitations in influencing national politics.
Initially, JI supported Pakistan’s military leadership, particularly during General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime, which advanced the Islamization process in Pakistan. The authors emphasize how JI’s alliance with Zia enabled it to push for Islamic laws, giving JI a rare moment of influence. However, as the chapter reveals, JI’s strict Islamist stance limited its broader appeal, especially as it encountered Pakistan’s diverse political landscape and increasing calls for pluralism.
Yilmaz and Shukri delve into JI’s organizational structure, describing it as both a strength and a “double-edged sword.” JI’s internal hierarchy, according to the authors, deeply rooted in discipline and loyalty, provides a solid foundation, yet its rigid framework hinders adaptability. Despite its “commitment to democratic principles” and holding intra-party elections, JI has struggled to expand its influence beyond its core supporters, often failing to capture significant electoral success on a national level.
The authors explore JI’s stance on the controversial blasphemy law and its impact on Pakistan’s democracy, particularly in relation to minority rights. JI’s call for the law’s strict enforcement has complicated its image, as it aligns the party with hardline interpretations of Islam that conflict with Pakistan’s aspirations for a more inclusive society. While JI advocates for “social justice, anti-corruption, and anti-imperialism,” its approach has been criticized for not sufficiently addressing the needs of Pakistan’s minority communities, a factor that limits its broader political appeal.
In discussing JI’s ideological adaptability, the authors argue that JI has recently shifted towards a “second-generation Islamism,” with an emphasis on social development and community welfare. The chapter notes JI’s active involvement in charitable work through its Al-Khidmat Foundation, an outreach strategy that has helped it maintain influence despite its limited political successes. This evolution highlights JI’s pragmatic side, as it aligns its goals with broader social issues while retaining an Islamic identity.
Yilmaz and Shukri conclude that JI’s trajectory exemplifies Pakistan’s complex relationship with Islam and democracy, where Islamist parties face the challenge of preserving religious identity while adapting to democratic norms. They suggest that while JI has struggled to secure a dominant political position, it remains a potent force due to its strong organizational base and grassroots support. Ultimately, Chapter 5 sheds light on the “delicate balance” between faith-based politics and the realities of Pakistan’s evolving democratic landscape.
PJD and Morocco
In Chapter 6, titled “Islamist PJD and the Monarchy in Morocco,” the authors delve into the dynamics between Morocco’s monarchy and the Justice and Development Party (PJD), focusing on Morocco’s unique Makhzen system. This system, led by the king as emir al-mu’minin or “commander of the faithful,” establishes him as both a secular and religious authority, allowing the monarchy to manage Islam as an integral part of Morocco’s national identity. The chapter emphasizes how this framework has been crucial in tempering “the potency of political Islamism” and limiting the PJD’s influence, even as it formed a government following its 2011 electoral success.
The chapter examines the PJD’s decade in power, a tenure punctuated by moments of compromise and concession. Initially, the party enjoyed significant popular support, riding the wave of Arab Spring reforms that included expanded parliamentary power. However, as the chapter illustrates, the PJD quickly encountered the limits of its influence. The authors highlight how the monarchy’s interventions in key government functions, especially in “sensitive roles and veto powers,” underscored the persistence of monarchical authority, often stifling the PJD’s ability to implement its agenda fully.
The COVID-19 pandemic further strained the PJD’s position, contributing to its electoral decline in 2021 and symbolizing the end of its era of Islamist governance in Morocco. This chapter argues that the monarchy’s symbolic Islamic leadership, combined with its political authority, successfully framed itself as the true custodian of Moroccan identity, relegating the PJD to “a second-generation Islamist party forced to work within the system.” This analysis reveals that the PJD’s journey reflects the complex interplay of religious and political authority in Morocco, where Islam is strategically woven into the fabric of governance, ultimately ensuring that power remains centered in the monarchy.
Ennahda and Tunisia
Chapter 7, titled “Ennahda as Tunisia’s Muslim Democratic Party,” delves into the rise, evolution, and challenges faced by Tunisia’s Ennahda party, highlighting its remarkable adaptability within the country’s political landscape. Initially, Ennahda emerged from Tunisia’s conservative Muslim roots, but, in the wake of the Arab Spring, it evolved into what the authors describe as Tunisia’s “Muslim Democratic Party.” This transformation underscores Ennahda’s pragmatism and its attempt to blend religious principles with democratic ideals. After winning Tunisia’s first democratic elections in 2011, Ennahda adapted its stance to suit a diverse political landscape, opting for “a practical kind of national reconciliation”with secular parties, which became crucial for political stability.
The authors highlight Ennahda’s ideological moderation, particularly when it decided not to impose Sharia as the foundation of the 2014 constitution. This choice, according to Yilmaz and Shukri, reflected Ennahda’s understanding of “the importance of Maqasid al-Sharia over specific rules,” showcasing the party’s evolving position on Islamic law to resonate with a broader national identity. The shift was further reinforced during the 2016 Tenth General Congress, where Ennahda officially prioritized politics over religious preaching, effectively becoming “a conservative political force capable of handling governance.”
The chapter also sheds light on the recent strain in Tunisian democracy, exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis, which impacted Ennahda’s reputation and led to widespread disapproval. Ennahda’s subsequent absence from the 2023 elections reflects a shift in its strategy, possibly spurred by President Kais Saied’s consolidation of power. In sum, Chapter 7 paints a nuanced picture of Ennahda’s transformation and challenges, illustrating its continued struggle between ideological values and the demands of a pragmatic political approach in Tunisia’s ever-shifting political terrain.
AKP and Turkey
Titled “Islamist Populist AKP and Turkey’s Shift Towards Authoritarianism,” Chapter 8 of the book presents an in-depth analysis of Turkey’s Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, exploring its journey from “Muslim democrat” roots to an authoritarian populist regime. Initially, the AKP championed democratization, economic reform, and EU membership; however, its trajectory shifted post-2011, notably after the “Gezi protests of 2013” and the controversial 2016 coup attempt. These events, according to the authors, paved the way for a clampdown on dissent, particularly targeting journalists, activists, and opposition politicians, marking a stark turn towards authoritarianism.
Erdogan’s leadership has progressively consolidated power, transforming Turkey’s democratic infrastructure into what the authors describe as a “competitive authoritarian regime.” With the 2017 constitutional referendum, the office of the prime minister was abolished, granting the president sweeping executive powers, leading one observer to note that “Erdogan [became] the virtually unassailable ruler of Turkey.” By diminishing checks on presidential authority, Erdogan’s AKP harnessed Islam and nationalism to foster a narrative that secures his base while casting opposition voices as foreign-controlled threats to national unity.
In this chapter, Yilmaz and Shukri also examine the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), highlighting its instrumental role in promoting the AKP’s vision of Islam as a component of Turkish identity. This vision extends internationally, where Turkey navigates a complex geopolitical landscape. According to the authors, through selective alliances, including with Russia and China, the AKP leverages religious and nationalist rhetoric to mitigate Western criticism, particularly regarding human rights issues. Yet, its economic policies, based on unorthodox monetary approaches, have led to high inflation and decreased living standards. The authors note that Erdogan’s insistence on low-interest rates, justified by Islamic teachings against usury, has led to what the text calls an “accelerated currency devaluation” that further strains Turkey’s economy.
In sum, Chapter 8 paints the AKP as a party that, while initially promising democratic reform, has instead pursued populist authoritarianism. This has strained Turkey’s democratic structures and polarized its society, positioning Erdogan as a powerful, divisive figure whose policies reflect both the aspirations and challenges of modern Turkish Islamism.
Trajectory of Islamist Parties
In Chapter 9, the authors overview “Trajectory of Islamist Parties” and synthesize the book’s key findings, examining how various Islamist parties navigate the balance between Islamism and democracy. The chapter delves into how Islamist parties, when allowed political participation, engage in governance yet often struggle with the tension between God’s sovereignty and popular sovereignty. This complex relationship has led to a diversity of outcomes, ranging from authoritarian shifts in Turkey under the AKP to democratic engagement in Malaysia, Morocco, and Tunisia.
The authors highlight the significance of “strategic interaction theory,” which suggests that an Islamist party’s moderation is contingent upon its relationships with secular forces and the military. “Credibility of signals sent by the Islamist party” is crucial in establishing trust with non-Islamist actors, although, as in the AKP’s case, prolonged power can erode democratic practices. The chapter notes that the AKP’s “immoderation was the result of dismantling institutional checks and balances” due to political crises like the Gezi protests and the 2016 coup attempt.
Through comparative analysis, the authors argue that some Islamist parties adapt to electoral losses, as seen in Tunisia and Morocco, where they have “accepted defeat albeit with some resistance.” However, once in power, these parties tend to favor pragmatism over strict adherence to religious principles to sustain governance. This adaptability is essential, particularly in Muslim-majority secular states like Indonesia, where the “balance between Islamic identity and democratic diversity” is necessary for political survival.
The authors suggest in brief that Islamist parties are, at their core, political entities that prioritize practical governance over ideology when necessary, making them susceptible to voter rejection if they fail to deliver on economic and social issues. This adaptability underscores the book’s central argument that policy efficacy outweighs Islamist rhetoric, shaping the evolution of Islamist parties within democratic frameworks. While it occasionally includes abundance of historical details that may seem excessive, the book’s nuanced approach provides an insightful resource for understanding the intersections of Islamism, Islamist populism, authoritarian Islamism and democracy on a global scale.
Ihsan Yilmaz & Syaza Shukri. (2024). Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries. Palgrave Macmillan. 313 pp. Hardcover: EUR 139.09. ISBN-10: 9819743427, ISBN-13: 978-9819743421.
In exploring the socio-political dynamics behind white Evangelicals’ support for Donald Trump and right-wing populism in the United States, Professor Marcia Pally of New York University identifies what she calls a “double loss” experienced by this group. She explains that white Evangelicals face both economic and societal losses—challenges shared by many Americans—which are further intensified by their distinct struggles as a religious community. This “double loss,” Pally argues, is coupled with a “double suspicion” of government and “outsiders”: a widespread American distrust of centralized authority, minorities, and new immigrants, paired with a doctrinal suspicion rooted of priestly and other authorities in Evangelical religious beliefs.
In a thought-provoking interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Marcia Pally of New York University delves into the socio-political dynamics driving the support of white Evangelicals for Donald Trump and right-wing populism in the United States. Highlighting what she describes as a “double loss” experienced by this demographic, Professor Pally explains how both economic and societal losses—shared by many Americans—are compounded by the unique religious challenges facing white Evangelicals. This sense of loss, she argues, is accompanied by a “double suspicion” of government and of “outsiders” (minorities and new immigrants): a general American wariness of centralized authority, alongside a doctrinal distrust of priestly and other authorities and of “outsiders’ rooted in Evangelical religious teachings.
Throughout the interview, Professor Pally unpacks the role of white Evangelicals in American right-wing populism, tracing their political engagement to a deep-seated suspicion of government and of “outsiders” and to a perceived erosion of cultural influence. She elaborates on the phenomenon of “Christian nationalism,” a relatively recent term describing a political movement that uses particular readings of Christianity to justify nationalist goals. However, she notes, Christian nationalism is not truly a form of Christianity but rather a form of nationalism that taps into the anger that arises from significant socio-economic losses and cultural marginalization.
Professor Pally also addresses how Trump’s rhetoric and policies—particularly on immigration and national identity—resonate with white Evangelicals, drawing on long-standing cultural anxieties about “outsiders” and threats to community. Finally, she explores the global implications of Trump’s potential re-election, predicting that right-wing populist movements around the world would likely adapt his strategies and rhetoric to their own contexts.
In this wide-ranging conversation, Professor Pally provides a nuanced understanding of the political and cultural forces shaping the white Evangelical electorate and their continued support for Donald Trump’s populist rhetoric in the United States.
Professor Marcia Pally is an expert in theology and political culture, teaches at New York University and was awarded the Mercator Professorship in the Theology Faculty at Humboldt University, where she is an annual guest professor.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Marcia Pally with some edits.
Populism as a Response to Duress: Loss, Threat, Fear or Anxiety about Change
What key differences do you observe between left- and right-wing populisms in the US, in particular the role of Evangelicals in American right populism, and how do these movements draw differently from America’s religio-cultural history? Could you elaborate on the American religio-political background from which populist beliefs emerge, and explain how this historical and cultural trajectory influenced Trump’s election in 2016?
Professor Marcia Pally: That’s a series of very complex questions. Let me take them step by step. You asked about the differences between left-wing and right-wing populism. Let me begin by saying that, following prominent research, I’ve developed a minimal core definition of populism. Then we can talk about left, right, strong and weak variants. The core definition of populism is that it’s a response to duress: loss, threat, fear of loss or anxiety about changes in economic situations, ways of life, technology, demographics, gender roles, etc.
When these losses or fears accumulate, people naturally shift their focus outward. They move away from their usual preoccupations—family, friends, schools, teams—and focus instead on identifying a “them” who is perceived to be causing harm to “us.” This shift to an “us versus them” mentality is a normal human response. It’s not specific to Europe, America or any particular ideology—it’s a species-wide reaction to perceived threats.
The third prong in this response to duress is identifying “them.” Populist movements—especially right-wing ones—seek to identify those they see as causing the harm. This identification usually draws from culturally familiar “others,” which can differ from culture to culture or even subculture to subculture. For instance, in the US, we don’t hear much about the Roma people because they play a negligible role in American history. But in other parts of the world, the Roma people have been historically singled out as a “them” responsible for certain fears or harms.
The “them” in the “us versus them” dynamic draws from historical and cultural ideas about society–who is “in” and who is “out”– as well as beliefs about the proper role and size of government.
To sum up, we can define populism as driven by duress, leading to an “us versus them” binary, where the “them” is identified based on long-standing cultural and historical factors. The key difference between left-wing and right-wing populism lies in who the “thems” are. Right-wing populism traditionally identifies the “them” as outsiders—new immigrants, religious and racial minorities and sometimes a corrupt government.
Left-wing populism, on the other hand, doesn’t usually target the government, as the left often views democratic governments as representatives of the people and legitimate agents of governance. Instead, left-wing populism tends to focus on economic exploitation, rather than identity politics, and identifies “them” as those responsible for economic inequality rather than as racial, ethnic or religious minorities. So, one key difference is that the right is more suspicious of government, while the left sees it as a potential agent of positive change.
I should also note that populism is not a static concept; it exists on a continuum. On one end, you have softer forms of populism, which align more closely with the normal agonistic aspects of democratic processes. For example, Bernie Sanders or Martin Luther King Jr. could be considered proponents of “soft” populism, which stays within the realm of democratic debate.
As you move along the continuum, populism can grow stronger, characterized by a much sharper “us versus them” binary and a diminished tolerance for ambiguity. In softer populism, someone can be an ally on one issue and an opponent on another. For instance, a corporation might support climate change action but oppose raising the minimum wage, and soft populism would recognize this complexity as part of politics.
In stronger populism, however, the “us versus them” division becomes much more rigid, often framing the struggle as a battle between good and evil, with existential stakes. This can lead to more extreme and uncompromising solutions.
The second part of your question, about cultural history and its impact, was quite broad. Could you narrow it down so I can address it more specifically?
The Problems People Face Are Often Real and Justified
Can you elaborate on the role of Evangelicals in American right-wing populism?
Professor Marcia Pally: Sure. I’m going to break this down by distinguishing between white Evangelicals and Evangelicals of color, because their histories in the US are very different. Evangelicals of color have a rich and vibrant history that really deserves its own study. Since my research focuses on white Evangelicals, I’ll focus on them here.
White Evangelicals—and their ancestors—have been coming to the US since the 17th century. They’ve contributed to and participated in the development of the country and contributed to three of the most foundational aspects of American political culture.
First, there’s covenantal political theory, which views the governed as a covenanted community. In this theory, sovereignty rests with the people, not the king or a ruler. If the leader—what we might now call the President or Prime Minister—violates the covenant with the governed, it is seen as legitimate to remove them. This is a productive heritage, and the ancestors of today’s Evangelicals played a significant role in introducing this idea to the United States.
Second, they contributed to republicanism—with a small “r”—which comes from Aristotelian thought. It emphasizes that citizens run the polis or state. This idea also centers around community engagement and governance, with sovereignty rooted in the people themselves.
Third, Evangelicals played a role in shaping liberalism, which, while less focused on the community aspect, emphasizes individual opportunity. However, like the other two traditions, liberalism maintains a strong suspicion of any government or ruler that abuses power. This suspicion runs through all three aspects: A leader who violates the covenant with the people; a tyrant who attempts to take control of the republic; and a ruler who tries to constrain individual freedoms.
Evangelicals, like other immigrants, contributed to all three of these foundational elements of American political culture. Additionally, two other important factors shaped their current position on the right wing of American politics.
First, their doctrinal belief that all governments are flawed and imperfect—none embody the Kingdom of God—leads them to be wary of authority. Each person, they believe, must determine how to live a moral life and foster a moral society, reinforcing their suspicion of centralized authority.
The Evangelicals we’re discussing are Protestants, heirs of the Protestant Reformation, which emphasized the individual conscience in developing a moral life and society. They are skeptical of priestly authority and instead trust the individual’s conscience. This, again, amplifies their wariness of government. This may foster the fear that the government could violate their covenant, their republic, their liberal rights and their doctrinal obligation to uphold the moral life. This suspicion also extends to outsiders who might interfere with their way of life.
This skepticism can be positive: a healthy distrust of government can guard against authoritarianism, bolster democracy and promote individual opportunity. Their strong sense of community has been a key factor in local development and community engagement. This commitment to community and localism is part of a long tradition in the US, especially within Evangelical circles.
However, under duress, things change. The usual focus on community and democratic localism can shift outward, leading to suspicion and fear of outsiders. Under pressure, the commitment to community may flip into an “us vs. them” mentality, where outsiders are perceived as threats to the community. Similarly, a healthy suspicion of autocratic government can morph into a blanket distrust of all government. Under stress, people tend to look for a “them” to blame for their problems, and nuanced thinking can give way to simplistic explanations.
Under these conditions, a suspicion of autocracy turns into a general suspicion of government, except when government is used to constrain outsiders. This shift makes it difficult for society to function effectively—if government is distrusted and outsiders are seen as threats, collaboration and compromise are stifled. If the government itself is seen as inherently suspect and if outsiders—who often bring talent, innovation, and entrepreneurialism—are also viewed with suspicion, a final tragedy emerges. This shift in perception, from community cohesion to distrust of outsiders and from a healthy skepticism of tyrants to a blanket suspicion of all government, leads to a loss of nuance in understanding the original sources of duress.
In today’s interconnected global economy, with its complex networks of transportation, communication and technology, problems such as economic hardship or changes in ways of life often have multiple, intertwined causes. This complexity can be overwhelming, leaving individuals feeling powerless to address the issues. In this context, the “us vs. them” mentality offers a simple explanation by blaming an identifiable group for the strain.
However, this appealing simplification can prevent people from recognizing the more intricate, systemic causes behind the challenges they face. In my research, I have found that the problems people experience are often very real and justified—people are generally aware when they are being impacted. The tragedy is that, if they can’t properly identify the true causes of their struggles, they may misdirect their frustration and fail to address the root issues.
Nothing Trump Said Is New in the American Cultural or Political Context
Former US President Donald Trump with a serious look as he delivers a speech at a campaign rally held at the Mohegan Sun Arena in Wilkes-Barre, PA – August 2, 2018. Photo: Evan El-Amin.
We know that it is not only Trump but other Republicans as well addressed economic and way-of-life duress but what made Trump’s policies so effective and ‘persuasive’ in garnering the votes? In what ways does the evangelical sense of cultural and political marginalization influence their embrace of Trump’s rhetoric and policies on immigration and national identity?
Professor Marcia Pally: This is a complex question but let me address it step by step.
First, it’s crucial to recognize that nothing Donald Trump said was new in the American cultural or political context. His identification of the “deep swamp,” the insider elite in Washington and the so-called elite media or “fake news,” is not new. It’s an expression of the long-standing suspicion of government in the US. As I’ve mentioned, this suspicion has a healthy, democratic side but can also morph into a general distrust of government. Trump was able to tap into this long-standing element of American political culture.
Similarly, regarding outsiders—whether new immigrants, religious minorities like Muslims or occasionally even anti-Semitic themes—Trump was able to activate these entrenched cultural anxieties. When you ask why he was so effective, it’s because he tapped into sentiments that had existed for a long time. In the 2015–2016 campaign, he experimented with different slogans to see what resonated, and when he received applause for certain themes, he kept using them.
When a political message touches on a long-standing concern—one that feels familiar or “right” to people—it’s likely to gain traction. Trump successfully tapped into both anti-government and anti-outsider sentiments and he continued to use those themes because they worked. But it’s important to emphasize that these ideas were not new.
For example, “America First” was not Trump’s invention. Woodrow Wilson used the phrase in 1916 in his efforts to keep the US out of World War I. Senator William Borah from Idaho also used it to argue against US involvement in the League of Nations after the war.
Similarly, “Drain the Swamp” was not Trump’s creation either—it was a campaign promise used by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.
Now, for the second part of your question regarding evangelicals, could you clarify what specifically you’d like me to follow up on?
In what ways does the evangelical sense of cultural and political marginalization influence their embrace of Trump’s rhetoric and policies on immigration and national identity?
Professor Marcia Pally: Thank you for that. Let’s return to our core definition: duress and the “us vs. them” shift through culturally familiar themes.
The pressures that white Evangelicals face are real and legitimate concerns. White Evangelicals experience the same duress many Americans do. There has been a loss of purchasing power since the 1980s, a decline in unionization and the disappearance of jobs for which Americans had been trained, alongside insufficient training for new jobs emerging from new technologies. Health care, housing, education, day care, senior care are all expensive for middle- and working class- Americans. Rapid technological advancements and changes in gender roles have also contributed to the sense that life today is harsher and more difficult than it was for their parents or grandparents.
There’s a growing sentiment that life has become less fair. People work hard, yet they lose their jobs or find themselves underemployed and communities are devastated when factories close or, more significantly, when technological changes increase productivity, reducing the need for workers. These are legitimate, very real hardships and neither political party did much to address them—until the Obama and Biden administrations, which took several productive steps, though not enough.
In addition to these economic hardships, Americans face “way of life” losses. By this, I mean the sense that one’s standingas respectable, middle-class individuals is being eroded or undermined. They feel powerless to change this, as policies are made by distant decision-makers who seem out of reach and unaccountable. These complaints are quite real.
On top of that, white Evangelicals have suffered a demographic loss. In 2004, they made up about 23–25% of the population; today, they are roughly 13%. They are the most aged of all religious groups in America, with an average age of around 56, and there is a growing fear of losing cultural influence in the US.
White Evangelicals once held more “soft power,” or cultural sway, in American life. As society has become more secular, urbanized and socially progressive, they’ve seen a decline in their influence. These demographic and cultural losses are felt as real and painful, compounding the economic and social changes that many in the middle and working classes are experiencing.
In summary, Evangelicals face a “double loss”: the economic and societal losses many Americans endure and the unique losses faced by their religious group. This double loss is paired with a “double suspicion” of government and “outsiders”—both the general American wariness of centralized authority and “others” (minorities, new immigrants) and the religious, doctrinal suspicion of priestly and other authorities.
This combination of double loss and double suspicion, particularly under duress, creates a volatile situation. When people are under pressure, they look for a “them” to blame and they turn to familiar explanations for their very real difficulties—ones that are culturally familiar, understandable, and resonate with their lived experiences.
You underline that in late 2019, the influential, mainstream evangelical publication, Christianity Today, ran an editorial calling for Trump’s removal from office. Yet in the 2016 presidential election, 81 percent of white evangelicals voted for Trump. How do you explain this strong bond despite forceful Evangelical reservations?
Professor Marcia Pally: It’s important to remember that Americans, in general, are suspicious of authority and evangelicals are doubly so. While Christianity Today is an influential magazine, an editorial it publishes doesn’t dictate how evangelicals across the country will respond. Evangelicals are likely to make up their own minds, based on their individual assessments of the situation, their personal sense of duress, loss or threat, and their views on the root causes of these challenges.
I’m not at all surprised that a major, influential magazine would criticize Donald Trump and declare him unfit for office, while at the same time, a substantial portion of evangelicals make their own decisions, grounded in their own perspectives and evaluations.
Christian Nationalism Is Not a Form of Christianity, but a Form of Nationalism
Christian singer Sean Feucht hosts a “Worship Protest” on the National Mall in Washington, DC, during the COVID-19 pandemic on October 25, 2020. Photo: Nicole Glass.
Can you elaborate on the concept of “Christian nationalism” and how it has been employed by White Evangelicals to justify their support for Trump and right-wing populism?
Professor Marcia Pally: Christian nationalism is a relatively recent term and it’s an important one, developed by colleagues of mine who have done excellent work. However, I’m not convinced that white evangelicals are actively using Christian nationalism. It might be more accurate to say that Christian nationalism is using white evangelicals. Let me explain.
First of all, Christian nationalism is not a form of Christianity; it is a form of nationalism. The core of it—the noun—is nationalism.
Christian nationalism aims to implement specific political, economic and social policies. It is a political position, not a faith tradition that aligns, for instance, with the teachings in Matthew 25, which calls for caring for “the least of these.” Rather, Christian nationalism is a political ideology that its proponents claim is justified by their particular readings or interpretations of Christianity.
Adherents of Christian nationalism argue that their political stances are rooted in their understanding of Christian doctrine and the Bible. However, it’s crucial to note that many Christians in the US have vastly different interpretations of Christianity. These Christians are working tirelessly to promote other understandings of the faith. This includes 20–25% of white evangelicals, whose voices are often underrepresented in mainstream media. They are actively advocating for alternative interpretations of the Bible and the Christian doctrine.
It’s also important to point out that Christian nationalism is not a uniquely white evangelical invention or “brand.” The movement extends far beyond white evangelicals, encompassing individuals from the broader religious right, including Catholics and mainline Protestants. So, while some white evangelicals may identify with Christian nationalism because they align with its “us vs. them” themes, it is a much broader political movement that goes beyond just one group.
How do you think right-wing populism will be affected globally if Trump gets elected on November 5?
Professor Marcia Pally: Right-wing movements around the world communicate with one another. Of course, this is not unique—left-wing movements, centrist movements, governments and NGOs also communicate globally. This is to be expected.
Given that right-wing populist movements exchange ideas and strategies, closely observing each other’s successes and failures in order to learn from them, if Trump is re-elected in November, I expect right-wing groups and leaders—or those aspiring to leadership on the right—to examine the strategies, rhetoric and promises of Trump’s campaign. They will likely try to adapt and apply these approaches within their own political contexts.
As Austrians head to the polls on Sunday, Professor Reinhard Heinisch contends that “If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope they come in first.” He explains this paradoxical statement by noting, “If the FPÖ comes in first, there’s a much greater probability that no other party would want to join a government led by someone as radical as Herbert Kickl. The Conservative Party (ÖVP) would have several options available—they could form a coalition with either the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and a smaller party, or with the FPÖ. But why would the ÖVP want to be the junior partner in a coalition under Kickl when they could be the senior partner in a coalition with the SPÖ?”
As Austrians head to the parliamentary elections on Sunday, September 29, 2024, the political landscape is tense, with the far-right, anti-immigration Freedom Party (FPÖ) potentially poised to achieve an unprecedented success. Although the FPÖ is unlikely to secure an outright majority in the 183-seat Nationalrat (National Council), the implications of their potential rise to power have sparked widespread debate and concern.
In a timely interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), ProfessorDr. Reinhard Heinisch, a leading expert on Austrian politics from the University of Salzburg, provides critical insights into the possible outcomes of this election. Professor Heinisch offers a paradoxical yet intriguing perspective: “If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope that they come in first.” He elaborates on this by explaining that if the FPÖ wins, there is a greater chance that other parties, particularly the Conservative Party (ÖVP), will refuse to join a coalition led by such a radical figure as FPÖ lider Herbert Kickl. “The ÖVP could form a coalition with the Social Democrats (SPÖ) instead, avoiding the complications of being a junior partner under Kickl,” Professor Heinisch notes.
However, Professor Heinisch also highlights the risks if the ÖVP comes in first and the FPÖ follows closely behind. In this scenario, the likelihood of an ÖVP-FPÖ coalition increases, with potentially significant implications for Austria and the European Union (EU). Professor Heinisch warns that Kickl, unlike some other far-right leaders who moderate once in power, has a clear agenda to fundamentally alter Austria and its position within the EU. “I take him seriously when he speaks about his goals,” Professor Heinisch asserts, pointing to Kickl’s past actions and statements that suggest a deep commitment to his radical agenda.
The interview with Professor Heinisch delves into the historical factors that have shaped the FPÖ, the party’s impact on Austria’s political dynamics and the broader European implications of its rise. Heinisch’s analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of the potential consequences of the upcoming election, making it essential reading for anyone interested in the future of Austrian and European politics.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Reinhard Heinisch with some edits.
FPÖ Poised to Emerge as Leading Party in Sunday’s Elections
Professor Heinisch, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Can you elaborate on the historical factors that have contributed to the rise of populist radical right movements in Austria? How far back can we trace these influences?
Professor Reinhard Heinisch: That’s a very good question. The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) is a populist radical right party, formed after World War II. However, it inherited a tradition that dates back to the Austrian Empire and the monarchy. Because Austria was not part of the German Empire during the reunification process in the 19th century, some people in Austria became German nationalists who wanted the German-speaking regions of Austria to join Germany. This sentiment laid the groundwork for what would later become the Freedom Party.
The FPÖ was founded after World War II and represented the aspirations of Austrians who identified themselves as Germans, including a significant number of former Nazis. Many of these former Nazi party members, once allowed to vote, did not align with the dominant conservative (Catholic) or socialist/social democratic parties. This led to the creation of a new party—the FPÖ—which was a German nationalist party that initially never exceeded more than 5% of the vote. It was a minor player in a political system dominated by two major parties: the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), a Christian Democratic party and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), which together controlled 95% of the electorate.
Over two generations, as the impact of the war receded, the FPÖ underwent a period of liberalization, attracting new members. In the early 1980s, it even partnered with the Social Democrats in government. However, the party was internally divided and during this time, a charismatic young leader from one of Austria’s provinces, Jörg Haider, recognized that future success depended on transforming the FPÖ from a nationalist, radical right party into a populist party.
A populist party, as Haider understood, positions itself against the elites, claiming that they have robbed ordinary people of their sovereignty. Under Haider’s leadership, the FPÖ rapidly grew, moving from 5-6% of the vote to 27%, largely on the strength of its populist appeal. Populist parties, even those on the right, are often less dogmatic than other radical right parties. For example, the FPÖ was initially pro-European integration, then turned against it; it was initially anti-Catholic, but later defended Europe against Islam. The party was highly flexible, adapting its platform to address societal grievances and attract voters.
Austria’s integration into Europe and the accompanying issues of borders, identity, immigration, globalization and European integration became increasingly important to the FPÖ. This focus allowed the party to capitalize on voter discontent with the dominant parties, particularly during times of political change, uncertainty and insecurity. Events such as the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the war in Yugoslavia—during which Austria, as a border country, experienced significant immigration—further fueled the FPÖ’s rise.
By 2000, the FPÖ had gained 27% of the vote and joined a conservative-led government, which caused a stir in Brussels and led to sanctions against the Austrian government. This was the first time a radical right populist party had become a junior partner in government. However, the FPÖ, as an opposition party, was ill-equipped to govern and its voters quickly became disillusioned. The party split, imploded and the government ended prematurely. After another round of elections, the coalition continued briefly before imploding again. The party split into a more moderate faction and a fundamentalist faction led by Haider. However, after Haider’s death in a car accident, his faction essentially disappeared.
The FPÖ reemerged and moderated itself when seeking office, but radicalized when rebuilding in opposition. In 2017, the FPÖ, once again seeking office, formed a government with the conservatives under the leadership of Sebastian Kurz, a young leader from the People’s Party. However, this government also ended prematurely due to the infamous Ibiza video, in which the FPÖ leader was seen offering influence to someone posing as a Russian oligarch. This scandal led to the collapse of the government and the FPÖ returned to opposition, where it had to reinvent itself once more.
Thanks to issues like the pandemic and problems within the government, the FPÖ rebuilt itself impressively and is now in a position where it is likely—or at least highly probable—that it will emerge as a leading party in the upcoming elections on Sunday, September 29 or at least finish as a close second. That, in a nutshell, is the situation.
FPÖ Takes Inspiration from Viktor Orbán’s Hungary
Protesters gather outside as the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) joins the coalition government in Vienna, Austria, on December 18, 2017. Photo: Shutterstock.
To what extent do socioeconomic issues like unemployment, immigration, economic inequality and globalization contribute to the appeal of the populist radical right in Austria? How do populist attitudes and attitudes based on populist radical right and left host ideologies affect citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making?
Professor Reinhard Heinisch: The Freedom Party (FPÖ), if we imagine political contestation along two axes—the socioeconomic and the sociopolitical—traditionally aligns more to the center-left on socioeconomic issues. This alignment has enabled them to form coalitions with the Social Democrats on economic matters. However, on sociocultural issues, they are quite far to the right, which currently gives them a unique selling position.
Both factors, socioeconomic and sociocultural, are important, but Freedom Party voters are probably more concerned with cultural issues, particularly questions of identity and immigration. You cannot completely separate these concerns from socioeconomic factors because the Freedom Party engages in welfare chauvinism. They often mobilize against immigrants or asylum seekers using socioeconomic arguments, such as advocating for cuts to subsidies and benefits for non-citizens, while emphasizing support for native Austrians. This approach is sometimes echoed by the Conservatives, making it a broader discourse that encompasses both socioeconomic and sociocultural issues.
Structurally, the overarching concern among Freedom Party voters is a fear of change and a sense of decline in their future prospects. This anxiety is encapsulated in the party’s election slogan, “Fortress Austria,” which speaks directly to these fears. What makes Austria unique is its historical difficulty in defining national identity, particularly in relation to Germany. In the past, German-speaking Austrians often considered themselves as Germans living in Austria-Hungary, where “Austria” referred to the Habsburg Empire’s territory, not to an ethnicity. It wasn’t until after World War II that Austrians began to see themselves as distinct from Germans.
Given this complex identity, Austrians often define themselves through lifestyle, traditions and customs. In the context of globalization and immigration, these customs and traditions feel particularly under siege. For example, in Vienna, the Freedom Party has mobilized support by highlighting issues such as schools no longer serving pork schnitzel due to the dietary restrictions of Muslims and Jews. While this might seem trivial, these identity issues resonate strongly with those who view their way of life as an authentic expression of Austrian culture. This divides the population, with elites and educated people defining themselves differently from those who see lifestyle as central to their identity.
This debate is not particularly intellectual, but it significantly affects Austria. The Freedom Party, however, is not as radical as the Alterantive for Germany (AfD) in Germany. Unlike in the past, the Freedom Party today does not philosophize about the “Germanness” of Austria. Instead, it is more pragmatic, drawing inspiration from Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and aiming to create an Austrian version of that model, rather than engaging in debates about national identity.
The Freedom Party Poses a Particular Challenge to the Conservatives
You argue that radical right fringe parties often act as agenda setters, with main parties responding by accommodating and adopting their most salient issues. How do you think radical right fringe parties affect the main parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)?
Professor Reinhard Heinisch: Well, I think it’s important to distinguish between Central Europe—those countries that were under communism—and those that were not. The main issue in Eastern European countries that were once communist is the contestation over cultural issues. There is very little debate over economic policy because the only consensus is on European Union (EU) integration and foreign investment. There’s not a significant difference in what center-left and center-right parties can offer their voters in economic terms, which is why center-left parties in Eastern Europe are often weak and underdeveloped. Where we do see substantial debate is around identity issues. Many unresolved identity issues exist and centrist conservative parties in these countries must constantly guard their right flank. Fringe parties often mobilize people on identity issues, positioning themselves to the right of mainstream parties. This is why we see so much identity-based populism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
In contrast, Austria has a more developed party system that spans economic and social fault lines. However, identity issues still play a significant role and the discourse around identity is particularly intense. On the right, we have the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria and while there are smaller parties trying to establish themselves, they may not make it into Parliament this time. On the other end of the spectrum, we have the Greens and a small liberal party occupying the left.
The contestation on the identity axis often influences the socioeconomic debate. Traditional parties like the Social Democrats would prefer to focus on social issues, but they are constrained by internal divisions. They must appeal to both progressive urban voters and more traditional constituencies, which often splits the party. The Conservatives face a similar problem, having experienced a split that led to the formation of the small The New Austria and Liberal Forum (NEOS) party.
The radical right poses a particular challenge to the Conservatives, pulling them further to the right. The future of democracy in Europe may well depend on how Conservatives handle this challenge. In Austria, the typical response has been co-option—embracing the radical right and bringing them into the fold. This strategy has led to the Freedom Party’s implosion on three occasions, but it has also validated the Freedom Party’s agenda. When the Freedom Party makes a comeback, they can point to the Conservatives and say, “We’re not saying anything different from what they said five years ago.”
So the question is: What are the risks of validating these parties versus trying to neutralize them through co-option? The verdict is still out, at least in the Austrian context.
As a Hard Eurosceptic Party, the FPÖ Would Advocate for Leaving the EU
How did the radical-right populist Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) construct its sovereignty claims, and how did the mainstream right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) adopt these claims? In doing so, how did the ÖVP significantly narrow the gap with the far-right FPÖ on the national and economic dimensions of sovereignty and largely renounce its previously pro-European and anti-sovereigntist positions?
Professor Reinhard Heinisch: The Freedom Party (FPÖ) is a hard Eurosceptic party. We distinguish between hard and soft Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism refers to a stance where a party, if it had the opportunity, would advocate for leaving the European Union. However, the FPÖ knows this is a difficult and still a minority position, as two-thirds of Austrians want to remain in the EU, even if Austria is not a particularly enthusiastic member state.
To navigate this, the FPÖ hedges its bets, a strategy we described as “equivocal Euroscepticism” in an article in the Journal of Common Market Studies. They push their critique of the EU to the brink but stop short of calling for an outright exit. Instead, they vaguely advocate for major reforms and restoring sovereignty to nation-states. The FPÖ aligns itself with European groups like the “Patriots for Europe,” which includes parties like the Rassemblement National (RN) in France, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and figures like Viktor Orbán. They are comfortable in this coalition and aim to weaken the EU as much as possible.
For the FPÖ, sovereignty means that decisions should be made within Austria. They advocate for weakening international judicial bodies like the European Court of Human Rights and the EU Courts, arguing that any international involvement should be strictly voluntary and based on national decision-making. This understanding of sovereignty is almost exclusivist and they push it as far as they can. For example, regarding the Sky Shield initiative—a missile defense system being developed by Austria, Switzerland, Germany and others—the FPÖ claims it’s a backdoor attempt to join NATO, illustrating their strict interpretation of sovereignty.
In contrast, the Conservatives (ÖVP) are fundamentally pro-European. While they might exhibit what we call “soft Euroscepticism,” this typically involves negotiating hard on behalf of national interests, as seen with the “frugal” alliance of countries. The Conservatives are far from the FPÖ’s stance, although they have shifted from their earlier, more enthusiastic pro-European position.
Historically, the ÖVP was the driving force behind Austria’s accession to the EU, even branding themselves as the “Europe party” in Austria. They were the main architects of Austria’s EU membership. However, over time, the ÖVP has moved away from this position. While they are still where most Austrian parties are in terms of EU support, they have significantly distanced themselves from their early 1990s stance. Today, the most pro-European party in Austria is NEOS, a small liberal party that consistently defends the EU. Meanwhile, the ÖVP often adopts a stance of blaming Brussels when things go wrong, while taking credit for EU successes.
Austria: From Islam-Friendly to Islamophobic
Activists from the Identitarian Movement Austria block the access road to the Hungary-Austria border at Nickelsdorf on October 17, 2015. Photo: Johanna Poetsch.
Austria was one of the first European states to officially recognize Islam in 1912. How has the rise of right-wing populism and party competition changed Austria’s policies toward Islam?What role did FPÖ play in this change of policy toward Islam?
Professor Reinhard Heinisch: Yes, that’s a very interesting question. Austria has historically had a progressive relationship with Islam, dating back to the monarchy. Islam has been a fully recognized and equal religion, sanctioned by the courts and rooted in the inclusion of Bosnian Muslims in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Traditionally, the Austrian military even had imams, rabbis and Catholic priests. These protections have been carried over and reinforced by the Islam Law of 1912, making it difficult for anyone to weaken the role of Islam in Austria.
Interestingly, Austrian Conservatives and other political parties historically defended the role of Islam and the autonomy of religious institutions. Austria has a tradition of autonomous interest associations, where the state allows these groups to self-govern within their areas of jurisdiction. This applies to labor markets as well as to religious institutions. For instance, religious communities in Austria have the autonomy to organize their own school curricula, appoint teachers, imams and other religious leaders, all within the framework of their contract with the government.
Initially, religion wasn’t a major issue for the FPÖ. Their focus was more on immigration rather than religion. For quite some time, the FPÖ even maintained strong, positive relationships with several Arab countries, such as the ties between Jörg Haider, the FPÖ leader and figures like Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. Even after 9/11, Austrians, including the FPÖ, differentiated between Islam and terrorism, seeing them as two separate issues.
However, as the FPÖ began competing with a splinter party led by Haider, they sought new ways to differentiate themselves. This led to an increasing focus on Islam and Islamophobia began to take root. The existing Islam Law became a focal point of controversy, and identity issues were increasingly linked to it.
At some point, these issues were picked up by the Conservative Party (ÖVP), which was locked in competition with the radical right, particularly in areas with larger concentrations of immigrants. Gradually, these ideas went mainstream. Meanwhile, the Greens and Social Democrats distanced themselves from the issue of religion, leaving it to the Conservatives, who were more traditionally aligned with religious matters.
While in a coalition government with the Social Democrats, the Conservatives began rewriting the Islam Law, largely under pressure from the radical right. Around this time, several Islamist terrorist attacks occurred in different European countries, heightening the sense of insecurity and driving a securitization of the new law. The focus shifted toward “Austrianizing” Islam, which included requirements for official translations of the Quran, preaching in German and school curricula reflecting these changes. The Islamic community was pressured to be more proactive in cooperating with government authorities, as outlined in the new version of the Islam Law.
By the 2016 election campaign, when Sebastian Kurz emerged as the strongman of the ÖVP, the question of Islam and “political Islam” became a central campaign issue for both the Conservatives and the FPÖ. Ironically, the Conservatives amplified this issue so much that the FPÖ had to remind voters that they were the first to raise these concerns. Since then, the ÖVP has continued to use the issue of Islam, even establishing a committee and a website to investigate “political Islam,” though the exact nature of this remains unclear. It became a political tool for them, although recently they seem to have stepped back from this focus, possibly realizing it benefits the radical right more than themselves. However, there remains a faction within the Conservative Party that continues to see Islam as a key issue and uses it opportunistically when they believe it can garner votes.
President’s Potential Actions Remain a Significant Unknown That Could Influence the Outcome
Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen during an interview with Russian television in Vienna on April 26, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.
How do you assess the significance of the September 29 elections for the populist radical right in Austria? What are the key factors that could influence their performance this time? Most pundits in the media argue that FPÖ could make a comeback and can win elections on Sunday? What is your take on the elections in terms of the potential success of populist parties?
Professor Reinhard Heinisch: I want to start with a paradoxical statement: If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope that they come in first. Let me explain this.
If the FPÖ comes in first, there’s a much greater probability that no other party would want to join a government led by someone as radical as Herbert Kickl. The Conservative Party (ÖVP) would have several options available, as they could form a coalition with either the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and a smaller party or with the FPÖ, but why would the ÖVP want to be the junior partner in a coalition under Kickl when they could be the senior partner in a coalition with the SPÖ?
Kickl has very far-reaching ideas about transforming the state, heavily influenced by the Hungarian model, which are not aligned with the interests of the ÖVP. This would likely result in constant conflict, with the ÖVP being forced to explain the radical actions of the FPÖ, as they have had to do in the past. ÖVP leader Karl Nehammer has ruled out such a coalition so many times that it seems almost impossible for him to go back on that promise—unless he is forced out, which I don’t see happening.
If the ÖVP comes in first and the FPÖ is a close second, the likelihood of a coalition between the ÖVP and the FPÖ increases. In that scenario, Kickl might not insist on becoming Chancellor since his party didn’t win, and he could remain the head of the faction in Parliament while playing both an opposition and government role. The FPÖ is not monolithic; there are members who could be appointed to government positions. In fact, in two Austrian states, including Salzburg, the FPÖ is already in coalition with the Conservatives, so there are experienced individuals who could step up at the national level.
Regardless of what happens, the FPÖ would need to enter a coalition, which would likely dilute its agenda. However, if the FPÖ were to secure the Chancellorship and the Foreign Ministry, it would have significant implications for the European Union. Although Austria is not a major power, a government led by the FPÖ, alongside other like-minded governments such as those of Viktor Orbán in Hungary or Robert Fico in Slovakia, could complicate EU policymaking, particularly on issues like sanctions against Russia, which the FPÖ opposes, or the Green Deal. The more governments embrace FPÖ-like positions, the more difficult it becomes to achieve consensus on critical European policies.
At this stage, I see the radical right as spoilers rather than as architects or agenda setters, at least not on the European level. They can disrupt important initiatives and use certain issues as bargaining chips to extract concessions. The FPÖ could potentially leverage Austria’s role in the EU, although I don’t see that as a likely scenario.
One unknown factor that could play a significant role is the Austrian President. The President has powers comparable to those of the French President, although he typically does not exercise them. However, President Alexander Van der Bellen, who is in his second term and has a popular mandate, has already announced that he would not appoint Kickl as Chancellor and that he would insist on a pro-European government. These declarations could factor heavily into the calculations of the different parties. Since Van der Bellen is from the Green Party and not aligned with the parties likely to emerge on top in the elections, his potential actions remain a significant unknown that could greatly influence the outcome.
FPÖ’s Success Would Be Seen as a Positive Signal by Putin
Media outlet Politico argues that ‘most worryingly, an FPÖ win would establish a populist, Russia-friendly Central European bloc stretching from Ukraine’s border with Slovakia and Hungary to Austria’s frontier with Switzerland, making it easier for President Vladimir Putin to sow discontent at the heart of Europe.’ Do you think a win by FPÖ will create for Putin to make more inroads to EU?
Professor Reinhard Heinisch: I would say yes, but with some qualifications. For this scenario to fully materialize, the FPÖ would need to gain 50% of the vote, which I don’t see happening. Additionally, I don’t see any coalition partner the FPÖ could align with that would fully support a pro-Russia stance. Even the Conservatives have defended Ukraine and criticized Russia, so the FPÖ wouldn’t be able to push this agenda on its own.
However, the election or success of a pro-Russian party, or a party friendly to Russia, would certainly be seen as a positive signal by Putin. It would be another piece in the puzzle for Russia, absolutely. If this trend continues, it could indeed lead to closer alignment with Putin.
That said, the upcoming US election is likely to be a much bigger issue on the global stage and will likely overshadow whatever happens in Austria. Given the lengthy negotiations that typically follow Austrian elections, it’s possible that the US election will be over before a new Austrian government is even formed. While the potential for increased Russian influence is there, the FPÖ would need to become much stronger to significantly impact EU-Russia relations. There would also be considerable pushback within Austria against such a shift.
FPÖ Leader Kickl: The Law Must Follow Politics
Some in Austria’s establishment believe that Herbert Kickl, the leader of FPÖ, would inevitably moderate should the FPÖ gain power, à la Giorgia Meloni, the leader of the far-right Brothers of Italy, who has taken a more pragmatic course than most expected since becoming Italy’s prime minister two years ago. Do you think we can witness a ‘Melonization of Kickle’ should FPÖ win the elections?
Professor Reinhard Heinisch:Generally, I’m not an alarmist, and I’ve always viewed the radical right as a more heterogeneous group. I should also disclose that one of the radical right leadership figures was a student of mine and I’ve known her for a long time. I’m not suggesting that we’re dealing with pure evil here.However, I do think we should take people at their word. I’m very much persuaded that when people make certain announcements, they mean what they say. When it comes to Kickl, we don’t know much about him, which is surprising for a political figure with his longevity and standing. He has no close allies within the party and we can’t look into his soul.
That said, he is one of the best communicators in Austrian politics. He’s extremely clever and was once known as the brain behind the previous party leader, the architect of many of the hard-right slogans. He skillfully peddles conspiracy theories and uses them to his advantage, but he’s also extremely disciplined. Kickl can tailor his message and say tough, often troubling things with a calm and reflective demeanor.
I believe he has an overarching agenda, one that involves fundamentally changing Austria and the European Union, if given the chance. I don’t think he’s simply interested in power for its own sake. Unlike other leaders who are content with a bit of glory and power, Kickl seems to have a mission. I take him seriously when he speaks about his goals.
If given the opportunity, I think he would go as far as he could to implement his agenda. If not, he might easily shift his stance and claim that his intentions were misunderstood. His brief tenure as Minister of the Interior was quite chilling; for instance, he once stated that “the law must follow politics,” rather than politics adhering to the Constitution. This gives us some insight into his mindset.
So, I believe it’s legitimate to be concerned about the extent of power Kickl might attain. He has surrounded himself with ideologically driven individuals who have become quite dogmatic. He has also used Nazi-era terminology, such as describing himself as a “Volkskanzler” (People’s Chancellor) and claims to represent a silent majority of Austrians. Despite the FPÖ garnering only around 27% of the vote, and survey after survey showing that the majority of Austrians are opposed to the Freedom Party being in government— with Kickl consistently ranking at the bottom of public trust indices—his discourse creates a distinctly different impression.
Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Saffron Republic – Hindu Nationalism and State Power in India.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. September 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0019
The book edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Srirupa Roy offers a critical examination of the rise and entrenchment of New Hindutva as a dominant force in Indian politics, providing an in-depth analysis of its implications for democracy, social cohesion, and the secular fabric of the nation. By critically examining the ideological foundations and practices of New Hindutva, the authors reveal the complexities and contradictions inherent in its project of constructing a Hindu majoritarian state. Ultimately, Saffron Republic serves as an essential resource for understanding the broader implications of Hindu nationalism’s ascendancy, particularly its impact on the erosion of democratic principles, the marginalization of minority communities, and the reconfiguration of Indian national identity. The book’s scholarly rigor and interdisciplinary approach make it an indispensable contribution to contemporary debates on populism, nationalism, authoritarianism, and the future of democracy in India.
The book Saffron Republic – Hindu Nationalism and State Power in India, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Srirupa Roy, examines the phenomenon of contemporary Hindu nationalism or ‘new Hindutva’ that is presently the dominant ideological and political-electoral formation in India. There is a rich body of work on Hindu nationalism, but its main focus is on an earlier moment of insurgent movement politics in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, new Hindutva is a governmental formation that converges with wider global currents and enjoys mainstream acceptance. To understand these new political forms and their implications for democratic futures, a fresh set of reflections is in order. This book approaches contemporary Hindutva as an example of a democratic authoritarianism or an authoritarian populism, a politics that simultaneously advances and violates ideas and practices of popular and constitutional democracy. Therefore, this volume is crucial for understanding the ideological and political transformations within India since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Narendra Modi came to power in 2014.
The book seeks to explore and explain key questions surrounding the rise of Hindutva and its impact on India’s electoral democracy. It examines the causes and consequences of the ascent of Hindu nationalist organizations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) within a competitive democratic framework. The book also investigates the transition from nationalist mobilization to authoritarian populist governance, questioning what changes when Hindu nationalism becomes the mechanism of rule rather than protest. Additionally, it delves into how civilizational boundaries are defined, the nature of the Indic identity, and what constitutes the Indian way of life—a central concept in civilizational discourse. The book further explores how the core tenets of Hindutva have become ingrained in everyday common sense and widespread sentiment, enabling the BJP to maintain and expand its influence across northern, central, and western India for over three decades.
The authors, Hansen and Roy, structure the book around four key themes: rule, articulation, inclusion, and violence, each representing a facet of New Hindutva. The discussion of “rule” highlights how the BJP, since coming to power in 2014, has engaged in practices of institutional capture and bypass, filling key positions with ideologically loyal individuals and undermining democratic checks and balances. The theme of “articulation” explores how Hindutva has become embedded in the social and spatial fabric of India, particularly in regions where anti-minority sentiments have been normalized. The “inclusion” theme examines the strategic incorporation of marginalized groups into the Hindutva fold, while “violence” addresses the central role of anti-Muslim violence in the project of Hindu nationalism.
The opening chapter of Saffron Republic, titled “What Is New about ‘New Hindutva’?” by Thomas Blom Hansen and Srirupa Roy, offers a deep exploration of the evolution of Hindu nationalism into a dominant ideological force in contemporary India. Hansen and Roy argue that New Hindutva marks a shift from a movement-based identity project to an institutionalized form of governance embedded within state structures. The chapter traces the transition from the insurgent mass mobilizations of the 1980s and 1990s—often centered around temple-building and religious identity—to the present-day governmental formation known as New Hindutva, which has gained significant institutional power and mainstream acceptance.
The authors emphasize that contemporary Hindu nationalism under New Hindutva differs markedly from its earlier versions. While cultural and religious identity remain central, the movement now also prioritizes economic and foreign policy initiatives. Hansen and Roy contend that New Hindutva embodies a form of democratic authoritarianism or authoritarian populism, paradoxically advancing and undermining democratic principles simultaneously. This governance style utilizes the mechanisms of constitutional democracy to legitimize and entrench its power, while gradually eroding the foundational norms of democratic governance.
The chapter reflects on the scholarly engagement with Hindu nationalism over the decades, noting that earlier studies primarily focused on the movement’s role in social engineering and identity formation. In contrast, the current scholarly focus has shifted to understanding how Hindu nationalism, now embedded in state power, seeks to transform India into a Hindu state. This transformation has led to the consolidation of Hindutva ideology across various societal domains, effectively blurring the distinction between a secular democracy and a majoritarian Hindu state. Overall, this chapter provides a compelling framework for understanding the multifaceted nature of New Hindutva, offering valuable insights into its ideological underpinnings and its efforts to reshape Indian society and politics. The authors’ analysis is both thorough and timely, making it an essential read for anyone interested in the current political landscape of India.
In Chapter 2, “New Hindutva Timeline: September 2013–October 2020” by Ashwin Subramanian, provides a detailed timeline of key events that have shaped the trajectory of New Hindutva, focusing on the period from September 2013 to October 2020. Subramanian highlights significant policy changes, legal reforms, and major incidents that have reinforced the BJP’s ideological project. This chronological overview serves as a useful reference for understanding the political and social milestones of Hindutva’s ascent to power.
In the chapter titled “Normalizing Violence: Lessons from Hindu Nationalist India,” Amrita Basu offers a compelling analysis of the evolving nature and growing normalization of violence under Hindu nationalism in contemporary India. Basu highlights how the RSS and its affiliates, which once orchestrated communal riots through carefully engineered rumors, now rely on decentralized acts of violence fueled by grassroots Hindutva sentiment. This shift reflects a broader societal acceptance of violence, particularly against religious minorities such as Muslims and Christians, as well as Dalits, women, and intellectuals who challenge the prevailing orthodoxy.
Basu argues that this normalization is deeply rooted in the current political environment, where the BJP under Modi has effectively blurred the lines between state and religion. By promoting leaders who endorse violence and enacting laws that implicitly encourage it, the BJP has created a climate where violence is not only tolerated but also justified as a defense of Hindu identity. Basu emphasizes that this violence serves to enforce upper-caste dominance and align Hindu nationalism with Indian nationalism, thereby redefining the boundaries of citizenship and nationhood. The chapter effectively illustrates how this modality of violence impacts not only the immediate targets but also the broader social fabric, signaling to minorities and dissenters that their place in society is conditional on their adherence to Hindu norms. Basu’s analysis is crucial for understanding the implications of Hindutva violence on the reconstitution of social identities and the erosion of democratic principles in India.
In Chapter 4, “Hindutva Establishments: Right-Wing Think Tanks and the Mainstreaming of Governmental Hindutva,” Srirupa Roy examines the transformation of Hindu nationalism into a governing ideology since the BJP’s rise to power in 2014. Roy highlights the pivotal role of right-wing think tanks in this shift, arguing that they have been instrumental in legitimizing and embedding Hindutva within India’s political mainstream. These think tanks function by translating Hindutva themes into the language of governance, connecting nationalist actors with existing power structures, and using strategic visibility and secrecy to advance their agenda. Roy also discusses the concept of “civilizational power,” used by these think tanks to subtly reframe Indian identity around Hindu values while marginalizing non-Hindu communities. This approach allows Hindutva to present itself as both modern and rooted in tradition, appealing to a broad spectrum of the Indian elite. The chapter offers a critical analysis of how Hindu nationalism has moved from the fringes to the center of Indian politics, raising concerns about the implications for democratic governance. Roy’s insights provide a deep understanding of the institutionalization of right-wing populism in contemporary India.
In Chapter 5, titled “New Hindutva and the ‘UP Model,’” Srirupa Roy and Thomas Blom Hansen present a revealing interview with journalist Neha Dixit and filmmaker Nakul Sawhney, exploring the institutionalization of Hindu nationalist ideologies in Uttar Pradesh under Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. Dixit and Sawhney discuss the normalization of anti-minority violence, the politicization of law enforcement, and the consolidation of a Hindu majoritarian state in the region. The chapter illuminates how previously fringe practices, such as the “Love Jihad” narrative, have become formalized, and how state power is used to target dissenters, particularly Muslims, Dalits, and other marginalized groups. The interview highlights the growing complicity of the police in enforcing Hindutva agendas, the suppression of free speech, and the normalization of media censorship and self-censorship. These insights underscore the broader implications of the “UP Model” as a microcosm of authoritarian populism in India, raising critical concerns about the erosion of democratic principles and civil liberties under the guise of governance.
In Chapter 6, “The Making of a Majoritarian Metropolis: Crowd Action, Public Order, and Communal Zoning in Calcutta,” Ritajyoti Bandyopadhyay explores the historical processes that have transformed Calcutta into a majoritarian city, where Hindu dominance over urban space has become normalized. The chapter traces the marginalization and ghettoization of Muslims following the Partition of India in 1947 and examines how these developments laid the groundwork for the rise of Hindutva in the city. Bandyopadhyay argues that communal zoning and the systematic exclusion of Muslims from key areas have created a “majoritarian common sense” that shapes everyday urban life. The chapter reveals how long-standing societal divisions and tacit violence have facilitated the contemporary rise of Hindutva, making it an integral part of Calcutta’s socio-political landscape. The chapter offers a critical approach on how historical segregation and the normalization of communal identities continue to influence urban governance and electoral politics in the city today.
In Chapter 7, “Social Segregation and Everyday Hindutva in Middle India,” Thomas Blom Hansen provides a nuanced exploration of how Hindutva ideology has been deeply embedded in the everyday life and social structures of northern and western India, particularly in the city of Aurangabad. Through longitudinal fieldwork, Hansen examines the historical and contemporary processes that have led to the spatial and social segregation of Muslims and Hindus, highlighting how the rise of Hindu nationalism has co-opted and amplified pre-existing social divisions. The chapter emphasizes the role of industrial growth in reinforcing these divisions, as Muslims and Dalits were systematically excluded from economic opportunities, further entrenching their marginalization. Hansen argues that Hindutva’s success lies in its ability to adapt to local contexts, merging historical narratives of conflict with contemporary political agendas. This chapter offers a nuanced analysis of how Hindu nationalism has permeated the socio-economic and cultural fabric, as well as the everyday life, of middle India.
In Chapter 8, titled “‘Mitakuye Oyasin – We Are All Related’: Hindutva and Indigeneity in Northeast India,” author Arkotong Longkumer explores the intersection of Hindutva ideology with indigenous traditions in Northeast India and its international dimensions. Longkumer examines how Hindutva seeks to co-opt indigenous identities by aligning them with Hindu cultural and religious frameworks, thereby integrating them into a broader Hindu universe. The chapter delves into the strategic use of indigenous symbols, land, and rituals to strengthen Hindu nationalist narratives, particularly through organizations like the RSS, RIWATCH, and the International Center for Cultural Studies (ICCS), which operate both domestically and internationally. The ICCS, for example, is involved in fostering connections between Hindu nationalism and indigenous movements globally, promoting the idea that Hinduism shares common ground with various indigenous and pagan traditions around the world. This alignment is presented as a form of cultural nationalism that supports a universalizing narrative of Hindutva, while simultaneously challenging the distinctiveness of indigenous practices. Longkumer provides critical insights into how these international linkages reinforce Hindutva’s ideological expansion and cultural appropriation, complicating the relationship between indigenous identities and the homogenizing impulses of Hindu nationalism.
In Chapter 9, “From Castes to Nationalist Hindus: The Making of Hinduism as a Civil Religion,” Suryakant Waghmore explores how Hindutva has transformed Hinduism into a civil religion that merges religious identity with nationalist ideology. Waghmore critiques the common distinction between Hinduism and Hindutva, arguing that Hindutva has not only survived but thrived by integrating caste into a broader nationalist project. The chapter emphasizes how Hindutva strategically co-opts elements of Hinduism, particularly by downplaying caste hierarchies and promoting Hindu solidarity against external threats, such as Muslims and Christians. This transformation aims to create a unified, modernized Hindu identity that aligns with the values of nationalism, equality, and progress. However, Waghmore notes the inherent contradictions in this project, as caste remains deeply entrenched in Hinduism’s social fabric.
In Chapter 10, “When Hindutva Performs Muslimness: Ethnographic Encounters with the Muslim Rashtriya Manch,” Lalit Vachani provides a critical analysis of the RSS’s Muslim outreach initiative through the formation of the Muslim Rashtriya Manch (MRM, Muslim National Forum). Vachani argues that the MRM’s primary function is not genuine inclusion but rather a performative strategy aimed at projecting a sanitized, compliant version of Indian Muslims that aligns with the RSS’s Hindu nationalist agenda. This chapter highlights how the MRM stages symbolic acts of Muslim participation in Hindu cultural practices to create a narrative of “inclusive Hindutva,” while simultaneously reinforcing the marginalization and secondary citizenship of Muslims. Vachani emphasizes that these performances are primarily designed for a Hindu audience, serving to legitimize the RSS’s broader majoritarian projects and deflect criticism. The chapter exposes the instrumentalization of Muslim identity within the framework of Hindutva, highlighting the complexities and contradictions inherent in the RSS’s outreach efforts.
In Chapter 11, “Violence after Violence: The Politics of Narratives over the Delhi Pogrom,” Irfan Ahmad critically examines the terminology used to describe communal violence, specifically focusing on the events of February 2020 in Delhi, which he argues should be accurately termed a “pogrom” rather than a “riot.” Ahmad challenges the pervasive nationalist epistemology that often equalizes Hindu and Muslim violence, thereby obscuring the significant power imbalances between these communities. He contends that this false equivalence perpetuates a biased narrative that overlooks the systematic nature of anti-Muslim violence in India. By engaging with historical and contemporary examples, Ahmad illustrates how this nationalist framework shapes both academic discourse and public perception, ultimately contributing to the ongoing marginalization of Muslims. The chapter is a powerful critique of the ways in which language and narrative are manipulated to serve political ends, emphasizing the need for precise terminology to understand and address the root causes of communal violence.
In Chapter 12, “Development: India’s Foundational Myth,” Mona Bhan critically explores the Indian government’s abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A in August 2019, which stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status. Bhan argues that this move was justified under the guise of promoting development, yet it is deeply rooted in a settler-colonial agenda aimed at erasing Kashmir’s Muslim-majority identity. The chapter challenges the myth that Kashmir is economically backward and dependent on India, revealing how this narrative has historically been used to legitimize Indian occupation and control. Bhan delves into how development has been weaponized as a tool of demographic warfare, with the intent to displace Kashmiri Muslims and alter the region’s cultural and religious landscape. Through a detailed examination of the economic, political, and ecological impacts of India’s policies in Kashmir, the chapter exposes the broader implications of India’s authoritarian turn under the Modi regime, which seeks to transform Kashmir into a Hindu-majoritarian state.
Although it contains editorial weaknesses, such as unnecessary and lengthy details about the weird speaking style of a Hindu peasant who built a shrine on land that a Muslim saint (pir), who frequently appeared in his dreams, claimed to belong to him in the past, Parvis Ghassem-Fachandi’s Chapter 13, titled “Pratikriya, Guilt, and Reactionary Violence,” offers a critical examination of the 2002 Gujarat pogrom. The chapter focuses on the politics of narrative, particularly the use of terms like “riot” and “pratikriya” (natural reaction) to downplay the severity of anti-Muslim violence. Ghassem-Fachandi argues that such terminology obscures the organized and premeditated nature of the violence, reframing it as a spontaneous response to the Godhra train incident. This narrative shift, he suggests, absolves Hindu perpetrators while placing collective blame on the Muslim community. The chapter also explores the broader socio-political implications, highlighting how this framing facilitated Narendra Modi’s rise to power by exploiting communal tensions and solidifying a majoritarian Hindu identity in Gujarat. Ghassem-Fachandi contends that the lack of public discourse on guilt and accountability has entrenched social divisions and normalized violence in the state’s political landscape.
Overall, Saffron Republic offers a critical examination of the rise and entrenchment of New Hindutva as a dominant force in Indian politics, providing an in-depth analysis of its implications for democracy, social cohesion, and the secular fabric of the nation. The contributors to this volume illuminate how Hindu nationalism have evolved from a fringe movement into a governmental ideology, now deeply embedded within state structures and mainstream political discourse. Through a comprehensive exploration of various regional and national contexts, the book highlights the pervasive influence of Hindutva on India’s socio-political landscape, including the normalization of violence, communal segregation, and the strategic manipulation of narratives that obscure state complicity in acts of violence.
By critically examining the ideological foundations and practices of New Hindutva, the authors reveal the complexities and contradictions inherent in its project of constructing a Hindu majoritarian state. Ultimately, Saffron Republic serves as an essential resource for understanding the broader implications of Hindu nationalism’s ascendancy, particularly its impact on the erosion of democratic principles, the marginalization of minority communities, and the reconfiguration of Indian national identity. The book’s scholarly rigor and interdisciplinary approach make it an indispensable contribution to contemporary debates on populism, nationalism, authoritarianism, and the future of democracy in India.
Thomas Blom Hansen & Srirupa Roy. (2022). Saffron Republic – Hindu Nationalism and State Power in India. Cambridge University Press. 330 pp. $99.99, ISBN: 978-1009100489, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009118873
Pretorius, Christo. (2024). “Populism in Ireland: Sinn Féin and the Alternative to Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s Political Dominance.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0039
Abstract
This article seeks to investigate populism in Ireland, but more specifically the populist left-leaning party Sinn Féin. Although having a checkered past, in the last decade the party has seen a surge in popularity as the alternative voting option. Up until now academic literature discussing the populist nature of Sinn Féin often struggles to define it as such, and so, using political psychology and a clear definition of populism, this article not only categorizes the party as a populist, but also discusses its history and what effect it has had (or lack thereof) on its popularity in the leadup to the last few elections. Furthermore, the article concludes by investigating why the momentum the party had as the alternative choice slowed down, and how this vacuum allowed other fringe populist parties to see greater success during the 2024 elections.
Keywords: Populism, Ireland, Sinn Féin, Irish elections
On the periphery of Europe is the small island nation of Ireland – often overlooked due to its much larger, and arguably more internationally important neighbor, the United Kingdom (UK). Despite this overshadowing, Ireland is no less important when studying the rise of populism on the European continent. Having faced numerous issues since the 2008 economic crisis, particularly with the provision of healthcare, housing, and more recently immigration, dissatisfaction with the two historically important rival parties – Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil – has boosted the popularity of the populist alternatives. One such party on the left of the political spectrum is People Before Profit – Solidarity (PBP-S), contrasted by the parties Aontú and Independent Ireland on the right. However, the best-case study for the growth of populism in the lead up to the joint 2024 European Parliament and local elections is Sinn Féin – a controversial left-leaning populist party who has a long history of relevance in the Republic, but only recently has begun shaking off its connection to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a paramilitary organization seeking Irish reunification with Northern Ireland.
Delving into the history of Sinn Féin will highlight why a generational divide exists between voters, and why the party is considered controversial. Building on this, the article will primarily focus on Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric and campaigning using political psychology to analyze how they have used emotionally provocative language to sway the electorate to vote for them. As PBP-S and Aontú failed to make any significant gains in the 2020 and 2024 elections, they will only briefly be looked at. The new Independent Ireland party, founded as of December 2023, does however require a longer investigation at the end of this article, as they managed to gain one seat in the EU Parliament elections in 2024. Finally, while independent politicians are politically relevant in Ireland, this article will focus solely on Irish political parties. Analyzing independents in depth would require a separate, dedicated piece of work.
Historical Context of Sinn Féin
It might seem odd to those outside of Ireland that to understand modern Sinn Féin one must first return to 1913 when Ireland was still a part of the UK. In this year the Irish Volunteers, a paramilitary organization of Irish nationalists and republicans, was founded in direct response to the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (Martin, 2013: 1-4). Whilst the latter sought to oppose domestic self-government on the island, the Irish Volunteers sought to secure and maintain the ‘rights and liberties common to the whole people of Ireland’ (Martin, 2013: 4). After a failed military coup in 1916 by rebels, who were predominantly Irish Volunteers, widespread dissatisfaction with British rule began to emerge across the island, both in the response to the British execution of the revolutionaries, but specifically to the Conscription Crisis of 1918 which sought to impose a British military draft within Ireland during the First World War (WWI) (Irish Times, 2017; Laffan, 1999: 122-168).
Sinn Féin, founded in 1905 as a conservative party advocating for a dual monarchy with the UK, saw many of its members join the Irish Volunteers during the 1916 Easter Rising, resulting in the Irish Times (1917) dubbing it the ‘the Sinn Féin Rebellion.’ Various republicans across the political spectrum flocked to the party thereafter, and in 1918 Sinn Féin changed political direction – now committed to achieving an independent Irish republic (Laffan, 1999: 4). The first post-WWI (and post-Rising) election in 1918 saw Sinn Féin win a landslide victory with 46.9% of the vote on the island, whilst in the north only securing 19% of the vote (de Bromhead et al., 2020: 890). In 1919, the independent Irish state sought by the rebels of 1916, became a step closer to reality with the formation of the elected Irish assembly named the Dáil Éireann (Farrell, 1971).
Figure 1: A 1918 electoral map of Ireland. Green are Sinn Féin seats, orange are Unionist seats and white represents the Irish Party (RTÉ, 2015).
Following the brutal Irish War of Independence, peace negotiations between the members of the Dáil and the British government concluded in 1921 with a treaty that saw the partition of the island between the republican south and the unionist north, the latter of whom was to remain within the UK (Saorstát Eireann, 1922). Amongst other terms, Ireland would also remain within the British Commonwealth under a Dominion status, similar to that of Canada, and required members of the Dáil to swear an oath of allegiance to the British monarch. Both Sinn Féin and its military wing, the IRA, was split on whether or not to accept the treaty. More hardline elements argued that the fight should continue until the entire island was free from British rule and recognized as a free and independent republican nation. However, a narrow vote of 64 votes to 57 saw the treaty ratified in the Dáil, resulting in a nearly yearlong bloody civil war between the pro-treaty IRA (reorganized as the ‘Defense Forces’) and the anti-treaty IRA. Sinn Féin had been marred by the civil war as anti-treaty politicians abstained from partaking in the Dáil, whilst pro-treaty politicians founded the new political party Cumann na nGaedheal (which would later merge with two other organizations in 1933 to form Fine Gael). Sinn Féin disintegrated thereafter, losing all relevance once its anti-treaty leader, Éamon de Valera, left the party to found Fianna Fáil – primarily abandoning their abstentionist stance towards the Dáil (Laffan, 1999: 441).
A surprise victory by Fianna Fáil in 1932 put the remaining IRA on the backfoot, as initially Fianna Fáil legalized the organization and freed all the post-civil war prisoners, but ultimately refused to dispute the partitioned north and failed to declare a republican Ireland (Coogan, 2008: 29). De Valera criminalized the IRA once again in 1936 following high profile murders, but at this stage the organization was a shadow of its former self (Laffan, 1999: 448). During the 1930’s the more left-leaning IRA had founded their own rival organization, the Republican Congress, and the fascist right-wing members joined with Cumann na nGaedheal and their ‘Blueshirts’ modelled on the Italian fascist paramilitary militia nicknamed the ‘Blackshirts’ (Laffan, 1999: 448). IRA numbers decreased even more significantly when a large majority of its republic seeking members left the organization once Fianna Fáil introduced a republican constitution in 1937, abolishing the Oath of Allegiance to the British monarchy, introducing an elected president as head of state, and making a territorial claim to Northern Ireland (Constitution of Ireland, 1937).
Although the remaining members of the IRA were unified by the goal of ending the partition in Northern Ireland, they were on the fringes of both the left- and right-wings of the political spectrum. As is evident by members leaving to form their own political parties in the previous decade, in the aftermath of the Second World War the IRA was struggling to maintain its numbers and believed political organization was necessary to rebuild. Its leadership voted and passed the resolution instructing IRA members to join the irrelevant Sinn Féin party, and repurpose it as the political party of the IRA (Maillot, 2015: 128). With such a wide range of political beliefs amongst its remaining members, the party’s nearly sole political priority was that of reunification. Thereafter, the IRA began conducting armed operations in Northern Ireland, initially receiving political support from the south which most evident in the election of four new Sinn Féin TDs to the Dáil in 1957 (Maillot, 2015: 10).
This militaristic momentum was ultimately lost by the 1961 election with the introduction of internment without trial, both in Northern Ireland and the Republic. The failed military campaign was called off and the IRA became dominated by new, younger, left-leaning members, which cumulated in the election of the Marxist Cathal Goulding as Chief of Staff. These left-wing members split from Sinn Féin to establish the Worker’s Party following disagreements over how to frame the struggle for unification in Northern Ireland. The more traditional Northern ‘Provisional IRA’ sought to frame the conflict through a nationalist and religious lens, as Catholic Irish against Protestant British, whilst the socialist/communist ‘Official IRA’ of the Republic sought to frame it through class warfare, and believed unification could be solved through political means (Gregory, 2010; Maillot, 2015: 169). The Provisionals would continue in the same year to conduct a thirty-year armed campaign against what they described as a British occupation of Northern Ireland, today known as ‘the Troubles.’ The conflict only officially ended in 1998 with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, claiming the lives of roughly 3,532 individuals, with the IRA being responsible for more than half this number (CAIN, n.d.).
Figure 2: Distribution of Catholics, at ward level, across Northern Ireland in 2001 (Prasannan, 2003).
Methodology
Defining ‘populism’ is often a difficult endeavor. For this article the widely accepted ‘the people’ vs ‘the elite’ narrative used by populist parties will be the primary qualifier to defining a party as populist. This theory argues that populists present “‘the people’ as a morally good force and contrasts them against ‘the elite,’ who are portrayed as corrupt and self-serving” (ECPS, n.d.). Investigating how modern Sinn Féin use this type of language against their rivals, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, will therefore be paramount in establishing them as one such populist party. But what type of language can be considered populist, especially when one man’s populist can be another man’s regular definition of a politician? In this case, the use of emotionally charged language will be used as the basis for investigation, primarily built on the ideas of political psychology that study the affect that emotions have of political mobilization (Aytac et al., 2024). Guillem Rico, Marc Guinjoan and Eva Anduiza’s article of how anger is mobilized will be the baseline for judging whether or not a statement or claim is populist (Rico et al., 2017). In their words: “Anger is linked to the perception that a frustrating event is certain, externally caused, and unfair… chiefly, the external attribution of blame and its fierce moral and confrontational outlook” (Rico et al., 2017: 445).
Using this foundation, we can deduce that Sinn Féin’s populist messaging revolves around being anti-establishment and anti-corporate, most evident in blaming the previous Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil governments for Irelands political issues by being ‘beholden to corporate interests’ (Sinn Féin, 2019). This article will only consider discourse that explicitly highlights an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ narrative as populist, meaning that which does not only state something a former government did, but actively generalizes and paints the opposition as the enemy in some manner. The following example highlights what this means: “In addition, the maintenance grant was cut and restricted under Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael Governments during the economic downturn and no sufficient attempts have been made by either party to restore them. Our third-level education system is simply not accessible to all. It is becoming less accessible to many on the basis of financial means” (Sinn Féin, 2020: 36).
In this paragraph arguing for free education in Sinn Féin’s 2020 manifesto, it is clearly stated that the party believes that previous governments are at fault for making education less accessible. However, while some may consider there to be populist undertones to this paragraph, there is no explicit discourse used that can be considered as emotionally charged. Compared to this paragraph from the same manifesto: “Without a government policy that is framed by climate justice and a just transition, the leadership and direction of climate action will become the plaything of bankers and corporate investors. They will be concerned with only one thing, how to make a buck out of the crisis. That is what they do, and it is killing the planet” (Sinn Féin, 2020: 25).
We can clearly see that it uses a strong anti-establishment and anti-corporate message to evoke an emotional response by broadly claiming corporations only wish to make money from crises. This supports the previous definition of ‘anger’ which includes ‘moral evaluations constitut[ing] a key component of the populist belief system’ (Rico et al., 2017: 449). To this end, an appendix will be included at the end of this article to show which pieces of texts were considered to be populist. Some researchers may argue that Sinn Féin’s manifestos and campaigns contain more (or less) populist language, but the key issue is that it is present in the first place—and, as will be shown, to a much greater extent than in the other two mainstream political parties in Ireland.
When investigating the demographic details of supporters for populist parties, exit polls often provide the best answer. Yet, to support this information, this article will also delve into the opinion pieces written by party supporters as they often give a more personal and grounded view on what issues they find pressing, and why they urge other voters to vote the same way. This is yet another attempt to gauge the emotions that populist parties tap into during their campaigns. Readers must be made aware that Ireland has a unique system of voting which is termed the ‘single transferable vote’ (STV), which is even used for the European Parliamentary elections. In summary, this voting system allows individuals to rank politicians on the ballot and, in theory, seeks to ensure that the electorate has at least some representation in government (Electoral Reform Society, n.d.).
STV most often results in coalition governments, sometimes even excluding the party with the most votes if they fail to form a coalition with the various other parties and independent politicians elected to parliament. An extreme example of this was the first Irish inter-party government following the 1948 general election which saw a grand coalition of five different political parties, and independent politicians, all led by Fine Gael to keep de Valera and his Fianna Fáil party out (McCullagh, 1998). Here, Fianna Fáil was six seats short of a majority, and up to then had been winning successive elections since 1932. For this reason, the popular vote is often gauged by the first preference of voters, not by the coalition government that claims majority in the Dáil.
The Popular Populist Leftist Party
Sinn Féin’s populist anti-establishment and anti-corporate messaging is clearly seen in the party’s manifestos. Particularly looking at when Mary Lou McDonald took over the party, there are blatant examples such as in the 2019 EU election manifesto: “EU banking policy, which is driven by unelected officials, favors banks and corporate elites at the expense of ordinary people;” the 2020 general election manifesto: “Without public broadcasting, we will be left with billionaire media moguls pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power;” and the 2024 EU election manifesto: “There are two competing visions for the future of the European Union. One is of an EU that continues to enlarge, becomes more centralized and bureaucratic, more militarized, lacks transparency, is under undue influence from corporate interests and lobbyists, and seeks to take ever more powers from Member States. Sinn Féin’s vision, in contrast, is for a European Union that works better for the people of Europe, that focuses on common challenges which we are best dealing with collectively – the cost-of-living crisis, food security, regional development, and climate change.”
Counting the number of times, we see the clear use of emotionally provocative and ‘us’ vs ‘them’ language being used, 10 instances can be found in their 16 paged 2019 EU Parliament election manifesto, 19 instances in their 110 paged 2020 general election manifesto, and three instances in their 27 paged 2024 EU Parliament election manifesto (See Appendix). Comparatively, there was no similar language used in both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’s manifestos from the same time (See Manifesto section in the bibliography for sources).
Manifestos only provide one avenue of investigation, their annual Ard Fheis, or annual party conference, is rife with emotionally charged discourse that portray Sinn Féin as the best party for the people to fight back against a corrupt elitist government. Take this example from McDonald’s speech in 2021: “I know you have had it with governments giving tax breaks to millionaire executives while homeless children eat dinner off cardboard on the street. Governments for the developers and bankers, for the cozy club and the insiders. It’s time now for a government for you and your family” (McDonald, 2021). Similarly, in 2023: “We ask for our chance. The others have had theirs. The longer they remain in power the worse things get. I’m asking you to back Sinn Féin. To back change and the future that you and your family deserve” (McDonald, 2023)
Such discourse builds into the larger political campaign that seeks to win votes by tapping into the ‘angry vote,’ the vote that seeks to disrupt the status quo, or as one voter puts it: “to send a message to the establishment” (Frayer, 2024). The younger generation played a key role in Sinn Féin’s strategy, which naturally involved leveraging social media to boost their popularity. Through various platforms, they were able to sustain the narrative that they represented the best chance for real change:
Figure 3: Screenshot example of Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric in Facebook posts (Sinn Féin, 2024).
Sinn Féin in a Post-Troubles Ireland
Clearly meeting the definition of populism, Sinn Féin’s use of emotionally provocative language attracts angry voters. However, the party is still affected by its historic links to the IRA. For instance, during his 2017 trial over his involvement in the killing of David Byrne a year earlier, Sinn Féin Teachta Dála (TD) Jonathan Dowdall was found guilty of membership in the IRA (BBC, 2017). Sinn Féin had already begun distancing itself from Dowdall after his resignation from the party in 2014—a move he attributed to bullying but could be seen as the party proactively managing the issue (Fegan, 2015).
On February 10, 2018, in a further attempt to shake off its bloody past, Mary Lou McDonald succeeded the controversial Gerry Adams, an individual who may have been a leading member of the IRA, despite his continuous denial of these allegations (O’Neill, 2019). McDonald differs from other leading members of Sinn Féin as she is a career politician with seemingly no ties to the paramilitary organization and was once part of Fianna Fáil but left the party due to policy differences and a strong support for Irish Unity – the latter issue of which she seemed to be undecisive about during Brexit (McCormack, 2020). More recently, during a televised national RTÉ’s Prime Time leaders’ debate a month before the 2020 election, McDonald was confronted with a question regarding a murder investigation that the victim’s family strongly claims was perpetrated by the IRA (BBC, 2020b). In the same election, after finding out he had been elected to the Dáil, Sinn Féin’s David Cullinane celebrated by ending his speech with: “Up the Republic, Up the ‘Ra. Tiocfaidh ár Lá” – the latter translating to ‘our day will come,’ a popular IRA slogan, alongside the show of support to the IRA that “Up the ‘Ra” displays (McGee & Leahy, 2020).
Since the Good Friday Agreement and their decision to end its support for the IRA’s armed struggle, Sinn Féin’s popularity has been steadily increasing (Adams, 1996). Within the national elections Sinn Féin obtained 2.55% of the vote in 1997, 6.5% in 2002, 6.94% in 2007, 9.94% in 2011, and 13.85% in 2016. The targeting of ‘those left behind’ has been the cornerstone of their campaigning in the post-2008 political climate, as affordable housing and accessible healthcare became the pressing issues over the last decade (Brennan, 2023).
Despite lingering links to the IRA, modern support for Sinn Féin comes from three primary sources. Staunch grassroot supporters of the party still have the primary goal of a united Ireland, dissatisfied that Northern Ireland is still part of the UK. The Irish Times investigated how these supporters viewed the change of leadership in 2018, and found they were excited by the prospect of McDonald offering a fresh new perspective, as long as policy remained the same – “…Irish unity, reconciliation, a shared republic, a big change in social conditions” (McGee, 2018). In an election exit poll conducted by The Irish Times, RTÉ, TG4 and University College Dublin after the 2020 general election, it was found that new Sinn Féin voters were predominantly younger, aged between 18-35, showing the effectiveness of Sinn Féin’s described strategy of ‘playing down the paramilitary legacy but without irking the republican base’ (Boyce, 2024; Collins, 2020). This could explain how the party can draw younger generations to vote for the party, as they do not have the same connection to ‘the Troubles’ that older generation might have, whilst retaining their ultimate goal of reunification. Polls and opinion pieces highlight that younger people feel let down by the continued dominance of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael in Irish politics – with housing and cost of living being the dominant pressing issues for this generation (IPSOS, B&A & The Irish Times, 2024; Haverty, 2022; Irish Times, 2022; Taylor, 2024). Finally, ‘those left behind’ also includes the working class that support the party’s leftist policies and have been one of the long-time supporters of Sinn Féin. The Think Ireland 2024 election poll provides concrete evidence of this as 61% of Sinn Féin voters described themselves as working class – the second highest group of working-class voters, right behind the ‘other right’ voters (Cunningham, 2024).
Sinn Féin During the Irish 2020 General Elections – The Time for Change?
In the lead up to the Irish general election of 2020 the fallout from Brexit had been one of the dominant political situations, but surprisingly it had very little impact on the campaign trail (Murphy, 2021). Instead, domestic issues—namely housing and healthcare—were the primary focus for all Irish parties. In healthcare, waiting times for appointments and admittance to inpatient hospital beds were at an all-time high, having increased year by year since 2016 (Department of Health, 2019). Housing is an issue resulting from rising rent and house prices. In 2020 the Irish Times explained: “Since 2012, house and apartment prices in Dublin have risen by 90 percent and 80 percent respectively (a little less in the country at large), while wages have increased by only 18 percent” (McWilliams & Taylor, 2020). Too few new housing builds, high prices for lower-priced apartments, all compound this issue (Tedin & Faubert, 2020).
The Irish general election of 2020 took place on February 8, roughly a month before the country-wide Covid-19 lockdown (Carroll, 2020). In a surprising turn, Sinn Féin received 24.5% of first preference votes, more than Fianna Fáil (22.2%) and Fine Gael (20.9%), and was set to form a majority coalition government if they could find allies to do so (Robertson, 2020). Ultimately Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, together having 72 of the 81-seat required for majority, formed a coalition alongside the Green Party. This kept Sinn Féin from governing, much to the party’s outrage and protests (BBC, 2020a). But why did Sinn Féin surge in popularity in this particular election?
The tipping point came from young people, especially those in the 18-35 year demographic that voted primarily with the housing issue in mind (Collins, 2020; Ní Aodha, 2020). This, coupled with dissatisfaction with how Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil had been running the country since the financial crisis, offered Sinn Féin an opportunity as the alternative vote. One analysis indicates that in the leadup to the election, the decision of RTÉ to initially exclude Sinn Féin in the televised Leader’s Debate, coupled with the refusal of the other two parties to form a coalition with Sinn Féin in case they gained enough votes, help to form a self-fulfilling prophecy that Sinn Féin was being excluded by the ‘old boys club’ of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’ (BBC, 2020b; Brennan & McConnell, 2020). The issues, the generational shift, coupled with the traditional left-leaning voting base of Sinn Féin, all paved the way for the party to receive the most first preferential votes in the election. The question now was whether they could keep this momentum going into the 2024 EU Parliament and local elections.
Sinn Féin and Europe Before 2024
Sinn Féin’s stance towards European integration started in 1967 with deep distrust – believing that Ireland should align itself with ‘the third world’ rather than the “inward-looking, protected, monopoly dominated group of rich industrial countries.” They also believed: “If Ireland joined the [common market] with Britain we would thus have to recognize the territorial frontiers of the United Kingdom. Yet the Constitution lays claim to part of the territorial area of the UK. Is the Dublin Government wiling to abandon also its claim for a politically united Ireland?” (Irish Left Archive, 2011).
By the 2004 European Parliament elections Sinn Féin had softened their approach to a ‘Eurocritical, not Eurosceptic’ stance. They supported EU expansion, but ensured voters knew the party stood ‘for change in the EU,’ placing emphasis on nation’s rights to self-determination and promising to ‘argue our case for a United Ireland and for an end to all military occupation in the EU’ (Sinn Féin, 2004). They also highlight: “Critical engagement is not an anti-European approach. Indeed, Irish republicanism has its origins in a broader European democratic movement. Today Sinn Féin continues to build cooperative links with like-minded democratic movements throughout Europe and beyond.”
The 2024 election continues this trend, but by now Ireland is firmly committed to the EU, a fact Sinn Féin realizes in a post-Brexit landscape: “It is time for the EU to focus on what matters to workers and families: the cost-of-living crisis, improving wages and conditions, regional development, and economic development. It’s time for the EU to play its part in advocating for and planning for Irish unity” (Sinn Féin, 2024). It should be no surprise that the second item mentioned in the manifesto is ‘Standing up for Irish Unity’ and a call for the ‘EU institutions to become advocates for Irish reunification, consistent with their position on Cyprus.’
Sinn Féin can be seen using populist language once again in their manifesto for the joint 2024 European Parliament and local elections, but this time to a lesser extent than previous elections. Of the three instances of populist language being used to aggravate voters, all three have a stark anti-corporate, anti-elitist message (Sinn Féin, 2024). The media campaign online mirrors this:
Figure 4: Examples of Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric in the leadup to the elections (Sinn Féin, 2024).
One video posted by Sinn Féin explicitly states that Fine Gael, Fianna Fail, and the Green Party are ‘the party of homelessness, the party of rising house prices, rising rents, the party of institutional investors and vulture funds,’ and Sinn Féin is the one to ‘deliver tens of thousands of genuinely affordable homes’ if you vote for them (Sinn Féin, 2024).
Sinn Féin During the Joint 2024 EU Parliamentary Elections and Local Elections – Steady as She Goes?
In the lead-up to the 2024 election, Ireland’s national public service broadcaster, RTÉ, highlighted that the key issues facing Ireland in 2024 are health, housing, migration, cost of living, the economy, and climate change (Cunningham, 2023). Sinn Féin’s 2024 European Parliament manifesto continues to address these challenges while also highlighting other issues considered important to Ireland at the European level, including Irish neutrality, Ireland’s stance on the Israel–Hamas conflict and the Ukraine war, human and workers’ rights, migration, and the environment (Sinn Féin, 2024).
During the same election, voters would be asked to vote in the local elections, which would see individuals elected to local government positions across the country. Unlike the 2020 general elections which saw a turnout of 62.88%, the 2024 elections only had 50.65% of the population turn up to vote (European Parliament, 2024; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, n.d.). Sinn Féin managed to secure 11.8% of the first preference votes in the local elections, compared to Fine Gael’s 23%, and Fianna Fáil’s 22.9%, a performance nearly echoed by the EU Parliament elections which saw the parties receive 11.8%, 29.6%, and 16.6% respectively (RTÉ, 2024). To Sinn Féin this came as a shock, with party member Matt Carthy stating during a radio interview: “There was a sense over the last number of weeks that there was a drop coming. To be quite frank nobody saw these results” (Halpin, 2024a). Despite the results Sinn Féin still managed to have two candidates elected to the European Parliament where they opted to join The Left in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL Group with other leftist European populist parties such as the Italian Five Star Movement and France’s La France Insoumise (European Parliament, 2024).
Commentators point to one leading cause of Sinn Féin’s less-than-stellar performance: immigration (O’Doherty, 2024; Pogatchnik, 2024). On November 24, 2023, three children and one woman were injured in a knife attack outside a Dublin school (Kwai & Satariano, 2023). Although Irish news outlets did not identify the man, rumors quickly spread online that he was an Algerian immigrant, escalating into a call to action that resulted in “tens of millions of euro worth of criminal damage” following an anti-immigration riot (Foy, 2023; Lally et al., 2023). Subsequently, there was the ongoing removal of “tent cities,” where migrants had gathered in tents due to the ongoing housing crisis and the government’s inability to find accommodation for the 1,780 unhoused migrant men as of May 14 (Figure 4) (Ehl, 2024). Taoiseach Simon Harris of Fine Gael supported these removals, stating: “We do not live in a country where makeshift shantytowns are allowed to just develop” (Halpin, 2024a). Reportedly, Sinn Féin failed to “reflect the concerns of ordinary people on immigration,” with reports suggesting that McDonald warned party members not to post anything contrary to her immigration stance, which remained unclear for a long time (Halpin, 2024b). Immigration became one of the key issues leading up to the 2024 elections, exacerbated by the housing crisis and the UK’s hardline immigration stance, which saw 80% of new applicants crossing the border from Northern Ireland (Finnegan & Conlon, 2024). UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak claimed this was due to the successful deterrent effect of his Rwanda deportation plan.
Figure 5: Asylum seekers’ tents near the International Protection Office and Refugee Legal Service on Lower Mount Street, Dublin, Ireland, on July 7, 2023. Photo: Derick P. Hudson.
However, this is not the only reason support for Sinn Féin has declined. Since the 2020 election, Sinn Féin has flip-flopped on many of its policy positions, losing “angry” supporters as a result of the decisions they made. Beginning with the coalition talks post-election, Sinn Féin alienated many grassroots voters by considering the possibility of forming a government with either Fine Gael or Fianna Fáil (Allen, 2023). This, combined with increased interaction with businesses, has led many to comment that their policies have been drifting economically more toward the center, thereby alienating their traditional left-leaning supporters (Brennan, 2023; Weckler, 2022). The party’s focus on the “wrong” social issues has also been problematic. They supported the “Family” and “Care” referendums, which aimed to modernize two articles within the constitution (39th and 40th) to be more vague about what constitutes a family unit and to remove a reference to a woman’s role within the home (University College Dublin, 2024). Before the referendum, Sinn Féin vowed to re-run them should they fail, but they did not anticipate that both acts would be resoundingly rejected, with 67% and 74% of voters casting a “No” vote on the amendments, respectively (O’Connell, 2024).
Adding to this, despite accusing “billionaire media moguls of pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists, and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power,” Sinn Féin has pursued a campaign of silencing critics, including The Irish Times and its political correspondent, Harry McGee, as well as the national broadcaster RTÉ (The Journal, 2023). The international community responded directly, with several journalist organizations and academics signing a joint letter to Sinn Féin and McDonald expressing their concerns about censorship (Reporters Without Borders, 2023). Additionally, Sinn Féin overestimated its success in the 2024 elections and fielded too many candidates, causing a split in the vote (McClafferty, 2024). These issues combined led supporters to turn to other populist options, namely PBP-Solidarity, Aontú, and Independent Ireland.
The Alternative to the Alternative Vote
Immigration has become the word du jour and many voters during the 2024 election that would have voted for Sinn Féin decided to turn to parties who are unapologetic in their hardline stance against immigration. Self-described as ‘a “comfortable alternative” to Sinn Féin,’ Independent Ireland was founded to focus on rural voters, but quickly became the right-wing populist party that attracted anti-immigration voters alongside Aontú (Ryan, 2023). The populism in both party’s stances on migration is clear: Independent Ireland states “We will secure Ireland’s borders by enforcing our immigration laws and end profiteering by vested interests at the expense of the Irish taxpayer” (Independent Ireland, n.d.); Whereas Aontú, ‘The Only Party Listening To The People,’ wish to solve the issue by tackling the various other crises facing Ireland, compensating communities where asylum seekers are moved into, and enforce stronger border control policies that will include more deportations (Aontú, n.d.).
Of the three alternative populist parties, only a candidate from Independent Ireland was elected to the EU Parliament, but divisions and criticisms quickly started to appear as MEP Ciaran Mullooly opted to join the liberal Renew Europe group (Independent Ireland, 2024). On a local level Independent Ireland preformed the best, gaining 2.8% of the first preference vote in their first election year, compared to PBP-S’ 1.2% and Aontú’s 2.1%. Overall, all three parties have seen an increase of seats on a local level, with each party now having 23, 13, and 8 seats respectively. Sinn Féin also gained 21 seats for a total of 102 during the local election, but with only 11.8% of the first preference votes, clearly their momentum from 2020 has slowed down (Irish Times, 2024).
Whether or not Sinn Féin will experience a resurgence in next year’s general election remains uncertain. Their historical connection to the IRA is now nearly irrelevant to most younger voters, and it appears that any news of Sinn Féin’s ties to the paramilitary organization primarily affects older voters who have a living connection to the violence. This generational divide is evident in a letter exchange between Irish Times readers discussing younger voters’ preference for Sinn Féin (Irish Times, 2022).
As for the other populist parties in the nation, while politically irrelevant and on the fringes for now, they stand to gain the most from Sinn Féin’s loss. Independent Ireland’s Ciaran Mullooly’s decision to join a pro-European parliament group despite the party’s Eurosceptic stance has raised the eyebrows of many, which might negatively affect the party’s ability to win over disgruntled voters in the next election. PBP-S continually fails to make any headway during elections, although left-leaning working-class voters may cast their lot in with PBP-S should they decide to stop supporting Sinn Féin. Most of all, Aontú stands to gain the most, offering disgruntled voters a new alternative to the alternative Sinn Féin, and attracting working class voters away from Independent Ireland, particularly given that The Think Ireland 2024 election poll suggests that this group predominantly support ‘other right’ parties (Cunningham, 2024).
However, Sinn Féin shouldn’t be counted out just yet, as they currently hold the majority in the Northern Irish Assembly—an unprecedented result that may drive further election promises in the Republic advocating for reunification (Pogatchnik, 2024). If Sinn Féin successfully refines its policies and regains public support, it could have a chance at making gains in the upcoming general election, reversing its currently declining popularity in polls, which now place them behind Fine Gael for the first time since September 2021 (REDC & Business Post, 2024). That said, Fine Gael’s response to immigration could explain their rise in the polls, a trend that might continue into the next election if the momentum persists (Clarke, 2024). While predicting the results of the next election may be futile, it is certainly one to watch closely.
Appendix: Populist Language Used in Sinn Féin’s Manifestos
2019 European Parliament Election Manifesto
Quote
Page
“Our MEPs now need to continue that fight – for communities, for ordinary working people and families.”
4
“In contrast, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael belong to the Right-wing EPP and ALDE groups which want to create a Superstate centralizing power in Europe far away from ordinary people. These groups are also determined to create an EU army with more military spending rather than investing to tackle the cost of living and provide quality public services. They are advocates of austerity and beholden to corporate interests.”
5
“Sinn Féin reject increased militarization and related spending and will fight for ordinary people.”
5
“It is only by voting for Sinn Féin that you will get credible and effective MEPs who will fight for ordinary Irish people’s interests in Europe, challenge vested interests and insiders and work for a radically and progressively reformed European Union.”
5
“EU banking policy, which is driven by unelected officials, favors banks and corporate elites at the expense of ordinary people.”
7
“The ECB’s quantitative easing programme is pumping billions into the banks to the benefit of corporations and major polluters.”
7
“Sinn Féin is opposed to PESCO and to Irish money being used to fund companies who are exporting arms and fueling conflicts around the world.”
10
“We call for a State Aid exemption for rural areas in light of Brexit and urge the reduction of bureaucracy so that a greater portion of EU funding for things like broadband actually reaches the intended beneficiaries instead of being pocketed by middlemen.”
10
“Local fisheries are suffering while profit-driven super-trawlers controlled by multi-nationals devastate our environment, fish stocks and coastal communities.”
11
“Sinn Féin MEPs oppose the Commission’s proposal to invest in militarization by plundering Regional Development Funding.”
11
2020 General Election Manifesto
Quote
Page
“In that time, we have had Governments for the wealthy, Governments for the privileged, Governments for the property developers, Governments for the banks. Sinn Féin believes that it’s time that we had a government for the people.”
3
“Successive governments have delivered for their friends and cronies. They have delivered for big business, for vested interests and for golden circles. In Government, Sinn Féin will deliver for the people.”
4
“Sinn Féin wants to be in Government to deliver for ordinary, working people. But we don’t want to be part of the system. We want to change the system.”
4
“Sinn Féin will take on the cartel-like beef processing sector that is pushing family farms out of business, reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) so that it supports the farmers who need it the most and ensure farmers are assisted in the transition towards a greener, more sustainable agriculture sector.”
13
“Without a government policy that is framed by climate justice and a just transition, the leadership and direction of climate action will become the plaything of bankers and corporate investors. They will be concerned with only one thing – how to make a buck out of the crisis. That is what they do, and it is killing the planet.”
25
“Without public broadcasting, we will be left with billionaire media moguls pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power.”
30
“Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labor are the yes men of Europe. Whatever Brussels and Frankfurt propose, they support. Their MEPs are the EU’s representatives in Ireland, promoting the agenda of the EU institutions rather than the interests of people in Ireland in the EU.”
44
“It is time to stand up for Ireland and the interests of all of the people who share this island. It is time to end the Brussels power grab, to reign in the Commission, and return powers to the member states. It is time to halt the attack on the wages and conditions of working people and to promote a basic threshold of decency for all. It is time to rebuild our public services and defend our public utilities.”
44
“Sinn Féin will build a fairer and more democratic European Union that works for the people of Europe, not for the EU insiders, middlemen and corporate interests.”
44
“Sinn Féin are determined that ordinary people in working class and rural communities must be protected from criminals… “Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil before them have abandoned working class and rural communities to organized crime gangs. They both starved the Gardaí of the resources they need to protect communities and they both failed to tackle garda corruption. They have not taken the necessary steps to ensure consistent and appropriate sentencing by judges. They are both soft on crime.”
69
“Sinn Féin in Government will demand probity and accountability from all who hold positions of power and responsibility. We will take on white collar crime and we will uphold the common good.”
71
“To make matters worse, the Fine Gael Government, supported by Fianna Fáil, have hitched their wagon to costly, risky Public Private Partnerships. This is despite the fact that we know they do not provide value for money. The Government knows this too, which is why we have no published reports on the value for money of these initiatives.”
91
“Sinn Féin in Government would not tolerate such abuse of political power, and our proposals set out to restore confidence in politics and ensure that those in power are working for the people and not for money or the vested interests of the golden circle establishment.”
96
“The public have lost confidence in the Dáil, this must be a priority focus for political reform.”
96
“For years, the insurance industry has pursued an aggressive campaign to portray sky-high premiums as the result of claims and fraud. Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil have served the industry by peddling their spin.”
104
“It is only a decade since the banks of this state crashed our economy. Poor regulation, an arrogant banking class, and a parasitic relationship between the banks and Government of the time created a dangerous climate for customers, taxpayers, and our democracy.”
105
“It is time the banks gave something back to the Irish people. Government must be vigilant and hold the banks to account.”
105
“Sinn Féin will challenge the arrogance and contempt for customers that persists at the core of our banking system. We do not believe that banks should exist only to increase their profits and deliver handsome dividends and bonuses for their managers. Banks should exist to support Irish society, its customers and businesses.”
105
“The effects of the economic crisis and property crash still live with us today. Our housing and property sector should have been rebuilt in the interests of citizens, renters and homeowners. Instead, Fine Gael rolled out the red carpet to vulture funds and international investors, allowing them to hoover up assets from distressed families and buy up commercial property in our towns and cities. They have allowed these vultures and funds to transfer wealth out of Ireland to hidden international investors using low-tax arrangements.”
106
2024 European Parliament Manifesto
Quote
Page
“There are two competing visions for the future of the European Union. One is of an EU that continues to enlarge, becomes more centralized and bureaucratic, more militarized, lacks transparency, is under undue influence from corporate interests and lobbyists, and seeks to take ever more powers from Member States.”
5
“We have already seen worrying levels of de-regulation brought in with these crises used as an excuse. Lessons that had been learnt about the need for regulation of the financial sector seem to have been forgotten. Some like Fine Gael are openly pushing for further rules to help vulture funds and banks. Only Sinn Féin can be trusted to stand up to this agenda.”
13
“Focus to be placed on those large corporate interests that are responsible for the climate crisis rather than undue burdens being imposed on ordinary citizens.”
— (2011). “The Case Against the Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join.” Irish Left Archive. January 24, 2011. https://www.leftarchive.ie/document/408/ (accessed on July 13, 2024).
— (2019). Fighting For Ireland, Ag Troid Ar Son Na Héireann; All Ireland In Europe/Éire Ar Fad San Eoraip: Sinn Féin European Election Manifesto 2019. Sinn Féin.
— (2020b). “Irish election: Sinn Féin criticises ‘disgraceful’ Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael.” BBC. February 14, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51508380 (accessed on July 27, 2024).
— (2024). “Homelessness hits record high of 14,000! Voting for Sinn Féin in the Local and European elections is the first step to getting a change of government that will fix this housing disaster. Because the longer Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the Greens stay in government the worse this is going to get.” Sinn Féin. May 31, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/reel/1171661350920330 (accessed on July 13, 2024).
Aytac S. E.; Carkoglu A. & Elci E. (2024). “Populist Appeals, Emotions, and Political Mobilization.” American Behavioral Scientist, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642241240343
de Bromhead, A.; Fernihough, A. & Hargaden, E. (2020). “Representation of the People: Franchise Extension and the ‘Sinn Féin Election’ in Ireland, 1918.” The Journal of Economic History. 80(3), pp. 886-925. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050720000376
Murphy M.C. (2021). “Brexit and the Election: The Issue That Wasn’t.” In: Gallagher M., Marsh M., & Reidy T. (ed.). How Ireland Voted 2020: End of an Era. Palgrave Macmillan: Switzerland.
Ní Aodha, G. (2020). “How did they do it? Sinn Féin’s historic 24% win was built on learnt lessons and a fed-up electorate.” The Journal. February 12, 2020. https://www.thejournal.ie/sinn-fein-comeback-5001379-Feb2020/ (accessed on July 24, 2024).
Rico, G.; Guinjoan, M. & Anduiza, E. (2017). “The Emotional Underpinnings of Populism: How Anger and Fear Affect Populist Attitudes.” Swiss Political Science Review. 23(4), 444–461. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12261
— (2019). Fighting For Ireland, Ag Troid Ar Son Na Héireann; All Ireland In Europe/Éire Ar Fad San Eoraip: Sinn Féin European Election Manifesto 2019. Sinn Féin. https://www.sinnfein.ie/files/2019/EU_Manifesto1.pdf
Kenes, Bulent & Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2024). “Fatwas as Tools of Religious Populism: The Case of Turkish Islamist Scholar Hayrettin Karaman.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 1, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0037
Abstract
This paper investigates the entanglement of religious authority, religious populism, political narratives, and societal transformation within the complex terrain of Turkish politics, through the influential role of Hayrettin Karaman, an Islamist scholar closely aligned with the AKP government under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Karaman’s fatwas and writings, disseminated through various media channels, have significantly impacted AKP supporters, fostering a radicalization that manifests in hate speech, intimidation, and reported acts of aggression toward political dissenters. The fusion of religious interpretations with political discourse has been crucial in legitimizing controversial governmental actions and policies, extending beyond domestic issues to global dynamics and defense strategies, including Karaman’s advocacy for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.
Introduction:AKP’s Religious Populism and Radicalization
Recent scholarly works have explored the convergence of authoritarianism, democracy, and Islamic movements across diverse regions. These studies delve into religious and pro-violence populism and assess the societal impacts of various far-right Islamist movements. Additionally, there’s a significant emphasis on the collaboration between Islamist populist parties and secularist far-right parties, examining how these partnerships influence and shape political landscapes. Further academic investigations have probed the relationship between populism, violence, and the stability of authoritarian regimes, including consideration of the concept of necropolitics within specific national contexts. Studies also dissect the role of religion in generating populist appeal, examining, for instance, the impact of the Friday sermons and the utilization of diverse populist narratives for political mobilization (Barton et al., 2021a; Barton et al., 2021b).
The Erdogan regime has cultivated a parallel legal system underpinned by unofficial and clandestine fatwas. To appease its religious constituents, the regime seeks validation for its actions from Islamist legal scholars. This article uses the case study of one such scholar, Hayrettin Karaman, to demonstrate how these Islamist figures can generate an ideological defense and validation for repressive Erdoganist policies, appeals and practices.
The Legitimizing Role of Hayrettin Karaman for the AKP
Hayrettin Karaman, a prominent Islamic Law professor and columnist for the pro-Erdogan daily Yeni Safak, has become one of the most influential figures in supporting the Erdogan’s parallel legal system. Karaman serves as an Islamist authority issuing fatwas which often legitimize illicit and corrupt practices among Islamist politicians and businessmen. These fatwas are connected to a range of political and social agendas, such as obtaining interest-based credit from banks and funneling substantial donations to politicians’ charities in exchange for lucrative public tenders and contracts.
Aligned with Karaman, numerous pro-Erdogan Islamist preachers espouse the belief that Turkey exists within a dar al-harb, an un-Islamic territory where their activities are considered jihad. In light of this argument, they argue for the circumvention of Islamic rules out of necessity, and they disregard official laws, which they perceive as products of the “infidel West.” They assert that the Erdogan’s AKP is the sole political representation of Islam in Turkey, and argue it is a religious duty for Muslims to vote for the party to prevent the division (fitnah, tafriqa) of the ummah, which is seen as being a graver offence than killing a fellow Muslim. The preachers propagate the idea that winning elections is akin to winning a jihad.
Political observers recognize the significant influence of figures like Karaman and the preachers supporting him within the AKP government and Erdogan’s inner circle. His fatwas and policy recommendations are perceived as authoritative in Islamic contexts, giving his statements substantial weight and warranting serious consideration. The remainder of this article presents and analyzes various statements, fatwas, and opinions provided by Karaman, which have helped legitimize and entrench Islamist ideas in Turkish society and support the Islamist populist agenda of the ruling AKP and authoritarian Erdogan regime.
Karaman’s support for the AKP and Erdogan extends to justifying even their controversial or morally contested actions, using interpretations of Islamic principles that benefit the ruling party. An illustrative instance is the 2010 incident involving Deniz Baykal, the former leader of the main opposition party, Republican People Party (CHP), and the release of a purportedly scandalous sex video he participated in. The surfacing of this scandal provoked reactions and criticisms from both sides, but significantly from those with the view that prying into an individual’s private life contradicts Islamic values.
The AKP and Erdogan defended the video’s release and were interestingly supported by Karaman, who stepped in to provide religious legitimacy to their defense. Karaman’s argument revolved around the idea of prioritizing the state’s interests over individual rights to privacy, aligning with the AKP’s stance that the exposure of such scandalous content was warranted for the greater good. Karaman wrote in his column:
“If one committing a sin in secret is a public office holder or trying to be one, in this case, ‘the duty of protecting people from its harm’ forestalls the duty of concealing of dishonor. The related people should be informed regarding the scandal. This sin and dishonor should not be concealed. If the law, without permission, forbids the prying and recording of the private activity, this law must be respected, unless there is no state of necessity (zaruret). According to Islamic ethic, it is also forbidden to attempt for prying and disclosing the secret behaviors of the individuals. However, if the concealed sin and misconduct bear upon the public and the act of concealing harms the public, the state of necessity becomes effective. In this case, this sin or misconduct can be released and publicized within the limits of the state of necessity allows” (Karaman, 2011).
His interpretation offered religious legitimacy by emphasizing the preservation of Islamic values within the context of governance and the political landscape.
Karaman’s Defense for the AKP During the 2013 Corruption Probe
Hundreds protest in Istanbul on December 22, 2013, against the country’s worst corruption scandal in years, which was linked to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Photo: Sadık Gulec.
During the notorious corruption probe of December 17-25, 2013 Karaman staunchly supported Erdogan and the AKP, fabricating religious fatwas in favor of the party’s politicians (Karaman, 2014a). Under this proposed system, elected Islamist officials may receive bribes, such as a 10—or 20 percent commission on billion-dollar public tenders from construction contractors, a practice Karaman likens to the share of “alms collectors” in the early days of Islamic civilization.
Karaman’s articles following the December 17-25, 2013, graft and bribery investigations take an intriguing turn, openly addressing the bribery and corruption associated with Erdogan. In an apparent effort to sway religious Erdogan supporters, Karaman endeavored to portray these actions not as personal misconduct but as contributions to the Islamic cause – a form of dawah and jihad, ostensibly carried out for the Islamist movement rather than Erdogan’s personal gain. Karaman defended the AKP’s actions in his minimizing statement that “corruption is not theft” (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018).
Karaman’s Framing of the 2017 Referendum as a Religious Obligation
Intensifying his explicit support for the AKP and Erdogan, Karaman was also notably involved in discriminating against voters based on their political choices before the April 2017 referendum on Turkey’s Constitution, which facilitated the shift to an executive presidential system. His statements aligned voters’ preferences with fatwas, adding a religious connotation to the political decision. Karaman disseminated the view that casting a “yes vote” was not just a political act but also an Islamic obligation, intertwining religious obligation with the referendum. In another article, he openly states that Naysayers are those who are standing against the Islam (Karaman, 2017f).
This stance concurred with that of Erdogan and his affiliated media outlets, who emphatically emphasized that a devout Muslim should support the “Yes” vote, and that “No voters will go to hell.” The entanglement of religious authority and political discourse was crucial to the public debate, with religious rhetoric explicitly influencing the referendum’s outcome (Yayla, 2017). According to Karaman, since Erdogan’s actions are aimed at fulfilling a religious obligation (to form an Islamic state), “every action that brings us closer to this goal is a religious obligation (fardh), including a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum.”
Karaman as a Key Agitator Against the West
Karaman has been outspoken in his disdain and distrust towards the West. Karaman utilizes his platform to critique the behavior of Western countries, particularly regarding their interactions with Turkey under Erdogan regime, and has become an important figure in broader discussions on international relations and perceptions of Turkey within global contexts (O’Brien, 2017).
In a statement attributed to the scholar, Karaman blames the US for employing strategies that contradict conscience, religious values, and legal principles (Karaman, 2017b). He reflects on the perceived intentions and actions of the US in the Middle East and globally, suggesting that the US sought dominance over the Middle East and the entire world, driven by insatiable interests. Karaman implies that any entity attempting to challenge or impede US interests faced coercion, manipulation, and subjugation through various, potentially unethical means (Karaman, 2017b). He accuses the US of using alliances and collaborations within different countries to incite unrest, create chaos, provoke conflicts, propagate terrorism, and manipulate perceptions to serve its agenda (Karaman, 2017b).
Karaman is also a vocal critic of Western countries, particularly in Europe, for their negative attitudes towards Turkey and Islam. In an online post for instance, Karaman addressed Christian countries in the West, accusing them of egotism and racism and claiming their negative sentiments towards Turkey have been rapidly escalating (O’Brien, 2017). In another statement, Karaman (2017a) shares his perspective on Europe’s attitude toward religion, particularly Islam, and the economic aspects associated with it. He portrays Europe as a continent disconnected from a fulfilling religion that guides human life in both this world and the afterlife. He criticizes Europe for rejecting its original religion, conforming religious beliefs to fit personal desires, and even embracing atheism when conformity fails.
Karaman also alleges that Europe does not welcome Islam as a potential replacement for this void in religious guidance. He draws parallels between historical exploitation, mentioning the use of workers from Muslim countries for labor-intensive jobs, and a contemporary narrative where Europe, facing economic decline, turns its attention to the assets of Muslims residing in the continent (Karaman, 2017a).
Pushing an Islamist Agenda for Turkey, the Muslim World and the Ummah
Karaman has also disseminated a range of Islamist ideas that often align with or presumably generate interest in Erdoganist Islamist populism. He portrays Turkey under Erdogan rule as representing an Islamic movement that can liberate the Ummah from various forms of perceived oppression and take a stance against exploitation and subjugation (Karaman, 2017b). Karaman has also made statements that deepen religio-political tensions in society, such as in his writing about the Gulen movement, when he insinuated that the movement acts against the state’s interests, fostering division (fitnah), thus legitimizing state intervention to counter it (Yilmaz, 2015b).
Moreover, a sense of Islamist victimhood is identifiable in the scholar’s statements. His statements evoke a sense of crisis, which helps justify the Islamist agenda in Turkish politics and beyond. In one statement, for example, he claims, “the opposition and enmity that began when our prophet openly started to invite people to Islam in Mecca, has, to date, found members from almost all corners of the world, and their destructive activities are ongoing. They have tried everything to destroy Islam and Muslims or to deviate the religion from its original form to achieve their aims. One of their methods was to divide Muslims and ensure that the divided parts consume each other” (Karaman, 2017d).
Promoting the View that Turkey Should Strengthen Its Military and Acquire WMDs
The Turkish Army and Free Syrian Army operated in Afrin, Syria, on February 23, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
Karaman’s discourse reflects a strong belief in the need for Turkey to strengthen its military capabilities. He underscores the necessity for Turkey to maintain comprehensive power, including a robust military, to safeguard its interests. Karaman expresses hope that Turkey will become powerful across various domains, emphasizing the importance of strength in addressing geopolitical challenges (Karaman, 2017c).
Karaman pushes his view that Turkey needs to achieve a balance with the Western and non-Muslim world, and this will be achieved in part by matching or attaining comparable weaponry to counter potential adversaries (Karaman, 2017c). He envisions the unification of all Muslims, the ‘ummah,’ as a force to deter external threats, particularly those stemming from the West (Karaman, 2017c).
Concerningly, the Islamist scholar has expressed a deep interest in Turkey acquiring nuclear capabilities, which he positions a a means of establishing a balance of power against imperialist forces and as a deterrent against oppression (Karaman, 2017c). Karaman’s stance, as articulated in the Yeni Safak daily, strongly advocates for Turkey’s acquisition and production of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), including nuclear arms, to counter the perceived dominance of Western powers (Karaman, 2017c). He emphasizes the need for Turkey to consider creating these weapons autonomously, disregarding any opposition or constraints from Western entities (Karaman, 2017c).
In a notable example, Karaman not only sanctioned the government’s acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) but also urged Turkish leadership to pursue this path. The gravity of his statements shouldn’t be underestimated, considering their potential impact on policy directions, especially concerning the alarming proposal for WMDs (Bozkurt, 2017).
Karaman justifies this perspective by advocating for a realist approach in world politics, suggesting that smaller states with nuclear arsenals can exert considerable influence over larger populations (Karaman, 2017c). Karaman claims that the US and the West have attempted to control or restrict Muslim nations like Pakistan (possessing nuclear weapons) and have concerns about Iran acquiring similar capabilities. However, Karaman highlights a perceived shift in Turkey’s approach under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He presents Erdogan as a determined leader who seeks to resist oppression and support the oppressed. Indeed, in 2018 President Erdogan expressed Turkey’s initiative in producing similar military capabilities as Western nations (El, 2018).
Conclusion
The context of Turkey’s political landscape involves a multifaceted interplay between religious authority, political narratives, and societal dynamics. Hayrettin Karaman’s influential role as an Islamist scholar and his ideological alignment with the AKP government under Islamist authoritarian populist Erdogan underscore a significant fusion of religious interpretation and political discourse. Karaman’s fatwas and writings, disseminated through media channels, have wielded substantial influence, particularly among the supporters of the Erdogan regime.
The influence of excommunicative fatwas and the narratives propagated by Islamist figures like Karaman within the media have had a notable impact on AKP/Erdogan followers. Karaman’s interpretations have bolstered the Erdogan regime’s stance on contentious issues and contributed to a radicalization of AKP/Erdogan followers. This radicalization is evident in the propagation of hate speech, intimidation tactics, and reported instances of physical aggression toward those holding opposing political affiliations.
Furthermore, Karaman’s narratives have extended beyond domestic matters, delving into geopolitical dynamics, defense strategies, and international relations. His assertions advocating the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and narratives concerning global powers highlight a vision of Turkey reliant on a robust stance against perceived adversaries.
The significance and widespread impact of Karaman’s controversial religious fatwas and recommendations within Islamist circles in Turkey and among Muslims should not be underestimated. They also have the potential to influence Turkey’s foreign policy and its relationships with other nations, particularly in defense and regional dynamics.
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Please cite as: Smith, Chloe; Bachtiar, Hasnan; Shakil, Kainat; Morieson, Nicholas & de Groot Heupner, Susan. (2024). “Appealing to a Religiously Defined ‘the People’: How Religion Was Performatively Operationalized in the 2019 and 2024 Election Campaigns of Indonesia’s President-Elect.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 25, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0034
Abstract
Observers widely acknowledged the lack of divisive Islamist populism in Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential Elections. This was in stark contrast to the 2019 elections in which Prabowo Subianto, the case study of this article and new leader of Indonesia, led a campaign that overtly supported Islamist interests and actors, and deepened religio-ethnic tensions in society. Despite this acknowledgement, it remains unclear if religion was still operationalized – albeit differently – in his most recent campaigning efforts. This article therefore seeks to examine if religion was politicized and performed by Prabowo in 2024 and contrast the findings with 2019 to address how and why his instrumentalization of religion varied significantly. Applying a discursive-performative lens, discourse analysis will be used to determine if and how religion featured in a sample of Prabowo Subianto’s speeches (six speeches in total, three from each election campaign). Specifically, this analysis will explore how references to religion and a religious community reflect a) his political goals and b) the political community he is attempting to engage. It will also discuss these findings in the context of contemporary populism studies.
Although there has been significant progress in recent years, the study of religious populism in non-Western democratic campaigning remains underdeveloped (Sumiala et al., 2023; Zuquete, 2017; Beuter et al, 2023). This is an important gap to address, because understanding the role of religion in electoral politics is important when religion and religious majoritarianism are tightly entangled in national identity, culture, and society and resulting in an inherently more complex phenomenon (Yabanci, 2020: 93; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022).
Electoral campaigns in these countries may feature both exclusionary populist appeals in which the religiously defined in-group is often used as a juxtaposition with ‘evil’ elites and ‘others’ (DeHanas & Shterin, 2018). What has been examined less, particularly in empirical research, is the politicization of religion to link together and homogenize a range of interests and identities (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001), influence the perception of the leader, and create enthusiasm for their political mission.
Indonesia’s 2024 presidential election – and its winner – provides a fascinating account of the instrumentalization of religion in political campaigning. To better understand Indonesia’s new leader and how he may command over the county’s religio-political space, this article considers Prabowo Subianto’s populist orientation toward Islamism in 2019 and compares it with his use of religion in 2024’s campaign, when Islamist rhetoric was notably absent. This has not yet been addressed adequately, nor supported by empirical research, although the change has been widely observed in political commentaries of the recent election (Ismail & Koh, 2024; Chaplin & Jurdi, 2024; Rozy, 2024).
A Brief Note on Indonesia’s Recent Religious-Political Context
In cases of Islamist populism, researchers have found that ‘the people’ are a collectivized identity group (‘pious Muslims’) consisting of a range of Muslim identities and interests that are grouped together and politicized (Susanto, 2019; Hadiz, 2018). In Indonesia, the literature indicates that in recent history, a range of actors have interacted with or influenced religious populism in Indonesia: from politicians and parties, social media influencers and online preachers, through to grassroots movements and organizations (Mietzner, 2020; Hadiz, 2018; Barton et al., 2021; Kayane, 2020; Widian et al., 2022).
In 2019, Prabowo Subianto constructed his political image, narratives, and performances in response to the socio-political tensions that had been heightening for some time in Indonesia. Although beyond the limitations of this article to explain in detail, it is suffice to note here that polarization in recent years had been exacerbated by various populist and extreme actors who used religion to inflame tensions, push for social and political change, and destabilize conditions for religious minorities (Mietzner, 2020; Widian et al., 2022; Temby, 2019).
The most notable period of intensification occurred during the ‘anti-Ahok’ mass protest movement, born in the lead up to the 2017 gubernational elections. The then Christian-Chinese governor of Jakarta, Busaki Tjahaja Purnama (‘Ahok’) was accused of blasphemy after citing a single verse from the Qur’an, and this shared grievance brought together a range of Islamist actors and many Indonesians in a significant period of populist mobilization (Mietzner, 2020; Hadiz, 2018; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018; Jaffrey, 2021: 224-225). Mietzner (2020) notes that Prabowo attached himself to this mobilization event, and incorporated Islamist populism and Islamist actors into his campaigning effort. Operationalizing religious populism in his election campaign, Prabowo became a highly influential player in one of the most divisive political contestations in Indonesia’s history (Ismail & Koh, 2024).
This article contributes to the developing field of religious populism by studying its manifestation in the discourses and performances of Prabowo Subianto in the last two Indonesian elections (2019 and 2024). In both election cycles, Prabowo makes references to religion and conveys religious meaning to the audience he is seeking support from. Yet, scholars widely agree that in 2019, Prabowo used Islamist populism to further his political agenda, mobilize supporters and exploit religio-ethnic tensions in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2020; Hadiz, 2018; Barton et al., 2021). In 2024 however, observers noted that Prabowo refrained from religious populism’s polarizing and antagonistic accounts of people in society (Ismail & Koh, 2024; Chaplin & Jurdi, 2024; Rozy, 2024), although there is little written about his broader incorporation – or eradication – of religion in his most recent political performances.
Equally, by using Indonesia as a case study, this article underlines how religious populism in the socio-political context of more religious societies usually presents quite differently from democracies of the secularized Western variety (Wawrzynski & Marszalek-Kawa, 2022: 2; Falki, 2022: 227).
Methodology
This research employs a deductive qualitative approach, in which the theoretical framework of this paper will guide the analysis of collected data (Widian et al., 2022: 354). Discourse analysis will be used to identify and compare the rhetorical religious elements of a sample of Prabowo’s communications.
The article will ultimately explore how Prabowo’s political style has pivoted away from an exclusionary religious populist style – and what it can teach us about the under-studied role of religion in electoral campaigning.
Sample Data Collection
This article will use a sample of Prabowo’s campaign speeches which were selected based on a number of considerations, including: Prabowo discussing his campaign and policies, the length of the speech – longer speeches were favored because they provided more data to analyze, and speeches that occurred shortly (in the three months maximum prior) before the election when a leader is likely to most powerfully perform their political persona.
Sample 1: Prabowo’s official national speech, ‘Indonesia Menang’ at the Jakarta Convention Center, Jakarta, 2019.
Sample 2: Opening campaign speech in Kotabaru, Gondokusuman – Yogyakarta, 2019.
Sample 3: Prabowo. CNN Indonesia. Pidato Berapi-Api GBK, 2019.
Sample 4: Prabowo’s political speech in Stadion Gelora Bandung, Bandung, West Java, on February 8, 2024.
Sample 5: The People Party for the Progress of Indonesia (Pesta Rakyat untuk Indonesia Maju) in Gelora Bung Karno (GBK) Stadium, Senayan, Jakarta, February 10, 2024.
Sample 6: Prabowo Subianto’s speech at a volunteer consolidation event at the Pekanbaru Youth Center, Riau, 2024.
Data Analysis
Each author contributing to this research is familiar with and currently undertaking scholarship into the context of Indonesia and Indonesian politics, and religious populism. Our analyses have been guided by our understanding of the socio-political context these speeches have been presented in. One contributor is a native Indonesian and has assisted in ensuring the integrity of the transcribed and translated speeches.
The four speeches were read in full several times before selecting the passages that have been used for the following analyses. These passages were selected based on their relationship with key themes of religion, religious populism, and religious association. This process resulted in the identification of certain key narrative themes, which the passages have been categorized under below.
References to God, Prophet Muhammad, and Religion
Prabowo Subianto gives a speech about the vision and mission of the 2019 Indonesian presidential candidate in front of a crowd of supporters on the campaign in Yogyakarta, Indonesia on April 8, 2019. Photo: Aidil Akbar.
In all sets of 2019 and 2024 speeches, Prabowo references Islam as a shared religion with the Indonesian people, and in each case, he opens with an Islamic greeting to the crowd.
In the 2019 speeches, Prabowo drew attention to his personal affinity with God and religion. In sample one (2019), he frames his concluding comments by declaring himself “a proud son of the nation and of Islam.” Similarly, in sample two (2019), he greets the crowd and immediately declares himself a Muslim:
“I pray that Yogyakarta is in a state of health and well-being. As a Muslim, let us send prayers and peace to our beloved Prophet Muhammad, who has enlightened us all.”
Populism often involves the personalization of politics, where voters connect with a political actor and their representation rather than strictly the set of policies and party affiliation they have (Soare, 2017; Weyland, 2017). In the above examples, Prabowo is drawing attention to himself as a Muslim and son of Islam, which supports his attempts at presenting himself as a pious religious figure throughout the 2019 campaign, and as will be demonstrated below, the savior of Indonesia.
In sample 3 (2019) Prabowo demonstrates this personalization again and links his happiness with serving the Indonesian people. He owes this to God for providing him with the opportunity to serve:
“And I invite all my friends to do the same. We are devoted, we serve the state and the nation and the people. And I am already 68 years old. The Almighty has given me too much. I am determined. The rest of my life is for the people of Indonesia. My happiness, my joy, if I can see the wealth of Indonesia returning to the people of Indonesia. I am happy.”
In one of the 2024 sample speeches (sample 4), Prabowo ends his speech with a prayer:
“I close my remarks with my prayer, I pray for the presence of Allah, subhanahu wa taala, God the Great, God the Almighty, who rules all the worlds. It is only to You that we pray, only to You that we ask for help. O Allah, O Lord, give us strength, amen, so that we are strong to receive the mandate from the people of Indonesia, so that we have the ability, wisdom, intelligence, courage, honesty, sincerity to protect the people of Indonesia … O Allah, give us the strength, give us the power to continue to be loyal to the nation and the people of Indonesia, amen. Thank you, O Allah, thank you for everything you have given, thank you for your favor, thank you for all the gifts you have given. Thank you. Wassalamualaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh.”
This prayer frames the Prabowo and the audience as collective Muslims who are seeking the right direction for Indonesia from God. While the sincerity of this prayer is not for our judgement, we can comment that religion is politicized to create unity and to frame Prabowo’s seeking of power as a holy and pious mission.
In sample 6 (2024) Prabowo expresses moral absolutisms of right, wrong and evil to highlight the virtuous path he is on:
“I got teachings from my ustaz-ustaz, from my kiai-kiai, from my teachers. If you are insulted, if you are mocked, if you are slandered, return it to the almighty. I believe that right is right, wrong is wrong, evil is evil, I continue on the right path, I have no doubt, O God, O Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala.”
The Discursive Construction of Crisis, Breakdown, and Threat
The sample speeches show Prabowo constructing a rhetorical crisis to a much greater degree in 2019 than he did in 2024 campaigning. Although these passages are not always inherently related to religion, the analysis will demonstrate how these crises can be used to augment an image of saviorhood by the political actor from ‘evil’ elites, which tends to lean on religious ideals and association.
A key narrative theme in the 2019 samples is that Indonesia is weak, threatened and at a crucial crossroads for its survival. This is most pronounced in the first sample, in which he shares a tragic story of a farm laborer and father who died by suicide because of the burden of his debts, and of the one in three Indonesian children who are malnourished, the ordinary people who can’t afford to live, and the debt Indonesia keeps accruing on a global scale. In the second sample, Prabowo evocatively claims that “our country is sick” and “Mother Earth is being raped” and “the rights of people are being trampled on.”
This state of crisis is attributed to the “handful of elites in Jakarta” that “do as they please.” Prabowo personalizes this state of crisis such as in sample 2 (2019) when he declares:
“I speak what’s in my heart. I’m fed up, fed up with the antics of the evil elite in Jakarta. Fed up. Always lying, always lying, lying, lying. Lying to the people.”
Religious populism is often used, as it has been here, to create moral distinctions between the ‘good’ people and the ‘evil’ others (e.g. DeHanas and Shterin, 2018).
The perpetuation of crisis, threat and blame was almost absent in the most recent election. In a significant pivot in 2024, Prabowo became allies with and endorsed by his former opposition President Jokowi, despite Prabowo having spread unfounded rumors about Jokowi secretly being a Chinese Christian who was selling out Indonesia in the former election (Lam, 2023). This consequently saw a change in Prabowo’s rhetoric, in which he stopped performing a state of despair when discussing Indonesia and blaming the political elites and government. For example, in sample 3 (2024), Prabowo claimed that Indonesia will become great and prosperous:
“Brothers and sisters, on the 14th of February, all of us, brothers and sisters, will determine the future of your children and grandchildren, brothers and sisters. We are now at a crossroads. Do we want to improve, do we want to progress, do we want to become a prosperous country, or do we want to become a mediocre country? Ladies and gentlemen, Prabowo Gibran and Koalisi Indonesia Maju, we are determined to continue all the foundations that have been built.”
In sample 4 (2024) Prabowo again optimistically describes Indonesia and the state of the country left by President Jokowi:
“We are also grateful to President Joko Widodo, ladies and gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, the Indonesian nation is a great nation, not just a great territory, not just a great population, but a great heart, a great soul, a great character, ladies and gentlemen.”
We can see a clear change in Prabowo’s strategy from the above passages, from claiming that Indonesia is facing imminent threats from internal and external factors and urgently needing a leader to save the country and its people, to portraying Indonesia as being on the right track but needing a leader to lead it to greatness.
Prabowo as the Savior of Indonesia
Former Minister of Defense and winner of the February 14, 2024, Presidential election, Prabowo Subianto, pictured at the 77th-anniversary celebration of the Indonesian Air Force in Jakarta on April 9, 2023. Photo: Donny Hery.
Political actors using a populist style generally rely on constructing a state of crisis, and then portraying themselves as the one – perhaps the only one – that can lead the people through the crisis or breakdown (Moffitt, 2016; Moffitt, 2020).
When religion is incorporated into this rhetoric, it can enhance and add credibility to these claims by sacralizing the leader (as the ‘savior’) and consequently, their politics take on a transcendent nature (Zuquete, 2017; Yilmaz, Morieson & Demir, 2021; Yabanci, 2020). Furthermore, when a leader references the majority religion, and appeals to the religious community, they are lending legitimacy and authenticity to their political agenda. We can see this in sample 1 (2019) when Prabowo ends his speech with:
“As a proud son of the nation and of Islam, allow me to proclaim the takbir, ‘Allahu Akbar! Allahu Akbar! Allahu Akbar! Independence! Independence!’ ‘Good luck fighting, together for a victorious Indonesia’.”
In this passage, Prabowo is creating a connection between himself (a son of Islam), God and religion of ‘the people’ (Allahu Akbar! God is Greatest!) and Indonesia’s independence (exclaiming and repeating Independence! following the takbir). Prabowo concludes his address in sample 2 (2019) in similar terms:
“Then, after voting, guard the counting until it’s finished. God willing, the people will win, Indonesia will win. Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar, Independence, Independence, Independence. Thank you.”
In sample 3 (2019) Prabowo once again portrays his political career as a sacred mission that has been granted by God. This example highlights his perceived role as fighting for justice and against those he opposes (the elite government):
“I am grateful. I am grateful. To God Almighty. God is great. Thank you, God. You gave me the opportunity. To defend the people. Danio. You gave me a chance. With these noble figures. You gave me a chance. To stand up for truth and justice. Thank you, Lord. You gave me the opportunity. To fight against the budget of wrath. To fight against injustice. To fight against leaders who deceive their own people.”
Interestingly, while Prabowo’s 2024 speeches did not construct a vision of Indonesia in crisis like they did in 2019, the most pronounced instance of Prabowo performing as the savior of Indonesia came from one of the 2024 campaign speeches (sample 3). In this example, Prabowo narrates to the crowd:
“Ladies and gentlemen, from the young age of 18, I have pledged that I am ready to die for the nation and people of Indonesia. Ladies and gentlemen, my ustaz, my kiai, taught me, ‘Prabowo, as a Muslim, before you spend your last breath, you must say two sentences of shahada.’ And I have said it in my life, because I should have been called by God. It turns out that God still gives, Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala still gives me breath, still gives me strength, still gives me health. That means I have to fulfil my duty to the nation and the people of Indonesia. And I, at this moment, after I have risked my life for decades for this republic, I am not willing to still see poor people in Indonesia.”
In this passage, Prabowo describes his political career as a sacred mission. Claiming that he is ready to die for the nation to fulfil this religious duty from God, Prabowo is making a passionate appeal to the emotions of the audience.
This is an interesting finding. It is quite evident that Prabowo was operationalizing exclusionary religious populism in 2019 to engage with the surging popularity of Islamist sentiment at the time. Yet in 2024, the above examples highlight Prabowo performatively and discursively communicating his religious identity and appealing to the religious identity of his audience.
Support for Islamist Actors and Collectives
Across the two election cycles, Prabowo expressed his support for very different political and social actors. In 2019 Prabowo clearly signaled to and supported to Islamist influences in Indonesian society. In sample 2 (2019) for example, Prabowo directly endorses the National Movement to Guard Ulama’s Religious Edicts (GNPF Uluma) and the populist Islamist group the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI):
“Ladies and gentlemen, thank you GNPF, thank you 212, thank you FPI. They want to accuse you of being radical. I say you are not radical. Why, do they want to pit Islam against Nationalism? Why do they want to pit Islam against Pancasila? Islamic leaders who participated in the birth of Pancasila, ladies and gentlemen.”
This quote demonstrates how Prabowo aligned himself with Islamist groups and movements that were widely acknowledged as accelerating religio-ethnic tensions and hostilities in Indonesian society, particularly against ethnic Chinese Christians. However, in this passage, Prabowo is implying that ‘they’ (the ‘others’) are responsible for these tensions by pitting Islam (Islamists) against the state and its ideology. Later in the speech, he directly places himself in the Islamist camp, stating:
“To say we are radical Islamists is an overstatement; we respect and protect all religions, all ethnic groups, and ethnicities.”
Although Prabowo is attempting to portray his mission as one of inclusivity, in this same statement he is also drawing attention to his association with the populist Islamist movement and the figures attached to it. As pointed out above, these figures are known to work against various types of pluralism in society.
In sample 3 (2019), Prabowo once again casts a blurry shadow of his position towards Islamism, which likely reflects an attempt to appeal to a broader support base. We also note an attempt to minimize negative perceptions of the Islamist actors he has associated with:
“Ladies and gentlemen. I am with Sandiaga Uno. We have no intention. We have no intention. Apart from working, serving, and devoting to all the people of Indonesia. Some say Prabowo-Sandi, the Coalition of Indonesia Adil Makmur, will change the Pancasila state. Lies! We will establish a khilafah state. Lies! This I say is slander. Cruel slander. Cruel slander. Cruel slander. But it doesn’t sell. The Indonesian people will not be affected, brothers and sisters. That’s right. That’s right. Our Ustadz-ustadz, our kiai-kiai, always teach that Indonesian Islam is Islam rahmatan lil alamin. Our Islam, peaceful Islam.”
By the 2024 election, Prabowo had publicly cut all ties with Islamist figures and instead allied himself with more moderate religious figures and organizations, including the leadership of one of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (Chaplin & Jurdi, 2024; Lam, 2023). As demonstrated in earlier passages analyzed, he redirected his support to the mainstream and became a vocal supporter of his predecessor – and former opponent – President Jokowi.
Calling for Unity and Inclusivity
Instead of the polarizing religious rhetoric Prabowo became known for in his 2019 campaigning, 2024 saw the leader operationalize religion to strengthen his new political agenda of unity and inclusion. For instance, in sample 3 (2024), he claimed:
“Prabowo, Prabowo, Prabowo, ladies and gentlemen, our ustadz-ustadz, our kiai-kiai, our religious leaders, teach us, religious people, pious people, you can’t demonize others, you can’t insult others, you can’t slander others, you can’t fight against each other, right, ladies and gentlemen…”
Prabowo is still displaying a people-centeredness here, and addressing those who follow and study Islam. Religion here becomes a driver for Prabowo’s new agenda for the de-polarization of Indonesian society (Arifianto & Budiatri, 2024). In sample 4 (2024), Prabowo expresses a similar desire and need for peace and the unification of the Indonesian people, although he steers away from using religious justifications:
“The condition is that we must get along, we must unite, we must be peaceful, we must not fight anymore, we must not divide, we must not suspect each other, demonize each other, ridicule each other, slander each other. No, we must unite so that we become a great country, our people prosper, we eliminate poverty from the land of Indonesia, ladies, and gentlemen.”
In sample 4 (2024) we also see Prabowo making a rhetorical effort to include the ethnic Chinese Christians he had vilified in the past. Although staying away from religious categorization, he stated:
“Firstly, I would like to congratulate all Muslims for celebrating the great day of Isra Mikraj, and also to wish our brothers and sisters of Chinese ethnicity who are celebrating the Lunar New Year. If I am not mistaken, today is exactly the Lunar New Year for the Chinese ethnic group, ladies, and gentlemen.”
These samples are a clear demonstration of Prabowo’s decision to move away from polarizing and antagonistic discourses and performances. There are several reasons why he has changed his strategy (Yilmaz et al., 2024 discuss these in their recent work) but this discourse analysis has also demonstrated that he continues to rely on the mobilizing and legitimizing power of religion in addressing and collectivizing ‘the people’ and connecting his political agenda with the beliefs and culture of the majority religion.
Concluding Remarks and Future Research
Whether or not Prabowo will return to a religious populist style that antagonizes ‘elites’ and ‘others’ and aligns itself with Islamist actors and ideals cannot yet be determined. What we can identify is that his political style in the most recent election was distinctly flavored by a characteristically populist effort to appeal to ‘the people,’ achieved by communicative strategies that sought the approval of various segments of society (see Yilmaz et al., 2024). Most relevant to this article was Prabowo’s use of religious rhetoric which, as this discourse analysis highlighted, continues to play a central role in his campaign speeches and efforts and showed a distinct effort to appeal to a (shared) collective Muslim identity. With recent polling showing that religious affiliations and identities continue to inform how many Indonesians vote (Chaplin & Jurdi, 2024), this undoubtedly contributed to his electoral success.
Ultimately, we note a shift from Islamist mobilization to a mobilization directed towards Indonesian Muslims. Like other politicized religions, Islamist ideals are often far removed from the religion it is associated with. Islamist movements and parties have developed their ideologies based on a range of factors such as the political, institutional, and historical legacies of colonialism and nation-building, Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism, and in response to authoritarian regimes (Cesari, 2021).
Funding: We acknowledge that this research is supported by the Australian Research Council (ARC) the Discovery Project – DP220100829, titled “Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation: Civilisationism in Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan” (2022-2025).
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Abstract
Ganjar Pranowo stands as a pivotal figure within technocratic populism, anticipated to advocate for the people’s volonté générale and counter the sway of Islamist civilisational populism within Indonesia. The impending 2024 election positions him in a direct contest against Anies Baswedan and Prabowo Subianto, both politicians who garnered support from Islamist populist factions in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial and 2019 presidential elections, respectively. Perceptions of Ganjar’s political stance vary, with some viewing him as a populist figure. However, in essence, he embodies the antithesis of populism, distinct from narratives and rhetoric persistently leveraging Islamism for political gain. This article seeks to delve into Ganjar’s political prospects in the upcoming 2024 election, shedding light on his role in confronting rivals and their supporters entrenched in Islamist populism. While widely seen as the most compelling figure for upholding the continuity of a vibrant democracy, his emergence also sparks inquiries into the trajectory of substantive democratic progress within the nation.
Dan Slater, an American political scientist, contends that Indonesia’s “vibrant democracy” stands a better chance of continuity under the continued leadership style of Jokowi (Slater, 2023). Among the limited pool of potential presidential candidates, Ganjar Pranowo emerges as a leading contender, viewed as the most fitting successor to Jokowi. Pranowo’s potential lies in his ability to potentially surpass other candidates, notably Anies Baswedan, who enjoys support from an Islamist “civilisational populist” (Yilmaz et al., 2022) group (Bachtiar, 2023), and Prabowo, classified as a chauvinist populist (Mietzner, 2020).
However, the upcoming 2024 political contest presents an unexpected turn as Jokowi aligns himself with Prabowo, positioning his eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming, as the vice-presidential candidate within Prabowo’s political coalition. This move poses a significant challenge to Ganjar’s standing, pitting him against both his political mentor and a potent political force. It seems plausible that Jokowi, recognizing that no one can precisely fill his leadership role, seeks to extend his influence through his son, whom he can effectively oversee.
Indonesia, in its ongoing pursuit of economic development and democratization, appears to lean towards an authoritarian trajectory (Power, 2018) following two decades of democratization since the 1998 political reform. Within this landscape, Jokowi’s inner circle comprises bureaucrats who echo the political ethos of the New Order era. This group notably includes Prabowo, serving as the Minister of Defense, and Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, holding the position of Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs in Indonesia. Their influence transcends their designated roles due to their adeptness in driving strategic state development. Trained and accustomed to Suharto’s militaristic approach, characterized by precision and effectiveness albeit often entailing human rights violations, they now wield considerable power.
This authoritarian inclination gains momentum amidst the aftermath of the Covid-19 outbreak and concurrent challenges stemming from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, triggering crises in food and energy. A recent illustration is the displacement of indigenous people from their customary lands in Rempang, Batam Island. This displacement aims to pave the way for the ambitious transformation of the region into Indonesia’s Eco-City, a venture seeking significant foreign investment from the Chinese corporation Xinyi Glass Holdings.
In his role as a symbol of popular sovereignty, Jokowi endeavours to persuade his cabinet that any developmental initiatives under his leadership should not undermine democratic progress. Their objective is to ensure the sustenance of formal democracy throughout the stipulated five-year periods between general elections. This perspective contrasts with criticisms asserting that Jokowi is eroding democratic principles (Mujani & Liddle, 2021; Lindsey and Butt, 2023). Consequently, the fate of substantive democracy in the nation remains uncertain.
The intricate web of relationships among political leaders, business figures, parties, and various influential actors significantly shapes the practical dynamics of politics, thereby shaping the gradual evolution of substantive democracy. However, prevalent manoeuvres seem to exhibit a recurring pattern that weakens democratic structures. Collaborations among political entities, leaders, and business elites often lead to multifaceted political manipulations (Bachtiar, 2020). Notably, the diminishing authority of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and its apparent tolerance toward corruption, particularly in strategic party projects, signify regressive steps detrimental to democracy.
A recent, contentious incident spotlighting the country’s political landscape involves Jokowi’s facilitation of his son, Gibran, assuming the position of Prabowo’s vice-presidential candidate. This manoeuvre involved leveraging legal and political channels excessively, evident in the Constitutional Court’s proceedings (Baker, 2023). Through his brother-in-law, Chief Justice Anwar Usman, Jokowi influenced legal amendments to ease the eligibility criteria for his son to run for office before turning 40.
Ganjar’s challenge extends beyond contending with Jokowi’s political influence. Amidst the stakes involving economic development, political stability, and the precarious state of substantive democracy, Ganjar confronts the remnants of post-Reformasi political manoeuvring, notably Islamist populism, which, while recently receding, still poses a significant challenge. Anies and Prabowo, figures supported by Islamist populist forces in the 2017 gubernatorial and 2019 presidential elections respectively (Barton et al., 2021a; Barton et al., 2021b), exemplify this trend. While Prabowo acquiesced to becoming Minister of Defense in Jokowi’s cabinet, Anies, having risen to Governor of Jakarta by defeating Ahok, remains in opposition.
This article aims to explore Ganjar’s approach to combating Islamist populism, particularly when certain political entities employ identity politics as a tool in their contestations. Examining Ganjar’s stance in this context will elucidate whether he indeed embodies the ideal figure capable of upholding a vibrant democracy and whether he exhibits the empathy necessary to drive substantive changes within the landscape of Indonesian democratization.
Who is Ganjar Pranowo?
On October 28, 1968, Ganjar Pranowo was born in Karanganyar, Central Java, Indonesia. He studied law at Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. This is the same campus that Jokowi and Anies graduated from. He subsequently completed postgraduate studies at the University of Indonesia. He had been a student activist since 1992. Three years later he was a member of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) during the New Order era. In the party, he was a loyalist of Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of the country’s founding father, Soekarno. Ganjar joined the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in early 2003, before running for parliament in the 2004 legislative elections, but he lost. However, after his rival (the winning candidate) was appointed Ambassador, Ganjar was also appointed to sit on the DPR RI Commission IV.
It was his tenacity and courage to speak out that made his political reputation grow. From 2009 to 2014, he had been entrusted with the position of Vice-President of Commission II in charge of internal affairs. He was experienced in serving on the Commission of Inquiry investigating the Century Bank case, Indonesia’s largest unresolved corruption case. In September 2012, with the support of the Central Java PDI-P Regional Leadership Council, he decided to run against the incumbent deputy governor, Rustriningsih, in the Central Java gubernatorial election. Ganjar Pranowo-Heru Sudjatmoko was officially sworn in as Governor and Deputy Governor of Central Java for the period 2013-2018 on August 23, 2013. After being inaugurated, he promised to execute the “Agenda 18” program, a kind of regional development blueprint that is considered progressive and pro-people.
Ganjar is known as a populist figure, a subject of political performance and ideology. Populism, in this context, is the simplest form of populism that is in favor of the interests of the people. In fact, he also portrays himself as a technocrat who cares about people’s everyday lives. This is the same image that his predecessor Jokowi has built up. In his official speech as governor of Central Java, he said, “…we must serve the people well, not betray them. And why this infrastructure development is so important because it is one of the main requirements to revive the people’s economy” (Pranowo, 2022). Ganjar can therefore be called populist, at least performatively and ideologically.
Ganjar’s Chance in 2024 Presidential Election
As governor of Central Java, he has a reputation for being a good leader, popular and close to the people. He is working to imitate Jokowi. He often makes impromptu visits (blusukan) or goes down to the grassroots to see and talk directly with ordinary people. Through this unique way, he evaluates whether his programs in government are working well or not. He also ensures that his policies benefit people’s lives. This made him a well-known figure and built his image as a leader close to the people. In addition, all his activities are always publicized through various social media, especially X/Twitter (@ganjarpranowo), Instagram (ganjar_pranowo) and YouTube (@GanjarPranowoOfficial). Taking advantage of his popularity, he has become one of the leading candidates who will take part in the presidential elections of 2024.
Prabowo Subianto gives a speech about the vision and mission of the 2019 Indonesian presidential candidate in front of a crowd of supporters on the campaign in Yogyakarta, Indonesia on April 8, 2019. Photo: Aidil Akbar.
As a candidate, Ganjar Pranowo faces competition from Anies Baswedan and Prabowo Subianto. Anies, a professor at the University of Paramadina, holds a Ph.D. from Northern Illinois University, USA. Although not affiliated with any political party, he has been declared as the presidential candidate of the Nasdem party and enjoys support from Islamist populist groups. Prabowo, on the other hand, is the former military commander of the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) and was once the son-in-law of Indonesia’s powerful figure, Suharto. Since being involved in various significant special operations, Prabowo has faced accusations of human rights violations, which has been a contentious issue for his party during election seasons. A co-founder of the Gerindra party, Prabowo has been a prominent political figure who contested against Jokowi in the 2014 and 2019 elections. Anies was part of Jokowi’s cabinet in 2014 but later underwent reshuffling. In contrast, Ganjar is perceived to share similarities with Jokowi, a sentiment reinforced when Jokowi expressed a preference for a presidential candidate with white hair and a wrinkled forehead, a description that notably aligns with Ganjar’s characteristics.
According to the Indikator Survey (October 2023), Ganjar Pranowo holds a significant lead in electability with 29.5%. He surpasses other candidates, including Anies Baswedan (22.8%), Prabowo (19.5%), Ridwan Kamil (5.7%), Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (1.9%), Erick Thohir (1.4%), Puan Maharani (1.3%), Khofifah Indar Parawansa (1.1%), Hari Tanoesoedibjo (1.0%), and Sandiaga Uno (0.8%). Even when compared to the prominent leader of Islamist populism, Habib Rizieq Shihab, Ganjar’s electability remains the highest (Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting, 2020). This dominance in popularity may be attributed to several factors, including his identity as a Muslim and Javanese, as well as his avoidance of identity politics that instrumentalize Islam in practical political contests. Ganjar positions himself as a pro-diversity figure, aligning with Indonesia’s multicultural nature.
Furthermore, Ganjar’s standing within the PDIP, the victorious party in the 2019 elections, is firmly established. He enjoys support not only from Megawati, the influential figure in control of the party but also from her daughter, Puan Maharani, who was initially his competitor within the party. While Puan was groomed to succeed Megawati and was expected to run in the 2024 elections, her extensive political experience did not translate into public electability. Despite holding key positions, such as Chairperson of the PDIP faction in the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) from 2012-2014, Coordinating Minister for Human Development and Culture of Indonesia from 2014-2019, and Speaker of the DPR from 2019-2021, Puan was not retained as a candidate for the 2024 elections. Puan’s internally strong but nationally weak position put her at odds with Ganjar. Hence the emergence of a symbolic polemic depicting a bull (banteng) against a wild boar (celeng), successively thought to represent Puan and later Ganjar.
Ganjar is known for his resilience and sagacity in confronting challenging decisions, although some perceive him as stubborn. However, he would certainly not contemplate attacking his own mother, let alone a larger animal like a bull. When questioned by a student about whether, as President, he would be a party cadre and officer (petugas partai) or a leader for all the people, he diplomatically responded, “When I led Central Java for ten years, did I prioritize only my party?” (Televisi UI, 2023). He aimed to convey that, as a party cadre, his role is to serve the people. On his official website, he states, “I’m ruled by the people, the Governor is just a mandate” (https://www.ganjarpranowo.com/).
Although considered the most fitting successor to Jokowi, Ganjar faced a practical challenge as Jokowi’s political moves diverged from PDIP. Without formally leaving PDIP, Jokowi nominated his son, Gibran Rakabuming, the mayor of Solo, as the vice-presidential candidate alongside Prabowo Subianto. Gibran is a PDIP cadre and won local elections on the party’s ticket, but his candidacy at the age of 35 is viewed as premature. Public perception suggests Jokowi’s involvement in dynastic politics, potentially impeding substantive democratization. This presents a significant obstacle to victory. On the other hand, Ganjar’s vice-presidential candidate is Mahfud MD, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Menkopolhukam). Known for his outspoken stance against corruption, especially among high-ranking officials, Mahfud shares Ganjar’s clean bureaucratic record and pro-pluralism stance, enhancing their chances in the race.
With his traditionally pro-people populist positions, a clean track record, experience as a technocrat, strong anti-corruption stance, and pro-diversity credentials, Ganjar was expected to appeal to a broad voter base, including moderates and individuals of various religious backgrounds. He still stands a chance to emerge victorious, but the outcome remains uncertain. The Prabowo camp, currently supported by Jokowi, poses a formidable force that the PDIP cannot underestimate. However, Ganjar has capitalized on public dissatisfaction with Jokowi’s perceived involvement in ‘dynastic politics.’ Additionally, Jokowi, once seen as a pro-democracy figure, is now viewed by some as an executioner of democracy itself. If Ganjar secures victory, the question arises: will he follow in Jokowi’s footsteps in handling populist Islamic groups?
Ganjar and Identity Politics
Identity Politics is a political strategy that employs specific identities to gain a political advantage. Typically, this involves appealing to the masses, particularly the majority, to secure their votes, as large population segments are often considered favorable voting blocs in formal representative electoral politics. However, this approach is not without challenges, particularly in the context of Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, characterized by thousands of ethnic groups, languages, and notable ethnic diversity. How does Ganjar navigate the complex landscape of identity politics in Indonesia, given its unique demographic and cultural context?
As the presumed successor to Jokowi, Ganjar embodies the charisma of a nationalist champion of the people. He possesses the essential qualities associated with the presidency: a Javanese figure connected to the populace, a tendency to avoid controversial statements, loyalty to the decisions of the prevailing political party, and a consistent reluctance to challenge the established power structure, even during instances when the ruling government had to counter opposition that often employed majority identity politics, such as Islam, as a political tool. Embracing the Pancasila ideology, Ganjar frequently emphasizes the need to protect and preserve diversity, considering it a crucial aspect that should be shielded from any form of degradation or destruction by any group. Despite being pro-government and pro-people simultaneously, he supports various democratic mechanisms, including demonstrations. However, he disagrees with protests and popular movements that employ the term “people power,” finding it discriminatory, intolerant, and undermining the values of unity in diversity.
In some respects, it is evident that Ganjar engages in identity politics, leveraging his Javanese, Muslim background to present himself as a nationalist Pancasilaist closely connected to the people. Simultaneously, he strategically criticizes those who exploit Islam as a tool in a confrontational, intolerant, and violently negating manner for realpolitik purposes. Ganjar takes a firm stance against groups like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Defenders Front of Islam (FPI), considering them ideological opponents of Pancasila, which promotes coexistence in a diverse society encompassing various elements such as ethnicity, religion, race, and class. His opposition intensified after the official government ban on HTI and FPI, with Ganjar, in his capacity as governor, issuing explicit instructions to civil servants not to associate with banned organizations. He vowed to dismiss any civil servant found violating his populist policies in this regard (Pranowo 2021b).
In this way, Ganjar positions himself as pro-government (establishment), pro-Pancasila, and pro-people. This is how he presents himself performatively. Notably, he also critiques Anies and Prabowo, his two main competitors, who, in the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2016 and the presidential election in 2019, capitalized on the power of Islamist populism. As the well-known Nusantara saying goes, “once you have rowed, you have passed two or three islands (sekali mendayung, dua tiga pulau terlampaui).”
Ganjar and Islamist Populism
DKI Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan with residents of Kampung Akuarium in Jakarta, Indonesia on April 14 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
Practical political contestation has exacerbated the polarization of Indonesian society, with identity politics playing a pivotal role in this process. On one side, there are nationalists who lean towards pluralism, while on the other, there are Islamists. This polarization is a direct consequence of the 2019 presidential election, where Jokowi faced Prabowo. Prabowo garnered support from the populist Islamist movement, although this alliance soured when the movement deemed Prabowo a ‘traitor’ for accepting a ministerial position in Jokowi’s government. Consequently, the populist Islamist group is now throwing its support behind Anies for the 2024 presidential elections. This coalition aligns with a popular political narrative aimed at challenging elites perceived as incapable of representing the collective will of the people and others deemed threatening to populist interests.
Indeed, there is no ‘stable and fixed’ theoretical concept of populism (Muhtadi, 2019). It is inherently contextual and dynamic, adapting to the prevailing circumstances. Generally, following Cas Mudde’s minimal definition (2004: 543-4; 2017), populism is a set of ideas or ideologies that dichotomize society into two homogenous and antagonistic groups—the pure people versus the corrupt elite. It is rooted in the moral belief that the elite either fails to serve the general interests of the people or actively corrupts them. When manifested as an ideological movement, populism tends to disregard the rule of law, champion popular sovereignty, emphasize people power, and is often viewed as detrimental to democracy. It can manifest as a street-level force, enabling mobocracy, where the crowd determines political direction and even the interpretation of truth.
In its expression, Islamist populism in Indonesia employs a civilizational rhetoric that diametrically contrasts ‘us’ and ‘them’ using cultural and religious language (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023). Within the Indonesian context, populists employ terms such as Islam against the West and China, the ummah against oppressive rulers, or the marginalized (mustadhafin) against the oppressors (mustakbirin). A recent addition is the dichotomy of defenders of Islam against blasphemers, which emerged from Jakarta electoral politics in 2016. However, despite emphasizing the rhetoric of civilizationism, the Islamist populism that has gained prominence lacks any inherent connection with the genuine interests of the people. Notably, NU and Muhammadiyah, claiming a combined mass of 100 million people, have expressed opposition to Islamist populism, considering it a disruptive minority that tends to hijack democracy, foster social polarization, discriminate against minorities, and threaten national integration (Triono, 2023).
While Islamist populism strategically deploys religious ideology and civilizationism as political instruments to advance its populist objectives within mainstream political contestation, practical political actors leverage the populist group to secure support from their voter base. This dual instrumentalization operates on two levels. Initially, it exploits religion to stir mass emotions, foment animosity toward elites, and create a narrative of “civilizational populism,” framing resistance to populist adversaries as a religious and holy struggle (Yilmaz and Morieson, 2021). Subsequently, Islamist populism becomes a political tool that recognizes the social and cultural significance of religious symbols within the majority of the population.
Ganjar takes a clear stance in opposition to Islamist populism. Unlike his political rivals Anies and Prabowo, who have benefited significantly from the maneuvering of Islamist populism to increase voter percentages in previous elections, Ganjar emphasizes identity politics. He positions diversity, pluralism, and nationalism as political symbols that can strengthen the ‘Indonesianess’ of society. Consequently, he challenges rivals like Anies and Prabowo, as well as Islamist populist actors such as HTI and FPI. Ganjar’s explicit warning to government officials in Central Java, under his jurisdiction, prohibiting their involvement in the activities of banned organizations (HTI and FPI), serves as evidence of his stance against Islamist populism.
The effectiveness of Ganjar’s confrontation, whether on an ideological or instrumental level, remains somewhat ambiguous. If his confrontation operates on an ideological level, it is rooted in his status as a cadre of the PDIP, the ideological successor of Soekarno’s nationalism. In this capacity, he positions himself as a defender of Pancasila, promoting ideas of pluralism, tolerance, inclusiveness, and human rights. Alternatively, if his confrontation in the instrumental level, it is because his appearance should be an Indonesian instead of Javanese Muslim. This strategic shift is essential due to the diverse composition of his voters, representing the varied demographics of Indonesia. Furthermore, Ganjar must craft his political narrative as the successor to the ‘Javanese King’ Jokowi, a figure whose actions, according to political scientists, have played a significant role in steering Indonesia toward authoritarianism through the political banning of HTI and FPI (Power, 2019).
Thus far, Ganjar has played the role of Jokowi’s mouthpiece, navigating important policy decisions in the political arena, even though this poses a dilemma as Jokowi is in disagreement with Megawati and the PDIP. Ganjar is the attacking pawn in the game of political chess that is ready to fight for the elimination of the agents of Islamist populism. However, in this game where he has not succumbed to the adversary, he also has the opportunity to ascend to the position of Crown Prince. Ultimately, he emerges as the frontrunner to succeed the king, especially as Jokowi hesitates to extend his term beyond the constitutional maximum of two terms. Meanwhile, Jokowi’s nomination of his son, Gibran, as Prabowo’s running mate is both a strength and a political experiment, but it also presents a vulnerability by fueling discourse around dynastic politics and authoritarianism, which has faced public criticism (Muhtadi & Muslim, 2023). This weakness in Jokowi’s strategy clearly works to Ganjar’s advantage.
If Ganjar genuinely takes on the challenge of eradicating Islamist populism – which, in the Indonesian context, presents an opportunity for elites to pursue democratization – on both ideological and practical-instrumental levels, he positions himself in the middle ground between the flawed elite and the oppressed people. He can be a successor to Jokowi and a committed member of the victorious party, making it easier to garner voter support, while also serving as a political force that counters Islamist populism. Simultaneously, he can align with the suffering populace by steadfastly upholding diversity and facilitating communication with the ruling elite, ensuring that the people’s aspirations are better understood. This approach may pave the way for new policies that prioritize the interests of the people.
On the flip side, Islamist populist entities can also function on two simultaneous levels: ideological and practical politics. Ideologically, Islamists aim to influence the electoral agenda and advocate for the implementation of Sharia, while instrumentally, their elites have historically been employed by previous rulers (such as Soeharto) to obstruct civil society’s efforts to compel the government to address the economic crisis of the late 1990s. Regardless of the level, Ganjar persists in countering them, driven by his robust ideological and nationalist convictions, as well as the pursuit of victory in the 2024 presidential election.
Ganjar Pranowo, the governor of Central Java, is visiting Purwokerto, Indonesia on August 20, 2022. Photo: Ainul Ghurri.
Conclusion
Ganjar’s prospects in the political arena are not without challenges, despite his viable chance of winning. Prabowo, supported by Jokowi, holds significant influence, even among Megawati and her dedicated supporters. In a hypothetical two-round election scenario where Anies loses in the initial round, it is anticipated that Anies’ voters would likely shift their support to Prabowo rather than Ganjar. This shift signifies that endorsing Anies aligns with supporting Islamist populism and other conservative Muslim factions. With only two choices—Prabowo and Ganjar—voters tend to lean towards Prabowo due to his previous candidacy in 2019, despite subsequent characterizations as a traitor and his current support by Jokowi. Ganjar’s candidacy does not align with the original intentions of Islamist populism, leaving the alternative for them to abstain from voting altogether.
Ganjar staunchly advocates for diversity, positioning himself as an anti-Islamist populist figure. In contrast to Islamist populism’s labeling of figures using derogatory terms, Ganjar consistently emphasizes the symbol of Pancasila and the motto of ‘unity in diversity’ to unite the nation and voters. He emerges as a significant advocate for democratization, emphasizing inclusivity in politics, religion, and fostering social tolerance.
While Ganjar may rhetorically support substantive democratization, his ability to maintain a vibrant democracy hinges on navigating the complexities of economic development, largely influenced by New Order cadres, ensuring political stability, and upholding national security. However, these complexities do not necessarily guarantee the concurrent advancement of substantive democracy.
The fragile democratic landscape in Indonesia is susceptible to conservative and authoritarian shifts, both signaling democratic regression. Though less superficial than in previous years, the highly polarized role of identity politics poses challenges to substantive democratization. Yet, persistent issues like oligarchic competition, weakened anti-corruption institutions, and eroding judicial roles remain significant hurdles.
The current political scenario underscores the difficulties in making informed political choices during elections, primarily due to the diverse interests among the three candidates—Anies, Prabowo, and Ganjar. This underscores Indonesia’s elite-centric political landscape, limiting substantial participation from the populace. The opaque and unpredictable nature of practical politics in the country constrains the organic development of democracy rooted in the demos. The evolving situation emphasizes the vital importance of substantial democratic progress. Ganjar’s capacity as a democracy-builder aligning with the people’s aspirations will ultimately stand the test of time.
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