Please cite as: Riddervold, Marianne; Rosén, Guri & Greenberg, Jessica R. (2026). “Conclusion: How Should the EU Deal with Changing Transatlantic Relations?” In: Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. (eds). Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén and Jessica R. Greenberg. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00139
This concluding chapter synthesizes the report’s core finding: under “Trump 2.0,” transatlantic relations face a systematic populist challenge across all four pillars—security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values. The authors argue that traditional crisis-management reflexes are no longer sufficient, as “America First” policies combine coercive alliance diplomacy, tariff-driven trade politics, and the instrumentalization of international law with an explicit contestation of liberal-democratic norms. While functional cooperation may persist through selective, issue-based “muddling through,” the EU’s most viable response is strategic adaptation without normative retreat. Key recommendations emphasize EU unity, enhanced European defence and industrial capacity, diversified trade partnerships, robust support for multilateral institutions, and renewed commitments to democracy, pluralism, and social cohesion to address populism’s structural drivers.
The transatlantic relationship has always shifted between cooperation and crisis, with tensions rooted in how United States (US) leadership is exercised, the evolution of European integration, and recurring disputes over institutions and burden-sharing. Those strains have usually been contained by shared threat perceptions and a baseline commitment to liberal democracy (Tocci and Alcaro 2012; Smith, this volume).
Under a populist right-wing policy under ‘Trump 2.0’, the authors in this volume depict a sharper, more systematic challenge to transatlantic relations across all four pillars of the transatlantic relationship. In terms of security, strategic interests, and threat perceptions no longer align, and the United States is a less reliable ally. Trump’s ‘America First’ agenda combines a broader rollback of international cooperation (including cuts and withdrawals affecting major bodies and funding streams) with punitive trade tools and more coercive alliance diplomacy, all weakening the relationship. In trade, changing policies under Trump is visible, not least in the use of comprehensive tariffs as well as an increasingly more antagonistic approach to the World Trade Organization (WTO). On the international arena, beyond targeting specific organizations, the shift is one of both practice and principle: international law becomes more openly instrumental, diplomacy more performative and multilateral institutions more readily treated as dispensable. As argued by Smith (this volume), for the European Union (EU), this is not only a difficult partner relationship but an assault on the institutional environment from which the Union derives legitimacy and leverage, while also accelerating a global ‘flux’ in multilateralism as other powers fill spaces left by US retrenchment. And not least, the value basis of the relationship is facing severe challenges, with right-wing populist forces challenging many of the core values on which the EU and the transatlantic relationship have been built.
All chapters in the report conclude that the transatlantic relationship has reached a turning point and is undergoing a significant shift. It is a clear possibility that transatlantic relations might weaken even further now, following a near decade of increased uncertainty. At the same time, several authors also emphasize the many adjustments made to accommodate the challenges to the EU–US relationship. One example is the framework agreement on trade (see Young, this volume). Another is defence and security, where increased European defence spending, the changing role of the EU, and the use of informal networks to bypass collaborative deadlocks indicate functional adaptation to the current impasse (Sus, this volume). ‘Muddling through’ implies that cooperation is issue-contingent. Arrangements are made based on the specific interests of either side rather than a shared ideological platform (Alcaro, this volume). While the relationship clearly is weaker than in previous decades, these various instances of ‘muddling through’ could lead to a redefined and different relationship in areas where interests align. Despite the deterioration of collaboration in international organizations, many of the existing networks of transatlantic relations, both public and private, remain strong and likely to withstand the strain, at least in the short to medium term (Smith, this volume). This form of ‘muddling through’ within a different and less strong relationship is identified as a plausible and likely future path for transatlantic relations, distinguishing it from full renewal or outright rupture.
While this is undoubtedly challenging, the European Union is in a strong position to build on and continue to lead in the areas that made the transatlantic relationship successful for so long, if the political will is there. These include active trade policies and more integrated economic and financial policies, a stronger and more independent European defence, robust commitments to core values, and sustained investment in international cooperation, institutions and coordination mechanisms. Across the chapters, the authors offer recommendations that aim to strengthen the alliance where possible, manage the pressures created by rising isolationism, trade conflict, and the current US political climate, and respond to the causes and effects of populist movements. They also emphasize the need for EU unity, a strengthening of European security and defence through investment in key strategic sectors, reaffirmed commitments to democracy, pluralism, and the rule of law, and a reinforcement of European leadership on global challenges. A further priority is to promote effective multilateralism through new strategic partnerships while also strengthening existing international institutions.
This chapter sums up the report’s main recommendations across the four pillars of the transatlantic relationship – security, trade, international institutions and values. At the end, we also provide a table that summarizes the recommendations of each chapter. Overall, the report argues that a broad coalition of actors is needed to address both the causes and the symptoms of strain in the transatlantic relationship and the impact of populism. Such broad action must include coordination among diplomatic services and international institutions, as well as engagement from citizen groups, civil society and rights advocates, state agencies, legal professionals and judges, teachers, social and health care workers, media literacy experts, academics and EU policymakers and elected officials. Both the EU’s executive institutions and the European Parliament (EP) have important roles to play, not only to create efficient but also legitimate solutions to common challenges. The report also notes that while there are clear areas for action in the state, civil society and the economy, many challenges cut across sectors and require combined approaches. For example, industrial policy can be linked with economic development programmes, environmental regulation and research and development that support new security strategies.
So, What Should the EU Do in Response?
While all the chapters have discussed the changes in transatlantic relations across different policy domains and the direction in which the relationship is moving, they also provide policy advice to the EU on how to respond to these changes. Overall, all the chapters argue for a coordinated and coherent EU response. Several argue that the EU should develop a more unified and firm political line towards Washington, moving away from appeasement and signalling that EU support cannot be taken for granted when US policies damage European security, trade or technology interests. While this is challenging when facing a US administration that links trade and other issues to security guarantees and US support for Ukraine, a coherent and strong EU will put the Union in a better position vis-à-vis its traditional partner and, not least, in a better position to adjust its policies in the face of common challenges. EU strategic autonomy should be strengthened further, and the EU must focus on developing its own security policies, although aligning with the US and cooperating where possible, when interests align.
The EU should also continue to promote international cooperation and trade, in multilateral settings where possible, and with like-minded countries where needed. Several chapters focus on the latter point, highlighting how the EU, in order to reduce its vulnerability, should seek to strengthen its strategic autonomy while deepening bilateral and plurilateral partnerships, both in trade and in other areas of common interests. And not least, the EU should continue to uphold the values that have underpinned the integration project since the beginning. In a changing global and domestic environment, with increased right-wing populism taking place in parallel with war on the European continent, increased geoeconomic and geopolitical conflict and changing transatlantic bond, this will perhaps prove to be the EU’s biggest challenge.
Security: Key Recommendations for the EU
The contributions on security (Alcaro, Pomorska and Morgenstern-Pomorski, Sus, Wong) all point to the same conclusion: the post-war transatlantic relationship is entering a ‘post-American’ phase, in which the EU can no longer rely on stable US leadership and must take much greater responsibility for its own security. Transatlantic ties are weakening, even if they are not collapsing, and US politics has become more volatile and less responsive to European concerns. At best, the relationship is muddling through, but due to developments in the EU, we also see a development towards a different, but redefined relationship where the EU takes a stronger role, and the two traditional partners cooperate in areas where interests overlap.
In this context, Europe has begun to improve coordination of resources and defence capabilities – both inside the EU and through flexible coalitions – but progress is uneven and too slow given the scale of the challenge. The EU needs to reduce its dependence on US military enablers, prepare for a possible weaker US commitment to NATO, and use its potential to strengthen member states’ military, industrial, energy and technological assets. To do so will require a firmer, more unified stance towards Washington, greater solidarity inside the EU, and a coherent long-term strategy: building a stronger European defence industrial base, providing predictable support and security guarantees for Ukraine, and investing in genuine interoperability and European capabilities. At the same time, the EU must manage relations with China and other partners in a way that reinforces – rather than undermines – its strategic autonomy and its ability to act with the United States when interests align.
Trade: Key Recommendations for the EU
The authors in the trade section (E. Jones, K.Jones, Poletti, Young) recommend a strategy where the EU builds its own economic strength and resilience while staying anchored in rules-based trade. The EU should keep prioritizing domestic policy goals, using its market power and regulatory tools to support growth, jobs and security at home. Doing so will form the core of a more competitive strategic autonomy. At the same time, member states need to coordinate enough to avoid pushing the costs of globalization onto one another and to prevent a patchwork of conflicting national measures. The EU should deepen trade and investment ties with partners on all continents, so it is less exposed to pressure from either the United States or China and better positioned as a key player in the multilateral trading system. Strengthening supply chains, technology capacity and the defence-related industrial base are central to this effort. In parallel, the EU should help keep the WTO functioning, work with others to update its rules and use WTO-compatible tools where possible. In the short term, it will often have to muddle through the Trump period with sector-by-sector bargaining, but the long-term goal should be a more autonomous and resilient EU economy that can both defend its interests and uphold an open, rules-based trading order.
International Institutions: Key Recommendations for the EU
The authors in the Institutions section (Drieskens, Fiorino, Smith, Veggeland) are also clear on their advice: under weaker transatlantic relations and more volatile US policies, the EU should approach international institutions as core instruments of European power and legitimacy, not as stable extensions of US–EU partnership. Doing so will require moving beyond a ‘wait and see’ posture and protecting the EU’s agency when US support is uncertain. The EU should be able to sustain institutional functions if the US withdraws, reduce the risks created by retaliation, and work to keep multilateral forums credible as places for rule-setting rather than coercive bargaining. Because internal division is a key constraint, the EU’s influence in the United Nations (UN) system and other bodies depends on stronger member state alignment and more predictable European financial and diplomatic capacity.
More generally, the EU should combine adaptation, selective pushback and long-term institutional strengthening. It should adapt where needed to manage short-term risk, while avoiding dependency or appeasement. It should resist in targeted, coalition-backed ways when core norms and interests are at stake. Over time, it should prioritize ‘reconfiguration’ by strengthening international rules, funding models and coalitions with like-minded states so institutions are more resilient to funding shocks, obstruction and shifting power balances. It should also stay the course on long-horizon agendas, especially climate and health and keep building durable EU leadership that is less exposed to temporary US political swings.
Democratic Values and Climate: Key Recommendations for the EU
Authors in the democratic values section (Andersson, Azmanova, Holmes, Newman) find that there is a clear crisis in the underlying consensus that has structured strong transatlantic relationships for the past 70+ years. The commitment to democracy, the rule of law, pluralism and minority rights is weakening on both sides of the Atlantic. This commitment arguably reached its height in the immediate post-Cold War period. Yet, a series of global shocks, including 9/11 and its aftermath, the 2008 financial crisis, the 2015–2016 migration crisis, anti-internationalist and anti-EU sentiments and finally the COVID-19 pandemic, have shaken those earlier commitments to the core. These factors have shaped the rise of right-wing, populist, xenophobic politics on both sides of the Atlantic. More recently, the second Trump administration has directly undermined the shared values and commitment to the transatlantic alliance. The relationship has gone from one of strong alliance, to growing scepticism, towards what now can be seen as outright antagonism.
At the same time, parts of the population and political elites across the Atlantic converge in the rejection of core liberal principles. This convergence has produced an overall picture in which liberal institutions are muddling through, at best and are being actively dismantled, sometimes from the inside out, by populist forces. Within this context, the EU is called on to be a leader in reestablishing the core values that helped achieve the peace and prosperity of the long twentieth century. Its strength lies in EU institutions as a site for multilateral coordination and a ‘bully pulpit’ for the centrality of democratic and rule of law values. The EU must recommit to robust policy and programmatic ways of modelling inclusive approaches to social solidarity and support for precarious and vulnerable populations; returning to models of social integration and human rights guarantees for people on the move; strengthening institutional responses to populist attempts to destabilize, undermine or co-opt democratic procedures, and rule of law principles. There is also a need to balance the need for investment in European security strategies and economic growth with social cohesion, commitments to environmental stewardship and increased civic and democratic participation.
Policy Recommendations on EU–US Relations
Security
Author
Chapter title
Key policy recommendations
Riccardo Alcaro
Overview and Background: Right-wing Nationalism, Trump and the Future of US–European Relations
– Reduce EU dependence on US defence and prepare for a weaker US commitment to NATO.
– Strengthen EU military, energy, technological and industrial capacities.
– Avoid fragmented national approaches and rely on pragmatic, issue-by-issue cooperation.
Monika Sus
Functional Adaptation Without Much Love: NATO and the Strains of EU–US Relations
– Increase European defence spending and shared capabilities to manage US unpredictability. – Use strong public support for EU defence to justify deeper cooperation. – Accept uneven progress while gradually reducing reliance on US military assets.
Reuben Wong
EU–US–China Security Relations
– Invest in European defence capabilities and the defence industrial base. – Reinforce coordination through NATO, the Strategic Compass and the Trade and Technology Council. – Pursue a pragmatic China policy while diversifying partnerships to reduce vulnerability.
Jost-Henrik Morgenstern-Pomorski and Karolina Pomorska
The Russia–Ukraine War and Transatlantic Relations
– Expand European production and supply chains for weapons, emergency supplies and reconstruction. – Improve military interoperability and develop genuinely European capabilities. – Provide Ukraine with credible, long-term security guarantees if US support weakens.
Trade
Author
Chapter
Key policy recommendations
Erik Jones
Transatlantic Trade from Embedded Liberalism to Competitive Strategic Autonomy
– Keep domestic policy goals at the centre of EU economic strategy. – Coordinate national responses to globalization to avoid burden-shifting. – Use EU regulatory and economic power to shape global trade norms while protecting domestic interests.
Arlo Poletti
EU–US–China Trade Relations
– Prepare to impose credible retaliatory trade measures when EU interests are harmed. – Strengthen trade ties with partners across regions. – Make full use of the EU’s geoeconomic policy toolkit.
Alasdair R. Young
From Trade Skirmishes to Trade War? Transatlantic
Trade Relations during the Second Trump Administration
– Diversify trade and reduce vulnerability to US pressure while supporting the WTO. – Pursue internal reforms to boost competitiveness and defence-related capabilities. – Strengthen supply-chain resilience in strategic sectors.
Kent Jones
Transatlantic Trade, the Trump Disruption and the World Trade Organization
– Expand rules-based trade with non-US partners using the WTO framework. – Muddle through with sector-by-sector bargaining during the Trump period. – Strengthen WTO rules, including through plurilateral agreements.
International Institutions
Author
Chapter
Key policy recommendations
Michael Smith
Overview and Background: International Institutions, Populism and Transatlantic Relations
– Prepare for further weakening of transatlantic cooperation. – Use resistance, adaptation and reconfiguration to sustain institutions. – Focus on institutional resilience rather than restoring past cooperation.
Edith Drieskens
The United Nations
– Acknowledge that EU–US relations at the UN are unequal. – Increase European capacity to fill gaps left by US retrenchment where possible. – Build stronger consensus among EU member states for coherent UN action.
Daniel Fiorino
The Trump Administration and Climate Policy
– Maintain EU climate leadership despite US obstruction. – Continue Green Deal policies such as ETS expansion, CBAM and climate finance. – Frame climate action as supporting jobs, security and democratic resilience.
Frode Veggeland
Turbulence in the World Health Organization: Implications for EU-US Cooperation in a Changing International Order
– Strengthen EU support for the WHO and global health governance. – Build coalitions of willing partners within and beyond the WHO. – Increase EU strategic autonomy in health while deepening cooperation with like-minded states.
Democratic Values
Author
Chapter
Key policy recommendations
Douglas R. Holmes
Overview and Background: Democracy and Populism: The European Case
– Treat populism as a structural political challenge. – Develop anticipatory tools to identify emerging political pressures. – Reinforce democratic engagement, especially through the European Parliament.
Saul Newman
Illiberalism and Democracy: The Populist Challenge to Transatlantic Relations
– Strengthen liberal democratic institutions. – Counter exclusionary populist narratives and protect minority rights. – Improve regulation of digital platforms to limit misinformation.
Ruben Andersson
The Illiberal Bargain on Migration
– Protect civil liberties and limit surveillance overreach. – Rework partnerships with migration host states through broader cooperation. – Frame migration as a social and economic issue rather than a security threat.
Albena Azmanova
Vulnerable Groups, Protections and Precarity
– Address economic precarity as a driver of populism. – Shift industrial policy toward stable jobs and public services. – Govern global markets through labour and environmental standards.
(*) Marianne Riddervold is a research professor at Arena, Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo and at the Norwegian Institute of international affairs (NUPI). She is also a senior fellow at the UC Berkeley Institute of European studies.
(**) Guri Rosén is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo, Norway. She is also a senior researcher at Arena, Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, Norway.
(***) Jessica Greenberg is a professor of Anthropology at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. She is a political and legal anthropologist, with expertise in the anthropology of Europe, postsocialism, human rights, social movements, revolution, democracy and law. Her most recent book is Justice in the Balance: Democracy, Rule of Law and the European Court of Human Rights (Stanford University Press, 2025).
Please cite as: Syvak, Nikoletta. (2026). “Post-Truth Populism: A New Political Paradigm.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. January 19, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0025
This review assesses Post-Truth Populism: A New Political Paradigm (2024), edited by Saul Newman and Maximilian Conrad, a timely and theoretically ambitious contribution to the study of contemporary populism. The volume advances the argument that post-truth populism is not merely about political lying, but about a deeper transformation in the status of facts, expertise, and epistemic authority in democratic life. Combining political theory, media studies, and comparative analysis, the book conceptualizes post-truth populism as an epistemic struggle in which claims to “truth” are grounded in identity and moral antagonism rather than verification. While the collection’s conceptual breadth sometimes comes at the expense of analytical coherence, it offers valuable insights into how populism reshapes knowledge, trust, and democratic governance in an era of information disorder.
Reviewed by Nikoletta Syvak*
This book review examines the edition 2024 – Post-Truth Populism: A New Political Paradigm, edited by Saul Newman and Maximilian Conrad, which explores the relationship between populism and post-truth in contemporary politics. The book offers an interpretation of post-truth populism (PTP) as a stable political complex in which anti-elitist mobilization logic is combined with a crisis of trust in expert knowledge and institutional sources of information. The review evaluates the central thesis of the collection, its place in political science literature, the quality of its arguments and empirical evidence, as well as its methodological strengths and limitations. It concludes that the book makes a significant contribution to the study of populism and political communication, although a unified conceptual framework is not always maintained at the level of individual chapters.
The main thesis of the collection is that post-truth is not limited to “lies in politics,” but reflects a change in the status of facts and expertise in the public sphere. The editors emphasize that populism has epistemic potential: the opposition between “the people” and “the elites” turns into a conflict between “the truth of the people” and “the manipulation of the elites,” where plausibility is subordinated to political identity (p. 4). In this sense, post-truth populism can be understood as a form of politics that not only ignores facts but actively redefines the conditions under which facts become legitimate in the first place. Particularly important is the idea that post-truth should be understood not as relativism, but as a kind of “truth fundamentalism”: actors can reject verifiable data while offering their own “only true” reality (p. 8).
The book is organized into four sections: theoretical debates about PTP, followed by chapters on political communication and media, counter knowledge and conspiracy narratives, and finally, the consequences for democracy (pp. 11-16). Thus, the collection combines political theory, media studies, and comparative politics, showing that post-truth politics concerns not only information bubbles but also the transformation of democratic institutions.
First, the book clearly positions itself within the political science literature on populism. The editors use an approach in which populism is understood as a “thin-centered ideology” based on a moral division of society into “pure people” and “corrupt elites” (p. 4). However, the collection also draws on the more recent “epistemic turn” in populism studies, which views populist politics as a struggle over knowledge, trust, and authority (p. 1). This allows the book to go beyond interpretations of populism exclusively as an electoral strategy or a reaction to economic crises.
Second, methodologically, the book is an edited volume, which means it includes different approaches. Qualitative methodology dominates conceptual analysis, a discursive approach, and case-oriented argumentation. However, the collection is not limited to theory. For example, the section on communication and media includes a study that uses experimental design to test how populist messages influence the perception of facts and the tendency toward “factual relativism.” This strengthens the book’s evidence base and shows that the PTP framework can be operationalized and tested, rather than just discussed at the level of metaphor.
Thirdly, the quality of writing and clarity of argumentation are generally high. The introduction provides a good introduction to the problem, quickly identifies its empirical relevance, and explains why post-truth populism cannot be reduced to moral condemnation of politicians. At the same time, it should be noted that some chapters in the collection may be theoretically dense and difficult for readers without prior knowledge: this is a typical feature of edited volumes, where a uniform style is not guaranteed.
Finally, the main question is how convincing the argument is and why it is important for us to pay attention to it. The strength of the book lies in its demonstration that PTP is not only about “fakes” and manipulation, but also about the erosion of trust as a resource of democratic governance. If citizens no longer share basic procedures for determining facts, rational public debate becomes impossible, and politics turns into a competition of moral narratives and identities. In this sense, the book raises a fundamentally important topic for contemporary political science
However, there are limitations. The term “post-truth populism” may be too broad and applicable to too many different phenomena, from anti-elite rhetoric to conspiracy theories and platform disinformation.
Furthermore, the claim of a “new paradigm” requires strict criteria: what exactly distinguishes PTP from mere populism plus media scandals? The collection presents a compelling formulation of the problem but does not always offer a single set of verifiable criteria that would allow PTP to be clearly distinguished from other forms of political communication.
Conclusion
Overall, the book makes a significant contribution to political science: it shows that populism should be analyzed not only as an ideology or mobilization strategy, but also as epistemic politics-the struggle for the legitimacy of knowledge and the right to “truth” in the public sphere (pp. 4-8). Despite its methodological heterogeneity and risk of conceptual vagueness, the collection is useful for researchers of populism, political communication, democratic theory, and the crisis of trust. The main merit of the book is its ability to explain why post-truth populism has become not a temporary anomaly but a symptom of structural changes in modern democracies.
(*) Nikoletta Syvak is a Graduate Student, Department of Political Science and International Relations, East China Normal University (ECNU). Email: syvaknikoletta@gmail.com
Newman, Saul & Conrad, Maximilian (eds.). Post-Truth Populism: A New Political Paradigm. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 349 pp. ISBN: ISSN 2946-6016
Iran is entering a critical juncture as renewed protests expose both the fragility and the resilience of the Islamic Republic. In this in-depth interview with the ECPS, Dr. Kamran Matin argues that since the 2009 Green Movement, the Iranian regime has ruled “primarily through coercion rather than consent,” relying on repression while retaining the support of only a small social base. Yet violence alone does not explain regime survival. As Matin emphasizes, the Islamic Republic endures “not only through violence, but through a fragmented opposition” that lacks organizational depth, ideological coherence, and a credible alternative vision. Drawing on political economy, Gramscian theory, and regional geopolitics, Dr. Matin analyzes why economic shocks quickly become systemic political crises in Iran—and why, despite widespread de-legitimation, the unresolved question of “what comes next” continues to constrain revolutionary outcomes.
Iran has entered one of the most volatile phases of its post-1979 history. The protest wave that erupted after the sharp currency shock of late December 2025 quickly escalated into explicitly anti-regime mobilization, revealing not only the depth of socio-economic dislocation but also the political vulnerabilities of the Islamic Republic. In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies, Dr. Kamran Matin—Reader in International Relations at the University of Sussex—offers a theoretically informed analysis of the current conjuncture, foregrounding two interlinked claims that capture the central stakes of the moment: “Since 2009, [the] Iran regime has ruled by coercion, not consent,” and “[the] Iran regime survives not only through violence, but through a fragmented opposition.”
For Dr. Matin, the disputed 2009 election and the Green Movement mark a critical turning point in the regime’s mode of rule. As he emphasizes, “almost all of these signals are present in some form, but at least since 2009—going back to that critical moment—the Iranian state, the Islamic Republic, has ruled primarily through coercion rather than consent.” In his account, the erosion of consent is not merely ideological but institutional: the narrowing of factional pluralism and the weakening of reformist mediation diminished the regime’s capacity to manage dissent through electoral incorporation. The result, he argues, is a system that “retains the support of a small segment of Iranian society—perhaps 10 to 15 percent at most, and maybe closer to 10 percent,” while relying on “brute force: repression, torture, imprisonment, surveillance, and so on” to govern the remainder.
Yet Dr. Matin’s analysis also resists purely repression-centered explanations of authoritarian durability. Alongside state violence, he argues, regime survival is sustained by the organizational weakness and strategic incoherence of its opponents. “I would argue that, in addition to massive levels of violence, what sustains the regime is precisely the fractured nature of the opposition, its disorganization, and the absence of a political discourse that appeals equally to the main segments of society.” Even as protests broaden to include bazaar networks, students, workers, women, and peripheral provinces, the opposition—he contends—lacks the institutional capacity to translate mobilization into a viable transition project. “Apart from state violence,” he continues, “this lack of an organized alternative—ideologically, discursively, and organizationally—is a key factor keeping the regime in power.” The enduring strategic dilemma is therefore not simply the de-legitimation of the regime, but the absence of a credible successor: “Many people ask themselves, ‘What comes next?’”
Across the interview, Dr. Matin situates these dynamics within wider debates on revolutionary crises, hegemonic contestation, and regional geopolitics. He examines how economic shocks in a rentier political economy can rapidly become systemic political conflict; how coercion is deployed through targeted and exemplary violence; and how opposition plurality can both energize revolt and inhibit the formation of a unifying, “national-popular” project. Taken together, Dr. Matin’s intervention offers a stark but analytically precise assessment of Iran’s predicament: a regime increasingly dependent on coercion, confronting a society in revolt—yet facing an opposition still struggling to answer the question that shadows every revolutionary moment: what comes next?
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Kamran Matin, slightly revised for clarity and flow.
In Iran, There Is No Sharp Distinction Between the Economic and the Political
Ruhollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Ali Hamaney on billboard in Tabriz, Iran on August 11, 2019.
Dr. Kamran Matin, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Protests in Iran reportedly originated in a sharp currency shock on 28 December 2025 and rapidly escalated into explicitly anti-regime mobilization. Through what causal pathways do socio-economic dislocations in Iran—currency collapse, inflationary spirals, and distributive breakdown—translate into systemic political contestation rather than reformist grievance, and how does Iran’s specific configuration of state–market–religious authority condition this radicalization?
Dr. Kamran Matin: First of all, I would like to thank you for giving me this opportunity to discuss the protests in Iran. Your question is obviously very dense and contains multiple sub-questions. I will try to address them one by one, to the extent that I remember them.
In terms of economic grievances translating into political contestation, I think we have to bear in mind that Iran is still largely a rentier state. Therefore, like many rentier states—but also developmental states in general—there is hardly anything that is not political in essence. There is no sharp distinction between the economic and the political, because the economic accumulation of capitalists, or the work that the working class does for capitalists, in a country like Iran is ultimately not based—if I use the language of Marxist political economy—on surplus value in the sense we understand it in theory. Rather, profit is ultimately a redistribution of external rent by the state to various sections of society. As a result, the distribution of profit and wealth is politically determined, although not directly; it is mediated through multiple institutions and mechanisms.
In that sense, it is very easy in Iran for economic problems to become political issues. This has always been the case, even before the revolution, during the Shah period. Currently, however, this dynamic has intensified, because the combination of sanctions, the illicit economy, and the informal economy means that control over currency, in particular, is very tightly exercised. The government allocates foreign currency at different rates to different actors. There are cheaper rates from which large industrialists or merchants can benefit, but access to these requires proximity to the state or the government. So even economic competitiveness becomes a fundamentally political process. It is not economic in the straightforward sense that greater efficiency or lower production costs automatically generate higher profits. That logic has very limited purchase in a place like Iran.
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the protests began in the so-called bazaar and then very quickly turned into a popular, widespread political movement. However, we should also bear in mind that the bazaar, in the context of Iran—and to some extent perhaps even in Turkey—has somewhat different meanings and characteristics. Historically, the term bazaar referred to the large mercantile bourgeoisie involved in trade. But in recent decades, and probably even earlier, the bazaar has come to include different layers. For example, the current protests were not initiated by traditional, ideologically religious merchants as such, but by shopkeepers selling electronic goods. These goods are imported, especially from Asia—South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and elsewhere—and these traders were unable either to buy or to sell because the currency was in free fall. As a result, they initiated the protests. Because society as a whole was already suffering from high inflation, unemployment, and general economic insecurity, the wider population could easily identify with their grievances.
As for the second part of your question—about Iran’s specific configuration of state–market–religious authority and how it conditions this situation. The bazaar, particularly its traditional merchant class, has historically been very close to the ulama, or clerical class, through intermarriage and shared religious conservatism. At the same time, the security forces—the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the Basij militia—have largely been recruited from the petty bourgeoisie, as well as from these social strata in different parts of Iran. There is therefore a close linkage among these elements. The government itself may be internally diverse, with competing factions, but in moments of crisis such as the current one, these factions tend to close ranks in order to weather the storm. The Supreme Leader plays a key role in maintaining a certain level of coherence within this system, though that is something we might discuss later.
Finally, there is, of course, the question of minorities, nationalities, and women—the gender dimension. In the last major wave of protests, the “Zan, Zendegi, Azadi,” or “Women, Life, Freedom” movement, women and subaltern nations were at the forefront, while large cities—especially in majority Persian-speaking regions—were comparatively quiet. This time, however, the pattern has been somewhat different. The protests began in Tehran and other major cities, while significant sections of Kurdistan remained relatively quiet, although some areas were highly active and bore the brunt of repression in the early days—places such as Ilam or Kermanshah. This difference also calls for explanation and is related to the way the previous protest wave was suppressed, as well as to the fragility and temporary nature of solidarity between the center—Persian speakers or Iranian nationalists more generally—and groups such as the Kurds, the Baluch, and the Arabs.
I hope I have addressed your question, but I am sure that we will return to many of these issues again in subsequent questions.
Wider, More Popular, Yet Unorganized: The Limits of Expanding Protest Coalition
“Woman, life, freedom”: London protest draws thousands following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody on January 10, 2022. Photo: Vehbi Koca.
If the current protest wave incorporates bazaar and merchant networks alongside students, workers, women, and peripheral provinces, how does this re-composition of class alliances alter the movement’s structural power, organizational density, and leverage vis-à-vis the state when compared to 2009, 2017–19, and 2022? In particular, does bazaar participation reintroduce a historically decisive—but long dormant—node of revolutionary capacity?
Dr. Kamran Matin: The fact that the bazaar was involved is significant, because in the previous protests you mentioned there was always this notion that the so-called gray area of the Iranian population was not participating. By this gray area, people meant those who were unhappy or dissatisfied but not willing to go to the streets, protest, and risk their lives. This time around, that changed, because we saw participation not only in big cities but also in small ones. There were a large number of casualties in places whose names I had never even heard before—very small towns in distant provinces like Khorasan in the northeast, near Afghanistan—where historically we have seen very little in the way of radical protest against the regime.
So, I think this time the protests were wider and more popular, with the partial exception of Kurdistan, which again has to do with the way Iranian nationalism operates. Opposition forces often fail to acknowledge Kurdish grievances as such, and not only that: by accusing Kurds of separatism and of being foreign agents, they actually—albeit indirectly—help the Iranian state repress them even more brutally. As a result, people were very afraid of much harsher repression in Kurdish areas, and some parts remained quiet, although, there were many protests in other regions.
Another important point is the significance of the Green Movement in 2009. Just to clarify, in case readers do not remember, it was triggered by a disputed election in which Ahmadinejad was declared the winner, even though Mousavi, the other candidate, contested the result, leading to large protests. That episode effectively resulted in the strategic marginalization of the so-called reformist faction within the Islamic Republic from the state apparatus and state power. This had incredibly important consequences for subsequent protests, because before 2009 the Islamic Republic was often able to remain flexible vis-à-vis popular mobilization. The reformist faction could articulate some of the grievances, allowing people to continue expressing their dissatisfaction through the electoral system by voting for reformist candidates. In this way, the Islamic Republic was able to absorb a great deal of social and political energy and was therefore not as fragile or brittle politically as it later became.
With the sidelining of the reformists, the state became more or less monolithic, dominated by what Western commentators often describe as hardliners or conservatives. Reformists did not disappear entirely, but they no longer wielded any significant power. At the same time, people lost faith in the reformist route to change. From that point onward, every new protest became more radical. Electoral participation dropped dramatically, even according to the state’s own statistics, which are themselves highly engineered and manipulated. Around 2017 or 2018, a famous slogan emerged: “Neither reformists nor conservatives—this is the end of the story.” In effect, people were saying that they no longer trusted either faction, which meant that they were now seeking radical change in the state itself. In their view, the Islamic Republic had to go.
In the most recent protests, we can also see that there was no reference to any possible alternatives within the establishment or the regime, and the slogans were overtly radical. Many of these slogans had appeared in previous protest waves as well, but from the limited footage I have seen, the key difference was the level of determination shown by protesters in confronting the security forces. They fought them in the streets and, in some cases, even chased them away. This is why, on the 8th or 9th of January, the regime deployed the IRGC. There are also many reports suggesting that the regime brought in militias from Iraq—the Shi‘a militias of the PMU, or Hashd al-Shaabi—as well as other foreign elements of the so-called axis of resistance that it could mobilize. The idea was that, because they were foreigners, they would have no relatives or social ties that might restrain their actions.
So, the density was there, and the scale was there, but organization was not necessarily present—and that is something we may want to discuss further.
Why Repression, Not Legitimacy, Remains the Regime’s Decisive Pillar
Free Iran Protest in Toronto, Ontario: A large group of demonstrators marches south along Bay Street. Photo: Cameron Ballantyne Smith.
In assessing whether the Mullah regime is approaching a decisive rupture, which indicators matter most analytically: elite fissures within the clerical–security nexus, defections or hesitation within coercive institutions, breakdowns in fiscal extraction and strike coordination, or erosion of regime legitimacy withinreligious networks? How should these signals be weighted relative to one another?
Dr. Kamran Matin: Almost all of these signals are present in some form, but at least since 2009—going back to that critical moment—the Iranian state, the Islamic Republic, has ruled primarily through coercion rather than consent. It still retains the support of a small segment of Iranian society—perhaps 10 to 15 percent at most, and maybe closer to 10 percent. For the rest, it relies on brute force: repression, torture, imprisonment, surveillance, and so on.
If I use Gramscian language, there were periods when a form of hegemonic governance existed, combining coercion with consent. Consent was generated through elections—however engineered they may have been—but also through internal plurality and factional diversity. Reformists and hardliners coexisted, and people could choose one over the other. At the time, many Iranians used to say that they were choosing the “bad” over the “worse.” That option, however, was removed after 2009. From then on, there was effectively only the “very bad” to vote for.
All the other indicators you mention are also present: dire economic conditions, a deep crisis of regime legitimacy, a lack of future prospects, international isolation, and geopolitical weakening—especially since October 7 and developments affecting the so-called proxy forces in the region, the fall of Assad, and related events. Without sheer violence, the Islamic Republic would not be standing. We can see this clearly in the current round of protests as well. Millions of people took to the streets across Iran, in both small towns and large cities, and yet within two nights the regime killed so many people that it managed to force the population back into their homes.
I would say—and this is not just my view, but one shared by scholars of revolution—that it is not enough for a population simply to reject the way it is ruled for a revolution to succeed. For a revolution to succeed, the state must also be unable to repress in the way it has. As long as the repressive and security organs of the state are both willing and capable of suppressing protests, the regime is likely to survive. This is precisely what we have seen over at least the past ten years. So, I think this is the most important indicator.
An indirect confirmation of this can be seen in the way the 12-day war last summer paved the way for the current protests. Militarily, people saw that the Islamic Republic was unable to defend itself. A large number of the most senior commanders of the IRGC were killed on the first day, and the so-called axis of resistance forces disappeared from the political scene, at least temporarily. This created the impression that the state was far more fragile than before, which encouraged people—or gave them the courage—to act as they did this time.
On top of that, there was a statement by Trump, which initially emboldened the protesters. But we know what happened afterward: he changed his position, and the threat of intervention, at least for now, disappeared. This again demonstrates how vital the physical, coercive power of the state remains for keeping it intact and for sustaining the current elite in power. The moment it changes, the Islamic Republic will fall.
So, everything now really depends on whether the coherence of the security apparatus and the repressive organs of the state can be maintained in the period ahead.
Many Symbols, No Common Project
Building on your work on societal multiplicity and the nation’s Janus-like form, how should we interpret the coexistence of competing symbolic projects in the streets—monarchist iconography, republican imaginaries, feminist slogans, and multi-ethnic frames? Under conditions of uneven and combined development, does this plurality enable a Gramscian “national-popular” articulation, or does it risk fragmenting sovereignty claims in ways that invite external instrumentalization?
Dr. Kamran Matin: I cannot remember the exact words, but Lenin has this famous line that says revolution brings together the most extreme, diverse, and different forces into some sort of unplanned alliance against the status quo. So, it is not surprising that we see very different forces—ideologically, politically, and socially—on the streets. Like most revolutions, these protests in Iran are defined more by opposition to what exists than by a shared vision of the alternative that each actor seeks to establish.
Historically, it is in such contexts that an organized political party or movement can harness this massive social energy toward a particular political objective. This role was played in 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini, a charismatic leader who was able, in some ways, to direct the revolutionary movement. He was vague enough to appeal to all sections of society, while at the same time being very clear in his opposition to the monarchy. This was central to how he built a hegemonic force, as he managed to present the particular interests of Islamists as the general interest of society as a whole. This, of course, ended once the revolution succeeded, when we saw how even Khomeini had to rely on massive violence to consolidate the post-revolutionary state.
At present, we have a great diversity of social and political forces and classes, but the opposition lacks two crucial things. First, it lacks organization on the ground—again, with the partial exception of Kurdistan, where Kurdish parties have a long history of organized politics. I am sure there are clandestine networks in Kurdish cities and elsewhere, but nothing comparable exists in the rest of Iran, for a variety of reasons. One key reason is that since the 1980s the Islamic Republic has invested almost everything in the physical destruction of the left: mass executions, imprisonment, forced exile, and, even in exile, hundreds of assassinations of dissidents and political leaders. Anyone who could potentially have played a leading role was eliminated.
As a result, we lack organization, we lack charismatic figures, and neither the left nor the liberals possess organic intellectuals in the Gramscian sense. A national-popular front or bloc, in Gramsci’s formulation, also requires organic intellectuals who can articulate a hegemonic project capable of uniting otherwise disparate sectors of the opposition. We do not have this, and in some respects we see the opposite dynamic at work.
Among monarchist forces gathered around the son of the former king, Reza Pahlavi, there is a strong unwillingness to engage in collaboration on an equal footing with other opposition forces. They seek dominance rather than partnership and claim a form of quasi-divine legitimacy. It is almost treated as the birthright of Reza Pahlavi to become the next monarch of Iran, or at least to lead a transitional period. As a result, meaningful cooperation with other parties or opposition groups becomes impossible. The so-called Georgetown alliance during the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement collapsed very quickly precisely for this reason, as he withdrew rather than accept equality with others.
Another major source of fragmentation within the opposition is the deployment of an exclusionary Iranian nationalism—by monarchists, by liberals in the opposition, and by the Islamic Republic itself. After the 12-day war, there was a sudden surge in nationalist symbolism: the promotion of Cyrus the Great, the erection of his statue in Tehran, and the revival of symbols of ancient Iran by the regime. The Islamic Republic understood that Islamist discourse could no longer mobilize society, but that nationalist appeals still might. At the same time, this further alienated the non-Persian peripheries of Iran, which in fact constitute more than half of the population: Azeri Turks, who make up roughly 20 to 25 percent; Kurds, around 10 to 15 percent; as well as Arabs, Baluch, Turkmens, Gilaks, and others.
Most of these groups are unwilling to contribute to the rise to power of forces that already seek to subordinate them politically and culturally. This denial of Iran’s internal diversity by large sections of the opposition creates a major barrier to forming a genuinely powerful nationwide opposition bloc. Each opposition group on its own is too small or too weak to overthrow the regime, yet the discourses they deploy and the strategies they pursue also prevent them from agreeing even on a minimal common program to confront the Islamic Republic.
I would argue that, in addition to massive levels of violence, what sustains the regime is precisely the fractured nature of the opposition, its disorganization, and the absence of a political discourse that appeals equally to the main segments of society. The Women, Life, Freedom slogan did manage to do this briefly. However, as I noted earlier, it was quickly undermined both by internal divisions within the opposition and by the regime itself. Within weeks, an alternative slogan emerged—“Man, Motherland, Development”—which is strikingly reminiscent of fascist slogans from Mussolini’s Italy. Woman, Life, Freedom versus Man, Motherland, Development. Until recently, Reza Pahlavi even displayed this slogan on his profile on X. I think the brief hegemonic role played by the Women, Life, Freedom slogan was significant, but it was actively undermined by substantial sections of the Iranian opposition.
Necro-politics in Practice: How the Regime Governs Through Maiming, Fear, and Exemplary Violence
Pro-government demonstrators march in support of the regime after the weekly Friday Prayers on January 05, 2018 in Tehran.
Reports describe systematic maiming, mass casualties, and targeted injuries amid an intensifying crackdown under communication blackouts. How should we conceptualize this repertoire of violence—deterrence, exemplary punishment, strategic mutilation, or biopolitical terror—and what does comparative evidence suggest about its medium-term political effects on mobilization, radicalization, and regime cohesion?
Dr. Kamran Matin: The Islamic Republic has a very complex necro-politics. Even the treatment of the dead has a particular political economy. In addition to what you mentioned in the question, many people have been shot in the eyes. This is very deliberate, because the aim is for those who are injured to remain alive and visible, walking around in public, so that others see this as the fate of anyone who opposes the regime.
This is particularly striking because, in the past, the Islamic Republic sought to conceal its violence. Even now, it is only in recent years that there has been some acknowledgement that in 1988 around 3,000 to 5,000 political prisoners were executed. At the time, almost nobody knew; most Iranians were unaware because it was carried out entirely in secrecy. By contrast, today state media actually show the protests and even display bodies in morgues and other locations.
What is also remarkable is that when families of those who have been killed go to collect the bodies of their loved ones, they are required to pay for the bullets that were fired at them. For each bullet, they are reportedly asked to pay around seven million Iranian tomans, which at the current exchange rate is roughly $80 or so—I cannot recall the exact figure. In other words, families are literally required to pay for the bullet that killed their loved one in order to retrieve the body.
On top of that, there are reports that families are offered the option of signing a document stating that the person who was killed was a member of the Basij, the pro-government militia—thus turning them, quote-unquote, into a “martyr.” This allows the government to claim that large numbers of security forces were killed by terrorists allegedly backed by Israel, the US, and others. If families refuse, the bodies may be buried in unmarked graves, and the family may never know where their loved one is buried. In some cases, families are confronted with this choice in addition to the financial demand.
I should add, however, that demanding money for bullets or for the return of bodies is not new. This practice was widespread in the 1980s, especially in Kurdistan, but also in cases involving political prisoners who were executed or hanged in prisons. The Islamic Republic therefore deploys violence in a highly complex and sophisticated manner. It uses exemplary punishment to deter others from protesting and to instill fear across society. When people see injured individuals everywhere, or witness bodies being withheld, mishandled, buried anonymously, or simply disappearing, the psychological impact is deeply traumatizing.
In the short term, this strategy may work for the regime by frightening people into submission. In the longer term, however, it produces enormous anger and even hatred within society—among individuals, families, and communities. This accumulated resentment is likely to erupt again in future protest waves. Yet the Islamic Republic is almost built on periodic crises; in a sense, it thrives on them. Just before we began, I saw a pro-regime journalist or activist claiming that, thanks to God, these recent events have extended the life of the Islamic Republic by fifty years.
They feel that they have not only repressed the protests, but that the very fact of having done so successfully has given them a sense—not of legitimacy, but of unassailability. This, in turn, makes people think twice before participating in the next round of protests.
Why Iran’s Opposition Is Unprepared for Transition
During revolutionary moments, the question of political succession becomes decisive. How would you characterize the current opposition landscape in terms of organizational depth, ideological coherence, and governing capacity, and what risks emerge when maximalist anti-regime unity is not matched by institutional preparedness for transition?
Dr. Kamran Matin: The opposition has none of these: neither organizational depth, nor a clear plan, nor the human capacity to run post-regime governance in any meaningful way at the moment. The material elements are there, but they are not organized in any coherent way. Again, I would distinguish between the situation in Kurdistan and the rest of Iran, because there are important differences.
I could talk for hours about this, but briefly, there are organized Kurdish parties with bases very close to the border, and there is an organic connection with society. As we remember from 1979, the moment the Shah fell, the Kurdish regions became autonomous and self-governing because this organizational infrastructure was already in place. We see similar patterns in Rojava after 2011, or in Iraq after the 1991 Kuwait War. But in the rest of Iran, we do not have this, and I think this absence is absolutely crucial.
Apart from state violence, this lack of an organized alternative—ideologically, discursively, and organizationally—is a key factor keeping the regime in power. Many people ask themselves, “What comes next?” And this is precisely why many were reluctant to take to the streets in the past. One reason Reza Pahlavi’s name was chanted in some protests is that people believed he had a workable plan, although we later saw that he really did not. He called on people to go to the streets and suggested that help was on the way, echoing Trump’s rhetoric, and obviously nothing materialized. In fact, many people now blame him for a significant portion of the casualties in Iran. So, overall, the opposition is rather weak.
Trump’s Iran Rhetoric Aims at Behavioral Change, Not Regime Change
US Presidential candidate Donald Trump held a campaign rally at PPG Paints Arena in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on November 4, 2024. Photo: Chip Somodevilla.
US President Trump’s call for Iranians to “keep protesting” and his claim that “help is on its way” mark an unusually explicit rhetorical intervention. How do such statements reshape internal protest dynamics, regime threat perceptions, and escalation logics—and where do they sit on the spectrum between moral encouragement, strategic signaling, and coercive diplomacy?
Dr. Kamran Matin: I think for Trump all three are objectives—strategic signaling, coercive diplomacy, and moral encouragement. But ultimately, he is pursuing his own interests. And his primary interest is not regime change, but a change in the regime’s behavior. That is crucial, because it means that Trump may seek to instrumentalize the protests in order to extract a deal from the regime.
The problem is that Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, cannot make such a deal, because it would be perceived as a form of submission. Any agreement—at least one based on US conditions—would be seen as a defeat of the regime. And those conditions are unacceptable: no nuclear enrichment, no long-range missiles, and no proxy forces. These are core pillars of the Islamic Republic, so they simply cannot concede them. This means that even though US preference is for behavioral change rather than regime change as such—and this is clearly articulated in the US National Security Strategy released a few weeks ago, as well as reflected in recent US interventions, such as in Venezuela—this strategy has inherent limits.
Trump was hoping that internal pressure within Iran, combined with the threat of intervention, could be leveraged to secure a deal that would advance US objectives in the Middle East, open Iranian markets, and distance Iran from China, among other goals. This has not happened. And the United States does not appear to have a clear plan for what to do if a deal proves impossible. This is where US and Israeli positions diverge to some extent. For Israel, any attack would need to lead to a radical outcome; otherwise, it would incur the costs of Iranian retaliation without achieving a clear political objective. This helps explain the confusion over recent developments, including why Trump has not followed through on what he initially appeared to signal.
That said, revolutions have historically been aided—often indirectly and unintentionally—by foreign powers. The October Revolution succeeded in part because of World War I and the weakening of the Tsarist regime. The French Revolution was linked to a severe fiscal crisis driven by geopolitical rivalry with England. More broadly, many classical revolutions have occurred in the context of war and wider geopolitical crises. In this respect, Iran is not exceptional.
The key issue, however, is whether there is sufficient organization on the ground to take advantage of these geopolitical and inter-imperialist rivalries. Unfortunately, to a large extent, there is not.
Why Rojava’s Future Lies Beyond Counterterrorism
Turning to Syria, with Kurdish-held areas under renewed assault and the future of Rojava/AANES increasingly uncertain, what are the plausible political trajectories—forced integration, negotiated autonomy, territorial rollback, or renewed international guarantees—and which are structurally most likely given current regional alignments?
Dr. Kamran Matin: The current so-called transitional government is clearly no different in terms of what it wants to do with the Kurdish parts of the region in Syria, or with other minorities. We have seen what it has done to the Druze and the Alawites. The fact that it is not doing more, or has not been able to do so, is because there has been resistance against it. So, I would say the long-term aim of this government is to control the entirety of Rojava, while making some sort of symbolic concessions—such as the decree announced yesterday (January 16, 2026) recognizing the Kurdish language to some extent—but without any constitutional guarantee of self-governance of the kind the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) demands.
From what happened in Aleppo in recent weeks, we know that this followed very quickly after a meeting in Paris between Israel, the Syrian transitional government, and the United States; I believe Turkey was present as well. It seems there has been an agreement that areas under SDF or Rojava control should be limited to east of the Euphrates. At the moment, the SDF is being evacuated from other regions. Leaders of the Autonomous Administration might think this will become the natural border between their autonomous region and the rest of Syria, and that may be the case in the short term, but I am confident that pressure will continue and that the government will push for more.
The Syrian government is prepared to make every concession possible to Israel in order to prevent intervention and then, with the help of Turkey, to deal with the Autonomous Administration in a gradual manner. Initially, it was thought that the so-called resolution process in Turkey—including PKK disarmament and dissolution—was the price the Kurdish movement was paying to keep Rojava safe. But I think this assessment has changed. At first, the Turkish state was clearly worried about Israel attempting to recruit allies in the region, as well as about Iran and the possibility of Iran fragmenting. Over time, however, Turkey regained its momentum. Now it is using the so-called resolution process precisely to keep the PKK, or whatever it is now called, out of the Rojava scene, and in fact to use the absence of conflict with the PKK in order to concentrate its efforts on Rojava.
I have written about this in recent weeks and days, and I do not know how much the Rojava leadership reads or listens to external advice, but I think they should be very concerned. This process is not going to end. Pressure will advance step by step, and attempts will be made to retake territory incrementally. The Autonomous Administration must ensure that its relationship with the United States is not based solely on counterterrorism and ISIS. It needs to push for some form of political recognition and for a decentralized or federal system. Otherwise, renewed conflict between the two sides is inevitable.
Regional Powers Prefer a Weakened Iran to a Collapsing One
How do regional power calculations—the Erdogan regime’s anti-Kurdish security doctrine, Damascus’s centralization drive, Russia’s brokerage role, and US/Gulf/Israeli threat perceptions—intersect with Iran’s internal crisis, and what implications does each Iranian outcome (hardening, fragmentation, or transition) carry for the fate of Rojava?
Dr. Kamran Matin: This is a very complex question. In terms of existing states—not just Turkey, but also the transitional government in Syria—they are ultimately driven by a vision of a centralized, unified, and homogeneous state. In societies characterized by a multiplicity of peoples, this model clearly does not work except through violence. And violence begets violence, which is precisely what we have witnessed over the past hundred years.
In that sense, any event or process that leads to de facto decentralization of power in these states—for example, what happened in Iraq in 2003—is viewed as a major threat. Turkey still regrets having allowed the KRG to emerge in the first place, and it now harbors similar concerns regarding Iran. As a result, Turkey—which is ostensibly a regional competitor of Iran—is now openly assisting the Islamic Republic. It opposes US intervention and provides intelligence against Kurdish armed forces, because it believes that the moment the Iranian state weakens, another Kurdish entity could emerge. Such a development would have direct implications for the Kurdish question within Turkey itself.
In this sense, the Kurdish question is a challenge for all these states, but at the same time it also constitutes the basis for their tactical cooperation—and even strategic alignment—at critical moments. If Iran were to weaken significantly, or if a situation similar to Syria in 2011–12 were to unfold there, this would pose a serious challenge for Turkey. At the same time, it is important to note that Iran has a large Azeri Turkish population. Some observers are concerned that Turkey might seek to instrumentalize this segment of Iranian society through Turkish nationalist sentiments in order to establish a foothold in northwestern Iran. There is also the question of Azerbaijan and whether the two might coordinate in such a scenario.
That said, from the perspective of regional states, the overall calculus appears to be that a weakened Islamic Republic is preferable to one that collapses entirely. This helps explain why Arab states, too, have urged the United States not to attack Iran. A breakdown of central authority and a deeply unstable Iran are outcomes that alarm everyone. At the same time, while many regional actors are hostile to the Islamic Republic, they also do not want to see an unmanaged, uncontrolled, and unplanned collapse of the Iranian state. As a result, they are actively seeking to prevent such an outcome.
Populism, Trump, and Changing Transatlantic Relations
Date: 3 February 2026
Time: 14:30 – 16:30 CET.
ECPS Role: Co-host
Language:English
Venue: Room 3E2 Spinelli, Brussels / European Parliament
Description: This event is organized with the European People’s Party (EPP). This event is private.
Event Details
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) and European People’s Party (EPP) are pleased to invite you to the Launch Event for the ECPS annual report, Populism, Trump, and Changing Transatlantic Relations, at the European Parliament in Brussels on February 3rd, from 14.30 to 16.30.
This year’s report focuses on populism and transatlantic relations during the Trump administration, based on four pillars of the relations: security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values. Each section includes a background chapter introducing the overarching debate, followed by three case studies that address specific questions and enable cross-comparison. Authors also provide policy suggestions where possible.
The event will be hosted by MEP Radan Kanev, the keynote address will be delivered by MEP Valérie Hayer, and remarks will be given by MEP Brando Benifei. The editors of the report, Prof. Marianne Riddervold, Associate Prof. Guri Rosén, and Prof. Jessica Greenberg, will present the report’s findings.
In this project, ECPS collaborates with the European Union Centre at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, ICS at the University of California, Berkeley, the European Centre at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and ARENA at the University of Oslo. The report is partially funded by the European Commission Jean Monnet-TANDEM Project.
The event will be at the European Parliament, Room 3E2 Spinelli, Brussels, Tuesday, 3 February 2026,14:30 – 16:30 CET.
As discussant for the final panel of the ECPS Conference 2025 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, Professor Karen Horn provided a thoughtful and incisive commentary, offering nuanced and analytically rich reflections on the four presentations featured in Panel 8.
Foreword
Introduction
Projects
Ongoing Projects …
ENCODE …
UNTOLD EUROPE …
Project Proposals
RE-EMOAR GOVERNOR (Horizon Europe)
INDEX (Horizon Europe – New European Bauhaus)
EQUITY-EU (Horizon Europe)
STANDUP (Horizon Europe)
DISCOPE (Horizon Europe)
INTEGRATE (Horizon Europe)
TRACE (CERV – European Remembrance)
VERITAS (CERV – Citizens’ Engagement and Participation)
HUMANADS-EMPOWER (Creative Europe – Journalism Partnerships)
J4CTZ – Journalism for Citizens (Creative Europe)
EduBridge (Creative Europe MEDIA)
CINEPHONIC (Creative Europe – European Cooperation Projects)
COHESION (IMREG – EU Cohesion Policy Information Measures)
Young EU Guardians of Tomorrow (Erasmus+ KA220-YOU)
Events
Panels
Annual International Symposium
Conference & Post-Conference Virtual Workshop Series
Partnerships with International Conferences
ECPS Academy Summer School
Publications
Journal of Populism & Politics (P&P)
Journal of Populism Studies (JPS)
ECPS Interview Series
Commentaries and Voice of Youth (VoY) Essays
Policy Papers
Reports
Profiles
Conclusion
***
Foreword
It is with great pride and a strong sense of responsibility that I present the European Center for Populism Studies’ (ECPS) Activity Report for 2025. This year marked a further consolidation of ECPS as a mature, internationally recognized center of excellence devoted to understanding, documenting, and confronting the global rise of populism, authoritarianism, and democratic erosion. As democratic norms continue to be challenged across regions, the mission of ECPS—to advance liberal democratic values through rigorous research, public dialogue, and international cooperation—has become not only relevant, but indispensable.
In 2025, ECPS expanded both the depth and breadth of its scholarly output. Our journals, Populism & Politics and the Journal of Populism Studies, published 16 peer-reviewed articles addressing themes such as civilizational populism, climate skepticism, digital authoritarianism, migration, inequality, and democratic backsliding across Europe, the Americas, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Beyond journals, ECPS produced a substantial body of non-journal outputs, including about 100 expert interviews beside of analytical articles, commentaries, policy-oriented texts, and long-form research reports. Together, these contributions reflect ECPS’s commitment to bridging theory, empirical research, and real-world political challenges.
Equally significant was ECPS’s role as a convening power in 2025. The Center organized and co-organized academic events, including the Fourth Annual International Symposium in Warsaw, the major interdisciplinary conference at the University of Oxford, multiple Mapping Global Populism panels, the ECPS Academy Summer School on Populism and Climate Change, and the launch of an ambitious virtual workshop series extending into 2026. These events brought together hundreds of scholars, early-career researchers, students, policymakers, and civil society actors, fostering dialogue across disciplines, regions, and generations.
Partnerships remained central to ECPS’s work. In 2025, the Center deepened collaboration with leading universities, research institutes, and civil society organizations, while actively participating in numerous EU-funded and EU-oriented project proposals under Horizon Europe, CERV, Creative Europe, Erasmus+, and related frameworks. These collaborations strengthened ECPS’s institutional capacity, interdisciplinary reach, and policy relevance, even where funding outcomes are still pending.
I am particularly proud of ECPS’s sustained investment in the next generation of scholars. Through the Early Career Researchers Network, the ECPS Youth Group, internships, summer schools, and case competitions, the Center continues to nurture critical thinking, methodological rigor, and civic responsibility among emerging researchers.
This report reflects the collective effort of a dedicated and growing community. I extend my sincere gratitude to the ECPS team, researchers, partners, contributors, and supporters. Together, we remain committed to defending democratic values, advancing critical knowledge, and fostering resilience in an increasingly uncertain world.
Irina von Wiese ECPS President
***
Introduction
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) further consolidated its position in 2025 as a leading international hub for research, dialogue, and policy engagement on populism, authoritarianism, and democratic resilience. As an independent, nonpartisan, and nonprofit organization based in Brussels, ECPS continued to advance its core normative commitments to liberal democracy, the rule of law, human rights, pluralism, freedom of expression, gender equality, and social and environmental justice. In a year marked by deepening global polarization and democratic strain, ECPS expanded both the scope and the reach of its scholarly and public-facing activities.
Populism in 2025 remained a defining force in global politics rather than a transient challenge. Across Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, populist actors increasingly fused majoritarian rhetoric with authoritarian practices, digital manipulation, and civilizational narratives. Ongoing geopolitical conflicts, accelerating climate crises, economic precarity, and the erosion of trust in representative institutions continued to create fertile ground for populist mobilization. At the same time, democratic backsliding became more normalized, often justified in the name of “the people,” security, or cultural survival. Against this backdrop, the analytical and civic mission of ECPS gained renewed urgency.
Throughout 2025, ECPS responded to these challenges by combining rigorous scholarship with sustained public engagement. Through its ten interrelated research programs, the Center mobilized a wide international network of scholars working on authoritarianism, extremism, political communication, religion, digital politics, foreign policy, gender, climate change, and political economy. This interdisciplinary structure allowed ECPS to move fluidly between theory, empirical research, and policy-relevant analysis, while remaining accessible to broader publics beyond academia.
In terms of publications, 2025 marked another productive year. ECPS journals published 16 peer-reviewed research articles, including 6 articles in Populism & Politics (P&P) and 10 articles in the Journal of Populism Studies (JPS), covering topics such as civilizational populism, climate skepticism, digital authoritarianism, migration diplomacy, intersectionality, and democratic erosion across multiple regions. In addition, ECPS released massive non-journal publications, including expert interviews, analytical articles, commentaries, policy-oriented texts, and long-form research reports. A significant share of these outputs documented and analyzed ECPS events—panels, conferences, summer schools, workshops, and symposiums—transforming live scholarly exchange into durable research resources.
Events and academic convening remained a central pillar of ECPS activity in 2025. Over the course of the year, ECPS organized and co-organized tens of academic events, including the Fourth Annual International Symposium in Warsaw, the major international conference at the University of Oxford, multiple Mapping Global Populism panels, the ECPS Academy Summer School on Populism and Climate Change, a case competition, and the launch of an ambitious 16-session virtual workshop series extending into 2026. These events brought together hundreds of scholars, early-career researchers, students, policymakers, and civil society actors from across continents.
Importantly, ECPS ensured that the knowledge generated through these activities reached audiences well beyond the event rooms. In 2025, the Center systematically published video recordings of all interviews and events on its website and YouTube channels, while simultaneously disseminating articles, reports, visual materials, and announcements through its social media platforms. This integrated dissemination strategy significantly amplified the visibility, accessibility, and long-term impact of ECPS research and discussions.
Alongside its scholarly outputs, ECPS continued to invest in institutional development, training, and collaboration. The Early Career Researchers Network, Youth Group, and internship program remained vital components of the ECPS ecosystem, supporting emerging scholars and fostering intergenerational dialogue. At the same time, ECPS strengthened partnerships with universities, research institutes, and civil society organizations, and remained actively involved in multiple EU-funded and EU-oriented project proposals, further enhancing its research capacity and policy relevance.
Taken together, the activities of 2025 reflect ECPS’s evolution into a mature, internationally recognized center—one that not only diagnoses the dynamics of populism and authoritarianism, but also contributes actively to the intellectual, civic, and institutional resources needed to defend and renew democratic life.
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Projects
In 2025, the ECPS further consolidated its role as an active and visible contributor to European research, policy, and civic-education initiatives by participating in a broad portfolio of competitive project proposals submitted to the European Commission. Building on the experience and partnerships developed in previous years, ECPS engaged in proposals across major EU funding frameworks, including Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) Programme, Creative Europe, IMREG, and Erasmus+. These initiatives brought together universities, research institutes, civil society organisations, media actors, cultural institutions, municipalities, and technology-oriented partners from across Europe and beyond.
The proposals developed and submitted in 2025 addressed a wide range of interconnected thematic priorities central to ECPS’s mission: democratic resilience amid authoritarian pressures; populism, disinformation, and epistemic polarization; media pluralism and journalism sustainability; decolonial perspectives on democracy and climate justice; territorial inequality and the political consequences of green and digital transitions; youth civic engagement; and innovative approaches to cultural and democratic participation. Across these proposals, ECPS contributed its core expertise in populism studies, democratic backsliding, political communication, and civic education, while also expanding into interdisciplinary domains linking democracy research with media innovation, environmental justice, and cultural production.
While funding outcomes varied and many proposals were not ultimately selected, ECPS’s sustained participation in highly competitive EU calls significantly strengthened its institutional capacity, proposal-writing expertise, and visibility within European research and policy ecosystems. The partnerships formed or deepened throughout 2025 have expanded ECPS’s transnational networks and reinforced its reputation as a reliable and conceptually strong partner in impact-oriented consortia.
Through these project-development activities, ECPS continues to invest strategically in long-term collaboration, institutional learning, and future-oriented research agendas that support democratic resilience, social inclusion, and informed citizenship across Europe and the Global South.
The ENCODE project aims to explore and decode the role of emotions in political discourse and their impact on democratic processes. The project’s primary goal is to create new positive narratives that can foster trust and engagement in European democratic processes, thereby counteracting the negative emotions that often dominate political discussions. Through innovative methodologies, including social media sentiment analysis, biometric research, and surveys, ENCODE aims to provide policymakers with better tools and strategies for incorporating citizens’ emotional needs into governance. This will ultimately enhance democratic resilience and foster a more inclusive political environment. This project is funded by HORIZON program. ECPS is rewarded 269.125.00 euro for all activities between June 2024 and May 2027. Project website: https://encodemotions.eu/
The UNTOLD Europe project is built around the need to analyze the implications of the legacy of colonialism on contemporary multicultural European societies in different areas: 1) public policies, 2) narratives of Europe, and 3) the digital world. The Action is aligned with Priority 3 of the Call. It aims to deepen the analysis and raise awareness of how European colonialism operates today, with its different tools, the narratives used in public debates, the digital space, and specific public policies. This project is funded under the Citizens, Equality, Rights, and Values (CERV) program. It will start in 2025, and ECPS will receive 18,500 euros in total. Project website: https://untoldeurope.eu
Project Proposals
RE-EMOAR GOVERNOR (Horizon Europe)
In 2025, the ECPS participated as a consortium partner in the Horizon Europe proposal RE-EMOAR (Applied Neuroscience, Digital Narrative and Immersive Technologies for Bullying Prevention and Social Wellbeing), submitted under the call HORIZON-CL3-2025-01-FCT-02 (HORIZON-RIA), within the Civil Security for Society cluster. Coordinated by Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa (Portugal), the proposal aimed to develop innovative, ethical, and preventive approaches to violence, bullying, and social harm among children and adolescents by integrating applied neuroscience, education sciences, psychology, immersive technologies, and community-based prevention.
RE-EMOAR proposed the development of a comprehensive digital ecosystem—the RE-EMOAR Suite—combining augmented reality (AR), emotional artificial intelligence (E-AI), and an Emotional Data Lab (EDL) to enhance empathy, emotional regulation, and social wellbeing. The project also planned an AI-assisted early detection tool (RE-EMOAR Test) to identify emotional risk factors linked to isolation, aggression, or vulnerability. Pilot implementations were envisaged across European schools, with close collaboration between educators, psychologists, civil society actors, and law enforcement agencies, emphasizing prevention, restorative practices, and child protection.
The consortium brought together 12 partners from Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Türkiye, and Luxembourg, including universities, NGOs, schools, technology developers, and public authorities. Alongside the coordinator, partners included ECPS, AMBER Alert Europe, INSIDE EU (Ireland), NARIA Tech (Spain), Inspectoratul de Poliție Județean Satu Mare (Romania), and several education and research organizations, ensuring strong interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral capacity.
The total project duration was planned for 36 months, with a multi-million-euro budget structured under a Horizon Europe Research and Innovation Action. ECPS contributed expertise on societal polarization, prevention of social harm, ethical governance, and dissemination strategies, particularly regarding the social and political dimensions of wellbeing and security.
The proposal was submitted in November 2025, and at the time of reporting, the evaluation process is still ongoing, with no final funding decision announced. Regardless of the outcome, RE-EMOAR has significantly strengthened ECPS’s engagement in Horizon Europe consortia at the intersection of security, social inclusion, digital innovation, and ethical governance, providing a strong foundation for future collaborative applications.
INDEX (Horizon Europe – New European Bauhaus)
In 2025, the ECPS participated as a consortium partner in the Horizon Europe proposal INDEX (INtegration of local communities in the Development of ecological and energy transition: culture and participation to combat the EXclusion of vulnerable groups), submitted under the call HORIZON-NEB-2025-01-PARTICIPATION-02 as a Research and Innovation Action (RIA). The proposal addresses a central challenge of the green transition in Europe: the risk that ecological and energy transformations exacerbate social inequalities and exclude vulnerable populations.
The INDEX project aims to develop a neighbourhood-based, participatory model for socially inclusive ecological transitions. It combines research-action methodologies, cultural and creative practices, and digital innovation to strengthen democratic engagement and community resilience. A core output of the project is the development and validation of a Social and Energy Development Index (INDEX tool), designed to assess and guide inclusive urban transitions. Additional objectives include constructing a “just transition” narrative, analysing multi-level governance barriers, and examining the role of culture and creative industries in fostering participation and inclusion.
The consortium is coordinated by Universidad Antonio de Nebrija (Spain) and brings together 15 partners from across Europe, representing universities, research centres, civil society organisations, municipalities, and creative-industry actors. Partners include institutions from Spain, Italy, Turkey, Ireland, Greece, Serbia, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium, among them ECPS, which contributes expertise on social exclusion, democratic participation, populism, and the political dimensions of sustainability transitions. ECPS’s role focuses particularly on the analysis of participation, governance narratives, and dissemination activities.
The proposal is planned for a 36-month duration and follows a Horizon Europe lump-sum budget model, with a multi-million-euro overall budget distributed across research, pilot actions, digital platform development, and dissemination. As of now, the evaluation process is ongoing, and the funding decision has not yet been announced. Regardless of the final outcome, INDEX has significantly strengthened ECPS’s involvement in New European Bauhaus–related consortia and expanded its network in interdisciplinary research on democracy, inclusion, and sustainable transformation.
EQUITY-EU (Horizon Europe)
In 2025, the ECPS participated as a consortium partner in the Horizon Europe Research and Innovation Action EQUITY-EU – Enhancing the Qualitative Understanding of Economic Inequality and Supporting Inclusive Democratic Governance in Europe, submitted under the call HORIZON-CL2-2025-01-DEMOCRACY-08. The proposal addresses the interlinked challenges of economic inequality and democratic fragility across the European Union, examining how structural disparities—economic, spatial, gendered, and racial—shape political participation, institutional trust, and civic engagement.
The project aims to combine large-scale data analysis with participatory and co-creation methods to deliver three main outputs: (1) the Economic Inequality and Democratic Exclusion Mapping Index (EIDEM Index), (2) the Democracy and Inequality Monitoring and Evaluation (DIMENSION) tool for policymakers, and (3) the COMMONS Playbook, designed to support inclusive citizen engagement and trust-building between institutions and communities. A further core component is the Equality and Democracy Enabling Network (EDEN), intended to connect researchers, policymakers, and civil society actors across Europe.
The consortium is coordinated by ASM Research Solutions Strategy (Poland) and brings together twelve partners from academia, civil society, policy support organisations, and local government, including Clever Together Democratie (France), Universität Wien (Austria), University of Turku (Finland), Center for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria), APRE (Italy), and ECPS (Belgium), among others. ECPS contributed expertise on populism, democratic backsliding, and inequality-driven political disaffection, supporting the proposal’s conceptual framework and dissemination strategy.
The proposal foresees a 42-month duration and a lump-sum Horizon Europe budget (final allocation subject to evaluation). The proposal was submitted on 16 September 2025, and the evaluation outcome is not yet decided at the time of writing. Regardless of the final result, EQUITY-EU has strengthened ECPS’s engagement in large-scale Horizon Europe consortia focused on democracy, inequality, and inclusive governance.
STANDUP (Horizon Europe)
In 2025, the ECPS participated as a consortium partner in the Horizon Europe Research and Innovation Action proposal STANDUP – Standing Up to Autocratisation in the Digital and Global Age, submitted under the call HORIZON-CL2-2025-01-DEMOCRACY-07. The proposal addressed the growing challenge of democratic backsliding and subtle forms of autocratisation in Europe, with a particular focus on digital environments, citizen participation, and early detection of authoritarian risks.
The project aimed to develop an integrated analytical and practical framework to help institutions, civil society organizations, journalists, and citizens detect, resist, and respond to autocratisation processes. Key planned outputs included a conceptual model outlining the “10 Possible Stages of Authoritarianism,” an open-source early-warning digital tool tested in Belgium, Greece, Poland, and Spain, and an interactive global repository of democratic resistance initiatives. The proposal also envisaged pilot participatory strategies, capacity-building activities across multiple countries, and the establishment of a European Observatory on Autocratisation as a long-term knowledge and action hub.
The consortium brought together 14 partners from across Europe, combining academic institutions, civil society organizations, think tanks, and innovation-oriented actors. The project was coordinated by INMARK (Spain), with partners including Political Watch (Spain), University of Coimbra (Portugal), Özyeğin University (Turkey), Cultures Interactive (Germany), Ashoka Belgium, Democracy Reporting International (Germany), Wellbeing Economy Alliance (UK), Inclusive Europe (Belgium), and ECPS (Belgium), among others.
ECPS contributed expertise on populism, authoritarianism, and democratic resilience, particularly in relation to conceptual framing, comparative analysis, and dissemination. The proposal was submitted in September 2025 with a planned duration of 36 months and a lump-sum Horizon Europe budget. At the time of reporting, the evaluation process was still ongoing, and the funding decision had not yet been announced.
DISCOPE (Horizon Europe)
In 2025, the ECPS participated as a partner in the Horizon Europe proposal DISCOPE – Addressing Disinformation in Europe through Global Comparative Lenses, submitted under the call HORIZON-CL2-2025-01-DEMOCRACY-09 (HORIZON-RIA). The proposal responds to the growing challenge of disinformation in Europe and beyond, intensified by geopolitical conflicts, platform deregulation, and the rise of authoritarian actors. DISCOPE aims to combine comparative social science research with technological innovation to better understand how disinformation circulates across media ecosystems and to develop practical tools to counter its spread.
The project is coordinated by Plateforme de Dialogue Interculturel (Belgium) and brings together a broad interdisciplinary consortium of 14 partners from across Europe, including universities, research institutes, civil society organisations, investigative journalism centres, and technology-oriented NGOs. In addition to the coordinator, the consortium includes institutions such as Paris-Lodron University of Salzburg, KU Leuven, University of Leeds, University of Derby, University of Copenhagen, Fundacja Levelflow, Context Romania, Debunk EU, and the ECPS, among others. This diverse partnership ensures strong coverage of media studies, political science, digital methods, journalism, and civic engagement.
DISCOPE is designed as a 36-month Research and Innovation Action with a lump-sum budget (exact allocation determined at grant agreement stage), structured around objectives such as mapping disinformation networks, analysing cross-border narratives, developing AI-driven tracing and fact-checking tools, and strengthening media literacy among citizens, journalists, and policymakers.
The proposal was submitted in September 2025 and is currently under evaluation; no funding decision has yet been communicated. Regardless of the outcome, DISCOPE has further strengthened ECPS’s integration into large-scale Horizon Europe consortia focused on democracy, disinformation, and digital governance, and has laid important groundwork for future collaborative applications in this field.
INTEGRATE (Horizon Europe)
In 2025, the ECPS participated as a consortium partner in the Horizon Europe proposal INTEGRATE – Innovation, Green and Digital Transitions and their Effects on Territorial Inequality and Democratic Resilience in Europe, submitted under the call HORIZON-CL2-2025-01-DEMOCRACY-08 (HORIZON-RIA). The proposal addresses a core challenge of contemporary European democracy: how the green and digital “twin transitions” generate new forms of structural inequality that undermine democratic legitimacy, participation, and resilience across regions and social groups.
Coordinated by the University of Bergamo (Italy), INTEGRATE brings together a multidisciplinary consortium of ten partners from across Europe, combining expertise in economics, political science, regional studies, innovation research, and democracy studies. In addition to the coordinator, the consortium includes Universidad de Castilla–La Mancha (Spain), Gran Sasso Science Institute (Italy), Friedrich Schiller University Jena (Germany), University of Vaasa (Finland), University of Dubrovnik (Croatia), Center for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria), META Group SRL (Italy), META BE (Belgium), and the ECPS (Belgium).
Designed as a 36-month Research and Innovation Action under a Horizon Europe lump-sum funding model, the project aims to map regional and demographic inequalities in access to innovation, identify causal links between exclusion and democratic vulnerability, analyse citizens’ perceptions of injustice and political disaffection, and develop scenario simulations and policy labs to support more inclusive transitions. ECPS’s contribution focuses on the relationship between populism, democratic backsliding, and perceived inequalities generated by innovation-driven transformations.
The proposal was submitted in September 2025 and is currently under evaluation, with no funding decision yet announced. Regardless of the outcome, INTEGRATE has further strengthened ECPS’s role in large-scale Horizon Europe consortia addressing democratic resilience, territorial inequality, and the political consequences of structural transformation, while opening new avenues for interdisciplinary collaboration and future funding applications.
TRACE (CERV – European Remembrance)
In 2025, the ECPS participated as a partner in the proposal TRACE – Tracing Colonial Legacies in Climate Vulnerabilities, submitted under the CERV-2025-CITIZENS-REM-HISTMIGRATION call within the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) Programme. The project addresses the long-term impacts of colonialism on contemporary climate vulnerabilities and migration patterns, aiming to integrate environmental justice into European remembrance practices. TRACE seeks to connect historical reflection on colonisation with present-day challenges related to climate change, displacement, and intergenerational justice, with a particular focus on youth engagement.
The project is coordinated by Associação EducPro (Portugal) and brings together a multidisciplinary consortium of six partners from five European countries. In addition to EducPro, the consortium includes Sumatra Innovation ASBL (Belgium), the ECPS (Belgium), CREDA Onlus – Centro di Ricerca Educazione Documentazione Ambientale (Italy), Altekio S. Coop. (Spain), and PIC – Legal Center for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment (Slovenia). Together, the partners combine expertise in education, research, civil society engagement, environmental justice, and human rights.
ECPS contributes its scholarly expertise on colonial legacies, political discourse, democratic vulnerabilities, and public dissemination, supporting the project’s analytical framework and outreach strategy. The proposal foresees participatory workshops, youth-led research, creative productions, and the development of a Youth Charter on Climate Justice and Colonisation.
The project has a planned duration of 24 months and a total requested budget of €248,275, with €15,855 allocated to ECPS. The proposal was submitted on October 1, 2025, and the evaluation process is currently ongoing, with the funding decision not yet announced. Regardless of the outcome, TRACE has strengthened ECPS’s engagement in CERV-funded remembrance and decolonial initiatives and expanded its collaboration with European partners working at the intersection of history, climate justice, and democracy.
VERITAS (CERV – Citizens’ Engagement and Participation)
In 2025, the ECPS coordinated the proposal VERITAS: Verifying Information, Encouraging Responsibility, and Integrity in Transparent Societies, submitted under the CERV-2025-CITIZENS-CIV call. The project was designed to address the growing threat of disinformation in Europe, with particular attention to populist communication strategies, epistemic populism, and the intersection between domestic disinformation and foreign information manipulation. VERITAS aimed to strengthen democratic resilience and media literacy, especially among young citizens aged 18–30, through participatory, co-creative approaches.
The consortium brought together five partners from Belgium, Italy, France, Romania, and Albania, combining complementary expertise in populism research, civic education, investigative journalism, and participatory democracy. In addition to ECPS as coordinator, partners included Centro Internazionale per la Promozione dell’Educazione e lo Sviluppo ETS (Italy), Démocratie Ouverte (France), Asociația Jurnaliștilor de Investigații Context (Romania), and the Albanian Institute of Technology (Albania). Together, the consortium planned to implement living labs, summer and winter schools, workshops, and policy roundtables, fostering collaboration between citizens, journalists, influencers, and media professionals.
The total requested budget amounted to approximately €253,570, allocated across partners according to their roles in coordination, training, dissemination, and evaluation activities. ECPS’s share focused on project coordination, analytical framing, and transnational dissemination.
Although the proposal was not selected for funding, it was positively evaluated and placed on the reserve list, reflecting the project’s relevance and conceptual strength. Despite the outcome, VERITAS significantly reinforced ECPS’s leadership profile in CERV-funded democracy and disinformation initiatives and consolidated a strong, multidisciplinary partnership. The proposal remains a solid foundation for future resubmission or adaptation under upcoming EU funding calls.
HUMANADS-EMPOWER (Creative Europe – Journalism Partnerships)
In 2025, the ECPS participated as a partner in the Creative Europe proposal HUMANADS-EMPOWER (Proposal No. 101241855), submitted under the call CREA-CROSS-2025-JOURPART-COLLABORATIONS. The project aimed to address the growing financial vulnerability of independent European media by developing an ethical, transparent, and sustainable digital advertising ecosystem based on AI-driven optimization and blockchain-enabled transparency. HUMANADS-EMPOWER sought to counter declining advertising revenues, platform monopolization, and public distrust by introducing a decentralized, user-centric revenue model that safeguards editorial independence and media pluralism.
The proposal was coordinated by Acrossmedia 241 Limited (Cyprus) and brought together a multidisciplinary consortium of seven partners from Cyprus, Poland, Greece, Belgium, Czechia, Italy, and Ukraine. In addition to ECPS (Belgium), the consortium included Computools Sp. z o.o. (Poland), Stix Web-Based Solutions EE (Greece), Grant Garant SRO (Czechia), FASI.biz EU Media S.r.l. (Italy), and King Danylo University (Ukraine). ECPS contributed primarily to impact assessment, media pluralism analysis, and the project’s normative alignment with EU democratic and ethical standards.
The proposed project duration was 24 months, with a total estimated budget of approximately €1.94 million, and a requested EU contribution of about €1.55 million under an 80% co-funding rate. Despite its strong technological ambition, policy relevance, and broad European partnership, the proposal was not selected for funding.
Nevertheless, HUMANADS-EMPOWER strengthened ECPS’s experience in Creative Europe journalism and media innovation calls, expanded its collaboration with technology-driven and media-focused partners, and generated valuable groundwork for future applications addressing media sustainability, digital ethics, and democratic resilience in Europe.
J4CTZ – Journalism for Citizens (Creative Europe)
In 2025, the ECPS participated as a consortium partner in the Creative Europe proposal Journalism for Citizens (J4CTZ), submitted under the call CREA-CROSS-2025-JOURPART-PLURALISM (Journalism Partnerships – Pluralism). The proposal aimed to strengthen media pluralism, support independent journalism, and counter disinformation across EU and selected extra-EU countries by combining content production, journalist training, cross-border collaboration, and a regranting mechanism for smaller media organizations.
The project was coordinated by PROGEU – Progress in European Union – Istituto per lo Sviluppo (Italy) and brought together a broad consortium of nine partners representing media outlets, journalist associations, and civil society organizations. Consortium members included MAGYAR ÚJSÁGÍRÓK ORSZÁGOS SZÖVETSÉGE (Hungary), Context RO (Romania), DELFI (Lithuania), EURACTIV Media (Belgium), POD TEPETO (Bulgaria), BIRN Hub (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Etipublica (Italy), and ECPS (Belgium). ECPS contributed its expertise on populism, disinformation, and democratic governance, particularly in relation to media narratives, political polarization, and democratic resilience.
The proposal envisioned a 24-month implementation period with a total estimated budget of approximately €1.45 million, requesting an EU contribution of around €1.30 million under a budget-based Creative Europe action. Key outputs included a monthly policy and democracy magazine, national conferences, transnational workshops, journalist training activities, and financial support to third-party media actors.
The proposal was submitted in February 2025 but was not selected for funding. Despite the unsuccessful outcome, participation in J4CTZ significantly strengthened ECPS’s engagement with European media-focused consortia and expanded its collaborative network with leading journalism organizations. The proposal remains a valuable reference for future Creative Europe applications in the fields of media pluralism, disinformation, and democratic accountability.
EduBridge (Creative Europe MEDIA)
In 2025, the ECPS participated as a consortium partner in the Creative Europe MEDIA proposal EduBridge – Educational Bridge, submitted under the call CREA-MEDIA-2025-AUDFILMEDU (Audience Development and Film Education). The project was coordinated by Art Sans Frontières – Pont de la Paix (France) and aimed to develop an innovative transnational film education model that uses music as an entry point to European cinema, enhancing media literacy, cultural participation, and audience development among young people and educators across Europe.
The consortium brought together five partners from four EU member states, combining expertise in film festivals, audiovisual production, education, and research. In addition to the coordinator, partners included Sauban Film Productions (France), Horatio Film Ltd (Hungary), Animart Ltd (Bulgaria), and ECPS (Belgium). ECPS contributed academic and methodological expertise, particularly in the areas of cultural inclusion, educational design, and pan-European dissemination strategies, supporting the project’s emphasis on accessibility, multilingualism, and social inclusion.
EduBridge proposed a 24-month implementation period and planned activities in at least six European countries, combining a multilingual digital platform with school-based screenings, festival-linked workshops, and educator training modules. The total estimated project budget was approximately €341,000, with a requested EU contribution of around €239,000 (70% co-financing rate). ECPS’s allocated budget focused on personnel costs related to pedagogical oversight, content development, and dissemination.
The proposal was submitted in March 2025 but was not selected for funding. Despite this outcome, EduBridge strengthened ECPS’s engagement with the Creative Europe MEDIA framework and expanded its collaboration with cultural and audiovisual partners across Europe. The proposal remains a valuable reference point for future applications at the intersection of cultural education, audience development, and democratic cultural participation.
CINEPHONIC (Creative Europe – European Cooperation Projects)
In 2025, the ECPS participated as a partner in the Creative Europe proposal CINEPHONIC, submitted under the call CREA-CULT-2025-COOP-1 (European Cooperation Projects – Small Scale). Coordinated by Art Sans Frontières – Pont de la Paix (France), the project aimed to foster cross-border cultural collaboration by bringing together young European filmmakers and composers to co-create short films accompanied by original orchestral scores. The project placed particular emphasis on youth mental health, emotional resilience, identity, and social inclusion through audiovisual and musical creation.
The consortium comprised four organisations: Art Sans Frontières – Pont de la Paix (France) as coordinator; the ECPS (Belgium) as partner responsible for communication, dissemination, and audience engagement; Filarmonica Banatul Timișoara (Romania) as partner leading orchestral mentoring, rehearsals, and recordings; and New Light Foundation, Inc. (United States) as an associated partner contributing to artistic and educational outreach. Together, the consortium combined expertise in cultural management, symphonic music production, public engagement, and transnational dissemination.
The project was designed for a duration of 24 months, with a total budget of approximately €250,000 and a requested EU contribution of around €200,000, complemented by documented in-kind contributions from the partners. ECPS’s allocated budget focused on digital communication strategies, outreach to youth networks, and the dissemination of project outputs across European cultural and educational platforms.
The proposal was submitted in May 2025 and was not selected for funding. Despite this outcome, CINEPHONIC strengthened ECPS’s engagement with Creative Europe cultural consortia and expanded its collaboration with artistic and cultural organisations beyond the social sciences. The experience contributed valuable institutional learning regarding interdisciplinary project design, cultural cooperation, and youth-focused European funding schemes, providing a solid foundation for future Creative Europe applications.
COHESION (IMREG – EU Cohesion Policy Information Measures)
In 2025, the ECPS participated as a partner in the project proposal COHESION – Shared Challenges, Shared Solutions: Investigating Cohesion Policies in Europe, submitted under the call IMREG-2024-INFOME (Information Measures for the EU Cohesion Policy). The proposal aimed to strengthen public awareness, understanding, and engagement with EU Cohesion Policy by combining data-driven analysis, public dialogue, and targeted communication activities across multiple member states.
The project was coordinated by PROGEU – Progress in European Union (Italy) and brought together a transnational consortium comprising Magyar Újságírók Országos Szövetsége (Hungary), Context – Association of Investigative Journalists (Romania), For Citizens – European Institute for Active Citizenship (Portugal), and ECPS (Belgium). The consortium combined expertise in policy research, investigative journalism, civic engagement, and political communication to address declining public awareness of Cohesion Policy, as highlighted by recent Eurobarometer findings.
COHESION proposed a 12-month work programme structured around three core objectives: (1) comparative data collection on the implementation and perception of Cohesion Policy in five countries; (2) citizen-oriented dialogue through local and transnational events; and (3) awareness-raising via multimedia campaigns and audiovisual outputs. ECPS was responsible for overseeing local events and contributing analytical expertise on disinformation, democratic trust, and public narratives surrounding EU policies.
The total estimated project budget amounted to approximately €240,000, with an EU contribution request of around €192,000, reflecting an 80% funding rate. ECPS’s allocated budget was approximately €39,500, primarily covering personnel costs, travel, and dissemination activities.
The proposal was submitted in January 2025 but was not selected for funding. Despite this outcome, the project significantly strengthened ECPS’s collaboration with media and civic actors working on EU governance, public communication, and policy legitimacy. The experience further enhanced ECPS’s institutional capacity in IMREG-type calls and laid valuable groundwork for future initiatives focused on democratic participation, cohesion, and public trust in EU policies.
Young EU Guardians of Tomorrow (Erasmus+ KA220-YOU)
In 2025, the ECPS submitted the Erasmus+ Cooperation Partnerships in Youth (KA220-YOU) proposal Young EU Guardians of Tomorrow, under the Call 2025 – Round 1. The project aimed to strengthen human rights awareness, democratic values, and active citizenship among young people—particularly migrants and refugees—through innovative educational tools combining research, digital learning, and storytelling.
The proposal sought to develop a multilingual e-learning platform on human rights, produce an educational comic book, organize participatory storytelling sessions, and formulate policy-oriented recommendations at the EU level. The project was designed to address key Erasmus+ priorities, including civic engagement, inclusion of marginalized youth, and the promotion of European values.
ECPS acted as the coordinator of the consortium, contributing its expertise in populism studies, democracy, and human rights education. The consortium brought together four partners from across Europe: Diplomatic Coalition (Spain), Diversity & Inclusion Institute (Greece), and Ro Technology srl (Italy). This multidisciplinary partnership combined academic research capacity, youth and civil society outreach, diversity and inclusion expertise, and technological innovation.
The proposal foresaw a 17-month implementation period (September 2025–January 2027) with a total lump-sum budget of €250,000, allocated across five work packages covering project management, research and content development, digital platform creation, creative outputs, and dissemination.
The proposal was submitted on 5 March 2025 but was not selected for funding. Despite the unsuccessful outcome, the project significantly strengthened ECPS’s experience as a coordinating applicant within the Erasmus+ framework, expanded its cooperation with youth-focused and technology-oriented partners, and contributed to institutional learning for future applications in the fields of civic education, human rights, and democratic resilience.
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Events
In 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) consolidated its position not only as a convening platform, but as a curatorial actor shaping how “populism” is researched, debated, and operationalized across scholarly, policy, and practitioner communities. Across the year, ECPS’s event architecture moved fluidly between diagnosis and design: diagnosing the shifting grammars of populism, authoritarianism, and democratic erosion in multiple regions, while also designing formats that translate research into usable frameworks for resilience, governance, and public reasoning.
The Mapping Global Populism (MGP) series continued to function as ECPS’s comparative engine, staging regionally grounded yet theoretically portable conversations. Panels on Israel and on ethnic–sectarian politics in Iraq, Syria, and Kurdish regions illuminated how populist projects are increasingly articulated through securitization, religious-national narratives, and “civilizational” imaginaries—where identity, threat perception, and institutional contestation become mutually reinforcing. The additional panel on post-election Germany extended this comparative logic into Europe’s contemporary realignments, foregrounding not only party-system change, but also the cultural-political infrastructures—media frames, antifeminist repertoires, and transatlantic anxieties—through which far-right surges normalize themselves.
The Fourth Annual International Symposium in Warsaw, dedicated to civilizational populism, marked a distinctive escalation in ECPS programming: it treated civilizational rhetoric less as mere discourse and more as a governing technology—one that reorganizes emotions, market imaginaries, international alignments, and constitutional boundaries. In parallel, ECPS’s interdisciplinary Oxford conference, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy, expanded the conceptual horizon of “the people” as a contested political object—tracking its reinvention through algorithmic mediation, broken social contracts, and the interplay between democratic ideals and populist capture.
A notable feature of 2025 was ECPS’s deepening commitment to training and applied scholarship. The Summer School on Populism and Climate Change linked the climate crisis to contemporary political contestation, while the ECPS Case Competition on Populism and Climate Change: COP30 Negotiations invited participants to operationalize theory under real-world constraints—treating multilateral bargaining as a two-level game shaped by domestic populist pressures and geopolitical rivalry.
Taken together, ECPS’s 2025 events program reads as an integrated research ecosystem: empirically expansive, theoretically ambitious, and increasingly method-aware—capable of moving from regional specificity to global comparison, and from critique to actionable political imagination.
Dr. Guy Ziv (Associate Professor in the Department of Foreign Policy and Global Security at American University’s School of International Service (SIS)).
Speakers
“Why Israeli Democracy Is More Vulnerable to Populism?” by Dr. Yaniv Roznai (Professor of Constitutional Law, Harry Radzyner Law School, Reichman University).
“Neo Zionist Right-wing Populist Discourse and Its Impact on the Israel Education System,” by Dr. Halleli Pinson(Associate Professor at the School of Education at Ben-Gurion University).
“Security-driven Populism in Israel,” by Dr. Shai Agmon (Assistant Professor in Political Philosophy at UCL) & Yonatan Levi (PhD candidate at European Institute, LSE).
“The Impact of Antidemocratic Populism on Israeli Media,” by Dr. Ayala Panievsky (Presidential Fellowship at School of Communication & Creativity, City University of London).
“Populism as a Strategy for Political Survival,” by Dr. Tom Lourie (Researcher, Political Science, UC Irvine).
Dr. Ibrahim al-Marashi (Associate Professor of History, California State University).
Speakers
“Syrian Sunni Jihadi Chickens Home to Roost: Assad’s Fatal Gamble in Iraq,” by Dr. Reda Mahajar (Research Fellow at The Conflict Analysis Research Centre (CARC) at the University of Kent).
“Waves of Populism in Iraq,” by Hashim Hayder Khashan Al-Rekabi (Lecturer, University of Baghdad).
“Memory, Fear, and Sectarianism in Syria,” by Dr. Haian Dukhan (Lecturer in Politics & International Relations, SSSHL Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Teeside University).
“Gendered Politics and Women’s Status Under Iraqi, Syrian, and Kurdish Authorities,” by Dr. Shilan Fuad Hussain(Marie Sklodowska-Curie Researcher; Research Fellow at the Institute of Domestic Violence, Religion & Migration, UK).
“The Evolution and Mishaps of Kurdish Identity Politics Under Multiple Dominations,” by Rojin Mukriyan (PhD candidate in the department of Government and Politics at University College Cork, Ireland).
Dr. Cengiz Aktar (Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member).
Speakers
“How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?” by Dr. Eric Langenbacher (Teaching Professor and Director of the Senior Honors Program in the Department of Government, Georgetown University).
“How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?” by Dr. Kai Arzheimer (Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz).
“Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election,” by Dr. Hannah M. Alarian (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida).
“The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications,” by Dr. Conrad Ziller (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen).
“Germany’s Far Right: Antifeminism Sells,” by Dr. Sabine Volk (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau).
Venue: University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmiescie 26/28, 00-927, Warsaw
The Fourth Annual International Symposium on “Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges,”held on 22–23 May 2025 at the University of Warsaw, marked a significant milestone in ECPS’s sustained effort to advance comparative and interdisciplinary scholarship on populism in an era of democratic uncertainty. Convened as a two-day, fully in-person event, the symposium brought together scholars, policymakers, and practitioners to examine how populism increasingly operates through civilizational, religious, and cultural frames—reshaping political conflict at local, national, transnational, and global levels.
This symposium can be read as both a diagnostic exercise and a conceptual intervention. Rather than treating populism as a uniform or context-bound phenomenon, the programme foregrounded its hybrid character: a “thin” political logic that acquires force when articulated with religion, nationalism, digital technologies, and civilizational narratives. Across keynotes, panels, and workshops, participants explored how these articulations affect plural societies, democratic institutions, market structures, identity politics, and international relations—across both the Global North and Global South.
Organized by the ECPS and hosted by the Centre for Europe at the University of Warsaw, the symposium was realized through close collaboration with a wide network of partner institutions, including Georgetown University, the University of Birmingham, Deakin University, DAAD/Cambridge University, the University of Duisburg-Essen (Institute of East Asian Studies), and the Centre for International Relations (Warsaw). This institutional constellation ensured strong interdisciplinary grounding, drawing on political science, sociology, law, economics, religious studies, and international relations.
Structurally, the symposium combined five thematic panels, high-level keynote addresses, and two specialized workshops, enabling both theoretical synthesis and fine-grained empirical analysis. Taken together, the event reinforced ECPS’s role as a convening platform for global scholarship on populism, while situating civilizational populism as a central analytical lens for understanding contemporary challenges to democracy, social cohesion, and global order.
Dr. Erkan Toguslu moderates a panel featuring Dr. Radoslaw Markowski and Dr. Marietta van der Tol, exploring alternatives to liberal democracies and the role of constitutional narratives in shaping ‘the Other’ in Europe. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.
DAY ONE – May 22, 2025
Opening Ceremony
Moderator
Dr. Azize Sargın (Director for External Relations, ECPS).
Welcome Remarks
Dr. Kamil Zajączkowski (Professor of International Relations, Director of the Centre for Europe, Warsaw University).
Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of ECPS, Lawyer, Academic, former MEP, and Councilor in the London Borough of Southwark).
Dr. Malgorzata Bonikowska (Professor of International Affairs and European Studies, President of the Center for International Relations).
Opening Speeches
Dr. Adam Bodnar (Minister of Justice of Poland / (Video Recording).
Dr. Alojzy Z. Nowak (Professor, Rector of the University of Warsaw).
Keynote Speech
“A Relational Approach to Religion and Populism: Recontextualizing Civilizational Narratives in National and Global Contexts,” by Dr. Jocelyne Cesari (Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham, UK, and Senior Fellow at the Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).
Panel 1: Populism: Is It a One-way Route from Democracy to Authoritarianism?
Moderator
Dr. Erkan Toguslu (Researcher at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven, Belgium).
Speakers
“Making Sense of Multiple Manifestations of Alternatives to Liberal Democracies,” by Dr. Radoslaw Markowski(Professor of Political Science, Center for the Study of Democracy, Director, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw & Polish Academy of Sciences & Polish National Election Study, Principal Investigator).
“Constitutional Intolerance: The Fashioning of ‘the Other’ in Europe’s Constitutional Repertoires,” by Dr. Marietta van der Tol (Politics & International Studies, DAAD-Cambridge).
Panel 2: Civilizational Rhetoric, Emotions, and Societal Cohesion
Dr. Erin K. Wilson moderates Panel 2 on “Civilizational Rhetoric, Emotions, and Societal Cohesion,” featuring Professor Ihsan Yilmaz, Dr. Nicholas Morieson on populism and restorative nostalgia, and Dr. Matthew Belanger & Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc on the emotional dynamics of civilisationist populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.
Moderator
Dr. Erin K. Wilson (Professor, Chair of Politics and Religion, the Faculty of Religion, Culture, and Society, University of Groningen).
Paper Presenters
“Populism, Civilization, and Restorative Nostalgia,” by Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow, Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization).
“Emotional Dimensions of Civilisationist Populism: A Comparative Analysis of Erdogan, Modi, and Khan with Transformer-Based Classification,” by Dr. Matthew Belanger (Lecturer in Substance Use Sociology, Social Policy, and Criminology Faculty of Social Sciences University of Stirling) and Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc (Reader in Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law at the University of Dundee).
Keynote Speech
“The Role of the UN in Fighting for Human Rights in This Populist Age,” by Kamil Wyszkowski (Director of UN Global Compact).
Panel 3: Religion and Populism: Local, National, and Transnational Dimensions
Moderator
Dr. Jocelyne Cesari (Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).
Speakers
“Remember to be Jewish: Religious Populism in Israel,” by Dr. Guy Ben-Porat (Professor of International Relations and Politics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev).
“Religious Populism and Civilizationalism in International Politics: An Authoritarian Turn,” by Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz (Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations and Chair in Islamic Studies at Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization) & Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow, Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization).
Paper Presenters
“National Populists of Christian Europe, Unite? Civilizations Dimensions of Far-right Populist Alliances in Post-Brexit Britain,” by Dr. Rafal Soborski (Professor of International Politics, The Department of Social Science at Richmond American University and Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University).
“Anwar Ibrahim’s Civilisational Populism: Between the Muslim World and Malaysia,” by Dr. Syaza Shukri (Assoc. Professor & Head of Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia).
DAY TWO – May 23, 2025
Dr. Jocelyne Cesari moderates Panel 3 on “Religion and Populism: Local, National, and Transnational Dimensions,” presented by Dr. Bulent Kenes, and featuring contributions from Dr. Guy Ben-Porat on religious populism in Israel; Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz & Dr. Nicholas Morieson on civilizational authoritarianism; Dr. Rafal Soborski on Christian far-right alliances; and Dr. Syaza Shukri on Anwar Ibrahim’s civilizational populism. Photos: Muhammed Gemi.
Keynote Speech
Dariusz Mazur (Deputy Minister of Justice of the Republic of Poland).
Panel 4: Impacts of Civilizational Populism on the Market and Globalization
Moderator
Antoine Godbert (Affiliate Professor of Law, Economics & Humanities at ESCP Business School, Paris, and Director of International Affairs at the Rectorat of Île-de-France – Paris).
Speakers
“On the Nature of Economics and the future of Globalization under Civilizational Populism,” by Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk(Professor of Economics, Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST), Germany, Senior Economic Researcher at the ECPS, Brussels).
“Populism as a Reaction to Neoliberal Technocratism,” by Dr. Krzysztof Jasiecki (Professor of Economic Sociology at the Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw).
“Far-Right Populism and the Making of the Exclusionary Neoliberal State,” by Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider(Associate Professor, Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna and Research Affiliate, Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge).
Panel 5: Religion and Identity Politics
Moderator
Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc (Reader in Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law at the University of Dundee).
Speaker
“Religion and Power in an Age of Identity Politics,” by Dr. Erin K. Wilson (Professor, Chair of Politics and Religion, the Faculty of Religion, Culture, and Society, University of Groningen).
Paper Presenters
“Civilizational Populism and the Making of Sexualized Cultural Christianity,” by Dr. Ludger Viefhues-Bailey(Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Gender, and Culture, Le Moyne University, NY).
“Imagine No More Small Boats in the Channel’: How Populist Parties and Their Leaders Normalize Polarization in Their Communication on Social Media Platforms, a Multimodal Discourse Analysis,” by Dr. Valeria Reggi (Post-doc Researcher at the University of Venice and Adjunct Professor and Tutor at the University of Bologna).
“Populism from a Double Perspective. Timo Soini and the Finnish Version of Populism,” by Dr. Jarosław Suchoples(Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw, Former Polish Ambassador to Finland).
Closing Remarks
Dr. Kamil Zajączkowski (Professor of International Relations, Director of the Centre for Europe, Warsaw University).
Workshops
Antoine Godbert moderates Panel 4 on “Impacts of Civilizational Populism on the Market and Globalization,” with Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk examining the future of globalization, Dr. Krzysztof Jasiecki analyzing populist responses to neoliberal technocracy, and Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider exploring the rise of the exclusionary neoliberal state. Photos: Muhammed Gemi.
Workshop 1: Populism in Regions
Moderators/ Discussants
Dr. Guy Ben-Porat (Professor of International Relations and Politics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev).
Dr. Rafal Soborski (Professor of International Politics, The Department of Social Science at Richmond American University and Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University).
Paper Presenters
“Civilizational Populism and Foreign Policy: Analyzing Italy-Tunisia Migration,” by Dr. Helen L. Murphey (Post-Doctoral Scholar at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State University).
“Greater Than the Nation: Civilizational Discourse in Orbán’s Hungary,” by Dr. Tamas Dudlak (International Relations, the ELTE Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest, and researcher in the Contemporary Arab World Center, Budapest, Hungary).
“Civilizational Populism in Hybrid Regime: The Case of Serbia,” by Nikola Ilić (PhD Candidate in political science at the University of Belgrade).
“The Return of Kahanism to Israeli Politics – the 2022 Elections,” by Adam Sharon (Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Somerville College)
Workshop 2: Selected Topics in Populism
Moderators/ Discussants
Dr. Ludger Viefhues-Bailey (Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Gender, and Culture, Le Moyne University, NY).
Dr. Joanna Kulska (University Professor, Institute of Political Science and Administration, University of Opole)
Paper Presenters
“Turanism, the Great Kurultáj and ‘Eastern Opening’: An Alternative View of Eurasia and the ‘West,’” by Dr. Robert Imre (Associate Professor in Political Sciences at the University of the Faroe Islands).
“Sanitary Segregation Enforced by Big Brother: A Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis of Grzegorz Braun’s Extreme Anti-Vaccine Rhetoric,” by Dr. Marcin Kosman (Assistant Prof., The University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw, Department of Social Sciences).
“State-led Civilizational Populism: A Comparison of Pakistan and Israel,” by Dr. Fizza Batool (SBAZIT University, Karachi, Pakistan).
“Populism and Traditional Catholicism in the United States: A Convergence of Religious Identity and Political Ideology,”by Tiffany Hunsinger (Ph.D. Candidate in Theology at the University of Dayton).
“The Role of Culture War in Shaping the Alliance Between Christian Conservative Movements and Chega Party,” by Francisco Batista (Ph.D. Candidate and Researcher, Political Science, Universidade Nova de Lisboa).
Participants of the ECPS Conference 2025 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, gather for a group photo on July 1, 2025.
In-Person Programme: July 1-3, 2025. St. Cross College, Oxford University
Virtual Workshops: September 2025 – April 2026 via Zoom
Across three days in Oxford and a longer season of virtual exchange, the conference “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches” convened a rare cross-disciplinary community around a deceptively simple yet politically decisive question: who gets to speak in the name of “the people,” and with what consequences for democratic life? Against the backdrop of accelerating democratic erosion—where the grammar of popular sovereignty is increasingly mobilized to legitimize exclusion, repression, and institutional capture—the programme approached “the people” not as a fixed referent but as a contested political technology whose meanings, uses, and effects demand sustained critical scrutiny.
Hosted in person at St Cross College, University of Oxford from July 1–3, 2025, the conference brought together scholars from the humanities, social sciences, and policy-oriented research through a rich format combining three roundtables and eight thematic panels. These sessions mapped how claims to popular authority are produced, governed, and resisted across diverse political and social contexts, addressing themes such as constitutional backsliding, identity and belonging, algorithmic mediation, crisis governance, and the shifting architectures of political representation. The roundtables enabled synthetic and normative reflection across disciplines, while the panels foregrounded fine-grained conceptual analysis and empirical diagnostics—tracing how “us versus them” repertoires travel, how social contracts fracture, and how democratic resilience is assembled under pressure.
The conversation extended well beyond Oxford through an ambitious virtual workshop programme (September 2025–April 2026), comprising sixteen sessions, eight of which were successfully delivered in 2025. This online strand widened participation, deepened comparative perspectives, and sustained thematic continuity across the academic year, reinforcing the conference’s role as both an intellectual intervention and a durable infrastructure for collaborative inquiry.
The conference was organized by the ECPS in close collaboration with a network of leading academic institutions at the University of Oxford, including the Humanities Division, the Rothermere American Institute, the Oxford Network of Peace Studies (OxPeace), the European Studies Centre at St Antony’s College, and the Oxford Democracy Network. This multi-institutional partnership ensured strong interdisciplinary grounding across political science, philosophy, history, law, sociology, and area studies, while reinforcing the conference’s mission to bridge rigorous scholarship with policy-relevant debates on democracy, populism, and democratic resilience.
IN-PERSON PROGRAMME
DAY ONE
Introduction
Sumeyye Kocaman (Managing Editor, Populism & Politics, DPhil, St. Catherine’s College, Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Oxford University).
Opening Address
Kate Lyndsay Mavor, CBE (Master of St Cross College, Oxford University).
Janet Royall (Baroness Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, Oxford University).
Roundtable 1: Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe
Chair
Jonathan Wolff (Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy and Public Policy, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford; President of the Royal Institute of Philosophy).
Speakers
“The Reappearance of ‘The People’ in European Politics,” by Martin Conway (Professor of Contemporary European History, University of Oxford).
“The Construction of the Reactionary People,” by Aurelien Mondon (Professor of Politics, University of Bath).
“Christianity in A Time of Populism,” by Luke Bretherton (Regius Professor of Moral & Pastoral Theology, University of Oxford).
Roundtable I of the ECPS–Oxford Conference 2025, held on July 1–3 at St Cross College, was titled “Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe.” Chaired by Professor Jonathan Wolff, the session featured presentations by Professor Martin Conway, Professor Aurelien Mondon, and Professor Luke Bretherton.
Panel 1: Politics of Social Contract
Chair
Lior Erez (Alfred Landecker Postdoctoral Fellow, Blavatnik School of Government, Nuffield College, Oxford University).
Speakers
“Exploring Human Rights Attitudes: Outgroup Perception and Long-term Consequences,’ by Sabine Carey (Professor of Political Science at the University of Mannheim and Director of the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research); Robert Johns (Professor of Politics at the University of Southampton), Katrin Paula (Postdoctoral Researcher, Technical University Munich) and Nadine O’Shea (Postdoctoral researcher, Technical University Munich).
“Doing Politics Non-politically: Explaining How Cultural Projects Afford Political Resistance,” by Nathan Tsang(Doctoral Candidate in Sociology, University of Southern California).
“From Demos to Cosmos: The Political Philosophy of Isabelle Stengers,” by Simon Clemens (Doctoral Researcher at the Cluster of Excellence “Contestation of the Liberal Script – (SCRIPTS)” and at Theory of Politics at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin).
Panel 2: ‘The People’ in the Age of AI and Algorithms
Chair
Alina Utrata (Career Development Research Fellow, Rothermere American Institute, St John’s College, Oxford University).
Murat Aktaş (Professor, Political Science Department, Muş Alparslan University).
Speakers
“Navigating Digital Disruptions: The Ambiguous Role of Digital Technologies, State Foundations and Gender Rights,”by Luana Mathias Souto (Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow, GenTIC Research Group, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya).
“The Role of AI in Shaping the People: Big Tech and the Broligarchy’s Influence on Modern Democracy,” by Matilde Bufano (MSc in International Security Studies, Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies and the University of Trento).
Panel 3: Populist Threats to Modern Constitutional Democracies and Potential Solutions: Research Output of the Jean Monnet Chair EUCODEM
Co-Chairs
Elia Marzal (Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).
Bruno Godefroy (Associate Professor in Law and German, University of Tours, France).
Speakers
“Theoretical Foundations of Modern Populism: Approaches of Heidegger, Laclan and Laclau,” by Daniel Fernández(Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, Universitat Lleida).
“Erosion of the Independence of the Judiciary,” by Marco Antonio Simonelli (Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).
“Referenda as a Biased and Populist Tool: Addressing a Complex Issue in a Binary Way,” by Elia Marzal (Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).
“Pro-Independence Movements as A Populist Way Out in Multinational Contemporary Societies,” by Núria González(Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).
“Potential Solutions: Second Chambers, Demos and Majoritarian Body,” by Roger Boada (Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).
DAY TWO
Panel 4: Politics of Belonging: Voices and Silencing
Chair
Azize Sargın (PhD., Director of External Relations, ECPS).
Speakers
“The Scents of Belonging: Olfactory Narratives and the Dynamics of Democratization,” by Maarja Merivoo-Parro(Marie Curie Fellow, University of Jyväskylä).
“Silent Symbols, Loud Legacies: The Child in Populist Narratives of Post-Communist Poland,” by Maria Jerzyk(Graduate student, Masaryk University in Brno, Czechia).
Roundtable 2: ‘The People’ in and against Liberal and Democratic Thought
At Roundtable 2 of the ECPS Conference 2025, Professor Naomi Waltham-Smith (University of Oxford) offered a deeply reflective and conceptually bold presentation exploring the political and philosophical significance of the often-invoked terms “listening” and “the people.”
Chair
Aviezer Tucker (Director for the Centre for Philosophy of Historiography and the Historical Sciences, University of Ostrava).
Speakers
“Listening to ‘the People’: Impossible Concepts in Political Philosophy,” by Naomi Waltham-Smith (Professor, Music Faculty, University of Oxford).
“Liberal Responses to Populism,” by Karen Horn (Professor in Economic Thought, University of Erfurt) & Julian F. Müller (Professor of Political Philosophy, University of Graz).
“The Living Generation – A Presentist Conception of the People,” by Bruno Godefroy (Associate Professor in Law and German, University of Tours, France).
Panel 5: Governing the ‘People’: Divided Nations
Co-Chairs
Leila Alieva (Associate Researcher, Russian and East European Studies, Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, Oxford).
Karen Horn (Professor in Economic Thought, University of Erfurt).
Speakers
“Catholicism and nationalism in Croatia: The Use and Misuse of ‘Hrvatski Narod’,” by Natalie Schwabl (Doctoral Candidate, Faculty of Arts, Languages, Literature and Humanities, Sorbonne University).
“‘Become Ungovernable:’ Covert Tactics, Racism, and Civilizational Catastrophe,” by Sarah Riccardi-Swartz(Assistant Professor of Religion and Anthropology, Northeastern University).
“Is There Left-wing Populism Today? A Case Study of the German Left and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance,” by Petar S. Ćurčić (Research Associate, Institute of European Studies, Belgrade).
Panel 6: The ‘People’ in Search of Democracy
Chair
Max Steuer (Principal Investigator at the Department of Political Science of the Comenius University in Bratislava).
Speakers
“Between Antonio Gramsci and Erik Olin Wright: Deepening Democracy through Civil Society Engagement,” by Rashad Seedeen (Adjunct Research Fellow in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Media in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Melbourne).
“Resilient or Regressive? How Crisis Governance Reshapes the Democratic Future of ‘The People’,” by Jana Ruwayha(PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law; Teaching and Research Assistant, Global Studies Institute; University of Geneva).
“The Performative Power of the ‘We’ in Occupy Wall Street and Gezi Movement,” by Özge Derman (PhD., Sciences Po and Sorbonne University).
DAY THREE
Panel 7: ‘The People’ in Schröndinger’s Box: Democracy Alive and Dead
Co-Chairs
Ming-Sung Kuo (Reader in Law, University of Warwick School of Law).
Bruno Godefroy (Associate Professor in Law and German, University of Tours, France).
Speakers
“The Matrix of ‘Legal Populism’: Democracy and (Reducing) Domination,” by Max Steuer (Principal Investigator, Department of Political Science, Comenius University).
“Lived Democracy in Small Island States: Sociopolitical Dynamics of Governance, Power, and Participation in Malta and Singapore,” by Justin Attard (PhD Candidate, University of Malta).
“Russia’s War on Democracy,” by Robert Person (Professor of International Relations and Director of curriculum in International Affairs, United States Military Academy).
Panel 8: ‘The People’ vs ‘The Elite’: A New Global Order?
Co-Chairs
Ashley Wright (Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Minerva Global Security Programme, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford).
Azize Sargın (PhD., Director of External Relations, ECPS).
Speakers
“We: The Populist Elites,” by Aviezer Tucker (Director for the Centre for Philosophy of Historiography and the Historical Sciences, University of Ostrava).
“Reclamations of ‘We, the People’: Rethinking Civil Society through Spatial Contestations in Turkey,” by Pınar Dokumacı (Assistant Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin) & Özlem Aslan (Assistant Professor in the Core Program at Kadir Has University).
“The Transatlantic Network of Authoritarian Populism: The Rise of the Executive and Its Dangers to Democracy,” by Attila Antal (Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Institute of Political Science, Eötvös Loránd University).
“The French New Right and Its Impact on European Democracies,” by Murat Aktaş (Professor, Political Science Department, Muş Alparslan University); Russell Foster (Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics, King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies).
Discussant
Karen Horn (Professor in Economic Thought, University of Erfurt).
Roundtable 3: When the Social Contract Is Broken: How to Put the Genie Back
Scholars and thought leaders reflect on repairing democratic trust at Roundtable III of the ECPS Conference 2025, titled “When the Social Contract Is Broken: How to Put the Genie Back.” Featuring Aviezer Tucker, Baron John Alderdice, and Julian F. Müller, co-chaired by Irina von Wiese and Selçuk Gültaşlı at St Cross College, Oxford.
Aviezer Tucker (Director for the Centre for Philosophy of Historiography and the Historical Sciences, University of Ostrava).
John Thomas Alderdice (Baron Alderdice of Knock, in the City of Belfast, Founding Director of the Conference on the Resolution of Intractable Conflict, Oxford University; Founder of the Centre for Democracy and Peace Building).
Julian F. Müller (Professor of Political Philosophy, University of Graz).
Closing Remarks
Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of ECPS).
POST-CONFERENCE VIRTUAL WORKSHOP SERIES
Session 1: The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World
Date/Time: Thursday, September 4, 2025
Chair
Oscar Mazzoleni (Professor, Political Science, University of Lausanne; Editor-in-Chief, Populism & Politics).
Introduction
David J. Sanders (Regius Professor of Political Science, University of Essex, Emeritus).
Speakers
“The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism in India and the US: Do Family Dynasties and Big Businesses Really Control Democracy?” by Dinesh Sharma, Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich, Britt Romagna, Ms. Ayako Kiyota (Fordham University,NYC), Amartya Sharma (Student, George Washington University, D.C.)
“Out-groups and Elite Cues: How Populists shape Public Opinion,” by Michael Makara (Associate Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations, University of Central Missouri) and Gregory W. Streich (Professor of Political Science and Chair of the School of Social Sciences and Languages, University of Central Missouri).
“From Economic to Political Catastrophe: Four Case Studies in Populism,” by Akis Kalaitzidis (Professor of Political Science, Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri).
“Populism, Clientelism, and the Greek State under Papandreou,” by Elizabeth Kosmetatou (Professor of History, University of Illinois Springfield) and Akis Kalaitzidis (Professor of Political Science, Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri).
Discussant
João Ferreira Dias (Researcher at the International Studies Centre of ISCTE, in the Research Group Institutions, Governance and International Relations).
Session 2: The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989-2025 Poland
Date/Time: Thursday, September 18, 2025)
Chair
Prof. Mavis Maclean, CBE (St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford).
Speakers
“Varieties of Polish Patriotism: Experience of “Solidarity” 1980-1989 in Context of History and Anthropology of Ideas,”by Joanna Kurczewska (Professor in the humanities, Head of the Sociology and Anthropology of Culture Team at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences).
“Single Text, Clashing Meanings: Political Polarization, Constitutional Axiology and the Polish Constitutional Quagmire,” by Kamil Jonski (Economist, PhD in law at the University of Lodz).
“Protection of Human Rights and Its Implications for Women’s and Minority Rights,” by Malgorzata Fuszara (Professor of humanities in the field of sociology, Institute of Applied Social Sciences (IASS), University of Warsaw).
“Who Speaks for Whom: The Issue of Representation in the Struggle for the Rule of Law,” by Jacek Kurczewski(Professor of humanities in the field of Sociology, Lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Customs and Law at the University of Warsaw).
Discussants
Magdalena Solska (Assistant Professor, Department of European Studies and Slavic Studies, University of Fribourg).
Barry Sullivan (Professor, Institute For Racial Justice, Loyola University Chicago School of Law).
Krzysztof Motyka (Professor, Institute of Sociological Sciences, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)
Session 3: Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes
Date/Time: Thursday, October 2, 2025
Chair
Marietta D.C. van der Tol (PhD, Landecker Lecturer, Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge; Senior Postdoctoral Researcher, Trinity College)
Speakers
“Religious Freedom as Hungaricum Hungarian iIliberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom,”by Marc Loustau (PhD., Independent Scholar).
“Religious or Secular Freedom? On Pragmatic Politicization of Religion in Post-socialist Slovakia,” by Juraj Buzalka(Associate Professor of Social Anthropology, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at Comenius University).
“Illiberal Theocracy in Texas? The Incorporation of Evangelical Christian Theology into State Law,” by Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen (First Unitarian Universalist of Houston and Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford).
Discussants
Simon P. Watmough (Freelance academic researcher and editor and serves as a non-resident research fellow at ECPS).
Erkan Toguslu (PhD, Researcher at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven, Belgium).
Session 4: Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging
Date/Time: Thursday, October 16, 2025
Chair
Oscar Mazzoleni (Professor, Political Science, University of Lausanne).
Speakers
“We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches,” by Samuel Ngozi Agu (Ph.D., Dean of the MJC Echeruo Faculty of Humanities at Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria).
“Uses and Meanings of ‘the People’ in Service of Populism in Brazil,” by Eleonora Mesquita Ceia (Professor at the National Faculty of Law of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil).
“The Idea of ‘People’ Within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” by Shiveshwar Kundu (Jangipur College, University of Kalyani).
“We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal,” by Mouli Bentman & Mike Dahan (Sapir College, Israel).
Discussants
Abdelaaziz Elbakkali (Associate Professor of Media and Cultural Anthropology, SMBA University, Fes; Post-Doc Fulbright visiting scholar at Arizona State University).
Azize Sargin (Director for External Affairs, ECPS).
Session 5: Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions
Date/Time: Thursday, October 30, 2025
Chair
Heidi Hart (PhD, Arts Researcher and Practitioner based in Utah, US and Scandinavia).
Speakers
“The Romanian and Hungarian People in Populist Leaders’ Narratives between 2010-2020,” by Gheorghe Andrei (PhD Student, University of Bucharest and Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris).
“The Application of the Concepts of ‘People’ and ‘Nation’ in Recent Political Developments in Germany: Theoretical Sensitivities and Their Implications for Democracy,” by Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari (Researcher at the Institute of Sociology, Technische Universität Dresden).
“Ripping off the People: Populism of the Fiscally Tight-fist,” by Amir Ali (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi).
Discussants
Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews).
Amedeo Varriela (PhD, University of East London).
Session 6: Populism and the Crisis of Representation: Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice
Date/Time: Thursday, November 13, 2025
Chair
Ilhan Kaya (PhD, Visiting Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University in Canada; Former Professor at Yıldız Technical University in Turkey).
Speakers
“De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in an Age of Liberal Backsliding,”by Jonathan Madison (Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute).
“Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy,” by João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho (Member of the Research Committee of Sociological Theory at the International Sociological Association (ISA) and a researcher at LabPol/Unesp and the GEP Critical Theory: Technology, Culture, and Education).
“Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-politics and Post-democracy,” by Andreea Zamfira(Associate Professor with the Department of Political Science, University of Bucharest).
Discussants
Amedeo Varriela (PhD, University of East London).
Amir Ali (PhD, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi).
Session 7: Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism
Date/Time: Thursday, November 27, 2025
Chair
Christopher N. Magno (Associate Professor, Department of Justice Studies and Human Services, Gannon University).
Speakers
“Beyond Fairness: Meritocracy, the Limits of Representation, and the Politics of Populism,” by Elif Başak Ürdem (PhD candidate in political science at Loughborough University).
“Memetic Communication and Populist Discourse: Decoding the Visual Language of Political Polarization,” by Gabriel Bayarri Toscano (Assistant Professor, Department of Audiovisual Communication, Rey Juan Carlos University).
“Paradigms of ‘Popular Sovereignty’: Populism as Part of the Transformative History of the Concept,” by Maria Giorgia Caraceni (PhD Candidate in the History of Political Thought, Guglielmo Marconi University of Rome; Researcher at the Institute of Political Studies San Pio V).
Discussant
Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Oxford).
Session 8: Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn
Date/Time: Thursday, December 11, 2025
Chair
Azize Sargin (Ph.D., Director for External Affairs, ECPS).
Speakers
“Charismatic Populism, Suffering, and Saturnalia,” by Paul Joosse (Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Hong Kong).
“The Evolution of the Rhetoric of the “Alternative for Germany”: A Comparative Analysis of the Election Campaigns for the European Parliament in 2019 and 2024,” by Artem Turenko (PhD Candidate, Political Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow).
Discussants
Helena Rovamo (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Eastern Finland).
Jonathan Madison (PhD, Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute).
On October 23, 2025, Deakin University hosted the International Conference on “Bureaucratic Populism: Military, Judiciary, and Institutional Politics” at Deakin Downtown, Melbourne, in collaboration with the Deakin Institute for Citizenship & Globalisation, the Deakin Digital Life Lab, POLIS, and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). The event convened leading scholars from across the globe to examine how unelected state institutions—from militaries to judiciaries—adopt populist idioms to claim legitimacy “in the name of the people.” Opening the conference, Professor Simon Tormey reflected on the indeterminacy of populism as both ideology and style, while Dr. Nicholas Morieson’s keynote advanced a framework distinguishing between populism’s exogenous capture and endogenous discourse. Through three thematic panels, participants explored how bureaucratic, military, and judicial populisms reshape governance, authority, and democratic accountability worldwide.
Panel 1: Bureaucratic Populism and its Implications
Paper 1:“No Public Service, No Democracy. Why Populist Administrations are Dismantling the Professional Public Service,” by Mark Duckworth (Co-Director of the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies; a Senior Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation).
Paper 2:“A Different Populism: Anglophone, New World, Frontier,” by Professor Stephen Alomes (Adjunct Associate Professor at RMIT University).
Paper 3:“Compliance and Capture: Bureaucratic Transformation under Populism in India and Hungary,” by Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University).
Paper 4:“Survival, Sovereignty and Destiny: Centralized Power in Putin’s Russia Through Bureaucratic Populism,” by Lachlan Dowling (Student at Deakin University).
Paper 5:“Bureaucratic Populism and Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: A Study of Institutional Populism and Hybrid Governance,” by Kashif Hussain (PhD candidate in Peace and Development Studies from the University of New England).
Panel 2: Military Populism in Comparative Perspective
Paper 1:“The Making of a People’s General: Military Populism and the Discursive Legacy of Soedirman in Indonesia,”by Hasnan Bachtiar (PhD candidate at Deakin University), Azhar Syahida (A Researcher at the Center of Reform on Economics (CORE) Indonesia) & Ahalla Tsauro (PhD student at Université Laval, Canada).
Paper 2:“Military Populism in Egypt, Pakistan, and Thailand: An Empirical Analysis,” by Muhammad Omer (PhD Candidate in Political Science at the Deakin University).
Paper 3:“The Re-Emergence of Military-Populist Governance in Indonesia under Prabowo Subianto,” by Wasisto Raharjo Jati (A Researcher at the Center for Politics within Indonesia’s BRIN (National Research and Innovation Agency) in Jakarta).
Paper 4:“Militarized Populism and the Language of Conflict: A Discourse-Historical Analysis of the India–Pakistan May 2025 Standoff,” by Dr. Waqasia Naeem (Associate Professor in School of English at Minhaj University Lahore).
Paper 5:“Hybrid Regimes and Populist Leaders: A Case Study of Imran Khan’s Trajectory from Parliament to Prison,”by Faiza Idrees (Independent Researcher from Pakistan) & Muhammad Rizwan (PhD Candidate in the Faculty of Arts and Education at Deakin University).
Panel 3: Judicial Populism and Competing Narratives of Authority
Paper 1:“How can courts be populist?” by Mátyás Bencze (Former Judge and a Professor of Law at the Universities of Szeged and Győr, Hungary).
Paper 2:“Judging the State of Exception: The Judiciary in the Israeli Populist Project,” by Dr. Elliot Dolan-Evans(Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at Monash University).
Paper 3:“Judicial Populism in Pakistan: Discourse and Authority in the Panama Papers Judgments,” by Muhammad Omer (PhD Candidate in Political Science at the Deakin University) & Prof. Ihsan Yilmaz (Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations, and Chair of Islamic Studies at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI), Deakin University).
Paper 4:“Populism and the Noxious Relationship Between Political and Intelligence Elites in Post-Communist Czechia, Slovakia, and Romania,” by Bohuslav Pernica (Lieutenant colonel (ret.), co-editor of the White Paper on Defence, Czechia) & Emilia Șercan (Assistant Professor in the Journalism Department at the University of Bucharest).
Paper 5:“Competing Populisms in Pakistan: Politicians’ Anti-Military Narratives and Bureaucratic Counter-Narratives,” by Zaffar Manzoor (MPhil Scholar at the Department of English Linguistics and Literature, Riphah International University Islamabad, Pakistan) & Dr. Muhammad Shaban Rafi (Professor of English at Riphah International University Lahore, Pakistan).
***
ECPS Academy Summer School and Case Competition
Populism and Climate Change: Understanding What Is at Stake and Crafting Policy Suggestions for Stakeholders
Date: July 7–11, 2025 | Format: Online
Situated at the intersection of pedagogy, policy relevance, and global urgency, the ECPS Academy Summer School and Case Competition 2025 marked a distinctive moment in the Centre’s educational and capacity-building agenda. Against the backdrop of intensifying climate crises and the growing politicization of environmental governance, the programme approached climate change not merely as an ecological challenge, but as a deeply contested political terrain shaped by populism, polarization, and struggles over representation.
Held online between 7–11 July 2025, the Summer School convened emerging scholars and young professionals from diverse regions to critically examine how populist actors—across ideological, geographical, and institutional contexts—reframe climate justice, sustainability, and global responsibility. Through a carefully curated sequence of lectures, discussions, and moderated exchanges, participants were invited to interrogate how climate narratives are mobilized, resisted, or distorted in the populist age, and how these dynamics complicate both domestic policy choices and multilateral cooperation.
The programme’s applied core was the ECPS Case Competition, which translated theory into practice by placing participants in simulated decision-making roles related to the COP30 negotiations. Working in teams under time constraints, participants developed policy proposals attentive to real-world political pressures, including populist skepticism toward international institutions, climate finance, and regulatory frameworks. This exercise foregrounded skills increasingly vital for future policymakers and analysts: strategic thinking, teamwork, feasibility assessment, and persuasive communication.
Taken together, the 2025 Summer School and Case Competition functioned as more than a training programme. They operated as a laboratory for democratic problem-solving—cultivating a new generation capable of navigating the fraught interface between populism, climate governance, and global justice.
Program Schedule and Lecturers
Monday, July 7, 2025
Lecture One:Far-right and Climate Change
Lecturer:Bernhard Forthchner (Associate Professor at the School of Art, Media and Communication, University of Leicester).
Moderator: Sabine Volk (Postdoctoral researcher, Institute for Research on Far-Right Extremism (IRex), Tübingen University).
Lecture Two:Climate Justice and Populism
Lecturer: John Meyer (Professor of Politics, California State Polytechnic University, Humboldt).
Moderator: Manuela Caiani (Associate Professor in Political Science, Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy).
Tuesday, July 8, 2025
Lecture Three: Climate Change, Food, Farmers, and Populism
Lecturer: Sandra Ricart (Assistant Professor at the Environmental Intelligence for Global Change Lab, at the Department of Electronics, Information and Bioengineering at the Politecnico di Milano, Italy).
Moderator: Vlad Surdea-Hernea (Post-doctoral Researcher, Institute of Forest, Environmental and Natural Resource Policy, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences Vienna).
Lecture Four: Ideology Meets Interest Group Politics: The Trump Administration and Climate Mitigation
Lecturer: Daniel Fiorino (Professor of Politics and Director at the Centre for Environmental Policy, American University).
Moderator: Azize Sargın (PhD., Director of External Relations, ECPS).
Wednesday, July 9, 2025
Lecture Five: Art, Climate, and Populism
Lecturer: Heidi Hart (Arts Researcher, Nonresident Senior Fellow at ECPS).
Moderator: João Ferreira Dias (Researcher, Centre for International Studies, ISCTE) (TBC)
Lecture Six: Populist Discourses on Climate and Climate Change
Lecturer: Dr. Eric Swyngedouw (Professor of Geography, University of Manchester).
Moderator: Jonathan White (Professor of Politics, LSE).
Thursday, July 10, 2025
Lecture Seven: Climate Change, Natural Resources and Conflicts
Lecturer: Philippe Le Billon (Professor of Political Geography at the University of British Columbia).
Lecture Eight: Climate Change Misinformation: Supply, Demand, and the Challenges to Science in a “Post-Truth” World
Lecturer: Stephan Lewandowsky (Professor of Psychology, University of Bristol).
Moderator: Neo Sithole (Research Fellow, ECPS)
Friday, July 11, 2025
Lecture Nine: Populist Narratives on Sustainability, Energy Resources and Climate Change
Lecturer: Robert Huber (Professor of Political Science Methods, University of Salzburg).
Moderator: Susana Batel (Assistant Researcher and Invited Lecturer at University Institute of Lisbon, Center for Psychological Research and Social Intervention).
***
Publications
Articles
In 2025, the ECPS consolidated its role as a hub for high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship through the sustained publication activity of its two journals, Populism & Politics (P&P) and the Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). Operating under rigorous double-blind peer review standards, these journals continue to serve as core infrastructures for advancing theoretically informed, empirically grounded, and methodologically plural research on populism and its multifaceted political consequences.
The articles published throughout the year reflect the intellectual breadth and analytical depth that increasingly characterize ECPS-affiliated scholarship. Across both journals, contributors engaged a wide range of themes, including far-right voting behavior and in-group favoritism, climate skepticism and rhetorical strategies, migration and citizenship regimes, civilizational populism, digital political communication, and the intersection of populism with war, geopolitics, and global capitalism. Methodologically, the publications span experimental designs, discourse and multimodal analysis, comparative political economy, political theory, and large-scale social media data analysis, underscoring ECPS’s commitment to interdisciplinary dialogue.
Populism & Politics continued to function as a venue for timely, theoretically engaged interventions that bridge academic research and public debate, while Journal of Populism Studies further strengthened its profile as a comprehensive, international journal addressing both established and emerging dimensions of populist politics. Together, the two journals provided platforms for scholars at different career stages and from diverse geographical contexts, reinforcing ECPS’s mission to globalize populism studies beyond Euro-Atlantic confines.
Taken collectively, the 2025 publications demonstrate not only the vitality of populism research but also the importance of maintaining independent, transparent, and methodologically robust publication venues. Through its journals, ECPS continues to contribute to cumulative knowledge production, critical scrutiny of power, and informed debate on the future of democracy in an age of populist contestation.
Articles Published by Journal of Populism & Politics (P&P)
van Oosten, Sanne. (2025). “The Importance of In-group Favoritism in Explaining Voting for PRRPs: A Study of Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 12, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0046
Lewis, Morgan. (2025). “Understanding Climate Skepticism: A Rhetorical Analysis of Climate Communication by PiS, AfD, and SD.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). February 6, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0047
Yogo, Edouard Epiphane. (2025). “The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 4, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0048
Lahti, Yannick & Palonen, Emilia. (2025). “Populism and EP Elections – Case Finland: Populism Gone Mad from Scissors and Chopping-board to Firing Guns and Latino Rush.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 28, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0049
Mancin, Luca. (2025). “Doing Populism with Words: A Philosophical-Linguistic Clarification of Empty Signifiers’ Role in the Post-Laclauian Approach.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). August 04, 2025.https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0050
Articles Published by Journal of Populism Studies (JPS)
Ozturk, Ibrahim. (2025). “Unveiling China’s ‘Transnational Populism’ and Sharp Power Politics: The Case of the Belt and Road Initiative.”Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). January 18, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000113
Wathtuwa-Durayalage, Sudeshika. (2025). “Impact of Civilizational Populism on Intergroup Emotions, Social Cohesion, and Civility in the UK.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). June 11, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000115
Ozturk, Ibrahim. (2025). “Capitalist Disruptions and the Democratic Retreat: A US–EU–China Comparison.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 11, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000116
Su, Yu & Li, Tongtong. (2025). “Diversity, Rationality, and the Diffusion of Online Populism: A Study of Chinese Social Media Discussions.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 21, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000117
Ben-Porat, Guy & Filc, Dani. (2025). “Authoritarianism Curbed? Populism, Democracy and War in Israel.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 24, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000118
Shukri, Syaza & Hassan, Isyraf. (2025). “Anwar Ibrahim’s Civilisational Populism: The Gaza War and Malaysia.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). October 9, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000119
Reggi, Valeria. (2025). “‘Patriots to Defend Our Identity from the Islamisation of Europe’: How Populist Leaders Normalise Polarisation, a Multimodal Discourse Analysis.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). November 16, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000120
Murphey, Helen L. (2025). “Civilizational Populism and Migration Diplomacy: Tunisia, the European Union, and Italy.”Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). November 23, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000121
Andits, Petra. (2026). “Alcoholic Mobsters and Welfare Criminals: Xenophobia, Welfare Chauvinism and Populism in Gyurcsány Ferenc’s Facebook Posts on Ukrainian Citizens Prior to the War.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). January 5, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000122
Chloé Ridel, Member of the European Parliament from the Socialist Group and Rapporteur for transnational repression, during her interview with ECPS’s Selcuk Gultasli. Photo: Umit Vurel.
In 2025, the ECPS significantly expanded its Interview Series, consolidating it as one of the organization’s most visible and impactful knowledge-production platforms. Over the course of the year, 98 in-depth interviews were conducted by ECPS’s Selçuk Gültaşlı with leading scholars, public intellectuals, policymakers, human rights advocates, and expert practitioners from across the globe. Together, these conversations formed a living archive of critical reflection on populism, authoritarianism, democratic backsliding, and resistance in an era of profound global turbulence.
The ECPS Interview Series functions not merely as commentary on current events but as a diagnostic instrument—capturing how populist dynamics unfold across regions, regimes, and policy domains. The interviews span an unusually wide geographical and thematic range, covering Europe, North America, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Asia-Pacific. They engage with issues including civilizational populism, religion and identity politics, far-right mobilization, migration governance, climate denialism, digital disinformation, state capture, geopolitical realignment, and the erosion—or resilience—of democratic institutions.
What distinguishes the series is its commitment to intellectual depth without sacrificing accessibility. Interviews are structured to foreground analytical clarity, comparative insight, and normative reflection, while remaining responsive to unfolding political developments—from elections and constitutional crises to wars, sanctions regimes, and mass protests. In many cases, ECPS interviews offered some of the earliest expert assessments of rapidly evolving events, providing timely yet rigorous interpretations grounded in long-term scholarship.
Collectively, the 98 interviews published in 2025 reaffirm ECPS’s role as a global hub for critical dialogue on populism and democracy—bridging academia, policy debate, and public engagement at a moment when such connections are more necessary than ever.
Dr. DB Subedi highlights how majoritarian populist politics in South and Southeast Asia marginalizes minorities by leveraging identity politics and ethno-religious narratives. He underscores how populist leaders, from Myanmar to India, utilize state apparatuses to consolidate power, often legitimizing exclusionary policies and fostering polarization. With examples like Hindu nationalism in India, Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar, and Islamist populism in Bangladesh, Dr. Subedi examines how these movements exploit historical grievances and global populist trends while adapting them to local contexts. His analysis sheds light on the fragile state of pluralism and democracy in these multicultural societies.
The Balkans, a region deeply influenced by historical tensions and sociopolitical complexities, has become a breeding ground for diverse populist movements. Dr. Vassilis Petsinis, an authority on Central and Eastern European politics, dissects the dynamics driving populism in Croatia, Serbia, and North Macedonia. According to Dr. Petsinis, the persistence of ethno-nationalism is a defining characteristic that distinguishes Balkan populism from its Western European counterparts. His analysis explores the interplay of nationalism, Euroscepticism, and historical grievances, shedding light on how populist actors consolidate power and reshape political landscapes, offering insights into the unique challenges populism poses in the region.
In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić discusses the shifting geopolitical landscape of the Balkans, emphasizing the critical role of the United States in maintaining regional stability. She highlights concerns over the potential impact of Donald Trump’s second term, arguing that if the US withdraws from its stabilizing role, the region could face new uncertainties. Dr. Šelo Šabić also explores Croatia’s position within the EU and NATO, the rise of populist leaders, and the influence of Russia and China, offering a comprehensive analysis of the region’s evolving political dynamics.
As Kosovo heads into a decisive election, Dr. Avdi Smajljaj warns of its significance for the country’s democratic trajectory. “The upcoming elections this Sunday will be crucial in determining the future of democracy in Kosovo,” he explains, emphasizing the risk of increasing authoritarian tendencies. Meanwhile, tensions with the EU and US complicate Kosovo’s international standing. “Kosovo’s statehood remains heavily dependent on US support,” he adds, particularly with the uncertainty of second Trump presidency. With growing populism and strained foreign relations, Kosovo’s future hangs in the balance, making this election a turning point for its domestic and international course.
In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Dr. Victoria Leukavets highlights the critical role of sanctions in pressuring Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime. She argues, “Sanctions do work, though some have a delayed effect—particularly economic and sectoral sanctions. However, they do have an impact.” Dr. Leukavets also discusses Russia’s deepening control over Belarus, media repression, and the resilience of Belarusian democratic forces in exile. She underscores that continued Western support for independent media and civil society is essential to counter Lukashenko’s grip on power and prevent Belarus from becoming a full extension of Russia’s influence.
Belgium’s long-standing reputation as a consociational democracy—marked by power-sharing, compromise, and consensus-building—is under strain. According to Dr. Emilie van Haute, the country’s political landscape has undergone a fundamental transformation, with growing polarization and the increasing influence of populist radical parties. In this compelling interview with the ECPS, Dr. van Haute examines the rise of populism on both the left and right, the impact of linguistic divisions, and how mainstream parties are adapting to radical competition. She provides valuable insights into Belgium’s shifting democracy and the challenges ahead.
In an exclusive interview with ECPS, Professor Julie Ingersoll exposes how Christian Nationalism, Reconstructionism, and Catholic Integralism have coalesced into a powerful theocratic force behind Trump’s second presidency. She explains how these groups reject democracy, embrace authoritarian governance, and aim to reshape American society under biblical rule. “They all seek to make religion the dominant force in shaping society,” she warns, highlighting Project 2025 and figures like Paula White as key players in this movement. This is not a fleeting moment but a systematic, decades-long effort to transform US governance.
Dr. Conrad Ziller, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen, discusses the key factors shaping voter sentiment ahead of Germany’s elections. In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, he argues that the recent terrorist attack in Munich is likely to have a greater impact on voter behavior than US Vice President J.D. Vance’s endorsement of the far-right AfD. Highlighting the growing openness of radical right parties, Dr. Ziller warns of the AfD’s shifting strategy—from Euroscepticism to consolidating political power through ideological alliances and nationalist rhetoric.
In an exclusive interview with ECPS, Professor Cornelia Woll, President of the Hertie School, criticized US Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, calling it “quite a hypocritical statement.” She pointed out that while Vance accused Europe of restricting free speech, the Trump administration actively attacks institutions like Wikipedia and NPR. Professor Woll also warned that the US, under Trump, is pursuing policies that align with Russia’s interests, deepening transatlantic fractures. With nationalist rhetoric rising on both sides of the Atlantic, she emphasized that Europe must navigate these challenges to maintain economic stability and security.
The EU’s human rights commitments are weakening as populist movements push restrictive migration policies, warns Dr. Ellen Desmet, Associate Professor of Migration Law at Ghent University. She describes a growing disregard for human rights, stating, “We are witnessing blatant human rights violations that are only increasing.” A 2024 report documented over 120,000 pushbacks at EU borders, violating non-refoulement by forcibly returning asylum seekers without assessing their protection needs. “Some EU countries have even legalized these pushbacks,” Desmet cautions, while the European Commission hesitates to act. She also points to far-right rhetoric shaping restrictive policies, with mainstream parties following suit. Meanwhile, according to Dr. Desmet, Belgium’s new government threatens judicial independence and tightens asylum rules, further escalating human rights concerns.
The Alternative for Germany (AfD) has doubled its vote share in the February 23 elections, marking what Professor Kai Arzheimer calls “a turning point in post-war German politics.” While expected, this surge solidifies the AfD as Germany’s second-strongest party, normalizing far-right rhetoric in mainstream discourse. Arzheimer highlights how economic anxiety, deindustrialization, and anti-immigration sentiment fuel AfD’s rise. He also warns that mainstream parties risk losing credibility by mimicking far-right policies rather than offering bold alternatives. Despite its growing influence, AfD’s radicalization presents both an opportunity and a challenge for German democracy. As political fragmentation deepens, the response of centrist parties will determine whether this shift is temporary—or part of a long-term realignment.
Despite the AfD’s strong performance in Germany’s Sunday elections, securing nearly 21% of the vote and dominating in the East, Professor Jonathan Olsen argues that the party faces a ceiling in its growth. “Opinion polls consistently show that around 80% of Germans do not support the AfD,” he notes, emphasizing its high negative ratings. While the AfD has solidified its base in the East, its influence in the West remains limited, requiring a broader appeal to expand further. Professor Olsen highlights that migration and security remain the party’s key mobilization issues, while economic concerns, though present, rank lower in importance for its voters.
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Dan Hough warns that mainstream parties must engage with voters’ real concerns or risk further legitimizing the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). “Ignoring the AfD hasn’t worked, and simply adopting their rhetoric hasn’t either,” Professor Hough explains. Instead, he urges democratic parties to develop credible policies that address the economic and social anxieties fueling AfD support. He highlights how discontent—particularly in Eastern Germany—extends beyond migration, with deeper dissatisfaction driving voters toward populist alternatives. As the AfD continues to shape public debate, Professor Hough argues that mainstream parties must lead with solutions rather than reactionary responses. “The discourse must be smart, and the outcomes must be meaningful.”
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Thiemo Fetzer argues that populist grievances are largely shaped by perception rather than lived experience. “Populism is a phenomenon of information overload,” Fetzer explains. “Many grievances amplified by populists are not grounded in demographic or economic realities but are shaped by narratives, particularly those spread through modern media.” Discussing global trade, economic inequality, and the rise of far-right movements, he warns that misinformation fuels discontent, making societies more vulnerable to populist rhetoric. From the future of the liberal order to the geopolitics of energy, Fetzer offers a data-driven perspective on the forces reshaping today’s world.
In a thought-provoking interview with the ECPS, Professor Stephen E. Hanson unpacks how US President Donald Trump exemplifies a growing global trend of patrimonial rule. Professor Hanson argues that Trump governs as if the state was his personal property—distributing power to loyalists, undermining impartial governance, and attacking state institutions. Drawing comparisons to Russia, Hungary, and Brazil, he warns of long-term damage to democratic institutions. Professor Hanson stresses the need for renewed public trust in government and a collective effort to counteract the erosion of modern governance.
Despite recognizing the difficulties brought by growing authoritarianism, Dr. Roberto S. Foa of Cambridge University maintains a measured optimism regarding the prospects for democratic renewal. He highlights historical patterns of democratization and shifts in public opinion—such as those triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Trump presidency—as indications that democratic principles can regain strength in response to perceived threats. However, he cautions against generalized solutions, stressing that each democracy grapples with distinct institutional and political hurdles that demand context-specific strategies for revitalization.
In a time of rising populism, Professor Eric Beinhocker explains how populist leaders capitalize on economic grievances and social distrust to fuel their movements. “When people feel the system is unfair and rigged, they seek someone to blame,” he says, pointing out how populists exploit feelings of broken social contracts to gain political traction. According to him, trade wars and economic nationalism further exacerbate global instability. “No country can make an iPhone alone,” Professor Beinhocker states, stressing that interconnected supply chains make protectionism self-destructive. Tariffs and trade barriers, he warns, will “lower living standards and harm American competitiveness” rather than protect workers. This insightful discussion unpacks the economic forces fueling populism and the fragility of global trade.
In a powerful interview with the ECPS, veteran political scientist Professor Doğu Ergil warns that Turkey has crossed from populist authoritarianism into full autocracy. “Persuasion—which was once the AKP’s greatest success—has evaporated,” he explains. “In its place, coercion has become more prominent, and the instruments of coercion, including the judiciary, have proliferated.” Professor Ergil outlines how Erdoğan’s regime has personalized power, delegitimized the opposition, and dismantled democratic norms. With Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu’s arrest and mass protests unfolding, Turkey, he says, faces a “deadlock” where the state’s legitimacy is crumbling from within. This is a timely and sobering reflection on democracy under siege.
In a compelling interview with ECPS, Dr. Salim Cevik argues that Turkey has “crossed the biggest threshold from competitive authoritarianism to full authoritarianism.” Highlighting the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu, Dr. Cevik sees it as a targeted move to eliminate democratic competition: “He is being arrested because he could potentially defeat Erdogan.” Populism, once central to Erdogan’s rule, is giving way to raw coercion: “Force is the fundamental strategy of Erdogan.” Dr. Cevik also condemns Western silence, especially from Europe and the US, warning that their inaction amounts to complicity. “Erdogan feels very strong… because he has international backing.” Drawing a parallel with past mistakes on Putin, he cautions: “You can’t really trust a personal autocracy for strategic partnership.”
In this timely and incisive interview, Professor Philippe Marlière (UCL) discusses Marine Le Pen’s conviction, the limits of far-right populism, and the resilience of democratic institutions in France. While Le Pen’s narrative frames her disqualification as a “denial of democracy,” Professor Marlière warns against buying into this rhetoric. “Politicians are not above the law,” he asserts, adding, “The far right has no free pass to establish a dictatorship in France.” A must-read on the legal, political, and symbolic stakes of France’s 2027 presidential race.
In a comprehensive interview with ECPS, Professor Jenny White calls the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu “absolutely… a sign of insecurity”—not strength. Professor White warns that this preemptive strike ahead of the 2028 elections reflects “regime fragility,” not confidence, adding: “If this stands… voting ceases to have any real meaning.” Drawing on her concept of “spindle autocracy,” she explains how personal loyalty has overtaken institutional merit, creating a brittle, fear-driven system. With Erdogan’s popularity fading and international pressure weakened, Professor White argues, “This is a line that has now been crossed”—one with dangerous consequences for Turkey’s democratic future.
In this compelling interview with ECPS, Dr. Hakki Tas argues that repression—not legitimacy—has become the Erdogan regime’s default mode of rule. Highlighting the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, Dr. Taş contends that Turkey is moving further from competitive authoritarianism toward full authoritarian consolidation. As electoral legitimacy weakens, coercion fills the void, revealing a regime reliant on fear, control, and chrono-political narratives to survive. “Remaining in power,” Dr. Tas says, “is the only survival strategy.” This conversation explores the strategic logic behind repression, the shrinking political arena, and the uncertain future of ailing Turkish democracy.
In an in-depth interview with ECPS, Professor Kent Jones warns that Donald Trump’s second-term trade strategy amounts to a “tariff dictatorship,” dismantling WTO norms and centralizing unprecedented power. “Trade has become a populist weapon,” says Professor Jones, “used to stoke anger and identify scapegoats rather than manage the economy.” He explains how Trump’s emotionally charged, anti-globalist rhetoric recasts trade deficits as existential threats while ignoring economic realities. Yet Professor Jones remains cautiously hopeful: “Globalization has faced downturns before. The human impulse to exchange and specialize endures.” As America retreats, he argues, others may step up. “If the US won’t lead, new trade alliances will form. But unpredictability is a burden—not a strength.”
“The more rigid the regime becomes, the more easily it may break,” warns Dr. Spyros Sofos in an illuminating interview with ECPS. Tracing the Erdogan regime’s shift from reformist Islamism to a personalized authoritarianism, Dr. Sofos highlights how the dismantling of institutional checks and grassroots engagement has deepened Turkey’s democratic crisis. He sharply critiques the EU and US for enabling this drift, arguing that their silence—rooted in strategic pragmatism over refugee control and regional stability—amounts to tacit complicity. As Erdogan’s rule grows more centralized and brittle, Dr. Sofos suggests its very inflexibility could be its undoing. Amid repression and international complacency, he insists, spaces for resistance persist—and the next rupture may come from within the regime itself.
In this incisive ECPS interview, Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher, Associate Professor at the University of Calgary, explores how populism is reshaping US foreign policy—from tariffs as symbolic resistance to institutional erosion under Trump 2.0. Arguing that “Trump is not the cause but a symptom,” Dr. Boucher warns that even without Trump, populist forces will endure, backed by media ecosystems, think tanks, and loyalist networks. He emphasizes that “this is not really an economic argument. It’s a political and populist argument,” driving a shift from multilateralism to nationalist retrenchment. A must-read for anyone interested in the ideological drivers behind today’s turbulent geopolitics.
In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Samuele Mazzolini argues that Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa has embraced populism not as a vehicle for transformation, but as a strategy to maintain power amid crisis. Recently re-elected after a snap presidency, Noboa has relied on emergency decrees, militarized crackdowns, and anti-crime rhetoric. “Populism has simply served as a means to cling to power and bolster his personal image,” Dr. Mazzolini asserts. Despite branding himself as a technocrat, Noboa “lacks a coherent national project” and governs through “sheer improvisation.” Dr. Mazzolini warns that Ecuador is entering a “permanent state of exception,” with rising authoritarian tendencies and no clear roadmap for reform.
On the 100th day of Trump’s second term, ECPS sat down with Dr. Robert Benson of the Center for American Progress to dissect the anatomy of democratic backsliding. In this wide-ranging interview, Dr. Benson warns of a “coordinated assault” on American civil society and urges a “coordinated defense” in response. Drawing comparisons with Turkey and Hungary, he highlights the early stages of authoritarian consolidation and calls for a “whole-of-society” mobilization. “We’re moving faster in the United States than the AKP ever moved in Turkey,” he cautions. From institutional capture to international instability, Dr. Benson’s insights are a timely wake-up call. “Authoritarians have coordinated,” he says—“now it’s time for democrats to do the same.”
In this timely and thought-provoking interview, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi explores how authoritarianism has become “the new normal” in the Middle East amid a global retreat from democratic norms. Speaking to the ECPS, Dr. Al-Marashi analyzes the region’s complex landscape shaped by imperial legacies, resource politics, and shifting global alliances. He highlights how populist rhetoric, digital platforms, and transactional diplomacy—especially under Trump-era politics—are empowering authoritarian leaders and weakening democratic institutions. While civil society faces mounting repression, Dr. Al-Marashi suggests that digital activism and “artivism” may offer spaces of survival and resistance. This interview provides essential insight into how populism and authoritarianism intersect in the Middle East—and what that means for the future of governance in the region.
In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Dr. Claudiu Tufiş, explains how far-right candidate George Simion’s success in the first round of Romania’s presidential elections on Sunday was driven by widespread voter anger and disappointment following the annulment of the original vote. “Voters were deeply disappointed by the cancellation of the elections,” he notes, “and many reacted with anger, leading to a noticeable erosion of trust in the electoral process.” With no credible democratic opposition and growing anti-establishment sentiment, Simion was able to capitalize on public frustration. Dr. Tufiş’s analysis sheds critical light on the structural and emotional undercurrents reshaping Romanian politics.
In a compelling interview with ECPS, political sociologist Dr. Josh Roose unpacks the 2025 Australian federal election, arguing it marked “a resounding rejection of Trumpist-style populism.” Dr. Roose explores how Liberal leader Peter Dutton’s strongman image backfired, while Labor’s inclusive yet grounded masculinity resonated with urban voters—especially women. He warns, however, of far-right undercurrents and rising generational and economic divides. Reflecting on political masculinities, Islamophobia, and online extremism, Dr. Roose calls for educational and legislative reforms to bolster democratic resilience. A timely deep dive into Australia’s populist landscape—and a must-read for scholars and studenst of global politics.
In this compelling interview, Dr. Maxine Newlands—an expert in environmental politics and ocean governance—warns that the “Australian political system has essentially stepped back from climate change.” Speaking with ECPS, she highlights how rising polarization and populist denialism have rendered climate policy too risky for major parties. “Politicians avoid addressing it altogether,” she explains, noting that even terms like “climate change” were strategically omitted from campaigns. Dr. Newlands critiques the media’s role in spreading disinformation and urges a more pluralistic approach grounded in community voices, Indigenous knowledge, and the Blue Humanities. Her analysis provides a powerful lens into how populist narratives have reshaped Australia’s environmental politics and what it will take to restore trust and democratic inclusion in climate action.
In this thought-provoking conversation, Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio—Gosling-Lim Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Michigan—discusses the resilience and transformation of populism in the Philippines. He explores how symbolic narratives of “pro-people, anti-elite” sentiment continue to drive support for dynastic figures like the Dutertes, despite mounting legal scrutiny. From social media toxicity to youth electoral shifts, Dr. Ragragio argues that populism is “here to stay,” shaped by local patronage networks and reinforced by mediatized political performance. He also highlights the importance of civic education and independent journalism as counterforces. This is a timely, incisive analysis of a political culture in flux.
In this compelling conversation with ECPS, Dr. Mark Riboldi unpacks how corporate influence and elite career pathways hollow out democratic representation in Australia. From revolving doors in politics to the marginalization of community voices, Dr. Riboldi warns that without transparency and reform, “the closed loop between politics and corporate power” will persist. He also explores party fragmentation, the Greens’ identity struggles, and the risks of technocratic drift. “Boldness needs legitimacy,” he insists, urging progressive parties to pair vision with credibility. Dr. Riboldi ultimately sees Australia’s electoral system as a “stopgap” against populist capture—but not an immunity.
In the wake of Romania’s high-turnout 2025 presidential election, Dr. Vladimir Bortun offers a powerful analysis of how deep-rooted economic insecurity—fueled by decades of neoliberal reform—has driven support for the far right. Despite a centrist victory, nationalist George Simion’s strong performance underscores a broader post-crisis populist consolidation. In this exclusive ECPS interview, Dr. Bortun explores the AUR’s appeal among the diaspora and rural poor, the ideological vacuum left by the mainstream left, and how Romania exemplifies a wider European shift from democratic to authoritarian neoliberalism. A must-read for anyone interested in the structural dynamics behind Europe’s populist realignment.
In this compelling post-election interview, Professor Radosław Markowski offers a candid, expert analysis of Poland’s newly elected president, Karol Nawrocki. Backed by PiS and inspired by Trump-style politics, Nawrocki’s narrow win poses serious challenges to Prime Minister Tusk’s pro-European government. Professor Markowski dissects the roots of this upset—calling it the result of a “fantastically prepared campaign”—and warns of potential institutional gridlock and democratic backsliding. While describing Nawrocki as “inexperienced” and lacking policy depth, Professor Markowski holds out a sliver of hope that he may rise above partisan loyalties. With sharp insights into Polish society, EU disillusionment, and the dangers of populist overreach, this interview is essential reading on Poland’s increasingly polarized and uncertain political trajectory.
In a candid and comprehensive interview with ECPS, Professor Guy Ben-Porat warns that Israel’s political rightward shift is not simply a strategic maneuver, but the product of deeper ideological currents. Describing the current coalition as “a unification of several forces,” Professor Ben-Porat highlights its populist hostility toward liberal institutions, minorities, and judicial independence. He draws direct parallels to Hungary and Poland, identifying a shared authoritarian trajectory. Professor Ben-Porat also reflects on how the October 7 attacks have further racialized political discourse, with Arab-Palestinian citizens facing intensified securitization. Yet, he sees hope in mass democratic mobilization: “Thousands of people have taken to the streets every week… the fact that many Israelis are still fighting for democracy means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.”
In this interview, Professor Rafal Soborski critiques Poland’s liberal democratic actors for mimicking right-wing rhetoric in a failed attempt to broaden appeal. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he warns, urging pro-democratic forces to adopt bold, progressive agendas rooted in class justice and social solidarity. Drawing comparisons to political centrists across Europe, Soborski emphasizes that ideological clarity—not cautious managerialism—is key to countering the far right’s emotional narratives and mobilizing mythologies. His insights offer a timely call for a renewed progressive vision amid the turbulent political landscape in Poland and beyond.
In this timely and wide-ranging interview, Stanford University’s Professor Larry Diamond explores the resurgence of authoritarianism and the global diffusion of fascistic features. “We don’t have the fully formed, classic version of fascism today,” he explains, “but there is a lot of fascistic behavior, organization, and intent spreading worldwide.” Drawing on his democratic theory expertise and recent support for an international declaration warning that “the threat of fascism is back,” Professor Diamond dissects how elected strongmen exploit polarization, subvert institutions, and erode epistemic authority. From Erdoğan to Orbán to Trump, he examines the authoritarian playbook and offers paths forward—through institutional reform, global alliances, and deliberative democracy—to defend liberal norms before they are incrementally strangled into irrelevance.
In this urgent ECPS interview, Professor Richard Falk warns that the US is facing a “Weimar moment”—a fragile liberal democracy under siege by a resurgent ultra-right. A signatory of the International Declaration Against Fascism, Professor Falk links today’s “techno-fascist enthusiasts” to a global authoritarian drift. He critiques surveillance capitalism, weaponized nationalism, and soft authoritarianism, highlighting leaders like Trump, Modi, Erdoğan, and Netanyahu as drivers of this ideological mutation. Despite this grim trajectory, Professor Falk calls for renewed “normative resistance”—a defiant civic ethics rooted in critical thinking, international law, and solidarity. This interview is a vital reflection on the future of democracy, authoritarianism, and global justice.
In an era when even naming an oppressive regime can invite peril, Professor Baskın Oran offers a cuttingly ironic response to a straightforward question: How should we define Turkey’s current political system? His reply—”Let’s just say a ‘democratic administration,’ so that no harm comes to anyone”—encapsulates the climate of fear and repression under Erdogan’s rule. In this wide-ranging interview, the veteran scholar and dissident traces historical fascism’s return through economic crisis, digital dependency, centralism, and xenophobia. With clarity and conviction, Professor Oran explores how Turkey’s authoritarian populism mirrors global patterns while revealing homegrown roots—and why excessive control may ultimately become the regime’s undoing.
In a wide-ranging interview with ECPS, renowned political scientist Professor Arend Lijphart warns that the design of democratic institutions plays a decisive role in democratic resilience or erosion. Drawing from over 50 years of comparative research, Professor Lijphart argues that presidential and majoritarian systems—as seen in the US, India, and the UK—enable dangerous concentrations of power. “Some electoral systems make the concentration of power much more likely,” he states. In contrast, parliamentary systems with proportional representation foster inclusion, accountability, and stability. His core message is urgent: consensus democracy is not just more effective—it’s essential in resisting authoritarian backsliding. “Strong governments may decide faster,” he notes, “but they often decide wrongly.”
In an in-depth interview with ECPS, Professor Dominika Kasprowicz of Jagiellonian University offers a measured assessment of Poland’s political trajectory following Karol Nawrocki’s narrow presidential victory. While acknowledging the rise of populism and deepening polarization, she maintains that “there is still substantial democratic potential within the system and society.” Professor Kasprowicz highlights the role of affective campaigning, the normalization of populist narratives, and the growing impact of disinformation as structural challenges to liberal democracy. Yet, she points to the resilience of civil society—especially youth and feminist movements—as a critical bulwark against authoritarian drift. “Civic involvement is one of the most important factors behind societal resilience,” she argues, emphasizing the importance of renewed mobilization in the face of rising illiberalism.
In this wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Professor Steven Friedman critiques dominant liberal democratic paradigms that prioritize constraining state power while ignoring the dangers of unregulated private power. “Private power exists and poses significant challenges,” he argues. Professor Friedman warns against the myth that today’s authoritarian surge simply threatens well-functioning democracies, pointing instead to the alienation of citizens by systems failing to meet their needs. He also critiques the hypocrisy of the so-called “rules-based international order,” emphasizing that “if we do not have international law that applies equally to everyone, then we do not have international law at all.” For Friedman, democratic renewal must address inequality and defend universal principles of participation and inclusion.
In an exclusive interview with ECPS, MEP Chloé Ridel, rapporteur for the European Parliament’s forthcoming report on transnational repression, underscores the urgent need for the EU to confront transnational repression—state-organized efforts by authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran to silence critics abroad. Ridel calls for expanding the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime to explicitly include transnational repression and highlights the procedural challenge posed by unanimity voting: “The only people we manage to sanction are mostly Russian… we will have difficulties applying the values we believe in.” She stresses that this is a human rights, security, and democratic issue requiring coordination, oversight of enablers, and stronger protection for vulnerable groups.
In this wide-ranging interview with ECPS, Professor Tariq Modood calls for the creation of a “multiculturalist international” to counter the rise of far-right transnational networks and exclusionary nationalisms. Highlighting the dangers posed by xenophobia, Islamophobia, and authoritarian populism across Europe and beyond, Professor Modood argues that multiculturalism is “not simply a reaction to populism… it is a positive vision” that affirms shared citizenship while respecting diversity. He contrasts his model of “moderate secularism” with French laïcité and Hindu nationalist secularism, emphasizing inclusivity and equality. Brexit, he notes, weakened the EU’s capacity for multicultural integration: “We need to create a multiculturalist alliance across countries, in the way that the far right is creating its own transnational network.”
In a powerful interview with ECPS, genocide scholar Omer Bartov argues that Israel’s military campaign in Gaza amounts to a “deliberate strategy of slow-moving genocide.” Drawing on the legal framework of the UN Genocide Convention and field reports from Israeli human rights groups, Professor Bartov contends that the Israeli government is intentionally making Gaza uninhabitable through starvation, displacement, and destruction of civilian infrastructure. He warns of a broader system of international complicity—what he calls a “diplomatic Iron Dome”—shielding Israel from accountability. As he dissects settler-colonial logic, media self-censorship, and the erasure of Palestinian voices, Professor Bartov issues a clear call: it is time for the world to confront both the scale of the violence and its own enabling silence.
In this powerful interview with ECPS, Professor Ruth Wodak warns that “autocracy has become a global economic corporation”—a transnational network where oligarchs, libertarians, and tech barons control discourse, distort truth, and undermine democracy. From Trump’s incitement of violence to Orbán’s fear-based migrant scapegoating, Professor Wodak outlines how authoritarian populists weaponize crises and social media to legitimize regressive policies. Yet she also defends the vital role of public intellectuals, urging them not to give in to “preemptive fear.” With deep insight into the politics of fear, techno-fascism, and discursive normalization, Professor Wodak’s reflections serve as both an alarm and a call to resistance in our increasingly volatile democratic landscape. A must-read for anyone grappling with today’s authoritarian turn.
In an exclusive interview with ECPS, Professor William Schabas, one of the world’s foremost authorities on genocide and international criminal law, warns that the Gaza crisis represents a “litmus test” for the credibility of international justice. He argues that the case filed by South Africa against Israel at the ICJ is “arguably the strongest case of genocide ever brought before the Court,” citing Israeli military actions and statements by senior officials as evidence of genocidal intent. Professor Schabas also highlights Prime Minister Netanyahu’s populist rhetoric, framing Gaza’s population as an existential threat, which he links to patterns of incitement fueling atrocities. Crucially, he stresses that third-party states, including the US, Germany, and others risk legal liability as “accomplices to genocide.”
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Nic Cheeseman dissects the global resurgence of authoritarian populism and the uneven pathways of democratic backsliding. Warning against the “temporal fallacy,” he argues that crises unfolding simultaneously do not share a single cause—from Europe’s far-right surge to West Africa’s coups. Professor Cheeseman spotlights the twin pillars of democratic defense: resilient institutions and organized civic resistance. “In countries where institutions are weak, mass mobilization becomes absolutely critical—often the only mechanism left to stop populist or authoritarian leaders from consolidating power,” he says. Citing Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia, he urges context-specific democracy support that amplifies local strengths over one-size-fits-all templates.
In this incisive conversation, Brookings scholar Professor William A. Galston argues that America’s decentralized system remains a crucial brake on executive overreach. While warning of real risks, he maintains, “We’re not there yet,” distinguishing the US from harder cases of institutional capture abroad. Professor Galston spotlights federalism and the courts as the decisive arena of resistance—urging institutions to defend their prerogatives through litigation, “not street protests but the law.” He assesses the influence of Project 2025, redistricting fights in Texas/California, and the politics of immigration, crime, and DEI, noting potential backlash among centrist voters. The result is a clear-eyed appraisal of democratic resilience—and the legal contests that will shape whether the US moves toward or away from competitive authoritarianism.
In a wide-ranging ECPS interview, Ben-Gurion University scholar Dr.Halleli Pinson argues that Israel’s Gaza policy is intertwined with an illiberal turn at home. “The polarization we saw before October 7 around judicial reform,” she notes, “is now translated into how people understand the war and the hostages,” adding that “the continuation of the war serves this broader agenda… to reconstruct the Israeli regime into an illiberal one.”Dr. Pinson details how curricula sideline liberal democracy while NGOs and academics face a shrinking space for dissent. Media framings and social media echo chambers deepen an “epistemic polarization.” Though anti-war discourse is growing, she warns that animosities are hardening: “It may take a generation to shift the discourse toward a more liberal, mainstream orientation.”
Professor Norman Finkelstein—NYC-born to Holocaust-survivor parents and, in 2020, ranked the world’s fifth most influential political scientist—tells ECPS that “Israel will mass Gazans at the border, bomb relentlessly, and force Egypt’s hand.” Professor Finkelstein forecasts pressure on Cairo amid “images broadcast worldwide,” frames today’s war as a qualitative break aimed at depopulation (“stay and starve or leave”) and argues that “an imposed famine…constitutes clear proof of genocide.” He argues that, while procedural workarounds to a US veto exist at the UN, they are politically improbable in practice; hence he looks to EU trade leverage instead—though that, too, is stalled by a ‘lack of political will.’ Downplaying doctrinal debates over Zionism, he casts Israel as a ‘Jewish supremacist state’ analogous to apartheid-era South Africa, and notes collapsing Democratic support alongside generational GOP splits.”
In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Aryeh Neier — founding Executive Director of Human Rights Watch and former President of the Open Society Foundations — delivers a powerful assessment of Gaza, free speech, and international accountability. Neier argues that criticism of Israeli policies must not be conflated with antisemitism, stressing that “even antisemitism constitutes protected speech.” He further asserts that “Israel is engaged in genocide,” citing systematic obstruction of humanitarian aid and disproportionate force in Gaza. While the ICC remains “the only viable path” for justice, he warns that political barriers persist. From US policy dynamics to global human rights challenges, Neier offers rare insights into one of today’s most divisive debates.
In Norway’s September 8, 2025, general election, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s Labour Party narrowly held on to power — but the real story was the historic surge of the populist Progress Party (FrP), which doubled its vote share to 24% and became the country’s second-largest party. In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Lise Bjånesøy (University of Bergen) explains how FrP converted economic grievances into populist momentum, capitalizing on anger over wealth taxes, cost-of-living pressures, and distrust of “wasteful elites.” FrP also mobilized younger men through social media, a trend Dr. Bjånesøy calls a key driver of Norway’s new political divides.
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Henri Barkey—born in Turkey and one of the leading US experts on Middle East politics—warns that Turkey has crossed a decisive threshold under President Erdogan. “Turkey has now become a full-blown authoritarian system,” he stated, arguing that Erdogan has removed the “competitive” element from competitive authoritarianism by subordinating the judiciary, jailing rivals, and even deciding opposition party leadership. While repression deepens, Professor Barkey sees a paradox: “The system is becoming more authoritarian, but society may be resisting much more than we realize.” He highlights youth-led mobilization, fears over arrested Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu’s popularity, and Europe’s limited leverage, concluding that Erdogan’s overreach may ultimately galvanize opposition forces.
A new United Nations commission of inquiry has concluded that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, citing mass killings, forced displacement, the destruction of essential infrastructure, and even measures to prevent births as evidence of genocidal intent. While Israel has rejected the findings as “distorted and false,” the commission underscored that all states are legally obliged to prevent and punish genocide. Against this backdrop, the ECPS spoke with genocide scholar and peace activist Dr. Mark Levene. In the interview, he warns that genocide is not an aberration but “a dysfunction of the international state system,” arguing that Gaza exemplifies how structural failures and powerful alliances allow atrocities to continue unchecked.
In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Mara Nogueira (Birkbeck, University of London) argues that Brazil’s decision to convict Jair Bolsonaro for plotting a coup marks a turning point in democratic accountability. “By convicting Bolsonaro, we are doing what the US should have done with Trump and moving in the right direction toward democracy,” she says. Rejecting claims of judicial overreach, Dr. Nogueira stresses: “The Supreme Court is not overstepping but rather fulfilling its role.” She welcomes the unprecedented prosecution of both civil and military senior officers since the 1964–85 dictatorship, while warning that far-right actors are already mobilizing “judicial dictatorship” narratives. For her, the trial sends a crucial signal: “It’s not acceptable to plan a coup d’état—and if you do so, you will face charges.”
Brazil’s democracy faces one of its greatest stress tests with former President Jair Bolsonaro sentenced to 27 years for plotting a coup. In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. André Borges, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Brasília, warns that Brazil is “becoming more like American politics, where affective polarization drives citizens to see opponents as existential threats.” Such polarization, he argues, risks normalizing democratic rule-breaking. Yet Dr. Borges also highlights Brazil’s resilience, rooted in its “institutional mix that deconcentrates authority”—federalism, separation of powers, fragmented parties, and an autonomous Supreme Court. This paradox defines Brazil today: resilient institutions confronting dangerously eroding democratic norms.
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Dinesh Paudel argues that the September 2025 youth uprising in Nepal was “the result of long-brewing frustrations.” Far from a sudden outburst, he situates the revolt at the intersection of elite failure, geopolitical maneuvering, and structural economic decline. Young Nepalis, caught in what he calls a “triple disjuncture” of mass migration, precarious labor markets, and digital mobilization, transformed simmering anger into protest. Yet Professor Paudel cautions against viewing it as a revolution: “It will not fundamentally alter the political structure that produced these conditions.” Professor Paudel highlights corruption as the “governing logic of elite power” and signals volatile struggles over Nepal’s political and economic future.
In an exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch and now at Princeton—warns that Israel is cynically using charges of antisemitism to shield what he calls genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” Drawing on three decades of human rights leadership, Professor Roth situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a broader authoritarian playbook: populist leaders tilt elections, capture institutions, and scapegoat minorities while silencing dissent. His central warning is stark: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism, and blurring this line endangers both Palestinians and Jews worldwide.
“Transitional Nepal may face real dangers from rising religious populism,” cautions Dr. DB Subedi, lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, in an interview with the ECPS. While the September 2025 youth-led uprising signaled a break with entrenched corruption, nepotism, and elite capture, Dr. Subedi warns that Nepal’s weak secularism leaves space for actors seeking to reinstate Hindu statehood. Such a trajectory, he argues, risks fusing populist nationalism with sectarian identity—posing a greater threat than conventional elite dominance. Yet he also sees in Gen Z’s unprecedented mobilization the embryonic signs of a participatory, post-elitist democracy. Much depends, he stresses, on whether Nepal’s interim government can ensure a smooth, accountable transition to elections.
In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Mom Bishwakarma reflects on Nepal’s September 2025 uprising, widely described as a Gen Z revolution. While youth mobilization toppled a government and ignited debates on corruption and “Nepo baby” privilege, Dr. Bishwakarma warns that deeper inequalities remain untouched. “Basically, we can say this has brought some destruction to political institutions, but not real change,” he stresses. Despite promises of inclusion in the 2015 constitution, caste discrimination and elite dominance persist, leaving Dalits marginalized. Drawing parallels with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, he cautions that without dismantling entrenched structures, Nepal risks repeating cycles of revolt and disappointment rather than achieving a genuine democratic transformation.
In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Cristian Cantir (Oakland University) described Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections as “a major win for the European Union and a major defeat for the Kremlin.” Despite massive Russian interference—including vote-buying, cryptocurrency transfers, and efforts to incite unrest—Moldovan institutions responded with unprecedented consistency, demonstrating what Dr. Cantir calls a “confirmation of Moldova’s democratic resilience.” Yet, he warns that Moscow remains influential through populist narratives exploiting poverty and weak institutions. The results, he argues, reflect both the enduring popularity of EU integration and the failures of pro-Russian opposition parties. For Dr. Cantir, Moldova offers a striking example of how Russian influence faces diminishing returns when met with institutional strength and sustained Western support.
The conviction of Jair Bolsonaro and senior military officers for plotting a coup marks an unprecedented moment in Brazil’s democratic history. For the first time, both a former president and high-ranking commanders have been held accountable for attempting to subvert constitutional order. In her interview with the ECPS, Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruzcalls this a “historic” cultural shift: “Brazilian society is no longer willing to tolerate such attacks on democracy.” She emphasizes that this resilience stems from institutional maturity and judicial independence. By focusing on concrete evidence rather than rhetoric, Brazil’s Supreme Court set a vital precedent: authoritarian populism meets its legal limit when courts remain credible veto players.
Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections mark a pivotal moment in the geopolitical tug-of-war between the European Union and Russia. Despite unprecedented hybrid interference—including disinformation, illicit financing, and the use of new technologies—the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) secured a decisive victory. Dr. Ecaterina Locoman cautions, however, that this success is “more of a temporary setback” for Moscow than a strategic defeat: “Russia will gather its resources again.” In this interview with ECPS, Dr. Locoman analyzes Moldova’s evolving democratic resilience, the adaptive strategies of Russian influence, the role of the diaspora, and the country’s ambitious EU accession goal. She underscores the importance of sustained domestic reform and Western engagement to keep Moldova on its “irreversible European path.”
On October 4, 2025, billionaire populist Andrej Babiš’s ANO party won the Czech parliamentary elections with just under 35% of the vote, setting the stage for coalition talks with two small right-wing, Eurosceptic parties. In this in-depth interview with ECPS, Professor Lenka Bustikova analyzes the implications of this outcome for Czech democracy and the broader Central European political landscape. Warning that “Babiš’s victory is a big win for illiberalism in Europe,” she explains how this election represents both a consolidation of illiberal forces and a strategic shift in Babiš’s populism—from managerialism to paternalism—raising concerns about democratic backsliding and Czechia’s future orientation within the EU.
In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Dr.Bruce E. Cain—Professor of Political Science at Stanford University—analyzes how Donald Trump has reshaped the Republican Party and advanced classical authoritarian strategies. “There’s no question that, whether by instinct or by deliberate strategy, Trump is playing the classical authoritarian game,” Professor Cain asserts. He situates Trumpism within long-term demographic, institutional, and ideological shifts while underscoring Trump’s unique use of crisis narratives, bullying tactics, and federal coercion. Professor Cain also warns that Trumpism has exploited structural weaknesses in party regulation, executive power, and campaign finance, stressing the urgency of reinforcing democratic guardrails to prevent lasting authoritarian consolidation.
Professor Vlastimil Havlík warns that the incoming Babiš government “is not good news for the quality of Czech democracy.” Although constitutional majorities are “very unlikely,” he predicts “a slower, incremental decrease in the quality of democracy” through politicization of public service media, weakening of liberal civil society, and the conflation of private business and state power. He describes ANO’s victory as “a consolidation of the illiberal space” and emphasizes that probable coalition partners like the Motorists and SPD share “hostile rhetoric toward NGOs” and key democratic institutions. Strategically, ANO now pursues “a soft version of Euroscepticism,” aligning with median voter preferences while maintaining a pragmatic, catch-all profile.
Populist actors often present themselves as defenders of “the people” while strategically boosting state capacity for select groups and undermining it overall, argues Edward L. Knudsen, a doctoral researcher at the University of Oxford and Affiliate Policy Fellow at the Jacques Delors Centre. In an interview with ECPS, Knudsen explains how modern populists “selectively increase governance measures for specific populations while often undermining them in the aggregate,” creating new forms of exclusion and weakening accountability. He highlights fiscal control as the central battleground for populist movements and warns that if democratic actors fail to adapt to the rise of state capitalism, authoritarian forces may fill the void with illiberal governance models.
In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. Maria Papageorgiou, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at Newcastle University, examines how digital platforms have transformed both domestic politics and international relations. Drawing on her Leverhulme project on Sino–Russian disinformation synergies, she argues that Russia and China have developed a “division of labor” in online influence operations aimed at destabilizing Western democracies. “They have attempted to amplify both sides of political debates through bots and anonymous accounts—using certain elements to appeal to the right wing and others to the left… In short, they play both sides,” she explains. By exploiting emotional content and deepening polarization, these actors are reshaping democratic discourse and testing the limits of resilience in open societies.
In this insightful interview, world-renowned revolution scholar Professor Jack A. Goldstone warns that we are witnessing both “a descent into an authoritarian pattern across much of the world” and “the beginning of a revolutionary movement.” Professor Goldstone argues that today’s global instability—rising inequality, elite overproduction, populist anger, and democratic decay—signals the breakdown of the post–World War II liberal order. “The global and national institutions of the last 50 years,” he notes, “are falling apart.” Yet he remains cautiously hopeful: while “the next ten years will be very difficult,” he foresees that by the late 2030s, a new generation will “demand more accountability, more freedom, and use new technologies to build a better world.”
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Richard H. Pildes, one of America’s leading constitutional scholars, warns that democracy’s survival depends not only on equality and participation but also on its capacity to deliver effective governance. “Democracy,” he says, “rests on two simple promises: equal voice and better lives. When governments fail in that second task, it profoundly undermines democracy itself.” Professor Pildes argues that excessive focus on participation, coupled with digital fragmentation and weakened political parties, have eroded governments’ ability to act decisively. The rise of “free-agent politicians,” algorithmic outrage, and social media-driven polarization, he cautions, threaten to make democracy less capable of solving problems. “Effective government,” Professor Pildes insists, “is the forgotten pillar of democracy.”
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Gijs Schumacher of the University of Amsterdam argues that Dutch politics may be entering a “post-populist era.” As the Netherlands approaches yet another general election, Professor Schumacher highlights growing fragmentation across left, right, and radical-right blocs, noting that “many voters no longer perceive meaningful differences between centrist parties.” While populism’s anti-establishment appeal remains psychologically powerful, he observes that this sentiment is now spreading “more evenly across the political spectrum.” According to Professor Schumacher, the Netherlands’ long tradition of elite cooperation could allow a shift toward “pragmatic governance,” provided that “the mainstream left and right tone down their toxic rhetoric.” The post-populist phase, he suggests, reflects not decline but recalibration.
In a wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Dr. Mariana Sendra, Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Deusto, examines the endurance and contradictions of Javier Milei’s populist-neoliberal experiment in Argentina. She interprets Milei’s strong midterm showing as “an endorsement of his government—but not a blank check,” warning that he and his followers “might interpret this electoral support as a green light to override institutional constraints.” Dr. Sendra highlights the exhaustion of Peronism, the influence of US backing, and Milei’s alignment with transnational far-right networks. While his administration remains formally democratic, she cautions that Argentina’s “democratic coexistence” is under pressure from rising intolerance and exclusion, calling on observers to “remain vigilant.”
In an in-depth and sobering interview with the ECPS, Princeton historian Professor Sean Wilentz warns that the United States has moved “beyond a constitutional crisis” into a state of “constitutional failure.” He argues that the Supreme Court’s presidential immunity ruling has “turned the presidency into a potential hotbed of criminality,” effectively dismantling the rule of law. “We’re no longer living in a truly democratic regime,” he cautions. Linking America’s democratic decline to a “highly coordinated global problem emanating from Moscow,” Professor Wilentz calls for a “democracy international” to counter what he terms a “tyranny international.” Despite his grim assessment, he expresses cautious faith that “most Americans will vindicate America itself” before it is too late.
In this exclusive interview with the ECPS, Professor Ivan Llamazares of the University of Salamanca analyzes Argentina’s shifting political landscape under President Javier Milei, whose recent midterm victory consolidated his power and emboldened his radical austerity agenda. Professor Llamazares argues that while Milei’s libertarian populism intensifies Argentina’s ideological divisions, it does not fundamentally alter them. “It’s a modification, an intensification—but the underlying structure is still there,” he explains. Rejecting comparisons to Bolsonaro’s authoritarianism, he insists that “authoritarianism is very weak in Argentina, whose popular culture is deeply democratic.” For Professor Llamazares, Milei’s experiment embodies an “extreme illustration” of global right-wing populism—yet remains distinctly Argentine, rooted in enduring social cleavages, economic crises, and democratic resilience.
In an exclusive interview with ECPS, Professor Juan Bautista Lucca of the National University of Rosario (UNR) analyzes Argentina’s shifting political landscape under President Javier Milei. He argues that Milei’s project represents “a radicalized hybrid—ultra-neoliberal in economics but ultra-populist in rhetoric.” For Professor Lucca, Milei has transformed neoliberalism into a moral crusade, “sacralizing the market” while turning politics into “a permanent apocalyptic theater.” He views Milei’s alliance with Donald Trump as part of a broader “geopolitics of Trumpism in the Global South,” where sovereignty is redefined through ideological, not strategic, ties. Following Milei’s sweeping midterm victory—with La Libertad Avanza winning 41% of the vote—Professor Lucca warns that Argentina stands in a Gramscian “interregnum,” facing both consolidation and disillusionment.
In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Dr. Simon P. Otjes, Assistant Professor of Dutch Politics at Leiden University, argues that the 2025 Dutch elections signaled not the decline but the reconfiguration of populism. “What was previously very strongly concentrated on the PVV has now dissipated into three different parties, representing three different ways of doing politics,” he notes. While JA21 seeks governmental influence and FvD appeals to conspiratorial electorates, the overall radical-right bloc remains stable. Dr. Otjes warns that a broad centrist coalition could “reproduce the very disaffection it seeks to contain,” fueling further populist resurgence. Far from a post-populist era, he concludes, “we’re still very much inside this populist moment.”
In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Professor Sarah de Lange of Leiden University cautions that “D66’s victory in Dutch elections cannot be presented as a victory over populism.” While the liberal centrist D66 led by Rob Jetten revitalized the political center, Professor de Lange stresses that “the total size of the radical right-wing bloc has not diminished—it’s just more fragmented.” She argues that Dutch politics is shaped less by populism than by nativism, which has “seeped so much into the mainstream.” Despite the PVV’s exclusion from government, Professor de Lange warns that illiberalism remains a significant threat, while the defense of liberal democracy has only recently become “more salient for mainstream parties and more visible to citizens.”
“We Need the GOP to Reclaim Its Role as a Check on Trump,” argues Associate Professor Rory Truex of Princeton University in a wide-ranging interview with ECPS. He warns that the United States is “in the middle stages of democratic backsliding,” driven by Trump’s effort to “capture the referees” through loyalist appointments across the DOJ, FBI, and Department of Defense. Dr. Truex cautions that framing opponents as “enemies from within” is a classic precursor to authoritarian repression, even as recent mass protests—“the largest in American history”—underscore civic resilience. While electoral results in New Jersey, Virginia, California, and New York signal public fatigue with Trumpism, Dr. Truex maintains that meaningful reversal hinges on Republican elites: “We need the Republican Party to come back to its senses.”
In an interview with the ECPS, Associate Professor Erica Frantz warns that the growing rise of personalist leaders worldwide is undermining democratic institutions and increasing the risk of international conflict. Personalist systems—where power is concentrated around a single dominant figure—erode checks and balances, distort party structures, and heighten foreign-policy miscalculation. Reflecting on the United States, she notes that Donald Trump has transformed the GOP into a “personal political vehicle,” enabling rapid consolidation of executive power. As domestic constraints weaken, Dr. Frantz cautions, “we are increasingly setting the stage for more volatile and unpredictable conflict behavior in the international arena.” She identifies leader-created parties and media-driven mobilization as critical warning signs of emerging personalist capture.
“Anti-gender discourses are very interlinked and interconnected; we see these floating narratives repeated across countries like Latvia, Poland, and Russia,” says Dr. Monika de Silva. She explains that populist actors strategically exploit linguistic ambiguity around concepts such as gender, transforming technical legal terms into polarizing political symbols. “Language is never neutral… this linguistic openness is used to argue that because gender replaces the word sex, we can no longer talk about men and women,” she notes. The Istanbul Convention—intended to prevent violence against women—has thus been reframed as an LGBTQ+ threat or “radical feminist project.” Yet Dr. de Silva stresses the importance of civic resistance: Latvia’s mass protests “undoubtedly shaped” the president’s decision to return the withdrawal bill to parliament.
In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Dr. Koen Vossen, political historian and lecturer at Radboud University, analyzes the ideological evolution and endurance of Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV). He stresses that “The anti-Islam core is absolutely the most important part of this party,” noting that despite tactical moderation, its fundamental worldview remains unchanged. According to Dr. Vossen, the PVV’s “one-man structure” and lack of internal democracy make it both flexible and fragile. Wilders’s “clash of civilizations” narrative, rooted in his early attachment to Israel, continues to shape his politics. As Dr. Vossen observes, media normalization, cultural anxieties, and declining institutional barriers have allowed the PVV to become a lasting—though polarizing—force in Dutch politics.
Argentina is facing an unprecedented assault on its scientific and educational institutions under President Javier Milei’s libertarian administration. Sweeping budget cuts, halted research careers, and the dismantling of science and human rights agencies have destabilized the country’s knowledge ecosystem. As Dr. Laura Rovelli warns, “the government has deployed anti-science and denialist rhetoric that seeks to discredit and undermine the institutions of science and higher education.” This interview explores how Milei’s radical anti-statist agenda erodes academic autonomy, weakens evidence-based policymaking, and reshapes public education amid growing attacks on universities accused of being “ideologically captured.” Dr. Rovelli also highlights emerging networks of resistance—unions, students, feminist groups, and scholars—mobilizing to defend academic freedom, public knowledge, and democratic life.
In an interview for the ECPS, Dr. Ulrike M. Vieten offers a sharp sociological reading of the 2025 Dutch elections, arguing that “progressive liberalism appears rather cosmetic, and the Dutch elections reveal a significant win for fractured far-right populist parties.” Despite Geert Wilders’ setback, Dr. Vieten stresses that the far right remains structurally resilient, with PVV, JA21, and FvD together securing 42 seats. She highlights the normalization of anti-immigration rhetoric, the co-optation of far-right frames by centrist actors, and the deepening tensions between state-centered citizenship and post-migrant identities. From femonationalism to coalition politics, Dr. Vieten situates the Dutch results within broader European trajectories of nativism, militarization, and socio-economic neglect—warning that liberal democracy risks privileging cultural cohesion over social justice.
In this interview for the ECPS, Dr. Damon Linker delivers a stark assessment of Trumpism’s place in the global surge of right-wing populism. Dr. Linker argues that Donald Trump is “the worst possible example of a right-wing populist,” not only for his ideological extremism but for a uniquely volatile mix of narcissism, vindictiveness, and disregard for constitutional limits. Central to his warning is Trump’s assault on what he calls the democratic “middle layer”—the professional civil servants who “act as a layer of defense” against executive tyranny. By “uniting the bottom and the top to crush that middle layer,” Dr. Linker contends, Trumpism pushes the United States toward an authoritarian model unprecedented in its modern political history.
In a compelling interview with ECPS, Professor Jan Kubik challenges one of the most persistent assumptions about Central and Eastern Europe: that right-wing populism is primarily a legacy of communism. Instead, he argues, its roots lie in far older social hierarchies. “Many people say populists are stronger in East-Central Europe because of communism. I think that misses the point. It is much deeper. It is actual feudalism… long before communism,” he explains. Professor Kubik outlines how these deep-seated structures—traditional authority patterns, weak middle classes, and historically delayed modernization—interact with neo-traditionalist narratives deployed by parties like PiS and Fidesz. The result, he warns, is a durable populist ecosystem requiring both organic civic renewal and, potentially, a dramatic institutional reset.
In this incisive interview for the ECPS, Professor Axel Klein offers a nuanced assessment of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s ideological profile. While her blend of nationalism, anti-feminism, and strong-leader rhetoric has led some observers to categorize her as a populist, Professor Klein cautions against this simplification. As he notes, “nationalism and anti-feminism… are trademarks of a conservative or right-wing politician, but they are not necessarily populist phenomena per se.” Instead, he situates PM Takaichi within Japan’s broader political culture—one shaped by nostalgia, stability-seeking voters, and the enduring dominance of the LDP—arguing that her conservatism reflects continuity more than populist rupture.
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Patricio Navia underscores a defining paradox of Chile’s 2025 election: “Chileans ended up voting for two radical candidates in the first round, but they want them to govern as moderates.” He stresses that the apparent right-wing surge is less ideological than punitive, describing the first round as “a punishment vote against the left-wing ruling party.” Professor Navia highlights how insecurity reshaped the campaign, noting that the right “successfully turned the migration issue into an issue of insecurity and crime,” yet simultaneously embraced moderate positions on social rights. While Kast’s discourse may appear Trumpian, Professor Navia cautions that “Trump is a protectionist; Kast is a free-market advocate.” Ultimately, he argues, Chileans remain centrist in expectations: “They expect those candidates to govern as moderates.”
In a penetrating interview with ECPS, Professor Barry Sullivan warns that “the separation of powers does not function as the Framers anticipated,” offering one of the starkest legal assessments yet of America’s constitutional crisis. Drawing on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump v. United States, he argues that “the constitutional doctrine and the man have met the moment,” producing a presidency with “virtually total control, without suffering any consequences.” Sullivan traces this shift to a revival of a “Nixonian” view of executive authority—summarized in Nixon’s infamous claim, “If the President does it, it is not illegal.” Such developments, he cautions, create “enclaves of unaccountable power” and dramatically heighten the risk of democratic backsliding, especially amid polarized parties and eroding constitutional conventions.
In his interview with ECPS, Professor Richard Youngs (Carnegie Europe; University of Warwick) offers a sharp assessment of today’s democratic crisis. Highlighting a “qualitative shift” in autocratization, he points to two transformative forces: digital technologies and a rapidly changing international order. As he observes, “we are in an interregnum between the liberal global order and whatever comes next.” Professor Youngs warns that democratic erosion is driven not only by structural pressures but by the “incremental tactics” of illiberal leaders who steadily undermine checks and balances—often learning directly from one another. Looking ahead, he argues that mere institutional survival is insufficient: democracies must pursue renewal and resilience, noting that “it is much easier to undo democracy than to reassemble good-quality democratic norms.”
Chile’s November 16, 2025 presidential vote has produced an unprecedented runoff between José Antonio Kast and Jeannette Jara, crystallizing what Assoc. Prof. Manuel Larrabure calls a historic ideological rupture. Speaking to ECPS, he warns that Chile’s shift must be understood within a broader continental realignment: “A new right-wing alliance is emerging in Latin America—and democracy will take a toll.” According to Larrabure, this bloc is not restoring old authoritarianism but “reinventing democracy—and it’s working.” Kast’s coalition embodies a regional “Bolsonaro–Milei playbook,” powered by what Larrabure terms “rule by chaos,” amplified by compulsory voting and disinformation ecosystems. Meanwhile, the Chilean left enters the run-off severely weakened—“the final nail in the coffin” of a long cycle of progressive contestation.
In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Lisa Zanotti—Assistant Professor at Diego Portales University and researcher at COES and Ultra-Lab—offers a sharply focused analysis of the far right’s accelerating rise in Latin America and its implications for Chile’s 2025 election. She underscores a crucial structural insight: “presidential systems ease populists’ rise to power in Latin America,” helping figures like José Antonio Kast gain rapid executive influence. While Chile’s rightward shift appears dramatic, Dr. Zanotti cautions that it is driven less by ideological conversion than by strong anti-elite and anti-incumbent sentiment. She also highlights the authoritarian core of the Latin American PRR, warning that “when the far right remains in power for an extended period, democratic backsliding occurs.”
In her interview with ECPS, Professor Susan Stokes explains how rising inequality and polarization create fertile ground for democratic backsliding. “There’s a kind of direct, almost organic effect of income inequality on polarization,” she notes, adding that the United States is “a very unequal country—and the oldest democracy—yet being an old democracy does not protect us from backsliding.” Despite these vulnerabilities, Professor Stokes rejects fatalism. Civil society mobilization and the courts, she emphasizes, have been “major blocks in the way of autocratization under the second Trump administration.” Ultimately, she remains cautiously optimistic: “There are lots of reasons to be hopeful that democracy will survive and can be rebuilt in a more robust way.”
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Joseph Wright (Penn State University) warns that the most alarming development of “Trump 2.0” is the rapid personalization of the state’s coercive apparatus. “The most troubling aspect… is the personalization of the security forces. That is the single most damaging thing that can happen to a country,” he cautions. Professor Wright notes that ICE has evolved into “a fully militarized internal security organization,” now poised to become one of the world’s largest such forces—capable, he warns, of being deployed “to seize ballot boxes” or “shoot protesters.” While federalism still offers partial safeguards, Professor Wright argues the United States is witnessing early signs of institutional capture characteristic of personalist regimes worldwide.
In this in-depth interview for ECPS, Professor Tim Bale offers a sharp assessment of Reform UK’s rise and Nigel Farage’s polarizing leadership. Farage, he argues, is “a Marmite politician — people either love or hate him,” making him both Reform’s engine and its constraint. Professor Bale suggests that Farage exemplifies “a classic populist radical-right leader” who channels anti-elite sentiment, yet risks alienating voters beyond his base. He links Reform’s surge less to ideological realignment than to Conservative decay, marked by Brexit fragmentation, leadership churn, and “over-promis[ing] and under-deliver[ing] on migration.” While Reform may reshape the political terrain, Professor Bale warns its ceiling remains visible—especially if questions of competence, Russia, and generational change intensify. Reform’s future, he concludes, is possible, but far from inevitable.
In this interview with the ECPS, Dr. Robert Butler, Senior Lecturer at the University of Lorraine, examines how far-right actors in France and the UK construct legitimacy amid crisis and geopolitical uncertainty. Drawing on critical and multimodal discourse analysis, Dr. Butler explores authorization, crisis narratives, and moral evaluation in the rhetoric of Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella, and Nigel Farage. Reflecting on Trump’s return to power, he cautions against simplistic readings of transatlantic influence, arguing that framing Europe as “weak and vulnerable” may have concrete political effects. As Dr. Butler strikingly notes, “non-intervention itself becomes a form of intervention,” reshaping sovereignty, responsibility, and counter-mobilization across Europe.
In this wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Dr. Matías Bianchi offers a powerful diagnosis of contemporary illiberalism. Moving beyond regime-centric explanations, Dr. Bianchi argues that today’s defining shift is normative: “illiberal actors no longer need to pretend they are liberal.” He shows how illiberalism now operates through transnational networks embedded within liberal democracies, sustained by funding, coordination, and discourse originating largely in the Global North. Highlighting the erosion of liberal legitimacy, the normalization of illiberal language, and the structural weakening of the nation-state, Dr. Bianchi underscores why democratic institutions struggle to respond—and what is at stake if they fail to adapt.
In 2025, the ECPS deepened its role as a forum for timely, critical, and pluralistic debate through its Commentaries and Voice of Youth (VoY) series, publishing more than 40 original pieces, including over 30 expert commentaries and 10 Voice of Youth essays. Together, these contributions complemented ECPS’s peer-reviewed scholarship by offering analytically sharp, normatively engaged, and publicly accessible interventions on unfolding political, economic, and social crises.
The commentaries—authored by established scholars, economists, legal experts, and public intellectuals—interrogated the evolving logics of populism, authoritarianism, and democratic erosion across regions. They addressed subjects ranging from Trumpism 2.0, trade wars, and new capitalisms to nativism, civilizational politics, climate governance, gendered authoritarianism, and the normalization of violence in both domestic and international contexts. Many pieces directly engaged with real-time events—elections, wars, protests, court rulings—offering theoretically grounded yet immediately relevant interpretations.
The Voice of Youth (VoY) essays added a distinct and indispensable dimension. Written by students, early-career researchers, and young writers from diverse backgrounds, these contributions foregrounded generational perspectives on migration, memory, gender-based violence, far-right radicalization, digital trauma, and everyday encounters with state power. Rather than echoing dominant narratives, VoY essays challenged them—often combining personal reflection with critical political insight—thereby expanding the epistemic boundaries of populism studies.
Collectively, the 2025 Commentaries and VoY publications underscore ECPS’s belief that understanding populism requires not only academic rigor but also moral clarity, intergenerational dialogue, and intellectual courage—especially at a moment when democratic norms are increasingly contested rather than taken for granted.
Donald Trump’s first campaign and election were not merely a triumph for populism but a “game-changer,” bringing it to the forefront not just as an ideology but as a method of governance. Trump’s rise reshaped Western democracies, fostering a culture where political norms were no longer stable foundations but tools to be discarded when inconvenient. This commentary seeks to analyze Trump’s prospective second administration and its potential to deepen existing fractures in governance. By examining the cabinet figures, controversies, and projected policies, this analysis will explore their implications for the balance of powers, climate policy, immigration, justice, and international relations.
Our agent-based simulations show that non-populist rhetoric, exemplified by former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, fosters societal cohesion through positivity, inclusivity, and broad audience engagement. By maintaining a “middle ground,” it promotes civil discourse and prevents ideological divisions from deepening into polarization. Inclusive language ensures all groups feel recognized, addressing societal fractures. In contrast, populist rhetoric, typified by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reinforces divides through negativity and exclusion. By antagonizing outgroups and amplifying grievances, it fosters conflict and consolidates ingroup loyalty at the expense of societal harmony. This sharp contrast highlights the stabilizing potential of inclusive rhetoric versus the fragmenting impact of populist communication.
By Matthew J. Belanger, Ana-Maria Bliuc, John Betts & Ihsan Yilmaz
How does Erdogan’s populist rhetoric resonate with his supporters? Our study dives into his use of nostalgia, threat, and unity to rally his base. We found that while Erdogan and his followers align on “threat” messaging—framing enemies as existential dangers—supporters amplify this far more than his calls for unity. Nostalgia for Turkey’s Ottoman past adds a powerful emotional pull, fueling his vision of a revived Islamic identity. These findings reveal how populist language not only connects leaders to their base but also reshapes grassroots narratives, driving division and loyalty in equal measure.
By Ihsan Yilmaz, Ana-Maria Bliuc & Daniel S. Courtney
Who do people trust in politics, and why? Our online survey experiment reveals that trust and credibility are driven less by emotional victimization narratives and more by partisanship. Political messages resonate most when they align with the audience’s ideological beliefs, overshadowing the impact of emotional appeals. These findings highlight the power of identity in shaping perceptions and the challenges of bridging partisan divides in today’s polarized landscape. Tailored messaging that speaks to shared values remains key to building trust and engagement.
Vice Admiral Gouveia e Melo’s rise from COVID-19 vaccination leader to potential presidential contender reflects Portugal’s cultural heritage of military messianism. His disciplined leadership, amplified by media narratives, crafted a savior image transcending political divides. This phenomenon taps into Portugal’s historical archetypes, where military figures with messianic undertones captivate public imagination. While appealing to a public seeking stability, his trajectory highlights the tension between democratic governance and charismatic authority. This case underscores the risks of media-driven political personas overshadowing pluralism and institutional accountability in democratic systems.
The politics of immigration in the U.S. reveal peculiar alliances on both sides of the aisle. For Democrats, the coalition spans ethnoracial diversity, balancing ideals of equality with the economic and cultural concerns of immigration. This tension often leaves the Left grappling with its own contradictions. For Republicans, an equally uneasy partnership emerges. Grassroots voters, driven by ethnonationalist anxieties, align with capitalist elites who benefit from cheap immigrant labor. This “awkward alliance” pits anti-immigrant rhetoric against the economic realities of business reliance on immigration, fueling policies that prioritize elite agendas while alienating vulnerable voters.
Populist US President Donald Trump’s self-proclaimed favorite word, “tariff,” has far-reaching implications beyond simple taxation. In this insightful analysis, Professor Eser Karakaş dissects the economic distortions and welfare costs associated with protectionist trade policies. He examines how tariffs disrupt relative price structures, reducing efficiency and shifting wealth from consumers to producers, ultimately leading to net societal losses. Drawing on economic theory and Mancur Olson’s “Logic of Collective Action,” Karakaş explains why seemingly irrational tariff policies persist in political decision-making. He further explores Trump’s tariff war with China, its impact on global trade, and how it could weaken the US economy in the long run.
Trumpism 2.0 marks a fundamental shift in global capitalism, blending nationalist protectionism, corporate oligarchy, and digital feudalism. The US is transitioning from ‘neutral’ state capitalism to a model where government policies explicitly serve dominant private entities, eroding economic democracy and consolidating monopolistic power. This transformation deepens domestic inequality while driving international economic fragmentation, trade wars, and strategic decoupling. Meanwhile, the Global South is asserting greater autonomy, challenging Western dominance, and reshaping economic alliances. If these trends persist, escalating geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions, and financial instability may define the coming decades. Yet, this period of turbulence—reminiscent of the 1930s—also presents an opportunity for systemic change, though it raises the risk of large-scale global conflict.
In his compelling analysis, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk explores how “Trumpism 2.0” and a multipolar world order are challenging the foundations of German and Japanese capitalism. As the US shifts toward protectionism, economic nationalism, and corporate oligarchy, both countries—once revitalized by American support after WWII—must now reassess their strategic and economic futures. Ozturk examines how trade wars, supply chain disruptions, and declining US cooperation threaten their export-driven models. From demographic decline to digital transformation, Germany and Japan face urgent structural reforms. This timely commentary not only maps the common and unique risks confronting these two economic giants but also outlines actionable strategies to maintain resilience in a fragmented world.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political journey reflects a dramatic transformation—from a reform-minded leader once hailed as a model for Muslim democracies to an autocrat presiding over a deeply polarized and economically fragile Turkey. His consolidation of power, particularly after the 2016 coup attempt, has ushered in a regime marked by institutional erosion, economic mismanagement, and authoritarian repression. Recent mass protests sparked by the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu highlight growing public resistance, yet the broader trajectory remains one of democratic backsliding. Erdogan has found space to entrench his rule in an increasingly multipolar world, with Western pressure diluted by competing geopolitical priorities. The critical question now is whether domestic mobilization can meaningfully challenge this entrenched authoritarianism.
Marine Le Pen’s conviction for embezzling EU funds might have marked a legal defeat—but politically, it became a narrative victory. In her commentary, Julie Van Elslander explores how France’s far-right leader transformed her trial into a populist spectacle of persecution, mobilizing public anger and institutional distrust. By reframing judicial accountability as elite conspiracy, Le Pen advanced a post-truth strategy that defied factual condemnation and resonated deeply with disillusioned voters. This timely analysis illuminates the broader phenomenon of populist resilience in the face of scandal, showing how legal consequences can be strategically repurposed as political capital by populist actors within Europe’s increasingly contested democratic landscape.
The surprising midterm victories of Benigno Aquino IV and Kiko Pangilinan—both underdog candidates backed by the progressive Pink Movement—signal a potential turning point in Philippine politics. Despite polling poorly before the vote, both secured top spots in the Senate race, fueled largely by a mobilized youth electorate and disillusionment with traditional power blocs. The resurgence of the Pink Movement, rooted in civic resistance during the Duterte era, now finds new momentum amid internal fractures in the Marcos-Duterte alliance. While questions remain about the opposition’s long-term cohesion and whether these gains reflect lasting ideological shifts, the current momentum and demographic advantage suggest the Pink Movement—and the youth—could play a decisive role in shaping the 2028 national elections.
Can we truly choose not to feel inferior? In this thought-provoking commentary, Syed Yousha Haider critically examines Eleanor Roosevelt’s famous quote, “No one can make you feel inferior without your consent.” Blending insights from psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and social theory, Haider explores the limits of agency in the face of trauma, social conditioning, and structural inequality. While celebrating resilience and self-determination, he also challenges oversimplified notions of empowerment. This essay invites readers to reflect on the complex dynamics of self-worth, consent, and resistance in a world where internal struggles are often shaped by forces far beyond the individual.
The rise of populism has exposed the fragility of representative democracy, particularly in an era of rapid technological change. The digital age has blurred the lines between the personal and the political, as social media platforms empower populist leaders to claim direct representation of the people. As the public’s trust in institutionalized forms of democracy wanes, this has led to a recalibration of what representation should entail. Beyond mere vote casting, representation is increasingly about ensuring a broader, more inclusive range of voices within political discourse. However, as Peter Mair (2013) and others have noted, this expansion often leads to fragmentation rather than cohesion, making the task of political representation more complex and urgently in need of reinvention in the face of emerging global challenges.
Donald Trump once portrayed himself as the guardian of Western Civilization. Yet his second administration has aggressively undermined the very unity it claimed to defend. The recent US-EU trade deal—imposing steep tariffs on European exports while demanding vast investments in American industries—signals a shift from partnership to dominance. This economic blow coincides with a deeper ideological rupture: Trump no longer sees Europe, especially the EU, as a cultural ally but as a bureaucratic adversary. Aligning instead with nationalist and religiously conservative leaders, Trump’s vision of the West excludes liberal, secular Europe in favor of sovereigntist regimes. Civilizational language remains—but it now serves to justify a reordered West where power, not pluralism, defines belonging.
Greece has become a critical gateway for asylum-seekers, yet increasingly restrictive migration policies, harsh detention conditions, and reduced aid leave refugees in precarious circumstances. Amid systemic exclusion, NGOs like REFUGYM, Sama Community Center, and El-Sistema Greece foster hope, dignity, and belonging through education, sports, arts, and grassroots initiatives. Drawing on interviews with NGO leaders, refugees, and first-hand field observations, this article highlights both the barriers asylum-seekers face and the community-led solutions redefining resilience. In a climate of tightening borders and rising polarization, refugee-led spaces remain vital for empowerment, solidarity, and imagining more inclusive futures.
Indonesia is witnessing its largest wave of protests since Reformasi, sparked by the death of Affan Kurniawan during Jakarta’s labor demonstrations. Demands range from fair wages and job security to dismantling elite privileges and revising the controversial Omnibus Law. Drawing on Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populist reason, the article analyzes how heterogeneous grievances converged into a collective identity of “the people” against “the elites,” fueled by widening inequality, institutional distrust, and elite arrogance. It further examines government securitization, social media narratives, and intra-elite rivalries, situating the unrest within Indonesia’s democratic backsliding. Hasnan Bachtiar argues this moment marks a potential turning point — either toward renewed progressive populism or deeper authoritarian entrenchment.
This commentary examines how queerness intersects with genocide and international law in the context of Palestine. Ass. Professor Izat El Amoor argues that queer Palestinians confront not only Israel’s genocidal violence but also Western pinkwashing narratives that weaponize queerness to justify oppression. By situating pinkwashing and pinkwatching within broader struggles of decolonization, the piece shows how queer analysis exposes the hypocrisy of Western legal and human rights frameworks while offering new tools for resistance. Linking Israel’s use of pinkwashing to global failures of international law—including the ICJ case brought by South Africa—the essay insists that genocide studies must reckon with queerness as central, not peripheral, to understanding both the violence in Gaza and pathways toward Palestinian liberation.
When Keir Starmer denounced populism as a “snake oil charm” in July 2024, he became the first British Prime Minister to attack it so explicitly in a major parliamentary speech. Yet inside Labour, the strategy is contested. Should populism be called out as corrosive to democracy, or quietly disarmed by fixing everyday grievances? Starmer prefers direct confrontation; his strategist Morgan McSweeney stresses delivery — “potholes, not populism.” Luke Malhi’s interviews with MPs, aides, and journalists reveal a party caught between naming the threat and co-opting parts of its language to blunt Reform UK’s rise. The debate echoes dilemmas across Europe, underscoring a central question: how can mainstream parties defend institutions without alienating the voters populists claim to represent?
In this commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias traces the rise of white Christian nationalism from Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” and Reagan’s Moral Majority to the Tea Party and today’s MAGA movement. He argues that what appears as grassroots populism is, in fact, a carefully engineered project to transform fringe radicalism into a national force. Electoral restrictions, demographic anxieties, and evangelical mobilization have converged to produce a politics that is ever more exclusionary, authoritarian, and puritanical. Dr. Dias asks: Is MAGA truly the majority, or is it the triumph of minority rule through strategic manipulation?
This commentary examines the tension between authoritarian populism and innovation-driven growth, drawing on the insights of Nobel laureates Joel Mokyr, Philippe Aghion, and Peter Howitt. Their research highlights that sustainable prosperity relies on creative destruction, institutional openness, and freedom of inquiry. In contrast, authoritarian populism undermines these conditions by eroding pluralism, legal stability, and academic autonomy. Using comparative cases such as China, Turkey, Hungary, and Poland, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk shows how populist regimes politicize innovation systems, stifling long-term productivity. The essay concludes that innovation is not merely economic—it is institutional, cultural, and democratic. Without inclusive institutions and free knowledge systems, technological progress becomes extractive rather than transformative.
In this incisive commentary, feminist scholar Afiya S. Zia dissects the myth that Imran Khan is “popular, not populist.” Drawing on theorists such as Laclau, Mudde, and Moffitt, Zia argues that Khan’s politics exemplify moral populism: a performative style that fuses piety, masculinity, and nationalism while eroding democratic substance. His rhetoric of virtue and victimhood, she shows, mirrors the Pakistani military’s own moral lexicon of sacrifice and honor, blurring the line between civilian populism and authoritarianism. From symbolic austerity to digital disinformation, Khan’s rule delivered moral spectacle but little structural reform. Zia concludes that his populism—like its global counterparts—offers redemption without reform, transforming faith into a tool of power and consuming democracy in the process.
In this thought-provoking commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias argues that the dominant ideology underpinning contemporary right-wing movements is not populism or illiberalism, but nativism—a worldview centered on defending the “native” population against perceived external and internal threats. Drawing on theorists such as Cas Mudde, Ernesto Laclau, and Fareed Zakaria, Dr. Dias shows that while populism offers the form of political antagonism (“the people” versus “the elites”), nativism provides its substance: the protection of cultural and demographic identity against globalization and multiculturalism. Dr. Dias concludes that nativism’s emotional and existential appeal—rooted in fear of the “other” and longing for cultural homogeneity—has achieved social hegemony across much of the West.
Brick Lane—London’s most iconic hub for street art and graffiti—runs from Whitechapel to Shoreditch through the heart of the East End, with nearby streets toward Spitalfields and Bethnal Green offering rich artistic stories of their own. Photo: Nicoleta Raluca Tudor.
Populists rise to power by claiming outsider status against a corrupt elite. Yet many—from Erdogan and Modi to Trump—retain legitimacy long after becoming establishment actors. How? Yilmaz and Morieson argue that populist leaders occupy a dual identity they term “Schrödinger’s Elite”: simultaneously insiders and outsiders. They convert privilege into moral performance—projecting humility, purity, and sacrifice while governing as entrenched elites. This performance is not hypocrisy, but strategy. Whether through Trump’s theatrical diplomacy, Imran Khan’s pious nationalism, or judicial populism in Pakistan and the United States, authority is reframed as service to “the people.” The paradox reveals why populism persists despite policy failure: emotional authenticity eclipses institutional accountability, transforming power into virtue.
In a period of deepening global democratic recession Zohran Mamdani’s ascent as mayor of New York City poses an important question: Can municipal socialism provide meaningful resistance to authoritarian and oligarchic drift? Mamdani’s redistributive agenda—rent freezes, universal childcare, fare-free transit, public groceries, and a $30 minimum wage—seeks to decommodify basic needs and challenge monopoly power. His platform echoes broader critiques of financialized capitalism and “techno-feudalism,” offering a localized experiment in restoring democratic control over markets. Yet structural constraints—capital mobility, state-level authority, and limited municipal capacity—risk reducing his project to a palliative rather than transformative intervention. Still, Mamdani’s rise signals renewed potential for democratic agency within advanced capitalism and highlights the symbolic power of left urban governance.
In her sharp analysis of the COP30 summit, Dr. Heidi Hart, an environmental humanities researcher and guest instructor at Linnaeus University in Sweden, captures the surreal moment when an exhibition pavilion in Belém caught fire—an unsettling metaphor for a world already burning. Despite tense negotiations and an extra day of talks, petrostates secured a final text that completely omitted fossil fuels, leaving UN Secretary-General Guterres to warn of a widening gap between science and policy. Dr. Hart situates this failure within a shifting global landscape marked by illiberal regimes, climate denial, and powerful petro-interests. With geopolitical turmoil and corporate greenwashing shaping outcomes, her commentary underscores a stark truth: on a “spaceship” with finite resources, political paralysis is accelerating us toward irreversible tipping points.
In this sharp geopolitical analysis, Dr. Imdat Oner examines the far-reaching implications of Operation Southern Spear, the Trump administration’s unprecedented shift from counternarcotics interdiction to direct military attrition across Latin America. Dr.Oner argues that the new strategy—marked by lethal maritime strikes, FTO designations, and carrier-led patrols—reflects far more than drug policy. It fuses domestic political messaging, America First security rhetoric, and a renewed push to reclaim hemispheric dominance amid Chinese and Russian encroachment. As Washington mobilizes a coalition of regional partners and intensifies pressure on Venezuela, Dr. Oner warns that this emerging “neo-Monroe Doctrine” could redefine US–Latin America relations for years to come.
Trump’s National Security Strategy marks a sharp break from post-Cold War US diplomacy: it portrays Europe, not rival powers, as the core site of Western civilisational decline. Warning of “civilisational erasure” through migration, demographic change and secularisation, it urges support for “patriotic European parties” resisting this shift. In this framing, the danger to the West is internal, not external, and the US becomes guardian of authentic Western identity—aligning more closely with Orbán, Meloni and PiS than with many elected governments. This leaves Europe facing a strategic dilemma: remain reliant on Washington or assert its own civilisational narrative. Europe must choose—adapt, resist, or define itself.
In this incisive analysis, political scientist Professor Cengiz Aktar examines Ankara’s latest initiative toward the Kurds, arguing that what has been presented as a peace process is instead a populist performance of reconciliation. Professor Aktar shows how Turkey’s government frames “brotherhood,” “national unity,” and “terror-free Turkey” as harmonious goals, even though such populist language masks structural inequalities and omits democratic guarantees for Kurdish identity. With Abdullah Öcalan’s call for dissolution of the PKK left unreciprocated, and no mechanisms for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), truth-seeking, or legal reform, Professor Aktar warns that the process risks being symbolic rather than transformative. He suggests that populism here functions not as conflict resolution, but as political containment — strengthening autocratic power while offering no durable settlement.
In his incisive analysis, Dr. Amir Ali, examines how the 2025 Bihar Provincial Assembly elections have reinvigorated Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s populist dominance in Indian politics. Situating Bihar’s results within India’s shifting electoral landscape, Dr. Ali shows how the BJP-led coalition’s victory undermines expectations of anti-incumbency following the party’s 2024 parliamentary setback. He critically engages controversies surrounding the Election Commission of India, welfare-driven electoral strategies, and the shrinking space for opposition politics. Drawing on his broader scholarship on populism, democracy, and sovereignty, Dr. Ali warns that the consolidation of power from “Parliament to Panchayat” raises serious concerns for institutional autonomy and democratic accountability in what V-Dem has termed an “electoral autocracy.”
In this commentary, Dr. Hafza Girdap offers a compelling comparative analysis of populism, law, gender, and freedom across two authoritarian contexts. Bringing Shirin Ebadi’s “The Golden Cage” into dialogue with transnational feminist theory, Dr. Girdap examines how populist regimes in Iran and Turkey moralize “the people,” narrow citizenship, and weaponize law to discipline dissent—particularly women’s dissent. Drawing on her original framework of contextual gendered racialization, she shows how gender governance operates through both patriarchy and racialized belonging. The article foregrounds women’s resistance as a form of epistemic, legal, and care-centered praxis, redefining freedom not as order or security, but as memory, accountability, and collective struggle beyond the confines of the “golden cage.”
In this analytically rich commentary, ECPS Youth Group member Saurabh Raj examines how direct welfare delivery is transforming electoral politics in India. Focusing on the recent Bihar assembly election, Raj shows how visible and targeted benefits—especially cash transfers to women—have become a powerful political language shaping voter participation and choice. Conceptualising this shift as “freebie populism,” the article argues that welfare now operates not only as a developmental tool but as a mode of political mobilisation, mediated through digital infrastructures and personalised state–citizen encounters. While caste, religion, and ideology remain influential, Raj highlights the growing importance of the individual beneficiary as a new axis of political belonging. Situating Bihar within broader interstate patterns, the article raises critical questions about democratic accountability, political reasoning, and the future trajectory of Indian democracy.
This commentary interrogates the rising popularity of “dopamine detox” as a moralized response to digital overload and burnout, situating it within contemporary populist logics. Rather than challenging the political economy of platform capitalism, the discourse reframes structural problems of attention extraction, inequality, and exhaustion as failures of individual self-discipline. Drawing on political economy and cultural sociology, the piece argues that dopamine detox resonates with a depoliticized form of populism that governs through moral binaries—disciplined versus undisciplined—rather than through explicit elite–people antagonism. By transforming self-control into a civic and economic virtue, the trend normalizes inequality and obscures corporate and regulatory responsibility. Ultimately, the commentary shows how neoliberal self-help cultures intersect with populist moralization to shift blame downward while leaving platform power largely unchallenged.
In this Voice of Youth (VoY) article, Emmanouela Papapavlou delivers a powerful reflection on state violence, immigration enforcement, and the fragile boundaries of democratic accountability. The article critically examines the fatal shooting of a civilian woman by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents in Minneapolis on January 7, 2026. Moving beyond official narratives of “self-defense,” Papapavlou situates the incident within broader patterns of institutional violence, racialized enforcement, and the erosion of human rights under the banner of security. By drawing historical parallels to the killing of George Floyd and interrogating the politics of “law and order,” the piece challenges readers to reconsider whose lives are protected—and whose are rendered expendable—in contemporary democracies.
In this timely and powerful Voice of Youth (VoY) essay, Emmanouela Papapavlou reframes migration not as a crisis or threat, but as a defining human reality of the twenty-first century. Moving beyond populist slogans and fear-based rhetoric, the piece exposes the gap between political discourse and the lived experiences of migrants—marked by legal precarity, exclusion, and everyday vulnerability. It critically interrogates the selective use of “legality” in public debates and highlights how populism redirects anger away from power and toward the powerless. Importantly, the article identifies Generation Z as a potential counterforce, emphasizing its everyday engagement with diversity and its rejection of xenophobic narratives. Published on the occasion of International Migrants Day, the essay is a compelling call to restore dignity, humanity, and ethical responsibility to migration politics.
In this compelling VoY essay, Emmanouela Papapavlou confronts the uncomfortable truth behind society’s yearly cycle of remembrance on November 25th. Drawing attention to the gap between public displays of solidarity and the everyday normalization of gender-based violence, Papapavlou argues that symbolic outrage too often gives way to collective amnesia. She highlights how cultural attitudes, institutional responses, and pervasive biases continue to silence women long after the awareness campaigns fade. This powerful reflection challenges readers to rethink what it truly means to remember—and what it would take to break the cycle of forgetting that enables violence to persist.
In this ECPS Voices of Youth contribution, Kader Gueye examines how European populist movements are transforming genuine agrarian grievances into political capital. From Dutch nitrogen protests to French mobilizations against the EU–Mercosur deal, Gueye shows how populist actors amplify farmers’ discontent by framing it as a moral struggle between “ordinary people” and “distant elites.” While such narratives generate visibility and significant institutional leverage—as illustrated by the rise of the BBB in the Netherlands and the far right’s support for French blockades—they rarely address the structural drivers of rural hardship, such as volatile markets, supply-chain imbalances, and climate pressures. Gueye argues that without constructive long-term solutions, populist exploitation risks deepening divisions and leaving farmers’ core challenges unresolved.
In this powerful reflection for ECPS – Voice of Youth, high school student Emmanouela Papapavlou warns that the rise of the far right is not a “youth trend” but a symptom of collective amnesia. The memory of the Polytechnic uprising—once a symbol of resistance to dictatorship—has grown hollow through ritual repetition, even as democratic backsliding accelerates across Europe, the US, and Greece. Papapavlou describes how everyday indifference and frustration quietly nourish extremist ideas, while pockets of young people fight back through music, art, and political expression. Her message is urgent: democracy erodes not when violence erupts, but when society forgets what unfreedom feels like. Memory, he reminds us, is not a burden—it is our first line of defense.
As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reshapes Europe’s security landscape, the EU faces a “watershed moment” demanding unprecedented defense spending and strategic autonomy. The “ReArm Europe Plan” allocates €800 billion for defense modernization, while EU states’ military expenditure has already surged 30% since 2021. Yet, this security buildup comes at a profound human cost: since 2022, over 1.3 million soldiers have been killed or wounded, with tens of thousands more facing lifelong trauma. While Europe seeks to safeguard territorial integrity and independence, the article questions whether spiraling militarization undermines humanitarian priorities, deepens instability, and perpetuates cycles of suffering rather than ensuring lasting security.
While the global community often articulates refugee detention as a banner of humanitarian concern, escalating evidence from Libya and North African regions reveals a deeper systemic failure where stateless refugees and other displaced persons are being subjected to medical procedures and organ removal through coercion masked as border security and health screening. Across these detention zones, a shadow economy thrives thereby transforming stateless refugees into targets of extrajudicial biomedical intervention. This article uncovers the alarming rise of coerced organ extraction and exploitative medical practices presented as humanitarian care, introducing the concept biomedical sovereignty to expose the violent necropolitics at play. To build upon forensic data, survivor testimonies, and policy analysis, the following article calls for an urgent re-evaluation of international ethical obligations toward radically marginalized populations.
As massacre and starvation content floods social media in the wake of Hamas’s October 7 attack, a new generation of users—especially teenagers—grapples with its psychological toll. In this Voice of Youth commentary, 19-year-old aspiring journalist Andrea Castelnuovo explores how platforms like Instagram, X, and TikTok have become both vital sources of information and sources of distress. Drawing on recent studies from Israel and Jordan, Castelnuovo highlights the anxiety, trauma, and emotional numbness that graphic imagery can induce in young viewers. He also shares his own experience of digital overwhelm and the importance of finding alternative, less triggering ways to stay informed. His article raises a crucial question for journalists: Can we raise awareness without harming those who bear witness?
Violence Against Women (VAW) and girls can take many forms globally, from the absence of personal agency to sexual violence and domestic abuse. To better understand how VAW affects women in the Middle East in particular, this policy brief addresses various instances of violence against Kurdish women in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). A particular focus is given to forced/arranged marriages, honour-based violence, and female genital mutilation, which form a ‘patriarchal trifecta’ of oppression: a phenomenon that the author has identified and researched extensively. The policy brief recommendations informed by this research are relevant to policymakers both in the KRI and beyond, including European Union member states that have dealt with troubling cases of violence against women in immigrant communities and are facing similar challenges to women’s rights.
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Reports
In 2025, the ECPS significantly expanded its reporting activity, using reports not merely as summaries of events, but as analytical instruments that translate collective scholarly exchange into durable, accessible knowledge. Over the course of the year, ECPS produced more than 30 reports, the vast majority of which were event-based, documenting and synthesizing insights from international panels, conferences, symposia, roundtables, summer school lectures, and virtual workshop sessions.
These reports reflect ECPS’s distinctive commitment to knowledge curation. Rather than treating events as isolated moments, ECPS systematically transforms live scholarly dialogue into structured analytical outputs. Panels from the Mapping Global Populism Series, the ECPS Conference 2025 at Oxford, the Fourth Annual Symposium on Civilizational Populism, the ECPS Academy Summer School, and the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series generated a substantial portion of the year’s reports. Together, they capture evolving debates on populism, authoritarianism, digital repression, climate politics, religion, identity, constitutional erosion, and democratic resilience across regions.
Alongside these event reports, ECPS also published a smaller but important number of stand-alone research reports, offering in-depth empirical and conceptual analyses on topics such as digital authoritarian diffusion, Muslim political behavior in Europe, and transnational populist strategies. These contributions demonstrate ECPS’s ability to combine real-time scholarly engagement with sustained original research.
Taken collectively, the reports section illustrates how ECPS functions as an intellectual bridge between dialogue and documentation, exchange and synthesis, and academic debate and public understanding. By preserving the substance of interdisciplinary conversations and situating them within broader comparative frameworks, ECPS reports contribute to cumulative knowledge rather than fragmented commentary.
In a year marked by democratic uncertainty and accelerating authoritarian convergence, ECPS’s reporting activity played a crucial role in ensuring that critical insights—generated through collaboration, debate, and pedagogy—were consolidated, contextualized, and made available for future research, teaching, and policy reflection.
The ECPS panel provided an in-depth exploration of how the 2024 US Presidential Election reflects and impacts global populism. Experts analyzed key dynamics, including economic grievances, cultural shifts, and political polarization. Moderated by Ali H. Aslan, the discussion highlighted the role of evangelical populism, Trumpism’s transatlantic influence, and global democratic erosion. Distinguished panelists emphasized the need for liberal democracies to counter autocratic trends by offering compelling solutions and reinforcing institutions. This timely dialogue shed light on the interplay between economic, cultural, and institutional forces shaping contemporary populist movements worldwide.
On December 19, 2024, ECPS hosted the 18th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, titled “Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries.” This session examined a number of key contemporary dynamics at the intersection of populism and authoritarianism in the Gulf region. A distinguished panel of experts presented on a wide range of topics, including the evolution of social contracts in Gulf states; autocratization processes; the environmental dimension of authoritarian leadership; and the role of religion in shaping both domestic and international politics. The session thus offered many key critical insights into both the nebulous features of populism itself and the importance of bringing the Gulf region into scholarly conversation regarding populism’s impact across the globe.
This report examines the key discussions from the 19th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, hosted by the ECPS on February 27, 2025. The session explored the influence of religious and nationalist populism on Israeli politics, media, and education. Prominent scholars analyzed how judicial overhauls, security-driven rhetoric, media manipulation, and educational policy shifts contribute to democratic erosion in Israel. The report highlights the increasing concentration of power, the delegitimization of opposition voices, and the broader global implications of Israel’s populist trends. By drawing comparisons with other global populist movements, the discussion underscored the necessity of protecting democratic institutions, ensuring media freedom, and preserving independent education.
Following Germany’s pivotal 2025 federal election, the ECPS hosted a high-level panel exploring the rise of the far-right AfD, democratic resilience, and the broader political shifts underway. Held on March 13, 2025, the event featured leading scholars, offering critical insights into the AfD’s electoral surge, its normalization and radicalization, and the East-West divide shaping German politics. Speakers examined key voter demographics—especially youth, working-class, and immigrant voters—and dissected issues like immigration, identity, gender, and economic anxiety that have fueled the far-right narrative. The session also addressed the implications for Germany’s transatlantic ties, institutional stability, and future party strategies. This report captures the panel’s core arguments, raising essential questions about how liberal democracies can respond to populist and authoritarian threats without compromising democratic norms or alienating significant voter blocs.
By Ihsan Yilmaz, Ali Mamouri, Shahram Akbarzadeh, Muhammad Omer
Egypt has emerged as a key adopter and regional diffuser of digital authoritarian practices. Once limited by weak digital infrastructure, the Sisi regime has transformed the country into a technologically repressive state through sweeping legal reforms, censorship mechanisms, and expansive surveillance networks. Drawing heavily from the models of China and Russia—particularly in urban monitoring and information control—Egypt actively emulates their approaches. Crucially, both Chinese and Western technology firms have facilitated this transformation, revealing a broader pattern of global complicity. This report demonstrates how Egypt’s trajectory illustrates the transnational diffusion of digital authoritarianism through mechanisms of learning, emulation, and interdependence—and offers a stark warning to democracies about the rising threat of state-enabled digital repression.
By Ihsan Yilmaz, Ali Mamouri, Nicholas Morieson & Muhammad Omer
This report examines how Turkey has become a paradigmatic case of digital authoritarian convergence through the mechanisms of learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence. Drawing on Chinese and Russian models—and facilitated by Western and Chinese tech companies—Turkey has adopted sophisticated digital control strategies across legal, surveillance, and information domains. The study identifies how strategic partnerships, infrastructure agreements (e.g., Huawei’s 5G and smart city projects), and shared authoritarian logics have enabled the Erdoğan regime to suppress dissent and reshape the digital public sphere. Through legal reforms, deep packet inspection (DPI) technologies, and coordinated digital propaganda, Turkey exemplifies how authoritarian digital governance diffuses globally. The findings highlight an urgent need for international accountability, cyber norms, and ethical tech governance to contain the expanding influence of digital repression.
This report presents the key insights from the 21st session of the Mapping Global Populism Panel Series, hosted by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Focused on Iraq, Syria, and the Kurdish regions, the panel examined how populism operates through ethnic and sectarian divisions in societies marked by authoritarian legacies and conflict. Drawing on political theory, field data, and comparative case studies, the session revealed how authoritarian leaders adapt populist strategies to manipulate communal fears, centralize power, and erode democratic institutions.
The political preferences of Muslims are often the source of contention and misinformation. In continental Europe, there is not much data available on political preferences of Muslims due to strict privacy regulations, creating a knowledge lacuna allowing for misinformation to fester. In this report, I focus on three countries where privacy regulations are particularly longstanding: France, Germany, and the Netherlands. I use a novel sampling method that complies with privacy regulations while achieving a large enough sample of minority respondents to conduct statistical analyses. Regarding policy preferences, I find that respondents with a Muslim minority background have more conservative attitudes towards same-sex adoption, while showing very similar attitudes to white majority respondents when it comes to gender equality.
The ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford began with a timely and thought-provoking opening session that explored the evolving meaning and political utility of “the people” in democratic discourse. Sümeyye Kocaman offered a nuanced welcome, highlighting how the term has been used across history to empower, exclude, and politicize identity. Kate Mavor, Master of St Cross College, underscored the value of interdisciplinary exchange in addressing democratic challenges, noting how the College’s diverse academic environment aligned naturally with the conference’s aims. Baroness Janet Royall then delivered a compelling keynote, warning of the double-edged nature of “the people” as both democratic ideal and populist tool. Her address emphasized the need for inclusion, institutional integrity, civic renewal, and interdisciplinary cooperation in the face of democratic erosion. The session set the stage for critical and globally relevant dialogue across disciplines.
Panel I – Politics of the Social Contract at the ECPS Conference 2025 brought together diverse approaches to examine how democratic legitimacy, resistance, and pluralism are evolving in the face of global democratic backsliding. Chaired by Dr. Lior Erez (Oxford University), the panel featured Professor Robert Johns and collaborators presenting experimental research on public support for human rights under repression; Nathan Tsang (USC) explored how Hong Kong diaspora communities engage in covert resistance through cultural expression; and Simon Clemens (Humboldt University) introduced Isabelle Stengers’ cosmopolitical philosophy, proposing a radical politics of coexistence over consensus. Together, the presentations reflected on how the idea of “the people” is being contested, reimagined, and mobilized across social, empirical, and philosophical registers.
Held at the University of Oxford on July 1, 2025, Roundtable I of the ECPS Conference launched the discussions of “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy.” Chaired by Professor Jonathan Wolff, the session explored how “the people” is constructed, contested, and deployed in contemporary European and global politics. Presentations by Professors Martin Conway, Aurelien Mondon, and Luke Bretherton examined the historical resurgence of popular politics, the elite-driven narrative of the “reactionary people,” and the theological dimensions of populism. Together, the contributions offered a nuanced, interdisciplinary account of how populism’s democratic and anti-democratic potentials shape the political imagination and institutional realities of the 21st century.
Panel II: “‘The People’ in the Age of AI and Algorithms” explored how digital technologies and algorithmic infrastructures are reshaping democratic life. Co-chaired by Dr. Alina Utrata and Professor Murat Aktaş, the session tackled questions of power, exclusion, and political agency in the digital age. Together, their framing set the stage for two timely papers examining how algorithmic filtering, platform capitalism, and gendered data practices increasingly mediate who is counted—and who is excluded—from “the people.” With insight and urgency, the session called for renewed civic, academic, and regulatory engagement with the democratic challenges posed by artificial intelligence and transnational tech governance.
Panel III of the ECPS Conference 2025, held at the University of Oxford, gathered five scholars from the Jean Monnet Chair in European Constitutional Democracy (EUCODEM) at the University of Barcelona to explore how populist forces are challenging liberal-democratic norms—and what institutional remedies might resist them. Chaired by Dr. Bruno Godefroy, the session addressed threats to judicial independence, the populist appropriation of secessionist demands, and the theoretical underpinnings of populism as a political strategy. It also examined the role of parliaments and second chambers in preserving constitutional order. Drawing from both comparative and case-specific perspectives—ranging from Spain and Scotland to Canada and the United States—the panel provided a timely and interdisciplinary diagnosis of populism’s constitutional impact and offered potential avenues for democratic resilience in increasingly polarized societies.
Panel IV of the ECPS Conference 2025, held at St Cross College, Oxford University (July 1–3), explored the theme “Politics of Belonging: Voices and Silencing.” Chaired by Dr. Azize Sargın (ECPS), the panel investigated how belonging is constructed and contested through populist discourse and historical memory. Dr. Maarja Merivoo-Parro (University of Jyväskylä) examined olfactory memory and grassroots aid in Estonia’s democratic awakening. Maria Jerzyk (Masaryk University) analyzed how the figure of the child is symbolically instrumentalized in Polish populism, revealing deep continuities with communist-era narratives. Together, the papers offered rich insights into how identity, exclusion, and affect shape democratic participation in post-authoritarian and populist contexts.
Held at St Cross College, University of Oxford, as part of the ECPS Conference 2025 (“We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches,” July 1–3), Roundtable II offered a wide-ranging philosophical and political interrogation of how “the people” is theorized, invoked, and contested in contemporary democratic thought. Chaired by Dr. Aviezer Tucker (University of Ostrava), the session featured presentations by Naomi Waltham-Smith (Oxford), Bruno Godefroy (Tours), Karen Horn (Erfurt), and Julian F. Müller (Graz). Together, the panel explored the rhetorical, constitutional, and epistemic instabilities surrounding the concept of “the people,” challenging static or essentialist understandings and calling for renewed attention to pluralism, temporality, and audibility within liberal democratic frameworks.
Panel V of the ECPS Conference 2025, “Governing the ‘People’: Divided Nations,” held on July 2 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, explored how contested constructions of “the people” are shaped by populist discourse across national, religious, and ideological contexts. Co-chaired by Dr. Leila Alieva and Professor Karen Horn, the session featured presentations by Natalie Schwabl (Sorbonne University), Dr. Sarah Riccardi-Swartz (Northeastern University), and Petar S. Ćurčić (Institute of European Studies, Belgrade). The panel examined Catholic nationalism in Croatia, American Christian ethno-populism, and the evolving German left, offering sharp insights into the manipulation of collective identity and memory in populist projects. Bridging multiple regions and disciplines, the panel revealed populism’s capacity to reframe belonging in deeply exclusionary and globally resonant ways.
As part of the ECPS Conference 2025 titled “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches,” held at St Cross College, University of Oxford from July 1–3, Panel VI—“The ‘People’ in Search of Democracy”—brought urgent focus to the evolving meaning of democratic agency. Chaired by Dr. Max Steuer (Comenius University, Bratislava), the session opened with a reflection on whether democracy and “the people” can be conceptually disentangled. Rashad Seedeen examined how Gramsci’s war of position and Wright’s real utopias intersect in Indigenous civil society initiatives. Jana Ruwayha analyzed how prolonged emergencies blur legal norms, threatening democratic accountability. Özge Derman showcased how the “we” is performatively constructed in Occupy Wall Street and the Gezi movement. Together, the panel offered sharp insights into the plural and contested meanings of “the people” in contemporary democratic struggles.
In 2025, democracy occupies a state of superposition—at once vibrant and eroding, plural and polarized, legal and lawless. Panel 7 exposed this paradox with precision: democracy is not a fixed ideal but a shifting terrain, where power is contested through law, ritual, narrative, and strategy. Whether it survives or collapses depends on how it is interpreted, performed, and defended. The Schrödinger’s box is cracked open, but its contents are not predetermined. As Robert Person warned, authoritarian actors exploit democratic vulnerabilities; as Max Steuer and Justin Attard showed, those vulnerabilities also reveal possibilities for renewal. We are not neutral observers—we are agents within the experiment. Democracy’s future hinges on our will to intervene.
At the 2025 ECPS Conference in Oxford, Panel 8 offered a rich exploration of populism, elite transformation, and democratic erosion. Co-chaired by Ashley Wright (Oxford) and Azize Sargın (ECPS), the session featured cutting-edge scholarship from Aviezer Tucker, Pınar Dokumacı, Attila Antal, and Murat Aktaş. Presentations spanned elite populism, feminist spatial resistance, transatlantic authoritarianism, and the metapolitics of the French New Right. Discussant Karen Horn (University of Erfurt) offered incisive critiques on intellectual transmission, rationalism, and democratic thresholds. Together, the panel underscored populism’s global diffusion and its capacity to reshape both elites and “the people,” demanding renewed theoretical and civic engagement. Democracy, the panel emphasized, remains a contested space—never static, always in motion.
At the ECPS International Conference 2025, Roundtable 3 explored how broken social contracts have fueled populism and democratic disillusionment. Held at St Cross College, University of Oxford, the panel featured Selçuk Gültaşlı’s summary of Eric Beinhocker’s fairness-based model of democratic collapse, Dr. Aviezer Tucker’s critique of elite entrenchment, Lord Alderdice’s focus on emotional wounds like humiliation and disillusionment, and Professor Julian F. Müller’s call for conceptual clarity around populism. Concluding the session, Irina von Wiese grounded abstract theory in lived inequality and called for renewed trust, dignity, and participation. The panel made clear: rebuilding democracy requires more than policy—it demands empathy, fairness, and respect for those left behind.
In his lecture at the ECPS Summer School 2025, Professor John M. Meyer offered a compelling exploration of the relationship between populism and climate politics. He critiqued authoritarian populism as a threat to equitable climate action while also questioning mainstream climate governance’s elitist, technocratic tendencies. Rather than viewing populism solely as an obstacle, Professor Meyer argued that climate justice movements themselves embody a form of inclusive, democratic populism—centered on equity, participation, and solidarity. Drawing on examples from grassroots activism and Naomi Klein’s concept of “eco-populism,” Professor Meyer proposed that climate action must address material injustices and engage people where they are. His lecture encouraged participants to rethink populism as a political form that, when inclusive and justice-oriented, can help build legitimate, durable, and democratic climate solutions.
Professor Sandra Ricart delivered a timely and insightful lecture on the intersection of climate change, agriculture, and populism in Europe. She explored how structural and demographic challenges, including a declining farming population and economic precarity, have fueled widespread farmer protests across the continent. Prof. Ricart emphasized how these grievances, while rooted in genuine hardship, have increasingly been exploited by far-right populist movements eager to position themselves as defenders of rural interests against European institutions. Her analysis highlighted the pressures created by climate change, policy reforms, and global market dynamics, and she called for more inclusive, responsive, and sustainable agricultural policies. Prof. Ricart’s lecture provided participants with a critical understanding of rural Europe’s evolving political and environmental landscape.
The fourth lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2025 featured Professor Daniel Fiorino, a leading expert on environmental policy at American University. Professor Fiorino examined how right-wing populism—characterized by distrust of expertise, nationalism, and hostility to multilateralism—combined with entrenched fossil fuel interests to undermine climate mitigation efforts in the United States during the Trump administration. He highlighted the geographic and partisan divides that shape US climate politics and explained how Republican dominance in fossil fuel-dependent states reinforces skepticism toward climate action. Professor Fiorino’s lecture underscored the vulnerability of US climate policy to political polarization and partisan shifts, warning that right-wing populism poses an enduring challenge not only to American climate governance but to global efforts to address the climate crisis.
Dr. Heidi Hart’s lecture illuminated the provocative intersection of art, activism, and climate trauma. Through an interdisciplinary lens, she explored why climate activists increasingly target iconic artworks in museums as sites of performative protest, interpreting these acts not as mere vandalism but as symbolic disruptions challenging elitist cultural values amid ecological crisis. Drawing on frameworks from populism studies, art history, and affect theory, Dr. Hart examined how these interventions reflect a passionate response to climate grief and injustice. Her analysis underscored the importance of understanding such protests within broader debates on decolonization, posthumanism, and collective responsibility, encouraging participants to view artistic destruction as both a critique of cultural complacency and a call for ecological transformation.
In his compelling lecture, Professor Erik Swyngedouw offered a radical critique of contemporary climate discourse, describing it as trapped in a “climate deadlock” where knowledge and activism coexist with deepening ecological crisis. He argued that mainstream and radical climate narratives mirror the structure of populism, constructing simplistic binaries while displacing attention from capitalism’s core role in driving environmental destruction. Professor Swyngedouw challenged participants to recognize that the environmental apocalypse is not an imminent future but an unevenly distributed present reality for much of the world. His provocative call to dismantle the comforting fantasy of a unified humanity urged a re-politicization of the climate crisis, demanding systemic transformation and solidarity grounded in confronting global inequalities.
Professor Philippe Le Billon’s lecture critically examined how climate-related conflicts emerge from three sources: the impacts of climate change itself, contestation over climate inaction, and backlash against climate action. He argued that climate change operates as a “threat multiplier,” intensifying pre-existing inequalities and vulnerabilities rather than acting as an isolated trigger of violence. He explored how climate activism—while driven by moral urgency—can be framed as elitist and provoke populist opposition, and how the implementation of climate policy can generate new conflicts when perceived as unjust or technocratic. Professor Le Billon warned that “green capitalism” risks reproducing extractive logics, creating new “green sacrifice zones,” and underscored that climate justice requires confronting colonial legacies, class inequality, and structural power relations.
The eighth lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2025 was delivered online by Professor Stephan Lewandowsky, a globally recognized expert on misinformation and political psychology. His presentation offered a penetrating analysis of how climate disinformation is fueled by an organized infrastructure of vested interests and amplified by populist politics, which undermine trust in science. Professor Lewandowsky highlighted that ideological commitments—particularly free-market conservatism—strongly shape public acceptance of climate science. He emphasized that communicating the overwhelming scientific consensus on climate change can be a powerful corrective but cautioned that disinformation thrives in an environment where politics and identity outweigh facts. His lecture underscored the urgent need to confront these structural and ideological barriers to effective climate action.
In his lecture at the ECPS Academy Summer School 2025, Professor Robert Huber examined how populist parties across Europe construct climate skepticism, emphasizing that populism’s “thin-centered ideology” (as defined by Cas Mudde) pits “the pure people” against “corrupt elites.” This framing makes climate science and policy institutions prime targets for populist critique. Professor Huber’s expert survey of 31 European countries showed a clear trend: the more populist a party, the more skeptical it is of climate policy and climate science, regardless of its left- or right-wing orientation. He cautioned participants to disentangle populism from related ideologies like nationalism or authoritarianism, underscoring that populism’s challenge to climate politics is complex, context-dependent, and shaped by deeper struggles over legitimacy, authority, and representation.
The ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, launched its Virtual Workshop Series on “The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World” on September 4, 2025. Spanning 16 sessions through April 2026, the series examines how populist strategies reshape democracy across diverse contexts. Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni, the opening session featured Professor David Sanders’ keynote on six structural drivers fueling populism and its growing threats to liberal democracy. Case studies explored populist dynamics in the US, India, Greece, Thailand, and Argentina, highlighting intersections of dynasties, corporate power, elite cues, and economic crises. Discussant Dr. João Ferreira Dias emphasized three takeaways: populism as performance, polarization over persuasion, and the enduring impact of national political cultures.
On September 18, 2025, ECPS held the second session of the Virtual Workshop Series — “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy. Chaired by Professor Mavis Maclean (Oxford), the panel examined Poland’s democratic trajectory through themes of patriotism, constitutional conflict, human rights, and representation. Highlights included Professor Joanna Kurczewska’s call to recover Solidarity’s inclusive legacy, Dr. Kamil Joński’s analysis of Poland’s constitutional “quagmire,” Professor Małgorzata Fuszara’s exploration of contested women’s and minority rights, and Professor Jacek Kurczewski’s reframing of judicial representation. Discussants added comparative and moral-philosophical perspectives. The session concluded that Poland’s experience reflects global struggles: reclaiming inclusive traditions, defending institutions, and embedding rights remain vital for democratic renewal.
The ECPS convened leading scholars to assess how populist movements are accelerating democratic decay and edging toward fascism. Moderated by Professor Cengiz Aktar, the panel featured Professors Mabel Berezin, Steven Friedman, Julie Ingersoll, Richard Falk, and Larry Diamond. Discussions ranged from Christian nationalism and techno-utopianism in the US, to the failures of Western democratic models, to the global hypocrisy of international law. Panelists warned that populism now serves as a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation with worldwide reverberations. They underscored the responsibility of intellectuals to resist euphemism, speak with clarity, and help reimagine democracy in an age of disinformation, mass manipulation, and systemic crisis.
On October 2, 2025, the ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, held the third session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Chaired by Dr. Marietta D.C. van der Tol, the session examined how populist and illiberal actors across Hungary, Slovakia, and the United States instrumentalize the language of religious freedom to consolidate power and reshape national identity. Presentations by Dr. Marc Loustau, Dr. Juraj Buzalka, and Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, followed by reflections from Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, revealed how religion, once central to pluralism, is increasingly politicized as a weapon in culture wars and transnational illiberal strategies.
On October 16, 2025, the ECPS held the fourth session of its Virtual Workshop Series “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches.” The session examined how political actors construct and mobilize “the people” to legitimize both inclusive and exclusionary political projects. Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni, the session featured presentations by Samuel Ngozi Agu, Shiveshwar Kundu, and Mouli Bentman & Michael Dahan, each exploring different regional and theoretical perspectives. Abdelaaziz El Bakkali and Azize Sargın provided incisive discussant feedback, followed by a lively Q&A. Concluding reflections by Prof. Mazzoleni emphasized populism’s dual nature as both a political strategy and a symptom of structural democratic crises, setting the stage for future interdisciplinary debate.
Session 5 of the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series examined how populist movements across different regions construct “the people” as both an inclusive democratic ideal and an exclusionary political weapon. Moderated by Dr. Heidi Hart, the session featured presentations by Dr. Amir Ali, Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari, and Andrei Gheorghe, who analyzed populism’s intersections with austerity politics, linguistic identity, and post-communist nationalism. Their comparative insights revealed that populism redefines belonging through economic moralization, linguistic appropriation, and historical myth-making, transforming pluralist notions of democracy into performative narratives of unity and control. The ensuing discussion emphasized populism’s adaptive power to manipulate emotion, memory, and discourse across diverse democratic contexts.
On November 13, 2025, the ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, held the sixth session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Under the skillful moderation of Professor Ilhan Kaya (Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada), the session featured Dr. Jonathan Madison, Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho, and Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira, who examined how populism both mirrors and magnifies democracy’s crisis of representation. Their analyses, complemented by insightful discussant interventions from Dr. Amir Ali and Dr. Amedeo Varriale, generated a vibrant dialogue on institutional resilience, digital disruption, and the reconfiguration of democratic legitimacy in an age of populist contention.
Session 7 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a compelling interdisciplinary examination of how contemporary populism unsettles the foundations of democratic representation. Bringing together insights from digital politics, the history of political thought, and critical social theory, the session illuminated the multiple arenas—affective, constitutional, and epistemic—through which representation is being reconfigured. Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano revealed how memetic communication and generative AI reshape political identities and moral boundaries within far-right movements. Maria Giorgia Caraceni traced these dynamics to enduring tensions within the conceptual history of popular sovereignty, while Elif Başak Ürdem demonstrated how neoliberal meritocracy generates misrecognition and drives grievances toward populist articulation. Collectively, the session highlighted the necessity of integrated, cross-disciplinary approaches for understanding the evolving crisis of democratic representation.
On December 11, 2025, the ECPS convened Session 8 of its Virtual Workshop Series under the theme “Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn.” Chaired by Dr. Azize Sargin, the session examined how contemporary populism reshapes democratic politics through affect, moral narratives, and strategic communication. Assoc. Prof. Paul Joosse explored charismatic populism, focusing on suffering, moral inversion, and ritualized transgression in Trumpism, while Artem Turenko analyzed the evolving rhetoric of AfD across the 2019 and 2024 European Parliament elections. Discussants Dr. Helena Rovamo and Dr. Jonathan Madison offered critical reflections on theory, methodology, and causality. A lively Q&A further addressed economic grievance, cultural representation, and the politics of knowledge production, underscoring the session’s interdisciplinary depth and relevance.
This study demonstrates that Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) is best characterized as a conservative party with a strong ideological foundation in cultural and socio-economic conservatism. While the party occasionally uses populist rhetoric—particularly anti-elitist and people-centric language—populism plays only a secondary role. The party’s programs from 2018 and 2022 emphasize traditional values, national identity, and limited but socially conscious state intervention, aligning it more with liberal conservatism than with radical right populism. FdI’s relatively moderate stances on civil rights and its pro-European, Atlanticist foreign policy further distance it from the extreme right. Thus, FdI is most accurately described as a populist-Conservative party, where conservatism is dominant and populism serves more as a rhetorical strategy than a core ideology.
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Conclusion
Viewed in its entirety, the European Center for Populism Studies’ activities in 2025 reveal an organization that has moved decisively from consolidation to strategic maturity. Across research, events, publications, and project development, ECPS did not merely respond to the global surge of populism and authoritarianism; it actively shaped how these phenomena are conceptualized, debated, and made legible to both scholarly and public audiences. The year stands out not only for the scale of output, but for the coherence of its intellectual architecture.
Throughout 2025, ECPS demonstrated an ability to hold together breadth and depth: global coverage paired with conceptual precision; live scholarly exchange transformed into durable research resources; and critical diagnosis complemented by forward-looking engagement with democratic resilience. The Center’s work consistently treated populism not as an isolated pathology, but as a relational political logic embedded in economic insecurity, cultural conflict, digital transformation, and institutional fragility. This integrative approach is visible across its conferences, panel series, summer school, reports, and extensive publication portfolio.
Equally significant is ECPS’s role as an infrastructural actor within the international research ecosystem. Its sustained engagement with EU-funded projects, competitive proposal development, and transnational partnerships underscores a long-term commitment to institutional learning and collaborative capacity building—even where funding outcomes were uncertain. Rather than episodic activity, 2025 reflects a cumulative investment in networks, expertise, and credibility.
From a wider vantage point, ECPS’s work in 2025 can be read as an effort to reclaim analytical clarity and democratic imagination in a political environment increasingly shaped by polarization, disinformation, and authoritarian normalization. By foregrounding interdisciplinary dialogue, nurturing early-career scholars and youth voices, and insisting on public accessibility without intellectual dilution, the ECPS positioned itself as both a critical observer and an engaged participant in contemporary democratic struggles.
As populist and authoritarian pressures continue to redefine political life globally, the record of 2025 suggests that ECPS is no longer simply mapping these dynamics—it is helping to set the terms under which they are understood, challenged, and, where possible, transformed.
Please cite as: Ferreira Dias, João. (2026). “Opening the Political Pipeline: Transparency and Civic Access to Party Lists as an Antidote to Populist Distrust.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 15, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0006
Abstract
The erosion of trust in liberal democracy – and the dynamic, described by Yascha Mounk, of a growing separation between democracy and liberalism – should be understood in a context of hyper-surveillance, that is, hyper-vigilance and intensified scrutiny. The massification of education and the acceleration and fragmentation of the media environment (online news and social media) have made a persistent social and experiential gap between voters and elected officials increasingly difficult to sustain politically—one that previously drew much of its legitimacy from the formal act of voting and from longer electoral cycles. In this setting, the demand for illiberal solutions emerges plausibly from disenchantment with politics, driven by three factors: (i) civic participation reduced to electoral moments; (ii) thin representative linkages that weaken proximity and blur accountability; and (iii) the perception that political parties function as closed recruitment machines, with internal circuits of elite reproduction and low permeability to merit and to extra-partisan social experience. When integrity failures and scandals compound these conditions, a narrative of moralization and “purification” intensifies and broadens populist repertoires, both in bottom-up variants on the radical left and in broad-based variants on the radical right—directed upward against elites and, at times, downward against minorities and immigrants. The paper’s point of departure is that citizens tolerate delegation when liberal democracy is perceived as functional and fair, particularly in the delivery of the welfare state and in the integrity of fiscal governance. Within a European framework, the paper proposes measures to increase transparency in list formation and open political recruitment (including regulated civic pathways into party lists) as a way to reduce the credibility of populist antagonism and strengthen democratic resilience.
Politics and policy – as two sides of the same coin – have become, in the last few decades, increasingly under hyper-surveillance, due to the growth of traditional media and the proliferation of social media. Historically, the media have functioned as the “fourth estate” (after government, parliament, and courts), a long-standing and pervasive concept that translates the social, political, and economic impact of media in modern societies, and that is widely associated with social democratization and political accountability (Schultz, 1998).
But while “citizen journalism” was a foundational idea that dwells in the concept of expanding the role of the citizen as a “watchdog” (Bennett & Serrin, 2005), weblogs and social media became a structural reconfiguration of the information ecosystem. Early blogging ecosystems were often framed as expanding voice and scrutiny beyond traditional gatekeepers, sometimes complementing or contesting mainstream agendas and lowering barriers to agenda-setting (Sánchez-Villar, 2019). However, social media further accelerated the cycle of attention and reward structures around fast, affective engagement, transforming complex ideas into memes, as argued by Yascha Mounk (2023) concerning post-modern theories and their translation into an “identity synthesis.”
The shift from broadcast to participatory media means surveillance is no longer top-down (state over citizens) but multi-directional: citizens monitor elites, and elites monitor public sentiment via data analytics. The hyper-visibility of political life redefines legitimacy and accountability. But social media proved the limits of this participatory media to work as watchdogs as a functional substitute for deliberative scrutiny, promoting slacktivism, a low-cost and symbolic participation (Christensen, 2011), and producing a set of high-cost externalities, including echo chambers, bubbles, misinformation, and hate speech. Importantly, the empirical literature is mixed on whether low-cost online actions crowd out offline engagement; the stronger claim is that platform dynamics can reconfigure incentives, attention, and affect in ways that strain deliberation.
As argued by Cass Sunstein (2017), democracy’s sustainability is at stake due to digital dynamics that undermine the basis of a healthy public sphere. Inspired by Habermas, Sunstein argues that the republic requires different types of citizens to interact and debate, with exposure to diverse arguments, while also prevailing on a common ground. However, the algorithm favors echo chambers and epistemic bubbles that reinforce preconceptions and beliefs, thereby undermining democratic dialogue.
This sketch of the informational ecosystem matters because continuous scrutiny changes how citizens interpret political distance. When everyday monitoring highlights missteps, style, and personal conduct—often detached from policy substance—trust can erode and politics can be read through a moral register. In such settings, accountability is simultaneously intensified (everything is visible) and blurred (responsibility is hard to attribute), creating a demand for clarity that representative institutions rarely satisfy.
This political purity has a strong link to theological backgrounds, since the tension between purity and danger is foundational in Judeo-Christian cultures (Douglas, 1966). Applied to political contexts, the grammar of purity is related to political messianism (Ferreira Dias, 2022) and populist-demagogic leaders (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018) who claim to represent the true voice of ‘the pure people’ (v.g., Ziller & Schübel, 2015; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). In practical terms, “purification” narratives convert institutional distrust into a moral diagnosis (“the system is rotten”) and a moral remedy (“clean it up”), which expands the repertoire of anti-establishment mobilisation.
All this context of “algorithmcracy” (Amado, 2024) puts stress on the democratic system, vulnerable to a range of factors such as economic crisis, political radicalization, and international affairs. Yet the key point for this paper is not that digital dynamics “cause” democratic erosion on their own, but that they magnify the political costs of long-standing representational frictions, especially the gap between who elects and who is elected.
Additionally, democracy is experiencing a singular crisis due to the emergence of illiberal responses, producing a split between democracy and liberalism, as argued by Yascha Mounk (2018). According to the author, since the 2008 economic crisis, native-born citizens have been experiencing a combination of emotional reactions to political, social, and demographic changes. First, a lack of hope among youth generations when comparing their welfare to that of their parents at the same age. Second, intense demographic changes – due to migration and refugee inflows and politicised migration debates – are producing emotional responses both in the US and Europe, with a return to nativist claims (Marchi & Zúquete, 2024; Betz, 2017; Marchi & Bruno, 2016; Guia, 2016) and racial working-class ressentiment (Begum et al., 2021; Carnes & Lupu, 2021; Mondon & Winter, 2020a, 2020b; Morgan & Lee, 2018). Third, a rapid progressive consensus in western societies – the so-called “woke culture,” i.e., and “identity-centred progressive agenda” – placed significant challenges, including strong claims about normative change, in terms of language, literature, and art revision based on (i) personal character of the artist/author versus the creation itself, (ii) current morality seen as the ultimate and correct moral. This led to the re-awakening of immaterial culture wars, with a tension between a cultural left and the cultural backlash of the radical right (Ferreira Dias, 2025; Fukuyama, 2018; Hunter, 1991, 1996).
These pressures converge on a structural vulnerability of representative democracy: the gap between who elects and who is elected. Under hyper-surveillance, that gap becomes easier to see and harder to legitimate—especially when (i) civic participation is largely episodic and confined to elections, (ii) representative linkages remain thin, and accountability is perceived as diffuse, and (iii) party recruitment is experienced as opaque or endogamous, privileging internal pipelines over merit and extra-partisan social experience. When integrity failures and scandals are added to this mix, the resulting moral register (“clean-up” and “purification”) increases the plausibility of populist antagonism and demand for illiberal shortcuts. The remainder of the paper, therefore, develops the political recruitment loop as a mechanism linking hyper-surveillance to democratic disenchantment, and proposes a phased, auditable policy toolbox: minimum transparency standards and civic access pathways into party lists, within a European framework, using Portugal as an illustrative case.
The Problem in Europe: Hyper-Surveillance Meets a Representation Gap
Representative democracy has always rested on a tension: citizens govern themselves only indirectly, by selecting others to make decisions in their name (Pitkin, 1967; Urbinati, 2006). This is a consequence of a long-term political process, related to the transition from absolutist monarchy to democracy (Manin, 1997). While the idea that power lies with the people was essential to desacralize the right to rule, the notion that representation seems to be the most effective way to fulfil the will of the majority leads to discomfort, since the will of the people is only indirectly and highly mediated (Manin, 1997; Przeworski, 2018). In stable periods, that tension is often politically manageable because the legitimacy of delegation is anchored in a simple ritual – elections – and in an expectation that institutions will remain broadly functional and fair between electoral moments (Manin, 1997). In other terms, we may say that people accept the rules of democracy – i.e., being set apart from decisions – if they are gaining from it. It is the economy of political satisfaction (Easton, 1965; Scharpf, 1999).
On the other hand, it leads to a recent, however intense, debate: how representation is limiting representativeness, and how representativeness is a political limitation to parties’ independence (Pitkin, 1967; Urbinati, 2006). In more practical terms, demographic changes are demanding affirmative and corrective actions – like quotas – for Parliament to reflect social diversity (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009; Phillips, 1995). However, while those affirmative actions are producing results, many social movements are claiming that political actors should act like the citizens rather than being independent (Dovi, 2007; Mansbridge, 2003). For instance, it means that it is not enough to have black people in the parliament, government, and other places, but they should act like activist movements expect them to do (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995). This is also applied to other visible traits of politicians, despite the racial aspect making this more evident (Young, 2000).
What Changed: Mass Education and the Acceleration of the Information Ecosystem
First, the massification of education increases the baseline capacity to evaluate political claims and the expectation that power must justify itself continuously. Even when information is imperfect, higher educational attainment broadens the social demand for reasons, transparency, and competence. In practical terms, citizens are more likely to notice inconsistency (between rhetoric and action), opportunism (between promises and constraints), and privilege (between ordinary life and elite trajectories).
Second, a more educated public is also very critical of politicians’ abilities, often being cynical towards what seems to be political careers, especially when they start from a young age and involve limited experience of the real world (Bovens & Wille, 2017; Mair, 2013; Przeworski, 2018). In countries where political parties maintain organized youth wings, it is more likely for citizens to see them as “factories of politicians”, i.e., early entry points that socialize and recruit future candidates, producing greater resentment about the gap between electors and the elected (Jalali et al., 2024; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995).
Third, the media environment shifted from periodic broadcast scrutiny to continuous participatory visibility. Traditional media long operated as a “fourth estate,” associated with accountability and the monitoring of power (Schultz, 1998). But the contemporary cycle is faster and more affective: social media ecosystems reward speed, novelty, and emotional resonance, often compressing complex issues into symbolic conflict. In Mounk’s account of contemporary identity politics, the public arena becomes particularly prone to moralized framings and simplified oppositions, an environment in which political legitimacy is judged not only by outcomes but by conduct, language, and symbolic alignment (Mounk, 2023).
European Symptoms: Low Trust, Party Dislike, and Perceptions of Closure
The European symptom profile is consistent: political parties attract among the lowest levels of trust, and citizens frequently describe politics in terms of closed careers and self-serving elites (Mair, 2013; Przeworski, 2018). In the EU-wide Standard Eurobarometer 101 (Spring 2024), only 22% of respondents “tend to trust” political parties (EU27), while large majorities report distrust (European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication, 2024). Even where trust in other institutions fluctuates, parties remain a focal point for scepticism because they control access to representation: they filter who appears on ballots, how political careers progress, and how internal accountability operates (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995).
Perceptions of closure are reinforced where party careers are seen as starting early and progressing through organized youth wings and internal staff roles. While parties tend to see it as a symptom of democracy, citizenship, and generational renovation, public opinion goes on the opposite side, being suspicious of a “jobs for the boys” factory.
Evidence from Portugal suggests an “iceberg-shaped” recruitment ladder: youth wings may be visible as entry points, yet their representation compresses sharply at the decisive stages of candidate selection and electable list placement, with informal bargaining between youth organizations and party leadership shaping outcomes (Jalali et al., 2024). In this sense, anti-establishment narratives are not only moral reactions to individual politicians but institutional reactions to party-controlled filters, what Przeworski (2018) summarizes as the perception that elections reproduce “establishment,” “elites,” or even a political “caste.”
This feeds perceptions aligned with the “cartelization” diagnosis in party scholarship: parties may remain indispensable to democratic coordination while becoming less socially rooted and less permeable to external talent, particularly where public funding and state-linked resources reduce reliance on membership and local embeddedness (Katz & Mair, 1995, 2009; Mair, 2013). Whether or not one adopts the cartel thesis in full, it captures a critical policy-relevant intuition: if citizens experience parties as closed recruitment machines, distrust becomes a rational inference rather than mere cynicism (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995).
Finally, the moral register of politics – particularly intense in digital environments –amplifies how integrity failures are interpreted. Scandals do not merely signal individual misconduct; they can erode institutional trust and confirm a broader narrative of closure (“they protect their own”), especially where gatekeeping is opaque (Bowler & Karp, 2004). In that sense, hyper-surveillance often functions less as a neutral accountability tool and more as a lens that magnifies the reputational costs of distance, opacity, and perceived self-reproduction.
A useful contrast is provided by single-member constituency systems such as the United Kingdom. Comparative work on electoral incentives suggests that systems encouraging personal vote-seeking strengthen incentives for constituency-oriented behaviour (Carey & Shugart, 1995), and UK evidence indicates that MPs’ constituency communication and service respond to re-election incentives (Auel & Umit, 2018; Cain et al., 1984; Norton & Wood, 1993). However, stronger constituency linkage does not remove party gatekeeping: candidate selection remains an intra-party process, and perceptions of closure can persist when recruitment is opaque or centrally controlled (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). The implication for European reform debates is therefore precise: improving accountability “at the front end” (representative–constituent linkage) helps, but tackling disenchantment requires reforming the “back end” of democracy: how parties recruit, select, and promote candidates.
Bridge Conclusion
This paper conceptualises the gap between electors and elected as a recruitment loop rather than merely a communication failure. Citizens watch politics continuously but can intervene meaningfully only episodically; they observe parties as gatekeepers but cannot see inside the gatekeeping process. Under these conditions, accountability becomes diffuse and trust costly. Portugal illustrates this dynamic in microcosm: party youth wings function as visible entry points but are seldom translated into real candidate diversity (Jalali et al., 2024). The challenge is therefore to open recruitment without undermining parties’ capacity to coordinate democracy, to make delegation intelligible again. The following section proposes a pragmatic policy toolbox for doing so, balancing transparency, civic access, and organizational integrity (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Katz & Mair, 1995; Mair, 2013).
Policy Toolbox: Opening without Breaking Parties
The central policy challenge is to widen civic access to representation without undermining parties’ coordinating functions. Parties are not merely electoral vehicles; they aggregate preferences, recruit candidates, structure parliamentary majorities, and make responsibility legible in government (Mair, 2013). Yet when parties are experienced as closed recruitment machines, distrust becomes a rational inference rather than a purely moral reaction, especially under hyper-surveillance, where citizens can observe political life continuously but cannot observe how candidacies are actually made (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). The toolbox proposed here follows a simple logic: make recruitment intelligible (transparency), make entry plausible (civic pathways), and make integrity credible (anti-capture safeguards). These reforms are designed to be phased, auditable, and compatible with freedom of association and party autonomy, principles emphasized in European standards on party regulation (OSCE/ODIHR & Venice Commission, 2020).
First Tool
A first tool is a minimum transparency standard for candidate selection. The aim is not to impose a single “best method” of selection, but to require that parties publish the basic architecture of their recruitment decisions in advance: who decides, by what criteria, on what calendar, and with what right of appeal or review. The OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission guidelines underline that party regulation should protect pluralism while encouraging democratic internal functioning and clarity of rules (OSCE/ODIHR & Venice Commission, 2020). Translating this into a practical standard means requiring parties to publish written procedures for list formation (including eligibility, stages, and decision bodies) and to report aggregated outcomes after selection (e.g., number of applicants, share coming from outside internal party roles, and basic diversity indicators, reported in non-identifying form). This aligns with the OECD’s emphasis on openness and inclusiveness as trust-relevant “values” drivers: citizens judge not only outcomes, but also whether processes are fair, transparent, and intelligible (OECD, 2017). Crucially, transparency here is not punitive; it is a low-cost infrastructural reform that reduces the informational asymmetry that makes gatekeeping look arbitrary.
Second Tool
A second tool is to create civic access pathways into party lists, designed to reduce the perception that politics is an insiders’ career ladder. Research on recruitment repeatedly shows that who reaches office depends on filters that operate well before election day, such as party selectors, eligibility rules, and informal networks (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). The policy aim, therefore, is to add a structured “external entry” channel alongside internal recruitment, without delegitimizing internal party work.
One workable design is a phased system of “civic slots” on party lists, limited in share, clearly defined in eligibility, and tied to an open call. Selection can combine a rule-based screening stage (including blind review where feasible for qualifications and experience), and a plural evaluation panel that includes party representatives plus external members with credibility (e.g., retired judges, academics, civil society leaders). This design reflects the core insight of candidate selection studies: openness alone does not guarantee fairness; the rules of selection and the identity of selectors shape capture risks and public legitimacy (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). To address the predictable objection that “amateurs cannot govern,” parties can attach a standardized training and mentoring track for civic entrants, which preserves competence while changing the optics and reality of permeability.
Third Tool
A third tool is a set of anti-endogamy and integrity safeguards that reduce the probability that openness becomes performative or captured. Here, European integrity standards provide a clear anchor: GRECO’s Fourth Evaluation Round explicitly focuses on corruption prevention for members of parliament, including ethical principles, conflicts of interest, restrictions on certain activities, asset and interest declarations, and enforcement mechanisms (Council of Europe, GRECO, n.d.).
Yet, the toolbox does not require reinventing ethics regulation; it requires connecting recruitment openness to integrity credibility. Practically, parties adopting civic pathways should commit to (i) basic conflict-of-interest declarations for candidates, (ii) simple anti-nepotism rules and disclosure obligations for close family ties in politically relevant appointments, and (iii) clear restrictions on incompatible roles where these create perceptions of insider privilege.
Because parties differ legally across European systems, the policy point is not uniform legal transplantation but a minimum package of auditable commitments that makes “purification” rhetoric less plausible by making integrity rules visible and enforceable.
Fourth Tool
A fourth tool is incentives and certification. One reason reforms fail is that voluntary openness is individually costly for a party, especially if competitors remain closed. A practical solution is a transparency certification: an independent audit against a checklist aligned with the minimum transparency standard, civic access design, and integrity safeguards. This can begin as voluntary and reputational, then become scalable if legislatures choose to connect it to permissible incentives (for example, earmarked public funding for training civic entrants, or additional reporting support), always within the constraints recommended in European party-regulation guidance (OSCE/ODIHR & Venice Commission, 2020). The OECD’s trust framework is relevant here: where citizens perceive institutions as open and aligned with public-interest values, trust becomes easier to rebuild; where processes remain opaque, even good outcomes are discounted (OECD, 2017).
Fifth Tool
A fifth, optional tool is participatory selection mechanisms that do not substitute for parties but complement them. Partial primaries or citizen panels (mini-publics) can be used not to choose entire lists, but to evaluate candidates’ competence and integrity claims in a structured, evidence-based setting. The point is to convert hyper-surveillance into functional accountability: create moments where citizens engage substantively with candidate profiles rather than through algorithmic fragments. Because participatory selection can intensify factionalism or media spectacle, it should be deployed cautiously and only with anti-capture rules and clear scope limits (Hazan & Rahat, 2010).
In sum, taken together, these tools aim to change the political economy of distrust by shifting recruitment from an opaque internal practice to a partially visible civic interface. This is particularly relevant in contexts where youth wings function as visible pipelines, yet the decisive stages of list placement remain compressed and informally negotiated, reinforcing the perception that internal circuits dominate political mobility (Jalali et al., 2024). The toolbox is therefore designed to “open without breaking”: to preserve party coordination while lowering the symbolic and practical distance between electors and elected.
Policy Recommendations, Implementation Roadmap, and Metrics
Recommendations
Recommendation 1 —Adopt a European minimum transparency standard for candidate selection. Parties should publish, ex ante, a written procedure for list formation (eligibility criteria; stages and calendar; decision body; complaint/review channel) and, ex post, an aggregated report on the selection process (e.g., number of applicants; number shortlisted; basic non-identifying diversity indicators; and the share of candidates coming from outside internal party roles). This does not impose a single selection model; it makes gatekeeping legible and therefore contestable on procedural grounds (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; OSCE/ODIHR & Venice Commission, 2020). The expected impact is to reduce informational asymmetry and weaken the plausibility of “closed casta” narratives under hyper-surveillance (European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication, 2024; Mair, 2013).
Recommendation 2 — Implement phased civic access pathways (“civic slots”) into party lists. Parties should reserve a limited and gradually expandable share of list positions for candidates recruited through an open call, with eligibility rules that allow genuine external entry (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). Selection should be rule-based and staged: a first screening phase can be partly blinded where feasible (qualifications, experience), followed by a plural evaluation panel combining party and external members with high credibility. This targets the core driver of disenchantment identified in recruitment research: citizens can vote, but they cannot realistically enter the pipeline (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995).
Recommendation 3 — Add anti-endogamy and integrity safeguards that make openness credible. Where recruitment opens, the system must also signal credible integrity boundaries: baseline conflict-of-interest declarations for candidates; simple anti-nepotism disclosure rules; and enforceable incompatibility rules where accumulation of roles creates perceptions of insider privilege. These measures align with European anti-corruption frameworks that emphasize conflicts of interest, codes of conduct, and enforceability for MPs (Council of Europe, GRECO, n.d.). The expected impact is to prevent openness from being dismissed as symbolic and to reduce “purification” dynamics that thrive on scandal amplification.
Recommendation 4 — Create a transparency certification (voluntary first, scalable later). An independent audit against a short checklist (procedural transparency; civic pathway design; basic integrity disclosures) can generate reputational incentives while limiting the collective-action problem where no party wants to “disarm” unilaterally. This is a policy instrument, not a European legal requirement; it is justified by the governance literature on rebuilding trust through competence and values (OECD, 2017).
Recommendation 5 — Publish annual aggregated metrics to track whether pipelines are actually opening. Parties (or an independent public body) should report a small set of comparable indicators annually (see below). This shifts debate from moral accusation to measurable change and allows phased reforms to be evaluated and adjusted (OSCE/ODIHR & Venice Commission, 2020).
Implementation Roadmap (0–48 months)
In months 0–12, implement the minimum transparency standard (Recommendation 1) and launch a pilot civic pathway with a small number of civic slots (Recommendation 2), accompanied by a basic integrity package (Recommendation 3). In parallel, start the voluntary certification scheme (Recommendation 4) and define the common reporting template (Recommendation 5).
In months 12–24, expand civic slots modestly (conditional on applicant volume and audit results), institutionalize the plural panel model, and introduce routine disclosure checks (lightweight, standardized, and auditable).
In months 24–48, consolidate reforms: embed transparency and reporting as stable practice, commission an independent evaluation, and recalibrate thresholds (slot share, screening rules, disclosure scope) based on observed capture risks and legitimacy gains.
Portugal can remain an illustrative benchmark rather than a dedicated section: recent evidence on the translation from youth recruitment to electable list placement shows why “pipeline visibility” does not automatically equal “pipeline openness,” and why reforms must target the decisive stages of selection (Jalali et al., 2024).
Metrics & Evaluation (minimal set)
A compact metrics package should track: (1) the share of elected officials with substantial professional experience outside party/political roles (aggregated); (2) average tenure and rotation rates in elected office; (3) number of applicants per civic slot and selection rates; (4) compliance scores on the transparency checklist (party-level, annually); and (5) time-series trends in trust in parties (national and EU benchmarks, including Eurobarometer) (European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication, 2024).
Conclusion
Hyper-surveillance did not create Europe’s representation gap, but it has raised the political cost of long-standing features of representative government: mediated will-formation, professionalized political careers, and party gatekeeping. When citizens can monitor politics continuously yet cannot observe – or access – the recruitment process, accountability becomes diffuse and trust becomes costly. The policy aim is therefore not moral “purification,” but infrastructural repair: opening the political pipeline while preserving parties’ coordinating capacity. A minimum transparency standard, civic access pathways, and credible integrity safeguards together can transform hyper-vigilance into functional accountability, reducing the plausibility of populist antagonism and strengthening democratic resilience (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Mair, 2013; OSCE/ODIHR & Venice Commission, 2020).
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On January 8, 2026, ECPS convened Session 9 of its Virtual Workshop Series, titled “Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion.” The session was chaired and moderated by Dr. Helen L. Murphey, who framed exclusionary populism as a dual process that claims to empower an “authentic people” while simultaneously criminalizing stigmatized “others.” Assoc. Prof. Christopher N. Magno introduced the concept of criminal populism, showing how legal scandal and criminality can be transformed into political capital in the United States and the Philippines. Dr. Russell Foster examined how Austria’s FPÖ and France’s Rassemblement National legitimate anti-migration agendas through securitization and Gramscian metapolitics. Saga Oskarson Kindstrand drew on ethnographic research on the Sweden Democrats to challenge assumptions that populism undermines party organization. Discussants Hannah Geddes and Vlad Surdea-Hernea provided incisive reflections on theory, methodology, and democratic implications.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On Thursday, January 8, 2026, theEuropean Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened Session 9 of its Virtual Workshop Series, titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Held under the session theme“Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion,” the session brought together an interdisciplinary group of scholars to explore how populist actors mobilize crime, security, and moral threat to redefine political belonging—deciding who counts as “the people,” who is constructed as a dangerous “other,” and how these distinctions increasingly enter mainstream politics.
The workshop opened with welcoming and technical remarks by ECPS intern Stella Schade, who introduced the session’s structure, speakers, and discussants on behalf of ECPS, situating the event within the Center’s broader commitment to comparative and theoretically grounded research on populism.
The session was chaired and moderated by Dr. Helen L. Murphey (Postdoctoral Scholar, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State University), whose introduction provided the session’s conceptual frame. Dr. Murphey emphasized that exclusionary populism operates through a dual logic: empowering an “authentic people” while simultaneously stigmatizing “others” as criminal, threatening, or disorderly. She highlighted how populists present themselves as reluctant political actors pushed into action by crisis and elite failure, while claiming exclusive authority over law and order. Importantly, she noted that these narratives are no longer confined to populist outsiders but increasingly circulate within mainstream party competition. Her framing raised core questions about the evolution of exclusionary discourse, its entanglement with crime and popular culture, and its implications for democratic norms and party organization.
Dr. Christopher N. Magno, who is an Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University, presented “From Crime Shows to Power: The Rise of Criminal Populism,” introducing criminal populism as a framework for understanding how leaders transform criminality into political capital. Moving beyond penal populism, Dr. Magno showed how indictments and scandals are reframed as proof of authenticity and persecution, strengthening affective ties with supporters while eroding accountability. Drawing on cases from the United States and the Philippines, he demonstrated how criminal identity becomes a political asset.
Dr. Russell Foster, Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies, delivered “The Legitimization Process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s Migration Policies,” examining how radical right parties in Austria and France mainstream anti-immigration positions through securitization and cultural adaptation. Using a Gramscian lens, he argued that migration is increasingly criminalized by being linked to anxieties over housing, welfare, and identity, while stressing that radical right trajectories vary across national contexts.
Saga Oskarson Kindstrand, PhD candidate at Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, Sciences Po, presented “Anti-Party to Mass Party? Lessons from the Radical Right’s Party Building Model,” challenging the assumption that populism rejects mediation. Based on ethnographic research on the Sweden Democrats, she argued that populist discourse can sustain dense party organization by moralizing membership, valorizing “ordinary people,” and cultivating urgency—re-legitimating the party as a representative vehicle.
The presentations were followed by engaged interventions from Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews) and Dr. Vlad Surdea-Hernea (Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences in Vienna). Their critiques highlighted shared strengths in challenging established assumptions while probing issues of novelty, case selection, class, and internal party power. Together, the session offered a cohesive examination of how populism reshapes crime, exclusion, and democratic representation.
On January 8, 2026, ECPS convened Session 9 of its Virtual Workshop Series, titled “Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion.” The session was chaired and moderated by Dr. Helen L. Murphey, who framed exclusionary populism as a dual process that claims to empower an “authentic people” while simultaneously criminalizing stigmatized “others.” Assoc. Prof. Christopher N. Magno introduced the concept of criminal populism, showing how legal scandal and criminality can be transformed into political capital in the United States and the Philippines. Dr. Russell Foster examined how Austria’s FPÖ and France’s Rassemblement National legitimate anti-migration agendas through securitization and Gramscian metapolitics. Saga Oskarson Kindstrand drew on ethnographic research on the Sweden Democrats to challenge assumptions that populism undermines party organization. Discussants Hannah Geddes and Vlad Surdea-Hernea provided incisive reflections on theory, methodology, and democratic implications.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On Thursday, January 8, 2026, theEuropean Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened Session 9 of its Virtual Workshop Series, titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Held under the session theme“Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion,” the session brought together an interdisciplinary group of scholars to explore how populist actors mobilize crime, security, and moral threat to redefine political belonging—deciding who counts as “the people,” who is constructed as a dangerous “other,” and how these distinctions increasingly enter mainstream politics.
The workshop opened with welcoming and technical remarks by ECPS intern Stella Schade, who introduced the session’s structure, speakers, and discussants on behalf of ECPS, situating the event within the Center’s broader commitment to comparative and theoretically grounded research on populism.
The session was chaired and moderated by Dr. Helen L. Murphey (Postdoctoral Scholar, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State University), whose introduction provided the session’s conceptual frame. Dr. Murphey emphasized that exclusionary populism operates through a dual logic: empowering an “authentic people” while simultaneously stigmatizing “others” as criminal, threatening, or disorderly. She highlighted how populists present themselves as reluctant political actors pushed into action by crisis and elite failure, while claiming exclusive authority over law and order. Importantly, she noted that these narratives are no longer confined to populist outsiders but increasingly circulate within mainstream party competition. Her framing raised core questions about the evolution of exclusionary discourse, its entanglement with crime and popular culture, and its implications for democratic norms and party organization.
Dr. Christopher N. Magno, who is an Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University, presented “From Crime Shows to Power: The Rise of Criminal Populism,” introducing criminal populism as a framework for understanding how leaders transform criminality into political capital. Moving beyond penal populism, Dr. Magno showed how indictments and scandals are reframed as proof of authenticity and persecution, strengthening affective ties with supporters while eroding accountability. Drawing on cases from the United States and the Philippines, he demonstrated how criminal identity becomes a political asset.
Dr. Russell Foster, Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies, delivered “The Legitimization Process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s Migration Policies,” examining how radical right parties in Austria and France mainstream anti-immigration positions through securitization and cultural adaptation. Using a Gramscian lens, he argued that migration is increasingly criminalized by being linked to anxieties over housing, welfare, and identity, while stressing that radical right trajectories vary across national contexts.
Saga Oskarson Kindstrand, PhD candidate at Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, Sciences Po, presented “Anti-Party to Mass Party? Lessons from the Radical Right’s Party Building Model,” challenging the assumption that populism rejects mediation. Based on ethnographic research on the Sweden Democrats, she argued that populist discourse can sustain dense party organization by moralizing membership, valorizing “ordinary people,” and cultivating urgency—re-legitimating the party as a representative vehicle.
The presentations were followed by engaged interventions from Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews) and Dr. Vlad Surdea-Hernea (Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences in Vienna). Their critiques highlighted shared strengths in challenging established assumptions while probing issues of novelty, case selection, class, and internal party power. Together, the session offered a cohesive examination of how populism reshapes crime, exclusion, and democratic representation.
Moderator Dr. Helen Murphey: The Adaptive Politics of Populist Exclusion
Dr. Helen L. Murphey is a Postdoctoral Scholar at Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State University.
Dr. Helen Murphey opened Session 9 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop series by situating the panel within both a timely political moment and an evolving scholarly debate. Beginning with acknowledgements to ECPS, the presenters, and the audience, she framed the session—Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion—as an interdisciplinary conversation addressing one of the most pressing intersections in contemporary populism research.
From the outset, Dr. Murphey emphasized that exclusionary populism, the unifying focus of the three papers, is defined by a dual logic of empowerment and marginalization. While such movements claim to restore political voice to what they portray as the “authentic people,” they simultaneously construct stigmatized “others,” frequently associating these groups with crime, insecurity, and social disorder. Within this framework, exclusionary populists present themselves as the guardians of law, order, and security—values they argue have been abandoned by political elites and mainstream parties.
Dr. Murphey further highlighted a recurring feature of populist self-representation: the claim to reluctant political engagement. Populists, she noted, often depict themselves and their constituencies as driven into politics by crisis rather than ideology. Importantly, she observed that exclusionary narratives are no longer confined to overtly populist actors. Instead, themes of identity, securitization, and exclusion have increasingly migrated into the political mainstream, raising urgent analytical and normative questions.
Against this backdrop, Dr. Murphey outlined several core challenges for scholars. These included understanding how exclusionary populism evolves over time, how it becomes entangled with issues such as crime, security, and popular culture, and what consequences these developments hold for democratic norms and institutions. She also underscored the need to examine how populist claims to represent “the people” shape internal party structures and collective self-perceptions.
The session’s papers, Dr. Murphey argued, respond directly to these questions through diverse case studies, methodologies, and theoretical approaches. Together, they illuminate understudied dimensions of exclusionary populism, particularly its emotive, affective, and cultural dynamics. She stressed that exclusionary boundaries are often deliberately vague and malleable, allowing populist actors to recalibrate identities and grievances as they become embedded within formal political systems.
Concluding her remarks, Dr. Murphey invited participants to reflect on the democratic implications of these shifting contours of exclusion and passed the floor to the first presenter, signaling the start of a discussion aimed at deepening understanding of populism’s complex and adaptive nature.
Assoc. Prof. Christopher N. Magno: “From Crime Shows to Power: The Rise of Criminal Populism”
Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor, Department of Justice Studies and Human Services, Gannon University.
In his presentation titled “From Crime Shows to Power: The Rise of Criminal Populism,” Associate Professor Chris Magno of Gannon University offered a provocative and theoretically ambitious account of how crime has been transformed from a political liability into a powerful resource within contemporary populist politics. Drawing on more than two decades of comparative research on the Philippines and the United States, Assoc. Prof. Magno advanced the concept of criminal populism as a novel analytical framework for understanding the convergence of populism, spectacle, and criminality in democracies under strain.
Assoc. Prof. Magno began by situating his scholarly trajectory, noting that his doctoral research at Indiana University Bloomington examined crime as a form of political capital in the Philippines. Upon encountering the concept of penal populism—most notably developed by John Pratt—he initially understood it as a phenomenon largely confined to “crime warrior” politicians in liberal democracies. Penal populism, as Dr. Magno summarized, rests on punitive political agendas framed through wars on drugs, immigration, terrorism, and communism, all of which rely on the symbolic criminalization of racialized and marginalized “others.” This logic, he argued, reinforces a rigid division between a supposedly threatened, morally upright “people” and a dangerous, criminalized “them.”
However, Dr. Magno emphasized that this framework became insufficient to explain emerging political developments, particularly following the electoral success of Donald Trump. Trump’s rise, despite—or rather through—his extensive legal controversies, revealed a critical shift: criminality itself had become a political credential. What was once disqualifying was now openly embraced and weaponized. This realization prompted Dr. Magno’s ongoing book project with New York University Press, which conceptualizes criminal populism as a distinct political formation in which legal transgressions, indictments, and scandals are transformed into sources of legitimacy, authenticity, and mass mobilization.
At the core of Dr. Magno’s argument is the claim that contemporary populist leaders increasingly use criminal records and legal persecution as political assets. Rather than denying or concealing wrongdoing, criminal populists reframe themselves as victims of corrupt elites and politicized justice systems. Through this performative inversion, courts, arrests, and trials are converted into stages of political theater. Indictments become “badges of honor,” reaffirming outsider status and strengthening emotional bonds with disillusioned publics. Dr. Magno argued that this pattern is no longer exceptional but increasingly normalized across democratic systems.
Empirically, Dr. Magno illustrated this trend through comparative electoral data. In the United States, multiple candidates facing criminal investigations secured victories during the 2018 midterm elections, while Trump retained strong electoral viability amid multiple felony indictments. In the Philippines, the pattern was even more pronounced: a majority of candidates facing trials, investigations, or prior convictions won office in both the 2019 and 2025 elections. These developments, Dr. Magno argued, signal a broader transformation in democratic norms, where accountability no longer weakens political authority but may actively enhance it.
To systematize these dynamics, Dr. Magno introduced four ideal-typical categories of politicians who use crime as political capital. The first type, crime warrior politicians, derive legitimacy from aggressively positioning themselves as defenders of law and order. Importantly, Dr. Magno challenged the assumption that this model is exclusive to the political right, pointing to Bill Clinton as a key example. Clinton’s embrace of tough-on-crime rhetoric and legislation, Dr. Magno showed, coincided with rising incarceration rates—particularly among African Americans—even as crime rates declined. This illustrated how penal populism operates through fear amplification, crime propaganda, and the mobilization of state institutions to produce political popularity.
The second category, criminal politicians, consists of leaders who openly acknowledge their own criminal acts and convert them into claims of authenticity. Here, Dr. Magno highlighted Rodrigo Duterte, who repeatedly confessed to killing individuals and promised further extrajudicial violence as part of his war on drugs. Duterte’s electoral success, Dr. Magno argued, rested on his unapologetic embrace of criminality, which resonated with voters seeking decisive, transgressive leadership. Dr. Magno underscored that thousands of documented drug war killings—now under consideration by the International Criminal Court (ICC)—form part of this broader pattern of fascistic criminal governance.
The third type, political criminals, refers to figures whose acts of protest, rebellion, or resistance are criminalized by authoritarian or corrupt regimes. While Dr. Magno acknowledged historical examples such as Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King Jr., his focus remained on the Philippine context, where dissidents and “coup leaders” have repeatedly transformed criminalized identities into electoral success. These actors, he argued, exploit state repression and the weaponization of law to build political legitimacy grounded in defiance.
The fourth and most extreme category, fascist criminal politicians, combines elements of crime warrior and criminal politician archetypes. These leaders both fight crime and commit it, openly violating legal norms in the name of order. Duterte again served as Dr. Magno’s paradigmatic case, as did Trump in the US context. Fascist criminal politicians, Dr. Magno argued, exceed constitutional limits, normalize extrajudicial violence, and blur the boundary between legality and criminality, thereby hollowing out democratic institutions from within.
Throughout the presentation, Dr. Magno emphasized that criminal populism operates through spectacle, emotion, and selective victimhood. Crime narratives overwhelmingly focus on street crime and marginalized populations, while elite crimes—such as corruption, environmental destruction, and corporate abuse—remain conspicuously absent. By exploiting public anxieties around crime, criminal populists redirect grievance away from structural inequalities and toward racialized or impoverished “others.”
In concluding, Dr. Magno stressed that criminal populism represents a profound challenge for democratic accountability and the rule of law. As criminality becomes normalized—and even celebrated—as political capital, the moral foundations of democratic legitimacy are fundamentally altered. His framework, grounded in long-term comparative research, offers scholars a critical lens for understanding how crime, populism, and power increasingly converge in contemporary political life.
Dr. Russell Foster: “The Legitimization Process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s Migration Policies”
Dr. Russell Foster is a Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies.
In his presentation, Dr. Russell Foster (King’s College London) delivered an unsparing account of how radical-right actors in Europe have helped convert anti-immigration positions—from once-fringe commitments into increasingly mainstream political common sense. Dr. Foster framed the topic as “depressingly apt” for the opening of 2026, situating the discussion within an atmosphere of accelerating radical-right momentum across multiple democracies. The talk unfolded as both an analytical map of party evolution in Austria and France and a conceptual argument about how exclusionary politics gains legitimacy not only through party strategy, but through deeper shifts in political culture.
Dr. Foster began by crediting his co-author, Professor Murat Aktas, for extensive work on the paper, and then outlined the study’s two guiding angles. The first angle concerns variation: while the literature often treats the “European radical right” as a coherent phenomenon, Dr. Foster argued that cross-national similarities can be superficial. Beneath shared slogans and familiar tropes lie national, regional, and local differences that shape how exclusionary policies are narrated and why they resonate. The second angle concerns explanation: to understand why criminalizing narratives about migration become broadly accepted, the paper draws on a Gramscian lens of hegemony and metapolitics. This approach shifts attention away from a purely top-down reading of party manifestos and campaign rhetoric toward the cultural conditions and everyday anxieties that make certain claims feel plausible and politically actionable.
A key motif running through Dr. Foster’s remarks was the rejection of singularity. Just as his earlier work on Euroscepticism emphasized that there are “multiple Euroscepticisms,” he suggested there are likewise multiple radical-right narratives across Europe. These narratives do not operate as simple copies of one another, nor do they necessarily mirror developments in the United States or other global contexts. The implication is methodological as well as political: comparative scholarship must resist flattening diverse trajectories into a single model, especially when trying to explain “mainstreaming”—the process by which exclusionary frames seep into the broader political field.
To clarify what sort of “right” is under examination, Dr. Foster offered a three-part typology. First, the “old right” was described as traditional Burkean conservatism: authority, tradition, continuity, and a largely upper-middle-class politics of maintenance—an establishment conservatism he suggested is increasingly in retreat. Second, the “extreme right” was characterized as overt neo-Nazism—an imagery of violent subcultural extremism that persists but remains socially stigmatized. Third, and central to the paper, the “radical right” was presented as a hybrid formation—what he noted has been dubbed “hipster fascism”: a politics that borrows flexibly from across the ideological spectrum, including the center, segments of the left, and even environmental themes, while retaining an exclusionary core. This radical-right formation, in Dr. Foster’s telling, is defined less by crude nostalgia than by adaptability, presentation, and the strategic recalibration of stigma.
Within this conceptual frame, migration served as the primary policy domain through which Dr. Foster traced legitimization. He argued that the framing of immigration has shifted over time: from earlier narratives that treated immigration as a cultural or even “medicalized” threat (suggesting contamination or societal illness) toward a securitized and criminalized framing in which migration becomes a question of law, disorder, and public safety. This shift is not presented as a sudden invention of the 21st century, but rather as an intensification—an acceleration in the last two decades as radical-right parties have learned to link migration to broader anxieties over housing, employment, education, healthcare, and welfare. Migration, in this storyline, becomes a “master key” issue: a flexible explanatory device used to connect disparate social grievances into one coherent politics of blame.
The comparative heart of the talk focused on two parties: Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) and France’s Rassemblement National (RN). Dr. Foster treated them as parallel case studies—both emerging in the postwar period, both marginal for decades, both rising sharply in the late 20th and early 21st centuries—yet he emphasized meaningful divergences in origins, strategy, and their relationship to governing power.
The FPÖ’s trajectory was presented as beginning nearer to the extreme-right pole. Founded in the mid-1950s after Allied withdrawal, the party was described as having been established by former National Socialist members, with its early leadership tied directly to the political structures of the Nazi era. Yet by the 1980s, Dr. Foster argued, internal shifts began to reposition the party toward respectability. The election of Norbert Steger in 1980 signaled an attempt at liberalization—an effort to appear more acceptable within democratic competition. That repositioning accelerated, paradoxically, with the rise of Jörg Haider in 1986, who pushed the party toward a sharper radical-right orientation and expanded anti-immigration messaging amid rising public anxieties. Dr. Foster described the 1990s as a further pivot point: as the Cold War ended, the party moved away from overt anti-communism and leaned more heavily into Euroscepticism and immigration. The critical marker of political breakthrough arrived in October 1999, when the FPÖ entered government in coalition with the Austrian People’s Party—an early European example of a radical-right party moving from protest to power.
Dr. Foster highlighted that, by the mid-2000s, the FPÖ’s anti-immigration rhetoric hardened again, especially under Heinz-Christian Strache, who intensified a discourse less rooted in older ethnic nationalism and more structured around a contemporary anti-immigrant logic. This repositioning proved politically advantageous as large-scale migration to Europe increased after the Arab Spring in 2011 and during the 2014–2016 migration crisis. Austria’s role as a transit country enabled the FPÖ to translate transnational events into national alarm. Dr. Foster stressed a recurring populist technique here: deliberate vagueness. By keeping categories of threat flexible, parties can “capitalize upon external events they did not cause,” retrofitting those events into an already-available narrative of invasion, insecurity, and criminality. Migration, in the FPÖ’s rhetoric, was reframed not simply as economic pressure or cultural change, but as Islamic threat—and, by extension, as a security and crime issue.
RN’s trajectory was presented as both comparable and distinct. Unlike the FPÖ’s immediate postwar origins, RN’s predecessor emerged in the 1970s, shaped by different historical sediments—anti-communism, antisemitism, and the aftershocks of imperial collapse. Under Jean-Marie Le Pen, it was positioned firmly within the idiom of the old extreme right. Yet, as with the FPÖ, Dr. Foster identified a major strategic shift from the late 1990s into the early 2000s, as the party began to pursue broader acceptability.
Where RN diverged, Dr. Foster argued, was in its relationship to governing responsibility. The FPÖ’s entry into coalition government created exposure: it had to bear consequences for policy and compromise, and it suffered popularity losses—before later recovery. RN, by contrast, had often gained influence without holding national executive power. This produced a distinct mode of mainstreaming: rather than governing directly, RN shaped the agenda indirectly by exerting pressure on mainstream parties, pushing them to adopt securitized, criminalized migration narratives. Dr. Foster characterized this as a metapolitical accomplishment: a capacity to move the boundaries of what can be said and proposed, even from opposition. He invoked the logic of “sniping from the sidelines,” where radical-right actors influence policy while evading the accountability costs of implementation.
Across both cases, Dr. Foster located a shared acceleration after major systemic shocks: the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, the migration crisis from 2014 onward, and—most sharply—the post-pandemic period. These moments, in his framing, expanded the “demand side” for exclusionary narratives. Economic insecurity, housing pressures, fraying trust in institutions, and general disillusionment with traditional politics created a receptive environment for frames that depict migration as the cause of scarcity and insecurity. The parties’ “supply side” strategy—softening overt extremism, abandoning some older tropes, and adopting a “veneer of civilization”—was presented as the enabling condition for legitimacy. But the deeper engine of mainstreaming was cultural: anxieties already present in society, which radical-right actors interpret, amplify, and bind into a coherent story.
Gramsci’s metapolitics served as the theoretical hinge connecting these observations. Dr. Foster treated the radical right less as the creator of public anxiety than as a highly skilled reader of it—an actor adept at sensing “where the wind is blowing socially” and attaching grievances to a politics of exclusion. This is where transnational movements and digital communication enter the account: social media, he argued, has made metapolitics easier by enabling the circulation of narratives, images, and everyday performances of relatability. He pointed to RN’s “de-demonization” efforts and the cultivation of ordinary, lifestyle-based authenticity—politics staged as casual normality rather than elite ritual—as a key mechanism in making radical-right actors seem socially acceptable even as exclusionary policy content remains.
Dr. Foster closed by returning to two concluding claims. First, both parties demonstrate a broad shift from medicalization toward criminalization of immigration—recasting migrants less as cultural outsiders and more as threats to social order. Second, both parties illustrate an evolution from hard Euroscepticism toward what he termed “Euro-alternativeism”: not seeking exit from the European project, but seeking to reshape it into a fortress logic of securitization, sometimes articulated through “great replacement” imaginaries. Ending on what he called a “delightfully cheerful note,” Dr. Foster left the audience with a bleak but analytically precise picture: legitimization is not a single act but a process—built through national histories, cultural anxieties, strategic moderation of style, and the steady normalization of criminalized boundary-making as everyday political reason.
Saga Oskarson Kindstrand: “Anti-Party to Mass Party? Lessons from the Radical Right’s Party Building Model”
Saga Oskarson Kindstrand is a PhD candidate at Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, Sciences Po.
In her presentation, Saga Oskarson Kindstrand (Sciences Po) offered an analytically focused intervention into a familiar assumption in populism studies: that populist politics rejects mediation and therefore tends to weaken or bypass party organization. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork with members of the Sweden Democrats, she proposed a more paradoxical reading. Rather than treating populism as the enemy of party-based linkage, her account suggested that populism can actively enable dense organizational ties—reviving, in certain respects, the relational grammar of the mass party.
Kindstrand opened by positioning the paper as an article-in-progress, shaped through multiple presentations as she refined its framing and contribution. Her starting point lay in the “older” literature on crisis of representation and party linkage—work that diagnoses how political parties attempt to sustain relationships with constituencies under altered social conditions. Within that debate, populism is often treated as either an endpoint of party decline or as a form of democracy that can function without parties. She pointed to formulations—such as Peter Mair’s notion of “populist democracy” as popular democracy without parties—as emblematic of a broader scholarly tendency to presume that populism seeks immediacy: direct, unmediated expression of “the people’s will” rather than representation through institutional intermediaries.
From this theoretical backdrop, Kindstrand sketched a synthetic map of how populism is commonly described across different schools. In an ideological register, populism is frequently opposed to constitutionalism: pluralism, minority rights, checks and balances, and procedural mediation are depicted as constraints on popular sovereignty. In a strategic register, populism is often associated with charismatic leadership and the circumvention of established party channels. In organizational accounts, populism appears as personalization, weak institutionalization, “anti-party” self-presentation, memberless structures, and publicity-driven linkages that privilege direct communication over internal deliberation. Across these literatures, she argued, distinct approaches converge on a shared conclusion: populism tends toward the rejection of mediation.
She then introduced the empirical puzzle that motivated her research. In recent years, a number of radical right populist parties in Europe have moved against this expectation by investing heavily in local organization: building branches and party offices, recruiting fee-paying members, and creating structured opportunities for activism and advancement. Some scholarship has even suggested these parties are “reviving the mass party.” This development, she noted, is puzzling not only because it appears to contradict the theoretical image of populism as anti-intermediary, but also because it defies a standard cost–benefit logic used in membership studies. Membership in stigmatized radical right parties can carry high social costs and limited career returns; yet membership has expanded nonetheless. The persistence of this pattern, she argued, signals that something beyond material incentives is sustaining attachment.
Against this backdrop, Kindstrand proposed a perspective shift: to understand contemporary radical right party-building, one must look at linkage—and crucially, from the viewpoint of members themselves. Her question was not merely whether these parties have organizations, but how they construct and sustain relational bonds with members and supporters, and how members perceive their own role in democratic representation. Do members believe in the party’s mediating power? Do they experience the party as a vehicle connecting “ordinary people” to decision-making, akin to classic mass-party imaginaries?
To answer these questions, Kindstrand presented findings from an ethnographic study conducted in Sweden with Sweden Democrat party members across different levels of engagement. Her research design combined interviews with participant observation of meetings and local activities, treating the party as a discursively constituted institution—one whose meaning and authority are continually produced through language, practices, and shared self-understandings. She briefly contextualized the Sweden Democrats as Sweden’s radical right party: long present as an organization since the 1980s, but relatively new as a parliamentary actor after entering the Riksdag in 2010, and widely discussed as having attracted segments of former Social Democratic and working-class support.
The presentation’s central claim was deliberately counterintuitive: the Sweden Democrats’ ability to cultivate mass-party-style linkage was not despite their populism, but because of it. Kindstrand organized this argument around three recurring themes that emerged in her fieldwork—each a familiar populist motif, but reinterpreted through the lens of party-based representation.
The first theme concerned representation through resemblance. Members repeatedly described the party as constituted by “ordinary Swedes,” an identity portrayed as self-evident yet rarely defined with precision. This vagueness, rather than weakening the category, appeared to strengthen its adhesive power: “ordinary” became an inclusive boundary marker for those who felt socially and politically unseen. Members articulated a belief that because the party was made up of ordinary people, it knew what ordinary people wanted. Political competence was grounded not in expertise or institutional experience, but in proximity to everyday life—being “close to life” and therefore able to “see the problems.” In this narrative, mainstream parties were represented as detached elites—physically and symbolically located in Stockholm, distant from the lived consequences of political decisions, especially on immigration. Populism’s anti-establishment stance thus operated as an epistemology: it claimed that social truth is accessible primarily through lived experience, and that ordinaryness is itself a credential.
Within this representational frame, Kindstrand observed a notable moral grammar: the party was described less as a career ladder and more as a citizen duty. Members frequently rejected careerism, portraying involvement as an obligation to society rather than a self-development project. This moralization of participation aligned with the second theme: the centrality of formal membership. For her respondents, political engagement was not primarily defined as online activism, symbolic support, or loose affinity. The preferred—and valorized—form was formal membership: paying dues, attending meetings, doing paperwork, and participating in the internal rhythms of party life. Joining was narrated as an act of courage, precisely because it entailed stigma. Members spoke of losing friends, encountering hostility from relatives, and feeling threatened—especially those who had joined earlier, when social sanctions were reportedly stronger. Paradoxically, these costs intensified meaning rather than deterring engagement: stigma functioned as a purification mechanism that distinguished insiders from outsiders and reinforced loyalty.
Kindstrand suggested that exclusion from mainstream legitimacy did not only consolidate identity; it also shaped the form of participation. When open political identification carried risk, members became less reliant on visible online expressions and more dependent on in-person networks and local organizational spaces. In her telling, this dynamic inadvertently strengthened local party structures, creating a participatory ecology resembling older mass-party models. She gestured toward Duverger’s “bullseye” model of affiliation—layers of involvement and commitment radiating outward—as a better descriptor of what she observed than the flatter, looser organizational patterns often attributed to contemporary parties.
The third theme was efficacy: a strong belief in the party as a vehicle for change. Here, populism’s crisis narrative did substantial work. Members frequently described Sweden as being in decline and framed politics as urgent, even existential. Mainstream parties were cast as self-serving and unresponsive, and this perceived abandonment strengthened the conviction that only the Sweden Democrats could correct national trajectory. Members described their engagement in future-oriented moral terms—securing safety for children, protecting the country, and restoring order. These narratives produced an affective intensity that made membership meaningful even when individual influence seemed limited. A single member might not “make change,” but being a small part of a collective project was experienced as politically consequential.
In this sense, Kindstrand’s presentation reframed populist anti-establishment discourse as an engine of organizational reproduction. By narrating crisis, betrayal, and urgency, the party could present itself as a historically necessary instrument—echoing, in form if not in content, the early 20th-century mass party described by political scientists Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair as the vehicle through which underrepresented groups gained access to state power. The difference in Kindstrand’s account was that the Sweden Democrats’ linkage was not built on class-based identity in the classic sense. Although class references sometimes surfaced, “ordinary people” functioned as a more flexible identity—portable across occupational categories and capable of absorbing multiple grievances.
Across the presentation, Kindstrand revealed an underlying argument about populism’s relationship to mediation. While populist theory often equates populism with immediacy and hostility toward intermediaries, Kindstrand’s material suggested that populism can also re-sacralize the party as a mediator—so long as the party is imagined not as an elite institution but as an extension of “the people.” In that configuration, the party does not appear as a barrier between citizens and decision-making; it appears as the people’s own organizational body, an authentic conduit into the state. The party becomes legitimate precisely because it claims to negate the distinction between representatives and represented.
Kindstrand concluded by returning to the initial puzzle: why radical right populist parties can sometimes build membership organizations that mainstream parties struggle to sustain. Her findings suggested that the answer may lie less in incentives and more in meaning—specifically, in how populist narratives transform membership into moral duty, stigma into solidarity, and organizational routines into evidence of authenticity. In that sense, the Sweden Democrats’ organizational strength did not contradict populism’s representational claims; it operationalized them. Rather than dissolving party mediation, populism—under certain conditions—can rebuild it on the basis of resemblance, loyalty, and crisis-driven efficacy.
Discussants’ Feedback
Hannah Geddes
Hannah Geddes is a PhD Candidate at the University of St. Andrews.
In her role as discussant, Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews) offered a thoughtful and analytically generous set of reflections on the three papers, emphasizing their shared strength in challenging entrenched assumptions within populism research. Her feedback moved sequentially through the presentations, combining close engagement with constructive questions that opened space for further theoretical development.
Geddes began with Saga Oskarson Kindstrand’s paper, which she described as particularly compelling in its formulation of a clear and persuasive puzzle. She highlighted the strength of the paper’s core move: juxtaposing dominant expectations about populism—especially the assumption that populist politics is inherently immediate, anti-institutional, and resistant to party organization—with empirical evidence that complicates those claims. Geddes praised the way the paper reframed what appears, at first glance, as a contradiction into a productive analytical insight. Rather than presenting the findings as merely “filling a gap,” she noted, the paper demonstrated that the assumed contradiction between populism and party mediation may not exist in the way the literature presumes.
A central point of appreciation concerned Kindstrand’s constructivist and interpretivist approach. Geddes emphasized that treating parties as discursively constituted institutions was not a limitation but a key strength of the research. She suggested that this perspective allows the analysis to move beyond causal explanation toward a richer understanding of what parties mean to members, and how those meanings reshape assumptions about organization, representation, and linkage. In this respect, Geddes encouraged the author to lean more explicitly into this epistemological stance, arguing that the paper’s contribution lies precisely in unsettling dominant theoretical categories rather than establishing linear causal relationships.
Turning to the presentation on the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and France’s National Rally, Geddes expressed strong interest in the analysis of immigration and its linkage to broader social concerns. She noted that the discussion of how migration is connected to housing, welfare, and security anxieties was particularly illuminating. Drawing on her own context in Scotland, she raised questions about the demand side of radical-right politics—specifically whether economic grievances are the primary driver, or whether cultural and securitized frames take on autonomous force. She also queried how economic discontent becomes translated into cultural or criminal narratives, describing this transformation as one of the most intriguing aspects of the presentation.
Geddes further reflected on the argument that radical-right parties employ deliberate vagueness in their rhetoric. She questioned whether this vagueness should be understood as intentional strategic ambiguity or as a more structural feature of how such parties operate and adapt to shifting grievances. While not pressing for a definitive answer, she highlighted the analytical value of interrogating intention versus structure in explanations of mainstreaming and legitimation.
In her comments on Chris Magno’s presentation on criminal populism, Geddes again returned to the theme of challenging assumptions. She commended the paper for moving beyond the familiar figure of the “crime warrior” politician and for demonstrating how criminal identity itself can be transformed into political capital. Particularly striking to her was the idea that political actors can simultaneously embody both crime-fighting authority and criminal transgression—an apparent contradiction that the empirical material showed to be politically viable. Geddes posed a key question here: whether this duality represents a contradiction that politicians consciously exploit, or whether they have succeeded in fusing these identities into a coherent populist performance.
Finally, Geddes raised questions about the role of class across the presentations, especially in relation to crime and migration. While acknowledging the emphasis on race and immigration, she suggested that class dynamics—particularly their apparent reconfiguration or blurring—deserved further exploration, especially in European contexts where traditional class cleavages appear increasingly unsettled.
Concluding her remarks, Geddes praised all three presenters for clearly articulated puzzles, empirical richness, and a shared willingness to rethink core assumptions in the study of populism. Her feedback framed the session as a cohesive and intellectually stimulating exchange that advanced both theoretical and empirical debates.
Dr. Vlad Surdea-Hernea
Dr. Vlad Surdea-Hernea is a Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences in Vienna.
In his role as discussant at the session, Dr. Vlad Surdea-Hernea, a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences Vienna, offered a set of analytically probing and methodologically oriented reflections on the three papers. His feedback emphasized their shared ambition to unsettle established assumptions in populism research, while also pressing presenters to clarify conceptual scope, empirical grounding, and causal claims.
Dr. Surdea-Hernea began by endorsing Hannah Geddes’s earlier observation that all three papers were united by a willingness to challenge dominant frameworks. Turning first to Assoc. Prof. Chris Magno’s paper on criminal populism, he described the conceptual intervention as innovative and intellectually stimulating, particularly in its move beyond penal populism toward criminality as political capital. At the same time, he raised a historical question about novelty. Drawing attention to early twentieth-century precedents—such as socialist candidates in the United States who campaigned explicitly as convicted prisoners—he questioned whether criminal populism should be understood as an entirely new phenomenon or as a contemporary reconfiguration of a longer-standing strategy. He suggested that tracing such antecedents could strengthen the framework by clarifying what is genuinely novel and what represents continuity.
A second point concerned the relationship between theory and evidence. While praising the conceptual originality of the argument, Dr. Surdea-Hernea cautioned that some empirical illustrations risked appearing adjacent rather than integral to the theoretical claims. He encouraged a tighter integration, arguing that the empirical material should serve as the backbone of the conceptual innovation rather than as illustrative side notes. In his view, the project’s real potential lay not in assembling compelling anecdotes, but in advancing a coherent framework for understanding how crime, populism, and legitimacy intersect—one that could anchor broader debates.
Moving to the paper on the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and France’s National Rally (RN), Dr. Surdea-Hernea focused on comparative scope and framing. He questioned the logic of case selection by asking how the argument might travel to contexts where radical right parties have become mainstream despite the absence of large immigrant populations, such as parts of Eastern Europe. Exploring such “deviant cases,” he suggested, could illuminate whether the criminalization of migration operates similarly where migration is more imagined than experienced.
He also reflected on the paper’s discussion of responsiveness. While agreeing that radical right actors are adept at sensing social anxieties and adapting their messaging, he cautioned against formulations that might be misread as implying that responsiveness itself is normatively problematic. He encouraged clearer differentiation between democratic responsiveness and the strategic reframing of grievances through exclusionary narratives. Additionally, Dr. Surdea-Hernea suggested that the role of mainstream center-left and center-right parties during and after the 2014–2015 migration crisis deserved greater attention. Within a Gramscian framework, he argued, it would be valuable to clarify whether radical right narratives emerged “downstream of culture” or whether mainstream parties played a more constitutive role in shaping that culture through their responses to crisis.
In his comments on Saga Oskarson Kindstrand’s paper, Dr. Surdea-Hernea raised two interconnected questions. First, he queried whether populist parties that emphasize membership and internal participation actually grant members greater power in practice. If they do, he suggested, this would imply a genuinely distinct organizational form—one that may require rethinking what is meant by a “party” as an institutional vehicle. Second, he pointed to the empirical status of members’ claims. Assertions that populist parties are composed of “ordinary people,” he noted, are at least partially testable through demographic data on class, education, and age. Whether such claims are accurate or not would not undermine the argument, but each outcome would carry different theoretical implications—either confirming real organizational distinctiveness or revealing the power of belief and persuasion within party discourse.
Concluding, Dr. Surdea-Hernea emphasized that these questions were offered in a constructive spirit. Across all three papers, he saw strong foundations for further development and praised the session as a rich and engaging contribution to ongoing debates on populism, representation, and exclusion.
Questions from Participants
Chair Dr. Murphey opened the floor to audience participation by inviting collective reflection on the discussants’ feedback and the presenters’ arguments. She also highlighted a written comment from an audience member, Dr. Heidi Hart, who echoed Hannah Geddes’s earlier question to Chris Magno regarding the paradox of anti-crime rhetoric advanced by actors who themselves engage in or normalize criminality. Dr Hart noted the timeliness of this issue in light of a recent shooting of a US citizen in Minnesota and encouraged reflection on how such events intersect with the performative dimensions of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) rhetoric and enforcement practices. Her intervention underscored how criminal populism operates not only discursively but also through real-time securitized performances by state actors.
Dr. Murphey then directed a question to Dr. Russell Foster concerning his typology of right-wing politics—distinguishing between the “old right,” the “extreme right,” and the contemporary radical right. While the old right was described as grounded in Burkean notions of tradition, she observed that today’s radical right also mobilizes appeals to “tradition,” albeit in reconfigured forms. Citing cultural battles over gender roles and family structures, Dr. Murphey asked whether this suggested a transformed, rather than abandoned, relationship to tradition—raising the possibility that tradition itself has become a more flexible and strategically redeployed resource within radical right politics.
Dr. Bulent Kenes followed with a question addressed to Saga Oskarson Kindstrand, drawing on his close observation of Swedish politics. He asked whether the organizational and discursive strategies identified among the Sweden Democrats were mirrored by mainstream parties, particularly in light of the Tidö Agreement, which has drawn center-right and even Social Democratic actors closer to radical right framings. Dr. Kenes queried whether similar narratives on criminality and migration were diffusing across the party system, suggesting a broader process of normalization and contagion beyond the populist radical right itself.
Responses by Presenters
Assoc. Prof. Chris Magno’s Response
In his response to the discussants’ feedback and audience questions, Assoc. Prof. Chris Magno offered clarifications that further situated his concept of criminal populism within a longer historical and comparative arc, while also addressing questions of class, identity, and apparent contradiction.
Dr. Magno began by engaging directly with Dr. Surdea-Hernea’s question regarding novelty. He agreed that the use of criminal identity as political capital is not a recent invention, stressing that his book project explicitly traces its roots to the colonial period. In the opening chapter, he examines how state power itself emerged through crime during the US colonization of the Philippines, arguing that many of the core elements of criminal populism—eugenics, racial othering, criminalization, propaganda, militarized policing, and surveillance—were forged in imperial contexts. He introduced the idea of a “colonial feedback loop,” whereby techniques developed in colonial governance later return to the metropole and are redeployed in contemporary democratic politics. This historical framing, he explained, is central to his comparative analysis of the Philippines and the United States, and challenges the assumption that criminal populism is a phenomenon confined to the Global South.
Responding to questions raised by Hannah Geddes on contradiction and class, Dr. Magno emphasized that criminal populists actively manipulate identities associated with poverty and marginalization. He illustrated this with examples from the United States, noting how Donald Trump transformed his mugshot into a fundraising and mobilizing tool, intentionally aligning his criminalized image with populations historically subjected to criminalization, particularly African Americans. Similarly, in the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte maintained extraordinarily high approval ratings—including among lower-income groups—despite conducting a violent “war on drugs” that disproportionately targeted the poor.
Dr. Magno further extended this logic to Bill Clinton, observing that Clinton retained strong African American support even amid scandal, underscoring how representation often operates symbolically rather than materially. Across cases, he argued, criminal populism thrives on irony and contradiction: leaders claim to embody marginalized identities while simultaneously enacting policies that harm those very groups.
Concluding, Dr. Magno reiterated that while criminal populism has deep historical roots, it is in the present moment that it has crystallized into a distinct political formation—marking a shift away from traditional penal populism toward the strategic weaponization of criminality itself as a source of legitimacy and power.
Dr. Russell Foster’s Repsonse
In his response to the feedback and questions, Dr. Russell Foster offered a wide-ranging and clarifying reflection that reinforced the conceptual ambitions of his paper while acknowledging areas for further refinement. Speaking from a comparative and theoretically self-aware position, Dr. Foster addressed questions of typology, tradition, case selection, responsiveness, and intentionality in the politics of the radical right.
Beginning with Dr. Murphey’s question on typology and tradition, Dr. Foster emphasized that the distinction between the old right, extreme right, and radical right should not be understood as rigid or mutually exclusive. While the old right is often associated with Burkean appeals to tradition, he argued that both the old and radical right rely on what Eric Hobsbawm famously termed “invented traditions.” In this sense, the contemporary radical right does not abandon tradition but actively manufactures new ones. Dr. Foster illustrated this through the example of gender politics, noting the emergence of highly stylized and exaggerated gender roles—hyper-masculine men and submissive “trad wives”—that would have been largely absent from radical right discourse a decade or two ago. These narratives, he suggested, exemplify how tradition is strategically reconstructed rather than inherited.
Addressing Hannah Geddes’s and Dr. Surdea-Hernea’s questions on supply and demand, Dr. Foster stressed that radical right narratives only gain traction where there is an underlying social appetite for them. While such parties may supply exclusionary frames, these frames resonate because they align with existing anxieties. Economic grievances remain central, but they are often experienced indirectly—through housing insecurity, job precarity, limited educational opportunities, and broader political disillusionment. Foster also pointed to cultural fatigue, including backlash against what some perceive as “peak woke,” as another source of demand that the radical right is adept at exploiting.
On case selection, Dr. Foster explained that Austria and France were chosen precisely because they offer contrasting yet complementary trajectories: a large state where the radical right has not governed nationally and a smaller one where it has entered government twice and rebounded electorally after failure. Responding to questions about countries with limited immigration, he argued that similar patterns can be observed in places such as Poland, Hungary, and the United Kingdom. Here, digital media and transnational narratives allow radical right actors to mobilize fear and civilizational rhetoric even in the absence of direct exposure to migration.
Dr. Foster also clarified a potential misreading of the argument on responsiveness. He stressed that the paper does not condemn responsiveness per se; rather, it critiques the framing of grievances as existential and criminal threats. When migration is securitized and criminalized, he argued, legitimate policy debates can slide into exclusionary politics with severe real-world consequences, as illustrated by the UK’s “hostile environment” policies and the Windrush scandal.
Finally, on the question of whether radical right vagueness is deliberate, Dr. Foster acknowledged the epistemic limits of intent. While it may be impossible to prove conscious strategy, he suggested that vagueness functions politically by allowing adaptability. Whether intentional or structural, this ambiguity enables radical right actors to remain relevant across shifting contexts—an adaptability that, in his view, remains one of their most consequential strengths.
Saga Oskarson Kindstrand’s Response
In her response to the feedback and questions, Saga Oskarson Kindstrand offered a focused clarification of her argument, addressing issues of intra-party power, social composition, and the broader diffusion of populist practices within Swedish politics. Her remarks reaffirmed the analytical intent of her study while drawing clear boundaries around what the article seeks—and does not seek—to explain.
Responding first to questions about whether populist radical right parties genuinely empower their members, Kindstrand emphasized that this varies across cases. In the Swedish context, she noted, the Sweden Democrats do not grant members greater internal influence than mainstream parties and, in some respects, offer even less internal democracy. This limited empowerment is, she argued, typical rather than anomalous. Importantly, she suggested that this does not weaken her argument; instead, it deepens the puzzle. Conventional theories would expect strong incentives—such as internal influence—to drive membership. Yet high levels of commitment persist despite centralized control, indicating that other mechanisms sustain organizational loyalty.
Kindstrand linked this centralization to stigma and exclusion. Because the party is subject to intense public scrutiny and reputational risk, tight control over messaging and behavior is framed as necessary. Granting extensive autonomy to local members is perceived as dangerous, particularly as the party has moved closer to governing power by supporting a coalition. As political influence increases, she observed, efforts to discipline the organization and manage public image intensify rather than recede.
Turning to questions about whether members’ claims of being “ordinary people” are empirically accurate, Kindstrand acknowledged the legitimacy of the concern. Existing studies, she noted, suggest that Sweden Democrat politicians tend to have lower levels of education and income prior to entering politics compared to representatives of other parties—patterns that may reflect both the party’s rapid growth and its outsider status. However, she stressed that adjudicating the truth of these claims is not the primary aim of her article. Instead, her focus lies on how such claims function discursively to sustain a particular organizational form and sense of belonging.
Finally, addressing the diffusion of populist rhetoric across the party system, Kindstrand agreed that mainstream parties in Sweden increasingly echo Sweden Democrat frames, particularly on migration and criminality. This agenda-setting role, she argued, powerfully reinforces members’ sense of efficacy. Observing other parties adopt their positions is interpreted internally as evidence that the party is reshaping politics—further strengthening organizational cohesion and belief in its transformative capacity.
Closing Remarks by Dr. Helen Murphey
In her closing assessment, Dr. Helen Murphey offered a synthetic reflection that drew together the panel’s core themes while highlighting their broader implications for the study of populism, crime, and exclusion. Thanking the presenters, discussants, and audience, she characterized the session as both intellectually engaging and conceptually enriching, particularly in its collective contribution to understanding the exclusionary dynamics at the heart of contemporary populism.
Murphey identified the construction of identity—alongside practices of inclusion and exclusion—as a unifying thread across the presentations. Central to this, she argued, was the differentiated treatment of crime within exclusionary populist narratives. Drawing on Chris Magno’s intervention, she emphasized how certain forms of criminality are attributed vertically to elites—through discourses of corruption and “draining the swamp”—while other forms are attributed horizontally to marginalized groups, who are cast as threats to social order. At the same time, she noted the paradoxical tolerance, and even valorization, of particular transgressions when they are framed as necessary tools to challenge an unjust status quo. This selective moralization of crime, she suggested, resonates strongly with criminological insights into how illegality is socially coded and unevenly sanctioned.
Murphey further underscored the adaptability of exclusionary populism, highlighting how shifting circumstances allow movements to recalibrate narratives of crime, security, and grievance. This adaptability, she argued, plays a key role in the mainstreaming of exclusionary ideas. Building on insights from scholarship on diffusion, she pointed to how legitimate socio-economic grievances—such as austerity, housing shortages, and affordability crises—become linked to politics of exclusion, thereby creating pathways through which non-populist actors adopt populist frames.
Concluding, Murphey emphasized that the session’s discussions demonstrated not only the mutability of exclusionary populism but also its capacity to reshape broader political discourse. She thanked ECPS for convening the workshop and closed by passing the floor back to the organizers, marking the session as a fitting and reflective start to 2026.
Conclusion
Session 9 closed with a clear analytical takeaway: “crime” operates less as a neutral policy domain than as a political grammar through which exclusionary populism makes boundaries appear natural, urgent, and democratically defensible. Across the three papers, crime and security functioned as elastic categories—capable of being redirected toward elites (as corruption and betrayal), toward marginalized groups (as disorder and threat), and toward institutions themselves (as politicized justice). In this sense, the session illuminated how populism’s promise of protection is inseparable from its capacity to moralize inequality and translate social conflict into hierarchies of belonging.
The discussion also underscored that exclusionary politics is simultaneously discursive, organizational, and institutional. Dr. Magno’s framework emphasized how legal jeopardy can be recoded as authenticity and persecution, turning accountability mechanisms into stages of political spectacle. Dr. Foster’s comparative analysis showed how the securitization of migration becomes “common sense” through metapolitical work: linking everyday grievances—housing, welfare, jobs—to civilizational narratives that render exclusion as prudence. Kindstrand’s ethnographic findings, meanwhile, complicated the assumption that populism merely bypasses intermediaries. Instead, populist discourse can re-legitimate party organization by moralizing membership, intensifying solidarity under stigma, and narrating participation as civic duty.
The discussants sharpened the session’s implications for research design and theory-building. Questions about historical antecedents, case selection beyond high-immigration contexts, the role of mainstream parties in producing cultural “demand,” and the empirical status of members’ claims collectively highlighted a shared methodological challenge: how to distinguish novelty from recombination, strategy from structure, and perception from measurable social composition—without reducing populism to either elite manipulation or voter pathology.
With Dr. Helen Murphey’s moderation providing conceptual continuity, the session ultimately positioned exclusion as an adaptive political technology: strategically vague, emotionally resonant, and increasingly portable across arenas and actors. The broader conclusion for scholarship is that the politics of exclusion cannot be studied only through rhetoric or electoral outcomes. It requires tracing how moral categories of criminality circulate through institutions, organize collective identities, and normalize new thresholds of coercion—thereby reshaping democratic accountability from within.
In this Voice of Youth (VoY) article, Emmanouela Papapavlou delivers a powerful reflection on state violence, immigration enforcement, and the fragile boundaries of democratic accountability. The article critically examines the fatal shooting of a civilian woman by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents in Minneapolis on January 7, 2026. Moving beyond official narratives of “self-defense,” Papapavlou situates the incident within broader patterns of institutional violence, racialized enforcement, and the erosion of human rights under the banner of security. By drawing historical parallels to the killing of George Floyd and interrogating the politics of “law and order,” the piece challenges readers to reconsider whose lives are protected—and whose are rendered expendable—in contemporary democracies.
By Emmanouela Papapavlou*
In a world where the concept of “security” weighs increasingly heavily on public policy, the use of state violence remains one of the most contentious and polarizing issues. In recent days, news that an agent of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) shot and killed a 37 year-old woman in Minneapolis has reignited the debate over the limits of state power, institutional impunity, and human rights in one of the world’s most developed democracies.
The incident took place on January 7, 2026, during a large-scale operation aimed at enforcing immigration law in the city. Official statements from government authorities described the shooting as an act of self-defense, claiming that the woman attempted to “strike officers” with her vehicle. At the same time, however, video footage and eyewitness accounts contradict this version of events, suggesting that the gunshot was fired as the driver was attempting to leave the scene, without an evident and immediate threat to the officers’ lives.
The government’s effort to justify the action, even employing language such as “domestic terrorism operation,” has sparked outrage and skepticism among local officials, human rights organizations, and ordinary citizens. The mayor of Minneapolis openly stated that the self-defense arguments were “false” and called for ICE to withdraw from the city altogether. Many have described the killing as a clear example of excessive use of force by state authorities, particularly within the context of a large enforcement mission that disproportionately targets vulnerable communities.
But can this case truly be treated as an isolated incident? Or does it represent yet another link in a growing chain of violent encounters that follow a disturbingly familiar pattern? The Minneapolis killing is already being described as at least the fifth fatal outcome of similar federal operations over the past two years, suggesting that law enforcement strategy has evolved into an aggressive and dangerous form of violence, often exercised without meaningful accountability or transparency.
Social scientists and activists point out that the use of force by state authorities, whether in immigration enforcement or neighborhood policing, frequently activates deeper structures of social inequality. When the rhetoric of “law and order” is prioritized over human safety, trust between state institutions and the communities they serve erodes rapidly. And this raises a fundamental question: is the principle of “legality” applied equally to everyone, or is it selectively deployed as a tool of control and discipline over specific social groups?
This case cannot be examined outside its broader historical context. In 2020, in the same city of Minneapolis, George Floyd was killed as a police officer pressed a knee into his neck, turning a routine arrest into a public execution witnessed by the world. That moment became a global symbol of systemic police violence and racial injustice, igniting mass protests and exposing how deeply embedded power, race, and state violence are within modern societies.
And yet, how much has truly changed since then? Even today, the way state violence is addressed, whether through policing or immigration enforcement, continues to be shaped by the same logic that transforms people into threats and human lives into acceptable risks. The stories of those killed become symbols not only of injustice, but of a persistent institutional indifference toward the protection of life and dignity.
The Minneapolis case therefore serves as a reminder that violence exercised by institutions is not merely a “tragic mistake” or an “unfortunate exception.” It is part of a broader relationship between power and vulnerability that tests the very foundations of democracy and human rights. And just as in the aftermath of George Floyd’s killing, a new generation is once again refusing to accept narratives that normalize violence in the name of security. A generation that insists on asking the same uncomfortable question: what does security really mean, when preserving it requires the loss of human life?
(*)Emmanouela Papapavlou is a high school student from Thessaloniki, Greece, deeply passionate about social and political issues. She has actively participated in Model United Nations and other youth forums, serving as a chairperson in multiple conferences and winning awards in Greek debate competitions. Writing is her greatest passion, and she loves using it to explore democracy, civic engagement, and human rights. Her dream is to share her ideas, inspire action, and amplify the voices of young people who want to make a difference. Email: emmanpapapavlou@gmail.com
On November 7, 2024, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) organised a panel at the European Parliament in Brussels to explore the rising influence of populism on the 2024 European Parliament elections and the upcoming US administration. Photo: Umit Vurel.
Foreword
Introduction
Projects
Completed and Ongoing Projects
VOLUNCITIZEN
ENCODE
UNTOLD EUROPE
Project Proposals
GOVERNOR (Horizon Europe)
CERYS (CERV)
IMN-SEMES (CERV)
GenDrive (CERV)
Mediascope (Erasmus)
Events
Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series
Other Panels
Annual International Symposium
Partnerships with International Conferences
ECPS Academy Summer School
ECPS Workshops
Publications
Journal of Populism & Politics (P&P)
ECPS Interview Series
ECPS Commentaries
Voice of Youths (VoY)
Policy Papers
Reports
Profiles
Conclusion
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Foreword
It is with great pride and a deep sense of responsibility that I present the European Center for Populism Studies’ Activity Report for 2024. This year has been one of significant growth, intellectual maturity, and global engagement for ECPS. As the challenges posed by populism and authoritarianism intensify across regions, our mission—to safeguard democratic values through rigorous research, public dialogue, and international cooperation—has never been more crucial.
In 2024, ECPS affirmed its role as a dynamic international hub by producing an exceptional volume of scholarship. Our digital journals published numerous articles, offering cutting-edge analyses on civilizational populism, digital authoritarianism, electoral transformations, and religious mobilization across continents. Beyond the journals, our researchers produced more than 100 additional outputs, including expert interviews, analytical articles, commentaries, and research reports. These contributions have enriched global understanding of political disruptions and democratic backsliding—from India and Indonesia to Europe, Latin America, and beyond.
Equally inspiring has been our expanding engagement with scholars, practitioners, and the public. ECPS organized 29 academic and outreach events, including major international conferences and the highly successful ECPS Academy Summer School, which received over 140 applications. Our Early Career Researchers Network, Youth Group, and internship programs continue to cultivate the next generation of critical thinkers—an investment in democracy’s long-term resilience.
Partnerships remain at the heart of our work. Through collaborations with leading universities, think tanks, and EU-funded initiatives such as ENCODE and UNTOLD Europe, ECPS strengthened its interdisciplinary reach and policy relevance. These alliances amplify our impact and ensure that our research informs both scholarly debate and practical policymaking.
Looking back at 2024, I am immensely proud of what our community has accomplished. ECPS stands today as a vibrant, credible, and globally recognized institution—one committed not only to diagnosing the threats of populism, but also to supporting democratic resilience in constructive and inclusive ways.
I extend my deepest gratitude to our team, researchers, partners, supporters, and young scholars. Together, we will continue to build the knowledge, networks, and civic capacity needed to confront the challenges of our time.
Irina von Wiese ECPS President
Introduction
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) continued to strengthen its role in 2024 as a young and dynamic international hub for research, dialogue, and policy engagement on the challenges posed by rising populism and authoritarianism worldwide. Established as an independent, nonpartisan, and nonprofit organization based in Brussels, ECPS remains firmly committed to advancing the core values of liberal democracy, including the rule of law, human rights, pluralism, freedom of speech, gender equality, and social and environmental justice.
Populism, once seen as a peripheral phenomenon, has evolved into a central force in contemporary politics. In 2024, its reach remained visible across advanced and developing democracies alike, often intertwined with authoritarian tendencies. The inability of post–World War II institutions to adequately respond to compounding crises—from climate shocks and geopolitical conflict to disinformation, economic instability, and widening social inequalities—continued to fuel mistrust in democratic structures and nourish populist mobilization. Increasingly, leaders and movements employing exclusionary rhetoric, conspiracy narratives, and institutional subversion have challenged democratic norms and global stability.
Yet 2024 also demonstrated the importance of civic and intellectual resilience, and institutional collaboration. ECPS has played an active role in this landscape by producing research-based knowledge, enhancing public awareness, and fostering international cooperation. Through its ten specialized research programs, ECPS mobilizes scholars working on extremism and radicalization, authoritarianism, foreign policy, the digital sphere, gender, economics, climate change, and related fields. This interdisciplinary structure enables rigorous analysis and accessible outputs for diverse audiences.
In 2024, ECPS delivered an exceptionally productive year of scholarship and outreach. The Journal of Populism & Politics (P&P) published 18 peer-reviewed articles, providing cutting-edge analysis on civilizational populism, digital authoritarianism, electoral politics, and religious mobilization across regions including North and South Americas, Indonesia, Turkey, Europe, and China.
Complementing these contributions, ECPS published 51 expert interviews, 20 analytical articles, 9 commentaries, 3 policy papers, and 42 research reports, including extensive multi-country analyses under the Mapping Global Populism initiative and the 2024 European Parliament Elections project.
ECPS continued to prioritize academic networking, training, and capacity building. In 2024, it organized 29 events, including international conferences, regional panels, workshops, and the annual ECPS Academy Summer School, which received over 140 applications, admitting more than 70 participants. The Early Career Researchers Network (ECRN) and ECPS Youth Group, each comprising around 30 young scholars, deepened engagement with emerging researchers, while the internship program provided practical experience to approximately 10 young researchers.
ECPS also strengthened partnerships with leading universities and think tanks, collaborating on research and co-organizing high-impact events. Its continued involvement in EU-funded initiatives—including the ENCODE (Horizon) and UNTOLD Europe (CERV) projects—further expanded its policy relevance and research capacity.
Looking ahead, ECPS remains committed to providing independent, evidence-based scholarship and open dialogue, working to ensure that democratic institutions and civic values remain resilient in the face of global populist challenges.
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Projects
In 2024, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) significantly strengthened its engagement in major European research, innovation, and civic-education initiatives by participating in numerous project proposals submitted to the European Commission. These proposals were developed under leading funding programmes—including Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and Erasmus+—and brought together universities, think tanks, civil society organisations, municipalities, research institutes, and digital-innovation partners from across the continent. This broad collaborative landscape reflects ECPS’s growing reputation as a key contributor to interdisciplinary research on populism, democracy, governance, and social transformation.
The proposals submitted in 2024 covered a wide thematic spectrum: digital democracy and governance innovation (GOVERNOR); youth Euroscepticism and European historical awareness (CERYS); intergenerational migration narratives and anti-discrimination frameworks (IMN-SEMES); gender equality and work–life balance (GenDrive); and media literacy, disinformation, and civic resilience (Mediascope). These initiatives demonstrate ECPS’s ability to integrate its core expertise—populism, democratic backsliding, political communication, and civic engagement—into broader, multi-sectoral research frameworks addressing Europe’s complex socio-political challenges.
Although funding outcomes varied across calls, ECPS’s participation in these competitive proposals solidified its visibility within European research ecosystems and reinforced its position as a trusted partner in interdisciplinary, impact-driven consortia. The collaborations forged throughout 2024 have expanded ECPS’s academic and policy networks and laid a strong foundation for future applications under Horizon Europe, Digital Europe, and CERV.
Through these endeavours, ECPS continues to contribute to innovative, policy-relevant knowledge production that promotes democratic resilience, social inclusion, and active citizenship across Europe.
The VolunCITIZEN Erasmus+ journey was launched in Denmark with the first kickoff meeting in January 2024, marked by passion and collaboration with partners from Poland, Estonia, and Belgium.
VolunCITIZEN is an online platform that connects civil society organisations, youth, and migrants. Its aim is to increase active citizenship, social participation, and intercultural exchange through these associations. By participating in this project, you can become a valuable volunteer for civil society organizations and contribute to society. This project is funded by the Erasmus + Small Scale program. Its total budget is 60,000 euros, and ECPS was rewarded with 12,500 euros. The project was implemented between 01/10/2023 and 30/09/2024. Project website: https://voluncitizen.eu/
The ENCODE project aims to explore and decode the role of emotions in political discourse and their impact on democratic processes. The project’s primary goal is to create new positive narratives that can foster trust and engagement in European democratic processes, thereby counteracting the negative emotions that often dominate political discussions. Through innovative methodologies, including social media sentiment analysis, biometric research, and surveys, ENCODE aims to provide policymakers with better tools and strategies for incorporating citizens’ emotional needs into governance. This will ultimately enhance democratic resilience and foster a more inclusive political environment. This project is funded by HORIZON program. ECPS is rewarded 269.125.00 euro for all activities between June 2024 and May 2027. Project website: https://encodemotions.eu/
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxfam Intermón and Qalia, hosted the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Ümit Vurel.
The UNTOLD Europe project is built around the need to analyze the implications of the legacy of colonialism on contemporary multicultural European societies in different areas: 1) public policies, 2) narratives of Europe, and 3) the digital world. The Action is aligned with Priority 3 of the Call. It aims to deepen the analysis and raise awareness of how European colonialism operates today, with its different tools, the narratives used in public debates, the digital space, and specific public policies. This project is funded under the Citizens, Equality, Rights, and Values (CERV) program. It will start in 2025, and ECPS will receive 18,500 euros in total. Project website: https://untoldeurope.eu
Project Proposals
GOVERNOR (Horizon Europe)
In 2024, the ECPS participated as a partner in the Horizon Europe proposal GOVERNOR, submitted under the call HORIZON-CL2-2024-DEMOCRACY-01 (HORIZON-RIA). The proposal, coordinated by ASM – Centrum Badań i Analiz Rynku (Poland), aimed to analyse the crisis of digital democracy in Europe and develop innovative tools to strengthen democratic governance, citizen participation, and institutional resilience across EU member states. The project sought to deliver a Digital Democracy Index, a decision-support tool for public institutions, and a deliberative governance playbook designed to inform policy processes at multiple governance levels.
The consortium comprised ten partners representing research institutions, civil society, local government, and technology-focused organisations. In addition to the coordinator ASM, the consortium included: Clever Together Democratie SAS (France); the European Center for Populism Studies – ECPS (Belgium); Universität Wien (Austria); Maynooth University (Ireland); Tallinn University (Estonia); Major Cities of Europe IT Users Group e.V. (Germany); Center for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Comune di Modena (Italy); and Aalto University Foundation (Finland).
ECPS contributed expertise on populism, democratic backsliding, and digital political behaviour, supporting the proposal’s analytical framework and planned dissemination strategy.
The proposal was submitted on February 7, 2024 and was not selected for funding. Despite the negative outcome, GOVERNOR strengthened ECPS’s engagement in Horizon consortia focused on democracy, governance innovation, and digital transformation. The partnership also expanded ECPS’s collaborations with leading European universities, municipalities, and research organisations, laying groundwork for future joint applications.
CERYS (CERV)
In 2024, ECPS participated as a consortium partner in the CERYS project proposal (Combating Euroscepticism in Young Students), submitted under the CERV Call CERV-2024-CITIZENS-REM (European Remembrance). The proposal (ID: 101196722) was coordinated by PROGEU – Progress in European Union (Italy) and brought together four civil society and research organisations: PROGEU (Coordinator, Italy), Foundation for Entrepreneurship, Culture and Education – FECE (Bulgaria), YouNet APS (Italy), and the European Center for Populism Studies – ECPS (Belgium).
The consortium aimed to address the rising trends of Euroscepticism among young people by designing a transnational programme of educational, cultural, and debate-based activities. The proposal envisioned structured training on EU history and institutions, a guided visit to the House of European History, and a multi-country public debate involving students, experts, and political representatives. ECPS contributed as the research and analytical partner, drawing on its expertise in populism studies and youth engagement to shape the project’s intellectual framework and dissemination strategy.
The consortium structure represented a balanced combination of EU-level civil society organisations with complementary competencies in youth training, cultural education, and academic research. Activities were to be implemented across Belgium, Italy, and Bulgaria, ensuring geographic diversity and transnational participation.
The proposal was submitted on June 6, 2024, successfully passing all administrative checks, but was ultimately not selected for funding. Despite this outcome, ECPS’s involvement strengthened its collaborative ties with European partners and reinforced its strategic commitment to combating disinformation, Euroscepticism, and democratic disengagement among youth.
IMN-SEMES (CERV)
In 2024, the ECPS participated as a partner in the proposal IMN-SEMES – Intergenerational Migration Narratives: Shaping Equality and Inclusion in Multicultural European Societies, submitted under the CERV-2024-CITIZENS-REM (CERV-LS) call (Proposal ID: 101196723). The initiative aimed to explore the historical and contemporary dimensions of migration in Europe through the narratives of intergenerational migrant and local women, situating personal stories within broader legacies of colonialism, racism, and structural discrimination. The project sought to counter rising xenophobia and far-right discourse by promoting inclusive historical understanding, critical thinking among youth, and cross-cultural community dialogue.
The proposal was coordinated by DRAMBLYS (Spain) and brought together ten organisations: DRAMBLYS (Spain), IDEC S.A. (Greece), CESIE (Italy), KMGNE – Institut für Kommunikation und Medien (Germany), Materahub (Italy), ALDA – European Association for Local Democracy (France), CARDET (Cyprus), the Irish Refugee Council (Ireland), Technovation Girls (Belgium), and ECPS (Belgium).
The partnership combined expertise in migration research, gender equality, digital storytelling, youth engagement, and human rights advocacy—ensuring a robust interdisciplinary structure aligned with the aims of the CERV programme. ECPS contributed in its capacity as a research partner, particularly in areas related to populism, discrimination, and democratic resilience.
The proposal was submitted on June 6, 2024 and received a negative funding decision. Despite its rejection, IMN-SEMES represented an important strategic engagement for ECPS, strengthening partnerships within a wide European network and expanding the organisation’s involvement in projects addressing the intersection of migration, identity, and anti-discrimination efforts.
GenDrive (CERV)
In 2024, ECPS participated as a consortium partner in the GenDrive proposal submitted under the CERV-2024-GE call, which sought to promote gender equality through innovative, cross-sectoral tools and collaborative engagement. The project, formally titled “Promoting the Dual Earner Dual Carer Equality Model and Work-Life Harmony Through Innovative Solutions,” aimed to address the persistent gender care gap by advancing shared caregiving responsibilities, combating structural stereotypes, and supporting employers and working caregivers with practical resources and digital tools.
The GenDrive consortium consisted of nine partners representing diverse expertise across Europe: Polska Fundacja Osrodkow Wspomagania Rozwoju Gospodarczego OIC Poland (Coordinator, Poland), G.G. Eurosuccess Consulting Limited (Cyprus), Camera di Commercio Italiana–Barcelona (Spain), FREYR Institute (Denmark), Intellisync Srl (Italy), C.M. Skoulidi & SIA E.E. (Greece), Universidad de Alicante (Spain), Ljudska Univerza Ptuj (Slovenia), and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) (Belgium).
Together, the partners designed a comprehensive framework comprising primary research, an innovative online platform, tailored training modules, capacity-building initiatives, and EU-level dissemination efforts. ECPS contributed its research and dissemination expertise, particularly in Work Package 6, drawing on its strong track record in policy analysis and public outreach.
The proposal was submitted on April 9, 2024 and evaluated later in the year. Despite the consortium’s strong expertise and the project’s alignment with EU gender-equality priorities, GenDrive was not selected for funding in the 2024 CERV call cycle. Nonetheless, the experience strengthened ECPS’s collaborative networks and informed future proposal development.
Mediascope (Erasmus+)
In 2024, the ECPS submitted the MediaScope project proposal under the Erasmus+ Small-Scale Partnerships in Adult Education (KA210-ADU) call. As project coordinator, ECPS led a four-partner consortium composed of: The European Center for Populism Studies (Belgium), Vidipost OU (Estonia), Creative Art Farm in Italy APS – CAFI (Italy), and Young Entrepreneurs Society – YES (Poland). This transnational partnership brought together expertise in digital education, media literacy, youth engagement, and cultural innovation.
MediaScope was designed to address the growing challenge of digital misinformation by promoting media literacy, critical thinking, and responsible digital citizenship among adults and young people. The project proposed three core activities: development of online Media Literacy Courses, a virtual Art-Tech Fair combining creative expression with digital awareness, and an interactive Fake News Game to strengthen critical evaluation skills through experiential learning. These activities collectively aimed to empower citizens to identify misinformation, understand manipulation techniques, and engage more confidently in democratic processes.
The consortium structure ensured strong complementarity: ECPS coordinated research and course development; Vidipost provided technical expertise in digital platform and game development; CAFI led art-based educational activities; and YES facilitated youth outreach and dissemination.
The proposal was submitted on March 4, 2024 and requested a total budget of €60,000, of which ECPS would manage €25,000 as coordinator. Although the project was not selected for funding, MediaScope strengthened ECPS’s collaborative network, expanded its capacity in media literacy initiatives, and laid valuable groundwork for future Erasmus+ and cross-sector partnerships.
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Events
In 2024, the ECPS organized and co-hosted about 30 major events, reaffirming its role as a leading international hub for research-driven dialogue on populism, authoritarianism, and democratic resilience. These activities—including global and regional panel discussions, academic conferences, high-level policy forums, workshops, and the annual Summer School—brought together hundreds of scholars, policymakers, journalists, and practitioners. With most events attracting 30–100 participants, ECPS sustained a dynamic and diverse platform for critical engagement across continents.
A centerpiece of this year’s programming was the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) series, which provided in-depth analyses of political developments across Asia, Eurasia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The sessions explored a wide array of themes, including digital authoritarianism in China, populist autocracy in Russia, democratic fragility in the Caucasus, Islamist nationalism in Turkey, and the growing influence of civilizational populisms. These global perspectives highlighted how populist narratives and strategies transcend borders, adapting to local political, social, and cultural contexts.
Complementing the MGP series were specialized regional panels on Latin America and Africa, the Populism & Politics Workshop at the University of Oxford, and the Third Annual International Symposium on “The Future of Multilateralism Between Multipolarity and Populists in Power.” ECPS also strengthened academic partnerships through two major conferences at Deakin University (Australia), focusing on digital disinformation, democratic resilience, and Indonesia’s 2024 elections.
A notable addition in 2024 was the high-level policy event, “Transatlantic Outlook on Populism in the US and Europe in Light of the ECPS 2024 Report on EP Elections,” held at the European Parliament in Brussels and hosted by MEP Radan Kanev. Featuring keynote speeches by Radan Kanev and Nathalie Loiseau, and a presentation of ECPS’s flagship report by Dr. Emilia Zankina and Dr. Gilles Ivaldi, the event underscored ECPS’s growing relevance in transatlantic policy debates on populism and democracy.
The ECPS Summer School 2024 further expanded the institution’s educational mission, offering interdisciplinary training on populism and foreign policy to emerging scholars worldwide.
Collectively, ECPS’s 2024 events illustrate its commitment to advancing global scholarship, informing public policy, and fostering collaborative research on the most pressing challenges posed by populism today.
Date/Time: Thursday, January 25, 2024 — 10:00-12:00 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. Syaza Shukri (Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia).
Speakers
“Islamic Extremism, Populism and Formation of National Identity in Bangladesh,” by Mr. Bobby Hajjaj(Department of Management, North South University, Bangladesh).
“Religious Extremism and Islamist Populism in Contemporary Bangladesh,” by Dr. Maidul Islam (Assistant Professor of Political Science, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta).
“Civilisational Populism and Buddhist Nationalisms in Sri Lanka,” by Dr. Rajni Gamage (Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore).
“Will Rise of Religious Nationalism and Populism in the Maldives Lead to Another Authoritarian Reversal?” by Dr. Mosmi Bhim (Assistant Professor, Fiji National University).
Date/Time: Thursday, February 29, 2024 — 10:00-12:00 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. Dachi Liao (Emeritus Professor at the Institute of Political Science at National Sun Yat-sen University in Taiwan).
Speakers
“The State of Populism in Japan: A Comparative Perspective,” by Dr. Toru Yoshida (Full Professor of Comparative Politics at Doshisha University in Japan).
“The Nature of Populism in Japan: Japan as an Uncharted Territory of Global Populism?” by Dr. Airo Hino(Professor, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University)
“Populism in Taiwan: Rethinking the Neo-liberalism–Populism Nexus,” by Dr. Szu-Yun Hsu (Assistant Professor, Political Science, McMaster University).
“How Professionalized Are Parties’ Populist Communication Strategies on Facebook? A Case Study of 2024 Taiwan National Election,” by Dr. Jiun-Chi Lin (Postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Marketing Communication, National Sun Yat-sen University).
Date/Time: Thursday, March 28, 2024 — 10:00-12:15 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. John Nilsson-Wright (Associate Professor in Modern Japanese Politics and International Relations at University of Cambridge).
Speakers
“Discourse Regimes and Liberal Vehemence,” by Dr. Joseph Yi (Associate Professor of Political Science at Hanyang University, Seoul).
“Foreign Threat Perceptions in South Korean Campaign Discourse: Japan, North Korea and China,” by Dr. Meredith Rose Shaw (Associate Professor, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo).
“Transformation of Populist Emotion in Korean Politics from 2016 to 2024,” by Dr. Sang-Jin Han (Emeritus Professor of Sociology, Seoul National University).
“Nationalism and Resilience of Authoritarian Rule in North Korea,” by Dr. Junhyoung Lee (Research Professor in the School of International Relations at the University of Ulsan, South Korea).
“Populist Nationalism as a Challenge to Democratic Stability in Mongolia,” by Dr. Mina Sumaadii (Senior Researcher at the Sant Maral Foundation, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia).
Date/Time: Thursday, April 25, 2024 — 10:00-12:00 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. Rune Steenberg (Anthropologist Researching Uyghurs and Central Asia, Principal Investigator at Palacký University Olomouc).
Speakers
“Who Are the People, Populist Articulation of the People in Contemporary China,” by Dr. Kun He (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Computational Linguistics Group within the University of Groningen).
“Religion with Chinese Characteristics – Regulating Religions under Xi Jinping,” by Dr. Martin Lavička(Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University).
“Unveiling China’s ‘Global Populism’: Sharp Power Politics Along the Belt and Road Initiative,” by Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk (Professor of Economy and visiting fellow at the University of Duisburg-Essen).
“The Expanding Reach of China’s Authoritarian Influence: Shaping a New Illiberal Digital Order,” by Dr. Yung-Yung Chang (Assistant Professor at Asia-Pacific Regional Studies, National Dong Hwa University, Hualien, Taiwan).
Date/Time: Thursday, May 30, 2024 — 10:00-12:00 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. Maxine David (Lecturer in European Studies at Leiden University and Foreign Policy Analyst Specializing in Russian and EU Foreign Policy).
Speakers
“Why Putin Is Not a Populist, But Worse,” by Dr. Luke March (Professor, Personal Chair of Post-Soviet and Comparative Politics at the University of Edinburg).
“Katechontintic Sovereignty of Z-Populism in Putin’s Russia,” by Dr. Alexandra Yatsyk (Researcher at IRHIS-CNRS at the University of Lille and a lecturer at Sciences Po, France).
“‘Traditional Values’: Gendered and (New)Imperial Dimensions in Russia,” by Dr. Yulia Gradskova (Associate Professor, Researcher at Södertörn University, Sweden).
“The Economic Costs of Autocracy in Putin’s Russia,” by Dr. Dóra Győrffy (Professor of Economy at Institute of Economics, Corvinus University of Budapest).
Date/Time: Thursday, June 20, 2024 — 10:00-12:00 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. David Lewis (Professor of Politics at University of Exeter).
Speakers
“Autocracy’s Past and Present in Kazakhstan,” by Dr. Dinissa Duvanova (Associate Professor at Lehigh University).
“Autocracy in Turkmenistan and The Role of Media in Cultivating Personality Cult,” by Oguljamal Yazliyeva(Ph.D. Researcher in International Area Studies at the Department of Russian and East European Studies of the Institute of International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague).
“Clan Politics: Kyrgyzstan between Informal Governance and Democracy,” by Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova(Postdoctoral Researcher, Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient).
Date/Time: Thursday, September 26, 2024 — 15:00-17:10 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. Simon P Watmough (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a Non-resident Research Fellow at ECPS).
Speakers
“Counter-extremism and Authoritarian Governance in Tajikistan,” by Dr. Hélène Thibault (Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan).
“Radical Islamism vs Extremist Secular State in Tajikistan,” by Dr. Kathleen Collins (Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and a faculty affiliate in Islamic Studies at Minnesota University).
“The Taliban’s Totalitarian Regime: Governance, Extremism, and Control,” by Dr. Zakia Adeli (Deputy Minister of Justice of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and a Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Kabul University (2018-2021) before joining East-West Center).
“Gender Dynamics and the Plight of Afghan Women under Taliban Rule,” by Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani (Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science, School of Liberal and Creative Arts, Lovely Professional University).
“The Rise of Populism in Iran: Inequality, Class Conflict, and Nationalist Authoritarianism,” by Amir Hossein Mahdavi (Ph.D. candidate at Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut).
Date/Time: Thursday, October 31, 2024 — 15:00-17:30 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. Cengiz Aktar (Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and Advisory Board Member of ECPS).
Speakers
“The State of Democracy and Populism in Armenia,” by Dr. Nerses Kopalyan (Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas).
“Populism Against Post-war Armenia’s Democratization and European Integration,” by Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan(Professor, Chair of Political Science, Faculty of International Relations at Yerevan State University).
“Hegemonic Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan,” by Dr. Jody LaPorte (Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford).
“Autocracy in Azerbaijan and Its Regional Implications,” by Thomas de Waal (Senior Fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region).
“From Technocratic Facade to Right-Wing Reality: The Evolution of Populism in Georgia,” by Dr. David Aprasidze (Professor of Political Science at Ilia State University).
“The Rotating Populist Discourses of the Post-Soviet Georgia – From the Nationalist Populism to the Conservative Populism,” by Dr. David Matsaberidze (Associate Professor at Department of International Relations, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University).
Date/Time: Thursday, November 28, 2024 — 15:00-17:10 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. Jocelyne Cesari (Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).
Speakers
“In Search of the ‘Infant People’: Continuity and Rupture in Turkey’s Political Landscape,”Dr. Spyros Sofos(Assisstant Professor, Department of Global Humanities, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver).
“Populism in Transition: Continuities and Shifts in Turkey’s Political Landscape (2023-2024),” by Dr. Emre Erdogan (Professor of Political Science at Istanbul Bilgi University).
“Autocratic Practices of The Gendered Regime in Turkey,” by Hafza Girdap (Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Stony Brook University, New York).
“Erdogan’s Media Capture Strategies and Their Role in Founding and Consolidating Autocracy in Turkey,” by Ergun Babahan (Journalist, Former Editor-in-Chief of Sabah daily and Ahval news).
“Erdogan Regime as Emerging Sharp Power,” by Dr. Aleksandra Spancerska (Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs).
Date/Time: Thursday, December 19, 2024 — 15:00-17:30 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. Courtney Freer (Assistant Professor, Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies, Emory University, Atlanta, GA).
Speakers
“Key Drivers of Autocratization in the Gulf Region,” by Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber(Professor, Chairholder, Institute of Political Science, Chair of Middle East Politics and Society, the Friedrich-Alexander-University of Erlangen-Nürnberg).
“The Evolving Social Contract in the GCC,” by Dr. Gail Buttorff (Associate Director of the Center for Public Policy and Assistant Professor at the Hobby School, University of Houston).
“The New Green Autocrats: How Saudi Arabia and the UAE Redefine Environmental Leadership,” by Dr. Tobias Zumbraegel (Postdoc at Geography Institute, the University of Heidelberg).
“The Role of Salafism in the National and International Politics of Gulf Monarchies,” by Kardo Kareem Rached(Assistant Professor at University of Human Development, Sulaymaniyah, Kurdistan Region of Iraq).
“Populism in Gulf Monarchies: Suppression, Cooptation, Adoption,” by Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan (Senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington).
Date/Time: Thursday, March 7, 2024 / 15:00-17:30 CET
Moderator
Dr. Maria Puerta Riera (Adjunct Professor in the Political Science at Valencia College)
Speakers
“Populism and Socio-Political Transformation in Latin America,” by Dr. Ronaldo Munck (Professor of Sociology and Director of the Centre for Engaged Research at Dublin City University).
“Varieties of Populism and Democratic Erosion: The Case of Latin America,” by Dr. Julio F. Carrión (Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Delaware).
“Global Power Dynamics and Authoritarian Populism in Venezuela,” by Dr. Adriana Boersner-Herrera (Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina).
“Libertarian Populism? Making Sense of Javier Milei’s Discourse,” by Dr. Reinhard Heinisch (Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Salzburg and Head of the Department of Political Science) and Dr. Andrés Laguna Tapia (Director of the Center for Research in Communication and Humanities and head of Communication Studies at UPB in Cochabamba).
“The Phenomenon of ‘Bolsonarism’ in Brazil: Specificities and Global Connections,” by Dr. Victor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho (Professor of the Human Sciences at Universidade Federal do Maranhão).
Date/Time: Thursday, May 09, 2024 — 15:00-17:30 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. Chipo Dendere (Assistant Professor of Africana Studies at Wellesley College).
Speakers
“Various Facets of Populist, Authoritarian, and Nationalist Trends in Africa,” by Dr. Henning Melber (Professor, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala; Extraordinary Professor at the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria and the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies at the University of the Free State in Bloemfontein).
“Democratizing Africa: Navigating Populist Trends, Building Trust in Institutions, and Promoting Stability through Inclusive Governance,” by Dr. Nchofua Anita Nyitioseh (Assistant Lecturer, Department of English Law, University of Bertoua, Cameroon).
“Taming the Lion: On the Conditions of Possibility of a Progressive Populism in Sub-Saharan Africa,” by Dr. Sergiu Mișcoiu (Professor of Political Science, Director of the Centre for International Cooperation Babeș-Bolyai University).
“Populism and The Challenges of Democratic Governance in Africa,” by Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo(Executive Director and Principal Researcher at the Bureau of Strategic Studies (BESTRAT), University of Yaoundé II, Cameroon).
“Populism Discourse and the Proliferation of Hate during Elections in Central African Sub-region,” by Dr. Derick Fai Kinang (University of Buea, Cameroon).
“The Protection of Female Rights and the Rise of Populism in African Democracies: A Need for a Reformed Society,” by Dr. Ama-Ambo Chefor (Senior Lecturer, Department of English Law, University of Dschang, Cameroon).
Date/Time: Tuesday, June 18, 2024 / 15:00-17:00 (CET)
Moderator
Irina von Wiese (ECPS Honorary President; Affiliate Professor at European Business School, the ESCP, and former MEP).
Speakers
“European Democracy’s Resilience to Populism‘s Threat,” by Dr. Kurt Weyland (Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts at University of Texas).
“A Far-right Tipping Point? The Impact of the 2024 European Elections in France,” by Dr. Gilles Ivaldi (Senior Researcher in Politics at CEVIPOF and Professor at Sciences Po Paris).
“The Populist Rebellion of the Young,” by Dr. Albena Azmanova (Professor of Political and Social Science at University of Kent).
“EP Elections in Austria: Between ‘So What’ and the New Normal,” by Dr. Robert A. Huber (Professor of Methods at the University of Salzburg and Co-editor in Chief of Political Research Exchange).
“Beyond the Cordon Sanitaire: Normalization of Far-right and Racist Politics,” by Dr. Ulrike M. Vieten(Assistant Professor in Sociology at Queen’s University Belfast).
Dr. Simon P. WATMOUGH (Non-Resident Fellow in the Authoritarianism Research Program at ECPS).
“The Implications of Rising Multipolarity for Authoritarian Populist Governance, Multilateralism, and the Nature of New Globalization,” by Dr. Barrie AXFORD (Professor Emeritus in Politics, Centre for Global Politics Economy and Society (GPES), School of Social Sciences and Law, Oxford Brookes University).
Panel -I-
Interactions Between Multilateralism, Multi-Order World, and Populism
(14:00-15:30 Central European Time)
Moderator
Dr. Albena AZMANOVA (Professor, Chair in Political and Social Science, Department of Politics and International Relations and Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent).
Speakers
“Reimagining Global Economic Governance and the State of the Global Governance,” by Dr. Stewart PATRICK (Senior Fellow and Director, Global Order and Institutions Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
“The World System: Another Phase of Structural Deglobalization? A Comparative Perspective with the Former Episode of Deglobalization in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries,” by Dr. Chris CHASE-DUNN (Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems, University of California, Riverside).
“Multipolarity and a post-Ukraine War New World Order: The Rise of Populism,” by Dr. Viktor JAKUPEC (Hon. Professor of International Development, Faculty of Art and Education, Deakin University, Australia; Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Potsdam University, Germany).
Panel -II-
The Future of Democracy Between Resilience & Decline
(15:30-17:00 Central European Time)
Moderator
Dr. Nora FISHER-ONAR (Associate Professor of International Studies at the University of San Francisco).
“Global Trends for Democracy and Autocracy: On the Third Wave of Autocratization and the Cases of Democratic Reversals,” by Dr. Marina NORD (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg).
“Resilience of Democracies Against the Authoritarian Populism,” by Dr. Kurt WEYLAND (Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts, Department of Government University of Texas at Austin).
“The Impact of Populist Authoritarian Politics on the Future Course of Globalization, Economics, the Rule of Law and Human Rights,” by Dr. James BACCHUS (Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs; Director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity, School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs, University of Central Florida, Former Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body).
Day II (March 20, 2024)
(13:00-17:30 Central European Time)
Keynote Speech
“How Globalization, under Neoliberal Auspices, Has Stimulated Right-wing Populism and What Might Be Done to Arrest That Tendency?” by Dr. Robert KUTTNER (Meyer and Ida Kirstein Professor in Social Planning and Administration at Brandeis University’s Heller School, Co-Founder and Co-Editor of The American Prospect).
Panel -III-
Globalization in Transition
(14:00-15:30 Central European Time)
Moderator
Dr. Anna SHPAKOVSKAYA (Postdoctoral Research Fellow, China Research Analyst at Institute of East Asian Studies, Duisburg-Essen University).
Speakers
“China’s Appeal to Populist Leaders: A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed,” by Dr. Steven R. DAVID (Professor of Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University).
“Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Vision for Globalization?” by Dr. Jinghan ZENG (Professor of China and International Studies at Lancaster University).
“Predicting the Nature of the Next Generation Globalization under China, Multipolarity, and Authoritarian Populism” by Humphrey HAWKSLEY (Author, Commentator and Broadcaster).
Special Commentator
Dr. Ho Tze Ern BENJAMIN (Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, Coordinator at the China Program, and International Relations Program).
Panel -IV-
Economic Implications of Rising Populism and Multipolarity
(15:30-17:00 Central European Time)
Moderator
Dr. Patrick HOLDEN (Associate Professor in International Relations at School of Society and Culture, University of Plymouth).
Speakers
“Demise of Multilateralism and Politicization of International Trade Relations and the Multilateral Trading System,” by Dr. Giorgio SACERDOTI (Professor of Law, Bocconi University; Former Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body).
“China Under Xi Jinping: Testing the Limits at a Time of Power Transition,” by Dr. Alicia GARCIA-HERRERO (Chief Economist for Asia Pacific at Natixis).
Closing Remarks
(17:00-17:15 Central European Time)
Dr. Cengiz AKTAR (Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member).
On November 7, 2024, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) organised a panel at the European Parliament in Brussels to explore the rising influence of populism on the 2024 European Parliament elections and the upcoming US administration. Photo: Umit Vurel.
Date/Time: November 7, 2024 — 15:00-17:00 CET.
Venue: European Parliament’s Spaak Building in Brussels / Room: P5B001.
This event is hosted by MEP Radan Kanev in cooperation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS)
Moderator
Dr. Simon P. WATMOUGH (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a Non-resident Research Fellow at ECPS).
Speakers
“Opening Remarks” by Irina VON WIESE (Honorary President of the ECPS).
Welcome and Keynote Speech by Radan KANEV (Member of EP, EPP) on “EU Elections and the Fragmentation of the Right-wing Populism: ‘Normalisation’ vs ‘Cordon Sanitaire’.”
Keynote Address by Nathalie LOISEAU (Member of EP, Renew) on “A Transatlantic Perspective on the New Composition of the EP and Upcoming Administration in the US, Challenges of Populist Politics and Its Repercussions on the Relations between the US and EU.”
Presentation of the ECPS Report
“2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism,” by Dr. Emilia ZANKINA (Editor of the Report, ECPS Advisory Board Member, Temple University-Rome) and Dr. Gilles IVALDI (Editor of the Report, ECPS Advisory Board Member, Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po).
Partnership with International Conferences
A scene from the International Conference on Populisms, Digital Technologies, and the 2024 Elections in Indonesia, hosted at Deakin University.
Venue/Date: Deakin University, Australia | April 17–18, 2024
In April 2024, Deakin University, in collaboration with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Universitas Indonesia, and Universitas Gadjah Mada, hosted The International Conference: Populisms, Digital Technologies, and the 2024 Elections in Indonesia. Held shortly after Indonesia’s multi-level elections in February, the conference offered a timely and comprehensive examination of the evolving intersections between populism, technology, and democracy.
Organized by the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization (ADI), the two-day event featured 31 papers across eight panels, covering a broad range of topics such as populist strategy and communication, gender and youth politics, sharp power and disinformation, and authoritarian and Islamist populism. These discussions provided a nuanced understanding of how digital technologies, artificial intelligence, religion, and collective emotions shape Indonesia’s democratic and political dynamics.
The conference featured two distinguished keynote speakers: Professor Simon Tormey, an internationally recognized scholar of populism theory, and Professor Vedi Hadiz, a leading expert on Islamic populism in Indonesia. Their insights helped frame the debates on the global and local trajectories of populism in the digital age. Generously supported by the Australian Research Council (ARC), ADI, and ECPS, the conference successfully fostered cross-disciplinary collaboration, enriching both academic and policy-oriented conversations about populism’s influence in Southeast Asia and beyond.
Venue/Date: Deakin University, Melbourne & Online | September 25–26, 2024
In September 25-26, 2024, the International Conference on “Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific” convened both online and in person at Deakin University, Melbourne. This high-profile academic event was jointly organized by the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI), Universitas Indonesia (UI), Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (UMM), International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), State Islamic University (UIN) Salatiga, the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).
The conference examined how digital technologies, while promising inclusivity and progress, have also become tools for disinformation, manipulation, and digital authoritarianism. Scholars and practitioners from across the Indo-Pacific explored how misinformation circulating through social media platforms—such as Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, Telegram, and WhatsApp—undermines democratic governance, social cohesion, and freedom of expression.
Participants analyzed case studies across the region, highlighting how political actors weaponize digital spaces to silence dissent and consolidate power, while others proposed innovative solutions to counter disinformation and promote digital literacy, accountability, and transparency.
Supported by the Australian Research Council (ARC), the Gerda Henkel Foundation, ECPS, and ADI, the conference successfully advanced international collaboration and critical dialogue on the urgent need to strengthen democratic resilience and ethical governance in the rapidly evolving digital ecosystem of the Indo-Pacific.
The ECPS successfully organized its fourth virtual Summer School from July 1–5, 2024, focusing on Populism and Foreign Policy. This intensive, five-day academic program brought together young scholars, early-career researchers, and graduate students from around the world to explore the growing intersection between populism and international relations.
Challenging the conventional view of populism as a purely domestic phenomenon, the 2024 Summer School examined how populist leaders reshape foreign policy, global institutions, and international norms. Case studies such as Trump’s “America First” diplomacy, Modi’s Hindu nationalist foreign policy, Erdogan’s transnational populism, and Orbán’s Euroscepticism were discussed to illustrate how populist politics affect global cooperation and the liberal international order.
The Summer School featured lectures by globally renowned scholars, including Professor Sandra Destradi, Dr. Angelos Chryssogelos, Dr. Jessica Greenberg, Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski, Dr. Georg Loefflman, Professor Cengiz Aktar, Professor Emeritus Louis Kriesberg, Professor Bertjan Verbeek, Irina von Wiese, Professor Craig Calhoun, and Professor Joanna Dyduch. Each session was moderated by distinguished academics such as Dr. Rubrick Biegon, Dr. Gustav Meibauer, Dr. Jonny Hall, Professor Ana E. Juncos Garcia, and Professor Franco Zappettini, ensuring rich, interactive discussions.
A highlight of the program was the Case Competition, where participants collaboratively addressed real-world challenges in populist foreign policy, developing innovative policy proposals evaluated by experts.
By fostering an interdisciplinary and cross-cultural learning environment, ECPS’s 2024 Summer School empowered participants to critically engage with pressing global issues. It strengthened their analytical, research, and communication skills while building an international network of scholars dedicated to understanding the populist transformation of global politics. The program awarded 5 ECTS credits and continues to serve as a model for academic excellence and civic engagement in populism studies.
Venue: European Studies Centre, University of Oxford (in-person) & ECPS Virtual Platform
In May 22-23, 2024, the ECPS, in collaboration with the European Studies Centre (ESC) and the Oxford Democracy Network at the University of Oxford, co-organized the two-day workshop “The Interplay Between Migration and Populist Politics Across Europe Ahead of European Parliament Elections.” This timely event brought together leading academics and emerging scholars to analyze the nexus between migration, populism, and electoral politics across Europe.
Hosted at the European Studies Centre in Oxford and online, the workshop was co-chaired by Dr. Othon Anastasakis (ESC, University of Oxford), Sumeyye Kocaman (University of Oxford & ECPS), and George Hadjipavli (University of Oxford). Opening remarks were delivered by Dr. Anastasakis and Irina von Wiese (Honorary President, ECPS).
Over six thematic panels, participants explored how anti-immigration narratives, diaspora engagement, and populist rhetoric shape European politics ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Topics ranged from political psychology and xenophobia to gendered representations of refugees, diaspora politics, and digital populism. Panels featured contributions from scholars across Europe, including Dr. Filipa Figueira, Dr. Sanne van Oosten, Dr. Márton Gerő, Dr. Tamas Dudlak, Dr. Ezgi Irgil, and Dr. Zeynep Şahin-Mencütek, among many others.
The second day, held virtually, expanded the discussion to encompass the far right’s use of asylum policies, Euroscepticism, and the role of populism in redefining citizenship and social inclusion.
By bridging disciplinary boundaries and fostering collaboration, the event deepened understanding of how migration continues to shape and be shaped by populist discourse across Europe—especially in the run-up to one of the most consequential European Parliament elections in recent history.
DAY ONE
Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 08:30-17:00 (UK Time)
Opening Remarks
Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director of the European Studies Centre).
Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of the ECPS).
Panel 1 – Supply and Demand Sides of Populism: Political Psychology, Neoliberalism and Xenophobia
Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 09:00-10:45 (UK Time)
Chair
Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of the ECPS).
Discussant
Dr. William L. Allen (British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, and Nuffield College, University of Oxford).
Presentations
“Populism, Fast and Slow – A Dual Thinking Approach to Populist Attitudes,” by Dr. Filipa Figueira (Lecturer at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College London) & George Hajipavli (DPhil Candidate in Area Studies and Research Associate at Southeast European Studies at Oxford).
“Recalibration, Not Austerity: The Interplay of Populism, Neoliberalism, and Welfare States in the Struggle for Liberal Values,” by Jellen Olivares-Jirsell (PhD Candidate in Politics at Kingston University).
“In-group Love Explains Voting for Populist Radical Right Parties amongst Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands,” by Dr. Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher, Equal Strength, COMPAS, University of Oxford).
Panel 2: Hungary: A Case Study for Migration, Elections and Diaspora
Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 11:00-13:00 (UK Time)
Chair
Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director, European Studies Centre, Oxford University).
Discussant
Dr. Márton Gerő (Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University).
Papers
“You Don’t Even Have to Press It Anymore” – The Moral Panic Button (MPB) and the Road to the 2022 Election in Hungary,” by Dr. Márton Gerő (Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University) & Dr. Endre Sik (Research Professor at the Institute of Sociology – Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence).
“Migration Challenge and Populist Responses. A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Elections in Hungary and Turkey,” by Dr. Tamas Dudlak (Researcher at the Contemporary Arab World Center, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University).
“Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Kin-State Minorities in the Hungarian State’s Diaspora Engagement,” by Judit Molnar (DPhil Candidate in Anthropology at the University of Oxford).
Panel 3 – Anti-Migrant Perceptions and Populist Reactions Across Europe
Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 14:30-16:30 (UK Time)
Chair
Rob McNeill (Deputy Director of Migration Observatory, Compas Researcher, University of Oxford).
Discussant
Jafia Naftali Camara (British Academy Research Fellow, University of Cambridge).
Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate in Management, University of St. Andrews).
Presentations
“Nationalist Myths and The Emergence of Anti-Immigration Discourses,” by Luca Venga (Post-graduate Student at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford).
“Scandinavian Countries and the Rise of Extremism,” by Priscilla Otero Guerra (Postgraduate Student at the University of Oxford).
“Gendering Conflict: A Comparative Study of How Palestinian Civilians and Arab European Refugees Are Portrayed within Europe Parliamentarian Narratives,” by Arunima Cheruvathoor (MPhil in Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford).
“Digital Engagement and Political Voices: A Comparative Analysis of Skilled Immigrant Women in Ottawa and Stockholm,” by Ayshan Mammadzada (PMP, PhD Candidate at uOttawa).
Concluding Remarks
Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director of the European Studies Centre, University of Oxford).
Rob McNeill (Deputy Director of Migration Observatory, Compas Researcher, University of Oxford).
DAY TWO
Panel 4 – Intersection of Populist Politics, Far Right and Asylum Policies
Date/Time: May 23, 2024 / 09:00-11:00 (UK Time)
Co-chairs
Dr. Ilkhom Khalimzoda (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Language and Communication Studies, University of Jyväskylä, Finland).
Dr. Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher, EqualStrength, COMPAS, University of Oxford).
Discussants
Dr. Simon Watmough (Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a non-resident research fellow at ECPS).
Dr. Tamas Dudlak (Researcher at the Contemporary Arab World Center, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University).
Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate in Management, University of St. Andrews).
Presentations
“The Victory Party at the Crossroads of Asylum Policies and Populist Discourse in Turkey,” by Dr. Ezgi Irgil(Postdoctoral Research Fellow within the Global Politics and Security Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs – UI) & Dr. Zeynep Sahin Mencutek (Senior Researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies).
“Populist Politics Kills Asylum Policies: How Populist Discourses About Migration in Bulgaria Invent the ‘Refugee Crisis’,” by Dr. Ildiko Otova (Assistant Professor in International Migration at New Bulgarian University) & Dr. Evelina Staykova (Associate professor in Political Science at New Bulgarian University).
“‘The More Refugees, the More Votes’: The Role of Migration on the AfD Growth,” by Dr. Avdi Smajljaj(Assistant Professor and lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirana, Albania).
“Between Gastfreundschaft and Überfremdung: The Populist Origins of Migration Politics in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973-1983,” by Simon Ahrens (MPhil in Development Studies, University of Oxford).
Panel 5 – The Influence of Populist Anti-Immigration Narratives on European Self
Date/Time: May 23, 2024 / 12:30-14:30 (UK Time)
Co-Chairs
Dr. Avdi Smajljaj (Assistant Professor and lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirana, Albania).
Dr. Marieke van Houte (Assistant Professor for Anthropology and Development Studies, Radboud University).
Presentations
“Refugees and the Eurosceptics: Understanding the Shifts in the Political Landscape of Europe,” by Dr. Amrita Purkayastha (Assistant Professor at Bangalore, India).
“Populist Discourse and European Identity: A Poststructuralist Analysis,” by Nazmul Hasan (PhD Candidate in the Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, West Bengal, India).
“Nationalism and Anti-Immigration Sentimentalism in Europe,” by Sulagna Pal (PhD Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, India).
“A Critique of Eurocentric Conceptualisations of Social Cohesion in Academia, Refugee Policy, and Refugee Settings,” by Basma Doukhi (PhD Candidate in Migration Studies at the University of Kent).
Panel 6 – Diverse Aspects of Anti-Migrant Populism in Europe
Date/Time: May 23, 2024 / 15:00-17:00 (UK Time)
Co-Chairs
Dr. Tamirace Fakhoury (Associate Professor of International Politics and Conflict, Fletcher School, Tufts University).
Dr. Zeynep Sahin-Mencutek (Senior Researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies).
Discussants
Dr. Jafia Naftali Camara (British Academy Research Fellow, University of Cambridge).
Dr. Azize Sargin (Director for External Relations, ECPS).
Presentations
“Enemies Inside: European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism,” by Dr. Ana Paula Tostes (Senior Fellow at the Brazilian Center of International Relations and Professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro).
“Emigration and Political Party Membership in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from a Difference-in-Differences Design,” by Melle Scholten (PhD Candidate at the University of Virginia).
“Digital Engagement and Political Voices: A Comparative Analysis of Skilled Immigrant Women in Ottawa and Stockholm,” by Ayshan Mammadzada (PMP, PhD Candidate at uOttawa).
“The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe,” by Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo (Lecturer-Researcher in Political Science at the University of Yaoundé, Cameroon).
Concluding Remarks & Thanks
Dr. Azize Sargin (Director for External Relations, ECPS).
Sumeyye Kocaman (DPhil Researcher in Asian and Middle East Studies and Executive Editor of Populism & Politics).
In 2024, Populism & Politics (P&P) further solidified its position as one of the interdisciplinary platforms of the ECPS for cutting-edge scholarship on populism, authoritarianism, and democratic resilience. The digital journal continued to foster vigorous academic inquiry across the humanities, social sciences, and related fields, encouraging bold theoretical and methodological innovation.
Reflecting the journal’s mission to explore populism’s multifaceted expressions—from global shifts in democratic governance to localized experiences—P&P published 18 peer-reviewed articles in 2024. These contributions addressed a remarkable breadth of themes, including civilizational populism in Turkey, India, China, and Russia; the role of religion and informal Sharia structures in Indonesian elections; Euroscepticism and transnational diaspora politics in Europe; digital authoritarian practices; and the transformation of nationalist victimhood narratives. Collectively, these studies offered regionally grounded yet globally resonant insights into how populist discourse, leadership, and policy continue to reshape political life.
A defining strength of P&P in 2024 was its emphasis on comparative and cross-disciplinary perspectives, with scholars drawing from political science, sociology, religious studies, international relations, gender studies, and media analysis. The journal maintained its commitment to inclusivity and conceptual diversity by promoting decolonial, gender-sensitive, and Public Humanities–oriented frameworks.
The journal’s rigorous peer-review process, anonymized at every stage, ensured the highest standards of scholarly excellence. Each published article received a DOI, facilitating broad dissemination and citation within the global research community. P&P also encouraged innovative forms of knowledge production and interdisciplinary reflections that expand the conceptual boundaries of populism studies.
P&P’s 2024 portfolio reflects both geographical range and thematic evolution. Special attention to the 2024 Indonesian elections and shifting patterns of populism in Europe’s changing political landscape illustrates the journal’s responsiveness to contemporary developments.
As populism continues to evolve—reshaping identities, governance, and global order—P&P remains dedicated to advancing accessible, original, and methodologically robust scholarship. Through its expanding global authorship and cross-sector engagement, the journal contributes meaningfully to understanding and addressing the most urgent democratic challenges of our time.
Articles Published by P&P in 2024
Yilmaz, Ihsan; Triwibowo, Whisnu; Bachtiar, Hasnan & Barton, Greg. (2024). “Competing Populisms, Digital Technologies and the 2024 Elections in Indonesia.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 2, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0029
Yilmaz, Ihsan; Bachtiar, Hasnan; Smith, Chloe & Shakil, Kainat. (2024). “Fluctuating Populism: Prabowo’s Everchanging Populism Across the Indonesian Elections.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 15, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0030
Axford, Barrie. (2024). “The Implications of Rising Multipolarity for Authoritarian Populist Governance, Multilateralism, and the Nature of New Globalization.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 30, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0031
Morieson, Nicholas & Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2024). “Is A New Anti-Western Civilizational Populism Emerging? The Turkish, Hungarian and Israeli Cases.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0032
Yilmaz, Ihsan & Morieson, Nicholas. (2024). “The Rise of Authoritarian Civilizational Populism in Turkey, India, Russia and China.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 14, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0033
Smith, Chloe; Bachtiar, Hasnan; Shakil, Kainat; Morieson, Nicholas & de Groot Heupner, Susan. (2024). “Appealing to a Religiously Defined ‘the People’: How Religion Was Performatively Operationalized in the 2019 and 2024 Election Campaigns of Indonesia’s President-Elect.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 25, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0034
Bachtiar, Hasnan; Shakil, Kainat & Smith, Chloe. (2024). “Use of Informal Sharia Law for Civilizational Populist Mobilization in the 2024 Indonesian Elections.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 26, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0035
Varriale, Amedeo. (2024). “Populism and the Extreme Right in Comparative Perspective: The French Rassemblement National and the Italian Forza Nuova.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). August 12, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0036
Kenes, Bulent & Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2024). “Fatwas as Tools of Religious Populism: The Case of Turkish Islamist Scholar Hayrettin Karaman.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 1, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0037
Erturk, Omer; Yilmaz, Ihsan and Smith, Chloe. (2024). “Blame Avoidance through Necropolitics and Religious Populism: Autocratic Responses to Nationwide Crises in an Authoritarian Islamist Polity.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 3, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0038
Pretorius, Christo. (2024). “Populism in Ireland: Sinn Féin and the Alternative to Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s Political Dominance.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0039
Morieson, Nicholas; Yilmaz, Ihsan & Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “From National to Manufactured: The Evolution of the AKP’s Victimhood Narratives.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 6, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0040
Yilmaz, Ihsan & Morieson, Nicholas. (2024). “How China’s Rise as a ‘Civilization State’ Spurs European States to Challenge US Political Dominance.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 10, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0041
Kenes, Bulent & Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2024). “Digital Authoritarianism and Religious Populism in Turkey.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 14, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0042
Tostes, Ana Paula. (2024). “Enemies Inside: European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 5, 2024. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0043b
Olivares-Jirsell, Jellen. (2024). “Recalibration, Not Austerity: Welfare States and the Struggle for Liberalism.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 6, 2024. Doi:https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0044
Molnar, Judit. (2024) “Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Transborder Hungarians in Hungary’s Diaspora Engagement.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 20, 2024. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0045
van Oosten, Sanne. (2025). “The Importance of In-group Favoritism in Explaining Voting for PRRPs: A Study of Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 12, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0046
In 2024, the ECPS significantly expanded its global knowledge base through 51 in-depth interviews with leading scholars, policy experts, and regional specialists. These conversations provided timely, research-driven insights into the evolving landscape of populism, authoritarianism, democratic backsliding, and civil resistance across multiple world regions.
The interview series captured critical developments—from the consolidation of Putinism and authoritarian resurgence in Russia, to democratic fragility in India, Iran, and Georgia; from the rise of radical-right forces in Europe to complex political transitions in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Scholars such as Arjun Appadurai, Christophe Jaffrelot, Kurt Weyland, Kai Arzheimer, Mabel Berezin, Claudia Wiesner, Staffan Lindberg, and Yascha Mounk reflected on the ideological, institutional, and socio-economic drivers behind contemporary populist movements.
Several interviews highlighted urgent democratic concerns: fears of intensified repression under Prabowo in Indonesia; the spread of civilizational populism; growing Euroscepticism and far-right electoral gains; and the potential global impact of a second Trump presidency. Others underscored the agency of citizens, institutions, and international networks in countering authoritarian pressures.
Together, these interviews provided a rich, comparative archive of expert assessments on the global struggle between populist forces and democratic resilience. They remain an essential resource for scholars, journalists, and policymakers seeking to navigate a rapidly changing political order.
Professor Kurt Weyland, a political scientist and Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin, shared insights into the evolving nature of populist movements and their impact on democracies. The interview covered key aspects of his research, addressing the weaknesses of personalistic plebiscitarian leadership, the comparative analysis of populism‘s impact on democracy in Europe and Latin America, the role of charismatic leadership in damaging political-party systems, and the long-term impact of populist movements on the political landscape.
Dr. Kai Arzhemier, Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz, assessed the exposure of a meeting involving right-wing extremist AfD politicians and neo-Nazis, where discussions about deporting millions of people with a non-German ethnic background, including citizens, took place. Professor Arzheimer characterize this meeting as echoing the ideologies of the 1930s-1940s, reminiscent of the Nazis’ plans to exterminate Jews. Arzheimer underscores that the meeting adds to the concerns about the AfD’s trajectory over the past few years, aligning with right-wing extremism.
Professor Arjun Appadurai, an Emeritus Professor of Media, Culture and Communication at New York University, analyzed the inauguration of the Ayodhya Temple by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2024. He expressed concerns about the potential rise of Hindu majoritarianism and its impact on India’s significant Muslim population. Appadurai emphasized that the monumental structure, replacing the Babri Masjid, symbolizes a shift towards the marginalization of India’s Muslims, potentially relegating them to a second-class status. Alongside many analysts, Appadurai predicts that Modi is poised to maintain a formidable grip on power in the Indian elections in April 2024, unless unexpected shifts in the political landscape occur.
Professor Albena Azmanova, a distinguished academic in Political and Social Science at the University of Kent, emphasizes that the ascent of populist parties finds its roots in widespread economic insecurity rather than mere inequality. She contends that the fear of job loss affects not only the unemployed but also those with stable jobs and good pay, emerging as the primary catalyst for societal insecurity. She critically examines the term ‘populism,’ expressing reservations about its negative connotations, and advocates for a linguistic shift. Azmanova argues that the term “populism” is misleading, diverting attention from the actual transformations in ideological orientations. Instead, she proposes a reframing of the political divide, suggesting the lens of opportunity versus risk, transcending conventional left-right categorizations.
Emphasizing that populist parties act as platforms for citizens with more critical perspectives, Professor Ann-Cathrine Jungar, Associate Professor of Political Science at Södertörn University in Stockholm, argues that these parties can serve as correctives for democracies, amplifying voices underrepresented in mainstream politics, even though not all their proposals may receive universal endorsement. While acknowledging that some supporters of populist parties may hold xenophobic views, she highlights the importance of distinguishing between exclusionary and inclusionary populism. Jungar notes that populist radical right parties typically fall into the exclusionary category due to their critical stance towards liberal democracy.
Drawing a comparison between radical Islamism and Islamist populism, Professor Samina Yasmeen, the Director of the Centre for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western Australia, emphasized the parallel communication styles utilized by both radical and populist Islamists, highlighting their reliance on simplicity and Islamic references to connect with the populace. However, she pointed out that while radical Islamists aim for a fundamental alteration of the state, populist Islamists, exemplified by figures such as Imran Khan, prioritize the establishment of a “well-governed state.”
Emphasizing the pressing challenges confronting Indonesian democracy, Professor Vedi Hadiz, Director and Professor of Asian Studies at the Asia Institute, and Assistant Deputy Vice-Chancellor International at the University of Melbourne, stressed, “The current concern with Subianto Prabowo’s election lies in his deep ties to the oligarchy.” He highlighted Prabowo’s track record of human rights violations and his family’s (his brother) involvement in questionable economic activities, resulting in outstanding debts to the state. Additionally, Prabowo’s disregard for democratic processes, principles, and human rights was underscored. Acknowledging Indonesia’s enduring struggle with its oligarchic tendencies, Professor Hadiz warned that Prabowo’s election heralds a new level of danger for Indonesian democracy.
Dr. Tatsiana Kulakevich, Associate Professor at the University of South Florida’s School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies and a research fellow and affiliated faculty at the USF Institute for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, underscores the resilience of the Belarusian protest movement amidst systematic repression and violence. Despite recent parliamentary elections failing to incite significant dissent, she suggests that future electoral events, especially presidential elections, could ignite substantial change. Despite the challenges ahead, the Belarusian people remain hopeful for a window of opportunity to usher in a new regime and reclaim their rights and freedoms. Kulakevich also draws attention to the plight of political prisoners in Belarus, whose uncertain fate mirrors Navalny’s tragic end.
Professor Luke March, from the University of Edinburgh, underscores that any surprises or intrigues in the upcoming Russian presidential elections are minor curiosities rather than significant events. He argues that these elections will further consolidate Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian rule, possibly securing up to 80% of the vote. According to March, Putin’s underlying message is clear: his dominance remains unassailable in the foreseeable future; any attempt at opposition will be swiftly quashed. March emphasizes his expectation that this pattern will persist without significant deviation.
Reminding that elections are pivotal in justifying Iranian religious leadership and sustaining political legitimacy, Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh, a distinguished Research Professor at the Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, emphasizes that the turnout data from Iran’s 2024 elections serves as a stark wake-up call for authorities. He argues that the low turnout raised serious concerns for the regime’s legitimacy and underscores that the Iranian regime has come to recognize that its legitimacy is significantly at risk, perhaps even non-existent.
Professor Neil Robinson, a distinguished scholar of Comparative Politics at the University of Limerick, expresses his concerns regarding a potential escalation in the crackdown on dissent, heightened control measures, intensified efforts to label domestic opponents as foreign agents or traitors, and increased indoctrination through the education and media systems following Vladimir Putin’s resounding victory in the 2024 election. Additionally, he underscores the notion that Putin does not operate alone at the apex of power but rather is bolstered by a circle of allies. Robinson argues, “While this has always been true, there’s now an effort to transform this ‘collective Putin’ into more than just a hegemonic identity that Russians are expected to adhere to; it’s becoming a true collective, an unquestionable identity. Thus, the expansion of these dynamics may lead us to reconsider Putinism as something distinct from official populism.”
Emphasizing that winning 87 percent of the vote and handpicking compliant candidates does not constitute a genuine election, Professor Veljko Vujačić, a distinguished scholar of Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies at Oberlin College and Conservator, argues that such practices do not strengthen Putin’s position; rather, they highlight the regime’s weaknesses. Similarly, the murder of Alexei Navalny does not demonstrate strength; it reveals weakness. He further asserts, “I find the term ‘dictatorship’ more accurately encapsulates the reality of the Putin regime than ‘autocracy’ or ‘authoritarianism’ because Putin’s behavior epitomizes dictatorship, where power is wielded outside the confines of law and constitution. Currently, his regime seems to be veering toward a weak form of totalitarianism.”
Stating that populism’s appeal has not significantly diminished in Turkey despite the opposition’s win in local elections, Professor Emre Erdogan, Head of the Department of International Relations at Bilgi University, underscores the fact that even leading politicians within the opposition, such as Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, exhibit certain populist characteristics. “Imamoglu’s use of populist rhetoric suggests that populism continues to hold sway in Turkish politics,” argues Professor Erdogan, urging the opposition in Turkey to adeptly harness the power of “good populism” to achieve success in upcoming elections.
Professor Staffan I. Lindberg, Director of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute at the University of Gothenburg, expresses his concern: “I am deeply concerned about the possibility of Donald Trump being reelected. In the current context, I believe that if Donald Trump is reelected, democracy in the US might not survive. He has been explicit about his dictatorial intentions, even going as far as labeling Democrats as vermin, a term that evokes disturbing parallels with Nazi Germany from the late 1930s to 1945. Such statements must be taken seriously, as they could embolden autocrats worldwide.”
Professor Meredith Shaw, a research professor at the Institute of Social Science (社研), the University of Tokyo and the managing editor of Social Science Japan Journal, discussed the issue of “autocratization” in South Korea, highlighting concerns about authoritarian tendencies even within progressive political circles. She pointed out that some progressive politicians on the left have at times exhibited authoritarian behavior. For example, they have proposed laws in mimicry of the existing national security law, which aimed to penalize statements perceived as supportive of North Korea. These include recent proposals for laws targeting the misrepresentation of historical events, such as the Japanese colonial rule or the democratic movements, including the Kwangju massacre under the military dictatorship.
When queried about the correlation between populism and democracy and the potential jeopardy to democracy in South Korea, Profesor Sang-Jin Han, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Seoul National University in South Korea, argues the potential threat to democracy in South Korea does not come from populist citizens, but from neoliberal ones. By sharing insights from his 2018 empirical study, he elucidated, “My research aimed to discern which citizens genuinely endorse autocracy and strong leadership. Surprisingly, the findings unveiled that those meeting specific criteria for populism did not inherently endorse robust autocratic leadership. Rather intriguingly, it was the neo-liberal citizens who exhibited a tendency to endorse such authoritarian leadership.”
Professor Christophe Jaffrelot, distinguished CERI-CNRS Senior Research Fellow who teaches at Sciences Po, notes that under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Hindutva has taken on a distinctly populist and more aggressive posture, marking a shift from the Bharatiya Janata Party’s previously disciplined, cadre-based approach. Modi’s populist influence has further polarized Indian society, rendering his brand of Hindu nationalism more exclusionary and assertive than ever. He also highlights the subtle yet significant similarities between India and Israel in their conceptualization and treatment of minorities. In India, minorities, particularly Muslims, experience systemic exclusion from equal opportunities in employment, housing, and other areas.
Just three weeks ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, Dr. Pawel Zerka, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), says he is more concerned about low turnout than the election results. Dr. Zerka stated, “Even if the far-right increases its number of seats, it will still be a clear minority. What is much more concerning is the lack of reasons for a high turnout.” Concerning the potential threat to liberal democracy in Europe due to the possible success of the far-right in the EP elections, Zerka said, “There is surely a danger for what the EU will stand for in the coming years. However, the responsibility for that danger lies on the shoulders of not just the far-right, but even more so on the center-right.”
As opinion polls indicated a potential surge in support for far-right parties in the European Parliament elections scheduled for June 6-9, Sir Graham Watson, a liberal politician and Advisory Board member of ECPS, emphasized the critical need to persuade younger people to vote. “In recent years, we have seen significant abstention among younger voters. This was a major factor in Brexit,” Watson explains. “We desperately need everyone eligible to vote, especially those over 18 across the European Union, to exercise their democratic rights. Perhaps the younger generation does not fully grasp that freedom must be actively used, or it can be lost. If they do not use their freedom to vote and participate in democratic society, they risk losing that freedom in the future,” he warns.
Dr. Tim Haughton, Professor of Comparative and European Politics and Deputy Director of CEDAR at the University of Birmingham, offered a concise analysis of Slovakia’s increasingly polarized political landscape. He noted that actors around Prime Minister Robert Ficohave advanced narratives characteristic of populist discourse, deepening societal divides and contributing to a charged political climate—one in which an assassination attempt against Fico unfolded. Dr. Haughton highlighted the growing influence of radical-right forces, shifting national identity debates, and contentious immigration narratives. His reflections underscore the challenges facing Slovak democracy and the broader implications of polarization and populist mobilization for politics across Central and Eastern Europe.
Professor Simon Tormey, a political theorist and the Executive Dean of Arts and Education at Deakin University in Australia, stated that great power rivalry is more significant than any new ideology, indicating a shift away from globalization, which suggested diminishing differences between countries. Tormey highlighted that nationalist and nativist power struggles are likely to shape political outcomes for at least the next two decades. He noted the reemergence of great power rivalry, alongside economic interconnectedness and trends of de-globalization and decoupling. Tormey predicted continued regional conflicts and the persistence of populism without evolving into a new form of neo-populism.
Dr. Ulrike M. Vieten, an Assistant Professor in Sociology of Gender, Migration and Racisms, at Queen’s University Belfast, points out that the 2008 economic crisis played a significant role in exacerbating people’s anxieties, highlighting that “profit is individualized while risk is socialized.” This economic instability, coupled with the recent pandemic, has deepened the feeling of insecurity across Europe. These socio-economic factors, she argues, have paved the way for the far-right’s rise, as people seek to channel their distress and anger. Drawing parallels with the normalization of far-right ideologies in the early 20th century, Vieten underscores that this historical context is crucial in recognizing how quickly societal values can shift and the dangers of complacency.
Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts-Lowell and Associate Director of the UMass-Lowell Center for Public Opinion, says Claudia Sheinbaum’s government in Mexico is set to begin in October, and it will be a period of significant interest as both the current president and the president-elect navigate this transition. He noted that Sheinbaum has a democratic trajectory, having worked as a scholar and scientist before joining López Obrador’s movement and stated that “Given her background, one might expect her government not to pose a threat to democracy. However, recent signs indicate she supports measures that could further erode Mexican democracy. We will need to wait until her government starts to see if these policies are implemented.”
From a historical perspective, Dr. Othon Anastasakis, the Director of the European Studies Centre and Southeast European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) at St Antony’s College, Oxford University, acknowledged that the rise of far-right parties in the European elections does not represent a significant rupture from the past. The mainstream political context still dominates European politics, which he finds reassuring. However, he sees two main risks for the future: the unification of far-right parties within the European Parliament and the potential alliance of center-right parties with far-right elements, which could normalize extremist rhetoric.
Professor Claudia Wiesner, Jean Monnet Chair and Professor for Political Science at Fulda University of Applied Sciences, voices her concerns regarding the troubling trend of the European People’s Party (EPP) and Ursula von der Leyen, showing a preference for collaborating with populist far-right groups over the Greens. Professor Wiesner argues that this strategy is fraught with risks for the European Union. She questions the strategic interest behind such alliances, emphasizing, “These parties would not support strong European integration. They favor a weaker Europe, whereas the Greens support a stronger Europe. It would be in the interest of a strong European Commission to align with parties favoring a stronger European Union.” Wiesner further highlights the potential legitimacy crisis the EU might face if it continues down this path.
Professor Jean-Yves Camus, a political analyst and Associate Research Fellow at The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), emphasizes that the social and economic policies of President Emmanuel Macron have driven many voters to the National Rally (NR). However, he cautions against viewing this merely as a protest vote. “When a party remains strong for over 50 years, it cannot be solely due to protest,” he notes. According to Camus, NR’s support base reflects a society grappling with increasing inequalities, where many citizens feel deprived of fair opportunities. This sentiment is compounded by a growing resentment towards foreigners, particularly those from North African, West African and Middle Eastern backgrounds.
By analyzing the electoral success of Nigel Farage’s Reform UK Party (RUKP) as a representative of European PRR parties, Professor Tim Bale, a renowned scholar from the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London, emphasized that “mainstream parties who oppose them have to learn to live with this fact and realize that while they can be beaten at elections, they can’t be eradicated.” Discussing the broader political climate, Professor Bale warned of the challenges posed by both right-wing and left-wing populism. He pointed out that left-wing populism, while lacking the xenophobic and Islamophobic elements of its right-wing counterpart, often proposes overly simplistic solutions that could threaten good governance and economic stability.
Professor Maria Isabel Puerta Riera, a political scientist at Valencia College, US, emphasized that Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is unlikely to concede defeat or accept any outcome other than his own reelection. She warned that increasing state-driven violence is probable, while diplomatic efforts by Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico are unlikely to sway the regime. Puerta Riera stressed that the core pillar sustaining Maduro is the military, whose loyalty shields him from prosecution. Because Maduro faces serious international and US legal charges, she argues that he cannot exit power without jeopardizing his personal security—making voluntary transition highly improbable.
Professor Louis Kriesberg, Maxwell Professor Emeritus of Social Conflict Studies at Syracuse University, argues that right-wing populism, as represented by Donald Trump in the US, is ultimately doomed to failure. He draws parallels to past episodes in American history, such as McCarthyism in the 1950s and the Ku Klux Klan’s influence in the 1920s, noting that while these movements caused significant harm, they eventually faded into obscurity as the country moved toward more inclusive and democratic norms. Although Professor Kriesberg expresses deep concern about the potential damage, he remains optimistic about the resilience of democratic institutions and the strength of resistance against authoritarian tendencies. He believes that the majority of Americans do not support Trump’s divisive rhetoric and that the country will ultimately reject right-wing populism in favor of more traditional, constructive political engagement.
In her deep analysis of the challenges facing Brazil’s democracy under the influence of authoritarian populism, Professor Natália Sátyro, a professor and researcher at the Post-Graduate Program of Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) in Belo Horizonte, Brazil and editor of the book titled “Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism – Lessons from Brazil,” highlights the vulnerabilities within Brazilian social policies and democratic institutions. She notes how these weaknesses have allowed authoritarian leaders to introduce harmful strategies with fewer obstacles. As Brazil navigates its political future, Professor Sátyro warns of the potential consequences if such populist strategies persist. She argues that Brazil’s resilience, while notable, will be further tested if global trends toward authoritarian populism continue to gain momentum, particularly with the possibility of leaders like Donald Trump regaining power in other countries.
Professor Yascha Mounk, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and founder of Persuasion, observes that many Americans perceive the Democratic Party as being out of sync with mainstream values and believe that Kamala Harris is too progressive, while fewer think Donald Trump is too conservative. He suggests that Democrats should consider making cultural concessions that align with public opinion, particularly where common sense prevails. Mounk presented two very different scenarios in the event of Trump’s victory on November 5, 2024. On one hand, he noted that Trump’s first term, though damaging and chaotic, was perhaps less consequential than some, including Mounk himself, feared in 2016. On the other hand, Mounk offered a sobering analysis of what a second Trump term could mean for the future of the US.
Reflecting on the deeply polarized political landscape in the US, Professor Alan Abramowitz, Alben W. Barkley Professor Emeritus at Emory College of Arts and Sciences, warned, “As we approach the 2024 election, there are signals that this polarization could again lead to violence, particularly if Trump loses the election.” His concerns stem from Donald Trump’s rhetoric, where Trump has already suggested that any loss would be due to fraud, effectively claiming the election would be stolen from him. Looking ahead to the 2024 election, Professor Abramowitz predicted a tight race, with Kamala Harris likely to win by a narrow margin. However, he cautioned that the dynamics of the Electoral College could result in a repeat of 2016, where the popular vote and the electoral outcome diverge.
Ahead of the 2024 Austrian elections, Professor Reinhard Heinisch, a leading expert on Austrian politics from the University of Salzburg, argued that “If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope they come in first.” He explained this seeming paradox by noting that a first-place FPÖ victory would make it less likely that other parties would join a government led by the radical Herbert Kickl. He emphasized that the Conservative Party (ÖVP) would retain multiple coalition options: partnering with the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and a smaller party, or with the FPÖ. However, he observed that the ÖVP would have little incentive to serve as junior partner under Kickl when it could instead lead a coalition with the SPÖ.
In exploring the socio-political dynamics behind white Evangelicals’ support for Donald Trump and right-wing populism in the United States, Professor Marcia Pally of New York University identifies what she calls a “double loss” experienced by this group. She explains that white Evangelicals face both economic and societal losses—challenges shared by many Americans—which are further intensified by their distinct struggles as a religious community. This “double loss,” Pally argues, is coupled with a “double suspicion” of government and “outsiders”: a widespread American distrust of centralized authority, minorities, and new immigrants, paired with a doctrinal suspicion rooted of priestly and other authorities in Evangelical religious beliefs.
Professor Jennifer McCoy, Regent’s Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, warns that a Donald Trump victory in the November 5th US presidential elections could embolden populist movements and authoritarian regimes worldwide. Professor McCoy asserts that Trump is unlikely to prioritize reinforcing democracy in countries where leaders are consolidating power or undermining democratic norms. “Instead, his victory will empower authoritarian regimes, particularly in countries like Russia and China,” she explained, highlighting the potential global consequences of another Trump term.
Highlighting that the success of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) is rooted in Austria’s long history of far-right politics, with origins tracing back to the post-World War I period, Professor Felix Roesel, a Professor of Economics, especially Urban and Regional Economics at Technische Universität Braunschweig in Germany, argues that the FPÖ’s presence as a dominant force in Austrian politics is unlikely to diminish, as historical, social, and political factors continue to bolster the party’s influence. He explains that Austria’s far-right movement is unique compared to other European countries, given its established presence both before and after World War II. According to Professor Roesel, the continuity of this tradition, marked by personal and ideological ties to the Nazi era, sets the FPÖ apart from other modern far-right parties in Europe.
Underscoring that Austria represents a unique case where neoliberalism has been driven by far-right politics—a phenomenon not commonly seen in other European contexts— Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider, Assistant Professor at the Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna, reflects on the FPÖ’s historical trajectory. She explains how the party, initially founded by former National Socialists, positioned itself as a pro-business, liberal alternative to the dominant Socialist and Conservative parties. This liberal economic stance was integrated into government policies when the FPÖ gained power, particularly during its coalition government in the early 2000s, introducing neoliberal measures such as deregulation and market liberalization. “What we’ve seen in Austria,” Professor Ausserladscheider notes, “is an unprecedented case of a far-right populist party significantly influencing economic policymaking.”
Professor Tom Ginsburg, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law at the University of Chicago, warns against the simplistic notion that a “strongman” can solve complex political and social problems, arguing that such leaders often weaken democratic institutions by eroding trust. He discusses how authoritarian regimes manipulate international law to shield themselves from scrutiny. Despite these trends, Ginsburg remains cautiously optimistic, believing that well-established democracies can endure with vigilance and strong institutions. However, he emphasizes the need for constant global cooperation to prevent the further erosion of democratic norms and institutions.
The re-election of Kais Saied on October 6, 2024, has sparked debates about the future of Tunisia’s democracy and the legacy of the Arab Spring. With only 28.8% voter turnout, the result reflects a growing disillusionment among Tunisians. Professor Francesco Tamburini, Professor of Political Science at Department of Political Sciences, Università di Pisa, examines the wider impact of Saied’s actions, drawing comparisons between Tunisia’s path and other post-revolutionary autocratic regimes in the MENA region. He emphasizes that “the absence of Ennahda is a significant loss for Tunisian politics,” noting that the lack of a moderate Islamic voice has left a deep void in the country’s political landscape.
The re-election of Donald Trump on November 5, 2024, raises significant concerns for American democracy, according to Professor Mabel Berezin, Distinguished Professor of Sociology at Cornell University. While she acknowledges that Trump is a troubling figure, she emphasizes that it is the individuals surrounding him who are especially dangerous. “What makes him even more dangerous is the group of people around him—J.D. Vance, Elon Musk, and the Project 2025 people. I think American democracy will be in serious danger if these people come into power. They are smart, they have a project, and they’re going to push it through,” she explains.
Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski, Lecturer in International Relations at Coventry University, argues Trump uses foreign policy as a tool to externalize US problems, reframing issues like poverty and unemployment as outcomes of foreign influence. Trump’s “American people vs. Washington establishment” narrative, Wojczewski says, fuels populist-nationalist sentiment by attributing domestic challenges to global elites and immigration, aligning with longstanding US nativist narratives. Wojczewski compares this approach to other populist strategies, contrasting it with left-populists like Bernie Sanders, who emphasize multilateralism and solidarity.
Professor Emilia Zankina, a leading expert in political science and Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University, explains that, despite the financial and mobility benefits of EU membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West” due to Bulgaria’s strong historic ties to Russia. The communist era deeply embedded Russian language, culture, and education in Bulgarian life, and “for many,” Professor Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator.” She observes that while the war in Ukraine initially reduced pro-Russian sentiment in the country, as the conflict continued, some Bulgarians have returned to their original views.
Professor David Aprasidze, political science professor at Ilia State University in Tbilisi: In Georgia, the Georgian Dream party exemplifies a technocratic form of populism, treating state governance like corporate management. Founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, a former businessman, brings a non-ideological, efficiency-focused approach, applying principles from his business career to politics. He appoints key officials as “managers” to carry out strategic directives, allowing him to remain distanced while exercising control. This model emphasizes expertise and governance over ideology, with Ivanishvili viewing the state as if it were one of his companies.
Professor Lucan Ahmad Way, Distinguished Professor of Democracy at the University of Toronto, expressed serious concerns about the durability of American institutions under Trump’s influence. “I am extremely worried about how American institutions might respond to Trump’s autocratic tendencies,” he stated, noting that subtle abuses, like politicized audits or investigations, could escape media scrutiny yet still erode democratic foundations. While US rule of law might limit overt actions, Professor Way emphasized the risk of covert pressures aimed at silencing opposition, highlighting the fragility of democratic safeguards in polarized times.
Highlighting the dangers of overlapping corporate and governmental powers, Paul Levinson, Professor of Communication & Media Studies at Fordham University, cautioned, “I am deeply opposed to having the person who owns X also hold a high-ranking government position. That kind of overlap means the government could end up controlling communication platforms.” He elaborated on Musk’s ethical responsibility, stating that if Musk were a “true believer in free speech,” he would either divest from X or refuse a government post. However, Levinson expressed skepticism: “I think we both know he’s likely to do neither.” Levinson also voiced his deep concern for American democracy under a potential second Trump administration, describing it as “the worst threat to our democracy since the Civil War.”
Professor Tanweer Fazal, a distinguished sociologist from the University of Hyderabad, emphasizes that “otherization is primarily a deliberate process rather than something inherently embedded in a culture.” He explains how this systematic targeting involves mobilizing economic, cultural, historical, and political resources to marginalize specific communities. Reflecting on the state’s role, Professor Fazal critiques its evolving relationship with secularism and justice. He notes a shift in the post-2014 political landscape, observing, “The state has increasingly abandoned its efforts to project a secular or morally incorruptible image,” instead embracing a majoritarian framework.
Highlighting Elon Musk’s dual role as a private tech mogul and a potential quasi-governmental leader under elected US President Donald Trump, Professor Anthony J. Nownes, a political science expert from the University of Tennessee, underscored the dangers of unregulated private power intersecting with public institutions. He emphasized that ceding excessive power to any private interest—whether in the tech industry or another sector—poses a significant threat to democracy. Illustrating this concern, Professor Nownes pointed to the proposed “Doge Department,” noting, “Unlike actual government departments with conflict-of-interest rules, such private entities lack safeguards, making them a potential avenue for unchecked influence over public resources.”
Describing Călin Georgescu’s first-round presidential victory as “shocking,” Professor Sorina Christina Soare, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence, highlights the pivotal role of social media, particularly TikTok, in mobilizing young voters. “TikTok’s visual simplicity and limited regulatory scrutiny allowed candidates to amplify anti-establishment narratives, effectively engaging younger demographics,” she explains. She emphasizes Georgescu’s populist appeal, driven by “simple yet resonant nationalist rhetoric” and a well-executed campaign strategy. “Georgescu’s polished image and reassuring tone contrasted with more vocal populist figures, enhancing his credibility,” she notes. Despite warning of potential instability, Professor Soare remains optimistic that Romania’s semi-presidential system and pro-European coalitions can sustain the country’s European trajectory.
Dr. Rajni Gamage, a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore (NUS), highlights the decline of Buddhist civilizational populism in Sri Lanka, noting its diminished public resonance following the transformative 2022 protests. These protests, she explains, challenged both the political elite and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, creating a moment of reckoning. However, Gamage warns that if Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government fails to deliver on its promises of progressive politics and economic recovery, opposition groups may exploit public discontent to revive Buddhist civilizational populism. “This phase of decline,” she says, “could shift if promises remain unmet, fueling alternative populist narratives.”
As South Korea’s Constitutional Court reviews President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment following his martial law declaration, Dr. Meredith Shaw, a leading expert on East Asian politics, highlights the deep-rooted issues plaguing the nation’s politics. Speaking with the ECPS, Dr. Shaw explains that a “tit-for-tat dynamic” of political retaliation has hindered systemic reforms, while populist appeals during economic crises fuel disillusionment. Drawing on South Korea’s history of authoritarian rule, she emphasizes the need for reform-minded leadership to restore public confidence. “Both sides have behaved in ways that don’t inspire confidence,” Dr. Shaw remarked, urging systemic change to strengthen democratic institutions amid this critical moment for South Korea’s democracy.
In a compelling interview with the ECPS, renowned historian Professor Michael Kazin of Georgetown University, explores the rise of right-wing populism as a “morbid symptom” of today’s political transition. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of interregnum, Kazin analyzes Donald Trump’s presidency, highlighting its profound impact on American and global politics. From galvanizing his MAGA base by aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism to forging ties with far-right leaders abroad, Trump’s leadership reflects the challenges of this transitional era. Kazin also envisions the potential for a progressive populism rooted in economic justice to counterbalance these dynamics.
Commentaries
In 2024, the ECPS continued to expand its editorial output through the ECPS Commentaries series, publishing 17 analytical essays that examined the multifaceted evolution of populism across global and regional contexts. Authored by distinguished scholars and experts, these commentaries provided timely, research-informed insights into the intersections of populism with nationalism, religion, gender, and democratic governance.
The year opened with Simon P. Watmough’s comprehensive overview “Populism in 2023: The Year in Review,” which assessed populism’s fluctuating fortunes worldwide, highlighting its uneven electoral performance and enduring ideological appeal. A strong thematic strand throughout the 2024 collection was the growing globalization of populist discourse, illustrated by Ajay Gudavarthy’s and Priya Chacko & Kanchan Panday’s analyses of India’s elections, Junhyoung Lee’s exploration of South Korea’s populist-nationalist dynamics, and Nicholas Morieson’s study of South Africa’s shifting political landscape.
European developments featured prominently, with Emilia Zankina & Gilles Ivaldi assessing the populist radical right’s advances in the 2024 European Parliament elections, while Kai Arzheimer, Hugo Marcos-Marne, and Robert Csehi provided country-specific insights into Germany, Spain, and Hungary. João Ferreira Dias contributed multiple essays exploring the populist right’s entrenchment in Portugal and the cultural polarization transforming Western democracies. Beyond electoral analyses, Hafza Girdap examined gendered Islamophobia through a transnational feminist lens.
Collectively, these commentaries underscored ECPS’s commitment to rigorous, comparative, and interdisciplinary engagementwith global populism. They not only documented the persistence of populist movements across continents but also deepened understanding of the structural crises—economic, cultural, and institutional—that sustain them. Through this rich body of analysis, ECPS reaffirmed its role as a leading platform for critical scholarship on populism and democracy in a rapidly transforming world.
In 2023, populism continued to shape the electoral landscape worldwide, notably in Europe but also in East Asia and Latin America. And it is clear that 2023 did not see the outright resurgence of populism worldwide as some had predicted but instead produced another year of mixed results, with critical successes and also major setbacks for populists at the ballot box.
As transnational feminist scholars and activists, it becomes imperative for us to intervene in feminist epistemologies by carefully discerning the nuances among the concepts of anti-Islam, anti-Muslim, and Islamophobia. An essential focus lies in understanding the ongoing transformation of the new transnational anti-Islamic movement from ethnic-based nationalism and oppressive authoritarianism towards a liberal standpoint that advocates equality, justice, and democratic values. This involves active participation in knowledge production through the experiences and agency of the complex subjects central to debates: Muslim immigrant women.
By Ihsan Yilmaz, Hasnan Bachtiar, Chloe Smith & Kainat Shakil
Prabowo Subianto Joyohadikusumo is the anticipated victor of the 2024 Indonesian presidential election, boasting a political career spanning more than three decades in the country. Over the course of the past decade alone, Prabowo has undergone significant shifts in ideological stances, rhetorical appeals, and electoral strategies. He has transformed from an ultra-nationalist, chauvinist, and Islamist populist into a technocratic figure with a more approachable demeanor, strategically forming and changing alliances in his efforts to secure electoral success.
Chega, a populist radical right-wing party known for its anti-systemic, morally conservative, and securitarian rhetoric, secured 48 MPs, solidifying its position as the most influential third force ever in the Parliament. This marks a substantial transformation in Portuguese politics. Despite warnings from the Left about the imminent threat of fascism, voters persist in seeking straightforward solutions and placing blame on elites and immigrants. Now, the pivotal question arises: “Will the Democratic Alliance break its cordon sanitaire with Chega?”
Given the inability of Turkey’s strongman Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s to satisfy Turkey’s 86 million citizens with an economy reliant on corrupt patronage networks and the challenges of implementing a heavy austerity program within a democratic framework, diverting public attention to domestic and foreign disturbances to suspend democracy becomes a realistic expectation. Ultimately, Erdogan’s pursuit seems to lead toward a costly Pyrrhic Victory.
The 22nd general election in South Korea offers a pivotal perspective for examining the interactions of populism, nationalism, and xenophobia within the nation’s political fabric. It sheds light on persistent issues such as confronting authoritarianism, bridging societal divides, and integrating foreign nationals more deeply into the societal framework. This election marks a critical juncture in South Korea’s political development, with implications that extend far into the realms of democratic governance, social unity, and the broader political landscape.
The BJP consistently built a mass movement to construct a temple for Lord Ram at his birthplace of Ayodhya. This populist narrative, which framed an imagined majority as the ‘authentic people,’ resonated widely. The temple’s construction became the central issue for the 2024 General Elections. However, soon after the temple’s inauguration in February, the expected exuberance was noticeably absent. Mobilization around the temple fell flat, failing to create the kind of hysteria that Modi expected would secure him a third term in office.
In the recent national elections in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) lost its parliamentary majority for the first time, indicating widespread discontent with its governance. While the ANC remains the ruling party, its ongoing failure to address the nation’s economic woes, violent crime problem, and racial inequalities has made South Africa fertile ground for charismatic populist leaders, like Jacob Zuma and Julius Malema, who make grand promises to solve these issues.
The elections to the EP in Spain largely reflect the broader trends occurring at the European Union (EU) level but also have unique dynamics and consequences. Notably, the evolution of the radical-right space is crucial; it appears divided yet shows potential for growth. The expansion of the Eurosceptic radical-right should concern all pro-European parties. It seems logical for mainstream parties to consider whether incorporating radical-right ideas contributes to their normalization and electoral success.
The 2024 European Parliament elections have justified fears of the rise of the populist radical right (PRR) and a potential shift towards more right-wing policies over the next five years. While pro-European parties will still maintain a majority in the new parliament, the populist radical right has registered significant gains, however with varied performances across countries and regions.
The EP election results in Hungary indicate interesting dynamics. The governing Fidesz party achieved a somewhat pyrrhic victory. Although it won 44.82% of the votes, making it the winner, this result is the worst the party has ever achieved in its EP election history. The big winner of the EP election is Magyar’s Tisza party, which received 29.6% of the votes and may send seven representatives to the EP. Given that the party practically did not exist in the minds of voters a few months prior, becoming the largest opposition party was a significant success. A big question now is, in which faction of the EP will the Hungarian parties find their political home?
The 2024 election was the least free and fair election in India’s history. Just days after India’s nationalist-populist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) formed a government for the third time, Delhi’s BJP Lieutenant Governor, V.K. Saxena, proceeded to charge the writer Arundhati Roy, a fierce critic of Modi, under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) 2019 for a speech she gave in 2010. The already draconian law was amended in 2019 to allow the government more extraordinary powers to designate individuals and organizations as terrorists without a formal judicial process. BJP leaders accused Roy of being a traitor backed by the Congress party. This strongly indicates that some version of authoritarian populism, with its attacks on dissent, undermining of institutions, and social polarization, will likely continue to shape governance under the new government.
While the AfD has contributed to the widely expected shift towards the right in the new European Parliament by winning four additional seats, this is unlikely to make a significant political difference. However, the impact of this result in Germany is difficult to underestimate. Paradoxically, as the AfD has become more radical, it has also become an almost normal part of political life in Germany. Unlike in many other European countries, German mainstream parties still choose to ignore that the radical right “owns” the immigration issue. Any attempts by mainstream parties to publicly take a tough stance on immigration will likely further benefit the AfD.
Universities, akin to the judiciary, media, and civil society organizations, assume a vital role in the preservation of democratic principles. Inability to safeguard their independence from external influences like governmental interventions and corporate interests hampers universities’ capacity to uphold the rights of their constituents internally or advocate for public interests outside their precincts. Brazil is among the nations that have witnessed a notable decrease in academic freedom over the past decade. Instances of political turmoil or authoritarian rule, like Bolsonaro’s in Brazil, have resulted in constraints on academic pursuits and the imposition of censorship.
The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party, exemplified by J.D. Vance’s rise, raises serious concerns about the future of American democracy. This development reflects broader shifts within American conservatism, where cultural and moral issues have become central to political identity and strategy. The implications of this shift are profound, raising concerns about increased polarization and the potential for democratic backsliding. As the Republican Party continues to evolve in this direction, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric have never been higher.
Some observers believe Nicolás Maduro will follow in the footsteps of Nicaragua’s dictator, Daniel Ortega, by transforming his government into an isolated, repressive regime. Like Ortega, Maduro has already intensified his crackdown on the opposition through increased repression, including arrests, expulsions, and even stripping citizens of their nationality to consolidate control. As this authoritarian trend continues, more Venezuelans will likely flee in search of opportunities and freedoms abroad, exacerbating the already severe migration crisis in the region and beyond.
Portugal is facing heightened scrutiny after a young, inexperienced policeman fatally shot Odair Moniz, a Black man, under dubious circumstances. This incident has reignited longstanding debates about structural racism and revealed deep-seated cultural and social divides, exposing unresolved issues around race, security, and the state’s role. Reflecting James Davison Hunter’s concept of “culture wars,” these moral conflicts have deepened into societal divisions that erode shared values. Portugal’s colonial legacy further intensifies these tensions, perpetuating systemic racial exclusion and fostering fertile ground for populist narratives.
Voice of Youths (VoY)
In 2024, the ECPScontinued to prioritize the inclusion of young scholars’ perspectives through its Voice of Youths (VoY) platform — a key initiative designed to amplify youth engagement in critical debates on populism, democracy, and global governance. With the publication of nine original pieces, this series reflected ECPS’s firm commitment to fostering the next generation of researchers, analysts, and public intellectuals.
The VoY commentaries tackled a wide range of contemporary challenges — from identity politics, digital populism, and activism,to migration, youth participation, and the resilience of liberal democracy. Authored primarily by postgraduate students and emerging scholars from across Europe, these contributions demonstrated analytical sophistication and a strong awareness of the social and technological transformations shaping modern politics.
Among the highlights, Katharina Diebold published several insightful essays analyzing the interplay between populism, activism, and digital media, exploring how movements such as Fridays for Future and Black Lives Matter adopt populist rhetoric to articulate collective demands. Konstantina Kastoriadou examined techno-populism and the growing political influence of social media on the European youth electorate, while Greta Martinez exposed the tragic human costs of the EU migration crisis and the underreporting of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean.
Expanding the intellectual scope of the section, Christo Pretorius provided a historical perspective on participatory governance in ancient Greece, linking classical democratic ideals to contemporary debates about citizenship and rights. Amedeo Gasparini’s reflection on the Ventotene Manifesto revisited the philosophical roots of European federalism and its relevance amid the rise of populism today.
Through Voice of Youths, ECPS not only offers a scholarly platform but also nurtures critical thinking, independent analysis, and civic responsibility among young contributors. By integrating youth voices into its research ecosystem, ECPS reaffirms that democratic renewal depends on empowering younger generations to engage critically with populism, challenge disinformation, and envision more inclusive political futures.
The 2024 EU parliament election polls show the populist right and far right as the main winners. The fact that voters tend to choose populist parties could increase the populist agenda of the left to compete with the far right, as an attempt to transform xenophobic tendencies by the right into inclusionary populism, which describes the conservative elite as the other and creates further social conflicts. Therefore, we need to ask ourselves how populism (both left and right) impacts EU legislation and what forecasts we can identify for the elections in 2024.
Activist movements such as Black Lives Matter (BLM), MeToo, Fridays for Future (FFF), Extinction Rebellion (XR) and many more use populist frameworks and rhetoric elements that contest the elites and claim the general will of the people. We see BLM standing up against the racist system of white elites. We look at #MeToo fighting against the patriarchal system of male elites. And we watch FFF and XR challenging the neoliberal, capitalist system of big corporate elites. All of these activist movements are supposedly fighting for the general will of the people, similar to populism. But how much of activist rhetoric is coopted from populist ideology, movements, and parties? And how much did populism copy from activist movements in their approach? This is what this article will try answer.
Populism – a term frequently used in the media, politics, law, as well as in academia in social sciences and political science studies – aims to describe a particular concept, ideology, and strategy to explain mechanisms closely related to democracy and the far-right and far-left as well as extremism. Populism is often referred to as a comprehensive and flexible term. But where strictly does it come from, and how is it still relevant?
Although not perfect, as no government form ever is, Athenian democracy allowed citizens to have the greatest say in how they were governed, giving them necessary legal and economic protections to do so. One can see why modern scholars define Athens as having a ‘radical’ democracy, as actions such as changing the surnames of citizens to incorporate the name of their deme, having a highly complex jury selection system, and even paying individuals for public service, were all radical ideas when compared to the oligarchic systems of other city-states and kingdoms such as Macedonia.
The Ventotene Manifesto beautifully weaves together the aspirations for a united Europe with the principles of (federalist) liberalism. Its legacy should encourage European citizens to ponder the significance of European values and to defend them. How? By promoting a system both market-based and social; that rejects collectivism and embraces individualism; that prompts personal responsibility and denounces populism; that promotes transparent, efficient, and democratic governance; that acknowledges liberal democracy’s flaws but knows that the authoritarian pathway – fostered by populist forces – is ruinous. This is federalist liberalism.
Statistics on the EU migration crisis indicate that over 3,000 lives have been lost in the Mediterranean Sea, with 60% of the deaths linked to drowning. However, these figures are not precise, many ‘ghost boats’ disappear from radar with no record of the number of migrants on board. Indeed, the majority of migrant deaths worldwide go unrecorded.
The 2024 EU parliament election polls show the populist right and far-right as the main winners. The tendency of voters to choose populist parties could push the populist agenda of the left to compete with the far-right. This could be an attempt to transform xenophobic tendencies by the right into inclusionary populism, which describes the conservative elite as the other and creates further social conflicts. Therefore, we need to ask ourselves how populism (both left and right) impacts EU legislation now.
As proven by a 2021 European Parliament Youth survey, which supported that people rely primarily on the web, whether this is social media or online news outlets to be informed for political and societal developments. This ultimately explains why politicians gradually turn to social media – it broadens their electoral base as they attempt to connect to younger voters but has the negative consequence of popularizing populism.
The traditional British political style and rhetoric were utilized by both former Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage of UKIP as tools to communicate their approaches to managing the COVID-19 crisis. This demonstrates the resilience of established political traditions while highlighting the volatility and ambiguity of populist strategies. Notably, populist narratives varied significantly depending on whether the leader was in power or in opposition, which influenced their responsibility towards citizens and their ability to connect populist grievances with pre-existing political arguments in the context of the pandemic. In particular, Johnson’s actions reflect a ‘government knows best’ approach to the crisis, blending epistemic and political authority in determining the necessary measures to address the pandemic.
Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have been gaining votes in recent decades, votes that were once almost exclusively given to mainstream parties. At the same time, voter turnout has declined. Regardless of the analytical reasons, mainstream parties are losing ground and are not convincing as many people as they once did. While it’s easy to blame external factors like misinformation or divisive rhetoric, that’s not enough in a democratic system. Our system is straightforward: parties and politicians need to win votes. If people aren’t convinced, they will shift their support to other parties. Blaming factors beyond their control will only further harm liberal democratic mainstream parties.
Policy Papers
In 2024, theECPSadvanced its policy engagement by publishing four policy papers that addressed critical global and regional governance challenges through evidence-based analysis and actionable recommendations. These papers reflect ECPS’s mission to bridge academic research and policymaking while promoting democratic resilience amid rising populism and technological disruption.
In “EU Employment Law and the AI Act,”Christo Pretorius examined the social implications of artificial intelligence regulation, urging the EU to embed employment security within its human-centric digital policies. Massimo Ronco and Christo Pretorius, in “Revising the Trumpian Legacy in US Foreign Policy towards Latin America,” analyzed the long-term consequences of protectionist policies and proposed strategic alternatives to counter China’s growing influence in the region.
The collaborative paper “Anticipating the Trump Effect,” led by Beatrice Bottura and co-authored by a diverse team of emerging scholars, assessed how US political shifts could shape Europe’s migration governance under populist pressures. Finally, “Future Resilience of European Technology” by Anton Miguel De Vera and colleagues explored vulnerabilities in EU technological infrastructure, emphasizing the need for coordinated policies to bolster digital security and autonomy.
Together, these policy papers underscore ECPS’s vital role in informing public policy debates with rigorous, interdisciplinary research.
This policy paper analyzes the European Union’s (EU) AI Act, aimed at regulating Artificial Intelligence (AI) through four risk classifications related to data protection, privacy, security, and fundamental rights. While the Act establishes regulatory frameworks, it neglects employment security, a critical factor behind public mistrust of AI. The paper warns that failure to address this issue could deepen socio-economic inequalities and lead to political unrest. Recommendations include promoting collective negotiation between workers and employers, advocating for legislation on redundancies linked to AI, and launching information campaigns to educate workers, thus ensuring fair working conditions and improving trust in AI technology.
Authored by Massimo Ronco & Christo Pretorius; Edited by Angelica Lisa Rossi-Hawkins
This paper revisits the legacy of former US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), with a particular focus on economic policies and their long-term impact. It argues that Trump’s policies eroded US soft power in the region and failed to adequately address China’s expanding influence. Although the Joe Biden administration sought to reset US relations with LAC, it retained the bulk of Trump’s protectionist policies, perpetuating ongoing trade volatility and regional instability. This paper emphasizes the need for a revised US economic strategy in Latin America that both counters China’s influence and fosters deeper economic integration across the region. The authors propose three policy scenarios for the future: a more aggressive protectionist stance under a second Trump administration, a continuation of Biden-era policies under potential future Democratic leadership, or a more integrative approach that enhances regional cooperation and infrastructure development.
Authored by Beatrice Bottura, Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston, Pinelopi Gkampeta, Ludmila Malai, Matt Lynch, Joon Park & Leon Gräf; Edited by Beatrice Bottura & Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston
This policy paper analyzes the potential effects of the 2024 US presidential election on EU politics, particularly the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. A Trump victory may intensify Euroscepticism and lead to more restrictive migration policies among his European allies. Conversely, a Trump defeat could fuel distrust in electoral processes, potentially triggering events similar to the 2021 Capitol attack. The paper recommends regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) to develop tailored migration strategies, anticipating that either election outcome could increase fragmentation and populist influence within EU member states, though with varying degrees of impact.
By Anton Miguel De Vera, Viktoriia Hamaiunova, Réka Koleszár & Giada Pasquettaz
This paper explores vulnerabilities in the European Union’s technological security, focusing on Huawei as a case study to illuminate broader security challenges. Amid intensifying US-China tensions, especially under former US President Donald Trump, the EU encountered new risks linked to the strategic positioning of Chinese tech firms within critical European infrastructure. Trump’s “America First” policy targeted China with tariffs and trade restrictions to address perceived unfair practices, triggering disruptions in global supply chains that reverberated through the EU economy. For Europe, heavily reliant on secure, stable trade flows, these events highlighted the urgency of reassessing technological dependencies and reinforcing digital security. The paper presents a series of strategic recommendations for the EU to mitigate such vulnerabilities, emphasizing the need for diversified supply chains, rigorous security standards for tech partnerships, and collaborative policies among EU members to strengthen resilience in the face of geopolitical shifts and technological competition.
Reports
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In 2024, the ECPS significantly expanded its research output, publishing 42 reports that included event summaries, annual analytical reports, and thematic sub-reports. Together, these publications form one of the most comprehensive yearly collections ECPS has produced, reflecting the organization’s commitment to documenting and interpreting the rapidly evolving global landscape of populism, authoritarianism, and democratic transformation.
A cornerstone of this year’s output was the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) panel series, which brought together scholars from across the globe to examine populist dynamics in regions as diverse as Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia. Each report distilled key insights from these expert discussions, offering accessible yet rigorous analyses of how populist actors, narratives, and strategies shape political behavior, governance, and social conflict.
The 2024 collection also included regional panels, thematic studies, and the ECPS Summer School report, collectively exploring intersections between populism and foreign policy, religion, gender, nationalism, state-society relations, digital authoritarianism, and global governance. This year’s flagship publication—The 2024 European Parliament Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism—provided a country-by-country examination of the electoral performance and policy influence of Europe’s populist parties, produced in collaboration with leading experts from all EU member states.
Together, the ECPS reports published in 2024 serve as an authoritative record of contemporary populist trends and their implications for democracy worldwide. They not only map where populism is gaining ground but also illuminate the social, economic, geopolitical, and cultural forces driving its evolution. Through these publications, ECPS continues to advance informed debate, support evidence-based policymaking, and foster a global research community committed to understanding and addressing the challenges posed by populism in the 21st century.
This report is based on the third installment of the Mapping Global Populism monthly panel series, held online from Brussels on May 25, 2023, under the theme “Religious Populism and Radicalization in Indonesia.” Co-organized by ECPS and the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI), the event brought together leading scholars from Australia and Indonesia to examine how religious narratives shape populist mobilization and radicalization processes in contemporary Indonesia. The report presents concise summaries of the panel’s presentations, highlighting key insights into the political, social, and ideological dynamics driving religious populism across the country. Moderated by Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz, Research Professor and Chair of Islamic Studies and Intercultural Dialogue at ADI, the panel featured Dr. Inaya Rakhmani (Universitas Indonesia), Dr. Pradana Boy Zulian (Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang), Dr. Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi (BRIN), and Dr. I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana (Universitas Airlangga). Together, their contributions offer a timely, interdisciplinary understanding of Indonesia’s evolving religious and political landscape.
This report provides a brief overview of the eighth event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping European Populism (MEP) panel series, titled “Populism, Gender and Sexuality in Europe” held online on January 26, 2023. Moderated by Dr.Agnieszka Graff, Professor at the American Studies Center, University of Warsaw, and a feminist activist, the panel featured speakers Dr. Elżbieta Korolczuk, Associate Professor in Sociology at Södertörn University, Sweden, Dr. Eric Louis Russell, Professor in the Department of French & Italian and affiliated with the Program in Gender, Sexuality and Women’s Studies at the University of California, Davis, Nik Linders, PhD candidate at Radboud Social and Cultural Research for Gender & Diversity Studies, Dr. Pauline Cullen, Associate Professor in sociology at Center for European and Eurasian Studies, Maynooth University, Ireland.
Report by Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi & Neo Sithole
This report gives a summary of the 9th session of the ECPS’s monthly Mapping Global Populism panel series titled “Civilizational Populism and Religious Authoritarianism in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives,” which took place online on January 25, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Syaza Shukri, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia, the panel featured speakers by Mr. Bobby Hajjaj, Department of Management, North South University, Bangladesh, Dr. Maidul Islam, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, Dr. Rajni Gamage, Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore, and Dr. Mosmi Bhim, Assistant Professor at Fiji National University.
This report provides an overview of the sixth event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping Global Populism panel series, titled “Varieties of Populism and Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore” held online on October 26, 2023. Moderated by Dr. Garry Rodan, Honorary Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland) the panel featured speakers Dr. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Professor of Political Science, University Sains Malaysia, Dr. Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia, Dr. Kenneth Paul Tan, Professor of Politics, Film, and Cultural Studies, School of Communication, Hong Kong Baptist University and Dr. Shanon Shah, Visiting Research Fellow at the Department of Theology and Religious Studies, King’s College London.
The 15th session of the Mapping Global Populism panel series, organized by the ECPS, took place online on September 26, 2024, under the moderation of Dr. Simon P. Watmough(University of Leipzig; ECPS). The session explored the intersections of theocracy, radicalism, and populism in Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, offering a comparative lens on authoritarian and extremist dynamics in these regions. Dr. Hélène Thibault (Nazarbayev University) examined Tajikistan’s anti-extremism policies as tools of authoritarian control. Dr. Zakia Adeli (former Deputy Minister of Justice of Afghanistan) analyzed the Taliban’s governance structure and its implications for state legitimacy. Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani (Lovely Professional University) discussed gender oppression under Taliban rule, while Amir Hossein Mahdavi (University of Connecticut) reflected on Iran’s political trajectory and the emergence of populist actors.
Report by Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi & Neo Sithole
This report gives a summary of the 9th session of the ECPS’s monthly Mapping Global Populism panel series titled “Civilizational Populism and Religious Authoritarianism in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives,” which took place online on January 25, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Syaza Shukri, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia, the panel featured speakers by Mr. Bobby Hajjaj, Department of Management, North South University, Bangladesh, Dr. Maidul Islam, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, Dr. Rajni Gamage, Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore, and Dr. Mosmi Bhim, Assistant Professor at Fiji National University.
This report provides a brief overview of the tenth event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping European Populism (MEP) panel series, titled “Various Facets of Populist, Authoritarian and Nationalist Trends in Japan and Taiwan” held online on February 29, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Dachi Liao, Emeritus Professor at the Institute of Political Science at National Sun Yat-sen University in Taiwan, the panel featured speakers Dr. Toru Yoshida, Full Professor of Comparative Politics at Doshisha University in Japan, Dr. Airo Hino, Professor, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Dr. Szu-Yun Hsu, Assistant Professor, Political Science, McMaster University, Dr. Jiun-Chi Lin, Postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Marketing Communication, National Sun Yat-sen University.
This report provides an overview of the first event in ECPS’s Regional Panel series titled “Old and New Facets of Populism in Latin America” and held online on March 7, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Maria Puerta Riera, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Valencia College, the panel featured speakers Dr. Ronaldo Munck , Professor of Sociology, Dublin City University, Dr. Julio F. Carrión, Professor of Comparative Politics, Delaware University, Dr. Adriana Boersner-Herrera, Assistant Professor of Political Science at The Citadel, The Military College of Charleston, Dr. Reinhard Heinisch and Dr. Andrés Laguna Tapia, respectively Professor of Comparative Austrian Politics at the University of Salzburg and director of the Center for Research in Communication and Humanities and head of Communication Studies at UPB in Cochabamba, and Dr. Victor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho, Professor of History at Universidade Federal do Maranhão.
Report by Philip Christo Pretorius and Radoslav Valev
This report encapsulates the highlights of the eleventh event hosted by the ECPS as part of its monthly Mapping European Populism (MGP) panel series on March 30, 2024. Dr. John Nilsson-Wright expertly moderated the panel, which boasted insights from five distinguished scholars in the field of populism. The panelists featured in the event included experts such as Dr. Joseph Yi, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Hanyang University, Seoul, renowned for his work on “Discourse Regimes and Liberal Vehemence.” Dr. Meredith Rose Shaw, an Associate Professor at the Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, provided valuable insights into the regional context through her research on “Foreign Threat Perceptions in South Korean Campaign Discourse: Japan, North Korea, and China.” Dr. Sang-Jin Han, an Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Seoul National University, shared his expertise on sociopolitical trends in South Korea, focusing on the “Transformation of Populist Emotion in Korean Politics from 2016 to 2024.” Dr. Junhyoung Lee, a Research Professor in the School of International Relations at the University of Ulsan, South Korea, contributed with his research on “Nationalism and Resilience of Authoritarian Rule in North Korea.” Lastly, Dr. Mina Sumaadii, a Senior Researcher at the Sant Maral Foundation, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, offered a unique perspective on “Populist Nationalism as a Challenge to Democratic Stability in Mongolia.”
Report by Neo Sithole, Christo Pretorius, Radoslav Valev, Andrea Guidotti & Hilal Duman
The ECPS convened its Third Annual International Symposium, titled “The Future of Multilateralism Between Multipolarity and Populists in Power,” held online on March 19–20, 2024. The event brought together distinguished scholars, policymakers, and experts to explore how populist governments are reshaping the global order and whether their policies are driving a new era of illiberal multilateralism characterized by economic protectionism, political isolation, and declining institutional trust. Panelists examined how the rise of multipolarity, coupled with populist rule, has weakened traditional institutions such as the UN, WTO, and IMF, while empowering alternative blocs like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Discussions underscored the challenges of sustaining global cooperation amid increasing nationalism and populist rhetoric that frames globalization as a threat to sovereignty. Speakers also analyzed how populist regimes maintain domestic support despite economic crises—by deflecting blame onto external actors and invoking notions of independence and “the will of the people.” The symposium concluded that understanding these dynamics is essential for devising inclusive, rule-based strategies that strengthen global governance and promote a new generation of equitable globalization resilient to populist disruption.
The twelfth session of the ECPS Mapping Global Populism series was held online on April 25, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Rune Steenberg (Palacký University Olomouc), the panel brought together leading scholars to examine China’s evolving political order under Xi Jinping. Dr. Steenberg opened by tracing the rise of populist narratives in China, highlighting their fusion with nationalism, surveillance, and authoritarian governance. Dr. Kun He (University of Groningen) analyzed populism’s distinct linguistic and cultural dimensions, while Dr. Martin Lavička (Lund University) explored the tightening regulation of religion under Xi’s rule. Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk (University of Duisburg-Essen) unpacked the Belt and Road Initiative’s populist and coercive geopolitical logic, and Dr. Yung-Yung Chang (National Dong Hwa University) discussed China’s digital authoritarianism and its global implications. The session underscored China’s unique fusion of populism and authoritarianism, offering vital insights into its domestic and international impact.
Report by Neo Sithole, Gabriel Cyril Nguijol & Martina Micozzi
The ECPS hosted its second regional panel in 2024, “Crisis of Democratic Political Legitimacy and Emerging Populism in Africa,” online on May 9, 2024. Expertly moderated by Dr. Chipo Dendere, Assistant Professor of Africana Studies at Wellesley College, the session brought together leading scholars to analyze the rise, evolution, and implications of populism across the African continent. Dr. Henning Melber (Nordic Africa Institute; University of Pretoria; University of the Free State) opened the discussion by tracing populism’s historical roots in Africa and its role in post-colonial political narratives. Dr. Sergiu Mișcoiu (Babeș-Bolyai University) examined the potential for progressive populism within African politics. Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo (University of Yaoundé II) highlighted populism’s destabilizing effects on governance and institutions. Continuing this theme, Dr. Nchofua Anita Nyitioseh (University of Bertoua) analyzed how policy failures and unemployment enable populist mobilization, while Dr. Derick Fai Kinang (Cameroon National Council of Crime Experts) discussed how populist rhetoric exacerbates hate speech and social polarization. Finally, Dr. Ama-Ambo Chefor (University of Dschang) explored how populist movements entrench patriarchal structures, undermining gender equality.
The thirteenth session of the ECPS Mapping Global Populism (MGP) series was held online on May 30, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Maxine David, Lecturer in European Studies at Leiden University, the panel brought together distinguished experts to examine Russia’s evolving populist authoritarianism. Dr. Luke March (University of Edinburgh) argued that although populist elements exist in Russia, Vladimir Putin’s rule is primarily defined by statism, imperialism, and nationalism, prioritizing control over mass mobilization. Dr. Alexandra Yatsyk (University of Lille; Sciences Po) explored how Putinism’s populist rhetoric is amplified by regime-aligned networks and intellectuals. Dr. Yulia Gradskova (Södertörn University) analyzed the regime’s use of “traditional values” to justify anti-LGBTQ+ and patriarchal policies reinforcing militarism and nationalism. Dr. Dóra Győrffy (Corvinus University of Budapest) concluded with an assessment of Russia’s post-war economy and the long-term effects of Western sanctions. The panel provided rich, interdisciplinary insights into Russia’s fusion of populism and authoritarianism and its enduring impact on global political stability.
The fourteenth session of the ECPS Mapping Global Populism (MGP) series was held online on June 20, 2024. Moderated by Dr. David Lewis, Professor of Politics at the University of Exeter, the panel gathered experts to examine the persistence and evolution of autocratic rule across Central Asia. Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova (Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient) analyzed Sadyr Japarov’s consolidation of power in Kyrgyzstan through populist rhetoric and cultural adaptation. Dr. Dinissa Duvanova (Lehigh University) discussed Kazakhstan’s managed populism under President Tokayev, highlighting its function in stabilizing elite power. Oguljamal Yazliyeva (Charles University) explored Turkmenistan’s deeply entrenched personality cults rooted in Soviet and tribal legacies. The panel offered a nuanced understanding of authoritarianism’s hybrid nature in Central Asia, emphasizing informal power networks, populist narratives, and enduring post-Soviet legacies.
The 16th session of the European Center for Populism Studies’ Mapping Global Populism panel series was held online on October 31, 2024, addressing “The Challenging Dynamics of Democracy, Authoritarianism & Populism in the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan & Georgia).” Moderated by Dr. Cengiz Aktar (University of Athens), the panel brought together leading scholars to analyze current political trends across the region. Thomas de Waal (Carnegie Europe) outlined the deepening autocracy in Azerbaijan and its regional ramifications. Dr. David Aprasidze (Ilia State University) traced the development of populism in Georgia, while Dr. David Matsaberidze (Tbilisi State University) examined the shifting populist discourses in post-Soviet Georgia. Dr. Jody LaPorte (University of Oxford) provided insight into Azerbaijan’s hegemonic authoritarianism. Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan (Yerevan State University) discussed post-war Armenia’s democratization and European integration under populist pressures, and Dr. Nerses Kopalyan (University of Nevada, Las Vegas) assessed Armenia’s democratic landscape. The panel underscored persistent democratic fragility across the Caucasus amid rising populism and geopolitical tensions.
The ECPS held the 17th session of its Mapping Global Populism Panel Series on November 28, 2024, titled “The Rise and Reign of Autocratic Populism and Islamist Nationalism in Turkey.” The session examined how Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s leadership has reshaped Turkey’s political and social landscape through intertwined strategies of populism, authoritarianism, and Islamist nationalism. Moderated by Dr. Jocelyne Cesari, a leading scholar on religion and politics, the panel featured Dr. Spyros Sofos, who traced the historical evolution of Turkish populism; Dr. Emre Erdogan, who analyzed contemporary political participation and populist dynamics; Hafza Girdap, who highlighted the gendered impacts of political Islam; Ergun Babahan, who provided insights into media repression and narrative control; and Dr. Aleksandra Spancerska, who examined Turkey’s use of sharp power in international relations. Together, the speakers offered a multidisciplinary assessment of Turkey’s autocratic populist turn, contributing to the series’ broader effort to map global patterns of democratic erosion.
Turkey, Russia, India, and China (TRIC) are reshaping the power dynamics in Africa, challenging Western dominance and promoting alternative development models. These nations leverage their untarnished histories with Africa and emphasize shared anti-colonial struggles to position themselves as allies of the Global South. However, their competition is far from altruistic. Beneath promises of “no-strings-attached” aid lies a strategic pursuit of resources, trade, and influence. While they share a common goal of diminishing Western power, TRIC nations also compete fiercely with each other, making Africa a critical battleground in the quest for a multipolar world order.
The ECPS held its fourth virtual Summer School from July 1–5, 2024, under the theme “Populism and Foreign Policy.” The five-day interdisciplinary program brought together emerging scholars and experts to explore how populism influences international relations, diplomacy, and global governance. The school featured lectures from leading academics, including Professor Sandra Destradi, Associate Professor Angelos Chryssogelos, Associate Professor Jessica Greenberg, Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski, Dr. Georg Löfflmann, Professor Cengiz Aktar, Professor Emeritus Louis Kriesberg, Professor Bertjan Verbeek, ECPS President Irina von Wiese, Professor Craig Calhoun, and Professor Joanna Dyduch. Each session was expertly moderated by Dr. Rubrick Biegon, Dr. Gustav Meibauer, Dr. Jonny Hall, Professor Ana E. Juncos Garcia, Professor Franco Zappettini, Professor Allison Carnegie, Dr. Ajay Gudavarthy, Dr. Aleksandra Spancerska, Professor Alexandra Homolar, and Dr. Andrei Zaslove. Participants analyzed theoretical and empirical dimensions of populism in foreign policy through case studies including the US, India, Turkey, Hungary, Israel, and the UK, deepening their understanding of how populist leaders reshape global norms and multilateral cooperation.
The ECPS released a comprehensive report analyzing the performance and influence of populist parties in the 2024 European Parliament elections, which confirmed the electoral consolidation of populism across Europe. Populist parties won 263 of the 720 seats (36%), coming first in six countries. The report, based on contributions from local experts across all 27 EU member states, highlights the continued rise and mainstreaming of populist movements on both the far-right and far-left. While right-wing populists achieved their strongest results to date—dominating in countries like Italy, Hungary, and Poland—left-wing and centrist populists made fewer gains. ECPS notes that populist influence in the European Parliament is expected to reshape debates on migration, climate policy, and EU enlargement, marking a discernible shift of the Parliament’s center of gravity to the right. Despite their growing numbers, populist parties remain ideologically fragmented across multiple parliamentary groups.
This report analyzes the performances and impact of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing from the analyses of country experts, we provide an account of how populist parties across the spectrum performed in each of the EU’s 27 member states, looking at the campaign, issues and demand for populist politics in each country separately and the challenges that populist party success more broadly bears for the future of the EU. In this introductory chapter, we briefly define populism, provide a topographic map of populist parties across all EU member states ahead of the 2024 European elections, and review the main drivers of populism identified in the literature. We then turn more specifically to the general context and outcome of the 2024 EP election, assessing the hypothesis of another ‘populist wave’ while also looking back at the 2019 election to compare populist party success over time.
The only competitive populist party running in the 2024 EU elections in Austria, the radical-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) relied on well-proven recipes that have made it one of the most successful populist parties in (Western) Europe for the last 30 years. It called for cutting down the EU’s competences to half the size of its institutions and budget and harshly criticized its policies concerning migration, the war in Ukraine, the climate crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. This criticism was combined with a highly alarmist rhetoric that portrayed political opponents as either corrupt, fanatical or insane. While all this met with uniform criticism by other Austrian parties and large parts of the media, this again allowed the party to present itself as the sole party actually fighting for the Austrian interest against a broken system controlled by a single establishment ‘unity party’ (Einheitspartei). Once more, this strategy paid off and the FPÖ landed in the first place for the first time in a nationwide election.
In 2024 elections in Belgium were concurrently held for the European, federal and regional levels. For that reason, the European elections were clearly second-order elections. As the main opposition parties at the federal level, populist radical parties of the right (Vlaams Belang, VB) and the left (the Workers’ Party of Belgium, PTB–PVDA) approached the 2024 elections in a strong position. They were portrayed as clear favourites in the polls and the media. From 2019 to 2024 they managed to set the agenda on their issues: migration and law and order for the VB, socioeconomic issues and civil liberties and rights for the PTB–PVDA. Both parties came out of the elections with more votes and seats. Part of the reason for this success is that their program matched with voters’ priorities. Their populist, anti-elite rhetoric also permeated public opinion. Yet they were perceived as having underperformed electorally. Moreover, because they were not politically indispensable, they were quickly sidelined. At the European level, the VB and the PTB–PVDA will likely continue directly pushing their respective populist, Eurosceptic and radical agendas. They are also likely to have a real indirect contamination effect through mainstream parties and public opinion integrating part of their programmatic positions and priorities.
The 2024 European Parliament election in Bulgaria took place amidst a prolonged political crisis and economic uncertainty. The EP elections, for the first time, coincided with national legislative elections – the sixth parliamentary elections in just three years. This two-in-one vote led to a complete overshadowing of the debate on Europe by domestic issues and concerns over the composition of the next national parliament and the likelihood of forming a stable government. The centre-populist GERB convincingly won the elections, although the populist radical right increased its representation by one MEP. Like many European countries, Bulgaria has had to contend with the rise of populism and nationalism, in addition to its continued struggle against corruption and, as a result of the war in Ukraine, with a population divided in attitudes towards Russia. This polycrisis has led to continued political fragmentation and polarization with little prospect of stable government and a growing disillusionment among voters.
This report focuses on Croatia and deals with the national conservative Domovinski Pokret/Homeland Movement (DP) party. In the latest European elections, the DP garnered a percentage of 8.82% (65,383 votes and one seat), taking third spot after the ruling (centre-right) Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the ‘Rivers of Justice’ coalition spearheaded by the (centre-left) Social Democrat Party (SDP). I begin the present chapter by sketching a typology of the constituent segments along the broad spectrum of the European right wing and situate the DP within it. I then offer a summary of the DP’s founding principles vis-à-vis further European integration and clarify the extent to which these principles were reflected in the party’s stances and active engagement in the latest European elections. I then identify the main catalysts behind the DP leadership’s success in mobilizing target groups and galvanizing electoral support for the party.
The objective of this report is to discuss the causes of rising discontent in Cyprus and assess the political outcomes. Within this framework we briefly assess how the EU has dealt with various crises in the last few years. Perceptions in Cyprus about the EU have changed over time. In the 9 June European elections, a member of the extreme right-wing party, National People’s Front (Ethniko Laiko Metopo, ELAM), was elected for the first time to the European Parliament. Understanding the circumstances in Cyprus that have gradually led to disillusionment with the national political system and the EU is essential to making sense of these developments.
The 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections brought significant changes to Hungary’s political landscape. While Fidesz, the ruling populist party led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, retained first place, it lost two EP seats amid the rise of a new opposition force reshaping Hungary’s political balance. Orbán’s campaign, heavily funded and amplified by pro-government media, revived familiar themes from the 2022 national elections, centering on the war in Ukraine. His slogan — “no migration, no gender, no war” — resonated with Fidesz supporters, though the anti-war message ultimately dominated. Employing fear-based, Manichean rhetoric, Orbán portrayed all opponents, domestic and foreign, as part of a “pro-war” coalition allegedly serving Brussels and Washington. Meanwhile, the radical right-wing Our Homeland (OH) emphasized anti-EU, nationalist narratives, securing one MEP. Although both Fidesz and OH joined newly branded Eurosceptic right-wing groups, their political isolation in the EP persists.
The report analyses the performance of populist political parties in the 2024 EP election in the Czech Republic. The election ended with a significant increase in support for several populist parties: Action of Dissatisfied Citizens, Freedom and Direct Democracy and the Oath and Motorists. All populist parties used radical-right rhetoric before the election, expressing different levels of criticism of the European Union, strong anti-immigration attitudes and negative attitudes toward the Green Deal. The preliminary data show that the electoral support for the populists was based on a higher level of mobilization in so-called peripheral areas of the Czech Republic, potentially affected by recent inflation and austerity policies pursued by the government. All in all, the 2024 EP election in Czechia significantly increased support for populist political parties.
The populist moment that defined Danish politics from 2001 to 2019 has recently transitioned into what can be described as mainstream populism. Two concurrent developments drive this shift: first, the Social Democrats’ strategy to reclaim (white) working-class support by adopting populist right-wing stances on immigration and integration, and second, the existential crisis confronting the Liberals (Venstre, V) and the Conservative party (Det Konservative Folkeparti, KF), whose electoral support reached historic lows. The 2024 European Parliament elections differed significantly from those of 2019, marked by the emergence of new political entities and pressing global issues such as the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Hamas conflicts, along with the existential threat of climate change and the lingering effects of the post-pandemic time. Traditional populists are exploiting these issues to regain support, advocating for greater national sovereignty and cohesion in the face of perceived global threats. This paper examines the evolving dynamics of Danish politics, focusing on how the intersection of domestic and international changes is reshaping EU-related positions and the role of populism.
Although past European Parliament (EP) elections in Estonia have witnessed the success of an anti-establishment candidate, Estonian EP elections are not generally fertile soil for populism. Estonian EP elections tend to be dominated by the liberal and progressive parties and candidates with notable foreign policy track records. The 2024 EP elections generally confirmed this pattern but also witnessed the conservative parties running on a second-order election agenda critical of the government and parties both on the right and left-wing edges of the spectrum tapping into the small but nonetheless committed pool of Eurosceptic voters. Moreover, most parties made use of the stylistic repertoires of populism, attempting to perform various crises. While the election results changed little in the overall composition of the Estonian MEP delegation, the events unravelling immediately after the election suggest that the Estonian populist radical right will become more diverse but also more isolated from its sibling parties on the European level.
In the 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections, the populist radical-right Finns Party had a disappointing result; it came sixth nationally and lost 6.2% of the vote and one seat compared to the 2019 elections. The centre-right National Coalition (NC) party won the elections with 24.8% of the vote and four seats, but the real winner was the Left Alliance, which came second (17.3%) and gained three seats. The elections revealed voters’ deep distrust towards the government, in which the Finns Party supported significant austerity measures and cuts to public spending through its leader and finance minister, Riikka Purra. People’s fear of the rising far right in Europe was also a salient theme in campaign debates, which diminished the Finns Party’s support, alongside a low voter turnout.
The 2024 French European election took place against the backdrop of an economic and cost-of-living crisis in a context marked by global uncertainty arising from the war in Ukraine, social unrest and deep political discontent with President Emmanuel Macron. Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN) emerged as the big winner with 31.4% of the vote, while Macron’s Renaissance list trailed far behind at 14.6%. Meanwhile, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s left-wing populist La France Insoumise (LFI) won 9.9%, reflecting current internal dissent within the party and deep ideological divisions exposed by the Israel–Hamas war. National issues dominated the electoral agenda in June. Populist voting across both sides of the political spectrum was strongly fuelled by political discontent with Macron, making the 2024 European elections primarily a ‘second-order’ national election. A crucial test for Emmanuel Macron, the outcome of the European election led to the decision by the incumbent president to call a snap legislative election. The election confirmed the electoral strength of the RN; however, it showed the revitalization of the Republican Front against the far right, which blocked Le Pen’s party from winning an absolute majority, delivering instead a hung parliament split into three blocks.
The 2024 European parliamentary election in Germany marked a significant shift in the political landscape, with devastating results for the governing coalition of the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens, and the Liberal Democrats (FDP). Chancellor Scholz’s SPD and the Greens experienced substantial losses, while the opposition Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) saw a modest increase in their vote share. The most notable gains were made by the populist radical-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the newly formed left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a breakaway from the Left (Die Linke), highlighting a growing demand for populist politics in Germany. The Left itself suffered heavy losses. Despite internal scandals and controversies that contributed to a considerable drop in support in pre-election polls, the AfD leveraged anti-immigration sentiments and economic concerns to gain substantial support. Like in previous elections, populist parties were much more successful in the post-communist eastern states. While its impact on the European level is limited, the election sent shock waves through Germany, suggesting a shift in future policy directions, particularly concerning the green transformation and relations with Russia.
The 2024 European Parliament (EP) election in Greece was held against a background of geopolitical instability in Europe’s neighbourhood. However, domestic – rather than European – issues dominated the campaigns, including the economy, inflation and the cost-of-living crisis. The electoral results were primarily an anti-government protest vote and confirmed a trend of electoral fragmentation across the political spectrum. On the right, three relatively new far-right populist parties received parliamentary representation, i.e., the Greek Solution, Victory and the Voice of Reason. On the left, SYRIZA–PA maintained its second place, although its support declined substantively compared to the previous EP election. Course of Freedom and the KKE, on the other hand, were key electoral beneficiaries in the left-wing space. Younger age groups primarily opted for SYRIZA–PA, whereas older groups were more likely to support New Democracy. That said, far-right parties also received votes from younger generations. Geographically, the far right is more successful in the north of Greece. The key message of this election was political discontent and a general feeling of economic malaise posing dilemmas across the political spectrum.
The 2024 European Parliament elections in Ireland came on the back of a rise in the prominence of immigration as an issue. Although Ireland had seen significant migration in the early to mid-2000s, the large number of migrants at this time had no significant impact on politics or voting. Nor was Ireland a country that saw any significant anti-EU sentiment. Thus, Ireland could be seen as an anomaly in Europe. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a sudden rise in the numbers in Ireland seeking international protection (asylum seekers). Most of these came as a direct result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and again, Ireland saw a positive reaction to inward migration even though the country accommodated a comparatively high number of Ukrainian refugees per head of population despite the country’s geographic distance. There had previously been ethnonationalist parties on the ballot paper in European and national elections, but they had never really featured. In 2024 none got elected, although some did in the concurrent local elections. The vote for some explicitly populist ethnonationalist parties was greater than ever before. This result occurred partly because Sinn Féin, another populist–nationalist (but not wholly ethnonationalist) party, saw its support drop dramatically. It suggests, however, that Ireland may not remain the anomaly it has been. In all about a third of the voting electorate chose parties or candidates that can be categorized as populist.
Italy has historically been one of the strongest proponents of a united Europe. However, recent years have seen a rise in Euroscepticism within the country, with a notable increase in the electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. Have the 2024 elections confirmed or refuted this trend? Italy features a variety of populist parties, both on the right and on the left, each with different Eurogroup affiliations and varying positions on European integration. As a result, during the 2024 campaign, the parties adopted different strategies. The results of the 2024 elections highlight two significant trends: a decrease in turnout and the strengthened influence of Fratelli d’Italia, reflecting a sustained support for right-wing populist ideologies among Italian voters.
Populism has been a feature of Latvia’s political landscape since the 1990s. New insurgent parties have utilized increasingly anti-establishment rhetoric, often through intensive and innovative use of social media, to win seats in the Latvian parliament and even join government coalitions. However, European Parliament elections in Latvia have been comparatively free of populism. There are two main reasons for this. First, and most importantly, there is a broad pro-European consensus in Latvia. Membership in the European Union and NATO is central to all three Baltic nations’ security strategy in light of growing threats from Russia. As a result, there is no serious Eurosceptic party in Latvia and no explicitly Eurosceptic politicians have ever been elected to the European Parliament from Latvia. Second, Latvia’s voters tend to support serious, experienced politicians in European elections, believing that they are better placed to support Latvia’s national interests in the European system. Party politics take second place in campaigning, with the focus being on the experience of candidates (after all, Latvia elected just nine MEPs in 2024) rather than policy differences. As a result, populist anti-elite rhetoric has less salience. This chapter will explore the extent to which the 2024 European Parliament election in Latvia has continued these trends.
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia has disrupted the previously perceived stability in Central and Eastern Europe (CCE) and exacerbated the prevailing sense of insecurity. The evolving circumstances are reshaping the political terrain and presenting avenues to mobilize support for the populist far right. However, to date, the far-right populist parties in Lithuania have not been successful in either national or European Parliament (EP) elections, as they have failed to surpass the required thresholds. However, the most recent European Parliament elections were an exception, with the election of a long-standing far-right politician in Lithuania as an MEP. This study delves into an analysis of the discourse employed by Lithuanian far-right populists throughout the 2024 EP election campaign, with a specific focus on the narratives pertaining to (in)security that they propagated. The investigation seeks to ascertain whether the far right capitalized on the situation to fuel discussions on crisis with the aim of attracting support and identifying the strategies utilized in constructing the narratives surrounding (in)security.
Right-wing populism in Luxembourg is largely confined to the Alternative Democratic Reform Party (Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei, ADR). The name is, however, a bit of a misnomer. While ideologically, the ADR maintains national–conservative positions consistent with other European right-wing populist parties, its views are not as extreme. The party retains relatively constant support, consistently gaining around 10% of the vote in national elections; in the 2023 election for the Chamber of Deputies, it gained 9.3%, while in the 2019 European Parliament election, the party gained 10%, just short of enough to obtain a seat. Given the rise in support for right-wing populist parties in other European countries (e.g., the AfD in Germany or the National Rally in France), the ADR was optimistic about its chances of gaining its first-ever seat in the European Parliament, which would require about 12% of the vote total. This contribution will investigate the results of the European Parliament election in Luxembourg, focusing on the ADR. It will discuss any ideological shifts in the party as well as its positioning on a host of issues where one finds a prominent voice for right-wing populist parties in Europe, including NATO, the war in Ukraine, migration, COVID-19 or the functioning of the European Union. The entry will also address the results of the election to determine how strong support for right-wing populism in Luxembourg is. Other relevant aspects of the election (e.g., campaign events, media coverage) will be discussed if they featured prominently in the campaign.
The European Parliament elections of 9 June 2024 were the next stage in the electoral marathon started by parliamentary elections in 2023 and local elections earlier in 2024 and ended with a good result for the populist Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and the radical-right Confederation of Freedom and Independence (Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość), confirming the relevance of right-wing populist parties in Poland. The combined electoral outcome of both PiS (36.16%) and Confederation (12.08%) is only slightly below 50%. The hopes of all those who treated the 2023 parliamentary elections in Poland as a victory over populism, paving the way for more victories, were thus dashed. The report aims to highlight the political and social context that led to these results and offer arguments supporting the classification of PiS and Confederation as populist communicators. The subsequent sections analyse the political communication strategies employed by both parties, emphasizing the intricacies of their discursive articulations concerning national and European themes. Lastly, the report explores the correlation between the political agendas of PiS and Confederation and the thematic preferences of their electorate, offering a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at play.
Unlike previous European elections, the 2024 European election brought the discussion of European issues to the media and political agendas in Portugal, a country where most voters hold a positive image of the EU. Despite managing to elect its first two MEPs, the European election was not fertile terrain for Chega, as it stopped Chega’s continuous electoral growth since 2019 and its objectives were not fully achieved. Poor candidate selection, overambitious goals, a disconnect between Chega’s soft Euroscepticism and its supporters’ mostly enthusiastic view of the EU, ambiguity about which European party group it would join, and intermittent support from its popular leader, André Ventura, were relevant factors influencing Chega’s campaign and ensuing results. A relatively low turnout and overrepresentation of constituencies that are unlikely to vote for the populist radical right compounded the scenario.
This report examines the landscape of the far right in Romania within the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Two Romanian far-right parties secured seats in the European Parliament: the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) and SOS Romania (SOS), receiving 14.9% and 5% of the valid votes, respectively. Both parties emphasize the defence of Romanian sovereignty and promote nativist and authoritarian rhetoric. However, over the past year, the AUR has increasingly incorporated neoconservative elements into its platform. Consequently, the 2024 campaign has revealed notable differences in programs, candidates, styles of political campaigning and alliance strategies.
This report offers a systematic analysis of Slovenian political parties in online campaigning during the 2024 EP elections. It draws on a dataset of political parties and their online representations, selected from official party websites and dominant social media platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram and TikTok, in May 2024. The results show that Slovenian parties’ communication during the 2024 EP campaign was quite self-referential, accompanied by images of the candidates, indicating a high degree of personalization of politics. Moreover, the results show the “non-European orientation” of the campaign, as domestic issues dominated the parties’ social media profiles and websites. Furthermore, the content analysis of the parties’ websites revealed five issues where some cross-party differences in attitudes were observed: 1) agreement in party attitudes towards the environment; 2) on Ukraine and Palestine, parties on the right took different positions; 3) the centre-left coalition supported the government’s domestic policy the most; 4) right-wing actors tended to frame migration and minority rights in a restrictive way; actors with a left-wing orientation took a more humanitarian approach; and 5) left-wing actors were most tolerant vis-à-vis gender and reproductive rights. The results, therefore, imply a clear distinction between Slovenian parties of the left and right during the 2024 EP campaign.
This report deals with the association between radicalism, populism and Euroscepticism in the context of the 2024 European elections. It first examines the electoral platforms of leading political parties and shows that Eurosceptic ideas, while not highly prevalent, are more common among forces of the radical right. It also suggests that, as second-order theories expect, national issues dominated the electoral campaign for the European Parliament (EP) in Spain. Second, public opinion data is used to describe the general state of attitudes towards the EU and their association with voting for different political parties. The main results from this section are evidence that voters of radical-right parties are more critical of the EU. They also underline a potential reconfiguration of the radical-right space that now includes Vox and a new anti-establishment, outsider formation, The Party is Over (Se Acabó La Fiesta, SALF).
Leading up to the 2024 European Parliament election, much attention was given to the anticipated gains of populist parties across Europe. While some populist parties made significant advances, the overall outcome was more moderate than expected. Sweden deviated from this general trend, witnessing gains for left-wing parties and a surprising setback for the populist radical right. The 2024 elections marked a historic decline for the Sweden Democrats, the first instance since their formation in 1988 that they regressed in comparison to previous national and European Parliament elections. This decline is particularly notable following their strong performance in the 2022 national elections, where they became Sweden’s second-largest party. This article examines these developments, drawing on existing research, media reports and exit polls, with a focus on the Sweden Democrats’ campaign strategies, election results and voter behaviour. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of these election outcomes for both Swedish domestic politics and the broader European political landscape.
The results of the 2024 European elections for populist parties in the Netherlands are intimately related to the events in national Dutch politics since 2021. The relative success of the Party for Freedom (VVD) since 2023 has been related to its more moderate position on European integration and Islam. This change of tone was part of increasing the party’s credibility at home and abroad. The European elections were presented as a litmus test for the proposed centre-right government in the Netherlands, and they testified to the increased room for the populist vote in general and the increased competition for that vote between various populist parties in particular. The European elections also proved a defeat for populist contenders such as JA21, Forum for Democracy and the left-wing populist Socialist Party. The impact of Dutch populists on European policies is most likely to be felt via the newly formed government, which contains two populist parties. At the level of the European Parliament, its impact will depend on the success of the newly formed Patriots for Europe (PfE) group.
Since Slovakia’s EU accession in 2004, populist parties have dominated national politics, although they are less influential in European Parliament (EP) elections. While Smer–Slovak Social Democracy led five national elections and Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) triumphed in 2020, populist parties performed weaker in EP elections. Progressive Slovakia (PS) won in 2019 and 2024, signalling different electoral dynamics. The rise of populism in Slovakia reflects a shared narrative of a virtuous people vs. a corrupt elite, although each party incorporates populism differently. Smer, led by Robert Fico, has shifted towards far-right nationalism, while OĽaNO evolved into Movement Slovakia (MS), with a focus on anti-corruption. The neo-Nazi Kotlebists (ĽSNS), initially successful, has splintered, losing its foothold in national politics. The 2024 EP elections, held amid an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Fico, reflected the political tensions. Smer placed second with 24.8%, while MS and ĽSNS underperformed. These results highlight the varied impact of populist parties on national and EU politics in Slovakia.
The reconfiguration of the extreme right in the European Parliament reaffirms prior tendencies and analysis (i.e., that despite the increased representation of radical-right actors, they continue to be divided and unable to act as a united front). Hence, we can expect more ad hoc coalitions on specific issues rather than united positions and policy proposals. What should not be neglected, although is the legitimation of the radical-right discourse and its impact on both European and domestic politics.
Profiles
Since its launch, the ECPS has published over 150 scholarly profiles, covering political leaders, parties, organizations, and countries worldwide. These profiles form a cornerstone of ECPS’s research mission—offering in-depth, evidence-based analyses of populist movements, ideologies, and their global diffusion. In 2024, ECPS added a new Leader Profile authored by Dr. Simon P. Watmough, titled “From Political Pariah to President: Prabowo Subianto and the Perils of Populism in Indonesia.” The study traces Prabowo Subianto’s transformation from a controversial former general to Indonesia’s eighth president, situating his rise within broader global trends of nationalist populism. Dr. Watmough underscores the implications of Prabowo’s victory for Indonesia’s democratic resilience, warning of potential risks to civil liberties, institutional checks, and the return of militarized politics. This profile exemplifies ECPS’s commitment to mapping how populism continues to challenge governance and democratic norms across diverse political systems.
Prabowo Subianto’s victory in Indonesia’s February 2024 presidential election marks a pivotal moment in the nation’s democratic evolution, echoing a global shift towards nationalist populism. As Indonesia’s eighth president, Prabowo’s political journey and ideological stance have sparked concerns about the future of the country’s democratic institutions. His controversial military past, including allegations of human rights abuses in East Timor and Aceh during the 1990s, continues to raise alarms about the potential for authoritarianism under his leadership. Critics fear his presidency may signal a return to repressive practices, with threats to civil liberties and increased polarization. Prabowo’s background as a former military general adds to concerns about a consolidation of power and the erosion of democratic checks and balances in one of the world’s largest democracies.
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Conclusion
The activities undertaken by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) in 2024 collectively demonstrate an institution that has significantly expanded its global footprint, deepened its research capacity, and strengthened its role as a key actor in debates on populism, authoritarianism, and democracy. Across research, publication, training, outreach, and policy engagement, ECPS delivered a highly productive year marked by interdisciplinary rigor and international collaboration.
A central pillar of ECPS activity in 2024 was its remarkable scholarly output. With 18 peer-reviewed journal articles published in Populism & Politics, alongside 51 expert interviews, 20 analytical articles, numerous commentaries, and 42 research reports—including major multi-country studies—ECPS provided timely and globally relevant insights on the evolving dynamics of populism. These activities highlight ECPS’s commitment to accessible, high-quality knowledge production across continents and thematic areas.
ECPS also strengthened its convening power, organizing 29 events ranging from international conferences and thematic panels to workshops and its flagship Summer School. The Summer School’s continued growth, with over 140 applications and more than 70 participants, underscores ECPS’s emerging role as a leading center for capacity building in populism studies. Parallel initiatives such as the Early Career Researchers Network, Youth Group, and internship program enriched the Center’s ecosystem by engaging young scholars and fostering an inclusive academic community.
Equally important were ECPS’s efforts to forge international partnerships. Collaborations with leading universities, think tanks, and EU-funded projects—including ENCODE and UNTOLD Europe—enhanced both the policy relevance and the methodological diversity of its activities. These initiatives expanded ECPS’s reach beyond traditional academic audiences, reinforcing its mission to bridge research, practice, and public dialogue.
Across all domains, ECPS demonstrated an ability to respond rapidly to global developments—from democratic backsliding in various regions to shifting electoral landscapes—while maintaining analytical depth and editorial independence. The inclusion of youth voices through the Voice of Youths platform further highlighted ECPS’s commitment to nurturing democratic engagement and critical reflection.
Overall, ECPS’s 2024 activities reflect a dynamic, innovative, and globally engaged institution. With strengthened partnerships, expanding networks, and an increasingly diverse research agenda, ECPS is well-positioned to play an influential role in addressing the challenges posed by rising populism and authoritarianism in the years ahead.
