SummerSchool

ECPS Academy Summer School — Populism and Climate Change: Understanding What Is at Stake and Crafting Policy Suggestions for Stakeholders (July 7-11, 2025)

Case Competition Information Pack

Are you interested in global political affairs? Do you wish to learn how to draft policy recommendations for policymakers? Are you seeking to broaden your knowledge under the guidance of leading experts, looking for an opportunity to exchange views in a multicultural, multidisciplinary environment, or simply in need of a few extra ECTS credits for your studies? If so, consider applying to the ECPS Summer School. The European Centre for Populism Studies (ECPS) invites young individuals to participate in a unique opportunity to evaluate the relationship between populism and climate change during a five-day Summer School led by global experts from diverse backgrounds. The Summer School will be interactive, enabling participants to engage in discussions in small groups within a friendly atmosphere while sharing perspectives with the lecturers. You will also take part in a Case Competition on the same subject, providing a unique experience to develop problem-solving skills through collaboration with others under tight schedules. 

Overview

Climate change intersects with numerous issues, transforming it into more than just an environmental challenge; it has developed into a complex and multifaceted political issue with socio-economic and cultural dimensions. This intersection makes it an appealing topic for populist politicians to exploit in polarizing societies. Therefore, with the rise of populist politics globally, we have seen climate change increasingly become part of the populist discourse. 

Populist politics present additional barriers to equitable climate solutions, often framing global climate initiatives as elitist or detrimental to local autonomy. Thus, populism in recent years has had a profound impact on climate policy worldwide. This impact comprises a wide spectrum, from the climate skepticism and deregulation policies of leaders like Donald Trump to the often-contradictory stances of left-wing populist movements. 

We are convinced that this pressing issue not only requires an in-depth understanding but also deserves our combined effort to seek solutions. Against this backdrop, we are pleased to announce the ECPS Summer School on “Populism and Climate Change: Understanding What Is at Stake and Crafting Policy Suggestions for Stakeholders”, which will be held online from 7 to 11 July 2025. This interdisciplinary five-day program has two primary objectives: a) to explore how both right-wing and left-wing populist movements approach the issue of climate change and how they influence international cooperation efforts and local policies, and b) to propose policy suggestions for stakeholders to address the climate change crisis, independent of populist politics. 

We aim to critically examine the role of populism in shaping climate change narratives and policies; provide a platform for exploring diverse political ideologies and their implications for climate action; and foster a deeper understanding of the tension between economic, political, and environmental interests in both right and left-wing populist movements. Critically engaging with the key conclusions from the Baku Conference on climate justice and populism (2024), we will particularly look at the impact of authoritarian and populist politics in shaping climate governance. 

Methodology

The program will take place on Zoom, consisting of two sessions each day and will last five days. The lectures are complemented by small group discussions and Q&A sessions moderated by experts in the field. Participants will have the opportunity to engage with leading scholars in the field as well as with activists and policymakers working at the forefront of these issues.

Furthermore, this summer school aims to equip attendees with the skills necessary to craft policy suggestions. To this end, a Case Competition will be organized to identify solutions to issues related to climate change and the environment. Participants will be divided into small groups and will convene daily on Zoom to work on a specific problem related to the topic of populism and climate change. They are expected to digest available literature, enter in-depth discussions with group members and finally prepare an academic presentation which brings a solution to the problem they choose. Each group will present their policy suggestions on the final day of the programme to a panel of scholars, who will provide feedback on their work. The groups may transform their presentations into policy papers, which will be published on the ECPS website. 

Topics will include:

  • Climate justice: global dichotomy between developed and developing countries 
  • Local responses from the US, Europe, Asia and the Global South
  • Eco-colonialism, structural racism, discrimination and climate change
  • Populist narratives on sustainability, energy resources and climate change
  • Climate migration and populist politics
  • Climate, youth, gender and intergenerational justice
  • Eco-fascism, climate denial, economic protectionism and far-right populism
  • Left-wing populist discourse, climate activism and the Green New Deal
  • Technological advancement and corporate responsibility in climate action.

Program Schedule and Lecturers 

Monday, July 7, 2025

Lecture One: (15:00-16:30) Far-right and Climate Change

Lecturer: Bernhard Forthchner (Associate Professor at the School of Art, Media and Communication, University of Leicester).  

Moderator: Sabine Volk (Postdoctoral researcher, Institute for Research on Far-Right Extremism (IRex), Tübingen University).

Lecture Two: (17:30-19:00) — Climate Justice and Populism

Lecturer: John Meyer (Professor of Politics, California State Polytechnic University, Humboldt).

Moderator: Manuela Caiani (Associate Professor in Political Science, Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy).

Tuesday, July 8, 2025

Lecture Three: (15:00-16:30) –– Climate Change, Food, Farmers, and Populism

Lecturer: Sandra Ricart (Assistant Professor at the Environmental Intelligence for Global Change Lab, at the Department of Electronics, Information and Bioengineering at the Politecnico di Milano, Italy).

Moderator: Vlad Surdea-Hernea (Post-doctoral Researcher, Institute of Forest, Environmental and Natural Resource Policy, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences Vienna).

Lecture Four: (17:30-19:00) — Ideology Meets Interest Group Politics: The Trump Administration and Climate Mitigation

Lecturer: Daniel Fiorino (Professor of Politics and Director at the Centre for Environmental Policy, American University). 

Moderator: Azize Sargın (PhD., Director of External Relations, ECPS).

Wednesday, July 9, 2025

Lecture Five: (15:00-16:30) — Art, Climate, and Populism

Lecturer: Heidi Hart (Arts Researcher, Nonresident Senior Fellow at ECPS).

Moderator: João Ferreira Dias (Researcher, Centre for International Studies, ISCTE) (TBC)

Lecture Six: (17:30-19:00) — Populist Discourses on Climate and Climate Change

Lecturer: Dr. Eric Swyngedouw (Professor of Geography, University of Manchester). 

Moderator: Jonathan White (Professor of Politics, LSE).

Thursday, July 10, 2025

Lecture Seven: (15:00-16:30) —Climate Change, Natural Resources and Conflicts

Lecturer: Philippe Le Billon (Professor of Political Geography at the University of British Columbia).

Moderator: Mehmet Soyer (Assistant Professor of Sociology, Utah State University).

Lecture Eight: (17:30-19:00) — Climate Change Misinformation: Supply, Demand, and the Challenges to Science in a “Post-Truth” World

Lecturer: Stephan Lewandowsky (Professor of Psychology, University of Bristol).

Moderator: Neo Sithole (Research Fellow, ECPS)

Friday, July 11, 2025

Lecture Nine: (17:30-19:00) — Populist Narratives on Sustainability, Energy Resources and Climate Change

Lecturer: Robert Huber (Professor of Political Science Methods, University of Salzburg).

Moderator: Susana Batel (Assistant Researcher and Invited Lecturer at University Institute of Lisbon, Center for Psychological Research and Social Intervention).

Who should apply?

This course is open to master’s and PhD level students and graduates, early career researchers and post-docs from any discipline.  The deadline for submitting applications is June 16, 2025. The applicants should send their CVs to the email address ecps@populismstudies.org with the subject line: ECPS Summer School Application.

We value the high level of diversity in our courses, welcoming applications from people of all backgrounds. 

As we can only accept a limited number of applicants, it is advisable to submit applications as early as possible rather than waiting for the deadline. 

Evaluation Criteria and Certificate of Attendance

Meeting the assessment criteria is required from all participants aiming to complete the program and receive a certificate of attendance. The evaluation criteria include full attendance and active participation in lectures.

Certificates of attendance will be awarded to participants who attend at least 80% of the sessions. Certificates are sent to students only by email.

Credit

This course is worth 5 ECTS in the European system. If you intend to transfer credit to your home institution, please check the requirements with them before you apply. We will be happy to assist you; however, please be aware that the decision to transfer credit rests with your home institution.


 

Brief Biographies and Abstracts

 

Day One: Monday, July 7, 2025

Far-right and Climate Change

Bernhard Forchtner is an associate professor at the School of Arts, Media, and Communication, University of Leicester (United Kingdom), and has previously worked as a Marie Curie Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences at the Humboldt University in Berlin (Germany), where he conducted a project on far-right discourses on the environment (2013-2015, project number 327595). His research focuses on the far right and, in particular, the far right’s multimodal environmental communication. Publications include the two edited volumes The Far Right and the Environment (Routledge, 2019) and Visualising Far-Right Environments (Manchester University Press, 2023).

Abstract: This lecture will offer an overview of the current state of research on the far right and climate change (with a focus on Europe), considering both political parties and non-party actors. The lecture will discuss both general trends of and the dominant claims employed in climate communication by the far right. In so doing, it will furthermore highlight longitudinal (affective) changes and will discuss the far right’s visual climate communication (including its gendered and populist dimension).

Reading list

Ekberg, K., Forchtner, B., Hultman, M. and Jylhä, K. M. (2022). Climate Obstruction. How Denial, Delay and Inaction are Heating the Planet. Routledge. pp. 1-20 (Chapter 1: ‘Introduction’) and 69-94 (Chapter 4: ‘The far right and climate obstruction’).

– ‘The far right and climate obstruction’ offers a review of research on the far right and climate change, while ‘Introduction’ provides a general conceptual model of how to think about different modes of climate obstruction.

Forchtner, B. and Lubarda, B. (2022): Scepticisms and beyond? A comprehensive portrait of climate change communication by the far right in the European Parliament. Environmental Politics, 32(1): 43–68.

– The article analyses climate change communication by the far right in the European Parliament between 2004 and 2019, showing which claims have been raised by these parties and how they have shifted over time.

Schwörer, J. and Fernández-García, B. (2023): Climate sceptics or climate nationalists? Understanding and explaining populist radical right parties’ positions towards climate change (1990–2022). Political Studies, 72(3): 1178-1202.

The article offers an analysis of manifestos of Western European political parties, illustrating salience and positioning over three decades.

 

Climate Justice and Populism

John M. Meyer is Professor in the Departments of Politics and Environmental Studies at California State Polytechnic University, Humboldt. As a political theorist, his work aims to help us understand how our social and political values and institutions shape our relationship with “the environment,” how these values and institutions are shaped by this relationship, and how we might use an understanding of both to pursue a more socially just and sustainable society. Meyer is the author or editor of seven books. These include the award-winning Engaging the Everyday: Environmental Social Criticism and the Resonance Dilemma (MIT, 2015) and The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Political Theory (Oxford, 2016). From 2020-2024, he served as editor-in-chief of the international journal, Environmental Politics.

Abstract: Many have argued that an exclusionary conception of “the people” and a politicized account of scientific knowledge and expertise make populism a fundamental threat to effective action to address climate change. While this threat is very real, I argue that it often contributes to a misguided call for a depolicitized, consensus-based “anti-populist” alternative. Climate Justice movements can point us toward a more compelling response. Rather than aiming to neutralize or circumvent the passions elicited by populism, it offers the possibility of counter-politicization that can help mobilize stronger climate change action. Here, an inclusive conception of “the people” may be manifest as horizontal forms of solidarity generated by an engagement with everyday material concerns.

Reading List

John M. Meyer. (2025).  “How (not) to politicise the climate crisis: Beyond the anti-populist imaginary,” with Sherilyn MacGregor. Politische Vierteljahresschrift.

John M. Meyer. (2024). “The People; and Climate Justice: Reconceptualising Populism and Pluralism within Climate Politics,” Polity.

John M. Meyer. (2024). Power and Truth in Science-Related Populism: Rethinking the Role of Knowledge and Expertise in Climate Politics, Political Studies.

Additional Recent Readings

Driscoll, Daniel. (2023). “Populism and Carbon Tax Justice: The Yellow Vest Movement in France.” Social Problems, 70 (1): 143–63. https://doi.org/10.1093/socpro/spab036 

Lucas, Caroline, and Rupert Read. (2025). “It’s Time for Climate Populism.” New Statesman (blog). February 7, 2025. https://www.newstatesman.com/environment/2025/02/its-time- for-climate-populism 

White, Jonathan. (2023). “What Makes Climate Change a Populist Issue?” Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper, no. No. 401 (September). https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/working-paper-401-White.pdf.

 

Day Two: Tuesday, July 8, 2025

Delving into European’ Farmers Protests and Citizens’ Attitudes Towards Agriculture in a Climate Change Context: Insights from policy and populism

Sandra Ricart is an Assistant Professor in the Environmental Intelligence Lab at the Department of Electronics, Information and Bioengineering at the Politecnico di Milano, Italy. She holds a PhD in Geography – Experimental Sciences and Sustainability by the University of Girona, Spain, in 2014 and performed postdoctoral stays at the University of Alicante (Spain), Università degli Studi di Milano and the Politecnico di Milano (Italy), Université de Pau et des Pays de l’Adour (France), and Wageningen University and Research (Netherlands). She was an invited professor at the Landcare Research Centre in New Zealand and a visiting scholar at the University of California, Los Angeles. As a human-environment geographer, her research focuses on climate change narratives and behavior from farmers’ and stakeholders’ perspectives, delving into how social learning and behavior modelling can be combined to enhance adaptive capacity, robust decision-making processes and trusted policy co-design. Dr. Ricart co-authored more than sixty publications, attended several international conferences, and participated in a dozen international and national research projects. Sandra serves as Assistant Editor of the International Journal of Water Resources Development and PLOS One journal, and she is an expert evaluator by the European Commission and different national research councils.

Abstract: Though there are national differences, farmers across Europe are generally upset about dropping produce prices, rising fuel costs, and competition from foreign imports, but are also concerned by the painful impacts of the climate crisis and proposed environmental regulations under the new CAP and the European Green Deal. These common challenges motivated, in 2024, a series of protests from the Netherlands to Belgium, France, Spain, Germany and the UK, with convoys of tractors clogging roads and ports, farmer-led occupations of capital cities and even cows being herded into the offices of government ministers. Farmers have felt marginalised as they feel overburdened by rules and undervalued by city dwellers, who tend to eat the food they grow without being much interested in where it came from. In this context, farmers started to receive increasing support from a range of far-right and populist parties and groups, who aim to crystallise resentment and are bent on bringing down Green Deal environmental reforms. This talk will delve into the reasons behind farmers’ protests and the link with populism, providing examples, as well as an analysis of citizens’ perspectives on agriculture and climate change strategies, which will enrich the debate on the nexus between policy and populism.

Reading List

Special Eurobarometer 538 Climate Change – Report, 2023, Available here: https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2954 

Special Eurobarometer 556 Europeans, Agriculture, and the CAP – Report, 2025. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3226

Zuk, P. (2025). “The European Green Deal and the peasant cause: class frustration, cultural backlash, and right-wing nationalist populism in farmers’ protests in Poland.” Journal of Rural Studies, 119:103708. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2025.103708

Newspapers

What’s behind farmers’ protests returning to the streets of Brussels? https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/19/whats-behind-farmers-protests-returning-to-the-streets-of-brussels

Rural decline and farmers’ anger risks fuelling Europe’s populism. https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/frankly-speaking-rural-decline-and-farmers-anger-risks-fuelling-europes-populism/

From protests to policy: What is the future for EU agriculture in the green transition? https://www.epc.eu/publication/From-protests-to-policy-What-is-the-future-for-EU-agricultre-57f788/

Farmer Protests and the 2024 European Parliament Elections https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2024/number/2/article/farmer-protests-and-the-2024-european-parliament-elections.html

Neoliberal Limits – Farmer Protests, Elections and the Far Right. https://www.arc2020.eu/neoliberal-limits-farmer-protests-elections-and-the-far-right/

Green policies, grey areas: Farmers’ protests and the environmental policy dilemma in the European Union. http://conference.academos.ro/node/1467

How the far right aims to ride farmers’ outrage to power in Europe. https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-farmers-outrage-power-europe-eu-election-agriculture/

 

Ideology Meets Interest Group Politics: The Trump Administration and Climate Mitigation

Daniel J. Fiorino teaches environmental and energy policy at the School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, DC, and is the founding director of the Center for Environmental Policy. Before joining American University in 2009, he served in the policy office of the US Environmental Protection Agency, where he worked on various environmental issues. His recent books include Can Democracy Handle Climate Change? (Polity Press, 2018); A Good Life on a Finite Earth: The Political Economy of Green Growth (Oxford, 2018); and The Clean Energy Transition: Policies and Procedures for a Zero-Carbon World (Polity, 2022). He is currently writing a book about the US Environmental Protection Agency. 

Abstract: The rise of right-wing populism around the world constitutes one of the principal challenges to climate mitigation policies. The defining characteristics of right-wing populism are distrust of scientific expertise, resistance to multilateral problem-solving, and strong nationalism. Climate mitigation involves a reliance on scientific and economic expertise, an openness to multilateral problem-solving, and setting aside nationalist tendencies in favor of international cooperation. At the same time, the Republican Party in the United States maintains a strong affiliation with the interests of the fossil fuel industry. These two factors have led to a Trump administration that is hostile to climate mitigation and participation in global problem-solving. This presentation examines the policies of the Trump administration with respect to climate mitigation and the effects of a right-wing populist ideology when combined with the historical alliance of the Republican Party with the interests of the fossil fuel industry.

Reading List

Fiorino, D. J. (2022). “Climate change and right-wing populism in the United States.” Environmental Politics, 31(5), 801–819. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2021.2018854

Huber, R.A. (2020). “The role of populist attitudes in explaining climate scepticism and support for environmental protection.” Environmental Politics, 29 (6), 959–982. doi:10.1080/09644016.2019.1708186

Lockwood, M. (2018). “Right-wing populism and the climate change agenda: exploring the contradictions.” Environmental Politics, 27 (4), 712–732. doi:10.1080/09644016.2018.1458411

 

Day Three: Wednesday, July 9, 2025

Art Attacks: Museum Vandalism as a Populist Response to Climate Trauma?

Heidi Hart (Ph.D. Duke University 2016) is a Nonresident Senior Resident (Climate and Environment) with ECPS. She is also a guest instructor in environmental humanities at Linnaeus University in Sweden. Her books include studies of climate grief, sound and music in climate- crisis narrative, and the destruction of musical instruments in ecological context.

Abstract: This lecture explores activist vandalisation of museum artworks, acts that draw attention to the climate emergency as they both subjugate human-made artworks and create new layers of visual and performative aesthetics. “Art Attacks” describes examples of recent art vandalism and subsequent academic responses, most of which remain ambivalent about the effectiveness of art destruction for the sake of ecological awareness. Two questions arise when investigating these interventions: do the actors involved function as environmental populists, as Briji Jose and Renuka Shyamsundar Belamkar have postulated (2024), and are they driven by a sense of climate trauma, a question informed by Katharine Stiles’ work on trauma’s role in destructive forms of art-making (2016)? Answering the first question requires looking at arguments against the convergence of populism and environmentalism and finding places where they do in fact overlap “in unconventional, problematic, and surprising ways” (ECPS Dictionary of Populism). Answering the second question leads to an exploration of how the climate emergency is experienced and mediated as trauma (Kaplan 2016, Richardson 2018). This lecture argues that an embodied sense of present and future emergency can indeed lead to a creative-destructive nexus of climate action, useful even in its ambivalence, in what Bruno Latour has termed “iconoclash” (2002).

Reading List

Jose, Briji and Renuka Shyamsundar Belamkar. (2024). “Art of Vandalism: A Response by Environmental Populists.” In: J. Chacko Chennattuserry et al., Editors, Encyclopedia of New Populism and Responses in the 21st Century. Springer Singapore, 2024, DOI 10.1007/978-981-99-7802-1.

Richardson, Michael. (2018). “Climate Trauma, or the Affects of the Catastrophe to Come.” Environmental Humanities, 10:1 (May 2018), DOI 10.1215/22011919-4385444.

Teixeira da Silva, Jaime A. (2023). “Is the Destruction of Art a Desirable Form of Climate Activism?” Environmental Smoke 6:1 (2023), DOI 10.32435/envsmoke. 20236173-77.

 

The Climate Deadlock and The Unbearable Lightness of Climate Populism

Erik Swyngedouw is Professor of Geography at The University of Manchester, UK and Senior Research Associate of the University of Johannesburg Centre for Social Change, South Africa. He holds a doctorate from Johns Hopkins University and has been awarded Honorary Doctorates from Roskilde University and the University of Malmö. He works on political ecology, critical theory, environmental and emancipatory politics. He is the author of, among others, Promises of the Political: Insurgent Cities in a Post-Democratic Environment (MIT Press), Liquid Power: Contested Hydro-Modernities in 20th Century Spain (MIT Press) and Social Power and the Urbanisation of Nature (Oxford University Press). He is currently completing a book (with Prof. Lucas Pohl) entitled Enjoying Climate Change (Verso).

Abstract: Over the past two decades or so, the environmental question has been mainstreamed, and climate change, in particular, has become the hard kernel of the problematic environmental condition the Earth is in. Nonetheless, despite the scientific concern and alarmist rhetoric, the climate parameters keep eroding further. We are in the paradoxical situation that ‘despite the fact we know the truth about climate change, we act as if we do not know’. This form of disavowal suggests that access to and presence of knowledge and facts do not guarantee effective intervention. This presentation will argue that the dominant depoliticised form of climate populism can help to account for the present climate deadlock, and will suggest ways of transgressing the deadlock.

My presentation focuses on what I refer to as Climate Populism. We argue that climate populism is not just the prerogative of right-winged, xenophobic, and autocratic elite and their supporters, but will insist on how climate populism also structures not only many radical climate movements but also the liberal climate consensus. I argue that the architecture of most mainstream as well as more radical climate discourses, practices, and policies is similar to that of populist discourses and should be understood as an integral part of a pervasive and deepening process of post-politicisation. Mobilising a process that psychoanalysts call ‘fetishistic disavowal’, the climate discourse produces a particular form of populism that obscures the power relations responsible for the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. I shall mobilise a broadly Lacanian-Marxist theoretical perspective that permits accounting for this apparently paradoxical condition of both acknowledging and denying the truth of the climate situation, and the discourses/practices that sustain this.

Reading List

Swyngedouw E. (2010) “Apocalypse Forever? Post-Political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change”, Theory, Culture, Society, 27(2-3): 213-232.

Swyngedouw E. (2022) “The Depoliticised Climate Change Consensus.” In: Pellizzoni L., Leonardi E., Asara V. (Eds.) Handbook of Critical Environmental Politics. E. Elgar, London, pp. 443-455.

Swyngedouw E. (2022) “The Unbearable Lightness of Climate Populism.” Environmental Politics, 31(5), pp. 904-925. DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2022.2090636

Jonathan White is Professor of Politics at the London School of Economics.  Books include In the Long Run: the Future as a Political Idea (Profile Books, 2024), Politics of Last Resort: Governing by Emergency in the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2019), and – with Lea Ypi – The Meaning of Partisanship (Oxford University Press, 2016).

 

Day Four: Thursday, July 10, 2025

Climate Change, Natural Resources and Conflicts

Philippe Le Billon is a professor of political geography and political ecology at the University of British Columbia. Prior to joining UBC, he was a Research Associate with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and worked with environmental and human rights organisations. His work engages with linkages between environment, development and security, with a focus on extractive sectors. He currently works with environmental defenders, including on small-scale fisheries and the ‘green transition’.

 Abstract: This lecture examines how the rise of populist politics is reshaping the nexus between climate change, natural resources, and conflicts. As climate impacts intensify, populist leaders across the political spectrum have exploited environmental anxieties, fueling nationalist rhetoric, weakening environmental regulations, and framing green transitions as elite-driven agendas. This has deepened social divisions and contributed to violent responses to both fossil fuel extraction and climate mitigation projects. The lecture will explore how populist regimes often repress environmental defenders, delegitimise scientific consensus, and stoke resentment against marginalised groups, further aggravating conflict dynamics. Case studies will illustrate how populism can exacerbate resource-related tensions, undermine international cooperation, and stall urgent climate action. The session will conclude with policy recommendations to counteract these trends, including democratic safeguards, support for “leave-it-in-the-ground” campaigns, and stronger protections for environmental activists. Ultimately, this talk highlights the urgent need to confront populist narratives in the pursuit of climate justice and conflict prevention.

 

Climate Change Misinformation: Supply, Demand, and the Challenges to Science in a “Post-Truth” World

Professor Stephan Lewandowsky is a cognitive scientist at the University of Bristol, whose main interest lies in the pressure points between the architecture of online information technologies and human cognition, and the consequences for democracy that arise from these pressure points.

He is the recipient of numerous awards and honours, including a Discovery Outstanding Researcher Award from the Australian Research Council, a Wolfson Research Merit Fellowship from the Royal Society, and a Humboldt Research Award from the Humboldt Foundation in Germany. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Science (UK) and a Fellow of the Association of Psychological Science. He was appointed a fellow of the Committee for Sceptical Inquiry for his commitment to science, rational inquiry and public education. He was elected to the Leopoldina (the German national academy of sciences) in 2022. Professor Lewandowsky also holds a Guest Professorship at the University of Potsdam in Germany. He was identified as a highly cited researcher in 2022, 2023, and 2024 by Clarivate, a distinction that is awarded to fewer than 0.1% of researchers worldwide.

His research examines the consequences of the clash between social media architectures and human cognition, for example, by researching countermeasures to the persistence of misinformation and spread of “fake news” in society, including conspiracy theories, and how platform algorithms may contribute to the prevalence of misinformation. He is also interested in the variables that determine whether or not people accept scientific evidence.
 He has published hundreds of scholarly articles, chapters, and books, with more than 200 peer-reviewed articles alone since 2000. His research regularly appears in journals such as Nature Human Behaviour, Nature Communications, and Psychological Review. (See www.lewan.uk for a complete list of scientific publications.)

His research is currently funded by the European Research Council, the EU’s Horizon 2020 programme, the UK research agency (UKRI, through EU replacement funding), the Volkswagen Foundation, Google’s Jigsaw, and by the Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC) Mercury Project.

Professor Lewandowsky also frequently appears in print and broadcast media, having contributed approximately 100 opinion pieces to the global media. He has been working with policymakers at the European level for many years, and he was the first author of a report on Technology and Democracy in 2020 that has helped shape EU digital legislation.

Abstract: I examine both the “supply side” and “demand side” of climate denial and the associated “fake news”. On the supply side, I report the evidence for the organised dissemination of disinformation by political operatives and vested interests, and how the media respond to these distortions of the information landscape. On the demand side, I explore the variables that drive people’s rejection of climate science and lead them to accept denialist talking points, with a particular focus on the issue of political symmetry. The evidence seems to suggest that denial of science is primarily focused on the political right, across a number of domains, even though there is cognitive symmetry between left and right in many other situations. Why is there little evidence to date of any association between left-wing political views and rejection of scientific evidence or expertise? I focus on Merton’s (1942) analysis of the norms of science, such as communism and universalism, which continue to be internalised by the scientific community, but which are not readily reconciled with conservative values. Two large-scale studies (N > 2,000 altogether) show that people’s political and cultural worldviews are associated with their attitudes towards those scientific norms, and that those attitudes in turn predict people’s acceptance of scientific. The norms of science may thus be in latent conflict with a substantial segment of the public. Finally, I survey the options that are available to respond to this fraught information and attitude landscape, focusing on consensus communication and psychological inoculation.

Reading List

Cook, J., van der Linden, S., Maibach, E., & Lewandowsky, S. (2018). The Consensus Handbook. DOI:10.13021/G8MM6P.

Sinclair, A. H., Cosme, D., Lydic, K., Reinero, D. A., Carreras-Tartak, J., Mann, M., & Falk, E. B. (2024). Behavioural Interventions Motivate Action to Address Climate Change. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/x3wsb

Lewandowsky, S. (2021). Climate Change Disinformation and How to Combat It. Annu Rev Public Health. 42:1-21. Doi: 10.1146/annurev-publhealth-090419-102409. Epub 2021 Dec 23. PMID: 33355475

Hornsey, M., & Lewandowsky, S. (2022). “A toolkit for understanding and addressing climate scepticism.” Nature Human Behaviour, 6(11), 1454–1464. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01463-y

 

Day Five: Friday, July 11, 2025

Populist Narratives on Sustainability, Energy Resources and Climate Change

Robert A. Huber is a Professor of Political Science Methods at the Department of Political Science at the University of Salzburg. He earned his PhD from ETH Zurich in 2018. Prior to joining the University of Salzburg, Robert served as a lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Reading. Additionally, he holds the position of co-editor-in-chief at the European Journal of Political Research and the Populism Seminar. Robert’s primary research focus revolves around examining how globalisation poses new challenges to liberal democracy. Utilising state-of-the-art methods, he investigates areas such as trade policy, climate and environmental politics, and populism. His work has been featured in journals, including the British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, the European Journal of Political Research, and Political Analysis.

Abstract: With climate change being a central challenge for humankind and far-reaching action being necessary, populists have decided to position themselves against climate change. But what is it about populists that makes them take this stance? And is it just a political show or rooted in their worldview? This lecture scrutinises how populism, thick ideological leaning and contextual factors lead to climate sceptic positions among populist parties. We also reflect on whether this translates to the citizen level.

Reading List

Forchtner, Bernhard, and Christoffer Kølvraa. (2015). “The Nature of Nationalism: Populist Radical Right Parties on Countryside and Climate.” Nature and Culture, 10 (2): 199–224. https://doi.org/10.3167/nc.2015.100204.

Huber, Robert A., Tomas Maltby, Kacper Szulecki, and Stefan Ćetković. (2021). “Is Populism a Challenge to European Energy and Climate Policy? Empirical Evidence across Varieties of Populism.” Journal of European Public Policy, 28 (7): 998–1017. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1918214.

Lockwood, Matthew. (2018). “Right-Wing Populism and the Climate Change Agenda: Exploring the Linkages.” Environmental Politics, 27 (4): 712–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1458411.

Zulianello, Mattia, and Diego Ceccobelli. (2020). “Don’t Call It Climate Populism: On Greta Thunberg’s Technocratic Ecocentrism.” The Political Quarterly, 91 (3): 623–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12858.

Roundtable I of the ECPS–Oxford Conference 2025, held on July 1–3 at St Cross College, was titled “Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe.” Chaired by Professor Jonathan Wolff, the session featured presentations by Professor Martin Conway, Professor Aurelien Mondon, and Professor Luke Bretherton.

ECPS Conference 2025 / Roundtable I — Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “ECPS Conference 2025 / Roundtable I — Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 8, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00103

 

Held at the University of Oxford on July 1, 2025, Roundtable I of the ECPS Conference launched the discussions of “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy.” Chaired by Professor Jonathan Wolff, the session explored how “the people” is constructed, contested, and deployed in contemporary European and global politics. Presentations by Professors Martin Conway, Aurelien Mondon, and Luke Bretherton examined the historical resurgence of popular politics, the elite-driven narrative of the “reactionary people,” and the theological dimensions of populism. Together, the contributions offered a nuanced, interdisciplinary account of how populism’s democratic and anti-democratic potentials shape the political imagination and institutional realities of the 21st century.

Reported by ECPS Staff

Roundtable I of the ECPS Conference, hosted at the University of Oxford on July 1-3, 2025, brought together leading scholars to explore the shifting meanings and political uses of “the people” in contemporary Europe and beyond. Titled “Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe,” this session opened the in-person component of the Conference “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy,” an interdisciplinary initiative addressing the democratic backsliding, populist resurgence, and the pathways toward civic resilience in the 21st century.

Chaired by Professor Jonathan Wolff (Senior Research Fellow, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford; President, Royal Institute of Philosophy), the roundtable featured three distinguished speakers: Professor Martin Conway (University of Oxford), Professor Aurelien Mondon (University of Bath), and Professor Luke Bretherton (University of Oxford). Their presentations tackled the historical re-emergence of “the people” as a political category, the elite construction of the so-called reactionary public, and the theological undercurrents of populist discourse—particularly in relation to Christianity.

Taken together, the presentations demonstrated that “the people” is not a static or universally democratic force. Rather, it is a flexible and contested category, often constructed, instrumentalized, and redefined by elites, political movements, and media systems. While it can serve as a source of democratic renewal—as in historical instances of resistance to authoritarian regimes—it can also be mobilized to undermine pluralism, dismantle institutions, and sacralize exclusionary forms of nationalism.

The roundtable emphasized that populism is neither inherently democratic nor inherently authoritarian. Its normative direction depends on how “the people” are imagined, who is included or excluded, and whether political participation is broadened or curtailed. The session challenged participants to move beyond reductive narratives that blame “the people” for democratic erosion, instead urging deeper inquiry into how elites, ideologies, and media infrastructures shape public discourse and democratic practice.

As Europe and its transatlantic partners grapple with polarized electorates, declining trust in institutions, and re-enchanted political imaginaries, understanding the politics of “the people” remains central to safeguarding and reimagining democratic life in our time.

Professor Martin Conway: “The Reappearance of ‘The People’ in European Politics”

Professor Martin Conway (far right), Professor of Contemporary European History at the University of Oxford, delivers his talk titled “The Reappearance of ‘The People’ in European Politics” during Roundtable I of the ECPS–Oxford Conference 2025.

In his compelling presentation, Martin Conway, Professor of Contemporary European History, University of Oxford, explored the reemergence and reconfiguration of “the people”in contemporary European politics. He framed his remarks within a broader intellectual and historical reflection on democratic transformation and political disruption, noting that current anxieties about populism echo earlier eras of upheaval in European history.

Professor Conway began by acknowledging what he termed a prevailing “liberal anxiety”—a sense of unease about the future of democracy that has come to define our political moment. This anxiety, articulated by many mainstream figures including Baroness Royall and commentators like Timothy Garton Ash, reflects a broader fear that democracy is moving in a precarious or even regressive direction. Conway noted that this sentiment contrasts sharply with the optimism of two decades ago, when history was assumed to be progressing in a linear, liberal-democratic trajectory. The shift, he argued, is not unprecedented; similar concerns were widespread in Europe on the eve of the revolutions of 1848. Today, we once again live in a period marked by ambient pessimism and apprehension about what lies ahead.

Several structural transformations underpin this shift, according to Professor Conway. First, he pointed to the stagnation and decline of living standards across much of Europe. While there are exceptions—such as regions in Spain or Poland—many Europeans have experienced over a decade of economic insecurity, eroding the sense of progress and stability that once undergirded liberal democratic institutions. This economic fragility, exacerbated by global market forces and the retreat of the welfare state, has deeply unsettled large segments of society, particularly small businesses, farmers, and precarious workers.

A second, related transformation is the collapse of analog political structures and their replacement by digital media environments. Professor Conway emphasized that the move to digital communication has “anarchized” political debate by weakening the traditional channels—such as party structures and deliberative institutions—that previously organized and moderated political participation. What has emerged in their place is a more fragmented, volatile, and emotionally charged political space.

Beyond these socio-economic and technological shifts, Professor Conway focused on a deeper historical development: the breakdown of a stable model of disciplined, representative democracy that had defined much of postwar Europe. This model, characterized by proportional representation, enduring party systems, and a deeply embedded political elite, ensured predictability and continuity. Politicians might lose a seat in parliament, but often resurfaced in other public roles—“never losing the chauffeur-driven car,” as Professor Conway wryly observed, referencing Belgian politics.

Today, according to Conway, that model is under strain. Challenger parties—often short-lived, leader-centric, and ideologically fluid—have emerged across Europe. They range from the Flemish nationalist Vlaams Belang to leftist, Maoist-rooted movements in Belgium and populist coalitions in Italy. These parties often lack coherent platforms but are united in their appeal to “the people” as a reactive force. Their rise reflects the erosion of elite control and the democratization—but also destabilization—of political life.

Populism, Professor Conway argued, is the label most often applied to this phenomenon. However, he warned that historians are justifiably skeptical of the term. While political scientists like Cas Mudde have successfully theorized populism as a “thin ideology,” historians are more attuned to national contexts, ideological distinctions, and historical specificity. The danger, Conway suggested, lies in collapsing all anti-establishment movements into a single, undifferentiated category, thereby overlooking the distinct traditions—secular, religious, leftist, rightist—that shape each movement.

Nonetheless, Professor Conway underscores that populism, for all its analytical imprecision, captures a genuine insurgent reality: the reassertion of “the people” in forms that diverge significantly from the norms of 20th-century political action. These new forms of engagement are often marked by a rejection of institutional decorum, a distrust of expertise, and the rise of emotionally driven, male-dominated political performances that are less about coherent goals and more about expressive, affective protest.

This shift from rational deliberation to emotional expression—what Professor Conway termed “a change in the musical key of European politics”—is both a cultural and political transformation. It reflects not only structural changes in how politics is conducted, but also the symbolic and psychological reorientation of “the people” as a force both feared and romanticized. Whereas 1989 symbolized the disciplined, hopeful advance of freedom through mass protest in Eastern Europe, today’s mobilizations often appear to many observers as erratic, exclusionary, and disruptive.

Professor Conway underscored that the liberal political class has responded by building rhetorical and institutional defenses—what he called “anti-popular politics.” These include efforts to create legal buffers against referenda, avoid direct electoral challenges, and portray populist movements as inherently irrational, racist, or manipulated by shadowy online forces. Yet such reactions, he warned, risk becoming elitist and anti-democratic in themselves.

In his closing reflections, Professor Conway posed several critical questions: Why did we assume that history would progress smoothly and democratically? Why do we dismiss the democratic potential embedded in disruptive and turbulent popular movements? And crucially, why are we so unwilling to recognize that today’s “people,” for all their volatility, remain committed to democratic participation—albeit in forms unfamiliar and uncomfortable to the liberal imagination?

The reappearance of “the people” in European politics, Professor Conway concluded, should not be seen merely as a threat. Rather, it presents an opportunity—if approached critically and constructively—to rethink the boundaries, forms, and aspirations of democracy in 21st-century Europe.

Professor Aurelien Mondon: “The Construction of the Reactionary People”

Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.

In his incisive presentation, “The Construction of the Reactionary People,” Aurelien Mondon, Professor of Politics, University of Bath, critically unpacked the prevailing narrative that positions contemporary far-right and authoritarian populism as an authentic expression of the will of “the people.” Drawing on over 15 years of research, Professor Mondon challenged the assumption that the so-called “reactionary people” are an organic democratic force. Instead, he argued that this concept is largely an elite-driven construction—a top-down narrative shaped by media, political actors, and intellectuals.

Professor Mondon began by distinguishing between two problematic “P” words: populism and the people. He cautioned against the overuse and imprecision of populism as a catch-all term, which, he argued, has distracted scholars and commentators from a more meaningful analysis of democracy. Instead, he emphasized the importance of critically interrogating how the people are represented, invoked, and constructed in political discourse—especially in reactionary and exclusionary ways.

Central to Professor Mondon’s argument is the idea that the figure of the reactionary people—often depicted as the “white working class” or “the left behind”—has been strategically constructed by elite discourse to justify regressive political shifts. Citing the rhetoric of Nigel Farage and Donald Trump, Mondon highlighted how these elite actors positioned themselves as champions of ordinary people, despite their wealth and elite status. For example, in a speech delivered shortly after the Brexit vote and just before Trump’s election in 2016, Farage drew a direct connection between disaffected Welsh voters and the American rust belt, constructing a transatlantic narrative of popular revolt. Yet, as Professor Mondon pointed out, this framing was less about listening to real grievances and more about legitimizing reactionary, often xenophobic agendas under the guise of popular will.

Empirically, Professor Mondon’s research—particularly in collaboration with Dr. Aaron Winter—demonstrates that the supposed mass support of the white working class for Brexit and Trump has been overstated or misrepresented. Their studies of electoral data reveal that lower-income individuals were in fact less likely to support Trump or Brexit. Many abstained from voting altogether, and among those who did vote, a significant proportion supported establishment candidates such as Hillary Clinton or remained skeptical of nationalist populism. Trump’s and Brexit’s bases, according to the presentation of Professor Mondon, were more accurately characterized by middle- and upper-income voters, including older property owners—groups not typically considered “left behind” in any meaningful socioeconomic sense.

Yet this data was widely ignored in mainstream discourse. Prestigious media outlets—from Newsweek and The Guardian to The Washington Post and Harvard Business Review—repeatedly promoted the notion that the rise of Trump and Brexit reflected the voice of the working-class majority. Professor Mondon emphasized that political scientists, journalists, and commentators across the spectrum helped entrench this myth. In doing so, they lent legitimacy to exclusionary and reactionary politics, even while claiming to merely reflect public sentiment.

Importantly, Professor Mondon warned that this elite narrative has real consequences. It racializes the working class by equating working-class identity with whiteness, thereby excluding ethnic minorities and immigrants who are themselves often working-class. It naturalizes racism by framing it as an inevitable response to economic hardship, rather than a political choice or a construct of political elites. And it normalizes regressive politics by presenting them as the authentic voice of a democratic majority.

This construction is, to Professor Mondon, continually reinforced by media coverage. For example, recent violent anti-migrant demonstrations in the UK were portrayed by outlets like the BBC as expressions of legitimate, working-class anger—despite the racist and xenophobic nature of the acts. The BBC even apologized for calling the far-right Reform Party “far-right.” Similarly, headlines after these riots claimed they were driven by “economic grievances,” offering justification rather than critique.

Professor Mondon challenged this narrative with data from Eurobarometer surveys, which show a stark gap between what people say matters to them personally—such as healthcare, jobs, and education—and what they perceive as problems for the country—typically immigration, a perception shaped by media and political discourse. During the 2016 Brexit campaign, for example, immigration emerged as a top concern at the national level, but it barely registered as a personal priority. This discrepancy reveals the power of media agenda-setting and elite framing in constructing “public opinion.”

Professor Mondon further questioned why only certain actors are granted the status of “the people.” Those protesting for climate action, racial justice, or trans rights are often dismissed as “elite,” “woke,” or “naïve.” Meanwhile, racist protestors, anti-migrant agitators, or conservative culture warriors are hailed as representing “real people” with “legitimate concerns.” Even billionaire authors like J.K. Rowling, or politicians like Farage and Trump, are cast as victims of elite suppression and defenders of democratic expression.

This discursive bias shapes policy outcomes. Both conservative and center-left parties—such as Labour under Keir Starmer—justify rightward shifts in immigration and cultural policy by claiming they are responding to “the people’s” demands. Yet, Professor Mondon argued, such moves are often preemptive responses to media-generated moral panics rather than genuine democratic pressures. The result is a cycle in which reactionary politics are platformed and amplified, while progressive movements are marginalized.

In concluding, Professor Mondon offered several urgent recommendations. First, we must stop exaggerating the electoral strength of the far right and critically interrogate low voter turnout and political disengagement. Second, we should resist euphemizing reactionary politics as “populism”—if a policy is racist or authoritarian, it should be named as such. Third, we must reject the reflex to blame “the people” for the democratic crisis, and instead scrutinize how power, media, and elite discourse mediate public knowledge and shape perceptions. Finally, Professor Mondon called for a critical reassessment of liberalism’s role in enabling far-right resurgence. Liberal elites’ failure to address inequality, racism, and disenfranchisement has contributed to the very crisis they now lament.

Rather than discarding “the people” as a dangerous force, Professor Mondon argued, scholars and policymakers must engage more honestly with the democratic potential of the broader population. The challenge lies not in taming the people, but in confronting the forces that construct reactionary myths in their name.

Professor Luke Bretherton: “Christianity in A Time of Populism”

A man clasps his hands in prayer during the opening ceremonies of President Donald Trump’s “Keep America Great” rally at the Wildwoods Convention Center in Wildwood, New Jersey, on January 28, 2020. Photo by Benjamin Clapp.

In his presentation, Luke Bretherton, Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology at the University of Oxford, offered a nuanced theological and political analysis of populism, with particular attention to its relationship with Christianity. Rather than treating populism solely as a pathological deviation from democratic norms—as is common in much of the European and North American literature— Professor Bretherton argued that populism is a perennial and ideologically fluid component of democratic life. Populism, he suggested, oscillates between democratic and anti-democratic forms, each shaping the political terrain in profound, and at times, conflicting ways.

Professor Bretherton opened by critiquing the dominant academic and journalistic lens through which populism is often viewed—namely, as an aberration associated with far-right, anti-immigrant movements. This narrow interpretation, he argued, overlooks historical and global instances of populism as vehicles of democratization, such as the Solidarity movement in Poland, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, and even populist peasant movements like La Vía Campesina. He emphasized that populism’s ideological indeterminacy makes it resistant to clear categorization on the traditional left-right spectrum, functioning instead as a vessel for diverse, often contradictory, political projects.

According to Professor Bretherton, populism’s complexity lies in its dual potential: it can either renew democratic life or corrode it. Drawing on the work of Margaret Canovan and Ernesto Laclau, Bretherton explained that populism arises from tensions internal to democracy itself, particularly between its redemptive promise—rule by the people—and its pragmatic reality, in which elite negotiation and institutional mediation often dominate. When the redemptive aspect is perceived to have been lost, populist movements emerge to reclaim it, often invoking the language of purity, moral renewal, and direct representation.

To differentiate forms of populism, Professor Bretherton proposed a typology contrasting democratic populism with anti-democratic populismDemocratic populism seeks to broaden political participation, construct shared moral vocabularies, and nurture long-term, deliberative engagement. It builds institutions, invests in civic education, and aims to create pluralistic forms of common life. Examples include community organizing movements like Citizens UK or the early American Populist movement of the late 19th century, which drew on religious traditions to foster democratic deliberation.

By contrast, anti-democratic populism, according to Professor Bretherton, simplifies political space through exclusion and dichotomy, often bypassing deliberative institutions in favor of plebiscitary rule and strongman leadership. It construes the people in essentialist, ethnoreligious, or racialized terms, delegitimizing opposition as traitorous or unpatriotic. Leaders like Donald Trump embody this form of populism, claiming to represent the “real people” while delegitimizing institutional checks and balances.

Professor Bretherton warned that while both forms of populism share characteristics—emphasis on leadership, romanticization of the “ordinary people,” skepticism toward elites and bureaucracy—they differ in their normative trajectories. Democratic populism aims to cultivate shared responsibility for the common good, while anti-democratic populism facilitates personal withdrawal from public life and the erosion of civic institutions in favor of authoritarian consolidation.

The latter part of Professor Bretherton’s presentation focused on the intersection between populism and Christianity. He argued that populism draws heavily on theological tropes, often reconfiguring religious narratives to legitimize its political vision. Christian theology itself, according to him, has longstanding populist impulses—particularly within Protestant traditions that emphasize unmediated access to God and critique ecclesial hierarchy. These impulses have historically fueled resistance to both clerical and political elites. However, Professor Bretherton cautioned that such impulses can be co-opted by anti-democratic populist movements, as seen in the rhetoric of far-right parties like Germany’s AfD or France’s Rassemblement National, which claim to defend Christian culture while attacking institutional churches.

Professor Bretherton emphasizes that this tension stems from the anti-institutional nature of anti-democratic populism, which bypasses mediating structures—such as churches or representative institutions—in favor of a direct identification between the leader and the people. Theologically, this dynamic manifests as a form of idolatry, in which the nation or a charismatic leader is elevated to a messianic role, effectively substituting for Christ. Bretherton described this as a “Christophobic and anti-ecclesial” form of Christianity—one that empties faith of its creedal and ethical commitments and repurposes it as a tool of exclusionary cultural identity.

Rather than treating Christian references in populist rhetoric as merely superficial or secularized, Professor Bretherton argued that we are witnessing a re-enchantment of political discourse. Far-right populism, he contended, does not secularize Christian symbols but sacralizes secular notions like sovereignty and nationhood, effectively reversing the modern trajectory of disenchantment. This shift represents a new kind of political theology, one in which secular concepts are infused with religious meaning, producing an existential, quasi-spiritual political struggle.

Professor Bretherton highlights global examples—from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Islamist turn in Turkey to the rise of Hindu nationalism in India—that illustrate the resurgence of political movements in which the sacred and the political are strategically recombined with potent effect. In Europe, this re-enchantment emerges in response to technocratic liberalism’s perceived hollowness and its failure to address existential anxieties, community dislocation, and crises of agency.

Professor Bretherton concluded by asserting that Christianity must confront these dynamics with a return to its core commitments: love of God and neighbor, solidarity with the stranger, and the rejection of idolatrous narratives of salvation through nation or leader. The Church, he insisted, must become a site of resistance against both authoritarianism and technocratic alienation by cultivating forms of common life grounded in justice, plurality, and mutual care. The ultimate theological task, he contended, is to convert politics from a false gospel of domination into a means of neighboring—turning the earthly city into a penultimate place of peace rather than seeking salvation through it.

Conclusion

Roundtable I of the ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford offered a compelling and multifaceted reflection on the politics of “the people” in a time of democratic uncertainty and populist resurgence. Under the skillful moderation of Professor Jonathan Wolff, the session foregrounded how “the people” remains a highly malleable and contested category—evoked to both revitalize and erode democratic life. Drawing on historical, political, and theological perspectives, the speakers dismantled simplistic narratives that equate populism either with democratic renewal or authoritarian decline. Instead, they highlighted the need to interrogate how elites, institutions, and media infrastructures construct and instrumentalize notions of “popular will” for divergent ends.

A shared theme emerged: that contemporary politics is marked not simply by polarization, but by a crisis of representation, legitimacy, and moral imagination. Whether in the reappearance of emotionally charged political forms (Conway), the elite-driven construction of reactionary publics (Mondon), or the sacralization of exclusionary ideologies (Bretherton), the roundtable underscored the urgency of rethinking democratic participation. As the idea of “the people” continues to shape our political futures, this conversation reminded us that its meaning must remain a site of critical, ethical, and democratic contestation.


 

Note: To experience the panel’s dynamic and thought-provoking Q&A session, we encourage you to watch the full video recording above.

Professor Arend Lijphart, one of the most influential political scientists of the past and present century and Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.

Professor Arend Lijphart: Presidentialism Creates a Greater Risk of Democratic Collapse

In a wide-ranging interview with ECPS, renowned political scientist Professor Arend Lijphart warns that the design of democratic institutions plays a decisive role in democratic resilience or erosion. Drawing from over 50 years of comparative research, Professor Lijphart argues that presidential and majoritarian systems—as seen in the US, India, and the UK—enable dangerous concentrations of power. “Some electoral systems make the concentration of power much more likely,” he states. In contrast, parliamentary systems with proportional representation foster inclusion, accountability, and stability. His core message is urgent: consensus democracy is not just more effective—it’s essential in resisting authoritarian backsliding. “Strong governments may decide faster,” he notes, “but they often decide wrongly.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving a wide-ranging interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Arend Lijphart, one of the most influential political scientists of the past and present century and Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, offers a sobering diagnosis of the institutional roots of intensifying democratic backsliding. Drawing on over five decades of comparative research, Professor Lijphart—one of the signatories of the International Declaration Against Fascism,” published on June 13, 2025, alongside Nobel laureates, public intellectuals, and leading scholars of democracy and authoritarianism—revisits his foundational distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies to illuminate why authoritarian populism so often flourishes in systems that concentrate political power. At the heart of his critique lies a stark warning: “Presidentialism creates a greater risk of democratic collapse.”

Throughout the interview, Professor Lijphart argues that the structural design of presidential and winner-takes-all electoral systems—such as those in the United States, India, and the United Kingdom—facilitates the erosion of liberal democratic norms. “Some electoral systems make the concentration of power much more likely,” he warns. “In presidential systems—such as the United States—we currently see a significant concentration of executive power.” Even parliamentary democracies are not immune, especially when paired with majoritarian electoral rules like first-past-the-post. These systems, he explains, enable governments to take power without majority support and to gradually expand their authority unchecked.

Professor Lijphart draws a direct connection between these institutional flaws and the rise of what he calls “strongman rule”—a hallmark of modern authoritarianism. “It is about trying to organize the entire society in such a way that civil society is weakened—anything that can challenge the authority of the single-person ruler or a single-party ruler.” From Trump’s attacks on journalists and universities to Modi’s and Erdoğan’s efforts to centralize power, Professor Lijphart sees a global pattern enabled by institutional design.

But he also offers a proven alternative: consensus democracy. Based on parliamentary systems and proportional representation (PR), these arrangements, he argues, are “much, much better” not only at ensuring inclusive governance but at resisting authoritarian encroachment. “Consensus systems do just as well—or even a little bit better” than majoritarian ones in terms of performance, he says, while also producing lower levels of terrorism, greater satisfaction with government, and stronger representation for women and minorities.

While Lijphart acknowledges that no democratic system offers perfect safeguards, his message is clear: “Strong governments may make decisions more easily than coalition or power-sharing governments—but those decisions are often the wrong ones.” His long-standing mantra—parliamentary government and proportional representation—emerges not simply as a technical preference, but as a democratic imperative in an age of global authoritarian drift.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Arend Lijphart, edited lightly for readability.

Majoritarian Systems Invite Authoritarian Drift

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Arend Lijphart, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your typology of democratic systems (1968), you contrast majoritarian and consensus models. To what extent do majoritarian systems—especially those lacking robust institutional checks, as seen in Hungary and India—enable the concentration of power that facilitates the rise of authoritarian or fascistic regimes?

Professor Arend Lijphart: I think this seems to be happening in many places—not everywhere, but in lots of places—that a government comes into power and then gradually expands its power step by step.

You’re specifically talking about the judicial system. It’s important that the system is strong, but in democratic systems, that depends very much on other factors. I think more important—and I guess that’s the main message of my book Patterns of Democracy—is that there should be more sharing of power, so that we do not get a concentration of power.

Some electoral systems make the concentration of power much more likely. For example, in presidential systems—such as the United States—we currently see a significant concentration of executive power. The same can occur in parliamentary systems, as in the United Kingdom. This typically happens when the electoral system is what the British call “first past the post,” or what is known in the US as the plurality system. That system creates a concentration of power.

In Britain, for instance, power can end up in the hands of a party that did not win a majority of the vote. The same happened in the 2016 US presidential election, where Donald Trump was elected despite receiving significantly fewer votes than Hillary Clinton. This, in my view, highlights a key weakness of both presidential systems and parliamentary systems that employ majoritarian electoral rules. But perhaps I’m circling around your question rather than addressing it directly.

Fascism Weakens Civil Society to Centralize Power

My second question is: The recent declaration you signed warns of a global authoritarian drift. How do you view the contribution of majoritarian democratic structures—particularly those favoring winner-takes-all outcomes, such as in the United Kingdom or the United States—to this resurgence of fascistic traits in contemporary politics?

Professor Arend Lijphart: I consider fascism to involve, among other things, strongman rule. It is about trying to organize the entire society in such a way that civil society is weakened—anything that can challenge the authority of the single-person ruler or a single-party ruler. Weakening civil society means targeting independent institutions and external sources of power.

In the United States, for instance, the federal system—because of its decentralization—provides some protection against the concentration of power. That’s one safeguard. The judicial system and the rest of civil society are also crucial. Yet we are currently seeing efforts to undermine these very institutions. Under President Trump, we’ve seen attempts to weaken universities, to attack journalists, and to discredit lawyers who may oppose the government. This all contributes to a dangerous concentration of power.

And what can we do about it? I signed that declaration to call attention to the danger. The declaration itself may not have any immediate or specific effect, but it is important that people become more aware of the threats we are facing in democratic systems today.

Consensus Democracies Are More Resilient

In your co-authored article with Matt Qvortrup (2013), you demonstrate that majoritarian democracies are significantly more prone to fatal domestic terrorism. Do similar institutional vulnerabilities—like those evident in the United States post-January 6 or in Brazil under Bolsonaro—help explain the susceptibility of these systems to authoritarian populist mobilization today?

Professor Arend Lijphart: Actually, my entire work—specifically Patterns of Democracy—shows that consensus democracies work better than majoritarian democracies. The old wisdom in political science was that you need majoritarian democracy in order to have a strong enough government to run things effectively. But what I found in a comparative study of 36 countries is that the idea of a strong and effective government is not the province only of majoritarian systems. Consensus systems do just as well—or even a little bit better.

Moreover, consensus systems are much, much better at doing other things. For example, when there is consensus in government, there’s likely to be less danger of terrorism. And there are many other advantages—better representation of women, better representation of minorities, greater public satisfaction with government, and so on. So it really all kind of boils down to that.

And then the question is—and perhaps I’m making this answer too long—is how do you create a consensus system? I think there are two mechanisms that are especially important: parliamentary government rather than presidential government, and proportional representation rather than majoritarian elections. Now, those two things are not, if installed, a guarantee of success. It’s not a sufficient condition for success—but I would say it’s a necessary one. It doesn’t guarantee that it will work, but it is more likely to work than the alternative.

No System Offers Absolute Guarantees

In “Democracy in the 21st Century,” you argue that democracies that ignore the institutional superiority of parliamentary government and proportional representation risk degradation. In the light of backsliding cases like Tunisia, Turkey, and Israel, what constitutional reforms would be most effective in preventing the kind of democratic erosion outlined in the declaration?

Professor Arend Lijphart: I suppose there’s really no guarantee—take Israel, for example. It essentially has a parliamentary government. Turkey, on the other hand, began with a parliamentary system but later shifted to presidentialism. Still, I’m not entirely sure. There’s simply no assurance that any given system will succeed. That said, I recall listening to a lecture by one of the authors of the important book How Democracies Die, and their central argument, as I understand it, is that democracies often collapse gradually.

That can happen in both systems. In a presidential government, it could be the president that decides, with the aid of the armed forces, to take over power—or the armed forces simply take over power. And I asked the author, does it make a difference whether you have a presidential or parliamentary government? And he said, “Oh, I see there is a political scientist in the audience”—that was me—but he said, yes, in presidential government you have a greater chance that this will happen than in parliamentary government. But there’s obviously just no guarantee whatsoever to ward off this danger.

Proportional Representation Could Have Prevented the Rise of the BJP

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is showing victory sign with both hand to supporters at Bharatiya Janata Party office amid the results of the Indian General Elections 2024 in New Delhi, India on June 4 2024. Photo: PradeepGaurs.

Your 1985 work on electoral rules illustrates the democratic benefits of proportional representation (PR). Given the rise of exclusionary populism in countries with first-past-the-post systems—such as the UK, the US, and India—how might PR systems act as a structural safeguard against democratic backsliding?

Professor Arend Lijphart: Well, I think in the case of the US, it would help to have proportional representation. Right now, even though it’s a presidential system, the president effectively controls the legislature. If you had proportional representation, there would likely be a multiparty system, and there would be much less chance that the president could control the legislature to the extent we see now in the United States. 

In fact, this past week you could see a similar dynamic in India. I wrote about India and the possible dangers for Indian democracy in the 1990s, and I said the danger is that an authoritarian party—namely, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—could come to power. How can you prevent that? The BJP does not have a popular majority. What the Congress Party should have done when they were in power was introduce proportional representation. I think that would have—again, there’s no guarantee— made it less likely for the BJP to emerge as the strongest party in India. The BJP has been engaged in democratic backsliding. Minorities have not been adequately protected, and so on. We know what is going on, and India has shifted from a liberal democracy to what is now an illiberal democracy. It’s no longer the kind of shining example of a big country in Asia that manages to be a stable democracy.

When Power Is Shared, Democracy Stands Stronger

Given your long-standing critique of power concentration in majoritarian systems, how can electoral reform—particularly the adoption of PR or mixed-member systems, as seen in Germany or New Zealand—disincentivize authoritarian tendencies and promote institutional pluralism in increasingly polarized democracies?

Professor Arend Lijphart: Well, again, you mentioned Germany and New Zealand—they basically have mixed-member systems that are fundamentally proportional. It’s just less likely that an extreme party will come to power. I mean, it’s kind of amazing to think about Germany in the early 1930s. How did Hitler come to power? Hitler never won an election. He was defeated in the presidential election by Hindenburg, and in the last free parliamentary election, the Nazi Party won more than 40% of the vote. But there were other conservative parties. The president then appointed Hitler to be chancellor, and that, of course, was the beginning of the complete end of democracy in Germany. But the important thing to remember is that—even in a time of severe crisis in Germany—and with the Nazi Party claiming they would solve everything, they still did not win a majority. And obviously, under proportional representation, parties can still win a majority, but it’s just less likely that it will happen.

Your 2010 research on democratic quality highlights the representational benefits of consensus systems for women and minority groups. In the light of resurgent anti-gender and exclusionary rhetoric in countries like Poland, Italy, Turkey and the US, how crucial is electoral system design in sustaining democratic inclusiveness and resilience?

Professor Arend Lijphart: Yes, indeed what proportional representation does is make it more likely that women and members of minority groups get representation—and if they get representation, they gain a political voice and some political power. I remember being in New Zealand and listening to an interview with the woman Prime Minister. This was after the change to proportional representation, and there was a proposal by her party to introduce some limits on proportional representation. She was asked, “Do you favor that?” And she said, “Well, just wait a minute. Proportional representation has made it easier for women to get representation,” and she pointed to the larger number of women in her own party. So, she said, “Well, let’s just wait a bit with limiting proportional representation,” because she was then thinking of protecting the women members of her own party. So, when women and minority group members gain representation, it is more likely to lead to policies and outcomes that advance the interests of women and minorities.

Social Media Amplifies Extremes—Just Like Primary Elections

Social Media

In an era marked by digital disinformation and epistemic fragmentation—phenomena actively weaponized in democratic erosion cases like India, Brazil, and Hungary—how must electoral and media institutions evolve to uphold the rational, inclusive discourse central to your model of consensus democracy?

Professor Arend Lijphart: I guess I don’t have a good answer to that. What do you do about social media, when so many voices—especially extreme ones—dominate the space? It reminds me of what has happened with primary elections in the United States. The idea was to give more influence to voters. But in practice, turnout tends to be very low, and those who do vote are often the most passionate and extreme. So instead of improving representation, the primary system has become a vehicle for amplifying more radical views. 

I think something similar is happening with social media: extreme voices gain disproportionate attention. And honestly, I don’t know what to do about that. Shutting down social media isn’t an option—people wouldn’t accept it. But the potential, and I think real, danger of extremism spreading through these platforms remains a serious concern.

Proportional Representation and Federalism Help Diffuse Power

The declaration, you signed, warns that fascism historically erodes the separation of powers. How can the institutional diffusion of authority in consensus democracies serve as a bulwark against executive aggrandizement, especially in light of how Erdoğan in Turkey and Modi in India have centralized power?

Professor Arend Lijphart: If you have—and again, I always come back to the same answer—a parliamentary government and proportional representation, you’re more likely to have a diffusion of power. But of course, in India they do not have proportional representation, which they really should have.

Now, you’re talking about an institutional diffusion of authority. For instance, a presidential system with separation of powers and a federal system with considerable decentralization. I think a federal system with a high degree of decentralization is one way of decreasing the danger of fascism and the concentration of power.

The problem with federalism, for instance in the United States—but also in countries like Brazil and Argentina—is that it means giving special representation to the states. In the case of the United States, it’s equal representation of the states of the federation, and this results in huge inequality of population. So you have a problem that is not a necessary element of federalism, but it often goes together with it.

In the case of Germany, also, Germany is a federal system, and I think that is helpful for its democracy. There is some inequality there too, but not as extreme as in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina.

Inclusion Weakens Extremists by Exposing Their Incompetence

Geert Wilders (PVV) during an interview at the Plenary Debate in the Tweede Kamer on June 4, 2024, in The Hague, Netherlands. Photo: Orange Pictures.

In systems where populist leaders have weakened judicial independence and neutralized parliamentary oversight—as seen in Israel’s controversial judicial overhaul and Hungary’s court packing—how might consociational design principles be leveraged to insulate democratic institutions from authoritarian encroachment?

Professor Arend Lijphart: I could come back to saying there are just no absolute instruments that will do—it is just less likely when you have a good proportional representation system and a parliamentary government. But, as you see in the case of Israel, they have a parliamentary government, and they do have proportional representation. Yet there is one party and its allies that has power, and it’s using it to slowly erode this.

That’s the idea in the book How Democracies Die—if you have a group, a party, or a president that has this power and aims to undermine the system, aims to concentrate power in one party’s or one person’s hands, then it’s not a guarantee that democracy will be preserved. But again, I think it’s all just less likely in parliamentary systems with proportional representation.

Your functionalist rationale for consensus democracy emphasizes broad-based inclusion. How can inclusive, multiparty coalitions help depolarize political discourse and counteract the “us-versus-them” narratives instrumentalized by authoritarian populists in cases like Venezuela or El Salvador?

Professor Arend Lijphart: If you have a highly divided and potentially polarized society, it’s important to include a broad range of parties and to foster compromise, even with those holding very different points of view. I often think it is better, when extreme parties are present—as in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands—to try to include them in government rather than to enforce what is known in Belgium as the cordon sanitaire, which excludes such parties.

In the Netherlands, for example, the tendency has been to include these parties, and doing so has often revealed that they are not particularly effective in governance—they lack qualified people to serve in government roles. In that sense, inclusion can become a way of letting them destroy themselves. Most recently, the Dutch cabinet collapsed after Wilders’s party—arguably the main extreme party—was part of the government but has since withdrawn. According to current opinion polls, they are now likely to lose votes. By being included and then shown to be ineffective, these parties have weakened themselves.

We Need a Broader Cultural Shift Toward Consensus and Inclusion

And lastly, Professor Lijphart, the anti-fascist declaration urges stronger international institutions. How might the core principles of consensus democracy—such as proportionality, minority protection, and power-sharing—inform the reform of multilateral bodies like the UN, EU, or African Union to more effectively resist authoritarian influence and erosion of global democratic norms?

Professor Arend Lijphart: I wish I knew. One thing I can say is that international organizations like the United Nations have increasingly shifted toward a preference for proportional representation—particularly to enhance minority representation. That was the case in Iraq, and I think it marks a significant change in the general attitude toward government and electoral reform.

Historically, the individuals who had influence in politics and governance tended to admire the British system. But in the case of the United Nations, for example, they advocated for proportional representation in Iraq. While Iraq is clearly not a well-functioning democracy, this still reflects a broader institutional endorsement of such reforms.

Of course, I would argue that these organizations should listen to experts who understand the specific context of each country and can guide them away from the assumption that strong governments are synonymous with good governance. Strong governments may make decisions more easily than coalition or power-sharing governments—but those decisions are often the wrong ones.

What we need, clearly, is a broader cultural shift. There’s an important relationship between culture and structure: if a society has a more consensual culture, it is more likely to develop consensual institutional structures. Conversely, introducing consensual structures—again, I always return to my mantra of parliamentary government and proportional representation—makes it more likely that consensus-oriented norms will take root.

Professor Baskın Oran, a veteran and venerated Turkish political scientist.

Professor Oran on Turkey’s Erdogan Regime: “Let’s Just Call It a ‘Democratic Administration’—So That No Harm Comes to Anyone”

In an era when even naming an oppressive regime can invite peril, Professor Baskın Oran offers a cuttingly ironic response to a straightforward question: How should we define Turkey’s current political system? His reply—”Let’s just say a ‘democratic administration,’ so that no harm comes to anyone”—encapsulates the climate of fear and repression under Erdogan’s rule. In this wide-ranging interview, the veteran scholar and dissident traces historical fascism’s return through economic crisis, digital dependency, centralism, and xenophobia. With clarity and conviction, Professor Oran explores how Turkey’s authoritarian populism mirrors global patterns while revealing homegrown roots—and why excessive control may ultimately become the regime’s undoing.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Baskın Oran, a veteran and venerated political scientist, offered reflections that resonate deeply with the political climate in Turkey today. In times when truth is often criminalized and words carry the weight of consequences, the choice to speak cautiously is, in itself, a powerful political act. When asked to define the nature of Turkey’s current regime—whether it aligns more with fascism, authoritarian populism, competitive authoritarianism, or autocracy—Professor Oran answered with quiet precision: “Let’s just say ‘a democratic administration,’ so that no harm comes to anyone—shall we?” That one sentence, both ironic and revealing, captures the essence of the repression gripping contemporary Turkey. It also offers a striking entry point into the mind of one of Turkey’s most principled and enduring intellectuals.

As one of the signatories of the International Declaration Against Fascism,” published on June 13, 2025, alongside Nobel laureates, public intellectuals, and leading scholars of democracy and authoritarianism, Professor Baskın Oran stands out as a figure whose life and career have been deeply shaped by Turkey’s political upheavals. Born in İzmir in 1945, Oran was convicted in 1971 while still a student at Ankara University’s Faculty of Political Science (Mülkiye) for participating in a protest march, resulting in his dismissal from his post as a research assistant. After a successful legal battle, he was reinstated by administrative court order. He later earned a PhD in international relations and completed postdoctoral research in Geneva on international minority rights.

Oran’s struggles did not end with student activism. Following the 1980 military coup, he was once again purged from his university post—only to be reinstated and removed again under martial law provisions. For eight years, he survived by working various jobs, including editing for AnaBritannica. In 1990, he was finally reinstated for good and rose to become a full professor by 1997. In 2004, his authorship of the “Minority Rights and Cultural Rights Report” for the Human Rights Advisory Board led to criminal charges under infamous articles 216 and 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. Though ultimately not convicted, the ordeal reinforced Oran’s image as a courageous dissenter within the Turkish academy.

That lifelong defiance permeates this interview with the ECPS, though it is now tempered with the strategic irony born of experience. In this wide-ranging conversation, Professor Oran explores the structural logic of fascism—“the most extreme and harmful form of capitalism,” as he puts it—and traces its return through today’s economic and geopolitical crises. Comparing the present moment to the capitalist collapse of 1929, he warns: “Back then, everyone tried to protect their own economy by closing to imports—and international trade collapsed. We’re witnessing a very similar process today.”

For Professor Oran, the rise of anti-immigration sentiment in the West and the shift from targeting “internal enemies” to “external threats” signals a reconfiguration, not a disappearance, of fascist logics. In Turkey, he argues, this reconfiguration is expressed through intense centralization, erosion of local governance, and state suppression of Kurdish identity and representation. “Fascism is centralism taken to its extreme,” he observes, linking today’s appointment of state trustees (kayyım) to a long tradition of top-down governance.

Yet even as he traces the parallels between historical fascism and present-day authoritarianism, Professor Oran remains grounded in a nuanced reading of political causality. He credits the excesses of past Kemalist policies—including headscarf bans and cultural repression—as having laid the groundwork for the current regime: “Those oppressive measures prepared the conditions for today’s authoritarianism.”

Despite this sobering diagnosis, Professor Oran ends with a dialectical warning rather than despair: “Excessive centralism and intervention in democratic will—dialectically speaking—mark the first step toward a regime’s self-destruction.”

In a political environment where naming power risks invoking its wrath, Professor Oran’s careful yet cutting answer—“a ‘democratic administration,’ so that no harm comes to anyone”—becomes more than evasion. This subtle yet telling response speaks volumes about the repressive nature of the current regime in Turkey. Coming from a scholar whose life has been marked by principled resistance and personal cost, Professor Oran’s cautious phrasing is itself a reflection of the political climate—one in which even naming the regime carries risk.

What follows is the full transcript of our interview with Professor Baskın Oran, originally conducted in Turkish and lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Fascism Is the Most Extreme and Harmful Form of Capitalism

Photo of a woman protester holding an anti-fascism sign during the Women’s March on January 21, 2017, in Washington, D.C. Photo: Richard Gunion.

Professor Oran, thank you very much for participating in our interview. How do you evaluate the historical continuity emphasized in the anti-rising fascism declaration—which you signed—through the statement, “fascism never disappeared; it merely remained on the sidelines for a while”? In your view, in what ways does today’s fascism differ from the classical fascisms of the 20th century, and what structural similarities does it maintain?

Prof. Dr. Baskın Oran: First of all, I would like to point out that while speaking on this subject, I do not wish to appear overly Marxist, but fascism—which is the most extreme and harmful form of capitalism—is a tool that the capitalist system resorts to when it feels threatened. We have witnessed this in the past as well.

The declaration from Italy, which I gladly signed, reminded us that the fascism of the Mussolini era is now resurfacing. This is a very accurate observation. In fact, it is possible to go even further back to the historical crises of capitalism. Today, we are experiencing a digital revolution. Artificial intelligence is also a significant part of this transformation—just like the Industrial Revolution that began in the late 18th century. That era brought major opportunities, but the working class was severely oppressed.

Today, too, many professions are disappearing due to digitalization. For example, I previously had one of my books translated by an American for publication in the US. Now, there’s no need for that—translation programs can complete it within a few days. These developments can be used for good or bad—technology itself is neutral.

We discussed the emergence of capitalism in the late 18th century and drew parallels with the present day, right? Then, about a hundred years later, in the late 19th century, the imperialist extension of capitalism emerged. They seized regions—especially in Africa and Asia—through every means possible, including military occupation.

We know that the crises of capitalism are inherent in its nature—they arise periodically from within the system itself. For instance, the Great Depression of 1929 was the result of such an internal contradiction. Just like today, all states at that time tried to cope by shutting down imports. What does that mean? It means blocking other countries’ exports, which in turn paralyzes international trade. But countries had no choice due to the crisis they were in. The 1929 crisis began with a stock market collapse in New York and soon spread worldwide. In the end, every country tried to protect its own economy, and the global economy essentially collapsed. We are witnessing a very similar process today.

However, this time there is a crucial distinction: today’s developments stem not only from capitalism’s internal contradictions but also from external pressures. A key example is China, which, despite maintaining Communist Party rule, has largely embraced a capitalist economic model. This shift has deeply unsettled Western powers—particularly during Donald Trump’s presidency. In response, economic protectionist measures were introduced, including attempts to impose significant tariffs on Chinese goods, which in turn posed risks to the European economy as well.

The dynamics we are witnessing today echo those of earlier historical moments—namely, the crises at the end of the 18th and 19th centuries, and the Great Depression of 1929. These parallels make the declaration I signed not merely a warning about present dangers, but a timely reminder that the past continues to shape our political and economic future.

The Real Fear Lies with the Regime Itself

Despite living under the Erdoğan regime, you have once again demonstrated an example of intellectual courage by being among the signatories of the declaration. In your view, how should the responsibility of intellectuals against fascism be defined under today’s conditions? How can the calls in the declaration—such as boycott, strike, and collective action—be concretized for academic and cultural circles?

Professor Baskın Oran: 
Frankly, I don’t think I’ve shown any major intellectual reaction in this matter. I mean, being afraid of something this small is out of the question. After all, as you know, there’s Article 299 of the Turkish Penal Code—insulting the president. But in this case, such a situation does not exist. No matter how much they try to stretch it, they cannot justify or substantiate such a claim. Therefore, it would not be right to see this as a small act of heroism.

As for the second part of your question: To be honest, I don’t always trust the (Turkish main opposition Republican People Party) CHP. However, the current trajectory of the CHP under the leadership of Özgür Özel is quite positive. This should be acknowledged, and he should be congratulated accordingly. Because he is truly expanding the societal movement to broader masses and succeeding in integrating with the people. He’s going beyond mere declarations and embracing a political approach that translates into action.

And precisely because of this, arrest warrants are being issued for those around him, and attempts are being made to ban political opponents—especially Ekrem İmamoğlu—from participating in elections. The system is clearly afraid of this new, young, and rightly governed CHP. That’s why I believe this process should be supported. 

Yes, if one day the CHP reverts to its old ways, then we will resume our criticisms. But for now, I support the CHP under Özgür Özel’s leadership.

A Turkish man in Hyde Park, London, shows support for protesters in Istanbul following the eruption of nationwide demonstrations—Turkey’s largest anti-government unrest —challenging then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authority in June 2013.
Photo credit: Ufuk Uyanik.

Authoritarianism in the West Is Rooted in a Deep Fear of the Consequences of Its Own Imperial Past

What role have the structural ruptures caused by imperialist expansion—gaining momentum in the late 19th century—in underdeveloped countries, and the waves of migration originating from these regions, played in the rise of fascist and authoritarian tendencies currently observed in the West? In this process, how has the concept of “development” undergone an inversion or distortion?

Professor Baskın Oran: Now, what you are actually asking me—albeit implicitly—is the following: In some developed countries, we are witnessing the hardening and spread of authoritarian regimes; however, at the same time, you are reminding us that similar authoritarian tendencies are also emerging in less developed countries. For example, within the European Union, we observe this trend especially in Poland and Hungary. On the other hand, you are also pointing out the grave actions committed by Israel in Gaza and how they are not being sufficiently condemned by the Western world—particularly by the European Union. You are essentially asking, “Why is this happening?” If I’m understanding your question correctly, I’ll respond right away.

This authoritarian turn and drift away from democracy in developed countries actually stems from a deep fear. And the root of that fear lies in the following reality: The desperate people living in countries oppressed by imperialist forces since the late 19th century no longer know what to do. With hope, they head toward more developed countries, seeking asylum.

Considering that the populations of these developed countries are already limited, that their social security systems are strong, and that these systems are also targeted for use by migrants, a major sense of fear has emerged in these societies. This fear has led to the rise of right-wing politics. Especially through the discourse of anti-immigration and anti-asylum seekers, this fear has provided fertile ground for legitimizing authoritarianism. That’s the heart of the matter.

Trump Globalized the Monroe Doctrine

How do you evaluate the United States’ position—particularly in the Middle East—its Israel-backed aggressive stance, and its anti-Iran strategy in the context of a contemporary reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine? What kind of groundwork has the unipolar order that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union laid for this process?

Prof. Dr. Baskın Oran: You brought up a very important point by mentioning Trump. Trump is, in fact, a typical contemporary representative of the Monroe Doctrine. People generally understand this doctrine as follows — this is also how it’s taught in schools: “America should not interfere in European affairs.” Because Europe’s affairs are complicated, and since America was newly founded at the time, getting involved could harm it. That is the first proposition of the doctrine. However, the real significance of the Monroe Doctrine lies in its second proposition: Europe, too, shall not interfere in the developments on the American continent. In other words, there is a principle of mutual non-intervention.

Trump, however, has taken this second proposition and interpreted it in an entirely different way. The issue is no longer confined to the American continent; Trump has extended this principle globally and is essentially saying: “I will intervene anywhere in the world, but no one may interfere with me.” With this mindset, he is trying to exert pressure everywhere — from Canada to Denmark, from China to Iran. One of the tools he uses for this pressure is Israel. By supporting Israel’s authoritarian and fascist policies, he is in fact pursuing his own global strategy. Looking at the current situation, we see that Trump has become an extremely radicalized representative of the second and most important proposition of the Monroe Doctrine: “I will interfere with everyone, but no one may interfere with me.”

Civilizations That Merely Consume Technology Do Not Survive

To what extent has the difference between producing and merely consuming technology throughout history determined whether civilizations survived or not? For instance, what kinds of historical parallels can be drawn between the impact of the Industrial Revolution on underdeveloped societies and the impact of today’s digital revolution on those same societies? Does the asymmetry between producers and consumers of digital technology constitute a new regime of dependency?

Professor Baskın Oran: Of course, it creates dependency—because there is a world of difference between producing technology and merely consuming it. In fact, just recently, in 2024, Çağatay Anadolu wrote a very interesting article. In that piece, he went quite far back in history and offered an eye-opening analysis.

He said something along these lines: As you know, we descend from Homo sapiens. But before Homo sapiens, there were Neanderthals. The Neanderthals were not as skilled as the sapiens in things like tool-making or abstract thinking. And while we cannot be sure whether the Neanderthals were wiped out by the Homo sapiens, he argued that it is entirely logical for the Neanderthals—who ended up in the position of technology consumers in contrast to the technology-producing sapiens—to have vanished over time. I found this interpretation quite enlightening.

We’re talking about the Stone Age—actually not even about humans, but about human-like species, hominids. Even back then, the difference between producing and consuming technology determined the fate of entire species. Today, we are facing a similar situation: In the digital age, the disparity between societies that produce technology and those that only consume it creates a new regime of dependency.

Crushed Societies Give Rise to Authoritarianism and War

Mass protests in Russia demanded the release of Alexei Navalny. Police detained protesters in Moscow, Russia, on January 31, 2021. A girl holds a sign saying “Freedom for Putin from office!” Photo: Elena Rostunova.

How do you interpret the structural and political similarities between the rise of economic protectionism, authoritarian regimes, and the atmosphere of pre-world war following the 1929 Depression, and today’s neoliberal crisis moment? Are figures like Trump, Putin, Erdoğan, etc., representative of an updated form of fascism in this process?

Professor Baskın Oran: There is a very serious similarity here. The process that began with the 1929 crash of the New York Stock Exchange needs to be carefully examined. Why did it collapse? Because the market had suddenly and excessively risen. Such sharp increases followed by steep declines can devastate stock exchanges. In that situation, people panicked, withdrew, and the market collapsed.

As we just discussed, this collapse triggered the 1929 Depression. Following that, all countries tried to overcome the crisis by restricting imports and increasing exports. But that wasn’t possible—because everyone was trying to do the same thing simultaneously. In an instant, international trade collapsed. And this, ultimately, led to the Second World War.

The Treaty of Versailles, which followed the First World War (1914–1918), imposed such severe conditions on Germany that the people could barely breathe. German women were forced to sell their jewelry. Hitler took advantage of this immense pressure and came to power through a democratic election in 1933. 

Around the same time, we see a parallel in Turkey: Mustafa Kemal launched the War of Independence in 1919 in response to the unbearable terms imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres on the Ottoman Empire. Just as Versailles had done to Germany, Sèvres imposed unacceptable obligations on the Ottomans.

There is an important lesson here: international treaties cannot be based on crushing one side; if they are, they lead to new crises and wars. Treaties must be mutually acceptable. Lausanne is an example of this. It remains the only World War I peace treaty still in force because it was balanced.

Turning Fear into Power: Populists Redefine the ‘Other’ to Justify Authoritarianism

In your view, does the shift from the rhetoric targeting the ‘internal enemy’ in classical fascism to the perception of an ‘external threat’ through rising anti-immigrant sentiment in developed countries today indicate a transformation in the structural codes of fascism? In this context, what kind of political significance does the redefinition of the ‘other’ carry?

Professor Baskın Oran: Actually, we just talked about this. The main reason why governments in developed countries that push the limits of democracy or verge on fascism come to power through elections is the fear generated by immigrants. The sudden influx of asylum seekers creates a significant perception of threat in these countries. However, the root of this fear is a direct consequence of the imperialist policies initiated in the 19th century.

Populism frequently derives its legitimacy from an artificial conflict constructed between “the people” and “the elite.” How has this form of conflict laid the groundwork for a model of authoritarianism in Turkey? How would you analyze the relationship between the populist rhetoric of the administration under Erdoğan’s leadership and its actual authoritarian practices?

Professor Baskın Oran: Let me begin by saying this: The main factor that brought the Erdoğan regime to power and strengthened it was the excesses of past Kemalist practices. Especially during the military coup periods, the oppressive and denigrating measures laid the groundwork for this process.

One of the most striking examples is the rector and vice-rector of Istanbul University of the time preventing veiled female students from entering the university. Can such a thing be acceptable? A university is a place where a thousand voices echo, a space for thought and freedom of expression. A veiled student should be able to enter the university; both veiled and unveiled should benefit equally from this environment.

So what happens if a veiled student is not admitted? She stays at home, waits to get married, and raises daughters who are veiled just like herself. But if she does enter university, she will take courses like my “Nationalism and Minorities” class and be exposed to new ideas. This is precisely the point: the oppressive excesses of Kemalist policies are what initiated the process that laid the foundations of today’s authoritarian regime in Turkey.

Therefore, we must analyze the emergence of Turkey’s authoritarian regime not solely through the lens of populism, but also within this historical context. Moreover, the Erdoğan regime’s increasingly repressive policies in recent years are actually fueling a process that may bring about its own downfall. Let’s not forget: the logic of dialectics applies to everyone.

Excessive Centralism Marks the First Step Toward a Regime’s Self-Destruction

Do the trustee policy targeting municipalities governed by the DEM Party and the CHP in Turkey, as well as the legislative attempts to transfer municipal powers to provincial governors, align with the classical centralist reflexes of fascism? Could you evaluate these developments in comparison with historical experiences of fascism?

Professor Baskın Oran: Fascism, by definition, is centralism taken to its extreme; in fact, fascism is the most radical form of centralization. After the War of Independence, the implementation of centralist policies in Turkey—specifically Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s, later Atatürk’s, rise to power as a single-man ruler and continuation of that rule—can be understood to a certain extent. Of course, by “understood,” I don’t mean “justified” or “approved.” One of the clearest examples of this excessive centralism was how it was applied to the Kurds. This is a broad topic, but just to give an example: from the Eastern Reform Plan (Şark Islahat Planı) to today, we are talking about a centralism where even speaking Kurdish can still be penalized, albeit indirectly.

As you just mentioned, removing mayors elected by popular vote and replacing them with centrally appointed trustees—either governors or district governors—is a clearly fascist practice. Such actions make the Kurdish issue increasingly intractable and end up strengthening parties like the DEM Party, which advocate against this oppression. Even the CHP, which has long maintained a distant stance on these matters, begins to feel its influence.

In this sense, excessive centralism and intervention in the democratic will—dialectically speaking—mark the first step toward a regime’s self-destruction.

‘Native and National Judiciary’ Is Just a Euphemism for Authoritarian Retreat from Universal Law

Does the frequent emphasis in recent years on a ‘national and native judiciary’ represent a departure from universal legal principles and the instrumentalization of the judiciary? What is the function of such rhetoric in the construction of ideological hegemony by populist-authoritarian regimes?

Professor Baskın Oran: There was a time when there was no ideological framework whatsoever to support people who were under extreme oppression. It was only after World War I that the concept of “minority rights” emerged. In fact, Articles 37 to 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne are titled “Protection of Minorities.” This was the first time such a protection mechanism entered the agenda of international law.

Following the Second World War, this concept evolved further with the emergence of the notion of “human rights.” Especially after the 1950s, efforts to institutionalize human rights gained momentum, leading to the establishment of the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights. Turkey also recognized the jurisdiction of this Court and pledged to comply with its rulings. However, unfortunately, despite this commitment, Turkey largely fails to implement these decisions.

For instance, in cases like those of Selahattin Demirtaş and Osman Kavala, the clear and binding rulings of the European Court of Human Rights are being ignored. The core reason for this is that such decisions are perceived as a threat by the centralized and repressive ideological structure in Turkey. This amounts to an attempt to avoid implementing human rights. But such a stance is not sustainable in the long run.

The frequent emphasis on a so-called “native and national judiciary” must also be understood in this context. This slogan signals a break from universal legal principles and the instrumentalization of the judiciary for political ends. Populist-authoritarian regimes deliberately employ such rhetoric to construct ideological hegemony. In reality, the phrase “native and national” is a euphemism for a regressive, inward-looking, and authoritarian vision that seeks to legitimize distancing from universal values.

Assimilation Backfires Once Identity Forms

Kurdish protesters gather in Taksim Square, Istanbul, on April 13, 2010, following the assault on Kurdish politician Ahmet Türk, who suffered a broken nose. Photo: Sadık Güleç.

Do the pressures on Kurdish citizens in the areas of language, culture, and representation—alongside the appointment of state trustees (kayyım) to municipalities—indicate that Turkey is moving away from a democratic resolution to the Kurdish issue? How do you foresee this approach impacting both national unity and democratization in the long term?

Professor Baskın Oran: Nazism has now reached such a point in the global and Turkish context that I believe Turkey is approaching the end of its centralized structure and its negative effects on Kurdish citizens.

Let me put it this way: you can attempt to assimilate a minority—a group treated as second-class citizens. This is a common historical occurrence. But assimilation has its limits: up until the point when a collective identity emerges within that group. Once that awareness forms, all further efforts at assimilation backfire and only serve to strengthen that group identity.

Turkey reached this point in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but failed to recognize it. Today, with the influence of external dynamics, this collective awareness has become even more visible. In this context, the autonomous Kurdish administration in northeastern Syria must be emphasized. This structure is supported by the most powerful country in the world—the United States—and is also recognized by the Syrian regime.

The current regime in Turkey, out of concern over this development, has initiated a second attempt at reform. The first attempt began in 1993, when Öcalan declared a ceasefire. Now, on July 17, 2025, it is planned that 30-40 PKK members will symbolically lay down their arms in a formal ceremony. This points to a very significant and positive development for Turkey.

“Let’s Just Call It a ‘Democratic Administration’—So That No Harm Comes to Anyone”

The foreign policy of the Erdoğan administration is frequently used as a tool for generating domestic political legitimacy. Does Turkey’s gradual shift away from Western values toward a “Russia-like” model resemble the foreign policy reflexes of fascism?

Professor Baskın Oran: Now, if you pay attention, there are two leaders with whom Erdoğan has very good relations: Trump and Putin. One is the head of the United States, the other of Russia. Although these two countries are fierce rivals and constantly at odds with one another, Erdoğan has managed to establish close ties with both. So, what is the common feature of these two leaders? Both are figures who have established—or are attempting to establish—autocratic regimes. That’s all I have to say.

Lastly, considering current developments, how would you conceptually define the regime in Turkey? Among terms such as fascism, authoritarian populism, competitive authoritarianism, and autocracy, which one do you think best fits today’s Turkey? Why?

Professor Baskın Oran: We’ve actually discussed this before. Let’s just say “a democratic administration,” so that no harm comes to anyone—shall we?

Panel 1, titled “Politics of Social Contract,” takes place during the ECPS Conference 2025 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1. Chaired by Dr. Lior Erez (Blavatnik School of Government, Nuffield College), the panel features presentations by Sabine Carey, Robert Johns, Katrin Paula, Nadine O'Shea, Nathan Tsang, and Simon Clemens.

ECPS Conference 2025 / Panel I — Politics of Social Contract

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “ECPS Conference 2025 / Panel I — Politics of Social Contract.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 8, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00102

 

Panel I – Politics of the Social Contract at the ECPS Conference 2025 brought together diverse approaches to examine how democratic legitimacy, resistance, and pluralism are evolving in the face of global democratic backsliding. Chaired by Dr. Lior Erez (Oxford University), the panel featured Professor Robert Johns and collaborators presenting experimental research on public support for human rights under repression; Nathan Tsang (USC) explored how Hong Kong diaspora communities engage in covert resistance through cultural expression; and Simon Clemens (Humboldt University) introduced Isabelle Stengers’ cosmopolitical philosophy, proposing a radical politics of coexistence over consensus. Together, the presentations reflected on how the idea of “the people” is being contested, reimagined, and mobilized across social, empirical, and philosophical registers.

Reported by ECPS Staff

Panel 1 of the ECPS Conference “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy,”—titled Politics of the Social Contract—offered a rich, interdisciplinary exploration of how democratic legitimacy, group identity, and political resistance are being reimagined in response to the erosion of liberal democratic norms. Held at St. Cross College, Oxford, and chaired by Dr. Lior Erez (Alfred Landecker Postdoctoral Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government and Nuffield College, Oxford), the session brought together empirical, ethnographic, and philosophical perspectives on the contested meanings of citizenship and coexistence in our contemporary moment.

The social contract—once the symbolic foundation of liberal democracy—has come under intense pressure in recent years. The rise of exclusionary populist movements, the securitization of public discourse, and the erosion of trust in institutions have all complicated the relationship between citizens and the state. Yet, even as these developments undermine traditional models of political legitimacy, new forms of democratic practice and resistance are emerging. This panel offers an interdisciplinary examination of how these tensions play out in empirical and philosophical terms.

The panel began with a presentation by Professor Robert Johns (University of Southampton), who—alongside co-authors Sabine Carey, Katrin Paula, and Nadine O’Shea—shared findings from an innovative survey experiment conducted in Germany. Their study investigated public support for police violence across various protest scenarios and tested whether different rhetorical frames—rooted in human rights, democracy, or universalism—could reduce support for repression. Strikingly, they found that traditional rights-based arguments were only modestly effective, and that democratic appeals had greater persuasive power. The research revealed the fragility of rights discourse and the challenge of mobilizing public support across group divides.

The second paper, by Nathan Tsang (University of Southern California), shifts the focus to diasporic resistance under authoritarian threat. Drawing from rich ethnographic fieldwork with Hong Kong communities in the US, Tsang reveals how cultural activities can serve as subtle yet powerful platforms for political expression—especially under the shadow of transnational repression. His analysis shows how everyday practices blur the line between political and non-political, reshaping our understanding of what resistance can look like.

Finally, Simon Clemens (Humboldt University of Berlin) invites us into the philosophical realm of cosmopolitics, drawing on the work of Isabelle Stengers to rethink pluralism, coexistence, and the political beyond the demos. Clemens challenges both liberal and radical democratic assumptions, offering a vision of politics rooted in heterogeneity, co-presence, and what he calls “cosmic proceduralism.”

Together, these papers open vital questions about power, belonging, and democratic futures in an unsettled world.

Professor Robert Johns: “Exploring Human Rights Attitudes: Outgroup Perception and Long-term Consequences 

Robert Johns, Professor of Politics at the University of Southampton, presents the paper of his research team on human rights attitudes and outgroup perceptions during Panel I, Politics of Social Contract, at the ECPS Conference 2025 held at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1, 2025.

In his empirically grounded and theoretically ambitious presentation, Robert Johns, Professor of Politics at the University of Southampton, examined the complexity of public attitudes toward human rights, with particular attention to how such attitudes are influenced by group identity, discursive framing, and rhetorical context. Delivered during Panel 1 of the ECPS Conference at Oxford University, his talk—titled “Exploring Human Rights Attitudes: Outgroup Perception and Long-term Consequences”—was a candid reflection on both the possibilities and limitations of persuasion in bolstering public support for human rights protections.

Professor Johns opened with an acknowledgment of the methodological diversity of the symposium and introduced his team’s (Sabine Carey, Katrin Paula and Nadine O’Shea) “quantitative persuasion experiment,” aimed not merely at observing public opinion but at exploring how to strengthen democratic and rights-based commitments in an age of populist backlash. He critiqued the prevailing notion that rights-supporting attitudes are stable, arguing instead that they are often thin, situationally dependent, and subject to manipulation by both rhetorical framing and group biases.

At the heart of Professor Johns’s research was a large-scale survey experiment conducted in Germany, designed to examine public reactions to the use of excessive police force against demonstrators. As Professor Johns explained during his presentation, respondents were randomly assigned to read a vignette describing peaceful protests, with the identity of the protestors varied across conditions—Muslim groups, climate activists, right-wing demonstrators, or an unspecified group. The primary dependent variable was the level of support for a hypothetical proposal to grant police amnesty for using excessive force in such scenarios.

Crucially, the study tested whether various types of arguments opposing this policy—framed in terms of human rights, democratic norms, universalism, or slippery-slope reasoning—could diminish public support for repression. As Professor Johns noted, a control group received no normative framing, providing a baseline against which the persuasive impact of each justificatory appeal could be assessed. 

Professor Johns’ findings were striking. Across the sample, about one-third of respondents supported the repressive measure. Yet, surprisingly, most of the interventions—particularly those grounded in explicit human rights language—had only modest or negligible persuasive effects. The strongest rhetorical appeal was not a rights-based argument at all, but rather an appeal to “democratic rights,” suggesting that public support may be more easily activated by the language of democratic norms than by abstract invocations of “human rights.”

The study also explored how group attitudes shaped policy support. Respondents who harbored negative views toward the outgroup mentioned in the vignette—especially Muslims and climate activists—were significantly more likely to support repressive policies. However, even among this subgroup, some framing interventions, particularly those emphasizing universality or future consequences, slightly reduced support for police impunity. Intriguingly, the only subgroup where the interventions had a noticeable effect were those respondents who had previously signaled a willingness to deny rights across multiple domains—those least committed to human rights. This paradoxical finding suggested that even people initially inclined to restrict rights might be susceptible to targeted persuasion, while those who profess stronger commitments often remain unmoved.

Professor Johns also acknowledged the broader discursive challenge facing human rights advocacy. He pointed to the structural asymmetry between “urgent,” emotionally charged justifications for repression (e.g., national security, law and order) and the often abstract, long-term nature of rights-based arguments. In public debates, human rights defenders are frequently forced into reactive positions, which are temporally and rhetorically disadvantaged. As Professor Johns noted, in televised or political discourse, “rights” advocates often lose momentum by having to concede moral complexity or nuance in response to emotionally powerful narratives focused on threats, danger, or victimhood.

In concluding, Professor Johns emphasized that the lack of strong persuasive effects in the study was not necessarily a failure but an invitation to recalibrate both the content and the communication of human rights advocacy. He posed several provocations for future research and political practice: Should we reframe human rights in terms more resonant with popular democratic identity? Can rights-based arguments be made more immediate, urgent, or emotionally compelling? And how do we bridge the psychological gap between “us” and “them” when advocating for truly universal rights?

Ultimately, Professor Johns’ presentation underscored the fragility of rights-based norms in the public imagination and the difficulty of mobilizing support across group boundaries in polarized societies. Yet it also suggested that with careful framing, strategic messaging, and attention to underlying group perceptions, there remains space to expand public commitment to inclusive democratic principles. His empirical approach—rigorous yet normatively engaged—offered a valuable contribution to ongoing debates about how best to defend and revitalize the language of rights in a climate of democratic uncertainty.

Nathan Tsang: “Doing Politics Non-politically: Explaining How Cultural Projects Afford Political Resistance” 

Umbrella Movement protesters gather in Admiralty, Hong Kong, after the launch of Occupy Central on September 28, 2014, demanding democratic reform and public consultation. Police blocked key access routes. Photo: Mike K.

Nathan Tsang, a doctoral candidate in sociology at the University of Southern California, presented his ongoing ethnographic research titled “Doing Politics Non-politically: Explaining How Cultural Projects Afford Political Resistance.” The project explores how diasporic Hong Kongers in the United States engage in political resistance within seemingly non-political cultural contexts. Drawing on two years of fieldwork, Tsang’s analysis offers a nuanced sociological account of how diasporic communities under threat of transnational repression navigate and perform political expression in the everyday.

Tsang’s inquiry originates in an empirical puzzle he encountered while attending a Chinese New Year festival organized by Hong Kong immigrants in the US. Amid the food stalls and traditional decorations, he noticed politically charged banners and banned books—materials overtly critical of the Chinese regime. What struck him was the blending of cultural celebration with veiled political protest. Why, he asked, do diaspora Hong Kongers embed political messaging in cultural settings? And how is political resistance sustained under the constraints of surveillance and repression from abroad?

The backdrop to this phenomenon is the 2019 Hong Kong protest movement, followed by intense repression by the Chinese and Hong Kong governments. Many activists fled and now live in exile, facing both psychological trauma and the threat of transnational repression. As Tsang noted, diaspora Hong Kongers wish to remain politically engaged without exposing themselves or loved ones to state retaliation. This has led them to embed resistance within cultural forms—New Year fairs, movie clubs, and community centers—allowing them to “do politics non-politically.”

While this blending of culture and politics in exile has precedent—similar dynamics have been observed in the Turkish, Iranian, and Tibetan diasporas—Tsang argues that existing literature leaves gaps. Most notably, while repression is often theorized as a top-down force that curtails public expression, less is known about how individuals interpret and navigate repression in real-time, social contexts. Furthermore, scholars have yet to fully explore how individual acts of covert resistance become collectively legible and politically potent. Tsang’s intervention centers on this “how” question: How do individuals under threat of repression switch between cultural and political modes of engagement in everyday life? How does resistance become collectively cued and sustained?

To answer this, Tsang adopts an interactionist ethnographic methodology. He embedded himself in two diasporic Hong Kong cultural organizations located in a major US West Coast city: a movie club that promotes Hong Kong cinema and a community center offering social gatherings and workshops. Both organizations were founded by former activists from the 2019 movement and operate in the same local network. By selecting highly similar cases—geographically co-located, ideologically aligned, and socially overlapping—Tsang sought to isolate the micro-interactional dynamics that differentiate more successful political cueing from less effective ones.

These dynamics, Tsang argues, demonstrate that political speech in diasporic communities under repression is contingent not only on intention but on a shared ability to “read the room.” Through repeated participation in communal settings, individuals learn when it is safe—and expected—to shift from being cultural consumers to political actors. These micro-cues and switches, often mundane and unnoticed, are the mechanisms through which political communities are built and sustained under repression.

A third case, from the US Pacific Northwest, further supported this argument. There, a movie screening group resembled the earlier movie club, but with one key difference: a small stand offering books on Hong Kong politics. This unassuming addition, not even strategically planned, catalyzed in-depth public discussions about resistance and community formation. Tsang concluded that such material cues—books, spatial layouts, symbolic gestures—can serve as powerful anchors for interactional shifts toward political engagement.

Theoretically, Tsang’s research bridges social movement theory, diaspora studies, and the sociology of culture. While concepts such as abeyance (from movement scholarship) and hidden transcripts (James Scott) capture aspects of suppressed activism, Tsang insists on the importance of micro-sociological analysis: the cues, environments, and interactions through which resistance becomes collectively meaningful. His work contributes to the growing body of scholarship that treats culture not merely as a resource or backdrop, but as an active site of political negotiation.

Tsang concluded with a sobering reflection. While his findings highlight creative resistance, he also cautioned against romanticizing these efforts. In recent fieldwork, he has observed “Hong Kong Trumpists”entering the same cultural spaces to reshape diasporic narratives in line with right-wing populism. This underscores that the same interactional dynamics that enable resistance can also be harnessed to spread illiberal ideologies. Hence, understanding how political meaning is cued in everyday life is crucial not only for recognizing resistance but also for identifying the incubation of populist backlash.

Tsang’s presentation, rich in ethnographic detail and theoretical insight, offered a compelling portrait of how politics persists—and is transformed—in spaces where it is ostensibly absent. His work sheds light on the subtle yet powerful ways diasporic communities negotiate identity, solidarity, and resistance in an era of transnational repression.

Simon Clemens: “From Demos to Cosmos: Isabelle Stengers’ Cosmopolitical Philosophy and Democratic Pluralism”

Simon Clemens, Doctoral Researcher at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, presents his paper titled “From Demos to Cosmos: The Political Philosophy of Isabelle Stengers” during Panel I at the ECPS Conference 2025, held at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1, 2025.

Simon Clemens, a doctoral researcher at the Cluster of Excellence “Contestation of the Liberal Script” (SCRIPTS) and the Theory of Politics program at Humboldt University of Berlin, delivered a nuanced presentation exploring the political philosophy of Belgian philosopher Isabelle Stengers. Titled “From Demos to Cosmos: The Political Philosophy of Isabelle Stengers,” the presentation aimed to reinterpret democratic politics and pluralism through the lens of what Stengers calls “cosmopolitics.”

Clemens contextualized his talk within his broader dissertation research, which interrogates the political significance of the so-called “new materialisms”—a theoretical tradition that reconsiders the relationship between nature and culture, particularly in light of climate crisis and transformations in the sciences. Through this framework, Clemens argued that Stengers offers an alternative imagination for politics that departs from liberal and utilitarian frameworks, introducing a politics grounded not in consensus or inclusion, but in co-presence and heterogeneity.

Clemens began by contrasting Stengers’ approach to pluralism with that of John Rawls, the quintessential liberal theorist. Rawls, in his theory of “reasonable pluralism,” acknowledges the coexistence of diverse worldviews in a democratic society, held together by an “overlapping consensus” of reasonable doctrines. Clemens noted that for Rawls, this consensus emerges from the institutional conditions of liberal democracy, enabling a coherent political framework that respects difference within bounds of reasonableness.

Stengers, however, rejects this premise. Rather than viewing pluralism as stemming from reasonable disagreement about a shared world, she posits that the world itself is fundamentally heterogeneous. Drawing from her work with Nobel laureate Ilya Prigogine in the philosophy of science, Stengers argues that even the natural sciences—particularly physics and thermodynamics—offer conflicting and irreducibly divergent perspectives on the nature of reality. Thus, heterogeneity is not just a social fact or epistemological disagreement but an ontological condition.

To conceptualize how such radical heterogeneity can coexist politically, Stengers develops two central concepts: the “ecology of practices” and “cosmopolitics.” An “ecology of practices” refers to the co-existence of diverse knowledge systems, ways of life, and forms of evaluation that interact without collapsing into a singular hierarchy. Each practice is embedded in specific environments, produces its own modes of meaning, and carries internal logics that cannot be subordinated to universal standards. This ecology does not demand consensus but mutual awareness and the maintenance of relations that allow different practices to endure.

Cosmopolitics, meanwhile, names the political moment in which these ecologies interact. Importantly, Clemens emphasized that Stengers departs from Kantian cosmopolitanism, which seeks universal moral order. Instead, cosmopolitics resists universalization and instead foregrounds what she calls “co-presence”: the simultaneous, non-hierarchical existence of entities and practices that assert their heterogeneity. It is, in her view, a political response to the “generalized state of war” imposed by projects of global homogenization, including capitalist globalization and abstract universalism.

Clemens then turned to what he termed “cosmic proceduralism”—Stengers’ approach to political process that eschews quick resolutions and seeks to create space for heterogeneity to express itself. The core practice here is “slowing down”: a deliberate deceleration of decision-making and political composition to make room for those whose practices and values are often excluded or marginalized.

Slowing down, Clemens explained, is not inertia but attentiveness. It is the art of “paying attention to those inhabiting the land,” to borrow Stengers’ phrase. In practical terms, it introduces hesitation into otherwise mobilized, goal-oriented political processes. This aligns with Stengers’ critique of “mobilization” in both scientific and political contexts, where speed and efficiency often override careful consideration of affected actors.

Complementing this is her interest in the figure of the “diplomat,” who negotiates among divergent worlds not by imposing unity but by pacifying potentially hostile interactions. Through diplomacy and slowing down, a fragile mode of coexistence is made possible—a cosmos that is always emergent and never fully known.

In the final section, Clemens addressed the implications of Stengers’ cosmopolitics for democratic theory, particularly the concept of the demos. Drawing on thinkers like Jacques Rancière and Claude Lefort, he noted that radical democratic theory defines the demos as inherently open and contestable. “We, the people” is never a closed category; it is always subject to expansion and redefinition.

However, Clemens argued that Stengers moves away from the inclusion-oriented logic of radical democracy. Her concern is not with expanding the demos to include the excluded, but with preserving the heterogeneity of forms of life without subsuming them into a unified political subject. In this sense, her cosmopolitics does not seek to rule “in the name of the people,” but to enable the coexistence of radically diverse actors—what might be called the rule of the heterogeneous.

This leads to a provocative claim: the liberal and even radical democratic emphasis on inclusion can become coercive when it imposes a shared ontology or worldview. Inclusion, in this view, risks annihilating difference under the guise of universality. Thus, Stengers’ cosmopolitics can be read as a post-democratic or even anti-democratic gesture—not in the sense of rejecting democracy, but of shifting its foundation from shared rule to plural coexistence.

Clemens concluded by noting that Stengers’ political philosophy makes an important intervention in both democratic theory and broader discussions of pluralism. It challenges the consensus-seeking, universalist tendencies of liberalism and radical democracy alike. By proposing a cosmopolitical proceduralism rooted in heterogeneity, slowing down, and non-hierarchical co-presence, Stengers reimagines political life as the careful negotiation of difference rather than its resolution.

In an era of planetary crisis, epistemic conflict, and social fragmentation, Clemens suggested, such a rethinking may be not only timely but necessary. Cosmopolitics, in this light, becomes a radical democratic gesture that centers the right to exist differently—not just for people, but for practices, worlds, and beings too often ignored by traditional political thought.

Conclusion

Panel I of the ECPS Conference 2025 at Oxford University illuminated the evolving tensions within the modern social contract by offering deeply complementary empirical, ethnographic, and philosophical insights. Each presentation underscored the ways in which democratic legitimacy is not only being tested but reconfigured in response to exclusionary populism, transnational repression, and ontological pluralism. From Robert Johns’ sobering data on the limits of rights-based persuasion to Nathan Tsang’s compelling ethnography of diasporic resistance and Simon Clemens’ philosophical reimagining of democracy through Stengers’ cosmopolitics, the panel revealed the fragility and adaptability of democratic norms under contemporary pressure.

Chair Dr. Lior Erez skillfully moderated a session that moved fluidly between grounded data, lived experience, and theoretical provocation. What emerged was a picture of “the people” not as a unified voice, but as a contested terrain—shaped by identity, institutional trust, and the search for meaningful participation. The session called not for nostalgia over lost democratic certainties but for rigorous engagement with the evolving forms of political subjectivity, belonging, and resistance. As the crisis of the liberal script deepens, such interdisciplinary dialogues remain vital in charting pathways toward inclusive, resilient, and plural democratic futures.


 

Note: To experience the panel’s dynamic and thought-provoking Q&A session, we encourage you to watch the full video recording above.

Participants of the ECPS Conference 2025 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, gather for a group photo on July 1, 2025.

Opening Session of the ECPS Conference 2025: ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy – Interdisciplinary Approaches

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff (2025). “Opening Session of the ECPS Conference 2025: ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy – Interdisciplinary Approaches.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 8, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00101

The ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford began with a timely and thought-provoking opening session that explored the evolving meaning and political utility of “the people” in democratic discourse. Sümeyye Kocaman offered a nuanced welcome, highlighting how the term has been used across history to empower, exclude, and politicize identity. Kate Lindsay Mavor, Master of St Cross College, underscored the value of interdisciplinary exchange in addressing democratic challenges, noting how the College’s diverse academic environment aligned naturally with the conference’s aims. Baroness Janet Royall then delivered a compelling keynote, warning of the double-edged nature of “the people” as both democratic ideal and populist tool. Her address emphasized the need for inclusion, institutional integrity, civic renewal, and interdisciplinary cooperation in the face of democratic erosion. The session set the stage for critical and globally relevant dialogue across disciplines.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The opening session of the ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford commenced with a series of remarks that collectively set an intellectually rich and politically urgent tone for the days ahead. Sümeyye Kocaman, DPhil candidate at St. Catherine’s College and conference coordinator on behalf of the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), offered a thoughtful and inclusive welcome, grounding the event in the contested and evolving significance of “the people.” She reflected on how this concept—invoked across diverse historical, geographical, and ideological contexts—has served both emancipatory and exclusionary purposes. Drawing on her research and recent electoral analyses, she highlighted the growing resonance of populist narratives and the imperative to examine how democratic rhetoric shapes lived experience beyond the ballot box.

Following Kocaman, Kate Lindsay Mavor, CBE, Master of St Cross College, welcomed participants on behalf of the host institution. Emphasizing the interdisciplinary character of St Cross—a graduate college home to scholars from over 60 fields—she noted the alignment between the conference’s aims and the College’s commitment to cross-disciplinary dialogue.

Baroness Janet Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, then delivered an incisive keynote, urging participants to confront the dual nature of “the people” as both democratic foundation and potential populist weapon. Her address called for rigorous, interdisciplinary engagement and collective democratic renewal.

Welcome Address by Conference Coordinator Sümeyye Kocaman

Sümeyye Kocaman, Managing Editor of Populism & Politics, and the coordinator of the ECPS Conference 2025 on behalf of the European Center for Populism Studies, opened the event with a thoughtful and inclusive welcome. Expressing gratitude to participants for arriving so promptly, she framed the conference around the contested nature of “the people.” Kocaman also highlighted the plurality and political weight of the term across time and place. From 19th-century American democratization to Cold War securitization and from the ideological symbolism of Albania’s People’s Republic to contemporary struggles for women’s rights and labor justice, she emphasized that invocations of “the people” are never ideologically neutral.

Kocaman noted that in populism studies, “the people” remains a central but fluid category—emerging in various forms such as “digital populism,” “climate populism,” and others. This terminological proliferation, she argued, speaks to the field’s theoretical dynamism but also to its increasing relevance in everyday political life. Drawing from her own research, she underscored the need to interrogate how notions of “the people” function not just in electoral discourse, but in the daily lived experiences of individuals and communities. This perspective, she asserted, is especially urgent in light of rising populist rhetoric across both Eastern and Western Europe, as recently documented in ECPS’s report on the EU elections.

Kocaman closed by acknowledging the collaborative support of academic and institutional partners—including the Rothermere American Institute, the European Studies Centre, Oxford’s Democracy Network, and scholars from Berlin and Brighton—and expressed solidarity with scholars unable to attend due to geopolitical crises. Her closing remarks served as a poignant reminder of the stakes of the conference: engaging critically with the idea of “the people” under conditions of global instability and democratic uncertainty.

Welcome Address by Kate Lindsay Mavor on Behalf of the Host College

Kate Lindsay Mavor, CBE, delivers the opening remarks at the ECPS Conference 2025 held at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1, 2025.

Kate Lindsay Mavor, CBE, Master of St Cross College, opened the Conference with a warm and appreciative welcome to all participants. She expressed genuine delight that the conference was taking place at St Cross and extended her congratulations to Sümeyye Kocaman for organizing what she described as an exceptionally rich and meaningful academic program. She also offered thanks to Ben Gladstone, Junior Dean at St Cross, for his role in helping bring the event to the college.

Mavor took a moment to reflect on the nature of St Cross College itself—an entirely graduate institution at the University of Oxford, with approximately 620 students representing over 60 academic disciplines. She noted that this unique breadth makes the College an especially fertile ground for interdisciplinary dialogue, and she emphasized that hosting events like the ECPS Conference is very much in line with the College’s mission to encourage rigorous, open, and diverse scholarly conversations.

She acknowledged the topic of the conference—centered on the idea of “the people” and its implications for contemporary democracy—as both pressing and, in some respects, deeply unsettling. Yet she expressed hope that the conference would provide space for thoughtful, evidence-based discussion at a time when such engagement is more necessary than ever. She concluded by welcoming attendees once again and graciously passed the floor to Janet Royall, Baroness Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, Oxford University.

Keynote Address by Janet Royall (Baroness Royall of Blaisdon)

Baroness Janet Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, delivers the keynote address during the opening session of the ECPS Conference 2025 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1, 2025.

Baroness Royall, in her opening address, brought to the fore a compelling blend of political insight, institutional experience, and democratic advocacy. While modestly noting her non-academic background, she framed her intervention with both humility and urgency—an acknowledgment of the significance of the moment and the thematic depth of the conference.

Speaking from her current role as Principal of Somerville College and her former position as Chair of the People’s History Museum in Manchester—a self-declared “museum of democracy”—Baroness Royall underscored the symbolic and practical weight of convening such a conference at a time when democracy is under unprecedented strain. Her address moved fluidly from personal reflection to systemic critique, offering a panoramic view of the challenges and possibilities that define our democratic era.

Baroness Royall opened by commending the ECPS and conference organizers for their vision and rapid execution of a robust program. She recalled an early conversation in January 2025 with the conference coordinator, Sumeyye Kocaman, about an “embryonic” idea to convene a gathering on the theme of “We, the People.” In less than six months, that idea had matured into an intellectually rigorous and internationally inclusive conference. She highlighted the potential of this initiative to lay the groundwork for a broader academic and civic endeavor, notably the proposed Oxford Democracy Network—a platform to foster long-term collaboration around democratic renewal.

At the heart of Baroness Royall’s speech was the concept of “the people”—both as a foundational democratic ideal and as a source of contemporary political peril. She asked, pointedly, whether the title of the conference might have been better framed as “We, the People and the Precarious Future of Democracy.” This rhetorical shift captured her broader concern: that the invocation of “the people” has become a double-edged sword in today’s political landscape.

Baroness Royall cited the alarming statistic that one-fifth of the world’s democracies have declined or disappeared between 2012 and 2024, pointing to a structural crisis in democratic governance. This regression, she argued, is not attributable to a singular cause but reflects a toxic convergence of polarizing narratives, us-versus-them mentalities, and the erosion of social cohesion. Crucially, she emphasized that these trends do not signal the end of democracy, but rather call for its reinvention—grounded in inclusion, resilience, and renewed solidarity.

Drawing on her political experience, Baroness Royall articulated how the phrase “we the people,” while historically empowering—as in the US Constitution—can also be weaponized. When deployed inclusively, the phrase serves as a unifying force, anchoring citizenship in shared values and a common public life. However, in the hands of authoritarian populists, the same phrase is used to divide, exclude, and delegitimize. By framing political opponents as enemies of the people, populist leaders transform democratic mechanisms into tools of domination. Royall cited cases such as Hungary, India, Turkey, and the United States, where the language of majoritarian legitimacy is used to undermine pluralism, erode judicial independence, and roll back minority rights. In such contexts, democracy may persist in name but is hollowed out in substance.

To confront these challenges, Baroness Royall stressed the necessity of interdisciplinary engagement. No single field, she argued, can adequately diagnose or respond to the crisis of democracy. Political science and law illuminate how constitutions shape and channel power; sociology and anthropology explore the socio-cultural dimensions of exclusion and cohesion; history and philosophy provide the longue durée through which the evolution of “the people” can be understood; and media and technology studies reveal how digital platforms both fracture and connect public discourse. She notably added science to this list—an unusual but thought-provoking inclusion—arguing that scientific knowledge and the practices of truth-seeking are indispensable to democratic life. Citing Nobel Laureate Sir Paul Nurse, she affirmed that “democracy is built on truth and trust,” and that science, in its ideal form, sustains both.

Baroness Royall’s address was marked by a tone of constructive realism. While expressing concern over democratic decline, she rejected fatalism. Instead, she outlined a multidimensional agenda for democratic renewal. First, she called for a redefinition of “the people” as an inclusive and dynamic community, one capable of accommodating diversity without retreating into fragmentation. Here, she invoked the post-Apartheid experience of South Africa as a model for constructing cross-cutting civic identities that transcend ethnic or sectarian divisions.

Second, Baroness Royall underscored the need to reinforce institutional integrity. This involves defending the independence of the judiciary, safeguarding electoral systems, and protecting a free press—all vital bulwarks against the authoritarian temptation of majoritarian rule.

Third, she emphasized civic renewal through grassroots participation, deliberative assemblies, and public education. Democracy, in her view, is not merely a set of institutions but a culture of engagement—a shared commitment to dialogue, complexity, and the common good.

Fourth, she called for global solidarity. Authoritarian populism is a transnational phenomenon and demands coordinated international responses. Civil society watchdogs, transnational legal norms, and cross-border academic partnerships must be part of the democratic arsenal.

Turning to her own political reflections, Baroness Royall acknowledged the widespread disillusionment with politicians. She argued, however, that this disaffection is often rooted in unrealistic public expectations. Voters demand lower taxes, higher pensions, and expanded public services—expectations that cannot be reconciled without trade-offs. Populists exploit this cognitive dissonance by offering simple solutions to complex problems. In contrast, genuine democracy, she insisted, requires honesty—about limits, about governance, and about the costs of collective decisions.

She also lamented the decline of local journalism and the rise of disinformation—particularly via AI-generated content—which has fractured the public sphere. Without a shared reality, she warned, the very possibility of democratic deliberation is undermined. In this context, she called for renewed investment in the civic infrastructure of knowledge: public media, media literacy, and forums for reasoned debate.

Baroness Royall then addressed a structural limitation of democracy often left unspoken: the influence of global capital. She noted that the need to placate financial markets can restrict democratic choice, creating a form of “attenuated democracy” where formal procedures persist but real power is constrained. This reality, she argued, highlights the need for vigilance and adaptation to preserve meaningful democratic sovereignty.

In her concluding remarks, Baroness Royall affirmed the value of the ECPS conference and its role in advancing a crucial intellectual and political mission. The “We, the People” program, she said, addresses the central paradox of modern democracy: that the very concept designed to empower citizens can also be used to erode their rights. By combining rigorous scholarship with policy-relevant insights, the conference aims not only to diagnose democratic decay but also to formulate strategies for renewal.

Baroness Royall closed on a note of cautious optimism, invoking Antonio Gramsci’s famous formulation: “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.” While the threats to democracy are serious, she maintained that collective action, informed deliberation, and institutional resilience can chart a path forward. She expressed hope that the conference would inspire not only intellectually stimulating discussions but also concrete contributions to policy and democratic reform.

Conclusion 

The opening session of the ECPS Conference 2025 laid a compelling foundation for the days ahead, offering both a sobering diagnosis of democratic fragility and an urgent call for renewal grounded in intellectual rigor and interdisciplinary collaboration. Anchored by the interventions of Sümeyye Kocaman, Kate Lindsay Mavor, and Baroness Janet Royall, the session deftly mapped the theoretical and practical stakes of examining “the people” as a contested and evolving concept at the heart of democratic politics.

Kocaman’s remarks highlighted the historical plurality and ideological malleability of “the people,” urging participants to interrogate its use not only in electoral campaigns but also in shaping everyday political experiences. Mavor emphasized the role of academic institutions in fostering open dialogue on questions of urgent public concern. Baroness Royall, meanwhile, offered a far-reaching keynote that moved from democratic theory to global political realities. Her speech underscored the double-edged nature of “the people” in democratic discourse—capable of both mobilizing collective agency and justifying exclusionary populism.

Collectively, these addresses set a tone of cautious optimism. While acknowledging the pressures of democratic backsliding, disinformation, and socio-political fragmentation, each speaker reaffirmed the possibility of renewal through civic education, institutional reform, and cross-sector dialogue. The session concluded with a clear message: that democracy cannot be taken for granted, and that critical, interdisciplinary engagement is essential not only for understanding the present crisis, but also for envisioning democratic futures that are more inclusive, participatory, and resilient. As the conference moves forward, the intellectual commitments voiced in the opening session will serve as both compass and challenge—calling participants to contribute meaningfully to the urgent task of democratic revitalization.

RichardFalk

Professor Richard Falk: The US Is Experiencing a ‘Weimar Moment’

In this urgent ECPS interview, Professor Richard Falk warns that the US is facing a “Weimar moment”—a fragile liberal democracy under siege by a resurgent ultra-right. A signatory of the International Declaration Against Fascism, Professor Falk links today’s “techno-fascist enthusiasts” to a global authoritarian drift. He critiques surveillance capitalism, weaponized nationalism, and soft authoritarianism, highlighting leaders like Trump, Modi, Erdoğan, and Netanyahu as drivers of this ideological mutation. Despite this grim trajectory, Professor Falk calls for renewed “normative resistance”—a defiant civic ethics rooted in critical thinking, international law, and solidarity. This interview is a vital reflection on the future of democracy, authoritarianism, and global justice.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a political climate increasingly marked by creeping authoritarianism, disinformation, and democratic fragility, Dr. Richard Falk, Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University, and former UN Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights, offers a powerful and sobering warning: the United States, he says, is currently undergoing a “Weimar moment.” This, he explains, refers to “a democratic superstructure and a liberal opposition, but one that is weak and unable to really mount effective resistance to a rising, ultra-right political formation.” Drawing on history and contemporary global trends, Professor Falk suggests we are witnessing not merely a democratic crisis, but the possible prelude to a systemic authoritarian transformation.

This interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) comes in the wake of the “International Declaration Against Fascism,” published on June 13, 2025. Professor Falk was one of the signatories, alongside Nobel laureates, public intellectuals, and leading scholars of democracy and authoritarianism. Echoing the spirit of the 1925 Anti-Fascist Intellectuals’ Manifesto, the declaration warns that “the threat of fascism is back—and so we must summon that courage and defy it again.” It urges citizens worldwide to resist not only overt autocracy, but also the instrumentalization of law, culture, media, and technology in the service of “techno-fascist enthusiasts.”

In our interview, Professor Falk elaborates on how the architecture of 21st-century power—surveillance capitalism, digital disinformation, populist polarization—is reshaping classical authoritarian strategies. While differing in structure and aesthetic from 20th-century fascism, he argues today’s movements share its core ambitions: the monopolization of political space, the stigmatization of dissent, and the erosion of checks and balances under charismatic strongmen. He points to figures like Trump, Modi, Erdoğan, and Netanyahu as examples of a new ideological formation—what he elsewhere calls a “mutation of soft authoritarianism” that weaponizes nationalism, racialized resentment, and neoliberal precarity.

Yet Professor Falk is not entirely pessimistic. He highlights the enduring relevance of “normative resistance”—a civic and intellectual defiance rooted in critical inquiry, public ethics, and transnational solidarity. In an age of disinformation and partisan moralism, he calls for a recommitment to truth, international law, and the unfinished democratic project, warning that the erosion of global governance and international legal norms risks a regression “to an era of colonialism, suffering, and destruction.”

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Richard Falk, edited lightly for readability.

Illustration by Lightspring.

‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches

DOWNLOAD PROGRAM 

In-Person Programme: July 1-3, 2025. St. Cross College, Oxford University

Virtual Programme: September 2025 – April 2026 via Zoom 

Between 2012 and 2024, one-fifth of the world’s democracies disappeared. During this period, “us vs. them” rhetoric and divisive politics have significantly eroded social cohesion. Yet in some instances, democracy has shown remarkable resilience. A key factor in both the rise and decline of liberal democracies is the use—and misuse—of the concept of “the people.” This idea can either unify civil society or deepen social divisions by setting “the people” against “the others.” This dichotomy lies at the heart of populism studies. However, the conditions under which “the people” become a force for democratization or a tool for majoritarian oppression require deeper, comparative, and interdisciplinary analysis. Understanding this dynamic is crucial, as it has profound implications for the future of democracy worldwide. This programme aims to foster a broad and interdisciplinary dialogue on the challenges of democratic backsliding and the pathways to resilience, with a focus on the transatlantic space and global Europe. It aims to bring together scholars from the humanities, arts, social sciences, and policy research to explore these critical issues.

Organiser 

European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) 

Partners

The Humanities Division, Oxford University

Rothermere American Institute

Oxford Network of Peace Studies (OxPeace) 

European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford University

Oxford Democracy Network

Special thanks to Phil Taylor, Pádraig O’Connor, Freya Johnston, Heidi Hart, David J. Sanders, Clare Woodford, Anthony Gardner, Liz Carmichael, Harry Bregazzi, Hugo Bonin, Benjamin Gladstone, Doris Suchet, Jenny Davies, Justine Shepperson, Daniel Rowe, Katy Long, Julie Adams, Réka Koleszar, Stella Schade, Louise Lok Yi Horner, Jacinta Evans, Contestation of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS), Network for Constitutional Economics and Social Philosophy (NOUS), and Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics (CAPPE).

 

Zoom Registration Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/bmhkaTKZTuKtqJIur132FA 

 

IN-PERSON PROGRAMME

DAY ONE

(Tuesday, July 1, 2025)

Introduction

(08:45 – 08:50 / London Time)

Sumeyye Kocaman (Managing Editor, Populism & Politics, DPhil, St. Catherine’s College, Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Oxford University).

Opening Address

(08:50 – 09:20 / London Time)  

Kate Lyndsay Mavor, CBE (Master of St Cross College, Oxford University).

Janet Royall (Baroness Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, Oxford University).

 

Roundtable -I-

(09:20 – 11:00 / London Time)

Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe

Chair

Jonathan Wolff (Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy and Public Policy, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford; President of the Royal Institute of Philosophy).

Speakers

“The Reappearance of ‘The People’ in European Politics,” by Martin Conway (Professor of Contemporary European History, University of Oxford).

“The Construction of the Reactionary People,” by Aurelien Mondon (Professor of Politics, University of Bath).

“Christianity in A Time of Populism,”  by Luke Bretherton (Regius Professor of Moral & Pastoral Theology, University of Oxford).

 

Coffee Break

(11:00 – 11:30)

 

Panel -I-

(11:30 – 13:00 / London Time)

Politics of Social Contract 

Chair

Lior Erez (Alfred Landecker Postdoctoral Fellow, Blavatnik School of Government, Nuffield College, Oxford University). 

Speakers

“Exploring Human Rights Attitudes: Outgroup Perception and Long-term Consequences,’ by Sabine Carey (Professor of Political Science at the University of Mannheim and Director of the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research); Robert Johns (Professor of Politics at the University of Southampton), Katrin Paula (Postdoctoral Researcher, Technical University Munich) and Nadine O’Shea (Postdoctoral researcher, Technical University Munich).

“Doing Politics Non-politically: Explaining How Cultural Projects Afford Political Resistance,”  by Nathan Tsang (Doctoral Candidate in Sociology, University of Southern California).

“From Demos to Cosmos: The Political Philosophy of Isabelle Stengers,” by Simon Clemens (Doctoral Researcher at the Cluster of Excellence “Contestation of the Liberal Script – (SCRIPTS)” and at Theory of Politics at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin).

 

Lunch

(13:00 – 14:00)

 

Panel -II-

(14:00 – 15:30 / London Time)

‘The People’ in the Age of AI and Algorithms

Chair

Alina Utrata (Career Development Research Fellow, Rothermere American Institute, St John’s College, Oxford University).

Murat Aktaş (Professor, Political Science Department, Muş Alparslan University).

Speakers

“Navigating Digital Disruptions: The Ambiguous Role of Digital Technologies, State Foundations and Gender Rights,”  by Luana Mathias Souto (Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow, GenTIC Research Group, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya).

“The Role of AI in Shaping the People: Big Tech and the Broligarchy’s Influence on Modern Democracy,”  by Matilde Bufano (MSc in International Security Studies, Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies and the University of Trento).

 

Coffee Break

(15:30 – 16:00)

 

Panel -III-

(16:00 – 18:00 / London Time)

Populist Threats to Modern Constitutional Democracies and Potential Solutions: Research Output of the Jean Monnet Chair EUCODEM

Co-Chairs

Elia Marzal (Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).

Bruno Godefroy (Associate Professor in Law and German, University of Tours, France).

Speakers

“Theoretical Foundations of Modern Populism: Approaches of Heidegger, Laclan and Laclau,”  by Daniel Fernández (Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, Universitat Lleida).

“Erosion of the Independence of the Judiciary,” by Marco Antonio Simonelli (Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).

“Referenda as a Biased and Populist Tool: Addressing a Complex Issue in a Binary Way,” by Elia Marzal (Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).

“Pro-Independence Movements as A Populist Way Out in Multinational Contemporary Societies,”  by Núria González (Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).

“Potential Solutions: Second Chambers, Demos and Majoritarian Body,” by  Roger Boada (Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona).

 

Drinks Reception

(18:15-19:00 — Common Room)

Dinner 

(19:00-21:00 — Dining Hall)

 

DAY TWO

(Wednesday, July 2, 2025)

 

Panel -IV-

(09:00-10:30 / London Time)

Politics of Belonging: Voices and Silencing

Chair

Azize Sargın (PhD., Director of External Relations, ECPS).

Speakers

“The Scents of Belonging: Olfactory Narratives and the Dynamics of Democratization,” by Maarja Merivoo-Parro (Marie Curie Fellow, University of Jyväskylä).

“Silent Symbols, Loud Legacies: The Child in Populist Narratives of Post-Communist Poland,” by Maria Jerzyk (Graduate student, Masaryk University in Brno, Czechia).

 

Coffee Break

(10:30-11:00)

 

Roundtable -II-

(11:00 – 12:30 / London Time)

‘The People’ in and against Liberal and Democratic Thought

Chair 

Aviezer Tucker (Director for the Centre for Philosophy of Historiography and the Historical Sciences, University of Ostrava).

Speakers

“Listening to ‘the People’: Impossible Concepts in Political Philosophy,” by Naomi Waltham-Smith (Professor, Music Faculty, University of Oxford).

“Liberal Responses to Populism,” by Karen Horn (Professor in Economic Thought, University of Erfurt) & Julian F. Müller (Professor of Political Philosophy, University of Graz).

“The Living Generation – A Presentist Conception of the People,”  by Bruno Godefroy  (Associate Professor in Law and German, University of Tours, France).

 

Lunch

(12:30 – 13:30)

 

Panel -V-

Governing the ‘People’: Divided Nations

(13:30 – 15:00 / London Time)

Co-Chairs

Leila Alieva  (Associate Researcher, Russian and East European Studies, Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, Oxford). 

Karen Horn (Professor in Economic Thought, University of Erfurt).

Speakers

“Catholicism and nationalism in Croatia: The Use and Misuse of ‘Hrvatski Narod’,” by Natalie Schwabl (Doctoral Candidate, Faculty of Arts, Languages, Literature and Humanities, Sorbonne University).

“‘Become Ungovernable:’ Covert Tactics, Racism, and Civilizational Catastrophe,” by Sarah Riccardi-Swartz (Assistant Professor of Religion and Anthropology, Northeastern University).

“Is There Left-wing Populism Today? A Case Study of the German Left and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance,”  by Petar S. Ćurčić (Research Associate, Institute of European Studies, Belgrade).

 

Coffee Break

(15:00 – 15:30)

 

Panel -VI-

The ‘People’ in Search of Democracy

(15:30 – 17:00 / London Time)

Chair

Max Steuer (Principal Investigator at the Department of Political Science of the Comenius University in Bratislava). 

Speakers

“Between Antonio Gramsci and Erik Olin Wright: Deepening Democracy through Civil Society Engagement,” by Rashad Seedeen (Adjunct Research Fellow in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Media in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Melbourne).

“Resilient or Regressive? How Crisis Governance Reshapes the Democratic Future of ‘The People’,” by Jana Ruwayha (PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law; Teaching and Research Assistant, Global Studies Institute; University of Geneva).

“The Performative Power of the ‘We’ in Occupy Wall Street and Gezi Movement,” by Özge Derman (PhD., Sciences Po and Sorbonne University).

 

DAY THREE

(Thursday, July 3, 2025)

 

Coffee  

(09:00 – 09:30) 

Panel -VII-

(09:30 – 11:00 / London Time)

‘The People’ in Schröndinger’s Box: Democracy Alive and Dead

Co-Chairs

Ming-Sung Kuo (Reader in Law, University of Warwick School of Law).

Bruno Godefroy (Associate Professor in Law and German, University of Tours, France).

Speakers

“The Matrix of ‘Legal Populism’: Democracy and (Reducing) Domination,” by Max Steuer (Principal Investigator, Department of Political Science, Comenius University).

“Lived Democracy in Small Island States: Sociopolitical Dynamics of Governance, Power, and Participation in Malta and Singapore,” by Justin Attard (PhD Candidate, University of Malta).

“Russia’s War on Democracy,”by Robert Person (Professor of International Relations and Director of curriculum in International Affairs, United States Military Academy).

 

Coffee Break

(11:00 – 11:30)

 

Panel -VIII-

(11:30 – 13:30 / London Time

‘The People’ vs ‘The Elite’: A New Global Order?

Co-Chairs

Ashley Wright (Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Minerva Global Security Programme, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford). 

Azize Sargın (PhD., Director of External Relations, ECPS).

Speakers

“We: The Populist Elites,” by  Aviezer Tucker (Director for the Centre for Philosophy of Historiography and the Historical Sciences, University of Ostrava).

“Reclamations of ‘We, the People’: Rethinking Civil Society through Spatial Contestations in Turkey,” by Pınar Dokumacı (Assistant Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin) & Özlem Aslan(Assistant Professor in the Core Program at Kadir Has University).

“The Transatlantic Network of Authoritarian Populism: The Rise of the Executive and Its Dangers to Democracy,” by Attila Antal (Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Institute of Political Science, Eötvös Loránd University).

“The French New Right and Its Impact on European Democracies,” by Murat Aktaş (Professor, Political Science Department, Muş Alparslan University); Russell Foster (Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics, King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies).

Discussant

Karen Horn (Professor in Economic Thought, University of Erfurt).

 

Lunch

(13:30 – 14:30)

 

Roundtable -III-

(14:30 – 16:00 / London Time)

When the Social Contract Is Broken: How to Put the Genie Back

Co-Chairs

Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of ECPS).

Selçuk Gültaşlı (Chairperson, ECPS Executive Board).

Speakers

Aviezer Tucker (Director for the Centre for Philosophy of Historiography and the Historical Sciences, University of Ostrava).

John Thomas Alderdice
 (Baron Alderdice of Knock, in the City of Belfast, Founding Director of the Conference on the Resolution of Intractable Conflict, Oxford University; Founder of the Centre for Democracy and Peace Building).

Julian F. Müller (Professor of Political Philosophy, University of Graz).

 

Closing Remarks

(16:00 – 16:10 / London Time)

Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of ECPS).

 

Biographies & Abstracts

Irina von Wiese is the Honorary President of the ECPS. She was born in Germany, the daughter and granddaughter of Polish and Russian refugees. After completing her law studies in Cologne, Geneva, and Munich, she secured a scholarship to study for a master’s degree in public administration at the Harvard Kennedy School. Her subsequent legal training took her to Berlin, Brussels, and Bangkok, providing her with initial insight into the plight of refugees and civil rights defenders worldwide. From 1997 to 2019, Irina lived and worked as a lawyer in both private and public sector roles in London. During this period, she volunteered for human rights organisations, advising on migration policy and welcoming refugees into her home for many years.

In 2019, Irina was elected to represent the UK Liberal Democrats in the European Parliament. She served as Vice Chair of the Human Rights Subcommittee and as a member of the cross-party Working Group on Responsible Business Conduct. The Group’s main achievement was the introduction of EU legislation that made human rights due diligence mandatory in global supply chains. During her term, she was also elected to the Executive Committee of the European Endowment for Democracy, which supports grassroots civil society initiatives in fragile democracies.

Having lost her seat in the European Parliament after the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union, Irina returned to the UK, where she was elected to the Council of Southwark, one of London’s most diverse boroughs. Her links to Brussels are maintained through an advisory role at FGS Global, where she works on EU law and ESG issues. In addition, Irina is an Affiliate Professor at the European Business School, the ESCP, teaching international law and politics (including a course entitled ‘Liberalism and Populism’). Irina is the proud mother of a teenage daughter.

 

Roundtable -I-  

Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe

Jonathan Wolff is a Professor at the Blavatnik School, University of Oxford, and President of the Royal Philosophical Society. He is a Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy and Public Policy and a Supernumerary Fellow at Wolfson College. He was formerly the inaugural Alfred Landecker Professor of Values and Public Policy, having been appointed Blavatnik Chair in Public Policy at the School in 2016. Before joining Oxford, Jo was Professor of Philosophy and Dean of Arts and Humanities at UCL. He is a political philosopher who works on questions of inequality, disadvantage and social justice. He has published a book, City of Equals (OUP 2024), co-authored with Avner de-Shalit. His work in recent years has also turned to applied topics such as public safety, disability, gambling, and the regulation of recreational drugs, which he has discussed in his books Ethics and Public Policy: A Philosophical Inquiry (Routledge 2011, second edition 2019) and The Human Right to Health (Norton 2012). His “An Introduction to Moral Philosophy” and an associated edited volume, “Readings in Moral Philosophy,” were published by W. W. Norton in 2018, with new editions forthcoming in 2024. Earlier works include Disadvantage (OUP 2007), with Avner de-Shalit; An Introduction to Political Philosophy (OUP, 1996, fourth edition 2023); Why Read Marx Today? (OUP 2002); and Robert Nozick (Polity 1991), together with several edited collections. His recent work has also explored social equality, poverty, and social exclusion, as well as methodological issues in political philosophy. He is now working on questions of belonging, nationalism, and civil society.

Martin Conway is a Professor of Contemporary European History at Balliol College, University of Oxford. His research has primarily focused on European history from the 1930s to the final decades of the twentieth century. Over the last few years, much of his work has focused on the history of Democracy in twentieth-century Europe. He has published numerous articles on the nature of democracy in post-war Europe and authored a large book, entitled Europe’s Democratic Age: Western Europe 1945-68, with Princeton University Press in the spring of 2020. He is continuing to write about democracy and is completing a collaborative project on the history of Social Justice in twentieth-century Europe. He has also begun a new project on Political Men, which seeks to problematise the forms of male political citizenship which have developed in Europe across the twentieth century. Its focus is consciously comparative, embracing a variety of political regimes and periods. Its underlying thesis is that we need to understand how male forms of political action have had a significant influence on the evolution of both democratic and non-democratic regimes. He also has a strong interest in the concept of the History of the Present, as a distinct era separate from the more familiar span of the twentieth century. He is one of the editors (with Celia Donert and Kiran Patel) of a new book series published by Cambridge University Press, entitled European Histories of the Present.

Aurelien Mondon (he/him) is a Professor of Politics at the University of Bath , specialising in politics, and co-convenor of the Reactionary Politics Research Network. His research focuses predominantly on the impact of racism and populism on liberal democracies and the mainstreaming of far-right politics through elite discourse. His first book, The Mainstreaming of the Extreme Right in France and Australia: A Populist Hegemony? was published in 2013, and he recently co-edited After Charlie Hebdo: Terror, racism and Free Speech, published with Zed. Reactionary Democracy: How Racism and the Populist Far Right Became Mainstream, co-written with Aaron Winter, was published by Verso in 2020. The Ethics of Researching the Far Right, co-edited with Antonia Vaughan, Joan Braune, and Meghan Tinsley, was published in April 2024 by Manchester University Press. His work has been published in various mainstream and expert outlets worldwide, including CNN, The Guardian, The Independent, Libération, Newsweek, Le Soir, Mediapart and Al Jazeera.

Luke Bretherton is Regius Professor of Moral & Pastoral Theology, University of Oxford. Before Oxford, Bretherton was the Robert E. Cushman Distinguished Professor of Moral and Political Theology and Senior Fellow of the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. Before joining Duke in 2012, he was Reader in Theology & Politics and Convener of the Faith & Public Policy Forum at King’s College London. Alongside his scholarly work, he writes in the media on topics related to religion and politics, has worked with a variety of faith-based NGOs, mission agencies, and churches around the world, and has been actively involved over many years in forms of grassroots democratic politics, both in the UK and the US. He also hosts the Listen, Organize, Act! podcast which focuses on the history and contemporary practice of community organizing and the role religion plays in democracy. Specific issues addressed in his work include debt, fair trade, environmental justice, racism, humanitarianism, the treatment of refugees, interfaith relations, euthanasia, secularism, nationalism, church-state relations, and the provision of social welfare.

M. Isabel Garrido Gómez is Titular Professor in Legal Philosophy at the University of Alcalá (Spain) and Director Chair for Democracy and Human Rights, University of Alcalá and Spanish Ombudsman. She is author of Family Policy in the European Union 2000 (Madrid: Dykinson); Criterions for Solution of Interests in Private Law 2002 (Madrid: Dykinson); Rudolf von Stammler´s Theory and Philosophy of Law 2003 (Madrid: Reus)”; Fundamental Rights and Social and Democratic Rule of Law 2007 (Madrid: Dilex); The Law as Normative Process, in collaboration 2007 (Alcalá de Henares (Madrid): University of Alcalá Press); Equality in the Law and in the Application of Law 2009 (Madrid: Dykinson); The Changes of Law in the Global Society 2010 (Navarra: ThomsonAranzadi); Democracy in the Legal Sphere 2013 (Madrid: Civitas); The Function of Judges: Context, Activities and Tools 2014 (Navarra: Aranzadi); (as traslator), in collaboration, Law without True 2005 (Madrid: Dykinson); (as coordinator), with , The Right of Child to Live in his/her Family 2007 (Madrid: Exlibris); (as editor), in collaboration, Social Rights as a Requirement of Justice 2009 (Alcalá de Henares (Madrid): University of Alcalá Press and Spanish Ombudsman); (as editor), in collaboration, Ideological Liberty and Conscientious Objection 2011 (Madrid: Dykinson); (as editor), The Right to Peace as an Emergent Right 2011; (as editor), The Human Right to Development 2013 (Madrid: Tecnos); (as editor), The Efectiveness of Social Rights 2013 (Madrid: Dykinson); (as co-editor), Democracy, Governance, and Participation 2014 (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch); in collaboration Challenges and Paradoxes of Constitutional Democracy 2014 (Granada: Comares).

 

Roundtable -II-  

‘The People’ in and against Liberal and Democratic Thought

Naomi Waltham-Smith is a Professor at the Music Faculty, University of Oxford. Specializing in the politics of listening, she is an interdisciplinary scholar working at the intersection of philosophy (especially recent French, Black radical, and decolonial thought) with music and sound studies. She is interested in how aurality is imbricated in some of the most significant and urgent political issues under contemporary capitalism, including the crises of democracy we are witnessing today, together with antiracist and environmental struggles. She has also worked on the politics of listening in contexts as varied as the Austro-German musical canon and Las Vegas casinos. Beyond academic publication, she works collaboratively in the public sphere to develop these ideas through listening workshops and citizens’ assemblies, multimedia installations in galleries and public spaces, long-term community collaborations, and policy engagement. Prior to joining Oxford in September 2023, she was Professor in the Centre for Interdisciplinary Methodologies and Deputy Chair of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Warwick, where she was also Chair of the Academic Freedom Review Committee. Before that she taught Music and Comparative Literature at the University of Pennsylvania (2012–2018), having held postdoctoral fellowships at City University and Indiana University, and supervised at the University of Cambridge. She is a graduate of Selwyn College, Cambridge and King’s College London.

Karen Horn is a business journalist, publicist and university lecturer. Horn studied economics at Saarland University and the University of Bordeaux III and received her doctorate from the University of Lausanne. From 1995 to 2007, she was a member of the economics editorial team of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. There, she wrote about regulatory policy issues and economics as a science. She was the editor in charge of the page Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft and responsible for the reviews of economics books. From October 2007 to the end of March 2012, she was head of the capital city office of the German Economic Institute in Berlin. From April 2012 to 2013, she was Managing Director of Wert der Freiheit gGmbH, founded by Theo Müller and Thomas Bachofer, Chairman of the Board of Sachsenmilch AG. Horn teaches as a lecturer at the HU Berlin, the University of Witten/Herdecke, the University of Siegen and the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Erfurt. She was appointed honorary professor at the University of Erfurt in 2019. She writes regularly for the debate magazines Standpoint and Schweizer Monat and occasionally for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung.

Julian F. Müller is a Professor of Political Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Graz. His main areas of research are political philosophy and applied ethics. In political philosophy, his work focuses on the themes of reasonable and unreasonable political disagreements. In his book, Political Pluralism, Disagreement, and Justice(Routledge 2019), he develops the concept of Polycentric Democracy, a set of institutions designed to promote justice in the face of widespread disagreements about facts and norms. The book received the Werner von Melle and Roman Herzog Prizes. In more recent work, he has explored unreasonable disagreements, formulating an epistemic theory of populist ideology. Currently, he is investigating the systematic role of the concept of truth in theories of classical liberalism. In applied ethics, he has published on topics including migration ethics, the ethics of emerging technologies, and economic ethics. 

Bruno Godefroy is an associate professor in Law and German at the University of Tours (France). His research focuses on constitutional theory, political philosophy, and the history of ideas. Recent publications: “Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology: Legitimizing Authority after Secularization,” Political Theory 53/1 (2025), “Karl Löwith’s Historicization of Historicism” (in H. J. Paul, A. van Veldhuizen (ed.), Historicism: A Travelling Concept, London, Bloomsbury, 2021), La Fin du sens de l’histoire. Eric Voegelin, Karl Löwith et la temporalité du politique (Paris, Classiques Garnier, 2021).

 

Roundtable -III- 

When the Social Contract Is Broken: How to Put the Genie Back

Selcuk Gultasli is the chairperson of ECPS’s executive board. Mr. Gultasli is responsible for the operations of both the ECPS’s academic group and administrative staff. Mr. Gultasli was previously the Brussels Bureau Chief of Zaman daily until the Turkish government confiscated the newspaper on March 4, 2016. He is interested in EU policy, especially expansion, and has written extensively on the EU and the potential expansion process. He also studies Turkish accession to the EU, human rights, rule of law, liberal democracy, Turkish-Kurdish relations, and the history of Armenian-Turkish relations. Mr. Gultasli graduated from Boğaziçi University in 1991; he continued his studies at Middle East Technical University, earning his M.A. with a thesis on the comparison of Turkish dailies in relation to EU membership discussions. He obtained another M.A. degree from the Catholic University of Leuven; he wrote his thesis on the comparison of English and French secularism. Concerned about the rise of illiberal democracies in many democratic countries, Gultasli thinks it is of the utmost importance to study the rise of populism and populist leaders.

Lord John Alderdice has an academic and professional background in medicine, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis. He is the founding Director of the Conference on the Resolution of Intractable Conflict, based in Oxford and with colleagues in Belfast he also established the Centre for Democracy and Peace Building which continues work on the implementation of the principles of the Good Friday Agreement and takes the lessons of the Irish Peace Process to other communities in conflict. More recently, he set up The Concord Foundation with a wider remit in understanding and addressing the nature of violent political conflict and its resolution. Lord Alderdice’s work has been recognised throughout the world with many fellowships, visiting professorships, honorary doctorates, and international awards. Having been appointed to the House of Lords in 1996, he was elected Convenor of the Liberal Democrats for the first four years of the Liberal/Conservative Coalition Government from 2010 to 2014. His international interests had previously led to his election as President of Liberal International, the global network of some 100 liberal political parties and organisations. He served from 2005 to 2009 and remains an active Presidente D’Honneur.

He was a consultant psychiatrist and Senior Lecturer at The Queen’s University of Belfast, where he established the Centre for Psychotherapy with various degree courses, research work and clinical services. He also devoted himself to understanding and addressing religious fundamentalism and long-standing violent political conflict, initially in Ireland, and then in various other parts of the world. This commitment took him into politics, and he was elected Leader of Northern Ireland’s Alliance Party from 1987 to 1998, playing a significant role in the negotiation of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. When the new Northern Ireland Assembly was elected, he became its first Speaker. In 2004, he retired from the Assembly on being appointed by the British and Irish Governments as one of the four members of the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC), appointed to close down the operations of the paramilitary organisations (2003-2011). He continued with this work on security issues when the new Northern Ireland Government commissioned him and two colleagues to produce a report advising them on a strategy for disbanding the remaining paramilitary groups (2016).

Julian F. Müller is a Professor of Political Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Graz. His main areas of research are political philosophy and applied ethics. For more info, see page 18-19. 

 

Panel -I- 

Politics of Social Contract

Exploring Human Rights Attitudes: Outgroup Perception and Long-term Consequences

Sabine Carey is Professor of Political Science at the University of Mannheim and Director of the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. She empirically investigates drivers of different forms of state-sponsored violence, with particular emphasis on the role of political institutions and repressive agents. She is interested in understanding what drives people’s perceptions of peace, security and human rights. Her work has been supported by research grants from the German Science Foundation and the European Research Council, among others. 

Robert Johns is Professor of Politics at the University of Southampton. He has twenty years’ experience of research and teaching in the fields of elections, public opinion, political psychology and survey methodology. He is interested in what people think about politics, where those opinions come from, and how we can go about measuring slippery things like beliefs, attitudes and values. Rob has worked on a large number of (often ESRC-funded) survey projects, most notably as a founding investigator on the Scottish Election Study series, and has particular expertise in the design of survey experiments. 

Katrin Paula is Professor of Global Security and Technology at the Technical University Munich. She researches and teaches in the field of Human Security and Contentious Politics. A particular focus of her work is how changing information- and communication technologies and their strategic use and control affect political mobilization and violence. Exemplary research areas include the effect of information technologies on the spatial and temporal diffusion of protests, the effect of state censorship on political attitudes, or the strategic use of violence during elections, as well as methods of data collection in the field of conflict studies and statistical modeling of spatial processes. 

Nadine O’Shea is a postdoctoral researcher, working with Katrin Paula and Sabine Carey in the DFG project “Security threats and fragile commitments: Stress-testing German support for human rights at home and abroad” at the Technical University Munich since November 2023. Nadine specializes in conducting empirical research within the field of peace and conflict studies, specifically focusing on human rights, civil wars, and foreign policy. She also has a keen interest in research methods. During her Bachelor’s degree in ‘International Relations (B.A.)’ at Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences in Kleve, Nadine completed an internship abroad at the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations in New York and a semester abroad at San Diego State University. In her Master’s degree ‘Political Science with a specialisation in conflicts, power, and politics (MSc.)’ at Radboud University, in the Netherlands, she focused on the research areas of democratisation, populism and peace and conflict research. By participating in the Radboud Honours Academy and completing a research internship, her interest in research grew. From 2018 to 2023, Nadine worked as a research assistant at the University of Greifswald, where she taught introductory and research practice seminars on international relations. Nadine also taught Quantitative Methods at the University West in Sweden as part of the Erasmus programme. In November 2023, Nadine submitted her dissertation entitled ‘External Interference and Violence Against Civilians During Civil Wars’ to the University of Greifswald.

Abstract: People are often willing to embrace rights-restricting policies, particularly if this is seen as necessary to maintain security or to restrain an out-group. These policies are typically framed as security benefits. What happens when the public is prompted to consider the human rights costs – and the possibility that restricting an out-group today might be applied to an in-group tomorrow? Research in this field has rarely tested public responsiveness to an explicit defence of human rights. To shed new light on this, we address two related questions: What arguments can strengthen support for human rights of others? How much does the answer to this question depend on people’s attitudes towards those whose rights are affected? With a novel survey experiment of over 6,000 adults in Germany, we find that highlighting human rights violations does not in general sway people’s opinions about amnesty for excessive police violence. But it does make respondents less supportive of such amnesty when they would be least committed to human rights. Our study paints an optimistic picture that a stronger human rights narrative might reach those who are otherwise least committed to human rights.

Doing Politics Non-politically: Explaining How Cultural Projects Afford Political Resistance 

Nathan Tsang is a third-year Ph.D. student in sociology at the University of Southern California. His research interests include cultural sociology, political sociology, and social movement studies, with a focus on the connections and disconnections between culture and politics in everyday situations. He has published on Hong Kong’s fact-checking activism in journalism and journalism studies, as well as on online incivility in social movements in computational communication research and the politics of language in Hong Kong. His forthcoming co-authored book chapter in the Handbook of Hong Kong Studies (published by Brill) discussed how different place configurations inform various conceptualisations of “Hong Kong diaspora.” He currently uses qualitative methods to investigate the cultural preservation projects of Asian immigrants in the United States and the United Kingdom. 

Abstract: While the literature on repression, diaspora, and resistance substantially enriches our understanding of how individuals resist secretly and creatively under political pressure, it is still unclear how political resistance survives in nonpolitical organizations. This question is crucial to diasporic migrants from autocratic countries who cannot engage in formal mobilization and use nonpolitical organizations to preserve their collective solidarity. Empirically, this study draws on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork in two cultural organizations by diasporic Hongkongers in the United States. It argues that by comparing two forms of cultural preservation projects—one emphasizing cultural artifacts and another focusing on communal gatherings—collective resistance can exist in organizational life without being deliberately political. Contrary to conventional logic, resistance in the Hong Kong case was neither disguised nor individualized but diffused in cultural activities. To accomplish this, people developed patterned ways to cue political speeches with the help of objects in the physical settings of cultural events. Relying on objects’ material affordances, organizers can regulate political speeches in activities, whereas participants can momentarily shift their speeches into political expressions. As such, organization members can consistently cue a sense of political resistance within their nonpolitical activities. I call this reliance on object-mediated interactions to articulate political concerns “afforded politicization.” The findings contribute to the scholarship by answering the question of when and how isolated, covert forms of everyday resistance can become politically meaningful in organizational life. By showing that diasporic cultural practices are a form of everyday resistance, the study argues that repressed people can mediate politics using objects, and with enough object-mediated interactions, individual resistance can aggregate into collective resistance.

From Demos to Cosmos. The Political Philosophy of Isabelle Stengers 

Simon Clemens is a doctoral researcher at the Cluster of Excellence “Contestation of the Liberal Script – (SCRIPTS)” and doctoral student at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin (Theory of Politics). Following a research stay at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, he is currently a research fellow at Brown University. In addition, he is a freelance contributor to the Federal Agency for Civic Education and the German Resistance Memorial Museum. In his dissertation, he examines the concept of democracy within the debate of New Materialism. His research interests include hegemony and democratic theories, (new and old) materialisms, memory culture, resistance and protest movements, environmental humanities, and (theories of) education. 

Abstract: Politics, when considering all beings—human and nonhuman—faces challenges in addressing this multiplicity. As climate and ecological crises reveal our mutual interdependence, the need for new democratic models is pressing, yet such political visions remain rare. Cosmopolitics, a concept proposed by Belgian philosopher Isabelle Stengers, offers a way to address this gap by expanding democracy beyond human concerns to include all beings, imagining new forms of collectivity.

Stengers’ cosmopolitics challenges the conventional focus on consensus and antagonism in democracy, presenting a “third way” beyond liberal, deliberative, and populist approaches. The paper unfolds in three parts: first, I contrast Stengers’ approach to heterogeneity with John Rawls’ notion of plurality, introducing her concepts of “ecology of practice” and “cosmopolitics” as alternatives to consensus-based coexistence. While Stengers addresses a problem common to liberal democratic theory, her solution and analysis diverge significantly, offering a distinct perspective. Second, I explore how Stengers’ proceduralism—focused on process rather than consensus—enables a common world without requiring agreement. Unlike Jürgen Habermas’ deliberative proceduralism, which excludes non-communicative beings, Stengers’ approach seeks coexistence without consensus, critiquing the limitations of traditional liberal frameworks. Lastly, I examine Stengers’ ecological framing and the figure of the diplomat, offering a path for pacifying antagonistic relations. Her cosmopolitics seeks to balance democracy with ecological awareness, proposing an inclusive model that avoids the coercion of both consensus and populism.

 

Panel -II-  

The “People” In the Age of AI and Algorithms    

Alina Utrata is a Career Development Research Fellow at St John’s College, University of Oxford, an associate member of the Department of Politics and International Relations and a fellow at the Rothermere American Institute. Her research examines technology corporations beyond the traditional political/economic divide, theorizing how and when corporations may enact a kind of political power, from cloud computing to digital payment systems. She received her PhD in Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge and was a 2020 Gates-Cambridge Scholar, where her thesis was awarded the Lisa Smirl PhD Prize. 

In addition to her doctoral research, she has published in the American Political Science Review and the Boston Review comparing Silicon Valley’s outer space colonization projects with the histories of colonizing corporations such as the British or Dutch East India Companies. Dr. Utrata grew up in the San Francisco Bay Area, where I received my BA in history from Stanford University with a minor in human rights. She received her MA in Conflict Transformation and Social Justice from Queen’s University Belfast as a 2017 Marshall Scholar. In her free time, she hosts and produces The Anti-Dystopians, a politics podcast about tech.

Reclaiming “The People” in an Age of Algorithms: AI Literacy as a Democratic Virtue

Hossein Dabbagh is an Assistant Professor in philosophy at Northeastern University London and an affiliate member of the Oxford Continuing Education Department. His research spans moral philosophy, applied ethics, political philosophy, and public policy, with a particular focus on AI ethics, AI-human cooperation, and democratic governance in the digital age. His recent work examines how emerging technologies shape public discourse, civic engagement, and social inequalities, emphasising the role of AI ethics education. 

He advocates for integrating AI ethics into school curricula to promote critical digital literacy and responsible technology use from an early age. In addition to his academic contributions, he has provided evidence for UK government inquiries and public policy initiatives on AI regulation, misinformation, and social media governance. Beyond academia, he collaborates with interdisciplinary networks, including UNESCO’s Inclusive Policy Lab, contributing to global discussions on ethics, technology, and public policy.

Abstract: “The people” is central to democracy, reflecting ideals of collective decision-making and open debate. Yet algorithmic governance reshapes this concept by determining who participates in public discourse, amplifying some voices while silencing others. This paper argues that AI-driven polarisation calls for new approaches to civic education and engagement.

Drawing on deliberative democracy and epistemic justice, I show how algorithmic systems can weaken rational debate by prioritising viral content over verifiable facts. Social media algorithms often push emotionally charged material, fragmenting discussions and fuelling antagonism. By exploiting cognitive biases, these systems reduce “the people” to passive consumers, deepening divisions and enabling exclusionary populist narratives.

Building on Miranda Fricker’s work, I argue that AI systems can intensify testimonial and hermeneutical injustices, distorting collective meaning-making and marginalising vulnerable communities. This breakdown erodes trust and shared understanding, both essential for democracy to function. To address these issues, I propose AI ethics literacy as a core democratic virtue. Beyond technical skills, AI literacy should cultivate a critical awareness of algorithmic influences, empowering citizens to question manipulative content and preserve meaningful public debate. This interdisciplinary effort—linking philosophy, policy, and education—can help align AI governance with democratic values. Reclaiming “the people” as an active, deliberative force is both a moral and political necessity in our algorithmic era. Only by fostering a critically informed citizenry can democracy survive in a world increasingly shaped by AI.

Navigating Digital Disruptions: The Ambiguous Role of Digital Technologies, State Foundations and Gender Rights

Luana Mathias Souto is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Gender and ICT Research Group at Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Spain. Principal Investigator of the project “Reproductive Health under Algorithm Surveillance (THELMA),” with a Marie Skłodowska-Curie (MSCA) Postdoctoral Fellowship by Horizon Europe. She holds a doctoral and master’s degrees in Law from Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (PUC Minas), Brazil. During her doctoral studies, she analyzed the effectiveness of women’s political rights under Giorgio Agamben’s state of exception theory. 

Her research findings also include the study of gender-political violence in Latin America. Since then, her work has analyzed the most recent threads on women’s rights, including how digital platforms increase violations of women’s rights. Her doctoral dissertation received a Magna cum Laude distinction. Her last publication is the chapter “The Biopolitical Perspective in Women’s Legal Education“ in the Routledge-edited book “Biopolitics and Structure in Legal Education.“ Formerly visiting Postdoctoral Researcher at the Max Planck Institute in Frankfurt (MPILHLT/2023) and in Hamburg (MPIPriv/2024), and Research Fellow at the Weizenbaum Institute in Berlin (2024).

Abstract: This paper explores how digital disruptions, particularly in the Rule of Law, ambiguously affect the democratic process and constrain women’s rights. In general, all the foundational elements of modern states- territory, people, and sovereignty – face significant challenges in the digital era, but the concept of people remains the most affected. Cross-border data flows, for example, challenge the principles of territoriality and sovereignty, emphasizing extraterritoriality when tech companies are based in different countries from their data users, making it difficult to protect data rights. The rise of “divisible dividual ” – individuals whose data is fragmented across various platforms – illustrates how personal data fragmentation challenges the concept of people. By examining the political, reproductive, and economic dimensions, this paper aims to shed light on the multifaceted ways digital technologies impact women’s rights. These disruptions ensure that gender inequalities remain embedded in state foundations. Even though technological advances are seen as crucial for democracy, bringing information, connecting people, and uniting diverse communities, they inherit unresolved social dilemmas, which illiberal actors explores to spread anti-gender practices in digital platforms, exacerbating the politics of “us and them ” and using gender issues as a “symbolic glue ” to weaken democracies. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing strategies to protect democratic values and promote gender equality in the digital era. This paper seeks to contribute to this ongoing conversation by providing a comprehensive analysis of the challenges and proposing potential solutions.

The Role of AI In Shaping the People: Big Tech and the Broligarchy’s Influence on Modern Democracy

Matilde Bufano is a graduate student currently finalising an MSc in International Security Studies at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies and the University of Trento. Her interests revolve around the role of AI in society in peace and war times, the exploitation of algorithms for propaganda in wartime. Her work covered the two most discussed current conflicts, namely the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict. 

Matilde has an interest in the right-wing extremism in peacetime, trans-exclusionary echo chambers and conspiracy theory bubbles. Theories such as QAnon and the Deep State have sparked particular interest, especially after the violent and undemocratic shifts peaked with the Capitol Hill events in the US. Matilde holds a cum laude bachelor’s degree in political science, International Relations, and Human Rights at the University of Padova.

Abstract: The main application of AI in social media is algorithmic curation based on user-preference data. Such a process creates echo chambers, i.e. bounded and enclosed media spaces in which similar content is infinitely propagated, insulating users from cross-cutting exposure. This effectively creates a distinction between “us” and “them”, grouping users in unescapable bubbles stemming from simply deduced preferences, making the gap between the two groups unbridgeable. 

This has been worsened by a simultaneous reduction in fact-checking and the rise of generative AI as a disinformation creator and amplifier, with which anyone can create a video of a non-event to instigate hate and exclusion. Disinformation contains a component of exclusion, often grounded in the stark distinction between an “us” and a “them.” According to Çoksan and Yilmaz (2023), fake news can be divided into six groups: contact-outgroup blaming, represented-outgroup blaming, outgroup derogation, outgroup appreciation, ingroup glorification, and phantom-mastermind blaming.

In recent years, ingroup glorification, outgroup blaming, and derogation have become increasingly common, using minorities as scapegoats for global issues, feeding into conspiracy theories propagated by algorithmic curation like QAnon, and effectively harming democracy not only in online arenas. The rise of the (tech) broligarchy and fall of liberal democracy has been apparent in online spaces. It is now spilling over to real life, with radicalising policies online (e.g. unescapable algorithmic curation) repeating themselves in exclusionary policies in the physical world.

 

Panel -III-  

Populist Threats to Modern Constitutional Democracies and Potential Solutions: Research Output of The Jean Monnet Chair EUCODEM

Elia Marzal is an Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Barcelona.   She holds a Ph.D. in Law from the European University Institute in Florence, with a dissertation on comparative constitutional law. Her research has focused on immigration, the historical development of political structures, the tensions between territorial political entities in normative production, the protection of minorities in heterogeneous states, and equality.

Theoretical Foundations of Modern Populism: Approaches of Heidegger, Laclan and Laclau

Daniel Fernández Cañueto is an Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Lleida. Director of the journal Nuevos Horizontes del Derecho Constitucional, Member of the Jean Monnet Chair EUCODEM at the University of Barcelona and junior associate researcher at the Giménez Abad Foundation. He participates in national and international research projects on institutional and democratic quality, rule of law, parliamentarism and populism. He has conducted research stays at the University of Ottawa and the University of Chile. He is also a member of the popular legislative initiatives Control Commission of the Parliament of Catalonia, a member of the Board of Advisors of the Institute for Self-Government Studies since 2021, and a member of the Board of the Association of Constitutional Lawyers of Spain. Author of several monographs and research works such as “Representación política y sistemas sociales,” (2020, CEPC), “La construcción de la representación territorial en Canadá”, (2021, Derechos Humanos, Derecho Constitucional y Derecho Internacional: sinergias contemporáneas), “Chile: de la democracia limitada de Pinochet al proceso constituyente de 2020” (2021, Revista de estudios políticos) or “Realidad constitucional, literatura y pensamiento” (2021, Revista de estudios políticos). 

Abstract: Populism is widely studied in political science and constitutional law. We refer to the definition of what constitutes the current populist parties, their actions, and the consequences of their approach to political activity on democracy and constitutionalism. However, their theoretical origins have not been analyzed in depth. In my opinion, there is a connecting thread between the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, the structuralist linguistics of Lacan, and the post-Marxist thought of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe that determines, frames, and defines the concept of populism. The aim of the paper is precisely to make this hitherto veiled connection visible, to make explicit how the critique of the universals of the Enlightenment and the fall of the Soviet Union end up having an impact on thinking about both linguistics and political theory and, from there, it is transformed into an original political thought that spreads first through Latin America and then through the rest of the West. Likewise, understanding this connection also allows us to glimpse how this populist thought is transferred, when it impacts law, into an illiberal doctrine. 

Erosion of the Independence of the Judiciary 

Marco Antonio Simonelli is an Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Barcelona. He obtained his Ph.D. in Comparative Constitutional Law from the University di Siena, an LL.M. in European Law from the University of Leiden, and a Law Degree from the University of Pisa. He is currently a Schumann Fellow at the University of Münster for 2025-2026 and has also completed research stays at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Public Law in Heidelberg and at the Centre of Comparative and European Constitutional Studies (CECS) of the University of Copenhagen. He was also an intern at the Rome Criminal Court of Appeal and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. Dr. Simonelli’s research interests focus on the multifaceted contemporary challenges to liberal constitutional democracy, with particular attention to counter-majoritarian institutions. He is the author of the book “The European Court of Human Rights and National Constitutional Courts (Springer, 2024)” and co-editor of “Populism and Contemporary Democracy: Old Problems and New Challenges” (Palgrave MacMillan, 2022), as well as several academic articles and commentaries in the field of European constitutional law published in national and international law journals.

Abstract: Since the rise of populism, the role of judges in democratic politics has become one of the major issues of debate. Populism indeed challenges one of the core tenets of constitutional liberal democracy: the idea that the judicial branch shall be separated from the legislative and the executive and that it shall be capable of controlling them. Claiming that unelected bodies cannot override the will of elected ones, populist leaders indeed attempt to depict the judges as “enemies of the people”. Recent developments in both established and emerging democracies—including open challenges to the validity of judicial decisions and questioning the impartiality of courts—demonstrate that no democracy is immune to these pressures. At the same time, the growing polarization of the political arena reverberates also on judicial appointments, further treating the independence of the judiciary and its ability to uphold legal and constitutional principles. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the impact of populism on judicial independence by providing a comparative review of the most common strategies employed by populist governments to undermine judicial independence, such as court-packing, changes in the appointment system, the conferral of disciplinary powers in the Minister of Justice as well the public delegitimization of courts. In parallel, the paper, drawing on national experiences, also explores the most effective strategies for insulating ordinary and constitutional courts from political branches, thereby contributing to the strengthening of constitutional democracy in an era of rising illiberalism.

Referenda as a Biased and Populist Tool: Addressing a Complex Issue in a Binary Way

Elia Marzal Yetano is an Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Barcelona and until 2022 she was professor of Constitutional Law and Legal History at ESADE Law School, Ramon Llull University, Barcelona. She holds a Ph.D. in Law from the European University Institute in Florence, with a dissertation on comparative constitutional law, in which she analyzed the convergence of legislative and jurisdictional entities in the creation of law in the specific field of immigration. Other than on immigration, her research has focused on the historical development of political structures, the tensions between territorial political entities in normative production, the intersection between Constitutional law and history, the protection of minorities in heterogeneous states, and issues on equality. Her research has been published in national and international journals, including the European Journal of Political Research, Managerial Law, Revista de Derecho Político, Revista Crítica de Derecho Inmobiliario, Revista de Estudios Políticos, Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español, Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger or the International Journal of Constitutional Law. 

Abstract: For secessionist movements, Canada and the United Kingdom represent examples of overcoming the traditional reluctance of liberal democracies to consider holding secession referendums as a means of resolving territorial conflicts. However, the doctrine established by the Supreme Court of Canada (later echoed in the United Kingdom) does not place the referendum at its core; rather, Parliament holds a prominent position. This paper examines the actual role assigned to Parliament within that doctrine and its potential implications for the framework of constitutional democracy. It analyzes the reasoning found in the key texts that support this doctrine—namely, the 1998 opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada on Quebec’s secession, the 2000 federal Clarity Act, and the 2022 opinion of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom on Scotland’s ability to unilaterally call a new secession referendum—assessing the weight given to Parliament from a social choice perspective. Two main conclusions emerge. First, the doctrine acknowledges the relationship between the legitimacy of a decision and the costs inherent in the decision-making process, which increase as the decision becomes more divisive within the affected community. Second, it implicitly highlights the need to nuance and complicate the liberal democratic fiction of a singular people and a general will, suggesting that in certain contexts, majority-rule democracy should be complemented by consensus democracy.

Pro-independence Movements as a Populist Way Out

Núria González Campañá is an Assistant Professor in Constitutional Law at the University of Barcelona. She received her DPhil in Law from the University of Oxford in 2019. Prior to that, she obtained her M.A. in Law and Diplomacy (The Fletcher School, Tufts University) and her B.A. in Law (University of Barcelona). Her main research interests are: 1) Self-determination and secession in Spanish, comparative and EU constitutional law and 2) Populism, constitutional democracy and rule of law. Among her research, the monograph “Secession and European Union Law. The deferential attitude” (Oxford University Press) was nominated for the 2024 Book of the Year prize awarded by the International Forum on the Future of Constitutionalism. In addition to being a team member in national research projects, she has also been a member of the European project “Democratic Efficacy and the varieties of populism in Europe”, led by Prof. Boda Zsolt, Institute for Legal Studies (Budapest) and funded by the European Commission. She is currently a member of the “core team” of the Jean Monnet Chair in European Constitutional Democracy (EUCODEM) at the University of Barcelona. She has carried out research stays at McGill University and the European University Institute.

Abstract: Spain is not alien to the phenomenon of populist narratives and constitutional erosion. Although probably unnoticed by international audiences, one of the most relevant examples of constitutional erosion that has taken place in Spain in recent years was the Catalan secessionist bid. In this paper, I’ll focus on one populist trait of the pro-independence movement: the illiberal interpretation of democracy. Catalan pro-independence leaders made great efforts to build the case that organizing a referendum on secession is a question of democratic quality. “Voting is normal in a normal country” or “This is about democracy” were some of the most repeated slogans. However, only a few democracies (e.g. Canada and the UK) have permitted a vote on the secession of a part of the country. Other constitutional democracies (e.g., the US, Italy, and Germany) have rejected the idea that one part of the country can organize a referendum on secession. 

Catalan pro-independence leaders assumed that democracy, understood as majority rule, should trump any other legal principle, like the rule of law, respect for minorities, or federalism. But democracy is not only about voting or about the wishes of the majority. Constitutional democracy means people decide but do so according to rules that can only be changed following their amendment procedure. However, in the populist narrative of the Catalan pro-independence movement, a majoritarian concept of democratic legitimacy took prevalence over the rule of law, and the popular will was conceived as the only source of power. The implication was that ‘the people’ cannot be wrong, and therefore, leaders and parliaments should find a way to carry out people’s aspirations, regardless of the letter of the law. The referendum became a moral goal, the only tool to allow for the political expression of the people’s will. Oriol Junqueras, former Vice-President of the Catalan government, insisted several times that “voting is a right that prevails over any law” This opposition between purported popular legitimacy and legality implies an illiberal version of democracy. The idea of the government of the people is taken literally, and checks and balances on the popular will are rejected.

Potential Solutions: Second Chambers, Demos and Majoritarian Body

Roger Boada Queralt is an Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at ESADE Law School in Barcelona. He has also been a Visiting Professor at the Centre for Transnational Legal Studies at King’s College London. He received his PhD from ESADE Law School and his LLM from Duke University School of Law. He has devoted much of his research to the constitutional theory developed by the School of Salamanca, particularly that of Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez. His book The Limits on State Power in the Thought of Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez has been published in Spanish by the Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales. In addition, he has written a chapter devoted to counterpowers in the School of Salamanca for a collective work titled Counterpowers in Constitutional Democracy in the Face of the Populist Threat, coordinated by Josep Maria Castellà and Enriqueta Expósito and published in Spanish by Marcial Pons. He has also lectured on the relevance of the notion of common good in contemporary Constitutional Law and its connections with the School of Salamanca. His current research focuses on second chambers in Spanish and Comparative Constitutional Law, with a particular focus on the Senate of Spain as a moderating chamber in the context of an imperfect bicameral system, as well as on the ongoing and potential reforms of the House of Lords.

Abstract: Second chambers in bicameral legislatures have long been debated in constitutional design. Nowadays, they often oscillate between two broad roles, which are not necessarily mutually incompatible. The first one would be that of a territorial chamber, which provides a channel for the participation of regions and federated states in the decision-making process at the national level or that specialises in issues related to regional autonomy or the territorial organisation of power. The second one would be that of a moderating chamber with varying degrees of political power, whose raison d’être would be to provide a check on the lower chamber, improve the quality of legislation, provide for more sober reflection, and pursue a broader consensus on disputed issues. Drawing on the distinction between these two models and adopting a Comparative Constitutional Law perspective, this presentation shall explore their potential as institutions capable of reflecting more complex demos while acting as moderators against the unchecked impulses of purely majoritarian bodies. The presentation will focus on the Senate of Spain and the British House of Lords, with particular emphasis on their role as moderating chambers in a context of imperfect bicameralism, which places them in a position of relative weakness vis-à-vis their respective lower chambers. The analysis will be enriched by relevant political developments and potential constitutional reforms. By integrating lessons from both countries, it shall posit that, even in an imperfect bicameral system, second chambers can enhance deliberation, restraint and stability, countering the risks of populist or unreflective majoritarianism.

Panel -IV-   

Politics of Belonging: Voices and Silencing

Azize Sargin is an independent researcher and consultant of external relations for non-governmental organisations. She holds a doctorate in International Relations, with a focus on Migration Studies, from the Brussels School of International Studies at the University of Kent. Her research interest covers migrant belonging and integration, diversity and cities, and transnationalism. Azize had a 15-year professional career as a diplomat in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she held various positions and was posted to different countries, including Romania, the United States, and Belgium. During her last posting, she served as the political counsellor at the Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the EU.

Anne-Margret Wolf is a Fellow at All Souls College, University of Oxford, where she researches authoritarian politics, focusing on the Middle East and North Africa. She has a particular interest in Tunisia, a country where she has researched for over a decade. Dr. Wolf is the author of Ben Ali’s Tunisia: Power and Contention in an Authoritarian Regime (Oxford University Press, 2023) and Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda (Oxford University Press, 2017). She is also the Editor of The Oxford Handbook of Authoritarian Politics.

The Scents of Belonging: Olfactory Narratives and the Dynamics of Democratization

Maarja Merivoo-Parro is a historian dedicated to exploring the history of mentality at the intersection of culture and politics in democratization processes. A Fulbright scholar, she is currently a Marie Curie Fellow at the University of Jyväskylä, where she examines the role of grassroots international relations in shaping civic identities. Her interdisciplinary research combines political history, sensory studies, and oral history to uncover how cultural experiences influence democratic engagement. Beyond academia, Maarja is an active young public intellectual who has recently gained national recognition for her work in bridging scholarly research and society. She has brought complex historical and political topics to wider audiences through television and radio programs, making history accessible and relevant to contemporary debates. She has been a longtime board member of the Baltic Heritage Network and the Estonian Diaspora Academy, contributing to international efforts to document and analyze migration, memory, and transnational cultural connections. Having conducted extensive oral history research across multiple continents, she is committed to preserving lived experiences as vital sources of historical knowledge. She has been awarded with the AABS Emerging Scholar Grant for continuing her contributions to the field.

Abstract: Amid the global erosion of democracies, cultural and sensory dimensions play an often-overlooked role in shaping collective identities and fostering civic cohesion. My research investigates how olfactory heritage – embedded in shared memories, rituals, and environments – historically contributed to defining “the people” in democratic and undemocratic contexts. This paper explores how olfactory cues have served to strengthen the democratic process and, conversely, to fuel divisions.

Through case studies from Finland and (Soviet-)Estonia, I analyze the interplay between olfactory culture and the rhetoric of “us” versus “them.” For instance, how have national and local scents – such as those tied to cross-border communication, industrial heritage, family celebrations, or contested spaces – shaped everyday understandings of democracy?

By combining sensory history with political theory, this study highlights the potential of olfactory heritage to serve as a medium for democratization and social cohesion, offering a novel perspective on the dynamics of civic identity.

This presentation employs an interdisciplinary approach, integrating sensory history, olfactory cultural studies, and political theory. Using archival sources, oral histories, and the media, I trace how olfactory practices have been used to define boundaries of inclusion and exclusion within democratic and authoritarian regimes. The study further explores how olfactory narratives interact with other cultural markers, such as music, art, and public ceremonies, in shaping aspirational and actual civic identities in the long 20th century.

Transnational Solidarity Movements: Autogestion, Community Building and Defining Colonial Alterity between French Algeria and Israel/Palestine 

Sara Elizabeth Green is a DPhil candidate in History at the University of Oxford. Her research examines transnational solidarity movements with the Palestinian cause in the wake of decolonisation, particularly how thinking about Palestinian displacement and dispossession reflects and shapes historical memory of settler colonialism; concepts of indigeneity and belonging; gender and affect in anticolonial politics; cultural decolonisation in the era of ‘Third World’ internationalism. She previously completed her undergraduate studies in History at the University of Leeds, followed by the MSt in Global and Imperial History at the University of Oxford, where her thesis focused on the racialised representations of female nudity and modesty in French colonial ethnography of Algeria (1881-1931).

Abstract: This paper will explore cultures of autogestion and democratic community building by Jewish and Muslim actors in Palestinian solidarity movements after the decolonisation of French Algeria (1964-1974). In a context of calculated state restrictions on the political and associative activities of stateless political exiles and immigrant communities, these spaces provided an avenue to discuss and define the parameters of colonial privilege and alterity between French Algeria and Israel/Palestine. Between clandestine networking with anticolonial militants across continents, or the circulation of cassette tapes connecting the Palestinian struggle with racial policing in postcolonial France in factories and worker’s unions, this paper will explore the methods used by activists to foster Muslim-Jewish dialogue under a state apparatus that frequently presumed the perpetual enmity of these communities. In particular, the development of a connected culture of memorialisation of colonial violence connected the displacement of Palestinian ‘undesirables’ to the waves of racially motivated violence and political assassinations that targeted these communities over the course of the 1970s. This reconfigured the notion of ‘the people’ by recentring the humanity of Palestinian, Arab and Jewish victims of racialisation and undermining the separatist logic that defined inequality in Israel/Palestine, particularly beyond the confines of official French perspectives that continued to characterise and surveille militants of the Algerian ‘rebellion’, Muslim and Jewish alike, as ‘subversive’ agents.

Silent Symbols, Loud Legacies: The Child in Populist Narratives of Post-Communist Poland 

Maria Jerzyk is a Polish sociology student at Masaryk University in Brno, Czechia. Her research spans populism studies, childhood studies, and the sociology of food, but at its core, it asks one fundamental question: how does the past quietly dictate the present? Viewing social realities through a post-Soviet trauma lens, she investigates how historical experiences of repression and transformation leave echoes in contemporary political rhetoric, cultural anxieties, and even what we eat. She is particularly fascinated by how populist movements weaponize the idea of childhood—simultaneously portraying children as symbols of purity and obedience while excluding those who challenge traditional norms. Beyond politics, she explores how food practices reflect national identity, historical trauma, and power dynamics. Through her interdisciplinary approach, she seeks to uncover the hidden ways inherited fears and unspoken histories continue to shape modern life. By blending political analysis with cultural sociology, her work offers a fresh perspective on how the ghosts of the past find their way into today’s populist narratives and everyday rituals.

Abstract: This paper explores the ambivalent role of children in populist discourse, focusing on Poland’s right-wing populist government (2015–2023) under Law and Justice (PiS). Populist rhetoric constructs childhood through a paradox: children are simultaneously portrayed as obedient, passive figures in need of protection and as “bad” or “dangerous” when they exhibit independence, agency or engage in activism. This dichotomy is further intensified when children’s perceived transgressions align with broader populist social divisions, such as identification with LGBTQ+ communities or participation in wide-variety movements, leading to their symbolic exclusion from the national collective.

The study analyzes political speeches from Law and Justice politicians, illustrating how these narratives frame childhood as a battleground for moral and ideological struggles. Additionally, it situates these discursive strategies within Poland’s post-communist context, where Soviet-era ideals of disciplined and collectivist youth continue to resonate with populist audiences. By examining propaganda films from Polska Kronika Filmowa, the paper traces continuities between communist and populist constructions of childhood, demonstrating how historical narratives are reactivated to legitimize contemporary exclusionary politics. Through this analysis, the paper highlights how the figure of the child becomes a potent symbol in populist storytelling, shaping political identities and reinforcing cultural anxieties in post-communist Poland.

  

Panel -V- 

Governing the ‘People’: Divided Nations

Leyla Aliyeva is an Associate of REES, Oxford School for Global and Area Studies (OSGA), previously Senior Common Room Member and Academic Visitor at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University. She holds a PhD from Moscow University. Originally from Azerbaijan, she founded and directed two think tanks in Baku and held fellowships at Harvard University, UC Berkeley, the Kennan Institute (Washington, DC), the NATO Defence College (Rome), and the IFK (Institut Für Kulturwissenschaften) in Vienna. My research and publications cover Azerbaijan, the Caucasus, Russia, and the broader Former Soviet Union, and range thematically from energy security and conflicts to democracy in oil-rich states, as well as issues surrounding integration into the EU (ENP and EaP) and NATO. Currently, Leyla is analysing the role of religious identities in transition, as well as comparing the role of the opposition in rentier states.

Karen Horn is Professor in Economic Thought, University of Erfurt. 

Catholicism and Nationalism in Croatia: The Use and Misuse of “Hrvatski Narod”

Natalie Schwabl is a doctoral candidate at the Faculty of Arts, Languages, Literature and Humanities of Sorbonne University/Paris, under the supervision of Professor Johann Chapoutot. The subject of her thesis is “Violence and Religion in the ‘Independent State of Croatia’ (1941-1945)”, focusing on the role of the Catholic clergy under the Croatian Ustasha regime. She is of German and Croatian origin and grew up and began her studies in Germany after a German-French Bachelor of Arts in History and French (Literature, Linguistics and Translation) at the universities of Mainz (Germany), Dijon (France) and Sherbrooke (Canada), she obtained her Master’s degree in Modern History at Sorbonne University in 2022, where she has been a Junior Lecturer in History since 2021, for classes in Modern History and English.

Abstract: This paper explores the relation between the Croatian state and radical Catholicism, including the role of the Catholic church as an institution, throughout the 20th century, until today. The inextricable link between Catholicism and nationalism in Croatia was fostered by the frequent change of regimes in the 20th century: the “First Yugoslavia” under the Karađorđević dynasty (1918-1929, 1929-1941), the “Independent State of Croatia” (1941-1945) and the fascist Ustasha regime, the “Second Yugoslavia” under Tito who died in 1980 and, after 1991, the new Republic of Croatia. As the most important vector of national identity for the Croatian people and the projection of their feeling of belonging to the West, the Catholic Church was omnipresent in Croatian political, social and cultural life.

By adopting an interdisciplinary and transnational approach, this paper aims at responding to the following questions: in what ways are religion and the question of faith employed and instrumentalized by rulers? How do they become tools of nationalist representation and revisionism, from the 1990s to the present day? By examining the influence of religious actors in the political sphere, how do socio-historical dynamics in Croatia relate to the continuity of old conflicts, still locked in revisionist discourse, and how do they influence the Croatian collective memory? What does this imply for Croatia today, as the youngest member of the European Union?

“Become Ungovernable:” Covert Tactics, Racism, and Civilizational Catastrophe 

Sarah Riccardi-Swartz is an Assistant Professor of Religion and Anthropology at Northeastern University. An interdisciplinary scholar, she is trained as a historian, ethnographer, and filmmaker of American religion. She is the author of Between Heaven and Russia: Religious Conversion and Political Apostasy in Appalachia (Fordham University Press, 2022). She is currently completing a book manuscript tentatively entitled Digital Dissidents: Science, Technology, and Orthodoxy in Far-Right Media Worlds. Her work has been supported by the NEH via Fordham University’s Orthodox Christian Studies Center, the Henry Luce Foundation, the Louisville Institute, the Institute for Citizens & Scholars, and the Social Science Research Council, among other organizations.

Abstract: Considering racialized theo-political ideas espoused by far-right Christians in the American South, this paper looks at their paradoxical need for social-moral securitization through nationalist policies and government policing in relationship to their anti-democratic desires to become ungovernable as citizens of heaven. Exploring the notion of an imperiled Christian civilization at the hands of “deep state” elites, this paper shows how far-right Christian anxieties over the “catastrophe” of democracy apocalyptically lead to covert sociopolitical tactics aimed at liberating the far-right self from the assumed system of Western liberal oppression. Specifically, I track the developing interest by American actors, from the VDare founders, to the League of the South, to social media content creators, in Russia illiberalism to advance a transnational conception of “the people” as founded in Christianity and Whiteness, positioning shared bloodlines and a “common faith” as hallmarks of a civilizational culture in contrast to the diversity of democracy that they believe is linked to social decline and catastrophe. In tracing this out, I look at how post-Soviet Russia becomes a salvific geo-political possibility for those fleeing ideological cartographies of assumed white Christian marginalization in the United States. Utilizing ethnographic data and media analysis, I show how transnational, digital flows of religiosity and racism are co-constituted in the illiberal dramaturgy of white panic and mythos of ungovernability that draws together actors from the American South and Putin’s Russia into a global imaginary of anti-democratic political possibilities for disaffected people.

Is There Left-wing Populism Today? A Case Study of the German Left and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance

Petar S. Ćurčić is a Research Associate at the Institute of European Studies in Belgrade, Serbia, where he has been employed since 2021. His academic focus spans political history, particularly of Germany and Central Europe, with a strong emphasis on the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany. Ćurčić’s research interests also encompass international relations, geo-economics, the study of capitalism, the history of ideas, the theory of historiography, as well as narratology and imagology. Ćurčić has contributed to various scholarly works, including book chapters and reviews. Notable publications include his chapter on the German Left and the 2024 elections, as well as reviews on topics such as conservatism, capitalism, social conflict, and political upheaval in Europe. He is an active participant in academic conferences, with recent presentations at the University of Westminster in London on the image of Europe in the political discourse of Alternative for Germany and at the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik, discussing late capitalism and the politics of crisis. He continues to engage in a wide range of scholarly activities, shaping contemporary political discourse through his research.

Abstract: In contrast to the Third Way social democracy and Green movements, radical left-wing parties, such as Germany’s Left Party, have resisted centrist shifts, instead developing distinct responses to neoliberalism. Formed in 2007 through the merger of the Party of Democratic Socialism and Labour and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative (WASG), the Left Party is a key actor in the EU, especially given Germany’s prominence. While critics like Karlheinz Weißmann and Ernst Nolte argue that leftist movements emerged in a period of capitalist expansion rather than worker impoverishment, scholars such as Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau offer a more refined categorization of leftist politics. They distinguish between pure reformism, radical reformism, and revolutionary reformism. The Left Party, as a radical reformist party, opposes oligarchy, bureaucracy, and global capitalism, while advocating for marginalized groups, including workers, migrants, and the LGBT+ community.

Internal divisions, particularly after Sahra Wagenknecht’s departure, have raised questions about the party’s future. Despite accusations of extremism and surveillance by Germany’s constitutional protection agency, the Left Party has become a crucial counterforce to the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). Wagenknecht’s Alliance, often linked to social conservatism, contrasts with the Left Party’s stance. Following a strong performance in the February federal elections, this paper examines whether the Left Party has moved toward the center, reaffirming its democratic commitments and distancing itself from populism, or whether it has adapted left-wing populism to the current political context.

 

Panel -VI-  

The “People” in Search of Democracy

Hugo Bonin is a postdoctoral researcher, specialising in the histories, practices and theories of democracy. Hugo received a PhD in political science from Université Paris VIII and Université du Québec à Montréal on the conceptual history of democracy in nineteenth-century Britain. This led to the publication of a monograph (in French) on the question: ‘At the sound of the new word spoken’: Le mot démocratie en Grande-Bretagne, 1770-1920, Presses universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 2024. His research has appeared in Briths Politics, the Journal of History of Ideas, and Global Intellectual History.

Max Steuer is an Associate Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University, Jindal Global Law School (India, on leave), Principal Investigator at the Department of Political Science of the Comenius University in Bratislava (Slovakia) and a 2024—2025 re:constitution fellow. His research centers on puzzles of democracy in the European Union with focus on Slovakia and Hungary, and thematic specialization on constitutional adjudication, militant democracy and extreme speech. His works appeared in European Constitutional Law Review, European Journal of Risk Regulation, International Journal of Human Rights, Legal Pluralism and Critical Social Analysis, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law and elsewhere. Among his recent editorial responsibilities is a coedited special section of the Jindal Global Law Review on ‘Cultural Expertise and Litigation in South Asia and Europe’ (2023). Max is principal investigator of ‘Harvesting Judicial Reservoirs of Resilience to Autocratization for Rebuilding Democracy in the Visegrad Four’ (Recovery and Resilience Plan as part of Next Generation EU, 2024—2026) and ‘Illiberalism and the Constitution of the Slovak Republic: Political Discourse Analysis’ (Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic, 2023—2025). He is member of the Management Committee and Working Group on Theory of the COST Action ‘K-Peritia (Cultural Expertise Junior Network)’.

The Two Peoples: Why Deliberating and Voting Don’t Belong Together 

Théophile Pénigaud is a postdoctoral researcher at the ISPS at Yale. He specializes in political theory, and his research interests include the history of political thought, democratic theory, the theories of justice, and political epistemology. His book The People’s Deliberations: Context and Concepts of Rousseau’s Political Philosophy was published in French by Classiques Garnier in 2024. He holds a Ph.D. from the École Normale Supérieure de Lyon. Just before coming to Yale, he directed a Junior Laboratory on “Changes and Current Trends in Democracies” at the École Normale Supérieure and was a lecturer at Lyon 3 University.

Abstract: There is a widely shared sense, rightly or wrongly, that the grip of (sound) arguments on public debate has waned in recent years. Donald Trump’s victory and Brexit in the UK in 2016 have spurred inquiries about alleged dysfunctions in public communication, including the spread of “fake news,” algorithmically curated social networks, or populist rhetoric. In this paper, I suggest that the problem may run deeper. From the beginning, deliberative democrats have overlooked a crucial distinction: that between deliberating and voting and the fundamentally different rationales underpinning them. In other words, it has been recklessly assumed that the virtues of public deliberation would carry over to voting. Yet many reasons for voting for or against a proposal may be entirely rational and understandable, irrespective of the merit of arguments. Conversely, the motivating power of public justification is considerably muted as soon as one enters the voting booth.  

In this paper, I argue that the impact of public deliberation on voting decisions has remained undertheorized, mainly postulated or inferred from the success of heterogeneous settings, such as deliberative mini-publics (Jürgen Habermas 2006). While some proponents of deliberative democracy have worked out the internal relationship between deliberating and voting (Chambers and Warren 2023), there remains a disconnect between the public forum and the voting booth. In response, I attempt to sketch out a voter-centered, realistic, and context-sensitive approach to democratic deliberation.

Between Antonio Gramsci and Erik Olin Wright: Deepening Democracy Through Civil Society Engagement

Rashad Seedeen is an Adjunct Research Fellow in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Media in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at La Trobe University, Melbourne. His research interests are focused on the residual hegemony of the United States, complex-Gramscian theory, and examining theoretical models in deepening democracy in all aspects of life. His current research is focused on the changing relational dynamics within global governance, the Global South and multipolarity, and democracy theory. His first book, The United States’ Residual Hegemony: A complex-Gramscian Examination, was published in 2023.

Abstract: With democracies worldwide in retreat, it is increasingly critical to reconsider our engagement with civil society. Two scholars have provided valuable insights in fortifying democratic institutions: Antonio Gramsci, the Italian cultural Marxist, analysed political change through state formation and its organic links to civil society, while Erik Olin Wright, a Marxist sociologist, conceptualized “deep democracy” and anti-capitalist frameworks through his Real Utopias project. This paper proposes that Gramsci’s concept of the “war of position” and Wright’s models for Real Utopias offer foundational elements for a reimagined, dynamic democracy. Gramsci’s “war of position” advocates for a strategy that exposes the contradictions of capitalism, promoting democratic projects to build a counter-hegemonic movement against the prevailing capitalist order. 

Similarly, Wright contends that deep democracy, centred on local empowerment and deliberative processes, can exist within liberal democracies to address public needs. A critical examination of two Real Utopias—associative democracy and participatory budgeting—focuses on the First People’s Assembly of Victoria in Australia and the participatory budget in Seoul, South Korea. The Assembly’s model offers the potential to address the alienation of Indigenous populations in Victoria and to build a more inclusive society through the integration of Indigenous Knowledge. Meanwhile, Seoul’s participatory budget has successfully redistributed wealth to marginalized communities and increased democratic inclusion. By examining these case studies alongside Gramsci and Wright’s theoretical contributions, this paper demonstrates that deepening democracy through such projects can act as a safeguard against existential threats to democratic systems.

Resilient or Regressive?  How Crisis Governance Reshapes the Democratic Future of ‘The People’ 

Jana Ruwayha is a PhD Candidate at the University of Geneva’s Faculty of Law and a Teaching and Research Assistant at the Global Studies Institute. Her research examines how prolonged states of emergency—such as counterterrorism measures and pandemic responses—reshape liberal democracies by blurring the boundaries between crisis governance and ordinary rule. She analyzes how exceptional powers, initially justified as temporary, become entrenched, enabling executive overreach, weakening institutional checks and balances, and transforming the relationship between “the people” and the state.

As a Visiting PhD Researcher at University College London and a member of UCL’s Global Centre for Democratic Constitutionalism, she contributes to interdisciplinary discussions on democratic resilience and the erosion of civil liberties. Her work engages with key debates on populism, majoritarianism, and the instrumentalization of “the people” in legal and political discourse. She examines how emergency rhetoric fosters exclusionary narratives, marginalizing dissenting voices and justifying illiberal shifts in governance.

Abstract: This paper examines how the normalization of states of emergency in liberal democracies reshapes the relationship between “the people” and the state. As part of my doctoral research at the University of Geneva, this study explores how emergency powers, initially temporary, become entrenched in governance, challenging democratic principles such as popular sovereignty, transparency, and accountability.

By situating this shift within the broader context of democratic erosion and resilience, the research highlights how prolonged crises enable executive overreach, weaken checks and balances, and justify power consolidation in the name of security. Using Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) theory, the paper analyzes how legal frameworks adapt to recurring crises, redefining civil liberties and human rights in favor of national security. This trend risks reinforcing an “us vs. them” dynamic, where emergency rhetoric suppresses dissent and fractures social cohesion.

The paper argues for reimagining crisis governance to safeguard democracy, ensuring that “the people” remain central to the system rather than tools for majoritarian or authoritarian control. It advocates for transparent decision-making, periodic review of emergency powers, judicial oversight, and a balanced approach that upholds human rights while addressing contemporary challenges.

The Performative Power of the “We” in Occupy Wall Street and the Gezi Movement

Özge Derman teaches sociology at Sciences Po and Sorbonne University. Qualified as an assistant professor by the CNU (18), she holds a Ph.D. in sociology from the EHESS Paris (2023), exploring creative performativity in post-2010 social movements in her dissertation. She earned a B.A. degree in design (Nuova Accademia di Belle Arti, Milan) and in dance (YTU, Istanbul), along with an M.A. degree in sociology (Galatasaray University) and in social sciences (EHESS). Her research focuses on creative and artistic forms of activism in social movements, intersections of culture, art and politics, political art, visual and performative activism, and the climate movement.

Abstract: This paper analyses the creative appearances of the “we, the people” in the context of two social movements. The idea of “we” was incorporated in various creative and performative forms during Occupy Wall Street in New York (2011) and the Gezi Movement in Istanbul (2013), drawing essentially on collective subjectivity (Diesing 2014) and human togetherness (Arendt 1959). This togetherness, both in its bodily and virtual compositions, brings about the performative power that Butler (2015) underlines, which is critical to creating new spaces for and of politics. The question is to understand how creative performativity (Derman 2023) and activism redefine and shape these spaces even when challenged with the other’s togethernesses.  

Voiced, graphic, and bodily performances of the “we” do not represent a homogenic entity but rather potential compositions of collectivity. The “sharing of words and deeds” (Arendt 1959: 198) does not necessarily mean sharing the same ideas at all times. The “Standing Man” and the “Standing Men against the Standing Man” in the Gezi Movement would be illustrative examples of the conflictual aspect of democracy. A single body of an artist/activist acting alone might spur a collective political action by inspiring similar actions at first, which then became collective through the participation of others. The act of standing inspired active citizenship through an everyday gesture that created plural counter-spaces (Derman 2017, 2019). The “we” also emerged as “the 99%” in the Occupy Wall Street and as the “çapulcu” – looter – in the Gezi Movement, which literally appeared in graphical and vocal representations such as the Occupy comics publication and posters of OWS, as well as the graffiti and comics of Gezi (Derman 2024). 

The nightly organised General Assemblies of OWS embodied the experience of direct democracy through the practice of the consensus method for collective decision-making without hierarchy. They aimed “to move beyond an exclusionary liberal universalist interpretation of the 99 percent” (McCleave Maharawal 2013: 180) while not ignoring the presence of “apparent consensus” (Urfalino 2007) by not opposing and the interruptor’s dissensus. The use of “people’s mic” and “hand signals” during the assemblies represented embodied and vocal tools of temporary compositions of collectivity and generated democratic decision-making practices. The data presented in this paper draws on my doctoral research on creative performativity between 2015 and 2023 and is collected from semi-structured interviews with activists, participant observation, and archival research, both conventional and digital.

The French New Right and Its Impact on European Democracies

Murat Aktaş is a Professor of Political Science Department at Muş Alparslan University. He graduated from Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, Department of Public Administration in 2000. In 2004, he completed his master’s degree in the Department of Information and Communication Science at Paris 10 Nanterre University. He completed his PhD at the University of Paris 7, Diderot, in Sociology of Politics, in 2011. His PhD focused on the European Union and Turkey. From 2017 to 2018 he was a post-doctoral researcher at Ecole des Haut Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, researching on the National Front (Front National-FN) and Immigrants. He has authored and edited several books, including The European Union and Turkey; The Information Society Globalization and Democracy; The Arab Spring; and Conflict Resolution and Peace. He also served as guest editor of a special issue for International Sociology on “The Rise of the Far Right and Populist Movements in Europe.” His current research focuses on radical right and populist movements in Europe, Artificial Intelligence, techno oligarchy, human rights and democracy.

Russell Foster is a Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies. He has an interdisciplinary academic background. From 2003 to 2006, he studied history at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, specializing in modern European political history and imperial history. He later earned MA degrees in international politics and human geography from Newcastle University (2008–2010). 

From 2015 to 2016, Russell was a Marie Skłodowska-Curie International Fellow at the University of Amsterdam’s Department of European Studies, researching the relationship between the EU’s symbols and European identity. From 2016 to 2019, he was a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at King’s College London, where he studied nationalism, European identity, and Brexit. His current research focuses on the relationship between the far right and European identity, the far right and LGBTQ+ politics, the legacy of the British Empire in contemporary politics, and the evolving relationship between identity and politics in the UK, the EU, and beyond.

 

Panel -VII-  

“The People” in Schrödinger’s Box: Democracy Alive and Dead 

Ming-Sung Kuo is a Reader in Law at the University of Warwick School of Law. Dr Ming-Sung Kuo’s research interests encompass the fields of constitutional and legal theory, comparative constitutional law (including the United States, Europe, and East Asia), administrative law and regulatory theory, and public international law. His recent scholarship has been focused on the issues of legitimacy in relation to the rise of transnational legal orders and the changing relationship between normalcy and exception in the tendency toward what he terms constitutional presentism in contemporary constitutional developments. He has also written on global constitutionalism and global administrative law (with emphasis on transnational governance and postnational legality), European constitutionalism and integration, and the role of judicial review and its bootstrapping in the context of Taiwan’s democratic transition. Dr Kuo’s publications have appeared in leading law journals in his field, including the Modern Law ReviewInternational Journal of Constitutional LawEuropean Journal of International LawRatio Juris, and Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. The Supreme Court of Canada in R v Albashir ([2021] SCC 48) has approvingly cited his article ‘Between Choice and Tradition: Rethinking Remedial Grace Periods and Unconstitutionality Management in a Comparative Light, 36 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 157 (2019). Dr Kuo’s article ‘Against Instantaneous Democracy’, 17 International Journal of Constitutional Law (I·CON) 54 (2019) is the winner of the 2020 I·CON Best Paper Prize. Dr Kuo is the recipient of the 2025 Prize for Scholarly Excellence in Constitutional Studies, awarded by the Constitutional Studies Program at the University of Texas at Austin in the United States. All of Dr Kuo’s work on SSRN can be accessed at http://ssrn.com/author=1199599. Dr Kuo’s complete publication list can be accessed at orcid.org/0000-0001-8400-0451.

The Matrix of ‘Legal Populism’: Democracy and (Reducing) Domination

Max Steuer is an Associate Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University, Jindal Global Law School (India, on leave), Principal Investigator at the Department of Political Science of the Comenius University in Bratislava (Slovakia). 

Abstract: This contribution identifies the intersections between two competing approaches to populism and law. Populism, for some, undermines pluralism as the lifeblood of democracy built on aspirations of reducing domination; for others, it allows to challenge dominating elites by exposing the harms they cause to ‘the people’. Law, for some, may equally entrench and reduce domination; for others, law inherently aspires to challenge domination. ‘Legal populism’ entrenches antidemocratic domination with the former conceptualization of populism and of law, while its effects are contingent with the latter conceptualization of populism and the former reading of law. In contrast, an aspirational reading of ‘law’ appears incompatible with either conception of populism because, whilst it allows to declare dominating legalism as illegal, it cannot accommodate populism that conceives of law as an elite-driven endeavour. The contribution illustrates the significance of recognizing this matrix in Slovakia, a country with two clear-cut periods of de-democratization after the dismantling of the state socialist autocracy in 1989: one in the 1990s (1994—1998) and another even after the 2004 European Union accession (2023—present). The Slovak developments show how the aspirational reading of law finds little footing and how challenges to dominating elites have mainly been raised by other elites, often having antipluralist ambitions themselves. Acknowledging such populist appeals as ‘legal’ invites getting lost in the matrix. Instead, the matrix exposes their illegality and allows to appreciate the domination-reducing potential of law that is not at odds with the appreciation of ‘the people’.

Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy 

Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez is a human rights advocate with experience in international advocacy, civil society engagement, and diplomatic affairs. She currently serves as Global Advocacy Officer at the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), working directly with representatives of minority communities to support their advocacy efforts. She has experience in consular affairs, particularly on migration issues, as well as in cooperation for development and youth participation in public policy-making. She holds an MSc in Diplomatic Studies from the University of Oxford and has a background in diplomatic engagement, focusing on capacity-building, advocacy, and international cooperation. She is also the co-author of the chapter “The Border Issue: From Policy to Cultural Identity” in Continuum Investigativo y diversidad lingüístico-cultural del sur de México (2021), which examines how the delineation of borders has shaped national identities at a nation-state level, often marginalizing identities that do not align with political boundaries.

Abstract: This paper argues that establishing frameworks for broader participation is essential for the future of democracy, advocating for mechanisms that go beyond state-centered diplomacy and amplify all voices. It examines representation and the right to diplomacy as fundamental pillars of democracy, emphasizing their role in ensuring the meaningful inclusion of all peoples in policy formulation and decision-making processes. Diplomacy is often reserved to sovereign states, leaving many unrepresented nations, indigenous groups, and minority communities without access to critical international and institutional platforms. The exclusion of these groups from diplomatic engagement undermines democratic principles by reinforcing a model that fails to reflect the diversity of political and cultural identities.

By analyzing cases where communities are denied representation, this study will focus on the Hmong community in Laos, who face systemic discrimination through an indigenous rights lens; the Ogoni in Nigeria, whose lack of representation is tied to environmental and climate justice struggles; and the people of Guam, who remain disenfranchised under the U.S. territorial rule, highlighting the challenges of decolonization and self-determination. The study will also explore the institutionalization of representation through case studies of organizations such as the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) and Minority Rights Group (MRG), which seek to secure spaces for participation and representation.  

The closure of spaces diplomatic spaces contributes to the erosion of democratic participation, the silencing of historically marginalized voices, and reinforces unequal power structures in global governance. Recognizing diplomacy and representation as fundamental rights strengthens democratic resilience by fostering dialogue, inclusion, and peaceful conflict resolution.

Lived Democracy in Small Island States: Sociopolitical Dynamics of Governance, Power, and Participation in Malta and Singapore

Justin Attard is a self-made entrepreneur turned into sociologist, currently pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Malta. With a strong academic background in political sociology, his research explores social class, community resilience, political culture, and the governance dynamics of small island states. His doctoral work focuses on comparative lived democracy in Malta and Singapore. His expertise in governance and policymaking led to his appointment as a board member of Arts Council Malta, where he contributed to the development of the local cultural sector. A dedicated grassroots activist and researcher, he integrates scholarship with community engagement to advocate for deliberative democracy, environmental sustainability, and social equity. 

Abstract: By interrogating the applicability of dominant democratic models within demographically and territorially constrained environments, this study advances contemporary debates on democratic erosion, populism, and the role of civil society in sustaining democratic institutions. Using Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence, the study examines how informal and institutional political networks mediate authority, shape political participation, and reinforce majoritarianism in Malta and Singapore. By doing so, it complicates binary distinctions between democratic and authoritarian governance, offering a nuanced understanding of power consolidation, exclusionary politics, and grassroots resistance in small state contexts.

Employing a mixed-methods approach, the research integrates political ethnography, participant observation, semi-structured elite interviews, and quantitative analysis of democracy indices (V-Dem, Freedom House, EIU). These nations serve as microcosms for examining the strengths and vulnerabilities of democratic institutions in an era of political uncertainty. Ultimately, this research contributes to safeguarding democratic governance by identifying pathways for inclusive civic engagement and offering counter-narratives to exclusionary populism, providing valuable insights for scholars and policymakers alike.

Russia’s War on Democracy

Robert Person is a Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy and director of West Point’s curriculum in International Affairs.  He teaches courses on Russian and post-Soviet politics, democratic and authoritarian regimes, international political economy, and international relations. His research on Russian politics and foreign policy has been published in various academic and popular media outlets, including Foreign Affairs, International Affairs, The Journal of Democracy, Post-Soviet Affairs, Problems of Post-Communism, The Washington Post, and The National Interest, among others. His commentary on current events in Russia and Ukraine has appeared in The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, NPR, BBC, The Telegraph, Deutsche Welle, Le Monde, Al Jazeera, El País, The Moscow Times, and other international media outlets.   

Dr. Person regularly consults as a Russia subject matter expert for the Army, Department of Defense, U.S. Government agencies, and in the private sector. He is a resident fellow at West Point’s Modern War Institute and a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He holds a PhD in political science from Yale University and an MA in Russian and East European Studies from Stanford University.  His current book project is titled Russia’s Grand Strategy in the 21st Century. Additional information: https://www.robert-person.com/

Abstract: For the last 25 years, Vladimir Putin has waged an ever-escalating war on democracy, not just in Russia but globally.  This war – whether in its overt or covert manifestations – has transformed the nature of Russia’s domestic political regime but also the character of the international system.  During this period, a multi-domain assault on democracy as an idea and as a set of institutions has been a central pillar of Putin’s grand strategy, whereby he seeks to restore Russia as a great power in a multipolar international system; establish a privileged and exclusive sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region; and undermine the cohesiveness and capabilities of the democratic West.

Much of Russia’s war on democracy has taken place in the “gray zone” using a well-honed toolkit of hybrid techniques to divide, disrupt, and destabilize Russia’s democratic adversaries.  Through information warfare, exacerbation of divisive cleavages, and support of populist and far-right political figures in target countries, the Kremlin’s strategy for many years focused more on weakening adversaries rather than strengthening Russia’s hard power.

Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine marked a turning point as Russia turned toward brutally conventional military methods to subjugate Kyiv and destroy Ukraine’s democracy and sovereignty.  However, it is important to recognize that Russia’s war against Ukrainian democracy did not begin in 2022, nor even in 2014.  Instead, its origins can be traced back to Moscow’s electoral manipulation that sparked the Orange Revolution in 2004.  From this perspective, it becomes clear that that the battle raging in Ukraine is just the latest – and most deadly – of a decades-long global assault on democracy waged by the Kremlin. 

The present paper is part of a new book project that explores the themes above.  As it becomes more challenging to discuss these perspectives openly in the United States, I look forward to feedback and fruitful discussion with my British and European colleagues at the conference in July.  

 

Panel -VIII-  

“The People” vs. “The Elite”: A New Global Order? 

Ashley Wright is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Minerva Global Security Programme, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, which focuses on contested cross-b

spaces, illicit flows, and order in the contemporary world. She specialises in data collection and quantitative analysis. Her doctoral research (DPhil, Politics at the University of Oxford) explores how key Congressional committees integrate US foreign assistance with foreign policy and national security priorities and involves the collection of original data on US foreign aid appropriations and elite interviews. She is currently working on a project on US military interventions and contested cross-border spaces for the Minerva Global Security Programme. 

Azize Sargin is an independent researcher and consultant of external relations for non-governmental organisations. 

We: The Populist Elites 

 Aviezer Tucker is a political theorist and philosopher.  He is the author of: Democracy against Liberalism (Polity Press, 2020), The Legacies of Totalitarianism: A Theoretical Framework, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), and The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence: From Patocka to Havel, (Pittsburgh University Press, 2000), as well asHistoriographic Reasoning, (Cambridge University Press, 2025) and Our Knowledge of the Past: A Philosophy of Historiography (Cambridge University Press, 2004). He is the director of the new Centre for the Philosophy of Historiography at the University of Ostrava in the Czech Republic. Prior to coming to Ostrava, he taught or conducted research at the Central European University, Palacky University, Columbia University, New York University, Trinty College, Long Island University, the Australian National University, Queens University Belfast, the University of Cologne, the University of Texas in Austin, and Harvard University. 

Abstract: Populism, as I define it, is the rule of political passions.  These passions override political interests and shape political beliefs.  Pure passions tend to be self-destructive.  For example, when people become very angry and burn their homes, start wars that hurt them more than they hurt their enemies, or demand economic policies that gratify immediately but generate inflation and accumulate debts that destroy the economy soon thereafter.  As La Bruyere (quoted in Elster 1999, 337) put it: “Nothing is easier for passion than to overcome reason, but the greatest triumph is to conquer a man’s own interest.”

The political “passionate” characterization of populism I use differs from standard contemporary approaches that associate populism with social movements that emphasize the struggle of homogeneous “people” vs. perfidious “elites.” (Canovan 2005, Muller 2016, Norris & Inglehart 2019) Populism in the United States resulted partly from resentment of elite and expert blunders in starting and managing the Iraq war and in failing to preempt and end the 2008 Great Recession.  In this respect, it may be argued that George W. Bush’s administration achieved successfully a regime change, though not the one intended and not in the country targeted, but in the United States.  Still, I find this standard approach to populism too broad and too narrow:  Popular distrust and resentment of elites and establishments are not distinctive of populism. 

Representations of political struggles as the “people” against the elites have been characteristic of all rebels in history, including political dissidents, socialists, anti-colonialists, and religious reformers.  Anti-intellectuals who resent better educated, artistically sensitive, and abstract-minded elites include human resource departments of major corporations and entrepreneurs who dislike academic “experimentation.”  Since elites are by definition always fewer than “ordinary people,” and their privileges or perceived privileges often generate some resentment, it often makes good democratic politics to attack them.  So mere anti-elitist rhetoric is insufficiently distinctive of populism.  Anti-elitist concepts of populism are also too narrow because they would exclude some commonly recognized populist movements that admire elite plutocrats (or apparent plutocrats) such as Berlusconi in Italy, Babiš in the Czech Republic, and Trump in the United States.  Some contemporary populists seem to admire wealthy elites in general as well as sports and popular music elites.  Trump’s fear of divulging his tax returns probably reflects his fear of losing his charisma with his base of supporters if they realize that he is not a member of the rich elite.  Populists resent only some elites, including experts, professional politicians, and the educated upper middle classes. 

Reclamations of “We, the People”: Rethinking Civil Society through Spatial Contestations in Turkey

Pınar Dokumacı is an Assistant Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin. Before joining UCD in September 2022, she was the Peacock Postdoctoral Fellow (2020-2022) at the School of Political Studies , Queen’s University (Canada) and a Postdoctoral Research Fellow (2019-2020) at the University of York (UK) in the Leverhulme Trust funded project Rethinking Civil Society: History, Theory, Critique led by Prof. Timothy Stanton. Ms. Dokumaci has a Ph.D. in Political Science (2018) from University of Toronto (Canada) with a specialisation in Political Theory and Comparative Politics. She also has degrees in Economics (B.A., Koç University, Turkey), International Relations (B.A., Koç University, Turkey) and European Studies (M.A., Boğaziçi University Turkey). Pinar Dokumaci is both a comparativist and a theorist, examining how contested perceptions of women’s rights, secularism, and religion inform dynamics of collective action and possibilities for social change in deeply divided contexts where Muslim women’s use of religious garments raise heated public debates. Her research is grounded in both ethnography and theory. She is especially interested in bringing together engaged and comparative political theorizing from a critical perspective to re-ground political theory in both Western and non-Western knowledges as well as methods, experiences, and ethnographies. She is interested in feminist disagreements, autonomy and solidarity dynamics in feminist groups, and different understandings of feminist resistance under authoritarian settings. She teaches undergraduate and graduate modules in politics of development, gender and politics, feminist theory, and comparative political theory.

Özlem Aslan is an Assistant Professor in the Core Program at Kadir Has University. Her research is at the intersection of democratic theory, environmental justice, critical spatial theory, and feminist political ecology. She earned her PhD in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto. Her doctoral research adopts an interdisciplinary approach to analyze the political implications of development projects and resistances against them in the context of Turkey. Based on her field work in Artvin, Turkey, she traces how place becomes a ground for political claim-making in the context of resistances against the run-of-the-river hydropower projects in Turkey. Her project received Globalink Research Award in and Ontario Graduate Scholarship in 2014 and doctoral research award from the International Development and Research Centre in 2015. Özlem Aslan received her masters degree from the Department of Political Science, Boğaaziçi University in Turkey. 

Abstract: This paper aims to rethink civil society in a relational form based on a politics of care. We examine (1) re-inventive democratic practices in Turkey that assert people’s “right to appear” through appropriation of political spaces and (2) how these practices urge us to rethink the way we conceive civil society under rising authoritarianism and populism. Our argument is two-fold: First, we demonstrate that these sporadic resistances in Turkey operate as an alternative way of confronting injustices and voicing critique by appropriating streets and public spaces. These resistances, “spatial contestations”, arise in response to declining democratic institutional structures to formally address such grievances and demands. Spatial contestations not only serve as a reclamation of “we, the people” against AKP’s “myth of the One”, but also show us the interrelatedness of democratic resilience and resistance beyond institutionalized practices. Second, we argue that these spatial efforts function both as iterative sites of democratic resilience and as potential sites for re-imagining civil society in a relational form based on a politics of care.

The Transatlantic Network of Authoritarian Populism: The Rise of the Executive and Its Dangers to Democracy 

Attila Antal is an Associate Professor at Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Law Institute of Political Science. He is a coordinator at the Social Theory Research Group at the Institute of Political History. He is doing his contemporary research in political theory of populism, state of exception, extraordinary governance measures, climate and ecological emergency, theory of democracy, green political thought, constitutionalism, and political history.

Abstract: A remarkable phenomenon is unfolding regarding the international networking of right-wing authoritarian populism (RWAP): the Hungarian Orbán regime has for a long time been looking to the radicalizing American right as a reference point, which after President Donald Trump’s fall is also trying to build a strong international network for authoritarian right-wing tendencies – as it evidenced by Orbán’s appearance at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in 2022. At the heart of these transatlantic ideological networks is the idea of the rise of the executive. There is an emergence of authoritarian executive power, which means on the one hand that the executive power is extremely strengthened, on the other hand, the theory of separation of powers has been totally redesigned, and this has a huge impact on the landscape of democracy. The second Trump administration has boosted these tendencies. In this paper, I will first examine what international right-wing authoritarian populism (IRWAP) represents and how it has begun to internationalize and build transatlantic structures. I then discuss the main theoretical approaches that link authoritarian right-wing populisms, Orbánism and Trumpism. Finally, I will also discuss how the Orbán regime has created an authoritarian right-wing network of conservative intellectuals. To conclude the paper, I will hint at the possible outcomes of the IRWAP phenomenon. The serious threats to representative democracy will be investigated posed by autocratic political leaders who rely on popular will and popular sovereignty.

Religious symbols on sand: Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Orthodoxy Buddhism and Hinduism. Photo: Godong Photo.

Fourth Annual International Symposium on ‘Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges’

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) successfully convened its Fourth Annual International Symposium at the University of Warsaw on May 22–23, 2025. The event brought together leading scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to examine the evolving dynamics of civilizational populism and its wide-ranging implications on local, national, transnational, and global levels.

Over two days of intensive dialogue and critical reflection, the symposium explored how populism—particularly in its civilizational form—interacts with religion, digital technologies, and identity-based narratives to shape political behavior, influence democratic institutions, and impact social cohesion across plural societies. Special attention was paid to the varied manifestations of populism in both the Global North and Global South.

The concept of civilizational populism—which deploys civilizational identity as a metanarrative to heighten antagonism between ‘the people’ and constructed ‘others,’ often along religious and cultural lines—was a central focus. Participants analyzed how this form of populism contributes to the intensification of intra- and inter-group conflicts and how it reshapes the discourse on globalization, South-South cooperation, and multipolar international relations.

Panels addressed the following core themes:

  • The relationship between civilizational populism and democratic backsliding.
  • The use of religion and civilizational rhetoric by populists to legitimize exclusionary policies.
  • The strategic role of digital technologies and artificial intelligence in amplifying populist messages.
  • Transnational linkages between populist actors and their impact on global governance frameworks.

The symposium further emphasized that while populism is often characterized as a “thin ideology,” it operates alongside thick ideologies—such as neoliberalism, nationalism, socialism, or religion—and plays a significant role in shaping emotions, mobilizing public sentiment, and reconfiguring political power structures.

Speakers highlighted that civilizational populist narratives, far from being confined to national borders, are increasingly embedded in global communication circuits, shaping diasporic politics, influencing foreign policy, and challenging multilateral norms.

Ultimately, the symposium fostered rich interdisciplinary discussions and called for innovative, inclusive, and ethically grounded strategies to address the challenges posed by civilizational populism in today’s digitally interconnected and ideologically polarized world.

Organizing Institution

European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) (Brussels)

Hosting Institution

Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw (Warsaw)

Partner Institutions

Georgetown University (Washington DC)

University of Birmingham (Birmingham)

Deakin University (Melbourne)

DAAD / Cambridge University

University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of East Asian Studies 

Centre for International Relations (Warsaw)

 

DAY ONE – May 22, 2025

Opening Speech

Dr. Adam Bodnar (Minister of Justice of Poland / (Video Recording).

 

Keynote Speech

“A Relational Approach to Religion and Populism: Recontextualizing Civilizational Narratives in National and Global Contexts,” by Dr. Jocelyne Cesari (Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham, UK, and Senior Fellow at the Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).

 

Panel 1

Populism: Is It a One-way Route from Democracy to Authoritarianism?

Moderator

Dr. Erkan Toguslu (Researcher at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven, Belgium).

Speakers

“Making Sense of Multiple Manifestations of Alternatives to Liberal Democracies,” by Dr. Radoslaw Markowski (Professor of Political Science, Center for the Study of Democracy, Director, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw & Polish Academy of Sciences & Polish National Election Study, Principal Investigator).

“Constitutional Intolerance: The Fashioning of ‘the Other’ in Europe’s Constitutional Repertoires,” by Dr. Marietta van der Tol (Politics & International Studies, DAAD-Cambridge).

Dr. Erkan Toguslu moderates a panel featuring Dr. Radoslaw Markowski and Dr. Marietta van der Tol, exploring alternatives to liberal democracies and the role of constitutional narratives in shaping ‘the Other’ in Europe. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

 

Panel 2

Civilizational Rhetoric, Emotions, and Societal Cohesion

Moderator

Dr. Erin K. Wilson (Professor, Chair of Politics and Religion, the Faculty of Religion, Culture, and Society, University of Groningen).

Paper Presenters

Populism, Civilization, and Restorative Nostalgia,” by Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow, Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization).

“Emotional Dimensions of Civilisationist Populism: A Comparative Analysis of Erdogan, Modi, and Khan with Transformer-Based Classification,” by Dr. Matthew Belanger (Lecturer in Substance Use Sociology, Social Policy, and Criminology Faculty of Social Sciences University of Stirling) and Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc (Reader in Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law at the University of Dundee).

Dr. Erin K. Wilson moderates Panel 2 on “Civilizational Rhetoric, Emotions, and Societal Cohesion,” featuring Professor Ihsan Yilmaz, Dr. Nicholas Morieson on populism and restorative nostalgia, and Dr. Matthew Belanger & Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc on the emotional dynamics of civilisationist populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

 

Keynote Speech

Kamil Wyszkowski, Director of the UN Global Compact, delivers the keynote speech highlighting the challenges and responsibilities of global institutions in defending human rights amid rising populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

The Role of the UN in Fighting for Human Rights in This Populist Age,” by Kamil Wyszkowski (Director of UN Global Compact).

 

Panel 3

Religion and Populism: Local, National, and Transnational Dimensions

Moderator

 Dr. Jocelyne Cesari (Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).

Speakers

“Remember to be Jewish: Religious Populism in Israel,” by Dr. Guy Ben-Porat (Professor of International Relations and Politics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev).

“Religious Populism and Civilizationalism in International Politics: An Authoritarian Turn,” by Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz (Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations and Chair in Islamic Studies at Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization) & Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow, Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization).

Paper Presenters

“National Populists of Christian Europe, Unite? Civilizations Dimensions of Far-right Populist Alliances in Post-Brexit Britain,” by Dr. Rafal Soborski (Professor of International Politics, The Department of Social Science at Richmond American University and Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University).

“Anwar Ibrahim’s Civilisational Populism: Between the Muslim World and Malaysia,” by Dr. Syaza Shukri (Assoc. Professor & Head of Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia).

Dr. Jocelyne Cesari moderates Panel 3 on “Religion and Populism: Local, National, and Transnational Dimensions,” presented by Dr. Bulent Kenes, and featuring contributions from Dr. Guy Ben-Porat on religious populism in Israel; Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz & Dr. Nicholas Morieson on civilizational authoritarianism; Dr. Rafal Soborski on Christian far-right alliances; and Dr. Syaza Shukri on Anwar Ibrahim’s civilizational populism. Photos: Muhammed Gemi.

DAY TWO – May 23, 2025

Keynote Speech 

Dariusz Mazur, Deputy Minister of Justice of the Republic of Poland, delivers a keynote speech addressing the challenges to the rule of law and the role of justice institutions in safeguarding democracy in an era of rising populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

Dariusz Mazur (Deputy Minister of Justice of the Republic of Poland).

 

Panel 4

Impacts of Civilizational Populism on the Market and Globalization

Moderator

Antoine Godbert (Affiliate Professor of Law, Economics & Humanities at ESCP Business School, Paris, and Director of International Affairs at the Rectorat of Île-de-France – Paris).

Speakers

“On the Nature of Economics and the future of Globalization under Civilizational Populism,” by Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk (Professor of Economics, Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST), Germany, Senior Economic Researcher at the ECPS, Brussels).

Populism as a Reaction to Neoliberal Technocratism,” by Dr. Krzysztof Jasiecki (Professor of Economic Sociology at the Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw).

“Far-Right Populism and the Making of the Exclusionary Neoliberal State,” by Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider (Associate Professor, Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna and Research Affiliate, Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge).

Antoine Godbert moderates Panel 4 on “Impacts of Civilizational Populism on the Market and Globalization,” with Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk examining the future of globalization, Dr. Krzysztof Jasiecki analyzing populist responses to neoliberal technocracy, and Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider exploring the rise of the exclusionary neoliberal state. Photos: Muhammed Gemi.

 

Panel 5

Religion and Identity Politics

Moderator

Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc (Reader in Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law at the University of Dundee).

Speaker

“Religion and Power in an Age of Identity Politics,” by Dr. Erin K. Wilson (Professor, Chair of Politics and Religion, the Faculty of Religion, Culture, and Society, University of Groningen).

Paper Presenters

“Civilizational Populism and the Making of Sexualized Cultural Christianity,” by Dr. Ludger Viefhues-Bailey (Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Gender, and Culture, Le Moyne University, NY).

“Imagine No More Small Boats in the Channel’: How Populist Parties and Their Leaders Normalize Polarization in Their Communication on Social Media Platforms, a Multimodal Discourse Analysis,” by Dr. Valeria Reggi (Post-doc Researcher at the University of Venice and Adjunct Professor and Tutor at the University of Bologna).

Populism from a Double Perspective. Timo Soini and the Finnish Version of Populism,” by Dr. Jarosław Suchoples (Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw, Former Polish Ambassador to Finland).

Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc moderates Panel 5 on “Religion and Identity Politics,” featuring Dr. Erin K. Wilson on the intersection of religion and power, Dr. Ludger Viefhues-Bailey on sexualized cultural Christianity, Dr. Valeria Reggi on populist polarization via social media, and Dr. Jarosław Suchoples on the Finnish model of populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

Gala Dinner

During the gala dinner, a short video clip was presented featuring a biopic on the Romani poet Papusza and Birds Are Singing in Kigali, two acclaimed Polish films directed by Joanna Kos-Krauze. Following the screening, Dr. Małgorzata Bonikowska moderated a brief conversation with the director and two other participants. (Photos: Muhammed Gemi)

Participants

During the coffee and lunch breaks, conference participants had the opportunity to connect, exchange ideas, and get to know one another better. They also engaged actively in the Q&A sessions, contributing thoughtful questions and insights to each panel discussion. (Photos: Muhammed Gemi.)

ECPS-Conference2025-Panel2

ECPS Symposium 2025 / Panel 2 — Civilizational Rhetoric, Emotions, and Societal Cohesion

Fourth Annual International Symposium on Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges’

May 22–23, 2025 | University of Warsaw

Moderator

Dr. Erin K. Wilson (Professor, Chair of Politics and Religion, the Faculty of Religion, Culture, and Society, University of Groningen).

Paper Presenters

Populism, Civilization, and Restorative Nostalgia,” by Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow, Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization).

“Emotional Dimensions of Civilisationist Populism: A Comparative Analysis of Erdogan, Modi, and Khan with Transformer-Based Classification,” by Dr. Matthew Belanger (Lecturer in Substance Use Sociology, Social Policy, and Criminology Faculty of Social Sciences University of Stirling) and Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc (Reader in Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law at the University of Dundee).