Tunisia flag.

Conspiracy Narratives and the Discursive Identity of ‘the Other’ in Tunisian Political Populism

Please cite as:
Ben Abdallah, Chahira. (2026). “Conspiracy Narratives and the Discursive Identity of ‘the Other’ in Tunisian Political Populism.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). November 16, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000133         

 

Abstract

This research focuses on political conspiracy communication and relies on the key theoretical components of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of populism in order to demonstrate the performative power and the persuasive appeal of conspiracy narratives in Kais Saied’s political communication. We extracted the six conspiratorial narratives that were frequently repeated in Saied’s speeches and statements covering the period from the so-called July 25 coup in 2021 to the 2024 presidential election campaign. To examine these narratives, we focus on the mechanisms of constructing the identity of the other/conspirators from three aspects: signifying practices, definitional frontiers, and the employment of passions. Our three-level analysis led us to a number of conclusions revealing that Saied’s conspiracy narratives represent a logic of simplification of political spaces. These narratives play on ambiguity, floating signifiers, and nationalist biases to create a common enemy and to make it the scapegoat responsible for the crisis. Therefore, these narratives are polarizing, divisive, and thus antagonistic. The power of conspiracy in Saied’s narratives stems from its ability to produce new meanings from existing facts and from not being locked into a fixed meaning. This is what Laclau and Mouffe call “articulation.” These narratives, loaded with moral stigmatization, have two functions: conspiratorial demonization, used to attack and delegitimize opponents, and conspiratorial mobilization, used to mobilize a more tangible “mass” of supporters through the formation of a collective identity.

Keywords: Political Conspiracy Communication, conspiracy theories, discursive identity, populism, political discourse analysis, Laclau and Mouffe’s approach

 

By Chahira Ben Abdallah*

Introduction

In the last decade, the return to conspiracy theory has coincided with nationalist and identity reversals driven by racism and hate. At the same time, there has been a steady increase in the diffusion of conspiracy theories in political communication. Consequently, there has been a surge in the number of studies tackling the use of conspiracy theories by political actors as a communication strategy. These studies have highlighted the fact that beliefs in conspiracy theories are very often associated with populism (Van Prooijen, 2018; Oliver & Rahn, 2016; Merkley, 2020). In fact, the hypothesis of an “elective affinity” between populism and conspiratorial ideas is old and can be traced back to the American literature on populism in the mid-1950s (Ivaldi, 2021). However, the adoption of conspiracy theories by populists in the twenty-first century is attributed to Donald Trump’s populism in the United States, which has relied heavily on conspiratorial ideas and the dissemination of fake news.

Conspiracy theories, such as those surrounding the origin of the COVID-19 virus and vaccines, as well as those related to immigration, such as the “Great Replacement” theory, have become an integral part of the ideological framework of both right-wing populist and non-populist politicians. In Italy, conspiracy theories were at the heart of the populist campaigns of the Lega as well as the M5S (Maccaferri, 2022). In France, Marine Le Pen’s party did not hesitate, during the coronavirus pandemic, to denounce the “incompetence” and “lies” of the executive authority. Likewise, in Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro’s management of the COVID-19 epidemic was very strongly marked by “scientific denialism” (Kaltwasser & Taggart, 2022).

These examples show the growing political relevance of conspiracy theories and the close connection between populism and conspiracy beliefs, “especially due to their common dichotomic nature” (Markou, 2022: 161) and “Manichean and antagonistic societal outlook” (Hameleers, 2020: 107). On that basis, our research aims to focus on the Tunisian political context in order to study “the specific case of the presidency of Kais Saied in Tunisia, which has been labelled as a form of constitutional populism integrating conspiracy theories” (Annovi, 2024: 43). We estimate that the conspiracy logic that Kais Saied frequently adopts is strategically exploited as a kind of “alternative reality” and a defense mechanism that he resorts to for strategic and pragmatic reasons.

Our analysis is based on the theory and methodological tools of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis, which examines populism as a reason/logic and considers the political opponent (other) as a central element in the analysis because it acquires a formative character in the formation of political discourse. We will rely on the key theoretical components of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of populism: antagonism, chain of equivalence, empty signifier, and the role of passions. This discursive approach, with the aim of showing the performative power and the persuasive appeal of conspiracy narratives in Kais Saied’s political communication, enables us to understand his “conspiracy rhetoric” (Goldzwig, 2002) or “conspiratorial imagination” (Jasmin, 2009).

Despite growing academic interest in the relationship between populism and conspiracy theories, and even though some studies have touched upon “conspiratorial populism” in the case of Kais Saied (Annovi, 2024; Kahlaoui, 2024; Sayfo & Kmeczko, 2026), there are, to the best of my knowledge, no studies that have examined Kais Saied’s discourse from the perspective of Laclau and Mouffe’s method. Thus, this study wants to fill this gap by using this well-known method to look at populism (discourse theory), thereby adding to the growing number of studies about the link between populism and conspiracy stories while offering a way to use discourse theory in the study of modern political communication in the Tunisian situation.

Thus, the questions that this study deals with are the following: What are the functions of conspiracy theory rhetoric used by the populist leader Kais Saied? Did Saied succeed in giving sense to the empty signifiers associated with the concept of conspiracy and linking them to a nodal point revolving around collective identity? What are the determinants of similarity and difference that Saied’s conspiracy discourse has formulated to construct the discursive identity of the other/conspirators? How did Saied’s conspiracy discourse employ emotions to motivate feelings of hostility and resentment?


(*) Chahira Ben Abdallah is an Assistant Professor and researcher in media and communication at the Institute of Press and Information Sciences, University of Manouba, Tunisia.

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Doctoral Researcher Fabiola Ermer.

Fabiola Ermer: Illiberal Political Ideas Become Socially Embedded Through Less Visible Mechanisms

In this ECPS Voice of Youth interview, Fabiola Ermer, doctoral researcher at the Heidelberg University for Jewish Studies, discusses her comparative research on right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary, the role of education in shaping ethno-national belonging, and the importance of looking beyond political leaders to understand how illiberal ideas become embedded in society. Examining educational programmes, transnational ideological networks, and the societal infrastructures of illiberalism, Ermer highlights the less visible mechanisms through which political narratives acquire legitimacy and become normalized. She also distinguishes illiberalism from democratic backsliding, reflects on the methodological challenges of comparative research, and emphasizes scholarly independence, international collaboration, and critical engagement with education’s role in reproducing political identities and sustaining ideological influence beyond electoral change.

Interview by Natalia Crane

In an era of democratic backsliding and increasingly interconnected illiberal movements, understanding how political ideas become embedded in society requires looking beyond electoral competition, political leaders, and formal institutions. Education, ideological networks, and the construction of national belonging constitute less visible but consequential dimensions of contemporary populism.

Fabiola Ermer is a doctoral researcher at the Ben-Gurion Chair for Israel and Middle Eastern Studies at the Heidelberg University of Jewish Studies and a doctoral fellow of the Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich Scholarship Foundation (ELES). Her doctoral research examines right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary, focusing on how their educational programmes for young adults contribute to the construction of ethno-national conceptions of belonging and form part of broader infrastructures of illiberalism.

In this ECPS Voice of Youth interview, Ermer reflects on the development of her academic interests, the relationship between populism and democracy, and the methodological challenges of comparative research. She also discusses international academic collaboration, education’s role in reproducing political ideas, and the mechanisms through which political narratives become socially embedded.

Drawing on comparative research in Israel and Hungary, Ermer emphasizes the importance of studying the ideological infrastructures operating between governments and society. “We need to look more beyond parties, campaigns, and individual leaders,” she argues, calling for closer examination of how political ideas acquire institutional durability and social legitimacy.

Central to her research is the recognition that education is not inherently democratic or emancipatory. As Ermer explains, “education can also reproduce particular worldviews and ideas of belonging.” She therefore encourages researchers to examine who provides education, which values are communicated, and how educational programmes relate to broader political structures.

Ermer also challenges the tendency to equate illiberalism with democratic backsliding, emphasizing the analytical distinction between rejecting liberal values and the deterioration of democratic institutions. Her comparative approach highlights how think tanks, transnational networks, and educational initiatives contribute to constructing the boundaries of political belonging.

Regarding scholarly responsibility, she advocates methodological transparency, analytical independence, and greater public engagement. Researchers, she argues, should “make complex developments understandable, challenge misleading assumptions, and provide the necessary context.”

Ermer hopes her research will illuminate “the less visible mechanisms through which political ideas become socially embedded and politically normalized, without the need for coercion,” offering a perspective on the societal foundations of illiberalism and the challenges facing contemporary democracies.

Interview with Fabiola Ermer lightly edited for clarity and flow.

Aerial view of the construction of a new artificial intelligence (AI) hub and data center on the outskirts of Columbus, Ohio, USA.

Governing AI’s Creative Destruction: Shared Prosperity, Financial Risks, and Democratic Resilience

In this commentary, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk examines the political economy of artificial intelligence (AI), highlighting its productive potential alongside distributional inequalities, financial vulnerabilities, and environmental costs. Distinguishing infrastructure investment from AI’s diffusion across the economy, he explores how productivity gains affect employment, wages, prices, inflation, and market concentration. The analysis considers how data governance, computing infrastructure, and financing arrangements shape the distribution of benefits and risks. Professor Ozturk also examines how labor displacement and economic insecurity may create opportunities for authoritarian populist mobilization, while AI-enabled surveillance raises concerns about democratic accountability. He advocates policies that distribute technological gains more equitably, strengthen institutional oversight, and protect household security. The central benchmark is a decent, dependable standard of living throughout employment transitions and retirement.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly reshaping the global economy, offering unprecedented opportunities for productivity growth, innovation, and economic transformation while raising profound questions about inequality, financial stability, environmental sustainability, and democratic governance. As investment in AI infrastructure accelerates, the diffusion of its applications across the real economy presents complex challenges concerning employment, wages, prices, inflation, and the distribution of economic gains. While AI can expand productive capacity and reduce costs, its benefits may become concentrated among powerful firms and capital owners, potentially transferring financial and environmental burdens to households. 

These developments also raise concerns about market concentration, labor displacement, economic insecurity, and the political conditions that may facilitate authoritarian populist mobilization. Against this backdrop, this article examines the interconnected macroeconomic, distributional, financial, environmental, and institutional dimensions of AI, emphasizing the importance of effective governance, equitable access to technological benefits, and policies that protect economic security. The central challenge is ensuring that technological progress translates into shared prosperity, allowing households to maintain a decent and dependable standard of living throughout employment transitions and into retirement.

An AI system may help a worker complete a task in half the time. Who gains the other half? A firm may use the savings to lower prices, improve its product, reduce working hours, or cut its payroll. Its technology supplier may capture part of the gain through subscription fees, while shareholders benefit from higher margins. The same improvement in technical capability can therefore produce very different outcomes for workers, consumers, and investors. Those outcomes matter politically because they determine who can withstand disruption and who must depend on the discretion of employers, platforms, or public officials.

The distribution of these gains depends on two processes that unfold at different speeds. The investment cycle commits capital to data centers, chips, power, and networks before their revenues are known. The diffusion cycle depends on whether firms and public institutions can reorganize production around useful applications. Their interaction determines when costs are incurred, when productivity gains appear, and whether firms, households, or public institutions capture them.

Historical Lessons from Technological Transitions

The historical record of major technological transformations provides critical empirical and theoretical insights into the current AI trajectory. Joseph Schumpeter’s paradigm of “creative destruction” details how radical innovations continuously revolutionize the economic structure from within, destroying old industries and creating new ones. However, as Karl Polanyi famously demonstrated in his analysis of the Industrial Revolution, the expansion of the self-regulating market inflicts severe social dislocation during the transition. The pivotal political-economic question centers on the temporal duration of this transition: How long does the period of destruction last before new livelihoods emerge, and who possesses the financial resilience to endure it?

Britain’s Industrial Revolution offers a sobering historical precedent known as “Engels’ Pause.” As Allen documents, for nearly half a century after the initial adoption of industrial technologies, output per worker expanded significantly while real wages remained stagnant. Corporate profits claimed an escalating share of national income, accumulating to early industrial capitalists while working-class households suffered prolonged wage depression and deteriorating living conditions. Even if real wages eventually rise in the long run, the intergenerational timing of gains is central: workers displaced in one decade cannot feed their families on the theoretical equilibrium of a subsequent generation. Similarly, the rollout of electricity as a general-purpose technology (GPT) demonstrates that macro-level productivity acceleration requires extensive, multi-decade investments in complementary machinery, organizational workflows, and human capital. As Perez emphasizes, financial capital frequently accelerates the installation phase of new technological paradigms, driving speculative asset valuations long before real-economy productivity gains materialize. 

The central historical challenge for AI is whether public institutions, labor markets, and non-tech sectors can cultivate human-centric applications as quickly as financial markets build out computational capacity. As Acemogluargues, technological trajectories are not preordained; innovation can be explicitly directed toward augmenting human capabilities rather than merely automating labor to cut immediate payroll costs.

Productivity, Prices and the Cost of Living

The task framework developed by Acemoglu and Restrepo distinguishes between automation that displaces labor and innovation that creates new tasks for people. An occupation often contains both kinds of opportunity. A nurse may spend less time on documentation and more time with patients. A firm could instead use the saved hours to raise staffing ratios. Which outcome follows depends on management decisions, demand for services, and workers’ and service users’ ability to influence deployment. The ILO’s occupational exposure estimates accordingly help identify where tasks may change. Actual displacement depends on adoption, cost, regulation, and work organization.

Evidence of complementarity deserves attention. In a study of customer support, AI assistance raised productivity by about 15 percent on average, with larger benefits for less experienced and lower-skilled agents. Access to advice previously available mainly through experience can help workers learn and perform more complex tasks. At the same time, a firm can use the same technology to change staffing levels or monitor individual performance. A productivity increase observed in one workplace tells us what the tool achieved in that setting. The division of the gain among wages, profits, and consumers is a separate empirical question. Estimates of aggregate productivity are sensitive to the share of tasks affected, the savings actually realized, and the cost of implementation.

The aggregate effect depends on the economic weight of the tasks affected, the savings realized after implementation costs and the scale of adoption. At the firm level, faster completion of a task raises output only when the task constrains production or the resources released can be put to productive use. A hospital that reduces administrative work may be able to see more patients if staff time is the binding constraint. If beds or specialist capacity are scarce, the gain may instead appear in shorter paperwork queues or better service quality. Investment in software, training, and organizational redesign also absorbs resources during the transition.

Control over specialized chips, cloud capacity, models, and distribution channels can influence where profits accrue. Large firms can capture substantial gains when other firms depend on their infrastructure or face high switching costs. Historical evidence on superstar firms links shifts in market share toward firms with lower labor shares to the aggregate decline in labor’s share. In AI markets, the relevant competition questions concern access to inputs and the terms on which firms can switch suppliers or reach customers. Control over training data and intellectual property adds another barrier: contested access to copyrighted works and uncertain licensing terms can favor incumbents with legal and computing scale. High market valuations indicate expectations about future earnings. Evidence of durable rents requires examining realized returns, entry barriers, and the scope for competition.

A decline in unit costs can lower prices when customers have credible alternatives and firms compete for their business. The same gain can widen margins or be captured upstream by providers of models and cloud infrastructure. The effect on the cost of living depends on the prices of goods and services that households actually buy, their budget shares and their disposable incomes. Cheaper digital services may raise consumer welfare while housing, food or utility bills continue to strain household budgets. For that reason, the relevant outcome is real purchasing power after essential expenses.

The inflation effect depends on timing. During the buildout, investment can raise demand for construction, equipment and electricity before new capacity comes online. As adoption spreads, lower unit costs and greater productive capacity can ease price pressures. Stronger investment or household spending can offset part of that effect. A one-time fall in the price of a service lowers its contribution to measured inflation during the adjustment period. A sustained change in aggregate inflation depends on how supply, demand and monetary policy respond.

Data Centers, Environmental Costs and Financial Risk

Data centers make the physical demands of AI visible. New facilities require power connections, cooling, and land. Their local effects depend on the energy mix, water availability, and utility tariff design. A utility may commit to network upgrades before a facility begins operating. If the project is delayed or uses less capacity than contracted, the allocation of the resulting costs depends on the tariff and the developer’s commitments. Local authorities should distinguish temporary construction jobs from continuing employment and compare expected tax receipts with abatements and the cost of public infrastructure. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) analysis underlines the importance of location and grid capacity when assessing data center electricity demand.

Political resistance reaches beyond immediate neighbors. In a May 2026 survey reported by Axios, 49 percent of registered voters supported a temporary moratorium on new data center construction. Among respondents opposed to data centers, 8 percent said they knew of a facility near their home. That figure measures reported awareness of proximity. In July, Navigator Research found that 65 percent of respondents in its survey of competitive congressional districts agreed with a statement accusing AI executives of using their wealth to influence politics for their own benefit. Taken together, these results are consistent with broader distrust of how the investment boom is governed. Local referendums and campaigns in the November midterms gave that distrust a political outlet. 

The scale of financing makes the distribution of risk equally important. Van Nieuwerburgh estimates that a scenario in which the United States builds 188 GW of AI capacity by 2032 would require nearly $9 trillion in investment, equivalent to about 3.2 percent of annual GDP over 2025–2032. The estimate depends on the assumed capacity and costs. Project loans, leases, joint ventures, and private credit spread funding across several parties, and their terms determine where losses fall. An investor who has yet to commit can defer spending. A leveraged project under construction can face continued interest charges while a grid connection or permit delays revenue.

Accounting depreciation spreads an asset’s recorded cost over its useful life. Investment recovery depends on cash flow, while debt maturity determines when creditors must be paid or refinanced. These schedules can diverge. A building and its power connection may serve multiple generations of equipment. Accelerators can lose economic value more quickly as newer chips become available. The project must cover operating costs and equipment replacement as well as debt service. A project that relies on a small number of tenants is also exposed to their capacity to honor commitments. If borrowing costs rise as utilization disappoints, the financing problem can become acute well before the site loses productive value.

Janeway separates the productive legacy of speculative investment from the financial consequences of its collapse. Railways, electricity networks, and fiber networks could continue to serve users after their original investors suffered losses. AI infrastructure may have a similar afterlife, although that possibility varies across power connections, buildings, and rapidly aging chips. The applications that justify investment on a social basis can take longer to spread than the contracts that finance the investment allow. The risk to the wider economy depends on who has financed the buildout and how leveraged those institutions are. Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2015) and Janeway (2026) have shown that historical asset bubbles fueled by credit tended to be followed by deeper recessions. For AI, that finding motivates scrutiny of banks’ direct and indirect exposures, including through private credit. It leaves the scale of those exposures to be established empirically.

A useful test is to compare the operator’s expected return with the project’s wider benefits and costs. The latter include productivity in sectors using AI, net employment and tax benefits in host communities, the resources drawn from local power and water systems, and the opportunity cost of public subsidies. A profitable project can impose costs on households if tariffs transfer network expenses to them. An unprofitable project can leave useful infrastructure behind. The terms of approval and financing determine how much of either outcome is shared with the public.

Electricity and water also link environmental constraints to financing. A delayed grid connection can leave a completed facility unable to earn revenue while interest continues to accrue. If the utility has already expanded capacity and the project is canceled, tariffs and contracts determine whether the developer, the utility or other ratepayers bear the cost. Water availability must be assessed at the basin level, and emissions depend on the generation mix and the power actually added to serve the load.

Income Distribution, Wealth and Economic Security

Four distributional questions follow. The first concerns wages among workers. The second concerns labor’s share of income relative to capital. The third concerns the ownership of assets that generate capital income. The fourth concerns where gains accrue geographically. An AI tool can narrow skill differences among employees while shifting income towards capital owners. The wealth effects can persist if higher capital returns are reinvested and ownership remains concentrated.

International distribution raises another issue. Countries reliant on labor-intensive exports can face weaker demand for some tasks even as firms elsewhere capture automation gains. Access to affordable computing, skills, and local infrastructure can help those countries develop their own uses. Their capacity to tax internationally mobile income also influences whether productivity gains finance public services where workers bear transition costs. US–China semiconductor controls and efforts to build sovereign AI capacity raise the cost of access for third countries, making compute dependence a new channel of geopolitical and developmental inequality. Redistribution within the economies that host the largest technology firms can leave these cross-border effects largely untouched.

Labor income, wealth and security can move in different directions. Labor’s share can decline even as some real wages rise, while higher average wages can coexist with fewer routes into stable employment. Job loss, volatile hours and insecure retirement affect people’s ability to plan and withstand shocks. A distributional assessment should therefore track real disposable income after essential expenses, exposure to income losses and pension adequacy alongside wage dispersion, labor’s share and wealth concentration.

Economic Insecurity, Surveillance and Authoritarian Populism

Workers’ ability to refuse unfavorable terms depends partly on their access to other jobs, savings, and public support. A technological shock can weaken those alternatives before it reduces headline employment. Workers may accept worse conditions because replacement seems more plausible. Younger entrants can face fewer opportunities to gain experience if employers automate the tasks through which they previously learned. The distribution of these risks matters for political trust, particularly where the costs fall on communities that already have few alternatives.

Evidence from previous waves of automation identifies one pathway. Anelli, Colantone, and Stanig find that exposure to industrial robots increased support for the radical right in their study of 13 Western European countries. The study concerns a particular kind of automation and a particular political context. It offers a mechanism to test in the AI transition. Parties can frame economic insecurity as a loss of status or control and promise protection through exclusion or personal loyalty. The strength of that appeal depends on local institutions, political organization, and the narratives that parties and media advance. The backlash against data centers likewise can lead to ordinary democratic demands for transparency and cost sharing. Opposition becomes relevant to authoritarian populism when political actors mobilize it against pluralism or use selective protection to reward supporters.

A second pathway concerns the tools available to governments. Beraja et al. document how procurement of facial recognition technology in China helped strengthen political control and supported further development of the technology. Public demand for surveillance can therefore help create a market for capabilities that reinforce the incumbent’s power. This evidence concerns a specific regime and technology. It illustrates why oversight of procurement, access to personal data, and avenues of legal challenge matter as AI spreads into public administration.

The two pathways can interact when citizens with fewer economic alternatives also face more intrusive monitoring. If access to work or public benefits is mediated by opaque scoring systems, challenging a decision may become costly for people who rely on it. Where the government controls access to benefits or tolerates selective enforcement, it can use economic insecurity to reward loyalty. Opaque models can also amplify bias in credit, hiring and public-benefit decisions, while synthetic media can lower the cost of electoral deception and weaken trust in public evidence. Rights to explanation, appeal, independent review and provenance disclosures matter because they make both automated decisions and manipulated information contestable.

Policies for Sharing Gains and Protecting Independence

The structure of the AI economy creates strong pressures toward faster wealth concentration and a more unequal distribution of income. A central question for democratic political economy is whether these pressures can coexist with a decent and dependable standard of living for the broad majority. That standard has concrete implications: households should be able to meet ordinary expenses without persistent anxiety, withstand a spell of unemployment or a temporary loss of earnings without financial distress, and look ahead to retirement with reasonable confidence. The policy test is whether people can count on that level of security throughout their lives as technological change alters the jobs and income sources on which they depend.

This distinction matters for understanding the appeal of authoritarian populism. When people lose confidence that established institutions can offer a credible path to a secure life, promises of protection from leaders who claim to speak for those left behind can gain force. A dependable income floor, backed by enforceable social rights and adequate pensions, would help restore the material basis for confidence in democratic institutions. How widely that security is shared should be a central criterion for judging the distributional consequences of the AI transition.

The immediate task is to align investment decisions with the costs they create. Utilities and regulators can require large users to cover attributable network upgrades and establish credible payment commitments if demand falls short. Local authorities can publish expected fiscal costs and benefits, assess water use in the affected basin, and tie incentives to measurable commitments. Financial supervisors need visibility into the routes by which leveraged projects can transmit losses. Separately, AI agents linked to payments, national accounts or critical infrastructure introduce operational and cyber risks: unauthorized instructions, data leakage and correlated model failures can transmit shocks even without excessive leverage. These measures clarify who bears the risk before the public is asked to absorb it.

Tax policy can then address who receives the gains. The case for reviewing the treatment of capital income and economic rents becomes stronger if automation shifts the tax base away from wages while raising demand for social protection. The design should distinguish returns needed to finance investment from rents sustained by market power or privileged access to scarce resources. The IMF staff analysis favors strengthening capital income taxation over a general tax on generative AI use. Models that find a role for taxing automation show that the result depends on transition conditions and workers’ ability to move into new occupations. International coordination can help keep mobile profits within reach of taxation, while leaving room for governments to choose how to support local adjustment.

The use of revenue is as important as its collection. Portable benefits and income support can allow workers to change jobs without losing basic security. Education systems must also prepare entrants for AI-complementary judgment, digital literacy, and transferable skills; reskilling is more valuable when it connects to actual demand, and workers can afford to take it up. Collective bargaining can give employees a say in how productivity gains translate into pay, working time, or the quality of services. Broad-based capital ownership, including through independently governed public or worker funds, could extend access to investment returns. Such arrangements require transparent rules for governance and distribution.

Public institutions also influence which applications are developed. Open procurement and access to shared computing resources can expand the pool of firms and researchers able to develop applications. Governments can use procurement to specify observable goals such as reducing administrative burdens, improving service quality, or giving professionals more time with patients and students. Risk-tiered audits, human oversight, data provenance and enforceable rights to challenge automated decisions are especially important when the public cannot choose another provider. Copyright licensing and creator remuneration should be addressed without allowing rights aggregation to entrench dominant platforms. The test is whether these arrangements increase the capacity of people and institutions to make their own decisions as they adopt the technology.

In conclusion, the AI transition will be shaped by the gap between the pace of infrastructure investment and the rate at which useful applications spread. Investment can strain power systems and balance sheets before productivity gains are realized. As those gains arrive, competition, ownership, and bargaining institutions will determine how much reaches households through prices, wages, and public services. The democratic consequences depend partly on whether people can absorb disruption without becoming dependent on discretionary protection. A credible response must link investment risk to the distribution of returns, safeguard critical systems and epistemic integrity, and preserve households’ ability to plan their lives. Without institutions that govern ownership, data, and public accountability, productivity alone cannot guarantee shared prosperity or democratic resilience.

Statue of Cecil Rhodes on the exterior of Oriel College, Oxford, UK.

The Hood on Rhodes and the Politics of Moral Purification

In this commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias examines the controversy surrounding a planned talk by philosopher Nathan Cofnas at Oxford University’s Oriel College, following a protest in which a Ku Klux Klan hood was placed on the statue of Cecil Rhodes. Drawing on debates about academic freedom, safetyism, moral purification, and Popper’s paradox of tolerance, Dr. Ferreira Dias explores the tensions between free expression, institutional responsibility, and the protection of students from discrimination. While rejecting Cofnas’s racial hereditarianism as scientifically unpersuasive and morally objectionable, he distinguishes institutional endorsement from providing a platform for public debate. He argues that universities should apply consistent principles, protect legitimate protest, and encourage critical engagement rather than allowing moral disagreement alone to justify exclusion.

By João Ferreira Dias

On November 12, 2026, a Ku Klux Klan hood appeared on the statue of Cecil Rhodes above the entrance to Oriel College. Below it, a sign read “racists welcome here.” The people who placed it there were protesting against a talk by Nathan Cofnas, scheduled for November 17. Why put the hood on Rhodes? The statue gave the protesters a way to make an accusation about the college. An institution that continues to honor a British imperialist, they suggested, was acting in character when it gave Cofnas a room.

Who invited Cofnas?

Cofnas is a philosopher affiliated with Ghent University. In his public writings, he argues that genetic differences contribute to alleged differences in average intelligence between racial groups. He uses this claim to predict who would reach positions of elite status under what he considers meritocratic selection. There are two questions here. What evidence establishes a genetic explanation for differences between groups? And why should a test score carry the weight in selection that Cofnas gives it? A trait’s heritability within a population, by itself, tells us nothing about the cause of a difference between population averages. Nor would such a difference tell a university what an individual candidate deserves.

The invitation came from the Oxon Universities’ Reform Society, a student association that describes itself as linked to Reform UK. Its public announcement advertised a talk on whether diversity policies affect university hiring and academic quality, with advance booking and questions from the audience. That topic explains why Cofnas’s wider views matter to the controversy, even though the announcement leaves open whether he would present his argument about race. Oriel College described the event as a booking by a registered student society under its freedom of speech code.

A college speaks in its own name when it chooses whom to commemorate. When it makes rooms available under general rules, it exercises authority over access. Of course, Oxford’s prestige can lend weight to an invitation issued by students. That makes the terms of access and the nature of the event worth stating plainly. As Simpson and Srinivasan (2018) argue, academic freedom includes the authority of scholars to decide which work meets disciplinary standards. A political society’s invitation to an academic for a public discussion and a department’s decision to feature his research in a seminar involve different judgements.

When Disagreement Becomes a Safety Question

An open letter reported by Varsity called on Oriel to cancel the invitation or halt the event pending a published risk assessment, an independent review and safeguards for Black students and staff. At a meeting on November 11, student representatives asked how risks had been assessed. A college has a duty to take credible threats and harassment seriously. Those reports leave open what specific dangers the signatories anticipated. The question is what would justify withdrawal if the concern were that hearing Cofnas’s views would itself make students unsafe.

The term safetyism describes what happens when safety expands to override other values (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018). Mounk (2023) identifies a difficulty for free expression when the category of harm comes to include the expression of an objectionable view as such. There is a paradox in the intellectual background to this argument. The suspicion that prevailing accounts of truth are shaped by power can coexist with a remarkable certainty about which views others should be permitted to hear. In a university, that certainty can become paternalism. Students who might ask Cofnas to defend his premises are imagined chiefly as people who need to be shielded from them.

The hood expressed a further claim. If opening the door implicates Oriel in what Cofnas believes, closing it becomes evidence of the college’s moral rectitude. Mary Douglas’s account of pollution and social boundaries helps explain how exclusion can take on that meaning (Douglas, 1966/2002). It also helps explain why a demand for cancellation can benefit the very association it was intended to oppose. Removing the room leaves the argument circulating and gives the organizers a reason to talk about censorship instead of answering for their choice of speaker.

Who May Organize on Campus?

Oxford also has student associations on the left, including the Oxford Labour Club. The university publishes general criteria for registered societies. The harder question is whether a university can apply its rules to a society whose politics many of its members consider objectionable. Progressives may regard their own associations as morally preferable. Institutional legitimacy requires reasons that can also be applied when the people exercising authority have different political sympathies.

This is where Popper’s paradox of tolerance is useful. Popper (1945, chap. 7, note 4) considered suppression unwise while intolerant views could be met by argument and checked by public opinion. He reserved the possibility of restraint for circumstances in which movements sought to prevent argument, including through intimidation or violence. At Oxford, a society can be expected to respect the conditions of participation and contestation it claims for itself. Students must also be free to protest against its events. A request to cancel a talk is itself an exercise of expression. The college’s decision to act on that request requires its own justification.

There is a temptation to think that our generation, after a long history of arriving at better moral judgements, has reached the final version of social morality. Yet convictions about equality can be held firmly while leaving room to test what we believe follows from them. Suppose another student society invites a historian who argues that Rhodes should come down. Opponents claim that giving her a room amounts to endorsing her account of British imperialism. What would we ask Oriel to do? The rule we would accept then should also govern how the college treats the students who invited Cofnas. I find his racial hereditarianism scientifically unpersuasive and morally objectionable. Even if the organizers and their opponents leave with their views unchanged, other students will have had the chance to hear the claims challenged and make up their own minds. 


 

References

Douglas, M. (2002). Purity and danger: An analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo. Routledge. (Original work published 1966)

Lukianoff, G., & Haidt, J. (2018). The coddling of the American mind: How good intentions and bad ideas are setting up a generation for failure. Penguin Press.

Mounk, Y. (2023). The identity trap: A story of ideas and power in our time. Penguin Press.

Popper, K. R. (1945). The open society and its enemies: Vol. 1. The spell of Plato. George Routledge & Sons.

Simpson, R. M., & Srinivasan, A. (2018). “No platforming.” In: J. Lackey (Ed.), Academic freedom, (pp. 186–210). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791508.003.0011

Doctoral researcher Fabiola Ermer.

Fabiola Ermer: Illiberal Political Ideas Become Socially Embedded Through Less Visible Mechanisms

In this ECPS Voice of Youth interview, Fabiola Ermer, doctoral researcher at the Heidelberg University for Jewish Studies, discusses her comparative research on right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary, the role of education in shaping ethno-national belonging, and the importance of looking beyond political leaders to understand how illiberal ideas become embedded in society. Examining educational programmes, transnational ideological networks, and the societal infrastructures of illiberalism, Ermer highlights the less visible mechanisms through which political narratives acquire legitimacy and become normalized. She also distinguishes illiberalism from democratic backsliding, reflects on the methodological challenges of comparative research, and emphasizes scholarly independence, international collaboration, and critical engagement with education’s role in reproducing political identities and sustaining ideological influence beyond electoral change.

Interview by Natalia Crane

In an era of democratic backsliding and increasingly interconnected illiberal movements, understanding how political ideas become embedded in society requires looking beyond electoral competition, political leaders, and formal institutions. Education, ideological networks, and the construction of national belonging constitute less visible but consequential dimensions of contemporary populism.

Fabiola Ermer is a doctoral researcher at the Ben-Gurion Chair for Israel and Middle Eastern Studies at the Heidelberg University of Jewish Studies and a doctoral fellow of the Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich Scholarship Foundation (ELES). Her doctoral research examines right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary, focusing on how their educational programmes for young adults contribute to the construction of ethno-national conceptions of belonging and form part of broader infrastructures of illiberalism.

In this ECPS Voice of Youth interview, Ermer reflects on the development of her academic interests, the relationship between populism and democracy, and the methodological challenges of comparative research. She also discusses international academic collaboration, education’s role in reproducing political ideas, and the mechanisms through which political narratives become socially embedded.

Drawing on comparative research in Israel and Hungary, Ermer emphasizes the importance of studying the ideological infrastructures operating between governments and society. “We need to look more beyond parties, campaigns, and individual leaders,” she argues, calling for closer examination of how political ideas acquire institutional durability and social legitimacy.

Central to her research is the recognition that education is not inherently democratic or emancipatory. As Ermer explains, “education can also reproduce particular worldviews and ideas of belonging.” She therefore encourages researchers to examine who provides education, which values are communicated, and how educational programmes relate to broader political structures.

Ermer also challenges the tendency to equate illiberalism with democratic backsliding, emphasizing the analytical distinction between rejecting liberal values and the deterioration of democratic institutions. Her comparative approach highlights how think tanks, transnational networks, and educational initiatives contribute to constructing the boundaries of political belonging.

Regarding scholarly responsibility, she advocates methodological transparency, analytical independence, and greater public engagement. Researchers, she argues, should “make complex developments understandable, challenge misleading assumptions, and provide the necessary context.”

Ermer hopes her research will illuminate “the less visible mechanisms through which political ideas become socially embedded and politically normalized, without the need for coercion,” offering a perspective on the societal foundations of illiberalism and the challenges facing contemporary democracies.

Interview with Fabiola Ermer lightly edited for clarity and flow.

From Israel’s Judicial Reform to Comparative Research on Hungary

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

To begin, could you introduce yourself, outline your academic journey, and explain how your research interests developed? What initially drew you to your studies, and why do you believe these areas of research are particularly significant in today’s global political environment?

Fabiola Ermer: Thanks for the invitation again. I’m currently a PhD student at the Ben-Gurion Chair for Israel and Middle Eastern Studies at Heidelberg University for Jewish Studies, and also at Heidelberg University. I’m supervised by two professors: Professor Johannes Becke, who is based at Heidelberg University for Jewish Studies, and Professor Dani Filc, who is a professor at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Israel.

I studied Jewish Studies, Political Science, and Semitic Languages, mostly in Germany, in Düsseldorf and Heidelberg. My interest in this particular topic, and in Israel and Hungary, actually started with an internship in Israel in 2023, before October 7. At that time, judicial reform dominated public and political debates in Israel. There were constant comparisons with Orbán’s judicial changes in Hungary. I became increasingly intrigued by this, and I was looking for a topic for my master’s thesis. I thought it was a perfect opportunity because it was such a current issue. So, I asked whether Hungary could serve as a role model for an illiberal transformation in Israel.

To make it very short, Orbán’s mechanisms would have been quite difficult to replicate in Israel for several reasons. One important difference is that Israel has no constitution, whereas Hungary’s constitutional changes in 2012 played a major role in its transformation.

What I realized while researching was how closely connected many actors, especially those on the right-wing spectrum, were between Hungary and Israel. They were working together, sharing interests, and organizing conferences together. I became very interested in the topic and decided that I wanted to pursue a PhD in this field, maintaining the comparison between Hungary and Israel.

Now I’m researching how right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary use educational programmes, mostly for young adults, to construct ethno-national conceptions of belonging. I’m also asking how and why these programmes may become part of a broader infrastructure of illiberalism. I’m not saying that they are the reason illiberalism is happening, but they are one element within a much broader process.

Populism, Illiberalism, and the Construction of Belonging

Your doctoral research examines think tanks in Israel and Hungary, particularly their role in shaping political and civic understandings of the people. How does your work intersect with broader debates in populism studies? How do you define populism in your own research, and why have you adopted that particular approach? Has your understanding of populism evolved since you began your academic career?

Fabiola Ermer: I’m working mostly with a broad approach to populism, particularly the definition by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. They define populism as a thin-centered ideology that sees society as divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the pure people” and the corrupt elite. It holds that politics should express the general will of the people. This approach is useful for me because it focuses on the content, which is exactly what I’m researching: how actors construct the idea of “the pure people” and, in this case, who belongs and who is excluded.

However, I’m not actually looking at leaders or campaigns. I’m looking more at the structures behind them, such as think tanks and educational programmes. In my framework, populism is therefore one element rather than the whole story. I’m working with four connected dimensions. The first is illiberalism and democratic backsliding as a broader process. The second is ethno-national and national-populist construction. The third is content and hegemony, particularly in a Gramscian sense. And the fourth is education as the medium through which these ideas are transmitted.

I would say that my understanding has changed. Before, I was more focused on how populism is articulated through governments and at the governmental level. Now I’m looking at it from different perspectives. I remember reading about the idea that populism works along a vertical axis, with the people positioned against the elite, while nationalism works along a horizontal axis. I’m essentially combining these two axes. I’ve realized that it isn’t always easy to define them strictly as two separate groups. They are much more interconnected. I think that’s where my understanding has changed most over the last year. I’ve just finished my first year of PhD research, so everything is still developing, but that is probably the biggest shift in my thinking about populism.

The Relationship Between Populism and Democracy

Photo: Shutterstock.

Populism remains one of the most contested concepts in political science. Given your research, which theoretical debates would you consider most consequential for the future of the field? What misconceptions about populism, illiberalism, and democratic backsliding do you encounter most frequently?

Fabiola Ermer: One of the most important debates we are still facing, both in academia and in public discussions, concerns the relationship between populism and democracy. We need to ask how we deal with populism and to what extent it can even nurture democracy by raising questions that might otherwise not be asked. However, especially now, with increasing polarization, illiberal actors are managing more and more to present themselves as the true defenders of democracy, mostly understood through elections and majority rule. Courts, liberal elites, and supranational institutions, such as the European Union, are increasingly framed as obstacles imposed from above.

To connect this, I think of Adam Przeworski, whose work I really admire. He discusses one of the key questions we face when defending democracy: Are we defending democracy itself, or the values we personally attach to it? And what happens when different people attach different values to democracy? This is where the tension between minimalist and maximalist conceptions of democracy becomes much more decisive. From a minimalist perspective, the erosion of liberal safeguards may become visible much later, when democratic backsliding is already happening. Hungary was quite a good example of this. There may now be a change, but it is still far too early to say whether there will be a shift from minimalist to maximalist ideas of democracy.

As for misconceptions, I think one of the most common ones, especially in public debate rather than academia, is that illiberalism and democratic backsliding are treated as synonymous. But technically, they are not the same. Democratic backsliding refers to the deterioration of democratic qualities, such as less competitive elections or restricted participation. We have seen this in Hungary and Serbia, for example. Illiberalism itself refers to the rejection of liberal values. From a minimalist understanding of democracy, an illiberal system may still be considered a valid form of democracy, even if it is not necessarily the form of democracy we personally want. This also raises the question of whether liberal democracy is the only form of democracy we should defend, or whether it is a more Western idea that we sometimes try to impose on systems that may work differently.

Another misconception is that we focus too much on governmental levels and not enough on the population or the actors behind governments. These actors still receive comparatively little attention.

Methodological Challenges in Comparing Israel and Hungary

How do you operationalize populism in your research? What challenges arise when comparing different national contexts, such as Hungary and Israel? And how do you balance qualitative and quantitative approaches?

Fabiola Ermer: I’m still working on my methodology, so there are some things that are changing. At the moment, I have a qualitative and comparative research design, with the individual organization as the unit of comparison. Instead of measuring populism quantitatively, I’m combining two procedures with separate tasks. One is a structured qualitative content analysis, which captures what the programmes actually communicate.

I have four main categories: the construction of the people, identity and belonging, concepts of democracy, and enemies and demarcations. These are closely connected to the populist narrative of “us versus them.” Another important category is the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland, which is relevant to both Israel and Hungary, although in different ways.

The subcategories I will use are likely to be developed from the material itself. In addition, I’m using discourse-analytical reading to capture how meaning is produced, particularly through language, metaphors, and implicit assumptions that make belonging appear natural and apolitical.

One of the main challenges is that both political systems are changing. Another is that the two cases are neither a most-similar nor a most-different design, so I had to look more closely at what makes them comparable in a qualitative analysis. I think I’ve now figured out how to frame this well enough for my PhD. I’m using the distinction between ethnic belonging and formal citizenship, which is anchored in the legal frameworks of both countries. Israel does not have a constitution, but it has a Basic Law with a somewhat ambiguous constitutional character. The distinction is also anchored in the Hungarian constitution. That is where the two cases are most similar. 

They differ, however, in how they draw their boundaries. Following other political scientists, Israel can be classified as an ethnic democracy. We also see this in other countries, such as Slovakia and Estonia. Hungary, on the other hand, is not generally considered an ethnic democracy. It is one of the most homogeneous countries in the European Union. Its inclusive boundary extends to ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries, such as Slovakia and Romania, while its exclusive boundary is drawn against more constructed threats. That is one of the limitations I have to deal with when comparing the two systems.

Do you plan to conduct fieldwork in these countries, particularly by speaking with people about ethnic belonging and related issues?

Fabiola Ermer: I do. The question now is whether I might shift more towards interviews. The difficulty with my research is that I won’t be able to make claims about the effects of these programmes. It would be too broad, and I don’t think it would be academically rigorous to say that someone attended classes at a think tank for a year, for example, and consequently developed more illiberal ideas. I can’t really speak about that effect. 

Instead, I’m looking more at why people, such as the heads of organizations, construct these courses in particular ways. Why are certain topics included? Even the names of subjects and the literature used to frame them can already provide hints. For example, in the Hungarian case, when organizations offer classes about Hungarian minorities, they may use Hungarian terminology for countries that have not been part of Hungary for more than a hundred years. That already communicates a particular idea before the lecture even begins. So, I will conduct fieldwork in the sense that I will speak with people and try to gather as much material as possible.

Digital Research and the Importance of Archiving

Social Media
Photo: Sujin Surakoon / Dreamstime.

The study of populism and contemporary political movements increasingly relies on digital data, social media, and computational methods. Given the importance of political communication and transnational networks in your area of research, what role have these tools played in your own work? How might they help scholars better understand political ideas and the development of movements?

Fabiola Ermer: Computational methods are not necessarily at the center of my methodology, but digital work matters in a different way. I actually didn’t expect this before, but with the changes in Hungary, I’ve become quite experienced in archiving websites. Websites and programmes are often digitalized, and they are among the most important sources for my research. When I want to understand how a class is framed beforehand, for example, and an organization has a Moodle course, I would really like to know how that course is presented. However, with the political changes, some materials are disappearing, particularly when organizations come under political pressure. So, I’ve started archiving relevant websites at regular intervals and working with earlier versions through web archives.

In general, digital methods have expanded considerably. They make it possible to analyze communication across large datasets and trace how messages travel across networks and platforms, sometimes even across countries and continents. But I think we need to be careful not to treat digital visibility directly as political influence. There are many more factors involved. Social media data tell us a lot about communication and mobilization, and they help us identify certain trends. But they do not necessarily tell us how ideas become embedded in institutions or in everyday understandings of society.

There is also the danger of being in certain bubbles all the time. Ideas can suddenly seem more natural, or it can seem as though everybody is saying something, when in reality, you’re only seeing a small bubble that appears much bigger than it is. Nevertheless, I don’t think any academic research field can ignore digital methods completely. They are important sources of data, but we should approach them carefully and make sure to bring other perspectives into the analysis.

Unexpected Discoveries and Changing Research Assumptions

What has been the most surprising finding in your work so far? Have you encountered any evidence that fundamentally challenged your original assumptions or shifted your thinking?

Fabiola Ermer: When I started my PhD, Hungary was still under Orbán’s government, while the Israeli political system was relatively stable, despite the elections and other developments. There was nothing fundamentally changing in the way we have now seen in Hungary. Orbán still had a two-thirds majority and was firmly in power. I think even many political scientists in Hungary would not have expected Magyar to win with such a strong majority in April.

One of my hypotheses was that institutions, once established, could endure even through political changes, particularly if they had been in place for a long time. But I hadn’t really considered what would happen if one two-thirds-majority system shifted into another two-thirds-majority system. With new legislation, defunding, and the creation of new foundations in Hungary, everything became very chaotic. That was one of my main surprises. Perhaps I should have considered it beforehand, but it was so hypothetical that even in April, many people thought such a fundamental change was unlikely.

Another interesting discovery came from comparing the organizations themselves. I’m currently looking at two or three Israeli think tanks, mostly on the right-wing spectrum, that are structured somewhat similarly to the Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Hungary. They offer classes for young adults, mostly between 18 and 26, with the aim of building a new intellectual elite.

What I found particularly interesting was how differently these organizations are structured. Hungary has, in a way, perfected the model of putting everything under one roof: a think tank, an educational sector, and other activities within one institution. In Israel, these activities are more divided between different think tanks, but the organizations are still closely connected. They may have the same lecturers or receive funding from the same organizations.

At first, I wasn’t sure whether this asymmetry would be a problem for comparing the cases. But after discussing it with my supervisor, I decided to approach it as two distinct modes of hegemonic articulation: direct pedagogical formation on one side and mediated ideological dissemination on the other.

I was also surprised by how little political foundations, and their non-governmental activities have been researched. We know quite a lot about institutions such as the Mathias Corvinus Collegium and their role within the Orbán regime, but there is still much less research on what they actually do at the non-governmental level. This is important because democratic backsliding and illiberalism do not necessarily happen only at the highest political level. They can also develop at an intermediary level, between the population and the government.

Researching Politically Sensitive Topics

Viktor Orbán campaign poster ahead of Hungary’s 2026 elections. Photo: Bettina Wagner / Dreamstime.

Populism often operates in politically polarized environments characterized by disinformation campaigns and contested narratives. Do you foresee these dynamics affecting your ability to collect data, access reliable resources, and conduct research? How do you navigate politically sensitive topics while maintaining scholarly rigor and analytical distance?

Fabiola Ermer: These dynamics have mainly affected the actors I’m researching. Internal teaching materials are particularly difficult to obtain, especially when they belong to organizations operating in a system that is undergoing political change. The situation in the Hungarian parliament is still quite heated and polarized, and access requests are currently being declined, often without any explanation.

Some of the materials in the Israeli cases are also difficult to obtain. Think tanks are generally not very willing to share their materials, and the broader polarization of the Israeli political system, as well as the international context, makes this even more complicated. Everything seems to be becoming more exclusive, and organizations are less willing to include outsiders.

Another substantive challenge is that the organizations I’m studying sometimes describe their work in ideological terms. Some openly state what they want to achieve, which can make certain questions easier to answer. But when programmes are presented as civic education, leadership training, or academic excellence, it becomes more difficult to understand their underlying purpose. I also don’t think it is academically sound to assume that because an organization describes its work in a certain way, that is necessarily what happens in practice. That’s why I’m trying to look more closely at why these programmes are constructed, not only how they are constructed.

With polarization more generally, I think it will become increasingly difficult for scholars to access materials. People are also becoming less willing to talk to those who may not share their ideas or worldviews, and this affects journalists and researchers alike.

The Responsibility of Scholars in Public Debate

When controversial topics such as populism generate intense public debate, do you believe scholars have a responsibility not only to produce research but also to intervene in these discussions? How can academics communicate complex findings to policymakers, journalists, civil society, and broader audiences?

Fabiola Ermer: Scholars have a responsibility to take part in public debate, especially when political concepts are used in simplified or highly polarized ways. However, I wouldn’t say our task is necessarily to provide political solutions. We are more the people who provide the facts and the analytical perspective.

The most important thing is that we are able to make complex developments understandable, challenge misleading assumptions, and provide the necessary context. I feel that this is actually a problem in political science. We talk so much about theory that people outside the field, or even people who work in a different academic discipline, sometimes ask themselves: What is actually happening? We need to adapt more to different settings and accept that each format requires something different. Policy advice is fundamentally different from writing about elections for a political journal or having a discussion within a political party and explaining what is happening in a particular country. Each format requires something different. In general, an audience needs a clear argument and a concrete example, so we should make our work as accessible as possible.

I think this is also one reason why populist narratives can be so effective. They are often very simple: they do this, everything else is bad, and we are here. There is no room for anything in between. But there are people in between, and we need to explain why things are not as simple as they may appear. This is where academia should intervene more. At the same time, academia should remain a place where fundamental disagreements can be discussed openly and where discussions are based on evidence and argument.

The debates surrounding Israel, in particular, show how polarization can reach into academic agenda-setting. It can affect which questions are considered legitimate and which perspectives are heard. We should not allow political positions to determine in advance which questions can even be asked. People sometimes misunderstand academia as a place where researchers are necessarily political activists. That can be true for some individuals, but academia should remain grounded in facts, evidence, and arguments rather than feelings.

The Broader Impact of Research on Democracy and Education

Photo: Iryna Kushnarova.

Beyond academic publications and your doctoral thesis, what kind of impact would you ideally like your research to have? How would you like scholarly work to contribute to our understanding of democratic challenges while avoiding becoming politicized itself?

Fabiola Ermer: Ideally, I would like my research to help explain how illiberal ideas become established beyond formal institutions. Democratic backsliding is still usually studied through constitutional reforms, judicial independence, or electoral cycles. All of these things matter, of course, but we also need to understand the societal infrastructures that make such challenges possible or acceptable. That’s where I would really like to contribute. With the Hungarian case, my research is also shifting towards a new question: How durable are these infrastructures once they have become well established? And how durable are they when there is an actual change in government or a fundamental political transformation?

The topic of education is also very personal to me. I would like to encourage a more critical perspective on education because, especially in Western democracies, education is often assumed to be democratic or emancipatory by nature. But we tend to forget that education can also reproduce particular worldviews and ideas of belonging. I don’t want to say that every politically oriented programme is inherently problematic. That’s not what I’m trying to argue. It is important, however, to pay attention to who provides education, which values it communicates, and how it relates to wider political structures. We should also ask why people feel the need to seek out alternative educational infrastructures rather than considering the existing government structures sufficient.

Regarding politicization, it is quite difficult to avoid it completely with my topic. But, in the end, I’m conducting academic research, and I distinguish between political advocacy and academic intervention. Research can contribute to democratic debate by making the mechanisms in both countries visible and hopefully providing evidence. But I’m not telling people what they should think. I’m stating what I have found, and then it is up to them to process that information.

The best protection I know is to be transparent about your methods, your materials, and the limitations of your research. It is also important to take seriously evidence that contradicts your expectations or even your results. In science, it is entirely possible that in ten years everything will have changed so fundamentally that our current findings no longer hold. But they are relevant to the period we are studying now.

International Collaboration and Academic Exchange

How has cooperation with other scholars, academic networks, and transnational initiatives such as the ECPS Early Career Researchers Network influenced your research, professional development, and intellectual outlook? How important are international dimensions to your work?

Fabiola Ermer: As you said, my whole project is international by design. It is co-supervised in Israel, and my co-supervisor primarily researches right-wing populism in Israel. He has already become a very important reference for me. This has shaped certain narratives, questions, and programmes that I’m looking at, particularly in the Israeli context. But it also means constantly moving between two academic environments, with different debates and assumptions.

What I learned quite quickly is that scholars are generally very open to helping if you ask them. Although I’m based in Germany, I speak with professors in Hungary and researchers in Israel. Even when you spend only a few weeks in a country and engage with people there, you can gain new insights, challenge assumptions, make connections, and meet people. Everybody knows someone who might be able to help, and that’s a great benefit of academia.

I also attended the ECPS Summer School, and it was a good example of this. We worked on a policy paper or policy advice in an interdisciplinary group, with people whose backgrounds were very different from my own. It encouraged communication across disciplines and helped us think in policy terms. I found it very enriching, and the connections we made continued even after the course finished. These international connections and regular opportunities to discuss ongoing work help prevent projects from becoming too narrow or one-sided.

To return to populism, it is generally a transnational phenomenon. The actors themselves work across borders, particularly when we look at right-wing networks. Studying populism therefore also requires transnational exchange.

Challenges Facing Early-Career Researchers

US Dollar
Photo: Mar Tas / Dreamstime.

Are there any personal or professional challenges you have faced while pursuing your research, particularly as an early-career scholar? What has enabled you to overcome these challenges? Has working on politically sensitive subjects presented any additional difficulties?

Fabiola Ermer: In general, one of the biggest challenges when starting a PhD or becoming an early-career researcher is the financial aspect. I’m very lucky to have a scholarship now, but in the beginning, there is a period when you don’t know whether your research will actually be financed or whether the funding will be sufficient.

For me, the first six months were particularly challenging because I was trying to obtain a scholarship and applying for different opportunities. Applications are very time-consuming, especially because every foundation wants something different. You write and rewrite applications, and sometimes you suddenly need another recommendation letter when you thought two would be enough.

Another challenge is balancing theoretical ambition with empirical feasibility. My project touches on so many theoretical dimensions: populism, illiberalism, democratic backsliding, nationalism, and education. At some point, it becomes tempting to cover everything, but that’s simply not possible. You sometimes have to overcome your own perfectionism and accept that you need to focus on a particular subject, even if there are many other interesting things you would like to explore. Otherwise, you could easily end up with enough material for several PhDs.

In the beginning, I wanted to compare three countries. Austria was one of the cases I considered because it offered a different ethno-national conception from Israel and Hungary. I thought it would be interesting to include a third case to show the contrast. But I realized quite quickly that the differences would make the comparison very difficult. Focusing on Israel and Hungary would actually make the project stronger.

I think that not losing focus is one of the most challenging things, at least based on my first year of experience. There are so many interesting things happening that it is easy to get lost in the details and become overwhelmed.

The Most Rewarding Aspects of Academic Research

What has been the most rewarding aspect of your work so far during your first year? Is there anything you would approach differently?

Fabiola Ermer: One of the most rewarding things has been starting to feel that people are actually interested in what I’m doing. I’ve been invited to talk about my research, present my ideas, and exchange views with other researchers.

Over the last year, I was invited to speak about the Hungarian system and the changes taking place there. Previously, I had been looking more at right-wing networks in Hungary and how they cooperate with other networks globally. It was really great to be invited and to have people interested in hearing me talk about it. I felt very honored.

I’m also grateful that I can work on something I’m genuinely interested in. I have to admit that when I first started studying Political Science, I hated it. I really didn’t like it. Perhaps I was too young when I started, but many things didn’t make sense to me, particularly political theory and democratic theory. That changed during my master’s degree. Now I’m doing my PhD in this field, and I genuinely look forward to reading and working on these topics. I think being able to work in a field that interests me so much is one of the best things I could have.

If I could start again, I would try to work more systematically with my materials from the beginning. I’m still at an early stage, so I have time to improve things, but the Hungarian case has become particularly challenging because of all the political changes. I suddenly have to archive as much material as possible, as quickly as possible.

I would also have liked to understand earlier that a dissertation does not need to address an enormous number of questions. It needs to address two or three fundamental questions that are important for the research and that ultimately help develop a clear and convincing argument.

Scholars and Ideas That Have Influenced Her Research

Professor Adam Przeworski.
Professor Adam Przeworski is Emeritus Professor of Politics at New York University (NYU).

Are there any particular scholars, theoretical traditions, books, or experiences that have fundamentally shaped your thinking about populism, ethno-nationalism, democratic backsliding, or the relationship between education and politics?

Fabiola Ermer: So far, the most important experience was probably the internship I had in Israel in 2023. That’s where everything started to develop, and I’m pretty sure I wouldn’t have chosen this topic if I hadn’t been there at that particular time.

My supervisors have also been very influential, especially my first supervisor. He brought me back into the political science part of my research when I presented my first draft for what would become my master’s thesis. He later encouraged me to pursue a PhD and supported me throughout the process.

On a theoretical level, Adam Przeworski has been particularly important. He’s a Polish political scientist who has lived in the United States for decades. His distinction between minimalist and maximalist conceptions of democracy is quite simple and logical when you first read it. But it changed a lot for me, especially in terms of the question of what we do with people who attach different values to democracy. It changed not only how I approached my own research topic but also how I engage with political debates when presenting my research and encountering different ideas.

It’s such a fundamental question: how do we deal with people who attach different values to democracy? Perhaps this is also one reason why we are becoming more polarized. We have started to neglect the question of how to deal with different values, and we sometimes assume that the values we attach to democracy are the only ones that matter. Przeworski essentially framed much of the theoretical framework of my PhD.

Other influential scholars include Fareed Zakaria, who helped popularize the distinction between democracy and constitutional liberalism, as well as Wolfgang Merkel and Aurel Croissant, particularly their work on formal and informal institutions.

For the Israeli context, the concept of ethnic democracy has also been important, particularly how it is understood in different countries and compared with European contexts. My second supervisor’s work on how Jewish populism has changed over the centuries has also influenced how I developed my own thinking.

Skills and Advice for the Next Generation of Scholars

As universities become increasingly internationalized and research more competitive, what skills do you believe young political scientists need most in order to thrive? What advice would you offer to the next generation of scholars entering populism studies?

Fabiola Ermer: There are quite a few things, although I’m still figuring them out myself. First, it’s important to be very precise about the definitions you use at the beginning of your research. You need to clearly explain what a concept captures and what it doesn’t. Rather than adopting a new term on every page, you should be clear about the concepts you’re working with.

I also think language skills are extremely important. We live in a world that is so globally connected, and even with AI and translation tools, linguistic skills remain essential. You can understand so many more nuances when you know the language and understand why a particular word is being used instead of another. This is particularly important in populism studies because different forms of populism can be quite subtle. When you’re not researching in your native language, having at least some basic language skills can be extremely helpful.

If there is an opportunity to receive a scholarship or participate in an academic exchange, I would also encourage researchers to spend time in the country they are studying and immerse themselves in its context. That’s one of the best skills we can develop.

Finally, being able to ask for help is an important skill. During bachelor’s and master’s programmes, you’re often expected to work independently, and it may not feel natural to approach your professors with questions all the time. But during a PhD, the expectations change. People ask why you didn’t seek help earlier. It’s important to develop the habit of asking questions and seeking guidance early, rather than continuing in one direction without knowing whether it is the right one.

The Future of Populism Studies

Photo: Dreamstime.

Looking ahead, where do you see populism studies evolving over the next decade? Which research questions or neglected areas deserve greater scholarly attention than they currently receive?

Fabiola Ermer: From an academic perspective, I’m quite optimistic that the topic won’t disappear. We need to look more beyond parties, campaigns, and individual leaders. We should ask more systematically how these ideas become embedded, rather than simply describing that they are becoming embedded.

Transnational networks are another important area. There are increasingly more mapping studies, and this kind of research will continue to develop. Social media also helps connect people globally and can facilitate the spread of populist narratives.

Another question that deserves more attention is what happens when populist governments lose power. Why do people become dissatisfied with the ideas these governments promote? Are they dissatisfied because those governments were populist, or are there other reasons why they decide to vote them out? We should also ask what happens to the infrastructures built during those years. Do they disappear, adapt, move somewhere else, or remain in the background? I think we will have more case studies to explore these questions, and they will become increasingly important.

We are also seeing populism become a much more prominent part of political debates in Western European countries. It will be interesting to compare countries where populist governments are losing power with those where populist movements are gaining influence.

The times are changing very quickly, and developments can be quite surprising. But these are some of the directions in which populism studies could develop.

Looking Beyond Israel and Hungary

If resources, time, and institutional constraints were no obstacle, what research project would you most like to pursue? Would you be interested in expanding your comparative research beyond Israel and Hungary or exploring other dimensions of transnational national-conservative networks? More broadly, what do you hope will ultimately be the lasting contribution of your work to scholarship and public understanding?

Fabiola Ermer: I would actually like to continue working on both countries, perhaps not necessarily as a direct comparison, but within a broader comparative project on how ideas of national belonging are transmitted across borders.

I would also like to focus more on diaspora programmes, transnational political networks, and how these different elements work together. This is particularly interesting in the Israeli case, but perhaps even more significant in Hungary, where these ideas are much more deeply embedded. For example, the whole idea of mystifying or romanticizing Hungarian history, and how that has become embedded in Hungarian society, is something I find very interesting. This is one of the lasting effects of the Orbán regime. The idea of Treaty of Trianon has become much more visible over the last fourteen years. You can see it in monuments standing in small villages, including those near Hungary’s former borders. It is very visible, and it also plays a role in how the idea of the people is constructed.

There is a similar phenomenon in Israel, although it operates in a different and less pronounced way.

I would really like to research the broader idea of romanticizing history and how it is narrated through political contexts. There are so many connected dimensions that could also be explored, such as how schoolbooks are designed and which vocabulary is used. These things are closely connected to my current topic, but there are so many nuances that I cannot examine all of them at the moment without making the project far too broad.

Ultimately, my hope is that my work can contribute to understanding the less visible mechanisms through which political ideas become socially embedded and politically normalized, without the need for coercion, and how these mechanisms shape the transformations taking place in our democracies today.

Professor Frances E. Lee.

Prof. Frances E. Lee: I Anticipate Very Hardball Politics in the US Over the Next Two Years

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Frances E. Lee of Princeton University examines the implications of the November 2026 US midterm elections, which delivered Democratic majorities in both chambers of Congress. Challenging interpretations of Trump’s presidency as consolidated competitive authoritarianism, Professor Lee argues that authoritarian ambitions have encountered significant institutional constraints, particularly decentralized election administration, federalism, and judicial independence. While warning that Trump’s expansive use of emergency and tariff powers has exposed constitutional vulnerabilities, she emphasizes the importance of congressional oversight and bipartisan accountability. Looking toward 2028, Professor Lee questions whether Trump’s personalistic coalition can survive his departure, even as populist rhetoric remains influential. Despite Democratic electoral gains, she anticipates continued polarization and intense partisan confrontation: “I anticipate very hardball politics over the next two years.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The November 2026 US midterm elections delivered a significant political setback for President Donald Trump, with Democrats securing majorities in both chambers of Congress. Driven partly by public dissatisfaction with inflation, rising prices, and the cost of living, the results underscored the continuing relevance of electoral accountability while raising fundamental questions about democratic backsliding, institutional resilience, and the future of authoritarian populism. With divided government returning in January 2027, the next two years will test Congress’s capacity to constrain presidential power and restore institutional accountability.

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Frances E. Lee, Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, jointly appointed in Princeton University’s Department of Politics and School of Public and International Affairs, offers a nuanced assessment of Trump’s electoral defeat and its implications for American democracy. Drawing on her research into congressional politics, party competition, and institutional constraints, Professor Lee challenges interpretations that equate authoritarian ambitions with successful democratic capture.

Addressing the debate over competitive authoritarianism, Professor Lee distinguishes between the administration’s attempts to undermine democratic institutions and its actual capacity to manipulate electoral competition. Despite serious concerns about attacks on civil society, universities, due process, and the rule of law, she emphasizes that “what the administration attempted to do looked like something straight out of the authoritarian playbook. But what it actually achieved was far more limited.”

Central to this resilience, Professor Lee argues, is America’s decentralized electoral system. State and local control over election administration prevented Republicans from changing electoral rules nationwide, even amid unprecedented mid-cycle redistricting efforts. As she explains, “A key source of that resilience is the decentralization of the US electoral system.” Federalism, judicial independence, and presidential term limits provide additional barriers against authoritarian consolidation.

Yet institutional resilience does not eliminate constitutional vulnerabilities. Professor Lee warns that Trump’s expansive interpretation of emergency authorities and tariff powers has exposed previously unrecognized weaknesses. She urges Congress to “rein in presidential emergency powers” by imposing time limits and reconsidering executive authorities that have enabled presidential overreach. She also advocates restraint in congressional investigations, emphasizing the greater credibility of bipartisan oversight.

Looking toward 2028, Professor Lee questions whether Trump’s personalistic political coalition can survive without its founder. “It may be that the Trump movement has reached its limits,” she observes. Nevertheless, populist rhetoric, anti-establishment appeals, and impatience with liberal-democratic constraints remain deeply embedded in American politics.

Finally, Professor Lee cautions against interpreting Democratic electoral gains as the beginning of partisan reconciliation. Given the continuing intensity of party competition and Republicans’ expectations of recovering power, she predicts: “I anticipate very hardball politics over the next two years.” Her analysis thus presents American democracy as simultaneously resilient, institutionally vulnerable, and politically polarized.

Here is our interview with Professor Frances E. Lee, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Dušan Spasojević.

Prof. Spasojević: Without Lustration and Accountability, Serbia’s Former Rulers Will Return

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Dušan Spasojević of the University of Belgrade examines Serbia’s student-led electoral victory and the challenges of democratic consolidation following Aleksandar Vučić’s defeat. While mass mobilization and civic solidarity helped overcome the structural advantages of competitive authoritarianism, Professor Spasojević cautions that entrenched political divisions, Serbian nationalism, and ethnonational tensions persist. He highlights the difficulties of maintaining unity within the ideologically diverse Students’ List and rebuilding democratic institutions. Drawing lessons from Milošević’s overthrow in 2000, he warns that without lustration and accountability, former authoritarian elites may return sooner than expected. Judicial independence, media freedom, and effective enforcement of existing laws, he argues, are essential to preventing renewed authoritarianism.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Serbia’s October 25, 2026, parliamentary elections marked a historic political turning point, with the student-backed Students’ List securing 140 of 250 seats and ending Aleksandar Vučić’s longstanding political dominance. Emerging from protests following the November 2024 Novi Sad railway station tragedy, the movement transformed demands for accountability into a nationwide challenge to institutional capture, political clientelism, and personalized rule. Yet electoral victory raises profound questions about democratic consolidation, institutional reform, and the resilience of entrenched authoritarian networks.

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Dušan Spasojević, Professor of Political Science at the University of Belgrade, offers a nuanced assessment of Serbia’s democratic breakthrough, highlighting both the transformative power of student-led mobilization and the formidable obstacles confronting democratic renewal.

Drawing parallels with Slobodan Milošević’s overthrow in 2000, Professor Spasojević identifies transitional justice as a decisive test. Warning against the complacency that characterized Serbia’s earlier transition, he argues: “If we fail to carry out lustration or establish some form of accountability, they will return, and sooner than we might expect.” Indeed, he cautions that “the return of the previous regime might be even easier now than it was in 2000.” His central recommendation is to prioritize accountability, judicial independence, media freedom, and implementation of existing laws.

Yet Professor Spasojević emphasizes that electoral victory has not erased Serbia’s deep political divisions. Although student mobilization attracted previously disengaged citizens and former government supporters, entrenched urban–rural and socioeconomic cleavages persist. Moreover, the Students’ List encompasses ideological positions ranging from the far right to the far left. Consequently, “Maintaining that unity will be a key challenge for the new government and the list itself.”

The interview also illuminates how mass mobilization can challenge competitive authoritarianism. Through nationwide canvassing, citizen participation, and election monitoring, students countered the ruling party’s institutional advantages. As Professor Spasojević observes, “the elections were ultimately neither free nor fair, but they were sufficiently competitive to make victory possible.”

Importantly, the movement’s anti-authoritarian success did not necessarily entail an ideological rupture with Serbian nationalism. Professor Spasojević argues that students “didn’t challenge Serbian nationalism,” pointing to their ambiguous positions on Kosovo, Russia, and European integration. Similarly, while solidarity between Serbian and Bosniak students represented meaningful civic progress, entrenched ethnonational divisions remain. The movement’s silence surrounding Srebrenica and the limited public participation of Albanian students illustrate the constraints of reconciliation through mobilization alone.

Professor Spasojević’s analysis distinguishes electoral transformation from democratic consolidation. Serbia’s experience demonstrates the importance of solidarity and collective action, but also the necessity of dismantling authoritarian structures. His overarching warning is unequivocal: “Democracy should never be taken for granted,” even after authoritarian incumbents lose power.

Here is our interview with Professor Dušan Spasojević, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Serbian researcher and activist Andrej Sevo.

Andrej Ševo: Serbia’s Students Made Democracy Cool Again

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Andrej Ševo, student movement activist and researcher at the University of Belgrade’s Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, examines Serbia’s historic student-led democratic breakthrough following the October 25 elections. Drawing on firsthand experience and scholarly research, Ševo explains how leaderless organization, participatory decision-making, and “Gen Z creativity” challenged Aleksandar Vučić’s personalized authoritarian rule. Arguing that “the students made democracy seem cool again,” he explores the movement’s populist dimensions, unprecedented civic mobilization, and emerging interethnic solidarity. Yet he warns that transforming electoral victory into durable democracy requires institutional innovation, judicial accountability, and lustration to prevent the return of entrenched authoritarian networks and another unfinished democratic transition.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Serbia’s October 25 elections marked a historic political turning point, with the student-backed list securing 140 parliamentary seats and ending Aleksandar Vučić’s longstanding political dominance. Emerging from protests following the November 2024 Novi Sad railway station tragedy, the movement transformed demands for accountability into a nationwide challenge to corruption, institutional capture, and personalized authoritarian rule. Yet electoral victory raises fundamental questions about democratic consolidation, transitional justice, and the resilience of entrenched authoritarian networks.

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Andrej Ševo, a student movement activist, researcher at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade, and PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences, examines this extraordinary transformation. Combining scholarly analysis with firsthand experience as an activist, election observer, and campaign organizer, Ševo explores how decentralized civic resistance evolved into a powerful electoral force.

At the heart of his analysis is the movement’s democratic innovation. Unlike conventional opposition parties, the students relied on plenums, horizontal decision-making, and rotating representation. According to Ševo, the government struggled to confront this unprecedented organizational model because “it did not know whom to attack.” By rejecting personalized leadership, the movement challenged the authoritarian, leader-centered logic of Serbian politics.

Equally important was what Ševo describes as the movement’s “Gen Z creativity.” Memes, humorous videos, songs, and innovative digital communication undermined the government’s established propaganda strategies. As he observes, “We were angry and disappointed, but we were also full of hope, creativity, and original ideas.” This cultural transformation accompanied a deeper democratic awakening: “The students made democracy seem cool again.” Ševo argues that younger generations increasingly embraced democratic participation over authoritarian leadership, while the movement’s deliberative practices helped overcome its own populist tendencies.

Yet the transition from protest to government presents an unprecedented institutional dilemma. Ševo acknowledges that the movement must develop new organizational arrangements without reproducing the hierarchical structures it opposed. “We simply have to try to create a system that has never existed before,” he explains, emphasizing the absence of historical precedents.

Looking ahead, Ševo warns that electoral defeat alone cannot dismantle entrenched authoritarian networks. Drawing on Serbia’s unfinished democratic transition after October 2000, he advocates “thorough criminal prosecutions” and “lustration” to prevent former regime figures implicated in abuses from returning to political power. Without sustained institutional transformation, he cautions, Serbia risks “another great disappointment.”

In sum, the interview examines whether Serbia’s democratic awakening can translate electoral victory, civic solidarity, and participatory innovation into durable democratic institutions.

Here is our interview with student movement activist, researcher Andrej Ševo, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Bernard Avishai.

Prof. Bernard Avishai Warns: Netanyahu’s Removal Could Trigger Greater Political Violence

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for PopulismStudies (ECPS), Professor Bernard Avishai of Dartmouth College warns that Benjamin Netanyahu’s removal from power could intensify political violence in Israel. Examining the enduring influence of Netanyahuism, religious nationalism, and the settler movement, Professor Avishai argues that Israel’s democratic crisis extends beyond electoral politics. He highlights the deepening confrontation between “Greater Israel theocrats” and “global Israel liberals and cosmopolitans,” cautioning that meaningful democratic reforms could provoke violent resistance. Advocating constitutional reform, judicial independence, universal civic obligations, and Arab political inclusion, he calls for a fundamental rethinking of Zionism and citizenship. Professor Avishai also emphasizes that lasting democratic renewal requires ending the occupation and establishing reciprocal political rights for Israelis and Palestinians.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Israel faces profound political uncertainty following the October 27 elections. Although Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud remains the largest party, his right-wing and religious coalition has lost its parliamentary majority. Gadi Eisenkot’s efforts to form an alternative government confront deep divisions over Arab political participation, ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, and the enduring influence of religious nationalism. Beyond coalition arithmetic, fundamental questions persist concerning judicial independence, Palestinian rights, and Israel’s democratic identity.

In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Bernard Avishai, visiting professor of political economy at Dartmouth College and former technology and strategy editor of the Harvard Business Review, warns that Netanyahu’s departure could intensify rather than resolve Israel’s political and institutional crisis. “The potential for violence here is really great, regardless of whether Bibi remains in power,” he cautions. “The prospect of violence might be even greater if he’s removed from power.”

For Professor Avishai, the underlying conflict extends beyond Netanyahu’s personalized leadership. “I think Bibi’s world will outlive Bibi,” he argues, emphasizing the entrenched religious-nationalist constituencies and institutional arrangements sustaining Netanyahuism. Comparing a possible Eisenkot government to Abraham Lincoln’s accession to power in 1860, he suggests that substantial democratic reforms could threaten communities whose political identities and material interests depend on the existing order.

Professor Avishai anticipates particularly fierce resistance from ultra-Orthodox communities and armed West Bank settlers. “If the opposition takes power and tries to introduce genuine changes,” he warns, “there will be violence.”Invoking Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination, he underscores the historical precedents for political extremism: “These people have already killed a prime minister. Let’s not forget that.”

Nevertheless, Professor Avishai rejects political violence as a justification for postponing democratic renewal. He advocates constitutional reform, an empowered independent judiciary, universal schooling, and equal civic obligations. A new Basic Law enshrining Israel’s Declaration of Independence, he argues, could establish the foundations for a more inclusive democratic republic.

Central to this transformation is the struggle between what Professor Avishai calls “Greater Israel theocrats” and “global Israel liberals and cosmopolitans.” Arab political participation becomes a defining democratic test. “There’s absolutely no reason why Hebrew Republicans cannot cooperate with Arab parties,” he insists, framing Israel’s predicament as a fundamental choice between “a Jewish theocracy and a Hebrew democracy.”

Drawing on his longstanding scholarship on Zionism and secular republicanism, Professor Avishai also maintains that lasting democratic renewal ultimately requires ending the occupation and developing reciprocal political rights with Palestinians.

The interview thus explores a central paradox of Israel’s post-election moment: electoral alternation may create an opportunity for democratic reconstruction while simultaneously provoking resistance from the very forces that such reconstruction seeks to constrain.

Here is our interview with Professor Bernard Avishai, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Florian Bieber.

Prof. Bieber: Serbia Must Avoid the Mistakes That Allowed Authoritarianism to Return After 2000

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for PopulismStudies (ECPS), Professor Florian Bieber, Professor of Southeast European History and Politics at the University of Graz, warns that Serbia’s democratic breakthrough risks repeating the failures of its post-2000 transition unless entrenched authoritarian networks are dismantled. Following the Students’ List’s electoral defeat of Aleksandar Vučić, Professor Bieber emphasizes the need to restore judicial independence, reform security structures, establish genuine media pluralism, and prevent socioeconomic exclusion. Drawing parallels with the aftermath of Slobodan Milošević’s overthrow, he argues that electoral victory alone cannot guarantee democratic consolidation. The challenge, he stresses, is to transform student-led civic mobilization into durable democratic institutions while ensuring that supporters of the defeated regime are not politically marginalized.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Serbia stands at a historic turning point. Following nearly two years of student-led protests against corruption, institutional capture, and Aleksandar Vučić’s personalized authoritarianism, the Students’ List secured a parliamentary majority in October 2026. Yet electoral victory raises fundamental questions about dismantling entrenched clientelist networks, restoring democratic institutions, and sustaining inclusive civic mobilization. Serbia’s experience also offers broader insights into the vulnerabilities of competitive authoritarian regimes.

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Florian Bieber, Professor of Southeast European History and Politics at the University of Graz and Director of its Centre for Southeast European Studies, examines Serbia’s democratic breakthrough through the historical failures of its post-Milošević transition. His central warning is that removing an authoritarian incumbent does not necessarily dismantle the structures that sustained authoritarian rule.

Reflecting on October 2000, Professor Bieber recalls that Serbia never experienced a decisive institutional rupture: “Many of the power holders from the previous regime managed to survive through these negotiations.” The failure to investigate entrenched political, security, and business networks enabled their continued influence and ultimately facilitated democratic reversal. He therefore emphasizes that “this kind of rupture with the previous institutional structures is critical.”

The Students’ List, Professor Bieber argues, now enjoys an important advantage: “It won an outright majority and did not have to make compromises to win the elections.” Unlike established parties, it carries fewer inherited political obligations. Nevertheless, reforming captured institutions remains exceptionally difficult. He identifies the judiciary as perhaps the greatest challenge, stressing the importance of “ensuring that it remains vigilant and that nobody is above the law.”Security structures, patronage networks, and politically dependent media present equally consequential obstacles.

Professor Bieber also warns against repeating the socioeconomic exclusions that undermined democratization after 2000. Citizens who experienced unemployment, poverty, and disillusionment became receptive to renewed authoritarian politics. Accordingly, he argues that those who supported Vučić’s Progressive Party must not be forgotten but instead “brought on board,” lest they become the constituency for another authoritarian resurgence.

Beyond institutional reform, the interview explores the students’ innovative horizontal organization, cross-ethnic solidarity, and prospects for European integration. Professor Bieber highlights their insistence that “We want institutions; we don’t want individuals,” while questioning how participatory practices can coexist with effective representative government.

Ultimately, Serbia’s experience offers lessons extending beyond the Western Balkans. As Professor Bieber observes, “There is no single path out of competitive authoritarian regimes.” What successful transitions share, however, is ideologically broad coalitions and sustained civic mobilization. The challenge now is transforming electoral victory into durable democratic institutions without reproducing the political exclusions and structural vulnerabilities of the past.

Here is our interview with Professor Florian Bieber, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.