In this compelling interview, Dr. Maxine Newlands—an expert in environmental politics and ocean governance—warns that the “Australian political system has essentially stepped back from climate change.” Speaking with ECPS, she highlights how rising polarization and populist denialism have rendered climate policy too risky for major parties. “Politicians avoid addressing it altogether,” she explains, noting that even terms like “climate change” were strategically omitted from campaigns. Dr. Newlands critiques the media’s role in spreading disinformation and urges a more pluralistic approach grounded in community voices, Indigenous knowledge, and the Blue Humanities. Her analysis provides a powerful lens into how populist narratives have reshaped Australia’s environmental politics and what it will take to restore trust and democratic inclusion in climate action.
In this in-depth and timely interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Maxine Newlands—a leading expert on environmental politics, ocean governance, and media ecosystems—offers a powerful diagnosis of Australia’s political retreat from climate leadership. Drawing on over a decade of research on the Great Barrier Reef, climate denialism, and populist media strategies, Dr. Newlands, Adjunct Professor in Political Science at James Cook University, Queensland, Australia, outlines how environmental discourse has become increasingly politicized in ways that have paralyzed mainstream policymaking.
“Australian political system has essentially stepped back from [climate change],” she states early in the conversation, framing the issue as a casualty of polarization and populist backlash. As climate change rose in political salience over successive election cycles, so too did opposition to it—especially from the populist right, which “either denies climate change outright or downplays its severity.” This dynamic, according to Dr. Newlands, has left the major parties “highly risk-averse,” with climate no longer functioning as a credible electoral issue.
Reflecting on recent electoral patterns in Australian politics, Dr. Newlands underscores how the Morrison government deliberately avoided the term “climate change” during its campaign, fearing it had become a political liability. This conscious rhetorical avoidance, she argues, exemplifies how populist pressure has warped the national conversation, “creating a vacuum” that has since been filled by more radical or issue-specific groups, such as the Greens or environmental NGOs.
Throughout the interview, Dr. Newlands unpacks how this climate retreat has been reinforced by media manipulation, especially from Rupert Murdoch’s syndicates, and disinformation campaigns that have framed environmental regulation as a threat to sovereignty, jobs, and national identity. These narratives are particularly potent in resource-rich regions like Queensland, where “climate becomes intertwined with concerns over foreign influence” and where populist slogans—like “Don’t take my mining job, and I won’t take your soy latte”—gain traction.
Against this backdrop, she calls for renewed, pluralistic approaches to environmental governance—ones grounded in the arts, Indigenous knowledge systems, and the Blue Humanities—to “open up the narrative” beyond the rigid binaries of denial versus technocracy. In her view, it’s not enough to combat populism with more data or more policy: what’s needed is a new cultural imaginary—one capable of re-enchanting the public’s relationship with nature and democracy alike.
Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Maxine Newlands.
Populist Pressure Has Made Climate Too Politically Dangerous to Touch
Thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question:In the light of your work on climate denialism and environmental media, how would you interpret the electoral retreat of both far-right and green populisms in the 2025 federal election? Does this suggest an emergent fatigue with ideological extremes, or a recalibration of populist rhetoric within major party discourse?
Dr. Maxine Newlands: I think it’s worth acknowledging the historical context of where climate change and climate denialism have sat within Australia. There’s been a slow increase over a series of election cycles where climate change has repeatedly been positioned as a key issue. We’ve had many elections branded as the climate change election. In 2019, for example, the narrative from the left focused heavily on net zero targets, climate impacts, and climate mitigation—particularly highlighting the Great Barrier Reef as a central concern.
This buildup has been met with a strong pushback. The conversation became polarized between a populist right that either denies climate change outright or downplays its severity, and a more progressive side where the issue was front and center.
This tension has politicized the debate to such a degree that the Australian political system has essentially stepped back from it. So yes, to an extent, we can ask whether denialism and populism have worked—because climate change has now become such a fraught issue that politicians avoid addressing it altogether. For example, in the election cycle under Scott Morrison, about three or four years ago, his Liberal-National coalition made a conscious decision not to use the term “climate change” at all in their campaign. It had become such a hot-button issue that they feared it would be hijacked or weaponized.
Understanding that landscape is crucial. The constant pressure from the populist movement has made the major parties highly risk-averse regarding climate change as an electoral issue. As a result, that political vacuum has been filled by the Greens, more radical green and environmental groups, and progressive activist and lobbying organizations. So, while there are many engaged stakeholders, the two major parties have adopted a very low-risk appetite when it comes to foregrounding climate change during elections.
Climate Policy Becomes a Battle for Sovereignty in Populist Strongholds
To what extent has the performance of populist environmentalism—particularly among regional independents—relied on symbolic appeals to land, livelihood, and sovereignty? Can these aesthetic registers be disentangled from the exclusionary logics of right-wing nationalism?
Dr. Maxine Newlands: No, is the simple answer. The populist right in Australia is very conservative—protectionist, nationalist—and often views Australia as a self-contained unit, rather than part of a global context. Within that framework, pressures on issues such as UNESCO World Heritage sites, like Kakadu National Park or the Great Barrier Reef, tend to generate highly binary debates.
You’ll see populist groups rejecting the influence of international organizations—typically referencing the UN—insisting that such bodies shouldn’t tell Australia what to do with “our” Great Barrier Reef, for example. This leads to a rejection of external input and turns climate debates into questions of sovereignty and national control.
In this way, the climate conversation becomes intertwined with concerns over foreign influence on domestic policy—particularly on issues like net-zero targets. The “external” becomes an enemy figure for the populist movement, which aligns with a classic populist playbook: identifying an outside threat to rally domestic support.
This tactic is particularly effective in regions like Queensland and Western Australia, both of which are heavily dependent on mining industries. Queensland, notably, is also home to the Great Barrier Reef, making it a focal point for these tensions.
Minor parties such as Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, as well as individual senators, often deploy this narrative, casting environmental policy as a threat to national sovereignty. This frames the issue not as one of ecological stewardship, but as a defense of Australia’s sovereign decision-making over its land, resources, and environment.
Disinformation Turns Reef Policy into a Battlefield of Economics vs. Environment
Coral reef with colorful marine plants in the ocean. Photo: Vitaly Korovin.
Drawing from your research on social media ecosystems, what role did digitally mediated climate disinformation and “blue denialism” play in shaping voter perceptions of reef policy and environmental restoration during the recent electoral cycle?
Dr. Maxine Newlands: This is an interesting one because, as I mentioned earlier, the reef hasn’t played a central role in the election narrative for the last couple of election cycles. In both 2020 and 2022, it wasn’t really part of the core political narrative. In 2019, it featured a bit more prominently, and during that cycle, social media played a significant role—disinformation definitely did as well, as we showed in the paper I co-wrote with my former student.
What we found was that traditional legacy media on the right—particularly Rupert Murdoch’s publications—were central to spreading certain narratives. Many of these are regional outlets, publishing syndicated stories across different communities, and they also produce The Australian, the only national newspaper. These outlets frequently framed stories by questioning environmental policy decisions, particularly focusing on the cost of net-zero policies from the Labor Party to individual voters—essentially promoting an “economics versus the environment” narrative.
This framing is often reinforced by climate denialism from certain political parties. Sometimes it’s outright denial; other times, it’s a refusal to engage with the science around coal burning, CO₂ emissions, or broader human impact.
Social media, in this context, becomes the platform through which these narratives are amplified. That’s where much of the disinformation circulates.
It’s important to note that the media landscape consists of two distinct dynamics: one is the dominant, loud “middle press” or mainstream media echo chamber; the other is a more decentralized network of progressive voices. You essentially get an echo chamber versus a network dynamic.
Because our political landscape is fairly binary, this dynamic tends to favor dominant, populist narratives. Preferential voting does sometimes complicate this, but the arguments remain largely the same—recycled each election cycle.
We hear the same populist talking points echoed in the UK and Europe: that climate change isn’t man-made, that it has nothing to do with coal. Or, if they don’t go down that path, the narrative shifts to fearmongering—claims that electricity bills will skyrocket, the lights will go out, or that renewable energy is unreliable (e.g., “wind turbines only work when it’s windy”). These are classic, well-worn lines used by populist parties everywhere—tried, tested, and repeated in every election cycle.
The Greens’ Paradox of Power in Parliament
How do you interpret the Greens’ simultaneous Senate gains and House losses within the broader context of Australian environmental politics? Does this reflect a strategic misalignment between parliamentary ambitions and the affective terrain of regional constituencies?
Dr. Maxine Newlands: The Greens did really well in the last election—back in 2022—by their standards. They gained two inner-city seats and the seat of Brisbane, which is the capital of Queensland. If you’re not familiar, these seats were heavily affected by flooding caused by heavy rainfall and a cyclone occurring at the same time. That cyclone hit the north of Queensland, and the resulting water flowed southward.
In that context, the Greens performed strongly, winning lower house (House of Representatives) seats. At the time, they already had representation in the Senate, but not as many seats as they do now.
Fast forward to the current cycle, they’ve only retained one of the three lower house seats they previously held in Queensland. This may be partly because people no longer have the same lived experience of those extreme weather events—flooded homes and damaged infrastructure. Voters may have reverted to the major parties: Labor or the Liberal Party.
But as you mentioned, the Greens made gains in the Senate. They now hold 11 Senate seats and, in effect, will hold the balance of power. The Labor Party has the most seats, followed by the Liberal-National Coalition, and then the Greens. If the Greens negotiate effectively with Labor, they could help deliver the 39 or more votes required to pass legislation in the Senate.
This sets the stage for a significant trade bloc—a shift in power. While the Greens have lost ground in the Lower House, where they now hold only one seat, they’ve gained considerable influence in the Senate. Maintaining a working relationship with Labor will be key, especially around contentious climate issues like net-zero targets. Australia has set different emissions targets: one around 2035 and another by 2050. The feasibility of these timelines is under debate.
What I’m trying to say is that, in the last election, Greens benefited more from urban dynamics. Regional factors were less influential. But this time, due to the way Senate seats are allocated—state-wide rather than by individual electorates—regional and preferential votes may have played a bigger role in their Senate success.
We don’t yet have the full data, but it could turn out that this broader, more regional voting base helped the Greens in the Upper House, while they struggled in the urban inner-suburban seats they performed well in last time.
Beyond Technocracy: Reclaiming Ocean Narratives Through the Blue Humanities
Underwater view of the coral reef. Photo: Dreamstime.
Given your leadership in reef restoration policy and blue humanities scholarship, how might populist critiques of technocratic ocean governance—often framed as elite overreach—be constructively re-engaged to foreground environmental justice and democratic inclusion?
Dr. Maxine Newlands: This is an interesting one. Over time, both the Reef Restoration Project and the Blue Humanities have emerged as relatively novel conceptual frameworks. They haven’t been explored or developed to the same extent as broader marine science. We’ve had small-scale reef restoration for quite some time, but at scale—what we’re now attempting—it’s about understanding how ocean systems function together.
It’s important to note that reef restoration has often been framed in binary terms: either we intervene to save the reefs and corals worldwide, or we do nothing and let them die. That binary framing has become problematic, and I think that’s where the perception of elitism comes in. The message becomes: “Either let us do this, or the reef will die.” That kind of either-or position limits the conversation. Initially, around 2017–2018, this was the dominant narrative. But now, there’s growing work focused on reframing our relationship with the ocean—rethinking the narratives around the “blue” and how we interact with it.
For example, in the Reef Restoration Project, one study involved surveys and in-depth interviews with more than 100 people. What they found was that individuals who had direct experiences with the reef—such as snorkeling—developed a stronger connection. They began to see the reef not as a scientific playground but as part of their community.
The Blue Humanities framework opens up this space for dialogue. The goal is to ask: What do we need to do to protect the oceans? How can we address climate change? And crucially, how can we do this without relying solely on science?
There are complementary approaches. The Blue Humanities draw from the arts, social sciences, politics, and history—areas that help people engage with these issues in diverse ways. This helps dismantle elitism and fosters a more participatory action research model, where people can understand and engage based on how their minds work and how they relate to the world.
So yes, I understand your point—it is technocratic, and it can be elitist. And while the scientists working on reef restoration are outstanding, their approach is highly engineered and solution-driven, operating within rigid technocratic systems.
The Blue Humanities—and other interdisciplinary methods—allow us to open up the narrative, create new stories, and still aim toward the same goal: encouraging people to bear witness to what’s happening. The difference is, these stories aren’t confined to foundational or pure science frameworks, like those used within RRAP (Reef Restoration and Adaptation Program).
Restoration Requires Political Will, Not Just Scientific Evidence
What institutional safeguards or communicative strategies would you recommend to inoculate reef science and environmental policy-making against the populist backlash tactics identified in your recent analyses of media manipulation and science skepticism?
Dr. Maxine Newlands: Oh, that’s a PhD in itself—not just a paper. And it’s a hard one, because, as I’ve alluded to, this is part of a global problem. It’s deeply connected to how people receive information and how narratives are framed.
At the end of the day, there is a need for policymakers to recognize that there’s space for restoration and for alternative or complementary methods to more traditional approaches. But it’s a slow process. Regulation can be slow—unless we have a crisis like the pandemic, where we clearly demonstrated that things can move quickly when needed.
Still, this is something that requires political will—and that’s not unique to Australia. It applies globally, whether you’re talking about coral reef restoration or broader ecosystem restoration, including marine and terrestrial systems, which have been studied and implemented far longer than ocean restoration.
I think it’s really about a convergence of efforts and, importantly, about shifting the broader mindset. That includes scientists being honest and realistic about what large-scale restoration can actually achieve—and then crafting policies that support and enable those realistic goals.
Women Wanted to Be on the Front Line—Not in the Kitchen
Photo: Dreamstime.
In your work on gender and environmental activism (e.g., Knitting Nannas and anti-fracking movements), how do you see the gendered performance of care and stewardship contrasting with masculinist populist narratives of control, particularly in climate policy debates?
Dr. Maxine Newlands: There are a couple of things I think of here. It’s very interesting that, in the last election cycle in Australia, we saw the emergence of what some have called the “Teals.” These are independents who prioritize climate change mitigation and adaptation as core policy issues, while also adopting an economically pragmatic approach. Although they are all independents, many began receiving financial support from Climate 200 in 2019. What’s notable is that many of these independents are community-based or city-based—and predominantly women. Not exclusively, of course—there are men in the mix—but there is a gendered dynamic worth highlighting.
There’s a connection here to movements like the Knitting Nannas. In both cases, these women have encountered patriarchal systems that try to define their roles and restrict their participation. In mainstream politics, as well as within broader activist spaces, this has often meant being side-lined or pigeon-holed.
One anecdote from the Knitting Nannas stands out. That group, a female-led anti-fracking movement, emerged partly because women involved in broader environmental groups—such as Lock the Gate—found themselves confined to “traditional” support roles, like cooking at protest camps, instead of being allowed front-line or leadership roles. They wanted to be out there, leading, visible, and equal. So they created a space where they could do that—and the act of knitting became a form of peaceful resistance and identity.
I think we are seeing a broader gender shift, particularly within activism and increasingly within the independent political movement. Women are stepping forward—not because this is solely a gender issue, but because they are reaching a point where their leadership is more visible and impactful.
It’s also important to remember that, since Federation in 1901, Australia has only had one female Prime Minister. But now, things are shifting. The deputy leader of the Liberal Party is Susan Ley, and the Greens’ Senate leader is Larissa Waters, while Prime Minister Anthony Albanese leads the Labor government.
So we’re seeing change, particularly in a political culture as historically conservative as Australia’s. Movements like the Teals, community independents, and the philanthropic and grassroots funding that supports them are helping make that change possible. It feels like we’re witnessing the beginnings of a move toward greater gender parity within the political system.
Time Will Tell If Hyper-Local Politics Can Dislodge Extractive Power
Given the strategic expansion of community independents into regional and rural electorates, how sustainable is their model of hyper-local environmental governance amid the entrenched political economies of extractivism and agrarian populism?
Dr. Maxine Newlands: I think time will tell. I know that’s a very wishy-washy answer, but ultimately, time will be the judge—particularly in Australia. We’ll see whether Australia follows a pattern observed elsewhere in the world, where voters move away from the traditional two major parties and toward independents and minor parties, especially because of hyper-local issues that directly affect them.
These include concerns like healthcare, education, early childhood care, and other day-to-day needs. The community independents tend to frame their approach not through the lens of agrarian politics, but through the broader needs of the community. They present themselves as advocates for the community as a whole, rather than emphasizing any one specific sector.
We’re seeing independents increasingly occupy that space, while, in some states, traditional conservative parties—particularly the Liberals (who are the conservative party in Australia)—appear to be retreating from regional and rural constituencies.
If we look at the last election, for example, the National Party—a right-leaning, rural-focused party—lost only one seat, whereas the Liberals lost many more. The Nationals, with their agrarian populist base, largely retained their support. While there are both progressive and populist factions within that party, they have managed to hold on to their core constituencies.
This suggests that agrarian populism still resonates in regional Australia. Meanwhile, the Liberals are struggling to define their role in these areas, which has sparked ongoing debate about whether the coalition between the Liberal and National parties can or should continue in its current form.
So yes, voters are turning to independents and to the Nationals to represent regional issues—but whether this momentum continues over multiple election cycles or proves to be a one-off anomaly remains to be seen.
The Blue Humanities Help Us Tell Ocean Stories Through Plural Voices, Not Just Science
To what extent can the cultural narratives embedded in the Blue Humanities reconfigure public imaginaries of marine ecologies in ways that resist populist reductionism and foster more pluralistic ocean ethics?
Dr. Maxine Newlands: The key with that would be to have that kind of variety of pluralistic voices. As we talked about earlier, it’s about having a different lens in the way that you tell the story of the ocean. One of the key ways of doing that, I would suggest, is through co-design with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, particularly in Australia.
They have lived on the land for a lot longer—65,000 years. They understand how the land and the oceans work. They understand the cycles and the way the system functions. And something like the Blue Humanities is not about co-opting or imposing; it’s clearly about understanding different ways of thinking and different ways of looking for solutions.
So it’s certainly not about cultural adaptation of Indigenous knowledge, but being willing to at least understand it and learn about it. And then, you have two different systems running in Australia, particularly around marine science. There are projects by the Australian Institute for Marine Science, for example, where they have a whole division or strand—I’m not quite sure of the technical term—that’s very much around assisting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
But it’s also about giving them autonomy and support to do their own projects. And at the same time, you have the scientists understanding that when they go onto sea country, when they go on country, respect needs to be shown. And that isn’t something that was happening ten years ago.
So, looking at the Blue Humanities and the cultural components that make up Australia, it’s not about adopting those perspectives, but about recognizing, understanding, accepting, and seeing how those two things can possibly work together—whether side by side or through a process of co-design. And obviously, it’s about collaboration. The Blue Humanities—this is why we have authors from Torres Strait and elsewhere—is to try and explain to people who may not be familiar how you can understand the relationship with water, the ocean, and the marine space in a way that isn’t rooted in that traditional, science-based, pure science, basic science kind of approach.
It’s Either Jobs and Mining or Nothing—That’s the Binary We Must Move Beyond
Active quarry with machinery and gravel, crushing rock to supply the Adani Carmichael mine in Central Queensland, Australia. Photo: Inge Blessas.
How should we understand the electoral backlash in coal-reliant regions as both a repudiation of top-down climate policy and a symptom of deeper socio-economic dislocation? Can climate justice be effectively articulated in such communities without capitulating to extractive populism?
Dr. Maxine Newlands: I think it can. The classic example that comes to mind is Queensland. In Queensland, we have strong senators who have adopted some of those populist strategies. But at the end of the day, those communities have been heavily reliant on the mining industry. The mining industry has been a key source of employment.
The political debate has often been framed around the loss of jobs. But there is just about enough space within those communities for alternatives. So we hear about things like just transition—moving away from those mining industries. And by mining, I mean fossil fuel mining, coal, etc.
I’m looking more specifically at those areas. But we are still mining in Australia—it’s about creating communities that are provided with an alternative, so those communities don’t just die off because the industry has moved away.
By the same token, we still have a lot of coal mining in those areas. For example, what used to be the Adani mines, now operated by Bravus, is a key player in that region.
That’s where the tension and electoral backlash come from. You’ve also got embedded conservative values in that state, which are tapped into by populist narratives that frame things around a North-South divide—“us and them.”
We had a classic campaign run by the Nationals in 2019. Our two biggest cities—Sydney and Melbourne—are south of Queensland. They ran a bumper sticker campaign with a slogan along the lines of, “If you don’t take my mining job, I won’t take your soy latte.” That created a binary opposition—don’t tell us what to do, we need the mines for our jobs and families.
That kind of populist rhetoric around coal was up against significant activism, like the Stop Adani campaign, which aimed to prevent the mine from opening. We’re still trying to find pathways for these communities to transition, but you’re right: the backlash has come because of that binary—it’s either jobs and mining or nothing.
That kind of framing makes the debate difficult. But ultimately, those communities will have to find alternatives—or rather, policymakers and governments must create them. One of the conversations we’ve had recently was around nuclear. Australia has a moratorium on nuclear power; we don’t have nuclear power stations, just one nuclear facility used for research and medical purposes.
They were trying to introduce the debate around nuclear power as an alternative for those communities, but that hasn’t worked. It’s not a viable long-term solution.
So that kind of repudiation is now folded into a broader debate around what we do next. But it’s increasingly becoming a grassroots, community-based debate. These communities are being held up as either the victims or the winners of whatever policy is yet to be decided.
We Haven’t Got That Far-Right Green Appropriation
And finally, Professor Newlands, do you perceive any co-optation of environmental discourse by far-right actors—such as eco-nationalism or green nativism—and if so, how should progressive movements strategically differentiate themselves in such contested semiotic terrain?
Dr. Maxine Newlands:I’m not sure we have that kind of extreme right-wing environmental discourse in Australia. Are you referring to the kind of green anarchism or radical eco-politics sometimes discussed on the far left? If so, not really. We certainly have a wide range of progressive groups—lobby organizations like GetUp, activist networks, and foundations such as the Bob Brown Foundation—but I don’t think any of them operate at the level you’re describing, at least not with significant electoral impact. It’s not something that has featured prominently in recent election cycles. There may be minor parties or independents entertaining such ideas, but that kind of radical or anarchist spectrum doesn’t really factor into mainstream political debate here, including within the Greens.
We have people that are more proactive, and people and organizations that host events. They may put on a protest, they’ll stage a high-profile action, or they’ll take their position to Canberra in order to generate public awareness. I’m thinking of organizations led by former leaders of the Greens, for example, like the Bob Brown Foundation. But to the point of it being anarchic, I would say personally I’m not aware of anything like that—that doesn’t mean it’s not there, but it’s hard to measure.
You’ve kind of got the middle ground. You’ve got Labor, which is progressive to the left on the environment, and they’re introducing their net zero targets. They have a whole suite of regulation and policy under the umbrella of “nature positive,” which includes things like biodiversity credits as well as net zero. Then you have the Greens, a little further left, and maybe a couple of others. But they generally tend to be more activist, lobby, or advocacy groups—things like the Environmental Defenders Office, which is a group of lawyers that help or advise activists like the Knitting Nannas.
But we haven’t got that far-right green appropriation to any significant degree. Let’s see what happens—it’s interesting that the Liberals lost so many seats this time around. It gives Labor, and as I said earlier with the Senate, a much bigger block to get things through.
For example, in the last election there was a bit of caution about whether the whole suite of environmental policy and regulation under “nature positive” would get through, so it was withdrawn. We would probably expect to see a version of that come back now, because there’ll be more confidence in getting those sorts of measures passed—which, of course, naturally negates any of those more far-right amplifiers, because the main political parties are already doing what those voices might be demanding in terms of regulation.
In a compelling interview with ECPS, political sociologist Dr. Josh Roose unpacks the 2025 Australian federal election, arguing it marked “a resounding rejection of Trumpist-style populism.” Dr. Roose explores how Liberal leader Peter Dutton’s strongman image backfired, while Labor’s inclusive yet grounded masculinity resonated with urban voters—especially women. He warns, however, of far-right undercurrents and rising generational and economic divides. Reflecting on political masculinities, Islamophobia, and online extremism, Dr. Roose calls for educational and legislative reforms to bolster democratic resilience. A timely deep dive into Australia’s populist landscape—and a must-read for scholars and studenst of global politics.
In a sweeping analysis of Australia’s 2025 federal election results, Dr. Josh Roose—a political sociologist and Associate Professor at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation—offers a compelling assessment of what he calls “a rejection of Trumpist-style populism in Australia.” Speaking to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Roose contextualizes the electoral defeat of Liberal Party leader Peter Dutton within a broader international trend, noting, “What we saw in Canada—where Trump backed the right and attacked Canada, and people mobilized against that and favoured the political left—played out in a very similar vein here.”
Throughout the interview, Dr. Roose explores the dynamics of Australia’s right-wing populism, which has been notably influenced by US political discourse. He underscores how attempts to “personalize Trump through Dutton” and flirt with alt-right masculinity narratives—such as “strong men create good times, weak men create tough times”—largely backfired, particularly among urban professionals and women voters. In this context, he points to Anthony Albanese’s reelection as emblematic of a political style that is both masculine and inclusive: “He doesn’t walk away from traditional working-class masculinity… but he does so in a way that is far more popular and acceptable to women.”
While the Labor Party’s landslide victory marks a historic realignment, Dr. Roose also cautions against complacency. He observes that far-right parties, including Pauline Hanson’s One Nation and the pro-Trump “Trumpet of Patriots,” collectively garnered 10–12% of the vote in some electorates—indicating persistent, if marginalized, populist undercurrents.
Dr. Roose also situates these electoral shifts in the context of deeper transformations in political legitimacy and authority. “The traditional authoritarian mode of politics with a strongman leader… is being resoundingly rejected,” he argues, especially by younger and more diverse electorates. However, he notes that Australia’s deeply masculinist political culture is only gradually giving way to more inclusive norms, catalyzed in part by pandemic-era changes to work and caregiving.
Drawing on his expertise in counter-extremism, Dr. Roose concludes with a call for civic and institutional interventions, from regulating online hate speech to embedding models of “healthy masculinity” in educational curricula. “We need a masculinity that is strong, but also nurturing… capable of moving beyond the ego,” he asserts.
Dr. Roose’s analysis offers both an in-depth case study of Australia’s evolving political terrain and a timely contribution to the global debate on the future of populism, masculinity, and democratic resilience in the post-Trump era.
Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Josh Roose.
It’s a Rejection of Trumpist-Style Populism Here in Australia
An Australian Labor poster targeting Peter Dutton at an early voting polling station in Heidelberg, Melbourne, Victoria, on April 26, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Josh Roose, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question:In the light of your work on populist political masculinities, how do you interpret the electorate’s resounding rejection of Peter Dutton’s leadership? Does this signify a critical juncture for the trajectory of right-wing populism in Australia?
Dr. Josh Roose: Great question. There’s a lot to unpack from this election, and we are nowhere near having all the data necessary to do so. My broad take on this comes down to two or three main points. First, it’s a rejection of Trumpist-style populism here in Australia. What we saw in Canada—where Trump backed the right and attacked Canada, leading people to mobilize against that and favor the political left—played out in a very similar vein here.
Australia hasn’t been immune to, for example, Trump-style tariffs, nor to the influence of members of the right faction of the Liberal opposition. For clarity, in Australia, the Liberal Party is the political right, unlike the US. Elements of Trumpist populist politics were embraced. For instance, one of the key figures, Jacinta Price—a prominent Aboriginal politician opposed to the Voice referendum, which would have given Indigenous Australians a voice to Parliament—was seen wearing “Make Australia Great Again” hats. She said this slogan publicly on the campaign trail.
There was also an effort to personalize Trump through Dutton. He even spoke about bringing in a DOJ-style department in Australia. That went down like an absolute lead balloon, particularly in urban areas with educated professionals.
That said, and somewhat concerningly, there was a surge to the far right that hasn’t yet been fully unpacked. In many seats, the One Nation Party—led by Pauline Hanson, a well-known figure on the populist right—performed strongly. They have, in some ways, become a more mainstream right-wing party, gaining more votes.
Additionally, the embarrassingly pro-Trump party called “The Trumpet of Patriots,” led by a mining billionaire, didn’t gain seats but still garnered 2–3% of the vote in many electorates. Combined with One Nation, that amounts to roughly 10–12% in a lot of areas.
So, while there was a surge toward the governing Labor Party, there was also a push to the right. The Liberal Party now finds itself wedged between its hard-right base and its more centrist, slightly progressive wing. Just today, they held a post-election leadership vote. The result was 28 to 25 in favor of the Moderates. The Australian Liberal Party now has its first female leader in the party’s history.
There Was a Strong Repudiation of Trumpist Politics
To what extent can Albanese’s re-election be read as a repudiation of the rhetorical and symbolic frameworks commonly associated with ‘strongman’ populism, or does it rather suggest a recalibrated centrism in response to global political volatility?
Dr. Josh Roose: Another good question. In many ways, Peter Dutton, the opposition leader, really struggled to overcome his past as a strongman. He had various portfolios when the Liberal Party was in government—Home Affairs, among others—and he was a former policeman who spoke extremely firmly about crime and other areas, which are traditional fodder for the political right and the populist right. So he struggled to overcome that.
Albanese paints himself very much as a centrist, moderate leader—the everyman. He shows up at Rugby League games, so he doesn’t walk away from masculinity or distance himself from traditional working-class masculinity. He seeks to embrace it, but he does so in a way that is far more popular and acceptable to women. Female voters, in particular, really turned significantly against the Liberal opposition in this election.
So, in the context of what’s going on globally, that played an important role. We’re yet to determine—based on the data, interviews, and upcoming research—just how important it was. But I do think there was a strong repudiation of Trumpist politics. Trump’s done more in his first 100 days to unite the world, in many respects—particularly among people in countries with elections coming up. You could argue that the conclave and the new Pope are also, to some extent, potentially indicative of this.
So, I think we’re seeing a reaction and a backlash to Trumpist politics in the developed world. And it will be really interesting to see how that plays out in the developing world.
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese attends the national memorial service for Queen Elizabeth II. Photo: Dreamstime.
No Appetite for Trumpism Even Amid a Cost-of-Living Crisis
Given the transnational dimensions of populism, particularly the re-election of Donald Trump in the US, how do you assess the ‘Trump effect’ in shaping Australian political sensibilities and its potential backfire in this electoral cycle?
Dr. Josh Roose: Trump has a strong following among segments of the political right here. They embrace not only the ultra-nationalist, self-interested approach, but also a nostalgia for a long-lost past that he successfully mobilized in the US election—this idea that men are being hard done by, the notion of “woke” politics, and so on. There’s still a strong element of that in Australian politics. By no means has that gone away.
In fact, elements of the opposition party have talked about needing to double down, arguing that the only reason they didn’t win the election was because they weren’t strong enough in embracing that extreme rhetoric. But I think, for the most part, there is no appetite for it—which is quite amazing given that we’re facing a significant cost of living crisis here, a global phenomenon at the moment. Housing is increasingly unaffordable; the average price of a house in Sydney and Melbourne now hovers around a million dollars. We’ve got a younger generation locked out of the housing market.
But what we’re seeing is that the older generation—the so-called boomer generation—is effectively becoming a minority in the electorate. We’re seeing younger people come through who are looking for more progressive policies and politics that speak to them, that resonate with their concerns about building a better life, having a chance of owning a home, starting a family, and so on.
So, it’s going to be really interesting to see how this plays out. But, it’s fair to say that, unless something quite incredible happens, this is now a two-term Labor government. Given their majority—I think it’s 91 seats in Parliament, which is just about historically unprecedented—we could be looking at at least three terms, possibly four. That gives the governing Labor Party a real chance to institute a progressivist agenda. They’ve got to play their cards right—they can’t come across as radical or overly focused on dramatic change. This could shape Australian politics for the next 20 to 30 years if things continue on their current trajectory.
Strongman Model Is Being Rejected by Young and Female Voters
Considering your research on political identity and citizenship, how might the 2025 election result reshape our understanding of political legitimacy and representative authority in the context of populist decline?
Dr. Josh Roose: If we’re talking about authority, we’ve got to look at what resonates with young people, because young people are increasingly shaping political outcomes—and women are increasingly shaping political outcomes. So, this authoritarian, hierarchical decision-making model, which has defined Australian politics since Federation—over a hundred years—is becoming less viable.
In a world of social media, where everyone is a publisher, where everyone has an opinion and demands to be heard, especially in a society with an education system that encourages critical thinking and resilience, I don’t think there’s an appetite for the traditional authoritarian mode of politics with a strongman leader. I think people resoundingly reject it.
Ironically, those who are most susceptible to such narratives tend to be the weakest and most vulnerable—the people who feel dispossessed, marginalized, alienated, disrespected, who experience humiliation and shame. They’re looking for someone strong to get behind, to pull them out of their challenges. But Australia appears to be navigating economic crises, international security, and other key issues reasonably well while keeping people onside.
So, while we do have an increase in extremism—particularly among young people—on a par with what we’re seeing in the UK, it is not necessarily playing out as mass mobilization toward a strongman leader.
This Is Labor’s Moment in Australia
Does the resurgence of major-party dominance and marginalization of the populist right suggest a broader democratic correction, or might it risk complacency in addressing the socio-economic grievances that often underline populist support?
Dr. Josh Roose: Good question. I think in the context of our preferential voting system—first and foremost—voting is compulsory, which is a real strength of Australian democracy. You line up, you vote, and then you go get what we call a “democracy sausage,” which is a sausage on a slice of bread, and people post photos of that to show they voted. You get fined if you don’t vote, so while people can vote informally, voting is really a requirement of all citizens. To that extent, you get much better buy-in to the political debate and the campaign, because people have to show up. It’s a key part of the responsibility of citizenship here.
That said, there’s been a lot of talk about the rise of minority parties. The vote for major parties has been falling year on year. The Labor Party used to hover in the mid-40s, then dropped to around 40%, and is now hovering at about 33% of the vote. The Liberal Party slipped below them. The National Party, which is more of a regional party, and the Liberal Party tend to combine—so it’s called the Liberal National Coalition—and they form government.
Labor has typically had to work with the Greens. But over the last three years, the Australian Greens have taken a more extreme bent. They’ve sought to consolidate real political power. The environment has been put on the back burner, and they’ve embraced social issues. For example, they’ve come out very strongly and worked with Muslim communities on the issue of Gaza and recognition. That might have alienated some among their base.
But for many Australians, there is a broad resistance to extremism at either end of the political spectrum. Some of the rhetoric and aggression from certain politicians proved detrimental. As a result, the Greens failed to gain any seats at the federal level and, in fact, may have lost three. The Labor Party’s victory in this election is historically unprecedented in terms of its strength. They no longer need the Greens to govern. While there had been serious talk of a minority government requiring Green support to pass legislation, Labor now holds full control in the Lower House—though they still need Green backing in the Senate.
Despite the major parties’ overall decline in vote share, this appears to be Labor’s moment. They’ve spoken of becoming the “natural party of governance”—a mantle once claimed by the Liberal Party. Their ambition is to remain in power for 10, 15, even 20 years, much like the Menzies government of the 1960s and 1970s. That is their goal.
Dutton Tried to Tap into ‘Alt-Right Masculinity’
People are attending a political rally and marching through the city streets of Melbourne with a police escort in Victoria, Australia on March 16, 2019. Photo: Adam Calaitzis.
Your scholarship explores ‘protest masculinities’ as fertile ground for right-wing mobilization. In what ways did Peter Dutton’s campaign draw on, or fail to effectively deploy, gendered narratives of crisis and control?
Dr. Josh Roose: Very early on in the campaign, Peter Dutton referenced a dominant trope seen frequently in more extreme right masculinity spaces that I’ve studied—a narrative I haven’t seen cited elsewhere. It’s the saying: “strong men create good times, weak men create tough times,” and so on. You’ve probably heard the narrative. It’s this idea that when times are good, men become weak, and only in tough times do strong men come to the fore and shape society. He adopted some of that language—alt-right type masculinity that’s been prominent online. It was clear he was tapping into it and attempting to mobilize it.
To be fair, however, the Liberal Party also came out incredibly strongly against anti-Semitism—not in a “Trumpian” way, but in a clear and firm manner. There has been a significant rise in anti-Semitism here. They also came out strongly against neo-Nazis.
There’s a neo-Nazi movement in Australia that’s attempting to grow. They’ve been hijacking public events like Anzac Day, trying to mobilize and exploit young men on the margins. While their numbers haven’t grown exponentially—maybe from a few dozen to around 100—they are very loud, very active, and there was a resounding rejection of that type of extreme right from the mainstream right-wing political party. That helps explain why some people have been pushed further right—why those fringes have been radicalized even more.
But where is this going? I think, ultimately, when you have a government with this kind of majority, they can implement meaningful changes over time—changes that will directly target extremism, particularly the far right. We’ve already seen strong legislative actions, such as banning the Nazi salute, the swastika, and other hate symbols. We know there’s likely to be further action in that space—positive action, to that extent.
Australia’s Deeply Masculinist Politics Is Starting to Shift
How do you situate the performance of masculine-coded populism—often framed through control, toughness, and sovereignty—in a political environment increasingly shaped by demands for inclusivity and post-pandemic care politics?
Dr. Josh Roose: There’s a lot of moving parts to that question. I think what we see—even on the left side of politics here—is an embrace of masculinity as a mobilizing factor. Let me take a step back. Australia produces some of the world’s leading scholars in both masculinity and feminist studies. Think of figures like Germaine Greer, or in the field of masculinity, people like R.W. Connell, Michael Flood, and others. Our gender politics are incredibly dynamic and prominent in public life.
While Indigenous Australians have lived here for 60,000 to 70,000 years, the modern nation-state is relatively young. In this modern context, gender politics are very much at the forefront. Because of that, we’ve seen strong resistance—not just from the right, but also from elements of the left, particularly the trade union movement—toward what is perceived as being too soft, too aligned with femininity, or too accepting of a “masculinity of care.” There’s some valuable literature on this, also written by Australian scholars.
It’s a complex issue, but I think the dichotomy is beginning to be challenged. It’s a process that will take time. Historically, Australia has had overwhelmingly masculine political leadership. For much of the 20th century, we were governed under the White Australia Policy. Multiculturalism only came into effect in the 1970s and 1980s. We’ve had only one female Prime Minister, and she came to power through what we call “knifing” the previous leader. She received a level of abuse for that which no male leader has ever experienced.
So, we do have a deeply masculinist political culture. However, the COVID-19 pandemic—working from home, the rise in care responsibilities—has begun to shift things. These changes are happening in ways we haven’t fully studied or understood yet.
But I do think, with three or four potential terms of a left-leaning government—and a Cabinet that is, for the first time in Australian history, made up of more than 50% women—we’re likely to see the political landscape change significantly over the next decade, particularly as younger generations rise. Exactly how that will unfold remains to be seen.
We’re Seeing the Beginnings of a New Class Divide in Australia
With economic precarity and housing affordability at the center of public concern, how might evolving expressions of masculine discontent shift political alignments among traditionally right-leaning working-class male voters?
Dr. Josh Roose: I think we’re seeing it—and I’ve discussed this elsewhere. People have shifted away from the Liberal Party and are increasingly critical of it. The Liberals have just elected a moderate as their leader—the first female leader and a moderate in the party’s history. That happened today (May 13, 2025), and it’s a pretty significant event.
It was also a very close vote within the party room, highlighting internal divisions. We know that men in Australia—much like in the rest of the world—are increasingly shifting to the political right. There was stronger support for far-right-style politics. While still a small minority, about 10% of the vote is not negligible and must be taken seriously.
At the same time, there’s growing tension within the major opposition party about its stance on economic precarity and working-class issues. The opposition has talked about becoming the party of the outer suburbs—areas where real economic struggle is concentrated. These are people who own homes and cars, are trying to put their kids through school, but can’t keep up with mortgage payments and are stuck in long commutes. The party assumed it would automatically capture that demographic—but it failed. It didn’t do enough to make the race competitive, let alone win government.
So, I think we’re witnessing a shift in political alignment. Smaller far-right parties are emerging. There was even talk from neo-Nazi groups about forming a political party, though they were far too late to register and, realistically, would never be allowed to register in Australia. Still, the fact that the idea was floated is notable.
We’re also seeing the emergence of a significant generational and economic cleavage in Australia—something I never thought I’d see. A new class system appears to be forming. Australia has long prided itself on being an egalitarian society, at least in principle. But increasingly, if you’re not born into a family that owns property, it’s incredibly difficult to enter the housing market at all.
So yes, I think we’re seeing the beginnings of a new class divide—one that will reshape the political landscape, including the major parties, while populist politicians on the fringes will continue to try and exploit the resulting anger and anxiety.
Anti-Muslim Racism Has Shifted—But It’s Still There
Anti-racism protesters clash with Reclaim Australia groups rallying against Muslim immigration in Melton, Victoria, Australia, in November 2015. Photo: Dave Hewison.
To what extent does Islamophobia remain a structuring logic within Australian right-wing populist discourse, and how has it evolved in the context of declining electoral returns for its chief proponents?
Dr. Josh Roose: It was a really interesting political campaign because the Muslim community became very active—I’ve written about this. They argued that neither major political party was representing their interests, particularly around the issue of Gaza.
A number of Labor Party politicians were campaigning in seats that had previously been somewhat marginal and were now being targeted on the basis of their stance on Gaza, due to high Muslim population concentrations—around 35 to 40% in some areas. There was an attempt to mobilize a Muslim vote, with three or four different groups emerging under names like “Muslim Votes Matter.” In some cases, these groups gained 15–20% of the vote. So, while they didn’t shape the overall outcome, they were influential.
Racism is embedded in Australia as a settler-colonial society with a long history of exclusion and discrimination. It persists in institutions, structures, parliaments, and businesses. However, the type of racism evolves over time. What we’re seeing now is more of an effort by the far right to put migration and immigration at the center of political debate. There’s this narrative—though factually unsupported—that Australia is being “flooded” by Indians, Chinese, or others.
With regard to Muslims, the evolution has been particularly interesting. For the first 10–15 years post-9/11, anti-Muslim racism was at a peak—especially during the rise of Islamic State (IS), when young men were going off to fight abroad. There was a lot of tabloid coverage and moral panic. But now, we’re looking at second-, third-, even fourth-generation Australian Muslims—highly culturally literate, deeply embedded in the fabric of society, business owners, homeowners, building wealth. That integration has shifted public perception.
There’s been a noticeable political alignment between Muslim communities and the Greens, despite some ideological contradictions. So, while Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism is still present and remains problematic—and likely always will be to some extent—I think we’ve seen a marked shift away from its peak in the last 5 to 10 years in the Australian context.
“We Need a Masculinity That Is Strong—But Also Nurturing”
And finally, drawing from your work on countering right-wing extremism, what institutional, educational, or civic interventions would you prioritize to consolidate democratic resilience and pre-empt future cycles of cultural backlash politics?
Dr. Josh Roose: To me, there are a number of layers. Social media is a massive issue here, and I know that there are various cases ongoing around that. We’ve got to hold social media companies accountable for what they’re allowing on their platforms. We need more responsive laws that prohibit, for example, unregulated anonymity—where people can say and do what they like and get away with it. Why can someone publish hate in Australia, from their home or in a public space on their phone, share it online, threaten, abuse, harass, and humiliate others, and not be held accountable? If they said the same things in a physical public space, they’d be arrested under our laws. So, there are significant issues around what people can say, do, and publish online. That’s not to say I want to get caught up in the freedom of speech debate, but where it crosses the threshold into hate and violence, it must be better regulated and enforced.
In terms of education, I think resilience is a key element of the Australian curriculum—there are entire units dedicated to teaching resilience to young people. But I think the construction of healthy masculinity is critical. A masculinity that, on the one hand, is strong, resistant to shock, capable of dealing with difficulty and challenge, embraces physicality, and even a bit of stoicism—but on the other hand, is caring, nurturing, loving, and capable of moving beyond the ego: doing housework, allowing vulnerability, and so on.
There’s a lot of really good work being done in that space, but it’s not systematic. It’s not embedded at a curriculum level. And wherever it does pop up, there’s always resistance from some parents claiming that it’s an attempt to “turn children woke.”
We’re still seeing this Americanization of our right-wing politics. The sooner that stops—when the right develops some maturity and a bit of introspection, and rejects this Americanized, extreme-right style politics, including Trumpism—the sooner they’ll reconnect with people. But honestly, the chances of that happening are low.
Please cite as: Yilmaz, Ihsan; Mamouri, Ali; Morieson, Nicholas & Omer, Muhammad. (2025). “The Transnational Diffusion of Digital Authoritarianism: From Moscow and Beijing to Ankara.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). May 12, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0098
This report examines how Turkey has become a paradigmatic case of digital authoritarian convergence through the mechanisms of learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence. Drawing on Chinese and Russian models—and facilitated by Western and Chinese tech companies—Turkey has adopted sophisticated digital control strategies across legal, surveillance, and information domains. The study identifies how strategic partnerships, infrastructure agreements (e.g., Huawei’s 5G and smart city projects), and shared authoritarian logics have enabled the Erdoğan regime to suppress dissent and reshape the digital public sphere. Through legal reforms, deep packet inspection (DPI) technologies, and coordinated digital propaganda, Turkey exemplifies how authoritarian digital governance diffuses globally. The findings highlight an urgent need for international accountability, cyber norms, and ethical tech governance to contain the expanding influence of digital repression.
This research explores the diffusion of digital authoritarian practices in Turkey as a prominent example of the Muslim world, focusing on the three mechanisms of learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence, covering four main domains: Legal frameworks, Internet censorship, urban surveillance, and Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs). The study covers both internal and external diffusion based on a wide range of sources. These include domestic precedents, examples from authoritarian regimes like China and Russia, and the role of Western companies in spreading digital authoritarian practices.
The study had several findings. The key findings are detailed below:
Learning: Turkey, like other regional countries that experienced public unrest, has learned from previous experience in order to impose power and control on people using different digital capabilities. Countries like China and Russia played significant roles in this learning process across the region, including in Turkey. The research highlights the importance of both internal learning from past protest movements and external influences from state and non-state actors.
Emulation: Authoritarian regimes in Turkey and across the Muslim world have emulated China and Russia’s internet governance models in all four aforementioned domains. The Turkish government has developed its own surveillance and censorship techniques, influenced by the experiences of authoritarian states and bolstered by training and technology transfers from China and Russia, and certain western companies.
Cooperative interdependence: Turkey’s economic challenges have led it to forge closer ties with China, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This cooperation often comes with financial incentives, promoting the adoption of China’s digital governance practices, including urban surveillance systems and censorship technologies.
Role of private technology companies: Western companies have played a significant role in facilitating the spread of digital authoritarianism, often operating independently of their governments’ policies. Companies like Sandvine and NSO Group have provided tools that support the Turkish government’s digital control strategies, contributing to a complex landscape of censorship and surveillance.
Diffusion of SDIOs: The diffusion process of digital authoritarian practice is not limited to importing and using digital technologies. It also includes the spreading of legal frameworks to restrict digital freedom and also running Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs), including state propaganda and conspiracy theories that China and Russia had a significant role in.
Based on these findings, the study proposes several recommendations to counteract the spread of digital authoritarian practices:
– Strengthening international cyber norms and regulations to define and regulate digital governance, particularly in countries with strong ties to the West.
– Enhancing support for digital rights and privacy protections by advocating for comprehensive laws and supporting civil society organizations in Turkey.
– Encouraging responsible corporate behavior among technology firms to ensure compliance with human rights standards.
– Fostering regional and global cooperation on digital freedom to counter digital authoritarianism through joint initiatives and technical assistance.
– Leveraging economic incentives to promote ethical technology use and partnerships with human rights-aligned providers.
– Using strategic diplomatic channels to encourage Turkey to adopt responsible surveillance practices and align with global digital governance norms.
The research illustrates the dynamics of digital authoritarianism in Turkey, revealing a complex interplay of emulation, learning, and economic incentives that facilitate the spread of censorship and surveillance practices. The findings underscore the need for international cooperation and proactive measures to safeguard digital freedoms in an increasingly authoritarian digital landscape.
Photo: Hannu Viitanen.
Introduction
Research suggests that a significant number of countries in the Muslim world, specifically those in the Middle East, are often characterized by authoritarian governance (Durac & Cavatorta, 2022; Yenigun, 2021; Stepan et al., 2018; Yilmaz, 2021; 2025). The rise of the internet and social media during the late 2000s provided immense capacities to civil society and individual activists in the Muslim world. This development burst into political action during the late 2000s and the early 2010s in the instances of the Gezi protests in Turkey and other examples in the region, including the Green Movement in Iran and the Arab Spring protests across the Arab world (Iosifidis & Wheeler, 2015; Demirhan, 2014; Lynch, 2011; Gheytanchi, 2016).
The fact that the protesters in all these cases have extensively used the internet and associated technologies (e.g., social media, digital messaging, and navigation) has led many observers to declare the latter as ‘liberation technology’ due to their role in facilitating anti-government movements across non-democratic countries (Diamond & Plattner, 2012; Ziccardi, 2012). Advocates of the internet as a liberation tool have also pointed to enhanced social capacity to mobilize and organize through the spread of dramatic videos and images, instigating attitudinal change, and countering government monopoly over the production and dissemination of information (Breuer, 2012; Ruijgrok, 2017). These qualities have been seen as giving the internet an equalizing power between the state and society. In the early 2000s, when the Internet and social media were spreading across the developing world, authoritarian governments were generally unable to control the digital sphere; they lacked the technical expertise and the digital infrastructure to curb the internet. So, they typically relied on completely shutting it down (Cattle, 2015; Gunitsky, 2020).
However, authoritarian regimes gradually learned how to use the digital space for empowering their control on the society and have even started using it for transnational repression and sharp power (Yilmaz, 2025, Yilmaz et al., 2024; Yilmaz, Akbarzadeh & Bashirov 2023; Yilmaz, Morieson & Shakil, 2025; Yilmaz & Shakil, 2024). Scholars such as Sunstein (2009) and Negroponte (1996) have warned against the capacity of the internet to fragment the public sphere into separate echo chambers and thus fundamentally impede ‘deliberative democracy,’ which is supposed to be based on debates of ideas and exchange of views.
Furthermore, the breakthroughs in deep learning, neural network, and machine learning, together with the widespread use of the internet, have accelerated the growth of artificial intelligence (AI), providing more capability to authoritarian regimes to impose control on people. In a Pew poll, almost half of the respondents believed that the ‘use of [modern] technology will mostly weaken core aspects of democracy and democratic representation in the next decade’ (Anderson & Rainie, 2020). This pessimism is driven by an unprecedented degree of surveillance and digital control brought forward by digital technologies, undermining central notions of freedom, individuality, autonomy, and rationality at the center of deliberative democracy (Radavoi, 2019; Stone et al., 2016; Bostrom, 2014; Helbing et al., 2019; Damnjanović, 2015). Tools of the governments to digitally repress democracy include smart surveillance using facial recognition applications, targeted censorship, disinformation and misinformation campaigns, and cyber-attacks and hacking (Feldstein, 2019).
Research as to how digital technologies such as high-speed internet, social media, AI, and big data affect, enable or disable democracy, human rights, freedom, and electoral process is in its infancy (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019; Margetts, 2013; Papacharissi, 2009). Further, most of this scant literature is focused on Western democracies. The existing literature on Muslim-majority countries is mostly focused on traditional social media (Jenzen et al., 2021; Wheeler, 2017; Tusa, 2013). This is despite the fact that extensive digital capabilities, especially AI and big data, offer governments of these countries the capabilities to exert control over their citizens, with disastrous outcomes for democracy. Indeed, we may be facing the rise of a new type of authoritarian rule: digital authoritarianism, that is, ‘the use of digital information technology by authoritarian regimes to surveil, repress, and manipulate domestic and foreign populations’ (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019; see also Ahmed et al., 2024; Akbarzadeh et al., 2024; 2025).
With the expansion of the internet in developing countries, authoritarian governments derive a similar benefit from technological leapfrogging with the capacity to selectively implement new surveillance and control mechanisms from the burgeoning supply of market-ready advanced AI and big-data-enabled applications. As one internet pioneer foreshadowed to Pew “by 2030, as much of 75% of the world’s population will be enslaved by AI-based surveillance systems developed in China and exported around the world” (Anderson & Rainie, 2020). Developing countries often experience technological leapfrogging; they shift to advanced technologies directly, skipping the middle, more expensive and less efficient stages because modern technologies, by the time of their implementation within those countries, become more economical and effective than the initial technology. This leapfrogging is demonstrated via the adoption lifecycle of mobile phones to that of landlines. It took less than 17 years, from the early 2000s to 2017, for mobile phones to be extensively adopted in Turkey, from 25% to 96%. (Our World in Data, 2021).
After the crises of the early 2010s, both democratic and authoritarian regimes worldwide started to invest heavily in sophisticated equipment and expertise to monitor, analyze, and ultimately crack down on online and offline dissent (Aziz & Beydoun, 2020; Feldstein, 2021). In addition to curtailing independent speech and activism online, authoritarian regimes have sought to deceive and manipulate digital environments in order to shape their citizens’ views. They have flooded the digital realm with propaganda narratives using trolls, bots, and influencers under their control (Tan, 2020).
More importantly, thanks to authoritarian diffusion, governments in developing countries are learning from and emulating the experiences of their peers of surveillance technologies such as China and Russia. However, there has been limited research on the political mechanisms through which such digital authoritarian practices spread. Against this backdrop, this report examines the mechanisms through which digital authoritarian practices diffuse in Turkey as an example of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. We ask: What kind of authoritarian practices have the governments enacted in the digital realm? How have these practices diffused across the region? To address these questions systematically, we develop an analytical framework that examines the mechanisms of diffusion of digital authoritarian practices. Our framework identifies three mechanisms of diffusion: emulation, learning, and cooperative interdependence. We focus on four groups of digital authoritarian practices: legal frameworks, Internet censorship, urban surveillance, and Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs). We aim to show how emulation, learning and cooperative interdependence take place in each of these four digital authoritarian practices. In addition to the above, the report will explore the international dimension of this phenomenon, discovering how Western companies, in addition to totalitarian systems like Russia and China, played a role in empowering the Turkish government to claim the digital space.
We first discuss our analytical framework which integrates the scholarship of digital authoritarian practices and authoritarian diffusion, and explain the concepts of learning, emulation, and as prominent diffusion mechanisms. We then move to the empirical section where we first identify convergent outcomes that are comparable between earlier and later adopters and then we will elucidate the mechanisms through which the diffusion process occurred by showing contact points and plausible channels through which decision-makers were able to adopt from one another.
Analytical Framework
To explore the phenomenon of diffusion, we follow best practices laid out in the literature (see Ambrosio, 2010; Ambrosio & Tolstrup, 2019; Bank & Weyland, 2020). We begin by identifying convergent outcomes that are comparable between earlier and later adopters. As part of this, we will also establish feasible connections between the two parties, which may take the form of physical proximity, trade linkages, membership in international organizations, bilateral arrangements, historical ties, cultural similarities, or shared language. Then, we will elucidate the mechanisms through which the diffusion process occurred by identifying contact points and plausible channels through which decision-makers were able to adopt from one another.
We will follow three good practices that have been advised by scholars (e.g., Ambrosio & Tolstrup, 2019; Strang & Soule, 1998; Gilardi, 2010; 2012). First, we adopt a comparative design that involves four middle powers (see Strang & Soule, 1998). There are important similarities and differences among the four cases that make comparison a useful exercise. Second, we provide extensive data to showcase the workings of diffusion mechanisms despite the challenge of working on authoritarian settings. As Ambrosio and Tolstrup (2019: 2752) noted, “the relevant evidence needed can be hard to acquire in authoritarian settings.” It is much more likely to gain access to strong evidence in liberal democratic settings where much of the current diffusion research has accumulated. Our article contributes to the literature on diffusion in authoritarian settings with Turkey as a prominent example. Finally, we provide smoking gun evidence based on several leaked documents to support our assertions.
In the empirical section, we follow the convention (see Ambrosio & Tolstrup, 2019) and start with identifying convergent outcomes among the major political actors in regard to the practices of restrictive legal frameworks, Internet censorship, urban surveillance and SDIOs. This section involves demonstrating the items that have been diffused between earlier and later adopters. Not only is there a substantial amount of similarity between the practices among these political systems, but also, we show a temporal sequence between earlier and later adopters that point at convergence.
We then move on to explain plausible mechanisms of diffusion, following the model provided by Bashirov et al. (2025): Learning, Emulation, and Cooperative Interdependence. It’s important to highlight from the outset that these three mechanisms functioned together in Turkey settings. As was observed in other settings (see Sharman, 2008), it is not feasible to examine the impact of these mechanisms independently. Instead of existing as separate entities or operating in a simple additive manner, these mechanisms are inherently interconnected, and they do overlap. We follow this understanding in our empirical analysis and discuss how each mechanism worked in tandem with other mechanisms.
Types of Digital Authoritarianism
Illustration: Shutterstock / Skorzewiak.
We identified four main domains of digital authoritarianism in general, and examples of them could be found in Turkey’s case as well.
Restrictive Legal Frameworks
The legal framework includes a variety of practices. We identified the following:
1- Laws that mandated internet service providers to establish a system allowing real-time monitoring and recording of traffic on their networks. These legislations mandated internet service providers to establish a system allowing real-time monitoring and recording of traffic on their networks (Privacy International, 2019). Moreover, all censorship laws refer to national security and terrorism as vague criteria to enforce widespread censorship of undesirable content. In Turkey, a Presidential decree (No 671) in 2016 granted the government extensive power to restrict internet access, block websites, and censor media (IHD, 2017). Under the decree, telecommunications companies are required to comply with any government orders within two hours of receiving them. In recent years, the Turkish government also prosecuted thousands of people for criticizing President Erdogan or his government in print or on social media (Freedom House, 2021).
2- Laws that have converged around penalization of online speech, referring to concepts such as national identity, culture, and defamation. It is hard to miss similarities between the laws in Turkey among other regional countries and those enacted in China earlier. In 2013, China’s Supreme People’s Court issued a legal interpretation that expanded the scope of the crime of defamation to include information shared on the internet (Human Rights Watch, 2013). In 2022, the Turkish Parliament passed new legislation that criminalized “disseminating false information,” punishable by one to three years in prison, and increased government control over online news websites. Article 23 of the law was particularly controversial as it stated that “Any person who publicly disseminates untrue information concerning the internal and external security, public order and public health of the country with the sole intention of creating anxiety, fear or panic among the public, and in a manner likely to disturb public peace, shall be sentenced to imprisonment from one year to three years” (Human Rights Watch, 2022). This clearly shows the pattern of diffusion from China and Russia by leaving vague and broad provisions of what constitutes “national security,” “peace” and “order” (Weber, 2021: 170-171; Yilmaz, Caman & Bashirov, 2020; Yilmaz, Shipoli & Demir, 2023; Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2022).
3- Laws that ban or restrict the use of VPNs following China and Russia’s lead. In Turkey, VPNs are legal, but many of their servers and websites are blocked. China banned unauthorized VPN use in 2017 in a new Cybersecurity Law. Russia introduced a similar ban the same year. The Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK), national telecommunications regulatory and inspection authority of Turkey, issued a blocking order targeting 16 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). These VPNs, including TunnelBear, Proton, and Psiphon, are popular tools used by audiences seeking to access news websites critical of the government.
While entirely banning VPN access remains a challenge, governments can employ Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology to identify and throttle VPN traffic. Countries like Iran, China, and Russia are indulging in such practices. Users in Iran and Turkey, for example, have reported extensive blockage of VPN apps and websites since 2021. Engaging in efforts to access blocked content through a VPN can potentially result in imprisonment (Danao & Venz, 2023). Simon Migliano, research head at Top10VPN.com, acknowledges that blocking VPN websites in Turkey makes it harder to download and sign up for new services. Moreover, individual VPN providers like Hide.me, SecureVPN, and Surfshark confirm technical difficulties for their users in Turkey. Proton, on the other hand, maintains that their services haven’t been completely blocked.
As such, the report “Freedom on the Net 2023” by Freedom House (2023) reflects the aforesaid harsh reality, ranking Turkey as “not free” in terms of internet access and freedom of expression. However, it is worth noting that the Turkish government’s censorship efforts are met with a determined citizenry. Audiences, even young schoolchildren according to Ozturan (2023), have become adept at using VPNs to access banned content. Media outlets themselves sometimes promote VPNs to help their audiences bypass restrictions. Examples abound: VOA Turkish and Deutsche Welle (DW), upon being blocked, directed their audiences towards Psiphon, Proton, and nthLink to access their broadcasts. Diken, a prominent news website, even maintains a dedicated “VPN News” section offering access to censored content dating back to 2014.
4- Laws that tighten control on social media companies. While Western social media platforms remain accessible in Turkey, in recent years the government has introduced similar laws and regulations that increase their grip over the content shared on these platforms. They do so by threatening the social media companies with bandwidth restrictions and outright bans if they fail to comply with the governments’ requests. Moreover, in 2020, the Turkish Parliament passed a new law that mandated tech giants such as Facebook and Twitter (now X) to appoint representatives in Turkey for handling complaints related to the content on their platforms. Companies that decline to assign an official representative have been subject to fines, advertising prohibitions, and bandwidth restrictions that would render their networks unusable due to slow internet speeds. Facebook complied with the law in 2021 and assigned a legal entity in Turkey after refusing to do so the previous year (Bilginsoy, 2021).
Since the early 2010s, many countries in the region including Turkey have enacted a series of legal reforms that converged around similar concepts and restrictions. As Table 1 shows, these laws follow the Chinese and Russian laws in temporal order. The table makes a comparison with some other countries in the region as well, in order to see Turkey’s position in this field.
Internet Shutdown
All governments in the region have resorted to shutting down the internet as a simple solution over the past 20 years, mostly during the times of mass protests, social unrest or military operations. In Turkey, in 2015, access to Facebook, Twitter and YouTube as well as 166 other websites were blocked when an image of a Turkish prosecutor held at gunpoint was circulated online. The internet was also cut off multiple times during the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, as well as during the Turkish military’s operations in the Southeastern regions of the country. In many instances, the government has used bandwidth throttling to deny its citizens access to the internet. However, internet shutdown is costly as it affects the delivery of essential public and private services and has been dubbed as the Dictator’s Digital Dilemma. Therefore, even when it is practiced, the shutdown is limited to a certain location, mostly a city or a region, and would typically last only few days. According to Access Now (2022), an internet rights organization, no internet shutdown has taken place in Turkey in 2021.
Given the high cost of switching off the internet and thanks to the rise of sophisticated technologies to filter, manipulate and re-direct internet content, censorship has become a more widely used digital authoritarian practice over the last decade. Countries have converged on the use of DPI technology. DPI is “a type of data processing that looks in detail at the contents of the data being sent, and re-routes it accordingly” (Geere, 2012). DPI inspects the data being sent over a network and may take various forms of actions, such as logging the content and alerting, as well as blocking or re-rerouting the traffic. DPI allows comprehensive network analysis. While it can be used for innocuous purposes, such as checking the content for viruses and ensuring the correct supply of content, it can also be used for digital eavesdropping, internet censorship, and even stealing sensitive information (Bendrath & Mueller, 2011).
Countries across the Muslim world including Turkey started in the mid-2010s to acquire DPI technology from Western and Chinese companies who have become important sources of diffusion. US-Canadian company Sandvine/Procera has provided DPI surveillance equipment to national networks operating in Turkey (Turk Telekom). This system operates over connections between an internet site and the target user and allows the government to tamper with the data sent through an unencrypted network (HTTP vs. HTTPS). Sandvine and its parent company Francisco Partners emerged at the center of the diffusion of DPI technology in the Middle East. Recent revelations show that the company has played significant role in facilitating the spread of ideas between countries. Through their information campaign, Sandvine contributed to learning by governments. As such, Sandvine and Netsweeper’s prominent engagement in provision of spying technology shows that it is not merely Chinese companies that enable digital authoritarianism. Western companies have been just as active.
Turkey made its first purchase from Sandvine (then Procera) in 2014 after the Gezi protests and corruption investigations rocked the AKP government the previous year. The government later used these devices to block websites, including Wikipedia, and those belonging to unwanted entities, such as independent news outlets and certain opposition groups in later years. The governments in the region including Turkey have gathered widespread spying and phishing capabilities sourced from mostly Western companies. For example, in Turkey, FinFisher used FinSpy in 2017 on a Turkish website disguised as the campaign website for the Turkish opposition movement and enabled the surveillance of political activists and journalists. FinSpy allowed the MIT to locate people, monitor phone calls and chats and mobile phone and computer data (ECCHR, 2023). This could link in with our discussion in emulation more clearly as well regarding private companies being key actors (Marczak et al., 2018).
Urban Surveillance
Three high-definition video surveillance cameras operated by the city police. Photo: Dreamstime.
With the advance of CCTV and AI technology, urban surveillance capabilities have grown exponentially over the past ten years. Dubbed as “safe” or “smart” cities, these urban surveillance projects are “mainly concerned with automating the policing of society using video cameras and other digital technologies to monitor and diagnose “suspicious behavior” (Kynge et al., 2021). The concept of Smart city captures an entire range of ICT capabilities implemented in an urban area. This might start with the simple goal of bringing internet connectivity and providing electronic payment solutions for basic services and evolve to establishing AI-controlled surveillance systems, as we have seen in many Chinese cities (Zeng, 2020). Smart cities deploy a host of ICT—including high-speed communication networks, sensors, and mobile phone apps—to boost mobility and connectivity, supercharge the digital economy, increase energy efficiency, improve the delivery of services, and generally raise the level of their residents’ welfare (Hong, 2022). The “smart” concept generally involves gathering large amounts of data to enhance various city functions. This can include optimizing the use of utilities and other services, reducing traffic congestion and pollution, and ultimately empowering both public authorities and residents.
The rapid development of smart city infrastructures across world has led to controversies as critics argued that the surveillance technology enables pervasive collection, retention, and misuse of personal data by everything from law enforcement agencies to private companies. Moreover, in recent years, China has been a major promoter of the ‘safe city’ concept that focuses on surveillance-driven policing of urban environments – a practice that has been perfected in most Chinese cities (Triolo, 2020). Several Chinese companies have been at the forefront of China’s effort to export its model of safe city: Huawei, ZTE Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, Zhejiang Dahua Technology, Alibaba, and Tiandy (Yan, 2019).
China has been a significant exporter of surveillance technology worldwide, including to countries like Turkey. Chinese firms such as Hikvision and Dahua have supplied surveillance equipment, including facial recognition systems, to various nations. Reports indicate that Turkey has utilized facial recognition software to monitor and identify individuals during protests (Radu, 2019; Bozkurt, 2021).
Holistically, the global expansion of China’s urban surveillance model sparks significant concerns, particularly in relation to its potential to increase authoritarian practices in adopting countries. In the absence of robust counter mechanisms, the adoption of Chinese surveillance model by authoritarian states is only likely to augment.
Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs)
Another interesting aspect of authoritarian regimes is the use of digital technologies in creating and spreading pro-regime propaganda and conspiracy narratives that benefit the regimes. This is happening extensively in the region, including Turkey, as a part of the manipulation of the people in order to impose control on them and silence the opposition. The pro-regime propaganda machine uses conspiracy theories with a dual strategy, defensive and offensive, to shape the public perception of the regime. Defensively, it seeks to portray the regime as a legitimate national authority, emphasising its adherence to the nation’s interests and well-being in a way that no legitimate alternative is imaginable. In these narratives, leaders are portrayed as heroic figures with exceptional qualities, and the system is presented as flawless and well-suited to the country’s needs. On the offensive front, the propaganda machine works to discredit any alternative to the current regime. Opposition figures are either assassinated, arrested or labelled as traitors, criminals, or foreign agents so they can be eliminated politically. To reach to this end, conspiracy theories link opposition figures to nefarious plots or foreign intervention, thus undermining the credibility of opposition narratives.
In recent years, propaganda and conspiracy theories have played a significant role in Turkey’s political landscape, influencing political narratives and public opinion. The Turkish government, particularly under President Erdoğan and his ruling party (AKP), has been known for using state-controlled or pro-government media to push certain narratives. The government’s media strategy includes promoting nationalistic themes, highlighting Turkey’s achievements under AKP rule, and portraying the government as the protector of national interests against both internal and external threats. The government often emphasizes Turkey’s sovereignty and positions itself against perceived Western interference, such as criticisms from the European Union or the United States. By doing so, it strengthens a nationalist image, resonating with citizens who view Turkey as being unfairly targeted by foreign powers. Propaganda often incorporates Islamic and conservative values to appeal to the AKP’s core voter base. Erdoğan’s speeches and media outlets supportive of the government emphasize the defense of Islamic culture and values, framing the AKP as a protector of both religion and national identity. Government narratives frequently depict opposition groups as threats to national stability. This includes not only political rivals but also groups like the Kurdish population, the Gülen movement (which is accused by Erdogan regime of being behind the 2016 coup attempt), and the pro-Kurdish HDP party, who are often associated with terrorism or disloyalty.
Additionally, conspiracy theories have been pervasive in Turkish political culture, often used to explain domestic unrest or justify political decisions. Here, pro-government media often propagate conspiracies about the opposition, portraying them as aligned with foreign powers or terrorist organizations. A persistent theme in Turkish political discourse is the idea that foreign powers or global financial institutions are working to undermine Turkey’s economy and political stability. Moreover, the failed coup attempt in July 2016 became a fertile ground for conspiracy theories. While the Turkish government attributed the coup attempt to Fethullah Gülen, a cleric who lived in exile in the United States for decades until his death, alternative theories continue to circulate. Some claim that foreign powers, particularly the US, were involved in the coup plot, while others suggest that elements within the Turkish government may have allowed the coup to proceed as a means to justify a subsequent crackdown on opposition. In the same vein, many conspiracy theories center around the idea that Western powers, particularly the US and Europe, are conspiring against Turkey to prevent it from becoming a major regional power. These theories often cite Turkey’s geopolitical location, its military interventions in the region, or its aspirations to become an independent economic powerhouse.
A significant portion of the mainstream media in Turkey is either directly controlled by the government or aligned with it. These outlets often echo government narratives, downplaying criticisms, and emphasizing government achievements or conspiracy-laden stories about opposition and foreign interference. Despite the dominance of pro-government media, social media platforms have become spaces for both opposition voices and pro-government voices. The government has sought to control these platforms through legal means, introducing laws to regulate social media and threatening to block access to platforms that do not comply with government requests to remove content.
Mechanisms of Diffusion
We observed that the diffusion of digital authoritarianism occurs in three main mechanisms: learning, emulation and cooperative interdependence.
Learning
It has been widely argued that countries across the globe learned from domestic and foreign experience to adopt various forms of digital authoritarian practices. This is more prominent in countries experiencing public unrest, like Turkey and Egypt. For example, they both have learned lessons from the Gezi Park and Tahrir Square protests, respectively. Despite many indications to this effect, for a long time there was a lack of smoking gun evidence pointing at this type of learning. In 2016, a series of leaked emails from Erdogan’s son-in-law and then Energy Minister Berat Albayrak’s account revealed that in the aftermath of the Gezi Park protests, the Erdogan regime identified its lack of control of digital space as a problem and sought solutions in the form of “set[ting] up a team of professional graphic designers, coders, and former army officials who had received training in psychological warfare” (Akis, 2022). In later years, the regime built one of the world’s most extensive internet surveillance networks on social media, particularly on X, according to Norton Symantec.
In regard to external learning, China (and Chinese companies) and Western private companies have been at the forefront of actors promoting internet censorship practices. China has been not only a major promoter but also a source of learning for middle powers when it comes to internet surveillance, data fusion, and AI. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become a key vehicle that drives these efforts. For example, during the 2021 SCO summit, Chinese officials led a panel titled the Thousand Cities Strategic Algorithms, which trained the international audience that included many developing country representations on developing a “national data brain” that integrates various forms of financial and personal data and uses artificial intelligence to analyze it. The SCO website reported that 50 countries are engaged in discussions with the Thousand Cities Strategic Algorithms initiative (Ryan-Mosley, 2022). China has also been active in providing media and government training programs to representatives from BRI-affiliated countries. In one prominent example, Chinese Ministry of Public Security instructed Meiya Pico, a Chinese cybersecurity company, to train government representatives from Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and other countries on digital forensics (see Weber, 2019: 9-11).
Moreover, the spread of internet censorship and surveillance technologies points to a highly probable learning event facilitated by western corporate entities. Specifically, Sandvine, NSO Group, and their parent company Francisco Partners, emerged at the center of the diffusion of DPI technology in most Middle Eastern countries except for Iran where the company is not allowed to operate. Recent revelations show that the company has played a significant role in facilitating the spread of ideas between countries. Alexander Haväng, the ex-Chief Technical Officer of Sandvine, explained in an internal newsletter addressed to the company’s employees that their technology can appeal to governments whose surveillance capacities are hampered by encryption. Haväng wrote that Sandvine’s equipment could “show who’s talking to who, for how long, and we can try to discover online anonymous identities who’ve uploaded incriminating content online” (Gallagher, 2022).
The spread of DPI practices in general and Sandvine’s technology in particular is also evidenced by the chronology of acquisition by developing countries. The list of countries contracted to buy Sandvine’s DPI technology includes Turkey, Algeria, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Sudan, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan (Gallagher, 2022). There is a clear trend here, both in terms of regime susceptibility and chronology of adoption. Turkey purchased Sandvine’s DPI technology in 2014, Egypt in 2016, and Pakistan did so in 2018 (Malsin, 2018; Ali & Jahangir, 2019).
It is highly likely that later adopters of this technology reviewed its performance in early adopters and decided upon their own adoption. We know from previous research that private companies can “influence the spread of state policies by encouraging the exchange of substantive and procedural information between states” (Garrett & Jansa, 2015: 391). Governments are required to understand details about the content of a technology and relevant institutional mechanisms to use it effectively. Corporations facilitate communication about these details. The existence of extensive links between Sandvine and authoritarian regimes, the similarities of how the tech has been used, and the sheer prominence of this company and its technology demonstrate a plausible argument for diffusion.
Using practice framework, we focus on ‘configurations of actors’ who are involved in enabling authoritarianism (Glasius & Michaelsen, 2018). In most instances, these actors are not states, but private companies (see Table 2). Moreover, contrary to perceived active role of Chinese companies, with the prime exception of Iran, it was Western tech companies that provided most of the high-tech surveillance and censorship capabilities to authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world including Turkey. These included, inter alia, US-Canadian company Sandvine, Israeli NSO Group, German FinFisher and Finland’s Nokia Networks.
Emulation
There’s evidence that authoritarian countries in the region like Turkey have emulated major powers, as well as each other, when it comes to internet censorship practices. Among other things, homophily of actors played important role as actors prefer to emulate models from reference groups of actors with whom they share similar cultural or social attributes (Elkins & Simmons, 2005). Political alignment and proximity among nations foster communication and the exchange of information (Rogers, 2010). We observe the influence of this dynamic between China and Russia, and political regimes in the Muslim world who are susceptible to authoritarian forms of governance to varying degrees.
Research noted that states tend to harmonize their policy approaches to align with the prevailing norms of the contemporary global community, irrespective of whether these specific policies or institutional frameworks align with local conditions or provide effective solutions. Notably, since most transfers originate from the core to the periphery, policy transfers to developing regions might be ill-suited and consequently ineffective. There’s evidence that adoption of city surveillance is driven by the desire for conformity rather than the search for effective solutions. China’s CCTV-smart city solutions are considered in the region to be “bold innovations” as they’ve gathered disproportionate attention from the developing countries across the world. However, there’s evidence that the countries adopt this technology because of their apparent promise rather than demonstrated success. For example, there has been a controversy about whether Huawei’s safe city infrastructure actually helps to reduce urban crime. In a dubious presentation in 2019, Huawei claimed that its safe city systems have been highly effective in reducing crime, increasing the case clearance rate, reducing emergency response time, and increasing citizen satisfaction. However, research by CSIS revealed that these numbers have been grossly exaggerated if not completely fabricated (Hillman & McCalpin, 2019).
Emulation and learning appear to be the major mechanisms through which such practices spread. First, by demonstrating the effectiveness of disinformation campaigns and propaganda – such as Russian interference in US presidential elections in 2016 and China’s propaganda around the Covid-19 pandemic – these countries have shown other regimes that similar tactics can be used to control their own populations and advance their interests (Jones, 2022). Second, China and Russia have acted as important sources of learning for authoritarian regimes. China has hosted thousands of foreign officials and members of media from BRI countries in various training programs on media and information management since 2017 (Freedom House, 2022). For example, in 2017, China’s Cyberspace Administration held cyberspace management seminars for officials from BRI countries. Chinese data-mining company iiMedia presented its media management platform which is advertised as offering comprehensive control of public opinion, including providing early-warnings for “negative” public opinions and helping guide the promotion of “positive energy” online (Laskai, 2019).
The governments in the Muslim world learned how to use the social media and other digital technologies for ‘flooding,’ which helps strengthen and legitimize their political regime. This is a part of a broader objective of shaping the information environment domestically and internationally (Mir et al., 2022). At home, these governments are attempting to mold their citizens’ conduct online. They hired social media consultants and influencers to do their propaganda. They learned how to flood the information space with propaganda narratives using troll farms and bots. For example, in Turkey, the AKP government created a massive troll army in response to the Gezi Protests in 2013. A 2016 study published by the cyber security company Norton Symantec shows that among countries in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, Turkey is the country with the most bot accounts on Twitter (Akis, 2022). In 2020, Twitter announced that it was suspending 7,340 fake accounts that had shared over 37 million tweets from its platform. Twitter attributed the network of accounts to the youth wing of the ruling AKP.
Through the aforementioned techniques, Turkey moved beyond strategies of “negative control” of the internet, in which the government attempt to block, censor, and suppress the flow of communication, and toward strategies of proactive co-optation in which social media serves regime objective. The opposite of internet freedom, therefore, is not necessarily internet censorship but a deceptive blend of control, co-option, and manipulation. As the public debate is seeded with such disinformation, this makes it hard for the governments’ opponents to convince their supporters and mobilize (Gunitsky, 2020).
Here, the practices appear to be a mixed bag of diffusion, convergence and even innovation on the part of some regional countries. There is some proof of learning on the part of the Turkish regime: Berat Albayrak’s emails reveal the government’s learning from the Gezi protests and intentional establishment of their own troll farms (Akis, 2022). Similarly, the Sisi regime learnt from the Arab Spring protests as well. While it is hard to find a smoking gun evidence of these regimes copying Russian or Chinese playbook, extensive links between some of these countries (such as Pakistan and Turkey), as well as between some of these countries and Russia/China (Turkey and Russia; China and Pakistan/Iran) brings some evidence of diffusion.
Cooperative Interdependence
Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
We have observed that a cooperative interdependence has been at play when it comes to the diffusion of internet censorship practices from China to developing countries. Countries like Turkey are facing serious economic challenges and are in dire need of foreign direct investment. When tracing China’s technology transfer in these countries, a common thread emerges that tie most of the Chinese engagement to various forms of aid, trade negotiations, or grants. Prominently, China uses its Digital Silk Road (DSR) concept under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to push for adoption of its technological infrastructure and accompanying policies of surveillance and censorship in digital and urban environments (Hillman, 2021). For example, at the 2017 World Internet Conference in China, representatives from Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE signed a “Proposal for International Cooperation on the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Digital Economy,” an agreement to construct the DSR to improve digital connectivity and e-commerce cooperation (Laskai, 2019). The core components of the DSR initiative are smart (or “safe cities”), internet infrastructure, and mobile networks.
We do not argue that China is “forcing” these countries to adopt internet censorship practices. Rather, a cooperative interdependence works through changing incentive structures of BRI-connected states where financial incentives by China, coupled with technology transfer, promote China’s practical approach to managing the cyberspace as well. Indeed, BRI’s digital dimensions include many projects such as 5G networks, smart city projects, fiber optic cables, data centers, satellites, and devices that connect to these systems. In addition to having commercial value in terms of expanding China’s business of information technology, these far-reaching technologies have strategic benefit as they help the country achieve geoeconomic and geopolitical objectives that involve promotion of digital authoritarian practices and Chinese model of internet governance (Malena, 2021; Tang, 2020).
For example, Huawei’s growing influence in Turkey, and other regional countries such as Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, and particularly in the context of building their 5G infrastructure, is tied to these countries’ involvement in DSR projects. As mentioned above, all the abovementioned countries have signed agreements to cooperate with Huawei to build their 5G infrastructure. The latter is not merely an advanced technology, but also a vehicle of promoting an entire legal and institutional infrastructure for China. In 2017 the Standardization Administration of China (SAC) released the “BRI Connectivity and Standards Action Plan 2018-2020” which aims at promoting Chinese technical standards and improving related policies among BRI-recipient states across technologies including AI, 5G, and satellite navigation systems (Malena, 2021).
Cooperative interdependence such as loans, commercial diplomacy and other state initiatives are prominent mechanisms through which China spreads its urban surveillance practices. The Table 2 also demonstrates this process.
In the Muslim world, countries converged on importing China’s smart city platforms in recent years. A close collaboration between Chinese technology companies and authoritarian governments has led to the development of smart city infrastructures in multiple urban settings. Several Chinese companies have been at the forefront of this endeavor: Huawei, Hikvision, ZTE Corporation, Alibaba, Dahua Technology, and Tiandy (Yan, 2019). Huawei is a key source of diffusion of urban surveillance practices.
Huawei has established partnerships with major Turkish telecom companies, Turkcell and Vodafone TR, to implement smart city technologies in Samsun and Istanbul, respectively (KOTRA, 2021). Additionally, Turkey hosts one of Huawei’s 19 global Research and Development centers. In 2020, Turkcell became the first telecom operator outside China to adopt Huawei’s mobile app infrastructure, a system developed by Huawei in response to US sanctions that limited the use of certain Google software on Huawei devices. In 2022, Turk Telekom signed a contract with Huawei to build Turkey’s complete 5G network (Hurriyet, 2022). This infrastructure, known as Huawei Mobile Services (HMS), encompasses a suite of applications, cloud services, and an app store, which Huawei describes as “a collection of apps, services, device integrations, and cloud capabilities supporting its ecosystem” (Huawei, 2022).
Countries have also emulated China as the role model when it comes to urban surveillance practices. Indeed, China’s influence was highly discernible in the area of urban surveillance, where it has emerged as a role model and a key provider of high-tech tools (Germanò et al., 2023). To begin with, there are extensive linkages between sender (mostly China) and adopter countries in political and economic areas. These include the growing presence of China in regional economies, participation in China-dominated organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and cooperation with China on internet governance issues such as the statement in the UN by several countries. Moreover, China has long acted as a laboratory to observe the results of its unique blend of high-tech authoritarianism that combined extensive urban surveillance with control of the internet under the pretext of national security and sovereignty (see Mueller, 2020). The perceived success of Chinese officials in curbing crime, ensuring stability and efficient management of urban settings, including their draconian measures to control the spread of COVID-19, have elevated China as a role model to be emulated by many authoritarian countries, including those in the Muslim world (Barker, 2021).
The table below demonstrates China’s role in the diffusion of digital authoritarianism in the region including Turkey:
Conclusion
This research illustrates how Turkey’s adoption of digital authoritarian practices—encompassing restrictive legal frameworks, internet censorship, urban surveillance, and strategic digital information operations—has been propelled by a combination of learning from domestic unrest, emulating paradigms set by major authoritarian players like China and Russia, and capitalizing on cooperative interdependence forged through economic and strategic partnerships. Despite Turkey’s NATO membership and other Western affiliations, the government has selectively borrowed from authoritarian models, integrating advanced surveillance technologies and normative frameworks that restrict civic freedoms in the digital realm. In this ecosystem, private Western companies, operating with limited oversight, have facilitated the supply of censorship and surveillance tools, challenging conventional expectations that illiberal digital governance is primarily state-driven.
These findings highlight the urgent need to establish robust international cyber norms and regulations that delineate clear boundaries on digital governance, particularly in states with deep ties to the West. Multilateral fora, including the United Nations and the Council of Europe, can take the lead by defining the scope of “digital authoritarianism,” instituting transparent guidelines on surveillance exports, and ensuring that technology providers are held accountable for the potential misuse of their products. Greater emphasis on privacy protections and digital rights is equally critical, calling for comprehensive legislation within Turkey that shields citizens from unwarranted data collection. Support from the international community—through funding, awareness campaigns, and legal assistance—can empower local civil society groups to advocate for these rights, educate citizens on online privacy, and hold authorities to account.
A second imperative is responsible corporate behavior, where companies must be compelled—via legal and reputational mechanisms—to adhere to human rights standards and disclose how their technologies are deployed in countries like Turkey. Establishing an independent monitoring entity to track repressive digital practices, publicize violations, and elevate them to international organizations can reinforce such accountability. Equally important, regional and global cooperation on digital freedom can help counter Turkey’s authoritarian trajectory; governments committed to open societies should launch joint initiatives aimed at improving cybersecurity, combating disinformation, and expanding transparent governance models that respect human rights. Technical assistance and knowledge-sharing will be particularly valuable where Turkey’s domestic institutions seek alternatives to purely repressive tools.
Moreover, economic incentives can be used strategically to steer Turkey away from partnerships that reinforce authoritarian tendencies. By prioritizing trade relationships and development aid tied to ethical technology practices, major economic powers and international financial institutions can encourage Turkey to align more closely with suppliers committed to democratic values. Such an approach has the added benefit of opening the market to innovators developing privacy-enhancing products, thus providing viable alternatives to invasive surveillance systems. Finally, the use of strategic diplomatic channels remains a powerful lever. Dialogue within NATO, discussions at the European Union level, and broader diplomatic engagements allow Turkey’s partners to advocate for transparent, responsible digital practices. Joint resolutions or multilateral condemnations of authoritarian behaviors can further raise the political costs of continued repression.
Taken together, these initiatives underscore that countering digital authoritarianism in Turkey requires a proactive, holistic strategy. While local factors—such as domestic protest movements and longstanding elite interests—play a crucial role, the role of international actors and private corporations is equally significant. Each dimension, whether it be legal reform, corporate accountability, economic leverage, or diplomatic pressure, offers a piece of the puzzle. Coordinated action that weaves these elements into a cohesive approach is essential not only for Turkey but for the broader effort to preserve the open, rights-respecting nature of the global digital landscape. By challenging the unchecked diffusion of repressive technologies and policies, the international community can mitigate the risks posed by an ever-expanding authoritarian playbook and ensure that the internet remains a domain of freedom and democratic possibility.
Funding:This work was supported by Australian Research Council [Grant Number DP230100257]; Gerda Henkel Foundation [Grant Number AZ 01/TG/21]; Australian Research Council [Grant Number DP220100829].
Authors
Ihsan Yilmaz is Deputy Director (Research Development) of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, where he also serves as Chair in Islamic Studies and Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations. He previously held academic positions at the Universities of Oxford and London and has a strong track record of leading multi-site international research projects. His work at Deakin has been supported by major funding bodies, including the Australian Research Council (ARC), the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, the Victorian Government, and the Gerda Henkel Foundation.
(*) Ali Mamouri is a scholar and journalist specializing in political philosophy and theology. He is currently a Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University. With an academic background, Dr. Mamouri has held teaching positions at the University of Sydney, the University of Tehran, and Al-Mustansiriyah University, as well as other institutions in Iran and Iraq. He has also taught at the Qom and Najaf religious seminaries. From 2020 to 2022, he served as a Strategic Communications Advisor to the Iraqi Prime Minister, providing expertise on regional political dynamics. Dr. Mamouri also has an extensive career in journalism. From 2016 to 2023, he was the editor of Iraq Pulse at Al-Monitor, covering key political and religious developments in the Middle East. His work has been featured in BBC, ABC, The Conversation, Al-Monitor, and Al-Iraqia State Media, among other leading media platforms. As a respected policy analyst, his notable works include “The Dueling Ayatollahs: Khamenei, Sistani, and the Fight for the Soul of Shiite Islam” (Al-Monitor) and “Shia Leadership After Sistani” (Washington Institute). Beyond academia and journalism, Dr. Mamouri provides consultation to public and private organizations on Middle Eastern affairs. He has published several works in Arabic and Farsi, including a book on the political philosophy of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr and research on political Salafism. Additionally, he has contributed to The Great Islamic Encyclopedia and other major Islamic encyclopedias.
Nicholas Morieson is a Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University. He was previously a Lecturer at the Australian Catholic University in Melbourne. His research interests include populism, religious nationalism, civilizational politics, intergroup relations, and the intersection of religion and political identity.
(**) MuhammadOmer is a PhD student in political science at the Deakin University. His PhD is examining the causes, ideological foundations, and the discursive construction of multiple populisms in a single polity (Pakistan). His other research interests include transnational Islam, religious extremism, and vernacular security. He previously completed his bachelor’s in politics and history from the University of East Anglia, UK, and master’s in political science from the Vrije University Amsterdam.
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Please cite as: Yilmaz, Ihsan; Mamouri, Ali; Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Omer, Muhammad. (2025). “Authoritarian Diffusion in the Cyberspace: How Egypt Learns, Emulates, and Cooperates in Digital Authoritarianism.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). May 9, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0097
Egypt has emerged as a key adopter and regional diffuser of digital authoritarian practices. Once limited by weak digital infrastructure, the Sisi regime has transformed the country into a technologically repressive state through sweeping legal reforms, censorship mechanisms, and expansive surveillance networks. Drawing heavily from the models of China and Russia—particularly in urban monitoring and information control—Egypt actively emulates their approaches. Crucially, both Chinese and Western technology firms have facilitated this transformation, revealing a broader pattern of global complicity. This report demonstrates how Egypt’s trajectory illustrates the transnational diffusion of digital authoritarianism through mechanisms of learning, emulation, and interdependence—and offers a stark warning to democracies about the rising threat of state-enabled digital repression.
By Ihsan Yilmaz, Ali Mamouri*, Shahram Akbarzadeh**, Muhammad Omer***
Executive Summary
This report examines the rise and entrenchment of digital authoritarianism in Egypt, spotlighting how the regime systematically reclaims and militarizes the digital space to suppress dissent and erode democratic freedoms. Digital authoritarianism in Egypt spans four key domains: restrictive legal frameworks, internet censorship, urban surveillance, and strategic digital information operations (SDIOs).
Drawing on a wide array of sources—including academic literature, human rights reports, institutional data, and credible news coverage—the report demonstrates how the Egyptian government has aggressively expanded its control over digital life. This control includes deep surveillance tactics, the criminalization of online expression, and state-sponsored manipulation of digital discourse, all contributing to the shrinking of civic space and the violation of fundamental rights to privacy and free speech.
The regime employs advanced tools such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), widespread website blocking, and targeted internet shutdowns to neutralize opposition. These repressive tactics are reinforced by an expansive legal arsenal that frames digital expression as a threat to national security—penalizing dissent, limiting VPN use, and compelling tech companies to align with government mandates.
At the urban level, AI-driven CCTV networks and Smart City initiatives—often developed in partnership with Chinese and Western firms—create a pervasive surveillance infrastructure, enabling real-time monitoring of public behaviour. Meanwhile, through coordinated SDIO campaigns, the regime floods social media and state-aligned platforms with pro-government narratives, systematically silencing alternative viewpoints. These operations blend defensive strategies (legitimizing the regime and quelling criticism) with offensive disinformation that delegitimizes opposition groups.
The diffusion of these practices is not solely domestically engineered. Egypt’s digital authoritarian model is transnational in character, built through mechanisms of learning, emulation, and technological dependence. China has emerged as a central enabler, exporting both surveillance infrastructure and governance models. Yet, Western corporations—including Sandvine, NSO Group, FinFisher, and Nokia Networks—have also contributed significantly, supplying critical technologies that bolster Egypt’s repressive digital architecture, often with little regard for ethical implications.
Egypt’s model of digital control illustrates a dangerous global trend: the normalization and globalization of digital authoritarianism, where regimes exploit emerging technologies and international complicity to entrench power, silence dissent, and undermine democratic norms.
Recommendations
To effectively counter the growing threat of digital authoritarianism in Egypt and beyond, a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy must be adopted. The following recommendations highlight key interventions to safeguard digital freedoms, enhance democratic resilience, and hold both states and corporations accountable:
1. Strengthen International Cyber Norms and Regulatory Frameworks: Establish binding international standards and protocols to govern the use of digital technologies by states. These norms must explicitly prohibit mass surveillance, politically motivated internet shutdowns, and the deployment of spyware against civilians. Multilateral organizations—such as the United Nations, the European Union, and regional bodies—must play a central role in enforcing these norms through treaties, sanctions, and export control regimes that restrict the transfer of surveillance technologies to authoritarian regimes.
2. Defend Digital Rights and Data Privacy at the National and Global Levels:Push for robust data protection legislation that empowers individuals and protects them from arbitrary state surveillance. Promote digital literacy campaigns and citizen awareness programs to strengthen public understanding of online rights and safety. Support grassroots civil society organizations, independent media, and digital rights defenders who expose abuses and advocate for open, secure, and rights-respecting digital environments.
3. Enforce Corporate Accountability and Ethical Tech Governance: Hold technology firms—both domestic and transnational—legally and morally accountable for their role in enabling repression. Establish international watchdog bodies to investigate, name-and-shame, and penalize companies complicit in human rights violations through the export or maintenance of surveillance technologies. Implement mandatory human rights impact assessments for all technology exports to high-risk regimes and enhance supply chain transparency in the tech sector.
4. Promote Strategic International Collaboration to Safeguard Digital Democracy: Strengthen multilateral coalitions of democracies to share intelligence, technological tools, and policy approaches for combating disinformation, propaganda, and transnational repression. Support cross-border investigations into Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs) and develop joint early warning systems to detect digital repression tactics. Extend technical and legal support to countries resisting authoritarian encroachment into their digital spheres.
5. Leverage Economic Incentives to Deter Authoritarian Partnerships: Use trade agreements, investment flows, and development aid as tools to condition engagement with states on the basis of their digital human rights records. Encourage private and public institutions to divest from companies involved in digital repression and prioritize investment in technologies that strengthen democratic institutions, secure communications, and civil society networks.
6. Deploy Diplomatic and Legal Instruments to Challenge Repression:Utilize bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to pressure authoritarian regimes to reform their surveillance laws and practices. Sponsor UN resolutions, global forums, and high-level summits that spotlight digital repression and mobilize international consensus. Support international legal actions against regimes and actors who violate digital human rights, using forums such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and regional human rights courts.
7. Build Resilience Through Innovation and Empowerment: Invest in the development of privacy-preserving technologies, secure communication platforms, and censorship circumvention tools. Support the creation of local digital infrastructures that resist surveillance, especially in vulnerable democracies. Back innovation ecosystems that empower civic tech, independent media, and digital rights advocacy to thrive even under authoritarian pressure.
Addressing digital authoritarianism requires more than reactive measures—it demands proactive, coordinated, and sustained global action. The recommendations above provide a roadmap for governments, international institutions, civil society, and the private sector to reclaim the digital domain as a space of freedom, accountability, and democratic possibility.
Photo: Dreamstime.
Introduction
In recent years, scholars have increasingly focused on the diffusion of authoritarianism (Ambrosio, 2010; Bank, 2017), a process where authoritarian institutions, practices, policies, strategies, rhetorical frames, and norms spread from one regime to another (Ambrosio & Tolstrup, 2019). This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in the Middle East and Muslim World, where many countries exhibit authoritarian governance (Durac & Cavatorta, 2022; Yenigun, 2021; Stepan et al., 2018; Ahmed et al., 2023; Akbarzadeh et al., 2024; Yilmaz et al., 2024).
The advent of the internet and social media in the developing world in the late 2000s significantly empowered civil society and individual activists in these regions, creating an equalizing power between the state and society (Breuer, 2012; Ruijgrok, 2017). The extensive use of these technologies by protesters led many to consider them as “liberation technology,” facilitating anti-government movements across non-democratic countries (Diamond & Plattner, 2012; Ziccardi, 2012).
Initially, authoritarian governments struggled to control the digital sphere due to a lack of technical expertise and digital infrastructure. They often resorted to internet shutdowns, as seen in Egypt during the Arab Spring 2011 protests (Cattle, 2015). However, as digital technologies evolved, so did the capabilities of authoritarian regimes. Therefore, despite the internet’s potential as a tool for liberation, its use by authoritarian regimes to disseminate propaganda, conduct surveillance, and control information has led to a new form of authoritarianism (Polyakova, 2019).
This transformation is driven by advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), big data, and the widespread use of the internet, which have enabled unprecedented levels of surveillance and control. As Wael Ghonim, an Egyptian activist, has reminded us: “The Arab Spring revealed social media’s greatest potential, but it also exposed its greatest shortcomings. The same tool that united [people] to topple dictators eventually tore [us] apart through echo-chamber polarization, misinformation, toxic hate speech” (Gardels, 2019).
Such widespread adoption of digital control measures has led to the emergence of “digital authoritarianism” literature (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019; Dragu & Lupu, 2021; Khalil, 2020; Lilkov, 2020; Mare, 2020; Feldstein, 2019; Ahmed et al., 2023; Akbarzadeh et al., 2024; Yilmaz et al., 2024). This literature posits that as regimes leverage AI and other digital tools to monitor and control dissent, the need for policymakers and civil society organizations to counter these practices has become critical. The pessimism surrounding the potential of modern technology to undermine democracy is growing, with concerns about misinformation, data collection, surveillance, spread of conspiracy theories and propagation of authoritarian governance models (Radavoi, 2019; Stone et al., 2016; Bostrom, 2014; Helbing et al., 2019; Damnjanović, 2015; Yilmaz et al., 2025; Yilmaz & Shakil 2025). In a poll conducted by Pew, almost half of participants believed that the “use of [modern] technology will mostly weaken core aspects of democracy and democratic representation in the next decade” (Anderson, 2020).
Extant literature mainly focuses on countries such as China and Russia and their technology companies facilitating and promoting digital authoritarian practices (Khalil, 2020; Taylor, 2022; Zhang, Alon, & Lattemann, 2020). Moreover, the literature has treated policies, norms, and technological tools in a general manner as phenomena analysing authoritarian regimes’ use of tools like filtering and digital surveillance (Hellmeier, 2016; Xu, 2021) and examining policies governing the internet (Kerr, 2018). However, policies, norms, and technologies cannot be separated as they are usually interlinked among government entities, private companies, and international organizations across global networks (Dragu & Lupu, 2021). Therefore, as Adler and Pouliot (2011: 5) stated, practices are “patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts,” this study chose a more holistic analysis, investigating norms, policies, and technologies employed by governments and non-state entities in an integrated manner.
This report examines the digital authoritarian practices in Egypt (see Akbarzadeh et al., 2025) and the diffusion of these practices by investigating the norms, policies, and technologies employed by the Egyptian government. What we mean by diffusion is the process that Gilardi (2012: 454) describes as what “leads to the pattern of adoption, not the fact that at the end of the period, all (or many) countries have adopted the policy.” As such, diffusion refers to the use of digital technologies by authoritarian regimes to surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (Feldstein, 2021). Therefore, diffusion does not necessarily require an absolute convergence of practices; rather, an increase in policy similarity across countries generally follows diffusion processes (Gilardi, 2010; 2012), which we demonstrate here. Egypt, similar to other authoritarian regimes, utilize digital technology—often sourced from abroad, including from Western countries—such as the internet, social media, and artificial intelligence to maintain control and suppress dissent.
We aim to understand how these practices spread and what can be done to counter them. Egypt, like other authoritarian regimes, have become adept at using sophisticated digital tools to monitor and control the internet rather than simply shutting it down. Technologies like DPI, “a type of data processing that looks in detail at the contents of the data being sent, and re-routes it accordingly” (Geere, 2012), allow for comprehensive network analysis and can be used for digital eavesdropping, internet censorship, and data theft (Bendrath & Mueller, 2011). This report will explore these dynamics in detail, providing a comprehensive analysis of the diffusion of digital authoritarianism in Egypt.
Data Analysis of the Digital Space in Egypt
Egypt, with a total population of 116 million by mid-2024 and a USD476.7 billion GDP as of 2022 (Worldometer, 2024), is considered one of the most important countries in the Middle East and has a wide influence on the Arab world. It was among the first countries to witness the Arab Spring Movement and go through dramatic changes in the political system. The internet played a significant role in this period and also in the aftermath of the military’s cope in 2013. The table below shows the rise of internet usage in Egypt.
The brief political openings in the late 2000s and the early 2010s were fuelled by the internet and social media’s empowerment of social mobilization and the authoritarian regimes’ inability to control the digital sphere as they lacked technical expertise and digital infrastructure to rein in on the internet (Cattle, 2015). However, as the use of the internet was on the rise in Egypt, the government’s efforts to control the digital space and impose more surveillance on people have been increasingly on the rise as well. Freedom House has reported a significant rise of government control on digital space in Egypt. The Freedom House Index shows that, on average, internet freedom has declined by about 40% in Egypt.
Freedom House’s World Index shows that Egypt has experienced declines in freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House, 2022). As a result, Egypt scored 26 on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free) in 2020, according to Freedom House (2021).
Tracing the pattern of practising digital authoritarianism in the world indicates that China and Russia play a significant role in leading this conduct, setting an effective example for authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, including Egypt, to follow the same pathway. The table in Figure 4 shows how Egypt followed the pathway of Chinese and Russian legislation in imposing digital authoritarianism.
The diffusion of digital authoritarian practice in Egypt is not limited to China. Many Western companies have contributed to providing the Egyptian government with sufficient technologies to impose control on digital space. The table in Figure 5 provides details about the source of technologies used in Egypt.
Digital Authoritarian Strategies, Policies, andPractices
In this section, we explore a variety of strategies and policies the Egyptian government has adopted to impose a digital authoritarian regime in the country. The Egyptian government worked on four domains: restrictive legal frameworks, internet censorship, urban surveillance, and SDIOs. By leveraging these four domains, the Egyptian government has constructed a comprehensive system of digital authoritarianism. This system not only fortifies its grip on power but also serves as a blueprint for other authoritarian regimes seeking to exploit digital technologies to suppress dissent and maintain control.
Restrictive Legal Frameworks
Digital authoritarian regimes implement four main types of legal restrictions, and examples of all of these can be found in Egypt. First, laws that mandate internet service providers to establish systems for real-time monitoring and recording of traffic on their networks. This enables continuous surveillance of online activities. Second, legal frameworks that penalize online speech under the guise of protecting national identity, culture, and preventing defamation. This often results in the suppression of dissenting opinions and freedom of expression. Third, VPN Restrictions, which follow the lead of countries like China and Russia to ban or restrict the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). While VPNs are technically legal in Egypt, many VPN servers and websites are blocked, hindering their practical use. Fourth, control over social media companies in various methods. Although Western social media sites remain accessible in Egypt, the government has introduced laws that increase its control over the content shared on these platforms. This is achieved by threatening social media companies with bandwidth restrictions and outright bans if they fail to comply with government requests. Moreover, Egypt’s 2018 Cybercrime Law requires foreign companies handling personal data within the country to designate a representative located in Egypt (Fatafta, 2020).
Despite the Egyptian Constitution guaranteeing freedom of the internet to some extent (for example, Articles 57, 68, 71, and 72), by prohibiting blocking websites, surveilling digital space, and harassing and prosecuting journalists and activists, the authorities continued to develop legislation in this direction and implement it on a large scale. Multiple legislations have been passed and applied to reach above goals.
The “cybercrime law” in Egypt, signed by President Sisi in 2018, legalizes and reinforces the existing censorship and blocking of websites (Freedom House, 2021). The new law treats all social media accounts with more than 5,000 followers as “media outlets,” making them eligible for censorship (RSF, 2018). The laws also mandated internet service providers to establish a system allowing real-time monitoring and recording of traffic on their networks (Privacy International, 2019). The cybercrime law criminalizes any form of speech that is against ‘national security’ which is defined so broadly that it covers “all that is related to the independence, stability, and security of the homeland and its unity and territorial integrity” and anything to do with the president’s office and all defence and security departments. The law permits the search of citizens’ personal devices and social media accounts can be blocked without judicial authorization, ostensibly for disseminating “false” information or inciting unlawful activities (Manshurat, 2018). Article 2 mandates that service providers retain and store records of their information systems, including all user-related data, for a period of 180 days. This information must be made available to any government agency upon request. Article 7 outlines the procedure for blocking websites that publish content deemed threatening to national security or detrimental to the country’s security or economy. Article 9 grants the Public Prosecutor the authority to issue travel bans and bring individuals accused of violating Article 7 before the Criminal Court.
The cybercrime law has led to increased penalties and harassment of journalists and activists on social media platforms (Freedom House, 2022). Consequently, there is minimal political opposition in Egypt, as expressing dissenting views on social media can lead to criminal prosecution and harsh punishments. Furthermore, there are significant restrictions and harassment of civil liberties, including freedom of expression, assembly, and the press. Security forces also engage in widespread violations against marginalized groups, including homosexuals and minorities, under the guise of national security concerns.
The Anti-Terrorism Law, passed in 2015, encompasses broad forms of criminalization and grants extensive powers to address electronic activities, including the arrest of journalists and activists, digital surveillance, and the closure and blocking of websites (Manshurat, 2020). Article 49 of this law empowers the Public Prosecution or relevant investigative authority to halt or block websites specified in Article 29 or any other aspect of online usage outlined in the legislation, as well as to confiscate devices and equipment used in the commission of such offenses. For instance, the Cairo Court of Urgent Matters issued an order to seize and freezethe assets, accounts, and properties of “Mustafa Mukhtar Mohamed Saqr,” the president of “Business News,” the company that owns the two Daily News Egypt websites.
Moreover, at the end of 2022, the Telecom Law amendments were made to expand telecommunication equipment restrictions (Rezk & Hashish, 2023). Now, not only is the importation, manufacturing, assembly of such equipment prohibited without a permit, but also possession, use, operation, installation, or marketing is prohibited without obtaining permission from relevant authorities like the NTRA (The National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority) and national security agencies. The penalty for violating these requirements has been increased to a fine ranging from 2 million to 5 million Egyptian pounds.
Internet Censorship
Photo: Dreamstime.
According to Access Now, a leading internet research organization, at least 182 internet shutdowns occurred in 34 countries in 2021 (Access Now, 2022). The Mubarak regime famously switched off the country’s internet during the mass protests in Cairo in January 2011. In recent years, however, internet shutdowns have been rare in Egypt. In 2018, the Egyptian Armed Forces ordered a region-wide shutdown of internet and telecommunication services in the Sinai Peninsula and adjacent areas during the army’s military campaign against ISIS-affiliated insurgents in the region (SMEX, 2018). One reason behind the reduction of internet shutdowns is that they are costly as they affect the delivery of essential public and private services and have been dubbed the Dictator’s Digital Dilemma (Hussain, Howard & Agarwal, 2011). Therefore, even when it is practised, the shutdown is limited to a certain location and typically lasts only a few days. According to Access Now (Hernández et al., 2023), no internet shutdown occurred in Egypt in 2021.
Common methods of censorship, which Deibert et al. (2010) highlighted as “first generation” are filtering and site blocking, which became more common in the late 2000s. IP blocking/filtering and DNS tampering are the common methods of filtering. IP filtering is used to block or filter objectionable content by restricting access to specific IP addresses. Freedom House reported in 2022 that Egypt was a not-free country in relation to the use of digital technologies, ranking it 27 out of 100, identifying three major issues: obstacles to access, limits to contents, and violation of users’ rights (Freedom House, 2022).
Since the imposition of a “state of emergency” in Egypt in 2017 (Atlantic Council, 2019), which directly granted the authorities the power to impose censorship and monitor all forms of online communication, Egypt blocked over 500 websites (AFTE Egypt, 2020). This includes independent news websites that publish articles criticising the Egyptian government, such as Mada Masr, Al-Manassa and Daily News Egypt, in addition to international news websites, such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, and Huffington Post Arabic. The blocking also included well-known Egyptian blogs that had previously warned since Sisi took power that he was rebuilding an authoritarian regime. The banned blogs included Fahmi Huwaidi’s blog (including his column in Shorouk News), Jawdell’s blog, Manal’s blog, Alaa’s blog, Bahia’s blog, and Ahmed Gamal Ziada’s personal blog. Manal and Alaa had previously won awards (Welle, 2005) from Reporters Without Borders. The blocking expands websites that provide content related to human rights and civil society, such as the website of Reporters Without Borders, the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI), the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, the Journalists Against Torture Observatory, and the website of Human Rights Watch, one day after the organisation released a report documenting the systematic use of torture in prisons in September 2017. The blocking was not limited to news sites only but also went on to block 261 VPN and proxy sites, including “Tunnelbear,” “CyberGhost,” “HotspotShield,” and messaging application Signal.
Censorship sometimes occurs via prosecution measures, which come in conjunction with punishing the authors or contributors. Egyptian authorities severely undermined media freedom and the right to access information and punished the publication of opinions on news sites and social media posts. For example, in February 2023, the Public Prosecution referred three journalists (Welle, 2023) from Mada Masr to trial in a case related to publishing a report alleging corruption in the pro-Sisi “Nation’s Future Party,” and in June, the authorities blocked two independent news websites, “Egypt 360” and “The Fourth Estate” (Access Now, 2023). In September 2023, security forces arrested two individuals from their homes in Menoufia and Mansoura governorates after they published tweets on the “X” website, supporting Tantawi and democratic change. In October 2023, the Supreme Council for Media Regulation referred workers (“x.com,” n.d.) at the independent media website “Mada Masr” to the prosecution, with the charge of “practising media activities without a license” and “spreading false news without verifying its sources.”
Authoritarian regimes have tended to use more subtle and insidious forms of censorship, which also use surveillance techniques and rely on quasi-democratic legal mechanisms (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010). This has included using DPI surveillance technology acquired from Western and Chinese companies, which have become essential sources of diffusion of authoritarian practices. Companies such as Sandvine Corporation, a US-Canadian company, have provided tech to over a dozen countries, including Egypt. DPI is “a type of data processing that looks in detail at the contents of the data being sent and re-routes it accordingly” (Geere, 2012). DPI inspects the data being sent over a network and may take various forms of action, such as logging the content and alerting, as well as blocking or rerouting the traffic. DPI allows comprehensive network analysis. While it can be used for innocuous purposes, such as checking the content for viruses and ensuring the correct supply of content, it can also be used for digital eavesdropping, internet censorship, and even stealing sensitive information (Bendrath & Mueller, 2011).
Urban Surveillance
In addition to digital monitoring, the government has significantly expanded its surveillance capabilities within urban areas. Advanced surveillance systems, including extensive CCTV networks equipped with facial recognition technology, have been deployed. These systems are integrated with AI-powered analytics capable of tracking and identifying individuals, monitoring public gatherings, and analysing behavioural patterns. This pervasive surveillance infrastructure not only deters public dissent but also enables the rapid identification and apprehension of activists and protesters.
Egypt has employed extensive surveillance technologies such as Smart City/Safe City platforms, facial recognition systems, and smart policing, as highlighted in the AI Global Surveillance (AIGS) Index. These technologies have been instrumental in suppressing democratic movements (Wheeler, 2017). During the 2010s, Egypt witnessed increased internet technology adoption and a concurrent decline in democratic practices. Data from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) indicates a dramatic rise in internet usage in Egypt since 2019, which led the Egyptian government to more investment in urban surveillance.
The aforementioned DPI technology acquired from the American company Sandvine/Procera Networks enabled the Egyptian government to monitor citizens’ internet activities, hack accounts, and reroute internet traffic. This technology allows Telecom Egypt to spy on users and block human rights and political content (Marczak et al., 2018). Additionally, Egypt’s General Intelligence Service has conducted sophisticated cyber-spying operations on opposition and civil society activists by installing software on their phones, granting access to files, emails, GPS coordinates, and contact lists (Bergman, 2019).
Safe or smart cities are another policy that Egypt is undertaking in order to increase its urban surveillance capabilities. The “Smart” concept generally involves gathering large amounts of data to enhance various city functions. This can include optimizing the use of utilities and other services, reducing traffic congestion and pollution, and ultimately empowering both public authorities and residents. According to a Huawei report, “Safe cities are an essential pillar supporting the future development of smart cities” (Hillman & McCalpin, 2019). These cities deploy high-speed communication networks, sensors, and mobile apps to enhance mobility, connectivity, energy efficiency, service delivery, and overall resident welfare (Hong, 2022). Becoming “smart” typically involves harnessing troves of data to optimize city functions—from more efficient use of utilities and other services to reducing traffic congestion and pollution—all with a view to empowering public authorities and residents (Muggah, 2021). With the advance of CCTV and AI technology, urban surveillance capabilities have grown exponentially over the past ten years. Dubbed “safe” or “smart” cities, these urban surveillance projects are “mainly concerned with automating the policing of society using video cameras and other digital technologies to monitor and diagnose suspicious behaviour” (Kynge et al., 2021).
Egypt’s most significant smart city project under the Sisi government is the New Administrative Capital (NAC) east of Cairo (Al-Hathloul, 2022). The NAC is designed with a full suite of smart/safe city solutions, including 6,000 CCTV cameras and a surveillance system by American company Honeywell, which monitors crowds, traffic congestion, theft, and suspicious activities and triggers automated alarms during emergencies (Mourad & Lewis, 2021). Honeywell also has contracts for Saudi Arabia’s NEOM megaproject. Huawei’s presence in Egypt has also been growing. In 2018, Huawei signed a memorandum with Telecom Egypt to establish a $5 million data centre for a cloud computing network, aiming to develop one of the five largest cloud networks globally and the first in MENA. Egypt and Huawei are also negotiating to bring Huawei’s 5G infrastructure to the country (Blaubach, 2021). The surveillance infrastructure includes Schneider Electric’s EcoStruxure platform, which connects various systems for optimization and sustainability (Egypt Today, 2022).
The development of smart city infrastructures has sparked controversies, with critics arguing that these technologies enable pervasive collection, retention, and misuse of personal data by law enforcement and private companies. The NAC, which is being built by China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) (Al-Hathloul, 2022), has been driven by an attempt by the authoritarian Sisi government to isolate and protect itself from a revolutionary scenario that befell the Mubarak regime in 2011. By moving government offices 50 km away from central Cairo and Tahrir Square, the regime aims to ensure its structures are safeguarded even during unrest. All the surveillance capabilities in the NAC will be further helpful in protecting the regime (see Middle East Monitor, 2021; Bergman & Walsh, 2021; Menshawy, 2021).
Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs)
Banners supporting Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi’s bid for a second term during the presidential elections, displayed along the crowded Al Moez Street in the Gamalia district of Cairo, Egypt, on March 25, 2018. Photo: Halit Sadik.
The Egyptian government employs a sophisticated network of SDIOs. SDIOs refer to “efforts by state and non-state actors to manipulate public opinion as well as individual and collective emotions by using digital technologies to change how people relate and respond to events in the world” (Yilmaz et al., 2023). Thus, the Egyptian government does not only rely on randomized acts of internet shutdowns but carefully manipulates and alters the information environment to serve its motives.
Egypt has begun to move beyond strategies of ‘negative control’ of the internet, in which regimes attempt to block, censor, and suppress the flow of communication and toward strategies of proactive co-optation in which social media serves regime objectives. The opposite of internet freedom, therefore, is not necessarily internet censorship but a deceptive blend of control, co-option, and manipulation. Scholars call this phenomenon ‘flooding’ as the governments try to ‘flood’ the informational space with false, distracting or otherwise worthless pieces of information (Roberts, 2018; Mir et al., 2022). As the public debate is seeded with such disinformation, this makes it hard for the governments’ opponents to convince their supporters and mobilize.
The Egyptian government employs a robust propaganda machine to shape public perception and maintain control over the narrative. This involves the strategic use of state-controlled media, social media platforms, and online influencers to disseminate pro-regime content and discredit opposition. The regime propagates conspiracy theories that portray political dissenters as foreign agents or terrorists, thereby justifying its repressive measures. As Akbarzadeh et al. (2025) demonstrates, “President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi frequently talks about conspiracies against the Arab World and Egypt in particular, thanking Egyptians who stood against these conspiracies and prevented the country from falling in the direction of Iraq, Syria, and Libya, all that were intervened by the US and other Western allies.” In the same way “Sisi used the consequences of the Western role in Iraq, Syria, and Libya as a method to promote his rule in Egypt and scare Egyptians from seeking change in their country, which would lead them to get trapped in conspiracies undertaken in other Middle Eastern countries” (Akbarzadeh et al., 2025).
Egyptian officials commonly instil fear among citizens to ensure their loyalty to the current government, often by amplifying concerns about potential conspiracies against the nation. This rhetoric tends to escalate as elections approach (Akbarzadeh et al., 2025). State-run TV channels, newspapers, and online portals play a crucial role in this information warfare, ensuring that the regime’s message reaches a broad audience. The Sisi regime, for example, employs troll armies to be used in political astroturfing operations. In 2020, Twitter banned over 9,000 accounts that were spreading misleading information. Another report found that the Sisi government used automated/bot accounts to promote its popular hashtags on Twitter (DFRLab, 2023).
The regime usually employs defensive and offensive approaches in this regard. The dual strategy, seamlessly blending defensive and offensive tactics, creates a narrative that reinforces the regime’s image and marginalizes any alternatives, fostering an environment of public trust and unity under the existing leadership.
Defensively, it seeks to portray the regime as a legitimate national authority, emphasising its adherence to the nation’s interests and well-being in a way that no legitimate alternative is imaginable. In these narratives, government leaders are portrayed as heroic figures with exceptional qualities, and the system is presented as flawless and well-suited to the country’s needs. Like many examples Igor Golomstock provided in his book Totalitarian Art (1990), Egyptian propaganda presents the head of state as the father of the nation, and any attempt to criticise him or his authority is introduced as a betrayal to Egypt. Egyptian TV channels frequently host Arab leaders praising Sisi and portraying him as the savour of Egypt and the Arab nation.
On the offensive front, the propaganda machine works to discredit any alternative to the current regime. Opposition figures or movements are subjected to character assassinations and labelled as traitors, criminals, or foreign agents. Conspiracy theories are propagated, linking opposition figures to nefarious plots or foreign interference, thereby undermining the credibility of opposing narratives. Additionally, the propaganda machine manipulates national unity sentiments to marginalise dissent, presenting the regime as a unifying force and framing opposition as divisive threats to the country’s unity. This comprehensive approach aims to fortify public support for the current regime while systematically diminishing the credibility of dissenting voices. In conjunction with the magnification and glorification of the president’s image, extensive work has been done to demonise the image of the opposition as a whole, generalising all under the unsightly titles of “traitors” cooperating with foreign enemies, “terrorism,” “riot” and “suspicious calls,” slamming all attempts of demonstrations or criticising the government.
One significant rationale lies in the inherent lack of genuine legitimacy, coupled with a substantial disconnect between the state and society. Consequently, the fabrication of imaginary adversaries becomes a tool for fostering national unity and identity under the regime’s rule. A parallel goal of this strategy is the cultivation of a cult of leadership. Totalitarian regimes craft an image of leaders as defenders against external enemies, fostering a cult of personality that solidifies their control over the narrative and the populace. This narrative, in turn, rallies support for the militarization of both the state and society. Moreover, the identification of enemies becomes a rationale for increased militarization and defence spending. Totalitarian regimes leverage perceived external threats to justify allocating resources to the military, enhancing capabilities, and maintaining control over the security apparatus. Consequently, these regimes effectively maintain fear and control over the population. Ultimately, the perpetual portrayal of an external threat or identification of internal enemies sustains a climate of fear among citizens, discouraging challenges to the regime.
In authoritarian regimes, conspiracy theories play a crucial role in consolidating power by channelling public discontent toward perceived external or internal threats. These narratives function as propaganda tools, allowing governments to justify repression, delegitimize critics, and deflect attention from governance failures. Unlike in democratic contexts, where conspiracy theories are often propagated by fringe actors, authoritarian regimes institutionalize them, presenting them as official truths that shape political realities. A key tactic involves accusing dissidents of affiliations with groups like the Muslim Brotherhood to suppress freedom of speech, protest, and independent media. By framing opposition figures as existential threats to national unity, regimes cultivate public trust and reinforce their own legitimacy while silencing alternative voices (Akbarzadeh et al., 2025).
Collectively, the sophisticated implementation of SDIOs manipulate feelings of national unity to marginalise the opposition, presenting the regime as a unifying force and framing the opposition as a divisive threat to the country’s unity. This comprehensive approach aims to strengthen popular support for the current regime while systematically diminishing the credibility of opposition voices. The dual strategy, which seamlessly blends defensive and offensive tactics, creates a narrative that enhances the regime’s image and marginalises any alternatives, fostering an environment of public trust and unity under the current leadership.
Diffusion of Authoritarian Practices
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Diffusion mechanisms are systematic sets of statements that provide a plausible explanation of how policy decisions in one country are influenced by prior policy choices made in other countries (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; 299). The literature on this topic often highlights areas of convergence and contact points between early and later adopters (see Kerr, 2018). Diffusion is any process where earlier adoption or practice within a population increases the likelihood of adoption among non-adopters (Strang, 1991: 325). It occurs when policy decisions in one country are systematically influenced by previous policy choices in other countries (Dobbin et al., 2007: 787; Gilardi, 2012). Traditionally, research on diffusion has focused on the spread of popular uprisings against autocratic leaders (Koesel & Bunce, 2013; Beissinger, 2007). However, more recently, scholars have shifted their focus to the diffusion of authoritarian practices (Ambrosio, 2010; Bank, 2017). The diffusion process occurs through three main mechanisms: learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence (Bashirov et al., 2025).
Learning
The process of learning can be driven internally, where actors learn from their own experiences, evaluating and adopting innovations based on the success of prior applications. It can also be externally driven, with an external actor facilitating the learning process. The role of the external actor can range from small, such as selling or installing technological tools, to extensive, involving large-scale activities like seminars and training programs to promote a policy or practice. Using a practice framework, we focus on ‘configurations of actors’ involved in enabling authoritarianism (Michaelsen, 2018). Often, these actors are private companies rather than states.
Contrary to the perceived active role of Chinese companies, it was Western tech companies that provided most of the high-tech surveillance and censorship capabilities to authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world. Notable examples include the US-Canadian company Sandvine, the Israeli NSO Group, German FinFisher, and Finland’s Nokia Networks. Internet surveillance has been facilitated through the cooperation between adopter countries willing to purchase the technology and companies like Sandvine willing to sell it. Sandvine’s willingness is evidenced by the company’s chief technology officer, who stated, “We don’t want to play world police. We believe that each sovereign country should be allowed to set their own policy on what is allowed and what is not allowed in that country” (Gallagher, 2022).
Regarding external learning, China, along with Chinese and Western private companies, has been leading the promotion of internet censorship practices. China has become a major advocate and a learning source for middle powers in internet surveillance, data fusion, and AI. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become a crucial platform for these efforts. For instance, at the 2021 SCO summit, Chinese officials led a panel called the Thousand Cities Strategic Algorithms, training an international audience, including many representatives from developing countries, on creating a “national data brain” that integrates various forms of financial and personal data and employs artificial intelligence for analysis. According to the SCO website, 50 countries are involved in discussions with the Thousand Cities Strategic Algorithms initiative (Ryan-Mosley, 2022). China has also been proactive in offering media and government training programs to representatives from countries affiliated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A notable example includes the Chinese Ministry of Public Security directing Meiya Pico, a Chinese cybersecurity company, to train government representatives from Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and other nations on digital forensics (see Weber, 2019: 9-11).
Russia is another leading source of diffusion of digital authoritarianism in the Middle East. Russia’s brazen attempts at disinformation and propaganda lend support to the emergence of digital manipulation as an acceptable practice across authoritarian countries. By demonstrating the effectiveness of disinformation campaigns and propaganda – such as Russian interference in US presidential elections in 2016 – the country has shown other regimes that similar tactics can be used to control their own populations and advance their interests (Day, 2022).
The role in the diffusion of digital authoritarian practice in the Middle East is not limited to China and Russia. Western countries, in fact, played significant roles as well. Despite Huawei’s involvement in projects like the $5 million data centre with Telecom Egypt and discussions about 5G infrastructure, Egypt has shown a preference for Western technology in its major smart city projects, like the New Administrative Capital (NAC). The adoption of urban surveillance capabilities in Egypt is thus a result of both internal and external learning mechanisms. The Sisi regime’s strategies, especially in the NAC, reflect an attempt to insulate the government from potential unrest.
US-Canadian company Sandvine/Procera has provided DPI surveillance equipment (hardware and software) to national networks operating in Egypt (Telecom Egypt). This system operates over connections between an internet site and the target user and allows the government to tamper with the data sent through an unencrypted network (HTTP vs. HTTPS). Moreover, recent revelations show that the company has played a significant role in facilitating the spread of ideas between countries. In an internal newsletter sent to employees, Sandvine Chief Technical Officer Alexander Haväng wrote Sandvine’s equipment could “show who’s talking to who, for how long, and we can try to discover online anonymous identities who’ve uploaded incriminating content online.” Through their information campaign, Sandvine contributed to learning by governments. In Egypt, the government has been using Sandvine’s devices “to block dozens of human rights, political, and news websites, including Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders, Al Jazeera, Mada Masr, and HuffPost Arabic” (Marczak et al., 2018: 8).
Emulation
Emulation can be defined as “the process whereby policies diffuse because of their normative and socially constructed properties instead of their objective characteristics” (Gilardi 2012: 467). Research has shown that in complex and uncertain environments, policymakers respond by emulating the structural models of recognized leaders in the domain (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005). This behaviour is primarily driven by the pursuit of legitimacy and harmonization. International organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, play a crucial role in spreading commonly accepted standards of behaviour and organizational structures among countries.
Emulation has been significant in the diffusion of legal norms regarding internet restrictions and, to a lesser extent, in adopting Chinese urban surveillance infrastructures. Chinese corporations have established training hubs and research initiatives to disseminate expertise in artificial intelligence, internet surveillance, and digital space management (Kurlantzick, 2022). For instance, Huawei set up an OpenLab in Egypt in 2017, focusing on smart city, public safety, and smart government solutions. China has been a major promoter of the ‘safe city’ concept, which focuses on surveillance-driven policing of urban environments. This approach has been refined in many Chinese cities (Triolo, 2020). Companies such as Huawei, ZTE Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, Zhejiang Dahua Technology, Alibaba, and Tiandy are leading the export of this model (Yan, 2019).
Moreover, homophily, in the form of cultural and political alignment, as well as China’s emergence as an authoritarian role model, contributed to the emulation process. Homophily among actors played an important role, as actors prefer to emulate models from reference groups with whom they share similar cultural or social attributes (Elkins & Simmons, 2005). Political alignment and proximity among nations foster communication and the exchange of information (Rogers, 2010). This dynamic is observed between China and Russia and political regimes in the Muslim world including Egypt, which are susceptible to varying degrees of authoritarian governance. Loan conditionalities and trade negotiations within the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have also played a role in enabling the spread of censorship and surveillance technologies from China to the Muslim world.
The Egyptian government has gathered widespread spying and phishing capabilities sourced from mostly Western companies. An obscure wing of the General Intelligence Directorate called the Technical Research Department (TRD) has purchased equipment from Finland-based Nokia-Siemens Networks (now Nokia Networks) that permits dial-up internet connection, enabling users to access the internet even if the primary national infrastructure is offline. Furthermore, Nokia Siemens Networks has provided the Egyptian government with an interception management system and a surveillance hub for fixed and mobile networks, granting the government mass surveillance capabilities to intercept phone communications (Privacy International, 2019). Another company involved in Egypt was the Italian surveillance technology company Hacking Team. In 2015, the latter was contracted by both the TRD (Technical Research Department) affiliated with Egyptian intelligence, and the Mansour Group (a conglomerate belonging to the second richest family in Egypt) to provide malware that grants the attacker complete control of the target computer (Privacy International, 2019).
In a brazen example of emulation of the practices of other authoritarian states, the Egyptian government started a widespread phishing campaign called Nile Phish in 2016 against the country’s civil society organizations implicated in the Case 173 crackdown (Scott-Railton et al., 2017). The campaign involved sending predatory emails and text messages to members of civil society to hack into their devices and accounts. An Amnesty International Report (2020) revealed that the Egyptian government used spying technology called FinSpy supplied by German company FinFisher Gmbh. FinSpy is a computer spyware suite sold exclusively to governments to monitor and intercept internet traffic, as well as to initiate phishing attacks against targeted users. FinSpy Trojan has been in use in Egypt to spy on opposition movements and enable the surveillance of political activists and journalists (ECCHR, 2023). In addition, denial-of-service (DoS) or packet injection practices are common in Egypt. For example, between May and September 2023, former Egyptian MP Ahmed Eltantawy was targeted by Cytrox’s Predator Spyware via links sent on SMS and WhatsApp. Eltantawy had announced he would be running in the 2024 presidential elections. Citizen Lab found that the network injection attack could be attributed to the Egyptian government and Sandvine’s PacketLogic product (Marczak et al., 2018).
Cooperative Interdependence
The practice of cooperative interdependence in the context of digital technologies refers to how internet censorship and surveillance are enabled through collaboration among adopting countries and state actors and private companies like Sandvine and NSO Group. Both Sandvine and NSO Group have faced significant controversy in their home countries, the US and Israel, over selling surveillance products to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and beyond, Egypt in particular as explained in this report. NSO Group has been banned by the Israeli government from selling its products to major clients in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Staff, 2021). Similarly, Sandvine ceased operations in Russia following US sanctions after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and was forced to stop selling equipment to Belarus after reports revealed its technology was used by the Lukashenko regime to suppress protests in 2021 (Gallagher, 2022).
The broad process of digital authoritarian diffusion has created cooperative interdependence between the involved parties. Through cooperation with global actors, both corporate and state-level, Egyptian governments have imported sophisticated technologies enabling comprehensive internet and urban surveillance. Cooperative interdependence occurs when the policy choices of some governments create externalities that others must consider, leading to mutual benefits from adopting compatible policies (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). This dynamic incentivizes decision-makers to adopt policies chosen by others, enhancing efficiency and yielding mutual benefits. Here, China leverages its Digital Silk Road (DSR) under the BRI to promote the adoption of its technological infrastructure and accompanying surveillance and censorship policies (Hillman, 2021).
For instance, at the 2017 World Internet Conference in China, representatives from Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE signed a “Proposal for International Cooperation on the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Digital Economy” to construct the DSR, enhancing digital connectivity and e-commerce cooperation (Laskai, 2019). Core components of the DSR include smart cities, internet infrastructure, and mobile networks. Rather than forcing these countries to adopt internet censorship practices, China alters the incentive structures of BRI-connected states. Financial incentives, coupled with technology transfer, promote China’s practical approach to managing cyberspace. The DSR’s digital projects—such as 5G networks, smart cities, fibre optic cables, data centres, satellites, and connecting devices—have commercial value and strategic benefits, helping China achieve its geoeconomic and geopolitical objectives by promoting digital authoritarian practices and its internet governance model (Malena, 2021; Tang, 2020).
Conclusion
Photo: Hannu Viitanen.
This research has demonstrated the mechanisms through which digital authoritarian practices diffuse in Egypt. We found that Egypt has enacted multiple policies, including restrictive legal frameworks, internet censorship, urban surveillance, and strategic digital information operations (SDIOs), to reclaim the digital space from opposition and civil society, thereby entrenching digital authoritarianism in the country. The models adopted by the Egyptian regime closely emulate China and Russia’s paradigms of internet sovereignty and information control. China’s extensive political and economic linkages with Egypt, its strategic role in regional economies, and its leadership in forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have facilitated this trend. Through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has exported its digital governance model while positioning itself as a global leader in information technology (Ryan-Mosley, 2022; Weber, 2019).
The diffusion of surveillance and censorship technologies also reflects a complex learning process involving both state and corporate actors. While China has played a critical role in promoting internet censorship practices, private Western companies have equally enabled Egypt’s digital authoritarian turn. Companies such as Sandvine, NSO Group, FinFisher, and Nokia Networks have supplied surveillance infrastructure independently of state policy, a departure from conventional diffusion literature that associates such practices with national strategic interests (Gallagher, 2022; Marczak et al., 2018; Privacy International, 2019). For instance, Sandvine’s DPI technology has been used in Egypt to block dozens of news and human rights websites, while its executives openly dismiss responsibility by deferring to national sovereignty (Gallagher, 2022). This corporate-led diffusion challenges the notion that digital authoritarianism is solely state-driven and reveals an under-regulated global market in repressive technologies.
Our findings have three broader implications. First, while Chinese influence is significant, the role of Western technology firms in enabling authoritarian diffusion should not be underestimated. Their operations in Egypt have not been directly aligned with their home states’ policies, contradicting earlier findings that firms facilitating authoritarian practices often act under state guidance (Arslan, 2022). Second, these private firms are not only exporters of tools but are actively involved in implementing government-sanctioned strategies, including malware distribution and interception systems (Appuhami et al., 2011; Teets & Hurst, 2014). Third, the study identifies the mechanisms of diffusion—learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence—as key to understanding how regimes adapt digital authoritarian tactics to shifting political and technological contexts (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Dobbin et al., 2007; Gilardi, 2012; Strang, 1991; Kerr, 2018).
Developing states may increasingly adopt practices such as national firewalls, smart city surveillance, and social credit systems modelled on early adopters like China and Russia. As they become embedded in transnational authoritarian networks—whether through SCO summits or Digital Silk Road initiatives—these regimes are incentivized to replicate practices that strengthen regime durability and evade democratic scrutiny (Hillman, 2021; Malena, 2021; Tang, 2020; Laskai, 2019).
Given these trends, addressing the entrenchment and diffusion of digital authoritarianism requires a coordinated, multi-level response. There is an urgent need to institutionalize international cyber norms and regulations that clearly define and prohibit practices such as mass surveillance, politically motivated internet shutdowns, and spyware exports. Multilateral institutions, including the United Nations and the European Union, must lead the effort to develop enforceable standards, promote transparency, and strengthen export control regimes. This would include holding corporations accountable through mandatory human rights due diligence, transparency disclosures, and legal sanctions when they contribute to repression.
Defending digital rights also requires robust national privacy protections and support for civil society organizations operating under authoritarian conditions. These groups need financial resources, digital tools, and international solidarity to resist surveillance, educate the public, and pursue legal redress where possible. Supporting democratic actors in repressive environments is essential for countering the normalization of authoritarian digital governance.
Private companies must no longer operate in a legal and ethical vacuum. Regulatory mechanisms should ensure that firms exporting surveillance technologies are held accountable for complicity in human rights violations. Public pressure campaigns and state-level policy interventions—such as targeted sanctions or procurement restrictions—can help enforce these norms. At the same time, incentives should be offered for ethical innovation and secure technology development that supports open societies.
International cooperation among democracies must deepen through the sharing of intelligence, technologies, and best practices in countering cyber repression and disinformation. Cross-national partnerships can create rapid response frameworks to detect and disrupt strategic digital information operations. Capacity-building programs should support governments seeking to manage their digital ecosystems in ways that uphold civil liberties and protect against authoritarian creep.
Economic leverage should be strategically employed. Trade policies, investment frameworks, and development aid must be conditioned on adherence to digital rights standards. This includes shifting financial relationships away from authoritarian technology providers and toward partners committed to democratic norms. Financial institutions and donor agencies must integrate digital governance benchmarks into their programming.
Diplomacy should play a more assertive role in exposing and isolating regimes that abuse digital technologies. Bilateral engagements, international resolutions, and public diplomacy should be used to condemn repressive practices, promote digital transparency, and advocate for global standards of accountability. Countries like Egypt must be pressured to reform not only through external criticism but through coordinated global action that combines legal, economic, and diplomatic tools.
In conclusion, the diffusion of digital authoritarianism is a multi-dimensional and complex phenomenon driven by both state and corporate actors, operating through networks of learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence. The Egyptian case exemplifies how these processes work in practice and the urgent need for a sustained, global response. Confronting this challenge will require a blend of regulation and resistance, innovation and accountability, diplomacy and solidarity. Only through such an approach can the digital realm be reclaimed as a space of freedom, rights, and democratic resilience.
Funding: This work was supported by the Gerda Henkel Foundation, AZ 01/TG/21, Emerging Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World.
Authors
Ihsan Yilmaz is Deputy Director (Research Development) of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, where he also serves as Chair in Islamic Studies and Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations. He previously held academic positions at the Universities of Oxford and London and has a strong track record of leading multi-site international research projects. His work at Deakin has been supported by major funding bodies, including the Australian Research Council (ARC), the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, the Victorian Government, and the Gerda Henkel Foundation.
(*) Ali Mamouri is a scholar and journalist specializing in political philosophy and theology. He is currently a Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University. With an academic background, Dr. Mamouri has held teaching positions at the University of Sydney, the University of Tehran, and Al-Mustansiriyah University, as well as other institutions in Iran and Iraq. He has also taught at the Qom and Najaf religious seminaries. From 2020 to 2022, he served as a Strategic Communications Advisor to the Iraqi Prime Minister, providing expertise on regional political dynamics. Dr. Mamouri also has an extensive career in journalism. From 2016 to 2023, he was the editor of Iraq Pulse at Al-Monitor, covering key political and religious developments in the Middle East. His work has been featured in BBC, ABC, The Conversation, Al-Monitor, and Al-Iraqia State Media, among other leading media platforms. As a respected policy analyst, his notable works include “The Dueling Ayatollahs: Khamenei, Sistani, and the Fight for the Soul of Shiite Islam” (Al-Monitor) and “Shia Leadership After Sistani” (Washington Institute). Beyond academia and journalism, Dr. Mamouri provides consultation to public and private organizations on Middle Eastern affairs. He has published several works in Arabic and Farsi, including a book on the political philosophy of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr and research on political Salafism. Additionally, he has contributed to The Great Islamic Encyclopedia and other major Islamic encyclopedias.
(**) Shahram Akbarzadehis Convenor of Middle East Studies Forum (MESF) and Professor of International Politics, Deakin University (Australia). He held a prestigious ARC Future Fellowship (2013-2016) on the Role of Islam in Iran’s Foreign Policy-making and recently completed a Qatar Foundation project on Sectarianism in the Middle East. Professor Akbarzadeh has an extensive publication record and has contributed to the public debate on the political processes in the Middle East, regional rivalry and Islamic militancy. In 2022 he joined Middle East Council on Global Affairs as a Non-resident Senior Fellow.
(***) MuhammadOmer is a PhD student in political science at the Deakin University. His PhD is examining the causes, ideological foundations, and the discursive construction of multiple populisms in a single polity (Pakistan). His other research interests include transnational Islam, religious extremism, and vernacular security. He previously completed his bachelor’s in politics and history from the University of East Anglia, UK, and master’s in political science from the Vrije University Amsterdam.
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Marine Le Pen’s conviction for embezzling EU funds might have marked a legal defeat—but politically, it became a narrative victory. In her commentary, Julie Van Elslander explores how France’s far-right leader transformed her trial into a populist spectacle of persecution, mobilizing public anger and institutional distrust. By reframing judicial accountability as elite conspiracy, Le Pen advanced a post-truth strategy that defied factual condemnation and resonated deeply with disillusioned voters. This timely analysis illuminates the broader phenomenon of populist resilience in the face of scandal, showing how legal consequences can be strategically repurposed as political capital by populist actors within Europe’s increasingly contested democratic landscape.
By Julie Van Elslander*
Introduction
On March 31, 2025, Marine Le Pen, long-time leader of France’s far-right National Rally, was convicted by the criminal court of Paris for the misappropriation of an estimated €4.6 million in European Parliament funds (Ledroit, 2025). Sentenced to a heavy condemnation, Marine Le Pen suffered a significant legal and political blow. Yet, instead of weakening her influence or undermining her party’s credibility, the trial became a platform for Le Pen to reaffirm her political narrative. Despite legal conviction and moral discredit, the National Rally maintained political relevance by reframing the sentence as an element of political persecution – raising a question: How does a legal defeat become a populist narrative victory?
At the core, this narrative dynamic is emblematic of what scholars qualify of post-truth populism: The transformation of political culture by the devaluation of factual correctness over emotional appeal (Conrad & Hálfdanarson, 2023). In a context where public discourse is increasingly shaped by the logic of “alternative facts” – a concept introduced by Trump’s counselor in 2017 (Gajanan, 2017) – Le Pen’s trial is another example of the way post-truth populists challenge liberal democracies.
Rather than interrogating the legal dimensions of guilt or innocence, this analysis focuses on the populist discursive strategies through which Marine Le Pen’s trial was reframed in the public sphere, and how those shaped citizens’ political thinking (Aslanidis, 2016). The trial serves not simply as a juridical event, but also as a communicative site where competing narratives about power, legitimacy and truth are constructed.
The Case of Le Pen’s Trial – Facts and Only Facts
Among twenty-four others, nine ex-MEPs and twelve parliamentary assistants from the National Rally were trialed for “embezzlement of public funds” and “complicity in the embezzlement of public funds” from 2004 to 2016 (Maad, 2025). In this case, the court recognized that the European Parliament’s public funds were misappropriated in order to remunerate employees working for the party management under fictitious contracts, rather than related to the European parliamentary activity – as it is normally required for those collaborators (ibid.).
Marine Le Pen was sentenced to a €100.000 fine, two years under house arrest while wearing an electronic ankle bracelet, additional two-year suspended sentence, and five years’ ineligibility for public office with immediate effect. Le Pen’s heavy condemnation was due to what the court’s president as qualified as her “central role” in this case: “at the heart of this system since 2009, Marine Le Pen has signed up with authority and determination in the operation established by her father, in which was participating since 2004” (Dao, 2025).
Le Pen will appeal the verdict, but she will remain ineligible and could be ruled out of the 2027 presidential elections. She won’t serve the house arrest until every appeal is exhausted but the ban on running for office will be implemented immediately despite her legal challenge.
The irony of the case is striking: Marine Le Pen, who used to call for life ineligibility for elected officials convicted of embezzlement or corruption (Brault, 2025), now contests the legitimacy of her own sentence – but how does such a reversal become not a source of discredit, but a tool for reaffirming political legitimacy?
Not Guilty, Just Targeted? Le Pen’s Populist Response to Conviction
Despite her conviction, Marine Le Pen managed to maintain her political standing by discursively reframing the charges into a populist narrative of persecution and resistance. Ever since the trial’s deliberation, Le Pen has not stopped claiming her innocence, repeatedly insisting the judges were “mistaken” and reducing the issue to a simple “administrative disagreement with the European Parliament” that involved “no personal enrichment” (Marchal, 2025). Yet, the tribunal clearly stated that although the actions did not generate direct personal enrichment, they constituted serious breach of integrity and democratic principles, involving deception of both the European Parliament and voters (Sicard, 2025). By providing financial benefits to the National Rally, the stolen funds allowed it to maintain political influence and electoral advantages for over a decade (ibid.).
The judges justified the use of the ineligibility sentence and its exécution provisoire (which allows the sentence to be enforced even before an appeal), emphasizing that the defendants had expressed no recognition of their violation of the law, and the court had a duty to ensure that “elected officials, like any other subject, do not benefit from a preferential regime incompatible with the trust sought by citizens in political life” (France info, 2025). In 2023 alone, around 16.000 ineligibility sentences were issued in France, 639 of which included the exécution provisoire (France info, 2025a). While such measure is applied selectively – and in about 4% of the cases – it is far from exceptional (ibid.). Indeed, several other high-profile political figures in France, such as Nicolas Sarkozy or François Fillon, have been sentenced to ineligibility in recent years (Louis, 2025).
However, in the populist narrative, these precedents are rarely acknowledged. By using terms such as a “tyranny of the judges” (Cossard, 2025), the National Rally reinforced the idea that Le Pen is being unfairly targeted. The rhetoric implies an extraordinary sanction used to silence political opposition: the trial isn’t presented as a neutral legal process, but as the proof of a biased system – with Le Pen denouncing a “political decision,” a practice “we believed to be reserved for authoritarian regimes” (Vignal, 2025). The judiciary becomes just another part of the “elite” that is supposedly trying to stop her from acceding to the Elysée: “the system has released the nuclear bomb. If it uses such a powerful weapon against us, it is obviously because we are about to win the elections” (A.B., 2025). Here, Le Pen’s reframing does not deny the factual events themselves; rather, she strategically reinterprets them because openly acknowledging illegality could undermine her political legitimacy and moral authority.
This discursive approach fits neatly into what researchers call post-truth populism: The idea isn’t just to reject facts but to question who gets to decide what’s true in the first place(Ylä-Anttila, 2018). Populist leaders like Le Pen challenge the credibility and intentions of traditional fact-producers – such as judges, journalists or experts – to position themselves as more trustworthy (Mahmutović & Lovec, 2024). By stating that their version of facts are biased, corrupt or politically motivated, populist leaders construct alternative narratives, in which facts are selectively reinterpreted in ways that support their political agenda. The aim is not necessarily to prove their narrative is objectively true, but rather to undermine opposing ones as suspicious and irrelevant.
This type of rhetoric fits within a common populist logic, where courts and other oversight bodies are seen as tools of an unaccountable elite trying to undermine the will of the “real people” – a homogeneous group not defined by citizenship, but by symbolic alignment with the populist cause (Arato, 2017). By framing her conviction as political persecution, Le Pen not only shields herself from public blame, but also primes her supporters to view the case as of a “stolen election”.
Why Marine Le Pen Wasn’t ‘Cancelled’: Political Loyalty in a ‘Stolen’ Election
Marine Le Pen may have been convicted in court, but in the arena of public opinion, she proved to be remarkably cancel-proof. This resilience is rooted in the post-truth populist strategy that places narrative above norms, and emotional appeal above factual truth. It particularly stemmed among her supporters, for whom the verdict was seen as a symbol of political persecution, and an attempt to steal the 2027 election – a narrative that quickly found concrete expression in public reactions. On March 31, 2025, a few hours after Le Pen’s conviction, a French national news broadcast captured street interviews where multiple citizens reacted with shock and outrage, describing the verdict as “personal” and a way to “take her out” of the presidential race (TF1info, 2025).
An online petition launched by National Rally, titled “Save democracy, save Marine” (Rassemblement National, 2025) rapidly gathered thousands of signatures and rallied support over social media, but its message was not just about supporting Le Pen – it was about defending her voters’ rights. In an open letter promoting the petition, Jordan Bardella, the young president of the National Rally, described the conviction as an attack against voters: “They are trying to prevent a candidacy supported by millions of French people, which is well ahead in all the polls. They deprive millions of voters of their choice and therefore their freedom” (Krupa, 2025). This sense of disenfranchisement was further amplified at a public rally held a week later, during which Bardella addressed the crowd and further defended Le Pen as a candidate of the people, framing her conviction as an attempt to prevent the National Rally from acceding to power (ibid.). The conviction, as he claimed, was not just about her but about the right of French voters to choose their leader. The rally became a platform where Le Pen was portrayed not only as a victim but as a representative of silenced voters.
This narrative fits the typical populist discourse, which emerges from a perceived failure of representation (Rosanvallon, 2020) and frames political reality as a fundamental conflict between a corrupted elite and the common people, “whose mobilization is presented as the only solution” (Aslanidis, 2016) to regain sovereignty. Here, the mobilization efforts are largely symbolic: Neither a petition nor public rally could change the judicial outcome, as courts are not influenced by popularity. However, their aim is to reinforce the idea that the verdict is unjust, judicial independence compromised and that the electors are the true victims of this case. Those efforts function as political and social tools – not legal ones – allowing Le Pen’s supporters to transform outrage into collective action, and to signal strength and solidarity.
This is a key aspect of post-truth populism: The National Rally’s version of events is framed as more authentic because it taps into a deeper, widespread sense of institutional distrust (Harsin, 2024). When ordinary citizens feel that traditional institutions no longer represent them fairly, populist leaders like Le Pen often claim to embody the will of the people directly, calling for diverse forms of direct democracy (ibid.). Within this logic, portraying Le Pen’s sentence as exceptional and biased doesn’t require evidence – it simply needs to fit the broader story that her supporters believe: That she, like them, is being unfairly treated by a system that no longer serves them.
Yet, while this narrative mobilized Le Pen’s supporters within France, the impact of her conviction also reverberated beyond national borders, sparking polarized reactions at the European level.
A European Issue with Global Repercussions
With the National Rally’s discourse focusing on national stakes, the European legal affair was reframed as a national political issue. That is, in part, due to the nature of the European Union’s legal proceedings. Even though the European Parliament’s public funds are distributed through the institutions, MEPs are elected nationally and therefore reside within national jurisdiction. The investigation was first opened by the OLAF – the European Anti-Fraud Office, an independent entity – in 2014 (Bouquet, 2025), but criminal prosecution and sentencing remained the responsibility of national courts. Although the matter originated at the European level, with the European Parliament lifting Le Pen’s immunity following a referral to French authorities, the fact that the trial was handled nationally contributed to the widespread perception that it was a purely domestic affair. This procedural pathway ultimately placed the case within a broader discursive shift, reframing the trial as a French political controversy – judges, media and legal discourse – all nationally situated.
Moreover, the French discourse largely undermined the collective European harm caused by the embezzlement. While the European Parliament – the civil plaintiff in the case – announced it “took note” of the decision and declined to comment further, Le Pen’s conviction quickly gathered support among fellow populist leaders, particularly from far-right figure such as Viktor Orbán, Matteo Salvini, and Donald Trump. Orbán expressed direct solidarity by stating “Je suis Marine!” – a phrase typically used to express support and mourning for victims – while Salvini denounced the verdict as a “declaration of war by Brussels” (Les Echos, 2025). Trump compared Le Pen’s legal troubles to his own, labeling it a “witch hunt” and accusing European elites of using the judiciary to silence political opposition (Le Monde, 2025).
These international endorsements were not merely supportive gesture; they became central elements of the populist narrative surrounding Le Pen’s case. While the trial was framed in France as a part of a broader struggle between national sovereignty and a hostile elite, this international support further cast her as a symbol of resistance against a corrupt system – reinforcing the idea of a national and European political conspiracy targeting her.
The same divisive framing extended into the European Parliament itself. During the plenary session held shortly after the verdict, several Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the Patriots for Europe group – Le Pen’s European political family – expressed their support for Le Pen, condemning the conviction as undemocratic and broadly questioning the state of the rule of law in Europe. Hungarian MEP András László notably accused the “Brussels elite” of trying to “legally sabotage a far-right politician” because of her patriotism and opposition to a “globalist elite” (European Parliament, 2025) – aligning with the narrative of persecution. In contrast, MEPs from other political groups welcomed the conviction as a critical step in combating corruption within the institution. German MEP Daniel Freund notably qualified the Le Pen’s actions as “the biggest fraud case in the history of the European Parliament” (ibid.).
This polarized reaction within the European Parliament highlighted the trial’s dual nature: Legally, it was a case of embezzlement involving European funds, but politically, it became a battleground over competing narratives. For Le Pen’s allies, it symbolized a struggle against an oppressive European elite; for her critics, it was a long-overdue act of accountability.
Indeed, Le Pen’s case comes within the broader context of corruption scandals that have been shaking the European Parliament itself. The Qatargate scandal in 2022, involving allegations of bribes paid by Qatar to influence European lawmakers, and the Huawei case in 2023, where Chinese lobbying was accused of seeking favorable policies through financial incentives, exposed the vulnerability of European institutions to corruption. These scandals not only undermined the Parliament’s authority as a democratic institution of EU decision-making but also deepened the citizens’ distrust in EU governance – a distrust that populists are quick to weaponize.
Conclusion
The Le Pen case is more than a legal scandal – it is a test of the resilience of European institutions against populist narratives that thrive on distrust. It is not merely about one politician reframing her conviction as persecution; it is a case study in how a legal process can be transformed into a battleground of competing truths. At its core, this case reveals a deeper conflict between factual accountability and symbolic politics.
Ultimately, the stakes go beyond Le Pen herself. The crisis of trust she has exploited is part of a broader European problem. As Qatargate and the Huawei scandal have shown, European institutions are not immune to corruption, and this vulnerability has fueled perceptions of institutional hypocrisy. It is this perceived hypocrisy that populist leaders weaponize, transforming legitimate accountability efforts into narratives of persecution. Ultimately, the Le Pen case is a message of political legitimacy: In an era of post-truth populism, the verdict in court may matter less than the verdict in public opinion.
(*) Julie Van Elslander is a double master’s student in European Governance (Sciences Po Grenoble) and Politics and Public Administration (Universität Konstanz), with a strong interest in how democracies respond to challenges like populism, post-truth politics, and institutional distrust. She has contributed to European-level research projects on political communication, corruption, and democratic accountability, and currently works as a research intern at the Center of International Relations (University of Ljubljana).
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In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Dr. Claudiu Tufiş, explains how far-right candidate George Simion’s success in the first round of Romania’s presidential elections on Sunday was driven by widespread voter anger and disappointment following the annulment of the original vote. “Voters were deeply disappointed by the cancellation of the elections,” he notes, “and many reacted with anger, leading to a noticeable erosion of trust in the electoral process.” With no credible democratic opposition and growing anti-establishment sentiment, Simion was able to capitalize on public frustration. Dr. Tufiş’s analysis sheds critical light on the structural and emotional undercurrents reshaping Romanian politics.
In the wake of Romania’s highly polarized first round of presidential elections on Sunday, Dr. Claudiu Tufiş, Associate Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Bucharest, provides a deeply analytical account of the socio-political dynamics that have propelled far-right candidate George Simion to the forefront of the political stage. Speaking with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Tufiş underscores a central factor behind Simion’s electoral surge: widespread public anger and disillusionment following the annulment of the 2024 presidential vote.
“When it comes to Simion’s results, they might seem like a surprise, but they really shouldn’t,” Dr. Tufiş observes. “If you look at the share of votes received by sovereigntists or extremists—however one chooses to label them—in the annulled first round of the November presidential elections, Simion and Georgescu together garnered over 30%.” In his view, the subsequent backlash—intensified by the disqualification of Călin Georgescu—created a perfect storm of grievance-driven mobilization: “Romanian voters were deeply disappointed by the cancellation of the elections, and many reacted with anger, leading to a noticeable erosion of trust in the electoral process.”
Simion’s first-round performance, securing 41% of the vote, represents more than a statistical anomaly. As Dr. Tufiş explains, “Basically, they had almost six months—from November until now—to coalesce more and more around the idea that somebody should pay for that decision to cancel the elections, and Simion was at the center of this movement.” The professor emphasizes that Simion’s rise is not merely an ideological success, but rather the product of a profound anti-establishment sentiment amid institutional instability.
Throughout the conversation, Dr. Tufiş unpacks the deeper structural factors shaping this moment: the erosion of confidence in Romania’s mainstream parties, the political mishandling of crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war, and the failure of democratic opposition forces to present a credible alternative. The result, he warns, is “not really a surprise”—but rather the culmination of years of frustration, disillusionment, and unaddressed socio-economic inequality.
This interview offers a timely and urgent insight into how electoral grievance, institutional decay, and populist strategy have converged to reshape Romanian politics. As Romania prepares for the second round of voting on May 18, Dr. Tufiş’s reflections provide a sobering lens on what is at stake—for democracy, for the region, and for Europe at large.
Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Claudiu Tufiş.
Simion Became the Focal Point for Voters Who Felt Betrayed by the Election Annulment
George Simion, leader of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) and a candidate in Romania’s 2025 presidential election, speaks at a press conference at the Grand Hotel Bucharest after submitting his candidacy to the Central Electoral Bureau, March 14, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Tufiş, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: What is your assessment of the first round of presidential elections in Romania, as the candidate of the far right, George Simion, got almost 40% of the vote? What is your prediction about the second round of the elections that will be held on May 18?
Dr. Claudiu Tufiş: Yes, George Simion won probably more than most people were expecting. In the first round, he managed to gather the support of 41% of voters, and in second place, we have a candidate from what’s considered to be a pro-European position—an independent, Nicușor Dan, who is the mayor of Bucharest.
When it comes to Simion’s results, they might seem like a surprise, but they really shouldn’t. If you look at the percentage of votes that the sovereigntists, the extremists—however you want to call them—received during the November first round of the presidential elections, the ones that were cancelled, Simion and Georgescu together got more than 30% of the vote. So it’s not unexpected. Voters in Romania were really disappointed with the decision to cancel the elections, and they got really angry. They lost trust in the electoral process to some extent. And basically, they had almost six months—from November until now—to coalesce more and more around the idea that somebody should pay for that decision to cancel the elections, and Simion was at the center of this movement. He was the one who captured the votes of all the disappointed voters in Romania. So from that perspective, an increase from 30-something percent to 41% over five months with people really disappointed about the decision—it’s not really a surprise.
As for what will happen two weeks from now, that is a little bit more difficult to predict. Of course, Simion has the first chance. He only needs 9–10% more than what he already gathered in the first round, and that is relatively easy to collect. The problem is that both candidates in the second round—Simion and Nicușor Dan—have already started negotiating with all political parties. Just last evening (Monday), the governing coalition broke up. The Prime Minister decided to resign. The leadership of the Social Democratic Party is also resigning. So everything is in flux right now. The Liberals decided on Monday that they will support Nicușor Dan in the second round of elections. The Social Democrats said they are not going to support either of the two candidates—they’re leaving it up to voters to decide.
But these are just public statements made by political parties. Behind closed doors, from what I hear, there are very heated debates and negotiations as parties try to figure out what the next majority will look like after the elections. So right now, we are in a period of flux, and even if I were a betting man, I couldn’t say for sure which of the two candidates is going to win. The only thing I know for certain is that George Simion currently has the advantage. It’s a lot easier for him to get to 51% compared to Nicușor Dan.
Voters Turned to AUR After a Decade of Disillusionment and Crisis Mismanagement
Romanian citizens demand an end to a corrupt system. Photo: Constantin Opriș.
As you noted in your studies, Romania was once a partial exception to the populist wave. What underlying shifts—political, social, or institutional—do you believe have led to the resurgence and normalization of far-right populism?
Dr. Claudiu Tufiş: I think there are several elements here. But probably the most important one we should focus on is the fact that, for quite some time, we’ve had only the Social Democrats or the Liberals in power in Romania. These two political parties, ever since 2012, have governed either together or alone. To some, that might seem like a lack of alternation in power, a lack of refreshment in the political scene, and the result has been increasing public disappointment with these two main political forces.
Usually, when people are unhappy with the incumbents, they turn to the opposition. The problem with the 2024 elections in Romania was that we didn’t really have a strong democratic opposition party. If you set aside the governing parties—the Liberals and the Social Democrats—the remaining parties in Parliament were the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), led by George Simion, the party representing the Hungarian minority, and the Save Romania Union (USR), which was originally led by Nicuşor Dan. But Nicuşor Dan had to leave the party because he could no longer identify with its direction.
Theoretically, the democratic opposition should have been the USR. But the party disappointed its voters. Instead of growing after its 2016 breakthrough, when it got about 10%, it became consumed with internal power struggles. That led to a lot of voter disappointment. As a result, by 2024, many discontented voters were left with only one viable option—AUR—as the repository of their frustration.
There’s also a second element: the Social Democrat–Liberal coalition governed through two major crises. Both were global or regional in scope but had a serious impact on Romania. I’m talking about the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.
The pandemic, of course, brought lockdowns—not as strict as Italy’s, but not as lenient as Sweden’s either. What caused significant discontent was the push for vaccination. While vaccination wasn’t mandatory, it was heavily promoted by the government. Romania has a significant portion of the population that is skeptical about vaccines. In fact, Romania now has the highest number of children suffering from preventable childhood diseases due to low vaccination rates.
George Simion’s party saw this as an opportunity. They were the only political party that capitalized on that sentiment and used it to gather support. That was the first crisis. The second, of course, is Russia’s war on Ukraine, right on our border, with the influx of Ukrainian refugees and all the accompanying pressures.
So, we’ve seen the two main governing parties being eroded simply by being in power for a long time, a process worsened by the two crises. Meanwhile, there was no strong democratic alternative. In the end, people chose what was available: AUR and newcomers like Călin Georgescu—parties that sought to capitalize on AUR’s image and appeal to voters with similar messages.
How Culture Wars Replaced Old Divides in Romanian Far-Right Discourse
People in traditional national costume return from Sunday church service—a cultural landmark in Maramureș, Romania. Photo: Theodor Bunica.
How do you interpret the redefinition of exclusionary discourse in Romanian far-right politics—from ethnic targeting to cultural and religious narratives? What explains this evolution in ideological framing?
Dr. Claudiu Tufiş: Romania had significant problems early in its transition with ethnic minorities—mainly with the Hungarian and Roma communities. Over time, however, we’ve managed to address those tensions to some extent. Today, there is relative peace between Romanian and Hungarian segments of the population. Occasionally, political parties try to reignite this conflict, but it generally doesn’t resonate—people no longer see it as a valid issue.
As for the Roma population, there are still negative perceptions among the broader Romanian public. But many Roma have migrated to other EU countries, so there’s less pressure now to activate that conflict politically.
The shift from ethnic or religious exclusion to identity- or culture-based narratives is, I think, partly due to a kind of mimicry of Western—mainly American—society. Issues like “woke culture” or “cancel culture” have been heavily criticized in other parts of the world, and these narratives have found fertile ground in Romania.
Romania remains a deeply traditional society, where there are widely accepted beliefs about fixed gender roles and a general resistance to discussions of gender equality or LGBTQ+ rights. This creates an environment where traditional misogyny and intolerance toward difference can be easily mobilized by political actors to boost support.
That’s why, for example, Romania attempted a referendum to redefine the family in the Constitution. It failed due to low turnout, but it reflected a broader regional trend in Eastern Europe—over the past decade—of pushing back against what are perceived as “new ideologies.”
And of course, there is a second element here: these ideologies and values are perceived as being imposed by the European Union and viewed as incompatible with Romanian traditions— with who Romanians are. As a result, these cultural conflicts have also fueled a broader pushback against the EU.
Simion Rides the Wave of Anti-Establishment Sentiment, Not Ideology
What do you see as the main drivers behind George Simion’s current popularity, particularly among younger voters and segments of the diaspora? To what extent is his appeal rooted in ideology versus anti-establishment sentiment?
Dr. Claudiu Tufiş: I would say that almost all of his appeal comes from anti-establishment sentiment and has little to do with ideology. George Simion has, at times, taken strong anti-European Union positions, but over time he realized that this message doesn’t resonate well with the Romanian public, so he has moderated his stance over the last two or three years. If you talk to regular voters in Romania, most of them will tell you what I mentioned earlier—they are sick and tired of seeing the same people governing the country for more than a decade.
This is evident in the candidates selected by the mainstream political parties for the presidency in both the annulled November elections and now—they are the same figures who’ve been at the center of power for the past 10 to 15 years, and people are simply unhappy with their performance. This time around, they want a change that is completely separate from the mainstream parties. That’s why voters seeking real change have turned to George Simion and his party.
Even Nicușor Dan, though he’s the Mayor of Bucharest and running as an independent, benefits from this desire for change. He was the founder of the Save Romania Union (USR), but he’s no longer a member, and USR is now a minor party. So Dan, too, is seen as detached from the traditional parties, though he appeals to a different voter base.
On Tuesday, some exit polls showed that Simion’s voters are generally less educated—he has a significant lead among those with only a high school diploma. By contrast, Nicușor Dan is mostly supported by voters with higher education—college degrees and above. So there’s a strong correlation between education level and candidate preference. And since education is often associated with income and wealth, the division essentially reflects a broader socioeconomic cleavage.
It’s a conflict between those who have benefited from Romania’s economic development over the past 10 to 20 years and those who have not. Romania has done well in terms of macroeconomic indicators, but the resulting wealth has not been evenly distributed. That inequality is being felt more acutely now.
So, in the second round of the presidential elections two weeks from now, we’ll see two candidates—both representing a break from the mainstream parties. George Simion represents change for those who feel left behind, while Nicușor Dan represents change for the educated, urban middle class that has benefited most from Romania’s recent growth.
Voters Wanted to Punish Those Who Canceled the Elections
Romanians cast their votes in the presidential election in Bucharest, Romania, on Sunday, December 6, 2009. Photo: Viorel Dudau.
The annulment of the 2024 presidential election and the disqualification of Călin Georgescu triggered strong domestic and international reactions, feeding into populist narratives of elite conspiracy and Western interference. How has this grievance-driven discourse shaped AUR’s electoral mobilization, and to what extent has public backlash against the court’s decision contributed to George Simion’s rise in popularity?
Dr. Claudiu Tufiş: It’s pretty much the same distribution of support for the two candidates as the one I’ve just mentioned. Both supporters of George Simion and of Nicușor Dan were unhappy with the decision to cancel the elections. Again, we’re looking at two groups in society: on one hand, the less educated and economically disadvantaged, who were angry because the annulment took away their candidate; and on the other hand, the more educated and financially secure, who were upset not necessarily because Călin Georgescu was barred, but because the annulment ran against democratic principles. So while the reasons differ, both groups share discontent with the court’s decision and want to punish those responsible.
This sentiment has played a significant role in mobilizing voters, particularly against the Social Democrats and the Liberals, who are widely seen as the ones responsible for canceling the elections and undermining the integrity of the electoral process. And it’s not just the annulment in December—these parties began interfering with the electoral system as early as June, when they decided to hold the local and European Parliament elections simultaneously. As a result, public debate focused solely on local issues, with little to no discussion about Romania’s role in the EU or what Romanian MEPs could accomplish in Brussels.
Later came the decision to ban Diana Șoșoacă from running in the election, which many also interpreted as a move by the governing parties to rig the process in their favor and secure an easy path to the second round. When voters perceive those in power as manipulating electoral rules to their own advantage, they’re going to respond by punishing them at the ballot box.
For Those Who Study Politics, the Election Results Weren’t a Surprise
The surge in support for far-right candidates like Georgescu and Simion—especially in light of their previous low polling—has been described as ‘shocking’. Do you agree with this characterization, or were there early indicators that mainstream analysis missed?
Dr. Claudiu Tufiş: I wouldn’t necessarily say it was shocking. I mean, it was probably shocking for people who don’t pay close attention to the political system and political actors. But for those of us who study politics, it wasn’t much of a surprise. Călin Georgescu may have appeared as a surprise to most voters, but if you look at his background, you’ll see that since the mid-1990s he was close to the center of political power. He worked at important ministries, and throughout the 2000s he was often discussed as a potential prime minister. Not more than four or five years ago—in 2020, during the last round of parliamentary elections—AUR actually proposed Călin Georgescu as prime minister during their consultations with the president.
Georgescu managed to construct the image of a new political actor largely because he held many of his positions abroad and wasn’t very visible in domestic politics. But in reality, he was not new to the political scene. The same goes for Simion. He’s not new either—he’s been active in Romanian politics and civil society since around 2010. So both are seasoned political actors who have spent years building their public presence—through activism, civic engagement, and later, political organization.
They built their support bases by channeling the discontent of voters fed up with the political establishment. In Romania, from 2012 to 2015, there was a notable shift in public political attitudes, marked by a significant wave of protests following various poor decisions and crises. That moment gave rise to movements like the Union Save Romania Party (USR) in 2015—emerging from the technocratic government—and eventually AUR as well. These two parties essentially originate from civil society and were created as vehicles to push people’s demands into the political sphere. Because as civic organizations, there’s a limit to what can be achieved. What we’re seeing now is the culmination of about a decade of organizing, during which these movements developed into serious political forces.
Far-right Romanian presidential runoff candidate Călin Georgescu speaks to the press at a closed polling station in Mogoșoaia, Romania, on December 8, 2024, after the elections were officially annulled. Photo: Dreamstime.
Romania Is Backsliding—Not Drastically, but Persistently
In the light of recent political events—including the annulled 2024 vote and US criticism of Romania’s handling of Georgescu’s candidacy—do you believe Romanian democracy is entering a phase of greater polarization or institutional erosion?
Dr. Claudiu Tufiş: This is really just the latest example of Romania backsliding a bit. There are two elements I would discuss here.
The first is polarization within the population. This has been present in Romanian society for quite some time. Since the beginning of the post-communist regime, we’ve had significant cleavages dividing the population. Initially, it was the communist versus anti-communist cleavage, which later transformed into a divide between supporters and opponents of the Social Democrats. In recent years, this has evolved further, but at its core, it reflects a broader tendency in Romania to avoid negotiation and compromise.
This is largely a product of the past 10 to 15 years, during which politics in Romania has been treated as a zero-sum game. Politicians refused to engage in dialogue, and people followed their lead. If political leaders are constantly in conflict and unwilling to talk, we can’t expect their supporters to behave any differently. So polarization has been very high for quite some time now—and it’s a serious issue. As a society, we need to be able to sit at the same table and ask: What do we want for the next five or ten years? How do we envision Romania’s future?
The second element is institutional. Romania has been slow to implement democracy. It progressed up to a certain point, and then politicians began tampering with democratic processes. They pitted branches of government against one another. Under Băsescu’s presidency, for instance, the parliament was regularly attacked and de-legitimized. At times, the judiciary was also pressured, with politicians attempting to assert control. Over the last decade, Romania has started to decline—not dramatically like Poland under PiS or Hungary under Viktor Orbán, but after a long period of stagnation, we’ve seen a gradual backslide in specific areas of democracy.
This democratic erosion has also been aided by low levels of civic engagement. Romanians don’t have a strong history of participation in politics or civil society. Compared to neighboring countries, we show lower levels of civic activism, and this has played a role. If politicians don’t feel public pressure—if no one is calling them out for failing to meet their responsibilities—they quickly realize they can act without consequences. It’s only when something particularly egregious or morally offensive happens that the public reacts and protests.
You may recall several major protests in Bucharest and other large cities, but when it comes to the day-to-day work of building institutions or holding parties accountable, that kind of sustained civic involvement is less common. Unfortunately, we’re still learning.
AUR’s Strategy Blends Traditionalism with Tactical Euroscepticism
AUR’s ideological framing includes Orthodox values, anti-globalism, and an ambiguous stance toward NATO. How does this fit into the broader regional trend of radical-right parties navigating between nationalism and global alignments like MAGA or Kremlin narratives?
Dr. Claudiu Tufiş: George Simion has been accused multiple times of being controlled by the Russians, though I’m not sure that accusation is substantiated—I haven’t seen any significant evidence linking him directly to Russia.
As for the other elements, AUR—the Alliance for the Union of Romanians—bases its ideological framing on several key pillars, which they present as central to Romanian identity. These are: the Orthodox Christian religion; the traditional family; Romanian cultural traditions; and the Romanian nation itself. These four values form the ideological foundation of the party.
Naturally, all four of these pillars align with a traditionalist worldview. AUR uses them to construct narratives that oppose what they see as external threats—particularly from the European Union. The EU isn’t framed explicitly as an enemy, but rather as a force that undermines these core values. For instance, AUR argues that the EU lacks true religious conviction and therefore poses a threat to the church. On the issue of family, they interpret any discussion around gender ideology or LGBTQ rights as a direct attack. Their vision of the family is strictly heterosexual and reproductive—only a man and a woman with children qualify as a legitimate family.
Tradition is the third pillar, and again, anything coming from the EU is painted as being out of step with or even hostile to Romanian cultural traditions. In this way, AUR initially positioned itself in stark opposition to the EU. However, they gradually realized that most Romanians still support EU membership. Many citizens view it as a net positive, citing benefits such as economic development, the ability to travel and work abroad, and enjoying the same rights as people in Germany, France, and Italy. Eventually, AUR understood this and began to tone down its anti-EU rhetoric. However, they continue to promote messages centered on identity and values, which they still use to their political advantage.
Simion Lacks the Team to Secure Romania’s Strategic Commitments
Given Romania’s strategic role in NATO, its support for Ukraine, and its position within the EU, what might a George Simion presidency mean for the country’s foreign policy orientation and regional stability? Could his leadership signal a shift away from Romania’s pro-Western trajectory, potentially making it a more disruptive force within transatlantic alliances?
Dr. Claudiu Tufiş: It’s certainly the worst outcome—having Simion as president—if we are thinking about Romania’s role externally. Looking at the geostrategic position of Romania, it’s part of the eastern border of NATO, part of the eastern border of the European Union. We already have Ukraine being destabilized, and Slovakia and Serbia—close neighbors or just the next country over—presenting challenges.
There is a growing sense that countries in the region are not advancing as they should, and if Simion were to become president, I fear Romania will start moving in that direction as well. This is probably the most worrying consequence of Simion winning the presidency: that he would destabilize Romania.
Part of the potential destabilization comes from the fact that, although Simion is very popular—as we’ve seen in the vote count—he doesn’t have a strong team around him. Everything we know about George Simion comes from himself or maybe one or two others. We don’t know who his advisers are on foreign affairs, economics, or military issues. There doesn’t seem to be a substantial, competent team behind him who could assume office and fulfill Romania’s responsibilities as a NATO member. From that perspective, it is worrying, and I would say the eastern flank of NATO would be destabilized.
There are, of course, a number of possible solutions to this. Romania should probably seek a stronger alliance with Turkey. Unfortunately, at this moment, we don’t have particularly strong relations—just standard diplomatic ties. Given Turkey’s regional power, I would say this is one area where Romania should look for support in building alliances. Poland is another strong regional actor that Romania should align with more closely.
Nicușor Dan, the General Mayor of Bucharest, announced his intention to run as an independent candidate in Romania’s presidential elections in Bucharest, Romania on December 16, 2024. Photo: Dreamstime.
But again, these are probably not the kinds of decisions George Simion would make as president. We’ll see how it goes. Regardless of whether Simion or Nicușor Dan becomes president, there is an upcoming summit in just over a month. That will be the first significant international meeting for the new president, and it will likely reveal more about the foreign policy direction Romania will take.
Trump Isn’t Backing Anyone—We’re on Our Own
Professor Tufiș, finally, how much do you think US President Trump’s policies have affected elections in Romania?
Dr. Claudiu Tufiş: I lived for six years in the United States—I consider it a second home. However, the current administration is difficult for me to understand. I don’t fully grasp why Trump is making some of the decisions he’s made. So I don’t see, or understand, what his current vision for Romania is. Let’s put it that way.
Of course, there have been some signals from the US administration. There have been high-profile visits to Romania, and some of these figures have met with George Simion. It seems like George Simion might be supported by the American administration.
But I’m not sure if that’s actually the case. Given Trump’s outspokenness, if he truly supported George Simion, he would have absolutely no trouble saying it publicly—and so far, he hasn’t. What the American administration has done is criticize the Romanian Constitutional Court’s decision to annul the elections. But again, we’ve just seen a couple of days ago that they also criticized Germany’s decision to label AfD as an extremist organization.
This administration plays very loosely with words, and they don’t follow the traditional diplomatic customs of avoiding interference in other countries’ domestic politics. So I think it’s more about the Trump administration promoting a different kind of democracy than about offering support for a specific candidate in Romania.
They do have troops and military bases in Romania, and there has been significant cooperation—especially military cooperation—both within NATO and bilaterally. But I don’t think Trump currently supports any particular Romanian candidate. So I don’t expect any such endorsement in the next two weeks. We’re on our own. We have to decide for ourselves who we’re going to vote for.
In this timely and thought-provoking interview, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi explores how authoritarianism has become “the new normal” in the Middle East amid a global retreat from democratic norms. Speaking to the ECPS, Dr. Al-Marashi analyzes the region’s complex landscape shaped by imperial legacies, resource politics, and shifting global alliances. He highlights how populist rhetoric, digital platforms, and transactional diplomacy—especially under Trump-era politics—are empowering authoritarian leaders and weakening democratic institutions. While civil society faces mounting repression, Dr. Al-Marashi suggests that digital activism and “artivism” may offer spaces of survival and resistance. This interview provides essential insight into how populism and authoritarianism intersect in the Middle East—and what that means for the future of governance in the region.
In an era marked by the erosion of liberal democratic norms and the global resurgence of authoritarian tendencies, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi—Associate Professor at Department of History, California State University, San Marcos—offers a timely and incisive analysis of the Middle East’s evolving political landscape. In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Al-Marashi argues that “authoritarianism has become normalized—it’s now the prevailing norm,” particularly in a world increasingly shaped by populist and transactional leadership.
Drawing from historical legacies and contemporary global shifts, Dr. Al-Marashi underscores how imperial interference and resource wealth have long laid the groundwork for authoritarian populism in the region. “Hydrocarbons enable political elites to generate revenue without relying on taxation,” he explains, allowing regimes to distribute wealth in ways that bypass democratic accountabilityand reinforce autocratic control. He connects this dynamic to broader regional patterns, noting that even militant groups such as ISIS have employed populist strategies by attempting to dismantle colonial-era bordersand mobilize transnational support.
Dr. Al-Marashi highlights the impact of shifting global power dynamics, particularly the rise of multipolarity and the influence of Trumpism, in undermining democratic aspirations. With the US retreating from its rhetorical commitment to democracy, populist-authoritarian leaders find renewed legitimacy. “If the US is adopting these behaviors,” he argues, “this is the new norm—this is the future.” This sets a precedent for regimes that increasingly embrace personalistic and sultanistic rule, with little concern for liberal democratic values.
Transactional diplomacy, particularly under Trump, has also reshaped regional alliances. Dr. Al-Marashi notes that such diplomacy empowers authoritarian actors like Netanyahu, while simultaneously emboldening sectarian militias and weakening traditional state structures. “It’s a double-edged sword—quite literally,” he remarks, especially when it comes to balancing regional power plays and proxy conflicts in places like Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
While the picture appears bleak, Dr. Al-Marashi also points to the resilience of digital resistance. He suggests that civil society and democratizing efforts may survive—if not flourish—through digital activism and what he terms “artivism.” In a region where the state has often failed to provide basic services, digital spaces may serve as the last frontier for democratic imagination and mobilization.
This interview captures the complexity of a region grappling with entrenched authoritarianism amid a globally permissive environment—and offers critical insights into how populist movements and power politics intersect in the 21st century Middle East.
Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi.
Imperial Legacies and Oil Wealth Laid the Foundation for Authoritarian Populism in the Middle East
Oil pump jack in the desert of Bahrain. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Ibrahim Al-Marashi, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: What historical and socio-political conditions in Iraq and the broader Middle East have laid the groundwork for the rise of populist authoritarianism in the region?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: The obvious factors are imperial interference and hydrocarbons—oil and gas. The involvement of foreign powers, whether Britain or the US, consistently provides a convenient enemy to rally against. Meanwhile, hydrocarbons enable political elites to generate revenue without relying on taxation. This, in turn, enhances populism, as the revenues can be distributed directly through large-scale projects that bolster support for figures like Saddam Hussein—or any other authoritarian leader—not only in Iraq but across the region.
How have legacies of colonialism, militarization, and post-conflict governance contributed to the entrenchment of populist and authoritarian leadership styles in the Middle East?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: In the case of Iraq, the British were always a convenient target to rally against. In other states ruled by France, for example, populations could similarly rally against the legacy of the colonial power. Even if you look at ISIS as a kind of populist and terrorist group, its goal of dismantling borders was an attempt to mobilize the masses—not just in the Middle East, but across the entire Muslim world. Saddam Hussein framed the invasion of Kuwait as an effort to erase borders established by British colonialism, making it a similarly convenient rallying point. And then, let’s not forget the United States. In the case of the Houthis, for instance, their appeal extends not only beyond Yemen but throughout the region, as they are perceived as one of the last groups seeking agency in a region largely shaped by US control. This is the legacy: there are concrete historical borders that have divided communities, but there is also, in the collective imagination, a persistent target around which to rally.
Authoritarianism Has Become the New Norm—This Is the Future
From a populism perspective, how are shifting global power dynamics — especially the rise of multipolarity and the return of a nationalist, transactional Trump administration — shaping authoritarian resilience and weakening democratic aspirations in the Middle East? In what ways might these trends bolster authoritarian populist movements across the region?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Authoritarianism has become normalized—it’s now the prevailing norm. Even though the US has often behaved in authoritarian ways, it at least used to pay lip service to the promotion of democratic governance around the world. I think that facade has now been abandoned. As a result, populist leaders can more or less say, “Look, if the US is adopting these behaviors, this is the new norm—this is the future.”
Even in the case of Russia, there appears to be, at the very least, a personalistic rapprochement—a relationship based more on the closeness of individual leaders than shared values. The emerging regime type in this multipolar world is personalistic—what you might call sultanistic—drawing on the term “Sultan,” as used by the academic Houchang Chehabi.
If that’s the case, then there is no longer a democratic model to aspire to. This increasingly looks like the wave of the future—the future of governance.
How has the populist rhetoric of the Trump administrations—particularly their framing of “radical Islam” and their regional double standards—impacted the legitimacy of state institutions and non-state actors in Iraq and the broader Middle East?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: In this case, there are two dynamics at play. This ties back to your earlier question about transactional foreign policy. If Trump makes a deal with Iran over its nuclear program—well, the Iraqi Shia militias are essentially mass mobilization forces for the Shia population, and much of that mobilization is supported by Iran. If Iran enters negotiations with the US, it would have less incentive to continue backing those militias. That’s one example involving non-state actors.
Then there’s the other paradox: an escalation of the war against the Houthis in Yemen. Iran might choose to rein them in, but if not, the Houthis may continue attacking Red Sea shipping as a consequence of these ongoing tensions. This illustrates how transactionalism, populism, and non-state actors intersect in the region.
Transactional Diplomacy Fuels Sectarian Populism
Shiite fighters take position in the Shia village of Al-Zahra, Syria, amid intense clashes involving Hezbollah. Photo: Ibrahim Khader / Pacific Press.
Could the Trump administration’s emphasis on transactional diplomacy further embolden sectarian and ethnic populism in conflict zones like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and how?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Not okay—on two levels. Transactional diplomacy with Netanyahu might embolden him to act unilaterally in Syria and Lebanon, and perhaps even as far as Yemen. Israel’s actions in these areas could fuel sectarianism in several ways: it could lead to a resurgence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, embolden the Houthis, and prompt Israel to use the Syrian Druze minority as a proxy. That’s one pathway through which sectarianism might be intensified.
Israel might also be emboldened to target Iraq’s Shia militias, which are part of the so-called “axis of resistance.”
On the other hand, if this transactional diplomacy were to result in a grand bargain with Iran, those same actors might be reined in.
So it’s a double-edged sword—quite literally—in terms of how this foreign policy could shape the region.
In your view, how does the militarization of politics via militias such as The Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) reflect populist strategies of political mobilization in the Middle East, especially in terms of bypassing traditional democratic institutions and appealing to ‘the people’?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: The PMU is really a broad body of militias. A good number of them first emerged to resist the US occupation of Iraq. Initially, I don’t think it was about bypassing democratic institutions. Many were mobilized because Ayatollah Sistani was able to rally the masses in response to the ISIS threat.
The way they later contributed to undermining institutions in Iraq was by becoming a parallel force to the Iraqi military, and eventually by playing a role against the protests that called for better governance and technocratic rule.
So it’s complicated. The Popular Mobilization Units emerged in response to the occupation, later served as Iranian proxies, then fought against ISIS, and eventually remained as a force that prevented the Iraqi military from maintaining a monopoly on violence—borrowing from Max Weber’s concept.
Again, we’re at an inflection point. I think it all hinges on a potential deal with Iran: whether these militias will be reined in and subsumed into the army or the security sector, or whether they will continue to act as spoilers to Iraq’s post-conflict governance structure.
When the State Fails, Militias Become the Security Provider
Mahdi Scouts boys during a funeral ceremony in Jannata, southern Lebanon, on February 9, 2017, for a Hezbollah military commander killed in the Syrian war. Photo: Nabil Kassir.
Considering your work on COVID-19 and militia reinvention, how do crises (like pandemics or conflicts) serve as opportunities for populist-authoritarian actors in the Middle East to entrench power under the guise of serving ‘the people’—and how might this intensify under a second Trump presidency?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Take the case of the pandemic—and I’ll give you an example closer to home, where I am in San Diego. When COVID hit Mexico, you had drug cartels, like those formerly under Guzmán (El Chapo), distributing medical kits—such as masks and water—to people affected by COVID-19. In other words, when the Mexican security sector failed and the health sector also failed, these non-state actors filled the void. They became both the security and health sectors.
That’s exactly what happened with COVID-19 in the Middle East—in places like Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. It was the Houthis, Hezbollah, and the Shia militias that were disinfecting public spaces, distributing masks, and so on. What these places have in common is the collapse of the security sector. As Max Weber said, when the state no longer holds a legitimate monopoly on violence, non-state actors step in and become both the security and health providers.
This is ultimately an indictment of the weak health sectors in those societies. But the weak health sector is a reflection of a weak security sector—you don’t have an army capable of enforcing the state’s monopoly on violence. When the state is unable to provide basic services—what we call biopower, the ability to keep the population alive—you get necropolitics instead. That’s when the state is too weak to deliver health services, and violent non-state actors—cartels or militias—step in to fill the void.
How do Middle Eastern regimes employ especially Islamist populist rhetoric domestically to justify authoritarian practices, especially in an international environment increasingly tolerant of illiberal governance?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Islamist rhetoric is by definition an attempt to mobilize the masses through faith. When governance fails, you turn to divine governance to justify authority and appeal to the imagination. That’s how I would see it. It’s similar to using anti-colonial rhetoric—it’s more or less an appeal to the masses. When the public has very little faith in the structures that govern them, this is where Islamist rhetoric steps in to fill the gap.
Every Power Is Backing Proxies—Democracy Is No Longer the Goal
What role do you foresee for regional actors (such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey) playing in either reinforcing authoritarianism or providing openings for democratic movements under these new global conditions?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: You know, in that regional mix, I would also add Israel—and this is a post-October 7th development. I’ll tell you why. In 2011, during the Arab Spring, for the first time in the region’s history, the US more or less refrained from intervening in the fate of regimes. It allowed the regime of Hosni Mubarak, a longtime ally, to fall. In that vacuum, Saudi Arabia and Iran engaged in a regional cold war, with Turkey also entering the mix. It became, in effect, a three-way conflict.
What followed was a regional cold war accompanied by counter-revolutionary dynamics. One of those counter-revolutionary tendencies eventually prevailed. Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia each chose sides—supporting different counter-revolutionary or revisionist forces. These rivalries played out through proxy conflicts.
Now, after October 7th, Israel has entered the fray.
So the region today looks very different from the era of Arab Spring optimism. Every major power is backing proxies to serve its own interests. And this is especially evident in Syria.
If you want to understand how four actors are shaping Syria’s future: Turkey is deeply invested in the current Syrian government; Israel is working to expand its presence; Saudi Arabia is wiping away Syria’s debts; and Iran is trying to preserve the influence it has lost. None of these four powers are interested in a transition to democratic governance in Syria. All are focused on maintaining their respective spheres of influence. In that sense, each is likely to reinforce autocratic tendencies. They are more inclined to back warlords as proxies than to support any meaningful democratic transition.
Given the historical reliance of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes on external patrons, how might a US foreign policy under Trump 2.0 reshape alliances, especially with regimes facing internal legitimacy crises?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: I think the best case in point is how close the Trump administration was to Saudi Arabia.So it might try, in a second term, a strategy of offshore balancing—essentially carving out spheres of influence in a multipolar system and telling Saudi Arabia: “We’re not really concerned about your human rights issues, but you maintain order in the Gulf.”
The US would provide as many weapons as needed, and of course, Trump would say, “You have to pay for them,” to boost his standing domestically. But the message would be: it’s your job to be the policeman in the Gulf. That’s what I mean by offshore balancing.
The same approach would likely apply to Israel. That doesn’t bode well for the future of Palestinian governance, and Saudi Arabia would have little incentive to address human rights issues—as long as it continues to receive a blank check from Washington.
Authoritarianism Is Not Just Tolerated—The Masses Are Seen to Want It
Protest march in Beirut against Lebanon bombing by Israel. Photo: Sadık Gulec.
Could the erosion of liberal democratic norms in the West, accelerated by populist leaders like Trump, provide ideological “cover” for Middle Eastern populist-authoritarian leaders? How?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Absolutely—especially now that the US doesn’t even go through the motions of paying lip service to human rights.
From the perspective of international relations theory—specifically constructivism—a new norm has been constructed: not only can authoritarian governance be tolerated, but the masses actually want it. It’s no accident that the masses elected someone like Trump. Or, to go further, take the case of El Salvador—you have another kind of authoritarian-populist leader who is more or less aligned with the Trump administration’s approach.
And I think that’s become a model for the rest of the world. Regimes can now say: not only does the US want strongman leadership, but you—the people—want it too. Because a strong hand gets things done.
In what ways might regional populist movements exploit global discourses of “national sovereignty” and “anti-globalism,” championed by Trumpism, to consolidate authoritarian rule?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: When you talk about discourses and global dynamics, there’s an important element here called digital populism. All of this is enabled because politics now also occurs on a digital plane. More or less, digital platforms have become a way for authoritarian regimes to bypass traditional media structures and appeal directly to the masses—especially in cases where traditional media has not yet been fully co-opted by authoritarian leaders. So, to answer your question, digital populism is the key. It’s the mechanism through which these discourses become normalized and reach mass audiences.
Exclusion, Not Sectarianism, Is the Real Threat
Given the weakening of traditional international pressure for democratization, do you foresee populist movements in the Middle East mutating toward more overt forms of sectarianism, ethno-nationalism, or exclusionary politics?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: I would say more toward exclusionary politics. And here’s why: if we look at this in terms of ethno-sectarianism, I wonder if the region has been exhausted by those challenges. Let me explain what I mean. At one point, the so-called “axis of resistance” included Persian Twelver Shia Iran; Arab Twelver Shia militias in Iraq; an Arab Alawite regime in Syria; Arab Twelver Shia Hezbollah; Zaydi Shia Houthis in Yemen; and Arab Sunni Islamist groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Of course, that axis of resistance has been dealt a very heavy blow in recent years. But the fact that such an ideologically diverse coalition could form makes me question whether the ethno-sectarian frame has been over-fetishized. There are other, more complex realities on the ground.
I think ethnic and sectarian identities are securitized—that is, they are instrumentalized when convenient for those in power, and then abandoned when such divisions no longer serve political interests. So, if that’s the case, I see the trajectory more in terms of exclusionary politics. Populism becomes a mask to mobilize the masses—but always at the expense of issue-based politics and inclusive governance. Those who are excluded often include civil society actors, journalists, and ethnic minorities, for example.
In a context where Western powers show declining interest in promoting democracy abroad, is there still space for bottom-up democratization efforts in the Middle East, or are we entering a phase of entrenched authoritarianism?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: I don’t think they’re mutually exclusive. We are indeed facing entrenched authoritarianism, but I would also say—thinking back to digital populism—that if authoritarianism is being entrenched through digital means, then perhaps bottom-up approaches can also survive through digital spaces.
I’m thinking, for example, of the digital hacktivist collective Anonymous. During the Arab Spring, when various regimes tried to crush protests, Anonymous hacked into state systems in support of the protesters. That’s just one example.
Because, of course, ideas can’t be killed, right? And the one sphere that hasn’t been fully subsumed by the state is still the digital realm. I think that’s where these democratic ideas and efforts can continue to exist.
Does that necessarily translate into on-the-ground resistance? That has yet to be seen. But at this particular inflection point, I believe that’s where the ideas will, at the very least, find refuge.
If Silence Is Spreading in the US, Imagine How Much Worse It Is in the Middle East
And finally, Professor Al-Marashi, considering the weakening of global democratic norms, how can civil society actors in the Middle East adapt their strategies for resistance and survival amid a more authoritarian-friendly international environment?
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Again, I refer to my previous answer. I think, at the end of the day, these groups might survive digitally. They’ll be able to organize online. But to be honest, if you look at how the region has been transformed since 2011, it does not look good. So many of these actors are barely surviving.
At the end of the day, the ideas might persist—through digital activism, through art, through artivism.
But I’m speaking from the US, where even here, the ability to speak openly—on campuses, for example—is being threatened. If I can sense a wave of silence coming here, I can only imagine how much worse it must be in the Middle East.
On the 100th day of Trump’s second term, ECPS sat down with Dr. Robert Benson of the Center for American Progress to dissect the anatomy of democratic backsliding. In this wide-ranging interview, Dr. Benson warns of a “coordinated assault” on American civil society and urges a “coordinated defense” in response. Drawing comparisons with Turkey and Hungary, he highlights the early stages of authoritarian consolidation and calls for a “whole-of-society” mobilization. “We’re moving faster in the United States than the AKP ever moved in Turkey,” he cautions. From institutional capture to international instability, Dr. Benson’s insights are a timely wake-up call. “Authoritarians have coordinated,” he says—“now it’s time for democrats to do the same.”
Marking the 100th day of Donald Trump’s second administration, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) sat down with Dr. Robert Benson, Associate Director for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress (CAP), to discuss one of the most urgent questions of our time: how democracies can defend themselves against coordinated authoritarian assaults. Drawing on comparative insights from Hungary, Turkey, and the United States, Dr. Benson offers a sobering but clarifying analysis of democratic backsliding and populist autocratization.
“This is truly a critical question,” Dr. Benson begins. “We must understand the timeline and scope of democratic backsliding.” While emphasizing the uniqueness of national contexts, he identifies recurring “red flags,” notably the failure of institutions and elites to respond decisively during what he calls the “early window”—the critical phase before authoritarians consolidate power. In the US case, Dr. Benson critiques what he calls a “politics of respectability” within the Democratic Party—an adherence to procedural norms long after the opposing party has abandoned them.
In an increasingly polarized and factionalized America, Dr. Benson warns of the systematic targeting of democratic institutions across civil society. Citing the German term Gleichschaltung—the 1930s strategy of coordinated authoritarian control—he stresses the need for a similarly coordinated democratic defense. “You target them all at once, and they fold,” he says of authoritarian strategy. “So how do we respond effectively? We need to build alliances… Business, universities, media—need to begin communicating with one another.”
Perhaps most striking is Dr. Benson’s comparison between institutional capture in Turkey and current trends in the US, where he argues the pace of democratic erosion is even faster. “We’re moving faster in the United States than the AKP ever moved in Turkey,” he warns. His call to action is clear: without “whole-of-society” mobilization that extends beyond coastal elites and engages Middle America, resistance risks fragmentation.
Dr. Benson does not limit his concern to domestic threats. He sees Trump’s foreign policy and suspension of military aid to Ukraine as emblematic of a broader unraveling of the post-1945 liberal order. “This is a complete victory for Vladimir Putin,” he states bluntly. From global alliances to civil liberties at home, the consequences are profound.
Yet amid the gravity of his analysis, Dr. Benson also sees opportunity—particularly in building transnational democratic networks. “Authoritarians have done a better job at coordinating,” he admits. “But that can change—if democratic actors start sharing tactics, intelligence, and, most importantly, a common purpose.”
The interview with Dr. Benson is a call to strategic clarity—and a coordinated democratic defense.
Dr. Robert Benson, Associate Director for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress (CAP).
Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Robert Benson.
Democracies Don’t Fall All at Once—They Fold, Institution by Institution, Unless We Resist in Time
Dr. Benson, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: To what extent do you see parallels between the initial public hesitation to resist Trump’s authoritarian tendencies in the US and the delayed resistance movements in Hungary, Turkey, and Serbia that you describe? How crucial is the timing of resistance in preventing democratic collapse?
Dr. Robert Benson: This is truly a critical question—understanding the timeline and scope of democratic backsliding. It’s important to acknowledge from the outset that the United States, Turkey, and Hungary are each unique cases. There isn’t a simple one-to-one comparison to be made between these systems, given their distinct political cultures, histories, and institutional frameworks. That said, there are certain common denominators—what I would call red flags—regarding how opposition forces respond during moments of constitutional peril. One recurring pattern is an initial hesitancy among those in positions of authority—within institutions—to take the threat seriously.
Let me begin with an American example. There has long been a belief—though I think that belief is starting to shift—that the Democratic Party, as the party of opposition, must adhere to a politics of respectability. That is, “we are not them,” and therefore we will stick to the rules of the game. This approach involves granting the ruling party the benefit of the doubt, even when it repeatedly disregards constitutional norms and even codified laws. This politics of respectability stems from a fundamental belief among many party members that they are still dealing with the Republican Party of 2012—or perhaps even 1995—not with a party that has been overtaken by a revolutionary political movement intent on dismantling the constitutional order. Because once you acknowledge the latter, your behavior must change. You don’t, for example—as the minority leader in the US Senate recently did—vote in favor of a Republican continuing resolution. In other words, you push back.
So why is it that we haven’t necessarily seen that kind of pushback? It stems from a moment of paralysis that often defines the early stages of democratic backsliding—when holding the governing party accountable can seem almost anti-democratic. There’s a reluctance to challenge those in power, a kind of political honeymoon period. But ironically, it’s during that very window that much of the most serious damage is done.
You emphasize the critical “early window” before authoritarians consolidate power. In the current U.S. context under Trump’s second administration, what institutional moves should civil society and opposition forces prioritize to prevent irreversible democratic backsliding? Based on recent U.S. protests, do you believe America is still within the “window of action”—or has it already started slipping into the harder phase of institutional capture?
Dr. Robert Benson: This is really a foundational question. There has to be an element of coordination when dealing with a coordinated attack on democratic institutions. The Germans have a word from the 1930s—originating from the era of state capture by the NSDAP—Gleichschaltung. It means coordination: getting business interests, civil society, universities to toe the government line and to yield to authority—all at once. You target them simultaneously, and they fold.
Now, I’m not making a direct comparison to the 1930s. I’m invoking the term more for what it offers in terms of definition. What we’re seeing today is a coordinated assault by the administration on all facets of American civil society—our universities, our civil service, the media, business interests—all happening at once. That’s intentional.
So how do we respond effectively? We need to build alliances. These individual, often atomized, components of our civil society—business, universities, media—need to begin communicating with one another. There must be an understanding that we need a broad democratic or republican front against this administration.
That’s why it’s so important, for example, for a university like Harvard, with a robust endowment, to stand firm and not capitulate to the administration’s demands. It creates a permission structure for others—whether in the media or private sector—to follow suit. That brings us to what I think is a fundamental law of democratic backsliding. And this idea isn’t mine—it comes from Tim Snyder, in his Twenty Lessons on Tyranny. His first lesson: Do not obey in advance.
Don’t give them what they want without even a fight. That’s exactly what was happening in the US at the beginning—with law firms like Skadden, for instance, capitulating before even receiving a list of demands. Or Columbia University, where the dominoes were falling quickly. The administration settled cases with ABC after the George Stephanopoulos interview, and there was another with CBS after an interview with Kamala Harris that Trump didn’t like.
But now we’re beginning to see a shift. There’s growing resistance to this impulse to obey in advance—and that is, I think, a reassuring sign.
We Only Have Ourselves: Resistance Must Come from Middle America
You noted the critical importance of institutional pushback. Given that some US institutions themselves — like parts of the judiciary or state legislatures — are increasingly aligned with authoritarian currents, how can civil society realistically force institutional resistance when traditional checks and balances are already compromised?
Dr. Robert Benson: The European Union and the United States are obviously two very different systems with two very different capacities for democratic resilience. The European Union has vastly different tools at its disposal compared to the United States.
Take, for example, Article 7 and the withholding of funds. In the Hungarian case, this has been a potent political cudgel that the EU can use to compel rule-of-law behavior. In the US, by contrast, there is no supranational authority that can hold this administration — or even the American courts — accountable for how they comport themselves. We only really have ourselves.
And by the time we reach the point of institutional capture, a lot of damage has already been done. Trump had four years in which to pack the judiciary. And he did — in a manner very reminiscent of what PiS, the Law and Justice party, did in Poland. And when I say similar, I mean strikingly similar. Withholding Merrick Garland’s nomination for 293 days and then ramming through his own nominee, using every tool at the majority’s disposal to pack not just the Supreme Court but also the lower courts.
As a result, about a third of the American judiciary now consists of Trump appointees. That’s a staggering figure — and, depending on your perspective, one of the great “successes” of his administration.
So, lacking any kind of supranational oversight like the EU, the US is left with its domestic institutions — and the most important ones, like the courts, have already been compromised.
Then you move to the legislature, to Congress. This is where it gets even trickier. The US political system has an internal mechanism that enforces party discipline — the primary system. Republicans are afraid to stand up to MAGAism because they face acute primary challenges from the right.
And here’s the really difficult part about democratic backsliding and autocratization: sometimes, especially in the initial phase, it can be popular. Trump won the popular vote. He won all seven swing states. He has a tight grip on one of our two major political parties. Until that grip is broken — and I mean broken from the bottom up, not by pressure from Washington, D.C., or New York or Los Angeles, but from places like Ohio and Middle America — we’re not going to see Congress behaving differently. Because doing so won’t be in their political interest.
In your analysis of European and Turkish cases, mass mobilization alone was often insufficient without elite defections. In today’s US context, do you see any meaningful elite-level breakaways that could help halt Trump’s authoritarian drift — or is elite resistance still too fragmented? What specific lessons can American opposition leaders learn from these cases to build more effective alliances against creeping authoritarianism?
Dr. Robert Benson: Turkey is a fascinating case — and a complex one. You have the AKP effectively in power for over 20 years, with a steady and systematic capture of institutions. As I mentioned in the op-ed, this culminated in the arrest of the mayor of Istanbul, arguably Erdogan’s most formidable challenger in a potential presidential election. Let’s not forget that Erdogan succeeded in changing the Turkish constitution to further consolidate power, shifting the system toward a fully presidential model.
What’s remarkable — and alarming — is that when comparing the Turkish and American cases directly, we’re moving faster in the United States than the AKP ever did in Turkey. That’s startling, but it’s true. And if you consider the damage done in Turkey over that timeline and extrapolate the same arc onto the US, factoring in the potential for at least three and a half more years of Trump — and possibly more, if constitutional meddling occurs, which is not unthinkable given the Republican Party’s trajectory — then the damage here could be decisive. Decisive in the sense of being existential for the Republic.
To return more directly to your question: Why is it that some cases of mass mobilization succeed while others don’t? Mass mobilization has to have a clear, unified aim. Take the Slovak case in 2018, following the assassination of a prominent investigative journalist. That led to a whole-of-society mobilization. And I emphasize that term — whole-of-society. That means unity between labor movements, students, public intellectuals, and crucially, ordinary people who may not identify as political at all. Historically, dissent tends to be concentrated in elite or intellectual circles — in Turkey, for instance, in large cities along the Mediterranean coast or like Istanbul or Izmir.
But if resistance remains confined to these enclaves, it remains too narrow to shift national trajectories. You have to expand the aperture. In the US, this means the opposition to Trump cannot be concentrated just on the coasts, nor can it come solely from universities or the educated elite. It has to emerge from Middle America. That’s when real political challenges begin to register.
The Romanian case against attempts to weaken anti-corruption laws is another example. Protests weren’t limited to Bucharest — they were widespread across cities like Timișoara and Cluj. That geographic spread was essential in forcing parliamentary actors to defect, to break with the government’s agenda and block the legislation. That’s the kind of pressure that needs to be replicated in the American case — to force elite-level defections. In this context, defecting means breaking with President Trump and his agenda.
Cultural and Economic Dislocation Is the Authoritarians’ Playground
Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.
You describe how conspiracy theories and economic neglect fueled authoritarianism in both the US and Europe. Beyond restoring institutional trust, what societal interventions — if any — do you believe are most critical to reversing the cultural dislocation exploited by the new authoritarians?
Dr. Robert Benson: The question of the genesis of these political movements — how they came to be — is still being debated in the social sciences. This is very much a live debate. By and large, you can summarize the competing perspectives along two poles: culture and economy. I think it’s probably a bit of both.
What do I mean by culture and economy? On the economic side, it’s the classic tale of globalization gone wrong. You have a globalized economy from the late 1990s into the 2000s that resulted in a hollowing out of the middle class across industrial societies — principally in the United States. Think of the American Rust Belt: the industrial heartland losing manufacturing jobs. But also look at Europe. Take the United Kingdom, particularly the North and Northeast.
If you continue to follow the economic thesis, it suggests people experienced a depreciating standard of living. They felt left behind by a political establishment that was inattentive to their concerns — and they began voting for the extremes. Then came the hucksters and charlatans — the Nigel Farages, the Brexiteers, or in the American case, Trump — who said, “I understand your pain. I get it. You’ve been screwed over by a political elite that doesn’t understand how hard it is to get by day to day.”
Then comes the pitch: setting Middle America — or the working-class communities of the Red Wall in the UK — against the elites in London or the elites in Washington and New York. And this is where the cultural element comes in. It’s not only that you’ve been economically neglected and cast aside by this mad embrace of globalization, whatever that means — but on top of that, you’ve been alienated culturally.
There are no cinemas in your town. No one tours there. There are no concerts, no communal activities. No opportunities for you to engage in public debate. You’re isolated. You’re economically disadvantaged. And you don’t share in — not just the national wealth — but the cultural wealth that society produces. And that makes people really mad.
So, it’s the combination of economic and cultural dislocation. The opportunity structures that exist within these two pillars gave us populism as a political phenomenon. But more specifically, authoritarian populism. Because populism on its own isn’t enough. It has to become authoritarian — in the sense that there’s only one solution: our solution. Democracy itself, they argue, has failed us. Therefore, we must look beyond democratic remedies.
The Hegemon Has Withdrawn—Now Comes the Disorder
You argue that Trump’s America First policy has undermined global stability and encouraged aggression. How much damage to the international liberal order is now irreversible, and where should democratic states prioritize defense and rebuilding efforts?
Dr. Robert Benson: If we’re moving from a domestic analysis—looking internally at our societies and what gave rise to authoritarian populism—to the international level, we see that authoritarian populism is highly destructive. It’s destructive because it fundamentally does not believe in cooperation.
The international order that the United States principally helped establish after 1945 was built on cooperation. Some would argue that this order was defined by American hegemony. But that hegemony, for all its flaws, created the conditions for global cooperation.
So, what happens when the hegemon withdraws? That is precisely what’s occurring now. The US is retreating from the international domain. We’re witnessing a descent into multipolarity—and potentially into regional or factional rivalries. This is dangerous for a number of reasons. It introduces a profound element of uncertainty.
In this new world of geopolitical competition, what is to stop an autocrat like Vladimir Putin from not only invading Ukraine but also extending aggression toward the Baltic States? What is to stop Xi Jinping in China from pursuing territorial ambitions in Taiwan?
More to the point—if we consider the realm of political economy—what is to stop nations from retreating entirely into protectionism and national isolationism, shielding their domestic industries to the detriment of their peers and neighbors?
Some might even attempt to annex foreign resources, as we’ve seen hints of US policies toward Ukraine’s critical minerals—or potentially even ambitions involving Canada or Greenland. This marks a retreat from the rules-based international order the US helped to forge after World War II, while simultaneously becoming the principal antagonist to that very order.
How has Donald Trump’s suspension of military aid to Ukraine reshaped not only the war’s dynamics but also the global perception of America’s commitment to democracy and international alliances? Can this policy shift be seen as a strategic victory for authoritarian regimes like Russia’s?
Dr. Robert Benson: Well, we can begin with the latter part of the question. I mean, certainly this is a victory for Russia. It’s a complete victory for Vladimir Putin—he could not have wished for a better outcome. From the beginning, Putin claimed that he didn’t have to win in Ukraine; he just had to wait out the Americans and the West, who he believed would grow tired and fickle in their commitment. And that’s exactly what has happened.
There’s a prevailing attitude among segments of the American public that Ukraine is a boondoggle. Take, for example, the hurricane that hit Asheville, North Carolina, last year and caused extensive damage to an economically deprived region. Trump and his allies on Fox News were able to exploit that moment by drawing a stark comparison: all this money—$60 billion in supplemental aid—is going to Ukraine, while Americans at home receive next to nothing. FEMA famously issued a check for about $750, and the narrative quickly became: $750 for you, even though you lost your home, but $60 billion for Ukraine. Now, that’s a misleading comparison—$750 was just an initial payout—but the narrative stuck. And it was highly effective. This is where Trumpism and MAGAism connect the domestic with the international. But what does this mean for the American-led alliance? At best, it means that alliance is destabilized. At worst, it means it has failed—that it’s over.
The new German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, on election night, said that Europe has to begin preparing for independence from the United States. He actually said this. The Americans have managed to turn the Germans into the French when it comes to strategic autonomy. That’s truly remarkable. There isn’t a more staunchly Atlanticist political culture than Berlin’s, yet there’s now a growing realization in Europe that the United States cannot be counted on.
Even if the Americans come back in 2028 with a new Democratic president and say, “We’re back,” who’s going to believe them? US politics have become so polarized and unpredictable—veering from one extreme to the other—that even that kind of return won’t restore trust.
Frankly, I’m skeptical that a Democrat will win the White House in 2028. The long-term trends point toward a consolidation of MAGA-style Republicanism. So, what do our European partners do in the meantime? They need to prepare for a post–Pax Americana—a world where the United States is no longer the hegemon, where its network of alliances no longer provides a reliable security guarantee. And they need to do this as quickly as possible.
The Far Right Coordinates Better Than Progressives—But Cracks Are Emerging
Giorgia Meloni, leader of Brothers of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia and Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, attend a center-right coalition rally in Rome, Italy on March 01, 2018. Photo: Alessia Pierdomenico.
How do you see the growing alliance between the American and European far right — as highlighted at events like CPAC (Conservative Political Action Conference) — accelerating global disorder? How significant is this transatlantic connection for democratic resilience in both Europe and the United States, and how seriously should mainstream democratic actors take this emerging cross-border coordination? What counterstrategies do you recommend to disrupt this movement before it becomes too entrenched, and is there still a realistic path to reverse its momentum?
Dr. Robert Benson: There’s something ironic—almost bizarre—about the fact that hyper-nationalists and authoritarian nationalists are, in many ways, more effectively internationalizing their political movements than progressives. Intuitively, one would assume that it’s in the DNA of liberal and progressive political parties to coordinate across borders more easily than nationalists, whose worldview is, by definition, insular. But the opposite has happened. The far right—and the authoritarians—have done a much better job at coordinating. This has serious implications. They are learning from one another. There’s a phenomenon called “autocratic learning,” where figures like Viktor Orbán realize that if they replace civil servants with party loyalists, they can more effectively control the machinery of government. Donald Trump observes this, communicates with Fidesz advisors, partners with the Heritage Foundation, and suddenly we see efforts to purge the civil service in Washington, D.C.
This is incredibly concerning—not only are they learning from one another in the abstract, but they are actively communicating, including at venues like CPAC. That said, I would qualify this by noting something interesting is happening. Because nationalists are inherently insular, there is always the risk of rupture in their alliances. And I think we may now be witnessing such a rupture. Look, for example, at how Marine Le Pen has responded to trade war rhetoric—she’s taken a very anti-American, or at least anti-American-administration, stance. AfD leaders like Alice Weidel have openly stated that German national interests are antithetical to those of the United States. So, embedded in these movements is a core belief in national self-interest that makes sustained international coordination inherently fragile. It’s only a matter of time before these tensions come to the fore.
Interestingly, what we’re now seeing—contrary to my earlier expectations—is that Trump may actually be catalyzing division within the European far right. These actors are distancing themselves, saying, “We didn’t sign up for this. We’re not in favor of the trade war. We don’t want to hurt rural workers in France or Germany.” This distancing is notable and worth watching. So, there’s nuance here. While the transatlantic authoritarian alliance is real and dangerous, it may not be as stable or unified as it initially appeared.
You describe the far right’s globalization as a new, coordinated movement. In practical terms, do you see any emerging counter-globalization among pro-democracy forces, or is the liberal democratic camp still acting mostly in isolated national silos?
Dr. Robert Benson: I think this follows nicely from the conversation we were just having. Yes, I do think the far right—and the authoritarian right—has done a better job of coordinating in recent years. There are, as I’ve discussed, vulnerabilities to that coordination.
So how do progressive, pro-democracy forces respond? They respond, first and foremost, by talking to each other. The Democratic Party in the United States has to be in contact not only with the Liberal Party in the United Kingdom and the Social Democrats in Germany—in terms of their common ideological alignment—but, quite frankly, with all parties that believe in the rule of law and democracy.
In particular, I think it would behoove the Americans to start talking to parties that have actually experienced societal democratic backsliding. Talk to the CHP in Turkey. Talk to the Serbian opposition. Talk to Elly Schlein’s PD in Italy, which is contending with Meloni. It’s important that we move beyond viewing the world strictly through the lens of left-to-left or right-to-right dialogues. Instead, we should begin thinking in terms of: who believes in democracy and preserving constitutional order—and who doesn’t? That’s the fundamental question of our time. And then we need to coordinate accordingly with those who share democratic commitments, sharing information, tactics, and messaging on how to effectively push back against incumbent authoritarian threats within our own societies.
Don’t Just Defend Democracy—Explain Why It Matters to Daily Life
Drawing from the examples of Turkey and Hungary that you cited, once authoritarian populists consolidate institutions, reversal becomes nearly impossible. What lessons should US opposition parties urgently learn from these cases to avoid repeating the same mistakes?
Dr. Robert Benson: There seems to be an emerging consensus that talking about democracy alone is probably insufficient. A colleague once told me, “I can’t eat the rule of law. It doesn’t put food on my table. It doesn’t pay for my prescription drugs.” And it may potentially ring hollow when a hyper-educated and cultural elite from Washington, D.C., or any of these national capitals, talks about the rule of law—about democracy—as these kind of abstract concepts that you can’t really concretize.
Maybe we have to do the important intellectual work of connecting these concepts—these abstract notions—to real-world things. What I mean by that is: it’s not just that losing the rule of law is dangerous in itself (which it is), but that it creates permission structures for corruption. Your quality of life is materially worse off when you cannot rely on the state to do what it’s supposed to do—and to do so honorably. So talk about that. Talk about how democratic backsliding undermines public healthcare—how it renders it ineffective—or how it takes away from public education, how it creates different strata of access based on who has connections, based on who can pay and who cannot.
Make it very clear that it’s not just a defense of these concepts in themselves that warrants our attention, but how these concepts intersect and feed into our lived experiences as citizens—of a collective, of a community. Because if we can do that—and do it successfully—we bring so many more people into our camp. So it is a challenge for those who believe in the rule of law, who believe in democracy, not simply to stop there, but to take it one extra step—and just tell us why it matters: to my life, and to the life of my children and my family. Because I think that is the only way we create a robust, whole-of-society resistance.
And lastly, Dr. Benson, reflecting on your comparison of today’s political climate with the pre-WWII appeasement of Nazi Germany, what lessons should US and European leaders draw right now to avoid repeating historical failures, especially when facing coordinated disinformation and populist-authoritarian challenges?
Dr. Robert Benson: History doesn’t repeat itself. I mean, the famous line is that history repeats itself, but actually, it more accurately rhymes. I don’t think we’re living through some kind of redux of the 1930s. Having said that, that doesn’t mean there aren’t lessons we can derive from the breakup of Czechoslovakia. Kaja Kallas-EU High Representative-famously said that this is 1938 and that we need to act accordingly. I’m not so sure it’s 1938—that would imply the response would have to be complete victory over Russia, the seizing of Moscow. I mean, that’s not where we are. Let’s be honest about where we are. We have echoes of the 1930s in our politics. So I think that means we have to take seriously threats both domestically to our democracies, but also to an international order that is under pressure.
The more appropriate comparison in my mind than the 1930s would actually most likely be the pre-World War I period, where you had incredible inequalities within societies and also between states. You had, for the first time, a truly globalized economy that had undergone an economic shock. And then you had the seemingly unstoppable spiral toward catastrophe—towards a global war. I think these dynamics are the ones that most concern me, and these are the dynamics I think were prevalent in the early 20th century, in the lead-up to the First World War. So I’m not so sure about the utility of making the 1930s comparison per se. But I do think, insofar as it serves as a wake-up call, it’s important for us to realize there’s work to be done.
Please cite as: Lahti, Yannick & Palonen, Emilia. (2025). “Populism and EP Elections – Case Finland: Populism Gone Mad from Scissors and Chopping-board to Firing Guns and Latino Rush.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 28, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0049
Abstract
After two relatively successful recent elections, the far-right Finns Party (FP) approached the early summer 2024 European Parliament elections amid a supranational atmosphere suggesting that these elections would mark a “turn for the far right” across both Europe and Finland. After successfully leading her party to a historic victory one year earlier in the national elections of Finland 2023, Riikka Purra was, according to polls and pundit opinions, heading toward a new election record—this time in the European Parliament. Facing a charged political atmosphere in national politics and due to her visible role as the national treasurer, Purra’s FP party adopted the populist radical right strategy of their ID and ECR fellows in the EU, and instead of loudly criticising the Union, as has traditionally been the case with far-right parties, they too adopted the tactic of aspiring to “change the European Union from the inside.” This led their whole campaign strategy to declare the FP as the “most pro-Europe party of Finland.” As neighbouring country Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine had left the FP with a united front, the question of whether to support Ukraine or not did not even enter the elections. FP in this regard was and still remains the most anti-Russian party of the far-right party families in Europe. With media coverage being favourable toward a positive outcome for the FP, the party’s concrete message left something to be desired. The cases of now former FP members Timo Vornanen and Teuvo Hakkarainen, not to mention the “Riikka scissors and chopping-board minister” case, undermined a more coherent message to the Finnish electorate, who just over a year ago had voted for the FP in great numbers. Partly, this led to an overwhelmingly poor result for the Finns Party, which took most politicians and spectators by surprise. The European Parliament elections of 2024 in Finland stand out as an interesting exception within the far-right in Europe, as FP steadily lost support in various constituencies.
Keywords: Finns Party (FP), Populist radical right, Far-right, European Parliament 2024, Riikka Purra, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Finnish populist radical right, populist influence.
By Yannick Lahti* & Emilia Palonen**
Introduction – Towards the Elections
The 2024 European Parliament elections were preceded by two intense national contests: the parliamentary elections in 2023 and the presidential elections in January 2024. The National Coalition Party (Kokoomus) emerged first in both but also witnessed a significant rise of the far-right Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset).
The first significant election result of the anti-elitist Eurosceptic party was in 2011 marking a change in the party landscape within the national scale of politics in Finland (Arter, 2011; Palonen 2020). In the subsequent elections, the two opposition parties emerged victorious, and the Finns Party (FP) became one of the key governing parties in the government led by Juha Sipilä from 2015 to 2019. However, the party’s rank and file were dissatisfied, and in 2017, the FP split after electing Jussi Halla-aho as its new leader, marking a radical shift toward a nativist direction. The former party elite and some marginal factions emerged as new splinter groupson the political spectrum and registering as political parties (Fagerholm, 2022; Lahti & Palonen, 2023). By 2021, Jussi Halla-aho had handed over the party leadership to Riikka Purra, who continued to advance a strong nativist agenda. Under her leadership, the party achieved its best-ever result in the 2023 parliamentary elections, becoming the second-largest party in the country with 20.1% of the vote (620,981 votes). The FP then entered government for the second time, this time in coalition with the NCP, the Christian Democrats, and the Swedish People’s Party of Finland. The FP currently holds seven ministerial posts. Purra’s predecessor, Jussi Halla-aho, came from the far-right organization Suomen Sisu, which had established a strong foothold within the FP. Although Halla-aho stepped down in 2021, his nativist line has continued (Palonen, 2021).
Finland’s next-door neighbour, Russia, and its full-scale war in Ukraine have played a significant role for the Finns Party, even under the leadership of former chair—and current Speaker of the Finnish Parliament—Jussi Halla-aho, who completed his doctoral thesis at the University of Helsinki in Slavic studies. The party first marginalized its pro-Russian faction, notably removing MP Mika Niikko from his position as chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Finnish Parliament as early as December 2021, prior to the attack on Kyiv. In 2023, the Finns Party also shifted from the ID group to the ECR group in the European Parliament (Lahti & Palonen 2023).
According to Heinö (2024), the Finns Party’s move from the ID to the ECR group coincided with its entry into the new Finnish government. Party leader Riikka Purra aimed to avoid unnecessarily provoking the coalition partners—particularly the newly appointed Prime Minister Orpo of the National Coalition Party—by signalling a more moderate and less radical approach to the party’s EU policies. However, just ten days into the new government, one of the Finns Party ministers, Vilhelm Junnila, resigned due to allegations of fascist references and neo-Nazi connections (Kuokkanen, Horsmanheimo & Palonen, 2023). Interestingly, both Junnila and Mika Niikko were candidates on the party list in the 2024 European Parliament elections.
In the presidential elections of January 2024, the Finns Party candidate Jussi Halla-aho finished fourth, securing 18.99 percent of the total vote (615,802 votes). Green Party (Vihreät) MP and former Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto—running as an independent but backed by the Greens—and former National Coalition Party Prime Minister Alexander Stubb advanced to the second round, with Stubb ultimately winning by a narrow margin of 51.62 percent. Despite not making it to the runoff, Halla-aho maintained a strong presence on social media, and widespread opposition to the far right played a notable role in shaping the outcome.
The Finns Party largely fits into the Radical Right category as defined by Mudde (2019), who distinguishes between the anti-democratic Extreme Right and the Radical Right, which operates within democratic systems. However, Heinö (2024) notes that ideologically, the Finns Party is best described as a national conservative party—socially conservative while leaning left on economic issues. The party’s founder, Timo Soini, once famously referred to it as a “workers’ party without socialism” (Demokraatti, 2016). The party’s roots lie in the Finnish Rural Party, which challenged the Centre Party’s realpolitik under President Urho Kekkonen, Finland’s longest-serving president, particularly its friendly posture toward the Soviet Union (Palonen & Sunnercrantz, 2021).
Five new populist Radical Right parties emerged on the Finnish political scene since 2017 (Fagerholm, 2022). These include the Blue Reform movement (now known as the Finnish Reform Movement) and Suomen Kansa Ensin (Finnish People First), which has its origins in the anti-immigration Rajat Kiinni! (“Close the Borders!”) movement. Two personal splinters are on a more general populist line: Valta Kuuluu Kansalle (Power Belongs to the People, VKK), formed around Ano Turtiainen, a former FP member of Parliament, in 2021. The VKK has networks among the leaders and influencers of Finland’s digital pro-Russian counter public. Vapauden Liitto (Freedom Alliance), a splinter of the VKK, was founded in 2022 by a former FP activist, Ossi Tiihonen, who also ran for party chair and has been vocal against Finland’s COVID-19 measures. Ano Turtiainen and his Valta Kuuluu Kansalle party did not get re-elected in the 2023 parliamentary elections, and thus the party lost its only seat.
In the EP elections, Vapauden Liitto received 0.9% of the total votes (16,717). Also ideologically distinct was the proto-fascist, ethnonationalist Sinimusta Liike (Blue-and-Black Movement), which was also founded in 2022. However, on April 23, 2024, the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland de-registered the movement. In its ruling, the court found that the party’s program was anti-democratic and disrespectful towards human rights, thus strictly contrary to the Finnish Constitution and the European Union’s Charter on Human Rights (Yle, 2024). In the following month, May 2024, the Blue-and-Black Movement re-applied to be re-registered into the official party register by preparing to collect the necessary 5,000 signatures that it would require, but it was not able to nominate candidates for the European parliamentary elections of summer 2024.
Also, the opposition party, Liike Nyt (“Movement Now”), is noteworthy due to its populist tendencies, even as it can by no means be regarded as a populist radical left nor right-wing party. It is an emerging force that fashions itself after Italy’s Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S), which successfully won seats outside the capital in the Finnish regional elections in 2021 (Yle, 2021). While a disproportionate number of the current leading figures of the FP hail from the universities and the teaching professions (Saresma & Palonen, 2022), Liike Nyt’s leadership consists of business elites that have been tied to Russian oligarchs (Luukka, 2022; Lahti & Palonen, 2023), which they now publicly disavow (Nalbantoglu, 2023). In the national elections of spring 2023, Liike Nyt managed to hold on to their one and only seat in the 200-seated parliament. The MP, co-founder, and chair Harry Harkimo also ran for president early 2024, arriving in last place out of 9 candidates with 0.53% of the votes (17,030). In the European Parliament elections, Liike Nyt had an electoral alliance with the Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit), who are serving in Orpo’s government. This alliance created a particular dynamic between an oppositional, rather liberal populist opposition party and a Christian conservative group serving in the government. The Christian Democrats’ candidate Eija-Riitta Korhola was clearly the most successful in this coalition, and with the exception of the multi-party debates, Liike Nyt was not very visible in the electoral campaigning.
Overall, with their two seats in the European Parliament and continuous representation since 2015—when then-party leader Timo Soini was elected—the Finns Party (FP) was the most relevant populist radical right party to observe in these elections.
The Finns Party in the European Parliament
In the context of the European Parliament, the Finns Party belongs to the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists). The FP has traditionally been at least softly Eurosceptic; it has had a long-term goal of leaving the EU, but in the short term, it argues that Finland needs to remain in the union to defend Finnish interests. In the 2024 elections, this was contested, and the party seemed happy to remain in the EU in the long run. Initially, together with most of the Finnish population and parliamentary parties, the FP was also against NATO membership claiming the need for national sovereignty. The party changed its stance on this matter after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Lahti & Palonen, 2023) and is among the most anti-Russian of Europe’s populist parties (Heinö, 2024). In short, the FP has roots in strong anti-Soviet thinking and lacks the Russophilia of other far-right parties in Europe (e.g., France’s Rassemblement National and Italy’s Lega Nord). This is echoed in the current pro-Ukraine stance, which is also strengthened by the former party leader’s personal history. In this sense, their anti-Sovietism also turned them against Russia and for Ukraine. Finally, Halla-aho’s policy direction testifies to his emergence in the anti-immigration faction of his party (Vaarakallio, 2015). For these reasons, the question about Finland’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war was not a theme in the European Parliament elections of 2024, even though overall security was. The party leader repeatedly raised two issues during the campaigning: Ukraine and migration. The leading MEP candidate MP Sebastian Tynkkynen of the FP also visited Georgia quite prominently during his campaign for the EP.
The MEPs for the Finns Party have included party chairs like Timo Soini and Jussi Halla-aho, but in 2019 two MEPs were elected after significantly successful elections: Teuvo Hakkarainen and Laura Huhtasaari. Eurosceptic Laura Huhtasaari, MP in 2015–2019 and again from 2023, ran for president in 2018 and received 6.9 percent of the vote with over 200,000 personal votes. A year later, running for the EP, she received 92,760 votes, which is a fine score in Finland, where, in the Finnish preferential voting system, voters choose a candidate within a party list to vote for. Teuvo Hakkarainen (29,083 votes in 2019) is an owner of a sawmill in central Finland who originally rose to the national parliament in 2011. Despite his personal popularity among voters since his first days in politics, he has been in the spotlight for perceived problematic language and conduct. Many claimed to have believed he was representing the interests of the forest industry in the EP for Finland. In the most recent news before the 2024 elections, MEP Hakkarainen was presented as largely absent from the parliamentary work, and he admitted having moved to Honduras, South America, in 2020. Laura Huhtasaari returned to the Finnish national parliament and was replaced by Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, a long-term Finns Party activist, who became an MP already in 2007 in the Soini era, serving in the European Parliament from a deputy seat in 2015–2019 and again in 2023–2024.
Indistinct EU-agenda and Other Issues
Even as the political climate as a whole seemed to be fatalistic toward an upcoming far-right surge in the context of the European Parliament elections of 2024, one ruling element alongside this was the fact that the FP party seemed to lack a direct focus and message in the upcoming elections. Events that had little to do with traditional day-to-day politics also emerged, as did some specific incidents such as the shooting affair of FP MP, now former FP member, Timo Vornanen.
FP published its EP2024 election program called “Päätetään itse – Let’s decide for ourselves” on April 24, 2024. The opening paragraph was as follows: The Finns Party is Finland’s most pro-Europe party. The people’s movement which is the Finns Party is uncompromisingly committed to protecting European civilization and to solving the many challenges facing Europe. Just as the Finns Party sees Finland as a refuge for Finns, Europe must first and foremost be the home of European nations.
This turned around the whole Eurosceptic undertones. Riikka Purra was mentioning in election debates the way in which authority in the EU lies within the member states. Moving away from Euroscepticism to a ‘critical European’ stance, as identified by Herkman and Palonen (2024) in the 2019 elections, the Finns Party appeared Eurosceptic, and the Centre Party (Renew) was critical European at home. It is relevant to point out that the FP declared themselves the most pro-Europe—not the most pro-EU—party of Finland.
Also in Finland, the FP EP2024 election campaign for the Finns Party kicked off in a period of hype for the far right in Europe (only that the Finnish media translated it to laitaoikeisto) (De Fresnes & Stenroos, 2024; Yle, 2024; Sutinen, 2024). Some scholarly opinions that were openly sceptical about a “far right tsunami” also emerged, as it was pointed out that the discourse within the European liberal media had been repetitive in this regard, considering the EP elections of 2014 and 2019 (Vaittinen, 2024). Yet, the major narrative remained widely fatalistic towards a “far right landslide” both nationally in Finland and elsewhere within the European Union member states.
Three factors negatively affected the Finns Party’s results: the Cases Vornanen and Hakkarainen, the jubilant Thatcherism of the party chair Purra, and the party list.
By the end of the same week of the official EP24 campaign start, an unfortunate shooting incident happened outside a nightclub. It involved a Finns Party MP since 2023, previously a policeman, Timo Vornanen, who fired his (legal) firearm (illegally carried) outside a bar not far from the Finnish parliament during the early hours of a Friday morning (Toivonen et al., 2024). Vornanen was immediately taken into police custody and later released facing official criminal charges. The incident was the political top news of the weekend and the week to come as the party had their campaign cruise event. Almost a week later, on May 2, 2024, the FP party dismissed Vornanen from its parliamentary group, and on May 9 the governing body of the FP ousted Vornanen from the party altogether, which led to him forming his one-man group in the parliament’s opposition.
Simultaneously with the case Vornanen, some unfavourable news governed the media sphere around the sitting Finns Party MEP Teuvo Hakkarainen as investigative journalists from the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat wrote about Hakkarainen’s de facto absence and lack of fulfilling his duties in the European Parliament (Teittinen, 2024; Teittinen & Elo, 2024). Commenting on his absences, MEP Hakkarainen referred to his “Latinokiireet”—translating as something like “being busy with Latino-related things” or “Latino business.” The news around Hakkarainen led to the party secretary of FP, Harri Vuorenpää, announcing that Hakkarainen would not be among the party’s picks to seek re-election in the upcoming European Parliament elections; the official reasons for his dismissal were never clarified (Harju, 2024). Contrary to his party’s wishes, MEP Hakkarainen claimed that he was seeking re-election anyway as an independent candidate from the list of the above-mentioned splinter group: Vapauden liitto (Freedom Alliance). This move was ultimately too much and resulted in the governing body of FP firing Hakkarainen from the party altogether. Hakkarainen continued to criticize his former political home, claiming that “FP has turned into a beagle (lapdog) of prime minister Orpo’s Central Coalition Party” (Hakahuhta et al., 2024; Sutinen & Toivonen, 2024).
Within the context of national politics, the party chair Purra started to obtain growing criticism about her online behaviour regarding the austerity politics in Prime Minister Orpo’s government and her role as the national treasurer. Purra posted on social media a picture of a gift she had received: two wooden chopping boards in the shape of an axe, with her face and the text “now is the time to cut” printed on them. A few weeks later, an MP of Purra’s party posted another picture on social media with an unapologetic and smiley Purra holding a big pair of scissors. Promoting a tight austerity regime, Purra was heavily criticized for her perceived lack of empathy and even glee towards what were seen as some of the heaviest public sector and social welfare cuts in the history of Finland, leading even to foreign media headlines such as: “Finland’s Thatcher tests limits of local frugality” (Kauranen, 2024). This is in stark contradiction with the historical takes of the Finns Party and its predecessor as guardians of the ordinary and vulnerable people.
With Hakkarainen, Huhtasaari, nor Halla-aho no longer on the list, the Finns Party list for 2024 was composed of less prominent figures but also included the very popular social media politician Sebastian Tynkkynen. FP vice chair and second-term MP Sebastian Tynkkynen stands among the leading figures but was not a minister of the unpopular government. He announced already in February that he was running in the upcoming elections with an “ambitious plan” (STT, 2024). Tynkkynen has been known as a widely skilful and provocative politician in terms of social media. Online video content allows the far right to affectively articulate and perform socio-political identities and construct relations to targeted audiences, and the Finns Party and Tynkkynen have been pioneers in Finland in this (Ekman, 2014; Salojärvi et al., 2023).
Tynkkynen, who proudly claims to have renewed his seat in the Finnish parliament in 2023 with a budget of 0€—relying only on creating online content—declared in his EP24 candidacy video that he intends to use the assistance money granted to members of the European Parliament in an unprecedented way for extensive framing. Tynkkynen’s bid and the rationale for it was an unprecedented case in Finnish politics, but it was not widely covered. In this case, the far-right politician’s goal was to act in the law-making parliament more as part of the journalists’ challenge and as a replacement for the media than as a legislator (Lahti & Mörttinen, 2024: 33). However, Tynkkynen was widely seen as one of the most potential winners of the upcoming elections, and the polls were favourable both to him and the FP, showing that the party might increase their seats from 2 to 3 (Hara, 2024; Hara & Särkkä, 2024).
Purra claimed the list was the best ever by the Finns Party. It included several figures known for their anti-immigrant and far-right stances, such as the short-lived minister of Orpo’s government in the summer scandal of 2023, MP Vilhelm Junnila. Even if Europe and Ukraine were Purra’s key issues, it also included Mika Niikko, who had been moved from party leadership for his earlier pro-Russian stances. None of these got questioned by the Finnish media. The most notable campaign ad by the FP during the late spring elections was one where traditionally masculine figures—two males working on construction—struggle to open a can of milk during their coffee break. The conclusion of the video is that due to EU regulation, the cork of the milk carton is an unnecessary nuisance. The punchline at the end of the video is the chosen FP party slogan: “Päätetään itse – Let’s decide for ourselves.” The realism behind this stance was also not much discussed. The public discussion around the campaign was focused mainly on the question of Ukraine and security, and the far right in the leadership of the European Parliament.
Given that the Finns Party was already the second party in the Finnish government, the EP elections also became a vote on the government. The opposition discourse was strong. SDP, the leading party of the previous government under PM Sanna Marin, was now the country’s main opposition party and, under the new leadership of MP Antti Lindtman, it was expected to do relatively well in the elections. Lindtman, facing the challenge of leading the SDP after the unprecedented Sanna Marin phenomenon, but also the historically most right-wing government of Finland in terms of fiscal policy since the Second World War, decided to embrace the so-called challenge of the “Rise of the European Far Right” and made the party’s entire campaign for the European Parliament in 2024 about repelling this rising.
Indeed, on May 4, 2024, the SDP announced that they would not collaborate with the far right in the European Parliament, promising that: “Every Finnish voter can be confident that the vote given to the SDP will definitely not promote the far-right’s rise to power in Europe.” Similarly to their self-stated political rivals, the SDP was also on the verge of getting their seat numbers increased from 2 to 3 inside the European Parliament. But they were not the only opposition party, and their party list was not as prominent as those for the Greens, the Left Alliance, or the Centre, who had several sitting or former MEPs and former party leaders. Even the Swedish People’s Party, who was slightly controversially in government again, now together with the Finns Party, had their party leader running for the European Parliament. The Sanna Marin phenomenon did contribute to these elections, boosting several former ministers of her cabinet and women into the Parliament.
Results of the Election
The momentum and media hype were on their side, but the far-right takeover did not happen in Finland. The election results came almost as a shock to the Finns Party leadership. Even until the last days before the election, the predictions suggested that the party would increase its seats from 2 to 3, even though the exact opposite happened: it lost one of its two seats. The party gained barely over half of their previous results in 2019: 7.6% of the vote (139,160 votes in total) compared to EP2019, where the party received 13.8%. They lost one of their two seats in the European Parliament, with Sebastian Tynkkynen being elected as the only one of his party, and Ruohonen Lerner lost her seat with only 0.4% of the vote (6,902 votes), while Junnila, shortly a minister in Orpo’s government, received 0.9% of the vote (16,357 votes), the second highest for the Finns Party. This came as a surprise to journalists, some media pundits, and researchers, as well as the FP chair Riikka Purra herself, as she commented on the results on election night: “Äärettömän huono – Extremely bad” (Strömberg 2024).
Perhaps more surprising was the success of Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto) chair and MP Li Anderson, who received personally a record number of 247,604 votes (13.5 percent of nationwide personal support), securing three seats for her party with 17.3% nationwide support (316,859 votes). The EPP’s Kokoomus won the elections, increasing their seats from three to four with 24.8% support (453,636 votes). The most popular candidate for Kokoomus was Mika Aaltola, an academic and leader of the Finnish Institute for Foreign Affairs known from his TV commentary, who had run as an independent candidate for president in January 2024: now he increased his personal votes to 95,757 votes, and a total of 5.2% national support. In the presidential elections, Aaltola had received 47,467 votes, a total of 1.5%. MP with expertise in military strategy, Pekka Toveri, with a similar public profile, was the second most popular. Curiously, the strategy adopted by the opposition leader Antti Lindtman for his party SDP did not bring the wished-for result, as the party had to settle for its two current seats without a poll-promised increase. The Greens lost one seat, but their two former party leaders and ministers secured seats in the EP, and the Centre and the Swedish People’s Party also retained two and one seats, respectively.
The splinter group Vapauden liitto (Freedom Alliance) got 0.9% (16,717 votes), with the former FP MEP Hakkarainen gaining 7,414 votes, thus not renewing his seat. Liike Nyt (Movement Now) received 0.5% of the vote share (9,641 votes altogether). Indeed, even though the FP did not do well due to a lack of a clear message, the message of opposing the far right and standing up for liberal democracy also did not resonate strongly with the voters of the SDP. However, the overall result can be seen as a victory for the opposition parties against those in government.
All Finnish citizens and EU citizens with permanent residency in Finland aged 18 and above were eligible to cast a vote. Similarly to the presidential elections, and contrary to the national parliamentary and municipal/regional elections, the entire country functioned as a single polling district. Voter turnout was 42.4%, a minor decrease from the previous elections, where the turnout was 42.7%.
In summary: the FP steadily lost support in various constituencies. In rural areas, where the support of the FP has been strong, the party’s percentage of support almost halved. It weakened significantly across the board in other ways as well, least of all in the core areas of large cities, where the FP generally gets little support.
Changes in electoral support for the FP can be observed as we compare the results of the previous European Parliament elections of 2019 to those of June 2024, gathered by the Suomen vaalidatapalvelu (Finnish election data service).
Outer frame area: 2019: 16.8% vs. 2024: 9.4%
Inner frame area: 2019: 14.5% vs. 2024: 8.2%
Countryside: 2019: 16.1% vs. 2024: 8.9%
A suburb or suburban area: 2019: 14.0% vs. 2024: 7.7%
Local center: 2019: 10.9% vs. 2024: 5.9%
The core area of big cities: 2019: 6.7% vs. 2024: 4.2%
Further Analysis: “Smile, You Are in the EU!” – The Finns Party’s Government Participation and Its Potential Influence on the Results
As has been widely established, in recent decades a growing number of various populist parties have succeeded in entering government coalitions with mainstream political parties—or even with other populist parties in Western Europe, such as is the case in Italy, for example. In Finland, the governing National Coalition Party faced the EU elections with a sense of calm and optimistic campaigning, as the party has traditionally been successful in these elections and is often regarded as the so-called EU party. The fact that the second largest party in both parliament and government—the Finns Party—was also fully campaigning under a pro-Europe message cannot be disregarded without underlining the paradoxicality and ironies that political reality sometimes brings forward in our field of studies.
Even as it is evident that a coalition government such as that of Prime Minister Orpo could proceed with the pragmatic “business as usual” attitude from a national politics point of view during another election, the fact remains that the national treasurer Purra was at the same time advocating for a very different future for the European Union. One cannot overlook the fact that the roots of her Finns Party lie fundamentally in the populist discourse of anti-elitism and Euroscepticism. Indeed, the founder of the Finns Party, Timo Soini, coined the phrase “Missä EU, siellä ongelma – Where there is the EU, there is the problem” into the history books of Finnish political rhetoric. Additionally, as mentioned before, just in January of the same year, the National Coalition Party had won the presidential elections with their candidate, former Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, who ran his campaign with a clear and steadfast angle on Finland being international, multilingual, and tolerant. It was also Stubb who, two decades ago, had launched his political career and risen to prominence as a young MEP with a famously unapologetic EU agenda for Finland. Stubb’s—back then still considered a progressive tool for political communication—blog was later published as a book: Hymyile, olet EU:ssa! Europarlamentaarikon päiväkirja – Smile, you are in the EU! A MEP’s Diary (Stubb, 2005; Lahti & Mörttinen, 2024).
This blatant conflict of interest between Prime Minister Orpo and Deputy Prime Minister Purra, as far as their parties’ EU policy was concerned, did not manifest itself publicly as a quarrel, but the undeniable tension on an ideological level politically requires further exploration—especially when analysing why the FP voters voted as they did (or as turned out to be the case: did not show up to vote). In general, when looking at the wide body of research investigating the changes in populist parties once they enter governmental positions, the question of populism’s moderation versus radicalization comes up for debate (Akkerman & de Lange, 2015; Albertazzi & McDonnell 2015; Krause & Wagner 2019).
Within the framework of the Finns Party and the surprising 2024 European Parliament election results, this scenario provides fruitful conditions to consider the weight of the contemporary argument which debates whether populist actors in government can exert a certain degree of influence on their coalition partners or if, conversely, they have to quit their populist and anti-system character under the impact of their “experience in office.” The questions proposed in these cases are often of the nature: “To what extent did populist parties succeed in influencing their government coalition partners, leading them to adopt a populist rhetoric and change their policy positions?” and “Have populist parties been successful in retaining their populist ‘outside mainstream politics’ identity, or have they been assimilated into mainstream parties?”
In the case of the EP2024 elections, the government of Prime Minister Orpo had not been in power for more than a year, and it had already overcome its most acute crisis: the mentioned summer scandal of 2023, regarding then-Minister MP Vilhelm Junnila, who as a result resigned. During and after this incident, Orpo’s government—under his leadership and his visibly loyal deputy, FP’s chair Purra—became known for repetitively referring to their ironclad commitment to the government’s program in the media. According to a textual analysis using corpus-assisted discourse studies, the results showed that the program was, in fact, very strongly driven and based on policies traditionally imposed and held in high regard by Orpo’s Central Coalition Party, and that Purra’s Finns Party had been given leverage in issues that were important to their core supporters, such as immigration policy, citizenship restrictions, and foreign aid to third-world countries (Lahti & Mörttinen 2023). This ensured that neither party was willing to “rock the boat” unnecessarily. From a practical point of view, it also means that whether populistic influence or, vice versa, non-populist influence was spreading within the coalition partners, it was too early a stage to identify any credible indications of it.
In terms of influence, we can accept Robert Dahl’s definition of it: “a relation among actors in which one actor induces other actors to act in some way they would not otherwise act” (Robert Dahl 1973, in Biard et al., 2019: 5). More widely, the actual concept of “political contagiousness” finds its roots in the field of electoral competition studies (Van Spanje, 2010), and it is firmly associated with the strategies political parties might adopt towards their (newcoming) competitors in an attempt to attract more voters. Direct populist influence, however, can be defined as follows: Populist influence is the impact exerted by populist parties on their government coalition partners in terms of communication contagiousness (people-centrism, anti-elitism, and general will) and policy position change (depending on the populist ideological attachment) (Napoletano, 2022: 60–61).
When investigating whether the FP was somehow assimilated into the mainstream parties from the point of view of the voter, it is relevant to note what happened to the party a decade ago when, in 2015, it entered into a centre-liberal coalition with the result of “a dramatic loss of popular support because it was not able to keep its promises” (Blanc-Noël, 2019: 69). The then leader and founder of the party, Soini, was seen as appeasing the coalition partners by moderating his pre-election agenda. In general, when this type of moderation takes place (Akkerman et al., 2016), populist parties certainly do not succeed in exerting a real influence on their coalition partners and, more extremely, they risk disappearing from the political scenario. Of course, what happened to the FP in 2015 until their splitting into two and later the resurrection into nationwide electoral success again is not explicitly comparable with what happened in the EP 2024 elections, as the context differs, but ignoring the fact that the FP has suffered sufficient loss in support before due to perceived moderation in times of a coalition government cannot be overlooked. It is important to underline that we are not arguing that the FP seriously altered their EU policy or, more prudently, their campaigning in the EP2024 elections due to the fact of political contagiousness—in this case, being in a coalition government with the traditionally pro-EU party of Finland, the National Coalition Party. We, however, note that their incoherent campaigning strategy and unorthodox message for the flagship party of Finnish Euroscepticism affected their traditional voter base, which has historically not been keen on voting in European Parliament elections to start with.
This alternation with the FP’s electoral support also challenges yet again the stances of many researchers between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, as they declared populism in power to be an “episodic” phenomenon that was not bound to last for a significant period of time. Indeed, in 2015, Albertazzi and McDonnell were among the first to argue that this conclusion was inaccurate and that, as a phenomenon, populism in power is here to stay. More interestingly, in regard to this paper, they claimed that populism in power is a “contagious” phenomenon able to make a concrete difference within the Western European political landscape.
Furthermore, Albertazzi and McDonnell claimed that, once in power, populist parties behave according to a combination of “responsiveness and responsibility” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015: 170; Biard et al., 2019). As a consequence of this choice, part of the populist electorate will feel betrayed, although in the long run, populist parties succeed (to different degrees) in maintaining their electorate. Some authors have also tried to explain the variation of such success; Akkerman and De Lange (2012: 578) argued that post-incumbency electoral success of the populist radical right seems to depend on three main factors: 1. policy achievements, 2. the performance of populist radical right ministers, and 3. party strategies to maintain internal coherence. Especially factors 2 and 3 are important as we analyse what has contributed to the end result of the FP’s electoral success in the EP2024 election.
Conclusion
Throughout the elections, the contradiction was the fact that the political discourse and the analysis in the media seemed to concentrate on the unavoidable landslide victory of the far right in Europe as such. Considering first and foremost the diversity inside the so-called far-right family of party groups in Europe, we see that the starting point was missing the point from the get-go. The discourse always remained on a very general level, thus underplaying the different actors and variations which might come into play. In Finland, the populist radical FP was enjoying steady support, and yet the support and seats halved, while overall the national voting turnout remained more or less the same – a difference of 0.3%.
Confusion within the party due to the cases of Vornanen and Hakkarainen and the lack of a strong election strategy, narrative, and mission towards the European Parliamentary elections played a role. The political discourse around the FP was mostly on Purra’s provocative communication, the far-right threat in Europe, and the campaigning of the most successful online politician of the FP group, vice chair and now newly elected MEP, Sebastian Tynkkynen. His political supporters followed him and showed their loyalty during election day, but even his message was more about himself as a politician and his mission to broadcast more effectively and intensively, instead of commenting on what his contribution would be to the Finnish electorate.
As popular as Tynkkynen is among his online audiences and actual voters, it is reasonable to argue that his message might not have been that effective in mobilizing voters outside of the digital sphere. Considering that the FP’s main television ad also aired on various online platforms, with its milk carton EU-regulated corks and the declaration of the FP as the most pro-Europe party of the nation, contributed to the lack of a wholesome message. It is possible that in fact, in that regard, one of the variables in order to ensure party success—as mentioned earlier by Akkerman & De Lange (2012)—the FP did not successfully execute a comprehensive party strategy to maintain internal coherence, not at least from the point of view of the Finnish voter.
It is important to note again that the FP declared themselves the most pro-Europe—not the most pro-EU—party of Finland. This distinction is clear, and it can be hypothesized that this was created as an attempt to redefine what being pro-European and pro-EU meant in a Finnish political context. Whether or not this was a strategy and a bait by the FP, the fact remains that the whole EP election campaign theme went largely unnoticed by the media and political opponents. It bears mentioning that the FP party secretary Harri Vuorenpää had started his tenure by the end of August 2023 and was not as experienced as his predecessors. However, Vuorenpää’s role in the analysis on why the party underachieved in the EP2024 elections should not be overstressed.
Indeed, even as it can be argued that the FP did not moderate their stances on national policy issues towards those of their coalition partner, the National Coalition Party—as was indeed unnecessary from a voter-pleasing strategic point of view, since both parties had strongly committed to the government’s program—it was, however, unexpected and peculiar from a campaign strategy stance to attempt to overshadow the traditional pro-EU party by declaring itself superior in so-called Europe-positivity.
It can also be argued that the stance of being the most pro-Europe party in the country was considered an act of moderation as far as their EU policy was concerned. It is possible that the voters who loyally showed up for the FP during the parliamentary elections of 2023 and the presidential elections later were not convinced of this new direction—in addition to the fact that the FP voter base is the least interested in the EP elections, as is the case for the entire Finnish voter base.
Taking into consideration that the Finns Party candidate came in third place in Finland’s previous—and timewise very recent—presidential elections, all that can be stated at this point is that the zigzag, volatile, and effectively complete change in direction in terms of the rhetoric of the traditionally anti-EU party did not work. If anything, it remains a case in point of a populist party in a coalition government proving that their presence is not contagious to the non-populist parties, but on the contrary, the opposite happened. It is also a finding worthy of further research.
The hybrid threat posed by Russia, in terms of transporting immigrants and asylum seekers to Finland’s eastern border, was considered—and still is—more of a national and defence policy affair rather than something that directly concerns the EU. It should also be noted that the FP voter base prioritizes national, presidential, and lastly regional elections.
In conclusion, we suggest that the predicted far-right threat mobilized opposition party voters on a large scale. Even the Swedish People’s Party held on to their seat (which they were in danger of losing) at a time when their partnership in the Finnish government with the FP was widely criticized by their own electorate. The voter turnout in these elections—almost identical to the previous EP2019 elections—indicates that many FP voters stayed at home instead of casting their votes.
One of the interesting details to note is also the fact that the FP lost support in Lapland—an electoral district where they usually do well. The unprecedented electoral success of the Left Alliance leader Li Anderson also reflected in the results in the area, as she personally received 13.6% (7,049 votes). Additionally, the Centre Party (Keskusta) elected two female MEPs from Lapland, MP Katri Kulmuni and incumbent MEP Elsi Katainen. This can be seen as a less conservative move by the voters in Lapland.
As much as this result came as a surprise, even to the scholars who remained sceptical throughout the election about the so-called “Far right tsunami,” it should be noted that the FP still holds a strong position within national politics in the country and that these elections, with their surprising result, are too recent for us to draw any further conclusions about a far-right downfall in Finland.
Indeed, even as the FP faced the 2025 local and regional elections with challenges of a different nature (due to its core voter base and their unenthusiastic approach towards these elections) and even as they again underperformed greatly coming in at sixth place with an overall 7.6% vote share (overall 184 616 votes) and a 6.8% drop from previous elections it is not credible to announce a general degradation of the Finnish populist radical right, or even the Finns Party. As further analysis in upcoming research will show in greater detail whether these two elections the EP2024 and the following local and regional ones had any similarities as far as the FP party support is concerned, it has to be stated again that only as recently as in 2023 Riikka Purra led her party to an all-time victory in the parliamentary elections – an election which traditionally has been the one were the FP dominates. The future elections will provide more data for analysis in order to make conclusions of the Finnish far right in the long run. So far, there are no concrete indications which would lead us to state that a long-term demand for populist radical right parties would be fading away from the Finnish political landscape.
To conclude, the European Parliament elections of 2024 in Finland stand out as one of the interesting exceptions, as the FP steadily lost support in various constituencies against the most optimistic predictions. In the future, we researchers must remain in our current positions, where we do not feed the narratives often adopted by the liberal news media in which election X is either about the huge victory of the far right or the great defeat of liberal democracy, or vice versa. The issues leading to far-right support (steady and unsteady) are far more complex and multifaceted, as we know. The Finnish case also demonstrated a new emergence of the left in 2024.
The authors thank the Research Council of Finland (RCF) for co-funding the Trans-Atlantic Platform Consortium project “ENDURE: Inequalities, Community Resilience, and New Governance Modalities in a Post-Pandemic World” (funding number 352413).
(*) Yannick Lahti is a political scientist and a former postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Helsinki. Lahti obtained his PhD-degree in 2022 from the University of Bologna in Italy. In his research, he examined European populism, populist actors, and political communication during the European Union elections of 2019 within the Hybrid Media system. In his work Yannick Lahti departed from the consideration that as populism and populist rhetoric are challenging concepts to define – especially in relation to different media environments; they should be addressed and analyzed through the usage of a combination of methods and theoretical perspectives, namely Communication Studies, Corpus Linguistics, Political theory, Rhetoric and Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies. Recently Lahti was involved with Whirl of Knowledge project and until 2023 conducting research for the transatlantic ENDURE-project funded by the Finnish Academy (Suomen Akatemia). Now as an independent scholar with a funding of C. V. Åkerlund mediafoundation, Yannick Lahti is conducting further research on populist radical right politics and its impacts on democracy. Right now Lahti is also working together with award winning journalist Matti Mörttinen on their third collaboration: a book titled: Jäähyväiset demokratialle (A Farewell to Democracy) which will be published in spring 2026. The researcher-journalist pair has previously published two books called Populismin anatomia / The Anatomy of Populism (2023) and Politiikan pinnan vangit / The prisoners of political shallowness (2024) which both received critical and commercial acclaim in Finland.
(**) Emilia Palonen is Associate Professor, Senior University Lecturer in Political Science, University of Helsinki. Currently Emilia is on research leave as Programme Director in Datafication at the Helsinki Institute for Social Sciences and Humanities and as Leader of HEPPsinki research group. She is PI of Academy of Finland project WhiKnow (2019-2022), Kone Foundation project Now-Time Us Space (2020-24), European Commission funded DRad project (2020-2023), and Academy of Finland and other Trans-Atlantic Partnership project funders’ ENDURE exploring resilience in crisis (2022-2024). Palonen has been evaluated as fit for full and associate professor (2022). She received in 2015 a title of Docent (Adj./Ass. Prof.) in Political Science (spec. Cultural Politics), University of Jyväskylä, where has taught and collaborated in research projects.She is an engaged scholar in media and associations: She is an Executive Committee member and chair of the publications committee of the International Political Science Association (IPSA). She served in 2018-2022 as the Chair of the Finnish Political Science Association. She is a board member of the Finnish Federation of Learned Societies (2021-2023), and Treasurer of the Society of Scientists and Parliament Members, Tutkas ry. (2019-2023).Palonen is a discourse theorist and an expert on politics, polarisation and communication, populism and democracy, local participative governance and planning. She has been working on politics of memory in symbolic urban landscapes but also populist movements and even the far right. Besides her expertise on Hungary since 1999, she has been actively following Finnish politics and authors the EJPR Political Data Yearbook on Finland. Academically she is particularly interested in Europe but also engages worldwide. She is an active and engaged scholar invited for talks.
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Toivonen, T., Kangas, L. & Strömberg, J. (2024, April 13). „PS:n puoluesihteeri: Aseen käytöstä epäilty Vornanen on vapautettu – tämän tiedämme kansanedustajan rikosepäilystä nyt.” Yle News.https://yle.fi/a/74-20086052
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Online Material
Finns Party: Election program for the European Parliament elections of 2024 (Published 24th of April 2024). https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/ajankohtaista/psn-eu-vaaliohjelma-on-julkaistu-katso-julkistustilaisuus-suorana-klo-9-30-alkaen/
“Syrian Sunni Jihadi Chickens Home to Roost: Assad’s Fatal Gamble in Iraq,” by Dr. Reda Mahajar (Research Fellow at The Conflict Analysis Research Centre (CARC) at the University of Kent).
“Memory, Fear, and Sectarianism in Syria,” by Dr. Haian Dukhan (Lecturer in Politics & International Relations, SSSHL Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Teeside University).
“The Evolution and Mishaps of Kurdish Identity Politics Under Multiple Dominations,” by Rojin Mukriyan (PhD candidate in the department of Government and Politics at University College Cork, Ireland).
