In this interview with the ECPS, Professor Tomaž Deželan offers a sobering assessment of Slovenia’s post-2026 electoral landscape, portraying it as a microcosm of broader European democratic tensions. While the election outcome reflects a degree of democratic resilience, it simultaneously reveals deepening fragmentation, rising anti-establishment mobilization, and the normalization of populist political styles. Professor Deželan argues that Slovenia is undergoing a structural transformation in political competition, marked by leader-centric mobilization, evolving campaign strategies, and the growing influence of digital communication. Most strikingly, he contends that mainstream and center-left actors are increasingly adopting populist tactics themselves, thereby weakening their normative advantage. In this sense, Slovenia exemplifies a wider trend in which democratic actors risk eroding liberal-democratic standards while attempting to counter populism.
Interview by Selcuk Gultasli
In the aftermath of Slovenia’s closely contested 2026 parliamentary elections, the country has emerged as a revealing case for scholars of democratic resilience, party-system transformation, and the adaptive capacity of populism in contemporary Europe. Long regarded as one of the more stable and institutionally consolidated post-socialist democracies, Slovenia now appears to be entering a more uncertain phase marked by electoral fragmentation, ideological polarization, and the growing normalization of political styles once associated primarily with the populist radical right. The narrow result of the election may have prevented an outright illiberal breakthrough, yet it also exposed how fragile the liberal-democratic center has become under mounting domestic and transnational pressures.
In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Tomaž Deželan, Chair of Policy Analysis and Public Administration at the University of Ljubljana, offers a nuanced and sobering interpretation of Slovenia’s evolving political landscape. Rejecting simplistic binaries, he argues that the current moment reflects both “a sign of democratic resilience” and the simultaneous emergence of “competitive illiberalism” within a formally democratic order. In his account, the 2026 election did not simply confirm the endurance of liberal democratic forces; it also revealed the strengthening of alternative actors and strategies that challenge the older political equilibrium from multiple directions.
A central theme of Professor Deželan’s analysis is the structural transformation of political competition itself. Slovenia’s fragmented party system, he suggests, can no longer be understood merely through the lens of episodic volatility. Instead, it points toward a deeper reconfiguration in which traditional party collusion, leader-centered organization, new gray zones of funding, and increasingly unregulated campaign practices coexist with novel forms of mobilization through civil society, digital platforms, and technocratic-populist appeals. Particularly striking is his observation that “we are bringing the messy world into Slovenia,” as strategies pioneered elsewhere in Europe and beyond increasingly shape domestic political behavior.
The interview’s central insight emerges most sharply in Professor Deželan’s comparative reflection on the changing repertoire of democratic actors themselves. As right-wing populists gain confidence, sophistication, and digital reach, he argues, mainstream and center-left forces have struggled to articulate a compelling non-populist response. Instead, they have increasingly adopted emotional and adversarial tactics of their own. Hence his stark conclusion: “democratic forces have, to some extent, responded to populism with populism,” and in doing so, they risk ceding further ground rather than reclaiming democratic initiative. This diagnosis is especially important because it shifts attention away from populist actors alone and toward the strategic exhaustion of those who claim to defend liberal democracy.
Professor Deželan also situates Slovenia’s trajectory within a broader European and transatlantic context. He traces the reconceptualization of Europe in more sovereigntist and ethno-national terms, the continued resilience of Janez Janša’s SDS (Slovenian Democratic Party) through leader-centric and affective mobilization, and the rise of anti-establishment formations such as Resnica as symptoms of deeper crises of trust and representation.
Taken together, Professor Deželan’s reflections suggest that Slovenia is not an outlier but a condensed laboratory of wider democratic tensions. This interview therefore offers not only an interpretation of one national election, but also a timely warning about how liberal-democratic systems may erode when their defenders begin to mirror the very logics they seek to resist.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Tomaž Deželan, revised so slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Slovenia Shows Both Democratic Resilience and Emerging Competitive Illiberalism
Professor Deželan, let me begin with the broader picture: In light of the razor-thin electoral margin between liberal and right-wing blocs, how should we theorize Slovenia’s current trajectory—as a case of democratic resilience under stress, or as an early-stage manifestation of competitive illiberalism within a formally consolidated democracy?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: First of all, thank you for the invitation. It is actually both. Obviously, there are different dynamics going on in Slovenian society, and they have been present for quite some time. But you are right: the latest election does show, in a way, a sign of democratic resilience, which has always been the case, particularly with support for the center-left liberal parties. Because, basically, when the center-right parties did not end up as at least relative winners of the national election, it was usually the case that the center-left liberal parties managed to secure at least a relative majority, often due to some sort of fear of autocratization of society or growing illiberalism. So, in that sense, we can see a clear demonstration of democratic resilience.
This is particularly evident in the fact that it was the first case since 1996 that the main governmental party ended up as the winner of the election. But it was a tight one, as you said—razor-thin—so there are also other things going on.
We also have to recognize that, even though the main governmental party, Gibanje Svoboda, ended up as a relative winner, there was, during the election campaign, a very clear idea that the left bloc is the key safeguard against growing illiberalism and autocratization. For example, Slavoj Žižek described it as a civilizational decision, and in many ways a lot of Slovenes, particularly supporters of the center-left, felt this way.
However, we also have to acknowledge that this party and the current Prime Minister did demonstrate some authoritarian actions or styles of governing, which were quite heavily criticized within the public. The current government also faced corruption scandals that were not fully examined and concluded in the period leading up to the election.
Moreover, we observed some visible steps by the current government and the Prime Minister that clearly portrayed big business, as well as certain professions, as parts of the elite, which indicates elements of populism. So, in that sense, the bloc that is supposed to defend democracy and liberal democratic values does demonstrate some problematic features.
At the same time, there is competitive illiberalism emerging, particularly in the form of two parties that can claim some degree of electoral success. This is especially true of the Christian Democrats, a minor center-right party that managed to gain support even though they did not strongly differentiate themselves from the dominant center-right Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) and its leader Janez Janša. This suggests that appearing as a close competitor, but also as an ally of the main illiberal force in the system, can be a successful strategy. As a result, we now have two alternatives that clearly support a more illiberal agenda and can generate more than 10% of the vote, which is quite significant in Slovenian terms.
So, in that sense, we can claim that there is a sign of democratic resilience—the democratic forces did not lose the election, if not outright winning it. At the same time, there is a clear indication of emerging alternatives to the well-established model of Janez Janša and SDS, and that is something new.
Fragmentation Signals a Shift Toward Post-Cartel Politics
To what extent does the pronounced fragmentation of Slovenia’s party system reflect a structural reconfiguration of political representation—perhaps akin to a transition toward “post-cartel party” dynamics—rather than episodic electoral volatility?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: There’s something going on there as well. For example, it’s true that political parties still heavily depend on the state, and obviously they are almost completely funded by the state. They also really try to avoid competition. Particularly the traditional parties like the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats and the conservatives, such as the Slovenian Democratic Party, try to avoid heavy competition. This kind of collusion is a pattern. There is also quite a lot of professionalization, particularly in terms of new ways of communication with the public, especially among the larger parties. Particularly the Slovenian Democratic Party, which has the upper hand here.
But obviously, there is also a clear response to a failure of the current model, and basically we can see that the calls for this kind of technocratic style of government mixed with populism are very clear, particularly with the two—I already mentioned the Christian Democrats—with this party that particularly calls for better governance of the economic system. This is their main kind of—I won’t say a differentiating point from the Slovenian Democrats, as they are actually supporting the same agenda—but it is obvious that they have managed to set the pace in that area, so basically this is their salient topic.
But at the same time, the new party, Democrats, led by Anže Logar, former foreign minister in the Janša government, has managed to instill this response to a failure of communication between the two camps. Basically, he is very much into this technocratic model of governance. He also kind of demonstrates this general—I won’t say shift of Slovenian parties, because more or less they have always been like that—but a very clear feature of centralized power concentrated around the leader or a very close leadership.
And then, not all of these new parties demonstrate this pattern of alliances with social movements. At the same time, however, the relatively new Gibanje Svoboda party, like the Liberal Democrats, does exhibit something that is not a feature of the traditional cartel model—namely, close alliances with social movements. In this sense, it was actually social movements that decided the election, as they effectively shaped the campaign leading up to it, which was at least partly run by external advisors from companies linked to both private and publicly affiliated Israeli organizations.
Basically, civil society actually alerted to this campaign that was supposedly also linked to the Slovenian Democratic Party, even though this has not been confirmed yet. There have been some connections—this is clear now—but the rest is still open and up in the air. But anyway, it was civil society that managed to mobilize a large part of the center-left voters to get to the polling stations and actually defend this democratic resilience bloc.
In a way, we can definitely see some sort of post-cartelization of Slovenian parties, but there is no clear model here, because different strategies are employed by different parties that do manifest this, I would say, important move toward a different kind of model. Particularly due to new avenues of funding for Slovenian political parties, it is very clear that even though almost all funding comes from the state, there have been and there are clear avenues and clear indications of funding that is quite a gray area. For example, there are links to different foreign agents or foreign interests that invest in companies supporting one or the other options. As well as what we have clearly seen is that the regulation of the electoral campaign is far too narrow and has basically opened up a field for a longer, at least medium-term campaign that is quite unregulated, as well as quite prone to abuse in terms of funding, and also of some conventions that were usually, or prior to these elections, quite well abided by.
So, in a way, we are bringing the messy world into Slovenia, which is getting messier by the minute, and obviously we are also seeing the strategies of other political parties—particularly populist and right-wing parties that we have been observing across Europe and the world—entering the Slovenian political arena. This was not the case during our period of independence; it started to appear in the middle of the past decade, but now it is very clearly present, and basically all parties are employing those tactics.
Slovenia Is Not Turning Eurosceptic—It Is Reimagining Europe
Drawing on your work on Europeanization, how do you interpret the increasingly salient tension between pro-European liberalism and nationalist-populist contestation? Does this indicate a recalibration of Slovenia’s embeddedness within the EU’s normative and institutional order?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: Unfortunately, you could say so even though there is still very strong support for European integration and for the EU, citizens have always been quite fond of Europe as such, because it has long been seen as a signal or a concept of progress. Europe was the alternative to Yugoslavia during the communist period and has remained so, which is why there has always been a positive notion of Europe.
That said, particularly after entry into the EU and following various crises, people have learned that Europe can also be a messy thing. Many people have become at least somewhat disillusioned, especially when they observed similar political dynamics reappearing at the European level as those seen in the national arena—particularly the rise of populism and right-wing themes. Europe had always been perceived as something better for Slovenes: more civilized, more democratic, and more committed to respecting democratic values.
However, when Eastern European leaders and countries began to demonstrate behavior that most Slovenians rejected—whether in the European Parliament or other EU institutions—this created a degree of public disappointment. This also provided an opportunity for conservative parties to take advantage of such sentiments, although it should be noted that the radical left—or simply the left—has occasionally attempted to capitalize on this kind of resentment as well. Primarily, however, it was the main party on the right, the Slovenian Democrats, that began to reshape this image of Europe—maintaining support for the EU but advocating for a different kind of Europe. For instance, another center-right party, which also has a member of the European Parliament and a former president, promotes a more economically oriented, arguably neoliberal, but still globally competitive Europe.
By contrast, the main party on the right has redefined Europe in terms more aligned with the Visegrád model—a Europe that is sovereigntist and strongly ethno-national. In a sense, this represents a Europe that is no longer Europe as it was previously understood by Slovenians. Therefore, I would not necessarily describe this as growing Euroscepticism or outright disappointment with Europe per se. Rather, it reflects a reconceptualization of Europe shaped by a certain degree of disillusionment—one that aligns more closely with authoritarian models in the East, envisioning a Europe that allows Central and Eastern European countries to thrive without imposing democratic reforms or rule-of-law constraints, which are perceived as limiting its global effectiveness.
This is what we have been observing, and it was not the case during Slovenia’s accession to the EU or in the early stages of membership. Of course, these developments should also be understood in relation to broader trends across Europe—particularly in Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Poland—which serve as important benchmarks. More recently, especially with the Trump administration, this shift has gained an entirely new level of legitimacy.
Janez Janša Mobilizes Both Supporters and Opponents
Right-wing populist leader Janez Janša’s Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) demonstrates enduring electoral resilience. How might we explain the persistence of its support base in terms of ideological anchoring, leader-centric mobilization, and affective polarization?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: That’s quite a challenging question, but it is actually all of the things you mentioned, because there is no party without the leader—there is no Slovenian Democratic Party without Janša. There simply is not, even though this is the best-organized party in the country. This mobilization around the leader is as strong as possible. In that sense, having a figure like him—who has led the government three times, in different periods, often during crises—is crucial. It is discussed and debated, but his role during Slovenia’s independence is undeniable. So, in that sense, this is the key programmatic point and also the central element that mobilizes the public in a very effective manner. Supporters of Janša become highly emotional when it comes to him, but even those who oppose him react emotionally as well. He also has a strong mobilizing effect on the left.
And sometimes this proves to be crucial when competing with him. In a way, it is a very strong party organization from the ground to the top, with a clear hierarchy and a rather authoritarian style of leadership and governance that resonates with voters who want to see a strong leader. I would not necessarily say authoritarian, but certainly a strong leader, especially given that, across the board, we have often had leaders who did not demonstrate the same level of leadership skills. He does, and that resonates well within the center-right camp.
What is particularly interesting now is that they are gaining support—becoming more and more successful—with what I would call unusual constituencies. Previously, their base consisted largely of more traditional voters from non-urban environments—older and less educated—but now they are achieving quite significant success with the youth vote, which they did not demonstrate in the past. At the same time, they continue to retain their traditional voters.
So, Janša and the party are being transformed in line with what we are seeing with the MAGA movement in the US. They have developed a very sophisticated network of individuals who are highly effective in communicating their messages to different audiences, and this is also evident in their outreach to younger voters. In that sense, they have reinforced the image of Janša as a clear leader and the best possible choice, particularly through effective youth mobilization. This is largely due to their youth wing, as well as networks of influencers who are not their traditional supporters but whom they have managed to bring on board. They are clearly thriving in this area.
So, you could say there is no party without Janša, but you could also say that they are developing a sophisticated model that does not rely solely on mobilizing their traditional base but is also bringing in new constituencies—and this is what frightens the left the most.
Anti-Establishment Politics Is Filling the Vacuum Left by Institutionalized Parties
The parliamentary entry of anti-establishment actors such as the right-wing populist movement Resni.ca suggests a widening space for anti-systemic politics. To what extent does this reflect deeper crises of institutional trust and political representation?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: You’re right—“Resnica” actually means “truth” in direct translation, and it clearly reflects a lack of trust, or distrust, in virtually everyone. Slovenian society suffers from low levels of trust in politicians, political parties, state institutions, other social institutions, and even fellow citizens. In that sense, Slovenians trust no one.
Resnica, which originates from resentment toward the Janša government and its actions during the pandemic, embodies this dynamic. Initially, it was expected to be a temporary, post-pandemic phenomenon that would eventually fade. However, that has not been the case. The movement managed to secure a visible share of votes in elections immediately after the pandemic, and although its momentum appeared to stall for a time, it re-emerged in this national election.
At this point, it has successfully reasserted its anti-establishment position, largely because all other parties are perceived as part of the establishment. Even Janša and New Slovenia—the Christian Democrats—cannot credibly claim to be anti-establishment, as they have all been in government at least once. In fact, every party currently represented in parliament has governed at some point. This is where Resnica holds a clear advantage.
This is also how it generates support and secures votes. While it is not the only party with anti-establishment origins, parties such as the Left—now part of the government and previously a supporting actor—have lost much of that appeal. As they became more institutionalized and integrated into formal politics, they relinquished their anti-establishment identity, which Resnica has effectively appropriated. As a result, Resnica draws support from across the ideological spectrum. Some of its voters come from the radical left, others from the extreme right, but its core appeal lies in its anti-establishment, anti-elite positioning.
Looking ahead, its role could be pivotal in government formation. Without Resnica, it may be difficult to form a government, regardless of its composition. However, participation in government would require the movement to transform itself, effectively becoming part of the establishment it opposes.
Immediately after the elections, Resnica signaled that it would push its priorities, but within a short time, it became apparent that such participation could fundamentally alter its identity and mode of operation. It is now publicly stating uncertainty—or even reluctance—about cooperating with any party associated with the elite, which effectively includes all other actors. This makes its future trajectory highly uncertain.
There is also the possibility that its support base could grow further, particularly if new elections were held due to a failure to form a government, although this scenario seems unlikely. What remains to be seen is how any engagement with the establishment would affect its electorate.
What is clear, however, is that this represents a new pool of voters in Slovenian politics. Even though some center-left voters abstained, overall turnout remained stable because these are voters who typically do not participate but were mobilized by Resnica. In that sense, it represents a genuine game changer in Slovenian politics.
Consensus Politics Is Eroding Under Pressure for Structural Reform
Slovenia has historically been viewed as a relatively stable post-socialist democracy. Do current developments indicate convergence with more polarized Central European trajectories, or does Slovenia retain distinctive institutional and cultural buffers?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: That’s a very good question. Of course, Slovenians value stability and appreciate periods without crises. This is also why the anti-Janša sentiment is so strong in Slovenia, as Janša is often associated with disruption, and Slovenians generally do not want disruptions. In that sense, this consensual style of governing—without major breakthroughs but also without major crises—is very much preferred in Slovenian society. Stability therefore remains very high on the priority list for virtually all political parties, even though some of them, particularly Janša’s SDS, are sometimes tempted to pursue more radical steps when in government.
I would expect stability to remain the dominant feature this time as well, particularly given the configuration of parties that have entered parliament, as well as the patterns of political behavior that Slovenians are accustomed to among their political elite. Stability is likely to be the primary objective, and it is already very high on the agenda in post-election negotiations, partly due to the global situation and conflicts such as those in Iran, Gaza, and Ukraine, but also in terms of internal dynamics.
At the same time, things are changing. In particular—though not exclusively—center-right political parties are increasingly prioritizing major reforms, that is, broader structural changes, which were often avoided in the past because people tend to resist change. In this sense, we may be witnessing a gradual transformation of Slovenia’s traditionally consensual, stability-oriented system toward a more erratic, but perhaps also more consequential, political arena—one that is being actively pushed, in particular, by some of the current opposition forces.
Slovenia Is Following a Populist Script Written Elsewhere
From a comparative perspective, how does Slovenia’s 2026 election refine our understanding of the evolving drivers of populist radical right (PRR) mobilization across Europe?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: As I said before, we are seeing a script that has been written elsewhere. In particular, the links of some party leaders to populist regimes or populist leaders abroad show how they benchmark their behavior and, at times, even rely on similar infrastructures. So, the script has clearly been written elsewhere. As I noted earlier, the success of Trump—rather than the Trump administration itself, but his re-election—along with the subsequent actions of his administration, has amplified what Slovenian populist agendas had already been in the past. As a result, these actors are now more willing and more confident in openly articulating positions that they previously sought to conceal or at least soften.
What we are seeing now is the growing importance of social networks and digital platforms, along with a hybridization of political communication in which traditional modes are reinforced by more postmodern forms, and vice versa. This has been accompanied by a higher degree of sophistication and a significant increase in resources devoted to these strategies—something that was not evident before.
We also observe a clear emphasis on emotional mobilization, particularly through fear. Notably, fear has also become a feature of what we might describe as left-wing populism. In this sense, democratic forces have, to some extent, responded to populism with populism. Center-left parties, which traditionally did not rely on such strategies, have struggled to develop effective alternatives to counter the populist dynamics emerging on the right.
This is also where civil society, as mentioned earlier, has played a role. Although civil society organizations—especially those advocating for democracy and the rule of law—are typically among the most active and vigilant actors, the intensity of the electoral contest has led to the widespread adoption of populist tactics across the political spectrum. And this trend is unlikely to reverse.
In essence, the democratic resilience bloc appears to have concluded that, at least for now, populism is the only effective means of countering populism on the right. More broadly, this suggests that pro-democratic forces currently lack the tools necessary to engage effectively with the forms of populism we are witnessing—not only globally, but also in Slovenia.
Without Compromise, Slovenia Risks Majoritarian Polarization
Looking ahead, do you anticipate a re-consolidation of liberal-democratic governance through coalition pragmatism, or a continued expansion of anti-systemic and populist actors under conditions of fragmentation, digital disruption, and socio-economic uncertainty?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: I would like to be an optimist. Of course, many Slovenians hope—and across the board, particularly those on the center-right who did not support the radical right but rather the moderate right—hope to see liberal-democratic institutions to consolidate as we have experienced them over the past three decades, and even their further deepening. They genuinely feel this way and hope for it.
But I am not such an optimist. I think the current result represents an opportunity, even though the outcome is highly uncertain and it is unclear who will ultimately form the governing coalition. Still, I would say this may be a last opportunity to return to a more consensual, albeit sometimes unstable, form of government. In such a scenario, we may again see changes in government in the final year before elections, as was usually the case in the past, though not this time.
At the same time, there would be a renewed necessity for negotiation, deliberation, and dialogue within the system. What I fear—and what many Slovenians seem to fear—is that, if new elections are held, we may end up with clearly defined blocs and a type of system that we do not want: one dominated by majoritarian logic, lacking deliberation, and prone to creating disruptions in society, ultimately further polarizing the Slovenian political community, which is already highly strained.
So, in a way, there is a broad hope that political forces will come together. The most viable configuration for such an outcome would likely involve cooperation between the Social Democrats, the center-left liberals such as Gibanje Svoboda, the Christian Democrats, and the Democrats of Anže Logar, a center-right liberal party. In other words, bringing together Christian Democrats, liberals, and Social Democrats to form a stable, moderate center.
Such a coalition may not produce dramatic transformations or elevate Slovenia into a dominant position in any particular domain, but it could respond to the expectations of the Slovenian public—namely, stability, a moderate style of governance, and responsiveness to ongoing crises without generating new divisions. At present, there is a widespread concern about deepening divisions and a strong desire to avoid them.
