The emergence of repressive and authoritarian “hybrid regimes” poses one of the most significant threats to democracy today. These regimes and authoritarian actors wield information suppression and manipulation as essential tools to disseminate narratives that erode democratic institutions. This issue transcends national borders; digital technologies now enable authoritarian states to infiltrate robust democracies, allowing them to project their authoritarian narratives globally. The transnationalization of authoritarian politics, facilitated by digital technologies, presents substantial challenges to the integrity of democratic processes and institutions.
In response to these challenges, a workshop which is a collaborative effort organized on November 7-8, 2024, by the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, Australia, and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) in Brussels, Belgium. The workshop aimed to investigate how various actors—governments, non-state organizations, state-sponsored entities, and political parties—suppress and manipulate information to erode trust in democratic processes, both domestically and internationally. The workshop also examined the darker dimensions of social media, focusing on the interactions between misinformation, negativity, and polarization.
Moreover, the workshop addressed strategies to counter misinformation and disinformation, along with intervention techniques to mitigate their impacts. It also focused on countering disinformation through activism and explored everyday online experiences with misinformation, emphasizing the importance of evidence-based media literacy education initiatives. Additionally, the event discussed necessary curricular reforms to combat disinformation, toxicity, and polarization in educational contexts, as well as the responses of political elites to conspiracy theories.
The aim of the workshop, funded by the Australian Political Studies Association (APSA), the Australian Research Council (ARC), and the Gerda Henkel Foundation, is to deepen the understanding of these critical issues and explore collaborative strategies to combat misinformation and disinformation in our increasingly complex digital environment.
Round Table 1 – Foreign Interference Campaigns on Social Media: Insights from Field Theory and Computational Social Science
Keynote by Dr. Robert Ackland (Professor, The Australian National University)
Round Table 2 – Manipulating Truth: Authoritarian Strategies of ‘Attention Bombing’ and ‘Epistemic Modulation’ in Hybrid Media Systems
Keynote by Dr. Timothy Graham (Associate Professor, Queensland University of Technology)
Round Table 3 – The Dark Side of Social Media: Misinformation, Negativity, and Polarization
Keynote by Dr. Jason Weismueller (Assistant Professor, University of Western Australia)
Round Table 4 – The Influence of Familiarity and Identity Relevance on Truth Judgements
Keynote by Dr. Li Qian Tay (Postdoctoral Fellow, The Australian National University)
Round Table 5 – Countering State-Sanctioned Information Operations: The #FreeYouth Movement in Thailand
Keynote by Dr. Aim Sinpeng (Associate Professor, The University of Sydney)
Round Table 6 – Investigating Everyday Online Experiences with Misinformation and Responding with Evidence-Informed Media Literacy Education Initiatives
Keynote by Dr. Tanya Notley (Associate Professor, Western Sydney University)
Round Table 7 – Reforming the Curriculum to Counter Disinformation, Toxicity, and Polarization
Keynote by Dr. Mathieu O’Neil (Professor, The University of Canberra; Honorary Associate Professor, The Australian National University)
Round Table 8
Ignore, Rebut or Embrace: Political Elite Responses to Conspiracy Theories
Keynote by Dr. Zim Nwokora (Associate Professor, Deakin University)
And
Disinformation in the City Response Playbook
Keynote by Dr. Jessica (Ika) Trijsburg (Research Fellow in City Diplomacy at the Melbourne University)
Closing Remarks
By Dr. Lydia Khalil (Program Director, Transnational Challenges at Lowry Institute)
On November 7, 2024, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) organized a panel at the European Parliament in Brussels to examine the critical influence of rising populism on the 2024 European Parliament elections and the forthcoming US administration. Hosted by MEP Radan Kanev and ECPS Honorary President Irina von Wiese, the event featured distinguished experts who discussed the challenges populism poses to transatlantic relations.
Moderated by Dr. Simon P. Watmough, the panel spotlighted ECPS’s comprehensive 2024 report, which analyzed populist party performance across the EU’s 27 member states. Dr. Emilia Zankina and Dr. Gilles Ivaldi, the report’s editors, provided expert insights into the outcomes of the June European Parliament elections. Keynotes by MEPs Radan Kanev and Nathalie Loiseau addressed the challenges of populist politics for EU-US relations and the implications for democratic governance.
We invite you to watch the panel video for in-depth perspectives on these pressing issues and the potential shifts in transatlantic relations amid the rise of populist movements.
In an insightful interview, Professor Lucan Ahmad Wayexpressed serious concerns about the durability of American institutions under Trump’s influence. “I am extremely worried about how American institutions might respond to Trump’s autocratic tendencies,” he stated, noting that subtle abuses, like politicized audits or investigations, could escape media scrutiny yet still erode democratic foundations. While US rule of law might limit overt actions, Professor Way emphasized the risk of covert pressures aimed at silencing opposition, highlighting the fragility of democratic safeguards in polarized times.
In a thought-provoking interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Lucan Ahmad Way, Distinguished Professor of Democracy at the University of Toronto, expressed deep concerns over the resilience of American institutions in the face of potential autocratic shifts under Donald Trump’s leadership. “I am extremely worried about how American institutions might respond to Trump’s autocratic tendencies,” Professor Way remarked, emphasizing the risk of subtle forms of abuse that might not attract significant media attention but could undermine the democratic fabric.
Professor Way highlighted concerns that Trump could politicize key institutions like the IRS (Internal Revenue Service), Department of Justice, or FBI to target political opponents discreetly. Although the United States’ strong rule of law may prevent extreme actions, such as the imprisonment of opposition leaders, Professor Way warned about the possibility of covert audits and investigations aimed at harassing Trump’s critics or opposition-aligned businesses.
Beyond the US, Professor Way discussed the evolving priorities of liberal democracies globally, noting a growing need for robust military investments in response to threats from authoritarian powers like Russia and China. He urged Western countries to shift focus from democracy promotion to securing the physical safety of democratic nations, particularly given the heightened risks of military conflicts in regions like Ukraine and Taiwan.
Touching on the broader global landscape, Professor Way also identified economic development as a critical factor in the stability of democracies, citing the correlation between increased wealth and democratic resilience. He underscored that while economic challenges often destabilize democracies, they also threaten authoritarian regimes, as seen recently in Bangladesh. Through this interview, Professor Way sheds light on the complex dynamics influencing the future of democracy in both the US and the wider world.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Lucan A. Way with some edits.
Cultural Backlash Is the Key Driver of Populism
Hungarian government’s anti-immigration billboard says “STOP the refugees” in Budapest, Hungary on April 4, 2018.
Professor Lucan Way, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In your view, what are the main factors driving the global rise of populism and authoritarianism today? How do these factors differ across regions, and are there shared elements that make populism a global phenomenon?
Professor Lucan A. Way: I think there are a number of factors. Traditionally, people have made two main arguments. One sees populism as a result of economic discontent or neoliberalism, specifically linked to the 2008 financial crisis. The other approach tends to view populism as a result of more cultural factors, such as fear surrounding the increasing empowerment of visible minorities. For example, in the United States, experiments show that if people are reminded that visible minorities are likely to soon make up the majority of the American population, they experience a sense of “racial threat,” which motivates support for racist parties.
Most studies show that, on a one-to-one basis, cultural backlash variables are more strongly associated with support for populism than economic factors. The evidence leans in favor of these cultural backlash variables in most cases, though they take different forms in different regions. In the United States, particularly in 2016, populism was historically tied to backlash against the civil rights movement and the empowerment of Black Americans. In Hungary, it has taken the form of anti-cosmopolitanism, where Viktor Orbán successfully tapped into resentment against urban elites to polarize the country and build support for Fidesz. In other cases, populism has been driven by anti-immigration sentiment. Overall, cultural factors, such as opposition to immigration, urban elites, or racial minorities, appear to unite most of these movements.
Given the decline of Western liberal hegemony and the rise of alternative power centers like China and Russia, how sustainable is the resilience of third-wave democracies in regions lacking robust civil societies or economic stability? How has the weakening of Western liberal hegemony, alongside the influence of countries like China and Russia, contributed to the persistence and even the rise of competitive authoritarian regimes globally?
Professor Lucan A. Way: What’s interesting is that the third wave of democracy was very much influenced by liberal hegemony in the 1990s, when the Soviet Union collapsed. During this brief decade-long period, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) were essentially the only global powers, which led to a dramatic increase in the number of democracies worldwide.
However, as most readers will know, this changed in the 2000s with the rise of China as a major economic power and Russia’s increasing military aggression—first in post-Soviet Georgia and, most recently, in Ukraine. This period of liberal hegemony has now ended. Given that liberal hegemony helped fuel the rise of democracies, one might expect that its end would lead to a dramatic decline in democracies. Yet, that has not been the case. Instead, we’ve seen a sort of stability in third- or fourth-wave democracies since the 2000s, with only a slight dip in the number of democracies over the last decade in a few countries like Venezuela and Hungary. So far, at least, democracy has remained relatively robust and certainly more resilient than one might expect given the current Zeitgeist.
In cases like Hungary and Turkey, we see competitive authoritarianism taking root even in countries with democratic traditions. What strategies have leaders in these countries used to effectively erode democratic norms while maintaining electoral competition?
Professor Lucan A. Way: I think Turkey is a case where democracy was limited; it had long periods of military rule with only brief stretches of democracy before Erdogan’s rise. So, I would question the extent of Turkey’s democratic history. Hungary, on the other hand, experienced about 25 years of democracy. The main strategy, particularly relevant to the current US context, has been to dismantle the independent bureaucracy, effectively removing the civil service and politicizing the state. This is essentially the “Orbán plan,” a very common approach, which I worry could become more prominent in the United States.
In Hungary’s case, they argued that the “deep state” was controlled by communists, justifying a purge of officials. These officials were then replaced by loyalists to the ruling Fidesz party. This tactic—removing independent officials and replacing them with loyalists—seems to align with certain elements of Donald Trump’s agenda in the US, which is, I believe, a significant cause for concern.
Far-Right Ideologies and Anti-Democratic Actions Are Distinct Issues
Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, speaks at the Atreju convention in Rome, Italy on December 16, 2023. Photo: Alessia Pierdomenico.
How resilient do you believe liberal democratic institutions are to the pressures posed by populist leaders and movements? What mechanisms or strategies have been most effective in safeguarding democracy against authoritarian shifts?
Professor Lucan A. Way: Well, a few things here. I think it’s important to distinguish between the so-called far right and anti-democratic parties. These are often conflated, but they’re distinct. For instance, you may have a far-right party that is anti-immigrant or opposes rights for certain minorities, yet that doesn’t necessarily mean it fundamentally attacks democracy. These are two separate issues.
A party may be anti-immigrant or even racist without undermining core democratic institutions. For example, in Italy, Georgia Meloni’s government has been characterized by far-right views, especially concerning immigrants, yet hasn’t fundamentally attacked minorities or democratic structures. This may also be true in other cases, like France. So, it’s essential to avoid conflating opposition to minorities or immigration with opposition to democracy—they’re not necessarily the same.
In the United States, however, these elements are more closely linked; you have an anti-immigrant party that is also highly anti-democratic. Given that the US is the world’s oldest democracy, this combination is, of course, deeply concerning.
Considering recent shifts in European policies, particularly Germany’s defense initiatives and economic distancing from Russia, what do you see as the long-term implications for Europe’s role in promoting and defending democratic values globally?
Professor Lucan A. Way: I think right now Europe’s main concern needs to be security. For many decades, including myself, we didn’t fully appreciate the importance of a robust military in preserving the liberal world order. However, with Russia’s violation of the norm against invading other countries and its interference in democratic elections in the US and Europe, this is a significant concern. Right now, liberal countries outside the United States are waking up to the necessity of seriously investing in their military capabilities—not only to defend Ukraine, a democracy directly attacked by Russia, but also due to the realization that failing to defend Ukraine could have profound global implications. Without such defense, there could be a concerning increase in the frequency of countries attacking one another.
Of course, I believe the biggest concern on this front right now is the potential for China to invade Taiwan. Here, we see very direct and literal military threats against democracies, which the liberal West needs to focus on preventing. In a sense, we are beyond simply promoting democracy as seen in the 1990s; the emphasis now is much more on actively maintaining the physical security of democratic nations.
In your article, “The Resilience of Democracy’s Third Wave,” co-authored with Professor Steven Levitsky, you contend that the findings of V-Dem and Freedom House may be exaggerated and don’t entirely reflect the real state of democracy. To what degree do you think the current narrative of “democratic decline” is overstated? Do you believe the data truly indicates a global democratic backslide, or are we seeing shifts in how democracy is interpreted? Has your perspective changed in the light of Trump’s election in the U.S. and the recent successes of far-right parties in Europe?
Professor Lucan A. Way: Regarding V-Dem and Freedom House, I don’t see a reason to question the data itself, but rather the rhetoric surrounding it. Their reports often have a hyperbolic tone that doesn’t fully align with the data they present. I feel these interpretations have become exaggerated, likely aimed at attracting media attention. You’re unlikely to get calls from major outlets like The Washington Post or The New York Times with a report stating that “things are basically the same,” so there’s a tendency towards more sensational claims, like democracy being at a level comparable to the 1980s, which is demonstrably inaccurate.
Moreover, terms like “autocracy” are used quite liberally in these reports. For instance, labeling India as an autocracy feels misleading. India under Narendra Modi has engaged in concerning authoritarian practices, including suppressing opposition and targeting the Muslim population. Ahead of the last election, they even sought to freeze the accounts of the opposition Congress party. Yet, the elections themselves remain largely democratic, as shown by the BJP’s loss of majority, requiring them to form a coalition. So, calling India an autocracy overlooks the fact that its elections still hold significant power in determining leadership. It’s more accurate to view India as a competitive authoritarian system, where elections remain meaningful but are accompanied by substantial abuses of authority.
These are cases where elections remain real and effectively determine who gains and retains power, yet they are accompanied by various forms of authoritarian abuses, including attacks on the opposition. I think that’s an important distinction to make, and I do believe it’s significant, yes.
Economic Crises and Public Dissatisfaction Also Challenge Authoritarian Regimes
Large protests demand the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government as part of the Anti-Quota Movement and Bangladesh Quota Reform Protests. Thousands took to the streets in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on August 4, 2024. Photo: M.D. Sabbir.
Given the increasingly unfavorable international environment, why has full-scale authoritarianism failed to make a comeback? What are the international and domestic roots of the resilience of competitive electoral regimes?
Professor Lucan A. Way: I have two main responses. First, the world has become significantly wealthier over the past generation. Since the 1980s, the number of high-income countries has doubled, and there’s an extremely strong correlation between wealth—excluding oil wealth—and democracy. According to the World Bank, if we exclude petro-states like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which derive their wealth primarily from natural resources, 95% of high-income countries today are democratic, with only Singapore and Hungary as exceptions. This correlation has held steady over time, indicating that, in the modern era, wealth contributes strongly to democratic resilience. Since the 1980s, the global increase in wealth has bolstered democratic stability, even in places where it was previously fragile, such as Romania, Portugal, and Greece. These countries are now high-income, and their economic development and robust domestic economies play a key role in preventing full democratic backsliding.
The second point is that, even among middle-income countries, it’s easy to overlook how challenging it is to establish and sustain authoritarianism. The same economic crises and widespread public dissatisfaction that threaten democracies also pose significant challenges to authoritarian regimes. For example, this was seen dramatically in Bangladesh over the summer, where deep dissatisfaction with the autocratic Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina contributed to her eventual ouster.
We, often, assume these challenges are unique to democracies, but authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes face similar issues in maintaining power due to general discontent with economic instability and corruption. Bangladesh is a case in point, where frustration with issues like the quota system and high unemployment intensified dissatisfaction, highlighting the limitations on the authority of an autocratic leader.
You argue there is considerable evidence that Russian President Putin’s attack on international norms could ultimately strengthen the liberal world order. Can you please explain how that could happen?
Professor Lucan A. Way: I wrote that piece shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, and I think it was impressive how strongly the West united in support of Ukraine. Putin likely hoped that Europe and the United States would not respond, partly because Russia has maintained corrupt ties with members of the European elite—most notably, Gerhard Schröder, who was paid millions by Russian oil companies and essentially became completely compromised. Putin may have believed that these relationships would allow him to divide the European elite. However, the brutal nature of the invasion shocked many and pushed Western leaders into unified action.
Remarkably, this led to Europe’s significant shift away from dependence on Russian energy resources—a transformation that has been quite notable. Many of us were pleasantly surprised by this level of unity. That said, we are not yet out of the woods. There continues to be some hesitation among European powers and an insufficient recognition of the need to strengthen their militaries against the Russian threat. I also think the war is likely to continue for some time, and I wouldn’t entirely discount the possibility of divisions emerging. I think Putin certainly hopes that, especially with Trump’s election, we might see divisions in Europe, particularly along lines similar to Orban in Hungary, who has been notably pro-Russian, or Serbia’s alignment with Russia. This is a development I’m quite concerned about.
Why do some authoritarian regimes survive for decades, often despite severe crises, while others collapse quickly, even absent significant challenges? How do you explain the nexus between social revolution and authoritarian durability? One of your articles suggests that many democracies in lower-income regions remain competitive due to authoritarian weaknesses. Could you expand on the dynamics that keep democracies stable in these challenging environments?
Professor Lucan A. Way: Why do social revolutions result in stable autocracies? Well, that’s a question we explored in our book, and it largely has to do with the fact that social revolutions—like Russia in 1917 or Cuba in 1959—almost always lead to civil war or violent conflict. This conflict enables the creation of a highly unified elite who maintain cohesion because of an outside threat, fostering a siege mentality. It also allows these regimes to build a strong military and eliminate alternative power centers, leading to a weakened civil society. China is a prime example of this phenomenon: while it faces economic issues, there is no significant opposition capable of capitalizing on public discontent with the Communist Party, which helps it remain in power.
Trump Will Make Life Difficult for His Critics and Opposition-Supporting Businesses
Former U.S. President Donald Trump and vice-presidential nominee J.D. Vance at a rally in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.
With the election of Donald Trump as the 47th president of the US, how do you think American institutions will react to his autocratic tendencies?
Professor Lucan A. Way: I am extremely worried about how American institutions might respond to his autocratic tendencies. While I think it’s very unlikely that this will lead to the end of elections or full-scale authoritarianism, American institutions remain vulnerable to politicization. I’m particularly concerned about potential abuses, such as using the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to audit Trump’s political rivals or the Department of Justice or FBI to investigate his enemies.
The US has a strong rule of law, so it’s unimaginable that Trump could jail high-profile opponents like Kamala Harris or Democratic leaders. However, it’s quite conceivable he could use audits or investigations to make life difficult for his critics, targeting businesses that support opposition candidates like Josh Shapiro. Recently, there was an attempt to pass a bill in the House that would allow the Secretary of the Treasury to revoke the nonprofit status of NGOs allegedly supporting “terrorism”—a vaguely defined term that could be used selectively against left-wing organizations while protecting right-wing ones.
There are many possibilities for more subtle forms of abuse that won’t necessarily be dramatic or attract major media attention. These wouldn’t involve actions as extreme as jailing political candidates or suppressing protests but could instead happen behind the scenes through tactics like targeted audits. This kind of abuse is harder to detect, especially for outsiders—it’s challenging to gauge, for instance, if the IRS is disproportionately auditing Democrats over Republicans. Such actions are easier to carry out because they’re more opaque, which is precisely why I’m deeply concerned. In fact, I think it’s incredibly likely that we will see these kinds of abuses, and I would be very surprised if they do not occur in the United States.
How do you think populism in the US and populists worldwide will be impacted by the election of Donald Trump?
Professor Lucan A. Way: I think initially, Trump’s election will certainly fuel and boost confidence among populists globally. At the same time, I want to point out that the driving force behind support for Trump may not necessarily be a fundamental shift to the right. Instead, it could be a reflection of deep anger directed at incumbents.
The silver lining, for those opposed to such populist figures, is that now, as they hold power, this anger is likely to be directed at them. It’s just hard to be an incumbent anywhere these days. Since 2013, in wealthy democracies, 15 out of 18 elections have led to incumbents being ousted. This intense anti-incumbent sentiment likely fueled the last US election.
What’s puzzling to me, honestly, is the source of this anger. Yes, there’s inflation, but inflation in the United States was 14% in the 1980s, while now it’s around 2.4%. Unemployment is very low, nearly 4%, which is close to full employment. The economy seems to be performing fairly well, so it’s somewhat perplexing. The anger and perceptions of the economy seem misaligned with the actual indicators.
And lastly, how do you explain the electoral victory of Maia Sandu despite heavy Russian influence in Moldova?
Professor Lucan A. Way: First, it was very close. There were actually two key elections—a referendum on joining the EU and Maia Sandu’s election. Both were definite nail-biters. I think Moldovans are likely quite fearful of Russian influence, especially given what’s happened to their neighbor Ukraine. Moldova also has a long tradition of anti-Russian sentiment, particularly among Moldovan and Romanian nationalists, which provided a strong basis of support for her. So, yes, that’s a piece of good news. In Georgia, however, it’s disappointing to see that the pro-Russian party appears to have used fraud to maintain power, so there’s positive news in Moldova but less so in Georgia.
Explore the insightful discussions from the International Conference on ‘Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific,’ held on September 25-26, 2024, in a hybrid format from Melbourne. This conference brought together a diverse coalition of experts, hosted by leading institutions across the Indo-Pacific and Europe, including the Alfred Deakin Institute at Deakin University, Universitas Indonesia, National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), Universitas Gadjah Mada, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, International Islamic University Malaysia, UIN Salatiga, and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).
The conference delved into how digital technologies, though transformative, have become tools for disinformation, political manipulation, and digital authoritarianism, posing serious challenges to democracy and social unity. This issue is particularly urgent in the Indo-Pacific, where misinformation on platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Telegram, and WhatsApp has fueled divisions and where political forces sometimes restrict access to vital digital spaces to consolidate control.
Attendees, including scholars, practitioners, and policymakers, shared perspectives on how digital disinformation affects the region and discussed strategies for promoting digital literacy, inclusivity, and democratic resilience.
Generously supported by the Australian Research Council, Gerda Henkel Foundation, ECPS, and the Alfred Deakin Institute, this conference aimed to foster collaboration and shed light on countering disinformation in today’s digital age.
Don’t miss the opportunity to engage with these compelling sessions—watch the full conference videos here:
Dr. Cengiz Aktar(Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and Advisory Board Member of ECPS).
Speakers
“Autocracy in Azerbaijan and Its Regional Implications,” by Thomas de Waal (Senior Fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region).
“The State of Democracy and Populism in Armenia,” by Dr. Nerses Kopalyan (Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas).
“The Rotating Populist Discourses of the Post-Soviet Georgia – From the Nationalist Populismto the Conservative Populism,”Dr. David Matsaberidze (Associate Professor at Department of International Relations, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University).
“Hegemonic Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan,” byDr.Jody LaPorte (Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford).
“Populism Against Post-war Armenia’s Democratization and European Integration,” by Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan(Professor, Chair of Political Science, Faculty of International Relations at Yerevan State University).
“From Technocratic Facade to Right-Wing Reality: The Evolution of Populism in Georgia,”by Dr. David Aprasidze(Professor of Political Science at Ilia State University).
Professor David Aprasidze: In Georgia, the Georgian Dream party exemplifies a technocratic form of populism, treating state governance like corporate management. Founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, a former businessman, brings a non-ideological, efficiency-focused approach, applying principles from his business career to politics. He appoints key officials as “managers” to carry out strategic directives, allowing him to remain distanced while exercising control. This model emphasizes expertise and governance over ideology, with Ivanishvili viewing the state as if it were one of his companies.
In a revealing interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. David Aprasidze, political science professor at Ilia State University in Tbilisi, sheds light on how Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of Georgian Dream, has transformed Georgian governance through a “technocratic populism” model. According to Professor Aprasidze, Ivanishvili “treats the state almost as if it were a business,” blending his extensive business experience with politics to establish a unique governance style that sets Georgian Dream apart from other political movements. Ivanishvili, who made his fortune in Russia in the 1990s, sees himself as a “highly successful businessman” who can replicate that success in governing Georgia.
Professor Aprasidze further highlights how this approach has affected democratic institutions in Georgia, where the judiciary and parliament operate less as independent bodies and more as extensions of Ivanishvili’s centralized authority. This concentration of power, Aprasidze suggests, marks a significant step back for democracy in Georgia and reveals broader trends of democratic backsliding that align with the recent autocratic shift in Georgian Dream’s populist narrative.
Interestingly, Professor Aprasidze points to Georgian Dream’s evolving relationship with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party. Initially, Georgian Dream was aligned with the European Socialists, positioning itself on the center-left, but “especially after the war in Ukraine,” Professor Aprasidze notes, the party quickly pivoted to the far right, embracing nationalist and traditionalist rhetoric. Professor Aprasidze observes that Orbán has become a “close ally and influential mentor to Georgian Dream,” offering a populist playbook that guides their current approach.
Reflecting on the EU’s recent stance, Professor Aprasidze underscores the European Commission’s demands for reform before recommending membership talks with Georgia. Yet he remains skeptical, stating that he and “many observers of Georgia” believe it’s unlikely the current administration will undertake the necessary democratic reforms. With a mixture of caution and insight, Professor Aprasidze’s analysis provides a critical lens on Georgia’s political transformation and its implications for both democratic integrity and EU integration.
Dr. David Aprasidze, political science professor at Ilia State University in Tbilisi.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor David Aprasidze with some edits.
Georgian Case Illustrates How Populism Can Evolve
David, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. How and under what circumstances does technocratic populism emerge in hybrid regimes? What are its principal characteristics, and what strategies do technocratic populists use to stay in power and govern? What is its difference from conventional populist parties?
Professor David Aprasidze: The Georgian case illustrates how populism can evolve—its color, content, and format can all shift. I believe we could indeed call the initial period of the Georgian Dream a form of technocratic populism. Now, returning to your questions: What are the main features of this type of populism?
A key feature is that those in power, or those aiming to assume power, possess a specific skill or expertise that sets them apart from others. They are, in effect, free from any rigid ideological stance and do not claim to adhere to one. Instead, they emphasize their ability to govern effectively and improve the lives of ordinary citizens. In Georgia, and particularly with the Georgian Dream, this technocratic approach to populism is reflected in their comparison of state governance to corporate governance, treating the state almost as if it were a business model. One of the most influential people in Georgia today, and the founding father of the Georgian Dream, exemplifies this approach. He comes from a business background, having built his fortune in Russia in the 1990s, and sees himself as a highly successful businessman. By bringing his business experience into politics, he positioned himself as someone who could replicate his business success in governing the country. He claimed that the principles he used to run a business would similarly apply to running the country, treating it as if it were one of his companies.
If we combine these features, first, they possess technical expertise. Second, they do not have or embody a strong ideological basis. Third, they bring business experience and apply similar principles to politics. This forms the foundation.
In Georgia, this approach was implemented by Bidzina Ivanishvili, who selected his followers—party members and especially those in government—as he would select managers in his own company. Acting as a stakeholder, he owns the “business” but hires managers to run it on his behalf. He is not involved in every routine decision; instead, his operatives carry out his strategic directives. Thus, the Prime Minister, Ministers, Speaker of the Parliament, and Chairman of the party function as his managers, each responsible for a specific area he has entrusted to them. Naturally, he can replace them based on their performance. If he’s dissatisfied, he can easily remove them and appoint new managers. This, in essence, was how Georgia was governed until 2022.
Technocratic Populism Poses a Serious Threat to Democratic Principles
How has the technocratic populism influenced the balance of power and the role of democratic institutions like the parliament and judiciary in Georgia?
Professor David Aprasidze: That’s a very good question, as technocratic populism has effectively subjugated these institutions. If we accept that this model describes how Georgia was governed, then all authorities—all institutions—become part of a unified mechanism. In this framework, the judiciary functions somewhat like the legal department of a business, while the parliament serves as a procedural body where policies are developed and drafted. Ultimately, however, these institutions do not balance or oversee one another, as the parliament is supposed to do with the executive. Instead, they operate as interconnected components of a single system—as administrative divisions within what resembles a corporate structure.
This approach is, of course, very harmful to democracy because it undermines key institutions. As you mentioned, both the judiciary and parliament are affected: the parliament loses its authority and prerogative to oversee and check the government, or the executive. The judiciary, similarly, becomes merely a registry, simply implementing decisions handed down from the top rather than making independent judgments. Like other forms of populism, this model is detrimental to democracy—though it employs a different method and approach. Ultimately, it poses a serious threat to democratic principles.
What role does the Georgian Dream’s strategy of managing political opposition through loyalty-based appointments and selective prosecution play in shaping an increasingly autocratic governance model in Georgia?
Professor David Aprasidze: Observing how the Georgian Dream developed over time, starting with their rise to power in 2012, we see that it was a weak coalition. Unlike traditional coalitions in European countries or elsewhere, the Georgian Dream wasn’t a coalition in the conventional sense. Instead, it was a unified front that included various opposition parties on a single list, aiming to challenge the previous government. In 2012, rather than competing individually in elections and forming alliances based on outcomes, these opposition parties came together before the elections. This unity created a diverse front in the initial period, with different politicians in Ivanishvili’s government and Parliament, providing a facade of democracy and contestation.
Starting with the second term in 2016, the Georgian Dream began to remove former allies. Some were co-opted, while others were pushed toward the opposition and marginalized. From 2016 through 2020, during this second period of Georgian Dream’s rule, they gradually co-opted or marginalized various politicians. In this process, they used all necessary means to compromise these individuals—whether through the judiciary, the media, or by corrupting them to the extent that they lost legitimacy to function as an opposition or challenge the ruling party.
They employed a range of methods, including controlled media and propaganda against these politicians, as well as selectively applied judicial actions. Those who remained loyal or stayed silent faced no legal challenges, while individuals who dared to criticize or act as opposition saw law enforcement agencies and the judiciary weaponized against them. Through these threats and by shaping public opinion, the Georgian Dream approached the opposition in a calculated manner, gradually silencing a significant portion of it. By the 2020 elections, the opposition was fractured, divided, and in many cases, effectively silenced.
Georgian Population Remains Strongly Pro-European
‘March for Europe’ demonstrations in support of EU integration and membership at Liberty Square in Tbilisi, Georgia, on October 20, 2024. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic.
To what extent do pro-Russian influences within the Georgian Dream party align with or diverge from the public’s pro-European aspirations, and how might this tension impact Georgia’s trajectory toward EU integration?
Professor David Aprasidze: This is a very good question. We could also reframe it slightly and ask, “Is Georgian Dream pro-Russian or not?” But there is no simple answer. I would say that, as with many populist parties across Europe, there is indeed a certain ideological alignment or shared understanding between Russia and this type of populist party, as they promote similar ideas. They both tend to undermine liberal democracy and the Western-style democracy we associate with Western Europe and other parts of the world. In that sense, they may appear to be natural allies.
However, this isn’t always the case. I wouldn’t argue that Georgian Dream is explicitly pro-Russian; rather, it is primarily pro-Georgian Dream. They seize every opportunity to strengthen their hold on power. Until 2020, 2022, or even the onset of the war in Ukraine, Georgian Dream attempted to maintain a pro-Western facade while operating autocratically behind the scenes. As a result, there was no clear stance. Many voices criticized Georgian Dream, claiming the party’s policies or rhetoric were pro-Russian, but it was challenging to make a definitive judgment on this.
Following the war in Ukraine and Georgia’s attainment of EU candidate status with a formal path to membership, Georgian Dream realized that this status would bring pressure to implement deep and far-reaching reforms—reforms they were unwilling to pursue. As a result, they gradually distanced themselves from the EU’s requirements. Step by step, they began shifting toward an anti-Western, anti-European stance, effectively distancing themselves from the Western sphere. Simultaneously, they increasingly adopted rhetoric similar to that currently used by Russia. Since 2020, and especially after the 2024 elections, this alignment of Georgian Dream with Russian policies has become more visible and noticeable than ever before.
As for the Georgian population, it remains strongly pro-European, as confirmed by public opinion polls and surveys. However, the recent election had contested outcomes, both domestically and internationally. I personally believe it was rigged, with Georgian Dream employing various methods to falsify the results. Still, it is now challenging to gauge the true public opinion.
We may learn more in the weeks and months ahead, depending on whether public protests emerge. If many people take to the streets to oppose Georgian Dream’s autocratization efforts, it would confirm that the Georgian population remains Western-leaning, while Georgian Dream acts in opposition to this will, effectively “capturing” the state. However, if there isn’t significant public protest or resistance, we may need to reassess our understanding of public opinion on this issue. Hopefully, this won’t be the case.
Elections in Georgia Mark a Clear Negative Trend
Given the Georgian Dream party’s recent policies that some compared to Russian-style “foreign influence” laws, how do you see these laws affecting civil society and independent media in Georgia, and are they part of a larger autocratic trend?
Professor David Aprasidze: Absolutely. I am quite certain that this is part of a larger autocratic trend, unfortunately. We saw signs of this when the law was introduced in the spring, just a few months before the elections, and have since witnessed further deterioration. Although there were critical voices and warning signs that the elections would deal another blow to democracy, it is now clear that this decline has continued following the adoption of this law.
The elections demonstrated a decline in the quality of democracy in Georgia, marking a clear negative trend. Will this go further and have a tangible impact on civil society and the media? That remains to be seen. However, if the current trend persists, we can expect Georgian media and civil society to face increased pressure in the coming days and weeks.
Firstly, we see a clear trend of deterioration. Secondly, with the law’s provisions soon to be implemented, if these are fully enforced by the relevant authorities, they will certainly shrink the space for civil society, limit access to independent funding, and may soon lead to a significant reduction in the number of independent media outlets and non-governmental organizations.
The European Commission has stated that it cannot recommend EU membership talks unless Georgia changes course. What specific changes do you believe the Georgian government would need to make to regain the EU’s confidence, and how likely are such reforms under the current/new administration?
Professor David Aprasidze: Unfortunately, I, along with many observers of Georgia, believe that under the current government or administration, it is very hard to imagine a restart of relations with the EU.
When the European Commission issued the requirements—known as the “9 steps”—for Georgia to progress toward membership, they were very specific about opening negotiations. The most important of these 9 points was free and fair elections, with an expectation for Georgia to conduct elections that are free, fair, and competitive. Now, we see those leading countries in the European Union, except Hungary (due to similarities in populist governance between Georgia and Hungary), have condemned the way the elections were organized and held in Georgia. They demand that the Georgian government fully investigate all the irregularities observed both on election day and beforehand.
However, we do not see any signs that the Georgian authorities are prepared to meet this requirement. Therefore, I do not expect that Georgian authorities will be ready to meet the other 8 requirements set by the European Commission. While Georgian authorities officially continue to argue that Georgia is still on the path to integration, the reality and evidence are quite limited. Thus, I do not expect, unless there is a comprehensive change in administration or policy, that these authorities are prepared to make the necessary changes.
Georgian Dream’s Shift to Far-Right Rhetoric Derails Path to EU Integration
Georgia’s President Salome Zurabishvili is welcomed by European Council President Donald Tusk ahead of a meeting at the European Council in Brussels, Belgium, on January 22, 2019. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.
How do recent allegations of electoral fraud and interference reflect broader trends of democratic backsliding in Georgia, and what role does populism play in reinforcing this shift?
Professor David Aprasidze: Well, absolutely. We have already talked about the irregularities during elections, and this is an unfortunate confirmation, a proof that Georgia is backsliding on its path of democratization. Actually, Georgia has never been a fully functioning, consolidated democracy. It was moving along a difficult path toward democratization, but now we are undermining all the achievements we have made along the way. Therefore, these elections were a very strong and significant step backward.
Populism—we initially discussed technocratic populism, right? Until around 2022, Georgian Dream exemplified this type of populism, emphasizing expertise and claiming to run the country like a successful business. However, since 2022, especially during the election campaign, we have seen a complete reshaping of this populist narrative. It has shifted toward a far-right, extreme position rooted in traditional values. While I have nothing against family values, this far-right approach frames family and religion in an anti-minority, anti-liberal context, openly attacking liberal values, including the protection of individual and minority rights. This shift from a purely technocratic populism to a far-right, anti-Western, anti-liberal rhetoric has become an important ingredient of Georgian Dream’s electoral campaign. This departure is why Georgian Dream has moved the country so far from its European integration trajectory, and it’s why I believe it’s simply impossible to restart the relationship between Georgia and the European Union under the current administration.
Hungary’s Populist Playbook Guides Georgian Dream’s Strategy
And lastly, David, Hungarian Prime Minister and the term president of European Union Victor Orbán visited Tbilisi and congratulated the leaders of Georgian Dream for their success while other EU’s leading officials criticized the election process. What sort of relationship does Georgian Dream have with Victor Orbán’s Fidesz Party in particular and with other far-right, populist parties in Europe?
Professor David Aprasidze: When Georgian Dream first embarked on its European trajectory, it joined the European Socialists as an observing member, initially positioning itself on the center-left of the ideological spectrum. However, especially after the war in Ukraine—partly due to geopolitical factors but, I believe, primarily due to domestic political motives and a desire to consolidate power—they quickly shifted toward the far right.
They aligned with and engaged in an exchange of ideas with Hungary’s Fidesz Party, and with Viktor Orbán in particular. Numerous mutual meetings took place; the Georgian Prime Minister met with Hungarian leaders multiple times, and Orbán visited Georgia. These exchanges occurred at various levels—parliamentary and party—making Hungary and its leadership Georgian Dream’s most reliable, if not only, partners in Europe.
Interestingly, if we trace the transformation of Fidesz and the evolution of Orbán himself—from the start of his political career to his current stance—it serves as a model for Georgian Dream. To answer your question directly, Orbán is a close ally and influential mentor to Georgian Dream. The Hungarian model of populist transformation, led by Fidesz, provides Georgian Dream with a playbook on how to proceed.
Miguel De Vera, Anton; Hamaiunova, Viktoriia; Koleszár, Réka & Pasquettaz, Giada. (2024) “Future Resilience of the European Technology Security.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0004
Abstract
This paper explores vulnerabilities in the European Union’s technological security, focusing on Huawei as a case study to illuminate broader security challenges. Amid intensifying US-China tensions, especially under former US President Donald Trump, the EU encountered new risks linked to the strategic positioning of Chinese tech firms within critical European infrastructure. Trump’s “America First” policy targeted China with tariffs and trade restrictions to address perceived unfair practices, triggering disruptions in global supply chains that reverberated through the EU economy. For Europe, heavily reliant on secure, stable trade flows, these events highlighted the urgency of reassessing technological dependencies and reinforcing digital security. The paper presents a series of strategic recommendations for the EU to mitigate such vulnerabilities, emphasizing the need for diversified supply chains, rigorous security standards for tech partnerships, and collaborative policies among EU members to strengthen resilience in the face of geopolitical shifts and technological competition.
Authored by Anton Miguel De Vera, Viktoriia Hamaiunova, Réka Koleszár & Giada Pasquettaz
Introduction
In the increasingly uncertain geopolitical climate, the European Union (EU) is facing the challenge of maintaining its technological resilience while protecting its security and autonomy. The fast-paced international competition for technological leadership is closely tied to the bloc’s economic competence and has consequences for its security. Given the importance of transatlantic cooperation in this domain, the upcoming US elections, and the possibility of a second Trump administration should urge policymakers to focus on strengthening the EU’s preparedness. This paper addresses the existing vulnerabilities in the EU’s technological security through the exemplary case of Huawei and outlines recommendations on how to tackle them.
Connectivity, one of the critical technologies of the rapid Fourth Industrial Revolution, has been at the center of heated discussions in recent years. Several nations identified connectivity to be an essential part of their competitiveness and development and, among others, Huawei emerged at the forefront of advanced technologies. The Chinese-owned ICT provider was among the world leaders in rolling out their next-generation telecommunication networks worldwide. Within the EU, the choice of 5G providers has generated crucial debates. Next to the obvious economic interests, building telecommunication networks came with important security considerations. As the US-China rivalry intensified under President Trump, the EU faced an important vulnerability.
Donald Trump’s trade war with China, a key component of his “America First” agenda, had significant repercussions for the EU. By imposing tariffs on Chinese goods, Trump sought to counter what he perceived as unfair trade practices by China. This conflict disrupted global trade and impacted the EU’s economy, which is heavily dependent on stable supply chains.
For the EU, the escalating US-China trade tensions presented both challenges and opportunities. While the trade war resulted in market volatility, it also provided Europe with a chance to strengthen its trade relationships with China. The two reached an agreement in principle on a comprehensive agreement on investment (CAI) in 2020 – although it was later put on hold due to the tit-for-tat sanctions. The prospect of deepening ties with China posed a risk of straining transatlantic relations, particularly as Trump urged European nations to collaborate with the US in pressuring Beijing. Trump’s populist trade policies thus compelled the EU to carefully balance its relationships with both the US and China while prioritizing its own economic and security interests. It is in this context that the debate around Huawei and the EU’s technological security is situated in.
The EU’s 5G Rollout: Rhetoric Coercion and Uneven Progress
The European Commission identified the possibilities of 5G early on and adopted an action plan in 2016 to launch 5G services in all member states by the end of 2020 (European Commission, 2024). Although some experts warned that the EU is falling behind in technological transformation, member states quickly began catching up and published their roadmaps. However, progress was uneven and fragmented (5G Observatory Quarterly Report 2, 2019). At that time, Huawei was in a prime position in the European market to support the 5G rollout and was already working with several European providers. By 2019, the Chinese company signed memorandums of understanding with wireless providers in at least 9 EU countries, including Germany, Spain, and France (5G Observatory, 2021). For many, it seemed evident that for the EU to stay competitive and meet the plans for 5G coverage, Huawei was the answer.
In parallel, however, concerns about the security of Huawei equipment began circulating. Against the backdrop of the escalating trade war between the US and China, the former began prompting allies to exclude Huawei from their networks (Woo & O’Keeffe, 2018). President Trump labelled Huawei a security risk and threatened to cut off intelligence and information-sharing with allies using the ‘untrustworthy’ 5G vendor (Business Standard, 2020).
US Policy towards China under Donald Trump: Framing as a Strategic Tool
Donald Trump’s political rise is often analyzed through the lens of populism and framing theory, both of which help explain his appeal and communication strategies. Populism, broadly defined, refers to a political approach that pits the “common people” against a perceived corrupt elite (Mudde, 2004). Trump’s rhetoric embodies this populist style, as he frequently claims to speak for ordinary Americans against the political establishment. His 2016 campaign, for instance, centered on “draining the swamp” in Washington, positioning himself as an outsider who would challenge entrenched elites. During the 2024 election, he is still using this populist communication, by portraying himself as “one of the people”, like in one of his recent tweets where he works for one shift in McDonalds.
One of the key aspects of Trump’s populism is his use of framing. He does not only use it on a national level for criticizing his opponents but also in relation to foreign policy issues. Framing theory, as defined by Entman (1993), involves highlighting certain aspects of a reality while downplaying others, effectively shaping how an issue is understood by the public. Trump’s framing of China is a prime example. Throughout his presidency and during his campaigns, Trump consistently framed China as a threat to American economic interests and national security. By doing so, he shaped public discourse and channeled public frustrations about job losses and trade imbalances into hostility toward China.
A prominent example of Trump’s framing of China came during his trade war with the country. He portrayed China as an “unfair” player in global trade, accusing it of “stealing” American jobs and intellectual property. In a 2019 speech, Trump stated, “China has taken advantage of the United States for many, many years. And those days are over.” This framing was effective in galvanizing his political base, particularly among working-class voters who felt economically marginalized by globalization (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). By framing the issue as a battle between patriotic Americans and a foreign adversary, Trump reinforced his populist credentials.
Trump’s framing of China intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, where he repeatedly blamed China for the spread of the virus, referring to it as the “China virus” and the “Kung flu” (The New York Times, 2020). By doing so, he shifted public discourse to portray China as responsible not only for the economic challenges faced by the US but also for the public health crisis, a narrative that resonated with many of his supporters.
A notable example of this framing came in March 2020, when Trump tweeted, “The United States will be powerfully supporting those industries, like Airlines and others, that are particularly affected by the Chinese Virus.” This statement reported widely in the media, sparked accusations of racism and xenophobia (CNN, 2020). However, Trump defended his rhetoric, arguing that it was necessary to hold China accountable for the pandemic’s global spread. His framing successfully linked the frustrations over COVID-19 to broader concerns about China’s role in the world economy, feeding into his populist narrative of protecting American interests.
Framing theory is particularly relevant here because it highlights how political actors shape public perception by focusing on certain narratives. As Entman (2007) notes, framing involves selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in communication. Trump’s framing of China as both an economic competitor and a national security threat played a significant role in justifying his tariffs and aggressive foreign policy stance. Moreover, Trump’s use of this frame was amplified by the media, contributing to rising anti-China sentiments in the US (Goffman, 1974).
By framing China as a direct threat to American prosperity, Trump not only advanced his populist message but also reshaped political discourse, making foreign policy a central issue for many voters. Through this, he created the basis of US trade policy against foreign companies deemed as a threat and towards allies who seemed hesitant to follow this approach.
With all this, the EU faced a two-fold dilemma: giving in to Trump’s strategy and losing out on competitiveness while appearing to have little strategic autonomy or seizing the opportunities with Huawei but straining the transatlantic relationship while potentially endangering critical infrastructure. As of 2024, the EU’s answer has been fragmented and disunited. Only 10 of the 27 member states have excluded Huawei and although almost all states put in place some kind of restrictions, only a handful of them implemented it (European Commission, 2023a). President Trump’s approach of pressuring allies and threatening to cut off intelligence-sharing may have been counterproductive, but it exposed an important weakness of the EU.
What Next – The Way Forward
With the US elections approaching, the EU has a window of opportunity to address this dilemma. The possibility of a second Trump administration brings the risk of further aggravating the US-China ties and putting the EU into an even more uncomfortable position. The war in Ukraine has heightened the EU’s need and dependence on intelligence-sharing with the US Upcoming challenges in transatlantic relations are likely to have significant repercussions for the EU’s security. At the same time, the EU-China relations are also at a heightened risk of entering into a trade war as the latest developments around the export of Chinese electric vehicles demonstrate. The economic vulnerability of certain European member states to Chinese pressure adds another dimension to the complex nature of achieving united European approaches. Essentially, the EU needs to safeguard its autonomy against unilateral actions while maintaining its competitiveness and ensuring the security of its critical infrastructure. To do that, policymakers should consider the following scenarios and the presented policy recommendations.
If Trump Wins
First, in case of a Trump victory, Europeans have to embrace another period of uncertainty. A second Trump Administration will renew concerns about US support for NATO while the protectionist policies will put direct pressure on transatlantic trade relations. It is expected that President Trump will continue his previous hardline approach towards China leading to an intensified trade war and a bigger volume of Chinese exports being dumped on the European market. All the while, Europeans will increasingly be pulled into a trade and technology war with the Eastern power amid calls from the US to reduce relations. In this scenario, Trump’s rhetorical pressure, as in the previous case of calling to exclude Huawei from the 5G rollout to maintain intelligence-sharing, might turn into actual policies. In 2025, this would come with a huge price given the EU’s dependence on the American intelligence infrastructure to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia’s war. Any threats thus must be taken seriously and addressed accordingly.
Next to that, internally, Trump’s success would galvanize far-right, populist figures and movements. His ideological allies in Europe, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Polish President Andrzej Duda would be emboldened to continue their path after a Trump victory. Far-right, populist politicians would find renewed reassurance to oppose more European integration. Consequently, reaching unity on crucial foreign policy questions might further be hindered.
Faced with the prospect of this challenging situation, European policymakers would do well to address the potential pitfalls early on. Given the foreseeable fragmentations, the EU must strengthen and implement the framework it already has agreed upon (such as the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox and the Digital Services Act). According to the latest assessment of the 5G Toolbox, which was adopted to mitigate security risks, only 10 out of the 27 Member States have restricted or excluded high-risk suppliers from their 5G networks (European Commission, 2023b). Based on its own and Member States’ independent analyses, the European Commission considers Huawei along with another Chinese company, ZTE, to ‘pose materially higher risk than other 5G providers.’ Dependency on these providers for critical infrastructure, which the 5G network is considered, creates a serious risk across the Union. Considering the level of interconnectedness between EU networks, a fragmented policy could jeopardize the entire bloc’s security. For instance, last year Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó highlighted Hungary’s development of 5G networks with the help of Huawei, next to signing additional cooperation agreements with the company (Szijjártó Péter, 2023).
To address the diverging approaches, the EU should develop a mechanism to actively encourage Member States to implement the existing framework and use the available tools. It should also hold Member States accountable for doing so. Considering the weight of risks in the EU’s technological security, policymakers should call for an EU-wide regulation with clear and urgent deadlines. This would support the EU’s autonomy in making security-related decisions as assessments of risks are done both by Member States and by the European Commission. Transatlantic relations are likely to become more friendly as a result and the EU’s security would increase. One of the downsides of this approach, however, is the expected response from Beijing. China is likely to retaliate for a European policy naming and restricting its companies from the market. Besides, reaching this agreement on a European level will not be easy as Member States’ security priorities and relations with China differ significantly. Nevertheless, this approach offers the EU a starting point to be a proactive actor.
If Harris Wins
If Americans choose a Harris administration for the next four years, the EU would find itself in a similar position as they were during Biden’s administration assuming that Harris will take up a similar approach against China. Despite their opposition to each other, President Joe Biden had taken a similar approach to his Republican predecessor. Biden ordered heavy tariffs on Chinese imports of high-tech items such as semiconductor chips while diversifying its sources for imports such as the EU and Mexico (Davis, 2024; Lovely et al., 2024). In doing so, the United States has become less dependent on China for all types of imported manufactured goods since 2018, according to recently released 2023 customs data (Lovely et al., 2024).
The EU and China, however, have maintained or increased their reliance on each other for almost all types of imported goods” (Lovely et al., 2024). As such, the EU could potentially clash with the US by maintaining this dependence which showcases some form of limited autonomy. On the one hand, the EU exercises its agency to shift towards maintaining and deepening ties with China. However, on the other hand, the EU’s agency is somewhat limited given its trade dependency with China which may compel it to act in favor of Beijing on certain issues.
A Harris administration would likely maintain the use of tariffs, particularly targeting China, to counter perceived unfair competition as emphasized by Trump, and to drive progress in the US energy transition, supporting its emissions reduction goals. This was evident during the presidential debate between Harris and Trump in September 2024. She highlighted Trump’s failed attempt to subdue China as an economic powerhouse arguing that “under Donald Trump’s presidency, he ended up selling American chips to China to help them improve and modernize their military” (Butts, 2024). She concluded with the statement, ″[he] basically sold us out when a policy about China should be in making sure the United States of America wins the competition for the 21st century” (Butts, 2024). This comment indicates to the EU and other US allies that Harris is likely to continue Biden’s approach if she wins the presidential race.
In this scenario, the EU faces a more predictable transatlantic landscape. This, however, may prove more perilous. Albeit Harris will follow a hardline approach to China and the pressure on allies to not share advanced technology with Beijing will remain, she is unlikely to strongly push the EU. In contrast to the Trump administration, instead of coercive rhetoric, she is likely to use softer means of persuasion. This carries in itself the risk that the EU will sit on its hands for too long instead of addressing the legitimate security threats that China poses. To ensure that the resilience of technological security remains a priority, the European Parliament should establish a sub-committee of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The sub-committee should deal with the security considerations that come with technologies and equipment from third countries and should ensure that the interests of European citizens are considered in tech security-related questions. This would address the risks of de-prioritization and would contribute to enhanced and more nuanced debates. Considering the viewpoints of Members of the Parliament directly through the sub-committee could help the European Commission to propose regulations that are more likely to enjoy support. The only constraining factor to consider is the budget of setting up the sub-committee but the importance of this issue should outweigh that.
Conclusion
This paper highlighted the importance of European technology security and looked at different scenarios European leaders will face during the US presidential election. The example of the rollout of the 5G technology in the EU and the debates around using Chinese Huawei as the technology provider illustrated the EU’s vulnerability when it comes to maintaining its autonomy and competitiveness in the tech sector. In the rapidly changing global landscape, EU leaders are facing a crucial dilemma about the way forward. To maintain technological competitiveness, the EU may have no choice but to rely on Chinese partners while to ensure the continent’s security and stability, it cannot afford to alienate its key transatlantic partner. At the same time, legitimate security risks should not be overlooked and considered as subordinate to trade relations.
This paper offers a concise depiction of the main factors EU leaders should consider as Americans head to the polls. In either scenario, what is crucial for the EU is to be prepared and engage in collective planning. A second Trump administration is likely to bring about a more hectic and turbulent period. His framing of China as a security threat could lead to more pressure on European allies to cut ties with Beijing while his victory could galvanize European populists making it harder to achieve consensus on the European level. To offset this, the paper recommends taking concrete steps to implement the already existing framework and strengthen the available toolbox. In case of a Harris victory, the EU can expect reasonable continuity. Perhaps an important challenge the bloc will face will be finding the impetus to keep the technology security issue in focus. The paper argues that one way to do that would be to set up a dedicated sub-committee within the European Parliament to keep the issue on the agenda and ensure the interests of European citizens.
Authors’ Biographies
Anton Miguel De Verais an MA student in International Business and Economic Diplomacy at IMC FH Krems. He previously earned a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from Central European University in Vienna, where he specialized in International Relations and Economics. His thesis examined the dynamics of Philippine agency within the US-Philippine security alliance and its nuanced relationship with China, entitled “The Faces of Philippine Agency in Foreign Affairs: The Philippines and the United States Security Alliances”. Currently based in Vienna, Anton works at Raiffeisen Bank International, where he combines his academic expertise with practical experience in finance and international relations.
Viktoriia Hamaiunova is a Ph.D. candidate at Newcastle University (UK), where she investigates the role of legal culture in shaping fair trial standards within ECHR member states, focusing on the integration of mediation into judicial systems to enhance human rights protections. Her research combines doctrinal and non-doctrinal approaches, incorporating thematic analysis and insights from interviews with ECtHR judges to examine how legal culture influences judicial reform and access to justice. Viktoriia Hamaiunova holds an MA in International Law and Human Rights from the University of Tartu, enriched by academic exchanges at Masaryk University and Comenius University. Her legal career includes in-house experience and ECtHR traineership. An accredited mediator and published author, Viktoriia Hamaiunova has presented her work at prominent conferences, including SLSA Annual Conference and the Human Rights Law Conference at the University of Cambridge. With extensive teaching experience, she leads discussions on topics spanning international law to mediation practices. As an interdisciplinary researcher, Viktoriia Hamaiunova is committed to culturally informed legal reforms, fostering development and facilitating discussions on effective judicial systems and dispute resolution.
Réka Koleszáris an independent researcher focusing on the relations between the European Union and Asia, in particular East Asia. Her experience spans international organizations and think tanks including working for the Council of the European Union and the European Policy Centre. Réka holds an MSc in Political Science from Leiden University, an MA in International Relations specializing in East Asian studies from the University of Groningen, and a diploma in the Art of Diplomacy from the European Academy of Diplomacy.
Giada Pasquettazis a doctoral student at the Chair of Political Science and International Politics of Prof. Dr. Dirk Leuffen since October 2023. Her interests are mainly in political communication, international relations, political behavior, comparative politics and quantitative methods. She holds a master’s degree in mass media and politics with a focus on international social movements’ communication from the University of Bologna. She also completed her bachelor’s degree in Sociology at the University of Bologna with a specialization in migration frames used in media. She completed semesters abroad at the University of Sundsvall (Sweden), at UCLouvain (Belgium) and at the UIT Tromsø (Norway).
Lovely, M. E. & Yan, J. (2024, August 27). “While the US and China decouple, the EU and China deepen trade dependencies.” PIIE. https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2024/while-us-and-china-decouple-eu-and-china-deepen-trade-dependencies
Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). “Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic
Trump, D. J. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2020, March 16). The United States will be powerfully supporting those industries, like Airlines and others, that are particularly affected by the Chinese Virus [Tweet]. X.https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1239685852093169664
Ivaldi, Gilles & Zankina, Emilia (Eds). (2024). 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 29, 2024. Brussels. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0059
Throughout the first two decades of the 21st century, populism has emerged as one of the most significant global political phenomenons, deeply affecting electoral politics in democracies across the globe, both new and consolidated. In Europe, populism has become a major force, reshaping the political landscape and discourse of the European Union and most of its member states in unprecedented ways. Over the years, the impact of populist parties has been felt both at the level of domestic and European politics, increasingly putting pressure on more established mainstream parties, particularly at the right of the political spectrum.
Populism is found in different locations in the party system, predominantly at the far-left and far-right of the spectrum. All available data of populist parties illustrates the rise in support for populist, far-left, and far-right parties in Europe since the early 1990s. Such parties have made significant electoral gains in recent years. They have joined coalition governments in several countries, including Italy, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Austria, more generally reflecting the mainstreaming of their ideas and themes in party politics and public opinion.
Populist performances typically vary across parties and contexts, reflecting the complex interplay between structural and contextual factors. The electoral support for radical parties is rooted in structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is conditioned by political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. While contemporary populism is generally seen as a response to a wide range of socioeconomic and cultural grievances and issues, it can also be seen as an expression of political discontent largely dependent on the national political cycle and the shorter-term country-specific opportunities produced for populist mobilization.
In this context, the analysis of the European Parliament elections in June 2024 provides a unique opportunity to assess the current wave of populism across all 27 European Union (EU) member states simultaneously. With elections occurring around the same time, we can examine this wave of pan-European populism more closely and comparatively, assessing its scale, dynamics, and impact on national politics and, ultimately, on the EU. Thus, this report by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) examines the electoral performance and influence of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing on country-specific analyses by local experts, the report evaluates populist party performance across all EU member states and discusses the challenges populist politics pose for European institutions and the future of Europe.
The ECPS report illustrates the diversity of populism and the variety of its manifestations across the political spectrum. The current trend is one of increasing mainstreaming and normalization of populist parties as a result of a dual process of modernization and moderation by populists, on the one hand, and accommodation of populist ideas and policies by mainstream parties, on the other hand. The report see that the modernization of populist politics concerns, in particular, the moderation and blurring of those parties’ positions regarding European integration, to increase their appeal to moderate and pro-EU voters and to foster collaboration with mainstream parties.
The results of the 2024 European elections have essentially confirmed the electoral consolidation of the populist phenomenon in Europe. In 2024, these parties won 263 of the 720 seats – approximately 36%. Populists came first in the elections in six countries, with radical right populists winning in four countries, while centrist populists topped the polls in another two countries. Such results reflect the rise in support for populism in recent national elections as well as the increase in the number and geographical spread of populist parties across Europe. No less than 60 populist parties across 26 EU member states gained representation in the European Parliament in June 2024. In comparison, a total of 40 populist parties had won seats in 22 EU countries in the 2019 election.
Populist party performances varied, however, across countries and different brands of populism. The results of the 2024 European elections have essentially attested to the consolidation of the populist right, while left-wing and centrist populist parties have received comparatively less support across Europe. Moreover, the new distribution of seats should not mask distortions due to the relative weight of national representations in the European Parliament.
The 2024 European elections have delivered a new European Parliament whose centre of gravity has clearly shifted to the right and where the presence of populist actors has increased. However, these parties remain divided in the European Parliament. With a few notable exceptions, such as Fico’s SMER in Slovakia and the German BSW, parties of the populist left are all found in the Left group in the European Parliament. Right-wing populists are currently distributed across three different groups – namely, the ECR, PfE, and ESN. Some populist parties are also found among the Non-inscrits (NI). Finally, somewhat reflecting the diversity in their ideological profile, centrist populist parties are scattered across different groups, including the EPP and Renew Europe.
With the increased representation of right-wing populists in the European Parliament, the report anticipates a growing influence on political debates and policy decisions in areas such as migration, climate change, EU enlargement, and support for Ukraine. It also foresees more ad hoc coalitions on specific issues rather than cohesive positions and policy proposals. The legitimation of radical-right discourse and its impact on both European and national politics is expected to continue. While the current EP majority may effectively maintain a cordon sanitaire around both the far-right and far-left, an overall shift to the right, in both rhetoric and policy, is already evident.
Each chapter of the report provides background information about the main populist forces in the country of focus by examining their history, electoral support and political agenda. This includes populist parties across the spectrum where deemed relevant. With a focus on the 2024 European election, each country chapter looks at the ‘supply side’ of populism (i.e., the positions of populist parties towards the EU in general and vis-à-vis specific policies, such as migration and asylum, fiscal policy, the Schengen system, European citizenship and democracy, the COVID-19 pandemic, human rights, as well as external affairs, including policy towards the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Hamas conflicts). Country analyses ask how populists used Euroscepticism, national sovereignty, ethnic culture, identity, xenophobia and religion during the 2024 EP election campaign and what their discourse was on the composition and working mechanisms of the European Parliament.
Additionally, each chapter examines the ‘demand side’ of populism by looking at how populist parties fared in the elections and which topics played a role in their success or failure. Wherever possible, the country chapters in this report provide public opinion data about critical political issues for populist voters and the characterization of crucial sociodemographics of populist voters across different parties and national contexts.
Finally, each country chapter assesses the impact of populist politics in their respective country and at the EU level (e.g., what kind of populist politics are the elected populist parties going to articulate in the EP and which may be their coalition strategy), allowing for the broader conclusions discussed in this report’s final section.
In an interview with ECPS, Professor Emilia Zankina explains that, despite the financial and mobility benefits of EU membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West” due to Bulgaria’s strong historic ties to Russia. The communist era deeply embedded Russian language, culture, and education in Bulgarian life, and “for many,” Professor Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator.” She observes that while the war in Ukraine initially reduced pro-Russian sentiment in the country, as the conflict continued, some Bulgarians have returned to their original views.
In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Emilia Zankina, a leading expert in political science and Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University, delves into the intricate landscape of Bulgarian politics. Currently Dean of Temple University’s Rome campus, Dr. Zankina offers an in-depth analysis of Bulgaria’s shifting political dynamics, particularly highlighting the nation’s complex relationship with Russia, the rise of populism, and public sentiment toward the West.
In Bulgaria’s recent parliamentary election, the center-right GERB party secured first place, but will need a coalition partner to govern. GERB garnered 25.52% of the votes, with the reformist We Continue the Change (PP) party in second at 13.74%, and the ultra-nationalist Vazrazhdane (Revival) party in third with 12.92%.
Exploring Bulgaria’s historic affinity with Russia, Dr. Zankina explains that despite the financial and mobility benefits gained through European Union membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.” She attributes this sentiment to the powerful legacy of the communist era, during which Russian language, culture, and education were integral to Bulgarian life. “For many,” Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator, and this view endures across generations, who often make little distinction between Russian people and the government.” She describes how, initially, the war in Ukraine prompted a decline in pro-Russian sentiment, but as the conflict has continued, some Bulgarians have reverted to their original views.
Addressing Bulgaria’s “mushrooming” populist landscape, Dr. Zankina sheds light on why the country has faced seven elections since 2021. The rapid turnover of parties, she explains, is fueled by populism’s promise of quick solutions and charismatic leadership, which attracts voters eager for change but dissatisfied with democratic processes’ slow pace. “This populist formula,” she says, “favors emotional appeals and big promises without real solutions.” In Bulgaria, populism has contributed to a “never-ending cycle” of new parties, each aiming to capture a portion of an electorate constantly shifting its support.
Dr. Zankina also highlights the unique dynamic of female representation within Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties, where women play a “strategic role” in appealing to female voters. However, the PRR remains largely male-dominated, reflecting broader perceptions of these parties as “Männerparteien.” As Bulgaria navigates its future in the EU amidst the influence of both Russian-aligned parties and anti-establishment movements, Dr. Zankina’s insights underscore the complexities of national identity, populism, and external influences in shaping Bulgarian democracy.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Emilia Zankina with some edits.
Populism Fuels Ongoing Volatility in Bulgaria’s Party System
Professor Zankina, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question. With the fragmentation of the Bulgarian parliament and the presence of nine parties, what role does populism play in shaping public perception and voter alignment within Bulgaria’s complex political landscape? Could this be the primary reason why Bulgaria has gone to the polls seven times since 2021? Additionally, what role have populist parties specifically played in contributing to this political crisis?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Populism is a broad phenomenon that has contributed to developments in party systems, not only in Bulgaria but throughout Europe. What we see is that populist appeals favor easy solutions in Manichean rhetoric and salvation narratives that make voters less patient with the difficulty and complexity of the democratic process, making them eager to vote for the next “savior” and the next quick solution. So certainly, the growing penetration of populism, both as a discursive technique and a way of organizing parties, as well as a way of moving away from hardcore ideologies, has contributed to an overall expectation by voters that they could be offered a simple solution by the next new party.
So we have this combination of populism breeding a string of new parties that come in a never-ending cycle with new promises and a core body of voters who move from one new party to the next. There is certainly a lot to be said about populism contributing to an overall volatility of a party system which, in the case of Bulgaria, was never fully stable, as it is a relatively young party system. It’s been 35 years, and we have already seen populist appeals for the last 20 or so years making their way, and these have become even more prevalent in the past four years.
Eastern Europe Tries to Build Party Systems as Western Models Erode
Boyko Borisov at a meeting with the President of Bulgaria in Sofia on April 20, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.
How has the shift from traditional political parties to personalistic, charisma-centered leadership impacted Bulgaria’s democratic institutions, and what long-term effects do you foresee? What role do crises play in the rise of charismatic leaders in Bulgaria, and how have leaders like Simeon and Borisov utilized such moments to construct and sustain political charisma? What made GERB and Boyko Borisov so successful in Bulgarian elections since 2006?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Moving away from traditional parties is a significant shift for Western European countries. Central mobilizing themes—often described by the “frozen party thesis” with divisions such as rural versus urban or industrial versus agricultural—have become less relevant as new issues like migration, climate change, and economic crises come to the forefront. In Eastern Europe, however, moving away from traditional political parties holds less relevance because there isn’t a long history of such parties. Eastern Europe emerged from a one-party system that was far from democratic; it could hardly be called a party system—it was essentially an authoritarian regime masquerading as a party system.
In building a party system, Eastern Europe faces a situation where the systems it seeks to emulate in the West are gradually eroding. Now, trends between West and East are less discernible because we also see interparty connectedness, transnational party cooperation, European party families, and so forth, as well as the replication of organizational formulas or personalistic behavior formulas.
In Bulgaria, a major shift occurred with the arrival of Simeon, a charismatic figure with significant legitimacy who attracted a substantial share of votes. During his tenure, he accomplished much and fulfilled many of his promises. At the same time, he established a personalistic model of charisma that Boyko Borisov later emulated in a markedly different style. While the two differ greatly in character, objectives, and persona, Borisov managed to replicate Simeon’s success through his own personal appeal.
Borisov’s approach is less refined and graceful, focusing instead on the image of a “tough guy” capable of handling criminals due to his familiarity with such environments. This approach quickly earned him credibility, not only domestically but also with the European People’s Party, which endorsed him as soon as GERB was formed. In the 2007 elections—Bulgaria’s first for the European Parliament—he gained this support and has continued to benefit from it due to the predictability and stability he brought to Bulgaria.
Borisov’s electoral record is impressive: in 15 years and 11 parliamentary elections, he has only faced defeat twice. His success extends to presidential elections, with his candidates winning twice, as well as to local and European Parliament elections. However, his party, GERB, has been marred by associations with corruption, fueling opposition that combines grassroots protests with a series of populist parties and personalities riding this wave of discontent. This opposition has recently challenged Borisov’s hold on power, while also enabling numerous newcomers to rise on anti-corruption narratives and critiques of GERB. Not all of these actors are necessarily sincere in their appeals, as each has specific political objectives and aims to gain power.
How significant is Boyko Borissov’s ability to distance himself from far-right oligarch Delyan Peevski for GERB’s potential coalition-building efforts, and what does this suggest about the influence of corruption-related sanctions on Bulgarian politics?
Professor Emilia Zankina: He has not shown any willingness to distance himself, even in the aftermath of the elections. On Sunday night, in his speech, he did not exclude Peevski and the MRF(Movement for Rights and Freedoms)-New Beginning from potential coalition-building efforts. Although We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria—the most likely and much-needed potential partner for Borissov—has called for a cordon sanitaire around Peevski, GERB remains one of the few parties in Parliament unwilling to join this exclusion. In fact, every other party has supported the cordon sanitaire except Borissov’s party, which suggests that there may be dependencies between Borissov and Peevski that are not apparent to the broader public. Whether it’s a question of financing or compromising information, he appears reluctant to sever that connection. This stance will undoubtedly create significant challenges in finding other coalition partners and establishing a viable governing coalition.
Far-Right Parties Gain from Alignment and Financial Support from Putin Regime
Demonstration commemorating May 9, Russia’s Victory Day over Nazi Germany, with participants expressing their emotions and displaying slogans in Sofia, Bulgaria, on May 9, 2022. Photo: Yulian Staykov.
Given the rise of pro-Russian and far-right groups like Vazrazhdane, how do you interpret the current balance between Bulgaria’s pro-European aspirations and the growing appeal of populist, anti-Western ideologies? How might Bulgaria’s prolonged political instability impact its path towards EU integration, and do you foresee populist narratives either accelerating or hindering this process within the current coalition negotiations?
Professor Emilia Zankina: The nationalist vote in Bulgaria has traditionally accounted for around 10 to 12%, beginning with ATAKA in 2005. However, in the latest elections, Vazrazhdane and other new parties like March for Justice and Great Glory collectively gathered over 20% of the vote. It’s important to interpret this cautiously, as it doesn’t necessarily reflect purely nationalist sentiment—a significant portion of this vote is protest-driven. Nationalist parties have capitalized on widespread discontent regarding various issues, from the economic crisis to Bulgaria’s stance on the war in Ukraine, becoming a magnet for groups experiencing different types of dissatisfaction. Whether these supporters are genuinely nationalist or simply unhappy is, in some ways, beside the point. If these parties manage to gain power, nationalists, once in government, tend to govern as nationalists.
We have already seen these parties push through two pieces of legislation in the previous parliament: one against so-called LGBT “propaganda” in schools and another targeting “foreign agents,” similar to measures observed in Hungary and Georgia. Additionally, these parties benefit not only from alignment with the Putin regime but also, at times, from its financial support. Examination of their financial reports over the past 10 years reveals that around European elections, unexplained funds—though not substantial—appear in the records of these populist parties. This is particularly notable as the categorization of these funds often shifts from donations to memberships, showing a lack of consistency, which strongly suggests these funds may originate elsewhere.
While directly linking these funds to the Putin regime is complex, it is well-documented that Western parties like Rassemblement National (RN) in France have received similar support. We can therefore reasonably surmise that Russian support reaches these parties, not only financially but also through disinformation campaigns and internet trolls, which amplify their narratives while eroding others, including basic facts.
In your view, what are the primary challenges for pro-European coalitions such as PP-DB in countering populist narratives, especially regarding issues like judicial reform and anti-corruption efforts? Given the “top-down, externally driven” approach to reform in Bulgaria, what specific measures do you believe could enhance the sustainability and local ownership of these reforms?
Professor Emilia Zankina: It doesn’t help that the champions of judicial reform and pro-EU orientation have proven to be quite incompetent themselves and often rely on populist narratives. They also depend on swing votes from the right, left, and center. The first priority is to establish themselves as legitimate political figures capable of predictable political behavior, which they have yet to demonstrate. Despite the sound programmatic appeals behind many of their reforms, their behavior during the campaign has been one of endless bickering with Borisov, and the collapse of the government showed a lack of political experience and acumen. Their inability to inspire trust or project legitimacy and experience doesn’t help their cause.
Furthermore, they face a complex situation: the largest party is GERB, and they have run on an anti-GERB platform, yet now they are in the position of having to uphold the pro-European line, with GERB as their only viable partner. It’s not an easy position, as GERB is both their biggest opponent on corruption—after Peevski—and their strongest ally on European versus pro-Russian orientation. This is a very delicate balance and a difficult task.
They must attempt to form this pro-European coalition while pushing GERB to distance itself from Peevski and commit to anti-corruption reforms. Although complex and challenging, they have no other option but to try to take this difficult step.
Corruption Persists, Demanding Focused and Sustained Solutions
People protesting on the main streets of the capital, demanding the Prime Minister’s resignation, in Sofia, Bulgaria, on July 14, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.
How have historical legacies and political choices shaped the challenges in Bulgaria’s public administration reform, particularly regarding transparency and accountability? What is the role of corruption in either consolidating or weakening populist parties in Bulgaria?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Corruption has been a major mobilizing factor, as there have been numerous corruption scandals involving key GERB figures, some of whom, like Tsvetan Tsvetanov, are no longer in power. Corruption remains a persistent problem, and it’s crucial to focus on and stay committed to solutions.
From experience in other former communist countries with similar bureaucratic legacies—a nomenklatura system, highly politicized, and, after the collapse of communism, highly corrupt—we know that one effective solution is electronic governance. Reforming public administration and expanding e-governance across more sectors and procedures have already made substantial strides in addressing corruption, particularly at lower levels. Currently, however, Bulgaria is dealing with political corruption at the highest levels, embodied by figures like Peevski. Peevski’s influence, demonstrated by his control over both the prosecution and the courts, also extends to swaying party behavior within other political groups.
The fact that he managed to secure more votes than party founder Ahmed Dogan, with only 25% of these votes coming from ethnic Turks and over 50% from the Roma population, suggests he has substantial resources for elections and vote-buying. Many of these votes are indeed purchased. Meanwhile, the splinter party Alliance for Freedom and Rights holds over 50% of the ethnic Turkish vote and the majority of the ethnic Turkish vote abroad, indicating that it is the party most recognized by ethnic Turks as their representative. Nonetheless, Peevski has managed to partially hijack the party, purchasing votes and accumulating around 280,000 votes—a considerable number and a significant financial investment.
How does voter perception of corruption differ from expert evaluations in Bulgaria, and what does this reveal about public tolerance for corruption among political parties? How does the relationship between ethnic identity and party support complicate anti-corruption voting behavior in Bulgaria? Furthermore, what role does voter apathy or ‘fatalism’ about corruption play in shaping the success of anti-corruption parties like “There Is Such a People”?
Professor Emilia Zankina: We have a political culture with low institutional trust, which opens opportunities for anti-establishment rhetoric and allows populist parties across the spectrum to benefit from this general distrust. At the same time, there is a dissonance between actual corruption, perceived corruption, and experienced corruption. Corruption is a significant problem in Bulgaria; at the highest levels, there is political control over prosecution and the distribution of EU funds—both serious corruption issues. These factors make it easy for new parties, like There Is Such a People, to exploit the issue. However, the question remains: what are the solutions, and which of these parties actually offers viable ones?
Judicial reforms were pushed by the last regular government with support from GERB, PP-DB, and Peevski; however, many of these reforms were poorly designed. They are often targeted at specific political situations or figures, and in 10 years, these reforms may prove as problematic as the current laws. We need to move away from witch-hunting and detach reform efforts from specific political figures when considering institutional solutions and mechanisms to combat corruption and prevent such opportunities from arising in the first place.
Pro-Russian Sentiment in Bulgaria Rooted in History and Soviet Legacy
How have the war in Ukraine and the Russian influence in the country affected populism and nationalism in Bulgaria?
Professor Emilia Zankina: This has certainly enabled parties like Vazrazhdane to increase their support tenfold over the past three years. In Bulgaria, there is a blend of genuine pro-Russian sentiment, rooted in the country’s long history, including its war for independence and a communist regime backed by Moscow. This regime benefited large portions of the population, though it also harmed many others. Nevertheless, deep-rooted support for all things Russian persists, embedded in families and generations who feel an affinity for the Russian language, culture, country, and worldview.
Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has placed many people with moderate views—those who may be pro-European but not anti-Russian—in a difficult position, forcing them to choose between their progressive pro-European stance and their affinity for Russia. This dynamic has contributed to the growth of parties like Vazrazhdane.
Interestingly, another strongly pro-Russian party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, has almost disappeared, losing over 1 million voters in just a few years and now falling below 8%, despite holding nearly 30% in the 2017 elections. This indicates a limit to the mobilizing power of both pro-Russian and anti-Russian rhetoric. Roughly a third of the population is likely strongly pro-Russian, while about half supports a position of neutrality in this war. For many Bulgarian voters, the stance of the European Union and the Western world on this conflict is challenging to accept.
How do you explain the mushrooming of populist parties in Bulgaria? What are the similarities and differences with other populist parties in Europe?
Professor Emilia Zankina: There are many similarities and differences, perhaps more than we might expect, with considerable variety. Across Europe—whether east or west, north or south—we see a proliferation of populist parties, and within each country, there is significant variation. In Bulgaria, populist parties emerge from the center and the right, while in other Eastern European countries, like Slovakia, they also emerge from the left.
What has become firmly established, however, is the populist formula: strong emotional appeals, a charismatic figure highlighting sharp divisions and real societal problems, yet offering no real solutions—only big promises and quick fixes that fail to materialize. In the long run, this erodes the foundations of democracy by creating voters who are less patient and loyal, making party identification and loyalty seem like luxuries.
Instead, we see an emphasis on responding to the mood and crisis of the day, with different charismatic figures performing almost in a TV show setting to attract more votes. This is a Europe-wide trend. In a country without a well-established party system, it’s even easier to erode what was never solidly in place to begin with.
Ethnic Turkish Minority in Bulgaria Endured Trauma from Forced Assimilation and Expulsions
The Banya Bashi Mosque, a landmark and the largest mosque in Bulgaria, on September 18, 2013, in Sofia, Bulgaria. Photo: Shutterstock.
Why have populist radical right parties significantly increased their share of the vote in the June 2024 European Parliament elections, and what key issues have driven their success? How has the Turkish minority influenced the mobilization of nationalist votes, and what role does ethnic and nationalist populism play in the strategies of Bulgarian political actors, particularly regarding the Turkish minority and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) party?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Bulgarian nationalism does exploit anti-Turkish rhetoric, but this is not its main mobilizing argument, as there is another minority in Bulgaria, the Roma minority, which actually has a far stronger mobilizing factor—much more so than the ethnic Turks or even external migrants. The Roma minority has traditionally been the primary target of such rhetoric, generating narratives around issues like welfare chauvinism, pensions, schooling, and healthcare, emphasizing access only for taxpayers.
Other issues, like the war in Ukraine and pro-Russian sentiments, also influence the discourse, particularly on topics such as energy policy—decisions around local refineries, the atomic power plant, and related matters. Regarding the ethnic Turkish minority, one key argument fueling nationalist parties is the portrayal of the Ottoman Empire in history books. The ongoing debate centers on whether Bulgaria was under the so-called “Turkish yoke” or merely experienced Turkish presence or dominance, making history books a battleground for these interpretations.
The ethnic Turkish minority, meanwhile, has faced significant historical trauma in Bulgaria, especially during the renaming process, when 800,000 ethnic Turks were forced to leave the country, and the entire minority was subjected to forced assimilation policies, including killings, expulsions, and restrictions on language, culture, and religion. This history has created a deep distrust within the ethnic Turkish community toward all parties, pushing them to continue supporting a corrupt party like the MRF, which understands their loyalty is rooted in a lack of trust for any other party.
Despite attempts from both left and right to reach out to the ethnic Turkish minority, the distrust runs deep, as the wounds are recent and severe, dating back only 30 to 40 years. Many people still hold passports with multiple names, reflecting the forced name changes. It will take time before the ethnic Turkish minority feels confident enough to vote outside an ethnically Turkish party and place their trust elsewhere.
In your recent article for the ECPS report, you note that prior to 2022, 58% of the population reported positive attitudes toward Russia and Putin, suggesting that the war in Ukraine has created fertile ground for PRR parties with strong pro-Russian stances. What are the main reasons behind this pronounced pro-Russian sentiment?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Immediately after the war began, this percentage dropped sharply, but it started climbing again as the conflict continued and Ukrainian refugees arrived in the country. The initial backlash and shift away from strong support for Russia were reversed as refugees from Ukraine came, and as the war extended into a second and third year, people gradually reverted to their original views. Here, we return to the powerful legacy of the communist regime and a party that had 1 million members, with many families still revering Russia regardless of its current regime. Little distinction is made between the Russian people and the Russian government, which becomes problematic; few people object to Russian culture and people, but many oppose Putin’s regime, including within Russia itself.
The historical legacy frames Russia as a liberator, followed by a communist regime that actively promoted Russian culture and language for many years. Many people studied in Russian schools, pursued professional development in Russia, and were raised with that cultural influence. Despite the benefits of the European Union—funds, improved living standards, and mobility—many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.
Populist Radical Right Parties Typically Remain “Men’s Parties”
How do you interpret the discrepancy between the low female representation in Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties and the comparatively high level of activity on women’s issues among PRR women MPs? How might the presence of women in PRR parties in Bulgaria influence broader perceptions of these parties as “Männerparteien,” and what factors contribute to this dynamic?
Professor Emilia Zankina: There is extensive research, not only mine but also by many other authors, showing that populist radical right parties are typically “men’s parties.” They are represented by men, supported by men, and largely serve men’s interests. However, we have also seen a narrative of traditional family values promoted by women within these parties. This trend, while not dominant, has been firmly established, extending from the UK to France and across Eastern Europe.
These parties have also strategically positioned women as a tactic to appeal to female voters and as a more legitimate means of promoting specific policies. When addressing gender issues, reproductive rights, or family services, having a woman advocate for these policies lends greater legitimacy. Consequently, parties have co-opted and promoted more women to the forefront as part of this strategy. Yet, for the moment, the appeal remains predominantly directed toward male voters, and representation within these parties still skews male. Despite these efforts, if you examine the gender balance in these parties, on electoral lists and among MPs, it remains largely male-dominated.
Portugal is facing heightened scrutiny after a young, inexperienced policeman fatally shot Odair Moniz, a Black man, under dubious circumstances. This incident has reignited longstanding debates about structural racism and revealed deep-seated cultural and social divides, exposing unresolved issues around race, security, and the state’s role. Reflecting James Davison Hunter’s concept of “culture wars,” these moral conflicts have deepened into societal divisions that erode shared values. Portugal’s colonial legacy further intensifies these tensions, perpetuating systemic racial exclusion and fostering fertile ground for populist narratives.
James Davison Hunter stands as one of the most prominent and enduring authors on the topic of “cultural wars” in the United States. He emphasizes how so-called moral issues tend to undermine the “common ground” that forms societies, with the potential to become an effective war by sharpening citizens’ moral divisions (Hunter, 1991). Conversely, Fiona Morris and other contributors in Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (2005) challenge this view, arguing that polarization largely operates within the media, while society as a whole tends toward consensus.
However, time has lent more credence to Hunter’s perspective and the work of other scholars who focus on cultural wars. Ezra Klein, in Why We’re Polarized (2020), argues that moral values and social identity issues have become central to our political identity, aligning with Cass Sunstein’s arguments in #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media(2018), which highlights how social media has become an echo chamber for tensions around morality and “customs,” amplifying socially divisive themes. But what does this theoretical prelude have to do with recent events in Portugal involving the case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public unrest? Quite a lot, as it turns out, and the reasons are worth exploring.
Among the polarizing issues within society, racial matters stand out prominently. In Portugal, we have engaged in ongoing debates over whether or not racism exists, what constitutes racism, whether Portugal is a racist country, and if structural racism is present. Much of this discussion is either redundant, given the evidence, or overly theoretical.
In summary:
i) racism exists wherever individuals are differentiated based on race, creating hierarchies of value and access (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Fanon, 2008);
ii) racism operates as a social process in which such differentiation disadvantages some while benefiting a dominant group—typically Caucasian in Western societies due to the legacies of slavery and colonialism. According to Achille Mbembe (2019), colonial histories have left profound imprints on social hierarchies, with racialized groups enduring forms of systemic marginalization that permeate all levels of society. In his concept of “racialized social systems,” Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2014) argues that racism is not a mere individual prejudice but is embedded in societal structures, creating a social order that inherently privileges certain racial groups over others. Theoretical discussions around power, privilege, capitalism, and racialization are ideologically relevant yet often seem to lack practical contributions in tackling urgent issues, though they offer critical insights into systemic challenges (Wynter, 2003).
iii) Portugal is a country where racism is evident, with unique characteristics that should not be oversimplified through comparative analysis with other contexts. Its documented history includes ties to late colonialism and scientific justifications for the supposed cultural, biological, and mental inferiority of Black populations (Mbembe, 2001). The continued influence of colonial narratives has shaped racial and social dynamics within contemporary Portugal, as examined by Carla Rodrigues and Jorge Leal (2009), who reveal how these legacies reinforce discriminatory practices that marginalize racialized communities.
To understand the recent incidents centered in Zambujal – the neighborhood where protesters fired cars and a bus, with latter mimetic acts in some areas of Lisbon – it is necessary to consider a history of misguided policies regarding the inclusion of racialized individuals within Portuguese society, as discussed in O Estado do Racismo em Portugal (2021), edited by Silvia Rodriguez Maeso. Despite critiques of its activist bias, this work rigorously details systemic issues related to racial policies in Portugal, including urban planning and policing, which are directly relevant to this case. Such policies, compounded by socioeconomic inequalities and an enduring colonial mentality, contribute to a racialized social order that perpetuates marginalization and exclusion for racialized communities (Mbembe, 2019; Fanon, 2008).
The decision—albeit somewhat understandable—to address the urban integration of people from former Portuguese colonies by establishing social housing has, as in other countries, led to ghettoization. This pattern has perpetuated social exclusion and generational poverty, with vulnerable families often lacking resources or sufficient parental involvement, leaving children exposed to criminal networks. Meanwhile, underfunded schools and educational neglect further diminish prospects for youth in these areas. Together, these factors create a “social cauldron” that stigmatizes these communities as socially excluded islands, often becoming the target of state policing.
Policing such isolated social islands fosters a cycle of mutual distrust, generating a divisive “us vs. them” mentality. For many in these communities, the police are the sole representatives of the state, fostering stereotypes and resentment. Bonilla-Silva (2014) describes how such dynamics reinforce the racialized social system, where state practices contribute to the social reproduction of racial hierarchies. Furthermore, police violence against racialized individuals in Portugal has been documented in international human rights reports, compounded by reports of far-right groups within the security forces. These conditions highlight a significant state failure on racial matters.
The Cultural War over the Police State
While we await judicial proceedings in the case of Odair Moniz’s death, another discussion has emerged. In summary, Portugal faces an endemic racism problem affecting opportunities for racialized populations, who generally confront the intersection of economic, educational, and gender-related issues. Although white social groups may share some of these challenges, racialized groups face additional disadvantages due to “race.” Portugal also has issues with the rapid and haphazard urban integration of racialized groups, leading to territories where poverty and crime are disproportionately associated with these communities. Consequently, policing efforts, compounded by resentment and distrust as well as racism within segments of the security forces, have sparked a surge in police violence against racialized individuals.
Thus, poverty, social exclusion, urban segregation, and police violence underlie these events, fueling popular outrage. However, as this outrage increasingly manifests as vandalism—absent an organized structure and peaceful leadership—it loses the capacity to garner widespread empathy, as it impinges upon fundamental and primary rights within the rule of law, such as the right to security and private property.
Hence, the “cultural war” over a “police state” or “security state” emerges from chaos. André Ventura’s – radical right Chega party leader – recent calls for a protest supporting the police, framing it as “cleaning the streets” of “criminals,” echo Brazil’s Bolsonaro and his supporters, embodying the mantra, “A good criminal is a dead criminal.” By organizing a pro-police demonstration, Chega openly aligns with a surveillance state model that prioritizes “law and order” over constitutional governance—a step towards a state that surveils citizens beyond constitutional limits. Public support for this stance has been evident on social media, as people trade freedom for order, recalling Alexis de Tocqueville’s warning that in times of chaos, people are prone to sacrifice freedom for the promise of order.
Meanwhile, for the cultural war to thrive, two opposing poles are necessary. Radical elements within the Left, associated with the Bloco de Esquerda party, have seized upon these events to encourage a racial revolution. While motivated by a desire to rectify racial injustices, this rhetoric parallels the radical right’s, both potentially threatening social cohesion and the “common ground” essential for future generations. Social changes addressing racial dynamics should not take a revolutionary approach, which may ultimately intensify racial divisions and compromise democracy.
Thus, it is within democracy and the hard-won social-liberal principles that we must pursue the republican ideal of effective equality—not authoritarian “equality” under radical poles, but the equality promised by constitutional ideals under the banner of human rights. Achieving this requires justice in Odair’s case and others like his, alongside public policies that, while slower than revolutionary impulses, restore the rule of law, social peace, and constitutional norms—enabling us to address what we’ve thus far swept under the rug.
Conclusion
The case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public response illustrate a deep-seated cultural and social rift in Portugal, revealing unresolved tensions around race, security, and the role of the state. This incident aligns with James Davison Hunter’s concept of culture wars, where moral divisions sharpen into polarized conflicts, eroding shared social foundations. In Portugal, these conflicts intersect with a colonial legacy that perpetuates systemic exclusion and racial disparities, creating an environment ripe for populist rhetoric.
As seen in André Ventura’s reaction, populist figures often exploit such moments, promoting a “law and order” narrative that taps into public fears, mirroring strategies observed in other countries. This populist stance risks shifting Portugal toward a security state model that emphasizes control over democratic principles. On the other side, radical responses advocating racial revolution pose their own challenges, as they could polarize society further and jeopardize social cohesion.
Ultimately, meaningful progress requires that Portugal confront these issues within a democratic framework, advancing policies that address structural racism and urban inequality while upholding the rule of law and human rights. Only by fostering genuine social inclusion and resisting polarizing impulses can Portugal hope to rebuild its social contract on a foundation of equality and shared values.
References
Bonilla-Silva, E. (2014). Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. Rowman & Littlefield.
Fanon, F. (2008). Black Skin, White Masks. Grove Press.
Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. Basic Books.
Klein, E. (2020). Why We’re Polarized. Simon & Schuster.
Maeso, S. R. (Ed.). (2021). O Estado do Racismo em Portugal. Edições 70.
Mbembe, A. (2001). On the Postcolony. University of California Press.
Mbembe, A. (2019). Necropolitics. Duke University Press.
Morris, F., Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J., & Pope, J. C. (2005). Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. Pearson Longman.
Rodrigues, C. U., & Leal, J. (2009). Portugal não é um país pequeno: Contar o “império” na pós-colonialidade. Edições 70.
Rodrigues, S. R., & Araújo, M. (2019). Racism and Racialization: Experiences in Portugal. In Lentin, A., & Titley, G. (Eds.), Racism and Media (pp. 113–126). Routledge.
Sunstein, C. R. (2018). #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton University Press.
Wynter, S. (2003). Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument. CR: The New Centennial Review, 3(3), 257–337.
