Election officials and witnesses count ballots papers of presidential election at polling station in Banda Aceh, Aceh Province, Indonesia on April 17, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

Competing Populisms, Digital Technologies and the 2024 Elections in Indonesia

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Yilmaz, Ihsan; Triwibowo, Whisnu; Bachtiar, Hasnan & Barton, Greg. (2024). “Competing Populisms, Digital Technologies and the 2024 Elections in Indonesia.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 2, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0029

 

Abstract

The upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Indonesia on 14 February 2024 are poised to involve over 200 million citizens out of a total population of 285 million. Among these eligible voters, approximately 115 million belong to the millennial or Gen Z demographic. Within this electoral landscape, the presidential race features a diverse array of candidates, where populism plays a significant, albeit not the dominant, role in shaping the campaigns and agendas of three key contenders. This study aims to explore the relationship between various forms of competing populisms and their utilization of digital technologies. It examines how these dynamics intersect with the digital divide, democracy, pluralism, and social cohesion within Indonesia’s electoral framework. Additionally, the paper outlines potential areas for further research in this domain.

By Ihsan Yilmaz, Whisnu Triwibowo*, Hasnan Bachtiar & Greg Barton**

Introduction

When Indonesia goes to the ballot box for the parliamentary and presidential elections on February 14, 2024, more than 200 million of Indonesia’s 285 million citizens will be eligible to vote, and more than half (~115 million) will be millennial or Gen Z voters. The forthcoming presidential race in Indonesia presents a diverse array of candidates (Prabowo Subianto, Ganjar Pranowo and Anies Baswedan), each embodying distinct and evolving political personas. Within this context, populism emerges as a pivotal, albeit not dominant, element shaping the campaigns and platforms of these three presidential candidates. 

Furthermore, the landscape of Indonesian leadership stands redefined, characterized by nuanced shifts and strategic recalibrations among key contenders. Analyses focusing on the manifestations and impact of competing populisms in the political landscape, specifically within the realm of digital campaigning, technological utilization, the digital divide, and the dissemination of disinformation are urgently needed.

Against this backdrop, this paper examines the interplay between diverse forms of competing populisms and their engagement with digital technologies, the digital divide, democracy, pluralism, and social cohesion within the Indonesian electoral context with a focus on the presidential candidates. It also suggests some avenues for further research. 

The Presidential Candidates

Ganjar Pranowo, as Central Java Governor, at a cultural festival in Batang / Central Java Regency, Indonesia on October 2, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

Anies Baswedan, once identified with Islamist populism, now takes center stage with a recalibrated persona, shedding overt affiliations while gathering support from influential right-wing religious factions (Bachtiar, 2023). This transformation marks a departure from his previous political maneuvers during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial race, presenting Anies as a potential unifying force for Indonesia’s diverse populace.

On the other hand, Prabowo Subianto’s trajectory since his last electoral defeat in 2019 has been a paradigm shift, pivoting towards a role within Jokowi’s cabinet as Minister of Defense. Prabowo first contested the presidential elections in 2014 as a classical ‘man on horseback’ strongman populist. He literally rode a chestnut stallion in military uniform whilst inspecting his ‘troops’ at a key campaign event in the National Stadium, where he also addressed his supporters dressed to imitate Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president. Formerly associated with cultural nativism and a stance against foreign influence, Prabowo has rebranded himself as a stalwart advocate for the people, navigating the choppy waters of geopolitical upheavals and external pressures. This transformation aims to project resilience and solidarity amid the evolving global landscape.

The third candidate, Ganjar Pranowo, following in the footsteps of his mentor President Joko Widodo, affectionately known as Jokowi, has embarked on a metamorphosis from a popular leader to a technocrat deeply engaged in bolstering public services and fostering developmental initiatives (Bachtiar, 2023). Paralleling Jokowi’s trajectory, Ganjar’s evolution underscores a shift towards a more technocratic approach centered on tangible progress and societal welfare.

Remarkably absent from the direct electoral fray is Jokowi himself, particularly following the setback of his proposal to extend the presidential term limit. His endorsement of Prabowo, coupled with the astute political calculus surrounding his son Gibran Rakabuming’s vice-presidential candidacy within Suharto’s son-in-law’s camp, delineates a nuanced political landscape, painting a mosaic of calculated realignments and strategic choices.

Jokowi has navigated a distinctive trajectory throughout his ten-year tenure as the incumbent president. Emerging from entirely outside the realm of Jakarta’s political elite, Jokowi initially embodied the quintessential underdog, advocating for the interests of the common populace upon entering national politics. His ascent was marked by a palpable sense of grassroots support, culminating in a commendable approval rating that continues to soar, defying global standards at around 70% to 80%. 

However, the landscape of his leadership has undergone a discernible evolution. While initially associated with a strain of populism, Jokowi has transformed into a bastion of development-focused governance, aligning himself closely with Indonesia’s preeminent political entity, the PDI-P. This shift has effectively overwritten earlier populist tendencies, reshaping him into an influential figure within the Jakarta establishment.

Yet, this metamorphosis has not occurred without repercussions. The paradigm shift towards a development-oriented presidency has coincided with a subtle erosion of accountability and scrutiny. Within this context, Indonesia has witnessed a nuanced regression in democratic tenets under Jokowi’s stewardship. The narrative of authoritarian developmentalism, often veiled in the rhetoric of populism, has become the reflexive justification for this incremental decline in democratic checks and balances.

Ganjar Pranowo, the nominee representing the PDI-P party and currently serving as the governor of Central Java, diverges notably from traditional populism in his approach. His candidacy is characterized by a departure from populist rhetoric, signaling a potential shift towards a more nuanced and pragmatic governance style.

Contrastingly, retired general Prabowo Subianto, making his third bid for the presidency, has surged ahead in social polling since March 2023. Prabowo has long cultivated an image as a stalwart strongman and populist advocate for the people. His political trajectory has been marked by a consistent portrayal of himself as a champion of the masses, embodying the tenets of populist leadership.

Occupying a steadfast position in the social polling rankings, former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan represents a distinct faction within the electoral landscape. Baswedan garners support from the forces aligned with Islamist “civilizational populism” (Yilmaz and Morieson, 2022a; 2022b), constituting a third but significant bloc within the upcoming presidential election. His candidacy embodies the fusion of religious identity with populist ideals, marking a distinctive presence in the political spectrum.

The diverse range of candidates vying for Indonesia’s presidency underscores the multifaceted nature of the electorate, with each contender offering a distinct and changing ideological and governance framework to the voters.

Competing Populisms in Indonesia

Prabowo Subianto gives a speech about the vision and mission of the 2019 Indonesian presidential candidate in front of a crowd of supporters on the campaign in Yogyakarta, Indonesia on April 8, 2019. Photo: Aidil Akbar.

The evolution of Indonesia’s political landscape since the conservative shift, highlighted by scholars like Bruinessen (2013), Assyaukanie (2013), and later examined by Sebastian et al. (2021), manifested prominently in the 2016 Islamist civilizational populist demonstrations in Jakarta. These events notably contributed to Anies Baswedan’s victory in the gubernatorial race, marking a pivotal moment in the country’s political trajectory.

This shift towards conservatism and the subsequent rise of Islamist civilizational populism coincided with an overarching trend towards authoritarian inclinations within the governance framework of Indonesia. Scholarly works by Power (2018), Diprose et al. (2019), and Mietzner (2018; 2020) have extensively documented this progression, highlighting the observable authoritarian undertones within the political landscape.

Simultaneously, the response from the established government to curb Islamist civilizational populist movements, exemplified by the banning of entities like the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), indicated a proactive stance against such groups. However, the manner in which these actions were executed, often without due process, raised concerns among scholars, signaling a potential deconsolidation of democratic norms and practices within the country.

Scholars and analysts have echoed apprehensions about the state of Indonesian democracy, painting a picture of a system under duress and potentially in regression. Works by Warburton & Aspinall (2019), Schäfer (2019), Power & Warburton, and Aspinall et al. (2020) collectively underscore the prevailing sentiment that Indonesia’s democratic foundations face formidable challenges, with some even suggesting a retreat from the established democratic principles. This confluence of events and scholarly observations emphasizes the complexities and potential threats facing Indonesia’s democratic fabric.

In the field of populism studies, the concept of ‘competing populisms’ elucidates the simultaneous existence of multiple populist ideologies within a singular political milieu, i.e. the nation-state. Scholars such as Mietzner (2020), Hadiz and Robinson (2017), and Vampa (2020) have showcased the relevance of competing populisms in understanding the complexities of political dynamics. Hadiz and Robinson’s analysis in 2017 sheds light on the landscape of populisms in Indonesia, identifying two prominent and competing strands: secular-nationalist populism and Islamist populism. Their argument posits that the rise of these rival populisms is deeply rooted in societal and ideological divides prevalent within the country. However, crucially, they attribute the ascendance of these populist movements primarily to the perception of enduring ‘systemic injustices’ that have persisted in the wake of a two-decade-long democratic era following three decades of authoritarian rule.

This perspective offers a comprehensive framework for understanding the genesis and proliferation of competing populist ideologies in Indonesia. The legacy of authoritarianism and the subsequent transition to democracy created a breeding ground for societal and ideological rifts, laying the groundwork for the emergence of rival populisms. The societal and ideological divides, amplified by historical and contemporary grievances, have given impetus to these divergent forms of populism. 

The divisions delineate the contours of competing chauvinist, Islamist, and technocratic populisms (Mietzner, 2018; 2020), where distinct factions vie for ideological dominance. The chauvinists, Islamists, and technocrats represent divergent populist visions for the nation’s political and socio-religious landscape. The clash between these populisms manifests as a multifaceted struggle, with each faction endeavoring to shape the narrative and direction of Indonesia’s political trajectory. It must be noted that the mere existence of these divisions within society is not adequate; instead, their active politicization by a populist leader becomes imperative (Mietzner, 2020). This process involves the strategic engagement with discourse surrounding socio-economic disparities, often framed within overarching primordial and ideological divisions. This viewpoint resonates with a broader body of literature that examines the relationship between populism and societal dynamics. It emphasizes that populism does not emerge in a vacuum but rather thrives within the fertile grounds of existing societal, economic, and ideological rifts and emotive polarizations. 

Populism, Emotions and Digital Technologies

DKI Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan with residents of Kampung Akuarium in Jakarta, Indonesia on April 14 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

In a comprehensive literature review focusing on emotions, religion, and populism (Yilmaz and Morieson, 2021), it was shown that populists frequently utilize emotions as a potent tool to garner support, establish connections with their audience, and influence public opinion. Their rhetoric is crafted to either create new or capitalize on existing collective grievances or aspirations, evoking intense emotions like fear, anger, hope, nostalgia, resentment, or vindictiveness, which deeply resonate with their followers. Through these emotional appeals, populists construct a narrative that pits ‘the people’ against ‘the elite,’ often portraying the elite as collaborating with or serving the interests of ‘dangerous others,’ typically marginalized groups and minorities. Consequently, this emotionally charged dichotomy reinforces a sense of victimhood, identity, and belonging among their supporters, simultaneously portraying their opponents as outsiders or adversaries. In Indonesia’s context, this becomes particularly evident as various populist movements tap into and amplify these divisions and emotive polarizations, thereby fueling their own narratives and agendas.

Populism often capitalizes on pre-existing fault lines within society, exploiting them to mobilize support and consolidate power. This dynamic interaction between populism and existing societal fissures perpetuates a cyclical relationship where populism both exacerbates and is influenced by these underlying divisions. By framing socio-economic inequalities within broader primordial and ideological contexts, populist leaders resonate with specific segments of the population, further deepening the societal fault lines they seek to exploit. This interplay underscores the complex and symbiotic relationship between populism and the existing socio-political landscape.

The notion of ‘systemic injustices’ serves as a catalyst for the traction gained by these populist movements. The perceived inadequacies and persisting inequalities within the democratic system have become fertile ground for the mobilization of support behind secular-nationalist and Islamist populist narratives. These narratives often capitalize on the grievances stemming from economic disparities, political marginalization, and cultural divisions, resonating with segments of the populace disenchanted with the post-authoritarian democratic order (Barton et al., 2021a; Barton et al., 2021b; Yilmaz et al., 2022; Yilmaz and Morieson, 2023).

The evolution of technology, particularly the advent of the internet and digital media, has dynamically reshaped the landscape of political engagement. This transformation has not only ushered in new avenues for communication but has also catalyzed the surge of divergent populist movements.

In contrast to traditional media outlets like newspapers, magazines, radio, and television, which were often beholden to the interests of media magnates, new media platforms operate on a different paradigm. The internet, especially when access is widespread and unrestricted, empowers citizens to freely engage with political messages disseminated by various populist figures. This direct interaction allows for real-time responses and active participation in shaping the discourse.

Media anthropologists underline the transformative potential of new media, emphasizing how these platforms revolutionize individual thought processes and communication patterns (Anderson, 2003; Eickelman and Anderson, 2003;Hirschkind, 2017). These digital landscapes present novel opportunities for fostering digital egalitarianism, enabling diverse voices to be heard and empowering individuals to actively engage with populist narratives. In essence, new media stands as a powerful intermediary, fostering direct and unfiltered communication between populist leaders and the populace. Through digital platforms, these leaders can directly connect with and mobilize their supporters, shaping and amplifying their messages in real-time, creating a dynamic and interactive political sphere.

The concept of digital equality as a catalyst for democratization is a compelling notion. However, the realization of this potential largely hinges upon the actions and intentions of the media users themselves. In the realm of political competition, the digital sphere becomes a battleground where self-image can be meticulously crafted to present an idealized and flawless persona. Conversely, it becomes a tool to fabricate negative narratives about political adversaries.

This phenomenon has contributed not only to the proliferation of misinformation but also the deliberate dissemination of disinformation. While misinformation refers to the misuse of accurate information in an inappropriate context, disinformation entails the deliberate spread of false or misleading information with the explicit aim of undermining political opponents, particularly those seen as opposition figures. Consequently, the aspiration to expedite the evolution of benevolent democratic practices through digital media confronts the harsh reality of its manipulation by entities that disregard fundamental values such as truth, integrity, equality, fairness, and civil liberties. This challenge poses a significant impediment to the genuine realization of digital platforms as drivers of democratic progress, highlighting the urgent need to address the ethical and moral dimensions of digital engagement in the political sphere.

The landscape of digital media in Indonesia has evolved into a key domain for political mobilization, offering an avenue for ordinary citizens to engage in the political discourse. This evolution, however, is marred by the proliferation of fake news, hoaxes, hate speech, and other divisive behaviors that run counter to democratic values (Lim, 2017). The online rivalry of competing populisms has notably exacerbated societal and political divisions, amplifying the polarization within Indonesian society.

This amplification of societal cleavages through the mediation of digital media in populist politics has significantly impacted Indonesia’s socio-political history over the past two decades. The period following the democratic transition that commenced in 1998 has been marked by intricate complexities stemming from the lingering effects of collective trauma, widening socio-economic disparities, and the exacerbation of public grievances fueled by competing populist groups. Consequently, this dynamic has posed formidable challenges to Indonesia’s pursuit of democratic consolidation in this era.

On the other hand, the control wielded by the governments and capital owners over key infrastructures presents a clear demonstration of their capacity to impact political contestation through means like access restrictions, hacking, surveillance, and even total control cut-offs. In instances where a ruling government maintains complete dominance over a country’s digital operations, political contestation tends to be severely lopsided, with one side significantly advantaged due to excessive control over technology. Consequently, this imbalance fosters an environment conducive to digital authoritarianism (Yilmaz, 2023).

Importing advanced digital technologies entails not just acquiring access but also welcoming a certain degree of influence from the exporting entities. This influence can extend politically, leading to interference between the technology’s owner/exporter and the user/importer, potentially empowering specific political entities, like the establishment, to monitor and manipulate their adversaries. This dynamic doesn’t just create opportunities for digital authoritarian behavior; it also introduces a transnational dimension wherein such behaviors are inherited or transmitted from external sources (Yilmaz, 2023).

Conclusion

The complexities surrounding the competing populisms in Indonesia, particularly in the lead-up to the upcoming February 2024 elections, present a complex and cyclical interplay within the realm of democratic processes. The dynamics of consolidation and deconsolidation in democracy create a compelling and challenging landscape that merits thorough investigation and extensive research to fully comprehend its multifaceted nature, demanding a comprehensive exploration to reveal its nuanced dimensions. There is an urgent need to explore the following key areas:

i) Understanding Diverse Manifestations: Investigate and categorize the varying forms and expressions of competing populisms within a specific country. Analyze their ideological underpinnings, rhetoric, and mechanisms of mobilization.

ii) Interplay with Democracy: Examine the complex relationship between competing populisms and democratic institutions. Investigate how populist movements impact the functioning, resilience, and legitimacy of democratic systems.

iii) Impact on Pluralism, Polarization, and Social Cohesion: Assess the effects of competing populisms on societal structures, focusing on their influence on pluralism, polarization, and social cohesion. Explore their implications for social fabric and unity.

iv) Digital Technologies and Populist Movements: Study the utilization of digital platforms and technologies by these populisms. Investigate how social media, online networks, and digital tools are employed to propagate populist ideologies and mobilize support. Explore the role of disinformation campaigns in shaping public opinion and polarizing societies.

v) Digital Divide and Its Implications: Analyze the digital divide’s role in the context of populist movements. Explore how disparities in access to technology and information contribute to social fragmentation and exacerbate existing societal divides.

vi) Mapping Transnational Dimensions: Explore the transnational aspects of competing populisms. Map connections, influences, and collaborations among populist movements across borders, identifying shared ideologies and exchanges of strategies.

By addressing these critical research areas, scholars can help to deepen our understanding of contemporary political dynamics, contributing to informed policymaking and the preservation of democratic values in an ever-evolving global landscape.

 

(*) Whisnu Triwibowo is an Assistant Professor (Communication) and the Head of Undergraduate Studies at the Universitas Indonesia. He holds a PhD in Information and Media from Michigan State University. His research interests are at the intersection of information studies and communication science. Especially in investigating the social dynamics of the internet, such as digital divides, inter-organizational networks, internet use, and persuasion in the digital environment. Email: w.triwibowo@ui.ac.id

(**) Greg Barton is research professor in Global Islamic Politics at the University of Deakin, Melbourne, Australia. Dr. Barton is one of Australia’s leading scholars of both modern Indonesia and of terrorism and countering violent extremism. For more than 25 years he has undertaken extensive research on Indonesia politics and society, especially of the role of Islam as both a constructive and a disruptive force. He has been active in the inter-faith dialogue initiatives and has a deep commitment to building understanding of Islam and Muslim society. Email: greg.barton@deakin.edu.au

 

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Ultra-right-wing Argentine politician Javier Milei during the PASO elections in Buenos Aires, Argentina on August 13, 2023. Photo: Facundo Florit.

Populism in 2023: The Year in Review

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHome

In 2023, populism continued to shape the electoral landscape worldwide, notably in Europe but also in East Asia and Latin America. And it is clear that 2023 did not see the outright resurgence of populism worldwide as some had predicted but instead produced another year of mixed results, with critical successes and also major setbacks for populists at the ballot box.

By Simon P. Watmough*

As 2023 draws to a rapid close, it is time to review the year in populism. With key electoral contests scheduled throughout the year, observers were keen at the outset to see whether and how populist movements might fare electorally after the“mixed bag” of 2022, which saw populists rewarded (think Georgia Meloni’s stunning win in Italian parliamentary elections at the helm of the neo-Fascist Fratelli d’Italia and Viktor Orbán’s success in achieving a fourth consecutive term for Fidesz in Hungary) but also rebuked (most obviously in the outgoing administration of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil in January and the decisive defeat of Marine Le Pen in the second round of the French presidential election in April).

In 2023, populism continued to shape the electoral landscape worldwide, notably in Europe but also in East Asia and Latin America. And it is clear that 2023 did not see the outright resurgence of populism worldwide as some had predicted but instead produced another year of mixed results, with critical successes and also major setbacks for populists at the ballot box.

In this commentary, I review the scorecard for populism globally in 2023. Looking back over the last twelve months, I detail the performance of populist parties and leaders, their electoral successes and failures and the significant political events of the year as they relate to populism. After surveying the major electoral events of the year, I offer some critical insights into their implications, in particular, with a view to the year ahead in 2024. Indeed, some have dubbed 2024 the “Year of Elections”, as it will be the biggest ballot year in world history, with some 2 billion voters going to the polls across the globe.

Key Wins and Losses

Populism globally in 2023 was characterized by a series of regional wins and losses, most notably in Europe in the first half of the year. The second half of 2023 saw notable gains for populist parties, culminating in Geert Wilders’ shock landslide win in the Dutch general elections in November.

A Win for Pluralism in the Czech Republic and for Populism in Slovakia

The year began with a decisive win for pluralism in the Czech Republic when retired NATO general Petr Pavel took 58% of the vote against Andrej Babiš, a billionaire industrialist, former prime minister and populist firebrand, in the second round of the presidential election on 27–28 January. The first round in mid-January had been much closer, with Pavel — who ran on a pro-Western, pro-European Union (EU) and pro-Ukrainian platform — taking 35.4 % of the popular vote, just ahead of Babiš (34.99 %). Babiš, who was facing criminal charges for corruption at the time of the election, led a divisive campaign featuring strong populist rhetoric and deep scepticism about the EU and Western support for Ukraine on the eve of the anniversary of Russia’s invasion. In a strong signal of the strength of Czech pluralism, voter turnout in the second round was high at over 70 % (up from 68 % in the first round).

In neighbouring Slovakia, the pendulum had swung the other way by the middle of the year. In late September, disgraced two-time former prime minister Robert Fico — who had resigned from office in March 2018 after widespread protests following his being implicated in the murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak — led his left-populist but socially conservative SMER (Direction–Social Democracy) to a surprise first position in parliamentary elections. With the issue of support for Ukraine high on the agenda (Fico declared he would end arms shipments to Slovakia’s embattled neighbour), fears rose in Brussels and Washington that a Fico victory would challenge the European consensus and embolden the camp of pro-Putin leaders in Europe led by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. In a highly fractured party system, SMER took 22.9% of the vote and 42 seats in Slovakia’s 150-seat National Council. As head of the largest party, Fico was commissioned to form a government, and after much wrangling, President Čaputová swore him in as prime minister on 25 October in a government that included the ultranationalist Slovak National Party.

Estonia and Finland

In the northern Baltics region, as well, 2023 was characterized by a pendulum swing. In parliamentary elections held on 5 March in Estonia, incumbent Prime Minister Kaja Kallas’s Reform Party increased its numbers. True to form, the far-right populist anti-immigrant Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) ran a highly divisive campaign focused on language politics, uncompromising border control, anti-immigration and opposition to further refugees from Ukraine. Under its new leader, Martin Helme, the party actually lost support but still came in second due to the collapse of the Centre Party, which had been caught up in a corruption scandal. Over half of ballots in the 2023 elections were cast online, and Helme cited supposed “anomalies and technical errors in the e-voting process” in his unsuccessful petition to Estonia’s Supreme Court to annul the results. In the end, Kallas returned to government at the head of a centrist coalition.

In neighbouring Finland, Prime Minister Sanna Marin was unable to head off a challenge led by the far-right nationalist Finns party (formerly the True Finns), who campaigned on a predictably anti-immigration and anti-EU platform and — like EKRE in Estonia — sought to make the climate transition a point of difference (challenging the Marin government’s carbon neutrality targets). Actually, in a campaign fought mostly on economic policy terrain, Marin’s own Social Democratic Party picked up three seats, while the Finns gained seven to take 46 seats, its strongest showing since the party was founded in 1995. Still, the Finns’ win came mainly at the expense of Marin’s far-left coalition partner, Left Alliance, whose vote share plummeted. After Marin and the other leftist parties ruled out forming a government with a party they described as “openly racist”, Petteri Orpo, leader of the victorious centre-right National Coalition, reached out to the Finns, the Swedish People’s Party, and the Christian Democrats to form a narrow majority government. In 2015–2019, the Finns were part of a coalition government — although mired in almost constant controversy and party splits — and already in June and July 2023, Finns’ ministers were courting media scandal for various anti-immigration remarks and harassment of journalists.

Unlikely Twins: Turkey and Thailand

Duncan McCargo and Ayşe Zarakol have famously dubbed Turkey and Thailand “unlikely twins” since — despite many obvious differences — they share histories as long-established nations that escaped direct colonization, allowing them the space to shape national modernization largely on their own terms, evolving very distinct “hybrid” forms of “tutelary democracy” as a result. In 2023, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Thailand’s Pheu Thai — two national–populist outfits formed in the early 2000s against a backdrop of economic and political crisis and helmed by “anti-establishment outsiders” with natural populist appeal — again faced the voters.

With parliamentary and presidential elections in Turkey scheduled for May 2023, many hoped that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s time was up after nearly two decades in power and an economy in serious trouble (not to mention his government’s initial poor handling of severe earthquakes in the southeast at the start of the year). Observers were especially keen to know whether the six-party coalition ranged against Erdoğan — the Nation Alliance, including the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) headed by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu — would fare better than the “United for Hungary” coalition against Viktor Orbán in Hungary in 2022. Alas, the Nation Alliance shared the same fate, failing to put forward a convincing campaign (coalition members bickered constantly) and Kılıçdaroğlu, while much-respected, seemed to lack Erdoğan’s legendary vim and vigour on the campaign trail. While Erdoğan narrowly failed to secure a majority in the first round (winning 49.5 % of the popular vote), he won a convincing second-round win against Kılıçdaroğlu to earn a third term in the presidential office, the first candidate to do so since the 1950s.

Thais also returned to the polls in May 2023 for the first truly free and fair elections since the Thai military coup of 2014 ousted the government of Yingluck Shinawatra, head of the populist Pheu Thai party and sister of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was himself ousted in a military coup and sent into exile in 2006. Thailand was primed for a populist revival after years of stagnant military rule, and the 2023 campaign was fought on issues of progressive reform and a complete restoration of democracy. Pheu Thai and the progressive Move Forward party cornered the reformist, pro-democracy vote. In a fragmented field of over 60 parties vying for voter support, Move Forward — whose program was dominated by appeals to younger urban voters — took a whopping 151 seats out of 500 in Thailand’s House of Representatives (up from 81 in 2019) and pipped Pheu Thai — which ran a classic rural populist campaign that featured giveaways and promises to the poor and elderly, including an innovative proposal to provide Thais aged over 16 with a 10,000 baht (US$287, €263) “digital wallet” to purchase essential items — to the post (38 % of the vote to Pheu Thai’s 29 %). Initially, Move Forward and Pheu Thai joined forces at the helm of a governing alliance that signed a memorandum of understanding a week after the election. However, talks broke down over the summer, and Pheu Thai began negotiations with the military-backed parties to head an alternative coalition without Move Forward. And when Thaksin announced he would return to Thailand and hand himself in to serve jail time, it was clear that a deal had been struck between Pheu Thai and the palace–military establishment. Over three months after the elections, on 22 August, the same day Thaksin returned to hand himself in to authorities, the king appointed Pheu Thai’s Srettha Thavisin as prime minister.

Two Big Blows Struck for Pluralism: Spain and Poland

Two key elections during the year proved populists can be defeated at the ballot box. In July, Spain’s socialist prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, fended off an electoral assault from the right headed by the conservative Partido Popular (PP) and Spain’s far-right populist Vox party. The PP underperformed expectations even as it won the largest number of seats. Quite unexpectedly, Vox’s vote share plummeted, ensuring that the PP had no viable partner to form a majority coalition even with its plurality. As a result, King Filipe commissioned Sánchez to form a new government, and he was sworn in for a second term in September 2023. The ballot box defeat of the far-right, anti-immigration Vox — which had surged in the 2019 elections and again ran a campaign focused on anti-immigration, rolling back hard-fought rights for women (including on abortion) and the LGBTQ+ community, limiting the power of autonomous communities, as well as curtailing Spain’s international climate commitments — proved that despite their frustration with the ruling left-wing government, Spanish voters have no stomach for the kind of virulent anti-immigrant and anti-progressive agenda Vox advances.

October saw the resounding victory of Donald Tusk’s “coalition of coalitions” led by his “Civic Coalition” (Koalicja Obywatelska, KO) against the ruling national–populist Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PIS) government — a continuous thorn in the side of Brussels and Berlin — which was defeated after eight years in power. As I wrote in an ECPS commentary earlier this month, Tusk’s victory was simultaneously a win for Polish pluralism and democracy (voter turnout, especially among the young as well as Poles living abroad, broke all records) and for Europe, especially ahead of European Parliament elections in July 2024: “PiS’s defeat represents a clear win for Polish democracy, for pluralism writ large, and for Europe”. This conclusion holds even in the light of Geert Wilders’ shock victory in the Dutch elections in November (see below).

An Indian Summer for National Populists?

The autumn also saw several key ballot box events that confirmed the enduring strength of national populism worldwide.

Elections in the German states of Bavaria and Hesse on 8 October saw a surge in voter support for the far-right populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), with the party coming in second in Hesse and third in Bavaria, mainly at the expense of left-wing parties. These results indicated a growing “normalization” of the party among the electorate and fears that Germany’s far-right “firewall”, which sees the major parties refusing to work or vote with the AfD, may not hold ahead of federal elections scheduled for 2025.

October also saw a decisive defeat of the Voice Referendum in Australia, a proposal by the centre-left government of Anthony Albanese to establish constitutional recognition for Australia’s indigenous peoples for the first time and a related advisory body — the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice to Parliament — to inform the legislature and executive on the impact of government policy on policies affecting Australia’s indigenous communities, who represent the oldest continuously existing culture on earth. The failure of the referendum indicates in no uncertain terms the thriving of Australia’s far-right populist “sovereign citizen movement” and its attendant social media ecosystem — made up primarily of far-right politicians and media commentators and internet trolls who spread mis- and disinformation, not to mention absurd conspiracy theories, about the referendum on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram but also messaging services like Telegram and WhatsApp. This campaign highlights that despite the Labor Party’s decisive May 2022 defeat of the incumbent centre-right Liberal–National Party coalition — dominated since 2010 by avowed right-wing populists — the underlying infrastructure for far-right populist mobilization in Australia remains alive and well.

State elections in India at the end of the following month also signal growing support for Narendra Modi’s right-wing national–populist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India. Modi — an avowed national populist who stands accused of abetting anti-Muslim riots that killed thousands when he served as first minister of his native Gujarat in the early 2000s — was buoyed by wins for the BJP in Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and the prominent state of Rajasthan across November, which seem to show his mix of Hindutva (Hindu chauvinism) ideology and anti-Muslim policies at home and nationalist foreign policy abroad is working ahead of general elections set for mid-2024 that seem likely to secure him a third term in office. Since the BJP first returned to power nationally in 2014, Modi has overseen a steady centralization of power in India and democratic backsliding that have seen observers increasingly concerned about the rule of law and pluralism in the world’s largest democracy.

November Surprise: Shock Victories for Milei and Wilders

No sooner had policymakers in Berlin, Brussels and Washington let out an audible sigh of relief at Donald Tusk’s decisive win in Poland in October than the map of populism was again scrambled with shock wins in late November for Javier Milei in the second round of the Argentinian presidential election and for Geert Wilders PVV in Dutch elections.

Let’s begin with the ultra-right libertarian Milei, an economist whose only political experience before the national elections was as a one-term member of the Chamber of Deputies from Buenos Aires. In the first round in October, the leftist candidate Sergio Massa pulled out an unexpected win (taking 36 % of the vote to Milei’s 30 %), leading some to contend that the threat from the flamboyant and mercurial Milei — who ran on a platform of laissez-faire economics and radical deregulation (he had previously described himself as an “anarcho-capitalist”, including a controversial proposal to dollarize the Argentinian economy and abolish the central bank — was overdone. But in the second round on 19 November, Milei, who paradoxically marries ultra-libertarian positions on questions of drug policy, guns, prostitution, and LGBTQ+ issues and a fervent opposition to abortion and euthanasia, won a resounding 55% of the popular vote. With protests against his sweeping, radical agenda already growing, led by the country’s voluble trade union movement, only time will tell how a president who cuts entirely against the grain of Argentina’s long-standing Peronist tradition will fare, especially given his limited support in the national legislature.

The shock of the year, however, came with the victory of Geert Wilders’ anti-Islam and anti-immigration Party of Freedom (PVV) in the Dutch elections on 22 November, which were fought mainly on issues of immigration and the economy and, worryingly, with several violent incidents against the far-right Thierry Baudet, came after a feud over refugee policy brought down the fourth government of Prime Minister Mark Rutte. In “one of the biggest political upsets in Dutch politics since World War II”, the PVV took 37 seats in the 150-seat parliament and now — as the largest party in the legislature for the first time — is in prime position to head a coalition government. Wilders — a firebrand’s firebrand who has been a feature of Dutch politics for decades but always from the sidelines — ran an openly racist campaign focused on banning new mosques, ending immigration to the Netherlands, leaving the EU and imposing harsh assimilationist policies on migrants already settled in the country.

Given his avowedly Christian nationalist (“I don’t hate Muslims. I hate Islam”) and anti-immigrant positions, the PVV victory triggered shockwaves across the political landscape in the Netherlands and Europe, with many seeing it as a harbinger of an ascendant far-right in Europe or even a return to fascism. Still, negotiations to form a government in the Netherlands are generally tortuous and always result in a moderation of partners’ positions. In the end, much of the PVV agenda is unconstitutional and will never be implemented. Moreover, if Wilders wishes to be part of a governing coalition, let alone prime minister, he will have no choice but to moderate his positions, something he has already pledged to do. As of the end of 2023, Only one other party with a significant number of seats has committed to a formal agreement with the PVV, and the likely long-drawn-out negotiations may not even result in the party being in government. Still, with the PVV taking nearly 25 % of the popular vote, it would be foolhardy to ignore the signal sent by Dutch voters in the November elections that they want to see an end to “business as usual”.

Implications: Looking ahead to 2024

As mentioned at the top, 2024 is shaping up to be the biggest ballot year in human history, with over 2 billion voters heading to the polls, including nearly 1 billion registered voters in India alone, where national elections will be held in April and May of 2024. Other key national elections will be held in Indonesia and Pakistan (February), Portugal (March), South Korea (April), the European Parliament and Mexico (June), South Africa (mid-year), the United Kingdom (likely late in the year) and the United States (November), to name just a few. Populism will be on the ballot of most, if not all, of these critical electoral contests.

We may gather the key implications into four key categories. The first concerns crises and breakdowns in the social contract. Elections in Finland, Slovakia, Argentina, and the Netherlands have shown that voters are turning to populist parties out of frustration with the failure of incumbent governments to address pressing social and economic concerns, including cost of living pressures. Take housing, for example. While the Dutch election was cast in terms of debates about immigration, rising urban densities and overcrowding and attendant shortages of affordable housing proved to be at the root of much of the electorate’s concerns.

The second implication is that populist politics has become the “new normal” in many countries and that subnational (state and municipal) elections and referendums can also be subject to populist pressures. The Voice Referendum in Australia showed that the “far-right media infrastructure” is still in place for populists to use as a mobilizing tool to spread mis- and disinformation. State elections in India and Germany in late 2023, in which populists saw a surge of support, send a dangerous signal ahead of national elections in those countries in the middle of 2024.

Third, in the EU populists are on the march ahead of European elections in June 2024. Fears are growing that a surge in anti-immigration politics and Euroscepticism off the back of Wilders’ shock win in late 2023 (and notwithstanding Poland’s return to the pluralist camp). Beyond the success of Robert Fico in Slovakia and the AfD at the state level in Germany, populists have no doubt been buoyed by gains in Italy, Hungary and Sweden in 2022.

Finally — and on a positive note — the stunning results in Spain and Poland tell us that voters in large democracies are put off by the most virulent anti-immigration and xenophobic appeals and that populists can be beaten decisively at the ballot box, especially when the opposition is united and has access to media and ensures “a savvy campaign platform that rallies … natural supporters while also allowing [for appeals] to the base of support of the populists.”

 

(*) Simon P. Watmough is a researcher based in Leipzig in Germany and a non-resident research fellow in the research program on authoritarianism at ECPS. Dr. Watmough’s research interests sit at the intersection of global and comparative politics and include varieties of post-authoritarian states, the political sociology of the state, the role of the military in regime change, and the foreign policy of post-authoritarian states in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. He is currently writing a book on the global history of populism.

Far-right Golden Dawn party supporters attend the main pre-election rally outside the party's headquarters in Thessaloniki, Greece on June 15, 2014. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Populism and Incompetence in Updating the ‘System’

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHome

Why do many societies suddenly exhibit xenophobic and anti-systemic tendencies? Persuading those with phobic views is essential, and if persuasion fails, it indicates a failure in addressing the underlying issues. The examples illustrate that populism thrives in environments where social problems remain unresolved or experience significant delays due to incompetence or bureaucratic practices. Instead of efficiently solving problems, responsible agents often opt for the easier route of criticizing populist approaches, which proves to be ineffective.

By Hercules Millas

The rise of populist discourses in recent decades, posing a threat to democratic regimes and fostering contempt for fundamental institutions, particularly the judiciary system in this context, is often linked to the failure of some states to address the everyday needs of their citizens. The expectation is that citizens should uphold and adhere to democratically established laws and the constitution of their country, resisting the demagoguery of populist leaders. However, a fundamental shift is required and at this point what is needed is to put the horse in front of the cart: laws and constitutions should be designed to earn respect and compliance by serving as effective tools for problem-solving rather than mere principles to be upheld out of propriety. Without this transformation, the proliferation of populism is likely to persist, eroding trust in institutions such as justice and law over the long term.

As an introduction, a case in Greece serves as an enlightening example to illustrate the challenges associated with illegal property occupation, particularly concerning second homes. The issue of squatting transcends national boundaries and is prevalent in both developed and developing countries. Effectively addressing this phenomenon is consistently complex, expensive, and time-consuming. While, in theory, the unauthorized occupation of another person’s property is considered illegal, practical deterrents and punitive measures often fall short. Squatters, armed with manuals, often sourced from the internet, employ strategies to prolong their stay in properties against the will of the rightful owners.

The state security forces, upon receiving complaints related to illegal property occupation, typically restrict their involvement to referring the cases to the appropriate court. This approach results in significant delays in restoring possession. Often exceeding a year, the process is prolonged due to the occupiers’ utilization of various procedural delaying tactics, such as presenting false rental contracts, filing harassment complaints against owners, lodging appeals, and more. In Greece, in particular, the retrieval of access to one’s property can span several years, during which the property is usually found vandalized and looted.

A potential “solution” to the problem gained attention in Greece when the far-right racist organization Golden Dawn took action in 2009. It is important to note that this organization has since been dissolved, and its leaders are incarcerated for their involvement in murders and actions reminiscent of Nazi ideology. However, for a period, its members effectively assisted property owners grappling with squatting issues. The process was straightforward: applying to the organization was sufficient. Within a few days, the property would be returned to the owners, sometimes even cleaned, and painted. Golden Dawn employed a simple method: threatening squatters with physical harm and more severe consequences.

In similar cases, citizens faced a dilemma: to remain law-abiding and watch their homes from a distance or to circumvent the law and reclaim their houses with the help of Golden Dawn. Most Greeks trust the state and its law-enforcing mechanisms expecting that they will be protected against outlaws and criminals. But on this issue of squatters they see that Golden Dawn was more efficient. The crucial point is this: The collaboration of the owner of the house with the criminal organization is not perceived by many as something against humane behavior or against established law and order. This perception stems from the frustration with the slow administration of justice by state mechanisms, including local police and the court. Although the state condemns squatters and recognizes the property rights of owners, the prolonged legal processes make citizens feel abandoned and unprotected. The populist promises of Golden Dawn-type entities, advocating for quick solutions by bypassing the law and established order, resonate as sensible and promising to many voters.

Naturally, this example is extreme, involving a criminal organization resorting to bullying and force. Despite ignoring potential justifications of the squatters in this case, it serves the purpose of illustrating how populist promises may seem more practical, sensible, and useful to many. The counterargument, suggesting that such “solutions” herald the end of democratic regimes and foster anarchy and authoritarianism, lacks persuasiveness for individuals desperately fighting for rights acknowledged by all but unsecured by the existing administration. The notion of a potentially dangerous rise in anarchy does not resonate as sensible to citizens already experiencing anarchic treatment, such as by squatters, in an environment where protection is lacking. In these conditions, an anti-systemic stance or understanding gradually gains supporters.

The argument that a democratic regime is “slow” in addressing similar social problems, and that this is the price societies pay for maintaining a lawful and orderly milieu, can be perceived as resigned acceptance, saying, “Sorry, there is nothing to be done!” While it’s true that time-consuming and exhausting bureaucratic procedures aim to prevent injustice or harm, the concern that expedited processes may lead to injustice contributes to a mood conducive to populism. Populist leaders claim to transcend unnecessary obstacles, presenting themselves as “practical” and “pragmatic.” They don’t waste time on trivial “details” such as courts, appeals, constitutions, and the like. This narrative aligns well with the image of a “single” man, a strong, determined, and daring leader.

There are several areas where democratic governments struggle to address problems promptly and take decisive measures. Issues such as illegal immigration, terrorism, general security and anarchy, inflation, unemployment, and police force bullying are among these challenges. While some of these problems are inherently complex, some fears and demands expressed by the public are often considered unwarranted phobias and unjustified whims. I will delve further into the topic of immigration.

In recent decades, there has been a surge in population movements from developing countries to developed ones, particularly towards the United States and the European Union. This trend was not at all notable prior the Industrial Revolution, as global disparities in welfare standards were not as stark as they are today. The factors driving immigration, besides economic considerations, include a) increased access to information about new opportunities, b) greater ease of travel compared to the past, c) improved living standards in developing countries, enabling the “middle classes” to afford the costly journey to their desired destination, and d) the capacity of host countries to accommodate and absorb newcomers either as cheap labor or as immigrants with limited prospects of repatriation. The net result is a growing influx of economic migrants to these “wealthy” countries.

However, it is evident that this trend presents a considerable challenge. The “poor” countries of Asia and Africa make up roughly 70 percent of the world population. Even if only 1 percent of the potential immigrants were to seek relocation, it would amount to sixty million people, and the 10 percent nearly equals the combined population of the USA and the EU. Moreover, only 19 percent of illegal immigrants were repatriated in recent years (See: Migration Information Source, ‘Recalcitrant’ and ‘Uncooperative’). The legal frameworks governing immigration were established at a time when the issue of illegal economic immigration was not as prominent. (It’s important to note that the refugee issue is a distinct economic, political, and ethical matter, which will not be addressed here.)

The issue of illegal economic immigration has created a strained social atmosphere within the EU, and this will be the focus of my discussion. The unrest is complex and multifaceted: some perceive an intrusion of “foreigners” threatening the social and national composition, as well as the unity of their country; others express their fear that their jobs are jeopardized; and still others emphasize the costs incurred by the country in trying to accommodate the newcomers. There are also those who dismiss these views as irrelevant, nationalistic, or even racist, opting to approach the entire issue from a humanitarian standpoint.

Eventually, in December 2023, the European Parliament and the Council reached an agreement on the “New Pact on Migration and Asylum of the EU,” initially proposed in December 2020. This new pact is aimed at managing and normalizing migration for the long term, ensuring a more rapid and effective response to future crises, including the instrumentalization of migrants. It took the EU three years to reach a consensus on measures that may seem self-evident. Understandably, the EU needed additional time to identify the problems and propose new measures. The implementation of these measures is expected to take further years, highlighting the lengthy process involved in recognizing and addressing complex issues. During those years of “dormancy,” populist attacks on the existing “system” resonated as logical and appealing. Tensions within the EU were escalating, providing a fertile ground for populist narratives. Populist leaders skillfully exploited the delays, criticizing and condemning the perceived inefficiencies of the “system.” They advocated for pragmatic, efficient, and strong single leaders as an alternative and their complaints found hospitable ears.Unfortunately, the New Pact on Migration of the EU arrived belatedly, contributing to the populist narrative of systemic failure.

The issue of populism cannot be solely framed within the dichotomy of good or bad, right or wrong, useful or harmful and legal or illegal. This complexity arises from its connection to popular perceptions and aspirations. In a democratic society, determinations of what is right, ethical, wrong, or unethical are not dictated by experts or authorities, as in authoritarian regimes. Instead, these categories of right/wrong and the related laws are relative and shaped by the democratic process—through votes, elections, and decisions made by elected bodies. Constitutions or internationally recognized principles like human rights may act as a “safety valve.” Still, even these are neither “holy” in the sense that they may not be changed, nor established in the absence of some kind of social and communal consensus.  

To fight populism solely based on “humanitarian principles, ethics, laws,” without considering the perceptions and wishes of the citizens, is counterproductive. The priorities lie with the needs and understanding of the voters, which should take precedence over abstract principles and laws. It’s essential to recognize whose principles are being referred to if they are not reflective of the people’s. Haughtiness and great trust to one’s convictions do not constitute a democratic approach to problems. The “worried” citizens do not change their minds when they are accused and confronted as racists, xenophobic and as being “wrong in their judgments.” On the contrary, they feel that the populist leaders who are called “racists” are closer to them, since they share their worries. 

Populist leaders leverage their arguments by addressing the immediate needs and demands of the masses, which may sometimes be influenced by undemocratic or racist perspectives. However, these concerns should not be dismissed outright. It is crucial to comprehend, address, and confront them, not on theoretical grounds, but by actively solving problems, dispelling fears, and curing phobias. To ignore and disregard offhandedly phobias, prejudices, stereotypes, xenophobic tendencies and similar manifestations of a section of a community, calling names and by assigning negative characterizations stops short of understanding what is going on. Labels at best describe situations but don’t explain what happens and why they occur. The undemocratic tendencies are not to be cured by psychoanalysis and/or by philosophizing on ethics.  They may be superseded when the conjuncture which creates them vanishes.

The main point of my argumentation can be succinctly summarized: Why do many societies suddenly exhibit xenophobic and anti-systemic tendencies? Persuading those with phobic views is essential, and if persuasion fails, it indicates a failure in addressing the underlying issues. The examples provided illustrate that populism thrives in environments where social problems remain unresolved or experience significant delays due to incompetence or bureaucratic practices. Instead of efficiently solving problems, responsible agents often opt for the easier route of criticizing populist approaches, which proves to be ineffective. The relevant procedures – which were decided in the past for societies that faced different problems – should be expedited, if needed risking some harm that may incur to some. Delays involve much more serious harm to many. 

Dr. Rafał Riedel, Full Professor and Head of the Department of Political and Administrative Systems at the University of Opole and visiting fellow at the Vienna School of International Studies.

Professor Rafał Riedel: Undoing Poland’s Eight-Year Illiberal Trend Demands Significant Time

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviewsMONITOR

Dr. Rafał Riedel of the University of Opole: “The illiberal trend in Poland persisted for a duration of eight years, during which Prawo i Sprawiedliwość / Law and Justice (PiS) party extensively seized control of the state. The changes PiS party implemented were so deeply ingrained that reversing them will require a considerable amount of time. While I won’t specify another eight years, it is evident that this is not an overnight transformation. In my view, certain changes may materialize in weeks, others in months, and unfortunately, some changes may take years or prove irreversible due to entrenched processes.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Rafał Riedel, Full Professor and Head of the Department of Political and Administrative Systems at the University of Opole and visiting fellow at the Vienna School of International Studies, delves into the challenges of reversing Poland’s eight-year illiberal trend. As the new government, led by Donald Tusk, takes the reins, Prof. Riedel acknowledges the deeply ingrained changes implemented during the illiberal era, emphasizing that the transformation won’t be an overnight process. The illiberal trend, characterized by the party-state capture, state-market relationship shifts, and erosion of liberal democratic values, necessitates time and strategic interventions.

Reflecting on the recent elections, Prof. Riedel highlights the central role of collective memory manipulation in shaping political discourse. He cites examples of Germanophobia during the campaigns, underscoring the strategic use of historical narratives for political gain. The interview delves into the impact of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość / Law and Justice (PiS) party’s populism on Poland’s political landscape, emphasizing the generational divide and the need to reassess the conservative label.

Discussing the illiberal turn, Prof. Riedel outlines the key indicators, including violations of liberal democracy and the phenomenon of state capture. The interview addresses the implications for democracy in Poland and the potential for reversing this illiberal trend through democratic means. The upcoming European Parliament elections in 2024 are anticipated with caution, considering the Eurosceptic sentiments, while concerns about a surge of far-right parties in the broader European context are analyzed in the context of Poland’s political dynamics.

As the interview concludes, Prof. Riedel emphasizes the significance of the October elections as a potential impetus for a positive shift in Central and Eastern Europe. Poland, with its substantial size and influence, has the potential to pioneer a new trend, challenging the illiberal status quo and reaffirming its commitment to European values.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Rafał Riedel with some edits.

Manipulating Collective Memory for Populist Political Gains

March of a Million Hearts. Hundreds of thousands march in anti-government protest to show support for democracy in Warsaw, Poland on October 1, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

Thank you so much for accepting our interview request. So, I start with the first question in the context of a liberal trend in Poland. How do you see the role of collective memory manipulation and its connection to authoritarian Populism? Considering your paper on collective memory manipulation and its connection to authoritarian populism, do you see any evidence of such manipulation in the recent electoral campaigns, and how might it impact democratic processes in Poland?

Dr. Rafał Riedel: Thank you for your invitation. Your question is impressively detailed and tailored to my work. 

Now, regarding the mentioned paper itself, it’s essential to note that it serves primarily as a conceptual framework, offering a tool for analyzing how memory manipulation, particularly collective memory, can be employed manipulatively by populist and authoritarian politicians. The focus is on understanding the mechanisms through which political leaders shape and exploit collective memory to further their agendas.

Secondly, the paper primarily offers a conceptual framework and does not delve into empirical analysis of specific cases, such as Poland or Hungary. However, if we focus on the context of Poland, especially considering the recent election, my simplest answer would be, “yes.” Concrete examples can be provided, and while I could share various instances, I’ll highlight one general and another specific example in detail.

It’s crucial to understand that in Polish politics and in Poland in general, history and historical education wield significant influence. This isn’t merely a subjective observation; scholars have extensively discussed the pivotal role of history, historical education, and what is termed “Gedächtnispolitik” in German, in Poland. This prominence is likely attributed to Poland’s dense and rich history, where the narrative of victimhood plays a central role. Political forces across the spectrum frequently recycle collective memory in the public sphere, saturating discourse with history, storytelling, and historical context. Unsurprisingly, this historical narrative becomes a potent tool in politics, at times employed in a manipulative manner.

If we look for recent examples from the election campaigns preceding the parliamentary elections on October 23, the role of Germany stands out, presenting a particularly intriguing case. The complex history between Poland and Germany, spanning over 1,000 years, is marked by various challenges. In terms of manipulation, a notable instance is the Law and Justice (PiS) party led by Jarosław Kaczyński. They engage in what I call “Germanophobia” in some extend. While it’s valid to maintain a critical stance towards neighbors, this fraction exploits and amplifies anti-German sentiment at every available opportunity. The inspiration for such sentiment is evidently drawn from historical narratives. To illustrate, a frequently used phrase during the political campaign in Poland was “Für Deutschland” which has become the subject of jokes and memes on the Internet.

I’m not sure how acquainted you are with the Polish discourse, but “Für Deutschland” originated from two words taken out of context from Donald Tusk’s speech. He was expressing gratitude to Angela Merkel after receiving the Charlemagne Prize. This speech, delivered in German, was extensively exploited by a particular political party, turning it into a crude instrument of party propaganda, suggesting Tusk’s servility towards Germany. Unfortunately, these two words were repeated several hundred times daily, by the politicians, and in the so-called public TV by the PiS media officers.

This repetition was part of a negative campaign aimed at portraying Donald Tusk in an unfavorable light. The use of “Für Deutschland” in their discourse is highly representative, as the term “German” was transformed into an epithet in their campaign. It ceased to be merely an adjective describing their adversary; instead, it became an offensive epithet. The discursive coalition, consisting of high-ranking party representatives, opinion leaders, and quasi-journalists, played a crucial role in shaping this narrative. Some individuals who were supposed to be journalists failed in their role and instead became instrumentalized by a particular political party.

The manipulation went beyond political communication and delved into the realm of discursive coalition, where the word “German” carried a pejorative connotation. 

It appealed significantly to 30-40 percent of the electorate, making it a functional tool. This example, with its Germanophobic and anti-German meta-narrative inspired by historical references, illustrates a manipulation that goes beyond electoral strategies and touches on broader societal sentiments. Certainly, there are numerous elements to this discourse, and one could delve into discussions about Second World War compensations from the perspective of international law. However, I’m not attempting to initiate such a debate on the justification or lack thereof. I’m emphasizing this from an electoral standpoint, where this historical topic was evidently utilized as a tool, instrumentalized for political purposes. This is why I categorize it as a manipulation—because it served a strategic function in the electoral context. 

PiS Party Predominantly Supported by Older Demographics

How do you perceive the impact of PiS party’s populism on the overall political landscape in Poland, particularly in terms of shaping public discourse and political behavior? PiS has often framed its policies as defending national sovereignty and traditional values. In your view, how has this populist narrative resonated with the Polish electorate, and what demographic groups are particularly influenced by it?

Dr. Rafał Riedel: I’m afraid I have to affirmatively respond to this question. So yes, PiS party’s populism certainly impacted the political landscape. Regarding the resonance of this popular narrative among different demographic groups, the answer to the last part of your question is relatively straightforward. Analyzing the electoral groups and their preferences in the recent elections, it’s evident that the PiS party garnered support predominantly from older demographics, or using a politically correct term, those who are chronologically advanced.

However, despite their victory in terms of seats won, they, in a sense, lost because they lacked coalition potential. The so-called democratic opposition, as a coalition, secured more votes and parliamentary seats. This outcome was driven by the mobilization of younger electoral groups who found PiS party to be an unappealing choice, viewing it as a more conservative, passe (old) type of party. This generational gap was observable not only in the leaders of the party but also in the messaging and support they garnered, including how they distributed resources and allocated the public funds.

While PiS party may address several electoral sectors as a massive party, its primary focus lies in Eastern Poland and older fractions of the electorate. Nonetheless, the younger demographic was mobilized during the elections, contributing to the high turnout, which was exceptional by Polish standards and indicative of a revolutionary momentum, which we witnessed in October elections.

It’s conceivable that when you tailor your message to an older electorate, it naturally aligns more with conservative values. Despite PiS labeling themselves as conservatives, I’m quite skeptical about this characterization. Often, when we discuss traditional values and national sovereignty, we automatically associate them with conservatism. While potentially conservatism is a significant ideological tradition, the PiS party’s message and behavior did not genuinely reflect conservative principles.

In my view, not every regressive idea qualifies as conservatism. I’m not aware of conservatives who disregard and actively undermine institutions, which is precisely what PiS party did. Their actions amounted to the vandalism of liberal democratic institutions. Consequently, I find it challenging, among other reasons, to label them as conservatives. While PiS party attempted to frame themselves as defenders of national sovereignty and traditional values, this was largely a verbal strategy. Upon closer inspection of their actions, decisions and policies, there was little evidence of a genuine commitment to defending national sovereignty or upholding traditional values. 

Liberal Democracy Encompasses More Than Mere Majoritarian Voting

In your paper “Populism Is the Only Game in Town. Poland’s Illiberal Turn as an Authoritarian Threat,” you argue that Poland has been experiencing an illiberal turn. Could you elaborate on the key indicators of this illiberal shift and its implications for democracy in Poland?

Dr. Rafał Riedel: Certainly, the indicators of Poland’s illiberal turn can be observed through various international rankings, such as Freedom House and Bertelsmann, which show a decline in liberal democratic ratings. However, delving more deeply into the developments on the ground in Poland, I would highlight two significant dimensions of this shift.

Just as liberalism can be defined in various ways, the same holds true for illiberalism. It’s important to note that illiberalism is not merely anti- or counter-liberalism. Rather, it can be analyzed along multiple dimensions. One such dimension can be termed as social-political, while another is distinctly economic. 

Primarily, illiberalism involves a rejection of liberal democracy. This rejection is evident not only in the most recent elections but also in preceding ones. Illiberal forces have successfully created a semi-cleavage, dividing the electorate into those aligned with liberal values and messages, and those favoring a more social-oriented approach. The illiberal factions vehemently oppose the liberal message, marking a significant aspect of their ideological stance.

At the same time, I get the sense that their opposition to liberalism was specifically directed at neoliberalism. Their message resonated strongly with those who felt disillusioned by the changes in Poland, particularly within the broader context of Central and Eastern Europe. While our focus is on Poland, it’s important to acknowledge that the post-1989 reforms were socially challenging, shaped significantly by the principles of the neoliberal paradigm.

The reforms were implemented during a Zeitgeist dominated by Thatcherism, Reaganism and a global shift toward neoliberalism. Many scholars argue that, given the prevailing atmosphere, there seemed to be little alternative. Fast forward one and a half decades, and the rise to power of these forces can be seen as a backlash against the weariness induced by the previous trend—a response to the fatigue stemming from the transformations of the late 20th century. In essence, this strain of illiberalism emerged as a counter-revolution, a reaction to the 1989 revolution and the subsequent wave of transformations.

And I believe this aligns well with various interpretations of illiberalism. Rhetorically, they skillfully placed blame on liberal democracy itself. As political scientists, we engage in debates about whether there exists any democracy other than liberal democracy. Even when simplistically defined, liberal democracy extends beyond mere majoritarian voting; it involves the safeguarding of minority rights. It also means that the political process operates within legal boundaries, encompassing non-majoritarian institutions such as the constitutional court and central bank, which are respected for their independence.

From this political perspective, the key parameters I would identify are the violations of liberal democracy and the phenomenon of state capture. In essence, I would characterize it as a party-state capture, as they have taken control of institutions like public media, the constitutional court, the Supreme Court, NGOs, foundations, and more, staffing them with party functionaries. While there may be some parallels with Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, it’s crucial to avoid direct comparisons due to the numerous differences in their approaches.

Now, a brief overview of the second dimension, focusing on economic terms. If we examine various parameters related to the state-market relationship, the post-communist reforms, characterized by liberalization, commercialization, and marketization—following a neoliberal Washington Consensus-type program—were similarly disregarded. Instead, there was a preference for increased state involvement in the market and economy. However, I hesitate to label it any form of a coordinated market economy, as the outcome was quite the opposite. What transpired was, once again, a form of state capture. Party functionaries took control of state-owned companies. At one point, they advocated for the “Polonization” of the banking sector, emphasizing the need for “re-Polonization.”

For example, the underlying assumption was that, following the privatization process post-Communism, the banking sector fell into the hands of foreign entities. To restore economic independence, they asserted the necessity to reclaim and “re-Polonize” the sector. Using public funds, they frequently acquired or, at times, coerced the sale of assets from foreign investors, manipulating legislation and employing various political maneuvers. While the outcome increased Polish capital in the banking sector, it concurrently meant a return to public ownership. Presently, it comprises state-owned banks or capital groups, including investment funds and insurance companies. Ultimately, this “re-Polonization” amounted to simultaneous “re-nationalization,” marking a regression from the trajectory of building a more privately oriented capitalist economy. It is again a backlash and represented a counter-revolution against the earlier trend of market liberalization. These two parameters stand out as significant indicators of the shift toward illiberalism in both the economic and political spheres.

The Key Lies in Distinguishing Between Democratic and Non-Democratic Forces

Donald Tusk speaks at an election rally after a televised debate on government television at the end of the campaign in Warsaw, Poland on October 9, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

Given the recent elections in Poland and the success of Donald Tusk, how do you interpret the results in the context of your research on populism and illiberalism in the country?

Dr. Rafał Riedel: The most appropriate answer, without leaning towards any particular viewpoint, would be to adopt a wait-and-see approach. It is still too early to draw definitive conclusions. Although the elections occurred in October, the constitutional periods were extended by the previous ruling party, and the new government was officially appointed on December 13, just a week ago. Speculation at this point is limited, and interpretations remain relatively soft, given the evident change in democratic mood in Poland.

Personally, I harbored some skepticism about the smooth transition of power, given my negative assessment of authoritarian populist politicians. I was even doubtful about whether the power transition would occur seamlessly, particularly considering earlier instances in Brazil and the United States where transitions faced challenges. While I am not suggesting a regular coup, there have been examples, often inspired by figures like Donald Trump, who served as an intellectual ally to these politicians. As of our current conversation, the formal transition of power is underway, with the President appointing a new government led by Donald Tusk.

The illiberal trend in Poland persisted for a duration of eight years, during which they extensively seized control of the state. The changes they implemented were so deeply ingrained that reversing them will require a considerable amount of time. While I won’t specify another eight years, it is evident that this is not an overnight transformation. In my view, certain changes may materialize in weeks, others in months, and unfortunately, some changes may take years or prove irreversible due to entrenched processes.

As of our conversation, there is an ongoing international spotlight on Poland, particularly concerning the battle over public media. The previous administration continues to occupy the buildings, creating a standoff with the new government attempting to usher in new leadership. While they may have formally relinquished political power, their presence persists in numerous institutions. For someone like Donald Tusk, governing becomes a formidable task when facing opposition in public media, the Central Bank, Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and more. The process of disentangling from these entrenched positions will undoubtedly take time.

Another significant and pressing question is whether reversing this trend is feasible through democratic means. While democratic expectations dictate that the process adheres to legal standards, there is uncertainty about its effectiveness in a reasonable timeframe. On the democratic front, the hope is for a proper and lawful reversal, but pragmatic considerations introduce the possibility that it may be a lengthy process, potentially facing another risk of backlash.

Categorizing these political forces in a simplistic right-, left-wing spectrum doesn’t suffice, as they transcend such conventional distinctions. The crux lies in distinguishing between democratic and non-democratic forces, with some aligning with authoritarian tendencies. This isn’t a standard political game unfolding within the democratic arena, with all players respecting the democratic principles. 

One of your articles explores the concept of “De-Europeanization of Eastern peripheries.” How might the recent elections impact Poland’s relationship with the European Union, and what implications could this have for democratic norms and values? Do you think that Tusk’s government could stop the de-Europeanization of Poland? 

Dr. Rafał Riedel: Yes, I think so, because this was one of the main points during the electoral campaign. The question of Europe emerged as a crucial point of reference, shaping the political discourse. On one side, there was Donald Tusk and the entire democratic coalition, explicitly declaring a pro-European stance. On the other side, the PiS party increasingly adopted a Eurosceptic position. In my view, they have shifted from soft Euroscepticism to a more assertive hard Euroscepticism, with their post-election message being distinctly hard-Eurosceptic. This marks a significant transformation in Polish European politics. The recent EU summit showcased the reception of leaders like Donald Tusk, signaling a positive response. There are high expectations, both pragmatically regarding the unfreezing of the recovery fund—frozen due to concerns over democratic backsliding—and symbolically, as a return to a closer relationship with Europe. The structured shift in Poland is apparent, touching both on practical matters like the recovery fund and symbolic aspects, emphasizing a reconnection with Europe.

Exchange of Knowledge and Know-How Among Populist Movements Across Borders

Chairperson of Law and Justice, Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Photo: Tomasz Kudala.

Considering the rise of populism globally, how do you see Poland’s political landscape influencing or being influenced by broader international populist movements?

Dr. Rafał Riedel: I’m currently collaborating with a colleague from Vienna on a paper exploring the diffusion of populist ideas across borders. Specifically, regarding the type of authoritarian populism seen in Polish politics led by Jarosław Kaczyński and his party, it’s clear that they drew significant inspiration from Viktor Orbán, openly expressing this influence. In 2011, after losing the parliamentary elections, Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of PiS, famously claimed that he was “convinced that one day, we will have Budapest in Warsaw,” providing a stark acknowledgment of his admiration for Orbán. The frequent meetings between Kaczyński and Orbán facilitated a learning process, with such influences openly declared in the Polish context.

The diffusion of illiberal ideas is working though transnational networks of the populists. There are numerous instances highlighting their admiration for figures like Donald Trump and their favorable view of how he was received in Poland ruled by PiS party. In contrast, after Joe Biden’s election, the Polish President notably delayed sending diplomatic congratulations to Washington. These populist leaders forged alliances through various means, organizing meetings, supporting one another, and hosting politicians from across Europe, such as Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, and others. They collaborated on conferences and attended events like Vox’s electoral events in Spain, showcasing the extent of knowledge and know-how exchange among populist movements across borders.

What are your expectations for the European Parliament elections in Poland scheduled for June 2024?

Dr. Rafał Riedel: Certainly, I wouldn’t attempt to predict the results as it’s too early, and I’m not a fortune teller. Typically, European topics hold significant importance in Polish discussions. I anticipate a highly spirited campaign, especially since it coincides with the ongoing pan-European debate about the future of Europe and federalization.

Presently, the PiS party and other Eurosceptic parties seem to be adopting a defensive stance, a trend likely to continue into the next year. If we manage to achieve re-democratization and re-Europeanization in Poland, I will predict the victory of pro-democratic, pro-European forces. However, it’s crucial to acknowledge that around 30 percent or more of the population holds Eurosceptic views, be it soft or hard Euroscepticism, and this will be reflected in the elections. The key question is whether the Eurosceptic camp will be dominated by PiS party or if it will be divided between PiS party and Konfederacja, a more right-wing and more Eurosceptic party in the Polish political spectrum.

Poland Can Once Again Emerge as a Pioneer in the Broader European Context

Lastly, how concerned are you about a possible surge of far-right parties after the Netherlands in the upcoming European Parliament elections in June?

Dr. Rafał Riedel: On the Polish political spectrum, my skepticism about categorizing PiS party as a far-right party, as I’ve previously mentioned, aligns with the reservations many political scientists have about the oversimplified notions of right-wing and left-wing. Such labels often fall short, especially considering that their economic program may not neatly fit into conventional right-wing characteristics. However, it’s undeniable that PiS party exhibits strong nationalist tendencies and holds hard Eurosceptic views. I anticipate their continued association with the European Parliament fraction, known as The European Conservatives and Reformists Group.

In the European context, I don’t anticipate PiS party achieving more than 30 percent. In fact, I expect even less, considering the prevailing trends in Europe, as you mentioned, such as in the Netherlands. While they secured around 20 percent in their electoral result, it’s crucial to recognize the Dutch political system’s fragmentation and optimization, making it unlikely for a significant number of Dutch deputies from the right-wing spectrum to be elected, despite being the leading party. Looking at Germany, especially in East Germany, anti-migration sentiments could potentially boost right-wing parties. However, European elections are often considered second-order elections, meaning that domestic issues frequently take precedence over European topics in the discourse. Hence, I believe this analysis needs to be conducted on a nation-state level rather than a pan-European level. The absence of a European public sphere and pan-European parties, coupled with the fragmented nature of campaigns, necessitates an examination within the domestic political systems of the 27 member states. Each country’s specific political dynamics will play a crucial role in determining outcomes.

Just to conclude, I consider the October elections in Poland as a significant impetus. The prevailing mood in Central and Eastern Europe, dominated by figures like Orbán and Kaczyński, had been rather disheartening. However, the results in Poland bring a sense of hope and a breath of fresh air. Given Poland’s substantial size in terms of territory, population, and economy, it has the potential to exert a powerful influence. Orbán, with his anti-European and illiberal stance, finds himself more marginalized, lacking a Polish ally in Brussels. I hope that akin to its role in 1989, Poland can once again emerge as a pioneer, regional leader, and initiator of new trends in the broader European context.

Ganjar Pranowo, as Central Java Governor, at a cultural festival in Batang / Central Java Regency, Indonesia on October 2, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

Ganjar Pranowo’s Quest: Resisting Islamist Civilizational Populism in Indonesia

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Please cite as:

Bachtiar, Hasnan. (2023). “Ganjar Pranowo’s Quest: Resisting Islamist Civilizational Populism in Indonesia.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 19, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0028

 

Abstract

Ganjar Pranowo stands as a pivotal figure within technocratic populism, anticipated to advocate for the people’s volonté générale and counter the sway of Islamist civilisational populism within Indonesia. The impending 2024 election positions him in a direct contest against Anies Baswedan and Prabowo Subianto, both politicians who garnered support from Islamist populist factions in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial and 2019 presidential elections, respectively. Perceptions of Ganjar’s political stance vary, with some viewing him as a populist figure. However, in essence, he embodies the antithesis of populism, distinct from narratives and rhetoric persistently leveraging Islamism for political gain. This article seeks to delve into Ganjar’s political prospects in the upcoming 2024 election, shedding light on his role in confronting rivals and their supporters entrenched in Islamist populism. While widely seen as the most compelling figure for upholding the continuity of a vibrant democracy, his emergence also sparks inquiries into the trajectory of substantive democratic progress within the nation.

By Hasnan Bachtiar

Introduction

Dan Slater, an American political scientist, contends that Indonesia’s “vibrant democracy” stands a better chance of continuity under the continued leadership style of Jokowi (Slater, 2023). Among the limited pool of potential presidential candidates, Ganjar Pranowo emerges as a leading contender, viewed as the most fitting successor to Jokowi. Pranowo’s potential lies in his ability to potentially surpass other candidates, notably Anies Baswedan, who enjoys support from an Islamist “civilisational populist” (Yilmaz et al., 2022) group (Bachtiar, 2023), and Prabowo, classified as a chauvinist populist (Mietzner, 2020).

However, the upcoming 2024 political contest presents an unexpected turn as Jokowi aligns himself with Prabowo, positioning his eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming, as the vice-presidential candidate within Prabowo’s political coalition. This move poses a significant challenge to Ganjar’s standing, pitting him against both his political mentor and a potent political force. It seems plausible that Jokowi, recognizing that no one can precisely fill his leadership role, seeks to extend his influence through his son, whom he can effectively oversee.

Indonesia, in its ongoing pursuit of economic development and democratization, appears to lean towards an authoritarian trajectory (Power, 2018) following two decades of democratization since the 1998 political reform. Within this landscape, Jokowi’s inner circle comprises bureaucrats who echo the political ethos of the New Order era. This group notably includes Prabowo, serving as the Minister of Defense, and Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, holding the position of Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs in Indonesia. Their influence transcends their designated roles due to their adeptness in driving strategic state development. Trained and accustomed to Suharto’s militaristic approach, characterized by precision and effectiveness albeit often entailing human rights violations, they now wield considerable power.

This authoritarian inclination gains momentum amidst the aftermath of the Covid-19 outbreak and concurrent challenges stemming from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, triggering crises in food and energy. A recent illustration is the displacement of indigenous people from their customary lands in Rempang, Batam Island. This displacement aims to pave the way for the ambitious transformation of the region into Indonesia’s Eco-City, a venture seeking significant foreign investment from the Chinese corporation Xinyi Glass Holdings.

In his role as a symbol of popular sovereignty, Jokowi endeavours to persuade his cabinet that any developmental initiatives under his leadership should not undermine democratic progress. Their objective is to ensure the sustenance of formal democracy throughout the stipulated five-year periods between general elections. This perspective contrasts with criticisms asserting that Jokowi is eroding democratic principles (Mujani & Liddle, 2021; Lindsey and Butt, 2023). Consequently, the fate of substantive democracy in the nation remains uncertain.

The intricate web of relationships among political leaders, business figures, parties, and various influential actors significantly shapes the practical dynamics of politics, thereby shaping the gradual evolution of substantive democracy. However, prevalent manoeuvres seem to exhibit a recurring pattern that weakens democratic structures. Collaborations among political entities, leaders, and business elites often lead to multifaceted political manipulations (Bachtiar, 2020). Notably, the diminishing authority of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and its apparent tolerance toward corruption, particularly in strategic party projects, signify regressive steps detrimental to democracy.

A recent, contentious incident spotlighting the country’s political landscape involves Jokowi’s facilitation of his son, Gibran, assuming the position of Prabowo’s vice-presidential candidate. This manoeuvre involved leveraging legal and political channels excessively, evident in the Constitutional Court’s proceedings (Baker, 2023). Through his brother-in-law, Chief Justice Anwar Usman, Jokowi influenced legal amendments to ease the eligibility criteria for his son to run for office before turning 40.

Ganjar’s challenge extends beyond contending with Jokowi’s political influence. Amidst the stakes involving economic development, political stability, and the precarious state of substantive democracy, Ganjar confronts the remnants of post-Reformasi political manoeuvring, notably Islamist populism, which, while recently receding, still poses a significant challenge. Anies and Prabowo, figures supported by Islamist populist forces in the 2017 gubernatorial and 2019 presidential elections respectively (Barton et al., 2021a; Barton et al., 2021b), exemplify this trend. While Prabowo acquiesced to becoming Minister of Defense in Jokowi’s cabinet, Anies, having risen to Governor of Jakarta by defeating Ahok, remains in opposition.

This article aims to explore Ganjar’s approach to combating Islamist populism, particularly when certain political entities employ identity politics as a tool in their contestations. Examining Ganjar’s stance in this context will elucidate whether he indeed embodies the ideal figure capable of upholding a vibrant democracy and whether he exhibits the empathy necessary to drive substantive changes within the landscape of Indonesian democratization.

Who is Ganjar Pranowo?

On October 28, 1968, Ganjar Pranowo was born in Karanganyar, Central Java, Indonesia. He studied law at Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. This is the same campus that Jokowi and Anies graduated from. He subsequently completed postgraduate studies at the University of Indonesia. He had been a student activist since 1992. Three years later he was a member of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) during the New Order era. In the party, he was a loyalist of Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of the country’s founding father, Soekarno. Ganjar joined the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in early 2003, before running for parliament in the 2004 legislative elections, but he lost. However, after his rival (the winning candidate) was appointed Ambassador, Ganjar was also appointed to sit on the DPR RI Commission IV.

It was his tenacity and courage to speak out that made his political reputation grow. From 2009 to 2014, he had been entrusted with the position of Vice-President of Commission II in charge of internal affairs. He was experienced in serving on the Commission of Inquiry investigating the Century Bank case, Indonesia’s largest unresolved corruption case. In September 2012, with the support of the Central Java PDI-P Regional Leadership Council, he decided to run against the incumbent deputy governor, Rustriningsih, in the Central Java gubernatorial election. Ganjar Pranowo-Heru Sudjatmoko was officially sworn in as Governor and Deputy Governor of Central Java for the period 2013-2018 on August 23, 2013. After being inaugurated, he promised to execute the “Agenda 18” program, a kind of regional development blueprint that is considered progressive and pro-people. 

Ganjar is known as a populist figure, a subject of political performance and ideology. Populism, in this context, is the simplest form of populism that is in favor of the interests of the people. In fact, he also portrays himself as a technocrat who cares about people’s everyday lives. This is the same image that his predecessor Jokowi has built up. In his official speech as governor of Central Java, he said, “…we must serve the people well, not betray them. And why this infrastructure development is so important because it is one of the main requirements to revive the people’s economy” (Pranowo, 2022). Ganjar can therefore be called populist, at least performatively and ideologically.

Ganjar’s Chance in 2024 Presidential Election

As governor of Central Java, he has a reputation for being a good leader, popular and close to the people. He is working to imitate Jokowi. He often makes impromptu visits (blusukan) or goes down to the grassroots to see and talk directly with ordinary people. Through this unique way, he evaluates whether his programs in government are working well or not. He also ensures that his policies benefit people’s lives. This made him a well-known figure and built his image as a leader close to the people. In addition, all his activities are always publicized through various social media, especially X/Twitter (@ganjarpranowo), Instagram (ganjar_pranowo) and YouTube (@GanjarPranowoOfficial). Taking advantage of his popularity, he has become one of the leading candidates who will take part in the presidential elections of 2024.

Prabowo Subianto gives a speech about the vision and mission of the 2019 Indonesian presidential candidate in front of a crowd of supporters on the campaign in Yogyakarta, Indonesia on April 8, 2019. Photo: Aidil Akbar.

As a candidate, Ganjar Pranowo faces competition from Anies Baswedan and Prabowo Subianto. Anies, a professor at the University of Paramadina, holds a Ph.D. from Northern Illinois University, USA. Although not affiliated with any political party, he has been declared as the presidential candidate of the Nasdem party and enjoys support from Islamist populist groups. Prabowo, on the other hand, is the former military commander of the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) and was once the son-in-law of Indonesia’s powerful figure, Suharto. Since being involved in various significant special operations, Prabowo has faced accusations of human rights violations, which has been a contentious issue for his party during election seasons. A co-founder of the Gerindra party, Prabowo has been a prominent political figure who contested against Jokowi in the 2014 and 2019 elections. Anies was part of Jokowi’s cabinet in 2014 but later underwent reshuffling. In contrast, Ganjar is perceived to share similarities with Jokowi, a sentiment reinforced when Jokowi expressed a preference for a presidential candidate with white hair and a wrinkled forehead, a description that notably aligns with Ganjar’s characteristics.

According to the Indikator Survey (October 2023), Ganjar Pranowo holds a significant lead in electability with 29.5%. He surpasses other candidates, including Anies Baswedan (22.8%), Prabowo (19.5%), Ridwan Kamil (5.7%), Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (1.9%), Erick Thohir (1.4%), Puan Maharani (1.3%), Khofifah Indar Parawansa (1.1%), Hari Tanoesoedibjo (1.0%), and Sandiaga Uno (0.8%). Even when compared to the prominent leader of Islamist populism, Habib Rizieq Shihab, Ganjar’s electability remains the highest (Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting, 2020). This dominance in popularity may be attributed to several factors, including his identity as a Muslim and Javanese, as well as his avoidance of identity politics that instrumentalize Islam in practical political contests. Ganjar positions himself as a pro-diversity figure, aligning with Indonesia’s multicultural nature.

Furthermore, Ganjar’s standing within the PDIP, the victorious party in the 2019 elections, is firmly established. He enjoys support not only from Megawati, the influential figure in control of the party but also from her daughter, Puan Maharani, who was initially his competitor within the party. While Puan was groomed to succeed Megawati and was expected to run in the 2024 elections, her extensive political experience did not translate into public electability. Despite holding key positions, such as Chairperson of the PDIP faction in the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) from 2012-2014, Coordinating Minister for Human Development and Culture of Indonesia from 2014-2019, and Speaker of the DPR from 2019-2021, Puan was not retained as a candidate for the 2024 elections. Puan’s internally strong but nationally weak position put her at odds with Ganjar. Hence the emergence of a symbolic polemic depicting a bull (banteng) against a wild boar (celeng), successively thought to represent Puan and later Ganjar.

Ganjar is known for his resilience and sagacity in confronting challenging decisions, although some perceive him as stubborn. However, he would certainly not contemplate attacking his own mother, let alone a larger animal like a bull. When questioned by a student about whether, as President, he would be a party cadre and officer (petugas partai) or a leader for all the people, he diplomatically responded, “When I led Central Java for ten years, did I prioritize only my party?” (Televisi UI, 2023). He aimed to convey that, as a party cadre, his role is to serve the people. On his official website, he states, “I’m ruled by the people, the Governor is just a mandate” (https://www.ganjarpranowo.com/).

Although considered the most fitting successor to Jokowi, Ganjar faced a practical challenge as Jokowi’s political moves diverged from PDIP. Without formally leaving PDIP, Jokowi nominated his son, Gibran Rakabuming, the mayor of Solo, as the vice-presidential candidate alongside Prabowo Subianto. Gibran is a PDIP cadre and won local elections on the party’s ticket, but his candidacy at the age of 35 is viewed as premature. Public perception suggests Jokowi’s involvement in dynastic politics, potentially impeding substantive democratization. This presents a significant obstacle to victory. On the other hand, Ganjar’s vice-presidential candidate is Mahfud MD, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Menkopolhukam). Known for his outspoken stance against corruption, especially among high-ranking officials, Mahfud shares Ganjar’s clean bureaucratic record and pro-pluralism stance, enhancing their chances in the race.

With his traditionally pro-people populist positions, a clean track record, experience as a technocrat, strong anti-corruption stance, and pro-diversity credentials, Ganjar was expected to appeal to a broad voter base, including moderates and individuals of various religious backgrounds. He still stands a chance to emerge victorious, but the outcome remains uncertain. The Prabowo camp, currently supported by Jokowi, poses a formidable force that the PDIP cannot underestimate. However, Ganjar has capitalized on public dissatisfaction with Jokowi’s perceived involvement in ‘dynastic politics.’ Additionally, Jokowi, once seen as a pro-democracy figure, is now viewed by some as an executioner of democracy itself. If Ganjar secures victory, the question arises: will he follow in Jokowi’s footsteps in handling populist Islamic groups?

Ganjar and Identity Politics 

Identity Politics is a political strategy that employs specific identities to gain a political advantage. Typically, this involves appealing to the masses, particularly the majority, to secure their votes, as large population segments are often considered favorable voting blocs in formal representative electoral politics. However, this approach is not without challenges, particularly in the context of Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, characterized by thousands of ethnic groups, languages, and notable ethnic diversity. How does Ganjar navigate the complex landscape of identity politics in Indonesia, given its unique demographic and cultural context?

As the presumed successor to Jokowi, Ganjar embodies the charisma of a nationalist champion of the people. He possesses the essential qualities associated with the presidency: a Javanese figure connected to the populace, a tendency to avoid controversial statements, loyalty to the decisions of the prevailing political party, and a consistent reluctance to challenge the established power structure, even during instances when the ruling government had to counter opposition that often employed majority identity politics, such as Islam, as a political tool. Embracing the Pancasila ideology, Ganjar frequently emphasizes the need to protect and preserve diversity, considering it a crucial aspect that should be shielded from any form of degradation or destruction by any group. Despite being pro-government and pro-people simultaneously, he supports various democratic mechanisms, including demonstrations. However, he disagrees with protests and popular movements that employ the term “people power,” finding it discriminatory, intolerant, and undermining the values of unity in diversity.

In some respects, it is evident that Ganjar engages in identity politics, leveraging his Javanese, Muslim background to present himself as a nationalist Pancasilaist closely connected to the people. Simultaneously, he strategically criticizes those who exploit Islam as a tool in a confrontational, intolerant, and violently negating manner for realpolitik purposes. Ganjar takes a firm stance against groups like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Defenders Front of Islam (FPI), considering them ideological opponents of Pancasila, which promotes coexistence in a diverse society encompassing various elements such as ethnicity, religion, race, and class. His opposition intensified after the official government ban on HTI and FPI, with Ganjar, in his capacity as governor, issuing explicit instructions to civil servants not to associate with banned organizations. He vowed to dismiss any civil servant found violating his populist policies in this regard (Pranowo 2021b).

In this way, Ganjar positions himself as pro-government (establishment), pro-Pancasila, and pro-people. This is how he presents himself performatively. Notably, he also critiques Anies and Prabowo, his two main competitors, who, in the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2016 and the presidential election in 2019, capitalized on the power of Islamist populism. As the well-known Nusantara saying goes, “once you have rowed, you have passed two or three islands (sekali mendayung, dua tiga pulau terlampaui).”

Ganjar and Islamist Populism

DKI Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan with residents of Kampung Akuarium in Jakarta, Indonesia on April 14 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

Practical political contestation has exacerbated the polarization of Indonesian society, with identity politics playing a pivotal role in this process. On one side, there are nationalists who lean towards pluralism, while on the other, there are Islamists. This polarization is a direct consequence of the 2019 presidential election, where Jokowi faced Prabowo. Prabowo garnered support from the populist Islamist movement, although this alliance soured when the movement deemed Prabowo a ‘traitor’ for accepting a ministerial position in Jokowi’s government. Consequently, the populist Islamist group is now throwing its support behind Anies for the 2024 presidential elections. This coalition aligns with a popular political narrative aimed at challenging elites perceived as incapable of representing the collective will of the people and others deemed threatening to populist interests.

Indeed, there is no ‘stable and fixed’ theoretical concept of populism (Muhtadi, 2019). It is inherently contextual and dynamic, adapting to the prevailing circumstances. Generally, following Cas Mudde’s minimal definition (2004: 543-4; 2017), populism is a set of ideas or ideologies that dichotomize society into two homogenous and antagonistic groups—the pure people versus the corrupt elite. It is rooted in the moral belief that the elite either fails to serve the general interests of the people or actively corrupts them. When manifested as an ideological movement, populism tends to disregard the rule of law, champion popular sovereignty, emphasize people power, and is often viewed as detrimental to democracy. It can manifest as a street-level force, enabling mobocracy, where the crowd determines political direction and even the interpretation of truth.

In its expression, Islamist populism in Indonesia employs a civilizational rhetoric that diametrically contrasts ‘us’ and ‘them’ using cultural and religious language (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023). Within the Indonesian context, populists employ terms such as Islam against the West and China, the ummah against oppressive rulers, or the marginalized (mustadhafin) against the oppressors (mustakbirin). A recent addition is the dichotomy of defenders of Islam against blasphemers, which emerged from Jakarta electoral politics in 2016. However, despite emphasizing the rhetoric of civilizationism, the Islamist populism that has gained prominence lacks any inherent connection with the genuine interests of the people. Notably, NU and Muhammadiyah, claiming a combined mass of 100 million people, have expressed opposition to Islamist populism, considering it a disruptive minority that tends to hijack democracy, foster social polarization, discriminate against minorities, and threaten national integration (Triono, 2023).

While Islamist populism strategically deploys religious ideology and civilizationism as political instruments to advance its populist objectives within mainstream political contestation, practical political actors leverage the populist group to secure support from their voter base. This dual instrumentalization operates on two levels. Initially, it exploits religion to stir mass emotions, foment animosity toward elites, and create a narrative of “civilizational populism,” framing resistance to populist adversaries as a religious and holy struggle (Yilmaz and Morieson, 2021). Subsequently, Islamist populism becomes a political tool that recognizes the social and cultural significance of religious symbols within the majority of the population.

Ganjar takes a clear stance in opposition to Islamist populism. Unlike his political rivals Anies and Prabowo, who have benefited significantly from the maneuvering of Islamist populism to increase voter percentages in previous elections, Ganjar emphasizes identity politics. He positions diversity, pluralism, and nationalism as political symbols that can strengthen the ‘Indonesianess’ of society. Consequently, he challenges rivals like Anies and Prabowo, as well as Islamist populist actors such as HTI and FPI. Ganjar’s explicit warning to government officials in Central Java, under his jurisdiction, prohibiting their involvement in the activities of banned organizations (HTI and FPI), serves as evidence of his stance against Islamist populism.

The effectiveness of Ganjar’s confrontation, whether on an ideological or instrumental level, remains somewhat ambiguous. If his confrontation operates on an ideological level, it is rooted in his status as a cadre of the PDIP, the ideological successor of Soekarno’s nationalism. In this capacity, he positions himself as a defender of Pancasila, promoting ideas of pluralism, tolerance, inclusiveness, and human rights. Alternatively, if his confrontation in the instrumental level, it is because his appearance should be an Indonesian instead of Javanese Muslim. This strategic shift is essential due to the diverse composition of his voters, representing the varied demographics of Indonesia. Furthermore, Ganjar must craft his political narrative as the successor to the ‘Javanese King’ Jokowi, a figure whose actions, according to political scientists, have played a significant role in steering Indonesia toward authoritarianism through the political banning of HTI and FPI (Power, 2019).

Thus far, Ganjar has played the role of Jokowi’s mouthpiece, navigating important policy decisions in the political arena, even though this poses a dilemma as Jokowi is in disagreement with Megawati and the PDIP. Ganjar is the attacking pawn in the game of political chess that is ready to fight for the elimination of the agents of Islamist populism. However, in this game where he has not succumbed to the adversary, he also has the opportunity to ascend to the position of Crown Prince. Ultimately, he emerges as the frontrunner to succeed the king, especially as Jokowi hesitates to extend his term beyond the constitutional maximum of two terms. Meanwhile, Jokowi’s nomination of his son, Gibran, as Prabowo’s running mate is both a strength and a political experiment, but it also presents a vulnerability by fueling discourse around dynastic politics and authoritarianism, which has faced public criticism (Muhtadi & Muslim, 2023). This weakness in Jokowi’s strategy clearly works to Ganjar’s advantage.

If Ganjar genuinely takes on the challenge of eradicating Islamist populism – which, in the Indonesian context, presents an opportunity for elites to pursue democratization – on both ideological and practical-instrumental levels, he positions himself in the middle ground between the flawed elite and the oppressed people. He can be a successor to Jokowi and a committed member of the victorious party, making it easier to garner voter support, while also serving as a political force that counters Islamist populism. Simultaneously, he can align with the suffering populace by steadfastly upholding diversity and facilitating communication with the ruling elite, ensuring that the people’s aspirations are better understood. This approach may pave the way for new policies that prioritize the interests of the people.

On the flip side, Islamist populist entities can also function on two simultaneous levels: ideological and practical politics. Ideologically, Islamists aim to influence the electoral agenda and advocate for the implementation of Sharia, while instrumentally, their elites have historically been employed by previous rulers (such as Soeharto) to obstruct civil society’s efforts to compel the government to address the economic crisis of the late 1990s. Regardless of the level, Ganjar persists in countering them, driven by his robust ideological and nationalist convictions, as well as the pursuit of victory in the 2024 presidential election.

Ganjar Pranowo, the governor of Central Java, is visiting Purwokerto, Indonesia on August 20, 2022. Photo: Ainul Ghurri.

Conclusion

Ganjar’s prospects in the political arena are not without challenges, despite his viable chance of winning. Prabowo, supported by Jokowi, holds significant influence, even among Megawati and her dedicated supporters. In a hypothetical two-round election scenario where Anies loses in the initial round, it is anticipated that Anies’ voters would likely shift their support to Prabowo rather than Ganjar. This shift signifies that endorsing Anies aligns with supporting Islamist populism and other conservative Muslim factions. With only two choices—Prabowo and Ganjar—voters tend to lean towards Prabowo due to his previous candidacy in 2019, despite subsequent characterizations as a traitor and his current support by Jokowi. Ganjar’s candidacy does not align with the original intentions of Islamist populism, leaving the alternative for them to abstain from voting altogether.

Ganjar staunchly advocates for diversity, positioning himself as an anti-Islamist populist figure. In contrast to Islamist populism’s labeling of figures using derogatory terms, Ganjar consistently emphasizes the symbol of Pancasila and the motto of ‘unity in diversity’ to unite the nation and voters. He emerges as a significant advocate for democratization, emphasizing inclusivity in politics, religion, and fostering social tolerance.

While Ganjar may rhetorically support substantive democratization, his ability to maintain a vibrant democracy hinges on navigating the complexities of economic development, largely influenced by New Order cadres, ensuring political stability, and upholding national security. However, these complexities do not necessarily guarantee the concurrent advancement of substantive democracy.

The fragile democratic landscape in Indonesia is susceptible to conservative and authoritarian shifts, both signaling democratic regression. Though less superficial than in previous years, the highly polarized role of identity politics poses challenges to substantive democratization. Yet, persistent issues like oligarchic competition, weakened anti-corruption institutions, and eroding judicial roles remain significant hurdles.

The current political scenario underscores the difficulties in making informed political choices during elections, primarily due to the diverse interests among the three candidates—Anies, Prabowo, and Ganjar. This underscores Indonesia’s elite-centric political landscape, limiting substantial participation from the populace. The opaque and unpredictable nature of practical politics in the country constrains the organic development of democracy rooted in the demos. The evolving situation emphasizes the vital importance of substantial democratic progress. Ganjar’s capacity as a democracy-builder aligning with the people’s aspirations will ultimately stand the test of time.

References

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ECPS-MGP-Panel8-Video

Mapping Global Populism — Panel 8: The State of Populist Authoritarianism in Indochina

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeMultimediaVideos

Moderator

Dr. Nguyễn Yến-Khanh

(Lecturer at Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication, Erasmus University Rotterdam).

Speakers

“Accountability in a High-Performing Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Vietnam,” by Dr. Nguyen Khac Giang  (Visiting Fellow at the Vietnam Studies Programme, Yusof Ishak Institute – ISEAS).

“Political Culture, Social Media, and Authoritarian Populism in Cambodia,” by Dr. Sokphea Young (Visiting Research Fellow at Queen Mary, University of London).

“Reflecting on 48 Years of Socialism in the Lao PDR: What Does This Mean, and What Comes Next?” by Dr. Phill Wilcox (Research Associate at Bielefeld University). 

“Is Myanmar a Totalitarian State?” by Dr. Mon Mon Myat (Instructor at the Peace Studies Department in Payap University, Thailand). 

Donald Tusk speaks at an election rally after a televised debate on government television at the end of the campaign in Warsaw, Poland on October 9, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

Eight Years of Populist Rule in Poland Comes to an End

by AuthoritarianismCommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHome

Unlike in Hungary and Türkiye, where opposition blocs failed to defeat long-term populists in power, the loosely aligned opposition “coalition of coalitions” in Poland rose to the task. Elites in Brussels and national capitals can rightly breathe a sigh of relief at Poland’s return to the camp of “regular politics.” PiS’s defeat represents a clear win for Polish democracy, for pluralism writ large, and for Europe. Nonetheless, we should not overread the outcome — Poland’s populists are certainly down but far from out. 

By Simon P. Watmough*

After eight years in power, Poland’s national-populist Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) has left office. On Wednesday, 13 December 2023, following more than eight weeks of delay tactics, Poland’s president, Andrej Duda — first elected in 2015 with PiS’s backing — finally appointed Donald Tusk as head of an incoming coalition government made up of his center-right Civic Coalition (Koalicja Obywatelska, KO), the centrist Third Way (Trzecia Droga), and the New Left (Lewica). Tusk now returns to the post of prime minister, which he first held between 2007 and 2014.

Throwing more than a little shade on the outgoing government during remarks as his government was sworn in, Tusk vowed: “Allegiance to the provisions of the constitution will be the trademark of this new team, this new government.”

The three coalition partners took 53.7% of the vote and a comfortable majority (248 seats in the 460-seat Sejm) in elections held on 15 October. On 10 November, the parties inked a coalition deal signaling their readiness to assume government immediately. But despite calls for a speedy transition in the national interest, President Duda chose to drag the government formation process out to its constitutional limit. While it had no chance of success — PiS took the largest vote share (35.4%) and won the most seats overall, but it failed to win a majority and was never in a position to form a government — the president gave PiS’s caretaker prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki the first shot at forming a government. Duda’s foot-dragging portends the kinds of challenges an incoming Tusk government will likely face as it seeks to reverse eight years of democratic backsliding.

The question now is what the PiS defeat means for the future of populism in Poland — and, indeed, Europe more broadly. This commentary argues that PiS’s defeat represents a clear win for Polish democracy, for pluralism writ large, and for Europe. Nonetheless, we should not overread the outcome — Poland’s populists are certainly down but far from out. Getting down to causes and conditions — that is, dealing with the underlying structural factors that have given rise to populism in the first place — will be essential if Poland is to remain in the pluralist camp.

The Most Divisive Government in Polish History

Commentators have described the 2023 parliamentary campaign as the most divisive and hardest-fought electoral campaign in Polish history. PiS was seeking an unprecedented third term in office, promising to complete its national-populist agenda of defending traditional Polish values against perceived threats and “cleansing” the state and society of leftists and “foreign influences,” including so-called “LGBT ideology.”

A third PiS term would almost certainly have seen Poland follow Hungary’s slide into outright “competitive authoritarianism,” an outcome that might have put the entire European project in jeopardy. On returning to power in 2015, PiS head Jarosław Kaczyński held up Fidesz — in power since 2010 — as the model the party would adopt in government.

Indeed, from confronting Brussels to subverting media freedom and stifling minority rights in the name of “traditional” national values, PiS has hued close to the Fidesz line. For example, like Fidesz, it engaged in political hiring and firing on a massive scale, placing thousands of party loyalists in every state institution — including the public broadcaster, which devolved into little more than a party mouthpiece during the campaign — but also the civil service and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Infamously, the party also brought sweeping changes to how judges are appointed, giving the political majority greater control over the judiciary and sparking a “rule of law crisis” with the EU. The European Court of Justice initiated legal proceedings against Poland for these breaches of the rule of law.

Attacks on women’s and LGBTQ+ rights — including the declaration of “LGBT-free zones” by some PiS-led municipal governments — were widely condemned by human rights groups and the international community. As a result, Poland’s Freedom House “democracy score” has fallen steadily since 2015, and the country has fallen from 18th in Reporters Without Borders’ global media freedom rankings in 2015 to 58th today.

During the campaign, PiS pulled every move in the populist playbook. PiS used its dominance of public media to target prominent Poles with any “foreign” connection, including Tusk himself (he has German ancestry). Casting him as a “German agent” deliberately invoked images of the Nazi occupation of Poland during the Second World War. This chimed with PiS’s general tendency to cast internal enemies as conspiring with the external Other to do the country in. PiS also directed government agencies and SOEs to promote the party’s electoral message, thus redirecting their advertising budgets toward campaigns that supported PiS’s agenda, effectively leveraging public resources for party gain.

The opposition parties met this onslaught with a campaign focused on the economy, the rule of law and Poland’s future in Europe. KO and Third Way, in particular, campaigned tirelessly in rural areas and Poland’s less prosperous urban areas. This went a long way to mitigating the perception in the mind of some voters that Tusk and his party are “aloof” liberal elites with little concern for “real Poles.”

A Win for Pluralism …

The biggest winner in PiS’s defeat is Polish democracy. Voter turnout broke all records, with 74.4% of Poles casting a ballot (compared to 69% in 2019). The rise in youth turnout was more impressive still, rising from 46% last time to 69%. The Polish diaspora, which generally disfavors PiS, also turned out en masse, with over half a million Poles living abroad registering to vote (nearly double that in 2019). The immense turnout necessitated a 70% increase in overseas electoral commissions to manage the volume​.

Secondly, it is now clear that PiS’s claim to represent “the people” is a dead letter. This much was already apparent in early 2021 when hundreds of thousands of ordinary Poles poured onto the streets to demonstrate against a near-total ban on abortion that went into effect after a ruling from the Constitutional Tribunal, which PiS has stacked with friendly judges. Such mass mobilization of “the people” against PiS was clearly in evidence during the campaign, with Tusk headlining a public demonstration of half a million people in Warsaw in July and another that was reportedly attended by a million Poles two weeks before the 15 October polls.

Crucially, we’ve learned that governance matters and that voters will punish populist governments that fail to deliver, engage in corruption, and push the policy and ideological envelopes too far. Beyond rampant corruption and cronyism, PiS has appeared incapable of handling basic policy. The government’s disastrous fumbling of the summer “grain imports” crisis (Romania’s government has deftly handled the same issue) and Prime Minister Morawiecki’s ham-fisted announcement that Poland would stop arms shipments to Ukraine (in fact, they continue) managed to simultaneously alienate farmers (and annoy Kyiv) and paint a picture of a government out of its depth.

As Polish political scientist Sławomir Sierakowski noted in September: “For Kaczyński and the PiS government, transferring cash is easy; but anything more complicated than that is beyond their capacity. That is why queues for doctors are twice as long as in the past, and why court cases take twice as long.”

… and for Europe

PiS’s defeat is also great news for the EU. Brussels (and, for good measure, Berlin) has long served as a useful foil for a national-populist outfit bent on emphasizing “cultural threats” to Polish sovereignty from hostile neighbors. Tusk is a Brussels brahmin, having served as president of the European Council between 2014 and 2019 and then head of the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) grouping in the European Parliament (EP) until his return to Polish politics in 2021. Ahead of plans to attend EU summits this week on 13–14 December, Tusk declared Poland would “regain its position as a leader in the European Union.”

Crucially, Poland will no longer play a spoiler role in the institutions. Tusk’s coalition is committed to abiding by EU law, not least to unlock the €35.4 billion in frozen EU recovery funds as quickly as possible. Poland’s “return to Europe” will strengthen the EPP and reduce the sway of the sovereigntist European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), home to many of Europe’s national-populist parties in the EP. With European elections scheduled for mid-2024, the result in Poland will be a welcome shot in the arm for centrists who have been fighting something of a rearguard action against populists across the continent.

Polish Populism: Down, but Not Out

Still, we should not overread the results. A KO-led government will face several challenges that PiS will be primed to exploit in opposition. While the coalition agreement pledges to reverse the near-total ban on abortion that sparked the aforementioned mass protests in 2021, the parties remain divided on the issue. In any event, any legislation loosening abortion access will likely face a veto from President Duda, which the coalition lacks the numbers to override despite its parliamentary majority. Other lightning rod issues will be recognizing same-sex unions (short of marriage), social policy (Lewica will push for major reforms) and support for farmers (the Polish People’s Party, an agrarian outfit, is part of the Third Way coalition).

Moreover, reversing eight years of democratic backsliding will prove a tougher challenge than some have predicted. Expectations are sky high, and with a daunting to-do list, the new government may struggle to meet the moment. The young voters who came out to vote for the coalition parties in droves will be impatient for change, and Tusk will be under pressure to quickly remove PiS loyalists from the media and judiciary. Yet in doing so, Tusk must be careful not to stoop to the same “decisionist” tactics of PiS, which saw the party bypass the law to make political appointments.

The Constitutional Tribunal is already showing signs of obstruction. In rulings this week, it has declared that proposed judicial reforms needed to unlock EU funds would be unconstitutional.

More importantly, PiS is now back on what is, in some ways, more familiar territory. Opposition is, in some respects, the “natural habitat” of populists since lobbing grenades at “ruling elites” is much more straightforward from outside the corridors of power. Those in any doubt about this should recall the relentless “post-truth” campaign Jarosław Kaczyński ran against Tusk after the Smolensk plane disaster in 2010, in which the forces of PiS’s networks in civil society and the Catholic media spread misinformation and conspiracy theories. And, while Mr. Tusk has worked hard to shed his image as an out-of-touch liberal with a haughty contempt for PiS’s conservative base, the resentment lingers in some quarters, something PiS is certain to exploit

Conclusion

Unlike in Hungary and Türkiye, where opposition blocs failed to defeat long-term populists in power, the loosely aligned opposition “coalition of coalitions” in Poland rose to the task. Elites in Brussels and national capitals can rightly breathe a sigh of relief at Poland’s return to the camp of “regular politics.”

But equally, policymakers must not learn the wrong lessons. Yes — governance matters, and voters will punish populists in power that cannot deliver. But the European social model remains broken, leaving plenty of scope for populists of the left and the right to exploit very real grievances and the perceived out-of-touchness of policy elites for electoral gain, something Geert Wilders’ shock victory in the Dutch elections last month makes all too clear.

Policymakers in Poland and elsewhere are on notice: both the style and the substance of policy must meet voters where they are at. The impending green transition and the need to address workforce gaps and demographic issues are vital and unavoidable policy moves. But if these policies are communicated ineffectively, and the cost of implementation falls most heavily on those least able to afford it, the forces of populism will have their opening.

(*) Simon P. Watmough is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a non-resident research fellow in the research program on authoritarianism at ECPS. Dr. Watmough’s research interests sit at the intersection of global and comparative politics and include varieties of post-authoritarian states, the political sociology of the state, the role of the military in regime change, and the foreign policy of post-authoritarian states in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. He is currently writing a book on the global history of populism.

MGP-Panel7-Thailand

Mapping Global Populism – Panel 7: Democracy in Thailand – Navigating Populism and Authoritarianism

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeReports

Please cite as:

Guidotti, Andrea. (2023). Democracy in Thailand: Navigating Populism and Authoritarianism. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 14, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0047      

 

This report offers a summary of the seventh event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping Global Populism panel series, titled “Democracy in Thailand: Navigating Populism and Authoritarianism,” which took place online on November 30, 2023. Dr. Michael Montesano moderated the panel, featuring insights from three distinguished panelists.

Report by Andrea Guidotti

This report provides an overview of the seventh event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping Global Populism panel series, titled “Democracy in Thailand: Navigating Populism and Authoritarianism,” held online on November 30, 2023. Moderated by Dr. Michael Montesano, Associate Senior Fellow at the Thailand Studies Programme, Yusof Ishak Institute – ISEAS, the panel featured speakers Dr. Petra Alderman, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Birmingham and Research Fellow of CEDAR, Itsakul Unahakate, PhD candidate at the University of Sydney and Lecturer at Thammasat University, and Pattanun Arunpreechawat from NUS Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.

In his opening remarks, Dr. Michael Montesano delved into the unique nature of populism in Thailand, emphasizing its distinctiveness and the challenges it poses for comparative analysis. He noted that while Thai populism may seem peculiar, it is crucial to understand movements like populism and authoritarianism within their specific local context to draw meaningful comparisons. The entry of populism into Thailand’s political discourse gained prominence over two decades ago with Thaksin Shinawatra’s premiership in 2001. Thaksin’s extravagant program, particularly targeting rural ties, introduced policies such as a moratorium on village development funds for farms and low-cost access to healthcare. Despite being perceived as unprecedented welfare measures for rural Thailand, they were often misunderstood and overlooked by commentators at the time.

Dr. Montesano explained that since Thaksin and his party introduced populist ideas and programs, policies deemed populist have been replicated in the platforms of almost all Thai political parties and even by the military dictatorship that took power in Bangkok in 2014. The key to Thaksin’s policy success lies in his ability to align programs with rhetoric and behavior, emphasizing his direct connection with the Thai people. Furthermore, this unmediated relationship with the Thai people was seen by many in the Bangkok elite as a challenge to another figure attempting to build a connection with the people, namely the Monarch.

Dr. Montesano highlighted that the question of mediation, or lack thereof, between the people and the government in Thailand is crucial not only to populism but also to manifestations of authoritarianism in the country. According to him, understanding Thai authoritarianism is more challenging than understanding Thai populism because pinpointing its precise onset is difficult. Does it date from the early 1890s when King Chulalongkorn reformed the government, endowing Royal absolutism with unprecedented power? Does it date to the 1930s when a small civilian military faction abolished the Thai absolute monarchy? Or does it date back to the long series of military governments from just before the Pacific War up to the very recent past, giving the country its current reputation for coups and dictatorships?

He concluded by emphasizing that the critical point is that both in the 1930s and during the Cold War era, high authoritarianism was, in fact, centered on the same concerns as Thaksin’s populism. The faction of civil servants and soldiers that seized power from the absolute monarchy in 1932 did so in the name of the people. Similarly, the counterinsurgency doctrine that the military-led government in Bangkok unveiled in 1980 espoused a version of democracy rooted in an unmediated relationship between the state and the people. Even the military dictatorship of 2014 to 2019 inherited this same idea regarding the relationship of the state to the Thai people from the counterinsurgency era.Hence, it can be stated that Thai authoritarianism has often been rooted in an effort to address the same need that underlies Thai populism: the necessity to establish connections between the demos and the state without the mediating structures of liberal democracy.

Dr. Petra Alderman: “Political Legitimation and Authoritarian Nation Branding in Thailand”

Dr. Petra Alderman stated that Thailand embraced nation branding during Thaksin’s premiership. This adoption was influenced by the premier’s business-oriented approach to politics and his association with numerous marketers. Thaksin’s brand presented an alternative strategic myth to the conservative triadic Thai expression of national identity, typically formulated as a nation-religion-king triad. The traditional triad is rooted in principles of deference, obedience, and strict social hierarchy. In contrast, Thaksin’s “nation economy” brand promoted the idea of a successful and competitive Thailand filled with business-minded individuals, aspiring to be on par with Western industrialized nations.

As the first panelist, Dr. Petra Alderman presented the key ideas from her book Branding Authoritarian Nations: Political Legitimation and Strategic National Myths in Military-Ruled Thailand, which focuses on nation branding in Thailand but is also broadly applicable to various authoritarian contexts.

Dr. Alderman explained that nation branding involves a unified way of representing a country, often through slogans like ‘Great Britain’ or ‘Britain is great,’ as well as logos and visuals. A clear example is a poster from Great Britain in a campaign which was launched back in 2015 at the time of David Cameron government. The concept of branding nations as products or corporations originated in the late 1990s in American and British branding circles, with Simon Anholt considered a key figure. Initially, the idea was for countries to engage in nation branding to enhance their global competitiveness, attracting more tourists and investors. The focus has often been on the external projection of countries, overlooking the domestic dimension of nation branding.

She highlighted three key points. First, nation branding is a profound political practice that merits careful study. Second, a shift in perspective is needed, moving away from an excessive focus on external manifestations to understanding its domestic implications. Third, discussing authoritarian nation branding is most effective when viewed through the lens of political legitimation. The potential for legitimation in nation branding lies in its capacity to generate strategic national myths—selective interpretations of the nation’s past and present character. These myths encompass future visions and aspirations, often rooted in a blend of economic and cultural goals. Their strategic nature is evident in how they aim to influence perceptions of the country’s elite, their interests, and the functioning of domestic power arrangements.

Dr. Alderman then contextualized this practice in Thailand, noting that the country embraced nation branding during Thaksin’s premiership from 2001 to 2006. This adoption was influenced by the premier’s business-oriented approach to politics and his association with numerous marketers. Thaksin’s brand presented an alternative strategic myth to the conservative triadic Thai expression of national identity, typically formulated as a nation-religion-king triad. The traditional triad is rooted in principles of deference, obedience, and strict social hierarchy. In contrast, Thaksin’s “nation economy” brand promoted the idea of a successful and competitive Thailand filled with business-minded individuals, aspiring to be on par with Western industrialized nations.

Dr. Alderman stated that significant changes were implemented by the NCPO after the 2014 military coup, adopting a different approach driven by distinct needs. The new regime focused on information operations, targeting perceived enemies, and attempting to alter their mindset. In Thai context, the enemy was often the domestic audience, particularly those opposing the coup and the regime. The NCPO aimed to delegitimize the “nation economy” Thaksin brand, steering people back toward the more conservative expression of Thai identity symbolized by the nation-religion-king triad. The NCPO introduced a new strategic national myth depicting a creatively modernizing but culturally and socially traditional Thailand. This narrative urged Thai people to reject the Shinawatra family, provincial identities, and social aspirations in favor of semi-authoritarian rule under the new regime.

As an illustration of the NCPO’s strategy, Dr. Alderman highlighted “Thailand 4.0,” a relatively short-lived project launched in March/April 2016 as Thailand’s flagship economic policy. It had a robust external component, signaling to the world that Thailand was aligning with the global trend toward Industry 4.0 and was an attractive investment destination. Simultaneously, Thailand 4.0 had a substantial internal dimension, initially presented as an economic policy but primarily serving as a tool for political legitimation for the NCPO. Essentially, Thailand 4.0 presented an enticing vision of the future to Thai people in exchange for their support, trust, and loyalty to the military government. It was basically narrating that it is not just the Thaksin government that could deliver all these exciting economic visions but also the NCPO is able to do the same. 

Itsakul Unahakate: “Authoritarian Ministry of Truth: A Case of Thailand’s Anti-Fake News Center”

Unakahate: The audience in Thailand is introduced to four state-centered responses: direct communication, fact-checking (systematic assessments of claims made by public officials and institutions with an attempt to verify their accuracy), content removal or blocking, and criminal sanctions. In democracies, journalists or third-party fact-checkers often play a role, with government support provided through funding or coordination with independent bodies to avoid partisanship. In contrast, authoritarian regimes strive to act as the Ministry of Truth by establishing their own fact-checking agencies, which may lack guaranteed independence.

The second panelist, Itsakul Unahakate, presented a pre-recorded session titled ‘Authoritarian Ministry of Truth: A Case of Thailand’s Anti-Fake News Center,’ which delved into the operations of anti-fake news centers in Thailand during the Covid-19 pandemic. His research is grounded in the notion that fake news can have social consequences, particularly during the pandemic, potentially justifying government intervention. This raises concerns about the potential impact on freedom of expression and democratization, especially in authoritarian regimes. While many studies examine the effects on civil liberties and freedom of expression, only a few explain the reasons behind the use of these responses. Different responses take various intrusive forms and affect freedom of expression differently. The research question is: What explains the variation in the state’s responses to fake news, and when does the state refrain from taking action?

The audience is introduced to four state-centered responses: direct communication, fact-checking (systematic assessments of claims made by public officials and institutions with an attempt to verify their accuracy), content removal or blocking, and criminal sanctions. A noteworthy distinction is observed between democratic and Asian countries in their approach to information correction. In democracies, journalists or third-party fact-checkers often play a role, with government support provided through funding or coordination with independent bodies to avoid partisanship. In contrast, authoritarian regimes strive to act as the Ministry of Truth by establishing their own fact-checking agencies, which may lack guaranteed independence.

Scholar Unahakate also detailed the methodology employed in the study. Data collection occurred between March 2020 and September 2022, encompassing the first six months after the declaration of a state of emergency under the Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations, which granted the government additional administrative power due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The decree allowed for criminal charges, including imprisonment, against offenders. The data were sourced from two fact-checking centers: Thailand’s Anti-Fake News Centre (AFNC) and AFP Thailand. The coding process followed the International Fact-Checking Network’s principles of non-partisanship and transparency, ensuring that fact-checkers justify why and how they select and assess claims. Finally, data were analyzed using qualitative Nvivo content analysis, comparing the patterns of AFNC and AFP reports to understand their approaches to fact-checking news.

Regarding the findings, during the first three months after the emergency decree’s announcement, the AFNC primarily focused its infection reports on the government’s Covid-19 policies and measures, as well as virus prevention and treatment. In the subsequent three months, there was a shift towards health-related news. A similar pattern was observed in AFP reports. However, noteworthy is that certain issues, such as protests, were only covered by AFP Thailand reports. In terms of sources, the AFNC often does not specify claim origins, frequently using unspecified sources. At best, the AFNC may select a less important claim than the available options; at worst, it might fabricate a claim to serve government agendas. Conversely, AFP utilized various sources, with AFNC often referring to government agencies like the Ministry of Public Health or the Department of Public Relations.

Unahakate concluded by highlighting the research outcomes. There are notable differences between the reports of the two fact-checking centers: around one-sixth of the claims in the AFNC are considered true, while none are in AFP. In essence, substantial disparities exist between the reports of the two fact-checkers. The AFNC appears to be a deficient fact-checker, at least based on the standards set by the IFNC Code of Principles regarding transparency and impartiality. Furthermore, the AFNC may have concealed objectives beyond its fact-checking responsibilities.

**

Pattanun Arunpreechawat: “Youth Perspective: Is Populism for the People? An Ecofeminist Movement from Thailand”

Pattanun Arunpreechawat’s central argument posits that many Thai populist policies lack inclusivity, disproportionately benefiting specific segments of society. In this context, feminism is defined as the eradication of factors contributing to the ongoing systemic domination or subordination of women. Ecology, on the other hand, signifies an environmental philosophy valuing all living beings for their intrinsic existence, not solely for their utility to humans. Ecofeminism, therefore, asserts that there are significant connections—historical, experiential, symbolic, and theoretical—between the domination of women and the domination of nature.

As the final panelist, Pattanun Arunpreechawat presented from a youth perspective, focusing on a specific definition of populism related to macroeconomic strategies prioritizing economic growth, national development, and fair income distribution. Politicians implementing these populist policies often target the rural poor and claim to represent the interests of the people. The key question revolves around who truly benefits from these populist policies and in what ways. Her presentation narrowed its focus to bilateral trade agreements, highlighting positive impacts such as promoting growth, creating new jobs, increasing GDP, and attracting foreign investments. On the flip side, negative impacts include environmental degradation, job displacement, and unequal distribution, sometimes leading to land disputes.

Her argument is framed within an ecofeminist framework, which examines the interconnection between environmental issues and the challenges faced by marginalized groups, such as women and the rural poor. This perspective highlights how certain populist policies overlook the exploitation and oppression of these groups. The central argument posits that many Thai populist policies lack inclusivity, disproportionately benefiting specific segments of society. In this context, feminism is defined as the eradication of factors contributing to the ongoing systemic domination or subordination of women. Ecology, on the other hand, signifies an environmental philosophy valuing all living beings for their intrinsic existence, not solely for their utility to humans. Ecofeminism, therefore, asserts that there are significant connections—historical, experiential, symbolic, and theoretical—between the domination of women and the domination of nature. In this regard, Elisabeth Warren contends that environmental issues are feminist because the environment is intricately linked to rural and household economies governed by women. Additionally, women tend to be more reliant on natural resources than men due to societal norms and gender roles, and they bear a disproportionate burden from environmental degradation and the destruction of forests.

Arunpreechawat presented a compelling example from Thailand that illustrates the intertwined patterns of domination over both women and nature—the Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA), which became effective in 2005. Through this agreement, the corporation Kingsgate Consolidated obtained a concession from the Thai government to mine gold ore in three provinces: Phichit, Phitsanulok, and Phetchabun. Akara Resources, a Thai subsidiary of the Australian mining company, initiated mining operations in 2001 in Phichit under the project named ‘The Chatree Mining Complex.’ Due to the use of Cyanide, a toxic chemical substance, in gold extraction, villagers filed a lawsuit against the company in 2016, alleging violations of the National Environmental Quality Act.

Amid reports and under the Prayut government, Thailand decided to halt the mining operation in 2017, citing health and environmental concerns. However, this victory for the villagers and environmental activists was short-lived. Thailand faced a lawsuit from Kingsgate Consolidated itself, demanding over 30 million baht (USD 866 million) through the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), an agreement mechanism that grants the company the right to sue a nation.

She then delved into the various implications arising from this example. Concerning health, numerous studies revealed that there were elevated levels of heavy metals exceeding healthy standards in the bloodstream, a high level of cyanide contamination was observed, mining workers experienced health deterioration, and long exposure to such toxins through inhalation could lead to central nervous system toxicity. Regarding the environment, the mining sites released toxic leakages into the environment and paddy fields, causing high concentrations of metals in the lotus pond and paddy fields, along with elevated levels of air pollution. In terms of society, a significant clash unfolded between mining supporters and anti-mining activists: while free trade agreements or mining sites created jobs and reduced poverty, the detrimental health impacts were severe. Many villagers were instructed to relocate, and the activists who filed the lawsuit faced defamation charges.

In conclusion, Pattanun Arunpreechawat emphasized that this case is not isolated, as women in agriculture and other provinces often lead the fight against environmental injustices that affect not only women but also men and children. This process can be perceived as a form of slow violence, as it may not be immediately apparent. In this context, ecofeminism serves to uncover the connections between issues of oppression, environmental domination, and women, illustrating that these problems cannot be addressed in isolation. The empirical evidence demonstrates how populist policies (such as FTAs) with poor environmental practices impact women’s lives, highlighting the conflict between national economic growth and the rural poor. It also underscores how mainstream policies often reflect, reinforce, or create practices that devalue, subvert, or render invisible the actual needs and contributions of women and the underprivileged.

ECPS-SZABIST University-OrtakPanel

Panel by ECPS & SZABIST University: Populism and Electoral Politics Around the World

by ArticlesEditor’s ChoiceHomeReports

Please cite as:
Zaman, Zahra & Shahid, Syeda Abeeha. (2023). Populism and Electoral Politics Around the World. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) and SZABIST University. December 13, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0046     

 

This report offers an overview of the panel on “Populism and Electoral Politics Around the World,” jointly organized by the European Center for Populism Studies and SZABIST University, Karachi, on 17th November 2023. The panel featured distinguished speakers addressing various dynamics of populism influencing electoral politics. This report comprises summaries of the presentations delivered by the esteemed panelists.

Report by Zahra Zaman* & Syeda Abeeha Shahid**

This report offers an overview of the panel on “Populism and Electoral Politics Around the World,” jointly organized by the European Center for Populism Studies and SZABIST University, Karachi, on 17th November 2023. The panel featured distinguished speakers addressing various dynamics of populism influencing electoral politics. This report comprises summaries of the presentations delivered by the esteemed panelists. 

The discussion was moderated by Dr. Fizza Batool, Assistant Professor at SZABIST University, Karachi. Panelists comprised Dr. Andrej Zaslove (Associate Professor of Empirical Political Science at Radboud University, Netherlands), Dr. Bert N. Bakker (Associate Professor at the Amsterdam School of Communication Research), Dr. Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington (Associate Professor at the London School of Economics), Dr. Farhan Hanif Siddiqui (Associate Professor at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad), and Dr. Salim Cevik (Associate Professor at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies, SWP in Germany).

 

Dr. Andrej Zaslove: “The Radical Right and the Radical Left in Anno 2023: What Does Populism Got to Do with It?”

Dr. Zaslove underscored the electoral success of populist parties, attributing it to their gradual dominance and integration into the political landscape, evolving into mainstream and stable features with shifting electoral cycles. He highlighted a recent substantial shift in left-wing politics, originating from the transformation of traditional left-wing parties into populist radical left entities. Additionally, he noted the expansion of populist parties across the political spectrum, surpassing national boundaries.

Dr. Andrej Zaslove discussed the diverse and constitutive elements of populism, emphasizing its implications in the electoral achievements of both left- and right-wing populist parties. Advocating for systematic measurement approaches, he introduced an instrument designed by him and colleagues to assess populism within political parties. Dr. Zaslove underscored the electoral success of populist parties, attributing it to their gradual dominance and integration into the political landscape, evolving into mainstream and stable features with shifting electoral cycles. He highlighted a recent substantial shift in left-wing politics, originating from the transformation of traditional left-wing parties into populist radical left entities. Additionally, he noted the expansion of populist parties across the political spectrum, surpassing national boundaries.

The presentation emphasized the necessity for empirical measures on both the supply and demand sides of populism. Dr. Zaslove shared insights from a recent study in which he utilized two instruments for measuring the supply of populism: PopuList, employing a dichotomous measure, and POPPA, which used a continuous approach with five items based on a thin-centered ideology. To gauge the demand side, the Akkerman scale was employed to assess populist attitudes in the public. The study revealed that mainstream populist parties scored lower on POPPA compared to radical right populist parties. The results indicated variations in the degrees and dimensions of populism, shedding light on the identity of populist parties and voter choices. While populism had limited impact on political praxis, it broadened its application to multiple actors, showcasing its ability to align parties along the left and right axes and garner support for diverse political entities.

In conclusion, Dr. Zaslove underscored the importance of employing a mechanism in a systematic and streamlined manner. Populism, as a political mechanism, plays a crucial role in shaping the interaction of political actors and institutions, as exemplified in Italy. Drawing a contrast between Georgie Meloni and Matteo Salvini, the presentation highlighted the impact of insider-outsider dynamics on popularity and emphasized the paramount role of populism in defining political representation for individual voters. It was noted that parties can modify or relinquish their populist identities depending on their governmental status, and populist voters may become less populist based on the varying motives and actions of political parties. Importantly, this does not imply a diminishing significance of ideology as a political mechanism. The evolving stances and political statuses of figures like Meloni and Wilders illustrate that populism will continue to dominate the political landscape, rooted in party establishment within institutional structures.

Dr. Bert N. Bakker: “Psychological Roots of Populist Voting”

Dr. Bakker shared research findings indicating that individuals with low agreeableness tend to resonate with anti-establishment and populist rhetoric, characterized by cynicism, distrust, and a tough-minded attitude. This sentiment aligns with the populist narrative, which criticizes the elite for self-centeredness and a disregard for the interests of ordinary people.

Dr. Bert N. Bakker delved into the psychological underpinnings of populism, highlighting the central role of anti-establishment rhetoric and people-centric themes in populist political discourse. He explored the implications of psychological dispositions, noting a positive correlation between openness and conscientiousness. Specifically, he associated dogmatic adherence to conservative policies, especially in cultural domains, with narrow-mindedness and conscientiousness.

Dr. Bakker shared research findings indicating that individuals with low agreeableness tend to resonate with anti-establishment and populist rhetoric, characterized by cynicism, distrust, and a tough-minded attitude. This sentiment aligns with the populist narrative, which criticizes the elite for self-centeredness and a disregard for the interests of ordinary people. Statistical and correlational evidence suggests that those with lower agreeableness are more inclined to vote for populist parties, a pattern observed in the USA, the Netherlands, Germany, UK, Denmark, Spain, and Switzerland. Additionally, the lower agreeableness trait is linked to anti-establishment rhetoric. It’s crucial to note that authoritarianism moderates the effect of ideology measures, distinguishing ideology as the factor between authoritarianism and populism.

Dr. Bakker highlighted physiological responses to political rhetoric, explaining how individuals physically react to speeches by populist radical right politicians. He suggested that those with lower education levels might be more susceptible to political manipulation, swayed by a leader’s charisma rather than the substance of the argument. Dr. Bakker emphasized the need for additional research to examine the role of emotions in politics, exploring how political ideology and populist discourse shape people’s perceptions and the mechanisms of politics.

Dr. Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington: “The Psychological Appeal of Populism”

Dr. Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington argues that collective emotions in left populist parties were predominantly negative and linked to dissatisfaction with social conditions. In contrast, collective emotions in right populist parties were mainly positive, centered on bringing change through challenging doubters from the opposing side. Regarding temporality, mainstream right parties focused on the future, mainstream left on the present, and populists on both sides emphasized the past.

Dr. Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington presented on the political psychology of populism, examining the impact of groups, hierarchies, and emotions. Her research delved into populism as a mobilizing discourse, emphasizing its psychological appeal in terms of intergroup relations, hierarchies, status concerns, and collective emotions. Dr. Sheehy-Skeffington elucidated the significance of groups and identity formation in her theoretical framework, drawing from social dominance theory to explore the role of hierarchy within groups and its connection to status concerns as a potential explanation for populism. She argued that populist leaders act as identity entrepreneurs, constructing narratives that align with populist rhetoric.

The research shared by Dr. Sheehy-Skeffington involved a combination of thematic analysis, content analysis, and rhetorical analysis of 163 speeches from election campaigns, including UK General Elections (2017, 2019), the Brexit referendum, and US presidential Elections (2016, 2020). These speeches were delivered by leaders of radical right populist, radical left populist, right-wing mainstream, and left-wing mainstream parties. The analysis revealed that mainstream parties emphasized national unity, while concerns about hierarchy manifested differently based on political orientation and populist status. Left-wing parties were more focused on social justice, with no significant difference based on populist status. Both left- and right-wing parties expressed concerns about system rigging, and emotional mobilization was more pronounced in the rhetoric of populist leaders compared to mainstream leaders. 

In both populist and mainstream parties, politicians discussed ingroup and outgroup dynamics in their speeches. However, collective emotions in left populist parties were predominantly negative and linked to dissatisfaction with social conditions. In contrast, collective emotions in right populist parties were mainly positive, centered on bringing change through challenging doubters from the opposing side. Regarding temporality, mainstream right parties focused on the future, mainstream left on the present, and populists on both sides emphasized the past.

Dr. Farhan Hanif Siddiqui: “Electoral Populism in Pakistan and India”

Dr. Siddiqui addressed the negative impacts of populism and the incorporation of populist elements by mainstream parties, emphasizing the adverse effects on social cohesion, diversity, acceptance, peaceful coexistence, and the instrumentalization of hatred, which pose challenges to harmony.

Dr. Farhan Hanif Siddiqui explored electoral populism in India and Pakistan, focusing on populist trends and nuances evident in the election manifestos of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) in India and The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) in Pakistan. The discussion delved into the nature of populism, its societal impacts, and various aspects observed in the political landscapes of both countries.

Dr. Siddiqui commenced his presentation by emphasizing the unique characteristics of populism and nationalism, underscoring the analytical distinctions between these two ideologies. Populism, he explained, establishes a vertical division within society, separating elites from the general population, while nationalism creates a horizontal differentiation between people within and outside the nation’s borders. Addressing a potential critique, he acknowledged the argument that far-right parties in Europe, which are anti-immigration and anti-immigrant, may intertwine populist and nationalist discourses, challenging the clear-cut analytical differentiation between the two.

He elucidated the characteristics of populism, emphasizing its reliance on the instrumentalization of hate and differentiation within political populist discourse. Dr. Siddiqui focused on the simplification of complex socio-political issues, the appeal to emotional sentiments, and the manipulation of electoral sensitivities as key elements of populism in shaping public opinion. His presentation underscored the role of populist leaders in effectively navigating the political landscape, often at the expense of social cohesion. Furthermore, he delved into the contributing factors to the rise of populism in India and Pakistan, highlighting the institutional weaknesses of political parties as a significant factor.

Examining the developmental populism in India through an analysis of the BJP election manifesto, Dr. Siddiqui highlighted its combination of class and caste systems, with a particular focus on the middle class and consumerist neoliberal capitalism. He emphasized Narendna Modi’s vision of a “New India” as a sustaining narrative for populism in the country. The presentation also delved into the rise of religious populism in Pakistan, exemplified by the manifestos of PTI and TLP. The implementation of blasphemy laws targeting the Ahmadi community was discussed as a singular focus of TLP to preserve the sanctity of the Prophet. Finally, Dr. Siddiqui addressed the negative impacts of populism and the incorporation of populist elements by mainstream parties, emphasizing the adverse effects on social cohesion, diversity, acceptance, peaceful coexistence, and the instrumentalization of hatred, which pose challenges to harmony.

Dr. Salim Cevik: “Populist Strategies of Erdogan in 2022 Election”

Dr. Cevik highlighted Erdogan’s “techno-nationalism” strategy and mega projects, such as national Turkish drones and new fighter jets, symbolizing Turkey’s technological progress. This techno-nationalism shifted the discourse from economic issues to national security, positioning Erdogan as a defender of Turkey against external threats.

Dr. Salim Cevik’s presentation covered three aspects: Erdogan’s employment of mixed populist strategies, the concept of Erdogan remaining a populist leader for 20 years in power, and his techno-nationalism as a political strategy. 

First, he analyzed Erdogan’s election strategies as a populist leader and his electoral victory in 2023. Dr. Cevik portrayed how Erdogan remained in power for 20 years with reference to the inherent ambiguity in the definition of populism. His talk highlighted the controversial usage of populist methods in Turkey. Accordingly, Erdogan’s policies appealed to emotional sentiments rather than material well-being. Second, he discussed how Erdogan sustained his populist appeal by redefining the establishment narrative, shifting it from a national to a global level, portraying himself as a leader fighting against a global elite opposing the rise of Turkey.

Dr. Cevik highlighted Erdogan’s “techno-nationalism” strategy and mega projects, such as national Turkish drones and new fighter jets, symbolizing Turkey’s technological progress. This techno-nationalism shifted the discourse from economic issues to national security, positioning Erdogan as a defender of Turkey against external threats. From his successful election strategies to implementing policies in Turkey, Erdogan adopted and adjusted populist language over decades by addressing the emotional and sentimental needs of the voters.

(*) Zahra Zaman is an undergraduate student majoring in International Relations at the Department of Social Sciences, SZABIST University, Karachi. She has demonstrated active engagement in both academic and co-curricular activities, previously serving as a Prefect, Proctor, President of the Literary Society, and Head Girl during high school. At SZABIST, Zahra has held various leadership roles, including Program Representative of the Social Sciences Department, General Secretary, Treasurer, and President of the SZABIST Student Council. With a strong interest in International Relations, she aspires to pursue research in areas such as security studies, foreign policy, and diplomacy, employing both comparative and case study approaches to comprehend global politics.

(**) Syeda Abeeha Shahid is an undergraduate Social Sciences student majoring in International Relations at SZABIST University, Pakistan. Her graduate research project focuses on examining the use of cultural diplomacy and soft power tools by populist leaders, employing a comparative analysis of two Asian populist leaders in power – Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India and President Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey. Her primary areas of interest encompass diplomacy, foreign policy, and intergovernmental organizations. Fueled by an unwavering passion for understanding the complexities of global relations, shaped by political choices and culture, she actively engages in social work initiatives through volunteer activities aimed at supporting socially deprived segments of society.

Geert Wilders (PVV) in House of Representatives during a debating at the Tweede Kamer on April 5, 2023 in Den Haag, Netherlands. Photo: Jeroen Meuwsen.

Dr. Rooduijn on the Normalization of Far-Right Discourse: Mainstream Parties Shift Towards Extremes, Populist Radical Right Persists in Radicalism

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviewsMONITOR

In examining the unexpected triumph of populist radical right leader Geert Wilders in the Dutch elections on November 22, Professor Matthijs Rooduijn highlights a noteworthy shift within mainstream parties. He notes their increasing embrace of more radical positions, which challenges the prevailing notion of substantial moderation within populist radical right parties. Delving into the narratives of prominent populist radical right figures like Wilders and Marine Le Pen, Professor Rooduijn contends that the observed changes are primarily stylistic rather than indicative of fundamental shifts in political programs.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Matthijs Rooduijn, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam, provides insights into the normalization of far-right discourse globally, particularly in the wake of the surprising election results in the Netherlands on November 22, 2023. Dr. Rooduijn underscores a significant transformation within mainstream parties, as they increasingly adopt more radical positions, challenging the prevailing notion of substantive moderation within populist radical right parties. Examining into the narratives of prominent figures such as Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen, he argues that observed changes are primarily stylistic, rather than representing fundamental shifts in political programs.

Delving into the complexities of populist radical right movements, particularly in the Netherlands, Dr. Rooduijn identifies nativism as the core feature, following Cas Mudde’s definition. Nativism, characterized by exclusionary nationalism, manifests in various expressions such as antisemitism, Islamophobia, anti-immigration attitudes and racism. The interview provides insights into how Wilders’ anti-Islam agenda fits into the broader narrative of populist radical right ideologies.

Examining the international landscape, Dr. Rooduijn explores both the similarities and differences between populist radical right movements in the Netherlands and other European countries. While leadership may vary, the core ideology resonates with a significant portion of the electorate holding right-leaning cultural views. The interview scrutinizes the normalization of far-right discourse in the Netherlands, highlighting shifts in public perception and electoral strategies. Dr. Rooduijn notes the adaptation of mainstream right parties towards the radical right, contributing to the observed normalization globally.

The discussion extends to Wilders’ stance on immigration, distinguishing his emphasis on Islam from other far-right parties. Dr. Rooduijn provides insights into the intertwining of civilizational populism, nationalism, and their resonance with the Dutch public. The interview further explores the relationship between populism and Euroscepticism in Dutch politics, emphasizing Wilders’ hard-Eurosceptic position and its significance in the broader European context.

Dr. Rooduijn sheds light on the role of social media in the success and visibility of populist radical right parties, acknowledging its transformative impact on political communication. Analyzing the recent Dutch elections on November 22nd, he highlights the unexpected shift in the political landscape and underscores the challenges in forming a government coalition.

Looking forward to the European Parliament elections in June 2024, Dr. Rooduijn expresses concern about the potential surge of populist parties, emphasizing the discordance between their ideas and liberal democratic principles. The interview concludes by addressing the challenges faced by populist radical right movements in maintaining long-term political relevance, particularly the stigma associated with Wilders’ party and its impact on recruiting candidates for political positions.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Matthijs Rooduijn with minor edits.

How would you characterize the key features of populist radical right movements, both in Western Europe generally and specifically in the Dutch political landscape? In your analysis, how do these features manifest in the context of Geert Wilders’ political ideology, and what societal and political factors have contributed to the rise and sustained presence of populist radical right parties in the Netherlands?

Matthijs Rooduijn: To address the first question, let’s focus on the definition of the populist radical right. I adhere to Cas Mudde’s definition, which identifies nativism as the core feature. Nativism is an exclusionary form of nationalism, where parties center their focus on the nation. Consequently, they argue that elements or people not compatible with the nation pose a threat. This can manifest in various ways, such as antisemitism, Islamophobia, anti-immigration attitudes, and racism – all expressions of in-group and out-group thinking. This thinking places the nation as the in-group and others as the out-group, forming the core of the radical right.

Furthermore, radical right parties exhibit authoritarian tendencies, advocating for a highly ordered society. They believe that severe punishment should be meted out to those who break the law. This authoritarianism is another core aspect of the radical right. Additionally, these parties adopt a populist stance, emphasizing a group of people, typically portraying ordinary citizens as betrayed, corrupted, or ignored by an evil elite. This elite can be political, cultural, or media-related. Populism is often an integral part of the program for these populist radical right parties. Geert Wilders’ party serves as a prototypical example, distinguishing itself with a particularly strong anti-Islam component. This summarizes the essence of the populist radical right and Wilders’ program.

Substantial Segment of the Population Are Potential Voters for the Populist Radical Right

Dr. Matthijs Rooduijn, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam.

Considering the international context, are there similarities or differences between the populist radical right movements in the Netherlands, led by figures like Geert Wilders, and those in other European countries?

Matthijs Rooduijn: Yes, there are both similarities and differences. The type of leader varies significantly from country to country. Wilders differs markedly from Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, or Giorgia Meloni. What they share is their ideology. Economic circumstances, party systems, and media landscapes also differ. However, what’s common across most of these countries, and beyond, is a fertile breeding ground for the success of these parties. In Western Europe and elsewhere, there’s a substantial portion of the electorate that leans right on cultural issues, supporting more restrictive immigration policies, often coupled with a general sense of discontent with politics. This sentiment is prevalent in almost all European countries.

The success of populist radical right movements hinges on their ability to tap into this sentiment and discontent and convince voters to vote for them. So, there is a substantial segment of the population that represents potential voters for the populist radical right. The crucial differentiator is the extent to which politicians can effectively appeal to and persuade these voters, influenced by wider contextual factors such as media coverage and actions of other political parties. Success, therefore, really depends on the circumstances surrounding these parties.

Can you discuss any notable shifts or developments in the public perception of populist radical right ideologies in the Netherlands, particularly in relation to Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV), and how have these shifts influenced their electoral performance?

Matthijs Rooduijn: So, you’re inquiring about how voters, parties, and media perceive Geert Wilders over the years and the changes in this perception. Broadly, the rhetoric of the far-right has undergone a significant normalization in the Netherlands, a trend not exclusive to the country but observed globally. For instance, in 2002, right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn faced vehement criticism for his perceived radicalism, even being labeled an extremist. However, a comparison of his statements from two decades ago with Geert Wilders’ current rhetoric reveals Fortuyn as relatively moderate. This shift highlights the extent to which the general discourse in the Netherlands has moved towards the radical right.

Academic studies support this observation, indicating that mainstream right parties, both in the Netherlands and elsewhere, have adjusted their election programs towards the radical right. While they haven’t transformed into radical right parties, there has been a noticeable directional shift. This trend is echoed in the general discourse on immigration and identity issues, showcasing a movement towards the radical right’s framing of relevant topics.

Notably, during the recent election campaign, there was a shift in how Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV) were portrayed by other parties. After approximately a decade of exclusion by mainstream right parties, Wilders was actively or passively presented as a negotiable political figure during this campaign. The mainstream right party opened the door to potential collaboration with Wilders in a government coalition, contributing to the normalization of the PVV. In conclusion, the normalization of far-right ideas is a prevailing trend not only in the Netherlands but also on a global scale. This normalization extends to both the ideas associated with the far-right and the PVV party led by Geert Wilders.

Geert Wilders Is Very Islamophobic

Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV) are often associated with anti-immigration policies. Could you provide insights into how his stance on immigration fits into the broader populist radical right narrative in the Netherlands?

Matthijs Rooduijn: Geert Wilders’ primary focus is on Islam, he is very Islamophobic, and he holds strong Islamophobic views, advocating for the prohibition of the Quran, Islamic schools, and headscarves—issues that have consistently been at the core of his agenda. While these concerns are now intertwined with broader topics like asylum and immigration, they remain distinctive aspects that set Wilders apart from other far-right parties in the Netherlands. For example, the Forum for Democracy (FvD) led by Thierry Baudet also embraces a nativist ideology but places less emphasis on Islam. Similarly, Right Answer 2021 (JA21), another populist radical right party, does not prioritize Islam to the same degree.

During the recent election campaign, Wilders asserted that Islam was not his primary concern at that moment, highlighting immigration and housing as more pressing issues. However, he simultaneously affirmed that Islam remains an integral part of his party’s DNA. Notably, he did not retract any elements from his election program, which unequivocally outlines his stance on Islam. In essence, while nativism constitutes a fundamental element of the populist radical right ideology, Wilders’ specific expression of nativism is rooted in Islamophobia, complemented by general negative attitudes toward immigration and asylum.

How does the relationship between civilizational populism and nationalism play out in the context of Geert Wilders’ political discourse, and to what extent does it resonate with the Dutch public?

Matthijs Rooduijn: Geert Wilders’ nationalism is fundamentally expressed in his views on Islam, asylum, and immigration. He advocates for closed doors and borders, and exclusionary policies, with a primary focus on Islam, Muslims, and cultural symbols like headscarves. This specific form of exclusionary nationalism is a defining feature of his political program. During the recent election campaign, he strongly emphasized these aspects, which remain integral to his party’s identity and are referred to as its DNA.

Wilders’ Hard-Euroscepticism Surpasses the Eurosceptic Rhetoric of Many Other Far-right Parties in Europe

How has the relationship between populism and Euroscepticism played out in Dutch politics, particularly within the context of populist radical right movements?

Matthijs Rooduijn: We observe that most radical right parties tend to be Eurosceptic, although there are instances where some actors within the radical right may display a less overt form of Euroscepticism, framing it as a defense of Europe against external threats. However, Euroscepticism has been a consistent element in the programs of almost all radical right parties, especially in Western Europe, including Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom. Wilders’ Euroscepticism is multifaceted, encompassing resistance to European elites and technocrats in Brussels, which he perceives as threatening Dutch identity and impeding the nation’s self-determination. This Eurosceptic stance incorporates cultural, identity-related, and political arguments, emphasizing the perceived erosion of national identity by Brussels and the loss of citizens’ control over important matters. 

Additionally, there’s an economic dimension to Wilders’ Euroscepticism, contending that excessive funds are being directed to other countries. Notably, his program advocates for the Netherlands’ exit from the EU, although the feasibility of this stands in contrast to the positions of other parties he is currently negotiating with, making it unlikely. The prospect of compromise on this issue might emerge if he becomes part of a government coalition. Despite this, it remains intriguing that Wilders maintains a hard-Euroscepticism in his election program, surpassing the Eurosceptic rhetoric of many other far-right parties in Europe.

Can you discuss the role of social media and communication strategies in the success and visibility of populist radical right parties in the Netherlands?

Matthijs Rooduijn: I have limited expertise on the subject of social media, as it falls outside my area of study. While I am aware that Geert Wilders is actively engaged on platforms like Twitter or X, I do not know to what extent social media have really helped to his success. In general, it could be argued that social media provides populist politicians, including Wilders, with a direct means of communication with their followers. In Wilders’ case, he has a sizable and devoted following, allowing him to communicate directly with a large segment of the population. This shift in the mode of communication with followers has undergone significant changes over the last two decades. While acknowledging its importance to Wilders, I cannot conclusively assess the specific role played by social media in his success during this election campaign.

Wilders Potentially Being Part of the Gov’t and Assuming the Role of PM Could Impact Int’l Relations

Can you explain what happened on the night of November 22nd in terms of populism in the Netherlands, populism in Europe, and populism across the globe?

Matthijs Rooduijn: What we have witnessed in the Netherlands is a remarkable and unexpected shift in the political landscape. Just a few weeks ago, it wasn’t anticipated that Wilders would emerge victorious in the elections. The last week of the campaign brought about significant changes. A noteworthy revelation is that one in four Dutch voters cast their ballots for a populist radical right party, indicating an unprecedented size for this party family. This figure becomes even more substantial when considering other radical right parties. Interestingly, voters, including Conservative Liberals, have contributed to the increased support for the PVV. It’s worth noting that some of these votes may be strategic and may not necessarily translate into enduring support for the PVV.

While the victory of the far-right is a significant development, the dynamics of forming a government coalition remain uncertain and complex. Predicting the outcome is challenging due to the absence of clear rules, allowing for various possible scenarios. The consequences of Wilders potentially being part of the government and assuming the role of Prime Minister extend beyond the Netherlands and could impact international relations. Additionally, it may influence how mainstream parties in other European countries approach populist radical right parties.

Simultaneously, when considering elections, it’s evident that, in most countries, the issues that resonate with voters on a national level play a pivotal role. The focus tends to be primarily on domestic matters, with international politics having a lesser impact. However, the upcoming European elections in June 2024 will be intriguing to watch. The strong performance of populist radical right parties in polls, not only in the Netherlands but also in other countries, indicates a noteworthy trend. While some projections for these parties in Poland and Spain fell short of expectations, the overall trajectory remains significant.

It’s crucial to recognize the significance of what transpired in the Netherlands. Yet, it’s essential to acknowledge that this represents a single moment in time. The election outcome could have unfolded differently with minor variations in the circumstances within the country. This emphasizes the fluid and contingent nature of political events.

Regarding the upcoming European Parliament elections, how concerned are you about the potential surge and victory of populist parties in Europe?

Matthijs Rooduijn: Undoubtedly, there is a substantial number of voters drawn to these parties. However, what is particularly concerning are their ideas, as several of them are not in harmony with liberal democracy, especially concerning minority rights, checks and balances, pluralism, and freedom of the media etc… This poses a significant problem. We have witnessed the consequences of such ideologies in countries like Hungary, Poland, and others in Europe. If a populist radical right party gains significant influence or becomes the most powerful actor in a government, it could have detrimental effects on liberal democracy. This is indeed a matter of serious concern.

Mainstream Parties Have Substantially Integrated the Discourse of Populist Radical Right Parties

What impact has the populist radical right had on the overall political discourse and policy agenda in the Netherlands, and how has it influenced the mainstream political parties? Or can we safely say that PVV has now been a mainstream party, and its discourse on immigration, the Moroccans, Islam, and the EU has been mainstream as well?

Matthijs Rooduijn: As mentioned earlier, mainstream parties have substantially integrated the discourse of populist radical right parties, and this is evident in the media landscape as well. The views expressed by figures like Pim Fortuyn, which were once considered radical, have now become relatively mainstream. Thus, the discourse of the far-right has been normalized, and mainstream parties have, to a certain extent, legitimized the arguments put forth by populist radical right parties. However, it would be inaccurate to claim that the populist radical right has become more mainstream in the sense of becoming more moderate. That’s not the case. On the contrary, it’s the mainstream parties that have shifted towards more radical positions. Over time, if we analyze the trajectory of populist radical right parties in Europe, they remain as radical as ever. While Geert Wilders may have projected a more moderate image during these elections, his election program retained its radical core. Similarly, in the case of Marine Le Pen in France, despite efforts to present a more moderate image, the National Rally (FN) remains a fundamentally populist radical right party. Therefore, any moderation observed tends to be more in the presentation style rather than a shift in the core elements of their political programs.

In your view, what are the main challenges faced by populist radical right movements in maintaining long-term political relevance, and how has Geert Wilders navigated these challenges in the Dutch political context?

Matthijs Rooduijn: I believe the primary challenge currently confronting Wilders is the persistent stigma attached to his party, making it challenging for him to garner support from other politicians. Despite securing a considerable number of votes, many political figures are hesitant to align themselves with the PVV. This reluctance poses a significant obstacle in recruiting candidates for political positions. For example, with 45 individuals on his list, a total of 37 were elected, leaving Wilders with only 8 potential replacements. In the event that some individuals assume ministerial roles in the government, he may encounter difficulty finding adequate replacements. The scarcity of willing individuals willing to be associated with him and the PVV makes it particularly challenging to identify suitable candidates for ministerial or significant political roles. Compounding this issue is the fact that Wilders faces personnel challenges due to the absence of party members; he is the sole member of his party and harbors trust issues with his colleagues in the PVV. This personnel shortage remains a considerable hurdle, even after his 17 years in politics.

Lastly, you counted anti-semitism as one of the basic features of populist parties. In the case of Geert Wilders, it is not the case. He is pro-Israeli. How do you explain this?

Matthijs Rooduijn: Antisemitism is not necessarily part of their program. What is part of the program is nativism, and nativism can express itself in different ways. It can manifest as antisemitism but also as Islamophobia, and that is how it is articulated in Wilders’ case. Nativism represents a broader framework of in-group and out-group thinking, centering around the nation versus dangerous others. When discussing antisemitism, the dangerous others are Jews. In contrast, when addressing Islamophobia, the dangerous others are Muslims, or, as Wilders argues, Islam as an extremist ideology. Thus, antisemitism is one manifestation through which nativism can express itself. However, Wilders is not antisemitic; he is Islamophobic. Therefore, it’s a distinct form of nativism, representing a different way in which his nativism finds expression.